The development of a theoretical model of partnership: with a case study on the Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership assembled for the first round of the Single Regeneration Budget.

by

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ABSTRACT

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s partnership has come to be the accepted mechanism for the delivery of regeneration initiatives. The widespread evidence of partnership working across all spheres of government activity suggests that it now represents the new economic orthodoxy in the approach to co-ordination. During the same period there has been considerable attention drawn to the emergence of new forms of co-ordination based upon networking. The growth of partnership and networking has however proliferated in the absence of any systematic evaluation of their efficacy as an organisational form. Throughout this period a major objective of regeneration partnerships has been to alter the internal dynamics of partnership by broadening the range of participants involved. Partnership and network forms of working have thus become significant channels through which a range of actors have been incorporated into regeneration initiatives.

In light of the growth of partnership and networking a major lacuna in our understanding arises from the absence of any theoretical framework which might describe the specific characteristics of these organisational forms of co-ordination. This thesis seeks to fill that vacuum by postulating a theoretical model of both partnership and network forms of co-ordination. The key attributes of the two models are identified, with common characteristics and key differentiating qualities discussed. This approach generated a set of analytical tools (a partnership checklist) designed in the first instance to be of practical use to the community and voluntary sectors as they engage in partnership but also to be of use to practitioners and participants generally. The checklist was tested on the Single
Regeneration Budget partnership formed by the Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership, however, the insights developed have wider application for our understanding of partnership and networks in general.
I would like to extend my thanks to Dr. Mike Beazley for his encouragement and constant support throughout this journey. Starting was easy: finishing proved a much more formidable task that was made easier by the support that Mike and colleagues at the Centre for Urban & Regional Studies consistently provided.

I also owe a considerable debt to Dr. John Mawson for starting me on this thesis and providing opportunities to work on projects that considerably informed my understanding of the policy making process and which greatly informed my approach to research.

Finally I need to thank Déanne who has had to endure my ups and downs and has always been there for me.
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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbr.</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABCC</td>
<td>ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE</td>
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<td>ADC</td>
<td>ASSOCIATION OF DISTRICT COUNCILS</td>
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<td>AMA</td>
<td>ASSOCIATION OF METROPOLITAN AUTHORITIES</td>
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<td>BC</td>
<td>BOROUGH COUNCIL</td>
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<td>CAT</td>
<td>CITY ACTION TEAM</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION</td>
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<td>CURS</td>
<td>CENTRE FOR URBAN &amp; REGIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVS</td>
<td>COUNCIL FOR VOLUNTARY SERVICES</td>
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<td>CWP</td>
<td>COVENTRY &amp; WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIP</td>
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<td>DEmp</td>
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<td>DETR</td>
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<td>FT</td>
<td>FINANCIAL TIMES</td>
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<td>GO</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR THE REGIONS</td>
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<td>GOWM</td>
<td>GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR THE WEST MIDLANDS</td>
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<td>HOUSE OF COMMONS</td>
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<td>HOUSE OF LORDS</td>
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<td>LGA</td>
<td>LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION</td>
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<td>MAFF</td>
<td>MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE FISHERIES AND FOOD</td>
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<td>MEP</td>
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<tr>
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<td>NDPB</td>
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<td>SG</td>
<td>STEERING GROUP</td>
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<td>SPD</td>
<td>STRATEGIC PROGRAMMING DOCUMENT</td>
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<td>TCE</td>
<td>TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS</td>
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<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>TASK FORCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>WARWICKSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL</td>
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The most expensive words he had ever had to listen to were: This time it’s different
(Sir John Templeton, FT. 25/6th October 1997)

One time will never fit neatly into another, and the old pictures we force into new frames
always look out of place (Tocqueville, 1970).

REGENERATION PARTNERSHIPS: A MOVABLE FEAST
DIFFERENT PROBLEMS: ONE SOLUTION
Introduction

Since the late 1970s central government has sought to actively encourage regeneration through a series of policy instruments. A primary aim of policy throughout this period has been attempts to establish regeneration partnerships that involve local communities. In policy terms this has been an extremely creative period with a series of major policy innovations coming out of central government on an almost regular basis. The election of a Labour government in May 1997 after eighteen years of Conservative administration continued the relentless cycle of policy innovation. One of the first actions taken by the incoming Labour government was the establishment of the Social Exclusion Unit in December 1997. This was located within the Cabinet Offices as part of the Economic and Domestic Affairs Secretariat reporting directly to the Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Its remit was to: “develop integrated and sustainable approaches to the problems of the worst housing estates, including crime, drugs, unemployment, community breakdown, and bad schools (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998:preamble). Although the lexicography of what is intrinsically multiple deprivation has changed over time many of the themes and policy solutions continue. In an examination of the efficacy of policy the Prime Minister was clear that:
Too much has been imposed from above, when experience shows that success depends on communities themselves having the power and taking the responsibility to make things better {Tony Blair cited in the Foreword to *Bringing Britain together: a national strategy for neighbourhood renewal* (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998)}

The key issue then for social scientists is not simply an examination of the efficacy of policy in some abstract quantitative fashion but rather as the Prime Minister suggests policy must be examined by the way it serves communities. To parody Lincoln, policy should not only be for the people but it should be by the people. A critic might suggest that continuous policy innovation reflects past policy failures. A supporter would no doubt argue that policy is an iterative process where change reflects learning. Regardless of which of these explanations you accept both political parties would agree that part of the explanation for this fertile policy arena lies in the observation that the term regeneration and partnership are both inextricably bound together and each of the terms has proved to be enormously malleable constructs.

**Methodology**

The central task of this thesis is to describe a theoretical model of an ideal partnership and from this develop a conceptual toolkit that can be used to examine any regeneration partnership. With partnership working clearly occupying centre stage in government regeneration policy from the time of the 1977 White Paper (HMSO, 1977) the attention of this thesis is on the evolution of what can best be described as ‘the partnership approach’ to the delivery of regeneration policy. Partnership was a central pillar of successive Conservative governments and so the thesis focuses primarily on the evolution of partnership through the period of successive Conservative administrations, 1979-97. Although the focus is principally on the development of policy towards partnership under the Conservatives a great deal of their approach has been carried forward by the Labour
administration. The significance of this for policy and what this reveals about partnership as a continuing economic orthodoxy is noted. Within the time frame the specific focus of this thesis is on the evolution and development of one partnership, the Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership (CWP), formed for the first round of the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB). This policy initiative was introduced by the government with considerable publicity in 1994. In hindsight it can be seen to have been the apogee of the Conservative government’s partnership approach to regeneration; the roots of which can be clearly traced right back to the 1977 White Paper.

The development of policy in this area is not linear, developing as it did in fits and starts. Periods of intense activity followed periods of almost quiet consolidation and organic growth. Because of the clear policy lineage however it is sensible, when trying to give an account of the evolution of regeneration policy under the Conservatives, to look back to these roots in the late 1970s. This period is significant for two reasons. First, the 1977 White Paper presaged the formalisation of a partnership approach by government. Second, this period coincides with the advent into office in 1979 of Margaret Thatcher’s first Conservative government and with it the break with the post war consensus that had existed between the two major political parties. The change of government had repercussions throughout the body politic of the UK; these changes reverberated not only throughout economic life but also changed the institutional landscape and manifestly changed the way people understood, and responded to, the problem of regeneration. These factors in turn changed the way the concept of partnership was defined.

The first round of the SRB sparked off a wave of partnership formations. More than 600 were assembled and submitted outline bids (Mawson et al, 1995:para.4.9). By the time that
the final bids were announced this figure had been reduced to the 201 ‘winning’ partnerships. The CWP was chosen as the focus of the case study because it had a number of particular attributes that distinguished it from what might reasonably be described as a typical SRB partnerships. Principal amongst these was the sheer magnitude of the task facing the putative partnership. The historical, political, cultural and economic obstacles that needed to be overcome to create a partnership were enormous. Exploring these different dimensions created what was in effect a series of case studies albeit under the umbrella of the one partnership case study.

Interestingly, the CWP, in the process of creating a new sub-regional space, was one of only a handful of round one SRB partnerships that sought to create an entirely new geopolitical structure. The scale of the achievement was all the more interesting given the magnitude of the task. There had been no previous history of joint working on this scale: the structures that were created effectively had to start from nothing. Remarkably, given its subsequent success, underlying the creation of this new space were stark political tensions that had historically prevented collaborative working between authorities at this [or any other] scale. The partnership that was assembled was extremely intriguing for a researcher of local government. Principally this was because the success in creating a partnership suggested that the CWP had successfully overcome the difficult task of bridging the political antagonisms that separated the local authorities at the sub-regional level. Not only that. The CWP reputedly created a structure that managed to not only assimilate a range of statutory actors but included the voluntary, community and ethnic minority sectors. Notwithstanding these formidable achievements the CWP also appeared to achieve the holy grail of regional planners since the time of Barlow (1940) in that it claimed to have
successfully bridged the chasm between urban and rural at a time when the aspirations of these communities were considered mutually exclusive.

**Research questions**

This thesis seeks to answer two fundamental research questions.

1. What in theoretical terms do we mean by a *true* regeneration partnership? The term true is taken from the Bidding Guidance issued in conjunction with the SRB. The significance of the term true is that it is understood to be a metaphor for a regeneration partnership that is not governed top-down but rather bottom-up. The Labour prime minister, Tony Blair, has made clear that his vision of partnership devolves power and responsibility down to the local community it seeks to serve.

2. How does the quality of partnership working developed by CWP compare to that predicted in the theoretical model and how useful is the model as an analytical tool?

The research questions having posed two problems the first needed to be answered conceptually the second practically. Astonishingly when approaching the first question it became clear that there appeared to be an almost inverse relationship between, on the one hand, a widespread, uncritical acceptance of the merits of working in partnership with, on the other hand, a complete absence of any theoretical foundations that might explain the dynamics of partnership working and what is actually understood by the term partnership. The literature review began therefore by examining partnership understood simply as a form of co-ordination and explored the literature on business co-ordination and interorganisational analysis to build a theory of partnership. With this in mind the second
research question could only be understood by examining the internal dynamics of the CWP. This was approached through a series of semi-structured interviews with key personalities representing the various sectors that came together in the partnership. The principle objective was to chart the chronology of key events and in so doing be able to establish who was party to what deliberations and how these effected the CWP and the strategy it subsequently pursued. These interviews were complemented by interviews with officers from the Government Office responsible for the regulatory oversight of the CWP. Official documents and the minutes of the CWP were also examined to corroborate the chronology of events. This documentary information was supplemented by official partnership publications, correspondence in the public domain and private correspondence.

Chapter two begins with an examination of the ascendancy of partnership as a new economic orthodoxy. Beginning with the publication of the climacteric 1977 White Paper Policy for the Inner Cities (HMSO, 1977) the role of partnership is examined. Following the entry into office in 1979 of a radical Conservative government [although ideologically diametrically opposed to its predecessors in many arenas] partnership was not abandoned but rather recast and in the process consolidated as the new economic orthodoxy.

Chapter three looks at the development of urban policy seeking to place the SRB in a historical context. The SRB represents in many ways the apogee of the partnership approach to regeneration but many of the themes found in the SRB mechanism have roots which can be traced back to earlier policy initiatives. The perennial concern with co-ordination and value for money which shaped SRB clearly hark back to the 1977 White Paper and before. The SRB can thus seen to have been shaped both by the political landscape it inhabited and by the lessons learnt from earlier policy initiatives especially
Chapters four and five seek to understand the macroeconomic and microeconomic forces that shaped the growth of partnerships. Chapter four begins by establishing the macroeconomic context within which partnerships were located in the 1980s. During this period the impact of global political, economic and social change had a profound impact on local economies. It was argued that the economy was in transition where global forces were precipitating profound local reverberations creating new economic spaces. It was argued that in these locations partnerships were proliferating. Throughout the 1980s, alongside the growth of partnerships, claims were also made that a new model of development was underway with a number of authors drawing attention to the growth of network forms of partnership. The theoretical analysis takes at its starting point that both partnership and networks represent different forms of co-ordination. The development of a theoretical model of co-ordination is however seriously prejudiced by the dearth of material on the topic. In the absence of a theory of partnership the approach taken is to explore the principle of co-ordination by examining adjacent policy arenas where more substantive work has been undertaken. Through the development of a theoretical model a distinction is made between partnership and network forms of co-ordination. In the process of articulating the model the analysis provides a partnership checklist that can be applied to any regeneration partnership.

Chapter six describes the sub-regional landscape that the CWP inhabited. Through semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in the creation of the CWP and a review of key published and unpublished documents it details the political and historical context within which the SRB partnership evolved. The chapter concludes with a
chronology of key events in the creation of the SRB partnership.

**Chapter seven** presents the research results of the case study on the CWP. The checklist developed in chapter four forms the basis of a systematic dismantling of the CWP and seeks to describe and comment on the quality of partnership relations within the CWP.

**Chapter eight** presents an analysis of the partnership checklist and examines how this worked in practice on the case study. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the trajectory of urban policy over the last thirty years and what it tells us about the evolution of partnership as an organisational form.
CHAPTER 2: PARTNERSHIPS & NETWORKS

NEW LABOUR & PARTNERSHIP
PARTNERSHIP IN THE LATE 1990S

Introduction

The start of 2000 is an interesting time to be writing about partnerships in regeneration. In 1997 after being in opposition for eighteen years a ‘New Labour’ administration swept into office. What is clear is that the new administration saw the political landscape in entirely different terms than the outgoing administration. Over their period in office there will undoubtedly be what Solesbury (1993) would call a reorientation of the ‘policy frame’ as New Labour’s ideology is translated into action and becomes embedded in society and the institutional landscape. However in the medium term what is remarkable is the continuity of Labour’s approach in a number of key policy areas not least in the promulgation of partnership working.

Partnership has been used by successive UK government’s as an organisational form to address what was in the 1990s generically termed regeneration policy. The term regeneration however is comprehensive. The Conservatives in their first competitiveness white paper (HMSO, 1994b) stated that: “The principle aims of regeneration are to improve the competitiveness of firms, the job prospects and quality of life of local people, and the social and physical environment.” Under New Labour the stress on competitiveness is not so manifest but regeneration still manages to include: “…housing, health, employment, crime, transport, education and almost any other social, environmental or economic issue” (DETR, 1998d: para.4).

Remarkably, the progressive redefinition of the parameters of regeneration has not led to
any fundamental reappraisal of partnership’s potential to deliver the burgeoning range of policy objectives. So, even as the nature of the problem evolved from a simplistic concept of poverty—urban or rural—progressing to deprivation, multiple deprivation and more recently with the Conservatives in the 1990s under the more generic term ‘regeneration’ it would seem that these all remain to be solved by partnership.

Partnership it would appear has been accepted, largely uncritically, by both Labour and Conservative administrations and yet surprisingly the efficacy of partnership working has not been rigorously examined. As one cynical observer suggested: partnership was perhaps going to be the most overworked word of the 1990s (Tighe, 1995). The very real concern is that: “…partnership is a convenient smokescreen behind which to conduct business, as it always has been” (Popham, 1995:11). The hegemonic domination of the partnership philosophy is evident in the affirmation given to it in the 1997 *Labour Party Manifesto* with no less than 29 mentions of partnership, and which includes the statement that: “Labour pioneered the idea of public/private partnerships” (Labour Manifesto, 1997). This theme is reproduced and reiterated in the separate document *Labour Business Manifesto* (1997) which states in unequivocal terms that: “In the future, public/private partnerships will play an increasing role in procuring public services and investment.”

This would appear to be no sudden conversion on the road to Damascus. Previous Conservative administrations were as vigorous in their promotion of the partnership ideal as a means of policy delivery as New Labour now intend to be. A measure of the universal acceptance of partnership is that after nearly twenty years of Conservative administration there remain few areas of government not touched in some way by the impact of the partnership philosophy. The ‘New Labour’ administration appear as committed to
maintaining the principle of partnership working as the last Conservative administration. Given this remarkable continuity in policy approach across the political spectrum it is reasonable to assert that partnership has indeed become the prevailing orthodoxy in regeneration policy.

**THE 1977 WHITE PAPER**  
**Partnership & regeneration policy**

Given what would appear to be a consensus on all sides of the political spectrum of the merits of partnership how is this explained?

The 1977 *Policy for the Inner Cities* White Paper proved to be a key turning point in the promotion of partnership. In the White Paper partnership was assigned a fundamental role in the regeneration of inner cities. This legislation set the parameters within which regeneration policy would play-out over the next two decades. And indeed the seeds of many of the tensions which would plague urban policy were set in place then.

The 1960s and early 1970s have been described by Lawless as a period of experimentation (Lawless, 1979) reflecting the shifting understanding of the dynamics of inner city decline. [Hambleton (1978) provides an illustration of the diversity of programmes operating in the period in Appendix (A): *Evolution of Neighbourhood Policies in Britain 1964-77*] By the time of the publication of the 1977 White Paper a considerable body of research had been conducted into inner city decline—for example, the three Inner Area Studies; the twelve Community Development Projects etc. The White Paper’s publication in effect synthesised a decade of research in urban experimentation, it proffered an analysis of the failure of inner city economies which was unusual in the fact that it was both strategic, and widely accepted. That it could establish a consensus on the understanding of the problem is
perhaps not so surprising given the state of many inner city economies. Evidence of decline may have remained overlooked or obscured by two decades of post-war prosperity. However, by the 1970s a casual visitor to the inner city areas of many of the major UK cities would have difficulty evading the palpable evidence of decline. Moore (1992:117) characterises the position as:

At the beginning of the 1980s Britain’s inner city population of working age had experienced three decades of uninterrupted decline, from just under 5 million to about 3.3 million. Similarly, employment of inner city residents had also fallen relentlessly in this period from 3.8 million to 2.2 million. In the same period, the number of unemployed inner city residents had risen by 269,000 and their unemployment rate was some 50% above the national average. Thus not only was there a problem of persistently higher unemployment rates among inner city residents stretching back over 30 years, but this problem was steadily intensifying.

The evidence appeared irrefutable: the UK and the wider international economy were experiencing unprecedented shocks and these were having profound and disproportionate impacts on inner city communities.

The Labour government’s White Paper *Policy for the Inner Cities* (HMSO, 1977) was a response to this deteriorating situation which saw an alarming escalation in the levels of unemployment and the wholesale collapse of urban economies. The White Paper’s historical importance lies in the fact that for the first time government officially endorsed partnership as a policy prescription (para. 41(6). In the White Paper the Government acknowledged the importance of private sector investment but laid greater stress on issues of co-ordination within the state and the need to focus and target resources. The small print of the paper reflected the prevailing strategic analysis and, without explaining why, proposed partnership as the preferred method by which the Government’s objectives were to be delivered. Moore & Booth (1986:365) suggest that: “One major assumption behind
the partnership approach is that a synthesis of central agencies and local government effort will result in more effective policy making and action than would otherwise be the case”, although why this should be the case has never convincingly been made.

The White Paper was clear in identifying the key participants in the process of inner city regeneration. However the model of partnership envisaged in the paper was strictly circumscribed being narrowly cast to directly include only central and local government. Local authorities were thus given a specific mandate to act—as a partner—in conjunction with the central state. The White Paper acknowledged the role of other agencies and actors but conferred special status on local authorities. In the process of defining the key parties the Government of the day was effectively [and inadvertently] embedding the principle of a hierarchy within the partnership model, this was a feature soon to be exploited by the incoming Conservative government.

In the context of the evolution of partnership the White Paper was to be of profound influence. It did this in two important ways. First, it legitimated partnership as a credible policy response: though partnership working was nothing new. Boyle (1993) cites examples of local authorities working with the private sector dating back to the 1930s, and Healey (1989:125) suggests that: “Throughout the post-war period, planning has provided the framework within which market transactions have occurred, and has often fostered partnership between the public and private sectors in the development process. The crucial change however, is in the impact that Parliamentary approval gives to the concept of partnership and the funding attached to partnership. By promulgating a particular policy model the government de facto legitimates a new orthodoxy. Secondly, having formally introduced and defined the policy response—partnership—the White Paper set in train a
discussion as to who should be involved in the partnerships. The White Paper commended as: “…one of the most far-sighted policy reviews in the post war period…” (Bailey et al, 1995:45) does give due weight to the valuable contributions made by the wide range of actors and agencies operating in the inner cities. However, the Government of the day clearly saw local authorities as their preferred partner amongst the many disparate actors operating in the inner city.

The case for choosing local authorities was made by central government on the grounds of accountability. Peter Shore, the Labour SoS for the Environment, in a debate in the House of Commons on ‘Inner cities’ (Hansard, 6 April 1977) which preceded the White Paper, set out the Government’s position. In identifying who should spearhead the process of addressing inner city decline he stressed that: “…local authorities…must be the main agents for action…” (col.1227){my emphasis} and in the same tone: “It is therefore right and proper that local authorities should have somewhat greater powers than they have at present to do things to help their own urban economies” (col.1245){my emphasis}. When challenged about what would be the role for community associations and community groups in the proposed partnership schemes the SoS replied:

I am glad that the hon. Member has brought me back to the important part that voluntary bodies and community groups can play in the inner areas. I believe they have a very important part to play. Local people should be involved in planning and development in their own areas, but whatever we do in this direction, I do not wish to derogate from what I believe to be the prime responsibility of properly elected councillors (Hansard, 6 April 1977, col.1237).

It was clear to the government that local authorities and their legitimate representatives were both acknowledged and expected to lead partnerships. This view was categorically spelt out in Part IV of the White Paper which stated:
(i) Local authorities are the natural agencies to tackle inner area problems (para.31).

[and]

(ii) [The Government proposed to]…enter into special partnerships with the authorities—both districts and counties—of certain cities (para.41 {6}).

In the process of translating political conviction into the formulation of policy the Labour government of the day clearly maintained the view that local authorities—working with central government—were to be the leading actors in the process of partnership. The White Paper acknowledged the important contribution of other actors but the overriding principle of: “…accountability to the local electorate” (para.31) convinced the government that the key partner, over and above any other agency or sector, was to be the local authority. In a second ‘Inner Cities’ debate in the House of Commons the merits of allowing local authorities to lead partnerships was again challenged. In replying to a question from the floor, the SoS, Peter Shore, restated the Government’s commitment to local authorities and their legitimacy enshrined by the process of democratic accountability. Rather more prophetically for events that followed he ridiculed the idea that partnership could be led by any other agency. The exchange is quoted in full:

Mr. Steen: Will the Minister agree that one of the things learned from the last 10 years of poverty programmes is that people should be consulted when they are to be affected by decisions, before a decision is taken rather than afterwards? Why was it, therefore, that when the right hon. Gentleman came to Liverpool on Friday he talked about the big bureaucracies and ministerial committees rather than insisting that people, and the inner city communities, should be part of the process? Was he thrown off balance when he missed his train from London to Liverpool?
Mr. Shore: I met the elected representatives of the city of Liverpool. The hon. Gentleman, whose contributions I have studied, had better make up his mind whether he is backing representative government at local and national level, or whether he sees urban area policies being conducted as a straight dialogue between Government and voluntary bodies and agencies of all kinds. I believe that voluntary bodies and other interests have a most important part to play at the local level, but it is not at the level of the partnership committees themselves (Hansard, 8 November 1977:493).

By bestowing special status on local authorities the Government in effect downgraded the contribution of the voluntary, community and private sectors. More crucially for the evolution of policy, the Government by their partisan support of one sector established a notional hierarchy amongst the various actors. This implicit hierarchy inadvertently introduced an internal tension and dynamic into the model of partnership. Whereas the White Paper’s strategic analysis of the underlying problems facing inner cities was informed by extensive urban research dating back to the 1960s, and by the time of its publication this analysis was widely accepted, the mechanisms to address the problem were open to challenge.

The partnership paradigm has not however been a static construct. The Labour government’s model of partnership established in the White Paper singled out local authorities as lead partners. In coming to this position the Government were clearly expressing their own ideological preference - but in politics ideology is contestable. Under successive Conservative governments—post 1979—the elements of what constitutes a partnership have been repeatedly redefined. In a pluralist democratic society by establishing a principle of preference in its choice of partners the government of the day set in train the possibility that this could be contested. In retrospect it is clear that a hierarchy sustained only by political conviction would be liable to challenge, as indeed it was. The hegemonic
status of partnership should therefore be viewed more as a reflection of the dominance of a specific organisational paradigm reflecting contemporary political thinking on regeneration rather than on any objective assessment based on operational efficacy.

**THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY**

**THATCHER AND THATCHERISM**

*Partnership post 1979*

With the arrival into office in 1979 of an ideologically driven right-wing Conservative government under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, the character and direction of regeneration policy changed markedly. The incoming government had a clear vision of the future direction of government policy succinctly captured in the maxim, ‘The business of government is not the government of business’. This new understanding of the role of government had a functional imperative which would have a radical impact on the political landscape. Prior to Thatcher:

> For almost 30 years the bi-partisan approach to Keynesian economics and full employment remained relatively intact, with an interventionist public sector operating a policy of demand management and a universalist approach towards consumption (Bailey, 1995:6).

Margaret Thatcher’s election effectively marked the collapse of the consensual politics which had overseen UK politics since the post-war Atlee Labour government. Thatcher was resolved to start as she intended:

> Our first opportunity to demonstrate to both friends and opponents that we would not be deterred by the [economic and social] difficulties [facing the country] was the Queen’s Speech. The first Loyal Address (as it is also called) of a new government sets the tone for its whole term of office. If the opportunity to set a radical new course is not taken, it will almost certainly never recur. And the world realizes that underneath all the brave new rhetoric, it is Business As Usual. **I was determined to send out a clear signal of change** (Thatcher, 1993:38){my emphasis}. 

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By the end of the debates on the Address it was evident that the House of Commons could expect a heavy programme, designed to **reverse socialism**, extend choice and widen property ownership (Thatcher, 1993:39) {my emphasis}.

The gulf between Thatcherite ideology and what had preceded her represents the post-war political cleavage. What is only now clear in hindsight is the impact of Thatcherism. During the 1980s and 1990s although obfuscated by the rhetoric of party politics the vast administrative machine and tiers of government, which remain largely unobserved but which constitute and underpin the modern state, adopted a new course. Critics of successive Thatcher governments rightly point out that many of the central tenets of her radical agenda were never successfully implemented: the Poll Tax ‘U’ turn, the collapse of the ‘property owning democracy’ and claims to be the party of low taxation are evidence of policy failure—for an excellent exposition see for instance Dunleavy (1995). But these policy failures should not in any way deny the real influence of successive Thatcher administrations. And as Gamble observes (1988:219) a major shift in policy becomes permanent when opposition parties adopt it as their own. The irrefutable legacy of successive Conservative administrations is rather less polemic but nonetheless crucial in the evolution of regeneration policy and partnership in particular.

Whilst all post-war governments prior to Thatcher accepted Keynesian Demand management, this was considered to be anathema, indeed it represented part of the problem. Drastic problems required drastic solutions most notably this took the form of an abandonment of ‘demand side’ interventions in favour of ‘supply side’ solutions and an experiment with a Monetarist macroeconomic policy. The new policy approach was spelt out at the 1984 Conservative Party Conference by Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer and a member of Margaret Thatcher’s inner circle, he stated: “Let us be quite
clear, you will not reduce unemployment by increasing what governments spend or borrow” (cited in Roper & Snowdon, 1987:113). In his autobiography Lawson spelt out the rationale of what is generically termed Thatcherism. It is:

…the greatest practicable market freedom within an overall framework of firm financial regulation [and]

...instead of seeking to use macroeconomic (i.e., fiscal & monetary) policy to promote growth and microeconomic policy (of which incomes policy was a key component) to suppress inflation, the Government should direct macroeconomic policy to the suppression of inflation and rely on macroeconomic (or supply side) policy such as tax and labour market reform, to provide the conditions favourable to improved performance in terms of growth and employment (1992:9).

Paradoxically, and what is most surprising, is that the concept of partnership established under the previous Labour government was not equally discredited and abandoned with the change of government. At a philosophical level it is perhaps easier to understand why a government would chose to be involved in partnership if the foundation of your political economy is built on consensus and the active demand management of the economy. Logically partnership should have been rejected because the political economy of Thatcherism which stresses: “…a free market philosophy, deregulation and privatisation of state assets” (Bailey, 1995:7) was the antithesis of partnership working; which where it involves the state, harks back to some form of collectivism and implies regulation, intervention and an anti-market position. In the event, partnership was simply recast to reflect the ideological and functional imperatives of Thatcherism.

In a radical departure to the post-war consensus Thatcherism as a political economy was not socially constituted: it made no pretence of being interested in socially re-distributive policies. [Indeed it was observed by many on the political right that the re-discovery of
poverty in the inner cities in the 1960s even after two decades of a Welfare State was a stark indictment of interventionist socialist policies] Rather, Thatcherism was concerned first and foremost with the welfare of the economy and personal liberty. Implicit in Thatcherism was the presumption that improvements in the general prosperity of the nation would inexorably feed through [trickle down] to deprived communities. “The underpinning argument was that national economic recovery was the most effective urban policy, since ‘a rising tide will float all ships” (Solesbury, 1993:34). In order to effect the transformation of the UK, successive Conservative administrations set about reorienting both policy and policy instruments in the image of their political economy. This required a new approach to regeneration policy. For Thatcherism the problem was the public sector and the solution lay with the private sector. This particular analysis propelled a distinct policy trajectory which emphasised the advantages of the private sector.

This policy shift variously described as ‘marketisation’ or ‘privatism’, sees the prosperity of a place tied inextricably to the vitality of the private sector (Barnekov & Rich, 1989; Deakin, 1991; Edwards & Deakin, 1992) and by logical extension to a diminution of the public sector. In order to understand the growth of partnership it is important to appreciate the impact of Margaret Thatcher. Here we must make the distinction between individual policies instigated by Margaret Thatcher and the political economy of Thatcherism. The term Thatcherism is used here to describe a generic set of political precepts—as distinct from specific political actions—which codified and institutionalised an entirely new policy agenda not only within government but also in the broader public and private sphere. This analysis should not be misunderstood to imply that there exists any generalised acceptance of a political ideology defined as Thatcherism. Rather, it acknowledges that throughout the
1980s and into the 1990s Thatcherite ideology subtly redefined, and made respectable, a new orthodoxy in which the parameters of the debate surrounding regeneration policy were progressively circumscribed and depicted in narrow market economy terms. It is abundantly clear that practitioners of regeneration policy may disagree on the relative importance of market mechanisms but none would now dare to refute the market and the interests of private capital. Labour’s 1997 manifesto is perhaps the clearest example of how Thatcherism has permeated beyond the boundaries of Conservative ideologues, as Tony Blair acknowledged: “Some things the Conservatives got right” (Labour Manifesto, 1997).

Throughout the Conservative period in office the UK experienced enormous internal and external pressures. Internally the dominant force was the impact of what has been described as the ‘Thatcherite project’ - taken here to include the policy innovations of John Major. Externally, the UK faced massive pressures from global forces as changes in the international political arena and revolutions in technology transformed, and made increasingly more permeable, the boundaries of the nation state. “The world economy is increasingly dynamic, open, and internationally competitive” (OECD, 1995:7). Indeed, the rate of change and the growing interdependence of the global market place can be said to be the defining condition of this new world order. Together these forces had a profound effect catalysing the expansion and proliferation of partnership working.

The Thatcher government’s reservations regarding the public sector, specifically the way in which local government could deflect central government’s attempt to constrain—if not curtail—public sector borrowing, precipitated a growing centralisation of powers in Whitehall as a means of effectively imposing control. The ability of the early Thatcher administrations to control local authority spending was challenged by a number of high
profile left-wing local authorities using a variety of creative mechanisms. These tactics by
local authorities proved to be pyrrhic victories as successive legislation severely
constrained the room for manoeuvre. By what John (1994) describes as a process of “policy
learning”, the Government had by the end of the 1980s eventually introduced an effective
system of financial ‘capping’ controls which could impose robust financial constraints over
wayward local authorities. Hambleton supports this view of growing centralisation
suggesting that: “…over fifty acts of parliament have been passed since 1979 which have
eroded the powers of local authorities” (quoted in Imrie & Thomas, 1993:89).

**Abolition of the metropolitan counties**

In 1986 Margaret Thatcher’s government abolished the Greater London Council (GLC) and
the Metropolitan County Councils (MCCs). The Government explained its actions in terms
of the need to remove a unnecessary tier of government.

> It was not signalled as a reorganisation of local government by the national government
> which instigated it, in the same way the 1974 local government reorganisation was so
> clearly designated. It was presented as a measure for removing an unnecessary and
> superfluous tier of local government, in one part of the country only - the metropolitan areas
> as opposed to the shire areas (Leach et al, 1990:1)

The MCCs, it was argued, represented an inefficient bureaucracy which squandered public
funds and was located at too great a distance from the electorate it purportedly claimed to
represent. The Government was resolute that abolition was proposed on efficacy grounds
and that abolition was a ‘streamlining’ process, [the phrase taken from abolition Act
*Streamlining the Cities* Cmnd 9063, 1983] removing waste, saving costs and, in the
process, bringing power closer to the electorate. The evidence would seem to contradict the
political rhetoric. Many of the strategic functions previously carried out by MCC continued
to be required after abolition. For this reason an extensive array of joint arrangements
followed from abolition in order to service strategic functions previously operated by the MCC. Abolition therefore created new statutory and voluntary joint boards and a raft of new partnership relations both formal and informal to fill the strategic vacuum. The exact nature of these were in turn shaped by the history, complexion and general climate of the local political situation in any one location. Not surprisingly then Leach et al (1990:3) conclude that:

> Very little that was done by the metropolitan county councils (and the GLC) has ceased to be done since abolition; and the level of activity in the fields where local government can choose to operate (rather than be obliged to) has not been materially affected. All that has happened is that a different range of organisations is now responsible for these activities at a local level…

Leach et al (1990, chp.4) catalogues the ‘process of re-adoption and influence’ of MCC members. Successive local elections provided opportunities for a significant number of key former MCC figures to re-establish their political careers within district councils. Through this route they re-entered local politics and found there way back into positions of responsibility either on statutory joint boards or on one of the range of joint co-ordinating arrangements created following abolition. Leach et al (1990) conclude that this mechanism provided the opportunity for key MCC personnel to return to positions of power fulfilling roles similar to those vacated at the MCC but simply reconstituted at a different spatial scale and within different partnership relations. If abolition did in fact not lead to ‘streamlining’ and cost savings as Leach et al assert, it is difficult not to disagree with the suggestion that abolition represented nothing less than a ideologically motivated act [entirely consistent with the political economy of Thatcherism] addressed at preventing any other alternative economic agenda challenging the hegemony of the central state. Although some see abolition as simply a vindictive political act Whitehead (1994:11) saw abolition
of the MCCs as part of a wider process of institutional realignment inspired by the Thatcher Government. The government’s actions can be understood both as a pragmatic reaction to events but also as a response to imagined enemies. An obvious enemy was the highly visible power and influence of Ken Livingstone and a Labour GLC located as it was literally on the doorstep of Parliament. However, it is also clear that the government were motivated by a desire to curtail local authorities being used as an experimental laboratory for policy initiatives that ran counter to the political economy of Thatcherism. At the heart of the abolition battle was central government’s conviction that local government should have its hands prised off the steering wheel henceforth only to be responsible for booking the taxis. Ironically then, for the Conservatives, the evidence of the abolition of the MCC suggests a great deal of continuity in both policy activities and – in the medium term – the personalities. For partnership however the importance of the institutional turmoil surrounding abolition lies in the dislocation of policy networks and their subsequent reformulation with the opportunities this offered in creating new partnership structures.

Privatisation

Heald (1988:36) notes that: “Until 1979, the United Kingdom possessed one of the largest public sector enterprise sectors in Europe. By the end of three terms of Thatcher government [i.e. 1992], it is scheduled to be extinct. Foreman-Peck speaking in 1989 suggested that “The sale of state owned industrial assets by the Thatcher Government promises to be the most radical restructuring of British industry at least since 1951” (1989:129). History would perhaps suggest that this was an underestimation. Privatisation is without doubt the defining characteristic and lasting legacy of Thatcherism. The magnitude of the impact of privatisation can be seen in the very existence of the annual
publication, *Privatisation Yearbook*, which records the scale of *global* privatisations. The 1994 issue notes:

Any attempt to estimate accurately the total size of global privatisations over the next few years is fraught with difficulty...World Bank figures show over 6,000 companies were privatised in the years 1980-1991 and another 6,000 in 1991-1993. The process has been accelerating and shows no sign of slowing down, with privatisations in Europe alone forecast to raise $150 billion over the next five years. To put that figure in perspective, the UK privatisation programme has so far raised the equivalent of about $75 billion (Nicholson, 1994:10).

Privatisation has an import push-effect for partnership. The reason for this is that privatisation invariably leads to unemployment as industries restructure—either in the run up or subsequent to privatisation—in order to become competitive and/or to reduce costs. The growth of unemployment feeds through into local economies and encourages local actors and agencies to engage more pro-actively in economic development activities. Tight fiscal controls, imposed by central government, on local authorities prevents them from acting unilaterally and so they turn to partnership opportunities to lever in resources. At a second level, privatised industries gain the potential for far wider managerial discretion in the pursuit of their strategic objectives albeit in the cold climate of the market place. This combination of managerial autonomy and competitive pressures created a climate for partnership working.

**Next Steps & Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT)**

As part of the process of introducing the private sector ethos into public policy the government introduced in its 1988 Local Government Act a compulsory regime of competitive tendering. This clearly expanded upon the approach of encouraging the private sector developed very early in the Conservative’s first administration.
Local authorities have been statutorily required...to subject the provision of services to competition. The Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980 introduced competition for building and highways construction and maintenance. The Act provides that local authorities’ own workforces may not enter into a contract unless they have won it in fair competition. In house service units are required to adopt commercial style accounting principles including meeting a financial objective set by the Government (HMSO, 1991b:22).

The subsequent 1988 legislation, which in its initial guise, incorporated a narrowly drawn list of “defined activities” including refuse collection and street cleaning. However, the importance of the legislation on the structure of local government may not have been evident at the onset. Implicit in the 1988 legislation was the authority to amend and add to the list of defined activities. Having secured enabling legislation the government set about to progressively extend the range and scale of activities caught up in CCT. In their evaluation Shaw et al are unequivocal: “…CCT was from the start envisaged as an incremental process which would by degrees fundamentally alter both central-local relations and the internal organisation of local authorities” (1995:65). CCT can thus pre-eminently be seen as an attempt to increase the market orientation of local authorities, whether this occurred directly, with private sector competition ‘winning’ contracts, or as has often been the case, by in-house direct labour organisations becoming ‘leaner and meaner’ in order to beat off the private sector. Either way CCT has made a material impact on the way local authorities operate. Traditionally, local authority services were not awarded on the basis of a competitive tendering regime and the internal accounting structures [rather the lack of them] within local authorities reflected this. CCT, by imposing a statutory obligation to tender, forced local authorities to examine their internal cost structures. It can be seen that in the process, the operational demands of CCT have advanced a distinct managerial response which has been called the ‘New Public
Management’. Dunleavy & Hood (1994) describe the key characteristics of this as primarily making the public sector less qualitatively distinct and in practice more akin to private sector modes of working. Operationally, it means bringing public sector management reporting and accounting approaches closer to business methods; reworking budgets to be transparent, costs attributed to outputs; disaggregating separable functions into distinct cost centres; separation of policy and implementation.

Paralleling the CCT innovation within the local state the Government were pursuing a similar agenda at a national level. In 1988 the Government Efficiency Unit, having spent only three months conducting research, published a report *Improving Management in Government: The Next Steps*, which would have an enormous impact on the institutional landscape. The report’s four main recommendations were accepted uncritically by the government and so was born the *Next Steps* initiative - see HMSO, 1988; NAO, 1989.

The Next Step principles committed the Government to a radical restructuring of state organisations, this meant that [to]: “…the greatest extent practicable, the executive functions of Government would be carried out by units designated as agencies headed by a Chief Executive. And the Government committed itself to a continuing programme for establishing Agencies…” (NAO, 1989 para.1). The success of this initiative is unambiguous. By 31st December 1996 129 Executive Agencies had been established (Cabinet Office, 1997:306-7). The transformation of state organisations into Agencies would, it was argued, transform operational [in]efficiency and in the process sweep away the endemic, anachronistic public sector culture which stifled innovation and helped to perpetuate the wholly negative image of many of these organisations. Agency status would herald a managerial revolution analogous to that of New Public Management. Sound
private sector disciplines would ensure the delivery of value for money and consumer responsiveness. Ministers would continue to set targets and negotiate strategic objectives but the reward for the organisation would be operational discretion by management in how objectives would be met.

In order to effect and institutionalise this permanent revolution and to make all public services answer better to the wishes of their users, and to raise their quality overall (HMSO, 1991a:2) a series of Citizen’s Charters would seek to define and refine targets. The structure of the targets and the government’s approach is to ensure that competition is injected into every facet of service provision.

The impact of these two initiatives, CCT and Next Steps, has been to transform the institutional landscape by fragmenting service delivery. CCT has inexorably altered the provision of services at the local level. Unquestionably, the private sector is now much more active in the delivery of local services. This occurs directly where the private sector wins contracts or indirectly, some would say insidiously, where the ethos of the private sector now pervades traditional public sector thinking. Similarly, Next Steps Agencies have dynamically altered the relationship between agency and government and instigated a managerial revolution in the delivery of services. Although these are disparate organisations they share a prevailing market ideology which shapes the way in which they operate. The common thread which links these initiatives is the perennial squeeze on finances. For local authorities this has meant a culture of ‘service level agreements’ both within an authority and with a range of external partners who undertake to provide services under contract. For Next Step Agencies rigorous targets place stringent demands on management to deliver results and they use their newly found discretion to ‘contract out’ a
raft of services to the private sector. In each case new relations are developed which add complexity to the formal institutional landscape as new actors and agencies are incorporated into the provision of service delivery. The relationship of these new actors to sponsoring organisations may be termed ‘contractual’ but the reality is that in effect the relationship is no more than a partnership defined in contract. This theoretical discussion is explored in more detail in chapter four.

**URBAN POLICY**

*Regional urban policy or inner city urban policy?*

The Thatcher government did not in fact have an explicit urban dimension to policy in 1979. The government’s political agenda was set out in its manifesto from which its priorities were clearly stated: “…the Conservative government’s first job will be to rebuild our economy and reunite a divided and disillusioned people (Conservative Manifesto, 1979:7). The manifesto went on to list five tasks. The first, reflecting its importance to the government, was the control of inflation. None of the five tasks make any explicit reference to an urban or regional dimension to policy. The reality was that the government inherited from the previous administration the remnants of a regional policy—administered by the DTI—which [coincidentally] had an urban impact along with an embryonic inner cities programme initiated by Labour’s 1977 White Paper – but only given legislative force in 1978 in the *Inner Urban Areas Act*. The inner cities programme envisaged the creation of formal Partnerships bringing together key actors [principally central/local government] who would identify strategic objectives, co-ordinate local strategies and in the context of these strategies bend mainstream budget headings to support these objectives. The reality in 1979 was that the inner city initiative was in its infancy with transitional arrangements in place: “…whereby selected authorities were to receive known Urban Programme allocations in
advance of the preparation of their bids” (Hambleton, 1979a:878){my emphasis}. In similar terms Michael Heseltine, SoS for the Environment, derided these early Partnership meetings as nothing more than a ‘carving up’ of additional resources. They [Partnerships] were:

…all looking for the little bit of their programme that they had not been able to get out of the traditional budget from their local authorities…[and]…It was very much an autonomous group of people, coming together to see if there was a bit more for them in what happened to be on the table (HC, 1982: para.341).

Regional policy was based on a map of spatially delineated ‘Assisted Areas’, divided into four sub-categories, reflecting a range of relative deprivation in discrete parts of the country. It was in effect a map of pockets of severe unemployment. Coincidentally all of the Assisted Areas lay within urban centres and only in this sense could regional policy be realistically described as constituting an ‘urban policy’. Certainly prior to the 1977 White Paper the government of the day would not have understood the ‘problem’ in anything other than regional terms. In 1979, at the start of the Conservative’s first administration, regional and urban policy could be seen as moving in the same direction. Interestingly, given the subsequent policy changes, the Conservative’s April 1979 manifesto makes no direct reference to regional policy. It does, in part 3, however contain a section on Industry, Commerce and Jobs that by inference refers to regional policy when it stated:

Government strategies and plans cannot produce revival, nor can subsidies…

Of course, government can help to ease industrial change in those regions dependent on older, declining industries. We do not propose sudden, sharp changes in the measures now in force. However, there is a strong case for relating government assistance to projects more closely to the number of jobs they create (Conservative Manifest, 1979:14-15).

Upon entering office in 1979 Thatcher set about refocusing regional policy. The ensuing changes ensured that the parallel trajectory of regional and urban policy became
progressively disengaged. The principle changes to regional policy were the re-drawing of boundaries (1979, 1983, 1993) and significant alterations in qualifying criteria and the range of eligible industries - see HMSO, 1983; 1988. The regionalism legacy lingers on in the ‘Assisted Area Status’ and the DTI continue to administer a regional policy in the form of ‘regional selective assistance’. [The continuing existence of Assisted Area status has been explained as no more than political expediency given that some form of delineation of declining areas is a pre-requisite for attracting assistance from European Structure Fund money. Alongside the obvious accepted measures of deprivation that figure in any discussion about Assisted Area boundaries Martin (1993) provides a compelling account of the importance of the political dimension in defining the re-drawing of the Assisted Areas].

In the late 1990s, with the benefit of hindsight, the historical importance of Labour’s 1977 White Paper can be seen clearly. After 1977, the allusion of a regional policy with urban impacts was manifestly displaced by the reality of an urban policy without recourse to regional pretensions: urban policy had came of age. The Labour government had accepted the problem as one essentially located in inner cities and this new understanding saw the mantle being passed on: from a regional policy located with the DTI (and its precursors) to an urban policy with the DoE. After 1977 the policy focus shifted from an inter-regional policy to an intra-regional policy. The policy approach was hereinafter to concentrate on small areas—and the small areas were all urban. The White Paper still prescribed a role for regional policy: “There is still a strong need for a continuing regional policy with differentials in industrial incentives for areas with major structural problems…[but it made the paramount distinction that what was required was] “…an intra-regional emphasis to policy designed to help inner areas in the Assisted Areas…” (HMSO, 1977 para.50). For
urban policy, and especially partnership, the 1977 White Paper can be seen as a rubicon. It created the idea and gave substance to an urban policy based on partnership and, simultaneously, without formally rejecting regional policy, ensured through diminishing resources that regional policy was ultimately eclipsed.

**Local economic development**

In the early 1980s the first Thatcher administration presided over a recession which precipitated a rapid increase in unemployment much of which was concentrated in inner urban areas. The phrase ‘de-industrialisation’ was coined to describe the magnitude of the restructuring and the absolute decline evident in many inner city economies. Historically, local authorities had been involved in what were known as ‘traditional’ economic development initiatives including promotional activities, site development, and the development of industrial estates and associated infrastructure. Invariably many of the areas suffering the most acute distress were Labour controlled administrations. The severity of the recession encouraged a number of these larger municipal authorities to experiment with a broader range of interventionist economic development initiatives which immediately brought them into conflict with the Government. Many of these initiatives exploited revenue from section 137 of the 1972 Local Government Act which: “…gave local authorities the power to spend up to the product of a 2p rate in the interests of their area…” (Audit Commission, 1989 para.154). The best example of these radical initiatives was Enterprise Boards. These provided a vehicle in which a local authority could invest in local firms. Because of the local authorities position as largest shareholder it could dictate the terms and conditions attached to its investment strategy. These terms invariably had social aspirations well beyond narrow market criteria typically expected by the private sector. The
apotheosis of this position can be seen in a GLC publication which argued that: “Profit is no longer an accurate guide to the way out of economic crisis” (GLC Economic Policy Group, 1983:17)\(^1\) Given the Thatcher Government’s unequivocal laissez-faire credentials suggesting that profit was not the overriding objective would have caused apoplexy in her Government and could only be understood as a direct threat to the Government’s management of the economy.

In this climate the 1980s came to be seen as a period of intense conflict between central and local government as the former attempted to [re]assert its authority over the latter. The Government’s desire to control expenditure and shift the balance of the economy towards the private sector laid the foundation of the conflict. The political economy of Thatcherism, it must be remembered, asserted that where an economy is dominated by the public sector this inexorably represses the wealth creating private sector. [The intellectual case for the so-called ‘crowding out’ phenomena was set out in Bacon & Eltis’ influential [amongst Thatcherites] book, *Britain’s Economic Problem: Too Few Producers* (1978).] By challenging local authority economic development activity the Government sought to re-establish their right to dictate both the direction and character of economic policy. For a variety of reasons local authorities lost the challenge. The resources they could muster in no way matched the scale of the problem; it became abundantly clear to the most left-wing authority that unilateral action could not solve the problem and; successive Conservative election victories reaffirmed the Government’s mandate to pursue their policies. Notwithstanding these factors the Government ensured their success by introducing legislation in the Local Government Housing Bill 1989 which, by making economic

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\(^1\) GLC publication: *Jobs for a Change* quoted by Cochrane in Chp.8:162 in Campbell {Ed} 1990).
development a statutorily defined function, removed the discretionary Section 137 spending and, in a stroke, redefined economic development to fall within the “category of discretionary expenditure” (Emmerich, 1994:2) thus placing it on an equal footing with other authority functions. In what many saw as an ingenious tactical manoeuvre the Government had legitimised economic development and simultaneously emasculated it. In future, economic development would have to compete against: “…dozens of functions where an authority’s effective funding is derived via the extremely stretched ‘Other Services’ Block of the Standard Spending Assessment” (Emmerich, 1994:2). The financial constraints endemic in local authorities however made it more and more difficult to sanction autonomous expenditure on economic development. For this reason Hayton felt that local government’s future role would be more corporate and that there would be a: “…greater need for local authorities to become involved in partnership with the private sector…” (1991:55). However, the contentious battles which had raged between a number of high profile local authorities and the Government diverted attention from the fact that by the end of the 1980s nearly all local authorities had developed some form of local economic development capacity—see Sellegren, 1987; 1990; Nickson, 1991; Audit Commission, 1989. And whilst the amounts of money spent specifically on economic development under Section 137 was small in relation to total local authority expenditure (less than 1% - Audit Commission, 1989 para.115), spending under main budget headings did have significant impacts on local economies.

By the mid 1980s, according to Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) estimates, over £250 million was being spent annually out of revenue budgets on economic development and promotion by local authorities...These amounts rival the level of central government spending on regional policy and in any case substantially
underrepresent actual spending on economic development, since some is buried under other (mainstream) budget heads (Cochrane p157 chp.8 quoted in Campbell 1990).

Economic development in its widest sense, which had begun as a marginal activity pursued by some of the more radical left-wing [Labour] local authorities, had become by the end of the 1980s, a legitimate and widespread function throughout local government. The DoE concluded that:

> During the 1980s, local authorities have tended to move away from their traditional involvement in the provision of industrial land and premises, towards more direct assistance to industry and towards new business development, often through the provision of advice and financial support. In some cases a more active and ambitious policy has been attempted based on a co-ordinated approach towards particular sectors. More recently, authorities have looked for ways of targeting assistance more directly towards the unemployed and disadvantaged groups, which has led to initiatives on issues such as training, community business, co-operatives, equal opportunities, employment subsidies, black businesses, and negotiated agreements with employers on local recruitment (DoE, 1990 para.2.12).

However, during this period stringent fiscal constraints and a tight regulatory regime meant that the experience of economic development was in fact the practice of partnership.

**UDCs**

Running in parallel to the growth of local authority economic development in the 1980s the Government progressively sought to alter the balance between the public and private sector. This substantive change in character of inner city policy was set out in 1981 in a major policy statement by Michael Heseltine, SoS for the Environment. He made clear the Government’s intention to place the interests of the private sector much higher than had been achieved previously. Heseltine stated:

> The private sector should be encouraged to play the fullest possible part. I therefore intend to make effective consultation with local industry a prior condition of providing urban programme grant. The voluntary sector can also contribute much, and should also be consulted (Hansard, 1981 col.603).
Part of this process can be seen in terms of the Government’s attempts to quell the activities of radical left-wing Labour authorities who, as described above, were seeking to redefine the parameters of economic policy at a local level. In effect local authorities were seeking to assert their right to adopt an economic policy independent of [and, in this case, contrary to] central government. However, running in the opposite direction, the political economy of Thatcherism promoted privatisation, and in 1981 in one of its first major urban policy initiatives the Government introduced Urban Development Corporations. Imrie & Thomas suggest that: “The UDCs were forerunners in reorienting urban policy towards new economic imperatives in urban regeneration…” (1993a p4). The Act which created UDCs:

…did not define regeneration but indicated some of the ways by which regeneration might be achieved—for example by bringing land and buildings into effective use, by encouraging the development of industry and commerce, and by ensuring that housing and social facilities are available to encourage people to live and work in the area (HC, 1988 para.3).

The early UDCs can be seen as spectacular examples of the imposition of a new policy regime. Ironically the act of imposing on the local state, an alien structure with significant powers and resources, rather than synthesising and co-ordinating economic activity in an area, had the perverse effect of adding to the fragmentation of local economic structures and by definition encouraging the need for partnership. Whilst the early UDCs, especially London, were vociferously criticised for being too narrowly focused on property, later UDCs had a significantly moderated mandate with wider economic and social objectives. Whilst UDCs were perhaps an extreme example of government intervention in the local economy they undoubtedly had an important impact on the development of local partnerships. The growth of partnership occurs regardless of whether UDCs were more or less open to private, as distinct from say the local statutory sector, or the community and voluntary sectors. The reason for this is the scale of resources and powers vested to UDCs.
By creating new institutional forms with significant budgets and relative local autonomy vis-à-vis existing local institutions, and then at the same time constrain if not diminish local authority spending, creates a compelling environment to promote co-operative working and by definition partnership proliferation. A number of local authorities attempted to resist the imposition of UDCs but the record shows that these attempts proved fruitless and by the end of the 1980s confrontation had largely been replaced by co-operation. As the Audit Commission noted:

There is less evidence now of unproductive effort by councils and a greater degree of coherence, co-ordination and pragmatism” (Audit Commission, 1989 para.10)...[and]... The era of confrontation between government and local councils on inner city policy is fading rapidly. There are examples of constructive co-operation and instances of quite remarkable changes of heart on the part of council leaders who were previously implacably hostile to government policy (op cit, para.43).

City Action Teams, Task Forces

Throughout the 1980s the Government was repeatedly criticised for a lack of co-ordination in its management of urban policy. This was not new. The 1977 White Paper had first raised the need to co-ordinate activity in order to gain the maximum advantage from the disparate actors operating in the inner cities. Co-ordination remained a perennial problem haunting the Government and a great body of research repeatedly drew attention to the problem throughout the 1980s: Scarman, 1982; Stewart, 1987; Audit Commission, 1989; HC, 1990. The high point of this criticism was the scathing rebuke made by the Audit Commission (1989)—the Government’s own audit watchdog—in describing Government policy as a “patchwork quilt” (p1) and “programme overkill in a strategic vacuum” (para. 102). The Government had introduced a number of initiatives specifically to address co-ordination. City Action Teams and Task Forces (TF) were two such examples. City
Action Teams brought together, on a regular basis, senior regional officials of the various regional departments of state, and representatives of departments without a formal regional presence, in order to ensure that each was working together effectively; Task Forces were similarly mandated consisting of small teams of civil servants from a variety of departments and people seconded from local authorities, the private and voluntary sectors (DoE, 1988b). Departmental parochialism inhibited the former from asserting any real effective influence on the policy agenda and by inference, co-ordination. The latter was criticised on account of their extremely small budgets, they were time limited, and the fact that they had no statutory powers to force co-ordination; rather they worked through voluntary agreements with all the reservations that this implied where intractable positions are encountered. Each of these initiatives was effectively a partnership building machine whose raison d’être was co-ordination. Ironically, in the case of Task Forces the chairman of the Environment Select Committee [although examining initiatives in Merseyside his comments apply equally to all Task Forces] suggested to the SoS for the Environment, Michael Heseltine, that:

…it is ironic that the Task Force is in essence trying to do what the Liverpool Partnership is supposed to have been doing for the past 3 years, namely, bringing together the relevant public and private institutions in an effort to identify key problem areas and appropriate co-ordinated responses, and conduct of affairs (HC, 1982: para.341:148).

City Challenge & the Single Regeneration Budget

Many of the policy initiatives introduced in the 1980s were criticised and much of this criticism was directed at the role of the private sector. In the 1980s a situation was created where the private sector [or its values] had come to dominate urban policy and critics argued that the Government in shifting the balance of power so strongly in favour of the private sector had effectively marginalised local authority involvement in local economic
development. Perhaps the most extreme examples of this policy shift—where local authorities were effectively excluded from the policy process—were Enterprise Zones and UDCs but this shift was mirrored in many other initiatives throughout the 1980s. This was especially the case in planning where in one of the government’s first initiatives a presumption in favour of development was implemented; planning by Appeal to the SoS repeatedly overturned local decisions; and a system of urban grants evolved from one which brought local authorities and the private sectors together to a situation in which the local authority was expressly omitted. Critics argued that this policy reorientation which saw the ascendancy of the private sector had created a democratic deficit where lines of accountability were blurred and co-ordination in the implementation of policy was severely lacking.

Appearing towards the end of the decade the Audit Commission Report on ‘Urban Regeneration & Economic Development’ which synthesised many of the criticisms directed at government policy (Audit Commission, 1989). Similarly, a report published in 1990 by the influential Committee of Public Accounts (HC, 1990) reiterated the Audit Commission’s largely critical report. The Audit Commission’s (1989) report made a number of specific observations:

**para.36**  successful urban regeneration has nearly always been accomplished in a framework of genuine partnership…it is of great benefit that a wide range of interested bodies should be substantially included, particularly local authorities.

**para.41**  it is widely perceived that central and local government departments do not work together as closely or effectively as the might…one of the clearest messages to emerge is that the efforts to turn around Britain’s cities will be shackled so long as the present uneasy relations between central and local government persist.
para.44 (a) Government rhetoric, allied to some specific changes designed to cut down the local authority role, has contributed to a climate which is less favourable for co-operation than it might be;

para.44 (b) The multiplicity of governmental agencies and schemes generates confusion on the ground, in the minds of local authority decision makers and business leaders alike;

para.44 (c) the structures and procedures of individual programmes do not harness the energies as effectively as they could; some are too constrained and bureaucratic;

para.44 (d) There is in spite of some positive developments in some areas inadequate co-ordination of local strategies, and the totality of government effort is less than the sum of its parts.

para.157 Local authorities themselves often experience difficulty in co-ordinating actions across departmental boundaries…

The City Challenge initiative announced in May 1991 can clearly be seen to have been organised to directly assuage these criticisms. Winning bids needed to show a comprehensive and integrated approach to urban regeneration. In the first of two rounds Michael Heseltine, SoS for the Environment, invited 15 local authorities to participate in a competition for funds. Eleven of these pace makers were successful. A second round was held which opened up the competition to all 57 Urban Programme authorities from which 20 were successful. Out of the two rounds 31 City Challenge Partnerships were formed with each receiving £37.5m spread over 5 years. City Challenge was important because it reaffirmed the importance of local authorities in the local development process but more importantly it categorically restated partnership as the preferred delivery mechanism and it made clear that these would include local authorities, the private and voluntary sectors and the local community (DoE, 1997c: para.4.31). City Challenge was first and foremost a competition to create partnerships. It encouraged partnership because only
partnerships could enter and win the competition.

An anticipated third round was overtaken by events. City Challenge was abandoned and replaced by the Single Regeneration Budget—for an exposition of the key implications see Mawson et al, 1995. The SRB developed the ideas begun in City Challenge but addressed some of the criticisms associated with it. SRB has had a profound impact on partnership formation. The three rounds of SRB has seen the creation of 552 partnerships formed specifically to implement SRB objectives (DoE, 1997c: para.4.6). With the SRB the Government effectively reaffirmed the commitment it made to partnership in the 1977 White Paper. Ironically, the position for partnership in the late 1990s under SRB is somewhat akin to that outlined in the 1977 White Paper which saw an important role for all the community of interests in the resurrection of inner city economies. The difference under SRB rules is that a partnership is only eligible to enter the competition if it formally includes all these actors in the development of the local strategy.

SUMMARY

Partnership by the end of the 1990s was without doubt the policy tool of government and which had effectively become the new economic orthodoxy in the delivery of regeneration policy. Along the path to ascendancy it had weathered strident political storms. Remarkably even as the post war consensus collapsed with the advent into office of the first Thatcher government, partnership appeared to be apolitical, remaining as it did the preferred delivery mechanism for the Tories throughout the 1980s and 1990s. During the early period of Thatcher’s government there were several celebrated cases of local authorities attempting to resist the new political and economic settlement introduced by Thatcher. The approach for these authorities was invariably to try and nurture an alternative interventionist political
platform based upon a radical socialist agenda, remarkably, partnership remained the preferred delivery mechanism. Ultimately, these challenges proved futile and were comprehensively defeated by the actions of central government. However, what that these challenges revealed was the potential for partnership to exploit and manipulate the political tensions inherent in the internal dynamics of partnership as constituted in the model set out in the 1977 White Paper. The experience of partnership during this period reflected its chameleon character and perhaps suggests something of its value to politicians who appreciate the fundamental flexibility of a policy instrument that has no theoretical boundaries.

The lesson for urban policy and perhaps for government policy in general was what might be called the Thatcher legacy. That is to say that dirigiste intervention either by central or local government was no longer tenable. Partnership had now become the new economic orthodoxy. Remarkably, the promise of effectiveness and value for money arising from partnership working as laid out in the 1977 White Paper has never been challenged theoretically. Experience in the 1980s and 1990s was that the key issue was control of the rules governing partnership formation. No one has yet sought to challenge the efficacy of partnership working or indeed provide anything other than an anecdotal description of what constitutes partnership. These matters will be explored in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 3: THE SINGLE REGENERATION BUDGET

INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to describe the origins of the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) and set it in the historical context of the evolution of urban policy. Many of the characteristics of the SRB can be traced directly back to earlier policy initiatives. These earlier initiatives help explain the trajectory of urban policy and are examined in order to help explain why the SRB turned out like it did. The evolution of urban policy under successive Conservative administrations in the 1980s and 1990s can be seen to have advanced in three stages and these phases are examined in detail.

Evolution
The SRB is only the latest evocation in a long line of regeneration initiatives addressed predominantly, although not exclusively, on urban problems. Indeed, that the SRB operates outside of what are considered traditional urban problem areas is just one of the characteristics which sets it apart from earlier regeneration initiatives. However, the SRB needs to be examined in the wider context of an evolving political economy: one which has continued to evolve over two decades. The SRB can therefore only be understood by examining the interplay between, on the one hand, a prevailing political ideology, and on the other, the changing understanding of what constitutes the problem it seeks to address.

Immediately a major methodological problem arises in trying to understand the evolution of regeneration policy and specifically the trajectory that the SRB has followed. The reason for this is that there have rarely been clearly articulated objectives for urban policy and this specific criticism was made by Robson et al in a comprehensive review of urban policy commissioned by the DoE—see *Inner Cities Research Programme: Assessing the Impact*
of Urban Policy. The report argued that:

…there is some difficulty both in determining unambiguously what government has aimed to achieve in developing its urban policy at any one time and in trying to characterise those aims over the course of the last two decades (DoE, 1994c: para.1.4).

What is clear from the early initiatives was that they can be characterised as attempts to systematically apply positive discrimination on discrete areas of the inner city. Higgins et al (1983:15-16) in a comprehensive review of the origins of urban policy argue that the original Community Development Programme:

…was not conceived as a poverty programme in any but the broadest sense, and its main thrust was towards encouraging the personal and moral growth of individuals, and the growth of hope and enthusiasm in declining communities.

The subsequent Urban Programme running in the period 1967-78 was characterised as a policy initiative which sought:

…the alleviation of urban deprivation or stress in areas of special social need by supplementing main programmes and filling gaps left by them, but it has also always had a special concern with immigrant areas and ethnic minorities (Higgins et al 1983:49).

Operationally however the policy approach adopted has always been to target what can be regarded as the symptoms of poverty articulated in terms of multiple deprivation. This approach can be seen as distinct from a policy that would attack poverty directly as, for example, transfer payments might. Success in policy terms was therefore determined with reference to proxy indicators: the best example of which has been unemployment [or the inverse, i.e., job creation, jobs protected]. The reason for this is tied up with the symbolic importance of unemployment which from the end of the second World War and to just prior to the advent of the first Thatcher government had been a touchstone of the efficacy of government economic policy. The actual process of disengagement from a commitment to
full employment began under the previous Wilson/Callaghan Labour administration. The Labour prime minister James Callaghan who took over from Wilson in April 1976 may indeed have maintained an ideological commitment to full employment but in the face of overwhelming economic pressure his government acceded to the de facto abandonment of this aspiration as unemployment breached the one million mark in 1976. [Numbers unemployed in the UK in June 1975 were below 900,000 by June 1976 this figure was 1,331,838 – see Annual Abstract of Statistics, HMSO, 1977: Table 6.7].

The differences in political economy between Callaghan’s Labour and Thatcher’s Conservative administration is important in the trajectory and evolving character of regeneration policy. Both Labour and previous Conservative administrations prior to Thatcher were committed to full employment and this was as much a moral as an economic imperative. However, the Labour administration was overwhelmed by a ‘tidal wave of economic forces’ and adopted a pragmatic view of the parlous state of the UK economy conceding that government in many respects was impotent and could not spend its way into full employment. Callaghan as prime minister vigorously made the point when he addressed the 1976 Labour Part Conference at Blackpool:

The cosy world we were told would go on for ever, where full employment would be guaranteed by a stroke of the Chancellor’s pen, cutting taxes, deficit spending – that cosy world is gone…

When we reject unemployment as an economic instrument – as we do – and when we reject also superficial remedies, as socialists must, then we must ask ourselves unflinchingly: what is the cause of high unemployment? Quite simply and unequivocally it is caused by paying ourselves more than the value of what we produce…
We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting Government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists, and that insofar as it ever did exist, it only worked on each occasion since the war by injecting a bigger dose of inflation into the economy, followed by a higher level of unemployment as the next step. Higher inflation followed by higher unemployment (text of speech quoted in Callaghan, 1987:425-6).

Interestingly the contrast with the Thatcher administration is only one of degree. The Thatcher administration, like all previous administrations, was genuinely concerned with unemployment, however, the political economy of Thatcherism, whilst sharing the same broad objective of a free and prosperous nation had a different view as to how this objective could be realised. Its distinguishing feature then is not as many would have it, of an indifference to unemployment—because Thatcherism presupposes that a prosperous economy creates jobs and removes all but [acceptable] frictional unemployment—rather, the substantive difference is the primacy given to economic over social objectives. For Thatcherism it is axiomatic that when you get the economy right you automatically solve unemployment and so policies for unemployment per se are no longer a legitimate government concern. All policy is thus subjugated to getting the macroeconomy working right. The level of unemployment is no longer an objective it simply becomes one symptom, amongst a range of many possible symptoms, which could be used to gauge how well [or not] policy is operating.

However, making judgements as to how an economy was operating, especially inner urban areas, is problematic. How do you evaluate the quality of the environment, the competitiveness of an area, educational endowment, crime levels, deprivation etc? Even where this evaluation could be shown to be done objectively it raises the question as to what is the relationship between any one—or even more problematic—combinations of
these variables and the efficiency of a local economy. Because of these substantive methodological difficulties the evaluation of urban policy in its various manifestations has largely been judged on its impact on unemployment. The basic reason for this is that comprehensive unemployment figures are collated regularly and whilst the definition of unemployment has been politically contested, unemployment figures [however defined] remain a robust empirically objective indicator commanding widespread respect in their underlying collation. The Treasury offer support to this interpretation, talking about additionality as a general concept relating to any output of regeneration policies they note that: “In practice, most empirical work relates to employment (HM Treasury, 1995:25)”.

**SRBs lineage.**

Historically then the origins of contemporary urban policy lie in a series of urban experiments introduced primarily by the Home Office and the DoE in the 1967-75 period—see Appendix (B): *Chronology of Urban Policy*. In all, about a dozen separate projects were initiated in this period in both Wilson’s 1964-69 Labour administration and Heath’s 1970-74 Conservative administrations (Lawless, 1988:531). Cullingworth (1988:287) notes that:

…the legislative landmarks (though modest) were the Local Government Act 1966 (section 11) and the Local Government (Social Need) Act of 1969. These constituted the statutory basis for the ‘educational priority areas programme’. The 1966 Act provided for grants in aid of staff costs involved in ‘dealing with some of the transitional problems caused by the presence of Commonwealth immigrants’. The urban aid programme was broader in concept, ‘designed to raise the level of social services in areas of acute social need, and thus help to provide an equal opportunity for all citizens…[and]
‘Areas of special social need’ were not defined in the legislation, but government circulars referred to ‘localised districts, within the boundaries of an urban authority, which bear the marks of multiple deprivation, such as old, overcrowded, decrepit houses without plumbing and sanitation; persistent unemployment; family sizes above the average; a high proportion of children in trouble or in need of care; or a combination of some or all of these.

The assessment of these initiatives were generally critical. Even before the publication of official DoE research by Robson et al (DoE, 1994b) criticised a lack of clearly articulated objectives for urban policy, Lawless (1988:531), in a prescient observation, was already suggesting that research was indicating that these experiments: “…proved unable rigorously to define urban deprivation or effectively monitor ameliorative policy”. The importance of these early initiatives however was the critical impact they had upon changing the direction of government policy. By repudiating a social pathology view of deprivation the research attributed the decline of inner cities to economic forces resulting from the contraction in employment opportunities and the consequent diminishing individual and community wealth (Lawless,1988:532). This analysis was persuasively argued in the conclusions of the ‘Inner Area Studies’ [Liverpool, Birmingham, Lambeth] instigated by Peter Walker as Secretary of State for the Environment in the 1972 Labour administration. The force of these arguments was acknowledged in the introduction of the 1977 White Paper ‘Policy for the Inner Cities’ (HMSO, 1977:1) which acceded that the cumulative impact of research into the various urban initiatives pointed to an economic explanation for urban decline. The logic of the analysis suggested that an economic problem required an economic solution and this policy frame dictated the nature of the urban policy initiatives. As chapter two described the 1977 White Paper introduced the concept of Partnership as the new idea to tackle the problem in inner cities. The problem was complex and multifaceted and so the response needed to reflect this and so the Inner
Area Partnerships were formed. As chapter one argued partnership has continued to be the policy response even when the government changed bringing in its train a new political economy to bear on the inner city problem.

**THREE STAGES OF URBAN POLICY**

It can be seen that the evolution of policy has occurred in roughly three stages—illustrated in figure 3.1 below—and each of these stages contributed to the essential character of what was to become the SRB.

**Figure 3.1: Stages in the development of urban policy**

![Diagram showing three stages of urban policy: Partnership (Stage I), City Challenge (Stage II), SRB (Stage III).](image)

**Stage I: need and targeting**

Stage I introduced two concepts which would play an important part in future policy initiatives: need and targeting. It also heralded the establishment of partnerships in the 57 towns and cities considered to be suffering the most extreme effects of economic decline. The actual process of identifying eligible locations [in this case a figure of 57 areas] involved a combination of indices some of which were subjective and open to political interpretation. Peter Shore, as the then SoS, outlined the criteria used to select Partnership areas in a debate in the Commons:
We have referred specifically to loss of population, to loss of jobs, to the actual social composition of population in the inner city areas, and to a number of quantifiable and, to some extent, admittedly, difficult to quantify, social factors (Hansard, Inner Cities debate 08/11/77 col.495).

Exchanges in the debate however emphasised the political dimension to these deliberations. Whilst the centres of many of the older industrial cities would readily qualify on any objective criteria of deprivation and, as the SoS stated, would be ‘almost self selecting’ (ibid. col.490), some legitimately needy locations failed to qualify and this point was raised more than once in the debate by MPs from these constituencies. Indeed, Hambleton (1981:53) suggests that: “…hints that the policy would seek to concentrate resources in particular areas resulted in a scramble for selection by many of the urban local authorities.” However, the subjectivity of the government’s analysis, and their sensitivity to the political dimension, was unambiguously stated in the subsequent White Paper which asserted that:

The Government have given careful thought to the selection of areas for partnership arrangements. There are no satisfactory objective criteria, comparable between one area and another, covering the whole span of problems—economic decline, physical decay and social stress (HMSO, 1977: para.72). {my emphasis}[and]

Account will be taken not only of the intensity of problems, but also of their extent and any wider effects on surrounding areas (ibid. para.77)

Chapter two argued that at this critical initial stage the concept of partnership was embedded in the policy process and whilst policy objectives changed over time the policy mechanism remained consistent. Crucial to the future development of policy was that the policy analysis outlined in the 1977 White Paper received widespread support. The problem was fundamentally economic in nature [which was new] and, given the magnitude of the problem, there was a desperate need to involve all the different sectors in a co-ordinated, and spatially concentrated, response to the problems facing inner city economies.
In stage (I) then the principle objectives of partnership were to administer a quadruple increase in the Urban Programme budget (£30m to £125m a year in 1979/80 - HMSO, 1977: para.64) and to improve co-ordination—in strictly circumscribed parts of inner cities—amongst the raft of players operating there. As chapter two details, during this stage the concept of partnership formally involved only the central state and local government. Although the 1977 White Paper had presciently identified the withdrawal of private sector investment as part of the inner city problem, the partnerships proposed under the revised Urban Programme placed control with local government. Operationally this effectively inhibited the potential contribution of the private sector. The White Paper had envisaged that the new partnership arrangements would lead to innovative developments in working practices: the evidence suggests that this did not occur.

Many local authorities were ill prepared for the substantial policy initiative. The speed of the introduction of the new partnerships meant that early partnership meetings, rather than instigating or supporting innovative methods of working transcending traditional operational and departmental boundaries, quickly descended into parochial departmental bidding mechanisms. Rather than developing new projects which would seek to exploit the potential synergy of a co-ordinated approach many projects were simply off-the-shelf projects brought forward by individual departments in order to exploit a new funding stream.

**Stage II: ascendancy of the private sector**

Following Margaret Thatcher’s election in 1979 the new Conservative government set urban policy on a new trajectory: one which sought to reconcile existing policy mechanisms with the new political economy of Thatcherism. Stage (II) began in the early
1980s with a raft of policy initiatives. These continued to use partnership as the preferred delivery mechanism and a policy of targeting resources. This continuity and change was spelt out by Michael Heseltine, SoS for the Environment, when he announced that: “The Inner City Partnership and Programme Authority arrangements will continue…I have decided not to make any changes now in the list of authorities with partnership or programme authority status…” But Heseltine also reaffirmed his intention, subject to Parliamentary approval, to set up UDCs in London and Merseyside (DoE, Press Notice 59/81 ~ 9th February 1981). The fundamental thrust of this new initiative was to incorporate the private sector into the policy making arena; at the same time the progressive inclusion of the private sector saw parallel moves to exclude the public sector. The Public Accounts Committee heard evidence that the experience of the 1977 Urban Programme Partnerships had convinced the government that: “…inner city regeneration was better led by private sector investment than by local authorities” (HC, 1990: para.10).

Ironically the lesson of stage (II) was the same as that which had been spelt out in the original 1977 White Paper which had called for co-ordinated action from all sectors active in the inner city. However initiatives undertaken under stage (II) especially Urban Development Corporations, which by the late 1980s were consuming the largest portion of the DoE’s Regeneration Budget Heading, were widely criticised and considered by many of the government’s critics to be the apogee of the privatism culture which Thatcherism fostered. Ironically, the basis of much of the criticism of UDCs arose from the observation that the government had in effect created a mirror image of the Inner Area Partnerships’ (i.e., those created by the 1977 White Paper and designated under the Inner Urban Areas Act 1978) and in so doing, exposed them to the same fundamental criticisms. It should be
remembered that the Inner Area Partnerships had been criticised because they were narrow secular partnerships consisting of only central and local government. And yet UDCs were structurally remarkably similar, although this time round the partnership was between central government and local private interests. However both of these approaches appeared to contradict the policy analysis in the 1977 White Paper which called for far wider participatory structures which would not exclude key sectors in local communities.

UDCs were controversial from the very beginning. Over time a burgeoning body of evidence was suggesting that the privatisation of public policy had gone too far. There may indeed have been merits in adopting elements of best practice found in the private sector and there were certain practical advantages of levering private sector capital into regeneration initiatives. However by the end of the 1980s it became clear that to exclude the public sector [amongst others] wasted a valuable resource. The public sector contained both a breadth of talent and experience and, in light of the continuing criticism of a democratic deficit, it brought to partnership legitimate local leadership, underpinned with genuine democratic credentials secured through the ballot box. Painter et al (1997:241) graphically illustrates this when describing local authority’s democratic legitimacy as a: “…major resource which can be used as a bargaining counter in relations with other agencies”, and goes on to quote an interview with a local authority officer who suggested that: “For them [referring to quangos] the positive thing…is they get caught up in the slip stream of our accountability.”

Of great significance for the evolution of urban policy and the character of the SRB Challenge Fund was the shift in emphasis away from need during this period. Urban policy throughout this period had instead been predicated on physical renewal which had a needs
element but this was not the primary aim. The focus of policy was rather on a property-led solution which would seek to resolve the legacy of decay. It was envisaged that public sector funding would lever in private sector capital, creating markets where none existed previously. The logic underpinning these initiatives was that public sector funding, administered by the private sector, would be used to build flagship projects and complementary infrastructure and that this would stimulate a climate conducive to further private sector [re]investment in the inner cities. The result of this public sector led investment [reverse leverage as its critics termed it] would be a virtuous circle of investment and growth which through the process of ‘trickle down’ would percolate prosperity downwards to the incumbent local communities.

**Stage III: co-ordination revisited & reconciliation of public sector**

Stage (II) was brought to an abrupt end at the end of the 1980s by the convergence of a number of critical factors. The collapse in the property market at the end of the 1980s exposed the weakness of a policy predicated on the creation of a property market (Solesbury, 1990; Turok, 1992; Imrie, R & Thomas, 1993). Alongside the puncturing of what had become a highly speculative property market bubble there had been a growing body of research and comment publicly criticising existing regeneration policy on a number of fronts. So, by the end of the 1980s highly influential sources were highlighting a continuing lack of co-ordination evident in many of the initiatives and a growing concern with what was described as the ‘democratic deficit’ of many of the policy tools—see Audit Commission, 1989; HC, 1990. This changing policy climate is described in detail in Mawson et al (1995):
...an alternative policy model was emerging, based on a collaborative approach, which sought to draw together all the key actors and agencies within a locality. Comparative studies of the successful regeneration of cities in North America and Europe had suggested that certain common features were evident in their strategic management and organisational capacity. In particular, there was evidence of a partnership between all the key local agencies, leading to a shared analysis of problems and opportunities, and the development over time of a vision expressed in an agreed strategy. These themes were also present in the Audit Commission's advocacy of the preparation of a Local Regeneration Audit, and in the thinking emerging from the work of the Business Leadership Teams in various British cities supported by the Business in the Community (BITC) and the CBI (para.2.3). {original emphasis}

The ideas were brought together in an accord between the Chambers of Commerce, BITC, the Enterprise Agency movement and the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) at Sunningdale, in September 1991, which proposed that a process be launched to develop joint ownership of local strategies throughout the country. This would involve a shared audit, development of a co-operative strategy based on a core vision and declared objectives, targets and action. This process would involve extensive consultation, leading to joint ownership, and publication of an agreed strategy, followed by incorporation by the partners into their respective organisation’s plans (para.2.4).

In one sense the policy shift which occurred at the end of the 1980s was both pragmatic and politically expedient. It would have been untenable to support if not commercially naïve to continue pumping large sums of public money into built solutions when the property market had so manifestly collapsed. New solutions were demanded. Out of this situation came City Challenge which presaged a major innovation in urban policy and marked the start of stage (III). Interestingly Davoudi & Healey (1995:80) give support to the above analysis suggesting that the funding for City Challenge was: “…primarily unspent grant allocations available as a result of the lack of interest in property development initiatives because of the property slump.”

Published towards the end of the 1980s The Action for Cities paper (Cabinet Office, 1988) had already begun to shift the character of the discourse surrounding the problems of inner
cities. In announcing the fact that they were spending £3b in the inner city the government sought to promote the idea that they were now making a major commitment to resolving the inner city problem. The three billion figure soon became a focus of critical scrutiny. Observers suggested that the figure was disingenuous (Lawless, 1988b; Nevin & Shiner, 1993). An FT leader article described it as: “strong on presentation but weak on new ideas or new money…[and]…the fatness of the prospectus is in inverse proportion to its contents” (FT, 08/03/88). The actual ‘new money’ targeted at the inner city represented only a small proportion of the £3b figure; the bulk of which was in fact made up by including statutorily defined departmental spending which would have occurred with or without a commitment to the inner city. These critics concluded that the £3b figure although crudely accurate was nothing more than a legitimate accounting manipulation which did nothing more than reflect the actual level of resources already directed at the inner city2.

Arguments over the funding aside, the paper was influential in other more subtle ways. Throughout the narrative of the paper a number of key concepts were introduced which proved highly influential in shaping future initiatives. First, Margaret Thatcher began in the Foreword to the paper by restating the government’s commitment to partnership. Second, at a different level, and perhaps of more symbolic significance for future policy, the paper in describing the range of government initiatives embracing inner cities went some way to define how the political economy of Thatcherism had been translated into practical policies in the inner city. The suggestion made by the government in the paper [although contested by critics] was that the sum of these initiatives reflected a deliberate, coherent strategic

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2 Labour in 2000 have been similarly criticised. See, for example, the ‘more spin than substance’ criticism para.45-53 Trade & Industry Select Committee Minutes of Evidence HC261-i); FT 11/02/00.
policy response to the problem of inner cities, rather than as critics would argue, a list of departmental activities which coincidentally had an urban impact. At the launch of the Action for Cities initiatives Margaret Thatcher was quoted by the FT as saying that: “I don’t think there is a single new policy here” (Pike, FT 08/03/88) but as the FT made clear: “Her remark was not made defensively” (ibid). The FT observed that in “words which occurred repeatedly” the Government saw the initiative as adding: “better co-operation, co-ordination and concentration of effort and resources” (Pike, FT 08/03/88) and, as if to reinforce this message of an innovative co-ordinated approach, the launch was attended by six cabinet ministers.

**Collage or strategy**

Regardless of which interpretation is taken—collage or strategy—the paper, when seen in its totality, sets out [and this may indeed have been deliberate or inadvertent] a structurally coherent and comprehensive programme for future inner city policies. In retrospect it can be seen that in the process of describing the various initiatives The Action for Cities paper sets out extremely crucial themes which went on to shape both City Challenge and the future SRB initiatives. In particular these include:

- comprehensive integrated solutions
- enterprise / opportunity
- local solutions

Re-reading The Action for Cities paper with these themes in mind, City Challenge’s lineage becomes clear. Responding to the ‘lack of co-ordination criticism’, City Challenge required a comprehensive programme of activities. There would be a requirement to focus on a discrete area in order not to spread resources too thinly and this came with the added benefit that results would be more visible. Additionally City Challenge sought to stimulate:
…the releasing of development potential, understood in terms of both economic development and property development, with the targeting of "areas of concentrated disadvantage", to improve their access to opportunities, primarily conceived in terms of access to the mainstream economy (City Challenge: government guidance (DoE, May 1991) quoted in Davoudi & Healey (1995:80). {my emphasis}

Aside from an understandable antipathy amongst local authorities associated with [any] reductions in public expenditure the City Challenge initiative was widely commended. The Conservative government certainly thought it a valuable exercise. In September 1992, Michael Howard, then SoS for the Environment, told the Association of Metropolitan Authorities that City Challenge had:

…revolutionised the way local authorities are tackling key localities in run-down urban areas…[and had]…‘dramatically changed’ the attitudes of local authorities in their quest for urban regeneration.

Working closely in partnership with the Government, the private sector and voluntary bodies had made them [local authorities] think afresh about how they can bring about real and lasting benefits to the people in their areas…[and]

It is not only the winners who have benefited…Everyone taking part will have gained from the relationship which they have forged with their partners. That is the real prize of City Challenge (extracts of speech reported in Planning, 27th September 1992).

City Challenge certainly had an influential impact on government thinking. The 1992 Conservative Party Manifesto (The Best Future for Britain, 1992) made this clear:

Competitive bidding [in City Challenge] has already galvanised towns and cities into bringing forward imaginative proposals for regeneration. It has improved co-ordination, secured better value for money and encouraged programmes which tackle problems on a number of fronts. We will continue to extend City Challenge and allocate a greater proportion of resources by competitive bidding (1992:39).

The DoE’s evaluation of urban policy, Assessing the Impact of Urban Policy (DoE, 1994c) also supported the judgment that City Challenge had been welcomed:
There was widespread agreement, whatever limitations were expressed about the initiative, that City Challenge represented a significant institutional innovation in the attempt to create local partnerships which even in the initial phase was showing some degree of success DoE (1994c: para.xxvi, pxi).

The interim evaluation of City Challenge conducted for the DoE commended the initiative concluding that it was the most promising regeneration scheme so far attempted (DoE, 1996d). By 1999 KPMG who had completed the final national evaluation of City Challenge spoke in glowing terms of City Challenge’s achievements:

City Challenge was a ground breaking and very successful programme, which has provided the basis for a step change in regeneration policy. Many of its features have been incorporated into subsequent regeneration and area-based programmes. It provides lessons for current and future regeneration activity (DETR, 1999a).

For local government the principle reason for their change of sentiment lay in the fact that after more than a decade of marginalisation and exclusion central government’s hostility had receded to the point where local authorities were now considered ‘no longer part of the problem’ but part of the solution. Environment secretary, Michael Heseltine, credited with devising the City Challenge initiative, announced that: “Local authorities will be invited to enter into partnerships with their local businesses and their community to draw together imaginative programmes for the regeneration of their areas” (DoE Press Release 335/91 ~ 23/05/91). [The irony of this policy ‘U’ turn was not lost on the government’s critics who recalled the fact that the original 1977 White Paper had singled out the important contribution that local authorities could make] Heseltine then went on to outline the raison d’être of City Challenge arguing that it represented an opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of government expenditure in urban areas in England. This was clearly a reference to the perennial concern of central government with ‘value for money’ but Heseltine also made clear the critical importance of attracting private finance and using the
private sector in managing any programme that was put forward. It could be argued that City Challenge was in effect no more than a restatement of the aspirations of the 1977 White Paper but adjusted to reflect the political economy of Thatcherism.

A defining feature of City Challenge then was that it effectively rehabilitated local authorities, re-establishing the legitimacy of their involvement in regeneration initiatives. However, the government maintained rigid control over the competition to select potential partnerships. Heseltine extended an invitation to 15 authorities chosen from the 57 Urban Programme authorities. The original press release suggested that there would be ten winning partnerships. In the event 11 pacemaker partnerships (involving 13 authorities) were selected from 21 competitors in the first round (DoE, 1993b: para.5.12). [The 21 figure arose from unsolicited submissions to the Secretary of State]. Following a second round a further 20 partnerships were established.

Through their manipulation of the City Challenge competition, likened to either a competition without the participants knowing the rules (Beecham, 1993) or a system of free-for-all prize fights for government cash (Bevins, 1994), the government in effect forced the creation of new extra-local institutional structures. These were mandated to incorporate a wider range of interest than any previous initiatives and this was seen by many participants as a genuine attempt at innovation albeit with the caveat of an extremely short lead-in time. The experience and critical feedback gained by the government through the two rounds of City Challenge appears to have been received constructively and this clearly fed through into the structure of the SRB.
The SRB took the fundamental principles embodied in City Challenge including:

- an explicit competition for resources;
- a comprehensive approach;
- focus on a discrete area;
- a partnership approach involving all interested parties;
- output driven – with set targets;

but in addition the SRB addressed some of the perceived shortcomings of City Challenge by:

- allowing more flexibility in the income stream rather than a fixed £37.5m per annum for 5yrs;
- an enhanced localism;
- flexible time scale – from 1 to 7 year programme;
- an even more diverse range of output measures;
- not just an urban focus;
- additional obligations to monitor ethnic minority outputs.

An immediate problem facing participants in the first round of SRB in 1994/95 was the rapidity of its introduction.

The SRB was announced in principle by the Secretary of State in November 1993. In January 1994 draft bidding guidance for round one was issued. Following a wide consultation, which included local authority associations, local authorities, TECs, voluntary organisations, academic and specialist consultancies, final bidding guidance for the round was issued in April 1994 (HC, 1995b: para.12).
### Figure 3.2: Round One Bidding Timetable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31st May</td>
<td>Deadline for submission of Outline bids*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-June</td>
<td>Outline bid stage: discussions between Government Office for the Regions and bid partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th September</td>
<td>Deadline for submissions of bids to Government Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-November</td>
<td>Government Offices made recommendations on bids received to the SoS for the Environment who reached final decisions in consultation with cabinet committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th December</td>
<td>SoS announced winners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From January 1995</td>
<td>Preparation of Delivery Plans by Partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1995</td>
<td>Implementation of approved bids.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(adapted from HC, 1995b: para.13)

*NB although this date did not appear in the published Bidding Guidance timetable it nevertheless was applied nationally)

**Genuine partnerships – in six weeks?**

The 31st May deadline gave bidders approximately six weeks to assemble and submit a bid and at the same time establish a comprehensive delivery mechanism. The latter had to be in the form of a partnership that would in effect be superimposed on the existing institutional landscape. This time scale was criticised by Mawson et al (1995) as being wholly unrealistic.

The SRB had consolidated the principles of City Challenge by institutionalising an entirely new agenda to regeneration initiatives the primary aim of which was to develop genuine partnership building. It is clear that the structure of the SRB Challenge Fund competition incorporated a specific institutional logic reflecting the political economy of Thatcherism. Underpinning the whole idea was that partnership in conjunction with competition would deliver tangible and wholly positive benefits, including:

- Partnership would deliver co-ordination [and]
Partnership working would inexorably lead to a cross fertilisation of ideas and this would stimulate innovative organisational responses in both partnerships and the participant organisations/interests;

The competition between partnerships as they bring forward programmes would guarantee that the best schemes were brought forward and this would simultaneously maximise the leverage of any programme.

The government were certainly convinced that partnership and competition worked:

We have made competition a central part of the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund and I make no apology for that. Competition has produced over 200 winning bids [i.e., partnerships] which will bring in nearly £3bn in private investment…[and]

The bidding process and the formation of partnerships pulls in people who have never before been involved in regeneration… (DoE Press Release 241/95 ~ 23rd May 1995){my emphasis}

This message was repeated when the Environment Select Committee conducted its first report on the Single Regeneration Budget:

Ministers consider that competition stimulates a creative approach to addressing an area’s needs and priorities and galvanises local people into preparing co-operative, constructive proposals. They believe that it was essential to maintain the effort started in City Challenge to break away from the routine allocation of resources characterised by the Urban Programme, and that competition has raised the quality of bids and has encouraged a range of partnerships, many of which will continue even in the absence of Challenge Fund support (HC, 1995b: para.39).

Beyond the obviously partisan political realm academic research was revealing evidence that partnership working had encouraged organisational innovation in response to new institutional structures, for example Hall et al (1996; 1997), however, this work has only focused on successful SRB bids and so the impact of partnership on failed bids remains unexplored. [Similar observations however have been made in relation to the City Challenge initiative see DoE, 1996d] Why partnership should inevitably lead to
co-ordination is similarly questionable. The experience of the Inner Area Partnerships shows that other far less constructive result are equally possible. [The experience of Merseyside Partnership perhaps being the best example of poor partnership working which is extensively documented in HC, 1982; HC, 1983; see also Higgins et al 1983; Heseltine, 1987]. Competition may bring the best schemes forward but this has not been proved either way; research does not yet exist to unequivocally sustain this proposition and so this presumption can only be taken for what it is as simply political rhetoric.

At a practical level Mawson et al (1995) review of the first round of SRB argued that genuine partnerships could not be built in such a short time scale and that many participants had failed to appreciate the fundamental shift in the character of policy. The failure to be sensitive and responsive to what was in effect a radical change in the policy environment meant that a number of bidders were caught out. The government had set out what they envisaged from partnerships in the round one Bidding Guidance issued shortly after the announcement of the SRB:

The Budget is intended to encourage joint approaches to regeneration through local partnerships. Bids should therefore be supported by partnerships representing the appropriate range of interests (Round 1 Bidding Guidance, DoE, 1994b:para.27) {my emphasis}

The broadening of the constituency of local partnerships was an integral element of the government’s approach to the SRB. It is probably no coincidence that attracting a wider range of partners (a long standing aspiration from as far back as the 1977 White Paper) perhaps continued to reflect an element of the residual disdain to the prospect of local authority domination of the SRB initiative. To help attract this wider constituency the government ensured that the Bidding Guidance issued before each round consistently
stressed the need to involve a range of interests.

Following round one, bidders discovered that titular partnerships assembled simply to qualify for the SRB pot were quickly exposed in the competition process. This experience confirmed to many that ‘business as usual’ was no longer tenable and that government’s expectations of partnerships had changed fundamentally and were now shaped by the City Challenge and not the Urban Programme model of partnership.

The government however proved receptive to the criticisms about the quality of some of the partnerships assembled for round one. Their response was to tighten the qualifying criteria for entry into the second round of SRB. They did this by inserting a clause in the bidding guidance that accompanied the second round of SRB. The effect of this was that all partnership submissions would be scrutinised by GOs to: “…look to ensure that there are true partnerships with real involvement of [all] groups” (Bidding Guidance, 1995b:para.12){my emphasis}. The subsequent report by the Environment Select Committee (HC, 1995a) sought to add substance to these phrases and suggested that:

The lesson we draw from our consideration of the respective roles of each of the partner organisations is that a good partnership; one where partners adopt leading or secondary roles as appropriate but have the opportunity to contribute to all aspects of a bid. Conversely, a bad partnership is one where a partner or more than one partner is for any reason not permitted to participate in the full range of work connected with the bid, or is dominated by more powerful partners (HC, 1995a: para.56).

That this model of partnership continues to have currency can be seen from the guidance issued by the Labour administration for round five in September 1998 which stated:

The Government believes it is crucial to ensure the active participation of local communities in the regeneration of their areas and that they should be directly involved, both in the preparation and implementation of bids (Round 5 Bidding Guidance DETR (1998c) para.3.6).
Bids must be supported by partnerships representing all those with a key interest. The make-up of partnerships should reflect the content of the bid and characteristics of the area or groups at which it is aimed (para. 5.1).

GOs and subsequently RDAs will look to ensure that partnerships truly represent and involve these interests, throughout the bidding process and, if bids are successful, in their implementation (para. 5.2).

**Historical parallels**

There would appear to be many historical parallels between the introduction of the SRB and the Inner Area Partnerships. The latter were hurriedly introduced following the 1977 White Paper. Critics suggested that the speed of introduction, with an annual bidding cycle, with financial controls prohibiting ‘rolling forward’ underspends, injected a sense of urgency that dictated the type of projects brought forward and the scope of engagement with wider interests—precisely the criticism directed at the first round of the SRB. These constraints severely inhibited Partnerships’ responses: consultation and project feasibility takes time. So although policy anticipated innovation, Inner Area Partnerships were in effect placed in a position where it was easier to put forward either ‘pet projects’ or ‘off-the-shelf’ projects previously languishing without funding (see Stewart, 1983; Hambleton, 1979b; 1981; Leach, 1982; Heseltine, 1987).

**A new localism**

The introduction of SRB was complicated further by the fact that in November 1993, the government announced a radical shake up in the organisational structure of regional departments of state. For the first time the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of the Environment (DoE), Employment Department (DEmp), and the Department for Transport (DT) were assimilated into one organisational structure under a Senior Regional Director, reporting to the relevant Secretaries of State. In explaining why
the Government Offices for the Regions (GOs) had been established, John Gummer, SoS for the Environment, in a debate in the House of Commons on *Regional and Urban Policy* on the 4th November 1993, stated that:

> We will therefore meet the widespread demand that there should be a **single point of contact** for local authorities, businesses, and local communities. That will provide a better service without increasing the power or cost of central Government one iota. In fact, there should be some room for savings in overhead costs (Hansard, col.517). {my emphasis}

However, the case for integrated offices was not only justified by efficacy. In the debate Gummer expanded this line of argument and made clear that the government thought that the SRB would make an important contribution in its own right in developing this new localism:

> The [SRB] budget will mean that priorities are set locally in the light of local needs, not in Whitehall. It will give local authorities, businesses and local communities real influence over spending priorities (Hansard, 4th November 1993, col.517). [and]

> With the new offices, the Government’s response to the needs of localities will be better informed….**Local needs**, rather than departmental interests, will be the prime considerations (col.518). {my emphasis}

The press release that followed the debate succinctly articulated how the locus of power was to be shifted under the government’s new policy. The creation of Integrated Regional Offices and the new SRB, would result in: “…sweeping measures to shift power from Whitehall to local communities and make Government more responsive to local priorities” (Press Release Notice, 731/93 ~ 4th November 1993).

It is clear that in uniting previously disparate departments of state and linking this to the provision of a single point of contact, the establishment of the GOs was an attempt to address the perennial criticism of co-ordination; allied to which was an emphasis on a new localism to policy. The government clearly felt that localism and partnership were the
cornerstone of the SRB. Michael Gahagan, Under Secretary, Cities and Countryside Policy Directorate at the DoE, giving evidence to the Environment Select Committee explained:

The point of the Single Regeneration Budget, the Challenge Fund element, is that the priorities are local, that there is the local partnership and that the programmes are worked up locally, with local priorities, not determined by any of the constituent programmes. And it is consistent with the philosophy that it should be the bidders who themselves decide on the priorities within their bid—that is the thinking behind it (HC, 1995b: para.27).

The emphasis here is clearly on the delivery of efficiency through local partnership. This is precisely what the government were thinking and this is evident from the way the initiative was promoted. The government in announcing the SRB made clear in the headline on the press notice which announced the SRB and the setting up of GOs: *John Gummer Announces Measures To Bring A New Localism To Improved Government Services* (press notice: 731/93 4th November 1993).

Upon establishing the system of GOs the Government set about a process of restructuring internal relations between what had previously been disparate departments of state. This process encouraged organisational innovations: “…to facilitate enhanced inter-departmental working through thematic working groups and area teams (Mawson & Spencer, 1997:81). This led David Richie, Regional Director for the GOLO, to observe that GOs were operating: “…in a far more integrated fashion than ever before” (quoted in Mawson & Spencer, 1997:82). The cumulative impact of these changes transformed the policy environment within GOs and this message was not lost on a number of local authorities who attempted to innovate their own policy responses in order to exploit this emergent policy arena.
SUMMARY

The form and character of the SRB can be seen to have evolved from yet another period of experimentation in urban policy the roots of which can be traced all the way back to the 1977 White Paper.

It can be seen that the principle result of the publication of the White Paper was to bestow a certain legitimacy on the concept of partnership. However, it is reasonable to argue that the widespread support that the White Paper achieved was based fundamentally upon a common acceptance of the policy analysis it contained, i.e., agreement on the problem. In a sense this consensus can be seen to have overshadowed any wider debate about the appropriateness of the delivery mechanism; the idea that partnership itself should be examined simply did not enter the debate.

Following from the White Paper partnership became effectively embedded in the ‘policy frame’. It has been argued that urban policy evolved through three stages in the period from the late 1970s through to the 1990s. During the first period, commencing with the publication of the White Paper in 1977, the understanding of the problem shifted away from a social pathology explanation to an economic analysis. The key concern of partnership activity during this period was to address needs with a focus on targeting effort. The second stage began with the arrival of the first Thatcher government. During this period partnership was recast to reflect the political economy of Thatcherism. This period saw the progressive estrangement of the public sector and the ascendancy of the private sector. The third stage began with the City Challenge initiative. This period saw the rehabilitation of the public sector alongside a commitment to a more comprehensive, coordinated, and local approach to regeneration policy. It is clear in retrospect that the shape
and character of the SRB was a product of this evolution. In what might be described as an iterative process elements from each of the three stages endured and cumulatively came to describe the principle characteristics of the SRB. Two decades later partnership is still the preferred mechanism to deliver regeneration policy.

The SRB, predicated as it was on a partnership building competition not surprisingly created partnerships. Also significant, because it occurred in the same time frame as the SRB, was the creation of GOs, described as: “…a radical departure from the centralised and compartmentalised traditions of the civil service…” (Mawson & Spencer, 1997:81). By bringing previously disparate government departments together under the umbrella of a GO and then giving these organisations a raison d’être of co-ordination accelerated partnership working. This obligation to co-ordinate activity with a range of agencies meant that GOs were being increasingly propelled into partnership working and this experience fundamentally changed the institutional architecture. Over two decades urban policy had progressively been transformed through the three stages of development described above. Taken together with the changes in the institutional landscape arising from the creation of GOs the net effect has been to fundamentally embed both the philosophy and the practice of partnership working. This then was the climate under which round one SRB partnerships formed.
CHAPTER 4: EXPLAINING PARTNERSHIP GROWTH (I)

MICROECONOMIC

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine a number of micro-economic explanations that might provide a theoretical rationale for the growth in partnership and network activity.

This chapter will seek to argue that partnership and networks are fundamentally similar organisational forms. However, there are differences between the two models, albeit subtle, and a theoretical exploration of these differences is a theme of this chapter. However, the case will be argued that for many purposes the terms are interchangeable but this creates difficulties in the presentation of the argument in the text. With this caveat in mind and in order to avoid any semantic confusion the term partnership will be assumed to subsume networks unless otherwise indicated.

A CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM

Muddy waters

The problem facing the researcher is that the wholesale adoption of partnership working has muddied the conceptual waters.

Partnership means many things to many people. Indeed it is not clearly defined precisely because its ambiguity can be politically attractive. It is difficult to be opposed to partnership. Unlike other institutional initiatives...it is not possible to identify particular administrative regulations or statutes which underpin them. They are not characterised by distinct fiscal regimes, organisational structures or modes of operation. There is no single easily transferable model of partnership. They vary in scope, purpose, membership, the degree of formality or their organisational structures, the level of resources they command and their actual and potential impact. All attempts to build upon their strengths which vary widely between places, according to history, economic circumstances, size, political tradition and the composition and capacity of the private sector.
Different organisations have adopted different definitions of the phenomenon. Sometimes partnership has been used to describe an agreement by actors to work together towards a specified economic development objective analogous to a contractual relationship. Others have included any initiative which is funded by more than one agency. Others have attempted tighter definitions. The ideal type would achieve synergy by pooling resources and gaining co-ordinated action, avoiding duplication and achieving more than the sum of its parts. It is generally agreed that all partners must get something out of the arrangements to reinforce their commitment and keep them at the partnership table (Roberts et al, 1995:16-7).

What is clear from the above quote is that the generic title partnership covers a myriad of organisational relations where substantive differences exist between partnerships. The DETR commissioned Newchurch and Co. Ltd to attempt to provide a definition of partnership. Their conclusions published in November 1999 was that:

> Our review of published material has so far failed to find a completely satisfactory definition. There is no single definition which captures the totality of the local authority partnership phenomenon (DETR, 1999b).

The central premise of chapter two was that partnership was a contestable concept. Under a different political economy it took on a radically different trajectory. In terms of conferring kudos on the partnership concept and its establishment as the new economic orthodoxy what has been the remarkable achievement of partnership is that regardless of the objective, social, economic or environmental, or indeed the manner of its achievement, with more or less accountability, the institutional form is still called partnership. Huxham (1996:2) conveys a sense of this linguistic abuse and the semantic difficulties that surround organisational relations when he suggests that: “...strategic alliance, joint venture, public-private partnership, co-ordinated service delivery, community development are all terms now in common usage...” and where each describes a form of partnership ‘relationship’. The questions arising from this diversity is whether any or all of these
‘collaborative arrangements’ impute partnership and within this plurality can **categorical** partnership qualities be identified? A central premiss of this thesis is that it is possible and indeed crucially important to precisely clarify what is intended by the term partnership—and this is especially the case for the future involvement of local communities.

In order to try and answer this, the first step must be to develop a robust theoretical model of what is understood by partnership. Such a model should provide a benchmark by which a partnership could, in the first instance, be objectively identified, and, be of sufficient detail to allow comparison with other organisational forms. To have relevance the model must describe both the structure and the internal dynamics of partnership. A two-pronged approach combines a functional analysis (mapping an organisations structure) with an approach which explores the qualitative dimensions of partnership working.

**The partnership enigma**

Chapter two described the historical evolution of partnership in regeneration policy and argued that a partnership approach had become the accepted orthodoxy in regeneration policy. Concomitant to the proliferation of partnership has been a trend towards complexity resulting from the increasing diversity in the range of partners typically brought together in any regeneration partnership—for a discussion see Stewart & Stoker (1995). However this complexity presents severe methodological problems. In order to understand the growth of the partnership phenomenon it is essential to address two issues:

1. What do we in fact understand by the term true regeneration partnership?
2. Why has partnership achieved pre-eminence as the organisational form to address regeneration?

This section will seek to address these two questions. It will also seek to argue that alongside the proliferation of partnership working has arisen an explosion in networks and
networking; the growth of which complements and is in many ways intrinsically related to the growth of partnerships. The inherent structural similarities between the two organisational forms suggests that they may in fact be connected in a symbiotic relationship and evidence of this will be explored. A key hypothesis of the research is that partnership and networks are similar structures differing only in degree. Therefore one purpose of this chapter is to explore the theoretical distinctions between partnership and networks in order to draw some conclusions as to whether these are in fact clearly differentiated organisational forms or fundamentally similar, diverging only at the margins.

The complexity of partnership relations evident in regeneration partnerships introduces additional methodological problems. Regeneration partnerships by definition bring together a range of actors and individuals. Each of these partners contributes different things to the partnership. For example, community and voluntary sectors although unlikely to possess physical assets often have a wealth of expertise in their particular field; the private sector also contribute expertise but it is likely to be of a different type and in addition they are far more likely to possess tangible assets. The task then is to develop a robust model which should promote the development of analytical tools [a check-list] which allow organisational relations to be dissected and evaluated. However, the diversity in partnerships presents immediate methodological problems. It is reasonable to assert that the different sectors drawn into partnerships have different aspirations and priorities and not surprisingly would make contrary judgements on regeneration partnerships. This observation in no way diminishes the obvious fact that even with widely different aspirations diverse partners do work together in regeneration partnerships presumably because there is some advantage [or less disadvantage] in doing so. This thesis is concerned
primarily with the contribution of the community and voluntary sectors in regeneration partnerships and whilst the theoretical approach to understanding the dynamics of partnership remains consistent regardless of which sector is considered the choice of sector will have an important bearing on the qualitative assessment of partnership working.

The reason why the choice of sector will influence the qualitative assessment within partnership is best understood using Arnstein’s (1969) eight rung ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’ which provides a useful methodological framework for looking at this problem.

**Figure 4.1: Arnstein’s ladder of citizens participation**

The ladder has proved an extremely influential conceptual tool widely used in planning and community development spheres. This is because it provides a method of assessing the **quality** of engagement of [typically] community organisations in the process of community development and planning but it has relevance beyond these groups and could readily be applied to any sector. The purpose of the ladder is to provide: “A typology of eight levels of participation...[to gauge]...the extent of citizens’ **power** in determining the plan and/or
programme” (Arnstein, 1969:216-7){my emphasis}. However, an inherent flaw with the ladder concept is that the ability to rank the various partners sphere of influence requires all participants to have a normative consensus which includes a clearly understood and shared hierarchy of objectives.

This point is understood better by example. Consider a partner brought into a partnership—one composed of a large number of partners—simply to fulfil a narrow objective. An example in a regeneration programme might be to refurbish a community centre. An individual partner may indeed have complete managerial discretion in the implementation of this objective, and, be entirely happy with what at first appears to be complete autonomy in this role. In terms of this particular project they have ‘delegated’ power—level 7 on Arnstein’s ladder (see above)—and this may lead them to erroneously conclude that they rate highly on Arnstein’s ladder. However what the example shows is how relative the concept of autonomy is. The example raises the much more fundamental issue about who determined the agenda. How was the decision to refurbish the community centre arrived at? Did the partner play any part in setting that wider agenda? Arnstein supports the contention that: “...participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless” (Arnstein, 1969:216). What Arnstein’s ladder does is draw attention to the relationship between power and the need for prior agreement as to what constitutes the key issues. Without agreement any sector represented in a partnership could appear to rate highly [on Arnstein’s ladder] in terms of their own narrow sectoral objectives. The test of a partnership should be how an individual sector’s objectives have been assimilated into the wider partnership’s strategies. Clearly sectoral objectives will vary. The private sector, for example, is unlikely to be motivated by the same rationale as [say] the community sector;
and it is this plurality of interests that needs to be considered. An individual partner can only really comment on the **quality of their engagement** after having first examined how their sectoral interests have been assimilated and [presumably] transmuted in the process of incorporation into the wider partnership strategies and structures.

**WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD BY THE TERM PARTNERSHIP?**

**The co-ordination of collaboration: partnership as one form of co-ordination**

Part of the mystique and confusion surrounding partnership relates to the lack of conceptual foundations. At an abstract theoretical level a partnership, by definition, describes a situation which brings at least two [typically more] actors together. Partnership is, at its simplest, what Hanf & Scharpf call a form of ‘**co-operation**’, a term: “...generally used to describe joint action by two or more parties for mutual benefit” (1978:22); what Hudson (1987) in a similar vein describes as a ‘**collaborative activity**’. Thus whenever we speak of partnership we are in fact simply describing a particular form of co-ordination. For the label partnership to have some objective reality—one which can have some methodological relevance—the concept must describe the **specific set** of institutional and organisational relations used to co-ordinate the behaviour of a group of actors involved in some form of joint endeavour.

The conceptual approach adopted in this chapter—seeing partnership as a particular form of co-ordination or governance structure—locates the evolution and development of partnership within the theoretical landscape discussed in the literature on organisational theory and inter-organisational analysis. Adopting this approach makes it possible to compare and contrast the characteristics of partnership in relation to other forms of co-ordination and identify and ascribe the unique qualities which both define and
distinguish partnership from other forms of co-ordination.

**Markets or hierarchies**

An examination of this literature suggests that the principle cleavage identified in inter-organisational analysis is between market or hierarchical forms of co-ordination—see Williamson, 1975; Thorelli, 1986; Powell, 1990; Thompson et al, 1991. If you were to take all possible forms of inter-organisational co-ordination and set them out on a continuum, then markets or hierarchies would be located at opposite ends. Located somewhere between these two polar extremes lie partnership and networks. The implication of this literature for partnership and networks is the suggestion that partnerships and networks are organised neither like markets or hierarchies although they may exhibit qualities evident in both.

In order then to understood what we mean by the term partnership we need to understand the logic of partnership. Why do they form? What are the particular institutional and organisational arrangements which both define it and [presumably] distinguish partnership from other forms of co-ordination? As chapter two described, partnership has been intricately embroiled in the delivery of regeneration policy since the 1977 White Paper. The increasing importance of partnership is itself a reflection of the realities of stringent public sector expenditure constraints. A tight fiscal climate has encouraged local authorities in particular to explore innovative approaches to capturing additional resources for their localities. An indication of the changing role facing local authorities lies in the observation by Metcalfe that: “…the distinctive task of management in any public organization is getting things done through other organizations, rather than through other people” (quoted in Huxham, 1993:21). This shift of emphasis by management away from inter-personal co-ordination to inter-organisational co-ordination is itself a reflection of the ascendancy of
the partnership orthodoxy. The move has not however entirely removed the personal dimension. Pulling in the opposite direction have been recent innovations in regeneration policy. For example, City Challenge and the SRB place an obligation on partnerships to broaden the range of actors involved in regeneration activity. The longstanding traditional established mainstream statutory actors have thus been supplemented by – amongst others – representatives of the private, voluntary and community sectors. All other things being equal, increasing the number of partners involved in any regeneration partnership only complicates the co-ordination of collaboration.

**Forms of co-ordination**

It is crucial to see the discussion of partnership in the wider debate on forms of co-ordination: where partnership is an expression, and *only one particular expression* of co-ordination. The complete set would represent a typology of co-ordination in all its various manifestations. The problem facing the researcher interested in advancing a theory on partnership as a particular form of co-ordination is the lack of any rigorous theoretical body of knowledge which might inform the debate. Part of the problem stems from the wholesale abuse of the term partnership [captured in the quote above]. It is the combination of a dearth of theoretical knowledge and semantic abuse which prevents a rigorous theoretical analysis. In contrast however there is a substantial body of work developed over many years which focuses on the two extreme forms of co-ordination—markets and hierarchies—conceptualised in Williamson’s theory of the firm (1990). This literature deals specifically with these two forms of co-ordination and invariably caricatures the two forms as mutually exclusive. The intention, in the first instance, is to conceptually link this work on markets and hierarchies to partnership. By examining the theoretical antecedents
developed in this literature it should be possible to provide a theoretical insight into co-ordination generally and by analogy to inform a theory of partnership. Given the dearth of theoretical knowledge on partnership this represents a pragmatic and useful reference point from which to start a wider examination of other forms of co-ordination.

Economists have devoted enormous amounts of time and energy examining the relative merits of co-ordination either through markets or hierarchies. The primary aim of this work has been to develop theoretical insights into the process by which a particular form of co-ordination is chosen, what Williamson (1990:2) describes as the ‘make or buy’ decision or less prosaically ‘organisational logic’. The historical emphasis, in what has been caricatured as a dichotomy between markets and hierarchies, is explained by the predominant paradigm in Economics and the influence of the prevailing structure of industry in late twentieth century capitalism. This sees the political economy of the non-communist world predicated upon liberal free-market economics with an industrial landscape populated with large [and growing] firms or organisations invariably linked to a more international orientation. The principle concern developed in the literature on the theory of the firm is an examination of how firms co-ordinate production; in particular it seeks to understand both the strategies and the methods firms employ as they strive to achieve an optimal level of output.

A major contribution to this debate was a seminal paper by Coase published in 1937 and which, at the time, represented a radical departure to the conventional approach to the theory of the firm. Although largely neglected at the time it subsequently proved extremely influential. Coase had observed that contemporary economic theory focused on the individual firm, in which the co-ordination of production was understood to be entirely
subordinated to the price mechanism (Coase, 1937). In his 1991 Nobel lecture he took the opportunity to reflect upon the impact on what had been the prevailing economic paradigm. In the lecture he argued that this approach, focusing narrowly on: “...the determination of prices led to...a neglect of other aspects of the economic system” (Coase, 1995:644). Whilst an approach which focused on the price mechanism could be seen to determine output at the level of the firm, it offered little in explanation for the organisation of an industry [or by extension an entire economy]. “What was lacking in the literature, or so I thought, was a theory which would enable us to analyze the determinants of the organization of industry” (Coase, 1972:62). At the time of Coase’s original article contemporary economic thinking on the firm offered no explanation for the distribution of firms: why was it that some firms were large and others quite small? Contemporary economic theory therefore told us nothing about how a particular co-ordination strategy is determined. Coase suggested that firms represented “islands of conscious power in [an] ocean of unconscious co-operation” (Coase, 1937:388 quoting Robertson 1932), contending that firms were an alternative to the market as a method of co-ordinating production. His perceptive insight was that there were considerable indirect costs associated with production and these would stimulate firms to organise outside of the market, in firms, where the costs of co-ordinating production could be managed internally.

Outside the firm, price determines the allocation of resources, and their use is co-ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within the firm, these market transactions are eliminated, and the allocation of resources becomes the result of an administrative decision (Coase, 1972 reproduced as Chp.1 in Williamson, O.E & Masten, S.E (Eds) (1995:63)

These ideas lay fallow and ignored until the 1970s when Williamson, openly acknowledging the intellectual debt of gratitude for the ideas stimulated by Coase’s initial
deliberations, effectively triggered the start of what was to become the school of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). Williamson argued that: Given bounded rationality, uncertainty, and idiosyncratic knowledge...prices often do not qualify as sufficient statistics and that a substitution of internal organization (hierarchy) for market-mediated exchange often occurs on this account (Williamson, 1974:5).

For Williamson then TCE provided a powerful insight in the internal dynamics of firms and a theoretical basis for understanding the organisation of industries. His important contribution was to directly relate the cost of transactions to the form of co-ordination a firm adopted. Williamson argued that: “Markets and firms are alternative instruments for completing a related set of transactions...[and]...whether a set of transactions ought to be executed across markets or within a firm depends on the relative efficiency of each mode...” (Williamson, 1975:8). Where the transaction costs are higher in the market, then a firm: “…may decide to bypass the market and resort to **hierarchical** modes of organization. Transactions that might otherwise be handled in the market are thus performed internally, governed by administrative processes instead” (Williamson, 1974:9)[my emphasis]. For Williamson then the primary cleavage in understanding co-ordination is a dichotomy between organisation by markets or by hierarchically organised firms.

**Opportunistic behaviour**

An important additional insight that Williamson brought to this discussion which is pertinent to this thesis was the concept of ‘opportunistic behaviour’.

Opportunism extends the conventional assumption that economic agents are guided by considerations of self-interest to make allowance for **strategic** behaviour. This involves self-interest seeking with guile and has profound implications for choosing between alternative contractual relationships (1975:26){original emphasis}.
Williamson observed that in situations where ‘large-number conditions’ exist [i.e., where there are many competing potential partners] then the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour is drastically reduced. However, where ‘small-number conditions’ prevail the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour increases. Understandably, as an Economist Williamson discusses the costs and benefits of opportunistic behaviour in economic terms. Accordingly, the concern is that under small number conditions a monopoly or oligopoly situation arises. Economic theory, supported by a wealth of thoroughly researched case studies, suggests that market manipulation occurs under these conditions significantly distorting the decision frame. Developing this theme, Williamson describes a scenario where a large number condition might realistically apply at the commencement of a contract, but at the point of renewal, a partner may enjoy ‘non-trivial cost advantages’ over other potential partners. Examples of these non-trivial cost advantages which might accrue through a period of joint working could be the establishment of a [good or bad] reputation for competency, diligence, efficiency etc. These historically determined factors can potentially become important considerations at the point of contract renewal. Given that transactions are conducted under uncertainty when it is very costly, perhaps even impossible, to describe the complete decision tree (Lacity et al, 1993) then reliance on previous relations and experience is much more likely to reduce the situation to a position where a small numbers condition applies. The significance of opportunistic behaviour is that under small number conditions partners in any partnership are much more likely to act opportunistically in their own self interest as distinct from the interest of the wider partnership.

The wider relevance to partnership of the TCE literature lies in the observation that a firm can be seen to represent a particular form of co-ordination. And so by analogy, the
theoretical insights developed in the Transaction Cost’s literature can be used to illuminate the internal dynamics of other forms of co-ordination.

**ORGANISATIONAL LOGICS**

**EXCHANGE AS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

*Partnership: one form of exchange*

It has already been argued that partnership represents a particular expression of inter-organisational collaboration. A defining feature of any partnership, and one which distinguishes it from other organisational forms, is that in entering into a partnership the participants are engaging in an exchange relationship. Levine & White (1960/1:583) suggest that under conditions of scarcity, inter-organisational exchanges are essential to goal attainment. Gray (1985:912) drawing on a variety of authors lists three other possible conditions which encourage collaboration.

1. ‘Indivisible’ problems, i.e., problems which are bigger than any single organisation acting alone can solve.
2. Limitations of traditional adversarial methods of resolving conflicts, and
3. Increasing environmental turbulence [which occurs when] large, competing organisations, acting independently in diverse directions, create unanticipated and dissonant consequences for themselves and others.

Hudson (1987:178) observes that:

> An exchange relation is balanced when the actors have equal power (or equal levels of dependency), but equality is not a precondition for exchange. What is necessary, is that neither party is powerless in relation to others, otherwise exchange will amount to little more than the formalisation of the clear dominance of one party over another.

At its simplest then a partnership brings two actors together in an exchange relationship and this situation is illustrated in the model below. Figure 4.2 is a *Model of an Ideal Partnership* and presents a crude graphical depiction of partnership relations with two
actors {A} and {B} and the model explores the concept of partnership in relational terms.

Figure 4.2: Model of an ideal partnership

![Diagram of partnership model]

The line which transects the arc, infers that **only at one point** {C} does a point of equality exist where each actor is held to be equal. The concept of equality is crucial in understanding the dynamics of partnership. Underpinning the crude depiction of partnership relations in the model above is the idea that a partnership has distributional effects. The significance of point {C} is that it represents a theoretical point of equality where relations are symmetrical. The model can only be seen to have any theoretical relevance if agreement exists between the parties on what is distributed. Levine & White (1960/1:597) approaching the question from a resource dependency model suggest there can be no exchange of elements without some agreement of understanding however implicit [and] exchange agreements rest upon prior consensus regarding domain. And Gray (1985:917) in a similar vein: “Unless some consensus is reached about who has a legitimate stake in an issue and exactly what that joint issue is, further attempts at
collaboration will be thwarted. Examples of domain could include: money, mandated authority, physical assets, human assets, tacit knowledge, goodwill etc. However, whilst comparing money is straightforward comparing money with [say] tacit knowledge is far more problematic because there is no objective criteria to compare the value of tacit knowledge with money.

It follows from this that if partnership is something more than the clear dominance of one party over another then there must first be agreement or at least tacit acceptance amongst the partners on the nature of their exchange relationship. Only where agreement exists on a notional index does it follow that we can make an exploration of partnership dynamics. In our abstract model we can see that by shifting the intersect line \{C\} either towards \{A\} or \{B\} alters the dynamics within the relationship: the balance between actors becomes asymmetrical. The model as an ideal type makes simplistic assumptions but implicit in the model is that movement in any direction away from equilibrium, by definition, rewards one actor at the expense of the other.

The models of asymmetry in figure 4.3 below extends the discussion further and describes, in the first case, a familiar situation in regeneration partnerships, where two actors in a partnership are not endowed equally and where the actor with a resource advantage [resources taken here in their widest sense] exploits this situation (circles of different diameters). The reality in regeneration partnerships is often a model of complex asymmetry. A typical partnership brings together combinations of resources. As the complex asymmetry suggests this may entail bringing a group of actors together who are similarly endowed (circles of equal size), or more likely, actors may possess similar resources but which are unequally distributed (circles of different diameters). A final
possibility is where the resources themselves are dissimilar (circles of different diameters). Hanf & Scharpf (1978:354) are clear that in any exchange relation: “The benefits exchanged may be quite different in kind, and they may also consist of the avoidance of an evil which would otherwise be inflicted.”

Partnerships formed to address regeneration issues are rarely constituted with two partners. More often than not a multiplicity of groups are drawn together. Complex asymmetry is therefore more likely to be the norm than the exception. Complicating this analysis there is clearly no reason to presume that relations between partners remains immutable: the internal dynamics which underpin relations may indeed fluctuate over time. Given the diversity of interests what is perhaps most remarkable is the ability of partnership to sustain complex asymmetrical relations over time.

Figure 4.3: Asymmetry in partnerships

Hanf & Scharpf (1978:356) develop a typology of exchange relations which can potentially
exist in a two party relationship consisting simply of two actors A & B. Table 4.1 below summarises the characteristics of A’s dependence on B and of B’s dependence on A.

Table 4.1: Typology of relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B’s dependence on A</th>
<th>A’s dependence on B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>(1) mutual dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>(2) unilateral dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) unilateral dependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) mutual independence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hanf & Scharpf (1978:355) suggest:

These comprehensive characteristics of an exchange relationship constitute the structural determinants of the feasibility of influence strategies attempted by A or B in specific policy interactions.

They go on to explain the range of possible positions which could potentially be adopted by partners within any exchange relation.

(1) A relationship of **mutual independence** is less likely to facilitate policy co-ordination. If the exchange relationship is either not very important to either party, or if alternative sources of supply could be easily found, none of the parties is likely to be very responsive to influence strategies intended to facilitate intrinsically disadvantageous interactions. In spite of the existence of an ongoing exchange relationship, the relative autonomy of both parties is maintained and specific interactions are likely to occur only if they are either mutually beneficial or if the request for a significantly disadvantageous response is accompanied by offers of adequate compensation.
In the case of unilateral dependence, the interest of the more dependent party in the maintenance of ongoing exchange relationship must be greater than the interest of the less dependent (dominant) party. This asymmetry of interests may be exploited in influence strategies directed by the dominant against the weaker party. Specific policy interactions which may be intrinsically unattractive to the weaker party may still be accepted if a refusal might jeopardise the underlying exchange relationship. Unilateral-dependence relationships can thus be powerful (but unidirectional) facilitators of policy co-ordination.

In the case of mutual dependence, the resources received are important for both parties, and neither party has easily available alternative sources of supply. Under such conditions, both parties should have a high interest in maintaining the ongoing relationship, and both should be willing to accept considerable disadvantages in order to avoid disruptions. Mutual dependency relations thus seem to present excellent preconditions for the application of influence strategies in interorganizational policy co-ordination.

(Hanf & Scharpf, 1978:356-7)

The abstract models raise a number of fundamental lines of enquiry for our understanding of partnership dynamics, specifically:

- What conditions need to prevail before co-ordination becomes a viable strategy;
- Why do actors enter in exchange relations;
- What is the organisational logic which promotes co-ordination through partnerships.

What conditions need to prevail before co-ordination becomes a viable strategy?

Before any group of actors can collaborate they must have defined a common interest. The schema in figure 4.4 below seeks to describe the institutional landscape which potential partnerships may inhabit and indicates the dynamics which propel individual actors into collaborative arrangements. The model is in effect a crude taxonomy of organisational forms and so includes both partnerships and networks. What the model in figure 4.4 seeks to describe is a theoretical position where the conditions arise—somewhere between market and hierarchy—which are conducive to their formation.
On the left of the continuum organisations share limited operational or strategic interests and effectively compete with each other. If this continuum were to be extended to the extreme left we would uncover organisations who for reasons either of geographical remoteness from competitors, or by virtue of operating in such specialised markets, they effectively compete with no one. As we move right, along the continuum, there is greater likelihood of a coincidence of organisational objectives and under these conditions a situation potentially arises which could sustain the development of partnerships and/or networks. Axiomatically:

When organisations have similar domains, they are likely to be aware of one another and to have the resources needed to help each other achieve their respective goals, but similar domains also increase the potential for territorial disputes and competition (Hudson, 1987:178).

The schema suggests that as you continue to move to the extreme right you would find a landscape dominated by merged organisations. The logic for this lies in economic theory.
which suggests that the greater the coincidence of organisational objectives the more likely that organisations would merge. The presumption in a dynamic free-market is that where similar goods or services are traded and cartels are effectively prohibited then competition would ensure only one organisation could survive.

The continuum can thus be seen to describe the nature of relations between organisations. The institutional landscape on the left is occupied by organisations who, by the nature and character of their activities, are engaged in competitive relations with each other. In contrast, again because of the nature and character of their activities, the right is occupied by merged organisations who structure their operations hierarchically. The model in figure 4.4 postulates that between the two extremes of market and hierarchy lies a environment where partnership and/or network formation is practicable.

Using Williamson’s TCE as a framework for analysis we can speculate why partnerships and networks arise. Transaction Cost Economics characterises the economic landscape as a dichotomy. Firms achieve co-ordination either externally through markets or internally through hierarchy. Logically then, the existence of partnership and networks suggests that these organisational forms are arranged neither like market or hierarchy. Economic theory suggests that, in the environment they inhabit – ceteris paribus – they must be a more optimal form of co-ordination than either markets or hierarchy. For firms to adopt these methods of co-ordination then presumably they must possess attributes superior to either market of hierarchy. Figure 4.5 below is an attempt to understand the organisational logic that encourages the adoption of novel forms of co-ordination lying between market and hierarchy.

In figure 4.5, at the hypothetical point \( A \), between the two extreme positions, lies a point
where organisations share a ‘domain of interest’ and where collaboration could be justified. Following Huxham (1996:1) the interpretation given to collaboration is one used in common parlance and taken to mean a situation where individuals or organisations work together towards some common aim. At point \{A\} organisations need to evaluate the possible advantages or disadvantages of entering into partnership; a process which sees organisations evaluating: “...the pitfalls of individualism - against those which arise out of collaboration” (Huxham, 1993:22). At this point TCE tells us that if the benefits of co-ordination through partnership exceed the benefits of individualism in the market then partnership becomes a **potentially viable** strategy.

**Figure 4.5: Organisational logics schema**

With all the caveats implied by the construction of an ideal type model the models seek to explore the dynamics—the organisational logics—which fuel the growth of partnerships and networks. The conceptual models seek to describe in abstract terms the theoretical landscape in which partnership and networks are located and where they are positioned
along the continuum defines the nature of their relationship to each other. The circles depicted in the schema represent the multiplicity of organisations inhabiting civil society where these could be individuals, organisations or any other coherent group active in civil society.

**Why do actors enter into exchange relations?**

There are two fundamental reasons why actors enter into exchange relations. The first is the complexity of the environment within which organisations operate. Hanf & O’Toole, (1992:166-7) maintain that:

> Many important policy questions are increasingly dealt with in arenas in which no individual or organisational actor possesses the wherewithal to co-ordinate by using authoritative pronouncements.

> The inter-organisational nature of the policy world is an endemic feature of the modern era… [and]

> The dominant feature of the public sector is the relationship between many organised actors with separate interests, goals and strategies.

Painter et al (1997:230) concurs: The structural upheaval entailed by [the] expansion of the local unelected state and associated fragmentation of local public service delivery has had obvious implications for organisational relationships.” The process of de-industrialisation, the restructuring of industry, privatisation, the fragmentation of the local state, can, each in their own way, be seen as catalysts, encouraging both organisational and institutional diversity. It is this proliferation which has dramatically altered the economic landscape making the environment that organisations inhabit cumulatively more complex. Exchange is thus a fact of life. A complementary factor which has already been suggested is that exchange is more likely to occur under conditions of scarcity. So:
Under realistic conditions of element scarcity, organisations must select, on the basis of expediency or efficiency, particular functions that permit them to achieve their ends as fully as possible. By function is meant a set of interrelated services or activities that are instrumental, or believed to be instrumental, for the realisation of an organisation’s objectives.

Although, because of scarcity, an organisation limits itself to particular functions, it can seldom carry them out without establishing relationships with other organisations… Levine & White (1960/1:586)

Levine & White (1960/1) thus conceptualise exchange relations [and by analogy their organisational logic] as a product of the interplay of actors seeking [their] goal attainment and, through this process: “…co-ordination occurs as organisations try to adapt to their environment or to maximise their own goal attainment (Hall et al, 1977:457). Benson (1975) agrees with the central premiss of scarcity but describes a slightly different organisational logic in his analysis when he suggests that organisations are linked by a common concern with resource acquisition:

The interorganizational network may be conceived as a political economy concerned with the distribution of two scarce resources, money and authority. Organizations, as participants in the political economy, pursue an adequate supply of resources. Interactions and sentiments of organisations are dependent upon their respective market positions and power to affect the flow or resources (Benson, 1975:229).

In Benson’s terms then actors enter into exchange relations specifically to capture resources. The efficacy with which partners achieve their aims is related to the structure and distribution of power within any given political economy and where success is a measure of the ability to exert power over others. Contrasting the Levine exchange model with Benson’s resource acquisition model Aldrich (1976) suggests that the former model presupposes consensus amongst participants, whereas in contrast, the latter model assumes: “…sentiments such as "consensus" are a result of the pattern of interaction that
emerges, rather than playing a role in conditioning the outcome” (1976:422-3) [original emphasis]. In each case however exchange is entered into voluntarily. Yet this is not the only basis upon which exchange can occur. Hall et al (1977) discuss ‘other bases of interaction’ [organisational logics] offering a typology of exchange that includes: voluntary, standardised-voluntary or mandated, where each describes differing degrees of asymmetry in the exchange relation. Aldrich (1976:422) makes clear that in some situations: “The manipulation of formal authority is a major strategy that organisations can use to increase their dominance in an inter-organisational field or to reduce their dependence on other organisations.” The research done by Hall et al (1977:466) corroborates this finding and supports what many would intuitively suspect, namely that: “A voluntary basis for interaction was much less strongly related to co-ordination than interactions mandated by law.” If we accept that exchange takes place in situations of complexity and scarcity then these models predict that the organisational form adopted is contingent on the nature of the exchange relationship and this in turn is governed by the organisational logic of the actors involved. In any exchange a participants organisational logic is shaped by both the character and distribution of resources. Hanf & Scharpf (1978:23-4) propose the following four tier typology in table 4.2 below.

Implicit in this categorisation in table 4.2 is that relations between partners and their subsequent strategic behaviour in any partnership is contingent on both the distribution and character of resources each participant is endowed with.
Table 4.2 Hanf & Scharpf’s typology of exchange relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-operation</th>
<th>A term generally used to describe joint action by two or more parties for mutual benefit. It describes a relationship between two or more directly involved parties and implies no reference to third parties who may be benefited or harmed by the co-operation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collusion</td>
<td>Similar to co-operation, providing net benefits to the co-operating parties but simultaneously imposes costs on third parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Describes a relationship which has reference to a minimum of three parties, where two parties compete to co-operate with the third.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>Refers directly to a minimum of two parties but it implicitly implies that the coerced party has no option but to meet the preferences of the coercing party or bear some sanction imposed by that party.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Hanf & Scharpf, 1978)

WHAT IS THE ORGANISATIONAL LOGIC PROMOTING CO-ORDINATION THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS?

Why co-ordinate?

How do we explain what it is that drives organisations to co-ordinate their activities within partnerships? In an area which lacks any substantial body of theoretical work Mackintosh (1993) provides a rare opportunity to shed some analytical light on the dynamics underpinning partnership formation. Mackintosh adopts a theoretical examination of the mechanisms propelling the formation of partnership identifying three conceptual models to help explain why partnership form. Logically the first precondition for any partnership is an acceptance by all partners of a ‘domain of interest’—point \( \{A\} \) in the Organisational logics schema depicted in figure 4.5. The distinctive feature of Mackintosh’s three models is that they each describe a different organisational logic and yet embrace the same organisational form: partnership. The first organisational logic identified by Mackintosh is synergy.

Mackintosh’s partnership logic: (1) Synergy

Synergy is a fundamental concept that is crucial in understanding the dynamics of...
partnership formation. Economic theory suggests that one of the fundamental reasons why a partnership is formed is specifically to exploit synergy. In the context of the SRB Challenge Fund the government define synergy as: “The process by which programmes interact with each other and give added value, achieving something more than the individual programmes would.” [my emphasis](Government definition, reproduced from the Bidding Guidance as used in all four SRB Challenge Fund rounds). Mackintosh sees synergy in similar terms—see figure 4.6. In the first model an archetypal partnership

![Figure 4.6: Partnership logic (1): Synergy](source: Mackintosh, 1993)

is described. Here a public sector institution pursuing social objectives collaborates with a private company pursuing private profit. For Mackintosh then, partnership can produce synergy by bringing disparate actors together in order to exploit distinctive yet complementary assets. The unique attributes ascribed to synergy are that it produces
outcomes which neither sector could have produced in isolation and—equally as significant—it delivers both a social and a private dividend. Gaster affirms this interpretation asserting that: “...synergy is a measure of the result of collective, or joint, action, compared with what would have been achieved by each party acting separately” (1997:18). Gaster then goes on to qualify what is in effect a static view of synergy by suggesting that synergy: “...is a form of additionality in relation to process rather than outputs or outcomes, although it is of course a means to both these ends” (1997:18).

Gaster then proceeds to outline some of the formidable methodological problems associated with an analysis of synergy which may in fact discourage assessment. A questionable assumption associated with synergy is the presumption that all participants benefit. Interestingly, in partnerships where the benefits accruing from synergy can unambiguously be shown to outweigh the costs [of co-ordination], the concept of synergy has nothing to say about distributional effects and whether benefits are distributed equitably/proportionally amongst partners. To complicate the matter further Gaster notes that synergy may have a temporal dimension which suggests it may only be evident at certain times during the lifecycle of a partnership.

Given these very real methodological difficulties a more realistic scenario is where there has been no rigorous objective appraisal for the evidence of synergy. Indeed it has been stated to the author in a number of interviews with SRB partners that the difficulty of effectively quantifying synergy has encouraged them not to attempt to bother, relying rather on a ‘gut feeling’ that synergy is occurring. Given that synergy is one of the central pillars underpinning partnership it would seem that without evaluation it is more a matter of faith or conviction. Similar misgivings are raised by Grucca et al (1997) in a short but cogent
article exposing some of the myths surrounding synergy. They argue that synergy arises out of the sharing of resources but add that sharing is a necessary but not sufficient condition for synergy. What is more important is the nature of the shared resource because only certain key critical resources have the potential to yield synergy. The point they stress is that: “When a shared resource does not lead to synergy, it is simple at that point to identify it as being not critical to output creation. The important issue is how to identify critical resources before basing decisions on their shared usage (Grucca et al 1997:609)[original emphasis]. The logic this entails for partnership is that there should be a clear understanding about what it is that is brought together in a partnership which has the potential to yield synergy. The concept of synergy thus suggests that bringing together diverse interests—as occurs in the case of regeneration partnerships—provides an opportunity to pool the disparate resources distributed amongst participants and in the process yield benefits which are more than the sum of the whole. Crucially though, simply bringing together diverse interests does not automatically mean they yield synergy. If we can not prove synergy occurs. Or whether it exists at all. How else can we explain the logic of partnership?

**Mackintosh’s partnership logic: (2) Budget enlargement**

Mackintosh’s second model proposes that partnership is motivated by a desire by both public and private sectors to increase budgets; where the ability to tap into a resource stream is contingent on joint working between public and private sectors. For the public sector joint-working reflects the general resource constraints endemic in the public sector during the 1980s and 1990s and which has resulted in the promotion of opportunistic behaviour. For the private sector, the possibility of tapping into public resources represents
an opportunity to subsidise risk.

**Figure 4.7: Partnership logic (2): Budget enlargement**

In this model, in what is essentially a selfish position, each sector adopts a pragmatic approach to joint working which sees results simply in terms of the ability to increase budgets. Although notionally working together. The reality is that the private and public sectors work in what could be described as, in parallel, where the parent organisations remain functionally independent of each other. The organisational logic is fundamentally cynical and sees partnerships assembled merely to gain resources or to qualify for resources that individually they would not be eligible for. Mackintosh provides an example of this logic:

...local authorities are in partnership schemes to raise money. If they could raise more funds themselves, they would not be undertaking joint ventures. These schemes are second best ways of achieving our aims (Local authority Chief Housing Officer) (quoted in Mackintosh, 1993:217)
Mackintosh’s partnership logic: (3) Transformation

Mackintosh’s third model describes a situation where the partnership has a transformation logic. This model envisages public and private sectors working together, not in parallel as in the budget enlargement model, but in a way which fundamentally changes the relationship between the public and private sectors. Through their involvement in partnership working each sector learns to appreciate the objectives, culture and methods of working of their partners. This leads to a situation where partnership: “…becomes a mutual struggle for transformation” (Mackintosh, 1993:216) where each of the sectors is: “…trying to move the objectives and culture of the other more towards their own ideas” (1993:216).

However, during the Conservative period in office the evidence suggests [and chapter two made the case] that it was not a mutual transformation based upon reciprocal relations rather, where it did occur, it typically benefited the private sector at the expense of the public sector.

Figure 4.8: Partnership logic (3): Transformation

Public or non-profit institution with mixed (internal & social) objectives, socially inefficient objectives

Private company pursuing short term and narrow objectives, socially inefficient objectives

Joint venture attempting mutual transformation of culture and objectives

(source: Mackintosh, 1993)
Huxham’s partnership logic: Collaborative advantage

Huxham (1993a; 1993b; 1886) provides another approach in understanding the logic of partnership through the concept of ‘collaborative advantage’. This analysis draws attention to the particular relationship which exists between what are described as ‘centrally involved organisations’. These organisations have an intimate symbiotic relationship based upon the fact that they share a similar organisational logic: “...that is, they complement, rather than compete with or service, each other...”. Collaborative advantage is therefore:

...concerned with the creation of synergy between collaborating organizations. It will be achieved when something unusually creative is produced—perhaps an objective is met—that no organization could have produced on its own and when each organization, through the collaboration, is able to achieve its own objectives better than it could alone (Huxham, 1993a:22).

This perspective clearly draws inspiration from the concepts of synergy already discussed. However, Huxham extends the idea in two ways. First, by suggesting that an organisation's own objectives can be enhanced as a result of its participation in some way mirrors Mackintosh’s transformation logic; although here the emphasis is on how one organisation gains by furthering its own objectives over others. Secondly, Huxham introduces the concept of ‘meta strategy’. This envisages a situation where through the process of collaborative advantage ‘broader societal objectives’ are achieved. The implication is that positive externalities, although not strictly prescribed by any one organisation [within a partnership], can result as a consequence of collaboration and that this ‘dividend’ is over and above the implicit objectives arising from participation in a partnership.

However, understanding why actors enter into exchange relations in the form of a partnership becomes ever more problematic with the introduction of externalities. The collective action of individual partners may result in broader societal objectives but as
these are not specified by the partnership or made explicit by the participants at the outset it remains enormously difficult to attribute these ‘windfall gains’. However, any approach which seeks to credit positive externalities must evaluate negative externalities to maintain any sense of credibility. The history of the evaluation of the Urban Programme has proved quite conclusively how contentious and problematic it is to quantify externalities. Benefits may indeed result from collaboration through partnership but the lesson of the Urban Programme however is that they could as easily be the product of a myriad of other initiatives operating in the same environment.

It is clear from the preceding discussion that partnership is an ambiguous concept not least because it is possible to capture a huge range of organisational relations within its ambit. The theoretical discussion above has presumed that the construction of partnerships is anything but equal. Considerable variations appear to exist in their constitutions and as Mackintosh and Huxham make clear they can have entirely different logics.

**NETWORK THEORY: A CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM**

*The network enigma.*

Any analysis of networks needs to combine an exploration of both the theoretical dynamics which encourages their initial formation with an explanation of the structural dynamics which govern their internal relations and which distinguishes them from other forms of co-ordination. But in just the same way that partnership appears to mean all things to all people, networks suffer a similar conceptual abuse. “The network concept is ‘enigmatic’ and appears in many shapes and forms. It is sometimes so varied as to fall into the
‘whatever-you-like’ category” (Genosko, 1997:285).  

Thus networks are:  

…a number of distinguishable organisations having a significant amount of interaction with each other. Such interaction may at one extreme include extensive, reciprocal exchanges of resources or intense hostility and conflict at the other. The organisations in a network may be linked directly or indirectly. Others may be characterised by a clustering or centering of linkages around one or a few mediating or controlling organisations (Benson, 1975:230).

A cluster or complex or organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resources dependencies (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992:182).

A network is generally defined as a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects or events (Mitchell, 1969 quoted in Thompson et al, 1991:175).

Generically, a network may be viewed as consisting of ‘nodes’ or positions (occupied by firms, households, strategic business units inside a diversified concern, trade associations and other types of organisation) and links manifested by interaction between the position (Thorelli, 1986:38). [original emphasis]

In general terms…the network metaphor is usually used to convey ideas of lateral rather than hierarchical structures; horizontal rather than vertical processes; collaborative rather than competitive relationships; and flexible rather than routinised responses (Harvey & Bennington, n/d)

Networks are a form of proto-organisation, or ‘loosely coupled’ organisation. … Networks differ from organisations by degree of formalisation of relations and by type of co-ordination (Van Waarden, 1992:31)

When the entangling of obligation and reputation reaches a point that the actions of the parties are interdependent, but there is no common ownership or legal framework, do we not need a new conceptual tool kit to describe and analyse this relationship? Surely this patterned exchange looks more like a marriage than a one-night stand, but there is no license, no common household, no pooling of assets. … such an arrangement is neither a market transaction nor a hierarchical governance structure, but a separate, different mode of exchange, one with its own logic, a network (Powell, 1990:301).

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Background: Proliferation

The growth of networks is widely discussed in academic circles and a number of authors suggest that this development represents a new economic paradigm (Morgan, 1992; Cooke & Morgan, 1993; Stoker & Young, 1993; Amin & Thrift, 1995) reflecting a strategic response to environmental complexity. An explanation for the apparent increasing complexity draws heavily on the literature informing the previous discussion surrounding the proliferation of partnerships. The network literature however identifies a pre-eminent significance to the impacts of technology. Supporters argue that technological development invariably entails prohibitively expensive start-up costs in R&D and it is this feature that, in combination with a parallel shortening in the product life-cycle, encourages joint working through networks to share the risks inherent in bringing new products to market.

An explanation for the growth of network forms of co-ordination comes from a growing body of work which questioned the validity of many of the presumptions underlying classic organisational relations in competitive markets. In classic neo-liberal models of free markets, economists have sought to perpetuate a myth of an atomised, rational economic man guided by the hidden hand of market forces. Granovetter (1985:487) refutes this proposition arguing that this is a painfully fallacious misrepresentation. Rather, attempts at purposive action are in fact embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations, and it is this social dimension which has been overlooked by mainstream economists.

The complexity and capriciousness of the environment which organisations, public and private, find themselves operating in—what Emery & Trist, 1965 describe as *turbulent fields*—has encouraged them to adopt strategies to reduce their exposure to uncertainty. This move is evidenced by a shift away from what are described as *transactional* relations,
where competition is the dynamic, towards adopting more relational ways of operating where trust and personal relations define interactions. At its most basic this reflects a move away from relations governed simply by crude market forces where price signals co-ordinate an organisation’s actions. Literature drawn from a variety of different disciplines – organisational analysis, inter-organisational analysis, strategic management, business management – gives an account of the distinctions between transactional and relational methods of working and is reflected in their widespread absorption into academic discourse. The characteristics of the two approaches are contrasted below:

Figure 4.9: Comparison between transaction and relational relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSACTIONAL</th>
<th>RELATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price</td>
<td>Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td>Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market rules</td>
<td>Market exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractual relations</td>
<td>Personal relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short term relations</td>
<td>Long term obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependence</td>
<td>Interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Established common knowledge</td>
<td>Tacit knowledge ~ Information rich/dense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repetitive standard transaction</td>
<td>Occasional idiosyncratic transaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflexible</td>
<td>Flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical organisation</td>
<td>Non-hierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vertical integration</td>
<td>Horizontal integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It has been argued that in a deregulated global market with digital technologies revolutionising product and process innovations, existing relations underpinned by competition, market rules, hierarchies etc appeared anachronistic and ineffective in this new economic landscape. One of the strategic responses to this new environment was therefore to question traditional methods of co-ordination. Organisations adopted the language if not the strategies of relational exchanges and in this sense accepted the
substance of Granovetter’s ‘social embeddedness’ argument. Networking can thus be seen as a practical expression of the acceptance of relational working arrangements. In a situation where a changing environment prevents effective planning and implementation, organisations responded to the limitations imposed on them by pursuing strategies which extricated them from this harsh environment. Networking then, it is suggested, developed as a response to the impacts of structural and political changes taking place at the global, national and local level. The underlying presumption is that networks possess an organisational logic which enables them to take [greater] control of their environment. The perception then is that networks are somehow inherently more effective in delivering objectives in turbulent environments than other models of co-ordination.

The organisational logic of networks.

Powell (1990) provides a structural rationale for the growth of networks. He suggests that a network’s organisational logic is based on the fact that:

- They are based on know-how and detailed knowledge of the abilities of others - so called tacit knowledge;
- The exchange of distinct competencies, be they knowledge or skills - is more likely to occur in networks. The transfer of resources - tangible items, such as equipment, services, patents and the like - more commonly occur through market transaction or among organisational units;
- The more general and more substitutable are resources, the more likely they will be secured through short term market transactions.

The Organisational Logics Schema in figure 4.5 described the conditions where organisations co-ordinate activity and which might be conducive for partnership and network formation. The primary motivating factor to co-ordination in a network is a degree of mutual interest and what Stoker & Young (1993) describe as the recognition by parties that: “…they depend on one another…. (p183) [and it is this]…mutual orientation which
provides the glue that binds together the various participants” (p185). Only when this ‘mutual orientation’ is achieved, and recognised, by the participants can the potential, though not the necessity, for network formation become practicable. This mutual orientation is depicted in *The institutional landscape of partnership & networks* schema in figure 4.5. The extreme left is inhabited by actors with no commonality of interests with other parties, and accordingly act independently. As you move to the right conditions develop where mutual interests may overlap with other parties. At this point, a domain of interest can apply and, it may be advantageous for parties to co-ordinate activities. As you move further to the right you describe a situation of ever increasing commonality of interests culminating in complete coincidence of interests. At this extreme position participants have no reason to co-ordinate actions and are therefore liable to either merge or compete directly with each other.

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTNERSHIP AND NETWORKS**

*Similar organisational forms*

This discussion on partnerships and networks should be seen as part of a wider debate on ‘governance structures’. It seems clear that the research task is to examine the competing claims made about the efficacy of various governance structures in order to see how effective they have been in delivering their stated objectives. The objective of partnership and network structures is both to secure co-ordination—amongst partners—whilst delivering this joint effort in the most optimally efficient manner. Partnerships and networks can thus be seen as a contemporary response by organisations operating in complex environments—especially in the public sector, under conditions of scarcity. The normative assumption implicit in the wholesale promotion of partnership by government[s] is that they are functionally superior to previous governance structures. This has however
neither been tested or proved. Until substantive research proves otherwise it remains entirely erroneous to infer that shortcomings in one approach equates to the superiority of any other approach.

However, the relationship between partnership and networks is problematic. It has been argued that partnership and networks are similar organisational forms that differ only in degree. The case has been made, through analogy with the literature on the firm, that partnerships and networks lie [somewhere] between market and hierarchical forms of co-ordination—depicted graphically in The institutional landscape of partnership & networks schema in figure 4.5. This conclusion is in itself relatively uncontroversial but drawing categorical distinctions between partnership and network forms of co-ordination, and clarifying the distance between these two forms on the market/hierarchy continuum, is far more problematic. Notwithstanding the obvious shortcomings related to the depiction in figure 4.2 of an ideal type, a number of observations can be drawn.

**Difference between partnerships and networks**

1. The primary cleavage differentiating a partnership from a network is the formalisation of institutional arrangements governing behaviour and objectives. The process of drawing up, and agreeing, clearly identified objectives and, as is often the case in regeneration initiatives, a vision of how they are to be secured, invests a partnership with a directed purposive mandate.

2. A partnership’s mandate is formalised through a process which reveals the distribution of [Benson’s] two scarce resources, money and authority. The most important observation is that there is no reason to presume that the current usage of the term partnership implies any form of equality amongst partners. Indeed, one of the semantic
difficulties associated with the partnership label is an implicit assumption that partnership brings together partners, if not exactly as equals, then with a degree of mutual dependency which is reflected in the power relations and the distribution of resources within any given partnership.

(3) It has been argued that the widely applied label of partnership simply describes a form of organisational co-ordination which, at its crudest, brings together a number of actors in a joint endeavour. Crucially though, as it currently stands, the label, partnership, says nothing about the character of the relations, the relative autonomy of the partners, or the distribution of resources between partners, and can be as Hudson (1987:178) warns us, nothing more than the formalisation of the clear dominance of one party over another.

(4) The Hanf & Scharpf typology suggests that only when partner relations are mutually dependent can each partner possess the capacity to influence the direction of a partnership. If this assumption is correct and if, in addition, we accept also that the concept of synergy explains why it is that partners come together. Then a real partnership should exhibit evidence of synergy which must be as Gaster (1997) argued, demonstrated in relation to process as well as ‘gross’ gains. Therefore any real partnership should exhibit demonstrable [synergetic] output gains [as distinct from synergetic claims] and there should be clear evidence of a process of mutual re-orientation by the participants. This reciprocity can be best understood as organisational learning evidenced by, for example, changes in an organisation’s culture, changes in working methods, a redefinition of collective objectives, and each might occur individually or together [Mackintosh’s transformation logic]. Axiomatically then, evidence of [Hanf & Scharpf’s] coercion or [Williamson] opportunistic behaviour implies unilateral or mutual independence that
undermines the potential for mutual dependence and genuine partnership working. Logically then any co-ordination mechanism which aspires to the title Partnership must exhibit both clear evidence of synergy and mutual dependency between partners. A contract or a service level agreement cannot in this sense qualify as partnership because the Hanf & Scharpf test of mutual dependence fails if the contract could have been awarded to other parties—there is no obligation of reciprocity. In this example a contract legally defines and circumscribes the relationship; reciprocity where it occurs is incidental but not essential to the relationship.

The distinguishing feature of a network form of co-ordination is the emphasis placed upon the qualitative nature of relations amongst participants; and this is explicitly reflected in the way in which resources are understood to be embedded in a social setting. The management of resources—understood to include a richer meaning than simply material resources which might for example include, knowledge, prestige, legitimacy etc—within a network therefore attaches enormous importance to the role of relationships between participants. Extending this theme of exploiting a wider range of resources beyond the simply material Powell (1990) draws particular attention to the importance of ‘tacit’ knowledge. This is understood to be invested in individuals—and perhaps can be best understood as a form of intellectual property. Because tacit knowledge is held by an individual it moves with them. Again, this importance of the individual further exaggerates the focus on the qualitative dimension of relationships between partners. The concept of reciprocity here reflects the importance attached to the character of the mutual dependency within a network. The cement which ties network participants therefore is reciprocity as distinct from a reliance on formal or contractual obligation and this can only be achieved
and maintained through **trust**. Indeed the importance of trust in networks is underlined by the absence of formal contractual relations evident in partnership. Logically again, if a series of formal rules govern the character of relations amongst partners then the co-ordination mechanism cannot reasonably be described as a network rather it must be a partnership.

**THE PARTNERSHIP CHECKLIST**

Part of the problem surrounding partnership lies in the observation that all co-ordination mechanisms labelled partnership believe that they are ‘real’. It has been argued that the reason this occurs is the lack of a conceptual model of what real partnership means. Therefore the principal task of this chapter has been to fill that void by theorising partnership in abstract terms. However, beyond the boundaries of academia partnership is an experience not a theoretical construct. Moving from the abstract to the concrete however requires conceptual tools that can link theory to practice. What is required is a practical method of evaluation, a toolkit which enables the partnership experience to be deconstructed and where that practical experience can be compared to that predicted in the theoretical model. Partners can in this way compare their experience to that postulated in the theoretical partnership model.

For the checklist to work the theoretical insights developed in the model of partnership had to be translated into practical tools. The key objective was to ensure that the checklist successfully addressed the key theoretical concerns. For example, the theory suggests that no one party should dominate. The checklist therefore had to operationalise this theoretical aspiration in a robust test which ‘reveals’ domination – or its absence. In practice this concept was explored by applying several tests: power sharing was one test but independent
arbitration reveals something of the power relations. The partnership checklist below therefore draws together the key theoretical themes identified in this chapter but seeks to interpret these into a systematic and practical methodology – one that recognises and is deliberately informed by good practice.

(i) Power sharing

To avoid the accusation that a partnership is nothing more than the clear domination of one party over another then partners should share power. A typical regeneration partnership brings together a vast range of partners with [potentially] enormous differences in resource endowment. A partnership structure that simply mirrors the power relations of the constituent organisations is not sharing power.

(ii) Agreement on key issues

The aims and objectives of any partnership should reflect the joint aspirations of all partners. Objectives should be established through an open process of bargaining and negotiation. A partnership’s strategic objectives simultaneously defines and circumscribe its current and future actions. Crucially, a partnership’s objectives, once agreed, forms a normative framework that ensures a particular pattern of resource distribution prevails. The setting of objectives is therefore a pivotal activity. Who is involved in this process, and when, says a great deal about the quality of partnership relations. The setting of objectives should never simply reflect the hegemony of any one dominant party or cabal: where this occurs the partnership is effectively nothing more than a contract or service level agreement. Organisations that have not been involved in the establishment of objectives cannot realistically be described as partners.
(iii) Organisational learning

Structures should not be set in stone. Partnerships should be flexible. Where serious concerns arise adaptive potential provides an opportunity for partners to re-negotiate a partnership’s terms of reference. Building-in, from the start, a mechanism that can challenge and change the way a partnership operates makes explicit to all involved that it is prepared to learn. [An analogous mechanism taken from the private sector would be the oversight function of non-executive directors who can challenge and potentially censure the main board and its strategies] Learning occurs when a partnership acknowledges changing circumstances and responds strategically to the challenge. Organisational learning might occur in response to, for example, a dramatic or unforeseen change in the environment; mistakes [e.g., the extreme case of maladministration, fraud etc]; or by the adoption of [new] ‘best practice’ arising in the wider policy arena.

(iv) Independent arbitration

The greatest concern for potential participants in any partnership is that it may not be real. It may in fact be nothing more than the clear domination of one party over another. This potential pitfall can be ameliorated if the partnership is a learning organisation—as described above—and adapts to overcome the concerns of partners. A second line of support for a partner, concerned about the uneven distribution of power and the limits of their own influence, would be independent arbitration. A partnership is clearly not real if the structure of a partnership emasculates partners and operates in such a way as to effectively institutionalise the hegemony of any one partner [or sub-set of partners].

(v) Mutual reorientation

Partnerships bring together disparate organisations endowed with very different resources
and organisational cultures. Within statutory constraints for probity and efficacy working practices should—not as of right—reflect the objectives of the partnership and not the habits or culture of dominant partners. Diversity of interests represent diversity of opportunity. Cultural diversity amongst partner organisations suggest that, for any given task, there will be a range of approaches and methods of working which could potentially be explored. If partners are meeting as equals then it is not unreasonable to expect that there should be evidence of an exchange of ideas and the adoption of novel ways of working. In practice this should be read backwards. Evidence of exchange should be taken as a proxy measure of the quality of partner relations. Where novel methods or approaches are proving to be effective within the partnership there should be evidence of these ideas percolating down and influencing the organisational culture of the partner organisations.

(vi) Standing orders

The conduct of a partnership should be governed by mutually agreed rules. These should seek to prevent the imposition of arbitrary decisions and/or the domination of the partnership by any one party. In order to allay concerns of overt domination new partnerships could formally adopt a common set of Standing Orders. A learning partnership would—over time—amend or adapt these to suit their particular circumstances.

(vii) Entered into voluntarily

There should be no barriers to entry or exit. There should be no costs or sanctions associated with not entering into partnership. Where a partner is coerced into joining a partnership the resultant organisation is not a real partnership because of the obvious disparity in power relations.
(viii) Accountability supported by sanctions

A major complication arises from the fact that partnerships bring together diverse interests each potentially with their own resource systems and associated patterns of accountability. The effect of this is that partner organisations may in practice have a subtly different understanding of accountability and these may in practice be resolved through different lines of accountability not necessarily compatible with those of organisations spending public money. An indication of the tension that arises in accountability between dissimilar organisations is evident in the Employment Select Committee examination of the work of TECs (HC, 1996a). Part II of the report specifically looks at TECs and accountability and the report describes TECs as: “…a new type of organisation, a hybrid body (para.7)…[which are]…unaccountable by design” (para.8). Much of the discussion in the report focuses on the alleged democratic deficit arising from the way in which TEC boards are constituted and the lack of transparency in the way they operate. With TEC/Local authority relationship clearly in mind the Association of London Authorities propose an Accountability Index (Figure 4.10 below) that seeks to promulgate a model of accountability good practice. Essentially a procedural model it is based upon the presumption of independence and transparency linked to democratic oversight.

Figure 4.10: Association of London Authorities Accountability Index

- Whether they are directly elected
- Whether they come within the remit of one of the public sector Ombudsmen
- Whether there is extensive statutorily defined public access to policy and decision-making meetings
- Whether there is extensive statutorily defined public access to information
- Whether members of the body are liable for surcharge
- Whether members of the body have a statutory requirement to declare any interests which may conflict with their duties
• Whether there are monitoring officers charged with a statutory duty to ensure probity and financial regularity


Given the different types of organisation brought together in a partnership the definition of accountability can be problematic⁴. Responding to widespread public concerns the government set up a commission headed by Lord Nolan to examine the issue of accountability in public bodies. His report *Local Public Spending Bodies*, argued that:

> The term accountability is used in a variety of ways, some rather loose and ill-defined. Processes of consultation, openness, and responsiveness are frequently characterised as accountability. They are certainly aids to, and components of, accountability, but on a more precise definition service providers and others are truly accountable only to those able to exercise sanctions over them (HMSO, 1996c para.16 p13).

The importance of sanctions is crucial and fundamentally related to the distribution of power in a partnership. If a partnership is to be more than the clear domination of one party over another then partners need a mechanism which allows them to call a partnership to account. Complicating matters, accountability operates at several levels.

### Table 4.3: Levels of accountability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Lines of accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>internal</td>
<td>between partners within the partnership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>external</td>
<td>back to the organisations represented within partnerships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upwards</td>
<td>to government and/or other funders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>downwards</td>
<td>to the wider constituency the partnership aims to serve.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These conflicting demands need to be resolved by partners at the outset and could be embodied in an explicit participation strategy which clarifies precise lines of accountability and the mechanisms by which the partnership will be held to account.

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⁴ For a comprehensive account see Day & Klein (1987) *Accountabilities: Five Public Services*
(ix) Participation strategy

To avoid potentially conflicting lines of accountability identified above a partnership should publish a participation strategy which states how the different lines of accountability will be resolved. Given that local populations are the target and the primary reason for the existence of many partnerships how do these interests feed into the partnership structure? Critical evaluation by the public or by partners necessitates informed judgement and this requires information. If a partnership is genuine in its aspiration to share power it must ensure that adequate information is both available and disseminated in a form that is accessible to all the interests it represents.

(x) Expenditure audit

Partners need to be able to identify what they put in and what they get out of partnership. Given that synergy is said to underpin partnership working, logically then, it must be evaluated. Partners individually, and the wider partnership, can only gauge the efficacy of their contribution if evaluation takes place. Any cost/benefit analysis should be sensitive to the range of resources brought together in partnership and should extend beyond the customary finance criteria to include contributions ‘in kind’ [i.e., the private sector brings a particular type of expertise, similarly, community and voluntary groups bring their own form of expertise]. Partnerships almost always seek to target a number of objectives simultaneously. Although crude, money is a practical measure of the importance a partnership actually attaches to specific action areas. A primary aim of any audit is to compare a partnership’s stated priorities with the actual resources attached to each objective to see if they do in fact coincide.
Similar but different

Partnerships and networks continue to proliferate and evidence of their widespread adoption is clear in a variety of different institutional settings. Not unreasonably, given this application across such a wide policy arena one should expect to see considerable variation in membership. However, a core concern of this thesis has been to examine the process of partnership. The challenge has been to examine the implicit claim that partnership represents an optimal co-ordination mechanism for regeneration initiatives. The unresolved and as yet largely neglected, research question remains: is this particular form of co-ordination mechanism functionally superior to [any] other organisational form?

If we look at networks we see they are fundamentally defined by the character of the relations which govern their co-ordination. In this their principle distinguishing characteristics are trust and reciprocity. In this respect network forms of co-ordination can be seen to equate to what the government would describe as ‘true’ partnership. Figure 4.11 below illustrates this. What the figure shows is how partnerships are the most common form of co-ordination [as you would expect given their longstanding and widespread approval]. However, within this larger set there are a distinct but minor subset that exhibit the characteristic trust and reciprocity. These could best be described as ‘networked partnerships’. The observation that networks appear to also lie outside of the wider partnership set reflects the way that some networks exist simply by virtue of the fact that they act as mediums or conduits for communication. It was established that an agreed set of objectives which structure or guide purposive actions was a necessary pre-requisite for any partnership [co-ordination]. Absence of agreement negates the possibility that a network can act as a co-ordinative mechanism.
Networks thus represent the development of a particular governance structure ideally adapted to a complex rapidly changing environment. It is clear that partnerships and networks do not represent a simple dichotomy. Rather it is much more likely that they occupy the same institutional landscape appearing as complex overlapping and interlocking layers, where the boundaries between the two are diffuse and open to conjecture. It has been argued that in the case of networks co-ordination occurs when actors are assimilated into new relationships based upon reciprocity and trust. These characteristics, reciprocity and trust, are like invisible chains which both govern and circumscribe network relations. Because networks are a pattern of linkages based upon reciprocal relations, where the parameter of a network is defined only by those actors assimilated into it, then in this sense, networks can be said to have an internal perspective. The contrast with partnerships is one of degree. Networks are considered to be information rich, underpinned by principles of trust and collaboration, where this fluidity and informality represents its key distinguishing characteristic. However unlike partnerships networks do not necessarily share any agreed
mandate for action.

In attempting to contrast partnership with network forms of co-ordination it is important to make the crucial distinction between what the government euphemistically call ‘real’ partnerships and others. It has been argued that the definition of a real partnership is one which shares power and successfully manages a process of learning and adaptation. These partnerships are in fact exhibiting reciprocity, founded on trust, amongst partners, and could be said to be emulating network forms of co-ordination. In contrast to a network the primary distinguishing feature of a partnership is that they are proactive, externally oriented, with a formal mandate to direct purposive action. Where partnerships are not ‘real’ the organisational logic is entirely different. Here partner/s abuse their dominant position to dictate outcomes simply by fiat. In these situations there is no reciprocity or trust between partners, no organisational learning or mutual reorientation; any relationship formed is therefore purely contractual (hierarchical), largely symbolic, and has the role of minor partners diminished to performing nothing more than a delivery service.

Partnerships and network structures have been widely adopted in the 1990s because they apparently offer so many advantages. At a superficial level—if the rhetoric is to be believed—the advantages of partnership seem self evident. Synergy. The holy grail of policy: where everyone is in a win win situation. Risk sharing. When funding is tight anything which reduces, or helps militate, an individual organisations financial exposure is obviously appealing; the pooling of finite resources is clearly an advantageous by-product of partnership building. At a political level partnership is a pragmatic response to a fragmented state. Partnership, by definition, let alone constitution, is a vehicle of incorporation. In this role a succession of governments since 1977 have used it very
prescriptively to integrate specific interests. Post 1979 Conservative governments focused first on private sector interests although the emphasis later shifted towards the voluntary/community sector. Clearly governments of different persuasions can as easily use this same mechanism to integrate other preferred interests.

**SUMMARY**
The purpose of this chapter was to examine microeconomic explanations for the growth of partnerships and networks. Methodologically this proved difficult because of the absence of any substantive existing theory to underpin the two concepts. It was clear that both partnership and networks had suffered considerable semantic abuse and this was evident from the variety of definitions that one finds. In order to progress a discussion the approach taken was to begin by acknowledging the dearth of theory and instead look to complementary arenas which might inform the debate. The key to this approach lay in recognising that partnership and networks could and should be understood simply as co-ordination mechanisms. The rationale of this approach was that any co-ordination mechanism would display a specific *co-ordinational logic*. By examining the particular *co-ordinational logic* it should then be possible to describe the type of co-ordination and, by definition, comment on whether what is under examination is a partnership or a network. The advantage of approaching the problem identified in terms of co-ordination was that it captured a considerably wider and more developed literature. Three key theoretical disciplines were examined: exchange theory, inter-organisational analysis and transaction cost economics. In addition, Macintosh [uniquely] provided three different models of partnership each with different co-ordinational logics and the significance of these was evaluated. Each of these approaches was in turn explored in order to categorise the various ‘logics’ inherent in the different models of co-ordination. The end result of this was the
development of a conceptual framework within which co-ordination could be more readily understood and within which partnership could be located. It was this conceptual framework that provided the necessary theoretical insights which then allowed the construction of an ideal model of partnership and an ideal model of a network – each of which displayed their own unique co-ordinational logic. Having developed the two models it then became possible to contrast them. The research suggests that the two forms share many similarities with the potential for the two to overlap. The principle cleavage, and the key to understanding what differentiates partnerships from networks, is most apparent in an examination of the quality of and the degree of formalisation of relations which govern their actions. With a clear conceptual framework it then was possible to describe in detail the co-ordinational logic of the specific form of partnership which the government describe as true. Axiomatically, the process of describing the co-ordinational logic of a true partnership simultaneously generated the conceptual framework upon which the partnership checklist which based.

The rhetoric of partnership makes a convincing argument. It suggests that partnership incorporates disparate interests who each bring unique skills to bear on complex regeneration problems. This contribution of the many, attacks problems on several fronts, delivering synergy in a structure which guarantees inter-organisational co-ordination. At the same time, in the process of uniting diverse interests, partnership has legitimated objectives that the constituent partners may indeed never individually have been in a position to support or deliver.

For over three decades successive governments have been criticised for a lack of co-ordination in policy delivery. And for almost three decades partnership has been
uncritically promoted as the solution. Given the dearth of evidence of synergy or evidence of genuine power sharing it remains to be proved whether partnership is indeed the optimal co-ordination mechanism for regeneration initiatives.
CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING PARTNERSHIP GROWTH (II)

MACROECONOMIC PARTNERSHIPS & NETWORKS: A NEW STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE

Introduction

In contrast to the previous chapter the aim of this chapter is to examine a number of macroeconomic explanations that might provide a theoretical rationale for the growth in partnership and associated network activity.

Not a new activity

Partnership activity is not a new phenomenon. It should be recalled that the Labour government’s 1977 White Paper had been predicated on a partnership approach to regeneration. However initiatives like City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget dramatically propelled partnership formation during the 1990s. During the same period a growing body of authors were drawing attention to the growth of networks. The burgeoning body of literature being published suggested that a new model of development had perhaps been discovered.

This chapter begins by first examining the theoretical basis upon which claims of a new model of development have been made and relates these to the proliferation of new organisational forms. This will be followed by a look at the various ‘organisational logics’ which have been put forward to explain specific forms of co-ordination. Finally, the often opaque and ambiguous characteristics which are ascribed to partnerships and networks will be examined. This approach will give substance to a critical theoretical model of partnerships and networks which both describes and differentiates the two concepts. Having
arrived at a theoretical model a partnership checklist is proposed which might be used to examine any regeneration partnership. In chapter seven the checklist provides the methodological toolkit used to systematically deconstruct the CWP and comment on the quality of partnership relations.

**BACKGROUND**

*Wider structural changes*

Chapter two described the arrival into office in 1979 of a Conservative administration mandated with a radical political agenda. It was argued that the political economy of Thatcherism sustained and promoted the development of partnerships. However, this represents only part of the explanation of their growth throughout the 1980s. To understand the context of proliferation it is important to relate these phenomena to the wider debate on structural changes taking place in the global economy throughout the 1980s. This chapter will therefore seek to conceptually link the evidence of partnership and networks to prevailing theories on the dynamics of change in contemporary society.

The 1980s was a period of dramatic change for the UK both nationally and internationally. Indeed it could be argued that this period is defined by the conjuncture of social, political and economic forces, which in combination, profoundly restructured the UK state during this period. The UK’s orientation to the global economy was markedly changed by the growing internationalisation of trade. This was a complex phenomena which was both sustained and encouraged on different levels. Internationally the 1980s witnessed the dramatic collapse of Communism in the former USSR. The ensuing ideological vacuum was quickly filled with Western neo-liberal economic philosophy with its emphasis on free-trade and markets. The case for this is made by Fukuyama (1992) whose central thesis
is that communist ideology has collapsed and has been entirely displaced by capitalism\textsuperscript{5}. And so in a short space of time ‘the market’ had completed its global hegemony—that the market means different things to different people is acknowledged but this does not in any way reduce the enormity of this event.

The ascendancy of Western neo-liberal economic philosophy had two important consequences. First, it created new economic spaces. In the 1980s Communism had been effectively discredited as a model for growth by its inability to deliver the same levels of [relative] prosperity self-evident in the West throughout much of the post war period. At the same time former Communist states and developing countries around the globe eagerly strove to attain the benefits of ‘first world’ status by actively inviting foreign direct investment as a means of modernising their own economies. Many of these previously insular command economies offered international investors substantial opportunities, offering vast reservoirs of cheap [often educated] labour combined with low social costs and a relaxed approach to development and the repatriation of profits etc.

The second factor in this account is that the hegemony of this new political economy had itself been progressively re-defined throughout the 1980s in the West and came to be described as Thatcherism in the UK or Reaganism in the USA. As has been described in chapter two the political economy of Thatcherism has an inherent economic logic which fundamentally ran counter to the prevailing post-war settlement. Thatcher’s free-market convictions secured the removal of national obstacles in the UK which had previously curtailed the free movement of capital to anywhere in the globe. Thatcher herself acknowledged that this was the one element of her first budget that gave her the:

\textsuperscript{5} This same theme has been repeatedly explored in the FT, see for example, \textit{No left, right or centre} (12/13
“…greatest personal pleasure…” (Thatcher, 1993:44) [this policy was copied by Reagan in the USA]. Removing these legal impediments made it easier to invest abroad encouraging a greater internationalisation of the UK economy:

…Not only do our companies invest more directly in overseas enterprises than nearly all our foreign competitors, but the UK also receives a similarly large amount of direct investment from overseas. UK inflows and outflows of portfolio investments are also very large by international standards…(HM Treasury, 1996b para.1.4){original emphasis}

Although the UK economy has always had a significant international outlook to trade, the effect of removing capital controls was to further substantially reinforce growing internationalisation—a process already evident from the end of the second world war.

The direct and portfolio investment positions of the UK make it one of the most globally integrated countries in the world. Relative to its size, the UK has greater international investment interests than any other country…(HM Treasury, 1996b para.53)

In addition, the growing process of internationalisation was substantially reinforced by the impacts of technology where it appeared that the world had been shrunk by digital technologies. This meant, for example, that the capacity to manage industrial production remotely had been significantly enhanced. Throughout this period advances in technology accelerated exponentially: computing capacity increased whilst the actual price decreased. The generic nature of the technology ensured it permeated into every facet of life catalysing a whole range of process and product innovations which only sought to reinforce the capacity of industry to operate globally—see Fröbel et al, 1980. By the start of the 1990s it was abundantly clear that we were living in a rapidly changing global economy and that this was having a profound local effect upon the UK economy. Indeed, the rate of change and the growing interdependence of the global market place may indeed be the defining

Oct 96); The global standard (18 Apr 98).
condition of this new world order. Eisenschatz & Gough (1993) put forward three competing explanations for changes in the UK economy.

- all places are made equal by the omniscient global market.
- places are made unique as they respond flexibly to satisfy fragmented markets.
- the branch plant paradigm is no longer national but global with core and periphery operating at a much wider geographical scale.

It appeared to many that the internationalisation of the world economy was having profound structural impacts on national economies and it was suggested that this growing globalisation emasculated the nation state: dirigiste policy instruments and institutions which had their origins in an older industrial epoch appeared anachronistic as we entered the so-called information age.6

In the 1980s the UK central government responded to this challenging economic and political environment by introducing new forms of policy instrument to combat the invidious decline of many of the older urban areas. Parallel innovations were implemented by local government, the voluntary and community sectors and the private sector, as they each sought to respond to the common threat. It appeared that throughout the 1980s in both the private and public sectors the changing dynamics of the international economy and regulatory shifts within the UK economy were encouraging the proliferation of partnership and networks. Indeed, in terms of Government policy the growth of partnership working was so conspicuous that it is reasonable to assert that by the end of the 1980s partnership had come to represent the archetypal policy response to this complex, dynamic, changing environment.

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6 For a discussion of the emasculation of the nation state see Jessop’s ‘Hollowing Out’ thesis (Jessop, 1994).
A CLIMATE FOR PARTNERSHIP AND NETWORKS

Crisis

It had already been observed that towards the end of the 1960s the UK—along with other major capitalist economies—was experiencing serious economic difficulties. The problem appeared to be one of intensifying international competition, declining profits, and stagnating markets (Schoenberger, 1988:245); productivity was slowing down, the capital/output ratio began to rise, and the rate of profit was falling and these conditions seriously threatened the vitality of capitalist economies (Leborgne & Lipietz, 1988:264-5). Similarly, Scott & Cooke (1988) argued that the entire economic system based on Keynesian welfare-statism had become mired down in seemingly incurable stagflationary conditions and, with the collapse of Bretton Woods, a major international economic crisis was precipitated. The conjuncture of these circumstances led to: “…a massive crisis of deindustrialization, job loss, and capital flight, with severe repercussions on the old industrial regions and especially negative impacts on employment and wages” (Scott & Cooke, 1988:241).

These changes in the global economy throughout this period—and the UK’s relationship to them—stimulated a vociferous debate amongst academics on the potential emergence of a new model of development. Indeed, a number of authors postulated that wider macroeconomic forces were held to have had a fundamental impact on the new geography and sociology of production. Whilst many academics would not dispute the widespread evidence of change there was little agreement on the mechanisms driving these changes. Loader & Burrows (1994:1) captured the intellectual dilemma when they noted:
That significant socio-economic changes have occurred in the UK and other advanced capitalist societies over the last twenty years or so is not in any doubt. However, how best to interpret these changes has become a source of much controversy. The literature on processes of ‘restructuring’ has been marked by a plethora of attempts to make some sort of sense out of recent economic, political and social change.

However one understands and explains the ‘crisis’ evident in Western capitalist economies it remains widely accepted that it heralded a period of dramatic structural adjustment. In an effort to understand the impact of this restructuring one hypothesis explored in this chapter is that these wider structural forces created a climate which propelled specific forms of organisational response: namely partnership and networks.

Transition

The point of departure for this debate is the concept of the state in transition: moving from one model of development to another. The principle starting point for this debate is the widespread acceptance [and inherent utility] of the concept of Fordism as an apposite description of the dominant political economy in Western capitalist economies. Jessop (1994:15) defines Fordism:

…in terms of its dominant labour process (the mass production of complex consumer durables); its nature as a feasible macro-economic system (a virtuous, balanced circle of mass production and mass consumption in a largely autocentric national economy); its profile as a social mode of economic regulation (notably the role of institutionalised collective bargaining and a Keynesian welfare state); its general implications for social organisation and cohesion (an urban-industrial, ‘middle mass’, wage-earning society); or even, finally, the co-presence and co-evolution of all four possible Fordist phenomena.

Arising from these observations a number of academics discussed in abstract theoretical terms the possibility, or even the probability, that the state was undergoing, or had undergone, a major structural realignment. Social scientists from a variety of disciplines became engaged in attempts to develop a theory which could help explain these processes
of change and a lively debate was joined.

Starting from the premise of a Fordist state, the restructuring process has been variously described in terms of a move from away from a Fordist’ to a ‘post or neo-Fordist’ economy. Amin (1994a:18) illuminates the potential diversity with lucid descriptions of these various models, suggesting neo-Fordism stresses a strong element of continuity; post-Fordism denoting a genuine resolution to the crisis of Fordism; and after-Fordism designating a period after Fordism rather than a new phase of capitalist development. Although as Jessop (1994:14) readily admits: “Even a cursory review of accounts of Fordism and post-Fordism reveals massive disparities in the use of these concepts”. Notwithstanding this criticism there is more agreement on the former than the latter. These reservations aside, within the post-Fordist literature the key task is to: “…excavate the key forces governing this shift from one societal form to another and to seek to discern the shape of the new order” (Murdoch, 1995:732) and it is to an exposition of the shape and how this translates into organisational form that we turn to next.

**Regulation theory**

Regulation theory has its origins firmly rooted in this inquiry. Championed primarily [although not exclusively] by a group of European academics, Regulation Theory offered a comprehensive, ‘totalizing’, theory of political economy. It has many supporters principally because it attempts to:

…provide some sort of conceptualising underpinning [for the process of change]. The key notion here is that the expanded social reproduction of capitalism is never guaranteed, but has to be continually secured through a range of social norms, mechanisms, and institutions which help temporarily to stabilise the system’s inherent contradictions around a particular regime of accumulation (Goodwin et al, 1993:68).

The French regulationists’ argued that the state was [either] in transition or being
transformed. This idea of the state in transition clearly draws heavily on Marxist theory which sees the evolution of capital located within distinct historical epochs—periodizing capitalism. Aglietta, one of the architects of regulation theory, and one of its leading intellectual lights, alludes to these Marxist origins when he describes regulation theory as: “…an approach to capitalism which isolates the conditions and rhythms of its long run cohesion and the forms of its crisis and social transformations under the disruptive and irreducible effects of class struggle” (1979:15){my emphasis}. This discourse is echoed within the regulation school surrounding the apparent transition from Fordism to [for example] post-Fordism.

Regulation theory’s appeal lies in the fact that it seeks to give an account of the processes of change, evident in many of the capitalist economies, and which ascribes as much importance to the social and institutional structure of the state as the economic. It does this by providing an account of restructuring which—unlike Marxism with its historical determinism underpinned by invariant laws which presumed the collapse of capitalism—was internally flexible enough to explain the divergent paths taken by different capitalist economies. Jessop (1990) in a comprehensive review of the subject maintains that Regulation Theory:

…can be seen as a distinctive approach to problems of economic and social analysis (p171).

[and]

The regulation approach stresses the successful development and institutionalization of a mode of regulation whose principal features are defined in terms of their contribution to maintaining the capital relation (p205).

Much of the appeal of regulation theory is the way it provides, what seems at first glance, a simple conceptual model. This simplicity however betrays its substantive theoretical
foundations grounded in empirical analysis of the various manifestations of capitalism exhibited in different nation states across the globe. Figure 5.1 below graphically depicts the key characteristics of the regulation model.

Figure 5.1: A model of regulation

![Model of Regulation Diagram](Source: Peck & Tickell, 1992:349)

The model has three principle dimensions: (1) a regime of accumulation; (2) an accumulation system; (3) a mode of social regulation. The regime of accumulation emerges from the tension between the accumulation system and the mode of social regulation.

The breadth of the regulation school and their own divergent trajectories make categorical definitions of these terms problematic, indeed the degree of this divergence is discussed by Jessop (1990) who identifies seven main schools within the regulationist approach. With this caveat in mind the following definitions have been harvested from several authors to convey the general thrust of the elements set out in the theoretical model.

(I). A regime of accumulation: “…describes the medium-term to long-term stabilization of the allocation of production between consumption and accumulation (Murdoch,
1995:733). In its early incarnation this was theorised as operating at an international level with the primary unit of analysis as the nation state. Within this paradigm Boyer identifies four ‘stylised historical models’ which equate to regimes of accumulation:

1. ancienne regulation, 18th Century;
2. competitive regulation, 19th Century;
3. modified competitive regulation, early 20th Century;
4. monopolistic regulation, 1947-76.


(II). The accumulation system is the dominant mode of economic growth and distribution. Elements of the accumulation system include the conditions of production (such as the amount of capital invested, the distribution of capital among the different branches and norms of production) and the conditions of consumption (such as consumption patterns, collectivized consumption expenditures” (Peck & Tickell, 1992:349).

(III). The mode of social regulation refers to an ensemble of regulatory mechanisms which guarantee the reproduction of the accumulation system (Murdoch, 1995:734). Hirst & Zeitlin (1991:19) distinguish four major modes of regulation in the history of capitalism since the eighteenth century:

1. extensive accumulation;
2. intensive accumulation without mass consumption (Taylorist);
3. intensive accumulation with mass consumption (Fordist); and,
4. an emergent post-Fordist accumulation regime whose contours have yet to be fully determined.

The distinctive contribution of regulation theory is that it does not have Marxism’s determinism. So: “…the emergence of a new regime of accumulation is not a preordained part of capitalism’s destiny” (Murdoch, 1995:734), [rather] “…there is no [single] logic of capital but a series of [potentially alternative] logics…” (Jessop, 1990:189). A new regime
of accumulation thus: “…emerges from the clash of multiple strategies” (Jessop, 1990:195). It is not the result of [Marxist] class struggle but is rather “…emergent, contingent, provisional, and unstable (Murdoch, 1995:736). The formidable task then for regulationists is to predict the trajectory and form of these evolving patterns of development.

As Jessop (1990) contends regulation theory is a broad church with common intellectual roots which over time has evolved and diverged. Irrespective of which of these positions is taken a number of common elements persist. They all stress the complexity and inter-connectedness of the social, political and economic world. All argue that regulation theory represents a synthesis or matrix of ideas which both interact and overlap and which provide an insight into the structural forces shaping and redefining the nation state in a changing global economy. However, the veracity of regulation theory remains challenged and as Jordan (1990:329), echoing Jessop’s sentiments about the diverging trajectories of the different regulation schools, muses: “…any academic theory tends to become fashionable - at the cost of being amended into something approaching a caricature of the more sophisticated and cautious formulations of their originators.”

However, whether Fordism exists as a specific form of political economy is itself debatable. Whether we have entered a new era remains equally contentious. Indeed whether we accept Peck & Tickell’s caution that: “Regulation theory has a very weak grasp on the nature of the transition, being unable to identify a single motive force to drive the transition from one regime of accumulation to another” (Peck & Tickell, 1995:23 citing: Gertler, 1992:267; Tickell & Peck, 1992) is not the primary concern here. What it is possible to say with confidence is that we continue, through lack of evidence, to be convinced of the
direction of causality—or even the relevant magnitude—of the forces shaping
contemporary economic restructuring: do economic forces shape society or is it society that
shapes economic forces? The resolution of this conundrum requires significantly more
research. Of more importance to the argument examined here is the compelling evidence
assembled by the regulationists which suggests that the economic and social sphere are
fundamentally inter-related.

Regulation theory has been used to describe variously, the contours of a post-Fordist
regime of accumulation, or indeed to suggest that that process of transition is incomplete
and as yet emergent. In these accounts the evidence of restructuring is not in dispute: the
dispute lies in whether the phenomena of restructuring collectively constitutes a new
regime of accumulation. What is compelling about the various regulationist accounts of
changes in the state is the importance attached to the growth of new forms of production
and the associated organisational relations this imparts. What the regulation debate does is
to draw attention to the evidence of changes in capitalist economies. The predicament for
the regulationists lies not in the paucity of evidence of change, because this is not in
dispute, rather their problem is in making sense of what these changes mean. Do these
changes constitute a new form of capitalist production? If so, what are the social
implications of this? The importance of regulation theory to this thesis lies not in the
observation that its adherents and critics disagree on whether a new regime of accumulation
has emerged to replace Fordism, rather, it is that—arriving from different directions—each
observe and comment on the growth of a new organisational form, namely the flexible firm,
archetypically constituted around a nexus of networks.
Flexible specialisation

Without necessarily resolving the economic/social controversy contained in a totalizing theory—like regulation theory—discussed above, a number of academics drew attention to the existence of a number of discrete industrial districts where, it was suggested, a new type of industrial space was being created. In these locations traditional relations between firms had been displaced by a new form of co-ordination: the networked firm (Amin & Thrift, 1992; Morgan, 1992; Cooke & Morgan, 1993; Murdoch, 1995). In these areas networks were prolific and it was reasoned that it was the existence of these dense network relations that had contributed to their success and that this phenomena represented a new model of capitalist development.

The precursor to much of this work was the seminal book by Piore & Sabel (1984) which developed the concept of ‘flexible specialisation’. They argued that we had entered a qualitatively new industrial age which they termed the ‘Second Industrial Divide’. Piore & Sabel however disagree with the regulationist school on a number of issues. Like the regulation school they take as their point of departure the concept of Fordism as a description of the dominant socio-economic paradigm. Whereas a regulationist approach sees the concept of capitalism as a mode of production; with capitalism as a contradictory and inherently crisis-ridden economic system which requires some form of institutional regulation for its continued reproduction (Hirst & Zeitlin, 1991:18) they rejected this as reductionist. Fundamental to the flexible specialisation thesis was an emphasis on the regulation of the social dimension of industrial organisation. Their research, based on case studies, drew attention to the importance of institutional structures and arrangements which supported the mediation of competition.
Their work identified a number of industrial districts which had successfully repositioned themselves in a growing international economy. In these areas they documented a range of structures or organisations which had evolved—or had been specifically developed—in order to diffuse innovative practices and promote relationships which encouraged a climate of co-operation and trust. They argued that successful industrial districts were defined by three mutually dependent characteristics (Piore & Sabel, 1984:29):

1. the districts’ relation to the market;
2. their flexible use of increasingly productive, widely applicable technology; and
3. their creation of regional institutions that balanced co-operation and competition amongst firms

Having argued that the first industrial divide occurred in the early nineteenth century with the victory of mass production over craft production their book sought to refute the idea that the mass production paradigm’s success was absolute. They then give an account of the mass-production-economy in crisis in which they attribute the deterioration in economic performance from the inherent: “…limits of the model of industrial development that is founded on mass production…” (Piore & Sabel, 1984:4).

Their research and historical analysis focuses on a simple dichotomy of industrial production along the cleavage of mass production / craft production; with the former becoming the dominant economic paradigm in the post-war period. They go on to show that the domination of the Fordist mass production paradigm did not in fact lead to the entire subjugation of craft skills. Instead they argue that the survival of craft skills is a fundamental and important element of capitalist mass production techniques. Thus paradoxically, a second and contrary form of production [craft skills] is inherent in the logic of mass production (1984:27). For them then, in opposition to Marxist determinism or regulationist’s reductionism: “Industrial technology does not grow out of a self-contained
logic of scientific or technical necessity…” (1984:5) rather, at certain key points in history the path of technological development can diverge in a number of directions. At these industrial divides “social conflicts of the most apparently unrelated kinds determine the direction of technological development for the following decades” (1984:5).

What Piore & Sabel’s book and the literature on flexible specialisation spawned was an examination of the social fabric of industrial districts. The concern was to examine how firms were embedded in their localities. What was it that tied firms together? What were the characteristics and mechanisms which made these districts uniquely privileged in this new competitive global market? Emerging from this literature was the identification of the prime importance of network structures which, it was argued, were fundamentally important to the success and vitality of these industrial districts.

Both the regulationist and the flexible specialisation analysis seek to understand the forces underlying the processes of change in contemporary society. Each in their own way can be seen to offer a compelling account of the underlying mechanisms of contemporary restructuring. Each view has its adherents and critics and these have sought to expose the others shortcomings. It remains unlikely that this competition of ideas will be resolved objectively; if only because of the influence of Marxist ideas on regulation theory. The contested and subjective nature of any ideology always alienates some people. Consequently, for some, Marxism is a pejorative term and through association the credibility of regulation theory will always be questioned.

**SUMMARY**

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s partnerships and networks proliferated. This chapter suggests that the background to this growth should be seen in relation to changes to the
wider economy which have in effect fuelled proliferation. In the 1980s and 1990s a number of authors have sought to provide compelling accounts which might explain the dynamics of change in what was a turbulent, complex and increasingly global economy. What is extremely interesting is that two of the dominant theories which were extensively debated throughout this period, regulation theory and flexible specialisation, provide compelling accounts of restructuring which give primacy to the creation of new forms of organisational relations with new organisational logics. So, on the one hand, to resolve the crisis in capitalism, the regulationist literature identifies the importance of:

…the sedimentation of a culture of co-operation, trust and negotiability between firms trading with each other, as well as within firms, as a key condition underwriting the interdependence and flexibility demanded by this model of industrial organization (Amin, 1994a:21).

and all this is achieved through partnerships based upon a network approach to industrial organisation. On the other hand, to remain competitive and profitable in a capricious and highly volatile global marketplace, flexible specialisation theorists would argue that simply in order to survive a new relational approach to organisation is demanded. And once again the solution is the networked firm. Remarkably then each theory arriving from different ideological trajectories provides a rationale for the creation of networks and partnerships.
CHAPTER 6: THE COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIP

INTRODUCTION
Chapter two described the policy lineage of partnership initiatives. It sought to explain the particular form of the SRB in the context of the historical evolution of a regeneration policy that had its roots in the 1977 White Paper. Following this historical account of partnerships chapter three described the particular policy lineage of the SRB. Chapters four and five then sought to deconstruct the rhetoric of partnership to build a substantive critical theory of partnership. Having proposed a theoretical model of partnership chapter four concluded by moving from the abstract to the concrete by producing a partnership checklist.

The aim of this chapter is to move the level of analysis from the global to the local—from the abstract to the concrete—to examine the particular development trajectory of one SRB partnership, the Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership (CWP). The research was principally concerned to identify how this partnership was conceived. How it fitted into the existing institutional landscape. How it evolved. How developments in the evolution of the partnership structure shaped relations between partners and how these dynamics shaped the character of the subsequent bid for Single Regeneration Budget funding. (See Appendix (C): Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership Chronology for an account of key events).

Given that in Warwickshire plans to form a partnership organisation preceded the SRB, albeit by only a few months, an objective of the research is an attempt to understand why a partnership organisation was already being pursued and why did it form when it did. In this context it was also important to understand how it evolved in the critical early stage, specifically the chronology of involvement of the various participants prior to the formal
incorporation of the organisation as a partnership company limited by guarantee.

**BACKGROUND**

**SRB announcement**

The government announced the first round of the SRB on the 14th April 1994. The *Bidding Guidance* (DoE, 1994b) and detailed timetable for bid submission were published to accompany the announcement (see Figure 3.2: *Round One Bidding Timetable*).

Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership Limited was registered as a company limited by guarantee on 19th August 1994. The Board had 25 directors (see table 6.1 below) representing a range of organisations drawn from the sub-region; alongside these however the partnership listed fifty seven member organisations—see Appendix (D): *Membership of CWP at May 1995*.

**Table 6.1: CWP Board structure at May 1995**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber of Commerce and Training &amp; Enterprise Council</th>
<th>Local Authorities</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th>Further &amp; Higher Education</th>
<th>Community and Voluntary Sector</th>
<th>Trades Unions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Coventry & Warwickshire Partnerships Limited ~ Annual Report 1996 (CWP, 1996a))

Occurring only four months after the government’s announcement the speed with which the partnership was constructed had an important bearing upon the partnership subsequently assembled.

Preceding the introduction of the SRB the government issued a *Draft Bidding Guidance* in January 1994 inviting interested parties to comment. Responses were received from a variety of sectors including: local authority associations, local authorities, TECs, voluntary organisations, academic and specialist consultancies (HC, 1995b: para.12:3).
Representatives of the voluntary and community sectors, in particular, expressed severe reservations at the unreasonably short time scale preceding the introduction of a major policy initiative and the likely effect that this would have upon the quality of partnerships subsequently formed. Research by Mawson et al (1995) evaluating the first round of the SRB confirmed—in a prophetic echo of a previous period of urban experimentation, which saw the start of the Urban Programme sprung upon a largely unprepared local government—the negative impacts that arise when a major new policy initiative is introduced too quickly. Notwithstanding the obvious short time scale, Mawson argued that the resource imbalance between and statutory and non-statutory sectors was so marked that the non-statutory sectors would be unable to engage effectively with the statutory sector. Mawson and the NCVO (1994), amongst others, argued that if the government seriously intended SRB partnerships to include a range of partners then steps should be taken to overcome both the material and the organisational disadvantages inherent in the bidding process. Mawson proposed that the resource imbalance could be mitigated by directly investing in the capacity of the non-statutory sectors in order that they might more effectively engage with statutory agencies in the process of partnership building. Significantly, whilst acknowledging these criticisms the government were not convinced of the merits of setting aside any portion of the SRB for capacity building arguing that such measures were already in place—see the Government Response to the Environment Committee ~ First Report into the Single Regeneration Budget Cm 3178 (HMSO, 1996a), details of these extant measures are listed as Appendix (E): Extant Capacity Building Measures; see also DETR (1998d) Community-Based Regeneration Initiatives: Working Paper.
**Partnership activity before the SRB**

The significance for the CWP of the short SRB bidding timetable is that, unlike the experience of many other SRB partnerships nationally, the CWP partnership had a substantive form prior to the SRB. The partners who would ultimately come together to form the CWP company had already been in discussions about the formation of a partnership organisation with which they might pursue common economic development objectives.

**Four core partners**

Even before its formal incorporation as a company limited by guarantee, with a specific SRB remit, a putative partnership organisation had been assembled amongst a group of core organisations. Individually, each of these organisations represented major players in the economic development of the sub-region in their own right:

1. Coventry City Council
2. Warwickshire County Council (WCC)
3. Coventry and Warwickshire TEC
4. The Warwickshire Chamber of Commerce and Industry

This meant that by the time of the official announcement of the SRB these core organisations were already working on a partnership initiative.

At that time the concept of working together in some form of partnership was a radical departure from traditional methods of working. This was especially the case for local authorities where partnership working was de facto an acceptance of a move from traditional dirigiste policy solutions, where they naturally assumed control, to a more innovative flexible approach to policy. In this sense a move to partnership working
represented a seismic shift in the way that local authorities [especially] but also other key statutory agencies approached joint working. This shift was radical not because it represented a new method of working because, as chapter two described, partnership was already a widely adopted method of working. Indeed, it was argued that partnership was so widely accepted that it had come to represent the accepted orthodoxy in economic regeneration. As a method of working then partnership was not, in the strictest sense, in any way radical. However, the seismic shift described here refers to a philosophical change rather than a literal one. The context for this change lay in the fact that economic, social and environmental problems remained and, in places like the inner cities, was getting worse (Robson et al DoE, 1994c:paras.xxxii / 5.3) but at the same time there was a grudging recognition by all those who had an interest in regeneration that the resources available to any individual organisation in no way matched the scale of the problem [Another echo from the 1977 White Paper]. This recognition arose in part as a by-product of the privatisation of policy that occurred under successive Conservative administrations. As chapter two argued, this process effectively removed the hegemony local authorities had enjoyed in the application of regeneration policy and also injected a range of alternative interests into the policy equation. This was also a period when ‘radical socialist alternatives’ were very publicly marginalised by a hostile central government and where local authorities were forced to confront the weakness of their own position – for a review of this literature see Boddy & Fudge, 1984. The reality for radical authorities was that they lacked both the resources and the autonomy of the central state with which they might hope to tackle many of the social and economic problems facing local communities. For many local authorities the lesson of this period of confrontational politics was that it simply exposed their impotence vis-à-vis central government.
The legacy of this period was twofold. First, it was clear to all involved that, when judged by the resources it attracts, regeneration has never been a government priority. Second, the analysis of what constitutes the regeneration problem has been continuously evolving. The problem was no longer simply viewed as one of poverty or unemployment but had expanded to include, for example, the competitiveness of a region, the quality of its environment, social exclusion, crime etc. The problem was increasingly being defined in ever more complex terms and this in turn demanded ever more complex solutions. In hindsight it is clear that the precedent set by City Challenge was the writing on the wall for the future shape of regeneration policy.

The new SRB initiative now demanded comprehensive solutions. This requirement became a threshold participants had to fulfil in order just to enter into a competition [that you might lose] for resources that in global terms were actually diminishing in real terms [see table 3.2 Expenditure on programmes within the SRB 1981/82-1994/95 in Mawson et al, 1995]. In this way the SRB changed the way statutory agencies thought about policy. Under the SRB it was understood that partnership was the only way of moving forward. The structure of the SRB and the way in which resources were distributed ensured that no individual sector could solve the problem alone or unilaterally dominate a partnership. The realpolitik of the SRB was that control could only be achieved through a process of bargaining and negotiation. Partnership had arrived again – having once more been redefined for the circumstances of the 1990s. The more astute players recognised this fact earlier than others and exploited this knowledge. Ultimately the rest were forced to acknowledge—often only after failure—the new political reality.

This philosophical shift took time to percolate through the institutional landscape.
Notwithstanding then the changes in philosophical outlook that enabled—for the first time—a partnership organisation an opportunity to ‘speak’ for the Coventry and Warwickshire sub-region, it is also equally important not to underestimate the degree of joint working that already existed between the core organisations. Previously, these core organisations had been involved in a variety of joint initiatives. The importance of these existing ties can be seen by the fact that they are acknowledged in the opening paragraph of the partnership’s draft economic strategy [this document describes itself as a position statement that was to form the basis of a wider consultation exercise. Indeed, the *Economic Strategy for Coventry & Warwickshire 1995-1998* (CWP, 1995) that evolved out of this consultation process, and was subsequently adopted, did in fact not diverge a great deal from the draft] which stated:

> In Coventry and Warwickshire there is a long history of liaison and ad-hoc alliances between agencies involved in actions to support the local economy. This reflects the inextricable links between the economies of the two areas based on Coventry’s industrial past and the dependency one has on the other for its economic success and employment prospects. Early successes of the Coventry and Warwickshire local authorities working in partnership with the Coventry and Warwickshire Training and Enterprise Council (TEC) and Chambers of Commerce to bid for UK and European Union (EU) help to restructure the local economy have demonstrated the power of collective action locally and played their part in fostering a new spirit of co-operation and mutual support (CWP, 1994 para.1.1).

Examples of this joint working include how the Coventry & Warwickshire TEC delivers training and education for Coventry City and also provides a similar service to WCC. Similarly, Coventry City Council [especially as regards their economic development brief] and the Warwickshire Chamber of Commerce and Industry share a common business agenda. These examples illustrate that joint working was a common experience for the organisations that would ultimately come together to form the core members of the CWP.
The draft strategy document *Meeting the Challenge of Change* (CWP, 1994) is primarily an audit of the extant partnership initiatives and provides an excellent overview of the range of measures engaged in by the various organisations in the sub-region. However, the importance of these examples lies more in the observation that they typically illustrate bi-lateral relations. The distinguishing and radical departure for the sub-region of the new partnership organisation was that for the first time all four of the core organisations voluntarily accepted the need to jointly co-ordinate their approach around a number of mutually agreed economic development objectives.

**FAULT LINES ~ THE SUB-REGIONAL LANDSCAPE**

*Tensions between county & city*

That all four of these organisations should accept the need to work in partnership would perhaps seem a natural extension to the examples of previous joint working. However, given their importance to the sub-region, a very important exception to these positive examples was the ambivalent relationship between Coventry City Council and WCC. Indeed, prior to the advent of the CWP a major problem bedevilling attempts to develop a sub-regional economic strategy was any agreed common agenda, or even an acceptable starting point from which to commence a dialogue between county and city. Separating these two dominant players in the sub-region were historical, political, economic and cultural differences that effectively precluded the possibility of joint working. A number of councillors interviewed observed that it was possible to characterise relations in two ways. If you took a sympathetic analysis. Then at the very least it could be said that the diversity between county and city created a climate of mutual indifference. A more cynical interpretation is also possible. This analysis sees the fractured relationship as the product of mutual animosity based upon competition and it is this that more realistically explains the
lack of any effective co-ordination on economic development matters.

In interviews with senior councillors in both councils it was repeatedly stated that prior to the CWP there had been nothing but mutual antipathy between city and county. A senior Coventry Labour councillor interviewed suggested that: “Coventry has a city state mentality, the ring road has taken over from the old city wall and it isn’t designed to help people get in, its designed to keep people out…”. On the other side similar sentiments were expressed by a senior WCC Labour councillor. Asked what was the nature of the relationship between the City and the county prior to the CWP initiative the councillor explained the longstanding historical antipathy existing between the two local authorities. Part of this antipathy he attributed as the result of the fractious reform of local government that occurred in 1972. During reorganisation the county lost influence in two ways.

**Loss of influence (I)**

First, the loss to the county was literal as the status of Coventry City changed to that of a metropolitan district and it was enlarged by the addition of certain areas of Warwickshire (Municipal Year Book, 1998). This boundary change, along with the creation of the West Midlands Metropolitan County (WMCC) that occurred at the same time, had the effect of removing a number of the county’s strategic functions it also meant a loss of direct influence in the areas ceded to Coventry and the WMCC. The case for reform had originally been made by the Redcliffe-Maud Commission. In metropolitan areas they had proposed a move to city regions with boundaries extending well beyond the traditional urban areas to cover areas corresponding roughly to travel-to-work areas—i.e., the implication for Coventry would be to move its boundaries outwards and into rural Warwickshire. In the event Coventry’s boundaries were adjusted, however, the effects were
marginal being more of an administrative tidying up of boundaries rather than any full scale reorganisation implicit in Redcliffe-Maud. The Conservative government of the day chose not to adopt the report’s recommendations in full. This was obviously politically expedient for them to do so, they understood that any radical redrawing of boundaries would have serious implications for its political base. Nationally, Shire counties have traditionally been dominated by Conservative administrations; any widening of the boundaries of urban authorities could potentially dilute Conservative strength in the Shires and simultaneously pose the threat of extending Labour influence beyond their existing traditional urban strongholds. This was clearly a politically unpalatable outcome. Given these concerns not unsurprisingly, under the circumstances, the logic of Redcliffe-Maud was tempered by political expediency. The outcome for Coventry was that its boundaries remained essentially constrained to its urban footprint. In contrast, the implications for WCC were:

…drastic, involving the removal of Coventry, Solihull and Sutton Coldfield.

The passage of the Local Government Act [vis The 1972 Local Government Act that became effective on 1st April 1974] therefore effected a dramatic change in the county of Warwickshire. Its boundaries, frequently noted through the years for their peculiarity, became even more irregular, assuming the shape of an inverted ‘C’ (Mitchell, 1988:xxi-xxii).

Perhaps more revealing in exposing underlying tensions was the implications for the county resulting from boundary changes:

The removal of these areas in the West Midlands ‘corridor’ brought with it a reduction of 29 per cent in the county’s population, demoting it from the thirteenth largest to the sixth smallest in the country…[and this]…loss was accompanied by a 19 per cent drop in the County Council’s administrative, professional, clerical and other grades of staff…(Mitchell, 1988:xxii).

Leach et al (1990:52) in research [albeit] examining the implications of the abolition of the
MCCs emphasised the personal dynamics flowing from reorganisation:

The antipathy to the metropolitan counties which was so strong in the mid 1970s, but still a significant force in the mid 1980s had little to do with the rational arguments for and against metropolitan counties per se. They had much more to do with the impact of the 1974 reorganisation on the interests of many of the key sector actors involved in the districts.

What Leach et al observed was that during abolition and the subsequent reorganisation of strategic functions “material interests, power and status could all in principle be affected” (1990:52). The research also observed that the threat of loss or diminution of these interests provided a fertile ground for mutual enmity. Interestingly, the research indicated that the legacy of the bitterness revealed in the 1974 reorganisation continued to cloud judgements [about the merits or effectiveness of the MCCs] long after the original event. What was particularly revealing—and relevant to this research—was the suggestion that the acrimony that had its origin in [one] particular reorganisation effectively became institutionalised through the collective [subjective] experience of the participants. This observation is all the more pertinent if you step back and take a longer historical perspective.

**Predatory neighbours**

Mitchell’s (1988) historical account of the development of WCC from its creation under The Local Government Act 1888 describes a catalogue of boundary conflicts with ‘predatory’ neighbours. It would appear that ever since it inception the county of Warwickshire has fought a series of acrimonious battles with neighbours with a voracious appetite for land for expansion. As Mitchell (1988:xiv) wryly notes: “Warwickshire was particularly fated in respect of boundaries in having to accommodate Birmingham and Coventry”. For Warwickshire this has meant that: “For most of its life one of [its] controlling ideological commitments had been the maintenance of the distinction between
town and country.” There seems little doubt that the rivalry that exists between Warwickshire county and the City of Coventry has a long lineage and these tensions were both evident and deeply ingrained in the institutional landscape long before the reorganisation in 1974. That fractious relations have persisted between the two authorities is in no small measure attributable to this acrimonious history of boundary skirmishes. Notwithstanding governments’ repeated attempts to review and instil some rationality in the structure and effective delivery of local government, history has allowed town and county to evolve in ‘splendid isolation’. Because of this Mitchell (1988:xiii) observes that: “Alterations in Warwickshire’s boundaries have always impinged upon ancient loyalties and aroused varying degrees of resentment.” This is nothing new. The President of the Local Government Board speaking of the [boundary] problem from an administrative point of view, can be seen to echo Leach’s research result about the longevity of bitterness

There is nothing which has created more feeling throughout the country than the supposition on the part of the inhabitants of the Counties that either County boundaries or their Union boundaries are to be altered…It is a feeling entirely sentimental; but Honourable Gentleman will understand that sentimental grievance is by no means the least difficult to overcome (quoted in Mitchell, 1988:xiii).

The significance of the comment is the date: 1888. Seen in this longer perspective the 1990s review of local government that saw districts pitted against county—threatening its very survival—is just yet another example of the principle of county government under siege. Understanding these historical developments helps to explain the tensions and ambivalent relationship that had developed between neighbours. Without the constant threat and the ever present need to defend itself from all sides, county politics may have proved to have been far less insular and introspective looking than it has historically been.
Loss of influence (II)

Beyond the obvious loss of resources resulting from reorganisation noted above, the second way that the county lost out over the City arose through an erosion of its political influence because of a shift in power to the newly constituted WMCC. With Warwickshire not part of the WMCC it was in the unfortunate position of having no direct influence on a major policy body right on its doorstep. In contrast, Coventry as part of the metropolitan county, took the opportunity to exert influence in what was a major political innovation; with this situation considerably improving as, over time, all the MCCs came to be Labour controlled. Coventry with its long history of Labour control consistently returned only a minority Conservative presence. The implication of isolation was political imbalance. Taken together, it is clear that any erosion of Conservative influence, even where this occurred from historically modest levels, simply reinforced Labour’s domination and these circumstances simply compounded the existing town and county dichotomy.

However, other fault lines run as deep, if not deeper, than the obvious historical political cleavage between county and city and these fault lines operate on a number of different levels. Coventry for example, is a urban environment with an economy based predominantly on [automotive] manufacturing. Whilst in contrast, Warwickshire is a rural environment, with an economy based predominantly on services – with parts of Warwickshire having been farmed for some ‘five thousand years’ (Mitchell, 1988:iv). The distinctive characters of county and city can be seen to reflect these widely divergent historical and cultural traditions. It could be argued that the process of local government reform [both 1972 and more recently in the 1990s] has only sought to compound these historically embedded differences and feed a sense of mutual ambivalence. The political
reality of a schism between the county and the city, and the basis of much of the underlying tension from which it is derived, was succinctly captured by a WCC Conservative councillor’s observation that: “Coventry had the jobs but Warwickshire had the land”.

**County / City cleavage**

In geopolitical terms, after reform, the Shire county resembled a part eaten doughnut – see figure 6.1. It had become physically disengaged, loosing parts of its area and, with it, influence it might have had there on strategic matters; and because of Labour’s urban dominance it was now completely politically disengaged. The county / city cleavage was now complete: it was both spatial and political. These very different trajectories were simply reinforced by the divergent history and culture of the two areas. It is understanding this background that helps to explain why it was that, from a county perspective, Coventry City Council could be caricatured as the ‘dreaded enemy’ and that because of this animosity, you would “perish the thought” of mutual assistance (interview with Warwickshire Labour councillor). Interestingly, in Warwickshire, at the county level, this mutual antipathy towards the City appeared to have been accepted as almost an apolitical act of faith. That these sentiments crossed the political divide at WCC can be seen from the comments of a senior WCC Conservative councillor who asserted that: “irrespective of which party was in power in Warwickshire, there wasn’t a lot of love lost politically between the two [the county and the City] councils”.
**Figure 6.1: The sub-region**

*NB*: The map is for illustrative purposes only. The actual administrative boundary of Warwickshire extends westwards. With Coventry Unitary authority at its centre and with Solihull removed during Local Government Boundary changes the map graphically illustrates Warwickshire’s inverted ‘C’ footprint. Solihull, although actually coterminous is shown detached for emphasis. Solihull formally applied to join the CWP becoming a member in mid 1998.
**County politics**

Historically then political rivalry was an obvious ‘fault line’ running through county / city relations, with the City a Labour bastion and the county traditionally Conservative. Although clearly never apolitical, prior to the 1980s county politics were not characterised by overt politicisation or the polarisation of politics that was endemic in the national political arena. Indeed, the county’s conservatism prior to the 1980s was of the small ‘c’ variety, with the politicisation of county politics only becoming a significant electoral issue following the economic downturn of the early 1980s. The growing trend towards politicisation of local government was not only a county phenomenon it had been an important factor identified by Widdicombe (HMSO, 1986); Leach (1987). Even after the 1980s a senior WCC Conservative councillor noted, without any hint of irony, that: “The difference between the Labour and Conservative on Warwickshire council the man in the street would be hard pushed to define what the difference was.” While there was certainly competition for control of the county throughout the 1980s – and control changed hands reflecting the shifting fortunes of the various political factions – party affiliation did not automatically constitute a major point of conflict. That this sentiment was more widely held was supported by a comment made in an interview with a senior Labour county councillor. He suggested that because the distribution of seats amongst the various political parties within the county is ‘fairly evenly balanced’ and that, ‘even in the worst years of the various Conservative governments they [Conservatives] still had a substantial representation’. It was his belief that this relatively stable political climate, the political fundamentals, influenced the way in which all the parties operate. This has meant that:
…in the county, in the Shires, we learn to work with our opponents for practical reasons. You’re not going to get anything done if you shout and argue with each other. Now the MCCs can’t understand this because at both Coventry and at Birmingham they’ve got so much of an overwhelming majority at the moment.

By the 1980s the Conservatives had been in control at WCC for over twenty years. This position was only relinquished in 1985 to a [unofficial] coalition of Labour and Liberal Democrats supported by independents. The Conservatives briefly took back control again with the support of minority parties following the 1989 elections but this slim advantage was overturned within a year. Following further erosion of Conservative support at the county, Labour as the largest party, took effective control following the 1993 by-elections.

Table 6.2: Distribution of seats on Warwickshire County Council 1979-98

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(source: Municipal Journal’s various years; WCC)

Table 6.3: Growth of Conservative opposition on WCC 1979-98 (% of seats)

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<td>68</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(source: adapted from table 6.2 above: Row two is the percentage of seats held by Conservatives; row three Labour seats; row four combines all non-Conservative seats to show the growth of opposition)

Table 6.3 above reflects the changing political dynamics on WCC and the gradual erosion
of Conservative power from the late 70s. The table seeks to illustrate the strength of the combined opposition to the Conservative administration which grew throughout the period. Several points emerge. First, following local elections in 1982, the Conservative’s lost their majority; opposition parties taken together now held more than 50% of all seats, potentially threatening the Conservative’s absolute majority. In 1994 Labour substantially increased the number of seats which although not bringing absolute control in numerical terms gave them de facto control over the Conservatives and the administration.

Labour’s triumph represented an enormous reversal of fortunes for the Conservatives and a rude awakening. This was an uncomfortable psychological blow to a party given to believing in its natural right to lead. This was doubly galling by the fact that the Conservatives’ losses had (for the first time ever) presented Labour with control of the county. But for Labour, control provided a window of opportunity to actively pursue a number of policy innovations that would subsequently have a direct impact upon the formation of a sub-regional partnership.

**Political contradictions**

A closer examination of the sub-region reveals an extremely complex and often contradictory political landscape. The perhaps obvious and understandable political cleavage that had historically marred relations between a Shire county and a metropolitan City is only one dimension. Remarkably then at the same time, within the county, the political distance between parties that nominally sit in ‘opposition’ was marginal.

The socialists at Coventry basically make the Labour members in Warwickshire look like Conservatives because obviously they [Coventry councillors] are much more to the Left by and large than they are in Warwickshire (senior WCC Conservative councillor).

These sentiments help to explain why it was that even when Labour took power in WCC
there remained a considerable political gulf between WCC and Coventry. The legacy of distrust and mutual indifference that had built up over time did not automatically disappear just because both authorities were now led by Labour administrations. Having successfully managed to avoid working together for so long the two authorities needed to be convinced of the merits of partnership working. The enormity of Labour’s achievement in taking control of a shire county was equivalent to a revolution in county politics: given its history, for WCC to then consider working with Coventry was a comparable revolution. However, the changing relations between county and city cannot be simply explained away by an electoral shift in county politics. Given the different character of Labour politics at county and city it is clear that political determinism alone does not explain the improvement in relations between the two authorities. Whilst a common politics may have created a more fertile terrain upon which improving relations could be built between the two local authorities, it does not on its own explain how they would come to share a common economic development trajectory within the CWP. For this to occur required other catalysts.

This complicated political landscape is further exposed when the five district councils within the sub-region are brought into the equation; their involvement only adds further layers of complexity and exaggerates the potential grounds for sub-regional rivalry. Closer examination of the relations between these tiers reveals further contradictions that explain some of the tensions manifested in the sub-region. Leach (1987) provides an excellent account of the tensions inherent in the county / district cleavage.

**Tensions between county & districts**

The animosity which had historically dogged county / city relations extends into the
political quagmire that represents county / district and city / district relations. Indeed, a measure of the complexity and tensions underpinning sub-regional relations was evident in the degree of antipathy if not outright hostility between the various Labour groups within the sub-region. A measure of this political hostility was publicly exposed during the [rolling] Local Government Commission review which began in the early 1990s. In a telling indication of their mutual antipathy four of the five districts and WCC [who subsequently subscribed to the CWP] submitted separate submissions to the Local Government Commission in an attempt to present a case—typically at the expense of their neighbours—for unitary status or an extension of boundaries or functions or both – for a summary of the proposed options put forward by the councils see HMSO, 1994a).

The review process brought into sharp relief the extent of the political antagonisms between neighbours. In a more telling indictment of the nature of relations between local authorities the review conspicuously revealed the degree of mutual enmity that existed amongst Labour controlled councils. As a senior WCC Labour councillor observed: “You’ve got to bear in mind that a Labour district councillor hates a Labour county councillor more than his Conservative opponent.” Alongside the obvious stark political aspirations revealed by the submissions, the Local Government Commission review exposed the competitive nature of the relations between the authorities; this was clearly not a climate conducive to harmonious relations from which spontaneous co-ordination or the recognition of mutually advantageous strategic objectives could emerge.

**Structure of local government**

To get an insight into the origins of the tensions between the tiers of local government it is necessary to examine the structure of local government. In the Shire counties local
government operates on two tiers: county and district. [This is not true in the strictest sense but given the very limited powers that parish councils possess they are, for the purpose of this discussion, to all intents and purpose marginal players in relation to the two upper tiers] Because local government does not have unitary status in the Shires this has meant that certain strategic functions, and associated budgets, are administered by the county but their effects are felt in the districts. Crucially though, the strict hierarchical nature of a two tier administration however means that [on paper] the reverse is not true! The best examples of these strategic functions conducted by the upper tier, and perhaps the most important to local politicians because of their size [in relation to the whole budget], are education and social services. In the political sphere this has led to resentment by district councillors in what they see as continual political interference by the county in district matters. That this is important to the districts can be seen from the fact that concern with political interference was a recurrent theme in submissions by districts to the *Local Government Review*; where districts couched their argument in terms of the need for local government to be ‘nearer’ the people, closer, more sensitive and responsive to local needs. What districts wanted was to be their own master without the added complication of another tier of government looking over their shoulders telling them what to do. In the highly charged atmosphere surrounding the *Local Government Review* every argument advanced for greater autonomy by districts was a clear threat to the political survival of a county administration.

Yet for all this political animosity, paradoxically, a two tier administrative system had meant that although district councillors deeply resent county interference the political reality had been that the two tiers, regardless of political persuasion, by necessity, have had to work together and politically cohabit. The effect of this is to puncture and blur the
picture of an apparently strictly hierarchical administration that sees county hegemony. The political reality is that whilst the county may manage important strategic functions, districts actually deliver them—the fact is that the county does not have the manpower to deliver many of the services even if it wanted to. This means that in order for the county to achieve its objectives requires either the tacit support, or at the minimum, no resistance, from the districts. This interdependence makes the relationship between county and district much more subtle. It is certainly not the black and white picture of a ‘top-down’ relationship that would be inferred if the relationship were simply depicted in an organisation chart. Rather the complicated political landscape of county politics has created a much more intricate and diffuse pattern of power distribution between county and district. This blurring of the boundaries of power has meant that the relationship between the two tiers is actually much more interdependent than the rhetoric reveals and it is this symbiosis that appears to have instilled a large degree of political pragmatism into working relations.

**Tensions between city & district**

It has already been noted that Coventry has had a long period of Labour dominated administrations with a Conservative presence that has progressively diminished throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

**Table 6.4: Distribution of seats on Coventry City council (% of seats)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>79</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>81</th>
<th>82</th>
<th>83</th>
<th>84</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>86</th>
<th>87</th>
<th>88</th>
<th>89</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>91</th>
<th>92</th>
<th>93</th>
<th>94</th>
<th>95</th>
<th>96</th>
<th>97</th>
<th>98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cons</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lab</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(sources: *City of Coventry Civic Diary* – annual publication/ various years; *Coventry Committee Services)*

In stark contrast to the two tier administrative system operating in the Shires, Coventry as a metropolitan district effectively operates on unitary lines. The lack of a second tier makes for very real differences in character between the two authorities. The absence of a second
tier—whether that relationship is understood to be hierarchical or [viewed less deterministically] interdependent—shapes the way that Coventry manages its affairs and this impacts upon the character of the administration and its relations with other authorities.

It has been noted above that in a scenario that saw WCC secure a mandate to carry out a policy initiative it would need, at a minimum, the compliance of the district/s in order to implement or at least not stifle objectives. At the county the two tier administration has effectively institutionalised interdependence and so local councils have chosen to adopt pragmatic political relations, this being the only way that any of them could hope to achieve any objective. These relations have occurred because all the parties appear to have accepted their relative strength / impotence within their given structure of local government. This would appear to suggest that, in county politics, the structure of local government has had a direct effect upon the character of county politics and this in turn has impacted upon the nature of relations between the county and the districts. The important point that should not be overlooked is that pragmatism in political matters has not removed old enmities rather they are set aside. In Coventry, the dominance of a Labour administration, in power for a long period, combined with a marginal opposition operating under a unitary system of government produced an entirely different institutional character and this in turn impacted upon the nature of relations between the city and the surrounding authorities. What is remarkable is that with such different trajectories how is it that these very different organisations, after a period of neglect and indifference, came to work together in partnership?

**CATALYSTS FOR CHANGE**

*The impact of City Challenge on partnership thinking*

Remarkably then, at the very same time that political relations were floundering, the
national experience of City Challenge and pronouncements by government regarding the forthcoming SRB were having an important influence at officer level. That the government were convinced of both the merits and principles embodied in the City Challenge model—discussed in full in chapter three—were made clear by pronouncements by Michael Howard, Conservative SoS for the Environment who argued that:

Competitive bidding for inner city funds…has dramatically changed the attitudes of local authorities in their quest for urban regeneration.
Working closely in partnership with the Government, the private sector and voluntary bodies has made them think afresh about how they can bring about real and lasting benefits to the people in their areas…It is not only the winners who have benefited…Everyone taking part will have gained from the new relationship which they have forged with their partners. That is the real prize of City Challenge (Extracts from a speech to the Association of Metropolitan Authorities conference quoted in Planning 25/09/92)  [and]

I believe that City Challenge has been immensely successful in sparking off a new wave of urban regeneration. Its competitive edge has provided the spur to bring together partners to work hard for the benefit of their towns and communities…We want to take stock of progress in, and learn lessons from, the first two competitions (Extracts from a speech to British Property Federation seminar quoted in Planning 29/01/93).

In the context of the highly charged local political environment it was not surprising that there was little evidence of any spontaneous co-ordination of resources or any recognition of mutually advantageous strategic objectives. However, it was clear to observers of the wider policy environment that the national experience would feed into the evolving SRB agenda. A senior officer in the CWP [interviewed in November 1996] suggested that in complete contrast to the political hostility at the local level, a recognition of the changing national policy environment was seen to have encouraged a “spirit of co-operation at officer level.” In interviews, officers close to the process suggested that it was only after acknowledging this changing national political environment was it possible to then begin a wider discussion on sub-regional strategies.
A second crucial influence came to prominence at the start of the 1990s. Unemployment was rising throughout the UK and its effects were particularly sharply felt throughout the sub-region. As the UK slipped into recession the West Midlands followed. The internationalisation of the manufacturing economy that had continued apace throughout the 1980s meant that the Coventry economy, relying as it did on manufacturing exports suffered particularly badly. Warwickshire, which had secured substantial growth through the development of the service sector was not immune to these global pressures as service industries shed jobs. Warwickshire was particularly vulnerable and in fact had to bear a double burden. On the one hand the county lost service sector jobs. On the other hand its position was compounded further by the economic downturn in Coventry where many of its residents commuted to work.

Table 6.5: Unemployment in the CWP area 1990-98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>91</th>
<th>92</th>
<th>93</th>
<th>94</th>
<th>95</th>
<th>96</th>
<th>97</th>
<th>98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coventry</td>
<td>147,504</td>
<td>191,975</td>
<td>240,727</td>
<td>241,874</td>
<td>201,441</td>
<td>165,387</td>
<td>151,821</td>
<td>113,068</td>
<td>98,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Warwickshire</td>
<td>14,214</td>
<td>21,963</td>
<td>31,082</td>
<td>32,352</td>
<td>25,467</td>
<td>19,589</td>
<td>16,847</td>
<td>11,630</td>
<td>9,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuneaton &amp; Bedworth</td>
<td>33,899</td>
<td>52,669</td>
<td>73,178</td>
<td>72,975</td>
<td>60,821</td>
<td>47,183</td>
<td>39,634</td>
<td>30,571</td>
<td>25,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugby</td>
<td>18,329</td>
<td>30,727</td>
<td>42,305</td>
<td>43,974</td>
<td>36,434</td>
<td>30,036</td>
<td>25,834</td>
<td>18,858</td>
<td>15,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratford</td>
<td>12,935</td>
<td>25,477</td>
<td>37,075</td>
<td>40,180</td>
<td>33,911</td>
<td>27,090</td>
<td>22,818</td>
<td>15,903</td>
<td>12,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick</td>
<td>24,043</td>
<td>39,631</td>
<td>53,441</td>
<td>54,780</td>
<td>45,672</td>
<td>37,624</td>
<td>32,481</td>
<td>23,232</td>
<td>20,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals =</td>
<td>250,924</td>
<td>362,442</td>
<td>477,808</td>
<td>486,135</td>
<td>403,746</td>
<td>326,909</td>
<td>289,435</td>
<td>213,262</td>
<td>181,911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% change: +44 +32 +2 -17 -19 -11 -26 -15

(source: provided by WCC Committee services)

Table 6.5 illustrates the impact of recession on the CWP area. What the figures show is the rate of increase in employment throughout the CWP area in the early 1990s. The point to note is the context within which discussions surrounding the development of a partnership initiative had been taking place. Although by the time of formal incorporation the economy had turned the corner—with unemployment beginning to fall from 1994—the early
discussions took place during a period of a dramatically rising unemployment. What the recession of the early 1990s did was to emphasise to the two major players in the sub-region the degree of interdependence between their economies. It painfully revealed their vulnerability to external shocks. What did not go unnoticed however, and what was crucially significant for future developments in the sub-region, was that the severity of the impacts of external shocks was interpreted as a [growing] measure of the internationalisation of the sub-regional economy. It was clear that the local economy had become [even more] intimately linked, and exposed to, the vagaries of a global economy. The slowdown in the economy and the growth of unemployment had a significant impact on a number of influential figures involved in economic development in the sub-region. These themes taken together: the philosophical change in how national regeneration policy should be delivered, a growing realisation of the impotence of local economies in the face of global forces and rapidly rising unemployment, changed the way the core partners thought about each other and helped to create an environment that was more conducive to partnership working.

**Political convergence at county and city**

The obvious county / city political cleavage of an urban Labour authority and a rural Conservative county was overtaken by events. Following local government elections in May 1993, Labour, with the support of three independent councillors, took control of WCC for the first time in its history. The incoming Labour administration came into office with a more interventionist platform than its predecessor and from the start sought to realign the County’s economic strategies to reflect the new political order. The historically divergent trajectories of the city and the [previously] Conservative-led county administration is
clearly revealed in the importance each authority attached to economic development. During the late 1980s and early 1990s while Coventry was expanding its economic development activities, paradoxically, WCC reduced the status of economic development by abolishing its Economic Development Committee—resolution passed by full council on 10th July 1990.

One of the new Labour administration’s first acts in office was to set up a working party to: discuss the importance of Economic Development; the need for a committee; and to work out an Economic Development strategy (Interview with senior WCC Labour councillor). Following this new political agenda and in order to advance the Labour group’s own economic objectives an economic development policy working party was established by the council and met for the first time in October 1993. Shortly after this it was itself succeeded by a economic development panel in March 1994. Following these initiatives an Economic Development Sub-committee was formally [re]established by the council and it met for the first time in July 1994 (WCC Committee Services).

It is difficult to overestimate the impact on the sub-regional political landscape of the arrival into office of a Labour administration at WCC. Labour’s entry into power—in what had been a longstanding Tory Shire—represented nothing less than a revolution in county politics. But of greater significance for the future CWP was that Labour’s ascendancy provided a window of opportunity within which the County’s and the City’s politics converged.

**Coventry leading partnership**

Interviews conducted with a range of partners indicated that the leadership of Coventry City Council was pivotal in stimulating the development of a partnership initiative. In
particular, Duncan Sutherland, who took up the post of Director of City Development at Coventry City Council on 11th January 1993 [coinciding with record levels of unemployment in the Coventry and Warwickshire sub-region – peaking at 11.2% in January 1993 with a national average of 10.8% (Challenges and Opportunities, 1998:19)] was widely credited by participants as a driving force behind attempts to develop a partnership approach to economic development.

By the early 1990s sentiments between the four core partners had converged sufficiently to offer up an opportunity to develop a sub-regional partnership for this part of the West Midlands. Ostensibly, the drive and conviction of a number of influential personalities proselytising the partnership concept suddenly found a receptive audience. That these ideas proved fertile lay as much in the merits of the partnership argument as to the fortuitous coincidence of the change in county politics, economic decline [recession] and philosophic changes [at a national level] surrounding the delivery of regeneration policy. Disaggregating the relative weight of each of these factors is extremely difficult but taken together they contributed to a climate conducive to partnership formation. This was quite a remarkable change of events as this objective had consistently eluded organisations involved in economic development in the sub-region. Nick Scheele, CWP’s first chairman, succinctly captured the dilemma and the strategic aspirations of the CWP in an editorial in their publication, *A Partnership for Prosperity*. The CWP is:

…a great improvement from the days when Coventry lost its natural hinterland and Warwickshire lost its geographical heart with the formation of the metropolitan council. To consider the economy of the Coventry and Warwickshire sub-region without recognising the considerable amount of interaction there is between the two districts is a nonsense…Coventry is very tight on its boundaries and needs to relate to Warwickshire.
Equally Warwickshire needs to relate to Coventry for without it the county loses its hub (CWP, 1996c).

**Partnership logic**

Sutherland believed that statutory agencies should be co-ordinating their efforts; the logic of his approach was to prevent wasteful duplication and harmful competition. The first obstacle was to develop a co-ordinated economic strategy which all the participants to a partnership could sign-up to. A tactic deliberately chosen by Sutherland was to pursue a narrow economic focused strategy. The rationale for this approach was that, given the historical political and cultural diversity in the sub-region, the pursuit of a narrow economic remit would make it easier to secure common ground. It was reasoned that a narrow objective would present less opportunities for partners to be drawn into the potentially controversial area of ‘socially driven’ expenditure programmes where consensus—amongst a group of such disparate partners—on a strategy might not so easily be reached. The logic of the original scheme envisaged by Sutherland was that, with the agreement of partners, a number of subsidiary companies would be set up to deliver specific elements of the CWP economic strategy (CWP, 1995: para.11). The method of delivery for the strategy deliberately proposed a partnership vehicle. This was perceived to offer certain practical advantages, chief amongst which was that a partnership vehicle should—theoretically at least—have no one dominant partner; and it was this quality which commended it to partners who expressed reservations [like the TEC] about the potential domination of the scheme by Coventry City Council. In addition, the proposal to create a number of discrete companies was also seen to acknowledge, and be sensitive to, the diversity of interests within the sub-region. An economic development structure based around a number of discrete partnership vehicles offered partners the opportunity of discretionary involvement.
(i.e., you contribute where you share a common interest) within a strategically agreed framework. In the event only one company has been formed, Business Link Coventry and Warwickshire Limited but the CWP has been responsible for co-ordinating member organisations in conferences, promotional activities and a number of IT initiatives.

**A narrow concept of partnership**

Sutherland’s initial partnership concept was cast narrower than what was ultimately to become the CWP. His original idea simply envisaged a Coventry Partnership that incorporated key public and private sector players within the City. At the time Coventry had an established working relationship with, what was then, the TEC and with whom it had co-operated successfully on a number of education and training initiatives and a European Regional Strategy document. It also had a working relationship with the Chamber which was a conduit to the private sector, especially small firms. Although the Chamber was regarded as ineffectual privately it was conceded [in interviews with CWP officers] that their involvement was deemed essential in order not to ostracise the private sector. The city was also closely involved with the two universities [described in SRB documents as the ‘private sector’] within the city boundaries: Warwick and Coventry. However the city’s initial attempt to formalise a working partnership with the TEC and the private sector met with resistance. The principal problem with the TEC was that its mandate was county wide. The view was taken by the TEC that entering into a relationship with Coventry could prejudice its relations with other significant partners in its area – this sensitivity is not surprising in the context of the history of local political conflict. Another obstacle arose from an unlikely quarter. “He [Sutherland] comes up not against the Left-wingers at Coventry but against the private sector” (Interview with a CWP director). Even before the
SRB had been announced Sutherland had anticipated the need to incorporate the private sector in order to exploit their expertise, their procedural innovations and their resources. His original partnership strategy envisaged creating opportunities for the private sector to become more centrally involved in the City’s economic development initiatives. However, unlike Coventry with its sharply circumscribed, and with what was perceived [by the private sector] to be arbitrary geographical boundaries, the private sector took the view that it thought that WCC should be involved because clearly what was being suggested was really part of a sub-regional issue (Interview with a CWP director). Given these sentiments Coventry approached the county to invite them to join the partnership initiative. One of the consequences arising directly out of this invitation was that WCC determined that it could not participate without the support of the districts in the county—this was for practical delivery reasons and the fact that deprivation lies within district boundaries as has been discussed previously. The quid pro quo of county participation was involvement of the districts. The issue that then arose is how they would be accommodated within the developing partnership structure.

**The development of a sub-regional partnership strategy**

On 29th March 1994 Duncan Sutherland (Director of City Development at Coventry City Council) produced a report to the Policy and Advisory Committee entitled: *Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships* (City of Coventry, 1994). The purpose of the report was to:

> …outline proposals for the establishment of an economic development partnership company to operate throughout Coventry and Warwickshire. This proposal is being made as it provides the most effective mechanism for the City Council, as the democratically elected local government, to join with others to promote the growth of the local economy and the well-being of the area. *Informal discussions are being held with Warwickshire concerning the extension of the partnership area to the whole sub-region* {my emphasis}. 


The report sketched out Sutherland’s strategy which envisaged the creation of a Partnership Company, *Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships*, which:

{para.1.3} …is likely to take the form of an umbrella company responsible for strategy and a series of delivery companies and initiatives responsible for implementing parts of the strategy e.g. tourism or the centenary of the motor car. [and]

{para.4.3} The strategy will be delivered through a variety of means depending on which is the most effective in each case. [and]

{para.4.4} Where a part of the strategy falls within the province of one member of the Company that member will deliver that part of the strategy directly. Where many members want to contribute towards the same element of the strategy or there is a need to focus on a specific topic or issue, that part of the strategy will be delivered in partnership. The partnership will take different forms, e.g.,

- 100% owned subsidiary companies of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships (possible examples are 1996 Centenary of the Motor Car and Coventry Tourism Convention Bureau Company).
- Stand alone joint ventures between members of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships and third parties (possible examples are property joint ventures).
- Looser partnerships and associations (possible examples are joint marketing campaigns).

The Policy and Advisory Committee approved the establishment of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Limited and authorised: “…the officers to negotiate with Warwickshire County Council with a view to that authority becoming a founder member of the company” (Minutes of Policy Advisory Committee, {para.124f:37} 29/03/94). Although approval to establish a partnership was reached in March 1994 informal discussions between senior representatives of the county and city had begun as early as July 1993. From the outset Sutherland’s partnership model only involved the city, the TEC, and the Chamber, and only after pressure was this broadened to incorporate the county council. Before any substantive actions could be undertaken the partnership was overtaken by events.
From provisional partnership to SRB bid

Following the government’s announcement of the round one SRB timetable on 14th April 1994 the core group [Coventry City Council, WCC, Coventry and Warwickshire TEC and the Warwickshire Chamber of Commerce and Industry] set about reorienting their original partnership to one tailored to meeting the demands of the SRB. Occurring as it did so early on in the life of the partnership the SRB can be seen to have been both a stimulus for the formal establishment of a sub-regional partnership and a vehicle to prove that partnership was indeed possible. At the time of the announcement discussions amongst the core group were at a preliminary stage and no substantive actions had been undertaken. For the core group then the SRB initiative was a catalyst that helped coalesce the putative partnership into the formal entity that subsequently become the CWP. The SRB helped encourage the formation of the CWP partnerships in two important ways. It did this first of all by providing a rationale for partnership: only partnerships get government money. Second, it defined the structural framework for a participating organisation: partnership.

Pre-empting the government’s SRB announcement Coventry City Council took the initiative and assembled a SRB ‘Bid Co-ordination Team’ in March 1994. This action was enormously significant because it preceded the CWP by approximately five months which legally only came into existence in August 1994. The decisions that were taken by the core partners in this period fundamentally shaped the character of the SRB bid and de facto effectively occurred in a strategic vacuum. At the very least crucial strategic decisions taken at this stage could not have been endorsed by the partnership as it did not yet exist.

The Bid Co-ordination Team first step was to set up a SRB Steering Group consisting of officers representing the four core partners and with their agreement and a strong steer from
Sutherland, also included other interests who were invited to join the team. The team operated from day one and included about 20 people and was split into Theme Groups consisting of persons who could bring specific areas of expertise and co-opted additional expertise as and where required (Interview with CWP officer November 1996). Although the partners accepted that the principle benefits arising from partnership working would be greater co-ordination and more effective delivery of policy this had not in practice been worked out. This meant that when the SRB was announced the partners were still very much engaged in discussions designed to explore and identify common agendas. With an extremely tight SRB timetable suddenly thrust upon them the partners took an extremely pragmatic approach. Each of the partners had in their own right produced a strategic analysis for their own organisations and this information was pooled to provide a comprehensive analysis of the sub-region. The task of the Bid Co-ordination Team was to sift through this morass of information and identify, where possible, any common themes or concerns. Out of this came target areas and themes.

**The development of the SRB partnership**

Sutherland’s original strategy based upon the formation of a number of companies was overtaken by events. It can also be seen that there were a number of structural explanations for the demise of a [multiple] companies approach. In the published details accompanying the SRB announcement it was made clear to bidders that SRB grants could only be paid by GOs through a ‘Single Accountable Body’ (SAB). The SAB would be liable in full for the repayment of grant [to GOs] in the event of (either) a failure to deliver contracted outputs or as a consequence of mismanagement or maladministration. Given the potential financial liability associated with being a SAB this has typically, although not exclusively, meant
some form of statutory organisation with considerable resources/assets. Experience nationally has indicated that most SABs have been local authorities or TECs (see Mawson et al, 1995; Hall et al, 1996, 1997) but other existing organisations [e.g., private-sector led partnerships, long-standing voluntary or community organisations] with rigorous systems of management and accounting controls have been acceptable to GOs. A practical consequence of this approach has been that innovative partnerships without the support of a statutory undertaker, or a new partnerships without a track record, are unlikely to be acceptable to a GOR.

The designation of SAB was particularly complicated by the form of organisation adopted by the CWP.

From the outset CWP has been a membership company open to organisations that share CWP’s goals and seek to work in partnership with others to achieve the Economic Strategy. Following a membership drive in the autumn of 1994 membership built steadily in the first half of 1995, with nearly 60 organisations in Membership at the year end (CWP, 1995: para.3). [and]

CWP’s income is derived from substantial contributions from the City Council, the County Council and the TEC, and from membership income (CWP, 1995: para.4).

This structure reflected the desire to incorporate the diversity of interests from around the sub-region and feed these into a sub-regional economic strategy. But an additional stimulus for the particular form of partnership adopted was the fact that local authorities have no statutory authority to spend resources beyond their own territorial boundaries. The CWP was thus an [external and independent] organisation established by its members. Once constituted the membership company set up the CWP office. This office had a small secretariat with a mandate to bid for SRB funds in round two in 1995 and round three in 1996, although this mandate did not extend to the fourth round in 1997. However, this form
of organisation meant that the partnership company had no assets [of substance] and, so in the event of a breach of a SRB contract, could not reimburse its grant if required [for whatever reason] to do so by its GO.

For these reasons the CWP does not actually deliver any part of the SRB programme itself, instead there are nine Guarantor Organisations—who collectively act as the SAB—and with whom the CWP contracts to deliver the programme and who effectively underwrite the SRB bid.

Table 6.6: The original nine guarantors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Coventry &amp; Warwickshire TEC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Coventry University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>North Warwickshire Borough Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nuneaton &amp; Bedworth Borough Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Touchstone Housing (Brought in because Rugby DC refused)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>University of Warwick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Warwickshire County Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Warwickshire District Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The legal position of the Company is made clear in the partnership’s accounts which shows that:

Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership Limited acts as an agent for administering and claiming SRB grants. During the 17 month period to 31 December 1995 the Company received grants of £853,000 and distributed some £790,000 of this to its members and other associated organisations. As the company is the grant holder it is ultimately responsible for the grant conditions being met. Consequently, if the conditions of the grant funding are not met, repayments by the Company may be required, albeit that the Company would subsequently reclaim such repayments from the organisations that received the grant (CWP, 1996b).
**SUMMARY**

Given the formidable political obstacles that needed to be overcome it is hard to underestimate the enormous political achievement represented by the creation of the CWP. When the partnership was formally incorporated it represented an entirely new geopolitical structure in the sub-region. Historical and political rivalries stretching back decades had effectively prevented partnership working yet under the CWP these had been set aside. In the process for the first time county, city and districts were united under the umbrella of one partnership and even more remarkable was that the partnership included a wide cross section of voluntary, ethnic minority and private sector organisations.

That it could be established in such a short time was also remarkable. It is clear that personalities played a crucial role in the early stages. Duncan Sutherland’s appointment as Director of City Development at Coventry was pivotal in the early stages. It was his partnership paper that effectively started the ball rolling. However, the creation of the CWP cannot be explained by Sutherland alone. The partnership concept as set out by Sutherland was transformed as it meandered its way through the harsh realities of the political landscape. The fact that politics could play an important part in shaping the outcome of the kind of partnership created is itself an indication of the malleability and contested nature of the partnership concept. Without doubt recession, high unemployment, and the realisation that the philosophy of regeneration as understood by central government had changed, fundamentally influenced the four core partners making them more susceptible to partnership working. The fact that the four core partners appear to have successfully anticipated changes to the policy frame meant that they were already engaged on a partnership initiative prior to the announcement of the SRB and this certainly helped the partnership to assemble a successful SRB bid in the time available. The existing
relationship between the four core partners appears to have placed them in a particularly powerful position during the formative period of the partnership. The evidence would suggest that early participation provided a much greater opportunity to influence the final shape of the partnership and the policies that were adopted.

As the putative partnership developed each of the four core partners appears to have sought to extract concessions as the price of participation. Ultimately, the partnership that was delivered at the end of the process bore little resemblance to the one envisaged by Sutherland. The evidence suggests that Coventry exploited its acknowledged expertise in regeneration and the resources at its disposal to assert influence over the outcome of the SRB bid albeit along an agenda acceptable to the four core partners. The gestation of the partnership reveals the importance of the interplay between the four core partners and how this process shaped the final outcome. The significance of this interplay for the discussion on partnership is that the four core partners arrived at their conclusions in isolation from the wider community. Notwithstanding that the four core partners represent wider interests, the experience of the CWP and the first round SRB strategy that finally evolved from it, was that it was effectively an internally managed process.
CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH RESULTS

INTRODUCTION

Objectives

This objective of the chapter is to take the conceptual understanding of partnership developed in chapter four and apply it to a real partnership. The checklist approach was therefore a deliberate attempt to develop a conceptual toolkit that used the theoretical insights from chapter four but provided a methodology that could be applied in a practical situation. Taking the toolkit and applying it to a SRB partnership offered an insight into both the state of partnership relations in contemporary regeneration policy and also revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the toolkit methodology in understanding partnership relations.

Methodology

The Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership (CWP) was chosen because it was an unusual SRB partnership with a number of interesting properties which made it particularly appealing to study. Nationally the experience has been that where SRB partnerships bring together local authorities this has typically involved adjacent authorities who share coterminous boundaries or a county authority working with a district. Reporting in 1998 the DETR were still able to observe that regions are [still] not comprehensively covered by sub-regional partnerships (DETR, 1998e).

The CWP was therefore novel in terms of the national experience because it brought together the county council, the city and the districts—each with distinctly different identities—and de facto, by its spatial coverage, created a entirely new sub-regional institution. This achievement, let alone the CWP partnership’s success in attracting partners
from the private, community and voluntary sectors, was all the more remarkable given the history of the area and the absence of any previous experience of joint working on such a comprehensive scale.

**Theory meets practice**

In chapter four it was argued that a coherent theoretical model of partnership did not exist. To address this lacuna a model of partnership was postulated which took as its starting point that partnership represented a specific form of co-ordination. This approach acknowledged the widespread abuse of the generic term partnership and the absence of any critical theory of partnership. In order to endow partnership with some meaningful and critical conceptual validity and to provide a foundation upon which to build a theory of partnership it was argued that partnership would have a specific partnership logic. Crucially, partnership logic would be **distinct** from other logics and this would differentiate it from other forms of co-ordination. In looking at the problem in this way an intellectual bridge could be made linking the theoretical literature on co-ordination with that of partnership.

To develop a theoretical model of partnership—a model which was both critical and objective—required the deconstruction of forms of co-ordination in order to identify what might be considered as categorical partnership qualities and this was the approach adopted in chapter four. It was argued in chapter four that a true partnership was endowed with specific institutional and organisational qualities which both distinguished it and contrasted it from other forms of co-ordination. The principle research task then was to develop a conceptual model that could be applied to a real world situation. The checklist should therefore be seen as an analytical toolbox where each item on the list represents an element
of the theoretical insight developed in chapter four. This chapter thus seeks to record the results of applying the checklist to one SRB partnership.

**TESTING THE CWP AGAINST THE PARTNERSHIP CHECKLIST**

**The checklist**

The theoretical analysis in chapter four deconstructed partnership. The analysis identified a number of different organisational logics. However, the principle concern of the research was to isolate and categorise what might be described as the essential partnership logic, what the government describe as ‘true’ partnerships. The theoretical analysis suggested that organisations operating with a partnership logic were in fact a distinct sub-set of the wider group of organisational logics. In order to be able to isolate partnership logic from the wider set of organisational logics a partnership checklist was developed. The purpose of this was to provide an intellectual toolkit that could be used to test the quality of organisational relations. In principle then, forms of co-ordination that match the partnership checklist might accurately be described as partnership. Axiomatically, where organisational relations did not satisfy the definition of partnership implicit in the partnership checklist then **they could not be described as partnership.**

The purpose then of this chapter is to systematically apply the checklist to the experience of the CWP. Testing the CWP in this way allows a comparison to be made between the relations predicted in the theoretical model with experience on the ground. The checklist is reproduced below for reference.
The partnership checklist

1. Power sharing
2. Agreement on key issues
3. Organisational learning
4. Independent arbitration
5. Mutual reorientation
6. Standing orders
7. Entered into voluntarily
8. Accountability supported by sanctions
9. Participation strategy
10. Expenditure audit

Complementing the partnership checklist the research uses five primary data sources to better understand the context within which the partnership was assembled, these included:

1. Semi-structured interview with partners;
2. Interview with Government Office personnel;
3. Bid documents / Annual Delivery Plans;
4. Published partnership material;
5. Local authority published material.

[a complete list of partners and organisations interviewed in connection with the research is listed in Appendix (F)]

POWER SHARING

to avoid the accusation that a partnership is nothing more than the clear domination of one party over another then partners should share power

There are a number of ways in which the concept of power sharing can be evaluated within the CWP. One way that it can be examined is through its formal executive structure.

Structure of the CWP Board

The CWP came into existence on the 19th August 1994 as a Private Limited Company registered No.2960454. In paragraph 5 of the Articles of Association it distinguishes six groups of members.
a) “Members Group A” shall comprise all Local Authorities, which are for the time being Members of the Company; and

b) “Members Group B” shall comprise all firms and organisations in the private sector or appointed representatives of such firms or organisations (as appropriate), which are for the time being Members of the Company; and

c) “Members Group C” shall comprise all institutions of Further and Higher Education, which are for the time being Members of the Company; and

d) “Members Group D” shall comprise all trades union organisations, which are for the time being Members of the Company; and

e) “Members Group E” shall comprise all community organisations or appointed representatives of such organisations (as appropriate), which are for the time being Members of the Company; and

f) “Members Group F” shall comprise the Coventry and Warwickshire Training and Enterprise Council and the Coventry and Warwickshire Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

The *Articles of Association* details the ‘Appointment of Directors’, it states:

Para.16(a) The Board shall comprise not more than 26 voting directors.

Para.16(b) Each group of Members will be entitled to appoint (and remove and replace) up to the number of directors stated below:-

Table 7.1 below provides a breakdown of the directors. Column four shows the proportion of the individual groups as a percentage of the total Board. What the figures show is that the group with the largest representation is ‘B’– the private sector. In strictly numerical terms the private sector represents a significant proportion of the Board. With 26.9% of Board seats this is the largest sectoral grouping but given the distribution of Board seats amongst other sectors this is in reality no more than a substantial minority interest. What is of more significance is to understand how the distribution of Board seats was arrived at.
Table 7.1: Distribution of Directors seats on the CWP Board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Directors</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5 Directors, two of whom will be appointed (and removed and replaced) by Coventry City Council and two of whom will be appointed (and removed and replaced) by Warwickshire County Council</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4 Directors, one being appointed by the University of Coventry, one being appointed by the University of Warwick, one representing Further Education Colleges in Coventry and the other representing Further Education Colleges in Warwickshire</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Trades unions</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 Directors, one of whom shall represent Community Organisations in Coventry and another of whom shall represent Community Organisations in Warwickshire</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Coventry &amp; Warwickshire TEC and the Coventry &amp; Warwickshire Chambers of Commerce and Industry</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total = 25</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Adapted from Memorandum and Articles of Association of CWP Ltd: Companies House, Cardiff)

The distribution of seats on the Board

In its early days when the CWP was being assembled a crucial decision was made between the two lead authorities that would have a fundamental impact on the size and character of the Board. A pressing concern amongst the local authorities was not to breach Part V of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. Part V constrains the ability of local authorities to participate in companies (Berwin, n/d: para.3.6.6.2). The importance to the local authorities of the legislation was that it ensured that:

Local authorities must structure their “joint venture” in such a way so as to achieve the minimum impact upon its capital projects. It is an inherent part of the control over local authorities capital expenditure that the authorities are given an allocation each year to fund their own capital projects and failure to use the right joint venture will use up part, or indeed all, of that allocation (Berwin, n/d: para.1.1).
According to a senior officer close to the process the issue that was foremost in the minds of the local authorities was not to commit themselves to any enterprise that might prejudice or potentially jeopardise existing capital allocations from central government. The effect of the legislation was that if a local authority set up a company:

Depending upon the extent of local control, the company may be treated for capital spending purposes as part of the local authority group, that is to say the legislation controlling capital expenditure will apply to the company as if it were the local authority (Berwin, n.d: para.3.6.6.8).

For the purposes of deciding whether the activities of a company should come under the aegis of a local authorities accounts or remain independent of them rested upon this principle of identifying with whom control lay. Understanding that power could be asserted in a number of different ways the Act established the principle issue as being the **power to exercise control**. The Act provides for a number of different situations where local authorities may participate in companies and identifies two different types of companies, the local authority **controlled** company and the local authority **influenced** company” (Berwin, n/d: para. para.3.6.6.9){my emphasis}. Controlled companies are defined where a local authority has the power to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors or has a majority of voting rights; a company can be an ‘Authorised’ company, authorised by the SoS in regulations and where the local authority has a non-controlling interest—that is less than 51%; and then there are Influenced companies. The latter has a crucial bearing upon the constitution of the CWP Board. Section 69 (1) of the Act states that an Influenced company is one which has either:

a) at least 20 per cent. of the total voting rights of all the members having the right to vote at a general meeting of the company are held by persons who are associated with the authority…

b) at least 20 per cent. of the directors of the company are persons who are so associated; or
c) at least 20 per cent. of the total voting rights at a meeting of the directors of the company are held by persons who are so associated…

(source: Local Government and Housing Act 1989)

It is no coincidence that if you examine the distribution of Board seats you will find that the five seats held by local authorities [two each for WCC and Coventry City, with the fifth seat taken by a representative of the districts, this being the price they extracted for their participation] equates to exactly 19.2%, \[\frac{5}{26} \times 100 = 19.2\%\] and falls comfortably below the 20% threshold for Influenced company status.

The size of the CWP Board was in fact calculated backwards. First, the number of local authority seats was fixed at five—this had been arrived at politically in discussions between WCC and Coventry. For their part WCC’s participation meant a representative from both the Labour and Conservative groups. This approach reflected the political reality at county level where power was finely balanced and which acknowledged that control was susceptible to movement in either direction. These political fundamentals influenced the character of county relations encouraging a more consensual bi-partisan approach to working in a number of policy arenas. Collectively, the local authorities understood that to avoid the ‘influenced’ company status local authority seats needed to represent less than 20% of the total board. Working the calculation out backwards – beginning with the 5 seats representing less than 20% – then the entire board would need to be 26 [vis: if 5 seats = 20% then 100% = 25]. In order to ‘fit’ the local authority presence below the 20% thus required a slightly larger board i.e., 26.

That this formulaic approach to the establishment of the size of the Board was used was confirmed in discussions with an officer of the CWP that was close to the process at the time. Incidentally, and no doubt related to this formulaic approach is the anomaly in the
Memorandum of Association which refers to ‘not more than 26 voting directors’ but then only identifies 25 seat. If you repeat the previous calculation using [the actual] 25 Board seats as distinct from the 26 seats maximum referred to in the memorandum then the results are slightly different vis. $\frac{5}{25} \times 100 = 20\%$. Under these conditions the company would technically be defined as an ‘influenced’ company with all that that entailed.

If we now look just at the proportion of seats that are controlled by the four core partners [WCC, Coventry City, TEC and the Chamber]. This works out to $30.8\% \ [\frac{8}{26} \times 100 = 30.8\%]$. So although the private sector is notionally the largest group the potential control implicit in the voting rights of the core group cannot be ignored. It is however not surprising that the private sector technically constitutes the largest group on the Board. Chapter two observed that the 1980s was a period when government progressively privatised policy across a range of activities. Privatisation marginalised local authorities by displacing them from dominant positions in areas that they had traditionally accepted as their preserve. For much of the Thatcher period private sector values, if not the actual private sector, were promoted at the expense of the public. In effect the structure of the policy environment was manipulated to place an obligation on the public sector to accommodate private sector interests. The lasting legacy of this period was a major fillip given to the private sector. In many policy areas the only way forward for local authorities was to work with the private sector. It could be argued that the privatisation of policy started by Thatcher, led to [and on occasions forced] an accommodation between the public and private sectors. If this was the general climate that local authorities operated in—one which automatically envisaged an important role for the private sector—policy innovation also pointed in this direction.
City Challenge rehabilitated local authorities but its structure was firmly rooted in a private sector model – it was managed by a board independent from local authorities, it drew upon representatives from a variety of interests of which the local authority was one of several. The significant change however was that the role of the local authority had been subtly redefined its task now was to: “…take the lead in putting an initial bid together and forging the partnership which will deliver the programme” (DoE, 1994f:6)\{original emphasis\}. The guidance issued for City Challenge made the clear distinction between local authorities leading and local authorities controlling partnerships: the former approved the latter to be resisted. By separating the concept of leadership from control City Challenge sought to redefine the role of local authorities in regeneration initiatives. The regulations guiding their formation, and the fact that City Challenge Partnerships required the stamp of approval of the SoS, ensured that suitable structures were adopted.

In 1994, with the City Challenge experience firmly in mind, with the structure of the forthcoming SRB being explored via public pronouncements by the government [see for example Single Regeneration Budget: Note on Principles (DoE, 1993) and, with the consultation document on the draft bidding guidance in circulation from January 1994 (DoE, 1994a), it was clear that the private sector would be expected to play a part in any SRB partnership. The final version of the SRB Bidding Guidance (1994b) [unsurprisingly] confirmed the importance of working with other partners. It stated:

The [SRB] Budget is intended to encourage joint approaches to regeneration through local partnerships. Bids should therefore be supported by partnerships representing the appropriate range of interests. Individuals or groups with ideas for initiatives should seek to involve the relevant partners to work up their proposals into a bid… (DoE, 1994b: para.26).

That the private sector should come to dominate [numerically] the board of the CWP can be
explained by the convergence of a number of factors. First, the obligation that any SRB partnership should reflect a range of interests would of itself encourage their inclusion. Second, the ‘20% Influenced rule’ inhibited local authorities from taking a controlling interest. Third, the SRB followed a decade that had seen local authorities marginalised in economic policy and the gradual institutionalisation of a perception of the merits of all things private. And finally, with local authorities having been in the front line of the government’s squeeze on the public purse then the private sector represented a potential alternate source of additional resources. The importance of ‘leverage’ – matching public money to other income streams – under the Conservatives became a highly potent measure of the effectiveness of policy. The concept had its apotheosis with the London’s Docklands UDC and although figures across the country never matched the dizzy heights achieved in the uniquely special environment found in the capital the concept of leverage continued to figure highly in central government’s estimation of the efficacy of policy. It was these conditions that structured the economic and political landscape and this then was the backdrop to the formation of the CWP. It was clearly an environment that was particularly propitious for an initiative described by its initiators as private-sector led.

**Choice of chairman**

Seeking to further advance the private dimension of the partnership a leading and influential private sector chairman was sought out by the core partners. A candidate who certainly fulfilled these requirements was Nick Scheele CEO of Jaguar Cars based in Coventry. A political judgement was taken that, in the prevailing ‘anti public-sector’ climate of the time, it would be advantageous to secure a leading private sector figure as chairman. According to a leading Coventry City Councillor the logic behind this approach...
was that this would provide kudos for the partnership especially in relation to bids either for funding through the SRB budget or through European Structural Funds. Significantly however the coincidence of other important factors helps explain how Jaguar’s CEO came to be put forward as a potential CEO of the CWP.

Occurring at approximately the same time were discussions taking place about where the new Jaguar XJ200 project would be manufactured. There had been veiled threats emanating from the parent company—Ford America—that the new Jaguar could potentially be manufactured abroad. Local authorities were only too aware of the sub-region’s over-dependence on manufacturing, particularly automotive:

\[
\text{Some 12,000 jobs – representing one in five local manufacturing jobs – are directly associated with motor vehicle assembly in Coventry and Warwickshire…Moreover, one third of all local manufacturing output stems from vehicle manufacturing (Challenges and Opportunities, 1998:20)}
\]

Losing the production of the new Jaguar would have serious political and economic ramifications for the local economy especially in Coventry. As important as any economic loss however was the potentially enormous psychological shock arising from the prospect of Jaguar production being taken abroad and what this might imply for the long term security of existing production for what is the largest employer in the sub-region. A primary reason therefore of seeking Scheele’s candidacy was to:

\[
\text{…give it [the CWP] that kind of image. [i.e., a high profile private-sector led initiative] It was also to attract manufacturing and of course we were working very hard to bring…because of the XJ200 project…we were very keen to give a high profile to Jag to impress the board at Detroit (Coventry City Councillor). \{my emphasis\}}
\]

The obvious and understandable sentiments of a local authority faced with economic turmoil were entirely complemented by the local TEC’s agenda.
The TEC's position

A network of TECs had been announced in December 1988 and completed in 1991 (HMSO, 1994c: para.255). Coventry TEC was formally established in September 1990. The TEC movement was established in a fanfare of publicity with aspirations that alluded to a substantial role in local economic development—significantly, however, ‘a substantial role for the TEC movement’ could only be taken as a threat to the many existing players in the economic development arena especially local authorities who feared for the future of their economic development functions. For the TEC movement nationally their formative years were a period of adjustment and accommodation as they struggled to define their raison d’être and establish their legitimacy in local economies—see Peck (1993) for an account of these developments. Coinciding with the TEC movement’s formative years the government had been undertaking a comprehensive examination of the competitiveness of the UK economy and published their first Competitiveness White Paper in May 1994 (Competitiveness: Helping Business To Win Cm.2563 HMSO, 1994b). The White Paper drew particular attention to the impacts of global competition and the importance of manufacturing to the UK economy. It went on to identify skill shortages and training deficiencies and linked improvements to these to the future wealth and prosperity of the UK economy. The importance of manufacturing in this analysis of competitiveness was made clear in the Trade and Industry Committee Second Report Competitiveness of UK Manufacturing Industry (HMSO, 1994c)[published coincidentally in April 1994—the same month as the announcement of the SRB, though hearings had begun in May 1993 see Trade and Industry Committee, Minutes of Evidence (session 1992/93, HC 702i)]. The report concluded that:
There were three reasons for regarding manufacturing as especially important to the economy (HMSO, 1994c:125 para.(1)):

(i) it provides over 60% of UK exports, compared with under 25% in the case of services;

(ii) a significant proportion of the service sector depends on manufacturing;

(iii) it is extremely improbable that service industries could substitute for a substantial part of UK manufacturing.

Manufacturing holds a particular significance for the West Midlands. The reason for this is that it is the most manufacturing dependent of all UK regions with 23.6% of employment directly attributable to manufacturing compared to 16% in the rest of the UK (*The Chamber Annual Report*, 1997:6). With the West Midland’s regional economy fundamentally geared to manufacturing and with an identified training and skills shortage the TEC’s strategic objectives mirrored the local authorities sentiments regarding securing the candidacy of a high profile manufacturer to lead the CWP.

**Control through nomination**

The Board structure that emerged for the CWP was designed and implemented by the core partners. Following agreement to work together on a partnership initiative they had set up an Executive Committee to co-ordinate their approach to partnership working, this was supported from the start by an Officers Liaison Group staffed by senior officers from each of the core partners.

Having first determined the total number of Board seats as 26 by the ‘reverse formula’[see above] and in order to assert the private sector led credentials of the partnership then the number of private sector seats had to exceed those of the public sector—so private seats were set at seven, two more than the local authorities. With the announcement of the SRB
the Executive Committee became intimately involved in the strategic development of a Shadow Board for the proposed CWP. This committee had enormous influence. It exploited this in its selection of candidates to what was initially a Shadow Board but would ultimately become the formal Board of the CWP. The core partners control of the selection process can be seen from the minutes of the Executive Committee of 06/06/94\textsuperscript{7}. Agenda item 5 on *Directorships* refers to a previous Executive Committee meeting where the merits of private sector candidates had been discussed, the minutes note that:

The Agenda had attached a list of names. Discussions centred around the need for the unfilled private sector directorships to be representative of the area and business. After considerable discussion eight prospective names or people were suggested…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation/Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R. Chappel</td>
<td>Evening Telegraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Ritchley</td>
<td>Coventry Building Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Cooper</td>
<td>County Artists {Rugby based Computer Software/hardware business man}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABA</td>
<td>Textile business woman?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Brown</td>
<td>AMEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Howes</td>
<td>Christian Salveston {sic: Salvesen}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Cocker</td>
<td>Seven Trent {sic: Severn Trent}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agenda item five of the minutes takes on more significance when read in conjunction with agenda item two. This minute refers to a meeting that had already taken place with GOWM. The significance of this meeting is the timing. The minutes confirm that representatives of the core partners had made a presentation to GOWM setting out the proposed £52m SRB bid and that this occurred *before* the discussion on prospective private sector directors. Agenda item 5 of the minutes continue:

\textsuperscript{7} The Executive Committee was formed prior to the formal registration of the CWP company. The Executive Committee minutes were administered by the Corporate Services Secretariat of Coventry City Council. The records the author has seen are not complete. The first minutes of 7th June 1994 refer to ‘notes of last meeting’ but no record of this or previous meetings exists.
The position of Eric Avery of Tile Hill College and a prospective director was discussed and it was agreed that the issue should be openly discussed and referred back to the Coventry FE Colleges.

The Director from the Community Helen Aird was agreed as the interim director pending a more formal nomination method.

Trades Unions Directorships is still open with only one or two names suggested. Further consideration in this area is needed including the number of directorships.

The position of the MP’s and the European MPs was briefly considered and agreed that it was not appropriate for them to be automatically directors.

A co-opted Director for the District authorities was noted as a possibility and referred to the main Board.

These minutes reveal the crucially important role of the core partners in determining the structure and by definition the character of the CWP Board.

Not surprisingly the core partners all had Board seats. They determined the size of the Board by what was described above as the reverse formula method. Having agreed to create a partnership they had formed an Executive Committee to co-ordinate their activities and this committee came to play an enormously influential role in the subsequent distribution of Board seats in the CWP. The minutes reveal that the Executive Committee exerted control over the Board through its management of Board nominations where they were in effect vetting candidates to the Board. The Executive Committee also applied its influence in another way.

By the time of its formal incorporation the CWP had 57 member organisations—see Appendix (D): Membership of CWP at May 1995. In the Directors first report (CWP, 1996b:para.3) it asserts that “From the outset CWP has been a membership company open to organisations that share CWP’s goals…” This statement is problematic.
The reason for this is that the company preceded its published goals. Minutes of the 14/09/94 Executive Committee (para.2) reveal that marketing the putative partnership was an important matter for the core partners.

The following points emerged in the discussion:

- The need to recognise the different audiences and the different ways that the sub-region has to be marketed to them.
- The importance of knowing how people outside perceive the area.
- The importance of getting local people involved in the Company’s activities to market the area.
- The need for a brief to develop a positive marketing programme for external parties.
- The emphasis on any money spent on marketing should be on changing perceptions rather than telling us what we feel is the current situation.

A member organisation structure was deliberately chosen in order to provide a vehicle that could potentially assimilate the numerous disparate interests within the sub-region. A membership organisation, that by definition was comprehensive, neatly dovetailed into the prevailing philosophy of inclusive partnership and co-ordination that the government were keen to promote with the SRB. A leading councillor from one of the core partners close to the process stated that the primary reason for a membership organisation was to be able to show central government that here was a new and innovative local approach that was showing leadership by seeking to respond to changes in the national debate. A sub-regional approach that appeared to incorporate all the various sectors and interests would clearly: “…impress government and particularly GOWM…” that what was being proposed was genuinely innovative and in tune with government policy. The superficiality of the proposed structure is apparent when you realise that member organisations that joined the CWP had their first opportunity to ratify the CWP’s goals at the Annual Conference held
on the 1st May 1995 held ostensibly to adopt The Economic Strategy for Coventry & Warwickshire 1995-1998 (CWP, 1995b). This document represented the definitive strategic plan for the sub-region incorporating a wide variety of issues one element of which was integration of SRB funding. When the conference took place the strategic parameters of the bid had already been determined—this was nine months after the legal incorporation of the company and eight months after the submission of the Final bid. Crucial also to an understanding of the power relations amongst members was the fact that at the conference members endorsed—with only minor amendments—the economic strategy. The SRB bid however, which was nominally integrated into that strategy, was not directly debated. In any case this was subsequently drastically amended by the Board in the Delivery Plan produced in July 1995 when the level of funding sought in the SRB bid was halved by the government. The reality for delegates at the Annual Conference was that in the process of endorsing the economic strategy document the wider membership de facto abrogated any role they might have played in determining the strategic objectives of the SRB bid. The agenda of the conference was the endorsement of the economic strategy and not the Executive’s right to determine it. Almost unnoticed by the members of the wider partnership was that by not challenging this implicit assumption they had not only allowed responsibility for the development and implementation of the SRB strategy to remain the prerogative of the CWP executive but almost inadvertently, certainly not deliberately, they had legitimated the Executive’s authority in these matters.

What remained after the dust had settled was a partnership ostensibly private sector led and incorporating numerous disparate interests. But in reality power remained with the core partners with nothing more than the illusion of private sector control and the wider
dispersion of power.

**AGREEMENT ON KEY ISSUES**

The aims and objectives of any partnership should reflect the joint aspirations of all partners

**SRB priorities**

The government set an extremely demanding timetable for the submission of bids, viz:

- 14th April 1994  SRB bidding timetable announced
- 31st May 1994  Deadline for submission of Outline Bid
- 7th September 1994  Deadline for submissions of Final Bid

The core partners had already begun to examine their economic development activities under the aegis of a shadow partnership board. [The evolution of the bid is depicted in figure 7.1: *Evolution of the CWP partnership and SRB Bid*] One of the first steps they took was to instigate a comprehensive audit of all extant economic development initiatives in the sub-region. This led to the publication of a report *Meeting the Challenge of Change* (CWP, 1994b). This reviewed the economic outlook for the sub-region, synthesised the extant initiatives, and mapped out from this morass of activities a strategic analysis that formed the basis upon which an action programme could be taken forward. This logical rational analysis would at first appear to commend itself. However, as with the distribution of Board seats the timing of this document is problematic. The draft version of this report was finally published in December 1994, three months after the submission of the Final SRB bid. So the refreshing strategic analysis that the document sought to promote therefore cannot be used to explain the SRB programme in round one.
Figure 7.1: Evolution of the CWP partnership and SRB bid
Experience would suggest that the government grossly underestimated the time needed to consult with what would be, by definition, new partnerships. The fact that geopolitically the CWP represented a novel organisational entity covering an area that lacked any cohesive unity defined by a collective experience of politics or culture could only exaggerate the scale of the consultation problem. It therefore seems all the more unrealistic for the government to imagine that six months could have been long enough to both effectively engage the disparate interests of the sub-region and also submit a bid. The magnitude of the problem can be seen by the fact that *The Economic Strategy for Coventry & Warwickshire 1995-1998* (CWP, 1995b) [which was what the *Meeting the Challenge of Change* document became after ratification] was only ratified by CWP’s first annual conference in May 1995 some thirteen months after the April announcement of the SRB.

If the round one SRB objectives cannot be accounted for by any published strategic analysis how were the priorities contained in the bid identified?

**Objectives in the outline bid**

The government’s timetable required Outline bids to be submitted to respective GOs by the 31st May 1994. Remarkably then, the core partners, in a little over six weeks following the announcement of the SRB were proposing a massive SRB bid based on a partnership that had yet to be formally incorporated—the bid which in the event was the 12th largest in the country out of a total of 201 successful bids. [The final bid is reproduced in full in Appendix (G): *CWP Final Bid document*] The early discussions that took place amongst the partners was handicapped by a lack of clear information from central government. An explanatory note issued to accompany the press release announcing the SRB (DoE, 1993) discussed the possibility that each GO might publish a set of regional priorities to assist
bidders. By the time of the publication of the *Bidding Guidance* (DOE, 1994b) this suggestion had not been followed through with the result that GOs did not publish a set of regional priorities to guide bidders. Similarly, whilst GOs were given indicative budgets these were not made public. Bidders therefore did not know what the GOWM regional priorities for the SRB were [if any], or the basis upon which national SRB funds would be distributed amongst the GOs. Bidders did know from published government documents that the aggregate totals were diminishing and that the budget total in 1994/95 would be £1.4bn (DoE, 1993: para.2). It was also made clear that existing commitments would be honoured. By discounting these existing commitments from an albeit diminishing global budget it was possible to make an informed judgement about the likely scale of *free* resources for the whole of England. Indeed a provisional figure of £100m, qualified by the clause “on current estimates”, was suggested in the January 1994 *Draft Bidding Guidance* (DoE, 1994a. para.12)—and this figure is mentioned in CWP correspondence. A GOWM Director suggested in an interview that: “Regional budgets were not actually published but the amount was public knowledge”. Jeff Jacobs, Assistant Secretary, Cities Policy and Co-ordination Division, DoE interviewed by the Environment Select Committee suggested that in round one the amount each region would receive: “…was unpublished in a formal sense, although the indicative allocations were actually made pretty widely available by regional directors (HC, 1995b: para.54). However, even working with a ‘ball park’ figure, bidders did not know the basis upon which this amount might be distributed between the regions. The position of GOs nationally was that regional indicative budgets were not to be made public. However, the Bid Co-ordination Team were aware of the regional allocation and used this to make a ‘best judgement’ about the likely magnitude of their proposed Outline
bid. The officer involved explained the thinking:

I worked it out on the basis of saying that we’ve got 10% of the population of the West Midlands…8% or whatever it is. That we’ve got a significantly higher level of disadvantage than that, although it’s difficult to compare. And I started saying well what’s a reasonable share of the total cake if we were successful. So I said well our upper share is going to be…a reasonable share would be anywhere between 8% and 12%, I then said well we ought to go higher than that because we’ve got something a bit unique [a sub-regional partnership]. And I thought the partnership was something which would appeal to head office and we’d done a reasonable amount of work. So I said well let’s go for between 15 and 17% of the total resources I thought were available over the period of the five years.

Without any clear understanding of the GOs selection procedures the core partners had to make a political judgement based upon crude calculations. Another explanation that was offered, and one that was used to garner political support, was a crude calculation of what might occur in the event of no bid being submitted, the so-called ‘neutrality position’. This approach sought to calculate what would be the potential scale of the losses from existing budgets that were being transferred into the SRB budget. The officer that did these calculations was remarkably surprised to discover that the two approaches produced near identical figures. Having two methodologies which such similar figures was expeditious for the Bid Co-ordination Team but it was also a comfort in that it enabled it to tailor the argument to suit the sentiments of different audiences. So whilst the Bid Co-ordination Team used the first approach to argue its case with officers the latter approach was extremely powerful with members sensitive to the political ramifications of a loss of any resources. That the latter approach could be used tactically can be seen from CWP correspondence from the period:
Quite simply SRB brings no new money to the table. In 1994/95 the Coventry and Warwickshire area received some £10m from the grants subsumed within the SRB. Our bid for next year 1995/96 is likely to be £7m. Following informal advice from Government Departments even this figure may be too high. So our likely bid over 5 years of £50m will at best protect our existing position…{original emphasis} [and]…

Working in partnership is not just the key to protecting our position in the short-term through SRB…{my emphasis}

(extracts from CWP Bid Co-ordination Team correspondence reproduced in full in Appendix (H): CWP Correspondence Bid Size ~ 16th June 1994)

It is logical to argue that, whether or not protecting existing budgets was a dominant motivation in the Bid Co-ordination Team’s thinking, the fact that the integration of budgets under the SRB threatened the existing resource distribution, then any successful bid would redress [in aggregate terms] the negative effects of any resource cuts. However, regardless of which of the two methodologies most accurately represents how the Outline figure was determined what is far more interesting is that the process of setting the figure reveals the strategic influence of the Bid Co-ordination Team based at Coventry City council.

Outline bid summary

The Outline bid summary provided what was described as a ‘short factual description’ of the SRB programme.

The aim of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd is "to improve the quality of life, prosperity and wealth of the inhabitants of Coventry and the county of Warwickshire" Our aim is ambitious and our bid for SRB is geared to deliver a substantial and imaginative programme which will integrate with other main programmes. Our strategy seeks to re-establish the sub-region as one of the most technologically advanced, prosperous and equal in Britain. To achieve this we are proposing a regeneration programme totalling £421m. SRB of £52.0m directly facilitates £175m of this, with the remaining £246m in complementary funding.
Our SRB Bid has targeted integrated local action in areas of greatest deprivation reinforcing broad strategic themes. The targeted areas are Hillfields, Foleshill, Wood End, Willenhall and Stoke Aldemoor (Coventry) and parts of west Nuneaton and Bedworth, the Old Town area of Leamington Spa and the Benn and Newbold wards in Rugby (para.2 Outline Bid Summary compiled by GOWM, 1994).

A critical examination of the Outline bid raises a number of important questions.

- How was the £52m figure arrived at?
- How were the strategic objectives, listed in the bid, identified?
- How was SRB money to be distributed?
- Given that the partnership did not get the money it requested how did the partnership manage the process of downsizing?

**A £52m bid**

Almost from the moment the core partners began to work together on the partnership initiative the SRB timetable was thrust upon them. Co-ordinating a SRB bid quickly became an objective of the putative partnership under the control of the Executive Committee but delegated to the Bid Co-ordination Team; the bid also came to represent a highly visible measure of the capacity of the partners to create the reality of an effective partnership mechanism. It seems certain that one of the considerations that pre-occupied the partnership was the scale of potential losses that were threatened by the amalgamation of budgets under the new SRB budget.

**Strategic objectives in the final bid**

Notwithstanding a lack of time to consult, the SRB Final bid lists what are described as three: “working themes to characterise the key areas where we [CWP] will apply SRB funds and other resources…” (CWP, 1994a:para.4.8). The three themes were:
1) Building business, especially engineering excellence, reskilling the labour force and increasing educational attainment (para.4.9).

2) Spreading market confidence North (para.4.13).

3) Building self-determining, safe and confident communities (para.4.18).

The Final bid then lists an additional eight strategic objectives (i.e., 4 - 12) that the partnership intended to pursue:

4) Skills to maximise growth & opportunities
5) Invest in business: Encourage Growth and Diversity
6) Promoting Coventry and Warwickshire
7) City & urban centres
8) Housing which meets peoples needs
9) A high quality environment
10) Safer communities
11) Health and caring communities
12) Deliver SRB programmes and monitor against strategy


These objectives are of fundamental importance as they would be used to assess the merits of projects submitted to the CWP for SRB funding. Any project submitted would need to conform to one or more of the stated objectives in order to qualify for assessment and possible inclusion in the SRB programme [i.e., to be included in the Delivery Plan of approved projects].

**How were the SRB objectives determined?**

The four core organisations had already begun a tentative dialogue in order to explore ways of co-ordinating their economic development activities—as has been noted this began in early 1994 as a result of the partnership initiative promoted by Coventry City under the personal aegis of its City Development Director, Duncan Sutherland. Although this putative partnership had produced no substantive results this early start bestowed a number of
structural advantages which the core group exploited when setting up the CWP. The fact that they had commenced a dialogue around partnership conferred upon the core group a certain legitimacy vis-à-vis organisations not included in the partnership initiative from the start—the obvious fact that these organisations were major players in economic development helped reinforce this dominant position. An example of the hegemony that their position conferred upon them was the way that the core group could, without reference to the views of [future] potential partners, unilaterally set themselves up as an Executive Committee [see table 7.3 below]. Being in at the start allowed the core group the opportunity to shape the subsequent structure of the CWP. Whether with hindsight the core group acted benignly is not the critical issue here. Of much more significance is the observation that being ‘in from the start’ offered the core group opportunities to manage the evolution of the partnership structure in a way not offered to partners that joined later. An officer with a district council interviewed in January 1998 expressed exactly these sentiments when describing the evolution of the CWP:

Coventry approached WCC and asked them if they were prepared to become a partner in this economic development company. And WCC were quite positive about that and they raced ahead and some way down the line they asked the districts if they would like to be involved, and organised a meeting and invited the districts along [where] the districts were presented with - essentially - a fait accompli. The county had agreed [already] that they were going to join this [CWP]…[and]

…There was no representation within the structure for the districts. So there was a little bit of bad feeling about that and one of the districts was concerned that they had been left to the very end to be consulted and were being asked to join something over which they had no control over….no representation on. So there were a lot of difficult bits in the early days.

The CWP experience suggests that there would appear to be clear structural advantages in early membership. Organisations close to the partnership at its evolution were party to a
discussion about how it should evolve: organisations that came to the partnership later join a structure that has been defined by others. In the absence of ‘organisational learning’ [see below] timing becomes a significant cleavage that highlights the relative impotence of organisations not party to the initial deliberations. This observation is all the more pertinent because the SRB bid contained a strategy, set out in a programme of themes tied to specific levels of projected expenditure, that was [pre]determined by the core partners, and although the programme would affect future [i.e., later] partners directly, they played no part in setting them.

**Control through objectives**

The four core partners controlled the SRB by defining the strategic objectives that set the parameters for projects submitted to the partnership. These SRB themes were not simply plucked out of the air. For most organisations involved in regeneration, need always exceeds the available resources—this is especially the case in times of economic decline [as in the recession of the early 1990s] or during periods of public expenditure constraint. The reality for many organisations is that they have a ‘bank’ of initiatives—ready to be taken off-the-shelf—in the event of an opportune funding stream being identified. For local authorities however the possibility to fall back upon a bank of initiatives had been strengthened as a result of legislation. Introduced in the late 1980s the *Local Government and Housing Act 1989* sought to formalise economic development undertaken by local authorities. Part III (para.35) imposed a duty upon local authorities to examine, before the beginning of each financial year, whether they intended to engage in activities to promote their area. If an authority wished to engage in economic development they had to set out their proposals in a public document. This needed to show the expenditure implications, the
likely income and, what the authority intended to achieve by their proposals. For local authorities committed to economic development the legislation compelled them to address economic development in a more formal and structured way. For those authorities that chose to pursue economic development it forced them to confront local priorities but it had the added advantage that they had a list of objectives that they could [would] reasonably argue had been achieved through an objective rational (technocratic) process. Whether local priorities were identified through a rational process or were simply pet projects that organisation were keen to pursue, a second important factor appears to have been crucial in identifying a number of the themes which the core partners later adopted in their SRB bid. These themes arose out of the collective insight that the core group gained preparing their part of the West Midlands European development strategy (this strategy was published as *Partners in Europe*, 1993). The core partners involvement however represented only part of the process.

**The West Midlands European development strategy**

The preface to the document states:

The strategy was built up from contributions from the major ‘economic actors’ in the Region. Steered by the West Midlands Regional Forum of Local Authorities (comprising the Metropolitan Districts, the Shire Counties and the Shire Districts within the Region, and the West Midlands Passenger Transport Authority), it draws heavily at regional level on the views of, among others, the Regional Economic Consortium (the Regional CBI, Chambers of Commerce, TECs, TUC, MPs and MEPs) the Regional Development Agency (WMDA), the Region’s Universities. The UK Government’s Regional Departments (the DOE, DTI, DEmp, MAFF) have helpfully provided technical information. The document has also benefited substantially from detailed consultations at a local level with contributions from sub-regional social/economic partners, particularly industry, training agencies, unions, educational and research establishments, and the voluntary sector (*Partners in Europe*, 1993:2)
*Partners in Europe* was published in 1993 in response to a review of European Structural Funds and set out the region’s economic development strategy. The strategic analysis underpinning the report was made clear in the opening paragraph which states:

> Present and past implementation of Structural Fund operational programmes and attempts to effect the maximum utilisation of all EC funds have demonstrated, both in this Region and elsewhere, the value of a **clear and practical framework with pre-established priorities** to marry-up the economic and social needs of the Region with the objectives of European aid. This strategy document is a means of building on earlier frameworks in response to the current review of the Structural Funds, utilising the experience of the last few years to **derive a programme** for the next three and six years (*Partners in Europe*, 1993: para.1).

*Partners in Europe* is unequivocal about the pivotal importance of manufacturing to the wider West Midland’s economy and how this was inextricably linked to its continued prosperity. The importance of manufacturing is confirmed when you observe that the first identified strategic priority for the region was: “To arrest the decline in manufacturing and develop a strong, diversified and adaptable economic base” (*Partners in Europe*, 1993:12).

After first setting out a series of priorities and strategic responses that apply to the whole of the West Midlands, the remainder of the document consists of seven discrete sections [The Sub-Regional Strategies] based on either existing EU Programme Areas or Non-Programme Areas. Each of these sections contains an audit of the strengths and weaknesses with a list of policy priorities. Section 3 covers the Coventry & Warwickshire sub-region. Coincidentally this document was written by David Taylor from Coventry City council who was asked by the then WM Forum of Local Authorities to co-ordinate the input. The sub-regional priorities in this document bears a striking resemblance to those later identified in the SRB bid that was produced almost a year after. Table 7.2 below—adapted from the European strategy document (*Partners in Europe*, 1993:15) and the CWP
Final bid document (CWP, 1994a:10)—seeks to compare the stated objectives and, where applicable, groups similar objectives together.

Table 7.2: Comparison between *Partners in Europe* & the SRB final bid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>European Strategy</th>
<th>SRB Themes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Centre Revival</td>
<td>City &amp; urban centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner City Development Partnership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Engineering excellence</td>
<td>Skills to maximise growth &amp; opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Coventry Employment Programme</td>
<td>Invest in business: Encourage Growth and Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Regeneration of Areas affected</td>
<td>A high quality environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Coal Mining Closures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safer communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health and caring communities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing which meets peoples needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deliver SRB programmes and monitor against strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: adapted from *Partners in Europe*, 1993:15; CWP, 1994a:10)

What is immediately apparent comparing the columns in table 7.2 is the number of obvious similarities between the two programmes. While this is patently clear in relation to the City centre objectives. What is perhaps more interesting is the degree of overlap of the other objectives that is revealed by a closer reading of the two documents. If you take, for example, the heading ‘Manufacturing and Engineering excellence’ in *Partners in Europe* then you can see that this is echoed in the SRB bid. The latter specifically states: There is a new national consensus that manufacturing industry needs to be at the forefront of our economic effort…” (CWP, 1994a: para.1.8) and goes on to itemise specific manufacturing initiatives. The ‘East Coventry Employment Programme’ heading in *Partners in Europe*...
focuses on development sites with the potential for industrial units or business parks and this again mirrors the SRB objective of ‘Invest in business: Encourage growth and diversity’. The ‘Regeneration of Areas affected by Coal Mining Closures’ heading assesses the impact of the closure of four coal fields in Bedworth, Nuneaton and Atherstone which created derelict land, environmental degradation and a shortage of training facilities. The SRB objective of ‘A high quality environment’ clearly responds directly to the degradation of the environment. Equally however, the generic nature of the wider SRB objectives provides considerable latitude and certainly several of them fit comfortably under the coal field regeneration heading.

It would seem then that the SRB bid drew heavily upon the work previously undertaken in the production of *Partners in Europe*. In the event, as has already been stated, the extremely short time scale following the introduction of the SRB prevented wide scale consultation and given that the research and consultation for the European development strategy was contemporaneous it seems logical that the themes identified by this process should appear in the SRB bid. But as has been argued, a set of priorities that emerges under a ‘competitiveness’ agenda are unlikely to be the same that might arise under another remit. The lack of consultation however makes it impossible to state with any certainty whether objectives that arose out of consultation for a European development strategy were appropriate to the SRB bid.

**Control through co-ordination**

Duncan Sutherland’s original idea was based around ‘multiple partnership companies’ which envisaged linking organisations in discrete economic development initiatives. The first step in developing this strategy was a comprehensive sub-regional audit. And so one of
the first things that the core partners instigated prior to the formal incorporation of CWP was to establish a Strategy Sub-Committee. Sutherland invited Mike Goldstein, vice chancellor of Coventry University (chairman) to undertake an audit of the local economy in order to prepare a sub-regional economic strategy. The product of this work was the *Meeting the Challenge of Change* report (CWP, 1994b)—completed in December 1994 after the SRB deadline and which only went out to consultation in January 1995.

The partners had only just commenced work on the audit at the time of the announcement of the SRB—and as described above this was published some time after the submission of the Final bid. Without any clearly developed strategic framework the core partners were, at the time of the SRB announcement, united simply in a common commitment to the general objectives of a sub-regional partnership sketched out by Sutherland. His partnership ideas were set out in a report, *Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships*, that he had produced and submitted to the Coventry Policy Advisory Committee (Minutes 29/03/94). Paragraph 1.2 of the report states that:

The principal aim of establishing the Partnership Company is to provide a mechanism for improving the quality of life, prosperity and wealth of Coventry and its environs (“the Area”) by involving all sectors of the community in developing and implementing a cogent economic strategy. The principal objectives of the partnership will be:

- to develop, implement and review a strategy that strengthens and diversifies the economy of the Area
- to encourage, attract and secure investment of all types from both private and public sources within the UK, European Union and elsewhere and increase business, training and employment opportunities in the Area
- to undertake and/or participate in projects for the economic development of the Area and enhance the skills and capabilities of the population
- to promote a positive image of the Area and develop it as a centre of business excellence and tourism and thereby improve the quality of life, prosperity and wealth of the inhabitants of the Area.
Setting up SRB structures

Following publication of the *Draft Bidding Guidance* (DoE, 1994a) in January 1994 documents indicate that the core partners began a dialogue on the shape of an SRB bid in late March 1994. Immediately following the announcement of the SRB bidding timetable in April 1994 two important structures were created that would influence the shape of the subsequent SRB bid. The first structure was a ‘SRB Bid Co-ordination team’ made up of Coventry officers with a remit to produce a bid. A senior Coventry officer described how the stimulus to create such a unit arose from within Coventry city council. Duncan Sutherland had been vigorously promoting a partnership strategy and with the announcement of the Bidding Guidance took the view that a partnership would be best placed to win any competition. Within Coventry he secured the support of chief officers to initiate a Bid Co-ordination Team under David Taylor. He then took this proposal to the core partners. Coventry’s latent expertise and resources made them particularly prepared to lead this initiative. WCC economic development function, although re-established under the Labour administration, was not as well developed or equipped to compete with the expertise at Coventry. It should be recalled that Taylor had only recently co-ordinated work for the sub-region on its input to the European SPD process and this had been relatively well received by the local authorities. Coventry’s control of this initiative was not challenged by the core partners. The partners response was explained by the combination of resource and expertise imbalance, an extremely tight timescale, and as an officer close to the process stated: “…no one else was prepared to put in the money to do it”. The Bid Co-ordination Team was initially one officer, David Taylor, a senior officer within Coventry City’s Policy Co-ordination Unit. The ‘team’ was located in the Chief Executive’s Department working to Duncan Sutherland, with secretarial support given by the Chief
Executive department at Coventry City council [shortly after it commenced work a second officer was seconded to provide support to Taylor].

Taylor in his position as Bid Co-ordination Team set up the second key structure. This was the SRB Steering Group (SG) with Taylor in the chair. Taylor invited people onto the group to reflect the interests from around the partners. The SG contained 20 members (Table 7.3 below). Like the Bid Co-ordination Team it was an administrative/technical group rather than a political body and contained no councillors. Its composition was made up of officers from the four core partners and other statutory organisations along with counterparts drawn from the non-statutory sector. With 30% [6 out of 21] of the members from Coventry City Council [with Taylor in the chair] this was the largest group and held a significant and influential minority interest.

**Control through themes**

Without any adopted SRB strategy in place, and time at a premium, the Bid Co-ordination Team sought to impose a rationale on the bid in order to manage its production in the short time available. The team’s first action was to organise meetings of the SG to develop a SRB agenda. [These meetings were ad hoc and no minutes were taken so no written record exists of the discussions that took place] At these very early meetings the SG brought forward an eclectic raft of projects. The exact magnitude of the proposed projects is unclear but interviewees suggest that the figure was somewhere in the region of £100-£120m.

The ideas put forward drew upon experience gleaned from a variety of sources including: the consultation for a European development strategy, the background of the competitiveness agenda, existing economic development strategies, the TEC business plan, the preferences of core partners and preliminary indications coming out of the sub-regional
audit.

Table 7.3: SRB Steering Group Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>Action Group Chair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Taylor (Chair)</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matt Feeley</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronwen Lacy</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graeme Betts</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Griffiths</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jos Parry</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigel Gaynor</td>
<td>Coventry &amp; Warwickshire TEC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorraine Butler</td>
<td>Coventry &amp; Warwickshire TEC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eamon Kelley/Noreen Dowd</td>
<td>Coventry Health Authority</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeremy Howell</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janet Fortune</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Carter</td>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eric Linton</td>
<td>Coventry Race Equality Council</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Davis</td>
<td>Advanced Technology Centre ~ University of Warwick</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Durham</td>
<td>Coventry &amp; Warwickshire Chambers of Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Goodman</td>
<td>Voluntary Sector</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iain Sharp</td>
<td>Voluntary Sector</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kishor Pala</td>
<td>Ethnic Minority Development Alliance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deborah de Haes</td>
<td>Rugby Borough Council</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Garden</td>
<td>Nuneaton &amp; Bedworth Borough Council</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: CWP internal documents)
3 = Member of an Action Group
5 = Not a member of any Action Group

Out of these a number of themes presented themselves as candidates for inclusion in any
potential SRB strategy. The formidable task that faced David Taylor as officer in charge of the Bid Co-ordination Team, and in his capacity as SG chair, was to take the disparate projects put forward by the SG and make them into a coherent SRB programme whilst at the same time satisfy the qualifying criteria set out in the Bidding Guidance. The task facing the team was thus both operational and strategic. Operationally, it had to design and administer a project appraisal mechanism. Strategically, it had to construct a framework document—in the form of a SRB bid—that managed simultaneously to satisfy both the SRB criteria and reflect the diverse interests of the partners. Board minutes confirm the approach taken by the Bid Co-ordination Team:

The bid has been divided into four groups - Economy and Development, City centre and Urban centres, Health and Caring, Living Environment. These contributed to 11 strategic objectives (Board minutes: 09/08/94 - para.6.1).

The Bid Co-ordination Team confirmed that the SG met: “…once a week initially, then fortnightly, then quarterly… [adding]…this [team] is now fizzling out with the whole process under review” [interview in December 1996 just prior to being restructured]. The officer confirmed that the strategic analysis in the SRB bid was: “…a synthesis of existing document…[and]…in the event the bid consisted of each partner pursuing their own existing development strategies.”

In order to evaluate projects that might fall under the chosen topic areas four Action Groups—as they became known—were created by the Bid Co-ordination team. The Action Groups consisted of members drawn from the core partners supplemented with additional expertise co-opted where appropriate and included amongst others, representatives from the two Universities, representatives of the ethnic minority business community and the voluntary sector—see Appendix (I): Composition of Action Groups for a complete list of
members. The Bid Co-ordination Team confirmed that in the early days the Action Groups met frequently and that in all about twenty people were involved on an ad hoc basis from day one.

Having isolated four strategic themes out of the morass of information the Bid Co-ordination Team commissioned Cooper Simms Consultants to write the first draft of the bid and to assist in the development of the necessary administrative systems to process potential projects. They also had a hand in producing the a project summary form (see Appendix (J): *Project Summary Form 1995/96*). These were distributed widely in a mailshot (see Appendix (K): *Consultation contact list for SRB Round One*) which invited interested parties to complete the forms by summarising their project and returning them by the 27\(^{th}\) June 1994 for inclusion in the assessment process [competition] with the possibility of inclusion in the SRB bid. The Bid Co-ordination Team, with the approval of the SG, also produced SRB strategic guidance in the form of guidance notes that accompanied the PSF. The guidance notes included three strategic *process* objectives:

**Strategic Objective 1 - Partnership:**
Empower local communities, residents, businesses and voluntary groups by listening and by investing in mutually beneficial partnerships and delivery mechanisms which enable services to better reflect local needs.

**Strategic Objective 2 - Reducing Disadvantage:**
Make services more accessible. Use resources effectively and direct them towards people facing poverty. Enable those in poverty to have greater control over services and their own living standards.

**Strategic Objective 3 - Seek to provide equality of opportunity and social justice:**
Enable individuals to exercise control over their lives, make use of available services, influence their design and delivery, and participate fully in the economic and social life of the sub-region.
Interestingly, these objectives did not feature in this form in either the Final bid (CWP, 1994a) or the Economic Development Strategy (CWP, 1994b) subsequently produced by the CWP but did reappear in the Delivery Plan (CWP, 1995a).

The three process objectives were mandatory. They ran throughout the whole programme and as the PSF Guidance Notes explicitly stated: they had to be addressed by all applicants as a qualifying criteria. In addition: “Each project should be ascribed to one of the other eight strategic objectives to which it is most closely related” (CWP, 1994c: para.2.6). The eight strategic objectives are listed in column three in table 7.4 below. The table illustrates the refinement of the bid as it progressed through the bid cycle. In the very early stages of the bid the core partners sought not only to define a practical deliverable programme but also one that was politically acceptable. The early discussions were a process of bargaining and negotiation with each partner seeking to extract the maximum possible benefit for their own constituency. And so the early discussions revolved around establishing an accommodation between the partners. This accommodation is recorded as adjustments to the bid objectives which were progressively refined during the course of the bidding cycle. A good examples of this accommodation in practice can be seen in table 7.4 under objective number 6 and 7. It can be seen that in their original form the focus of these was on Coventry. Within a week of the production of the first draft and following discussions with the core partners these proved to be politically unacceptable. In the second draft (column 3) following the consultation with partners objective 6 had evolved to incorporate the whole of Warwickshire. Similarly, objectives 7, 10 and 11 illustrates the same move away from an implicit Coventry focus to a more broadly based spatial objective where
Coventry whilst obviously still qualifying is not named directly.
Table 7.4: The evolution of strategic objectives during the bid cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Strategic Objective CWP document (3rd June 1994)</th>
<th>Strategic Objective CWP document (8th June 1994)</th>
<th>Strategic Objective Final Bid (7th September 1994)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Empowering through partnership</td>
<td>Empowering through partnership</td>
<td>Building business, especially engineering excellence, reskilling the labour force and increasing educational attainment (para.4.9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reducing Disadvantage</td>
<td>Reducing Disadvantage</td>
<td>Spreading market confidence North (para.4.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ensure skills to maximise growth &amp; opportunities</td>
<td>Ensure skills to maximise growth &amp; opportunities</td>
<td>Skills to maximise growth &amp; opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Investing in business</td>
<td>Investing in business</td>
<td>Invest in business: Encourage Growth and Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Promoting Coventry</td>
<td>Promoting Coventry &amp; Warwickshire</td>
<td>Promoting Coventry and Warwickshire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Developing the City centre</td>
<td>Developing Coventry City centre &amp; surrounding urban centres</td>
<td>City &amp; urban centres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Housing to meet people’s needs</td>
<td>Housing which meets people’s needs</td>
<td>Housing which meets peoples needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Providing a high quality environment</td>
<td>Providing a high quality environment</td>
<td>A high quality environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Making the City safe</td>
<td>Safe communities</td>
<td>Safer communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Developing a healthy and caring City</td>
<td>Healthy caring communities</td>
<td>Health and caring communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deliver SRB programmes and monitor against strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In a similar vein the 03/06/94 Guidance Notes document also refers to a series of themes developed by the Bid Co-ordination Team to be used as a means of linking projects which
meet more than one strategic objective’. Column two in table 7.5 below lists the four themes. By the time that the Final bid was produced discussions amongst the core partners had ensured that the fourth theme with its explicit emphasis upon Coventry had been dropped.

Table 7.5: Comparison between themes during the bid cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Linking Themes (3rd June 1994)</th>
<th>Linking Themes in Final Bid (7th September 1994)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Building business, especially engineering excellence, reskilling the labour force and increasing educational attainment</td>
<td>Building business, especially engineering excellence, reskilling the labour force and increasing educational attainment (para.4.9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Spreading market confidence North</td>
<td>Spreading market confidence North (para.4.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Building self-determining, safe and confident communities</td>
<td>Building self-determining, safe and confident communities (para.4.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Strengthen Coventry City centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In drafting the Final Bid document the Bid Co-ordination Team operated at the boundaries of the political landscape that separated the core partners. The Bid Co-ordination Team was thus required to balance its own self-interest (i.e., pursue with maximum vigour a Coventry agenda) against what it determined would be acceptable in the political landscape they hoped to co-habit with their partners. The subtle changes referred to in the bid through the bid cycle reflected the complexity of the political dynamics of partnership. It also illustrated the interdependence of the core partners and their ability to pursue a wider set of interests. The evidence in the documents through the bid cycle suggests that the partners’ motivations for changes in the themes were to deflate, or at least constrain, the domineering aspirations...
of Coventry whilst at the same time to assert their own secular interests. The results of this bargaining and negotiation was political agreement on a set of acceptable objectives—that would ultimately have an distributive impact on any SRB resources won. Consensus by definition pre-supposes that the core partners conceded ground to each other in order to establish agreement. Without the principle of concession disagreement would inevitably lead to the dissolution of the partnership or expulsion of the partner. Almost as a by-product of the pursuit of consensus the core partners created a set of strategic objectives that defined the new institutional entity [CWP] and yet simultaneously distanced it from the existing institutional entities that were the core partners.

All bids were processed through the Bid Co-ordination Team and they passed them on to an appropriate action group for appraisal. Projects would be assessed against a checklist produced by the Bid Co-ordination Team this required each project to be scored on a scale ranging from ‘very good, good, average, poor to very poor’ (CWP letter explaining Project Prioritisation, dated 22/06/94 and including project checklist reproduced in full as Appendix (N).

As has been shown, this early stage of the bid development coincided with and overlapped discussions surrounding the structure and constitution of the putative CWP. A consequence of this has been a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma which has tended to obfuscate the direction of causality that links SRB objectives with who set them. There has been a tendency—in documents published by the CWP—to ‘post ad hoc rationale’ the development of the strategy in the bid. A good example of this occurs in the Final bid (CWP, 1994a) which states that:
We have applied best practice to the development of the programme, especially by gaining widespread ownership and support for the priorities of the strategic programme...and adjusting these priorities as a result of consultation {my emphasis}(para.4.1). [and] Consultation early in the programme and bid development, with a wide range of interests consulted on principles at key stages: in particularly the community and voluntary sector have been closely involved in strategy development...{my emphasis}(para.4.2).

The cycle of bid development and submission—already discussed—precluded a programme of widespread public consultation. It seems reasonable to argue that, in relation to consultation, the combination of best practice and haste [especially in the development of a new policy initiative] appears to be if not mutually exclusive then mutually antagonistic. Similarly, whilst community and ethnic minority interests did sit on the SG and also the Action Groups they took no part in defining them and in all cases only constituted a minority interest. This is of crucial significance. By managing pre-determined qualifying criteria the Action Groups did exert control and influence the nature of submitted bids but in the process they ensured [critics might say conspired to guarantee] that SRB funding would only be directed to objectives set by others. The fact that community and ethnic minority interests were only a [even smaller] minority interest in the SRB Steering Group simply reinforces this position.

A second but important issue arises out of the methodology adopted. By choosing Action Groups—even with the caveat that themes have been defined by others—it can legitimately be argued that the structure does provide an opportunity for participants, especially those from the non-statutory sectors, to become engaged in the shaping of the bid. Crucially however, this role is purely administrative. The subtle achievement of the approach adopted here is that in providing opportunities for engagement you at the same time deflect attention away from other perhaps more controversial areas, notably any discussion on the
distribution of SRB resources that had been agreed elsewhere.

**Control by structure**

In figure 7.2 below the *SRB management arrangement* flow chart is taken from the PIEDA audit report (PIEDA, 1995:para.1.1) undertaken in May 1995. The chart describes the CWP’s management’s lines of accountability and purports to show how the SRB fitted within a logical and rationale structure under the oversight of the CWP main Board. However, this structure did not officially exist in the manner described until the CWP was formally incorporated. When the bid was being put together there was no Main Board and so there could be no SRB sub-group. Figure 7.3 however sets out the organisational structure linking the early partnership initiative before incorporation. What did exist was an Executive Committee consisting of representatives of the four core partners - effectively acting as a putative Shadow Board. Created at the same time was an Officer Liaison Group to service the Executive Committee—including David Taylor—with officers drawn from the key partners and with one officer representing the five district councils. Directly below this was the SRB Steering Group and Bid Co-ordination Team both under the chairmanship of David Taylor at Coventry City Council. Below this level was the four Action Groups. The result of this structure ensured that in the period before incorporation David Taylor occupied an extremely influential position. As team leader of the Bid Co-ordination Team Taylor he managed the day-to-day administration of the bid assembly programme; he oversaw the creation of the Action Groups, with the Bid
Figure 7.2: SRB management arrangements

CWP Main Board
(26 Directors: meets c4 annually)

CWP SRB Sub-group
(11 Directors: meets c4 annually)

CWP Executive Team

SRB Steering Group
(meets c8 annually)

SRB Guarantors Group
(meets c6 annually)

4 SRB Action Groups

(Source: PIEDA, 1995:3)
Figure 7.3: SRB management arrangements before incorporation

CWP Executive Committee
(Shadow Board)
Four core partners: 2 each from Coventry, WCC, TEC & Chamber

SRB Steering Group
Chair: David Taylor
Coventry City Council

Bid Co-Ordination Team
Chair: David Taylor
Coventry City Council

Officer Liaison Group
Senior officers drawn from core partners

4 SRB Action Groups
- Living / Environment
- Warwickshire SRB
- City Centre
- Health & Caring
Co-ordination Team as the principle conduit to the Action Groups respective chairs; through his chairmanship of the SRB SG he influenced the methodology used to assess and prioritise projects; he was the principle officer that negotiated with GOWM; he was part of the Officer Liaison Group alongside Duncan Sutherland. These roles placed Taylor in an extremely fortuitous position, one that commanded him considerable opportunity to exert influence on the developing partnership agenda and specifically the strategic direction of the SRB bid. A good example of where this influence was used to considerable effect was in the deciding what would be the ‘split’ between Action Groups. Whilst there was a discussion about the degree of emphasis, the core partner had accepted from the onset that any bid would have an economic bias, however, for the purposes of project appraisal Taylor needed a clear indication on the distribution of resources between the various Action Group areas. Accordingly, he took a short note to the Officer Liaison Group asking them to endorse what he thought would be an acceptable distribution. Having secured their approval this decision was taken to the SG and these global figures framed subsequent prioritising within the groups.

The apparent contradictions between what is shown as the SRB management arrangement in figure 7.2 and practice on the ground (figure 7.3) stems directly from the Government’s tight timetable and the evolving partnership’s pragmatic approach to putting a bid together. The overriding concern in the early stage was to assemble a bid and submit it in the time available. Appendix (O): CWP Single Regeneration Budget Timetable, shows how formal planning for the bid had already begun in March before the April announcement of the SRB. It is interesting to observe that the timetable indicates that public consultation occurred at the end of the bid assembly period. The Bid Co-ordination Team approached
bid assembly with a single minded determination. Problems understanding the management structure arise because within the same time frame as the bid developed a parallel process of developing a Shadow Board, i.e., expanding and formalising the Executive Committee was also taking place. Confusion arises because the culmination of the bid coincided with the formal creation of a partnership Board. And with an almost circular logic the partnership, and its newly constituted Board, was confronted almost immediately with a need to deal with the later stages of the SRB bid and had in effect to retrospectively take ownership of an achievement secured by others but undertaken in its name.

Whilst the SRB helped catalyse the development of the CWP, and was important to the concept of the sub-regional partnership, it represented only one part of that organisation's agenda. Even so the SRB proved fortuitous for an evolving CWP because it provided an early opportunity to target ‘new’ money; it also allowed the putative partnership to show both its partners and observers from within the wider community that broad objectives could be achieved through partnership.

Throughout the period of the bid development the Executive Committee received representations from groups wishing to join the Shadow Board and conversely it actively canvassed key individuals to sit on it. It was explained by a CWP officer that individuals invited to sit on the Shadow Board were encouraged to take an early interest in the activities of the partnership and this included involvement in the Steering and Action Groups. Although CWP documentation indicates that Action Groups reported to the Bid Co-ordination Team and this in turn reported to a Directors SRB Sub-group which had ultimate control over the strategic direction of the SRB bid. The evidence suggests however that this structure was not fully operational until after the submission of the Final bid. CWP
minutes record the official position which indicated that a sub-group of seven directors with a specific SRB remit was only formally constituted on 24/01/95 (para.6.1), with the minutes recording the membership as:

- Helen Aird Voluntary sector
- Alan Stothard Private sector
- Colin Holland Private sector
- Hardev Bahia Ethnic minorities
- Mike Goldstein Universities
- Mick Jones District councils

Nominations from founding partners to David Taylor by 25 January [1995]

RESOLVED that the group be chaired by Sir Brian Follett

**Control through downsizing**

However, because the bid was being assembled in the period when technically the CWP did not exist in law and de facto there could be no SRB Directors sub-group, then the day-to-day oversight of the evolving bid gravitated to David Taylor in his dual roles in the Bid Co-ordination Team and SG.

Having invited bids on the PSFs the Action Groups received a total of 423 bids worth £210m (para.6.1 Minutes of the meeting of the Shadow Board of CWP 09/08/94)[i.e., requests for £210m of SRB funding]. The bids were sent in the first instance to the Bid Co-ordination team and then copied to the Chair of the relevant Action Group; the relevant group having been identified by the applicant when defining the primary strategic objective of the project in the PSF. At this stage the projects entered what was described by an officer as ‘an open competition’.

The Bid Co-ordination Team and Action Groups performed two distinct roles. The first role, performed by the Bid Co-ordination team, was to analyse the aggregate effects of the
projects in order to get a strategic oversight of their potential impact. The Bid Co-ordination Team therefore sought to assess the impacts of the programme of bids in terms of:

- All expenditure by strategic objective
- SRB expenditure by strategic objective
- Outputs by type of strategic objective
- All expenditure by area
- SRB expenditure by area

The Action Groups on the other hand scored and prioritised the individual projects using a system of scoring developed by the Bid Co-ordination Team and described in CWP correspondence—*Single Regeneration Grant: Project Prioritisation*(22/06/94) reproduced as Appendix (N). The document states that:

> After initial appraisal by the Action Groups, the Bid Co-ordination Team will regroup the information into a management report by area. If resources are a constraint then local partnerships will be asked to exercise their own priorities in coming down to the appropriate resource level (para.1)

But the level of response produced its own problems. The Bid Co-ordination team was immediately faced with the mammoth task of having to cut the programme of projects to bring it into line with the £52m figure bid for in the Outline bid. [It should be remembered that the amount of money available for round one for the whole of England was envisaged to be somewhere in the region of £100m—with an actual outturn of £136.4m (HC written answer 9th March 1998)]. The process of downsizing was passed down to the Action Groups where figures were ‘tweaked’ to fit the bid. An officer with the Bid Co-ordination Team explained the procedure:
All projects would be scored [using the criteria for project prioritisation – Appendix (N)]. There was general agreement that points did not mean prizes… **juggling** is needed to balance issues in terms of employment, capital/revenue split. {my emphasis}

The officer emphasised that the ‘juggling’ was undertaken by the Bid Co-ordination Team and that its deliberations were ‘rubber stamped’ by the Executive Committee. The Bid Co-ordination Team could feel confident that they could achieve this without recourse to recrimination. The reason for this is that the SG which nominally existed to provide strategic oversight to the SRB was chaired by Taylor and in addition had a strong contingent of Coventry council officers. This position was reinforced by the interlocking nature of relations between the SG and Action Groups. Coventry City officers chaired two of the four Action Groups with a third chaired by a Coventry Health Authority officer—see table 7.3 above. Thus the first tranche of downsizing that took place at Action Group level could be assured to be acceptable at SG level because the same people were represented in each group. Minutes of the CWP Shadow Board 09/08/94 (para.6.5) record that:

David Taylor explained [retrospectively] that the prioritisation process had taken into account:

- the quality of the bidder
- value for money
- meeting unmet needs
- innovation
- leverage

[and, in addition]

It was agreed that the Executive Committee should be authorised to receive comments arising from the consultation period and approve the final SRB bid (para.6.6){my emphasis}

**First board meeting of CWP**

It transpires that what should have been the inaugural meeting of CWP on 28th June 1994 was technically invalid because the certificate of incorporation had not yet been granted.
Interestingly however, the minutes of this meeting lists the names of only 18 Directors with two apologies [not the 26 listed in the Memorandum of Association]; subsequent board minutes continue to refer to the appointment of directors. It is only when you get to the minutes of the 19/10/94 Board meeting that you get to something approaching a more comprehensive list of directors vis., 24 (sic). However the minutes of this first Board meeting are revealing in another way. This is because they record the approval of a resolution for the creation of an Executive Committee that would consist of ‘the 8 people from the founding members’ (Shadow Board Minutes 28/06/94 para.5). [A committee by the same name, consisting of the four core partners, had already been meeting for some time prior to the SRB] The minutes (para.6) record the remit of this new committee as:

- The management of the Single Regeneration Budget bid.
- The development of the Economic Strategy
- The drafting of financial proposals, and
- The establishment of delivery mechanisms

The effect of the resolution was to formally place the control of the SRB bid with the core partners: a position that did nothing more than reflect what had been occurring in practice. So, whilst the CWP documentation may refer to strategic oversight by a Directors SRB sub-group under the chairmanship of Sir Brian Follett, it was clearly not formally structured in the manner described by CWP until January 1995 as described above. Rather the process at the beginning was seen by an officer who participated as: “…managed but nevertheless chaotic”. The combination of an extremely tight timescale along with an absence, or rather more accurately, an evolving Shadow Board, effectively created what might reasonably be described as a partial strategic vacuum. The vacuum was partial because a number of the parameters had already been developed by the Bid Co-ordination Team and accepted by the
core partners at the onset and these strategic objectives circumscribed the evolving bid. Crucially, a consequence of the gross over-bidding of projects precipitated two tranches of downsizing. Because the institutional structure of the partnership was literally being built at the same time as the bid was developed the structure remained fluid. Operating in this environment the Bid Co-ordination Team could fill in the details. Albeit that the principle themes were set, the Bid Co-ordination Team operated in the absence of strategic oversight and this latitude provided considerable opportunity for it to influence the specific shape of the SRB programme.

**ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING**

...structures should not be set in stone

**Humility**

The test of organisational learning is in fact a test of humility. The presumption underlying organisational learning is a recognition that structures are not fixed in stone, i.e., they are not organised optimally for the objectives set for the partnership, or that as circumstances change then structures need to adapt to reflect changes. This may be framed negatively, and this occurs when the current structure is recognised as actively hindering the effective delivery of objectives, alternatively it can be framed positively, where new structures are recognised as a more effective method of delivering objectives. The logic of the checklist implies that a partnership that exhibits no evidence of organisation learning is either perfectly aligned or is nothing more than the clear domination of one party over another.

**From executive committee to executive committee**

Having agreed in principle to the concept of developing a sub-regional partnership the four core partners in March 1994 established working arrangements under the oversight of what was called an Executive Committee—the workings of which were private and the minutes
confidential. The choice of this name is problematic for anyone examining the evolution of the CWP. The reason for this is that the members of the Executive Committee along with invited directors progressively took on the role of a Shadow Board prior to legal incorporation as a company. Even as the Shadow Board was evolving the Executive Committee continued to operate in parallel to the evolving Shadow Board. Its deliberations were private and its minutes were confidential. One of the things the Shadow Board did was to create a sub-committee which it called an Executive Committee. Confusion might arise because of the name and the fact that it had the same membership. The distinction between the two committees however is that whilst the former was in effect a private and essentially secret body, and thus had no publicly acknowledged remit beyond an obvious concern to develop a partnership; the activities of the latter on the other hand is recorded in the CWP minutes as having an expressly SRB remit (28/06/94 Shadow Board minutes).

The early development of the partnership was pre-occupied with two distinct projects. The first, and the more important of the two, was the preparation of a sub-regional economic development strategy that would unite and co-ordinate the activities of all the actors in the sub-region. The logic underlying this was that in defining a sub-regional strategy you simultaneously create a case for partnership working and provide CWP with its raison d’être. The second project essentially presented itself with the arrival of the SRB. And with it it provided an opportune channel through which the putative partnership could establish its credentials both to GOWM but also to the wider community. The need to impress GOWM arises from its hegemonic position in the West Midlands polity. Regardless of whether GOWM is seen as an agent of central government in the regions, or a representative of the regions in London, it sits at the top of the institutional hierarchy in the
West Midlands. From here it performs a number of important roles, not least disbursing exchequer money through a variety of initiatives [and European money] but it also plays a part in the monitoring and oversight of regional expenditure. Either interpretation of the role of GOWM sees it as the institutional conduit through which sub-regional actors engage with government. The position GOWM occupies, at the top of the sub-regional pyramid, ensures that it is enormously influential and for this reason, its support and largesse, would be actively courted by any partnership keen to tap into funding.

It could be argued that SRB precipitated organisational learning. With the announcement and publication of the *Bidding Guidance* (DoE, 1994b) Coventry quickly moved to exploit a vacuum. It could exploit this opportunity because of its established capability in this area of work. It has been shown that WCC had had an ambivalent attitude to economic development and this was illustrated by the downgrading of this function under the Conservatives. Similarly, at a district level the local authorities only began to create specific economic development officer posts from the mid 1990s. This meant that at the time of SRB, although Labour, now in control at WCC, and with a more interventionist attitude, the economic development function at the county bore no comparison to that operating at Coventry. The City on the other hand through its longstanding concerns with areas of multiple deprivation had been linked to a raft of regeneration initiatives, for example, Urban Programme, a [failed] City Challenge bid, European funding etc. The experience it gained over many years pursuing these initiatives and the knowledge secured in successfully tapping into funding streams meant that it could justifiably claim to have a certain expertise in this area. In a revealing comment an officer who worked for the city at the time observed that:
…the City thought it was in a lead role in economic development, ahead of the game if you like compared to many authorities. Because of that it was kind of disdainful of WCC and their smaller economic development efforts. Just ignored the districts! Of course some of the districts did not have an economic development officer at that time.

One implication of this capability or experience was that Coventry had the operational capacity already in place and could at very short notice take a lead in the process of bid assembly: an opportunity it did not hesitate to exploit.

**From executive committee to CWP SRB directors group**

From its formation the Bid Co-ordination Team under the chairmanship of David Taylor at Coventry successfully managed the development of the bid. This position was not challenged until the creation of the CWP SRB Directors Group which was formed after the CWP was incorporated (August 1994) and after the Final bid had been submitted to GOWM (September 1994). Although, as has already been acknowledged, the SRB bid was ‘a synthesis of existing documents’, the methodology employed to assess projects, craft an SRB programme, and write a coherent bid document out of the melange of projects submitted, benefited enormously from the experience and expertise of the officers from Coventry city. By administering the PSF forms, setting up Action Groups, chairing the SG and: “…writing a strategy which unified the projects into a coherent [SRB] programme” David Taylor ensured that he exerted enormous influence over the character of the assembled programme. This influence was further enhanced through the Bid Co-ordination Team’s control over the process of downsizing the bid first to fit the £52m figure and then the £22m

**Evolving structures**

In between submission of the Final bid and winning, the partnership had become
incorporated. With this the structure that had developed in a rather ad hoc manner began to change. The pressures for this arose from a number of directions. In the first instance the need to establish the legal entity of the CWP compelled the partners to prepare Memorandum and Articles of Association and this meant that they had to consider the formal structure of the partnership. It can be seen that organisational learning was stimulated as the partners acknowledged the pressure to formalise ad hoc arrangements and put in place structures that would satisfy legal obligations under company law.

A second equally pressing need was for the partners to agree a Delivery Plan. This took on growing importance because it would contractually tie the partners to specific outputs. One of the demands contained in the Delivery Plan was the need to show GOWM how a partnership would ensure the delivery of outputs claimed in any bid. This meant that the Deliver Plan formally set out the SRB management oversight. It would also become a measure of the partnership’s effectiveness: with a range of sanctions [including financial] being the measure of the partnership’s ineffectiveness. Under this pressure [all SRB] partnerships were keen to prove to their respective GOs that they could get this right. For the CWP the progressive refinement of ad hoc structures was part of a strategy that sought to convince GOWM that the partnership took its obligations seriously.

Restructuring

The Delivery Plan proved extremely difficult to negotiate for a variety of reasons. Chief amongst these was that the CWP had not only to agree key outputs with GOWM but also negotiate service level agreements with the nine Guarantors. The Delivery Plan was only approved by GOWM - after several tortuous drafts - in July 1995, some seven months after the announcement of the win. Because the SRB contained no provision for ‘roll-over’ of
underspends this put immediate pressure on the partnership. It should be remembered that in this period the partnership had to set up an office from scratch, establish a secretariat, negotiate service level agreements with each of the nine Guarantors and, begin delivery of the key outputs agreed in the Delivery Plan. This proved to be an inauspicious start and one which very soon had material impacts. The problems are described in a CWP document reviewing the partnership’s first year:

The performance of SRB activity and spend against our forecast has been varied in 1995/96. Initially the delay in signing the Grant Offer Letter caused no problems in the first quarter, due to the fact that allowances had been made for the delay. The second quarter saw our first underperformance against forecast and although at that stage we were commended on our management systems as mentioned earlier we also received the Government’s “Yellow Card” warning. This card is issued to show that the Government Office is aware of an underperformance in spend and/or outputs by 10% or over. The third quarter showed that the position on spend had not improved enough and we were still underperforming. This situation did mean that technically we should have expected a "Red Card", the Government’s follow up to the Yellow Card. However to date we have yet to receive official notification. By the end of the final quarter we had completely caught up on the forecast activity. This was a great ending for a very ambitious first year, but we do need a more controlled delivery process in the following years to avoid any possibility of a Yellow or Red Card being issued (CWP, 1996e para9).

The national programme of SRB contained the provision for external monitoring. Accordingly, the DOE had commissioned PIEDA Consultants to examine an number of SRB partnerships as part of an agreed national programme of case studies. Following the partnership’s failure to meet key targets set out in their Delivery Plan, CWP was chosen as one of the national case studies. Ostensibly the CWP was selected as part of that national programme of work but given GOWM’s concern over CWP’s underperformance the choice of CWP seems unsurprising. Although the CWP should have automatically received a ‘red card’, in the event GOWM did not serve it having received reassurances that the matters of
concern were being addressed with the utmost urgency by the partnership. However, as a result of the PIEDA work a number of problems were raised. Chief amongst these were concerns with CWP’s relationship with its Guarantors. These had contracted to CWP to deliver specific outputs but PIEDA’s work confirmed the GO’s anxiety that the Guarantors did not understand their role or responsibilities and this had led to ‘organisational confusion’. In January 1996, responding directly to the threat of GO sanctions and the PIEDA criticism the CWP Board set about restructuring the management of the SRB. The partnership sought to achieve two objectives. First, was to remove any ambiguity about what were the responsibilities of the various groups that had arisen in an ad hoc way during the early development of the partnership. Second, there was a pressing need to ensure that the Guarantors adopted a more professional approach to monitoring with the creation of robust reporting mechanisms that fed into the CWP secretariat. [see CWP documents, Appendix (P): SRB roles and relationships SRB1 and 2 [and] Appendix (Q): SRB Management Processes for the revised structure and CWP’s explanation for the changes].

INDEPENDENT ARBITRATION

A partnership is clearly not real if the structure of a partnership emasculates partners and operates in such a way as to effectively institutionalise the hegemony of any one partner [or sub-set of partners].

First among equals

It is impossible to ignore the influence of the four core partners on the character of the partnership that was created. As has been described above the evolution of the Board structure built in a institutional bias that favoured the core partners. This hegemony allowed the character of the bid to be entirely controlled by the core partners. In the early part of the bid this was achieved through the activities of the Bid Co-ordination Team and the SG.
Their role was to put into effect the political decisions taken between the core partners about the broad geographical distribution of resources. This hegemony continued after incorporation through the formal ratification of an Executive Committee—made up of the same four core partners—with SRB oversight.

For the CWP the real test of Independent arbitration is to see what recourse is available to anyone who disputes or disagrees with the action or direction that the partnership is taking. One possible line of defence is that as a member organisation strategic objectives can be challenged at the annual conference. The first of which was held in May 1995, ostensibly to inaugurate the partnership and endorse its [three year] Economic Development strategy. Whilst this provided an excellent public relations opportunity the conference in total lasted only two hours and forty-five minutes from start to finish – see Appendix (R): CWP correspondence: Conference Acknowledgement. The economic development strategy was endorsed with only minor alterations and formed the strategic backcloth for the next three years. Following conferences focused on a celebration of achievements rather than providing a forum for discussion or dissent. In the event the agenda for conferences was set by the Board and this would of itself provide a significant hurdle for a critic of that Board.

An useful structure used extensively in the private sector is the concept on non-executive directors. In the private sector these provide a mechanism that allows for the oversight of the workings of boards. They have proved to be an effective vehicle to examine areas of activity where, for example, conflicts of interest arise, issues of probity, propriety or simply a critique of the strategic direction of the board. No such equivalent exists in the CWP.

The nature of the relationship between the CWP and GOWM has been described. As the GO is the principle conduit for both funding and approval for a variety of aspects of the
SRB programme the nature of the relationship is one of mutual dependence. This relationship bestows considerable importance on the Bid Co-ordination Team which acts as the primary point of contact between the GO and the partnership. A disgruntled partner would be in an invidious position if it unilaterally approached a GO. The reason for this is that, in the event that the GO took action, or even simply sought to investigate an issue, then it is highly likely that a partnership could identify the source of any criticism and their position could be further compromised. In the event that a partner was so aggrieved that it needed to contact its GO to complain about its fellow partners then it would be reasonable to argue that the principle of partnership working no longer maintained.

In a somewhat circular logic, it can be seen that, in the absence of independent arbitration or some other mechanism to safeguard the interests of individual partners then, in the event of a grievance, a partner would need to approach the partnerships to complain about its own behaviour. There is a certain irony in this and it is clearly not a tenable logic but is one that appears to apply to the CWP.

**MUTUAL REORIENTATION**

*A partnership should reflect the objectives of the partnership and not the habits or culture of dominant partners*

**Dominant partners**

The history of the development of the CWP is dominated by the actions of the four core partners. Having agreed to work in partnership the four set up a partnership structure that, through its board structure, inherently favoured them. The arrival of the SRB competition provided a practical objective for the core partners, it also provided a vehicle through which they could be seen to exercise partnership working. At the same time it thrust the putative partnership into an invidiously short bidding cycle the most important consequence of
which was that Coventry exploited its expertise and resource advantages to lead the SRB bid. The result of this was that many of the structures set up in the early stages of the bid were fundamentally shaped by decisions taken by, or controlled by, the Bid Co-ordination Team. That this would operate impartially is a moot point and one that would certainly be disputed. However, regardless of how impartially this role was conducted the power of patronage that lay with the Bid Co-ordination Team was significant but of far more importance to the structure that was eventually created was that this patronage was not open to challenge by partners who joined later. The interlocking membership of the Action Groups created by the Bid Co-ordination Team merely helped reinforce the hegemony of the four core partners. This domination by the four core partners ensured that their methods of working and their culture permeated the early CWP.

It should be remembered that the partnership developed to promote an agenda wider than the SRB. By the middle of 1996 CWP had been successful in the first two rounds of SRB and the role of the CWP was evolving reflecting a shift [critics would say drift] away from strategy and more towards the administration associated with monitoring the delivery of existing projects. This consolidation however exposed the growing rift between what should have been a partnership established to develop and implement a sub-regional agenda and a partnership that was becoming a vehicle for SRB. These moves proved to be a catalyst that encouraged a period of introspection and analysis about the future direction of the partnership. Within the Board, Nick Scheele the first chairman, and other private sector directors were complaining that the private sector did not understand its role or what its specific contribution could be to the partnership. The partnership responded by commissioning research by GFA Consultants that examined the private sector’s role in
local economic development and the attitude of the CWP private sector board members. The report raised a number of concerns one of which was that the size of the Board was unwieldy and this was proving to be a serious operational handicap. Alongside this there was a growing clamour within the Board that the SRB exercised too much of the main Board’s time preventing it from addressing a wider agenda. This concern with excessively large boards getting in the way of efficiency reflected national debates about the optimal size of boards but it also echoed sentiments expressed by GOWM about the efficacy of some of the CWP structures. Compounding the partnership’s problem was that in the same period discrepancies arose in relation to one of the partnership’s approved projects precipitating an examination by auditors and the involvement of the GOWM.

It was in this climate that the Board explored a number of options for changing structures and improving relations with GOWM. ECOTEC consultants were commissioned by the partnership with a remit to:

…build up partnership and trust with the GOWM, to take a hands on role in managing SRB1 and 2, to advise on resource requirements and to provide those extra resources if required (source: Executive Committee minutes 17/09/96).

Stemming directly from these deliberations an extraordinary general meeting was called on 10\textsuperscript{th} December 1996 to discuss restructuring of the board. This meeting approved a new board structure consisting of 12 persons: “…not chosen to be representative of their particular sectors, but for their understanding and influence on economic issues in the Coventry and Warwickshire area (CWP Directors Report for the 15 months to 31 March 1997, para.4) - see table 7.6 below. With almost an element of déjà vu the new board contained what amounted to the Executive Committee with one additional councillor representing the five districts, two universities and one private sector member drawn from
the construction industry.

Table 7.6: Revised CWP board membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Richard Drew</td>
<td>Chairman (Retired)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cllr John Fletcher</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cllr Nick Nolan</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cllr Gordon Collett</td>
<td>WCC (Cons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cllr Derek Forwood</td>
<td>WCC (Lab)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Malcom Gillespie</td>
<td>C&amp;W Chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>David Burton</td>
<td>Grant Thornton Accountants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>President of C&amp;W Chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cllr Mick Jones</td>
<td>Nuneaton &amp; Bedworth Borough Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sir Brian Follett</td>
<td>Vice Chancellor University of Warwick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Michael Goldstein</td>
<td>Vice Chancellor Coventry University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Peter Deeley</td>
<td>Deeley Construction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: *CWP Directors Report for the 15 months to 31 March 1997*)

At the same time a SRB Board Committee was established to replace the role previously exercised by the SRB Directors Group, the SRB Steering Group and the SRB Guarantors Group - table 7.7 below. As in previous structures appointments to this revised committee were the responsibility of the Board but because of their majority on this it could be taken as synonymous to approval by the core partners.
Table 7.7: Membership of the restructured SRB board committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Richard Drew</td>
<td>Chair (retired private sector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sir Brian Follett</td>
<td>Vice Chancellor University of Warwick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>David Taylor</td>
<td>Coventry City council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nigel Gaynor</td>
<td>Coventry &amp; Warwickshire TEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Alan Durham</td>
<td>Coventry &amp; Warwickshire Chamber of Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chris Garden</td>
<td>Nuneaton &amp; Bedworth BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dorothy Barrett</td>
<td>North Warwickshire DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Dennis Stanley</td>
<td>Warwick DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Anne Haebens</td>
<td>West Midlands Probation Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>{to be determined}</td>
<td>Coventry University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Alan Rowe</td>
<td>University of Warwick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Gordon Stokes</td>
<td>Further Education Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Helen Aird</td>
<td>Coventry CVS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Liz Stewart</td>
<td>Nuneaton &amp; Bedworth CVS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Hardev Bahia</td>
<td>Coventry REC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Raj Sohal</td>
<td>Ethnic Minority Development Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>{to be determined}</td>
<td>Touchstone Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Trevor Cornfoot</td>
<td>CWP Ltd Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Lorraine Butler</td>
<td>CWP Ltd Secretariat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: CWP Board Meeting 10/12/96 para.30)

Below this was a number of Forum Groups that were to provide opportunities for the numerous member organisations to become involved in the work of the partnership.

**STANDING ORDERS**

...the conduct of a partnership should be governed by mutually agreed rules

**He who pays the piper**

The gradual evolution and development of the partnership was strictly circumscribed throughout by the core partners. This influence was applied through the original Executive Committee and which established the working pattern of the partnership. One of the
characteristics of the CWP was that it inhabited a new institutional environment. As a new organisational entity it did not fall within the traditional institutional boundaries of local authorities nor did it fall within the remit of Quangos (as evidenced by its omission in the deliberations by Lord Nolan on the Committee on Standards in Public Life). The partnership did adopt a number of standing orders but in each case this originated with one of the core partners and was passed with the support of the other core partners. The distribution of seats on the Board effectively created an insuperable hurdle for other partners. Without any statutory standing orders, or a mechanism to protect the role of minorities on boards, then it is reasonable to argue that the structure CWP adopted effectively circumscribed the distribution of power.

**ENTERED INTO VOLUNTARILY**

...*there should be no barriers to entry or exit*

**Fiscal stringency**

As has been described the creation of the SRB integrated a number of budgets under one heading. In the process of integration it was understood that this could have a potentially serious re-distributive effect, or worse, it could result in cuts to existing programmes. For local authorities this was not an entirely new situation. They had been working in a climate of fiscal constraint for a number of years. This squeeze on resources also effected TECs who, co-incidentally, in the period running up to the introduction of the SRB had suffered: “...a substantial decline in annual budget levels – from £3 billion in 1990 to £1.4 billion in 1994” (HC, 1996a: para.2). Any organisation involved in regeneration activity and operating in a climate of cuts would have welcomed any opportunity to tap into a new funding stream. The effect of this fiscal climate was to create a situation where partners found it increasingly difficult to resist the lure of partnership. Indeed, it is logical to argue...
that the greater the exposure a partner has to funding streams that were to be incorporated into the integrated SRB budget the stronger the impetus to engage in partnership working—the case for this is certainly clear in the case of Coventry. It could be argued, using a reverse logic, that fiscal stringency imposed its own compulsion on potential partner organisations: they could not reasonably refuse to join a partnership initiative and in this sense their was a barrier to exit.

Given that the health of the voluntary sector is intimately tied to that of local authorities it is not surprising therefore that they are even more vulnerable to the fiscal pressure to participate in partnership. The voluntary sector receives considerable direct funding from local authorities but it also can gain (or suffer) materially from the benefit or removal of patronage. One of the insidious effects of patronage was revealed in a interview with a representative of the ethnic minority community who recalled the invitation to participate in the CWP. Along with another colleague they had been invited to lunch with Duncan Sutherland. Over lunch it was suggested to them that they ought to consider participating in the CWP. Although not spelt out, they understood that if they did not participate it could have repercussions that might effect their relations with the council. The perception was that this approach fitted a pattern of local intervention which saw the local authority as: “…instrumental in manipulating competition between ethnic minority communities within the City.” The interviewee noted with interest that having an established relationship with another statutory organisation had meant it had access to a funding stream not under the control of the local council. This alternative income stream proved to be a form of security that helped insulate it—though not extricate it completely—from coercion. The interviewee felt that one of the most important benefits that arose through working with sectors outside
of the local authority was that it provided both an independent ally and an opportunity to develop relations with the GO independent of the local authority.

ACCOUNTABILITY SUPPORTED BY SANCTIONS

If a partnership is to be more than the clear domination of one party over another then partners need a mechanism which allows them to call a partnership to account

Following Nolan’s definition that conflates accountability with sanctions it can be seen that, in the absence of formal mechanisms that resolves the different lines of accountability—internal, external, downwards—then the primary line of accountability for the CWP is ‘upwards’ to the GOWM. Part of the problem lies in the observation that SRB partnerships generally are anomalous organisations which can be neither characterised as statutory, private or even NDPB. So in the absence of other lines of accountability it is the Delivery Plan that de facto performs a measure of financial accountability, and this responsibility falls to the GO – this being the only organisation with the power to impose sanctions upon the partnership.

PARTICIPATION STRATEGY

A partnership should publish a participation strategy which states how the different lines of accountability will be resolved

The CWP does not have a participation strategy. Indeed it is understood that the partnership does not even recognise that different lines of accountability exist. It cannot however be argued that, as the Board is constituted by members drawn from a variety of sectors, and they in turn are elected or have their position ratified in some way that qualifies them as representative, then they are in some way accountable to these constituencies. The reason that this argument is untenable is because the Memoranda of Association makes clear that directors sit in a personal capacity with a primary responsibility to the partnership.
EXPENDITURE AUDIT

Although crude, money is a practical measure of the importance a partnership actually attaches to specific action areas. A primary aim of any audit is to compare a partnership’s stated priorities with the actual resources attached to each objective to see if they do in fact coincide.

How was SRB money to be distributed

Column three in table 7.8 below sets out the distribution of SRB money by expenditure activity as indicated in the Final bid (CWP, 1994a). The largest portion of the budget is attributed to a ‘Skills to maximise growth & opportunities’ heading, taking 34.07% of the budget this compares to 12.81% for the next category.

Table 7.8: Distribution of SRB funds in the final bid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Final</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills to maximise growth &amp; opportunities</td>
<td>17.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invest in business: Encourage Growth and Diversity</td>
<td>6.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City &amp; urban centres</td>
<td>5.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing which meets peoples needs</td>
<td>9.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A high quality environment</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safer communities</td>
<td>5.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and caring communities</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver SRB programmes and monitor against strategy</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Adapted from Final bid (CWP, 1994a:10))

The division of the bid into four groups referred to in the Board minutes of 09/08/94 above was confirmed in the PIEDA audit (PIEDA, 1995) which indicated that the distribution of funds would be allocated in the following proportions.

- Economy Development: 40%
- Living [and] Environment: 35%
- City Centre: 12.5%
- Health & Caring: 12.5%
However, the distribution of resources is problematic because a variety of methods of calculation appear to have been used and what is apparent is that crude heading hide as much as they reveal. The 09/08/94 Board minutes also mention that the overall balance of the bid, in expenditure terms, was split into employment 45% and environment 55%. Regardless of which headings we examine their inherent opaqueness appears to allow considerable latitude for interpretation. For example, did these percentages refer to outputs or is it expenditure?

In order to overcome becoming embroiled in a forensic dissection of each of the 53 approved round one projects and attempt to clarify whether individual projects are principally economic or environmental or social or some other combination, then table 7.9 below instead examines which organisation received the resources rather than attempt to analyse them under potentially ambiguous or contested headings. An illustration of the problem can be seen by examining Appendix (S): *Comparison of SRB outputs - Final To Delivery*, which compares outputs listed in the Final bid and the subsequent Delivery Plan. What Appendix (S) shows is how, in aggregate terms, the character of the bid changed as certain types of outputs were cut or added. However, without an understanding of the expenditure attached to the outputs it becomes impossible to accurately judge their actual value as a proportion of the total bid.
Table 7.9: Distribution of SRB funds in round one

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
<td>12,781,000</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>5,310,000</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuneaton &amp; Bedworth BC</td>
<td>1,076,000</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwickshire University</td>
<td>718,000</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry University</td>
<td>575,000</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touchstone Housing</td>
<td>464,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warwick DC</td>
<td>451,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Warwickshire BC</td>
<td>118,000</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands Probation Service</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCC</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>21,626,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: CWP internal document)

What is clear from table 7.9 is that projects led by Coventry secured the lion’s share of the SRB resources. Interviews with the core partners indicates that the geographical distribution of SRB funds was the result of political bargaining and negotiations undertaken at the start of the SRB cycle. A senior councillor involved in private discussions between WCC and Coventry City indicated that officers of the two authorities discussed an options paper in the Officers Liaison Group. This paper addressed the question of the distribution of resources and formed the basis of confidential discussions amongst the core partners.

Participants to the discussion did not dispute Coventry’s legitimate claims for a substantial part of the budget. It was openly acknowledged that by any measure of need the scale of deprivation in Coventry would justify it receiving the lion’s share of any bid. However, the distribution of SRB resources had to acknowledge the political realities. A councillor privy to the discussions argued that the distribution of resources was: “…a political carve up”, albeit one that acknowledged Coventry’s primacy in any claim. Part of the political calculation was that in order to allay the reluctance of the districts to participate, and also to
ensure they committed themselves to the partnership, then all four districts needed to get something out of the bid [and they did]. A district councillor asked why their authority had joined the SRB was unequivocal, we: “…got involved because of the possibility of getting SRB money…[adding]…Getting hands on extra money was always a very attractive proposition.” These exact sentiments were repeated by an officer from the same district authority. When asked:

Q: Presumably once involved in the SRB did you have a clear understanding as to why you were there?
A: Yes. [laughing]…
Q: …and what was it?
A: Principally to secure funds for the district council, for the district council areas, and principally those areas identified in the Index of Local Conditions as being areas of need. So, if you can picture it then. New initiative. Lots of funding being piled into one pot. Lots of funding being taken away from, from…
Q: …top-slicing?
A: Yes. And everyone wanting to get a finger in the pie basically.

**Control through prioritising**

The Final bid was submitted to GOWM by the 7th September 1994 deadline. Shortly after this the CWP received news that their bid had been well received. However, by late August 1994 the Bid Co-ordination Team was expressing concerns that the bid would be reduced, with GOWM possibly asking CWP in late September to prioritise against a lower total. Concerned that this situation could arise the Shadow Partnership was asked to consider the need to think about what guidance it might issue in order to prioritise the bid if GOWM requested this. At the same time a number of ‘obvious’ options were put to the partnership by the Bid Co-ordination Team and these included:
Within a fortnight of submission circumstances changed dramatically and this situation is recorded in the minutes of an Emergency meeting of the Executive Committee on 27/09/94.

Duncan Sutherland introduced the item and explained that the Government Offices were eager to see our bid scaled down by over half the amount of resources requested. Indeed it was noted that the Partnership was expected to respond in only three working days to this request. Unofficially the Government Offices had advised the Partnership that a first year spend of £2m was to be expected. This figure would double in subsequent years leading to a total SRB allocation of about £18m. The question was whether a strategic programme could be run at this level (para.2).

What followed was a discussion on priorities that might help the revision of the bid and included, amongst other items, reducing the number of target areas, phasing schemes over a number of years. Other suggestions included taking out the city and urban centre schemes and removing one of the large housing proposals or schemes formally supported under Urban Programme funding. This last suggestion was possibly connected with an URBAN bid that Coventry were in the process of submitting to the EU. Conversely a strong case was made to protect the Hillfields [Coventry] scheme as the most deprived area in the sub-region.

Following the announcement by the SoS of the winning SRB bids on 6th December 1994 it was confirmed that CWP had in fact actually received under half of what it bid for (43-38%) a total of £22.6m over five years with £2.5m in the first year. The partnership was immediately forced to prepare a second tranche of downsizing.
**A second tranche of downsizing**

The period after the submission of the Final bid on the 7th September 1994 and the confirmation of winners in December 1994 is confusing. The reason for this is that the first tranche of downsizing arose because of over-bidding and was managed entirely by structures established under the aegis of David Taylor. The need for a second tranche arose because of government imposed cuts. Although a formal partnership structure was not operational when the Outline bid was presented to GOWM, by the time of the submission of the Final bid an informal partnership structure had been in place for a couple of months operating as a Shadow Board. The confusion arises because in the early weeks of the partnership’s life parallel structures were operating. So alongside Taylor’s work in putting together a SRB bid the core partners were also actively engaged in recruiting members to a Shadow Board that would become the blueprint for the CWP. So as to be able to progress the two distinct objectives of the CWP [an economic development strategy and an SRB bid] the core partners established a Strategy sub-committee—the actual date when this began work is not recorded. A CWP officer stated that one of the ways in which new directors could be ‘brought up to speed’ with what the partnership was doing was to involve them in the work of the shadow partnership. One of the ways that this operated was to involve new shadow directors in the activity of the SG or more directly in Action Groups, or both. The second way that shadow directors were involved was working in the sub-committee drafting an economic development strategy. There are no published records of these early meetings and it is not possible to state with certainty whether all directors listed in the SG participated from the start and/or attended all of the meetings.

At the time of the incorporation of CWP the oversight of the SRB bid lay with an Executive
Committee that had been approved by the Shadow Board on 28th June 1994. Shortly after hearing it had won, the CWP subsequently approved the formation of a SRB Directors sub-group with a remit to: “oversee the finalisation of the process” (para.6.1 CWP Board minutes, 24/01/95). As its title suggested it was constituted by CWP directors. In its metamorphosis from SG to SRB Directors sub-group its membership shed the representatives of the four core partners. However, subsequent to this development the SRB Directors sub-group was enhanced during the production of the Delivery Plan and in the process re-incorporated personnel from the four core partners. The changes to the partnership structures are recorded below in table 7.10 It is of interest that David Taylor serviced both the SRB Directors sub-group and the revised CWP Steering Group as an ‘advisor’ with the title SRB co-ordinator.

**Table 7.10: Evolution of structures during the bid cycle**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Executive Committee</th>
<th>David Taylor’s {interim} Steiling Group (source: CWP internal document)</th>
<th>SRB Directors sub-group (source: CWP Minutes 24/01/95)</th>
<th>CWP [SRB] Steering group (source: taken from Delivery Plan, 1995a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cllr. Brian Clack Coventry City Council</td>
<td>David Taylor (Chairman) Coventry City Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cllr. Kevin Maton Coventry City Council</td>
<td>Matt Feeley Coventry City Council</td>
<td>Cllr. Kevin Maton Coventry City Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roger Griffiths Coventry City Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jos Parry Coventry City Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bronwen Lacy Coventry City Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graeme Betts Coventry City Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eamon Kelly / Noreen Dowd Coventry Health Auth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cllr. Derek Forwood (Lab) WCC</td>
<td>Jeremy Howell WCC</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cllr. Derek Forwood WCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cllr. Gordon Collett (Cons) WCC</td>
<td>Janet Fortune WCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jane Carter WCC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Committee (source: Shadow Board Mins, 28/06/94)</td>
<td>David Taylor’s {interim} Steering Group (source: CWP internal document)</td>
<td>SRB Directors sub-group (source: CWP Minutes 24/01/95)</td>
<td>CWP [SRB] Steering group (source: taken from Delivery Plan, 1995a)</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. D. Burton Cov &amp; Warwickshire Chamb Comm &amp; Ind</td>
<td>Alan Durham Cov &amp; Warwickshire Chamb Comm &amp; Ind</td>
<td>Mr. D. Burton Cov &amp; Warwickshire Chamb Comm &amp; Ind</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Willis Cov &amp; Warwickshire Chamb Comm &amp; Ind</td>
<td>Alan Durham Cov &amp; Warwickshire Chamb Comm &amp; Ind</td>
<td>Alan Durham Cov &amp; Warwickshire Chamb Comm &amp; Ind</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Malcom Gillespie CEO Cov &amp; Warks TEC</td>
<td>Nigel Gaynor Cov &amp; Warks TEC</td>
<td>Mr. Malcom Gillespie CEO Cov &amp; Warks TEC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron Jones Cov &amp; Warks TEC</td>
<td>Lorraine Butler Cov &amp; Warks TEC</td>
<td>Lorraine Butler Cov &amp; Warks TEC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Davis Advanced Tech Centre University of Warwick</td>
<td>Sir Brian Follett (Chairman) University of Warwick</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chris Garden Nun &amp; Bedworth BC</td>
<td>Mick Jones District councils Cllr. Mick Jones Nun &amp; Bedworth BC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deborah de Haes Rugby BC</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Mike Goldstein Universities</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>John Goodman Voluntary Sector Ms. Helen Aird Voluntary sector Ms. Helen Aird CVS</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iain Sharp Voluntary Sector</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eric Linton Coventry REC Hardev Bahia Ethnic minorities Mr. Hardev Bahia Coventry REC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kishor Pala Ethnic Minority Development Alliance</td>
<td>Alan Stothard Private sector Alan Stothard GEC, Rugby</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colin Holland Private sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Having won less than half of the amount they bid for the partnership had to manage a second tranche of downsizing. Looking at table 7.11 below it seems that the approach taken was a combination of following the ‘steer’ given by GOWM and expediency. Advice emanating from GOWM about the possible scaling back of the bid had already encouraged an examination as to how this might be managed. Once again the Bid Co-ordination Team played an influential role in this process. David Taylor’s role as the primary conduit for information to and from the GOWM was a two edged sword. On the one hand working
relations with the GO offered an opportunity to be close to the decision makers and where access to information offered opportunities that could be exploited. On the other hand this also can be seen to have been somewhat of a poisoned chalice when the GO effectively exacted cuts to the Final bids [although the position was that publicly partnerships proffered cuts]. This situation was not unique. The evidence from Mawson et al (1995, Chp.4) was that nationally the experience of round one was that there had been elements of competition and negotiation in the determination of bid size with evidence that in the case of GOWM downsizing was undertaken in-house after submission of the Final bids.

By proposing a bid for less than the full amount GOWM was in effect imposing an ultimatum: accept or fail. It is entirely unrealistic to imagine, as GOs suggested at the time, that once bids were submitted they became in effect sub judice. Here we had a massive £50m bid chopped in half. It seems incredulous that the GO would not have discussed downsizing with the Bid Co-ordination Team at some point prior to the announcement of winners. Even if we accepted the GO position that they did not impose a ceiling it begs the question: what possible rationale could the Bid Co-ordination Team have used in the absence of any steer about the possible size of an acceptable bid. Like all partnerships around the country GOs were themselves under considerable pressure to deliver. It should be remembered that they too were new entities, with new organisational structures, operating under the same onerous time constraints. As the deadline approached and GOs finalised their SRB programmes, reprofiling or queries required immediate action from partnerships – especially if ‘negotiation and bargaining’ was needed prior to submission to the EDR Cabinet Committee. The strategy that the partnership appears to have used in the
second trance of downsizing translated into cuts of approximately 50% across most of the objectives; the exception to this being the *City & Urban Centres* heading which was reduced by 82% with the *Deliver SRB programmes* and the *Monitor against Strategy* heading remaining unchanged.

Table 7.11: The scale of cuts between final bid stage and delivery plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Final £m</th>
<th>Delivery £m</th>
<th>Change £m</th>
<th>Change* %</th>
<th>Change*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City &amp; urban centres</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A high quality environment</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing which meets peoples needs</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills to maximise growth &amp; opportunities</td>
<td>17.72</td>
<td>8.03</td>
<td>9.69</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and caring communities</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invest in business: Encourage Growth and Diversity</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Safer communities</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52.01</td>
<td>22.56</td>
<td>29.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Column (d) expresses Delivery as % of the Final bid
\[\text{vis. (Final - Delivery)/ Final } \times 100\]*

Numbers may not add up due to rounding

(source: Adapted from Final bid (CWP, 1994a:10) & Delivery Plan (CWP, 1995a:2))

A CWP officer familiar with the procedure that was followed in the second tranche of downsizing observed that decisions were taken in a meeting held between Sir Brian Follett and David Taylor. The results of these discussions were ‘presented’ to the remaining members of the SRB Directors sub-group with the SRB directors simply accepting the judgements that had been made for them. This interpretation of events can be partially explained by the way GOWM handled its own SRB programme management. When GOWM approached the CWP to discuss scaling down the bid they extracted a commitment, made on behalf of the partnership by David Taylor in the Bid Co-ordination
Team, for a bid half the original size. Crucially though, Taylor who had to reply to GOWM at very short notice had to indicate the profile of a revised bid and he did this on the basis of what he understood to be the priorities of the partners. It was this profile that effectively circumscribed the parameters of the revised bid. This meant that whilst the CWP Steering Group ratified the revised bid figure, they did not take part in the discussion about how, if at all, the SRB strategy should be modified in the light of the revised figure, i.e., the proportion of expenditure on economic projects could have been increased/decreased or changed to reflect other interests for example, environmental, social etc. The role of the CWP Steering Group thus was administrative and took the role of ‘culling’ projects that least met the objectives set out in the project summary forms.

**CONCLUSIONS**

**What did the expenditure audit say about the CWP’s priorities?**

Any attempt to conduct an expenditure audit of the CWP is problematic because of the way the bid was assembled. In the first instance the four core partners achieved political agreement on the broad split. From this point on the management of the bid was co-ordinated by the Bid Co-ordination Team who actively sought to avoid a debate about ‘figures’ and ‘who got what’. Obfuscation, it was argued, was tactically useful because it helped deflect debate about the distribution of resources. Public debate it was suggested would almost certainly have ended acrimoniously exposing partnership relations and this would have had a seriously prejudicial impact upon the image of the partnership that was being assembled; argument and consensus were held to be mutually exclusive. Only the Bid Co-ordination Team were in a position to comment on the distribution of resources and they confirmed that this analysis could only be undertaken on a project by project basis. However, even at the individual project level problems arise. The administrative
arrangements put in place by the CWP dictated that before a project could be accepted it had to be categorised by its primary activity; it was emphasised that this was not done by the CWP rather it was done by whoever submitted the project. Given that a typical SRB project will deliver a bundle of outputs there will be occasions when this labelling is, if not arbitrary, than has a large element of subjectivity. For example. A project whose primary activity is categorised as environmental may contain ethnic minority outputs but no distinction is made in returns on what proportion of the project spend relates to individual outputs. A £100k project described under an ‘environmental’ heading might have, for example, a number of employment and ethnic minority outputs. These specific outputs will have of course to be accounted for. Financial probity in the SRB demands a clear audit trail but this focuses on reconciling how much is spent (compared to that predicted) and when it is spent (timescale) so that outputs can be shown to have been delivered to schedule. The crucial point is that returns in this example would show only the aggregate figure of £100k spent on environmental issues; it would be practically impossible to disaggregate what proportion of that £100k was spent on the ethnic minority outputs described in the original project summary: was it £50k £10k or £10? One way of looking at this opacity might be that it allows operational flexibility allowing actual expenditure to be directed [skewed] towards areas that might not necessarily have benefited as much under a more transparent regime. The concern must be however that flexibility can be a two-edged sword. That this is an area of wider concern is apparent from the Audit Commission’s criticism of a number of SRB partnerships’ expenditure controls. In light of their concerns the Audit Commission qualified the audit of the DoE expenditure vote [Appropriation Accounts 1996-97 Class VI Vote 2: Regeneration and countryside and wildlife, England] because:
...of a limitation in the evidence available to the Comptroller and Auditor General to confirm that grants paid in relation to the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund have been applied to the purposes intended by Parliament and conform to the authorities which govern them...[and]....

In the first year of operation...some partnerships did not operate the financial systems in the way intended by the Department [DoE]. This resulted in a number of annual returns being qualified by the relevant external auditors. For 40 out of a total of 194 returns where certificates were due in 1996-97, covering some £25.1 millions, the external auditors of the accountable bodies had stated that there was no evidence available to verify the use of some or all of the grants paid by accountable bodies to their partners (Audit Commission, Press Notice 9/98).

It is clear from the CWP minutes and other published documents that the SRB figures have been presented in a variety of manners to suit different audiences. An example of how this operated is clear from comments made by a representative from the ethnic minority community who stated that in the very early days of the partnership ethnic minority community representatives received a specific undertaking that 20% of the SRB spend would be on ethnic minorities. This commitment played a significant part in convincing the ethnic minority community to participate in the partnership. Problems only arose later when this figure was challenged by the ethnic minority community. It became clear to them that the system of monitoring was not set up to disaggregate outputs at this level of detail. This inability to quantify – with any confidence – the actual spend on ethnic minorities became a source of considerable tension.

**An evolving partnership**

On the other hand the CWP has shown itself quite able to evolve organisationally. There was clear evidence of both mutual reorientation and organisational learning. The transformation of project objectives illustrated in table 7.4 is an example of the process of mutual reorientation which helped resolve tensions amongst the core partners over the
strategic direction of the bid. Similarly, table 7.10 illustrates how the structure of the partnership evolved during the development of the SRB bid; from an informal agreement amongst the four core partners in pursuit of a common goal to a formal legal structure with a broader membership operating with an agreed strategic agenda.

In the early period, in the transition from round one to round two, control of the bid assembly process moved from the Bid Co-ordination Team, to a newly constituted SRB Directors sub-group. This example of organisational learning needs to be examined critically. The new structure was created by the now legal entity CWP. Ostensibly the wider partnership were giving this new arrangement (co-ordination mechanism) a formal mandate. However in practice the new arrangements appear merely to have legitimated the four core partners control over the SRB process. The same core group of partners continued to dominate this revised structure with the role of senior Coventry officers continuing to play important roles. This process of organisational learning has continued with the restructuring of the CWP Board. Pressures coming from a number of sources encouraged the partnership to consider reducing the size of the main Board in order to give it a more strategic remit. It was felt that SRB business was dominating the Board’s agenda and that this was having a deleterious effect upon the wider effectiveness of the Board. A point repeatedly made was that the SRB was intended to be only one element of the partnership’s sub-regional economic strategy. A paper produced by the company secretary [the Chief Executive of Coventry City Council] examined the option of reducing the size of the Board in order to allow it to focus more specifically on a strategic role. The paper proposed that oversight of the SRB should be devolved to a sub-committee with a specific SRB remit. These proposals formed the basis of an extraordinary AGM held in December 1996 which
approved a reduction from 26 directors to ‘not more than 12’. The basis upon how directors should be selected was also addressed. The original structure saw directors selected on the basis of a representational model, albeit directors sat as individuals, they nominally represented specific sectors. The new arrangements called for this representational model to be discarded in favour of what could be termed a ‘competency model’ akin to that operating in the private sector. Directors in future would be selected on the basis of the contribution and expertise that they could bring to the partnership. The extraordinary AGM approved the change in the Memorandum of Association. The impact of these changes was felt largely by the ethnic minority and community groups whose Board seats were abolished—see table 7.10. The four core partners retained seats upon the Board albeit [once again] not specifically named as representatives of any particular agency.

Is the CWP a ‘true’ partnership?

It is clear from an examination of the Board of CWP that the voting rights of the four key partners created a dominant voting block; a position that was maintained even as additional sectors were invited to join the partnership board. The subsequent development of a membership organisation can on the one hand be seen as an attempt to broaden the franchise of the organisation, however, the role of ‘members’ is not defined in the Articles of Association and in terms of the Company they have no legal rights. The formal role of members appears to have extended no further than consultees along with an invitation to attend AGMs to give a mandate for previously drafted policy. These occasions appear to have been primarily public relations occasions celebrating the achievement of key milestones. A typical AGM lasted approximately three hours with an agenda set by the CWP and were not structured as forums for dissent or for the questioning of the strategic
direction of CWP. The distribution of seats on the CWP Board ensured that a cabal made up of the four key agencies could exert considerable control over the strategic direction of the partnership. This same mechanism also allowed the same cabal to manage the recruitment of additional Board members. Although the involvement of a diverse range of actors and agencies were actively canvassed and genuinely encouraged to participate in the evaluation of SRB projects, the structural advantages implicit in the distribution of seats on the Board made it possible for the same group of core agencies to determine and manage the development of strategic objectives. Whether intended or not a repercussion of this structure was that control was not widely distributed. A direct consequence of these arrangements was to circumscribe the autonomy and influence of subsidiary partners. The reality appears to have been that power resided with the four core partners who effectively exerted enormous control over the evolution and development of the partnership. It is also clear that the relationship between the four core partners was fundamentally different to the relationship that existed between the core partners and partners invited to join later. The core cabal met effectively as equals. Albeit that Coventry effectively catalysed the creation of both the partnership structure and the SRB strategy the partnerships early development was contingent upon agreement being achieved between the four core partners. It seems improbable that the CWP could have convinced the GO that the partnership was genuine if any one of the core partners had refused to participate or openly dissented about the partnerships objectives in round one. The four partners had (in various combinations) already worked together prior to the SRB. What was new however was the commitment of the four core partners to come together and work on a common economic policy and SRB strategy. This was a radical innovation. Throughout the process of building the partnership and developing a SRB strategy the core partners effectively recognised their mutual
interdependence. The evidence suggests that the partnership they constructed reflected their interests first and foremost. However, it is also clear that the core partners came together voluntarily. It is also the case that the common agenda that was agreed upon within this group was built upon the trust that developed between the partners during the partnership building process. In terms of the theoretical model developed in chapter four the core partners exhibited all the qualities of a network partnership.

**Summary**

The experience of the CWP then was that although there was clear evidence of mutual reorientation and organisational learning this experience was partial. The evidence suggests that the four key partners did adjust their operational objectives and reorganised their actions to accommodate the concerns of the other core partners. However, what was noticeable by its omission was any evidence of accommodation of the needs and interests of the subsidiary partners. The inability to disaggregate the expenditure profile by either ethnic minority or community interests severely prejudiced the objectivity of the partnership in the eyes of these communities and served only to reinforce the perception of the dominance of one group over another. [The CWP did in fact present papers with a breakdown of expenditure profiles but these were contested by representatives of the community sector and served only to illustrate to those who felt aggrieved by the process of the importance of transparency]. The experience of the ethnic minority and community sector was that mutual reorientation was in fact not mutual and could more accurately be described as a one way street in which they were obliged to follow in order to ‘qualify’ for funding. The organisational learning experience of the voluntary and community sectors is starkly illustrated by their impotence in challenging the revised board structure which
effectively further emasculated their sectors roles in the CWP hierarchy.

As chapter six explained the development of key issues was severely prejudiced by the extremely short time table. The partners – even before the incorporation of the CWP – with a strong steer from Coventry adopted [what was acknowledged to be an opportunistic move] a competitiveness agenda based upon work previously undertaken for the European SPD. Having in effect informally adopted this agenda as the strategic backdrop to round one the principle of competitiveness was then formally adopted when *The Economic Strategy for Coventry & Warwickshire 1995-1998* (CWP, 1995b) was approved at the CWP’s first AGM. However, approval of an economic strategy for the sub-region does not of itself suggest that agreement on key issues should be accepted uncritically. A fundamental aim of the wider CWP initiative was to secure the co-ordination of economic development strategies across the sub-region. Given that all the local authorities involved in the CWP subsequently revised their local plans to accommodate the overarching themes of the CWP economic strategy this can be interpreted as a measure of the partnership’s success. The fact that the document is described as an ‘economic’ strategy reflects the primary focus of the document and no doubt accounts for the emphasis on competitiveness and manufacturing. This is not to say that given the opportunity to steer the strategy at an earlier stage the voluntary and community sectors may have adopted a programme that focused on a different agenda, for example, social exclusion or poverty. The important point is that this debate never took place!
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS

An academic theory tends to become fashionable at the cost of being amended into something approaching a caricature of the more sophisticated and cautious formulations of their originators (Jordan, 1990)

The difference between academic life and government is the difference between arguing to a conclusion and arguing to a decision (Healey, 1989)

Partnership?

This thesis set itself a number of objectives. The first, and most important, was to describe and give some objective substance to the idea of partnership. Having developed a theoretical model the second task was to translate the theoretical insights into a practical toolkit which could be used to examine the quality of relations within partnerships. This was operationalised by testing the checklist on the CWP to see if it was a real partnership. In the process of this evaluation the efficacy of the partnership checklist itself was tested. An important but subsidiary part of this inquiry evolved from the first question and this was an exploration of the relationship between partnership and network forms of co-ordination. The latter, it was suggested in the academic literature, had been proliferating to the extent that it potentially represented a new model of co-ordination, one that potentially threatened the dominant partnership orthodoxy. What was envisaged at the onset was an opportunity to make a definitive and unambiguous statement as to whether the CWP is a *true* partnership. The answer proved to be both yes and no.

The test of an SRB partnership

The test of an SRB partnership, as distinct from a partnership assembled for other reasons, is straightforward and has two dimensions. The first is whether the organisational form that
is created is a partnership understood in the theoretical terms set out in this thesis. The second dimension, reflecting the new localism agenda was to examine whether the partnership could realistically be described as local.

Although City Challenge was widely acknowledged as re-asserting the concept of a partnership linked to a specific local agenda it was different in one major respect. This was the level of central influence over the partnerships’ that were formed. City Challenge, was not an open competition, rather, certain localities were invited by central government to form a partnership and these were then subject to ministerial approval. The key distinguishing factor, and what made the SRB so radical, was that for the first time, the concept of partnership (as an efficacious organisational form) was explicitly linked with a new localism [unlike City Challenge invites, the form of SRB partnerships was not overly prescriptive or nominally subject to direct ministerial dictat]. In principle then SRB partnerships would deliver organisational efficiency and be responsive to local needs. In the theoretical terms discussed in chapter four these characteristics represent the co-ordinational logic of SRB partnerships: efficiency and localism.

The checklist seeks to answer the first question by providing a generic methodology through which all partnerships can be analysed. It usefulness lies in its ability to compare the quality of relations within a partnership against that predicted in a theoretical model and in doing so comment on its internal dynamics. However, the checklist is problematic in relation to localism. The reason for this is that whilst the checklist provides a systematic methodology for evaluating the contribution of partners included in a partnership it has not been designed to comment on the role of actors not formally constituted in a partnership. The checklist presumes that the various combinations of partners in a locality do in fact
constitute a new localism envisaged by central government.

This partnership checklist then comes with a very important caveat. It does not attempt to comment on constituencies of local interest that seek to play no part [for whatever reason] in a partnership; it does address exclusion, and the mechanics of exclusion that are seen to operate within partnership structures but it does not attempt to explain why interests might be excluded. The checklist was therefore principally designed to be used to evaluate the quality of organisational forms and the contribution made by, and relations between, the various constituency of interests that have either chosen or have been coerced to participate in a partnership. Implicit in the methodology is the presumption that the partnership approach, by incorporating a diversity of interests, does in fact ‘add up’ to a new localism. The checklist’s primary aim was therefore to evaluate the contribution of partners in partnership and does not (nor was it designed to) directly address the dynamics of constituencies of interest not formally represented in a partnership. The checklist approach therefore accepts the government’s assumptions about SRB partnerships and these assumptions are important and are worth repeating. First, partners brought together in SRB partnerships do in fact constitute a new localism and that their joint endeavours in fact describes a comprehensive approach to specific local issues. Second, that the principle of ‘true and real’ does in fact describe the quality of relations between partners.

In evaluating the CWP it is crucially important to reflect on the discussion on Arnstein’s (1969) eight rung ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’ in chapter four on the potential conflicts that arise depending on which sector undertakes the evaluation of a partnership. This debate is highly significant for a number of reasons. It should be remembered that a fundamental part of the government’s case for promoting partnership was to create an organisational
form that could effectively incorporate the diversity of actors that were considered absolutely essential for a regeneration policy to be effective. Allied to this concern was the government’s stated intention to shift the locus of decision making away from the centre.

It has been argued that partnership had become the new economic orthodoxy one accepted without question and vigorously promoted by successive governments as the institutional form that agencies and organisations should adopt when addressing regeneration. This is perhaps evident from the recent experience of City Challenge and the SRB but it applies equally to European funding. However, it is also clear that partnership has far wider acceptance and evidence for this can be seen from the comprehensive list of initiatives compiled by HM Treasury (1996) which catalogues the range of government led initiatives that promote partnership. In many spheres of activity then partnership has become a qualifying criteria and this has meant that there is now a clear structural reason to form or become involved in partnership. An inherent problem with the partnership approach to regeneration has been that where a system demands the creation of partnerships these may in fact not be ‘true’. Critics have consistently argued that there is compelling evidence that the obligation of partnership formation has created a climate where organisations and/or sectors have been seen to participate in partnership but have in reality been marginal to that process – see Mawson et al (1995); HC (1995a); Hall et al (1996, 1998) Dunmore et al (1996).

It was argued in chapter four that a coherent theoretical model of partnership did not exist. Because of this a conceptual model of partnership had to be built up from literature from a number of disciplines. This approach took as its starting point that partnership represented a specific form of organisational co-ordination. To better understand these dynamics the
theoretical chapter deconstructed several different forms of co-ordination to isolate the
various logics of partnership and ‘discover’ what could be considered as categorical
partnership qualities. It was argued that a ‘true’ partnership is a specific type of
coordination (a discrete sub-set of the various models of coordination called partnership)
derived with unique institutional and organisational qualities. These characteristics both
distinguish and contrast partnership from other forms of coordination that might lay claim
to the title of partnership.

The principle research task then was to develop a conceptual model that had application in
the real world. This was the intention behind the development of the checklist. The idea of
which arose from the realisation that there were a variety of organisational forms assembled
to engage in regeneration activities – many purporting to be partnerships – and that these
arrangements although called partnership were not necessarily applying a specific
partnership logic. It was intended to use the checklist [conceptual model] as an analytical
toolbox to prise open partnerships. Given the multiplicity of partnerships the checklist had
to achieve a number of objectives. It had to be able to embrace a range of organisational
forms; it had to be applicable in a variety of settings; it had to be able to identify and
substantiate the unique partnership qualities predicted in the model but perhaps most
importantly it should be simple to apply.

The theoretical model suggested that true partnership logic would be distinct from other
‘co-ordinational’ logics and these specific qualities would differentiate partnership from
other forms of co-ordination that might seek to claim the title of partnership. By identifying
a specific partnership logic the checklist gave real substance to the concept of partnership
so that it could be used both critically and – it was hoped – constructively. By looking at
the problem of partnership in terms of the character of the co-ordination mechanism an intellectual bridge was built between the existing theoretical literature on the co-ordination of firms with that of partnership.

The checklist approach was in principle simple. Select a partnership, in this case the CWP, and compare the real life experience of the development of the CWP with that predicted in theory. The checklist described the cardinal partnership qualities: the observer need only to check off the attributes. The logic implicit in this approach was that where an organisation under observation did not conform to the model then it could not justifiably qualify as partnership. However, exposure to reality revealed the naivety of some of the assumptions upon which the checklist was built.

**Future work**

The evidence from chapter seven suggests that the CWP operated as a partnership on many levels but what was being sought was one measure, one score, which could be described as a definitive statement as to whether the CWP [or any other partnership under examination] conformed to the theoretical model of partnership. This question proved extremely difficult to answer in practice. Part of the problem is that, in use, whilst the checklist reveals and confirms the many dimensions and complexity of what constitutes partnership it simultaneously introduces additional layers of complexity that were not initially envisaged and are problematic to resolve conclusively. The methodological problem arises in the process of translation from pure theory to practice. This can be understood in terms of a ‘closeness of fit’ dilemma.

The checklist encourages a systematic dissection of the constituent parts of what are considered to be partnership characteristics. In this sense it represents a series of null
hypotheses. The task of the researcher is to run through the checklist sequentially accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis. In principle the theoretical model of partnership, described by the checklist, suggests that if any one hypothesis is rejected then the organisational form cannot be a partnership and must be rejected in its entirety. In practice however the experience of the CWP was that it matched expectations in some areas but not all. Even this needs to be qualified. In some areas the CWP matched expectations – though not entirely. Methodologically this poses formidable obstacles for evaluation. However, a principle in the checklist was the notion of humility which acknowledges that problems (in all their guises) can be ameliorated through learning. This idea was specifically picked-up in the concepts of mutual reorientation and organisational learning which imply that within the partnership structure there exists the potential for an organisation to examine its own shortcomings and make conscious adjustments to its own development trajectory. The principle of adjustment, which reflects as it does experience on the ground, does not of itself imply that evolution necessarily always have positive outcomes.

This thesis set out to describe ‘categorical’ partnership qualities with at its starting point an examination of the literature on theories of co-ordination. It comes as no real surprise to discover that the CWP does not conform precisely to the model postulated in theory. The question that arises is how close is the CWP to partnership, and assuming that it is an evolving structure, in which direction is it moving (closer to or further from the theoretical model). The checklist whilst a useful starting point requires further work in order for it to become more sensitive to the realities of partnership operation evident in the real world. Having set the parameters of what constitutes a ‘true’ partnership the experience of the CWP case study suggests that what is now needed is further refinement to the methodology
that would enable the elements to be weighted. In seeking to assess the CWP it became clear that the checklist only provides a snapshot of the organisation that can be held as a mirror for comparison to the theoretical model. However, for all its inherent weaknesses an advantage of this approach is that (if repeated over time) it becomes possible to see in which direction the partnership is travelling: either closer to or further away from the ideal described in the theoretical model.

PARTNERSHIP IN URBAN POLICY
What goes round comes around

What is remarkable for any researcher examining the involvement of local communities in regeneration partnerships are the obvious echoes from the past. Partnership as a policy instrument was fundamentally embedded as an institutional response following the seminal 1977 White Paper. This was acknowledged as providing an unusually perceptive insight into the structural problems facing inner urban economies and was widely commended as such at the time.

A core element of the analysis contained in the paper was the recognition that inner urban economies were complex systems and any policy response needed to reflect both this diversity but also provide a mechanism to bring these disparate constituencies (stakeholders) together. Early partnership experience suggests that whilst rhetoric formally acknowledged the importance of the various stakeholder groups, partnership in practice was something done to, and not with, local communities. A great deal has been written in the intervening years on the need to actively involve local communities in their own local strategies. The DoE published, *Involving Communities in Urban and Rural Regeneration: A Guide for Practitioners* (DoE, 1995). This weighty report, principally a good partnership
guide, provided a convincing and cogently argued case for the efficacy of involving communities in the setting of strategies which shape the trajectory of their collective futures. Involving communities, it was argued, translates into policies that are sensitive to the needs of local economies and are more effective in achieving their objectives. The Audit Commission (1999b) have similarly argued that policy shaped by local communities for local communities, is more likely to become embedded in local communities and when this occurs it has a much more realistic opportunity to become sustainable over the medium to long term. That this conclusion needs to be discovered by researchers is a telling indictment of the structural failures of partnership working during the last three decades. It should be remembered that as long ago as 1969 Skeffington (People and Planning: Report of the Committee on Public Participation in Planning) was already saying that participation was an active thing: participation meant sharing in the formulation of policies and this should take place throughout the plan making process (HMSO, 1969:1).

The history of regeneration policy over the last three decades is littered with policy echoes. The rapid introduction of new policy initiatives understandably makes it difficult to secure meaningful engagement of all parties. The experience of Urban Programme Partnerships is evidence of this but remarkably this was repeated for both City Challenge and SRB partnerships. In practice a partial mandate has always been considered better than no mandate. Perhaps the most remarkable observation is the consistent failure of institutional actors to create structures that might accommodate community interests on a more equal footing. Looking at this the other way round what is equally remarkable is that community interests have consistently been overlooked, if not marginalised, in partnerships. It is hard not to draw the conclusion that although the merits of community involvement are
understood and well documented, institutional actors have chosen not to seek to redress the balance.

What we see in the history of partnership over the last thirty years is how it has been continually re-constituted to reflect the hegemony of the prevailing political economy. Given that resources are, and probably always will be, distributed unequally, experience suggests that resource rich sectors or organisations that are favoured by the prevailing political economy will tend to act opportunistically to secure their own advantage. If we consider the control exerted by the four core partners in the CWP it becomes hard not to concur with Benson’s (one might say cynical) analysis that the core partners’ principal objective was to ensure the continued maintenance of their control over the network of resources (Benson, 1975). It is difficult, given the evidence, not to conclude that the core partners did indeed use their resource advantages to opportunistically maintain their dominant position in the policy network. In the absence of any countervailing force, partnership effectively rewarded the core partners with hegemony over the policy process and control over Benson’s two key resources: money and authority. This experience has parallels with the Conservative government’s criticism of the Urban Programme Partnerships. These along with being accused of being ineffective were criticised because their involvement was cynically explained as simply a channel through which local government sought to capture additional government money during a period of fiscal retrenchment. It is reasonable to suggest that the same criticism could equally be made against UDCs, City Challenge and SRB partnerships generally. In each case although the core partners might be drawn from different sectors or agencies, the rhetoric of community involvement remains undiminished, however, the reality is that partners (in partnerships)
are always unequal. On each occasion when partnership has been used in regeneration policy the particular form of partnership has been inextricably tied to the prevailing political economy. On each occasion the rhetoric of community involvement has been undiminished and yet on each occasion communities have been involved as junior partners. In the absence of a definition of what constitutes a real partnership, and given the enormous resource differences that exist between institutional actors and community groups, this situation looks set to remain unchallenged.
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Appendix (A): Evolution of Neighbourhood Policies in Britain 1964-77

(sources: Figure 12 in Policy Planning and Local Government Hambleton, R. 1978.135)
### Appendix (B): Chronology of Urban Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15th Oct 1964</td>
<td>Labour elected (Harold Wilson wins: majority of four)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Nov 1965</td>
<td>Race Relations Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Mar 1966</td>
<td>Immigration Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Mar 1966</td>
<td>Labour re-elected (Harold Wilson)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Apr 1968</td>
<td>Enoch Powell’s <em>River of Blood</em> speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd Apr 1968</td>
<td>Race Relations Bill Second Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th May 1968</td>
<td>Urban Programme Announced by Harold Wilson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1969</td>
<td>Community Development Project (CDP) announced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Conservatives elected (Heath)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1972</td>
<td>Peter Walker’s announcement of a ‘total approach’ to the cities presaging the Inner Area Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Feb 1974</td>
<td>Conservatives elected (Heath)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1974</td>
<td>Comprehensive Community Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th Oct 1974</td>
<td>Wilson/Callaghan Labour Government elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Spring Budget includes Healey’s (Labour) experiment with Monetarism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Labour autumn Party Conference Callaghan states you cannot spend your way out of a recession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1977</td>
<td>Policy for the Inner Cities, White Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Policy for the Inner Cities White Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>IMF debacle – Healey cancels flight to IMF meeting in Manila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd May 1979</td>
<td>Labour defeated - first Thatcher government elected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Re-drawing of regional policy boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>UDC policy initiative begun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Bristol riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-14th Apr 1981</td>
<td>Brixton riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Jun 1983</td>
<td>Thatcher Second Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Jul 1983</td>
<td>Southall, Toxteth and Moss Side riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Re-drawing of regional policy boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Jun 1987</td>
<td>Thatcher Third Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early 1980s</td>
<td>Recession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Re-drawing of regional policy boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1990</td>
<td>Thatcher resigns / John Major becomes Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early 1990s</td>
<td>Recession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1991</td>
<td>Heseltine announces City Challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Apr 1992</td>
<td>John Major Elected (Conservative’s fourth term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1992</td>
<td>City Challenge commences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1993</td>
<td>Principle of SRB announced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Mar 1994</td>
<td>Inner Cities Debate, HC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1994</td>
<td>SRB formally established at the same time as Government Office for the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1994</td>
<td>First Competitiveness White Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Apr 1995</td>
<td>SRB round one announced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st May 1997</td>
<td>Tony Blair elected (end of 18yrs of Conservative administration)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix (C): Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event/Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 1985</td>
<td>Conservatives lose control of WCC ~ Hung administration led by Labour. Shortly after election WCC Labour group write to Coventry proposing a meeting to discuss economic development. Invitation politely declined by Coventry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1990</td>
<td>Coventry &amp; Warwickshire TEC established. Chief Executive Scott Glover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th January 1993</td>
<td>Duncan Sutherland appointed as Director of City Development, Coventry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st May</td>
<td>Labour take control of WCC for the first time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Jul</td>
<td>Senior personnel from Coventry City Council &amp; WCC meet informally to discuss partnership working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>WCC take initial steps to reconstitute a county Economic Development function by establishing an Economic Development policy working party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Nov</td>
<td>Single Regeneration Budget announced by SoS for the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Nov</td>
<td>DoE issue SRB: Notes on Principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1994</td>
<td>Round one SRB Draft Bidding Guidance issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>WCC set up an Economic Development Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Mar</td>
<td>Coventry City Policy Advisory Committee approve establishment of Coventry &amp; Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd with mandate for officers to negotiate with WCC with a view to becoming a founder member. Committee Report ‘Coventry &amp; Warwickshire Partnerships’ outlined proposals for an economic development partnership company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Mar</td>
<td>Consultation meeting on SRB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st - 29th Apr</td>
<td>Multi-agency action group meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Apr</td>
<td><strong>SRB round one Bidding Guidance issued</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th May</td>
<td>Consultation letter on operational objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th May</td>
<td>WCC pass council resolution to participate in Coventry &amp; Warwickshire Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th May</td>
<td>Nuneaton &amp; Bedworth BC Policy &amp; Resources Committee endorse sub-regional initiative and resolve to support Coventry City and WCC on economic development matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23rd May - 3rd Jun</td>
<td>Consultation / Information exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st May</td>
<td>Outline bid submission deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>Malcom Gillespie becomes 2nd Coventry &amp; Warwickshire TEC Chief Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Jun</td>
<td>CWP presentation to Phillipa Holland Head of Regeneration at GOWM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Jun</td>
<td>Extant Executive Committee Minutes begin ~ references to previous meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Jun</td>
<td>Revised operational objectives and their code numbers issued. Project summary forms for projects requiring SRB funds accepted from this date. Project summary forms for complementary projects contributing to the objectives issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Jun</td>
<td>Deadline for project summary forms to be returned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Jun</td>
<td>CWP Shadow Board ~ first meeting. Minutes record an Executive Committee with specific SRB oversight was formed from the 8 people from the founding members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>WCC re-establish an Economic Development Sub-Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Jul</td>
<td>Rugby DC Policy &amp; Resources Committee consider officers report on CWP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Jul</td>
<td>Action Groups send ‘first sieve’ of projects received to Steering Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th - 22nd Jul</td>
<td>CWP and constituent partners, e.g., City Council, TEC Board, endorse strategy statement, operational objectives, draft programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Nick Scheele named chairman of the CWP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd Jul - mid Aug</td>
<td>Public consultation on SRB bid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid - end Aug</td>
<td>Final bid document finalised and printed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Aug</td>
<td>CWP Registered as company limited by guarantee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Aug</td>
<td>Executive Committee Minutes record David Taylor’s concerns about the possibility of the bid being reduced by GOWM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Sep</td>
<td>Final Bid submission deadline to GOWM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Sep</td>
<td>Emergency meeting of Executive Committee. Letter from GOWM recommends CWP’s £50m bid be scaled down by half.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Oct</td>
<td>Board minutes record growing list of directors - now 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Dec</td>
<td>SoS announced winners.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dec  | Final Recommendations on the Future Local Government of Warwickshire published recommending status quo in county administration  

| Jan 1995 | The CWP Board agree to create a small staff complement to work to the Board to further the Partnerships and be independent of the founding partners or other interests.  
Meeting the Challenge of Change. Interim economic development strategy published for consultation  

| 24th Jan | CWP Board minutes record resolution to create SRB Directors sub-group  

| 20th Feb | Rugby DC Policy & Resources Committee pass resolution to become member of CWP  

| 14th Feb | Warwick DC Policy & Resources Committee pass resolution to become member of CWP subsequently ratified by full council on 1st March 1995  

| 1st May | CWP First Annual Conference  

| May/June | PIEDA Audit CWP for GOWM  

| Jun | Economic Development Strategy adopted  

| 5th Jun | Lorraine Butler, SRB Manager appointed  

| 3rd Jul | Trevor Cornfoot, CWP Executive Manager appointed  

| 27th Jul | Delivery Plan approved by GOWM  

| Aug | CWP sign contracts with Guarantors to deliver SRB programme  

| Sep | Staffing & premises in place  

| 26th Oct | Directors SRB Group given delegated responsibility by the CWP main Board  

| 8th Jan 1996 | Special SRB Steering Group convened to identify the roles and relationships between the various levels and ‘players’ in the management and delivery of SRB rounds one and two. Discussion ratified by CWP Board 23rd January 1996.  

| Jan | Announcement that the CWP would not make a third round bid itself. Instead CWP issued its own strategic guidance for potential round three bidders and anticipated considering the endorsement of individual bids.  

| 6th Feb | CWP SRB Conference - Coventry City Football Ground  

| 7th May | 2nd Annual Conference
Extra-ordinary General Meeting. Change of Board structure, reduced from 25 to not more than 12. Move away from representation to constituencies of membership

(Sources: Hansard 04/11/93; Coventry Policy Advisory Committee Minutes 29/03/94; round one Bidding Guidance (DoE, 1994a); WCC Minutes of Spring Meeting 10/05/94; Nuneaton & Bedworth BC, Policy & Resources Committee, minutes of meeting 11/05/94; CWP Internal documents; (HMSO, 1994d) CWP, 1996b; Minutes of CWP Extraordinary General Meeting 10/12/96)
Appendix (D): Membership of CWP at May 1995

(source: reproduced from Coventry & Warwickshire Partnerships Limited ~ Annual Report 1996 (CWP, 1996a)

Private Sector

1. Aidl Ltd
2. Allied Design & Management Service Ltd
3. AMEC Design & Management Ltd.
5. BT.
6. Burgis & Bullock
7. Coventry Building Society.
8. Coventry Newspapers
9. D&P Holt
10. Deeley Group Ltd
11. East Midlands Electricity Plc
12. Federation of Small Businesses
13. Galliford Plc
14. GEC Alstrom Neypric Ltd
15. Grant Thornton
16. Hilton National Hotel
17. Jaguar Cars Ltd
18. Jobs for Coventry (Central) Ltd
19. Massey Ferguson
20. Midland Bank Plc
21. Miller Partnerships
22. Peugeot Motor Company Plc
23. RSA Examinations Board
24. Severn Trent Water Ltd
25. Sohal Chartered Accountants
26. The National Grid Company Ltd
27. University of Warwick Science Park
28. Workworld Ltd

Further & Higher Education

29. Coventry Technical College
30. Coventry University
31. Henley College
32. Mid Warwickshire College
33. Tile Hill College
34. Stratford Upon Avon College
35. Unit for the Development of Alternative Products
36. University of Warwick

Local Authorities and other Public Sector

37. Coventry City Council
38. Employment Service
39. North Warwickshire Borough Council
40. Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council
41. Rugby District Council
42. Stratford Upon Avon Council
43. Warwick District Council
44. Warwickshire County Council
45. Warwickshire Health

Community and Voluntary Sector

46. Coventry and Warwickshire Co-operative Development Agency
47. Coventry and Warwickshire Ecumenical Council
48. Coventry Race Equality Council
49. Coventry CVS
50. Groundwork Coventry
51. Hillfields Partnership
52. National Rural Enterprise Centre
53. Nuneaton and Bedworth CVS

TEC and Chamber of Commerce

54. Coventry and Warwickshire Chamber of Commerce & Industry
55. Coventry and Warwickshire Training & Enterprise Council

Trades Unions

56. T&GWU
57. AEEU
Appendix (E): Extant Capacity Building Measures


CAPACITY BUILDING
Availability of support for capacity-building

1.1. This Annex describes some of the main sources of support outside the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) for different forms of capacity building i.e., enhancing the ability of voluntary groups and local communities to participate in regeneration initiatives.

GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES

1.2. Special Grant Programme—This Department of the Environment programme provides around £1m per annum for grants to voluntary organisations undertaking services or projects relevant to the Department’s policy objectives on regeneration. The services/projects must be either of a national nature, or else be a pilot capable of national application. Organisations given support include:
   • the NCVO Urban Forum, which provides a forum for dialogue between the Government and national voluntary organisations;
   • the Development Trusts Associations;
   • PFA (People for Action) 2001—a membership organisation for housing associations, which provides the following services to its members: advice, consultancy, newsletters, training, workshops and seminars, a directory of members activities and a handbook of good practice;
   • the Civic Trust Regeneration Unit.

1.3. The Home Office Voluntary Services Unit—The Home Office Voluntary Services Unit aims to support a healthy and cost-effective voluntary sector and to promote volunteering activity. The Unit provides core-funding to the NCVO and Community Development Foundation (CDF) and The British Association of Settlement and Social Action Centres (BASSAC). These national organisations use this funding to develop their infrastructure and to provides services—some of which include capacity building activities—to their member organisations. The Voluntary Services Unit also gives grants to local or national community/voluntary organisations for innovatory and replicable projects.

1.4. European Structural Funds—Like the Challenge Fund, the Objective 1, 2 and 5b programmes of the European Structural Funds are open to applications from partnerships which may include community/voluntary organisations.

1.5. Other Government Funding for Capacity Building—Among the other sources of Government funding for capacity building are the following:
• **Section 16 funding for tenant management**—The Department of the Environment manages a budget of some £5-6m per annum from which grants of up to £40-50k are paid directly to tenants groups to promote tenant involvement in housing management. The Government provides 75% of each grant on condition that the local authority finds the other 25%. Grants normally cover around two years work and may be used for purposes such as training events, feasibility work, publicity, meetings and conferences, as well as to cover an agency’s time and direct costs, such as photocopying, postage and travel.

• **Department of Health funding for capacity building**—Under the National Health (Miscellaneous Services) Act 1985, section 64 grants are available to voluntary and community groups to develop their capacity to provide health and social care. The grants cover training and the cost of replacing staff on training courses.

2. **NON GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES**

2.1. Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs)—TECs run a range of training courses which are relevant to community/voluntary organisations (although those receiving training need to pay for the courses). Voluntary organisations may also contract with TECs to provide training to other organisations and individuals: some of this training constitutes capacity building for the organisations receiving the training.

2.2. A wide range of other organisations also provide capacity building training to local organisations, including local authorities, commercial companies and individual consultants. The following organisations listed in the Regeneration Source Book (produced by EDAW/CR Planning on behalf of the Department of the Environment) specifically offer training in capacity building.

- Civic Trust Regeneration Unit
- Community Development Foundation
- Community Matters
- Development Trust Association
- Groundwork (Environment Focus)
- NCVO
- National Tenants Resource Centre
- Neighbourhood Initiatives Foundation
- Association of Community Technical Aid Centres
- Standing Conference for Community Development.

2.3. In addition, capacity building can be encouraged through mentoring and secondment. These are techniques which enable community/voluntary organisations which are lacking in certain skills to obtain these through association with another organisation. For example, an established community group may act as mentor, providing advice to a newer community group. Alternatively, individuals from community/voluntary
organisations can benefit from a period of secondment, for example in their local authority.

3. INFORMATION

3.1 Access to information is crucial to the process of capacity building in community/voluntary organisations. This information comes from a wide range of sources and includes seminars, conferences, magazines/newsletters and handbooks. Some organisations offer a wide range of services to those involved in regeneration, for example the Planning Exchange. Some relevant publications include:

- British Urban Regeneration Association (BURA) has published a handbook promoting an integrated approach to urban regeneration, aimed at the full spectrum of interest groups involved.
- Community Development Foundation (CDF) ‘Regeneration and the Community: produced with the encouragement of the Department of the Environment, this provides guidance to those involved in Challenge Fund partnerships on how to maximise community involvement.
- Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) have produced a Good Practice Guide on the involvement of Ethnic Minorities in the Challenge Fund.
Appendix (F): List of partners and organisations interviewed

1. Philipa Holland: Housing & Regeneration Division GOWM 01/12/95
2. Ruth Dudley: Finance & Policy Branch GOWM 17/04/96
3. Lorraine Butler: Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership 22/05/96
4. Margaret Tovey & Paul Turnor: Birmingham Employment Services 18/06/96
5. Linda Roberts: Commission for Racial Equality 04/07/96
6. Philipa Holland: Housing & Regeneration Division GoWM 24/09/96
7. GOWM: Heads of Branch Meeting 14/09/96
8. Mike Walker: University of Birmingham 24/10/96
10. Donna Hopkins: GOWM Birmingham SRB contact officer 05/11/96
11. John Payne: GOWM Redditch SRB contact officer 06/11/96
12. Terry Coton: GOWM Head of Branch - South Staffordshire - Burton 06/11/96
13. Margaret Geary: GOWM Head of Branch - Black Country 07/11/96
14. Caroline Morrisey: GOWM Impact SRB contact officer 07/11/96
15. Gill Caves: GOWM CWP SRB contact officer 07/11/96
16. Andy Monroe: GOWM Head of Branch - Wolverhampton & Sandwell 08/11/96
17. Deputy Head of Regeneration Division: Sandwell Regeneration Partnership, John Sutton {Deputy Head of Regeneration Division} Piers Waterston {SRB Programme Manager} 12/11/96
18. Lorraine Butler: Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership 13/11/96
20. Sonja Rowe: Impact Training {Round 1 SRB voluntary-led partnership in Dudley} 28/11/96
21. Nigel Summers CEO: Sandwell Regeneration Partnership 02/12/96
22. Matt Feeley: Bid Co-ordination Team/Coventry City council 03/12/96
23. Mr. Bahia, Coventry Race Equality Council 04/12/96
24. Helen Aird Coventry Voluntary Services 09/12/96
25. Mr. Kwame: SACDA {Sandwell} 12/12/96
26. Davinda Panesar: CWP Ethnic Minority Representative 23/12/96
27. Councillor Mick Jones, Nuneaton & Bedworth Borough Council 15/12/97
28. Malcom Gillespie, Chief Executive Coventry & Warwickshire TEC 19/12/97
29. Councillor Nick Nolan Coventry City Council 23/12/97
30. Councillor Derek Forewood, Warwickshire County Council 15/01/98
32. Councillor Gordon Collet, Warwickshire County Council 02/01/98
33. Trevor Cornfoot: CEO CWP 02/02/98
34. Lorraine Butler: Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership 14/12/98
35. David Taylor: Bid Co-ordination Team/Coventry City council 06/01/99
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE

SINGLE REGENERATION BUDGET

Bid for Funding

"Action Through Partnership"
Map of Sub-Region with Infrastructure

- Nottingham
- M6
- Nuneaton
- M69
- Bedworth
- M6
- Coventry
- Rugby
- A46
- Warwick
- Leamington
- Stratford upon Avon
- London
- English Channel Ports

Key cities and towns:
- Birmingham
- Northampton
- Rugby
- Warwick
- Stratford upon Avon
- London
- English Channel Ports

Main roads:
- M42
- M6
- M69
- M45
- A46
- M40

Additional notes:
- Hams Hall
- Warwick Golf Course
- Stratford-upon-Avon
- London & English Channel Ports
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**Supplementary Information**

Already made available: Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd - Interim SRB bid

7th September 1994
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This is Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd bid for Single Regeneration Budget (SRB). It follows an interim bid made in June 1994 to the Government Office for the West Midlands.

1.2 The aim of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships is to "improve the quality of life, prosperity and wealth of the inhabitants of Coventry and the County of Warwickshire." Our aim is ambitious and our bid for SRB is geared to deliver a substantial, innovative and imaginative programme which integrates with other main programmes. Our strategy seeks to re-establish the sub-region as one of the most technologically advanced, prosperous and equal in Britain, building upon our strong exporting tradition. To achieve this we are proposing to implement a regeneration programme totalling £421m over five years. SRB of £52m will directly facilitate £175m of this, with the remaining £246m in complementary funding from the Partners, English Partnerships, the European Union and the private sector. Our SRB bid is a strategic bid with targeted, integrated local action reinforcing broad strategic themes.

1.3 The Partnership, a limited company, stems from an alliance of core players in the area - Coventry City Council, Warwickshire County Council, Coventry and Warwickshire Training and Enterprise Council and Coventry and Warwickshire Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The partnership has been widened to bring all other relevant agencies on board, including the universities, the District Councils, business community and voluntary sectors. Many of these operate within the same geographic boundary, thus creating a small close Partnership which can develop a deep and thorough understanding of the local economy. From this base, the Partners will use their ability and authority to devise and deliver coherent programmes. Details of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd are given in Annex C.

1.4 The Partners feel that the need for integration of all the relevant agencies, whether public, private or voluntary, within the sub-region is of paramount importance for effective delivery. To this end, the Partnership will bring together Business Link, inward investment, tourism, city and centre developments, training, technology transfer and small area regeneration activities.

1.5 The Partnership has worked hard to ensure that this bid represents the consensus view of as many consultees as possible on priorities for regenerative action in the area. This has been a landmark process, being the first ever full consultation and joint working on a strategic regeneration programme, to take place for the whole of Coventry and Warwickshire. As such, it embraces far more than SRB. The programme covers five years, as a reasonable planning horizon. SRB is deployed to fill gaps which the strategy reveals but which there are no other funds to fill. Nevertheless, as an indication of the scale of the exercise the Partnership received 433 individual SRB bids totaling £210m.

1.6 The founding partners have agreed to put at the direction of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships very substantial elements of existing economic regeneration programmes. The bid demonstrates this through its complementary funding.

1.7 All the Partners share a vision for Coventry and Warwickshire but resources constrain how quickly we can achieve it. The resource guidelines we received from government, and which we shared widely, imply heavy, reductions in public sector funding for the task of regeneration.

1.8 There is a new national consensus that manufacturing industry needs to be at the forefront of our economic effort and must renew itself to compete internationally. As a key manufacturing and exporting area, our bid adds world class engineering and manufacturing excellence to traditional objectives of economic regeneration aimed at closing the gap between rich and poor, recycling industrial land and renewing inner city and other urban communities.

1.9 There is no doubt that SRB in 1995/96 is inadequate to meet these needs. The bid seeks to balance the scale dictated by the strategic analysis and realism over resources. We shall be creating added value through all our joint working. We have promised carefully our projects; if necessary, we can demonstrate this at lower or higher resource levels. We hope to be successful in a realistic bid designed to have significant impact in a five year period and to continue to work with Government to identify imaginative solutions to a rapidly evolving local and international economic situation.
2.1 The Partners' vision is for:

An excellent, innovative manufacturing and engineering sector - Which will remain key to renewed prosperity. We will invest and innovate to stay ahead of international competition. Our SRB proposals will create or preserve 9,000 jobs.

An exporting, international quality manufacturing sector - The sub-region's manufacturing firms will be internationally competitive, strongly supported by Warwick and Coventry Universities. We will be enterprising. We will have more, smaller companies linked in a network of purchase, supply, technology transfer and mutual support to work together for Britain and export abroad.

An expanding service sector - The area now includes the Headquarters for Barclays Bank, PowerGen, National Grid and Conoco. The Partners' proposals will ensure the continued fast growth of services but they realise that service growth by itself will not counteract the loss of jobs in the local economy.

A stable, sustainable local economy - Our positive, supportive approach to industry will be rewarded with retention of major firms, inward investment and new companies. We shall listen carefully to the requirements of inward investors and expanding local firms.

A special place for small and medium sized companies - The rate of formation of businesses will be maintained and survival rates will improve. Major companies will continue the trend of out-sourcing; but small companies will respond by supplying at low cost and high quality. Our proposals will help 5,000 firms.

A sound rural economy in Warwickshire - The rural economy will be experiencing structural employment change and will have diversified. People will be engaged in new, varied jobs independent of urban infrastructure, making use of both traditional rural self-sufficiency and modern information technology.

Equality of prosperity north and south in the sub region and within the City of Coventry - The north-south divide created by structural employment changes and inner city deterioration will be halted and reversed. New 'clean' industries will be occupying the sites of the old ones. Good transport links will be in place. The canal-side running from Coventry northwards will have opened up sites and be a part of a newly attractive north-south corridor.
3. THE COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE SUB REGION - STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS (SWOT) ANALYSIS

3.1 Building on our existing separate knowledge and strategies, Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships has analysed the local economy. This analysis is summarised in the following SWOT analysis. Basic data on the Coventry and Warwickshire sub-region which underlies this analysis can be made available to the Regional Office at any time.

3.2 STRENGTHS

Traditionally, the area has been a focus for positive change and local people do not readily accept decline

Creation of a strong local partnership involving a wide range of interests from the public, private and voluntary sectors in the sub-region

Well-established and competent not-for-profit and voluntary sector

Central location in UK on motorway network - M1, M6, M40, M69, A14, giving ready access to markets and suppliers in an attractive location for distribution, with close proximity to Birmingham International Airport and NEC

Record of enterprise - higher than average rate of business formation in recent years. Strong capability in engineering, manufacturing and design especially in automotive, electrical and power industries

Good links between industry and education sector. In particular, two Universities with specialisms relevant to business development, international excellence and economic regeneration

University of Warwick Science Park and successful adjacent Business Park

Good record for inward investment

Expanding service sector, including Powergen, National Grid and the new HQ for Barclays Bank

Outstanding natural environment and internationally renowned historical/cultural heritage in most of the county, serving tourists, visitors, businesses and residents

Diversity of housing across the area, with sufficient good quality housing development opportunities to meet the demand for new housing

Good track record of developing and implementing innovative housing schemes and partnerships especially with regional Housing Associations

Record of success in mobilising local private and public enterprise in obtaining and applying assistance from the Government and the European Union

3.3 WEAKNESSES

Severe unemployment, deprivation, poverty, reduced life expectancy and other quality of life indicators concentrated in parts of Coventry and Warwickshire

High and concentrated crime rate, and widespread fear of crime

Attitude surveys reveal poor self-image in Coventry City

Changing patterns of employment and living leading to pockets of rural deprivation and isolation

Shortage of good industrial land ready for development and unsatisfactory local road access to industrial land

Poor north-south public transport links

Large manufacturers shedding staff - 21,000 manufacturing jobs have been lost between 1984 and 1991.

Permanent loss of coal mining jobs concentrated on communities in the north of the sub-region

Narrow employment base - 1 in 3 of the sub region's workforce in manufacturing (mainly vehicles and engineering, both declining) compared to 1 in 5 nationally

Over-dependence on larger manufacturing employers and under-representation of SMEs

Insufficient companies investing in the potential of their staff to maximise performance

Slow pace of investment in city and other town centres - threats from recession and changing retail patterns, lack of diversity, poor range of facilities and limited use at particular times of day

Shortage of appropriate space for "clean" industries requiring high quality environment

Environmental quality not as good as it could or should be, especially in priority areas
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD

3.5 THREATS

- Widening gap between successful and unsuccessful areas of the sub-region.
- Failure to provide public investment in infrastructure and services.
- Loss of support from the Rural Development Commission leading to a risk of failure to address rural problems.
- New jobs created go to people commuting or moving into the area rather than resident unemployed.
- Rising dissatisfaction, health, social and housing problems, crime and fear of crime.
- Unemployment remaining high in Coventry and in localised areas of Warwickshire.
- Continued rationalisation of dominant larger employers, effects on supplier chains and loss of local control of productive facilities.
- Failure of SMEs to grow rapidly and securely and to respond to the quality standards that large firms increasingly set through "out-sourcing".
- Businesses fail to respond to new international requirements on quality, cost and environmental standards.
- Market failures to provide sites and premises, particularly on reclaimed or derelict land. Throughout Warwickshire, significant areas suffer from the effects of mineral extraction.
- Reduced resources available for housing leading to reduced confidence by communities in the long-term future of housing in areas of disadvantage.

3.4 OPPORTUNITIES

- Development of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships offers potential for greater cooperation between partners, efficiency in delivery and increased capacity.
- Assisted area status, Objective 2 status and SRB itself.
- Build on continuing inward investment.
- UK automotive design in resurgence, Coventry and Warwickshire well-placed.
- New International Manufacturing Centre at Warwick University will be leader in Europe.
- R&D infrastructure investment to build on existing international excellence.
- A series of anticipated and existing government backed measures in the north of Coventry, including the North South Road, Foleshill Enterprise Park and Foleshill Gasworks site. The nearby Coventry Canal offers substantial potential for environmental improvement and development.
- Bermuda Park in N Warwickshire & sites in Rugby.
- Hams Hall: European direct freight facility.
- A chance to redevelop prestige, Private Finance Initiative sites in the City Centre at Parkside and City Centre West.
- Build on successful Estate Action and community based housing initiatives.
- Further partnership with developers, Housing Associations and voluntary sector to increase targeted housing supply.

Dereliction and contamination from former mineral working and industrial activity (500Ha)

The high level of disrepair of housing stock in public and private sectors.

The shortfall in overall availability of sufficient affordable social housing.
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD

4. THE SRB BID DEVELOPMENT

4.1 As a result of sharing our knowledge and perceptions, we have developed a working set of Strategic Objectives and more detailed operational objectives, which have been made available to Government Office for the West Midlands. We have applied best practice to the development of the programme, especially by gaining widespread ownership and support for the priorities of the strategic programme employing SRB and other resources and adjusting these priorities as a result of consultation. Multi-agency Action Groups have subsequently worked to draw together the partners’ understanding of the issues facing them and have identified existing action already planned to achieve these priorities. The gaps remaining have been matched to the project bids received. Thus, via consultation and the work of the multi-agency groups, we have created priorities for the SRB proposal and for existing programmes of public and private sector action. These issues are addressed in the next section.

4.2 The process of programme development had the following key features:

- The Partnership delegating initial responsibility to a multi-agency Steering Group and strategy-led Action Groups. In parallel, key interests in Warwickshire combined within a project team to ensure the necessary synergy.
- Transparent processes, with papers widely available in all sectors, clear timetable and procedures, networked contacts across the sub-region.
- Consultation early in the programme and bid development, with a wide range of interests consulted on principles at key stages, in particular the community and voluntary sector have been closely involved in strategy development. Discussions have also been held with Government Departments including DOE, DTI and Employment Services.
- Delivery agencies involved in setting up an effective project management database from the start.
- Good practice in project appraisal procedures disseminated early.
- Centralised coordination but decision-making devolved to lowest possible levels.
- Programme of workshops/seminars to inform and engage all partners.

4.3 We provide in Annexes D to G a package of supporting material on the process, including details of working groups, consultation, data management and project appraisal and project prioritisation. A response to the overwhelming number of individual project bids has been the creation of strategic programmes in the areas of greatest demand. This defines a balance in resources and allows a strategic approach to the problems identified by the bidding process to be developed.

THE SRB BID - THE CRITICAL ISSUES AND THE PRACTICAL RESPONSE

4.4 The Coventry and Warwickshire sub-region has a population of some 780,000, one third of whom live within the largely urban conurbation of Coventry city, the remainder in towns and rural communities in Warwickshire. The relationship of City to County is one of close interdependence in journey to work patterns, supplier networks with industry (especially the motor industry) and in the provision of educational and healthcare facilities.

4.5 Proximity to London and the more prosperous south of the country may have shaped aspirations in the sub-region. Coventry and Warwickshire have a record of responding effectively to recession, drawing in new activity, new investment. The sub-region makes comparisons with national and international exemplars and seeks to match the best in manufacturing excellence, in city development, in development of its people, its tourist attractions, its agricultural practice.

4.6 Coventry and Warwickshire share with all of the West Midlands a central location in the UK, good transport communications and a strong bias towards manufacturing in the economy. In common with the other West Midlands urban programme areas, Coventry has a large ethnic minority population, geographically concentrated in a number of inner city wards suffering multiple deprivation. The city also suffers the typically higher rates of crime, concentrations of single parents, poor health indicators and below average educational attainment levels. Parts of Warwickshire share many of the same problems. The legacy of large scale scarring from coal working in the north of the county and mineral working in parts of the remainder is still a deterrent to business development and visitors. Similarly, multiple deprivation is concentrated in West Nuneaton and in parts of Leamington Spa and Rugby.

4.7 The Partnership has developed in consultation with all interested parties a strategic programme. Its priorities will reflect our joint judgement of where we can most effectively intervene in the local economy and living environment to achieve regeneration.

7th September 1994
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD

4.8 We developed the following working themes to characterise the key areas where we will apply SRB funds and other resources, which were described in our interim bid. Here, we explain how main programme funds and private sector resources are contributing to the themes, how the themes reinforce each other, and describe major features of the SRB projects designed to fill the gaps:

4.9 Building business, especially engineering excellence, reskilling the labour force and increasing educational attainment - Working together to help engineering and other firms in growth sectors to be competitive through reaching the highest international standards, using technology transfer, international benchmarking, investment in high-level technical and managerial skills, especially for SMEs, transferring skills from declining to growth areas, enhancing market knowledge, building business confidence and providing supporting infrastructure.

4.10 There are pre-existing partnerships, such as the World Class Coventry and Manufacturing Excellence initiatives through which this theme is being pursued by Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd. Successful bids for EC funds from the local authorities already reflect the initiatives. The Universities have major programmes in place funded through EC and private sector resources.

4.11 The activities of the TEC and Chambers are central to this theme, particularly through Business Links - with programmes such as Business reviews, Business Development Initiative, the Growth programme, Trade and Export Agency, Business Advice Bureaux, Business Skills Seminars and Gateways for Business. Their work also provides much of the linkage between this theme and that of Building self-determining, safe and confident communities, whereby people are helped to gain the skills which business needs to succeed, and special help is extended to disadvantaged groups. These groups are concentrated in priority areas, by definition, and small area targeting provides the key linkage between the themes.

4.12 Major projects for which SRB funding is requested under this theme are:

* Improving the Engineering Competitiveness of SMEs: Coventry University's School of Engineering will provide specialised and customised training for 1,500 people over 5 years in manufacturing management, engineering and information technology - with a particular emphasis on employees and firms facing change. SRB funding of £0.7m will lever another £1.1m, including £1.2m from the private sector.

* Breakthrough Technologies Infrastructure: The Advanced Technology Centre at the University of Warwick will aim to achieve technology transfer with breakthrough technologies in 50 companies over the five year programme.

* Manufacturing Excellence Initiative: Warwick Manufacturing Group, linked with Engineering Management at the University of Warwick, will provide advice and training for 450 companies, especially SMEs, to develop within sectors and supply chains. The same group will address benchmarking by importing international best practice in the 'Developing Fertile Ground' project.

* Developing trade and export through the Trading and Development Initiative and Regant, working with small firms to improve their supply links to larger purchasers, and providing training in trade and export related topics creating and safeguarding 1,000 jobs.

* Raising Educational Attainment - Main Programme spending on Education in Coventry and Warwickshire is already substantial and spending is above Education SSA. Nevertheless, the Partners have identified two key projects and look for SRB support: Raising Achievement in the National Curriculum which will take the lessons learned from Section 13 experience to improve the performance against national curriculum targets of 54,000 students - targeting on disadvantaged groups, in particular ethnic minorities. Education Business Partnerships is designed to maximise the contribution of the business community to raising educational standards, developing the work-related curriculum, introducing General National Vocational Qualification (GNVQs) and achieving the foundation National Targets for Education and Training (NTETs). This will be achieved through a series of original initiatives most notably the local Partnership Centres established on employer premises and a mentoring programme for special needs students. Over 1,000 people will be trained and obtain qualifications, and 300 employers participate.

* Lifetime Learning - This is a key part of our strategy to improve business competitiveness and regenerate the sub-region and includes a project to 'DevelopSkills in the Workplace' focusing on the development of a lifetime learning culture in the workplace and raising the skills base for 250 local companies. This builds on the highly successful Gateways for Business and Assessment of Prior Learning (APL) initiatives and will complement mainstream programmes to improve competitiveness through training eg the Investors in People Award. A series of training measures to raise the IT skills base of the local community and to increase the stock of local people with higher level qualifications will also support our efforts to achieve the lifetime learning NTET targets.
4.13 Spreading market confidence north - Using developments in infrastructure such as the North South Road, Hams Hall Euro-freight site and the release of development sites through industrial rationalisation and sector decline to reproduce conditions in the more successful south of the county, recycle land and attract new, growing and inward migrating business into the north of the City and County.

4.14 The high incidence of unemployment, poor housing and deprivation and consumption of land in the north of the City and County has led to area-targeted initiatives in main programmes. In North Warwickshire, the ERDF and RECHAR initiatives have particularly assisted the redevelopment of former mining areas and provided help for those made redundant by structural change. Examples are the Bermuda Park development (30 Hectares, with potential for 5,000 jobs, the largest in the current Objective 2 programme), reclamation at the former Newdigate Colliery, Bedworth and Couplai Fields, Nuneaton. The number of small firms have increased, with for example, 170 firms attracted to the Attleborough Industrial Estate. Structural funds have been used to provide training in the coalfield settlements and under RECHAR many voluntary groups are involved in local projects which address the needs of communities affected by colliery closure.

4.15 In the north of Coventry, the City Council has given priority to the North South Road in its Transport Policies and Programme which will release several developments. One such is the former Foleshill Gasworks site (24 hectares) for which a City grant application is under appraisal. Urban Partnership Funds have also been successfully targeted onto this task, with development of the Canal basin and Foleshill Enterprise Park. In Willenhall, Estate Action and City Grant money are anticipated to improve the quality of housing and provide a redesigned shopping centre.

4.16 This theme is linked to the first, "Building business excellence", through the re-use of land for new businesses. It is more difficult to attract investment to the north than the south of the county and city but all these efforts are designed to provide the environment, access and quality premises that business needs - close to the people who need the employment. This small area targeting and theme 1, Building self-determining, safe and confident communities reinforces this process. This is achieved by designating the local priority areas where the need is manifest, mainly in the north of the county and city: Hillfields, Foleshill, Wood End, Willenhall and Stoke Aldermoor (Coventry), parts of West Nuneaton, the Old Town area in Leamington Spa, and the Bazin and Newbold wards in Rugby, and targeting action there.

4.17 Major projects requiring SRB funding in this area are:

- **Hillfields Partnership**: a community led regeneration strategy aiming to make significant improvements to Hillfields, one of the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods in the West Midlands. This is being undertaken by a strong partnership of local people, voluntary groups, local businesses and statutory agencies. The partnership is seeking to revive the local economy, improve access to training and jobs, make the area safer and more attractive and improve confidence and the image of the area, with benefits to the whole sub region.

- **Canal Corridor Regeneration**: The Coventry Canal extends five and half miles from the canal basin in the city centre to Hawkesbury Junction which is to the south of Bedworth. As the thread which links many of the city's most important redevelopment sites, the Canal Corridor has become a major focus for the regeneration of the inner city. This regeneration is being co-ordinated by a partnership of public, private and voluntary organisations called Coventry Waterside which, amongst other things, hopes to establish a Groundwork Trust to undertake environmental initiatives.

- **The Bermuda project**: SRB would support the creation of a Centre for Training on Bermuda Park, a prestige inward investment site which is itself part of the regeneration strategy for Western Nuneaton/Bedworth, greatly affected by coal closures. Non-SRB projects are local business park development and housing regeneration projects. This area strategy is supported by the proposals to strengthen Nuneaton and Bedworth town centres.

- **The Barpool Valley Project**: This is an engineering scheme which would improve drainage in an area of West Nuneaton by allowing development to go ahead, including housing, health and community projects as well as providing a new leisure amenity.

- **Nature Reserve on former colliery**: Part of the North Warwickshire Leisue Strategy, this is another project designed to change the appearance, use and prospects of the area.

4.18 Build self-determining, safe and confident communities - Provide the framework to enable people to combat both poverty and dependency, especially in areas of concentrated multiple deprivation through better and more integrated access to employment, community safety, health and caring, local environment and housing.
4.19 A considerable number of main programmes directly support this theme. Programmes of work in areas of housing and environment, including projects proposed in this bid, are determined by the well established locally developed strategies. We have been necessarily selective in quoting complementary schemes. The local authorities' education and community education programmes, social service programmes, environmental and transport improvement projects and continuing Section 11, GEST and Estate Action projects all contribute and include targeted action. TEC programmes such as STEP, YT Quality Training and Career Choice directly assist individuals towards employment and thus confidence and prosperity.

4.20 Many SRB funded projects in this area are strongly focused on young people, an investment in our future and a recognition of their vulnerability. Several programmes under this theme quite specifically create links between local people and Business Competitiveness, through the partner's lifetime learning proposals.

4.21 Key projects within this theme relate to:

- **Guidance and Access to Training and Employment:**
  - An 'Access to Training' programme designed to provide a bridge between unemployment and mainstream programmes for disadvantaged groups, in particular ethnic minorities, almost 1,400 of whom will enter vocational training. Overall 4,500 will receive training from this programme. A 'Customised Training' initiative to link the unemployed to vacancies identified as a result of inward investment, business expansion and property development will provide qualifications for a further 1,170 people. A 'Youth Outreach Service' will aim to win back disaffected youth to education, training and employment as part of a concerted drive to reduce the local training 'failure index' and to achieve the foundation NTETs targets. These measures will be supported by 'One Stop Shops' and Training Access Points to ensure that targeted groups have access to high quality, up-to-date and comprehensive information advice and guidance on education, training and employment.

- **Child Care:**
  - There are few funds available from main programmes to assist those unable to afford child care, so frequently identified as the barrier to work. Two programmes will allow 300 women access to employment by enabling them to take up training or return to work.

- **Community Safety:**
  - With the ending of the Safer Cities project, the lack of statutory provision in this area of enormous concern to local people re-emerges (47% of attitude survey respondents thought Coventry was unsafe and 57% had experienced crime). There are over fifty initiatives in Coventry alone on community safety. Within Coventry an initiative titled Community Action Against Crime is underway which seeks to build a partnership amongst key agencies to create a policy framework to support community safety schemes taking place in local neighbourhoods. This city-wide approach will also ensure projects are delivered at a level closest to the public, as the particular concerns of each area need to be recognised. A specialist worker will be appointed shortly to act as a focus for coordinating activities and linking across agencies. In 1995/6 a 10% reduction in crime is anticipated through 30 initiatives.

- **Helping those with Learning Difficulties:**
  - SRB funding is sought in particular for two schemes. A 'Citizens Advocacy' project will provide advocates for those with learning difficulties. The intention is to supply a wide range of information on available services and help protect the rights of this group of people. Similarly, the 'Grapevine' project provides a drop-in centre for those with moderate learning difficulties. Implemented by the Coventry Cooperative Development Agency this centre links to lifetime learning by providing vocational training for a particularly disadvantaged group.

- **Housing Improvement:**
  - As part of small area regeneration schemes of estate improvement in Henley Green, Hillfields and Stone Aldermoor (all Coventry) and Camp Hill (Nuneaton) to improve living conditions, the local environment and safety as part of comprehensive local action plans for areas with exceptionally high deprivation scores in the Index of Local Conditions. Over 3,250 dwellings will be improved by these projects which will lever £1.5m of private sector investment.

- **Housing for the Young and Vulnerable:**
  - A programme consisting of four projects enabling young people and others at risk and in housing need to live independently in the community by addressing their accommodation needs and linking them to other services taking them through to employment and long term independence. In Coventry City Centre a separate 'Foyer' scheme will provide linked training facilities and housing accommodation for young people.

- **Benn and Newbold Partnerships Centre:**
  - A bold programme to develop new community resources in the most deprived wards of Rugby. The Centres will have shared management facilities for voluntary organisations to access, Housing units for homeless young people are part of the scheme. Over 5 years, 800 people will be trained, including 600 from the ethnic minorities.

- **Health for the Young and Vulnerable:**
  - Series of projects to promote sexual health, combat developing drugs and alcohol dependency and reduce inequalities in health.
4.22 Strengthen Coventry city centre and other urban centres - The area's urban centres and, in particular, the centre of a major city like Coventry, play an important role in the economic, social and cultural life of the whole sub-region. Coventry's rebuilt City Centre provided an international model for urban redevelopment in the 1950s. However, it now needs substantial reinvestment to meet the changed demand of urban lifestyles. Surveys have shown that negative perceptions of the City Centre and surrounding urban centres have hindered inward investment.

4.23 In Coventry, the City Council is deploying its own resources, including landholdings, in major joint ventures with the private sector to ensure the centre is an asset actively contributing to economic regeneration. Several significant redevelopments and upgrading of shopping facilities have already been secured but other problems remain. The Private Finance Initiative site at Parkside will provide 24 hectares for a small conference centre for Coventry University, much needed City Centre office floor space, an innovation centre and a science and technology park at a cost of £1.1m. It is anticipated that a quarter of this will be funded by English Partnerships. The City also needs to address safety, tourism, gaps in key facilities, and the integration of inner city communities, especially young people into the centre.

4.24 On a smaller scale, the urban centres of Nuneaton, Bedworth, Rugby and Leamington Spa require support to face change and adapt to a new role. Whilst much redevelopment is funded by the private sector, gaps remain. In respect of Nuneaton and Bedworth there is a strong linkage between this theme and that of "Moving market confidence north", since these centres have key roles to play in the local economy. In Rugby, the Borough Council has already committed itself to achieving an ongoing programme of environmental improvement and has established a partnership with developers to secure further town centre redevelopment. Many of the targeted communities in "Building confident communities" lie close to the urban centres and we wish to avoid the further fragmentation of our urban areas.

4.25 SRB funding can facilitate filling these gaps:

- Centre for Cultural Training and Enterprise: SRB funding is sought for a centre complex which will bring together education/training, business, employment and leisure activities for young people, especially ethnic minorities, alongside a relocated Coventry Centre for the Performing Arts.

- Community Safety: £0.5m from SRB is aimed at a programme of community safety initiatives targeted towards the City Centre and surrounding urban centres and Leamington Old Town Partnership, benefiting over 10,000 people.

- City Centre West: This project aims to provide a first-class cultural and tourism facility reusing the former GPT site in the City Centre. The 26-acre, £17m, development creating 800 jobs will provide a flexible arena, a theatre, conference centre, "Coventry Past, Present and Future" museum and a family entertainment centre provided by SEGA Ltd. SRB funding is asked for rental guarantees to enable leases to be agreed with the private sector operator of the site. This project will provide a permanent legacy from the Centenary of the Motor Car and Year of British Industry celebrations in 1996, and also maximise the potential of the medieval buildings in the adjacent Spon Street area.

- Leamington Old Town Partnership: This is a package of projects to redress economic and social disadvantage in the Brunswick area of south Leamington. The fact that over 20 different agencies combined to submit this bid demonstrates the degree of local partnership. 10,000 people will benefit from the projects supported by SRB.

SMALL AREA REGENERATION

4.26 Coventry and Warwickshire Partnership's Strategic Regeneration Programme is multi-faceted. The Strategic Objectives characterise all the measures we feel are necessary to achieve a successful sub-region. As partners, we cannot afford to ignore any of them. The themes described above target the critical issues and priorities for which we can see no alternative but help from SRB. Delivery of the regeneration programme and the links between the themes we have identified is mediated through small area targeting. Small area regeneration has proved a valuable and effective approach and, despite the scarcity of resources, we shall not be abandoning it. We are strongly involving local partnerships and local action plans in the detail of the SRB funded and main strategic regeneration programme.
The Partnership has detailed knowledge of the concentration of deprivation in Coventry and Warwickshire. The diagram on page 13 shows those areas which, according to the Index of Local Conditions, are most severely disadvantaged. A principal strategic consideration of the Partnership in bringing together our SRB bid is to focus on these areas. Programmes for Hillfields, Foleshill, Wood End, Willenhall and Stoke Aldermoor (Coventry) and for parts of West Nuneaton and Bedworth, the Old Town area in Leamington Spa and the Bence and Newbold wards in Rugby (Warwickshire) are specifically targeted. Statistical details are provided in Annex 1. Of the total bid of £52m, some £32m is targeted for projects in these priority areas. In addition, these areas will also benefit from many of the sub-regional initiatives.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>SRB FUNDING (£m)</th>
<th>TOTAL SRB PROGRAMME (£m)</th>
<th>ADDITIONAL COMPLEMENTARY (£m)</th>
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<td>TOTALS</td>
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10th September 1994
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD

5. THE STRATEGIC PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

5.1 The applicant for SRB funds is Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd (CWPL). We have an incorporated body which can sign an implementation agreement with Government. Our mission statement has already been quoted. We have a Board in place. Since the organisation is in place, there are no difficulties with handover on SRB from bid preparation to operation or ensuring continued commitment. The overall structure of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships, its executive and delivery companies, is shown in the diagram at Annex C.

5.2 There are 25 Directors on the Board, representing different interests as follows:

- 3 Community
- 7 Local authorities
- 2 Private sector
- 4 TEC/Chambers of Commerce and Industry
- 2 Trades Union
- 4 Education

5.3 The Board is chaired by Nick Schoele, Chairman and Chief Executive of Jaguar Cars. The Board meets quarterly and a quorum consists of a member from each of the interest groups. Directors of the Board are nominated by each membership group as specified in the Memorandum and Articles of Association.

5.4 The function of this Board is to determine and ensure delivery of, and review the strategy for, regeneration of Coventry and Warwickshire SRB will thus be a small, but important part of the Partners' regeneration activity. The Board will endorse SRB expenditure through an annual Action Plan and individual project approvals. However, it would not receive directly these or any other funds, other than running costs.

5.5 CWPL is the formal embodiment of a longstanding working partnership in the area which has already established a track record, including:

- The development of the joint KONVER bid for European funds
- Warwick Science Park
- Gateway for Business project
- Joint Labour Market analysis for the sub-region

5.6 CWPL already has an executive team, meeting monthly, drawn from the funding partners - ie the TEC, Coventry City Council, Warwickshire County and District Councils and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The role of this group is to ensure that the constituent agencies of the Partnership, who have resources to deploy, do so in line with the agreed strategy and decisions of the main Partnership Board.

5.7 A small executive support team will be created to support all the roles of the Partnership. The Partnership will use the experience of preparation of the multi-agency SRB bid with a Bid Co-ordination team to move on to implementation. The role of the support team in relation to SRB would be to quality-check projects, issue approvals below delegated limits, monitor progress, provide management reports and evaluate impact. In addition, the team will coordinate information, monitor and review the activities of the separate delivery companies and carry out corporate functions such as public relations and marketing of the Partnership, and consultation, research and survey functions. The structure will be as follows:

5.8 The team will be funded in part by SRB funds (25%) and partly by the Partners (75%). In the first instance, we will provide an SRB Co-ordinator, a programme finance officer and an administrative/secretarial officer.

5.9 The Partnership is linked through its membership with a number of key fora in the sub-region. The SRB bid preparation process has demonstrated our commitment to local consultation with all interested parties. Local area partnerships are creating local action plans and will scrutinise local programmes. Within a budget agreed by the Board, they will be responsible for ensuring local priorities are met.

5.10 For SRB and any subsequent Government grant regime initiatives, there will be a series of management agreements between the Government and the Board, between the Board and the main delivery agencies, between those agencies and sub-contractors for services, and between the local area partnerships and those delivering projects. These agreements would confer authority and funds in one direction and ensure accountability in the other.

7th September 1994
5.11 No expenditure will occur on a project until a project appraisal has been carried out by the relevant lead agency and approved by the Partnership at the appropriate delegation level. The project appraisal check list and approval forms have already been provided. Project appraisal will normally occur in three stages:

- the project officer responsible within the agency implementing the project will prepare an initial project appraisal
- if appropriate, the implementing agency will pass the appraisal to the lead or sponsor agency (e.g., the TEC or relevant local authority) who will undertake further appraisal or, for smaller projects within programmes, the project appraisal will pass to project officers within the SRB Secretariat
- all projects will be sent for decision to the Executive Committee of Coventry & Warwickshire Partnership Ltd subject to appropriate delegation agreed by the Board.

5.12 The local authorities, the TEC, Chambers and voluntary sector are now very familiar with the concept of service level agreements. This model will be used for delivery of projects and services. The agreement which the Partnership makes with the government will be implemented through a series of contracts between the Board and the lead agencies and between those bodies and agencies implementing projects on the ground.

AFTER SRB

5.13 The transition from the bid preparation to implementation will be straightforward for Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd. The organisation is already formed and incorporated and has a core staff support within the founding agencies. The additional staffing described will coordinate the financial and output management and monitoring of project progress and impact of the programme against baseline data.

5.14 Indications of our baseline position are given in the SWOT analysis and considerable additional detail is held and shared by Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships. We will continue to update and refine the database and checks on progress against baseline will occur in the course of normal working. A wide range of organisations will be involved in evaluation but specific strategic studies will be carried out by Coventry and Warwickshire Universities. On key issues highlighted in the strategy, in addition, a full, independent impact evaluation will be carried out after 18 months then again after five years, in the context of economic activity in the sub region.

5.15 Details of the systems for project monitoring and evaluation are given in Annex B. An Annual Report will be produced each year informing all partners of lessons learnt, important events and changes in year, achievements of the programme and progress against targets. Accountability will also be ensured through audit and random quality checks. To ensure widespread participation we will hold an Annual Conference on the programme where local comment and criticism will be invited.

5.16 We anticipate that partnership working will continue to deepen and the efficient sharing of management information will expand to allow widespread understanding and participation in the strategic regeneration programme as a whole. This process is intended to continue indefinitely; our exit strategy envisages a future where change is endemic and a thinking assessment and response to change is therefore always required. Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships will evolve with changes as yet unpredicted. The certainty is that we shall be watchful and ready to respond.
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE
Areas of Greatest Deprivation

SOURCE: Index of Local Conditions.
Enumeration Districts in the 'worst' 10% of the West Midlands Area.

7th September 1994
Appendix (H): CWP correspondence bid size—16th June 1994

COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS

Dear Colleague

COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE SINGLE REGENERATION BUDGET BID

It is clear from the consultation process that a number of organisations are substantially exaggerating the level of funding, that SRB will bring to Coventry and Warwickshire. Can I take this opportunity of clarifying the position.

Quite simply SRB brings no new money to the table. In 1994/95 the Coventry and Warwickshire area received some £10m from the grants subsumed within the SRB. Our bid for next year 1995/96 is likely to be some £7m. Following informal advice from Government Departments even this figure may be too high. So our likely bid over 5 years of £50m will at best protect our existing position.

Nationally, the same position is occurring with the loss of the Urban Programme and cutbacks in Section II and other grants. A parliamentary answer has revealed that across the country existing programmes now subsumed under SRB have been cut from some £1.7bn per annum to around £1.3bn per annum—a cut of almost a quarter.

Of this national £1.3bn only some £100m is available for new schemes. The whole West Midlands region including Birmingham, The Black Country, Staffordshire, Shropshire and Hereford and Worcester—as well as Coventry/Warwickshire—is likely to receive about £13m in 1995/96 through SRB.

In this context I hope you will agree that individual bids will need to be realistic. We must also make the best use of all available resources. We will only be successful if we can demonstrate that we are deploying all other resources to achieve our priorities.

Working in partnership is not just the key to protecting our position in the short-term through SRB but also to ensure the long-term regeneration of Coventry and Warwickshire.

Yours sincerely

David Taylor
SRB Bid Coordination Team
C/o Chief Executive’s Department, Coventry City Council
## Appendix (I): Composition of Action Groups

### City Centre Action Group  
(14 members)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martin Ritchley</td>
<td>Chief Executive, Coventry Building Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duncan Sutherland</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matt Feeley</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony Vincent</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Debbie Kingley</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
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<td>Jos Parry</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Deeley</td>
<td>Deeley Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Kenny</td>
<td>Manager, Marks &amp; Spencers Plc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Mike Bromwich</td>
<td>West Midlands Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Chappell</td>
<td>Editor, Coventry Evening Telegraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Monkman</td>
<td>Deputy Editor, Coventry Evening Telegraph</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amos Anderson</td>
<td>Ethnic Minority Development Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ron Mason</td>
<td>Coventry &amp; Warwickshire TEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Bellamy</td>
<td>Coventry University</td>
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(Source: CWP internal documents)

### Health and Caring Action Group  
(10 members)

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<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Greame Betts (Chair)</td>
<td>Coventry City Council, Social Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kevin Crawford</td>
<td>Coventry City Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ian Powell</td>
<td>Coventry City Council, Environmental Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Noreen Dowd</td>
<td>Coventry Health Authority</td>
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<td>Vernon Hunkins</td>
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(Source: CWP internal documents)
### Living / Environment Action Group
(15 members)

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(Source: CWP internal documents)

### Warwickshire SRB Project Team members
({became: Economy & Development Action Group})
(12 members)

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(Source: CWP internal documents)
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE
PARTNERSHIPS
SINGLE REGENERATION BUDGET

PROJECT SUMMARY FORM 1995/96

Please read guidance notes to help you complete this form.
Please use block capitals and black ink.

CLOSING DATE FOR APPLICATIONS - 27 JUNE 1994

Office Only:
Reference No.: Title: Action Group:
1. Please explain briefly how your project will contribute to the Strategic Objectives/operational objectives, including Strategic Objectives 1-3.

2. The single regeneration budget will operate where other funding is not available for a key regeneration task. Please explain what gap in existing provision your project fills and what justification there is for it, preferably by reference to survey data or other evidence of need.

3. Please indicate any special problems which will need to be overcome to implement the project - eg other parties' agreement acquiring premises, gaining planning permission or other approval, another project needing to go ahead at the same time.

4. Please indicate likely arrangements for monitoring and evaluation of the project. How will you know when and if you have succeeded?

5. Please make any other point about the project which you feel is important and not covered by the rest of this form.

When complete, please return form to:
Coventry & Warwickshire SRB Bid, c/o Policy Co-ordination Unit,
Coventry City Council, Christchurch House, Greyfriars Lane, COVENTRY.

Any enquiries or advice on completing the project summary form can be made to:
Teresa Chalcraft Tel: (0203) 833376 or
Lesley Butterwick Tel: (0203) 833741
at the Policy Coordination Unit.

or alternatively
to lain Sharp at ADEPT on Tel: (0203) 230606.
Title: __________________________________________________________

Description: _____________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________

Linked Projects: ___________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________

Apply codes shown in guidance notes to below:

Theme: ___________________________ Target Group: ___________________________

Area: ___________________________ Target Sector: ___________________________

Strategic Objective: ___________________________ Priority: ___________________________

Operational Objective: ___________________________ Status: ___________________________

Sponsor/Lead Agency: _____________________________________________________________

Implementation Agency: _____________________________________________________________

Main Contact:
Name: _____________________________________________________________

Address: ___________________________ Post Code: ___________________________

Telephone No: ___________________________ Fax: ___________________________

Position held: _____________________________________________________________

Key Partners: _____________________________________________________________
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# Single Regeneration Budget - Complementary Project Form

**Project Ref:**

**Title:**

**Theme:**

**Strategic Objective:**

**Operational Objective:**

**Target Group:**

**Area:**

**Target Sector:**

**Sponsor/Lead Agency:**

**Implementation Agency:**

**Main Contact:**

**Contact No(s):**

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**Comments:**

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**Form:** SRB/1/94

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**WARWICKSHIRE ORGANISATIONS**

**Addressees for SRB Consultation paper**

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<td>Father Hudson Homes</td>
<td>Coleshill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ath &amp; Dist Blind Assoc</td>
<td>New Arley</td>
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**Other addresses**

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Alcester</td>
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<td>Worcs</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Potters Bar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid Assoc for Spina Bifada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fellowship of Handicapped</td>
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</table>

In total: 230 addresses
COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS LTD

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 1 - PARTNERSHIPS

Empower local communities, residents, businesses and voluntary groups by listening and by investing in mutually beneficial partnerships and delivery mechanisms which enable services to better reflect local needs.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2 - REDUCING DISADVANTAGE

Make services more accessible. Use resources effectively and direct them towards people facing poverty. Enable those in poverty to have greater control over services and their own living standards.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3 - SEEK TO PROVIDE EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Enable individuals to exercise control over their lives, make use of available services, influence their design and delivery, and participate fully in the economic and social life of the sub-region.

ALL PROJECTS SHOULD ADDRESS THESE THREE "PROCESS" STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4 - ENSURE SKILLS TO MAXIMISE GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITIES

Develop and maintain a high level, competitive, versatile, world class skills base which ensures equal access by recognising the crucial connection between education, training and business success.

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES:

1. Enable targeted groups (see note 1) to improve job search skills, gain access to education, training and employment opportunities and increase their take up of available training, eg. improving child care arrangements.

2. Improve the competitiveness of local industry by identifying and filling critical gaps in training/upskilling provision eg. SME management (see note 2), high level technical skills, numeracy and literacy, key sectors undergoing growth and/or change (see note 3).

3. Improve employment prospects of targeted groups by identifying and accrediting their skills, particularly transferable ones.

4. Further develop the coherence of the framework of links between business and education and particularly increase the ownership of education-business partnership by employers eg. by demonstrating the benefits of active involvement.

5. Improve educational attainment and reduce the "failure index" by monitoring and improving educational performance in schools, including key stages 1-4 in schools, and NTETS (National Targets for Education and Training).

NOTE 1: Targeted groups are: young people, women, ethnic minorities, the unemployed and people with disabilities. These apply to all objectives.

NOTE 2: SME = Small/medium sized enterprise, less than 250 employees, including community enterprises.

NOTE 3: Key targeted sectors are: experiencing growth: financial services, IT/communications, care services, catering, cultural industries, distribution. Undergoing change: SME engineering, defence, textiles, retail, defence and engineering sub-contractors.

NOTE 4: Failure index = measure of 16/17 year olds who do not continue in full time education, training or jobs with training possibility.

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 5 - INVESTING IN BUSINESS

Develop and implement a coherent economic strategy which encourages growth and diversity, particularly through engineering excellence and industrial competitiveness.

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES:

1. Promote and develop excellence in the engineering sector through technology/knowledge transfer, and increasing the availability of state of the art equipment for SMEs.

2. Promote and develop diversification that will sustain and expand the local economy, including community enterprises.

3. Promote and develop innovation and flexibility in businesses within targeted sectors by encouraging links with the higher/further education sectors, and through providing targeted market research and advice.

4. Create and develop active links between local purchasers and suppliers in key targeted sectors to strengthen local supply chains, ensure more effective investment and the sharing of resources.

5. Improve survival rate of SMEs and encourage their expansion through the systematic provision of advice, information, signposting and expertise, including on exporting and through provision of appropriate sites and premises, including managed workspace on recycled land.

6. Facilitate access to finance and sources of funding for SMEs and start-up businesses.

7. Attract inward investors by providing suitable sites, wherever possible through recycling/reclaiming land.

8. Retain and attract investment and encourage the sub region's workforce to reach employment by providing access to development sites.

9. Encourage long term success and sustainability of businesses through promoting and enabling environmental sensitivity and competence, and energy efficiency.

10. Maintain the viability of rural communities by improving the prospects of survival and expansion of SMEs serving these communities.

11. Strengthen the local economy by encouraging local investment, ownership and management of businesses and the take up of business support options.

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 6 - PROMOTING COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE

Promote and develop Coventry and Warwickshire as a prime business investment location, visitor destination and high quality place to live through an approach which will generate pride in the area.

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES:

1. Promote Coventry and Warwickshire as an international business location with world class engineering and manufacturing base.

2. Further the development and promotion of an integrated sub-regional approach to inward investment and exporting.

3. Promote positive images of the people, skills, specific communities and areas within Coventry and Warwickshire.

4. Identify locally distinctive opportunities for promoting visitor attractions within Coventry and Warwickshire.

5. Encourage diversification of tourist visits to Coventry and Warwickshire including development of new attractions, increased lengths of stay.
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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 7 - DEVELOPING COVENTRY CITY CENTRE AND SURROUNDING URBAN CENTRES

Develop Coventry city centre as a major focus, which is safe and accessible for residents, visitors and investors for retail, residential, commercial, cultural, entertainment and leisure facilities. Improve access, facilities and investment in other urban areas within the sub-region.

1. Enhance and promote the appeal of the cathedral quarter by bringing historic buildings into use and animating the quarter through a broad range of activities.

2. Improve local people’s participation especially those in target groups in developing and delivering city and town centre activities and facilities and increase their use of existing facilities.

3. Encourage city centre living by encouraging development in housing including low rise and low rent accommodation, integrated with commercial premises.

4. Stimulate the evening and weekend economy by developing events management, encouraging evening activities and improving access and safety.

5. Promote investment in the city centre through creating an integrated environmental enhancement strategy and providing safe, open and attractive pedestrian ways, including across the ring road.

6. Promote investment in the city centre by encouraging the reuse of historic buildings, and the development of conference, exhibition, hotel and catering facilities, industrial heritage attractions and facilities for cultural industries.

7. Encourage diversification of retailing in the city and urban centres to include innovative and independent operators.

8. Strengthen the role of the city and urban centres by supporting and promoting the arts including the work of target groups.

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 8 - HOUSING WHICH MEETS PEOPLE’S NEEDS

Ensure that all existing and future citizens of the area have access to a choice of housing in the public rented, owner-occupied and private and voluntary rented sectors that is safe, affordable, of adequate size, condition and quality and is effectively managed.

1. Extend the life and adequacy of existing housing, through repair, maintenance, renovation and, when other options are not viable, replacement of the stock.

2. Provide housing to meet residents’ needs and aspirations through renovation and adaptation for those with special needs.

3. Ensure areas of unsatisfactory housing environment are targeted for comprehensive review and treatment.

4. Facilitate the construction of sufficient new homes to meet known housing need and give choice in all sectors.

5. Provide adequate, affordable social housing to meet the needs of those least able to compete in the housing market, including innovative and creative approaches such as self-build and housing cooperatives.

6. Ensure sufficient land is available for the development of a full range of housing tenures and types to meet different needs.

7. Provide accommodation, advice, training and support services to enable access or continued use of existing housing by vulnerable groups, including the homeless, those leaving care and offenders.

8. Develop partnerships with private, public and voluntary sectors to maximise resources for housing provision and investment in the condition of stock.

6. 8 June 1994
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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 9 - PROVIDING A HIGH QUALITY ENVIRONMENT

Protect and enhance the area's quality of life by securing the best achievable and sustainable environmental conditions having regard to access, safety, employment provision and reduction of disadvantage

1. Empower local communities to protect and improve their local environment, including the preparation and implementation of Local Agenda 21 (see note 5)

2. Make the best use of energy and resources, including increasing energy efficiency, recycling and reducing waste

3. Improve the local environment by removing or reducing industrial and other pollution

4. Reduce the impact of transportation on the environment, including promoting public transport, cycling and traffic management initiatives, and ensuring new development promotes movement by public transport, cyclists and pedestrians and is accessible to people with a variety of disabilities

5. Improve the quality of the physical environment, particularly in relation to identified environmental problem areas, key redevelopment sites and key routes through and into the sub-region's towns and City

6. Preserve, restore and enhance the interest of historic buildings, in particular encouraging economically viable uses or through their upkeep to encourage tourism and leisure

7. Encourage inward investment by reclaiming vacant and derelict land, including the removal of contamination, improving accessibility and enhancing the wider environmental setting

NOTE 5: Local Agenda 21 are local environmental action plans created and endorsed by local partnerships for their neighbourhood

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 10 - SAFE COMMUNITIES

Provide an effective framework for preventing crime, reducing fear of crime and supporting victims through developing a multi-agency approach based in local communities

1. Achieve a more effective response to racial harassment
2. Raise the profile of women's safety and promote initiatives to tackle these concerns
3. Provide a focus for preventative and educative work on drugs-related problems
4. Reduce the fear of crime
5. Increase support to victims of crime
6. Promote and develop positive action with young people, especially in high crime areas
7. Reduce the opportunities for crime through advice and introduction of physical measures aimed at "designing out" crime
8. Provide opportunities for safe play and a range of family support
COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS - SRB
GUIDANCE NOTES ON COMPLETION OF PROJECT SUMMARY FORM (PSF)

1. GENERAL

1.1 The form is intended to collect information to create a database of projects and to enable an initial assessment of the projects to be made. Please complete in a colour of ink which will be reproduced by a photocopier/fax (n.b. red and green are not good colours). Do not use pencil for versions which are to be returned.

1.2 The timetable allows for the completion of forms and a return to the Bid Coordinators by 27 June 1994.

1.3 Any queries or questions on the completion of the form should be directed initially to the Bid Coordination Team - Teresa Chalcroft on 0203 833376 (Coventry) or Janet Fortune on 0926 412090 (Warwickshire).

1.4 The form is divided into three main data areas plus some questions to help us to initially assess the project. These notes provide guidance on filling in the form and answering the questions.

2. PROJECT DESCRIPTIVE DATA

2.1 Project Reference
The project reference will be unique to each project and will be derived from the strategic objective and operational objective. The format of the reference will be 9.9.999 where the last element is a sequential number for the project. The initial project referencing will be undertaken by the Bid Coordination Team consultants.

2.2 Project Title
A short but meaningful title which adequately describes the project eg "Wheels Project for Young Offenders", "One Stop Neighbourhood Centre in______", etc.

2.3 Description
A brief description of the project, which describes what the funds are to be spent on and what the project is aiming to achieve. For the first example above the description might read "Rental of 2,000 sq ft of light industrial premises and employment of Youth Worker to train young offenders aged 13-19 in the x area of the City in motor car mechanics, with the object of reducing car crime and stimulating employment opportunities through NVQ credits."

2.4 Linked Projects
Where the project has associated, complementary or other related projects, then these should be quoted as "linked projects". The form allows for three to be quoted. Additional ones may be attached or referred to as comments.
2.5 **Themes**

A series of themes are being agreed by Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships as a means of linking projects which meet more than one strategic objective. Where a project meets more than one, then all that the project meets should be quoted in the sequence which the project is likely to address these eg order 3,1,2 would place key aim number 3 as the primary aim, number 1 as the secondary aim etc. The themes are still in draft and may be amended when the programme is developed. The current draft themes are:

1. **Building business, especially engineering, excellence** - working together to help engineering and other firms in growth sectors to be competitive through reaching the highest international standards, using technology transfer, international benchmarking, investment in high-level technical and managerial skills, especially for SMEs, transferring skills from declining to growth areas, enhancing market knowledge, building business confidence and ensuring premise and infrastructure support.

2. **Spreading market confidence north** - use developments in infrastructure such as the north/south link road, Hams Hall Euro-freight site and the release of development sites through industrial rationalisation and sector decline to reproduce conditions in the more successful south of the county, recycle land and attract new, growing and inward migrating business into the north of the City and County.

3. **Build self-determining, safe and confident communities** - provide the framework within which people can combat poverty and dependency, whether by making communication links to employment, ensuring education and training leading to employment is on offer, making user-friendly self-employment easier, freeing people from burdens of crime and fear of crime, poor health, environments and housing, and sharing their caring responsibilities, especially in areas of concentrated, multiple deprivation.

4. **Strengthen Coventry city centre** - build on the city centre development opportunities and historical heritage to provide a community, business and visitor focus, expressive of a successful sub-region, focusing the area's image and serving its population with commercial, leisure and cultural opportunities.
2.6 Strategic Objective

A series of strategic objectives have been agreed by Coventry & Warwickshire Partnerships and amended in consultation. The first three run through the whole programme and should be addressed by all SRB projects. The last eight relate to areas of work. Do not therefore code 1, 2 or 3 but explain at the back of the form how your project contributes to these Objectives. Each project should be ascribed to one of the other eight strategic objectives to which it is most closely related. Projects should not be assigned to more than one strategic objective, even though some may relate to more than one. Again you can explain further contributions at the back of the form. The strategic objectives agreed following consultation are as follows:

(i) - all projects address:

1. Empowering through partnerships
2. Reducing disadvantage
3. Providing equality of opportunity

(ii) - pick the closest of:

4. Ensuring skills to maximise growth and opportunities
5. Investing in business
6. Promoting Coventry
7. Developing the City Centre
8. Housing to meet people's needs
9. Providing a high quality environment
10. Making the City safe
11. Developing a healthy and caring City

2.7 Operational Objective

These have been the subject of consultation. The revised objectives are issued with this form and guidance notes in the 'project pack'.

2.8 Target Group

Target client groups have been identified for the single regeneration budget programme. Projects which target these groups will be given priority. They are as follows:

1. young people
2. women
3. ethnic minorities
4. the unemployed
5. people with disabilities

If your project involves one or more of these groups, please fill in the appropriate code(s)
2.9 Area

The geographic location or focus of the project. Where a project is based in one location but is focused on a wider area, then the wider area should be shown and the location included in the project description. Some projects will be part of an area strategy; the area code will help us to identify this. Other areas are being targeted as having special problems eg. coal areas. Area codes have been structured as follows:

1. Foleshill
2. Hillfields
3. Wood End
4. Willenhall
5. Stoke Aldermoor
6. Coventry city centre
7. Coventry (city-wide/other)
8. North Warwickshire
9. Nuneaton and Bedworth
10. Rugby
11. Leamington and Warwick
12. Stratford DC
13. Warwickshire (county-wide/other)

2.10 Target sector

The Action Group concerned with Economy and Development have identified key target sectors whose health is critical to the local economy. Projects which assist the competitiveness of these sectors will receive priority. Key targeted sectors are:

*experiencing growth:*

1. financial services
2. IT/communications
3. care services
4. catering
5. cultural industries
6. distribution

*undergoing change:*

6. SME engineering
7. defence
8. textiles
9. retail
10. defence and engineering sub-contractors
2.11 Priority
Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships, the SRB Steering Group and Action Groups will be considering priorities for projects in the context of overall resources and programme. The contribution an individual project makes to achieving the Strategic and operational objectives, the justification put forward on this project form, targeting on key groups, sectors and areas, value for money and readiness for delivery will all be taken into account in setting priorities. The Partnership will then consult on the whole programme, its content and balance.

2.12 Status
Standard entries for the various project stages are as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Notional - no detailed information available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Feasibility - study commissioned and under way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Preliminary approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Detailed design</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Final approval</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Implementation</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Live</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Complete</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Post Implementation Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Dead</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

At this stage, the entry will generally be "0" for bids for funding.

2.13 Sponsor/Lead Agency
The name of the organisation promoting and leading the project in its initial stages.

2.14 Implementation Agency
The name of the organisation actually responsible for the implementation of the project which may differ from the project’s sponsor or lead agency.

2.15 Main contact
The name of the contact responsible for providing management information for the project. Initially this is likely to be a contact in the sponsor/lead agency. Subsequently this may change to a contact in the implementing agency.

2.16 Contact Numbers
Telephone and Fax numbers for the contact. A list of all contacts will be compiled from the initial data trawl.
2.17 Partners
SRB projects should be carried out in partnership. A project which involves only one agency is unlikely to attract SRB funding. It may, however, quite legitimately be a complementary project funded from other sources. Please indicate here community sector partners and whether consultation with relevant local groups and interests has taken place.

3. PROJECT FUNDING

3.1 This is shown as a table which is broken into three main parts for which details are required of estimated annual spend (net income or expenditure) for five years and any spend in later years, together with the total spend. All amounts should be shown rounded to the nearest £100 pounds. The three main parts are as follows:

- SRB Funds
- Other Public Funds
- Private Sector Leverage

3.2 SRB Funds
A split is required between capital and revenue costs and within these the funding regime under which the project costs are most likely to fall, eg Estate Action etc. A full list of the SRB funding regimes is shown at Annex A.

3.3 Other Public Funding
This is further broken down into the Government/Local Authority Programmes and Other Public Sector Funds. A suggested differentiation of the two is as follows:

- Government/Local Authority Programmes
  - Local Authority Main Programme - Capital eg Education, Housing etc
  - Local Authority Main Programme - Revenue eg Education, Housing etc
  - Employment Service
  - Home Office
  - etc
  - Use the "regime" column to indicate the funding programme if known.

- Other Public Sector
  - Housing Corporation
  - Training and Enterprise Councils
  - Urban Development Corporation
  - English Partnerships
EC Structural Funds and community initiatives

Use the "regime" column to indicate the funding programme if applicable eg Housing Action Grant, City Grant, ERDF, ESF etc. A list of the major sources of central and local government finance and other assistance for the inner cities is shown at Annex B.

Private Sector
Source company or organisation (if known)

Only show investment in land, works, plant and machinery, equipment or other additional contributions eg training contributions or grants. These should be "additional" and are leveraged as a result of SRB funds. An exception would be complementary projects where no direct SRB funds are required. Do not include income from fees or charges from the public at large.

Voluntary sector
Source company or organisation (if known)

Only include funds which are not listed elsewhere. If a voluntary sector group are funded from local authority or other public sector grant and these funds will be used complementary to SRB, they should be shown as the appropriate other public sector source.

4. PROJECT MILESTONES

4.1 Project milestones are the dates on which certain activities either commence or are completed. Information required includes a brief description of the activity, many of which are standard, the agent responsible for achieving the target date, and the target date itself. The date can be either full or abbreviated to month and year ie 12.10.94 and Oct 94 are both valid. Dates in UK format ie DD/MM/YY or MM/YY.

4.2 Some common key activities are shown in Annex B. A project could involve many or all of the activities for which milestone dates could be set. Target dates should be established for the key activities by which the project may be implemented. This should include at least one milestone for each stage of the project (see status for stages). The list at Annex C is by no means exhaustive and other activities should be shown where appropriate.

5. PROJECT OUTPUTS

5.1 A list of the standard "core" outputs and output measures is included as Annex C of the bidding guidance which is reproduced in code order as Annex D. The list is somewhat long and can be confusing. However, each project should generate
one or more outputs and these must be capable of being measured. Overall outputs will be amalgamated and will lead to an assessment of "outcomes" eg change in the rate of unemployment.

5.2 Government has in the past focused on certain key outputs, and as a minimum these should be quoted if appropriate, as follows:

- Land reclaimed or brought back into beneficial economic use (hectares)
- Roads or other infrastructure built/improved (Km)
- Dwellings built or improved (no)
- of which for private sale (no)
- Floorspace created or improved (sq metres)
- New business start-ups
- Jobs created (fte)
- Jobs preserved (fte)
- Pupils benefitting (No)

5.3 Where a project has a definite output which does not appear in the standard list of "core" outputs, this should still be shown and marked with an asterix. There are clearly several vital ones not listed here - eg. reduction in crime, local people into jobs. We would like to see the number of volunteers involved in the project as an output.

6 GENERAL QUESTIONS

6.1 Contribution to Strategic/Operational objectives

The project description tells us about the project activity. However, it is particularly important in the context of SRB to understand the strategic context of the project. Two projects may both employ enterprise development officers but have completely different functions - one may be seeking to stimulate community enterprise on a run-down estate, the other could be targeting SMEs in a hi-tech sector. We need to know the objectives of the project and how they tie in with those identified for the programme as a whole.
6.2 Justification for the project
The single regeneration budget will only operate where there is no alternative funding source. Projects should use SRB to make maximum use of other funding and to fill gaps in existing provision. For example a project may make use of existing training provision but increase the take up by ethnic minorities. The justification for the project would be evidence that ethnic minorities were under-represented on training schemes and the gap identified would be the lack of any action being taken to remedy this situation.

6.3 Special Problems
The project may be well-targeted and highly desirable, but there may be some barriers to implementation. There may be problems of continued funding after SRB runs out. If this is likely to occur, we should like to be aware of them, in order to engage partners who may be able to solve them or in order to take this into account in programming the project by year.

6.4 Monitoring and evaluation
The government's bidding guidance for SRB indicates that it will be a requirement of all projects funded by SRB that they should be monitored and evaluated. We will have to consider carefully the status of projects which are hard to evaluate eg 'raising awareness', 'providing information' and may recommend methods of monitoring, for example by 'before and after' survey, as a condition of project funding.

6.5 Comments
Any comments which are pertinent to the project eg 'previously rejected by DoE for DLG' or other meaningful and relevant comments. Can also be used to augment data shown in other parts of the form.

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## SRB Funding Programmes

### Department of Environment
- **Estate Action** (EA)
- **Housing Action Trusts** (HAT)
- **City Challenge** (CC)
- **Urban Programme** (UP)
- **Urban Regeneration Agency** (EP)
- **Derelict Land Grant** (DLG)
- **City Grant** (CG)
- **Urban Development Corporations** (UDC)
- **Inner City Task Forces** (TF)
- **City Action Teams** (CAT)

### Employment Department
- **Programme Development Fund** (PDF)
- **Education Business Partnerships** (EBP)
- **Teacher Placement Service** (TPS)
- **Compacts/Inner City Compacts** (ICC)
- **Business Start-Up Schemes** (BSU)
- **Local Initiative Fund** (LIF)
- **TEC Challenge** (TEC)

### Home Office
- **Safer Cities** (SC)
- **Section 11 Grants (part)** (SIX)
- **Ethnic Minority Grant** (EMG)
- **Ethnic Minority Business Initiative** (EMB)

### Department of Trade and Industry
- **Regional Enterprise Grants** (REG)

### Department for Education
- **Grants for Education Support & Training (part)** (GEST)

In completing PSF forms it may be convenient to use acronyms rather than full descriptions.
MAJOR SOURCES OF CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND OTHER ASSISTANCE FOR THE INNER CITIES

### CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES

#### Department of the Environment
- Housing Investment Programme Allocations (HIP)
- Living over the Shop (LOTS)
- Energy Efficiency Demonstration Programme (EEDP)
- Home Improvement Agency Grants (HIA)
- Housing Revenue Account Subsidy (HRAS)
- Private Sector Housing Renewal (PSHR)
- Revenue Support Grant (RSG)
- Special Grants Programme (SGP)
- Grants to UK 2000 (UK2K)

#### Department of Trade & Industry
- Consultancy Scheme (CS)
- Enterprise Initiative (EI)
- Export Initiative (ExI)
- Small Firms Merit Awards for Research & Technology (SMART)
- Regional Selective Assistance (RSA)
- English Estates (now English Partnerships) (EE)

#### Department of Employment
- Travel to Interview Scheme (TIS)
- Placing Advisory & Counselling Team (PACT)
- Enterprise Allowance (EAL)
- Business & Enterprise Training (BET)
- Training Credits (TC)
- National Development Projects (NDP)
- Career Development Loans (CDL)
- Loan Guarantee Scheme (LGS)
- Advisory Services (AS)
- Jobclubs (Jbs)
- Job Interview Guarantee (JIG)
- Job Review Workshops (JRW)
- Job Search Seminars (JSM)
- Job Self Service (JSS)
- Restart Courses (RC)
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<td>Primary Health care for homeless people</td>
<td>PHCH</td>
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<td>Link worker schemes</td>
<td>LWS</td>
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<td>Dental location incentive scheme</td>
<td>DLIS</td>
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<td>Deprivation payments to GPs</td>
<td>DGP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Social Security</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Benefits via Benefits Agency and local authorities</td>
<td>BA</td>
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### OTHER PUBLIC FUNDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Corporation</th>
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<td>European Structural Funds</td>
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<td>European Social Fund</td>
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<td>KONVER programme</td>
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<td>Poverty IV programme</td>
<td><strong>POVERTY</strong></td>
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<td>EC Urban Initiative</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other EC programme</td>
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COMMON KEY MILESTONE DATES

Feasibility study - brief prepared by
Feasibility study - invitation to tender
Feasibility study - consultant appointed
Feasibility study - completion
Consultation commence
Consultation complete
Committee approval
Steering Group approval
IRO approval
Detailed design - brief prepared by
Detailed design - invitation to tender
Detailed design - consultant appointed
Detailed design - completion
Outline planning permission sought
Outline planning permission granted
Detailed planning permission sought
Detailed planning permission granted
Building regulations approval
Listed building consent
Scheduled Ancient Monument consent
Conservation Area consent
Compulsory Purchase Order made
Compulsory Purchase Order confirmed
Public Inquiry
Land transfer complete
Works contracts let
Works contract complete
Staff advertised
Staff appointed
Project completion
Post implementation appraisal complete by
**DOE 'CORE' OUTPUTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Output</th>
<th>Measure (unit)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Jobs created/safeguarded</td>
<td>No FTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B</td>
<td>Pupils benefitting from projects</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1C</td>
<td>People trained obtaining qualifications</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1D</td>
<td>Training weeks</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1F</td>
<td>People trained into employment</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1G</td>
<td>Unemployed people into employment</td>
<td>No residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1H</td>
<td>Ethnic minority pupils benefitting from ESL</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1I</td>
<td>Disadvantaged people into employment</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1J</td>
<td>Young people benefitting from projects</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1K</td>
<td>Employers involved in educational projects</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1L</td>
<td>Teachers on placement into business</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2A</td>
<td>New business start-ups</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B</td>
<td>New/improved business/commercial floorspace</td>
<td>sq metres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2C</td>
<td>New business survivals</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3A</td>
<td>Dwellings completed/improved</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>3A1</td>
<td>Dwellings into tenant management</td>
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<td>3Aii</td>
<td>Dwellings into tenant management public sector</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3B</td>
<td>Increased rent collected</td>
<td>% increase for year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3C</td>
<td>Increased repairs in target time</td>
<td>% increase for year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A</td>
<td>Ethnic minority business start-ups</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Output</td>
<td>Measure (unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4B</td>
<td>Unemployed ethnic minority people into employment</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4C</td>
<td>Ethnic minority pupils to higher education attainment levels</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>4D</td>
<td>Ethnic minority people entering vocational training</td>
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<tr>
<td>4E</td>
<td>Ethnic minority people advised or assisted</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>5A</td>
<td>People benefitting from community safety initiatives</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5B</td>
<td>Dwellings and commercial buildings upgraded for security</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5C</td>
<td>Community safety initiatives</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5D</td>
<td>Crime prevention initiatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>6A</td>
<td>Land reclaimed/improved for open space</td>
<td>Hectare</td>
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<tr>
<td>6B</td>
<td>Land reclaimed/improved/serviced for development</td>
<td>Hectare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6C</td>
<td>Buildings improved and brought back into use</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6D</td>
<td>Roads built/improved</td>
<td>Km</td>
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<td>6E</td>
<td>Traffic calming schemes</td>
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<td>6F</td>
<td>Waste management/recycling schemes</td>
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<tr>
<td>7A</td>
<td>Local people benefitting from new activities/facilities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7B</td>
<td>Community facilities improved/established</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8A</td>
<td>Voluntary Organisations supported</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8Bi</td>
<td>Dwellings into estate management arrangements</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8Bii</td>
<td>Dwellings into estate management arrangements %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8C</td>
<td>People employed in voluntary work</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8D</td>
<td>Local employers with employee volunteer schemes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8E</td>
<td>Community enterprise start-ups</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9A</td>
<td>Ratio of SRB to private sector funding</td>
<td>1:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dear Colleagues

SINGLE REGENERATION GRANT: PROJECT PRIORITISATION

I am writing to you to explain the process for prioritisation of projects that Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd proposes to adopt for the Coventry and Warwickshire SRB bid.

The process will have several distinct phrases which are drawn out below.

1. Project Summary Forms - initial processing and prioritisation

Project information and application packs have been sent to those requesting them. Further packs are available from the address below or by telephoning 83 3376 or 83 3374. Project Summary Forms are due in by 27 June.

It should be noted that we are asking local partnerships to disaggregate their programmes by strategic and operational objectives. This is essential for good appraisal and to satisfy Government department SRB requirements. After initial appraisal by the Action Groups, the Bid Co-ordination Team will regroup the information into a management report by area. If resources are a constraint then local partnerships will be asked to exercise their own priorities in coming down to the appropriate resource level.

When Project Summary Forms arrive with the Bid Co-ordination Team the projects will be given a unique reference number and entered onto a database. The project forms will, at the same time, be copied to the Chair of the relevant Action Group. (The applicant is asked in the Project Summary Form to assign their project to one Strategic Objective which will determine which Action Group it is allocated to).

The Action Groups will look at projects and carry out the following tasks:

i) nominate a member of the Action Group to resolve any issues of interpretation, details or clarity by direct contact with the applicant or other organisations. This person will also inform the applicant of any similar projects where merging of projects - or at least shared knowledge - may be desirable. This may result in a revised application. To avoid confusion a separate Project Summary Form will be issued for this purpose.

ii) undertake a first sieve of projects. The project criteria against which the Action Team will appraise are given in Appendix 1. Each project will be appraised against each of the criteria on a scale ranging from very good, good,
average, poor to very poor. A Project Appraisal Form will be issued for this purpose. The results of this exercise will be passed by the Action Group chair to the Bid Co-ordination Team.

iii) recommend where “block” schemes would be the most appropriate form of action and suggest criteria to be applied when, if the bid is successful, individual projects are appraised.

2 Complimentary project forms

We have asked for complimentary project forms giving information on projects which help to deliver the strategic and operational objectives but do not require SRB funding. Again these will be entered on the database. Where gaps obviously exist the Bid Co-ordination Team will chase the data.

Action Groups will:

i) check complimentary project forms and comment to the Bid Co-ordination Team as appropriate;

ii) seek to identify more complimentary funding using their day to day contacts. We are looking for about £250m of complimentary funding over five years.

3. Project Summary Form: further prioritisation

The results of this first sieve will be sent by the Action Groups to the Steering Group by 11 July. By this time the Bid Co-ordination Team will also, using the Project Summary Forms, provide the Steering Group with a summary analysis of:

i) all expenditure by strategic objective

ii) SRB expenditure by strategic objective

iii) outputs by type of strategic objective

iv) all expenditure by type

v) SRB expenditure by area

We anticipate that at this stage we will find ourselves with an excess of bids over £50m, an understatement of outputs and too little complimentary funding. The Steering Group will recommend to Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd a balance of resources between objectives and areas together with a financial profile over the five years of the bid. In making its recommendations the Steering Group will obviously bear in mind the quality of projects but will be more concerned with strategic issues, need, and the development of linked programmes and themes.

The Action Groups will be asked to reconsider their prioritisation of projects in the light of this guidance from the Steering Group.
A recommended SRB programme (together with a full list of all SRB schemes submitted) will be presented to Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd for their approval towards the end of July.

There will then be a period of further consultation on the draft SRB strategy and programme. It is anticipated that the final document will be approved by Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd in the third week in August so that it can be submitted to Government Departments by 7 September.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

David Taylor
SRB Co-ordinator

Policy Coordination Unit
Chief Executive’s Department
Christchurch House
Greyfriars Lane
COVENTRY
## SINGLE REGENERATION BUDGET TIMETABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 MARCH</td>
<td>CONSULTATION MEETING ON SRB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-29 APRIL</td>
<td>MULTI AGENCY ACTION GROUP MEETINGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 APRIL</td>
<td>BIDDING GUIDANCE ISSUED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 MAY</td>
<td>CONSULTATION LETTER ON OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES ISSUED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 MAY</td>
<td>DEADLINE FOR COMMENTS ON OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 MAY - 3 JUNE</td>
<td>CONSULTATION/INFORMATION EXCHANGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 JUNE</td>
<td>REVISED OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND THEIR CODE NUMBERS ISSUED. PROJECT SUMMARY FORMS FOR PROJECTS REQUIRING SRB FUNDS ACCEPTED FROM THIS DATE. PROJECT SUMMARY FORMS FOR COMPLEMENTARY PROJECTS CONTRIBUTING TO THE OBJECTIVES ISSUED.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 JUNE</td>
<td>DEADLINE FOR PROJECT SUMMARY FORMS TO BE RETURNED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 JULY - 22 JULY</td>
<td>COVENTRY AND WARWICKSHIRE PARTNERSHIPS AND CONSTITUENT PARTNERS, EC CITY COUNCIL, TEC BOARD, ENDORSE STRATEGY STATEMENT, OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES, DRAFT PROGRAMME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 JULY - MID AUGUST</td>
<td>PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON SRB BID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID TO END AUGUST</td>
<td>DOCUMENT IS FINALISED AND PRINTED FOR DISPATCH BY 7 SEPTEMBER</td>
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Appendix (P): SRB Roles and Relationships SRB1 and 2

SRB ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS.

SRB 1 and 2

Context

The management of the Single Regeneration Budget is complex. Overall responsibility lies with the Board of CWP Limited but a range of other groups have various roles in the process, notably the Directors SRB Group which was given delegated responsibilities by the Board on 26 October 1995.

A special SRB Steering Group on 8 January was convened in order to identify the roles and relationships between various levels and 'players' in the management and delivery of Single Regeneration Budget 1 and 2. This note arose from that meeting and was presented to, and agreed by, the Board of Coventry and Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd on 23 January 1996. The note was slightly updated following a discussion with Sir Brian Follett on 11 April 1996, in order to clarify, further, the roles of the Directors Group and the Steering Group.

The following roles for each group were agreed as being appropriate for the management of SRB1 and SRB2. No implications should be drawn in relation to roles for SRB3; these are the subject of current discussions.

Board.

- Delivering overall SRB1 and 2 in Coventry and Warwickshire
- Agreeing overall approach to SRB bidding (Type, scale and priorities)
- Agreeing amendments to programmes through SRB Directors Group and new projects
- Reviewing overall progress
- Reviewing delivery in context of CWP Economic Strategy document
- Individual Director involvement on projects and/or issues
- Overall representation to Government
- Delegating responsibilities within the process to the SRB Directors Group, SRB Manager and Steering Group as below

SRB Directors Group

Operating under delegated responsibilities from the Board (“RESOLVED that the SRB Directors’ Group be delegated authority to approve the reprofilting of grants or increasing grants to successful projects, but that new projects should still be referred to the Board.”)

- Approving Delivery Plan for SRB1 and SRB2
- Quarterly meetings to receive progress reports and if necessary
  - Reprofilting of agreed activity (over £10k per project, over £50k per quarter)
  - Inclusion of new projects - exceptionally
  - Re-allocation of grant
- Advising Board re strategic role in management and delivery of SRB
SRB Manager

- Appropriate reports to SRB Directors Group, Executive, Board and Government Office.
- Focal point of contact with Government Office on SRB 1 & 2.
- Implementation and management of SRB contracts with Government and Guarantors.
- Strategic overview of implementation of SRB 1 and 2.
- Convening meetings and producing reports and information.
- Auditing and financial monitoring of individual projects.
- Monitoring relationships between projects and guarantors.
- Information dissemination and publicity.
- Reprofiling of agreed activity (up to £10k per project and/or £50k per quarter).
- Commissioning impact studies.
- Drafting Annual Delivery Plans for SRB1 and SRB2.

Guarantors

- Operating within contractual arrangements of CWP and SRB.
- Reporting on individual and collective projects to SRB Manager.
- Reporting to own committees on own responsibilities.
- Auditing and monitoring of contracts under their control.

Steering Group (chaired by CWP Executive Manager)

The Steering Group is essentially advisory and represents the Partnership.

- Appraising progress through regular quarterly SRB progress/performance and themed meetings.
- Reporting on quarterly progress to SRB Directors Group and advising them on policy and action regarding any underspends or overspends.
- Monitoring "balance" of SRB activity.
- Discussing progress by SRB themes.
- Evaluating impact of SRB activity and customer satisfaction.
- Convening Action Groups.

Action Groups

- Co-ordination of theme/target area, avoiding duplication of delivery.
- Development/preparation of data for bidding purposes.
- Process role in ensuring awareness.
- Discussing and (sometimes) advising on decisions on underspends.
- Sub Groups of the Steering Group reporting to Steering Group as appropriate.

T. Overfoot
11.2.96
and updated with Sir Q. Fallett 11.4.96
CWP Board
26 members

CWP Executive Board
David Burton
Cllr Derek Forwood
Malcolm Gillespie
Brian Willis
(Cllr Brian Clack
Cllr Gordon Collett
Cllr Nick Nolan
Vacancy
(sw 2 City Council, 2 County Council, 2 TEC, 2 Chamber together with 2 CWP Officers and usually 1 officer from each of 2 LA's)

Directors SRB Group
chair Sir Brian Follett
Helen Aird
Hardev Singh Bahia
David Burton
Alan Durham
Cllr Derek Forwood
Malcolm Gillespie
Dr Michael Goldstein
Cllr Mick Jones
Cllr Nick Nolan
Gordon Stokes
Alan Stothard

CWP Executive Manager
CWP SRB Manager
GOWM Principal Officer
Trevor Cornfoot
Lorraine Butler
John O'Shea

SRB Guarantors
City Council
County Council
TEC
Touchstone Housing Association
University of Warwick
Coventry University
Nuneaton and Bedworth Borough Council
North Warwickshire Borough Council
Warwick District Council

SRB Steering Group
CWP Executive Manager (T Cornfoot)
CWP SRB Manager (L Butler)
3 City Council (D Taylor, M Feeley, M Rawson)
2 County Council (J Howell, J Fortune)
1 Warwickshire Districts (D De Haes)
2 TEC (N Gaynor, S Bladon)
1 Chambers of Commerce (A Durham)
1 University Sector (C Dent)
1 FE Sector (C Crawford)
2 Voluntary Sector (I Sharp, H Aird)
1 Ethnic Minorities (S Malhotra)
Appendix (Q): SRB Management Processes

SRB MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

Context

At its meeting of 20 March CWP Directors on the Directors SRB Group requested a summary document about the processes of SRB Management which would apply to SRB 1 and SRB 2. This paper meets that request and both develops and supplements the paper agreed at CWP's 23 January Board meeting on "SRB Roles and Relationships."

It is important to be aware of the changing role of the Directors SRB Group whose activities have now changed, significantly, from a role of approving SRB projects and bids to monitoring spend and outputs. This has led to the Group now identifying that its work should be undertaken through a programme of meetings centred around the timing of the Quarterly Grant Claim. These 'Review Meeting' dates are set out in the attached table.

Given the creation of a regular programme of information collection and assessment as an essential part of CWP's monitoring of the SRB it is clearly important that Guarantors submit timely and accurate information to CWP, and that each Guarantor receives similarly timely and accurate information from their relevant project officers (see 'Description of Practical Processes, below). Only through such cooperation can the SRB Management process work effectively and efficiently to the benefit of the communities and businesses we seek to serve.

Diagram

The diagram attached seeks to explain the processes of SRB Management in terms of the groups and individuals within the management processes and the nature of the relationship (contractual or advisory). The names of the individuals or organisations involved are also attached.

At the centre of the diagram are the 100 SRB1 and 2 projects and their delivery on "the ground". Moving upwards are a range of mainly contractual relationships between the Guarantor Organisations and CWP (represented by CWP staff, Directors SRB Group and the CWP Board). Moving downwards are a range of advisory mechanisms which seek to ensure the strategic overview and balance of the SRB programmes are maintained. The SRB Steering Group has an important advisory function to the CWP Executive Manager and SRB Manager and the Directors SRB Group.

The roles for each of the group in the process are as agreed at 23 January Board. That paper is attached. The "prime roles" shown on the diagram are an extract from that note, not a replacement for it.
SRB 1 and 2 Management Processes

CWP Board
Chair: Nick Scheck
26 Directors (meets 4 x annually)
Executive Board of 4 Directors (meets 4 times per year)
Director Role on SRB
Delivering the overall SRB

Directors SRB Group
Chair: Sir Brian Kennedy
15 Directors and 1 Substitute (meets quarterly)
Prime Role: Monitoring SRB implementation and advising the Board

CWP Executive Manager
CWP SRB Manager
Prime Roles: Contracts with Government; oversees contractual and consultative processes; liaison with GOWM, reporting to Directors Group/Board

SRB Guarantors
9 Guarantor organisations (meets 6 x annually)
Prime Role: contractual and financial responsibilities for SRB projects including providing monitoring information on expenditure and outputs

Projects and SRB Delivery
SRB1: 60 Projects
SRB2: 40 Projects
Each project has a project officer
Prime Role: delivery of spend and outputs

SRB Action Groups
Economy and Development
Health and Caring
Living and Environment
City and Urban Centres
Prime Roles: coordination within each theme, report to Steering Group as appropriate, advisory role to SRB Steering Group on SRB1 & 2 bids, may play a role in formulating SRB3 bids

SRB Steering Group
Chair: CWP Executive Manager
17 Participants (meets 8 times per year)
Prime Role: Appraising SRB overall performance and progress on SRB themes; reporting quarterly to SRB Directors Group; convening Action Groups

Key
- Advisory relationships
- Contract Management relationships
Description of Practical Processes

1. Spend and outputs from each of the 110 projects is sent quarterly by project officers to their Guarantors.

2. By the 20th of the quarter month (April, July, October, January) this information is collated by Lorraine Butler at CWP. It is checked against the contract and the conclusions put to the SRB Guarantors.

3. SRB Guarantors meetings occur very soon after the 20th of the quarterly month.

4. Results from the Guarantors meeting then go on to the SRB Steering Group held a few days after the Guarantors meeting. The SRB Steering Group decides on advice they wish to give to the Directors SRB Group on the performance of SRB activities.

5. Lorraine Butler, the SRB Manager, and nominated representatives from the SRB Steering Group then report to the Directors SRB Group, which meets soon after the Steering Groups quarterly progress meeting.

6. The Directors SRB Group determines any changes necessary to the programme and gives authority for Lorraine Butler to make such changes and communicate them throughout the SRB process, including to the Government Office West Midlands, where necessary.

Timetable

A timetable of meeting dates for the management of SRB 1 and 2 is attached.

SRB 3

The Directors Group will need to meet twice in order to discuss and, if appropriate, endorse SRB3 bids. The first meeting is to be on 20 May and the second will need to be in late August 1996.
20th April 1995

Dear Colleague

Thank you for your prompt reply to the invitation to attend Coventry & Warwickshire Partnerships' first Annual Conference.

This will be held on Monday 1st May, 1995 at the Jaguar Cars Conference Suite, Browns Lane Plant, Allesley, Coventry. Directions are printed overleaf. Please note that on approach to the entrance of Jaguar Cars, you will see three barriers, please take the turning to the right and report to the guard in the gatehouse who will direct you further.

Car parking spaces close to the Conference Suite will be limited, so we would advise you share transport with colleagues wherever possible.

Registration and coffee will be available from 2.30 pm. The Conference is scheduled to begin at 3.00 pm and finish by 5.45 pm. Light refreshments will then be available.

Enclosed is the revised economic strategy for the sub region produced by Coventry & Warwickshire Partnerships. It is still in draft form and will be revised and reissued subject to debate at Conference. If you can, it would be useful if you can spare the time to read the document before 1st May.

Yours sincerely

Janet Fortune
for Coventry & Warwickshire Partnerships Ltd
## Appendix (S): Comparison of SRB outputs – Final to Delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SRB Output Indicators</th>
<th>Final</th>
<th>Delivery</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a No of jobs created/safeguarded (fte)</td>
<td>9,133</td>
<td>6,297</td>
<td>- 2,836 -31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b No of pupils benefiting from projects</td>
<td>228,969</td>
<td>124,697</td>
<td>- 104,272 -46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1bb Post 16 pupils benefiting</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c No of people trained obtaining qualifications</td>
<td>27,337</td>
<td>6,206</td>
<td>- 21,131 -77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1d No of target residents accessing employment</td>
<td>22,657</td>
<td>2,113</td>
<td>- 20,544 -91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1e Training weeks</td>
<td>34,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1f People into employment</td>
<td>1,558</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1g Unemployed into employment</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1h Ethnic minority pupils ESL</td>
<td>18,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1i Disadvantaged into employment</td>
<td>360</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1j Young people benefiting from projects</td>
<td>60,115</td>
<td>174,555</td>
<td>114,440 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1k Employers investing in education</td>
<td>3,822</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a No of new business start-ups</td>
<td>4,997</td>
<td>1,915</td>
<td>- 3,082 -62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b New/improved floorspace in msq</td>
<td>72,846</td>
<td>9,145</td>
<td>- 63,701 -87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a No dwellings completed/improved.</td>
<td>3,417</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>- 2,247 -66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3c Increased rent collected (%pa)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
<td>- 64 -100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a No of ethnic minority business start-ups</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2,280 -100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b No of ethnic unemployed getting work</td>
<td>2,833</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2,833 -100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4c No of ethnic pupils achieving higher education attainment</td>
<td>12,957</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>- 12,951 -100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4d No ethnic minority into vocational training</td>
<td>761</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4e No of ethnic minority people advised/assisted</td>
<td>11,254</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>- 10,209 -91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a People benefiting from community safety</td>
<td>65,044</td>
<td>48,045</td>
<td>- 16,999 -26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b No dwellings/commercial buildings improving security</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>- 610 -48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5c Community safety initiatives</td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>- 1,483 -95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5d Crime prevention initiatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6a Ha land reclaimed/improved for open space</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>- 108 -67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6b Ha land reclaimed/improved for development</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>145 1036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6c No buildings improved/brought back into use</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>- 21 -38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6d Roads built/improved</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6f Waste management schemes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7a No of locals accessing new opportunities/facilities</td>
<td>468,848</td>
<td>22,031</td>
<td>- 446,817 -95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7b Community facilities improved/established</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>- 171 -80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8a No of voluntary organisations supported</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>- 21 -5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8c No people employed in voluntary work</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8e Community enterprise start-ups</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98 Companies assisted Tech</td>
<td>430</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99 Co staff trained</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No education in employment premises</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs assisted</td>
<td>190</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Final Bid (CWP, 1994a); Delivery Plan (CWP, 1995a))