Political Party Organisation in East Asia

Towards a new framework for the analysis of party formation and change

by

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At present, progressive theory-building in the area of political party organisation is being hampered by the controversy over how much freedom of choice decision-makers within a party enjoy in relation to their environment. This piece of research will therefore develop an analytical framework that transcends this debate by acknowledging the causal effects of both structures and party leadership. Based on the ideas of historical institutionalism, it will argue that party organisation is the product of strategic decisions made in a strategically selective context. The framework is then applied to political parties in the newer democracies of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. The selection of cases is motivated by the fact that East Asia has so far been largely ignored by systematic studies of political party organisation. As will be seen, post-autocratic environments in the region strongly favour political parties that are mere façades for informal patron-client networks. However, we can also find parties characterised by a higher level of formal organisational strength, including parties that share many similarities with the classical mass party. These parties thus demonstrate that political actors are able to develop alternative organisational responses to the same structural context.
Für Mama und Papa

Ich hab dann mal fertig studiert.
Acknowledgements

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ABBREVIATIONS

CDA  Christen Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal)
CKP  Creative Korea Party
DJP  Democratic Justice Party
DLP  Democratic Liberal Party
DP  Democratic Party
DPP  Democratic People’s Party [South Korea]
DPP  Democratic Progressive Party [Taiwan]
DPP  *Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* (Central Executive Board) [Indonesia]
DPR  *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (People’s Representative Council)
DS  *Democratici di Sinistra* (Democrats of the Left)
FN  *Front National* (National Front)
FPÖ  *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (Austrian Freedom Party)
GAD  Grand Alliance for Democracy
GNP  Grand National Party
Golkar  *Partai Golongan Karya* (Party of Functional Groups)
GPB  British Pound
ICMI  *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
IDR  Indonesian Rupiah
KAMPI  *Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino* (Partner of the Free Filipino)
KBL  
*Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement)*

KDLP  
Korean Democratic Labour Party

KMT  
*Kuomintang* (Nationalist Party)

KRW  
South Korean Won

LABAN  
*Lakas ng Bayan* (People Power)

Lakas-CMD  
Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats

Lakas-NUCD-UMDP  
Lakas ng EDSA-National Union of Christian Democrats-National Union of Muslim Democrats of the Philippines

LAMMP  
*Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino* (Struggle of the Patriotic Filipino Masses)

LDP  
*Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino* (Struggle of Democratic Filipinos)

LFP  
Liberty Forward Party

LP  
Liberal Party

M/E  
Membership-electorate ratio

M/V  
Membership-voter ratio

MDP  
Millenium Democratic Party

NAMFREL  
National Movement for Free Elections

NCNP  
National Congress for New Politics

NDRP  
New Democratic Republican Party

NKDP  
New Korea Democratic Party

NKP  
New Korea Party

NP  
*Nacionalista* Party [Philippines]

NP  
New Party [Taiwan]

NPC  
Nationalist People’s Coalition
<table>
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<tr>
<td>NPRP</td>
<td>New Political Reform Party</td>
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<td>NPUPP</td>
<td>Non-Party for a Unified People’s Party</td>
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<td>NTD</td>
<td>New Taiwan Dollar</td>
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<td>NU</td>
<td>Nahdatul Ulama</td>
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<td>PAN</td>
<td>Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party)</td>
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<td>PCI</td>
<td>Partito Communista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDI</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Partido Demokratiko Pilipino (Philippine Democratic Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>People First Party</td>
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<td>PHP</td>
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<td>PKB</td>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)</td>
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ULD  United Liberal Democrats
UNDP  United New Democratic Party
UNIDO  United Nationalist Democratic Organization
UPP  United People’s Party
NOTE ON ROMANISATION

In order to create Latin script readings for Chinese and Korean characters this thesis uses the Pinyin and the Revised Romanisation systems respectively. The only exceptions are widely recognised names that follow alternative guidelines of romanisation (such as Kuomintang). Chinese and Korean names within the text are given with the surname first.
THE STRUCTURE-AGENCY DIVIDE IN THE PARTY ORGANISATION LITERATURE

Introduction

Theories that help to explain party organisations can, broadly speaking, be divided into two strands, depending on whether they stress the importance of contextual factors, or rather focus on the political actor. Several scholars of political parties have in the past more or less explicitly made reference to this highly unsatisfactory stand-off between these two seemingly contradictory interpretations of party formation and adaptation. Probably the clearest description of the current situation of theory-building in the field of party organisation comes from van Biezen, who points out that it is yet not clear “how much structure actually matters and how much room it leaves for parties as active agents” (2003a: 179). Similarly, Müller (1997) distinguishes between an “environmentalist” and a “purposive-action” approach to
the problem of how to explain different forms of party organisation. Less explicitly, this debate is also reflected in the concepts of party organisational “change” and “innovation”, with change defined as the “difference found between two points in time in the way a party operates”, whereas innovation is understood as “the part of that change which is intentionally brought about by some agents inside the party” (Heidar and Saglie 2003: 223; emphasis added). Likewise, Harmel (2002) makes a distinction between the “life-cycle” approach and “system-level trends” approach on the one hand and the “discrete change” approach on the other. Although he argues that the three primarily differ as to the type or pattern of change they are aiming to explain, he acknowledges that the former puts more emphasis on internal and environmental factors respectively, while the latter sees the interests of party actors as the prime source for organisational change.

Although this structure-agency divide seriously limits our understanding of the processes of party formation and change, the relevant literature has not yet offered any ways to transcend the obvious tension between the different theoretical approaches to party organisation. Therefore this thesis will develop an analytical framework, which, based on the central ideas of historical institutionalism, acknowledges the explanatory power of both structures and agency. In particular, it will be argued that, although structural contexts favour certain strategies over others, actors are able to develop divergent strategic responses to the opportunities presented by a particular context. In other words, although political parties within the same environment will tend to exhibit certain regularities in their organisation, the
outcome of any given decision on how to organise a party is unpredictable, since actors are always able to choose alternative courses of action. As a result, because there can be more than one strategy to respond to a particular context, the development of political parties is best seen as a constant conflict between different party internal groupings, all offering different organisational strategies.

The framework will then be applied to study the organisation of political parties in the newer democracies of South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia.\(^1\) The selection of cases was motivated by the fact that – in contrast to other geographical regions hit by the “third wave” of democratisation\(^2\) – political parties in East Asia have not yet been the subject of any systematic analysis. While the study will thus contribute to our understanding of party formation and change in East Asia, we hope that the analytical framework itself will prove useful as a general tool for party scholars with very different geographical areas of expertise. Most notably, we hope that the analytical framework will make a contribution to study of Western European parties, which still forms the basis for most existing theories of party organisation.

In order to achieve these objectives the study will be structured into two main parts. The first half will be devoted to the development of the analytical framework.

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1 The terms ‘South Korea’ and ‘Korea’ will be used interchangeably throughout the text.
2 Huntington (1991) distinguishes between three historic waves of democratisation, which were separated by two reverse waves of authoritarian setback. The “first wave” (1828-1926) had its origin in the American and French revolutions and slowly weakened after the coming into power of Musсолini in Italy. With the end of the Second World War the “second wave” (1943-62) was initiated by the victory of the allied forces, but it came to an early end when military coups in Latin America brought down a number of democratically elected governments. Finally, the third and last “wave” has been set off by the fall of the Portuguese right-wing dictatorship in 1974.
This, first of all, requires reviewing the existing literature on party organisation along the structure-agency divide, which will show that the strengths of one approach are the weakness of another approach and vice versa. Having established the need for a more integrative perspective on party organisation, we will then use the dialectical understanding of the relationship between structures and agency suggested by historical institutionalism to integrate existing theories of party organisation from different levels of analysis into a single model. This will be followed by a methodology chapter, in which, most importantly, we put forward a new way to conceptualise party organisation, since existing typologies are too closely connected to structuralist theories of party formation and change.

The analytical framework developed in this first section will then be applied to political parties in the newer democracies of East Asia. In each country chapter we will outline the main properties of the particular context, discuss how political actors develop different electoral strategies within this context and finally demonstrate how these strategies translate into party organisation. As will be shown, we are not witnessing the emergence of particular type of party organisation across all countries or within single polities – as structuralist theories would want us to believe – nor are we confronted with a confusing multiplicity of different types of party organisation, as the agent-centred theories would expect. Rather, the organisation of political parties in East Asia is the product of strategic decisions made by knowledgeable and reflexive actors within a context that favours certain strategies over others.
The development of political parties in Western Europe

Existing theories of party organisation can be grouped into two strands, depending on whether they attribute more importance to structures or agents. However, the theorisation on party organisation not only suffers from a divide between structural and voluntarist approaches, but also from a geographical and cultural bias. Most, if not almost all theories of party organisational change and adaptation have been developed in the context of the established democracies in Western Europe. With a few exceptions, the study of political parties in newly democratising polities in other parts of the world has not generated new theoretical insights. Rather, analyses of party organisation in the “third wave” of democracy tend to employ existing party models. Hence, before outlining the different theories that have been offered to account for the organisational formation and adaptation of political parties, it seems necessary to briefly summarise the historical development of political parties in Western Europe, which serves as the empirical underpinning of these theories.

Of the many typologies of political parties (see Krouwel 2006), the historical narrative will follow the classification by Katz and Mair (1995), which has proven to be the most influential. One central characteristic of this classification is that each party type takes a previously existing one as reference point. Hence, the historical narrative would be incomplete if it did not include the factors that caused the development of an existing type into a new type. Obviously, these factors will reflect the specific structuralist approach associated with the writings of Katz and Mair, which
will be critically assessed later in this chapter. At the moment, however, this approach serves as a heuristic device to paint a coherent picture of party organisational development in Western Europe.

The general trajectory of party organisational development in the industrialised democracies of the West has frequently been described as in decline. Several scholars argue that political parties have lost many of their core functions to other organisations of interest representation and hence portray political parties in a severe crisis from which they will almost certainly never recover. The main problem with this gloomy picture is that it is based on the idea of parties as unitary actors. If we instead distinguish three different elements – or faces – of party organisation, it becomes clear that only the “party on the ground” has become less important, while the “party in central office” and particularly the “party in public office” have in fact been strengthened (Mair 1994; Katz and Mair 2002; see also Webb 2002). The trend in party development in Western Europe should therefore not be interpreted as general decline, but more accurately as organisational change and adaptation (Bartolini and Mair 2001). Hence, it makes sense to describe the historical development of Western parties along the changing power relations between the three faces of party organisation. Moreover, as our analytical framework will be centred around party internal power relations as the central mechanism to explain political party

3 Arguments presented in order to support the thesis of “party decline” differ markedly in their level of generalisation. Whereas some authors interpret the weaker role of parties in the political process as a universal trend (for example Schmitter 1999), others insist on a more nation-specific approach (for example Reiter 1989; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995).
development, this historical discussion will serve as an important reference point to integrate our findings into the existing literature on party organisation.

Broadly speaking, the party on the ground refers to the membership organisation of a party. Members can be distinguished from the general electorate as to the obligations and privileges that they have been assigned by the party (Heidar 2006: 301). The party in central office, on the other hand, is more difficult to define. In very simple terms it can be described as the national headquarters of the party consisting of two different groups: (1) the party leadership and (2) the party bureaucracy (Katz 2002: 98). Finally, the party in public office is self-explanatory, encompassing those party members who hold office as members of parliament or cabinet ministers.

Although they have never been clearly stated, a number of different indicators can be drawn from the literature that scholars have used to measure the power relations between the three faces of party organisation. Certainly, the most frequently analysed indicator is the size of party membership. In fact, the arguments of the advocates of the “party decline” thesis are mostly built upon the decreasing number of members in West European parties during the past decades. Another indicator used to determine the distribution of power within political parties is intra-party democracy. The procedures used to elect the party leadership and to nominate candidates for public elections are a valuable gauge to draw a general power-map of a party (Katz 2001). Finally, the distribution of resources relevant to electoral competition
is also employed to uncover the party-internal balance of power (Katz 1996). The most important resources include money, staff, and access to media.

According to these indicators, the dominant organisational face of the first parties to emerge in proto-democratic Europe in the 18th and 19th century was almost certainly the party in public office. Although it is questionable whether one can really talk of a dominant face, since, as a matter of fact, what has been termed the “cadre party” (Duverger 1964) or the “party of individual representation” (Neumann 1956) was nothing more than a loose alliance of notables with the aim of getting their candidates elected into parliament. An extra-parliamentary party was virtually non-existent, and the party in public office thus tended to be the only group in the party that had “the need or the opportunity to make collective decisions” (Katz and Mair 2002: 115-116).

The cadre party was not based on an enduring local membership organisation, but if the party required people to help in mobilising votes it would primarily rely on the personal networks of friends and clients of its members. Membership was restricted to those with independent and personal access to politically relevant resources. In the words of Duverger (1964: 64), adherence to the cadre-party type is

a completely personal act, based upon the aptitudes or the peculiar circumstances of a man; it is determined strictly by individual qualities. It is an act that is restricted to a few: it is dependent upon rigid and exclusive selection. If we define a member as one who
signs an undertaking to the party and thereafter regularly pays his subscription, then cadre parties have no members.

The only function of the small elitist circle of party “members” was to nominate candidates for election. In-between elections these local alliances of notables would be dormant, leaving the party’s representatives in parliament with an absolute free mandate and in every respect responsible only to their own consciences (Neumann 1956: 404). The selection of candidates was a highly informal process, with the patrons usually nominating one of themselves (Katz 2001: 283).

Taking all this in mind, it is not difficult to understand why the cadre party had no need for a strong party in central office. Since the individual members could themselves provide the resources necessary for electoral success (i.e. money and votes), they were not dependent on central resources, and therefore felt no need to defer to a central authority (Katz and Mair 2002: 115).

The crucial context for the emergence of the elitist cadre party was the régime censitaire with its restrictive suffrage requirements linked to wealth and property (Daalder 2001: 42). As the number of people who could meet these requirements in the early stages of the process of industrialisation was relatively small, political parties only had to mobilise a small number of votes in order to get their candidates elected. This did not require highly sophisticated electoral campaigns, but sufficient votes could simply be secured through personal contacts held by the party mem-
bers. In other words, the personal influence of the members in public office made an extra-parliamentary organisation redundant.

This all changed when restrictions on working-class organisation, which were increasingly seen to be incompatible with liberal ideas, became more relaxed, thus allowing social groups locked out of the political decision-making process to organise their own parties “outside” parliament. As these groups lacked the resources of the ruling elite parties, they tried to attract as many members as possible, thereby substituting individual quality with quantity (Duverger 1964: 23). Members not only provided a source of income for the party by having to pay regular membership dues, but they also contributed free labour both during and between election campaigns. Moreover, since the “mass party” – alternatively “party of social integration” (Neumann 1956) – usually represented a particular and clearly defined social or religious segment of society, thus embodying an ideological vision of a better social order, members represented a valuable basis for spreading that ideology (Ware 1996: 66).

In return for their contributions, the mass party gave members a say in internal matters, such as the election of leaders, the nomination of candidates for public elections, and the formulation of policy goals. Decision-making was organised in a hierarchical system of delegation, with the lower levels electing representatives on the next higher level. The idea behind this was that the party leadership and the members of the party in public office should act as agents of the masses. At the same time, the party tried to insulate its members from counter-ideologies through
propaganda, party press, and party-organised activities in all spheres of life from the cradle to the grave (Neumann 1956: 405). Like the participatory rights granted to members, these activities, such as sport clubs, reading groups et cetera, also functioned as incentives for people outside the party to enlist as a member.

All this, the administration of the membership registry, the collection of membership dues, the management of voluntary work, the publication of party newspapers, and the supervision of ancillary organisations created the necessity for a strong party central office staffed by full-time professionals. However, given the symbiotic relationship between the party on the ground and the party in central office – the former supplying the party with the resources necessary for its survival, while the latter provides central co-ordination – it is difficult to determine the dominant organisational face of the mass party (Katz and Mair 2002: 117). The party in public office, on the other hand, was clearly subordinate to the extra-parliamentary organisation.

With progressing industrialisation, which meant that more and more people were able to meet the requirements of the régime censitaire, and the increasing electoral success of socialist and denominational parties, the classic cadre parties were forced to mobilise votes beyond their traditional constituencies in the upper socio-economic strata of society. This made it necessary to emulate the mass party as an organisational type, and to open membership to the wider electorate. As a consequence, a stronger central organisation became indispensable, which would coordinate campaign activities and administer the growing party on the ground (von
Beyme 1985: 161). The prototype for a permanent central party organisation was the much cited Birmingham Caucus of the British Liberals, established by Joseph Chamberlain in 1877.

However, as Katz and Mair (1995: 11-12) argue, it was unappealing to the leaders of the cadre party to copy the mass party model in every respect. First of all, organisationally encapsulating clearly defined segments of society seemed ineffective, since the groups that would have been left to them were permanent minorities (for example farmers, industrialists). Secondly, the idea that the extra-parliamentary organisation ought to be dominant went against the interests of those already established in government. And finally, as the parties of the upper and middle classes, and as the parties in government, they were not so dependent on the material resources provided by party members. Consequently,

the leaders of the traditional parties tended to establish organizations that looked like mass parties in form (regular members, branches, a party congress, a party press), but which in practice often continued to emphasize the independence of the parliamentary party.

(Katz and Mair 1995: 12)

In doing so, they created a new organisational form, which the mass parties would then feel pressured to imitate from the 1950s on: the “catch-all party” (Kirchheimer
1964) or “electoral-professional party” model (Panebianco 1988). Although these parties were still based on large membership organisations, the role of party members was downgraded considerably. This showed primarily in three ways (see Krouwel 2003: 28). First of all, one could observe stagnation in the size of party memberships. In addition, instead of being limited to a specific segment of society, the social profile of party membership became more balanced. And last but not least, parties offered far fewer opportunities for membership activity, as they closed down many of the ancillary organisations.

Simultaneously, the party in public office witnessed a significant increase in power – vis-à-vis both the party on the ground and the party in central office. Having gained a taste of office, the parliamentary leaders of the mass party naturally wanted to get re-elected, and hence developed an interest in broadening their electoral appeal beyond their original class gardée (Mair 1997: 102). However, in order to be able to pursue a catch-all strategy, the party in public office needed to free itself from the control of the party on the ground. In achieving this, the party in public office profited from two developments. Firstly, technological innovations in systems of mass communication revolutionised electoral campaigning. Parties put less emphasis on labour-intensive campaigns stressing individual contact with voters at the local level, but campaigns became more standardised at the national level, as television brought politicians closer to the people (Farrell 1996). Secondly, through the introduction of public subsidies for political parties the party in public office obtained its own source of income (Katz 1996: 121). Taken together, this meant that
the party in public office became less dependent on the resources provided by party members – free labour and money.

The balance of power within the catch-all party can be described as a conflict between the party on the ground and the party in public office that was played out in the party in central office (Katz and Mair 2002: 122). Broadly speaking, the conflict revolved around the question of whether the party in central office should be the agent of the party on the ground in controlling the party in public office, or rather the agent of the party in public office in organising and directing their supporters in the party on the ground.

Eventually, the party in public office won the struggle for party-internal power, because the trends mentioned above have become even more apparent. More and more people now make use of new communication technologies in their everyday lives, and the level of state subventions for political parties has steadily increased. The resulting dominance of the party in public office with respect to the other faces of party organisation led Katz and Mair (1995) to diagnose the emergence of a new party type, the “cartel party”, which is believed to be the dominant party organisational form in contemporary Western Europe.

The cartel-party thesis claims that established political parties seek to monopolise the access to political power by limiting the intensity of inter-party competition through informal agreements. They create an oligopolistic cartel within which they allocate state resources to themselves, giving them a significant electoral advantage in relation to outside challengers. Clearly, this also has a large impact on the distri-
bution of resources within the parties themselves, as it is principally the party in public office that negotiates the terms of the party cartel. Not only does the party in public office tend to be the prime beneficiary of state subventions, but, in addition, it heavily profits from the growing number of publicly funded staff in parliamentary offices (Katz and Mair 2002: 123). Together, these crucial organisational resources ensure the party in public office a more or less undisputed position of privilege within the party organisation.

Given the increasing self-sufficiency of the party in public office, party members have become much less important for electoral success. This is reflected in the declining levels of party membership that can be observed throughout Western Europe (Mair and van Biezen 2001). The party elite in parliament increasingly seems to perceive party members as a disadvantage rather than an asset, and political parties seem much less interested in recruiting new members. At the same time, the remaining membership has been atomised, meaning that members exercise their participatory rights as individuals rather than through delegates (Katz and Mair 1995: 21). This becomes particularly apparent in the methods used to select candidates for public elections, where more and more parties are following the principle of “one member, one vote”. The causal mechanism identified behind this trend is again the desire of the party in public office to maintain electoral success. In order to enjoy the necessary autonomy to pursue aggressive electioneering, party leaders give each member an individual vote, thereby leaving no power to the intermediary party structures, which are usually crowded with the most ideologically radical
members (Katz 2001; Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000). In fact, many parties have opened their processes of candidate selection to the general electorate, thereby making a distinction between members and non-members difficult.

**TABLE 1:** THE ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cadre party</th>
<th>Mass party</th>
<th>Catch-all party</th>
<th>Cartel party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant face</strong></td>
<td>no clear boundaries between faces</td>
<td>symbiotic relationship between party on the ground and party central office</td>
<td>conflict between party on the ground and party public office played out in the party central office</td>
<td>clearly party in public office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td>virtually non-existent; usually friends and family of the party elite</td>
<td>extensive and socially homogeneous</td>
<td>stagnating and socially heterogeneous</td>
<td>distinction between members and non-members is blurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decision-making</strong></td>
<td>informal and highly centralised</td>
<td>organised in a hierarchical system of democratic delegation</td>
<td>the rules regarding party internal decision-making become fiercely contested</td>
<td>highly inclusive: one member, one vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational resources</strong></td>
<td>personal contacts and money concentrated in the hands of the party notables</td>
<td>party members contribute free labour and pay regular membership dues</td>
<td>technological revolution and state subsidies make resources provided by party members less important</td>
<td>party in public office virtually self-sufficient</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The organisational development of political parties in Western Europe is summarised in Table 1. It was important to outline the historical trajectory of party organisations in the established democracies because the great majority of theories to explain different types of party organisation have been developed in this particular empirical context. However, as the next section will show, the history of political parties in Western Europe is much more complex than the above table suggests and full of cases that existing theories fail to account for. This failure results from the fact that existing theories pay too much attention to either structures or agency, without acknowledging the dialectical relationship between the two. In short, the historical development of political parties in Western Europe just outlined will help us, first of all, highlight the weaknesses of existing approaches towards party organisation and, secondly, demonstrate how the analytical framework developed here can contribute to our understanding not only of political party formation and adaptation in newer democracies but also political party development in Western Europe.

Structuralist approaches to party organisation

Theories that emphasise structural factors in order to account for different forms of party organisation have been arranged into three distinctive groups (van Biezen 2005; see also Bartolini and Mair 2001: 328-330). These can be distinguished on the
basis of how much importance they attribute to external or internal factors respectively. While the “life-cycle” approach conceives party formation and adaptation as an endogenous process of maturation that will always unfold in the same way, regardless of the context around the party, the “period effect” approach – used above to outline the historical development of Western European parties – argues that the organisational structures implemented by parties will, in contrast, tend to reflect the environmental circumstances in which these parties compete. Finally, the “generation effect” approach maintains that the type of party organisation is very likely to be indicative of the contextual factors that formed the setting for the party’s initial formation. In other words, the formation of a political party will be determined by external structural factors, whereas the further development will be constrained by the internal party structures originally adopted.

The “life-cycle” approach

Probably the most widely cited theory that can be related to the life-cycle approach is Robert Michels’ well-known “iron law of oligarchy”. Studying the German Social Democratic Party in the early 20th century, Michels claims that all parties that attain a certain degree of complexity will undergo a centralisation of power in the hands of
a small number of leaders. This is summarised in his famous dictum: “Who says organization, says oligarchy” (Michels 1962: 365).

The causal mechanism underlying Michels’ argument involves two different stages. First of all, Michels establishes the necessity of leadership in large organisations, arguing that beyond a certain size technical specialisation and a division of labour become indispensable. This will force the party to replace direct democracy by a system of delegation, which, in turn, will give rise to a distinction between leaders and followers. Although this first step in the argumentation seems almost banal, it nevertheless forms the crucial basis for the second stage in Michels’ line of reasoning, when he contends that this newly emerged leadership will necessarily become oligarchic.

Michels offers two different sets of factors that will encourage leaders to act oligarchically. To begin with, exercising power has a number of psychological effects on those in leadership positions, since, according to Michels, the desire to dominate is inherent to human nature. It follows from this that

> [...] every human power seeks to enlarge its prerogatives. He who has acquired power will almost always endeavour to consolidate it and to extend it, to multiply the ramparts which defend his position, and to withdraw himself from the control of the masses.

(ibid.: 206)
Moreover, leaders will seek oligarchical control of the party, because of the material benefits attached to their status within the party organisation. These would decrease in value if they had to share them with a larger group of people.

After having answered the question of why party leaders would try to centralise power within their elitist circle, Michels goes on to explain how this is achieved. The principal cause he identifies in this regard is the mere technical indispensability of leadership:

The technical specialisation that inevitably results from all extensive organisation renders necessary what is called expert leadership. Consequently the power of determination comes to be considered one of the specific attributes of leadership, and is gradually withdrawn from the masses to be concentrated in the hands of the leaders alone. Thus the leaders, who were at first no more than executive organs of the collective will, soon emancipate themselves from the masses and become independent of its control.

(ibid.: 70)

In other words, as the party organisation becomes more sophisticated, so will leaders become more expert in running the organisation. This will make it hard to replace them, which, in turn, makes leaders feel more secure and less responsive to rank-and-file influence: The leaders’ monopoly of expertise in many areas will mean
that ordinary party members have to depend on their judgement, exposing them to the leaders’ control. Tools used by the party leadership to maintain control over the party on the ground include the manipulation of party finances, control over the party press, and particularly the “tactic of resignation”.

While Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” is without doubt the most prominent example of the life-cycle approach, other authors also perceive the development of party organisations as a single common trajectory that all parties will be forced to follow. One example is the study of parties in Norway and Denmark by Harmel and Svåsand (1993), in which it is argued that the “entrepreneurial issues parties” found in these two countries did all go through the same three phases of organisational progression. Each stage, the authors argue, required particular types of leadership skills to deal with its special challenges. During the first phase, building a party organisation is less vital, but the emphasis is on developing a message and drawing attention to the party. This will be more successful to the extent that the leader draws attention to him- or herself. In the second phase, on the other hand, establishing routinised procedures and developing an electoral apparatus will enjoy highest priority. Hence, the leader first and foremost requires organisational skills. Finally, during the third phase the primary focus is on solidifying a reputation as a reliable partner in government, which calls for a “moderator” and “stabiliser” as party leader.

What this approach has in common with Michel’s thesis is that they both explain different types of party organisations with different stages in a party’s life. Similar to
living organisms, proponents of the life-cycle approach argue, political parties go through a process of maturation, and their organisational structures will reflect their current developmental stage. In other words, just as a human being experiences different phases of physical development (baby, child, adolescent, adult), which are all associated with particular changes in the body, a political party is perceived to grow up along a universal path that can be divided into different segments. Hence, all parties on the same stage of development will be characterised by the same type of organisation. This means that if two parties are established simultaneously in very different contexts, totally isolated from each other, they will display very similar organisations, simply because they are both “new”. Moreover, they are then predicted to run through the same phase of maturation, eventually both reaching the final stage of organisational maturity. Unlike living organisms, however, political parties are not perceived as having a maximum life expectancy.

Accordingly, we should expect political parties in young democracies to follow the same trajectory as parties in Western Europe did, developing from cadre parties to mass parties, and subsequently adopting the catch-all party type, followed by the cartel-party type. However, while such a scenario can probably be dismissed on mere empirical evidence (cf. van Biezen 2005: 153), this should not lead us to disregard the life-cycle approach completely. In fact, speculations about more general trends in the development of party organisations, such as oligarchic tendencies in internal decision-making, are much less easy to falsify. It does indeed require a
much more abstract argument to tear down the deterministic theories developed by Michels and his disciples.

Certainly the main weakness of the life-cycle approach is its general neglect of party actors and their interests. Picturing party organisational formation and adaptation as a process of maturation similar to those of any life form denies the substantial differences between the natural and the social world. Unlike the entities studied by natural scientists, social actors do not always react in the same manner to a specific stimulus. Rather, the objects of analysis in social science are capable of learning and acting differently under the same conditions.

This can be exemplified by looking at the development of Green parties in Western Europe, which instituted highly transparent and inclusive structures of decision-making. In fact, it could be argued that – knowing about Michels’ iron law of oligarchy – these parties deliberately tried to counter the oligarchical tendencies found in established political parties (cf. Kitschelt 1988). For instance, in the case of the German Greens (Die Grünen), which is probably the best documented example, the organisational philosophy of Basisdemokratie was clearly aimed at preventing the development of a professional party leadership that would then become increasingly indispensable and thus difficult to control (Poguntke 1993: 138). Several rules were implemented to put this democratic ideal in practice. To begin with, the original party charter provided for a system of midterm rotation of parliamentary seats to those lower in the party list. Moreover, it embraced the idea of the “imperative mandate”, which ruled that deputies who deviated from the policy resolutions
passed by the party assembly could be removed from office. Regarding the party in central office, it was decided that party posts should not be salaried, while party leadership tenure and re-eligibility were limited.

In short, contrary to Michels’ iron law, many grassroots members in Green parties deeply distrust leadership, and do not follow them blindly. And although most Green parties have, since their formation, crafted considerable organisational reforms that abolished several of the sacred “new politics” principles of intra-party democracy, there is widespread consensus among scholars that Green parties are still far away from conventional parties in terms of their organisation (for example Rihoux 2006; Burchell 2001). Put differently, the oligarchical trends in Western European Green parties are much weaker than the life-cycle approach wants us to believe. Hence, Michels is wrong when he says that “historical evolution mocks all the prophylactic measures that have been adopted for the prevention of oligarchy” (1962: 368). Rather, anticipating the oligarchical tendencies of organisations, actors are not restricted to sitting back and watching the process of maturation unfold, but they can indeed consciously work against these tendencies.

Moreover, the life-cycle approach does not only deny any role to agents within the party, but it also ignores the environment around the party. Even if we accept the idea that party formation and adaptation can be understood as an endogenous process of maturation, we need to make certain assumptions about the external conditions (cf. Harmel 2002: 121). Similar to any living organism, political parties need a certain input from the environment in order to move on to the next stage of
their organisational development. In other words, progress in the life-cycle is not only dependent upon internal dynamics, but these dynamics, in turn, are the product of external factors. Similarly, the speed of party organisational change will also be determined by the environment surrounding the party.

Having outlined the weaknesses, it is necessary to point out that the life-cycle approach also has its strengths. In fact, what it does, it stresses the importance of internal factors in order to understand different forms of party organisation. In particular, the possible effects of party size have in the past motivated much research. For instance, Tan (1998), disintegrating Michels’ iron law of oligarchy into measurable variables, tests the impact the number of party members has on intra-party participation and the distribution of power within party organisations. His findings only partly support Michels’ hypotheses. While, on the one hand, large membership decreases meaningful participation by party members and encourages free-riding behaviour, organisational complexity (resulting from large membership size) does not necessarily result in a centralisation of power at the top of the hierarchy. The first relationship has been confirmed in a more recent study by Weldon (2006). Regarding the second relationship, Lundell (2004) comes to a conflicting conclusion when he identifies a correlation between party size and the procedure of candidate selection for public elections: The larger the party, the more centralised the selection of candidates will tend to be.

To sum up, similar to the ageing of living organisms, the life-cycle approach perceives party organisational formation and adaptation as a uni-directional process of
maturation. In doing so, it totally denies any explanatory power to agency and the external environment around the party. However, the life-cycle approach deserves to be acclaimed for drawing our attention to the possible impact of internal factors when explaining different forms of party organisation.

The “period effect” approach

While the life-cycle approach focuses exclusively on endogenous dynamics to account for different forms of party organisation, the “period effect” approach gives sole attention to the external environment. Particular types of party organisation are said to derive from competition with other parties, which all have to participate in democratic elections under the same external circumstances. The basic thesis claims that if a party is going to compete successfully with other parties, it needs to look and act like them. However, advocates of this approach are still undecided on which level of analysis matters most in explaining party organisational structures. One group – nowadays particularly associated with the writings of Katz and Mair (1995) – argues that political parties are converging towards a common type of party organisation, since they likewise have to respond to universal trends that are observable in all modern democracies. Others, on the other hand, claim that parties
are diverging as to their organisation, thus stressing explanatory factors on the domestic level (for example Detterbeck 2005; Gallagher 1988a).

The first argument goes back to the much cited debate between Duverger and Epstein revolving around the question of which organisational structure would be most likely to dominate democratic politics after the Second World War. Duverger (1964) argued that the mass party, with its large membership and its extensive network of local branches, was superior to the cadre party, as it provided a more effective apparatus to secure large quantities of resources needed for electoral competition. Consequently, there would be a “contagion from the left”, meaning that other parties would feel forced to copy the organisational form of socialist parties in order to attain a higher level of competitiveness. In contrast, Epstein (1980) claimed that American-style parties, which shared many similarities with the classical cadre party in proto-democratic Europe, were much more suited to cope with the challenges of modern election campaigns. Epstein maintained that the large membership organisation and the encapsulation of specific social groups would cost the mass party the necessary flexibility to react to social changes in the electorate. He thus suggested party leaders cut down on party members, and instead mobilise voters directly through mass media. Only then would the mass parties be able to retain their competitiveness. In other words, Epstein did not expect a “contagion from the left” to characterise the development of party systems in Western democracies, but rather a “contagion from the right”.

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Scholars who accept that the cartel party is now the dominant organisational type in Western Europe, would argue that neither Duverger nor Epstein were right in their predictions. As has already been outlined further above, both the “leftist” mass party and the “rightist” cadre party felt compelled to craft organisational reforms that led to the emergence of a new common form of party organisation. While the leaders of the cadre party established organised membership branches similar to those of the mass party, without giving up the independence that they previously had enjoyed, the leaders of the mass party made organisational choices that would limit the influence of the party on the ground, without completely abolishing the membership organisation (Katz and Mair 2002: 120-121).

Factors that facilitate the rise of the party in public office as the dominant organisational face of a party, advocates of the cartel-party thesis argue, are broader historical developments that affect all democracies in the same way. As social identities are weakening due to the general improvement of living standards, the expansion of the welfare state and better education, voters are increasingly conceived as free floating. An encapsulation of the electorate through grassroots organisations has therefore become largely inefficient. Rather, the most promising electoral strategy is to make a catch-all appeal to the wider electorate. Pursuing such a strategy is now possible because party leaders have become largely independent from constraining opinions expressed by the party on the ground. As a result of the technological progress in the field of mass communication and the availability of public funding for political parties, party members no longer enjoy the same powerful posi-
tion within the party organisation as they did during the era of the mass party. Party leaders can now address voters directly via television or the internet, without having to rely on door-to-door canvassing or leafleting carried out by unpaid party members. In addition, subsidies paid by the state mean that membership dues have become a much less important source of income.

In order to explain why the cartel party nevertheless still maintains a membership organised into local branches, a number of enduring benefits have been identified from the party leadership’s perspective. While voluntary labour and membership dues have not lost all their value as organisational resources, in recent times other functions of party members are perceived to have become relatively more important for electoral success (see Katz 1990; Scarrow 1996: 42-45). To start with, a large membership organisation gives voters the impression that the party is popular and strongly rooted in society. Moreover, members themselves are assumed to be most loyal voters in elections, and through their everyday contacts they may advise other people how to vote. In addition, members provide a channel of communication, which keeps the party leadership in touch with popular opinion. And finally, the party membership can be used as a recruitment pool for future political leaders.

To put it briefly, advocates of the cartel-party thesis argue that despite the decreasing importance of volunteer work and financial contributions by members, political parties still regard a membership organisation as an advantage in the electoral contest.
In order to attract members, contemporary parties – similar to the traditional mass party – grant their members rights of democratic participation. However, unlike leftist parties in the early 20th century, the cartel party does not organise internal decision-making in a hierarchical system of delegation, but decisions are made by vote of the full membership. This highly inclusive organisation of party internal democracy assures the party leadership the necessary freedom of action to pursue aggressive electoral strategies, since, due to their often disaggregated nature, grassroots party members are not very likely to mount a serious challenge against the positions adopted at the top.

All parties, the cartel-party thesis goes, will display the organisational trends just outlined: Party membership will decrease in size – without vanishing completely, intra-party democracy will become increasingly inclusive, and resources will more and more be provided by the state. Altogether, these trends will give rise to party in public office as the dominant organisational face of any party. Concerning the development of political parties in young democracies, we should then expect parties to make an “evolutionary leap” (Smith 1993) over previous stages of organisational development, and to converge towards the cartel party type. In fact, this is the scenario numerous studies suggest (for example Puhle 2001; Olson 1998). The argument is that political parties in young democracies compete within the same environment as parties in contemporary Western Europe: Stable political identities have only developed weakly, state funding for political parties has been available
instantly, and party leaders can communicate their messages directly to the electorate through mass media.

However, based on contradicting empirical evidence from both Western Europe and new democracies, the perception of party development as a more or less simultaneous transformation of all party systems during particular periods in history has come under heavy criticism. Rather, a second group within the period-effect approach argues, factors capable of explaining different types of party organisation are to be found on a lower level of analysis than universal trends and developments. Consequently, we should not expect all political parties to converge towards a common organisational type. For instance, von Beyme (2000: 202) claims that the catch-all party never emerged in the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian democracies. Factors identified by other scholars as having a determining effect on whether parties will adopt the cartel party model include political institutions (Detterbeck 2002), political party funding laws (Young 1998) and the ideological polarisation of the party system (Yishai 2001).

While most studies within the “period effect” refer to these established models of political party organisation, there is also a small number of studies that develop their own typologies to account for different forms of party organisation that can be found across modern democracies. One example is Kitschelt’s (1995) investigation of parties in post-communist Eastern Europe, which distinguishes the “charismatic”, the “clientelistic” and the “programmatic party”. Although this typology is mainly

\[4\] See also Table 3 on page 54.
based on the criterion of how parties mobilise voters, it also makes reference to party organisation. Broadly speaking, both the programmatic party and the clientelistic party make high investments in organisational structures, whereas the charismatic party avoids high costs of organisation-building. However, while the organisation of the programmatic party usually rests on abstract rules and regulations, clientelistic parties tend to be built on highly informal personal networks that ensure a constant flow of resources to the party following. Kitschelt lists several factors that help to predict which party type is likely to emerge within a new democracy. These include the type of the pre-democratic authoritarian regime, the process of democratic transition, the institutions implemented at the end of this process, and the time passed since the first free and fair elections. Moreover, Kitschelt claims, it is also necessary to consider more historical factors such as whether the country experienced democratic government before autocratic rule and the timing of industrialisation.

A somewhat different method that has been used to study differences in party organisation is to focus only on certain elements rather than to apply a broad typology. In particular, the selection of candidates for public office has received much attention, probably because the degree of intra-party democracy is seen as a useful indicator for how well parties fulfil their function as intermediary institutions. Corresponding to the study of party organisation more generally, the most significant variables that have been identified as having an impact on the procedure of candidate selection are the socio-political context, the institutional setting, and the party
system. Two basic causal mechanisms can be identified behind these variables. The first one is based on the notion of ideas: Political parties will open candidate selection to broader participation, if mass political culture or the party’s own ideology understands parties as an important institution to promote democracy within the wider society – in other words, if intra-party democracy is perceived as an end in itself (Gallagher 1988a; 1988b). On the other hand, the second mechanism of causality is centred around more outcome-oriented expectations towards political parties. Scholars have isolated numerous factors that will allow a political party to justify a greater degree of leadership control over candidate selection. All these factors have in common that they are positively correlated with higher levels of uncertainty as to political and electoral outcomes, and thus require political parties to enter into agreements and coalitions, which, in turn, requires elite selection of candidates in order to increase party discipline and enforce the necessary inter-party understandings. Factors that have been found to increase the need for such agreements are pacted transitions (Field 2004), strategically complex electoral systems (Siavelis 2002; Thiébault 1988), parliamentarism (as opposed to presidentialism) (Gallagher 1988a; 1988b), and highly fragmented party systems (Field and Siavelis 2006). Conversely, there are factors that will force political parties to adopt more inclusive procedures of candidate selection. One such factor is inter-party competition: If there is space for successful splinter parties, party leaders will be willing to delegate candidate selection to larger groups in order to increase the likelihood that resourceful contenders will stick to the party (Poiré 2003).
In sum, the period-effect approach sees different party organisations as a product of their environment. Parties competing under the same conditions are expected to adopt the same organisational features. The underlying causal assumption is that under a certain set of contextual circumstances there is always a type of party organisation that will yield the best results. Hence, similar to Darwin’s theory of evolution, political parties are perceived to find themselves in a struggle for survival of the fittest, adjusting to the environment in order to be as competitive as their opponents. Parties that do not follow the logic of competition will be punished by the electoral market. Although they might not share the same destiny as extinct species such as the dodo bird or the Tasmanian tiger, parties that refuse to adapt to the environment will eventually become politically irrelevant. However, advocates of the period-effect approach do not agree on which environment should be considered the most important. While one group argues that political parties all over the world are increasingly competing under the same circumstances of a modern society, thus converging towards the cartel party, another group stresses divergence between party organisations, contending that the most important explanatory variables can be found on the domestic level.

Disregarding their differences, both camps would probably dismiss the view of party formation and adaptation as an evolutionary process as too harsh. In fact, they point out themselves that there are always exceptions to the general trend. For instance, while Katz and Mair (1995) admit that the cartelisation process is uneven, with not every party adopting the organisational characteristics of the cartel party,
Gallagher, studying candidate selection across industrialised democracies, observes some “residual variance” that contradicts what could theoretically be expected from the context (1988b: 265). However, proponents of the period-effect approach do not seem to be aware of the wider theoretical implications of these exceptions. If the external environment fails to explain differences in the organisation of political parties competing within the same environment, we need to look for possible explanations at lower levels of analysis – either at the party level or even at the individual actor’s level. Hence, by admitting that there are a number of empirical exceptions to the theoretical assumptions, the period-effect approach hints at its own weaknesses, namely the negligence of both internal and agential factors.

The development of the Italian party system is an excellent example to illustrate this, as different party models have always existed next to each other within the same environment (Bardi and Morlino 1994: 244). Up until its implosion in the early 1990s, the Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) was the only major party that could organisationally be characterised as a catch-all party. The other two main parties followed the model of the mass party: Both the Communist Party (Partito Communista Italiano, PCI) and to a lesser extent the Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI) were structured according to Leninist principles of worker and peasant mobilisation. The mass-party idea also reflected in the organisation of the neo-fascist Social Movement Party (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI), which had abandoned the traditional fascist militia model, but was based on a dense network of territorial branches. Although these parties went through considerable organisa-
tional change in the early 1990s, they have retained certain characteristic elements of the mass party (Bardi and Morlino 1994; Pamini 1998). Simultaneously, new party types emerged, such as Berlusconi’s *Forza Italia* (Go Italy!), which has been described as a “business firm party” (Hopkin and Paolucci 1999) with only rudimentary organisational structures and an insignificant membership.

The multiplicity of different party organisation that have coexisted in Italy at any given time hints at the explanatory power of factors which are largely ignored by the period-effect approach. For instance, it has been suggested that “the maintenance of organisational structures has been easier for parties with stronger identities, such as extreme or radical parties” (Morlino 2001: 135). This could be an indication that the goals and ideas of actors within the party play an important role in accounting for different types of organisation. Moreover, the combination of traditional organisational elements of the mass party with modern electoral communication techniques, as in the PCI-reestablishment *Partito Democratico della Sinistra* (Democratic Party of the Left, PDS) (see Giannetti and Mulé 2006: 471) – or *Democratici di Sinistra* (Democrats of the Left, DS) as it has been called since 1998 – suggests that party actors are not at the mercy of the environment, but they are able to develop diverging courses of action to react to new opportunities presented by the context. In addition to agential factors, it has also been claimed that the organisational differences between Italian parties can be explained by internal dynamics. The many enduring characteristics of the typical mass party within the DS, Pamini (1998: 152) argues, are due to the strength of the extra-parliamentary party: Thus far, the de-
mands of the party leadership for a greater freedom of action in order to formulate an inter-class electoral platform have been successfully restrained by the powerful position of the party on the ground.

However, while the period-effect thus suffers from a neglect of agential and internal factors, it highlights the importance of the environment around parties in order to understand different forms of party organisation – a variable that has no place in the life-cycle approach. As has already been argued above, internal dynamics cannot be understood without taking into account contextual factors around the party. Moreover, it is impossible to see how party actors should make organisational decisions without paying any attention to the opportunities and constraints provided by their environment. For instance, going back to the above example of the Italian party system, it was impossible for the leaders of the traditional mass parties to ignore the technological progress in mass communication as well as the shrinking of the social classes they claimed to represent. In other words, environmental factors always have an important influence on the decisions made by party managers.

In conclusion, the period-effect approach understands party formation and adaptation as a process of evolution, with all parties having to adapt to the environment in the same way in order to maintain their competitiveness. Thereby our focus is drawn to external variables around the party. Yet, advocates of the period-effect approach do not agree on the question of which environment should be considered the most important one. While one group argues that parties are increasingly competing under the same conditions, another group argues that domestic factors constitute
the crucial environment to explain different forms of party organisation. Nonetheless, as both approaches ignore internal as well as agential variables they suffer from the same weaknesses.

The “generation effect” approach

The third structuralist approach to party organisation, which is closely associated with the writings of Panebianco (1988), can be labelled “generation effect”. It differs from the two approaches already discussed by clearly distinguishing between the phase of formation and the subsequent phase of adaptation, stressing the explanatory power of either external factors or internal dynamics. Regarding the formation of a party, the organisational configuration of a party is believed to be determined by the environmental circumstances. The particular power pattern reflected in the organisation of the party will then drive the further development. In other words, the capacity of a party to adapt to its environment will be heavily constrained by its internal dynamics.

Although Panebianco is primarily interested in party institutionalisation, defined as the process through which an organisation “becomes valuable in and of itself” (ibid.: 53), we can still infer important theoretical ideas for the study of party organisations. Essentially, Panebianco argues that different levels of institutionalisation are due to how a party was formed, its “genetic model”:
A party’s organizational characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor. The characteristics of a party’s origin are in fact capable of exerting a weight on its organizational structure even decades later. Every organization bears the mark of its formation, of the crucial political-administrative decisions made by its founders, the decisions which “molded” the organization.

(ibid.: 50)

The organisational decisions taken by the party’s founders, according to Panebianco, are the product of the founders’ interests and goals as well as the environmental factors surrounding the formation of the party:

During the organization’s formative phase, the leaders, whether charismatic or not, normally play a crucial role. The spell out the ideological aims of the future party, select the organization’s social base, its “hunting ground”, and shape the organization on the basis of these aims and this social base – taking into account, of course, available resources, different socio-economic and political conditions in different parts of the country, etc.

(ibid.: 53)
Panebianco names three central factors to describe a party’s genetic model. The first one concerns the party’s construction, which can either occur through territorial penetration or territorial diffusion. Territorial penetration means that a party establishes a network of local branches throughout the country, while in the case of territorial diffusion the party is founded by independent groups of local elites who come together at the national level. The second principle determining a party’s genetic model is the presence or absence of an external “sponsor” institution. Accordingly, Panebianco distinguishes between externally legitimated parties and internally legitimated parties. Finally, the third factor to take into account is the role of charisma in a party’s formation. It is necessary to answer the question of whether the party was essentially created by, and as a vehicle for, a charismatic leader.

Each of these elements of parties’ genetic models is related to certain degrees of institutionalisation. Whereas the organisational construction through penetration tends to produce a strong institution, construction through diffusion will rather lead to a weak institution, because the organisational resources are in the hands of the many competing elites, thus forcing the organisation to develop through compromise and negotiation. Similarly, the presence of an external sponsoring organisation generally results in a weak institutionalisation, as the external sponsor should have no interest in strengthening the party for this would inevitably reduce the party’s dependence upon it. In contrast, internally legitimated parties are much more likely to become strong institutions. Finally, in order for a party to reach a higher level of institutionalisation, it should not be built on charisma, since a charismatic leader
will – similar to an external sponsoring organisation – resist strong institutionalisation but keep the party under his personal control.

In other words, the level of party institutionalisation will very much depend on the distribution of power within a party. A party can be expected to reach a high level of institutionalisation, if organisational resources are monopolised at the “centre” of the party within a cohesive coalition of leaders. On the other hand, if power is diffused among local elites, or if the party is dependent either on an external sponsoring organisation or on a charismatic personality, institutionalisation is very unlikely.

In principle, change to the organisational structures initially established is possible. Identifying the causes for change, Panebianco adopts a seemingly integrative approach when he says that change is

the result of deliberate choices (made within the dominant coalition) influenced by bounded rationality and anonymous pressures (e.g. resistance to change, environmental changes, technological changes etc.) which interact with the choices to produce both desired innovations and counter-intuitive effects.

( Ibid.: 242)

Organisational change happens in three phases. First of all, an organisational crisis must be unleashed by strong environmental pressure, such as electoral defeat. This
will unavoidably harm the reputation of the dominant coalition which was unable to handle the crisis, and the party will then – in the second phase – witness the formation of new alliances and the replacement of the leading group. Finally, during the third phase the rules of party internal competition are changed. However, as Panebianco points out, “no institution can [...] entirely escape from its past” (ibid.: 261).

In other words, the freedom of choice of the new leading group in designing organisational innovations is severely limited by existing internal structures. Hence, traces of the party’s genetic model will always remain visible in the party’s organisation.

It is probably this emphasis of a party’s initial formation and the continuing constraining power of the organisational structures initially implemented, which is the main weakness of the generation-effect approach. Although Panebianco mentions the role of agency in the construction of party organisations, he denies the actors within the party much freedom to substantially alter the organisational configuration. Moreover, Panebianco untenably underestimates the need for political parties to adapt to a changing environment in order to remain electorally competitive (cf. Ware 1996: 104). Rather, in his understanding, the organisation of political parties will always reflect the choices made by the party founders within the environmental circumstances that surrounded the party’s founding, as the organisation is able to endure despite changes in the same environment or despite changes in the actors’ interests.

However, there are many empirical examples of political parties that have been able to shed historical baggage, effectively erasing the traces of their organisational
past. Two interesting cases in this regard are the Austrian Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) and the French National Front (*Front National*, FN). In contrast to Panebianco’s predictions, although extremely dependent on their leaders’ charisma – Jörg Haider (up until 2000) and Jean-Marie Le Pen respectively – both these extreme right-wing parties have achieved relatively high levels of institutionalisation (Pedahzur and Brichta 2002). Put differently, judging from their contemporary institutional strength, it would be extremely difficult to imagine that both the FPÖ and the FN were originally founded as a personal vehicle of power for their charismatic leaders. Certainly, as charismatic leadership still plays a role in both parties, the genetic model undeniably matters to explain different party organisations. However, the constraining effect of party’s origin on its organisational development is exaggerated.

Yet, this should not lead us to overlook the strengths of Panebianco’s work. Not only does the “generation-effect” approach stress the importance of contextual factors to explain the initial formation of a party, and the effects of internal structures to understand the further organisational development, but by clearly distinguishing between the stages of formation and change it teaches us that we must not simply analyse a snap-shot of party organisation at present, since this might produce wrong results. Rather, we also have to investigate under which circumstances these organisational regulations were established in the first place. The problem is that since the time of the original founding of the party the environment might have changed, while the party organisation has remained unaltered. Studying the party organisa-
tion only at the present stage, we would then conclude that it is a product of the con-
temporary context, while, in fact, the organisational decisions were taken within a
much earlier environment. The party organisation retained its original form, how-
ever, because internal dynamics and the interests of the actors within the party im-
peded environmental change to translate into organisational change.

To sum up, the generation-effect approach maintains that the initial formation of
a party will be driven by environmental factors. The subsequent development will
then be constrained by the internal structures. Similar to a living organism, the de-
velopment of the party organisation is limited by the available genetic pool, meaning
that the internal structures only offer the party actors a very limited number of
choices as to organisational reform. However, by perceiving party organisational
development in such a way, the generation-effect approach overrates the impor-
tance of internal dynamics, and neglects agential and external factors to understand
different types of party organisation. Its main strength, on the other hand, lies in
making a distinction between the stages of formation and adaptation, which is im-
portant in order to identify the correct causes behind the development of a particu-
lar party organisation.

The three structuralist approaches are again summarised in Table 2. While they
all have their own specific strengths, they all share the same weakness, namely the
negligence of agential factors. As this chapter has thus far show shown, party inter-
nal actors should not be excluded from any theory of party organisation. It is not
conducive to our understanding of party formation and change if we treat political
parties as living organisms, and describe their organisational development as maturation or evolution, or as limited by their genetic pool. Rather, as the many empirical examples have demonstrated, parties are able to react differently to the same stimulus, since the individuals who comprise the parties are knowledgeable and reflexive.

### TABLE 2: STRUCTURALIST APPROACHES TO PARTY ORGANISATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life cycle</th>
<th>Period effect</th>
<th>Generation effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theoretical claim</strong></td>
<td>maturation: party organisations are perceived to grow along a common path that can be divided into different organisational stages</td>
<td>evolution: political parties are perceived to find themselves in a struggle of the fittest, adjusting to the environment in order to be as competitive as their opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
<td>stresses the importance of internal factors</td>
<td>stresses the importance of external factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weaknesses</strong></td>
<td>neglects external and agential factors</td>
<td>neglects internal and agential factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Voluntarist approaches to party organisation**

In stark contrast to the strictly structuralist approaches just presented, other authors stress the independent role of political actors in the construction of party
organisations. That is to say, it is not environmental conditions and internal dynamics that shape the organisational structures of a party, but the deliberate will of those individuals acting within the party. Broadly speaking, it is argued that actors within the party can play two possible roles in the process of party change. On the one hand, they play an intervening role – deciding on which external changes will be transformed into organisational responses – while on the other hand also being able to shape the organisation of the party more pro-actively without the need for an environmental stimulus. Therefore, party change can either be goal-motivated or power-motivated (Harmel and Janda 1994).

Goal-motivated change happens as a response to external “shocks”. However, in contrast to the period-effect approach, which explains party organisation as a process of the best possible adaptation to the environment, in the view of the voluntarist approach, the party will only consider new organisational alternatives if the actors within the party perceive a need for organisational change in the light of their interests and strategies (Wilson 1994; see also Appleton and Ward 1997). Party leaders and their goals are thus seen as the key intervening variable between environmental pressures and organisational adaptation. In order to be translated into reforms to the party organisation, changes in the party’s environment must be perceived as a shock by the party leadership. What constitutes such a shock will depend on the party leadership’s primary goal (Harmel and Janda 1994: 269-271). Borrowing from the literature on coalition formation (see Strom 1990; Budge and Keman 1990; Laver and Schofield 1998) the voluntarist approach to party organisation
usually distinguishes four different goals that can be held by the party leadership: (1) votes, (2) office, (3) policy, and (4) intra-party democracy. The most obvious shock for vote-maximisers would be electoral failure. Office-maximisers, on the other hand, understand such developments as a shock that are directly related to their participation in government. The most significant shock to policy advocates, who are neither interested in winning votes nor in gaining access to office, would be related to the party’s policy positions, while those leaders trying to maximise intra-party democracy would see any major alteration to the party membership as a shock.

Power-motivated organisational change, in contrast, happens without an external stimulus. In other words, party internal actors and their interests are themselves the ultimate cause for change. The voluntarist approach claims that we should thus expect reforms to the party organisation if there has been either a leadership change or a change in dominant faction. A new leader is likely to alter the organisational structures he inherited from his predecessor for several reasons (Harmel, Tan and Janda 1995: 5). First of all, different leaders have different abilities and orientations, and will therefore evaluate situations differently. Secondly, leaders will usually want to leave their mark upon the organisation, assuring themselves a visible place in the party’s history. Thirdly, organisational reforms are an important strategy to consolidate the newly achieved power. And fourthly, leadership changes are generally destabilising events. However, the extent to which changes of leader will actually result in party change will depend on a number of additional factors. Most import-
antly, the extent to which the new leader's desires and strategies for the party are different from those of the predecessor will have a decisive impact on the scope of organisational change. Moreover, we need to take into consideration the personal abilities of the leader to answer the question of whether he will be able to fully realise his ideas (see also Harmel and Svåsand 1993). Finally, the extent to which the party is willing to follow the leader is also part of the equation. This latter factor consists of two components: First, advocates of the actor-centred approach argue, extensive organisational change is more likely in parties where the leadership position is equipped with far-reaching powers. Second, the likelihood of organisational change is greater if leadership change goes together with a change in the party's dominant faction.

It has also been suggested that dominant faction change itself can be a source of significant party organisational change (Harmel and Tan 2003). However, as with leadership change, the strength of the relationship between change in dominant faction and reform of the party organisation is subject to several intervening factors. To start with – and very similar to what has been said about leadership change – the extent of party change after the emergence of a new dominant faction will very much depend on the intensity of factional rivalry. The greater the distance between factions and their organisational preferences, the more extensive the organisational change will be. Second, the ability of the newly dominant faction to fully enforce its organisational preferences rests on whether the change in the internal power distribution has resulted in the complete, rather than just partial, replacement of the
dominant coalition. If the former dominant faction still holds on to significant organisational resources, substantial party change is rather unlikely. Finally, we should expect more party change if the dominant faction change coincides with a change in party leadership. If the leadership positions of the party are not held by members of the newly dominant faction, the leadership might resist dramatic party change. In other words, “the combination of leadership and factional change […] creates opportunities for change that are greater than what either event would accomplish alone” (Harmel, Tan and Janda 1995: 17; emphasis in the original).

A slightly different example of an actor-centred approach is Aldrich’s (1995) analysis of the formation of political parties in the United States of America. Using game theoretical models, Aldrich shows how parties are institutions able to overcome problems of collective action and social choice. Although the main aim of the study is rather to explain why parties were established in the first place, and even if rational choice can indeed be accused of being latently structuralist (Hay 2002: 103-104), the analysis is still founded on an individualistic basis, thereby hinting at the possibility of political actors affecting the organisational structures of political parties in their own interests.

While this latter approach has not gained much prominence in the literature, the theoretical framework developed by Harmel and Janda has repeatedly been applied to explain different cases of party organisational change. However, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Müller (1997), studying the development of the Austrian Socialist Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ), maintains that leader-
ship change and change in the dominant faction are both valuable factors to explain party organisational reforms. In contrast, Bille (1997) finds that past changes in the organisation of the Danish Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokraterne, SD) cannot be attributed to different interests held by the various leaders that have been in charge of the party. Similarly, Duncan (2007), who analyses the history of the Dutch Christian Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appèl, CDA) concludes that the Harmel and Janda model of party change requires several refinements. Despite suffering a disastrous electoral defeat in 1994 and losing government office for the first time since 1918 the CDA did not change extensively because of the nature of the Dutch party system, its specific history, and secondary goal priorities held by the party.

The last study hints at the possibility that the voluntarist approach to party organisation might oversimplify the process of party formation and adaptation by only looking at the party actors’ interest. It thereby denies the fact that internal and external structures favour certain organisational strategies over others in order to achieve the given interests. As the structuralist approaches all point out, structures matter and it does not become clear why we should ignore their findings and explain different forms of party organisation only by the interests of the party leadership and the dominant faction.

In order to achieve their goals party internal actors need to take into consideration the opportunities and pressures provided by the environment. Policy-maximisers, for instance, should include many elements of the mass party, as these
will help them to stay in contact with the social groups they wish to represent, and to keep the party in public office under close control. However, which of these elements are necessary to gain influence on policy outcomes will very much depend on the context. While in the mid-20th century many parties came close to the ideal type of the mass party, hence leading Duverger to predict a “contagion from the left”, contemporary policy-seeking parties, as in the Italian party system, make increasing use of modern technologies of mass communication, and have abolished the workplace branch system, since nowadays far fewer voters fit into clearly defined social categories. Epstein, expecting a “contagion from the right”, argued that the American-style party was much better suited to mobilise large number of votes. Thus, if vote-maximisers want to achieve their goals they should instead organise their party according to the catch-all type. The cartel-party thesis, on the other hand, assumes that all parties are primarily office-seeking, trying to get access to the cartel in order to participate in the distribution of state resources. It is easier to gain access into the cartel, the basic argument goes, if the party adopts the organisational characteristics of the parties already safely positioned within the cartel. In other words, no matter what interests party-internal actors pursue, their strategic calculations will always have to include the external environment around the party.

Moreover, party organisers will have to take into account the structures provided by the party itself. Although the Harmel and Janda model of party change incorporates the power of the leadership position as one intervening variable, it fails to include broader internal dynamics. For instance, maximisers of intra-party de-
Oliver Hellmann

Democracy will have to be aware of the dangers of Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy”, which they will have to counter by certain organisational measures that will prevent the leadership from becoming indispensable. Put differently, knowing about such organisational trends will force party internal actors to react accordingly.

Other factors not considered by Harmel and Janda regard power-motivated changes. While the model argues that some party change can be explained without an external stimulus, but simply through leadership and dominant faction changes, it falls short of explaining these reconfigurations of party-internal power. However, a comprehensive theory of party change should certainly include variables that can have an impact on the distribution of power within a political party. In line with the arguments made by Panebianco, parties are best understood as very conservative organisations that try to safeguard the power relations that existed among the groups that initially established the party. In other words, the power map of a political party does not just change, but it will take an external trigger – or even an internal trigger (such as the death of a leader) – to significantly disturb the balance of power. Without knowing what constitutes such a trigger, every theory of party organisational change will remain incomplete.

To sum up, the voluntarist approach to party organisation – mostly associated with the model developed by Harmel and Janda – understands different party types as the product of the interests of the party leadership and the dominant faction. However, it largely ignores the structuring effect of both the environment around the party and the party-internal dynamics. In addition, it fails to explain changes in
leadership and in the dominant faction, which should be considered as an integral element of any general theory of party change. Nevertheless, the voluntarist approach must be praised for introducing the party actors’ interests and goals into the analysis of party organisations - factors that are largely neglected by the structuralist approaches. The different causal factors offered by the structuralist and voluntarist approaches to party organisation are summarised in Table 3.
## TABLE 3: DETERMINANTS OF PARTY ORGANISATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical approach</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Examples of indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Formation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• internal creation (Duverger 1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• availability of public funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• partisan identities (Katz and Mair 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global trends</td>
<td>• autocratic regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-political context</td>
<td>• process of transition (Kitschelt 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>• system of government (Croissant and Merkel 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• electoral system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• direct democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• territorial organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• type of public financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• party laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party system</td>
<td>• number of parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>• ideological polarisation (Yishai 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• nature of competition (Warner 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• contagion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social group</td>
<td>• factions (Harmel and Tan 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>• factional coalitions (Harmel and Janda 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• party leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• faction leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structuralist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>approaches</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Voluntarist</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>approaches</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
In order to explain the origin and the subsequent development of political institutions, numerous scholars have for a long time insisted on an integrative approach towards the structure-agency debate (for example Thelen and Steinmo 1992). The study of political parties, however, has so far remained totally unaffected by this ontological shift in comparative politics.\(^5\) As the previous section has shown, to account for different forms of party organisation the relevant literature still offers either structuralist or voluntarist theories. No attempt has been made to integrate these into a general explanation. This seriously weakens our understanding of party formation and adaptation, since the weaknesses of the structuralist approach are the strengths of the voluntarist approach, and vice versa. Moreover, advocates of the structuralist approach do not agree on whether universal, domestic or party internal factors should be considered the most important ones.

\(^5\) As Hall (2003: 387: 387) argues, “[C]omparative politics has moved away from ontologies that assume causal variables with strong, consistent, and independent effects across space and time towards ones that acknowledge more extensive endogeneity and the ubiquity of complex interaction effects”. In other words, many scholars now recognise the unpredictable nature of human behaviour. One area that effectively combines structure and agency is, for instance, the study of democratic transitions (see Mahoney and Snyder 1999).
Consequently, in order to gain a better insight into the process of party organisational development we should synthesise existing explanatory variables from different levels of analysis into a single theory. This section will argue that historical institutionalism offers several useful ideas as to how to manage such an integration. The goals of this chapter are therefore to outline the basic theoretical propositions of historical institutionalism and use these to construct an integrative theory of party organisational formation and change.

**Historical institutionalism**

Until at least the early 1950s political science consisted of little more than the study of institutions. Scholars mainly engaged in the formal-legal comparison of whole systems of government, trying to find normative arguments for the best institutional order. This all changed through the “behavioural revolution”. Rather than producing descriptive analyses of the political system, the focus of scholarly attention was shifted towards the inputs from society into the political system. Research particularly centred on forms of mass political participation, such as voting, and the actions of interest groups and political parties. As the main aim became to develop theories that could explain why individuals and organisations of interest aggregation behave in the way they do, political institutions were reduced to a “black box” in which soci-
etal inputs are invisibly converted into outputs of the political system. However, the empirical observation that “processes internal to political institutions, although possibly triggered by external events, affect the flow of history” (March and Olsen 1984: 739) has led to a comeback of institutions in political science.

While behaviouralists argued that institutions were not more than the simple aggregation of individual preferences, the “new institutionalism” claims that the same individuals will make different decisions within different institutions. Yet, in contrast to the “old” institutionalism, which employed a descriptive-inductive method, new institutionalists are experimenting with deductive approaches that start from theoretical propositions about the way institutions work (Lowndes 2002: 95). On the basis of these propositions, it is possible to distinguish three basic theoretical varieties within the new institutionalism: (1) sociological (normative) institutionalism, (2) rational choice institutionalism, and (3) historical institutionalism.

On a general level, all three approaches agree that institutions are “the rules of the game” (Rothstein 1996: 145). They vary, however, in the specific criteria they use to characterise an institution. Moreover, the three strands of institutional theory do not concur in how institutions affect the choices of political actors, how institutions are reproduced, and how to explain institutional change. According to Hall and Taylor (1996), these differences arise from the assumptions the distinctive approaches make about human behaviour. Rational-choice institutionalism follows the “calculus approach”, arguing that individuals are rationally calculating utility maximisers. Proponents of sociological institutionalism, on the other hand, found their
work on the “cultural approach”, which sees individuals as satisficers, their behaviour constrained by their own interpretation of the world. Historical institutionalism, Hall and Taylor argue, finds itself in-between these two approaches, using either the one or the other.

The problem with this distinction between the various approaches is that it ignores the potential of the new institutionalism to transcend the long unfruitful debate between structure and agency. Theoretically, by stressing the role of human behaviour in the construction of institutions, the new institutionalism draws attention to the interaction between institutions and individuals, and acknowledges that both influence each other (Lowndes 2002: 102). However, as Hay and Wincott (1998) maintain, both the “calculus” and the “cultural approach” are latently structuralist, not allowing much space for agency. We should then instead distinguish between rational-choice and sociological institutionalism as quasi-structuralist approaches on one side, and historical institutionalism on the other side, which does not vacillate between “calculus” and “cultural” considerations, but – in contrast to Hall and Taylor’s argumentation – is founded on very distinctive ontological premises. Accordingly, the prospects for intellectual borrowing between the different approaches of the new institutionalism are much more limited than widely believed. Only the particular theoretical foundations of historical institutionalism, numerous scholars argue (for example, Hay and Wincott 1998; Koelble 1995), promise to take us a good deal further to a resolution of the structure and agency debate. This is because, most significantly, historical institutionalists see the world in terms of circu-
large causal relationships between actors and structures, rather than unidirectional links of causation, with either actors creating structures or structures determining actors' behaviour.

What are institutions?

The definition of an institution given by historical institutionalism is much less abstract than those provided by the other approaches. Whereas rational-choice institutionalism holds a highly functionalist view of institutions, describing them as collections of decision-making rules for determining how individual actions will be aggregated into collective decision (Peters 1999: 45), sociological institutionalism understands an institution as a set of “rules of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1984: 741), which comes into existence through the interpretation of the dominant institutional values by the individual members. Historical institutionalism, on the other hand, uses a rather “down-to-earth” definition of institutions. Historical institutionalists define institutions by example rather than by an underlying mechanism, or an overarching principle (Peters 1999: 66).

The reason behind the less abstract definition of an institution given by historical institutionalists can be directly linked to their specific ontological foundations. As has already been pointed out, rational-choice and sociological institutionalism make
certain assumptions about general regularities driving human behaviour. They then apply their deductive model to the real world in an attempt to confirm their assumptions. These assumptions must necessarily be incorporated into their definition of an institution, in their quest to explain why institutions are created and how institutions affect political outcomes. Historical institutionalists, in contrast, take a much more inductive approach to the analysis of institutions. They usually “begin with empirical puzzles that emerge from observed events or comparisons” (Thelen 1999: 373). Accordingly, an historical institutionalist’s definition of an institution derives directly from empirical observations, which will then be classified to make them available to political analysis. Unlike in the “calculus” and “cultural” approach to institutionalism, the definition of an institution does therefore not contain any clear theoretical expectations of how agents will behave.

By generally stressing the “intermediate” character of institutions (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2) – meaning that institutions reside somewhere between the state as an entity and individual behaviour – historicists would, without doubt, characterise political parties as institutions. As with any institution, parties are purposeful human constructions that embody the “rules of the game”. When establishing a party, actors explicitly or tacitly agree upon a set of rules of behaviour that will help them to make decisions aimed at fulfilling at least the most basic function of all political parties, namely to compete in public elections.
The structuring effect of institutions

This directly leads to the question of how institutions in general – and political parties in particular – structure human behaviour. Starting from the basic assumption that “conflict among rival groups for scarce resources lies at the heart of politics” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 937), historical institutionalism points out the various options to the resolution of political conflict. Institutions are conceived as “filters” that selectively favour some interests over others (Immergut 1998: 20). In contrast to a pure pluralist approach, historical institutionalists argue that the institutional structure of a polity will limit the number of ways in which political actors can combine their resources (Krasner 1984: 228). In short, an institution shapes the goals, preferences, and strategies of the political actors competing within its boundaries, thereby steering the resolution of conflict, and ultimately affecting the outcomes. This stands in strong opposition to the position taken by the proponents of rational-choice institutionalism, who argue that the preferences of the individual are exogenous to institutions (Rothstein 1996: 147).

However, historical institutionalism is not deterministic in its propositions about the effects of political institutions. Rather, it is recognised that the same institution may produce completely different outcomes within different social and cultural settings. In other words, historical institutionalists view causality as being contextual (Immergut 1998: 19). Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 16-17) identify four distinct causes for the variability in the impact of institutions over space and time: (1) broad
changes in the socio-economic or political context transform a previously latent institution into an increasingly important institution; (2) changes in the socio-economic context or the political balance of power facilitate the entry of new actors who pursue their (new) goals through existing institutions; (3) exogenous changes produce a shift in the goals or strategies pursued within existing institutions; and (4) political actors adjust their strategies to accommodate changes in the institutions themselves. That is to say, political actors do not only choose their strategies according to the institutional structures they find themselves in, but they also take into consideration the wider social, cultural, and economic context. Moreover, actors are able to learn about the effects of institutions, and under certain circumstances may alter their strategies in order to produce different outcomes. Historical institutionalism thus stresses indeterminacy and multi-causality. In this view, institutions are only one factor among others when trying to account for political outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996: 942). However, as institutions, the structural context does not determine actors’ strategies, but actors can develop different strategies to deal with problems posed to them by the context. Put in the words of Hay and Wincott (1998: 954):

> *actors are strategic, seeking to realize complex, contingent and often changing goals. They do so in a context which favours certain strategies over others and must rely upon perceptions of that con-*
text which are at best incomplete and which may very often reveal themselves inaccurate after the event.

Similarly, when analysing the effect of political parties on actors within the party we should always take into consideration the context around the particular party. More than other institutions, however, political parties seem to be able to dominate their environment, as parties fill those other institutions, on which historical institution-alists usually focus (for example, legislatures, bureaucracies), with life. Conversely, political parties are organised by the same actors, who decide on legislation and other political outcomes. In other words, actors within parties enjoy a comparatively large amount of freedom towards their environment as they control a vehicle with which they are able to change the environment according to their own interests. Consider the cartel-party thesis, for instance: Parties co-operated to exclude contenders by introducing public funding and changing other party laws (Katz and Mair 1995). In a similar way parties can work together to change other rules of the electoral competition, such as the voting system. Moreover, there is still much controversy over the extent to which parties reflect the interests of the mass electorate. While Downs (1957) argues that parties adapt their policy programmes to the demands of voters, others (for example Dunleavy 1991) claim that parties are able to actively shape voters’ preferences. In short, what these examples show is not that actors within political parties are totally independent from the environment around the party, but that they might be more independent than actors within those institu-
tions usually analysed by historical institutionalists. That is to say, party internal actors are not only able to adapt their strategies to the context, as theorised by historical institutionalism, but they are in some cases also able to change the environment in order to make the context fit their strategies.

**Institutional formation and change**

While historical institutionalism thus maintains that institutions have an effect on the behaviour of individuals acting within these institutions, it also acknowledges the capability of political actors to consciously shape institutions. It thereby disagrees with the sociological approach, which maintains that institutions are largely shaped by culture (March and Olsen 1984). Yet, a frequently cited problem of historical institutionalism is the fact that it seems much stronger in explaining persistence than formation and change (Peters 1999: 67-71; Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 15). Historicists adhere to the idea of “path dependency”, by which in a general sense they simply mean that “history matters”. Essentially, they put forward the argument that
the policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is being initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future.

(Peters 1999: 61)

In other words, institutions are able to persist in the absence of the forces responsible for their original establishment – a phenomenon that economists capture by the concept of “increasing returns”. In a process of increasing returns, the probability of maintaining a once adopted institutional pattern increases with its continued adoption, because over time the benefits of the chosen pattern will increase in comparison with the benefits of previously available options (Pierson 2000).6

Perceiving institutional development as a process of self-reinforcing reproduction causes a dilemma, however, since any “convincing account of institutional change must contain within itself its own negation, and yet somehow remain consistent” (Immergut 2005: 290). Historical institutionalism tries to escape this dilemma by distinguishing between the mechanism of reproduction and a separate logic of change. Broadly speaking, historicists understand the development of institutions as a chain of long periods of persistence divided by moments of institutional innovation. Borrowing from evolutionary biology, Krasner (1984; 1988) introduced the concept of “punctuated equilibrium” into the analysis of institutions. In contrast to

6 One often cited example is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard, which gained an advantage over competitors, although it is generally not regarded as the most efficient alternative. However, being “the fastest out of the gate” was critical. Now that people have become accustomed to writing with the QWERTY keyboard, and computer producers have adjusted the industrial standard accordingly, the costs of switching to some previously available alternative are very high.
the conventional Darwinian view of evolution as a slow, continuous process of change, proponents of punctuated equilibrium argue that change takes place rapidly in geographically isolated groups. They therefore do not assume that constant causes explain the evolution of living organisms, but they stress uncertainty and chance. Similarly, historical institutionalists theorize that the history of institutions is punctuated with moments when structural factors are least determining and when actors have the greatest degree of freedom to shape institutional change. In other words, during such “critical junctures” (Collier and Collier 1991) the mechanism of institutional reproduction is disrupted, giving space to agency and choice. In order to explain critical junctures historical institutionalists usually point to exogenous crises – typically shocks from changes in macro-structures. Such crises can cause the breakdown of existing institutions, which will then create room for political conflict over the shape of a new institutional arrangement.

However, by mere empirical observation it is possible to criticize the punctuated-equilibrium model on the ground that punctuations neither seem to be a sufficient or a necessary condition for institutional change. First of all, institutions regularly persist despite external shocks of far-reaching historical importance, such as wars or revolutions. Moreover, not all institutional change happens within punctuations, but institutions also evolve during periods of supposed stasis.

7 For example, Stephen Jay Gould, one of the driving minds behind the theory of punctuated equilibrium, argues that wings originally only served for thermoregulation, i.e. to lower excess body temperature. As wings grew in size for more effective thermoregulation, they co-incidentally also developed an aerodynamic function, allowing animals with wings to fly (Gould 1987).
In order to deal with the first weakness, Thelen (1999: 397) suggests that we should acknowledge that “different institutions rest on different foundations, and so the processes that are likely to disrupt them will also be different”. Put differently, what constitutes an external shock will depend on the mechanism assumed to underlie the process of institutional reproduction. A useful contribution into this direction has been made by Mahoney (2000a), who identifies four possible causal mechanisms behind the phenomenon of path dependency. The first one is based on a utilitarian explanation: Actors rationally choose to reproduce institutions, because any potential benefits of transformation are outweighed by the costs. A second theory makes use of functionalist ideas in order to explain the reproduction of institutions. It is argued that path dependency happens as every institution is embedded into a large system within which it fulfils certain functions. Third, institutional persistence has been explained through the distribution of power among actors. The basic idea of this theory is that any institution initially empowers a certain group at the expense of other groups. The advantaged group will then use its additional power to defend the originally implemented institutional order against pressure for change from less powerful groups. Finally, a fourth explanation for path dependence is built around the notion of legitimacy. According to advocates of this theoretical position, institutional reproduction occurs because actors view an institution as legitimate and thus voluntarily opt for its reproduction.

Depending on the specific mechanism of institutional reproduction, only particular changes in the environment around the institution will be perceived as a shock
by the actors within the institution. Hence, utilitarian theorists often emphasise how increased competitive pressures can lead to institutional transformation, while functionalist accounts argue that institutional change usually requires an exogenous shock that puts pressure on the overall system, making a given institution’s function obsolete and demanding its transformation to preserve the system in the environmental setting. Scholars who adopt a power-based mechanism of institutional reproduction, on the other hand, would argue that changes in the environment constitute a shock when they weaken the elites and strengthen subordinate groups within the institution. And finally, legitimation explanations of path dependency define shocks as events that trigger changes in the values or subjective beliefs of actors.

The problem with most of these approaches to institutional reproduction is that they must necessarily resort to elements exogenous to the theory in order to explain change. This is a point frequently raised by critics of historical institutionalism, who argue that historicist theory should be able to account for change through reference to the nature of institutions themselves (see for example Harty 2005). Only the power-based explanation of institutional reproduction seems to fulfil this requirement, as it assumes that institutions reproduce through a continuous conflictual process, which itself will eventually lead to institutional change (cf. Mahoney 2000a: 523). In other words, both reproduction and change can be explained through conflict between elites and subordinate groups. In light of this, the power-based theory
of reproduction promises to be the most coherent approach to the study of institutional change.

The power-based approach to the study of institutions fits in perfectly with the more general arguments of historical institutionalism regarding the relationship between structures and agency. As discussed earlier, agents act strategically and possess the ability to develop different strategies within the same context. Conversely, contexts are strategically selective, favouring certain strategies over others. This means that over time such strategic selectivity will throw up systematically structured outcomes. However, these outcomes are by no means inevitable, as strategic agents can formulate alternative strategies to deal with the opportunities provided by the context (Hay 2002: 129-130). In other words, within the same institution we can theoretically expect separate groups to follow different strategies. These strategies will then feed into corresponding preferences regarding the nature of the institution, since any institution – as structures in general – will favour certain strategies over others.

Therefore, similar to the arguments of power-based accounts of institutional change, political parties should not be seen as unitary actors with a single goal, but consisting of coalitions of political actors who pursue their individual interests and goals. Just as politics in general can be seen as a process of consensus and conflict among interdependent individuals, intra-party politics is also marked by consensual and conflictual relationships among interdependent party sub-groups (Maor 1997: 147). As already hypothesised by the voluntarist approach to party organisation, the
conflict between these intra-party groups, so-called factions, can have a significant influence on organisational change (Harmel and Tan 2003). Accordingly, reproduction of the party organisation happens as the dominant faction will try to preserve the organisational configuration, from which it gains an unequal share of power (Panebianco 1988).

While making a distinction between different mechanisms of institutional reproduction can help explain why not all large-scale external events cause institutional change, it still leaves us with the question of why some institutional change does not require an external shock. As a solution to this problem it has been recommended that we give up the zero-sum view of institutional change versus institutional reproduction, and instead allow for modes of change that go beyond the cases of institutional breakdown or wholesale replacement as implied in the punctuated equilibrium model. Two possible concepts in this regard are institutional “layering” and institutional “conversion” (Thelen 2003). While layering means that new arrangements are set on top of pre-existing institutional structures, conversion describes the situation when existing institutions are redirected to new purposes. In short, rather than picturing institutional development in terms of a sharp dichotomy between punctuations and stasis, we should aim for an analysis “that seeks to identify what aspects of a specific institutional configuration are (or are not) renegotiable and under what conditions” (ibid.: 233; emphasis in the original).

Similarly, in the case of political parties, external shocks that lead to institutional breakdown and wholesale replacement are relatively rare, and certainly more ex-
exceptional than historical institutionalism supposes. The reason is that constitutional institutions must almost necessarily be replaced in case of a breakdown, while parties can simply die and be replaced by other existing parties. In contrast, those institutions that are typically regarded as the analytical object of historical institutionalism need a functionally equivalent replacement for the larger political system to fulfil its function.

Hence, when explaining party organisational change we are generally dealing with change that falls between the two extremes of institutional breakdown and institutional stasis. Again corresponding to the theoretical views of the power-based strand within historical institutionalism, it is argued that such incremental party change happens when certain individuals or factions within the party experience an increase in their relative power vis-à-vis other individuals and factions, thus leading to a redistribution of power within the party.

**Summary**

Although there is still much controversy over how to explain institutional change, historical institutionalism provides an appealing theoretical framework with which to transcend the structure and agency debate. Its main propositions can be formulated as follows:
(1) Structures influence human behaviour by functioning like a filter that selectively favours some strategies over others.

(2) However, although this means that outcomes within the same structural context will exhibit a characteristic regularity when observed over a longer time frame, the outcome of any particular strategic calculation is unpredictable, since actors can choose alternative courses of action to respond to opportunities presented by the context.

(3) As a result, at any point in time, we should not be surprised to find actors offering different strategic responses to the same context.

(4) Institutional reproduction and change is therefore best seen as a constant conflict between different groups within that particular institution, holding divergent views as to the norms and regulations that constitute the institution.

In sum, when accounting for political outcomes, historical institutionalism acknowledges the explanatory power of institutions, external factors, and agency. These are exactly the three groups of factors that can be found in the party organisation literature, represented by the “life-cycle”, the “period effect”, the “generation effect”, and the voluntarist approaches respectively. Hence, historical institutionalism again demonstrates – albeit on a more abstract level than in the previous chapter – that the strengths of one approach towards party organisation are the weaknesses of the another approach and vice versa. Actors cannot simply form and change political
parties according to their own goals, as claimed by the voluntarist theory of party organisation, but their freedom of action is, first of all, curtailed by power relations within the party. Moreover, their organisational strategy must be oriented towards the environmental context around the party. However, this does not mean that party organisations will be the product of either internal or external structures, as argued by the “life-cycle” and “period effect” approaches respectively – or, in fact, driven by a successive combination of the two, as hypothesised in Panebianco’s “generation effect” approach – but actors are able to develop diverging strategies to overcome the problems posed by structures around them. In other words, historical institutionalism teaches us that the divide within the party organisation literature is weakening our understanding of party formation and change.

Historical institutionalism not only helps us to criticise existing theories of party organisation, but, at the same time, it offers an abstract model through which to construct a stronger theory of party organisation. That is to say, there is no need to refuse existing theories of party formation and change altogether, but we only need to re-define the relations between existing theories on the basis of the theoretical claims made by historical institutionalism. This is precisely the aim of the following section, namely to construct a general framework for the analysis of party organisation by synthesising causal factors from different levels of analysis found to have an influence on the organisation of political parties.
Explaining party formation and change

Political parties as constellations of power

Political parties, as with any other institution, are constellations of power between different actors. These constellations can be explicitly codified in the *formal* norms and regulations of the party or *informally* supported by general practice. In this regard it is important to note that informal institutions are to be understood as more than mere behavioural regularities. They are “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 727). Therefore, although party structures in the “third wave” of democratisation are in many cases non-bureaucratic and informal, such informality should not be conflated with weakness or lack of organisation (Levitsky 2001). Numerous parties maintain solid informal organisations that are both extensive and enduring. In other words, ignoring the informal politics within many political parties in young democracies would reduce the analytical depth, resulting in an inadequate understanding of how these parties actually operate (Erdmann 2004: 75). Existing models of party organisation, unfortunately, largely fail to incorporate informal dynamics into their analytical frameworks.

Only if actors decide to translate the power relationships between them into formal rules will political parties develop the three faces of party organisation that
have been accepted by many as the most powerful concept to describe the development of political parties in Western Europe. However, the number of possible power constellations between the three elements is limited. In fact, as the historical development of European parties has taught us – both empirically and theoretically – there can only be two different models to formally distribute power within a party: Either the party in public office is the dominant face or power lies with the party central office. In-between these two constellations there can be transitional stages of power distribution. Moreover, the party on the ground – the third organisational face – can be stronger or weaker, thereby weakening the position of the respective dominant party element. However, the party on the ground can never be the dominant party element itself, because it faces a collective action problem. The party in central office will always be stronger, as it is a necessary vehicle to organise collective action among the individual members of the party.

In other words, political parties are never unitary actors but rather collections of individuals and sub-party factions with often diverging interests and strategies. The power relations between these actors can be either formalised in the party’s official decision-making rules or established informally through mutual understanding. This is in line with one of the central tenets of historical institutionalism: that actors can develop different strategies within the same context. The relevant strategies to consider when trying to account for party organisations are strategies relating to the electoral market. This follows from Sartori’s influential definition of political
parties, which identifies the participation in elections for public office as the defining property of parties vis-à-vis other voluntary organisations:

A party is any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office.

(Sartori: 1976: 63)

This is to say, actors do not form a political party for the sake of establishing an organisation, but the party is primarily a vehicle to participate in public elections. As a result, the organisation of the party is not based on a separate organisational strategy, but it will always be closely linked to the actors’ electoral strategy.

**Electoral strategies**

Broadly speaking, there are two different strategies politicians can use to mobilise voters and link their respective party to the electorate: (1) programmatic principles or (2) clientelistic exchange circuits (Kitschelt 2000).\(^8\) Both of these linkage mechanisms are, broadly speaking, based on exchange relations between politicians and

\(^8\) Kitschelt also lists charisma as a third electoral strategy. However, we will treat charisma as a secondary strategy and therefore discuss it later on.
voters, who trade material incentives for political support. However, they differ in terms of the procedure these exchange relations adopt, as clientelism describes direct exchange relations, compared to indirect exchange relations. This property is captured by the classical definition of clientelism offered by Lemarchand and Legg (1972: 151-152):

Political clientelism [...] may be viewed as a more or less personalized, affective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships.

While it has rightfully been pointed out that the patron in a clientelistic relationship can also be the party organisation, rather than any individual within it (Hopkin 2006: 409), the important question to ask in order to establish whether there is a direct exchange relation between the party/politician and the voters is: Who will benefit from the distribution of material incentives? Whereas in clientelism voters will only be included in the distribution of material incentives if they comply with rules of the exchange game by providing political support, programmatic benefits have a public-good quality and voters cannot be excluded from benefiting from them (Stokes 2007). That is to say, clientelistic linkages target benefits either to individuals or small groups, who are expected to support politicians with control over re-
sources. As such, the resources distributed through clientelistic exchange networks can be either of an individualistic nature – including material goods (money and other gifts), employment (both private and public) and services (such as help with the authorities, protection et cetera) – or of a collective nature (for instance, public infrastructure projects or the provision of community facilities).  

However, in reality, it is often very difficult to clearly distinguish between these latter benefits and programmatic benefits. In many cases the class of beneficiaries targeted by a given programmatic strategy can be very narrowly defined (for instance, steel workers, war veterans, the unemployed) and resources are therefore made available to very small groups only. Conversely, if clientelistic benefits are allocated to larger groups (for instance, defined by geography or constituency), politicians cannot exclude non-supporters living in those areas from enjoying the resources provided. Hence, in order to make a better distinction possible we should ask a second question: Are there any facilities for the politician to effectively monitor or enforce the direct exchange linkages (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007)? Whereas in clientelistic relationships such monitoring mechanisms are available, they are absent from programmatic linkages between politicians and voters. In other words, in clientelism, only voters who actually vote for the politician are in-

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9 The allocation of public employment in return for electoral support will be defined as patronage. Many other authors use patronage and clientelism interchangeably, but this analysis will keep them strictly separate. Moreover, in order to clarify a further term often used in discussions of clientelism, the distribution of pork barrel will be defined here as the lawful clientelistic allocation of government spending to the politician’s electoral district – as opposed to vote buying which is almost always illegal. Patronage, on the other hand, has to be located somewhere in the grey area between illegality and legality.
cluded in the distribution of resources and the politician has access to monitoring systems through which to control whether they did so or not.

The enforcement of the clientelistic exchange agreement can be achieved through various different measures (see Schaffer and Schedler 2007). First of all, political parties and politicians may choose to manage the exchange of material benefits and votes through established social networks and personal relationships. Accordingly, candidates often recruit people with a high social status in their respective local communities as intermediaries between themselves and the voters, as this is likely to impose on voters a strong moral obligation to vote as instructed. However, in addition, parties will also need to monitor the vote by circumventing electoral secrecy, as the imposition of sanctions will have to be based on the knowledge about non-compliance. In order to monitor how individuals vote, politicians can make use of various strategies. For instance, voters can be given carbon paper to record how they voted, or, in more modern societies, voters take a photo of their completed ballot with their mobile phone to send as a picture message to the vote broker. Another way is to give the voter a faked or stolen filled-in ballot paper before entering the polling station. The voter casts the filled-in ballot and gives the official ballot paper he or she received in the polling station to the vote broker waiting outside. Alternatively, politicians can offer larger groups of voters incentives for abstaining from voting altogether. Finally, politicians can also monitor the aggregate turnout of villages or neighbourhoods. This strategy is especially relevant in places
where candidates and their agents distribute material incentives widely within larger geographical units.

Again, these monitoring systems ensure – or are to be understood as an attempt to ensure – that the goods the politician promised in return for voting support will only be distributed to actual supporters. Programmatic electoral strategies, in contrast, lack similar monitoring systems, which means that there is a much greater likelihood that even non-supporters will benefit from the allocation of resources after the election. However, we can distinguish programmatic strategies in terms of how clearly they define the target group for the redistribution of goods. While a catch-all strategy seeks to aggregate the widest possible variety of social interest, narrow programmatic strategies aim at a clearly specified electoral clientele consisting of individuals who define themselves as belonging to a distinct social group. Hence, in the latter case – similar to clientelistic strategies – voters will be mobilised through “club goods” – benefits for subsets of citizens that impose costs on other subsets (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 11).

In addition to clientelism and the two programmatic strategies just outlined we can identify two further electoral strategies: charisma and coercion. Charisma, in the classical Weberian sense, refers to “supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers and authorities” (Weber 1964: 358), meaning that politicians can mobilise votes simply through their personal skills and powers of persuasion. Electoral strategies are coercive when politicians make use of violence and intimidation in order to achieve electoral success. Both these strategies, however,
should only be considered secondary strategies, which are used in a combination with either a clientelistic or a programmatic electoral strategy (Hicken 2007: 54). Whereas charisma clearly has natural limits, suggesting that only a very small number of politicians can rely on charisma alone, the use of violence is very cost intensive and carries great personal risk. Both strategies can theoretically combined with either clientelism or programmatic appeals.

*Strategically selective contexts*

Having identified the basic electoral strategies political actors can use to mobilise voters, we should now turn our attention towards the structural environment. As historical institutionalism teaches us, the context around actors is itself strategically selective, meaning that it will favour certain strategies over others. In other words, when choosing between potential courses of action, actors will have to take into consideration the environment in which their strategy is to be realised. As social agents are knowledgeable and able to enhance their understanding of the context around them – and the constraints and opportunities this context imposes – their intentional conduct will produce systemically structured outcomes. In other words, we will not see a confusing array of strategies, but the context will select for a cer-
tain outcome, thereby – in combination with the learning effect on agents – causing certain regularities to emerge over time.

However – and this is a very important point – although the outcome is strategically selected for, it is by no means inevitable. First of all, in order to realise the opportunities inherent in a particular environmental context, access to strategic resources is crucial. That is to say, although contextual factors facilitate the strategies of actors with access to these particular resources over the expense of those without access, the latter can develop alternative strategies – requiring different sets of resources – to deal with the problems posed to them by the context. Secondly, in order to act strategically actors must interpret the context. As interpretations of the environment can vary between actors, actors’ strategic responses will accordingly differ. In short, we can make certain predictions about the most likely outcome, but actors are always able to develop strategies that will deviate from this strategically selected outcome – either because they control different sets of resources or hold different sets of ideas through which to interpret the context. More precisely, we should not be surprised to find clientelistic, catch-all and narrowly focused electoral strategies within the same structural environment.

Keeping these basic theoretical propositions in mind, the first thing to note about newer democracies as a context for the formation and adaptation of political parties is that they are strategically selective towards clientelism and catch-all programmatic appeals. The reasons lie in the sequence of democratisation in the “third wave”, which has been very different from earlier waves of democratisation. First of
all, unlike in Europe, processes of national unification and industrial development did not precede political mobilisation, nor have these processes necessarily been realised since (Randall 2001). Consequently, electoral strategies aiming to mobilise clearly defined social groups are likely to be unsuccessful, as social group identities will not translate into voting behaviour. Secondly, while the “first wave” of democratisation is best described as a gradual process, the democratic transitions in the “third wave” have been relatively sudden, not leaving political parties enough time to formulate clear programmatic platforms and develop close ties to specific voter clienteles.

While the context in newer democracies thus militates against narrow programmatic strategies, we need to look at structural factors at the polity level to decide whether the specific environment favours either clientelistic or catch-all strategies. Contextual environments that are strategically selective towards clientelism are those characterised by a high level of poverty.\footnote{The most convincing explanation as to why the poor are an effective target for clientelistic practices refers to income inequality as the causal mechanism (Robinson and Verdier 2002): A context of low socio-economic development favours clientelistic over programmatic strategies, it is argued, because voters are likely to accept low-value rewards in return for their electoral support, while the upper class, paying for both these rewards and}

\footnote{10 Other factors that are frequently mentioned as having a positive effect on the effectiveness of clientelistic electoral strategies are the institutional context – in particular the electoral system (for example Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005) – and mass political culture (for example Putnam 1993). However, the empirical evidence is far from convincing and the relevant literature is understandably divided over these two factors. Rather, it is argued here that although both the institutional context and mass political culture can contribute to a personalisation of politics, this should not automatically be equated with clientelism.}
the maintenance of the monitoring system, will only have to invest a small share of their own resources. Economic development, on the other hand, will make clientelistic transfers more expensive, as they will have to be paid by a growing upper middle class, increasingly targeted at a lower middle class. That is to say, payments become more and more expensive to politicians. As a result, the best strategy for political parties is to withhold the reward from the voter. Knowing that the party, even if it wins, is likely not to reward voters, voters are always better off defecting.

However, this does not mean that in a context of higher economic development programmatic catch-all strategies targeted specifically at the growing middle class become the strategically selected outcome. In fact, if clientelism is established as a repeated game, it can be strategically selected for even in higher developed societies. Viewed from a game theoretical perspective, clientelism will not work under conditions of higher economic development as a one-shot game. But if the dyadic relationship between the politician and the voter is embedded in a social network this will help solve the prisoner’s dilemma (Stokes 2007). Hence, theoretically, establishing a clientelistic network in a relatively developed society is very difficult, because – as explained in the previous paragraph – the initial game is very likely to result in one of the two sides defecting. Instead, the clientelistic exchange must be reproduced over time, assuring both sides that the respective other side will comply with the agreement.

More specifically, in newer democracies, the environmental context will favour clientelism as a strategy of voter mobilisation, if the former autocratic regime used
clientelistic means to gain support from the population.\footnote{Whether the autocratic regime had been able to establish effective clientelistic networks will have depended on a number of other factors commonly identified in the literature as causes for clientelism – most importantly, the degree of state control over the economy (Wilkinson 2007) and the degree of bureaucratic professionalisation (Shefter 1994). For matters of simplification these factors will be excluded from our analytical framework or otherwise the historical chain of causality would become uncontrollable.} However, it will also depend on the type of democratic transition as to whether the clientelistic networks will be able to survive the end of non-democratic rule (cf. Kitschelt 1995). In other words, when describing the context around parties in new democracies we need to ask two questions: (1) Who held power under the autocratic regime and (2) did these actors use clientelism to legitimise (or “buy” legitimisation for) their power? If the answer to the second question is “yes”, we then need to ask whether these actors were able to maintain their positions of power through the democratic transformation of the political system, or whether the transition was triggered and controlled by the pro-democratic opposition from below, leading to a total “replacement” (Huntington 1991) of the regime. If elements of the autocratic regime were able to maintain their positions of power, we should expect them to use their access to state resources to both sustain the monitoring network and provide material incentives for voters.

The relevant contextual environment to make predictions about the electoral strategies to emerge in new democracies is summarised in Figure 1. However, it must again be noted that these predictions will always be imperfect. As this analytical framework tries to integrate both structure and agency, we can only predict outcomes that are\textit{strategically selected for}. That is to say, these outcomes are not inevi-
table, but actors can always develop alternative electoral strategies that go against the strategically selected outcome. In particular, we should not rule out the possibility of actors developing narrow programmatic appeals targeted at clearly defined social groups – a strategic option that we would theoretically not expect in new democracies of the “third wave”.

**FIGURE 1: ELECTORAL STRATEGIES – STRATEGICALLY SELECTED OUTCOMES**

*Linking electoral strategies and organisational preferences*

Actors are theoretically not only able to develop alternative strategies within the same environmental context, but actors with different strategies can also co-exist
within the same political party. As a result of this, parties should not be regarded as unitary actors but rather as collections of individuals and sub-party factions with often diverging interests and strategies. Acknowledging this notion of political parties as coalitions of factions – and largely reflecting our earlier distinction between clientelistic and programmatic electoral strategies – Sartori (1976: 76-77) distinguishes “factions of principle” and “factions of interest”. While factions of principle primarily serve to articulate different policy ideas, the main function of factions of interest, on the other hand, is to allocate posts and resources among their members. Put differently, factions of principle develop programmatic appeals, whereas factions of interest are clientelistic networks connecting politicians to voters through the allocation of resources.

Based on their particular electoral strategies, these factions hold different preferences as to the organisation of the party: Whereas factions of principle will push for a transformation of inter-factional power relations into a set of formal rules, factions of interest will resist a formalisation of decision-making procedures. Politicians following a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation should theoretically not be interested in the formal party organisation as the central arena for decision-making, because clientelism is built around particularistic relationships. Under these circumstances, collective decision-making mechanisms become unnecessary, but conflict will rather be resolved through the allocation of resources:
Because [clientelism] relies on material incentives and self-interest, it undermines the very essence of the organization using it: the political party [...] With self-interest as the link between voter and the party, and between politician and the party, sacrifices for the collective good of the party are unlikely to occur [...] [Clientelism] prevents collective decision-making by the voters and by the party.

(Warner 1997: 535)

Consequently, the formal party organisation will be without a real purpose, but it will only act as a formal cloak around the clientelistic networks. There is no need to invest in the formal organisation, as all functions usually attributed to political parties, such as the recruitment of candidates or the mobilisation of supporters, can be performed by the clientelistic machine. For the formal party organisation this means that the different elements – the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office – are indistinguishable, simply because, as Duverger (1964) explained in regard to the classical cadre party, admission to the party will depend on the individual’s capacity to contribute politically relevant resources that can then be used to maintain and extend the clientelistic networks. As a result there will be a large personal overlap between the three faces, making it impossible to draw clear boundaries between them.

Politicians following a programmatic strategy, on the other hand, will necessarily have to invest in the political party as an arena for collective decision-making and
conflict resolution among diverse interests. This imperative follows from the fact that

the party must speak with a more or less single collective voice in order to create a measure of confidence among voters that it will pursue the policy objectives after elections it has announced before an election.

(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 9)

However, how parties will organise collective decision-making will depend on whether their programmatic strategy targets clearly definable social groups or whether it is rather a catch-all strategy. If politicians aim to mobilise a distinct electoral clientele, they will assign a high value to constituency representation and develop a policy platform that clearly reflects the interests of this constituency. Consequently, ideological consistency and conformity are important keys to achieve the party’s goal, which is why politicians following a narrow programmatic strategy of voter mobilisation should be interested in strengthening the party central office in order to increase discipline among the representatives in public office. If, on the other hand, politicians aim to appeal to the wider electorate, they should be interested in a powerful parliamentary party, because the parties’ elected officials will need considerable freedom of action to prove themselves as managers of the public good. Hence, as in the case of electoral strategies targeting well-defined social
groups, there is still a need for formal mechanisms of collective decision-making in order to articulate policy objectives, but these policy objectives will be formulated in very general terms, making it necessary to take more concrete political decision in parliament on an everyday basis.

However, whether to strengthen the party central office or the parliamentary party is not only the product of actors’ interests, but actors will again have to take into consideration the structural context. As the more general literature on organisations points out, the environment surrounding an organisation should be described according to its degree of uncertainty.\textsuperscript{12} The basic theory claims that organisations naturally resist unpredictability, and will thus adapt accordingly in order to render the outcomes of their actions more certain (see Burns and Stalker 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). Correspondingly, it is hypothesised here that the outcome strategically selected for by a context of high uncertainty is a centralisation of power within the party organisation and thus a more powerful party central office. In other words, under conditions of high environmental uncertainty, actors following a catch-all strategy will be under great pressure to strengthen the party central office in order to increase party discipline – although this outcome is by no means inevitable.

In new democracies, environmental uncertainty for political parties is particularly high, given that voter loyalties are often only weakly developed, which reflects

\textsuperscript{12} This is at least the assumption of \textit{contingency theory}, which is considered the dominant approach to organisation design. For an application of the concept of uncertainty to the study of party organisation see Panebianco (1988: 204).
in high levels of party system fragmentation and electoral volatility (Mainwaring 1998). Moreover, loyalties also tend to be underdeveloped within parties, leading to frequent inter-party conflicts (van Biezen 2003b: 216). These conflicts are particularly damaging when they affect the stability of government coalitions, thereby jeopardising the party’s capacity to influence public policy outcomes. In short, the context for politicians following a catch-all electoral strategy should be described along the following indicators for environmental uncertainty: party system fragmentation, electoral volatility and government durability.

**FIGURE 2:** PARTY ORGANISATION – STRATEGICALLY SELECTED OUTCOMES
Whereas a programmatic electoral strategy thus requires a party organisation to provide formalised decision-making procedures, the two secondary electoral strategies outlined above – similar to clientelism – do not need large investments into the political party as an abstract institution. In the case of charisma, decision-making authority will flow naturally from the leader’s personality (cf. Panebianco 1988), while parties following a coercive electoral strategy will only have to invest in an informal militant group. Hence, just as clientelism, charisma and coercion will reduce the function of the party organisation to that of a formal legal cloak, meaning that the three elements of party organisation will be indistinguishable. When combined with programmatic strategies, we should still expect parties to develop formal procedures for decision-making, but, depending on how much the party relies on either charisma or coercion as an electoral strategy, these secondary strategies can create informal channels of authority that will circumvent the formal regulations.

However, the central causal mechanisms to explain different types of party organisation are still clientelistic incentives and programmatic appeals. Using these as the link between the structural context and organisational preferences, we can now identify the strategically selected outcomes in terms of party organisation (see Figure 2). As was discussed earlier, the context of young democracies clearly favours either clientelistic or catch-all electoral strategies and we should therefore expect either parties without formal organisational faces or parties with the party central office as the dominant element as the strategically selected outcome. However, actors following a catch-all strategy will have to take into consideration the level of
environmental uncertainty: If environmental uncertainty is high they will be under great pressure to strengthen the party central office rather than the parliamentary party.

Based on the idea that actors can develop different strategies within the same party, we should then see the reproduction and change of parties as a constant conflict between internal actors, each pushing for the organisational structures that will best allow the implementation of their respective electoral strategy. Accordingly, factions of interest will resist a formalisation of decision-making norms, while factions of principle will be interested in strengthening the role of the party as the principal arena for decision-making. Depending on whether the latter follow a catch-all or a narrowly focused electoral strategy, they will work towards a more powerful parliamentary party or a stronger party central office respectively. In other words, the development of political parties is not a linear process, as maintained by structuralist approaches to party organisation, but it is an open-ended process driven by conflicting electoral strategies within the same context. However, unlike voluntarist approaches suggest, the context strategically selects for a certain outcome, thereby strengthening certain actors over others.

As the power-based strand within historical institutionalism maintains, the distribution of power between actors within the same party is thus the mechanism to explain both the reproduction of the party organisation and organisational changes. Party organisations reproduce over time as conflicting interests create a deadlock situation, with neither side being able to advance their interests any further. Con-
versely, changes to party organisation will become possible if the distribution of power within the party is altered. This can happen under either of two conditions: (1) the relevant environment around the party changes to such an extent that the strategically selected outcome becomes a different one; or (2) a faction chooses to change its strategy in attempt to deal more effectively with the problems posed by the given context. In other words, in the first case the context changes while strategies stay the same, whereas in the second case actors offer new strategies for unchanged environmental conditions.

Summary

From the theoretical framework just outlined it should have become clear that predicting the development of political parties in new democracies per se is impossible. That is to say, it is very unlikely that parties in new democracies will follow exactly the same path of organisational development as their counterparts in Western Europe, nor should we expect them to take an “evolutionary leap” towards more contemporary models of party organisation found in the established democracies in Western industrialised countries. Furthermore, it is highly improbable that all parties in new democracies will converge towards a common type of party organisation
that will clearly distinguish them from parties formed in earlier waves of democratisation.

Making predictions about the development of political party organisations in newly democratic societies becomes impossible, as our analytical framework acknowledges the importance of human agency. Accordingly, all we can predict are strategically selected outcomes, as contextual environments favour certain outcomes over others. These outcomes, however, are by no means inevitable as actors are able to develop alternative strategies within the same context. We should therefore allow for the possibility that different strategies may compete against each other both within the same polity and the same political party. The development of political parties is thus best described as a constant conflict between different party internal actors following different strategies and interests.

Given that the defining function of political parties is to compete in public elections, actors’ electoral strategies become the key to understand different types of party organisation. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between clientelistic and programmatic strategies for voter mobilisation, with the latter further differentiated as to whether the platform is narrowly defined or aimed at aggregating a wide range of social views. While the environmental context in new democracies of the “third wave” strategically selects for clientelistic and catch-all strategies, it depends on the particular context in which actors make their strategic calculations as to which of these two will be the most likely outcome. Generally, a context characterised by low levels of income inequality and/or a democratic transition largely controlled by an
autocratic regime that made wide use of clientelistic incentives to legitimise its non-
democratic rule will strategically select for clientelism as the dominant electoral
strategy.

Electoral strategies are then closely linked to preferences for certain types of party organisation: While actors following a clientelistic strategy for voter mobilisation will resist a formalisation of decision-making, actors campaigning on programmatic appeals will be interested in strengthening the formal party organisation as the central arena for decision-making. More precisely, those campaigning on narrowly focused programmatic appeals will push for a centralisation of power in the party central office, whereas actors with a catch-all strategy will try to strengthen the party in public office vis-à-vis the other elements of party organisation. However, in new democracies environmental uncertainty for political parties tends be to relatively high, making it difficult to realise this latter option.

As actors within the same party can follow different electoral strategies and thus hold different preferences as to the organisation of the party, the organisational development of political parties is best described as an on-going conflict between party internal groupings with an interest in either reproducing or transforming the party organisation. This conflict will lead to party change if changes in the environment strengthen groups rejecting the current norms and regulations, or if actors decide to change their strategies. However, in order to realise the opportunities created by environmental changes actors must both control the necessary resources and interpret these changes as opportunities in the first place. Moreover, changing
strategies will not always lead to a relative increase in power, as contexts are strategically selective, favouring certain strategies over others.
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

In a logical sequence, the theoretical assumptions that constitute our analytical framework shape our research methodology. Thus, this chapter will discuss the methodological implications of conceptualising the development of political parties as a constant conflict between strategic actors in a strategically selective context. This involves operationalising the variables that constitute our theory of party formation and change, deciding on appropriate methods of data collection and analysis, and selecting the cases.

Measurement

The preceding chapter identified several variables that need to be taken into consideration when explaining party formation and change. These variables must now
be operationalised in order to make them empirically measurable. As a general rule for the process of operationalisation, the chosen indicators must adequately capture the full content of the concept the researcher seeks to analyse (Adcock and Collier 2001).

**The environmental context**

To remind ourselves, in order to make a prediction about electoral strategies – which are the key to understanding different types of party organisation – the environment around political parties in new democracies should be described along three variables: (1) the autocratic regime, (2) the process of democratic transition and (3) the level of socio-economic development. These variables do not have a deterministic influence on human behaviour, but they will help us to predict outcomes that are *strategically selected for* by the environment. Since “third wave” democracies as a context mitigate against narrow programmatic electoral strategies, the only two outcomes we should expect are either clientelistic practices or catch-all campaigns. Clientelism will always be the strategically selected outcome under conditions of low socio-economic development, which provide the perfect breeding ground for vote-buying and/or patronage. Most importantly, in less developed societies, clientelism does not need to be established as a repetitive game, but it can be
set up from zero. In order to measure the level of socio-economic development the following indicators will be used: (1) GDP per capita, (2) the Gini coefficient\textsuperscript{13}, (3) the degree of urbanisation and (4) the literacy rate. Whereas the first two indicators are related the question of how much of their resources politicians will need to invest in the establishment of a clientelistic network, the latter two indicators have an influence on how well the system to monitor voters’ compliance will work: It is much easier to maintain effective monitoring systems in rural areas, while poorly educated voters might not know about the unlawfulness of vote-buying and other clientelistic methods.

However, if clientelism is established as a repetitive game, clientelistic electoral strategies can also be the strategically selected outcome in more modern societies. In new democracies this will, first of all, depend on whether the outgoing autocratic regime used clientelistim to legitimise its power. Unfortunately, the literature does not offer any typology of non-democratic regimes that would capture the differences we are interested in.\textsuperscript{14} It is therefore necessary to build our own typology, based on two separate dimensions. First of all, we need to ask how the regime legitimised its rule: Was the curtailment of political pluralism justified only by universalistic motives – such as the need for development and modernisation, religious beliefs, political ideologies, an external military threat or nationalism – or did the regime also

\textsuperscript{13} The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of the distribution of income. It is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1: 0 corresponds to perfect income equality, while 1 corresponds to perfect income inequality.

\textsuperscript{14} Probably the most influential typology of autocratic regimes is the conceptualisation by Linz (2000), which is organised around three core dimensions: (1) the degree of pluralism, (2) the degree of mobilisation, and (3) the degree of ideology.
maintain clientelistic exchange relations with the population through which to “buy” political support? Secondly, in order to establish whether the elements controlling these clientelistic relationships were able to re-establish themselves as political actors in the new democracy it is necessary to ask: Who ruled? Possible answers to this question are a single leader, a political party, the military or the bureaucracy.

However, in order for the clientelistic networks to survive the transformation of the political system, the democratic transition must at least be partly controlled by the regime elites: If the regime is completely removed from power, this means that the clientelistic networks will decay, as they are disconnected from the supply of public resources. Following Huntington (1991), we can distinguish three ways in which an autocratic regime can be developed into a democracy: (1) “transformation”, (2) “replacement” and (3) “transplacement”. In a transformation the regime takes the lead in institutionalising democracy, while in a replacement the regime is overthrown, allowing opposition groups to control the process of transition. Transplacement, on the other hand, describes the situation when neither the regime nor the pro-democratic opposition have the necessary power to control the transition process independently of each other. Democratisation will hence largely result from joint action. In other words, elements of the authoritarian regime will be able keep positions of power in a transformation and a replacement, whereas a replacement provides the worst conditions for the regime to maintain its clientelistic networks.

We should therefore expect the context to favour catch-all electoral strategies over clientelism under conditions of high socio-economic development, provided
that the exiting autocratic regime did not use clientelistic appeals to "buy" legitimation for its non-democratic use of power – or if it did, that the democratic transition was triggered from below and completely removed the autocratic elites from power. As explained in the previous chapter, actors following a catch-all strategy to mobilise voters should be interested in strengthening the party in public office. However, if environmental uncertainty is high, these actors will be under great pressure to centralise power in the party central office in order to increase party discipline. Environmental uncertainty for political parties can be measured along the following dimensions: party system fragmentation, electoral volatility and government longevity. Party system fragmentation can be expressed as the “effective number of parties” through the index developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), which takes account of both the number of parties in the system and their share of votes/seats. A widely used method to capture electoral volatility is the Pedersen index, which is equal to the next percentage of voters who changed their votes between two subsequent elections (Pedersen 1979). Finally, government stability is measured in years, using the following criteria to determine the end of a cabinet: (1) new elections, (2) change in party composition or (3) change in prime ministership/presidency (Lijphart 1999: 132). Environmental uncertainty is higher, the higher party system fragmentation and electoral volatility, and the lower government durability.
Several typologies of party organisation have been offered (see Krouwel 2006). These are, however, not without major weaknesses. First of all, most party models were developed in the context of politics in Western Europe (cf. Wolinetz 2002: 137). This makes them difficult to apply to the numerous parties that have only recently emerged through the third wave of democratisation in other parts of the world. Due to this “travelling problem” (Sartori 1970), the real-world differences between political parties in young democracies and their counterparts in established democracies in the West are often obscured. Moreover, existing typologies of party organisation suffer from a “transformation bias” (van Biezen 2003a: 178), as most of the existing party types actually reflect models of party change rather than models of party organisation per se. However, a general theory of party organisation must necessarily be based on party models that can accommodate theoretical claims on both party adaptation and formation.

Broadly speaking, there are two solutions to these problems. One is to develop a new typology that can capture the broad empirical variation among political parties in different parts of the world (see Gunther and Diamond 2003), the other is to disintegrate existing party models into their single elements (see van Biezen 2003b). The latter option has undeniable advantages, since it much more effectively adds to existing knowledge concerning the organisation of political parties. Introducing yet another typology of political parties would make it difficult to compare our results
with those that have already been generated by the existing literature. However, simply disintegrating existing types is not enough, but the single indicators that we obtain must be clustered according to a meaningful matrix that defines the interplay between these defining characteristics (Sartori 1984: 46-50; 1993).

In order to integrate the new model into the ongoing debates surrounding party organisation, the power relations between the “party on the ground”, the “party in central office” and the “party in public office” promise to offer such a meaningful organising matrix. These relations are extremely valuable, since they have a significant effect on the linkages between civil society, political parties, and the state. Hence, the particular functioning of a democracy will always depend on the internal power relations of the parties competing within its boundaries (cf. Katz and Mair 1995).

According to the democratic ideal, political parties should function as “gatekeepers” (Easton 1965) of the political system by aggregating social interests into possible policy options. Parties fulfil this role as a bridge between civil society and the state when, as in the era of the mass party, there is a symbiotic relationship between the party on the ground and the party in central office. If the party internal power pendulum swings too far towards the party on the ground, the party will not be able to realise demands from civil society against the interests of the state bureaucracy. Conversely, if it swings too far towards the party in public office, the party will transform into an agent of the state, removed from civil society. If no clear distinction can be made between the three faces (similar to the classical cadre party), civil society, the party system, and the state will also be indistinct.
When disaggregating existing models of party organisation we obtain a number of formal indicators that serve to evaluate the power distribution between the party on the ground, the party in central office, and the party in public office. In order to assess the relative strength of the party on the ground scholars usually rely on the size of the party membership. The simplest measure by which to assess party membership strength is simply to compare the absolute number of members between different parties over time. However, although such a raw membership count is valuable information for the individual party, it does not allow us to control for such intervening variables as the size of the electorate. Hence, it must be supplemented with more sophisticated methods to evaluate the strength of the membership organisation. One method is to express the absolute numbers as a percentage of the party’s own electorate. Yet, the weakness of this technique is that it wrongly assumes each party to have a fixed electorate (Katz et al. 1992: 331). Therefore, the better indicator for party membership strength is the ratio of a party’s membership to the overall national electorate.

The problem with standardised membership figures in general, however, is that the figures vary according to the party’s performance in attracting members, which again is dependent on a number of factors beyond the control of the party leadership. Thus, if we want to include some space for agency in our theory of party organisation, we also need to take into account the height of barriers separating party members from non-members, because only these can – at least in theory – intentionally be shaped by the actors within the party. Generally, the level of inclusive-
ness of a party can be determined by the extent of duties and privileges attached to party membership, and by the ease or difficulty of enrolment (Scarrow 1996: 30). On a more specific level we can ask the following questions to operationalise the ease of access to party membership:

(1) Is enrolment open or restricted (Duverger 1964: 72)? Does the party require that individuals meet certain conditions, such as age, ethnicity or nationality?

(2) How formal is the membership procedure? For instance, joining socialist parties in the early 20th century required the would-be member to follow a lengthy application procedure that, among other formalities, involved signing the party’s statutes, and securing sponsorship from existing members. Moreover, one often had to go through a probationary period in order to be granted full member rights.

(3) Do members need to pay regular dues? And if so, how much do they have to pay? In order to allow for cross-country comparison the level of membership dues should be put in relation to the average per-capita income.

How high the party sets the barriers of party membership tells us a lot about the type of members the party is looking to attract. Broadly speaking, we can say that the lower the barriers the less engagement in party-internal politics is excepted from members. In this regard, Scarrow (1994: 51) distinguishes five different forms of activities for party members (ranked in increasing order according to the in-
tensity of engagement): (1) statistic, (2) donor, (3) ideas, (4) volunteer, and (5) candidate. It is reasonable to claim that the party on the ground will weakest, if party members are only perceived as statistic. It will be more powerful, if party members are recruited as important providers of money, ideas, and free labour. Finally, the party on the ground will be strongest if, in addition, it is also perceived as a pool of potential candidates for public elections.

Measuring the strength of party on the ground – based on a combination of its numerical strength and its inclusiveness – provides very little value, if we do not also consider the relative power of the two other organisational faces. A second and more comprehensive indicator of the distribution of power within a political party is the procedure used to select candidates for public elections. Whereas many of the functions originally monopolised by political parties are now also exercised by other institutions, competing for governmental offices – and the necessary recruitment of political leadership – remains the exclusive realm of parties. Hence, given the relative importance of electoral competition as a motivation to establish and sustain a party, the selection of candidates inevitably becomes one of the central objects of party internal power struggles (Gallagher 1988a). In other words, the process of candidate selection is not only an indicator of the distribution of power within a political party, but it also influences the distribution of power.

Existing models of party organisation usually put most emphasis on the inclusiveness of the procedures of candidate selection, asking who is entitled to vote in the decision-making process (see Katz 2001). Hence, if we want to compare parties
in young democracies to their counterparts in Western Europe, we should include the same indicator in our analytical framework. According to the operationalisation of candidate selection developed by Rahat and Hazan (2001), the selectorate, i.e. the body that nominates the candidates for election, can be classified on a continuum. At the most inclusive extreme, every citizen has the right to participate. At the most exclusive extreme, on the other hand, the selection of candidates will only be decided by a single party leader. The main categories in-between these two extremes are summarised in Figure 3.

**FIGURE 3: DIMENSIONS OF CANDIDATE SELECTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1) Candidacy</th>
<th>All citizens</th>
<th>Party members</th>
<th>Party members + additional requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inclusive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>exclusive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2) Selectorate</th>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>Party members</th>
<th>Selected party agency</th>
<th>Non-selected party agency</th>
<th>Selected party leader</th>
<th>Non-selected party leader</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inclusive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exclusive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Rahat and Hazan 2001*

However, this indicator alone is not enough to measure the distribution of power within a political party, as the party leadership may use other regulations to have significant influence on the outcome. This particularly applies to norms ruling the
access to candidacy: Who is allowed to present his or her candidacy in the candidate-selection process? Again, this dimension can be classified in a continuum: At the inclusive end, every voter can stand as party candidate; at the exclusive end, potential candidates will have to fulfil a series of restrictive conditions (see Figure 3). If the procedure of candidate selection under analysis can be placed at the highly inclusive end, the researcher can certainly identify the party in public office as the dominant organisational face. This is because membership records administered by the party in central office will not play an important role in mobilising support, and because the party on the ground will be atomised. However, it becomes difficult to measure the distribution of power when party agencies are involved in nominating the candidates or electing the party leader (who then monopolises nomination). Often, such agencies are composed of representatives from the different faces – particularly from the party in central office and the party in public office, making it difficult to isolate a dominant face. Consequently, we should supplement candidate selection, which only paints a very general power-map of a party, with more accurate indicators to determine the internal balance of power.

Based on the work by van Biezen (2000; 2003b) on political parties in the young democracies of Southern and East-Central Europe, we can identify a number of aspects in the official party rules that will help to describe the relationship between

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15 The framework by Rahat and Hazan includes two further indicators. One is the degree of the territorial (or functional) decentralisation of candidate selection. However, this concept has hardly any influence on the internal balance of power between the three faces of party organisation, and will thus not be included here. The same applies to the fourth indicator developed by Rahat and Hazan – the question of whether each candidate is determined exclusively by votes or whether an agreed-upon list is ratified by the selectorate. This dimension has probably a greater impact on the problem of who gets nominated, hence candidate recruitment (see Norris 1996).
the party in central office and the party in public office. Firstly, we should explore how much independence the party in public office enjoys from the extra-parliamentary organs. The party statutes can be expected to include a number of provisions that rule the position of the party in public office, such as the norms of behaviour of the party’s parliamentary representatives, the establishment of the parliamentary fraction’s internal rules, the selection of its leader(ship) or the formulation of public policy. Secondly, we must take into consideration the degree of personnel overlap between the organs of the extra-parliamentary office and the party in public office, looking at both the office rules that regulate ex-officio representation, and the actual extent of personnel overlap. Thirdly, it is helpful to ask who decides about the allocation of financial resources within the party. And finally, the distribution of party-funded staff can also be a valuable indicator to measure the power relations between the party in central office and the party in public office.

### TABLE 4: BASIC ELEMENTS OF PARTY ORGANISATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td>• absolute size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• membership-electorate ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• inclusiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Candidate selection</strong></td>
<td>• openness of candidacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• inclusiveness of selectorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control over parliamentary party</strong></td>
<td>• official subordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• personal overlap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• financial decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• allocation of staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To sum up, the power relations between the three faces of party organisation can effectively be measured by describing parties along three dimensions: (1) membership, (2) candidate selection and (3) ties between extra-parliamentary and parliamentary organs. These three central elements of party organisation and their basic properties are again summarised in Table 4.

Feeding these indicators back into our organising matrix will then allow us to measure the distribution of power between the three faces of party organisation. As a reminder, there are three possible power constellations: (1) The three faces are indistinguishable, (2) the party in central office is the dominant face or (3) the party in public office is the dominant face. The three central elements of party organisation are indistinguishable if party membership is highly exclusive – that is, admission to membership is dependent on whether the person in question can contribute resources that make him a strong candidate in public elections – the selection of candidates highly centralised, and the party bureaucracy almost non-existent, while the leadership of the parliamentary party often perfectly overlaps with the leadership of the party as a whole. On the other hand, the party in public office will be dominant organisational face if both party membership and the selection of candidates are highly inclusive, with the latter often organised as open primaries, and the parliamentary party controlling most of the party’s resources and decision-making. Finally, the party central office will be the dominant face, if admission to party membership is located somewhere between highly inclusive and highly exclusive, candidate selection decided by membership vote within the party and control over
resources and decision-making exercised by the party bureaucracy and the party leadership.

**Data collection**

As the previous section demonstrated, different types of data will be required to empirically test our theory of party formation and adaptation. We need to fill various levels of analysis with empirical information, ranging from the environmental context, the formal organisation of political parties and the power relations between party internal groups to actors’ electoral strategies. Depending on the nature of the data, social scientists make use of a wide variety of data collection techniques. In our case, documentary analysis and elite interviews are certainly the most adequate methods. Concerning the sequencing of these two stages it should be noted that when interviewing elites, one should not only have detailed knowledge of the interviewee, but also of the facts surrounding the event or the activity studied. Therefore, interviews should take place towards the end of the data collection process (Lilleker 2003: 212) and we shall begin with a documentary analysis.

Usually, three different types of documents are distinguished: (1) primary sources, (2) secondary sources and (3) tertiary sources (Burnham et al. 2004: 165). Primary sources are “those that were written (or otherwise came into being) by the
people directly involved and at a time contemporary or near contemporary with the period being investigated” (Finnegan 1996: 141). Primary sources that should be used in the analysis of party organisations are party statutes and other party documents, such as finance reports, membership statistics or proceedings of party meetings. Secondary sources, on the other hand, consist of other evidence produced soon after the event, and usually made available to a larger public. When studying party organisations, printed mass media – one example of secondary sources – serves as a good source to learn more about the inner-workings of parties, and the socio-political context around them. The same applies to tertiary sources, which differ from secondary sources in having been created much later after the event, such as books and academic journal articles. These also help the researcher to get a better understanding of the parties under analysis, and to structure the respective context.

The problem with documentary sources in general is that they are of varying quality. While it is more difficult to determine the reliability of secondary and tertiary sources, Scott (1990: 6) suggests four easily manageable criteria to assess the quality of primary documents:

(1) Authenticity: Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin?

(2) Credibility: Is the evidence free from error and distortion?

(3) Representativeness: Is the evidence typical of its kind, and, if not, is the extent of its untypicality known?

(4) Meaning: Is the evidence clear and comprehensible?
Official party documents are likely to be authentic and meaningful. Issues of representativeness and credibility will probably exercise the researcher somewhat more. Representativeness could be a problem if the researcher is denied access to certain documents, or when some documents have been destroyed. While this could be simply stated in the analysis, it is more difficult to establish credibility. One example are party membership figures. Political parties have a tendency to exaggerate their membership levels, and there is very little the analyst can do about this but to accept the figures made available by the parties (Mair and van Biezen 2001: 7-8).

Having analysed the most relevant documents, we can then proceed to interview elites. Interviews fulfil several purposes. Not only can they be used to fill gaps in the data, but most importantly they help us to understand how parties work in reality – behind the formal procedures and norms – as well as giving us an idea of the perceptions and strategies held by the relevant party actors when designing the organisation. Commonly, three different types of interviews are identified: (1) structured interviews, (2) semi-structured interviews, and (3) unstructured interviews (Punch 1998: 175). While in structured interviews the interviewer reads out very specific questions exactly in the same order as they are printed on the interview schedule, very often offering the interviewee a fixed range of answers, unstructured interviews tend to be very similar in character to a conversation, with the interviewer trying to cover a certain range of broader topics. In a semi-structured interview, on the other hand, the researcher has a list of questions, but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply.
As we want to compare between parties and elites in order to explain why parties organise in different ways, unstructured interviews are not a good choice, since a comparison always requires a certain level of standardisation across cases (Bryman 2001: 315). However, we should not structure the interviews too much, because elites “appreciate being treated as individuals” (Zuckerman 1972: 174). Moreover, as we are unlikely to have nearly perfect knowledge after the stage of documentary analysis, questions should rather be open-ended, allowing the interviewees to bring in their full expertise as well as their perceptions of the events under analysis (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674). However, ultimately, the degree of standardisation applied to the interview will depend on who we are interviewing.

Generally speaking, conventional sampling techniques can usually not be used in elite interviewing, since respondents are not of equal weight (Burnham et al. 2004: 207). Rather, interviewees should be chosen on the basis of their relevance to the research question and to the theoretical framework. Thus, in our case, we will interview political party elites in order to collect the information about the formal party organisation, and academic experts as well as other elites (such as NGO leaders) to get an insight into the informal power dynamics within the parties studied. Moreover, the latter interviews will help us understand the meaning and relevance of our theoretical concepts in the different countries, as these can considerably differ from our Western European understanding. Consequently, we will use structured inter-
views with political party elites\textsuperscript{16} in order to ensure full comparability between the political parties and semi-structured interviews with party external elites.

Similar to documents, elite interviews can suffer from problems of credibility. In some cases the interviewees can have different perceptions of what the facts are or they may also attempt to rewrite history in their own favour. In order to deal with this problem Davies (2001) – writing about elite interviewing in security and intelligence studies – suggests applying the method of “triangulation”. This means that data the researcher has collected from interviews is cross-referenced, firstly, with data obtained from primary documents and, secondly, with published secondary and tertiary source material. Where interviews conflict with written records, the latter should be taken as the final authority. If interviews come into conflict with other interviews, the uncertainty must be reported in the text.

\section*{Data analysis}

Once the data has been collected, it can be used to build general theories. Following Lijphart (1971; 1975), we can distinguish three social scientific methods that can be used for hypothesis-testing: (1) the statistical method, (2) the comparative method and (3) the case-study method. The first two methods are based on John Stuart Mill’s “methods of experimental inquiry”, which are “modes of singling out from

\textsuperscript{16} See Appendix for questionnaire.
among the circumstances which precede or follow a phenomenon those with which it is really connected by an invariable law” (Mill 1875). In other words, by changing the circumstances in which a relationship among variables is observed, rival observations can be ruled out and hypotheses tested. In political science, the most common units of analysis are countries. Countries are compared to control for those socio-political variables that are not part of the hypothesised causal relationship, allowing the researcher to examine the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable with more confidence. As such, both the statistical and the comparative method can be seen as an inferior substitute for the experimental method, which involves the controlled manipulation of the object of analysis under laboratory conditions, but which due to practical and ethical impediments is not available in the social sciences.

The crucial difference between the statistical method and the comparative method is the number of cases compared (Lijphart 1971: 684). The statistical method, which is Mill’s “method of concomitant variations”, compares many cases. This is also referred to as “variable-oriented” research (Ragin 1987), since cases are not compared directly to each other, but only broad patterns of covariation are assessed, making it possible to infer a variable’s average, net effect in all contexts. The comparative method, on the other hand, compares a small number of cases. It is divided primarily into two types of system design: the “most similar systems design” (MSSD) and the “most different systems design” (MDSD) (Przeworski and Teune 1970). While MSSD, which is based on Mill’s “method of difference”, compares cases
that are as homogeneous as possible except the variables under analysis, MDSD, or Mill’s “method of agreement”, serves to analyse cases that, ideally, do not share any features but the variables that are part of the theory to be tested. These two designs of comparison are thus referred to as “case-oriented” (Ragin 1987), because the researcher focuses on the similarities and differences among cases, rather than the analytical relationship between variables.

Large-N comparisons generally suffer from two serious weaknesses (cf. Landman 2000: 25; Mackie and Marsh 1995: 185). First of all, collecting data for the large number of cases necessary for a significant statistical analysis can be difficult, time-consuming and expensive. As the above paragraphs on data collection explained, data on party organisations and their relevant environments is usually not easily available but must be gathered through laborious processes of documentary analysis and elite interviewing. As such, analysing a large number of cases seems almost impossible. Second, by applying concepts to a broader range of cases, global comparisons often suffer from “conceptual stretching” (Sartori 1970), as the meaning associated with the original concept fails to fit the reality of the new cases. Rather, in cross-cultural research, we should constantly keep our concepts open for revision by engaging in “a continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of global structure” (Geertz 1983: 69). Doing so is near impossible if concepts used in the theory of party organisation developed above (such as party membership or clientelism) are numerically coded for statistical analysis.
The problems associated with the statistical method suggest that we should compare a smaller number of cases instead. Regarding the question of what to compare, the answer lies in the theoretical assumptions of our theoretical framework: Since – by acknowledging the importance of agency – we do not rule out the possibility of different types of party organisation emerging within the same context at the same time, political parties should be chosen as the unit of analysis, not countries. However, this is not only a logical consequence of our dialectical understanding of the relationship between structure and agency, but the comparison of sub-national units is in fact a useful tool to control for variation (Snyder 2001). Thus, MSSD becomes the automatically selected research design to study political parties within the same political system, because all parties compete within the same environment. It follows from this that – with all contextual variables being equal – different types of party organisation can, with great confidence, be explained by actors’ diverging electoral strategies and the distribution of power between these actors within the different political parties.

In order to isolate environmental factors that have an effect on actors’ choice of electoral strategies we will then have to compare between countries, thereby injecting contextual variance into the research design. However, applying either MSSD or MDSD in a strict sense does not seem possible in this second step. This is because it would be impossible to establish unit homogeneity, which is a basic assumption to make causal inferences (King et al. 1994: 91-94). Put differently, while in the first step we assumed that political parties are heterogeneous within the same context,
we would now have to assume that they are homogeneous. As a result, we should apply the comparative method in a less rigorous way, only using it as a rough guideline for the conduct of our inquiry.\footnote{This would also help us avoid more general weaknesses of the comparative method, such as the degrees of freedom problem, the combined causes problem and the different causes problem. For a critique of the MSSD and the MDSD see Ragin (1987), Lieberson (1992) and Faure (1994).} In fact, as Ragin points out, we need to distinguish between formal characteristics of case-oriented methods, as formulated by Mill and others, and their application. That is to say, case-oriented methods should not be used in a rigid or mechanical manner, but, instead, they should only be used to carry on a dialogue with the empirical evidence, helping us to pinpoint “patterns of constant association” (Ragin 1987: 42).

For that reason, to isolate environmental factors that constrain political actors in developing electoral strategies, we will apply our framework to different countries. We will thereby – through the comparison of these countries – establish patterns of constant association. Admittedly, our causal inferences will be weaker than those produced by a rigorous application of the comparative method. However, by replicating our findings over several countries our evidence will, first of all, be more compelling than if we used the single case study method. Moreover, causality can be increased through methods of \textit{within-case analysis}, such as pattern matching, process tracing and causal narrative (Mahoney 2000b; Mahoney 2003). In particular, process tracing offers a strong alternative to making causal inferences when it is not possible to do so through the method of controlled comparison (George and Bennett 2004: 214). Broadly speaking, the process-tracing method attempts to identify the
causal chain between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable. Hence, rather than examining multiple instances of $X_1 \rightarrow Y$ (as in large-N statistical designs), the researchers examines a single instance of $X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \rightarrow X_3 \rightarrow X_4 \rightarrow Y$ (Gerring 2007: 173). In other words, it is the quality of the observation, not the quantity of observations, that is relevant in evaluating the truth claims of a process-tracing study. If the researcher can connect empirical evidence to a convincing historical sequence that links cause and effect, he is in a good position to assert that the relationship under analysis is causal.

**Case selection**

There is widespread consensus among scholars of democratic transitions that political parties play a significant role in the consolidation of democracy (for example Morlino 1998; Pridham 1990; Sandbrook 1996). Unsurprisingly, then, a significant number of comparative studies have been produced in recent years that study the development of parties in the different regions that were hit by the third wave of democratisation during the past three decades. There are numerous works analysing political parties in Eastern Europe (for example Kopecký 1995; Kostelecký 2002; Lewis 2000), Southern Europe (for example Bosco and Morlino 2006; Diamandouros and Gunther 2001; Ignazi and Ysmal 1998), Latin America (for example Dix
1992; Levistky 2003; Mainwaring and Scully 1995), and we even find comparisons of parties across regions (for example van Biezen 2003b). Astoundingly, however, East Asia, which got caught by the third wave in the mid-1980s, has so far been widely ignored by political party research. As a matter of fact, most of the very few analyses of East Asian parties have not been written by distinguished experts, but rather by scholars specialising on single countries. The resulting reports tend to overlook the more theoretical and methodological debates within the general literature on political parties, instead focussing on description and failing to apply generally accepted typologies or existing theories. When authors move beyond a pure description, explanations tend to remain largely case-specific with a very low level of abstraction. Moreover, scholars do not engage in cross-national comparisons, but rather lock themselves in their country of specialisation.

Admittedly, different from the regions that have so far been in the analytical focus of political party research, East Asia only describes geographical borders, not a common cultural and historical heritage. In fact, it is consistently pointed out that “Asia” is no more than a European invention. Nevertheless, this heterogeneity across East Asian societies has not prevented political scientists from treating East Asia as a single region in comparative studies of democratisation and democratic consolidation (see for example Cheng 2003; Croissant 2004; Hsieh and Newman 2002; Laot-hamatas 1997). In other words, there is no reason to dismiss a comparison of East

18 This geographical term often causes confusion. *Northeast Asia* is usually defined as comprising of the following countries: the People’s Republic of China, the two Koreas, Japan, and Taiwan. *Southeast Asia* encompasses Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Singapore) as well as Indonesia, the Philippines, and East Timor. Together these two regions are termed *East Asia*. 

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Asian political parties as not feasible. Rather, a systematic analysis of political parties in the new democracies of East Asia is long overdue.

**TABLE 5: DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political rights</th>
<th>Civil liberties</th>
<th>Average score</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Electoral democracy?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar (Burma)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Political rights and civil liberties ratings range from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Each pair of political rights and civil liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.” Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered “free”, 3.0 to 5.0 “partly free”, and 5.5 to 7.0 “not free”. To qualify as an “electoral democracy” a state must satisfy the following: (1) a multiparty political system, (2) universal adult suffrage, (3) regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy and in the absence of massive fraud, and (4) public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and open political campaigning.

Source: Freedom House (2007)

The Marcos regime on the Philippines was the first to be washed away by the “third wave” of democratisation in February 1986. Subsequently, democracy was also installed in Taiwan (1986-1992), South Korea (1987/88), Thailand (1992), Cambodia (1993), Indonesia (1999) and most recently East Timor (2002). However, the democratic system installed in Cambodia by the United Nations only lasted for a single
national election, while Thailand, too, reverted to more authoritarian forms of government after a military coup in September 2006. Hence, in its 2007 report, Freedom House only lists six East Asian countries as “electoral democracies”: Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, East Timor and Japan (see Table 5). The latter two, however, will be excluded from this analysis: Japan because it has been a democracy since the end of the Second World War and is therefore not comparable with “third wave” democracies, as political parties formed under very different circumstances; East Timor because it has only been an independent state since 2002 and held legislative elections only once, in June 2007, meaning that parties have not had enough time yet to develop an organisational apparatus. We will thus study political parties in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia – in a time frame ranging from the first free and fair elections to December 2008.\footnote{In the 2008 Freedom House report, the Philippines’ political rights rating declined from 3 to 4 as a result of serious, high-level corruption allegations; the pardon of former president Joseph Estrada; and a spike in political killings in the run-up to legislative elections. The country is therefore currently not listed as an "electoral democracy" anymore. However, there is no need to retrospectively exclude the Philippines from our analysis, as this is only a recent development.}

For our cases we will only choose political parties that have competed in the two latest elections and have obtained at least three per cent of the votes in the latest election. Choosing parties according to their electoral success and their age does not constitute a selection bias – as selecting cases on the dependent variable is considered highly problematic (Geddes 1990) – but it is rather an attempt to keep the number of cases manageable and select cases where party organisational change is actually \textit{possible}. To exclude irrelevant cases where the outcome has no real possibility of occurring is another key guideline for selecting cases (Mahoney and Goertz
2004) and we should thus not include parties in the analysis that are simply too young to have experienced organisational change. Applying these two criteria leaves us with 17 cases summarised in Table 6.

**TABLE 6: CASE SELECTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>▪ Grand National Party (GNP, Hannaradang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ United Democratic Party (UDP, Tongham Minjudang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDLP, Minju Nodongdang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>▪ Nationalist Party (KMT, Kuomintang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, Minjindang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>▪ Liberal Party (LP, Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Nacionalista Party (NP)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Struggle of Democratic Filipinos (LDP, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Partner of the Free Filipino (KAMPI, Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Filipino Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>▪ Party of Functional Groups (Golkar, Partai Golongan Karya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle (PDI-P, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ National Awakening Party (PKB, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▪ National Mandate Party (PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:*
<sup>a</sup>For the 2004 elections, the Nacionalista Party and KAMPI joined president Arroyo’s K-4 coalition and therefore no separate election results were reported for these two parties. However, as both parties competed the elections they still fulfil our criteria for case selection.
<sup>b</sup>The PKS participated in the first free elections in 1999 under the name Justice Party, but then had to change its name purely for legal reasons.

Over the next four chapters we will apply our theoretical framework to each of the four countries listed above, in order to discuss the environmental context, actors’ strategic choices within this context and how electoral strategies translate into
party organisation. Following these chapters, we will then compare our findings across the countries in final chapter to identify patterns of constant association.
The post-authoritarian party system in South Korea is dominated by highly elitist parties, which – similar to the classical cadre party – are characterised by almost perfect overlap between the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office, making it very difficult to distinguish the three faces. At the same time, the minor Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDLP, *Minju Nodongdang*) features a strong party central office. However, although this constellation seems very similar to party systems in 19th century Europe, it is very unlikely that Korean parties will follow the same path of development as their counterparts in Western Europe. Rather, as will be shown, party organisation in South Korea is the product of actors’ strategic decisions within a strategically selective context.
The environmental context

South Korea was drawn into authoritarian governmental control in the early 1950s when the Korean War provided the pretext to demolish the democratic system that the Americans had installed after liberating the peninsula from 35 years of Japanese colonialism in 1945. However, regime cohesion was not very strong, as elite factions frequently putched against each other, and short democratic interludes alternated with longer periods of autocratic rule. The central pillars of the regime were the military, the bureaucracy and – as a junior partner – large business conglomerates (jaebol). Operating within the legalistic frame of a pseudo-democracy, the regime tolerated opposition parties, but competition for political offices was subtly curtailed so the elites’ claim to power would not be threatened. The elites sought to gain legitimacy for their authoritarian rule by emphasising the military threat posed by North Korea and – closely related – the need for economic development.

In particular, its high economic efficiency proved to be a powerful source of legitimacy (see Table 7). Not only did the economic strategy of export-oriented industrialisation lead to a general improvement of living standards, but profits were directly channelled to individual citizens through clientelistic networks connecting the regime with the electorate. The regime mobilised the financial resources necessary to nurture the clientelistic exchange of particularistic material gifts against political support through “quasi-taxes”, which large businesses – particularly the jaebol – were required to pay for preferential treatment in the allocation of state subsidies,
public loans, import licenses et cetera (Kang 2002). Payments were organised – either before elections as classical vote-buying or in-between elections as irregular gifts (for example for weddings or funerals) – through the extensive party apparatus of the regime’s DJP (Democratic Justice Party, Minjeondang).

### TABLE 7: SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP per capita (US-Dollars)</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient</th>
<th>Degree of urbanisation (in per cent)</th>
<th>Literacy (in per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Source:** United Nations ESCAP (undated); United Nations Development Programme (undated); Hong (1996)

Interestingly, not only the regime mobilised voters through clientelism but the opposition, too, employed clientelistic linkage mechanisms to gain votes. However, given their relative lack of resources, opposition candidates could not engage as actively in the distribution of clientelistic rewards as the regime party’s legislators (Park 1988: 1057). As a result, opposition politicians would in addition campaign on the demand for political democratisation, which is why the opposition tended to enjoy strong support among more affluent, better educated urban voters, while the regime gained the majority of votes in rural areas – a phenomenon that came to be

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20 The opposition generated the resources necessary for a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation through the private wealth of its candidates, private donations and by securing public infrastructure projects for their constituencies.
known as *yochon yado* (villages for the government, cities for the opposition) (Kim H.N. 1989: 487). Confirming the central assumption of modernisation theory, economic development had given rise to a new urban middle-class, which was no longer willing to accept a restriction of its participatory rights.\(^{21}\)

The pro-democratic opposition performed better in cities, as the regime’s programme for economic modernisation was primarily based on cheap labour and repressive employment laws, causing the income gap between the urban working class and the rest of the population to widen accordingly. In 1980, when the Korean economy plunged into a deep recession, forcing the government to implement a rigid adjustment and stabilisation programme, the working class again felt themselves to be the big loser due to these new economic policies, and – with the support of students and intellectuals – took its protest to streets (Croissant 1998: 176).\(^{22}\) Finally, it is important to mention that by the early 1980s, the regime’s scenario of a permanent military threat from North Korea had lost much of its credibility (Potter 1997: 235).

Confronted with this apparent loss of legitimacy, the regime decided to hold “nearly” free and fair elections for a new National Assembly in 1985, in which the newly formed opposition party New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP, *Sinhan Min-judang*) under the leadership of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam won a surprising 29.3% of the votes. The NKDP subsequently based its strategy on two elements: ob-

\(^{21}\) For a detailed description of the ambiguous and complex role of the middle class in the South Korean democratisation process see Koo (1991).

\(^{22}\) The most violent protest was the so-called “5.18 Uprising” in south-western Gwangju when, after a mass rally on 15 May 1980, demonstrators took control of the city. The regime answered a few days later with the deployment of elite troops, leaving hundreds dead and thousands injured.
structive opposition in parliament and – in alliance with other pro-reform movements – mass public demonstrations (Cheng and Kim 1994: 136). Eventually, the increasing political pressure forced the regime to invite the opposition to mutual talks on constitutional reforms. When these negotiations failed after only a few months, the opposition camp mobilised large parts of the urban population. This left the regime with the choice of whether to return to more violent repression or to continue along the path of liberalisation. However, political pressure from the United States, which in the late 1980s abandoned its policy of supporting anti-communist regimes even against the will of their citizens, plus Seoul’s hosting of the 1988 Olympic Games – which moved South Korea into the spotlight of international attention – benefited the soft-liners within the regime. Hence, in June 1987, the regime accepted most of the opposition’s demands, and resumed the negotiations over constitutional reform.

Thus, the transformation of South Korea’s military-bureaucratic autocracy into a political system with free and fair elections took place through a process of bargaining between the regime and the democratic opposition. By the mid-1980s both sides were locked in an uneasy stalemate that could only be broken through a negotiated compromise (Saxer 2002: 54-61). As a result of this, both actors were able to continue their clientelistic strategies of voter mobilisation, as will be described in the next section.
Actors and their strategies

The 1990s have been described by observers of Korean politics as the “three Kims” era, as elections were dominated by three politicians with the same family name: Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil. The two largest parties in Korea today are the final product of strategic games played by these highly charismatic politicians: While the Grand National Party (GNP, Hannaradang) is strongly linked to earlier parties under the leadership of Kim Young-sam (DLP and NKP), the United Democratic Party (UDP, Tongham Minjudang) is the last link in a long chain of parties that harboured politicians loyal to Kim Dae-jung (PPD, DP, NCNP, MDP, Uri Party, UNDP). Kim Jong-pil’s party, the ULD, on the other hand, lost nearly all significance in the 2004 National Assembly election, when it only won four parliamentary seats and even Kim Jong-pil himself failed to secure a mandate. As a result of this, three of the newly-elected lawmakers left the party to form the People First Party (PFP, Gungmin Jungsimdang), while the only remaining assemblyman decided to join the GNP in 2006.\textsuperscript{23} The only other relevant party that was not founded shortly before the 2008 National Assembly election is the Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDLP) – established in 2000.

\textsuperscript{23} In 2008, the PFP was then absorbed by the newly founded Liberty Forward Party led by Lee Hoi-chang, who, after leaving the GNP, had run as an independent candidate in the 2007 presidential elections, finishing third.
The era of the “three Kims”

The strongest party to emerge out of the 1988 elections was the former regime party, the DJP (Democratic Justice Party, Minjeongdang), which was not surprising, given that the pro-democracy movement had split in two. Already during the constitution talks, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam split away from the NKDP to form the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP, Tongil Minjudang). Only a few months later, Kim Dae-jung established the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD, Pyeongmindang) in order to compete in the 1987 presidential elections. Yet another opposition party was founded by Kim Jong-pil, who had served as prime minister from 1971 to 1975 – the NDRP (New Democratic Republican Party, Sinminjudang).

When, in a surprising move in 1990, Kim Young-sam merged his RDP with the former regime party DJP to form the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP, Minjadang), this heralded the era of the “three Kims”. At the same time, the merger between the two parties meant the end of the democracy-authoritarianism cleavage. Instead, coming from different regions, the three Kims mercilessly overplayed the existing rivalries between their home regions, thereby turning regional identities into the most important factor to explain voting behaviour throughout the 1990s (Sonn
Initially, the vote in the south-eastern region of Yongnam was divided between Kim Young-sam and Roh Tae-woo, the leader of the ruling DJP, who had his family roots in the same region. However, when both politicians merged their parties in 1990 to become the DLP, they created a monopoly of regional representation by the “three Kims” through which each of the Kims was guaranteed the full electoral support from their respective home region. This reflects in the effective number of political parties, which throughout the 1990s hovered around the three-party mark (see Table 8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ENEPa</th>
<th>ENPPb</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>3.34</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>55.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>72.03</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
"Effective number of electoral parties in elections to the National Assembly. After 2004, when a second vote was introduced to elect a party on the closed party list, the number is calculated on the share of votes parties received in the single-member constituencies.  
"Effective number of parliamentary parties in the National Assembly.  
Source: Author’s own calculations based on Table 9.

24 While Kim Young-sam is from Yongnam, located in the southeast of the Korean peninsula, Kim Dae-jung has his family roots in the south-western region of Honam. Kim Jong-pil, finally, mobilised most of his voters in the Chungchong region to the north of Honam. Although these three regions do only represent a part of the Korean electorate, an unknown number of voters living in other parts of the country in their third or fourth generation tended to vote according the regional roots of their regional family background.
The conflict between the south-western and south-eastern part of the Korean peninsula clearly has its roots in the unequal socio-economic development between the regions (Kim W.B. 2003). However, after the democratic transition, the economic aspect of the regional conflict lost much of its significance. Instead, regionalism became mainly driven by the regional origin of candidates, as recent research shows that post-authoritarian governments allocated state resources evenly to their respective home region and the opposition’s region (Horiuchi and Lee 2008).

While the charisma of the three Kims was thus one strategy parties relied on to mobilise voters, clientelism was the other. Although Kim Dae-jung would not be elected into government until 1997, he still attracted a substantial amount of corporate – mostly undeclared – donations (Thornton and Korvick 2003: 282). As in the governing party, this money was then channelled to candidates to build and maintain clientelistic linkages to voters. Typical activities to strengthen the loyalty within these clientelistic networks ranged from offering condolences at funerals, to making gifts at weddings, to placing supporters in jobs, to interceding with the police or courts for favorable treatment and in the case of legislators who are lawyers, pleading before the court on behalf of constituents; helping to obtain business licenses, permits, or registra-

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25 Southeastern Yongnam, home region of former military dictators Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1988), was the preferred target for large industrial and infrastructural projects during the period of state-led economic modernisation in the 1960s and 1970s. Southwestern Honam, on the other hand, remained largely excluded from the Korean economic miracle, keeping its largely agriculturally based economy. Moreover, during the authoritarian regime the economic and political elite was mainly recruited from Yongnam, while Honam – compared to its population size – suffered from serious underrepresentation.
tions through administrative agencies; helping to get promotions and transfers in public or private agencies; providing assistance in obtaining bank loans or in securing relief funds and a wide range of compensations for accidents, planning and zoning projects, shoddy work by construction companies, industrial pollution, and so on; making financial donations and contributions, such as those to assist constituents with living expenses, children's school expenses, and local festivals; and helping to resolve constituents' tax disputes with the revenue office.

(Park 1988: 1059)

As a result of their charisma and their control over effective clientelistic networks, the three Kims – Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil – more or less shared the total national vote between them throughout the 1990s and were the all dominating players in the post-autocratic party system. Before withdrawing from the political stage, the three Kims altogether established ten political parties: Kim Young-sam three, Kim Dae-jung four and Kim Jong-pil three. They saw their parties merely as functional vehicles to gain access to power, creating, dissolving, merging and renaming them as it suited their personal interests (Kim B.-K. 2000: 60; Heo and Stockton 2005: 685). This strategic game the three Kims played with their parties translated into extremely high electoral volatility figures in the 1990s (see Table 8).
Below the Kims, faction leaders competed for the party president’s favour, without ever acquiring enough power to seriously challenge the Kims. Factions did not develop high levels of institutionalisation, and all decisions were made by the faction leader. Factional coherence among the clearly identifiable members was mainly based on patron-clientelism rather than shared ideological interests (Yun 1994). In other words, parties were large clientelistic networks with the party leader as the

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<td>38.3</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
*aShare of votes (in per cent)
*bShare of seats (in per cent)

Source: Croissant (2001); Psephos Election Archive (undated)
highest patron, who – due to the fact the he could be sure of the exclusive electoral support from his respective home region – could take all significant organisational decisions without the interference of other actors within the party.

The environmental context in Korea during the 1990s favoured the clientelistic strategies of the three Kims for several reasons. First of all, as to be expected in “third wave” democracies, the conditions for the electoral mobilisation of social classes based on ideology were bad, meaning that politicians campaigning on pro-grammatic appeals did not pose a serious electoral challenge. Most importantly, the virulent anti-communism of the outgoing autocratic regime had prevented socialist or social-democratic parties from forming (Kang W.T. 1998), while the ban on the formation of independent trade unions – which stayed in place until 2002 – meant that workers were not organised outside the state corporatist structures. This made it very difficult to mobilise these groups. Instead, the three Kims were able to turn the regional conflict between the south-eastern and south-western parts of Korea into the most important electoral cleavage. Secondly, both the old regime elites and the pro-democratic opposition successfully transferred the clientelistic networks they had been using in the regime’s pseudo-elections into the new democratic arena. Although the process of export-led industrialisation had resulted in a dramatic improvement of living standards for the general population, patron-client relationships had become embedded within social life and thus continued to play an important role in the voters’ electoral decision. And thirdly, independent from the environmental context, the three Kims radiated natural charisma, thereby acting as a
magnet for votes and donations.

*The post-Kims party system*

Power only became more evenly spread among other politicians within the major political parties once the Kims left the political arena. When Kim Young-sam’s term as president came to an end in 1997, his influence within his own party declined steeply, as he would no longer be able to distribute state resources and patronage to his supporters in return for loyalty. Instead, influential factions grouped around other presidential hopefuls, with Lee Hoi-chang, who had served as prime minister under Kim Young-sam, eventually emerging as the *primus inter pares* and the party’s presidential candidate in 1997.26

Similarly, as Kim Dae-jung’s presidency was reaching the constitutional five-year limit, he began losing authority within the MDP. Finally, after he resigned from the party chairmanship in 2001 (to focus his energies on his last months as president), a number of corruption scandals and a disastrous defeat in the 2001 by-election, a number of young reform-minded politicians emerged as a new force within the MDP. The most significant figures were Chun Jung-bae, Shin Ki-nam –

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26 The author owes much of the information about the development of inter-factional conflict within Korean parties contained in this and the following paragraphs to personal communication with Jin-Min Chung (16 April and 23 April 2008) and Wook Kim (17 April 2008).
both human rights lawyers – and Chung Dong-young, a former TV-anchorman. All three politicians had been nominated by Kim Dae-jung as candidates for the 1996 National Assembly election to give the party a younger image. The faction led by these politicians (commonly known in Korea as Chun-Shin-Chung) rallied behind Roh Moo-hyun who was nominated as the MDP's candidate for the 2002 presidential election and then defeated Lee Hoi-chang of the GNP by a small margin.

After this defeat, reform-minded politicians also gained more power within the GNP – albeit to a much lesser extent than in the MDP – eventually forcing Lee Hoi-chang to step down as party president. Choe Byung-yul, again a rather conservative politician, was elected as his successor in 2003. However, the progressive camp more or less restored the balance of power only a few days later when reform-oriented Hong Sa-duk became the party's floor leader in the National Assembly. Amid continuing demands for party reform, Choe's presidency only lasted for a few months. In March 2004, he was replaced by Park Geun-hye. Being the daughter of ex-dictator Park Chung-hee, Park enjoyed strong support among conservative forces within the GNP, while her corruption-free image also pleased more progressive thinkers. She was therefore a party president acceptable to both sides.

Meanwhile, in the MDP, the movement around Chun-Shin-Chung was very disappointed by the merely marginal support the party showed for newly elected president Roh Moo-hyun and thus, in September 2003, split away from the MDP to form the Yeollin Uidang (generally abbreviated to Uri Party, “our party”). In addition to 42 of the MDP's 103 lawmakers, this newly established party also attracted five
legislators of the GNP. Moreover, it absorbed the Reform Party under the leadership of Yu Si-min that had emerged out of Roh Sa Mo – the mass social movement uniting supporters of Roh Moo-hyun in the 2002 election. The Yu Si-min group soon established itself as the dominant faction in the Uri Party: As the most fervent supporters of Roh they profited enormously from Roh’s high popularity ratings during the early stages of his presidency – more than any other grouping within the Uri Party.

In the GNP, factions again began to form around presidential hopefuls. While Park Geun-hye – with her election as the party chairman in 2004 – had established herself as one of them, Lee Myung-bak, the mayor of Seoul, slowly ascended as her main competitor. The two politicians represent very different groupings within the GNP: Park has the support of the older guard of politicians with constituencies in the GNP’s traditional stronghold in the southeast of the Korean peninsula; Lee enjoys the backing of more progressive assemblymen from Seoul and the provinces around Seoul. Lee Myung-bak seems to have won the power struggle for now, as he was nominated as the GNP’s presidential candidate for the 2007. However, as several Park supporters, who had left the GNP shortly after to found the Pro-Park Alliance, were able to win parliamentary seats in the 2008 National Assembly elections, Park is seen by many as the actual winner of the latest elections, which will definitely strengthen her position within the GNP.

The Uri Party also witnessed a major reshuffle of internal power before the 2007 presidential elections. After president Roh’s popularity dropped dramatically – leading to a series of humiliating defeats for the Uri Party in the 2005 by-elections – the
Yu Si-min faction’s power within the party decreased simultaneously. Finally, as politicians wanted to distance themselves from Roh as far as possible in order not to jeopardise their chances in the 2007 and 2008 elections, 80 out of 152 lawmakers of the Uri Party left the party to establish the UNDP in August 2007. Factions soon grouped around those politicians with good chances of winning the party’s nomination as the presidential candidate: the aforementioned Chung Dong-young, Son Hak-gyu (the former governor of Gyeonggi-do who had joined the UNDP with a small group of progressive politicians from the GNP) and Lee Hae-chan (former prime minister under Roh Moo-hyun). Chung won the party’s nomination, but was then defeated in a landslide by Lee Myung-bak. Before the 2008 National Assembly election, the UNDP was merged with the DP – the successor of the MDP – to form the UDP, with Son Hak-gyu elected as its chairman.

In short, after departure of the three Kims, conflict arose within both of the parties between old party elites and younger politicians. As these younger politicians were not embedded into the existing clientelistic structures they had to develop different strategies in order to be elected into office. They did so by reintroducing economic incentives into the regional cleavage and extending regionalism to other parts of the Korean peninsula. In fact, according to Hyeok Yong Kwon, one of the leading experts on electoral behaviour in Korea, economic voting and the distribution of pork have become the most important factors to explain voting in national elections.27 One example for this recent trend is Lee Myung-bak’s promise in the 2007

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27 Personal communication with Hyeok Yong Kwon, 7 April 2008.
presidential election to use public funds to turn Seoul’s greenbelt into a massive housing programme, thereby providing investment opportunities for voters in his home constituency.\footnote{The author is very much indebted to Eun-Jeung Lee for pointing out this example (personal communication, 15 April 2008).} Put in more abstract terms, because these younger politicians lack private resources to establish patron-client relationships, they are using public goods to mobilise voters. They do so not in a legal grey zone but through the lawful distribution of pork barrel programmes. This represents a notable departure from earlier clientelistic strategies and thus confirms one of the central tenets of our analytical framework, that social actors are able to develop alternative strategies within the same context.

However, while these strategies do not differ categorically from the strategically selected outcome, as they are still clientelistic in nature, real disparities become obvious when looking into the Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDLP), which is populated with actors campaigning on programmatic electoral appeals. The KDLP emerged out of the pro-democratic student movement, which had always been divided into two main streams: the National Liberation and the Political Democracy factions. The National Liberation’s main political aim was the reunification of Korea and – strongly influenced by North Korea’s \textit{Juche} ideology – the realisation of autonomy of the Korean nation from US imperialism, while the Political Democracy faction were followers of traditional Marxist-Leninist ideas and thus put more emphasis on the liberation of the worker, as opposed to the liberation of the nation. Accordingly, both streams also differed in their strategies: Whereas the National...
Liberation stressed participation in the regular political process and sought to build a “united front” of all Koreans that would also include the middle class, the Political Democracy group took a class-based approach that only aimed at improving the position of the working class through organising strikes and demonstrations. However, with the founding of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in 1995, the Political Democracy movement slowly adopted a more participatory strategy, and soon joined the National Liberation’s efforts to establish an independent progressive party that could successfully compete with the existing parties created by the three Kims.

Finally, cooperation between the two groups ended in the founding of the KDLP in January 2000. While the KDLP defines its constituency as including farmers, small business entrepreneurs, the urban poor, women, the disabled, youth, students and concerned intellectuals, it is primarily a party that seeks to represent Korea’s working class (Gray 2008: 119). The party’s electoral breakthrough came in the 2002 local elections, in which it received 8.3% of the votes. Then, in 2004, ten KDLP candidates were elected into the National Assembly, making the KDLP the country’s third largest party. However, analyses of the 2004 elections show that the party was not very successful in gaining the support of its core constituency, but most votes seems to have been “protest votes”, which suggests that mobilising the Korean working class is still a very difficult task (Lee and Lim 2006: 328). In fact, the KDLP was unable to repeat its success in the 2008 elections, when it only won five legislative seats.
As the National Liberation had been the driving force behind the founding of the KDLP it was initially the dominant faction within the party. However, the continuation of Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy through Roh Moo-hyun – finally leading to an eight-point peace agreement between South and North Korea in October 2007 – made it difficult for the National Liberation to justify the KDLP’s continuing strong focus on the relations with the communist regime in the north. Hence, the Political Democracy faction was strengthened, and for the first time in the party’s history factional fissures became visible to the public, when the party’s nomination process for the 2007 presidential election turned into a race between Kwon Young-ghil from the National Liberation faction and Shim Sang-jeong from the Political Democracy faction. When Kwon won the nomination, several members of the Political Democracy faction, including Shim, left the KDLP to found the New Progressive Party (NPP).

To sum up, the post-autocratic context in South Korea clearly favours clientelistic over programmatic electoral strategies. Both old regime elites and the pro-democratic opposition were able to maintain their clientelistic networks through the democratic transition, and – although the socio-economic conditions that provided the breeding ground for these networks have largely disappeared – the distribution of clientelistic rewards still plays an important role when accounting for voting behaviour in Korea. In recent years, younger politicians have emerged within the major parties, challenging the old guards and their clientelistic networks. Lacking the resources to maintain similar networks, these younger politicians have introduced economic incentives into the regional cleavage through the allocation of
public goods to their own constituencies. However, while this is certainly an interesting case to study strategic calculations, the most striking evidence for actors being able to develop alternative strategies within the same context is to be found in the KDLP, where factions are campaigning on narrowly focused programmatic platforms – something we should theoretically not expect in young democracies of the “third wave”.

**Party organisation**

Based on the different electoral strategies political actors pursue in South Korea – clientelistic and programmatic – we should expect a similar diversity of party organisations. In fact, as will be seen in the following sections, the parties of Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung served merely as formal cloaks to cover their extensive patron-client networks, making it very difficult to distinguish between the three faces of party organisation. This is still true for the two major parties today, but younger politicians have successfully pushed for a formal regulation of candidate selection, making the process less dependent on money and other resources. In contrast, in the KDLP, where politicians follow programmatic strategies for voter mobilisation, the three faces of party organisation are clearly distinguishable, with the party central office enjoying the most powerful position.
Membership

Political parties in South Korea portray themselves as large membership organisations based on dense networks of local branches that cover the whole country. For instance, in his analysis of party institutionalisation in neo-democratic Korea, Köllner (2003: 7) cites a longer passage from a GNP brochure, in which the party tries to convey the impression that its members are integrated into a complex organizational hierarchy, which gives every member the possibility of participating in the internal decision-making of the party:

The Grand National Party (Hannara Party) consists of the Central Party (Party Hq), 16 City & Provincial Chapters and 253 district parties each of which has a secretariat. [...] The city & provincial convention consists of 150 to 300 representatives. It performs such functions as electing representatives for the National convention, operating the committees of the Central Committee, choosing the chairmen of city & provincial chapters, deliberating on matters recommended by the district party, and submitting recommendations of every kind to Central Party. [...] The district convention consists of 100 to 150 representatives. It performs such functions as choosing the chairmen of district chapters, electing representatives for the National Convention, and submitting recommendations of every kind to Central Party.
However, in reality, the local branches of political parties in Korea are usually just the personal political machine of the assemblyman or candidate in the respective constituency. The formal local party chapter only serves as a cloak for the politician’s personal network of supporters at the grassroots level. These networks are the true source of political identity for party members. People do not join the local party organisation because they share the party’s ideological positions or because they feel they belong to a distinctive social grouping. Instead, “the district party is based [...] on personal and particularistic bonds between a political boss and followers” (Park 1988: 1051). Hence, party members are usually recruited among friends and relatives of the local political boss, or they join because they are otherwise socially connected to the boss, such as through school ties or regional provenance. Moreover, party membership networks are held together by the boss’ provision of particularistic benefits and favours in return for electoral support.

The status of the local party branch as an autonomous membership organisation from the party central at the national level is further reinforced by the fact that the membership register is kept by the district chapter chair privately, not by the regional branch officially.29 The political boss thus has exclusive access to all membership data, which means that any effective communication between the party headquarters and the individual member will be dependent on the boss’ cooperation. The powerful position of the assemblyman or candidate was further strengthened in 2004, when an amendment to the Party Law Act abolished the requirement for part-

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29 Personal communication with Yong-Ho Kim, 12 April 2008.
ties to be based on a dense network of local party chapters. Although the main purpose of this amendment was to lower the expenses for political parties in order to reduce the need to accept illegal donations, local bosses have found ways to maintain the institutionalisation of their personal networks without party funding. For instance, work that was previously done by full-time party staff, is now often delegated to friends and family or to employees in the boss’ own private company. In other words, the personal networks of supporters of assemblymen and candidates are now established as the parties’ grassroots organisation, as political parties only have official representation at the provincial level.

Outside the formal party organisation every legislator maintains other informal vote-gathering machines that do not function under the official banner of the party. These so-called sajojik can take different forms. Some common examples include friendship societies, clan groups, alumni groups, hiking clubs, and other recreation groups. Usually, the assemblyman does not directly influence the operation of the informal groups affiliated with him or her, and will only act as their sponsor and advisor. In the case of long-serving parliamentarians, the sajojik are characterized by a certain degree of stability, but they have never achieved the same level of institutionalisation as the personal vote-gathering machines found in neighbouring Japan.

30 Up until 2004 Articles 25 and 26 of the Party Law Act required political parties to have district offices in at least one-tenth of the electoral districts and five of the seven main metropolitan areas. District branches had to consist of at least 30 members.
31 One example given by Heike Hermanns (personal communication with the author, 16 April 2008) is the case of a GNP candidate in the 2008 National Assembly election, who turned her English language school into the virtual local party branch, with members of staff having to help out with the organisation of the campaign and other administrative work. In such cases money is usually paid under the table, or employees are compensated with a gift or a free meal.
(koenkai) (Köllner 2003: 8).\footnote{32 For a detailed analysis of the Japanese koenkai see Bouissou (1999).} Regarding membership, it must be noted that although there can be high personal overlap between the formal party branch and the sajojik, members of the latter do not automatically become formal party members.

A slightly different type of support organisation to the sajojik emerged in the run-up to the 2002 presidential election, when followers of Roh Moo-hyun used the internet to form a fan club, known as Roh Sa Mo (literally, gathering of the people who love Roh). This virtual support group attracted a lot of attention, mostly from younger voters, who – disillusioned with the old style of politics – came together on the web to debate policy issues and mobilise votes for Roh – a human rights lawyer and for many a real alternative to the old guard of politicians. As this online network of supporters proved to be an important pool of voters behind Roh’s electoral success (Walker and Kang 2004: 843), similar websites mushroomed before the 2004 National Assembly. This time, however, fan websites were created on the initiative of the candidates – not by the supporters themselves – who tried to attract visitors with online games, personal blogs, videos and other contents. Since then, however, the virtual networks of supporters have dramatically declined in importance, since the new Election Law revised in 2004 stipulates that internet portals should not post any content, which supports or opposes a political party or a candidate 180 days before the election (Article 93). In fact, in the 2007 presidential elections the internet hardly played any role at all (Woo and Lee 2008).
Although there is thus a formal concept of party membership that distinguishes party members from ordinary citizens, it seems a bit misleading to speak of party membership, as voters join parties through their personal loyalty to the local assemblyman or candidate. Moreover, the criteria that define party members are very limited. Parties usually refer to the Political Party Act, which states that any person older than 19 years (20 years up until 2005) may join a party – with the exception of public officials, which included most teachers, and, up until 2000, labour-union functionaries. In addition, membership fees are relatively low and generally not enforced. For example, the rules of Kim Young-sam’s NKP (1995-1997) prescribed that party members should pay at least 1,000 KRW (about 0.50 GBP) (Kim Y.H. 1998: 145). The successor party of the NKP, the GNP, charges 2,000 KRW per month, which members are, again, not obliged to pay\textsuperscript{33}, while the UDP does not specify a fixed sum, but members can make a voluntary contribution\textsuperscript{34}. In other words, joining either of these parties only requires filling in a membership form. What is more, cases have been reported when people were even signed up as party members without their own knowledge.\textsuperscript{35} This commonly happens when the head of a voluntary social organisation has strong personal connections to a local boss and simply transfers the members of his or her organisation into the party membership register.

\textsuperscript{33} Personal communication with the GNP, 17 April 2008.
\textsuperscript{34} Personal communication with the UDP, 24 April 2008.
\textsuperscript{35} Personal communication with Eun-Jeung Lee, 15 April 2008.
The only major political party in South Korea that attaches higher requirements to party membership is the KDLP.\textsuperscript{36} In order to be granted full party membership, individuals must pay a monthly fee that ranges from 5,000 KRW (2.50 GBP) for those without a regular income (i.e. students, housewives, senior or disabled citizens) to 10,000 KRW (5 GBP) for everybody else. Moreover, in addition to signing a declaration, saying that they will adhere to the party statutes, aspiring members need to attend an introductory lecture to familiarise them with the party's policies and decision-making structures. In contrast to the other major parties in Korea, the KDLP keeps a membership register at the party central office, with two full-time members of staff responsible solely for the maintenance of the register. The KDLP also distinguishes itself from its competitors in that its members are organised into 150 genuine party branches across the country, each with local organisation at the neighbourhood or workplace level. Unlike in other Korean parties, the local chapters are organised by the party as an organisation, not by a local boss as his or her personal machine.

In 2004, the newly founded Uri Party experimented with the introduction of a membership model similar to the one of KDLP, trying to enforce regular dues among its members. Initially, the monthly membership fee was set to 8,000 KRW (4 GBP), but over the next months it was continuously reduced to 6,000 and then to 2,000 KRW, before finally dropping the obligation of a regular financial contribution completely. The statutes of Uri Party had originally also stipulated that party members

\textsuperscript{36} The information in this paragraph was obtained through personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008.
should attend at least one party meeting a month, but as with the membership fee this requirement was soon abandoned.37 Clearly, these measures to make the party membership less inclusive reflect the strategic calculations of the dominant Yu Si-min group within the Uri Party, which contained large numbers of fervent Roh Moo-hyun supporters.

The KDLP also differs from the two older parties regarding membership activity. In both the UDP and the GNP – and in their respective parent parties – members are usually dormant and will only become active shortly before elections, when they help with the electoral campaign. One common sight in the streets of major Korean cities during the 2008 electoral campaign, for instance, was groups of supporters of the local candidate – all dressed in the party’s colours – performing choreographed dances to the party’s official pop song.38 Not surprisingly then, party members of the GNP and UDP receive no significant training from the party. The NKP, Kim Young-sam’s party, used to maintain a Central Training Centre at the central level to provide political education for party officials and activists, but, as Yong-ho Kim (1998: 148) points out, the effectiveness of these training programmes was highly questionable.

In the KDLP, in contrast, members are active throughout the year. The party’s local chapters usually hold two meetings per week: one political meeting, in which current events and party related matters are discussed, and – in the style of socialist

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37 Personal communication with Yong-ho Kim, 12 April 2008.
38 Usually, the campaign songs are light upbeat pop tunes – sometimes based on the melody of famous chart hits – which in their lyrics will constantly repeat the party’s name and party’s number on the voting ballot as well as the key words of the party’s pledges.
parties in early 20th century Europe – one social meeting, where members come together for activities such as hiking tours. Moreover, although there is no institution-alised training programme for party members as such, local chapters can request ad hoc training sessions from the party central, which, according to the party's own report, happens very frequently.39

After this cross-party analysis of party membership it has become clear that the traditional parties on the one side and the KDLP on the other side are aiming to recruit very different types of members. What is more, in the case of the GNP and the UDP – and the parties of Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung respectively – it is probably even better not to speak of party membership, as individuals primarily join the personal network of the local assemblyman or candidate. In fact, neither of these two parties makes any centrally coordinated effort to recruit new members. However, at the same time, both parties do not hold off presenting large membership figures. While in the mid-1990s Kim Young-sam's NKP claimed to have about three million members (Kim Y.H. 1998: 146), in 2008 its successor, the GNP, still maintains to have a membership of 1,070,000.40 Similarly, the UDP purports to have roughly one million members.41 This roughly translates to a membership/electorate ratio of 2.6% for each of the major parties. However, it is widely known that Korean parties vastly inflate their membership figures when prompted by political scien-

39 This paragraph is based on information provided by the KDLP through personal communication with the author on 15 April 2008.
40 Personal communication with the GNP, 17 April 2008.
41 Personal communication with the UDP, 24 April 2008.
tists in order to create the impression that they have strong support in society (Köllner 2002: 11).

In the Korean context, in contrast, political parties do not even seem to value members as statistic, since their clientelistic strategies do not require parties to give the illusion that they are strongly rooted in society. For the candidates, on the other hand, members are a loyal pool of voters. While they also provide free labour during election campaigns, this contribution is far from vital for electoral success. Moreover, votes can also be mobilised outside the formal party structure through the numerous sajojik affiliated with each candidate. In other words, members within both traditional parties have virtually no power, as there is very little to distinguish them from regular voters. Correspondingly, members do not enjoy significantly more participatory rights in the parties’ internal decision-making processes than the average citizen, as will be shown in the next chapter.

On the other hand, in the KDLP, the party on the ground enjoys some considerable power. First of all, the fact that members pay regularly fees makes them a valuable financial asset to the party. According to the KDLP’s own declaration, in 2007, about 50 per cent of the party’s total income came from membership payments.42 This again stands in stark contrast to the budget structure of the two more traditional parties, which in 2003 obtained only 16 per cent (GNP) and 12 per cent (MDP) of their total income from membership dues (National Election Commission undated). However, it must be noted in many cases, these dues are paid by the po-

42 Personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008.
political boss of the member’s local branch, not by the member. Secondly, the fact that the KDLP holds regular meetings at the local level and organises political training sessions for its members, shows that the party perceives its membership as a pool of candidates for public election. This – in addition to their financial contribution – gives KDLP members yet another source of power within the party.

As a result, the membership figures published by the KDLP, as opposed to the blown-up figures of the other major parties, actually hold significance. As of 2008 the party claimed to have about 80,000 members, of which roughly 50,000 pay their dues regularly. However, only the latter group are regarded as full members who are given voting rights in the party’s decision-making processes, which thus clearly distinguishes them from the ordinary voter outside the party (see next section for more details). The figure seems reliable, and is supported by the literature (Gray 2008: 119). In terms of membership strength the 50,000 members translate to 0.13% of the total electorate – or 5.1% of the party’s electorate in 2008. Particularly the M/E ratio is relatively low when compared to the average M/E in the established democracies of Western Europe (see Mair and van Biezen 2001: 9), but in the South Korean context of alarmingly high levels of political apathy this must be interpreted in a different light, particularly if we remind ourselves that the KDLP is the only party that charges membership fees.

43 Personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008.
44 One indicator for political apathy in South Korea is the declining level of voter turnout. In the 2008 National Assembly elections turnout hit a record-low 46 per cent, down 14.6 percentage points from the 2004 elections and 11.2% from the elections in 2000. For an analysis of recent public opinion surveys on Koreans’ views on democracy and politics see Shin, Park and Jang (2005).
To sum up, traditionally, the party on the ground in Korean parties is hardly recognisable. Members are merely passive subjects in the personal network of the local assemblyman or candidate, and they hardly differ from the average voter outside the party, since membership obligations and rights are negligible. The only exception to this general pattern is the KDLP – founded in 2000 – which to some extent tries to emulate the grassroots organisation of the classical socialist party in early 20th century Europe. Because in the KDLP party membership is attached to a number of demanding criteria, members – in their role as financial supporters and potential candidates – carry some significant weight.

**Candidate selection**

While the membership structure of political parties – except for the newly founded KDLP – has remained the same since the end of the authoritarian regime, there has been some significant change in the ways the relevant parties select their candidates for public elections at the national level. Fundamentally, the development of candidate selection procedures can be divided into a “three Kims” phase and a post-“three Kims” phase. Although Article 31 of the old Party Law Act demanded that “the nomination of public post candidates by parties must be made in a democratic manner”, the selection of candidates has only recently become more inclusive. For more
than a decade after the first and free elections in 1987 decision-making in all relevant parties of South Korea had been highly centralised. All control over the nomination of electoral candidates rested with the party leader (Kim Y.H. 1998: 151), and it is probably not an exaggeration to say that “they ran the parties as if they were feudal lords” (Im 2004: 189).

A thorough description of candidate selection during the “three Kims” era can be found in K.S. Kim’s (1997) case study of the 1996 National Assembly election. The usual practice in Korean parties then was to select a district party chair, who – almost automatically – became the party’s candidate of that district in the coming election. In order to nominate the local party chairs, both Kim Young-sam’s NKP and Kim Dae-jung’s NCNP established a kind of screening committee. These committees, composed of high-ranking party officials, reviewed both incumbents and newly applying candidates, and submitted their recommendations to the party president. The president then made the final decision on whom to nominate. In the case of the NCNP, party leader Kim Dae-jung announced that he would not alter the screening committee’s selection of district chairs, but it was a matter of common knowledge that his intentions were carried out by close aides in the committee.

In other words, the selection of candidates was perfectly monopolised by the party leader. In fact, nomination for a National Assembly mandate could be bought from the party leader in return for a donation (Chon 2000: 72). Besides corporate donations, this practice was the most stable financial resource for parties during the “three Kims” era – particularly for opposition parties, as these lacked the power to
influence government policies. The price varied according to the prospects of success. The higher one wanted to be ranked on the party list – used in addition to single-member plurality in Korea’s parallel electoral system – the more one was expected to donate to the party.

Using the process of candidate selection as an indicator for the distribution of power within political parties during the “three Kims” era, we can follow Thornton and Korvick (2003: 292) and offer the following summary:

This highly centralized leadership style has contributed to low levels of internal party democracy. Party members are dependent on the party leader for political advancement, and opposition or criticism of the party leadership is tantamount to political suicide. Loyalty to the party leader is often rewarded with “safe” electoral districts.

The processes of candidate selection in Korean parties have only become more democratic since the late 1990s. The first party to organise its nomination system according to more abstract regulations was the NKP. When Kim Young-sam announced his retirement from politics after the end of his presidential term in 1997, the party had to appoint a new candidate for the upcoming elections. The newly implemented rules governed that the presidential candidate was to be elected by the delegates in the NKP’s national convention. Moreover, the ratio of ex-officio posts versus elected delegates in the convention was shifted from 40:60 to 15:85. In order
to register a bid for candidacy, the recommendation of at least 50 delegates from three regions was required (Lee H.C. 2002). Overall, these regulations marked a historical milestone, as it was the first time since the beginning of the democratic transition in South Korea that a presidential candidate was selected through competition among multiple aspirants. On the other hand, the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections remained highly centralised in a special committee of party leaders. Candidates were evaluated by criteria such as public visibility, loyalty to the party, connections with the top leader, and likelihood of victory (Park C.W. 2000; see also Köllner and Frank 1999: 96).

The selection of candidates became much more inclusive when Kim Dae-jung left the political arena four years later. To nominate a candidate for the 2002 presidential elections, his then party, the MDP, implemented a system that combined a closed and an open primary. Voting for the open primary took place in several cities, and votes were then averaged with the results of a vote among party members. Shortly after, the GNP, the successor party of the NKP, adopted the same system to select its presidential candidate.

However, in order to fully understand the meaning of these seemingly democratic reforms, it is necessary to take into consideration the membership structure of Korean parties. As was explained in the previous section, party members are primarily passive subjects at the lower ends of a local boss’ patron-client network. In return for particularistic services, members promise the boss electoral support. While we have so far only discussed how these clientelistic practices affect elections
outside the party, it is common practice that the boss will also demand his or her cli-
ents’ votes inside the party. Hence, in the case of a closed primary, for instance, the
boss will instruct his or her members to vote for the candidate endorsed by his or
her faction, or – if he or she stands for election – for him- or herself (Lee H.C. 2002).
Similarly, votes in an open primary can effectively be mobilised through the boss’
sajojik. In other words, opening up the selection of the presidential candidate to the
wider party membership and general electorate, did not strengthen the party on the
ground, but it simply distributed the power that had originally been monopolised in
the hands of the party leader among a larger group of political bosses.

In the KDLP, in contrast, members enjoy genuine voting rights, which are not
undermined by informal dependencies on local bosses. Moreover, its procedures of
candidate selection again underline the value that the party attaches to members, as
to nominate the presidential candidate for the 2002 election the KDLP held a closed
primary, without extending voting rights to the common citizen. Hence, members of
the KDLP not only differ from non-members in their obligations, but also in their
rights. The party on the ground in the KDLP is therefore much stronger than the
grassroots members in the traditional parties, who only carry out voting instruc-
tions given by their respective patron.

The same applies for the 2004 National Assembly elections, for which the three
traditional parties – the GNP, the Uri Party, and the dwindling MDP – organised the
selection of candidates in very similar ways to 2002, and, again, based nomination
on the combined result of a closed and an open primary, whereby both outcomes
were weighted equally. However, to be able to participate in the primary, candidates needed the endorsement of their party’s “independent” screening commission. These commissions were appointed by the party leadership, and consisted of party officials and popular personalities of Korean society (such as clerics, professors or writers). Moreover, the party leadership reserved itself the right to make so-called “strategic” selections. That is to say, the leadership could nominate candidates without the need of a primary, if they felt that this was necessary to secure electoral victory. And, in fact, the leaders of the three parties made extensive use of that right: The GNP only held 15 primaries for a total of 228 nominations (6.6%), the Uri Party 86 in a total of 229 districts (37.6%), and the MDP 73 out of 217 (33.6%) (Kim and Kim 2005). In other words, the selection of candidates was – to a very high degree – still controlled by the party leadership.

The only exception was again the KDLP, which held a closed primary in each constituency to nominate the candidates for the SMP race in Korea’s parallel electoral system. The composition of the party list was decided by the party’s executive committee, but it then needed to be approved by the vote of the whole party membership. Moreover, in drawing up the party list, the leadership is bound by specific rules in the party’s constitution, such as the requirement that the first candidate on the list must be a disabled person.45

For the 2007 presidential election the two traditional parties went away from the 50-50 formula and adopted much more complicated rules. Particularly the sys-

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45 Personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008.
tem institutionalised by the GNP seemed a patchwork of different methods and selectorates. While the overall selectorate size was 231,652 (representing 0.5% of the total electorate), votes were not counted equally. 20 per cent of the votes came from “representative party members”. This group consisted of 4,811 members who were holding a public office either on the national, provincial or local level, and 41,386 regular party members who were appointed by these office holders. Another 30 per cent of the vote came from “other party members” (69,496), whose vote was again split between members who had paid a regular membership fee of 2,000 KRW for at least 18 months, and all other members. Moreover, the party conducted phone interviews with randomly selected voters outside the party, which accounted for 30 per cent of the total vote. As this “citizen committee” was supposed to embody the average Korean electorate, this was done until enough representative votes from all age groups and both genders had been collected. Finally, in order to fill the last 20 per cent of the selectorate, the party commissioned three independent social-survey organisations to ask 5,490 randomly chosen citizens for their candidate preferences.

The UNDP – successor of the Uri Party – also changed its procedure to select its presidential candidate, albeit less drastically than the GNP. A two-round process was adopted, in which the first round served to find the five top-runners that would then be allowed to participate in the second round. The selectorate in the first round consisted of randomly selected voters through an opinion poll (50 per cent of the

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46 Personal communication with the GNP, 17 April 2008.
total vote) and 10,000 randomly selected party members (another 50 per cent). In the second round an open primary was held, that counted 90 per cent towards the final result. In order to participate in the primary, voters could vote in one of eight multi-provincial primaries or they could also cast their vote by sending a text message from their mobile phone.\footnote{Before being able to participate in the mobile-phone vote voters had to register on the party’s website. Personal details needed for registration were kept to a minimum: name, resident registration number, address and phone number.} The remaining 10 per cent of the final vote came from a public opinion poll conducted across the country.\footnote{Personal communication with the UDP, 24 April 2008.}

The KDLP, again, did not invite common citizens to participate in its process to nominate the presidential candidate for 2007, but, similarly to the UNDP, a two-round system was adopted. The new rules stipulated that a second round of voting would be held if in the first round no candidate won an absolute majority of votes, while only allowing the two top runners to participate in the second round. In both rounds the size of the selectorate was 50,117, equalling the number members regularly paying the membership fee. Members could exercise their vote either in one of 227 voting stations across the country, or online on the party’s website.\footnote{Personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008.}

While the KDLP kept its closed primary system to nominate candidates for the 2008 National Assembly election, the traditional parties again revised their procedures by abolishing the possibility of holding primaries at the district level. The nomination of candidates thus became the exclusive domain of the “independent” screening committees. In both the GNP and the UDP – the successor of the UNDP – this committee was nominated by the respective party’s executive committee. In the
case of the GNP, the committee had eleven members – six from outside the party and five party members. Among the six outsiders were university professors, leaders of NGOs and a former public prosecutor, while of the five insiders two were assemblymen and three party politicians without public office.\textsuperscript{50} Similarly, the UDP nominated six members from outside the party – two university professors, a lawyer, a medical doctor, a museum director and a poet – and four assemblymen from within the party.\textsuperscript{51}

It thus seems that with the introduction of the screening committees the two traditional parties have reverted to the un-democratic style of the “three Kims” era. However, the reforms must be seen in the light of inter-factional conflict within the parties. As the old guards within the party still controlled the vast majority of party members, any efforts to democratise the procedure had to open the decision-making process to non-members outside the party. However, even outside the party long-established politicians have a competitive advantage, since they potentially control large shares of the electorate through their sajojik. In other words, younger politicians needed to find other ways to ensure a fair competition, which is why they pushed for the introduction of independent screening committees. These committees refused to nominate candidates who had been found guilty of corruption and

\textsuperscript{50} Personal communication with the GNP, 17 April 2008.
\textsuperscript{51} Personal communication with the UDP, 24 April 2008.
other illegal activities.\textsuperscript{52} This particularly affected the old guards, who – in order to fuel their clientelistic networks with resources – are much more likely to engage in corrupt activities than younger politicians. The committees seemed to have been quite independent in their decisions and it now seems more difficult, if not impossible, to buy a nomination from one of two major parties.\textsuperscript{53}

To sum up, this section supports the conclusion formulated after the earlier discussion of the membership structure of Korean parties: The party on the ground in the two traditional parties is virtually powerless. While during the “three Kims” era candidate selection was decided only by the party leader, the formally more democratic procedures institutionalised thereafter did not succeed in cutting through the informal patron-client networks that connect the party leaders to the grassroots membership. As a result, younger politicians have pushed very hard to move candidate selection outside the political party – either by conducting public opinion polls or giving the decision-making power to independent screening committees. In the KDLP, on the other hand, candidate selection is organised according to effectively democratic rules. However, different to its membership structure, the KDLP does not follow the classical mass-party model, which is usually associated with a hierar-

\textsuperscript{52} For instance, prominent figures that were eliminated by the UDP’s screening committee included former presidential chief of staff Park Ji-won, Kim Hong-up – Kim Dae-jung’s second son – and Lee Yong-hee, a four-term lawmaker. Park was convicted of taking 100 million KRW (50,000 GBP) in bribes from two local conglomerates, while Kim Hong-up was found guilty of receiving about 2.5 billion KRW (1.2 million GBP) from several companies in July 2002. Lee Yong-hee received a suspended jail term for taking bribes.

\textsuperscript{53} The only alleged case of a bought National Assembly seat in the 2008 election concerned the Pro-Park Geun-hye Alliance – a splinter party from the GNP – which placed publicly unknown Yang Jung-rye as the number one candidate on its party list – after her mother had donated 1.55 billion KRW (about 782,000 GBP) to the party. However, the party claims that it only borrowed the money to cover electoral campaign costs.
chical system of delegation, but rather more contemporary models of party organisation and the principle of “one member, one vote”. This weakens the party on the ground, as members are atomised and will thus have difficulties coordinating a serious challenge to the other two faces. However, in order to determine which of the organisational faces within each of the Korean parties should be regarded as dominant, let us turn to the next section.

Distribution of resources and decision-making positions

When discussing the distribution of internal resources in Korean political parties, we can once again observe significant differences between the parties of the three Kims, on the one hand, and their successor parties on the other. During the “three Kims” era, all politically relevant resources were channelled through the hands of the respective party leader. Given that the three Kims shared almost the total national vote among them, aspiring politicians were practically forced to join the party of one of the Kims. Establishing a fourth party or standing as an independent candidate would have been futile, since the regional electoral strongholds of the three Kims were impossible to break. Moreover, the three Kims did not only attract the majority of votes, but at the same time acted as a “magnet” for substantial financial donations. Similarly to voters, who would not waste their vote on a fourth party,
businesses would not invest in a party that could not be expected to win. Particularly the ruling party was thus a popular choice for corporate donations, which were often paid as “quasi-taxes” – principally by the large conglomerates, the *jaebol* (Kang 2002; see also Park B.S. 1995).

As donations were given directly to the party leader, this led to the emergence of a hierarchical exchange of money and loyalty through a system of patronage embedded within the political parties. Money was handed down to the faction leaders for their political support, who would then inject the money into their own clientelistic networks until it reached the grassroots members. This high degree of control the three Kims exerted over both the collection and distribution of party funds made assemblymen and candidates highly dependent on their respective party leader. Expressed in the words of a civic group leader cited in Thornton and Kovick (2003: 293), “money is the channel through which party bosses keep candidates subordinate”.

However, not only assemblymen and candidates depended on the party leader for their political survival, but the whole party as an organisation. This explains the short life span of Korean political parties throughout the 1990s, since parties only existed at the mercy of their leader, and were dissolved, merged or renamed according to the leader’s own interest. In case the leader chose to leave the party, the party would simply die, as it had no value in itself. Although the parties of the three Kims were highly bureaucratised, the party bureaucracy would usually follow the party
leader into his new party or cease to exist with the new one.\textsuperscript{54} This shows that the party central was best understood as the “property” of the party boss, solely employed to perform organisational and administrative tasks.

As a result of this dependency on the party leader, the three Kims also monopolised all decision-making responsibilities. In the parliamentary party, the unquestioned authority of the leader was further strengthened by the practice of nominating a large number of fresh candidates who, when and if elected, were placed around a core of very experienced parliamentarians. These experienced lawmakers conducted the work in committees and the party’s caucus according to the guidelines of the party leader. While more experienced parliamentarians were often bound to the party leader by decades long political loyalty, the newly elected deputies were normally inexperienced, did not have their own political networks, and depended very much on the support of the party patron when it came to their political career (Croissant 2002). Finally – as an indicator of the party leader’s decision-making authority and a factor that further reinforced his authority – the floor leader was not usually chosen by the Assembly members of the party but appointed by the party president.

The dependency on individual party leaders decreased when the three Kims left politics. Moreover, stricter political financing laws were crafted, which meant that it became more difficult for individual politicians to collect large corporate donations.

\textsuperscript{54} For instance, the secretariat of Kim Young-sam’s NKP was a large organisation with three-tier offices on a geographical basis (the central office, the province/city offices and the electoral district offices), employing about 1,200 full-time staff. Kim Dae-jung’s NCNP, which was in opposition then, still had 300 party employees on its payroll (Kim Y.H. 1998: 150).
Already in 1999, president Kim Dae-jung launched a national anti-corruption programme, which tightened the regulations on donations and contributions, imposing ceilings on the amounts individuals and corporate bodies could give to the central party organisation or a local branch. Moreover, the new Political Fund Act established an annual government subsidy for political parties calculated at the rate of 800 KRW (0.40 GBP) for each vote cast in the most recent National Assembly election. However, given both the high running expenses of Korean parties and the embarrassing corruption scandal surrounding Kim Dae-jung’s own son in 2000, the effectiveness and wholeheartedness of these reforms must be seriously questioned (Ferdinand 2003: 65).

A more serious attempt to reform political financing laws was made in 2004. First of all, a lower limit for financial contributions was set, as the maximum amount money each assemblyman is allowed to collect each year decreased by half – from three billion KRW (150,000 GBP) to one and a half billion KRW – while the maximum amount each voter can donate a year was lowered to 20 million KRW (10,000 GBP), which is only one sixth of the previous limit. Secondly, the new laws regulate unidentifiable money: The maximum amount for anonymous donations, per person and per donation, is now 100,000 KRW (50 GBP) – lowered by one tenth – and donations larger than 500,000 KRW (250 GBP) must now be transferred through check or credit card. The new political funding laws were passed through the initiative of younger politicians across different parties. They did this with the support of civil society organisations, which had been blackballing corrupt politicians since the
late 1990s, thereby putting public pressure on those legislators who opposed reforming the political finance laws (see Horowitz and Kim 2002).

However, although formal political funding laws have become more effective, the party bureaucracy remains powerless as an organisational element. To start with, an amendment to the Political Party Act in 2002 stipulates that parties are only allowed to have 150 salaried employees at the central party level, meaning that the parties had to considerably slim down their bureaucratic apparatus. Moreover, the party central office enjoys no representation in any of the parties’ decision-making bodies. The members of both the GNP’s and UDP’s executive committee are all elected, and there are no designated ex-officio posts within these bodies.\(^{55}\) Similarly, no representative of the party bureaucracy has voting rights in the parties’ National Assembly caucuses, but these are comprised of assemblymen only, who will also elect their floor leader without interference from outside. Finally, in both parties – and in contrast to the typical Western European model – the general secretary has in the past always been a parliamentarian, appointed by the party chairman (in the case of the GNP) or the executive committee (UDP).\(^{56}\)

The party bureaucracy does not have any power to demand participation in the parties’ decision making, because the party in public office is largely self-sufficient. First of all, as was discussed earlier, assemblymen have their own networks of supporters and do not have to rely on the party central office to communicate with

\(^{55}\) The executive committee of the GNP consists of nine members, all of whom need to be approved by the party congress. The 10 members of the UDP’s executive committee, on the other hand, are elected by all party members.

\(^{56}\) The information in this paragraph was obtained through personal communication with the GNP (17 April 2008) and the UDP (24 April 2008) respectively.
grassroots members. Secondly, assemblymen are financially independent, as their respective party's contribution to their electoral campaign budget is minimal, but the money comes almost exclusively from donations the candidate collects him- or herself. Finally, parliamentarians are provided with administrative assistants by the National Assembly, and do not depend on staff allocated by the party central office.

In the KDLP, in stark contrast, the party central office is much more powerful. First of all, the party's constitution declares that the party central office must be represented in all decision-making bodies. Accordingly, the supreme committee, the party’s highest executive body, is composed of the party chairman, the leader of the parliamentary party, the general secretary, the chairperson of the policy committee and seven other elected members. The general secretary, who – in contrast to other Korean parties – is usually a party bureaucrat, also participates in the meetings of the party’s caucus in the National Assembly. Moreover, KDLP parliamentarians are not only obliged to forward all donations they collect to the party central office, but, in addition, they must hand over much of their assemblyman salary so they do not earn more than the average Korean worker.57

To sum up, during the three Kims era all politically relevant resources were monopolised by the party leader. Since Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung left politics, resources in their respective parties (and their successor parties) have been more evenly distributed among a larger number of politicians, with a particular concentration in the National Assembly. However, it is doubtful whether we can thus con-

57 Personal communication with the KDLP, 15 April 2008.
clude that the party in public office is the dominant organisational face in this regard. First of all, significant resources are also held by political bosses who do not occupy a public office. Secondly, it is not the party in public office as such that controls the resources, but rather each individual politician controls his or her own resources. In contrast, in the KDLP political resources are mainly located in the party central office, which, consequently, is also empowered to participate in the party’s decision-making process.

Summary

The environmental context in post-autocratic South Korea clearly favours clientelistic over programmatic electoral strategies: First of all, similar to other newer democracies of the “third wave”, the working class is difficult to mobilise for electoral means because of the virulent anti-communism and the repressive anti-union laws that accompanied the process of industrialisation under the authoritarian regime. Secondly, both the regime and the pro-democratic opposition used clientelistic forms of electoral mobilisation in the regime’s pseudo-elections, and through a negotiated democratic transition were able to transfer their patron-client networks into the new democratic arena. These networks are deeply embedded in Korean mass political culture and have thus taken on a life of their own – independent of the
conditions of low socio-economic development that allowed their establishment in the first place.

Therefore, as clientelism is the outcome strategically selected for by the environmental context, the major political parties in South Korea are nothing but a formal façade for informal patron-client networks that connect politicians and voters. Very much like in the classical cadre party in early-democratic Europe, the formal party organisations remains underdeveloped and the three faces of party organisation are indistinguishable: Party members do not differ much from common citizens in terms of their rights within and their obligations towards the party, the party central leadership selects itself as candidates for public elections and the party central office is merely a passive bureaucratic body without any independent decision-making power.

However, after losing their charismatic leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, the major Korean parties have increasingly become affected by internal conflicts between factions of younger politicians and old guards. As these younger politicians are not embedded into the existing clientelistic networks and lack the necessary private resources to establish similar patron-client relationships, they introduced public economic incentives into the regional electoral conflict. Simultaneously, they have been trying to overpower the older generation within the major parties by introducing party membership fees – which failed – give the right to nominate candidates for public election to independent forces outside the party –
either through screening committees or public opinion polls – and pass stricter political finance legislation.

While these measures have not led to the emergence of a new type of political party in South Korea, party internal processes have become more formalised and transparent. This is particularly true for the selection of candidates for public election, which is now less dependent on resources controlled by individual politicians and factions, particularly votes and money. Moreover, the party internal allocation of resources is much more closely regulated by law, making it impossible for single politicians to gain control of the party, as happened during the “three Kims” era. In other words, as in the classical cadre party, the different elements of party organisation are still indistinguishable, as extra-parliamentary organisation is minimal. However, very similar to Koole’s (1994) “modern cadre party” there seems to exist a stronger link of accountability between the party public office and both the party members and the wider public.

Although these party internal conflicts are a good example of how actors can develop different strategies within the same context, which then translate into diverging preferences regarding the party organisation, the outcome is not very different from the outcome strategically selected for the environment. Therefore, a much more valuable case to study is the KDLP, which is the only major party that breaks with the traditional pattern of Korean political party organisation. To begin with, the mass membership within the KDLP holds significant power as it contributes significantly to the party’s financial survival. In return for this contribution, the member-
ship is granted significant participatory rights in the party's process of candidate selection. However, candidate selection is organised as a closed primary, which atomises and thus somehow weakens the party on the ground. This gives considerable power to the party central office, which administers the party membership register, thus forcing the party in public office to rely on the bureaucracy for any communication with the rank-and-file. Moreover, the party in central office also controls the financial resources of the party and has considerable participatory rights in the party's internal decision-making procedures. We can thus conclude that – in stark contrast to the two other major Korean parties – it is the party in central office that dominates the KDLP. This particular outcome is, again, closely linked to the key actor's electoral strategy, which, in the case of the KDLP is based on a narrowly focused programmatic platform. Thus, similar to the socialist mass parties in late 19th century, the KDLP needs a strong party bureaucracy in order to discipline the members of the party in public office.

In short, the KDLP is a perfect example of how actors can make diverging strategic choices within the same environment. This could be because actors in the KDLP either lack the necessary resources to establish clientelistic networks or interpret the context through a different set of ideas than other actors. However, whatever the reason, the important point to note is that the outcome strategically selected for by the context – elitist parties characterised by the lack of formal faces of party organisation – is by no means inevitable. Moreover, as the bitter internal conflicts within the two major Korean parties show, even the strategically selected
outcome is not a direct product of the environment, but it is constantly contested by actors with different sets of resources or ideas. Therefore, although the constellation of party organisations in post-autocratic Korea is very similar to party systems in 19th century Europe, with mass parties challenging the hegemonic position of cadre parties, this should not be understood as a case of “history repeating itself”, but party organisations in Korea are the product of strategic calculations made in a particular context that favours certain strategies over others.
Political parties in Taiwan share many similarities with contemporary parties in Western Europe, as the party in public office is clearly the dominant organisational element. However, as our analysis will show, they arrived at this stage not through an “evolutionary leap”, but each of the parties followed a very distinctive path of organisational development, constrained by the inter-factional conflict within each of the parties and the particular environmental context.

The environmental context

The change of the Taiwanese political system from a one-party state to a fully-fledged democracy happened through a transformation guided from above (Tien 1997: 124). The ruling Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) never lost con-
trol of the protracted transition process, while the pro-democratic opposition could only sit and watch as different groupings within the regime negotiated the new rules of the electoral game. Therefore, the clientelistic networks the regime had built around local power brokers in order to mobilise voters in local-level elections survived the transformation of the political system and we should expect these networks to be used to activate electoral support also under the new democratic rules – despite the high level of socio-economic development that characterises Taiwan today.

The KMT imposed martial law on Taiwan in 1949 after the national government of China around Chiang Kai-shek was forced to flee the mainland from the advancing communist forces. That way, Taiwan became the last fallback position for the Republic of China, leading to a sudden influx of two million party functionaries, state officials, soldiers and entrepreneurs. The KMT, which after the defeat reorganised itself according to Leninist principles in order to emulate the Communist Party of China (CPC), soon began to “colonise” the island by placing party cadres in all key positions of the state apparatus – including the military – and integrating society into party mass organisations (Dickson 1993). All other parties were banned, and elections only held at local level, while the distribution of seats in the national parliament was “frozen”. The Taiwanese, who still constituted the overwhelming majority of society, were thus practically excluded from the political decision-making
The KMT legitimised its authoritarian rule by declaring itself to be the sole legal government of China, with the aim of temporarily rebuilding military force on Taiwan before retaking the mainland from the communists. Moreover, legitimacy also stemmed from the miraculous economic development that Taiwan enjoyed under KMT government (Roy 2003: 104). Much of this economic success can be explained by strong state intervention into the market (Wade 2004). The KMT shaped the market by laws, regulations and fiscal policies, but also by becoming an economic actor itself, using its monopoly on vital inputs – such as steel, petrochemicals and heavy machines – to build an “array of satellite suppliers and subservient downstream firms” (Cheng and Chu 2002: 200).

**TABLE 10: SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP per capita (US-Dollars)</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient</th>
<th>Degree of urbanisation (in per cent)</th>
<th>Literacy (in per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>33,238 (2005)</td>
<td>0.360 (2007)</td>
<td>89.7 (2005)</td>
<td>99.0 (2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Department of Investment Services (undated); Government Information Office (undated); Tsai (1996)

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58 The term “Taiwanese” in this regard refers to ethnic Chinese, who immigrated to Taiwan from the 17th century onwards mainly from the coastal regions of Fujian and Guangdong. Today, slightly less than 85 per cent of the island’s population are considered as Taiwanese, whereas mainland Chinese account for approximately 14 per cent of the population (Copper 1996: 12).
However, when, in the late 1970s, it became clear that the international community was no longer willing to support the KMT’s claim of sovereignty over China, the KMT suffered a severe blow to its credibility (Wachman 1994: 135). At the same time, Taiwan’s rapid industrialisation had led to the emergence of a new middle class (see Table 10), which clearly reflected the sub-ethnic division in society: “As national politics was primarily reserved for mainlanders, [...] Taiwanese pursued economic advancement for social upward mobility” (Cheng 1989: 482; emphasis added). The political demand of the growing middle class was clear: Taiwan should be governed by the Taiwanese majority, not by a small minority as a part of China.

Under the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, who succeeded his father in power in 1978, the KMT reacted to this loss of legitimacy with a strategy of “Taiwanisation”, opening top ranks in the party and in government to sub-ethnic Taiwanese (Hood 1997: 65). Consequently, the proportion of Taiwanese members of the KMT’s central standing committee rose from 14.3% in 1973 to 57.1% in 1993 (Huang 1996: 119-120). By the late 1980s this sub-ethnic divide within the KMT gave rise to the formation of two larger factions: the Mainstream, including mostly Taiwanese, and the Non-mainstream, mainly a grouping of mainland-born politicians and children of mainlanders born on Taiwan. Both these factions consist of a number of smaller factions, which are all more serious than tendencies or cliques, since members need to enlist officially, and the leadership team meets regularly to discuss faction matters (Cheng and Chou 2000: 61-62).
Simultaneously, the regime decided to hold “supplementary” elections on the national level in order to replace those parliamentarians who had either become too old to govern or had passed away. Marginalised in the party internal power game, members of the Mainstream faction started developing links with local factions to mobilise support in these and local elections (Hood 1997: 109). Local factions (di-fang paixi) are large interpersonal networks that are held together by guanxi – a term connoting social ties and connections (kin, patron-client, friendship, neighbourhood, school et cetera) (Bosco 1992: 158). The electoral mobilisation of these groups was achieved through vote-brokers (called tiau-a-ka in Taiwanese), utilising political campaigns, personal relationships, the mobilisation of employees and vote-buying.

The ban on political parties remained in force, but opposition candidates began to coordinate their campaign activities in the so-called dangwai-movement (literally, “outside the party”). However, there was disagreement over whether this was the best strategy to bring down the KMT regime, resulting in a split between radical and moderate groupings (Tsang 1999: 12). Whereas both the Mainstream faction, led by Kang Ning-hsiang, and the Formosa faction advocated political change through elections, the New Tide faction was committed to push for democratisation from outside the system. As the opposition still had hardly any influence over legislation, the resulting frustrations favoured the radicals within the dangwai (Cheng and Haggard 1990: 68). At the same time, the regime perceived the limited electoral success of
the dangwai as a serious threat, which provoked a split within the regime between hard- and soft-liners, with the hard-liners instantly gaining the upper hand.

The more radical tactics of the dangwai – which were centred on social mobilisation – were soon crushed by the regime hardliners when a mass demonstration held in Kaohsiung on 10 December 1979 was put to a violent end by riot police, and most leaders of the radical faction within the opposition were jailed. This tipped the balance back in favour of the moderate forces in the opposition camp, which, in turn, advantaged the KMT soft-liners, who soon resumed the process of political liberalisation (Cheng 1989: 486-487). With the moderates in control, the dangwai again concentrated on institutionalising a competitive electoral organisation, eventually leading to the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, Minjindang) in September 1986. The KMT silently tolerated this move, before proclaiming the end of martial law and, only a few weeks later, the prohibition of political associations. The first free and fair elections for a national parliament were held in 1991.

**Actors and their strategies**

The strategic calculations made by the KMT’s soft-liners turned out to be correct, as the party succeeded in staying in power until 2000. The electoral success of the KMT during that decade was to a large extent based on the Mainstream faction’s clientel-
istic connections with local factions. On the other hand, lacking similar clientelistic links, both the Non-mainstream faction within the KMT as well as the DPP developed programmatic appeals. Therefore, when the DPP took power at the turn of the millennium, clientelism ceased to be a viable strategic option. This is because the KMT found itself excluded from access to state resources, while the DPP was unable to use its newly-achieved executive power to establish clientelistic linkages with the electorate, since its electoral success was largely built on criticising the growing level of corruption due the KMT’s clientelistic money politics.

_A one-party dominant system (1991-2000)_

Some authors have described the process of democratisation in Taiwan as a “protracted transition” (Rigger 2000), given that the KMT continued to dominate party politics for almost a decade after holding the first free and fair elections. In fact, throughout the 1990s, the effective number of parliamentary parties never exceeded 2.5, as the KMT successfully managed to maintain its absolute parliamentary majority. Similarly, volatility remained at a relatively low level for new democracies, indicating that voters did not switch their votes from the regime party to other alternatives (see Table 11). As a result, the DPP, as the main opposition party, failed to
significantly increase its seat share in 1990s elections and never posed a serious threat to the former regime party (see Table 12).

Turning our attention towards the intra-party level, we can observe that, from the beginning, a power-sharing agreement was institutionalised within the DPP to accommodate the different groupings: While the moderates dominated the party’s decision-making apparatus (the party chair and the central standing committee), the New Tide obtained a disproportionate share of posts in the party bureaucracy (Rigger 2001a: 25). In order to diminish the influence of the New Tide, the moderate forces within the DPP merged with the Formosa Faction, which had risen to high prominence after its leaders were pardoned and released from prison in the late 1980s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ENEP</th>
<th>ENPP</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>16.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>11.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>28.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>7.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>23.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.85</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.40</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. Effective number of electoral parties calculated on the share of votes in elections to the Legislative Yuan (for 2008 using the vote for the single-member constituency).
2. Effective number of parliamentary parties in the Legislative Yuan.
3. For 2008 based on the vote for the single-member constituency.

**Source:** Author’s own calculations based on Table 12.
Factional politics in the DPP were thus characterised by intense confrontation. Conflict between the two factions revolved mainly around the search for an efficient electoral strategy. Once the KMT followed through with its promise to lift martial law and hold free and fair elections, the issue of democratic reform lost its value as a vehicle for voter mobilisation (Rigger 1999: 148). It soon became apparent that the DPP had been nothing more than an “umbrella” party for adversaries of the KMT regime. Whereas the Formosa faction gathered most of the opposition’s political celebrities, thus combining charisma with a catch-all programmatic strategy, the New Tide followed a very narrow ideology, stressing the sub-ethnic cleavage and calling blatantly for Taiwanese independence from mainland China. The Formosa group, in contrast, took a much more moderate standpoint, and argued that self-determination could only be achieved through open debates and referenda (Chao 2002: 108). Both factions also differed as to their level of institutionalisation. Whereas the Formosa faction could be classified as a personalised faction, the New Tide is virtually a “party within a party” (Arrigo 1994: 161) with its own professional staff, and a highly sophisticated organisational apparatus.

In the initial years after the DPP’s founding, the Formosa faction prevailed over the New Tide. However, things changed when overseas advocates of Taiwan independence were allowed back into the country. Many of the returning exiles soon joined the DPP, thereby tipping the inter-factional balance in favour of the New Tide (Wachman 1994: 118). This allowed the New Tide to launch a credible attack on the party’s policy platform at the 1991 national party congress to include the goal of
Taiwan independence. After several rounds of negotiations the two factions finally came to a compromise. The Formosa faction was allowed to renew its party leadership, while the New Tide’s urge for national sovereignty for Taiwan became the DPP’s official ideological line (Cheng and Hsu 1996: 147).

**TABLE 12:** TAIWAN – RESULTS FOR LEGISLATIVE YUAN ELECTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vb</td>
<td>Sc</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- The share of votes for the 2008 elections is calculated on the absolute number of votes received by parties in the single-member constituencies.
- Share of votes (in per cent)
- Share of seats (in per cent)


Thus, the issue of national identity was introduced into the electoral arena, almost immediately developing into the most important factor with which to explain voting behaviour (Hsieh 2002: 38). If the KMT wanted to compete successfully with the DPP under the new democratic rules, it needed to take a stand on the question of national identity. This caused intense factional conflict within the former regime party. Whereas the conservative Non-mainstream held the orthodox view that the government in Taipei was the sole legitimate government of China, which had the
duty to promote Chinese unification and nationalism, the Mainstream – although not ruling out the possibility of a unified China in the future – maintained that Taiwan was de facto independent (Hood 1996).

As can be seen from Table 13, public opinion benefited the KMT Mainstream, as the largest share of voters was grouped around the centre of the spectrum, either preferring to retain the status quo or supporting unification with China only under certain circumstances. Moreover, the Mainstream faction’s strong links with local factions proved to be very effective channels for electoral mobilisation, allowing the Mainstream to become the dominant faction within the KMT (Hood 1997: 109). Already in 1988, Taiwanese Lee Teng-hui had been elected the party’s chairman, thereby automatically also becoming president of the Republic of China. With the government resources at his disposal, Lee slowly consolidated his power by bring-
ing people who supported him into important decision-making positions within the party and the state (Tan 2002: 157). Under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui the KMT then shifted towards a more moderate position on the Taiwan identity versus Chinese identity spectrum (Fell 2005: 111).

We can therefore summarise that both major parties in Taiwan were each split into two larger factions, which differed considerably in their electoral strategies. This again supports our view that social agents are able to develop alternative strategic reactions to the same context. In the KMT, the Mainstream faction, based on its close link with local factions, followed a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation. The faction also gave itself a broad programmatic image to distance itself from the Non-mainstream, which campaigned on very narrowly defined programmatic appeals, pushing for re-unification with the Chinese mainland. In the DPP, too, factions were divided over strategies for voter mobilisation: While the Formosa faction campaigned on a broad programmatic platform, supported by the charisma of its leaders, the New Tide targeted very narrowly defined social groups with its call for Taiwanese independence. The reasons why these various actors developed divergent electoral strategies are beyond the scope of this analysis – most likely because actors hold different sets of resources or ideas – but the important point to note is that the major Taiwanese parties were deeply riven by factionalism.

However, in the DPP, the inter-factional conflict over the best electoral strategy lessened through the 1990s. When the DPP moved to the far left of the unification-independence spectrum in 1991, this was heavily penalised by the electorate, as the
party only won 29.34% of the votes in the first free and fair elections to the National Assembly (compared to 71.17 won by the KMT). After this disastrous defeat, the DPP began to redraft its independence policy, bringing it into line with public opinion (Rigger 2001a: 126). However, the failure of the pure Taiwan independence platform did not weaken the position of the New Tide within the DPP. In fact, for the subsequent years the DPP was controlled by a balanced New Tide-Formosa coalition that was pitted against smaller factions that emerged in the early 1990s (Fulda 2002: 331). Rather, the New Tide moderated its own ideology (Chao 2002: 113). Particularly after the 1996 presidential election, which was overshadowed by military manoeuvres held by the People’s Republic of China in the Taiwan Strait, it has become clear that Taiwanese independence can only be achieved by risking a major war. In the same year, a group of die-hard radical independence advocates left the DPP, and founded their own party – the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP, jianguo-dang).

When the DPP moved further to the centre of the ideological spectrum, the KMT had to follow, if it did not want to lose the electoral fight for the median voter. This, again, helped the Mainstream to tighten its grip on power. Moreover, by moving away from the revolutionary mission of the KMT, and taking a more Taiwan-oriented stance, the Mainstream disappointed many who wished to uphold the political legacy of Chiang Kai-shek. Ultimately, in 1993, the New Alliance, a faction of mainly second generation mainlanders within the Non-mainstream, decided to split away from the KMT in order to establish the New Party (NP, Xindang) (Hood 1996:
This gave the Mainstream yet more leverage over the KMT decision-making apparatus, allowing Lee Teng-hui to move the party even further to the centre of the national identity spectrum. Finally, after winning the 1996 presidential election Lee and his faction ultimately beat the Non-mainstream in the inter-factional struggle, making the distinction between the two factions obsolete. As an expression of this dominance Lee proclaimed his “two-states theory” in July 1999, which held that Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China enjoyed “special state to state relations” (Schubert 2004: 540).

However, Lee’s leadership did not go unchallenged, as the highly charismatic James Soong emerged as a serious opponent. Once close party associates, Lee had appointed Soong as the governor of Taiwan Province in 1993. Things became sour between the two when Lee perceived Soong’s increasing popularity with the electorate as a threat to his own status and thus did not nominate Soong as prime minister in 1996, although Soong felt that as the governor of Taiwan he should have naturally been selected. Moreover, in 1998, the Lee government decided to abolish Taiwan Province as an administrative unit, thereby – as Soong and his supporters believed – destroying Soong’s power base. Finally, when Soong lost the KMT’s nomination for the presidential candidate in 2000 against Lien Chan, who Lee endorsed as his successor, Soong left the party to stand as an independent and establish the People First Party (PFP, Qinmindang) shortly before the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections.

59 When the KMT arrived in Taiwan in 1949 the administration that ruled Taiwan as a province of the Republic of China was left untouched. However, since Taiwan also became the last territory to be effectively ruled by the government of the Republic of China, this gave rise to an odd double administrative structure.
A two-party system emerges

Lee’s powerful position within the KMT suddenly collapsed when Lien Chan only finished third in the presidential election behind the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian and James Soong. Rumours started spreading within the KMT that Lee had only favoured the unpopular Lien Chan to secretly support Chen Shui-bian, who otherwise would not have been strong enough to beat Soong. As a result, Lee had to resign from the party chairmanship to take responsibility for the devastating result, and Lien Chan was elected as his successor by the national party congress in June 2000. Immediately after assuming chairmanship, Lien Chan formed a reform committee to examine ways that the party could reform itself and make itself competitive in future elections (Tan 2002: 158). One strategic mistake identified was the KMT’s problematic position at the ideological centre of the national identity spectrum. Under Lee Teng-hui, the KMT attacked both the DPP for pushing for independence, and the NP for advocating rapid unification. It was felt that this contradictory tone lost the KMT votes on both sides (Fell 2005: 120). Accordingly, the new party leadership decided to move the party back to the centre-right. Moreover, the Mainstream’s reliance on its links with local factions for electoral mobilisation had paved the way for organised crime into the Legislative Yuan and led to increasing levels of political corruption at the national level (Yu et al. 2008). The DPP successfully attacked the KMT on the “black gold” issue, forcing the party to take a tougher line on corruption and cutting the connections to local factions.
Consequently, since 2000 more programmatic-oriented forces have come to dominate the KMT, which, in turn, have reintroduced many traditional principles into the party’s policy platform. The KMT clearly returned to the formula of “one China, two political entities”, which advocates unification of Taiwan and the mainland in a Chinese confederation (Schubert 2004: 541). As a result of the ideological shift to the right, supporters of the policies advocated by Lee Teng-hui left the KMT in order to establish the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, Taiwan Tuanjie Lianmeng), shortly before the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections. However, this did not mean the end of ideological conflict within the KMT, as the KMT saw the emergence of a new faction, the Bentupai faction.\textsuperscript{60} The faction arose because KMT politicians in central and southern Taiwan, where competition with the DPP is fiercest, saw the necessity to take a more moderate position on the national identity issue in order not to jeopardise their electoral chances.\textsuperscript{61} Wang Jinpyng, speaker of the Legislative Yuan since 1999, is widely seen as the leader of the Bentupai.

Hence, while the KMT has remembered its ideological roots, the DPP has continued its ideological moderation. Since winning the presidency in 2000, the party has repeatedly expressed its wish to conserve the status quo in the relations between Taiwan and PRC, while leaving any decision about future changes to the Tai-

\textsuperscript{60} Bentu literally means “homeland”. In political Taiwan, the term bentupai refers to any public figure or group who identify with Taiwan and give priority to the well-being of the Taiwanese ahead of concerns for the Chinese nation.

\textsuperscript{61} Traditionally, the KMT is stronger in the north of Taiwan around the capital of Taipei because this area was the main target for public infrastructural investments under martial law. Moreover, Taipei is were most supporters of the KMT settled after they fled the mainland in 1949. Conversely, voters in the south are more likely to feel Taiwanese rather than Chinese and support an independent Taiwan (Lee P.S. and Hsu 2002).
wanese population (Chao 2003). As to the factional configuration within the DPP, it can be noted that the New Tide is now the only founding faction left, as the Formosa faction increasingly merged into other factions and ceased to exist. The main reason for its disintegration was the decision of its long-term patron, Xu Xinliang, to run as an independent candidate in the 2000 presidential election (Fulda 2002: 331). Other prominent Formosa members established their own factions: Zhang Junhong founded the New Era faction, Xu Rongshu organised the New Energy faction. The New Energy and other smaller factions allied at the parliamentary level to form the Mainstream Alliance in order to support president Chen Shui-bian in the Legislative Yuan.

Chen Shui-bian also won the 2004 presidential election, thereby forcing Lien Chan to step down as KMT chairman. In order to elect a new leader the KMT – for the first time in its history – held a closed primary in 2005 that allowed all party members to participate in the voting. Two politicians put forward their candidacy: Wang Jinpyng and Ma Ying-jeou, the then mayor of Taipei. The primary again reflected the ideological conflict within the party. While Wang had the loyal support of the Bentupai, Ma, born in Hong Kong to mainland parents, represented the more traditional forces in the KMT. Ma defeated Wang with a clear 72 to 28 per cent margin, but was forced to step down as chairman only two years later when he was charged over misuse of public funds during his tenure as mayor of Taipei. However, after he was found not guilty, Ma made a swift comeback and was nominated as the KMT’s candidate for the 2008 presidential election.
Meanwhile, the DPP’s victory in the 2004 presidential elections allowed Chen Shui-bian to further consolidate its power over the smaller personalised factions. This dominance continued despite sharply dropping popularity ratings for Chen after a series of corruption and insider trading scandals involving Chen and his family became public in 2006. According to some observers, this is probably due to the fact that several faction leaders – with Chen’s knowledge – were also involved in corruption, giving Chen effective blackmail material.62

The case of Taiwan confirms one of the central theoretical foundations of historical institutionalism: Surrounded by the same external context, party internal actors have since the introduction of free and fair elections simultaneously developed very different electoral strategies to mobilise voters. Within the KMT, the Mainstream faction used its strong links with local factions to integrate voters into clientelistic exchange networks, while the Non-mainstream faction – either because it lacked similar patron-client links or because its interpretation of the environment did not allow the faction to recognise these opportunities – developed programmatic appeals targeting traditional KMT supporter groups. Similarly, using a resource-based approach to explain different electoral strategies, for the DPP clientelism as an electoral strategy was not an option either, since it took the party nine years to be elected into national government. Therefore, the major factions within the DPP competed over a programmatic profile for the party: While the New Tide – at least initially – pushed for a rather extremist platform, openly calling for independence

62 Personal communication with I-Chou Liu, 8 May 2008.
from China, the Formosa faction combined a catch-all electoral strategy with the charismatic qualities of its leaders.

A central aspect of the DPP's programmatic profile was the call for clean government, whereby the party created a public discourse very hostile to clientelism. In other words, when the DPP won the presidency in 2000 the party was unable to use its access to state resources to employ a clientelistic strategy for voter mobilisation, but it had to follow through with its electoral promises to implement anti-corruption reforms (see Göbel 2004). An important condition for this discourse to emerge was clearly the high level of socio-economic development in Taiwan, meaning that voters were not caught in a dependency relationship but able to assess other options and defect from the clientelistic game. Clientelism only continues to play a role in local-level elections, where electoral districts are small enough for people to know each other and voters will thus find it very difficult not to vote for their respective local faction (Mattlin 2004). Fuelled by its early electoral success at local level, even the DPP has developed extensive clientelistic linkages with the electorate in county, township and village elections.63

Concerning the organisational development of political parties in Taiwan, we should therefore expect the KMT Mainstream to invest most of its resources into informal clientelistic networks, while the Non-mainstream should be interested in strengthening the party as a formal institution for decision-making. Similarly, in the DPP, the Formosa faction and other smaller personalised factions heavily relying on

63 Personal communication with Chung-li Wu, 1 May 2008.
the charisma of their leaders for voter mobilisation should have little interest in strengthening the party central office. The New Tide, on the other hand, which – at least into the second half of the 1990s – campaigned on a clear programmatic platform, can be expected to push for strong formal mechanisms to centrally enforce party discipline.

**Party organisation**

As will be shown in the following sections, our expectations are indeed met. This means that, currently, as the Non-mainstream is now the dominant faction in the KMT, while the DPP’s New Tide has broadened its own programmatic appeals into a broad catch-all strategy, the two major political parties in Taiwan share many similarities with their counterparts in contemporary Western Europe: Party members do not differ significantly in their rights and obligations from ordinary citizens, the procedures of candidate selection are highly inclusive – extending participatory rights to voters outside the party – and the role of the party bureaucracy is limited to the professional administration of the party’s resources. This all translates to the party in public office being the dominant element of party organisation. However, parties in Taiwan arrived at this stage not through an “evolutionary leap”, but they followed very distinctive paths of organisational development, constrained by the
inter-factional conflict within each of the parties and the particular environmental context.

*Party membership*

In Taiwan, as in South Korea, many party members do not join the party because they identify with the party’s ideology or policy programme, but because they are recruited through the personal network of a politician within the party. The politician will then pay the membership fees, administer the membership IDs and instruct the members how to vote in party internal elections. However, this form of “party” membership – solely motivated through the interpersonal relationship between the member and the politician – is not the general case. While it is impossible to present figures that would reflect the exact share of members who are simply power resources in the hands of a political boss, a number of indirect indicators can help to achieve a rough estimate. First of all, the fact that there are several words in political Taiwan to describe this type of members – *rentoudangyuan* (literally, head members) or *koudaidangyuan* (pocket members) – thus distinguishing them from regular party members in a more Western European understanding, shows that they are not
the general rule.\textsuperscript{64} Moreover, pocket members have usually been regarded more as a problem of the DPP rather than the KMT, simply because the KMT has a much larger membership, thereby making it more difficult for single politicians to have a large enough personal network of supporters that could influence party internal decision-making in his or her favour.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Table 14: TAIWAN – PARTY MEMBERSHIP}
\end{center}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>M/V\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>M/E\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M/V</td>
<td>M/E</td>
<td>M/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,448,106</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2,570,904</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>24,546</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2,617,651</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49,674</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Notes:}  
\textsuperscript{a} Party membership – real figures and estimates.  
\textsuperscript{b} Membership/voter ratio.  
\textsuperscript{c} Membership/electorate ratio.  
\textit{Source:} Wu C.L. (1997: 236); Guo, Huang and Chiang (1998: 195); and personal communication with the political parties.

Under the one-party regime of the KMT party membership figures have traditionally been relatively high. In an attempt to imitate the organisational structures of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the KMT, in the early 1950s, started building a

\textsuperscript{64} The term “head members” refers to the fact that members whose membership fees are being paid by powerful bosses are nothing more than pieces in the strategic games played by these bosses. Similarly, “pocket members” is used to describe the common practice of bosses keeping “their” members’ membership cards in their own “pockets” and only handing them out to the actual member before a party internal election.
mass membership foundation that would incorporate all sectors of society into the party. Members were organised into about 30,000 party cells in geographical and administrative units (down to village level) as well as at the workplace (such as in government offices, schools, businesses and the transportation sector). Party membership size grew from 80,043 in 1950 to more than 2.6 million in 1992. Even after the introduction of free and fair elections, the membership level remained well above the 2 million mark, which translates into more or less 14 per cent of the total electorate. However, these figures were based on outdated records that included people who had died, changed residence, or shifted party loyalties. Consequently, when the KMT asked its members to re-register in 2000 – after the devastating defeat in the presidential elections – this resulted in a membership of 900,000 – or about six per cent of the total electorate (see Table 14).

However, the sharp drop in membership figures was not only the result of an update of the official membership records, but the re-registration process also included measures that were aimed at excluding pocket members – or fake members (who only existed on paper) – from the party. In order to re-register party members had to pay their annual membership fee at a local convenience store, and then send the receipt together with the completed membership form to the national KMT headquarters. Collective receipts that listed more than one membership fee payment were not accepted. What is more, the national party conducted spot checks to make sure that the citizens who registered did indeed exist and provided the correct contact details.
Although this system still contains some loopholes, recruiting pocket members has definitely become more difficult, as can also be deduced from the smaller membership figure after 2000. In other words, we can assume that the majority of party members join the KMT because they feel psychologically attached to its ideological programme, and not due to their role as a client in a patron-client relationship. Therefore the re-registration process must be understood as an attempt by the Non-mainstream faction, which re-established itself as the dominant faction after the disastrous 2000 presidential election, to cleanse the party membership of Mainstream followers. While the Mainstream had been attracting the largest share of its supporters through the clientelistic distribution of material rewards, supporters of the Non-mainstream are more interested in collective incentives – sharing the faction’s goal of reunification with the Chinese mainland in the long run – and thus more likely to pay regular party membership fees.

One party internal group that has traditionally been characterised by a high share of die-hard ideologists is the party's Huang Fuhsing division.\(^{65}\) This special branch consists mainly of military servicemen and veterans as well as their relatives, most of whom are mainland Chinese and still have strong feelings for China. The Huang Fuhsing had lost a large number of its members due to Lee Teng-hui's pro-Taiwan policy, but when the KMT returned to its more traditional position on the China question many re-joined the party (particularly from the NP), bringing the

\(^{65}\) Personal communication with Chung-li Wu, 1 May 2008.
membership figure of the sub-party grouping back to about 200,000 (Taipei Times 2001).

In the DPP, because the party membership is much smaller, pocket members are a more serious problem. As can be seen from Table 14, even nine years after the party's founding only 50,000 voters had registered as DPP members. Even before the 2000 presidential elections the figure had only risen to 150,000. The sudden increase to 400,000 after Chen Shui-bian’s historical victory was interpreted by DPP leaders as a sign that fears of persecution based on political affiliation still existed under the newly crafted democratic rules. However, as the DPP became the party in power, thereby gaining immense powers of patronage and government spending, this also led to an increase of pocket members. Established figures in the DPP suddenly found themselves close to real political power and many saw the recruitment of pocket members as an effective way to promote their own interests within the party (Rigger 2001a: 65). In other words, the ballooning of the DPP’s membership size after 2000 must be taken with a pinch of salt, since a large number of members only joined because they were paid by politically ambitious bosses.

In 2006 the DPP passed a resolution stipulating that the party would expel people who "buy" members, and that those who sell their names would not be able to join the party for two years. Clearly, the New Tide faction within the DPP must be interested in combating pocket members, since the faction's membership has traditionally been highly exclusive, making admission dependent on ideological commitments. However, as will be shown below, the DPP is financially dependent on the
membership dues paid for pocket members. Moreover, a large share of the pocket members is recruited by local-level politicians. Cracking down on pocket members could therefore provoke these politicians to run as independents, thereby reducing the DPP’s already small pool of candidates even further.

As a result, unlike in the KMT, the resolution issued in 2006 was not accompanied by any measures that would effectively help to identify pocket members, such as re-registering party membership in person. The dramatic drop of the membership size to 250,000 in 2008 thus seems to be unrelated to this measure, particularly since in the same year Wu Chin-tai, a member of the DPP’s youth committee still complained that “the old system of collective voting [of pocket members] will continue and the same old faces will run the party” (Wu C.T. 2008).

We can thus sum up that the majority of party members in Taiwan join a party because they identify with its policy goals. However, particularly within the DPP there is a large share of pocket members among the rank and file, while the KMT, which – because of its larger membership had never been affected by this problem to the same extent – implemented fairly effective measures to exclude pocket members from the party in 2000. Pocket members do not enjoy any powers as party members, since their membership fees are paid by the respective boss, who will also instruct them how to vote in party internal elections. The question that remains to be answered is how powerful regular members are.

The requirements to become a member in one of Taiwan’s two major parties are relatively low. The only obligations that come with party membership are abiding to
the respective party’s statutes and paying regular fees. Up until 2000, the KMT did not even enforce the payment of membership dues. A strictly enforced fee of 200 NTD (about 3.30 GBP) per annum was only introduced in the context of the member re-registration process\textsuperscript{66}, which should be understood primarily as a strategic move by the Non-mainstream faction to make it more difficult for the Mainstream faction to sustain their clientelistic networks. In contrast, DPP members have always been required to pay regular party dues or otherwise their party rights will be suspended. At the moment the annual fee amounts to 300 NTD (about 5 GBP).\textsuperscript{67} While the DPP relies heavily on these fees for its financial survival, the KMT, as will be discussed later, has a number of more profitable sources of income, with membership fees only accounting for a small share of the party’s overall budget. In other words, members in the DPP hold an important resource, which – in comparison – makes them more powerful than members within the KMT. Yet, we should remind ourselves that, often, the membership fees are paid collectively by political bosses, not by the members themselves.

However, the fact that the KMT regularly communicates with its members (through an electronic newsletter and a frequently updated news-section on the party’s website), provides training to the heads of the local branches (in election campaigning, vote monitoring et cetera) and holds introductory seminars for new members, shows that the party values its members more than just as a mere statistic. Similarly, the DPP sends a weekly electronic newsletter to its members and

\textsuperscript{66} Personal communication with the KMT, 12 May 2008.
\textsuperscript{67} Personal communication with the DPP, 8 May 2008.
frequently communicates with the rank-and-file via e-mail and text-messaging. Moreover, the party also has a training programme that includes presentations by senior party leaders on party ideals as well as educative sessions on party regulations and the party platform.

Nevertheless, in-between elections members in both parties are largely inactive. Before 2000, in the KMT, each local branch was required to hold a monthly meeting and report back to the national party central, but this was a mere formality to keep up the façade of a Leninist mass party.\textsuperscript{68} In the DPP, local branches enjoy a high degree of independence from the party central (Rigger 2001a: 58). Therefore, the activity of members will vary from branch to branch, with those local party chapters that are filled with pocket members usually characterised by the lowest levels of membership activity.

We can thus conclude that, in general, the party on the ground in both the KMT and the DPP is not a very powerful organisational element. Put in comparative perspective, it is probably safe to say that party memberships in Taiwan show very similar characteristics to party memberships in contemporary Western European political parties in terms of size and inclusiveness.\textsuperscript{69} However, the membership organisations in both the KMT and DPP have developed in very different ways, which can be explained through the different electoral strategies followed by the main factions in each of the parties. Whereas the KMT's Mainstream, which used clientelistic

\textsuperscript{68} Personal communication with I-Chou Liu, 8 May 2008.

\textsuperscript{69} As a matter of fact, the total membership/electorate ratio in Taiwan is even higher than in any Western European democracy in the late 1990s, with the exception of Austria and Finland (see Mair and van Biezen 2001).
networks to mobilise voters, was not interested in a strong party on the ground, the Non-mainstream, following a programmatic electoral strategy, pushed for a less inclusive – and thus more powerful – party membership, as this would exclude members who were not ideologically committed, but who only joined the party as pocket members paid by leading politicians of the Mainstream faction. As a result, when the Non-mainstream became the KMT’s dominant faction in 2000, the party asked all members to re-register and introduced membership fees.

In the DPP, on the other hand, pocket members remain a characteristic feature, as the membership is relatively small and many politicians – particularly those competing in local elections, where clientelism continues to play an important role for the mobilisation of voters – do not face any sanctions when paying the membership fees for their supporters. The New Tide faction, which, like the KMT’s Non-mainstream, follows a programmatic strategy to gather votes, has been unable to crack down on the problem of pocket members, since the party is financially dependent on the regular fees paid for these members by local bosses. Instead, as the next section will show, the New Tide has, over the past few years, opened the selection of candidates for public elections to the wider electorate in order to diminish the influence of pocket members in the internal decision-making process – a strategy also pursued by the KMT’s Non-mainstream.
Candidate selection

In both larger Taiwanese parties the procedures to nominate candidates for public elections on the national level have gone through some considerable changes over the last two decades. Already in the late 1980s the KMT made significant reforms to its regulations of candidate selection. In order to pick candidates for the 1989 “supplementary” elections to the Legislative Yuan, the regime-party softened the highly exclusive nomination system that had been used up to that time, and held a closed primary. Soon after, the DPP announced its intention to adopt a very similar primary system, hence also leaving the selection of candidates to the rank-and-file.

In the KMT, where the Non-mainstream – although increasingly losing power – was still the dominant faction, a closed primary was used to make it more difficult for the Mainstream faction to use its strong links with local factions as a resource in the inter-factional conflict. It was hoped that by forcing candidates to compete in party primaries, the party would not have to negotiate with local factions over nominations and resources held by local factions could gradually be taken over by the party (Robinson and Baum 1993). In other words, “the party was using inner-party democratization as a tool in its inner-party power struggle against local factions” (Fell 2006: 176).

Moreover, the Non-mainstream calculated that conservative party members, particularly those grouped in the Huang Fuhsing, would be easier to mobilise than the less ideologically-committed supporters of the Mainstream faction (Wu C.L.
2001: 108). Similarly, in the DPP, the dominant Formosa faction estimated a numerical advantage over the New Tide, based on the two factions’ differing organisational structures. As Rigger (2001a: 27) points out,

[from the beginning, the Formosa Faction was centred on personalities, not issues. [...] Aspiring politicians affiliated with Formosa because they wanted to partake of its political resources: its power in nominations for electoral and party offices, its contacts with political heavyweights, and its connections with local political networks capable of mobilizing votes and raising money. The faction did not impose much discipline on its members, nor did it require them to embrace a particular ideology of platform. The only obligation Formosa imposed upon faction members was to support its leaders in contest for power within the party.

The New Tide, in contrast, was characterised by strong ideological identity. Admission to the faction was based on quality, not quantity. Even grassroots-level activists were required to pay regular dues, attend meetings, and commit vast amounts of time and energy to faction activities. Hence, the Formosa faction could be sure to rally more support for their candidates within the party than the New Tide. As a result, a closed primary was implemented in the late 1980s.
Taiwanese democratisation took a crucial step when the regime declared to hold elections for a new National Assembly in 1991, and a new Legislative Yuan one year later. In the run-up to these founding elections, the KMT crafted considerable procedural revisions. Candidates were now selected by what the party called a “revised” closed primary. In the new system party members were still given a vote, but the outcome did not serve as the only foundation on which the central standing committee nominated the candidates. The evaluation by local cadres contributed 40 per cent in 1991, and 50 per cent in 1992 (Wu C.L. 2001: 109). The DPP, in contrast, retained the genuine closed primary system.

In the following years the KMT continued to curtail membership participation. To select candidates for the 1995 Legislative Yuan election and the 1996 National Assembly election, the former regime party conducted non-binding opinion inquiries among its members. All power to nominate candidates was now with the central standing committee. The nomination of the central standing committee members in turn was very much centralised in the hands of the party chairman who, since the 14th party congress in 1993, appointed half of the members plus one, while the remaining members needed the approval of the central committee, which again was to be elected by the delegates in the national congress (Huang 1996: 112).

This increasing centralisation of the candidate selection process within the KMT can be explained by the growing dominance of the Mainstream faction. In particular, after leading figures of the Non-mainstream left the party in 1993 to establish the NP, the Mainstream tightened its grip on party internal power. Centralising the
nomination procedure became necessary to nourish the clientelistic networks on which the Mainstream faction based its strategy of voter mobilisation. Local factions not only received material rewards in return for their electoral support\textsuperscript{70}, but local faction members were themselves nominated as candidates. As a consequence, the percentage of legislators with a local faction background increased steadily throughout the 1990s, leading some observers to estimate that about 60 per cent of KMT legislators in the 1992 Legislative Yuan represented local factions (Chen M.T. 1996: 189). In order to strategically allocate nominations to local factions the Mainstream needed to centralise the procedure for candidate selection and abolish the closed primary system, which did not allow for much control over the outcome.

The DPP also devised new rules that curbed the power of the membership, albeit far less drastically than the KMT. In 1995 and 1996 the party selected candidates by holding a ballot among party officers and elected officials at the national level as well as among party members, with both results contributing 50 per cent to the final outcome (Guo, Huang and Chiang 1998: 200-201). As in the KMT, this reform of the candidate selection procedure can be explained by changes in the inter-factional power balance within the party. With the New Tide growing increasingly stronger vis-à-vis the Formosa faction, both factions were eventually locked in a stalemate by the mid-1990s. Due to this perfect balance of power, the DPP adopted a system of candidate selection that pleased both major factions: While the 50 per cent through

\textsuperscript{70} Part of these material rewards was taken from the party coffers, but the largest share consisted of public resources, extracted from local monopoly and oligopoly rights and “money machines” like the credit departments of the fishermens’ associations (yuhui), the water conservancy associations (shuilihui), and the farmer’s associations (nonghui).
membership votes satisfied the Formosa faction, the adjacent 50 per cent through party cadre votes was a concession to the New Tide, which had a numerical advantage in the intermediary party-structures.

1996 not only saw elections to the National Assembly, but also the first popular presidential elections in the history of the Republic of China. In order to select their presidential candidate, both major parties implemented systems that were rather different from the ones used for the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections. According to the newly designed regulations, the presidential candidate of the KMT needed the support of the party’s national convention. Delegates included two categories: 700 ex-officio delegates, and 1,400 elected by the grassroots members (Wu C.L. 2001: 109). The DPP, on its part, employed a primary consisting of two stages. The first stage equalled the system used for the selection of legislative candidates. In the second stage, the two winners then competed in an open primary. For this, the DPP carried out 49 public meetings at which the candidates spoke, after which votes were collected (Rigger 2001a: 78).

The different selectorates for the nomination of presidential and legislative candidates are easy to explain. Regarding the KMT, although relatively democratic on paper, the system to select the presidential candidate was, in reality, still highly centralised, as the national convention “served as no more than a rubber stamp for party chair Lee Teng-hui’s decisions” (Fell 2006: 180). In the DPP, considering that the nomination of the presidential candidate is a winner-takes-it-all game, it would have been difficult to reach an agreement through inter-factional negotiations,
which is why a more democratic procedure needed to be institutionalised. An open primary allows for the largest selectorate possible, thereby also making it difficult to influence the final outcome through the mobilisation of pocket members within the party.

Whereas the KMT held on to the regulations just described up until 2001, the DPP introduced new regulations again before the 1998 elections to the Legislative Yuan. Party cadres and elected party officials were excluded from the decision-making process. Instead, nominations were based on a party member primary and public opinion surveys, with both results being weighted equally. As has been described above, after the disastrous 1996 presidential elections, the New Tide faction, which was growing stronger and stronger, felt the need to moderate its ideological stance and move away from its unrestricted independence policy. This made it necessary for the faction’s leadership to gain independence from the more ideologically radical members in the intermediary party-structures. As a matter of fact, the founding of the TAIP did not attract many pro-independence hardliners from within the DPP (Rigger 2001b: 954) Hence, in line with the more theoretical arguments developed by Katz (2001) and Scarrow, Webb and Farrell (2000), the New Tide decided to render the selectorate more inclusive. The New Tide opted for public opinion polls for two main reasons. First of all, members-only primaries would have translated into a numerical advantage for the Formosa faction. Secondly, the experi-

71 The DPP conducts the public opinion polls through its own survey centre, which has eight full-time staff members. Respondents are offered a list of prospective candidates, and asked to choose their first and second preferences. Party members are not surveyed. The results of the surveys are kept secret, even from the candidates, who are given only their own results and a summary of their competitors’ results.
ence with an open primary in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election had shown that far fewer ballots were cast at the mass meetings than expected (Rigger 2001a: 99), meaning that outcome could be influenced by those politicians in the party controlling a large share of pocket members.

Moreover, the DPP redesigned the nomination process for the 2000 presidential election. Under the new rules, a candidate needed the endorsement of 40 party officials (including professional staff and elected officials). If more than one candidate had received a recommendation, the party would have held a closed primary (Rigger 2001a: 101). However, as it turned out, only one candidate was recommended. In this case the party regulations only demanded a three-fifths approval by the national party congress, which, according to Fell (2006: 186), was merely a question of rubber-stamping Chen Shui-bian’s candidacy.

Facing the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections, the KMT adopted the system employed by the DPP for the 1998 elections. Candidates were chosen on an equal weighting of two factors: a closed primary and public opinion surveys. The logic behind this radical reform can again be found in the party internal conflict between different factions: After the humiliating defeat of Lien Chan in the 2000 presidential elections and Lee Teng-hui’s resignation as party chairman, more traditional, programmatically oriented forces within the KMT regained power and began to destroy the Mainstream’s capacities to follow a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation. They thus had to cut the links to local factions by making it more difficult for anyone within the KMT to allocate nominations to local factions in return for electoral sup-
port. Hence, rather than centralising the selection of candidates in the party leadership, public opinion polls were introduced. The basic calculation was that because many of Lee Teng-hui’s followers had been recruited through local factions and thus were generally associated with organised crime, corruption and other illegal activities, they were unlikely to do very well in public opinion polls. However, in order to include party members in the internal decision-making process in return for their financial contribution, public opinion polls were supplemented with a closed primary. The compulsory re-registration of party members and the introduction of membership fees meant that most pocket members had been excluded, with the share of ideologically driven members likely to increase.

While the KMT introduced public opinion polls for the first time in 2001, the DPP decided to put more weight on the opinion polls, which now constituted 70 per cent of the total result. This ratio was then again adopted by the KMT before the 2004 parliamentary elections, while the DPP did not undertake any procedural reforms. In both parties these changes can again be explained by the respective dominant faction increasing its power even further - the New Tide in the DPP and traditional forces – now rallying behind president Ma Ying-jeou – in the KMT.

However, not only did the KMT copy the DPP’s system to select candidates for parliamentary elections, but it also took on a very similar system for the nomination of its presidential candidate in 2004. According to the newly introduced regulations, a candidate must obtain the endorsement of 50,000 party members. If only one candidate meets the required benchmark, voting will be held at the party’s national
congress. Otherwise a closed primary and opinion polls will be used to find the winner. Yet, as in the case of the DPP, there was only one applicant, meaning that both parties only allowed delegates in the national party congress to participate in the decision-making process. The real decision was made behind closed doors and then merely rubber-stamped by the delegates’ vote (Fell 2006: 183).

The development of candidate selection in the KMT and DPP is summarised in Figure 4. As can be seen, both parties began with relatively inclusive selectorates, giving all party members the right to vote. However, they then moved towards more exclusive procedures of candidate selection. The KMT, in particular, underwent a considerable regression to a much less democratic past, when before the 1995 Legislative Yuan election the nomination of candidates was centralised in a party agency (central standing committee) that was half-elected, half-appointed by the party leader. The DPP also reached its low in selectorate inclusiveness in 1995, by basing nominations on an equally weighted vote by party members and a selected party agency (party cadres). Since then, however, both parties have returned to more inclusive methods of candidate selection. They now employ a rather unusual combination of binding opinion polls and closed member primaries. Binding opinion polls, which are not covered by the analytical framework by Rahat and Hazan (2001), should be settled halfway between open and closed primaries, since they take candidate selection outside the political party, while choosing the voters through scientific sampling methods.
The particular development of candidate selection in Taiwan can again be explained by the inter-factional conflict within each of the major parties. In the KMT, candidate selection was centralised because the Mainstream faction, which grew increasingly powerful throughout the early 1990s, followed a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation, meaning that the allocation of nominations for public elections had to be concentrated in the hands of the party leadership. In the DPP, on the other hand, the selection of candidates underwent a process of centralisation – albeit less dramatically than in the KMT – as the increasingly powerful New Tide, following a programmatic electoral strategy, wanted to transfer decision-making power to the intermediary party structures in order to increase party discipline.
This process was reversed only a few years later, when the New Tide broadened its programmatic appeals into a catch-all electoral strategy, forcing the party leadership to free itself from the constraining grip of the hardcore ideologists within the party. However, atomising the party membership through either an open or a closed primary was not an option, as this would have played into the hands of the Formosa and other smaller personalised factions, which controlled a large share of pocket members. The New Tide therefore opted for binding public opinion polls in order to limit the opportunities for vote-buying. Based on similar strategic calculations, the KMT’s Non-mainstream, after re-establishing itself as the party’s dominant faction, copied this system to diminish the influence of the Mainstream’s clientelistic networks over the final outcome of the candidate selection procedure.

Distribution of resources and decision-making positions

While the two major Taiwanese political parties show many similarities with regards to the two organisational dimensions discussed so far, they differ substantially in their endowment with politically relevant resources – particularly financial resources: Whereas the KMT is considered by some to be the wealthiest party in the world, the financial survival of the DPP has long been hanging from a very thin thread, and to this day the party has to operate under an extremely tight budget
(Rigger 2001a: 69). The KMT's financial superiority lies in its business operations, which the party set up in Taiwan after fleeing the Chinese mainland from the communist forces. These enterprises, including construction companies, financial institutions, computer companies, electrical appliance companies, newspapers and television stations, were run in close association with the state and prospered with the strong economic development in Taiwan. As of the turn of the century, estimates suggest that the KMT's accumulated assets were worth as much as 200 billion NTD (about 3.4 million GBP) (Matsumoto 2002: 360).

When the democratisation process set in in the late 1980s the KMT was reluctant to give up its organisational wealth. Although the party claims its wealth has been accumulated through legal means, there is very little transparency in the management of the financial resources as the KMT's assets have never been disclosed to the public or even to party members. Before 1994 all party assets were held in accounts under the names of individual party leaders. When the party took control of the assets, a centralised finance committee was established to supervise party finances, and party regulations were developed to restrict the buying and selling of party assets. Moreover, in 2005, facing increasing public accusations of corruption and dirty money politics, the KMT decided to transfer all its assets into a fund managed by a private financial management company, while the party itself would cease to engage in any profit-seeking activities. However, the KMT still benefits from the revenue generated by its assets as well as from profits made from selling assets, thus provid-
ing the party with a large war chest, which ensures that the KMT does not have to rely on more traditional fundraising activities for its organisational survival.72

The DPP, in contrast, has to follow a strategy of diversification and currently depends on four primary sources of income: (1) government subsidies, (2) mandatory contributions from elected politicians, (3) membership dues, and (4) private and corporate donations (Rigger 2001a: 67-69). Public subsidies for political parties, introduced in 1997, are the DPP’s main source of funding. However, as they will depend on the party’s electoral performance, they are not a very stable source of income. In the presidential election, parties receive 30 NTD (0.51 GBP) for each vote obtained above the threshold of one-third of the votes required for election, while in legislative elections parties receive a subsidy of 10 NTD (0.17 GBP) per vote for each vote obtained above the threshold of three-quarters of the votes required for election. Only the former subsidy, however, is paid directly to the party. Moreover, parties that surpass the threshold of five per cent of national votes in the legislative elections receive an annual subsidy of 50 NTD (0.86 GBP) per vote.

In addition to the public subsidy, the DPP requires its elected officials to pay a certain percentage of their income from the government to the party. The national president must contribute 8 million NTD (137,000 GBP), the vice president 5 million NTD (86,000 GBP), the party chairperson 5 million NTD, committee members 500,000 NTD (8,600 GBP), national legislators 300,000 NTD (5,200 GBP), local representatives 200,000 NTD (3,400 GBP) and party list legislators 100,000 NTD (1,700

72 Personal communication with Shiow-duan Hawang, 15 May 2008.
However, as with public subsidies, this source of income will again ultimately depend on the party’s electoral performance. The DPP thus also continues to rely on both membership fees as well as private and corporate donations.

Yet, neither of these two latter sources of income benefits the party central office. First of all, as the party’s own regulations stipulate, ninety per cent of membership dues are to be allocated to party branches, and only the remaining ten per cent to the national headquarters. Secondly, in Taiwan’s candidate-centred electoral system, candidates generally find it easier to raise funds than political parties (Kovick 2003). What is more, the DPP statutes rule that those financial contributions raised by the local branch are to stay with the local branch. In other words, the party central office administers only a small proportion of the party’s income, most of which is spent on covering the expenses of the central office itself. As a result, “the party is almost totally without financial leverage to use in disciplining its candidates” (Rigger 2001a: 69). In other words, candidates can expect very little financial assistance from the party for their electoral campaigns. Rather, candidates need to raise the necessary funds themselves.

In the KMT, on the other hand, the national party headquarters controls a very large share of the funds at the disposal of the KMT’s candidates (Ferdinand 2003: 60). This dependence of the candidate on the central party is further reinforced by the fact that the Taiwanese election law requires individual candidates to file a campaign spending report, while there are no restrictions as to the amount the party

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73 Personal communication with the DPP, 8 May 2008.
74 Personal communication with the DPP, 8 May 2008.
headquarters can spend. Moreover, KMT candidates very much rely on the party central office for the mobilisation of campaign workers and voters among the party rank-and-file\textsuperscript{75}, whereas in the DPP, where the membership register is maintained by the local branches, and – as was discussed earlier – many branches have been hijacked by local bosses for their own particularistic interests, the party central office plays a much less important role in the organisation of electoral campaigns. Or put in more general terms, the party central office in the KMT seems to be a more powerful organisational element than the DPP’s bureaucracy.

However, interestingly, the importance of the KMT’s central office as an administrative apparatus does not automatically translate into decision-making power within the party. Traditionally, the KMT operated according to a top-down Leninist hierarchy in which the higher bodies appointed those beneath them and all power originated from the chairperson. Hence, the chairperson would nominate all members of the central standing committee, who would then select the members of the central committee, who, in turn, appointed the delegates for the national assembly. While first changes to these regulations were already implemented under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui (see above), more far-reaching reforms were only passed in 2001. According to the new rules, the delegates of the national assembly will either be elected by all party members at the local level (900 delegates) or be drawn from elected leaders and party officials (600 delegates, including committee and branch chairpersons). The national assembly will then elect the 210 members of the central

\textsuperscript{75} Personal communication with Szu-yin Ho, 6 May 2008.
committee, which then, finally, nominates the 31 members of the central standing committee.\textsuperscript{76} In other words, there has never been a provision that guaranteed party bureaucrats a seat in the two highest executive bodies of the party, but their nomination always had to be confirmed by either the next highest or next lowest body in the party.

As to be expected, the same applies to the DPP. The national congress, the highest decision-making body in the party, is composed of 150 delegates that are directly elected by local party members, and 150 nationally elected leaders representing the DPP in government. The national congress then elects a 31-member central executive committee, which, in turn, selects 10 of its members to serve on the party’s central standing committee.\textsuperscript{77}

Therefore, as the party central office does not enjoy automatic decision-making power in the KMT or the DPP, the distribution of professional staff between the party bureaucracy and the party in public office as an indicator for the distribution of power within the party can be misleading. In fact, neither party allocates any full-time staff to the party in public office. Any assistants to the legislators are either paid by the state or by the legislators themselves. Hence, although both parties employ around 100 members of staff in their headquarters – with the KMT employing another 700 across its local branches\textsuperscript{78} – neither of the party’s bureaucracy plays an

\textsuperscript{76} Personal communication with the KMT, 12 May 2008.
\textsuperscript{77} Personal communication with the DPP, 8 May 2008
\textsuperscript{78} Personal communication with the respective political party.
autonomous role in party internal politics, but they are rather an administrative tool at the disposal of the party in public office.

This impression is confirmed by looking at the regulations concerning the inner-workings of the party in public office. First of all, the parliamentary caucuses of both the KMT and DPP elect their own leadership without interference from other bodies of the respective party. Secondly, no voting power is given to members of the party central office taking part in meetings of the caucus. And thirdly, the parliamentary parties of both the KMT and the DPP make their own decision-making rules. This in particular concerns the regulations to enforce discipline among the legislators. Both parliamentary parties established a system of fines that penalise legislators for not attending important plenary sessions or voting against the official party line.

We can thus summarise that organisational resources are highly centralised in the KMT, whereas in the DPP they are more evenly distributed among elected politicians, candidates and local branches. In the KMT, the party in public office largely depends on the central office for financial support and communicating with the rank-and-file. In the DPP, on the other hand, candidates cultivate their own sources of income and have easy access to the party membership register through the local branches. However, the vital role of the KMT’s bureaucracy in administering the profits generated through the party’s business assets and in maintaining the membership register do not translate into formal decision-making power. It is thus

79 The information contained in this paragraph was collected through personal communication with the political parties.
highly questionable whether the bureaucracy’s administrative functions amount to a qualitatively different position of the party central office within the party internal power structure, compared to that of the DPP. Rather, as in the DPP, the party in public office seems to dominate over the central office.

This distribution of power between the party central office and the party in public office is perfectly in line with the electoral strategies followed by the main actors within each of the parties. Factions adopting a clientelistic (the KMT’s Mainstream) or charismatic strategy (the DPP’s Formosa) were not interested in a strong party central office, because actors would have had to pool their political resources under the party’s centralistic control. Similarly, factions pursuing more programmatic strategies – the Non-mainstream in the KMT and the New Tide in the DPP – also have an interest in a powerful party in public office, since they do not target clearly defined social groups but develop broader policy appeals. In order to do so they need sufficient autonomy from the party central office. The only faction that should have been interested in a strong, disciplining role of the central office over the party’s legislators was the New Tide, in the early 1990s, when the faction openly called for independence from Taiwan. However, neither was the New Tide strong enough to realise such a reform, nor did the DPP control enough resources to gain control over its local branches and elected politicians.
Summary

The case of Taiwan confirms one of the central assumptions of historical institutionalism – that agents are knowledgeable and reflexive, and thus able to develop different strategies to overcome the same environmental barriers. During the KMT’s authoritarian rule only one group within the ruling party, the Mainstream faction, developed clientelistic networks to mobilise voters in the pseudo-democratic elections. Given the top-down process of democratisation these networks survived the introduction of free and fair elections, and allowed the Mainstream to become the dominant faction within the KMT. In contrast, other groupings in the KMT, mainly the Non-mainstream faction, as well as the main opposition party, the DPP, developed programmatic appeals as their electoral strategy. This could possibly be due to the fact that these actors held different sets of ideas to the Non-mainstream, or due to their lack of similar links to local vote brokers. Assuming the latter, setting up new clientelistic networks was not an option, since both the KMT’s Non-mainstream and the DPP remained excluded from access to public resources, while the high level of socio-economic development meant that investing politicians’ private resources was unlikely to be successful. Instead, the DPP turned the KMT’s money politics into an effective campaign issue, ultimately superseding the KMT in power in 2000. However, this did not mean that the DPP could now change to a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation, as its “black gold” campaign had created negative public opinion against vote-buying and other particularistic means of electoral campaigning.
The conflict between these different electoral strategies clearly reflects in the organisational development of political parties in Taiwan. In order to facilitate the implementation of its clientelistic dealings, the KMT’s Mainstream centralised all decision-making and the power to allocate politically relevant resources. As a result, the boundaries between the three faces of party organisation slowly began to fade. Only when the party lost the 2000 elections, giving the Non-mainstream the opportunity to re-establish itself as the dominant faction, was this process reversed by making the party membership less inclusive, democratising candidate selection and rendering the allocation of resources more transparent. As such, the party in public office is now the strongest organisational face within the KMT.

The same can be said about the DPP. However, the DPP arrived at the same stage via a very different path of organisational development. Throughout the 1990s, the increasingly dominant New Tide pushed for a stronger party central office in order to increase party discipline. However, it faced opposition by the Formosa faction, which mobilised voters primarily through the charisma of its leaders and a broad catch-all strategy, and was therefore interested in making the party in public office the dominant organisational face. Moreover, as the DPP has severe financial difficulties, the New Tide was unable to introduce more exclusive party membership criteria (particularly higher membership fees) and make politicians financially dependent on the party central office. As a result, the only significant organisational change took place in candidate selection, where decision-making power was shifted to the intermediary party structures. However, this decision was soon reversed.
when the New Tide moderated its own policy platform, making it necessary to regain independence from hardcore ideologists among the mid-level functionaries. The faction therefore introduced binding opinion polls in 1998, which, at the same time, undermined the influence of pocket members in any voting process.

As a result, both major political parties now share central characteristics with political parties in contemporary Western Europe: The inclusiveness of party membership falls somewhere between “indistinguishable from ordinary citizens” and “highly selective”; the selection of candidates is open to citizens outside the party; and the party in public office decides about the allocation of resources. Political parties were able to establish the party in public office as the dominant organisational face, because environmental uncertainty for political parties in post-autocratic Taiwan is relatively low (as indicated by the low levels of party system fragmentation and electoral volatility). Therefore, actors campaigning on a catch-all electoral strategy did not feel forced to strengthen the party central office to increase party discipline as a means to control external uncertainty. In fact, it can be argued that on the inter-party level the two major political parties exhibit typical cartel behaviour. This can be exemplified by the reform of the electoral system in 2008, which replaced the single non-transferable vote system with single-member plurality, thereby considerably reducing the electoral chances of smaller political parties. In other words, similar to many contemporary parties in Western Europe, the two major political parties in Taiwan work together to keep environmental un-
certainty at a minimum, which allows the parliamentary party to maintain its independence from the rest of the party.

However, despite these striking similarities between Taiwanese parties and their contemporary counterparts in Western, this does not mean that the former took an “evolutionary leap” as the “period effect” approach would want us to believe. Rather, as our analysis has shown, each major political party followed its own distinctive path of organisational development, constrained by the inter-factional conflict within each of the parties and the particular environmental context.
Unlike in South Korea or Taiwan, the democratisation of the political system in the Philippines was not driven by socio-economic growth. As a result, the environment political actors face when developing electoral strategies heavily favours clientelism as a mechanism to mobilise voters. Similar to the classical cadre in early-democratic Europe, parties are therefore no more than formal cloaks around highly informal patron-client networks. However, this does not mean that political parties in the Philippines are following the exact same path of organisational development as parties in Europe. Rather, because of the particular context in the Philippines, programmatic mass parties are very weak, meaning that there is little pressure on the major parties to open up for wider participation.
The environmental context

The process of democratic transition in the Philippines can primarily be characterised as a replacement, as it began as a society-led upheaval. This upheaval, however, required almost no violence, since parts of the armed forces sided with the reformist civilian groups (Wurfel 1990). It has been argued that an overthrow was the only way to re-establish democratic rule, because the highly personalistic character of Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorship meant that there were no collective interests that could be saved once Marcos relinquished office (Thompson 1996). Hence, as there was little hope he could win competitive elections, Marcos refused to negotiate a democratisation of the political system but held on to power as long as he could.

Marcos justified the declaration of martial law in 1972 with the need for peace and order – overplaying the strength of the communist insurgency – and the promise of economic growth. Congress was closed and the two traditional parties, the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, soon withered, as their legislative functions were supplanted by presidential decrees and instructions. Thereby, Marcos put an end to the two-party cycle, which, since the end of the American colonial period, had ensured that the country’s elites would alternate in government “with almost mechanical regularity” (Thompson 1995: 15). He thus barred the other elites from access to the government-distributed pork barrel, but instead – after initially implementing a number of auspicious reforms – Marcos’ authoritarian rule lapsed into
“crony capitalism”, which only nurtured family members and close friends with jobs in the state apparatus, operating licences, state contracts, and cheap credit.

As a result of Marcos’ patrimonialists dealings, the Philippine economy deteriorated, real wages declined, and rural poverty increased. This and the increasing patrimonialisation of the military, which seriously undermined its professionalisation and fighting effectiveness, led to a dramatic growth of the communist movement. Faced with a severe loss of legitimacy, Marcos decided to liberalise the system. Hence, in 1978, legislative “elections” were held, and, in 1981, Marcos declared the lifting of martial law and called for presidential elections. Fraud and the absence of real opposition, however, robbed the electoral process of any legitimising effect, and the dominance of Marcos’ New Society Movement (*Kilusang Bagong Lipunan*, KBL) remained unthreatened. Moreover, the KBL bought electoral support directly from voters through clientelistic exchange mechanisms. In order to facilitate the monitoring of voters, Marcos introduced the *barangay* as the smallest administrative unit (100 to 500 people), with the *barangay* captain usually acting as vote broker (Wurfel 1988: 131).

The legitimacy crisis worsened when opposition politician Benigno Aquino, upon returning from exile in the United States in 1983 to compete in the 1984 parliamentary elections, was shot at Manila airport. This clumsy assassination, evidently planned by Marcos’ wife, Imelda, and her military allies, energised the existing opposition and politicised new sectors of society (Timberman 1991: 126). The civilian coalition against Marcos – the Catholic Church, the middle class and the old
economic elite – cooperated in forming a poll watchers group, NAMFREL (National Movement for Free Elections). Under the monitoring activities by NAMFREL, the pro-democratic opposition, led by the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (Philippine Democratic Party-People’s Power, PDP-Laban), performed relatively better.

In an effort to, again, demonstrate his political legitimacy, Marcos called a snap presidential election in February 1986. However, against Marcos’ strategic calculations, the reform movement united behind Corazón Aquino, widow of Benigno Aquino, as their single candidate. Only the Communist Party, various labour unions and peasant organisations chose to boycott the elections. When voting finished, Marcos was declared the winner, but NAMFREL and other poll watching organisations reported numerous cases of electoral fraud. Aquino responded by appearing before a Manila crowd of more than half a million to proclaim her own victory and to launch a campaign of civil disobedience. It was the involvement of the military, however, that tipped the scales, when a faction of young officers led by the defence minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, and the deputy chief of staff, Fidel Ramos, seized control of a building in the armed forces headquarters and declared their rebellion against Marcos (Wurfel 1990: 119-122). Having no firepower, the rebels turned to the Aquino camp for protection. The event that followed went down in history as the “people power” revolution, as tens of thousands of civilians followed an appeal over the radio by Cardinal Sin to support the rebels with food and human shields. With the refusal of the security forces to act against civilians, the United States intervened
to persuade Marcos to leave the country for exile in Hawaii. Aquino was declared president and set about restoring the democratic constitutional structure.

**TABLE 15: SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP per capita (US-Dollars)</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient</th>
<th>Degree of urbanisation (in per cent)</th>
<th>Literacy (in per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>719 (1990)</td>
<td>0.468 (1991)</td>
<td>27.0 (1990)</td>
<td>93.6 (1990)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** United Nations ESCAP (undated); United Nations Development Programme (undated); Solon (1996)

Unlike in South Korea and Taiwan, the process of democratisation in the Philippines was not accompanied by socio-economic development. Although the economy has been slowly growing since the overthrow of Marcos, this growth has yet not reflected in a more even distribution of wealth (see Table 15). In other words, although the democratic transition can be characterised as a complete replacement of the authoritarian regime, we should expect the environment in the post-Marcos Philippines to be favourable to clientelistic strategies of voter mobilisation, as the economic elite can use their relative financial strength to invest in the establishment of new exchange networks. This is encouraged even further by the low degree of urbanisation, which helps to ensure that voters do not defect from the clientelistic
game, as most voters live in small rural communities, which are easier to monitor for electoral compliance.

**Actors and their strategies**

In fact, studies of voting behaviour have shown that voters in the Philippines tend to support the candidate who is “helpful to those in need” and “establishes government programs for development” (Institute for Political and Electoral Reforms 2004). The effectiveness of clientelistic strategies to mobilise voters has led observers of Filipino politics to describe the post-Marcos political system as “elite democracy” (Bello and Gershman 1990) or “cacique democracy” (Anderson 1988), based on the observation that the country is run by a small number of influential families. At the same time, there is hardly any pressure from the lower spheres of society. Neither has the large non-governmental organisation (NGO) community been able to break the dominance of traditional elite clans (Eaton 2003), nor have political parties representing the poor succeeded in playing a more significant role in the electoral competition (Quimpo 2005).
**Elite families in post-Marcos Philippines**

Most lawmakers in the post-authoritarian Philippines come from political clans – that is, they are tied to a family base whose members are currently holding or once held elective posts. In the House of Representatives, two of every three congressmen are members of political clans.\(^{80}\) The vast majority of these are second- and third-generation politicians with parents and grandparents who had in the past been elected into public office (Co et al. 2005: 50). In most cases they will also have multiple relatives who are currently in public office.

Democratic politics in the Philippines work according to the logic that – once elected into public office – politicians will seek to transform the public office into a private legacy for their family. Filipino culture puts strong emphasis on the family as the basic unit of society, with families often performing a broad range of economic, social and political functions. This *política de familia*, conditioned by interpersonal reciprocity and social obligations, ensures “that the Filipino is more inclined to perceive the world in terms of how outside resources could be used to improve that status of the family in socio-economic terms” (Roces 2000: 188). As Wurfel (1988:34) explains,

> [t]he family has long been the center of Filipino society. As in most

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\(^{80}\) For instance, 80 per cent of the congressmen elected in 1987 could be classified as belonging to “traditional clans” (Gutierrez, Torrente and Narca 1992: 25).
parts of Southeast Asia kinship is essentially bilateral; that is, ancestry is traced through both the mother’s and the father’s line. Effective kinship ties are maintained with relatives of both parents. A bilateral system gives a potentially huge number of living kin, especially as five to ten children are not uncommon even today in each nuclear family of each generation.

The Filipino constitution contains explicit provisions on political clans, opening the possibility for a law that prohibits political dynasties. However, such a law is unlikely to be passed in the near future. Similarly, the existing constitutional law that bans representatives from seeking more than three consecutive terms is not an effective obstacle either, since clans simply field other family members to replace those who face term limits, or – in other cases – the place of the incumbent is taken by rival clans.

Elections in the Philippines, in other words, can thus best be described as anarchic competition among dominant elite families. In order to be elected into office, politicians primarily mobilise their kinship networks and family assets. If they win, they will repay their family by using their legislative post to expand the family’s economic interests – for example through loans, monopolies, tax exemptions, cheap foreign exchange or subsidies. In addition, legislators will strengthen their respective kinship network through the distribution of patronage:

81 The term “anarchic” is borrowed from the title of McCoy’s (1994) opening chapter in the book of the same title “An anarchy of families”.

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Once in office, they pave the way for other relatives to be either appointed to the bureaucracy or elected to government posts. Within a few years, a newly elected legislator will likely have kin in local office, various government agencies, and state-owned corporations. Before long, the next generation takes over.

(Coronel et al. 2004: 11)

However, while this explains the general reproduction of elite family dominance in the Filipino Congress, it can neither explain how these families became the elite in the first place nor why some political dynasties have disappeared while new ones have emerged. There has always been a Filipino upper class, whose position is based on combined economic and political power, as Paredes (1994) points out. However, the composition of this class – the actual families that comprise it – is constantly changing. We must thus distinguish between different types of political clans, which use very different resources and strategies to compete successfully in the democratic game.

Traditionally, the national political oligarchy was composed of members of wealthy landowning families – particularly those involved in export agriculture – that emerged in the 19th century, such as the Aranetas, the Cojuangcos, the Jacintos, the Madrigals or the Yulos. Today, these families are much less powerful, as is indicated by the relatively small percentage of lawmakers in the House of Representatives who own agricultural land (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism 2004).
However, because of their sheer wealth the traditional landed elites are still a strong electoral force. Moreover, their plantations provide these families with an efficient machine to mobilise votes among their workers and tenants, while their hacienda organisation can be used to conduct the electoral campaign.

The influence of landed families began to wane after 1945, as the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during the Second World War had disrupted the traditional economy, while the landowners’ collaboration with the Japanese weakened their moral hold on the peasantry. A new type of elite swiftly moved into this power vacuum: local warlords. Political warlordism was the result of the proliferation of arms and the weakening of the central authority in the provinces at the end of the war. Famous families that rose to power through armed violence included the Lluch-Badelles clan of Lanao – though they were later eclipsed by the more violent warlord Ali Mohamad Dimaporo – the Remullas of Cavite and the Duranos of Cebu. Although warlordism in the narrow sense is nowadays limited to very few areas, particularly Mindanao, many clans still rely on violence and coercion in order to win elections – a phenomenon that has been described as “bossism” (Sidel 1999) and “authoritarian clientelism” (Franco 2001). During the campaign period election-related violence can range from intimidating and threatening people with bodily harm, to kidnappings and murder, as well as arson and bombings. Not only candidates and their campaign staff are targeted, but also their supporters as well as ordinary voters. On election day itself, the threat and use of violence also extends to poll watchers and election officials, and it is no rarity to see burning voting sta-
The state, on its part, is unable to enforce the rules of the democratic game, which has led to the observation that “members of the governing class are [...] exempt from the rule of law” (Rogers 2004: 116).

The 1960s saw the emergence of yet another type of political clan: the *nouveaux riches*. Unlike the traditional elite, these families – among them the Enriles, Puyats, Sarmientos and Silverios – did not have a base in landholdings, but they amassed wealth through industrial manufacturing. They then expanded their economic base after winning office, thereby gaining access to government credit and licenses and government-administered foreign aid and loans. In order to get an idea of how this business elite dominates electoral politics in the Philippines, one can look at the social composition of Congress. In 2001, on average, each member of the House of Representatives held assets worth 22 million PHP (262,000 GBP) – according to the legislators’ own reporting and thus probably understated - while in the Senate the average net worth was 59 million PHP (704,000 GBP). In contrast, in 2000, the typical Filipino had an annual income of about 150,000 PHP (1,800 GBP) (Coronel et al. 2004).

Finally, in the 1990s a number of new political dynasties were built simply on popularity. While, in the past, popular starlets from show business and sports had only been hired by established politicians to attract voters, celebrities increasingly realised that they themselves had the potential to win public office, thereby – in

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82 According to different press sources, 126 people were killed and 148 others wounded in violence leading up to and during the 2007 parliamentary and local elections. In the 2004 presidential elections, election-related violence claimed 189 lives. For older figures see Patino and Velasco (2004).
some cases – laying the foundation for influential showbiz clans. The most prominent among these are the Ejercitos around movie star Joseph Estrada, the Revillas – actor Ramon Revilla has 80 children with different wives, many of whom hold public office – and the family of Robert Jaworski, former basketball player and coach. Meanwhile, a number of more traditional political families have been trying to increase their own popularity by either marrying a celebrity or going into show business themselves.

We can thus summarise that Filipino electoral politics are dominated by a small number of influential families, who use different resources to win elections. However, the differences between traditional landed elites, warlords, nouveaux riches and celebrities is not clear-cut. Rather, they all follow a mix of electoral strategies, primarily relying on clientelism, with charisma and coercion as complementary sub-strategies.

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83 For instance, in 2002, Negros Occidental representative Julio ‘Jules’ Ledesma IV walked down the aisle with movie star Assunta de Rossi in a televised ceremony at his hacienda. Earlier, Batangas representative and now Senator Ralph Recto wed popular movie actress Vilma Santos in 1992, a marriage that helped catapult the third-generation legislator into the Senate. Other celebrity marriages of political clans in the House include those of Negros Occidental representative Carlos Cojuangco, son of San Miguel Corporation chairman Eduardo ‘Danding’ Cojuangco, to the late actress Rio Diaz, and that of Antonio ‘Tonyboy’ Floirendo to former Miss Universe and TV host Margie Moran.

84 Several politicians host talk shows on radio or television. For instance, Ilocos Norte representative Imee Marcos, daughter of Ferdinand Marcos, anchored an entertainment talk show on the popular radio station DZBB, and has made appearances in TV soaps and comedies. Renato Cayetano, who died in 2003, was elected to the Senate in 1998 mainly because he hosted a popular radio and TV talk show where he gave free legal advice.
**Political parties as coalitions between families**

Political clans do not control a political party each, but parties are usually coalitions of several powerful families (McCoy 1994: 8). However, these coalitions are highly unstable, which is why it is difficult to establish personal continuity between the myriad of political parties that have emerged and died since the ousting of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. As clans enter into new coalitions with other clans, the old party will be dissolved and a new party will be founded in order to provide a formal framework – or organisational manifestation – for the newly forged coalition. We can thus summarise, in the words of Coronel et al. (2004: 7), that

[I]ooking at the history of the Philippine legislatures from the 1898 Malolos Congress, it would seem that families, not parties, are their most enduring feature. Regimes come and go but the families remain. Political parties are formed and disbanded but the clans that make them up stay on.

The fluid nature of the Filipino party system reflects clearly in the relatively high effective number of political parties and the high degree of electoral volatility (see Table 16). However, despite the transient life of political parties in the Philippines, it is still possible to find parties that fulfil our criteria of case selection. The most notable cases are without doubt the Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas*, LP) and
the *Nacionalista* Party (NP). Founded in 1907, when several pro-independence parties united to contest the elections to the first Filipino parliament, the NP is the oldest party in the Philippines. It dominated Philippine politics until 1945, when the LP formed as a splinter party. From 1946 until 1972 (the year Marcos declared martial law), these two parties constituted the party system and regularly shifted control over the presidency between them. However, after Marcos’ authoritarian interregnum the fragmentation of the party system exploded, leaving the NP and the LP as two parties among many.

**TABLE 16: PHILIPPINES – PARTY SYSTEM INDICATORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ENEP</th>
<th>ENPP</th>
<th>Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>43.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>48.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.20</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.34</strong></td>
<td><strong>45.75</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- The voting results provided by the electoral commission COMELEC have often been incomplete in the past, hence for some years no indicators could be calculated.
- Effective number of electoral parties based on the first vote in elections to the House of Representatives.
- Effective number of parliamentary parties in the House of Representatives.

**Source:** Author’s own calculations based on Table 17 and Teehankee (2002; 2006).

Of the myriad of political parties that have been established since the ousting of Ferdinand Marcos in 1987, only a few have been able to survive for longer than one election, while, at the same time, regularly winning national parliamentary man-
dates. One of them is the *Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino* (Struggle of Democratic Filipinos, LDP), which was formed in 1988 from a merger between two parties closely associated with then president Corazon Aquino: *Lakas ng Bayan* (LABAN), the coalition that had supported Aquino in the 1987 presidential election, and a splinter group of *Partido Demokratiko Pilipino* (PDP), led by Aquino’s brother, Jose ‘Peping’ Cojuango.

Unable to secure the LDP’s nomination as presidential candidate for the 1992 elections, Fidel V. Ramos, defence minister under Aquino, left the party to establish the *Partido Lakas Tao* (Lakas). Only a few months later, he then merged Lakas with the National Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD), which was led by then secretary for foreign affairs Raul Manglapus. Shortly after, the United Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (UMDP) joined the bandwagon, giving Ramos the necessary support to win the presidency.

For the 1998 elections, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP joined a coalition with KAMPI (*Kabalisak ng Malanyang Pilipino*, Partner of the Free Filipino), a splinter group of the LPD that supported the political aspirations of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The LDP, on the other hand, formed a coalition called *Laban ng Makabayan ng Masang Pilipino* (LAMMP) with two other parties: the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC) – founded in 1992 as a grouping of smaller parties and members of the NP (Rodriguez wing) – and the *Partido ng Masang Pilipino* (PMP) of movie star Joseph Estrada. While Estrada won the presidency, Arroyo of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP-KAMPI coalition assumed the vice-presidency. However, when, in 2001, Estrada was forced to step
down, Arroyo automatically became president.

**TABLE 17: PHILIPPINES – RESULTS FOR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Coalition</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABAN</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP-Laban</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBL</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAD</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakas-NUCD-UMDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP-PDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP/Lakas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAMMP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAMPI</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party list</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- Share of seats (in per cent).

Source: Hartmann, Hassall and Santos (2001); Teehankee (2006); House of Representatives (undated)

These parties again played the most important role in all subsequent elections. However, the coalition landscape has been subjected to significant changes. In 2001, the three coalition partners of LAMMP – LDP, NPC and PMP – formed a new coalition, *Puwersa ng Masa* (Force of the Masses), along with other smaller parties. Supporters of Arroyo, on the other hand formed the People Power Coalition (PPC), comprising Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Liberal Party and a number of minor parties.
Before the 2004 election the coalitions were re-shuffled again, with KAMPI, LP, Lakas, NPC and NP forming the Coalition of Experience and Fidelity for the Future (Koalisyon ng Karanasan at Katapatan sa Kinabukasan, K4) supporting incumbent president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, while the LDP and a number of smaller parties united behind opposition candidate Fernando Poe Jr. in the Coalition for National Unity (Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino, KNP). Finally, in 2007, supporters of Arroyo – most notably Lakas, KAMPI and the LDP – grouped under the banner of TEAM Unity, while those in favour of impeaching Arroyo established the Genuine Opposition.

It can thus be summarised that with the exception of the NPC only the two traditional parties, LP and NP, and parties of former presidents, the LDP (Aquino), Lakas (Ramos) and KAMPI (Arroyo), have been able to maintain themselves in the party system. Moreover, already this short historical overview hinted at the logic of party formation in the Philippines: Political parties are established as families rally behind presidential candidates in large electoral coalitions. Political clans who support the winning presidential candidate can expect to be rewarded after the elections. The presidential system of the Philippines is one of spoils: The president can appoint his or her choices to more than 6,000 positions in the bureaucracy. Traditionally, these are given out to political supporters. Moreover, being a presidential ally also means access to government loans, contracts, and other benefits.

In return, the presidential candidate will expect electoral support. Families are themselves highly efficient political machines to mobilise votes and ensure that
these votes are properly counted in the election process, but families also extend these machines beyond family loyalties – particularly if they are aiming for office at the national level. A congressman’s political machine typically includes a network of lider at the village or barangay level. The lider can be either the barangay captain, a council member, or any other influential person, such as a successful local entrepreneur or the head of a community organisation. This lider in turn mobilises a network of supporters for the candidate, who will help with the election campaign (for instance, by putting up posters and conducting door-to-door canvassing), serve as poll watchers on election day, and last but not least give their vote to the candidate endorsed by the lider. The lider usually gets paid for his or her work; in some cases he or she even receives regular monthly allowances from the congressman’s payroll, while sometimes leaders are bought off by other candidates who offer bigger rewards.85

As the influence of a family – and the effectiveness of their political machine – is usually limited to the local level and the family’s own bailiwick, families who wish to win the presidency or a seat in either the Senate or the House of Representatives, will have to enter into coalitions with families who dominate other geographical areas of the country. In return, the latter will expect their fair share of state resources. Political parties are thus, put simply, the formal manifestation of these temporary patron-client networks, in which the access to state resources is exchanged for organisational support during elections (voter mobilisation, campaign-

85 The information contained in this and the following paragraph was gained through personal communication with Ramon C. Casiple, 19 June 2008.
ing, poll watching). Or in the words of Co et al. (2005: 82): “Parties represent the mechanism for rendering and sustaining [the] exchange of political resources and support”. It thus still holds true what Landé (1965: 24) observed about Filipino democratic politics in the mid-1960s:

Candidates for national office need votes, which local leaders with their primary hold upon the loyalty of the rural electorate can deliver. Local leaders in turn need money to do favors for their followers, and this the candidate for high offices can supply [...] The result is a functional interdependence of local, provincial, and national leaders which promotes a close articulation of each level of party organization with those above and below it.

Moreover, parties not only serve as the formal framework for coalitions between political clans from different administrative levels, but there are also a number of legal provisions that encourage these elitist families to establish political parties. For instance, being a member of a political party allows a candidate to extend the legal campaign-spending limit, as parties are allowed to spend an additional 5 PHP (0.06 GBP) per voter registered in the constituencies where the party is fielding candidates. Yet, most importantly, the electoral law stipulates that only the three strongest parties are to receive detailed copies of the certificate of canvass that is based on the tally of elections returns from the different polling precincts. Access to these
documents provides a strong safeguard for the candidate against being cheated in the vote counting process.

However, despite these reasons to establish political parties, the binding power of the coalition agreements between the different families is very weak, and boundaries between political parties are thus highly permeable. Candidates frequently run for several different parties at the same time; political clans – while affiliated with one party – often support candidates of other parties; and sometimes political party affiliation does not become clear at all.

After elections, winning candidates who supported a non-successful presidential runner will, in large numbers, flock to the party of the newly elected president. As Villanueva points out, “[p]oliticians change party identification as fast as they change their clothes” (1996: 180). However, the president will not distribute state resources exclusively to his own party, but in order to build a broad coalition of support in parliament resources also flow to other parties. For instance, as of 2008, president Arroyo was the chairperson of three parties, which again shows just how little political party boundaries matter as an organising principle for the political process. Rather, political clans and the coalitions forged between them – often across parties – are the key to understanding Filipino politics.

To sum up, the post-autocratic environmental context in the Philippines strategically selects for clientelism, while militating against programmatic electoral strategies. Most importantly, the high level of income inequality and the low degree of

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86 For instance, right after the 2004 elections, 24 out of 210 legislators changed their party affiliation in the House of Representatives (Teehankee 2006: 239).
urbanisation increase the certainty that setting up patron-client relationships will not fail with either of the two sides defecting. The context thus gives an advantage to political actors with the necessary resources to establish a clientelistic network – that is, the country’s economic elite. This elite derives its economic power from different sources – traditional landownership, large business, celebrity status or local monopolies of violence – but, irrespective of the source, actors will then use their access to government to enhance the wealth of their families even further. However, as historical institutionalism maintains, even in a context strongly biased toward one outcome, social agents should be able to develop alternative strategies that deviate from this strategically selected outcome. In fact, towards the bottom end of the Filipino party system we can find political parties that campaign on programmatic appeals to attract voters. The most notable example of these, AKBAYAN!, will be discussed in a separate section, as its electoral success is too limited to be included in our initial case selection.

Party organisation

As can be expected from the previous discussion of electoral strategies, all major political parties in the Philippines are very similar in their organisational structures. First of all, parties are generally characterised by the total lack of a rank-and-file
membership. As a result, the small elitist circle of party leaders largely select themselves as candidates for public office, while access into these highly exclusive parties has to be bought with politically relevant resources. It follows from this that there is no clear separation between the three faces of party organisation, but the party in public office largely overlaps with the party on the ground, which therefore means that there is no need for a party central office outside the parliamentary party.

**Party membership**

As should have become clear from the previous discussion, the Filipino party system is largely comprised of parties that are essentially coalitions of influential families, providing a clientelistic network that links local political bosses at the barangay level to national politicians. Not surprisingly then, the membership base of these parties is almost entirely drawn from the politically active elite, particularly from powerful political clans (Velasco 1999: 176). Or as Rocamora puts it, Philippine political parties are “unabashed boys clubs” (2002: para. 13). In other words, parties do not have ordinary members who join the party because of collective incentives, but the party membership overlaps with the party’s pool of candidates, meaning that only those who can be expected to win a political mandate will be considered as party members.
Although Filipino political parties claim to have ordinary members, none of the major parties maintains a membership register that would list all the members with their personal details and contact address. What is more, there is no formal procedure that needs to be observed when applying for party membership, nor do parties hand out membership cards that would identify their members as such. In their constitutions, political parties only list a number of criteria that members need to fulfil, ranging from very specific requirements, such as minimum age or Filipino citizenship, to very vaguely formulated conditions, such as expressing a belief in the respective party’s ideology and objectives. Hence, what Filipino parties refer to as ordinary “members” are nothing but loyal supporters who do not differ from common citizens in any respect. Membership figures provided by the parties are therefore without any meaning, as are references to “members” in the parties’ formal decision-making statutes. Moreover, these supporters are not loyal to the party itself, but they are mobilised through clientelistic networks of leaders at the local level. If these local elites decide to join a different party, because the latter offers better material returns for their political support, the supporters will be transferred en-bloc to the new party.

However, not only is it difficult – if not impossible – to distinguish ordinary party members from regular voters, but even on the elite level party affiliation does not always become clear. During elections, due to the fact that the electoral law allows parties to nominate candidates who are not party members, often confusing elec-

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87 Personal communication with the political parties.
toral slates of mixed party candidates are created. And even after elections it is very difficult to identify the political party to which politicians belong, as party loyalty is generally very weak. Party defections are thus a daily part of political life in the Philippines.

Moreover, the highly elitist nature of Filipino political parties also reflects in the parties’ local organisational structures. Although political parties are by law required to establish party chapters in the majority of the country’s regions and, within each region, in the majority of provinces, towns and barangays, this legal provision is rarely enforced. Rather, the common practice is for the local party leader’s residence or office to serve as the party’s local branch (Leones and Mora‐leda 1998: 310). In‐between elections the “branch” will be dormant, and usually no full‐time members of staff will be employed. Only shortly before elections will the branch become active and perform campaign‐related functions. Labour‐intensive campaign work that – in Western European parties – is usually carried out by party members on a voluntary basis, such as door‐to‐door canvassing, organising mass events or posting campaign posters, will be delegated to local politicians’ clientel‐

istic networks. Clients perform this role as part of their promise of political support in return for material benefits.88

Political parties in the Philippines, as an abstract organisation, do thus not recruit members – neither as financial assets (through the regular payment of membership fees) nor as free labour. Given that parties only play a negligible role in

88 Personal communication with Joel Rocamora, 26 June 2008.
voters’ decisions in the election process, parties do not even seem to be interested in members as statistics, which could create a public image of parties as effective aggregators of social interests. Instead, the only feature that distinguishes party members from ordinary citizens is that they have been nominated by the respective parties as candidates for an upcoming election. The membership size of the major Filipino parties is therefore always limited to the number of nominations for public elections. As the next section will show, in order to gain access to this highly exclusive circle of party members, individuals will have to provide politically relevant resources that will make up for the lack of a mass party membership.

In short, the major political parties in the Philippines are characterised by a total absence of a party on the ground, as there are no criteria that clearly distinguish rank-and-file members from ordinary voters. Rather, we find all party members concentrated in the party in public office. However, even here it is very difficult to establish who is a member and who is not, as the boundaries between parties are highly permeable. It is thus very doubtful whether elected politicians identify as members of a party in public office. Instead, as discussed earlier, politicians are more likely to identify with their own political clan.
Candidate selection

In their constitutions, all major political parties in the Philippines make specific provisions regarding the selection of candidates for public election. In most parties the respective party’s national convention is supposed to nominate the candidates (Lakas, LDP, LP, NP and KAMPI), while in the NPC the national central committee, the party’s highest executive body, has the right to decide on the selection of candidates.\(^89\) However, given the lack of a mass party membership, it is obvious that these formal regulations are nothing but a façade to portray political parties as democratically organised institutions that effectively mediate between society and the state. A more precise description of the level of internal democratisation in Filipino political parties is provided by Leones and Moraleda (1998: 307):

> Although most political parties may claim that almost all sectoral groups are well represented in their organizational structure and membership, the real influence – that is, in decision-making and control – remains largely with its elite-dominated higher organs.

In fact, party conventions in the Philippines – if they are held at all\(^90\) – have been

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\(^89\) Personal communication with the political parties.

\(^90\) For instance, the constitution of Lakas stipulates that a party convention should be held at least every two years. However, in practice, lack of sufficient financial resources – the party claims – has prevented the convention from meeting on a regular basis.
compared to Roman orgies, which are organised by the party leadership solely to entertain the clients with “wine, women and song” (Rocamora 2001: 6). As it was discussed earlier, national politicians need the support of local families in order to mobilise voters at the grassroots level. In turn, local politicians are dependent on national candidates and their parties for financial support. It is thus at the party conventions where these informal exchange agreements are celebrated, and politicians from lower administrative levels are rewarded for their loyalty towards the national elites.  

Candidates for national elections are thus not selected by delegates to the party convention, as stipulated in most of the parties’ conventions, but rather, because of the total lack of a party on the ground, the party in public office selects itself. In other words, in order to be nominated as a candidate for a larger party, politicians need to gain access to the small elitist circle of party members. The selection of candidates is therefore largely non-transparent and undemocratic, and will primarily be decided through horse-trading and bargaining (Co et al. 2005: 95). Factors that will play an important role in these negotiations will be the candidate’s past electoral performance, political machinery, popularity (name recall and public acceptance), geographical base and support, and financial resources (Rocamora 1998: 6). The decision whether a candidate will be admitted to the party is made by the highest executive body in the party, which is usually comprised of high-ranking incumbent politicians.

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91 For instance, Rocamora (2001: 6) received reports that during the Lakas convention in 1998 about 60 million PHP (716,000 GBP) was distributed to the delegates in order to secure De Venecia’s nomination as the party’s next presidential candidate – 300,000 PHP (3,600 GBP) to each member of Congress, 200,000 PHP (2,400 GBP) to governors, and 100,000 PHP (1,200 GBP) to city mayors.
(or former) elected officials. Incumbents, on the other hand, will – as a general rule – be nominated automatically.

However, as Hutchcroft and Rocamora (2003: 278) point out, “it is the number of candidates that determines the number of parties, not vice versa”. That is to say, if a candidate is refused by one party, he or she will simply establish another party or form a splinter group. The procedures for candidate selection are therefore not only highly informal, but – because of the volatile properties of the Filipino party system – they also fail to reduce the number of candidates. Nevertheless, as candidates will aim to be nominated by the party of a strong presidential candidate – in order to be included in the distributive coalition after the election – candidate selection still serves as a valuable indicator for the party internal distribution of power.

We can thus sum up that in all major Filipino political parties the party in public office will simply re-nominate itself. However, elected politicians are not very loyal towards their party and they will generally try to join the party of the presidential candidate, who they think is most likely to win. Presidential candidates, in turn, are looking for legislative candidates who are themselves strong candidates, so after the election they will have broad support in Congress. Access to a party will therefore depend on the candidate’s bargaining skills and politically relevant resources.
**Distribution of resources and decision-making positions**

Party membership – and hence a nomination for public elections – can thus literally be bought from the party leadership. This has led Co et al. (2005: 101) to observe that, although “there is no legal restriction to party membership, in practice the system excludes those who cannot afford to shoulder or attract sufficient campaign funds.” However, it must be noted that the resources candidates need in order to be admitted to the party are then not transferred to the party as an abstract institution, but they are distributed to other individual politicians within the party in return for political support. As Rocamora (2001: 6) explains,

> [t]o gain the support of lower level leaders in support of his/her nomination by the party, [and] to organize the campaign, candidates have to spend prodigious amounts of money. The higher up the ladder, culminating in the presidential candidate, the more you have to spend. Not just for your own campaign, but to finance those of party mates and other supporters running for lower level positions.

Put differently, it is common practice in Filipino parties for candidates at a particular administrative level to shoulder the campaign expenses of the next lower political office. That is to say, the campaign expenses of barangay captains are funded by
the councillor, while the councillors’ expenses are covered by the mayor, and so on, until the subsidy ladder reaches the candidate for president.

The political party itself has traditionally not been a major source of campaign funding in the Philippines. This is largely due to the fact that parties themselves do not cultivate their own sources of income. Since there is no public funding available for political parties, most parties (LDP, LP, NP, NPC) do largely rely on mandatory contributions from their elected officials.92 Private – including corporate – donations are almost exclusively paid to individual candidates, not to parties. The two main sources for candidates’ campaign funds are ethnic Chinese businessmen and the “grey” economy (Arlegue and Coronel 2003: 231). The ethnic Chinese dominate the business sector, but because of their numerical minority status they are effectively barred from the political process, thereby leaving campaign financing as the only way to safeguard their business interests. Grey contributions, on the other hand, come mainly from illegal gambling, prostitution and drug smuggling syndicates, seeking the protection of the politician.

The party central office thus completely depends on the party in public office for its financial survival. As a result, the parties in the Philippines hardly have an organisational representation outside of parliament. Usually, parties do not have national headquarters, but the party central office tends be located in the private office of its party leader. In-between elections parties hardly employ any full-time staff, and even during campaigning periods many of the functions that we usually

92 Personal communication with the political parties.
associate with the party bureaucracy will be performed by externally contracted media professionals (Velasco 1999: 175). In other words, political parties in the Philippines do not only lack a party on the ground, but also a party in central office. Those members of staff employed to co-ordinate the election campaign or fulfil other administrative roles simply serve the political ambitions of the party leadership – they do not themselves hold significant political resources and do not qualify as a distinctive organisational element within the party.

The party in public office is thus the dominant – or even only – face in political parties in the Philippines. However, again, political resources are not held by the party in public office, but by individual politicians. This is the main reason why the party leadership in Congress cannot exert pressure on legislators to enforce voting behaviour along the official party line (Croissant 2003: 82). Rather, the degree of cohesion in the party in public office is very low, as is reflected in the frequent occurrences of party switching. This further contributes to the difficulty identified earlier of clearly distinguishing between three distinctive elements of party organisation within major political parties in the Philippines.


A deviant case: AKBAYAN!  

AKBAYAN! was founded in 1998 in order to compete for seats in the newly introduced party list system for the House of Representatives. The party only won one mandate in the first election but then continuously increased its number of representatives – two in 2001 and three in 2004 – before suffering a setback in the latest elections in 2007, when it only won enough votes for two seats in the House of Representatives. In contrast to the major political parties in the Philippines, AKBAYAN! has worked very hard to develop a programmatic platform, primarily targeting the socially marginalised with demands for far-reaching reforms of the political and social system. This programmatic electoral strategy clearly reflects in the party’s organisation, which is very different to the typical elitist party described in the sections above.

To begin with, AKBAYAN! is the only Filipino party with a central membership register and a sophisticated membership ID card system. Although the party does not require its members to pay regular dues, membership is tied to a number of other requirements that clearly distinguish members from ordinary voters. Most importantly, new members have to attend a basic introductory seminar where they

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93 All information in the following paragraphs was gained through personal communication with AKBAYAN!, 23 June 2008.
94 Up to 52 seats (20 per cent of total seats) are allotted in a separate ballot on a national list according to proportional representation. Parties need two per cent of the total valid votes for the PR-lists in order to gain parliamentary representation. They obtain one seat for every two per cent of the total votes, but can only hold a maximum of three seats. Thus, only 14 of the possible 52 seats were filled in 1998, 20 in 2001, and 24 in 2004.
learn about the party’s principles and structures. They are then assigned to a party unit – either based on geography or functionality – where members are expected to regularly participate in party activities. Typical activities of local party branches include supporting associated NGOs in their work, providing assistance to local communities (such as para-legal aid, education, basic health care) and helping to organise citizens’ protest regarding issues close to the party’s central principles.

In return for their voluntary labour, party members are given extensive participatory rights regarding internal decision-making. Hence, the selection of candidates for public election is not decided behind closed doors by a small circle of party leaders, as in all the major Filipino parties, but the procedure is organised in a highly democratic fashion. For instance, the composition of the party list for the lower house of Congress must be approved by the party congress, which consists of representatives from each of the party’s local chapters. Nominations for local elections are decided by vote from all members in the respective local party branch.

 Politically relevant resources are mobilised by the party, not by individual members or candidates. AKBAYAN!’s main sources of income are (in descending order of importance): foreign financial support for joint projects with NGOs (as direct foreign funding for political parties is illegal), local government programmes, contributions from public officials, fund-raisining activities (such as concerts) and donations. Local branches are usually financially self-sufficient, while the party central office is responsible for funding electoral campaigns, membership training and education programmes.
Given the important role of the party bureaucracy in maintaining the membership register and mobilising resources, representatives of the party central office are given ex-officio seats on the party’s executive committee. Specifically, the executive committee comprises the party’s Congress representatives as well as the party president, vice-president, the general secretary and five additional members who are elected by the party’s national convention. The party central office thus clearly has more power than the party in public office, allowing it to strictly enforce discipline among the party’s elected representatives.

Summary

From this descriptive analysis it can thus be concluded that political parties in the Philippines share many organisational similarities with the classical cadre party of 19th century Europe. The most striking analogy is the difficulty of clearly distinguishing between the different elements of party organisation. Rather, the party in public office largely overlaps with the party membership, since the only criteria to separate members from ordinary citizens is the party’s nomination as a candidate for public election. The procedure for candidate selection is thus highly informal and obscure, with the party in public office usually nominating themselves. Similarly, parties hardly maintain an organisational apparatus outside of parliament, but gen-
eral administrative functions and campaign strategies tend to be managed by party external professionals, who are hired at the expense of the party in public office.

This observation is clearly in line with the clientelistic electoral strategies followed by the major parties in the Philippines. Parties are merely formal cloaks for more informal alliances between political families, linking national politicians to local bosses through the exchange of political support for material inducements. These clientelistic channels serve as the main vehicle to mobilise votes, recruit candidates and allocate resources, while the political party’s primary reason for existence is to provide a formal label for the clientelistic alliances between powerful families in order to coordinate electoral campaigning efforts. Moreover, the logic of party formation also has a legal dimension, as only the three strongest parties receive detailed copies of the official election results. Consequently, there is no need to develop a strong formal party organisation, which makes it impossible to distinguish between the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office.

However, while the environmental context favours a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation, there are a few cases of political parties developing programmatic appeals, the most notable example being AKBAYAN!. Similar to the classical mass party in late 19th century Europe, AKBAYAN! was established outside of government, with the aim of challenging elitist parties that use their access to state resources to mobilise voters through patron-client exchange relationships. Either because the party lacks the necessary resources or because party internal actors use a
different set of ideas to map the contextual terrain, AKBAYAN! developed programmatic appeals. This, in turn, made it necessary to develop a party organisation that aggregates social interests through strong grassroots links and articulates these interests as policy proposals through a strongly disciplined party in public office. So far, however, this strategy has not translated into major electoral success and the Filipino party system remains dominated by clientelistic parties without notable organisational foundations.

The case of the Philippines therefore again demonstrates that actors can develop different electoral and organisational strategies within the same context. However, the neo-democratic environment in the Philippines heavily favours clientelism over other strategies. This is because high levels of poverty mean that voters are unlikely to defect from the clientelistic exchange agreement, while low degrees of urbanisation facilitate the monitoring of voters’ behaviour. As a result, political parties are generally no more than a formal façade for highly informal patron-client networks, linking politicians to voters. Actors developing programmatic appeals, on the other hand, face enormous difficulties. It therefore seems highly unlikely that mass parties will enjoy similar electoral success compared to communist and socialist parties in late 19th century Europe. Thus, rather than following the same path of organisational development as their counterparts in Western Europe, political parties in the Philippines might be able to maintain their highly elitist character for an unforeseeable time to come.
Similar to the Philippines, the post-authoritarian party system in Indonesia is dominated by political parties close to the classical cadre party. These parties are heavily populated by elements of the *ancien régime*, who controlled the democratic transformation from above and were thus able to keep their influential positions within extensive patron-client networks. However, the regime-populated parties face serious electoral competition from parties campaigning on programmatic appeals, which were established by actors opposing the regime. The most notable example of these parties is the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which, as we would expect, is based on a mass party membership and characterised by a strong party central office. This should not be interpreted as a confirmation of the “life cycle” theory of party organisation, with Indonesian parties following the same path of development as Western European parties. Rather, as will be explained, party organisations in Indonesia are the product of strategic decisions made in the particular country context.
The environmental context

Classifying the end of Suharto’s “New Order” regime in Indonesia in May 1998 is not without difficulties. Although the collapse of the regime was initiated by student protests and mass riots, the pro-democratic opposition did not have any influence on the transformation of the political system. Rather, negotiations over the new rules of the political game took place almost entirely between soft-liner and hard-liner groups within the authoritarian regime, not between regime defenders and challengers (Malley 2000: 153). As a result, the transition to democracy left the statuses of many elements of the authoritarian regime untouched, providing these elements with the opportunity to re-position themselves under the new democratic rules by capturing existing parties or establishing their own parties.

Suharto, then a major-general in the Indonesian army, seized power in 1967, through a stealthy coup d’état against the first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, who had abolished democracy in 1957 to rule under martial law. While the officially stated goal of the New Order was socio-economic development, political stability and security were declared as its necessary conditions (Vatikiotis 1998: 33-35). The ideological centrepiece of this urge for harmony in such an ethnically and religiously diverse society as Indonesia was the national philosophy of Pancasila.95 In accordance with Pancasila, only 40 per cent of parliament was openly elected, and multi-

95 Literally the “five pillars”, or principles, Pancasila comprises: (1) belief in one God, (2) just and civilised humanitarianism, (3) a united Indonesia, (4) democracy guided by wisdom, through consultation and representation, and (5) social justice for all the Indonesian people.
party politics were virtually banned by merging all opposition parties into two larger parties. The secular-nationalist parties had to unite under the banner of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI), while the Muslim parties were forced to fuse into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP). The regime itself used Golongan Karya (or Golkar) as its electoral vehicle.96

Political power under the New Order was initially shared by four actors: (1) president Suharto, (2) the armed forces, (3) the bureaucracy, and (4) large business conglomerates, mostly owned by ethnic Chinese (Liddle 1985; 1999). At the heart of the regime laid a complicated system of patronage through which Suharto skilfully managed competing tensions between the elites, and which soon allowed Suharto to become the dominant player. Personal loyalty in Suharto’s increasingly “sultanistic regime” (Chehabi and Linz 1998) was rewarded with promotions, business licences, subsidies, loans and other gifts. This system worked extremely well, as the New Order regime delivered its promise of socio-economic modernisation, hence producing enough spoils to be distributed among the elites.

In line with the arguments of modernisation theory (see Lipset 1981), however, through the success of its economic policies the New Order regime gave rise to a

96 As it was not regarded as a party in the legal sense, but rather as a “functional group”, Golkar was not restricted by government regulations on the conduct of parties. In contrast, both the PDI and the PPP were seriously constrained in their election campaigns. For instance, neither party was allowed to directly criticise the government or its policies, no campaigning was allowed in villages (where most people lived), and government permission was required for all rallies. Furthermore, party nominees for legislative office were screened by the regime for possible “extreme left” (communism) or “extreme right” (militant Muslim) connections or tendencies. And finally, neither the PDI nor the PPP was allowed to have branches below the district level.
new middle class. Many members of this emerging urban middle class found it difficult to adjust from the collectivism in their villages to the individualism in big cities, such as Jakarta, and turned from their “statistical” Islam towards more active participation in search for moral guidance and orientation. This growing Islamist movement soon became a hotbed for political discontent that threatened the stability of the New Order (Hefner 2000: 123-126). Suharto responded to this menace by announcing a new policy of openness, or keterbukaan. Moreover, he co-opted Muslim leaders, such as Amien Rais, into the regime, through the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990, and by enacting a number of conservative religious laws.

Still, several influential Islamic leaders, including Abdurrahman Wahid, the head of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation, Nahdatul Ulama (NU), decided not to join the ICMI, and continued to publicly debate the need for political reforms. Meanwhile, the PDI, now led by Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati, managed to win a historic 15 per cent of the vote in the 1992 legislative elections by appealing directly to the lower classes who felt marginalised by the process of industrialisation. However, as the regime soon moved to again end the era of openness, it took an external trigger to bring down Suharto. When the Asian economic crisis hit Indonesia in late 1997, students and the urban poor poured into the streets in thousands, protesting

97 Due to the particular pattern of Islamic conversion, Indonesian Muslims form a very heterogeneous community. First of all, it is possible to distinguish practicing Muslims from nominal Muslims: While santri are Muslims of a strict orthodoxy, abangan, although acknowledging an adherence to Islam, order their lives according to more indigenous precepts and practices. Moreover, santri can be further subdivided into modernists and traditionalists. Whereas modernists accept the validity of none but the primary texts of the Islamic tradition (the Qur’an and the Hadith, the traditions of the prophet Mohammed), traditionalists also look towards mysticism and ritual practice.
against unemployment, food shortages and economic hardship, which they blamed on Suharto’s patrimonialistic and nepotistic dealings. The most violent riots took place in Jakarta on 14-15 May, 1998, mainly targeting properties and businesses owned by ethnic Chinese, leaving more than 1,000 dead.

**TABLE 18: SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP per capita (US-Dollars)</th>
<th>Gini Coefficient</th>
<th>Degree of urbanisation (in per cent)</th>
<th>Literacy (in per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,824 (2007)</td>
<td>0.376 (2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** United Nations ESCAP (undated); United Nations Development Programme (undated)

At the same time, since there were no longer any economic rewards for supporting Suharto, many elites abandoned their support for the regime (Eklöf 1999: 235). Of crucial importance was the decision by the armed forces to refrain from force against the students or the rioters in Jakarta. An essential parameter in these strategic calculations was the organisational weakness of the pro-democratic opposition. After a failed attempt by Amien Rais, who resigned from the ICMI in 1997, to unite his *Muhammadiyah* with Wahid’s NU and Megawati’s PDI into a broad anti-Suharto alliance, it became clear that the opposition movement was riven by ideo-
logical and personal feuds. Hence, the ruling elite agreed to demands for democratization, and forced Suharto to step down, because “[t]here were few prospects of a serious overturning of the social order” (Aspinall 2005: 264).

These calculations were supported by the socio-economic context in the late 1990s. Although the raw figures suggest that the process of late industrialisation led to a relatively fair distribution of income comparable to those of Western European countries (see Table 18), there are in reality wide disparities between different geographical areas, and pockets of poverty also are also evident within more affluent provinces (World Bank 2006: 36-37). Moreover, Indonesia is characterised by a relatively low level of urbanisation, creating perfect conditions for the implementation of clientelistic strategies of voter mobilisation. In other words, we should expect elements of the New Order regime to use their access to state resources, which was left untouched by the process of democratisation, to attract mostly impoverished voters in a largely rural context, through the distribution of clientelistic incentives.

98 Muhammadiyah is the main organisation to represent modernist Muslims. It was established in 1912, and now encompasses approximately twelve million members. In line with its philosophy, namely to reconcile Islam with the modern world through education and welfare, Muhammadiyah is based on a broad network of educational institutions ranging from kindergartens to universities. Nahdatul Ulama (NU) is the main traditionalist Islamic organisation. Founded in 1926, it commands, at present, the support of some 30 million Muslims. Also active in education and welfare, NU runs the majority of rural religious boarding schools (pesantren).
Actors and their strategies

Indeed, the strategic calculations made by the former regime elites held true. As several observers of Indonesian politics point out, the first free and fair elections conducted in 1999 did not undermine elite statuses and interests, but many members of the old elite were able to reconstitute their positions of power in the new democratic environment (for example Case 2002: 69; Ghoshal 2004: 515). In a widely accepted argument Slater (2004) observes that the major political parties in post-authoritarian Indonesia now form a “cartel”, which makes it very difficult for new parties to win parliamentary representation. The cartel is built on informal, inter-personal networks that span across party boundaries, and highly restrictive party laws.\(^99\) The obvious evidence for the existence of such a cartel is the practice of forming oversized coalitions, which involve more parties than needed for a legislative majority.\(^100\) The “cartelised elite sees politics to a great extent as business” (Ufen 2006: 29), and a large government coalition is the mechanism with which to

\(^{99}\) To participate in the 1999 parliamentary elections parties had to have branches in at least 9 out of the 27 provinces of the country, and within them, at least in one-half of the respective administrative sub-units. Only those parties conquering at least two per cent of the seats in the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) or at least three per cent of the seats in local legislatures were then allowed to run in the 2004 election. Similarly, only parties or coalitions of parties that obtained a minimum of three per cent of the seats or five per cent of the votes in the 2004 parliamentary election were allowed to nominate candidates for the presidential election. For the 2009 presidential election, the minimum will be 15 per cent of the seats and 20 per cent of the votes.

\(^{100}\) While Megawati Sukarnoputri formed a Kabinet Pelangi (Rainbow Coalition), including her party (PDI-P), Golkar, PPP, PAN and other parties, her successor Yudhoyono formed the so-called Koalisi Kerakyatan (People’s Coalition), which allied his PD with six other parties, giving him the support of 73.6% of representatives in the DPR.
distribute the spoils of office evenly among the members of this elite. Electoral competition is thus largely

about furthering dominance over the institutions of the state, and their resources and coercive power, and about developing networks of patronage and protection.

(Robison and Hadiz 2004: 245)

The major political parties in Indonesia are thus filled with rent-seeking politicians, who are exclusively interested in gaining office in order to get access to state resources. Elites then use these resources to maintain clientelistic networks to mobilise voters. However, as will be seen, very little is actually distributed to the electorate, but clientelism is rather a mechanism to accommodate elites both at the national and the local level.

Conflict between personalistic factions

The post-autocratic party system in Indonesia is dominated by actors, who already played an important role under the New Order regime: Golkar, its two satellite par-
ties (the PPP and PDI-P\textsuperscript{101}), and the parties of religious leaders Wahid and Rais, the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN) respectively. These five parties emerged as the winners in the 1999 elections, but then lost electoral strength in the 2004 elections, which translates into an increasing level of party system fragmentation (see Table 19). All five parties follow clientelistic strategies for voter mobilisation, which is clearly reflected in the fact that conflict within the parties is not driven by ideological differences, but party internal factions group around individual politicians who control patronage and other politically relevant resources.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{INDONESIA – PARTY SYSTEM INDICATORS}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & ENEP\textsuperscript{a} & ENPP\textsuperscript{b} & Volatility \\
\hline
1999 & 5.10 & 4.68 & - \\
2004 & 8.55 & 7.07 & 28.55 \\
\textit{Average} & 6.86 & 5.88 & 28.55 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textbf{Notes:}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{a}Effective number of electoral parties calculated on the share of votes in elections to the People's Representative Council.
\item \textsuperscript{b}Effective number of parliamentary parties in the People's Representative Council.
\end{itemize}


This pattern of party internal conflict is particularly obvious in the former regime party, Golkar, where no single politician has so far been able to establish him- or herself as the dominant leader. Rather, the ousting of Suharto left a power vacuum

\textsuperscript{101} The PDI-P was established as a splinter party from the PDI in 1998.
in the party, with several individuals competing for the position at the top.\textsuperscript{102} When then vice-president Habibie took over from Suharto in May 1998, Golkar was divided into two groups: one led by Habibie himself, consisting mainly of civilians closely linked to Suharto, the other a military faction critical of Suharto. The Golkar chairman election in July 1998 turned into an open contest between these groups, with Akbar Tandjung, the candidate of the Habibie group, winning over his opponent, and the military leaving Golkar – at least in terms of formal structure. However, soon after his victory, Akbar decided that it was time to distance himself from Suharto and Habibie. As the former chairman of the Islamic Students Association, Akbar benefitted from a strong network of supporters within the party, and when Habibie withdrew his presidential candidacy for the 1999 elections – after his accountability speech had been rejected by parliament – Akbar became the dominant leader of Golkar.

However, Akbar’s dominance was only short-lived, as several affluent businessmen entered the party in order to be nominated as Golkar’s presidential candidate for 2004. The most powerful of these were Aburizal Bakrie, chairman of the large Bakrie conglomerate, Suryah Paloh, the media tycoon behind Metro TV and Media Indonesia, Agung Laksono, the founder of Adam Air and now speaker of the People’s Representative Council (\textit{Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat}, DPR) and Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s son-in-law. Despite these candidates’ economic power, Golkar’s presidential nomination, nevertheless, went to General Wiranto, who had risen to power

\textsuperscript{102} For a more detailed analysis of inter-factional conflict within Golkar after the fall of Suharto see Tomsa (2006) and Suryadinata (2007).
through a steep military career under the New Order, eventually appointed army chief of staff in 1997. Similarly, the Golkar chairman election was also fiercely contested, with Wiranto supporting Akbar, but all other big players throwing their support behind Jusuf Kalla. Kalla, again an affluent businessman, had run successfully as vice-president for Yudhoyono and thus offered much better access to state patronage than Akbar.

**TABLE 20: INDONESIA – PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1998&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>S&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes:*
<sup>a</sup>38 additional seats were reserved for the armed forces.
<sup>b</sup>Share of votes (in per cent) in elections to the People’s Representative Council.
<sup>c</sup>Share of seats (in per cent) in the People’s Representative Council.

*Source:* Rüland (2001); na Thalang (2005)

In other parties the distribution of power is much clearer. This is especially true for the PDI-P and the PKB, in which the parties’ respective leaders, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Abdurrahman Wahid, “have almost cult status and attract unquestioning,
often fanatical, loyalty from many of their grassroots supporters” (Fealy 2001: 102). In the case of the PDI-P, this loyalty is largely based on Megawati being the daughter of Sukarno – the founder of modern Indonesia – and her active role in opposition against Suharto. Hence, despite dramatic vote losses in the 2004 parliamentary election (see Table 20), Megawati and her clan led by her husband, Taufik Kiemas, continue to exert immeasurable power at the top of the party. Critics are rigorously silenced and often only left with the option of exiting the party. So, for instance, Megawati opponents around leading party executive Arifin Panigoro established the so-called PDI-P Reform Movement (Gerakan Pembaruan) in December 2005. The driving force behind this move, however, was not an interest in democratising internal decision-making, as the name of the new party may suggest. Rather, because the differences between Megawati and the Yudhoyono government seemed irreconcilable, Arifin and his cronies were effectively barred from access to lucrative state resources.

Similarly, in the PKB, Abdurrahman Wahid has been able to fight off any serious internal opposition against his leadership. As the grandson of the founder of Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Wahid enjoys extraordinary support among modernist Muslims, allowing him to maintain his powerful position within the party despite challenges by Matori Abdul Djali, in 2001, and Alwi Abdurrahman Shihab and Saifullah Yusuf in 2004-5, which both eventually had to be settled in court as each side claimed to be the true representative of the PKB. Between 2006 and 2007, some local party chap-

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103 Personal communication with Ignas Kleden, 14 July 2008.
ters refused to follow directions from the leadership in Jakarta, resulting in the closure of 40 party branches, but Wahid remains in strong control of the party, as is reflected in the fact that Saifullah left the PKB in January 2007 to join the PPP. Moreover, the PKB split once again in May 2008 when Wahid ousted Muhaimin Iskandar as party chairman, who then claimed to lead the real PKB – thus leading to the current situation where there are two PKBs.

Albeit less powerful than Wahid, Amien Rais, the former leader of Indonesia’s second-largest Muslim organisation, *Muhammadiyah*, also plays a strong role within his own party, PAN. Although he relinquished formal control of the party after the 2004 election, Amien Rais is still ensured influence within the PAN, after pushing through the election of a close confidant, businessman Sustrino Bachir, as new party chairman.⁴ Amien also retains the influential position of chairman of the party’s advisory council. The strongest opponent of Bachir is Hatta Rajasa, the current general secretary of PAN and cabinet minister for transportation. Unlike Wahid, Amien Rais is unable to extinguish party internal opposition, largely because *Muhammadiyah*, in contrast to NU, is not a personalised but an abstract organisation, meaning that Amien Rais does not enjoy unconditional grassroots support.⁵ In fact, the connection between *Muhammadiyah* and PAN has become increasingly loose over the years, eventually ending in a statement issued by the *Muhammadiyah* leadership in 2006 that explicitly allowed the rank-and-file to vote for any party they wanted.

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⁴ Personal communication with Rizal Sukma, 15 July 2008.
⁵ Personal communication with Ignas Kleden, 14 July 2008.
In contrast to both PKB and PAN, a further Muslim party, the PPP, has never been dominated by a charismatic leader. From 1998 to 2007 the party was under the leadership of Hamzah Haz, an experienced but uninspiring career politician who had been active in politics since the early New Order days. For a long time Hamzah’s leadership remained largely unchallenged, and the most serious conflict was taken outside the party when the popular preacher Zainuddin MZ defected from the PPP in 2002 and founded the Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi, PBR). However, in 2005, a group led by deputy chairman and cabinet minister Suryadharma Ali organised a huge informal gathering of hundreds of party executives from all administrative levels, which severely weakened Hamzah’s leadership, leading him to announce that he would not contest the chairmanship in 2007. Again, while Hamzah lost his position as vice-president in 2004, Suryadharma, in his role as minister of cooperatives and state and medium enterprises in president Yudhoyono's cabinet, could provide much better access to the state’s institutions.

Social identities as drivers for voting behaviour

Internal conflict within the major political parties in Indonesia is therefore almost exclusively about the distribution of patronage and other politically relevant resources. Ideological issues, on the other hand, are very rarely sources of internal
conflict, since actors within the major parties are not interested in developing policy platforms. Interestingly, this seems to contradict the electoral behaviour of voters, who show strong religious, regional and social affiliations, leading to a striking continuity in voting patterns (Ananta, Arifin and Suryadinata 2004; King, Baswedan and Harjanto 2005). In other words, although parties have done very little in the way of developing clear policy directions that would relate to the interests of the social groups who support them, electoral studies have revealed long lasting allegiances between the major parties and the various religious, class and regional groupings in Indonesian society.

To maintain these allegiances parties build connections with local notables who have a strong influence over the cultural, economic and public life in the region, and who will then either implicitly endorse the party or explicitly instruct their followers how to vote (Sherlock 2004: 22-23). If voters see a party as well-connected to the leaders of a particular social group, the party is considered to be able to represent the interests of that social group. Moreover, parties not only build networks of local notables to establish themselves as representatives of well-defined segments in Indonesian society, but some of them – especially the PDI-P, the PAN and the PKB – rely heavily on the personality of their respective leader.106 Hence, while Megawati still embodies her father’s vision for social justice, thus making the PDI-P particularly popular among rural and urban workers, both the PAN and the PKB benefit

106 For a more detailed analysis of party leaders as an important factor to explain voting behaviour in Indonesia see Liddle and Mujani (2007).
from the personification of religious traditions in their respective leaders – modernist Islam in Amien Rais, traditionalist Islam in Wahid.

In short, the major political parties in Indonesia all follow a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation, which in some cases is supported by the charisma of the party leader.\footnote{Moreover, several local politicians used their considerable financial resources to hire organised gangs of thugs (preman) to intimidate both voters and other candidates (Wilson 2006: 270-5).} However, very little trickles down to the voter through these clientelistic networks, as the phenomenon of vote-buying is almost unheard of in the Indonesian context (Hadiwinata 2006). Rather, citizens vote according to their religious, class or regional identity. Therefore, as van de Walle (2003: 313) observed for African party systems,

it is more useful to think of clientelistic politics as constituting primarily a mechanism for accommodation and integration of a fairly narrow political elite than as a form of mass party patronage. Most of the material gains from clientelism are limited to this elite. The stronger link between political elites and the citizenry is through the less tangible bonds of ethnic identity.

In other words, voter mobilisation in Indonesia is organised through intra-elite networks based on clientelistic exchange relationships between politicians at the national level and local notables. These networks survived the democratic transition and allowed elements of the old regime to maintain their positions of power in the
electoral market. However, the patron-client relationships inherited from Suharto’s regime do not reach down to voter level. This is because, in the regime’s pseudo-elections, votes were bought through the local branches of the state administration, which is why voters in Indonesia today are not used to receiving money for their votes from parties. Instead, the connection between the politician and the voter is made as common people adopt local notables as their babak, or father, based on religious, ethnic or class identities (see Cederroth 2004). That is to say, there is no need for politicians to extend the clientelistic network beyond local notables, because voters will vote for the party endorsed by their respective babak, irrespective of material incentives.

The context in post-Suharto Indonesia thus favours actors who have the necessary resources to integrate local power holders into a clientelistic network. These actors are – as the examples of Golkar and PAN illustrate in particular – mostly members of Indonesia’s economic elite. Moreover, other actors, especially elites who belonged to the close circle around Suharto’s regime, were able to the transfer the clientelistic connections they had been developing through decades of authoritarian rule into the democratic arena, such as Hamzah Haz, the leader of the PPP, Wiranto and Akbar of Golkar, or current president Yudhoyono. Finally, some actors base their electoral strategy not only on clientelism, but also benefit from their personal charisma – most notably Wahid and Megawati. However, whatever actors’ source for clientelistic power, these actors form a close cartel based on personal relation-

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108 Personal communication with Anies Baswedan, 17 July 2008.
ships that ensures government participation, while excluding smaller parties. This thereby allows all elites access to public resources as an additional source to further consolidate their clientelistic networks.

Yet, while the contextual environment clearly selects for clientelistic strategies of voter mobilisation, it is important to point out that not all relevant political parties follow a clientelistic strategy, hence confirming our argument that social agents can develop alternative strategic responses to the same context. The most notable example of a programmatic party is the PKS, which was established under the name Justice Party in July 1998 by activists of the Islamist student movement. Whilst not openly pushing for an Islamic state or the adoption of sharia law, the party’s platform focuses on the need to educate the masses on sharia through da’wah (inviting people to learn about the Qu’ran and other Islamic sources), which implies that the PKS sees the incorporation of Islamic law into the constitution as a long term goal (Baswedan 2004). The party only achieved 1.8% of the votes in the 1999, failing to achieve the two-per cent electoral threshold that was legally required to compete in the 2004 legislative elections. It was thus reconstituted as the Prosperous Justice Party, and this time managed to win 7.3% of the votes and 45 out of 550 seats, making the PKS the seventh-largest party in parliament.

The PKS’s search for a policy platform clearly reflects in the conflict between its party internal factions. For a long time the party had been able to contain its internal differences and prevent a dividing schism. However, factional tensions surfaced in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election, deriving from the tension between
Islamist goals and a commitment to democracy. While the party mainstream around then party leader Hidayat Nur Wahid wanted PKS to support Amien Rais as a presidential candidate, a hardline faction around the party’s general-secretary Anis Matta argued that the PKS should put its weight behind Golkar-nominee Wiranto, who – although a less devout Muslim than Amien Rais – was considered as having much better chances of winning the election. Factionalism in the PKS is thus not driven by patronage and clientelism. Rather, the party is split between moderates committed to Islam and democracy, and more radical forces who seek power in order to achieve Islamist goals.\footnote{109 Personal communication with Rizal Sukma, 15 July 2008.}

The driving motivations behind actors’ strategic calculations are again difficult to identify and not part of this analysis. Taking a more resource-focused approach, we could argue that – as the PKS was formed \textit{externally} to the party cartel – the party lacked the necessary means to develop a clientelistic strategy for voter mobilisation and thus had to focus on programmatic appeals instead. Alternatively, we could build an argument based on ideas, arguing that agents within the PKS hold certain views about their environment, which do not allow them to realise the opportunities for clientelism presented by that environment. More precisely, actors in the PKS could genuinely be interested in introducing \textit{sharia} law through \textit{da’wah}, leading them to reject clientelism as particularistic relationships not conducive to the universal extension of Islam.
Whatever the reason behind the PKS’s programmatic platform, the central lesson to be drawn from this example is that – although the contextual enviromental will strategically select for a particular outcome – this outcome is not inevitable, but social actors can follow alternative courses of action. However, the characteristic regularity that we can identify in the major political parties in post-authoritarian Indonesia is that they are dominated by elites who had been embedded into Suharto’s distributive coalition. After the introduction of free and fair election the elites used these inter-personal channels and their access to state resources for an electoral strategy based primarily on clientelism. It must be noted, however, that clientelism in the Indonesian context is mainly a strategy to accommodate the political elite, while voters are linked to politicians through religious, ethnic and social identities.

Party organisation

The clientelistic strategies of the major Indonesian parties clearly reflect in their organisation, as all internal decisions are made informally, while the formal elements of the party organisation are impossible to distinguish. Rather, as in the Philippines, the party membership largely overlaps with the party in public office and a party bureaucracy is almost non-existent. Actors invest heavily in the maintenance of in-
tra-elite clientelistic networks, with the function of the formal party organisation reduced to a mere façade. In contrast, the PKS, which follows a programmatic strategy of voter mobilisation, has developed a strong mass membership organisation, in which the party central office clearly plays the dominant role.

**Membership**

In accordance with the amended Law on Political Parties, which was ratified in December 2007, a political party in Indonesia must have branches in 60 per cent of the provinces, 50 per cent of the districts in each province, and 25 per cent of the sub-districts in each district. These requirements were put into effect, as it was feared that – in the multicultural society that is Indonesia – political parties could be used to promote racial, religious or ethnic hatred, or to encourage the secession of certain regions from the Indonesian state. In accordance with these legal regulations, all major Indonesian parties have established formal representative offices in most provinces and in many districts across the whole archipelago. For instance, Golkar, which as the former regime party enjoyed a considerable head start concerning the construction of an organisational apparatus, claims to have 30 provincial branches, around 380 district and 3,900 sub-district branches.\(^{110}\)

\(^{110}\) Personal communication with Golkar, 2 July 2008.
However, in general, the quality of these offices and their ability to communicate with the people at the grassroots level is very poor. In fact, party branches are usually only organised as an empty shell in order to meet the legal requirements set out in the party law. In-between elections Indonesia’s party organisations wither away and party activities are almost non-existent (Johnson Tan 2006: 107). Given the little interest national party leaderships have in organising and maintaining a strong local organisation, party branches have, in most cases, been “hijacked” by local notables – such as wealthy businesspeople, well-connected bureaucrats, traditional noblemen, or violent gangsters. The politicians then use the local party branch to contest for public offices at lower administrative levels, which through the process of decentralising administrative governance and fiscal governance – initiated in 1999 – have become increasingly interesting (Hadiz 2004; Choi 2004a).

Local party branches are thus highly independent from the central party (Buehler and Tan 2007). This independence goes so far that in order to mobilise support for the election campaign, candidates for national elections will have to pay the party branches in their respective constituency for their loyalty. In other words, a dyadic patron-client relation connects the national politician to the head of the local party branch. The latter will then use this money to reimburse party workers for their services during the campaign (such as canvassing, putting up posters or participating in a mass rally). The payment is made either in cash or through other

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111 Personal communication with Benny Subianto, 3 July 2008.
gifts, such as a free meal, vouchers for local transport or entertainment through a music show.

Ordinary party members, who would perform these campaign-related tasks on a voluntary basis – as is the common practice in most West European parties – do not exist in Indonesia. Political parties provide membership figures on request, but without a party membership register and a sophisticated system of membership ID cards, these figures are without value, since distinguishing party members from ordinary voters becomes impossible. The parties’ statutes merely list a number of very general requirements members need to meet – with Golkar making a distinction between members and cadres\(^\text{112}\) – not including the payment of regular membership fees.\(^\text{113}\) Instead, party “members” are paid by the party – or rather, the local politician – to put their labour force into the party’s service.

The only notable exception to this pattern is the PKS, which “has provided Indonesia with an alternative model of grassroots party building centred around recruitment” (Fionna 2008: para. 1). To start with, members are required to attend weekly party meetings, which take the form of Qur’anic study sessions (\textit{tarbiyah}), covering the main topics of Islam: God, the prophet, and Islamic regulations.\(^\text{114}\) Moreover, while there is no fixed membership fee, party members are expected to donate part of their income to the party through obligatory \textit{infaq} – a donation bene-

\(^{112}\) Golkar claims to have about 14 million cadres and ordinary members. The eligibility criteria for ordinary membership include age, literacy, acceptance of the party’s platform et cetera, while cadres, in addition, have to pass a political training and education programme.

\(^{113}\) The PAN envisioned regular membership fees when it was founded in 1998, but this requirement was soon dropped as the enforcement proved very difficult.

\(^{114}\) The author gained the information contained in this paragraph through personal communication with the PKS on 9 July 2008.
ficial to Islam, repeatedly mentioned throughout the Qu’ran. As will be shown later, the PKS relies heavily on the financial contributions of its members. It is thus not surprising that the party actively engages in the recruitment of new members, such as through “open houses” – Qu’ranic study sessions open to non-members. The success of Islam as a recruitment tool reflects in the party’s membership figures: As of 2008, the PKS claims to have 2 million members, which translates into 24 per cent of the party’s electorate or 1.4% of the total electorate.\footnote{The calculation is based on the results of the 2004 legislative elections.} This is a relatively impressive figure – particularly if we consider that other major parties do not attach any requirements to party membership at all.

We can thus conclude that in most of the major Indonesian parties a party on the ground is non-existent, since what the parties describe as “members” are indistinguishable from ordinary voters. Rather, party “members” are recruited as clients through the clientelistic networks of local notables who have taken control of the party branches. Hence, in the Indonesian context, the real strength of a party is not measured by the sheer number of its offices and members, but rather in its ability to accommodate informal local power holders into the party’s patronage network. In contrast, the PKS defines itself to great extent through its mass grassroots organisation with ideologically committed members. However, as will be shown in the next section, this membership commitment does not equate a powerful party on the ground – as in the traditional West European mass party – but all decision-making power is highly centralised in the party leadership.
Candidate selection

All political parties in Indonesia make reference to the nomination of candidates for public election in their official statutes, but these procedural guidelines are usually very general, leaving ample room for interpretation by the party leadership. In fact, the actual practice of candidate selection in the major Indonesian parties is a very obscure process, with the final decision made by the highest strata of party elites behind closed doors (Haris 2005). Even in the PKS, which differs considerably from the other major parties regarding its grassroots organisation, the nomination of candidates for public elections is highly centralised at the top of the party.\footnote{116}{For a more general critique of the elitist decision-making structures in the PKS and the very limited opportunities for participation by the rank-and-file see Wanandi (2007).}

Despite the of candidate selection in the major political parties in Indonesia, observers of Indonesian politics have identified a number of factors that will play a role in the nomination process. The most important of these appears to be the control over financial resources. As Mietzner (2007: 251) explains,

Political parties in Indonesia [...] have in an increasing number of cases sold the nominations for legislative and executive office to wealthy individuals who had no particular connection to the party or its beliefs, but who could afford to pay large sums of money to the party.
For national legislative elections the prices for nominations are usually staggered according to the ranking on the party list, with high rankings that virtually secure election into parliament being significantly more expensive than lower positions that do not come with a similar guarantee of success. For instance, in 2004, candidates who wanted to be nominated for the highest list places in Golkar were asked to pay up to 100 million IDR (about 5,840 GBP) (Tomsa 2008: 64). However, as this is precisely the amount of money a private individual is legally allowed to donate to a political party, it can be assumed that the price for a place on the party list was in fact much higher.

Moreover, candidates are not only required to pay their respective party for the candidacy, but, in addition, candidates need to prove that they will be able to shoulder the financial costs of their own personal election campaign (Ufen 2008: 27). Given the explosion of campaign costs since 1999, this sum is much larger than the “donation” to the party, resulting in a growing influx of wealthy businesspeople into the political parties, as is best exemplified by Jusuf Kalla and Sutrisno Bachir, the party leaders of Golkar and PAN respectively. Conversely, less affluent party politicians have found themselves increasingly marginalised, since the party itself is usually not a source of campaign funding (Choi 2004b: 342). In general, parties will finance the national media campaign, while candidates are expected to fund the campaign “on the ground”.¹¹⁷ The only exception to this rule is again the PKS, where money does not seem to influence the candidate selection process and the party al-

¹¹⁷ Personal communication with Marcus Mietzner, 28 June 2008.
locates a large share of its budget for campaign purposes (Manikas and Emling 2003: 123).

However, money is not the only factor that will decide who gets nominated for public election. Candidates will also have to demonstrate to the party leadership that they are able to mobilise voters in their respective constituencies. Broadly speaking, this involves proving two things. First, that one is well-connected to local power brokers, such as religious leaders, key bureaucrats and traditional aristocratic elites. Second, that one has the support of the constituency’s local party chapters, which – as was discussed earlier – have in most cases fallen prey to the interests of local bosses and enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the party central.118 Both of these informal norms require the candidate to span a dense clientelistic network across the constituency that can then be used as a vote mobilising machine. Finally, in addition, party leaders also take into consideration the candidate’s popularity with the electorate, with parties making increasing use of public opinion polls in order to identify the candidates with the highest popularity rating (see Mietzner 2009a).

As a general rule can be formulated that the better candidates score on these latter factors, the less they will have to contribute in terms of financial resources.119 In fact, parties usually reserve around ten per cent of the places on the party list for big “vote-getters”, such as popular artists and show-biz celebrities, whose campaign

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118 Personal communication with Rainer Heufers, 14 July 2008.
119 Personal communication with Benny Subianto, 3 July 2008.
costs will be fully covered by the respective political party. For instance, in the 2004 election the PDI-P recruited the actresses Desy Ratnasari, Marissa Haque and Deddy Sutomo and singer Franky Sahilatua, while the PKB enlisted actors Rieke Dyah Pitaloka and Ayu Azharia, and Golkar nominated actress Nurul Arifin. This trend is interpreted by Ufen (2006: 18) as one indication of an increasing “Philippinisation” of the Indonesian party system.

While this process is thus highly undemocratic, the nomination of the presidential candidate tends to be even more elitist: Usually, the party leader will be selected automatically without any serious opposition. Only in parties that are not dominated by a single leader can the nomination process turn into serious competition. The only significant example of such a case is Golkar, which – as was mentioned earlier – plunged into a power vacuum after the ousting of Suharto, leaving several strong contenders competing for the party’s presidential nomination in 2004. However, this process was only democratic in a formal sense, as the race was in fact decided by whichever candidate “bought” the support of the majority of local party chapters (Tomsa 2008: 88).

To sum up, the selection of candidates for national elections in the major Indonesian political parties is both a highly centralised and highly informal process. As there is no party on the ground, candidates are recruited from outside the party. In order to be admitted as a candidate, politicians need to contribute financially to the respective party’s electoral campaign, control an effective clientelistic network

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120 Personal communication with Marcus Mietzner, 28 June 2008.
down to the grassroots level, and – less importantly – score high in popularity ratings. In the PKS, on the other hand, where the membership would be large enough to serve as a recruitment pool, party leaders use their religious authority to legitimise a centralisation of decision-making power.

**Distribution of resources and decision-making positions**

The previous section identified an important source of income for Indonesian political parties: the “auctioning” of nominations for public elections. Once elected into parliament, legislators will then be asked to make regular contributions to their party – sometimes reaching up to 40 per cent of their salary.¹²¹ Moreover, cabinet members will be put under intense pressure to use their access to state resources to syphon off public money into party coffers, mostly by offering projects to businesses and individuals closely associated with the party. Two exemplary cases of this practice that became public were the Baligate scandal in 1999, when Golkar officials managed to extort 546 billion IDR (about 32.5 million GBP) from the state-owned Bali Bank for questionable consultancy services, and the Buloggate scandal in 2000, in which then president Wahid was accused of diverting substantial amounts of money belonging to the national food agency, Bulog, to foundations close to the PKB.

¹²¹ On this and the rest of the paragraph see Mietzner (2007).
Finally, parties also rely heavily on external contributions, particularly from businesspeople. These donations are usually handed to senior party leaders, who often keep the money for themselves. Only during election time, when most party funds are pooled in a number of central accounts to coordinate the financing of the national campaign, do entrepreneurs use the official party treasury as their main entry point for donations. Party financing laws – setting a maximum limit for donations – exist, but violations are hardly ever punished (Hadiwinata 2006: 106).

The financial survival of the major political parties in Indonesia thus strongly depends on the parties’ candidates and representatives in public office. State subsidies for parties, it should be noted, are insignificant. Money, as the example of external donations shows, is generally not channelled through the party as an abstract organisation, but through individual party leaders. This is supported by the observation that Indonesian parties are only weakly bureaucratised. Even Golkar, the former regime party, which had decades to establish a bureaucratic apparatus, only employs about 100 permanent members of staff in its headquarters.122 Rather, managerial and administrative functions are largely performed by external professionals without political links to the parties (Mietzner 2007: 255). As Johnson Tan (2006: 107) explains,

due to the strong concentration of decision-making authority at the party centre and the magnetic role of party leaders, other arms of

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122 Personal communication with Golkar, 2 July 2008.
the organization do not develop: this is rational in that other parts of the organization are neither wanted nor needed.

The only party that deviates from this pattern is once again the PKS. Although – like other Indonesian parties – the PKS withholds parts of the salary of its elected officials (25 per cent), the majority of funding comes from party member contributions (Manikas and Emling 2003: 124). Furthermore, the PKS also receives funding through *infaq* and *shadaqah* (voluntary charity for the cause of Allah) from non-members. Party politicians who receive such donations must transfer them to the official party treasury. Finally, the party also benefits from *wakaf* – property or land endowed for public use – a tradition highly encouraged through the teachings of Muhammad.

The importance of the party central office in administering financial resources clearly reflects in the party’s decision-making structures. All members of the party’s central executive council (referred to within all Indonesian parties as the *dewan pimpinan pusat* or DPP) are selected by the consultative council (*majelis syuro*) – the highest executive authority within the party, composed mainly of Islamic teachers and clerics. The consultative council also nominates the members of the *sharia* council, whose main duty is to ensure that the party’s policies and platform conform to basic Islamic laws and principles.¹²³

¹²³ Personal communication with the PKS, 9 July 2008.
In all Indonesian parties the DPP has more power than the party in public office. The most powerful mechanism of control is the right to recall parliamentarians – as stated in Article 12 of the political party law – i.e. to withdraw their party membership, through which they will automatically be dismissed from the legislature, since independent lawmakers are not permitted. Moreover, the DPP will usually also appoint the leadership of the parliamentary party group (fraksi), thereby severely curtailing the latter’s freedom of decision-making.\textsuperscript{124}

We can thus conclude that in all major parties – with the exception of the PKS – the party in central office is only weakly developed. Resources are not mobilised by the party as an abstract organisation, but the organisational survival largely depends on financial contributions by candidates for public elections. Under these circumstances, the function of the party bureaucracy is largely reduced to managing the funds for the national election campaign, leaving the party in public office as the dominant – and probably only – face of the party organisation. In the PKS, in contrast, the party central office is much more powerful. Although the party’s official rules deny bureaucrats a vote in party internal matters, all decision-making power is monopolised in the consultative council – the party leadership.

\textsuperscript{124} Personal communication with Frank Feulner, 28 June 2008.
Summary

As we would expect in a “third wave” democracy, the sudden arrival of democracy in Indonesia did not leave actors much time to develop programmatic strategies for voter mobilisation. As a result, the winners in the country’s first two elections were those political parties with significant links to parties that dominated Indonesia’s first democratic party system in the 1950s (Mietzner 2008: 439). While the PDI-P is perceived as continuing Sukarno’s legacy of socialist secularism, several religious parties have strong historical roots in different groups within the Muslim population – Wahid’s PKB represents Nahdatul Ulama, Rais’ PAN is closely connected to Muhammadiyah and the PPP claims succession to Masyumi, the largest modernist Muslim party in Indonesia’s post-independence democracy. In addition to these four “historical” parties, Golkar was able to maintain its support base through the democratic transition, allowing the former regime party to finish first in the 1999 elections.

However, voters do not only vote for these parties on the basis of historically informed psychological attachments, but political parties need to strengthen their traditional links with the respective communities by gaining the endorsement of local notables representing these communities. Accordingly, the context favours actors who already control clientelistic networks that integrate a large number of local power holders, or who possess the necessary financial resources to establish such a network in a short period of time. That is to say, the contextual environment stra-
technically selects clientelism as the dominant strategy for voter mobilisation. It must be noted, however, that the patron-client relationships rarely reach down to voter level, but they are primarily a mechanism to accommodate elites from the national and local level.

Nevertheless, very much like the classical cadre party in early democratic Europe, political parties in Indonesia do not invest in a formal party organisation. Party leaders want maximum freedom in the management of their intra-elite networks and are therefore not interested in a formal party membership and a powerful party bureaucracy. Rather, the formal party organisation only serves as a cloak to conceal the clientelistic dealings. All functions usually associated with political parties, such as the recruitment of candidates, the mobilisation of funding and the organisation of electoral campaigns, are performed by the informal networks within that cloak. As a result, the three formal faces of party organisation – the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office – are indistinguishable. Instead, there is a strong personal overlap between the three faces, as party membership is restricted to actors who have the necessary resources to run their own electoral campaign, while functions usually associated with the party bureaucracy are mainly performed by external professionals.

However, while clientelism is the outcome strategically selected by the context, agents have developed alternative strategic reactions to the environment around them. The most notable example of such political parties is the PKS, which tries to mobilise voters through Islamist policy ideas. Finding itself in a similar situation as
socialist and communist mass parties in late 19th century Europe – that is, having been established external to government – the PKS combines these programmatic appeals with a mass membership organisation. The mass membership provides the PKS with financial resources and connects the party to the social milieu whose interests it claims to represent. However, in contrast to the classical mass party, the PKS is not democratically organised, but decision-making is controlled by a small group of religious preachers and scholars. The party central office therefore possesses powerful means to enforce discipline among the members of the party in public office in order to push forward the party’s ideological programme.

Despite the similarities to party systems in 19th century Europe, the case of Indonesia should not be viewed as evidence of political parties in the country following the same path of organisational development as parties in Western Europe. Rather, as has been shown, party organisations in Indonesia are the product of strategic decisions taken within a context that favours clientelism over other strategies for voter mobilisation. Unlike in South Korea or the Philippines, clientelistic networks in Indonesia do generally not provide material incentives to voters, but the exchange relations tend to be limited to the intra-party level. The connection between voters and politicians is made as the established political parties benefit from their traditional images as representatives of certain social communities.

However, as the results for the 2009 legislative elections suggest, this pattern of voter mobilisation could slowly be changing, since all major parties lost consider-
able support. Instead, the big winner was president Yudhyono’s Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party, PD), which gathered 21 per cent of the vote – an increase of almost 14 percentage points over 2004. As several observers of Indonesian electoral politics have pointed out, Yudhyono’s success was largely due to the government’s scheme of handing out millions in cash to poor citizens shortly before the election in – what was claimed as – a compensation for rising fuel prices (Sherlock 2009; Mietzner 2009b). Hence, as under the New Order regime, voters are receiving material incentives for electoral support through channels of the state administration. How other parties will react to these changing circumstances remains to be seen: They could extend their clientelistic networks to the electorate or develop programmatic appeals. While we should not see any changes in the way Indonesian parties are organised if clientelistic networks are extended, organisational changes will be dramatic if actors decide to take the programmatic route.

125 All five parties that emerged as the major players in the 1999 elections suffered significant losses compared to the 2004 elections. Two of the biggest losers were Golkar and the PDI-P: Golkar’s vote fell by 7% to 14.5%, while the PDI-P lost 4.5% to 14%. The Islamic parties were also hit by a major decline in vote share: The PKB only won 5.0 % of the vote (-5.6), the PPP 5.3 (-2.9) and the PAN 6.0 (-0.4). The PKS, on the other hand, following a programmatic strategy of voter mobilisation, was able to slightly increase its vote to 7.9% (+0.6).
Towards a new framework for party organisation analysis

The starting point of this piece of research was the observation that the literature on party organisational formation and change is divided along an agency-structure spectrum. Although several scholars of party politics have, in the past, implicitly hinted at the division between theories stressing the explanatory power of structures and those arguing for a more agent-centred approach to the study of party organisation, nobody has fully recognised yet the implications of the conflict between these two theoretical strands for our understanding of party organisation. In fact, the first section of this paper offers the first ever review of the relevant party literature based on how much significance authors attach to either structural variables or political actors as autonomous and reflexive agents.

Within the structural strand we then distinguished between three further approaches, depending on whether they put more emphasis on either internal or ex-
ternal factors – or both. While the “life-cycle” approach believes that each party follows the same evolutionary pattern in its development as a consequence of a largely endogenous process of maturation and institutionalisation, the “period-effect” approach gives sole attention to the external environment, arguing that parties need to evolve with changing political and social circumstances or otherwise they will not survive in the “survival of the fittest”. Finally, the “generation effect” approach combines these two approaches, maintaining that the formation of a party will be driven by external circumstance, whereas the further development will then be determined by internal dynamics.

Subsequently, we argued that the hardened stand-off between structuralist and voluntarist approaches seriously weakens our comprehension of how political parties establish and change their organisations. This argument has both an empirical and a meta-theoretical dimension. Using examples from established democracies in Western Europe, we showed how the strength of one approach is the weakness of another, and vice versa. Moreover, on a more abstract level, we argued that there exists a dialectical relationship between structures and agents, rather than a linear causal link in only one direction – depending on whether one takes a structural or an actor-centred approach. Following the basic propositions of historical institutionalism, we argued that social actors are knowledgeable and reflexive, which gives them the ability to develop different strategies within a context that favours certain strategies over others. In other words, if we only focus on structures to explain different types of party organisation we ignore the ability of actors to develop strat-
egies that will help them overcome the problems posed by structures around them. On the flipside, only focussing on agents means neglecting the context as a contoured terrain which selects for certain outcomes.

It is important to note that this does not mean that we need to refuse all existing theories of party organisation – we only need to revise the relationship between them. Fortunately, historical institutionalism not only offers a medium for critique but also a framework for how to integrate explanatory factors from different levels of analysis into a single theoretical model. More specifically, historical institutionalism helps us understand that, within a given context, there is not a single ideal type of party organisation, but political actors can develop different organisational strategies to deal with the problems presented to them by the environment. At the same time, however, the environment is strategically selective, meaning that actors are not totally free in designing party organisations. Instead, they will have to orientate themselves towards the environment in which their party is to compete with other parties. Moreover, historical institutionalism provides us with a convincing mechanism to explain the reproduction of party organisations, which also carries in itself an explanation for the disruption of this reproductive process: that is, the distribution of power among party internal actors. Put briefly, party organisations reproduce over time as different factions often push for different types of organisation and space for agency to change the organisational structures of the party will only open up if the inter-factional power configuration is significantly altered.
As the defining function of political parties is to compete in public elections, organisational strategies are inseparably linked to strategies of voter mobilisation. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish two basic electoral strategies: clientelistic exchange relationships and programmatic appeals. Politicians who follow a clientelistic strategy will invest the largest share of their resources into the construction of patron-client networks, in which political support will be exchanged for material goods, such as money, jobs or services. The political party will thus only be rudimentarily organised, merely serving as the formal shell for these networks. Very similar to the classical cadre party in 19th century Europe, the three faces of party organisation – the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office – will be indistinguishable. In contrast, a programmatic strategy requires an investment into the party as an abstract organisation, which will have to be open for wider popular participation and provide formal mechanisms for conflict resolution. Parties will thus be characterised by (1) a strong party central office, if politicians target clearly identifiable social milieus, or (2) be dominated by the party in public office, if the electoral appeal is targeted at the median voter.

Newer democracies of the “third wave” are generally selective towards either clientelism or catch-all strategies, because the typical abruptness of the democratic transition does not leave actors enough time to develop clearly focused programmatic platforms. Moreover, unlike in the “first wave” of democratisation, in many younger democracies processes of industrialisation and nation-building did not pre-
cede the democratisation of the political system, meaning that electoral cleavages on which to mobilise voters around ideological programmes have not emerged.

Whether the particular context favours either clientelistic or catch-all strategies will then depend on a number of other factors at the polity level. Broadly speaking, the structural environment selects for clientelism under either, or both, of the following two conditions: (1) The outgoing autocratic regime legitimised its non-democratic rule through the clientelistic distribution of goods and had at least partial control of the democratisation process; or (2) the level of economic development is so low that clientelism can be set up as a new game, without a high risk of either of the two sides defecting. Conversely, catch-all strategies are the strategically selected outcome if – under conditions of high economic development – (1) the democratic transition was controlled “from below”, completely removing the regime from power, or (2) the autocratic regime did not use clientelistic mechanisms to legitimise its non-democratic power.

However, this does not mean that we should expect only two types of political parties to emerge in new democracies (i.e. parties with no formal organisational faces and parties dominated by the party in public office). In fact, under conditions of high environmental uncertainty, actors following a catch-all electoral strategy will suffer difficulties in enforcing party discipline, which could force them to strengthen the party central office over the party in public office. Environmental uncertainty, in turn, is largely the product of properties of the party system, particularly fragmentation and volatility. That is to say, strengthening the party central office could be-
come necessary under conditions of high party system fragmentation and high electoral volatility.

**Asian contexts and actors’ strategies**

In most newer democracies in East Asia, the contextual environment is highly selective towards clientelism. This is not a new phenomenon – clientelism as a mechanism to secure political power has deep historical roots in many East Asian societies and all autocratic regimes that preceded the “third wave” of democratisation used, in one way or the other, clientelistic incentives to legitimise their dictatorial rule. This was most obvious in the Philippines, Indonesia and South Korea: Although differing widely in terms of power structures – the more sultanistic regimes of Marcos and Suharto on one side, and the military-bureaucratic regime in Korea on the other side – all three regimes used public money to “buy” voters in the regularly held pseudo-elections. In South Korea, even the pro-democratic opposition relied on clientelistic practices to mobilise electoral support, while in Indonesia clientelistic incentives were distributed through the state administration, not political parties. Finally, in Taiwan, the KMT regime, after retreating to the island from the Chinese mainland, did not develop patron-client linkages with the local population, but instead integrated society into an extensive network of party cells and branches.
However, after higher party ranks were opened to sub-ethnic Taiwanese in the 1970s, the emerging Mainstream faction of Taiwanese politicians used their connections to local factions to mobilise voters in local and supplementary elections through clientelistic means. This eventually allowed the Mainstream to become the dominant force within the KMT, sidelining the more traditional groups within the party.

In the Philippines, the democratic transition completely removed Marcos’ sultanistic regime, which also resulted in the destruction of existing patron-client linkages. However, the low level of socio-economic development meant that clientelism could be established as a new game without a high risk of either the politician or the voter defecting. Moreover, Marcos had left institutional structures very favourable to setting up clientelistic networks by introducing the barangay as the smallest administrative unit. These conditions strongly benefit the country’s economic elite, which can use its private wealth as clientelistic incentives, while the impoverished mass of the population see these incentives as a means of improving their everyday lives. In some cases, politicians combine clientelism with charisma – either their own charisma or charisma by association, by marrying a celebrity. Some politicians even use violent coercion, particularly in Mindanao, where the Filipino state struggles to maintain a monopoly on the use of force.

In contrast, in Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan, the clientelistic networks established under autocratic rule were largely left untouched by the process of democratisation, meaning that political actors could continue using them in elections
under the newly implemented democratic rules. In Indonesia, democracy was installed through a palace coup against Suharto, which gave central elements of the regime the opportunity to re-position themselves in the electoral market by hijacking existing parties or establishing their own political vehicles. Regarding the mobilisation of voters, the major parties in post-Suharto Indonesia benefit from their historical linkages with the specific social milieus whose interests they claim to represent. However, the linkage between politicians and voters is not made through a policy platform that aggregates the interest of the politician’s specific constituency. Instead, politicians provide clientelistic incentives to local notables exercising moral authority over their respective constituency in return for their endorsement in national elections. Hence, clientelism in Indonesia is best described as a mechanism to accommodate political elites from the national and local level, with only a very small share of material gains trickling down to the voter.

In South Korea, on the other hand, clientelism is a direct exchange relationship between the politician and the voter, in which material goods and services are provided in return for electoral support. Somewhat unusually, under the military-bureaucratic regime, the regime party was not the only party to employ clientelistic strategies, but the pro-democratic opposition also mobilised voters through clientelistic incentives. It is thus no surprise that these clientelistic networks survived the negotiated transition to democracy and continue to be used under the new democratic rules. What is more, clientelism persists despite a growing level of economic development in South Korea, which shows that the prisoner’s dilemma does not
arise when clientelism is embedded in social structures. However, the nature of electoral clientelism in South Korea has recently been changing, as younger politicians are pushing into the major political parties. This younger generation of politicians is not integrated into the existing clientelistic networks and has thus reintroduced *public* economic incentives into the regional cleavage, rather than distributing *private* goods. Put in more abstract terms, this is therefore an example of how social agents can develop alternative strategic responses to the same structural terrain.

An even stronger case for the argument that actors are strategically reflexive can be made by looking at political party competition in Taiwan. Even before the arrival of democracy, the KMT had been divided over the best electoral strategy: While the Mainstream faction used its links to local factions to mobilise voters through clientelistic practices, the Non-mainstream followed a strategy of party organisational penetration into society, based on an ideology of Chinese nationalism. As the KMT – or rather the Mainstream faction – remained in tight control of the democratisation process, the clientelistic networks established by the Mainstream under authoritarian rule were successfully transferred into the new democratic arena. The Non-mainstream, on the other hand, continued to campaign of programmatic appeals, demanding reunification with the Chinese mainland. The reasons for this strategic choice are beyond the scope of this analysis, but two possible explanations could be the Non-mainstream’s lack of relations to local factions or its diverging understanding of the environment through a particular set of ideas. For similar reasons, actors
within the largest opposition party, the DPP also developed programmatic appeals rather than patron-client relationships. Whereas the New Tide faction built a policy platform promoting independence for Taiwan, the Formosa faction followed a wider electoral agenda, supported by the personal charisma of its leaders.

Both the KMT’s Non-mainstream and the DPP’s New Tide faction thus opted for relatively narrow programmatic strategies, which we should theoretically not expect in newer democracies. They are therefore good examples of how social actors can develop strategies that deviate from the outcome strategically selected for by the structural context. Even clearer cases of politicians mobilising clearly defined social groups through ideological platforms can be found in South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia. Although in all three countries the environment is highly selective towards clientelism, political parties have emerged that aggregate the interests of certain constituencies in detailed policy agendas: The Korean DLP targets the working class; the Indonesian PKS represents the interests of conservative Muslims; and, in the Philippines, AKBAYAN! serves as a voice for the poor. Again, the motivating factors behind these programmatic strategies are not part of this analysis, but actors could hold specific sets of values that do not allow them to realise the opportunities for clientelism provided by the context – Marxist ideas of social equality in the KDLP and AKBAYAN!, and Islamic values of piety and belief in God in the PKS. Alternatively, these parties might have developed narrow programmatic appeals because they do not control the necessary resources for a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilisation. In order to make up for the lack of resources, the parties’ pro-
grammatic platforms provide citizens with collective incentives to join the party, and contribute money and/or labour.

Although the electoral success of these three parties has so far been limited, they are nonetheless excellent examples of the ability of agents to make strategic decisions in a strategically selective context. Moreover, factional conflict in the major parties in Korea and particularly in Taiwan shows that social actors with diverging strategic responses to the same environment can also co-exist within the same political party. Since electoral strategies feed directly into preferences regarding party organisation, political parties are therefore best described as constellations of power between different party internal actors. Accordingly, party organisations reproduce and change, as actors will push for those organisational structures that will best allow the implementation of their electoral strategy. That is to say, by favouring certain electoral strategies over others, the environmental context will strategically select for a certain type of party organisation. However, given actors’ ability to develop different electoral strategies within the same context, this outcome is not inevitable. Indeed, as we have seen, the wide variety of electoral strategies used to mobilise voters in the younger democracies of East Asia translates into an equally large variety of party organisations in the post-autocratic party systems.
Party organisation in East Asia

As the post-autocratic environments in East Asia are generally selective towards clientelism, most political parties are characterised by their lack of formal organisational faces. Instead, as in the classical cadre party, there is an almost complete overlap between the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office. However, since actors are able to develop alternative electoral strategies, we can also find parties that have translated the distribution between party internal actors into formal norms and regulations. Taiwanese parties, which have, since the introduction of democracy, been deeply fragmented with factional conflict over the best electoral strategy, are now dominated by actors following catch-all electoral strategies, resulting in the party in public office as the most powerful organisational element. Moreover, party systems in South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines contain single parties that mobilise voters on narrowly focused programmatic strategies, which means actors within these parties have developed the party central office as the dominant face as a means to increase party discipline among the members in public office.
**Party membership**

Most political parties in East Asia are very vague about the conditions they attach to party membership. The constitutions of the dominant parties in South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines only list general requirements, such as nationality, age and identification with the party’s principles. In addition to these basic criteria, party membership does usually not carry any other obligations. In particular, party members are not required to attend regular party meetings or pay regular membership fees. Moreover, there is no formal procedure that needs to be followed to join a party as a member: There is no application process, no ID cards are given out to party members and no centrally administered membership register exists by which to record the personal details of members. As a result, it is impossible to distinguish party members from regular voters, which, in turn, means that it is also impossible to provide meaningful membership figures for these parties.

The only criterion to identify party members is whether they have been nominated as candidates for a public election by the respective party – although in the Philippines even this criterion is not free from problems, as candidates often campaign under the banner of more than one party. There is therefore a strong overlap between the party on the ground and the party in public office. Admittance as a party member/candidate will depend on whether the individual can contribute resources to undertake a successful electoral campaign. Given that these parties follow clientelistic electoral strategies, relevant resources tend to include money, patron-
client networks, personal charisma, and (in Indonesia and the Philippines) militant organisations to intimidate candidates and supporters of other parties. Ordinary members, on the other hand, have no value to these parties, as parties do not have to rely on membership fees for their financial survival. Moreover, campaign-related functions traditionally performed by party members on a voluntary basis, such as canvassing or attending rallies, are carried out by clients of powerful politicians in return for material incentives. Finally, members are not even valued as mere statistics: Since voters are mobilised through clientelistic practices, parties do not need to create the impression that they are strongly rooted in society. In short, the organisational strength of these parties should therefore not be measured as a function of their membership size, but on their ability to integrate resourceful politicians as candidates for public elections.

Party membership is more exclusive in Taiwan in the sense that party members can be distinguished from ordinary voters. Most notably, in both major Taiwanese parties, the KMT and the DPP, there is an official membership register and members are issued with membership cards. Currently, the two parties enjoy a membership-electorate ratio of roughly seven and two per cent respectively, which is comparable to many parties in contemporary Western Europe. However, in both the KMT and the DPP a large share of the party membership are so-called “pocket members”, who do not join the party because they identify with the party’s policy programme, but because they have been recruited through the personal network of a local boss. These politicians will then use “their” members to influence party internal voting. In
the KMT, the Non-mainstream faction, which became the dominant faction after the disastrous 2000 presidential election, cracked down on the problem of “pocket members” by enforcing stricter registration procedures and introducing a small membership fee.

In the DPP, members have had to pay regular fees since the party’s founding, but “pocket members” remain a more serious problem than in the KMT, because of the party’s smaller overall membership. However, the dominant New Tide faction – which has traditionally been characterised by a strong ideological identity and thus strictly opposes the recruitment of “pocket members” – has so far been unable to implement efficient measures against “pocket members”, because the DPP is highly dependent on collective membership fees paid by local bosses. For the DPP, members’ financial contributions are therefore an important reason for maintaining a formal party membership. In the KMT, on the other hand, financial considerations were not an important motivating factor when introducing membership fees in 2000. Instead, the decision to make party membership more exclusive was largely driven by factional rivalries and calculations by the dominant Non-mainstream that this would exclude large numbers of “pocket members” controlled by the Mainstream faction. As in the DPP, however, members are valued for their free labour – particularly during campaign times – and as statistic, thus giving the party a semblance of social representation.

While party membership in Taiwan is thus more exclusive than in the dominant parties in other newer democracies of East Asia, membership criteria are even
 stricter in the Korean DLP, the Filipino AKBAYAN! and the Indonesian PKS. Most notably, new members need to attend introductory seminars, where they are taught about the party’s goals and values. Moreover, party branches are highly active in-between elections and attendance of regular party meetings is even compulsory in the PKS (in the form of weekly Qu’ranic study sessions) and AKBAYAN!, where party members need to contribute labour to local party projects as a substitute for not paying membership fees. Therefore, more than Taiwanese parties, these three parties constantly engage their members in party related activities, thereby indoctrinating them with the party’s ideology. It is thus safe to say that, in addition to sources of financial support and free labour, these parties perceive their membership as a pool of candidates for public elections, who need to be trained and educated in all aspects of politics. Since the KLDP, AKBAYAN! and the PKS all follow narrowly focused electoral strategies, strict party discipline is an important condition for working towards the implementation of the party’s clearly defined goals. Educating and recruiting candidates from within the party is an effective way of committing the party in public office to the party’s policy programme.

We can therefore summarise that most parties in the newer democracies in East Asia have not developed a formal party on the ground. This is because they mobilise voters through clientelistic incentives, which means that the patron-client networks employed in elections can also be used to recruit campaign supporters, while the necessary financial resources are provided by the electoral candidates themselves. In Taiwan, on the other hand, party members can clearly be distinguished from the
rest of the electorate, largely because parties want to add substance to their catch-all strategies by giving the impression that they are strongly rooted in society. Moreover, the DPP is also highly dependent on membership fees for its financial survival, while in the KMT the introduction of regular dues was driven by factional rivalries. Finally, parties campaigning on a narrow programmatic platform – the KDLP, AKBAYAN! and the PKS – feature the strongest parties on the ground, since members are not only seen as sources of money and labour, but also as potential candidates for public elections.

Candidate selection

As highlighted earlier, in the major parties in South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia the only criterion to distinguish party members from ordinary citizens is whether they have been nominated as candidates for public elections. There is thus no party on the ground that could democratically legitimise the nomination of candidates by vote. Instead, candidate selection is a highly informal and centralised process, controlled by the closest circle of party leaders. Nomination usually has to be “bought” with money or other politically relevant resources. In South Korea and Indonesia, where closed party list systems are used to elect national legislators, the higher one wants to be ranked on the list, the higher the financial contribution will
have to be. Even party internal elections that seem superficially democratic – examples include the nomination of candidates in the Korean NKP in 1998, party conventions held by the Filipino Lakas and the race for presidential candidate in Golkar in 2004 – are highly corrupted by money politics, as the outcome is effectively decided by who can buy the most support from lower party levels. Ultimately, this pattern of candidate selection reflects the logic of clientelism – that is, the actors with the most resources will be positioned at the top of the clientelistic network, channelling part of these resources further down the pyramid in return for political support.

Candidate selection is also highly centralised in the Indonesian PKS. Although the party would have the necessary party on the ground to conduct a democratic nomination process, party leaders use their religious authority to legitimise a decision behind closed doors. However, unlike in other Indonesian parties, this decision does at least not seem to be affected by money politics. In contrast, other parties with a mass membership organise the selection of candidates in a much more democratic way: While in the Filipino AKBAYAN! candidates for national elections get nominated by the party congress, the Korean DLP holds closed primaries. Similar to the classical mass party, both of these parties thus give their members participatory rights in return for their labour and financial contributions. In the PKS, on the other hand, the payment of regular membership fees is justified through religious concepts in the Qu’ran, such as *infaq* and *shadaqh* – donations for the cause of Allah.

In the major Taiwanese parties, the process of candidate selection has in the past been a frequent target for party organisational reform, reflecting the ongoing fac-
tional conflict within the parties. Initially, both the KMT and the DPP used closed primaries to select candidates for parliamentary elections. In the KMT, the then dominant Non-mainstream faction was hoping that this would limit the influence of local factions closely linked with the opposing Mainstream faction, while in the DPP the dominant Formosa faction calculated that the “one member, one vote” rule would give it a numerical advantage over the New Tide. However, both parties then gradually curtailed membership participation: In the KMT, the increasingly powerful Mainstream centralised candidate selection in the central standing committee because the faction’s clientelistic strategy demanded special allocation of nominations to local factions in return for their political support, while in the DPP the New Tide succeeded in moving decision-making into the middle tiers of the party, which is where the faction had most of its supporters.

However, more recently, both the KMT and the DPP have again decentralised the nomination procedure. In the DPP, after the disastrous 1996 presidential election, the New Tide began to broaden its electoral appeal, effectively replacing its narrow programmatic strategy with a catch-all strategy. In order to do this the faction had to free itself from ideologically radical members in the intermediary party structures, which, in turn, made it necessary to increase the inclusiveness of the selectorate. The New Tide did this by introducing public opinion polls, because a closed primary would have translated into a numerical advantage for the Formosa faction. Similarly, in the KMT, the Non-mainstream faction, which again became the dominant faction after Lee Teng-hui’s resignation as chairman in 2000, adopted a very
similar system. This was because the Non-mainstream anticipated that candidates of the Mainstream faction, who are generally associated with corruption and other illegal activities, would do relatively badly in public opinion. In other words, in Taiwan, the decision over the nomination of candidates for public elections is now largely made outside the major political parties.

In recent years, a similar trend can be observed in the major South Korean parties. As younger politicians, who are not integrated into existing clientelistic networks, are entering the two largest parties, the old pattern of candidate selection, in which nominations can be bought through clientelistic incentives, has come under attack. However, as in the two Taiwanese parties, democratising the procedure by extending the vote to members and even non-members is not an option, since their clientelistic networks would give the old guards a competitive advantage in any election. Therefore, younger politicians have successfully pushed for the implementation of independent screening committees, which include respected personalities of Korean society. Before the 2008 elections, these committees refused to re-nominate many of the guards because they had been involved in corrupt activities.

However, this new procedure for candidate selection in Korea has not significantly altered the party internal distribution of power. As in the dominant parties in the Philippines and Indonesia, the three faces of party organisation remain indistinguishable. Nevertheless, the final outcome has become more formalised and less dependent from money politics. In the Taiwanese parties, on the other hand, where we can clearly distinguish between the three formal elements of party organisation, the
system of public opinion polls strengthens the party in public office. This is because legislators and cabinet members are regularly in the news, which increases their chances of people recognising their names in public opinion polls. In contrast, the centralised procedure of candidate selection used in the PKS clearly benefits the party central office, while the highly democratic procedures employed in AKBAYAN! and the KDLP are a power asset for the party on the ground – more so in AKABAYAN!, as the open primary in the KDLP means that the membership will be atomised.

Distribution of resources and decision-making positions

In most East Asian parties, the largest share of politically relevant resources are held by politicians as individuals, not the political party as an abstract organisation. As discussed above, in order to be nominated as candidates, politicians usually need to contribute substantial resources for electoral campaign purposes. The party itself is hardly ever a source of financial support. In Indonesia, parties will fund the national media campaign, but candidates will have to finance the campaign “on the ground”. In Filipino parties, the general pattern is for campaign expenses at a particular administrative level to be shouldered by the next higher political office, while in Korea candidates maintain their own political machines (sajojik) outside the political
party, which are used to mobilise both voters and donations. It follows from this that parties do not develop a strong party bureaucracy, as a bureaucratic apparatus is neither wanted nor needed: Given that they follow clientelistic strategies of voter mobilisation, politicians are not willing to pool their resources under the control of a party central office, while functions usually performed by the party bureaucracy can be carried out by externally hired professionals.

In Taiwan, too, a large share of politically relevant resources is controlled by politicians and not the political parties – particularly in the DPP. However, in contrast to the dominant parties in South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia, both the KMT and the DPP have developed a party central office as a distinctive face of party organisation. This is, first of all, due to the fact that both parties have a party on the ground, which requires permanent bureaucratic management, such as maintaining the membership register and collecting membership fees. Secondly, both parties have opened their own sources of income, the administration of which again needs permanent bureaucratic structures. The KMT in particular, which is often regarded as the richest party in the world, commands a huge campaign war chest. Initially, all party assets we held by individual party leaders. Only after the Mainstream had established itself as the dominant faction in the early 1990s were party finances put under central supervision in order to facilitate a central allocation of resources for clientelistic purposes. However, these vital functions performed by the party central office do not translate into decision-making power. As in the DPP, the party central office does not enjoy automatic representation in the party’s key executive bodies.
and the party in public office elects its own leadership without interference from outside.

In the KDLP, AKBAYAN! and the PKS, in contrast, the party central controls all politically relevant resources. Not only do the respective party bureaucracies have their own sources of income, but, in addition, all financial resources mobilised by party politicians need to be transferred to the official party treasury. As a result, in all three parties, the party in public office is completely dependent on the party central office for the financing of electoral campaigns. This puts the party central office in a very powerful position, which also reflects in the parties’ formal decision-making rules: While in the KDLP and AKBAYAN! the party bureaucracy enjoys ex-officio representation in all central executive bodies, in the PKS, the party central office is itself the highest authority in the party (in the form of the consultative council), retaining the right to appoint all members of the party's decision-making committees.

To sum up, in the dominant parties of South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia we do not witness the emergence of a party bureaucracy as an autonomous actor. This is because the largest share of politically relevant resources is controlled by individual politicians, who use these resources to feed their patron-client networks for mobilising votes in both party and public elections. The two major Taiwanese parties, on the other hand, feature a formal party central office. This is because, most importantly, permanent organisational structures become necessary to administer the party membership and manage the party's own sources of income. However, as
in the other countries of East Asia, politicians in Taiwan also control their own funds, which is why the party central office does not enjoy automatic representation in any of the executive bodies within either the KMT or the DPP. In the KDLP, AKBAYAN! and the PKS, in contrast, all resources are controlled by the party bureaucracy, which ultimately translates into ex-officio decision-making powers for the party central office.

**Summary**

Since most contextual environments in the newer democracies of East Asia are highly selective towards clientelism, most political parties are no more than a formal cloak around patron-client networks used to mobilise votes in public elections. As a result, when described according to their formal properties, these parties are characterised by the following organisational features: (1) there is no formal party membership that could be distinguished from the common electorate based on its rights and obligations towards the party; (2) the selection of candidates is highly centralised within the party leadership, with the party leadership usually nominating themselves; and (3) politically relevant resources are held by the politicians themselves, not by the party central office as an abstract institution. Accordingly, as in the classical cadre party of 19th century Europe, we can observe a large personal
overlap between the three elements of party organisation, making it impossible to distinguish between the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office.

The only context that does not favour clientelistic over programmatic electoral strategies can be found in Taiwan. Instead, as can be expected in younger democracies of the “third wave”, the environment is strategically selective towards catch-all strategies. As a result, the two major parties in Taiwan – the KMT and the DPP – share many central characteristics with the dominant party type in contemporary Western Europe – the cartel party: Requirements for party membership are not very demanding, candidate selection is highly inclusive, and the parliamentary party controls its own resources and decision-making. All this amounts to the party in public office being the dominant face of the party organisation. The resulting autonomy for the parliamentary party has allowed both parties to work closely together in a cartel to exclude minor parties from government participation, as is best exemplified by the introduction of a single-member plurality electoral system for Legislative Yuan elections in 2008.

However, against our theoretical expectations, we can also find political parties who have developed narrow programmatic appeals. The most notable examples are the Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDPL), the Filipino AKBAYAN! and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Since the implementation of clearly defined programmatic goals requires strong party discipline, all three parties have developed the party central office as the dominant organisational element. The party
central office performs two central functions. First of all, an effective bureaucratic apparatus is required to perform essential functions related to a mass membership. These parties do not only value members as a source of income (except AKBAYAN!) and providers of free labour, but they also perceive them as a pool of potential candidates for public election. Recruiting candidates from within the party is an effective mechanism to increase party discipline, and the party central office plays the key role in setting up training programmes and keeping the members engaged with the party’s ideology. Secondly, party discipline is also strengthened by pooling all resources in the party bureaucracy, which gives the party central office an instrument to impose effective sanctions on noncompliant legislators. Most importantly, lawmakers will be dependent on the party central office for the financing of electoral campaigns.

In short, it has become clear that political parties in the newer democracies of East Asia are not following the same path of development as Western Europe, nor have they taken an “evolutionary leap” towards more contemporary types of party organisation. Instead, we find very different types of party organisation within environmental contexts that are very similar. The analysis has therefore shown that party organisation is the product of strategic choices made by knowledgeable and reflexive actors within a context that favours certain strategies over others. This demonstrates again that the hardened stand-off between structuralist and actor-centred approaches to the study of party organisation seriously limits our understanding of party formation and change, as the strength of one approach is the
weakness of another and vice versa. This does not mean that existing theories of party organisation need to be refused all together, but we need to rethink the relationship between them. Hopefully, the analytical framework offered here is a first big step into that direction, offering scholars around the world a new perspective to think about party politics in their geographical area of specialisation.

The implications for the study of party organisation in Western Europe

As the development of party organisations in Western Europe is the empirical basis for the largest share of existing theories of party formation and change, it seems necessary to discuss what the analytical framework developed here will mean for the study of party politics in Western Europe. First of all, it must be noted that the development of political parties in Western Europe is neither unique nor the only possible path of organisational development. Rather, it should be understood in terms of strategic decisions and strategically selective contexts. While strategies can be distinguished along a clientelistic-programmatic spectrum, the context should be described according to factors favourable to either of these strategies.

In fact, the context in 19th century Europe featured many characteristics we can also observe in the younger democracies of South Korea, the Philippines and Indo-
nesia. Most importantly, as only a small minority was eligible to vote under the electoral rules of the régime censitaire, voters could easily be mobilised through interpersonal networks, thereby eliminating the need for a strong party organisation. Instead, political actors invested the largest share of their resources into patron-client relationships, which resulted in the emergence of the classical cadre party, characterised by an almost complete overlap of the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office. Meanwhile, political actors excluded from government and lacking the necessary resources to establish similar clientelistic networks developed programmatic appeals targeted at clearly defined social groups. By providing collective incentives and opening decision-making to wider participation, these parties successfully recruited large groups of fee-paying members, thereby making up their lack of resources through mass memberships. As the management of the membership and the enforcement of discipline in the parliamentary party required effective party internal control, these mass parties were characterised by a strong party central office.

However, both cadre and mass parties were soon forced to rethink their electoral strategies: While the lifting of the régime censitaire meant that clientelism was far less efficient now, as a growing number of voters had to be integrated into the patron-client networks, the rising level of socio-economic development meant that targeting specific social groups through narrow programmatic platforms had become more difficult too, since less and less voters would feel like members of these groups. Hence, both types of parties began campaigning on programmatic appeals,
aimed at winning the vote of the median voter. As a result, both types of parties transformed into the same party type: the catch-all party. The trend became to make party membership more inclusive and extend participatory rights to a wider group, thereby making the party in public office more autonomous from the rest of the extra-parliamentary party. This development has now reached its temporary peak with the emergence of the cartel party, in which the party in public office clearly is the dominant organisational element.

However, as politicians are becoming more and more professionalised, the problem with catch-all electoral strategies is that they fail to differentiate political parties in the electoral market: If all parties position themselves as responsible managers of the state, this will not set them apart from their competitors. In the future, we should therefore expect political parties in Western Europe to increasingly supplement their catch-all strategies with secondary electoral strategies. One such complementary strategy that will help parties to differentiate themselves from the competition is charisma. Although recent empirical evidence suggests that political parties still have a more significant influence on voting behaviour than leadership appeals, it is clear that “in an age of increasingly competitive elections, electorally appealing leaders may make all the difference” (Webb and Poguntke 2007: 346). A second strategy political parties can use to separate themselves from the competition is patronage. However, unlike in the newer democracies of East Asia, patronage will not be directed at the electorate as a clientelistic mechanism of voter mobilisation (since this will be difficult to realise in the highly developed context that is
Western Europe), but it will be used as an instrument of governance. Political parties will make increasing use of patronage to build organisational networks in the state (and semi-state) sector that will combine political loyalty with technocratic expertise. These networks will facilitate the implementation of public policies, thereby helping parties to boost their image of efficient managers of the state (Kopecký and Mair 2006).

Although not targeted at the mass electorate, patronage in the Western European context will have a similar effect on party organisation as clientelistic strategies of voter mobilisation in the newer democracies of East Asia. More precisely, it will accelerate a process that is already under way. First of all, political parties will be more interested in membership quality than quantity, with quality measured in terms of technocratic expertise. Secondly, the decreasing size of party memberships will make it necessary to open candidate selection to the wider electorate, thereby making it even more difficult to distinguish between party members and normal citizens. Thirdly, this will further weaken the party central office as the mediating link between the party in public office and the party on the ground, while the party in public office will be strengthened as the coordinating body in the growing patronage network. In short, the party in public office will further consolidate its position as the dominant party organisational face, until it may eventually become impossible to distinguish between the three formal faces of organisation. Instead, the function of political parties could be reduced to no more than that of a formal cloak around inter-personal networks that connect the party leadership to appointed par-
tisans at different levels of governance. The growing focus of electoral campaigns on the charismatic qualities of single political leaders – as already addressed by our analytical framework – will stimulate this process even further.

However, it must be noted that predictions about the future of party organisation, such as this one, will always be limited to strategically selected outcomes. They thereby deny actors the ability to develop organisational strategies that deviate from the expected outcome. As our analysis of political parties in East Asia has shown, this is neither empirically or theoretically a fair assumption. Rather, we must acknowledge the fact that – although the strategic selectivity of a context will throw up regularities over time – single organisational decisions are always unpredictable. In fact, the prediction described above rests on the premise that parties have access to certain resources (most importantly, government spoils and charisma). Political parties lacking these resources will therefore be forced to take alternative routes of organisational development. Moreover, we have certainly not reached “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1992) – and we probably never will – but political actors will always hold diverging sets of ideas through which to interpret the environment around them. As interpretations of the opportunities provided by a context will differ between actors, so will strategic responses to this same context.

Similarly, although phrased in terms of strategic decisions and strategically selective contexts, the brief historical summary of political party development in Western Europe above cuts out the many historical cases of political parties that do not fit into a generalised narrative. However, it is precisely these cases that deviate
from the general pattern of structured outcomes that can help us gain a better understanding of the relationship between structure and agency, and processes of party formation and change more specifically. There are, for instance, many party systems in which the cartel party has not emerged as the dominant party type. While several authors have made this observation in democracies outside of Western Europe (such as Young (1998) in Canada or Yishai (2001) in Israel), Detterbeck (2002; 2005), studying political parties in Denmark, Germany, Britain and Switzerland, claims that the emergence of cartel parties depends on a number of contextual factors: (1) the institutional setting, (2) political culture and (3) the level of political professionalisation. This heterogeneity across polities, combined with homogeneity within polities, shows that external structures matter. Approaches to party organisation that focus either on the causal power of internal structures (“life cycle” approach) or the role of agency therefore struggle to account for these cases.

However, heterogeneity of party organisation cannot only be observed across countries but also within countries. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Italian party system is a good example in this regard, since, at any point in time, different types of party organisation have existed side by side – catch-all and mass parties up until the 1990s, and modernised mass and “business firm” parties more recently. Thus, theories of party organisation emphasising the importance of external structures (“period effect” approach) run into severe difficulties when trying to account for different types of party organisation within the same polity, as there are obviously factors below the systemic level with a strong influence on how parties organise. The only
theory that integrates factors from different levels of analysis is Panebianco’s “generation effect” approach, which argues that the formation of a party will be driven by external circumstances, while its further development will be severely constrained by internal dynamics. However, this approach underestimates actors’ ability to drastically reform the organisation of a political party, as can be exemplified by the fact that the Italian communist and socialist parties have gone through considerable organisational change. Even clearer examples of party change are parties of the new right. The French FN and the Austrian FPÖ, for example, have both gone through a continuous process of institutionalisation, making themselves much less dependent on their respective charismatic leader.

In other words, no existing theory of party organisation has yet been able to account for both systemically structured outcomes and the numerous cases deviating from these regularities. Existing theoretical frameworks can only do so on an ad-hoc basis by borrowing from other approaches: While structuralist approaches need help from voluntarist approaches to explain diversity, actor-focused approaches need to turn for support to structuralist theories when facing homogenously distributed outcomes. The analytical framework developed here is therefore the first attempt to integrate factors from different levels of analysis into a single model by acknowledging a dialectical relationship between structure and agency. Future research might show that the contextual factors included in this framework are less meaningful in the context of established democracies, and actors might develop strategies never observed before, but the basic relationship between structures and
agents will remain the same across space and time. In other words, party organisation will always be the product of strategic decisions made within a strategically selective context.
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QUESTIONNAIRE
ON THE ORGANISATION AND FACTIONALISATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES

Name of political party

Name of interviewee

Job title

Date of interview

SECTION 1: General Information

Q1 Do written organisational rules exist to guide the functioning of the party?
☐ Yes.
☐ No.

Q2 What is the name of the national executive body of the party?

Q3 How many members does this body have, and how are these members elected or appointed? Check all that apply and specify each.

☐ Party leader(s).
☐ Parliamentary party.
☐ Local or regional party branches.
☐ Delegates to a party congress.
☐ Party members.
☐ Other.

Total number of members:

Q4 What is the name of the highest decision-making body in the party?

Q5 How many members does this body have, and how are these members elected or appointed? Check all that apply and specify each.

☐ National executive body (see above).
☐ Party leader(s).
☐ Parliamentary party.
☐ Local or regional party branches.
☐ Delegates to a party congress.
☐ Party members.
☐ Other.

Total number of members:
Q6  Which, if any, of the above has changed since the party was founded?

SECTION 2:  Party Membership

Q7a  Is there an official membership register?
☐ Yes.
☐ No.

Q7b  If Q7a = yes, who maintains the register?
☐ National party.
☐ Regional branches.
☐ Local branches
☐ Other (please specify):  

Q8  How many members does the party have, and how has this changed since the party’s founding? Provide year and indicate if real figures or estimates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership size</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Real figure</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
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</table>

Q9  What is the party’s membership fee?
☐ Fixed amount. Please specify (in local currency):  
☐ Voluntary contribution.
☐ No membership fee.

Q10  Where can citizens register as party members?
☐ National party office.
☐ Regional branch.
☐ Local branch.
☐ Party website.
☐ Other (please specify):  

Q11  What, if any, requirements/criteria exist to be eligible for membership? Check all that apply and specify each requirement.
☐ Belonging to a certain ethnic group.
☐ Coming from a certain geographical area.
☐ Age.
☐ Other.

Q12  What, if any, responsibilities come with party membership?
☐ Adherence to party statutes.
☐ Unpaid work.
☐ Other (please specify):  

Q13  What, if any, formal rights come with party membership?
☐ Discounts with merchants.
☐ Voting rights at party meetings.
☐ Other (please specify): ____________________________

Q14  How, if at all, does the party seek to recruit members between elections?
☐ Party-organised mass events.
☐ Information tables in public places.
☐ Door-to-door.
☐ Advertising.
☐ Other (please specify): ____________________________

Q15  How often, if at all, does the party communicate with its members? Check all that apply and specify each.
☐ Electronic newsletter. ____________________________
☐ Paper newsletter. ________________________________
☐ Individual correspondence. ________________________
☐ Meetings. _________________________________
☐ Website. ________________________________
☐ Other. ________________________________

Q16  To whom does the party provide training? Check all that apply and describe type of training and at what level.
☐ Campaign volunteers. ________________________________
☐ Candidates. ________________________________
☐ Elected members. ________________________________
☐ General members. ________________________________
☐ Party officials. ________________________________
☐ Other. ________________________________
☐ No training. ________________________________

Q17  Which, if any, of the above has changed since the party was founded?
__________________________________________
__________________________________________
__________________________________________
__________________________________________

SECTION 3:  Selection of Candidates for National Elections

a) Parliamentary elections

Q18  What are the eligibility requirements established by the party rules to become s/elected as a candidate? Check all that apply and specify each requirement.
☐ Membership in the party. ________________________________
☐ Endorsement by party body. ________________________________
☐ Certain position in the party. ________________________________
☐ Signatures. ________________________________
☐ Age. ________________________________
☐ Qualifications. ________________________________
☐ Other. ________________________________
Q19  **Who is entitled to vote in the selection process/nominates the candidates?** Check all that apply and provide more details for each.

- All voters.
- Party members.
- Elected party agency.
- Non-elected party agency.
- Elected party leader.
- Non-elected party leader.
- Other.

Q20  **What informal practices, if any, undermine the written party rules?**

Q21  **Which, if any, of the above has changed since the party was founded?**

b) **Presidential elections** (if applicable)

Q22  **What are the eligibility requirements established by the party rules to become s/elected as the presidential candidate?** Check all that apply and specify each requirement.

- Membership in the party.
- Endorsement by party body.
- Certain position in the party.
- Signatures.
- Age.
- Qualifications.
- Other.

Q23  **Who is entitled to vote in the selection process/nominates the candidate?** Check all that apply and provide more details for each.

- All voters.
- Party members.
- Elected party agency.
- Non-elected party agency.
- Elected party leader.
- Non-elected party leader.
- Other.

Q24  **What informal practices, if any, undermine the written party rules?**

Q25  **Which, if any, of the above has changed since the party was founded?**
**SECTION 4: Internal Distribution of Resources**

**Q26** What are the party’s main sources of income? Provide an estimate in percent and indicate the total amount in local currency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public state funding</th>
<th>Membership fees</th>
<th>Donations</th>
<th>Party-owned businesses</th>
<th>Other:</th>
<th>Total</th>
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**Q27** How is this income dispersed within the party?

**Q28** What amount of funding do candidates receive from the party for their personal election campaigns? Specify amount in local currency and provide a percentage estimate of the average share in the candidates’ budgets.

**Q29** How many professional staff does the party employ? Provide an estimate of the total number and indicate how they are allocated between the central party bureaucracy and the party in the national parliament.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party bureaucracy</th>
<th>Parliamentary party</th>
<th>Total</th>
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**Q30** Which, if any, of the above has changed since the party was founded?

**SECTION 5: Status of Parliamentary Party**

**Q31** Are there procedural rules to select the decision-making body of the parliamentary party? If yes, describe in more detail.

- Yes, formal rules.
- Yes, informal rules.
- No.

**Q32** Are there formal rules for decision making in the parliamentary party? If yes, describe how these rules are made.

- Yes.
- No.
Q33   How, if at all, can parliamentarians be held accountable for not following party policy decisions?

☐ Exclusion from promotion within party ranks.
☐ Demotion within party ranks.
☐ Expulsion from the party.
☐ Other (please specify):  __________________________________________

Q34   Which, if any, of the above has changed since the party was founded?

_____________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________
**SECTION 6: Factionalisation**

**Q35** What are the main factions within the party? For each faction please indicate the main functions of the faction (multiple answers are possible) and specify these, and rate the faction’s degree of institutionalisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of faction</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Articulate specific policy idea:</th>
<th>Allocate posts and resources:</th>
<th>Represent specific social group:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name of faction</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Articulate specific policy idea:</th>
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<th>Function</th>
<th>Articulate specific policy idea:</th>
<th>Allocate posts and resources:</th>
<th>Represent specific social group:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Q36** Outline the development of the inter-factional power relations. Identify the dominant faction, and describe significant changes in the distribution of power among factions.