THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND ALLIED NAVAL FORCES’ OPERATION
WITH THE ANTI-COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN THE KOREAN WAR:
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE OPERATION ON THE WEST COAST

By

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School of History and Cultures
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces operation on the west coast during the final two and a half years of the Korean War, particularly focused on their co-operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas. The purpose of this study is to present a more realistic picture of the United Nations (UN) naval forces operation in the west, which has been largely neglected, by analysing their activities in relation to the large number of irregular forces.

This thesis shows that, even though it was often difficult and frustrating, working with the irregular groups was both strategically and operationally essential to the conduct of the war, and this naval-guerrilla relationship was of major importance during the latter part of the naval campaign. It concludes that, to the British Commonwealth Commanders and Allied Naval forces on the west coast, a large part of the relationship with the guerrillas during the Korean War could be explained as that involving a compelled co-operation with unreliable partners.
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<td>ASHCAN</td>
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<td>ARGONAUT</td>
<td>Yalta Conference February 1945</td>
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<td>BRICKWOOD</td>
<td>Haeju Unit (TU 95.12.4) patrol area</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHEERFUL</td>
<td>Guerrilla raid operation to recapture Ung-do</td>
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<td>CIGARRET</td>
<td>Chodo-Sokto Unit (TU 95.12.1) patrol area</td>
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<td>EUREKA</td>
<td>Tehran Conference November-December 1943</td>
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<td>GUINNESS</td>
<td>Han River Unit (TU 95.12.3) patrol area</td>
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<tr>
<td>PANDORA</td>
<td>Naval evacuation plan from the northern islands</td>
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<td>ABLE</td>
<td>Initial guerrilla operational plan</td>
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<td>QUICKSILVER</td>
<td>Guerrilla unit integration plan into the ROK Army</td>
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<td>SEXTANT</td>
<td>Cairo Conference November 1943</td>
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<td>SMOKING CONCERT</td>
<td>Naval Island defensive operation in the Chodo-Sokto area</td>
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<td>TASK FORCE WILLIAM ABLE</td>
<td>Early Codename of the American guerrilla organisation</td>
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<td>TRIX</td>
<td>Local evacuation plan of Operation PANDORA</td>
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<td>WORTHINGTON</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFFE</td>
<td>Army Forces, Far East (US)</td>
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<td>A/S</td>
<td>Anti-submarine</td>
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<td>BCOF</td>
<td>British Commonwealth Occupation Force</td>
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<td>CCF</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Forces</td>
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<td>CCRAK</td>
<td>Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities, Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-in-C</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMNAVFE</td>
<td>Commander Naval Forces, Far East (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTE</td>
<td>Commander of Task Element</td>
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<td>CTF</td>
<td>Commander Task Force</td>
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<td>CTG</td>
<td>Commander Task Group</td>
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<td>CTU</td>
<td>Commander Task Unit</td>
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<td>FEAF</td>
<td>Far East Air Force (US)</td>
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<td>FEC</td>
<td>Far East Command (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEC/LD (K)</td>
<td>Far East Command, Liaison Department, Korea</td>
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<td>EUSAK</td>
<td>Eighth US Army, Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMAS</td>
<td>His/Her Majesty’s Australian Ship</td>
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<td>HMCS</td>
<td>His/Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship</td>
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<td>HMMNZS</td>
<td>His/Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship</td>
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<td>HMS</td>
<td>His/Her Majesty’s Ship</td>
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<td>JACK</td>
<td>Joint Advisory Committee, Korea</td>
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<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chief of Staff (US)</td>
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<td>JSPOG</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLO</td>
<td>Korea Liaison Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCVP</td>
<td>Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing Ship, Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHCI</td>
<td>Military History Compilation Institute (Korea)</td>
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<td>NAVFE</td>
<td>Naval Forces Far East (US)</td>
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<td>NKPA</td>
<td>North Korean People’s Army</td>
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<td>OSI</td>
<td>Office of Special Investigations</td>
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<td>ORO</td>
<td>Operations Research Office (Johns Hopkins University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>Partisan Infantry Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>POWs</td>
<td>Prisoners of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>SAU</td>
<td>Special Activities Unit</td>
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<td>SO (I)</td>
<td>Staff Office, Intelligence (RN)</td>
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<td>TARCAP</td>
<td>Tactical Air Reconnaissance and Combat Air Patrol</td>
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<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives (Kew)</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Command</td>
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<td>UNPFK</td>
<td>United Nations Partisan Forces, Korea</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<td>W/T</td>
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The last two years of naval operations in the Korean War (June 1950–July 1953) have been defined as a classic example of the ‘static warfare on shore’ in that most UN fleets in Korean waters were engaged in various static tasks.¹ This unspectacular and dull image of static warfare has led to the UN naval campaign being viewed with relative indifference. Unlike ‘the mighty drama of Inchon and Hungnam’ of the first critical year, the following two years of naval operation lacked dramatic fleet action.² Therefore, regardless of the actual value and characteristics of this fleet operation, the UN sea power’s involvement in the last two years of the Korean War has been poorly documented. This indifference, obviously, has restricted our understanding of a realistic picture of the UN naval forces’ operation in Korea.

Even though there were no major fleet actions, it would be wrong to conclude that naval operations were irrelevant. This thesis will argue that on the west coast, in particular, naval (and air) co-operation with guerrilla forces was of major importance. The analysis in this thesis will show that, although often difficult and frustrating, working with the irregular groups was both strategically and operationally essential to the conduct of the war.

The naval operation in the Korean War differed from the pattern of previous wars in the Pacific area in that it entailed no severe clash of fleets. As North Korea had only negligible surface forces, except for a small-scale engagement conducted in early July 1950, there were no

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conflicts between fleets. Other than mining and shore batteries, there was virtually no Communist opposition in Korean waters; even the possible threat from Soviet submarines never materialised.

Based on the control of the sea that was accomplished early on, the naval operation was asked to increase its involvement in support of ground operations. This was particularly true during the first twelve months of war. This period involved radical changes in front-line positions, and was one in which the naval forces’ support role brought about very significant changes to the war situation. However, unlike the earlier period, the following two years of naval operations in Korea lacked dramatic fleet action. The need of naval force direct support for ground operations was largely reduced once the immediate crisis in the UN ground forces was relieved, and battle lines reached a stalemate roughly on the 38th Parallel in June 1951. This enabled the UN Naval forces to place more emphasis on the issues within the blockade areas, thus their operation became largely static.

To the US Naval forces who mainly conducted their missions on the east coast during the war, the latter part of naval operations particularly lacked spectacle. Due to its geographical configuration — a very steep coastline and very few islands off its shore — the US Naval forces were able to maintain a close blockade relatively easily. It was also advantageous for naval bombardment as its coastal area contains North Korea’s main road and rail communication lines to the front line within the reach of naval gunfire and air strike.

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Owing to the Communists’ unlimited manpower to keep the communication lines operating and their continued mine warfare, the UN sea power in this area was rarely diverted from their naval blockade, bombardment and mine sweeping tasks during the latter period.\(^7\) That is why this part of the campaign was commonly described by American sailors as a period of ‘monotony and boredom’ with ‘a lot of gunfire and stuff but no running battle and no spectacles’ and has received relatively little attention from American military historians.\(^8\) Even one of the most influential and comprehensive accounts of the history of the naval operation in this war, James A. Field’s *History of United States Naval Operations, Korea* (1962), only dedicated one chapter to this vast period of naval operation. This chapter’s title, ‘Two More Years’, clearly revealed the American historiography’s low interest in this period.\(^9\)

As the US Navy (USN) constituted the largest part of UN Naval forces and took the overall naval command in Korea, this American perspective has been established as a dominant discourse in describing the latter part of naval operation. This, undoubtedly, influenced the subsequent study of the UN naval campaign on the west coast even though this operation was conducted mainly by the Royal Navy (RN) and her attached Allied Naval forces. Therefore, distinguished characteristics of the west coast naval operation and its importance during this period were largely dwarfed. In fact, the British Naval Staff History, the only full-scale study of the west coast naval operation, defined this period as the last phase of the six naval operational stages in the Korean War and also paid relatively little attention to this extensive period.\(^10\)

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\(^9\) Field Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations, Korea*, Chapter XII.

\(^10\) The British Naval Staff History defined the Korean War and naval operation into six phases as follows:
During the first year of the conflict, the west coast was regarded as a relatively less important area than the east. The western side of North Korea was mainly an agricultural area which had little industry, and there were no railways or main supply routes within naval gunfire range. In addition, owing to the geographical characteristics of the west coast — high rise and fall of tide, very shallow water near the coastline and a large number of islands — close inshore blockade activities by large naval vessels were almost impossible. These operational environments largely restricted the west coast naval forces’ operation to the supporting role for US Naval forces’ special missions or to maintain a loose and ineffective naval blockade.

Unlike the general descriptions of the naval historiography, however, during the latter part of the war, the strategic value of the west coast area increased. Therefore, the role of the UN Naval forces in this area also became more significant. This was particularly due to the changed value of the UN-held islands in the northern area.

As a war of attrition had persisted along the 38th Parallel, the need to break this stalemate situation increased for the UN Command (UNC). To pressurise the Communists towards the truce talks and to effectively progress the negotiations, behind the front line operations became increasingly important. Also, these operations were encouraged to relieve pressure on the UN ground forces by dragging more Communist forces from the front line. Under these operational...

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- Phase 1: 25 June–6 August 1950 (Initial invasion)
- Phase 2: 6 August–14 September 1950 (The establishment and retention of a beach-head)
- Phase 3: 15 September–25 November 1950 (The UN counter-attack)
- Phase 4: 26 November–14 January 1951 (The Chinese came to the assistance of the North Koreans)
- Phase 5: 15 January–12 June 1951 (The United Nations counter-attack)
- Phase 6: 23 June 1951–27 July 1953 (Long, drawn-out truce talks, static warfare on shore)


requirements, it was the islands on the west which were selected and used as the main bases and launching points of the UN clandestine operations.

The UN-held islands became more significant when the UN Air Force set up Shoran navigational Beacons and early warning radars on several islands in this area.\(^\text{13}\) Under the continued air aggression from the Red Chinese, the west coast area became one of the more vital bases to the UN Air Forces in terms of the struggle for air superiority.\(^\text{14}\) As a consequence, the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces’ role, who were in charge of the west coast naval blockade, also became more significant during the latter period.

The value of the western naval forces operation was at its most important during the island defensive operation. From late October 1951, the UN-held islands on the northern area were utilised as UN Delegation bargaining counters at the cease-fire negotiation. To take the initiative in the negotiations, the Communist forces initiated an assault against these islands. As a British flag officer wrote, it represented the beginning of ‘the most critical period’ for the western naval forces.\(^\text{15}\) To the UNC, the success of this naval defensive operation was particularly significant as the status of inshore islands became one of the major issues that decided the progress of the truce talks. The genuine value of the islands as operational bases for the clandestine and air operations also could not be overlooked. Therefore, to the UNC, this island warfare ‘assumed even greater importance’ than the ground operation for a while.\(^\text{16}\)

This changed war situation, needless to say, heavily increased the importance of the western naval forces role who had to take the primary responsibility of this defensive

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\(^{16}\) Bartlett, *With the Australians in Korea*, p. 129.
operation. On behalf of the UN Naval forces on the west, their latter part of the naval campaign was a more valuable contribution than during the earlier period. This is the reason why the latter part of the naval operation deserves greater academic attention.

A prominent point to note is that large parts of this naval campaign had been conducted under a close co-operation with the UN guerrilla forces. Also, following the establishment of naval-guerrilla relationships, the western naval forces operation became a lot more active and systematic, thus, they were able to carry out the critical missions more effectively.

The anti-Communist guerrilla groups, called Leopard and Wolfpack, were spontaneously formed irregular forces who mainly lived in North Korea before the start of the war. Most of them were students or peasants younger than twenty-three years of age who had conducted anti-Communist activities since the establishment of the Communist regime in the North from late 1945.17 As a consequence of the Chinese intervention and their subsequent reoccupation of the territory over the 38th Parallel in December 1950, the anti-Communists were compelled to form an exiled sanctuary on the west coast islands. With the sole motivation of liberating their hometowns from the Communists, they continued to conduct guerrilla activities, moving between the mainland and the islands.

To the UNC, the emergence of several thousand irregular forces who had the potential to conduct clandestine operations and guerrilla activity on the rear side of the enemy line was welcome news. Therefore, under the initiative of the Eighth US Army, Korea (EUSAk), large numbers of irregulars were reorganised and absorbed into American guerrilla organisations;

they actively conducted guerrilla raids, sabotage and intelligence gathering activities from early 1951.

As the largest guerrilla forces controlled by the UNC during the Korean War, their emergence and start of activities on the west coast heavily influenced the western naval forces’ operations. In particular, the addition of large-scale guerrilla activity made the British Naval Task Group’s operation more distinctive from that of the naval forces located in the east; it was also more active and effective than in its earlier period.

The UN Naval forces’ direct relationship with the American guerrilla organisation began from early March 1951; right after the start of its guerrilla activity. As these guerrillas conducted operations mainly based from the islands on the west coast, for the defence of their bases and to make various guerrilla activities more effective, it was essential to have close naval gunfire and air support. As for the naval forces located in the west, who had long-desired a local intelligence team and island garrison forces for the naval operation, co-operation with these irregulars was also an inevitable choice. Subsequently, this new relationship significantly changed the pattern of naval operations.

Starting from their intelligence of Communist force coastal area movements, the western naval forces depended heavily on guerrilla intelligence for naval operations up until the end of the war. This greater dependence on intelligence enabled the naval forces’ active and effective attack against the Communist forces and allowed the maintenance of a close naval blockade, which were nearly impossible during earlier period. The naval forces also frequently supplied close naval air and gunfire support for the guerrillas’ amphibious landing operations. These raids were regarded as very advantageous by the naval forces, in that they would cause a large

18 Regarding the start of a relationship with the guerrillas, see Chapter 4.
19 Regarding the American guerrilla organisation’s early plan to co-operate with the naval forces, see Appendix 5: Copy of Operation Plan ABLE.
20 Regarding the western naval forces’ intelligence and garrison forces related problem, see sub-chapter 3.2.
deployment of Communist troops from the front line, and they inflicted heavy damage on the coastal guard detachments.\textsuperscript{21} Therefore, from the early stage of their co-operation, a close naval support system for guerrilla activities was established and maintained. Beyond the passive intelligence collection and the naval support system, more active ways of utilising the irregular forces were also carried out. Under the initiative of the blockade ships, the guerrillas were utilised as naval gunfire spotters and special agent teams to support the various naval missions.\textsuperscript{22} Undoubtedly, this allowed the naval forces’ operation against the Communists to be more effective and bold. Even the routine patrols for the naval blockade mission were directly influenced by the guerrilla activities. As the performance of several thousand guerrilla activities could increase west coast blockade instability, it was essential for the naval patrol ships to know their intended movements and to have a proper identification procedure.\textsuperscript{23} This accelerated the development of a communication and co-ordination system between the two groups. As a consequence, this made the naval-guerrilla relationship closer.

These naval-guerrilla relationships were at their most important during the island defensive operation. As the defence of the UN-held islands needed to be given the highest priority by the ships in this area, to deter the Communists’ offensive operation, the value of co-operation with these irregulars increased considerably. In particular, as the only available local intelligence source and a sizeable garrison force, the close co-operation with the guerrillas was imperative. The intensified naval-irregular co-operation was maintained for most of the operational period of 1952, and, consequently, this deepened inter-relationship played a key


\textsuperscript{22} For several examples of the guerrilla use for naval operation, see sub-Chapter 4.4.

\textsuperscript{23} ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 30 at Sasebo, 17 January and 6 February 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station’s letter FO2FE/ 2960/11, dated 10 March 1951, pp. 5–6.
role in the defensive operation. Despite a lack of dramatic fleet action, the western naval forces conducted highly significant tasks successfully with the guerrillas.

To the UN Naval forces in the west, the close co-operation with the guerrillas seemed to be a more valuable contribution than during the earlier period and, accordingly, deserves greater attention and appreciation. However, our current understanding of naval operations in the Korean War obviously fails to appreciate the actual value of the vast period of the west coast naval campaign. For a better understanding of the UN Naval forces’ operation during the latter period, it is essential to examine the UN Naval forces’ inter-relationship with the anti-Communist guerrilla forces.

The main subject of this thesis concerns the naval operation on the west coast during the latter part of the Korean War. The research is particularly focused on the UN naval forces’ co-operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas. The purpose of this study is to present a more realistic picture of the UN naval forces’ operation on the west, which has been largely neglected, by analysing their activities in relation to the large number of irregular forces. In so doing, the study contributes to and revises the current historiography by demonstrating that, owing to this naval-irregular relationship, the latter part of west coast naval operations became far more complex and valuable, thus deserving greater academic attention and appreciation.

1.1 The Literature

From early July 1950 to the end of the war, the responsibility for the west coast naval blockade mission was assigned to the RN and her attached British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces, including Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, the Netherlands and New Zealand. In
addition, several United States Marine Corps (USMC) light carriers were also attached to British command from early 1951 and rotationally operated on the west coast to relieve the British Commonwealth carrier. Although they were not under direct British command, from late July 1950, several Republic of Korea (ROK) naval craft also supported this western naval forces’ operation.

Under the command of a RN flag officer and several sub-element commanders, mostly British, they conducted various tasks on the west coast. Therefore, as an initial step to arrive at an understanding of naval co-operation with the guerrillas, it is essential to survey the literature documenting the RN’s operation in Korea.

Unfortunately, this topic has received very little attention from British military historians and specialists. To the British, the issues in the Korean Peninsula have been regarded as an area of very little direct interest. In addition, its naval operations, which lacked naval engagement, also seemed quite unimpressive. For these reasons, as Edward C. Meyers wrote, ‘the Korean War was a most un-English war’. As a research topic, these facts have made the naval operation in the Korean War less attractive. For despite the large number of vessels and personnel deployed in this conflict, no comprehensive full-scale study of this topic exists except for a British Naval Staff History, which was written for internal purposes only.

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24 Regarding the list of the British Commonwealth and Allied Ships that served under British Command, see Appendix 1.
28 This literature is ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53.
As the only available study which comprehensively covered the British Commonwealth Naval forces operation in Korea, it provides a good starting point in understanding the latter two years of naval operations on the west coast. It also provides basic information on the relationship between the naval forces and the guerrilla organisations, including several roles and operations of Leopard and Wolfpack related to the British Commonwealth naval forces and some Naval Commanders’ evaluations of the guerrillas’ activities. However, like the American historiography, this book also focused more on the early part of the naval operations which seemed less important on behalf of the RN and her attached Allied Naval forces’ role in the Korean War. Therefore, the guerrilla-related information was only scantily described. Needless to say, it fell short of mentioning basic guerrilla information such as their origins, characteristics and processes of co-operation.

Fortunately, several documents exist that focused mainly on the minor part of naval operation in this area, including the studies of attached Allied navies and the aircraft-carrier elements. These are useful to acquire deeper understanding of the attached naval forces and the Fleet Air Arm’s activities and their different perceptions concerning the west coast operation, in particular with the guerrillas. A history published by the ROK Naval Headquarters is particularly useful in understanding the UN naval forces early relationship with the guerrillas.

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29 Ibid. This study dedicated only four chapters amongst totally twelve to describing this vast period of naval operation, as could be seen in each chapter’s title; ‘8. Opening of Truce Talks’, ‘9. Beginning of Stalemate’, ‘10. Stalemate in 1952’, ‘11. End of Hostility’. This Naval Staff history was not concerned much about the increased value and complexity of the naval operation itself conducted on the west coast.

when they were not controlled by any friendly authority. However, as they mainly focused on their own activity, they also lacked information on naval-guerrilla co-operation. This literature is only useful for complementary purposes in understanding the overall west coast naval operation.

Except for the above-mentioned literature, it is not possible to find any additional study covering the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces’ latter two years of operation. Thus, the state of the existing historiography is insufficient to fully understand the latter part of the naval operation on the west coast, in particular their co-operation with the guerrilla organisations. For a more thorough understanding of the topic in question, comprehensive archival research is essential to complement existing material and possibly revise any opinion. Therefore, to further enhance understanding, it is imperative to collect and analyse existing Naval Commanders’ operational records that cover the two-year plus period of the west coast operation; particularly focusing on naval-guerrilla relationships.

However, as this research topic is about the inter-relationship between the naval forces and the guerrillas, this study cannot be completed without resources relating to the guerrillas themselves. Since the Naval Commanders had only limited information of the characteristics of the guerrillas, their internal affairs and higher command’s directions which decided their activities, it is not possible to study this topic meaningfully without additional literature regarding the study of anti-Communist guerrillas.

The topic of the anti-Communist guerrilla activities themselves, however, is also poorly represented in studies. As Major General John K. Singlaub (Ret.), who led the Central

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Intelligence Agency's (CIA) intelligence operation during the Korean War mentioned, the guerrilla operations in the Korean conflict have been regarded as ‘the most unknown part of it’. This is largely due to a shortage of primary resources to record them. As they were irregular anti-Communists who spontaneously decided to join the American organisation, the guerrillas operated under the loose control and supervision of the American officers. Therefore, except for their intelligence or after activity reports, only limited numbers of records were produced during the war. This is typified by the fact that the lists of guerrillas under their command had not been maintained by the American organisations. Moreover, as the existence and the operation of the guerrilla organisations were highly classified, relatively few resources were disclosed to researchers. Therefore, any studies on the anti-Communist guerrilla were mainly conducted by the military institutes or the participants of this operation, both in the USA and South Korea.

It was the US military institutes, and their civilian research contractors, who first conducted comprehensive studies of this topic; these studies were intended for the purpose of analysis and evaluation of the guerrilla warfare during the war. The first of these governmental documents was produced by the US Army Forces, Far East (AFFE) Military History Detachment in 1954. In this study, AFFE analysed the guerrillas’ characteristics and their ways of operations from 1951 to 1952. This research is very useful in that they conducted several interviews with the guerrilla leaders, and significantly it contains detail on their motivation, forms of activity and records of several memorable operations. The subsequent study was conducted by the Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins University (ORO study) in 1956. Under

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33 Regarding the relationship between the guerrillas and the American advisors, see Chapter 5.
contract to AFFE, the ORO study analysed and evaluated the guerrillas’ activities from March 1951 to July 1953. As a comprehensive working paper on this topic, this study is especially valuable in that it contained the most detailed data and extensive evaluation concerning guerrilla actions.\(^{36}\) In addition to these documents, the US Air Force also conducted research on the guerrilla activities in the Korean conflict. In his book of 1964, Lawerence V. Schuetta described guerrilla operations focused on their relation with the Air Force, and evaluated these from an Air Force perspective.\(^ {37}\)

These governmental documents are invaluable in understanding the anti-Communist guerrilla activity, in that they contain the higher command’s plans and directions for guerrilla deployment, which directly influenced the guerrilla’s actual operations. They also supply plenty of supporting documents which are useful for revealing guerrilla backgrounds, organisational structure, the changing pattern of various activities, and also their results.

However, these documents are essentially military policy reports to determine lessons for any future guerrilla warfare, rather than historical research; so they mainly focus on the results of guerrilla action. Although the US Army Military History Detachment’s research concentrates more on guerrilla characteristics and has a narrative of the guerrillas themselves, due to the limited period it covers, it is not possible to describe the last year of guerrilla activity from this source.\(^ {38}\)

The limitations of government-led studies, however, were partly complemented by several books published since the mid-1980s. As large amounts of previously restricted records and government documents related to the guerrilla actions were declassified in 1980 as a consequence of the Freedom of Information Act, some US participants of the guerrilla

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\(^{36}\) Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’.

\(^{37}\) Schuetta, *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea*.

\(^{38}\) This research covers the guerrilla operation between 1951 and 1952.
operations published autobiographies based on personal experiences and newly released sources.\textsuperscript{39}

These publications are also valuable in that they provide detailed accounts of the guerrilla activities, including the guerrillas’ relationships with American officers and the process and problems of their joint operation with the naval forces.\textsuperscript{40} They also give insight into the guerrilla attitude to their activities, and also the American officers’ personal evaluation of the guerrillas; all of which has not been significantly revealed in the governmental documents. However, the descriptions in these autobiographies were restricted to the scope of the authors’ personal experiences, except for the accounts written based on the above mentioned governmental documents. Therefore, they were able to describe only a limited period and area of this topic.

In Korea, as a research topic, the anti-Communist guerrilla activities during the Korean War are similarly not popular. Although most of the guerrillas were transferred into the ROK Army after the end of the Korean War, and hundreds of them are still alive in South Korea, their struggle against the Communists has rarely received attention from either the Government or researchers. This was mainly due to the command and control over guerrillas during the period of the war, which was conducted by the US Army, and official records of the guerrilla activities were exclusively produced and accessed by American military organisations until the declassification of Far East Command (FEC) documents. Moreover, studies of guerrilla warfare


\textsuperscript{40} Ben S. Malcom’s book is particularly useful in understanding the process of co-operation with the naval forces.
have primarily focused on Communist partisan warfare in South Korea and not so much relating to anti-Communist guerrilla activities.\textsuperscript{41}

Therefore, publications on this topic are mainly by the guerrilla members themselves, and, based on their memories and personal records, boosts their own public recognition for anti-Communist activities. Since the publication of The Flame of the Anti-Communism (1957) by Cho Donghwan, several autobiographies were published to introduce guerrilla activities.\textsuperscript{42} Starting from former Donkey-15 members, one of the sub-units of Leopard, the guerrilla veteran associations also published history books of their guerrilla warfare respectively.\textsuperscript{43} These resources are important, as they were written from the perspectives and experiences of the guerrilla themselves, with detailed narratives on their activities. These are particularly useful in that they contain the guerrillas’ reactions and morale as war circumstances changed, all of which directly influenced their co-operation with the naval forces. However, these accounts were produced mainly from their memories, hence the credibility of these books is questionable, and validation using official records is required.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, p. 5.


\textsuperscript{43} Kim Eungsu 김응수, 북위 40 도선: Donkey-15 [The 40th Parallel: donkey-15] (Military HistoryCompilation association of the White Horse Guerrilla Unit, 1974); Suwol Unit Military History Compilation association 수월부대전사편찬위원회, 은율유격전사 [The History of the Guerrilla Warfare of Eunyal] (Suwol Unit Military History Compilation association, 1986); The Veteran Association of Wolfpack-3 유격군울팩 3 부대 전우회, 유격전사 [The Guerrilla Warfare] (The Veteran Association of Wolfpack-3, 1990); The Veteran Association of White Tiger Unit 백호부대유격군 전우회, 백호부대 유격전사, [The History of the Guerrilla Warfare of White Tiger Unit] (The Veteran Association of White Tiger Unit, 1992); Lee Yongjae (ed.) 이영재 편저, 학도유격부대 전사 [The Military History of the Student Guerrilla Unit] (Seoul: Myungsung Publish, 1992); The Veteran Association of Horim Unit 호림유격전우회, 호림부대전사 [The History of the Guerrilla Warfare of Horim Unit] (The Veteran Association of Horim Unit, 1999); The Veteran Association of the Haeju Guerrilla Unit 해주유격부대전우회, 해주유격부대전사 [The History of the Guerrilla Warfare of Haeju Unit] (The Veteran Association of the Haeju Guerrilla Unit, 1992).

The full-scale study of this topic was published in 1994 and 2003 by the ROK Army Military History Detachment and the Military History Compilation Institute of ROK Ministry of National Defence (ROK MHCI), respectively.\(^5\) The latter is particularly useful in that it is a developed version of the previous study, which included additional resources. As the most comprehensive and detailed research regarding the anti-Communist guerrilla activity, the ROK MHCI’s study is one of the best publications for understanding the guerrillas themselves. It includes detail of each guerrilla unit’s respective origins, the process of reorganisation into the American organisation, major activities and also the process of their disbanding.

However, ROK MHCI’s study also has a critical limitation in describing the anti-Communist guerrilla operation in the Korean War. In fact, this limitation not only applies to this book, but also to all the above-mentioned literature regarding the guerrilla activity. That is, it contains little information on the guerrilla co-operation with the UN naval forces. This is due to most of preceding literature being produced based on AFFE sources thus excluding naval forces records. This fundamental limitation is clearly mentioned in the ORO study as follows:

This analysis does not take into account the value of intelligence functions performed by the partisans [guerrillas] incidental to their overt operations, or whatever value they may have had as a defensive force for islands on which the UN command maintained radar and other installations. Some of these functions, especially the furnishing of target information for air strikes or naval gunfire, may have indirectly produced a considerable number of casualties and a considerable amount of damage and destruction of enemy facilities, though it is not possible from the data at hand to establish this. The performance of these two functions-behind-the-lines intelligence and defense of island installations did not require the organization and support of a specifically partisan effort, of course, but there may have been real value in the partisan contribution to them.\(^6\)


\(^{6}\) Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 55.
Considering the fact that the ORO study was conducted based on the most comprehensive primary resources produced by AFFE, the authors’ confession of their fundamental limitation is very meaningful. This limitation once again substantiates the need for a study primarily based on the operational records of naval ships on the west coast. This also intensifies the need for a study of naval-guerrilla co-operation in that this reveals the unknown but one of the most valuable parts of the guerrilla activities during the Korean War.

In order to shape a specific picture of the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas, more archival sources should be examined. In particular, the naval forces’ operational records, which can be traced mainly via The National Archives (TNA), Kew are particularly important. As most of the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces on the west coast operated under the unified command and control of a British flag officer, most of their operational records were to be reported to this RN Admiral. Hence, most of these records are kept as TNA documents.

This study particularly focuses on the operational records produced by RN flag officers (Monthly and Interim Evaluation Reports), their Intelligence Staff Officer (Monthly Intelligence Reports), each sub-element Commander (Report of Proceedings and Turn-over Notes) and each patrol ship (Report of Proceedings and Summary of Daily Action).

Due to the disparity of naval aircraft’s main operational areas from that of the naval craft, its way of co-operation with the guerrillas had to be conducted quite differently. Thus, for the purpose of comparison with the naval patrol craft’s descriptions regarding the guerrilla activities, additional archival resources of carrier operation have to be examined. For this, in addition to War Diaries written by Carrier Borne Air Liaison Section (TNA documents), the archival resources of the Fleet Air Arm Museum in Yeovilton (Squadron Diaries) and the US
Internet Archive documents (USMC Carrier Action Reports) are consulted for the complementary purpose of the study of naval-guerrilla relationships.

For the study of the guerrilla activity themselves, the above-mentioned guerrilla-related literature is examined. In particular, this study concentrates mostly on the records in the literature of US and ROK military institutes and the retired US officers, which provide more reliable sources.

1.2 Content

This research rests on the belief that a more realistic picture of the latter part of UN naval operations conducted on the west coast cannot be properly drawn until more attention is paid to the naval-guerrilla co-operation which has been largely ignored. By examining the two groups’ changing relationship from the start of their co-operation to the end of war, this thesis attempts to revise the current historiography which has undervalued the latter part of the naval operation and invigorate academic attention on this untold western located naval-guerrilla co-operation.

For this purpose, this thesis is organised as follows. The second chapter examines the emergence of the anti-Communist movement and its development in North Korea since the start of Soviet Military Government’s trusteeship in 1945. It describes the influence of several pivotal events, including the establishment of the Communist regime and its subsequent policies which invoked the emergence of the anti-Communist movement within the northern part of Korea. It then looks at the start of the Korean War and the changing war situations that heavily influenced early development and movements of guerrilla activity. Focusing on the anti-Communist movement particularly in the western area of North Korea, this study also examines
the process of their final exile to the islands on the west coast. Such exile represents the anti-Communist guerrilla’s conditions before any direct co-operation was secured with the UN Naval forces.

Chapter 3 outlines the first year of naval operations conducted on the west coast. It focuses on several pivotal incidents which totally changed the war situation and discusses the changing naval forces’ operations and challenges that occurred before the start of its co-operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas. For this purpose, this chapter tracks the process of the British Naval forces involvement in the Korean War and their early operation in Korean waters. Following this, newly emerging challenges in the course of conducting the naval blockade operation on the west coast, particularly focusing on intelligence-related problems, are also examined. The final section of this chapter discusses the influence of the Chinese intervention, which compelled additional duties and challenges to the UN naval forces on the west coast. By focusing on these challenges, this chapter will show the backgrounds of the naval forces’ subsequent decision to start co-operation with the anti-Communist irregulars.

Chapter 4 examines the start and development of co-operation between the UN Naval forces on the west and the anti-Communist guerrillas from mid-December 1950 to early July 1951. This chapter firstly focuses on the naval forces’ early relationship with the guerrillas when they were uncontrolled by any friendly authority. It then explores the guerrilla reorganisation process, mainly focusing on the establishment of the American guerrilla organisation, the Leopard. Subsequently, this chapter discusses the Naval Commanders’ changing positions regarding the guerrillas and the ensuing development of co-operation.

Chapter 5 examines the subsequent collapse of co-operation between the naval forces and the guerrilla organisation since the start of truce talks. The news of truce talks seriously undermined guerrilla morale and thus created a wavering allegiance. Therefore, from late July, several
problems emerged within the guerrilla organisation. This chapter explores these challenges which caused the Naval Commanders to increasingly doubt the reliability of guerrilla activities.

Chapter 6, which covers the longest but most critical period of this study, discusses the changed roles of the naval forces and the guerrilla organisations since the start of the island warfare. Due to the Communists’ new offensive operation, recapturing the west coast islands from early November 1951, the Naval Commanders were required to be the island defender. Faced with the imminent threat from the Communist forces, the Naval Commanders had to re-establish a close relationship with the unreliable guerrillas. Their relationship, then, became more complex in the course of conducting this defensive operation. This chapter examines the two groups’ changing relationship over the course of 1952. The nature of the required roles in the face of new challenges is detailed, along with the respective co-operation between the parties, albeit of diminishing credibility.

Chapter 7 examines the changed relationship of the UN Naval forces and the guerrilla organisations from December 1952 to the end of the Korean War. Although the Communist forces’ threat against the UN-held islands was largely relieved from late 1952, operational uncertainty still prevailed in the west coast area. This state largely originated from the increasing possibility of a signed truce. In particular, by late April 1953, when the signing of the truce was imminent, the west coast operation was ordered to be oriented for post-war preparations. In this transitional period, the relationship between the naval forces and the guerrillas was required to be changed once again; that is to a more distant relationship. This chapter explores the chronological events which influenced the lack of co-operation and inactiveness of these two groups from the beginning of the winter season.

Chapter 8 concludes by analysing the two groups’ relationship from the start of their co-operation to the end of the war. It highlights the overall unreliability of the guerrilla
organisations as a co-operation partner and emphasises the UN Naval forces’ operational conditions, instrumental in forming closer relationships with this unreliable partner. Through this compelled co-operation with the unreliable partners, this chapter reveals the distinctive characteristics of the latter part of the naval operation on the west coast.
Chapter 2

The Emergence of the Anti-Communist Guerrillas on the West Coast

The anti-Communist movement in North Korea during the Korean War largely originated from the result of the wartime Allied conferences regarding the liberation of Japanese occupied territories, which included Korea. In particular, the terms of the Cairo Declaration and its subsequent conferences directly influenced political change in Korea from mid-1945. It provided the basis for the resolution of the Korean problem and subsequent independence, following several years of Allied Power trusteeship.

As a result of the wartime Allied agreements, Northern Korea (that is the territory above the 38th Parallel) was placed under the Soviet Military Government’s trusteeship. To a number of Koreans who resided in the northern area, the establishment of the Communist regime was an unwelcome change. Particularly, the Communist Economic Reform and their conscription policy, which was carried out from late 1945, caused severe resistance from vested interests and the young generation. As an attempt to resist ensuing political changes, an anti-Communist movement was instigated by those antagonistic to Communist policies. Consequently, in the advent of the Korean War, this resistance movement became one concerned in an armed struggle, fighting for the liberation of their homeland.

This chapter outlines the emergence of the anti-Communist movement and its development in North Korea from the liberation from Japanese control in 1945. It describes the influence of several external pivotal incidences, including the establishment of the Communist regime and the changing war situations that prevailed. Focusing on these structural changes which acted as inducements to the anti-Communist movement, it covers the changing processes of the anti-Communist movements particularly in the western area of North Korea.

For this purpose, this chapter refers to the Allied Powers’ war-time conferences which were held from the latter part of the Second World War. Regarding the liberation of Korea, a brief narrative is included on the process of the Allied Powers’ resolutions. It then describes the establishment of the Communist Regime that brought radical political and economic changes and, subsequently, the beginning of the anti-Communist movements. The process of establishing a Communist Government, and the details of policies such as the Land Reform Act and the Draft Act, are also briefly discussed.\(^2\) This context is important to the thesis as it establishes the reason why the resistance groups came into being and what motivated them to continue their actions during the war.

Finally, this chapter examines features concerning the changing activities of the anti-Communists’ during the early stages of the Korea War. Faced with radical changes in the war situation, within six months of its inception, their situation in North Korea correspondingly and dramatically changed. This chapter covers the anti-Communists responses, as a consequence of the progression of war and also their final exile on sanctuary in the islands on the west coast. Such exile represents the anti-Communist guerrilla’s conditions before any direct co-operation

\(^2\) The Land Reform was one of the socialist economic reform programmes which was to be put into effect on March 1946. The Draft Act was effected on early 1947 to conscribe the People’s Army from all able-bodied men between seventeen and twenty-five. For further information, see Chapter 2.2.
was secured with the UN forces. This also shows the backgrounds of these North Korean irregulars’ need of support from the UN forces, including the western naval forces.

2.1 From Liberation to Division

The Allied Powers first discussed the issue of Korean independence in March 1943. In the talks with President Roosevelt in Washington on 28 March, Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary of Britain raised the matter as part of their discussion in dealing with Japanese occupied territories. In the course of preparing for the meeting in Washington, Eden’s staff noted that Japan had annexed Korea in mid-1910. As to the future of the overseas territories of Japan, he proposed a solution of international trusteeship for this area. This idea was actually discussed in the meeting. According to a telegram from Eden regarding the substance of his discussion with Roosevelt, they broadly discussed the topic of Korea’s independence as follows: ‘(3) intermediate cases like Korea and Pacific Islands […] Korea and French Indo-China would pass under international trusteeships; for the former the trustees might be the United States, the Soviet Union and China […]’ However, this was no more than a suggestion as this discussion was held without the other two possible trustees.

As an extension of the discussion in Washington, the Allied Powers involved in the Cairo Conference (codenamed SEXTANT) in November began to discuss the issue of the Korean problem in depth. In this conference, the leaders of the United States, Great Britain and China, declared that

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Japan shall be stripped of […] all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.  

From an early stage of the Allied Powers’ plan, the immediate independence of Korea upon Japan’s surrender was not considered. This is exemplified by Mr Eden’s reference to ‘pass under international trusteeships’ and the Cairo Declaration expression ‘in due course’. These implied that Korea’s independence would be secured after a certain number of years. This was reconfirmed in the subsequent summit conference in Teheran (EUREKA), on 28 November 1943. Also, Joseph V. Stalin, the Soviet leader, agreed to the declared basic principles of Cairo regarding the Korean problem. Thus, with the four great powers’ agreement, after Japan’s defeat, the terms of discussion in March 1943 and at SEXTANT became the basis for the resolution of the Korean problem. However, by this time, there was no detailed plan for Korea’s independence.

It was at the Yalta Conference (ARGONAUT), in early February 1945, that a tentative plan was announced that concerned a trusteeship administered by the four powers; USA, the USSR, China and Britain. Although there was disagreement for the duration of the trusteeship, the fact that no foreign troops would be stationed on Korean soil after a certain period was broadly agreed. In this secret conference, the concessions to the Soviet Union as conditions for the Soviet forces’ entrance into the war against Japan were also agreed. This meant the

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8 During the Conference, Roosevelt and Stalin broadly agreed that no foreign troops were to be stationed in Korea. However, as for the duration of the trusteeship, Roosevelt, drawing from the American experience in the Philippines, surmised that such an arrangement might last for twenty or thirty years, but Stalin suggested that the shorter the duration of the trusteeship, the better. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
Communist forces were given direct deployment in Korea after the liberation, to disarm the Japanese.

Five months after ARGONAUT, the last Allied Wartime Conference took place in Potsdam. By this time, Germany had already surrendered, and only Japan was putting up final resistance. In order to hasten the ending of the war, the Allies at Potsdam discussed the timing of the Soviet entrance into the war and the necessary US-Soviet co-ordination.\(^{10}\) While discussing the Soviet entry into the war against Japan, the US and Soviet military representatives developed, to a considerable extent, a plan concerning the division of Korea. It was at this time that the military planners considered an operational boundary approximating the 38\(^{th}\) parallel.\(^{11}\) With regard to Korea, Washington wanted the dividing line to be as far north as possible, but also needed to consider the US troops’ ability to advance and replace Japanese troops. Balancing these two factors, Washington settled on a plan to divide Korea into two occupation zones along the 38\(^{th}\) parallel, which would secure for the United States the two logistically important cities of Inchon and Seoul.\(^{12}\)

To inflict the final damage on Japan, the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945 respectively. At the same time, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan. Therefore, to occupy northern Korea, under the command of Colonel General Ivan M. Chistiakov, various Soviet movements were deployed. This involved five divisions and one brigade of 120,000 troops of the Soviet 1\(^{st}\) Far East Command, auxiliary forces of 30,000 and


\(^{11}\) Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 8.

naval units from the Pacific Fleet. On 8 August 1945, the Soviet ground forces advanced across the Tumen River, which bordered the Soviet Union, China and Korea.

Ultimately, as a result of the serious damage inflicted on Japan, the nation announced her unconditional surrender on 15 August 1945. Therefore, Japan signed the ‘General Order 1’, prepared by Washington and agreed by the Soviets, British and Chinese. It included the following provisions in regard to the surrender of the Japanese troops in Korea:

(b) The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within [...] Korea North of 38 degrees North latitude [...] shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East [...] (e) The Imperial General Headquar... Korea South of 38 degrees North latitude... shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific.

Following Japanese surrender, and facing virtually no resistance from the Japanese army, the Soviets advanced rapidly towards the south. On 24 August, they reached Pyongyang, and occupied Kaesong the next day. By late August, the Soviet forces had continued to advance and occupy all areas north of the 38th parallel.

Almost twenty days after the Soviet forces’ advance into the Korean Peninsula, the US Government designated the US 24th Corps in Okinawa to carry out the terms of the Japanese surrender in Korea. From 4 September 1945, under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, a total strength of 77,600 forces landed on and occupied the southern area of Korea.

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13 The Soviet Far East Force consisted of the 1st and 2nd Far East army, Trans-Baikal army and the Pacific Fleet. As the right flank of the 1st Far East Army, the 25th Army carried out a supporting attack to penetrate the Japanese defensive position. US War Department Intelligence Division, Intelligence Review, June 20 1946.


16 Institute of North Korea Studies, The History of Democratic Unification Movements in North Korea, p. 187.

After the completion of the Japanese forces’ disarmament, Washington sought, within an established framework, to hold a meeting with other Allied Powers. On 27 December 1945, at the suggestion of the US Secretary of State, a meeting was held in Moscow of three Allied Power Foreign Ministers; namely, those of the US, Britain and the Soviet Union. Concerning the future of Korea, the three foreign ministers agreed to pursue the terms of the Cairo Declaration and set up a US-USSR joint commission to facilitate the creation of a provisional Korean Government after a short period of trusteeship. Following the agreement that trusteeship would not exceed five years, representatives from the US and Soviet commands in Korea started meeting to establish the Joint Commission and to select the main agenda. However, owing to the divergence of opinion regarding the establishment of a united provisional government and the rapidly deteriorating US-USSR relationship, on 21 October 1947, the Joint Commission was closed without tangible result. Thus, during this period, respective efforts to set up the civil governments were going ahead in the North and South. Therefore, the democratic Government in the South and the Communist Government in the North were established based on their own ideological beliefs.

18 The representative of China subscribed later.
19 Regarding the terms of trusteeship, see ‘The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State’ (December 27, 1945), Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Vol. 6 (Washington, D. C.; USGPO, 1969), 1150–1.
2.2 The Establishment of a Communist Government and the Beginning of Anti-Communist Movements in North Korea

After the occupation of major cities in North Korea, the first step taken by the Soviet forces was to set up the Soviet Military Command in Pyongyang and establish a military government regime for all of northern Korea. The General Office for Civil Administration, under the command of Major General Andrei A. Romanenko, was charged with the responsibility to administer the military government. Subsequently, the Soviets began to organise People’s Committees, an administrative body in Communist countries. Upon the Japanese surrender, each People’s Committee was handed administrative powers relating to government bodies, including the police and economic organisations. The Military Government allowed a Korean to assume the chairmanship of the People’s Committees. However, they appointed a Soviet officer as advisor and placed Soviet-Koreans who showed loyalty to the Soviet Union in key posts.21

Subsequently, to consolidate the Communists’ control over northern Korea, the Military Government sponsored Kim Il Sung, who was then a captain in the Soviet Army, to be the new leader of northern Korea. On 18 November, the Military Government established the Administrative Body, responsible for the Five Provinces of northern Korea. It was responsible for supervising the operation of the People’s Committees. Almost one month later, the Military Government had Kim Il Sung assume the post of Secretary of the North Korean Communist Party. Therefore, four months after the establishment of the Soviet Military Government, Kim

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Il Sung, as a high-ranking official of the Party, began to develop the Communist system in northern Korea.\textsuperscript{22} The de facto establishment of a Communist government in northern Korea started from early 1946. On 8 February, when the North Korean Interim People’s Committee was created, Kim Il Sung was designated as its chairman. Building on the foundation of the Provincial People’s Committees, this central government was dominated by pro-Soviet Communists. \textsuperscript{23} Subsequently, in early November, the first municipal People’s Committee election was held at province, city and county levels. According to the announcement of the Communist party, the successful settlement of communism in North Korea was testimony to a very successful People’s Committee launch. During this time, the Korean Democratic National Front nominated a single candidate in each district; and each received around 97% support from the North Korean populace.\textsuperscript{24}

Despite the Communists’ official announcement, however, from the early stage of the establishment of the Communist regime, there had been widespread anti-Communist movements in northern Korea. The very fact that 3% of North Koreans opposed a Communist candidate implied the existence of reactionary movements. The municipal election in November was conducted by ‘black-or-white’ balloting. In this balloting method, those who are ‘for’ the candidate cast their ballot in a white box, and those ‘against’ cast their ballot in a black box. Considering the fact that this election was carried out under the supervision of election monitors, confidentiality was not maintained.\textsuperscript{25} Despite the totally non-democratic voting environment,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Korea Institute of Military History, \textit{The Korean War}, Vol. I, pp. 14–16.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 30.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Institute of North Korea Studies, \textit{The History of Democratic Unification Movements in North Korea}, p. 198.; For more detailed information of the first Municipal People’s Committee Election, see Cho Sung Hun 조성훈, ‘1946 년 11 월 북한의 인민위원회 선거연구’ [‘The North Korea’s election for People’s Committee in November 1946’] \textit{The Journal of Historical Studies on Korean National Movement}, Vol. 22 (1999), pp. 439–75.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Institute of North Korea Studies, \textit{The History of Democratic Unification Movements in North Korea}, p. 199.
\end{itemize}
3% of North Korean voters clearly showed dissent towards the Communist regime’s establishment. In fact, even during the early stage of the Communist regime, several cases exist that show evidence of voting obstruction movements that clearly signified anti-Communist activities. Christians, who largely disagreed with the establishment of a Communist government, collectively declared their intent to boycott the election. Organised efforts to defeat the preparation of the election, by anti-Communist youth groups, were also reported. Even ‘black box movements’ were organised to try to sway opinion to this voting option.

This early stage of anti-Communist activity was largely a consequence of economic policies and the Communists’ form of compulsory mobilisation and military recruitment, which were carried out during 1945–1947. Right after the establishment of the North Korean Interim People’s Committee, on February 1946, the Communist regime embarked on a socialist economic reform programme. First to be put into effect was the Land Reform Act of March 1946. During this reform, wealthy landowners were deprived of 85% of their land, resulting in the confiscation of 2.45 million acres; all without any compensation to the owners. Once land had been seized, the People’s Committee freely distributed it to peasants. Although this reform caused a positive reaction from the majority of peasants, it also yielded severe resistance from landlords. The Land Reform of March 1946 was followed in August by the nationalisation of major industries, which affected approximately a thousand industrial facilities. This also caused

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26 Park Won-Hong, ‘북조선 인민위원회 선거(1946. 11. 3)와 북한 개신교의 대응’, [‘North Korea Municipal People’s Committee Election (3 November 1946) and the North Korean Christian Churches’ Confrontation’] (MA thesis of Korea University, August 2009), pp. 39–44.
capitalists’ resistance. 30 It followed that, by virtue of the Communist Government’s compulsory economic reform, the initial anti-Communist movement was mainly made up of deprived landowners and capitalists.

The compulsory regimentation, which began from the end of 1945 and affected the whole society, also increased the number of anti-Communists in northern Korea. As a part of Communist propaganda efforts, intellectuals and artists were mobilised, students and youth groups were integrated, and various mass rallies were held, to ensure that no one could exist as an individual outside a social organisation. Thus, every North Korean was compelled to join the Communist Party or one of its sub-organisations, and to carry a resident registration card. 31 Under such strict ideological circumstances, large numbers of students and intellectuals longed for ideological liberty and became anti-Communist activists.

In addition, the North Korean draft, initiated from early 1947 added young-generation dissenters to the growing numbers of anti-Communists protagonists. Hence, as the Communists increased conscriptions to the People’s Army to include all able-bodied men between seventeen and twenty-five, the resistance from such a demographic increased accordingly. 32 Large numbers of draft dodgers decided either to hide themselves or to join the anti-Communist movement. Lim Jong Duk, who conducted anti-Communist activities during this time, was interviewed in early November 1952 by an American officer. He explained the general responses of youths, who were against the compulsory draft, as follows:

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The Communists made an act called the “Draft Act” [...] The people who didn’t like the Communist Army took action and escaped and went into the mountains. They also hide themselves in ceilings and houses and other places of hiding that they could find. They hid for a while and then re-grouped in the mountains.33

However, under the Communists’ severe surveillance and control, any overt anti-Communist movement was largely restricted. Through the initiative of municipal Communist organisations, anybody classified as being from South Korea or anyone who showed reluctance to involvement, was put under surveillance and interrogated. According to the account of an anti-Communist guerrilla leader, Lee Jung Hok, on visiting his hometown Ongjin in Hwanghae Province from Seoul, he was arrested by North Korean police ‘for the necessary interrogation which was required for anybody who came from South Korea’.34 Another guerrilla leader, Kim Yong Bok, protested that he was not able to be actively involved in Communist activities through an obligation to support his family as a householder. Therefore, the Communists constantly paid close attention to him.35

There were limited options left for the anti-Communists. The majority left their hometowns and crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea. In fact, from 1946 to May 1949, up to 480,000 North Koreans took refuge in South Korea.36 According to a US Military Government survey, between 25 July and 22 November 1948, almost 80% of all North Korean refugees in South Korea stated ‘dissatisfaction with the Communist economic policy’ or ‘aversion to Communism’

34 After he was released from jail, he joined an anti-Communist party named the ‘Chosen Democratic Party’. Ibid., p. 73.
35 This fact can be seen in his interview record with American officer in November 1952: ‘many Communists interfered with my life, because […] I did not join any particular organization and become an enthusiastic member’: Ibid., p. 115.
as the main reasons of their border crossing. This figure showed the extent to which North Koreans rejected the Communist regime and its policies and preferred to live in exile.

The remaining anti-Communists situated in North Korea organised small underground groups based in their villages. They instigated intermittent quasi-guerrilla activities, by distributing anti-Communism leaflets, raiding local Communist party officials, and conducting demonstrations. According to the record of a former anti-Communist guerrilla, these types of activities were very common amongst youth groups. To acquire required materials, close contact with the anti-Communist organisation in South Korea was also maintained. Their underground activities were well accounted, as follows:

After liberation on 15 August 1945 in North Korea I joined the Democratic Party in North Korea and went underground with the party under the Communist regime. We resisted the Communist government in every way possible. We also had contact with the North Korean Youth Group in South Korea, which consisted of North Koreans who went to South Korea and were under South Korean protection. We resisted the Communists’ political and military policies […] Anti-Communists were under consistent pressure. These anti-Communists had close contact underground with the people in South Korea. Sometimes the movements of the anti-Communists were discovered and […] many of our friendly people were killed by the Communists. Most of anti-Communist movements took place underground […] We killed North Korean policeman, ambushing and surprising them. We organized students in school in North Korea who were against Communism. These students helped us drop propaganda leaflets in the classrooms and in the field. We resisted from every direction, attacking, sabotaging, and raiding.

The movements against the Communists in North Korea were very active amongst the populace in the west side of North Korea, including three Provinces — Hwanghae, North and South Pyong-an. It was primarily an agricultural area which had comparatively little industry.

37 According to the ‘G-2 Period Report’ on 3 December 1948, amongst the 371 North Korean refugees who responded to the survey, 48.3% cited their main reason for defection as ‘economic difficulties after the economic reform’ and 29.4% cited ‘aversion of Communism’: Ibid., pp. 42–4.
However, it was a leading producer of Koreans’ staple food: rice. This meant that there were large numbers of landowners who had been deprived of their property as a result of the compulsory Land Reform.

The relatively large number of Christians in these areas was also an influencing factor in the support for anti-Communist movements. As could be seen in the Soviet case, due to the ideological incompatibility with the official belief of Marxist-Leninism which actively encouraged atheism, churches cannot be absorbed into the Soviet system. The fact that religious organisations were not able to fit easily under complete control of the Soviet totalitarian regime also intensified the Communists’ antipathy against the believers. Therefore, under the policy of ‘comprehensive programme of anti-religious propaganda’, in the Soviet Union, millions of believers suffered, and outward appearance of religious life had been largely destroyed.

At that time, the number of Christians in this area was about two thirds of the total number of Korea. As could be easily expected, this new Communist regime repeated the persecution of its sponsors. Therefore, this large contingency of Christian organisations within this area also contributed to the number of reactionary movements against Communism.

40 Ibid., p. 1.
43 Before the eve of the Communist Revolution, there were around 50,000 Orthodox churches in the Russian Empire. By the end of 1930s, however, only several hundred churches survived: Ibid., p. 16.
The anti-Communist activities were particularly active in Hwanghae area, a Province on the south-west side of North Korea. At that time, it was considered not only the bread basket but also the ‘Cradle of Christianism’ of North Korea. Its geographical proximity to South Korea was also a reason for relatively enthusiastic resistance amongst the Provinces in the west side of North Korea. The people of Hwanghae Province were close to Seoul; the political, historical and cultural centre of Korea. Therefore, there were large numbers of its populace who had worked or attended school in Seoul. They were more informed than most about each side’s political stance. It made the Communists’ regimentation less influential.45

In fact, on January 1950, in Haeju, one of the largest cities in the Hwanghae Province, around 1,300 anti-Communists were reportedly arrested.46 This record showed the high activity of anti-Communists in this area. Due to this area’s relatively enthusiastic anti-Communistic character and geographical condition, this area became the bedrock of anti-Communist guerrilla activities following the establishment of the Communist regime in the North.

However, the initial anti-Communist activities were merely protests or demonstrations that only occasionally turned violent. They were also conducted by non-systemically organised North Korean groups. Therefore, it is impossible to regard these activities as the type of guerrilla activities which essentially entailed organised armed struggles.47 As the Soviet ambassador to North Korea mentioned in his report regarding the North Korea situation in mid-1949 that ‘the hostile activities of anti-Communist are not threatening the current political system’, to the

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47 Institute of North Korea Studies, The History of Democratic Unification Movements in North Korea, p. 405.
Communists, the anti-Communists activities were no more than light harassment. Although their movements were not that influential, however, these activities served as a stepping stone for the anti-Communist guerrilla activities during the Korean War.

2.3 Anti-Communist Movements during the Early Stage of the Korean War

On 25 June 1950, troops of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) crossed the border of the 38th Parallel, with the intention of occupying South Korea. In the early stages of war, the Communist offensive was very successful. In fact, the Communist forces occupied Seoul, the capital of South Korea, just three days after the onset of war. Following this, the Communist offensive broke the thin Allied ground forces’ defensive line, which led to a series of retreats. On 1 August, UN forces were forced to be withdrawn behind the Naktong River. This is the natural south-east side barrier to Pusan, known as the ‘Pusan Perimeter’ or ‘Pusan Pocket’.

Map 2.1 NKPA’s Advance from June to August 1950

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As allied ground forces held on precariously to defend the Pusan Pocket, the anti-Communists were deeply affected. They witnessed returning refugees, who had previously crossed the 38th Parallel before the start of war. They heard of the current war situation from those returnees, and their morale severely deteriorated.⁴⁹ Kim Chang Song, one of the anti-Communist leaders accounted their situation as follows:

⁴⁹ Lee (ed.), *The Military History of the Student Guerrilla Unit*, p. 98.
The anti-Communists who went into North Korea were disappointed to see the United Nations forces as well as ROK Forces retreating as far as the Naktong River. We though the situation was hopeless [...] There was a great difficulty with our decision which was to fight against Communism. The difficulty was Kim Il-Sung’s policy which was to draft every young man and have him join the North Korean Army or have him go to the mines and work as a laborer. As a result of that policy there was no chance for us to be organized as a certain group.50

Under such an unfavourable war situation, the anti-Communist movement became less active. In particular, the introduction of the Communist Government’s new Draft Act, mentioned above, after the war broke out, increased the draft age ceiling to 35, which drove organised movements to become more restricted.51

Notwithstanding desperate conditions however, anti-Communist movements that had begun during the pre-war period continued. Their activities included distributing anti-Communism leaflets and raiding local Communist party officials. In particular, one remarkable change occurred regarding anti-Communist activities; following the outbreak of the Korean War, anti-Communists’ underground activities developed into an armed struggle. Small numbers of anti-Communist militia moved into the mountains and started guerrilla-type activities using weapons. They acquired rifles by various means; by capturing small numbers of Communist soldiers, through smuggling, or by self-assembly.52

These armed anti-Communists tried bolder raids such as attacking small groups of Communist forces. For instance, in mid-September 1950, around 90 armed guerrillas from Kyungsung in Hambuk Province attacked a coast defence guard post in the Ondae-jin area and captured

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50 U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 87.
51 Ibid., p. 110.
52 Schuetta, Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, p. 63.
In early October, small numbers of armed guerrillas in the Sinchon area assaulted trucks carrying weaponry to the front line. They captured around 100 Soviet-made rifles. However, large numbers of attacks were still disorganised and their equipment was generally substandard for effective guerrilla raids against the Communist regular army. Except for the above mentioned very successful anti-Communist groups, by that time, only a small number of anti-Communists were able to be equipped with rifles. For example, even the guerrillas in the Gam-ak Mountain in Hwanghae Province, one of the most active anti-Communists domains in this area, were able to arm only five members with rifles. Considering the fact that they consisted of about 100 guerrillas in total, only five percent were actually armed. The shortage problem regarding proper ammunition was even more severe. Therefore, despite their activities, they were not able to inflict significant damage on the Communists.

### 2.4 The UN Forces’ Advance towards the North and the Changed Anti-Communist Movement

As a result of a successful landing at Inchon, the tide of battle was clearly turning towards a favourable phase for the UN Forces. On 15 September 1950, under naval gunfire and air support, assault troops of the US 5th and 1st Marines, together with the ROK 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment, landed on the beach of Inchon.

Following this landing, the UN ground forces situated on the Naktong River front, started to launch a massive counterattack. By 19 September, the landing troops captured Kimpo air base,

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near Seoul. The UN Forces on the Pusan Perimeter also advanced north, and on 27 September linked up with the friendly landing forces. On 28 September, three months after the Communist forces captured Seoul, UN forces recaptured the Korean capital.57

As soon as the UN Forces reached the 38th Parallel, their march northward had to be delayed. The question whether they should cross the former border between the South and North became a controversial policy issue within the UN countries. At the beginning of the war, the UN had initially set the goal of restoring the pre-war condition. By approaching the 38th Parallel, the UN accomplished its early goal, but more justification was needed to continue the advance. The fact that crossing the line could cause a possible intervention by Chinese forces was also problematic. As a result of this controversy on crossing the 38th Parallel, on 7 October 1950, the UN General Assembly passed the resolution which indirectly allowed the UN Forces to cross the line.58 Hence, regardless of the potential danger of Chinese involvement, the UN Forces continued across the line and marched northward.

Map 2.2 Inchon Landing and the UN Forces’ Advance

58 The UN General Assembly passed the resolution which included the establishment of a unified and independent democratic government on the Korean peninsula. The US Government considered this as a support for military operation north of the line and initiated the troops’ march toward the North. Regarding the controversy amongst the UN countries and within the US cabinet over the crossing the line question, see Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. I, pp. 738–55; Kim Gyeong Kim Gyedong 김계동, 한국전쟁: 불가피한 선택이었다 [The Korean War: Was It an Unavoidable Choice] (Seoul: Myungin Books, 2014), pp. 125–57.
A large number of anti-Communists also realised this changed situation through radio connectivity to the UN side. As the United Nations forces marched into North Korean territory, anti-Communists emerged from their mountain hideouts and attacked police stations, retreating North Korean People’s Army recruits, and fleeing Communist Officials. In some areas, such as Sinchon in the Hwanghae Province, the anti-Communist underground overthrew the local communist government and took control of government functions even before the UN troops.
arrived. They also volunteered to provide quasi-government organisations.\textsuperscript{59} Lee Byong Gun and Lim Jong Duk, who conducted anti-Communist activities around the Mountain Kuwol in Hwanghae Province, explained their experience as follows:

We were organized into a band which was a body of the partisan forces. We were in hiding in the mountains of Kuwol-san [Mountain Kuwol] listening to the radio beamed to the United Nations and Communist sides and getting the situation. We knew therefore that UN Forces were coming into North Korea and we were waiting for them […] On or about 17 or 18 October 1950, the UN Forces advanced into the vicinity and just before they arrived there, we left the mountains and went down to the village and tried to cut the retreating route of the enemy. We surprised them. We had some rifles and that is all. Otherwise we fought with stones, rocks, lumber, bars, and anything we could use. When the UN Forces occupied the district, we became security forces, and we served under them until 5 December 1950.\textsuperscript{60}

After the UN Forces entered the north, a tragic civil war flared up in each area. In retribution to those offering services as police officials and government workers, the anti-Communists cruelly punished these local Communist party members and officials in their villages. Punishments were even extended to Communist party sympathisers and their families. In particular, after discovering the Communist forces’ massacre of anti-Communists, political offenders and draft dodgers in Pyongyang, Haeju, Hamheung and other areas, right before their retreat further north, retaliatory punishments against any Communist sympathisers became more violent.\textsuperscript{61} As one of the anti-Communist group leaders in Ongjin wrote, ‘In addition to the maintenance of the local peace and order, the first work had to be conducted was to solve the grudges of local peoples who had to endure the Communists and their sympathisers’ atrocities’. For most anti-

\textsuperscript{59} Evanhoe, \textit{Dark Moon}, pp. 64–5.
\textsuperscript{60} U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 111.
Communists, the execution of Communist collaborators was supported, or at least, tacitly permitted.\textsuperscript{62}

According to a report written by the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, who visited North Korea in March 1952 to investigate the UN forces’ violations of international law during the Korean War, around 55,000 North Koreans were killed only in the Sinchon and Anak area between late October and early December 1950. This report wrote that large numbers of them were Communists, sympathisers and their families.\textsuperscript{63} As this report was written largely based on the Communists’ arguments, the credibility of such numbers is doubtful. However, it was revealed in the former anti-Communist guerrillas’ memoirs and by South Korean mass media that the massacre against the North Koreans was actually committed by anti-Communist North Koreans during the two months of UN forces’ occupation period.\textsuperscript{64}

Whilst the anti-Communists concentrated on the execution of Communist sympathisers and the maintenance of local order, the UN Forces continued their advance northwards. On 20 October 1950, the ROK 1\textsuperscript{st} Division and the US 1\textsuperscript{st} Cavalry Division entered Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea. By the end of the month, lead elements of ROK 1\textsuperscript{st} Division had captured Chosan, the border town on the Yalu River, and a section of US troops had advanced to Chonggo-dong, just South of Sinuiju.\textsuperscript{65} Within only fifty days of the Inchon Landing, the UN Forces seemed to be on their way to winning the war. Amongst the UNC, including

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p. 115.
\textsuperscript{63} International Association of Democratic Lawyers, ‘Report on US Crimes in Korea’ (31 March 1952), pp. 13–15; The Communists argued that there were additional massacres in Hwanghae Province including 13,000 in Unryul, 6,000 in Haeju and 5,545 in Songhwa. Hankyurae Daily, 한겨례, ‘新천비극: 좌우대립설 설득력’ [‘The Tragic of Sinchon: Persuasiveness of the View of Ideological Conflict’] (6 August 2003).
\textsuperscript{64} A documentary video series titled ‘Now It Can Be Told’ concluded that under the tacit admission of the UN forces, mass-massacres were committed by the anti-Communists throughout Hwanghae-Province. MBC, 이제는 말할 수 있다 57 화, ‘망각의 전쟁, 황해도 신천 사건’ [Now It Can Be Told video series, Vol. 57, ‘Forgotten War, Sinchon Incident of Hwanghae Province’] (21 April 2002).
MacArthur, euphoria had spread in that ‘the war was over, and that the only job left was a certain amount of mopping up’. Even amongst the troops in Korea, there was much talk that ‘we are going home soon before Christmas’.66

2.5 Chinese Intervention and Evacuations from the Mainland

The participation of China in the Korean War impacted hugely on the military situation. The massive assault by the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) started from 25 October 1950, and was truly a disaster to both UN forces and anti-Communist North Koreans.

In fact, there had been several threats from the Communist leaders regarding the possible entry of China if the UN forces crossed the line. Considering any controversial UN advancement across to the north, Chou En-Lai, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister warned that, ‘Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists’.67 However the UNC regarded the CCF leader’s declaration as ‘probably in a category of diplomatic blackmail’.68

From mid-October, there had been intelligence reports of the fact that large numbers of CCF were gathered along the border awaiting a possible cross into Korea.69 On 25 October, the intervention of the Chinese was officially confirmed by ROK 15th Regiment on the Yalu River area.70 Even after the confirmation of Chinese deployment, General MacArthur seemed to

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67 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 60; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 197.
69 Ibid., p. 761.
70 On this date, in the course of battle with the Communist forces, ROK Army captured the first CCF prisoner. As a result of interrogation, the Chinese forces’ entry into the Korean War was officially confirmed. Halberstam, The Coldest Winter, p. 14.
believe that the Chinese would never intervene with large forces, and in any case, through close support capabilities and interdiction by UN air power, CCF intervention would be effectively prevented. His optimistic perception was exemplified by his message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that ‘I believe that with my air power […] I can deny reinforcements coming across the Yalu in sufficient strength to prevent the destruction of those forces now arrayed against me in North Korea.’

At that time, the UNC expected that the Communist forces’ strength would be at 82,799 North Koreans and between 40,000 or 70,935 Chinese. However, the actual strength of CCF alone was around 300,000 men. In the face of the numerical superiority of Communist forces, the recently advanced UN forces were compelled to a full withdrawal from North Korea. Between early November and the beginning of January 1951, the UN Forces retreated from the Yalu River to the 37th Parallel.

Map 2.3 CCF’s Involvement and the UN Forces’ Retreat

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71 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 765
72 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 293.
As the Communist forces reoccupied their territory over the 38th Parallel and pushed south, the anti-Communists were also forced to flee their villages. They knew the Communists would be unforgiving for assisting UN forces and killing Communist officials. Only a few options remained to them. One was to move to South Korea as a refugee by joining the UN forces’ retreat. Large numbers of the anti-Communists in the eastern side of North Korea were able to make their way to the south by the UN forces’ evacuation ships from Hungnam.\textsuperscript{74} In the west,

\textsuperscript{74} Regarding the Evacuation of Hungnam, see Field Jr., \textit{History of United States Naval Operations Korea}, pp. 295–305.
however, only limited numbers were able to take refuge in the south safely as most were cut off by the rapid Communist advance.\footnote{U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 4.}

As an alternative, tens of thousands of anti-Communists and their families in the west side had to flee to the islands off North Korea’s west coast.\footnote{Ibid.} As mentioned in chapter 1, there are approaching a hundred small and large islands on the west coast. Because of their proximity to the mainland and the shallow depth of the inshore area during low tide, large numbers of small islands were easily approachable. Refuge to the larger islands such as Paengyong-do and Chodo, which were some distance from the mainland, was possible by the support of ROK Navy patrol ships or their own ‘wiggly boats’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 139.} With the hope that the UN Forces would initiate counter offensives, and they could return home in near future, large numbers of refugees decided to move to nearby islands. The fact that it would be much easier to acquire food from their hometowns, because of proximity to the mainland, helped this decision.\footnote{Lee (ed.), The Military History of the Student Guerrilla Unit, pp. 118–19.} According to the operational records of the ROK Navy operated on the west coast, by late January 1951, there were around 62,000 refugees on Paengyong-do and its surrounding small islands.\footnote{Military History Institute, The Naval General Staff of Intelligence and Operation 작전경과보고서 3–4 [Reports of Proceeding 3–4] (Kyeryong: ROK Navy Headquarters, 2001), p. 174.}

The other choice for the remaining anti-Communists in the western side was to return to their hideouts and conceal themselves or revert to guerrilla warfare. Therefore, some who remained took their captured weapons and ammunition and went into the mountains.\footnote{Malcom, White Tigers, pp. 15–16.} The Kuwol area and the Tura Mountains in Hwanghae Province around Sinchon were common hiding places of anti-Communists in the western side of North Korea. In both the mountain areas, around 2,100 guerrillas continued their activities, such as intelligence gathering, rescuing well-known anti-
Communist and raiding the small numbers of NKPA troops. As they acquired more weapons during October and November 1950, some of the anti-Communist groups even boldly took the offensive against the Communist occupation forces. For instance, on the night of 15 January, a group of guerrillas from the Mountain Kuwol, successfully repulsed a NKPA unit approaching Wolsa-ri. Two days later, they even re-captured Eunryul, which had been in the hands of the Communists and conducted offensives against the NKPA troops in Songwha and Changyon.

Map 2.4 West Coast and the Adjoining Mainland

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82 Lim Jong Duk and Lee Byong Gun who were guerrilla members of the Mountain Kuwol recounted that ‘We had more weapons than we had when we started; we captured weapons when we cut the retreating rout of the enemy, and we received some from the UN Forces […] We were much better equipped at this time.’ They also told how they even had three Russian-made 81 mm mortars, three 76 mm guns and twenty-six Russian light machine guns at that time. U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, pp. 112–13.
83 Headquarters Korean Navy, Pusan Korea, from No. 703, 16 January 1951, in Ibid., Supporting Documents, p. 18.
84 Ibid.
However, it was not possible for them to continue their guerrilla activities on the mainland for a long period of time because the Communist forces deployed more troops to reoccupy Hwanghae province. As these regular forces were better equipped than the anti-Communists,

85 The Communist Command deployed a brigade of NKPA infantry and some irregular Communist groups. U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 5.
it was unrealistic to expect these poorly equipped and inadequately trained resistances to successfully defend their hometowns.86

Faced with massive attacks from the Communist forces, most anti-Communists were forced to flee to the several islands around their homeland. The largest guerrilla groups from Sinchon, Eunryul, Haeju and Changyeon in the Hwanghae Province retreated to Paengnyong-do, Chodo and their surrounding smaller islands. The guerrillas from the South Pyong-an Province, the middle-west side of North Korea, mainly fled to Cho-do and Sokto. The smallest and most northern guerrilla groups from the North Pyong-an Province fled to Ae-do, Sin-do, Taehwa-do and Sowha-do, around the Yalu Gulf area. Before departing, large numbers of these groups left small units in their hometowns or mountains in the vicinity to obtain information on the enemy. This was, at least, a token of resistance against the Communists. Before the start of February 1951, almost all of the guerrilla groups that had operated in the mainland of North Korea had completely moved to the islands.87

2.6 Concluding Comments

Since the establishment of the Communist Government, the anti-Communist movement, who were emphatically opposed to Communist policy, began to emerge amongst the North Korean populace. In particular, as a consequence of economic reforms and conscription, the number of anti-Communist activities increased in a controlled way. These activities were particularly pronounced in the western area of North Korea. However, initially, these activities were merely protests or demonstrations, which sometimes entailed violence.

86 Ibid.
In the course of the Korean War, the anti-Communist movement experienced significant changes in its activities and operational environment. Firstly, anti-Communist movements started to develop as an ‘armed-struggle’ type of resistance. Equipped with small numbers of weapons, they tried to attack the small groups of Communist forces. Some of the large guerrilla groups even conducted offensive operations against the NKPA troops. Secondly, the anti-Communists in the west side moved their main operational area from their hometowns to the islands on the west coast. During the UN Forces’ advancement towards the north as a result of Inchon landing, they officially supported the UN Forces and crucially punished the Communists in their own territory. By doing so, the anti-Communists disclosed themselves to and went into a more antagonistic relationship with the Communists. Therefore, it is easy to imagine their plight after CCF involvement and the subsequent UN Forces’ retreat. Faced with hostile Communist occupation forces, most anti-Communists eventually fled to the islands on the west coast.

As a result of this island exile, they suddenly became last-stand strongholds for the rear side of the 38th Parallel in terms of Communist resistance. Amongst tens of thousands of refugees there were several thousand North Koreans who were eager to resume the fight.\(^88\) However, even after the retreat to the islands, the anti-Communists’ plight continued. Although they were relieved from imminent threat by the enemy, because of the presence of friendly Naval Forces inshore, they faced a severe shortage of food, weapons and ammunition. Although there were sporadic supplies from the ROK Navy, they were far from sufficient. The guerrillas had little option but to capture war supplies from the Communists on the mainland, and this caused heavy

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\(^88\) U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 9.
casualties. Moreover, the lack of communication equipment and the absence of command and control systems for their future activities were other significant obstacles.

Although friendly forces gradually gained knowledge of their existence and activities, no detailed plan to support and utilise these large numbers of irregulars was made within the UNC at this point. In the face of the numerical superiority of the Communist Forces, the UNC was not able to pay attention to a relatively unimportant area. Therefore, the anti-Communists had to continue their painful struggle against hunger with poor equipment, awaiting a UN Forces counter-offensive and support.

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90 CTG 95.1 was informed of the existence of these anti-Communists on 28 December 1950. The Eighth US Army realised this fact on 8 January 1951. Both of them were reported by ROK Navy patrol ships on the west coast. For more detailed information, see Chapter 4.
Chapter 3

The British Commonwealth and Allied Forces’ Naval Operation on the West Coast:

From Inception to the End of 1950

To the British Government, Korea had been regarded as an area of very little direct interest. Therefore, the attack from North Korea on 25 June 1950 was truly unwelcome news, as this called for British commitment in this area. As a permanent member of the Security Council, it was required to take a shared responsibility for the working of the collective security system of the United Nations.¹

As the first British forces deployed in the war, a detachment of British naval forces from the Far East Station urgently responded and arrived in Korean waters. Without any proper preparation for the war, under the command of Rear-Admiral William G. Andrewes, they started a naval operation in Korean waters with the British Commonwealth and allied forces.

This chapter outlines the first year of naval operations conducted on the west coast. It focuses on several pivotal incidents which totally changed the war situation and discusses the changing naval forces’ operations and challenges that occurred before the start of its co-operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas.

For this purpose, this chapter tracks the British Government’s position on the Korean Peninsula from the latter part of the Second World War to the inception of the Korean War. Also, Britain’s involvement, albeit one of initial reluctance, is briefly explained. Following this, the main west coast mission, embarked on from an early stage of the war, namely the naval

blockade operation, is then discussed. Newly emerging challenges, particularly focusing on intelligence-related problems, are also examined.

Finally, this chapter examines the two incidents, that of the Inchon landing and the Chinese intervention and discusses their influence on the naval operation. In a situation that involved no conflict between fleets, the naval operation was more focused on the support of ground operations.\(^2\) In particular, the latter compelled additional duties and challenges to the ships on the west coast. Such involvement represents the naval operational situation before any co-operation was secured with the anti-Communist guerrillas.

### 3.1 Deployment of HM Ships in the Korean War

Although the UK was one of the associates that decided the international trusteeship for Korea after its independence from Japan, the British Government was reluctant to become deeply involved in the issues of this area. From a British standpoint, unlike the part of Asia lying south of the Tropic of Cancer (including Hong Kong and Malaya) which was regarded as of ‘greatest importance and greatest urgency’, there was very little UK direct interest in the north of it. Therefore, Korea and neighbouring areas were regarded as under the United States’ responsibility and a ‘policy of non-involvement rather than active policy’ was required.\(^3\)

This British policy of non-involvement was apparent even before the end of the Pacific War. On 22 July 1945, during their visit to the United States for the foundation of the United Nations Organisation when the Russian delegation proposed discussion of Korea by the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Foreign Office replied with its views that ‘our own direct interest is small

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\(^2\) Field Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations, Korea*, p. IX.

\(^3\) Yoichi, ‘Commonwealth Cooperation and Rivalry’, p. 165.
and if it proves necessary to oppose the Russian proposals we should leave it to the Americans to play the hands’.4

The British Government maintained its position after the Japanese surrender. When the issue of participation in the occupation of Japan and Korea was requested by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British displayed negativity in that ‘There are no British military interests in Korea and the provision of occupation forces for this area would, therefore, serve no military purpose’.5 However, as they recognised that the Americans might exert heavy pressure to this end, the British Government’s stance was that ‘it may thus become politically necessary for us to provide a token force, though on military grounds such provision would be a most undesirable commitment’.6

During this period, it was Australia who was keen to participate in matters concerning the peace settlement in this area. Since 1941, Australia had been actively participating in the Pacific and Europe, thus it had been declared that Australia, at least in the Pacific area, ‘possesses the right to the status of a party principal to every armistice and peace arrangement’.7 In particular, for the purpose of improving their international prestige under the leadership of an energetic External Affairs minister, Herbert Evatt, Australia focused more on enhancing its role in the Pacific area.8

Since the Japanese surrender, for the purpose of occupying Japan, the Australian desire was to send a separate force under Australian command.9 As a means of lightening the British burden in this area and to enhance the British Commonwealth’s position and status in north-

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5 CAB 79/38, ‘Minutes of Meetings’, COS(45)210 of 30 August 1945.
6 Ibid.
9 CAB 79/38/8, COS (45) 210th Meeting, Occupational Forces For Japan and Korea (Final), 30 August 1945.
east Asia, the British Government was in favour of this idea. Consequently, they allowed Australia to be the representative of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF). As a result of a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting held on 30 August, it was agreed that ‘a further approach should be made to the Australians for the creation of a unified Commonwealth Force, and the proposal was that the inter-Service Commander-in-Chief of this Force should be an Australian’. However, Britain required that the commander be jointly responsible to the United Kingdom and Australian Governments through their respective Chiefs of Staff and that HM Ships in Japanese waters remain under Royal Navy control.

On 17 October 1945, Australia despatched the proposals of the BCOF, on behalf of the UK, New Zealand, Australian and Indian Government, as well as to the American Government. The United States suggested no further contribution to the occupation force in Japan in addition to the proposed British Commonwealth joint force.

Small numbers of advanced forces were deployed to Japan in February and larger forces landed two months later. For demilitarisation tasks in Japan, the BCOF was established in Japan under an Australian commander-in-chief, Lieutenant General John Northcott. From the four countries which constituted the BCOF, they supplied a military force of around 37,000 at its maximum in 1946–1947. The British Government also deployed up to 10,000 individuals, including some shore-based Royal Navy personnel. However, this quota tailed off from 1947 onwards, immediately after the completion of the Japanese demilitarisation.

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10 Wood, The Forgotten Force, p. 6. Albeit with Britain’s official acceptance, there were disagreements within the cabinet for allowing Austria to represent the UK in this area. For instance, in mid-1946, General Gairdner, the Personal Representative of Mr. Attlee to General MacArthur, told Ernest Bevin that this allowance ‘reduced the prestige and position of Great Britain in Japan to a very low ebb’; PREM 9/969. Minute by Bevin, 13 June 1946 cited in Yoichi, ‘Commonwealth Cooperation and Rivalry’, p. 166.
11 CAB 79/38/8, COS (45) 210th Meeting, Occupational Forces For Japan and Korea (Final), 30th August 1945. 
13 Ibid., p. 8.
15 Ibid.
bulk of these withdrawn forces came firstly from the United Kingdom, and subsequently from New Zealand and Indian contingents. Therefore, by 1950, except for an Australian force, including a unit of the Royal Australian Air Force and one Australian battalion, there were no additional Commonwealth forces remaining in Japan. At least up to the start of the Korean War, the region was subject to Britain’s ‘policy of non-involvement’. As there was a new situation of major imperial involvement south of the Tropic of Cancer, in particular, counter-insurgency in Malaya, it was hardly surprising that the early British desire toward the Korean War was ‘not to get involved’.

As Washington decided to use United States forces to defend South Korea from the Communist attack, however, the prospect of British commitment became inevitable. Under American pressure, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of North Korean troops to the 38th Parallel. As the Communists ignored the warning, an additional resolution was made and approved calling for forces to be sent to defend South Korea. Sixteen countries gathered under the flag of UN; the British were one of them.

On 27 June, the British decision to support the Security Council resolution was announced by Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister, in the House of Commons. Two days later, orders from the Admiralty arrived directing Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), Far East Station, to ‘place the Royal Navy at present in Japanese waters at the disposal of the

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19 Thomas, Furies and Fireflies over Korea, p. 9.
United States Naval Commander for Korean operation in support of the Security Council resolution’.\(^{21}\)

Although there was no joint headquarters for the UN forces, there was a ready-made high command; that of the United States General Headquarters (GHQ) in Japan. Under the command of Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, commanded the naval forces in Japanese waters. Therefore, as they arrived, the naval forces provided by the British Far East Station naturally came under the operational control of Admiral Joy’s command.\(^{22}\)

At that time, there was a detachment of the British Far East Fleet under Rear-Admiral Andrewes in close contact with the US naval authority in Japan. Through a directive by Admiral Brind, this detachment was temporarily deployed to Japanese waters to escape the heat of Hong Kong and Singapore during the summer months. Admiral Andrewes, Second-in-Command, Far East Station, with his flag in HMS *Belfast*, was in northern Japanese waters. In addition to the *Belfast*, HM Ships readily became available for service for the Korean War; those being a light carrier (*Triumph*), a cruiser (*Jamaica*), two destroyers (*Cossack* and *Consort*) and three frigates (*Black Swan*, *Alacrity* and *Hart*). There were also some fleet auxiliaries, such as the HM Hospital Ship, *Maine*.\(^{23}\)

As a result of orders from the Admiralty, on 29 June, the HM Ships under Admiral Andrewes naturally joined the UN naval forces. Without any proper preparation for the Korean War, the British naval forces in Japanese waters started a naval operation with American forces.

In the first UN naval plan, which was issued on the same day, the HM Ships were disposed into two groups; the US Seventh Fleet in Okinawa (HMS *Belfast*, *Triumph*, *Consort* and

\(^{21}\) DEFE 11/193, Admiralty signal to CINC FE Station of 281720A June 1950.


Cossack) and the East Coast naval force (HMS Jamaica, Alacrity and Black Swan). The frigate Hart was ordered to take the role of a communication ship between Admiral Joy and the HM Ships.24

On 30 June, as the first British Forces’ deployed to Korea, the light carrier HMS Triumph arrived in Korean waters accompanied by two cruisers, two destroyers and three frigates. On the following day, the Essex-class carrier, USS Valley Forge, a heavy cruiser and eight destroyers also took up station on the west coast. Under the overall command of USN Vice-Admiral Arthur D. Struble, Commander of the US Seventh Fleet, this Anglo-American force began their operation under the designation ‘Task Force 77 Striking Force’.25 At dawn on 3 July 1950, Supermarine Seafires and Fairey Fireflies from HMS Triumph, and F9F Panthers, F4U Corsairs and AD Skyraiders from USS Valley Forge initiated their first strikes on airfields, railways and bridges in the Haeju and Pyongyang areas, respectively.26

While the carrier forces were proceeding to the west coast, HMS Jamaica, Alacrity and Black Swan were sent to the east sea to join the East Coast Naval Force group. Under the command of Rear-Admiral John M. Higgins, USN, they started gunfire support for the ROK Army and also conducted patrols to deny the landing of the Communist forces south of 38th parallel.27 It was the start of almost three years of UN naval force operations in Korean waters.

3.2 The Start of the West Coast Blockade and Emerging problems

27 HMS Alacrity was sent to the west coast on 2 July. ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53, p. 17.
During the first week of naval operation in Korean waters, no difficulty was experienced by the British ships in working with the Americans. This was largely due to the experience of many Royal Navy officers who had undergone joint operations with US partners in the previous war and also due to two recently experienced joint naval force manoeuvres. Therefore, after the first co-operation with the Seventh Fleet, Admiral Andrewes wrote that ‘It all seemed so familiar [...] as it was just what we had done so often during the exercises in March with very similar forces. We didn’t feel out of things and were already getting back into the easy use of American signal books.’

However, from early July 1950, after the west coast blockade conducted by Rear-Admiral Andrewes and his newly assigned British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces, various unsatisfactory situations started to emerge.

It was five days after the start of the war that the naval blockade plan conducted by the UN Forces was first suggested. On 30 June, to deny the Communist use of the Korean waters for resupply and reinforcement, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, USN, recommended a blockade of Korean waters. President Truman agreed this the next day, and Operation Order 8-50 was issued to establish the blockade. It was on 3 July that Admiral Andrewes received a signal from Commander Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE) regarding the establishment of the blockade, and by this order, the west coast north of 37° was assigned to the British naval forces operating in this area. This force was named as the West Coast Support Group (Task Group 96.8). Concurrently, the coasts south of latitude 37° N became an area responsible to ROK naval forces (Task Group 96.7) whilst north of 37° on the east coast,

28 Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 60.
blockading responsibilities were assigned to the United States Navy (East Coast Support Group, Task Group 96.5).\textsuperscript{31}

Map 3.1 Blockading Areas under Responsibility of the UN Naval forces (July 1950)


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
On 7 July, after further talks and arrangement with Admiral Joy in Tokyo, it was decided that, other than the American ships and ROK Navy, all allied ships including New Zealand and Canadian warships approaching Korean waters would join the TG 96.8. The next day, Admiral Andrewes issued his first operation order to his ships in which he outlined his intentions for operations mainly focused on the west coast blockade. His direction was as follows:

a. Enforcement of blockade of the coast occupied by North Koreans.
b. Prevention of infiltration by sea on coasts held by South Koreans.
c. Provision of naval support as required against North Korean maritime forces or land targets.

To carry out these duties, Admiral Andrewes divided his blockade naval forces into three task units, viz.,

TU 96.8.1. Belfast, Cossack, Consort, under Rear-Admiral Andrewes  
TU 96.8.2. Jamaica, Black Swan, Alacrity, under Captain Salter (Jamaica)  
TU 96.8.4. Kenya, Cockade, under Captain Brock (Kenya)

Each of these units carried out patrols in the blockade area in rotation, as ordered and worked separately. Each Task Unit arranged the details of its own patrol. From the morning of 9 July, as Admiral Andrewes sailed for the west coast in the HMS Belfast with the Cossack and Consort in company, the blockade was inaugurated.

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33 Ibid., p. 70.  
With the start of the blockade of the west coast, Admiral Andrewes had to deal with many problems in connection with logistics and the administration of his forces. Sasebo, the base for the UN Naval Forces, is 1,079 miles from Hong Kong and about 10,580 miles from the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the British naval forces were involved in this war without any preparation or any expected defined length of time in Korean waters. Due to the distance from the British Naval bases, Admiral Andrewes immediately faced difficulties in logistic supply and, in particular, was short of ammunition. Several administrative problems in Sasebo, such as shortages of repair and docking facilities, and a limited number of amenities, also emerged.\textsuperscript{36} However, the most problematic situation faced by the west coast blockade naval forces was the poorly organised intelligence co-ordination system within the UN Forces and the limited sources of intelligence for their operation.

As mentioned above, to the British Government, Korea was a territory which held no military interest, and therefore, Britain had no direct intelligence sources in this area when the Korean War was initiated. The primary way to procure the required intelligence was to depend on the supply from General Macarthur’s intelligence staff (G2) in Tokyo, Japan. This fact could be seen in Air Marshal Elliot’s signal to Lord Tedder on 27 June 1950 as follows:

\begin{quote}
Most of our information on the situation in Korea comes from the UK Liaison Mission in Tokyo as the result of an unofficial arrangement with G2. Without this we should virtually know little more than appears in the Press.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

Therefore, Admiral Andrewes and his ships in the west coast, which did not have any proper dedicated intelligence team for their operation, also had to heavily depend on the Americans for their intelligence. However, due to the absence of a joint intelligence organisation within

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., pp. 19–20.
\textsuperscript{37} DEFE 11/193, MOD DEF 463 to BJS, Washington of 271815A June 1950.
the UN forces, which would have suitably conducted the role of co-ordinator and disseminator of all collected information, it was difficult to have proper intelligence for the naval operation. From the onset of war, the US Army, Navy and Air Force had their own agent parties for intelligence gathering. In addition to these set-ups, there were a number of other involved parties, such as the CIA, that were responsible directly to Washington. The problem was that these US Intelligence organisations appeared to lack any co-ordination, so all units had to operate and rely on their own intelligence organisations.

Since North Korea had no proper navy and air force during 1950, there were little maritime or air engagements. Therefore, the focus of naval and air operations concentrated more on the support of ground operations. In particular, during the first twelve months of war, a period that involved intense fighting and dramatic changes in front-line positions, ‘the three services were pretty constantly mixed up in each other’s affairs’. For more effective support for endangered ground forces, the establishment of a theatre-level intelligence organisation was required. However, notwithstanding the strong necessity, there was no proper authority given for this until late 1951.

Under a poorly organised UN Forces’ intelligence system, it followed that Admiral Joy and his Naval Staff’s role was very significant, acting as an intelligence centre for all naval groups.

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40 Field Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations, Korea*, p. IX.

41 In December 1951, for the purpose of co-ordinating all behind-the-lines activities, including intelligence supply and the guerrilla operation, a theatre-level organisation was set up under FEC. It was named as the Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK): Malcom, *White Tigers*, p. 27.
in Korean waters. However, the intelligence co-ordination between the UN naval forces was also ‘fragmentary and confusing’.\(^\text{42}\) As mentioned above, since the outbreak of the war, any ship that arrived in Korean waters came under the unified command of Vice-Admiral Joy. As a result of the US Joint Chief of Staff’s (JCS) decision that the Seventh Fleet would be placed under MacArthur’s control if required, Vice-Admiral Struble (though senior to Admiral Joy) and his Seventh Fleet, were ordered to be under Admiral Joy’s control. Because US military culture was that ‘seniors normally did not report to juniors’, and additionally due to Admiral Struble’s fleets’ separate command and responsibilities; the Seventh Fleet were allowed to operate nearly independently under Admiral Joy’s broad directive.\(^\text{43}\) Therefore, each naval force, such as the Carrier Task Force, the Escort Carrier Group, the Amphibious Group, and the Escort Group were controlled separately, although operating ‘in the same waters’. This separated the command and control of naval forces, which not only caused considerable overlapping, but also raised difficulties in the co-ordination between the friendly ships during the war.\(^\text{44}\)

In addition to this, Admiral Joy’s burdensome role during the early stage of war, diverted him from accomplishing effective co-ordination. He was required to deal with so many policies and inter-Service problems; such as evacuating the Americans, the blockade in North Korean waters, supporting friendly ground forces, and also protect Formosa, to mention just some of his duties. However, there was a very limited number of naval staff in Japan. By the end of June, the total strength of the Naval Forces Far East (NAVFE) under the Command of Admiral Joy was only 188. Therefore, he was not able to pay sufficient personal attention to daily movements and

\(^{42}\) Field Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations, Korea*, p. 53.


operations of ships under his command; the co-ordination of which suffered until November when a significant reinforcement of staff took place.\textsuperscript{45}

Under these unfavourable conditions, unsurprisingly, Admiral Andrewes and his naval forces experienced a lack of intelligence, in particular, from the start of the operation on the west coast. In such a situation in which Admiral Andrewes lacked dedicated intelligence sources, he was obliged to initially depend on NAVFE sourced intelligence. In fact, there had been a certain amount of general information from the NAVFE office in Tokyo in the form of Intelligence letters and summaries. Except for these cases however, there was little contact between the Naval Intelligence Office and the blockade ships.\textsuperscript{46} Therefore, even the supply of maps of the Korean water channels, coastal lines and the mainland, which had to be supplied by the Commander of NAVFE, was subsequently delayed. Acquiring the various maps, thus, had to be done by the blockade naval forces who depended on their own ‘ingenuity’ and ‘resourcefulness’.\textsuperscript{47}

The distance between Sasebo and Tokyo intensified this problem. As the majority of United Nations Naval Forces were operating from Sasebo, a port in southern Japan, most Naval intelligence of the Korean War was concentrated in Tokyo, almost 600 miles from this naval base.\textsuperscript{48} This situation disrupted communications between sea-going commanders and the Naval Intelligence Office. It was also unrealistic to expect Admiral Joy, who had many difficult and varied tasks, to improve contact with the Blockade Commanders.

Furthermore, even the intelligence supply gained by radio communication between friendly ships on the waters was problematic, as it was often clogged, due to the ‘sudden expansion of

\textsuperscript{45} As a result of bulk of reinforcement, this strength increased to 1,227 by November 1950: Field Jr., \textit{History of United States Naval Operations, Korea}, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{46} ADM 1/27269, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July–December 1950, Part III-Operational, Section Seven-Intelligence, para. 1.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 6.

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 8.
high-precedence of traffic’. In particular, British naval forces experienced difficulty in receiving signals from their US partners.\footnote{Field Jr., \textit{History of United States Naval Operations, Korea}, pp. 60–1} Therefore, Admiral Andrewes hoped the establishment of a local intelligence centre in Sasebo would improve the situation, collecting and disseminating intelligence directly with all of the UN ships. This could be seen in Admiral Andrewes’s report as follows:

The United Nations Naval Forces have been organised into Task Forces and Task Groups and operate almost entirely from Sasebo. These units have their own Intelligence organisations working for their own particular elements, they rely entirely on their own resources and co-operate with each other well but they have no local central department to refer to. This lack of a local intelligence centre has been keenly felt, there is nowhere outside the Task Force or Group that ship’s Intelligence can turn to, either to procure information, give information or to be briefed before sailing for patrol.\footnote{ADM 1/27269, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July–December 1950, Part III-Operational, Section Seven-Intelligence, paras 2–3.}

Notwithstanding this ambition, there was no active movement within the NAVFE to establish a local intelligence centre. As an alternative, the British Commonwealth ships had to rely mainly on Admiral Andrewes’s Staff Office, Intelligence [SO(I)] afloat for Intelligence Liaison. The Royal Navy’s Headquarters ship, HMS \textit{Ladybird}, was used to accommodate the information centre and conducted a liaison role, usually afloat in Sasebo.\footnote{Ibid., para. 4.}

For Admiral Andrewes and his naval forces, acquiring the intelligence of the Communist movements within the designated operational area, namely the west coast, was even more problematic. Unlike general information, which was expected to be gained from Tokyo, and various local intelligence irregularly supplied from other naval groups, the information of enemy activities in the blockade area had to be obtained mainly by the naval forces operating in this area. In this situation of having no proper British naval forces’ intelligence team for gathering local information, most of the required information had to be collected by blockade
ships or naval aircraft’s patrols. Owing to the geographical characteristics of the west coast however, naval forces intelligence gathering was largely restricted.

As mentioned in chapter 1, the east coast is steep, with very few islands off it; features that were advantageous for US naval forces in maintaining a close blockade of inshore traffic. On the other hand, due to the extensive mud flats and silting, the west coast is very shallow near its coastline. With the large range of tides rising as much as 32 feet, its geographical characteristics consequently create an almost impossible situation for close inshore blockade activities by large naval vessels. Consequently, these surroundings largely restricted any large blockade ships’ patrols for intelligence gathering, and for screening enemy activity in acquiring supplies provided by shallow draft junks navigating inshore routes. Needless to say, this geographical configuration significantly restricted the western naval forces’ effective conduct of their missions.

To solve this problem, from an early stage of the blockade mission, several measures had been taken. For example, by late July, as a result of co-ordination between the British blockade forces and the ROK Navy, some small ROK patrol vessels were used for west coast inshore patrols. Also, from early August, with the carrier HMS Triumph moving to the west coast, it became possible to examine and attack the Communist inshore traffic during the daytime using its aircraft. However, due to this reinforcements’ limited capability, night-time inshore traffic was still impossible to screen, and thus only meagre information of the Communist forces’ mainland movements was gathered.

54 Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 127. In total, seven ROK crafts were operated on the west coast. During August, three of them were operating in the Inchon area (Nos 702, 502, 313) and another four (Nos 309, 505, 513 and 703) were operating further south. ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53, p. 33.
55 On 30 July, the Triumph started operation as a part of Admiral Andrews’s west coast patrol from 13 August. Lansdown, With the Carriers in Korea, pp. 11–25.
What made the blockade mission more difficult and dangerous was that the west coast is fringed by lots of small islands which provided armed enemy forces’ the locations for occupation. In fact, at that time, a large number of islands on the west were conceded as likely to be sheltering Communists, but due to the little intelligence available, the correct detail of the Communist-held islands was not known. Such ignorance was not just about extent of strength but also whether batteries had been mounted on any of them.\textsuperscript{56}

Since there were no available forces to land on these islands, no alternative existed to verify the Communist garrison forces’ strength and equipment other than that of asking local North Korean fishermen found in the patrolling area. Owing to the language difference, however, this could not be done by Admiral Andrewes’s naval staff. Significantly, one of the officers of HMS Cossack stated that ‘the value of having a Korean aboard who spoke reasonable English enhanced the value of our intelligence gathering fivefold’. Hence the role of ‘a Korean liaison team’ aboard blockade ships was very important.\textsuperscript{57} However, to find an able Korean interpreter in the ROK Navy who could adequately speak and understand spoken English was very difficult.\textsuperscript{58}

The credibility of information collected from local North Koreans was even very dubious. On 11 July, it was known that Paengyong-do had been captured by the Communist forces ‘armed with light weapons only’ from a report from a fisherman.\textsuperscript{59} The next day, however, it was confirmed that this information was just partly correct. Early in the morning of 12 July, when HMS Cossack patrolled in the northern area of Techong-do, she was engaged by shore batteries

\textsuperscript{56} ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), \textit{British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53}, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{58} Therefore, the blockade ships largely relied on hired civilians of questionable reliability during early period: \textit{Ibid.}, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{59} ADM 116/5794, Korean War-Fourth Report of Proceedings-Blockade of the West Coast of Korea, Office of Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East Station, 21 July 1950, para. 11.
on Paengyng-do. Although those batteries were silenced after a short engagement, and there was no damage on the HM ship, this highly surprised the Naval Commanders as they were unaware of enemy field artillery on the island.\textsuperscript{60}

Although there was no further shelling from the Communist-held islands following that occasion during 1950, the possibility of further attacks from batteries caused great anxiety for naval patrol ships. To rule out the threat from the islands within the blockade area, in addition to the need of a local intelligence team, the reinforcement of sizeable forces to conduct the amphibious raid and the island garrison role was also required.

By late July, substantial naval reinforcements were arriving in Korean waters, thus Admiral Joy directed a reorganisation of his naval forces. Under the command of Rear-Admiral Hartman, USN, he placed all blockade and support ships in a single task group which was called TG 96.5.\textsuperscript{61} As before, the west coast blockading task was the responsibility of Rear-Admiral Andrewes, and all British Commonwealth and Allied (other than US and ROK) forces were under his command. However, his blockade forces were renamed as TE 96.53 and were subject to a reinforcement.\textsuperscript{62} These additional naval forces, along with the appropriate reorganisation, notably increased the available west coast operational strength of TE 96.53. Therefore, in addition to the initial HM Ships which had conducted the blockade mission under Admiral Andrewes’s command, HMAS Bataan and HM Netherland Ship Evertsen also joined in mid-July. From 30 July, TE 96.53 was further enlarged by the arrival of the three Canadian

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., para. 15.
\textsuperscript{61} ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), \textit{British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53}, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
destroyers (HMCS *Athabaskan*, *Cayuga* and *Sioux*), two New Zealand frigates (HMNZS *Pukaki* and *Tutira*) and one French frigate (*La Grandiere*).\(^{63}\)

Despite the sizeable reinforcement in the west coast blockade unit, there were no initiatives ordered to solve the intelligence-related problem, and this factor was a significant influence in limiting operational effectiveness and even causing great danger to the blockade ships. Needless to say, no reinforcement of garrison forces was also made. Due to the precarious ground operational situation, it was not possible to expect any such reinforcement. At that time, the west side of Hwanghae Province was not a prioritised operational area for the UNC.

### 3.3 Successful Landing at Inchon and the Reduction of the Naval Forces

While the British Commonwealth naval forces were experiencing difficulties in the course of conducting the blockade on the west coast, totally different types of joint operations had been planned within the UNC. With a strategic aim of crushing the Communists in a single blow, the UN forces had been secretly planning a landing operation.

To gain overall victory, MacArthur keenly felt the necessity of an amphibious landing at the rear of the Communists. Their forces had mostly concentrated against the EUSAK on the front line and had negligible numbers of trained reserves. Since the North Koreans had neglected their rear defence and were depending on a thin logistical line, MacArthur thought a landing assault could play a decisive role in crushing the Communists.\(^{64}\) To MacArthur, this landing should be conducted once sufficient UN forces had accumulated on the Pusan Perimeter; thus


\(^{64}\) Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*, p. 493.
enabling a break out towards the north. By landing a large force on the enemy rear and forcing them to move eastward, he thought the UN forces would trap the North Korean Army.\textsuperscript{65}

Therefore, he instructed the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) to study potential locations for such an operation. Under MacArthur’s instruction, JSPOG conducted a study for an effective landing site. As a consequence, this short study recommended Inchon as the optimum location and General MacArthur concurred.\textsuperscript{66}

Although there were controversies concerning the selection of the landing site due to Inchon’s unfavourable geographical configurations, by late August, the JCS formally approved MacArthur’s suggestion to landing at Inchon. The landing was planned to be conducted on 15 September.\textsuperscript{67}

After attaining approval, General MacArthur accelerated the organisation of the UN forces for this amphibious operation. It was to be under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Struble (Commander 7\textsuperscript{th} Joint Task Force), whilst Rear-Admiral Doyle, the commander of the Amphibious Force, took the responsibility of the naval side’s assault (TF-90), and Major General Oliver S. Smith, Commander of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Marine Division, was assigned to take the responsibility of the military side (TF-92). Duly, the date of landing was fixed for 15 September, and the size of operation decided at some 70,000 men to be landed and 260 ships to be involved.\textsuperscript{68}

During the actual assault planning stage, Admiral Andrewes’s TE 96.53 continuously carried out their main mission; maintaining the blockade of the west coast of Korea. Once the planned

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[65] ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), \textit{British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53}, p. 46.
\item[66] Cagle and Manson, \textit{The Sea War in Korea}, p. 77.
\item[67] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 82. The major reason for controversy was the inaccessibility of Inchon mainly due to the large range of tides as much as 32 feet. Regarding the landing controversy see, Appleman, \textit{South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu}, Chapter XXV.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
event at Inchon became imminent, Admiral Andrewes’s naval forces assumed Blockade and Covering Force responsibilities (Task Force 91) and were assigned tasks in addition to their blockade mission as follows:

a. Conduct special reconnaissance and covering missions prior to D-day.
b. Provide cover for units of the attack force en route to the Inchon area.
c. Perform interdiction mission on D-day and thereafter. To this was added air spotting for the Jamaica and Kenya.  

The landing operation was carried out on the planned date. For the preliminary movement, Admiral Andrewes proceeded to the west coast on 12 September in HMS Triumph and initiated his blockade and covering mission for the Inchon landing. On the second day (D-2 day), HMS Triumph began blockade patrols in the Mokpo and Kunsan areas and then provided air cover for the landing forces on their way to Inchon. On 15 September and following days, she carried out an anti-submarine (A/S) screen operation with HMS Ceylon and provided spotting duties for HMS Jamaica and Kenya. Simultaneously, the north, south and the west side of Inchon was covered by the remaining British Commonwealth ships. Admiral Andrewes’s TF 91 continued their tasks on the west coast until 20 September and, with the pleasing news of the land invasion’s great success, returned to their normal mission.  

On 25 September, with the completion of the Inchon landing, the Blockade and Covering Force (Task Force 91) was dissolved. Therefore, Admiral Andrewes’s naval forces became Task Group 95.1 with the same general blockading duties as before the landing.  

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spectacular movement of the ground operation, TG 95.1 had to continue a total holding role on the west coast.

In fact, the blockade ships’ immobility was intensified by a new complication which appeared in this area from early September; that of the Communists’ surface mines being laid. On 7 September, HMS *Jamaica* reported a number of mines near to the approach of Chinnampo, and the next day, HMS *Ceylon* also reported similar types of mines on the Fankochi point, northwest of Haeju. These mines were easily laid using North Korean sampans safely out of the reach of friendly ships. As the threat of mines necessitated the blockade ships’ more precautious movements, the naval forces patrol area had to be more restricted.\textsuperscript{72} If the Chinnampo and Haeju areas were occupied by the Communist forces, at least for the safety of the naval blockade forces, the need to acquire intelligence regarding the Communist activities on the nearby mainland and inshore area became more vital. However, there was no significant change in the blockade ships’ way of gathering intelligence before and after the landing. As a passive response against the surface mines, HMS *Whitesand Bay* was joined by five Japanese minesweepers for the mine-sweeping task. However, due to the complication of searching and sweeping, this task proceeded very slowly.\textsuperscript{73}

Admiral Andrewes was not pleased with the current situation, as expressed by his comment ‘I was disturbed lest the British and Commonwealth forces should have been given a purely holding role on the west coast’.\textsuperscript{74} To him, putting his naval forces in a vulnerable position in relation to mines for blockade purposes was an ineffective and misguided commitment. In his

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 43.
\textsuperscript{74} ADM 116/5794, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 22: Blockade Patrol in HMS *Theseus* and Activities at Sasebo, 8–22 October 1950, 12 November 1950, para. 5.
opinion, the importance of the west coast blockade had significantly decreased since the Inchon landing, and it was not sensible to subject the blockade to the potential risk of mines.

As a result of the landing at Inchon, the UNC accomplished their initial purposes; cutting the enemy’s logistic line and trapping them between the UN forces. Then, by late September, UN forces finally recaptured the Korean capital, Seoul.\(^7^5\) Moreover, the UN Forces continued their march northwards, following the decision of the UN General Assembly to authorise their crossing of the 38\(^{th}\) Parallel. The crossing was in early October, and by 13 October, coupled with the advance of the UN troops towards Haeju, it was clear that the majority of the Communists had evacuated from the Haeju-Ongjin area. On 21 October, Pyongyang fell into United Nations’ hands.\(^7^6\)

Due to the UN forces rapid progress northwards, the reason of maintaining the blockade patrol became significantly weakened. Therefore, Admiral Andrewes detailed HMS Ceylon and three destroyers under his command (HMS Cockade, HMCS Athabaskan and HMAS Warramunga) to work with the Gunfire Support Group on the east coast. Subsequently, HMS Mounts Bay, HMNZ Ships Pukaki and Tutira and the French Ship La Grandiere were also directed to join the part of the Minesweeping and Protection group under Captain Sponfford, USN. As a result, there were only nine ships remaining on the west coast for the blockade, including HMS Theseus who had recently relieved Triumph.\(^7^7\)

This favourable war situation also largely relieved the commanders of TG 95.1’s concern of intelligence-related problem. Despite the newly emerged threat from enemy surface mines, faced with seemingly imminent victory, the lack of intelligence for the naval operation seemed

to have become a needless worry. Undoubtedly, no additional endeavour to get better intelligence within the blockade area was attempted during this period.

When UN victory seemed imminent, Admiral Joy and his NAVFE staff gradually turned their attentions to the issue of post-war preparation. In fact, on 19 October, even before the occupation of Pyongyang, Operation Plan 114-50 was issued by COMNAVFE, detailing ‘naval missions in support of the pacification of North Korea’ and ‘an annex on the homeward movement of forces’. 78

This atmosphere within the NAVFE also influenced the operating naval forces on the west coast. On 22 October, when Admiral Andrewes arrived back at Sasebo after west coast operations, it appeared that the end of war was in sight, and a considerable reduction of naval forces in Korea would soon be carried out. Therefore, he signalled Admiral Sir Patrick Brind regarding the need to plan the return of the British Naval Forces from Korea to Hong Kong. On Admiral Brind’s approval, he visited Tokyo to confer with Admiral Joy and General Robertson (C-in-C, British Commonwealth Occupation Forces) regarding the reduction of British and Commonwealth Forces in Korean waters. 79 In this meeting, Admiral Andrewes proposed that, with the exception of a new task group consisting of one cruiser, five destroyers, three frigates and a corvette under the command of a captain’s rank, he and his staff and remaining British ships would move to Hong Kong as soon as the war situation permitted. 80 As both Admiral Joy and General Robertson agreed to his proposal, the run-down of British Commonwealth naval forces in Korean waters was implemented. 81

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78 Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 251.
80 Ibid., paras 31–5.
81 Ibid., para. 21.
By late October, the news that lead elements of ROK 1st Division had occupied the border town on the Yalu River was delivered. To the UNC, it was deemed that the time had come to reduce the naval forces; and from late October the US carriers Valley Forge and Boxer departed for their homeland. On 15 November, Admiral Joy signalled to Admiral Andrewes, authorising the reduction of British Commonwealth naval forces. Hong Kong and Japan were chosen as locations for Commonwealth and Allied ships, rather than a directive for them to return home. This allowed for emergency contingencies, and so they were to be kept at short notice if a quick recall was necessitated. Therefore, this transfer commenced with HMS Constance, which left Sasebo for Hong Kong on 20 November, and other ships under Admiral Andrewes’s command also were then redeployed. Accordingly, Admiral Andrewes sailed for Hong Kong on 25 November in HMS Kenya, after relinquishing command of TG 95.1 to Captain Lloyd-Davies of HMS Ceylon.

Under the command of Captain Lloyd-Davies, TG 95.1 was regrouped into seven destroyers (HMAS Bataan and Warramunga; HMCS Cayuga, Sioux and Athabaskan; HMS Cossack, H. Neth MS Evertsen); and four frigates (HMS Cardigan Bay, Morecambe Bay, HMNZS Tutira and Rotoiti). With the optimistic expectation that ‘the war would be over by Christmas’, the remaining naval forces continued routine blockade patrols on the west coast.

### 3.4 Chinese Intervention and the West Coast Operation

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By late November, it became clear that the UNC underestimated the CCF’s strength and intention. It also became apparent that the reduction of naval forces from Korean waters had been premature. Immediately after the departure of Admiral Andrewes and his forces to Hong Kong, from 25 November, the CCF launched a massive attack against the EUSAK on the north of the Chongchon River, the 1st Marine division and lead units of the 7th Infantry Division in the east.86

This had disastrous consequences for UN ground forces, and in the face of the massive assault by the Communist Forces, they were forced to retreat from northern Korea. In the east, the 1st Marine Division had been cut off by seven Chinese divisions near the Chosin reservoir and was fighting its way south toward Hungnam to join up with the remainder of the 10th Corps. Preparations seemed to be made to evacuate the 1st Marine Division, and probably the entire X Corps.87 In the west, a rapid retreat had to be made by the EUSAK to the Taedong River area. As Pyongyang was just about to fall into the Communist forces’ hands, they were likely to be cut off west of the Taedong River. The only remaining evacuation route open for them was by amphibious lift through Chinnampo, a port that lies 24 miles north of the Taedong Estuary. In addition to that, preparation for the withdrawal from Inchon, a location employed as the EUSAK supply base, also had to be made.88

On 28 November, Vice-Admiral Joy warned Rear-Admiral Doyle, the Commander of TF 90, that his Amphibious Force would probably be required to lift UN ground forces out of North Korea and redeploy them further south. On receipt of this direction, Admiral Doyle at once

started a preliminary plan to redeploy his amphibious forces; half of them for the west coast under the command of Admiral Thackrey, USN and the other forces for the east coast.89

An urgent call to hurry the return of the RN stationed at Hong Kong was also implemented. On 30 November, Admiral Joy signalled to Admiral Brind the request for the return of Admiral Andrewes and the immediate availability of HM ships. This reversal was administered only two days after Admiral Andrewes’s arrival at Hong Kong. Therefore, on 1 December, Vice-Admiral Andrewes, who was promoted on that day, hoisted his flag on HMS Theseus, and, with HMS Constance in company, he sailed for Sasebo.90 This time again, due to the shortage of time and resources, Admiral Andrewes and his ships had to return to Korean waters without any additional preparation.

He arrived at Sasebo on 4 December and took the duties of Commander, TG 95.1 from Captain Lloyd-Davies. As before, Admiral Andrewes’s Task Group had been assigned the responsibility for all west coast areas. The first task of TG 95.1 was to support the evacuation of units of the EUSAK from Chinnampo.91

As a result of continued mine-sweeping operations, its channel had been opened to the amphibious ships, and the responsibility for the evacuation was assigned to the US amphibious forces.92 Therefore, the TG 95.1 ships’ primary task was to defend the evacuation process. For the support of the evacuation, a plan was implemented to provide naval gunfire support and to escort the transports out of the port with CAP, air spot and A/S patrols over the area by aircraft.

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89 Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. 265.
from HMS *Theseus*. Simultaneously, a blockade of the west coast was to be maintained to prevent any Communist movements by sea.\(^{93}\)

On 4 December, under the command of Captain S. G. Kelly in USS *Bayfield*, the amphibious forces sailed towards Chinnampo from Inchon, with the intent of lifting forces and stocks.\(^{94}\)

Fortunately, the intensity and speed of the CCF’s pursuit of the retreating EUSAK decreased at some point in the northern Pyongyang area, and thus most of the surviving UN forces decided to move south via the main highway rather than by the seaway.\(^{95} \) This significantly relieved the burden placed on the amphibious forces. Throughout 5 December, evacuation operations proceeded smoothly, and by 17:00 that afternoon, 5,900 ROK troops and 1,800 US Army and Navy port personnel had been evacuated. HMS *Theseus* covered the ships engaged in the evacuation, and in the course of the next day, all forces of Commonwealth and American ships had withdrawn from the Chinnampo area and moved south towards Inchon.\(^{96}\)

On his arrival at Inchon on 5 December, Admiral Andrewes instructed the duties of Task Group 95.1 as follows:

a. West Coast blockade  
b. Anti-aircraft defence of Inchon and naval gunfire support  
c. Air cover over the task group and armed reconnaissance north of the Bomb-line.\(^{97}\)

Admiral Andrewes thought that the CCF would never restrict their efforts to land operations, and considered it highly probable that they would strike at naval forces by aircraft and submarine. In particular, this fear was substantiated in early November, when MiG-15 fighters,

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\(^{93}\) ADM 116/5794, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 26: Concentration of All British Commonwealth and Allied Ships off West Coast of Korea, 4 to 15 December 1950, para. 9.  
the Communists’ new jet, appeared and attacked friendly bombers operating in the Yalu area, increasing his concern of threats from the air. As a further precaution against air attack, Admiral Andrewes stressed the importance of anti-aircraft defence of operational areas.

To conduct these duties, his Task Group was reorganised into the following Task Elements:

**TE 95.11** To operate west of Inchon – HMS *Theseus* (flag of Commander TG 95.1), *Cossack*, *Constance*, *Concord*.

**TE 95.12** West Coast Blockade – HMS *Ceylon* (Commander TE 95.12), HMCS *Cayuga*, *Sioux*, HMAS *Bataan*.

**TE 95.13** At Inchon; available for various duties as required – HMS *Cardigan Bay* (CTE 95.13), *Morecambe Bay*, HMNZS *Tutira*, *Rotoiti*.

**TE 95.14** At Inchon, primarily for A.A. defence – HMS *Kenya* (CTE 95.14), HMAS *Warramunga*, H. Neth. MS *Evertsen*, HMCS *Athabaskan*.

For the remainder of the month of December 1950, TG 95.1 operations were based on the above-mentioned instructions. The blockade patrol was maintained between Inchon and the Yalu Gulf by TE 95.12, and task element ships were periodically exchanged with those of the Inchon Gunfire Support Element. Operations in the Inchon area involved covering by air and surface blockade for the seaward flank of the EUSAK, conducting strikes over north-west Korea, and carrying out armed air reconnaissance.

To the UNC, the west coast area was not a high priority operational area at that time. Therefore, when they were forced to retreat from Chinnampo in December 1950, the UNC even decided to abandon the control of the northern islands situated above the 38th Parallel. By the request of

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Admiral Andrewes, who pointed out the importance of retaining possession of several islands to provide vigilance against enemy mine laying, only a few islands were secured.\footnote{ADM 1/27288, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 45, 1–22 December 1951, Office of the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station, FO2FE/2960/11, 23 December 1951, p. 7.}

Owing to the higher command’s neglect of this area, the intelligence and the island garrison-related issues largely had to be dealt with by the blockade ships’ own resources and ingenuity. Faced with imminent challenges, however, the ships of TG 95.1 were not able to pay attention to these issues. After the returning from Hong Kong, Admiral Andrewes and his naval forces had to immediately support the naval evacuation operation. Subsequently, due to the seemingly precarious UN ground forces and newly introduced threat from the air, blockade naval forces were required to direct more attention to gunfire support for the EUSAK and anti-aircraft defence. Therefore, these issues still remained as ongoing problems to the western naval forces.

Although during the last few weeks of the blockade operation ‘Little occurred to break the monotony’, there was a totally unpleasant calm.\footnote{ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch(Naval), 
\textit{British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53}, pp. 103–4.} As the Communists reoccupied the north side of the 38\textsuperscript{th} Parallel, the recommencement of enemy mine laying in the Chinnampo and Haeju areas was expected. Even though cold weather and unfavourable ice on the inshore area temporarily hindered this objective, it seemed highly possible that from spring, mine laying would be reintroduced in earnest.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 112.} The Communist forces’ threat against the islands on the rear side of the battle-front was also problematic. Although large numbers of those were occupied by refugees and anti-Communists, being unarmed and poorly organised, they could not guarantee the safety of the islands in the blockade area.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 112–13.}
With this pessimistic prospect, the naval forces first year in the west coast passed by with Admiral Andrewes’s hope addressed to each active ship member that ‘next year they may be able to enjoy peace and be in their homes and with their families’.105

3.5 Concluding Comments

During the first six months of operation in the Korean War, Admiral Andrewes’s and his naval forces’ operation could be broadly described as carrying out a blockade of Korea’s west coast. As the Korean War continued in earnest using ground forces, and also because North Korea’s naval forces were negligible, Admiral Andrewes requested his naval forces to concentrate more on the blockade to deny the Communists’ use of inshore traffic. Even during the Inchon landing and the evacuation from Chinnampo, this intransigent mission persevered as a major duty.

However, as the operation commenced without adequate preparation, various problems emerged immediately following the naval blockade’s inauguration. In particular, limited sources of intelligence for the blockade mission often meant operational ineffectiveness and increasing exposure to dangerous situations. Under the unique conditions of the west coast, which has a large number of islands and limited access to the inshore area, and with the commencement of the Communists’ surface mine laying, the intelligence related problem intensified. However, as the west coast area was not a prioritised operational area to the UNC, except for reinforcement of naval craft, no proper measures were provided by this higher command.

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105 ADM 116/5794, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 27: Covering the Left Flank of UN Forces in Korea, 16 to 27 December 1950, 19 January 1951, para. 79.
After the Inchon landing, this unpleasant situation was temporarily reduced. As the UN forces marched northwards, a large part of the enemy territory came under friendly hands, and this significantly decreased the need of the naval blockade. However with the Chinese intervention, the war situation totally changed. Due to the UN ground forces’ retreat to the 37th Parallel, the importance of the blockade mission became once again significant. Consequently, the Communist forces’ reoccupation of northern Korea reintroduced the threat of the Communists’ surface mines and possible attack against the islands on the west coast.

The most disappointing aspect for the Naval Commanders was that there had been little improvement in the TG 95.1’s capability of intelligence gathering. Except for the increase in naval patrol ships to collect information in the course of their patrol, there was no fundamental change in the way of intelligence gathering, either by the North Korean civilians on the islands or by naval aircraft patrols.\footnote{In fact, from mid-December some changes in the blockade ships’ way of collecting information had begun. As opposed to asking for information from the North Korean fishermen, they started to collect mainland information from the refugees and anti-Communist guerrillas by the liaison of ROK Naval craft. For a detailed account regarding this, see Chapter 4.} As 1951 approached, a pessimistic outlook prevailed with regard to an early end to the war. What was essentially required was a fundamental change in the intelligence collecting system to gain more effective information and a safer way of conducting the naval blockade.
Chapter 4

The Beginning and the Development of Co-Operation:

From Mid-December 1950 to Early July 1951

TG 95.1’s relationship with the anti-Communist guerrillas started from mid-December 1950, in a very indirect way. Collecting some intelligence from the ROK naval craft, who had contacted and collected intelligence from several guerrilla groups, was the only connection between the two groups. At that time, the Blockade Commanders were not able to pay deep attention to the anti-Communist activities emerging within their operational area due to the heavy involvement in supporting ground forces who were retreating south of the Han River. Therefore, to TG 95.1, the large number of guerrillas were just the uncontrolled North Korean irregulars which had potential as a useful intelligence source.

From early February 1951, a more active step in the development of guerrilla co-operation was taken by the Blockade Commanders. After the start of the UN forces’ successful counterattack and steady advance to the North, TG 95.1 was able to concentrate more on the naval blockade. At the same time, friendly authorities commenced a guerrilla reorganisation to get the guerrillas under their command and control. These situations caused a more favourable environment for better relationships with the guerrillas. In particular, the establishment of the American guerrilla organisation, the Leopard, which successfully reorganised a large number of guerrillas, accelerated blockade ships’ close co-operation with these anti-Communist irregulars.

This chapter explores the start and development of co-operation between Task Group 95.1 and the anti-Communist guerrillas from mid-December 1950 to early July 1951; just before the start
of the truce talks of the Korean War.\footnote{The truce talks for the Korean War opened on 10 July 1951 at Kaesong. Korea Institute of Military History, \textit{The Korean War}, Vol. III (Seoul: Korea Institute of Military History, 1999), p. 51.} It focuses on the guerrilla reorganisation process, which was conducted by the ROK Navy and EUSAK. It then discusses the Blockade Commanders’ changing positions toward their relationship with the guerrillas and the ensuing development of co-operation.

For this purpose, this chapter tracks the beginning of co-operation between these two groups. The early stage of their relationship, which commenced from mid-December 1950 by the ROK Navy’s liaison, is also briefly explained. Following this, the small-scale guerrilla reorganisation process, which was led by the ROK Navy, is then discussed. New accomplishments achieved in the course of co-operation with partly organised guerrillas and the emerging limitations are also examined.

Finally, this chapter examines the emergence of the \textit{Leopard} organisation as the single authority of all guerrilla activities. It subsequently discusses the various developments in the naval-guerrilla co-operation, which was rapidly accomplished during their four months’ relationship. By focusing on this accomplishment, this chapter will show the changed naval operations brought about by this co-operation and the benefits gained by the western naval forces. It will also show that, despite the benefits, there had been a potential risk remaining in their relationship as this co-operation started without any confidence in the guerrilla organisation’s reliability. Such risks presented the limitations that underpinned the naval-guerrilla relationship during the Korean War.

4.1 The Beginning of Co-Operation with the Guerrillas
During his patrol as Commander of Task Element (CTE) 95.12, between 4 and 18 December, Captain Lloyd-Davies, the Commanding Officer (CO) of HMS Ceylon, acquired some very valuable and up-to-date intelligence in regard to the Communist activities. This was supplied by Captain Choi Hyoyong, the CO of ROKN PF 61, who was operating a rescue attempt for refugees from the mainland. Captain Lloyd-Davies was impressed with the value of intelligence supplied by the ROKN frigate, which had been previously unavailable.2

This intelligence was mainly collected by the North Korean anti-Communists, who were evacuated to the west coast islands by the support from ROK craft. In the course of supporting various North Korean refugees and anti-Communist irregulars, the ROK Navy was able to maintain contact with some of the guerrillas and collect up-to-date information regarding the Communist movements.3

ROK Navy’s gaining of new intelligence sources was welcome news for the blockade ships who had wanted to develop their intelligence collecting system. Therefore, Captain Lloyd-Davies made arrangements with the ROK Navy on the west coast to make collecting intelligence a major part of its activities. Captain Choi agreed to detail one of his officers to act as an intelligence officer. In addition, he also arranged to send North Korean guerrillas onto the mainland to collect information, and, if any particularly valuable information was gathered, he was ordered to signal a request for a rendezvous.4 This indirect relationship continued during the subsequent blockade patrol. HMS Kenya (Captain P. W. Brock), who relieved HMS Ceylon,

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3 For more detailed accounts of ROK Naval crafts’ lifting operation for refugees and the anti-Communist guerrillas, see, ROK Navy, The Korean War and the ROK Naval Operation, pp. 379–86; Regarding the enemy intelligence acquired as a result of the relationship between the ROK Navy and some of the guerrilla members from December 1950 to January 1951, see U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, Supporting Document, pp. 1–30.
frequently met the CO of *PF 61* on Techong-do and received information of the Haeju and Chinnampo areas.\(^5\)

However, except for this intelligence gathering, no further attempt was made for a while by the Blockade Commanders to build a closer relationship with the irregular anti-Communists. This position could be seen in the Blockade Commanders’ responses regarding the ROK naval crafts’ requests for the guerrilla support.

On 29 December 1950, HMS *Kenya* received information from the CO of *PF 61*. It stated that ‘in the whole area south and west Pyongyang and east of Haeju, there were only about 2,000 men of the North Korean Strugglers Army’.\(^6\) It also wrote that ‘these could be contained by ROK sympathizers if the latter [North Koreans] could be given arms and more ammunition’.\(^7\) This short update was the first official report requesting the support for anti-Communist guerrillas to Task Group 95.1.\(^8\) As they could be used as a local intelligence team for the blockade naval forces, if properly supported and organised, Captain Choi reported the need of the anti-Communist support firstly to CTE 95.12.

This information, however, generated little interest at that time in Captain Brock, because he was not able to ensure that the ‘Struggler Army’ from North Korea truly were in the ‘right hands’.\(^9\) To Captain Brock, any direct relationship with these irregulars seemed dangerous as he had no basic information of their nature and activities.

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\(^5\) The CO of HMS *Kenya* had meeting with the CO of *PF 61* 4 times (21, 25, 28 and 29 December 1950) on Techong-do during his patrol as CTE 95.12. ADM 116/6218, HMS *Kenya*-Report of Proceedings from 1 to 31 December 1950, Appendix I.

\(^6\) ADM 116/6218, HMS *Kenya*-Report of Proceedings from 1 to 31 December 1950, HMS *Kenya*, 1 January 1951, Appendix II.

\(^7\) Ibid.

\(^8\) On 8 January 1951, Captain Choi reported to the EUSAK headquarters in Taegu regarding the activities of the guerrillas and the need of support for their operation. This was the first message signalled to the UN forces except for a message sent to HMS *Kenya*. Regarding the detailed information of this message, see sub-chapter 4.3.

\(^9\) ADM 116/6218, HMS *Kenya*-Report of Proceedings from 1 to 31 December 1950, Appendix II.
The fact that the operation of several thousand guerrilla forces on the west coast seemed very ineffective at that present time also influenced him.\textsuperscript{10} Since the EUSAK’s rapid retreat to Seoul in early December, there was no contact with the Communist forces on the west during last three weeks of December 1950. However, faced with the seemingly imminent Communist forces offensive, blockade naval forces were required to direct more attention to gunfire support for the EUSAK.\textsuperscript{11}

From the first day of 1951, the wartime situation of the west coast became less conducive for a closer relationship between the blockade ships and the anti-Communist guerrillas. Since the Chinese counter-offensive started on 31 December 1950, the UN Forces were compelled to withdraw from the 38\textsuperscript{th} parallel area. Therefore, blockade naval forces’ main effort was required to focus more on the support of ground operations. Outnumbered by Communist forces, the EUSAK carried out an extremely rapid withdrawal south of the Han River. Seoul was once again occupied by the enemy on 3 January, and Kimpo airfield and Inchon followed suit two days later. During January 1951, the main naval interest on the west coast had to be centred on gunfire support for the friendly army, especially on Inchon and Pyongtaek, where the final stages of evacuation were in progress.\textsuperscript{12} For additional reinforcement of gunfire support, on 13 January, Admiral Andrewes temporarily decided to reduce TE 95.12 to one cruiser and two small ships.\textsuperscript{13} Due to this reduction, blockade ships were not able to pay attention to the early stage of guerrilla activities within their blockade area.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{10} Ibid.
\bibitem{13} Ibid., p. 112.
\end{thebibliography}
At the same time, an additional problem emerged within the blockade area; the increase of unauthorised movement of small craft. This was directly related to the uncoordinated activities of various friendly clandestine organisations and irregular anti-Communists.\textsuperscript{14} As mentioned in the previous chapter, clandestine organisations began to appear soon after the war began, for the purpose of intelligence gathering based on the friendly islands. Although these were controlled by friendly forces, they were considered so secret that they were unknown to anyone else or, indeed, to each other.\textsuperscript{15} These clandestine activities increased following the Chinese forces’ intervention. To collect more Communist intelligence, inspired and overseen by the UNC, uncoordinated friendly movements in the blockade area doubled at that time.\textsuperscript{16}

Additionally, large numbers of refugees and anti-Communist movements emerged in the blockade area. As mentioned in the latter part of Chapter 2, since the Chinese intervention, around 62,000 North Koreans took refuge in the Paengyong-do and the nearby small islands. In this area, there were also collectively almost 4,000 young guerrillas who were conducting amphibious anti-Communist activities. Large numbers of them continued their movement between the islands and the mainland for collecting food or guerrilla activities by using their sampans without knowledge of the Blockade Commanders.\textsuperscript{17}

From an early stage of war, Admiral Andrewes had been worried about the clandestine activities that were operating without any notification of their movements to allied naval forces and with negligible or unreliable means of identification. As the performance of their missions necessitated breaking the blockade, it was essential for Admiral Andrewes to know how many organisations, including friendly ones, were operating on the west coast. However, he was not

\textsuperscript{17} ROK Navy Headquarters, \textit{The Korean War and the ROK Naval Operation}, pp. 386–8.
able to acquire any information of such and he was dissatisfied with the current blockade situation. Therefore to Admiral Andrewes, the recent increase of uncoordinated movements, particularly the emergence of large irregular forces, created additional problems that could increase the instability of the west coast blockade. His concern over these activities is clearly revealed in his Report of Proceeding No. 30:

Recently there have been numerous cases of small boat and other parties operating on the west coast of Korea without my knowledge. [...] Apart from the lack of knowledge about the prospective movements of small craft off the coasts of Korea, it also seems that there is likely to be difficulty in recognising them as friend or foe.

In the situation where there was no proper friendly authority to organise and control these irregulars, to the Blockade Commanders, the issue of supporting the uncontrolled irregulars was regarded as increasing the confusion of the blockade situation. In addition to the guerrillas’ credibility-related problem and the naval forces’ heavy diversion from the blockade mission, the guerrillas’ uncontrolled movements within the blockade area became an additional challenge for the development of naval-guerrilla relationship.

These unfavourable conditions for closer relationships with the guerrillas intensified the Blockade Commanders’ negative position regarding the issue of supporting guerrillas. Therefore, when the ROK Navy’s requests of the guerrilla support were sent again during January 1951, CTE 95.12 had to reply with a flat refusal. For instance, in the meeting with Captain Choi on 9 January, Captain Lloyd-Davies was asked once again for ‘support for the

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friendly guerrillas still operating [...] and arms and ammunition for the large numbers of recruits in these friendly islands’. This request, as before, was not supported.

On 15 January, an additional request was made from Captain Choi for the loan of several boats of TE 95.12 for the evacuation of small numbers of mainland guerrillas and refugees. This was a less demanding task for the Task Elements compared to the previous case. Invariably, the CO of HMS *Kenya* declined to help. This was because Captain Brock ‘did not feel justified in offering these hostages to fortune for an operation of uncertain duration and doubtful value’.

Apart from their reluctance to support guerrillas, however, within the frame of the indirect relationship, the Blockade Commanders maintained attempts to utilise the guerrilla activities during January 1951. For instance, after returning from gunfire support for ground forces in Inchon, HMS *Ceylon*’s first destination as CTE 95.12 was Techong-do. This was to make contact with the senior officer of the ROKN for information gathering.

On 19 January, a more active attempt to use the guerrilla activities for the blockade ships’ task was tried by Admiral Andrewes. He received a signal from CTF 95, stating that the enemy was operating a night-time train between Haeju and Ongjin and instructing him to ‘catch that train’. Admiral Andrewes decided to use the guerrillas known to operate on the mainland, and therefore he sent instructions to HMS *Kenya* to find out whether the guerrillas could destroy the train. In addition to passive intelligence collecting, Admiral Andrewes tried to use the guerrillas for this operational purpose.

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This trial, however, did not yield any subsequent guerrilla activity due to the guerrillas’ incompetence in demolition and the ROK Navy’s limited contact with them. In the meeting with senior ROKN officers to determine whether the guerrillas could dispose of the train, Captain Brock was told by the CO of PC 704 that ‘he was not in communication with any guerrillas in the south of Hwanghae Province’ and ‘very much doubted whether there were any with training in demolition’. Therefore, Captain Brock reported to Admiral Andrewes that ‘it was unlikely that the guerrillas could carry out the necessary demolitions’.

Whilst this could be regarded as evidence of the Blockade Commanders’ willingness to use the guerrillas more actively if needed, it also clearly showed their lack of understanding about guerrilla capability, nature and operational area. It meant that, at least until late January 1951, they had been largely ignorant of the anti-Communist activities within their blockade area. To the Blockade Commanders who had to be largely diverted to the support of ground forces and who were unsatisfied with the guerrilla’s chaotic movements within the blockade area, the guerrillas were no more than the uncontrolled North Korean irregulars which had potential as a useful intelligence source. This caused the Blockade Commanders’ indirect relationship with the North Korean irregulars at least until early February 1951.

4.2 The Development of Co-Operation with the Guerrillas Controlled by the ROK Navy

From late January, the mainland situation was changing. After the successful retreat to Pyongtaek, south of the Inchon area, the Communists began building an additional offensive,

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25 After which, this instruction was deemed incorrect by a report from USS Bataan. In this report, CTE 95.11 mentioned that his aircraft had cut a track several times earlier, and this track between Haeju and Ongjin was in a poor condition. Hence the recent report about its use seemed unlikely. ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 30 at Sasebo, 17 January and 6 February 1951, p. 4.
but UN forces successfully counterattacked. By the end of January, the initiative had passed to
UN Forces. Starting from 6 February, friendly forces steadily advanced toward the North and
were able to recapture Inchon on 10 February.\(^{26}\)

Throughout this period, the naval forces’ were heavily involved in the left flank ground
operation. HMS *Ceylon* and two HMC ships, *Nootka* and *Cayuga* were used as reinforcements
from the blockade patrol for gunfire support, interdiction and harassment fire. HMS *Belfast*
subsequently took this responsibility from *Ceylon*. TG 95.1’s involvement continued until UN
Forces recaptured Inchon. As the immediate crisis on the left flank was relieved and UN ground
forces progressed steadily north, TG 95.1 was able to concentrate more on their main mission,
the west coast Blockade.\(^ {27}\) Eventually, a more favourable environment allowed them to focus
on the issue of co-operation with the guerrillas.

With the gradual change of the war situation, there was also a remarkable change in the
guerrilla organisation on the west coast islands; especially from Paengyong-do. Paengnyong-
do is the island located approximately 15 miles from the mainland, southwest of the Hwanghae
Peninsular and two miles south of the 38\(^{th}\) Parallel. It was large enough — almost 18 square
miles — to support large numbers of troops, with prominent hills where radar and radio
antennas could be installed. It also had a lengthy beach of hard-packed sand running northeast
to southwest from the harbour. The depth of water was such that an Landing Ship Tank (LST)
could moor on the beach at mid to high tide.\(^ {28}\) There were around 4,000 young guerrillas on
and around Paengyong-do who continued anti-Communist activities.

From mid-January, an early step in reorganising these irregulars commenced on this island,
and the ROK Navy was the first to try to organise and utilise the guerrillas. Under the direction

of ROK Navy Headquarters in Pusan, a company of ROK Marines and 30 ROKN personnel were deployed to Paengyong-do, and Lieutenant Colonel Lee Huijeong, ROKN was ordered to command them. Although their main duty was island defence from enemy threat, Colonel Lee was also instructed to organise these guerrillas.\(^{29}\) In order to use them as a raiding, intelligence gathering and garrison party, Colonel Lee and his staff selected several hundred loyal anti-Communist youths in Paengyong-do, and then, provided them basic military and communication trainings.\(^{30}\) War supplies such as rice, ammunition and weapons were also provided.\(^{31}\) After training, these anti-Communists were regrouped as thirty to fifty members into guerrilla units, with some employed as garrison forces, whilst others continued in intelligence gathering and guerrilla activities on the mainland.\(^{32}\)

Simultaneously, the ROK Navy tried to expand the number of guerrilla groups which were in close communication. By supplying gunfire support and ammunition for guerrilla groups operating in the Chodo-Sokto area, additional contact lines were maintained in the area further north. For example, as a consequence of close support by the ROKN craft, No. 303 and No. 304, quite regular contact was made with the largest guerrilla group from the Mountain Kuwol. Under the command of Captain Kim Jongbyuk, the ROK Army, around 2,500 men fled to the Chodo-Sokto area on 21 January.\(^{33}\) As they left a small group on the mainland and actively conducted amphibious operation, they supplied very valuable up-to-date enemy information.\(^{34}\)

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\(^{30}\) Ibid., pp. 388–9.

\(^{31}\) These war supplies were supported by the EUSAK staff who were preparing to use the guerrillas for their large-scale guerrilla operation. Evanhoe, *Dark Moon*, p. 37; for more detailed information of the EUSAK’s plan of the guerrilla operation, see sub-chapter 4.3.


\(^{33}\) Cho, *The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War*, p. 266; Lim Jong Duk, the sub-leader of this guerrilla group reported that their strength was about 3,700 in his interview with an American Officer in 1952. U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 112.

\(^{34}\) In January 1951, they even attacked the enemy coastal area garrison under the 26th Brigade, IV Corps and captured 32 prisoners. They were sent to the ROKN vessel (No. 303) which was patrolled nearby Sokto. Ibid., 112–3.
Admiral Andrewes had been paying attention to the changes taking place with the guerrillas in Paengyong-do. As the deployment plan of ROK Marine garrison forces’ on Paengyong-do was started by Admiral Andrewes’s request on December 1950, for the defensive purpose of several important islands, the garrison reinforcement procedure had been conducted in close communication with the Blockade Naval Task Group.\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, Admiral Andrewes had information regarding the ROK garrison forces’ movements and their missions; which included ROK Navy’s plan to use ‘large parties of young men’ in the operation.\textsuperscript{36}

As the ROK Navy was able to organise only a small proportion of the guerrillas on the west coast, it was not possible to expect it to adopt a role as a unified authority to command and control all the guerrilla activities, as yet. However, this early stage of guerrilla reorganisation sparked the Blockade Commanders’ interest. By watching the current changes in Paengyong-do, they came to recognise additional availabilities of these irregulars, if they were controlled and trained by a friendly authority. In addition to their potential value as a useful intelligence source, the guerrillas’ availability as raiding and garrison forces for naval operation were also recognised by the Blockade Commanders.

With the war situation change that now allowed the Naval Task Group to focus more on the issues of blockade area, and the emergence of a friendly authority able to organise at least some of the guerrillas, the relationship with the guerrillas developed rapidly. This change began during the patrol period of Captain Lloyd-Davies as CTE 95.12 between 13 and 24 February. He had been interested in the activities of the guerrillas since December 1950 through

\textsuperscript{35} ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), \textit{British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53}, pp. 112–3. Regarding the detailed information of Admiral Andrewes’s request for the garrison forces, see Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{36} ADM 116/5794, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 29 at Sasebo, 6 January and 17 January 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station’s letter FO2FE/2960/11, 18 February 1951, p. 12.
intelligence from the ROKN. He was particularly impressed by the guerrilla organisation operating from Paengyong-do under ROK Navy’s control as he realised the potential advantages that might accrue from raids by the guerrillas, supported by TE 95.12 and the ROK Patrol craft.37

The whole area from Inchon to Chinnampo seemed to be lightly held by North Korean troops. These troops were employed in a police role rather than a defensive one. Moreover, there were many beaches and places for amphibious landings, therefore, there was very little to prevent UN forces from walking ashore in that area.38

After returning from Inchon, Captain Lloyd-Davies initiated some actions to give shape to his idea. He immediately held several meetings with the CO of PC 704, PF 62 and some of the ROKN officers in command of the guerrillas. As a result of these, one guerrilla raid was actually planned. In his Report of Proceedings, Captain Lloyd-Davies described in detail his first plan of co-operation with the guerrillas as follows:

It was agreed that a raid should be made on the village of Kujin-ni (XC 6240), where 150 North Koreans had been reported with one or two field guns, which we intended to capture. If suitable, a follow up attack would be made on Hongga-ri (XC 6523), where there was a further batch of the enemy. The raid was to be conducted in three phases; the first was to land at night some guerrillas with Type 68 sets lent from Ceylon, for bombardment spotting; the Second was the landing of 200 guerrillas in two parties one either side of the town at dawn, followed immediately by the attack, supported by Ceylon, Consort and Amethyst. The whole raid was to last about 3 hours. CTE 95.11 had agreed to support the raid and the necessary planes were laid on.39

Unfortunately, this plan had to be called off owing to an unexpected, strong south-westerly gale. However, it provided a model for future co-operation to support guerrillas, involving naval support gunfire and air strikes.

Interestingly, in addition, Captain Lloyd-Davies tried a more developed way of co-operation. This involved organising a gunfire support team for guerrilla raids. He based the instruction on the Royal Navy’s bombardment procedure, in the operation of a Type 68 wireless telegraphy (W/T) set. This support team consisted of a small number of guerrillas under ROK Navy’s control. The training, on Techong-do, was conducted by his Signal Communication Officer and the Second Gunnery Officer. Because these guerrillas all had local knowledge of the west coast, Captain Lloyd-Davies planned to land them before their attack with the Type 68 set. He had intended to use them as gunfire spotters, but owing to the short time available to instruct the men, this plan did not result in a tangible outcome. However, he was satisfied with the progression of their training, stating that ‘they appeared to be coming along quite nicely, and it might be worth following up’.\footnote{Ibid., para. 7.}

The most impressive part was his plan for ‘improving the arrangements’. In his report to Admiral Andrewes, Captain Lloyd-Davies suggested not only the need of guerrilla raid support and the continued training of the gunfire support team, but also the immediate supply of arms, ammunition and landing craft for the guerrilla operation which had been declined by the British Task Group. Moreover, he also suggested the need of an appropriate communication system and the detailing of a liaison officer to remain with them for better co-ordination and communication with the guerrillas. Captain Lloyd-Davies’s suggestions were specifically recorded in his last report during the Korean War as follows:
a. The immediate supply of arms and ammunition to Paengyong-do. The 4,000 recruits already there should then be capable of holding the islands against anything except a major amphibious attack, which the enemy is not at present capable of mounting, owing to lack of suitable craft [...] 

c. The provision of a few LCM’s or other suitable landing craft. These could be manned by ROK’s, and kept at Paengyong-do and would be used for raids on the mainland [...] 

d. The detailing of a liaison officer (American or British) to be with the guerrillas and act as a permanent link between TE 95.12 and the guerrillas. 

e. A final “tie up” of communications with the ROK’s, guerrillas, Shoran and TE 95.12. [...] In Ceylon, it was found we could compete with all stations by either having certain routine calling times, a constant loudspeaker listening watch, and one wave, permanently manned, to the principal ROK patrol craft for emergency. 

f. The training of guerrilla bombardment and reconnaissance team, who could land at night with Type 68 Sets lent from TE 95.12, prior to combined operations or for obtaining information. These are local men who know the country and there may be quite good possibilities in this. Teochong Island makes a suitable place for training them. 

g. The provision of a suitable code for communications with the ROK’s and Paengyong-do. This code could be changed frequently and only used during operational periods. 41 

Although this was written as a form of suggestion, strictly speaking it was more than that. In fact, it was more akin to a master plan for the direction of future co-operation with the guerrillas. However, Captain Lloyd-Davies seemed not to consider the provision of above mentioned war supplies should be made by the TG 95.1. He recognised the EUSAK’s plan to support the guerrillas, and he also helped with the transportation of ammunition for the guerrillas by request from the American organisation during this patrol period.42 Therefore, it seemed more proper to regard this suggestion as to draw more attention from Admiral Andrewes and other TE Commanders concerning the current ongoing issue of guerrilla support and reorganisation before Captain Lloyd-Davies’s departure from Korean waters. This was his last patrol in the Korean War.43 

41 Ibid., para. 12. 
42 For more detailed information regarding Captain Lloyd-Davies’s recognition of the EUSAK’s plan, see sub-chapter 4.4. 
43 HMS Ceylon was relieved as CTE 95.12 by HMS Belfast on 23 February and arrived at Sasebo the next day. ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 13 to 24 February 1951, Appendix I: West Korea - Last Blockade Patrol.
Unfortunately, Admiral Andrewes was not able to pay attention to this suggestion at that time. On 19 February, as directed by Washington, Admiral Andrewes took over the command of Task Force 95 from Admiral Allen E. Smith.\(^{44}\) Therefore, from that day, Admiral Andrewes assumed responsibility for the overall direction of operations on both coasts of Korea as CTF 95. This new command caused Admiral Andrewes a large amount of extra work. In fact, during the first 14 days of his command as CTF 95, his staff officers had to deal with 3,050 signals. As Admiral Andrewes commented, ‘Although […] not more than a small percentage of these signals reach me personally I find that the work of reading those that pass through the sieve is very large.’\(^{45}\)

Due to this naval command change, the issue of co-operation with the guerrillas had to be handled based on each Blockade Commanders’ discretion for a while. Since Captain Lloyd-Davies’s last patrol, the Blockade Commanders concurred that the co-operation with the guerrilla could yield a more effective result for TG 95.1’s operations. Captain Sir Aubery St. Clair-Ford who relieved HMS \textit{Ceylon}, reported on the possible value of the guerrillas’ amphibious operation after his patrol between 22 February and 6 March: ‘to prevent this would necessitate the enemy making a major effort and would cause a large deployment of troops, guns and transport to be made to that area.’\(^{46}\) Captain Brock who had declined the initial request of the ROKN regarding the guerrilla support, also agreed with the potential value of their co-operation, writing ‘It is clear […] that the ROKs [Guerrillas], with their offensive spirit and our control of the sea, could

\(^{44}\) Since his promotion in December, Vice-Admiral Andrewes had been senior to Rear-Admiral Smith, at that time CTF 95.1, and it was somewhat anomalous that he should be serving under the operational control of the junior officer. Therefore, Admiral Andrewes regarded the reason of this surprising appointment as ‘purely because of my own and Admiral Smith’s relative rank.’ ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 32, 16 February–15 March 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station’s letter FO2FE/2960/11, 31 March 1951, p. 3.

\(^{45}\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 4–5.

represent much more than a pin prick to the enemy on the west coast, given proper training, planning and logistics’.\textsuperscript{47}

Based on these positive positions, Captain Lloyd-Davies’s early endeavours to develop more active co-operation with the guerrillas were continued by subsequent CTE 95.12s. A prominent result was gained, firstly in their intelligence gathering. HMS \textit{Belfast} was able to contact more guerrilla groups via ROK Navy and collected more target information. In particular, intelligence from Captain Kim’s guerrilla group on Chodo-Sokto area was very useful, and as a result of extended intelligence sources, HMS \textit{Belfast} could get much target intelligence. On 28 February, Captain Sir Clair-Ford reported some of this received intelligence in his Report of Proceedings, as follows:

(a) 270 troops in Songyo-ri XC 5524  
(b) 15 men with one machine gun (caliber unknown) in a cave on hillside XC 4623  
(c) 40 troops just west of Hongga-ri XC 6524  
(d) About 700 troops are believed to be located in the area of Changyon XC 8435.  
(e) 270 troops in Soktan-ni XC 8166. They are probably there to check guerrilla activity by ROK forces operating from Ung-do.\textsuperscript{48}

As this report showed, this target information contained an approximation of enemy numbers and their location. It also indicated the probable purpose of the enemy activities. This was the most detailed target information for the Task Group’s gunfire and air strikes, which had been previously unavailable. Based on this information, HMS \textit{Belfast} carried out several direct bombardments on the enemy’s beach defensive positions and also conducted indirect bombardment using air-spotting from USS \textit{Bataan}, CTE 95.11.\textsuperscript{49} In addition, HMS \textit{Belfast}
passed on information which might be useful for air strikes to USS *Bataan*, and the aircraft also conducted bombardments on the guerrillas’ targets.\(^{50}\)

The issue of naval support for guerrilla raids was also discussed throughout this patrol period. In a meeting on 4 March, onboard HMS *Belfast* with Captain Kim (the Chodo-Sokto guerrilla leader), Captain Clair-Ford learned about the guerrilla leader and his agents’ previous mainland activities and was impressed by their considerable success. Therefore, after learning about further planned raids in the next few days, Captain Clair-Ford decided to support them. As HMS *Belfast* had soon to be relieved by HMS *Kenya*, he told Captain Kim to contact HMS *Kenya* to obtain naval and air support if required.\(^{51}\) At that time, Captain Kim’s guerrilla group was not controlled by any friendly authorities, which meant that CTE 95.12 would support guerrilla raids if required, not only under the ROK Navy, but also the uncontrolled groups.

Finally, during HMS *Kenya*’s patrol as CTE 95.12, the first gunfire support for the guerrilla raid was carried out. Following an urgent call from a ROKN craft on 8 March which was supporting a guerrilla landing on the mainland nearby Chodo, HMS *Kenya* proceeded to the area and supported with gunfire.\(^{52}\)

By early March, co-operation with the guerrillas became one of the main objectives of the Task Element. This can be confirmed by comments in Captain Brock’s final report of the Korean War. It stated that ‘During out last patrol, the main object, in addition to maintenance of the

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\(^{50}\) Amongst the target information received on 28 February A. A. guns in the town of Changyon area (XC 8435) were attacked by USS *Bataan*’s Corsairs: *Ibid.*, Appendix I.

\(^{51}\) *Ibid.*, 5 April 1951, Appendix I.

\(^{52}\) ADM 116/6218, HMS *Kenya*-Report of Proceedings 1 February to 14 March 1951, HMS *Kenya*, 5 April 1951, Appendix I.
blockade and discouraging renewed mine-laying, have been […] supporting the ROK’s [guerrillas] in this area.\textsuperscript{53}

However, after several relationships with the guerrillas by ROKN liaison, some significant problems were also clearly revealed. Primarily, these problems accrued from lack of a communication system. At that time, most of the guerrillas were not equipped with a proper radio system, therefore communication between the guerrillas and blockade ships was only able to be conducted by ROKN craft. Therefore, the way of collecting up-to-date information from the guerrillas was to proceed to friendly islands such as Chodo, Sokto and Paengyong-do with a ROK naval vessel. If they were not able to contact guerrilla leaders on the islands, however, intelligence was unavailable.\textsuperscript{54} Therefore, to pass information directly, a guerrilla leader in Chodo requested the supply of a wireless radio in his meeting with the CO of HMS \textit{Belfast}. Owing to the lack of radios in his Task Element, however, this request was not satisfied.\textsuperscript{55}

Due to this reason, TG 95.1’s timely and effective support for guerrilla activity also became largely limited. In fact, the first gunfire support for the guerrilla raid was not carried out smoothly. As mentioned in Captain Brock’s report, this support was conducted ‘in the absence of more information and co-ordination’, thus ‘a blind preliminary bombardment in the dark would be useless, if not dangerous to our allies’.\textsuperscript{56}

Naval air support for the guerrillas also caused a similar problem. From late February, CTE 95.11 received emergency calls from ROKN craft requesting air strikes for guerrillas. The commander of USS \textit{Bataan} also expressed his dissatisfaction in his Action Report as follows:

Requests from naval surface forces on the west coast for air spot services and immediate strikes against coastal targets frequently have been received with insufficient details to permit

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, para. 4.
\textsuperscript{56} ADM 116/6218, HMS \textit{Kenya}-Report of Proceedings 1 February to 14 March 1951, HMS \textit{Kenya}, 5 April 1951, Appendix I.
their being fulfilled promptly. Most frequently lacking are communications instructions, designation of the coordinating agency, strike clearance information, and time limitations.57

Both cases show that guerrilla support was conducted without appropriate communication, thus ineffective and dangerous support ensued.

However, supply of communication systems and direct connection with the guerrillas was not a proper solution for this problem as this supply might cause various guerrilla to increase the number of careless emergency calls made. Since there was still no appropriate authority to control and screen the various guerrilla activities, setting up direct communication would essentially cause an increase in unwanted diversions of blockade ships away from their main mission in order to support guerrilla activities of doubtful value.

In fact, by early March 1951, most guerrillas were still operating without proper command and control. Although the ROK Navy controlled some of the guerrillas, it was not possible to expect its staff to do more than support the several hundred guerrillas on Paengyong-do and maintaining irregular contact with several guerrilla groups scattered on the islands. It had no proper resources to organise large numbers of irregulars under a unified command and control system. Although, from mid-February, a detachment from EUSAK earnestly commenced guerrilla reorganisation based in Paengyong-do, it was not until mid-March that this American organisation established the command system of large groups of guerrillas.58 Therefore, large parts of guerrilla activities were conducted without the Task Group’s knowledge, and their calls for gunfire support were also received without any previous planning, screening or coordination.

58 On 14 March, by joining of Captain Kim’s guerrillas on Chodo, this American guerrilla organisation had grown to about 3,000 strength. U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, Part IV, p. 78; for more information, see sub-chapter 4.3.
The absence of authority was also problematic in that there were no proper means of controlling the guerrillas’ pursuit of their own private wars. As the guerrillas were North Korean irregulars with different motivations that were liable to engage in private conflicts, blockade ships needed to be very careful that any engagement of targets was not simply to support the private interests of guerrillas in carrying out rice raids or settling personal grudges against local North Koreans. In fact, there were some reports noting the guerrillas’ conduct in personal conflict, especially concerning rice raids.\textsuperscript{59}

Under this situation, blockade ships’ direct communication with the guerrillas could do more harm than good. Even before setting up of any the communication system with the guerrillas, in fact, these uncoordinated requests caused blockade forces to be diverted from their main mission. As the CO of USS \textit{Bataan} wrote, ‘apparently urgent requests have caused flights to be diverted from targets’ thus it ‘caused considerable inconvenience in the rescheduling of flights’.\textsuperscript{60} Diversions from the main mission were particularly frequent amongst ROK naval craft who maintained close contact with the guerrillas. This meant activities such as those concerning inshore blockades and anti-mine missions were often diverted from their primary duties.\textsuperscript{61} A more fundamental problem was that these activities conducted without Blockade Commanders’ knowledge essentially infringed the naval blockade, increasing the risk of possible accidents.\textsuperscript{62}


\textsuperscript{62} ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 30 at Sasebo, 17 January and 6 February 1951, pp. 5–6.
These limitations generated Admiral Andrewes’s prudent attitude towards close co-operation with the guerrillas. By watching several instances of co-operation, Andrewes was assured that without the establishment of proper authority to control and co-ordinate all the guerrilla activities, communication with the guerrillas might divert blockade ships’ attention towards these guerrilla activities which had doubtful value and motivation. In particular, he emphasised to his Task Group that the guerrillas must be involved only in programmed operations.63 In other words, he agreed with his Task Group’s co-operation with the guerrillas, if it was co-ordinated with TG 95.1, and its purpose was compatible with their missions. Due to these fundamental problems the early stage of co-operation with the irregulars faced great challenges.

One of the interesting points was that, notwithstanding fundamental problems, CTG 95.1 decided to continue direct relationship with these irregulars, albeit in a prudent manner. To the Blockade Commanders, it was imperative to maintain contact with the guerrillas who had potential value as a local intelligence team and raiding forces for the naval operation.

Fortunately, there was hopeful news for TG 95.1; the commencement of large-scale organisational changes amongst the guerrilla parties by the initiative of the EUSAK Headquarters. This initiative was to utilise them for behind line operations based in Paengyong-do. Admiral Andrewes also recognised these changes.64 With the hope of establishing appropriate authority to control the activities of the various guerrillas, he watched these changes carefully. However, his position on this reorganisation was very clear; avoid exerting any influence that might cause TG 95.1’s deeper involvement.65

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64 Admiral Andrewes recognised this organisational change at least during Captain Lloyd-Davies’s last patrol period. For more detailed information, see sub-chapter 4.4.
4.3 Code Name ‘Leopard ’: Guerrilla Reorganisation under the EUSAK

On 8 January, 1951, ten days after the report of the ROKN PF 61 regarding the activities of the guerrillas, the EUSAK headquarters in Taegu received a radio message from the CTG 95.7, charge of ROK Navy, stating that:

Incomplete info indicates majority reptd [reported] 10,000 volunteers in Hwanghae Province West of Haeju and Sariwon are armed with Japanese rifles model 99 and 38. Russian rifles type unknown and some US Carbines. Contact has been ordered to ascertain approx nmbrs [approximate numbers] each types. Suitable dropping site for air drops. Additional information, related subject, does EUSAK control any stocks Japanese ammunition. Believe many serviceable rifle are available which might be used by volunteer groups if ammunition could be made available.66

This message reported the existence and activity of voluntary irregulars with the request of ammunition supply. It contained very similar, but more specific information regarding the current situation of the guerrillas to the previously received report from the ROKN PF 61. However, the EUSAK headquarters’ reaction to this message was different compared to that of TG 95.1. EUSAK headquarters showed more interest in this rather cryptic message. Amongst the EUSAK staff who quickly recognised the guerrillas’ potential was Colonel John G. McGee, EUSAK G-2 staff and a veteran of guerrilla operations during the Second World War. Colonel McGee immediately sent a message to TG 95.7 asking about the weapons possessed by these guerrillas, the approximate number of these guerrillas and any other information that TG 95.7 could supply.67 On the same day McGee was able to receive a reply stating that the guerrillas were armed with ‘700 Russian rifles, 80 US rifles M1, 20 US Carbine, 200 Jap [Japanese]

67 Ibid., p. 72.
Model Niti 9, and 100 Jap [Japanese] Model 38’ with a request for ammunition for ‘100 rds [rounds] per rifle’.68

In fact, after the onset of war, Far East Command (FEC) had planned to organise unconventional warfare units to relieve the pressure on the UN forces from the NKPA. This was to be through guerrilla operations behind enemy lines. By the lead of FEC’s G-3 Miscellaneous Division, headed by Colonel McGee, a plan for guerrilla warfare was progressed.69 Initially, he considered the use of North Korean refugees in South Korea because guerrillas should be familiar with the layout of the land around their operational area in North Korea. However, after his visit to the thousands of North Korean refugees in Taegu and Pusan, he was disappointed in that they were not willing to return to their homeland as guerrillas.70 The only remaining hope was to try to connect with anti-Communist activities in North Korea. However, their activities were not well known to UN Headquarters at that time. And, on August 1950, his plan for unconventional warfare was cancelled.71

The concern over guerrilla warfare was reignited in late 1950, as the front line temporarily stabilised around the 37th parallel. This was because of the EUSAK’s belief that the guerrillas’ amphibious raid on the rear side of the enemy would cause effective harassment on the concentration of the North Korean and Chinese Armies on the front line. In the situation where UN forces were badly outnumbered by the NKPA and CCF, a new attempt to relieve the pressure from the Communist forces was essential.72

68 Ibid., p. 73.
69 At that time, McGee was a head of FEC’s G-3. Malcom, White Tigers, p. 15.
72 Seibert, The Regulars, p. 189.
Therefore, a message from the TG 95.7 that arrived early January was very timely in that it acted as an accelerator for the organisation of guerrilla units. McGee started to plan an operation for these poorly trained guerrillas. By 13 January, McGee quickly made a plan for unconventional warfare and reported to FEC through a memorandum, in order to deploy resources to these anti-Communists.\(^{73}\)

On 15 January, FEC authorised the formation of the Attrition Section within the Miscellaneous Division (later 8086\(^{th}\) Army) of G-3. For the first step of the guerrilla operation, McGee assigned Major William A. Burke as his executive officer, and then he ordered Burke to secure war supplies for the guerrilla operation. Led by Major Burke, an armour officer of FEC G-3, a US Army group headed for Pusan to scrounge rice, and capture ammunitions, weapons and radios for the guerrillas. These war supplies were loaded on the ROK Naval craft which headed for Paengyong-do. Burke supplied his shipments to the guerrillas on Paengyong-do for use in defending the island, not for their guerrilla operation because he was not able to contact forces on the mainland.\(^{74}\) However, he was able to collect specific first-hand information from the guerrillas on the island. On Paengyong-do, Burke conducted interrogations with his staff officer, and gathered information of the current situation on Paengyong-do. In particular, by contacting each guerrilla leader, they collected details on the strength, equipment, supply needs and other valuable information on each group.\(^{75}\) Simultaneously, Burke started searching for a guerrilla headquarters base amongst the islands on the west coast from which partisans could launch raids behind enemy lines. He was able to find an optimal place on Paengnyong-do.\(^{76}\)


\(^{74}\) Evanhoe, *Dark Moon*, pp. 38–9.


As McGee approved Paengnyong-do for the headquarters, the follow-up procedure was being conducted. Major Burke was assigned the commander of headquarters, named Task Force WILLIAM ABLE, and he assembled his staff containing five members; that is three officers, one staff sergeant and a private. Simultaneously, based on Plan ABLE, initially contrived by McGee and later revised by Burke, they outlined the operational plan for guerrillas. According to this plan, command and control over guerrillas would be handled by the EUSAK Headquarters in Taegu. Also, co-ordination with naval forces on the west coast for guerrilla support would be conducted by the FEC. To make up for the guerrillas’ lack of military experience, the establishment of bases for the training of intelligence gathering, demolitions, communications and basic infantry tactics were to be started on the offshore islands. It was planned that these guerrillas would be commanded by an American officer responsible for all guerrilla training and operations, as well as the use of all United Nations radio nets. Supply to the guerrillas was a self-help based system once the initial requirements had been supplied. Therefore, the guerrillas had to depend on themselves for their supplies, such as food and equipment, in the course of their operation. This plan also specified the main purpose for the guerrilla operation as follows:

The first phase envisaged the training of partisan cadres on the secure island bases available. These cadres were then to be sent back behind enemy lines to form cell units that could organize other local dissidents. It was also anticipated that they would be able to gather intelligence and perform sabotage missions of a covert nature. The second phase of the plan contemplated the use of these partisans in conjunction with a UN offensive to the north in the spring of 1951. The interior partisan cells were to be sufficiently well organized by that time so that when supplied on a large scale they could expand into a strong force in support of the regular UN effort. Two types of units were conceived a ‘base unit’ and a ‘mobile unit.’ The base units were to train partisans and stage attacks from island bases and be capable of

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78 Regarding the full text of the Plan ABLE, see Appendix 5.
infiltrating men to the enemy rear. The mobile units were to operate on the mainland behind the lines and be capable of supporting themselves in the interior.  

Based on this plan, the EUSAK’s primary purpose did not directly coincide with the Blockade Commanders’ expectation that this organisation would act as a controller and co-ordinator of all guerrilla activities and became a valuable intelligence source for the naval blockade operation. As mentioned above, this American organisation’s main purpose was neither for introducing an additional intelligence agency nor for the proper co-ordination with TG 95.1. In particular, since the start of second phase of plan which intended to use the guerrillas for the support of the UN ground forces’ offensive operation, the guerrillas’ relationship with the blockade ships would be largely restricted. However, at least during the first phase of plan, the possibility was opened between the two groups for better co-operation, particularly in the intelligence supply and co-ordination with naval forces. During the guerrillas’ activities to form inland ‘cell units’, enemy intelligence was expected to be collected as a by-product. The need of co-ordination with friendly naval forces on the west coast for guerrilla support also essentially required closer relationship with TG 95.1.

From early February 1951, Burke tried to contact local guerrilla leaders in earnest. During his short tour to the islands on the west coast, he was encouraged, as he found around 2,000 guerrillas scattered on the island. He met some of their leaders and explained the Plan ABLE. Colonel McGee also visited Paengyong-do and met guerrilla leaders. There, he informed them that the ‘Eighth United States Army and its United Nations members were now preparing another advance into North Korea which would liberate their people’. He urged them ‘of the

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81 Ibid., pp. 40–1.
need for guerrilla help in the form of raids, ambushes, information, assistance to downed airmen and support of the final liberating advance.’

On 15 February, the date of arrival to Paenyon-do of the WILLAM ABLE staff, Burke was able to accomplish a tangible result. A guerrilla group of thirty-seven members from Sinchon led by Chang Jae Hwa agreed to be the first subunit of the EUSA. They had been members of the intelligence corps of the ROK Navy since mid-January and had worked with them before they decided to work with the American organisation. Subsequently, twenty-six members from Changyon, led by Chang Sok Lin, became an additional subunit from 6 March. On 14 March, one of the largest groups of up to 2,500 members led by Captain Kim Jongbyuk joined. Almost two weeks later, another large group of 800 student guerrillas from Sunwi-do, Owhado and Kirin-do also became a unit of this new American organisation.

Immediately following recruitment of the first guerrilla unit, 15 days of demolitions and communications training followed. After the start of the training, the guerrilla members suggested the names of the overall unit and the subunits respectively ‘Leopard’ and ‘Donkey’. As a symbol of a stealthy and speedy hunter, the name of ‘leopard’ reflected their desired way of operating. The origins of the Donkey relate to the donkey-shaped generator for the radio. A guerrilla member was responsible for this name which was based on a whim. As Burke approved these names, Task Force WILLAM ABLE changed their name to Leopard, and subunits became Donkey 1, 2, 3 etc.

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83 Ibid.
84 ‘The Narrative of the Leader of Donkey 1, Mr. Chang Jae Hwa. 4 Nov 1952’, in U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, Part IV, p. 68.
85 ‘The Narrative of Me Pak Choll, Leader of Donkey 4, 3 Nov 1952’, in Ibid., Part IV, p. 78.
86 Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, p. 266.
88 ‘The Narrative of the Leader of Donkey 1, Mr. Chang Jae Hwa. 4 Nov 1952’, in Ibid., Part IV, p. 68.
89 Evanhoe, Dark Moon, p. 46.
91 Evanhoe, Dark Moon, p. 46.
On 3 March, the first guerrilla unit was sent to the mainland with radio contact to obtain intelligence on enemy activities. The American-led guerrilla base *Leopard* initiated its activities in earnest.

### 4.4 The Development of Co-Operation with the *Leopard* Organisation

TG 95.1 recognised the guerrillas’ organisational changes led by the EUSAK on Paengyong-do, at least from mid-February. During Captain Lloyd-Davies’s last patrol in Korea, he supplied ammunition for guerrillas by the request from the EUSAK. He also tried to contact Major Burke to confer with him about the plan for deploying the guerrillas. Although he was not able to meet Major Burke who being in Pusan at that time, records show that TG 95.1 was well aware of the EUSAK’s plan for utilising the guerrilla.

The Blockade Commanders formed a direct relationship with this American organisation right after the start of its first guerrilla unit’s activity. Based on the operational record of HMS *Belfast*, blockade ships collected intelligence from *Leopard* Headquarters for the preparation of a feint landing operation planned on 5 March 1951. However, except for this intelligence gathering, they did not show any further action for closer co-operation with this organisation. Their attitude towards this American organisation was one of prudent observation rather than being actively involved. As mentioned in a previous section, the Blockade Commanders tried not to

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92 ‘The Narrative of the Leader of Donkey 1, Mr. Chang Jae Hwa. 4 Nov 1952’, in U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, Part IV, p. 68.
93 Captain Lloyd-Davies said in his interview with IWM that ‘Before I’m leaving Korea […] particularly my ship was a cruiser supplied them [guerrillas] automatic weapons and ammunition’; IWM Interview 9380, Lloyd-Davies, Cromwell Felix Justin, Part 2.
95 ADM 116/6211, HMS *Belfast*-Report of Proceedings 22 February to 6 March, para. 28; this feint landing was planned on south of Taedong River to relieve enemy pressure on the main military front by direction from Admiral Andrewes. It was not possible to carry out this plan due to the heavy gales. Regarding the records of this feint landing, see *Ibid.*, paras 20-30.
be deeply involved with guerrilla activities, and they were mindful of any of infringement of the US Army’s primary responsibility for these irregulars.\textsuperscript{96}

It was the EUSAK Headquarters’ official request for naval support in early March for the guerrilla operation which caused the Blockade Commanders’ to become more actively involved in Leopard’s activity. On 8 March, a message received from the EUSAK Headquarter to CTF 95 stated; ‘Request RN Officer your TF [TF 95] visit this HQ for conference on support friendly guerrilla activities Western Coastal area.’\textsuperscript{97} Via this message, arrangements were initiated for applying naval co-operation with the Leopard organisation.

Admiral Andrewes replied the next day stating that he wanted to hold a conference onboard HMS Belfast on 14 March and requested the EUSAK to send representatives.\textsuperscript{98} Concurrently, he arranged for the CO, HMS Belfast to make contact with representatives of the EUSAK and the ROK Navy, to improve and secure communications.\textsuperscript{99} During his patrol period between 12 and 21 March, Captain Clair-Ford paid closer attention to Chinnampo-Haeju and the nearby islands to clarify the guerrillas’ activities, using special reference to the guerrillas’ command and organisational change.\textsuperscript{100} Simultaneously, on 14 March, he held a meeting onboard which was attended by Colonel McGee and Colonel Thompson of the 1st Corps, the CO of USS Eldorado (CTG 90.1) as well as officers from his own ship. In this conference, Captain Clair-Ford required as complete information as possible about the guerrilla groups on

\textsuperscript{96} ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 12 to 21 March, HMS Belfast, 24 March 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 5 April 1951.
\textsuperscript{97} U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086th Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, Supporting Document, p. 50.
\textsuperscript{98} CTG 95.1 replied that ‘CTE 95.12 in Belfast with Lieutenant Commander Archibald from my staff will arrive Inchon AM 14 March. Propose you send Representatives to conference on board Belfast at 1000 14 March’: \textit{Ibid.}, p. 51.
the islands off the Hwanghae Province. As a result of this request, the current situation of friendly guerrillas in the west coast was given by Colonel McGee as follows:

1) Area controlled by guerrillas now operating under control of EUSAK and CTG 95.7 include all islands off the Hwanghae peninsula from Han Estuary to Sokto Island at the mouth of Taedong River. Three friendly groups are located on the peninsula.
2) Strength is estimated as 12,000.
3) Communication is by means of radio. One net from Paengyong-do to stations on Chodo and mainland. The other net from Island to EUSAK.
4) Arms in hands of friendly guerrillas is estimated at approximately 1,000 rifles and a few crew served weapons.
5) The guerrilla mission of initial covert small attrition actions against enemy supply system and subsequently, on arming, for an overt supporting effort to an attack of the Eight Army.\footnote{U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086th Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, Supporting Document, pp. 50–1.}

The conference also discussed the problem of liaison, communication and intelligence dissemination between the EUSAK, TG 95.1, I Corps and the ROK Navy and Marines. It ended with the following conclusions:

The blockade fleet will periodically put ashore at Paengyong-do a boat to contact Major Burke and secure intelligence of the Hwanghae Area. If it becomes necessary a liaison officer from blockade fleet will be placed on Paengyong-do. The possibility of netting the Island Radio with the blockade fleet will be considered.\footnote{Ibid., p. 51.}

Through this conference, they were able to draw general agreements in regard to the way of co-operation with the \textit{Leopard} organisation. Unlike the Blockade Commanders’ previous relationships with the guerrillas, which had been maintained based on their personal discretion, the first step toward systemic co-operation was taken by the establishment of the American guerrilla organisation.

Based on this early co-operation system, their way of co-operation developed rapidly. In particular, from late March, meaningful results ensued in four different areas; intelligence
supply, guerrilla use for naval operation, naval support for guerrilla activity and co-ordination of guerrilla movement. Needless to say, these developments also directly influenced the pattern of western naval forces’ operation.

Intelligence Supply from the Leopard

One of the most impressive accomplishments of the above-mentioned meetings was the improvement of intelligence supply from the guerrillas. Firstly, as an attempt had been made by the EUSAK to get an appropriate authority to control the activities of the various guerrilla groups, the process of collecting information became simpler and more systematic. Starting from the guerrilla party from Sinchon, most of the guerrillas, which were under the control of ROKN, gradually integrated into the command and control of the Leopard organisation. Moreover, irregulars who were operating independently, such as Captain Kim’s guerrillas on Chodo, were also accepted under the control of this American organisation. Therefore, ships of TE 95.12 could gather intelligence covering a wide range of area from one resource, Leopard Headquarters on Paengyong-do, very effectively.

The amount and quality of intelligence received from Leopard also increased considerably. From early March, after a short period of training, Leopard’s Headquarters deployed guerrillas on the mainland to obtain intelligence. They employed a radio system which was netted with the high-powered radio on the Paengyong-do Base. This was in accordance with the order from Major Burke to concentrate on intelligence gathering during the initial stage of the guerrilla operation. Lack of experience and training in conducting traditional guerrilla

103 Most of Guerrillas under the control of ROKN joined Leopard until April 1951. In August, the last guerrilla group operated under ROK Navy to garrison Paengyong-do became Donkey-13. ‘The Narrative of Mr Kim Chang Song, Leader of Donkey 13’, 3 November 1952, in U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, Part IV, p. 117.
operations also led the guerrillas to focus on the relatively easy work of collecting information.\textsuperscript{105}

As a result, from early April, the Task Element 95.12 received a large number of target intelligence reports from the \textit{Leopard} Headquarters by signals or hand messages. For example, between 16 and 30 April during HMS \textit{Belfast}’s patrol as CTE 95.12, more than sixty target information items were received covering the overall area of Hwanghae Province. This information covered intelligence on enemy’s offshore activities, such as floating mine laying and small boat movements, and also mainland activities such as troop movement, the location of enemy Battalion Headquarters and A. A. gun positions.

HMS \textit{Belfast} conducted gunfire bombardments based on this target intelligence and also passed on information of possible interest to CTE 95.11, HMS \textit{Theseus} and USS \textit{Bataan}.\textsuperscript{106} The Carrier Borne Air Liaison Officer of HMS \textit{Theseus} made the following comments regarding the supply of \textit{Leopard} targets:

\begin{quote}
We are now receiving […] rather more intelligence information, from the ROK agents and naval patrols, of enemy activities, positions and movements, chiefly in the area West of a line from Haeju to Chinnampo. […] some of it is very useful, and justifies recces and strikes by us. Some of today’s targets were planned on this ROK intelligence material.\textsuperscript{107}
\end{quote}

The CO of USS \textit{Bataan} also expressed his satisfaction in his report about \textit{Leopard} targets, saying that ‘intelligence received from ROK sources through CTE 95.12 has been exceptionally accurate and detailed’.\textsuperscript{108} His comments showed that it was not only the amount but also the

\textsuperscript{105} The ORO study mentioned the background of the guerrillas as follows: ‘Few of the partisans had any military training and most of them were young, in the age group between 17 and 26. They appear to have been drawn essentially from student groups, anti-Communist youth organizations, white-collar workers, and landowning families.’ Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 76.

\textsuperscript{106} ADM 116/6211, HMS \textit{Belfast}-Report of Proceedings 16 to 30 April 1951, HMS \textit{Belfast}, 4 May 1951, Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{107} WO 281/1201, NO. 63 Carrier Borne Air Liaison Section, HMS “\textit{Theseus}”: War Diary for the period 1 March to 31 March 1951, pp. 16–17.

quality of intelligence which improved radically during this period. In particular, the *Leopard’s* timely intelligence supply increased in quality. The supply of radio equipment to the guerrillas and the establishment of communication system with the *Leopard* Headquarters largely reduced the time for intelligence delivery. This US captain’s following comments clearly showed this development; ‘At first this information was received several days late, but since the establishment of Major Burke on Paengyong-do it has been very timely’.109

Blockade ships’ endeavour to obtain the latest intelligence also improved intelligence supply from the *Leopard*. As the majority of target intelligence was usually passed directly by Major Burke or his staff officers’ hand messages, the blockade fleets tried to contact American officers on Paengyong-do as frequently as possible. During his patrol as CTE 95.12 from 10 to 17 April, HMAS *Warramunga* instructed ROK craft under his command to concentrate on collecting up-to-date intelligence from *Leopard* officers.110 HMAS *Belfast*, the subsequent CTE 95.12 visited the *Leopard* base four times to contact with *Leopard* officers. As Captain Clair-Ford commented, to the Blockade Commanders, ‘It is essential to keep in close touch with this most valuable source of information.’111

In fact, according to the EUSAK Headquarters’ plan for the Guerrilla Warfare, intelligence gathering was a by-product of guerrilla operations. Although there was an agreement between TG 95.1 and *Leopard* regarding the dissemination of intelligence, it was not the American officers’ duty to supply all the information acquired by their guerrilla agents. Moreover, the *Leopard* organisation was planned to use the guerrillas for the EUSAK’s premised offensive on

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111 ADM 116/6211, HMS *Belfast*-Report of Proceedings 16 to 30 April 1951, para. 16.
spring 1951. Therefore, when there was additional direction from the EUSAK, the *Leopard* had to shift their activity from current intelligence gathering to offensive operation.

The inauguration of this offensive phase, however, had to be delayed due to the CCF’s Spring Offensive between April and May 1951. Therefore, during this period, the EUSAK Headquarters made no additional directions requiring the guerrillas’ change of current activities.\textsuperscript{112} Instead, interestingly, they directed the *Leopard* Headquarters to put more emphasis on the target information for the Naval Forces in mid-April.\textsuperscript{113}

Therefore, the task of intelligence supply to the ships of TG 95.1 was left to American officers’ discretion who were controlling the guerrillas. Although it was not their duty to supply all the information gathered by their guerrillas, *Leopard* officers were very co-operative in supplying information for naval craft. This was largely due to each naval commander’s endeavours to build good relationships with *Leopard* officers. To collect the latest information available, ships of TEs needed to visit *Leopard* Headquarters frequently. When collecting this intelligence, they provided *Leopard* officers with special services such as warm baths, western-style meals, hot coffees and mail deliveries in recognition of *Leopard*’s efforts.\textsuperscript{114} These officers were living in poor conditions on the islands.\textsuperscript{115} At least to ‘get a cup of coffee and a decent meal aboard ship’, American officers preferred to supply intelligence to the blockade ships in person.\textsuperscript{116}

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\textsuperscript{112} The ORO study wrote that there were no other comprehensive plans directed from the EUSAK Headquarters by late 1951. Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{113} ‘Misc Correspondence File’, 8240 AU Files, 1951, memorandum, Ltr, Lt Col Koster to Maj Burke, 11 Apr 1951 in *Ibid*.
\textsuperscript{115} The *Leopard* Headquarters office was an old ‘mud-and-wood building’, which had no western-style amenities. This building had been used as the fish market before the start of the war. American officers’ main diet was the ‘usual army-issue meat-and-potatoes’. Malcom, *White Tigers*, pp. 44–6.
\textsuperscript{116} Meyers, *Thunder in the Morning Calm*, p. 151.
\end{flushleft}
Based on this friendly relationship with *Leopard* officers, a more developed way of co-operation in their intelligence supply was achieved from May 1951, involving *Leopard*’s supply of ‘After Bombardment reports’ for the British Task Group. It was not clear from when TG 95.1 started to receive these reports from *Leopard*. Based on the operational records of Task Elements which mention these, it can be estimated that *Leopard* started to supply such to CTE 95.11 from May and to CTE 95.12 from mid-June. These reports obtained by *Leopard* agents on the mainland contained brief information about the number of enemy casualties and number of houses and equipment destroyed by friendly bombardments.

This report was only used when there were guerrilla agents close to target areas, to act as observers; and mainly these guerrillas were also the initial providers of target intelligence. Due to the fact that this target intelligence for naval gunfire was mostly obtained by guerrillas based on the friendly islands, and that they usually stayed on the mainland for a limited time, the results of gunfire bombardments were not reported frequently — even though the majority of target intelligence was supplied for the blockade fleets. However, in case of air strike targets, this was different. They were mainly obtained by guerrilla unit detachments on the mainland, and guerrillas had hiding places around the target areas. Therefore, they could more easily check the results of bombardments. Hence, regardless of the relatively small numbers, Task Element 95.11 was able to receive ‘After Bombardment Reports’ quite regularly.

Pilots generally regarded these guerrillas’ reports as being effective; not only were they morale boosters, but they were also useful for training purposes to correct their previous mistakes. The

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118 HMS *Kenya* received a report after bombardment that read ‘one of the 6-inch shoots at a target well inland killed 5 North Korean soldiers, wounded three, and destroyed several houses which were used as billets’. *Ibid.*
CO of USS Bataan wrote in his report about his pilots’ satisfaction over the Leopard’s ‘After Bombardment Reports’ as follows:

Target information received from covert sources during this and previous operating periods proved to be both accurate and useful [...] Covert sources often reported results of attacks on the targets they had recommended. These reports were always heartening to the pilots who so often never learned whether their efforts had been really productive. They also provided a basis for correcting mistakes in technique or arming which may have been made in executing attacks.\(^{119}\)

By the end of June, Leopard’s intelligence supply system became very stable. It set a standard for the validity of target information for the Task Group. According to Major Burke, all targets were to be reported every seven days, and therefore, any target more than seven days old from the date of the intelligence report was obsolete. If the enemy were still in their reported position, Leopard was to report the targets again.\(^{120}\)

In addition to the stability, the amount of target information consistently increased. This was largely due to the considerable increase of enemy activity in the area from mid-June.\(^{121}\) An additional direction from the Eighth Army Headquarters on 22 June, which instructed the Leopard to place more emphasis on the intelligence supply for the Naval Forces, also caused increases in the number of Leopard targets.\(^{122}\) Faced with an upsurge of Leopard intelligence, blockade ships had to be discerning with respect to bombardment targets in order to use limited ammunition most effectively.\(^{123}\)

The CO of HMS Cardigan Bay’s comments showed this development very clearly:


\(^{120}\) ADM 116/6212, HMS Black Swan-Report of Proceedings, 17 to 24 June 1951, the Captain (F), Third Frigate Flotilla, HMS Black Swan, 2 July 1951, Appendix B.

\(^{121}\) Admiral Scott-Moncrieff regarded this increased enemy activity as caused as a result of guerrilla’s active amphibious raids on the Hwanghae area. ADM 116/6212, HMS Cardigan Bay-Report of Proceedings, 24 June to 4 July 1951, para. 7, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 4 August 1951.

\(^{122}\) ‘Misc Correspondence File’, 8240 AU Files, 1951, memorandum, Ltr, Lt Col Koster to Maj Burke, 22 Jun 1951.

\(^{123}\) ADM 116/6212, HMS Cardigan Bay-Report of Proceedings, 24 June to 4 July 1951, para. 7, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 4 August 1951.
The excellent communication system which forms a part of the Leopard organisation proved invaluable in providing a wealth of up to date enemy intelligence. This enable air strikes and ship bombardment to be directed, not only at permanent targets, but also at enemy positions very shortly after they had been established.\textsuperscript{124}

Although the period of co-operation between TG 95.1 and Leopard was very short, they had been producing excellent results in their intelligence supply system. In particular, this enabled the naval forces’ active and effective attack against the Communist forces and allowed the maintenance of a close naval blockade, which were nearly impossible during 1950. Considering the intelligence related problem which this blockade naval forces had experienced during the first six months of the Korean War, the current intelligence gathering system was apparently invaluable and a satisfactory accomplishment for the blockade ships.

\textbf{Guerrilla Use for Naval Operation}

TG 95.1’s co-operation with the Leopard organisation was not limited to passive intelligence gathering. Under the initiative of the Blockade Commanders, more active ways of utilising the Leopard agents were also planned and carried out.

From the end of April, TG 95.1 started to use Leopard agents more actively to collect information. For instance, on 21 April, the ROKN PC 703 fired four shots on a gun position on the mainland during her inshore patrol around the Monggumpo Peninsula. Because of bad weather PC 703 was not able to find the exact location of this gun position. Therefore, Task Element asked Leopard to send his agents to spot the gun. Leopard reported on 27 April that two large guns were at the base of the hill on the Monggumpo Peninsula at XC 593252. After

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., para. 14.
discussion with *Leopard*, this target intelligence was passed to HMS *Glory*, which relieved HMS *Theseus* for the first patrol as CTE 95.11.  

A more active guerrilla use for TG 95.1’s operation was conducted during late May. In the course of preparing Operation ASHCAN, a demonstration landing operation planned on 20 May, *Leopard* agents were used not only to obtain enemy information, but also to spread rumours amongst the enemy. As the Chinese offensive started once again from mid-May, Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, who succeeded Admiral Andrewes from early April as CTG 95.1, thought that a feint landing might play a very useful part in relieving pressure on the front line. Right after the approval from Admiral Martin, Commander Naval Forces, Far East, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff proceeded to the west coast to conduct the operations.  

His plan in the first place provided for the spreading of ‘vague and nebulous rumours’, through the *Leopard* organisation, of an impending landing. A conference was held onboard CTE 95.11, HMS *Glory* between the Element Commanders and Major Burke regarding guerrilla deployment, and it became clear that *Leopard* was to agree with CTG 95.1’s intention. Therefore, Major Burke ordered his mainland guerrillas to spread this rumour.  

During a preliminary bombardment on 20 May, pilots of HMS *Glory* reported an increase of flack around the planned landing area. They also reported that there was a new sign laid out near the selected area, reading ‘Welcome UN Army’. *Leopard*’s activities seemed to yield some practical results in terms of the enemy movement.

125 ADM 116/6211, HMS *Belfast*-Report of Proceedings 16 to 30 April 1951, Appendix I.  
126 As Vice-Admiral Andrewes, who was CTF 95 at that time, was relieved by Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, Admiral Smith retook the command of CTF 95 from 3 April 1951 and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff became CTG 95.1. ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 33–Final Report of Vice-Admiral Andrewes, 16 March–10 April 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station’s letter FO2FE/2960/11, 10 April 1951, p. 7.  
After the end of this demonstration, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff wrote regarding the result of the feint landing that ‘It is clear at any rate that the enemy has decided to patrol this piece of coast more actively.’ He also wrote about the satisfaction of ‘admirable liaison with the Leopard organisation, should give us even more opportunities to harass him [the Communist forces].’

Unlike the intelligence supply system which established a stable and regular based relationship, these more active attempts were, by their nature, conducted sporadically. This co-operation, however, was a significant step towards the development in the relationship between TG 95.1 and the guerrillas insomuch as it went beyond passive intelligence collecting, with CTG 95.1 starting to use the guerrillas more actively with satisfactory liaison with the Leopard Headquarters. This also allowed the western naval forces’ operation against the Communists to be more bold and active.

**Naval Support for Guerrilla Activity**

As mentioned in sub-chapter 4.2, guerrillas’ uncontrolled and careless emergency calls for naval gunfire or aircraft support were problematic to the blockade ships before the emergence of Leopard. As these calls could not only harm to the naval forces’ routine operations but also lessened their effective support, the Blockade Commanders were dissatisfied with this disorganised and unscreened guerrilla support system.

In fact, due to their unpredictability, most of emergency calls from the guerrillas could not be discussed with the blockade ships in advance. Therefore, the improvement that could be gained in this area was quite simple; setting up a unified single communication channel in asking for and directing naval support. This was to reduce any unscreened emergency calls and

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uncontrolled naval deployment. This was also for timely and effective naval support. Fortunately, this problem had largely reduced since the emergence of the *Leopard* organisation.

The *Leopard* Headquarters’ establishment of a communication system with each *Donkey* unit itself intensified the control of the guerrillas’ careless emergency calls. As each guerrilla unit’s radio system was directly net with their Headquarters, to ask for naval support, each guerrilla unit had to report to Major Burke’s staff on Paengyong-do. Due to this unified communication system for requesting naval commitment, each guerrilla’s careless emergency call could be primarily screened by the American officers. This also enabled more correct and timely information about the guerrillas’ emergency situation. This was due to the *Leopard*’s direct communication system with guerrilla parties on the mainland.

On top of that, an additional endeavour to have a specific procedure for naval support was made. On 17 March, Captain Clair-Ford established contact with the American Army officers at Techong-do. This was attended by Major Burke, Commander Lee, ROK Navy and Captain V. C. Begg, RN (D.8). In this meeting, the procedure asking for naval support was co-ordinated. They agreed that every request for naval support must be received by CTE 95.12 and then disseminated to appropriate ships of the Task Elements. This was to minimise the unintended blockade naval forces’ diversion from their main task, in particular, the ships of the ROK Navy patrolling the inshore area.

As a result of this meeting, *Leopard*’s call for support was immediately received, and on 19 March, Major Burke asked HMS *Belfast* for an air strike on the mainland (Namha-ri). This was immediately passed to USS *Bataan*, CTE 95.11, who promptly launched the air strike. Almost

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131 ADM 116/6211, HMS *Belfast*-Report of Proceedings 12 to 21 March 1951, para. 13: Actual agreements with the *Leopard* Headquarters for naval gunfire and air strikes in support of guerrilla operations was made on 25 March 1951. This was largely based on the agreed results of a meeting on 17 March. Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, Appendix: Chronology of Partisan Campaign.
two hours after the request, Major Burke reported that the results were very satisfactory.\textsuperscript{132} The first successful naval support was made as a consequence of the consultation with the \textit{Leopard} organisation.

There was also a development of co-ordination concerning the naval support of guerrilla raids. Guerrilla raids conducted without consultation with the Blockade Commander were problematic before the emergence of \textit{Leopard}. Unlike emergency calls, which were unpredictable, naval support for guerrilla raids could be planned with blockade ships in advance. However, during guerrilla raid support on 8 March 1951, naval support was carried out without any prior co-ordination, thus totally ineffective and dangerous support was conducted.

This problem was placed in a state of suspended animation until mid-June because there were few raids during the early stage of \textit{Leopard}’s organisation. This was due to the guerrillas’ lack of experience and that the EUSAK’s instructions directed them to focus on intelligence gathering duties. This problem re-emerged from mid-June, as a number of small \textit{Leopard} organised mainland raids commenced in earnest. As before, the problem was that these raids were conducted without prior consultation with the CO of TE 95.12. Although HMS \textit{Cardigan Bay} heard by chance of two of these raids during its patrol period and was able to support one of them, such uncoordinated raids were not welcomed by the British Task Group.\textsuperscript{133}

Therefore, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff instructed CO of HMS \textit{Ceylon} (Captain G. A. Thring) to convene with \textit{Leopard} Headquarters to confer as to the need of prior notification for intended raids. \textit{Ceylon} anchored at Techong-do on 5 July 1951, and a meeting was held with \textit{Mounts}


\textsuperscript{133} The first, consisting of 150 men launched from Chodo and was reported by chance a few hours before of the raid. By the request of guerrillas, privately ROKN PF 62 also supported this raid. The second raid, to the east of Haeju, was heard about too late even to consider naval assistance. ADM 116/6212, HMS \textit{Cardigan Bay}-Report of Proceedings, 24 June to 4 July 1951, para. 16.
Bay, Whitesand Bay, PF 62 and Leopard’s representative (Captain Jacobsen). During this meeting Captain Jacobsen agreed with the requirements to ‘keep CTE 95.12 informed in advance of such operations so that any possible air and sea bombardment would not endanger his forces, and in order that such support as could be given by CTE 95.12 would be forthcoming’.  

As a result of this meeting, a properly coordinated guerrilla raid was immediately conducted. On the same day, HMS Whitesand Bay supported one of Leopard’s raids. It landed at night from junks and attacked a small village containing enemy troops. During this operation, HMS Whitesand Bay was able to fire at some targets indirectly, using spotting from the ROK Marines who carried portable W/T sets. Although there were some difficulties with the timing of the landing from junks, the guerrilla raid on the mainland was quite successful.  

Since the start of naval support of guerrilla activities from late February 1951, the first prior coordinated raid was conducted under gunfire support from the blockade forces. This also meant the establishment of a unique naval-guerrilla amphibious co-operation system in the west which was maintained during the remaining period of the war.

Co-ordination of Guerrilla Movements

Unlike the above mentioned three co-operative areas, the co-ordination between the British Task Group and Leopard in regards to guerrillas’ intended inshore movements experienced difficulties with un-notified activities of craft by Leopard guerrillas. As mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, the Commanders of TG 95.1 had been watching the emergence of the

135 Ibid., para. 13.
Leopard organisation with the hope that this American organisation would act as an authority to co-ordinate the various activities of the guerrillas. This was because a stable blockade on the west coast could not be accomplished without proper co-ordination with the irregulars’ movements.¹³⁶

In spite of the Blockade Commanders’ expectation, however, the Leopard organisation was not able to work as a proper co-ordinator of guerrilla movements. This was mainly due to the Leopard Headquarters’ lack of control over their guerrillas. Although most of the guerrillas joined this American organisation spontaneously, it did not mean that they totally complied with the Leopard Headquarters’ instructions.

According to Donald A. Seibert, who was a former advisor of Donkey 3 and Donkey 13, American officers’ control could only be exerted through the leaders of the guerrillas. He wrote that ‘in no sense did I command the pack’.¹³⁷ Each guerrilla leader recruited and led men from a particular region of North Korea with which he and they were familiar. Many members of the Donkey units, thus, had been friends before the war. This enhanced unit integrity and cohesion, but restrained the influence of US advisors because the guerrillas naturally associated themselves with their leaders. Therefore, most of the final decisions regarding their operations and activities were made by the respective leaders, and the US advisors could merely suggest operations or discourage ‘questionable operations’. The only penalty US advisors could impose was reducing supplies, such as rice, ammunition and clothing.¹³⁸

American officers were not allowed to accompany guerrilla activities on the mainland before early May 1952, as US officers could not be sure of their safety due to the uncertainty of

¹³⁸ Ibid.
guerrilla loyalty. Hence it was almost impossible for Leopard officers to have complete information on guerrilla activities. Their role in the guerrilla organisation was administrative or concerned with logistics, rather than commanding each Donkey Unit. Moreover, although they had information of guerrilla movements, these plans could easily be changed because of weather condition and the tide. Thus, even guerrilla movements reported to the Blockade Commanders, were easily changed without knowledge.

Due to the very nature of the guerrillas and their Headquarters’ broad control, there had been fundamental limitations to obtaining proper information of all guerrilla activities in the blockade area. The Blockade commanders also recognised the problems of the guerrillas and the Leopard organisation. This can be seen in the CO of HMS Cardigan Bay’s report on 4 July 1951 as follows:

This apparently chaotic state of affairs is due [...] partly by the nature of guerrilla activities themselves. Leopard himself is doing what he can [...] but the latter seems to be more or less inevitable [...] the majority of the activities of his large guerrilla force are necessarily controlled by broad directives which are implemented by the units concerned as and when circumstances permit.

Due to these fundamental problems in building a proper co-ordination system, as an indirect method to reduce expected unpleasant results, an alternative was tried; the introduction of identification procedures between the two groups.

In fact, there were some practical results achieved between these two groups regarding ways of identification. As mentioned in sub-chapter 4.1, uncoordinated activities were dangerous as

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139 According to the ORO study, American officers began to participate in guerrilla raids on the mainland from 1 May 1952. ‘CHRONOLOGY OF PARTISAN CAMPAIGN’, Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, Appendix E, p. 156. Regarding the general perception of US advisor over their guerrillas, see Malcom, White Tigers, pp. 2–3.

140 Ibid., p. 22.


this situation increased the risk of possible accidents as it caused difficulty to the blockade ship and aircraft in identifying them as ‘friend or foe’.\textsuperscript{143} Therefore, in late May as a back-up plan for the co-ordination of guerrilla inshore movements, the \textit{Leopard} organisation issued security passes for their guerrillas. This was to aid identification between the \textit{Leopard} guerrillas and naval fleets when they encountered each other in the blockade area.

Usually, when the blockade ships spotted any unidentified craft during the patrol, they firstly ordered it to stop for inspection. If it did not respond and retreated, they would open fire.\textsuperscript{144} However, when the craft stopped and complied with the naval staff’s inspection, it was not possible to identify whether they were the friendly guerrillas or the enemy. To the Blockade Commanders, thus, issuing security passes was a helpful measure to identify the \textit{Leopard} guerrillas. Therefore, HMS \textit{Cossack} obtained specimens of them from \textit{Leopard} and shared these with all ships in the Task Element.\textsuperscript{145}

In addition to that, an identification procedure for the aircraft of TE 95.11 was also introduced.\textsuperscript{146} Concerning small vessels, in accordance with the operational records of HMS \textit{Glory} and HMS \textit{Ceylon}, guerrillas needed to display ‘Red Panels’ as a recognition signal when they faced friendly aircraft. If there was no recognition signal, aircraft made a ‘warning burst

\textsuperscript{143} ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No. 30 at Sasebo, 17 January and 6 February 1951, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{144} Malcom, \textit{White Tigers}, p. 50
\textsuperscript{146} It was not clear when they agreed to use this way of identification. However, based on the operational records, it seemed clear there was an agreed identification signal at least from early May. On 13 May, two Fireflies attacked a \textit{Leopard} junk because it was not displaying ‘the approved recognition signal’. This indicates that there was an agreement between the two groups regarding the recognition signal. ADM 1/22521, Korean War Reports of Proceedings No .36, 8 May–24 May 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East Station’s letter FO2FE/2960/11, 25 May 1951. pp. 12–13.
of five’ ahead of the craft, and then, after a further delay of ninety seconds, pilots conducted an attack.\(^{147}\)

Even after the establishment of the *Leopard* organisation, due to the nature of the guerrillas and their relationship with American officers, it was not possible to have proper information of guerrillas’ intended movements within the blockade area. By introducing some identification procedures between the two groups, however, it was possible to introduce a minimal safety measure to reduce any possible naval forces’ attack against the friendly guerrillas.

By early July 1951, the total strength of the *Leopard* organisation had grown to about 7,000, and there were fifteen *Donkey* Units under the control of *Leopard* Base. The number of Americans assigned to guerrilla related work grew to twenty-one officers and forty-four enlisted men. The American-led guerrilla base, *Leopard* completed its reorganisation as a unified authority of guerrilla operations for attrition warfare on the west coast.\(^{148}\) With this successful establishment and based on the friendly relationship with *Leopard* officers, the co-operation between the two groups became more stable. Thus, as one of the main missions of the western naval forces, the value of the co-operation with the guerrillas became more significant.

**4.5 Conclusions**

Over the period covered by this chapter, the relationship between the British Task Group and the guerrillas can be divided into two periods based on the following watershed, the emergence


of the *Leopard* organisation. Before the EUSAK headquarters started guerrilla organisation, the Blockade Commanders were reluctant to be deeply involved in guerrilla related work. Therefore, there was only limited room for co-operation based on intelligence supply by indirect methods. Although there was a gradual development from mid-February 1952, when the guerrillas were partly controlled by the ROK Navy, this experience rather clearly revealed several limitations in the issue of co-operation with the irregulars. After several direct co-operations, the Blockade Commanders were assured that without establishment of proper authority to control and co-ordinate all the guerrilla activities, close relationships with the guerrillas might cause harm to the blockade ships’ routine operations.

Following the emergence of the *Leopard*, however, the co-operation with the guerrillas developed drastically. In particular, from late March to early July 1951, meaningful results were achieved in the intelligence collecting system, guerrilla use for naval operation, naval support for guerrilla activity and the mutual identification procedures. These developments also radically changed the western naval forces’ operation to be more active and effective than in its earlier period. From early and mid-1951, co-operation with the guerrillas became one of the most important aspects of the western naval forces’ operation.

To the Blockade Commanders, the first four months’ co-operation was, quoting Admiral Scott-Moncrieff; ‘producing excellent results all round.’\(^{149}\) Although there was continued difficulty in co-ordinating the guerrillas’ un-notified activities within the blockade area and their possible conduct of private war, the benefits seemed much greater than the disadvantages.

However, this co-operation started without any confidence of the guerrillas’ reliability. Moreover, as the guerrillas were programmed to shift their current activity by the higher

\(^{149}\) ADM 116/6213, HMS *Ceylon*-Report of Proceedings from 28 May to 10 June 1951, HMS *Ceylon*, 10 June 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 8 July 1951.
command’s instruction, in terms of viable sustainability of co-operation, the two groups’ relationship was essentially unstable. From the beginning of the co-operation, there had been several potential limitations in the naval-guerrilla relationships. With these underlying problems emerging in the co-operation with the *Leopard* guerrillas, TG 95.1 faced a new war situation; the opening of the truce talks for the Korean War.
Chapter 5
The Collapse of Co-Operation with the Leopard Guerrillas:
From the Start of Truce Talks to November 1951

With the first meeting of the UN and the Communist side’s main truce delegations at Kaesong on 10 July 1951, an effort for a peaceful solution for the Korean War was started. The decision for truce talks, however, was truly unwelcome news to the anti-Communist guerrillas. To these anti-Communist North Koreans, the signing of a truce agreement directly meant the loss of their sole motivation to fight; liberation of their hometowns from the Communists. The decision for truce talks, therefore, became a significant turning point in Leopard guerrillas’ activity.

This chapter explores several challenges in the naval-guerrilla relationship which emerged since the beginning of the truce talks. For this purpose, this chapter firstly tracks the efforts, behind the battle line, to restore peace by cease-fire negotiation by the UN and the Communist sides. The final arrangement of the pursuit for cease-fire negotiations and its subsequent influence on the guerrilla activity will also be followed.

It then seeks to show drastic changes in the naval-guerrilla relationship from late July 1951. Rather than attempt to present a chronological account, it examines several problems that emerged within the Leopard organisation. Simultaneously, it examines the perspectives and responses of the Blockade Commanders regarding these challenges. Due to the close relationship with the guerrillas, new problems emerging within the Leopard directly influenced the blockade naval forces’ operation. By explaining these aspects, the chapter will address a series of developments that caused the drastic collapse in co-operation.
5.1 The Start of Truce Talks and its Influence on the Leopard Guerrillas

From the outbreak of the war to the time of the Communists’ spring offensive in 1951, each side experienced a see-saw war with front-line movements oscillating from the Pusan Perimeter to the Yalu. However, behind the battle lines, from the early days of the war, the UN and Communist sides made sporadic efforts to restore peace by cease-fire negotiations, particularly at a time when each side’s military situation was unfavourable.

Right from the initial conflict, the United Nations had made attempts for a peaceful conclusion. First of all, in 1950, as soon as North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June, the United Nations Security Council demanded that North Korea cease its hostile behaviour and withdraw its troops to restore the pre-war status quo. However, at the time of the deliberation of the Security Council, the Communist side ignored the Resolution of 26 June, and the North Korean aggression continued.¹

Apart from this UN’s official attempt, the US government also tried to contact Moscow to persuade North Korea. On 27 June, President Truman sent his first direct communiqué to Stalin since the start of the Communists’ assault. In this telegram, he asked ‘the Kremlin to use its good offices to persuade Pyongyang to withdraw its forces from the South’.² However, Moscow declined this request by claiming that this conflict was a civil war between the two Koreas, thus, this should be resolved internally.³ During the summer of 1950, to the

¹ The Resolution defined ‘North Korean Army’s military attack on South Korea as behavior destructive of peace’, and urged North and South Korea ‘to immediately stop hostilities’ and North Korea ‘to withdraw its army to the 38th Parallel Line’: Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. III, pp. 13–14.
³ Ibid.
Communist side, which was winning the war, there was little interest regarding the end of war by political measures.  

The Communist side made the subsequent official suggestion concerning the start of truce talks. On 2 October 1950, when the North Korean forces were retreating from the UN Forces’ counter offensive, A. Y. Vyshinsky, Soviet Foreign Minister proposed an armistice to the UN General Assembly under the name of ‘Immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the Korean Peninsula.’ As the UN forces stood a good chance of defeating North Korea, Washington showed little interest in the Soviets’ suggestion. In addition, as this proposal had a caveat demanding ‘the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops’, the UN Forces could not accept it. Therefore, this proposal was voted down at the UN Political Committee, and, on 7 October, a new proposal was adopted by the UN General Assembly ‘to establish Korea’s unified, independent, and democratic government’ under the supervision of the UN. As a result of this resolution, which virtually allowed the UN Forces to cross the 38th Parallel, the UN Forces continued across the line and marched northward.

In December 1950, following the invasion of Korea by CCF, the tide of battle changed again, and a cease-fire became one of the most significant issues to the UN side. To the UNC who wanted to have a cease-fire based on the 38th Parallel, it was necessary to start the truce talks before the CCF reached this line. Therefore, the United Nations General Assembly established the Three Persons’ Committee for Armistice. This included the Chairman of the UN General Assembly and representatives of India and Canada. The committee demanded that the CCF

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7 Ibid., p. 167.
should cease military actions in all South Korean territory and to start cease-fire talks for establishing the Demilitarised Zone around the 38th Parallel. However, the CCF rejected this proposal by replying that without ‘withdrawal of all the foreign armed forces from South Korea’ and ‘withdrawal of the US troops from the Taiwan Strait’, a cease-fire would not be considered.**

The first six months’ efforts to restore peace were not successful. Each side felt decisive victory was possible, in particular the Communist side, and both sides distrusted each other, with the consequence of continued fierce fighting and colossal human and material losses. In the course of the CCF’s Spring Offensive between April and May 1951, however, the two sides began to pursue political, rather than military, means to resolve the current conflict.**

During the months of April and May 1951, the UN forces encountered the Red Chinese Fifth Offensive forces, and withdrew thirty to sixty-five kilometres south of the 38th Parallel.**

Despite being faced with a potential crisis, the UN’s superior firepower successfully countered the numerical superiority of the Communist forces. Thus, by the end of May, the allies had regained the initiative of the war, capturing the 38th Parallel for the third time. However, because both sides were embroiled in such an intense battle, the Communists as well as the UN forces paid with a great loss of human life. In particular, the loss for the Communist forces was very heavy. The UN forces suffered substantially less in its combat capabilities due to well organised delaying actions and superior fire and mobility. On the other hand, the Communist forces

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10 The Chinese advanced to the outskirts of Seoul in the April offensive, and in the May offensive, they exploited the breakthrough in the central eastern area up to the line of Soksa-ri and Hajinbu-ri: *Ibid.*, p. 702.
suffered a heavy loss of 85,000 men, and more than 10,000 Chinese surrendered or were captured.\textsuperscript{11}

The two camps, confronting each other in a situation similar to that of the pre-war days, became convinced that a decisive victory was impossible. As for the United States, not only was it pressured by Free World countries to bring about an early end to the war, but it was losing confidence of victory against the combination of Communist China, which could ostensibly mobilise almost unlimited human resources, and the Soviet Union, which provided material support. Accordingly, the US Government began to consider measures ‘to end the war under an appropriate armistice mechanism and return to the status quo ante bellum’.\textsuperscript{12} Judging that it would take two months for the Communists to recover, the UN trusted that the sixty days ahead would give them ample time to proceed with the negotiations in their favour, by taking advantage of the initiatives of the ground operations, the supremacy of the sea and the command of the air.\textsuperscript{13}

As for Communist China, although it carried out a total of five offensives with enormous manpower, referred to as the ‘human wave’, it was unable to achieve its initial objective of driving out the UN forces from the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the Communists came to realise that there was a limit to which they could secure reinforcements and logistical support. Therefore, Peng Dehuai, Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Army, issued a directive to pull the troops back to the starting point for the Fifth Offensive.\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{13} War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, The History of US JCS; The Korean War, Vol. I, pp. 394–5
\item\textsuperscript{14} This directive stated that ‘The frontline is overextended. Supply of rations and ammunition are met with difficulties due to lack of transportation. Troops are tied and southward advance at this point is impossible’: The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), CCF’s History of the Korean War, pp. 160–1.
\end{itemize}
Communists also assumed a defensive posture in order to recover the fighting power of their ground units. Accordingly, to the Communist Forces, the period of the truce negotiations was regarded to be beneficial for improving their unfavourable situation.

In conclusion, both camps decided that the following two months would be advantageous for making an effort for a peaceful solution. It was possible for cease-fire negotiations to proceed rapidly from then on. Through behind-the-scene contact initiated by the US, the Soviets agreed to achieve peace by armistice by recovering the ante-bellum situation. Thus, the pursuit for cease-fire negotiations was finally arranged. Both camps made policy decisions around June 1951 that the solution of the war was not through taking up arms but by negotiation and that the armistice conference would thus commence the following month. As a consequence, on 10 July 1951, the first meeting of the main truce delegations at Naebongjang, Kaesong, took place. On the UN Forces side, Admiral Joy headed four other representatives; and on the Communist side, Nam Il, the chief of staff of the NKPA headed four other representatives.

With the decision to start cease-fire negotiations, the UN ground forces’ operation also changed. Although hostilities continued, based on some tactically important points such as the Iron Triangle and the Soyang River, ground action continued to diminish, and the UN Forces’ operations were limited to the improvement of defensive positions and patrolling. Therefore, the EUSAK’s mission was limited to that of defending ROK territory against aggression from the Communist Forces. Only for this purpose was the EUSAK allowed to conduct military

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15 *Ibid.*, p. 174. The Chinese had a plan to push southward by counteroffensive in August in case the UN forces declined to pull down south of the 38th parallel in armistice negotiations: ROK Ministry of foreign Affairs, *Secret Russian Diplomatic Documents related to the Korean War*, Vol. IV, p. 120. In the text sent by Mao Tse Tung to Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang who were visiting Moscow, Mao told them to take a defensive posture for two months.


19 A triangular area connecting P’yonggang-Ch’orwon-Kimhwa was given the modifier ‘iron’ to emphasize the advantage of the terrain for enemy defence and disadvantage for friendly offensive: Field Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations, Korea*, p. 408.
operations north of the 38th Parallel. In addition to that, the EUSAK was directed to focus all its efforts on inflicting enough damage on the Communists so that they would accept the US terms for peace.20

As mentioned in the previous chapter, initial planning for the Leopard organisation was premised on using their irregulars for the EUSAK’s planned offensive to the north for spring 1951. It was to be established that a covert net of guerrilla groups within the enemy’s mainland would attract and organise the North Korean dissidents. This was to be deployed in conjunction with the UN forces’ offensive. Leopard’s units were to rise up, secure the Hwanghae Peninsula, and harass and interdict the retreating enemy.21

Since the start of the truce talks, however, the possibility of a planned UN offensive became more and more remote as the EUSAK was directed towards achieving a cease-fire along the 38th Parallel.22 This situation invoked a gradual indifference to Leopard and its operation in the EUSAK Headquarters. As mentioned in the previous chapter, except for several directives requiring special intelligence activities for the blockade naval forces, there were no other comprehensive plans directed from the EUSAK Headquarters during 1951. Moreover, there was not even any general reappraisal of guerrilla activities, or revised plans for future operations. Therefore, any plans for guerrilla operations had to be left in the hands of Leopard unit commanders and the guerrilla leaders.23

The EUSAK Headquarters’ indifference to their guerrilla organisation, ironically, expedited the development of co-operation between the TG 95.1 and Leopard. Leopard was able to maintain the first phase of their operation Plan ABLE which directed them to focus more on the

21 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 41.
22 Ibid., p. 43.
23 Ibid., p. 41.
intelligence gathering and sabotage missions. This naturally allowed significant scope for better co-operation with the friendly naval forces by early July 1951. Therefore, based on the friendly relationship with Leopard officers, the Blockade Commanders were able to achieve stable intelligence collecting and naval support system within a short period of time.

The decision for truce talks, however, became a significant turning point in Leopard guerrillas’ activity. To these anti-Communist North Koreans, the signing of a truce agreement meant that they would be left on the wrong side of the line. In fact, as mentioned in McGee’s letter below, a cease-fire agreement meant more than just isolation from their hometowns. As most had sought refuge on the west coast islands, it also meant they were unsure about their family’s safety at home. This concern is expressed in McGee’s letter written more than thirty years after the end of the Korean War. He wrote about his disappointment when he was told ‘never’ by the EUSAK Headquarters in reply to his question asking ‘when the counteroffensive would take place’, as follows:

The answer ‘never’ to me immediately suggested the calamity of our Donkey Leaders, their unit members and probably family members had been forsaken by the United States, their Free World leader. A forsaking by a Cease Fire that was a sentence of them to death by a subsequent Communist methodically conducted extermination. A sentence that harked back to my now false promise of liberation at that joyous night of our meeting at the cove on [Paengyong-do]. A sentence that I was never permitted to defend them.  

The major problem was that news of truce talks seriously affected the guerrillas’ will to fight. In fact, this news led to a significant deterioration in their morale. An operational history written by a veteran association of Donkey-3 and -4 mentioned their deep disappointment as follows:

From late July, there has been some news regarding the start of the truce talk negotiation at Kaesong. At first we thought it was a rumour. However, when we heard that news was true, colour drained from our face through surprise […] We were very discouraged thinking about

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family members who will be remained in the horrible control of the Communist Government after the cease-fire was signed.25

In addition to that, cracks were beginning to grow in the relationship between the UN forces and the Leopard guerrillas. As for the guerrillas, there was the sole motivation of liberating their hometowns from the Communists. This explains their spontaneous decision to conduct hazardous activities behind enemy lines. In that sense, a main reason for guerrilla groups’ participation with the American organisation was that they originally shared some common objectives. However, as UN forces officially began to discard their offensive plan to the north, the guerrillas’ reason to accept the Leopard Headquarters’ directives became weaker. With the start of cease-fire negotiations, a large number of the guerrillas transferred earlier lofty motivations to that of personal gains, when they began to consider their uncertain future. This created a wavering allegiance and increased the possibility of the ‘conduct of private war’. This, in turn, resulted in a significant control problem for Leopard officers with their agents.

A similar reliability problem with the guerrillas emerged involving UN forces. From the beginning of their relationship, there was no trust building between the guerrillas and the UN forces. Although there was a distrust of these former North Korean irregulars, in particular within the blockade naval forces, early relationships of co-operation had given beneficial results. Thus, the Blockade Commanders regarded their co-operation system with Leopard as very valuable as the benefits seemed much greater than the disadvantages. Since the start of the truce talks, however, there were growing doubts regarding the reliability of guerrilla activities. This could be seen in CTG 95.1 with the comment:

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With the Peace Talks going on it is certain that there is a good deal of wavering allegiance, if only re-insurance for the future. This is particularly likely to be the case amongst the guerrilla agents who are likely to be left on the wrong side of the line.\textsuperscript{26}

A corollary of the UN forces’ decision to discard their plan to march toward the north was the ominous prospect of drastic damage in relations. In particular, in the course of experiencing the problems that emerged within the \textit{Leopard} organisation, the drastic collapse of the naval-guerrilla co-operation eventually ensued.

**5.2 Guerrillas Holding Back and Unsatisfactory Intelligence Supply**

The first case of influence resulting from the truce talk initiative, in terms of \textit{Leopard} guerrilla and TG 95.1 co-operation, was one that affected guerrilla intelligence supply. As mentioned in the previous chapter, an intelligence supply system, as developed with the \textit{Leopard} organisation, was a most satisfactory achievement for the Blockade Commanders. Owing to the fact that there was no intelligence organisation for west coast Naval forces, and little contact and exchange of military information with the Higher Commands, TG 95.1’s dependence on \textit{Leopard} intelligence rapidly increased within a short period of time.\textsuperscript{27} Bombardments were conducted based on \textit{Leopard} defined targets, and enemy movements were exposed through \textit{Leopard} reporting. Even the evaluations of their bombardments were partly conducted based on \textit{Leopard}’s ‘after bombardment’ report. Therefore, any potential problem related to intelligence supply could significantly impede TG 95.1’s operations. Considering the fact that gathering information had been entirely conducted by the guerrilla agents, and the quality and quantity of

\textsuperscript{26} ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 40, 15 August to 10 September 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/2960/11, 10 September 1951, p. 20.

intelligence was heavily dependent on their activity, it was predictable that once truce talks commenced, guerrilla information passed to allied naval forces would be impaired.

In fact, from late July, dissatisfaction emerged regarding Leopard’s intelligence. This included information supplied late, lack of target numbers and an overall lack of reliability. The first record of this problem concerned HMS Ceylon’s report covering dates between 28 July and 8 August. It wrote that:

I discovered [...] that this source [Leopard] of intelligence was not so good as had been anticipated, due to the time lag caused by his agents having to return to the island, and also to the fact that they were engaged in various form of chicanery, not compatible with producing results.28

Subsequently, HMS Mounts Bay mentioned an overall distrust in regard to the guerrillas’ enemy movement reports. This is exemplified by this report when she operated around Han area as CTU 95.12.2 as follows:

They [Leopard guerrillas] produced a mass of very doubtful targets on the Northern shore and cross questioning made me wonder how much was genuine how much was staged for our benefit. They seemed to think the enemy, who kept themselves someway inland, were in constant fear of a landing from our ships. I suggested that if we sent in several boats in daylight we might get the enemy to expose himself and come under fire, but I was assured they would merely retire to the northward.29

There were also complaints of unreliability concerning post bombardment intelligence reports on targets indicated by Leopard agents. HMS Mounts Bay reported that Leopard guerrillas over-exaggerated damage inflicted on the enemy, as a result of her bombardments. The CO of Mounts Bay commented that ‘I found it hard to believe’.30 Pilots of HMS Glory also mentioned that they were doubtful of the reliability of post bombardment reporting by the guerrillas. On

30 Ibid., para. 6.
early September, the 804 Squadron historian wrote that ‘The only trouble with these targets is that by the time we get them they are a few days out of date. However, on several occasions good results have been reported.’³¹ Immediately following the commencement of truce talks, the intelligence-related co-operation that had been accomplished between the two groups started to rapidly deteriorate.

Therefore, in late August, to confer with the CO of Leopard regarding the recent problems of the guerrillas’ intelligence supply, HMS Ceylon proceeded to Paengyong-do. In this meeting, the CO of HMS Ceylon was told the reasons for the recent scanty and unreliable intelligence supply by the new Leopard Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott, who had recently relieved Major Burke. According to Leopard, this was largely due to the fact that many guerrilla agents had been ‘holding back’ in the belief that a truce talk agreement would be signed in the near future.³² In other words, guerrilla inactivity categorically caused problems in the supply of intelligence.

In fact, between late July and early September, little Leopard guerrilla reporting on blockade ships took place. The only operational records of TG 95.1 reported were of active rice raids conducted by the guerrillas in the Ongjin Peninsula and a guerrilla raid on 26 August, supported by HMS Morecambe Bay.³³ Most of the history books written by members of the Veteran Associations of former Leopard guerrillas also rarely mention their

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³¹ This sentence was written on 3 September. On 8 September, the 804 Squadron historian also wrote that ‘Most of today’s trips were Leopard targets and in one case where a headquarters building had been hit by rockets; a report came through that about sixty casualties were caused. How reliable these reports are nobody knows’: FAAM, Royal Naval Air Squadron, No. 804, Diary, 10/46-3/53.

³² ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 16 August to 1 September 1951, HMS Ceylon, 1 September 1951, para. 6.

activities during this period. Only Donkey-14 and -15, operating on the North side of the west coast were still active for securing a base on the Taewha-do and Ae-do locations. Considering the vigorous activities of the Leopard guerrillas before the start of the truce talk negotiations, it could be presumed that the guerrillas were relatively inactive.

Although Leopard had reported several times that this problem was in the process of being rectified, there were no noticeable changes for a couple of months, and CTG 95.1 kept receiving negative reports regarding Leopard intelligence. However, it was impossible for this naval Task Group to discontinue their relationship with the Leopard organisation, because there was no alternative intelligence source. As mentioned in the previous chapters, there were various friendly clandestine organisations operating on the west coast independently. However, it was still impossible to gain information from them.

These were mainly for intelligence gathering, such as the Special Activities Unit (SAU) and the Joint Advisory Committee, Korea (JACK) which operated under the control of the 5th US Air Force and the CIA. There was also a small intelligence organisation called Salamander, which operated from the island of Chodo. It supplied intelligence to the British

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34 Donkey-7 and -11 each recorded only one activity, Donkey-3, -4(White Tiger) mentioned only two small raids in the mainland, and Donkey-2 mentioned no operation. Suwol Unit Military History Compilation association, *The History of the Guerrilla Warfare of Eunyul; The Veteran Association of White Tiger Unit, The History of the Guerrilla Warfare of White Tiger Unit*; Lee (ed.), The Military History of the Student Guerrilla Unit; The Veteran Association of Kuwol-San Partisan Forces 구월산부대 전우회, 구월산 부대: 대원의 체험기 [Kuwol-San Partisan Forces: Their Memoirs] (Seoul: The Veteran Association of Kuwol-San Partisan Forces, 2006).
35 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 43.
36 During the patrol period from late July to early August as CTE 95.12 HMS Ceylon was told by Leopard Commander that ‘Leopard was in the process of rectifying this’: ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 28 July to 8 August 1951, para. 7. During her subsequent patrol period, he was told by Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott once again that ‘he was taking early steps to rectify this attitude’: ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 16 August to 1 September 1951, para. 6.
37 ADM 116/6231, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July 1952–April 1953, Flag Officer, Second-in-Command Far East Station, 14 July 1953, Part 3 (Intelligence). On 4 August, CTG 95.1 commented in the HMS Cardigan Bay’s report that except Leopard and Salamander, ‘these organisations still show a reluctance to divulge information to our ships, preferring to remain mysterious and independent and accepting the risks involved’: ADM 116/6212, HMS Cardigan Bay-Report of Proceedings, 24 June to 4 July 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 4 August 1951.
Task Group. However, it was not able to be a *Leopard* alternative because its intelligence was not only ‘unpredictable and irregular’, but it was also more focused on the extreme North Korean and Manchurian areas. These were outside the Task Group’s operational area. The Tactical Air Reconnaissance and Combat Air Patrol (TARCAP) of CTE 95.11’s aircraft, the only way of reconnaissance for a task group, was also an ineffective source of intelligence gathering. Owing to the enemy’s excellent camouflage skill, it was very difficult for pilots to find any targets for gunfire and air strikes.

In the situation that there was no attractive alternative, TG 95.1 had to maintain reliance on the *Leopard* agents for intelligence. They knew that only *Leopard* guerrillas could handle and obtain valuable intelligence which, if properly processed and assessed, could be very useful for their operation. However, whilst choosing to continue this relationship, they assumed a very prudent attitude towards the intelligence provided. This was exemplified by Admiral Scott-Moncrieff’s report submitted on 10 September 1951 as follows:

I am [...] very sceptical of the quality of the targets being reported by the various agents [...] It is of interesting to note that [...] a veritable stream of new targets were reported, followed by a report the following day of astronomical number of enemy killed by ships gunfire [...] I am afraid those reports both on targets and results achieved must be taken with more than a grain of salt [...] I have in mind, of course, the possibility of small scale raids, for corroborative intelligence purposes, if the military value is worth-while.

An interesting point was that, as mentioned above, CTG 95.1 decided to conduct an independent raid to capture prisoners using only forces under his command. In fact, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had been reluctant to use his trained seamen or Royal Marine Commandoes for raiding on the

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mainland, due to the possibility of their becoming casualties. For instance, on 11 July 1951, HMNZS Rotoiti conducted a raid independently with some of her seamen to obtain prisoners. At that time CTG 95.1 criticised the CO of Rotoiti by commenting that ‘There have been few military targets in this particular area which would justify accepting casualties amongst United Nations forces.’\(^{42}\) Considering Admiral Scott-Moncrieff’s previous position, this decision to conduct an independent raid was significant in showing the extent of his low regard for current intelligence.

5.3 The Taewha-do Incident: Conflict between Leopard Headquarters and Donkey-2

In the early morning of 31 July, in heavy rain, HMS Ceylon proceeded to Paengyong-do to answer a signal from the Leopard Headquarters asking for assistance to transfer 300 mutineers under armed guard at Yukto island. When she arrived at Yukto, and after a meeting with American Officers, all mutineers had already been removed from the island. Half of them had departed to Inchon for interrogation whilst others had catastrophically drowned in the middle of a heavy storm.\(^{43}\)

The mutineers were Donkey-2 guerrillas in Sokto; one of the largest and most active guerrilla groups, under the lead of Captain Kim. Although they were sentenced as mutineers by Leopard Headquarters, strictly speaking, they could be more appropriately explained as a consequence of a conflict between Major Burke, the Commander of Leopard and the Donkey leader. From late March, Donkey-2 had experienced severe shortages of supplies; in particular, medicines for first aid and drinking water. These necessities could not be acquired through guerrilla raids.

\(^{42}\) ADM 116/6222, HMNZS Rotoiti, Assault on Observation Post and Suspected Machine Gun Post in the Chinnambo Estuary, 17 July 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 17 July 1951.

Therefore, Captain Kim had requested these supplies to be delivered to the *Leopard* Headquarters. However, except for some sporadic and mostly insufficient support from CTE 95.12, no additional supplies from Headquarters were forthcoming.\(^{44}\)

In April, after the loss of forty agents through typhoid, Captain Kim decided to visit the ROK Army Headquarters to ask for support. The problem was that this trip was conducted without prior approval of the *Leopard* Headquarters, and by accident, at the same place, he encountered Major Burke visiting the EUSAK Headquarters. According to Captain Kim’s memoirs Burke promptly recognised the purpose of Kim’s visit. Then he proceeded to become angry at Captain Kim and ordered his immediate return to Paengyong-do.\(^{45}\) After this, their relationship became strained, and on 6 May, Captain Kim was dismissed from his position as the leader of *Donkey*-2 and summoned by the EUSAK Headquarters. Therefore, *Donkey*-2 had to operate without a leader for a while.\(^{46}\)

In late June, when Captain Kim visited Sokto again, *Donkey*-2 members reselected Kim as their leader and reported this fact to their headquarters.\(^{47}\) Major Burke promptly declined this request by answering that ‘It is not permissible to select a soldier in active service as a guerrilla leader’. However, the *Donkey*-2 guerrillas ignored this. As a result of this conflict, the *Leopard* Headquarters decided to stop all of the supplies for *Donkey*-2. Facing starvation, these guerrillas decided to move north to find a new base, and they landed on Taewha-do, where *Donkey*-15 was based.\(^{48}\)


\(^{45}\) The Veteran Association of Kuwol-San Partisan Forces, *Kuwol-San Partisan Forces*, p. 92.


\(^{47}\) According to the records written by the ROK Army Headquarters, Captain Kim visited Sokto to meet his family there: The ROK Army Headquarters, *The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 171. However, Captain Kim wrote in his memoirs that he was ordered from the ROK Army Headquarters to ‘return to Sokto and re-secure the command of *Donkey*-2’. According to Captain Kim, he had no family members at Sokto at that time (he said it was a rumour to deceive the *Leopard* Headquarters). The Veteran Association of Kuwol-San Partisan Forces, *Kuwol-San Partisan Forces: Their Memoirs*, pp. 92–3.

Following this, the *Leopard* Headquarters identified *Donkey*-2 guerrillas as mutineers and ordered *Donkey*-15 to disarm them. More than 300 guerrillas, therefore, had to be primarily deported to Sokto under an armed escort. Amongst them, 149 guerrillas were sent to a Prison Camp in Pusan. Of the others, 171 guerrillas, were drowned in a junk in heavy storms as they were transferred from Taewha-do to Yukto.\(^49\) After this incident, the survivors had to distribute themselves over smaller islands such as Ung-do and Chongyang-do nearby Sokto, and took the policy of ‘lying low’. They remained under cover until early August 1951, when one of Captain Kim’s staff, who was in charge of the Operation in *Donkey*-2, reorganised these guerrillas and re-joined the *Leopard* organisation under the new name of *Donkey*-20.\(^50\)

To the Commanders of TG 95.1, the fact that *Donkey*-2, one of their best partners during the early stage of guerrilla operations, was involved in a mutiny was surprising news. On one hand, they did not oppose *Leopard*’s decision on the matter, but equally, they regretted their former partner’s unfortunate outcome, in particular that of Captain Kim. This can be seen from the CTG 95.1’s report as follows:

The garrison, and the landing force, led by the redoubtable Captain Kim, one of our earliest “Allies” in this line of business, are reported to have mutinied. Colonel Burke nipped this in the bud, and some 300 prisoners were removed from Sokto and reinforcements put in. The fate of the mutineer does not bear much speculation, but it is a matter for regret that Captain Kim has already gone to join his ancestors. He was always in the forefront of the battle in the early days.\(^51\)

Regardless of the truth concerning the *Donkey*-2 guerrillas’ experience, their problem lay in the fact that the British Naval Commanders regarded this incident as a mutiny conducted by one of the formerly most helpful guerrilla units. Moreover, incidentally, this ‘mutiny’ immediately

\(^{49}\) There were 173 guerrillas in this junk and only two of them were survived. Former *Donkey*-2 veterans called this the ‘Taewha-do Incident’. The Veteran Association of Kuwol-San Partisan Forces, *Kuwol-San Partisan Forces: Their Memoirs*, p. 93.


followed the commencement of the cease-fire negotiations. As mentioned above, the origins of the Leopard Headquarters and Donkey-2 conflict took root before the cease-fire talks actually began, and thus the cease-fire talks cannot be claimed as being decisive in creating the conflict. However, despite this moot point, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff recognised the incident as one of a series of outcomes resulting from truce discussions. His comments on this subject clearly supported the perception that the incident happened ‘because of their anxieties and uncertainty over their future in the event of a cease-fire’. Although this incident did not cause any immediate changes in their co-operation, with the intelligence supply problem, the Task Group’s distrust over the Leopard guerrillas rapidly increased within a short period of time.

5.4 Double Agents amongst the Guerrillas

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff commented in his report covering 15 August and 10 September, stating; ‘I have for some time been sceptical of the reliability of these gentlemen’. Hence, from an early stage of co-operation there were some doubts concerning guerrilla reliability amongst the Blockade Commanders. In fact, to them ‘It would be very surprising if there were not large numbers of double and treble agents, working probably not only for the enemy but for more than one of our own agencies covering the area.’ Although commanders of TG 95.1 fully recognised potential hazards in deploying these former North Koreans, as it was just speculative and not based on actual experiences, to a large degree they trusted the Leopard Headquarters’ ability to control the guerrillas’ activities. Therefore, there seemed to be no significant reluctance for the Blockade Commanders to share their future plans with the Leopard Headquarters and the

52 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
guerrillas. As could be seen in the case of Operation ASHCAN, a demonstration landing operation conducted on 20 May, TG, 95.1, it was not only sharing the feint landing plans with the guerrillas, but also using them to spread rumours of the so-called landing. They even selected bogus landing places based on the guerrillas’ recommendations.

However, after the start of cease-fire talks, due to the events of several salient episodes, suspicion grew of double agent infiltration. Immediately after the Taewha-do Incident, the concentration levels of mainland enemy troops opposite Sokto was reported to HMS *Ceylon*. According to the report, enemy forces were arming junks on the Amgak Peninsula to invade Sokto. Because all civilians have been moved out of the area, there was no doubt that they were in fact enemy forces building up their numbers. As the enemy position was out of range of gunfire, HMS *Ceylon* asked HMS *Glory* to strike with her aircraft as a first measure. After such, two ROK craft were immediately directed to join HMNZS *Rotoiti*, the only ship in the area.

Fortunately, there was no further enemy action. The Communist manoeuvres occurring immediately after the transfer of Donkey-2 guerrillas from Sokto to Taewha-do, however, was a problem to the Blockade Commanders. Considering the fact that Donkey-2 had been garrisoned on this island since March of 1951 and only small numbers of ROK Marine garrison forces remained after the guerrillas’ moved, meant that it was therefore the best opportunity for the Communists to re-capture this island. It seemed reasonable for the Blockade Commanders

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56 A landing place for Operation ASHCAN was selected based on the information acquired by these agents. For more detailed plan of this operation see: ADM 116/6213, HMS *Ceylon*-Report of Proceedings from 7 to 22 May 1951, HMS *Ceylon*, 23 May 1951, Appendix II. Operation “ASHCAN”. The Royal Marines’ decision to land at Songgon-ni on 25–26 August to obtain prisoners was also conducted based on the Leopard agents’ intelligence: ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 40, 15 August to 10 September 1951, p. 9.

to associate this episode with the influence of guerrilla double agents. In fact, CTG 95.1 also speculated this enemy movement ‘as a result of inevitable leakage of the Leopard guerrillas’.\textsuperscript{58}

The increasing distrust of guerrilla allegiance reached its peak in the course of conducting a raid in late August. As the quality of intelligence supplied by Leopard had become unreliable since the start of the truce negotiations, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided to conduct small raids using Royal Marines and trained seamen. These raids were planned to obtain prisoners for corroborative intelligence purposes, because it was clear that much of the intelligence of troop movements and enemy intentions supplied by the Leopard guerrillas was unreliable and usually exaggerated.\textsuperscript{59}

The first was conducted on the night of 25 and 26 August by ten Royal Marines and seven able seamen under the gunfire support from HMS Ceylon, Charity and HMNZS Rotoiti. However, the friendly raiding party had to withdraw without the necessary prisoners, due to strong enemy resistance.\textsuperscript{60} Accordingly, the task group planned an additional raid on the Mongumpo a couple of days later.

On the early morning of 30 August 1951, a large-scale landing party, consisting of two platoons of Royal Marines and one of stoker-mechanics, landed on Choni-dong near Mongumpo. The main purpose of this landing was to round up a number of Communist troops reported by Leopard in this area.\textsuperscript{61} Through deploying the large-scale landing, it drew enemy troops from the front line. This was an additional objective. In this raid, Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott, Commander of the Leopard organisation was accompanied by an assault platoon.\textsuperscript{62}

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With a covering of heavy bombardment from HMS *Ceylon*, *Concord* and HMNZS *Rotoiti*, the assault party proceeded inshore in a Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP). The bombardment was then lifted inshore, for the assault party to land on the beach. However, before they could get inland, heavy and accurate mortar and small-arms fire opened from the flanks and rear. The assault party also faced small grenade-type mines, and three of these were exploded. It seemed clear that the enemy determinedly held strong positions and were unharmed by the earlier bombardments from the blockade ships. According to HMS *Ceylon’s* record, there were also two or three mortars registered on the beach and mortar shells arrived in salvoes. As there was no reason to expect any opposition, the landing forces were embarrassed. Although, the assault party responded with their rifles, they received orders from HMS *Ceylon* to quickly withdraw. As a result of this landing fifteen casualties were suffered — one was seriously wounded, six others were cot cases, and eight were slightly wounded.63

The problem was that the landing place was selected based on the *Leopard’s* recommendation. In a meeting with *Leopard* officers at Paengyong-do on 29 August, the CO of HMS Ceylon was told that ‘It was not anticipated that there would be any enemy in the immediate vicinity of the beach since they were all reported as being well back’.64 However, what the allies experienced in the course of landing was not a peaceful beach, but an enemy ambush. There was no doubt that the enemy was prepared and waiting to attack. As a result of this landing, the Blockade Commanders felt assured that double agents existed amongst the friendly guerrillas.  

As CTG 95.1’s comments in his Report of Proceeding clearly showed:

It is quite clear that advance information of the intended raid must have leaked out. The reliability of some of the agents employed by *Leopard* has recently became open to doubt, and this regrettable episode has confirmed it. The methods and speed of dissemination of target information also leaves something to be desired.65

63 Ibid., para. 38.
64 ADM 116/6213, HMS *Ceylon*-Report of Proceedings from 16 August to 1 September 1951, para. 36.
After this episode, the Blockade Commanders became more prudent in their co-operation with the *Leopard* guerrillas. CTG 95.1 immediately issued a directive asking for raids to be discontinued, unless CTE 95.12 was satisfied that he was not being double-crossed.\(^{66}\) In addition to that, CTG 95.1 decided to be very chary when placing any reliance on guerrilla reports of enemy intentions or activities, and to be more prudent in the sharing of the Task Group’s future plan or intentions with them.\(^{67}\) He also stressed the importance of contacts with the US officers in charge and the need of reducing direct communication with dubious *Leopard* agents unless screened by the *Leopard* Headquarters.\(^{68}\)

Therefore, to improve the liaison of the *Leopard* organisation with TG 95.1, and for a better evaluation of intelligence being passed to the blockade ships, CTG 95.1 arranged one Royal Marine officer to be stationed in Paengyong-do.\(^{69}\) Concurrently, he took actions to decrease any direct communication with the guerrillas. When HMS *Cardigan Bay* operated in the Han area, she recommended that the guerrillas should be supplied with a more portable W/T sets to improve target information. However, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff expressed a negative attitude by commenting that ‘If they do provide more sets, the objections of lack of security and duplicity have to be considered’.\(^{70}\) The Admiral even showed reluctance to communicate directly with the *Leopard* agents in the course of guerrilla spotting activity for gunfire bombardments.\(^{71}\)

\(^{66}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{67}\) *Ibid.*, p. 20

\(^{68}\) ADM 116/6212, HMS *Cardigan Bay*-Report of Proceedings, 7 August to 14 September 1951, 26 September, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 26 September 1951.

\(^{69}\) ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 41, 10 to 29 September 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/2960/11, 29 September 1951, p. 9. As a liaison officer, Lieutenant Dicketts, the Royal Marines 41st Commando was deployed to the *Leopard* Headquarters at the beginning of October: ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 43, 17 October to 12 November 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/2960/11, 12 November 1951, p. 5

\(^{70}\) Regarding HMS *Cardigan Bay*’s recommendation see ADM 116/6212, HMS *Cardigan Bay*-Report of Proceedings, 7 August to 14 September 1951, para.16a; in regards to CTG 95.1’s Comments, see *Ibid.*, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 26 September 1951.

\(^{71}\) *Ibid*. 157
The *Leopard* officers’ trust in guerrilla integrity was also severely reduced. As could be seen in HMS *Ceylon*’s report on 1 September 1951 mentioned below, they agreed that there were likely double-agents within the organisation and promised better control and supervision.

On talking this over with *Leopard* we both agreed that the local ROK Guerrilla unit responsible to *Leopard* for producing intelligence in that area cannot be regarded as reliable, and may even be a traitor in that *Leopard* had previously encouraged him to get more and better intelligence of the beaches, which fact he may have divulged to the enemy. There is no doubt that the enemy was prepared to be attacked. *Leopard* is now of the opinion that he should organise very much better supervision of his ROK agents to the extent possibly of putting American or British specially trained troops ashore with them.\(^\text{72}\)

In particular, the new *Leopard* Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott’s was extremely distrustful. He even considered the possibility that enemy agents’ had infiltrated Paengyong-do. As a first step to rectify this situation, new passes for the guerrillas were issued. Old passes were regarded as a security problem for blockade ships, insomuch as the passes signed by the previous Commander, Major Burke, had been in circulation for a dubiously long time and had possibly fallen into enemy hands. Therefore, an initiative was set by the new *Leopard* Commander ordering the withdrawal of all such passes by 30 September 1951. Simultaneously, new passes were issued containing the signatory of *Leopard*’s Intelligence Officer, the thumb print of the bearer and a specifically designed notification mark. Specimens of these passes were immediately shared with blockade ships.\(^\text{73}\)

*Leopard*’s target intelligence supply system was also changed. During Major Burke’s command, all target information was to be reported every seven days. Any targets more than seven days old from the date of the intelligence report, therefore, were regarded obsolete. If the

\(^{72}\text{ADM 116/6213, HMS *Ceylon*-Report of Proceedings from 16 August to 1 September 1951, para. 39.}\)

\(^{73}\text{ADM 116/6211, HMS *Belfast*-Report of Proceedings 31 August to 11 September 1951, HMS *Belfast*, 11 September 1951, Appendix IV. Covert Organisation – West Coast of Korea.}\)
enemy were still in the reported position, *Leopard* would support the target again. However, because of the perceived shortage of reliable guerrillas, this seven days rule was changed after a meeting with *Leopard* to the following:

a. Targets of mobile nature [troop concentrations] can be considered dead after 14 days from the date of the intelligence.

b. Targets of a semi-mobile nature [guns, store dumps] can be considered dead after 28 days. Apparently mobile guns are moved less often than infantry.

c. Targets of permanent nature [ammunition factory, gold mines] can be considered dead only after their destruction.

Although several measures were conducted to rectify the problem of the reliability of the guerrillas, *Leopard* headquarters’ distrust did not improve. According to HMS *Black Swan*’s records regarding her meeting with the *Leopard* Commander, the latter said ‘he only has about five really reliable agents and that most of them are of the coolie class’. Within two months from the beginning of a cease-fire talk, the *Leopard* guerrillas faced a crisis of confidence from all of their friendly forces.

### 5.5 The Guerrillas’ Conduct of ‘Private War’

By definition, ‘private war’ means ‘hostilities against members of another state that take place without government sanction’. Considering the fact that the Korean War was an international war conducted by various countries, and wartime operational control was transferred to the

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74 ADM 116/6212, HMS *Black Swan*—Report of Proceedings, 17 to 24 June 1951, the Captain (F), Third Frigate Flotilla, HMS *Black Swan*, Appendix B.

75 ADM 116/6212, HMS *Black Swan*—Report of Proceedings, 22 September to 1 October 1951, the Captain (F), Third Frigate Flotilla, HMS *Black Swan*, 8 October 1951, Appendix B: Gunnery Targets.


hands of the C-in-C of UN forces; it would be more appropriate to change the words ‘without government sanction’ in this definition to ‘without the sanction of higher command’.

In judging the conduct of private war, the Commanders of TG 95.1 strictly applied this definition to their ships. On 11 July 1951, when HMNZS Rotoiti successfully attacked and raided an enemy gun position by landing two of her able seamen without prior permission from CTE 95.12, the CO of HMS Ceylon pointed out to Captain of HMNZS Rotoiti that he had conducted a ‘private war’. Almost two months later, HMCS Cayuga supported a guerrilla raid successfully in her patrol in the Yalu Gulf.Whilst Admiral Scott-Moncrieff agreed with the need of supporting this type of guerrilla raid, he considered HMCS Cayuga’s support as an example of a ‘private war’, as it was conducted without notification and permission of CTE 95.12.

In fact, Canadian Captains under TG 95.1 regarded this episode as RN commanders’ way of taking initiative from its Commonwealth partners, and expressed shared disagreements with the advice of RN Commander. However, regardless of genuine purposes and results, other than that of an emergency situation, operations conducted without a higher commander’s agreement were called ‘private wars’ by the Blockade Commanders.

In fact, the expression ‘private war’ was most frequently used in describing the Leopard guerrillas’ activities. However, the Blockade Commanders’ definition of ‘private war’ in relation to Leopard guerrillas and blockade ships was quite different. As they were not members of the organisation’s higher command, it was impossible to know all of the directives ordered

80 In particular, Captain James Plomer, the CO of HMCS Cayuga latterly expressed his deep resentment regarding the RN commander’s calling these activities ‘private war’: Meyers, Thunder in the Morning Calm, p. 152.
by the *Leopard* Headquarters. This meant that TG 95.1 did not have appropriate information to
decide whether the guerrillas’ activities were conducted with permission from their US officers.

Therefore, the Blockade Commanders used this expression to describe guerrilla activity
carried out for private objectives. Unlike ships under their command, who were rarely diverted
from their main missions, the guerrillas frequently conducted various activities seemingly with
little relationship to their missions; such as conducting rice raids or hostility against civilians.\(^{81}\)

As mentioned by Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, ‘some of the guerrilla raids are for personal gain
only. I had always been wary of this possibility and have constantly warned CTE against
becoming involved in private wars’, hence activities, not required by their mission, but for
private objectives, were deemed examples of ‘private war’ by the Blockade Commanders.\(^{82}\)

Based on this definition, from an early stage, the *Leopard* guerrillas had a tendency to conduct
private warfare. Although they were organised under the command of the US Army, they were
inherently irregular forces, spontaneously gathered for their own objectives. Moreover, large
number of the guerrillas were breadwinners for their family and refugees living on the islands
with the guerrillas. They had to acquire rations, not only for their activities, but also for their
families and dependants.\(^{83}\) Therefore, from an early stage, some guerrilla activities were for
satisfying private objectives.

The EUSAK’s logistic support policy for their guerrillas also intensified their guerrillas’
pursuit of private gain. Since large quantities of supplies including food, ammunition and
weapons were sent to Paengyong-do and other islands when each guerrilla groups had joined
the *Leopard* organisation, supply to the guerrillas was determined by EUSAK’s initial plan that

\(^{81}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{82}\) ADM 116/6211, HMS *Belfast*-Report of Proceedings 14 to 24 October 1951, HMS *Belfast*, 25 October 1951,
CTG 95.1’s Comments, 16 November 1951.

\(^{83}\) For example, there were totally 383 family members of around 480 *Donkey*-21 guerrillas on Sokto. Cho, *The
Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War*, p. 182.
'the partisans would require little continuous logistical support, once basic requirements in equipment had been met'.

Therefore, each Donkey unit was asked to capture a large part of their military supplies and food in the course of their activities.

During the first few months of 1951, however, US officers began to realise that their logistic policy was impractical. It became clear that most of their Donkeys were not able to capture enough military goods, in particular food, in the course of conducting their main missions. Therefore, especially in case of rice, Leopard headquarters decided to supply additional supplies to their agents. However, the EUSAK’s regular supply was still insufficient for the guerrillas. Due to the shortage of ration supply from the EUSAK, to support themselves and their dependents, the guerrillas had to continue private warfare.

These guerrillas’ tendency to private war, whilst apparent from an early stage by virtue of its nature and the higher command’s policy, increased radically from the start of cease-fire talks. The possibility of the signing of a cease-fire negotiation, based on the 38th parallel, not only reduced motivation to fight, but also triggered anxiety as to an uncertain future. As the guerrillas were not officially integrated with any allied force, and their status was considered no more than a ‘private army of the Korean guerrillas’, their living situation after the end of the war became one of the main concerns.

As for the first response to the possible armistice, the number of deserters increased amongst former students and breadwinners of families. Unlike the regular army, the Leopard Headquarters did not have any of their guerrillas’ lists, hence, there was not any way to control

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84 Ibid., p. 239.
85 Ibid., p. 111; Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, pp. 53–4.
86 According to the ORO study, each guerrilla was able to be furnished with around 35 kg per month: Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, pp. 53–4.
88 U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’ p. 287.
89 Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, p. 171
or punish deserters. Therefore, to be a regular ROK army officer, or to find a job to support their family, large numbers of guerrillas left their islands.\textsuperscript{90}

Much more important, it became clear that the abrupt change in the wartime situation heavily influenced the remaining \textit{Leopard} guerrillas’ motivation and activity. Large numbers of guerrillas, including some of the \textit{Donkey} leaders and cadres, discarded their early lofty motives and started prioritising their own interests. One of the most famous cases involved the corruption of a former \textit{Donkey} leader. The leader of \textit{Donkey}-4, named Chang Sok Lin, along with his unit, was regarded by the \textit{Leopard} Headquarters and guerrillas as the finest and most able. His colleagues remembered him as a ‘powerful and strong man and full of spirit’ who ‘had no love of material’.\textsuperscript{91} However, after the start of the truce talks, a very fine leader became radically corrupt. He put his family members into important positions within \textit{Donkey}-4 and sequestered supplies from their Headquarters for his family. The guerrilla leader, once regarded as one of integrity, became greedy for material gain within a short period of time.\textsuperscript{92} Although he was killed by his \textit{Donkey} members on 1 January 1952 as a result of his corruption, this story showed that even a respected guerrilla leader was prone to temptation and capable of changing his principles to suit his private interest.

Some of the guerrillas who had left families in their hometowns, endeavoured to bring family members to their islands. At that time, based on the Hwanghae Province, the Communist Government had conducted a search operation against the \textit{Leopard} guerrillas’ families and sympathisers. As a result, large numbers of family members and sympathisers were deported to a province further north or punished.\textsuperscript{93} To the guerrillas, it was a race against time to move

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., pp. 171, 182, 183, 195.
\textsuperscript{91} U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., pp. 82–3.
\textsuperscript{93} Lee Ik Ho, one of the former \textit{Donkey}-4 members wrote that he was not able to bring his family as they were deported to Hamkyeongbuk Province: Cho, \textit{The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War}, p. 240.
\end{footnotes}
their families to safe locations before the signing of truce talks and retribution occurred. Therefore, Donkey members passed landing plan details to their families through mainland agents in an effort to relocate these relatives on returning to the safety of the islands.  

Although transferring families from the mainland was an essential task for the guerrillas, this consequently increased each guerrilla’s burden to support them. As there was no additional food supply from the Leopard Headquarters for these family additions, rice raids became more necessary for each Donkey unit.

In fact, from mid-August, large numbers of rice raids and similar activities had been witnessed in the island of Sunwi-do, Yongwi-do and around the Ongjin Peninsula. These activities, coinciding with the start of the rice harvest season, drastically increased. HMS Ceylon’s report showed it clearly as follows:

On 11th October, on the way up the Route Cigarette two friendly raiding parties were observed returning loaded with rice and cattle. The season seemed to have opened with a swing, with raids being carried out up and down the coast.

The Blockade commanders also understood the need for rice raids by guerrillas who had family and other refugees to support. To some extent, they caused damage to the enemy’s rice supply system. However, as mentioned above, the guerrillas’ excessive involvement in these activities, not only diverted them from their main mission, but also frequently disturbed the blockade ships’ operations. In fact, during this time, intelligence supply from the Leopard organisation became even more scanty and unreliable. The CO of HMS Ceylon was told by

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94 For example, during a landing operation carried out on September 1951, a Donkey unit on Chodo transferred twenty families in this event: Ibid., p. 228.
95 Ibid., p. 183.
98 CTG 95.1 therefore described these rice raids as ‘more or less justifiable’: ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 31 August to 11 September 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 15 October 1951.
Leopard officers in a meeting that this was due to increased guerrilla activity in rice raids. Their increased uncoordinated movements and frequent emergency calls also were problematic to the ships of TG 95.1. In cases when raid intentions were unclear, supporting their emergency calls could often jeopardise the blockade ships’ main operation, diverting resources to private wars. These concerns were clearly mentioned in CTG 95.1’s comments that:

It was always been necessary to be careful in deciding which raids to support, and which to discourage […] These may be more or less justifiable rice raids to feed the large numbers of refugees in the off-lying islands, or they may be in satisfaction of local feuds or personal prejudices as against the local money lender, or the gang leader's mother-in-law.

Regardless of an agreement with the Leopard Headquarters in early July 1951 concerning the prior notification of intended guerrilla raids, owing to the upsurge of rice raids and their other private activities, the co-ordination system in naval support became chaotic again.

The Blockade Commanders’ dissatisfaction towards the guerrillas’ conduct of private war reached a peak in the course of supporting a large-scale guerrilla raid to capture Sinmi-do. Sinmi-do is the largest island in the Northern group of the Yalu Gulf, being eight miles long and four miles wide. At that time, most of the larger islands in the Yalu Gulf were captured by Donkey-15. From mid-May 1951 (the start of operations from the island of Taewha-do) until the end of June, they captured twelve islands in the Yalu Gulf. Sinmi-do was an exception. Unlike others, there were around seventy enemy garrison forces on this island. This was assumed to be connected to the existence of a large warehouse containing large amounts of rice.

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99 ADM 116/6214, HMS *Ceylon*-Report of Proceedings from 5 to 17 October 1951, Appendix II.
100 ADM 116/6211, HMS *Belfast*-Report of Proceedings 31 August to 11 September 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 15 October 1951.
On 2 October, HMS *Cossack* was asked by the *Leopard* Headquarters to visit Taewha-do with Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott and his staff. Once there, they held a conference with the leader of *Donkey*-15, Kim Ung Soo. During this meeting, a plan to capture Sinmi-do was discussed. The CO of HMS *Cossack* was told that *Donkey*-15 would use Sinmi-do as an advanced base for future operations. After this meeting, HMS *Cossack* proceeded to Paengyong-do to confer with the CO of HMS *Ceylon*, and in this meeting they decided to support this raid. A further conference was held during the evening of 7 October, and it was decided to attack Sinmi-do in the early morning of 9 October.

Covered by HMS *Cossack*, 800 guerrillas landed on the eastern side of the island in the early morning. Their primary object was capturing the high ground and then attacking the town from landward. At first, some success was achieved. The party secured a beach-head and advanced to the hills. HMS *Cossack* remained around Sinmi-do to provide gunfire support for more than 48 hours, until daylight of 12 October, when success seemed assured, and she left for Sasebo. However, the Communists landed reinforcements over the mud-flats during the night, and on the arrival of HMS *Ceylon* that evening to continue the support, she found the guerrillas withdrawing. HMS *Ceylon* covered the withdrawal successfully during the nights of 12 and 13 October.

The problem was that, facing the reinforcement, the guerrillas decided to withdraw without the knowledge of HMS *Ceylon* and without active resistance against the enemy. More pertinently it seemed, their main motivation was to loot the warehouse. In fact, *Donkey*-15 had

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102 ADM 116/6214, HMS *Ceylon*-Report of Proceedings from 5 to 17 October 1951, Appendix II.
104 ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 42, 29 September to 16 October 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/2960/11, 16 October 1951, pp. 6–7; for more specific narrative about this raid, see ADM 116/6217, HMS *Cossack*-Report of Proceedings 1 to 6 October 1951, HMS *Cossack*, 13 October 1951.
raided this warehouse on 7 June. As a result of this raid, they were able to capture a large amount of rice bags.\textsuperscript{105} One of the main reasons for Donkey-15’s additional raid was that they expected large amounts of rice again.

HMS \textit{Ceylon} was understandably disappointed with the guerrillas who had taken advantage of naval forces for their personal gain. It could be seen in the following records that:

\begin{quote}
It is a great disappointment for him [the CO of HMS \textit{Cossack}] that his carefully laid plans of cooperation and vast expenditure of ammunition have been partially wasted due to this precipitous withdrawal. Looking at the operation in the light of subsequent events, I am sure that the guerrillas ‘bit off more than they could chew’. I also know that they were very disappointed with the amount of rice and oxen to be looted […] I do not think that the guerrillas ever meant to hold the Island against opposition, and the lack of loot undoubtedly influenced them in deciding to leave.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

After the raid, the CO of HMS \textit{Ceylon} told the Commander of the \textit{Leopard} organisation that the continual day-to-day support of Blockade ships for guerrilla raids was not a practicable exercise, thus it would only be applied to the initial stages of any raid.\textsuperscript{107} CTG 95.1 also stated to his Blockade Commanders; ‘It has been evident for some time that […] some of the guerrilla raids are for personal gain only. I had always been wary of this possibility and have constantly warned CTE against becoming involved in private wars’.\textsuperscript{108}

\section*{5.6 The Guerrillas Cry Wolf: Naval Forces’ Fruitless Demonstration}

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
From the first meeting of the main truce delegations on 10 July 1951, it was clear that there were great differences between the objectives of the two sides, and this suggested that the negotiations would not proceed smoothly. Therefore, it took five days to straighten out basic matters such as the establishment of neutrality in the talk site and the substitution of military police for armed troops in the area. The talks pertaining to agenda requirements started on 19 July, and disagreement between the two sides meant that a more definitive agenda was eventually adopted on 26 July. However, when the negotiations entered practical discussion, the second agenda item, namely 'the fixing of a military demarcation line between the two sides for the establishment of a de-militarised zone' aroused conflict.109

At this conference, the Communists, who currently suffered a net loss of territory, insisted that the 38th parallel had to be the demarcation line. But based on the superior naval and air power, the UN negotiators, for their part, sought compensatory consideration and wanted a line north of the current front. Subsequently, this discussion evoked the relevant question as to which side actually controlled the territory of the Ongjin and Yonan peninsulas, south west of 38th parallel. It was considered important to emphasise that these areas, although actually held at the time by the Communists, were controlled by superior air and naval forces of the United Nations. Accordingly, in the evening of 24 July, Admiral Joy acting in his capacity as senior delegate at the truce talk negotiation issued a message to Rear-Admiral Dyer, CTF 95, requesting a show of strength in the Han River estuary, as close as possible to the neutral area around Kaesong. CTF 95, therefore, ordered Admiral Scott-Moncrieff that all activities on the west coast should

109 ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53, pp. 161–2. The agreed five-item agenda was as follows: 1) Adoption of agenda; 2) Fixing of military demarcation line between the two sides so as to establish a demilitarised zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea; 3) Concrete arrangements for the realisation of cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and function of a supervisory organ for carrying out the terms of cease-fire and armistice; 4) Arrangements relating to prisoners of war; 5) Recommendation to governments of countries concerned on both sides. Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. III, pp. 68–9.
be subordinate to the requirements of this demonstration. HMS *Glory*, which was relieved by USS *Sicily* on 20 July, was ordered to join USS *Sicily*. At this time, both carriers concentrated their air operations on this area. All but one of the frigates and the ROK patrol vessels under the command of CTG 95.1 were also ordered to the Han River estuary.110

The fact of the matter was that, as the negotiations failed continually to establish a demarcation line, large numbers of blockade ships were operating dangerously in the Han Estuary for little profit. This was because the approaches to the Han River were shallow and included many islands surrounded by shifting mud-flats that dry at low water. There were no navigation marks existing and tidal streams ran at four to eight knots. Moreover, targets for bombardment, obtained mainly from the *Leopard* organisation, were generally unprofitable, and local enemy activities seemed non-existent at this time.111

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was dissatisfied with this situation, as it diverted his ships from the Northern area of the Han River which he considered more important for blockade operations. He tried to withdraw some of the frigates from the Han area, however, it was not possible. Therefore, the mobile part of TE 95.12 was reduced from four ships to only two; namely one frigate and one destroyer.112 This could be seen in CTG 95.1’s comments as follows:

> Although the Kaesong Cease-Fire talk had been off for some time, I had been unable to persuade CTF 95 to allow me to withdraw even one frigate from the Han River. The original reason for our entry, it will be remembered, was to show the enemy that we controlled what little territory he still held below the 38th parallel and to impress upon the enemy negotiators at Kaesong our presence in the Han from the sound of our gunfire. However, I have always felt that this could be done adequately with one frigate and air support.113

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112 ADM 116/6212, HMS *Black Swan*-Report of Proceedings, 22 September to 1 October 1951, the Captain (F), Third Frigate Flotilla, HMS *Black Swan*, 8 October 1951, para. 3.
113 Ibid., CTG 95.1’s Comments, 2 November 1951.
During this period, however, the requirements for patrol and commitments for gunfire support for *Leopard* guerrillas had greatly increased. From July, *Donkey*-15 earnestly started intelligence gathering activities and raids in the Yalu Gulf. Thus, to support their gunfire requirements, the blockade patrol ship quota in this area required strengthening. Requirements of gunfire support from *Donkey* units in the Hwanghae Province also increased, due to a heavy involvement in rice raiding and other offensive activities.\(^{114}\) In addition to that, incidental bombardments had also multiplied to at least one every other day on a remarkable variety of targets. This was mainly due to increased numbers of enemy troops in the Haeju and Chodo areas.\(^{115}\) Considering the fact that there was an appreciable mine-sweeping commitment in the Cigarette route, such heavy commitment of blockade ships reached an unsustainable level. The CO of HMS *Black Swan*, who was CTE 95.12 between 22 September and 1 October 1951, therefore described this situation in these terms; ‘it was therefore apparent that the adequate fulfilment of these many requirements would afford an interesting exercise in the construction of bricks with a minimum complement of Israelites.’\(^{116}\)

During this time, that was one of the most demanding periods for TG 95.1’s ships, the *Leopard* guerrillas’ were conducting their personal imprudent activities. This naturally increased antipathy towards them. Whilst enemy troop numbers increased on the west coast, there was also a great deal of concern over the need for extra ship support to address security issues for the unstable islands in the Chodo and Haeju area. In fact, *Leopard*’s communications increased considerably, and appeared disproportionate to their importance in the general scheme.\(^{117}\)

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\(^{114}\) During HMS *Black Swan*’s patrol period, there were seven requirements for gunfire support from *Leopard* and four of them were unco-ordinated emergency calls. *Ibid.*, Appendix A: Narratives of Event-CTE 95.12.


\(^{117}\) *Ibid.*, para. 10.
Such examples of calls that undermined and debilitated more important missions are as follows. On the evening of 29 September, HMS *Black Swan* received an emergency call from *Leopard* at the island of Yukto, asking for support against enemy forces threatening their islands. As it was thought that the enemy might try to cross over to Yukto at low water, HMS *Black Swan* and HMS *Comus* proceeded to this area and carried out bombardments against the reported concentrations of troops and gun positions. Complying with the request of *Leopard* guerrillas, patrols between Paengyong-do and the mainland were conducted each night until further notice. Therefore, HMS *Comus* carried out this additional patrol over the next two days, by which time, the anxiety seemed to be relieved. On 28 October, HMCS *Cayuga* was diverted for gunfire support by the request of *Leopard* and required to cover an evacuation in the Changsan-got area. When she arrived, however, she was told that this had already been completed during the night.

Although the Blockade Commanders recognised the increase of enemy forces, they thought it was not an imminent threat to the friendly islands. They thus regarded these calls as ‘Cry Wolf’ situations, provoked by unnecessary jitters on behalf of the security of the respective islands. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction in that these requirements diverted them from their main missions and added extra burden to the over stretched resource of blockade ships. Therefore, CTE 95.12 (at that time HMS *Ceylon*) visited the *Leopard* Headquarters and conferred with US officers in charge to determine as follows:

a) What ship’s gunfire could do by night and by day with and without air spot.

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120 ADM 116/6214, HMS *Ceylon*-Report of Proceedings from 22 October to 5 November 1951, para. 57.

b) That ships could not be at the constant beck and call of any Donkey who thought he might be attacked, although we were always prepared to help in case of actual invasion provided navigational circumstance allowed.

c) That the use of Flash priority on so many occasions when it was not really necessary would lead to it losing its significance when there was a real emergency.

d) That failure to answer signals had led to uneconomical employment of Naval Forces.

e) That ships had blockade and other duties to perform besides supporting guerrillas.\textsuperscript{122}

In the course of this meeting, he was able to acknowledge that American officers had very little idea of what was going on regarding this issue. Therefore, he had to return from Paengyong-do comforting himself that Leopard officers would in the future use discretion before making signals.\textsuperscript{123}

5.7 Leopard Headquarters’ Haphazard Screening of the Guerrillas

In mid-August, most of the US officers who had been working for the Leopard organisation were simultaneously relieved. Major Burke, the first Leopard Commander was also relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott. The Commanders of the task group regretted the departures, as they had been involved in a successfully developed co-operation system with the Blockade Commanders from an early stage. Moreover, it was over a period of time when operational conditions were very demanding. They were particularly sorry that Major Burke, a capable and a very level-headed officer, had been withdrawn.\textsuperscript{124}

From the initial stage of co-operation there had been several problems in the guerrilla activities, such as the previously mentioned uncoordinated movements and conduct of private war. These problems nevertheless remained, despite the reorganisation under the command of American

\textsuperscript{122} ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 22 October to 5 November 1951, para. 41.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., para. 4.
officers in March 1951. However, when Major Burke was in command, his organisation worked very smoothly with TG 95.1, and his staff tried to sort ‘the chaff from the grain’ as much as possible.\textsuperscript{125} Although there was no development of trust with former North Korean irregulars, the co-operation system was satisfactorily developed. This was mainly due to the early American officers’ capability and endeavour.

Co-operation, however, significantly deteriorated once the truce talks commenced, and it reached its worst as time progressed to the end of 1951. Considering the fact that CTG 95.1 described that ‘the Leopard organisation at its lowest ebb’ in mid-November 1951, it can be presumed that there was a deepening disillusionment of the Blockade Commanders with this organisation.\textsuperscript{126}

Once guerrilla morale and allegiance rapidly deteriorated on the commencement of the truce talks, their credibility also significantly weakened. This happened within a short period of time. Had an appropriate assignment from Headquarters taken control, however, such a radical collapse of the relationship could have been avoided. In fact, the Blockade Commanders supported this notion to some extent, as the new Leopard Commander and his staff’s lack of ability arguably increased problems.

Unlike Major Burke’s officers, who were keenly involved in the establishment process of Leopard organisation and vigorously prepared the second phase of plan ABLE, the new Leopard officers were appointed when the EUSAK Headquarters became indifferent to this organisation’s activities. Therefore, the motives of US officers transferred to Leopard gradually became centred on their own self-interests, such as remaining in a safer location or minimising their length of stay.

\textsuperscript{125} ADM 116/6211, HMS \textit{Belfast}-Report of Proceedings 14 to 24 October 1951, HMS \textit{Belfast}, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 16 November 1951.

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Ibid.}
in Korea. This situation undermined the morale of the newly appointed Leopard officers who had relieved most of their predecessors in August 1951. This also impaired the level of supervision and control of guerrilla activities.

The new Leopard Commander also seemed less competent in controlling his guerrillas. Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott had experienced special operations during the Second World War in Greece. He had also worked under G3 of the Eighth Army before he was transferred to the Leopard organisation. Despite this experience, however, from an early time of his command, the Blockade Commanders’ evaluation of the new Leopard commander was generally unfavourable. Following the landing operation in the Mongumpo area on 30 August, the CO of HMS Belfast wrote of Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott; ‘although he was most co-operative, he seemed to be very highly strung and unable to concentrate for long on any one subject.’ After his patrol as CTE 95.12 during late September, the CO of HMS Black Swan made an evaluation of Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott, stating that ‘the man himself did not appear to be as competent as Burke, and it was difficult to get any really hard and fast rulings.’

In fact, from the early time of new American officers’ placement on the Leopard organisation, they revealed lack of control of their agents by showing that they had no important knowledge relating to guerrilla movements. On 8 September 1951, HMS Cayuga and three ROKN Minesweepers were engaged in the support of a large guerrilla raid in the Pungchon area, near the island of Chodo. A problem existed in the fact that it was conducted only through the

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127 American officers were able to transfer to other countries if they fulfilled 36 duty points. During the Korean War, islands were categorised as a four-point area, thus they could leave Korea only after 9 months’ stay: U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 256; Cho, The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War, pp. 152–3.
130 ADM 116/6212, HMS Black Swan-Report of Proceedings, 22 September to 1 October 1951, the Captain (F), Third Frigate Flotilla, HMS Black Swan, 8 October 1951, Appendix I: Gunnery Targets, para. 4.
co-ordination of blockade ships, and not from any knowledge from Leopard Headquarters. The CO of HMS Belfast realised this in the course of a conference with Leopard officers at Paengyong-do almost a day before the raid. Although this raid was conducted under the auspices of the Salamander officer in Chodo, the CO of HMS Belfast expressed his disappointment that Leopard knew nothing about it.¹³²

This event reinforced the Blockade Commanders’ belief that Donkey units operated under an inadequately loose control, and usually passed only their results of activities to their headquarters without sharing their plans. It meant that Leopard officers lost their capability of liaison regarding guerrilla activities. To the Blockade Commanders, the Salamander officer, who satisfactorily co-ordinated the previous guerrilla raid, was regarded as more appropriate for liaison, although his organisation was much smaller than Leopard, and he was only able to conduct local arrangement based on Chodo.¹³³

A similar situation happened in the course of a meeting with Leopard officers regarding HMCS Cayuga’s unplanned gunfire support for the Leopard guerrillas on 28 October. In this meeting, the CO of HMS Ceylon was surprised that the Leopard Headquarters had very little knowledge of the guerrillas’ imprudent emergency calls in which they frequently asked for support. The US officers were rarely involved in the distribution of signals from each Donkey guerrilla unit.¹³⁴

On 21 October, two Leopard junks were sunk near the island of Taewha-do by an attack from the aircraft of HMAS Sydney, at that time CTE 95.11. Ironically, this attack was conducted at the request of Leopard Headquarters, who considered these large numbers of junks in the area as intent on capturing Taewha-do and the adjacent islands. Although Leopard were

¹³² Ibid., para. 13.
¹³³ Ibid., CTG 95.1’s Comments, 20 September 1951.
unquestionably confident that no friendly junks were in the vicinity area, a large number of guerrillas were killed by this unfortunate accident. In his comments regarding this accident, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff referred to Leopard as ‘funny parties’ who displayed a haphazard communication system.

The Blockade Commanders’ doubt as to the ability of the new regime of Leopard headquarters to control their guerrillas was reinforced by a report from Lieutenant Dicketts. He was with the Royal Marines 41st Commando and was sent to Paengyong-do as a liaison officer at the beginning of October. Although it was not possible to find his original report, its summary was introduced in the CTG 95.1’s report as follows:

*Leopard* has about 800 [8,000] agents spread out on the west coast. The only time *Leopard* sees these agents is when a representative of a group comes to Paengyong-do to get stores. The screening of them seems very haphazard and the information they send in is only what they think is required; there is no close supervision, and they are not trained observers.

In fact, this information was not so surprising to the Blockade Commanders. They had already acquired strong suspicions based on their previous experiences. They already considered the Leopard Headquarters’ as having poor control and inadequate procedures for screening agents. As a result of this report, the Blockade Commanders were clearly assured of this American organisation’s lack of control.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided to treat information received from Leopard organisation with reserve. Moreover, he clearly disagreed with the blockade ships’ direct communication.

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137 In CTG 95.1’s report he wrote the guerrillas’ number as 800. However, considering the fact that their total reached 7,000 in July of 1951, this seemed an error in his writing: *Ibid.*, p. 5.
with guerrilla agents on the various islands. Only emergency situations, such as the enemy’s imminent and obvious threat of invasion, were exempt from this policy.\(^{139}\) As the Admiral commented in the HMS Belfast’s report; ‘former cooperation which we have been at such pains to foster between Leopard […] [appears] to have been largely wiped out’\(^{140}\). Hence co-operation with Leopard regressed from the initial stage.

CTG 95.1 appeared to connect Leopard’s poor agent control partly to Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott’s character and lack of ability. This could be seen in his records in the statement; ‘My personal views are that Lieutenant Colonel Erghott is unsuitable for this duty. I will go further and say that he appears to have lost his nerve’.\(^{141}\) The only optimistic news for the Blockade Commanders was that, in early November, Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott was relieved by Major McKean. He seemed more stable and tried to re-establish better operational conditions.\(^{142}\)

### 5.8 Conclusions

From the early stage of their co-operation, there were risk factors in deploying former North Korean irregulars; these were primarily the lack of reliability concerning the guerrillas and their activities. The COs of TG 95.1 naturally realised these problems in the course of co-operation. However, to some extent, they overlooked these operational deficiencies partly due to the beneficial results gained by co-operation. They also trusted the American officers’ role as a control tower. Therefore, the west coast naval forces’ dependence on the Leopard organisation, in particular their intelligence supply, deepened within a short period of time.

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\(^{140}\) ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 14 to 24 October 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 16 November 1951.


\(^{142}\) ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 14 to 24 October 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 16 November 1951.
The relationship which had satisfactorily developed up until July 1951, however, rapidly collapsed once the truce talk negotiations began. The uncertainty of the guerrillas’ future undermined their motivation, and the increased possibility of a cease-fire only accelerated their failing morale and allegiance. Conversely, their propensity for ‘private war’ was strengthened. Moreover, Leopard Headquarters’ inadequate ability to control their agents, and its new leadership’s shortcomings as a controller and co-ordinator, accelerated these problems. As a result, these factors combined in various situations, and the Blockade Commanders’ distrust of this organisation reached a peak and the early co-operation, once established, was almost wiped out. Undoubtedly, this radically deteriorating naval-guerrilla relationship immediately caused the ineffectiveness, inactiveness and even great danger in the western naval forces’ operation.

By early November 1951, for the Blockade Commanders, little hope of redressing the situation remained, other than the prospect that a new appointment, relieving Lieutenant Colonel Ehrgott, may improve matters. As a large part of current guerrilla-related problems emerged from their nature, however, the new Leopard commander’s role seemed to have limited influence. With the gloomy outlook of their future co-operation, the TG 95.1 and the Leopard organisation entered a phase of a totally new operational environment on the west coast; the start of island warfare.
Chapter 6

Island Warfare and Imposed Close Co-Operation with the Guerrillas:

From November 1951 to November 1952

From early November 1951, TG 95.1 and their allied forces faced drastic changes in the operational environment with the start of the Communists’ new offensive operation to recapture the west coast islands. As Admiral Scott-Moncrieff commented, it represented the beginning of ‘the most critical period’ for the friendly forces on the west coast.¹ This situation forced the British Naval Forces to shift their main mission from the blockade to the islands’ defences. This required a close relationship between the Naval Commanders and the guerrillas, the latter of which had reached their lowest ebb in terms of reliability since truce talks had commenced. From November 1951, to the end of the enemy’s offensive on the islands in late 1952, naval forces in the west had to act as ‘island defenders’ and also continue in their close co-operation with these unreliable irregulars.

This chapter outlines the changed roles of TG 95.1 and the guerrilla organisation since the start of the island warfare. Their changing relationship during the period is also examined. Faced with new challenges, the nature of the required roles is detailed, along with the respective co-operation between the parties albeit of diminishing credibility.

For this purpose, this chapter will seek to explore the course taken from the beginning of island warfare. A brief narrative is given of the UN Forces’ island use on the west coast before the start of the Communists’ offensive against the islands. And then, the chapter describes why they conducted the offensive operation; mainly focusing on the dispute in the truce negotiations.

¹ ADM 116/6219, HMS Mounts Bay-Report of Proceedings from 1 to 9 December 1951, HMS Mounts Bay, 10 December 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 21 December 1951.
It then discusses the process of island warfare and the UN Forces’ measures to defend the enemy’s offensive.

Finally, this chapter examines the changing relationship between the two groups; TG 95.1 and the guerrilla organisations. It covers the complex situation, as perceived by the Naval Commanders, in relation to the guerrilla activities during almost one year of the action emulating the game of ‘Tom Tiddler’s Ground’ on a large number of small islands.²

6.1 The Communists’ Preparation for the Offensive over the Islands

During the first six months of the Korean War, the islands on the west coast were not considered very valuable to the UN Forces. Therefore, when they were forced to retreat from Chinnampo on the Taedong River in December 1950, and from Inchon on 5 January 1951, the UNC decided to abandon these previously occupied islands and withdraw. By the request of CTG 95.1, Admiral Andrewes, who pointed out the importance of at least retaining possession of several islands on the north side of the 38th parallel to provide vigilance against enemy mine laying, a number of small islands were able to be secured.³ The islands selected were Chodo, controlling the approaches to the Taedong River, Techong-do and Paengyong-do, which controlled the only inshore route on the west coast. This route had reasonably deep water and larger ships could get within gun range. Importantly, Tokchok-do controlled the approaches to Inchon. Therefore,

² ‘Tom Tiddler’s Ground’ is an old children’s game. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff used this terminology in his operational report to describe the way island warfare was conducted between the Communists and the friendly forces throughout 1952, on the west coast. ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, Office of the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station, 104/FO2FE2/1209/1, 13 February 1952, p. 6.
the Naval Commanders deployed a small number of ROK Marine garrisons to defend these islands.\textsuperscript{4}

**Map 6.1 Four Garrisoned Islands on the West Coast (Early 1951)**

However, when the UN Forces started to fight back and the front line stabilised around the 38\textsuperscript{th} Parallel, the exact value of these islands was soon appreciated. These islands were used as bases for large guerrilla numbers and several clandestine organisations. They were important as

launching points of intelligence and for raiding operations. They became more significant when Fifth Air Force set up Shoran navigational Beacons and early warning radar on several islands such as Paengypng-do, Chodo and Yonpyong-do. The value of the islands as operational bases and guerrilla havens was highlighted by Fifth Air Force Headquarters as follows:

All the islands are used in the intelligence penetration of the mainland. Many of the islands are bases from which resistance movements are supported and/or sabotage operations against enemy installations are launched. [...] The islands provide home stations for the native boats which attack enemy shipping along the NE and NW coasts of Korea. The islands provide havens useful for evasion and escape activity and bailout point for pilots in distress. The islands are a basic necessity in rescue work. One or two helicopters are maintained on alert at Paengyong-do; another is at Chodo […] There are D/F station on Chodo, Paengyong-do and Yonpyong-do which show the fighter aircraft the way home from the Chongchon and Yalu River areas. There are Shoran Beacons on Taechong-do [Techong-do] and Tokchok-to which guide the bombers to their targets in North Korea. There is early warning radar on Chodo and Paengyong-do.5

Because of these characteristics, the numbers of friendly-held islands were increased. In particular, as the volume of Leopard agents expanded, each Donkey’s operational area also extended further north. Consequently, by September 1951, there were operations on most of the islands of the Yalu Gulf with the exception of Sinmi-do. In other words, the UN Forces actually occupied most of the west coast islands at that time.6 Therefore, the Blockade Commanders supplied additional patrols and occasional bombardments on this northern area, to support Leopard and secure friendly islands.7

To the Communist Command, various activities conducted on these islands were regarded as more than harassment. In particular, the guerrillas’ intelligence gathering, in regard to their

intended movements and frequent raids, could not be ignored. Moreover, the naval forces’
frequent bombardments on the Ongjin and Chulsan Peninsulas kept inflicting heavy damages
on their troops and equipment.\textsuperscript{8}

As there were only limited numbers of naval craft, and most of these were junks for mine
laying, the Communists’ response to these UN Forces activities was also limited. Based on the
blockade ships’ operational records, there were only two cases mentioning the Communist’s
raids against the friendly held islands. One relates to the friendly islands of Yongmae-do on the
Ongjin Peninsula and the other concerns Wolto on the Cholsan Peninsula. They occurred in
April and September 1951 respectively. These could be considered as isolated incidents and
were successfully repelled by the guerrillas and blockade ships.\textsuperscript{9} The Communist aircraft
activities were also of limited interference, because of the friendly air superiority. Several
unidentified aircraft had approached the friendly islands by night and, from time to time,
dropped a few bombs. However, the damage incurred was negligible.\textsuperscript{10} The sporadic shelling
from the mainland gun positions against the friendly islands and the naval craft in offshore
operations were no more than light harassment.\textsuperscript{11} It meant that without reinforcement of trained
troops and equipment, appropriate for amphibious operation, there seemed no way of driving
out the UN Forces from the islands.

\textsuperscript{8} The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.)
중국 군사과학원 군사역사연구부, 국방부 군사편찬연구소 역, 중국군의 한국전쟁사 3, [CCF’s War
History of Resist America and Assist North Korea] (Seoul: Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK, 2005), p. 212; National Institute of Korean War History, Summary of Proceedings, Tenth Session, 6th Meeting at
Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegation on Agenda Item 2, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, United
Nations Command Advice, 30 October 1951, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{9} Regarding the enemy attack on Yongmae-do, see ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings 16 to 30
April 1951, HMS Belfast, 4 May, Appendix I.; Regarding Wolto, see ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of
Proceedings No. 41, 10 to 29 September 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force,
FO2FE/2960/11, 29 September 1951, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{10} ADM 1/27269, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, January–June 1951, Flag Officer, Second-in-

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
Therefore, on 27 September, 1951, Peng Dehuai requested research on the Dongbei Military Region. This was to determine an effective way of conducting an offensive over the west coast islands. On 6 October, as the Commander of Dongbei Military Region suggested that an amphibious operation plan be conducted by the 50th CCF Division performed with the aid of air support, they started an offensive plan in earnest. The Communist Command directed Chai Zēng Guo, Vice-Commander of the 50th Division to control the island offensive operation. Therefore, from mid-October, the 50th Division commenced the preparatory requisition of equipment and training of their troops.\footnote{12 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) *CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea*, Vol. III, pp. 212–13.}

6.2 The Truce Talks and the Beginning of Island Warfare

Although the Communist Command decided to start an offensive operation on the UN Forces held islands, it was not clear when it would be ready to be carried out. However, its commencement date needed to be considered urgent; as the importance of recapturing islands drastically increased once the truce talks resumed.

By late August 1951, the conference turned negative. The Communists unilaterally broke off from the conference, claiming an alleged UNC violation of the neutrality agreement. According to the Communist side, UNC planes had bombarded the conference site of Kaesong at 23:20 on 22 August, killing Communist delegations. Therefore, regardless of the truth of this accusation, the truce talks entered a period of suspension by late October 1951.\footnote{13 The UNC liaison officer and his party who inspected the evidence on 23 August reported the whole affair ‘nonsense’, and UNC also officially denied it. General Matthew Ridgway saw it as ‘an excuse to break off the negotiations, with the blame falling on the UNC’ and to suspend the conference ‘to strengthen their propaganda position, and to regain the initiative in the negotiations’. Korea Institute of Military History, *The Korean War*, Vol. III, pp. 95–100. The Communist side regarded this bombardment as an intentional provocation to delay the progress of the truce talks and to change the place of conference. The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), *CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea*, Vol. III, pp. 212–13.}
On 25 October, 1951, the truce talks resumed in a large tent set up at Panmunjom. This was after several meetings between liaison officers of both sides to determine a date and place for resuming the negotiations. Eventually, they were able to reduce issues in the dispute. During the following three weeks, both sides extracted a new security agreement for resuming the conference, and tents for the meeting were set up.

At the resumed meeting, both sides showed considerable flexibility over the issue of the demarcation line. In their first meeting in Panmunjom on 25 October, the UN delegates proposed the following point; ‘The demilitarized zone is based on the line of ground contact and generally conforms to this line’. This meant that they would not continue with their prior position which asked for compensation in return of their superior air and naval forces. Next day, General Lee Sang Jo, one of the representatives of the Communist side replied that ‘When this proposal is compared with the one your side made previously, it is, indeed, a step forward’, and he agreed that the UN delegates proposal of a demilitarised zone should be based on the battle line.

Although both sides agreed that the demarcation line should be negotiated from the perspective of where the current line of contact existed, there were several differences in each sides’ proposals. In particular, there were severe differences over the issue of how to deal with Kaesong, the former location of the truce talks.

Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.)* CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, Vol. III, p. 123.
14 Panmunjom is a small farm village of Neulmun-ri, half-way between the front lines of the two sides. This was at a UNC requested conference in Panmunjom: Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. III, pp. 104–5.
15 Ibid., pp. 106–8.
In fact, Kaesong was important to both sides, not only from the point of view of military strategy, but it was also important politically. For the UN forces, the Kaesong area was a critical point to give more adequate security to Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea. This was possible as it constituted a good foothold against enemy attack. For the Communists, it was important for the defence of their capital, Pyongyang. Moreover, it was the historical capital of the old Korean Kingdom and the first major city to fall into the Communists’ hands in June 1950. The occupation of Kaesong, therefore, was significant beyond its territorial size.

In addition to that, the UNC thought that Kaesong should be under their control because they had to withdraw their battalion strength forces who had successfully marched to the south of Kaesong right before the start of the truce talks. With the assumption that this agreed site for the conference would be completely neutralised, the UNC decided this withdrawal. However, contrary to the allies’ expectation, Kaesong became Communist territory from the start of the negotiations and was free from any UN Force attacks during the truce talks.

Therefore, from the second meeting, Major General Henry J. Hodes, USA, one of the representatives of the Sub-Delegation on Agenda Item 2, strongly reasoned the need for Communist withdrawal from Kaesong. He argued that ‘if there had been no armistice negotiations, the Kaesong area would have been occupied by UNC troops. The only reason UNC troops are not in the Kaesong area is because it was declared a neutral zone about 1 July.’

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18 Ibid., p. 4
General Lee Sang Jo, NKA promptly refuted this, stating that General Hodes’s argument was ‘only a conjecture’ and was based on their ‘unilateral necessity’.  

From the third meeting held on 27 October, the UN delegates suggested one more proposal to the Communist side for acquiring Kaesong. As compensation for the Communists to concede this area, they suggested that the UN Forces should withdraw from the islands north of the 38th parallel, which friendly forces occupied. This proposal can be seen in General Hodes’s comments during the meeting as follows:

The United Nations Command holds areas north of the proposed demarcation line and numerous coastal islands off the coasts of North Korea. The total area of these holdings which should be eliminated in the interest of smoothing out the trace of the demarcation line approximates that of the Kaesong area. Thus, even disregarding what I said about now you occupied the Kaesong area, acre for acre, this exchange is fair and equitable. Moreover, as I pointed out early this equal exchange of real estate contributes to the symmetry of the two general areas under consideration which will lessen administrative problems.

This ‘bargaining on the demarcation line’ continued into the next day’s meeting. General Hodes proposed again the ‘trade acre for acre’ concept and that giving up friendly islands was ‘fair and equal to both sides’. Admiral A. A. Burke, USN, put more pressure upon the Communist side by stating that, if there was no appropriate compensation for the islands, the UNC would ‘keep them during the military armistice’. The Communist side responded, saying that they were not ‘merchants’ and would not bargain territory.

Faced with UN delegate negotiations, to secure Kaesong, the Communist Command ordered the 65th Division in charge of the Kaesong area, to strengthen their position of defence. This

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22 Ibid., pp. 4–5.
was achieved by establishing strong defensive positions and deploying several brigades under the 64th Division to support the 65th Division.\textsuperscript{26} Simultaneously, to rule out any possibility of continuation in the UNC preferred trading of islands and Kaesong, the Communist Command directed operations to recapture the islands on the west coast.

This was performed from late October. With their policy of ‘from near island to far, one by one’ they planned a specific joint operation with the Air Force, and conducted landing drills. Concurrently, from 2 November, the Communists conducted air reconnaissance over the islands around the Yalu Gulf area by deploying LA-11 and MiG-15. Following this, on the night of 5 November, their operation started by landing two infantry battalions on Tan-do, a small island on the north side of Taewha-do.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{6.3 The Process of the Island Warfare during November, 1951}

Following the failed guerrilla landing in early October to capture Sinmi-do, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided to restrict his ships’ entrance to the Yalu Gulf area, where there was a high risk of mining by sampans along the narrow channels.\textsuperscript{28} In his view, any attempts to permanently hold the islands on the northern area were regarded as ‘more of a liability than an advantage’.\textsuperscript{29} Since it was more than likely that the Communists would reinforce themselves over the mud-flats, there seemed no advantage in holding them, other than for ‘prestige’.\textsuperscript{30} Although there were several reports from \textit{Leopard} and blockade ships, stating that there was a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 212–3.
\item ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 42, 29 September to 16 October 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/2960/11, 16 October 1951, p. 6.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 6–7.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
significant increase in Communist movements in this area, no friendly reinforcement was allowed to the Yalu Gulf.\(^{31}\)

In fact, towards the end of October 1951, it was noticed that there was a tendency of Chinese troop infiltration into the Hwanghae area and the northern area around the Yalu Gulf. More accurately controlled fire and a stronger reaction from the enemy shore batteries was also reported by the blockade ships.\(^{32}\) As mentioned above, it was an integral part of the Communists’ offensive operation, to recapture the islands. However, TG 95.1 was not fully ready to respond to the enemy’s offensive movements, because of a lack of reliable intelligence and a shortage of available ships.

In particular, the lack of reliable intelligence over enemy movements and intention was a significant problem. This was because it restricted the Blockade Commanders’ assessments for appropriate countermeasures. In addition to the deepened distrust over Leopard intelligence, the frequency of imprudent guerrilla emergency calls also compounded the difficulty in judging enemy intent. Moreover, intelligence from the higher command was also very limited. Even the fact that the islands had become a bargaining tool for negotiations was noted by CTG 95.1 from radio broadcasts.\(^{33}\)

Therefore, the Commanders of TG 95.1 did not consider the Communist reinforcement as an imminent threat to the friendly held islands. Instead, the main measures were greater attention to enemy movement and keeping a close proximity to several important islands south of Chodo. The Blockade Commander’s position and regard to enemy reinforcement is described in the

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\(^{33}\) ADM 1/23901, Korean Naval operations—10 November to 8 December 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/21209/1/67, 9 December 1951, p. 2.
CO of HMS *Ceylon*’s report written during his patrol, between 22 October and 5 November as a CTE 95.12 as follows:

On 2nd November, *Ceylon* proceed to Paengyong-do and his Intelligence Officer went to visit *Leopard*’s headquarters. The information he brought back showed that the Chinese are definitely moving into the coastal area North of Haeju and the North Koreans being moved out. I do not consider that this constitutes an immediate threat to the islands, but they have moved the inhabitants 1.2 miles inland, and they are better armed troops than the North Koreans. Therefore it is prudent to keep a close watch on them particularly regarding junk concentrations and new gun emplacements. I consider that ships should be in supporting distance of the more important islands.\(^{34}\)

It was imperative that the Blockade Commanders’ prudent attitude changed once the Communist’s offensive commenced on early November. During the early morning of 6 November, HMS *Belfast* (at that time CTG 95.12) received a series of signals from *Leopard* reporting that a Communist landing had occurred on Kado and Tando. Subsequently, an air attack by several bombers on Taewha-do was also reported from the *Leopard* Headquarters.\(^ {35}\)

Under the escort of sixteen LA-11s, nine TU-2s dropped bombs on Taewha-do that afternoon. According to the Chinese Official History, this bombardment was to consolidate the security of recaptured islands by inflicting damage on the guerrillas on Taewha-do.\(^ {36}\)

The CO of HMS *Belfast* at once ordered HMCS *Athabaskan*, which patrolled in the nearest area to the Yalu Gulf, to assist an evacuation of *Leopard* representatives and wounded guerrillas in Taewha-do. Owing to the impossibility of giving ships air cover in this area, the blockade ship’s role was confined to screening. HMS *Belfast* also proceeded to the north with the *Leopard* officers, to give HMCS *Athabaskan* support and to cover the approaches to the island from the west. A failure of the normal radio station, following the air attack, hampered the *Athabaskan*’s

\(^{34}\) ADM 116/6214, HMS *Ceylon*—Report of Proceedings from 22 October to 5 November 1951, para. 57.


task. During the night, it was ascertained that Tando and Kado, a few miles north-east of Taewha-
do, were occupied by the Communists.\(^{37}\) As a result of the Communists’ first offensive, most islands in the Yalu Gulf were recaptured by them. The exceptions were Taewha-do, which was still in friendly hands, and a few of the smaller adjacent islands.\(^{38}\)

Concerning these Communists’ assaults, the Commanders of TG 95.1 regarded them as clear evidence of ‘definite enemy offensive against our islands’.\(^{39}\) The EUSAK Headquarters also regarded this situation as an imminent threat to the friendly held islands. Therefore, they officially requested the UN Naval Command saying ‘Taewha-do should if possible be held and visited as frequently as possible by HM Ships’.\(^{40}\)

As there had been additional indications of a possible enemy attempt of landing on Taewha-
do, from then on, the main interest beyond routine blockade duties on the west coast had to be the security of Taewha-do. The security of the main friendly islands further south, such as Chodo, Sokto and Paengyong-do, also became more significant. Therefore, to ensure a proper naval supply of the enemy’s potential threat against remaining islands, CTG 95.1 directed two destroyers, as well as a cruiser, to remain in the Blockade Element.\(^{41}\) In addition to that, regular nightly visits to the Taewha-do area, which had previously stopped in early October, resumed. During nocturnal visits, bombardments were also carried out on Kado and Tando and on the neighbouring Chorusan Peninsular by HMS *Comus*, HMCS *Cayuga*, HMCS *Athabaskan* and USS *Edmonds*. These bombardments were mainly part of boosting the morale of the Taewha-do garrisons; but sometimes they inflicted damage on the enemy build-up.\(^{42}\)


\(^{40}\) *Ibid.*., p. 10.

\(^{41}\) ADM 116/6228, Korean War-Report of Proceedings No. 44, 13 November to 30 November 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/2960/11, 30 November 1951, p. 3.

\(^{42}\) *Ibid.*., p. 4.
Towards the end of November, however, the Communists’ interest in Taewha-do appeared to be waning. No further reports of enemy build-ups were received from Leopard, and it was confirmed that the whole of the island of Tando, which was previously captured by the enemy, was cleared. Thus, CTG 95.1 considered, in consultation with the Leopard Headquarters, to reduce the frequency of nightly visits. At that time, the Leopard guerrillas were ordered by their higher command not to resist, but conduct evacuation plans if seriously attacked by the enemy. From the Blockade Commanders’ perspective, it meant that the guerrillas were not willing to secure Taewha-do anymore. The reason for continuously supplying sizeable naval commitment in this area became weaker. Therefore, rather than focusing on defensive movements, the blockade ships’ operation gradually became more concerted towards supporting guerrilla raids in the southern area, such as Haeju and Mongumpo. Through interrogation of Chinese prisoners captured by guerrillas during their raid on Kado, it was disclosed that the Chinese intended to capture Taewha-do within the near future. However, the date was not known, and this information was not passed to Admiral Scott-Moncrieff before the enemy’s attack on this island. Thus, apart from routine night time patrols on this island, there was no additional directive for a stronger defence.

It was somewhat of a surprise therefore, when a message was received by HMS Cockade from Donkey-15 in Taewha-do that a Communist landing was taking place. Late in the night of the

43 ADM 1/23901, Korean Naval operations-10 November to 8 December 1951, the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station’s Force, FO2FE/21209/1/67, 9 December 1951, p. 1.
45 HMS Ceylon supported a raid in the Haeju area on 16 November, and HMNZS Hawea supported guerrillas in the Chodo area on 19 November. New batteries threatening Chodo were raided by guerrillas under the gunfire support by HMCS Cayuga on 24 November: ADM 234/385, Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval), British Commonwealth Naval Operations, Korea, 1950–53, pp. 195–6.
46 Ibid., p. 199.
47 ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 13 November to 3 December 1951, Enclosure to the Commanding Officer, HMS Ceylon’s letter 2887/01.
30 November, an invading enemy force numbering about 1,000 landed, using collapsible rubber boats, on both the north-west and north-east coast of Taewha-do. They were backed up by junks and sampans, and it was a truly well-planned landing operation.\(^{48}\) For the preliminary bombardment, on the afternoon of the same day, nine TU-2 bombers took off to attack Taewha-do. According to the Communist’s record, only six of them could reach this island, and they conducted bombardments as they faced opposition from F-86s on their way.\(^ {49}\) However, their attack was enough to undermine the garrison forces’ morale. As a result of this attack, a forest fire started, and a large number of casualties were inflicted on *Donkey*-15 guerrillas.\(^ {50}\) Subsequently, the Communists’ landing on the northern beaches was conducted in three waves during the darkness of night. The first wave consisted of rubber boats, the second wave utilised sailing sampans, and the third wave landed from motor junks. The attack was heavily supported by artillery fire from the island of Kado.\(^ {51}\)

Although HMS *Cockade*, which was carrying out the nightly patrol in the area, immediately proceeded and engaged the enemy junks, due to the accurate fire from the enemy batteries on Kado, she had to withdraw out of range. When HMS *Cockade* closed this area again, it was impossible to distinguish between the enemy junks attacking and the friendlies evacuating. What was worse, at that time, was that all radio communications with the Taewha-do garrisons had by this time failed.\(^ {52}\) As HMS *Cockade* could not acquire further information regarding


\(^{49}\) The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) *CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea*, p. 214; US Fifth Air Force wrote that this air combat was as follows: ‘Late in the afternoon of November 30, enemy bombers approached Taewha-do. It was then that the first major clash between US jet fighters and Russian-made bombers took place in the skies over Taewha-do. Shortly, the results were decisively in favour of the US fighters. Fourth Fighter Interceptor Wing F-86’s destroyed eight and damaged three of twelve TU-2’s, destroyed three of 16 LA-9’s, and destroyed one Mig-15’: Schuetta, *Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 1950–1954*, pp. 92–3.

\(^{50}\) ROK Army Headquarters, *The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 269.

\(^{51}\) ADM 1/27291, Korea-General Intelligence Report, Staff of the Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East station, 20 June 1952, Appendix A.

the situation and was unable to bring down supporting fire for the friendly forces, she decided to withdraw and she joined HMS Ceylon, CTE 95.12, who was closing the area from Paengyong-do.\(^{53}\)

In the early morning of 1 December, with a CAP from CTE 95.11 and friendly Air Force, blockade ships closed Taewha-do to gather more information about the situation. By questioning inhabitants of the small neighbouring islands and the guerrillas evacuating toward the south, it was learnt that all of the major islands in the Yalu Gulf were captured by the Communists.\(^{54}\)

Large numbers of guerrillas had tried to evacuate as soon as the landings took place. However, it was later known that only small numbers of guerrillas actually were able to evacuate to the Southern islands. During the first wave of enemy landing, some of the enemy approached the location where guerrilla junks were moored, and they dropped hand grenades as a part of their first assault.\(^{55}\) Therefore, amongst the approximate number of 1,200 guerrillas operating in the Yalu Gulf, only around 300 were able to evacuate successfully.\(^{56}\) The Chinese Official History records that, as a result of the offensive conducted in late November, they killed or captured 570 Leopard guerrillas.\(^{57}\) Considering the fact that many of the guerrillas were drowned or declared missing trying to evacuate, by this attack alone, Leopard lost almost 900 guerrillas. Therefore, one of the largest and most active guerrilla units, namely Donkey-15, had to retreat to Techong-do with only around 200 surviving


\(^{56}\) ADM 1/27291, Korea-General Intelligence Report, Staff of the Flag Officer, Second-in-Command, Far East station, 20 June 1952, Appendix, A.

\(^{57}\) The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, pp. 214–5.

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guerrillas.\textsuperscript{58} Another guerrilla unit in this area, Donkey-14 also lost most of its agents and had to be joined by Donkey-20 by the direction of Headquarters.\textsuperscript{59} As a result of this offensive, Leopard not only suffered their heaviest damage, but also lost all of their bases in the northern area. In particular, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff regretted that there were three British military personnel and one Leopard officer on the island and confirmed they failed to have escaped.\textsuperscript{60}

After experiencing this enemy offensive, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff expressed his surprise that the Communists had the resources to carry out an attack, which was obviously a well-planned and successful landing operation without any patrol ship detection. In particular, it was evident that they had even considered, in the course of planning, the fact that Leopard would try immediate evacuation by boat, when their island was attacked. Also, it was of interest to the allies, that the Communists had made effective countermeasures for such a reaction.\textsuperscript{61} Hence the enemy’s threat to the friendly held islands, which the Blockade Commanders had previously been inclined to discount, became imminent and real.\textsuperscript{62}

6.4 Naval Anti-Invasion Measures and Imposed Close Co-Operation with the Guerrillas

A series of successful offenses conducted on the Yalu Gulf area were considered an especially meaningful accomplishment for the Chinese Forces. This was because it was the first joint operation between the Army and Air Force, not only in the Korean War, but also in the history of the People’s Liberation Army. Their Official History, therefore, evaluates this offensive

\textsuperscript{58} ROK Army Headquarters, \textit{The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare}, pp. 269–70; U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{59} ROK Army Headquarters, \textit{The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare}, p. 259.


\textsuperscript{61} ADM 116/6220, HMAS \textit{Murchison}-Report of Proceedings 25 to 30 November 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 21 December 1951.

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Ibid}. 

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operation as one in which ‘its experience and lesson had been heavily influenced to the People’s Liberation Army’s future joint operation.’ It also includes a comment that ‘the Island Offensive Operation was very helpful for the Communist delegates to be in the lead of the deadlocked Panmunjom meeting’.

However, to the UN Forces, in particular to TG 95.1, it meant the start of the most critical and painful commitment for the islands’ defence. The Communists’ reaction over Taewha-do strongly indicated that concerted efforts were required to protect the more southerly islands. Coupled with the infiltration of the Chinese troops in the Hwanghae area, the concern over the safety of Sokto and Chodo, which were very close to the enemy’s strongly held shoreline, was radically increased. After the experience of the Taewha-do offensive, the existence of collapsible boats was regarded as a real threat. They were reported to be capable of carrying ten armed personnel and possible mortar provision. If their offensive was conducted when tide and ebb conditions were favourable for attack, it could be difficult to carry out an effective defensive operation with only naval and air commitments. An increasing threat from the installation of new enemy batteries on the Wolsa-ri peninsula, on the opposite side of Chodo and Sokto, also restricted the movement of friendly patrolling ships around this area. Moreover, on 2 December 1951, a directive was received from the UNC saying that the security of the friendly held islands was to be given the highest priority; even above blockade and escort missions.

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63 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) *CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea*, p. 215.
64 *Ibid*.
68 ADM 1/27288, Korean War–Report of Proceedings 45, 1–22 December 1951, pp. 13–14; regarding the signals from higher commands, see Appendix 1 of this document.
Establishing these measures for the safety of the islands became an imminent task for the Blockade Commanders.

The reason why the defence of these islands became such a major commitment was well stated in Admiral Scott-Moncrieff’s report, covering between 9 January and 8 February, 1952. He explained as follows:

They have been used as a bargaining counter at the Peace Conference table at Panmunjom, and the enemy has an added inducement to try to capture them. [...] they are used by UN forces for Shoran and radio beacons, radar early warning stations, air sea rescue bases, etc., and prior to November, were used extensively for the launching of covert operations. In the event of the resumption of a hot war, particularly in the air, they would be of great value.69

The islands to be secured by direction of the UNC numbered six; Chodo, Sokto, Paengyong-do, Yonpyong-do, Techong-do and Tokchok-do.70 At Chodo there were some 50 Radar stations and also SAR personnel. A new early warning Radar station was in the process of being erected at that time. Although there were around fifty American military personnel, most of them were virtually non-combatants and were there for manning an AA defended radio station. Around two hundred Leopard guerrillas were the only defensive resources ashore.71 In Sokto, there were no important friendly facilities. It was regarded important, because it could be used as a stepping stone for capturing Chodo. However, the naval defence of this island, in particular, was complicated by its proximity to the enemy’s coast; in places 3,000 yards and at the most 7,000 yards. Therefore, there were 100 guerrilla coast guards and a US Army advisor along with 230 ROK Marines. In addition to that, batteries of guns of various calibre had already been mounted and used.72 At Paengyong-do, where the Leopard’s headquarters was located, there

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70 Ibid., Appendix I.
were a number of Air Force and Army personnel, together with a small number of guerrillas, but no garrison. In the case of Yonpyong-do, located on the opposite side of the Heaju area, an Air Force beacon unit had been established. At that time, other than about 200 *Leopard* guerrillas, there were no garrisons available.\(^{73}\) In Techong-do and Tokchok-do, where the level of enemy threat was relatively low compared to other islands, there were Air Force Shoran parties and Radar stations. However, there were no appropriate garrison forces.\(^{74}\)

The anticipated method of Communist offensives was expected to be similar to that employed at Taewha-do. There were already enough troops and equipment in the Hwanghae Province. They were known to have large numbers of CCF in the area. In the Chinnampo Estuary, they had many junks and other suitable invasion craft, including rubber boats, such as those that were used at Taewha-do. These might be either self-propelled, launched from other junks, or moved without the use of outboard motors but on the ebb tide. Invasion by day or night was possible, but the most likely time was expected during darkness using the ebb of the tide.\(^{75}\) The possibility of an enemy joint operation with the Air Force was also a necessary consideration.

As the Communists’ air potential was becoming more formidable, preliminary bombing on the islands or strafing of ships prior to invasion was predicted.\(^{76}\) In fact, during December, a considerable amount of enemy air activity had been reported around the Chodo and Sokto areas. Even though there was no serious damage, on the night of 7 December, Chodo was actually bombed by two enemy aircraft.\(^{77}\) Appropriate counter-measures for any further Communist operations was hence required, especially considering the fact that this form of attack might be


\(^{75}\) ADM 116/6222, HMS *Mounts Bay*, CTE 95.12’s OP-PLAN 12-52, ‘Naval Anti-Invasion Measures for West Coast Islands’, 21 December 1951, para. 2.

\(^{76}\) *Ibid.*

later combined with offensive action conducted by enemy shore batteries — a continual threat to the islands.\footnote{ADM 116/6222, HMS Mounts Bay, CTE 95.12’s OP-PLAN 12-52, ‘Naval Anti-Invasion Measures for West Coast Islands’, para. 2.}

To defend islands from the above-mentioned threat, it had been necessary to concentrate all available ships at night in the vicinity of Chodo and Sokto, and to a lesser extent round Paengyong-do. The CO of HMS Ceylon instructed available ships in the swept channels to be stationed during the night on various beats. This covered the north and south approaches to Sokto and the channels across to Chodo.\footnote{ADM 1/27288, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 45, 1–22 December 1951, p. 13.}

This unit generally consisted of one frigate, three destroyers (two Commonwealth and one USN), one LSMR and four minor ROK craft. A US Rescue tug was also normally attached to respond in case of accidents.\footnote{ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, p. 4.} Inshore patrols, in shallow water, would be conducted by ROK patrol craft under the back-up of one frigate. Other warships were ordered to wait in the outer circle, in case of enemy approaches from Amgak and the Chinnampo estuary. Their watch was illuminated with star shells during the critical tides and moonless days. This defensive operation was named as SMOKING CONCERT.\footnote{ADM 1/23901, Korean Naval operations-10 November to 8 December 1951, p. 2.}

Due to additional commitments, it was necessary to increase the number of ships to be involved in this operation. Therefore, ship numbers in the Han River were reduced to just one. HMNZS Taupo, which had been operating on the East Coast, also ordered to join this operation.\footnote{Ibid., p. 3; ADM 1/27288, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 45, 1–22 December 1951, pp. 14–15.} TE 95.11 was also asked to be involved. During this period, the primary task of carrier borne aircraft had been the detection and destruction of any enemy build-ups to attack the friendly islands. The mainland opposite Chodo and Sokto had received particular attention,
and, in this area, a permanent TARCAP was maintained by day. This was to deal with a number of gun and mortar positions which had fired on the UN ships and islands.83

Also, the possibility of an air attack could not be discounted, especially at dusk, after the naval aircraft of TE 95.11 had withdrawn. Therefore, it was agreed that a task of the Fifth US Air Force was to be to assist in an emergency situation when TE 95.11 were not available, by the request of CTE 95.12.84 The Air Force was also asked to provide a flare-dropping or searchlight-fitted aircraft to patrol the Taedong Estuary at night. It was subsequently discovered unofficially that this was available at short notice if required.85

Although there were reinforced defensive movements of the naval forces and additional commitment from the Air Force, because of the lack of proper garrison forces, the shortage of intelligence regarding the present conditions, and difficulty of co-ordination with Leopard guerrillas and other clandestine organisations, the defensive operation could not properly ensure the safety of the vital islands.

Firstly, a significant problem was the fact that there were only limited number of regular troops available for the defence of these islands. Owing to their proximity to the mainland, it was almost impossible for naval patrols to detect all small ship movement toward the islands. The essence of the Naval Forces’ role to defend the islands, was to do their utmost in preventing landings. However, once any enemy forces were able to get a foothold, it was taken out of the Naval Forces hands. Therefore, at least in the more vitally important islands, garrison forces were needed to repel such landings.86 This presented a particular conundrum. Whilst requests

84 ADM 116/6222, HMS Mounts Bay, CTE 95.12's OP-PLAN 12-52, ‘Naval Anti-Invasion Measures for West Coast Islands’, para. 6.
85 ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, p. 16.
were made for the EUSAK to deploy the garrisons on the islands, the reply was that it could not supply such because it had no responsibility for these islands. Responsibility for the policy concerning irregular organisations rested with the C-in-C, Tokyo, but he had no combatant forces other than guerrillas. A suggestion that ROK Marines should be used was dispelled at that time by Admiral Martine, because of its implication for naval responsibility.\textsuperscript{87}

On 19 December, the UNC clarified that the responsibility of island defence was firmly with the UN Navies and the guerrilla organisation. Consequently, it was decided to deploy additional ROK Marines. However, the number of reinforcement troops was only two companies, planned to be deployed respectively on Chodo and Sokto at that time. Due to the time required for military training of newly recruited ROK Marines, additional reinforcements were planned to arrive after mid-January. This meant that there were still shortages of garrison forces to safely secure the vital islands.\textsuperscript{88} Therefore, for most of the friendly held islands, the garrison role was still dependent on the guerrillas.

Although there were around 8,000 guerrillas scattered on the vital islands and in the vicinity of lesser important islands, they were not trained particularly for island defence, and their fighting capability was doubtful. In a conference at Paengyong-do with Major McKean, the new Leopard Commander concurred that ‘he really had no organised plans for the defence of the islands, and he very much doubted whether his guerrilla garrisons were capable of doing so’.\textsuperscript{89} Moreover, the previous directive of the EUSAK, G3, their parent organisation, was to withdraw if attacked and not to attempt to hold the islands.

Because of the contradiction between their garrison role and this directive, some definitive conciliation was needed between the naval requirement and the Army directive.

This came on the 14 December, as a result of a final conference for the Military Defensive plan. It was agreed that, if the enemy landed on vital islands that ‘on no account was an evacuation to take place as soon as the enemy landed’. In addition, Leopard Commander also promised that ‘if the enemy came in large numbers of small craft, and some were able to get a foothold, the main line of resistance should be held at all costs during the night.’ This was for joint counter-attack on the following day with Naval Air and gunfire.90 However, to the Blockade Commanders, the fact that they had to largely depend on the garrison of guerrillas, considered ‘of doubtful fighting capacity or loyalty’, still remained an uneasy prospect.91

The second problem was the lack of intelligence available to the defensive naval forces regarding the Communist build-up and movements. For immediate and effective response against the enemy offensive, prompt up-to-date enemy intelligence was imperative. Therefore, some of the communication system with the main intelligence source, guerrilla organisation, had to be changed. Direct communication with the guerrillas had been restricted since early October. Hence, for direct communication between all ships of TE 95.12 and each of the Donkeys on the islands, the Donkey Net frequencies were organised. This radio communication system included all Donkey units on the west coast, and it relayed traffic and information to the Commanders of Task Element. However, this communication system was frequently congested and had little security.92 As a means to overcome these problems, all ships of TE 95.12 were provided with portable type SCR 300s for emergency inter-

92 ADM 116/6222, HMS Mounts Bay, CTE 95.12’s OP-PLAN 12-52, ‘Naval Anti-Invasion Measures for West Coast Islands’, Appendix D: Communications.
communication. At that time, a number of Donkey agents ran their own SCR 300 nets, and it was thought that in an emergency, direct communication would reduce time for naval support work.\textsuperscript{93}

However, regardless of the communication system, the guerrillas’ intelligence supply was severely limited as they directed their efforts to island defence. Although a large proportion of naval air effort was devoted to continuous air patrols in the area, due to the Communists’ excellent camouflage skill and mobility, it was virtually impossible to detect enemy movement by aircraft. Air patrols only sufficed in keeping the enemy quiet.\textsuperscript{94}

There had been an improvement in passing on certain top secret information by CTF 95, of which the source or reliability was never stated. Furthermore, except in verbal discussions, no qualifying information was ever passed on. Thus CTG 95.1 was very unsatisfied in that he was not even able to assess the strength or reality of the current enemy threat.\textsuperscript{95} He also regretted the fact that the conduct of naval operations and much effort had to be based on dubious guerrilla information.\textsuperscript{96}

The last problem related to the difficulty in recognising and co-ordinating with the various clandestine organisations, including the Leopard agents. Identification of friendly small craft moving on the west coast was always a source of difficulty. As a result of great efforts to improve recognition and co-ordination, some form of identification of craft was secured, in addition to some limited co-ordination with the Leopard organisation. However, it transpired never to have been satisfactory.\textsuperscript{97} The need for stricter co-ordination and more precise identification of craft was drastically increased.

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{96} ADM 1/27273, ‘Evaluation of The Naval Operations off the West Coast of Korea’, Office of the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station, FO2FE/21175/50, 1 December 1951, pp. 7–8.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
due to the imminent threat to the islands. In view of various reports of numbers of beached enemy junks in the Hwanghae area, all friendly movements had to be disclosed and their recognition signals clearly identified to the Naval Commanders. This was necessary in order to avoid casualties through friendly fire and to continue rigorous defensive operations.98

The above-mentioned communication system, the Donkey Net, was also useful to supply information on intended junk and sampan movements. It was agreed that each Donkey advisor would inform Donkey Net Guard, who would then promulgate the information to TE 95.12. This person was in charge of relaying all traffic and information between the Task Element and each of the Donkeys.99

In the vital island area, the recognition procedures for small craft were also simplified to improve identification. For example, a series of six white flashes on a directional lamp meant ‘Do not fire on me’ and three red lights meant ‘Enemy in sight’. When friendly forces were evacuated from the friendly islands, to distinguish them from the enemy, ‘Very lights’ were used. This was in the form of ‘two green Very lights followed by a single green Very light after a short interval’. Based on these measures, efforts were made to prevent any unidentified junk movements at night, especially from Sokto.100

One of the interesting points was that TG 95.1 formed closer relationships with the Leopard guerrillas, who were regarded as an unreliable party by the Naval Commanders in the course of preparing defensive measures. As mentioned in a previous chapter, after a series of episodes since the start of the truce talks, the relationship between these two groups had drastically deteriorated and reached its lowest point by the end of October. Therefore, the

99 ADM 116/6222, HMS Mounts Bay, CTE 95.12’s OP-PLAN 12-52, ‘Naval Anti-Invasion Measures for West Coast Islands’, Appendix D: Communications.
100 Ibid.
Commanders of TG 95.1 decided to discontinue any direct communication with the local guerrilla agents and treated any information from them with a certain level of scepticism. They also regarded the guerrillas’ frequent calls for naval demonstrations as ‘Cry Wolf’ situations, and asked them to be more prudent when using emergency signals.

Following the start of the Communist offensive to capture the friendly islands, and after several directives received from the UNC for their defence to be given the highest priority, relationships were required to change again. The value of the *Leopard* guerrillas became much more important, as they were the only force and intelligence source available. For a more effective defensive operation, an additional mission that required closer co-operation with this unreliable party was imposed on the Naval Task Group.

Moreover, within this changed operational environment, the guerrillas’ frequent emergency signals reporting enemy build-ups and requesting naval demonstrations, were not regarded as ‘Cry Wolf’ any more. The CO of HMS *Belfast* commented that ‘though some of it [intelligence] may be inaccurate, I would rather have it coming through [...] than the deadly silence’. So, rather than interrogate reliability, active intelligence supply of enemy movements and timely emergency calls thus became more important.\(^\text{101}\) The guerrillas’ activities, that were once criticised by the Naval Commanders and often provoked by their nervousness towards the security of the islands, became essential.

To the guerrilla organisation, facing the imminent threat of the Communists, to secure their base and themselves more safely, they had to make more active and close relationships with the naval forces. Therefore, by gaining more immediate emergency support from the UN naval and air support, communication was possible without long delays. Moreover, co-

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ordination with the Task Element ships was also drastically developed in an effort to reduce any unreported movement. With the *Leopard* officers’, who were directed to share the responsibility of the island defensive operation with the navalforces, adopting a very co-operative attitude, communication and co-ordination with the guerrilla organisation developed radically in a short period of time.102

6.5 Tom Tiddler’s Ground on the West Coast

As mentioned above, the UNC continued ‘bargaining on the demarcation line’ from late October to gain Kaesong from the Communist side. However, the UN side’s demand for Kaesong was not supported by President Truman and the US JCS. To them, the UN Delegation’s stand on this issue was regarded as ‘backing and filling over a seeming trifle’.103 They worried the UNC’s strict attitude toward Kaesong might breakdown any agreements which had been made in the truce talks. Therefore, on 14 November, the JCS directed General Matthew Ridgway, C-in-C, Far East, to proceed on this issue based on the principle of the line of contact.104 As the Communist side had already agreed this idea, subsequent conferences were begun to decide ‘the demarcation line based on the present line of contact with minor adjustments’.105

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102 HMS *Cossack* mentioned how the guerrillas’ developed intended movement by commenting that ‘Thanks to the efforts of my predecessors. The local intelligence officers were very good at informing me of their prospective movements’; ADM 116/6217, HMS *Cossack*: Report of Proceedings - 27 February to 16 March 1952, HMS *Cossack*, 17 March, para. 7.


On 27 November, the UN and the Communist side ratified an agreement regarding the basic principles of the Military Demarcation Line.\textsuperscript{106} This meant that the UN side would not demand Kaesong any longer if it was under the Communist Control. On the same day, both sides also agreed that all armed forces should withdraw within a certain number of days from the signing of Armistice, ‘from the other side’.\textsuperscript{107} However, each side showed clear disparity in their definition of ‘other side’. The Communist side argued that this withdrawal should be conducted ‘with the demarcation line as the dividing line’. This meant that the UN forces would be forced to evacuate from the islands on the rear side of the extended demarcation line right after the signing of Armistice.\textsuperscript{108} However, the UN Delegation argued that the withdrawal should be conducted ‘from the territory controlled by the other side’, thus certain islands currently controlled by the allied forces also should be regarded as friendly areas.\textsuperscript{109}

During the subsequent sub-Delegation meetings during early December 1951, the UN side showed a clearer position to control islands currently in the friendly hands even after the armistice. On ninth session of the sub-Delegation meeting on Agenda Item 3 held on 12 December, the UN Delegation replied ‘Yes, these islands are not your islands’ to the Communist

\textsuperscript{106} The results of agreement are as follows: 1) The principle is accepted that the actual line of contact between both sides […] will be made the military demarcation line and that at the time specified in the signed armistice agreement both side will withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to establish the demilitarised zone for the duration of the military armistice; 2) If the military armistice agreement is signed within thirty days […] the military demarcation line and demilitarised zone shall not be changed, regardless of whatever changes may occur in the actual line of contact between both sides; 3) […] if the military armistice agreement is not signed within thirty (30) days after the two Delegations approve in the plenary session […] the sub-delegations shall revise, immediately prior to the signing of the military armistice agreement, the above military demarcation line and the demilitarised zone in accordance with the changes which have occurred in the actual line of contact between both sides ….: National Institute of Korean War History, Summary of Proceedings, Thirty-Seventh Session, 31\textsuperscript{st} Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegation on Agenda Item. 2, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, United Nations Command Advice, 30 October 1951, Enclosure 1: Proposed Agreement on Item 2 for Plenary Session.

\textsuperscript{107} National Institute of Korean War History, Transcript of Proceedings, 28\textsuperscript{th} Session, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, on the armistice proposal. General Headquarters, United Nations Command Advance, 27 November 1951, pp. 4–6, 8.

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., pp. 5–6.

\textsuperscript{109} National Institute of Korean War History, Record of Events, Twenty-ninth Session, 3\textsuperscript{rd} meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Military Armistice Conference, General Headquarters, United Nations Command Advance, 28 November 1951, p. 12.
side’s question ‘Do you […] still intend to retain certain islands from which your armed forces will not withdraw?’\textsuperscript{110}

However, from the twelfth session held on 15 December, the UN Delegation changed their position and suggested that they were willing to ‘withdraw from our own islands that are in your territorial waters.’\textsuperscript{111} This abrupt change was once again made by instructions from the JCS requiring General Ridgway to accept the Communist’s requirement of the offshore islands issue. By giving concessions to the Communists, the American government intended to gain an advantage on more critical issues, in particular, rehabilitation of the Airfield in North Korea.\textsuperscript{112}

However, the Communists firmly rejected this offer. To them, any ban on the rehabilitation of the airfield was an unacceptable offer as this was regarded as intervention in North Korea’s domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{113} Furthermore, although the UN delegation agreed the principle of withdrawal from the islands in Communist waters, the UNC still showed its will to hold several offshore islands on the rear side of the extended demarcation line.\textsuperscript{114} After a series of meetings with the UN side during early December 1952, the Communists re-confirmed that the island-related issue still remained as a possible bargaining chip for the UN side.\textsuperscript{115} This fact was also mentioned by Admiral Scott-Moncrieff: ‘When an alternative line was settled on 27th November, 


\textsuperscript{112} Schnabel and Watson, \textit{The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy}, Vol. III, Part Two, pp. 50–4; during the meetings on Agenda Item 3, the UN Delegation argued that rehabilitation of the airfields on both sides would be denied for the purpose of insuring against the recurrence of hostilities. For more information regarding the negotiation on Agenda Item 3, see Kim, ‘A Study on the Truce Talks During the Korean War’, pp. 111–37.

\textsuperscript{113} Schnabel and Watson, \textit{The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy}, Vol. III, Part Two, p. 54

\textsuperscript{114} In their meeting on 15 December, the UN Delegation argued that ‘We have agreed to withdraw from our own islands that are in your territorial waters. But that is not enough for you. You want us to withdraw from our own islands which are neither in your rear nor are a threat to you. […] Some of these islands have never belonged to you at any time’. National Institute of Korean War History, Transcript of Proceedings, Twelfth Session, Meeting at Pan Mun Jom, Sub-Delegations on Agenda Item 3, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{115} The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) \textit{CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea}, p. 336.
the islands became bargaining counters again for various other points of agreement.”

Thus, to rule out any advantage for the UNC in the negotiations, the Communist forces’ assault against the friendly held islands in the area further south continued.

To the Communist Forces, however, conducting offensive operations on the UN Forces’ held islands on the opposite side of the Hwanghae area was not as easy as in the Yalu Gulf. Unlike the defensive condition of Taewha-do area, where only limited naval and air supply was allowed, around the vital islands and, in particular, the Chodo and Sokto area, there were well-prepared defensive positions maintained by the UN Forces. This characteristic contributed to the fact that it was very difficult for the Communists to conduct successful direct offensives on the vital islands. Therefore, rather than attempting daring direct attacks on major islands, such as their policy ‘from near island to far, one by one’, they were more inclined to capture more inshore small islands first, which had little defensive forces.

The UN Forces, regardless of each islands’ tactical importance, were not allowed to let the Communists permanently hold any of the islands on the coast of Hwanghae Province. Although by the direction of the UNC, six islands were selected as strategically vital, this did not mean that the UN Forces were indifferent to other islands. The large number of small islands could potentially be used as stepping stones for capturing the vital islands. Hence, if possible, it was also necessary to secure these less important islands. Even the several small islands close to the mainland needed to be denied to enemy capture, as such occupation would threaten the friendly mine sweeping activity around the inshore area. The minor islands were also used as stepping stones for amphibious operations and intelligence activities for friendly guerrillas:

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117 It was not clear whether the Communist Command actually intended to capture the vital islands. The Blockade Commanders were also unsure about their intention.
118 ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, p. 5.
another reason why their value could not be overlooked. Therefore, a second round of island warfare was developed, as Tom Tiddler’s Ground for small and less important islands between the major islands and the mainland.

From mid-December, a Communist offensive towards the islands opposite Hwanghae Province was initiated. In the early morning on 16 December, the enemy tried to capture Chongyang-do, an islet four miles south-east of Sokto, by landing around seventy troops.\(^{119}\) This islet was used by the friendly forces as landing places for shore fire control parties and guerrilla operations. This small island was also important in that it would be a useful stepping stone towards the southern approach to Sokto.\(^{120}\) From the request of the guerrillas on Sokto, HMS *Ceylon*, *Constance*, *Alacrity* and HMCS *Sioux* proceeded into this area and conducted bombardments toward the expected enemy positions. Simultaneously JML 309 was sent to evacuate refugees on this islet. In the afternoon, a heavy air attack on enemy positions followed. As a result of continued bombardment, it was reported that the enemy evacuated at around 19:00, and Chongyang-do was recaptured by the guerrillas.\(^{121}\)

Early next day, Ungdo, another islet nearby Chongyang-do, was also invaded by around 700 enemy troops. Unlike the case of the previous day, the Communists continued to secure the islet despite continued naval and air bombardments for more than a week. Thus, by the request of the *Leopard* officer on Sokto, a guerrilla raid named Operation CHEERFUL was planned. The object of this operation was to recapture Ungdo using guerrillas from Sokto under naval and air support. Although prior to guerrilla landings, a considerable softening up process took

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\(^{119}\) ADM 116/6214, HMS *Ceylon*-Report of Proceedings from 8 to 20 December 1951, HMS *Ceylon*, 22 December 1951, Appendix I: Chronological Summary of Events.


\(^{121}\) ADM 116/6214, HMS *Ceylon*-Report of Proceedings from 8 to 20 December 1951, Appendix I: Chronological Summary of Events.
place with naval bombardments and air strikes, the guerrillas were repelled with heavy
 casualties after facing fierce and effective mortar resistance from the enemy.\textsuperscript{122}

From late December 1951, when most of the naval commitments were focused in the Chodo-
Sokto area and small number of nearby islands, the Communists simultaneously attacked the
islands in the Ongjin Peninsular and Haeju areas. On 23 December, the small islands Yukto and
Chodo, near the Haeju area, were captured by enemy landing troops.\textsuperscript{123} The islands of Taksom,
and Yuksom, near Yonpyong-do, were also captured on the next day.\textsuperscript{124} On 26 December,
another small island in the Yonpyong-do area named Sosuap-to, was reported to be captured
by 300 enemy troops. Taesuap-to, about one mile south of Sosuap-to, was also captured by the
enemy on 28 December.\textsuperscript{125} During a similar period, a number of islands on the South of the
Ongjin Peninsula; Sunwi-do, Ohwa-do, Yongho-do and Changin-do also fell to the
Communists. This Communist threat continued towards other UN-held islands, such as Mahap-
to, Mudo and Wollae-do, and within three weeks of enemy offensive, more than ten islands
were captured by them.\textsuperscript{126}

\textbf{Map 6.2 Islands on the West Coast (Naval Operational Area)}

\textsuperscript{122} ADM 116/6211, HMS \textit{Belfast}-Report of Proceedings, 22 December 1951 to 8 January 1952, HMS \textit{Belfast}, 8
January, Appendix I: Chronological Summary of Movements and Events.
\textsuperscript{123} This Chodo is a small island on the opposite side of the southern Hwanghae area.
\textsuperscript{124} ADM 116/6211, HMS \textit{Belfast}-Report of Proceedings, 22 December 1951 to 8 January, Appendix I: Chronological Summary of Movements and Events.
\textsuperscript{125} ADM 116/6224, HMNZS \textit{Taupo}-Report of Proceedings from 11 to 31 December 1951, HMNZS \textit{Taupo}, 9
January 1952, paras 10–11.
\textsuperscript{126} ADM 1/27272, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 46, 22 December to 8 January 1952, p. 8.
Because of these simultaneous attacks, in the Ongjin and Haeju areas, and also because of a strong indication that additional offensives would follow, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided to issue new directives to the Blockade Commanders to improve the effectiveness of the naval forces’ defensive operation. During his stay on the west coast from 23 December 1951 throughout January 1952, he clearly realised that the defence of the islands was a prolonged...
high-priority commitment. Therefore, under the Command of CTE 95.12, ships of Task Element were organised into four task units. Each of the defensive task units was given a daily patrol area and a wider area of responsibility. The new organisation of Task Element 95.12 was as follows:

**TU 95.12.1** Sokto-Chodo Unit. Patrol area, code name CIGARRET, from Sokto to Choppeki Point.

**TU 95.12.2** Peongyong-do Unit. Patrol area, code name WORTHINGTON, from Choppeki to approximately meridian 125°15′E, including Wollae-do, Yukto and Kirin-do.

**TU 95.12.3** Han Unit. Patrol area, code name GUINNESS, Han estuary, but frigates not to proceed beyond Fork anchorage.

**TU 95.12.4** Haeju Unit. Patrol area, code name BRICKWOOD, from Worthington area to the eastward.

This reorganisation invoked more immediate responses, in particular in the southern area, but recapturing the Communist held islands and defending additional threats were not easy tasks. Experiencing the enemy offensive, the *Leopard* guerrillas, the only available landing forces, suffered heavy casualties. Based on several remaining records, it is clear that *Donkey*-1, who had to move to Kirin-do from Yongho-do whilst under enemy attack, suffered the loss of more than seventy guerrillas. *Donkey*-11, who shared the same island with *Donkey*-1, suffered even greater numbers of dead and wounded. After the withdrawal to Paengyong-do, only around 270 guerrillas remained from amongst 700. *Donkey*-21, who participated in the Operation CHEERFUL, lost more than fifty of their guerrillas. Owing to these heavy losses, it was very difficult to expect any guerrilla counterattack before regrouping. Moreover, after experiencing such heavy damage, the *Leopard* Headquarters issued a direction stating that

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'Except for the vital islands, if there are enemy attack on the guerrilla held islands, immediately report this information to the Headquarters and Task Unit Commander, and then withdraw without any trial to secure them.' 132 Rather than defend these less important islands by using their guerrilla forces, who had little training for garrison roles, it was a new policy to inflict heavy damage on the enemy landing troops by bombardments through air strikes and gunfire.

Between late December 1951 and late January 1952, therefore both the attacks on enemy captured islands and the primary defensive activities against additional threats had to be conducted mainly by the UN naval gunfire and air strikes. Each blockade ship’s defensive and harassing activities were conducted during the night-time. During these dark periods, they took up defensive stations on the enemy lines of approach, between them and the mainland. This line was illuminated by star shell. Concurrently, periodical harassing bombardments were carried out against the enemy held islands and their concentration areas. Also, further inshore areas were patrolled and harassed by the ROKN Craft. 133 By daylight, the ships usually had to withdraw out of the immediate range of shore batteries and mortars. 134 Therefore, except for emergency situations, day-time harassment was conducted by the aircraft of CTE 95.11, which at that time entailed HMAS Sydney and USS Badoeng Strait. 135 During this period, the guerrillas’ main role was reporting enemy movements on both islands and mainland and recapturing islands with no or little enemy resistance. An example of the UN Forces’ response can be seen in the process report on the recapturing of Sosuap-to, as follows:

On the evening of the 27th the island of Sosuap-to, in the Haeju estuary, north of Yongpyong-do, was attacked and captured by the enemy during the night. The local guerrilla agent on this island escaped to Taesuap-to and reported the situation calling on HMNZS Taupo for assistance. HMNZS Taupo bombarded the island and next day USS Badoeng Strait’s aircraft

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132 Ibid., p. 240.
133 ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, p. 5.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid., p. 2.
carried out air strikes and attacks on junks in the vicinity causing a great many casualties. In fact subsequent reports indicated that some 300 enemy and 700 civilians had been killed in the original attack and counter-attacks. Friendly forces re-occupied Sosuap-to the next night and this island is now safely held.\textsuperscript{136}

During late January, however, the enemy’s advances in this area became less active. Several islands in this area, such as Mahap-to and Mudo, were reported to be under a continuous threat, and enemy build-ups on the coast line of the mainland were constantly being reported, yet, during this period, no additional island had fallen into enemy hands.\textsuperscript{137} It was also reported that the Chinese troops in Hwanghae Province were replaced by the North Korean Army, namely, the 23\textsuperscript{rd} and 26\textsuperscript{th} Brigades during this time.\textsuperscript{138}

The Communist forces’ inactivity and their replacement of troops in the Hwanghae area were followed by agreement from both sides on several issues pending under Agenda Item 3 in late January 1951. Due to the differences of the two sides’ viewpoints in regard to the restoration of the airfields, the sub-Delegation meetings on this item had been significantly obstructed until early January.\textsuperscript{139} However, since instructions from the US government on 10 January directed that ‘the discussion of the airfield problem should be postponed until the other issues in Agenda items 3, 4, and 5 have been agreed upon’, the UNC decided to discuss other issues first, which had little differences of opinion, except for the airfield issue. As the Communist side agreed to the UNC’s changed negotiation strategy, on 27 January, the status of inshore islands issue gained a \textit{de facto} ratification by both sides.\textsuperscript{140}

According to the ‘draft Armistice Agreement’, agreed by the Staff Officers under Agenda Item 3, the UN forces mainly withdrew from the friendly held islands on the western and northern

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item [137] ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, p. 1.
\item [138] \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 1, 5; The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) \textit{CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea}, p. 215.
\item [140] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 340.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
side of the Hwanghae and Kyong-gi Provincial line. It was also agreed, however, that the UNC ‘shall retain control of, and may continue to occupy, the islands of Paengyong-do, Techong-do, Sochong-do, Yonpyong-do, and U-do’. Accordingly, one of the troublesome issues of the truce talks, ‘the status of inshore islands’ was resolved. Undoubtedly, this situation also weakened the motivation of the Communist forces’ continuation of an active offensive against the UN forces’ islands.

Regardless of the Communist forces’ changed posture, TG 95.1 had to maintain their defensive operation on the west coast. In addition to that, it was an imperative from the Blockade Commanders that the enemy should never permanently occupy the inshore islands. Although it seemed not very plausible, there was however some possibility that the Communists would use them as stepping stones to capture the vital islands. Moreover, such possession would restrict friendly activities and threaten inshore minesweeping operations. Therefore, from early February, steps were taken by HMS Ceylon, at that time CTE 95.12, to recapture the islands in the southern area. The Leopard guerrillas on the Haeju area and the Swanny Force were also involved this operation.

However, before the start of this operation, very interesting situations were reported by the guerrillas. As a result of investigation of each island, it was confirmed that the enemy had withdrawn from the small islands of Yuk-som and Changjae-do. It was also reported that they had withdrawn from Sunwi-do, Yongho-do and Changnin-do on 2 February. Two days later,
Mudo was re-occupied by the guerrillas without opposition. On 6 February, Pado and Wido were reported clear as well.

Another interesting situation in relation to the enemy also came about in the same period. From the night of 3 February, they initiated attacks on the small islands by capturing Yukto. In spite of the presence of HMCS *Athabaskan* and LSER 401 around this area, under the fire cover from their shore batteries, the enemy successfully landed troops. The *Leopard* guerrillas on this island at once evacuated, and the island passed into enemy hands. However, on 5 February, Yukto was reported clear of the enemy, and the guerrillas then reoccupied it. A similar situation occurred at Mahap-to a few days later. On 18 February it was also reported that the enemy had recaptured Yongho-do, Pado and Wido — from which they had withdrawn almost two weeks previously.

In this area, the Communists seemed to adopt the policy of periodically occupying the small inshore islands off the south and west coasts of the Ongjin peninsula. They only remained in them for a day or so, and then returned to the mainland. Any friendly guerrillas who might be based in these islands were evacuated as soon as the enemy was seen approaching, and returned after they left. This strange enemy activity pattern was well explained by Admiral Scott-Moncrieff as follows:

These islands in the South are therefore a kind of Tom Tiddler’s Ground, where either side can occupy them at will, but neither one is prepared to expend a great effort to hold them. Only if our main islands are threatened do we allow the enemy to tie us down.

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147 Ibid.
During this time of Tom Tiddler’s Ground, it was clarified, in the course of recapturing the islands, that the enemy’s main intention was to raid the islands and try to capture the guerrillas. After this, the intention was to mine the beaches but not necessarily to hold them.\textsuperscript{151} Therefore, based on the fact that there was no attempt by the Communists to invade any of the vital islands, and because they were largely replaced by North Koreans, CTG 95.1 tentatively concluded that the enemy did not have ‘sufficient forces to do more than raid the smaller islands close inshore’.\textsuperscript{152}

In fact, until late 1952, there was continuous Tom Tiddler’s Ground between the UN Forces and the Communists without any actual attempt to capture the important islands. This was particularly active on the Ongjin and Haeju area which has a large number of small islands and which had been used for guerrilla bases. However, due to the uncertainty of the Communist intention, TG 95.1 had to continuously be involved in this toilsome commitment until late 1952.

6.6 The Change of the Guerrilla Organisation during the Island Warfare

During December 1951, when the UN Forces on the west coast endeavoured to respond to the Communists’ changed offensive movement, the guerrilla organisation underwent a command and control realignment. On 10 December 1951, responsibility for the guerrillas was handed over from G3, EUSAK to the 8240\textsuperscript{th} Army unit of the Far East Command, Liaison Department, Korea [FEC/LD (K)].\textsuperscript{153} This meant that the responsibility of the guerrilla operation was transferred from the EUSAK to a theatre-level agency that was in charge of intelligence activities.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{151} ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 13 to 29 February 1952, HMS Ceylon, 29 February 1952, para. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{152} ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 74.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
At the same time, for the purpose of co-ordinating all behind-the-lines activities, including intelligence supply and the guerrilla operation, an additional theatre-level organisation was set up. It was named as the Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK).\textsuperscript{154} However, these changes were not so welcome to the field officers, who commanded Leopard guerrillas and the guerrillas themselves. To the Leopard officers, instead of reporting to just one staff level, as they had been done before, they had to report any intended operation and its results not only to FEC/LD (K), their new parent organisation, but also to CCRAK. This also meant that they had to conduct operations under the influence of these organisations’ directions. To the guerrillas, although it was not clear whether they realised the influence of this change, it meant that they were no longer regarded as a viable operational force. Unlike the EUSAK who intended to use the guerrillas for a counteroffensive, as these theatre-level organisations mainly dealt with clandestine operations, it could be expected that there would be some changes in the pattern of the guerrilla activity.\textsuperscript{155}

In addition to the higher command and control level change, another significant change was concurrent within the guerrilla organisation. On December 1951, for the purpose of relieving the overburdened Leopard responsible for all of the west side of North Korea’s costal area, it was decided to establish an additional overall unit, code-named ‘Wolfpack’ on the west coast.\textsuperscript{156} In fact, the division of this area into two separate organisations had been considered from mid-1951. This was owing to the logistical and administrative problems of several southern Donkey bases a long distance from Paengyong-do.\textsuperscript{157} Once island warfare had commenced, it was finally decided to divide the area under Leopard responsibility.

\textsuperscript{154} Malcom, \textit{White Tigers}, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{157} Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 74.
The reorganisation related to the guerrillas operating in the southern area of Hwanghae Province, and in particular, the middle of Sunwi-do, in the Haeju area, to the mouth of the Han River. In this area, four Donkey units had been operating under the loose control of the Leopard Headquarters. There were also around 1,000 guerrillas under the command of the ROK 1st Division that had operated on Kangwha-do, a large island at the mouth of the Han River. This entire area was transferred from Leopard to Wolfpack.158

The new organisation became official on 1 January 1952, under the command of Major Richard M. Ripley. Starting with the ROK Army guerrillas on Kangwha-do and some part of Donkey-5 on Kydong-do, Wolfpack gradually formed its organisation. Later, the remaining part of Donkey-5 and other Donkeys on Haeju area, such as Donkey-8, -12 and -13, also joined this organisation. As the Wolfpack Headquarters, Kyodong-do, a small island at the Han Estuary was initially designated. However, in early spring this shifted to Kangwha-do because of better lines of communication with the mainland. The guerrillas on these southern islands dropped their previous names and were designated as ‘Wolfpacks’ and a number.159 The Wolfpack organisation was as follows:

**Table 6.1 Organisation of Wolfpack (April, 1952)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
<th>Previous Organisation</th>
<th>Date of Joined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wolfpack-1</td>
<td>Kangwha-do</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>5816 guerrilla Unit</td>
<td>December 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ROK Army 1st Division)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfpack-2</td>
<td>Kyodong-do</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>Donkey-5</td>
<td>December 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Vicinity small islands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfpack-3</td>
<td>Yongmae-do</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Donkey-13</td>
<td>March 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfpack-4</td>
<td>Sosuap-to, Mudo</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>Donkey-8</td>
<td>May 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfpack-5</td>
<td>Taesuap-to</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>Donkey-12</td>
<td>February, 1952</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The eight Wolfpack units were assigned to take over the east and south side of the Ongjin Peninsular, whilst Leopard was able to concentrate operations on the farther north side of North Korea.160

From the early stage of Wolfpack’s establishment, the Blockade Commanders fully recognised the organisational change within the guerrilla organisation. This fact was mentioned in the CO of HMS Belfast’s report on 8 January 1952, as follows:

Major Mause [Major Richard M. Ripley], US Army has taken over control of the Han River and all islands West as far as, and including, Mudo from the Leopard organisation. The old ‘Donkey’ is the above area are now called ‘Wolfpacks’. Communications with the new ‘Wolfpack’ organisation were not wholly straightened out by the time we left, but, as a result of your conference with Major Mause, it should be working smoothly shortly.161

As mentioned above, by early January 1952, the islands were not yet ready to change to the Wolfpack organisation, and the Donkey set-up was still in existence. Contrary to the CO of HMS Belfast’s expectation, it took a relatively long time for this new guerrilla command to settle down. Because of the Communists’ intense offensive toward the small islands on the south of Ongjin Peninsula, they were heavily involved in the defensive operation. As they also needed

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160 Ibid.
some time to recover from damage; their transition continued up until March 1952, when five of their units initiated an active operation with six American officers.162

6.7 The Task Group Commanders’ Mixed Evaluation of Leopard and Wolfpack Activities

From early February 1952, after more than ten days of extremely low temperatures, ice had formed in the northern side of the operational area. Before mid-February, the Chodo and Sokto areas had become fairly well covered with ‘pancake ice’, which made the position of the ships somewhat precarious and prevented boat work.163 The ice, although a foot thick or more, remained tumbled and broken, hence it was unsafe for potential invaders to walk on it.164 Fortunately, this situation provided the defenders some opportunity to experience a peaceful period. Although this situation in fact isolated Sokto, Chodo and smaller islands in their vicinity, it also made any enemy invasion impracticable throughout the period.165 Towards the end of February, as the ice reached its worst state, it even stretched to the Ongjin Peninsular.166 As a result of conditions, the Communist activities covering the overall area of Hwanghae Province were hampered until the end of this month.

In fact, their inactivity continued throughout this cold period. Other than a feint raid against Mudo on 26 February, the Communists had not launched any attacks on the friendly-held

164 Ibid.
islands, although several firing incidences from shore batteries on friendly patrol ships were recorded. However, any damage was negligible.\textsuperscript{167}

It was not only the Communists, but also the guerrillas who were restricted during this period. However, this lack of activity was apprehended by the Blockade Commanders, as it was largely due to harsh weather conditions; ice and snow handicapping the movement of agents.\textsuperscript{168} The ice on the inshore area heavily restricted any sampan movements towards the mainland from landing or picking up the guerrillas. Another feature was that all of the habitants of Hwanghae Province that dwelt in and around the coastal area defence zone were removed. They were taken almost 2 km from the coastal area as a precautionary measure. Therefore, any guerrilla activities on the snow would offer a very easy means of tracking for the enemy forces. Due to these prevailing conditions, only limited ambushes and intelligence activities by mainland agent cells were feasible.\textsuperscript{169}

The thaw started around the end of February, and, by the first week of March, nearly all of the ice had disappeared in the Chodo-Sokto area. Therefore, the channels around Sokto became navigable again, and all patrol routes opposite Hwanghae Province could be used once more.\textsuperscript{170} With the increasing temperatures, so the expectancy of the Communist raids on the UN-held islands grew. Unlike the situation at the end of 1951, TG 95.1 was suitably prepared to respond to any Communist offensive. As mentioned above, during January 1952, there was an additional reinforcement in the garrison forces. Therefore, not only Chodo and Sokto but also the other several vital islands such as Paengyong-do and Yonpyong-do had been reinforced by the ROK

\textsuperscript{168} ADM 116/6212, HMS Cardigan Bay-Report of Proceedings from 7 to 21 February 1952, HMS Cardigan Bay, 23 February 1952, para. 7.
Marines, and the responsibility for the defence of these islands, which was under CTG 95.1, had been assigned to TE 95.15. This was a new sub-element responsible for vital island garrison tasks and commanding the ROK Marine and, if required, guerrilla forces. For this duty, Colonel W. K. Davenport, CTE 95.15, US Marine Corps, commanded a small number of US Marine Corps personnel to be assigned to each of the main islands as Island Defence Commanders.\textsuperscript{171}

With a continual heavy commitment in UN naval and air defensive activities, a stable defensive readiness to protect the vital islands was maintained.\textsuperscript{172}

The defensive changes required \textit{Leopard} and \textit{Wolfpack} guerrillas to become more active. In particular, the Commanders of TG 95.1 expected a large increase in guerrilla supplied intelligence on the vital islands, because large numbers of them were relieved from garrison tasks as a result of the island defence forces’ reinforcement.\textsuperscript{173} Guerrillas of the Chodo and Sokto islands, due to their relatively close proximity to the mainland, were especially expected to be more active. Unlike Paengyong-do and Yonpyong-do, being respectively nine and seven miles from the mainland, Sokto and Chodo are only three and five miles respectively. This expectancy was not due to distance alone, but also by virtue of the fact that the numbers of \textit{Leopard Donkeys} were more concentrated in this area; being six out of a total of twelve units.\textsuperscript{174}

However, it soon transpired that these expectations were only partly correct; at least to the Blockade Commanders. From March, increasing guerrilla activities were reported in several areas of \textit{Leopard} and \textit{Wolfpack} involvement. However, unlike previous relationships with the guerrilla organisation, the Commanders of TG 95.1’s had differing opinions concerning

\textsuperscript{171} ADM 1/23906, Korean Naval Operations-9 January to 8 February 1952, pp. 1–2.
\textsuperscript{174} There were \textit{Donkey}-3, -6, -7, -9, -20 and -21 in the Chodo-Sokto area. However, as there was one more \textit{Donkey} (D-13) was set up from 31 August 1952 and started operation on Sunwi-do, the total number of \textit{Donkey} units became thirteen. ROK Army Headquarters, \textit{The Korean War and the Guerrilla Warfare}, pp. 250, 270, 355.
the two guerrilla groups’ activities; as discussed in the remainder of this chapter. This was particularly so amongst the Task Unit Commanders who had continual close relationships with these two guerrilla organisations.

As mentioned above, Task Element 95.12 was reorganised into four task units, to improve their defensive operations since mid-January 1952. Each Task Unit ship co-operated mainly with guerrillas within their designated patrol area; that is, TU 95.12.1 with *Leopard* in the Chodo-Sokto area, TU 95.12.2 with *Leopard* in the Paengyong-do area, and TU 95.12.4 with *Wolfpack* in the Haeju area. The fourth, TU 95.12.3, patrolled the Han estuary. This area contained a large number of *Wolfpack* guerrillas in Kangwha-do and Kyodong-do, but very little contact was made with them. Due to the low level of enemy threat against the islands in this area during this defensive operation, only intermittent visits of a frigate were allowed in the Han area.\(^\text{175}\)

As most of the blockade ship’s movements in each area were heavily influenced by the local guerrillas’ activities, these activities were subsequently constantly evaluated by the COs of the Task Units.

An interesting point was that clear, distinctive and fairly consistent evaluations of these three groups of guerrillas acting in different areas began to emerge. To the COs of TU 95.12.1, the *Leopard* guerrillas’ activities in the Chodo-Sokto area could be briefly described as poor intelligence supply and short of offensive activities although there were continued active movements toward the mainland. In the case of the *Leopard* guerrillas in the Paengyong-do area, they were reported to be very inactive during the earlier period of 1952. However, since July, more active and successful movements were gradually reported by CTU 95.12.2. On the

\(^{175}\) Therefore, the *Wolfpack* Headquarters requested that the blockade ships paid more frequent visits in this area for the purpose of boosting *Wolfpack* guerrilla morale: ADM 116/6219, HMS *Morecambe Bay*-Report of Proceedings from 23 to 29 September 1952, HMS *Morecambe Bay*, 30 September 1952, para. 11.
other hand, the COs of TU 95.12.4 showed high satisfaction with the Wolfpack guerrillas’ overall activities in their area.

*Leopard Guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto Area*

During March, there had been a relatively low level of enemy threat on the mainland opposite the Chodo-Sokto area. There had been several attacks by the enemy on the two islets, Hodo and Chongyang-do, near Sokto. However, it was not in the Naval Commanders policy to hold them because they were of a walkable distance from the mainland during low ebb. Therefore, except for spasmodic bombardments by friendly patrol ships, or TARCAP aircraft, when the enemy were seen in these islets, no additional commitments were provided to these islets. It meant that the guerrillas in this area could conduct their own activities without the heavy burden of garrison roles. Moreover, despite the low level of enemy threat, as there had been continued Communist movements in that area, target intelligence for TU 95.12.1 should be forthcoming from the guerrillas as before.

In fact, from early March, increasing guerrilla activities were reported again by the ships of Task Unit within this area. However, unlike the expectation of the Blockade Commanders, there was actually no intelligence supply from Leopard. During her patrol as CTU 95.12.1, between 27 February and 16 March, HMS Cossack reported the activities of Leopard guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto area as follows:

It is worthy of comment that despite the large number of what were assumed to be agents who were landed almost nightly on the mainland from Chodo not one single target was provided by intelligence sources the whole time Cossack was in this area.177

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This situation continued during April and May. Therefore, ships in this area had to rely on several intelligence reports by TE 95.11’s aircraft patrolling around this area. The problem was, without any exception, that a shortage in intelligence supply remained up until the end of November 1952. An interesting point was that there had been a constantly active guerrilla movement reported by the friendly naval forces. The report of the CO of HMS Mounts Bay, who was the last CTU 95.12.1 covering the period to be discussed in this chapter, showed this problem clearly. His comments were as follows:

No local intelligence was received whilst I was in the area. The same state of affairs obtained during my last patrol as CTU, and is most unsatisfactory. There are nightly friendly movements of all sorts proceeding in and out of Chodo, but nothing of local interest ever seems to emerge, and one has neither targets to shoot at […] nor any idea of what is going on ashore.

It was not only the intelligence supply which had yielded poor results for the blockade ships, the Leopard’s offensive activity during the covering period was also very inactive. In particular, based on the operational records of TG 95.1, it was very surprising that there had been no guerrilla raid reported to the Task Unit Commanders up to mid-June. Moreover, even the first raid recorded, that of 26 June by guerrillas on Chodo, gave the impression of inadequate co-ordination with CTU 95.12.1. The biggest problem was that the guerrillas acquired the ROK craft’s support in this area without the knowledge of CTU 95.12.1’s command.

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A more surprising fact to be noted was that, since this poorly co-ordinated raid, there were no further records with regard to Leopard guerrilla raids on the Chodo-Sokto area. Considering the fact that, regardless of their reliability, these guerrillas in this area were one of the most active agents to the Blockade Commanders in 1951, this called into question their purpose and was a source of dissatisfaction to the friendly Naval Commanders. Needless to say, TU 95.12.1’s lack of co-operation with the guerrillas inevitably caused its blockade ships’ inactiveness.

**Leopard Guerrillas in the Paengyong-Do Area**

In and around Paengyong-do, another Leopard area of responsibility, no direct enemy threats had been made by mid-July on any of the friendly held islands. Except for a reported threat to invade the island of Mahap-to on 29 May, this area had remained quiet. The problem was that the guerrillas in this area were also very inactive during the same period. Their lack of intelligence reported by CTU 95.12.2 is shown in the CO of HMNZS Taupo’s report, as follows:

It became apparent at the beginning of April that what little enemy was reported in my area was in the Wollae-do area and therefore the Worthington destroyer was on future given that area for her patrol. The area Kirin-do, Changin-do and Sunwi-do had been devoid of any intelligence for fourteen days and it was considered a waste of the destroyer’s time and capabilities to make her patrol in that area.

However, unlike Leopard in Chodo-Sokto, who demonstrated disparity between their active movements and lack of reported results, there were several comprehensible reasons for the guerrillas in the Paengyong-do area. This situation was not only caused by the lack of enemy movements, but also by the fact that the guerrillas were undergoing internal problems. To the

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guerrillas, enemy inactivity meant few targets to report and little opportunity to conduct raids. Moreover, large number of the guerrillas in this area had to concentrate on regrouping rather than their main tasks for a while. Of the six Donkeys remaining in TU 95.12.2’s patrol area, Donkey-1, -4, -5, -10, -11 and -13, three Donkey units (-1, -11 and -13), that had suffered heavy casualties during the previous enemy offensive, had to retreat to Paengyong-do to recover and regroup. It was around late April that they were able to initiate operations. In case of Donkey-4, which had been in a state of turmoil since the assassination of its leader on 1 January 1952, it was able to restart its operation in earnest from early May 1952. Considering the fact that the other two Donkeys were operationally based on Paengyong-do, a relatively long distance from the nearest point of mainland, it was very unrealistic to expect much active movement from them.

From mid-July, in the Paengyong-do area, an area that had been relatively quiet over the previous four months compared to the other two areas, enemy activity began to increase. After the redeployments of several Donkey units from Paengyong-do to the smaller islands and their restart of activities, the Communist reinforcement and their recommencement of offensive movements followed. In fact, the number of bombardments on friendly patrolling ships from enemy batteries placed on the southern side of Choppeki point increased significantly. Moreover, on 16 July, the island Changin-do was captured by around 160 landing enemy forces. Even though this island was recaptured by the guerrillas several days later, the enemy’s active movements continued for a while.

185 Ibid., p. 203.
186 ADM 1/23941, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 54, 14 July to 4 August 1952, Office of the Flag Officer,
In the same period, increasing guerrilla activities in this area began to be reported gradually to the ships of TU 95.12.2. Due to increasing enemy troop activities, guerrilla activities also increased as a countermeasure. In particular, guerrilla raids, which had never been conducted during the early part of 1952, resumed in earnest. The first raid was conducted on 10 July. Under the gunfire support of HMS *Belfast, Amethyst* and USS LST 883, and air strikes from the aircraft of USS *Bataan*, a guerrilla raid was launched to destroy enemy batteries on the Ongjun peninsula. This raid was quite successful in that one of the enemy gun positions was destroyed and about 60 North Korean casualties were inflicted.\(^{187}\)

Four days later, on 14 July, a very well co-ordinated and successful guerrilla raid was achieved by *Donkey-4* on Wollae-do. Under the command of the *Leopard* advisor, Lieutenant Ben S. Malcom, 120 heavily armed guerrillas conducted an amphibious raid on the mainland opposite their island. It was regarded as a model raid by the friendly Naval Commanders in as much as the guerrillas not only landed punctually, in accordance with the planned time, but they also completed the evacuation on schedule and achieved their overall objectives. As a direct result of this raid, seventy-three casualties were inflicted on the enemy and several guns were put out of action. In the course of the raid, HMS *Belfast, Amethyst* and LST 883 supported with naval gunfire and air strikes from USS *Bataan*’s aircraft, and this resulted in more reported enemy casualties, numbering around 200.\(^{188}\)

Other successful raids continued in this area, as on the night of 14 August, when about 100 guerrillas led by an American officer made a raid on the Ongjin Peninsula. This was under

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\(^{187}\) Second-in-command, Far East Station, FO2FE/2960/13, 18 August, 1952, pp. 4–5. According to the records of CCRAK, this attack was started on 15 July and there were about 300 enemy landing forces. Cho, *The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War*, p. 364.


gunfire support from HMCS *Rotoiti*. On 30 August, under the naval gunfire and TARCAP air support, an additional two raids were conducted; on the Ongjin Peninsular and on Changindo. Although their results were not as successful as the previous raid, CTU 95.12.2 positively evaluated that, in the course of both raids, intercommunication between the ships, the American shore controller and the aircraft was good. After experiencing some raids with ships of TU 95.12.2, CTE 95.12 (at that time HMS *Newcastle*) also wrote his of satisfaction regarding the well co-ordinated guerrilla raids in this area, as follows:

At the moment [...] the ships acting more and more in support of the guerrillas; playing the role of half-back [...] The co-operation between the Task Unit Commanders and the guerrilla leaders is still improving; we are now kept much more in the picture and the raids are jointly planned before execution.

From September, as the autumn harvesting period started, Communist activity in the west coast area drastically decreased. This was because of the Communist forces’ main concern of harvesting and securing their supply route. Therefore, the number of targets for guerrilla raids also decreased. In fact, the guerrillas’ offensive operations were not as active as the previous month, with only three more raids reported up until the end of November. The first raid was conducted on 27 September, followed by another on the night of 19 October; each of which were conducted on the Ongjin Peninsula using gunfire support. During the night of 28

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189 As a result of this raid, approximately 80 enemy troops were killed, a few captured and two villages destroyed. The raid was regarded as very successful in that it accomplished its object; killing enemy troops and destroying military installations. ADM 116/6220, HMS *Newcastle*-Report of Proceedings, 9 August to 5 September 1952, HMS *Newcastle*, 6 September 1952, Appendix I: Chronological Summary of Events.

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October, one more raid was then conducted on the mainland opposite from the guerrillas’ situation on Mahap-to.\textsuperscript{194} Even though there was a notable decrease in activity during these last three months, *Leopard* guerrillas’ operations in the Paengyong-do area were much more energetic than those of the guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto area, in particular, following the redeployment of several *Donkey* units to the smaller islands and the restart of enemy activity. And, with the increase of guerrilla activities, the ships of TU 95.12.2’s operation also became more active.

*Wolfpack* Guerrillas in the Haeju Area

From mid-March, the Communist threat against the islands held by the *Wolfpack* guerrillas recommenced. On 15 March, an enemy attack on Yongmae-do was reported to HMS *Concord*. Although they were repelled by the TU ships’ immediate support, enemy troop concentrations on the mainland opposite Yongmae-do were continually being reported.\textsuperscript{195} Concurrently, imminent threats against Mudo were also reported. Therefore, on 17 and 25 March, HMS *Concord* conducted bombardments on the reported enemy build-ups.\textsuperscript{196} During April, these Communist offensives continued along with threats against the small islands in and around this area.\textsuperscript{197} In the spring of 1952, the *Wolfpack* guerrillas and the ships of TU 95.12.4 faced much more active enemy movement than those in the other two areas.

Such concerted Communist movements required a suitable guerrilla response, and in fact, from early March, several reports of useful intelligence were supplied by *Wolfpack* guerrillas.

\textsuperscript{194} *Ibid.*, para. 12.
\textsuperscript{195} ADM 1/23915, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 50, 16 March to 7 April 1952, Office of the Flag Officer, Second-in-command, Far East Station, FO2FE/2960/11, 8 April 1952, p. 3.
During 15 and 17 March, when the enemy conducted raids to capture Yongmae-do and Mudo, the *Wolfpack* guerrillas in this area showed very effective movement. Immediately the enemy’s build-up was made, it was immediately reported to CTU 95.12.4, at that time HMS *Concord*, and based on their information, bombardments were carried out. Subsequently, reports of enemy casualties were supplied by the guerrillas, and from the resulting pre-emptive attacks, the enemy threat were successfully repelled.\(^{198}\)

A most satisfactory point was that the *Wolfpacks* were even qualified to provide information when bombardment should commence; that being between 0800 and 0900, or 1700 and 1800, when the troops were gathered for meals.\(^{199}\) After this operation, the CO of HMS *Concord* expressed a positive evaluation of this organisation: ‘The *Wolfpack* guerrillas appeared to be both energetic and effective. They supplied a continual flow of intelligence’.\(^{200}\)

The Communists’ active offensive movement in the Haeju area continued into late March and throughout April, and hence, the *Wolfpack*’s intelligence reports also continued. On 29 March, enemy troop concentrations opposite Yongmae-do and Chomi-do were reported.\(^{201}\) On 13 April, there was also an enemy raid conducted on Yongmae-do.\(^{202}\) Following this, on 26 April, enemy build-ups were reported on the opposite site of Mudo and Taesuap-to.\(^{203}\) All of these enemy threats were successfully repelled before they could materialise using intelligence supplied by the *Wolfpack* guerrillas. After conducting operations from 20 April to 12 May as

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\(^{199}\) Ibid.

\(^{200}\) Ibid.


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the CTE 95.12 in both Leopard and Wolfpack areas, HMS Belfast reported the contrasting activities of Leopard and Wolfpack as follows:

Wolfpack agents here [Haeju area], as always, have been prolific in intelligence and, though some of it may be inaccurate, I would rather have it coming through, to be assessed for what it is worth, than the deadly silence experienced in the Chodo area.\textsuperscript{204}

The Wolfpack guerrillas’ active intelligence supply continued through the latter period of 1952. So plentiful was it that in August, HMS Concord, at that time CTU 95.12.4, was able to comment that their intelligence supply was so continuous that it ‘has now reached a stage where the list of targets is so large thus careful scrutiny is necessary before engaging a target’.\textsuperscript{205} HMS Mount Bay, who operated in both of the Leopard and Wolfpack areas during her patrol in November, also commented on the stark contrast between the two entities. She clearly recognised Leopard’s lack of activity and intelligence after the short service experienced in the Haeju area as CTU 95.12.4, when compared to the activities and results achieved by the Wolfpack guerrillas.\textsuperscript{206} It was undeniable that, after March, Wolfpack’s intelligence activities for the blockade ships were clearly superior to that of guerrillas in other areas.

During the same period, Wolfpack also showed energetic offensive activities, and from late March to the end of November, large-scale raids and numerous small-scale raids were carried out by the guerrillas. Their first guerrilla raid since independence was carried out on 11 March. Under gunfire support from HMS Cossack, a successful raid was conducted near the small island of Chodo, within the Haeju area.\textsuperscript{207} An additional raid followed on 21 March, when

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[204] ADM 116/6211, HMS Belfast-Report of Proceedings, 20 April to 12 May, para. 10.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
under the support of AMC 309 and aircraft from HMS *Glory*, a guerrilla attack on the north bank of the Han River was conducted. As a result of this raid, they inflicted twenty-five enemy casualties without any friendly damage.  

Further *Wolfpack* raids continued into April and May, including a small-scale raid on 24 April on the Haeju area. Under the support from HMS *Whitesand Bay*, there were five very successful raids carried out to inflict casualties and to capture prisoners. Amongst them, the latter two raids were more successful. The first raid was conducted under the naval direction of HMAS *Bataan* on 19 May, and the second was under the naval direction of HMS *Whitesand Bay* six days later. Both operations were planned by Captain George Lamm, US Army, who commanded the guerrilla forces in this area, and he was supported by HM Ships and aircraft from HMS *Ocean* and USS *Bataan*. As a result of the first raid, 150 enemy were killed or wounded, and one Chinese Communist Forces prisoner captured. Additionally, an air spot from HMS *Ocean* destroyed one complete command post killing 40 CCF, one mortar and three machine guns. The later raid also inflicted heavy damage, which according to the *Wolfpack*’s report, resulted in 120 enemy troops being killed. After experiencing these *Wolfpack* activities, the CO of HMS *Belfast* even commented that ‘This area was full of activity, thanks to the drive and enterprise of the *Wolfpack* organisation hereabouts’.

During June, under constant enemy threat, *Wolfpack*’s active raid policy continued, and four successful guerrilla raids were carried out up to early July. The first was on 14 June, and was

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210 The remaining two raids were conducted on 1 and 2 May under the support from HMS *Whitesand Bay*: *Ibid.*
213 *Ibid*.
supported by HMCS Athabaskan, followed by another on 19 June, which was supported by HMS Amethyst. The third on 29 June, was conducted by Wolfpacks from Yongmae-do under the support from HMS Ceylon, Amethyst and Comus, and the last was carried out on 5 July against the enemy troops on the northern side of Mudo with close co-operation of HMS Comus, PC 703 and aircraft from HMS Ocean. In these cases, no prisoners were taken, but heavy damage was inflicted on the enemy troops.

However, the Wolfpack Guerrillas’ offensive operation was restricted from mid-July to early September because of the Communists’ heavy reinforcement. Since June in the Haeju area, there had been continued enemy build-up and construction of defensive positions on the west bank of the estuary. These reinforcements in this area consisted of increasing the construction of trenches and gun emplacements, and increasing the numbers of troops. CTG 95.1 considered this a direct result of the series of successful guerrilla raids made in the Haeju area, as these activities could easily prompt enemy counter actions. It was also due to the Communist forces reinforcement in this area to strengthen their defensive position against the prospect of additional large-scale landing operations by UN forces. Due to this greater need for alertness and preparation to fire at any approaching ships, the guerrillas’ amphibious activities needed to cease during this time.

The Wolfpack’s offensive operation restarted from mid-September. As mentioned above, with the autumn period begun, the Communist troops’ main focus was shifted to harvesting and

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219 For more information of the Communist forces’ defensive movement on the west, see Chapter 7.
securing their supply route. Therefore, other than occasionally reporting troop concentrations on the coast, the remaining period was generally peaceful with no significant threats made on the friendly islands.\textsuperscript{221}

During September, however, due to decreased enemy movements and a shortage of landing craft, guerrilla activities were relatively fewer and less significant in comparison to those performed between April and June. However, despite this comparative lull and unfavourable situation with regards to landing craft, three guerrilla raids were carried out, each assisted by Naval gun and Air support.\textsuperscript{222} Their movements were continued the following month, with three Naval and Air supported guerrilla raids on nearby Taesuap-to, Mudo and a small city in Haeju respectively.\textsuperscript{223}

As a result of these continued \textit{Wolfpack} guerrilla offensives, CTU 95.12.4 recommended the provision of a Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM) or similar craft to support \textit{Wolfpack}'s intruder junks.\textsuperscript{224} As mentioned above, from early September, the \textit{Wolfpack} guerrillas had experienced a shortage of landing craft. In a single gale on 3 September, \textit{Wolfpack} lost more than 10 junks. Hence, to encourage their amphibious operation, the CO of HMS \textit{St. Brides Bay} made the exceptional requisition of one landing craft.\textsuperscript{225} Considering the fact that there was only one LCM allocated in the \textit{Wolfpack} area, and this was for the purpose of the US personnel’s evacuation and prohibited for \textit{Wolfpack} operational use, this infers that the Task Unit Commander was highly satisfied with guerrilla activities.\textsuperscript{226} Based on the operational records

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{221} ADM 116/6220, HMS \textit{Newcastle}-Report of Proceedings, 26 September to 20 October 1952, HMS \textit{Newcastle}, 20 October 1952, para. 2.
\item \textsuperscript{222} The first on 10 September, which achieved little of merit. The second was conducted on 20 September. The third raid on 28 September was large-scale, and in which around 450 guerrillas were involved: ADM 116/6211, HMS \textit{Belfast}-Report of Proceedings, 3 to 30 September 1952, HMS \textit{Belfast}, 30 September 1952, para. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{223} ADM 116/6219, HMS \textit{Morecambe Bay}-Report of Proceedings from 16 to 24 October 1952, 24 October 1952, paras 10–14.
\item \textsuperscript{224} ADM 116/6222, HMS \textit{St. Brides Bay}-Report of Proceedings, 6 to 16 October 1952, 17 October 1952, para. 13.
\item \textsuperscript{225} Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, Appendix: Chronology of Partisan Campaign.
\item \textsuperscript{226} ADM 116/6222, HMS \textit{St. Brides Bay}-Report of Proceedings, 6 to 16 October 1952, para. 13.
\end{itemize}
of the blockade ships, it could be concluded that the *Wolfpack* guerrilla’s offensive activities were more active than those of the *Leopard* guerrillas in the other two areas during the same period. With the energetic activities of the *Wolfpacks*, the ships of TU 95.12.4 experienced the busiest time in the west during overall 1952.

**Higher Commands’ Direction: The Reasons for Each Guerrilla’s Different Activities**

An interesting point to note is the relationship between the level of enemy activities around the inshore area and the number of reported guerrilla activities, in particular, in the Pangyong-do and Haeju area. It shows that little enemy activity invoked less guerrilla derived intelligence and offensive operations correspondingly. For example, one of the main reasons for guerrilla inactivity in the Paengyong-do area during the early period of 1952 was the lack of enemy movements. This is similarly reflected in the *Wolfpack* guerrillas’ activity in that there was a decrease in offensives through September and October, due to reduced enemy threats.

However, in cases when there was heavy enemy reinforcement on the coastal area and the mainland, guerrilla activity was also largely restricted due to the difficulty of manoeuvring. For this reason, *Wolfpack* guerrillas showed relatively little record of movements from mid-July to early September.

However, the lack of activity of the *Leopard* guerrillas in Chodo-Sokto area could not be explained by this logic. Regardless of enemy activities in the coastal area, there was a consistent shortfall in their relationship with the ships of TU 95.12.1. Unlike *Leopard* units on Paengyong-do area, *Donkeys* on Chodo-Sokto area had no severe internal problems, hence, they continued activities. That is why the Commanders of TU 95.12.1 shared similar opinions as expressed in
their reports, as follows: ‘It was not be fully appreciated that the local intelligence units on Chodo-Sokto provide virtually no local intelligence.’

A point to be considered is that, at least during March and April of 1952, there had been a large amount of target intelligence supplied from the guerrillas in this area to Task Element 95.11. According to the operational records written by CTE 95.11 and Carrier-borne Air Liaison Officers, continuous target intelligence was supplied by the Leopard guerrillas during March.

Therefore, after this patrol period, the CO of HMS Glory commented that ‘greater success’ was achieved owing to the ‘good targets reported by Leopard’. During April, there was also a continued target supply from these guerrillas. Considering the fact that there was very little Donkey unit activity in the Paengyong-do area until late April, most of the targets for TE 95.11 seemed to be reported by the guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto area.

At that time, most of the targets supplied by the Leopard guerrillas, such as the villages or buildings which contained enemy troops, were on the mainland which could be attacked only by naval aircraft. This fact was also commented on by HMS Cossack, in that the targets reported by the guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto area were not within the range of her ships and could only be reached by air strike. It meant that, rather than operating inshore and in nearby coastal areas, the guerrillas in Chodo and Sokto tried to infiltrate deeper mainland territory and report this intelligence to TE 95.11 through their Headquarters.

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230 According to the War Diary written by 67 Carrier Borne Air Liaison Section, between 18 and 30 April, at least two Leopard targets were actually engaged by the pilots of HMS Glory: WO 281/1317, NO. 67 Carrier Borne Air Liaison Section, HMS “Glory”: War Diary for the period 18–30 April 1952.
In fact, according to an ORO study, in July 1952, almost 1,000 *Leopard* guerrillas were reported to have infiltrated the mainland. This was almost 30 percent of its total strength.\(^{232}\) By mid-1951, most of the guerrilla activity apparently changed to the ‘commando-type shallow-penetration hit-and-run raids launched from the islands’, and large numbers of guerrillas on the mainland retreated to the islands during the Communist forces’ offensive operation against friendly islands between December 1951 and January 1952.\(^{233}\) This meant that the *Leopard* guerrillas infiltrated the mainland very actively during spring of 1952; and, in particular, the guerrillas from Chodo-Sokto area who had more than 2,000 men under their *Donkey* Units were more keenly involved.\(^{234}\)

In addition, as mentioned below, the number of guerrilla activities conducted on the mainland largely increased from spring 1952. Considering the fact that there were very little *Wolfpack* guerrillas operated on the mainland throughout 1952, it seemed clear that these mainland activities in 1952 were largely conducted by the *Leopard* guerrillas, in particular, by guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto area.\(^{235}\)

### Table 6.2 Number of Reported Mainland Activities by the Guerrillas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Activities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on Civil Administration</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks on Transport &amp; Facilities</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{232}\) Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 68.


\(^{234}\) At that time, the number of *Leopard* guerrillas on Paengyong-do area was around 1,000: *Ibid.*, p. 70.

\(^{235}\) According to the ORO Study, in July 1952, *Wolfpack* infiltrated a ‘much smaller portion of their personnel in interior’. And even in early 1953, it was reported there was no interior unit at all: *Ibid.*, p. 68.
Based on the ORO study’s classification, ‘Intelligence Activities’ included ‘escorting of agents, reconnaissance, and patrols’ and excluded the guerrillas’ target intelligence supply. ‘Attacks on Civil Administration’ included their raids against the Communist party and the police stations. ‘Attack on Transport and Facilities’ included the guerrillas’ assault on the Communist vehicles, rails, roads and bridges. All these types of activities were usually conducted on the mainland for special purposes. A possible explanation of their constant movements from these islands without proper co-operation with the ships of TU 95.12.1 might be inferred from these records; owing to the guerrillas’ large infiltration of the mainland for a different type of special activities.

Based on the records in Table 6.2, it is important to note that the radical increase of the numbers had been started since the emergence of new theatre-level commands of guerrilla activity. The question arose as to the high possibility of new instructions from their new parent organisation, FEC/LD (K), regarding the activity of Leopard guerrillas in this area. If so, this meant that, unlike the EUSAK Headquarters who had been largely indifferent to their guerrilla activity, the new higher command seemed to be more active in using their own resources for its purposes.

An additional possible reason for the Chodo-Sokto guerrillas’ lack of relationship with TU 95.12.1 also seemed to be related to the directions of another theatre-level organisation, CCRAK. As mentioned above, CCRAK was a higher organisation that was in charge of the co-ordination of all behind-the-lines activities. One of its main roles was to disseminate all of the collected information from each clandestine agency to the friendly forces as a type of weekly intelligence report; hence no agents existed to carry out intelligence gathering. As a new theatre-
level intelligence organisation, to conduct its role properly, its first action was to take control of intelligence dissemination, which had been conducted independently by various clandestine organisations. Therefore, undoubtedly, owing to this organisation’s influence, Leopard and Wolfpack’s intelligence dissemination policy was also required to be changed.\(^{237}\)

In fact, on 15 March, the Leopard Headquarters directed their guerrillas regarding the regulation of intelligence dissemination as follows:

> All information obtained will be sent direct to this Headquarters either by radio or hand carried. Under no circumstances will information of any kind be furnished to any other organisation such as ROK Army, ROKMC, ROK Navy, HID, or any other organisation operating in this area including other American agencies. Any infraction of this rule will be reported to this Headquarters immediately.\(^{238}\)

It is not clear whether this instruction was directed by CCRAK as it has not been possible to find any document containing this instruction. Some of the Blockade Commanders’ comments, however, supported the high feasibility that there was a direct connection between the above instruction and CCRAK.

After experiencing such constant lack of intelligence from the Leopard guerrillas on Chodo throughout March and April (this was despite having large movements toward the mainland), the CO of HMS Cossack decided to determine the reason for such a lack of intelligence. In the course of direct contact with some of the Leopard guerrillas, he gained first-hand knowledge that ‘intelligence was in fact forwarded to higher commands, but it certainly never reached the

\(^{237}\) Other than the guerrilla organisations, 6004\(^{th}\) AISS, and Salamander were also under direct influence of CCRAK. 6004\(^{th}\) AISS, the Fifth Air Force Detachment, usually collected intelligence from refugees, and Salamander concentrated more on the northern area of West Coast. Although CCRAK also dealt with intelligence from American special agencies, such as CIA and SAU, it was not allowed to supply any to the British Naval Commanders: ADM 116/6231, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July 1951–June 1952, Part 3 (Intelligence); ADM 116/6231, Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July 1952–April 1953, Flag Officer, Second-in-Command Far East Station, 14 July 1953, Part 3 (Intelligence).

Task Unit Commander until it came out in the printed Weekly Intelligence Summaries’. Although the CO of HMS Cossack did not write the name of higher commands, possibly due to the lack of the interviewed guerrillas’ knowledge, this showed that the guerrillas were directed to supply their intelligence directly to the higher command.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff’s comments revealed more obviously that this situation might be caused by CCRAK. His comments in the HMS Cossack’s report showed this fact, as follows:

It is unfortunate that the output locally and the freedom of dissemination of raw intelligence has not been as good as it was previously. This may possibly to the result of new directives from CCRAK. The falling off in the output of raw intelligence is most noticeable in the case of Salamander and Leopard, but the co-operation between ships and the organisations in the Haeju [Wolfpack] area remains good.

Based on these comments, it was highly possible that the Leopard guerrillas’ lack of co-operation and intelligence supply were caused not only by FEC/LD (K)’s instructions, but also by CCRAK’s regulation of intelligence dissemination.

A remaining question is that, even if it was due to higher command’s instructions, why was it the Leopard guerrillas in Chodo-Sokto area who were directed to infiltrate the mainland and to be regulated in intelligence dissemination?

In fact, it was not only the Chodo-Sokto but also several Donkey units based on Paengyong-do who were directed to infiltrate the mainland for special operations. For example, according to the operational records of Donkey-15, in mid-March, when guerrillas regrouped in Paengyong-do, they received a special order from a FEC/LD (K) Colonel (Frederick B. Alexander Jr.) to ‘infiltrate into the Chongju area and destroy the enemy raider system and

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240 Ibid., CTG 95.1’s Comments, 4 June 1952.
capture their raider operation manual’. Therefore, they concentrated on this mission up until
early June, but without any significant accomplishment.\(^{241}\) Donkey-10’s case was also similar.

During their stay in Paengyong-do, they were trained to infiltrate the mainland and make a base,
particularly in the Kuwol Mountain area. Because of the difficulties moving through the land
route, they had to undergo airborne training. This mission was accomplished around October
1952.\(^{242}\)

In addition, it seemed most of the clandestine organisations under CCRAK’s influence were
instructed to change their intelligence dissemination policy. Based on the above-mentioned
comments of Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, two of three organisations who had supplied
intelligence to the Blockade Commanders changed their position after the CCRAK’s
instructions. It was only Wolfpack which continued with its good intelligence supply. It meant
that the direction of intelligence dissemination regulation was not only sent to Leopard, but also
to the other clandestine organisations on the west coast. Thus, it seems more proper to change
the question to why did only Wolfpack conduct constant and active intelligence supply to the
Blockade Commanders.

In fact, this seemed mainly related to the operational environment of the Wolfpack guerrillas.
Unlike the Chodo-Sokto and some parts of Paengyong-do areas, where a relatively low level of
enemy threat had been faced, the Haeju and Ongjin areas were exposed to continued enemy
offensive movements against the islands. Since the direction from the UNC, on 19 December,
which placed the responsibility for the defence of the islands on the UN naval forces and the
indigenous forces under the influence of FEC/LD (K) and CCRAK, island defence had been
regarded as the first priority also by the two organisations’ officers. It meant that the importance


of the island defence took precedence over the new instructions such as ‘infiltration to the mainland’ and ‘regulation of intelligence dissemination’. Therefore, the Wolfpack organisation, which had been faced with imminent enemy threats should be regarded as an exceptional case of these instructions.

In addition to that, the characteristics of the Wolfpack’s intelligence also influenced this difference. In fact, during this period, most of the target intelligence supplied by the Wolfpack guerrillas was transferred as emergency calls. As there was a continued enemy threat against the small islands, any evidence of enemy troop concentrations was directly reported to CTU 95.12.4, and he called for air support from the patrolling TARCAP. As this urgent information had to be delivered immediately, Wolfpack’s target intelligence rarely reported to CCRAK. Considering the fact that the Commanders of TE 95.12 regarded the ‘Weekly Intelligence Report’ received from CCRAK as ‘no more than background information’, it could be argued that it contained no useful information for the Blockade Ships’ primary commitment; the islands’ defence.

On the other hand, the Leopard guerrillas in areas of relatively low enemy threat and with proper garrison forces, such as Chodo, Sokto and some areas of Paengyong-do, seemed more required to follow the CCRAK’s instruction. There is additional evidence that the CCRAK officers regarded Donkeys in these areas as suitable for intelligence gathering. During early June, a plan to raid the mainland using ROK Marine Corps troops from island garrisons was suggested by CTG 95.1. He thought this would assist the defence of the islands by forcing the enemy onto the defensive and boosting the morale of the Korean Marine Corps. However, in the course of planning a raid, this plan was objected to by CCRAK. Their grounds for objection

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were very meaningful, in that they argued that ‘such activities would make the coast too hot for their requirement for intelligence activities, but no objections were raised to raids further south in the Choppeki area’. As a result of CCRAK’s comments, two points are considered; first, Chodo, Sokto and Paengyong-do were main areas for CCRAK’s intelligence activities. Secondly, large parts of the small islands in the Paengyong-do area including Kirin-do, Ohwado and Sunwi-do, and all of the Wolfpack area, where it was necessary to be more alert against the enemy threat, were insignificant in terms of its intelligence operation. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the Blockade Commanders’ negative evaluation of Chodo-Sokto guerrillas was not due to their actual inactivity but because of the lack of actual chances of co-operation. Under the instructions of two theatre-level agencies which controlled the guerrilla activity, they were directed to operate on the mainland and to be more prudent in sharing their collected intelligence with the naval forces. By virtue of the combined effect of enemy activities and newly emerged high-level directives, the Wolfpack and Leopard guerrillas were engaged in different types of operations. The consequence of this was that the Commanders of TG 95.1’s gave mixed appraisals of the two guerrilla groups. And, owing to the naval operation’s high sensitiveness to guerrilla activities, this also caused a large difference in each TU’s activities in the west coast.

6.8 Conclusions

Following the November 1951 Communist offensives in the Yalu Gulf area, very active steps were needed to be taken by the UN Forces to protect the more southerly vital islands. In particular,
as the UNC placed island defence responsibility on the UN naval forces, the blockade ships were thus continuously and heavily involved in this defensive operation. Owing to this unusual situation, which required a naval defensive task, around sixteen ships of TG 95.1 were tied up in this static commitment, and thus lost their facility for other duties.\textsuperscript{247} Even though there were no major fleet actions, however, to the western naval forces, this period of naval campaign was the most critical and strategically important commitment.

During this critical period, ironically, the interdependence between the TG 95.1 and the guerrilla organisations became deeper. To the Blockade Commanders, it was essential to make closer relationships with the guerrillas for effective defensive operations. As there were no other alternatives to supply useful information of enemy activity on the west coast, the Commanders of TG 95.1 had to depend largely on the guerrilla organisations. In particular, due to the imminent threat from the enemy, the Blockade Commanders prioritised promptitude of intelligence over reliability.\textsuperscript{248} Moreover, at least during the early stage of island warfare, with only small numbers of available garrison forces, the Naval Commanders were obliged to use guerrillas as island defenders. These guerrillas also strongly needed naval and air support, without which, it was impossible to secure their bases inshore. Therefore, based on the direct communication system between the two groups and the reorganisation of TE 95.12 into four sub-units, they were able to construct closer relationships within a short period of time.

From March 1952, however, when enemy activities recommenced mainly in the Haeju area, and the guerrilla organisation underwent a command and control realignment, the relationship between ships of TG 95.1 and the guerrillas became more complicated. Unlike the previous relationship with guerrilla organisations, the Commanders of TG 95.1 evaluated guerrilla

activities differently, based on the different operational areas. In particular, there was a large
difference in perceptions of the *Wolfpack* guerrillas and those of *Leopard* in Chodo and Sokto.
Even though there had been a positive evaluation concerning *Wolfpack* guerrilla activities in the
Haeju area, the *Donkeys* in Chodo-Sokto were deemed disappointing owing to their total lack
of activity.

In fact, this dichotomy was influenced by the different levels of enemy threat in the respective
areas and two higher commands’ directions. However, to the Commanders of TG 95.1, who
were allowed to access only a limited part of higher level intelligence, this variance in guerrilla
group activity across different areas was somewhat incomprehensible. With these mixed
Blockade Commanders’ perspectives regarding each regional guerrilla groups’ activity, the
most critical and demanding period for the UN forces on the west coast was closed. And, albeit
one of diminished credibility and mixed evaluation of guerrilla activities, the naval-guerrilla
relationship played a key role in conducting this defensive operation.
Chapter 7

Alienation from Co-Operation: From December 1952 to the End of the War

During the last eight months of the Korean War, operational uncertainty prevailed in the west coast area. As a war of attrition had persisted for over a year along the 38th Parallel, the need to break this stagnant situation increased for both the UNC and the Communist Command. As both sides fully realised the impossibility of a decisive victory, they planned and conducted different types of movements on the west coast. One hope was to effectively progress the currently dormant truce talks, whilst another was to effectively counter any expected enemy activities. In particular, by late April 1953, when the signing of the truce was imminent, the west coast operation was ordered to be oriented for post-war preparations.

Therefore, the operations in this area were largely influenced by both sides conducting their new operational plans and also preparing for armistice negotiations. These situational changes inevitably directed the Blockade Commanders’ and the guerrillas’ main concerns toward these new missions, which had little in common with the previous relationship. Thus, regardless of the intention, these situational changes resulted in a more distant relationship between both groups.

This chapter outlines the changed relationship of TG 95.1 and the guerrilla organisations from December 1952 to the end of the Korean War. In particular, it explores the events which influenced the lack of co-operation and inactiveness of these two groups from the beginning of the winter season of 1952.

As a first step, the Communist forces’ defensive movements on the west coast and the guerrillas’ winter reorganisation are both briefly described. Following this, the reasons why these changes caused poor co-operation between the two groups is discussed; mainly focusing
on the objectives of the guerrilla reorganisation. Finally, the accelerated progress of the truce talks and its influence on the west coast operation are discussed. By focusing on the process of their alienation from co-operation, this chapter will reveal the underlying limitations in the naval-guerrilla relationship which emerged not only from the nature of the irregulars, but also from the American guerrilla organisations’ separate objectives.

7.1 The Start of Winter and Inactivity on the West Coast

From late October 1952, the temperature of the northern west coast dropped enough to bring the first snows. By November, it became so cold and snowy that the guerrilla movement was gradually restricted. It was from mid-January that the weather conditions reached their worst. Because of bad ice conditions in the Haeju Estuary, it was difficult for frigates to navigate most of its channels. In the Chodo and Sokto areas, close packed ice around the channel reduced the ability of surface ships to operate there.

At the start of winter, most of the forces in and around the west coast were largely inactive. From December 1952, the Communist forces stopped any offensive activities against the friendly held islands. The CCF, who were present in the Paengyong-do area, also withdrew from the coast, except for a few detachments. Whilst during January 1953, a large number of Communist troop deployments were reported in the Hwanghae Province, the west coast still remained calm and peaceful, apart from several isolated cases of enemy gunfire from the mainland against Chodo-Sokto and Chanjae-do on 23 December 1952 and 3 January

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1 Malcom, White Tigers, p. 164.
respectively. Even in the Haeju area, where there had previously been the most enemy offensive activities, it remained very peaceful. This situation was well described by the CO of HMS Cardigan Bay, who operated in this area, as follows:

I had been led to believe that the present time, the Haeju area was the “hot spot” of the coast. I was therefore expecting an interesting and active eight days to finish up with. Actually, the total ammunition expenditure for the whole TU was two star-shell used investigating a ghost echo. The enemy fired nothing at all.

As this operation was his first patrol in the Haeju area since September 1952, the changed mode of Communist activity caused embarrassment.

The guerrillas’ activities were also largely reduced. This inactivity did not only apply to Leopard, who had maintained poor relationships with the Blockade Commanders during 1952, but also to the Wolfpack guerrillas. Unlike the pilots of TE 95.11, who had received target intelligence from Leopard and Wolfpack during the winter, this situation was much more prominently reported by the COs of TE 95.12. In fact, between late December 1952 to February 1953, except for sporadic intelligence regarding enemy movements and also of information on intended landings of Leopard on 30 January, there were no additional records of guerrilla activities reported to the blockade ships.

It was undoubtedly true that adverse Korean winter conditions caused a very unfavourable environment for military activities, and in particular, in the coastal area. The ice-ridden sea and

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5 Regarding the records of the Communist Forces deployments, see ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of Proceedings, 7 to 20 January 1953, para.17; regarding the Communists’ gunfire shelling against Chodo-Sokto area, see ADM 116/6210, HMS Birmingham-Report of Proceedings, 17 December 1952 to 2 January 1953, HMS Birmingham, 2 January 1953, para. 4; and regarding the shelling against Changjae-do, see ADM 116/6216, HMS Crane-Report of Proceedings, 31 December to 7 January 1953, HMS Crane, 8 January 1953, para. 6.


7 The CO of HMS Glory wrote that the main air effort was directed against troop concentrations and stores during his patrol, and these targets were mainly reported from the 1st PIR (Leopard) and 2nd PIR (Wolfpack): ADM 116/5946, HMS Glory-Report of Proceedings, 19 to 29 January 1953, HMS Glory, 3 February 1953, p. 2.

piled snow made most sea based operations impossible. For example, the former *Donkey*-4 advisor commented that, ‘Winter reduced partisan operations by at least 80 percent’. 9

Nevertheless, even despite weather restrictions, considering the fact that there had been very active movements on both sides between November 1951 and February 1952 in island warfare, the cold weather itself was not enough to explain such low activity.

In fact, both sides used the winter season as a preparatory period for future operations. For example, most of the winter was needed for the Communist forces to complete large-scale troop redeployment and reinforcement to improve their defences along the west coast. Similarly, the *Leopard* and *Wolfpack* organisations also underwent additional reorganisation which involved drastic changes of troop composition.

**The Communist Forces’ Preparation for the Counter-Landing Operation**

Since the successful amphibious landing operation at Inchon in September 1950, the Communist Command had been concerned at the prospect of additional large-scale landing operations by UN forces. 10 In particular, after the stabilisation of the line of contact around the 38th Parallel, this concern regarding UN forces’ landing gradually increased. The Command considered that the UNC would play an adventurous card to break the current static situation, and the most obvious way was to conduct another ‘Inchon like’ landing operation. 11 The most viable landing places were considered to be in the Yalu and the Cheongcheon River areas on the west coast. 12 Unlike the inland of the east coast, which has a very steep geographical

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10 The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) CCF’s *War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea*, p. 526.
configuration, the west coast is mainly of low hills and ridges. This would allow an easier approach to the rear side of the Communist forces on the front line. Moreover, there were large numbers of beaches and UN-held islands, which could be useful for the landing operation. This meant that the overall west coast area was very unfavourable in terms of effective defences against an UN force amphibious landing.\(^\text{13}\)

To respond to this potential threat, from September 1951, the Communist Command set up a Combined Command Organisation for the coastal defensive operations. This was under the command of the Northern-Central Combined Operations Headquarters and deployed additional forces to the west coast. However, the coastal defensive condition was still considered to be unsatisfactory. The Communists were not able to fully concentrate on the coastal defence until the summer of 1952 due to the unstable defensive positions along the front line.\(^\text{14}\)

It was around the late autumn of 1952 that the Communist forces initiated in earnest their large-scale reinforcements in the coastal area. This positional change was directly related to the Communists’ confidence of their front-line defence, consequently gained in the course of their autumn campaign. From July 1952, the Communist Command engaged in a continuous large-scale military build-up in troop strength and fire power. They increased the strength of the ground forces from 910,000 men (as in early July) to 1,008,900 men by September.\(^\text{15}\) Their artillery fire power was also largely increased. Using provision from the Soviet Union, the Communist forces employed additional field guns, and their artillery delivery capability rose

\(^{13}\) U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 8086 Army Unit, ‘UN Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict’, pp. 30–1; The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, pp. 545–6.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 526.

\(^{15}\) The Korea Research Institute for Strategy (trans.), CCF’s History of the Korean War, pp. 221–2.
from 8,000 rounds to 43,000 rounds a day.\(^\text{16}\) Moreover, during the long period of static operations, the Communists were able to improve their logistical situation greatly.\(^\text{17}\)

Based on these reinforcements, the Communist forces were able to secure advantageous outposts on the line. In particular, after the successful defence of the UN forces’ offensive for Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge conducted during October and November 1952, the Communist Command came to regard their primary task as consolidating the front-line defence and this was largely accomplished.\(^\text{18}\) The battles for Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge, indeed, were the fiercest contests of the year and the last offensive operations undertaken by the EUSAK in 1952. Nevertheless, in the 42 days of bloody fighting, the UN forces were not able to make any progress in these areas where they were faced with strong Communist defences.\(^\text{19}\)

The increased Communists’ confidence in front-line defensive readiness allowed them to accelerate coastal defensive reinforcements, in particular, around the west coast. For the first measure, on 23 November 1952, Peng Dehuai ordered the reinforcement of west coast defences.

The full-scale strengthening of defence in this area started from late December as a result of the directive from Mao Zedong on 4 December 1952. In a meeting for the Chinese Voluntary Forces’ Operational direction during 1953, Mao instructed as follows:

It is highly possible that the enemy would conduct large-scale landings on the West Coast with around five to seven Army divisions [...] The time could be this coming spring, or possibly earlier. We have to not only deploy around five army corps in this area, but also fix and fortify defensive facilities. In particular, there should be four army corps who have a


\(^{17}\) According to an ROK Army intelligence report, by late autumn 1952, the Communists’ supply status improved and was better than at any other time since the Chinese troops’ intervention. War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, The History of US JCS: The Korean War, Vol. II (Seoul: 1991), p. 254.

\(^{18}\) The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea, p. 526.

wealth of operational experience in Korea [...] The enemy landing on the West Coast must be denied at all costs.\textsuperscript{20}

As a consequence, a large-scale military build-up proceeded in terms of troop numbers and quality, fire power and the construction of defensive facilities. As a result of the Communist Army troops’ redeployment, four Chinese Army Corps — 38\textsuperscript{th}, 39\textsuperscript{th}, 40\textsuperscript{th} and 50\textsuperscript{th} — were moved from the front line to the west coast. Considering the fact these army corps were experienced from the very earliest stage of the Korean War, this redeployment constituted a high level of qualitative reinforcement in the area’s troop strength. In terms of numbers, this redeployment increased troop strength by around 23,000, with additional supplies of field guns and artillery. In particular, there were increased fortifications using mines and barbed wire for beaches and defensive positions.\textsuperscript{21}

An important point to note was that the Communist forces’ large-scale build-up was not for an offensive operation against the friendly held islands but totally for defensive purposes. In particular, this defensive movement was mainly for responding to a UN force large-scale landing rather than to counter guerrilla operations. Rather than showing aggressive activities, therefore, the Communists focused mostly on their troop redeployments and fortifying defensive positions along the west coast during winter.

**The Reorganisation of the Guerrillas**

On September 1952, as decided by the FEC, the last theatre-level command and control change was performed in regard to guerrilla operations. In an attempt to establish a single theatre-level

\textsuperscript{20} The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) *CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea*, p. 523.

\textsuperscript{21} According to the records of Chinese Official History, from early January to late April 1953, around half million people were employed daily for the construction of these defensive facilities: *Ibid.*, pp. 543, 546–7.
agency to co-ordinate and control all behind-the-line activities in Korea, the FEC gave CCRAK operational control of FEC/LD (K). In other words, all responsibility for the guerrillas was transferred from FEC/LD (K) to CCRAK.\(^{22}\)

Subsequently, in early October, the FEC decided to increase guerrilla strength within a short period of time by an intensive recruiting program. By July 1953, this quadrupled the number of guerrilla forces from around an original 9,000 to about 40,000. For the first step of this large expansion, it was planned to recruit around 11,000 new guerrillas by mid-March 1953.\(^{23}\) At the time of that decision, *Leopard* and *Wolfpack* maintained the bulk of guerrilla forces, 4,600 and 4,100 respectively. As a result of this programme, however, *Leopard* and *Wolfpack* guerrillas almost doubled by the end of 1952.\(^{24}\) This recruitment attempted to address the more comprehensive use of guerrilla forces to break the rear and front Communist defences in the current stalemate, and also to pressurise them towards a cease-fire agreement.\(^{25}\)

Based on these guerrilla related changes, from late November 1952, a significant organisational change was also carried out within *Leopard* and *Wolfpack*. This task involved incorporating the guerrilla organisations into the US Army command structure, such as regiments and battalions. This was an effort by the FEC to get a better grasp of the largely expanded guerrilla forces and their operations.\(^{26}\) From this time, the official title of the guerrilla changed to ‘partisan’ and their section of FEC/LD (K), was given the title of ‘United Nations Partisan Forces, Korea’ (UNPFK). The names of *Leopard* and *Wolfpack* were also changed, becoming ‘regiments’. Therefore, *Leopard* was re-designated as the 1st Partisan Infantry

\(^{22}\) Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, pp. 64–6.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 76.
\(^{26}\) Malcom, *White Tigers*, p. 177.
Regiment (1st PIR) and Wolfpack became the 2nd PIR. During the early part of 1953, as a consequence of the increased numbers, the 5th and 6th PIR were separated from the 1st and 2nd PIR. Simultaneously, each Donkey and Wolfpack were re-designated with the appellation ‘Partisan Infantry Battalion’.

For the sake of appearance, these organisational changes seemed to reflect merely the strength of reinforcement and a related cosmetic name change. However, the implications were not so simple. It was the FEC’s decision that it would more actively involve the guerrillas’ in future activities by making them more physically defined and manageable. As with the Leopard guerrillas’ activities in the Chodo-Sokto area during 1952, these organisational changes would possibly cause a distraction to intelligence collection and the guerrillas’ close co-operation with the blockade ships.

Moreover, it delayed guerrilla operations and time was lost in their resurrection. This was because these reorganisations involved a large-scale rotation of American officers and major guerrilla recruitment and training. According to the ORO study, more than thirty American officers and forty-five enlisted men were newly appointed for guerrilla operations at the reorganisation stage. Based on this comment of the CO of HMS Cardigan Bay, made in early February 1953, after his first west coast operation that ‘I found all the Americans I had previously known ashore had been relieved’, most guerrilla advisors seemed to be relieved during this period.

27 The 5th PIR was separated in the area of west side of former Wolfpack area, and a 6th PIR added in the northern area of previous Leopards. These tasks were completed by April 1953: Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, pp. 67–8.
28 As a result of this change, Donkey-4 became 4th Partisan Infantry Battalion: Malcom, White Tigers, p. 177.
29 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, pp. 73–4.
A salient problem was that a large number of Americans assigned to the guerrilla organisations had neither the experience nor the training necessary for the demands of unconventional warfare, and thus began their duty without any proper foundation. Although there were predecessors who learned well, they never had an opportunity to pass on what they learned to the new comers before the end of their duty. Each new guerrilla advisors had to start from the beginning and relearn lessons that were essential for the clandestine operation. Therefore, it took a greater length of time than was desirable for the new American recruits to smoothly control and coordinate their agents’ activities.

The drastic expansion of the guerrilla strength also restricted their activities for a while. This was largely due to the way of recruiting. Due to the limited number of available refugees on the islands and their reluctance to join, large numbers had to be recruited from the South Koreans. To fill this requirement of a large number within a short period of time, more than 600 recruiters had to be employed. They travelled throughout South Korea and persuaded young men, promising money, food and clothing.

A clear problem was created through such an aggressive expansion. Significant numbers of the South Korean recruits were pimps, thieves, and other undesirables who signed up because they thought that by doing so they could avoid dangerous front-line duty. In fact, large numbers of the new recruits were not mentally or physically ready to conduct guerrilla activities. This situation required long periods of training for the new recruits. Therefore, for the new American officers and recruits, it was necessary to utilise most of the winter season to prepare the tasks ahead.

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32 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 76.
33 Evanhoe, *Dark Moon*, p. 163.
34 Malcom, *White Tigers*, p. 175.
During this totally inactive period, TG 95.1 also underwent the organisational and operational changes necessary to respond to the changing operational environment. By the direction of Admiral E. G. A. Clifford, the new CTG 95.1 who relieved Admiral Scott-Moncrieff in late September 1952, on 1 January 1953, a new Task Unit organisation came into force as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Name</th>
<th>Duty</th>
<th>New Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CTE 95.11</td>
<td>Carrier Force</td>
<td>CTU 95.1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTE 95.12</td>
<td>Inshore Cruiser</td>
<td>CTU 95.1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 95.12.1</td>
<td>Chodo-Sokto Area</td>
<td>CTU 95.1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 95.12.2</td>
<td>Paengyong-do Area</td>
<td>CTU 95.1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTU 95.12.4</td>
<td>Haeju Area</td>
<td>CTU 95.1.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTE 95.15</td>
<td>Island Defence</td>
<td>CTU 95.1.3</td>
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This change was to alleviate the pressure on the cruisers who had to command each Task Unit during the previous island defensive operation. Simultaneously, the permanent TARCAP, which had been supplied in the Chodo-Sokto area by naval aircraft, was directed to be flown only if required. Considering the fact that the previous systems were maintained to effectively defend the friendly islands, this latest Task Unit organisational and operational change reflected a new CTG 95.1 perspective regarding the current west coast situation; that is no more imminent Communist threat against the UN-held islands.

The Blockade Commanders also assumed a lack of winter guerrilla activity; not only due to the cold weather, but also due to the organisational changes and the American officer

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36 WO 281/1046, NO. 63 Carrier Borne Ground Liaison Section, HMS “Glory”: War Diary for the period November to December, 1952, p. 1 (Dec).
replacement process. This fact is very well commented by the CO of HMS Newcastle (CTE 95.12) as follows:

The guerrilla reorganisation and new blood, coupled with the rapid rotation of the officers of the guerrillas has put us back in some measure as the winter weather has prevented us from carrying out our usual frequent visits and consultation with these officers.\footnote{ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of Proceedings, 5 February to 3 March 1953, HMS Newcastle, 2 March 1953, para. 33.}

However, he expected that the close relationship with the guerrillas would be restored in the near future in stating that, ‘With the advent of spring, we shall regain the complete personal touch we had last summer and autumn with these various organisations’.\footnote{Ibid.}

7.2 Phase I and II: The Start of Special Missions of the Guerrillas

The thaw started from late February around the Haeju area. By mid-March 1953, all ice on the blockade ship’s operational channels had completely disappeared, hence, inter-island movement was again quite free.\footnote{ADM 116/6210, HMS Birmingham-Report of Proceedings, 28 February to 20 March 1953, para. 21.} With the advent of improved spring weather conditions, large numbers of enemy deployments toward the coastal area were conducted. Activity had been reported opposite Sokto and was particularly noticeable in the Paengyong-do area, opposite the islands of Yukto and Wollae-do, and in the Choppeki Point region.\footnote{ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of Proceedings, 21 to 30 March 1953, HMS Newcastle, 30 March 1953, para. 1.} Unlike the spring of 1952, however, rather than conducting offensive landings against the UN forces’ held islands, the Communists tended to concentrate more on conducting harassments by using their shore
batteries and night-time air bombardments. To the Blockade Commanders, their activities seemed to constitute a coastal defence, and not an offensive operation.

Increasing guerrilla movements were also reported from the Haeju area, where the thaw initially began. From late February, the un-notified guerrilla movements in this area were found by the Blockade ships. As the reorganisation of the guerrilla forces seemed largely completed, and with improved weather, the Blockade Commanders expected an increase of intelligence supply and offensive activities from what was formerly Wolfpack’s area. Contrary to this expectation, however, there was no intelligence from the guerrillas. This situation continued over March 1953, and the lack of guerrilla intelligence is reflected in the CO of HMS Whitesand Bay’s comments:

The apparent complete inactivity of the Wolfpack [2nd PIR] in the area was a strange contrast to 9 months ago. At the same time there were each night many friendly movements from the front line islands but no intelligence was received.

At that time, the Blockade Commanders thought this was just a temporary problem. They regarded this as due to a new American officer’s long absence from the responsible area. According to the records of HMS Whitesand Bay and HMS Cardigan Bay, the new Wolfpack officer, Lieutenant Colonel Todd frequently visited Kangwha-do, where his Headquarters was

47 Regarding the lack of guerrilla intelligence, the CO HMS Cardigan Bay commented as follows: ‘During this patrol we were spared even that excitement as we received no intelligence whatever. I got the impression that all the Partisans on the neighbouring islands were hibernating’: ADM 116/6212, HMS Cardigan Bay-Report of Proceedings from 18 to 26 February 1953, HMS Cardigan Bay, 26 February 1953, paras 3–4.
located, for the reorganisation. Therefore, over March, the guerrillas in this area had to conduct their operation without any proper control or co-ordination from their CO.\(^\text{40}\)

To the Blockade Commanders, this type of situation was not an unusual experience. For example, almost four months previously, they had experienced a very similar situation in the Haeju area. At that time, there had been very active and satisfactory continued co-operation with Wolfpack guerrillas. However, a very significant guerrilla movement plan was made which required sharing intelligence with the Blockade Commanders; but the latter had no knowledge of such a plan. On 10 October 1952, for better access to the mainland, Wolfpack-8 moved their base from Chumun-do to Sunwi-do. The problem was that this movement was carried out without the effective dissemination of information, and it transpired that an aircraft from HMS Ocean regarded them as enemy junks attacking Sunwi-do. By chance, CTU 95.12.2, at that time HMS St. Brides Bay, heard of this operation and refused permission for HMS Ocean to bomb the junks. It was later known that this information was not passed because of the senior officer of this area, Captain George Lamm’s absence from the area. He was in Seoul at that time, and it was not till after his return that the co-operation became smooth again.\(^\text{50}\)

Therefore, as the CO of HMS St. Brides Bay commented that ‘The current reorganisation of the Wolfpacks into Partisan Regiments has temporarily reduced our own activity but […] this will not remain the case for long’, the Blockade Commanders thought that this problem would be solved from April with the new US officers earnestly commencing their tasks and subsequently re-building relationships.\(^\text{51}\) There were several instances to prove that this would not remain the case for long. From late March, increasing friendly activities were gradually


\(^{50}\) ADM 116/6222, HMS St. Brides Bay-Report of Proceedings, 6 to 16 October 1952, 17 October 1952, para. 7.

reported in the 1st PIR area.\textsuperscript{52} On 1 April, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Todd, the Headquarters of 5th PIR was activated in the Haeju area.\textsuperscript{53} And early that month, in a meeting with the new CO of the 1st PIR, Lieutenant Colonel Perry, an agreement was made to establish closer co-operation.\textsuperscript{54}

In fact, to some extent, the Blockade ships’ co-operation with the guerrillas grew more active from mid-April. Since the meeting with the 1st PIR officers, requests for naval gunfire support for the guerrilla organisations had increased. According to the operational records of the TG 95.1’s ships, between April and early May 1953, seven naval gunfire supports for guerrilla raids had been conducted.\textsuperscript{55} In particular, the guerrilla activity focused more on the large-scale raids. According to the blockade ships records, three out of four raids conducted during early May were large-scale which involved more than 150 guerrillas.\textsuperscript{56}

The problem was that these raids never accomplished satisfactory results; a fact recognised in a report by the CO of HMS St. Brides Bay who supported three guerrilla raids during May. It states:

The plain fact is that the partisans are neither equipped nor trained to carry out landings more than a handful of men. However, their terms of service are not conducive to aggressiveness

\textsuperscript{52} ADM 116/6219, HMS Mounts Bay-Report of Proceedings from 8 to 27 April 1953, 27 April 1953, paras 9, 12.


\textsuperscript{54} ADM 116/6225, HMS Whitesand Bay-Report of Proceedings from 6 to 22 April 1953, HMS Whitesand Bay, 24 April 1953, Appendix A, para. 3.

The first guerrilla raid was conducted on 15 April by the 1st PIR on Kirin-do, and the second one was conducted on 19 by the 1st PIR on Sunwi-do. Both of them were supported by HMS Whitesand Bay: ADM 116/6225, HMS Whitesand Bay-Report of Proceedings from 6 to 22 April 1953, para. 4; on 19 April, HMAS Calgou supported a guerrilla raid on Kanjuce peninsula: ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of Proceedings, 18 April to 3 May 1953, HMS Newcastle, 3 May 1953, Enclosure: Chronological Summary of Events; three more raids were carried out respectively on 4, 8 and 10 May. All of these were supported by HMS St. Brides Bay: ADM 116/6222, HMS St. Brides Bay-Report of Proceedings, 28 April to 11 May 1953, HMS St. Brides Bay, 12 May 1953, Appendix I, paras 10–22; the last raid was conducted on 17 May by the support from HMS Sparrow and USS Bairoko: ADM 116/6222, HMS Sparrow-Report of Proceedings from 9 to 26 May 1953, HMS Sparrow, 1 June 1953, Enclosure 4: Operation SWANBUT.

\textsuperscript{55} The guerrilla raids on 8 and 10 May were conducted by an estimated 150 guerrillas respectively: ADM 116/6222, HMS St. Brides Bay-Report of Proceedings, 28 April to 11 May, Appendix I, paras 10–22; the last raid on 17 May was conducted by 410 guerrillas: ADM 116/6222, HMS Sparrow-Report of Proceedings from 9 to 26 May 1953, Enclosure 4: Operation SWANBUT.
on the face of resistance. It is believed that their role of keeping large numbers of enemy troops deployed on the coast and of collecting intelligence would be better conducted by sticking to minor operations.\textsuperscript{57}

In fact, the ineffectiveness of the large-scale guerrilla raids was fully realised by the Blockade Commanders and the guerrillas during the last two years of co-operations. Due to the guerrillas’ relatively poor combat capability and equipment, their raids had largely focused on small sized attacks that maximised the element of surprise. Other than in recapturing islands, or performing rice raids which by nature required large numbers of troops, most raids used relatively small sized units. Hence to the blockade ships, supporting consecutive large-scale raids was regarded as a very unusual and largely ineffective commitment.

Regardless of active guerrilla raids, however, there was no clear increase in the intelligence supply from the guerrilla organisations. As HMS Mount Bay, who operated in the 1\textsuperscript{st} PIR area, commented; ‘The reluctance of the PIR to disclose future operations [….] to the CTU continues’, the US officers showed rather an uncooperative attitude in sharing their intelligence and future plans.\textsuperscript{58} As a single theatre-level agency which had taken the operational control of the guerrilla activity since late 1952, CCRAK’s regulation of intelligence dissemination to the western located naval forces seemed to be continued during 1953.

The lack of intelligence supply also applied to the guerrillas in the Haeju area. The CO of HMS Newcastle wrote on 3 May after his visit to Yonpyong-do, the island of the 5\textsuperscript{th} PIR’s Headquarters that, ‘If the same energy and care is put into the operational side as has been put in to the administrative arrangements, the 5\textsuperscript{th} PIR should become an excellent weapon.’\textsuperscript{59} He

\textsuperscript{57} HMS St. Brides Bay-Report of Proceedings, 28 April to 11 May 1953, Appendix I, para. 20.
\textsuperscript{58} ADM 116/6219, HMS Mounts Bay-Report of Proceedings from 8 to 27 April 1953, 27 April 1953, para. 11.
went on to blame the American officers, who seemed more concerned about island cleaning than their main operations including intelligence supply.  

An interesting point was that, unlike the ships of Task Units, the pilots of TU 95.1.1 had continuously received large numbers of target intelligence reports during the spring of 1953. This fact was well documented by the operational reports of HMS Glory as follows:

Since HMS Glory started operating in Korean waters an effort has been made to work up a close liaison with the Guerrillas […] Far more information is now being received from the Partisan as a result, and few targets are rejected, as results of strikes leave little doubt of their authenticity and value.

As most targets for the naval aircraft were troop concentrations or supplies on the mainland, the continued and satisfactory intelligence supply meant that there were large numbers of guerrilla activities in this area during the spring. Except for the conduct of large-scale raids, an almost similar situation, which had occurred amongst the Leopard on Chodo-Sokto area during 1952, reoccurred in 1953 in the overall guerrilla areas.

The ORO study shows that the number of mainland guerrillas largely increased during their reorganisational period. In July 1952, there were an estimated 1,000 on the mainland, but this number increased to 1,618 by mid-February 1953. Significantly, reported activities of interior units increased by approximately 25 percent during the first three months of 1953. This meant that the guerrillas had conducted a large part of their activities, not on the inshore or coastal areas, which largely needed the blockade ships’ support, but on the mainland.

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60 Ibid.
62 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 68.
63 Ibid., p. 135.
It seems impossible to imagine that the guerrillas’ mainland-centric activities were purely decided by themselves. The Communists’ defensive build-up during the winter to counter the UN forces’ landing operation inevitably increased the danger of the guerrilla activities on the mainland. On top of that, the Communist Command directed additional measures to eliminate any clandestine activities in this area. They regarded the UN’s clandestine activities at that time, in particular intelligence gathering, as the UNC’s preparatory tasks for an impending landing operation.\(^{64}\) Thus, from February 1953, the Communists started ‘the Month of the Counter UN Agent’ along the coastal areas. In close relationship with the local Communist cadres and citizens, it required all of its defensive forces and security police in this area to conduct additional tasks to defend any infiltration and activity of these agents. According to the Communists’ records, as a result of these activities, they were able to capture sixty-six agents and 653 defectors between 1 and 10 March 1953.\(^{65}\) Under these circumstances, it is likely that the choice of increasing guerrilla mainland activities was via a directive from the higher command, and not by their own volition.

The guerrillas’ mainland-centric activities were more likely related to their organisational changes. After the decision in October of 1952 to increase guerrilla strength, an extension to their operational area was also decided. Therefore, as they were largely relieved of the burden of island defence on the west coast from late 1952, the guerrillas’ infiltration of the mainland became more actively directed. This direction was applied not only to the former *Leopard*, but also to the *Wolfpack* guerrillas.\(^{66}\)

Subsequently, there was a general review of command objectives for this operation. It was in mid-January 1953 that FEC started their new plan for guerrilla deployment during that year. By

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\(^{64}\) The Chinese Academy of Military Science (ed.), Military History Compilation Institute, MND, ROK (trans.) *CCF’s War History of Resist America and Assist North Korea*, pp. 518, 564.


\(^{66}\) Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 64.
the direction of General Mark W. Clark, C-in-C, Far East, three plans were outlined to use guerrilla operations more actively and comprehensively. These operational plans covered two phases; the first, from 28 January to 15 March and the second, from 15 March to 15 September.

Phase I of the plan essentially directed the guerrillas to infiltrate the mainland, with further instruction for them to organise cellular groups in the Hwanghae Province. They were also required to conduct continuous harassment of the enemy, to cause the Communists to employ large numbers of troops as a counter-guerrilla operation. The plan then emphasised the defence of two islands, namely Kangwha-do and Kyodong-do, which had been garrisoned by 2nd PIR. These islands were located on the left side of the EUSAK, therefore this mission was intended to defend the EUSAK’s left flank.

Phase IIA, restated almost the same missions as those introduced in Phase I. The exception was an emphasis on increasing an operational area within the interior of North Korea. Both Phase I and IIA were based on the assumption that the EUSAK would continue an active defensive role. Phase IIB assumed the EUSAK general offensive from late summer.67

In addition to the above-mentioned plans, a number of special operations were also instructed during the first four months of 1953. For the purpose of conducting psychological warfare, a leaflet campaign was carried out. The guerrilla agents, therefore, distributed leaflets behind enemy lines to encourage defection amongst the North Koreans.68 Moreover, another special, very ambitious series of operations was directed by FEC, involving the objectives of assassinating Communist officials, penetrating POW camps and capturing MiG aircraft.69

An overlying prominent point of these plans, regardless of their phases, was that the higher command was consistently directing the guerrillas to infiltrate the mainland and conduct

67 Ibid., pp. 63–4.
68 Ibid., p. 62.
69 Ibid., pp. 63–4.
operations there. Guerrilla activities on the inshore and coastal areas were largely neglected, except for the defence of Kangwha-do and Kyodong-do, located out of the blockade ships’ main operational area, and raiding operations to employ more enemy troops from the front line.

Thus these direct instructions from FEC meant that each guerrilla organisation was strongly pressured in relation to infiltrating the mainland. With the CCRAK’s continued regulation of intelligence dissemination, FEC’s new guerrilla operational plans largely caused a lack of naval-guerrilla co-operation, and in particular, a lack in the supply of intelligence for the blockade ships. It also explains why there were continued large-scale guerrilla raids regardless of their poor performances. The guerrilla raids were encouraged by FEC to relieve pressure on the front line, and probably, the larger the scale of such raids, the greater the approval, as it might drag greater numbers from the Communist front line. Regardless of the Blockade Commanders’ intention, and possibly irrespective of the plans of the guerrillas themselves, during the spring of 1953, their co-operation became largely inactive.

7.3 The Impending Armistice Agreement and the Preparation of Operation PANDORA

Until early 1953, the Truce Negotiation had reached stalemate due to a dispute on the issue of Prisoners of War (POWs) exchanges. From the early stage of the truce talks, the Communists consistently insisted that the exchange of POWs should be conducted based on Article 118 of the Geneva Convention. This states that ‘Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after a cessation of hostilities’.70 Thus this meant that all POWs of both sides should be exchanged soon after the signing of an armistice agreement without any further

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condition. The UNC, however, argued that this exchange should be carried out based on the principle of voluntary repatriation, due to the fact that large numbers of Communist prisoners captured by UN Forces did not want repatriation. The UNC thought that prisoners should have a free personal choice to return to their original unit or to join an opposing unit after the cease-fire.  

Because of this dispute in terms of POWs exchange, and voluntary or enforced repatriation, the Truce Negotiation recessed from 8 October 1952.  

It was in early March 1953 that a turning point was reached in this totally stagnated negotiation. On 5 March, the Soviet Premier Stalin suddenly died of a cerebral hemorrhage. His death directly influenced the Communists’ stance on the truce talks. Due to internal problems following the death of Stalin, the new Kremlin leaders did not want to continue the war. Chinese leaders also readily agreed with the Kremlin’s stance. In fact, as the economic situation in China had grown worse owing to the prolonged involvement in the Korean War, Peking also hoped to get the negotiations going again. Needless to say, the Pyongyang Government, whom had expressed the wish for immediate cease-fire since early 1952 to its Communist partners, welcomed this decision.  

On 28 March, the Communist Command announced that they were willing to exchange the sick and wounded prisoners either before resuming the armistice negotiation or prior to the signing of a cease-fire agreement. This was in response to the UNC’s request of 22 February 1953, requiring an immediate exchange of the sick and injured prisoners. Accordingly, on 6  

72 Ibid., p. 418.  
73 Kim, ‘A Study on the Truce Talks During the Korean War’, p. 224.  
75 Due to the heavy damage continuously inflicted by the UN forces air bombardment, on 8 February 1952, Kim Il-Sung sent a letter to Mao Zedong wrote that ‘I want to discontinue this war any longer’: Ibid., p. 544. When news of the Chinese leaders’ agreement on the Kremlin’s stance was sent to Pyongyang, it was known that Kim Il-Sung ‘erupted into cheers’: Ibid., p. 550; Kim, ‘A Study on the Truce Talks During the Korean War’, p. 225.  

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April, both sides resumed the meeting at Panmunjom for the so-called ‘Little Switch’, and they agreed that this repatriation would commence from 20 April.⁷⁷ Thus, up to 3 May, the UNC released 6,670 POWs, and in return, the Communist side repatriated 684 POWs. ⁷⁸ Simultaneously, both sides agreed to resume plenary sessions from 26 April. By early June, the prolonged debate regarding the repatriation of POWs reached an agreement. The only critical issue to be settled before the signing of the truce talks was a renegotiation of the military demarcation line to reflect changes in the military situation since November 1951.⁷⁹ At this stage, for both sides, an armistice agreement seemed highly probable.

Regardless of an impending cease-fire, there seemed little change in the front-line situation. During this period, the UN forces had to continue an active defence against a Communist summer offensive that commenced from mid-May.⁸⁰ However, at least to the UN Forces operating on the west coast, the increased possibility of an imminent armistice agreement forced them to shift their attentions to pertinent post-war questions, such as the preparation for the evacuation from the northern islands.

As mentioned in Chapter six, as a result of an agreement regarding the territorial water demarcation line on 3 February 1952, the UNC mainly withdrew from the friendly held islands on the western and northern side of the Hwanghae and Kyong-gi Provincial line. The exception being non-withdrawal from five islands; namely, Paengyong-do, Techong-do, Sochong-do, Yonpyong-do and U-do. This evacuation had to be completed within five days after the signing

⁷⁸ The UNC’s POWs consisted of 5,194 North Koreans, 1,030 Chinese and 445 civilians. In return, the Communist Command released 471 ROK, 149 American, 32 British, 15 Turkish, 6 Colombian, 5 Australian, 2 Canadian and 1 Greek, South African, Filipino and Polish soldier each. *Ibid.*, p. 533.
of the armistice agreement. Those to be evacuated included the previously defended and garrisoned islands of Chodo and Sokto, and seventeen minor islands which were held by the guerrillas and which, in many cases, held inhabitants and refugees who wished to leave before the Communists took over. It was estimated that a total lift of 45,000 people, including guerrilla forces, and 2,300 tons of material, would need mobilisation within a short period of time. This situation particularly caused drastic operational changes and demands for two groups; that is TG 95.1 who had to plan and control this large-scale evacuation and the guerrillas who were forced to evacuate.

To the Blockade Commanders, completing this large-scale withdrawal within five days was not an easy task, and they therefore prepared an evacuation plan from early February 1952. As the UNC decided to withdraw from the majority of islands on the rear side of enemy territory, the CO of HMS Ceylon, CTG 95.12, conducted a brief investigation to identify possible evacuation problems. By late March 1952, a draft evacuation plan named Operation PANDORA and its complementary local plan TRIX were prepared. However, except for some minor corrections in the draft version and a meeting to check its progress, there had been relatively little concern paid to this plan due to continued enemy activities on the west coast and scepticism regarding an early armistice agreement.

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81 Meeting of Staff Officers on Details of Agreement of Agenda Item 3, Held at Pan Mun Jom, General Headquarters, United Nations Command Advance, 3 February 1952, p. 7.
85 The CO of HMS Ceylon wrote that he corrected some part of draft plan due to the arrival of more Radar equipment and personnel at Chodo: ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 20 June to 4 July 1952, HMS Ceylon, 4 July 1952, para. 8; in August 1952, there was also a meeting regarding the evacuation plan: ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of Proceedings, 9 August to 5 September 1952, HMS Newcastle, 6 September, 1952, paras 23–4.
It was in early May 1953 when this operation became imminent. After the decision on ‘Little Switch’, a conference was held between the commanders of PIRs and the Blockade Commanders to determine immediate requirements in the event of an armistice. Subsequently, during the patrol period of HMS *Birmingham* as CTU 95.1.2 between 6 and 20 May, an evacuation inventory for all islands concerned was recorded covering equipment and personnel. During the latter part of May, several discussions with the PIR Commanders and Garrison Commanders were carried out to make up the detail of the local evacuation plan. As a result of continued meetings and co-ordination with friendly forces in this area, on 1 June, the final draft plan was produced.

With Operation PANDORA an impending prospect, the Blockade Commanders needed to be fully preoccupied with this large-scale plan after mid-May 1953; this had little in common with the previous tasks of the blockade and island defence. However, the ‘evacuation clock’ moved quicker than originally supposed during June.

On 5 June, the UNC announced an instruction to the effect that ‘the armistice terms forbade any civilian to cross to the UN side of the armistice line who had not been resident south of it prior to 25 June 1950’. Effectively, this directive meant that the evacuation of the guerrillas and their dependants, refugees, and all the inhabitants who wished to move, had to be completed before the signing of the cease-fire. Therefore, an earlier than originally expected evacuation was commenced.

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86 Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 108.
The first evacuation began in the night of 9 June. With the signing of the POWs agreement of 8 June making a possible armistice imminent, the Commanding General of CCRAK (Brigadier General Stuart, USA) directed each PIRs Headquarters to begin the evacuation, starting from the outer islands.\(^91\) On the 10 June, the 6\(^{th}\) PIR, located on Chodo-Sokto and further north, began to withdraw using their own boats. The next day, the 1\(^{st}\) PIR in the Paengyong-do area, and the 5\(^{th}\) PIR in the Haeju area, also started to leave their small islands. Simultaneously refugees and inhabitants were also moved. Initially, they were instructed to gather on the larger islands such as Paengyong-do, Techong-do and Yonpyong-do, and this first phase mobilisation was conducted within a short period of time.\(^92\) Therefore, by 16 June, other than the so called ‘stay-behinds’ and the small patrol units assigned to observe enemy activity, the guerrillas were completely evacuated from the outer islands.\(^93\)

Although this evacuation was conducted by fishing junks under the command of PIR Commanders and LSTs, all loading and landing of individual craft needed to be closely supervised by each Task Unit ship. Therefore, all of the ships of TG 95.1 needed to be involved in this evacuation. For this, CTG 95.1, Admiral Clifford, stayed on the west coast and assumed the duties of Officer in Tactical Command west coast to establish a proper controlled operation.\(^94\)

During the same period, the operational direction of CCRAK in terms of guerrilla deployment, also drastically changed. This was to prepare for the post-war period. Thus, in late April, a directive was issued for CCRAK to stop recruiting guerrillas, and also to streamline their

numbers by getting rid of any incompetents.\footnote{By May 1953, the guerrillas’ strength reached its highest at 22,227, and it was decided to decrease this to 20,000 by July 1953: Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, Appendix I: Chronology of Partisan Campaign; \textit{Ibid.}, p. 116.} Subsequently, their command objective was also modified, in that they were not told to execute the Phase IIA plan, which required mainland infiltration and harassing the enemy. Instead, the plan was to exercise more effort in placing a small number of covert groups in Communist territory in a hope of retaining ‘stay-behind’ assets after the signing of an armistice.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 109.} Therefore, groups of volunteer guerrillas from each \textit{PIR} were selected. Consequently, on 26 May, the first ‘stay-behind’ groups of 124 guerrillas began their operation, and for the same purpose, an additional 82 guerrillas infiltrated almost two months later for post-truce contingencies.\footnote{Malcom, \textit{White Tigers}, p. 188.}

However, for the guerrilla organisations, the most significant change to their activities was the impending evacuation from their islands. As preparing for the large-scale withdrawal became the primary task, the guerrillas were largely diverted from their main missions. Moreover, these withdrawals from the smaller islands needed to be conducted mainly by fishing junks lent by the local civilians as a large number of guerrilla bases were in inshore areas that severely restricted the approach of friendly LSTs and blockade ships. Therefore, each \textit{PIR} had to commandeer a large number of ships within a short period of time.\footnote{ADM 116/6222, HMS \textit{Sparrow}-Report of Proceedings from 9 to 26 May 1953, para. 10} An immediate logistic supply for a large-scale withdrawal was also needed. In particular, because of the day-to-day uncertainty of an armistice, the lack of adequate water for relocated guerrillas needed to be solved prior to starting the evacuation operation. Because these requirements needed to be procured by the American officers in charge, greater attention was paid to preparing for the evacuation, rather than performing their normal activities.\footnote{Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 108}
In the course of this preparation, the guerrillas’ inactivity became very apparent. As mentioned in Chapter 5, for guerrillas originally from North Korea, the prospect of an early truce meant that their voluntary war would terminate without any definite outcome. Their post-war disposition was also obviously of great concern in that there was no clarified agreement between the UNC and the ROK Government regarding their future legal status.\textsuperscript{100} Therefore, the commencement of preparing an evacuation plan understandably meant these men experienced another significant drop in morale. This fact could be seen in the ORO study as follows:

In this period the imminence of the cease-fire and the June evacuation of forward islands, along with the ambiguity of partisan status, led to serious concern about partisan morale. In late June partisan headquarters requested special morale surveys. The number of criminal incidents, the number of AWOLs [Absent Without Official Leave] and desertions, the number of complaints from partisan leaders, and the number of partisans refusing to participate in raids were considered serious problems.\textsuperscript{101}

This situation caused a rapid decrease in guerrilla activities. According to the ORO study, even though their total strength was at its greatest, with around 22,000, an approximated 30 percent decline in activity was reported.\textsuperscript{102} Needless to say, a lack of co-operation with the Naval Forces was also continued. Even the naval gunfire support, which had continued during the previous period, also largely decreased.\textsuperscript{103}

During this transitional period, the Blockade Commanders’ main concerns in their relationship with the guerrillas also significantly changed. Unlike on the previous occasion, they paid

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. 116
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., p. 117
\textsuperscript{103} Between 18 May and 15 June, there had been only one raid conducted. It was conducted on 20 May by the 2nd PIR: ADM 116/6210, HMS Birmingham-Report of Proceedings, 6 to 20 May 1953, HMS Birmingham, 20 May 1953, Appendix I: Chronological Summary of Events; there were no reported guerrilla activities on the Haeju area overall during May, even though it was during the early stage of preparing evacuation: ADM 116/6222, HMS Sparrow-Report of Proceedings from 9 to 26 May 1953, HMS Sparrow, 1 June 1953, para. 6.
relatively little attention to the guerrilla activities and their intelligence. Therefore, even though there was continuous guerrilla intelligence regarding a high possibility of enemy invasion on Sunwi-do and Yongmae-do in early June, there was no gunfire support provision made for the guerrillas.\(^{104}\) The Naval forces’ main concern seemed clearly directed toward the evacuation plan.

Moreover, their perception of the guerrillas also drastically changed. For a long time, the guerrilla had been regarded by the Blockade Commanders as unreliable partners. However, as there was no real alternative to support such naval force missions like the ‘west coast blockade’ or ‘island defence’, they had to continue close co-operation with the guerrillas. Facing an imminent truce and preparing Operation PANDORA, however, the usefulness of these irregular forces largely decreased and their unreliability became more prominent. To the Commanders of TG 95.1, the guerrillas were largely perceived as armed former North Koreans who might resist the evacuation.

In fact, from the early stage of planning the large-scale evacuation, the Blockade Commanders were worried that the guerrillas would become ‘armed bandits’, ‘pirates’ or ‘persons carrying on with their present activities’, and this provoked unfortunate incidents stemming from this belief.\(^{105}\) Therefore, the Blockade Commanders requested the guerrillas’ disarmament once the armistice agreement was signed, and the American officers in charge consented to this.\(^{106}\)

It follows that, in the course of conducting the preliminary evacuation of mid-June, the Blockade Commanders’ main fear of guerrilla resistance became very palpable. Hence, in situations where no proper security forces existed to suppress such contingencies, the Blockade

\(^{104}\) ADM 116/6220, HMS Newcastle-Report of Proceedings, 22 May to 8 June 1953, HMS Newcastle, 8 June 1953, paras 63–6.


\(^{106}\) Ibid.
Commanders’ approach was very cautious in dealing with the guerrilla evacuation. Rather than forcing them to comply with the UNC’s decision of evacuation, American officers and the Blockade Commanders explained to the guerrilla leaders about the withdrawal plan in order to convince them. The following records clearly showed the Blockade Commanders’ approach to the guerrillas when there was resistance.

In the evening of 14th June, lifts were assembled at Sosuap-to and Taesuap-to and it was reported that, though the latter island was quiet, the Sosuap-to garrison was in a disturbed condition — vehemently refusing to consider evacuation. I ordered the Naval beach party to be withdrawn to prevent any incidents and the same facility was offered to United States personnel, who however elected to remain. On 15th June arrangements were made to evacuate Taesuap-to, and although the partisan loaded their arms into their boats and had dismantled their defences, they declined to move until ordered by their leader, who was absent..... Accordingly I landed early pm and a conference was assembled of the island leaders, or their representatives, at the Headquarters of the 5th PIR. It was carefully explained to them that they were to remain in being on the islands further south, that their dependents were to come with them [...] Evacuation was then agreed upon.

In particular, the CO of HMS Newcastle’s above-mentioned comments of ‘I ordered the Naval beach party to be withdrawn to prevent any incidents’ clearly shows the Blockade Commanders position toward the guerrillas during this period. Facing the impending armistice, their former operational partner became potentially a very troublesome one that may disturb the naval forces’ final mission in the Korean War.

Even in the course of conducting this evacuation, however, it became clear that the guerrillas still remained as one of the naval forces’ main concerns. As the largest of the

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107 The ORO study also mentioned the US officers’ concern of the guerrilla evacuation as follows: ‘The state of mind of the partisans was considered a problem in this period, and the evacuation of the partisans from islands above the 38th Parallel in June caused considerable uneasiness.’ Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 116.


friendly forces to be evacuated from the northern islands, the success of Operation PANDORA still depended on these irregular forces’ co-operation.

7.4 Delayed Armistice and Redeployment of the Guerrillas

To the ROK Government, that the conditions of the truce had been progressed without their prior consultation was unacceptable. In particular, as to the agreed repatriation of the POWs, this Government maintained their position that ‘the anti-Communist non-repatriates should be released upon the armistice agreement’. This directly countered the agreement on the exchange of POWs, which stated that, rather than release them immediately, those prisoners who had not been repatriated should be delivered to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, thus officially allowing the Communists’ representatives access to them and the opportunity to convert them to Communism.

To express their opposition to this controversial armistice condition, the ROK Government decided to release anti-Communist prisoners without any consultation with the UNC. On 18 June, by the direction of President Syngman Rhee, a total of 27,388 anti-Communist prisoners were released from UN prison camps. The Communist Command promptly reacted by calling off a planned staff officer meeting for detailed work on the demilitarised zone. This incident immediately diminished any prospect of an early armistice.

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As the armistice was eventually postponed from 18 June, the UNC instructed the reoccupation of the outer islands to prevent them falling into enemy hands.\textsuperscript{114} Therefore, steps were taken to redeploy a small number of guerrillas to the outer islands. They were provided with boats so that they could make patrols and withdrawals freely.\textsuperscript{115}

Regardless of the guerrilla redeployment, however, the Blockade Commanders’ main concern was still directed toward the evacuation issue. Although most of guerrillas and their dependents had been withdrawn by mid-June, there were large numbers of refugees, inhabitants and equipment still remaining on the islands. Therefore, as CTG 95.1 wrote in his report, stating that ‘Though the armistice was eventually postponed […] the evacuation during the preliminary period continued, and this did much to relieve final task’, the Blockade Commanders regarded this time as an additional preparatory opportunity for the main evacuation.\textsuperscript{116} Hence, during this period, they continued Operation PANDORA with a slow tempo.

This directive overrode any concern with guerrilla activities. This fact is substantiated by the CTG 95.1’s report of proceedings covering the period between 1 June and 7 August. Interestingly, in this report, there were no comments in regard to guerrilla activity, other than their evacuation from the outer islands during the preliminary period. Although there were several remarkable guerrilla activities conducted during this period, including their redeployment and co-operation with naval forces to recapture several islands, these were omitted in his report.\textsuperscript{117} Considering the fact that the guerrilla activities and their co-operation with the blockade ships was one of the main recorded topics of this report, it appears that any

\textsuperscript{117} The guerrilla operations to recapture the islands are explained in the paragraph below.
concerns over their activities were considered insignificant, by the Blockade Commanders, in relation to the evacuation.118

However, the continued progress of the evacuation did not mean that the Blockade Commanders were uncooperative in guerrilla activities. In fact, right after the redeployment of the guerrillas, the CO of HMS Newcastle re-constituted CTU 95.1.2 to resume the regular patrol of all previously held islands.119 This meant that the blockade ships were ready to conduct co-operation with the guerrillas when required. Since the evacuation of each PIRs’ Headquarters, however, the former co-operation system had largely regressed. As there was no system remaining on the northern islands to co-ordinate guerrilla activities, this task had to be conducted by the Island Defence Commander, who unfortunately was not in close touch with the guerrillas. Therefore, even the most simple communication task with the guerrillas became difficult. As the CO of HMS Cossack commented, ‘the former arrangement has lapsed’.120 The two groups’ relationship largely regressed to that which had existed in early 1951.

The guerrillas also seemed less active. This might have been not only due to deteriorated morale, but also due to the reduced number of guerrillas redeployed and their sole purpose of temporally securing the islands. Therefore, except for a few intelligence reports regarding an imminent enemy threat, there were no others from the guerrillas.121 Even the targeting intelligence, which had been satisfactorily supplied to the CTU 95.1.1, also largely decreased. This fact is well documented by the CO of USS Bairoko stating that ‘The evacuation of the PIR

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121 ADM 116/6217, HMS Cossack-Report of Proceedings, 30 June to 25 July 1953, Turnover Note- HMS Cossack to HMS Crane, para. 27.
from positions, on friendly held islands along the coast, considerably reduced the source of fresh and accurate target information’. 122

If there had been active Communist activities to recapture the empty islands, equally, there might have been a return to active co-operation with the guerrillas, as they reoccupied the outer islands. However, the Communists’ will to recapture the islands was not very strong. Immediately after the guerrilla evacuation from the outer islands, Sunwi-do and Yukto were occupied by the Communist Forces. However, except for the defensive reinforcement of these two islands, the Communists remained quiet; their guns did not fire on any UN ships, nor did they show any activity in the coastal area. 123 They deemed it was not worthwhile to recapture the small islands, considering it likely that they would return into their hands in the near future. Therefore, the guerrillas’ redeployment to the outer islands, other than the two above mentioned islands, was conducted quite peacefully.

The guerrilla raids to recapture them were also less than enthusiastic. The guerrillas from 1st PIR conducted raids under naval and air support to recapture Sunwi-do on 29 June and Yukto on 2 July respectively. However, faced with strong defensive enemy positions, they decided to withdraw. Following this, except for several gunfire harassments, no additional raids to recapture these islands were conducted. 124 Considering their operation during 1952 involving continual bombardments and harassment up until the recapturing of the islands, their activities seemed little more than a temporary stay prior to imminent withdrawal.

Between late June and mid-July, the delayed armistice agreement gave one more opportunity for co-operation between the ships of TG 95.1 and the redeployed guerrillas. In fact, it was the last viable instance that the two groups were potentially able to conduct co-operation during the

124 Ibid., paras 12–14.
whole of the Korean War. However, the shared belief that the armistice was just temporally postponed made it impossible to retrieve any effective level previously attained. With the inactivity of the Communist forces in this area, both sides were preparing post-war plans based on their own priorities, and this last opportunity for co-operation passed without a fruitful result.

7.5 The Signing of the Cease-fire and After

Right after the release of the anti-Communist prisoners of war on 18 June, the US Government decided to dispatch the Assistant Secretary of State immediately to South Korea. This was to persuade the ROK Government not to further endanger the armistice. Therefore, between late June and early July 1953, conferences between the ROK and the US continued.

It was on 11 July that the US representatives were able to draw up a final agreement with the ROK Government for a truce. By promising to accept large parts of the ROK’s requirements, including i) the signing of the mutual defence pact guaranteeing a prompt and automatic American commitment upon Communists’ reinvasion, ii) the provision of long-term economic assistance and iii) continued support for ROK military reinforcements, the US representatives honoured the ROK Government’s pledge not to disrupt the armistice.

Simultaneously, the UNC sent a letter to the Communist Command requesting that the truce talks were resumed and seeking assurance of the ROK Government’s co-operation in signing the armistice agreement. As the Communist side responded positively to this suggestion, from 10 July, the plenary conference reconvened at Panmunjom. In particular, from 19 July, the

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Communists showed a co-operative attitude for an immediate cease-fire, and delegates started to discuss the final preparations for the truce.\textsuperscript{128} Finally, on the morning of 27 July, the armistice was signed with a cease-fire to be effective at 22:00 the same day.\textsuperscript{129}

On 25 July, the CO of HMS \textit{Birmingham} received a message from the Naval Command at Sasebo indicating that the signing of a truce agreement was imminent.\textsuperscript{130} It was the signal for the final west coast island evacuation; the Commonwealth Naval Forces’ main consideration since May 1953. Since June, there were no substantial changes to the numbers of the islands that had to be evacuated. The only change in the finalised armistice terms was that the period allowed for evacuation from behind the truce lines was increased from five to ten days, until 6 August. Regardless of this modified term, however, it was decided to keep the original five-day period because of LST commitments.\textsuperscript{131}

Because of the limited time for the evacuation of the disaffected North Koreans to the south, the withdrawal of these redeployed guerrillas and refugees from the outlying islands was ordered to be completed first. The final evacuation was very easily and smoothly carried out, with the small groups of guerrillas on the outer islands able to use their own transport. It was also aided by the fact that the main body of guerrillas and refugees, who were the most troublesome, had already left. Only the more disciplined with arms remained, but under proper leadership. As four LSTs had been retained for this operation, the evacuation was expected to be completed within five days.\textsuperscript{132}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 685.  \\
\textsuperscript{129} War History Compilation Committee, ROK MND, \textit{The History of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Korean War}, Vol. II, p. 442.  \\
\textsuperscript{130} ADM 116/6210, HMS \textit{Birmingham}-Report of Proceedings, 24 July to 12 August 1953, HMS \textit{Birmingham}, 12 August 1953, para. 3.  \\
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ibid.}  \\
\textsuperscript{132} ADM 1/24856, Korean War-Report of Proceedings 62, 1 June to 7 August 1953, p. 5.  
\end{flushleft}

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Under the direction of HMS *Birmingham*, the operation proceeded smoothly. The evacuation started on 26 July with guerrilla elements in the Haeju area. The guerrillas in the Paengyong-do and Chodo-Sokto area were also evacuated by 27 July. Therefore, before the armistice’s effective time, all of the outlying guerrillas had been completely evacuated.\(^{133}\) Subsequently, the regular unit, with their associated equipment, commenced their evacuation from Sokto and Chodo, the two vital islands which were to be handed over to the Communist side.\(^{134}\)

By 1 August, it was reported that the evacuation of the west coast islands was completed.\(^{135}\) With the completion of PANDORA, the ships of TG 95.1’s major mission during the Korean War was finished. Their relationship of almost two and a half years with the guerrillas also neared closure.

After the completion of the evacuation, HMS *Birmingham* and HMCS *Iroquis* had to remain in the Chodo area to provide radar surveillance for two control officers from Tactical Air Defence Centre in Chodo. They were evacuated on 6 August.\(^{136}\) Subsequently, HMS *Ocean* took over as the Officer in Tactical Command. In order to remind the Communists that UN naval forces were still on the alert, during August, air and surface patrols were continued outside the three-mile limit of the Communist coast. She conducted three more patrols in Korean waters up until 16 October.\(^{137}\)

Regardless of the signing of an armistice, the British Commonwealth Naval forces remained within a close distance of the Korean coastal waters until mid-November 1953. This force included an aircraft carrier, cruiser and ships of the destroyer and frigate squadron. As there


was no recurrence of hostilities, Rear-Admiral Clifford decided to haul down his flag as Flag-Officer, 2nd in Command, Far East Station, at Hong Kong on 18 November 1953. With this event, the deployment of the British Commonwealth Naval forces in the Korean War was considered at an end.\textsuperscript{138}

As a result of the evacuation, the guerrillas’ co-operation with the Naval Forces terminated. However, their operations continued by early 1954. Owing to the possibility of the Communist side’s violation of the Armistice agreement, the UNC decided to operate the guerrilla forces for some further time.\textsuperscript{139} Therefore, rather than breaking up these irregulars, a provisional unit was to be made to administer and to control them. Based on an agreement between the FEC and the ROK Government, on 16 August, the 8250 ROK AU was formed under the direct control of the ROK Minister of National Defence.\textsuperscript{140}

During the autumn and the winter of 1953, most of the guerrillas continued their mission on Kanghwa-do and Kyodong-do; two islands on the left side of the EUSAK. This was to defend the ground forces’ left flank. Concurrently, they were trained to initiate unconventional warfare by amphibious and airborne operations against the North Korean targets. Several hundred guerrillas, who were ordered to infiltrate North Korea from late May 1953 for a ‘stay-behind’ mission, also continued their activities to recruit underground members.\textsuperscript{141} Although this covert mission was officially closed by late February 1954, the guerrillas reported back that they had successfully recruited around 600 underground members amongst the North Koreans.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 278.
\textsuperscript{139} Malcom, \textit{White Tigers}, p. 183.
\textsuperscript{140} Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, pp. 143–4.
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 129, 141.
\textsuperscript{142} Malcom, \textit{White Tigers}, p. 188; Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 142.
The de facto breakup of this guerrilla unit was decided in early 1954. On 8 January 1954, the ROK government issued an order which required the 8250 ROK AU to be integrated into the ROK Army up until 24 February 1954.\(^{143}\) According to a direction known as Operation QUICKSILVER, guerrillas with two years of service in the Korean War or who were inappropriate for military service were to be honourably discharged and given some incentives, such as blankets and 90kg of rice.\(^{144}\) Others were ordered to be enlisted in the ROK army for at least two years. They were given an army rank based on their previous career and position in the guerrilla organisation.\(^{145}\)

As a result of this decision, by early March, 9,657 guerrillas were transferred into the ROK Army.\(^{146}\) In fact, large numbers of former North Korean guerrillas wanted to continue their unconventional operations in regular ROK organisations. As a group of fighters who experienced the guerrilla operations against the Communist forces, the guerrilla members wanted to continue special operations, as a counter-insurgence force against the Communist guerrillas in South Korea or an intelligence agent unit operating on the islands such as Paengyong-do.\(^{147}\)

Contrary to the guerrillas’ hope, however, they were directed to be broken up and scattered throughout the ROK Army. To the ROK government, they were no more than unreliable North Korean refugees or irregulars who were ‘easy to desert and join bandit groups’.\(^{148}\) Thus, it was ordered to place ‘no more than five to seven’ former guerrillas in any ROK Army company and

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\(^{144}\) *Ibid.*, pp. 144–5

\(^{145}\) Each Regimental and Battalion leader was to be commissioned as a Major and Captain, and their staff officers became First or Second Lieutenant. Normal agents were offered army rank from Private to Sergeant based on their career: Cho, *The Guerrilla Warfare in the Korean War*, pp. 580–3.


that they should be from different guerrilla units. Due to the ROK Army’s suspicions about their motives, the guerrillas had to be scattered as individual regardless of their experience or careers. With this decision made, the anti-Communist guerrillas’ operation as a voluntary irregular force in the Korean War ended.

7.6 Concluding Comments

From late 1952, the Communist forces’ threat against the UN-held islands on the west coast was largely relieved. As the guerrilla organisations and the Communist forces in this area used the following winter season as a preparatory period for future operations, following this, operational inactivity prevailed in the west. With the advent of spring, when the guerrilla activity recommenced, however, the naval-guerrilla relationship significantly changed once again.

As FEC decided to use the guerrilla forces more actively in breaking the current stalemate of the cease-fire agreement, most guerrillas were directed to infiltrate the mainland more actively and conduct operations there. Therefore, except for several amphibious raids, guerrilla activities on the inshore and coastal areas were largely neglected, and this immediately caused a lack of co-operation with the blockade naval forces. A similar situation to that involving Leopard in the Chodo-Sokto area in 1952 was occurring again on a much larger scale. Also, this clearly revealed an underlying limitation of the American guerrilla organisations as a co-operation partner; that of very limited viability for sustainable close co-operation due to different objectives from the naval forces.

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
From early May 1953, as the signing of the truce became more imminent, the Blockade Commanders’ main concerns also had to be directed toward post-war preparation, that of the evacuation from the northern islands. As this new mission had little in common with the previous relationship with the guerrilla organisations, the naval forces’ heavy commitment in this evacuation task resulted in a more distant relationship between the two groups. Also, in the course of conducting this final mission, it became clearer that even after almost two years of co-operation, the guerrillas were still perceived as unreliable by the naval forces.

Faced with an impending armistice agreement, the two groups’ relationship, which had been maintained during the large part of the Korean War, naturally and rapidly disintegrated. And, with the signing of the armistice agreement and subsequent completion of evacuation, this relationship came to an end without any lingering connections. Despite such a futile conclusion, however, it was clear that even in the course of conducting the final evacuation mission, as the largest forces to be moved, the guerrillas remained one of the naval forces’ main concerns. This speaks volumes about the influence of the guerrilla forces on the naval operation. That is why, in spite of little attention in the current historiography, the latter part of naval operation on the west coast has to be studied in terms of the naval-guerrilla relationships.
Chapter 8
Conclusion: Compelled Co-Operation with Unreliable Partners

Since the publication of the James A. Field’s History of the US naval operations during the Korean War, perhaps, the academic analysis of UN naval operation during the Korean War has been dominated by this simplified description: ‘a year of violent and dramatic action’ followed by two years of ‘deadlock’.¹ Due to this tedious and unspectacular image of static war, the latter part of UN naval forces’ operation has received relatively little academic attention compared to the earlier period.

It is undeniable that the latter part of UN naval operations in Korea was essentially a static war in that most fleets in Korean waters had to be engaged in various naval tasks within each designated operational area. As Admiral Scott-Moncrieff wrote in late 1951, ‘This loss of naval mobility’ was ‘a feature of this war’, this static image was one of the representative characteristics in describing the last two years of UN naval operation.² However, the historiography overlooked the heterogeneity of naval operations between the east and west which was clearly revealed within the frame of ‘static war’. Therefore, the historiography fails to pay proper attention to the actual features and value of the west coast naval campaign.

What made the western naval forces’ operation more distinctive and important was the emergence of the several thousand of anti-Communist guerrillas and the following naval-guerrilla co-operation. As the largest guerrilla forces controlled by the UNC during the Korean War, the start of their activity and the subsequent development of naval-guerrilla relationships naturally made the naval forces operation very sensitive to any guerrilla activities. This

¹ Field Jr., History of United States Naval Operations, Korea, p. IX.
consequently caused the western naval forces operation to be more complex, but more effective. In addition, this naval-guerrilla co-operation system became a key role in carrying out the various naval tasks in the west. Nevertheless, although often difficult and frustrating, working with the irregular groups was both strategically and operationally essential to the west coast naval campaign, and this naval-guerrilla relationship was of major importance during the latter part of the naval operation. This study has sought to show that for a more realistic picture of the latter part of the UN naval operation conducted on the west coast, it is necessary to examine it in terms of the naval-guerrilla relationships.

To the Commanders of the western naval forces, the anti-Communist guerrillas on the west coast had been regarded as unreliable partners. This largely originated from the nature of the guerrillas; they were former North Korean irregulars who spontaneously gathered for their own objectives. Therefore, there had been the perception of doubtful reliability in respect of this irregular forces’ activity from the early stage of the relationship. However, owing to the intelligence-related problems which are mentioned in Chapter 3, it was imperative for the Naval Commanders to have a close relationship with these irregulars. Notwithstanding fundamental problems, the guerrillas’ potential value as a local intelligence team for the naval operation seemed highly desirable. Moreover, their amphibious raids, supported by naval air and gunfire support, also seemed very advantageous in that they would cause a large deployment of enemy troops from the front line. Therefore, from mid-February 1951, the naval blockade ships’ relationship with the guerrillas commenced, albeit in a tentative and prudent manner.

Notably, the naval forces’ co-operation with the guerrillas drastically gained some momentum; in particular after the establishment of the Leopard Headquarters. As this American organisation successfully reorganised large numbers of guerrillas under their unified command
and control, the Blockade Commanders’ initial worries of close co-operation with these irregulars were largely relieved. Due to this guerrilla reorganisation, the Blockade Naval Forces accomplished a very satisfactory co-operation system during the first four months. As previously quoted, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff’s comments confirmed that it was ‘producing excellent results all round’. Although there were understandably continuing difficulties in controlling any un-notified guerrilla activity and involvement in their privately motivated conflict, the benefits seemed much greater than the disadvantages. Based on the deepened naval dependence on the Leopard organisation, this unique naval-irregular relationship became one of the most important and distinguishing parts of the west coast naval operation within a short period of time. As this co-operation started without any confidence of the partner’s reliability, however, a potential risk remained in their relationship.

As for the American guerrilla organisation, which needed naval support for more effective operations, a close relationship with the naval blockade ships was welcomed. Significantly it was the EUSAK Headquarters, the parent organisation of these guerrillas, which initiated the request for this naval co-operation. However, its primary purpose did not directly coincide with the Blockade Commanders’ objective that this organisation would become a valuable intelligence source and act as both controller and co-ordinator of all guerrilla activities. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Leopard Headquarters’ main purpose in the guerrilla reorganisation was to provide support for the EUSAK’s premised offensive in spring 1951. Therefore, this guerrilla organisation’s close relationship with the blockade ships, based on its initial plan, was intended to be maintained for only a limited duration of time. Through any directive from the EUSAK, the Leopard was programmed to shift their activity from the early phase of

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3 ADM 116/6213, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 28 May to 10 June 1951, CTG 95.1’s Comments, 8 July 1951.
intelligence gathering and sabotage missions to a counter-offensive operation. In terms of viable sustainability of the co-operation with the Naval Blockade Forces, this American organisation was also fundamentally an unreliable partner.

It was thus somewhat of an accidental result of the EUSAK’s delayed inauguration of counter-offensive, which radically developed the two groups’ co-operation during the early days. Due to the CCF’s Spring Offensive between April and May 1951, and the subsequent UNC’s consideration of truce talks, the possibility of a planned UN offensive was remote. This situation invoked the EUSAK Headquarters’ towards gradual indifference to the guerrilla activity, and ironically, this indifference expedited the development of co-operation between the two groups. As the EUSAK did not direct additional guerrilla activity obligations, the Leopard was able to maintain the first phase of their operational plan, and this naturally allowed great scope for close co-operation with the friendly naval forces.

From such tentative beginnings, there was a real problem that the two groups’ relationships with each other might deteriorate operationally, exasperated by the higher command’s instruction to use the guerrillas for special purposes. With the problems accrued from the very nature of the guerrillas, this underlying limitation significantly influenced the drastic change in the two groups’ co-operation during the remaining operational period in Korea.

The first crisis in the two groups’ relationship emerged immediately following the start of the truce talks in mid-July 1951. As for the guerrillas, the sole motivation was to liberate their home towns from the Communists. This was the only reason for their spontaneous decision to join the Leopard organisation and to conduct hazardous activities behind enemy lines. The decision for truce talks, therefore, became a significant turning point in Leopard guerrillas’ activity. In particular, news of the truce talks seriously undermined their will to fight and created wavering
allegiance. In addition, due to the increasing concern over their uncertain future, a large number of guerrillas exchanged their earlier lofty motivations to that of personal gain; thus this, in essence, increased their conduct of ‘private war’. The truce talks issue clearly revealed and intensified the guerrillas’ underlying problems, which had previously been somewhat overlooked by the friendly naval forces during the first four months of the successful co-operation period.

Undoubtedly, this situation resulted in growing scepticism amongst the Naval Blockade Commanders regarding the reliability of the guerrillas. In fact, from late July, they had experienced various situations which clearly showed the danger of co-operation with the guerrillas. After witnessing guerrillas in the ‘Taewha-do Incident’, an early example of wavering allegiance at least to the Blockade Commanders, their distrust of the guerrillas increased, and by late August they were convinced that double agents existed amongst the Leopard guerrillas. Increasing dissatisfaction over poor Leopard intelligence, their growing propensity for ‘private war’, and imprudent ‘cry wolf’ scenarios all intensified the Blockade Commanders’ disappointment in guerrilla involvement. Decisively, after sensing the new Leopard Headquarters’ inadequate ability to control their agents, the Blockade Commanders’ distrust of this organisation reached a peak.

Due to the on-going problems of reliability, the Commanders of the British Naval Task Group decided to discontinue any direct communication with the local guerrilla agents. They also treated any information from them with a certain level of scepticism. Therefore, the early successful co-operation system, once established, was largely wiped out within four months from the start of the truce talks. And, the challenges emerging from inside the guerrilla organisation resulted in inactiveness, ineffectiveness and even danger in the western naval forces’ operation.
However, regardless of the Blockade Commanders’ perception of the guerrillas, from November 1951, the Naval Task Group was required to establish an even closer relationship with this unreliable guerrilla organisation. As the friendly held islands on the west coast became used as UN Delegation bargaining counters at the cease-fire negotiations from late October, to rule out any advantage for the UNC in the negotiations, the Communist forces initiated an assault against the friendly held islands.

With a radical change in the war situation on the west coast, the defence of the friendly islands needed to be given the highest priority by the blockade ships. Faced with the imminent threat from the Communists, the Blockade Commanders had to develop a direct communication system with the guerrilla agents in order to expediently collect enemy information on inshore areas. Moreover, despite the perceived unreliability and doubtful capability, the Naval Commanders were obliged to use the guerrillas as a main source for island garrison forces. During this defensive period, similar to the start of the relationship, guerrilla co-operation was inevitable, as the blockade ships needed closer ties with this unreliable partner.

Whilst the enemy’s offensive on the islands continued until late 1952, from early February, the Communist forces’ actual threat against the important islands was significantly reduced. This activity diminished when the final agreement regarding the status of inshore islands was issued as part of the cease-fire negotiation in late January 1952. From then on, island warfare was conducted, as ‘Tom Tiddler’s Ground’, in that each side’s concerns were mostly focused on the small and less important islands that were situated between the major islands and the mainland. Simultaneously, the Communists’ main purpose of offensive was redirected to raiding the islands and trying to capture the friendly guerrillas. This meant that the enemy threat was more concentrated in the Haeju and Ongjin areas, which contained more small islands of guerrillas.
inshore than in the Chodo-Sokto and Paengyong-do areas. Thus, guerrillas and naval ships in these areas had to be more actively and closely involved in the defensive operation.

This different level of Communist activity threatening each inshore area largely influenced the relationship change between the ships of the British Task Group and the guerrillas. This relationship, with the influence of the guerrilla organisation’s command and control realignment in late 1951, became particularly complicated. As mentioned in Chapter 6, as a result of this change, the responsibility of the guerrilla operation was transferred from the EUSAK Headquarters to FEC/LD (K) and CCRAK, theatre-level agencies who were in charge of clandestine activities. At the same time, for the purpose of relieving the overburdened area for which Leopard was responsible, Wolfpack was separated from the former guerrilla organisation.

An interesting point to be noted was that, unlike the EUSAK Headquarters, who had been largely indifferent to its guerrilla activity, the new higher commands of the two guerrilla organisations were more active in using their resources for their purposes. In particular, they were more active in directing the Leopard guerrillas in the Chodo-Sokto area and Paengyong-do, as these locations were relatively light in defence. Under the initiatives of the two theatre-level agencies, several Donkeys were directed to infiltrate the mainland for special activities, and to be more prudent in sharing their collected intelligence with the friendly naval forces. In particular, the Chodo-Sokto guerrillas, who suffered little damage in the course of early enemy attacks, were able to respond most actively to these higher command instructions.

To the Commanders of the Naval Task Group, who were allowed to access only a limited part of higher level intelligence, this variance in guerrilla group activity across different areas was somewhat incomprehensible. In particular, there was a large difference in perceptions in terms of the activities of Wolfpack guerrillas and those of Leopard in Chodo and Sokto. Even though there had been a high level of satisfaction concerning Wolfpack guerrilla activities overall, in
the Haeju area, the Donkeys in Chodo-Sokto were deemed disappointing owing to their total lack of co-operation. In particular, a commonly shared question of the blockade ships in Chodo-Sokto area was why the guerrillas in this area demonstrated poor intelligence supply and a shortage of offensive activities, despite continual active movements towards the mainland.

In fact, the Blockade Commanders’ negative evaluation on the Chodo-Sokto guerrillas was not a consequence of actual inactiveness, but a symptom of few co-operation opportunities. Due to the disparity of main operational areas, there had been little contact made between the two groups. In addition, CCRAK’s regulations regarding intelligence dissemination to friendly forces also contributed to a lack of intelligence supply. On the other hand, Wolfpack guerrillas had to continue a close relationship with the naval forces to provide the security to their islands. Under the continued threat from the enemy, they were required to supply up-to-date information to the friendly naval forces and had to conduct pre-emptive attacks against enemy build-ups. By virtue of the combined effect of enemy activities and the newly emerged high-level directives, the Wolfpack and Leopard guerrillas were engaged in different types of operations. Owing to the naval operation’s deepened dependence on the guerrilla activities, this situation also caused a large difference in each TU’s activities in the west coast.

When the Commanders of the Naval Task Group were virtually compelled to ignore the problem of the guerrillas’ reliability and obliged to maintain a close relationship with them, the American guerrilla organisations gradually withdrew their co-operation with the naval forces to concentrate on their own objectives.

From December 1952, the Communist forces stopped their direct offensive activities against the friendly held islands, and subsequently conducted large-scale troop reinforcements along the west coast. This enemy build-up, however, was totally for defensive purposes, to respond
to the threat of a possible large-scale UN force landing operation. To the naval blockade ships and the guerrilla forces on the west coast, this change in Communist movements clearly signified an end to island warfare.

Under the new operational environment, it was the American guerrilla organisations that immediately changed their activities; this significantly impacted on the relationship with the naval forces. In fact, from late 1952, FEC initiated the guerrilla reorganisation process by an intensive recruiting program to radically increase guerrilla strength and also to incorporate these organisations into the US Army command structure. This reorganisation process reflected FEC’s decision that it would be a more effective use of guerrilla resources to optimise size and manageability. In particular, this organisational change attempted to address the more comprehensive use of guerrilla forces in breaking both rear guard and front-line Communist defences in what was a current stalemate situation, and also to pressurise them towards a cease-fire agreement.

This FEC intention of reorganising materialised with a new guerrilla operational plan covering the overall period of 1953. As mentioned in Chapter 7, an overlying prominent point regarding this plan was that the higher command was consistently directing the guerrillas to infiltrate the mainland and conduct operations there. They were also instructed to carry out a number of special operations, such as assassinating Communist officials, penetrating POW camps and distributing leaflets. Therefore, except for the amphibious raids, guerrilla activities on the inshore and coastal areas were largely neglected, and this immediately caused a lack of cooperation with the friendly naval forces. A similar situation to that involving *Leopard* in the Chodo-Sokto area in 1952, occurred again in 1953; but on a much larger scale. An underlying limitation of these American guerrilla organisations was the unsustainability of relationships with the naval forces; a feature clearly revealed in the last year of the Korean War. Needless to
say, this situation limited the naval forces’ routine operations, which still had to largely depend on guerrilla intelligence for their west coast Blockade mission.

By early May 1953, with the restart of the truce talks and the prolonged debate regarding the repatriation of POWs seemingly coming to a conclusion, an armistice agreement became highly probable. An impending cease-fire forced the UN Forces operating on the west coast to shift their attentions to pertinent post-war questions; that of the preparation for the evacuation from the northern islands. This situation particularly caused drastic operational changes and demands for Naval Blockade Forces whom had to plan and control this large-scale evacuation. As this evacuation, code named Operation PANDORA, was agreed to be completed within five days after the signing of the armistice agreement, the Blockade Commanders needed to be fully occupied with this operation from mid-May 1953.

Unlike previous missions which required close naval-guerrilla relationships, this new mission had little in common with past relationships with the guerrillas. In fact, during this transitional period, the Blockade Commanders’ position with the guerrillas significantly changed. As the Naval forces’ main concern was directed clearly towards conducting Operation PANDORA, they paid relatively little attention to the guerrilla activities. Moreover, in conducting the evacuation mission, to the Naval Commanders, the guerrillas came to be perceived as potential ‘armed bandits’ or ‘pirates’ who might resist the evacuation.\(^4\) It became clear through this experience that, even after almost two years of co-operation, the guerrillas were still perceived as unreliable forces by the friendly navies.

An interesting point to note was that, even in the course of preparing the evacuation plan, the guerrilla issue still remained as one of the naval forces’ main concerns. Whilst preparing

\(^4\) ADM 116/6214, HMS Ceylon-Report of Proceedings from 1 to 12 February 1952, para. 11.
Operation PANDORA, the pattern of the relationship between the two groups had to be changed. However, as the largest of the friendly forces to be evacuated, the success of this naval mission largely depended on the guerrillas’ co-operation.

With the signing of the armistice agreement on the morning of 27 July 1953, a cease-fire condition prevailed. On the same day, all of the outlying guerrillas were completely evacuated. Subsequently, the regular units, with their associated equipment, commenced their evacuation from the vital islands which were to be handed over to the Communist side. Finally, on 1 August, the evacuation of the west coast islands was achieved. With the operation of PANDORA successfully completed, the ships of the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces relationship with the guerrillas also came to an end.

In actual fact, it was only for the duration of six months that the naval forces had operated without any relationship with the anti-Communist guerrillas during the three years of their west coast operation. Essentially, the ships of the British Naval Task Group had to continue their relationship with the guerrilla organisations, although deemed unreliable, during the best part of the Korean War. Ironically, regardless of the Naval Commanders’ perception of these irregular forces, their relationship with the guerrillas was one of the most important factors in understanding the operations of the western UN naval forces in the Korean War. This is the reason that this research rests on the belief that a more realistic picture of the latter part of UN naval operation conducted on the west coast can be properly drawn when we pay more attention to this naval-guerrilla co-operation.

Overall it is considered that the guerrillas, who spontaneously participated in the clandestine activities behind enemy lines without proper compensation, conducted various activities which
deserved to be respected.\textsuperscript{5} However, for the Commanders of the Naval Task Group, owing to the nature of the guerrillas, it was difficult to build any direct trust with them. The American organisations which reorganised and controlled these irregulars were also, from a different perspective, an unreliable partner. Due to the difference of primary objectives for the use of the guerrillas, there was only a limited amount of manoeuvrability for close co-operation with the naval forces. It was the parent organisation’s early indifference, and also the tense war situation on the west coast, which improved and maintained the two groups’ close relationships for more than two years. The American organisations’ viability for sustainable close co-operations with the Naval Blockade Forces was thus inherently very limited.

However, due to the absence of an alternative partner to properly support the naval forces’ missions on the west coast, the blockade ships were deeply dependent on the relationship with the guerrilla organisations. In addition to the changes in the war situation, the naval operation during the latter two-year plus period on the west had been largely decided by the opportunities and challenges that emerged from the naval-guerrilla relationship. To the British Commonwealth Commanders and the Allied Naval forces on the west coast, a large part of the relationship with the guerrillas during the Korean War would be remembered as that involving a ‘compelled co-operation with unreliable partners’. And, perhaps, rather than ‘static warfare on shore’, this simplified description is a better concept to explain the extensive period of western naval forces operation in Korea.

\footnote{5 Regarding the result of their actions, see Cleaver et al., ‘UN Partisan Warfare in Korea’, p. 16.}
Appendix 1. British Commonwealth and Allied Ships that served under British Command

Note - Ships are listed alphabetically according to type. Short absences from the war area (minor defects, recreation, and so on) are not shown. ROK Naval craft operated on the west coast are not shown as they were not served under direct British command.

1.1 Light Fleet Carriers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Time in War Area</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Glory</td>
<td>April ~ September 1951</td>
<td>Captain K. S. Colquhoun, DSO</td>
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<td>Captain K. S. Colquhoun, DSO</td>
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<td>November 1952 ~ May 1953</td>
<td>Captain T. A. K. Maunsell</td>
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<td>Captain E. D. G Lewin, DSO, DSC</td>
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<td>Ocean</td>
<td>May ~ November 1952</td>
<td>Captain C. L. G. Evans, DSO, DSC</td>
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<td>May ~ November 1953</td>
<td>Captain B. E. W. Logan</td>
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<td>Theseus</td>
<td>September 1950 ~ April 1951</td>
<td>Captain A. S. Bolt, DSO, DSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Triumph</td>
<td>June ~ September 1950</td>
<td>Captain A. D. Torlesse, DSO</td>
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<td>Unicorn</td>
<td>July 1950~July 1953</td>
<td>Captain H. S. Hopkins, OBE</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Captain J. Y. Thompson</td>
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<td>Sydney</td>
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<td>Captain D. H. Harries, CBE</td>
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<td>Badoeng Strait (CVE-116)</td>
<td>December 1951 ~ February 1952</td>
<td>Captain Roy L. Johnson, USN</td>
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<td>October 1952 ~ February 1953</td>
<td>Captain H. L. Ray, USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bairoko (CVE-113)</td>
<td>February ~ April 1952</td>
<td>Captain R. D. Hogle, USN</td>
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<td>May ~ July 1953</td>
<td>Captain L. T. Morse, USN</td>
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<td>Captain Emmet O’Berne, USN</td>
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<td>January ~ June 1951</td>
<td>Captain E. T. Neale, USN</td>
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<td>April ~ July 1952</td>
<td>Captain W. Miller, USN</td>
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<td>Captain H. R. Horney, USN</td>
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<td>Captain S. S. Miller, USN</td>
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<td>August ~ September 1952</td>
<td>Captain A. Schoech, USN</td>
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<td>Rendova (CVE-114)</td>
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<td>Captain Almond E. Loomis, USN</td>
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### 1.2 Cruisers

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<td>June – August 1950 Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford, Bt, DSO</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>January 1951–September 1952 Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford, Bt, DSO Captain A. C. A. C. Duckworth, DSO, DSC</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Jamaica</em></td>
<td>June ~ October 1950 Captain J. S. C. Salter, DSO, OBE</td>
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<td><em>Kenya</em></td>
<td>July 1950–August 1951 Captain P. W. Brock Captain T. E. Podger</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Ceylon</em></td>
<td>August 1950–July 1952 Captain C. F. J. Lloyd-Davies, DSC Captain G. A. Thring, DSO Captain J. C. Stopford, OBE</td>
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<td></td>
<td><em>Newcastle</em></td>
<td>July 1952–July 1953 Captain W. F. H. C. Rutherford</td>
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<td><em>Birmingham</em></td>
<td>September 1952–July 1953 Captain J. D. Luce, DSO, OBE Captain C. W. Greening, DSC</td>
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### 1.3 Destroyers

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<td>August ~ November 1952 Commander J. A. C. Henley Commander R. Gatehouse, DSC</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Cockade</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>July ~ November 1950 Lt Commander H. J. Lee, DSC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>March – August 1951 Commander J. T. Kimpton, DSC</td>
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<td>November 1952–February 1953 Commander W. J. Parker, DSO</td>
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<td>Lt. Commander J. D. McLoughlin, DSC</td>
<td>Lt. Commander J. R. Carr</td>
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<td>Captain G. G. O. Gatacre, DSO, DSC</td>
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<td>Captain J. S. Mesley, DSC</td>
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<td><strong>Bataan</strong></td>
<td>September 1951–January 1952</td>
<td>Commander W. B. M. Marks, DSC</td>
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<td>Commander R. I. Peak, OBE, DSC</td>
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<td>Commander I. H. McDonald</td>
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<td><strong>Warramunga</strong></td>
<td>August 1950–August 1951</td>
<td>Captain O. H. Becher, DSO, DSC</td>
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<td>January 1952</td>
<td>Commander J. M. Ramsay, DSC</td>
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<td>Commander D. G. King, DSC, CD</td>
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<td>Commander J. C. Reed DSC, CD</td>
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<td>Captain J. V. Brock, DSC, DSC, CD</td>
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### 1.4 Frigates

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<td>June – August 1950</td>
<td>Commander H. S. Barber</td>
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<td>February – June 1951</td>
<td>Lt. Commander N. R. Turner</td>
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<td>Commander H. A. I. Luard</td>
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<td>August – October 1950</td>
<td>Commander R. de L. Brooke, DSO, DSC</td>
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<td>October 1951</td>
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<td><em>Amethyst</em></td>
<td>February – June 1951</td>
<td>Commander P. E. Fanshawe</td>
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<td>September 1951–January 1952</td>
<td>Commander A. R. L. Butler</td>
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<td>April – July 1952</td>
<td>Commander A. R. L. Butler</td>
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<td><em>Black Swan</em></td>
<td>June – August 1950</td>
<td>Captain A. D. H. Jay, DSO, DSC</td>
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<td>Captain G. A. F. Norfolk, DSO</td>
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<td>September – November 1951</td>
<td>Captain W. L. M. Brown, OBE, DSC</td>
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<td><em>Cardigan Bay</em></td>
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<td>Captain W. L. M. Brown, OBE, DSC</td>
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<p>| <strong>Royal Netherlands Navy</strong> |                  |                                                         |
| <em>Evertsen</em> | July – August 1950 | Lt. commander Van Doorninck                             |
|           | November 1950–April 1951 |                                                     |
| <em>Van Galen</em> | May 1951–January 1952 | Commander A. M. Valkenberg                            |
| <em>Piet Hein</em> | March – July 1952 | Commander A. H. W. von Freytag Drabbe                |
|           | September 1952–January 1953 |                                                     |</p>
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<td><strong>Hart</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Morecambe Bay</strong></td>
<td>Commander C. C. B. Mackenzie</td>
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<td>Commander J. E. Farnol, DSC</td>
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<td><strong>Mounts Bay</strong></td>
<td>Captain J. H. Unwin, DSC</td>
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<td><strong>Opossum</strong></td>
<td>Commander J. C. Cartwright, DSC</td>
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<td><strong>St Bride's Bay</strong></td>
<td>Commander W. J. P. Church, DSO, DSC</td>
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1.5 Headquarters Ships

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<td>Commander A. H. Diack, DSC</td>
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1.6 Hospital Ship

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<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Time in War Area</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>June 1950–February 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Master, Captain S. G. Kent, OBE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Master, Captain W. W. Peddle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>May 1952–July 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Master, Captain W. W. Peddle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2. Naval Operation Commands During the Korean War

2.1 25 June – 20 July 1950

Commander, Naval Forces Far East
Commander, Task Force 96

Commander, Seventh Fleet

Task Force 90
Amphibious Force Far East

Task Force 96

Task Force 77
(Striking Force)

Task Group 96.1
(Movement Group Escort Group
Fleet Activities Japan-Korea)

Task Group 96.2
(Search and Reconnaissance Group
Naval Air Japan)

Task Group 96.3
(Shipping Control Administration,
Japan)

Task Group 96.4
(Towing and Savage Group
Service Group)

Task Group 96.5
(Naval Support Group
East Korea Support Group)

Task Group 96.6
(Minesweeping Group)

Task Group 96.7
(Republic of Korea Navy)

Task Group 96.8
(West Coast Support Group)

Task Group 96.9
(Submarine Group)

Task Group 77.7
(Replenishment Group)

Task Group 70.6
(Fleet Air Wing 1)
2.2 21 July – 11 September 1950

Commander, Naval Forces Far East
Commander, Task Force 96

Commander, Seventh Fleet

Task Force 90
Amphibious Force Far East

Task Force 96

- Task Group 96.1
  (Fleet Activities Japan-Korea)
- Task Group 96.2
  (Naval Air Japan)
- Task Group 96.3
  (Shipping Control Administration, Japan)
- Task Group 96.4
  (Service Group)
- Task Group 96.5
  (Japan-Korea Support Group)
  - TE 96.50: Escort Element
  - TE 96.51: East Korea Support Element
  - TE 96.52: East Korea Support Element
  - TE 96.53: West Korea Support Element
- Task Group 96.6
  (Minesweeping Group)
- Task Group 96.7
  (Republic of Korea Navy)
- Task Group 96.8
  (Escort Carrier Group)
- Task Group 96.9
  (Submarine Group)
2.3 Since 12 September 1950

Commander, Naval Forces Far East
Commander, Task Force 96

Commander, Seventh Fleet
Task Force 90
Amphibious Force Far East

Task Force 95
UN Blockading and Escort Force

Task Force 96

- Task Force 77
  (Striking Force)
- Task Force 79
  (Service Squadron 3)
- Task Group 70.6
  (Fleet Air Wing 1)
- Task Group 77.3
  (Task Force 72/
  Formosa Patrol)

- Task Group 95.1
  (West Coast Group)
- Task Group 95.2
  (East Coast Group)
- Task Group 95.6
  (Minesweeping Group)
- Task Group 95.7
  (Republic of Korea Navy)

- Task Group 96.1
  (Fleet Activities Japan-Korea)
- Task Group 96.2
  (Fleet Air Japan)
- Task Group 96.3
  (Shipping Control Administration,
  Japan)
- Task Group 96.4
  (Service Group)
- Task Group 96.8
  (Escort Carrier Group)
- Task Group 96.9
  (Submarine Group)
Appendix 3. UN Commanders in Chain of Command
(Controlling Commonwealth Naval Forces)

**Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (Pearl Harbour)**
- Admiral A. W. A. Rford, USN

**Supreme Commander, UN Forces (Tokyo)**
**Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command**
- General D. MacArthur, USA (4 April 1951)
- General M. B. Ridgway, USA (4 April 1951~5 May 1952)
- General Mark Clark, USA (May 1952 ~)

**Commander, Naval Forces Far East**
- Vice-Admiral C. T. Joy, USN (June 1952)
- Vice-Admiral R. P. Briscoe, USN (June 1952 ~)

**Commander, Blockade and Escort Force**
- Rear-Admiral J. M. Higgins, USN (July 1950)
- Rear-Admiral C. C. Hartman, USN (July ~ September 1950)
- Rear-Admiral A. E. Smith, USN (September 1950~February 1951)
- Vice-Admiral Sir W. Andrews, RN (February ~ April 1951)
- Rear-Admiral A. E. Smith, USN (April ~ June 1951)
- Rear-Admiral C. C. Dyer, USN (June 1951 ~ May 1952)
- Rear-Admiral J. E. Gingrich, USN (May 1952~February 1953)
- Rear-Admiral C. E. Olson, USN (February 1953 ~)

**Commander, Commonwealth and Allied Forces**
(West Coast)
- Rear-Admiral W. Andrews, RN (July 1950~April 1952)
  * Promoted to Vice Admiral From 1st December 1950
- Rear-Admiral A. Scott-Moncrieff, RN (April 1951~September 1952)
- Rear-Admiral E. G. A. Clifford, RN (September 1952 ~)

**Commander-in-Chief, Far East Station (Singapore)**
- Admiral Sir P. Brind, RN (* February 1951)
- Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir G. Russell, RN (February 1951~March 1953)
  *Promoted to Admiral from 10th April 1952
- Vice-Admiral Sir C. Lambe, RN (March 1953 ~)
Appendix 4. Guerrilla Operation Command during the Korean War

4.1 Organisation of EUSAK Miscellaneous Group and Guerrilla Units (July 1951)

Diagram:

GHQ
Far East Command

G3
(Staff for Operations)

Eighth Army

G2
(Staff for Intelligence)

Miscellaneous Group
8086 AU

EUSAK Main (Taegu)

EUSAK Rear (Pusan)

Leopard Base
(West Coast/ Paengyong-do)

Baker Section
(Airdrop/ Pusan)

Task Force Kirkland
(East Coast)

Guerrilla Units
(About 15 Donkeys operated on the 17 islands)

------------- Staff Coordination
4.2 Organisation of Guerrilla Section, FEC/LD (K) (December 1951)

GHQ
Far East Command

G3
(Staff for Operations)

G2
(Staff for Intelligence)

FEC/LG 8240 AU
(Tokyo)

CCRACK 8249 AU
(Seoul)

FEC/LD (K) 8240 AU
(Seoul)

Guerrilla Section

Guerrilla Organisations
On the West Coast

Baker Section
(Airdrop/ Pusan)

Task Force Kirkland
(East Coast)

Leopard
(Above West Side of Ongjin Peninsula)

Wolfpack
(From East side of Ongjin Peninsula to the Han River area)

---------------- Staff Coordination
4.3 Organisation of Partisan Section, CCRAK (December 1952)

```
GHQ
Far East Command

G3
(Staff for Operations)

G2
(Staff for Intelligence)

CCRAK 8242 AU
(Tokyo)

FEC/LG 8240 AU
(Tokyo)

FEC/LD (K) 8240 AU
(Seoul)

Partisan Section

Partisan Organisations
On the West Coast

Baker Section
(Airborne/ Pusan)

1st PAIR
(Airborne/Seoul)

3rd PIR
(East Coast)

1st PIR *
(Formerly Leopard)

2nd PIR **
(Formerly Wolfpack)

* By April 1953, 6th PIR (Leopard North) was separated from 1st PIR
** By April 1953, 5th PIR (Wolfpack West) was separated from 2nd PIR

---------- Staff Coordination
```
Appendix 5. Copy of Operation Plan ABLE (23 January 1951)

SUBJECT: Organization and plan for partisan operations in Korea. (Plan ABLE)

1. MISSION: To establish in Korea, the cadre of partisan organizations that will perform covert-type missions of sabotage and intelligence, and be capable in organization and training so that, when supplied on a large scale, it may be expanded into large forces that can be employed in conjunction with a major effort of UN forces.

2. GENERAL PLAN: To establish at strategically located bases, a strong center which will be capable of:
   a. Providing for its own security.
   b. Operating a high-powered radio station for communications with central headquarters.
   c. Operating a radio net which will ensure communications with partisan groups.
   d. Training partisan cadre in the following subjects:
      (1) Intelligence
      (2) Radio operation and maintenance
      (3) Individual weapons
      (4) Organization of the fighting groups
      (5) Supply, airdrops
      (6) Demolitions

3. ORGANIZATION OF THE BASE.
   a. The following chart shows the organization of the base. This organization will be modified depending on the tactical situation, should the need arise. Detailed discussion of each section and its responsibilities follows thereafter. [Data not available]
   b. Commanding Officer: Responsible for the security of the key base by utilizing the ROK Marines, and in coordination with Naval forces operating in that area.
   C. ROK Marines: One hundred ROK Marines are assigned to the base for security purposes only. This security unit operates directly under the commanding officer. It should be noted that provisions have been made, in the TE for the base, to furnish crew-served weapons to augment individual weapons of this unit.
   d. Operations: To be commanded by a US officer who will be responsible for all training and employment of the partisan groups (on orders from central headquarters) as well as the operation of all US radio nets. This will be accomplished with US personnel, plus a group of
eight ROK Marines (separate from the security force) which will be utilized for small-arms training. The closest coordination will be exercised between this US officer and the commanding officer of the base.

e. Communications: US operators will operate a high-powered radio station for communication to central headquarters and other stations as discussed herein. They will be responsible for conducting maintenance on all US radio sets used in the operation, as well as training key personnel in the partisan cadre in the operation and maintenance of radio sets used in carrying out their missions. The ROK Marines will operate a high-powered station, which is discussed under “Base communication nets” below.

f. Training: This section is composed of US personnel and eight ROK Marines, and is responsible for training the partisan cadre in all subjects listed in 2d above, with the exception of communications.

4. PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION OF THE BASE

a. Personnel to occupy these bases will be assigned from the original table of organization submitted for the Attrition Warfare Section. ROK Marines are assigned through ROK Naval Headquarters, Pusan.

b. US Personnel:

(1) One officer MOS 1542 Operations
(2) One officer MOS 0200 Communications
(3) Three radio operators MOS 0740 Communications
(4) One radio operator MOS 0766 Communications
(5) One powerman MOS 0166 Communications
(6) Two radio repairmen MOS 0648 Communications
(7) One demolition instructor MOS 3533 Operations
(8) One weapons
(9) Total US personnel 11

c. ROK Personnel:

(1) ROK Navy, Commander, commanding officer of the base.
(2) ROK staff officers for commander.
(3) One hundred ROK Marines for security.
(4) Eight ROK Marines for assistant instructors.
(5) All ROK personnel will be supplied by the ROK Naval Headquarters, Pusan.
5. ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTISAN CADRE.

a. The Korean Gun (county) is made up of a varying number of townships. It is planned that from each Gun a cadre of loyal partisans will be organized and will undergo training to perform covert acts of sabotage and gather information of enemy forces operating in their area, or in other areas wherein a mission may be assigned.

b. This partisan cadre will (under cover) organize loyal Koreans within their respective Guns into fighting groups, and train them sufficiently to be available for large-scale operations, upon being properly equipped.

c. Training of the partisan cadre will be the responsibility of the Attrition Warfare Section and will be accomplished on strategically located bases. Training and organization of the groups within each Gun will be the responsibility of the partisan cadre, under the supervision of the US operations officer who will remain on the base, This training will take place within the Gun proper.

d. Weapons and radios will be made available to the partisan cadre on completion of their training, to enable them to carry out their acts of sabotage and intelligence, but not to the entire Gun organization until such time as need arises.

e. The partisan cadre, once trained, will remain in their respective localities and begin operations without delay, on order from Central Headquarters. Contact will be established between this cadre and the base, by the communications net operated by the communications section.

f. The following is the organization of the Gun partisan cadre and the subjects in which they will be trained.

(1) Gun leader and four assistant leaders
   Intelligence
   Organization of the fighting group
   Supply, airdrops
   Small arms and crew-served weapons

(2) Assistant leader
   Operation and maintenance of low-powered radio set
   Small-arms instruction

(3) Two assistant leaders
   Saboteur training, demolitions
6. BASE COMMUNICATIONS NET

a. A high-powered radio station will be operated by US operators and will be in direct contact with the following station:

(1) Central Headquarters
(2) UN blockade vessels
(3) Other stations as deemed necessary

b. Communications with partisan leaders (base to Gun).

(1) Two plans for the establishment of direct communication with the partisan leaders (cadre) are available. The adoption of either depends on distance involved, terrain, and seasonal weather conditions. The success of the operations depends on adequate communications; therefore when one plan is unworkable owing to condition described above, or mechanical failure, the other plan may be put into operation with a minimum of effort. In either plan, a system of prearranged visual signals will be available.

(2) Plan “one”: The partisan leaders are equipped with radios which will net with the high-powered radio on the base. By using US operators on these sets (which will be located with the leaders in Gun) adequate communications will be established under the most adverse conditions.

(3) Plan “two”: The partisan leaders are equipped with low-powered radio sets on which they received training and are capable of operating. A similar set will be available on the base for the establishment of direct communications.

c. ROK communications net.

(1) The RCK Marines will normally establish a high-powered radio station on the base and, by using their own equipment, maintenance personnel, and operators, will be in direct contact with the following stations:

i. ROK Naval Headquarters.
ii. ROK Naval vessels on blockade.
iii. UN vessels on blockade, conditions permitting.

d. Emergency: Should an emergency arise on the base, wherein fire support, evacuation, or other aid is needed without delay, the following means of communication, within the basic nets described, are available:
(1) US operators will establish direct contact with control headquarters by means of the high-powered radio net. Central headquarters will contact COMET 159, who will contact, by direct communication, the jeep carrier (TF 77 or CTE 95.11) operation off the West coast. This method will give the desired method.

(2) US operators will establish direct contact with UN blockade vessels, by means of the high-powered radio net.

(3) ROK Marines will establish direct contact with ROK vessels. These ROK vessels will be an organic part within the defense plans of the base. Pre-arranged plans for fire support and evacuation will be drawn up under the direct supervision and orders of the commanding officer of the base. These plan will be rehearsed within the limits of secrecy from possible observation by enemy force.

(4) Naval vessels and friendly aircraft may be contacted by the following virtual means:

i. Blinker signal
ii. Signal flares
iii. Flags
iv. Panels

e. To render close support to the base, and to make certain acts of sabotage more effective, direct communication between the partisan leaders, the base, and friendly aircraft is highly desirable.

7. COMMUNICATIONS DIAGRAM

a. The diagram on the following page portrays graphically the communication net for the execution of operation plan ABLE. It must be kept in mind that this communication plan, as well as any established in the future for other bases, must be flexible. [Data not available]

8. TABLE OF EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATION OF BASE.

a. The equipment listed below is not included in the original table of allowances for the Attrition Warfare Section. It is felt that this equipment will become standard for all bases, except in the following cases:

(1) Unforeseen changes in the tactical situation, resulting in need for additional weapons.
(2) Expendable items such as wire, ammunition, demolitions, and batteries.
(3) Gradual increase in US carbines and M1 rifles as additional partisan cadre is trained.
(4) Weapons to arm partisan groups.

b. Ordnance
1) Weapons
i. Three ea LMG cal.30 M1917-AG
ii. Three ea automatic rifles, Browning cal.30 M1918-A2
iii. Two ea rifles, recoilless, 75mm M20
iv. Four ea carbines, cal.30
v. Four ea rifles M1, cal.30
vi. Two ea projector, pyro, hand M9
vii. Sufficient magazines for carbines and BARs

2) Vehicles
i. One ea 2.5 ton truck LWB 6x6 (for SCR 399)
ii. One ea 3/4-ton truck
iii. One ea 1-ton trailer (for PE 95)

3) Miscellaneous
i. One ea, set, demolition (1, 2, 5, or 7)

C. Signal Corps
(1) One ea, SCR 399
(2) Two ea, receivers BC 342
(3) One ea, PE-95
(4) Two ea, PE-75
(5) Five ea, SCR 300
(6) Four ea, SCR AN/GRC-9
(7) Five ea, telephones EE8
(8) Five ea, wire W110-B on DR 5
(9) Fifteen ea, battery BA 70
(10) Fifty ea, battery BA 30
(11) Ten ea, flashlights
(12) One ea, panel set AP30C
(13) One ea, panel set AP30D

D. Engineer
(1) One carpenter equipment set 2, engineer platoon
(2) Five ea, compass, wrist, induction-damped

E. Quartermaster
(1) Three ea, tents, CP M1945, complete with poles and pins
(2) Three ea, stoves, tent M45, complete with burner
(3) One ea, outfit, cooking, small detachment
(4) Five ea, lantern, gasoline, leaded fuel
(5) Twenty ea, drum, gasoline, 5-gal
(6) Five ea, tubes, flexible, nozzle
(7) Ten ea, cans water, 5-gal
(8) Ten ea, cots, canvas folding

WILLIAM A. BURKE
Major Armor
S-3
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