Abstract

Renewing the Soul: Towards an Enhanced Pentecostal Philosophical Theological Doctrine of Human Constitution

Having given a fresh historical overview of Pentecostal thought concerning the doctrine of human constitution, and so ascertained the trajectory Pentecostal theology is on concerning this doctrine, this thesis identifies Amos Yong and then Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen as significant voices towards the end and present of the trajectory, with the potential to influence its future direction. The thesis highlights both scholars’ assumption that any dualistic view of human constitution - specifically, understanding the soul as a distinct immaterial (and after death, separable) entity from the body - is theologically and philosophically problematic, and charts their alternative proposal(s) of an emergent monist view of human constitution. Responding to them, the thesis counters their theological and philosophical challenges, and further contends that their emergent monist proposals suffer much greater problems. It then argues for and constructs an enhanced Pentecostal view of human constitution - one more consistent with Pentecostal theological emphases, and also stronger philosophically than Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s - proposing a new ‘Enspiritable Dualist’ view, by renewing the soul. Through giving it suitable prominence in Pentecostalism’s theology of constitution, and by establishing the centrality of the S/spirit in the new model, the soul is renewed, in turn, redirecting the trajectory’s future.
Dedicated to Mum and Dad, with deep thankfulness for your love, and for all the opportunities you’ve given me in life
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Introduction

I.1 Defining Pentecostalism

Pentecostalism, at its heart, is a renewal spirituality that emphasises a human’s on-going encounter with God by the Holy Spirit of Christ, in spontaneous and unexpected, as well as more formal and expected, ways.¹ This is somewhat different to the more popular understanding which tends to view Pentecostalism more doctrinally as a denomination which emphasises subsequent Spirit baptism and the miraculous gifts as its defining features. This latter more popular definition might be fairly close to how Classical Pentecostals have traditionally defined themselves, however the consensus that has arisen in Pentecostal scholarship defines Pentecostalism as a spirituality as opposed to a set of doctrines, and a spirituality which ‘plugs in to’, or (like a river) ‘runs through’, many Christian denominations, bringing a Spirit enlivening renewal to their Christian life.² Such a spirituality has actually been present throughout Church history,³ but particularly had a renaissance since the turn of the 20th century. Allan Anderson argues that since then, the best taxonomy for Pentecostals is to categorise them into Classical Pentecostals, Older Independent / Spirit Pentecostals, Charismatic Mainline denominations, and Neo-Pentecostals / Charismatics,⁴ this suggesting that the terms ‘Pentecostal’ or ‘Pentecostalism’ can be used to refer to any

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³ Cf. ch 2 (“The Charismatic Tradition in Church History”) of Cartledge’s Encountering, ibid.

⁴ Assemblies of God, Foursquare, Elim, Church of God, being examples of Classical Pentecostal churches; The True Jesus Church in China, Zion/Spirit-type churches of Africa would classify as examples of the Older Independent churches; Renewed Anglican and Catholic churches being examples of the third category; and Vineyard, the house church movements, the New Wine network coming under the neo-pentecostal grouping.
of these groupings that practise the spirituality.⁵ This idea is further underlined by Mark Cartledge who has demonstrated that the term ‘Charismatic’,⁶ can be happily interchanged for the term ‘Pentecostal’ or, or as Amos Yong prefers, ‘Renewal’ can also be used synonymously.⁷ All these contemporary thinkers recognise that the term ‘Pentecostal’ is better used as an adjective than a noun, to describe believers in a range of denominations who experience and practise this type of spirituality - a spirituality that plugs into an already existing tradition.⁸ The terms ‘Pentecostal’, ‘Charismatic’, ‘Renewal’ could hence be used synonymously to refer to any Christian believer who practises such a spirituality, but for simplicity, this thesis employs the single term ‘Pentecostal’, the one most commonly used in the scholarly literature.⁹

I.2 Pentecostal Emphases

Although Pentecostalism is well known for its emphasis on the renewing work of the Holy Spirit (given rise to by the spirituality), it also has a strong accent on its eschatological vision, which some have argued may be an even greater emphasis - one incorporating the

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⁶ Cartledge, Encountering, ibid.


⁸ Cartledge confirming in a personal conversation that the Classical Pentecostals could quite easily be termed ‘Charismatic / Pentecostal holiness believers’, the spirituality enlivening the already existent strand of Methodism around the turn of the 20th century.

⁹ And the term ‘renewal’ is not capitalised to allow for its wider and less specific usage. On the occasions where the first of Anderson’s groups are specifically referred to, the thesis will use the phrase ‘Classical Pentecostals’ to describe them.
Pentecostal pneumatology, recognising the Spirit as the eschatological Spirit. This distinctive flows from the emphasis on the eschatological Kingdom of God that was inaugurated by the coming of Christ, who then sent the Spirit into the world post-resurrection, the Spirit coming in fulfilment of the promise in Joel 2 and who ushers in the new eschatological age. For Pentecostals, the text of Pentecost – Acts 2 – is the key interpretative passage for understanding who the eschatological Spirit is and his work in this framework, and the Luke-Acts corpus are the key books (possibly, ‘canon within the canon’) for Pentecostal theologising. These two Pentecostal emphases – eschatology and renewal pneumatology - are arguably the lead defining features of the movement, however, are also joined by other emphases characteristic of Pentecostalism. Its emphasis on the holistic nature of a believer as one who encounters the Spirit, and responds bodily (for example in dancing, singing, falling prostrate in worship, receiving healing [bodily and psychologically], laying on of hands), as well as ‘spiritually’, to the Spirit, is one of those additional emphases. This is interestingly balanced with a further emphasis on the ‘supernatural’ realm – i.e. the world of angels, demons and ancestor spirits – or what might be termed the ‘spirit’ realm, giving Pentecostalism a certain dualistic emphasis. These two features bring a natural

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11 The word ‘dualism’ (with its adjective ‘dualistic’) needs here to be clarified as is often misunderstood, or used as a polemical term in the academic literature (somewhat akin to the way the term ‘fundamentalism’ is used in everyday language). Although there is a vast range of uses for this term in philosophy and theology (see for instance, N.T. Wright’s list of 10 uses he finds in just the theological arena [The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992) pp.253-4]), used in this thesis, it is to be clarified that the term is not used to mean the opposing of the physical world to that of the immaterial world – as if the immaterial / spirit realm were good and the material / physical were bad (like on a Platonist sense). As a healthy doctrine of creation, incarnation and eschaton emphasise, the material realm is to be as valued as much as the immaterial realm. It is not used here either in the sense of depicting God and his forces of good in battle against Satan and the forces of evil – that understanding is countered by a healthy doctrine of God and his sovereignty (though this sense of dualism is particularly evident for instance in Peter Wagner’s Pentecostal
balance between the spirit world and the physical world in Pentecostal thinking, giving additional emphases to the lead distinctives of eschatology and pneumatology.

I.3 Scholarly Pentecostal Theology

As the Pentecostal movement was burgeoning in its renaissance at the start of the 20th century, Pentecostals were originally reticent to engage with academic theological thinking, considering it as dry, and irrelevant for real lived-out Christian life. But as the century went on, such an attitude changed, and Pentecostals have steadily developed a corpus of theological work through that time, covering a range of topics. By the turn of the 21st century, Pentecostal theology had developed to a notable level, Pentecostal scholarship emerging as a specific strand of the Christian theological academy, recognisable from its scholarly journals, conferences, monographs and other academic work. However, as Pentecostal theology has developed into a scholarly discipline, Pentecostals have wanted to consider what is distinctive about their theologising, and how their theology could be specifically described as Pentecostal. Particularly the more popular Pentecostal theology of

work, and to an extent, that of the early John Wimber. [e.g. C.P. Wagner, Territorial Spirits: Insights into Strategic Level Spiritual Warfare & Intercession (California: Gospel Light Publications, 1991] and J. Wimber and K. Springer, Power Evangelism [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986]). In this thesis, the term ‘dualism’ is used in an ontological sense, making a distinction between the two realms, the material and the immaterial – both on a macro (whole of reality) level (physical world / spirit beings) and an anthropological level (material bodies / immaterial souls). But as stated above, the thesis recognises the value of both realms, the downplaying of one or the other being inappropriate.

In terms of grammar, the adjectival use of ‘dualism’ differs across the literature – some preferring ‘dualistic’, others ‘dualist’ - likewise with the terms ‘monism’, ‘holism’ and ‘Thomism’. Generally, this thesis uses ‘dualistic’ as the adjective, however when joined with another (or even two others) of the above adjectives, to avoid regular cumbersome phrasing (e.g. ‘a “Thomistic dualistic” view’), the ultimate adjective becomes the alternative form (e.g. ‘a “Thomistic dualist” view’ or ‘a “holistic dualist” position’). This usage of the double adjective forms phrases of a technical variety, and so further double adjectival termini technici of an anthropological variety also follow the rule, hence the thesis speaking of ‘an “Emergent dualist” understanding’, ‘a “substance dualist” model’, or ‘a “Cartesian dualist” position’. In further consistency of the above, this is applied to ‘monism’ ‘holism’ and ‘Thomism’, so whereas being used ordinarily as a singular adjective in which instance ‘monism’, for example, becomes ‘monistic’ (e.g. ‘a “monistic” understanding of the human’), when functioning as the ultimate adjective of two (or more), it becomes ‘monist’ (e.g. ‘a “holistic monist” position’ or ‘an “emergent monist” view’).
the last century shows very little difference from Evangelical theology, from whom Pentecostals traditionally borrowed a lot of their approach and theological thinking. Indeed, with possibly slightly more emphasis on being filled with the Spirit and on miraculous gifts, Pentecostal theology often drew heavily upon Evangelical theology, which is partly what has given rise to the common perception that Pentecostals are basically ‘Evangelicals plus Spirit baptism and practise of Spiritual gifts’. But following the time of Stephen Land’s landmark *Pentecostal Spirituality*, what is distinctly Pentecostal about Pentecostal theology has been a question that Pentecostals have been seeking to address.

Though still considering the question, a general consensus among Pentecostal scholars is that Pentecostal theology is that that *begins* from participation in the Pentecostal spirituality (with its emphasis on experiencing the [transformational] Spirit of Christ). Like all Pentecostals historically, contemporary Pentecostal thinkers *ground* theology in the final authority of Scripture, but the spirituality is the context from and within which a Pentecostal theologian operates when constructing their theology. Scholars James Smith and Amos Yong speak of the Pentecostal ‘social imaginary’ or ‘pneumatological imagination’ (respectively), as a (pre-cognitive) framework or worldview that is given rise to by participating in such a spirituality, this ‘imagination’ supplying the pre-suppositions

12 In inter-denominational evangelical movements, this is the common view. Pentecostal scholars, particularly in the 1990 and early 2000s, recognised this and typically articles such as T. Cross’ ‘The Rich Feast of Theology: Can Pentecostals bring the main course or only the relish?’ *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 16 (2000): 27-47 set out to address the question.


14 Cf. Vondey who, in application of this insight to Pentecostal theological method, comments ‘The move to theological reflection is born from this emphasis on the Spirit of Christ, and although theological articulation can begin with doctrine (or other starting points), the development of Pentecostal doctrine always passes through a personal encounter with Christ through the Holy Spirit. In this Christo-pneumatological sense, Pentecostal theology begins as spirituality.’ (W. Vondey,‘Presentation: Prolegomena to Global Pentecostal Theology’ Society for Pentecostal Studies, Lakeland, United States, 12/03/15 - 14/03/15, p.2 [emphasis his]).

15 James Smith is the same Smith who the rest of the thesis refers to as ‘J.K.A.’ Smith.
Pentecostals then bring to theology.\textsuperscript{16} Put differently, through participating in Pentecostal ‘worship practices’ (and its wider ‘lived experience of faith’), with its emphasis on experiencing the Spirit in an on-going (sometimes, unexpected) manner, Pentecostals come to form a pre-cognitive lens through which they interpret the world, viewing it with a ‘radical openness’ to the Spirit,\textsuperscript{17} a disposition more fully entailing a pneumatological worldview assuming the world’s being Spirit-filled, and the Spirit affecting every area of life. This is the context and starting point that informs Pentecostal theological thinking, Pentecostals operating from and within their spirituality and with the associated worldview as they do theology. This makes (contemporary) Pentecostal theology distinctly Pentecostal as a theology that is grounded in Scripture as the final basis of authority, but interpreted through the lens of the Pentecostal worldview, one given rise to by the Pentecostal spirituality and experience.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. J.K.A. Smith, *Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010) and A. Yong, *Spirit-Word-Community: Theological Hermeneutics in Trinitarian Perspective* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002). In effect, the difference between Pentecostal and Evangelical theology is one of theological approach. Acknowledging that difference and employing the Pentecostal approach in their writings, both scholars cited are also content to describe themselves as Evangelical (as well as Pentecostal).


\textsuperscript{18} Although being a distinct Pentecostal method, this interestingly appears to have the potential to be employed alongside / within (so Pneumatically enriching) Kevin Vanhoozer’s advanced evangelical theological method – his ‘canonical linguistic’ approach. (cf. *The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology* [Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005]). Though Vondey has argued that the cognitive-poetic imagination that Vanhoozer designates may be too limited an imagination to capture the fullness of the pneumatic imagination Pentecostals begin with (W. Vondey, *Beyond Pentecostalism: The Crisis of Global Christianity and the Renewal of the Theological Agenda* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010] pp.37-40), my personal view is that Vanhoozer’s cognitive-poetic imagination, shaped and formed by the polyphonic genres and speech-acts of Scripture – but of course so by the Holy Spirit who breathed them – could be a helpful pneumatic focussing lens for Pentecostals, who at times have wanted to see the Spirit at work in all things without (biblical) limitation.

On the specific question of the Spirit in the world, see further the work of J.K.A. Smith drawn upon in chapters 4 and 7 of this thesis.
I.4 Pentecostal Theology of Human Constitution

The doctrine of anthropology, and specifically human constitution is one of importance for Pentecostal theology, not least because Pentecostals emphasise the Divine-human encounter at the heart of their spirituality (though the human aspect often being overlooked in favour of considering the Divine pneumatological aspect of this encounter). But the doctrine is also important because of the implications it has for many other significant and associated areas of theology and philosophy. Areas such as eschatology (particularly what happens after death), metaphysics (particularly whether a substance or relational view is more apt19), what a person is (extensive ethical issues [such as disability, beginning/end of life] being entailed), and the nature and reality of spirits (such as ancestral and ghostly [and angelic] spirits) are all implicated by one’s philosophical theological doctrine of human constitution. But implications can even extend (if purely philosophically constructed) to potentially giving grounds for constructing an apologetic as to the existence of God through consideration of the subject. Pentecostals in differing contexts around the world will feel the significance of certain of these implications more than they will others. Yet the range of philosophical and theological ramifications such a doctrine has, underlines the significance of the doctrine of human constitution.

Given the above, it is somewhat surprising that the doctrine has received a lot less attention from Pentecostals than more favoured doctrines such as pneumatology, Christology and (more recently) the Trinity. It should be acknowledged that there has been a thin stream of Pentecostals who have considered this issue over the last hundred years, revealing something of a ‘trajectory of thinking’ on this issue, but only very recently, in the (relatively

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19 Hence having implications for understanding other doctrines such as the Trinity.
new) scholarly era of the movement’s history has it received a degree of thorough consideration, this by Amos Yong and then also Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen. The work of these two scholars is welcome in the sense that it might encourage other Pentecostals to examine the subject, going some way to filling the dearth. But whilst affirming their contribution in this respect, their work on human constitution is also very much in need of response, due to certain problematic contentions they make.

In their work, both Yong and Kärkkäinen make two particularly significant contentions regarding human constitution: 1. They reject dualism (of any kind) - with the entailed view of the (distinct, immaterial [and separable]) human soul – viewing such a position as theologically and philosophically flawed, and instead, 2. They propose emergent monism as a more commendable constitutional model.\(^\text{20}\) Such is bold theological innovation, but when examined carefully, both of these contentions show to be mistaken. Although recognising Yong and Kärkkäinen as having good reasons for rejecting Platonist and Classic Cartesian Dualism(s), their arguments against dualism do not stand against better, healthier forms of dualism. And when assessed more thoroughly, it is seen that their emergent monist view is inconsistent with the aforementioned Pentecostal theological emphases, and philosophically unpersuasive. Further, recognising the serious implications their emergent monist view would have for other areas of Pentecostal thought (for example Yong’s revisionist belief of emergent angels [viewing them as entities that supervene on a physical substrate] that arises from his emergent position, or issues of life after death [such as removing the grounds for identity persistence in and through an intermediate state]), the prospect of Pentecostals following Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s thinking is not a positive one.

\(^{20}\) To give variation of language, the adjective ‘constitutional’ will be employed through this thesis in a narrow sense, to refer to work done on the theology of human constitution. It is not used in the grander and more popular sense of meaning ‘lawful’ or ‘statutory’. 
Moreover, given the historical Pentecostal trajectory of thought on this issue, and where it currently stands, the possibility of Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s work encouraging other Pentecostals also in the monistic direction, and so likewise shaping the future direction of the trajectory, is uncomfortably real. So given the problems with their work, the implications such work would have on other areas, and the current status of the Pentecostal trajectory, response to their work, at this time, is essential.

This thesis seeks to respond, and does so in both a critical and constructive manner. After giving a fresh historical overview of Pentecostal thought concerning the doctrine of human constitution over the last 100 years, and so ascertaining the trajectory Pentecostal theology is on concerning this doctrine, the thesis identifies Amos Yong and then Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen as significant voices toward the end and present of the trajectory - with the potential to influence its future direction. It then reviews and critiques their current work on the subject of human constitution, on the lines identified above, admonishing Pentecostals not to follow their monistic lead. Having carried out this critique, it then further responds by arguing for, and constructing an enhanced Pentecostal philosophical theological model of human constitution - one termed ‘Enspiritable Dualism’ – to redirect the future path of the trajectory. The Pentecostal model constructed is ‘enhanced’, in the sense that it is more consistent with the Pentecostal theological emphases, and is stronger philosophically, than Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s view (the degree of philosophy entailed underlining the appropriateness of a philosophical theological approach for constructing such a doctrine21).

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21 Philosophical theology as a discipline is ultimately theological, but theology well informed by the insights of philosophy – in this case, the philosophy of mind. Cf. the definition of Moore who defines it more fully, arguing the approach of Philosophical theology ‘(1)uses philosophy to clarify and confirm the truth of dogmatic affirmations, and (2), is prepared, where consistency with revelation requires it, to modify, suspend, or discipline philosophical positions by reference to the unique subject matter of theology.’ (A. Moore, ‘Philosophy of Religion or Philosophical Theology?’, *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 3.3 [2001]: 310) Plantinga likewise confirms ‘Philosophical theology is a matter of thinking about the...doctrines of the
As such a model is constructed (and in further contrast to Yong and Kärkkäinen, who reject/redefine the soul), it is seen that by renewing the soul in the construction, that the enhanced model can be proposed. Through giving the soul suitable attention and prominence in the constructed theology of constitution, and by establishing the centrality of the S/spirit in the new model, in this double sense, the significance of a renewed (and renewable) soul for the doctrine of human constitution is underlined. And through re-establishing the soul’s significance to the doctrine, this in turn redirects the future of the Pentecostal trajectory.

1.5 Thesis overview

In part A, chapter 1 gives a fresh historical review of Pentecostal theological thought as regards human constitution over the last century. In doing so, Pentecostals’ consistent emphasis on the authority of Scripture as the basis on which they want to ground their doctrine of human constitution is identified, as is their interest in the concept of a human spirit.22 The underlying theological and philosophical influences contributing to the shaping of their thinking as regards constitution are further identified, leading to a trajectory being highlighted, tracing the journey of where Pentecostal thinking has come from surrounding

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22 As will be seen, the human ‘spirit’ Pentecostals are referring to in chapter 1 they see as being, in some sense, distinct from the ‘soul’. This will be borne in mind for latter chapters of the thesis. But by chapter 2, it will be seen that any soul/spirit distinction dissolves in the work of many recent scholars – including Yong and Kärkkäinen, so following that contemporary usage until the final chapter of the thesis, ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ will be used synonymously through the thesis.
this doctrine up to the early stages of the 21st century, so giving hints as to where it might potentially be going to in the future.

In chapter 2, the work of the latest thinkers to write on the subject, Yong and Kärkkäinen - the current point of the trajectory – is considered, and their two important contentions articulated. Their reasons, theological and philosophical, for rejecting dualism are identified, and having done so, their preferred emergent monist view(s) are then expounded.23

In chapter 3, Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s two contentions are assessed and critiqued. It is seen that their theological and philosophical reasons for rejecting dualism are only accurate when aimed at Platonist and Classic Cartesian dualisms, but do not extend as justification for rejecting dualism per se; their inadvertently rejecting any dualisms through their critique of two particular types of dualism is fallacious. And their emergent monist proposal(s) show themselves as inconsistent regarding two of the Pentecostal theological emphases, and unpersuasive when exposed to philosophical critique.

In part B, the thesis further responds by constructing an enhanced Pentecostal philosophical theological model to that of Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s. Chapter 4 begins the process by drawing on the exegetical work of J.W. Cooper to give a biblical basis for constructing the better view of human constitution. Recognising the commonality between Cooper’s view of Scripture and Pentecostals’ view, the chapter traces Cooper’s (philosophically-informed) exegesis, to his conclusion that Scripture affirms a holistic dualist view of human

23 Although they title their position(s) in different ways - with minor nuances of differentiation, their views are recognised as being very similar, sharing a common emergent monist core. So identifying this, at the end of chapter 2 and into the beginning of chapter 3, the ‘proposals’ / ‘models’ (plural) gives way to viewing their work as an emergent monist ‘proposal’ (singular), only drawing attention to the slight differences when they arise.
This view is initially assessed and seen as consistent with two of the Pentecostal theological emphases his work obviously applies to. To then assess whether it would also be consistent with the remaining two, his work is brought into dialogue with J.K.A. Smith’s work on Pentecostal spirituality, to bring the necessary light to assist in this process. It is seen by the end that Cooper’s holistic dualism is consistent with all four emphases, but he does not go as far as advocating a more specific type of holistic dualism (e.g. Cartesian, Thomistic, Emergent Dualist etc.).

Chapters 5 and 6 then move onto this philosophical discussion, focussing particularly on the philosophy of mind, to see which direction Cooper’s ground work might be taken, and whether a more specific type of holistic dualism might philosophically commend itself. Recognising this as an issue requiring a lot of analysis, and being keen to ensure that the model-in-construction is fully rigorous philosophically, it is given a double chapter, in which the soul-body relation – within the holistic dualist parameter – is considered. Through concentrating on 3 phases of holistic dualist, soul-body debate, and engaging with particularly astute philosophical dialogue partners, the question of whether a more specific philosophical model of holistic dualism can be commended is assessed. By the end of the chapters, this philosophical work shows itself valuable in having allowed the narrowing of the options, but leaves the final establishing of a more specific holistic dualist model to the

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24 In this thesis, ‘holistic dualism’ and ‘dualistic holism’ (and its associates ‘holistic dualist’ and ‘dualistic holist’) are interchangeable – the former emphasising the ontology of the human, the latter emphasising the functioning of the human. Cooper, in his key printed work Body, Soul and Life Everlasting (Grand Rapid: Eerdmans, 1989 reprint. 2000) opted for the former, hence in this thesis, following such terminology. However Cooper more recently reversed his preference to ‘dualistic holism’ (working specifically from the biblical texts) clarifying at the Biola conference ‘Neuroscience and the Soul’ (2013) that, with Scripture’s emphasis being more on the function of humanity, he wanted to do likewise – hence opting instead for ‘dualistic holism’. The thesis appreciates this insight and affirms it. Yet being a thesis emphasising the renewing of the soul, it maintains the former language, drawing attention to the ontology (whilst still affirming the holistic functioning of that ontology).
following chapter, to allow for the further insights of Pentecostal theology to inform the decision.

In order to go as far as possible in answering the above question then, and in order to further develop the model in a Pentecostal sense, chapter 7 moves on to (re)consider Pentecostal theology. Having already brought some Pentecostal colour to the question of constitution by assessing Cooper’s work in light of the Pentecostal thinking of Smith in chapter 4, insights gained from that interaction with Smith’s Pentecostal ‘Enchanted creation’ understanding of the world, and the following Pentecostal ontology he develops, are brought to bear again on the question of whether a more specific philosophical understanding of the soul-body relation is apt for advancing the Pentecostal theology of constitution gained from Cooper and the Scriptural work. Recognising that there are indicators both in, and derivable from, Smith’s Pentecostal work which tip the balance in favour of a Thomistic holistic dualist model, this prospect is then considered by again looking at Scripture, drawing upon the work of two Pentecostal biblical scholars – John Levison and Gordon Fee – to check whether this view would be consistent with, and possibly endorsed by Scripture. Concluding that it would, the Thomistic holistic dualist model is ascertained as being the desired advancement of Cooper. It is then brought into dialogue one further time with Smith’s Pentecostal ontology, along with a suggestion made from Moreland regarding the relationship between the human soul and spirit, to suggest a specifically Pentecostal advancement of this model, leading to the proposing of an ‘Enspiritable (Thomistic Holistic) Dualism’ as a model of human constitution. This Pentecostal development is added to the Thomistic philosophical advancement of the biblical model, and so an enhanced Pentecostal philosophical theological model of human constitution is proposed.
In the panoramic picture, it is by renewing the soul in this constitutional project, that is, giving the soul revived focus and prominence when establishing the model, and allowing it to be renewed by the Spirit, that the thesis is able to propose an ‘Enspiritable (Thomistic Holistic) Dualism’. In conclusion, this is proposed as an enhanced Pentecostal philosophical theological doctrine of human constitution, in turn, redirecting the Pentecostal trajectory of thought on this doctrine.
PART A: Engaging Pentecostal Thought on Human Constitution
Chapter 1: Literature Review

Pentecostal theology is relatively sparse in its consideration of anthropology. Although obviously having a direct relation to its more popular focus – the area of pneumatology, anthropology has received little attention and remains a somewhat neglected area. Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that even less has been said about the specific area within that field, on the constitution of humanity, of what a human consists of / is ‘made up of’ - sometimes described as ‘human ontology’. However, though limited in quantity (and, in some instances, in quality), those Pentecostals who have addressed the question of constitution in some sense (often as part of a wider project such as a systematic theology) show not only some interesting trends within Pentecostal thought on the subject, they also demonstrate certain development of the Pentecostal position over the last 100 years regarding human constitution, as a result of outside theological and philosophical influences. Analysing this development and what influences such, specifically gives a sense of Pentecostalism’s trajectory concerning the issue, from where it was at the start of the twentieth century, to where it now is. But further, identifying such a trajectory also gives a strong indicator as to where Pentecostalism might be heading in the future concerning its constitutional anthropology, giving reason for engaging with the subject now, to try and speak fruitfully into that future.

Because of the significance of understanding the trajectory, the literature review below will initially proceed in a chronological and more descriptive manner to show the gradual development over the last 100 years. Although aware that Pentecostalism is a lot older than the 20th century, the review will advance from the most clearly defined Pentecostal writings of the early 20th century, through to those of the (very) beginnings of the 21st century to
give a historical overview of what has been said there. But having done this more
descriptive work, the review will then progress by analysis of such, identifying the trends
that remain consistent throughout the last century, but also highlighting the gradual
development of Pentecostal thought concerning constitutional anthropology - the latter by
particularly focussing on the theological and philosophical influences that have coloured
Pentecostal thinking in this area. Having done so, the trajectory of Pentecostal thought
through those years will become evident, and recognising such by the end of the chapter
will be of particular benefit for stepping into the next chapter when the literature review
and current state of the trajectory will be brought completely up to the present. This latter
and contemporary chapter will finish the literature review by considering the most current
work published on the subject, that of Amos Yong and Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen - the two
Pentecostals to have considered anthropology most academically and thoroughly to date.
The natural flow between the two chapters will arise as both Yong and Kärkkäinen
essentially embody all that will be argued in this chapter, and further illumine the
trajectory’s current status. But stepping beyond the dualistic end of the literature reviewed
in this chapter, the monistic steps of Yong and Kärkkäinen, and potential influence of theirs
on the trajectory, will be expounded in the next, and then thoroughly scrutinised in the
chapter following that, to establish whether this next step in the trajectory is beneficial or
not.

1.1 Historical Overview

1.1.1 The early 20\textsuperscript{th} century magazines (1910s and 20s)

The very earliest specifically Pentecostal texts to contain any reference to the theology of
human constitution are ‘Confidence’ magazine - a devotional magazine for Pentecostals that
ran from 1908 to 1926 with the Anglican minister, Alexander Boddy, as its editor; and ‘The Pentecostal Evangel’, initially founded as ‘The Christian Evangel’ in 1913 by J. Roswell and Alice Flower - the official publication of the Assemblies of God, published weekly (still being published today).

1.1.1.1 Confidence and the Boddys

The earliest hints of the anthropology espoused by writers (and readers) of ‘Confidence’ came from Boddy’s wife, Mary, who wrote a devotional each month from December 1909 to August 1910 (excluding June) on the theme of “The New Creation, or a wonderful salvation – for body, soul and spirit”. However it was with Alexander Boddy’s article “The Indwelling and Abiding Trinity”, published in 1912 that it was really made clear where ‘Confidence’ stood in terms of its trichotomous anthropology (an anthropology that could not be missed by readers as, from the early editions onwards, was printed on the front of each magazine: ‘Confidence advocates...an unlimited Salvation for Spirit, Soul and Body...’).

In that milestone article, A. Boddy argued that God wants to fully possess his redeemed children, and each member of the [Holy] Trinity has a special role and relationship within that, linked to the different aspects of the “trinity” that constitutes redeemed man.26

26 Ibid., p.123. The switch to the term ‘man’ is employing Boddy (and the following writers)’s language. The current trend in anthropology is to prefer revisionist language and speak of the doctrine of ‘humanity’, as opposed to the doctrine of ‘man’, and to speak of ‘humankind’ instead of ‘mankind’. The underlying allergy to any hint of patriarchy and oppression of women is evident in the politically correct language, and the concerns underlying the revisionist language, important. Yet whilst wanting to endorse the equality entailed in such language - so generally opting for the politically correct terms - the discarding of the terms ‘man’ and ‘mankind’ seems problematic, not least because of the terms’ long heritage in theological anthropology (demonstrated by the majority of the reviewed texts using these terms), but also the naming of the human race ‘man’ in Genesis 5:1 by God. Some would contend that this is part of the heart of the problem, and that Scripture was (and is) one of the dominating forces in keeping such patriarchy going; but bearing in mind the equality of the sexes underlined in Gen 1:26-27, and a hermeneutically careful reading of Scripture which distinguishes between description and prescription (or what the Bible records, and what it actually affirms) such a contention is hermeneutically naïve. To value both sexes equally whilst valuing the heritage of terms such as ‘mankind’ is far from impossible. Therefore, whilst very aware of the philosophical ideology and appreciating the concerns of the contemporary language, the importance of Scripture and tradition is also
Elaborating further, although Boddy recognised that the whole [Holy] Trinity is involved in all of the human person, he argued that each person of the Holy Trinity has a particular relation to the different aspects of man, associating God the Father with the human spirit (cf. Hebrews 12:9, and remembering that Jesus committed his spirit into the Father’s hand when he died), seeing the Son as the overseer of the soul / mind (cf. 1 Peter 2:25 / 1 Corinthians 2:16, acknowledging that Jesus alone in the Holy Trinity possesses a human soul) and linking the Holy Spirit to the human body (cf. 1 Corinthians 6:19, the Spirit ‘incarnating himself in Blood – bought Blood – cleansed bodies, new creatures in Christ’).27 Taking that a step further, he then associated the human body with the Old Testament Tabernacle and Temple, regarding the human spirit as related to the Holy of Holies, the soul / mind to the Holy Place, and the body to the Outer Court. In application, he assured his readers that the human spirit is secure in the Father’s hand, encouraging them to be loyal to Jesus in soul, and exhorting them to welcome the Holy Spirit in the body.28

Although not expounded further in any other editions (other than a 1926 edition in which Boddy reprinted his article,29) any passing references to a person’s constitution in the ensuing editions of ‘Confidence’ assumed Boddy’s anthropology and referred to man as ‘body, soul and spirit.’

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27 Ibid., p.124.
28 Ibid., p.124
29 A. Boddy, “The Holy Trinity in Us”. Confidence, 1926, No.141
1.1.1.2 Early Editions of Pentecostal Evangel

At that time in America, Pentecostal Evangel was sounding similar themes. The Assemblies of God minister, J.T. Boddy, made clear in his early article that (though not having much to say about the bipartite / tripartite discussion), it is the whole person that is of value, as opposed to elevating a specific part (whether that be spirit, soul or mind). And the (anonymous) editorial of the November 29th Evangel, 1924, clarified that (whilst bearing that in mind), man, by nature, is trichotomous in his make-up. J.T. Boddy later went on to add another interesting article, one hinting at the intellect being a ‘faculty’ of a person. He argued that there is nothing wrong with the intellect and reasoning (or any other faculty) in and of themselves - it being merely the failure to exercise these faculties as God ordained, that causes ‘trouble’ in our fallen world, - in the process advancing a refreshing alternative mentality to the general negativity in Pentecostalism at the time, towards reasoning, and the human intellect. However, due to the brevity of the article, he did not elaborate on quite what he meant by referring to the intellect as a ‘faculty’.

1.1.1.3 Further, subsequent magazines

One further notable article from the 1920s is A.W. Orwig’s “Jesus as saviour of the soul and healer of the Body,” an article that potentially appears dichotomous from its title, but actually is trichotomous in its content. Such an ambiguity suggests that the title has come

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30 Unrelated to Alexander or Mary Boddy.
34 A.W. Orwig, “Jesus as saviour of the soul and healer of the Body”. Pentecostal Evangel, 14th March 1925
35 The terms ‘dichotomous’ and ‘dualistic’ are interchangeable; the former is used in phrases closely linked with the associated term ‘trichotomous’, for smoothness of language. When used as an adjective, dichotomy and trichotomy become ‘dichotomous’ and ‘trichotomous’ respectively. However, when used as a term to connote one who holds that position (e.g. Boddy is a trichotomist), the ending takes the ‘ist’ form, making it consistent with how dualism and monism are used (e.g. X is a dualist, Y is a monist).
from outside the tradition and is more of a catch-phrase from popular culture, or from a
different tradition of Christian thought - it also being common to other editions too. But
without doubt, the growing number of Pentecostal magazines in the first half of the 20th
century expressed very similar theology to ‘Confidence’ and ‘The Pentecostal Evangel’
regarding what constituted a man: Though not being as open to the use of the intellect as
J.T. Boddy appeared to be (intellect and academia was generally regarded with suspicion in
the early 20th century), the general consensus across the Pentecostal magazines
(‘Bridegroom’s Messenger’, 36 ‘Bridal Call’, 37 ‘Foursquare Crusader’ and its later ‘Foursquare
Magazine’, 38 ‘The Pentecost’, 39 ‘Pentecostal Testimony’ 40 etc.) was that a man was
constituted of three parts in the one person, of body, soul and spirit.

1.1.2 Watchman Nee and ‘The Spiritual Man’ (late 1920s)

In 1928, Watchman Nee, a pastor and evangelist working in China, wrote his tome ‘The
Spiritual Man’, 41 in which he gives the most extensive exposition to date of a trichotomous
theology of man’s constitution. Though not himself a professing Pentecostal, his work is
included here because of the significant influence his theology had on subsequent
generations of Pentecostals.

Grounding his view in 1 Thessalonians 5:23; Hebrew 4:12 and the Darby translation of Luke
1:46-47, Nee expounds the concept of man as body, soul and spirit, in a creative, and
exegetically-driven manner. He argues that Genesis 2:7 teaches that God breathed his spirit
into man, so (though being distinct from God’s spirit) the human spirit is the highest

36 Of the International Pentecostal Church of Christ.
37 Of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel.
38 Also of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel.
39 Independent.
40 Independent
41 All the following references will be from the reprinted edition, W. Nee, The Spiritual Man (New York:
Christian Fellowship Publishers, rprnt 1977)
element of man because of its connection with God, and can also be described as the ‘principle of life within a person’ (based on John 6:63).\textsuperscript{42} Further, the spirit is the aspect by which a person communes with, worships and apprehends God, so is what gives a person what he calls their God-consciousness.\textsuperscript{43} The body, on the other hand is the lowest element because it is made up of matter (having been formed from the dust) and relates on an ongoing basis to the things of the material world, and so gives us a sense of world-consciousness.\textsuperscript{44} (And there is a very close relationship in Nee’s writing between ‘the body’ and what Paul describes as ‘the flesh.’) Thirdly, Nee thinks that God has created humans with a soul, the soul being the substance that came about when the newly created human spirit reacted with the physical body in Genesis 2:7, and so formed a separate entity – the entity of the soul.\textsuperscript{45} In Nee’s view, the soul gives the person their individuality and self-consciousness, and functions as a kind of middle-man between the spirit and body – the soul being linked with both the spiritual and material worlds and can choose from its environments which to favour, so in effect the spirit can subdue the body by means of the soul, and the body can subdue the spirit by means of the soul.\textsuperscript{46} To expound Nee’s view further, he thinks the spirit has three functions: conscience – discerning right and wrong (e.g. Deut 2:30; Ps 34:18; Ps 51:10), intuition – intuiting what God is saying (e.g. Mt 26:41; Mk 2:8; Acts 18:5), and communion – worshipping God (e.g. Jn 4:23; Rom 8:15-16; Rev 21:10);\textsuperscript{47} the soul, for Nee, is what gives a person their personality, and has three faculties, volition, mind and emotion;\textsuperscript{48} and the body has the faculty of being the bearer of the five

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p.27
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p.29 (emphasis his).
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p.29.
\textsuperscript{45} Nee finds exegetical support for this in Genesis 2:7 in recognising that the word ‘life’ in that verse is in the plural (chay), so this might suggest a bringing a bout of a twofold life ‘soulical and spiritual’. (p.27)
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., pp.28-30.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., pp.36-7.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p.40.
Although therefore, the soul is the centre of a person,\(^{49}\) God willed in creation that the soul would submit to the spirit and be led by it - the soul being designed as a steward of the spirit.\(^{51}\) However, since the fall, the soul of man has usurped the spirit, overplaying its role in questioning, weighing, deciding whether God was really right in his commands, and so in effect the spirit has become sunken, and in post-fallen life, is barely evident at all in a person’s life.\(^{52}\) The spirit is still there, but because of sin, has lost its influence and lost its connection with God anyway, so just becomes an accessory for the soul - the soul, though being dead towards God, being the active entity in unregenerate man.\(^{53}\) Interestingly, this is why Nee thinks dichotomy / dualism is popular in thinking today – it is a natural consequence of a fallen world that is not able to see any evidence of a human spirit.\(^{54}\) For really depraved man, they are able to sink even lower, and the soul can sink to the lows of listening primarily to the body – having descended from ‘spirit-control’ to ‘soul-control’ to the pits of ‘body-control’,\(^{55}\) - the body on the latter, in turn reducing the soul to its service.\(^{56}\) However, this is not as common as soul-control, and only happens in the most depraved instances. In salvation and sanctification, the Holy Spirit regenerates the human spirit, and the soul (and body) in turn is able to live according to the spirit. Living between the fall and the eschaton, the soul is successful to varying degrees in carrying this out, awaiting the day of Christ’s return when all will live according to the spirit,\(^{57}\) so Nee’s book is a call to his readers to live as a ‘spiritual man’, not a ‘soulish man’ between now and the new creation, allowing the spirit to lead in a person’s life, not the soul.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., p.29.  
\(^{50}\) Ibid., p.32  
\(^{51}\) Ibid., pp.47, 89.  
\(^{52}\) Ibid., pp.55 and 38 respectively.  
\(^{53}\) Ibid., pp.38-9, 55.  
\(^{54}\) Ibid., p.25.  
\(^{55}\) Ibid., p.58.  
\(^{56}\) Ibid., p.65.  
\(^{57}\) Ibid., p.146.
1.1.3 Myer Pearlman (1930s)

Pearlman is the first Pentecostal of the 20th century to write a ‘systematic theology’.\(^{58}\)

Though not citing any of his sources, he follows the fairly standard model that systematic theologies have traditionally followed, and thus has some thought-provoking things to say about man’s nature – particularly in relation to other doctrines. Of all the Pentecostal thinkers in the first half of the 20th century, he offers the clearest definition of a soul defining it (a God-breathed soul – see below) as

The life-giving and intelligent principle animating the human body, using the bodily senses as its agents in the exploration of material things and the bodily organs for its self-expression and communication with the outside world.\(^{59}\)

The reason he clarifies it as the God-breathed soul comes from his reading of Genesis 2:7, but taking a slightly different view to Nee (though plausibly influenced by him), he notes that a natural reading of Genesis 2:7 would lead to a belief in dichotomy (as opposed to Nee thinking it suggests trichotomy), but does grant that 1 Thessalonians 5:23 and Hebrews 4:12 point more in the direction of trichotomy. So he argues that in fact, both statements have elements of truth in them when properly understood. For him, the soul and spirit represent two ‘modes’ of man’s non-physical substance. Although they are separate, they are not separable, rather they interpenetrate and permeate each other.\(^{60}\)

Pearlman sees a fairly close, and even interchangeable use of the words ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ in Scripture, which he finds unsurprising given their being different aspects of the same ‘spiritual’ entity in a man, but he notes that the word ‘soul’ is used particularly in reference

\(^{58}\) This has been put in inverted commas because he does not title it as such, and is more of a devotional, and smaller text.


\(^{60}\) Ibid., p.104.
to a person’s earthly life, whereas the term ‘spirit’ is the regular description for those who have passed into the next life.\textsuperscript{61} In an explanatory paragraph, he clarifies the interrelation of the two:

The spirit is the centre and source of human life; the soul possesses and uses this life and expresses it through the body. In the beginning God breathed the spirit of life into an inanimate body and man “became a living soul.” This soul is embodied spirit, or a human operating through a body, the combination of both constituting man a “soul”. The soul survives death because it is energized by the spirit, yet both soul and spirit are inseparable because spirit is woven into the very texture of soul. They are fused and welded into one substance.\textsuperscript{62}

On this view, humans differ to animals, in that although animals share in common with humans the having of a more advanced, intricate, soul, animals do not have the aspect of ‘spirit’ in their soul, and so do not relate to God in the unique way humans do (Gen 1:27) and do not survive death (cf. Eccl 3:21).\textsuperscript{63} Further, the human soul is what differentiates humans, one from the other (Eccl 1:5; Rom 13:1), as well as differentiating us from angels who are purely spirit.\textsuperscript{64}

For Pearlman, as well as there being an intimate link between spirit and soul, he also sees there being an intimate (though seeing them as separate substances) relation between the soul and the body as seen in his definition of the soul above. But linked in with this, he also wants to give place for the emphasis in Scripture on the human heart as being the centre of the person, Pearlman saying that that there is a close relation between the soul and the heart.\textsuperscript{65} He argues there is a spiritual link between heart and soul, (seemingly interpreting

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., pp.101-2.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., p.102.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p.104.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p.105.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p.107.
Scripture’s teaching to be asserting that the heart is the *physical* centre of a person as well as the spiritual centre) contending that the soul is very closely related to the life-blood - blood being the carrying fluid of the person’s physical life from the heart to rest of the body – so, like the heart, the blood is the primary seat of the soul.\(^\text{66}\) Regardless of how this latter statement is taken, for Pearlman, there is an intimate relation between the soul and spirit in the ‘spiritual substance’ of a person, and in turn, a very close relation between that ‘spiritual’ substance and the physical body in a person’s life. The soul is the holder of life and permeates the whole body.\(^\text{67}\)

Two further points to note; like Nee, Pearlman argues that when a person turns away to evil, and allows those passions to control him as opposed to the spirit, it is because the spirit (or ‘soul-life’) has been dethroned, and so only by means of regeneration is the spirit restored, and the person able to function as they were designed to.\(^\text{68}\) But the more interesting note and discussion he brings to the Pentecostal table, is that of the origin of each human soul, arguing for a traducian view as a suggestion for how each subsequent soul comes into existence.\(^\text{69}\)

1.1.4 The Prosperity Gospel (1940s onwards)

The health and wealth movement had its origins in the 1940s - the best known proponent being Oral Roberts, however it having progressed since then, and been active throughout the rest of the 20\(^{th}\) century, and is still around and active today. Their inclusion at this point of the review is because the movement’s anthropology has remained constant since the early days of its existence. Due, almost undoubtedly to the influence of Nee, the prosperity

\(^{66}\) Ibid., pp.111-114 particularly 114.

\(^{67}\) Ibid., pp.106-7.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., p.103.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., p.106.
evangelists spoke (and speak, today) of a person using the (in)famous dictum which describes: ‘Man is a spirit, has a soul, and lives in a body.’ Further evidence of Nee’s influence is evident in past and current proponents of Word Faith theology, in their idea of the cosmos being controlled by God-given ‘spiritual’ forces which take priority over material forces.\textsuperscript{70} However, contra Nee, they often stated that it is a person’s spirit, not the soul, that is the real ‘I’ of the person.\textsuperscript{71}

1.1.5 Summary of the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century

Given the expositions above, it can be said with conviction, that the Pentecostals in the 1900s-50s were almost unanimously trichotomous in their anthropology. The one notable exception appears to be Pearlman who would probably be content to have his view titled as a neo-trichotomous (or maybe neo-dichotomous might be more accurate - though recognising his Pentecostal heritage, would assume he would favour the former) view, one which advocates a keen place for body, soul and spirit, but sees the latter two as dual aspects of the same part.

1.1.6 E.S. Williams and the 1950s

E.S. Williams, was the first Pentecostal to actually \textit{title} his work a Systematic Theology, due no doubt to the growing influence of Evangelicalism on Pentecostalism. Much of his anthropology shows signs of this influence and is not hugely original in and of itself. Particularly on the place of the \textit{imago Dei} (which will not be covered here\textsuperscript{72}) he is very

\textsuperscript{70} E.g. K. Hagin, \textit{In Him} (Tulsa: Faith Library Publications, 1975) part 1 or K. Copeland, \textit{Believer’s Voice of Victory} 33.5 (June 2005) p.3.


\textsuperscript{72} For such discussion, the interested reader is recommended the PhD thesis of my friend and colleague Elmer Chen, on the subject of Spirit Baptism and the \textit{imago Dei} (‘The Pentecostal Doctrine of spirit baptism: a
reliant on sources from the wider protestant tradition; however his significance and reason for inclusion within this review is to note his ‘breaking into’ and being (or at least openly revealing his) being influenced by the wider academy (something it is suspected was beginning to happen in the writing of Pearlman, but which he never acknowledged). Of other interest is his striking similar notes to Pearlman on the differentiation between people on the basis of their souls;\(^73\) he also agrees with Pearlman that people differ from animals by nature of their relationship to God and further points out that humans are above animals in creation derived from the fact that animals are given to humanity for the purposes of food and sacrifices.\(^74\) This theme of the difference between humans and animals, plus the intellectual rigour with which theology was carried out seems also to have spilled further afield into the more devotional magazines such as *Pentecostal Evangel*; E.J.G. Titterington being characteristic of a change in gear with his very short article “What Genesis 1-3 Teaches About Man” but which includes telling paragraphs such as

‘It is significant that the Hebrew word for “create”, *bārā*, used in Genesis 1:1 and 2:3 of creation as a whole and in 1:21 of animal life, is used three times in one verse (1:27) referring to the creation of man. The word *bārā* is used in the Old Testament only in the sense of bringing into being something new, something which was not there before.’\(^75\)

The point Titterington is alluding to is Genesis 1’s distinguishing of animals from the rest of creation, and then humans from mere animals, but as already stated, it is the engagement with the theme in a more robust theological approach that is worth noting.

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\(^{74}\) Ibid., 2:110.

\(^{75}\) *Pentecostal Evangel*, June 24\(^{th}\), 1956, pp.26-7
One final article from the 50s worthy of identifying, again for its showing signs of intellectual rigour, but also introducing further discussion of ‘faculties’ into discussion, is a brief article by H.E. Fisher in ‘Foursquare Magazine’. He argues that just as the body has five material faculties [senses], so the soul consists of five spiritual faculties: conscience, memory, reason, affection and imagination; and the spirit, five kindred faculties: faith, hope, reverence, prayer and worship.\(^76\) And so, derivatively, (though being a very short article), Fisher shows evidence of some thought given as to how that affects a person’s after-life, adding the passing comment that the spirit, as well as the soul, returns to God at death.\(^77\)

1.1.7 Duffield and Van Cleave, and J. Rodman Williams (1980s)

In 1983, G.P. Duffield and N.M. Van Cleave furthered the discussion of human constitution, showing additional advancement of Pentecostal thought on the subject in their *Foundations of Pentecostal Theology*.\(^78\) In that work, though exhibiting awareness of the arguments for trichotomy, they display a more definite inclination towards dichotomy;\(^79\) taking their cue from Genesis 2:7, they emphasise the two ‘gifts’ God has given man in creation – body, and the (immaterial) breath of God.\(^80\) They strongly affirm the physicality of the created body, giving plentiful reason for valuing such,\(^81\) but also likewise affirm the immateriality of the ‘breath’ (or ‘soul’), and contend that a plethora of words (life, soul, spirit, mind, heart, strength, self, will and affections) are used in Scripture to refer to this immaterial aspect of man.\(^82\) Whilst wanting to affirm this, and arguing that the usage of ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ are


\(^{77}\) Ibid., p.8.


\(^{79}\) Ibid., pp.130-31.

\(^{80}\) Ibid., p.125.

\(^{81}\) Ibid., pp.126-29.

\(^{82}\) Ibid, p.129
generally interchangeable, like Pearlman, they do want to distinguish ‘soul’ from ‘spirit’ in
their precise usage in Scripture, arguing that the terms refer to man’s inner-self in regards to
different relationships: For them ‘the soul is Man in his earthly relationships; the spirit is
Man in his spiritual and immortal relationships.’

As regards the distinguishing of man from animals, Duffield and Van Cleave are slightly more
qualified than previous thinkers, arguing that it is not the spirit as an additional faculty of
man that distinguishes them from animals (animals also being referred to in Scripture as
having a soul and spirit [Eccl 3:21; Ps 104:25-30]), but rather it is the quality of human
faculties generally that distinguishes them from animals – drawing attention specifically to
the distinct status of man as being made in the image of God, and having life-everlasting.

Showing further nuance, they also contend that, though dichotomous, there is a
fundamental unity to man, in that he is to worship God with the whole of his being - all of
his heart, all of his soul, all of his mind and all of his strength (Mk 12:30). So whilst man is
able to live on after death and without the body, it is in a state of ‘nakedness’ (cf. 2 Cor 5:1-
10), and it is only when properly embodied that a man is able to function wholly.

Following Duffield and Van Cleave, J. Rodman Williams contributed to the lineage, his
inclusion in the review also drawing attention to the progress of Pentecostalism from the
time Fisher wrote (in the mid 50s) to when Duffield and Van Cleave did (in the early 80s),
during which time the mainline denominations had experienced Pentecostal renewal, and
neo-Charismatic churches were burgeoning, the shapes of which were somewhat different
to Classic Pentecostalism, though carrying the same DNA. This being that case, in 1988, J.R.

83 Ibid., p.131.
84 Ibid., pp.129-30.
85 Ibid., pp.131-32.
86 Ibid., pp.132-33.
Williams – a Reformed scholar, wrote his systematic theology from within his Reformed tradition, but with a clear Pentecostal leaning, entitling that work a ‘Renewal Theology’. Some of the anthropological threads of this work have an interesting relationship to what has previously been written by Pentecostal writers, and help demonstrate how their thought was evolving.

Continuing the development of ideas prevalent in E.S. Williams, Titterington, Fisher, Duffield and Van Cleave’s thought, J.R. Williams wanted his Pentecostal readers to appreciate the relationship between people, animals and plants, and the connotations of bārā in his discussion of what constitutes a man. He too, holds to the two-fold distinction being that animals are made of the same ‘materials’ as plants, but the radically new element of animals – and the reason bārā is used of them - being the conscious life they have. And then a step beyond for humans, the further element is their being made in the image of God, and inbreathed by God himself. Explicating the latter, he states:

The specific difference [between man and animal] is that man’s conscious life includes the range of his intellectual, emotional, and volitional life. This does not mean that animals, especially the most highly developed ones, have none of this. However, with man there is such a great difference in these areas that quantitative measurement does not suffice: there is a quantitative otherness. With the mind man rises into the realm of concepts, ideas and imagination and can even reflect upon himself in his rational self-transcendence; with the emotions man can rise to the supersensible realm and may rejoice in the good, the true, and the beautiful; with the will man can put into practice complex energies of self-determination and move beyond the confines of instinct and environment. Man as living soul, by virtue of being grounded in spirit, is self-transcending in every area of his conscious life.  

So for Williams, a being’s ‘soul’ is the kind of conscious life that being has.

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Like Pearlman and Duffield and Van Cleave, Williams sees a close relationship between a person’s spirit and their soul, arguing that a downplaying of the place of spirit in a human results in the downplaying of a person’s relationship to God, in turn reducing the essence of a human merely to their intellect, emotion and volition. But, rather than being a trichotomist, (though he may be reticent to describe himself as a dualist), Williams divulges his position following a lengthy exegesis of Gen 2:7 (in which he outlines man’s constitution as being 1. Dust from the ground [a physical body] 2. A spirit [having received the breath of life] and so becomes 3. A living soul/being) saying:

As we…reflect on man as a “living being” or “soul”, we are not to understand this as a third part of man, but as a resulting expression of spirit functioning through body. It might be said that spirit is the principle of man as soul. Soul (or life) is grounded in spirit and so is inseparable from spirit, but it is not a third part. It is the whole of life through which the spirit of man expresses himself.

So the soul comes into existence through the combination of spirit and body, and has a vital role in the life of a person. However, being derivative of the spirit, Williams says that ‘it is the spirit and not the soul that is said to go immediately “upward”’ post-death because of the spirit being the primary in the relation of the two. That said, Scripture is also able to

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88 Ibid., p.212 and also fn. 58 on that page.
89 Similar to Nee, Williams too was keen to differentiate in Genesis 2:7 between the ‘breath of God’ and the human ‘spirit’ that results. Drawing on Job 33:4, he states ‘Man does not have a [literal] deposit of the divine Spirit, else he were partly divine…Man’s spirit…is inbreathed by God…and is intimately related to, but by no means identical with, the Spirit of God. (Ibid., p.211 emphasis mine)
90 Ibid., pp.208-214.
91 His related footnotes on dichotomy and trichotomy are interesting: Fn. 58 on page 212 states ‘one of the basic weaknesses in a dichotomous view of man…[is]…that [on this view] he is only body and soul, spirit being identified with soul. Since soul has basically to do with the intellectual, emotional and volitional aspects of man, what spirit points to may be eliminated or radically subordinated. Whereas fn. 64, page 213 states ‘trichotomy, which views man as constituted of three parts, also has a serious weakness: “soul” is not a third part of man. However, since it is not identical with body or spirit, trichotomy does point in the right direction.’
92 Ibid., p.213.
93 Ibid., p.214 emphasis mine.
speak of the soul as being present with the Lord post-death (e.g. Rev 6:9), because of the soul’s being grounded in, and living out of, the spirit.\textsuperscript{94}

1.1.8 Munyon, Arrington, Grudem and Hart (1990s)

Following in the trend of distinguishing between humans and animals, Munyon pushed the question of human ‘faculties’ further, arguing that humans are a lot more advanced in their nature; For example, though both build houses, human homes are built with reason and imagination, whereas animal homes are built from mere instinct.\textsuperscript{95} And in answer to the dichotomy / trichotomy question, Munyon was content to just present the arguments for both positions, leaving it as an open question for the reader to decide.\textsuperscript{96} Arrington did similarly, not committing to either of these positions, but does underline the unified nature of the human, regardless of which position is chosen.\textsuperscript{97}

Grudem, who, like J. Rodman Williams falls into the category of someone who is Pentecostal, but who primarily wrote his systematic theology from an Evangelical Reformed point of view (but with charismatic tendencies when the related issues arose),\textsuperscript{98} pushed the Pentecostal thought just a nudge further when noting:

Although the arguments for trichotomy do have some force, none of them provides conclusive evidence that would overcome the wide testimony of Scripture showing that the terms soul and spirit are frequently interchangeable and are in many cases synonymous.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., p.214.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., pp.81-3.
\textsuperscript{98} He is helpful to the review because he helpfully highlights the growing influence of outside theological influences on Pentecostalism.
\textsuperscript{99} W. Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Bible Doctrine (Leicester: IVP, 1994) p.481.
Going even further on the question, (the Charismatic Evangelical) Larry Hart, in his Truth Aflame, commented (regarding the self-conscious aspect of a human) that ‘The writers of the Scriptures and theologians down through the centuries have called this aspect “soul” or “spirit”’ suggesting a commitment to the dichotomous position.\(^{100}\) And again ‘Are there two natures within an individual – the physical body and the soul or spirit? The consensus of the church has been that there are.’\(^{101}\)

More will be said in regard to these views in evaluation of the aforementioned Pentecostal anthropology, but are interesting comments, written as they are at the end of the 20\(^{th}\) century.

1.1.9 Post 2000

From the 1990s into the 21\(^{st}\) century, Pentecostal academia rapidly developed, yet anthropology, and specifically writings on human constitution still remained somewhat neglected, so, with the exclusion of Amos Yong’s work and the recent work of Kärkkäinen,\(^{102}\) (which will receive a lot more extensive treatment in following chapters), only two other significant works post 2000 contributed to the Pentecostal discussion.\(^{103}\) The first is William L.D. Hart, Truth Aflame: Theology for the Church in Renewal (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999, reprint 2005) p.242 (page number from reprint edition in 2005) (emphasis mine).

\(^{101}\) Ibid., p.243.


\(^{103}\) Lisa Stephenson wrote a book on a different branch of anthropology to what I am focussing on, in her Dismantling the Dualisms for American Pentecostal Women in Ministry: A Feminist-Pneumatological Approach (Leiden: Brill, 2011). In that, she argues that the equality of women is not only justified on the grounds of the imago Dei in creation, or in Christology, but also (and arguing that Pentecostals, particularly, should have eyes open to this) in pneumatology, based on Acts 2. This of course is a fascinating area of anthropology, but due to limited scope, I am leaving aside the question of imago Dei in order to focus on the specific area of the constitution of humanity, hence not including Stephenson’s book in the above review. Another article that is likewise of interest anthropologically, but not specifically related to the issue of constitution (so has not been reviewed in the above) is D.M. Coulter’s ‘The Whole Gospel for the Whole Person: Ontology, Affectivity, and Sacramentality’, Pneuma 35.2 (2013): 157-61.
Atkinson’s ‘Spirit, Soul and Body: The Trichotomy of Kenyon, Hagin and Copeland.’

Much of Atkinson’s article is review and evaluation of the trichotomous position, so (as my own evaluation will follow shortly) not much of his outline will be reviewed here, however, it is interesting to note that in response to the trichotomy of the Word Faith proponents he engaged with, Atkinson appears thoroughly dichotomous in his evaluation. Drawing on the exegetical and philosophical treatment, and Evangelical book of renowned dualist John Cooper, Atkinson argued that Scripture teaches (what he calls) a ‘moderate dualism’ (Cooper calls it ‘holistic dualism’\textsuperscript{105}) - in order to refute the teaching of the trichotomous Word Faith Teachers. His position can be summarised by his comment ‘moderate dualism holds that the true person is the combination of body and soul, such that neither without the other can be regarded as “I”, or the full person.’\textsuperscript{106} The other significant contribution post 2000 is Paul and Caileen Shrier’s ‘Wesley’s Sanctification Narrative: A Tool for Understanding the Holy Spirit’s Work in a More Physical Soul.’\textsuperscript{107} Although recognising that Wesley’s sanctification model fits most naturally with a ‘holistic dualist’ model, Shrier and Shrier also suggest that Pentecostals might entertain a (non-reductive) monistic position, (brought to their attention by the work of N. Murphy, W. Brown, M. Jeeves and J. Green). In contrast to what the Shriers see as the traditional model of the soul Christianity adopts – a Cartesian / ‘radical’ dualism, due to the findings of neuroscience which imply that what happens in the brain affects the will, emotions, thoughts, beliefs, morals – all things traditionally associated with the soul - they contend that Christianity needs to consider the soul something more physical. With a person’s will and behaviour being that shaped by the regular routines and practices the person carries out, this piques their interest in Wesley’s

physical practises of piety, as being disciplines that physically shape the brain, so help to develop a person’s sanctification.

1.2 Evaluation

By way of evaluation, there appear to be two constants throughout all of the literature reviewed: the authority Scripture has for Pentecostals - on which they build their anthropology, and the desire they have to maintain some place for the human spirit in their anthropology. The former is significant in the bearing it has on creating an appropriate methodology for the thesis, the latter, engaging for the potential avenues it opens up for constructive thinking for later in the thesis. To maintain the importance of both, they will be separated and will bookend the evaluation. In the middle, the development of constitutional thought, and the influence of other theological traditions as well as philosophical ideologies, will be expounded, to identify why Pentecostal thought has changed (and is changing), from the beginning of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st. These theological and philosophical categories are naturally bridged by considering the place of hermeneutics in Pentecostals’ consideration of Scripture concerning this issue, so a section on hermeneutics will intersect and join the two areas of theological and philosophical influences in this middle section, establishing what it is that has caused Pentecostal thought on constitution to develop in those 100 years.

1.2.1 The Authority of Scripture

It is very clear that Pentecostals have consistently sought to construct their view of human constitution on the basis of the authority of Scripture. The consistent trend of appealing to

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108 Even if this latter point is merely to use the word ‘spirit’ (in favour of any other term) in theological anthropology as opposed to seeing it as a separate ontological entity. See chapter 7 for further exploration.
what the Bible says concerning anthropology is evident throughout the last century and has not changed since the time Boddy wrote his articles at the beginning of the 20th century. Despite their valuing of the place of experience in their theology, the above reveals very clearly that Pentecostals hold Scripture as their final authority when considering their anthropology, as they do, theology generally. This means that the appropriate methodology for developing a consistently Pentecostal theology of the soul must likewise regard Scripture as authoritative, and enter into careful exegesis of the relevant passages.

1.2.2 Theological Influences

Clearly the above affirmation of the authority of Scripture is not unique to Pentecostals and is a position they have inherited from other Protestant traditions, but specifically within their constitutional thought, there are many other strands that also feed into their thinking.

1.2.2.1 Trichotomy influence

The tripartite position in much of the earlier 20th century Pentecostal writing (emphasising the whole nature of a person, but conceiving of humanity as being body, soul and spirit), was quite idiosyncratic of Pentecostal thought of that period, but though marking them out from the majority of Christian traditions of the time, this trichotomy is not unique to Pentecostal thought, but rather flowed into it from other theological traditions – this time from a marginal stream of church history.

Historically, though it is a noteworthy minority who held to it, the trichotomous view of man was never one which enjoyed a majority status in church history, it being one that suffered from associations with heretical thinkers and ideas. Though being espoused by a number of
the Church fathers, the position had a rapid fall from grace after the era of the Church Fathers, the fall occurring particularly because of Apollinarius’ use of it in his teaching that the (human) spirit in Christ was replaced by pure divine spirit, and partly because of the influence Greek philosophy came to have on it. In his Systematic Theology, Berkhof helps clarify the unpopularity of the view, explaining:

The tri-partite conception of man originated in Greek philosophy, which conceived of the relation of the body and the spirit of man to each other after the analogy of the mutual relation between the material universe and God. It was thought that, just as the latter could enter into communion with each other only by means of a third substance or an intermediate being, so the former could enter into mutual relationships only by means of a third or intermediate element, namely the soul. So serious was this combination that by the fourth council of Constantinople (AD 869-70) trichotomy was actually condemned. Since then, it has received something of a resurgence from theologians such as Luther, a number of the Evangelical Lutherans, and a handful of 19th century thinkers, who all came to espouse it in some form; and in fact Luther, 400 years before A. Boddy came up with it, had made the link between the human trichotomy and the Old Testament ‘trichotomy of the temple’. However, Boddy certainly was not alone among those early 20th century Pentecostal thinkers in being influenced by this minority tradition, probably the most obvious other example was Watchman Nee, who, in his exposition of the trichotomy view, appears to have swallowed the view’s history whole, including that of the mistaken Greek philosophy entailed from the first millennium Berkhof

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109 Irenaeus, Melito, Justin Martyr, Clement, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and Basil of Caesarea were all trichotomists of a sort – though not in the sense that trichotomy might be understood today.


111 E.g. Roos, Olshausen, Delitzsch, White and Heard.

112 Luther’s Works, J. Pelikan (ed.) (St.Louis: Concordia, 1956) 21:304.
mentions. Nee in turn passed on such a misunderstanding to the Word of Faith movement who adopted much of his ideas.

So it has to be admitted that, though quite distinctive, the trichotomy early Pentecostals held to was at least partly inherited from the marginal theological tradition of history, a stream that was at odds with the majority dichotomy tradition – one held to by the majority of thinkers in Church history.

1.2.2.2 Dichotomy Influence

The dichotomy trend then, has been the favoured position through church history, and came to colour Pentecostal thought through the influence of Evangelicalism. Pentecostalism found itself forming closer and closer ties with Evangelicalism through the 20th century, Evangelicalism itself being influenced by major influential thinkers such as Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin, and the prominent dualistic positions such held. Although Pentecostalism’s partnership with Evangelicalism was officially marked when the National Association of Evangelicals invited Pentecostalism to be a part of the association in 1948, Evangelicalism’s influence is already evident in the writings of Pearlman – the first to show signs of moving towards a dualistic direction (as well as to write something of an ‘academic’ systematic theology) – who, though not citing his sources, on close analysis is influenced by the thought of Berkhof. But even before that, the affinity Pentecostalism had with Fundamentalism (out of which many of the members of the NAE grew [though then maturing, and later seeking to distance themselves from such roots, and giving more emphasis to critical scholarly thought]) gave a natural basis from which the Evangelical-Pentecostal partnership could arise, and as the century went on, Pentecostalism was
Evangelicalised, and Evangelicalism Pentecostalised. Particularly by the end of the century, the shift towards full blown dualism is evident in the writings of Duffield and Van Cleave, J.R. Williams, Munyon, Grudem, Hart, and then Atkinson and Shrier and Shrier in the 21st century, all of whom would happily recognise Evangelicalism’s influence in their thought, and many of whom would happily identify as Evangelical as well as Pentecostal. As seen, by the point of 2005, Atkinson fully assumes (the Evangelical) John Cooper’s exegesis and anthropology when refuting the Word Faith Movement’s anthropology, also inherent in Shrier and Shrier’s anthropology, so by this point, the shift through the century towards the dichotomous position appears ‘complete’, and the majority view of Church history appears to have become the one Pentecostals (of more academic persuasion) prefer by the very early 21st century.

1.2.3 Hermeneutics

Seeing something of the above influences also sheds light on Pentecostal hermeneutics through the 20th century and why they moved from a trichotomous position transitioning more towards (or as will be seen later [possibly] ‘through’) a dualistic position.

The early Pentecostal ‘say what you see’ hermeneutical method when exegeting for example 1 Thess 5:23, Heb 4:12 and Luke 1:46-7 was significant in them coming to the early trichotomous position. As seen again in A. Boddy’s position, such a hermeneutical approach was influenced by the Darby translation which he inherited, and the associated

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114 The word ‘complete’ is put in inverted commas because as will be seen, it appears that dualism may not be the end point on this developing trajectory.
115 It should also be noted of course that many Pentecostals, influenced by some of the earlier and more popular writings of their history, as well as ‘say-what-you-see’ hermeneutics (see below), maintain the trichotomous position today and are not aware of any progression of thought.
hermeneutical approach of millennial movements of the 19th century from which the Darby translation arose. This, combined with the growing influence of the fundamentalist movement, helped to bring about the associated literalistic hermeneutics the early 20th century Pentecostals adopted. As seen, Pentecostalism came then to find a growing affinity with Evangelicalism in the middle of the 20th century, an influence which also helped shape its hermeneutics (as well as influencing Pentecostals towards a dualistic position). Such evangelical hermeneutics were influenced by its own tradition, and particularly the likes of Calvin and Zwingli’s theology did much to shape Evangelicalism’s - hence derivatively Pentecostalism’s - hermeneutics in the historical-grammatico direction. Such an approach seeks to ask what the human author’s (and hence, God’s) intention was in writing what he did in the words of Scripture, so much attention is paid to the historical context in which the writer was writing from, the type of genre being used, as well as how such an interpretation fits with the rest of Scripture. The work of Gordon Fee, towards the end of the 20th century, highlights an academic application of this to Pentecostal thought,116 and on a more popular level, many Pentecostals seek to employ such a method today when preaching, drawing upon (for instance) John Stott’s practical application of the historical-grammatico method.117 So the Evangelical hermeneutical approach has also done much to shape Pentecostal’s thinking and development surrounding the constitution of humanity.

1.2.4 Philosophical influences

This leads quite naturally into considering the philosophical influences that have contributed to the change in constitutional attitude of Pentecostals throughout the last 100 years.

Though very suspicious of any kind of philosophy they were aware of, the above review demonstrates that Pentecostal thought about human constitution was shaped by philosophical influences – which probably they were unaware of.

With much of these philosophical influences, they are often hidden or masked under other categories so will need further exploration in coming chapters because are often recapitulated in the writings of contemporary writers too. But what can initially be said here is that (and in further unity with the Fundamentalist movement) the literalistic approach to Scripture hermeneutically, combined with the recognition of the on-going ‘issue’ of evolution, is likely to have piqued Pentecostals’ interest in the more philosophical question of a person’s faculties, and what differentiates humans from animals from plants. This is an issue that the review highlights arises in the early 20th century writings, but has been an issue in some sense ever since, Pentecostals clearly feeling the need to defend the unique distinctiveness of humanity in regard to other living species. However, although the claim was that science was pointing away from humanity’s existence being a specially-divinely-made creation, a closer look at such ‘science’ reveals it to be more a philosophically and worldview-bent interpretation of science that had a significant bearing on the Pentecostal articulations of human constitution, and has been an influence which

118 Pentecostals took very seriously (though mistakenly extracting it from its context) the admonishment of Paul in Colossians 2:8: ‘See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition and the elemental spiritual forces of this world rather than on Christ.’

119 This hiding and masking of philosophical influence is not something that Pentecostals are alone in having (often) missed; it happens repeatedly in contemporary thought, one only becoming aware of the philosophical ideologies affecting thought, culture, and life through engaging with the past, and careful philosophical analysis of thinkers and their ideas. The ideas are then often revealed and unmasked (i.e. described truly for what they are as philosophical ideology as opposed to ‘science’ or ‘history’) when seen at their origins, and identifying how these have been promulgated through history since.

120 That is, evolution in the sense proposed by Charles Darwin in 1859 (remembering that the theory of evolution had been around a long time before Darwin, it being his specific mechanism of natural selection that caused the ripples).
Pentecostals have been responding to throughout when forming their anthropology.\textsuperscript{121} As mentioned, more will need to be said on the issue of science and evolution, but early Pentecostals, and in fact many through to today, mistakenly considered their faith to be antithetical to science because of such an issue, however, as will be further made clear in following chapters, the ‘Evolution’ issue was and is actually one to do with \textit{philosophy} not science.

The other (often) unidentified philosophical ideologies that influenced the writings reviewed and the development of their thought were (and are) those of the academy. As seen, Pearlman was the first Pentecostal to really engage with, and attempt to write something of an academic theology, and since his time, Pentecostalism has been gradually progressing in its theological output, attaining to more and more of an academic standard. By the point of Hollenweger’s \textit{The Pentecostals} in 1972,\textsuperscript{122} and consolidated by Land’s \textit{Pentecostal Spirituality} in 1993,\textsuperscript{123} a precedent had been set for Pentecostals to be writing fully-fledged academic work, acceptance of such work becoming more and more widely recognised across the academy since.\textsuperscript{124} Though an exciting endeavour, the writings of the late 20\textsuperscript{th} century thinkers reviewed above highlight the (again, often unnoticed) trends of philosophical ideas, which permeate the culture of the academy. Though again needing

\textsuperscript{121} For example, though more will be said on this in coming chapters, whether evolution is ‘blind’ (or ‘purposeless’ – in the sense of being a teleological) cannot be a scientific discussion (though there might be hints in science to help come to a conclusion on it). When speaking of issues of teleology, one is in the domain of philosophy not science (as the term is used today), but this is often lost when philosophy of science is buried / masked under the term ‘science’ skewing the conversation into mismatched discussions such as ‘faith vs science’ (when a more carefully articulated discussion would be teleology vs a-teleology, when considering the approach / method [questions of method are questions of philosophy] of science).

\textsuperscript{122} (London: SCM, 1972).

\textsuperscript{123} (Sheffield: Sheffield University Press 1993).

\textsuperscript{124} This may raise the question of what ‘academic’ means. Such a discussion is too large for this chapter, so will merely comment that Pentecostal writings of such standard are now accepted to be such by others publishing at a university and doctoral-plus level. A number of academic publishing houses have now sought to facilitate Pentecostal academic journals, monographs and books, and Pentecostal academics are now considered to be in a league with other such thinkers, welcomed – as it were – to the table of academic discussion in Christian theology.
further chapters for elaboration, a particularly pertinent one is the influence discussions within the philosophy of mind were and are having on the theology of constitution, as well as the underlying philosophical assumptions being assumed (though for the more careful, still being debated) in many of those discussions. Those underlying assumptions will also be elucidated later, but the ‘mind-body’ question (being debated in the field of philosophy of mind) is one that has gone some distance to shaping Evangelicalism’s thought on the theological equivalent discussion – ‘the soul-body’ discussion; and Pentecostalism’s writers appear to have initially encountered these ideas indirectly through Evangelicalism’s thinking (itself a forerunner encouraging Pentecostals in an academic direction). In 1994 and then 1999, one can see these issues in the background of Grudem’s and Hart’s writings on constitution, and then a lot more obviously in Atkinson’s, and the Shriers’ work. Affirming the point yet further, Atkinson and the Shriers’ works are those written post-Cooper’s re-published, and strongly influential book Body, Soul and Life—Everlasting – a work written in reaction to trends he saw in biblical studies, but also from the mind-body discussions. The mind-body, and hence soul-body, discussion is keenly debated among philosophers and so still feeding into any theological discussions of anthropology as will be seen. How aware of it Pentecostals have been up to 2009 is uncertain, yet the influence of such discussion is evident towards the end of the above review.

Bringing these theological, hermeneutical and philosophical strands together, the shift from trichotomy to a definite dualistic emphasis at the very beginning of the 21st century (and maybe considering going a step further) has been very much influenced by the significance of other theological and philosophical traditions, and those influences still very much shape Pentecostalism today. Contemporary examples of how this is born out in Pentecostal

125 Again, with the exclusion of Yong then Kärkkäinen - see following chapter.
scholarship in the immediate present will be articulated in the next chapter, however, before leaving the history above, one further theme that arises from the overview and is particularly noteworthy, is the place of the human spirit. Despite the gradual move away from trichotomy to dichotomy, Pentecostals have generally had a desire to retain a place for the concept of a human ‘spirit’ in a person’s constitution, even if they were / are not quite sure what that distinction is or how to phrase it.¹²⁶

1.2.5 The Concept of (human) spirit

Although the trichotomous trend was drifting out of vogue by the middle of the 20th century, Pentecostals still thought that the concept of the human spirit was scriptural in some sense, the general feeling in the literature above (the only real exceptions being Atkinson, the Shriers and Hart [and possibly Grudem]) being that there is some kind of a distinction between ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ even if not much, and it being difficult to state what that is.¹²⁷ This leads back to the interesting question of exegesis and what is actually being referred to when the word ‘spirit’ is used when speaking of a human, and what exactly is being referred to in 1 Thess 5:23, Heb 4:12 and Lk 1:46-47. Although not the place for full exegeses of these passages, some comment about how commentators have regarded the exegesis of the latter verses is important, so will be briefly addressed here.

There is a unanimous impression among commentators that (a) the main emphasis of 1 Thessalonians 5:23 is that Paul is praying that God would sanctify the Thessalonians wholly (linking it back to his exhortations in 3:13 and 4:3-8), and like-wise, with Hebrews 4:12 that

¹²⁶ J. Rodman Williams seems to be very much in this category. His wanting to retain that difference but suggesting the concept of the spirit being the soul’s principle of life with some special kind of relationship to God appears to be a classic example of the above (J.R. Williams, Renewal Theology, p.212).
¹²⁷ And even if not wanting to make such a conceptual distinction, Pentecostals want to retain the term ‘spirit’, as the following and chapter 7 will make clear.
the main point is that the word of God is able to penetrate to the very core of a person’s being, and (b) that it would be ‘precarious’ to build a trichotomous doctrine of humanity upon these verses.\textsuperscript{128} Yet, it is interesting that, though thinking they are very close in what the terms represent, few commentators are willing to entirely rule out that the spirit is something distinct from the soul, even if they do not think it is a separate substance.\textsuperscript{129} The reader is often presented with comments such as those of O’Brien: [In Heb 4:12] ‘Spirit and soul are virtually identical.’\textsuperscript{130} But that there might be room for some distinction comes out in Marshall’s work who comments that the most probable reading of 1 Thess 5:23 would be

\begin{quote}
...taking it in the sense that Paul here distinguishes three aspects of the Christian’s personality, his life in relationship with God through the ‘spiritual’ part of his nature, his human personality or ‘soul’, and the human body through which he acts and expresses himself.\textsuperscript{131}
\end{quote}

And again, Fee:

\begin{quote}
...it is very likely, given the way Paul here expresses himself, that he might think of the human spirit and soul as distinct entities in some way. But how he might think of them as different is not at all clear from the rest of his letters. Since he tends to use
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{128} F.F. Bruce’s word ‘precarious’ helpfully summarises the feelings of wider commentators on this particular issue, see both his 1 and 2 Thessalonians: Word Biblical Commentary (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1982) pp.129-30 and his The Epistle to the Hebrews (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990) p.113.


\textsuperscript{130} cf. his footnote 137 on the same page ‘There seems to be little difference in meaning between one’s ‘soul’ and...‘spirit’ P.T. O’Brien, The Letter to the Hebrews (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010) p.117.

\textsuperscript{131} He goes on to say ‘These distinctions are loose, and do not suggest three ‘parts’ of man which can be sharply separated, but rather three aspects of his being. Paul lists them together here to emphasise that it is indeed the whole person who is the object of salvation.’ (I.H. Marshall, 1 and 2 Thessalonians: The New Century Bible Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983) p.163.
such terms both broadly and somewhat interchangeably, one is hard pressed to come to final conclusions.\textsuperscript{132}

So on exegetical grounds, particularly apparent from Fee, the \textit{possibility} of a distinction between the ‘soul’ and the ‘spirit’ seems valid, even if it is not immediately clear what that distinction is. But it gives an interesting lead for future chapters as the philosophical issues are further delved into, for contributing to the related ontological discussion of the relationship between soul and the spirit, whilst working on the bigger theological question of Pentecostal constitution of humanity. This interest is likely to be furthered in a theological sense too in remembering that Pentecostal spirituality is one that emphasises the on-going encounter between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit, so has potential to be a very interesting theme to consider as the thesis develops.

\textbf{1.2.6 Evaluation in short}

In summary, the historical review given outlines that Pentecostal theology of human constitution over the last 100 years, and into the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, exhibit a high and authoritative view of Scripture. Such writings also show a desire to retain the idea of the (human) spirit somehow in their constitutional anthropology. And as the last 100 years have gone on, the writings reveal a development of opinion regarding what constitutes a human, influenced by theological and philosophical ideas. These influences have strongly contributed to the trajectory on which Pentecostalism finds itself regarding its constitutional thought. As the literature review moves up to the present and contemporary state of the discussion in the following chapter, it turns to look at Amos Yong and Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, whose work epitomise many of these strands, embodying what has been said

above and magnifying it, so giving a strong indicator, not only of where Pentecostalism now is, but where it potentially may be going from here.
Chapter 2: Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s Anthropology

As identified at the end of the previous chapter, Pentecostal anthropology is on a trajectory, having moved from full trichotomy, through a lesser version of that, to (through?) dualism, to the point of 2009 where Shrier and Shrier were describing the soul as more ‘physical’ in nature (at least, more than some dualistic positions suggest). Whilst a high view of Scripture, and interest in maintaining some understanding of the human spirit in Pentecostal anthropology, has been evident throughout, such a trajectory has been influenced by outside theological traditions, and philosophical considerations, shaping the direction of this trajectory. As will be seen, this trajectory, its influences, as well as the constant themes of biblical authority, and desire to continue speaking of the human spirit, continue, and are embodied in the work of the two Pentecostal theologians who have given the most contemporary and academic thought to the subject of constitution, Amos Yong and Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen. These scholars’ writings on this issue will be surveyed and expounded in this chapter, so further illuminating the current place of the trajectory. And in seeing that these thinkers, in many ways, stand in line with the direction of the trajectory - indeed, taking it a further step into a monistic understanding of human constitution, the chapter will raise the issue of the possible continued direction for the future of the trajectory in light of these scholars’ work. This will illumine the importance of further engagement with this topic in the present to speak fruitfully into the discussion, for (re)shaping the future of the trajectory.
2.1 Amos Yong

2.1.1 Introducing Yong as a thinker and his theological anthropological work

Amos Yong is professor of theology and mission at Fuller theological seminary. Having published thoroughly in a wide range of subjects, it is fair to say he is Pentecostalism’s most prolific theologian, and his work is having influential effects all around the Pentecostal academy and beyond.\textsuperscript{133} Specifically with regard to theological anthropology – and within that, the doctrine of human constitution - he is the Pentecostal scholar to have written most comprehensively on the subject, and through his full, academic treatises on the topic, appears to have already influenced other Pentecostals considering human constitution. Particularly his writings from 2005 to 2011 are his significant texts on the issue, those in which he lays out his anthropology, so in what follows, Yong's major claims from these publications will be surveyed. However, before focussing specifically on Yong’s work within anthropology, it would be helpful to say something about his methodology in general, so illumining why he approaches anthropology in the way that he does, why he makes the anthropological claims he does, and why he is attracted to the model of human constitution he is.

2.1.2 Yong’s Theological Method

Yong’s method, or ‘theological hermeneutics’,\textsuperscript{134} is most fully articulated in his Spirit-Word-Community, in which he sets out his \textit{theological} (as opposed to, more narrowly, just biblical) hermeneutic. This hermeneutic is one that

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{133} See W. Vondey (ed.) \textit{The Theology of Amos Yong and the New Face of Pentecostal Scholarship} (Leiden: Brill, 2013)

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Spirit-Word-Community: Theological Hermeneutics in Trinitarian Perspective} (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). On p.2 he comments that ‘theological method’ and ‘theological hermeneutics’ in the way he uses the terms are virtually indistinguishable.
\end{footnotes}
aims at interpreting [not just the Bible but] the totality of human experience – and that includes God and God’s relationship with human selves and the world as a whole – from a perspective that is specifically and explicitly grounded in faith. Yong seeks to interpret the entire God-self-world human experience from a theological perspective in his hermeneutic, but further aims to do so in a manner that deliberately and specifically leaves the door open for other disciplines (such as science, history, philosophy, politics etc.) to contribute in this interpretative quest of gathering and discerning truth. For Yong, all truth is God’s truth - wherever it may be found, so although beginning with his theological assumption of reality being one Spirit-charged whole, he understands reality as one that can be understood and interpreted through the (welcome) insights of many different disciplines. In his work, he draws upon Acts 2 and the description of the ‘many tongues’ in which the apostles spoke (to proclaim the gospel on the day of Pentecost) as a metaphor to describe his Pentecostal method; for him, the many differing academic disciplines serve to build (proclaim) together a coherent picture of the Spirit’s truth. Not surprisingly therefore, Yong has been attracted to the disciplines of neuroscience and philosophy in his anthropological work – as disciplines he seeks to draw upon to inform his theology.

2.1.3 Application of Yong’s method to his (theological) anthropology

Using the above approach for the differing areas of theology Yong considers, his theological anthropology is informed by (neuro)science, philosophy (of mind) and biblical studies. In three significant works, the insights he gleans from these disciplines combine to inform his theological anthropology. ‘Christian and Buddhist Perspectives on Neuropsychology and the

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135 Yong, Spirit-Word-Community, p.6.
136 Cf. Spirit-Word-Community, p.305. Truth being ‘pragmatic, transformative, and liberative... and... Theologically, truth is said to be salvific and sanctifying.’ (p.276)
Human Person: *Pneuma and Prativyasamutpadh* 137 and *The Spirit of Creation: Modern Science and Divine Action in the Pentecostal-Charismatic Imagination*, 138 are texts in which Yong seeks to draw more on the ‘natural’ or ‘hard’ sciences (physics, chemistry and biology) (as well as philosophy of mind and biblical studies) to inform his theological anthropology; His *Theology and Down Syndrome: Re-imagining Disability in Late Modernity*, 139 is more in dialogue with the social sciences, specifically disability studies, helping to inform his particular theology of disability. Together, the three texts display an overall picture of Yong’s Pentecostal anthropology.

2.1.4 Yong’s rejection of dualism

In all these works, it becomes obvious that much of what Yong writes regarding theological anthropology is written in reaction to dualistic understandings of a human being, and that his ensuing ideas are a wanting to move away from such a position. He gives a number of significant theological reasons, and then also philosophical reasons for rejecting such a position. These reasons will be surveyed before moving onto expound his own preferred anthropology and model of human constitution.

2.1.4.1 Theological reasons for rejecting dualism

In three definitive quotes, Yong makes very clear that his theological reasons for rejecting dualism are its downplaying of the scriptural emphasis of anthropological holism, and also its denigrating of the associated emphasis on *embodiment*. Regarding the first of these, he comments

137 *Zygon* 40.1 (March 2005): 143-165.
138 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011)
139 (Waco, Texas: Baylor University Press, 2007). This book was motivated in part by Amos Yong’s personal interest in disability studies, an interest that arose from an early age growing up with a disabled brother. But as such, it is very much in accord with Yong’s overall method, bringing theology into dialogue with a wide range of differing disciplines.
[that he wants to move] beyond traditional (Platonist and especially, Cartesian) dualist definitions of humans as “disembodied souls” toward ontological wholist [sic] understandings of human beings...\textsuperscript{140}

For him, the locating of the human identity primarily in the soul is unacceptable, because of the \textit{holistic} emphasis in Scripture of a human, one which underlines the importance of the \textit{body}. On this second, and associated theme of the body, he states

...human embodiment cannot be relegated to secondary status in any theological anthropology.\textsuperscript{141}

And again

Only a theology of embodiment can begin to overcome Cartesian dualism and account holistically for the human experience as including other bodies, the environment and technological enhancements or even substitutes for our bodily parts.\textsuperscript{142}

The reason Yong puts so much emphasis on these two themes of \textit{holism} and \textit{embodiment} is because of his focus on humans being made in the image of God, the concept he sees as key for understanding human identity and nature. Specifically the foundational \textit{imago Dei} verses, Genesis 1:26-27, embedded in the creation narratives of Genesis 1 and 2, and located in the Old Testament with its Hebraic – holistic and embodied - understanding of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{140} ‘Christian and Buddhist’, 147. Note, that Yong uses the term ‘wholist’ [commonly (and in this thesis) spelt ‘holist’] in a way interchangeable with the term ‘monist’. More will be said about this later, but here it would be useful to define such terms. [W]Holism affirms ‘the functional unity of some entity in its totality, the integration and interrelation of all the parts in the existence and proper operation of the whole.’ (J.W. Cooper, \textit{Body, Soul and Life Everlasting} [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000] p.45.) Monism is the understanding that an entity ontologically consists of one ‘stuff’ (to use a popular term, but one commonly employed by philosophers for the sake of definition) e.g. ‘a human consists of (just) physical matter’ (as opposed to a dualistic understanding, ‘a human consists of physical matter and an immaterial soul’).
\item \textsuperscript{141} \textit{Theology and Down Syndrome}, p.171.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Ibid., p.182.
\end{itemize}
humanity, Yong regards as the source of theological anthropology, and looks to these as the foundation for his understanding of humanity.

In contrast to Platonist, and Cartesian understandings that value an immaterial soul to the detriment of a physical body, Yong argues that the imago Dei verses in their (physical world-affirming) context of Genesis 1 and 2 completely undermine these positions. Instead, these verses emphasise the material aspect of humanity and value the whole-functioning

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143 This is not to say that the New Testament does not carry this Hebraic understanding too, rather, that that understanding is grounded in that of the Old Testament.

144 Classic Cartesian Dualism will be expounded further in chapter 5, showing how certain contemporary positions in the mind-body discussion derive their position from Descartes’ (but whilst learning from his mistakes). But not being of such direct significance for this thesis (rather, just functioning indirectly as a position most want to distance themselves from), it would be helpful here to expound the Platonist view that is so often critiqued.

Plato argued that man was a material being that had a soul, but soul here meaning a being’s principle of life, with no religious connotations. Man’s soul was different to those of other living beings because it also had a rational capacity and was able to understand the ‘Form’ world (In Plato’s metaphysics, the realm of Forms was a non-material abstract world of universals, a realm of eternal, changeless and bodiless objects, that could not be perceived, but only known through the intellect, through reason [this being in contrast to the material realm, the world of particulars, its entities being made of parts, subject to destruction, a realm that could be perceived by the five senses {cf. Phaedo, 78b-80b}]). In fact, for Plato, really man knows the Forms before being taught them, they just need a guiding teacher to help them realise them, so deduces that they must have known them before they were born (Meno, 82b-86b). He therefore concludes that a man’s soul pre-existed and is eternal – itself being a Form (Phaedo, 81c-d). Exploring further (and switching to the preferred inclusive terminology [see fn. 26]), Plato actually saw the human soul as being tripartite, the top part being the logistikon – the reasoning part of the soul, the bottom part being the epithumetikon – the part responsible for the bodily desires, and the middle part being the thumoeides – what Plato calls the ‘spirit’ part, i.e. the part representing the passions (such as anger, shame, ambition). In a human, the rational aspect of the soul is always trying to control the ‘spirit’ and bodily desires part (so for example, when seeing a beautiful person, the reasoning part of a human soul is filled with wonder at the person’s beauty, the bodily aspect immediately wants to move forward suggesting the pleasures of sex to that person, but the spirit part recognising the shame that would bring [so the spirit, though not as dignified as the reason, helps it keep the bodily desires in check]) (Phaedrus, 253d-257b). A human being needs all three, but reason must dominate, and when this happens, then well-being results for the person. Although all three aspects are part of the soul, (what contemporary philosophers would call) the ‘soul’ of this soul is really the logistikon, and whilst in a material body, the logistikon is held back from searching for truth – Plato being famous for describing the soul as imprisoned in the body. So on this view, the reasonable soul is seeking freedom from the confines of the body, in order to return to the forms, but then, being eternal, will end up being re-incarnated in another earthly form, until it has led a suitably philosophic life, at which point it is able to fully jettison thumoeides and epithumetikon, and never come back to earth, remaining with the forms forever.

Although the mature Plato moved beyond the position outlined above, this is the view entailed in the legacy of Platonism. But as stated earlier, this view is very stark in its denigrating of the body, viewing it as part of the evil material world, and so such a view puts forward an unhelpful dualism that sees the soul at odds with the body in the human. It is further unhelpful for Christian theology because of its ‘eschatology’, being in discord with Scripture’s emphasis on personal (as part of the corporate) resurrection at the eschaton.
nature of what it is to be human. And in contrast to what has come to be known as ‘structural’ or ‘essentialist’ understandings of the *imago Dei*, which view humans as in some ways like God ontologically (whether that being possessing an immaterial nature, having a mind, free will, etc.), he is more persuaded by the ‘relational’ view, which sees humanity as the ‘thou’ made to be in relationship with God (the ‘I’) - and in turn to be in relationship with other humans. These further themes, then, of materiality and relationality are added to those of holism and embodiment as important emphases for Yong’s anthropology. With all four of these emphases being grounded in the biblical *imago Dei*, Yong rejects dualistic views and seeks instead for a view of humanity that celebrates these four aspects.

As regards the concept of the human ‘soul’, or ‘spirit’ (concepts and terms he regards as synonymous), Yong is happy to retain that language, but rather than understanding the soul as Christian theology and philosophy has done throughout the centuries as an ontologically distinct, immaterial (and after death, separable), entity from the body, he wants to retain the *biblical* meaning of such. In elaboration of this, he affirmatively cites M. Dahl who states ‘[t]he Hebrew mind never produces anything quite like an abstraction; “soul” and “heart” and “flesh” each mean the totality of man considered from different aspects.’ Yong follows this with his own comment that ‘theologically speaking, the Hebrew soul or heart captures the *totality* of the human person as he or she stands in relationship to God.’

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145 ‘Christian and Buddhist’, 146-47.
147 ‘Christian and Buddhist’, 146-7.
149 *Theology and Down Syndrome*, p.189 (emphasis mine).
So because of his theological work on the *imago Dei*, Yong dismisses dualism and searches for an anthropology that emphasises anthropological holism, embodiment, materiality and relationality.

### 2.1.4.2 Philosophical reasons for rejecting dualism

Yong also has some philosophical problems with dualism. Although the following quote suggests that the theological / philosophical issues are not particularly separable, in it, what he terms as ‘theological’ difficulties with dualism, actually highlight his *philosophical* issues with the position, namely the issue of interaction between immaterial and material substances, and the issue of (the interpretation of the implications of) the neuroscientific data.

From a theological [sic] perspective, substance dualists argue, among other points, that only if human beings are seen as souls with bodies, will it be possible for personal identity to persist in the “between” state prior to the resurrection. Even if we grant this point, the problems here are both the Cartesian one about how the material and immaterial realms relate to each other and the more recent neuroscientific evidence that correlates mental life with cognitive brain states.\(^{150}\)

In a different passage, Yong elaborates his thinking regarding the problem of interaction for a dualist, where (locating the discussion in the debate within the *philosophy of mind* regarding the mind-body problem) he comments

> The mind-body (or mind-brain, or soul-body) problem has persisted for centuries. Various dualisms and monisms have explored how they are related and interact. Dualist conceptualizations – whether supernaturalist, interactionist, Aristotelian-

\(^{150}\) *Theology and Down Syndrome*, p. 170. As Yong is referring to the theological concepts of the ‘soul’ awaiting the time of ‘resurrection’, one can see why Yong uses the term ‘theological’ at the start of this paragraph. But recognising that really the key issue in that first sentence is that of *personal identity* in the period between death and resurrection, more accurately, this is actually *philosophical* territory, further demonstrated by the content of the rest of the paragraph.
Thomist, or Cartesian – are increasingly suspect but provide some explanation for intentionality, the emotions, and top-down / mental causation more difficult to overcome by otherwise.\textsuperscript{151}

In Yong’s mind, how an immaterial substance could interact with a material substance – soul to body – is uncertain and problematic for a substance dualist position, again causing him to look for alternative answers to the mind / soul – body debate, and wanting to distance himself from dualistic positions.

And in furtherance of the problem of the neuroscientific data for dualists, Yong elsewhere comments

...the contemporary neurosciences have certainly shown that mental activities are emergent from and in that sense dependent upon brain and bodily functions. This includes, necessarily, the emotive and affective parts of the body...\textsuperscript{152}

Yong cites Peterson as one who summarises various studies that show how damage to different parts of the brain inhibit and in some cases destroy mental functioning.\textsuperscript{153} Then as further evidence of his contention, quotes Philip Clayton, affirming his comment as correct when observing that results from the cognitive sciences ‘present a clear challenge to those who would rend thought and affect from its physical substratum.’\textsuperscript{154}

So when considering the neuroscience, Yong is of the opinion that any place for a distinct and separable immaterial soul has been invalidated by the neuroscientific findings that highlight that it is brain states which affect mental functioning, personality, spirituality. All

\textsuperscript{151} ‘Christian and Buddhist’, 144 (emphasis mine).
\textsuperscript{152} ‘Christian and Buddhist’, 148.
the things that were traditionally associated with being the work of the immaterial soul, neuroscience is gradually eroding away and showing that these mental states are dependent upon brain functioning.

Added to his theological reasons, these philosophical reasons leave Yong dissatisfied with any form of dualism, and instead lead him to seek for a better anthropological model.

2.1.5 Yong’s own proposal

2.1.5.1 Philosophy of Mind

What becomes evident in his theological constructive work, is that, being primarily a theologian, Yong relies heavily on dialogue partners within the field of the philosophy of mind in order to give him the substance of the related questions in anthropological thinking, concerning the mind-body problem. As seen, in his earlier works, Yong opts primarily for the philosopher Gregory Peterson with some input from Nancey Murphy as his key interlocutors, but then latterly, advances his work by dialoguing with Philip Clayton (philosopher of science, and philosophical theologian) along with, but then moving beyond, Murphy. As thinkers who have written in collaboration with Murphy from further disciplines, Yong further adds insights from psychologists Malcolm Jeeves and Warren Brown to his list of sources. All of these thinkers hold to monistic and emergence theories of mind in some way, however, Murphy, Jeeves and Brown term themselves nonreductive physicalists (that is, they see the mental as genuinely real, allowing for top-down causation,

155 The mind-body question seeks to explain the relationship between a person’s mind – their inner subjective consciousness (or ‘mental states’), and the mind’s body – its bodily matter or (‘physical [particularly, brain] states’).
free will, the appropriation of language, rationality and a first person perspective – none of which can be reduced merely to the physical - but do not see mind as a metaphysically different entity to the body), whereas Clayton prefers the term emergent monist (allowing as he does for the emergence of mind as a distinct metaphysical entity).

Yong (influenced heavily by Peterson) makes clear that he considers the best solution to the mind-body problem to be an emergence view, but one in which the brain, once it reached a certain level of complexity in evolutionary history, gave rise to a radically new property – that of mind (so more than just the nonreductive physicalist account). To reiterate, on this view, mind (or Yong is content to interchange the words, ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ for this) emerges from, and is dependent upon, the brain, but is irreducible to just the physical matter, meaning that the mind genuinely is a new entity (the sum being greater than the parts) that supervenes on the brain. Yong is attracted to this view for a number of reasons (for now remaining with just the philosophical and ‘scientific’): it gives a cogent explanation in

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156 Though if what Hasker argues is correct, it would appear, for the nonreductive physicalist, that this cannot be libertarian free will, but only compatibilist free will. For Hasker, libertarian free will is only possible in the event of a property being given rise to that is genuinely completely independent of its subvenient base, and having causal powers that cannot be explained by causal interactions at the level of the particles (The Emergent Self [New York: Cornell University Press, 1999] p.188). Put another way, he comments ‘If we are to include libertarian free will as an attribute of persons, it seems we shall need to recognize persons, or minds, or souls, as unitary subjects, not analysable as complexes of parts.’ (p.178 [emphasis mine]). (See further, chapter 5 of this thesis).

157 As opposed to reductive physicalists who argue that everything in the world ultimately reduces to simple physics.

158 Peterson prefers the title ‘radical emergentism’ to describe his view, which is closer to Clayton than Murphy (though neither of them are far apart).

159 Arising due to the complexity and arrangement of the brain neurones.

160 ‘Christian and Buddhist Perspectives’, 63, 143-4; Theology and Down Syndrome, p.183.

161 Emergentists commonly use the examples of H2O or a wheel to illustrate emergent properties: an oxygen molecule on its own does not constitute a liquid, but when arranged together with two other hydrogen molecules, the property of liquid emerges, the sum being greater than the parts. Likewise, a single molecule does not have the property of being able to roll, but when combined with other molecules into the complexity of a wheel, the molecules together gain a new kind of property – that of being able to roll. (Cf. R.W. Sperry, ‘A Modified Concept of Consciousness’, Psychological Review 1969 and ‘Mind-brain interaction: Mentalism, yes; dualism, no’ Neuroscience 5.2: 195–206.)

162 The reason for putting the term science in inverted commas, if not evident from the following paragraph will become obvious by the end of chapter 3.
philosophy of mind for the hard problem of consciousness,\textsuperscript{163} it gives grounds for a mind able to exercise top down causation (and hence for free will and moral responsibility),\textsuperscript{164} it retains the elegance and beauty of a monistic understanding of the world,\textsuperscript{165} the latter means it has the associated benefit of not impeding science’s operating according to its methodological naturalism,\textsuperscript{166} and (particularly important for Yong) it is consistent with contemporary neurosciences that ‘have certainly shown that mental activities are emergent from and in that sense dependent upon brain and bodily functions.’\textsuperscript{167}

Quite clearly, it is the ‘scientific’ aspect of the position that is of much appeal for Yong, and though the scientific basis he gives for both a bottom-up, yet top down, causation ‘evolves’ from the time of his writing ‘Christian and Buddhist Perspectives’ to his later \textit{Spirit of Creation},\textsuperscript{168} that is doubtless part of the appeal of the position for him, that it allows room for the developments in science to strengthen the position over time. As such he identifies closely with Clayton (as opposed to [though sympathetic to] Murphy) in offering the

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Spirit of Creation}, p.62. The ‘hard problem of consciousness’ is a phrase coined by David Chalmers, a neuroscientist and philosopher of mind (of a naturalist persuasion), who, having sought every possible reductive solution to the mind-body problem, concluded that though science could solve ‘the soft problem of consciousness’ (that is, the problem studious neuroscientists are going to have in studying and mapping the brain and its $10^{12}$ neurons and $10^{14}$ neural connections), it could go no way to solving the ‘hard problem of consciousness’. That is, once all that work of the ‘soft problem’ has been achieved, it still leaves the problem of how to explain a person’s inner subjective mental life, their ‘qualia’ – that being their first person experience of what it is like to be them (D. Chalmers, \textit{The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory} [New York: Oxford University Press, 1996] pp.24-5) (Chalmers, though still a naturalist, has moved to a form of ‘naturalistic dualism’ and subsequently, further to a panpsychist position.) See also T. Nagel’s novel ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, \textit{The Philosophical Review} 83 (1974): 433-50 for a different slant on the question.

\textsuperscript{164} ‘Christian and Buddhist Perspectives’, 148-50; \textit{Spirit of Creation}, pp.58-61. These first two points also give (philosophical) critique of reductive physicalism for Yong, particularly the point about top down causation, in that rather than being purely the result of an unguided neo-darwinian process, which at best gives rise to epiphenomenalism (the view that mental states are merely a bi-product of evolutionary theory and as such have no causative influence on the brain), an emergent mind means the escaping of biological and social determinism in exchange for free will.


\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Spirit of Creation}, p.61.

\textsuperscript{167} ‘Christian and Buddhist Perspectives’, 148.

\textsuperscript{168} Compare the development from ‘Christian and Buddhist Perspectives’, 148-50 to \textit{Spirit of Creation} pp.59-60.
emergentist position as one that, though never being scientifically confirmable (science is always progressing), yet serves as a substantial metaphysical position that allows for ongoing and fruitful empirical research. And not just this aspect, but in fact the whole of Philip Clayton’s model appeals to Yong, and is (of all the interlocutors Yong dialogues with) the one that has the most influence on his thinking. As such, he follows Clayton’s emergent monistic basis most closely in constructing his own theological anthropology.

Once having resolved the question of the mind-body problem by opting for the emergence solution, the position also brings Yong theological benefits, Yong seeing the advantages of the emergence theory of mind (/ soul / spirit) as the following: The view allows for the recognition that the human brain and body are essential features of human identity (apart from which consciousness and self-consciousness are impossible), it gives a holistic emphasis to human nature – underlining embodiment, environmental / social situatedness, and spiritual relationality, and it plays into the eschatological scriptural emphasis of the resurrection of the body. As a theologian seeking an anthropology that emphasises holism, embodiment, materiality, and relationality, Yong sees potential for all of these aspects in emergence theory, and finds himself attracted to the position. And remembering that Yong favours Clayton’s brand of emergent monism specifically, he goes onto construct his own theological anthropology on Clayton’s emergent monist model.

2.1.5.2 Clayton’s model

In elaboration of this model Yong is most drawn to, Clayton advocates a monistic picture of the world, but his emergent monism is a unique variety that advances an ‘ontological

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170 Theology and Down Syndrome, p.171.
Clayton thinks that there are many differing levels of emergence that have appeared through the history of the world, which, although differing in degree or ‘strength’ (there being ‘stronger’ levels [such as those that happen at the biological level] and ‘weaker’ levels [such as those that occur at the physical and chemical level]), all share common traits and could be grouped under an emergence ‘family resemblance’. For Clayton, these common traits they share are: the higher level’s emerging at a later time in natural history to, and being dependent upon, its lower level it supervenes upon; the higher level emerging due to a sufficient amount of complexity at the lower level (meaning one could possibly predict the emergence of a higher level based on knowledge of the lower [even if the relationship between those levels and the exact nature of the higher would be uncertain]); and the higher level, though emerging from the lower, being non-reducible to (in a metaphysical, causal, explanatory ontological sense of ‘reduction’) its lower level.

So the key distinctive in Clayton’s emergent monistic view is the ontological (emergentist) pluralism he derives from Morowitz, but which he underlines with the monism that he espouses. This distinctive acknowledged, Clayton still shares much in common with Murphy’s and other emergentists’ thinking regarding the top level of his ontology – the emergence of mind. He shares Murphy’s emphasis on downward causation as integral to the model, and he likewise views the emergence solution to the mind-body problem as superior to the other contenders (such as dualism) because it can give a suitable account for the neuroscientific data that demonstrates mental states as being dependent upon brain

174 Clayton, *Mind and Emergence*, pp.61, 66, 80-84.
states.\textsuperscript{175} So in many ways his view is similar to other emergentists’ thinking. Yet as previously stated, he both makes clear he believes in a \textit{metaphysically distinct} emergent mind, and that his emergent monistic theory is his unique version which factors in an \textit{ontological pluralism}, grounded in the philosophical monism he embraces.

\textbf{2.1.5.3 What Clayton gives Yong (and Yong offers Clayton)}

Yong prefers Clayton’s particular branch of emergentism because it retains the benefits of Murphy’s project (in providing an emergentist framework that encourages scientific research, and [Clayton’s] though itself being a metaphysical hypothesis, is one that is falsifiable by science), but further advances Yong’s \textit{theological} project. Remembering Yong’s ‘many tongues’ theological hermeneutic, drawing on an ‘emergent universe’ with many different levels of emergence, Yong advances the idea of science itself being a ‘many tongues’ discipline which (operating within Yong’s \textit{wider} theological hermeneutic) needs to draw upon the insights from all of its disciplines to discover truth. Yong is then able to take Clayton’s work a theological step further, offering Clayton a ‘pneumatological assist’, arguing that Clayton’s work is happily theologised through recognising the immanent presence of the Spirit in creation, the Spirit who is the author of, and vitalises those many tongues of science. Applied at the level of anthropology, Yong appreciates the nature of Clayton’s work as that that requires all the disciplines of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology etc. to fully explicate the nature of a human. But he also appreciates the embodiment and dependence of mind upon the body on his model, which accentuate the holistic view of a human – something consistent with modern theological positions that are emphasising embodiment and materiality. Finally, the scientific model that Clayton

\textsuperscript{175} Clayton, \textit{Mind and Emergence}, pp.120-123.
proposes also has the benefit for Yong of advancing an indeterminate quantum view of the sciences – one which allows room at the micro level for the interaction, not just of creaturely mind, but for God as well, in the creation (paving the way for his teleological divine action theory [which he seeks to advance throughout his The Spirit of Creation\textsuperscript{176}]).

2.1.5.4 Biblical support for the Emergent Monist anthropology

As well as seeking to build his anthropology from his understanding of the science and philosophy, Yong gives a level of exegetical support for his model, exegesis that is integral to making Clayton’s proposal his own, and which allows him to advance his own theological anthropological model. The way Yong proceeds in carrying this out (doing something similar in his earlier Zygon article, but there he theologises a more generic supervenience theory of mind\textsuperscript{177}), is by theologising and supplementing Clayton’s proposal by means of exegesis of the creation accounts in Genesis 1 and 2, and specifically by what he calls a ‘canonical-pneumatological’ reading of those narratives.\textsuperscript{178} By ‘canonical-pneumatological’ Yong means a reading of the accounts which interprets the Genesis chapters on their own terms, but allows the teaching of later passages of Scripture to help bring out the implicit pneumatological colour of these creation accounts. Such an approach means that Clayton’s insights from science and the philosophy of mind are put into the framework of a pneumatological doctrine of creation, which has the effect of furthering Yong’s Pentecostal ‘one and the many’ methodology, viewing the ‘many tongues’ of the differing (emergent) scientific disciplines as all flowing from the authorship of the one Spirit in creation.

\textsuperscript{176} See all of, but particularly chapters 3 and 4 in Spirit of Creation.
\textsuperscript{177} Yong, ‘Christian and Buddhist Perspectives’, 145-50.
\textsuperscript{178} The ‘canonical-pneumatological’ hermeneutic is his own description of his approach (Spirit of Creation, pp.152-63) but acknowledges Warren Gage’s work (The Gospel of Genesis: Studies in Protology and Eschatology [Winona Lake, Indiana: Carpenter Books, 1984]) as part of the inspiration for such an approach.
In his exegesis (and work generally), Genesis 1:2 is particularly important for Yong, for two reasons: firstly because of the identity of the *ruach Elohim*, and secondly because of what the *ruach Elohim* does in this verse. In terms of identity, although *ruach Elohim* here can be translated “‘wind’, ‘breath’, or even ‘storm’ of God’, it is most commonly translated as “‘Spirit’ of God’ – Yong identifying this as the Holy Spirit. And in terms of the Spirit’s role in this verse, the Spirit is ‘hovering’ over the waters of creation, the word ‘hovering’ being the same word used for when a hen ‘broods over’ her eggs, so the Spirit’s ‘brooding over’ in creation is the Spirit’s work in bringing about, warming – giving life to creation.  

Interpreting Genesis 1:2 as a ‘bookend’ to the creation narrative with its opposite bookend as the creation of man in Genesis 2:7, Yong views the *ruach Elohim* as actively working to bring about all elements of creation. He argues that throughout chapter 1 and into chapter 2, it is s/he (the Spirit) who divides, defines, differentiates between sea, sky and land, gives breath (*nephesh*) to all the living creatures in Genesis (cf.1:30); indeed, Yong sees the ‘breather’ of the words of creation on each day (saying ‘let there be...’) as being the Spirit him/herself. So as an over-arching summary of his understanding of creation, Yong is very affirmative of Jay McDaniel who describes creation as being ‘en-spirited by God.’

When it comes to relating his exegesis to Clayton’s project, Yong argues that the Spirit’s brooding over the primordial waters is what/who gave birth to the first level of Clayton’s ‘emergent universe’ - the primary level of physics. This same Spirit providentially guided all

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179 It is doubtlessly partially because of this picture of a hen brooding that Yong opts to give the Holy Spirit the pronoun ‘she’. *Spirit of Creation*, p.172.
180 Yong, ‘Christian and Buddhist Perspectives’, 146, *Theology and Down Syndrome*, p.181, *Spirit of Creation*, pp.152-6. His canonical approach leads Yong to draw upon Psalm 33:6 (‘By the word of the LORD the heavens were made, and all their host by the breath of his mouth’) and Ps 104:29-30 (‘When you hide your face, they [the animals] are dismayed; when you take away their breath, they die and return to their dust. When you send forth your spirit, they are created; and you renew the face of the ground) to support such a reading.
the subsequent levels of emergence in the pluralistic universe it now is – arguing that

Genesis 1 gives hints of God creating an earth that itself was able to create (e.g. the ‘let the earth *put forth* vegetation’, ‘let the waters bring forth living creatures of every kind’), so Yong thinks the world was created to ‘co-create’ (along with God [not allowing the deistic approach]), which in turn gave rise to ensuing levels of emergence.\(^\text{182}\)

Of particular interest is what Yong has to say about the creation of humanity in Genesis 1:26-28 and 2:7. In one sense, Yong is very clear that *hā ādām* (what he sees as generic humanity [as opposed to initially male Adam, later followed by female Eve in 2:18ff]) is part of, and similar to the rest of creation. According to Genesis 2:7 *hā ādām* is literally of the earth and made of dust - and so there is a close biological relationship between humans and the rest of the animal world. However, in another sense, the pneumatological breath of life that *hā ādām* is given in Genesis 2:7, and the specific aspects of being made in the image of God, distinguish humankind considerably from the rest of creation. Yong elaborates the latter arguing that Genesis 1:26-28 underline humanity’s (special) creation in relation to God (being made in his image and likeness), their having an extra element of relationality in terms of their horizontal relationships with one another,\(^\text{183}\) and their being given the specific task of caring for and ruling over the rest of creation (a task which, volitionally, is open to them to fulfil and obey or refuse to carry out).\(^\text{184}\)

In terms of Genesis 2 and Clayton’s project, Yong sees emergence theory as at least consistent with Genesis 2:7, and in fact argues that emergence theory helps to bring out the

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\(^{182}\) *Spirit of Creation*, p.158. It should be noted at this point that Yong is in full agreement with all contemporary science e.g. big bang cosmology, neo-darwinian theory etc. He does not read Genesis 1 and 2 as (what he calls) a ‘literal-historical’ account of creation, rather he sees it as an account written to combat ancient Near Eastern cosmogenies (p.152).

\(^{183}\) Yong follows the Barthian view that to be made male and female is a significant part of their being created in God’s image.

\(^{184}\) Yong, ‘Christian and Buddhist Perspectives’, 146-7.
nature of what is happening in this verse. For Yong (and Clayton), humanity is the final (to date) step in the emergent universe, the emergence of the human mind / spirit being what distinguishes humanity from the rest of the animal kingdom. This emergence of the human spirit is partially explicated by Genesis 2:7 by way of the Spirit’s breathing life into the dust of ha ādām; Yong’s philosophising of the verse suggesting the passage’s acknowledgement that the human mind / spirit is dependent on, and interconnected with its material substrate – its physical / earthly matter, yet suggesting that human consciousness and self-awareness which differentiate humanity from all other creatures, (is part of what) derives from the Spirit’s breathing life into ha ādām.185

In this sense, Yong sees the creation of humanity as fitting very naturally into his overall canonical-pneumatological reading of Genesis 1-2, seeing humans as ‘dust–enspired beings.’ Yong thinks that this reading has the further advantage of being more in accord with a holistic Hebraic understanding of a person (favoured in current contemporary theology) instead of following the traditional Platonist / Cartesian readings,186 and affirmatively cites Claus Westermann’s conclusion that “The person as a living being is to be understood as a whole and any idea that one is made up of body and soul is ruled out.”187 This holistic Hebraic understanding Yong regards as the direction in which contemporary biblical studies is pointing, and at the end of his exegetical foray in ‘Christian and Buddhist Perspectives’ further points to the work of Joel Green as a contemporary, currently seeking

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185 Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, p.183 and Spirit of Creation, p.159. Again, Yong would want to say that this is not a literal-historical piece of literature that he is exegeting, it is in some ways symbolic, allowing room for his interpretation.
186 That define humans as disembodied souls but devalue the body.
to apply this holistic Hebrew worldview to theological anthropology from his biblical studies starting point.\footnote{188}

\subsection*{2.1.5.5 Summary of Yong’s constructive proposal}

In sum, Yong is attracted to emergence theory. Valuing initially Murphy’s version of it, due to the scientific benefits he sees it giving, he moves from that as a building block onto Clayton’s emergent monist proposal, appreciating the metaphysical thesis Clayton advances. Recognising the theological potential of the emergent universe Clayton advocates, Yong then takes Clayton’s idea, and adopts it into his Pentecostal ‘many tongues’ approach and theologises Clayton’s emergent monist idea, showing how exegesis from Genesis 1 and 2 could further support his findings. This gives Yong an anthropology that he regards as consistent with, and drawing upon as much of, the sciences as possible, which is a valid answer to the mind-body problem, but can also be theologically injected pneumatologically (and supported biblically) to give him his own Pentecostal theological anthropology.

\section*{2.2 Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen}

\subsection*{2.2.1 Introducing Kärkkäinen as a thinker and his theological anthropological work}

The second Pentecostal thinker, who has gone in a (very) similar direction to Amos Yong in his anthropology and doctrine of human constitution, is Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen. Like Yong, Kärkkäinen is also a professor at Fuller Theological Seminary - himself being that of

Systematic Theology. Though not considering the doctrine quite as extensively as Yong (reflected in the length of the following exposition), the work in which he does consider the doctrine is significant, due to his being the latest Pentecostal thinker to have written thoroughly on the subject of constitution (in 2015) so being the most recent voice to be added to the Pentecostal trajectory. Identifying Kärkkäinen as ‘Pentecostal’ might be viewed as slightly contentious by some; in recent times, he has opted to re-designate himself ‘Lutheran’, in slight difference to his Classical Pentecostal heritage. Some of the Lutheran-coloured influence of Pannenberg certainly comes out in his recent work and approach, and Kärkkäinen has been working recently with Lutherans in a pastoral setting (giving some understanding as to why he might re-designate himself such). But given Classical Pentecostalism is his home tradition, his devotional experience of the Spirit, the articles he has authored for Pentecostal scholarly journals, and his recent editing and contributing to Pentecostal scholarly compendiums, to continue identifying him as

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190 In his ‘A Review of Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen’s Pneumatology: The Holy Spirit in Ecumenical, International, and Contextual Perspective’ (*Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 12.1 [2003]: 3-8) Pinnock comments ‘I would say this man is personally a charismatic. Who else would know about and cite our beloved Gordon Fee and Roger Stronstad among many others, and who else would so evidently understand existentially what it means to be filled with the power of God? I would say that he understands these texts from the inside. Perhaps he will tell us in his response.’ (p.5). In response, Kärkkäinen replies affirmatively (having identified his home tradition) commenting ‘Professor Pinnock was right in reading between the lines: I have personal experience of the Spirit’ (p.10 of “Surveying the Land” ibid.)


Pentecostal (in the ‘Renewal’ sense defined in the introduction and used through this thesis) seems legitimate.\textsuperscript{193}

As a constructive thinker, his anthropology is laid out most fully in volume 3 ‘Creation and Humanity’ of his \textit{A Constructive Christian Theology for the Church in the Pluralistic World},\textsuperscript{194} in a chapter he entitles ‘Multidimensional Monism’. Before turning to this chapter, again his overall theological method and its approach to anthropology will be summarised, which will help illumine why he makes the anthropological claims he does, and why he is attracted to the view of constitution he is.

2.2.2 Kärkkäinen’s Theological Method

Kärkkäinen’s systematic (or as he prefers, ‘constructive’) theology espouses a high view of Scripture, but (unlike many of the thinkers in the previous chapter) rather than simply systematising all the biblical texts he can find on an issue to produce a doctrine, Kärkkäinen’s approach is a lot more nuanced, recognising the contextual nature of all theology, and identifying that his context is the ‘post’ world i.e. a postmodern, postfoundational, poststructuralist, postcolonial, postmetaphysical, postpropositional, postliberal, postconservative, postsecular and post-Christian world.\textsuperscript{195} Though not committing himself to all of these philosophical ideologies, as a theologian working within this academic atmosphere, much of his theologising is effected by this context and the associated ‘post’ philosophical ideology, as will be seen below in his anthropology. And as

\textsuperscript{193} Pairing that adjective with ‘Lutheran’ as the noun would seemingly be accurate, designating him as a ‘Pentecostal Lutheran’.

\textsuperscript{194} V.M. Kärkkäinen, \textit{Creation and Humanity}, vol. 3 of \textit{A Constructive Christian Theology for the Church in the Pluralistic World} (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015).

has already been mentioned, he is also very much influenced in his theology, by the Lutheran, Pannenberg.

As a clear admirer of Pannenberg, Kärkkäinen adopts his coherentist approach to truth, viewing it as a web that is continually being built (truth as historical is constantly evolving [as opposed to being something continually to be discovered]), and has an eye to the eschaton when the full web (or network) of knowledge will be realised. For Kärkkäinen, constructive theology is one of many different disciplines contributing to the web (or to use Pannenberg’s description, ‘the Science of God’) meaning Kärkkäinen is keen to draw on not just all the theological disciplines to inform his constructive theology,¹⁹⁶ but also the non-theological disciplines such as natural sciences, cultural studies - and even other religious faiths, in order that his contribution to that web is informed by those disciplines that are contributing to it in other senses. Related to this, he takes a post-foundationalist attitude to epistemology, seeing knowledge both as tradition-rooted, and as that done from a particular historical, cultural and ideological context. With this being the case, though genuinely able to contribute to the web of truth, he argues that knowledge is coloured by the location in which it arises, is fallible, and needs to be regarded with humility with appreciation for what can be learned from others outside of the tradition and context from which it has arisen. So he aims, in his work, for his constructive/systematic theology to be

An integrative discipline that continuously searches for a coherent balanced understanding of Christian truth and faith in light of Christian tradition (biblical and historical), and, in the context of historical and contemporary thought, cultures, and living faiths...aims at a coherent, inclusive, dialogical, and hospitable vision.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ I.e. the disciplines of biblical studies, church history and historical theology, philosophical theology and ministerial studies – plus also religious studies, ethics and missiology.
¹⁹⁷ Kärkkäinen, *Creation and Humanity*, p.1
2.2.3 Application of Kärkkäinen’s method to his (theological) anthropology

Already, the philosophical and theological colours in Kärkkäinen’s approach are quite obvious, but are revealed more when considering specifically his anthropology.

Having considered ‘the loss of self’ through history to the postmodern age - in a section of a chapter entitled ‘The Constitution of the Self and the Image of God’ - Kärkkäinen considers the goal of theological anthropology to be

A robustly God-referential holistic and communion-driven account [of the self – bisecting modernism and postmodernism’s short-fallings] based on Trinitarian resources...[in which] rationality, physicality, emotions, and sociality all play key roles particularly when the deepest biblical intuitions are rediscovered and put in conversation with current neurological, behavioural and other scientific fields of study, all done with a willingness to learn from theologies of the Global South and female theologians and other liberationists.198

In a paragraph, this makes clear that the ‘post’ world ideology he mentions above is one he not only works in, but embraces much of as his own, and it appears specifically the ‘postmetaphysical’ philosophy that has bearings on his constitutional anthropology.199

2.2.4 Kärkkäinen’s rejection of dualism

Showing a distrust of traditional ‘substance metaphysics’ in his chapter entitled “Multidimensional Monism: The Nature of Human Nature”,200 it is not surprising that any talk of (substance) dualism is anathema for Kärkkäinen, seeing any view of a separable soul and body as falling foul of his anthropological goal articulated above. In a quote displaying

198 Ibid., p.274.
199 Like the other ‘posts’, it appears that Kärkkäinen is not ‘anti’ metaphysics, rather, not wanting to be constrained by traditional models of metaphysics.
200 Although as a theologian, Kärkkäinen clearly has to have some place for metaphysics in his work, his distaste for traditional substance ontologies and metaphysics is strongly implied in polemical comments such as ‘...dynamic relationality has replaced the hegemony of a static substance ontology.’ (p.290) and ‘It seems to me the Thomistic view...has by and large funded substance ontology (p.338).
his historical understanding of the growth (and demise) of dualism through the ages, his attitude towards the position becomes evident:

‘While the shift toward a unified, monist, and holistic view [in the present] is usually attributed to changes in philosophy and particularly (neuro)sciences, Pannenberg reminds us that the shift is “in line with the intentions of the earliest Christian anthropology.” [ST 2:182] Too often the investigation into the history of the body-soul relationship ignores the fact that, unlike Platonism (which by the end of the second century had become the dominant philosophy), important early patristic thinkers defended the psychosomatic unity even when they continued distinguishing between body and soul (spirit). However, that attempt to hold on to the idea of body-soul unity soon gave way to dualism for the simple reason that, in keeping with the times, even those theologians who championed the psychosomatic unity did not thereby reject the idea of soul as an independent entity.’\textsuperscript{201}

2.2.4.1 Theological reasons for rejecting dualism

Theologically, Kärkkäinen states five reasons for rejecting dualistic understandings of human beings. Firstly, substance dualist views locate human uniqueness specifically in the (self-conscious) soul. Similarly to Yong, Kärkkäinen finds this problematic because it downplays the place of the body in human identity. But going beyond Yong, and leading into his second objection to dualism, he views the emphasis on the soul, and particularly the ‘rational’ (intellectual) soul as a further problem with dualism. In Kärkkäinen’s mind, such an emphasis on the ‘rational’ soul could overemphasise intellect in society, meaning that (and here seemingly presuming a Platonist view of dualism) a “higher” class of person could be associated with the ‘soul’ (hence be viewed as superior) whereas a lesser educated class of person would be associated with the ‘physical’ (hence inferior). He is fearful that such

\textsuperscript{201} Creation and Humanity, p.309. Note, Kärkkäinen (like Yong) is also content to use the terms ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ synonymously (as indeed he is the term ‘mind’).
dualisms could potentially be used as a means of legitimising all kinds of oppression e.g. racism because of the “hierarchical” view of the soul-body relationship he sees (for instance) in Barth’s anthropology.202

Thirdly, whereas Genesis 2:7 attributes the breath of life breathed into the human as being the ruach of God, dualistic views (and even [specifically?] the Thomistic view) regard such a verse as referring to a ‘soul’ being inserted into the human, which instead does the work of animating the body. Kärkkäinen highlights this as an eisegetical move (which in other literature is often blamed on Philo), and instead wants to maintain that ‘The existence of human life (Job 23:14-15) – along with all life of all creation (Ps 104:29-30) – is the function of the life-giving force of the divine Spirit.’203 His fourth reason for rejecting dualism is very closely related to his first, in that he thinks it downplays the body, emotions and passions, and his fifth reason is that dualism runs contrary to contemporary neuroscientific findings.

In discussions of the neuroscientific research, that monists assert disqualify dualistic understandings of human constitution, two particular stories are regularly given to make the case against dualism, along with certain neuroscientific findings that demonstrate particular brain states occurring when the mental states (traditionally associated with the soul) are being experienced by the subject. As Yong does not cite what neuroscientific evidence he is referring to, but Kärkkäinen cites the classic stories and findings succinctly, to illustrate Yong and Kärkkäinen’s neuroscientific objection, Kärkkäinen’s summaries of the evidence will be cited.

...in the nineteenth century it took dramatic events such as the oft-referred-to Phineas Gage instance to wake up society to the tight link between the brain and

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202 Ibid., p.315.
203 Ibid., p.315.
human behaviour. In 1948 an explosion caused a tamping iron to pierce the skull, exiting from the top of the head, of this twenty-five-year-old New England railroad worker. This led to a serious change in his personality, making this once stable person emotionally and socially bankrupt – yet without any visible effects at all! The obvious lesson from this poor rail worker’s incident is simply that brains and neurons have much to do with emotions, sociality, and thoughts.\textsuperscript{204}

A recent counterpart to Gage is the widely reported instance of the school teacher in the U.S. state of Virginia in 2000. He was caught collecting and using child pornography, facilitating prostitution, and molesting a child. Having had his brain examined before criminal sentencing, he was diagnosed with a tumor in the right orbitofrontal lobe, routinely associated with moral-knowledge acquisition and social integration. Upon removal of the tumor, the teacher’s behaviour returned to normal – but amazingly, after a couple of years, the immoral traits returned, and the reason was the return of the tumor.\textsuperscript{205}

More recently rapid developments in experimental psychology, comparative neuropsychology, and brain-imaging techniques have yielded an amazing array of results, insights, and information about the deep and wide connections between the brain and human behaviour at all levels...there is no denying the tight link between the functioning of the brain and human behaviour. ...certain regions or systems have been shown to be linked with particular mental and physical activities, such as memory functions [the case of London taxi drivers’ brains is often cited at this point, brains which, having had to memorise multiple roots as a prerequisite for being a black cab driver, exhibit a certain shaping different to those who have not had to memorise such information], or error detection and compensation...[but] Not only behavioural, cognitive, and emotional functioning...[and moral decision-making activities, but also] spiritual and religious activities [such as] charismatic Christians’ glossolalia (speaking in tongues), or Tibetan Buddhist meditation, or Franciscan nuns’

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., p.317.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., pp.318-19.
silent prayer, or Carmelite nuns’ mystical experiences with God [have been empirically demonstrated, and the correlations in the brain, mapped].

In light of neuroscientific data such as this, and the demonstrated dependence on the brain for a person’s mental functioning, Kärkkäinen, Yong (and other monists) reject dualism of any sort as being falsified by such neuroscience.

2.2.4.2 Philosophical reasons for rejecting dualism

Kärkkäinen’s classifying the objection from neuroscientific findings as a ‘theological’ objection is curious, and will receive further comment later on, but a further philosophical objection he raises to dualism is (again, like Yong) the issue of interaction between an immaterial soul and a material body.

...Cartesian dualism (or any other form of dualism, for that matter) is not saved from the problem of mental causation; its challenge is just different from other theories. Ironically, the mind’s capacity to work on matter / the physical had become a major problem with the rise of modern science as hylomorphism was left behind...

Kärkkäinen phrases this in the past tense as he is again handling the issue in historical perspective, but still retains it as a problem for (if not hylomorpic / Thomistic dualisms) Cartesian dualism(s). How can an immaterial substance interact with a material substance? For Kärkkäinen, he sees there being no suitable answer from a dualist’s perspective and so finds it another problem with the position.

2.2.5 Kärkkäinen’s own proposal

Instead of dualism, Kärkkäinen looks to contemporary philosophers of mind to find an alternative conception of human nature. He builds off Nancey Murphy and Warren Brown’s

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206 Ibid., pp.318-19.
207 Ibid., p.314.
nonreductive physicalist models to finally arrive at his own ‘multidimensional monism’, an idea very much in line with the ‘emergent holism’ of Ted Peters, ‘emergent monism’ being a label (as seen, deriving from Philip Clayton) he also feels comfortable with.\textsuperscript{208} Although critical of some aspects of Murphy’s project, he values the physical nature of the human on her account, and how hers gives a decent account of the neuroscientific findings. But he recognises the thorns for nonreductive physical thinking concerning the mind and brain, namely the intentionality (that is, ‘aboutness’ / ‘object-directedness’) of certain mental states, the notion of ‘qualia’ (what it is like for me to experience X), and the inconsistency physicalism(s) poses for theological thinking (namely theology can only view the physical as the \textit{penultimate} explanation as opposed to God – spirit – being the ultimate explanation).\textsuperscript{209} So because of these problems with the position, he finally moves from nonreductive physicalism to (Clayton’s) emergent monism.

Emergent monism is attractive to Kärkkäinen because it allows him to keep the emphasis on the physical, but, regarding (as he does) the reality of consciousness as being so other to the physical realm, also allows him to affirm that the mind has to be something metaphysically different to the brain.\textsuperscript{210} It likewise means his difficulty with ultimate explanations is loosened in that emergent monism does not force him to say that the physical explanation is the ultimate in the universe, because (though monistic) God can be appealed to as the ultimate explanation for occurrences in the monistic universe he created. Further, having different levels in his ontology also gives grounds for him thinking that different levels of understanding can be brought when explaining the world, so rather than thinking that

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid., p.341.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., pp.329-31.
\textsuperscript{210} On the model, the mind emerged at some point in human history, and as a mental property, supervenes on the brain. However, the relationship between brain and mental states is not \textit{identity} type, but \textit{token} type, namely different mental states can arise from the same brain states due to different social, environmental and historical contexts. This he calls ‘multiple realizability’. (pp.322-24).
physics has to give the only natural explanation (and God the spiritual), other scientific explanations such as biology, chemistry, psychology etc. can be employed to fill out our understanding of the universe and people – hence employing the term “Multidimensional Monism” for his anthropological position. With his integrative approach to theology, drawing upon neuroscience, and wanting to give space to the other scientific disciplines in his methodology (amongst others), one can see why such a position is appealing, and through his ventures into the philosophy of mind, he feels he has obtained a strong view of human nature. As regards his theologising of such a project, he looks to the biblical studies of Joel B. Green, but also to those of N.T. Wright for exegetical support for his position.

Drawing upon Wright’s proposal that Paul presents the person in his letters as a ‘differentiated unity’ (using different anthropological terms e.g. ‘mind’, ‘heart’, ‘soul’, ‘spirit’ as emphasising different facets, but of the one person), or as ‘many aspects, one single reality’, when added to his preferred model in the philosophy of mind, one can see how Kärkkäinen has gone the further step to term his position ‘multidimensional monism.’

As regards the ‘soul’, terminologically, because the word has such an established history in the Christian (and non-Christian) tradition(s), despite having a real dislike for the concept as he understands it, Kärkkäinen thinks the word should be retained because of its wide use in Scripture, and the benefit it has for interfaith consideration. However, he thinks theologians should redefine the word to mean the whole person - it being a functional way of referring to that whole person (similar to Dunn’s [the inspiration for N.T. Wright’s ‘differentiated unity’] idea that terms such as heart / mind / body refer to the whole person

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212 Though he would follow Green and Wright in saying that it has a very different meaning to the one it has gained through history.
but emphasising different dimensions of the person), underlining that ‘soul’ does not mean an immortal part of you that has always existed; with this new definition in mind, he thinks theologians should re-educate the laity. Kärkkäinen is also drawn to the idea of using the word ‘spirit’ instead of ‘soul’, but makes very clear that this would not be some kind of substance dualism. Rather, he is attracted towards Karl Rahner’s idea that to speak of a human as spirit could be a way of recognising the deep embodiment of a person, but at the same time highlighting the ‘more-than-physical’ nature of a human, namely that s/he is ‘one who reaches out to the transcendent, even to God.’

The above articulation of Kärkkäinen is clearly shorter than that of Yong, partially because his work is not as extensive as Yong’s, and also because he does not theologise the favoured emergent monist position to the same extent. However, a further reason for briefer overview is simply the recognition that much of what Kärkkäinen proposes is very similar to that of Yong, and so further exposition is unnecessary as the ideas have already been surveyed in the overview of Yong.

2.3 Summary of Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s anthropology and the current place of the trajectory

The above has surveyed Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s anthropology, with specific focus on their understanding of human constitution, and highlighted that their own positions arise in reaction to dualism(s) which they see as facing insurmountable theological and philosophical challenges. In response, they both propose models of human constitution they view as stronger and preferable in light of the theological and philosophical issues. Both

214 Kärkkäinen, Creation and Humanity, p.346.
thinkers are comfortable with terming their models as emergent monist (even if Kärkkäinen finally opts for the title ‘multidimensional monism’).

Having traced the trajectory of Pentecostal thought in chapter 1 from trichotomy, to the dualism the Shrier’s advocate, in the subsequent years, and in light of the above, it is clear that Yong and then Kärkkäinen have gone the next step, to advocating a monistic position. Being the latest-to-date contributions to the Pentecostal scholarly discussion of constitution, this is where current academic Pentecostal writing (temporarily) is, and hence influencing the community; however, are Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s reasons for rejecting dualism as strong as they contend? And is their preferred emergent monist model a better option? Before allowing the trajectory to continue down the monistic path these thinkers are advocating, careful analysis and critique of their contentions is in order.
Chapter 3: Responding to Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s Anthropological Contentions

In the previous chapter, Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s contention that the dualistic view(s) of human constitution is problematic on theological and philosophical grounds was laid out, as was their emergent monist proposals that they contend are better models. In this chapter, these claims will be the central focus, and will be evaluated, along with the other relevant aspects raised in their work from the previous chapter. After initially considering the relationship between the two thinkers, and how their work illumines the ‘field’ in which research concerning human constitution should be carried out, the theological and philosophical reasons that they, and the dialogue partners they rely upon, give for rejecting dualism will be considered. Having considered this first contention, the second, their own emergent monist proposals, will then be considered for how strong philosophically their models are, and how theologically consistent they are with the Pentecostal emphases laid out in the introduction. Having considered both contentions, this will indicate how robust their work on human constitution is.

3.1 The Relationship of Yong’s work to that of Kärkkäinen

What became particularly obvious in the previous chapter is the similarity of the views held by Yong and Kärkkäinen. This is not too surprising given their friendship and collegiality at Fuller Seminary. Indeed, they both draw upon the same dialogue partners, and for the same reasons. Influential as these dialogue partners are, two of whom are also based at Fuller, it is plausible that they came to their positions independently, though it seems more than likely that Yong was also of direct influence in Kärkkäinen’s thinking. But the very close

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216 This suggestion is made all the more plausible when it is recognised that Yong’s influence is definitely evident in Kärkkäinen’s work on the theology of religions. Although having (also) drawn upon dialogue partners outside of the (Classical? [as he appears to have drawn upon the Charismatic, Clark Pinnock’s work])
similarity makes it straightforward in assessing their work because almost all of the major components of their constitutional thinking is the same, and so the two of them can be considered together when considering the two aforementioned contentions. When it comes to assessing their emergent monist proposals, because of this very close likeness in their work, rather than referring to both of their emergent monist proposals (plural), from this point onward, the chapter will refer to their proposal/model in the singular. As seen, Kärkkäinen is content to have his work described with the ‘emergent monist’ title; and, on the few occasions there is minor differentiation between their thinking, the intricacies will be drawn out as and when they arise.

3.2 Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s Methods and the Field of inquiry for investigating human constitution

Much could be said about both Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s methods generally. However, comment will be limited to brief assessment of their approach for considering the doctrine of human constitution specifically. Although both Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s systematic theological methods display a substantial amount of philosophy, when it came to expounding their own proposals of human constitution specifically, it became very clear how important the discipline of philosophy of mind is to their constructing of such a doctrine. As was seen, both were very reliant on thinkers in this area for arriving at the

Pentecostal arena, Kärkkäinen’s affirmative overview of Yong’s work in this area (V.M. Kärkkäinen “Pentecostal Pneumatology of Religions” in The Spirit in the World: Emerging Pentecostal Theologies in Global Contexts, V.M. Kärkkäinen [ed.] [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009] pp.173-5) - specifically ending a chapter in the aforementioned compendium by encouraging ‘Pentecostals of all stripes, along with their mainline counterparts, [to] join hands and minds in Discerning the Spirit(s)’ (p.180) - suggests that Yong’s influence is there in Kärkkäinen’s theology of religions. When this is added to Kärkkäinen’s comment that he himself is likewise seeking to construct a theology of religions through ‘developing a Trinitarian understanding of the Spirit in the world’, this further suggests appreciation, and influence of Yong’s, approach on his work. The fact that they have both written affectionately of one another and each other’s work, as well as being friends and colleagues at Fuller would further the contention that Yong has been of influence in Kärkkäinen’s theological anthropological thinking [see for instance Kärkkäinen’s work cited in previous footnote, and Yong’s ‘Whither Evangelical Theology: The Work of Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen as a case study of Contemporary Trajectories’ Evangelical Review of Theology 30.1 (2006): 60-85)].
constitutional view they did, underlining the degree of philosophy required for properly engaging the issues. As such, rather than the doctrine of human constitution being merely a systematic theological endeavour, it indicates that this is a field further along, being more *philosophical theological* in nature, recognising the substantial degree of philosophy required for thoroughly informing the theology. When coming onto the more constructive nature of the thesis then, it will likewise follow this approach, being philosophical theological in nature, the theology being thoroughly informed by the relevant insights from philosophy – in this case, specifically from the philosophy of mind.

### 3.3 Response to the critiques of dualism

Specific assessment of Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s critiques of dualism will follow – the theological and philosophical intricacies of their various challenges to receive comprehensive analysis. However, right from the beginning, it will be said that all the challenges Yong and Kärkkäinen pose to dualism are on target *only for Platonist and Classic Cartesian dualism(s)*. Although much of their critique levied against dualism is accurate in response to these two (straw men) forms of dualism, there are other, better forms, which their plethora of critiques do not touch. Indeed, any dualism that advocates a more integrated or holistic relationship of the soul and body (or, as Kärkkäinen recognised in the Church Fathers, a more ‘psychosomatic’ unity\(^\text{217}\)) than Platonist and Classic Cartesian dualisms espouse, are untouched by the critiques, and therefore should not be discarded grouped with the straw men. Indeed, better forms of dualism in fact celebrate the emphases that Yong and Kärkkäinen are keen to maintain in their constructive proposing of their own emergent monist view. But as will be seen in more detail, rejecting dualism per se

\(^{217}\) ‘Creation and Humanity’ p.309 cf. p.293.
because of a rejection of two weaker versions, is a fallacy which Yong and Kärkkäinen fall into, which will be highlighted further in the critique. As the chapter progresses, it will be seen that this fallacy appears to have been one they inherited from their key dialogue partners, Green, Murphy and Clayton. As critique of Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s rejection of dualism and (later on) their own proposal follows, the influence of these three thinkers will be illumined, and (particularly) the philosophical mistakes of these three will come to light which have skewed Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s thinking on the issues.

3.3.1 Response to the theological critiques

Yong’s theological reasons for rejecting dualism were based on his work on the imago Dei in the context of Genesis 1 and 2 and the wider Hebraic Scriptures. He dismissed dualism as not giving enough emphasis to the holistic, embodied, material and relational themes he found in the creation narratives. Kärkkäinen rejected dualism because it locates human life and uniqueness (particularly rationality) in the soul, so downplays the body, emotions and passions, which in turn leads to types of hierarchic dualisms (resulting in oppression e.g. sexism, racism etc.). Both thinkers also want to reject dualism ‘theologically’ because of the neuroscientific data, but as will be seen below, this is a category mistake, the objection coming under the banner of ‘philosophical’ challenges to dualism.

Given that Kärkkäinen especially recognises that (psychosomatic) dualism was the position of the early church fathers,²¹⁸ that dualism is the default position of people all over the

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²¹⁸ Ibid., p.309, cf. p.293. Not being able to separate in his mind dualism from Platonist or Cartesian dualism, Kärkkäinen, having identified the soul-body dualism prevalent in both Rabbinic literature (such as the Mishnah and Talmud) as well as in the Christian stream at the time of the Church Fathers, comments ‘This is quite astonishing in light of the accent on embodiment in the Old Testament.’ (See main text below for comment on O.T. anthropology).
world today and throughout the centuries,\(^\text{219}\) and has been the traditional and received Christian position through Church history up until the present,\(^\text{220}\) his quick rejection of dualism is slightly surprising. Indeed, these factors give cause for all theologians to think twice before rejecting the position. But for both Yong and Kärkkäinen, it seems that they have been influenced away from such a position theologically by Joel B. Green, whose exegetical and theological work (as well as philosophical assumptions), appears to underlie their theological objections to dualism.\(^\text{221}\)

### 3.3.1.1 The Influence of Joel Green

Yong favourably references Joel Green in a direction of further exegesis supporting his own embodied ‘holistic’ theological monistic understanding of a person.\(^\text{222}\) And indeed, Kärkkäinen picks up the thread and in his work shows dependence on Green’s exegesis for his own monistic proposal,\(^\text{223}\) his latter pages being populated with reference to Green.\(^\text{224}\)

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221 Even if Green is not the direct influence, the following will suggest that he certainly is a key influence; but the similarity of the ideas, structure and direction of Green’s work in comparison with Yong and Kärkkäinen’s thought (and their references to Green’s work generally) suggest a more direct influence.

222 Yong, ‘Christian and Buddhist’, 147. Cf. chapter 2, fn.188.

223 Kärkkäinen also draws upon N.T. Wright’s anthropology, specifically his conference paper ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body: All for One and One for All, Reflections on Paul’s Anthropology in his Complex Contexts’, paper given at the Society of Christian Philosophers’ Regional Meeting, Fordham University, 18th March 2011, available: [http://ntwrightpage.com/Wright_SCP_MindSpiritSoulBody.htm](http://ntwrightpage.com/Wright_SCP_MindSpiritSoulBody.htm) (accessed 5th June 2016). Although not assessed here, Wright’s paper is having ramifications across both Pentecostalism and Evangelicalism as regards
Because of this, and the apparent influence of him on Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s thinking (whether that influence is direct or more indirect), Green’s general (exegetical) theological anthropology will briefly be expounded. This will be followed by a critique of Green’s work, which, due to the very close similarity of ideas, will likewise entail critique of Yong and Kärkkäinen, which will provide much of the basis for a response to their theological objections to dualism.

As a precursor to the below, Green advises that when speaking of humanity’s nature, the biblical passages often handle the question implicitly, sometimes assuming a certain view of a human person, other times countering alternate views, and at other times implying a view whilst discussing the nature of renewed humanity. For this reason, exegetes need to be careful in proceeding, he warns, but he identifies a few passages that give clues as to the Bible’s view of anthropology.

3.3.1.1.1 Old Testament

Green cites four Old Testament texts which give a feel for the Bible’s anthropology: Psalm 8, Psalm 144, Job 7:17-18, which all have their basis in Genesis 1:26-7. He argues that all four of them give the following basic perspectives of a human: (a) A human person is defined in relational, not essentialist terms (b) has continuity with, but a higher vocation than animals their views on human constitution, but the paper needs careful consideration before adopting his views. What Wright (helpfully) draws attention to in the paper is how the Bible’s use of the term ‘soul’ has different meaning(s) to what current philosophers and many theologians have understood it to mean; however his paper also (like the main thinkers articulated in this chapter) suffers from the mistake of equating dualism and talk of the immaterial soul with Platonist or Classic Cartesian Dualism, plus his original proposal mistakenly confuses the teleological vocation of the imago Dei in Gen 1 with ontological constitution – a category error – making his proposal unhelpful as regards the discussion of constitution. These mistakes need to be highlighted because his work has been drawn upon by other Pentecostal PhD students, who make the same mistakes following Wright, so though not the lead voice for a conservative biblical exegete espousing monism (that title currently going to Green), Pentecostals should be critical when engaging this paper.


because (s/he) (c)bears the image of God, and (d)is seen as a bio-psychospiritual unity.226

Genesis 1:26-27 is the key text here so Green gives greater attention to these two verses as the other passages flow from such a source.

Much of what Green has to say concerning Genesis 1:26-27 (and anthropology generally) appears to be a reaction against the Platonist view(s) of a person, and instead he very much emphasises the relational aspect of being human from the verses. Much of this, it can be gathered, appears to have been influenced by Karl Barth’s exegesis of Gen 1:26-27 in which Barth emphasises the covenantal nature of what is occurring in these verses, underlining that humanity are in relationship with God, in relationship with each other (he made them, male and female he created them), and in relationship with creation (the covenantal setting). As such, to try and maintain an essentialist view of a person (i.e. one that defines a person as a being possessing certain essential faculties [e.g. mind and will]) from these verses, as has been the norm in traditional exegesis, Green views as a major mistake.

Instead he elevates the relational ‘being-in-relation’ view of personhood (a view arguing that humans are inter-related, interconnected beings who find their true personhood in relation with others) as one more persuasively flowing from the text. In a concise summary of the *imago Dei*, he states

> What is this [the *imago Dei*] quality that distinguishes humanity? God’s words affirm the creation of the human family in its relation to himself, as his counterpart, so that the nature of humanity derives from the human family relatedness to God. The concept of the *imago Dei*, then, is fundamentally relational, or covenantal, and takes

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as its ground and focus the graciousness of God’s own covenantal relations with humanity and the rest of creation.227

How this relates to Genesis 2:7 then is that the ‘nephesh’ which God breathes into man is not some unique soul as per Philo’s reading of this verse (and the reading which Green thinks has been passed down ever since in the essentialist tradition), but rather is the same word – nephesh = ‘life-force’ - that he breathes into all the living creatures (cf. Gen 1:30).

Indeed, underlining the interconnectedness of humanity with creation, all animate beings share this same life-force that God breathed into Adam in Genesis 2:7, and are thoroughly dependent on God for life. So drawing this together, he comments

Genesis 1-2 does not locate the singularity of humanity in the human possession of a “soul,” but rather in the human capacity to relate to Yahweh as covenant partner, and to join in companionship within the human family and in relation to the whole cosmos in ways that reflect the covenant love of God.228

With Green’s reading of Genesis (and the corresponding passages from the Psalms and Job) portraying human life in ways centred around bountiful-life-giving-relationship, in contrast, what Green thinks the Old Testament [O.T.] has to say about death is that it is the very opposite. Although arguing the O.T. shows very little interest in the fate of those who have died,229 he acknowledges that it speaks of death in very stark terms, showing that life is marked by finitude, that death is absolute, and that in the realm of the dead, relationship with God is lost. Indeed, re-arguing that the O.T. as a whole defines the human person in relational rather than essentialist terms, he defines death as ‘the cessation of life in all of its

227 Green, Body, p.63.
228 Ibid., p.64.
229 Ibid., p.146.
aspects, and especially the severance of all relationships – relationships with God and with every person and with everything in the cosmos.'\textsuperscript{230}

3.3.1.1.2 New Testament

With regard to the New Testament [N.T.], it becomes apparent that Green often finds himself refuting the popular misconception that the O.T. is monistic in its (Hebrew) anthropology, but because of the Greek influence on the N.T. writers, the N.T. is dualistic.\textsuperscript{231} In response, Green argues that to imagine that the N.T. writers were primarily influenced by a Greek Dualism of their day is to incorrectly imagine that most Greek philosophy was Platonist in some form. In fact, most Greek thought in the first century Roman world was \textit{monistic} in its view of a person, and the popular conception is also wrong-headed in that the primary influence on the N.T. writers was the Hebraic O.T. writings, not Greek influences. He writes ‘In short [concerning the time of the writing of the N.T.], support for body-soul Dualism is minimal,'\textsuperscript{232} and instead argues that, just like the O.T., the N.T. is monistic in its anthropology. Particularly in his work on Luke’s gospel, Green finds this holistic understanding of humanity and salvation played out in numerous stories of when people met Jesus. A dramatic example of this holistic salvation is the story of the Gerasene demoniac (Lk 8:26-39) who, before encountering Jesus was: homeless, naked, lacking human identity, religiously unclean, living among the dead, demonized, uncontrollable and engaged in self-harm; after his encounter, ends up: fully clothed, restored to mental health,

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., p.147.
\textsuperscript{231} A similar objection, but one not to be confused with this, is what theologians regularly advance, that in the \textit{early Church}, under Greek influence, theologians read philosophical positions such as Philo’s \textit{into} their exegesis of Scripture. This is related, but somewhat different to what Green is refuting – a position that suggests that this Greek influence was affecting the content of the New Testament documents \textit{themselves} (as opposed to later understanding of those documents).
liberated from demons, portrayed as a disciple, sent back to his home and community, and
given a vocation to tell others what God had done for him. Green argues that the holistic
nature of humanity and hence salvation is evident across the whole of Luke, but also the
other gospels as well, and should be read with this fully-orbed view of humanity in mind.

3.3.1.2 Critique of Green

It is obvious by this point that much of the content of Yong and Kärkkäinen is very similar to
that of Green, them quite plausibly deriving a lot of their theological anthropology, and
specifically, objections against dualism, from him. This is helpful in some areas, though
problematic in others. But as assessment of Green follows, assessment of Yong’s and
Kärkkäinen’s thinking will naturally be entailed, having so much overlap and similarity as
they do with his work.

The holistic emphasis is very clear in Green’s theology. It appears that, as a specialist in
gospel studies and understanding the holistic nature of salvation described in the gospels,
he willingly accepts the relational understanding of the image of God he finds in the Old
Testament, and extrapolates that to personhood generally. This means that his work
naturally draws out the Hebrew themes of community, relationality, embodiment - all of
which shape a person’s identity and character – and helpfully colours his work giving the
holistic colour that Biblical Studies generally is keen to emphasise. Indeed, (though not
mentioned above), he has found complementary resonances of this in the neurosciences
too, which have shown that, through neuroplasticity, the brain is regularly reshaping itself
bringing about certain behaviours based on the context and practises of the person. 

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233 Joel B. Green, ‘What are Human Beings?’, 3.
234 See J.B. Green, ‘Sacred & Neural’ Lecture given in September 2010 (minute 36.00-47.00), Available:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=4vFrZnsRR20 (accessed 17th July 2014) and Green, Body, pp.115-122.
very helpful material for thinking through a Christian epistemology, and lifestyle. Because of
the above, he therefore sees anything other than monism as very wide of the mark and his
work is almost an apologetic against Platonist dualism, plus what he sees as the associated
essentialist view of a person.

As work standing merely in line with the background of the monistic trend of biblical studies
(to be explicated further in the next chapter), Green’s work might seem solid. But not
recognising, simply assuming, certain philosophical assumptions embedded in that monistic
trend skews Green’s theological thinking in a number of ways.

These are initially difficult to spot because they are embedded among helpful insights such
as his comment that most of Scripture’s anthropology is implicit rather than explicit,
indicating that certain questions concerning biblical anthropology have to be inferred rather
than being taught unambiguously in the text. From this correct assertion, Green derivatively
makes inferences from the 4 major texts in the O.T. (the inferences of a – d cited above235) -
three of which (b, c and d) are helpful. But with the fourth, (a), his comment that Scripture is
‘relational as opposed to essentialist’ in its view of a person seems to be both a false
dichotomy, as well as concluded prematurely; but having made that conclusion, this shapes
the rest of his thinking, particularly that surrounding death (and then eschatology).

Green’s argument for the relational view seems to proceed from the holistic soteriology of
Luke, to that of the gospels generally, to the holistic worldview of the O.T., to the imago Dei
passages (with particular help from Barth and friends), to the conclusion that the Bible is
‘relational’ in its (philosophical) view of a person. One could actually agree with all four of
the premises, but not draw the relational ontology of a person; and regarding the 4th

235 (a)A human person is defined in relational, not essentialist terms (b)has continuity with, but a higher
vocation than animals because s/he (c)bears the image of God, and (d)is seen as a bio-psychospiritual unity.
premise, what Green fails to see is that some kind of ‘essentialist’ understanding of a person is necessary for advocating a relational view, in that a person can only be in (personal) relation with someone if they have certain metaphysical faculties such as mind and will to facilitate such a relationship. Indeed, though Green might be correct at the theological and exegetical level, that the *imago Dei* texts are primarily those referring to covenant, focussing on relationship (and it would also be helpful to add ‘vocation’), such a view cannot be sustained without a stronger philosophical view of a person to underpin it.  

More exegetical work (particularly on the New Testament) will follow in the ensuing chapter, but enough has been said above to note the problems in Green’s anthropology, and therefore Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s. The problems might be summarised as follows:

236 The question of personhood is not one this thesis majors on, due to it not receiving particular attention in the key Pentecostal texts being engaged with. However, it is a significant, related, question due to the implications it has for metaphysics generally, and human constitution specifically. As will be seen in coming chapters, Aquinas’ and Descartes’ views of human constitution assume a substance ontology, inheriting their view of personhood from Boethius who defined a person as ‘an individual substance of a rational nature’ (Boethius, *Liber de Persona et Duabus Naturis*, c.3). This view was then developed through Richard of St. Victor, Aquinas and Scotus, and through until recent times has been received as the standard traditional view, and known as the ‘substance’ view of a person (Boethius drawing upon Aristotle’s definition of a substance as his basis). However, due to a discontent with substance metaphysics, a number of recent thinkers have turned to a more ‘relational’ metaphysics and associated view of a person, defining a person instead as a ‘being/creature-in-relation’. The relational view has particularly been developed by Zizioulas (*Being as Communion* [New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985]) and, as seen in the work of Green, Yong and Kärkkäinen, is favoured amongst some theologians (and philosophers). The theologians in particular are drawn to the view, owing to the relational emphasis of Gen 1:26-28 (humans being made in the image of a relational God) so argue that this is what it is to be a human theologically. Expounding the relational aspect, and drawing attention to the *covenantal* nature of the *imago Dei* texts, Green, is an example of such, but in arguing this *theological* understanding of humanity, he (and representative of other theologians) makes the category mistake of assuming that the theological view of humanity means the relational *philosophical* view of a person is correct. However, whilst recognising that the relational and covenantal *theological* view of a person is very credible, if one is to accept that theological view, one needs to remember that the (‘first person’ – humans here being addressed by God) relationship of Gen 1:26-28 enjoyed between God and humans on this view, actually *presumes* some kind of substance / essentialist view, in that only a being (person) with metaphysical faculties of mind and will can enter into such relationship with God. So though recognising there are insights in the relational view of personhood, and the relational view of the *imago Dei*, they appear to presuppose an essentialist / substance view to allow such (personal) beings to enter into relation. As the argument of the thesis progresses, further reason will be given (and indicated in the conclusion) as to why the ‘being-in-relation’ view is less adequate, and why the traditional substance metaphysics and view of a person is more persuasive.
Firstly, Green, Yong and Kärkkäinen think that because Genesis 1 and 2 is so affirming of creation – and so the Hebraic themes of embodiment, relationality, and materiality – all dualistic forms of constitution have to be dismissed. But this is a mistaken equating of all forms of dualism with either Platonist or Classic Cartesian dualism. Better forms of dualism could happily affirm the relational nature of humanity, their embodied character, and the Hebraic material and holistic view of humanity.

Secondly, though beginning with the *imago Dei* is a helpful place from which to build anthropology, Green, Yong and Kärkkäinen are confusing the Hebraic theological emphases of Genesis 1 and 2, with the *ontological* question of human constitution. Genesis 1 and 2 have much to say about the ‘who’ and ‘why’ (or ‘identity’ and ‘vocation’) of humanity. But these chapters have little (if anything) to say about the ‘what’ and ‘how’. As has been highlighted for instance by Wenham and Walton, Hebrew thinking was interested in *function and identity*, the very emphases of Genesis 1 and 2 (so dualists would be unwise to read constitutional thinking into Genesis 2:7 [though also applying to Yong’s reading emergentist philosophy into the verse in support of his constitutional proposal]). But recognising this, with the chapters having nothing to say about human constitution, this means also that *monism* cannot be concluded, simply because relationship is emphasised. What is being further confused here is functional holism with ontological monism. Although Genesis 1 and 2 teach holism, no ontological anthropology can be gleaned from these chapters (alone). That is not the Hebraic interest of the chapters. Green, Yong and

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238 As the following chapter will further reveal, this misunderstanding is one that J.W. Cooper’s work identifies – seeing it as inherent in much biblical studies thought regarding human constitution through the second half of the 20th century (and into the 21st).
Kärkkäinen are making category errors and confusing identity and vocation with constitution.

So with these key critiques of Green, Yong and Kärkkäinen, Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s theological challenges to dualism are undermined. None of the theological objections Yong or Kärkkäinen (or Green) raise are problematic for a good, holistic or psychosomatic dualism.

### 3.3.2 Response to the philosophical critiques

#### 3.3.2.1 The neuroscience objection

As has been repeatedly noted, Yong and Kärkkäinen want to categorise the neuroscience objection under ‘theological’ objections, or more specifically as a ‘scientific’ objection against dualism. Again, some of this is likely to have come from Green, who makes such an assertion regularly (and has even undertaken graduate studies in neuroscience to inform his theology), but it is an error to categorise the findings of neuroscience as a ‘theological’ objection to dualism, as it is indeed, to categorise it as a ‘scientific’ objection to dualism. Rather, it is only when the neuroscientific findings are philosophically interpreted in a certain manner, that any objection can be raised.

The confusion surrounding the ‘neuroscientific data’ objection again appears to have been fed into Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s thinking via a dialogue partner, this time Nancey Murphy (who also leads Green in this direction). In *Whatever Happened to the Soul?*, Murphy summarises her and her fellow writers’ position in the book in the opening chapter, in which she admits that some form of dualism, historically, has been the predominant view in relation to the mind-body question. But despite this, what she sees as vast numbers of

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philosophers who have examined the issues and come to a physicalist position on the mind-body problem, *combined with the rapid advances in neuroscience which are eroding away any place for a soul in the discussion* (plus recent findings in biblical studies [cf. Green]), have led her and her fellow writers to reject the dualistic position. In a second and more recent article of 2011, Murphy re-affirmed her position saying:

> It is becoming increasingly obvious that the functions once attributed to the soul or mind are better understood as functions of the brain. These developments in neuroscience, along with the judgment that no account can be given of mind-body interaction, have resulted in a near total rejection of dualism in philosophy of mind.

This kind of thinking (suggesting that the issue of interaction was also fed into Yong and Kärkkäinen via the same source) is a mistaken understanding of the findings of neuroscience, but finds itself absorbed into, for example, Yong, where he comments

> ...the contemporary neurosciences have certainly shown that mental activities are emergent from and in that sense dependent upon brain and bodily functions. This includes, necessarily, the emotive and affective parts of the body...

What has been confused here, and indeed in Murphy’s thinking, is the neuroscientific data with the *philosophical interpretation* of such data. Neuroscience has shown that, under ordinary embodied conditions, human mental activity and consciousness is *functionally dependent* upon the brain; one can see the required neurons in the brain firing when a person has a thought, sensation, or exercises her will, for example. But neuroscience has *not*

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241 N. Murphy, ‘Immortality versus resurrection in the Christian tradition’, *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1234.1 (2011): 77. See also Kärkkäinen who contends ‘While in the past, body-soul dualism was assumed to be the default position, in light of the current scientific knowledge, theology has also come to a new appreciation of the fact that “we know conscious and self-conscious life only as bodily life...bodily functions condition all psychological experience.”’ (Kärkkäinen “Multidimensional Monism” p.309, citing Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology* 2:181-82 in inverted commas).
242 ‘Christian and Buddhist’ p.148 (emphasis mine).
shown, and cannot show that mental activities are emergent from the brain.\textsuperscript{243} Emergence is one philosophical interpretation of the neuroscientific data – one of a number of suggestions put forward in the mind-body discussions (in the philosophy of mind) to explain the relationship between mind and body.

Neuroscience is only problematic for dualism if the proponent is advocating a Classic Cartesian position. This is because Descartes was of the opinion that the soul and body were completely separate entities and he thought that the soul was responsible for specific activities such as thinking, desiring, spiritual and moral activity etc. (whereas the body was responsible for activity such as digestion, excretion, respiration etc.) As neuroscience then began to show that all these ‘soulish’ activities have correlated neurons in the brain which a neuroscientist can see firing when a subject for example prays or thinks, then the Classic Cartesian viewpoint found itself in difficulty as the activities traditionally accredited to the soul were eroded away by the evidence that showed such activity occurring in the brain. But no philosopher of mind holds to that classic position today, rather all contemporary dualistic positions take full account of the neuroscientific data, and indeed welcome further findings.\textsuperscript{244} More carefully phrased, such philosophers of mind talk about the evident correlation of mental activity between the mental states and the associated brain states, and a subject is ordinarily dependent on their brain operating normally for their conscious

\textsuperscript{243} Nor can neuroscience show that mental events are identical to brain events.
\textsuperscript{244} Due to the overly hasty advancing of the neuroscience as an objection to the soul, it may be helpful to draw attention to the well-known neurologists whose work has actually helped them arrive at dualistic positions. Wilder Penfield (arguably the father of modern neuroscience) discovered that, though he was able to stimulate numerous patients’ brains in order to make them raise their arms, the patient would always say that it was Penfield who was making them do this - that they, the subject, did not choose to. After an exhaustive study of the cerebral cortex, this led Penfield to conclude that ‘there is no place in the cerebral cortex where electrode stimulation will cause a patient...to decide.’ W. Penfield, \textit{The Mystery of the Mind} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) p.77. Similarly, John Eccles – nobel laureate for his work in brain science – also came to a dualistic conclusion and famously came to describe the interaction of mind and brain as being like that of a pianist to a piano. (See for example his dialogue with Karl Popper, K. Popper and J.C. Eccles, \textit{The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism} [London and New York: Routledge, 1977] p.495).
and mental activity to function. But rather than saying what Yong states, that mental states ‘emerge’ from the brain states (or in the bigger scheme, the mind emerges from the brain once a certain level of complexity obtains in the brain), such dualists would argue that there are two distinct substances - soul and brain – that interact, and the soul / mind’s mental states have correlated states in the brain. On this philosophical interpretation, they would argue that the soul is indeed functionally dependent upon the brain in ordinary circumstances; indeed, the soul feels pain, for instance, due to the C-fibres in their body relaying that sensation of pain through the brain to the soul, but the soul is active in that it thinks, decides, desires, for instance, by using the brain and the associated C-fibres for carrying out its operations.

Both emergentism and dualistic interactionism are valid philosophical interpretations of the neurological findings. Again, the only dualistic position that would suffer from Murphy, Yong and Kärkkäinen’s objection would be the straw man dualism - the Classic Cartesian view. However, for research into human constitution seeking to engage with positions in their strongest forms, the neuroscientific objection is not a valid objection. Rather, the words of scientist and philosopher Daniel Robinson are apt:

Truth be told…it is fair to say that, whatever it was about the mind-body problem that made it a philosophical problem in the first instance, developments in the brain sciences have done nothing to solve, settle, or eliminate it. ... [Regardless of the neurological findings]...the vexing fact [is] that the available and even foreseeable findings can be applied with equal evidentiary force to such radically different solutions to the mind-body problem as interactionism, parallelism,

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245 The word ‘ordinarily’ is part of this description, clarifying that in a normal, embodied state, the human soul is functionally reliant on its brain, but in disembodied states (seen for instance in the accounts of Near Death Experiences), though not the norm, mental activity is still possible – allowing for mental functioning in a (temporarily) disembodied afterlife.

246 Robinson, in his career, has been a consultant to the American National Science Foundation, as well as to the National Institutes of Health, and the government’s Department of Health and Human Services.
epiphenomenalism, eliminativism, supervenience etc. It would seem that there is no experimentum crucis that will tell so thoroughly for one solution and against all the rest as to establish the solution. To the extent that a problem is a bona fide scientific problem if and only if there is some imaginable experiment that will settle it, the mind-body problem would have to be judged as falling outside the boundaries of scientific modes of verification. For this reason if for no other, little is gained by today’s philosophical advocates who reach for one another “finding” to support a pet conjecture.247

3.3.2.2 The Problem of interaction

Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s other philosophical objection to dualism was the issue of interaction. The problem of interaction between an immaterial substance and a material substance is a classic objection and has been raised ever since the time of Descartes, and indeed, is the most commonly advanced difficulty against dualistic views. It is sometimes augmented by the ‘conservation of energy’ issue, namely for an action to occur in the brain, stimulated by a mental state originated in the soul / mind, there would have to be at least some form of energy-momentum exchange to cause the physical brain state; but this would violate the conservation of energy principle by introducing extra energy into a world which has a precise and limited amount of energy (and the inverse disappearance of energy with the soul being informed by brain states [the brain informing the soul, for instance, about the body’s being in pain]). But though repeatedly surfacing in such debates, the ‘problem’ of interaction is one that has itself received critique.

The philosopher William Hasker, himself an emergentist, not a substance dualist comments

There is...the ancient, and by now extremely boring, objection that causal interaction between diverse substances such as mind and body...is impossible...Once we have recognised that, as Hume long ago taught us, all causal relations are at bottom conceptually opaque, this hoary objection should be relegated to its appropriate place in the dustbin of history.'

Hasker’s dismissive comments imply his viewing the objection as a cheap knock-down argument of substance dualism, but which few have actually considered. Indeed, as will be seen by the comments of his fellow philosopher, Collins, below, Hasker is not alone in thinking this. But before considering Collins, it would be helpful to identify the underlying assumptions of the argument and how valid they are.

In fact, there are two mistaken assumptions that underlie such an objection. Firstly, to challenge a substance dualist view by asking how an immaterial substance could interact with a physical substance, assumes that X cannot causally influence or interact with Y unless X is like Y. But why make this assumption? Unless good reason is given for such a supposition, it does not give good grounds for under-cutting immaterial-material interaction. Secondly, the objection assumes an out-dated view of physics. For most thinkers using the objection of interaction, they simply assume the same view of physics that was popular when the objection was originally levied against (and at the time of) Descartes (namely Newtonian physics, often pictured as billiard balls bouncing into each other). But as philosopher of physics, Robin Collins reminds, physics has moved on significantly since this objection was raised. In fact, when focussing on the energy-conservation challenge by drawing upon findings of current physics, he highlights that

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‘[the objection] fails when one considers that energy conservation is not a universally applicable principle in physics and that quantum mechanics sets a precedent for interaction (or at least law-like correlation) without any sort of energy-momentum exchange; or even any intermediate carrier.’

Collins further comments

‘...the fact that so many leading philosophers have trumpeted the energy conservation objection as a fatal blow to dualism, without carefully examining the relevant physics, should make us suspicious that the wide spread rejection of dualism within academia is based more on the fashion of the day than on sound argument.’

So the underlying philosophical assumptions of the objection render it impotent. And when considered with Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s theological framework as well - that assumes that God as an immaterial entity is interacting with the material / physical world in an on-going manner, the issue of interaction is not an objection that is convincing.

3.4 Summary of Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s challenges to dualism

In sum, Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s reasons for rejecting Platonist and Classic Cartesian dualisms are strong. They join a long line of thinkers who, for a long time, have been critiquing these positions. But though somewhat aware that there are other types of dualism, they reject these dualisms as well, but thinking they can do so for the same reasons


250 Ibid., p.133
that they reject the straw men. This is a mistake. None of Yong’s or Kärkkäinen’s objections – theological or philosophical – are problematic for a good, contemporary, psychosomatic or holistic dualism. Though it is a cliché, they have both thrown the baby out with the bathwater. What it seems they assume dualism advocates is a soul that is a distinct, separate, immaterial entity to the body. Rather, it would be more helpful for them to have been thinking of dualism as advocating a soul which is a distinct, immaterial (and after death separable) entity that (ordinarily) functions in intimate relation with the body.

Healthier forms of dualism will be considered in the second half of this thesis. But having mistakenly depreciated dualism per se, does Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s emergent monist suggestion itself stand up to philosophical and theological scrutiny?

In assessing their emergent monist viewpoint, again, the philosophical strength of the position will be considered. But recognising that it is advanced as a position commendable to Pentecostals, it will also be assessed in light of how consistent it is with Pentecostal theological emphases – namely the four stated in the introduction of the thesis.

3.5 Philosophical Assessment of Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s Emergent Monist proposal

3.5.1 Strengths and weaknesses of the Murphy and particularly Clayton project

Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s anthropology is very dependent on the theory of emergence. They lean heavily on the work of Murphy and Clayton for most of their philosophical anthropology, and for both, their theologising project in many ways is like an icing of the emergentist cake. Consistent with Yong’s ‘many tongues’ approach, and Kärkkäinen’s coherentist method, in which both expect to find truth in many different disciplines, they
have both gone to the discipline of philosophy of mind, and then from discoveries there, filled out their findings with their own theologising. This philosophical theological nature of their approach is apropos, but as was the case with the biblical component in reliance upon Green, their emergentist philosophy is very reliant on Murphy and Clayton, so again critique of Murphy and then Clayton’s emergent monist projects will entail critique of Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s model.

In coming to the position they do on the mind-body problem, some of Clayton’s and Murphy’s work is strong. Particularly their refutation of the reductive physicalist position shows rigorous philosophical thought and argument, and so following in their footsteps, Yong and Kärkkäinen are on strong grounds in accepting their reasoning when dismissing reductive physicalism as not giving any adequate explanation for the hard problem of consciousness. But there are considerable philosophical problems with both Murphy and Clayton, which in turn make Yong and Kärkkäinen’s reliance on them unwise. Some of the ‘scientific’ aspect of Murphy’s model has already been responded to above, and identified as being philosophically weak, so given that it has received a level of critique already, and that (once having assumed Murphy’s ‘scientific basis’) both Yong and Kärkkäinen move beyond her work to Clayton, no more will be said in critique of Murphy. Instead, Clayton’s philosophy will be assessed as he is the fuller dialogue partner for Yong and Kärkkäinen as they seek to build their emergent monist model.

3.5.2 A Closer look at Clayton’s project

Clayton recognises that unless there are more than two sorts of properties (mental and physical) in the world, his position collapses into a mental / physical dualism. So avoiding

251 Clayton, *Mind and Emergence*, p.156.
this, as already seen, Clayton (following Morowitz) argues that there could be as many as 28 differing types of properties in the world, but that are all derived from the one same monistic stuff. Such a view seems to escape dualism by inserting a gradient between the pure base level of the physical \( P_p \), and the pure highest level of the mental \( M_p \), Clayton arguing that between these two levels, more and more sui generis properties have been given rise to (through the multiple levels of emergence [defined in chapter 2]). On this view, far from there just being a simple ontological dualism, \( P_p \) and \( M_p \) are just two of many differing types of properties, each new property arising through history as a new sui generis property from the one below. But in a critique of such a view, J.P. Moreland has commented that Clayton’s supposedly naturalist ontology is ‘bloated’, and like a ‘shopping list’ ontology.\(^{252}\) Unlike views that would consistently be viewed as ‘naturalistic’ or ‘physicalist’,\(^{253}\) Clayton contends for layer upon layer of sui generis emergent properties, none of which can be reduced to their lower level. This would mean that the usual reductive physicalist ontology is avoided, but Moreland comments that such an ontology could only be built on a *theistic* and *theological* foundation.\(^{254}\) Although being a theist (of sorts), and recognising that his project is consistent with theism, Clayton is particularly keen to advance this project as a *philosophical monistic* one to prevent any naturalists (philosophers or scientists) rejecting it on the basis that it is theologically motivated. But this means that

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\(^{253}\) I.e views that follow what Moreland calls the naturalistic ‘Grand Story’, namely that everything in the world ultimately reduces to particles and the domain of physics, and out of this, everything in the world has gradually emerged through natural (i.e. without teleology) history.

\(^{254}\) Moreland, Ibid., p.142.
Moreland’s critique holds, Clayton rejecting the theological basis that would genuinely allow for his multi-levelled sui generis emergence theory (even if bloated).\textsuperscript{255}

Clayton’s emergence model psychologically softens the mind-body distinction by giving the philosopher a gradient to walk up between ‘physical’ and ‘mental’, however as Moreland further points out, all the instances Clayton gives of ‘emergent’ properties (apart from that between brain and mind) are not actually instances of ‘sui generis’ properties, rather they are what philosophers call ‘structural’ emergent properties – examples where, given an exhaustive understanding of science, scientists would have been able to predict the arising of such properties. Similar to a differentiation the renowned neuroscientist and philosopher David Chalmers makes between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ emergence,\textsuperscript{256} Moreland distinguishes between ‘structural’, and ‘sui generis’ properties, defining a structural property as that ‘constituted by the parts, properties, relations, and events at the subvenient level,’ whereas a true emergent (sui generis) property is one where ‘a completely new kind of property [is given rise to,] different from those that characterize its subvenient level.’\textsuperscript{257} Clayton’s attempt at differentiating between ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’ emergence in reference to the type of emergence he identifies in chemistry and biology is really a blurring of the issue, they both fall into the structural (or Chalmers’ ‘weak’) definition.

So though trying to multiply examples of emergence in the universe to help soften the difference between brain and mind (and avoid an ontological dualism) Clayton’s model is

\textsuperscript{255} Were Clayton to build his sui generis emergence theory upon the theistic foundation, his theory would not face the difficulties that are expounded in the main text, in that he could claim that the series of sui generis properties arose in evolutionary history with input from a divine agent. Due to his purposes in seeking to commend his project to natural(istic) scientists, Clayton does not want to go this route so tries to contend that such properties have all arisen naturally (i.e. without divine agency), but as a result suffers the critiques articulated in the main text.


not able to hide the reality that there is just one example of ‘strong’ ‘emergence’, the example that has given rise to a debate lasting hundreds of years in philosophy - that of mind. So his pluralistic ontology really does not provide the plurality of different properties he wants them to, and in the end, is just left with one level of real emergence, the difference between the physical and mental. When this is revealed, it further becomes clear that real emergence (sui generis / strong emergence), when applied to mind, is simply a theory that seeks to suggest why there is this radically new property – that of mind - evident in the world. However, given that there are no other examples of such a radically new property emerging anywhere in the universe ever, its credibility as a solution to the mind-body problem radically reduces.

Given the lack of empirical evidence for radically new properties emerging anywhere in the universe, a stronger critique and interpretation of (sui generis) ‘emergence’ made by a growing number of philosophers and scientists alike is that actually (sui generis) ‘emergence’ is more a description of the problem as opposed to providing a solution to the problem. As Clayton himself admits

Much of the suspicion about emergence within the scientific community stems from the sense that emergence is sometimes used as a “magic pill.” That is, scientists

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258 In a stimulating conversation with Professor Chad Meister, he questioned whether, in addition to the example of human consciousness (mind), animal consciousness (or mind) might count as another example of sui generis emergence, potentially giving a little more credence to Clayton’s proposal. Affirming the distinction and agreeing that the human mind is different from and more advanced than animal mind (the former being self-conscious [e.g. a human being able to contemplate her place in the universe, have self-reflective thoughts about her thoughts, or desires about her desires etc.]), Meister’s contention might be more helpful to Clayton, again were Clayton to build his theory on a theistic basis. But on Clayton’s naturalistic approach, even though the human mind is more advanced, any kind of mind – animal or human – falls into the category of ‘mental’ (as opposed to physical) so animal mind would not appear to give a further instance of a sui generis property.

259 As further defence of his critique, Moreland comments ‘it is important to note that in the best current defense of genuine top-down causation regarding emergent properties, O’Connor and Churchill acknowledge that the only clear candidates for such causation are emergent mental properties’ (Moreland, ‘Mental vs Top-Down’, 141, pointing the reader towards T. O’Connor and J.R. Churchill, “Nonreductive Physicalism or Emergent Dualism? The Argument from Mental Causation” in , R.C. Koons and G. Bealer (eds.) The Waning of Materialism (New York, Oxford University Press, 2010) pp.278-9.
complain that in certain treatments emergence seems to represent a strange mystical power within evolution that constantly works to lift the universe to new levels of reality.\footnote{Clayton, Mind and Emergence, p.47.}

This realisation and designation of (sui generis) emergence as a ‘magic pill’ is becoming more and more pertinent in current discussion, and the credibility of such a position, lowering, as it is seen that emergence is not an explanation of how (normally in reference to) the mind arises, but rather another way of describing the situation, (namely, it has emerged). This critique would undermine Clayton’s (and any) brain-mind sui generis emergent model, but given that he espouses multiple sui generis emergence throughout his ontology, this means that the critique is multiplied throughout his ontology.

Further philosophical critique could be added,\footnote{For instance David Barnett’s critique of emergentism that complexity and arrangement of parts does not give rise to a simple (not composed of parts) conscious mind. Barnett (drawing upon Ned Block’s analogy of arranging the required number of people in the space of an appropriately large country e.g. China) proffers the thought experiment of the correct number of people standing in the right relation to one another, with the right nature, and in the correct structural formation – all with the appropriately advanced radios – to emulate the configuration and interaction of the parts of a brain. Even with exactly the number, structure, nature and relations – and so exact configuration to emulate the brain – one would not expect those billions of people to then give rise to some overall conscious subject, so there is no reason to expect it with the normal human brain. Even more complex than the human brain is the configuration of the universe, yet it does not give rise to consciousness, so why think that something less complex, namely the human brain, would? (D. Barnett, “You are simple” in The Waning of Materialism, R.C. Koons and G. Bealer [eds.] [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010] pp.161-174 [cf. N. Block, “Troubles with Functionalism” in N. Block [ed.], Readings in Philosophy of Psychology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980) pp.268–305]). (Even if one were to seek to counter Barnett and Block’s critique taking the unconventional route of panpsychism [the idea that the whole of the universe is proto-conscious, so giving rise to consciousness in certain animals and humans], this would not solve the issue for the emergentist of why one conscious mind arises through the configuration of the brain, as opposed to many, like the universe would [theoretically] give rise to [but the panpsychist view suffers much greater fundamental problems as a theory to begin with, not least that of how to explain this supposed ‘fifth’ dimension of the universe - ‘proto-consciousness’ - to add to the accepted four dimensions of physics]).} and as the argument of this thesis develops, supplementary theological argument will be given, standing additionally in opposition to Clayton’s view. But for now, enough has been said to justify the critique that Clayton’s particular proposal is not a convincing philosophical model, revealing that Yong and Kärkkäinen are unwise to build their anthroplogy upon his emergent view. However,
there are further philosophical problems, particularly with Yong’s anthropology, not fundamentally linked with Clayton (or Murphy), but that also need to be considered.

3.5.3 Further philosophical difficulties with Yong’s anthropology

Though the above gives reason for declining emergentism, there are other reasons Yong is attracted to the concept, but that are also questionable.

Firstly, Yong prefers emergence to dualistic construals of the world, because for him, emergence preserves the beauty and elegance of a monistic understanding of the world; this has the related benefit of allowing science to proceed according to its received methodological naturalism. Although not particularly the place to focus much on his claim that science should proceed according to such a method, it is worth pointing out in passing that to argue for methodological naturalism, within which science should be operating, is a philosophical position, and so should be one that is substantiated by philosophical reason.

But as Alvin Plantinga has pointed out, although seemingly the consensus across the scientific and philosophical academy, none of the philosophical reasons given for advocating such an approach weigh up to much; so Plantinga concludes that if a scientist chooses to adopt such an approach, then fine, but if a Christian scientist decided to maintain their Christian worldview whilst operating as a scientist - possibly detecting hints of agency and teleology within the scientific arena - then there is no reason why she should refrain.\(^{262}\)

However, the more immediate issue is his comment that monism is a more elegant and aesthetic understanding of the world than dualism. Although possibly receiving this from Clayton, there are many other philosophers who have commented similarly, however, these

tending to be naturalistic philosophers. But given Yong’s Christian – and particularly
Pentecostal position, it is slightly surprising that such a view would appeal to him in the way
it does. Were one to argue that the idea of a Unitarian God is more ‘elegant / beautiful’ than
a triune God, Yong would be unimpressed, so why so for a monistic world?

A reason commonly given by philosophers seeking to argue the monistic case on the basis of
‘elegance’ (regardless of what they think of Clayton’s proposal) is that there are no spirits,
souls, demons etc. to have to account for when telling ‘the story of the world’ (that is, how
the world arrived at the point of evolutionary history it now has). Not wanting to be side-
tracked by the issue of evolution here, simply granting it when defined carefully,263 (though,
because of his prominence in philosophy generally, and the mind-body problem specifically,
it is worth highlighting the atheist Nagel’s recent book on the subject, Mind and Cosmos:

*Why the materialist neo-darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false*264) one can

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263 Academically-minded Christians (Pentecostals included) seem to be at peace with neo-darwinian evolution
so long as it is defined in a *biological sense* - happy to accept something like Francisco Ayala’s definition that
sees evolutionary theory entailing three aspects: 1.Descent with modification, 2.Universal Common Ancestry
DC.: Joseph Henry Press, 2007]). Sometimes proponents will add the word ‘random’ in front of genetic
mutation which, again, when defined in a careful scientific sense to mean something to the effect of
‘irrespective of its adaptive benefit to the host organism’ is fine, however problems arise when metaphysical /
worldview commitments are smuggled in under this word ‘random’ to mean something to the effect of ‘it was
‘unguided’, or ‘blind’. Similar to reductive physicalists in the philosophy of mind, such philosophising under the
banner of ‘science’ causes problems.

264 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) In a revealing passage, Nagel comments ‘It is prima facie highly
implausible that life as we know it is the result of a sequence of physical accidents together with the
mechanism of natural selection. We are expected to abandon this naive response, not in favor of a fully
worked out physical/chemical explanation but in favor of an alternative that is really a schema for explanation,
supported by some examples. What is lacking, to my knowledge, is a credible argument that the story has a
non-negligible probability of being true. There are two questions. First, given what is known about the
chemical basis of biology and genetics, what is the likelihood that self-reproducing life forms should have come
into existence spontaneously on the early earth, solely through the operation of the laws of physics and
chemistry? The second question is about the sources of variation in the evolutionary process that was set in
motion once life began: In the available geological time since the first life forms appeared on earth, what is the
likelihood that, as a result of physical accident, a sequence of viable genetic mutations should have occurred
that was sufficient to permit natural selection to produce the organisms that actually exist? There is much
more uncertainty in the scientific community about the first question than about the second. Many people
think it will be very difficult to come up with a reductionist explanation of the origin of life, but most people
have no doubt that accidental genetic variation is enough to support the actual history of evolution by natural
selection, once reproducing organisms have come into existence. However, since the questions concern highly
specific events over a long historical period in the distant past, the available evidence is very indirect, and

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appreciate on first sight why the monistic position is more appealing than some kind of
dualism – because it does not have to ‘jack-knife’ the appearance of souls and other spirits
into evolutionary history at any point, it can simply proceed along naturalistic lines (matter
giving rise to everything that exists in the world). Specifically in relation to the mind-body
problem, William Hasker articulates the issue clearly when arguing that the dividing line
between non-conscious and conscious animals is a difficulty, if not an embarrassment, for
dualistic positions that have to find a place in evolution for conscious souls to be inserted.\textsuperscript{265}
Instead of having to consider ‘mind / soul’ as something ‘added from the outside’, and so
being forced to work down the animal line trying to work out where ‘the soul’ is brought in,
he maintains that through viewing evolutionary history from within a monistic (and
emergentist) framework, one can simply see the soul / mind as arising somehow out of the
original constituents of the situation.\textsuperscript{266}
Hasker goes further with this point asking (on the assumption that his opponents would
maintain a creationist account of souls that sees God as responsible for giving each person a
soul [rather than the traducian view {which advocates the soul coming into existence in a
less direct way somehow through human sexual reproduction}]) whether God would have to
create individual souls for each \textit{animal} too.\textsuperscript{267} His overall point being that monistic
construals are a lot more natural than dualistic ones. However, a few things in Hasker’s

\textsuperscript{265} W. Hasker, “Souls Beastly and Human”, \textit{The Soul Hypothesis}, p.210. All (exempting the reductive
physicalist) philosophers have been content to view animals as having minds (or what some would call souls).
Theologically, throughout church history, this was also the standard position up until the time of Descartes
who viewed animals as automata. A theological distinction however was made between the varying degrees of
animal souls, and the special human soul.
\textsuperscript{266} Ibid., p.213 cf. Hasker’s ‘The Dialectic of Soul’, paper given at Biola University Conference ‘Neuroscience and
the Soul’, July 2013, available: \url{www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwUMBIIkRXk} \hspace{1em}(accessed 6\textsuperscript{th} March 2014).
\textsuperscript{267} Ibid., p.211.
account are questionable and whether monism is the more ‘elegant’ view is to be contested.

Firstly, to clarify, there are philosophers who are not theists who in their careers have come to hold some form of dualistic picture of the world. David Chalmers is one,\textsuperscript{268} Thomas Nagel another (though both now exploring avenues of panpsychism as opposed to being comfortable with a \textit{substance} dualist position).\textsuperscript{269} So the dualistic position is not (necessarily) motivated by theistic commitments as Hasker’s comments might appear to assume, it is often one arrived at through careful examination of the philosophical arguments surrounding the mind-body discussion.\textsuperscript{270}

Secondly, it is not clear why a monistic picture is advantageous over a dualistic picture; (leaving for a moment the issue of entities such as demons, spirits) it should also be said that both dualistic \textit{and monistic} positions have to account for where in the animal kingdom the line is between mere automata and primitively conscious animals, the simple reason being because there is a line somewhere. The same might also be argued as to where the dividing line is between an animal and a person. A naturalistic monist (who did not believe in God) would not have to address the issue of how God interacted with the animal kingdom in order to bring about the first self-conscious humans, however, they would have to give another account for the arising of this latter consciousness (and in fact there seems to be no reason a theist could not borrow whatever answer the naturalist gave for the arising of human consciousness and claim that it was the secondary cause God used to infuse

\textsuperscript{268} Cf. D. Chalmers, \textit{The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) whose position has evolved in the subsequent years and is now of the panpsychist view (cf. \textit{The Character of Consciousness} [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010]).


\textsuperscript{270} To be fair, it should be noted that Hasker made this comment in responding to a Christian position, however, the point is worth maintaining as a response to the above charge - one commonly levied against dualists.
consciousness into humanity). Further, given that there is very clear precedent for a break between animals and persons, although not necessarily knowing exactly when in history it occurred, a dualist (at least a theistic dualist) would have an answer as to why it is that persons are so distinctly different from animals, why their consciousness is so much fuller, and how mind/soul entered the evolutionary chain – because there is a divine Mind behind the world who created humanity. Whether that Mind/God creates subsequent souls of animals and people on a traducian or creationist basis would then be an in-house discussion for theistic dualists, but given the efficiency of a creative act, it is not evident why Hasker’s, Yong’s and the monist’s ‘elegant’ claim is a valid one. And it could be argued that monism is in fact a rather mono-tonal conception of the world.

3.5.4 Further philosophical problems with Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s model

Further points of philosophical critique of Yong and Kärkkäinen’s emergent view come from:

(a) Certain thought experiments that suggest that the soul is an ontologically distinct and separable entity from the brain, (b) the research done on near-death/out of body experiences (which further emphasise the ontological distinctness and separable nature of soul from brain/body), and (c) the phenomena of people being born with brains yielding

271 It is difficult to conceive of there being such thing as half / a percentage of a person – the Cartesian intuition that it is ‘all or nothing’ seeming sound.

272 For example the oft used duplication arguments composed to demonstrate that the essential ‘I’ is distinct from, and conceivably separable from the physical brain and body I have (see Swinburne’s use in chapter 5 of this), or the argument of conceivability (linked with Leibniz’ law) that argues that if it is possible to conceive of something that could be true of yourself that is not true of your brain and body (such as waking up to find you have jettisoned the body of a human for that of a beetle [like Kafka’s Metamorphosis]) then (regardless of whether these events could actually happen or not) the fact that one can conceive of something that is possibly true of yourself, but not true of your body shows that there is something possibly true of A (your self) that is not true of B, therefore A is distinct from B.

273 The subject of near death experiences is a particularly interesting question in this category, and is a research area Yong affirms the validity of (cf. The Spirit of Creation [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011] pp.196-207). The findings of near death experiences throughout history display a quantity of stories sharing a similar core of details (such as the subject speaking of experiencing a light, speaking with heavenly persons, feeling at deep peace, reluctance to return to their body) regardless of the diverse cultures and times of history from
just one level of cortex yet clearly displaying minds.\textsuperscript{274} As much critique has already ensued of Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s emergentism, these will just be left mentioned and not expounded. But a further point of critique (associated with the issue of near death experiences) against both Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s account that \textit{would} be helpful to expound (given its importance and re-arising later in the thesis) is that their position is not able to give an account of identity persistence over time between the point of death and a person’s resurrection.

Although both thinkers are attracted to emergentism because it emphasises the embodied nature of a person, and as such is also compatible with Scripture’s teaching about the resurrection body at the eschaton,\textsuperscript{275} their emergent monist idea suffers the set-back of not having any means for maintaining personal identity through death until that final resurrection. Again, aware of the problem, both seek to appeal to J. Polkinghorne’s suggestion that each person has a complex information-bearing pattern (or blueprint) given by God which God then uses to re-exemplify the person at the time of the resurrection,\textsuperscript{276} but this is not a sufficient response as such as is a work of \textit{re-creation}. As Yong, himself citing Fee, states

\begin{quotation}
which these accounts arise. Of particular philosophical interest though among these stories are recent accounts in which the subject is able to recount events that occurred whilst s/he was in a comatose state after being revived (particularly the very recent accounts, where medical monitoring suggests that their cortex was entirely shut down during such periods.) Accounts where patients describe rising up and looking down on their comatose body in the hospital ward, and are further able to recount events such as where certain surgical instruments were placed in the ward, discussions doctors/relatives had outside the ward, or even events occurring further afield during that time, give empirically testable claims. If (and sometimes, they are) validated, this would suggest another argument for thinking that an essential person or subject is ontologically separable from, and not dependent upon, their brain substrate.
\end{quotation}

\textsuperscript{274} These findings suggest that, contrary to the emergence view that would say that consciousness is given rise to by an intricate connection of the neurones in the layer upon layer of carefully interwoven cortex in the brain, that the existence of mind appears regardless of the state of the brain, and does not depend on a certain complexity of the brain.

\textsuperscript{275} Yong, \textit{Theology and Down Syndrome}, p.171. Of course, giving an eschatological emphasis to his view.

...for Paul, resurrection is neither resuscitation (which preserves continuity) nor re-
creation (which severs identity); rather, since “flesh and blood cannot inherit the
kingdom of God” (1Cor 15:50), Paul teaches a resurrection of the body that
preserves but also transforms personal identity.277

Paul Badham has convincingly argued that unless a person has an immaterial (and
ontologically distinct) soul that persists through death until the resurrection, there are no
grounds for saying that the person that is alive today at time A, is identical to the person at
the time of resurrection, time B.278 On all views apart from dualistic views, when the brain
dies, the person dies with it, so the closest a non-dualistic construal could get to identity
would be to argue that another body and brain is created by God on the last day which gives
rise to another mind that is that person. However there is no way of being able to say that
this person is identical to the person who is alive at time A, because nothing survives from
time A to time B – it is simply a replica of the person alive at time A.279 So Yong’s and
Kärkkäinen’s eschatology is deficient in the philosophical issue of identity persistence over
time, adding a further problem to their emergent monist proposal.

3.5.5 Summary of the philosophical problems with Emergent Monism

When brought together, the above gives a lot of reason for rejecting Yong’s and
Kärkkäinen’s emergent monism on a philosophical basis. Yong does seem aware of some of

(emphasis mine). Although this is moving into theological territory (to be further assessed in the following
section), it is particularly the aspect of identity persistence over time that is being considered here, so
remaining in the area of philosophical assessment.
‘God remembers the pattern of the human’ sounds like special pleading as a last-ditch attempt to somehow
maintain belief in an individual’s retaining their identity through to the resurrection, and philosophical
attempts such as Zimmermann’s or vanInwagen’s idea that ‘Fission’ occurs at the time of death seem hugely
implausible.
279 Or as is sometimes stated in philosophy ‘One thing cannot have two beginnings’ (J. Locke, Essay II, xxvii, 1).
the problems with emergentism, but rather than admitting them as such, he prefers to regard them as ‘questions for further research’,\textsuperscript{280} or areas where ‘much more work needs to be done’.\textsuperscript{281} Yong’s sympathetic categorisation might be granted were there just one or two problems to be accounted for, but given the range of difficulties with the position, to categorise them as such is more like special pleading. When taken together, it is seen that Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s excursion into emergent philosophy to help form an anthropology is not successful, and there is a lot of reason to disregard the emergent monist views that both have come to in dependence on this arena of emergent philosophy.

3.6 Pentecostal Theological Assessment of Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s Emergent Monist proposal

Remembering that the theological critique of these two writers’ proposal is to be specifically Pentecostal in nature, their emergent monist view will further be assessed in terms of how consistent it is with the Pentecostal emphases outlined in the introduction:

1. The Pentecostal renewal pneumatology
2. The Pentecostal eschatological orientation
3. The Pentecostal appreciation of the dualistic nature of the world – accentuating the ‘supernatural’ / world beyond just the physical\textsuperscript{282}
4. The Pentecostal holistic understanding of creation and particularly humanity

When viewing the emergent monist proposal in light of these, it is particularly obvious that it certainly fits very naturally with 1 – the specific Pentecostal pneumatology. Particularly in

\textsuperscript{280} ‘Christian and Buddhist Perspectives’, 160.
\textsuperscript{281} Yong, \textit{Theology and Down Syndrome}, p.287 fn.21 (printed as an end note on page 337).
\textsuperscript{282} Although the term ‘supernatural’ is regularly employed by Pentecostals, the term is rather unhelpful as it tends to create a divide between the physical and non-physical (or material and immaterial) realms. This will be seen more clearly as the thesis develops, however, recognising that it is common parlance amongst Pentecostals, here the word is retained, yet placing it in inverted commas to draw attention to the author’s unease with the term.
Yong’s work, he consistently allows such pneumatology to inform, ‘assist’, and enhance the theology he is proposing, which is what leads to his developing of Murphy’s and Clayton’s model into his own - in effect, a ‘Spirit-energiséd’ or ‘Pentecostal’ emergent monism. Though Kärkkäinen says less about this, being so similar to Yong’s proposal, his could also pass as being consistent with the Pentecostal pneumatology. Their emergent monist proposal is also very consistent with 4 - the holistic understanding of a human. The on-going emphasis in both of a human being who is spiritual, yet such spirituality being displayed through that person’s physicality and embodiment, makes very clear that this too is an emphasis that their emergent monist view comfortably comports with.

On first glance, it would further appear that their understanding of constitution (particularly Yong’s, in light of his emphasis on the ‘dunamis / teleological’ working of the Spirit), is also consistent with 2 – the eschatological orientation inherent within Pentecostal Theology, as it would with 3 – recognising the ‘supernatural’ degree of a world and persons charged with the Spirit. Yet on a closer look, and more scrutiny of these latter emphases, it becomes evident that the emergent monist model does not fit with 2, and is not a particularly obvious fit with 3.

3.6.1 The emergent monist inconsistency with the Pentecostal eschatological emphasis

The problem with criteria 2 will be handled first as this might seem more of a surprising claim given the eschatological emphasis on the resurrection of the body in Yong and Kärkkäinen’s emergent monist thinking. But the issue with their proposal is (and putting some theological flesh on the philosophical bones of identity persistence over time) that in endorsing emergent monism, they rule out any place for the eschatological intermediate

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283 The term ‘spiritual’ could actually be made ‘Spiritual’, owing to its connection with point 1.
state. On their view, with the brain having died, the person’s mind / soul is completely dead too and does not continue in any form. Yong is aware of the implication and, in a footnote muses:

I am unsure what to think about the traditional doctrine of the “intermediate state” given my commitments to an emergentist anthropology. If human beings are constituted by (even if irreducible to) their bodies, then there can be no proper human “existence” after death and prior to the resurrection of those bodies. However, the biblical data can be read in a way that does not necessarily demand a dualistic construal of the relationship between the human soul and body. Even the appearance of Samuel to the medium of Endor can be understood as made possible by a resurrection theory.284 Clearly, while much more work needs to be done in this area, at the very least it can be said that an emergentist anthropology takes the resurrection of the body as constitutive of human personhood and identity in the afterlife much more seriously than any dualistic view can.285

Leaving the polemical statements at the end of the quote aside, there are two further issues here to add to the associated philosophical problem of identity persistence over time. Yong recognises that the doctrine of the intermediate state is traditionally what Pentecostals have believed,286 but he is discarding the doctrine nevertheless. But he has also previously commented that Paul does not believe in death and then (after a period of nothingness) re-creation, but ruling out the intermediate state as he does, this means that he is forced to adopt the re-creation position - one he recognises is contra Paul. As for Kärkkäinen, he

285 (Yong, Theology and Down Syndrome, p.287 fn. 21 [printed as an end note on page 337]).
286 Cf. M. Pearlman, Knowing the Doctrines, pp.370-71 (Pearlman specifically disavowing the soul sleep hypothesis on the basis of Is 14:9-11; Ps 16:10; Lk 16:23; 23:42; 2 Cor 5:8; Phil 1:23; Rev 6:9), E.S. Williams, Systematic Theology, vol.3, p.178, F.L. Arrington, Christian Doctrine, p.238, S. Horton, “The Last Things”, pp.606-13 (who argues on the basis that Moses and Elijah appeared with Jesus at the transfiguration that there has to be some kind of existence between death and final resurrection) and W. Grudem, Systematic Theology, pp.816-24.
seems to feel the force of the difficulty implied by his struggling with different ideas from Polkinghorne and Zizioulas to try and make sense of what happens to a person after death. The best he can suggest is again Polkinghorne’s idea that God *remembers* the ‘pattern’ of a person (a pattern to be re-embodied in the resurrection\(^287\)) but that does not do anything to remove the difficulty of the person ceasing to exist, only to be re-created on the final day. Added to the philosophical issue of identity persistence over time, their emergent monist view has a major problem eschatologically, meaning it is not a particularly comfortable fit with this emphasis of Pentecostal theology.

### 3.6.2 The emergent monist inconsistency with the Pentecostal dualistic world

As regards emphasis 3, the emergent monist conception of a human, though not necessarily excluding the idea, would sit somewhat strangely within the dualistic world Pentecostals advocate. As Yong himself has commented

> belief in a spirit-filled cosmos is *endemic* to Pentecostal spirituality...[this spirit-filled cosmos is a world] that includes not just the Holy Spirit but also angels, demons, and other spiritual beings and powers.\(^288\)

This is the dualistic world Pentecostals believe in, in which God and angel spirits (at least, traditionally understood) exist without a physical substratum. So to then argue that *human* spirits / minds need that subvenient physical base for their existence seems unconvincing.

To clarify, the classical understanding of angels (and demons), the view that has been embraced throughout most of church history, is specifically the view most Pentecostals


\(^{288}\) A. Yong, *The Spirit of Creation: Modern Science and Divine Action in the Pentecostal-Charismatic Imagination* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011) pp.174-5 (emphasis mine). Yong has elaborated this point much more fully in his *Discerning the Spirit(s): A Pentecostal-Charismatic Contribution to Christian Theology of Religions* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000) pp.127-32, 234-55 and 294-308. However, it is only in his more recent book that he has sought to give a full interpretation of these phenomena.
have held to and have in mind when they speak of such ‘spirit beings’. Influenced by the Augustinian model, the angels that Pentecostals believe in might be defined as:

Created, immaterial, (self)conscious (hence, animate) beings, who joyfully worship God, and function as servants in the carrying out of God’s plans and purposes – ‘angels’ often being a specific term to refer to those heavenly beings who from time to time take on a visible or physical form to carry out some of those purposes in the material world.

And in a related sense, demons might further be defined as:

Created, immaterial, (self)conscious (hence, animate) beings, who have rebelled against, and hate God, and seek to hinder and destroy his work.

Although not necessarily using such language, a similar type of definition is what most Pentecostals have in mind when reflecting on angels and demons within their theology - classic expositions of such being given, for example, by C.D. Baker and Macchia, or Grudem in the 1990s.

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289 As seen, Yong himself acknowledges this, and his latter work on angels appears to be a shift from his earlier work in which he describes such beings as personal and individual beings (Discerning the Spirits, p.238) (cf. the definition to follow).
289 Neh 9:6; Ps 148:2,5; Col 1:16; Rev 4:11.
291 Under the term ‘(self)conscious’, it is worth explicating more fully that (among other things) they are moral agents, (Ps 103:20-21; Mk 8:38 / Lk 9:26; Acts 10:22; Rev 14:10), intelligent beings (2 Sam 14:20; Mt 24:36; Eph 3:10; 1 Pt 1:12; 2 Pt 2:11), and those with significant causal powers (Ps 103:20-21; Dan 10:13, 20; 2 Thess 1:7; 2 Thess 2:9) – something that applies similarly to demons in the definition to follow.
292 Neh 9:6; Ps 103:20-21; Ps 148:2,5; Is 6:3; Heb 12:22; Rev chs 4,5,7,15.
293 Heb 1:14; Ps 103:21.
294 E.g. Genesis 18; Judges 13:8-20; 1 Kings 19:5-6; Matthew 1:20-21; Acts 1:10; Acts 12:5-10. With both Hebrew and Greek words for angel meaning ‘messenger’ it is not surprising that a number of those purposes they are given to carry out in the material world are to convey messages.
This is the world Pentecostals believe humans inhabit, one populated by such immaterial beings. So to think a human spirit / mind needs a physical substratum, though not impossible, seems less likely given the theological context.

Kärkkäinen gives no consideration to angels in his work, but, seemingly feeling the issue, Yong seeks to address the issue of angels but in a peculiar way, seeking to argue that they themselves are emergent beings from within a physical structure.\footnote{A. Yong, \textit{The Spirit of Creation: Modern Science and Divine Action in the Pentecostal-Charismatic Imagination} (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011) pp.175-207, 213-221.} The limitation of space will not allow for an excursus into how he comes to this conclusion, but, though admirably creative, his suggestion is implausible, and again stands in contradiction to how Pentecostals have traditionally understood such beings.

Of the two issues further investigated above, the eschatological issue is more problematic for Yong and Kärkkäinen. Concerning the dualistic nature of the world, it is still possible that humans have an emergent mind that arises out of the complex brain, even within the spirit-populated cosmos where humans share the self-conscious characteristic with immaterial God and angels. However, at best, such an idea would only be considered of equal plausibility to other views that might suggest that humans have an ontologically distinct immaterial aspect to their constitution; but when coupled with the eschatological issue, the emergent monist proposal feels uncomfortable within the Pentecostal emphases, and would suggest that searching for a more consistent model is preferable.

\textbf{3.7 Summary}

The purpose of this chapter has been to consider the two contentions Yong and Kärkkäinen made from the previous chapter, namely that any kind of dualism needs to be rejected
because of the theological and philosophical challenges brought against it, and that their emergent monist model is better. As has been seen, their first contention is refuted when closer inspection is made of all their arguments. Although their challenges are on target and do refute Platonist and Cartesian dualisms, they have little by way of challenge to a holistic, psychosomatic type of dualism. Their work simply whips the straw men who for a quite a while have already been exposed for what they are. As regards their second contention, their emergent monist proposal has been seen to have numerous philosophical difficulties with it, particularly when the philosophy of mind involved is analysed. The philosophical problems are only added to by the theological difficulties, those showing that their proposal is inconsistent with two of the Pentecostal emphases and not a natural fit for Pentecostal theology.

For these reasons, neither of the contentions arising from chapter 2 are persuasive. The three thinkers behind Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s work on human constitution appear to have done much to lead them both in an unhelpful direction; the potentiality being that these two contemporary Pentecostal scholars in turn might lead other Pentecostals in a similar direction and influence the Pentecostal trajectory of thought concerning human constitution down a similar monistic path.

Responding to their work, and the possibility of further monistic drift, the constructive part of this thesis now aims to propose an enhanced Pentecostal philosophical theological model of human constitution, which also seeks to redirect the path of the trajectory. By ‘enhanced’, it is meant a view that is more consistent with the Pentecostal theological emphases, and that is stronger philosophically (than Yong and Kärkkäinen’s model).
PART B: Towards an Enhanced Pentecostal Philosophical Theological Doctrine of Human Constitution
Chapter 4: Considering J.W. Cooper’s Holistic Dualism

Having identified Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s work towards the end and present of the Pentecostal trajectory of human constitution, part A has responded to their contention that dualism (of any variety) should be discarded – with its entailed view of the (immaterial and separable) soul, as well as given critique of the emergent monist model they propose instead. It has been seen that only Platonist and Classic Cartesian dualism should be rejected on the grounds they give, and that their emergent monist proposal is not particularly strong philosophically, or consistent with the Pentecostal emphases outlined in the introduction. Recognising their influence in potentially ushering the trajectory in a monistic direction, part A has focussed on analysis and critique of their position.

Part B now moves on and seeks to construct an enhanced Pentecostal doctrine of human constitution, one that is more consistent with the Pentecostal emphases, and is stronger philosophically than Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s proposal. In doing so, it is the intention of the work to redirect the Pentecostal trajectory of thought away from a monistic direction, and as the thesis progresses, and the enhanced model of constitution is constructed, it will be seen that it is specifically by renewing the soul within the doctrine that the enhanced model is achieved and a better direction suggested. By ‘renewing the soul’, it is meant that the soul is given the attention and prominence it deserves (along with the body) in (and, to be seen, in light of) the following theological and philosophical constructive work, and it also means allowing for the renewing work of the Spirit, within the construction of the model. More will be said about this as part B progresses, but by way of establishing an enhanced Pentecostal philosophical theology of constitution, the constructive part of the thesis will develop by
employing more cogent dialogue partners, both theologically and philosophically, in order to construct a more robust model than Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s.

It instigates the quest, in this chapter, by engaging J.W. Cooper’s (philosophically-astute) work on the biblical texts. Through interacting with Cooper’s exegetical work and constitutional proposal, this starts the constructing of an enhanced Pentecostal philosophical theological model, in a manner consistent with the Pentecostal precedent of wanting to ground doctrine in Scripture, and constructing upon this authoritative foundation.298

As already implied in the literature review, Cooper’s work, though from a more Reformed Evangelical perspective, is not new or foreign to Pentecostal theology. Indeed, Atkinson assumed Cooper’s work in critiquing the anthropology of the Word of Faith movement, so clearly finds his work conducive to Pentecostal theology.299 And again, the high view of Scripture which Cooper advocates is one Pentecostals would also want to endorse, giving an ideal, shared foundation for building anthropology upon. So Cooper’s view will be presented and evaluated in this chapter, and proposed as the beginnings of a position for Pentecostals seeking an enhanced view of constitution.

As Cooper’s proposal progresses, it will be seen that it is initially consistent with at least two of the Pentecostal theological emphases – those of the Pentecostal eschatological orientation and the Pentecostal holistic understanding of creation and particularly humanity. It will be also be seen that, possibly, it might be consistent with a third emphasis, namely the dualistic (underlining the ‘supernatural’, not just physical) nature of the world;

298 This desire being demonstrated in the review of chapters 1 and 2.
But though hinting at the latter, little is said in that regard (due to the particular focus of Cooper’s work), or indeed anything about the primary Pentecostal emphasis, its particular renewal pneumatology. In order, then, to consider whether Cooper’s view genuinely is consistent with those further two Pentecostal emphases, his work will need to be assessed in light of Pentecostal spirituality, particularly the work of the Spirit within the world, and the ontology Pentecostals espouse. As one who has given this worthy attention, J.K.A. Smith’s work in this area will be used as the Pentecostal light to aid in understanding whether Cooper’s proposal is might be consistent with all the Pentecostal theological emphases. Through this interaction with Smith, enough light will be provided for answering the above question in this chapter, but as a lead for further constructive philosophical and Pentecostal development of Cooper’s proposal, certain hints as to how that further construction might develop will also arise through the engagement with Smith, which will then be considered more fully in ensuing chapters.

4.1 J.W. Cooper

Before turning to Cooper’s work, the lineage of anthropological biblical studies through the 20th century will be outlined, for the following two reasons. Firstly, it will help situate Cooper, and see what exactly he is responding to in articulating his view, which in turn will bring clarity as to what he is (and is not) advocating. Secondly, it will make Pentecostals more aware of some of the further philosophical confusion that lies in the discipline of biblical studies when it comes to thinking about anthropology.300

300 As this is the field that biblically oriented Pentecostals will likely turn to, to construct their future theological anthropology, philosophical awareness of what is occurring in the discipline is important and likely to influence the choice of dialogue partners from the field. Indirectly, the overview to follow will give the heritage from which Green (and Wright) come, illumining more clearly some of the philosophical issues he (and Wright) assumes, so indicating the effect that has had on his (and their) biblical studies.
4.1.1 The contextual background of biblical Studies concerning anthropology in recent thought

Contemporary biblical studies has been keen to draw attention to the influence of varieties of Platonism on the early church fathers, and how such an influence affected their exegesis – particularly concerning the doctrine of humanity’s constitution. Particularly Augustine (in his earlier writings) has been shown to have been affected in this way, his idea of a ‘soul having a body’ being an obvious example of such, and one that was read into his exegesis of Scripture. Being maybe the greatest influence in church history, biblical scholars emphasise how Augustine’s ideas were then passed down to generations of subsequent exegetes, and have been apparent since then. This appears true, and is demonstrable in the work for instance of Calvin, who stated

Indeed, from Scripture we have already taught that the soul is an incorporeal substance; now we must add that, although properly it is not spatially limited, still, set in the body, it dwells there as in a house; not only that it may animate all its parts and render its organs fit and useful for their actions, but also that it may hold the first place in ruling man’s life, not alone with respect to the duties of his earthly life, but at the same time to arouse him to honour God.\(^{302}\)

So the claim that much anthropology has been affected by this form of Christian Platonism does appear valid and is particularly apparent in the writings of those who read Scripture, trying to draw conclusions about the nature of humanity based on word studies surrounding terms such as ‘soul’ and ‘body’ in Scripture (cf. some of the studies of Pentecostals reviewed in chapter 1). This is an approach that is still prominent in current popular Christianity today.

\(^{301}\) Sometimes seen as analogous to a captain steering his ship.

But at the beginning of the 20th century, biblical studies, which had previously assumed such ex/eisegesis, began to question this foreign import, and instead, the discipline began reading Scripture on its own terms, and against the background of a Hebrew, Old Testament worldview (as opposed to the Greek, Platonist one). As such, there was significant development throughout the century in regard to many areas of theology, particularly that of anthropology.

In 1911, H. Wheeler Robinson argued that, rather than seeing man as a union of a soul and body - both of which have differing functions (for example the soul decides, prays, thinks etc. whereas the body eats, excretes, reproduces etc.), a closer look at the Hebrew texts (including word studies surrounding terms such as leb, basar, nephesh) suggests that the Hebrew concept of humanity was one of fundamental unity of the two, the human is not divided, but functions holistically.303 This move towards holism was then affirmed and progressed by Rudolf Bultmann’s extensive treatment of New Testament anthropology, in which he famously contradicted Augustine by stating: ‘Man does not have a soma (body); he is soma.’304 Under the existentialist influences of his day, Bultmann went on to argue that in Paul’s (and representative of the whole of Scripture’s) thought, the word ‘soma’ was synonymous with the ego – the self, the ‘I’. He comments: ‘man, his person as a whole, can be denoted by soma....Man is called soma in respect to his being able to make himself the object of his own action or to experience himself as the subject to whom something happens.'305 As well as advancing the holistic emphasis that was to dominate the latter half of the century, inherent in Bultmann’s statements above, one can also identify the

305 R. Bultmann, Ibid., 1:195-6 (emphasis his).
beginnings of a turn from dualistic interpretations of humanity, to the monistic, materialistic position.

Around the same time, and moving the discussion a step further, Oscar Cullman gave (and published) a series of lectures in which he argued that the eschatology of the New Testament has, as its goal, the resurrection of the body, not the immortality of an incorporeal soul, further emphasising the Hebrew understanding and valuing of the body. Following the influential work of these writers, the discussion escalated and very quickly more and more publications ensued arguing that Paul was thoroughly Hebrew in his anthropology, him speaking only of a human in holistic terms. So within a period of just 50-60 years, the sway of New Testament anthropology was rapidly changed. Although in 1971, Robert Jewett wrote a substantial critique of Bultmann’s work in which he concluded that the ‘kardia’ is more like the ‘I’ in Paul, which was followed by an ever fuller critique of Bultmann’s anthropology by Robert Gundry in 1976 - who concluded, after extensive research, that the ‘soma’ refers to the physical aspect of man, by this point, the holistic and monistic opinion had taken hold and the majority of biblical scholars have advocated such a position since.

At the end of the century, James Dunn’s work The Theology of Paul the Apostle belied the general consensus of the academy (whilst bringing his own angle on the debate), in which he argued that words such as ‘kardia’, ‘psyche’, ‘soma’ etc. specifically in Paul (though often

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extrapolated by biblical exegetes to Scripture generally) should not be regarded in the Greek ‘partitive’ sense – ‘partitive’ being a term Dunn uses to refer to the Greek interest in the ‘parts’ of / what ‘makes up’ a human being, but rather in a Hebrew ‘aspectival’ sense - as words that describe the whole of the person from a particular angle (e.g. the distinction between the Spirit and the flesh being a concern with living either according to the ways of God, or to the ways of sin [not a distinction between body and soul]). By this date in 1998, the transformation seems to have been completed, the academy moving from a Christian Platonist viewpoint to a Hebrew holistic position. What is often passed over, however, is what J.W. Cooper pointed out in 1989, and again in 2000, that Hebrew holism does not necessarily equal monism. Although Gundry’s writing had already suggested this (in which he showed himself content to maintain a form of dualism whilst recognising the holistic nature of anthropology), Cooper’s work very much underlined such a position, his book arguing for a position he titles ‘holistic dualism’ (which he later reversed to ‘dualistic holism’). The latter book recognised the insights of previous biblical scholars and agreed that biblical studies generally emphasised the holistic nature of a human (particularly suggesting that simple word studies were not the grounds for concluding that there is a

311 Gundry preferring to use his own terminology distinguishing not between ‘aspects’ of a person (what Dunn calls the ‘partitive’ distinction), but between the ‘essences’ of a person, by which he means body and soul (or what philosophers might call the ‘substances’ of a person). (R.H. Gundry, Ibid., p.83.)
313 See his clarification during ‘Panel 2’ question and response panel at Biola University’s conference ‘Neuroscience and the Soul’, July 2013, available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ojiALgi0 min 11 [accessed 10th August 2016]. The reversal was made to put the emphasis on the holistic functioning of a human being that Cooper thinks is the more prominent emphasis in Scripture. To remind of what was said in 1.5, though Cooper’s insight and latter description is to be affirmed, drawing on his key writing as this thesis does, his ‘holistic dualism’ terminology is generally used in this thesis - one emphasising the ontology because of the desire to renew the (ontological) soul in the doctrine of constitution. But in a different context, the author would be content to use either dualistic holism or holistic dualism, drawing out either the emphasis on the function or the ontology of the human as required.
distinguishable essence / part / aspect of a human that might be called a soul\textsuperscript{314}, however, pointed out that this does not give grounds for concluding the Bible is monistic in its teaching. To the contrary, by looking at the Old Testament, Intertestamental, and New Testament writers’ understanding of what happens to a person after they die, Cooper argued that the natural reading of these texts indicate that the biblical writers were of the view that something of the human lives on after she dies, and therefore there has to be more to a human than just the physical body.

As someone whose work was not refuted in the 11 years after he originally proposed it - and so in 2000 he simply re-published it with an update on current literature in the ensuing years – Cooper’s view stands as something of a resistance work amidst the now mainly monistic academy of biblical scholars. Biblical scholars are commonly aware of Cooper, yet apparently unable to refute his work, hence his being able to simply re-publish his original book.\textsuperscript{315} Although Cooper finds himself in the minority in the present, his work does not suffer the general philosophical confusion identified above, making it more commendable philosophically, and giving a clearer understanding of the biblical texts. Through more analytical philosophical thinking, Cooper’s work (though appreciative of the corrective ‘holistic’ Hebraic emphasis brought by 20\textsuperscript{th} century) identifies the relevant philosophical issues that the 20\textsuperscript{th} century stream of biblical scholars have missed, so enabling him to properly consider dualism – as well as monism – from a philosophically-astute biblical

\textsuperscript{314} As work from the 20\textsuperscript{th} century has shown, terms such as psyche (‘soul’ / ‘life-force’), pneuma (‘spirit’) differ in their meanings depending on which biblical author is writing and how they are employing the terms. Although as an example, a rough translation of two such terms (psyche and pneuma) has just been given, they cannot be relied on to have a consistent meaning for every author throughout the New Testament; the variation of the meaning of anthropological terms in Scripture make word studies approaches complicated and, if employed, a lot of care is needed before drawing conclusions from such an approach concerning Scripture’s position on the constitution of humanity.

\textsuperscript{315} Green has attempted to, but as the following will demonstrate, such an attempt has been repeatedly unsuccessful.
As one, therefore, combining exegetical rigour with the necessary philosophical astuteness, this makes Cooper an ideal thinker and exegete to propose the biblical basis for constructing an enhanced Pentecostal doctrine of human constitution.\textsuperscript{317} So it is to Cooper’s work and proposal that the chapter now turns.

4.1.2 J.W. Cooper’s proposal

Cooper contends that Scripture should be the primary place from which doctrine and understanding of humanity should come from, so states that the approach of his work is one which is predominantly exegesis and theological reflection, but also with an eye to the philosophical discussions of the mind/soul-body relation.\textsuperscript{318} Given what Scripture teaches, and specifically its teaching of personal survival into the intermediate state - grounds Pentecostals usually thoroughly want to affirm - Cooper’s key argument is that humans have to be constituted of more than just a monistic, physical body, for them to be able to continue in existence into that intermediate state (after death and bodily decay). He argues that seeing a human as some kind of dual entity – body and soul – makes best sense of this, a position that has been the main and traditional view of Christians throughout church history.\textsuperscript{319} Grounding the argument in progressive revelation of the teaching of Scripture, Cooper builds his case cumulatively through assessing the teaching of the Old Testament, inter-testamental period, and New Testament.

\textsuperscript{316} Green, whilst stating that his view is in line with the biblical holistic and eschatological vision, admits that his position may not commend itself to those with a more philosophical mind (\textit{Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible} [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008] p.34).

\textsuperscript{317} Cooper was trained a philosopher, but one in the evangelical tradition. So though specialising in philosophy (and particularly philosophical anthropology), his training also entailed a strong degree of biblical studies and languages, enabling him to bridge both disciplines – philosophy and biblical studies – for rigorously engaging the monism-dualism debate (cf. p.5 of \textit{Body, Soul and Life Everlasting}).

\textsuperscript{318} Cooper, \textit{Body}, p.xvi.

\textsuperscript{319} Ibid., e.g. pp.xv, 15, 31.
4.1.2.1 Old Testament

In accord with the general leaning of biblical studies, Cooper affirms that the Old Testament [O.T.] is holistic in its anthropology. Through a summary of the way terms such as Nephesh, Ruach, Basar, Qereb and Leb are used,\(^{320}\) he concurs that there is no bifurcation in the O.T. between parts of the human that have ‘spiritual’ functions, and those that have ‘bodily’ functions.\(^{321}\) Instead, he contends that the O.T. affirms ‘the functional integration or unity of the psychophysical totality rather than the compartmentalization of the soul’s functions and the body’s functions.’\(^{322}\) However, he then points out that this functional holism is often misinterpreted by biblical scholars to imply ontological or monistic holism, but mistakenly, particularly given what the O.T. suggests about existence after death. Regarding the latter, he contends that, though the verses concerning life after death in the O.T. are few and far between, there is a consistency in those texts that led the Israelites to believe that people continue to exist as ‘Rephaim’ (‘shades’) in Sheol (the place of the dead) after they die, in a ‘shadowy, ghostly’ form of their earthly self.\(^{323}\)

Cooper rejects the impression of many scholars who think the O.T. teaches that death is the end, arguing particularly that Israel’s forbiddance of practising necromancy (calling up the dead) indicates that some kind of existence post-death is likely, an idea in fact demonstrated by the raising of the ghost of Samuel in 1 Sam 28.\(^{324}\) Citing Wolff, he argues that ‘The Old Testament itself is able to report a successful case of conjuring up the

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\(^{321}\) In distinction from what many Platonist-influenced Christians have asserted.

\(^{322}\) Ibid. p.44.

\(^{323}\) The language comes from Otto Kaiser’s *Death and Life* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1981) p.34 which Cooper affirms (Ibid., p.53 fn 3).

\(^{324}\) Cf. Yong’s use of Arnold, chapter 3, fn. 284 but also a response to Arnold, chapter 4, fn. 360.
dead...Samuel does actually rise up in ghost-like form.' And from this account, he further contends that the story reveals evidence of continued personal identity of beings after death, Samuel being a typical resident of Sheol, the possibility of conscious communication with beings in Sheol (though recognising that most of the descriptions of beings there [in the O.T.] are depicted in a more dormant / sleeping state), and that such beings are not Platonist/Cartesian mind or soul (Samuel being a ‘shade’ / ‘ghost’). For necromancy of these beings to be possible, and for the story of Samuel's calling-up to be read responsibly, there must be some kind of existence for the rephaim in Sheol as opposed to mere extinction, something in fact borne out by careful exegesis of the handful of Sheol passages. His argument then is that after death, the rephaim exist on in Sheol anticipating the day of resurrection spoken of in Daniel 12:1-2 (cf. Is 26:14, 19), when such beings will rise again and experience full and whole (earthly) life again. The implication of his exegesis is that if some aspect of the person survives even when she dies and her body decays in the grave, then humanity is not just a material being, but rather, some kind of dualism is more appropriate to describe a human person - even though when living the full life (pre-death), the relationship and functioning between body and this other aspect is inseparable.

4.1.2.2 Inter-Testamental Period

Cooper's ultimate reason for investigating the O.T. is that it gives the Hebrew background for understanding New Testament [N.T.] texts, texts which fill out the O.T. teaching on the

326 Cooper makes a distinction taking into account the bodily dimension of the ghost of Samuel (in contrast to the non-bodily nature of Plato's / Descartes' soul): 'the dead are thought of as ethereal bodily beings whereas the living are fleshly bodily beings. The contrast is between fleshly and non-fleshly, not between bodily and non-bodily.' (Cooper, p.67)
327 Cooper recognises the force of passages such as Eccl 9:10; Isa 38:19; Ps 88:10-12 but says they have to be read in light of necromancy passages, as well as passages such as Gen 35:18; Lam 1:1; Ps 30:3; 86:13 and Isa 14:9-10.
doctrines of anthropology and eschatology, and give a clearer picture as regards the
constitution of humanity. But he also recognises that thinking surrounding these issues
developed through the writings of the Inter-Testamental Period [I.T.P.], also forming part of
the background of the N.T., and affecting the way N.T. writers understood and wrote about
these doctrines. Because of this, he argues that the popular approach of constructing
anthropological doctrine by assuming terms like ‘spirit’, and ‘soul’ etc. mean the same thing
throughout Scripture is overly simplistic. Rather, he claims these terms and the wider
doctrines of anthropology and eschatology need to be read in their context, and recognised
as doctrines that are revealed progressively from O.T. through to the N.T. With this
recognition, Cooper includes a chapter on how the terms and relevant doctrines developed
through the I.T.P., in order to give a full background for understanding these in the N.T.
writings.328

Cooper identifies that the Jewish writers of the I.T.P. were much more interested in the
afterlife than the O.T. writers, and that their ideas concerning life after death (though some
being influenced, to a degree, by Hellenistic ideas) were derived from, and augmentations
of, the concept of Sheol spoken of in the O.T. Although such ‘developments’ on the theme
led to a wide variety of views as to what happens to a person after they die, Cooper argues
that the I.T.P. writings can be roughly summarised into three positions: 1. a person dies and
that’s the end (no life after death - the view of the Sadducees), 2. a person dies and then
lives on eternally but ‘spiritually’ (by which he means in a non-physical form [a more Greek
view]), 3. a person dies but in anticipation of some kind of resurrection. The latter group
sub-divides into a further three: those who thought either (a)the person would be raised
immediately after death with a transformed resurrection body, (b)the person would await

328 Cooper, Body, pp.73-4.
the end of time in an intermediate state and then receive a transformed resurrection body (the Pharisees’ view) or (c) the person would (either immediately or later) be raised as a ‘heavenly being’ (by which there was a range of interpretations, ranging from being transformed into a star or planet, to some kind of super-spiritual physical person [possibly akin to a kind of angelic being] though some interpretations of such could also be compatible with [b]).

Though acknowledging the variety, Cooper maintains that what is consistent about all these positions is the correlation between the mode of existence of the being in the afterlife, and the location of existence. More specifically, for those views which fall into category 3b or c - who thought that death was not the end but there was a time of waiting between death and the awaited ‘transformation’, there is again consistency along the following lines: The ‘people’ in this intermediate state [I.S.] are described more often as being conscious and active (as well as being described as asleep at times), those people are referred to as ‘souls’ and ‘spirits’ in that I.S., and they exist in some form, but are not ‘whole’ i.e. they desire what is lacking – a physical body, anticipating the final resurrection.

As regards the doctrine of the I.S., and the three developments just cited of the O.T.’s teaching regarding such, Cooper draws attention to the third of these to clarify that the Hebrew holistic concept of the O.T. has not been jettisoned or polluted by Greek

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329 Ibid., pp.76-80.
330 With the exception of the Sadducees’ view who, though it could be argued that the mode of the dead person fits with the location in (what the Sadducees viewed as) the place of extinction, would likely object to the use of the term ‘existence’.
331 Cf. 1 Enoch 22:3-9; 102:4-5; Jubilees 23:31; 2 Esdras 7:78-80; 2 Baruch 36:11;
idealism. He reminds that the I.T.P writers continued to operate with the holistic thought of their O.T. heritage, viewing nephesh, ruach, leb, basar (and their now Greek translations [soul, spirit, heart, flesh]) as having the same connotations they did in the O.T., but identifies that in the I.T.P., the O.T. meanings of such terms were developed / filled out to mean that terms such as nephesh and ruach could be used to describe people in their ethereal form in the I.S. Remembering that none of the bodily terms are given specifically ‘physical’ or ‘spiritual’ functions in the O.T., the fact that a nephesh or ruach could be conscious in the I.S., even without its default physical body, is a natural extension of how the terms are used in the O.T. Although there are hints, and a scholarly debate as to whether ‘nephesh’ is used to describe the rephaim in the O.T. sheol, in the I.T.P. this was clarified, and the terms psuche and pneuma certainly were used to describe a disincarnate person in that state. These ethereal (bodily) spirits were able to function consciously, morally, religiously even though a truncated version of itself (without its physical body).

A further development consistently found in the I.T.P. is Sheol being translated hades in the Greek translation of the O.T., with the spirits / souls of dead people abiding there, and Hades (the residence of the dead) being understood (and further developed) as a place in which there was a division between the quarters of the ‘blessed’ and quarters of the ‘cursed’ (quarters that some I.T.P. texts suggest are intermediate state heaven and

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333 Similarly to Green, he notes that the standard rhetoric of Greek dualistic ideas influencing the Hebraic holism of the Jews, is far too simplistic; among Greek Hellenists, there were holists and monists too, and some of that thinking influenced certain groups of (more Hellenised) Jews (for example the Stoic ideas found in Ben Sirach, and the materialism ideas found in the Sadducees’ thought [p.85]). However, Cooper maintains that, even recognising the influence of Hellenistic culture ‘most Jews continued to think of the soul as retaining bodily form after death and included the notion of bodily resurrection in their eschatologies’ (p.86). So the standard rhetoric is inadequate and needs to be re-considered.

334 The words ‘ruach’ and ‘nephesh’ were used synonymously in that context, weakening the case for a trichotomous understanding of humanity (Cooper, p.82 and fn. 20).

335 Ibid., pp.83, 93.
The topography of the I.S. varied somewhat in the thoughts of the various Jewish groups, due to differing interpretations of the writings of the I.T.P., and the terminology of such places within hades also varied. However, Cooper argues that the general idea of the I.S. as hades, containing the deceased who are (already enjoying or lamenting whilst) awaiting the final resurrection, was a view consistent with the O.T. and became the view of the religious group the Pharisees. By the time of the writing of the N.T., this pharisaic view (found in the gospels and in the person of Paul [cf. Act 23:8]) had also come to be a commonly held belief among a number of ordinary Jews in first century society who endorsed the (I.T.P.-developed) O.T. Hebraic view of the Pharisees in preference to the Hellenised view of the Sadducees or Herodians. Recognising this background and coming to the point of the first century naturally leads Cooper’s work into his section on the N.T. and how understanding of the anthropology and eschatology further developed in the writings of the N.T.

4.1.2.3 New Testament

Cooper approaches the N.T.’s anthropological teaching carefully, aware as he is of the mistakes dualists have made in the past. He recognises the point that a lot of Christian dualists have read metaphysical (Platonist dualistic) thinking into passages that refer to

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336 Note, however, that ‘heaven’ and ‘hell’ in these texts are (mainly) descriptions of the Intermediate State. In (some) contemporary Christian circles, these terms are used (possibly capitalised) to refer to the final destination of the righteous and unrighteous after the resurrection. However such an understanding should not be read into the I.T.P. texts, which (for the specific Jewish groups which interpreted the passages in this way) refer to the I.S, as a place of awaiting the final judgment (either in joyful, or lamenting anticipation of the final Day.) (Ibid., pp.88-9).

337 Passages such as 1 Enoch 22 suggest different chambers in Sheol, some reserved for the righteous, some for the wicked, the same in 2 Esdras 4:41. Or 2 Baruch 21:23 and 30:2 speak of ‘store-houses’ and ‘treasuries’, and in Jewish apocalyptic, the description of a place with ‘many mansions’ is articulated. 2 Esdras 7 suggests the blessed find rest there (1 Enoch 60:8 extending this to describing their location as a [edenic] ‘garden’, otherwise described as ‘paradise’), whereas the cursed must roam around. (Cooper, pp.87-8).

‘soul’, ‘spirit’, ‘body’ etc. rather than seeking to understand what the N.T. authors themselves meant by the terms. Cooper counters this approach by admonishing that the terminology of the N.T. is just as diverse and complex as that of the O.T. and that different authors used terms such as sarx (flesh), soma (body), psyche (soul), pneuma (spirit) and kardia (heart) in different ways to suit their purposes. He identifies that N.T. writers often drew upon and modified the terminology of their audience to communicate their intended sense, so regularly used devices such as synecdoche, synonyms and parallelism in their writings to make their point. These devices, he claims, are often overlooked by those seeking to draw metaphysical conclusions from relevant verses. A classic example Cooper suggests of this could be the metaphysical reading of 1 Thess 5:23 (‘May God himself, the God of peace, sanctify you through and through. May your whole spirit, soul and body be kept blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.’), and drawing a trichotomous conclusion from the verse when in actual fact a synecdotal reading of it – with Paul stacking up the synecdotal terms spirit, soul and body to emphasise the wholeness and totality of the Thessalonians’ sanctification (for which he is praying) – may be more appropriate. Other verses such as Mt 10:28, 1 Cor 14:14 or Heb 4:12 – verses often taken to support metaphysical conclusions – could also be read in ways, not to distinguish individual faculties or metaphysical parts, but rather to refer to different functional aspects to the

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339 The literary device of using anthropological ‘part-terms’ to refer to the whole person e.g. Lk 12:19.
340 For example Heb 8:10 quoting Jeremiah 31:33 ‘I will put my laws in their minds and write them on their hearts.’ Heb 10:16 later goes onto quote identically except that ‘minds’ and ‘hearts’ have changed places in the sentence.
341 Cooper argues that the device used may be similar to that used by Jesus, where he teaches people to love God with all their heart, all their soul, all their mind and all their strength (Mk 12:30). The fact that Matthew and Luke use different anthropological terms in their equivalent narrating of this pericope suggest that this synecdotal stacking is exactly what is happening in the latter example.
342 Mt 10:28: Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the One who can destroy both soul and body in hell.’ 1 Cor 14:14 ‘For if I pray in a tongue, my spirit prays, but my mind is unfruitful.’ Heb 4:12 ‘For the word of God is alive and active. Sharper than any double-edged sword, it penetrates even to dividing soul and spirit, joints and marrow; it judges the thoughts and attitudes of the heart.’
whole human person. Cooper emphasises that the eisegetical approach is flawed and suggests that the fluidity with which N.T. terms are used underlines more the holistic anthropological picture than giving grounds for assuming dualistic conclusions. Similar to what he argued with regard to the O.T., he comments

Numerous examples could be given demonstrating that heart, soul, spirit, and mind are each used to refer to the seat of the emotions, the source of thoughts and actions, and the deep self which knows and is known by God.

So wanting to avoid the Platonist-Christian mistakes of the past, Cooper circumvents word studies that would look to the use of terms such as ‘spirit’, ‘soul’ and ‘body’ to try and draw metaphysical conclusions about human constitution.345

But having recognised a potential problem with the case dualists have made in the past, Cooper then points out the monistic philosophical mistake that often follows – the assumption that because the dualistic case (made on word studies) is often faulty, then monism has to be the actual anthropology of the New Testament. This is fallacious as the N.T. writers could have been dualists, monists, or trichotomists, but one cannot tell simply from these verses. If verses such as Mk 12:30 or 1 Thess 5:23 give no grounds for assuming dualism, they neither give any grounds for assuming monism. But what they do underline is a functional holism.347 Cooper is willing to admit that if there is nothing else in the N.T. which might suggest dualism, then monism would be a reasonable guess, but the monistic assumption certainly is not valid. But further, Cooper thinks there is additional evidence in

342 Ibid., p.98.
343 Ibid., p.97.
344 Other passages which Cooper appears to encompass under such a point are the above cited 1 Cor 14:14 and Heb 4:12. The word ‘appear’ is used because in the section he is giving examples of what might well be the case (assuming the arguments of biblical scholars) to underline that he does not make his case built on the word studies approach.
345 Ibid., pp.99-103.
346 That is, humans are ‘single, functionally integrated entities’ (p.103 fn. 14).
support of dualism related to what the N.T. teaches about life after biological death, the key question in deciding whether the N.T. is monistic or dualistic being ‘what happens to us when we die?’

In answering the above question, Cooper contends that a N.T scholar has three options, she can opt for: 1. A person dies, and is resurrected immediately, 2. A person dies and goes extinct, only to be recreated on the day of resurrection, or 3. A person dies and whilst awaiting resurrection, some non-physical part of them survives and waits in some kind of intermediate state. Of those options, Cooper implies that if 1 or 2 is correct, then there are no grounds for dualism. However if 3 is correct, then monism cannot be right and dualism most likely is. He goes about seeking which of these is advocated by the N.T. by looking firstly at the non-Pauline N.T. books, then at the Pauline books, and examines theological themes within both to determine the answer.

As regards the non-Pauline books, Cooper advances that if terms such as ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ can be identified in verses as being used for existing persons but who lack an earthly or resurrection body, then this gives grounds for thinking that some part of a human is separable after death giving grounds for thinking dualism is correct. Cooper finds clear examples of such regarding the term ‘spirit’ in Heb 12:23, as well as passages that speak

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349 In terms of how he narrows the options from those discussed in the I.T.P., it is quite obvious why he would eliminate the Sadducees’ ‘complete annihilation’ view. This would be because all (conservative) scholars concerned recognise that ultimate resurrection is the goal of the N.T., that there is life after death. This also sheds light on why the Greek ‘spiritual existence’ option is removed, because in the N.T., ultimate life after death is resurrection, physical life. One can also understand why, though it is not specifically commented on in his chapter on the I.T.P., Cooper gives the extinction-recreation view as an option; Given that some scholars would rather bypass the I.T.P. and its views of the afterlife entirely because of its wide variation and opt solely for the O.T. as the background, such a background has led a number of scholars to the extinction-re-creation view.
350 Ibid., pp.113-14.
of Jesus ‘giving up his spirit’ in death (e.g. Lk 23:46),\(^{351}\) with a third possibility being 1 Pt 3:19-20.\(^{352}\) Further, regarding the term ‘soul’, he argues that Rev 6:9-11 might also be an example of the above, and (though not explicit) Mt 10:28 would suggest an assumed dualistic anthropology. So there is evidence in the non-Pauline literature of people being described as ‘souls’ or ‘spirits’ in the afterlife post biological death.

As regards the Pauline literature,\(^{353}\) although Paul never uses the terms ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ in the above way, Cooper contends that his eschatology strongly implies the existence of the essential person post-death and without a body (‘away from the body but with the Lord’ [awaiting ‘re-clothing’ with a resurrection body]). This is borne out particularly clearly in 2 Cor 5:1-10, and also in a shortened form in Phil 1:21-23 (though hints of such also given in Acts 23:6-8 and 1 Thess 4:13-18). In distinction from other N.T. writers, Paul prefers to speak of the ‘I’ continuing in existence, even without his body.\(^{354}\)

So the above would give grounds for the intermediate state–resurrection view. But Cooper goes further giving evidence \textit{against} the other two positions from a number of theological themes found in the N.T. He argues that Luke’s speaking of the resurrection as being \textit{in the age to come} (Lk 20:35) counts against the immediate resurrection view, something prominently underlined by Paul’s teaching that the resurrection will occur when Christ returns (see Romans, Philippians, and particularly 1 Corinthians 15). And he argues that the extinction-resurrection position is refuted on \textit{multiple} lines of evidence: Jesus’ comment that the patriarchs are \textit{living} (today) (Mt 22:32), Moses and Elijah appearing alive at the

\(^{351}\) Lk 23:46 needing to be read in conjunction with Luke’s use of pneuma in Lk 24:37 – the verse in which Jesus differentiates between a spirit / ghost and himself as a physical / fleshly being.

\(^{352}\) Though with the ambiguity of this latter case, he does not lean on it as part of his argument.

\(^{353}\) Cooper regards all 13 letters as Pauline.

\(^{354}\) Ibid., p.156.
transfiguration, the story of the Rich man and Lazarus in the I.S. in Lk 16:19-31, Jesus’ comment that the thief executed with him would be with him in paradise today (Lk 23:43), the incompatibility of the view with Chalcedonian Christology regarding Christ’s existence between crucifixion and resurrection, all profoundly undermining extinction-resurrection as a competing claim.

On these bases, Cooper is of the opinion that the N.T. clearly teaches a person’s continued existence in the I.S. whilst waiting for the final judgment. This is consistent with what he has been arguing throughout, that Scripture teaches the existence of the essential person in the intermediate state awaiting the final resurrection. He therefore draws the conclusion that the Bible is holistic, but dualistic as opposed to monistic as regards human constitution.

4.1.2.4 Evaluation

As commented above, between the years he originally penned his *Body, Soul and Life Everlasting*, and the second edition, there was little by way of critique of it, hence Cooper was just able to add a new preface to it when re-publishing it in 2000. Recognising this, and Cooper’s growing following as the biblical studies advocate of a form of dualism, Green targets him in his work, so the evaluation will begin by looking at Green’s critique.

Green thinks Cooper’s eschatological approach to anthropology is problematic for three reasons. 1. The question ‘what happens when we die?’ was not rampant in Greco-Roman antiquity and those who held beliefs about it were varied in their views, 2. Jewish beliefs in the first century concerning that question also varied, and 3. Discussions of the afterlife by

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355 In their ethereal / rephaim bodies – comparable to that of Samuel (1 Sam 28) (p.123).
356 Read in light of Jesus’ comment in Lk 23:43.
357 This verse also shedding light on Paul’s vision in 2 Cor 12:1-4. But even without such insight, the fact that Paul entertains that it was possible for him to have such an experience out of the body, Cooper points out, also assumes a dualistic anthropology (pp.149-51).
358 Ibid., pp.120-132.
the N.T. writers is speculative because they had no first-hand knowledge on which they were able to draw.\textsuperscript{359} Instead, Green thinks it is better to build anthropology upon what the Bible says about human nature on this side of the eschaton and then later work out what can be inferred about human nature on the other side. But as seen when looking at the details, these reasons are weak. Against 1, even if ‘what happens when we die’ was not rampant in 1\textsuperscript{st} century Roman history, this would do nothing to undermine the fact that non-Roman thinkers held a view. Remembering Green’s own comment (see previous chapter) that the primary influence behind N.T. writings was the Jewish influence of the O.T., his comment that beliefs held about the afterlife were varied within Greco-Roman antiquity would appear irrelevant. As regards 2, a sympathetic reading of 1. might understand Green to be saying that the Greco-Roman variety of beliefs had coloured Jewish beliefs leading to an even further variegation of views making it difficult to pinpoint consistency, but then Cooper had already noted that and taken it into account with his proposal. And regarding 3, that discussions of the afterlife by the biblical writers is speculative because they had no first-hand knowledge on which they were able to draw is a somewhat strange comment given Green’s Evangelical perspective. Were the N.T. writers giving their own feelings on the subject as say somebody off the street might do today, there might be some value in the objection, but the N.T. writers were apostles (and associates) given their commissioning by a resurrected Christ whom most of them had spent 3 years being taught by, so to the contrary, (even leaving aside any discussion of inspiration) they had plenty of knowledge upon which to draw, surrounding life and life-after-death.

In response to Cooper’s O.T. eschatology, it has already been seen that Green firmly denies any existence of rephaim between death and the final resurrection. He therefore denies

\textsuperscript{359} Green, Body, p.60.
Cooper has any grounds for his case from the O.T. Yet Cooper builds his case, arguing that in a handful of instances, these rephaim are regarded as ‘alive’ or ‘existing’, particularly demonstrated by the prohibition of necromancy. Green recognises that necromancy was an issue for O.T. Israel, but counters in a footnote that the practise of necromancy, though requiring existence beyond death, would not require an intermediate state nor a disembodied person.\footnote{Ibid., p.156, fn.32. This rather opaque comment may be a reference to a chapter Bill Arnold wrote for Green’s compendium \textit{What About the Soul}, a chapter entitled “Soul-Searching Questions About 1 Samuel 28: Samuel’s Appearance at Endor and Christian Anthropology” (which Yong also appears drawn towards [see previous chapters]). In that, Arnold ‘argues’ that it could have been a \textit{resuscitated}, physical Samuel that spoke to Saul as opposed to Samuel’s spirit. The word ‘argues’ here has been put in inverted commas because rather than arguing the case, Arnold merely asserts that with both readings being possible options, the resuscitated view is more likely because the worldview of the O.T. was the Hebrew holism spoken about above. He comments both ‘the socio-historical background of the text makes it unlikely that a disembodied “soul” of Samuel could be involved’ (p.81) and then ‘Recent studies have admitted the Hebrew Bible’s purely physical perception of human personhood, acknowledging the impossibility of developing a Christian dualistic anthropology on the basis of these data.’ (p.83). But this begging the question is comparable to ‘arguments’ such as ‘God does not exist because there is no evidence to suggest that he does; So any evidence presented is unconvincing because God does not exist.’ It is not argued, merely asserted.} The only thing Green can be advocating here would be a resuscitation of someone (i.e. Samuel), but given that the miracle of resuscitation is only one that God can do and God does in Scripture, it is difficult to conceive of such a physical resuscitation happening without his directly ordaining it (just happening through the work of a medium [or as sometimes translated, a spiritist]).

As regards the N.T., in Green’s work, he makes a case for an exegesis of Lk 16:19-31 that becomes apparent is a direct confronting of Cooper’s exegesis,\footnote{Green’s exegesis is a countering of the view that the dialogue between the rich man and Lazarus in this story occurs in the intermediate state. He contends that a number of dualists take the ‘intermediate state location’ view because they assume three things: (a)in the Inter-Testamental Period, belief in an intermediate state was ubiquitous, (b)that the intermediate state was conceived in a common way across the Jewish writings of this time, and (c)that such ideas were built upon, and expansions of, what was already hinted at in the Old Testament concerning Sheol. But Green argues that these three assumptions are nothing like as black and white as usually portrayed. Leaving those assumptions aside, Green counters such exegesis with two arguments. Firstly, due to the picture of torment the rich man is experiencing, and the bliss Lazarus is experiencing, the place the dialogue occurs is no intermediate state, but rather the final destination of Heaven or Hell being referred to. Secondly, given the corporeal existence of the characters in the story, it is unwise to think that Jesus is speaking here of a disembodied existence in an intermediate state, a location and state people exist in between the end of life and the day of resurrection.} however Green takes no
account of the way Cooper explicitly constructs his argument, and instead responds to a straw man. Cooper presents it by building his view of the intermediate state on Jesus’ words in Lk 23, then moving from there to Lk 16, not vice versa as Green insists on. And Green’s reasons for rejecting Cooper’s exegesis anyway are not persuasive. He attempts to rule out Lk 16’s referring to the intermediate state by suggesting that (‘like Lk 23’) this story also sounds like the end of time, not an intermediate state – due to the physicality of the events, plus what looks like the finality of the torment / bliss. The latter has already been responded to in regard to Lk 23 – the intermediate state appears to be an anticipation of the reward / punishment coming on the final day. But the former is handled by Cooper in his exegesis, and responded to on three accounts: The depictions of the rich man suffering bodily torment are consistent with Intertestamental period depictions of the intermediate state; that this is not referring to the end of time is demonstrated in the story by the rich man’s brothers still living on earth (the rich man pleading that someone warn them about what is to come); and that the place is described as Hades as opposed to Gehenna (remembering the terminology from the I.T.P.) gives much better grounds for assuming that it is a depiction of the intermediate state as opposed to Green’s contention that it refers to the end.

So in sum, though recognising Cooper’s as the position to be refuted, Green is unsuccessful in countering it, giving an indication of the position’s strength.

4.1.2.5 Further evaluation

What makes Cooper’s view strong, is that obviously it is biblically grounded, but it benefits from his background training as a philosopher. In effect, he gives the Scriptural framework
but recognises that no constitutional ontology is explicitly taught, it is something that has to be philosophically inferred from the texts. But what is explicitly affirmed is the functional holism of a person. Whereas the trend of biblical studies has been to equate this functional holism with ontological monism, Cooper’s work further makes clear that these are different categories. Having cleared the air, his work is a helpful analysis of whether monism or dualism is a better inference ontologically from Scripture, and his arguments more persuasive that dualism is the implicitly assumed ontology. His key argument for this is obviously the person’s continuing into the intermediate state leaving behind the physical body, and though at times, one wonders whether he has actually started with N.T. teaching and worked backwards, his progressive revelation understanding gives strong grounds for seeing the N.T. teaching as the clearest of all, hence legitimising such an approach, helping him to exegete understanding from the O.T. As is often expressed, the Old Testament has very little to say about eschatology. Whether this ‘backwards reading’ hunch is correct or not, the overall key argument is supported by, and allows much more natural exegesis of key verses, allowing them to say what they actually mean, rather than starting with them as proof-texts for a favoured ontological position, and forcing their meaning.

Cooper’s work is apologetic in nature, and as such he appears willing to concede a lot of ground for the sake of allowing his key argument to shine. Recognising the potential mistakes that have been made by the ‘word studies’ approach, he distances himself from any such approach to clear the way for his key argument so that his case is not written-off too early by monistic biblical scholars. But actually, Cooper is quite coy in the language he uses when referring to such word studies arguments – he does not entirely rule them out, but instead cites how a monist would respond to such, and only uses terms such as ‘might’, ‘could’, ‘may’ when giving his own opinion of the validity of such arguments. Such
arguments play no part in Cooper’s case, and he does not reveal where he stands on a number of verses, however, given that he initially appears to concede Mt 10:28 on a monistic reading, but then rehabilitates the verse recognising its dualistic implications, one wonders whether he would actually be open to further work investigating terms such as ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ even if they play no role in his case. Clearly he has circumvented such questions not wanting his main argument to be clouded. But whilst granting these terms’ functional roles in Scripture, underlining his holistic contention, might it be that certain terms could be referring to the immaterial entity he infers from intermediate state passages? More will need to be said in later chapters to address this, but for now, there may be more grounds to Cooper’s dualistic case than he allows.

Due to the biblical approach Cooper takes, the final ‘critique’ and ‘limitation’ of his work to be mentioned, is that he does not go any further than his holistic dualist position. He makes no attempt, for example to affirm whether a Thomistic or contemporary Cartesian dualist position is preferable. This is understandable, given that his is a work in (philosophically-informed) exegesis, and Cooper appears to be deliberately leaving the door open, wanting to claim that many different dualist positions could fit under his holistic dualist proposal. But would commending a more specific philosophical position under the holistic dualist banner be valuable, and serve as a helpful advancement of Cooper’s work?

In commentary on this, a similar approach to Cooper has also been embraced recently by Stuart Goetz, who prefers not to advocate one particular dualistic position, but instead opts to endorse what he calls ‘Mere Dualism’, recognising that the intricacies and pros and cons of differing dualisms make the issue a complex one for coming to a conclusion on the
issue. To expand the C.S. Lewis-inspired language, Lewis argued for ‘Mere Christianity’ as opposed to arguing for any particular denomination of Christianity specifically, arguing that his role as an apologist was merely to bring the unbeliever into the Christian ‘house’ (faith), into the hallway. Which room / denomination the (now) believer opted to reside in was up to her, but his work was affirming ‘Mere Christianity’, the house generally, rather than any particular denomination. The analogy needs no further spelling out for Goetz’ adoption of it, however, what Goetz passes over in adopting Lewis’ language, is that Lewis was not of the opinion that one could just remain in the hallway of the house. One did need to opt for a room to reside in, to enjoy the furniture, the contents and life of the room, it was just not his role as an apologist to usher them into a particular one. Likewise, although Goetz and Cooper might see their particular role in their fields as being to bring people into the holistic dualist house, it would appear that once in, the holistic dualist would need to find a room to reside in, and adopt a type of holistic dualism, rather than just remaining content in the hallway. To affirm holistic dualism and recognising it as the biblical position is a positive thing, but when philosophical-theological questions arise (such as [more precisely] what is the soul? what does it do? how does it function and relate to the body?), the holistic dualist would need to have taken a step beyond just mere holistic dualism to be able to engage with such questions. So can Cooper’s work be taken a step further and a type of holistic dualism be contended for, drawing upon the further insights of philosophy of mind and Pentecostal thought? Part of the contention of following chapters is that it can, and though Cooper’s is a firm (philosophically-astute) Scriptural basis upon which to build, in light of further constructive work, a particular type of holistic dualism (even if that type or ‘room’

itself has many sub rooms) can be proposed through further consideration of the relevant (holistic dualist) philosophy of mind, and insights from Pentecostal theology.

4.1.3 Cooper’s work in light of Pentecostal emphases

Although a dialogue partner from outside of the Pentecostal tradition, and one whose work could be advanced, from the above, it should be quite clear that Cooper’s work has been chosen because of the strength it has in seeking to begin building a Pentecostal doctrine of constitution giving a strong (philosophically robust but) scriptural foundation to the view. But it is also evident that his view is very consistent with at least two of the Pentecostal emphases.

In terms of the Pentecostal emphasis of eschatology articulated in the introduction, Cooper’s approach is clearly consistent with that emphasis, his view being built upon the premise that some kind of dualism follows from the biblical teaching on the eschatological intermediate state. Cooper’s view also celebrates the prospect of a resurrection body, recognising that the disembodied soul in the intermediate state is not the natural state for a human, rather, that period and condition is an awaiting of the eschaton where the soul will receive its resurrection body, this being the full, natural, embodied state humanity is intended for. This links to Cooper’s consistency with the holistic emphasis of Pentecostalism, of course, (the name making it obvious) his being a holistic dualist position. His view of human constitution very much underlines the integrated, functioning, worshipping person as a whole, again very consistent with this Pentecostal emphasis. His being a holistic dualism suggests that his position may fit consistently with the Pentecostal dualistic / ‘supernatural’ understanding of reality, but not enough has been seen as regards this Pentecostal emphasis yet to establish whether such a suggestion is accurate. Nor has the first
Pentecostal emphasis on the renewing Holy Spirit, an area which also needs considering. So these will be further considered in light of the work of Pentecostal J.K.A. Smith, but at this point, nothing of what Cooper articulates appears inconsistent with these latter Pentecostal emphases, and his holistic dualist view is certainly consistent with the former Pentecostal emphases. This potentially bodes well for establishing Cooper’s exegetical proposal as a starting point for constructing a model of human constitution that is consistent with Pentecostal theological emphases.

4.2 Considering Cooper’s work further in light of Pentecostal emphases in dialogue with J.K.A. Smith

J.K.A. Smith has given considerable attention to Pentecostal spirituality, and, as one whose primary book on the issue, like Cooper, shows ease in handling both theology and philosophy, he is an ideal dialogue partner for further considering the consistency of Cooper’s proposal with Pentecostal emphases. Smith’s general understanding of Pentecostal spirituality, and the entailed ‘elements of the Pentecostal “social imaginary” (or “worldview”364)’ he develops, will be outlined. From this basis, the specifically relevant, second element of his Pentecostal social imaginary - the ‘Spirit-enchantment of the world’ he articulates - will be considered. Through filling out Smith’s element to also give attention to the nature of angels within that, and putting some theological flesh on the (pre-)philosophical bones of this element of his Pentecostal

363 Smith is a continental philosopher teaching in a Reformed theological college (Calvin College). But having wide interests, Smith has also contributed to the Journal of Pentecostal Theology, as well as written other significant theological texts (such as Imagining the Kingdom [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009]) demonstrating his being able to straddle not just theology and philosophy, but also the Reformed and Pentecostal traditions too. The text of preference to be drawn on for this chapter is his Pentecostal Manifesto Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010). He and Yong are those thinkers that have gone the furthest in attempting to articulate Pentecostal spirituality from a philosophical as well as theological perspective. Much of their work crosses over, so although Smith is chosen as the primary dialogue partner (though Yong would use different terminology), much of what Smith says is endorsed by Yong, as it is other Pentecostals who have given the spirituality consideration, but not so much from a philosophical-theological perspective.

364 ‘Social imaginary’ is Smith’s terminology, ‘worldview’ is essentially what he means by it.
worldview, this will give the stimulus for considering Cooper’s proposal in light of the dualistic ‘supernatural’ world emphasis of Pentecostal theology.

Having done that, by then considering and evaluating Smith’s ‘Enspirited creation ontology’ which arises following his second element, sufficient insight will be brought as to whether Cooper’s view is consistent with the other Pentecostal emphasis – the particular renewal pneumatology Pentecostals celebrate and experience (in their on-going encounter with the Holy Spirit in unexpected as well as expected ways). Though Smith’s ontology focusses on the Holy Spirit in creation generally and not on the human aspect of the divine-human encounter relationship with the Spirit specifically, enough light will have been given to argue that Cooper’s model is consistent with this emphasis too; but, recognising the potential for more to be said at the anthropological level in dialogue with Smith’s work, his will also provide fruitful leads to be returned to in chapter 7.

4.2.1 Engaging J.K.A. Smith on Pentecostal worldview and spirituality

It is helpful to be reminded of how, for Smith, the Pentecostal worldview arises. Smith begins with the assumption, as do all other contemporary Pentecostal scholars, that Pentecostalism is a renewal spirituality (as opposed to a set of doctrines) involving an openness to on-going encounter with God through his Spirit. He agrees that this is a spirituality in which Pentecostals are open to experiencing God’s Spirit in unexpected as well as more expected ways. However, in elaboration of this as the heart of the spirituality, Smith identifies Pentecostal spirituality more fully as a set of worship practises which carry a certain worldview or ‘social imaginary’ within them. The worldview developed (or

365 See introduction ‘Defining Pentecostalism?’ (I.1) and ‘Scholarly Pentecostal theology’ (I.3).
366 Smith borrows the language of ‘social imaginary’ from Charles Taylor. On Yong’s model, whilst agreeing that the Pentecostal presuppositions are what are distinctive to Pentecostal theological method, he prefers the
through participating in Pentecostal worship practices, he argues, becomes a believer’s presuppositions or pre-theoretical assumptions they bring to the world, and functions as the lens through which Pentecostals see and experience the world. Smith’s articulation of this worldview has 5 elements to it. Not surprisingly, his first is ‘a Radical Openness to God’, from which all the other elements follow.\(^{367}\) His third element is ‘An Affective Narrative Epistemology’, his fourth ‘A Non-Dualistic Affirmation of Embodiment and Materiality’ (using ‘nondualistic’ here in the sense of not opposing the spiritual and physical worlds together as good and evil),\(^{368}\) and his fifth, ‘an Eschatological Orientation towards Mission and Justice’. But the key element for the purposes of this chapter, is his second one: ‘An “Enchanted” Theology of Creation and Culture’.\(^{369}\)

Smith’s fuller definition of his second element of the Pentecostal worldview is as follows. Pentecostals assume:

> An *enchanted* theology of creation and culture that perceives the material creation as “charged” with the presence of the Spirit, but also with other spirits (including demons and “principalities and powers”), with entailed expectations regarding miracles and spiritual warfare.\(^{370}\)

With such a definition, this then enables Smith to elaborate very creatively a potential Enspirited ontology of the world, and the place of the Spirit, creation, miracles and science within that. However, he says very little about ‘the other spirits’ he mentions above, a discussion that would have been of great value for Pentecostals particularly in relation to

\(^{367}\) Having had a renewing encounter with the Holy Spirit, further encounters are expected.

\(^{368}\) In a footnote on p.42 he clarifies where he stands regarding ‘dualism’ in the sense that this thesis is particularly concerned with: ‘pentecostal spirituality remains dualistic...insofar as it maintains an ontological distinction between spirit and matter, and affirms the existence of immaterial entities.’ (p.42 fn. 69).


\(^{370}\) Ibid., p.12 (emphasis his).
the topic of the human soul / spirit. So under the banner of Smith’s ‘Element 2’ – An ‘Enchanted / Enspirited creation’, what follows is that necessary elaboration, giving the chapter a suitable understanding of angels. This will then facilitate a sufficient understanding of the Pentecostal world, for considering whether Cooper’s holistic dualist view is consistent with the further Pentecostal emphases of the renewal pneumatology and the dualistic conception of the world.

4.2.2 Filling Out Smith’s Enchanted / Enspirited Creation – A doctrine of Angels

When seeking to fill out the hole in Smith’s second element of a Pentecostal worldview, the understanding of angels Pentecostals believe in from chapter 3 would helpfully be elaborated. There, it was stated that these are immaterial beings, but giving a fuller definition, one might define angels as a type of heavenly being; they are:

- Created, immaterial, (self)conscious (hence, animate) beings, who joyfully worship God, and function as servants in the carrying out of God’s plans and purposes – ‘angels’ often being a specific term to refer to those heavenly beings who from time to time take on a visible or physical form to carry out some of those purposes in the material world.

The angels (and other spirit beings) that Pentecostals accept as an endemic aspect of their worldview are immaterial self-conscious beings. These beings populate or (to use Smith’s phraseology) ‘enchant’ the physical world humans live in, so humans share reality with (multitudes of) these immaterial agents. As immaterial beings, these angels have no physical bodies (unless given a specific purpose to carry out in the physical world [any remains, or ‘shell’ of which, interestingly, are apparently never left behind after the purpose has been

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371 The two terms will be continue to be used synonymously in referring to the immaterial human aspect. On the rare occasions Smith refers to this entity, he opts for the term ‘spirit’.

372 Cf. Deut 33:2; Dan 7:10; Neh 9:6; Ps 148:2, 5; Col 1:16; Heb 12:22; Rev 5:11.
carried out], they are simply immaterial agents whose ordinary existence is as spirits. This immaterial self-conscious nature of the immaterial angel spirit should not be too much of a surprise when it is remembered that these beings, like humans, also derive their being from a (maximally great) immaterial self-conscious being – God. Indeed, God is spirit (Jn 4:24) and is the ultimate immaterial self-conscious agent from whom all other agents derive their being.

Giving focus to angelic beings (which Smith says little about) fills out Smith’s second element, enabling a richer appreciation of the Pentecostal ontology he develops (to be expounded). As will be seen, Smith argues that the world is Enspirited by the Holy Spirit, but in drawing attention to the nature of angels articulated above, it can be emphasised that it is also enspirited by angelic beings.  

Whilst giving indications then of how any understanding of human constitution might be consistent or inconsistent with the 1st Pentecostal emphasis – the renewal pneumatology, this richer appreciation of Smith’s ontology also gives indications as to how consistent such a constitutional view would be in light of the 2nd emphasis too – the dualistic nature of the world.

4.2.3 Viewing Cooper’s proposal in light of the Pentecostal enchanted world

From the above, it should be clear that Cooper’s holistic dualist view of constitution is very much in accord with the Pentecostal emphasis of a dualistic world, a Pentecostal world which underlines the ‘supernatural’ aspect to reality as well as the physical. Although as will be seen, the word ‘supernatural’, though commonly used by Pentecostals, is not very helpful, the immaterial aspect of Cooper’s view of a human – namely, what could be called a

373 Note the difference between Enspirit (upper case) and enspirit (lower case). As an infinite being, God’s Spirit Enspirits the whole cosmos. As finite beings, angelic spirits enspirit parts of the cosmos.
‘soul’ or ‘spirit’, fits very naturally within a Pentecostal world that emphasises the realm of immaterial angelic beings, as well as the immaterial nature of God. Indeed, the (ontological) dualistic nature of a human being is very consistent with the (ontological) dualistic nature of the wider world. So having filled out this second element of Smith to incorporate angelic beings, it has been seen that Cooper’s exegetical view is consistent with this Pentecostal emphasis. Whether it might be consistent with the other emphasis, that of the Pentecostal renewal pneumatology, will now be considered in light of the Pentecostal ontology Smith develops following his Spirit (and spirit) enchantment element of his Pentecostal social imaginary.

4.2.4 Smith’s Pentecostal Ontology

Turning from angelic spirits to the Holy Spirit, the closely associated Enspirited creation ontology that flows from the Enspirited / Enchanted creation element of Smith’s social imaginary, allows the beginnings of consideration of the Pentecostal renewal pneumatology - with particular focus on the Spirit’s relationship to creation.

It is to be remembered that for Smith an Enchanted creation and hence Enspirited ontology is central to Pentecostal spirituality, him commenting

Endemic to a Pentecostal worldview is the implicit affirmation of the dynamic, active presence of the Spirit not only in the church, but also in creation. And not only the Spirit, but also other spirits. Thus central to a Pentecostal construal of the world is a sense of “enchantment”.374

Smith rejects the standard bifurcation of the natural and supernatural world as being an overhang from the Enlightenment. He regards such an idea as being (at best) a deistic

374 J.K.A Smith, Thinking in Tongues (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010) p.39. Or see also p.101 where he comments ‘This sense of all creation – nature and culture – is charged with the presence of the Spirit is implicit in the prayer and practices of Pentecostal spirituality.’
understanding of the cosmos – a universe that follows its own autonomous laws and regularity, but into which God sometimes intervenes to do supernatural things (such as miracles, and revealing himself). Dismissing this, Smith advocates instead a creation (and culture within that) with a lot more emphasis on the immanence of the Spirit within the created order – him describing nature / creation as being ‘suspended in and inhabited by the Spirit such that it is always already primed for the Spirit’s manifestations [such as miracles].’

Smith’s route towards such an ontology has clearly been influenced by Radical Orthodoxy, a theology with which he is very happy to associate himself (though with his uniquely Reformed slant). Such a theology holds to a ‘participatory ontology’ – one which values the material realm in a nonreductive sense by recognising that creation and nature is ‘only insofar as it participates in, or is suspended from the transcendent Creator’, yet is an ontology that is also unequivocally incarnational, him affirming a ‘significant sense in which the transcendent inheres in immanence.’ This participatory ontology therefore rejects the Enlightenment idea that nature is autonomous, recognising that it only has its being through participating in the realm of the Spirit, allowing creation to retain its place as being ‘enchanted’, namely, full of the presence of the Spirit (and spirits). This foundation is obviously attractive and helpful for Smith’s Pentecostal thinking in that

375 Ibid., p.101 (emphasis his).
376 See his Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004).
377 Thinking in Tongues, p.100.
378 Ibid. p.100. Note, ‘immanence’ in this reference refers to the ontological status of the material world as opposed to the sense of God’s being immanent.
379 Three other Pentecostal writers who have recently explored the Spirit’s relation to the world in parallel projects to that of Smith are Cartledge, Vondey and Chris Green. Although preferring the concept of ‘sacramentality’ (one which on occasions Smith adopts), Vondey and Chris Green’s projects happily dovetail with (and sometimes use ideas from) Smith. Likewise, Cartledge, who prefers and builds on the concept of ‘Mediation’, yet whose project also has close affiliation to that of Smith. (cf. W. Vondey, ‘Between This and
Pentecostal spirituality and practice don’t merely expect that God could “interrupt” the so-called “order” of nature; rather, they assume that the Spirit is always already at work in creation, animating (and reanimating) bodies, grabbing hold of vocal chords, taking up aspects of creation to manifest the glory of God.\textsuperscript{380}

The 2010 ontology Smith presents is a more Pentecostally-coloured version of his standard participatory ontology, having accepted an assist from Yong in 2007, who suggested Smith’s work could be enhanced by viewing creation as ‘suspended’ \textit{in the realm of the Spirit} (the person of the Trinity in which the whole cosmos is suspended).\textsuperscript{381} This gives Smith a more pneumatological and Pentecostal colour to his participatory ontology, demonstrated in the above, his (2010) Pentecostal / Enspirited creation ontology. However, Smith’s appropriation of Yong’s assist is illuminating too in that it shows the theological framework in which Smith has developed his Enspirited ontology.

In responding to Yong’s assist (in 2007), Smith outlined his salvation-historical framework and how his ontology works in relation to that. He gave a creation-fall-redemption context for framing his ontology arguing (in acceptance of the assist) that although the whole world in some way participates in the Spirit, the church has a special place within his participatory (and Enspirited) ontology, making a distinction between the world as it is in rebellion against God, and the church as it is in harmony / relationship with him. In that 2007 work, Smith

\textsuperscript{380} Ibid., p.101.

made a distinction between people experiencing a ‘structural’ and a ‘directional’ participation in the Spirit. ‘Structural’ participation is had by something (specifically, someone) that does not participate fully/properly in God – it just merely has a structural existence which (though not acknowledging God) it owes to the life-giving nature of the Spirit. ‘Directional’ participation is had by someone that does fully/properly participate in God, and is properly ordered or directed to the divine. To phrase it more succinctly, Smith argues that to participate properly in the Creator is to also be directed to the Creator. In light of his theological creation-fall-redemption framework then, though created for the directional participation in the Spirit, humanity is now participating merely in a structural manner in a less intense form of participation, due to the event of the Fall. However, though being the status of fallen people, in redemption, the restoring work of the Spirit intensifies such participation when a person is re-oriented directionally towards God, restoring them back to the participation they were designed for in the beginning. But, specifically in a Pentecostal mind-set, Smith also contends that, even within that directionally participatory state, a believer can experience greater and further intensifications as they live in and continue to participate in the Spirit.

This development of his 2007 work to the point of advancing his Enspired creation in 2010, demonstrates that, on the one hand, Smith wants to argue that creation participates in the Spirit, and on the other, that the Spirit fills creation. And like creation’s participation, which can intensify in the realm of the Spirit, Smith’s 2010 work argues that the Spirit intensifies his presence at times and at places in creation. Such a Pentecostal ontology allows Smith to regard the world as primed by the Spirit for his work. In response to the on-going debate concerning whether God acts within creation in a supernatralist/naturalist sense, with all
the implications that has for science and miracles, Smith argues that the world being
Enspirited means that a unique solution is found in the debate. With the Spirit’s dwelling in
creation, this gives a natural foundation for his more regular work of creating and sustaining
the natural rhythms and order of creation, so facilitating a solid base for science. Yet at the
same time, the Spirit’s more ‘miraculous’ manifestations such as healing, speaking words of
prophecy etc. are due to ‘more intense instances of the Spirit in creation – or…”sped-up”
modes of the Spirit’s more “regular” presences.’ Based on his Pentecostal ontology,
Smith’s ‘Enspirited / enchanted naturalism’ facilitates both natural science whilst leaving
room for miracles, his position allowing for the spirituality of Pentecostalism, whilst also the
order of science.

More will need to be said later on about the relationship of the Spirit to humanity, because
Smith’s philosophical theological pneumatology is focussed particularly on a world scale.
However, for the purposes of clarity, and to lead into the area of evaluation, it might be
helpful to summarise Smith’s model of an enchanted/enspirited creation and relationship
between the world and Spirit, by using the analogy of a (large) sea sponge and its

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382 Thinking in Tongues, p.104. At this point, the specifics of the place of ‘naturalistic’ science might rear its
head asking of Smith how his idea of Enchanted Creation would engage / facilitate the scientific method.
Although here not having the space to articulate such, Smith is very aware of such discussions and devotes
much of his chapter to the relevant (and often underlying philosophical) issues of metaphysical and
methodological naturalism, defining categories such as supernaturalism, anti-supernaturalism and (what he
calls) supernaturalism, and elaborating how science is born out in his proposal. As said above, he is very clear
that his Enspirited creational ontology would facilitate the regular workings of science (as well as allowing the
place of miracles within creation), and is keen (with Yong and others) that Pentecostals engage thoroughly
with the scientific arena. (See further his “Is There Room for Surprise in the Natural World? Naturalism, the
Supernatural, and Pentecostal Spirituality” in Science and the Spirit: A Pentecostal Engagement with the
Sciences, J.K.A. Smith and A. Yong [eds.] [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010], and the compendium
as a whole). For an overview of how Pentecostals have engaged with science generally from the beginning of
the 20th century, see Yong’s Spirit of Creation, ch.2, and of course, in the wider discussion, the literature
surrounding the relationship (and complementarity) between theology with science is becoming vast (cf.
works by P. Davies, A. McGrath, J. Polkinghorne, A. Peacocke, F. Collins, O. Gingerich, to name but a few).
relationship to the sea.\textsuperscript{383} The sea sponge is a distinct entity, but only in the sea can it live, move and have its being. The sea gives rise to it, surrounds it, fills, and is in it, yet the sponge itself is not the sea, it has an existence that is distinct from, but dependent upon the sea. At times, the sponge (or parts of it) might experience particular surges of the sea, or a particular warmth of the sea as the intensity of the water varies, but throughout, it is thoroughly dependent on the sea for its life, being and movement.\textsuperscript{384}

4.2.5 Evaluating Smith

Before considering Cooper’s work in light of Smith’s Pentecostal ontology, evaluation of Smith’s proposal will ensue to check that it is indeed a view of the Spirit’s relation to creation that Pentecostals would recognise and advocate. Thorough evaluation is also important because if it is indeed a position Pentecostals would advocate, it may have further potential for developing the model begun by interaction with Cooper, in further chapters of the thesis.

\textsuperscript{383} As with all analogies, of course this one is limited. To compare two material entities, the sea and the sponge, does not do justice to God as an immaterial entity in relation to a world, much of which is physical in nature. And whereas the sea is finite, God is infinite, so another limitation reveals itself. That said, the following is still regarded by Smith as helpful for summarising his ontology (confirmed in an e-mail reply dated 16\textsuperscript{th} October 2015).

\textsuperscript{384} The place then of the other spirits in the picture (which was missing from Smith’s own work), though slightly more complex, would be: Like the sponge, and as part of the created cosmos, such spirits would also be surrounded and filled by the sea (though as will be seen later, the intensity with which an entity has the Spirit living in them varies – in the instance of an evil spirit, this would be merely in a structural sense – see below), though of a different substance to the physical world. Due to being of a different substance, these spirits can possess / indwell material entities (though in Scripture, only evil spirits are said to do so) so could also be analogous to some other more limited liquid-fillable entity such as algae (or in the instance of evil spirits, mud), surrounding, and filling (at least) a part of the sponge, \textit{but} because such spirits themselves are filled with the Holy Spirit, their indwelling of material beings is of a differing kind to that of the Spirit. The entities of algae and mud extend the analogy and give insight as to the place of angelic and demonic spirits, in that these can be and are indwelt with the water of the Spirit, but could also indwell in a part of the sponge. As with all analogies, the above has its limitations, however, the analogy as a whole is particularly helpful for illustrating the relationship of the Holy Spirit to the material creation (the place of angels and demons in the analogy being secondary).
In evaluation, Smith appears to have carefully and successfully walked the difficult line of steering between valuing God’s immanence, without collapsing into a kind of panentheism\(^{385}\) - a position Pentecostals tend to be wary of. At times, it appears that he has come close, but has ultimately avoided such territory, his (Reformed) Radical Orthodoxy theology being the basis guaranteeing his position as immanentist, but not panentheist.\(^{386}\)

To elaborate and recognise how he keeps the distinction, two things need to be noticed, namely the context of his articulating his ontology, and what he does with Yong’s assist. His ontology is articulated in response to the ‘naturalist/super-naturalist’ debate concerning science, and God’s relation to the world. Because of his rejection of the bifurcation, he often expresses sympathies towards nonreductionist materialists such as the panentheistic

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\(^{385}\) Defining panentheism loosely, at first, to mean “The belief that the Being of God includes and penetrates the whole universe so that every part of it exists in Him, but (contra Pantheism) that his Being is more than, and not exhausted by, the universe.” (“Panentheism” in F.L. Cross and E.A. Livingstone (eds.) *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 3rd Rev. ed.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p.1213 (Emphasis mine).

Smith’s ontology appears not to fall into such a category because he does not see the world as included in the being of God, but instead participating in, and infused with the presence of God’s Spirit. Again, see the analogy of the sea sponge above.

But it is to be noted that Panentheism is a notoriously slippery word to define, particularly given that all theists want to assert that everything is ‘in’ God in some sense, and God is ‘in’ all things in a sense (Acts 17:28). But (depending on who defines it [cf. Clayton’s and Cooper’s respective works on the issue “Panentheism Today” in *In Whom We live, Move, and Have our Being*, A. Peacocke and P. Clayton (eds.) (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004) particularly pp.251-252; And J.W. Cooper’s *Panentheism: The Other God of the Philosophers – from Plato to the Present* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006)]) panentheism tends to be a position that is defined as meaning that the universe is part of God. Panentheists sometimes use the analogy of an interactionist soul-body relationship to describe the relationship of God to the world: God (the soul) causally brings about effects in the world (his body), and God gains understanding and knowledge through the world. The analogy is not perfect because panentheists recognise God as beyond, above, transcending the world (unlike the human soul to its body) but the interaction between the two is helpfully illustrated by the analogy and gives an understanding of God’s ‘developing’, in some way (for instance, in his understanding), through his relationship with the world. So to further distinguish Smith’s view from this, and in clarification of the sea-sponge analogy, on Smith’s view, it would be helpful to clarify that God is ‘in’ creation in a metaphysical sense, and likewise, creation ‘in’ him. (Trying to articulate the difficult issue of how creation is ‘in’ God, and drawing attention to the metaphysical distinction, E. Stump (a follower and expositor of the classic classical theist Thomas Aquinas) suggests it helpful to consider the world as being like a 2 dimensional square in a 3 dimensional sphere (‘Omnipresence, Indwelling, and the Second Personal’ *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 5.4 [2013]: 33-34, 37).

\(^{386}\) At no point does Smith want to say that God is mutually dependent on creation as creation is dependent on God, so the soul-body interaction analogy is only helpful to the extent that God causes events in the body in this one way direction. On Smith’s ontology, the opposite is not true - God does not ‘develop’ in any sense due to what happens in the ‘body’ / the world. It should be further clarified that his view does not downplay or reject the aseity of God either.
thinkers Clayton and Griffin. Yet at other times, he distances himself from them, forging his own view also in response to theirs. In response to Yong’s assist, which might appear to entail Trinitarian panentheism, Smith’s articulated 2007 response shows that the assist merely Spirit-colours his own ontology, an ontology that, using a creation-fall-redemption context, retains a distinction between church, creation and culture. Through articulating his view of differing degrees of intensity in which these different aspects of the world participate in the realm of the Spirit, this distinguishes him from Yong’s Trinitarian panentheism, as well as general panentheism. So in sum, it is his Spirit-Coloured

387 For example his footnotes 17 on p.191 of Radical Orthodoxy and fn. 38 on p.102 of Thinking in Tongues, which suggest that his view might be a close relation to Clayton’s more refined panentheism(s); Clayton (maybe in slight contradiction to the general definition above) identifying 5 different degrees of panentheism, with which a handful of Christian thinkers have recently wanted to identify to differing degrees, grading from very weak panentheism (2) to very strong panentheism (6) (with very weak panentheism being the next step down from Classical theism (1) and very strong Panentheism being one step up from Pantheism (7)), outlined as follows:

1. God created the world as a distinct substance. It is separate from God in nature and essence, although God is present to the world.
2. God is radically immanent in the world.
3. God is bringing the world to Godself.
4. The world is in God – at least metaphorically, and perhaps also in a stronger sense.
5. God’s relation to the world is in some sense analogous to the relationship between mind and body.
6. The world and God are correlated (contingently for some authors, necessarily for others).
7. The world and God are “nondual,” or there is only one substance that can be called “nature” or “God.”


388 Smith clarifies that Clayton (and Peacocke’s) (weak) panentheistic position emphasises the ‘immanence of God to the world as the world’s dynamic principle’, but critiques this arguing that it differs from the Pentecostal ontology he espouses ‘insofar as the “God” internal to the world, as it were, does not, would not, and cannot act outside of the “laws” of nature’ on Clayton’s view (i.e. it does not have a place for the miraculous in such a worldview) (Smith, Thinking in Tongues, p.97). More specifically (in a separate footnote), ‘I think Clayton’s panentheism does not start from a sufficiently dynamic sense of the contingency of the “laws” of nature.’ (Thinking in Tongues, fn. 38, p.103).

389 The Spirit being the ‘agent’ in which creation is suspended.

390 In distinction from classic panentheists, Clayton and Yong class themselves as Trinitarian Panentheists, seeing everything as being in the Spirit specifically, as opposed to in God completely. In this sense, they would be classified as weak panentheists in distinction from the process thinkers who are strong panentheists.

391 However, on Clayton’s taxonomy, even such distinctions as these could still mean a thinker qualified as a weak panentheist. For example Christian scholars such as C. Pinnock, would likely have been happy to incorporate themselves under the banner of ‘weak panentheist’ categorised as such by Clayton, in that they maintain the distinction between Creator and creation - retaining the transcendence of God – whilst being willing to accept even up to point 4 on Clayton’s typology (see for example Pinnock’s Flame of Love [Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP, 1996] pp.56,57,61,77 (cf. also D. Edwards Breath of Life: A Theology of the Creator Spirit [Mary Knoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2004] pp.113, 140-41.)
Reformed-Radical Orthodox participatory ontology that is what allows him to steer clear of panentheism, whilst still maintaining God’s immanence. This allows him to affirm the biblical passages that speak of the world as being ‘in’ God and God being ‘in’ all things (e.g. Ps 139:7; Jer 23:23; Acts 17:28; Eph 1:22-23), yet also to have a clear concept too of God’s transcendence, his being a careful ‘immanentalist’ route which bisects panentheism and supernaturalist / interventionist theologies.

As well as maintaining the balance, Smith’s work is also beneficial in his managing to Pentecostalise the benefits of the Radical Orthodoxy movement, and introduce Pentecostals to an ontology which fits their experience, practise and theology. As it stands, his work makes a lot of sense of the ‘Come Holy Spirit’ ministry so common to Pentecostal worship, but which many have found difficult to discuss theologically. His work further values the

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392 Phrasing it as such, and in light of the footnotes above – even with Smith’s clarifications and distinctions above – I wanted to check directly with Smith whether his view might be regarded as panentheistic in any sense, recognising that it was just conceivable that Smith might willingly assent to 2, 3 or even 4 on Clayton’s classification. But in a personal communication in which I asked whether he would classify himself as a panentheist at any point on Clayton’s scale, in response Smith clarified that he did not feel entirely comfortable with any panentheistic affiliation, stating instead that his view (like that of Jonathan Edwards) does not fit into such standard classifications, and more fine-grained categories are needed; the closest one could use categories-wise would be affiliating his view to the position of (the Catholic) de Lubac via the (Reformed) Boersma (the J.I. Packer professor of theology at Regent College). (See for example Boersma’s article ‘Sacramental Ontology: Nature and the Supernatural in the Ecclesiology of Henri De Lubac’ New Black Friars, vol. 88, issue 1015 [May 2007] 242-273.) Such a comment underlines that his view is a Radical Orthodox participatory ontology, that is assisted by Yong’s suggestion of the world being suspended in the realm of the Spirit, meaning it does not fall into Clayton’s classifications of panentheism. For further consideration of the issue, and whether Smith’s ontology is consistent with his Reformed tradition, the interested reader is recommended Wolter Huttinga’s Participation and Communicability: Herman Bavinck and John Milbank on the Relation between God and the World, online available at http://www.academia.edu/11252500/Participation_and_Communicability_Herman_Bavinck_and_John_Milbank_on_the_Relation_between_God_and_the_World (accessed 23rd February 2016). After extended analysis in this essay, Huttinga arrives at the conclusion (though recognising that it is somewhat contentious amongst Reformed thinkers) that such participatory ontology is at home within the tradition.

393 As another Pentecostal (of an Evangelical Anglican persuasion), who has carefully struck the balance, one is reminded of Mark Cartledge’s comment ‘I assume that the Holy Spirit is present in the created order, but is distinct from that order.’ (M. Cartledge, The Mediation of the Spirit: Interventions in Practical Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015) pp.51-52).

394 Again, a helpful recent elaboration on this concept is provided by Cartledge who follows his comment above with ‘I assume that there is an inextricable connection between the work of Christ and the work of the Spirit, such that what we call the “coming of the Spirit” is in fact an intensification of the Spirit’s work in creation but directed towards the eschatological goal of salvation in, with and through Christ…The Spirit as
place of the Spirit as the author and giver of life. In sum, he appears to have given a helpful articulation of the Spirit in his relation to creation, one with which Pentecostals could gladly concur.

4.2.6 Considering Cooper’s model in light of Smith’s ontology

The above review of Smith’s ontology is quite extensive, but so being to draw out the pneumatology that Pentecostals endorse. Now returning to Cooper’s project, it seems evident that his holistic dualist view could happily be consistent with such a pneumatology. Indeed, with Cooper’s drawing attention to the human spirit / soul, there appears room to develop his position Pentecostally (as well as philosophically), in considering the anthropological aspect of the Pentecostal (Holy) Spirit – (human) spirit encounter relationship. This anthropological side of the encounter relationship will receive further attention later in the thesis, where indeed Smith’s ontology will be drawn on as a resource for advancing the holistic dualist model of Cooper into a specifically Pentecostal view. But for here, sufficient light has been given for suggesting Cooper’s view is consistent with the outstanding Pentecostal pneumatological emphasis as well as the other three already addressed.

4.3 Summary

This chapter has drawn on Cooper’s exegetical work, suggesting this as a helpful starting point for constructing an enhanced Pentecostal view of human constitution to that of Yong

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and Kärkkäinen. He has been chosen because of his project’s being firmly rooted in the authority of Scripture, the source of ultimate authority for Pentecostals seeking to construct doctrine. Through considering his holistic dualist proposal, it has been seen that his model is obviously consistent with the eschatological emphasis of Pentecostal theology, as it is with the holistic emphasis. Through assessing Cooper’s work further in light of Smith, it has been further seen that Cooper’s proposal is also consistent with the (ontological) dualistic emphasis of Pentecostalism, as well as the renewal pneumatology emphasis.

Through engaging Smith’s second element and associated Pentecostal ontology, certain hints have arisen as to how Cooper’s model might be advanced into a more specific type of holistic dualism. Although the ensuing chapters need to consider this more from a philosophical perspective first, assessing the intricacies of the relevant debate in the philosophy of mind and how they might inform the discussion (that being an issue that arose from critique of Cooper), the hints seen in Smith will receive further exploration in chapter 7. Particularly how his Pentecostal ontology might be applied to Cooper’s (to be philosophically advanced) holistic dualist model of constitution may be of benefit for continuing developing the model-in-construction into a particularly Pentecostal model. But at this point, in wanting to attain a view of human constitution that is also philosophically strong, not just consistent with Pentecostal theological emphases, the related discussion within the philosophy of mind concerning which holistic dualist view is strongest, will be turned to and assessed, itself continuing to advance the constructing process and seeking to answer the question that arose from assessing Cooper’s work as to which type of holistic dualism might be opted for.
Due to his philosophically-astute, and careful exegesis, Cooper’s work has been commended as a good biblical starting point for constructing an enhanced Pentecostal view of human constitution. It was seen that this view is consistent with Pentecostal theological emphases, but one that might be advanced further, recognising that Cooper does not go so far as to giving a commitment to a more specific type of holistic dualism. Such a prospect is the (entire) focus of this and the next chapter, seeking, within the Scriptural holistic dualist model that Cooper’s work gives, to make that philosophical step forward, in wanting to be more specific as regards which type of holistic dualism might be best. In so doing, the goal of developing a model that is also stronger philosophically (as well as more consistent with Pentecostal theology) than Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s will naturally be achieved.

This moves the thesis into the area of the philosophy of mind, to achieve the above aims. This advancement into the philosophy of mind is to be made with the definite parameter, wanting to focus purely on views within the field, which would specifically fall under the already established holistic dualist banner. Once the parameter has been narrowed to this, it becomes clear that there are only a handful of options to be discussed: a (more integrated) contemporary (as opposed to classic) Cartesian substance dualism, versions of Thomistic ‘dualism’, and a (unique and) new dualism (specific to Hasker) called Emergent dualism.

396 There is a debate within Thomistic studies as to whether Thomas’ view is best described as dualistic, monistic, hylomorphic etc. Here it is termed ‘dualistic’ because it allows for the survival of some ‘part’ of the person at the point of bodily death - the entity that survives being what Thomas calls a ‘rational soul’, so legitimises dualistic terminology.
In considering this discussion, this chapter, joined with the next, use three phases of the current dualistic debate in seeking to identify the best models. The first lays out the classic Thomistic and Cartesian dualist models as these are the positions from which all current (Christian) dualistic positions flow (or in some way correspond to). Then the second phase examines the contemporary holistic dualist positions, expounding the viewpoints of three leading defenders of the differing dualisms: Richard Swinburne (contemporary Cartesian substance dualist), J.P. Moreland (contemporary Thomistic dualist), and William Hasker (contemporary Emergent dualist [whose work, he argues, arises as an alternative, but stands in dialectic relation to the Thomistic dualist heritage]) in the historical order in which they wrote their principle book on the subject. The most current or revised edition of the texts of these philosophers, written around the same time, naturally engage with one another’s positions helping to bring some evaluation of each other’s proposals, so their critique of each other’s ideas are used as a basis for evaluation, but a full review of such is left until the end of the following chapter to allow more space for fuller interaction and inter-critique of their positions.

Writing as he does at the beginning of the 21st century, and so providing a natural hinge point of the chapters, after finishing with review of Hasker’s work at the end of this chapter, Moreland’s account opens the following chapter and is followed by phase three of the discussion, consideration of the issues raised by their (the three philosophers’) work in the

397 Some may question Moreland as the leading defender of Thomistic dualism. It might be argued that Brian Leftow of Oxford University might be a better candidate, or David Oderberg, Eleanor Stump or William Jaworski. The latter is a strong candidate for Hylomorphism generally, but not Thomism specifically, and Stump, Oderberg and Leftow, though certainly able defenders of Thomism have not written as fully and specifically on the issue of the mind-body problem as Moreland, and tend to advocate either Thomas’ original position, or something very close to. So because of the many years Moreland has been refining his view in dialogue with that wider mind-body literature, his is taken as the leading contemporary Thomistic (-like) position today as, a view further suggested by his being asked to represent that position at the Biola University conference, engaging the leading proponents of each position in 2013.
21st century and since they wrote their key texts. Particularly in light of the ‘Neuroscience and the Soul’ conference hosted by Biola University in which the three thinkers (as well as others) were brought together in 2013 to discuss their positions further in light of one another’s work, this third part of the double chapter will focus on the time from their key books, up to (and including) their lectures at that conference (as well as engaging with the responses to their lectures, and the question and answer plus interaction panels that followed). This will allow the even more thorough delineating of the positions and identifying of the key issues within these positions.

From this interaction, and the varying levels of critique brought, a final evaluation of the best positions will conclude these chapters, bringing clarity as to which are the most helpful holistic dualist models for proceeding forth with. The two chapters seek to finish a step beyond Cooper’s Scriptural work, revealing which soul-body views are philosophically strongest for advancing Cooper’s model - narrowing the options, to then allow further examination and development of those narrowed options, when returning to Pentecostal theological territory in chapter 7.

5.1 Phase 1: The Classic Dualistic Positions

The ‘Fathers’ of the current holistic dualist debate within the philosophy of mind are Thomas of Aquinas’ position, and that of René Descartes. Although Descartes’ classic view cannot be classified as holistic dualist, so itself is not an option for consideration in contemporary philosophy of mind, his being the origin of the contemporary Cartesian model

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398 Both Hasker and Moreland have published (amended versions of their) papers given at the conference (see W. Hasker, ‘The Dialectic of Body and Soul’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87.3 [2013]: 495-509 and Moreland’s ‘Mental vs. Top-Down Causation: Sic et Non: Why Top-Down Causation Does not Support Mental Causation’, Philosophia Christi 15.1 [2013]: 133-148). However in order to have the benefit of the response and critique of the others at the conference, the material cited will be specifically from the conference, citing the youtube videos and the timings of them as references.
(see below), and the originator of the mind-body debate, his view is significant, and his position helpfully expounded for setting the scene for the second and third phases of the debate.\footnote{And doing so further underlines that, though aware of his position, this is not what the thesis is advancing when it proposes a ‘dualistic’ position.}

5.1.1 Thomas of Aquinas

As Aquinas’ model is laid out, a preliminary caveat is in order: Although the general content of Aquinas’ position is clear, there are different interpretations of aspects of his thought concerning the soul, and human constitution. When giving a certain interpretation of him in the following outline, it will be following Eleanore Stump’s interpretation, as a leading (quite possibly the lead) exponent of Aquinas’ thought. The following of Stump’s interpretation is a useful manner in which to proceed not least because Hasker’s critique of Aquinas’ dualism also follows that of Stump’s interpretation.\footnote{In the \textit{Emergent Self} (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), Hasker draws particularly on Stump’s article ‘Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism’, \textit{Faith and Philosophy} 12 (1995): 505-531. This thesis has the benefit of drawing on her later work \textit{Aquinas} (London and New York: Routledge, 2003) in order to clarify what she was arguing.}

5.1.1.1 Aquinas’ view of the soul and body

Aquinas’ classic view, in many ways, is a Christianising of Aristotle’s. Like Aristotle, Aquinas argued that a being’s soul is the \textit{form} of the body – a body being en-souled (or en-formed) matter. On this model, it is the soul which animates the body, and gives it its powers, characteristics and purpose. But in differentiation from Aristotle, who did not believe in (a monotheistic) God, so in turn, nor in the angelic realm, creation, eschatology etc., Aquinas, though taking inspiration from Aristotle, modified Aristotle’s concept, into a unique view, one compatible and helpful to Christian theology. In fact, so much modification had to be done in this project that the Thomistic model must be regarded as something quite a
distance beyond Aristotle’s original account. It is founded upon Aristotle’s, but a lot fuller, in order to allow for the wholeness of the Christian worldview, a worldview that has a place for God, angels, the intermediate state etc.  

Aquinas’ argued that all things that exist in the material world are composed of form and matter. For him, a ‘being’ (or ‘thing that exists’) is constituted from (prime) matter, but configured by its specific form – the prime matter is given its ‘being’ by means of a form, which causes that matter ‘to be’ in a particular configured state. For every being in the material world (apart from humans), Aquinas calls this causal form a material form, and for

401 In the main text, for clarity and specificity’s sake, the exposition of Aquinas’ view to follow is given focussing on ‘form’ and ‘matter’ (or, at relevant instances, ‘soul’ and ‘body’). But Aquinas, over many different texts, drew upon a plurality of terms, each with intricate nuances, to articulate his expansive metaphysics of ‘being.’ Particularly expounded in De Ente et Essentia, he argues that ‘beings’ - or entities that exist in reality, (with the exception of God – a special category) have their existence, through the actualisation of their ‘essence’ (the essence being only in potentiality until it is actualised), at which point, an entity can be described as having ‘being’. (God is a special category because [being completely in actuality [a point integral to Aquinas’ doctrine of simplicity]] he is being [being qua being] as well as having an essence, and actualises [in a primary sense] all other essences). Aquinas uses the term ‘substance’ for an actualised entity (or thing that has being), and a substance is categorised / is part of the particular species it is by way of its essence. An essence is the ‘what it is’ (quid est [or ‘quiddity’]) to be a sort of being (for example ‘humanity’ is the essence of a human being), and for compound substances (those in the material world), consists in the combination of a being’s ‘form’ – its principle of organisation – and its ‘prime matter’ – indeterminate matter (or matter merely in potentiality – what might be thought of as dust or particles). When prime matter is enformed (so becoming determinate), this gives rise to the (categorised, due to its essence, type of) material substance. In actuality, it is by way of the prime matter that a form is ‘individuated’ (that is, given its distinctness from other substances in its species), however, with the form being that that gives a being its characteristics, powers and function, in a mutual sense, what makes the (previously indeterminate) prime matter determinate (e.g. having its size, shape, proportions) is its form, so a thing receives indivisibility by means of its form (and when actualised, such beings are also therefore termed ‘concrete particulars’). Substances in the immaterial world, those Aquinas calls the intelligent forms (forms of a rational nature) are ‘pure’ forms, those whose essence is inherent entirely in their form, and, being those not actualised or individuated in prime matter, such forms are said to ‘subsist’. God and angels are examples of such, however, whereas the essence and being of angels are distinct (angels being contingent beings, so their essence having potentiality), uniquely, God’s essence is not distinct from his existence, because, as being qua being, there is no potentiality in him, only complete actuality. The question of how humans fit into this metaphysics is the question the main text seeks to focus on. However, in light of the complexity of Aquinas’ metaphysics and use of his terms (the intricacies of both being debated extensively in Thomistic scholarly circles), for the sake of clarity and focus, the exposition given in the main text opts to proceed using particularly the terms ‘form’ and ‘matter’. Some of the concepts just drawn attention to above, therefore, are re-narrated in such terms to give context to the focus on the human. And where appropriate, the terms ‘soul’ and ‘body’ are also used, as such is the focus of the thesis chapter.

402 The closest parallel today of ‘prime matter’ might be termed quarks or particles – the basic fundamental building blocks of physics (though see footnote below).

403 For Aquinas, prime matter is merely theoretical, a thing-in-potentiality. Prime matter does not ‘have being’ on its own as is formless, but when enformed, this combination of form and prime matter gives rise to a (material) entity, giving it its being.
every living being in the material world, he describes this form as the being’s ‘soul’. 404

However, he argues there is another kind of form that does not configure matter, and all non-material agents are and act by means of such a form. 405 This is not to say that all immaterial forms are the same, but to say that they are (with the exception of man406) of a different substance i.e. an immaterial substance.

The particular immaterial agents Aquinas has in mind when speaking of these immaterial forms are rational beings, specifically, God, and angels too. 407 He comments ‘although matter has a being through a form and not conversely, nothing keeps a form from subsisting without matter, even though matter cannot exist without a form.’ 408 These forms (of God and angels) differ in degrees of rational capacity (mind and will), though sharing immateriality in common. 409 And these immaterial forms are themselves configured in a certain way, but unlike the forms of material beings, these immaterial forms do not configure matter. So whether a being is immaterial or material, Stump helpfully summarises that (for Aquinas), “to be” is to be configured or have a form. 410

404 ‘Soul’ in Aquinas – like Aristotle – referring to a being’s principle of life (not having the over-tones the word soul has to modern ears).
405 E. Stump, Aquinas (London and New York: Routledge, 2003) p.197. Remembering that a rational being in Aquinas includes morality, free will, the ability to use logic, so agency is included within what it is to be a rational being.
406 The exception is an important one because for a human / man, Aquinas specifically does not use the word substance to speak of a man’s soul. This will be elaborated on later.
408 Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis un.1 ad 6 cited in E. Stump, Aquinas, p.199.
409 Aquinas argues that human forms also share the immaterial property in common with those of angels and God (though again with a differing degree of rationality [mind and will]). But in a (further) differentiation from the immaterial forms of God and angels, humans gain some of their knowledge through their corporeal organs. (Summa Theologiae 54.5 and 75.3).
410 Stump, Aquinas, p.200.
So far, Aquinas’ view is quite straight forward: God and angels, though very different to one another, share in common that they are immaterial configured forms. Animals and plants are ‘en-formed’ bodies, their particular (material) souls configuring prime matter, giving the being its particular existence. But the question of humans is difficult, because Aquinas wants to maintain that they are of the material world, because they live on earth, yet are also of the spirit world, in that they are created with a rational soul (and one that is able to operate independently of its material body and will return to God at death\(^{411}\)). So human persons, on Aquinas’ view, lie on the border between the material and immaterial world.

The way Aquinas handles this issue is to say that the human soul resembles an angelic form in that it of itself is a configured, \textit{subsistent} form, but resembling the forms of animals, has the ability to configure matter.\(^{412}\) Stump pithily summarises that the human soul is a ‘configured configurer’, a thing capable of existing independently of matter, but also able to configure matter.\(^{413}\) This means that the soul, though ordinarily being at home in, and what configures the human body, is also capable of surviving away from it, i.e. in the intermediate state when a person dies.\(^{414}\) But, in this state, Aquinas says that the soul ‘subsists’, because it is not the natural state of the soul/form, and is not the whole person, the complete person being the en-souled body. Further, although being a \textit{configuring} rational form, the soul does not need the body to think (so continues to do so [as it does being moral, logical and free] in the intermediate state), but unlike God and angels, the human soul does need the body in order to experience sensations and other knowledge dependent on the

\(^{411}\) This being in contrast to the soul of an animal which Aquinas argues corrupts / goes out of existence when the animal corrupts (\textit{Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima}\, 2).

\(^{412}\) The significance of putting ‘subsistent’ in italics will be developed below.

\(^{413}\) Stump, \textit{Aquinas}, p.206.

\(^{414}\) \textit{Summa Contra Gentiles}\, II. 51.
corporeal organs, so is not a complete person without the body. With this in mind, in his more specific exposition of the view (in *Summa Theologiae*) Aquinas refuses to call the human soul a ‘substance’ (in differentiation to God or angels), rather it simply ‘subsists’ away from the body.

Because of his view on what makes a being exist / alive, Aquinas’ position has some interesting implications entailed concerning what he thinks happens at the beginning and ending of earthly human life. Though it should be mentioned for clarity here that (like Augustine) he was a traducian in terms of how plant and animal souls originate, but a creationist when it comes to human souls (giving more grounds to the following), he thought that a (potential) human is conceived in the womb with merely a vegetative soul, which is then replaced by an animal soul, only later (after a number of weeks) to be given a specifically human soul by God, who enfuses it into the growing foetus (replacing the animal soul). And at death, he thinks the ‘human body’ is replaced with a different non-animating substantial form, to replace the human soul which goes to the intermediate state. Aquinas’ view also appears to have the quirk of appearing to advance the view that the human soul – the substantial form of the body – does not use any particular bodily organ in order to think, it is simply the undertaking of the rational soul, which is then able to continue doing so in the intermediate state. Such ideas are interesting and somewhat contentious and lead naturally into an evaluation of his project.

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415 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 54.5 and 75.3.
416 *Summa Theologiae* 75.4 ad 2.
417 Unlike Plato, Aquinas thought that a being could have just one particular form.
418 This would not mean though that Aquinas would be open to the idea of early stage abortion; an entity being a potential human is enough for him to ground the dignity of the growing foetus.
419 For Aquinas, the new form, at the point of death, configures the body’s matter differently to the human soul (cf. *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima* II. 11.226) so the ‘human body’ can only be termed such equivocally (*De Anima*, un. 9)
5.1.1.2 Evaluation of Aquinas’ view

Aquinas’ view is a very careful and substantiated position which defies obvious philosophical categorisation. Because he thinks a human’s soul survives after death, in some sense he has to be termed a dualist – the soul can exist apart from the body. However, Aquinas makes very clear that this ‘separability’ of soul from body is something that only came about because of the Fall; in its natural condition, the soul would never have been separated from the body because the complete human person is the whole, body-enformed-with-soul. So it would be wrong to describe the soul as a separate substance on Aquinas’ view, leading Stump to consider labelling Aquinas’ position a materialist one, proposing Aquinas’ view as an alternative to substance dualist positions. The ‘materialist’ title might appear to have the edge terminologically, however, clearly the Thomistic position maintains the criteria established for designating it as a ‘dualistic’ proposal (the soul can survive death and pass into the intermediate state [though accentuating that that is not the natural state of mankind]). And of course it is ‘holistic’ given the essential en-souled nature of the body, so comports very comfortably with the holistic dualist anthropology espoused in the previous chapter.

His view also fits very naturally with the teleological direction that is particularly seen in exegesis of Gen 1:26-28 and runs all the way through Scripture. Indeed to this end, Aquinas clearly argues that the purpose of the human person is to experience the beatific

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422 See for instance (the more astute biblical thread [as opposed to the mistaken philosophical threads]) of N.T. Wright’s ‘Mind, Spirit, Soul and Body: All for One and One for All, Reflections on Paul’s Anthropology in his Complex Contexts’, paper given at the Society of Christian Philosophers’ Regional Meeting, Fordham University, 18th March 2011, available: http://ntwrightpage.com/Wright_SCP_MindSpiritSoulBody.htm (accessed 5th June 2016).
vision of God, and puts his major emphasis on the resurrection of man on the last day when soul and body are to be re-united.

His idea that the soul is what animates the body (is the body’s life-force) is also interesting philosophically, in that if he is right about this animating feature of the soul, it would also make sense of an intuition people seem to have that it is the soul that makes a person alive and makes you you. When visiting a deceased friend or relative in hospital / a funeral parlour, the words ‘she’s gone’ or ‘she looked different’ or ‘It wasn’t her’ often pass from the visitors lips. Aquinas’ view would make sense of this intuition because he argues that it is a person’s soul that animates the body and gives them their personal identity, and at death that soul departs the body leaving some other form. So there are a number of reasons why Aquinas’ view might seem attractive to the (Pentecostal) theologian and philosopher today.

However, there are also a number of problems which might seriously undermine his position. Beginning where the positive evaluation finished, the issues surrounding the beginning and end of bodily life certainly raise questions. Granting for now the idea that the dead ‘human’s’ body is replaced by a different, material form on death (the immaterial human form separating and going to be in the intermediate state), the replacing of new forms at the beginning of life might seem difficult philosophically and scientifically.

Even if one allows for Aquinas’ progression from plant, to animal, to human in the womb (a natural entailment of Aquinas’ metaphysics), as Hasker points out, no physician watching closely throughout the whole process would see any difference between the foetus

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423 Summa Theologiae 76.1.  
424 Remembering that an embryo progresses from being merely alive, to becoming sentient, to becoming human – each having different forms. This may actually be a position some thinkers are attracted to, despite the following critique above.
between the sudden change from plant form to animal form, nor would they see any
difference from (material) animal form to (immaterial) human form.\footnote{William Hasker ‘The Dialectic of Soul and Body’, Lecture given at the conference ‘Neuroscience and the Soul’, Biola University, July 2013 (available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwUMBIlkRXk) min 13:25 – 14:10 (accessed 27th March 2015).} This might not be too problematic given that the change from plant to animal material form is a metaphysical change, so might not be physically visible. The metaphysical change with no physical entailments might even be possible from animal material form into human immaterial form (as God infuses the new soul). But even if these were allowed for,\footnote{But remembering that on the Thomistic account, it is the soul that also animates the body, so would likely have implications biologically.} Hasker critiques that, if all the organs are already there for the potential human by virtue of it having a previous plant and then animal form, by the point it receives its immaterial soul, everything physical is already in place, and it seems there is very little for the immaterial soul to do in a person that a material soul does not do in an animal, other than give them the capacity for rationality.\footnote{Hasker, Ibid., min 11:05 – 11:50 and 14:10 – 14:35.} If a person has all of their brain intact and develops thoroughly in a physical sense just by virtue of its having an animal (material) soul, for that animal soul to give way to an immaterial soul seems a rather big jump just for the purpose of giving that animal rationality. Although the ‘rational’ soul in Aquinas entails the likes of a human’s sense of morality, volition, freedom, thought etc. – the very things that make a person human - the gap between a material form and an immaterial form seems wide just for the purposes of giving a person this rationality.\footnote{Hasker, Ibid., min 10:45 – 11:01.}

Put in another way, Hasker argues that chimpanzees and dolphins have (though not as advanced) similar mental lives to humans in that they have thoughts, sensations, desires, etc., yet on Aquinas’ view, these animals can have such simply by way of their material form
and configuration. Is it not a case of special pleading to therefore argue that a human needs an entirely metaphysically different (immaterial) form in order to just have an extension of those higher mental faculties? This ties in with Hasker’s general impression that there is a serious void on Aquinas’ view between humans and the rest of the natural world because of this material / immaterial form distinction, and Aquinas’ view does not fit very naturally with the continuity between humans and the rest of the natural order.\(^{430}\)

As will be seen further below, some of these problems are coloured by Hasker’s wanting to emphasise the ‘developmental’ continuity of everything in the material world. However, he potentially does have some strong points against Aquinas, and further argues that there is no reason philosophically to accept Aquinas’ immaterial soul / physical body distinction. Hasker actually thinks there are good philosophical reasons for advancing a distinct immaterial substance, but he sees Aquinas’ metaphysics as dissolving such reasons; Because Aquinas’ metaphysics sees no separation (in their normal state) between the human’s immaterial soul and its body – they are together a substantial form (a material composite) – Aquinas relinquishes any ground by which the distinct (immaterial) substance dualist might be able to build a philosophical argument for an immaterial soul. All Aquinas is left with is theological grounds for advocating his position. This bothers Hasker who advocates there should be philosophical reason for postulating an immaterial soul.\(^{431}\)

But one could actually go further and ask whether (maybe slightly ironically) today’s arguments in favour of mind and body separation (such as the qualia and intentional states) actually undermine Aquinas’ materialistic composite view. Is it the case that the very


\(^{431}\) Hasker, Ibid., min 15:00 – 15:31 and following to 17:50.
arguments that would be advanced against today’s non-theistic materialists would also undermine Aquinas’ theistic materialist view of a person (if indeed that is the best categorisation of his view)? It could be argued that on Hasker / Stump’s reading of Aquinas, which interprets Aquinas as advocating that human thought has ‘no bodily organ’ (thought is solely the prerogative of the immaterial rational soul), then actually the mind is distinct from the brain so his view would not be damaged by such arguments. But Hasker is unimpressed by this and what he understands Aquinas to be saying, and assumes that Aquinas just got the biology wrong due to the age in which he lived, and that in light of current neurological research, it is impossible to hold to a view that advocates that thought does not use the organ of the brain. In light of this, Hasker would proffer Stump’s account which just admits Aquinas’ neurological naiveté (leaving it as an unnecessary feature of Aquinas’ view), but which of course leaves the Thomistic view still exposed to the philosophical problems that intentionality and qualia present for materialist proposals.

So the philosophical justification for Aquinas’ immaterial soul view seems weak, as does aspects of the science. But additionally, looking at the argument semantically, Hasker further critiques that Aquinas has to equivocate on his use of the word ‘form’, in order to allow for the continuity of humans with the rest of the material world whilst also enabling them to survive into the intermediate state. Hasker thinks that Aquinas oscillates between an abstract and a concrete meaning in different parts of his work: sometimes he uses ‘form’ to refer to an ‘abstract state’ e.g. when referring to all forms (vegetative, animal, human etc.), one that configures in the material world; But then at other times he uses the same word in a different and ‘concrete’ sense, when referring to God and immaterial forms.

432 Ibid., p.165.
Hasker contends that this equivocation allows Aquinas to maintain his ‘configured configurer’ when referring specifically to human forms, but is inconsistent and only maintainable by introducing equivocation into his use of the word ‘form’.\textsuperscript{433}

Though there are many things, then, to commend Aquinas’ view, the critiques levied against it, particularly by Hasker, initially appear to make it difficult - as it stands - to apply in 21st century anthropological construction. That said, these critiques would benefit from closer scrutiny in a later chapter.

5.1.2 René Descartes

For a number of reasons, Descartes is known as the father of modern philosophy, and specifically in relation to the question of the soul and what constitutes a human, he has also bequeathed the issue to philosophers with the title ‘the Mind-Body problem’.

5.1.2.1 Descartes’ Dualism

(Like Plato) Descartes considered empirical thought as a less certain basis of knowledge because the senses are capable of deception; He therefore saw empirical thought as a secondary kind of knowledge. What was primary, and what his ‘First principles’ were based upon, was the knowledge the intellect could acquire without the use of the body (hence being termed a rationalist). Following from his famous ‘I think therefore I am’ method, it was not a far step for Descartes to then make his key argument for substance dualism,\textsuperscript{434} that, as a thinking thing, he could undoubtedly conceive of himself existing, however he

\textsuperscript{433} The Emergent Self, pp.167-168.

could not undoubtedly conceive of his body existing, therefore concluding that the thinking thing was a distinct and separate substance to the body (and could exist without it).\footnote{Descartes' full quote is ‘my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing. It is true that I may (or, to anticipate, I certainly have) a body that is very closely joined to me. But nevertheless, on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.’ (Descartes, Meditation VI, in \textit{The Philosophical Writings of Descartes}, Ibid., vol. 2. p.54).}

Though this was the lynch-pin for his viewpoint, he later added a second and related argument for this dualism, that of the indivisibility of the mind.\footnote{As will be seen in a minute, the word ‘mind’ for Descartes became synonymous with the word ‘soul’.} Descartes argued that he could not conceive of a mind being divisible into parts (so is a simple entity), whereas it is very possible to conceive of the body being so divided, for example, if a foot or arm was separated from the body. Therefore, the mind has to be a separate substance from the body.\footnote{Descartes' full argument is laid out in his \textit{Meditations on First Philosophy}, trans E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, S. Tweyman (ed.) (London and New York: Routledge, 1993) p.97: ‘there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For, as a matter of fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend myself to be clearly one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet if a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is separated from my body, I am aware that nothing has been taken away from my mind. And the faculties of willing, feeling, conceiving, etc. cannot be properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one and the same mind which employs itself in willing and in feeling, and understanding. But it is quite otherwise with corporeal or extended objects, for there is not one of these imaginable by me which consequently I do not recognise as being divisible; this would be sufficient to teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if I had not already learned it from other sources.’}

Descartes rejected the aspect of Aristotelian and Thomistic thought that argued man is a rational soul-body entity so it is the whole person doing the thinking. Instead he was of the view that thinking is done \textit{specifically} by the thinking substance, a substance that is un-extended and non-spatial (i.e. immaterial), unlike an entity made of matter (which is extended ‘spatially’ [i.e. in length, breadth and depth {note, for Descartes, matter and space are not separable, there is no space that is not filled with matter so ‘spatial’ extension =
constituted by extended matter\textsuperscript{438}). Although he thought interaction occurred between soul and body, and that the soul used the body for secondary thought such as memory and sense-perception, for Descartes, these were a less pure form of knowledge. As such, Descartes equated the soul with the mind, in so doing, narrowing the soul from the Aristotelian / Thomistic view of it (being the principle of life which gives the organism its functions of growth, nutrition, motion etc.) to simply being a thinking subject. \textsuperscript{439} Although he broadened his predecessors views of mind to a thinking subject that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, imagines and senses,\textsuperscript{440} the soul was reduced to simply that, and all Aristotelian emphasis on function and teleology was discarded.\textsuperscript{441}

Descartes was of the opinion that the mind and the body interacted at the point of the pineal gland, a tiny organ in the centre of the brain (which we now know as an endocrine organ which produces the hormone melatonin in amounts varying with the time of day).\textsuperscript{442} Descartes thought this gland played an important role in the causation of body movement, and was involved in imagination and memory (the secondary ‘modes’ of the mind as opposed to its pure intellect). In a rather scientifically weak suggestion (for his time as well as now), he contended that the pineal gland had arteries (they are actually veins) leading up


\textsuperscript{439} His fuller thinking on this is encapsulated in his Correspondence to Gassendi 2:246 where he comments ‘the first men did not perhaps distinguish between, on one hand, that principle in us by which we are nourished, grow, and perform without any thought all the other functions we have in common with the brutes and on the other hand, that principle by which we think. They applied to both the single term ‘soul’. Then, noticing that thought is different from nutrition, they called that which thinks ‘mind’, and believed that it is the principal part of the soul. I, however, noticing that the principle by which we are nourished is entirely different from the principle by which we think, have said that the term ‘soul’ is ambiguous when it is used for both. And in order to understand it as the first act or principal form of man, it must only be understood as the principle by which we think. To this I have as much as possible applied the term ‘mind’, in order to avoid ambiguity. For I do not regard the mind as a part of the soul. But as the whole soul which thinks.’

\textsuperscript{440} See his Correspondence to Gassendi 2:19.

\textsuperscript{441} One of Descartes’ ‘fatherly insights’ he bequeathed to modern philosophical thought following him was the jettisoning entirely of teleological cause.

\textsuperscript{442} Descartes reasoned that, having two eyes and ears, but only seeing / hearing one thing, this central gland must be where the soul is.
to it full of ‘animal spirits’. These animal spirits were something like a kind of fine wind or air that Descartes thought brought physical sensations to the gland, informing the soul/mind; and he thought these operated in the other direction too, the mind affecting the body through this means - the animal spirits being the means by which the mind’s will was carried out in the body.\textsuperscript{443} He was therefore able to say that the gland was the seat of interaction between the soul and the body.

In light of the above, Descartes strongly differentiated between humans and animals, arguing that, not being capable of intellectual thought, animals did not have souls - they were merely automata that reacted in certain ways when stimulated. He also advanced his thesis of the uniqueness of humans from animals, by arguing that humans were capable of language, an argument indirectly further supporting his substance dualism (and pre-empting the fully fledged Chomskian language argument [which states that a machine could be programmed to utter words, but only a soul could form concepts and put them into meaningful language])\textsuperscript{444}.

In sum, Descartes’ impact on the question of the mind / soul has been huge. Specifically, his method had the effect of contributing to the elimination of the place of teleology (in philosophy and generally as well as the human specifically). His view of the soul / mind bequeathed to philosophy a sub-branch, namely the philosophy of mind with a particular interest in the mind-body problem, and within that, left behind the legacy of the most well-known form of substance dualism, (classic) Cartesian dualism.

\textsuperscript{443} Note, for Descartes, the mind is ‘an intellectual substance’ (Meditation VI, Ibid., vol. 2, p.54) so although it has a will, the intellect is more basic to the mind because the will depends on it.

5.1.2.2 Evaluation of Descartes’ view

Not surprisingly, Descartes’ dualism has received a lot of attention and critique, most of it focussed on his key argument, the question of interaction, and the issue of science.

Many have sought to point out that really his key argument for substance dualism is an argument from ignorance:

In summary, Descartes argued:

1. He could undoubtedly conceive of himself existing however
2. He could not undoubtedly conceive of his body existing therefore
3. The thinking thing was a distinct and separate substance to the body (and could exist without it)

But Hatfield, for example, responds that it is possible that actually the thinking mind and the body are the same thing and the thinker is just simply ignorant of that.445 ‘If so, he [the thinking self] could doubt the existence of body (including his own body) while affirming his existence as mind alone, simply through ignorance of his real identity.’446 During his lifetime, Descartes pre-emptively came to recognise the force of such an argument, and somewhat backed away from it, yet still held to its conclusion.

The problem of interaction, though not being entirely unique to Descartes (Augustine having experienced difficulties with it too), was clearly a thorn for him, simply because empirically, science (and certainly since) proved his theory of the pineal gland to be inaccurate. It is now

446 Hatfield, Descartes, p.246.
known clearly what that gland does, so revealing his fanciful idea of animal spirits as completely wrong. Cottingham highlights the impression of many:

> Once Descartes had taken the vital step of assigning so many of the traditional functions of the “soul” to the minute physical mechanisms of the nervous system, it was only a matter of time before Western science would go all the way and make even the residual *ame raisonable* redundant.\(^{447}\)

The impact this had on following thinkers is recognised by Rozemond:

> While Descartes makes sensation and imagination modes of the mind, but with a special dependence on body, later early moderns did not make this distinction between intellectual and other mental states.\(^{448}\)

Further, in letters from Princess Elizabeth dated the 16th May, 20th June and 1st July (following replies from Descartes that she viewed as not being convincing responses), she argued that a further problem with Descartes’ interaction was how an immaterial substance could interact with a material one. Such a question has been posed to dualists ever since. With these two issues for followers of Descartes to take into account, thinkers such as Malebrauche rejected Descartes’ idea that there was causal interaction between mind and body and opted instead for a view called parallelism.\(^{449}\) Leibniz and Berkeley on the other hand rejected Descartes basic mind assumptions, even though they retained his view of substance dualism.

Another difficulty posed of Descartes’ view was pointed out by Louis de la Forge who argued that if the soul is pure intellect, and not able by itself to sense or imagine, then in the

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449 Parallelism contends that the mental world and physical world do not interact, they have just been designed to run parallel to one another, so when a mind thinks and acts, in the material world the ‘effect’ occurs, though there is no interaction between the two.
intermediate state, it would be without any particularity – its knowledge derived from sensations would fade, and the soul would just be left with merely abstract ideas – such as those of maths – to contemplate.\textsuperscript{450}

As such, though in general having an enormous effect on the history of academia, Descartes’ substance dualism (though not forgetting his other arguments, many of which have been developed since) has not been popular, yet, as has been seen in previous chapters of this thesis, is almost always what people think a dualist is referring to when they talk about a soul being a distinct entity.

These critiques make it obvious that Descartes’ view (unlike that of Aquinas) is not holistic in its functioning of a human (because he separates the functioning of the soul from the brain too much) so not appropriate to be further considered in this thesis. However, the critique of Descartes just given above is a helpful one to finish on, because it highlights again what has been a trend revealed throughout this thesis so far – when hearing the term ‘dualism’, or ‘soul’, most opponents of the position are thinking either of Platonist dualism, or more often, the classic (Des)Cartesian dualism above. But as has already been seen, and will be further seen as the thesis progresses, both of these are straw men dualisms, and not defended today by the best dualistic scholars. Rather than continuing to reject the straw men positions, responsible scholarship should be considering, and carefully engaging, the best dualistic positions - those to be examined below and into the next chapter.

\textbf{5.2 Phase 2: The Contemporary Variants of the Classical Positions}

The following contemporary views bear resemblance to their Thomistic and Cartesian fathers, but are expositions that are carefully modified in the light of subsequent

\textsuperscript{450} Cited in Cottingham, “Cartesian Dualism”, p.241.
(particularly philosophical and scientific) knowledge, that has been gained since their original expositions by Aquinas and Descartes.

5.2.1 Swinburne’s Contemporary Cartesian Dualism

Richard Swinburne has advocated his variation of dualism for a long time. Ever since proposing his argument for substance dualism in the early 80s, he has defended his substance dualist view, right up to the current day. His monumental *The Evolution of the Soul* is where he expounds his view most fully, and even more fully again in the revised edition (which will be used here) of 1997. In that, he makes the argument that for any comprehensive description of the world that seeks to take into account all the goings on in that world, it would have to take account of mental states as well as brain states. Brain states are the physical firings of neurones in the person’s brain when a person, say, experiences a sensation, and such physical activity is ‘public’ in the sense that any interested member of the public could be made aware of what is happening in that person’s brain through the benefit of science (specifically neuroscience). In this sense, the knowledge of brain states are readily available to anyone from a third person perspective on the basis of science, because they are physical events. However, the person having the mental state - e.g. a sensation - would have further, privileged access (and access not available to anyone else) and knowledge of her mental state, namely experiencing the first person feeling of ‘what it is like’ to be having this mental state e.g. sensation.

Swinburne argues that the above suggests that mental states are different things to brain states and the mental is a property of the mind, whereas brain states are a property of the brain. He contends that there are five kinds of mental states: sensations (e.g. having the

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452 Philosophers of mind sometimes using the word ‘qualia’ for this.
sensation of being in pain), thoughts, desires, purposings (or volitions / intentions), and beliefs – all of which the person having them would have privileged knowledge of, being aware of what it is like to be having those states, but such knowledge being that that the brain scientist could never have.\(^{453}\)

Going further, Swinburne argues that an essential person who has these first person perspectives is a different thing to the brain. The way he argues this is by initially considering the possibility of the survival of a person, who, under an operation, has various parts of their body removed or transplanted, Swinburne submitting that most people would think that the only organ which could not be taken out / replaced, yet still resulting in survival, would be the brain. But he then presses this further using a thought experiment in which a person’s right brain hemisphere is severed from her left hemisphere at the corpus callosum, and each separate (surviving) hemisphere put into the skull of a new body, to underline the fact that knowledge of the person’s physical brain and body is not enough to tell an observer about who the person actually is – in the experiment, it would be impossible to know whether that person now had body A or body B, both, or neither.

This latter thought experiment is built upon the scientific facts that, when joined as normal, the right brain hemisphere controls much of what goes on in the left side of the body, and the left hemisphere, much of the right, but both are used for processing memory and forming character, and both (if the other were damaged) are able to adapt to carry out the function of the other. So given the plausibility of survival in the operation where both hemispheres were severed from one another, each of the two new bodies taking a hemisphere could not just survive, but both would give the appearance of being the person,

\(^{453}\) Ibid., p.2, expounded in chapters 2-7.
character and memory-wise. So physically, it would not be possible to know who the person actually is (is it one of them, both of them, or neither of them?) demonstrating that personal identity and personhood is something different and beyond the realm of physical sciences and so personhood cannot be reduced to the brain. This gives grounds for thinking that there is something beyond the brain which is the essential person, which for now will be called ‘mind’.\(^{454}\)

However, having argued the above (and in modification of Descartes), Swinburne maintains that there is a very intimate relationship between the essential person / mind and their brain, in that the person’s mental events are clearly *correlated* with brains events, and when a subject has a mental thought, the neuroscientist would likely be able to see the correlated firings of neurons in the brain (and he thinks neuroscientists would be able to make a long list of such correlations).\(^{455}\) So the brain and hence body is the instrument of the mind to exert action on the outside world, and reciprocally, the mind is affected by what is experienced in its body and brain. So Swinburne describes the mind as *functionally* (though not causally) *dependent* on the brain.\(^{456}\) This helps clarify the place of consciousness within the description above; consciousness is the mind’s *awareness* of certain beliefs, desires, sensations, purposings and thoughts that it is experiencing. For instance, the eye might see a green tree, which is translated through neurons in the brain, giving the mind the sensation of ‘being appeared to greenly’, and it is this awareness of such things, as brain and mind interact, that brings about consciousness. However, beliefs and desires are assimilated over time, and are states that *continue* in the mind even when the subject has no conscious

\(^{454}\) Ibid., pp.9-10, 147-50.

\(^{455}\) Ibid., p.188.

\(^{456}\) Ibid., pp.10, 174-6. In rather straight forward terms, Swinburne comments ‘A person has a body if there is a chunk of matter through which he makes a difference to the material world, and through which he acquires true beliefs about that world.’ (p.146).
awareness of them. So when asleep (in a deep sense, and not dreaming), knocked-out, or some other form of not being conscious, the person still has her desires and beliefs, but is not consciously functioning or experiencing sensations, thoughts or intentions.

So far, Swinburne’s arguments demonstrate that mind and brain are different entities, but he recognises that for this to be a fully-fledged substance dualism, he requires slightly more substantiation of his original arguments (otherwise, this may just be argued for by a property dualist who is a substance monist). His brain transplant thought experiment only shows that a level of brain continuity is insufficient for personal identity but does not rule out the possibility that a person needs some kind of bodily matter to survive as a person. So he gives further thought experiments centring round the claim that it is logically possible that a person could survive even when their body is annihilated, to argue that a person is not essentially their body. Articulating the argument further (his argument being laid out in formal logic as an appendix to confirm its validity), and clarifying (in a later lecture at the University of Birmingham) that in the argument, logical possibility entails metaphysical

457 Ibid., chapters 6 and 7.
458 Ibid., pp.18-19 and 174-5.
459 His well-formed formula for the argument uses the following representation:

& = and  ~ = not  ◊ = it is logically possible that
p = ‘I am a conscious person and I exist in 1984’
q = ‘My body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984’
r = ‘I have a soul in 1984’
s = ‘I exist in 1985’
x ranges over all consistent propositions compatible with (p & q) and describing 1984 states of affairs ‘(x)’ is to be read in the normal way as ‘for all x’

So in formal logic terms, the argument proceeds:

p …Premise 1
(x) ◊ (p & q & x & s) …Premise 2
~ ◊ (p & q & ~r & s) …Premise 3

Taken from Appendix C, p.322 (with further defence in pp.323-332) elaborating on his argument in chapter 8 specifically pp.151-4.
460 ‘Substance Dualism’, Lecture given at University of Birmingham 25th April 2012.
possibility, Swinburne’s main argument for substance dualism is that if it is (logically [so
metaphysically]) possible for me (a person) to exist even when my brain and body are
destroyed, then I am (essentially) not my body, and can exist without it, therefore I have to
be a distinct (non-physical) substance from my (brain and) body, i.e. a soul.\footnote{To clarify the relationship of the person’s body to their soul, Swinburne’s elucidation is worth citing in full: ‘Some dualists, such as Descartes, seem sometimes to be saying that the soul is the person; any living body temporarily linked to the soul is no part of the person. That, however, seems just false. Given that what we are trying to do is to analyse the nature of those entities, such as men, which we normally call ‘persons’, we must say that arms and legs and all other parts of the living body of a man are parts of that person. My arms and my legs are parts of me. The crucial point that Descartes and others were presumably trying to make is not that (in the case of men) the living body is not part of the person, but that it is not essentially, only contingently part of the person. The body is separable from the person and the person can continue even if the body is destroyed. Just as I continue to exist wholly and completely if you cut off my hair, so, the dualist holds, it is possible that I continue to exist if you destroy my body. The soul, by contrast, is the necessary core which must continue if I am to continue; it is the part of the person which is necessary for his continuing existence. The person is the soul together with whatever, if any, body is linked temporarily to it.’ (Ibid., p.146).}

As further evidence for substance dualism, Swinburne argues that a person’s having an
immaterial soul lends the most natural grounds for explaining the reality of personal identity
over time (rejecting the view that memory or character provide the necessary persistence
conditions for a person over time),\footnote{Cf. R. Swinburne, ‘Personal Identity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1973): 231-247.} and also suggests that the ‘thisness’ of individual
minds, plus the unity of consciousness argument, give further weight to his conclusion.\footnote{For ‘thisness’, see Evolution of the Soul, pp.152-3, for ‘unity of consciousness’, see p.160. Such arguments not being key to his argument have merely been mentioned here, but, due to Hasker’s engagement with the unity of consciousness argument, and Swinburne’s critique of Hasker on the grounds of ‘thisness’, more will be said about these arguments later.}

Given the above, Swinburne contends that, though how the soul originates is not altogether
clear, it is certainly there in a fully grown adult and cannot have a scientific explanation as to its origin. Instead, he argues that God is the maker of the immaterial soul, suggesting that on individual instances, this was either passed on indirectly somehow by means of a traducian understanding of the soul’s origin, or more conceivably, by a direct creation of it (the creationist view) some time between conception and birth. Not surprisingly (given what he has argued previously), Swinburne advocates the latter, and also clarifies that, although
it clearly needs the brain to function and experience consciousness, function is different from existence so it is possible that God created this new entity at conception and it existed not functioning until the development of the brain. Alternatively, (and this is his slightly more preferred position) it could be created just before that development of the nervous system – originating as a direct creation of God.⁴⁶⁴

Again, given his conviction of the existence of a soul based on the above, he further argues that, though he does not give a mechanism for the interaction between soul and body, that not knowing what this mechanism is, is not important and not a substantial objection against the view, the point is that there are clearly two substances involved, a soul and a body. As this is often the main counter to substance dualist positions, Swinburne is clear: the fact that we know of no mechanism by which soul and brain interact goes no way to refuting the position, there clearly is some kind of mechanism given the interaction between soul and brain, it is just a question the answer to which is not known.⁴⁶⁵

As an interesting excursus on how his thinking applies to animals, Swinburne (in a very different view to Descartes) is happy to advance the idea that animals also possess souls, due to their experiencing consciousness and having mental states. Swinburne says that inference to the mental life of animals can be done but only as far as to the extent that their brains are similar to human brains. So three major distinctions that must be made are that animals do not have moral beliefs, nor libertarian free will, and are not able to think rationally – that is, logically, in terms of universals, particulars, truth and negation etc. –

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid., chapter 10, particularly the appendix pp.198-99.
⁴⁶⁵ And, following McGinn, muses that human beings may not have the intelligence to enable them to ever know what that mechanism is (Ibid., p.xii, reflecting on McGinn’s The Problem of Consciousness [Oxford: Blackwell, 1991]).
much of which being due to their not speaking in language. So he argues that the human soul is a lot more complex than those of animals.

Finally, though not persuaded of any of the philosophical arguments for life after death (claims of re-incarnation, medium-spiritualism, or near-death experiences), he argues that, again, it is logically possible that the soul survives after death (something all the more likely if God exists [but which he does not argue as writing a piece of philosophy of mind]). For Swinburne, the most likely event is that the soul, though having left its brain (and so no longer experiences sensations, thoughts and willings in the natural way of embodied human life), carries with it the desires and beliefs (which Swinburne argues, together, form the character of the person) it has built up over time which, into whatever life without the body is like.

5.2.2 Hasker’s Emergent Dualism

Two years after Swinburne published his revised edition of the above, Hasker published The Emergent Self. Like Swinburne, Hasker’s earlier chapters are devoted to showing that varieties of physicalism (eliminative, reductive and quasi-eliminative [i.e. behaviourism and functionalism]) give no satisfactory explanations for the reality of qualia (such as sensations). He also argues that such views cannot account for intentional states, that is thoughts / beliefs that are intended towards something i.e. are thoughts ‘of’ or ‘about’ something. Diagnosing that a lot of physicalist philosophy is governed by the conviction that the universe is a closed system of cause and effect and so Darwinist epistemology tends

466 Evolution of the Soul, chapters 11-13, particularly p.203.
467 Ibid., chapter 14, particularly p.262.
468 Remembering that a person’s beliefs and desires persist even when a person is unconscious / unaware of them.
469 Ibid., chapter 15, particularly p.310.
471 Ibid., chapters 1 and 2.
to prevail in such circles, he develops his refutation of physicalism further by arguing that
the presence of mind causes problems for such a worldview and additionally that such a
worldview is undermined by the argument from reason.\textsuperscript{472} He then takes the existence of
libertarian free will to be yet another argument against the idea of such a system and argues
that the emergence of a non-reducible mind also gives a better explanation for the reality of
agent causation.\textsuperscript{473}

Up to this point, he and Swinburne are arguing in a similar direction. However, Hasker
rejects Swinburne’s modal argument for substance dualism outlined above because he says
that Swinburne’s appeal to our pre-philosophical intuitions for his second premise is
dubious (outlined again for ease in the footnote).\textsuperscript{474} For Hasker, Swinburne’s second
premise is questionable both to the lay person and the professional philosopher (whether
such an intuition is hard fact is not established, nor when that would hold). Further, he
argues that the argument is actually epistemically circular in that the implied premise (which
he numbers) \textsuperscript{7} (Hasker’s extended version of Swinburne’s logic laid out in the following
footnote),\textsuperscript{475} assumes the conclusion he is seeking to argue for, and is one that some

\textsuperscript{472} Ibid., chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{473} Ibid., chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{474} Reminding that \( p = ‘I am a conscious person and I exist in 1984’ \), \( q = ‘My body is destroyed in the last instant
of 1984’ \), \( r = ‘I have a soul in 1984’ \), \( s = ‘I exist in 1985’ \) and the argument goes

\begin{align*}
\text{Premise 1} & \quad \boxed{p} \quad \text{Premise 1} \\
\text{Premise 2} & \quad (x) \left( p \land q \land x \land s \right) \quad \text{Premise 2} \\
\text{Premise 3} & \quad \left( p \land q \land \neg r \land s \right) \quad \text{Premise 3} \\
\end{align*}

\textsuperscript{475} Adding in the further logical symbols \( \rightarrow \) = if (the clause before) ... then (the premise following) (note, for
the sake of clarity, Hasker’s preferred symbol of the \( \Rightarrow \) has been substituted for symbols Swinburne would use
[namely \( \rightarrow \)]), Hasker elucidates Swinburne’s logical formula more fully as:

\begin{align*}
1. \quad & p & \text{Premise} \\
2'. \quad & (x)[(p \land q \land x) \land (x \text{ describes a state of affairs in 1984})] \rightarrow \diamond (p \land q \land x \land s) & \text{Premise} \\
3. \quad & \neg \diamond (p \land q \land \neg r \land s) & \text{Premise} \\
4. \quad & \neg r \text{ describes a state of affairs in 1984} & \text{Premise} \\
5. \quad & \neg \diamond (p \land q \land \neg r) & \text{Premise} \\
6. \quad & \neg \diamond (p \land \neg r) \rightarrow \neg \diamond (p \land \neg r) & \text{Premise}
\end{align*}
materialists may disagree with. Although not content with the soundness of Swinburne’s main argument for substance dualism, he does think his (lesser argued) supporting argument of the unity of consciousness is a good argument. He agrees with the contention that the fact that our awareness of any conscious episode is experienced as a unified picture, (and more importantly) to and by a single subject (as opposed to the multiple parts of the brain) shows that the mind is logically irreducible to the brain, but further, is also ontologically irreducible to the brain.

Hasker is clearly sympathetic to Cartesian substance dualism, and sees some insights in the position, even though seeing it as flawed in too many instances for either the traditional, or contemporary varieties, to be of benefit to the mind-body discussions today. He actually does some helping work for the position in his assessment of it responding to counter-arguments he sees as invalid. For example the suggestion that Cartesian Dualism leads necessarily to a worldview proffering an alienation of the person from her body (and so devaluing the material) he thinks carries no philosophical weight whatsoever and should be rejected once for all; as he does (to remind) the critique that dualism gives no means of interaction between the two substances. Recalling his comment from earlier

7. \( \sim \Diamond (p \land \sim r) \) From 5,6
8. \( r \) From 1,7

476 Eric Steinhert immediately springs to mind. Steinhert has done work on the possible options a materialist might have in front of her when considering a materialist view of survival after bodily death (suggesting, on the basis of patternism, that options such as quantum immortality, teleportation, transhumanism, computational monadology are possible [E.Steinhert, ‘Naturalistic Theories of Life After Death’, Philosophy Compass (2014): 1-14]). None of these suggestions are in the slightest bit plausible, but supposedly Hasker might argue that if any of them are logically possible, then Swinburne’s pre-conclusion (number 7) it is not logically possible that I am a conscious person and I exist in 1984, and that I do not have a soul in 1984 is not justified.
478 The Emergent Self, pp.133. Ontological irreducibility follows from logical irreducibility to the brain because the mind (in Hasker’s words) ‘has properties which are not logically implied by the properties of, and relations between, the physical parts of the brain.’ (p .133). But in light of the principle of reducibility, the further step follows that the mind is also irreducible ontologically to the brain.
There is...the ancient, and by now extremely boring, objection that causal interaction between diverse substances such as mind and body...is impossible...[But] Once we have recognised that, as Hume long ago taught us, all causal relations are at bottom conceptually opaque, this hoary objection should be relegated to its appropriate place in the dustbin of history.'

Though giving it more weight, he also thinks that Kim’s ‘pairing problem’, is not insurmountable either. So he is sympathetic to dualistic views (disregarding the common critiques as weak), yet he does think there are some very real problems with both (Des)Cartesian dualism and contemporary Cartesian dualisms which render them insufficient solutions to the mind-body problem. Because such problems further identify the differences between Descartes’ original position and the contemporary variation on it that Swinburne advocates, and also because it helps to begin bringing some evaluation to the Swinburne position laid out above, it is worth examining these problems Hasker identifies carefully, before proceeding with Hasker’s suggestion of his own proposal.

5.2.2.1 Hasker’s critiques and reasons for moving away from Cartesian Dualisms

Firstly, Hasker thinks a collection of difficulties for Descartes’ position is the problem of the souls of animals. Descartes’ idea that animals were merely automata with no souls or consciousness, Hasker thinks, is definitely false given that some (higher) animals clearly

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480 Kim’s pairing problem, formed as a question, was, on a view where souls were immaterial and not extended in space, what is it that makes a person’s soul their soul, and keeps it connected with their body as opposed to floating off and influencing another person’s body? J. Kim, ‘Causality and Dualism’, Lecture given at the University of Notre Dame, 7th March, 1998).

481 As with a number of monumental thinkers (particularly Aquinas and Calvin), there is debate as to whether Descartes historically actually did advocate the viewpoint that has come to be associated with him. However, the word ‘original’ has been used above in line with what has been the common interpretation viewpoint, that what is commonly called traditional (or ‘Des’)Cartesian dualism associated with Descartes’s position is what he actually believed.
enjoy a mental life. But if the Cartesian position were to be modified to include animal souls, then the position would also have to advocate God creating each animal soul. This position has difficulties with issues such as animal cloning as well as other unusual instances such as an animal losing a limb which separately develops into another animal (like in the instance of a starfish); Does God have to jump in and create these extra souls as dictated by humans or other physical factors? And he argues that evolution also poses problems for the view because Cartesian dualism implies that once an organism has evolved physically, God then creates for it an appropriately different soul to that that was had by its predecessors, something that jars with the gradual development of species according to neo-darwinian theory.\footnote{Emergent Self, pp.152-3.}

The second collection of problems surrounds the recent discoveries of neuroscience that show that the mind is functionally dependent on the brain; on Descartes’ view, if the \textit{mind} were what was conscious, then why would \textit{it} black out if someone was hit over the head (brain)? And why would consciousness be altered by ‘mind’ (brain) altering drugs, or brain damage on this account? After considering some possible solutions more traditionally leaning current Cartesian dualists (e.g. Charles Taliaferro\footnote{Cf. Taliaferro’s \textit{Consciousness and the Mind of God} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).}) \textit{might} want to suggest to such questions, but finding them unlikely, Hasker states ‘it seems...that the actual dependence of mind and personality on brain goes far beyond what one would naturally expect on the basis of Cartesian dualism.’\footnote{Emergent Self, p.157.}

Hasker gives the impression that he considers Swinburne’s alternative to be more scientifically nuanced than that of Descartes, and recognises that philosophically the
critiques given of (Des)Cartesian dualism do not generally apply to his view. However, in modifying the original Cartesian view, Hasker contends that Swinburne’s view faces its own set of challenges which also renders his view problematic:

Firstly, Swinburne’s contention that (in ordinary instances) the body (brain) is what enables the soul to function, Hasker sees as problematic particularly in reference to sleep and unconsciousness. The reason he sees an issue is that in an earlier section of the book, Swinburne deliberated the idea that in sleep and unconscious episodes, one might speak of the soul ‘ceasing to exist,’ only to give rise to conscious life again when the body awakes. Hasker sees such as very difficult to reconcile with Swinburne’s creationism (and philosophical thought generally).

Secondly, he thinks that Swinburne actually undermines his creationist view in arguing that the lives, and specifically, mental lives, of animals can come into existence in ways other than by the normal sexual processes (e.g. cloning, the starfish situation). Hasker thinks that the creationist should affirm that only God can create souls, they cannot be manufactured elsewhere – it is either one or the other.

Thirdly, Hasker has a problem with Swinburne’s suggested personal explanation of the observed correlations of mental to brain states. Swinburne makes his suggestion in his appendix where he lays out his creationist position and contends that, because scientists could likely never propose a scientific theory that would explain mental-brain state correlations, a personal explanation is more promising – namely God has given to each human and animal a ‘limited nature’, i.e. one that (in normal circumstances of embodiment) keeps a soul functioning in expected ways. Hasker describes this as ‘fascinating’ yet ‘baffling’ and contends that such an idea cannot just be left as it is as it raises far too many

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485 This extra material (to the overview of Swinburne’s work given above) comes from his appendix at the end of his chapter 10, ‘the origin and life of the soul’ (pp.198-9).
questions. But because Swinburne does not explicate this any further, Hasker seems to suggest, as it stands, it is not a sufficient theory to explain the correlations that the *scientific* explanation cannot explain either.\textsuperscript{486}

So for these reasons, Hasker rejects the Cartesian options when considering substance dualism.

5.2.2.2 Hasker’s own position

Having rejected all forms of physicalism, but also all standard views of dualism (remembering his critique of Thomism above), this leaves Hasker in an interesting position, but helps him give rise to his own original position, one he terms ‘emergent dualism’.

Modifying Searle’s categorisation from his *The Rediscovery of the Mind*,\textsuperscript{487} and elucidating even more clearly what was highlighted in chapter 3 (when responding to Clayton and Yong), Hasker helpfully clarifies that there are actually four ways in which the term ‘emergence’ is used in the philosophy of mind currently, in constructing his own view. He explains them by way of the following.

As a primitive base, there is the level of physics - particles, and at the basic level, these particles exist and are that from which more complex matter might arise. As an example of something more complex arising from this (and it may seem preferable to give even this basic arising an emergence level of its own - but Searle and Hasker choose not to), some of these particles might conjoin together to make some bigger entity e.g. a rock. The arisen rock would then have predictable properties, made up of the properties of its basic particles (e.g. the rock weighs 10 grams when its 10,000 component particles each weighs 0.001

\textsuperscript{486} *Emergent Self*, p.160.

grams) that the individual particles individually would not have on their own. As said, Searle and Hasker do not call this a level of ‘emergence’, but instead label properties that arise as a result of the whole (such as weighing 10g) ‘systems features’ (to use Searle’s terminology). But Hasker thinks that even these basic systems give rise to some surprising and beautiful features, for example fractal patterns, so he wants to call these features ‘logical emergents’ or officially, $E_0$ (emergence level 0).

At a level above that, Searle and Hasker recognise that certain systems features are not predictable - even given their composition of elements and environmental relations - and instead require an explanation on the basis of the causal interactions among those elements which give rise, for example, to properties such as solidity or transparency. Hasker calls that $E_{1a}$ (emergence level 1a). But including another level within Searle’s organisation, he thinks that the emergence of something like life is an example of something that could be explained by causal interactions among the elements but ‘the laws that govern these interactions are different because of the influence of the new property that emerges in consequence of the higher-level organization.’\textsuperscript{488} Building some of O’Connor’s work into his levels, he calls this level $E_{1b}$ and thinks that such a level, able to produce ‘downward’ influence on the lower level, is an example of where the lower level’s behaviour (from which the higher level emerged) is altered due to the new property that has arisen, the higher-level’s organisation producing downward causation. He comments

\begin{quote}
‘the behaviour of the “lower” levels – that is, of the components of which the “higher-level” structure consists – is different than it would otherwise be, because of the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{488} Ibid., p.174.
influence of the new property that emerges in consequence of the higher-level organization.489

The highest level, E2, is where a property is given rise to that is genuinely completely independent of its subvenient base, and has causal powers that cannot be explained by causal interactions at the level of the particles.

Given these different levels of emergence, Hasker is able to place his emergent dualism within the descriptions currently used in the mind-body debate. He distinguishes himself from the likes of emergent monists, who would affirm that mind is E1b (that is, it emerges from and ‘supervenes on’ the brain [its subvenient base], and [due to being endowed with novel causal properties] is so able to exercise top-down causation on the brain). Rather, though granting the subvenient base, Hasker wants to go even further and claims that the mind exercises an example of level E2 - namely libertarian free will - something that is in no way determined by anything at a lower level.490 This means that any description of a person that is going to include (libertarian) free will as one of her attributes will have to recognise that persons (or ‘minds’ or ‘souls’) are unitary subjects (not just emergent properties of the brain).491 So (because of rejecting the creationist account of its origins), he argues that the mind / soul must therefore be an emergent self i.e. a (free) subject that emerges from the brain.492

To spell this out in a bit more detail, Hasker explicates that it is the human brain that, given the right material constituents and at a sufficient level of evolutionary complexity, gives rise

490 Ibid., p.188.
491 Which comfortably fits with his unity of consciousness argument.
492 Ibid., p.178 – emphasis his.
to a mind, one that is produced by the brain and not ‘added’ from the outside. Hasker gives the analogue of the formation of a magnetic field to illustrate, commenting ‘as a magnet generates its magnetic field, so the brain generates its field of consciousness.’\textsuperscript{493} So on a big scale picture and on the evolutionary story, at some point in that history, the first animal with a complex brain gave rise to a primitive form of consciousness, which (as animal brains have developed) has subsequently given rise to more and more developed consciousness up to human consciousness. At this latter point, the human brain became so complex that it gave rise to a complete self / mind / soul with libertarian free will, and which exercises top-down causation due to its new causal powers. Hasker sees this as the solution that fits all the locks of the mind-body debate, avoiding the problems identified for the physicalists, but also the dualists, and sees it as a carefully carved middle way between the pitfalls of both.

Theologically, one might think that, similarly to Murphy, Clayton and hence Yong, Hasker’s view might suffer from the problem of ‘when the brain dies, the person dies’ so could not survive death,\textsuperscript{494} but in his concluding pages (similarly to Wilder Penfield\textsuperscript{495}) he comments that

\...there is little doubt that an omnipotent God could, for example annihilate all of the electromagnets in a particle accelerator, and instantaneously replace them with others, while causing the identical field to persist in being. Alternatively, he could directly sustain the field by his own power, without the need for a material ‘generator’ of any kind. Both these scenarios model possible ways in which God could sustain the lives of human persons after their biological death. It seems clear,

\textsuperscript{493} Ibid., p.190.
\textsuperscript{494} O’Connor and Van Inwagen, as Christian materialists would also fall into this group. These have both attempted some intriguing suggestions as to how one can survive after death until the resurrection on a materialist view, but all of which being quite bazaar and seemingly ad hoc, they cannot be considered as plausible options.
then, that emergent dualism is far better placed than any kind of materialism in accounting for the survival of persons.\footnote{The Emergent Self, p.233.}

Given that the emergent ‘self’ is a distinct enough individual, it does seem possible that it could survive death, being sustained / energised by God after the death of the body, as opposed to a E\textsubscript{1b} emergentist whose mind being merely a property of the brain, is too dependent on the workings of the brain to survive. This therefore justifies Hasker as genuinely being dualistic, as he gives a different account to most emergentists. This means that as well as answering issues in the mind-body debate, his position also fits the theological criteria looked at in previous chapters allowing his view to be considered along with more traditional (contemporary) holistic dualist views.

### 5.3 Summary

The above has so far laid out the classic positions of Aquinas and Descartes and then that of two of the three contemporary philosophers of mind who seek to advance their ‘fathers’ work. This has been done as part of the search for strong philosophical models of the soul, and its relationship to the body, to allow the suggesting of an advancement of Cooper’s holistic dualist project, and give a more specific type of holistic dualism, by drawing on the discipline of the philosophy of mind. The following chapter continues this quest by moving to the third of the three thinkers being analysed in the second phase of the holistic dualist, soul-body debate, before moving onto further assessment of these from the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.
In the seeking to identify a robust philosophical model of the soul and its relationship to the body, two of three contemporary philosophers, who hold differing positions, but all of whom come under the already established banner of being ‘holistic dualists’, have been articulated in the previous chapter. Along with the third, to be exposited in this chapter, their work is being considered to try and establish a rigorous philosophical model for advancing Cooper’s Scriptural holistic dualist model a step further, and the constructing of an enhanced Pentecostal philosophical theology of human constitution. The third of the three is J.P. Moreland, whose key book functions as a hinge between the chapters, finishing as it does the second phase of the debate, but written as it was in 2000, introducing the third phase of the debate. So following exposition of Moreland’s position, the third phase to follow focusses on the debate in the 21st century, from the time of the original writings of these thinkers, to the present. This third phase will focus particularly on Biola University’s Conference, ‘Neuroscience and the Soul’, at which the writers met and engaged one another’s work face to face. Having accomplished this expositional and inter-critical work, the chapter will conclude by bringing evaluation to each of the positions, and consider which might be contenders for advancing Cooper’s model, to then be enhanced through further engagement with Pentecostal spirituality in the following chapter.

6.1 Moreland’s Contemporary Thomistic Dualism

Moreland’s position is possibly the most intricate and complex of the three contemporary writers. He opens his (and Scott Rae’s) book *Body and Soul* with a considerable overview of
the underlying issues within the mind-body debate, followed by a discussion of the actual positions advocated in the debate. Within this opening, he focusses particularly on the difference between what he calls ‘substance’ and ‘property-thing’ views; a ‘substance’ being a unified whole whose any parts (it might have) are internally related to one another (and therefore inseparable to the point that if they were broken off, would cease to be termed part of the entity), and a ‘property-thing’ being an entity whose parts are externally related to one another (and so are separable in themselves from the entity). His overview then moves to explicating how the property-thing view is applied in Naturalist and Complementarian perspectives.

Within that overview, and specifically of interest because of its relation to Hasker above, Moreland devotes some space to critique of ‘emergentist’ positions arguing that advocates often use terms such as ‘emergence’ and ‘supervenience’ synonymously, however, mistakenly so, because the concept of emergence is stronger than supervenience. He says that ‘structural’ supervenience should be made distinct from ‘emergent’ supervenience in the discussions, and would likely equate ‘structural’ supervenience with Hasker’s ‘emergence’ levels 0-1a, but real ‘emergence’ only with Hasker’s levels 1b-2. This is not merely a matter of semantics but is significant in that Moreland contends that only ‘structural’ examples of supervenience are found in nature and there are no other examples of ‘top-down’ supervenience (genuine ‘emergence’) to be found. So the ‘emergence’ of

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497 J.P. Moreland and S.B. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis of Ethics (Downers Grove, Illinois: IVP, 2000). Though authored by both of them, it becomes apparent that Moreland writes the first half on the issues surrounding a person, soul, human nature, mind-body problem etc., and Rae writes the second half on ethics as an application of what Moreland has written in the former half.

498 A Naturalist perspective is one that advocates that the natural / physical world is all there is (there is no God, souls et al. to contend with). A Complementarian perspective means one that is open to God and religion but advocates that religion and science are non-interacting but complementary descriptions of the world.

499 So again, Chalmers’ ‘weak’ emergence could be correlated with Hasker’s levels 0-1a and Moreland’s ‘structural’ terminology, and his ‘strong’ emergence could be correlated with Hasker’s levels 1b-2 and Moreland’s ‘emergence’ terminology.
mind is a different category to the rest of the structural examples often cited and (though he does not refer to his work specifically) would likely argue that Hasker has blurred that emergence of mind into a family of supervenience which would more accurately be termed ‘structural supervenience’. In so doing, Hasker mistakenly makes the emergence of mind sound more plausible than it is.

However, though diverging from Hasker in the early stages, Moreland agrees with him in a number of other areas and proceeds to outline two similar key factors that only make complete sense on some kind of dualistic view: the factors of libertarian free will and personal identity. This is similar also to Swinburne’s direction, and of the two, Swinburne’s would be the view Moreland follows more closely – he specifically agrees that persons are beings that have (non-physical) mental states of sensation, belief, desire, thought and volition and the associated brain states for such are correlated with their mental states.

Where he departs from Swinburne is concerning his understanding of the body, and the relationship of the body to the immaterial soul. As a Cartesian, Swinburne thinks that the words ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ could be inter-changeable in that the soul is the human’s capacities for consciousness (hence having a mind-body problem). But Thomistic dualists like Moreland see the soul as more comprehensive than just being the mind, in that the mind is a faculty of the soul, but the soul contains other faculties (to be elaborated below), so is broader, not merely synonymous with the mind. More than this, Moreland advocates that the soul is responsible for the development of the brain, the nervous system - indeed, the whole body - and is what animates the body giving it its biological function and purpose.500 Moreland also thinks that the above, therefore, gives the Thomistic view a better account of

500 Ibid., pp.200-201.
the body, in that it is not just a property thing as on Swinburne’s view (making it difficult to define just what makes a human body human), but is specifically human owing to the fact that the soul – as the essence of the body – is diffused throughout the body, animating (or ‘informing’) it, the body having a specifically human identity due to the nature of the human soul that informs it.\textsuperscript{501}

Put simply, Moreland has articulated that (in difference to the Cartesian views) ‘a soul is an immaterial substance, that contains consciousness, and that animates the body.’\textsuperscript{502} Put more fully, he defines: ‘the soul is an individuated essence that makes the body a human body and that diffuses, informs, animates, develops, unifies and grounds the biological functions of its body.’\textsuperscript{503} With such a definition, he then clarifies that, though the chemical parts (such as DNA) are evidently involved in morphogenesis, carried as they are by the sperm and egg and so at conception then are the means by which morphogenesis occurs, it is not that chemistry \textit{per se} that decrees the \textit{form} and \textit{structure} of the body, but rather it is the soul which informs the process, and uses those chemical parts and processes as \textit{tools/mechanism} by which to develop the zygote in its morphogenesis.

Elaborating on these concepts, Moreland states that the relationship and ‘location’ of the soul to the body is somewhat akin to that of God to the universe: although God cannot be said to be \textit{located in} space, he \textit{occupies} space in that he is fully ‘present’ at each point.\textsuperscript{504} (Moreland may do better to take this further and say God is ‘consciously present’ and

\textsuperscript{501} Ibid., p.201.

\textsuperscript{502} Cf. his interview with Robert Lawrence Kuhn for website ‘Closer to Truth’, available: \url{http://closertotruth.com/series/the-soul-immortal} (accessed 18th March 2016) min. 0.20-0.26. ‘Is the Soul Immortal?’

\textsuperscript{503} Body and Soul, p.202.

\textsuperscript{504} Ibid., p.202.
‘causally active’ at each point\(^{505}\). Likewise, the soul is not spatially located in the body, but occupies it, so has ‘direct, immediate conscious awareness throughout the body, [though not necessarily of each and every part of the body] and it can directly and immediately will to move the various parts of the body.’\(^{506}\) The mechanism by which this happens is that of the brain and nervous system, but the brain itself is not what has the volitional state, and is not located between the soul and parts of the body. One particularly significant implication of such a position is that, on his view, if a person had an arm cut off, she would not therefore lose part of her soul, because the arm is no longer part of the body, and so the soul is no longer consciously present or causally active in the arm.

Moreland further expounds that, as well as the soul having states (e.g. being in a state of thought, volition, feeling), it also contains a vast number of capacities (making the soul a very intricate and complicated structure) such as the capacity to see green, to hear music, to think deeply, to speak Chinese etc. Any person able to put such capacities to use, he says, has a ‘first-order capacity for…(e.g. seeing green)’ Whereas someone, who, for example, does not speak Chinese yet, though they have the capacity to learn to speak Chinese at some point, he describes as having a ‘second-order capacity’ i.e. a capacity (or potential) to have the first order capacity to actually speak Chinese. One could go back further and say that, due to having the third order capacity to learn foreign languages generally, this gives the potential for the capacity to learn Chinese (the second order capacity) etc. until one gets all the way back to ‘ultimate’ capacities, the specific capacities a soul contains within its essence that facilitate the functioning of the organism. So whether such an organism, say,


would ever have the first-order capacity to grow a leaf, would depend on its ultimate capacities inherent in its soul. Although there are thousands of capacities in the soul, Moreland categorises similar capacities under headings e.g. the capacity to see red or green come under the soul’s faculty of sight, the capacity to think logically or to believe that there are polar bears in Alaska comes under the faculty of mind (in a human soul, that is). Though not giving an exhaustive list, Moreland states ‘Among other things, the soul contains five sensory faculties; and the mind [under which he groups thoughts and beliefs], will, and, arguably, the spirit are among the faculties of the soul.’

In terms of further clarification about the relationship of this soul to the body, Moreland argues that each soul – being a substance - has an essence; if it is a dog, it has the essence of doghood, if it is a person, it has the essence of human personhood. The essence (or [the soul’s] ‘inner nature’), he says, ‘contains, as a primitive unity, a complicated, structural arrangement of capacities and dispositions for developing a body’ (or as short-hand, a ‘principle of activity’), and is that which governs the sequence and ordering of the body’s development. Put in other words, the process the body goes through in developing from a zygote into a fully grown adult is governed by the ‘law’ or ‘information’ inherent in the essence of the soul, and it is that which directs the growth and structuring of the body.

Moreland makes very clear that this law is a teleological guiding principle for the development of the organism – the growth of the body’s parts and structure are directed by the soul so that those parts can actualise the function the body is intended to carry out. As such the soul gives the boundaries of what the organism can grow into and become, the

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507 Ibid., 203. Moreland elaborates ‘When something has a defect (e.g. a child is colour blind), it does not lose its ultimate capacities. Rather, it [sic] lacks some lower-order capacity it needs for the ultimate capacity to be developed’ (pp.203-4).
508 Ibid., p.204.
509 Ibid., p.204.
organism’s faculties and capacities being limited by the soul’s essence. Moreland summarises: ‘The law is a teleological structure, a principle of unity, an orderly sequence of activities whose unfolding forms body parts in order to realize bodily functions.’\textsuperscript{510}

An important implication of the above is that the (macro-level) body parts are \textit{internally} related to the soul (as they are to one another [as opposed to externally related {like on the contemporary Cartesian view}] in that ‘They are the external realization of the internal structure within the soul’s essence.’\textsuperscript{511} On this view, the soul is ontologically prior to its body, and is that that teleologically guides the development of its body, through the various chemical processes (including the work of DNA) as the body is nourished, the soul being both the body’s efficient cause and final cause. Bringing this all together, Moreland summarises that ‘the body is in the soul and the soul is in the body’\textsuperscript{512} to the effect that:

\begin{quote}
The soul is ‘in’ the body as the individuated essence that stands under [the literal meaning of ‘substance’], informs, animates, develops and unifies all the body’s parts and functions and makes the body human. And the body is ‘in’ the soul in that the body is a spatially extended set of internally related heterogeneous parts that is an external expression of the soul’s ‘exigency’ for a body, that is, of the non-extended law (structural set of capacities) for forming a body to realize certain functions latent within the soul itself.\textsuperscript{513}
\end{quote}

Taking a step back, Moreland’s opinion is that the Thomistic view is superior to the Cartesian views not just for the reasons outlined at the beginning of the section, but because the intimate relationship between body and soul he is arguing, makes more sense of two kinds of intuitions we have, firstly, the intuition that a body part is only such if it is

\textsuperscript{510} Ibid., p.204.\textsuperscript{511} Ibid., p.205. On the same page, Moreland describes the soul as ‘taking body parts within itself’ during the process of morphogenesis (as the body is nourished).\textsuperscript{512} Ibid. p.202.\textsuperscript{513} Ibid, p.205.
attached to, and functioning for, the body. A hand, for instance, ceases to be a hand if it is cut off (Moreland arguing the apparentness of which becoming evident over a few days).

The second intuition he argues the position also makes better sense of is the intuitive appearance of ‘proper function’ in biology generally (both in the workings of internal organs and the organism as a whole) - what appears to be teleological out-workings.

Moreland recognises that this latter point might raise eye-brows among biologists but says that, at the least, it has been almost impossible for biologists to avoid using such terminology within biology (even if they do not ultimately advocate teleology within the discipline), but more powerfully, he argues that the internally-related parts-of-the-body position makes more sense than the property-thing view given the role of DNA on biology, commending the Thomistic view he is defending above the ‘ordered-aggregates’ (or externally related, property-thing) view. Contrary to the popular view that DNA is that that contains everything needed for the development of an organism, and hence development of life generally, Moreland contests that this idea rests on three flawed assumptions: 1. That because DNA replicates itself and is passed down from one generation to the next, it must be such that governs the forming and development of the organism, 2. That because a change in just one single gene is able to bring about a change in the organism’s structure, it must be genes that contain all the information needed for forming and developing that organism’s structure, and 3. Because Neo-Darwinian evolution explains how all life came to be, then the explanation of the complexity of life must be one of bottom-up causation, and genes are the best contender for what that causal entity is (at least, a lot more likely than
Moreland rejects all of these, and (what he terms) the *genocentric* view generally, and thinks instead that Brian Goodwin’s *organocentrism* is a better candidate for explaining the place of DNA within the process. Moreland explains that on this view

DNA plays the role of specifying the patterns for making the proteins [the building blocks] to be used in assembling the organism. Genes play a role in stabilizing certain aspects of the spatial and temporal order of growth and development, but they do [sic] not generate that order. Genes produce *cell materials* but *not the overall plan* or internally related organization among the parts. According to organocentrism, living organisms are substances that are irreducible to, and ontologically prior to, their parts.

Moreland has biological reasons for preferring organocentrism; firstly he identifies that DNA’s role in an organism (i.e. being replicated during cell division, and being transcribed by the RNA molecule to hence form strings of amino acids [which ultimately form the finished proteins]) can only be carried out in combination with other complex molecules, in the context of a living cell; and the relationship between that DNA and its living cell is species-specific, meaning that it is dependent on the nature of the cell within which it is functioning, to carry out its purpose. Secondly, he argues organocentrism is preferable because there is more than just DNA passed on in reproduction: in a fertilized egg, there is other complex...
machinery necessary for morphogenesis, the absence of which leads to DNA lying dormant and not able to function. Again, the relationship of the DNA to this complex machinery is species-specific and if DNA is removed from the embryo, and transferred into another species’ egg, before long, the egg dies and no life arises.517 So Moreland quotes affirmatively the biologist H.F. Nijhout ’...genes can...be said to control...development pathways, just as the steering wheel of a car controls the direction of travel. However, this is far from equating the steering wheel with the driver.’518 In answer to the biological question as to what is the driver, he follows Goodwin’s biology, arguing that it is:

‘the organism [the cell] as an autonomous, irreducible center of activity; a whole with its own internal nature; its own species-specific principle of development in which the various parts are genuine functional entities that exist for and by means of each other and the whole of which they are parts.’519

Moreland identifies that Goodwin is describing organisms in the way that he (following Aristotle) defined substances above (as opposed to them being ordered aggregates or ‘property-things’), and having already argued that the ‘soul’, on the Thomistic view, entails the ‘individuated nature’ that organocentrism espouses, argues that it is therefore credible to believe that Goodwin’s ‘organism as a whole’ terminology could otherwise be described as a ‘soul’.520

One further biologically-related point of clarification Moreland wants to make is that this view is not to be wrongly equated with some primitive type of biological vitalism (Moreland

517 Ibid., p.211-12.
520 Body and Soul, p.213. Remembering that on the Thomistic view, it is not just humans and animals that have a soul, but also vegetation as well.
defining vitalism as ‘the view that in addition to physically interacting parts, living things also have a vital force or fluid that interacts mechanistically with the physical parts of living things.’\textsuperscript{521}). Identifying that crude versions of this idea tend to actually reduce the organism merely to a special type of property-thing - by saying that the organism is a machine, just with this extra physical force / fluid to vitalise it - Moreland rejects such an idea. However, he clarifies that what he is advocating, if it is to be called ‘vitalism’ (though he prefers the term ‘organicism’), needs to be recognised as a metaphysical proposal (not a physical one), and that the ‘life-force’ is grounded in factors such as

‘the irreducible organic holistic relation among parts to parts and parts to whole, the species-specific immanent law of organization and development, and the internal structural form and normative functioning found in living things.’\textsuperscript{522}

Again, referring to the language biologists use, Moreland notes that, though many would want to reject any talk of vitalism or organicism completely, often they substitute different terms such as the organism’s ‘self-boundedness’, ‘self-generation’, or ‘self-perpetuation’ to try and encapsulate that there is something about an organism as a whole which energises its life.\textsuperscript{523} Moreland is content with such language as it could be consistent with what he has argued concerning substance, such terms revealing a thinker’s commitment to an organism’s having an ontologically prior whole (even if unlikely to be described as such), but admonishes that such life-force need not necessarily be physical (and in his view, is not

\textsuperscript{521} Body and Soul, p.217.
\textsuperscript{522} Ibid., p.217.
\textsuperscript{523} Ibid., p.218. One is reminded of the way physicalists such as Carl Sagan would reject a personal creator of the universe but yet personalise concepts like ‘cosmos’ and ‘nature’ in an attempt to give some kind of adequate explanation for how the universe came to be and is governed. Sagan would talk about the ‘Cosmos’ or (Mother) ‘Nature’ with capitalised letters, in effect personifying what (if being consistent) would be impersonal physical forces.
physical) and would break with such positions philosophically if they were merely advocating operational definitions with no unified teleology involved.524

Returning to the more philosophical and theological issues, from the above, it should be clear that, though rooted in Aquinas’ position, Moreland’s Thomistic dualism is distinct from that of Aquinas in that the origin of the soul is at the point of conception (Moreland hinting, at the time of writing, that he is [was] of a creationist view of its origin), and that there is continuity between the souls / forms of people with those of animals and plants in that they are all immaterial substances. This then leads Moreland to make a quick excursus from Scripture (and church history) to argue that Gen 1:30; Eccl 3:21 and Rev 8:9 do suggest the reality of animal souls (though whether or not they survive death, he is somewhat doubtful) as his philosophical position maintains, but clarifies in a shorter and later overview of his work that Scripture nowhere speaks about them as being made in the image of God like humans, and (likely, derivatively) animals do not have human rationality, morality, libertarian free will, nor are they self-conscious.525

Finally, he recognises the challenge(s) posed to substance dualists by Hasker, and more directly by Howespián, requiring an explanation for how such a position could account for cases of cloning, twinning, and how to account for the non-development of frozen embryos.526 However, as Moreland has written on this more fully since his landmark Body and Soul, and the following phase will be addressing, and more thoroughly evaluating, the content of Moreland and the debate from 2000 until the conference at Biola - plus on to

524 Ibid., p.218.
today, such exposition will follow in the section below, as part of the review of the 21st century state of the debate.

6.2 Phase 3: The debate in the 21st century since the writings of the key texts

As the debate has progressed, Swinburne’s, Hasker’s and Moreland’s views have received a lot of attention. This is unsurprising given their status as the lead thinkers in the holistic dualist soul-body debate, and since the writings of their key texts, a number of critiques and further issues have been raised concerning their work. In recognition of this, they were asked (along with other presenters) to participate in Biola University’s 2013 conference ‘Neuroscience and the Soul’, in which they further presented their work in light of the further development, issues and critiques that arose between then and the time they wrote their key texts. The Biola conference, therefore, figures prominently later on in the third phase, as an important landmark in this phase.


As was noted in the previous chapter, Moreland (but also entailing Swinburne)’s position has been critiqued in light of the issues of cloning, twinning and cases of frozen embryos. Moreland was / is aware of this critique, recognising these as issues for (non-emergent) dualists of all types, and since his work in 2000, has subsequently addressed the issues further. In a rather generous manner – suggesting solutions for the contemporary creationist and traducians of both Cartesian or Thomistic varieties – in 2010 he wrote in elaboration of his related section in Body and Soul, proffering his article ‘The Origin of the
Soul in Light of Twinning, Cloning and Frozen Embryos,’ to propose solutions to these issues.\(^{527}\)

Moreland notes that all these issues concern the *origin* of the soul, but begins his article by arguing that even if persuasive, these objections must be considered *secondary* when considering a dualistic proposal. This is because, on the grounds he has already given for the existence of the immaterial soul (see above), one would be justified in believing in such a soul even if one had no theory of how it originated (in the same way that one can be justified in believing in the existence of planet Jupiter without having a theory as to how that planet originated).\(^ {528}\) He further begins the article contending that, though every view of the soul’s origin should be consistent with scientific facts (that when the [strictly] physical conditions of reproduction occur [e.g. the chemical and physical aspects of sperm, egg and their union\(^ {529}\)], a zygote obtains), really the origin of the soul is an issue that science cannot yield much insight into. Rather it is the domain of theology and philosophy to work through the identified issues, so focusses his discussion on such.

Having begun with this stance, he briefly outlines the three leading historic positions on the origin of the soul as:

1. The Cartesian Creationist view: When the physical conditions occur, God creates a soul to be joined with the physical body (that obtains because of the physical union of sperm and egg), this creation of the soul occurring at some point between conception and birth.


\(^{528}\) Ibid., pp.1-2.

\(^{529}\) Ibid., p.6.
2. The Thomistic Creationist view: That on their own, the physical conditions would not produce a body, but at the same moment as sperm and egg meet, God infuses the union with a soul making it a new substance – the 3 way union making the sperm-egg-soul-entity a particular being.

3. The (or ‘A’) traducian view. That, as well as having the right chemistry and physics for giving rise to a body, the sperm and egg also have ‘soulish potentialities’, and when the two meet, they naturally give rise to the being’s soul as well as its body.

In light of these views, Moreland applies them to the three issues (elaborated here for clarity) as to 1. How a substance dualist view can make sense of a zygote splitting to produce two twins when supposedly there was just one soul there in the first place (particularly given that souls are not the kind of thing to split), 2. How another soul suddenly arises in the instance of an animal being cloned (assuming both animals have a soul) or the instance of a new starfish developing out of a severed leg, and 3. What happens to such a soul in the instance of frozen embryos.

The third is probably the most straightforward. Making the distinction between a soul’s existing and its functioning, Moreland explains that a Cartesian creationist would say that in the case of a frozen embryo, either God has not yet created the soul, or he has, and it exists, it just will not function until the body functions. The Thomistic creationist will take a similar approach and argue that the soul’s powers to develop the body are latent, but will proceed naturally once put back in a more natural surrounding. And the traducian would happily agree.

530 While acknowledging a variety of traducian views, most notoriously Tertullian’s suggestion that the soul a child receives is a fragment of the soul of his father (or a ‘chip off the old block’), Moreland rejects these weaker variations and proposes the above view as the most substantial of the traducian options.

531 Ibid., pp.6-8.
In response to the second and first, Moreland reminds that the Christian is committed to God’s causal interaction with the world (whether that be on 1. A fully secondary causality view, 2. An occasionalist view, or 3. A concurrentist view,\textsuperscript{532} - Moreland stating that all three agree that ‘the regularity of natural law and causal processes is due to God’s faithfully sustaining, causing or ratifying certain effects when certain causal conditions obtain in the world’\textsuperscript{533}), so given this, the three views on the soul’s origin might argue as follows concerning twinning and cloning:

1. Cartesian creationist – God makes a body to be the means by which a soul interacts with the world - that is the purpose he made the physical conditions of reproduction for in the first place. Given this and the above on God’s faithful and regular causal interaction with the world, He faithfully creates a new soul each time the physical conditions occur, regardless of how those physical conditions obtained (whether that is by the usual processes or via twinning or cloning).

2. Thomistic creationist – similarly to the above, but when the physical conditions occur on this viewpoint, God uses this as the circumstance to create a soul, but one that incorporates the physical components into one substance (as opposed to the two on the Cartesian creationist view), espousing a kind of miraculous concurrentism. This position suggests that on their own, the physical conditions would not result in a new zygote, but are dependent on God’s causal power in creating a soul to then form a new body.

\textsuperscript{532} Moreland defines them respectively as (1)the view that ‘God sustains the world in existence; but in the normal course of things, the entities of the world exert their own causal powers, and such exertions are sufficient to produce changes in the world’ (2)the position that ‘there are no autonomous, distinct causal powers possessed by created objects; God is the only true cause and no effect in nature is brought about by natural entities’ and (3)the view that ‘every event cause has God collaborating with the natural causal entity, cooperating with its causal activity by ratifying that activity, which alone would not be sufficient to produce the effect.’ (Moreland, Ibid., pp..8-9).

\textsuperscript{533} Ibid., p.9.
3. Traducian account – this is rather different, remembering that physical entities have soulish potentialities, and (in the same way that two substances, e.g. sodium and chlorine give rise to one new substance, salt) under the right conditions, a new soul would obtain making two physical and immaterial substances into one new one. However, exactly what the conditions and boundaries of those physical conditions are that would lead to the generation of a new soul cannot be specified a priori – it is merely an empirical question (to be observed in instances such as the starfish, cloning, twinning) as to what circumstances are within the physical conditions boundary of a new soul being generated.  

Remembering Moreland’s assertion at the beginning of the article, and finishing with the conclusion that more work needs to be done in this area, it might suggest that he views these issues as the ‘tender’ part of the substance dualist views, however, at least some of the solutions put forward are plausible, and among them, he rebuts one of the objections made against Swinburne’s position by Hasker (the cloning issue).

6.2.2 Further developments from the original writings up to the 2013 conference

6.2.2.1 Leftow’s response to Hasker’s critique of Aquinas (2010)

Returning to Hasker, his critique of Aquinas’ view (though largely endorsed by his commentator, Stewart Goetz, at the Biola conference in 2013) has come in for some critique since 2010 by Brian Leftow - an Oxford Philosopher of Religion with a specialism in Aquinas’ thought. As a result, it was notable that Hasker’s critique of Aquinas at the conference was a slightly softened version of his original exposition in The Emergent Self, but the content of his critique proceeded along similar lines to the version in The Emergent Self none-the-less,

534 Ibid., pp.9-12.
so Leftow’s response to that still remains and needs to be heard as a counter-critique of Hasker’s critique of Aquinas.

In his “Soul, Mind and Brain,” Leftow, in effect, does what Stump did in 1995 and lays out a contemporary exposition of Aquinas’ view contending how such a position could be defended in contemporary mind/body debate, but particularly with an eye to rebutting two of Hasker’s objections to the position originally penned in *The Emergent Self*. The two objections he responds to are the contention that Aquinas equivocates over the word ‘form’ in his work (masking a philosophical inadequacy), and the contention that the mental lives of humans with immaterial souls differs too much from that of animals with material souls. The latter critique is one that Hasker has dropped, but adapted into a different argument – laid out above – so will not be further discussed in light of Leftow’s work, however, the former issue requires some more exposition. And entailed within Leftow’s critique of Hasker on the mental lives of animals and humans comes a clarification as to what Aquinas meant when saying that the human has no organ of thought, so will be tied in at the end of the section.

To elucidate the issue of equivocation highlighted earlier a bit more fully, Hasker is of the view that Aquinas blurs two different senses of the word ‘form’ in his metaphysics allowing him to hold the seemingly paradoxical statements that (a)humans have immaterial souls that can exist apart from a material body, and (b)a human being is a single material substance. On the one hand, when referring to forms that enform matter – those of the material world - he means ‘form’ in the sense of it being an abstract state (or [to use

Braine’s terminology whilst making the same critique] ‘shape’\textsuperscript{536} – the material form configures prime matter resulting in its existing in its configured state / shape; however, when using the word in respect to God and angels, they cannot be described as being ‘states’ so Aquinas inadvertently shifts his usage of the word to mean something more like ‘immaterial particular’ (that is, an individual not made of material stuff). Because of Aquinas’ unawareness of such equivocation, this allows him to continue to build his view of the human soul as (to use Stump’s phraseology) a configured configurer – one that enforms a body in the material world but is actually an immaterial form that can exist without the body it enforms. But once the inconsistency is exposed, he cannot hold this anymore and statements (a) and (b) are shown to be incompatible.

But in response, Leftow argues that this reducing of a material being’s form down to an abstract state / shape as some readers of Aquinas want to do is mistaken, in that Aquinas never reduces his definition to that. Rather, Aquinas has a broad, but univocal and consistent understanding of the word ‘form’, Leftow clarifying that for Aquinas, ‘the… [substantial]\textsuperscript{537} form of [any] x is that y such that y is present as a whole in each part of x, and for y to be so is for all x’s matter to be F [F meaning in a particular functional state].’\textsuperscript{538}

So under such a definition, a form could be an abstract state, but the definition is not restricted to just that, but allows for the instance of an immaterial particular as well – a form holenmerically present throughout every part of the entity it enforms, but being what causes the entity to exist in a certain state. Robert Pasnau comments (responding this time to Braine’s terminology of ‘shape’):


\textsuperscript{537} The ‘substantial’ aspect of the definition referring to the role the form plays in in giving rise to an entity as a configured \textit{substance}.

\textsuperscript{538} Ibid., p.397 (emphasis his).
Forms, for Aquinas, are not mere shapes [or ‘states’], but are causal principles in the natural world. They are indeed the primary causal principles in nature, actualizing matter that would otherwise be characterless and inert, if it could exist at all. A soul without a body is therefore not to be conceived on the model of a free-floating shape. Souls [forms] are causal agents, powers. 539

So Hasker’s charge of equivocation against Aquinas is unfounded, and not a valid critique of his metaphysics.

In response to Hasker’s contention (though alleged by other writers) that Aquinas thinks the body has no organ of thought, 540 and so making a fundamental scientific error in not recognising the place of the brain in thinking, 541 Leftow has some further insights worthy of note. Taken in isolation, Aquinas’ comment does appear to be rather naïve, and is not surprising that some read it to the effect that Aquinas is stating that the higher rational processes (i.e. thinking logically etc.) have no neural correlate. But Leftow contends that, read in the wider context of Aquinas, such a reading is rather short-sighted, because elsewhere, Aquinas writes that there are physical changes in the relevant organs when the subject generates thought, implying that the subject uses such organs when thinking. 542

This, when put in the wider context still of Aquinas’ general understanding of the role of the body in carrying out the ‘acts’ of the soul, leads Leftow to think that Aquinas is not making an empirical comment when saying that the body has no organ of thought, but rather is making a philosophical comment about a person’s (or animal’s) mental state when they think, and the content of such a mental state. 543 This philosophical reading in effect suggests

540 Summa Theologiae 1a 75:2.
541 Hasker, Emergent Self, p.164.
542 B. Leftow, “Soul, Mind and Brain”, pp.405-06.
543 Ibid., pp.405-410.
that when speaking of the body having no organ of thought, Aquinas is saying that the mental state and content of thought is not itself physically encoded in any organ, yet in the natural (embodied) condition, a person having that thought / mental state, does so in virtue of her soul, but the power(s) of which being realised in the relevant physical organ(s) of the body. So Hasker’s uneasiness with Aquinas’ view as being unscientific seems to stem from a mis-reading of the wider context of Aquinas’ writing and is not as problematic as Hasker thinks.

Leftow’s counter-response to the Hasker critiques of Aquinas, therefore, has the interesting indication that some of Hasker’s critiques are not particularly valid, suggesting that further evaluation of some of his other critiques (not addressed by Leftow) might be insightful. This, therefore will follow in the evaluation of the contemporary thinkers toward the end of the chapter.

6.2.2.2 The Issue of ‘Thisness’ levied against Hasker (Biola 2013)

Moving from assessment of Hasker’s critiques of the views of others to addressing some his own view faces, his received an interesting critique from Swinburne at the Biola conference in which Swinburne argued that a subject only given rise to by its body would, on the direction contemporary physics is heading, not have any individuation or ‘thisness’ by which it could be called ‘me’ or ‘you’. Although previous views of physics maintained that each particle had its own ‘thisness’ or individuation just by nature of it being what it is solo numero (hence allowing composites of such particles derivatively to have their own individuation - all the way up to human persons having such), a more contemporary view of physics states that particles do not have this individuation, and are what they are only due to their having the properties they do as particles with a qualitative history (e.g. electron A
existed at time 1 and then at time 2 came into relation with electron B etc.). If the more
current view of physics is correct (and Swinburne contends that opinion is leaning more in
that direction), then Hasker has no grounds on his emergentist view for saying that a person
has any individuation because the body (and hence emergent self) has only been given rise
to by these non-individuated particles.544

Such a critique is very interesting, because if the physics he is citing in 2013 is correct, then
it might cut both ways, Swinburne himself appealing to the ‘older’ physics in his 1997 book
to counter the objection ‘what is it that makes each soul unique if it is not the physical body
it inhabits?’. His counter in 1997 was to argue that if one can argue that two physically
identical rocks have their thisness due to their being solo numero, then it is just as plausible
to argue the same of the soul.545 However, Swinburne would no longer have this appeal if
he critiques Hasker’s view based on the 2013 physics. But, unlike Hasker who would be
captured by such an objection, what Swinburne could argue instead (given his creationist view
of the soul’s origin) is that each soul gets its personal individuation due to its originating
from a personal God, who gives individuation when creating persons (and animals?)
whereas He does not create individuation when creating inanimate objects. Whether or not
Swinburne would want to use such a counter-rebuttal would be something Swinburne
would need to decide, however what should be noticed in the bigger picture is that, for him,
he would only be responding to a side issue levied in response to his proposal. However, for
Hasker, if the trend in physics is correct, then he, and the emergentists generally, have
another problem a lot more centrally for the view.

544 ‘Panel 3: Neuroscience and the Soul’ Discussion and Question and Answer panel, particularly of Hasker and
Moreland’s views of the soul at the conference, ‘Neuroscience and the Soul’, Biola University, July 2013,
6.2.2.3 Critique of Moreland’s view at the Biola Conference (2013)

Until this point in the two chapters, not much analysis has been given of Moreland, however his view received thorough scrutiny at the conference. Firstly, by Hasker, who, having critiqued Aquinas’ view, went on to evaluate Moreland’s position. Much of his response was positive, saying that Moreland, though in the family of Thomistic dualists, had helpfully managed to modify Aquinas’ view to avoid the metaphysical void between human immaterial forms and the rest of the material world’s material forms (in that every animate being is [immaterial] soul and body). Hasker also credited his view with having established the origin of the human (and animal) at conception (hence avoiding the issues of development of the plant-into-animal-into-human); and also values Moreland’s view for giving place for all the substance dualist arguments for justifying the existence of the soul – all very positive philosophical developments in Hasker’s eyes.\textsuperscript{546}

Stewart Goetz, who, though primarily as Hasker’s commentator at the conference, also commented on Moreland’s view (as Hasker had expounded and critiqued Moreland’s view as part of his paper), identifying that though Thomistic in its view of the soul animating the body, Moreland’s view is built upon Cartesian intuitions (he names five): 1. That a person cannot exist in degrees (or the ‘indivisibility of a person’), 2. The unity of consciousness at any given time, 3. The unity of consciousness across time (one is the same person in three weeks’ time as she is today), 4. That personal identity through time is not based on memory, character, personality traits as these are neither necessary nor sufficient for continued existence through time, and 5. That a person and their body have different persistence.

conditions through time. So in personal conversation Goetz asked whether Moreland had a more Thomistic intuition – namely does he have any awareness that he animates his own body. Moreland replied no to this, but clarified that he had the further intuition of being aware of his being spatially present at all points in space occupied by his body, which would be a Thomistic intuition.

Such a mixture of intuitions is interesting (and justifiable), but certainly makes Moreland’s a hybrid view - justifiably Thomistic because of the role the soul has in animating the body, but very Cartesian in its substance dualist stance. Indeed, as pointed out above, it is very clear that Moreland has been strongly influenced by Swinburne’s views, explaining why Moreland devotes so much of his other writings to justifying substance dualism generally (demonstrated above by his twinning, cloning and freezing article) than Thomistic dualism specifically. Goetz did go onto argue that with the Cartesian interactionist paradigm at work, Moreland (unlike Aquinas) needs to give an account of the interaction between soul and body which he (as every other contemporary dualist) had not yet done. However, as has been said a number of times now (Hasker, Swinburne, Moreland and also Collins – all as friends of dualistic interactionism or foes - all rejecting the objection as being rather tired, weak and dated), not being able to give a mechanism of interaction by no means counts against an interactionist position, so Goetz’ critique here is not really of any significance.

Given the above, there is, so far, little philosophically to critique of Moreland and as such, Hasker contends that ‘Moreland’s view of the soul-body relationship is well developed and

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deeply considered...[and one that] demands serious attention. However, though philosophically strong, Hasker also contends that the view has some serious pitfalls scientifically which make it untenable given the contemporary scientific paradigm.

The first difficulty Hasker identifies is that of its advocating vitalism, a view that biologists once favoured, but is now regarded as a ‘failed research project...that has been abandoned by virtually all biologists.’ As seen above, Moreland is aware of that issue, but Hasker’s critique puts it very starkly. He secondly also critiques Moreland’s view as being incompatible with any type of evolution. Because Moreland argues that the soul is an individuated essence that from the beginning teleologically gives the organism its being, kind and function, this appears to leave each substance as immutable, and non-adaptable. This is a view that might be advocated if its proponent holds to progressive creationism of an intelligent design persuasion, but is incompatible with any current form of evolutionary theory, discrediting the view scientifically today and meaning that a more scientifically compatible theory of mind should be sought for. For these reasons, though positive about Moreland’s philosophy, Hasker rejects Moreland’s modified Thomistic opinion and hence moves onto outline his alternative emergent dualism.

6.2.2.3.1 A Counter response to the critiques of Moreland?

By way of response, in the panel that followed Hasker’s lecture, Moreland clarified that for him, theological and (purely) philosophical issues were more important in framing a worldview than scientific issues, so was not as concerned by the science above as Hasker

(who, in answer to a previous question [which made further sense of some critiques he has
levied against other thinkers in his work] responded that ‘philosophers disagree on
everything, but at least within science there is a consensus’, suggesting he sees the
knowledge science gives as just as [maybe slightly more so?] important as [than] the
knowledge theology and pure philosophy gives us\(^{551}\). However, as already elucidated from
his original writing in 2000, Moreland is aware that his view entails certain scientific
implications which, though supported by the cluster of scientists he footnotes, are not in
line with current consensus of scientific thought.

In response to the specifics, and leaving aside the escape-route of paradigm shifts within
scientific consensus (which Mark Baker [himself editor of The Soul Hypothesis\(^{552}\) raised in
regard to the vitalism issue at the conference\(^{553}\), Moreland responds that there is an
alternative purely metaphysical Aristotelian alternative which he could still hold to, to
maintain his general proposal. This alternative view does not entail the specifics of
morphogenesis and other scientific implications that his preferred proposal does – making it
immune from such charges of vitalism (though he prefers the term ‘organicism’ seeking to

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\(^{551}\) The place of science within philosophising is an interesting discussion which is too big for investigation here,
but one that is very large in philosophical thought today, particularly given the prevalence of scientism within
the philosophical thought of many scientists and also popularisers of atheism. Hasker himself is too nuanced a
thinker to advocate such a weak position as that, however, the way he and Moreland approach the issues
raises the question as to whether science should have an equal footing to pure philosophy (and theology?)
when constructing philosophical thought, whether it should play second violin, or whether that should be
reversed and it play first violin. The discussion is sure to continue and play a significant part in people’s
epistemology and ontology generally, and such underlying issues will need to be exposed in discussions at all
levels because of the major effect such issues have on a person’s worldview.

\(^{552}\) M.C. Baker and S. Goetz (ed.), The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of the Soul (New York:
Continuum, 2011).

\(^{553}\) In the question and answer session following Hasker’s lecture, Baker commented that, though rejected, the
scientific community never gave a sound reason for rejecting the more careful forms of vitalism – it just fell out
of favour; and that actually, prominent scientists such as Rupert Sheldrake are espousing similar ideas to such
in their current scientific work (William Hasker ‘The Dialectic of Body and Soul’ Lecture given at the conference
‘Neuroscience and the Soul’, Biola University, July 2013 [available:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XwUMBlkRXXk] [accessed 30\(^{th}\) April 2015] min 1.08.50 – 1.10.15].

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distance himself from primitive forms of vitalism), as well, presumably, from any issue
evolution might cause.

Moreland has since written a paper to be included in a compendium of essays articulating
something of this position and underlines that it is a purely *metaphysical* understanding:554
He calls the alternative view a ‘Metaphysical Late-Medieval Aristotelian,’ [MLMA] position –
with Thomistic colouring, one which retains something of the understanding of his above
proposal, seeing an organism’s soul as mereologically simple (not containing parts),
metaphysically complex (due to its containing a complex essence, exemplified in an
individuator [prime matter - see below]), and holenmerically present throughout the body it
animates (the body being of the *accidental* forms a substantial form might take). But he
emphasises that it is purely a hylomorphic *metaphysical* proposal, and one not to be
advanced in competition with a corpuscular-mechanical scientific proposal.

On this MLMA view, an organism (a substantial form [a composite of form and prime
matter]) is defined as the same thing as its soul, namely ‘a thin particular, viz., an essence
exemplified by an individuator (usually prime matter), that stands under (sub-stands) the
accidental features of the organism, including its body.’555 And being a metaphysical
proposal, in terms of the evolution objection, the MLMA alternative does not suffer the
objection, because hylomorphic metaphysical proposals of the time are consistent with it.

Moreland recognises that his favoured (Organicism) view does suffer the evolution

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554 Sent in a private correspondence from Moreland. Moreland originally submitted the paper for a conference
in Durham in his absence, but was uncertain then as to what the organiser of the conference was planning to
do with it, and under what title the conference essays were to be published.
555 ‘A Critique of, and Alternative, to Nancey Murphy’s Christian Physicalism’, a paper sent in private
 correspondence from Moreland, and originally intended to be read on Moreland’s behalf at a conference in
University Press, 2011) pp.99-134. The (material composite) substance (of enformed matter) is termed a ‘thin
particular’ because it is irrespective of any accidental forms the substantial form might later possess. Including
the latter, Pasnau describes such a substance as a ‘thick concrete’ substance.(p.99).
objection, yet he countered arguing it is not a problem for him because for independent reasons (following much of Thomas Nagel), he rejects evolution and described himself as a progressive creationist of an intelligent design persuasion. Such a comment is controversial and merits further attention.

6.2.2.3.2 Moreland on Evolution

Digging deeper, it is interesting to discover what Moreland means by evolution and what the reasons he rejects (certain types of) evolution are. In a lecture entitled ‘Doubts about Darwinism’, he argues (in something of a variation to the definition given in the footnote in chapter 3) that evolution can have one of three meanings 1. Organisms change when in new environments (or ‘micro’ evolution) 2. The thesis of common descent (that all life forms appear on earth in a sequence of simpler to more complex life – right through from single-celled organisms to human beings), and 3. The blind watchmaker thesis (or ‘Darwinism’ - that all of life came to be by means of entirely unguided natural processes). In that lecture, he contends that all the evidence presented for evolution supports only the first and second understanding of the definition. In terms of 3, Moreland argues that there is no evidence whatsoever that the Darwinian mechanism is correct, and in fact, following Nagel, argues that there is scientific and philosophical reasons to reject it, namely the origin of life (being too improbable to have occurred by natural processes), biological diversity over time (life being too complex and intricate to have evolved by such a mechanism in 3.8 billion years), and the origin of consciousness.

558 Ibid., minutes 24:10 – 26:24.
This is interesting in light of the work of the Alternburg 16 (a group of renowned evolutionary biologists) who agree and have set up the research project of seeking to find a better mechanism than the neo-darwinian explanation that is currently popular but designated weak by the grouping. So Moreland / Nagel may have good grounds for rejecting aspect 3 of evolutionary theory, but Moreland goes further than this and says that (though advocating 1, and is convinced of microevolution) he rejects the second premise of universal common descent, the one that considerable evidence is given for. In his lecture, Moreland did not comment on why he rejects universal common descent, though presumably it would be along the lines that Intelligent Design theorists reject it, such as the problems in the fossil record, the lack of any intermediate forms etc. However, at least the genetic evidence does seem to suggest that universal common descent is right, and that Moreland would be rejecting a lot of evidence to the contrary in rejecting aspect 2.

This leaves his proposal(s) at an interesting, though awkward point; interesting in that he will no doubt be keeping an eye on the developments of evolutionary biological mechanisms in this century as they may shed light on the problems he and others identify with neo-darwinian theory. He may be hoping that such mechanisms will give more grounds for overturning aspect 2 of the theory, however it is also awkward in that, given the science we have today, his favoured proposal appears to be contradicted by the evidence for aspect 2.

However, through closer analysis of his view(s), it may be that his view actually has more prospects concerning evolutionary theory than initially appears, and that possibly his model is compatible with such evolutionary theory after all. Space here does not allow for a complete articulation as to how the soul might also evolve, however three things are worthy
of comment; firstly, though Moreland appears to be assuming a fairly static model of the
soul, at various points throughout the Biola conference, Swinburne, Hasker and Collins all
rejected a contention that Tim O’Connor made that a created soul could not develop new
powers – i.e. was a static substance. If this is possible through a life-time, might it not be
possible through history? Secondly, recognising that evolutionary biologists still maintain
the categories of ‘species’, would not such a distinction – even within evolving organisms
also allow some place for an evolving soul that yet delineated kinds and individuals at a
substance level? But further, thirdly (and from a different angle), Moreland’s view might
gain encouragement from the rise in biology of ‘systems biology’, an area garnering the
interest of the scholarly world because of its acknowledging that teleology genuinely does
seem to be a built in factor within biology. With this being the case, and thinkers such as
Denis Noble, and James A. Shapiro suggesting that Aristotelian models of biology have more
explanatory power for biology than standard Corpuscular, Democritus-type views,\(^{559}\) might
this indicate that for newer models of evolution that arise, they would be more likely to
allow for models such as Moreland’s with their Aristotelian/Thomistic-friendly frameworks?
The latter question veers into speculation about the future of science, a direction less
appealing. But as the former two questions suggest, even assuming current theories of
evolution, Moreland’s view of the soul may be a lot more compatible with such than is
supposed.

Systems Biologist, and the future of Physiology’, *Experimental Physiology* 93 (2008): 16-26; J.A. Shapiro,
6.3 Evaluation

6.3.1 Evaluating Hasker’s position and work

Having surveyed the positions advocated by leading contemporary philosophers of a holistic dualist persuasion, it will be seen that they all have much in them to be commended, and are all philosophically sharp and defendable positions. However, in beginning to bring overall evaluation to the discussion and seeking to identify which might be the most helpful for the aims of this thesis, commencing with Hasker’s, it would need to be identified that his is the least favourable of the positions. Although genuinely able to make emergent theory into a dualistic position – hence able to maintain the biblical criteria that the self / soul survives the death of the body – his view encounters a number of problems.

Firstly, despite genuinely being an emergent dualist, he still has the problem of emergentist theory generally, namely that there is no precedent of any other entity (only structural properties) emerging anywhere in the world with which to support his model.

Secondly, his view falls short, if the new models of physics are correct, by not being able to give any ground for individuation of a person due to the individuation-less nature of particles.

Thirdly, his view, raises the difficulty of whether matter could give rise to / create a new immaterial substance ex nihilo, something that most would think only possible for God to do.

Although these move from stronger to weaker reasons for rejecting his view, cumulatively, and when added to those critiques of emergentism given in chapter 3, they would be cause for, though appreciating his view, not advancing it forward as a comparably strong dualistic
position for this thesis. However, his has been a particularly helpful view to consider because of his critiques of other views, and because it has enabled greater clarity in seeing why emergence theory concerning mind is unconvincing.

It should be said that Hasker’s emergent self is an improvement on Murphy and Clayton’s position, so, though not as strong as other dualistic positions, if Yong and Kärkkäinen continued to want to build so much anthropology on emergence theory, they would be advised to go for Hasker’s position rather than Murphy and Clayton. Hasker’s view at least gives some grounds for allowing for the continued persistence of a person into the intermediate state (hence giving them person-identity at the time of the resurrection [also (if newer views of physics are not correct) allowing for personal identity over and through time generally]) due to his contention that an actual new substance emerges from the brain.

This also gives his view credence over Murphy’s, Clayton’s, Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s view and allows him to maintain libertarian free will. However, though an improvement, the problems identified above – even for Hasker’s refined emergent dualism – make his position one that does not commend itself for further use in this thesis.

6.3.1.1 Critiquing Hasker’s criticisms of Aquinas

Whilst considering the thought of Hasker, a further area that has been illumined through considering Leftow, is the questionability of some of Hasker’s critiques of Thomas Aquinas’ classic position (given in chapter 5). Having seen that a number of Hasker’s key critiques of Aquinas do not stand through the counter-responses by Leftow, on re-consideration of the critiques Hasker made (not responded to by Leftow), on closer scrutiny, many of these do not appear to stand either. To remind, Hasker critiqued Aquinas on the grounds that the human having an immaterial soul / form puts a void between humanity and the rest of the
material world (with their merely material forms). But this only feels a leap when looking exclusively at the *material world* aspect of Aquinas’ metaphysical position and ignoring the wider context of his *whole* metaphysics. This wider context does not just see humans in a material world, but more fully also part of an immaterial world consisting of beings like God and angels. For Aquinas, human beings are like the amphibians of the created order: in common with God and angels they have an immaterial form, but in common with the material world have a material body. So in fact there is no void, but continuity in seeing humans as between the angels and the material world.

Hasker’s difficulty with Aquinas’ position due to the human soul merely giving the human rational thought (as opposed to any biological difference) is not devastating either. It is just a recognising of what it is that differentiates humans from other animals and stating that the human soul is what is responsible for that.

Further, the idea that a human develops from a merely living thing into a sentient thing, into a human person is an idea that some (though recognising, not all) would find, and have found convincing, so Hasker’s *intuition* that there is something wrong with such generation in the womb does not seem to hold.

Regarding Hasker’s critique of Aquinas that he has no grounds for viewing the rational soul as one that can operate independently of the body (unlike the material form) - other than a theological premise (Aquinas’ philosophical reasons for this are quite weak), that in itself is not a reason to reject it (given Aquinas’ theistic metaphysics). And the argument that it might suffer dualistic counter arguments against it would only be valid if it were a reductive

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561 For a closer exposition of Aquinas’ position regarding human embryonic development, see Leftow “Souls Dipped in Dust”, pp.121, 129-30.
physicalist proposal. With this not being the case, and Aquinas regularly repeating that a human being is able to do X in virtue of her having a soul, a Thomist could gladly agree with all the arguments put forward by dualists.

These further counter-responses, added to those of Leftow, imply that Hasker’s critiques of Aquinas are not particularly strong. It needs to be acknowledged, therefore, that though possibly in need of modification, the essence of the classic Thomistic position appears to stand after all as a lot more viable a position than it initially seemed after critique of it in chapter 5. So rather than jettisoning it like the Classic Cartesian view, it will be maintained as an option for further consideration in the seeking for viable philosophical models, recognising, further, that there are a number of defenders of the position in contemporary mind-body debates today. Stump has already been seen to be such a contemporary defender, but because Leftow’s position gives slight modifications of Aquinas’ classic position (he follows Aquinas closely, but for example modifies it by proposing that dust would be a preferable foundational matter to Aquinas’ ‘prime matter’), his is a good example of an alternative position that follows the essence of Aquinas but gives it modifications needed for contemporary debate. Along with Aquinas’ view, then, Leftow’s contemporary refinement should also be considered as a philosophically robust holistic dualist view.

6.3.1.2 Critiquing Hasker’s criticisms of Swinburne’s contemporary Cartesian view

Whilst continuing to focus on critique of Hasker, it also needs to be highlighted that his critiques of Swinburne’s view are not particularly strong either. Hasker’s contending that Swinburne’s view would imply that God waits for the animal / human body to take a certain

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shape in the course of evolution before assigning its specific soul, is in fact a correct observation (not a critique) of Swinburne’s view, and there is no problem associated with it (unlike there may be for Descartes original version [and though speaking of Swinburne, in reality Descartes may be the real target of Hasker’s critique here]).

Whether Swinburne’s ‘modal logic premise two’ is questionable – Hasker’s contention - is a fair point; but even if it is questionable, it is still more plausible than not, such plausibility allowing it to stand as a premise (and even if it did not, and the argument collapsed, this would mean only that Swinburne does not have so strong a case for his position as opposed to having an argument against).

In response to the critiques that his argument is circular and that his modal argument is not strong, Swinburne wrote articles in direct counter to these objections identifying why they are mistaken, and in light of his counters, such critiques have now been dropped.\textsuperscript{563}

Hasker’s critique that he considers the idea that the soul goes out of existence only to come back when revived was only a thought Swinburne entertained in passing, however, he makes clear that he does not hold such a position – his actual view was outlined in the overview above. And Hasker’s further critique that Swinburne’s view is difficult to give an account of on issues of cloning / twinning was generously responded to by Moreland.

Hasker’s criticism that Swinburne suggests a \textit{personal} explanation of the correlations between body and soul – the ‘limited nature’ idea - is not a strong critique either, given that Swinburne merely suggests this in an Appendix (i.e. that, with science almost certainly not going to be able to give an explanation for the mental and physical correlations between mind and brain, God [as a personal explanation] is the best explanation for such, in so doing,

giving an argument for the existence of God\textsuperscript{564}). Being an appendix, his suggestion does not make up the fundamental argument Swinburne is putting forward (which, it will be remembered, is that we have no knowledge of the interaction between brain and body); it is merely a suggestion given the limits of science. If this suggestion happened to be overturned scientifically somehow, then all the better for being able to give an explanation for mind-body interaction.

Before continuing to assess Swinburne and Moreland then, the above indicates that, although very much valuing Hasker, for the contribution and level of analysis he has brought to the discussion, his position, as well as a number of his critiques of the other positions, are not as strong as they might appear to be, so will be left at the end of this chapter.

6.3.2 Further evaluating Swinburne

Moreland’s critique that Swinburne’s being merely a property-thing view is actually a natural entailment of what Swinburne argues, but this is not a difficulty in that on Swinburne’s view, the soul is what ensures personal identity over time, and the uniqueness of a person. That Swinburne does not have the grounds for adjudicating a human body as specifically human, Swinburne would not see a problem with - again, it is the soul that gives the body its identity.

As well as being able to withstand much of the critique advanced against his view, in fact, since writing, Swinburne’s view may have been given further support by the Near Death Experiences (NDEs) that have been recorded in the last few years. At the time of writing, Swinburne was wary of endorsing such accounts due to there being no instance of an

\textsuperscript{564} See further Richard Swinburne “The Argument from Consciousness”, Lecture given at the ‘Plantinga Conference’ at Baylor University, 7\textsuperscript{th} November 2014 available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cD3agKZZLVA (accessed 30\textsuperscript{th} April 2015).
account where the brain was monitored constantly throughout the time of the conscious (near death) experience, and shown to be entirely shut down. But recent examples such as that of Harvard neuroscientist Eben Alexander,^{565} are claimed to be those such instances that were lacking when Swinburne originally wrote – recorded with complete medical monitoring throughout. Such occasions where the patients’ cortex were completely shut-down and monitored during the time they were having their conscious near death experiences, as well as instances of subjects like Pam Reynolds, where detailed knowledge was given by the subject of what was going on in the hospital ward during the time their cortex was officially shut-down, have recently arisen.^{566}

So it is possible that NDEs would add to Swinburne’s case. But regardless (and as seen, he does not argue the point), his is an excellent candidate to build an anthropology upon, making sense in light of theology, philosophy and science, and, as a slightly easier theory to comprehend than others, is likely to commend itself to many for its development in theology.

6.3.3 Further evaluating Moreland

Moreland’s view is also particularly commendable as one that is original, complex, but articulated clearly. The fact that, as well as making sense in the light of theology, philosophy and (much of) science, it has the further benefits of (a) being able to maintain the benefits of

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^{565} For his popular account of the events, see his *Proof of Heaven: A Neuroscientist’s journey into the Afterlife* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012). For his debate with sceptics Sean Carroll and Steven Novella on the subject see ‘Debate – Sean Carroll, Steven Novella vs Eben Alexander, R Moody – Death is Not Final – 2014’ available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEeDCmEqv9o (accessed 8th July 2014).

^{566} For one of the leading scholarly investigations into the subject of Near Death Experiences, see Pim Van Lommel’s *Consciousness Beyond Life, The Science of the Near-Death Experience* (London: Harper Collins, 2011). Note, the instances of light, tunnels and appearances of relatives in NDEs, though interesting, are less helpful as evidence than the patients being able to identify what was happening in the empirically-verifiable hospital room during their experience.
traditional Thomist dualism and able to give account of proper function, (b) giving a strong basis for teleology, (c) presenting a reason for stating that a human body is specifically a human one, and (d) also hinting at a fuller explanation for the intuition that a person’s life ends when their soul departs; this combination makes Moreland’s view also very attractive.

However, having said this, a note of caution might be in order. Because of the place of science today, there is a question mark as to whether Moreland’s would be a position for burgeoning Pentecostal Anthropology to be attracted to at the moment. With his organismic position being rightly or wrongly associated with vitalism (a connection Moreland himself recognises people are making), and the potential issue of evolution arising in connection with the position, the advocate is likely to get a lot of difficulty with the proposal because of its scientific entailments’ lack of popularity in today’s scientific community. Having said this, Baker’s point at the Biola conference was that even if this association is a right one (though see Moreland’s views on this above), vitalism just ‘fell out of favour’ with the scientific community but without there being good reason for its rejection, and as Moreland pointed out, at least some leading biologists hold to organicism. This plus the growing number of leading biologists who are speaking about function and rejecting the ‘aggregate of parts’ view of organisms might suggest that there is potential in Moreland’s view as science develops. The same could be said of the objection from evolution. Although the above suggested it would be possible to develop his model and suggest an understanding of how the soul evolved (along with the body) which comports with current Neo-Darwinian theory, as said, the rumblings from the philosophical and biological quarters suggest that such a neo-Darwinian mechanism may not be the status quo in 50 years’ time; possibly the

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567 As an example of what this might look like, see Robin Collins’ proposal in “A Scientific Case for the Soul” in M.C. Baker and St. Goetz (eds.) The Soul Hypothesis (New York: Continuum, 2011) pp.244-45. Other versions of how Moreland’s view of the soul might be compatible with evolution could also be proposed.
newer mechanism(s?) of evolution would shed more light on how to understand Universal Common Ancestry and possibly comport more happily with Moreland’s view.

So Moreland’s view is not inconceivable with regards to the science, it may even be ahead of its time. But though, as Hasker commended, it is definitely a position worthy of consideration and merit, it should be highlighted that the Pentecostal may potentially put herself in difficulty by adopting Moreland’s view because of the current Zeitgeist of the academy and its favour for knowledge from the sciences currently. This is something to be considered, yet positions should be assessed on their rational merits, as opposed to the trending zeitgeist, so his organocentrism (‘organicism’ being his alternative to vitalism within that) will be maintained as worthy of consideration. His alternative ‘Metaphysical Aristotelian’ option is sound, and avoids any scientific difficulties, and is a viable alternative. For Moreland himself, advancing it, and employing hylomorphic metaphysics as opposed to post-17th century corpuscular-mechanical thinking, might be difficult, given that he has built much of his philosophy of mind on the (post 17th century) Cartesian-influenced intuitions he has and wants to, rather than on pre-17th century metaphysics. But that is more of an issue for Moreland himself. Philosophically speaking, it is a consistent position, and also one to be commended within a holistic dualist framework.

6.4 Conclusion and way forward

Of the three dualisms analysed – Contemporary Cartesian, Thomistic (the group of), and Emergent, it is clear why all of them are defended, and in many ways, all commend themselves strongly philosophically, and all would be consistent with the biblical holistic dualism that has been argued for in chapter 4. That said, Swinburne’s Contemporary Cartesian view, and the handful of Thomistic positions (classic Thomism, Leftow’s
contemporary refinement of the classic view, Metaphysical Aristotelianism, and Moreland’s
Organicism), distinguish themselves on the grounds of their more plausible account of how
the soul continues into the intermediate state, as well as not having to respond to the
difficulties the theory of emergence entails, as being more persuasive philosophically. At
this point, then, Hasker’s Emergent Dualist position will be jettisoned.

This leaves the Swinburne Contemporary Cartesian, and family of Thomist positions as the
better options. As regards the latter family, it should be recognised that all of the Thomist
options discussed seem philosophically defensible, even if having their own idiosyncrasies.

In wanting to be more specific about which holistic dualism might advance Cooper’s project,
but not requiring ultimate specificity, to select just one of these Thomist options is not
necessary, however, to move forward and allow the grouping to be considered as just
one ‘Thomistic’ holistic dualist position (to be assessed alongside the Contemporary
Cartesian view), the four positions need to be grouped under a Thomistic ‘banner’
definition. Such a ‘banner’ definition will then enable the next chapter to assess which is a
preferable enhancement – the Contemporary Cartesian or Thomist holistic dualist view, by
bringing the insights of Pentecostal theology to bear on the question.

Intriguingly, such a banner definition has already been articulated in the Pentecostal
systematic theologian Myer Pearlman, who, it is to be remembered defined the soul as

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568 To narrow these options to one would be a fascinating major philosophical project requiring extended
attention to be given to: the philosophy and historical development of Thomistic and hylomorphic metaphysics
(to further assess the classic Thomistic view plus Metaphysical Aristotelianism), the nature of quarks in particle
physics (to sift Leftow’s contemporary refinement), as well as consideration of the intricacies of biological
evolution and the philosophical history of organicism (to more fully scrutinise Moreland’s view).
The life-giving and intelligent principle animating the human body using the bodily senses as its agents in the exploration of material things and the bodily organs for its self-expression and communication with the outside world.\textsuperscript{569}

Although remembering that Pearlman never cited his sources, it has to be that one of his sources was a kind of Thomistic thinker in order to arrive at such a definition. It also appears that he came to his position partly through (unconsciously) following Philo’s thought (with his eisegesis of Genesis 2:7) and also hints of Greek thought (namely of the soul arising as a result of the Spirit’s interaction with the physical world [see the exposition and critique of Nee in chapter 1]), so these aspects would have to be divorced. But as an over-arching definition, it itself is pure (from the unhelpful influences above), and certainly does the job of encapsulating all the views articulated above that fall into the Thomistic camp. However, it is slightly on the long side, and a more succinct definition might be preferable. Such can be found in some of Moreland’s work where he sometimes shortens his definition of a Thomistic view to ‘an immaterial substance that contains consciousness and that animates the body’,\textsuperscript{570} one which would also encapsulate all the ‘Thomistic’ views mentioned above. Though more concise, a number of scholars of Aquinas might have a problem saying that the soul is a substance in itself (as opposed to when it has enformed a body). So the way to proceed, appreciating the definition of Pearlman (minus the unhelpful influences surrounding), whilst valuing the conciseness of Moreland (though needing to alter his term ‘substance’), would be to combine elements of these definitions, and adding some further flavour in light of the afore-given discussion of the philosophy of mind.


\textsuperscript{570} Cf. his interview J.P. Moreland, ‘Is the Soul Immortal?’ Interview with Robert Lawrence Kuhn for website ‘Closer to Truth’, available: \url{http://closertotruth.com/series/the-soul-immortal} (accessed 18th March 2016) min 0.19 - 0.26.
So taking these factors into account, and seeking to advance a Thomistic definition which can combine these strands to give an overarching definition which all four positions can endorse, it is proposed that defining the soul as ‘an immaterial principle that is the Subject and Experiencer of consciousness, and which animates the body’ would be a helpful definition, and encompassing position, to carry forward into following chapters. Although not a, and ultimately specific Thomistic model, this family Thomistic view advances a step beyond Cooper’s holistic dualist position, and is helpful for reducing the options.

Whilst having given such a Thomistic definition of the soul-body relation, it is also to be remembered, however, that the Swinburne Contemporary Cartesian view could also be a philosophically strong advancement of Cooper. At this point, then, the thesis will keep both philosophical positions in mind, and return to Pentecostal theology. When considering this again, certain philosophical theological clues arise as to which of the aforementioned philosophical positions would be more helpful in constructing an enhanced Pentecostal theology of constitution. As will be seen, this occurs whilst in the process of continuing to construct a Pentecostal philosophical theological doctrine of human constitution, Pentecostal theology being the focus of the following chapter. Through considering this, the question this chapter is left with will be resolved, before then considering how it might be enhanced through the application of Pentecostal theology to the model.

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571 The word Subject has been capitalised to underline that it is the first person being referred to (as opposed to being interpreted as merely ‘the topic of…’). Experiencer is also capitalised to highlight its referring to the Subject as well as clarifying and expounding the meaning of ‘Subject’.
Chapter 7: Angelic spirits, Holy Spirit and the human spirit

In seeking to construct an enhanced Pentecostal Philosophical Theology of human constitution, Cooper’s philosophically-astute, holistic dualist exegesis has been adopted as the Scriptural basis for building the model. The desire of the previous two chapters was to advance beyond and within that holistic dualist paradigm to being more specific in suggesting which type of holistic dualist model might be apt. In that chapter, both the contemporary Cartesian view, and the bannered Thomistic view, commended themselves in their understanding of the soul and its relationship to the body, as potential models for making the advancement. Though not having yet chosen one of these two potentials, in now returning to Pentecostal theology, it will be seen that through further consideration of the particular Pentecostal worldview and ontology that is entailed within Pentecostal spirituality, certain theological indicators are given as to whether the Contemporary Cartesian or the Thomistic understanding is preferable within the Scriptural holistic dualist model. Having made this resolution, and further checked for its consistency with Scripture, this Pentecostal spirituality (already identified in chapter 4) will also be shown to give further resources for then enhancing this preferred philosophical model of the soul-body relationship Spiritually.572 This will make the Scriptural-philosophical model to be established specifically a Pentecostal one.

In considering Pentecostal theology over the course of this chapter, three spirits endemic to Pentecostal spirituality will be the key. Through further examination of angelic spirits, a potential solution to which of the two positions carried over from the previous chapter will be hinted at. Through then further considering the Holy Spirit in his relation to creation, the

572 The capitalisation draws attention to the role the Holy Spirit plays in this.
comfortability of this philosophical view of the soul, within a Pentecostal framework, will be further revealed, helping to consolidate the solution. In then considering the human spirit within the framework,\textsuperscript{573} additional reasons in support of this position will be given, the human spirit in turn receiving further consideration – along with the Holy Spirit again – when checking to see whether such a view is consistent with Scripture. Having made this exegetical check, the Pentecostal ontology seen in chapter 4 (which considered the relation of the Holy Spirit to creation generally) will be applied to the human spirit specifically; this will allow the developing of the newly established philosophical view of the soul, into a specifically Pentecostal model of the human spirit / soul.\textsuperscript{574}

The chapter will therefore confirm which of the potential soul-body views is better for a Pentecostal philosophical theology of constitution, as well as give the resources for pneumatologically-enriching such a position. The outcome will be the thesis being able to present an enhanced Pentecostal philosophical theology of human constitution.

\section*{7.1 Chapter dialogue partners}

Through returning to the work of Smith, and considering further the filled out, and theologically fleshed out, nature of the second element of his Pentecostal worldview established in chapter 4, further attention will be given to the nature of angels, and reason from this suggested for preferring one of the two philosophical models of the soul suggested. It will then be seen that such a position also comports naturally with the Pentecostal Enspirited creation ontology (which gives particular focus to the relationship of the Holy Spirit to creation), and further, through extending Smith’s second element

\footnotetext[573]{At this point, and through most of the chapter, the terms (human) ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ will be used synonymously and interchangeably. Recognising that this question of terminology requires proper addressing, it will receive that necessary consideration towards the close of the chapter.}

\footnotetext[574]{See footnote above.}
additionally to consider human spirits, two more reasons will be given for preferring such a view of the soul, so commending the view as a preferable philosophical model of the soul.

Through then drawing upon the biblical work of Pentecostal scholars John Levison and Gordon Fee, it will be possible to assess whether the suggested model derived from the above is consistent with Scripture, and possibly given further credence by, the exegesis of Scripture carried out.

Then by returning to Smith’s ontology via Moreland, Smith’s Pentecostal ontology will be applied in the direction specifically of anthropology and the human spirit. This final move will be carried out via dialogue with J.P. Moreland as a secondary dialogue partner because he provides a creative means for handling the ‘soul’ / ‘spirit’ terminological issue that has been arising through the thesis, and which explicitly arises in the interaction with Levison and Fee’s biblical work. More than merely giving a terminological answer as to whether a Pentecostal might prefer the word ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’, by engaging Moreland’s work, stimulus will be given for a more interesting philosophical-theological answer to the ‘soul’ / ‘spirit’ question, and one which allows the further development of the (by then) established preferred philosophical model of the soul, through application of Smith’s ontology to the anthropological model being established.

Through developing this model, and then applying Smith’s Enspirited Creation ontology specifically to it, this will result in such a model being Spiritually enhanced. This means the chapter will end being in a position to enable the achieving of the overall goal of this chapter, a Pentecostal Spiritual enhancement of the philosophically advanced holistic dualist model.
7.2 Returning to Smith

It will be remembered that when filling and fleshing out the hole in Smith’s second element of a Pentecostal worldview - to incorporate angelic beings as enspiriting the world (as well as the Holy Spirit Enspiriting it) - the definition of angels Pentecostals believe in was identified as the following. They are a type of heavenly being that are:

- Created, immaterial, (self)conscious (hence, animate) beings, who joyfully worship God, and function as servants in the carrying out of God’s plans and purposes – ‘angels’ often being a specific term to refer to those heavenly beings who from time to time take on a visible or physical form to carry out some of those purposes in the material world.

In chapter 4, it was particularly the self-conscious aspect of such beings that was noted as important for constructive work. For the further constructive work now being carried out, it is particularly the implied animate nature that is here important. Both the Swinburnian and Thomistic models underline the immaterial and self-conscious characteristics of the human soul, but the animating nature of the angel’s immaterial being reminds the thinker of the distinctly animating aspect of the Thomistic definition of the soul.

The angels (and other spirit beings) that Pentecostals accept as an endemic aspect of their worldview are living immaterial self-conscious beings. These beings populate or (to use Smith’s phraseology) ‘enchant / enspirit’ the physical world humans live in, so humans share reality with (multitudes of) these living immaterial beings. As immaterial beings, these angels have no physical bodies (unless given a specific purpose to carry out in the physical

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575 Cf. Deut 33:2; Dan 7:10; Neh 9:6; Ps 148:2, 5; Col 1:16; Heb 12:22; Rev 5:11.
world) so their vitality has to come from their immaterial nature - their soul / spirit is what gives them life.\textsuperscript{576}

This animating nature of the immaterial angel spirit should not be too much of a surprise when it is remembered that these beings, like humans, also derive their being from a (maximally great) living immaterial self-conscious being – God. Indeed, life flows from God’s being (Jn 1:4; 6:63; Rev 22:17), but of course physical biology is no part of God’s nature.

Given, then, that the world humans live in derives its life and existence from God – a living immaterial self-conscious being (of a maximally great, infinite and necessary nature) who (to be seen) \textit{Enspirits} the world; and given that the world He has created in which humans live is further enspirited by finite living immaterial self-conscious beings – namely angels,\textsuperscript{577} it would be logical to think that the immaterial spirit a human has is also living, and likewise shares this animating nature in some sense. For self-conscious agents, then, it appears that it is their immaterial soul which gives them animated being; so, sharing that self-conscious and immaterial nature of soul humans do with God and angels, it seems plausible that their (human) souls are also what animates human being.

Two things immediately arise from this argument. Firstly, it might be asked what is new or Pentecostal about this, it being very similar in nature to Aquinas’ argument. That is a good and helpful comparison. What Is Pentecostal about it is the helpfulness their contemporary focus on angels brings to the discussion. Focussing on angels, due to the Enlightenment, is

\textsuperscript{576} For those heavenly beings / angels given a task to carry out in the physical world, it seems plausible that their immaterial soul is also what animates the physical body they obtain for their task, given the suddenness of their appearances and disappearances in Scripture (apparently being a sped up mode of composition and decomposition of the body [to that experienced by human beings]). The plausibility of this view seems slightly greater than the idea of God immediately creating for them a body for their immaterial soul to be united with, to then immediately annihilate it after the task has been carried out.

\textsuperscript{577} Note the difference between Enspirit (upper case) and enspirit (lower case). As an infinite being, God’s Spirit Enspirits the whole cosmos. As finite beings, angelic spirits enspirit parts of the cosmos.
something a number of contemporary Christian scholars have avoided, as such beings are often regarded as being pre-modern superstitions. But of course Pentecostals have no problem focussing on such beings in constructing their theology because they (should) ignore the materialist assumptions of Enlightenment philosophy, and they see angels as endemic to their worldview. So in fact Pentecostal theology is able to renew the Thomistic tradition in this sense and draw upon that line for considering human constitution.

Secondly, the above argument raises the issue of the life and animating principle of animals and other living entities in the physical world if it is argued that the self-conscious immaterial human soul (unique in the physical world) is what animates the (human) body. This is a question which this thesis does not take a position on. If one were to adopt the hylomorphic metaphysics, the answer would be that, having their animated being in virtue of their self-conscious immaterial soul (and one able to subsist and operate independently of the body), humans are a different category to animals and other living beings, but those other living beings have their animated being in virtue of their (non-self-conscious [or ‘non-rational’]) soul (or ‘form’) (which only is and functions when configuring matter) (cf. the Classic Thomistic, Leftow, and Metaphysical Aristotelian views). If one were to adopt corpuscularian metaphysics, the answer (as per Moreland) would be that animals and living beings have their animate being in virtue of their soul, which, though not self-conscious, yet is similarly (to humans) an ontologically distinct substance from the body, and which animates the body. Possibly giving stronger grounds for such an organism’s soul being able to survive even after the death of its physical body. (Although, even on the hylomorphic view, might it just be conceivable, given that Aquinas’ contention that human souls are able to operate independently has to be taken on theological grounds (as the

578 Summa Theologiae I q. 75 a.2.
579 Leftow makes no comment in his writings on the soul regarding animal souls. But as a close follower of Aquinas’ argument, presumably he would maintain the distinction and argue that animals have their animated being in virtue of their material form.
580 Possibly giving stronger grounds for such an organism’s soul being able to survive even after the death of its physical body. (Although, even on the hylomorphic view, might it just be conceivable, given that Aquinas’ contention that human souls are able to operate independently has to be taken on theological grounds (as the
being in a position to give the extensive discussion needed for coming to a position on whether hylomorphic or corpuscularian metaphysics is preferable, this thesis takes no position on the souls or life of animals or other living entities. But though not coming to a position on this question, in a general sense, what can be said is that the theologically-grounded argument above suggests that life is primarily a *metaphysical* thing before it is a biological thing, flowing as it does primarily from God. In some sense, the metaphysical life of God must give rise to biological life, though, again, how, and the connection between the two is too broad for consideration here.\(^\text{581}\) So acknowledging these factors, and focussing specifically on the human soul, what is argued above is that in a world created by God, and populated with angels - whose immaterial self-conscious souls give them animated being – as those who also share the immaterial self-conscious nature of their soul in common with such spirit beings, it seems logical to suggest that *humans* also share the *animating* nature of their soul in common with God and angels. This points in the direction of a Thomistic understanding of the soul as being preferable to a Contemporary Cartesian view.

This is a step towards a Thomistic understanding, but through further consideration of Smith’s Pentecostal ontology, this case is advanced by recognising that the Thomistic view

\(^581\) What the connection between the two (metaphysical life and biological life) are cannot be spelt out here – it is not known. It is certainly conceivable that the current mystery surrounding the origin of life on earth could be answered by this metaphysical source – seeing the origin of biological life as a direct act of God. This is the case Stephen Meyer makes in his *Signature in the Soul* (London: Harper Collins, 2009), showing all scientific attempts at an explanation as inadequate, therefore concluding that it must have been a miracle (Interestingly, the atheist Francis Crick also comments that life’s origin on earth is ‘almost a miracle’ [though less of an articulation of God’s being at work, more as a ‘we’ve got nothing on this’ comment]) (F. Crick, *Life Itself Its Origin and Nature* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981] p.88). However, recognising that building philosophical (with theological implications) positions upon science that is still developing, can be shaky, one is slightly wary of building such an argument at this point. Of course, knowledge is constructed on where our field of understanding is in the present, so is a legitimate ‘best explanation’ argument, but currently, this author is wary of arguing that the origin of biological life was a miracle (something that it was impossible to have happened naturally), and also has nothing to say at this point about how the metaphysical life ‘feeds’ / ‘relates to’ the biological.
also comports very naturally with the Pentecostal understanding of the Spirit in relation to creation - the renewal pneumatology already considered in chapter 4.

Again, it is to be remembered that Smith’s Pentecostal ontology draws attention to creation’s participating in the Spirit, and the Spirit filling creation. Indeed, he argues that creation is suspended in the realm of the Spirit, the Spirit who authored creation’s life, and who continues to uphold, animate, and work in, creation. The Spirit’s being the source of life, and who gives life to all creation, is stimulating, giving further reason to think that life is metaphysical before it is biological, and this aspect of pneumatology also gives reason for thinking that a Thomistic dualism would be comfortable in Pentecostal philosophical theology. Indeed, remembering that on a cosmic Spirit-world level, the relation of the soul to the body is a limitedly helpful analogy for picturing the relationship of the Spirit to creation for Smith’s Enspirited creation ontology (though underlining of course that the Spirit also transcends creation [unlike the human soul which merely occupies the human body] and also underlining the clarification of the limited use of this analogy [to follow] which ensures the avoiding of any hint of panentheism), one could further this analogy in its animating Thomistic soul sense. As the Spirit fills, is (metaphysically) ‘in’, and animates creation – causally bringing about effects in the world, so seeing a soul as filling, ‘in’, and animating the human body - causally bringing about effects in the body, would seem consistent with such pneumatology. Again, it is to be clarified, that unlike the panentheist position, the analogy would be limited to the extent that for the Holy Spirit, this interaction is one-way, the Spirit does not gain understanding and knowledge through the world on
Smith’s ontology (in differentiation to a human soul which does by its body). However, drawing the analogy, at least to the extent it can be applied, underlines further the comfortability with which the Thomistic definition of the soul would fit within Pentecostal philosophical theology.

So, thinking about angelic spirits and the Holy Spirit from Smith’s work points somewhat in a Thomistic direction. But expanding Smith’s thought a step further, and including human spirits – particularly (for purposes here) ghosts – under his banner of spirits that dwell in the enspirited Pentecostal world, gives further reason for thinking the Thomistic dualism might be preferable.

It is to remembered that Yong commented

> belief in a spirit-filled cosmos is *endemic* to Pentecostal spirituality...[this spirit-filled cosmos is a world] that includes not just the Holy Spirit but also angels, demons, and other spiritual beings and powers.\(^583\)

And then elaborates on these ‘other spiritual beings and powers’ confirming

> Besides angels and demons...pentecostals of various stripes also believe in all kinds of intermediary, disincarnate spirit beings... [such as] recently, or long-dead ancestors, separated from their bodies but still capable of interacting with, and often tormenting, their living descendants.\(^584\)

\(^582\) And it might be helpful to further clarify that creation is distinct from, but dependent upon, the Spirit. But the opposite is certainly not the case, the Spirit, though definitely distinct from, is *not* dependent upon, creation.

\(^583\) A. Yong, *The Spirit of Creation: Modern Science and Divine Action in the Pentecostal-Charismatic Imagination* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011) pp.174-5 (emphasis mine). Yong has elaborated this point much more fully in his *Discerning the Spirit(s): A Pentecostal-Charismatic Contribution to Christian Theology of Religions* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000) pp.127-32, 234-55 and 294-308. However, it is only in his more recent book that he has sought to give a full interpretation of these phenomena.

\(^584\) Ibid., p.176. Yong even notes the place of ‘animal spirits’ in certain forms of Pentecostalism around the world (p.192) which might be further evidence for ideas hinted at in this chapter, however, because this is not a universally recognised phenomena in global Pentecostalism, it will be left aside as merely a point of interest.
This gives support to the further extension being made of Smith’s work, as such ghostly spirits are also part of the Pentecostal worldview. In his biblical work on human constitution, it is to be remembered that Cooper drew attention to what can be learnt about ghosts, particularly from the ghost of Samuel that was called up by the medium at Endor. So within the Smith-extended element of his Pentecostal worldview, his work will be briefly returned to as is illumining on the issue, before then giving one further argument that follows regarding the disembodied (to be resurrected) human spirit in support of a Thomistic understanding of the human soul.

From 1 Samuel 28, and the identification that (a) the spirit / ghost called up from the dead is recognisably Samuel (from the description the medium gives of ‘an old man wearing a robe’\(^585\)), (b) that he is a typical resident of Sheol (for Samuel states that Saul and his family would join him there the next day [28:19]), and that (c) (though resting) he is able to wake up and engage in some conscious communication (i.e. he spoke), Cooper asserts that this ghostly being cannot be some purely immaterial mind as on Platonist or Cartesian thought; Rather, the ghost is quasi-bodily.\(^586\) For Cooper, this implies that in Old Testament thought (whether or not visibility is a constant property of such a being) ‘bodiliness in some ethereal mode or other is a constant [of the deceased]. The ghost retains the form of the earthly body.’\(^587\) In embellishment of this, Cooper draws firstly upon John Hick to elaborate, citing Hick’s designation of such an entity being ‘a double or shade...of the bodily individual. That which survives death was...thought of as...a shadowy and insubstantial counterpart of the

\(^585\) 1 Sam 28:13b-14b: ‘The woman said, “I see a ghostly figure [or “spirit”] coming up out of the earth.” “What does he look like?” he [Saul] asked. “An old man wearing a robe is coming up,” she said. Then Saul knew it was Samuel.’


\(^587\) Ibid., p.59. Put alternatively, he later comments ‘Samuel was still an ethereal bodily being of some sort. He lacked the material substantiality of a fleshly body was not wholly incorporeal.’ (p.66).
Cooper then turns to philosopher Peter Geach to further the understanding, who adds that this view is the commonsense animistic view, one espoused by spiritists (educated and noneducated) around the world today. This leads Cooper to the conclusion that, in contrast to the Platonist and Cartesian immaterial mind view,

[In the Old Testament] The dead are thought of as ethereal bodily beings whereas the living are fleshly bodily beings. The contrast is between fleshly and non-fleshly not between bodily and nonbodily.

Whether such beings are the remaining ‘life-force’ (to use an Aristotelian / Thomistic category) of a human once they’ve died (and their fleshly body decays), or whether they are all that is left as a result of the life-force having been taken away (and death ensuing), Cooper does not express an opinion. However, what his work indicates is that from the fullest account of a ghost in Scripture, the immaterial soul appears to be bodily (though not fleshly).

The above is very interesting, because the exegesis is very much in accord with Yong’s description of the disincarnate spirit beings prevalent in the Pentecostal worldview, and is an understanding of ghosts Pentecostals would recognise and hold to. But it is further of interest because it appears to give another reason in support of the bannered Thomistic understanding of the soul as opposed to the Contemporary Cartesian view. It appears that although only fully human when in union with a fleshly body, these ghostly beings are very much like the Thomistic (independently operational rational) human forms that enform

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590 Though as already seen earlier in this thesis, given his progressive revelation approach, he argues that the understanding of the dead in the Old Testament is consistent with, and developed and filled out in, the Intertestamental texts, and then the New Testament texts (see chapter 4).

591 Cooper, Ibid., p.67.
prime matter. These beings (although not excluding any of the other Thomistic options) sound very much like (what’s left after death of) the ‘thin particular’ of the Metaphysical Aristotelian (MLMA) view, or, alternatively like souls that were dipped in dust (Leftow Thomistic description). So from having extended Smith’s second element of the Pentecostal worldview a step further to include disincarnate human spirits – namely, ghosts, another reason has been given to favour the Thomistic understanding of the human soul. And having done so leads to a fourth consideration in favour of the Thomistic understanding of the soul, namely the reconstitution of a human being at the final resurrection.

Articulating this fourth consideration, the Thomistic soul gives good grounds for understanding how a human could have a resurrection body as opposed to a recreated one at the final resurrection. This is not a repeat of the already advanced ‘identity persistence over time’ argument. Rather it is to state that in difference to the Contemporary Cartesian view which would require a recreated body for the individual’s soul to occupy, a soul that animates or constitutes a body would naturally be a resurrection body, resurrected as it is from the dust (cf. Eccl 3:20; 12:7 with Dan 12:2), (re)animating physical particles to constitute the same, physically recognisable person (though in a Spiritual, flourishing state). This argument is linked chronologically following the one above, and would mean that living human spirits, if desired, could be affirmed (as well as the dead spirits / ghosts) in the extension of this element of Smith’s element. Such a further extension, however, is unnecessary, and possibly unhelpful for clarity’s sake. Whilst embodied human spirits are certainly consistent with, and happily find a place in Smith’s enchanted creation, the

593 Though such a being’s also carrying with them their beliefs and desires (hence character) through the intermediate state would give further (possibly better) means of identifying them.
purpose of the ‘enchanted’ adjective is to draw attention to the unembodied spirits prevalent in the Pentecostal worldview, so regular (embodied) human spirits need not serve as a further addition within this element. That said, the resurrected human spirits argument is still one that further points in favour of a Thomistic dualism, and could lead to an interesting consideration of what differences there might be in Smith’s Pentecostal ontology if considering a Pentecostal ontology of the (fully) renewed creation – the eschatological sense of which would tie in with his 5th element of the Pentecostal worldview, and the eschatological emphasis of Pentecostalism generally.

Smith’s Pentecostal ontology is therefore helpful in giving theological indicators as to which model of the soul carried over from the previous chapter is more commendable to Pentecostal theology. His ontology is also helpful in giving further resources for making this a distinct Pentecostal model, however, before considering this, the question of whether the suggested Thomistic model would be consistent with Scripture (the authoritative base for Pentecostal doctrinal construction), although receiving some initial consideration with Cooper above, will be checked, through interacting with the biblical work of Pentecostals John Levison and Gordon Fee.

7.3 Levison’s and Fee’s biblical work

Primarily in dialogue with two Pentecostal thinkers John Levison, and Gordon Fee, the biblical ‘check’ will be carried out. Bringing into focus even more the human spirit, in relation to the Holy Spirit, these dialogue partners will be used to focus the discussion on the Spirit and spirit in Old Testament (Levison), and then the Spirit and spirit in Paul (Fee), to
be able to assess whether the suggested Thomistic (holistic dualist) model comports with Scripture.

7.3.1 Engaging Levison: Spirit and spirit in the Old Testament

Levison’s biblical understanding of what the Old Testament [O.T.] term ‘ruach’ (‘spirit’) refers to is somewhat controversial, diverting considerably from the typical view. Standardly, scholars adopt a position to the effect that ruach in the O.T. is predominantly ‘the divine Spirit…the principle of life, life-force.’ This just-mentioned quote from O.T. scholar (and specialist in its anthropology) Wolff, conveys and leads the consensus, and in a chapter in his landmark Anthropology of the Old Testament he elaborates that ruach’s originating sense is that of the moving wind or air. Like the term nephesh, ruach in Wolff’s (and the consensus’) work is associated with breath, and though referring sometimes to the breath of a human, most often, refers to the breath of God. He furthers that this breath is the animating power, force or energy which vitalises living beings (cf. Ezek 37), given to them by God, and more than that, the ruach not only animates them, but also enables them to fulfil what they were made to do and be. So in humans, ruach is responsible for empowering thought, will, gifting etc. and so empowers the person to carry out their God-given vocation. This tends to be what most Old Testament scholars see ruach to be. Levison agrees with much of the meaning but disagrees with the referent.

In his Filled with the Spirit, Levison argues the case that theologians mistakenly read the person of the Holy Spirit back into the Old Testament, when reading references to ‘the spirit / breath of God’ there. He argues that this is an incorrect approach because there is no

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indication given in Old Testament passages that it (the ruach of God) is the person of the Holy Spirit, it is simply ‘the spirit of God’ (or ‘spirit of life’) which inhabits and vitalises all living things. For Levison, this ruach (breath / spirit) of God, breathed into every living being, is the same spirit that charismatically endows people for certain roles (e.g. Moses), or gives wisdom and godly character to his people (e.g. Daniel). He argues that this divine spirit which animates a person is the same spirit that empowers virtue, knowledge and skill – they are blended into one. On this understanding, it is up to the individual person as to whether they reject or nurture the divine spirit within them, whether (as part of this) they develop their God-given gifts and character, and how they respond when called by God. So rather than anachronistically reading ‘the Holy Spirit’ into certain references in the Old Testament, any reference to ‘spirit’ there should be non-capitalised – they are all referring to the holy breath of life. The implication is that the Old Testament does not distinguish between the concept of a human spirit and the divine spirit, a human is alive because of the (vitalising) spirit / breath of God in them. In terms of how this relates to the coming of the Spirit in the New Testament, Levison argues that, because of the imbalanced work of Gunkel (who argued that after the time of the last Old Testament prophet, the Spirit stopped being among Israel until the time of the New Testament), most theologians think the ‘coming of the spirit’ is something new, and unique to Christians who have received the redemption offered in Christ. However, given what the Old Testament teaches, this coming is not something entirely new, but rather an additional endowment, an ‘expansion’ of the spirit of God in a human. Levison contends that Luke, Paul and John’s pneumatology (as well as that of the intertestamental time with its emphasis on charismatic endowment) compliment and fill out the pneumatology of the Old Testament, which assumes that the spirit of God is in everyone / everything, enabling creatures to be alive.
Such an account is intriguing, and not surprisingly garnered much interest from Pentecostals, and the interaction between Levison’s work and their (mainly appreciative) critiques give fuel for considering the place of the human spirit. In his critique, Max Turner helpfully clarifies a premise that could be easily missed, that according to Levison, a lot of the references to ruach / pneuma of God in a human person are not speaking about

‘the transcendent divine Spirit (the Holy Spirit), occasionally on loan to humans...[but of the] immanent God-given anthropological spirit – the living heart, mind and soul, ever open to, and influenced by, the Lord himself.’

And he further clarifies that, particularly in Old Testament thought, this holy spirit (note the non-capitalisation) planted in a person, for Levison, is the means ‘by which YHWH orchestrates human activity to enhance creation and accomplishes his particular historical purposes with Israel.’ In the mind of Donaldson and Buchanan (but speaking on behalf of many), this reinterpretation of the ‘spirit’ in Scripture reveals an ‘ambiguity of “spirit”, “a spirit”, and “the spirit”...[that is] inherent in Levison’s thesis.’ Of course, this is something Levison wants to maintain, but the majority of Pentecostals disagree with him exegetically. Gabriel, for instance, points to Numbers 16:22 and Psalm 32:2 as clear references to a (human) spirit differentiated from the spirit of God. Adding to this, when applied to the New Testament, Turner’s own critique is that in Luke’s pneumatology (as well as that of Paul and John), if a person has not received the Holy Spirit (soteriologically), s/he has not got the

596 Turner, Ibid., 195.
597 See also the responses by A.T. Wright, J.B. Shelton, J.M. Everts and F.D. Macchia in the Pneuma 33.1 (2011).
Spirit at all, so Levison’s talk of ‘expansion’ or ‘greater endowment’ or ‘re-direction’ cannot do complete justice to the New Testament texts.  

Anticipating such a response, Levison wrote his own rejoinder to the Pentecostals’ responses, at the end of both the Pneuma and the Journal of Pentecostal Theology editions devoted to his work. Unsurprisingly, he sought to defend his position, and in the process, helpfully elaborated that ‘The original Hebrew and Greek words for “spirit” were used to convey concepts as diverse as a breath, a breeze, a powerful gale, an angel, a demon, the heart and soul of a human being, and the divine presence itself.’  

Such a full understanding of what ‘ruach’ can mean and refer to is helpful, as is his underlining of the very close association between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit. Whilst Pentecostals’ exegetical critique needs to be maintained regarding the distinction the Old Testament makes between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit, the intimate relationship between the two underlined by Levison’s work, is clearly demonstrated, and highlighted further by contemporary translators often not knowing whether to translate verses such as Gen 6:3; 6:17; 7:22; Job 12:7; 34:14-15; Ps 51:10; 104:29-30 as referring to the Holy or the human S/spirit. When combined with the meanings Levison identifies for ruach, it seems possible that the life-giving connotations of ruach are applicable to the human spirit as well as the Divine Spirit.  

Remembering Wolff’s understanding of the term, and also bearing in mind a comment from Dryness - that (particularly alluding to Ezek 37) ‘the spirit or breath that God gives is almost equivalent to a life substance,’ the further work Levison has done adds an extra interesting factor, potentially giving some biblical support to understanding the

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600 Turner, Ibid., 199.  
602 As well as being applicable to the nature of angel spirits as well.  
human spirit as itself being some kind of life-force - having an animating aspect to it. This has a very consistent feel with some of the threads that have arisen above in the chapter that have so far pointed in the direction of the human spirit being Thomistic in nature, having an animating nature to it. Levison’s drawing attention to the life-giving anthropological spirit in the O.T. is helpful, but pushed too far - there being a definite distinction in the O.T. between the Divine Spirit and the human spirit. But its help lies in his redressing the pneumatological balance, bringing more focus on the anthropological spirit than is sometimes given by traditional scholars. If drawing upon his work, but retaining the distinction between the two – Divine and human S/spirit, a combining effect could be to argue that it is the Divine Spirit who gives life to all things, but his means of doing that in a human is to give them a human spirit, the entity which animates the human body (and which is providentially kept animated and in existence by the Holy Spirit). This spirit having originally been breathed into a human by the Holy Spirit, would be a distinct spirit from the Holy Spirit, though naturally intimate with Him (drawn attention to by the number of verses in the O.T. that translators are unsure whether to translate as ‘Spirit’ or ‘spirit’), and would be the means by which the Holy Spirit gives life to a human body. Such an understanding would bisect Turner’s critique of Levison concerning Lukan, Pauline and Johannine pneumatology, and would be more clearly elaborated by putting the idea in a salvation-historical framework, the argument going as follows: Every person has a spirit (given by the Spirit\textsuperscript{604}) in them which enlivens them, but unless that (human) spirit (now damaged, as a result of sin) is filled with, restored by, and redeemed by, the Holy Spirit, then the person is lost because of the now (sin-owing) loss of connection / relationship with the original author of life. Put another way, though given their life-giving spirit in the first place by the Holy

\textsuperscript{604} Which at death will be returned to him.
Spirit, because of the effects of the Fall, each person needs the Spirit to restore them in a redemptive and Pentecostal way, in order to really experience the life they were designed to have from the beginning.

Although this is a tentative suggestion from the Old Testament exegetical work, what certainly can be said is that the human spirit has a very close and intimate relationship with the life-giving Holy Spirit. The intimate relationship between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit described in the O.T. also underlines the natural Spirit-spirit encounter relationship at the heart of Pentecostal spirituality, and suggests that the anthropology being considered that addresses the Spirit-spirit encounter perhaps may be more accurately described as pneuma-anthropology, emphasising this intimacy. But the association between the life-giving Spirit and the human spirit is apparent. Might it be (and potentially bringing clarity to the texts which make distinguishing between the Spirit and spirit in the O.T. difficult), that having given general ‘breath of life’ to each living being, the Breath of Life sustains and continues to vitalise that spirit / breath within each being – drawing the distinction between Spirit and spirit but maintaining that both have a life-giving aspect to them?

Although quite a lot of the theology might point in this direction, it cannot be fully concluded at this point merely from an O.T. perspective, or that the human spirit is its own life-giving substance / principle (in the way that has been suggested previously in the chapter). However, the view is at least consistent with O.T. theology, and it would not be a surprise to discover that the human spirit itself is a life-giving spirit (to the human body).

Having considered the question, and also brought out the Spirit-spirit relationship that is central to Pentecostal spirituality biblically, further work on the New Testament and specifically Paul might bring clarity to whether the O.T. human spirit actually is a (life-giving)
substance in its own right, whilst further underlining the relationship of the Holy and human S/spirits.

7.3.2 Fee’s work on the S/spirit in Paul

Fee’s fullest work on the Holy Spirit in Paul is a 967 page anthology, in which he gives a thorough exegesis of every passage in Paul’s letters that mentions the S/spirit, and then theologises on the findings to fully appreciate Paul’s pneumatology. As still the leading work on this issue, such a comprehensive approach and work, plus Fee’s credentials as a Pentecostal himself makes him another particularly valuable dialogue partner when considering the Spirit and the spirit so integral to Pentecostal spirituality and the potential life-giving nature of the human spirit.

In his book God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul, Fee makes the case that to really understand the Spirit in Paul, the Spirit must be recognised as an experienced reality and person, a dynamic eschatological experience of the living God who Paul did not write about simply as a doctrinal concept to be systematised, but as a person and power to be experienced, central to Christian life. He comments ‘For Paul the Spirit, as an experienced and living reality, was the absolutely crucial matter for Christian life, from beginning to end.’ Central to his book are the three words of his title. He relates that God the Holy Spirit is a person, the person of the Trinity who, through Christ, makes God known to us, and the person by whom we experience the living God. Linked to this, he emphasises that the Spirit as a person is also God’s presence with his people. In fulfilment of the promises made in the Old Testament, the Holy Spirit is God’s personal presence dwelling in

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605 Fee considers all the letters bearing his name to be Pauline.
607 Empowering, p.1.
and with his new covenant community, them being the New Testament realisation of the tabernacle and temple in the Old Testament, and particularly the fulfilment of the promises made in Jeremiah and Ezekiel of God’s coming to indwell his people. And thirdly, the Spirit is God’s *Empowering* presence among his people, those not left on their own to live out the Christian life, but filled with God’s power in order to accomplish such a task. So Fee’s key emphases are Person, Presence, Power.\(^{608}\) He recognises that the Spirit is not the centre piece of Pauline theology, such a place being more ‘salvation in Christ’, but the Spirit of Christ being so integral to making that an experienced reality, the two cannot be separated, again underlining his Trinitarian presuppositions, and the essential role the Spirit has in Christian lived experience.\(^{609}\)

When expounding the relationship of the Holy Spirit to the human spirit in the texts, Fee makes clear that the vast majority of the (145) occurrences of ‘pneuma’ in the New Testament refer to the Holy Spirit. Yet he also identifies that there are 14 references of such which refer to the human spirit (1 Thess 5:23; 1 Cor 2:11; 5:5; 7:34; 14:14; 16:18; 2 Cor 2:13; 7:13; Gal 6:18; Rom 1:9; 8:16; Phlm 25; Phil 4:23; 2 Tim 4:22). Recognising that some of these 14 are controversial, and responding particularly to Jewett who thinks many of them are simply referring to the Holy Spirit,\(^ {610}\) Fee convinces of this distinct (human) use by giving an in-depth exegesis of each of them, giving reason to think that all 14 refer to the human spirit. In the process, he goes a distance in defining what this human spirit is, saying that this entity ‘refers to the interior, nonmaterial component of the human personality.’\(^ {611}\)

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\(^{608}\) Ibid., pp.5-8.

\(^{609}\) Ibid., pp.896-99.


\(^{611}\) *Empowering*, p.66.
this further, and underlining the relationship between this spirit and the Holy Spirit, he further articulates

‘Those who see this usage [pneuma referring to the interior, nonmaterial component of the human personality] as denoting that part of human existence that serves as the place of intersection between the human and the divine by means of the Holy Spirit are most likely moving in the right direction.’

Such ‘intersection’ language is very interesting and further draws attention to the intimate relation of the Holy Spirit to the human spirit in Scripture, one very much emphasised by Pentecostal spirituality. But going a step further in this direction, Fee then argues that along with the distinct 14 verses, there are 4 further uses of ‘pneuma’ where Paul seems to be deliberately blurring the two (1 Cor 5:3-4; 6:17; 14:14-15; Col 2:5), Fee proposing that the term pneuma in these instances could quite happily be translated as S/spirit. Again, the reason he feels happy to allow for such fluidity is that Fee contends that for Paul ‘the believer’s spirit is the place where, by means of God’s own Spirit, the human and the divine interface in the believer’s life.’

This is interesting, entirely consistent and explicatory of Pentecostal spirituality, and parallels the discussion had in the O.T. section surrounding what ruach refers to, underlining the consistency that both testaments share in maintaining a distinction between the Holy and the human S/spirits (the emphasis being on the former), but yet the intimate connection between the two. But developing the discussion of the O.T., particularly Fee’s definite contention that the human spirit is an immaterial part of the human being is strong and seems to bring clarity as to whether the human spirit in the O.T. could be described as such, or as its own substance / principle.

612 Ibid., p.66.
613 Ibid., p.25.
If Cooper’s progressive revelation approach of chapter 4 is employed, it could then be suggested that the human spirit in the O.T. receives its clearest articulation in the New Testament, in Paul, pointing to the fact that this spirit definitely is immaterial, and essential to human constitution for relating intimately to God, but also entailing the spirit having an animating role. This actually goes beyond Cooper who opted not to employ word studies as part of his case for dualism, but given what Fee has argued for, it seems to be the case that such a progressive revelation approach is appropriately employed for moving from what was seen in the O.T. section (the human spirit potentially being the life-breath and animating substance of a human) to recognising that spirit is an immaterial entity and substance in the N.T.. This consideration of Fee’s work appears to lend further support for thinking that the human spirit in the O.T. is a substance/principle, and a life-giving one, and it actually rehabilitates word studies as a potentially useful tool for considering this more widely.

With such a word studies tool in operation, not only would Fee’s work give legitimation for thinking that passages such as 1 Cor 7:34 and 2 Cor 7:1 refer to the two components of a person, (material) body and (immaterial) spirit, but would further establish the potential for use of word studies after all in wider biblical studies, for example considering the understanding of ‘spirit’ in Luke. With careful employment, the implications of Luke’s using the word ‘spirit’ to refer to immaterial demonic beings as well as angels, could further be explored, as could the implications of ‘spirit’ being used to refer to a ghost. Cooper briefly and limitedly explored the latter in order to legitimate that Jesus giving up his spirit at his death referred to his giving up his immaterial spirit, but remembering that almost the exact same phrase is given when Stephen gives up his spirit in Acts 7:59, would have wider

614 A being, of course, which is also immaterial.
implications for the N.T. And extending this even further, recognising that Jesus was
drawing upon David’s language from Ps 31:5 in Lk 23:46, it would then seem fair to
extrapolate that these N.T. understandings were giving a filled out progressive revelation
understanding of what certain O.T. texts were saying in terms of O.T. believers giving up
their spirit (cf. Ps 146:4; Eccl 3:21; 12:7). This would give further grounds for proposing the
tentative suggestion that the human spirit referred to in the O.T. actually is an immaterial
soul that animates the human body.

The key points of Fee are his underlining the intimate relationship between the Holy Spirit
and the human spirit in Paul, and his drawing attention to the immaterial nature of the
human spirit. If progressive revelation then is employed, then Paul’s understanding brings
further clarity to the O.T. understanding of the human spirit and its relationship to the Holy
Spirit, and with the O.T. background as the S/spirit being that that gives life, it seems to
have a very consistent feel with the Thomistic view of the soul that has been considered.

7.4 ‘Soul’ or ‘Spirit’?

The above biblical work gives reason for suggesting that the Thomistic definition of a soul is
consistent with Scripture, and adds to the case that the Thomistic view would be preferable
to Pentecostal theology. But it also raises a question that has been lurking throughout the
thesis as to whether the term ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ would be preferable for Pentecostal theology
when referring to this entity. Before returning to Smith then to seek to apply his Pentecostal
ontology in an anthropological sense, and actually as a means of fuelling the model that
arises, the issue of whether to speak about ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’ will be addressed, in dialogue
with a suggestion made by Moreland.
Chapter 1 revealed that traditionally, Pentecostals have wanted to retain the word ‘spirit’, because they thought that biblical studies justified a trichotomous view, and an ontologically distinct human spirit to that of the soul. It has been seen that the trichotomous position is inaccurate, and to this point, the thesis has followed contemporary thinkers’ (including Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s) usage of seeing the terms as synonymous. But would one of the two terms be preferable? In answering this, on the one hand ‘spirit’ would seem to fit very naturally with Scripture’s terminological usage that appears to regularly use ‘spirit’ as referring to an immaterial entity. It would also fit very well with Pentecostal general usage which sees a close relationship between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit. On the other hand, traditionally Pentecostals have held to and referred to the entity of a ‘soul’ in line with the tradition of Church history, where (with dualism being the historically

615 Pentecostals traditionally appealed to verses such as 1 Thess 5:23 and Heb 4:12, supported then by 1 Cor 14:14 to contend that a human is made up of a body, soul and spirit. That there is a distinction between ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ is clear from these verses (cf. the list of commentators in the footnote below). But given that there is no clear instance of Paul using the term ‘psuche’ to refer to an immaterial part of a human in the 12 other times he uses the term (instead tending to use it as a synonym for a person, personal pronoun, or in its ‘living creature’ sense [cf. Rom 2:9; 11:23; 13:1; 1 Cor 15:45; 2 Cor 1:23; 12:15; Eph 6:5-6; Phil 1:27; 2:29-30; Col 3:23; 1 Thess 2:8]), it appears there is very little grounds for thinking that the soul [in Paul] is an immaterial entity, which is what trichotomists usually assert (in distinction somehow from the ‘spirit’ as a further immaterial entity). And given that ‘soul’ is used in the book of Hebrews also as more of a synonym for a person / a personal pronoun (cf. Heb 6:19; 10:38; 12:3; 12:17), it appears there is no grounds for appealing to the traditional trichotomy doctrine there either.


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prevailing position) the immaterial entity of the human person has much more commonly been termed a ‘soul’. And it also might appear preferable given that the arena of philosophy of mind, which Pentecostals need to engage with to think carefully about human constitution, has no room for talking of a ‘spirit’, instead the word ‘soul’ (though often mistakenly disparaged) is used. This gives a conundrum, as historically and philosophically, the term ‘soul’ seems preferable; but Pentecostal-spiritually, ‘spirit’ seems better. So with good arguments on both sides, which is a better term for Pentecostal philosophical theology - ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’?

Before coming to a conclusion on this issue, one further issue needs to be raised – whether in a philosophical theological sense, they are wanted to refer to the same thing. Although it would need to be made very clear that a particular, nuanced philosophical theological usage is being made, it may be preferable to distinguish these two concepts, and use them to refer to slightly different things.

This suggestion is made, stimulated by an idea proposed by Moreland, who himself makes a philosophical theological distinction between the two terms but yet one that keeps soul and spirit in very close relationship. Although ultimately coming to a slightly different understanding to that of Moreland, following his lead in defining the two terms philosophically-theologically will be shown to be beneficial in resolving the question above. But, in advancement of Moreland, the philosophical-theological distinction between the two this thesis makes, will be further beneficial in allowing for the applying of Smith’s Enspirited creation ontology to the Thomistic model of the soul, hence facilitating the Pentecostal enhancement of it.

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617 I.e. this is a contemporary philosophical theological distinction (using the terms of current language), not so much an exegetical distinction (using the biblical language).
7.5 Enhancing the soul with a Pentecostal S/spirit

In Moreland’s work, he views the human spirit as a *faculty* of the human soul. In this sense, the spirit is not something ontologically different to the soul, but rather an aspect, a *faculty* of the soul. Drawing upon his more popular analogy, Moreland describes the soul as like a chest of draws, each draw representing a different faculty of the soul: so one draw would be the faculty of sensations, another, the faculty of desire, another that of the will, another the spirit. So the spirit is part of the soul, but a specific faculty in it. Moreland comments

The *spirit* is *that faculty of the soul through which the person relates to God* (Ps 51:10; Rom 8:16; Eph 4:23).* Before the new birth, the spirit is real and has certain abilities to be aware of God. But most of the capacities of the unregenerate spirit are dead and inoperative. At the new birth, God activates, makes alive those capacities and implants new capacities in the spirit, such as new desires for God’s Word, Christian fellowship, growth in spiritual maturity. These activated and newly implanted potentials are fresh capacities that need to be nourished and developed so they can grow.619

Such an understanding would allow Pentecostals to advocate the spirit being something specific in itself, responsible for a human’s relating to God, but not having to ground it in weak biblical exegesis, as Moreland’s idea is more a philosophical theological understanding. As Moreland clarifies (in a footnote marked * in the citation), the biblical anthropological words for heart, soul, mind, spirit etc. have differing meanings depending on their author and context, and ‘*no specific use of a biblical term should be read into every occasion of the term.***620 So rather than putting forward a definition that he claims is

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620 Fn. 22, expounded as an endnote on Ibid., p.60 (emphasis mine).
exegetically rooted (in differentiation from generations past of Pentecostals), his is more of a philosophical theological understanding of the terms.

However, having made this very helpful distinction, and defined the spirit as he does above, Moreland says no more about the subject.\(^6\) This may not be too surprising, given that Moreland is a philosopher; bringing such theological concepts as the ‘spirit’ into philosophy of mind where many do not share his theological convictions may be something he deliberately avoids, however, recognising the richness of his idea, it appears a lot more could be said about it, and Pentecostal thinkers would benefit from carefully considering it.\(^6\)

If Moreland’s idea was advanced and it were argued that the spirit faculty is the lead and representative faculty of the soul, this would mean that it could be argued that a human being is defined primarily as someone made for the vocation of knowing and serving God. This would certainly fit and develop the Thomist understanding of the rational soul with its emphasis on function, giving that model even further legitimation here. But it would likewise give a philosophical theological anthropocy to which to apply Smith’s Enspirited creation ontology, to allow a Pentecostal enhancement to that Thomistic model of the soul.

In making this latter application, it could be argued that having the faculty of the spirit renewed by the Holy Spirit is the means and difference between a person participating merely structurally in the Spirit, and them participating fully directionally (vocationally).

To make such an application, it would be helpful to adapt Smith’s terminology and speak of the human soul being ‘Enspiritable’ (as opposed to ‘Enspirited’). This draws attention to the

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\(^6\) Other than an even shorter reference to it in his Body and Soul, p.204.

\(^6\) Such a consideration may also commend itself to Pentecostal thinkers given that – in his soul/spirit distinction – Moreland is in line with a view popular (though expressed in differing ways) in the era of Church Fathers c.f. Irenaeus, Against Heresies 2.33.5 and 5.6.1.
fact that, as fallen people, out of vocational relationship with their creator, humans 
ordinarily only function with merely a structural participation in the realm of the Spirit. Yet, 
as per the Pentecostal call to renewal, they are invited to come and have their spirit 
renewed by the Holy Spirit, to therefore enjoy directional participation in the Spirit. Of 
course, once Spiritually renewed, the human spirit is open to Pentecostal on-going 
encounter with the renewing Spirit, but the ‘structural’ spirit only becomes the ‘directional’ 
spirit by means of the Holy Spirit’s renewing work in it. This Pentecostal Enspirable nature 
of the human soul draws attention to the potential and intended orientation the human 
soul – led by the human spirit - is designed to have, in relational intimacy with the Spirit. In 
effect, the human spirit serves as the entry and connection point of the human soul to the 
Holy Spirit, and through such encounter, the spirit hence soul is made new, and rather than 
just being potentially Enspirable, it becomes Enspirited. But when speaking about the 
constitution of humanity generally, that tension between being merely those who 
structurally participate in the Spirit, yet being called to come and enjoy life to the full, is 
underlined by describing the soul as being ‘Enspirable’.

Such an understanding has interesting implications for studies of the *imago Dei* because for 
the first time, a vocational category has been brought to the issue of human constitution 
here. Much effort has been poured into trying to identify *ontologically* what the *imago 
Dei* actually is, even though the directional flow of the early chapters of Genesis appears 
much more *functional*, concerning the *identity* and *purpose* of humanity (as opposed to its 
constitution). But bringing the teleological, vocational nature of the human spirit

623 The intermingling of human constitution studies with *imago Dei* studies is almost always premature, 
regularly causing the category mistake of confusing the issues of human ontology with human teleology. 
proposed above (to further be fulfilled in the person of the Holy Spirit) would bring much interest and resource to Genesis 1:26-7 and the study thereof. Although here is not the place to try and elaborate fully such an application - the *imago Dei* being a distinct, even if anthropologically-related topic to human constitution - it might be argued that at least part of what it is to be human and made in the image of God is to say that humans have been made with a self-conscious soul with a leading faculty of a human spirit, designed specifically to relate to God. This teleological capacity, is one that all humans possess, however, due to the Fall needs to be functionally renewed by the Holy Spirit, in order for the human to fully be, and enact, the *imago Dei* which s/he was designed as, and called to.

Application to the *imago Dei* is interesting, though here, not able to be fully considered; and more reason to leave the topic aside for now would be the potentially confusing of the specific philosophical theological terminology that has been adopted for this chapter, with exegetical terminology needed for considering the *imago Dei*. Resisting, then, the interesting subject, but being reminded of the important issue of terminology, it would again be helpful to remind that what has been proposed above (human constitutionally) is specifically a philosophical-theological use of the terms ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, and the use of that to give a Pentecostal enhancement to the model of the soul being constructed through the thesis. What has been suggested above is not an exegetical terminologically-rooted understanding of soul and spirit; it is a philosophical-theological understanding that should not be lifted and tried to be transplanted into biblical studies.625

625 When speaking in Scriptural language, it appears legitimate to describe the immaterial principle of the human person as a ‘spirit’ (cf. Luke and Paul’s usage mentioned above), though being careful of the variations the term has when employed by different writers. It is also legitimate to call it a ‘soul’ (cf. Mt 10:28), but again recognising that sometimes soul means more ‘me’, ‘person’, ‘life-force’. So referring to that immaterial entity as ‘spirit’ or ‘soul’ has to be caveated by which author is using it as such, and not giving it a blanket ‘it always means this in Scripture’ definition. Some might try to argue that the philosophical theological difference
7.6 Conclusion and Further Consistency with Pentecostal Theological Emphases

Drawing upon the work of Smith as a primary philosophical-theological dialogue partner, confirmed by biblical dialogue partners Levison and Fee, and with Moreland as a secondary-type partner, the chapter has achieved two things. It has resolved the question left from the end of the previous chapter and identified that a Thomistic dualism is preferable to a Contemporary Cartesian one. This means that the general definition of seeing the soul as an immaterial principle, that is the Subject and Experiencer of Consciousness and which animates the body, seems best. Secondly, this has been Pentecostally enhanced in the chapter, to the point of being able to describe the soul on this Thomistic model as in fact an Enspiritable immaterial principle (that is the Subject...etc.). Through listening to the different terminology employed, and furthering an idea of Moreland, then applying Smith’s Enspirited Creation ontology to that, this Pentecostal enhancement has been made. This sees the human spirit as the lead and representative faculty of the human soul, which, through the Spirit’s renewal, is transformed from merely participating structurally in the Spirit to participating directionally. This connection point is the means by which the soul is Spiritually renewed.

At this concluding point, it is helpful to identify how such a view further comports with the four Pentecostal emphases. In accordance with the renewal pneumatology emphasis, this view is inspired by, and charged by the Pentecostal pneumatology. In consistency with the eschatological emphasis, the teleological features entailed with the new Pentecostally-enhanced Thomistic view further the model’s eschatological nature (which is also consistent with the biblical data that draw attention to the eschatological intermediate state). In between ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ advanced in this thesis is exegetically sustainable, but the wisdom of that is questionable and is not the intention of what is being argued.
further consistency with the dualistic and supernatural nature of the world, the nature of God and angels, and other spirit beings in the cosmos has been further underlined, showing that this dualistic model is very consistent with the Pentecostal dualistic emphasis. And finally, being a holistic dualist model, it naturally fits with the holistic anthropological emphasis of Pentecostal worship.

This therefore makes it an enhanced Pentecostal model of human constitution.
Conclusion

The doctrine of human constitution is significant for Pentecostal theology. With the heart of Pentecostal spirituality being the Divine-human encounter, the doctrine of human constitution shows its vitality when considering what is happening in such an encounter from the anthropological perspective. The doctrine is also of importance due to the implications it has for further related areas of theology and philosophy, such as life after death, angelic beings, views of personhood (and hence associated topics of ethics), and understandings of metaphysics. With this being the case, it is surprising that comparatively little has been said regarding this doctrine by Pentecostal scholarship. Given the significance of the doctrine, this is a dearth that needs to be filled. Yet at the same time, the two Pentecostal scholars who have addressed the topic, though helpful in their drawing the attention of other Pentecostals to the subject, have contributed work to the discussion that is in need of response, because of the contentions they make, the implications their work would have for the related areas, and the potential influence such work may have on the future direction of Pentecostal theological anthropology. In light of this situation, this thesis has set out to make such a response, and to contribute critically and constructively to the limited (to date) Pentecostal discussion of the doctrine of human constitution.

C.1 Thesis summary and contributions

The thesis has defined Pentecostalism as a renewal spirituality that emphasises a human’s on-going encounter with God by the Holy Spirit of Christ, in spontaneous and unexpected, as well as more formal and expected, ways; and articulated four particularly prominent emphases of the movement’s theology: the renewal pneumatological, the eschatological, the supernatural dualistic, and the holistic anthropological emphases. With this spirituality
as a starting point, and the Pentecostal emphases as a framework, the thesis has sought to address the question of human constitution.

In the early chapters, a fresh historical overview of Pentecostal thought concerning human constitution over the last 100 years was presented. From this work, a trajectory of thought became identifiable, and it was seen how, over the last century, Pentecostals’ thinking has moved from being strongly trichotomous in the early 20th century, to becoming dualistic at the end of that century, to now considering a monistic route in the early stages of the 21st century. Particularly the most recent writers, Yong and then Kärkkäinen, were identified as those who argue in that monistic direction (Yong being the first to issue such a view, with Kärkkäinen following), and the potential their work has in ushering the trajectory in the monistic direction was highlighted. Recognising the significance and implications of their work, their writings have been critically engaged.

Positively, it was seen that Yong and Kärkkäinen do have good reasons for rejecting the straw men versions of dualism – Platonist and Classic Cartesian views. It was also seen that their approach for constructing a view of human constitution is apt, their attempt at theological construction that is well-informed by philosophy indicating that the required approach for such construction is a philosophical theological approach. However, having highlighted Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s two key contentions regarding human constitution, that dualism of any type needs to be rejected on theological and philosophical grounds, and that emergent monism is a more commendable model, the thesis has sought to respond in critique of them, and admonish against the monistic direction their work encourages. The thesis recognised that the two of them are themselves influenced by certain dialogue partners who shape their philosophical and theological thinking in ways that seem to be
problematic for Pentecostal theology. It was also seen that the theological and philosophical reasons Yong and Kärkkäinen provide for rejecting (more holistic) dualism(s) (with its entailed view of the [distinct, immaterial and separable] soul) are inadequate. And it was further recognised that their alternative Pentecostal emergent monist proposal has a range of problems which the thesis has highlighted. In effect, it has been argued that they have no good grounds for rejecting an immaterial and ontologically distinct (and after death) separable soul (that is [ordinarily] intimately and holistically related to the body), and their emergent monist view suffers from rejecting / redefining such an entity. It has been contended that the above renders their view theologically inconsistent with Pentecostal emphases, and also philosophically unpersuasive.

In further response, an enhanced Pentecostal philosophical theological view of human constitution has been constructed, drawing upon dialogue partners whose work is more cogent and consonant with Pentecostal thought. Through initially engaging with Cooper’s philosophically-informed exegetical work, a general holistic dualist view was founded, one biblically grounded and consistent with all of Pentecostalism’s emphases. This was then advanced through engaging with the soul-body debate in the philosophy of mind, to the point of being able to advocate either a Thomistic, or a Contemporary Cartesian type of holistic dualism - the process ensuring the philosophical robustness of the model-in-construction, whilst also indicating analytic dialogue partners Pentecostals would do well to engage with surrounding the soul-body question. By then bringing to bear the (further) insights of Pentecostal theology on the developing model, it was seen that a Thomistic type of holistic dualism is preferable. This was then developed further, and Pentecostally coloured, by applying insights from Smith’s Pentecostal ontology to the model, in conversation with Moreland’s idea of the soul-spirit relationship. Through interaction with
these further dialogue partners, it was suggested that viewing the soul as having a particular faculty of spirit, that is (on-goingly) renewable and Enspiritable by the Holy Spirit, serves to make the Pentecostal advancement, resulting in a newly proposed view of human constitution - Enspiritable (Thomist, Holistic) Dualism.

In the bigger picture, as opposed to rejecting / redefining the soul, it was seen that by renewing the soul in construction, that an enhanced Pentecostal philosophical theological view of human constitution is attainable. This renewing work occurred both by giving the soul the required attention and prominence it needed in the construction of the model, and by allowing for the renewing work of the Holy Spirit in the model.

C.2 Evaluation of contribution(s) and further implications

Having spent much time in analysis of the work of others in this thesis, the above contributions themselves require evaluation, and raise both interesting questions for further research in the related areas, as well as significant implications for wider theological and philosophical consideration.

C.2.1 The Future of the Constitutional Trajectory

The thesis has freshly identified a trajectory of thinking regarding Pentecostal thought on the subject of constitution, and recognised that as that trajectory has come into the 21st century, that Yong and Kärkkäinen are the main Pentecostal scholars to have given extended thought to, and written about human constitution. Articles from Atkinson and the Shriers are interesting, but not as full as the books and articles Yong has written on it, or the extended chapter Kärkkäinen has written on the subject. But, although these two are the Pentecostals to have written the most on the subject, in contradistinction to the monistic
direction suggested by their work, the suggestion of this thesis is that the Pentecostal trajectory would benefit from being re-directed. So though acknowledging Yong’s and Kärkkäinen’s work on the subject, rather than allowing the trajectory to stop at those stations on the journey, and influencing its future direction, it is suggested that from the Shriers’ work in 2009, through to this thesis, the trajectory just passes through those stations, and views them as interesting sights without stopping. With the Shriers recognising the importance of critiquing the (often standardly adopted) Classic Cartesian view and suggesting a more integrated understanding of the soul and body, it is suggested that this thesis is a more adequate next station on the journey to stop at, advocating as it has an Enspiritable Dualism that values the integrated, holistic, relationship of soul and body. Interestingly, Yong and Kärkkäinen briefly entertain the idea of a (more holistic) Thomistic or Aristotelian dualism in their writing, seeing it as thought-provoking alternative to their standard ideas of dualism (Platonist or Classic Cartesian). But they give it little attention, and instead continue in the polemic against the straw men dualisms. It is suggested that the Enspiritable (Thomistic Holistic) Dualism that this thesis has suggested would be a better next stopping point on from the Shriers’ work, and through doing this (and merely passing through Yong and Kärkkäinen’s work), the Pentecostal trajectory would be helpfully redirected.

C.2.2 A Thomistic view of human constitution

The thesis has built an Enspiritable Thomistic Holistic Dualist model, within that, adopting a general Thomistic understanding of the soul-body relation, defining the soul as ‘an

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(Enspirable) immaterial principle, that is the Subject and Experiencer of consciousness, that animates the body.’ The ‘animating’ nature of the soul entailed within the Thomistic understanding has been preferred over the Contemporary Cartesian (Swinburne) view, the life-giving aspect of the soul given credence by the nature of angels, the Pentecostal ontology, the nature of ghosts, and the resurrection body at the eschaton, as well as having consistency with Scripture. But further interesting research regarding this Thomistic nature of the soul might be found in the following areas: Whether an even more specific type of Thomistic holistic dualism can be found for a model of the soul, and the implications the animating nature of the soul has for issues of life and death. Regarding the former, though recognising the Thomistic family as what was required for attaining the more specific advancement of Cooper’s view, and establishing the enhanced Pentecostal view set out to be achieved, further research would be valuable for focussing in even more specifically as to whether the Classic Thomistic, the Leftow enhancement, the Metaphysical Aristotelian, or the (Moreland) Organicist views would be definitively apt. Such would require further research into the questions of hylomorphic / corpuscularian metaphysics (for Aquinas’ and the metaphysical Aristotelian positions), the nature of the quarks in fundamental physics (for Leftow’s view), and the philosophical and scientific intricacies of (contemporary) evolutionary theory (for Moreland’s view) but would be of great interest in trying to establish whether a particular Thomistic dualism might advance the project even further. As regards the latter, the further area of potential exploration would be the implications the animating soul has for philosophical questions of life and death, one particular angle of interest being the philosophical intuition people have that a soul is what gives life (at least metaphysically) to a person’s body.627

627 Philosophically, the question of what life and what death is, is intriguing. Although in society today, the
C.2.3 Pentecostal Philosophical Theology

The thesis has been explicit in approaching the doctrine in a philosophical theological manner, recognising the degree of philosophy required to adequately handle the subject. This has been, to an extent, following the approach of Yong and Kärkkäinen in their work, but seeking to be more cogent regarding the philosophy entailed (whilst also keeping in mind the Pentecostal spirituality and theological emphases as well).628

Focussing on the specifics of this thesis, a number of philosophical issues have arisen through the critical phase of this thesis, and through not recognising them for what they are, has led the aforementioned thinkers to mistakes, those which Pentecostals – and all thinkers – need to be particularly careful of. The major four have been: the caricaturing of the ‘soul’ and ‘dualism’, the mistaken equating of ontology and function, erroneously considering the doctrine of constitution to be a subset of imago Dei studies, and misunderstanding certain philosophical views as being ‘science’.

...
With the first of these, it needs to be understood that dualism, and understanding of the word ‘soul’, does not have to equate to the unhelpful Platonist or Classic Cartesian versions of the past. When the best, most biblical, most philosophically defensible dualisms and articulations of the soul are proposed, these are quite different from the caricatures that are regularly and fashionably disparaged today. The best versions are the ones that need to be engaged with.

With the second, thinkers need to be aware of the philosophical distinction between ontology and function. Particularly in recent biblical studies, mistakenly thinking a holistic Hebraic worldview equates to monism is common. But though the Hebrew worldview might be a lot more interested in holistic function, to mistakenly reduce this to ontological monism is a philosophical category error that should be learned from. Functional (Hebraic) holism comports very naturally with ontological dualism.

As regards the third (and related to the second), thinkers need to recognise that imago Dei studies and human constitution doctrine are distinct anthropological areas. The first arises from the phrase in Genesis 1, which emphasises the identity and (teleological) purpose of humanity, so theologically, it is right to say that humans are relational beings, and that is what it means to be human (made to relate to God, to each other, and to the rest of creation). But the ontological question of what a human is constituted of is different and gets little to no explicit attention in the theological flow of the biblical imago Dei texts (even if a certain metaphysical view would be assumed). In effect, imago Dei studies (from within the wider framework of Genesis 1 and 2) are addressing the questions ‘who’ and ‘why’ is humanity. Human constitution is addressing the question of ‘what’ is humanity. These are not to be confused. It is only when the category of vocation was added in chapter 7 to the
specific view of human constitution established in this thesis, that a glance towards *imago Dei* became appropriate. Before then, it would have been premature.

Fourthly, knowing where the boundaries lie between science and philosophy is vital. Although particularly highlighted in this thesis with regard to the mind-body debates, the unhelpful blurring of science and philosophy also occurs more widely, where certain philosophical views are often masqueraded consciously or unconsciously as being ‘science’ or ‘scientific’.\(^{629}\) Although sometimes it can take a little while to see through this, this confusion of the terms is analytically weak, and Pentecostals need to be aware of where the actual boundaries lie and what the terms ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ are actually referring to. Being aware of these philosophical issues would allow more precise and constructive work to be done in the future, particularly in anthropology, so philosophical awareness is something all Pentecostal thinkers should be evidencing in their work, particularly those involved in systematic theology, but also biblical studies. For specific work that requires precise and philosophical care such as consideration of the doctrine of human constitution, the thesis has sought to model a *philosophical theological* approach, ensuring that theological construction is thoroughly-informed by the relevant insights of philosophy (in this case, particularly the philosophy of mind). This approach is one that might be employed for constructive consideration of further doctrines such as creation, the Trinity, atonement.\(^{630}\) But whilst considering the philosophical aspect of such work, some Pentecostals might even want to go a philosophical step further and consider the engaging discipline(s) of philosophy of religion (as well as that of mind) for Pentecostal benefit.

\(^{629}\) It has recently been demonstrated more widely, for example, in the polemic of the militant atheist movement – in that instance, masquerading certain views in the philosophy of *religion* as ‘science’ (Though it happens across both philosophical disciplines as demonstrated for instance by the work of Daniel Dennett).

\(^{630}\) Though the appropriate discipline of philosophy to be thoroughly drawn upon in these instances might be philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of law respectively.
C.2.4 A Philosophical means of arguing for the existence of God

The above suggestion flows from the location of the field of philosophy of religion, as the next field along from philosophical theology, but located between that and the work done here in the philosophy of mind (a field engaged with in this thesis). As an interesting starting point for such a suggestion, one might consider drawing upon the components inherent in this thesis for constructing an argument for the existence of God from the reality of consciousness (or the soul). Being a theological piece, this thesis has argued from the assumption that God is there, and so to then make an argument for the existence of God from how this thesis has argued would be circular. But with the philosophical components the thesis has shown, from a bottom-up, philosophical approach, it might be possible to put together an argument that contends that God is the best explanation for the existence of a conscious soul. As a somewhat initial version, the argument would run:

P1: Given the reality of qualia, intentional states, and the unified nature of consciousness, a conscious subject (a.k.a. a soul) is a distinct entity from its brain.

P2: There are two explanations as to how this conscious subject came to exist, it arose out of a complex physical substratum such as the brain – whether that being a purely physical entity, or one with proto-mental properties (as on panpsychism) – or it exists due to a higher immaterial conscious subject.

P3a: There is no evidence anywhere in the world of something conscious arising from a physical substratum

and
P3b: The empirical evidence of near death experiences indicate it is possible that a subject’s consciousness can occur apart from the brain.

P4: Therefore the best explanation for the existence of a conscious subject (soul) is not that it arose from a complex physical substratum – either of the purely physical or proto-mental version.

C: Therefore, the best explanation for the existence of a conscious subject (soul) is a higher conscious subject (God).

Though potentially in need of refinement, this is yet another possible avenue that (more philosophical) exploration of the subject of human constitution opens up.

Pentecostals, as yet, have not been particularly interested in apologetics, due to the type of rationality inherent in their spirituality. However, if being willing to employ the approach used in this thesis and move into the area of philosophical theology, it is not a far step for those who might want to take the next step and do some philosophy of religion. Whether or not this specific discipline is one Pentecostals will opt for in the future, time will tell, but as Pentecostals develop theologically, they will need to develop philosophically too, so it would not be surprising if some of the future philosophers of religion are those with a Pentecostal heritage.

Whilst encouraging Pentecostals to be considering the next field as well, returning to the philosophical theological territory this thesis has primarily been working in, as stated in the introduction (as well as the outset of the conclusion), the philosophical theology proposed also has implications for further related areas of theology and philosophy.
C.2.5 The issue of the intermediate state and angels

It was noticed that the facets of (philosophical) identity persistence beyond death (IPBD) to the time of the resurrection, or (put theologically) the intermediate state (IS), as well as the nature of angels, caused problems for Yong and Kärkkäinen – particularly when viewed in light of the four Pentecostal emphases. But it is likely that these would be the thorn in the side for any monistic position. In fact, the reality of the (biblically rooted) intermediate state was the central argument to Cooper’s case in building a holistic dualist view. When considering the problematic these areas presented for Yong and Kärkkäinen, it is very interesting to think about the further implications this has for metaphysics generally and the affect that has on other vital questions of philosophy and theology.

Essentially, Yong and Kärkkäinen want their work to be ‘post-substance’ in its metaphysics, yet, if one goes that route, it is very difficult to see how the issues of the intermediate state / identity persistence over time (IS / IPBD) and that of angels’ nature can ever be answered satisfactorily. Both scholars are following a current trend wanting to move beyond substance metaphysics to relational metaphysics (demonstrated also by Green’s leaning in this direction), Zizioulas’ influence being apparent in this potential metaphysical shift. But as seen when articulating how Kärkkäinen handles the issue of what happens to the person after death, and how their identity persists through that time until the final resurrection, Zizioulas has no convincing answer to this either.

The relational view of persons – regarding them as ‘beings-in-communion’ or ‘relational beings’ – focusses on the Trinitarian persons, and then human persons as relational beings, which is helpful to a degree, but unless there is a substantial essence to a person that is able to survive death and exist in the intermediate state (and indeed, is the essence of the
person that is in relation), then such a metaphysics is going to have problems with this doctrine and identity persistence over time. It is noteworthy too that the subject of angels rarely appears in any exposition of the nature of a person on the relational view, causing further issues for this type of metaphysics. Indeed, from the biblical evidence, and the philosophical theological definition of such beings drawn upon in this thesis, it seems legitimate to also include angels in the category of ‘persons’. So any metaphysical view of what a person is needs to factor these beings into the question as well.

Taking this a step further, it is difficult to see how any view other than a substance metaphysics view of a person would be able to give a suitable response to the IPBD / IS and angelic persons issues. If this is indeed the case, this further has significant implications for the doctrine of the Trinity that has come back into vogue, as well as that of what it is to be a human person, both being so reliant on the question of personhood. Recognising the implications the doctrines of the IS / IPBD and angels have, theologians would be advised to think carefully before abandoning the substance metaphysics that has been inherent to much theology for the past two millennia, in favour of recent innovations.

C.2.6 The Intermediate State and Ghosts

The intermediate state also has further implications for the subject of ghosts and ancestor spirits that are prevalent in Pentecostalism around the world, and commented on in chapter 7. Like angels, ghosts get a wide birth in secular western academic thought. This is because such beings are perceived as being pre-Enlightenment superstition and something of an embarrassment to consider. But as seen, Pentecostals should feel no such limitations in their scholarship because by this point, they would hopefully recognise some of the

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631 So of course having wide-ranging implications for many ethical issues.
(mistaken) underlying philosophical assumptions in this Enlightenment attitude, and as seen, regard such beings as endemic to Pentecostal spirituality.

Though advising a biblical cautionary note to such consideration, the ghost of Samuel at Endor, the apparent acknowledgment of Jesus of ghosts (Mt 14:26; Lk 24:37-39), and the appearance of Moses and Elijah with Jesus at the transfiguration, would all seem to give something of a framework for understanding of such beings. When this is added to the thought that Scripture says nothing about where the intermediate state is,\textsuperscript{632} (the implication being that it may be closer to the earthly realm than is sometimes thought), that voices from many other cultures around the world readily acknowledge the existence of such beings, and even people in the secularised west also give accounts of having encountered them, these would seem to open the door for further consideration of the nature and influence of these beings.

\textbf{C.2.7 The human ‘spirit’ and disability, in light of the intermediate state}

Further, the issue of the intermediate state has implications when considering disability, with specific interest in the functioning of the human spirit in this area. Taking the general definition of a Thomist soul, the thesis has argued that this (and hence any of the 4 Thomistic models) is Enspiritable, via the spirit faculty within the soul. On all these models, in the ordinary functioning sense, the human spirit is dependent upon the brain for its consciousness – as are the other mental states (such as desires, thoughts, sensations etc.). Yet, with the soul able to consciously function in the unusual instance of the intermediate state, this would likewise apply to the spirit aspect of the soul. And if this is the case, one wonders whether, in instances such as brain damage, where conscious mental functioning is

\textsuperscript{632} Other than suggesting that those who believe in Christ are being kept safe in paradise
not able to occur as per usual, whether the Holy Spirit might have some special way of relating to the human spirit that does not need the brain for its conscious functioning. Just like the disembodied soul relates spiritually to the Holy Spirit in the intermediate state without a brain, might it be that even in embodied human life, this spirit aspect of the soul is able to consciously function in some sense, in instances where the brain is damaged e.g. Alzheimer’s disease?

The implications for ethics that arise from such conjecture are obvious, and would be added to all the issues surrounding the nature of personhood that have derived from considering the intermediate state. And of course, all of these are entailed in the considering of the doctrine of human constitution and would be of interest for further research.

C.2.8 The immaterial and the material world

A further implication that arises from this thesis on human constitution, with focus on the soul, is the re-vitalising of the immaterial world as a subject of research (as well as the material). In modern times, in wanting to correct what is often perceived as being Platonist and even Gnostic influences that are interested in the ‘spiritual’ and ‘immaterial’ world over and above the material (/ physical), theologians have heavily emphasised the doctrines of creation, incarnation and the (physical) eschaton as a corrector to this, and put a lot of focus on the material world. Such is a helpful correction, but in some, even many instances, this has become an over-reaction and now any talk of souls, the intermediate state, angels - the immaterial realm - is downplayed. This is a mistake, the immaterial realm is one that does need to be researched, even if such subjects are not particularly fashionable in a materialist dominated academy. Given a careful balance of the emphases of the material and the immaterial (seen in the Pentecostal holistic dualist view of constitution presented), the now,
often neglected immaterial world requires, and is worthy of further investigation. Christian (philosophical) theology would benefit from such an investigation, and is one that could be spear-headed by Pentecostal theology, due to its worldview which gladly embraces such a realm.633

C.2.9 Summary of evaluation and areas for further research

Pentecostals in different parts of the world would naturally gravitate more towards some of these areas for further thought than they would, others. Yet metaphysics, personhood, life-after-death, ethics, spirituality, ghosts, apologetics, spirit-beings, are all affected by studying the doctrine of human constitution. For this reason, rigorous philosophical care needs to be given (alongside theological reflection) to the subject of human constitution, as Pentecostals (and others) engage with the subject.

Yet, whilst underlining the importance of philosophy to the project, the Pentecostal renewing of the soul is what Pentecostal theology primarily needs to take account of. The philosophical considerations are integral to the proposing of the Enspiritable (Thomistic Holistic) Dualist model that has been proposed, but remembering that the heart of Pentecostal spirituality is the Divine-Human Spirit-spirit encounter, the Spirit’s renewing relation to that soul is essential. Pentecostals would do well, therefore, to remember and know that the soul is to be renewed academically, but is also to be renewed personally and Spiritually, through the on-going renewing work of the Spirit.

633 Though Pentecostals would be wise to lay out their valuing of the material world at the start of such projects, due to the reputation they have gained from their past in which the ‘spiritual’ or ‘immaterial’ was over-emphasised to the expense of the material.
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