BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS IN THE SUDAN:  
A STUDY OF ACCESS TO RESIDENTIAL LAND  
IN GREATER KHARTOUM

by

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A Thesis Submitted as the Requirement  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in Local Government and Administration,  
in the Faculty of Commerce and Social  
Science, University of Birmingham

Institute of Local Government Studies  
August, 1985
This study examines the process of the distribution of residential land in Greater Khartoum, Sudan, and inquires into the processes which constrain the access of the urban population to residential plots. The main objective is to analyse the constraints which bear upon the implementation of urban housing policy, and to develop an adequate explanation of their sources and underlying mechanisms.

The study employs a broad framework of analysis that combines a structural analysis of the political economy with an institutional analysis of policy and organisational process. It will be argued that the limitations inherent in the urban housing policy in Sudan can be explained in terms of the prevailing policy planning model and the underlying structural constraints which arise from the nature of the political economy.

The study consists of seven chapters. Chapter One provides an overview of perspectives of policy implementation in the Third World. The relevance of some of these perspectives to an approach that relates policy problems to social structure will be considered.
Chapter Two presents an exposition of the Sudanese economy and highlights the question of how dominant economic interests influence public policy.

Chapter Three addresses the links between social structure and public policy by analysing the prevalent model of policy planning in Sudan. It will be argued that there is a correspondence between the social content of the policy model and the interests of dominant economic classes identified in Chapter Two.

Chapter Four focuses on the effect of the policy model on urban social policy. Two policy areas will be examined: the policy of regional development and its impact on housing problems in the capital; and the policy of urban land development.

Chapter Five investigates the concrete limits on access to residential land at the level of housing agencies. Their organisational patterns, rules of allocation and operational processes will be examined.

Chapter Six narrows the focus on the limits on access by examining the upgrading process in one of the capital's illegal settlements.

Chapter Seven concludes the argument on the source and the incidence of constraints on policy implementation. We will synthesise the processes underlying the constraints.
identified in the preceding chapters, and advance a broad explanation of the nature and the incidence of these constraints.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I must first acknowledge my sincere gratitude to the people of Sudan who financed my study. I hope my effort in this study to tackle some of their problems will clear part of my debt to this great nation. In preparing this work I had the help of many persons and institutions.

I am indebted to a number of colleagues at the University of Khartoum. Dr Fatima B Mahmoud and Dr Galal eddin el-Tayeb read and commented on my initial research plan. Ustaza Su'ad I Ahmed, Dr Saif-eddin M El-Hassan and Ustaz Ahmed M El-Hassan helped me with the design of the questionnaire. The staff of the Sudan library gave me access to much needed information. I am grateful to all of them.

My thanks go to my friend Ali A Ismail and his colleagues in the Department of Social Care who helped me with the sample survey. Hafez Omer, Amin A Amara and Abdel Moneim M Abdulla were a great help. I should like also to thank the employees of the Research Unit in the Department of Housing and also those of the Land Office of Omdurman Al-Gadida for their kind cooperation. I would also like to express my gratitude to the residents of the Unity Settlement.
At Birmingham University I should like to thank the staff of the ILGS Library and the staff of the main Library for their unfailing help. I am also grateful to Mr M Walker of CURS who helped me with the data processing. I greatly appreciate the financial assistance I received from the University's Welfare Office. I should like to thank Dr A Shepherd, Charles Collins and Arif Amlani for their kind support. My special thanks go to Dr Richard Batley who supervised my research. I am grateful for his encouragement, constructive criticism and moral support. I also owe a great deal to Ms Jones who has typed this work efficiently and has worked tirelessly to help me submit this thesis on time.
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INTRODUCTION

As the Sudan emerged into independence in 1956, expectations of speedy development were running high. The state occupied a central place in the economy and was, therefore, seen as a pace-setter in the race for economic and social progress. Now, after almost three decades of independence the state is in deep economic and financial crisis; many areas of the country are famine-stricken and over four million are estimated to be starving in mid-1985. This state of affairs lends critical enquiry into public policies and implementation strategies, uncontested significance and extreme urgency.

The objective of this study is to examine the constraints on the implementation of urban housing policy in the Sudan, and construct an adequate explanation of the sources and underlying mechanisms of problems of public policy. The specific focus of the study is the process of the distribution of residential land in Greater Khartoum and the causes of constraints on the access of urban population to residential plots.

The significance of this research topic arises in relation to two main considerations:

First, most approaches to policy implementation in the Third World, namely those in the discipline of public administration, are predicated upon the assumption that the state
is a neutral institution, which is above class and group conflict. It follows from this assumption that policy process is an essentially technical matter and is socially neutral in its impact on the public.¹

However, there is now an increasing appreciation in social and political theory that the notion of a neutral state is untenable and therefore indefensible. This change in the understanding of the state calls into question the adequacy of prevalent explanations of policy implementation. The notion of a socially neutral policy process cannot be sustained. Implementation analysis is, therefore, confronted with the task of developing adequate explanations that take note of the change in the concept of the state and which are capable of accurately describing the policy process.

The second justification for this research is the progressive increase in the role and size of the state in contemporary society, and particularly in developing countries. The state in the Sudan, as in many post-colonial societies, has become widely involved in economy and society.

"In addition to the customary regulatory and public service functions of government, the state operates or controls the greater part of the modern sector production. There are more than 60 public corporations in agriculture, transport, industry and commerce ... so that total employment in public service ... represents well over 5 per cent of the total labour force, broadly defined, and more than half of modern-sector employment - and the numbers have quadrupled since independence". (ILO, 1976, p.147).²

¹ A full exposition of this point and the following one will be conducted in Chapter 1 Sections 1.2 and 1.3 respectively.
² The government sector employs about 84% of the labour force with post secondary education, (ibid, p.469).
Growth in the role and size of the State in Sudan was accompanied by an increasing centralisation of power, particularly from 1969 onwards. With its huge control of strategic resources, the state became a focus for class and group interests and a vehicle for social mobility. In the process of managing the distribution of state benefits and penalties among the population, public policy will have a vital impact on the "life chances" of individuals and groups in the country. Public policy analysis acquires, therefore, an increased importance not simply for its concern with policy output but more so because of the social significance of policy outcomes.

Determinants, constraints and social implications of public policy become increasingly shaped, on the one hand, by the social character of the state and, on the other hand, by the growing role of the state in society. In contrast to dominant approaches in public administration which perceive administrative failures in developing countries primarily in terms of organisational weaknesses and cultural contradictions we will argue that implementation problems bear a complex relationship to the nature of the post-colonial Sudanese state and its role in economy and society. Limitations on urban housing policy will be explained mainly in terms of the prevailing policy planning model and underlying structural constraints flowing from the political economy.
We will adopt a broad framework of analysis that combines structural analysis of the economy and institutional analysis of policy and organisational process. The macro/micro nature of the research required the use of a multidisciplinary perspective. As some of the processes we intend to analyse fall outside the domain of the discipline of public administration we needed to cross disciplinary boundaries and draw on works from political economy, urban studies and the sociology of organisations.

The specific focus of the study will be the administrative allocation of residential land in Greater Khartoum. We will address analysis more to the structural underpinnings of the state, economy and administrative agencies and less to the behavioural and cultural traits of individuals who run housing agencies. While analysis will span colonial and post-colonial periods to provide a complete view of the development of the state and economy, the period 1970-1980 will constitute the main referrent for the study. Data used were drawn from library material, official documents of the Sudan Government, interviews with employees in housing agencies and a sample survey in an illegal settlement in Greater Khartoum. Difficulty of access to data, particularly in housing agencies deprived us of first hand material about behavioural aspects of housing institutions; and forced us to rely heavily on content analysis of official documents.
The study consists of seven chapters. Chapter One provides an overview of perspectives of policy implementation in the Third World. It begins with a critique of conventional explanations of implementation problems, which are predominant in the literature of public and development administration. It then considers the Marxist perspective of policy process and identifies its limitations. Further, we explore writings on "urban managerialism", radical organisation theory and German political studies and consider their contributions to an approach which relates policy problems to social structure. Finally, building on elements from the three latter traditions we propose a framework for studying constraints on urban housing policy in the Sudan.

Chapter Two presents an exposition of the main features of the Sudanese economy. It analyses its major structural weaknesses as a product of dominant class interests and concludes by posing a question about how dominant interests influence the state policy.

The link between social structure and public policy is examined in Chapter Three, through a political analysis of the prevailing model of policy planning under the May (1969) Regime. The policy model will be examined against the ideology of the regime, the institutional organisation of the state and the social character of policy makers. We will argue that there is a conformity between the social content of the policy model and the dominant social interests identified in Chapter Two. We therefore propose that policy models
can be an important mechanism for mediating social interests in the policy process.

The effect of the dominant policy model on urban social policy will be investigated in Chapter Four. We focus on two main policy areas: the link between the policy of regional development, urban growth and housing problems in the capital; and the impact of the policy of urban land development on the provision of and access to urban housing. We will argue that the pattern of regional development tends to destabilise the peasant communities in the Western region and accelerate the rate of migration to the capital. As we consider the policy of urban development we will show that the commercialisation of urban land in the early 1970s generated pressures on housing opportunities for the low income families and constrained their access. It will be argued that both urban and regional development policies had their origin in the dominant national policy model.

The fifth chapter investigates concrete limits on the access of urban groups to residential land. These limits will be traced to the content of the allocation rules and the organisational arrangements at the distribution points. We will discuss how the allocation structure fostered differential access to residential plots relating to site quality, plot space, and levels of urban service. It will be shown that the state bureaucracy enjoyed a subsidised access to high class housing whereas low income families were relegated to low quality housing. We will argue that limits on access
deriving from the allocation rules operated between housing classes. A second set of limits on access operated at the distribution points of the service, and mainly affected the access of applicants within housing classes (see Diagram 1.1).

Chapter Six focuses on a case-study of an upgrading project in National Unity settlement of Omdurman city. The case-study material will be used to illustrate three dimensions of constraints on access to residential land. First it illustrates the link between the policy of regional development and housing problems in the capital, which is proposed in Chapter Four. Second, it shows the constraining effect of political intervention in housing policy on the access of lower class families to legal residence. Third, it highlights other non-structural constraints on access which arose at the operational level of the upgrading project.

Chapter Seven concludes the study by proposing an alternative interpretation of the sources and incidence of constraints on urban housing policy. This will be done in two stages. First, a summary of constraints is provided and the constraints classified into three categories relating to: the institutional setting, urban political economy, and national political economy. Second, we attempt to synthesise processes underlying constraints in one integrated explanation: it consists of identifying social forces and interests underlying the prevailing policy model, and of specifying institutional mechanisms through which social interest acted upon administrative process. We argue that by adopting this proposed
research strategy it will be possible to comprehend how structural processes flowing from the wider political economy can influence and constrain policy implementation.
CHAPTER ONE

PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD

1.1 INTRODUCTION

A distinctive feature of contemporary political systems is the increasing involvement of the state in society. Expansion in the scope of state functions during the second half of this century was enormous. Parallel to this trend has been an equally significant tendency toward centralisation of power (Saunders, 1979, p.140). Although the magnitude of state intervention may be large and complex in developed societies, it seems to acquire particular significance and to have profound impact in developing countries. Because of the scarcity of economic resources and the centralisation of political power in the latter countries, state actions have a vital impact on the "life chances" of individuals and groups.

The expanding role of the state in developing countries attracted an increasing concern about strategies, processes and outcomes of public policy. A number of studies on implementation were carried out, particularly during the last two decades. Generally most of these studies focused more narrowly on administrative systems and procedures of implementing bureaucracies or on the characteristics of administrators (Grindle, M. 1980, p.4). Little attention was given to linking implementation problems to the characteristics of political power.

1. Footnotes 4 and 30 in Grindle, M. (1980) provide an overview of this literature.
regimes or to the wider environment of implementation. It is the intention of this study to extend an analysis of problems of implementation in the Sudan to other variables in the social, economic and political settings of the implementation process.

As an area of policy analysis, studies of implementation cover a wide range of aspects. Hogwood and Gunn (1981) mentioned seven areas of policy analysis (Ham, C. and Hill, M., 1984, pp.8-10). Three areas of these viz. policy content, policy process and policy outcomes often constituted the main focus of implementation studies. Our main focus in this study will be policy output and its outcomes in the sphere of the allocation of residential land in Greater Khartoum, Sudan. But since we regard implementation as an integral part of the policy process rather than as an administrative "follow up" from policy making (Barrett, S. and Hill, M., 1984, p.220), we will naturally extend our investigation to the process of policy formation and to the content of housing policy in the Sudan.

The starting point of our inquiry is an exposition, in the second section of this chapter, of prevailing explanations of problems of policy implementation in developing countries. These explanations are usually predominant in the literature of public and development administration. They were basically criticised for restricting analysis to one level of the policy

1. Exception to this statement were Riggs, F. 1964; Daland, R. 1967; Graham, L. 1968; Cleaves, P. 1974; and Grindle, M. 1977 and 1980, (quoted in Grindle, 1980).
process - behavioural and organisational aspects - to the neglect of other important issues relating to the content and context of implementation. It will be argued in this section that the distribution of political power and conflict in society is as important for understanding problems of implementation.

The argument on the impact of political power and conflict on implementation will be examined, in the third section, in the light of the relation between state, bureaucracy and society. We will consider first the conception of bureaucracy in Marxist theory of the state, identify its limitations and underline its inadequacy for analysis of constraints on policy implementation. We take issue with that Marxist view which suggests that policy outcomes could only be explained in terms of class conflict external to the state's apparatus.

The link between political power and implementation is further illuminated by considering writings on "urban managerialism", research on radical organisation theory, and the debate in German political studies on the "materiality" of the state apparatus. We note an increasing appreciation in these three traditions of the role the internal organisation of the state plays in extending social interests into public policy. However, the link between political action and social structure through the institutional structure of the state is not yet satisfactorily articulated in this literature. The work of Offe (1974 and 1975) and radical organisation theorists contained important ingredients of an approach to the study
of determinants of and constraints on public policy. Building on these ingredients we will present in the fourth section, a framework of analysis to examine the constraints on urban social policy in the Sudan.

We outline the research problem in the fourth section of this chapter. Examination of constraints on the allocation of residential land in the capital is spread over a number of levels. At a macro-policy level we focus on the dominant policy model in the Sudan and analyse it in the light of the regime's ideology, the institutional organisation of the state apparatus and social character of incumbents. We associate limits on access to residential land with certain aspects of urban and regional development policies. At a micro-policy level, we trace limits on access in the structure, technology and processes of allocation agencies. We use the notion of internalisation of biases in policy into institutional forms, organisational structures and processes to denote links between the two levels of constraints and to underline their combined effect at the distribution points of residential land.

1.2 IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ORTHODOXY OF DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

1.2.1 General

Most Third World countries, especially in Africa, emerged into independence in the post-World War II period. While their economies were relatively weak, expectations of
speedy development were high. The state was expected to play a major role in improving living standards, mostly through the public sector. Now, after almost three decades of independence the gap between expectations, however modestly defined, and actual state performance was widening. Questions about what went wrong ranged from questioning the relevance of planning strategies to addressing capabilities of administrative systems and appropriateness of implementation strategies.

In this section we look, firstly, at the common explanations of problems of implementation which prevailed during the past three decades. We associate these explanations with the tradition of development administration. We focus on its theoretical orientation, and outline policy implications and prescriptions which ensued. Secondly, we underline the main limitations in the work of development administration in developing countries. Broadly speaking, systematic study of the context of implementation received little attention in the approach of that tradition.

Thirdly, we consider the usefulness of organisational analysis in making up for limitations in the work of development administration. As we review a critique of mainstream organisation theory we note the relevance of the debate arising in the course of that critique to problems of implementation in developing countries. We conclude this section

1. The widespread famine in Sub-saharan Africa (1984/85) reflected the gravity of the situation in real terms.
emphasising the need to link the study of public organisations to issues of power and conflict in wider society.

1.2.2 The Development Administration Movement

Two organisational models basically influenced the structures and processes of policy planning and implementation in post-colonial societies: the colonial European model and the post-war development administration model. Although the legacy of colonial administrative survived well into the independence era, the tradition of development administration has been predominant. During the past three decades most scholarly work on problems of public administration in developing countries came from the North American school of development administration.¹ The aim of the movement was to produce knowledge, basic and applied which had social utility in the context of developing countries. To understand properly the analytical perspective of development administration and assess its relevance or otherwise to problems of implementation in developing countries we need to specify its place in social theory, establish its conceptual orientation and identify consequent policy implications.²


2. It is important to note that there was no acknowledged "paradigmatic consensus" among participants in the movement nor did "CAG" formally espouse specific positions relating to issues to be discussed below. Hence not all members of "CAG" have adopted all the assumptions, characteristic and methodologies elaborated below.
(a) Theoretical Orientation

As a sub-field of public administration, development administration essentially related to two traditions of administrative thought: the tradition of scientific management, started in America at the turn of the century; and the trend towards national planning and government interventionism which emerged as a direct consequence of the depression, World War II, and the post-war reconstruction (Nef and Dwivedi, 1981, p.44).

Initiation of technical assistance programmes during the 1950s and the 1960s posed questions about the relevance of orthodox administrative theories and concepts to administration of development in the Third World (Riggs, F. 1976, p.648). The tendency was to search for appropriate concepts that would facilitate cross-cultural comparison, mostly borrowing from other disciplines such as Anthropology, Sociology, Political Science and Economics. As Ilchman (1971,p.8) noted, almost every innovation in social science technology - systems analysis, pattern variables, the tradition-modernity dichotomy, information theory, pluralism, and others - found its way into the writings of development administration. Structural-functionalism, systems analysis and behaviourism provided a significant measure of integration of the movement into large conceptual structures (Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit., p.51).
Different strands of social theory usually contain implicitly or explicitly certain key assumptions relating to ontology, epistemology and methodology (Burrell, G. and Morgan, G., 1979, pp.1-4). Structural functionalism and systems analysis upheld specific assumptions on the nature of social science, society and the state, which largely underlined the work of development administration, as we explain below.

In its approach to social science the functionalist paradigm held that the social world consisted of relative concrete empirical artefacts and relationships which can be identified, studied and measured through approaches derived from the natural sciences. The use of mechanical and biological analogies as means of modelling and understanding the social world was particularly favoured in many functionalist theories (Burrell, G. and Morgan, G., op.cit p.26).

This epistemology influenced the research orientation of development administration. Nef and Dwivedi (1981) identified three methodological traits in the approach of the movement.

(a) There was an emphasis on the context and ecology of administration, e.g. Riggs, F. 1964, p.399.

1. Kuhn defined paradigms as "universally recognised scientific achievements that for a time provided model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners" (1970, quoted in ibid, p.35).
(b) There was an interdisciplinary flavour blending a multitude of methods and concepts "which did not fit into classical political science or western public administration" (Raphaeli, 1967, p.18).

(c) There was an emphasis on logical empiricism: an expressed concern with theory building and the testing of propositions through empirical analysis e.g. Riggs, 1964, p.399.

A key concept that underlined the functionalist perception of society was that of the "system". According to social systems analysis a system consisted of interdependent parts such that when the properties of one component in a system changed, all other components and the system as a whole were affected (Almond, G. and Powell, G., 1966, p.19). This view of the social order presumed a number of assumptions about the nature of society:

"(1) Every society is a relatively persistent, stable structure of elements.

(2) Every society is a well integrated structure of elements.

(3) Every element in a society has a function i.e. renders a contribution to its maintenance as a system.

(4) Every functioning social structure is based on a consensus of values among its members" (Dahrendorf, R., 1959, quoted in Burrell and Morgan, op.cit., p.92).
In its conception of the polity, structural functionalism substituted the concept of political system for that of the state (Almond and Powell, op.cit., pp.16,17). A political system was defined as a "system of interaction in a society which produces authoritative decisions ... that are binding on the society as a whole, and are reinforced by legitimate physical compulsion if necessary" (Heady, F., 1979, p.7). A functional model of political systems, introduced by Almond, proposed that such systems shared six universal functions: interest articulation, interest aggregation, rule-making, rule application, rule adjudication and communication. These functions represented the conversion process whereby a political system transformed inputs into outputs (see Almond and Powell, op.cit.).

Most social systems theories espoused a pluralist perspective of political power. They perceived the state as neutral in its functions and independent of any particular class interests. Its functions were to regulate and mediate conflicts within society, by use of force if necessary (Saunders, 1979, p.151).

Development administration held typical views about society, state and political power (Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit., pp.52,53). The role of the state was perceived as responding to and facilitating the "free flow" of competitive market politics. Development administration was viewed as being compatible with and providing support for liberal democracy in the developing world (Spingler, J., 1969, pp.588 and 611-12, in Braibanti, op.cit.).
(b) Policy Orientation

The aforementioned theoretical orientation reflected closely on the movement's policy analysis and policy approach. The movement used the term "development administration in two interrelated senses (Heady, op.cit., p.20): it referred to the administration of development programmes, and to strengthening of administrative capabilities in developing countries. In order to elucidate the policy approach adopted to achieve these objectives we shall consider the movement's views on development, the role of bureaucracy in change, and the instrumentality of technology to development.

1 The Concept of Development

The movement did not have a clear and explicit theory of development or precise specification of goals of development (Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit.). Its definition of development, characteristics and goals were mostly derived from the model of "developed system" formulated by Almond (Almond and Powell, op.cit.). Absence of the characteristics and behaviour patterns of the "developed system" in the Third World was taken to denote a certain state of underdevelopment. Underdevelopment, on the other hand, was perceived as resulting from innate social, cultural, political and economic defects prevailing in developing countries (Tapia Videla, 1976, p.121). Development was often defined in terms of concepts such as "modernisation", "industrialisation", "westernisation", "self-sustained-
growth", "structural-differentiation" (Gunnell, 1970, quoted in Cleaves, op.cit. p.8).

Emphasis varied, in the literature of development administration, between political and economic development. Economic development was defined in terms of economic growth (e.g. Meier, 1970, quoted in Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit., p.51), and the expansion of GNP per capita over a period of time. A diffusion model of growth was envisaged involving the notion of spread of development, within an underdeveloped society, from "modern" to "traditional" sectors of the economy (Bodenheimer, 1970, pp.111,112). Political development was conceived as the movement towards a political system that approximated a "modern industrial society" (e.g. Huntington and Dominguez, 1975, quoted in Heady, op.cit., pp.85,86). Thus, the building of political institutions and processes after western political systems was considered a necessary requisite for political development in the Third World.

ii The Role of Bureaucracy in Change

In its analysis of how to effect change, development administration treated the concept of development as a dependent variable and administration as the independent variable (Cleaves, P., 1974, pp.7,8). Attention was mainly focused on improving the administrative requisites for realising the goals of public policy, but the latter were considered less problematic. This position conformed to the perspective of structural functionalism about the role of
bureaucracy in society:

"a system cannot develop a high level of internal regulation, distribution or extraction without a "modern" governmental bureaucracy in one form or another" (Almond and Powell, op.cit., pp.323, 324).

In societal terms, public administration, being predominantly drawn from the middle class, was seen as a modernising social force capable of introducing change in traditional values and behaviour patterns in developing countries. This view of bureaucracy was close to Lipset's analysis:

"the growing middle class ... like its 19th century European counterpart supports a democratic society by attempting to reduce the influence of the anti-capitalist traditionalist and the arbitrary power of the military" (Lipset, 1963, quoted in Bodenheimer, op.cit. p.117).

Within the middle class, the bureaucracy was seen as the focal group "... perhaps the most important elite modernising roles are the technical and civil services of a country" (Apter, D., 1965, quoted by Ilchman, 1969, p.483). The major underlying assumption in development administration was, therefore, that by perfecting the bureaucracy, the task of establishing socio-economic change and political democracy was to be made easier.

This conception of bureaucracy was further strengthened following the failure of liberal democratic governments in a number of developing countries during the 1960s (Loveman, B., 1976, p.618). A view, giving first priority to political
stability that would be the foundation of economic growth and democracy, emerged within the ranks of development administration. The implication was that the creation of effective administrative systems had to precede the concern for political and economic development (e.g. Esman, 1971, mentioned in ibid). The main thrust of development administration centred on administrative reform and administrative training to equip bureaucracy for its perceived role in social change.

iii Neutrality and Instrumentality of Organisational Technology

There was a view within the movement that the vast amount of experience in reconstruction and organisation, gained during the post-war reconstruction in Europe, could be adopted to suit the specific developmental needs of the post-colonial societies (Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit. p.54). Emphases were laid on the transfer of appropriate organisational design and of modern administrative technology (Heady op.cit. p.13). The bureaucratic model, based on Weber's "ideal type" construct was transferred to the Third World with some modifications.¹ A host of administrative techniques, mostly drawn from the American experience were introduced. These included: personnel administration, budgeting and financial administration, information technology, techniques of administrative planning, records management, and work simplification (Siffin, W., 1976, p.62).

¹ As Benson (1977(a), p.4) noted in a different context, some important features of Weber's argument, such as the emphasis on historical context and trends were removed. The core idea - the bounded rational organisation was retained.
The policy of transferring technical know-how to developing countries presumed that such techniques were value-neutral and essentially had a cross-cultural, cross-national utility. Administrative techniques were, thus, considered objective universal principles. The normative elements implicit in this type of technology, and their value orientations were not questioned (ibid, pp.62-66).

Furthermore, there was a belief that the use of this technology could be divorced from the substance of the governmental policies which it would be serving. Administrative techniques were considered invariably useful and applicable to different policy sectors in developing countries.

Looking back in retrospect, the policy approach of development administration to implementation problems in developing countries was characterised by its concentration on one level of the policy process ie. the administrative level. Much of its effort focused on introducing administrative reforms and promoting administrative training. The goals of public policy and the nature of the policy process were not central to the movement's perspective, as we explain below.

1. Between July 1952 and March 1963 almost 6,000 persons were sent abroad for training under the US aid programme alone. The United Nations, the Ford Foundation and the United States Government had helped establish or develop some 70 public administration institutes in developing countries. (Siffin, op.cit. p.66).
1.2.3 Limitations in the Development Administration Approach

By the end of the 1960s it was evident that externally induced modernisation had failed to eradicate the basic problems it purported to solve. Whilst significant increases of GNP had taken place, poverty, inequalities and political repression had either worsened or remained unaltered (Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit. p.55; Loveman, op.cit. pp.619,620; Kesselman, 1973, p.140). The work of development administration came under close scrutiny in terms both of its theoretical orientation and its practical implications. Of the ensuing critiques, relevant to this study is the failure of the movement to systematically relate administrative process to its social, economic and political settings. The implications of this limitation for the study of implementation problems will be clarified as we consider below the main criticisms directed against the work of development administration.

(a) The Theoretical Difficulties

Criticism of the conceptual orientation of development administration came as part of a wider critique of the objectives, methodologies, epistemologies and value assumptions of western social science (Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit. p.55). Development administration was criticised for adopting a positivist approach to theory building and for using inadequate methods in selecting research variables and in data collection.

As for the first limitation, it was argued that, far from
being value-free and objective, the concepts used were value-laden and ethnocratic (Bodenheimer, op.cit., Fay, B., 1975, Ch.3, Jun, J., 1976, p.642). A recent trend in public administration considered the rules implicit in the "bureaucratic model" as socially negotiated constructs rather than absolute rules (e.g. Barrett and Hill, op.cit., p.228). A similar view in organisation studies questioned the taken-for-granted objectivity of concepts such as specialisation, centralisation, span of control and so on ... (eg. Benson, 1977(a), p.4). The import of these critiques is that the conceptual constructs of development administration were theoretically incapable of accurately describing administrative reality in developing countries.

The conceptual weakness noted above reflected on methods of selecting research variables and of collecting data. For instance, some studies attempted to deduce administrative behaviour from the properties of the total social system (e.g. Siffin, 1966, mentioned in Cleaves op.cit. p.6), assuming away the possible effects of lower level variables on administration. To paraphrase Springer, those studies which dealt with many levels of analysis focused on one or few units of analysis e.g. culture in Siffin's study of Thai bureaucracy, (1966) or Berger's study of Egyptian bureaucracy (1957, referred to by Ilchman 1972, pp.231,235). On the other hand, more extensive research in terms of units was confined to a single level of analysis (Springer, J. 1977, p.33). The result of these conceptual and methodological limitations was an

1. We present the complete argument on this point in subsection 1.2.4 below.
incomplete handling of the complex variables obtaining in the implementation environment, partial explanations of administrative problems, and inappropriate policy prescriptions.

(b) Policy Implications

Government policies which followed the analyses of the development administration school received a number of criticisms. We shall be concerned here with specific aspect of these critiques, namely, the emphasis on a predominant role for bureaucracy in change and the implication of this view for a number of political and developmental issues.

We note from the above review that development administration upheld two interrelated views about bureaucracy: bureaucracy was equated with rational administration; it was also considered, in social terms, as a modernising force in comparison to other social groups and classes. The obvious policy implication, therefore, was to inculcate bureaucrats into modern techniques of organisation, and also to increase the political power of the bureaucracy so that it was capable of mobilising resources for modernisation.

The possible imbalance in the distribution of political power between various social groups, which might arise therefrom, was considered a necessary short-term cost in anticipation of long term political and economic development. Any concern for restraining bureaucratic authority had to be subordinated
to the need to create effective administrative institutions. Thus, Esman wrote:

"To a number of scholars including this writer, the emphasis on control of bureaucracy in the context of most of the developing countries is a misplaced priority, one that might seriously retard their rate of progress. We ought to be much more concerned with increasing the capacity of the bureaucracy to perform, and this we see as a function of greatly enhanced professional capability and operational autonomy rather than further controls" (Esman, op.cit. p.62).

This view was reportedly widespread among bureaucrats in developing countries. From a study of a group of planners from the Third World studying in the United States, Ilchman concluded that they saw the forces to overcome backwardness as either themselves and their bureaucratic colleagues, or elites in other fields (Ilchman, W. 1969, p.494). This orientation in development administration analysis meant support for increased state and bureaucratic control over political power and national resources in developing countries. As Loveman observed, by the 1970s development administration had become euphemisms for authoritarian and frequently military regimes (Loveman, op.cit. p.619). The view that an "administrative state" was the best administrator of development had two important implications for the process of policy planning and implementation as well as for social outcomes of state actions in the Third World, as we argue below:-
(i) Irrelevance of politics and ideology to development

Over-emphasis in the literature of development administration on the centrality of administration to development had not been associated with comparable concern about the social character of development goals or about how they were reached in the first place. There was an implicit assumption of societal consensus over these issues. Politics or conflict relating to development goals were assumed away in a search for stability and order, themselves seen as vital requisites for development to happen.

But "political order" argued Kesselman (1973, p.142) was equated with strengthening the established authorities as evidenced in the works of Huntington (1968) and Binder (1971). In this sense the concept of "political order" obscured the legitimacy of the means used by governments to maintain power (Kesselman, op.cit. p.143).
Obviously, by equating development goals with the interests of those holding power, and in the absence of political debate there was a risk of excluding from the agenda of development the interests and aspirations of underrepresented groups. In the meantime, those underrepresented or excluded were largely the people in whose name development was being initiated. Failure of these groups to express their interests through a process of negotiation, bargaining or conflict would lead to miscalculation of the goals of development. In such situation, planners would be deprived from weighing accurately the human costs of development and less able to conduct an equitable distribution of these costs between various social groups and classes. Moreover, as some social groups believed that their interests were excluded from the agenda of development the very effort of mobilisation demanded by development was defeated.

(ii) Technocracy as substitute for politics

Closely associated with the notion of the irrelevance of politics and ideology to development was a belief that there were non-ideological bases for setting development goals. "Scientific planning", seen as a socially-neutral process conducted through the planners, was perceived both by aid agencies and aid receiving governments as a sound basis for identifying the socio-economic goals of development. The underlying trend was a gradual shift in the nature of policy formation from a politically-oriented process, as
presumed in the pluralist perspective, to a technocratic process: one that was governed by "scientific" rules. Public administration, therefore, increasingly replaced politics as the appropriate institution and process for identifying developmental goals.

Commenting on Kenya's Special Rural Development Plan, Ekekwe noted the lack of any notion of politically involving the masses. Its emphasis was on providing the personnel with the requisite skills of administration (1977, p.56). In Ghana Marshall reported that members of the "technocratic elite ... (were) ... highly suspicious of popular mobilisation and ideology and convinced of technocratic solutions..." (1975, quoted in ibid, p.57).

In their definitions of and approaches to development, planners in the Third World followed closely the prescriptions of development administration, noted earlier. Ilchman's (1969) perceptive analysis of the "ideology" of planners in developing countries deserves quoting at some length:

"Industrialisation and modernisation are deeply held values, and the costs of these processes tend to be minimised by the planners. Their explanations of causes of backwardness stress the pervasiveness of values hostile to development and imply the need for substantial reform before the processes can become self-sustaining ... Despite problems defined in cultural and political terms, the planners feel that economic programmes and planning - the more comprehensive the better - are the more trustworthy guides for action. The agricultural sector must be "educated" for innovations, though structural reform and force are also advocated. Both the desired increases in resources of foreign aid and the desired allocation of resources by the government are defined largely in technical terms with explicit rejection of premises.
that might be labelled "political." (Ilchman, op.cit. pp.504-505, in Braibanti, R., 1969, emphasis mine).

By the late 1960s the paradigm informing this pattern of economic planning - neo-classical economic analysis - came under serious criticisms (Mabogunje, 1980, Chs 1 and 2). It was criticised for lack of historical specificity by treating underdevelopment without any awareness of the historical reality of the world capitalist economy out of which these conditions have emerged. It was also criticised for lack of class analysis, as it presumed that the development and organisation of the economy could take place in the setting of an implicitly harmonious social order where there would seem to be no internal structural contradiction.

The foregoing discussion of the limitations in the approach of development administration underline two important concerns about the study of public policy. First, as long as development is about people, conflict of interests over goals, process and costs of development cannot be assumed away. Analysis of the policy process must take account of social interests underpinning public policy if it is to be able to understand and adequately explain that policy. Second, planning models, administrative techniques and organisation designs, far from being socially-neutral, can mediate social interests in public policy. Sociological analysis of what is conventionally considered "scientific" administrative techniques and models must be central to analysis of public policy. This last point is considered in some detail in the following subsection.
1.2.4 Relevance of Organisational Analysis

Limitations in the approach of development administration prompted many participants in the movement to consider alternative approaches to the study of administration. Proposed perspectives included policy studies, institution-building process, organisational analysis, among others (eg. Henderson, 1981; Heady, F., 1979).

A number of scholars in the movement called for the use of concepts drawn from organisation theory in the study of administration in developing countries (eg. Springer, 1976; Jun, 1976; Tapia Videla, 1976). While no specific recommendations were offered on how organisation theory might be useful for development administration, there was an unguarded optimism about the relevance of concepts of the former tradition. Assumptions about the immediate relevance of organisational concepts seem to have overlooked a continuing debate in organisation theory about specific conceptual, methodological and empirical issues. These issues relate closely to the relevance or otherwise of organisation theory to the study of development administration. We shall look first at the main difficulties in organisation theory and then consider how the issues generated by the debate relate to the study of public policy in developing countries.
(a) Limitations in Mainstream Organisation Theory

Numerous criticisms have been made against mainstream organisation theory during the past decade. (For a summary of the critiques see Zey-Ferrell, 1981). These criticisms originated from inside as well as outside the discipline and were launched from a variety of perspectives. We shall consider briefly these critiques under the headings of theory and methodology.

1. Conceptual problems

Mainstream organisation theory was criticised for treating organisations as goal-seeking rational entities (Benson, 1977(a)). Critics argued that the presumed rationality of organisations was partial. For instance, rationality of goals cannot be attributed to the organisation since these goals were usually defined in terms of goals and interests of managers and owners of capital. There was, it is argued, a multiplicity of rationalities originating from various actors and groups in organisations (Zey-Ferrell, op.cit. p.184).

Attributing intrinsic rational tendencies to organisations precluded adequate explanations of their structural features.

1. Targets of these criticisms were the comparative structural approach associated with writers such as Blau and Schoenherr, 1977; Hall, 1963; Pugh, et al 1963 among others; and the structural contingency approach associated with eg. Hinings and Lee, 1971; Hickson et al 1971; Child 1973 (quoted in Zey-Ferrell, 1981, p.183).

2. They emanated from diverse sources such as ethnomethodology, phenomenology and Marxism.
For instance, power in organisations was often analysed in terms of the formal authority structure. Other types of power external to the definition of authority were not adequately considered (Mouzelis, 1975; Albrow, M., 1970). Critics argued that this view of power ignored the underlying societal distribution of power and its impact on the nature of goals, authority structure and other major features in organisations. The import of the above critique is that the notion of organisations as rational goal-seeking entities is suspect and inadequate for understanding organisations.

ii Methodology

The conceptual limitations, noted above, reflected on methods adopted in mainstream organisation theory for identifying organisational reality. For instance, attributing rational goals to organisations resulted in conceiving of organisations as "boundary maintaining" systems (Pettigrew, 1973, mentioned by Zey-Ferrell, op.cit. p.187). By defining boundaries in terms of existing goals, analysts in mainstream organisation theory were able to demonstrate that organisations existed as exclusive units of analysis. This view was criticised for:

1. its neglect of the society within which organisations exist ...

2. its reification of systems and goals (of organisations) ...
3. its abandonment of concern for organisational domination ...

4. its neglect of the power dynamics through which organisations gain control over their environment; and

5. its isolation from issues of social class, social stratification and social conflict ...

(Zey-Ferrell, op.cit. p.199).

These methodological limitations made it difficult to differentiate organisational reality from management reality. Organisational features, it is argued, were measured without much concern about the process through which they had been created (Benson 1977(a), p.4). Concepts such as centralisation, specialisation, span of control etc. were measured according to descriptions given by senior participants and uncritically accepted by researchers. Thus data gathering methods often focused on key informants in management positions. By contrast, the workers' perceptions of organisational reality were seldom considered (Goldman, P., and Van Houten, 1979, mentioned by Zey-Ferrell, op.cit., p.188).

The result of these conceptual and methodological limitations was a major gap in sociological theory as organisational processes were not linked to macro and micro processes in any systematic fashion (Zey-Ferrell, op.cit., Benson, 1977(a)). This inadequacy bears close similarity to the limitations in
the approach of development administration noted earlier. Both traditions faced a problem of conceptual adequacy. Their methodologies were depicted as crude and unsatisfactory for identifying research objects. However, the on-going debate in both traditions and particularly in organisation studies offers promising guidelines for dealing with the aforementioned limitations. In the remaining part of this section we will outline the positive contributions of recent research in organisation analysis.

(b) Contributions of the Debate in Organisation Studies to the Study of Public Organisations:

The critique of development administration underlined a need for a broad perspective of public organisations, that accounts for relations between administration and the wider socio-economic system. It also underlined the importance of power and social interests (eg. Loveman, op.cit.) and their manifestations in the policy process (e.g. Tapia Videla, op.cit, and Cleaves, P., 1974). However, there is yet little clarity about how administration-environment relations are structured and how power and social interests impinge on administrative action. The aforementioned debate in organisation studies contained useful insights into the nature of public organisations and their links with their environment. These insights may be classified as relating to concepts and to methodology.
i Concepts

We noted earlier that critics of mainstream organisation theory challenged the view that organisational constructs were objective, scientific categories. Alternatively, they called for the grounding of organisational phenomena i.e., structures, goals, technologies etc. in the activities and practices of participants (Benson, 1977(a), p.6). The import of this critique is that organisational features were socially constructed. Adequate understanding of these features entails, therefore, examining circumstances and processes through which those features were created and sustained.

As research focuses on production and reproduction of organisational reality, issues of power and interests become central to understanding organisations, in contrast to assumptions of intrinsic rational propensities of organisation, predominant in mainstream organisation theory. But the central question is: how do issues of power and interest help explain the organisational phenomenon? Writing from the perspective of radical organisation theory, Benson (1977b) proposed studying an organisation as a social formation with multiple inter-penetrating levels and sectors cutting across organisation-environment boundaries. He introduced two concepts - organisational morphology and substructure - to denote two levels of organisational reality. As one identified components of this

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1. The term radical organisation theory was used by Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) to denote organisation theorists writing from neo-Weberian and Marxist perspectives.
reality at each level it would be possible to study processes whereby the totality of organisational reality was constructed, and to establish the extent to which power and social interests were involved in the process of construction of organisations. For instance, at the level of organisational morphology Benson identified four main aspects of organisational reality:

a - The paradigm commitments of an organisation
   - specifically, its commitment to a domain, a technology and an ideology.

b - The officially recognised and legitimate structural arrangements.

c - The constitution of the organisation ie. bases of participation.

d - The organisation-environment linkages (1977(b) pp.10-12).

Whereas much work in mainstream organisation theory on the above-mentioned features was conducted there was little attention to how they were created and maintained except through reference to rational tendencies of organisations. Benson's approach redirects attention to the role of power and social interests in the process of creation of organisational features. This approach decouples the presumed link between rationality and organisational features and opens up the latter for sociological analysis by grounding them in
the practices of social actors. In this way the concepts we use in identifying and classifying organisational life approximate actual practice and therefore become more accurate in describing organisational reality.

Methodology

In the area of methodology the cited debate raised questions about appropriate units of analysis, number of levels and method of linkage between them.

The assumption of the existence of more than one rationality called for exploring other organisational rationalities or "rules of action". In methodological terms this would involve collecting data from multiple sources i.e. workers, professionals, management, and other sources.

Some of the underlying organisational rationalities were presumed external to the organisation. We noted that critics have recommended that analysis should be extended to the institutional and societal environment. However, there was little agreement among critics as to the appropriate levels of analysis and method of linkage between them.

One approach in this regard was the use of exchange theory in interorganisational studies (eg. Cook, 1977, mentioned in Benson, 1977(a), pp.10,11). This strategy bridged the gap between levels of analysis by breaking complex phenomena - both organisations and networks - into general processes of exchange
of resources between organisational networks. The locus of explanation was shifted from the rational tendencies of organisations to the structure of networks, markets and institutional complexes (Benson, 1977(a), p.10).

Another approach was the use of the Marxist perspective of contradiction between the on-going production of social formations and the established order previously produced (Heydebrand, W., 1977). Attention was focused in this perspective on the process through which specific organisational form was produced, the mechanisms with which it was maintained and its continuous reconstruction. The work of Benson (1977b) cited above, adopted a similar approach toward organisation-environment links. He used the notion of substructure to denote the structure of these links. According to his scheme an organisational sub-structure consisted of:

(1) the non-rationalised sphere of organisational action, linking participants to each other and to the larger social world.

(2) Linkages to the larger social system such as: the bases of recruitment of the organisational elite; the framework of interests in the larger society; the power structure controlling the flow of resources into organisations; ties of the organisation to social class, racial and sexual groups.
(3) The bases of dominance at the inter-organisational level e.g. control over strategic resources, technology, uncertainty etc.

Both of these approaches promised to extend organisational analysis beyond the confines of single organisations. Moreover, they offered specific examples on the possible levels of analyses and about the processes that link between them.

The debate in organisation studies seems, therefore, to have offered certain conceptual and methodological innovations to the study of public organisations in comparison with approaches of mainstream organisation theory and development administration. It brought power and interest to the centre of organisational analysis and therefore made it possible to study organisations in relation to the balance of power and interest in the larger social system. The specific relevance of this debate to this study will be outlined in the following sections of this chapter.

1.2.5 Conclusion

We examined above three approaches to the study of public organisations. The first approach was represented by the work of development administration in the Third World. We outlined its theoretical orientation, policy approach and policy implication. Then we reviewed some of the limitations in that
approach. Theoretically, concepts used were found less capable of accurately describing administrative reality in developing countries. Methodologically research objects were misidentified in some cases, and variables were, in other cases, confined to a single level of policy process. Consequent policy implications tended to foster a central role for bureaucracy in change in comparison to other social institutions and groups.

The second approach was represented by mainstream organisation theory. Contrary to assumptions about the immediate relevance of organisational concepts to the study of development administration we noted certain basic limitations to those concepts. We reviewed criticisms of the conceptual constructs and methods of mainstream organisation theory. We underlined the similarity of these limitations to those noted in the approach of development administration.

The third approach was exemplified by the debate arising from the critique of mainstream organisation theory. Theoretically, the debate focused attention on the production and reproduction of organisational reality and placed power at the centre of analysis. Methodologically, it reformulated the unit of analysis to encompass a variety of processes and institutions outside administrative organisations. The main import of that debate was its attempt to link, in a systematic way, forms, characteristics and practices of organisations to the wider environment.
1.3 BUREAUCRACY, STATE AND SOCIETY

1.3.1 General

We noted in the preceding section that a pluralist perspective of society and polity basically underpinned the work of development administration and its policy analysis.

In this section we will examine the conception of bureaucracy and policy analysis in another tradition - Marxist theory of the state. Firstly, we will argue that this tradition exhibits some of the limitations of the pluralist perspective, namely that constraints on policy act externally upon bureaucracy. We take issue with the implicit assumption in Marxist political theory about the neutrality of administrative techniques, and the view that public policy can only be adequately explained in relation to class conflict external to the state apparatus.

Secondly, we will consider some of the recent advances in social theory beyond the Marxist conception of bureaucracy. We will argue that the trend of "urban managerialism", research in radical organisation theory, and the debate in German political studies offer important contributions toward understanding the role bureaucracy plays in mediating social interests in state policy. The work of Claus Offe and radical organisation theorists, in particular, contained ingredients of an approach to the study of constraints on policy implementation. This approach would aim at relating broad structural and micro aspects of policy together in a systematic analysis in order
to delineate processes and points where constraints on policy are likely to occur.

1.3.2 Marxist Perspective of Bureaucracy

Marxist conceptions of bureaucracy basically derive from Marxist theory of the state. Two perspectives of the state characterise contemporary Marxist theory: the "instrumentalist" and "structuralist" perspectives. The former perspective sees the state as an "instrument" of the ruling class. While admitting of "structural" constraints on state policy, this perspective frequently infers the nature of state policy from the class character of state personnel (eg. Miliband, R., 1969, p.67).

The "structuralist" perspective, on the other hand, also sees the state as acting in the interests of the dominant class. However, this is seen not because of a conscious action either by dominant class or by state personnel, but basically due to the logic of the system (eg. Poulantzas, N., 1973, p.245). According to this latter perspective, state policy is explicable neither in terms of state structure nor in relation to the class character of its personnel. State actions can only be explained in relation to the whole political economy and the "objective" relation between the state and the bourgeois class.
These two versions of state theory generate different approaches to policy process and to the notion of bureaucracy. To the extent that the determinants of state policy are located outside state institutions, the "structuralist" perspective contains little room for institutional analysis of policy formation or of the role of bureaucracy in that process. The "instrumentalist" perspective, on the other hand, implies a conception of bureaucracy akin to the "classic" Marxist view that bureaucracy is a means by which dominant class interests are maintained.

In fact, Marx developed no explicit theory of bureaucracy (Perez-Diaz, 1978, p.85). Generally, he viewed bureaucracy in its political rather than industrial setting. As an aspect of bourgeois administration, bureaucracy was seen both as a manifestation of the centralising tendencies of capitalism and as an instrument of class domination (Hearn, P., 1978, p.39). The dynamics of modern bureaucracy received little attention in Marx's critique of industrial capitalism.

It was left to Lenin to present a complete theory of the state and bureaucracy. In his 'The State and Revolution' Lenin adopted two notions of bureaucracy. In the first one, he perceived bureaucracy as a political structure through which capitalist class ruled. In this sense, Lenin clearly adopted the "classic" Marxian conception of bureaucracy. In the second notion, bureaucracy denoted technical administration. Here Lenin differentiated between the roles of bureaucrats and those of technical experts (Wright, E., 1974, p.87). The former
group was associated with political control and domination in the capitalist state, whereas the latter was seen as socially neutral, at least during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. Lenin wrote: "The question of control and accounting (presumably the function of bureaucrats) should not be confused with the question of the scientifically trained staff of engineers, agronomists and so on. These gentlemen are working today in obedience to the wishes of capitalist, and will work even better tomorrow in obedience to the wishes of the armed workers" (Lenin, 1949, p.96).

Generally, the two notions of bureaucracy noted above remained, until recently, central to Marxist analysis of bureaucracy and public policy. The notion of bureaucracy as a political structure of domination was predominant and often directed research to the class positions of bureaucrats, away from the internal structure of the state.¹ Analysis of state policy mostly focused either on the class character of state personnel or on the limits on policy set by "structural" aspects in the social formation.

Limitations of the Marxist Perspective of Bureaucracy

The Marxist conception of bureaucracy, outlined above, contains a number of interrelated limitations. These relate to assumptions about the determinants of state policy e.g. class origins of bureaucrats, that administrative technology is

socially neutral, and that an ownership/non-ownership of means of production dichotomy is adequate to explain problems of power and conflict in organisations.

The first limitation concerns the assumption that the class origins of bureaucracy partly determined state policy. ¹ To support this assumption the link between the class character of the state, including bureaucracy, and dominant societal interests must be convincingly established. Mechanisms that relate political action to economic classes and limits on state action need to be specified. However, the "instrumentalist" perspective neither identified clearly these mechanisms nor specified how they defined and limited the range and form of possible class action (Esping-Anderson et al., 1976, pp.187-190).

The underlying notion of bureaucracy as a political structure of domination largely distracted research from considering the internal organisation of the state as a possible medium of class interest. Adopting a one-dimensional view of bureaucracy, Marxist analysis was unable to establish empirically how bureaucracy acted in the interest of dominant classes.

A second limitation in the Marxist conception of bureaucracy was the implicit assumption that administrative technology was neutral. This view is implicit in Lenin's work cited above.²

1. Miliband explained the bias in function of the state as the necessary consequences of (a) the class background of state personnel, (b) the power of business interests over state personnel, and (c) the structural constraints imposed by the mode of production (Miliband, 1977, pp.73,74).

2. Hearn, F. noted that this particular view of organisational technology was used in the Soviet Union to justify the incorporation of technical achievements of capitalism, ranging from modern industrial technology to managerial programmes of labour discipline, developed by Taylor (1978, p.41).
The critiques of development administration (Section 1.2.3(a)) and those of mainstream organisation theory, (Section 1.2.4(a)), showed that administrative technology was socially constructed and could well be seen as:

"tactics and resources in a political struggle open and available to controllers of the means of production and reproduction" (Clegg, S. and Dunkerley, D., 1980, p.547).

According to this view, administrative techniques, planning models, and organisational designs can mediate social interests which may, in turn, constrain state policy. Thus it was not simply the class affiliations of bureaucrats that extended social interests into policy; institutional structures, policy processes and policy models could be more effective in carrying and sustaining social interests.

The above Marxist perspective of bureaucracy developed in connection with the relation of the state to dominant classes. Marx's analysis did not cover the division of labour in organisations (Ibid, p.485). Given the absence of a Marxist theory of organisational contradictions, problems in organisations were explained solely in terms of a theory of social or system contradictions. But class analysis based on the notion of ownership of means of production was inadequate for understanding problems of organisational conflict and analysing the complex relations between various groups in organisations (Salaman, G., 1981, pp.219-225). The notion of organisational technology as a socially neutral phenomenon precluded Marxist analysis from perceiving major organisational characteristics as arenas of
social conflict and pivots of organisational contradictions.

The above limitation in the Marxist conception of bureaucracy distanced Marxist analysis from organisational studies for a long time. Underestimating the propensity of institutional structures and processes to mediate social interests, Marxist analysis excluded the internal organisation of the state from its explanations of state policy; and focused entirely on class conflict outside the state. This limitation, partly, made it difficult to build causal explanations of links between state policy and social structure.

1.3.3 Materiality of the State Apparatus and Mediation of Interests:

We underlined in Section (1.2) above the tendency in development administration and mainstream organisation theory to treat public organisations in isolation from the social contradictions in which they were embedded. Then we noted in this section the limitations in the Marxist conception of bureaucracy and the associated difficulty in Marxist analysis of conceiving the state internal structure as a determinant of state policy. Given these two positions, what is needed is a systematic understanding of the relationship of social structure to the internal organisational processes of the state (Wright, op.cit. p.103). On the one hand, we need to delineate the limits that social structure sets for state action; on the other hand, we must identify the processes through which such limits operate in practice to influence
state policy.

It is our view that both "classic" Marxist and pluralist perspectives provided little contribution toward integrating macro and micro aspects of policy. Recent developments in social theory provided certain insights into the relation between social structure and state apparatus. These insights derived from three different traditions in social theory: "urban managerialism", radical organisation theory and German political studies. We will now consider each of them below.

(a) "Urban Managerialism"

"Urban managerialism" is a variant of British urban sociology that derived mainly out of Weber's political sociology (Saunders, op.cit. p.166). The early thesis of "Urban managerialism" postulated that the actions of urban managers mediated and reinforced urban inequalities (Pahl, R., 1975, p.201). This argument directed attention to the study of attitudes and motives of managers who were considered as major determinants of urban policy. However, this argument was criticised for failing to take adequate account of the context of constraints in which urban management decisions were made (Norman, 1975). In a subsequent reformulation, Pahl suggested that the study of urban managers should be based on a specific theory of the state and should take explicit account of the internal structure of the state and of its external relationship with the private sector (Saunders, op.cit. pp.168, 169).

1. Pahl adopted a corporationist theory of the state in which bureaucrats played a crucial mediating role between state and capital (ibid).
By bringing the motives and orientations of bureaucrats to the fore of analysis, as possible carriers of social interests and, therefore, likely mediums for constraints on policy, "urban managerialism" clearly went a step forward beyond the position of development administration, reviewed in the preceding section. For in the latter tradition, the motives and attitudes of bureaucrats were only considered in cultural terms in relation to the impact of culture on "efficiency". They were not considered as vehicles for social interests.

Notwithstanding its noted inadequacies, "urban managerialism" has been useful in drawing attention to organisational ideology (managers' motives and value assumptions) as likely mediums for mediating and sustaining social interests in policy process. However, "urban managerialism" did not elaborate on how such "ideological" orientations corresponded to organisational forms and processes and therefore, how they operated to include or exclude other social interests. This inadequacy was met in the work of radical organisation theory.

(b) Radical Organisation Theory

Radical organisation theory evolved as part of the critique of mainstream organisation theory which we outlined in section (1.2.4(a)) above. The central argument of radical organisation theorists was that organisations should be studied as social formations that were part of a wider social system (eg. Heydebrand, op.cit.). Organisational characteristics such as goals,
hierarchies, technologies etc. were to be seen as socially constructed devices that were capable of reflecting patterns of interactions, conflict and balance of power within organisations and between them and society.

This approach to organisation makes it possible to develop the argument about the incidence of social interests in the state apparatus beyond the Marxist "instrumentalist" position and beyond that of "urban managerialism". This is because in the perspective of radical organisation theory the focus of analysis was extended from class affiliations and the motives of managers to the internal processes of state organisation. As the issue of power was central to this perspective, major organisational features were seen as tactics and resources in a contest between social interests inside and outside organisations. In this sense, a study of the impact of interests on policy must extend beyond the motives and class origins of bureaucrats to analyse the social content of organisational goals, design, technology and policy models.

A major test facing radical organisational analysis is how to relate the analysis of power and conflict in organisations to wider societal contradictions. While certain tentative proposals were made (eg. Heydebrand op.cit., Benson, op.cit., Goldman and Van Houten, 1977) the field was still in embryonic form.¹ A major difficulty was the underdevelopment of the Marxist theory of the state apparatus as we pointed out earlier in this section. The work of the German sociologist

¹ Also see Clegg, S., and Dunkerley, D., 1980, Ch.13.
Claus Offe went some way toward dealing with the relation between social structure and political action, as we explain below.

(c) German Political Studies

Difficulties in Marxist analysis to show the links between state action and social structure generated an increasing concern among Marxists with the state apparatus. Instead of being treated as a passive tool of dominant classes, recent research has addressed the state structure as a sphere of class conflict (Asping-Anderson, op.cit., O'Connor, 1973; Therborn, 1978). This emerging approach introduced two important modifications in the "classic" Marxist conception of bureaucracy: First, it elevated the state apparatus from the status of a tool and gave it a form of material existence that allowed it to shape and become shaped by class conflict. Second, it brought the internal organisational dynamics of the state into the sphere of class analysis, opening up questions about how they relate to "structural" constraints deriving from the social formation.

This new approach to the state apparatus is found in the work of Claus Offe (1972, 1974, 1975, 1976). Offe attempted to analyse the extent to which the internal structure of the state permitted it to pursue the interests of capital. He distinguished between the allocation and production functions of the state (ibid, 1975, p.128). The former functions corresponded to the state's traditional role in distributing resources
such as roads, police and education. The latter referred to the state's direct involvement in the production process. Both functions supported the process of private accumulation. But they differed in the way policies were made for either of them. Allocative policies were subject to direct political conflict and therefore "instrumental" in character. However, production policies cannot be made in the same way, i.e. in response to direct political pressures. This is because the demands of the powerful groups were not necessarily consistent with the sorts of policies necessary for ensuring continued accumulation.\(^1\) The state must, therefore, devise its own criteria for production policies. The origin of these policies, thus, becomes internal to the organisation of the state (Saunders, op.cit. p.175).

The work of Offe draws attention to policy models, policy processes and organisational designs as important determinants of state policy. For instance, he identified three policy models that were available for the state in making its production decisions: the bureaucratic model, rational planning model and political conflict/consensus model (Offe, 1975, p.175). Being the immediate determinants of the state policy the study of these models should help explain how state action relates to the social structure and to the dominant interests.

The role of the internal organisation of the state in shaping state policy acquires significance in the context of the postcolonial state. Given the fragmented nature and

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1. For instance, nationalisation of certain industries might be in the long term interest of private accumulation but against immediate interests of some capitalists.
heterogeneity of the social structure in these societies, it is difficult to identify an economically dominant class.\(^1\) Offe's above distinction in the policy process between allocative and production policies becomes less important as the state assumes a high degree of autonomy, and, in Miliband's words, almost become a "state for itself" (Miliband, R., 1977, p.109). Under these circumstances the relation between economic and political power is inverted:

"It is not economic power ... which shapes political decision making ... it is rather political power... which provides the basis for the formation of an economically powerful class, which may in due course become an economically dominant one" (ibid, pp.108, 109).

The expansive role of the state in post-colonial societies gives its internal organisation a wide ranging influence over both allocative and production policies. As Leys observed, the more of the total volume of surplus value which the state directly appropriated, the more it was likely to be immediately involved in the class struggle (1976, p.42). This involvement must be empirically established via analysing the internal organisational dynamics and exploring their class content.

The import of Offe's work is that the state-apparatus was an important arena for class conflict. "Structural" limits on state policy that derive from the nature of the social formation were not, then, external to the state organisation but internal to it (Batley, R., 1980, pp.26-30). These limits must

\(^1\) According to Leys, C., the dominant class in post-colonial African societies was still the foreign bourgeoisie (1976, p.44).
be sought in the dynamics of the state organisation. Within the internal organisation of the state, Offe's analysis focused only on policy models as important explanatory variables of state policy, but recent research emphasised the need to look at the whole organisational framework and establish how it...

"defines the included interests and how they are related, and thus sets limits on the action and perceptions of participants". (Batley, op. cit. p.29).

The research on radical organisation theory went some way in exploring how power and interest operate within organisations, as we explained in subsections (1.2.4(b) and 1.3.3(b)) above. Used in conjunction with Offe's approach, it would make it possible to identify and analyse constraints on state policy at different levels of the policy process. Such analysis would have to make use of the vast literature on development administration and mainstream organisation theory.

The proposed approach would aim at making up for the limitations in the study of public organisations which we have reviewed above. Important in this respect is the need to integrate macro and micro levels of policy analysis, and at the same time provide causal explanations of state policy. Thus, at the macro level we need to attend to relevant economic and political processes that relate to the policy under study. We then need to consider how these macro level processes translate, in institutional terms, into policy models, organisational structures and policy processes. At a micro level we should
investigate the extent to which macro-level limits on policy are produced (or not) in the daily routines of agencies, their members and their clients. An outline of this approach as it applies to our research problem is presented in the following section.

1.3.4 Conclusion

We focused in this section on the relation between bureaucracy state and social structure. First, we examined the conception of bureaucracy in the Marxist theory of the state and identified two views of bureaucracy implicit in "classic" Marxist writings. The notion of bureaucracy as a political structure of domination remained central to Marxist policy analysis. We underlined three main limitations in the Marxist conception of bureaucracy. We argued that these limitations precluded Marxist analysis from linking political action to social structure. The link between the two remained largely presumed rather than empirically established.

Secondly, we reviewed some of the relevant recent advances in social theory that contributed toward overcoming limitations in the study of public policy. These contributions came from "urban managerialism", radical organisation theory and German political studies. They served to illuminate the importance of the internal organisation of the state in the process of policy formation. More importantly, they offered useful insights into the mechanisms and processes through which social interests impinge on state policy. The import of these
contributions was that social interests act upon policy institutions and processes, not externally, but from within the state apparatus. Thus, in order to examine the impact of interests on public policy the internal organisation of the state should be analysed.

1.4 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM: LIMITS ON ACCESS TO RESIDENTIAL LAND IN GREATER KHARTOUM - SUDAN

1.4.1 Defining the Problem:

The object of this study is the implementation process of urban social policy in the Sudan. The specific focus is the limits on the access of different urban groups to residential land. Urban housing policy in the Sudan is essentially about providing access for all families to a "standard" level of housing.¹ Limits on access are seen, by this study, as a reflection of the existence of specific constraints on housing policy. Our objective, therefore, is to seek to (a) identify these constraints, (b) locate their sources, and (c) explain the mechanisms through which they operate to limit access to residential land.

We advance two propositions on the nature and incidence of limits on access to residential land in Greater Khartoum:

(a) Constraints on urban housing are explicable in relation to the national model of policy formation.

Analysis of ideological orientations, social content, and institutional features of the policy model would help identify and locate sources of constraints on housing policy.

(b) Limits on access can be traced to the organisational structures, technology, and ideology of housing agencies. These agencies mediate macro-level constraints on housing policy but also generate secondary limits on access at the points of distribution of residential land.

1.4.2 Frame of Analysis

Whereas limits on equal access can be observed at the distribution points of residential land, sources of constraints on policy and their mechanisms are not necessarily explicable at the same level of the incidence of limitations on access. Thus, in order to encompass the various institutions and processes involved, we need to adopt a broad frame of analysis. We conduct this study at three levels of analyses as diagram 1.1 illustrates.

At a macro-policy level, we will analyse the dominant policy model in the Sudan in the light of the regime's ideology, the institutional organisation of the state and the social character of the policy-making machine. We argue in Chapter Two that the prevailing policy model generates specific social and regional disparities that circumscribe housing policy.
Constraints on the Administration of Access to Urban Residence and their Underlying Mechanisms in the Sudan

The State

Technocratic planning models
Political and economic support

National Political economy

Urban Political Economy

The State

Technocratic planning models
Political and economic support

National Political economy

Urban Political Economy

Bureaucracy

Generation of constraints

Elite recruitment
Ideology
Rewards

Urban Political Economy

Systemic constraints:

1. Stratification of access
2. Preferential treatment for bureaucracy
3. Land commercialisation
4. Rationalisation of urban services on cost-effective basis

Allocation structure:
- Land, planning and services delivery regulations

Secondary constraints:

1. Political intervention in implementation decisions
2. Political control over access
3. Differential resources of applicants
4. Local network of clientele relationships - esp. with local bureaucracy

Implementation at project level
At a middle-range level of analysis, we will consider the direct link between the dominant policy model and housing problems in Greater Khartoum. Three dimensions of this link will be explored: (a) the relation between national economic policy, migration, urban growth and their impact on urban housing. (b) The impact of the policy of land commercialisation on housing in Greater Khartoum. These two dimensions will be examined in Chapter Four. (c) The trend toward rationalising urban services on a cost-effective basis and its impact on access to municipal services associated with housing. This point will be considered in Chapter Five.

At a micro policy level, we examine closely the concrete limits on access to land by analysing the structure, technology and processes of housing agencies. We hope to be able to identify at this level of analysis limits on access deriving from macro-level constraints from those generated by secondary constraints - of a non-structural nature. This analysis will be presented in Chapters Five and Six.

Finally, we attempt to integrate various levels of analysis in Chapter Seven, and outline how constraints occurring at a macro-policy level are internalised in the organisational structures of housing agencies and limit the access of certain groups of applicants to residential land.
1.5 GENERAL CONCLUSION

We noted at the beginning of this chapter the significance of implementation studies in the Third World and underlined the inadequacy of dominant perspectives. An examination of these limitations was conducted in the second and third sections of the chapter.

In the second section we examined the perspective of development administration and identified its limitations. These related to conceptual formulations, methodology and policy implications. In terms of its policy implications, development administration was criticised for: (a) its support for a central role for bureaucracy in change; (b) the belief in the non-compatibility of politics and conflict with development, and (c) the tendency to substitute "technocracy" for politics. Explanations of constraints on implementation in that tradition were inadequate, because they either concentrated on a single level of analysis or neglected issues of power and social conflict in multi-level analysis.

We considered in the same section the relevance of organisational analysis to the study of policy problems in the Third World and the extent to which it may provide for the limitations we noted in development administration. Reviewing the literature, we noted the critique of mainstream organisation theory. There were specific objections to its conceptual constructs and research methods. However, the debate generated in the course of that critique offered promising guidelines
toward overcoming the limitations cited above. The import of the debate was that it placed political power at the centre of analysis and reformulated the unit of analysis to encompass a variety of institutions and processes outside administrative organisations.

The link between political power and implementation was considered in the third section. Firstly, we examined the conception of bureaucracy in the Marxist theory of the state. The notion of bureaucracy as a structure of political domination was pervasive in Marxist analysis. We underlined three limitations in that conception of bureaucracy, relating to the determinants of policy, the neutrality of organisational technology, and the adequacy of a two-class model for organisational analysis. We argued that these limitations partly underlined the difficulty of Marxist analysis to account for the link between the state action and social structure.

Secondly, we considered some of the relevant advances in social theory and their contributions to the study of public policy. We outlined the relevance of works from "urban managerialism", radical organisation theory and German political studies. We emphasised the contribution of Claus Offe's work in underlining the importance of the state apparatus in policy formation. Both Offe's work and that of radical organisation theorists contained important elements of an approach to the study of constraints on policy implementation. The proposed framework is intended to integrate the macro and micro aspects of state policy, in a systematic analysis, in order to
delineate processes and points where constraints occur.

Finally, we outlined in the fourth section, the research problem to be addressed by this study and presented a framework for analysis to be used in the study of the limits on access to residential land in Greater Khartoum, Sudan.
CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SUDAN

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an overview of the political economy of the Sudan. It consists of two parts.

In the first part we will trace the evolution of the economy through its precapitalist and capitalist phases. Special attention will be focused on the process of the transformation of the economic structure under the Condominium rule and the ascendancy of the capitalist mode of production. Then we will proceed to outline the dominant features of the post-colonial economy, both its pre-capitalist and capitalist forms. We will focus on four main sectors of the capitalist economy: agriculture, industry, trade, and transport and communications. It will be shown that the state's involvement in the economy has risen markedly during the 1970s. We will conclude by highlighting major structural weaknesses in the economy.

We will address, in the second part of the chapter, the relation between dominant economic interests and the state in Sudan. We will pose the question of how dominant interests influence public policy. In the process of examining this issue we will outline the significance of the institutional approach to policy analysis - within a broad structural framework.
2.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY

2.2.1 General

The Sudan is the largest country in Africa, with an area of 2.5 million km$^2$. Its soils are sandy in the North, clayey in Central Sudan and lateritic in the South. Of its total area of 598 million feddans about 200 million feddans are potentially arable land. Only 20 million feddans were actually under cultivation. Annual rainfall ranges from virtually none in the North to about 120 cm in the South. The River Nile dominates the landscape running through the country for 2.5 thousand miles from south to north. It has two main tributaries; the White Nile originates in Lake Victoria in Uganda, and joins the Blue Nile, which comes from the Ethiopian Highlands, in Khartoum. The population of the country was put at 18.3 million in 1980.

We will address in this section the main characteristics of the economy. First, we will trace the evolution of the present structure of the economy. Then we will outline the main sectors of the post-colonial economy. We will conclude by underlining structural weaknesses in the economy.

2.2.2 Colonialism and the Structuring of the Economy

The present structure of the Sudanese economy has developed through a long process dating back to the Middle Ages. Its process of evolution may be conveniently divided

1. Feddan = 1.038 acres = 0.42 hectares.
into two main periods: the pre-capitalist and the capitalist.

(a) **The Pre-Capitalist Phase:**

The pre-capitalist phase can be dated to the earliest Sudanese Kingdom of Napata (725 BC - 350 AD). The economy was then based on animal husbandry and farming, and production was for use value (Khalafalla, E., 1981, p.31). The structure of the Napatian economy persisted under the subsequent Nubian kingdoms. After a long period of political decay, those kingdoms collapsed during the fourteenth century.

The Nubian kingdoms were succeeded by the Islamic Sultanates of Funi, Musba'at and Fur in central and western Sudan. That period (approximately 1300 - 1600) witnessed large movements of Arab nomadic tribes into the country, which increased pressure on free fertile land. Feudal relations of production progressively increased (El-Tayeb, G., 1984, p.26). The population movements stimulated trade and the spread of commodity exchange.

The basic structure of the economy persisted to the 19th Century, when the Egyptians conquered the Sudan in 1820. The Turco-Egyptian rule (1821-1882) marked the first large scale incorporation of the economy into the world market through progressive increase of imports and exports and the emergence of wage labour, mainly in agriculture but also in commerce and services (El-Tayeb, op.cit., pp. 26,27). Despite

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1. But no land-owning class succeeded in consolidating its power (Khalafalla, op.cit., p.43).
these developments production structures remained essentially feudal.¹

A politico-religious revolution liberated the Sudan from the Turco-Egyptian domination and established an independent Sudanese state – the Mahdist state (1882-1898). The productive forces of the Mahdist state were superior to those of the Funj and Fur Sultanets (Adam, F., 1977, p.38).² But the feudal mode of production remained.

By the turn of the century the dominant mode of production was peasant farming, occasionally intermingled with slavery or share-cropping relations (Khalafalla, op.cit., p.43). The family was the unit of production and consumption. Land was largely collectively owned, with private ownership confined to riverain areas. Simple commodity production was minimal and exchange and money circulation were limited.

(b) The Capitalist Phase:

An Anglo-Egyptian military campaign overthrew the Mahdist state and established Condominium rule (1898-1956). The new regime introduced fundamental changes in the structure of the economy and created new forms of economic organisation. Arrangements resulting from those changes became

¹. The Turco-Egyptian rule was a mere pre-capitalist imperialism that adopted a process of primitive accumulation similar to that of the European Mercantilism (Amin, S., 1976, mentioned in ibid, p.32).

². Methods of cultivation improved allowing the expansion of irrigable areas by the main Nile. Handicrafts and small factories started to develop and commerce made great progress (ibid).
the basis for the post-colonial economy. It is, therefore, imperative to outline broadly those changes.

i. The Structure of the Economy

The main economic objectives of British colonial rule in the Sudan were to exploit the natural resources of the country for the provision of raw materials to British industries and to expand domestic market for the sale of British products. The realisation of these aims necessitated changing the pre-capitalist economic order and the synthesis of a new economic structure. Thus, two strategies were adopted by the new regime: the geographical extension of both feudal and capitalist modes of production into the most backward areas of the country; and the expansion and intensification of capitalist relations of production in the less depressed parts (El-Tayeb, op.cit., p.27).

A number of policy measures were initiated to facilitate changes in the structure of the economy. To begin with, the land tenure system was detrimental to the intended changes. A series of land reforms were initiated, beginning in 1899, to release land for capitalist investment. Land in the Gezira area of central Sudan was compulsorily leased by the government.¹ Riverain lands in Northern and Khartoum provinces were mostly recognised as private ownership; and central rain-belt lands were considered government land under communal use.

¹. The Gezira Land Ordinance 1921 was introduced for that purpose. The price paid to peasants was 10 piastre per feddann and the duration of the lease was forty years.
The structuring of the economy along capitalist lines adopted three main patterns: the monetisation of the economy, direct capitalist investment, and incorporation in the world capitalist market.

Monetisation of a pre-capitalist economy is necessary for its integration in a capitalist one (Ake, C., 1981, p.32). Although a market economy existed in Sudan prior to the Condominium, money circulation and commodity exchange were limited. Imposition of taxation and promotion of imported consumer goods were part of the policy measures the new regime used to expand the money economy. A top priority was given to developing infrastructure. The early development of transport and communications enhanced the expansion of commodity exchange and money circulation.

The process of monetisation went hand in hand with the spread of capitalist relations of production. A large-scale capitalist investment, the Gezira Scheme, was inaugurated in the Blue Nile Province in 1925. It was financed by British public and private capital to secure an adequate supply of long staple cotton for the British textile industry, which was facing increasing competition from the United States, Germany and Japan (Barnett, 1975). The mode of production, which has rested on the agrarian relations devised by the Gezira Land Ordinance 1927, was capitalist (Kursany, I.,

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1. Between 1899 and 1918 the government spent 76.3% of total public expenditure on the transport sector (Osman, O., 1960 mentioned in El-Hassan, 1976, p.14).

2. The scheme began with 26,000 tenancies on an area of 80,000 feddans.
1982 (I), p.16). The new system of production relations was adopted in all succeeding cotton schemes in the country.

Introduction of cotton as the major cash crop oriented the economy to export production and restructured the country's economic relation with the international market. Government revenue came to depend heavily on the cotton trade. As the government was the largest entrepreneur in the country, dependency on cotton made the logic of the Sudanese economy closely geared to the needs and strategies of international capital. The integration of the colonial economy into the international capitalist market reinforced the country's specialisation in primary products, and enhanced the expansion of capitalist relations of production into the non-capitalist sectors of the national economy. It was in response to the international market that colonial capital facilitated the production of oil seed and sorghum under capitalist relations of production.

Parallel to the process of establishing capitalist relations of production in central Sudan, the colonial policy reconstructed and consolidated pre-capitalist relations in remote areas of the country. The policy of "indirect rule" or "native administration" gave the rural elite important powers over population and natural resources,

1. The scheme operated according to a tripartite arrangement between the government, the management and the tenants (see Section 2.2.3 below). The initial allocation of tenancies stratified peasants into rich, middle and poor and helped thereby to accelerate differentiation among them (see Adam, op.cit., p.40).
2. For further details on this process, see Mahmoud, F., 1984, Chapter Two.
allowing them to reconstruct feudal relations through administrative means (Adam, F., op.cit., p.39). A form of semi-feudal relations was noted in Southern Sudan where agriculturalists and pastoralists gained access to land through tribal rights and either worked on the land for their local leaders or paid them part of their own product (El-Tayeb, op.cit., p.29).

The preservation of pre-capitalist relations was instrumental to the process of capital accumulation in two ways: first, it provided a reserve army of labour for the capitalist economy. Second, it contributed to the reproduction of labour by bearing the cost of maintaining the families of migrant labour.

ii. New Forms of Economic Organisation

The above process of economic transformation, under the second colonial state, provided for new organisational forms where the public sector assumed a leading role in capitalist production, with private (foreign) capital concentrating on distribution and circulation levels.

1. This policy gave tribal chiefs tax and judicial powers under the Power of Nomads Sheikhs Ordinance 1922 and the Power of Sheikhs Ordinance 1927 (see Bakheit, G., 1974, in Howell, J., 1974, pp.45-64).

2. Asad depicted a similar process in Western Sudan: "Among the pastoral Kababish livestock is owned by individuals and managed by households, while grazing and water points are collectively owned resources. The collective process of production ... make available a surplus which is partly appropriated by Awlad Fadlallah rulers (i.e. by native administration). In other words, the elite does not contribute uniquely to the collective process of production, i.e. to the basic means of existence- but it does appropriate a privileged portion of the collective surplus" (Asad, T., 1972, quoted by Khalafalla, op.cit., p.44).
According to Khalafalla (1981) private foreign capital made a few attempts to establish plantation enclaves, but without success. This failure prompted the government to initiate, in conjunction with private foreign capital, large-scale capitalist schemes such as Gezira. The colonial government, thus, emerged as a large capitalist entrepreneur, investing in production and hiring wage labour. This leading role in the economy predetermined, to a large extent, the future economic role of the post-colonial state, as we explain below.

Private (foreign) capital operated mainly in commerce and finance. In her study of the business class in Sudan (1978) Mahmoud found that foreigners and foreign companies dominated the import-export trade throughout the colonial period.¹ Their control over trade was facilitated by the availability of finance from branches of foreign banks in Sudan. The first Sudanese bank was established after independence.

Industrial development was blocked by Condominium government until the outbreak of the Second World War. The underlying policy was to keep the country as a market for British manufactured goods (Mahmoud, 1984, Ch.3).² War conditions necessitated establishing certain local industries to supply

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¹ A Sudan Directory (1921) showed that out of 259 prominent business firms in the Sudan only one was owned by a Sudanese (mentioned by Khalafalla, op.cit., p.47).
² However, intensification of cotton production led to the establishment of cotton ginning factories, and by 1933 there were some 21 ginneries in the country (Nimeiri, S., in El-Hassan, 1976, p.77).
goods which could not be imported. But failing to withstand competition from imported goods after the War most of those industries closed down.

To recapitulate, the second colonial state introduced a radical change in the structure of the economy. It created a new agrarian structure based on capitalist relations of production and closely linked to international capital. It also extended feudal and capitalist relations into the backward regions of the country. These changes generated new organisational forms of production. The public sector assumed a leading role in capitalist production and private capital operated mainly at the distribution and circulation levels of the economy.

2.2.3 The Post-Colonial Economy

The post-colonial state inherited an economy combining several modes of production. According to El-Tayeb the Sudanese social formation ...

"exhibits a combination of a primitive mode of appropriation of nature, ... a feudal mode of appropriation of surplus labour ..., and a capitalist mode of appropriation " (El-Tayeb, op.cit., p.29).

The capitalist mode of production is the dominant one, as we explain below, and has been progressively incorporating the feudal and petty commodity modes. To outline the dominant features of the post-colonial economy we shall classify
forms of production into capitalist and non-capitalist. We will then highlight the main economic activities undertaken in either mode, according to economic sector and ownership of capital wherever possible.

(a) **Non-Capitalist Forms of Production:**

Non-capitalist forms of production in the Sudan are often associated with what is commonly known as the "traditional" sector of the economy. Two forms of production are identified under this mode: primitive appropriation of nature and petty commodity production.

The former type refers to the production of crops and animals for subsistence, with very limited circulation of money, commodities or labour. This type of activity exists in some parts of the Southern Region, but there is no reliable information on the exact population involved in primitive appropriation activities.

Petty commodity production can be distinguished from primitive appropriation by the former's relative proximity to the market economy, though subsistence is the prime goal of production. This form of production is characteristic of small-scale agriculture and animal husbandry in Southern

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1. For objections to the use of the term "traditional" to describe non-capitalist economic activities in Sudan see Mahmoud, op.cit., pp.18,19.
2. In Southern Sudan, households' own produce provided 66% of their cereal consumption, 60% of their meat consumption, 80% of eggs and milk consumption, and 66% of vegetable and fruit consumption (Khalifa, A., in El-Hassan, op.cit., p.201).
and Western Sudan. The family is the basic unit of production. Primitive cultivation methods are used, with hand implements rather than mechanical ones and with little or no inputs of fertiliser or pesticides (ILO, 1976, pp.35,36).

These forms of non-capitalist production have also encapsulated elements of feudal relations of production in the form of the exchange of labour power for access to land (El-Tayeb, op.cit.). We have already cited typical examples in Section 2.2.2(b) above.

The aforementioned pre-capitalist forms of production do not exist in pure form. They are being increasingly modified and incorporated in the capitalist mode of production. At the level of production, communal ownership of land is giving way to individual ownership in the wake of an increasing expansion in capitalist agriculture, as we explain in the following section. The extended family is disintegrating and communal relations are continuously individualised (ibid, p.30). At the level of distribution and exchange, the produce of the non-capitalist economy is integrated within the capitalist market through merchant capital activities and taxation (Mahmoud, op.cit. pp.20-22). Commercialisation of livestock production was stepped up during the 1970s, as foreign capital started investing in animal fattening, fodder and meat production in central and western Sudan.
(b) Capitalist Production

The structure of the colonial economy in general and the leading role of the public sector in particular were sustained in the post-independence period. The main development was the slowing down of accumulation towards the late 1960s and the subsequent rise of state capital during the 1970s, in conjunction with international capital. In what follows, we will delineate major sectors of the capitalist economy.

Agriculture

Agriculture is the dominant economic sector; it contributed 38% to GDP, absorbed 79.9% of the population, and provided 50% of government revenue and 95% of exports in 1973/74 (El-Hassan, op.cit., p.5). Agricultural production is practiced under two main forms: irrigated and mechanised agriculture.

(i) Irrigated Agriculture

This constitutes 20% of the total area under cultivation. The post-independence period witnessed a marked expansion in irrigated agriculture, increasing from 628,815 feddans in 1955/56 to over two million feddans in 1973/74. Three main features characterise irrigated agriculture: dominance of the public sector, specialisation in cotton production, and concentration in central Sudan. Expansion in acreage during
the 1950s and the 1960s reinforced these features.

A major post-independence development in this respect was the construction of Managil Extension (800,000 feddans) of the Gezira scheme in 1957, which brought the total area of the scheme to two million feddans. The scheme is managed by a public corporation, the Sudan Gezira Board (SGB).\(^1\) It has some 96,000 tenant farmers and usually attracts much more labour during the picking season.\(^2\) Seasonal labour comes mainly from the western provinces of Kordofan and Darfur.

Public sector investment in irrigated agriculture increased during the 1960s by the construction of Kashm el-Girba scheme (450,000 feddans) in 1964 and the "nationalisation" of the pump-irrigated schemes (700,000 feddans) on the White Nile and the Blue Nile in 1967.\(^3\)

1. Production is organised by a tripartite arrangement. The SGB manages the planting programme for tenants and provides services such as irrigation, ploughing, spraying, part of the cost of labour, and ginning and marketing of the cotton crop. These costs are debited to a "joint account" which is fed by income from the cotton crop only. The tenants supply their own labour, some of the hired labour and some of the mechanised services, and market all crops other than cotton. The proceeds are divided, giving 49% to the tenant, 10% to the SGB and 41% to various government accounts (ILO, op.cit., p.48). For a critical assessment of this arrangement see Kursany I, 1982(I).

2. In 1973/74 season a total of 542,000 people were engaged in cotton picking. Out of this total, 139,000 were tenants and members of their families, 57,000 were resident labour, 9,000 were casual labour, and 330,000 were migrant labourers (ILO, op.cit., p.258).

3. For events leading to this "nationalisation" see Section 2.3.3(a) below.
More than half of the irrigated area is under cotton cultivation (Abdel-Salam in El-Hassan, op.cit., p.45). Wheat and sugar cane were also introduced. Cotton and wheat, in addition to sorghum, constitute about 91% of the total area under permanent irrigation. The three main projects in irrigated agriculture - Gezira, Khashm el-Girba and pump-irrigated schemes - are located in central and east-central Sudan.

Post-1970 Development in Irrigated Agriculture

The post-1970 period witnessed a considerable expansion in irrigated agriculture, bringing acreage to four million feddans by the early 1980s (Africa Guide, 1982, p.348). Two main features mark recent development: attempts to diversify crop production, and a pronounced increase in foreign investment.

The Five Year Plan 1970-75 and the Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 put much emphasis on diversifying in sugar cane production, groundnut, broad beans and kenaf. Three large sugar plantations were established in Sennar, Assalaya and Kennana, south of Gezira scheme, on a gross area of 144,000 feddans. Groundnut production increased considerably with the launching of Es Suki scheme (1972) on a total area of 80,000 feddans, divided equally between groundnut and cotton. Broad beans are grown in Al-Rahad scheme (300,000 feddans), which was inaugurated in 1977. Out of the 152,000 feddans under cultivation in 1980/81 52% were under broad beans and
48% under cotton (Economic Survey 1981/82 p.23). Kenaf is a new crop, introduced in 1976 in Abu Na'ama project (15,000 feddans).

The popularisation of the idea of the Sudan becoming a "bread basket" for the Arab world, during the early 1970s, attracted foreign capital to Sudan.¹ Foreign capital participated in financing Al-Rahad project and the sugar plantations.² Except for Kennana sugar project, all development in irrigated agriculture was undertaken by the public sector in conjunction with foreign finance. All projects were located in central and east-central Sudan.

(ii) Rainfed Agriculture

About 11.5 million feddans, that is 82% of the total cultivated area in the country in 1974/75 were under rainfed agriculture. Of the total rainfed land, 3.5 million (ie. 30%) were prepared mechanically (El-Hassan, op. cit., pp.11,12). The history of capitalist rainfed agriculture goes back to the closing years of the Second World War when the colonial government encouraged the production of sorghum

1. A multi-Arab fund was formed in 1977 to finance agricultural developments in Sudan costing over six billion dollars.
2. Al-Rahad project cost £S 210 million. This was financed by International Development Association, Kuwait Development Fund, Saudi Development Fund, Arab Development Fund and United States Agency for International Development. Sennar sugar project was financed by Kuwait (£S 4.5 million) and Lloyds, UK (£S 9 million). Assalaya was financed by Sudan Government (27.5%) and the Arab-African Bank (72.5%). Kennana was financed mainly by Kuwait (31.7%), Sudan Government (30.8%); other shareholders include: Lonhro (UK), Saudi Government, Arab Investment Company, Arab Development Authority, a Japanese firm and Gulf Fisheries Company (Economic Survey 1981/82).
in the Gedaref area of eastern Sudan. Since then, capitalist production extended from the eastern region along the southern part of the Savannah belt to the western region. The area under cultivation increased from 33,000 feddans in 1943 to 1,993,000 feddans in 1967, mostly in Kassala and Blue Nile Provinces (Simpson and Simpson 1978, mentioned in Shepherd, A., 1983, p.302).

Much of the expansion in acreage occurred following the formation of the Mechanised Farming Corporation (MFC), a state-owned corporation in 1968. The area increased from 2.8 million feddans in 1968 to 14 million feddans in 1979/80 (FAO, 1982, p.68). About 30% of the cropped area was under sorghum during the 1970s and 20% was under sesame; a little short staple cotton was also grown (ILO, op.cit., p.45).

Generally the capacity of mechanised farming to generate employment is limited. But in Sudan weeding and harvesting operations are carried out by manual labour. The ILO estimated that 8,000 permanent jobs and 500,000 seasonal jobs were created in mechanised farming in 1975 (ibid, p.272).

Mechanised rainfed agriculture is considered more profitable than other forms of agricultural production in Sudan (see O'Brien 1978, pp.3,4, Kursany, I., 1982 (II), pp.18,19; Shepherd, op.cit., pp.308,309; Mahmoud, op.cit., pp.49,50). High returns to capital makes the business highly attractive to private capital.¹ Thus, the pronounced presence

¹. Foreign capital, especially from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), was the major source of finance in mechanised agriculture, both for the private and public sector. (For details on loans from these institutions see Kursany, op.cit., f.n.12).
of state capital in irrigated agriculture is matched by the dominance of private capital in rainfed agriculture.

By the end of the Extended Five Year Plan 1970/71 - 1976/77, the private sector controlled over 92% of land grants in mechanised farming, leaving about 8% to be run by the public sector (Adam, F. and Mohamed, E. 1979 mentioned in Kursany, 1982 (II), p.3.). Like irrigated agriculture, mechanised farming recorded a considerable increase during the 1970s, but it is predominantly controlled by the private sector.

Industry

Modern manufacturing industry emerged in Sudan in the post-independence period. Its contribution to the economy was insignificant and its share in GDP did not exceed 10%. It absorbed only 4.5% of the labour force in 1976 (Economic Survey, 1981/82, p.14).

The post-colonial state played a major role in stimulating industrial growth. In the first years after independence, the industrial policy was to encourage private investment in industry and confine public sector investment to those fields "where private initiative and knowledge are wanting and private capital is either shy or not forthcoming" (A memo on Government Industrial Policy in 1956, quoted by Rashid, S., in El-Hassan, A., 1977, p.84). Thus, the Approved Enterprises Act 1956 was promulgated to encourage both local and foreign
capital to invest in industry. ¹

The number of industrial establishments rose rapidly, from 40 at the eve of independence to 146 in 1958 (Mahmoud, op.cit., p.59). The share of the private sector in industrial investment amounted to 98% of the total investment in industry during the period 1955/56-1959/60 (Saeed, O., 1972, mentioned in Nimeiri, op.cit., p.89).

A new phase in industrial policy began in the early 1960s, with the promulgation of the Ten Year Plan 1961/62-1970/71 (see Appendix 2.2). The government initiated public sector industries. Nine factories representing a total investment of £S 23 million were established during the first half of the 1960s (Rashid, op.cit., p.84). But this expansion was not intended to compete with or displace private industry. ² Concessions provided to the private sector in the 1956 Act were consolidated. An industrial bank was established by the government in 1962 to provide loans and technical assistance to private enterprise. ³

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¹ It provided for tax exemptions from Business Profit Tax, reduced import duties, accelerated depreciation allowances, protection against foreign competition, and other non-fiscal incentives such as provision of industrial land at reduced prices, reduced power and freight notes, assured government purchases of locally produced manufactured goods, guarantees against nationalisation and an assurance of transferability of imported capital and profits abroad (Nimeiri, S. in El-Hassan, 1976, p.83).

² Introducing the Ten Year Plan the Minister of Finance stated that: "Economic development is not a task to be shouldered by the government alone, but it also entails the participation of private enterprise, its encouragement and channelling of its efforts so that public and private efforts may proceed in harmony and cooperation in furthering economic development" (quoted by Taha, A., 1976, p.116).

³ Loans provided by the Bank to private capital during the period 1962-1969 constitute 10% of the private sector total capital expenditure of the manufacturing industry (Khalafalla, op.cit., p.53).
1956 Act was superseded by the Organisation and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act, 1967. The latter retained the concessions of the 1956 Act, but also made them more generous than before (Nimeiri, op.cit., p.83).

Though its contribution to GDP was small, the industrial sector grew rapidly during the period 1955/56-1969/70. Its share in GDP rose from 4.5% to 8.4% during the same period. The private sector controlled a substantial proportion of industrial investment during the above period. Its average share in capital investment in manufacturing represented 62.6% of total manufacturing investment, despite increasing levels of public sector investment (Taha, op.cit., p.116). A large part of private industrial capital was owned by resident foreigners.¹

Post-1970 Industrialisation

The early 1970s saw the emergence of a strong statist approach to economic development.² Redefinition of the role of the public sector was reflected closely in the role, size and composition of industry. Emphasis on a leading role for the public sector was evident in the Five Year Plan 1970-75, and in the Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 (See Appendix 2.2).

¹. A study of the ownership of private industrial capital in the Sudan (1967) found that 74% of the total industrial capital was owned by foreigners, 15% was owned by Sudanese and 11% was in mixed ownership (SCP, 1968, mentioned in Mohmoud, op.cit., p.60).
². This point will be elaborated in Chapter Three of this study.
An immediate expansion in the public industrial sector occurred as a result of the nationalisation and confiscation of foreign (and local) businesses in May 1970.\(^1\) Besides, the public sector initiated new developments in sugar processing, textiles and leather industries.\(^2\) We do not have comparable data on the respective shares of public and private capital in manufacturing production during the period 1970-80, but on balance, the public industrial sector has recorded a marked expansion.

Private industrial enterprise has also expanded particularly after the inauguration in 1972 of the "open door" policy. Private industrial establishments increased from 153 in 1970/71 to 864 in 1981 (Economic Survey, 1981/82, p.43). Concessions provided by the state to private capital were maintained in subsequent legislation. The Development and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act, 1972 made very extensive and explicit guarantees to foreign capital.

Despite a substantial expansion in industrial capacity during the period 1970-80, manufacturing output as a percentage of GDP declined from 9.3% in 1969/70 to 8% in 1979/80 (ibid, p.15). This was partly due to severe rates of under-capacity utilisation (Rashid, op.cit., pp.97,102). The estimated annual growth rate of manufacturing during the

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1. As a result public sector factories increased from 9 to 47.
2. Two sugar factories, Sennar and Assalaya, were established in 1976 and 1980 respectively. Nine spinning and weaving factories were established during the period 1970-82. Two new tannaries were also built during the 1970s.
1970s was only 1.3% contrasting sharply with a 5.5% growth rate during the period 1960-70. Industrial investment concentrated on the processing of agricultural products and consumer goods; there was little concern with the production of intermediate and producer goods (Nimeiri, op.cit., p.94). Finally, the manufacturing industry remained highly concentrated in Khartoum Province despite the requirement of industrial policy that new industries should be located in the regions.

Trade

Two distinct phases mark the development of the commercial sector during the post-independence period. The period 1956-69 witnessed the process of the indigenisation of trade and ascendancy of local private capital. The early 1970s ushered in a rise in state intervention in commerce, which was subsequently followed by a return of foreign capital.

(i) The First Phase: 1956-1969

At the time of independence the Sudanese economy was heavily dependent on foreign trade (Hamid, G., 1977, p.31). The value of imports and exports amounted to around 40% of GDP in 1955/56, and government revenue relied greatly on taxes on foreign trade.¹

¹ In 1967/68 import and export duties represented 36% of total government revenue (Ali, A., 1976 in El-Hassan, op.cit., p.150).
General trade and foreign trade in particular, was dominated by the private sector. The share of the private sector in foreign trade varied between 70-80 per cent of imports and between 35-55 per cent of exports (Mahmoud, op.cit., p.39). As we noted above, the sector has been dominated by foreign capital since the colonial period. By the early 1960s, indigenous capital began to move into commerce and finance (Khalafalla, op.cit., p.49). In 1960 the first Sudanese commercial bank was opened. In 1962 a law was passed forbidding the issuance of trade licences to foreigners. Sudanese businessmen managed to check the influence of foreign commercial capital and also made efforts to limit the involvement of the state in trade. The share of the public sector in import trade showed a decline during the second half of the 1960s as the following table shows.

Table 2.1 : Trend of Imports and Exports 1964-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Imports (£S millions)</th>
<th>Government Imports (£S millions)</th>
<th>Government Imports as % of total</th>
<th>Total Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ali, op.cit., p.151 and p.156.

1. The government controlled the marketing of cotton, and in 1968 it took over the importation of tea, coffee and the wholesale distribution of salt.
The imports bill during the above period consisted mainly of consumer goods (52.6%), raw materials (33%) and capital equipment (13.6%). In export trade, cotton and cotton seed accounted for 55.8% of the total exports (1973). The main export commodities included: cotton, groundnuts, sesame, gum, hides, sorghum and cattle. The deficit in the balance of trade ranged between £S 5 million and £S 9 million annually during the period 1965-69 (Five Year Plan, 1970, Vol.1, p.117).

(ii) The Post-1969 Phase

The nationalisation and confiscation measures of 1970 extended the control of the public sector to important areas of commerce and banking. Three large public sector commercial corporations were formed in 1970 dealing in automobiles, engineering equipments, and services and trade. Control over banks facilitated governmental involvement in foreign trade. Its share in the import trade increased from an average of 21.8% during the period 1964-68 to 40.5% during the period 1969-73 (Ali, op.cit., p.152), while exports grew at a higher rate.

The nationalisation policy also benefited indigenous businessmen (O'Neil, N., 1978, p.7). But the big stimulus to private commercial capital came with the 1972 "open door" policy which brought foreign finance and released the state's restrictions on foreign trade. The commercial sector became

1. In April 1972 a "nil-value" import policy was introduced allowing businessmen to import goods financed by money held abroad without having to satisfy import-control requirements imposed by the Ministry of Trade and the Bank of the Sudan. This policy led to a flood of imported luxury consumer goods. "nil-value imports increased from £S 17.2 million in 1972/73 to £S 26 million in 1973/74, constituting 15% of total imports (ILO, op.cit., p.452).
highly attractive to investors, diverting resources from agriculture and industry. It was credited with generating twice as much value added in 1972/73 as industry and more than half of the amount attributed to agriculture (ILO, 1976, pp.166,167) (eg. see Appendix 2.1).

The "open door" policy encouraged foreign capital to invest in trade and finance. Eventually, a number of investment laws were enacted. The Encouragement of Investment in Economic Services Act, 1973, offered lucrative opportunities for investing in tourism, warehousing and transport. Finance became available as foreign and indigenous private banks were allowed to reopen in 1976. By 1982 there were eight private commercial banks, the majority of which were financed by Arab capital. Investment activities of most of these banks centred on the import-export trade.

The country fell into acute financial crisis during the second half of the 1970s. The massive in-flow of foreign capital dried up during the period 1976-78; this was coupled with stagnant exports and soaring imports. The deficit in

1. Also, following the July 1971 abortive coup the United States opened up $18 million worth of credit to Sudanese wheat importers; the IMF granted the Sudan a $40 million loan and UK offered $24 million.

2. E.g. Faisal Islamic Bank (£S 18.6 million paid capital) directed 82% of its investment in 1979 to trade (Economic Survey, 1979/80, pp.141,142).

3. 1980/81 was a record year in terms of disastrous yields of cotton; the share of cotton in the value of exports dropped from 65% in 1979 to 19.2% in 1981 (ibid, p.178). By mid-1981 the cost of basic imports - oil and sugar - was more than Sudan's total export earnings.
the balance of trade grew from £1 million in 1971 to £244.6 million in 1979, as the table in Appendix 2.3 illustrates. Reduced capital inflows and the rising trade deficit produced severe problems in the balance of payments. Payments for imports and debt servicing have fallen into arrears, and the external debt, standing at £3 billion in 1978, had risen to £6.3 billion by December 1982 (Niblock, 1985, p.31; ROAPE, 1983, p.66).

Transport and Communications

Inadequacy of infrastructure is often cited as a major weakness of the Sudanese economy. When the country attained independence, much of the infrastructure development was concentrated in central Sudan, linking areas of capitalist production in Gezira to centres of commerce and finance in major urban areas and to Port Sudan, the main outlet to the international market.

The transport sector consisted of three main modes: rail, river and road transport. Rail transport has been the dominant mode, carrying about two thirds of long distance freight and one half of passengers by the early 1970s (ILO, op.cit., p.66). It is run by a state agency, the Sudan Railways Corporation. The rail network was extended in the early 1960s to the provinces of Darfur in the west and Bahr el-Ghazal in the South. Carriage by railway increased considerably during the period 1955-1969. Despite the rise in

1. Air freight is insignificant. There are 19 airports, and one sea port.
2. Passengers increased from 2.71 million in 1955/56 to 3.8 million in 1969/70. Goods increased from 1.6 million tons to 2.9 million tons during the same period (ibid, p.65).

River transport was also run by the Sudan Railway Corporation until 1972, when it was put under the River Transport Corporation. Steamers operated almost entirely on two main reaches of the Nile: the northern reach - between Karima and Dongla (275 km) - and the southern reach - between Kosti and Juba (1,450 km). River transport recorded a marked increase in goods and passengers during the period 1955-1969.1

Road transport received little consideration during the first phase of the post-independence period. Until the early 1970s there were only 330 km of asphalt-paved roads outside urban areas (mainly in central Sudan), and around 2,000 km of gravel roads, mainly in Southern Sudan. The rest of the road network was dry weather tracks most of which were impassable during the rainy season. Under-development of the road network held up the growth of commercial trucking.2 Road transport was dominated, until the early 1970s, by Sudanese businessmen (Mahmoud, op.cit., p.66).

1. Passengers increased from 42,000 in 1955/56 to 302,000 in 1969/70; and goods increased from 87,000 tons to 122,000 during the same period (ILO, op.cit.).

2. In 1958 there were about 13,000 trucks and buses and only 11,000 passenger cars. By 1970 the stock of trucks and buses had increased by only 5,000, whereas the stock of passenger cars had gone up by more than 14,000 (Wilkins, C., 1976, in El-Hassan, 1976, p.105).
Post and telecommunication services have increased during the post-independence period. Most of the increase has occurred in northern and central Sudan, with the western and southern regions receiving 17% and 13% respectively of the total number of post and telegraph offices, and 19% and 3% respectively of the total number of telephone exchanges in 1972.

**Post-1970 Developments**

The post-1969 development planning laid more emphasis on developing road transport and telecommunications. It introduced new elements into the transport strategy, calling for competition between different modes of transport, assigning a leading role for the public sector in developing road transport, and soliciting the participation of foreign capital.

Most of the development in the transport sector focused on roads. A major project was the 1190 km highway linking Khartoum with Port Sudan via Gedaref and Kassala (completed in 1980), which was seen as a breakthrough in transport problems between central Sudan and Port Sudan. A related project was the construction of a petroleum products pipeline (320 km) between Khartoum and Port Sudan in 1977. Another 225 km highway linking Medani-Sennar-Kosti was completed in 1982.

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1. Post and telegraph offices increased from 92 in 1956 to 198 in 1972. The number of telephone exchanges rose up from 84 to 147 (Sudan Government, 1974, p.27).

2. The Five Year Plan 1970-75 assigned all investment in transport to the public sector. The Six Year Plan 1977-83 advocated competition between different transport modes to improve the total capacity of the transport system.

3. For an argument on the possible conflict between rail and road in Khartoum-Port Sudan route see Wilkins, C., op.cit., pp.116,117.
Improvements in road transport and lucrative investment concessions attracted the growth of private haulage firms.\(^1\) In the mid-1970s foreign capital moved into the transport sector, establishing a number of large haulage companies.\(^2\)

Another area of expansion was telecommunications. The Sudastat project built satellite ground stations in fourteen cities and towns in Northern, Western and Southern Sudan. It was supplemented with a micro-wave communication network connecting Khartoum with North-Eastern Sudan. The two projects brought radio and television services to almost all parts of the country, and augmented the capacity of the telephone system.\(^3\)

The above expansion in the transport and communication sector was reflected in a steady rise in the share of the sector in GDP from 7.3% in 1969/70 to an estimated 10.6% in 1979/80. Except for the development in telecommunications,

\(^1\) The total number of vehicles in the country reached 115,000 in 1979, of which 60,000 were commercial vehicles (Africa Guide, 1982, p.348).

\(^2\) The Sudanese Kuwaiti Company for Road Transport was created in 1974. It started its operations with 100 juggernauts and built two maintenance shops. The Emirate-Sudan Investment Company Ltd., (capital: £S 20 million) was founded in 1977 to operate in the transport sector, among other fields.

\(^3\) Other developments in telecommunications included: the introduction of telex services in 1974, and automatic telephone dialling system in major cities. By 1979 there were around 63,000 telephones in the country, of which two thirds were in Khartoum (Africa Guide, 1982, p.347).
the other developments in the sector followed closely the old pattern of distribution of the infrastructure in the country. It is obvious that developments in road transport largely concentrated on central Sudan with little development expenditure going to western and southern Sudan.

2.2.4 **Structural Imbalance of the Economy**

We provided in this section an overview of the evolution of the Sudanese economy, and then outlined the main sectors of the post-colonial economy. The above review alerts us to three areas of incompatibility in the structure of the economy. These relate to its links with the international economy, links between its capitalist and non-capitalist part, and inter-sectoral links within the capitalist part of the economy. Outlining these series of incompatibilities is important for this study because they constitute a backdrop to the process of Sudanese urbanisation and its attendant problems, such as those of urban housing. Thus, by way of concluding this section, we shall delineate briefly each area of incompatibility.¹

To begin with the links with the international economy, we have already explained above that Condominium government had structured the economy towards production of primary export crops. Cotton was established as the principal crop contributing around 65% of export earnings (1979), and over

¹ The following analysis is based on the work of Ake, C., 1981, Chs. 3 and 5.
50% of government revenue. Dependence on cotton made the economy sensitive to price changes in the international market. The ability of post-colonial governments to promote self-sustained growth is, therefore, constrained by their dependence on unreliable earnings from a few primary products. The resource base of the economy, that would provide for a rapid capital accumulation adequate to generate internally oriented development is extremely narrow.\(^1\) The international division of labour, on the other hand, has reinforced specialisation in the production of cotton and constrained attempts at diversification.\(^2\)

The problem in the above situation is that the need of the economy to diversify in order to generate resources for development is incompatible with the requirements of the international market.

The second area of incompatibility concerns the impact of specialisation in primary production on the structural coherence of the economy. We have noted earlier that the initiation of capitalist production of cotton in central Sudan was accompanied by a reconstruction and preservation of non-capitalist relations of production in southern and western Sudan. As a result, the development of the productive forces in the non-capitalist sector of the economy was blocked for a long time. Even in the post-independence period capitalist production of cotton has generated little

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1. Hence the heavy dependence on external borrowing to finance development during the 1970s.

2. Against attempts to diversify the economy and reduce reliance on cotton the IMF-formulated economic changes in 1979 and after shifted emphasis back to cotton - (eg. see ROAPE, 1983, pp.67-69).
development in the non-capitalist sector.\textsuperscript{1} Development expenditure and social spending remained highly concentrated in areas of capitalist production as we will explain in Chapter Four. The external orientation of the economy is a major underlying factor behind incoherence in the structure of the economy. As Kursany observed:

"most of the economic ventures which were developed within the Sudanese agriculture sector took the form of an "enclave" with all their linkages being tied to the economies of the metropolitan countries. As such they fail to inject any stimulus for the development of the domestic economy". (Ibid, p.28).

The third incompatibility relates to inter-sectoral linkages within the capitalist sector of the economy, namely between agriculture and industry. The external orientation of the economy did not allow the development of an internally oriented manufacturing industry. Forward linkages which resulted from cotton production stimulated British, instead of Sudanese, manufacturing. Unlike European industrialisation, the post-independence Sudanese industrialisation did not develop from a local handicraft industry. As such it failed to generate effective linkages with other sectors of the economy.\textsuperscript{2} Its reliance on imported inputs, on the other hand,

\textsuperscript{1} In fact, through the importation of labour into central Sudan, the unequal exchange with the petty commodity producers and the encroachment of capitalist mechanised farming into the non-capitalist economy, the capitalist economy managed to siphon out economic surpluses from the non-capitalist sector and to marginalise its inhabitants. But the capitalist economy failed to transform the production relations in the non-capitalist sector which would permit the complete absorption of its members in the capitalist production process (Kursany, 1982(II), p.33).

\textsuperscript{2} Intersectoral linkages occur as the home sectors supply each other with intermediate inputs and capital goods. The higher the proportion of the sectors' requirements of these locally produced goods the stronger will be the linkages. Salih (1975) found weak intersectoral linkages in Sudan amounting to 11.2\% in 1955/56 and 11.9\% in 1962/63. In USA and Japan these were 41\% and 43\% respectively (Hamid, G., 1977, p.32).
contributed to problems in balance of payments, which in turn encouraged the intensification of primary production to pay for imports.

A major outcome of the structural incoherence in the economy has been a growing schism between the city and countryside, in terms of the distribution of investment, incomes and social spending. Rural areas where capitalist production is not dominant suffered, not only a lack of investment inputs, but more seriously a rapid deterioration in the natural environment as evidenced in western Sudan. We will consider the relation between the rural economy and urbanisation in Chapter Four.

2.3 CLASS AND DETERMINATION OF THE STATE POLICY

2.3.1 General

The preceding analysis revealed certain structural problems in the Sudanese economy. We traced some of them to the colonial economic structure and the underlying interest of metropolitan capital in securing cheap raw materials and secure markets. However, the termination of colonial rule in 1956 was not followed by a fundamental restructuring of the economy. The persistence of major structural features almost three decades after independence poses a question about the interests sustaining the prevailing economic structure and their relation to the post-colonial state.
We shall focus briefly, in this section, on the social character of the state in the Sudan and consider its relation with dominant economic interests. Our purpose is not to reach a definitive conclusion on the nature of the Sudanese state. We are rather interested in opening up the issue of how dominant interests influence the state's policy. First, we will make a short note about social classes in Sudan. Then we will consider the nature of the Sudanese state and address the relation between class and the state's policy; that is how social interest influences public policy.

2.3.2 Social Classes in Sudan

The complexity of the post-colonial Sudanese social formation makes it difficult to identify mutually exclusive classes on the basis of labour situations. This is particularly the case in the agricultural sector which absorbs over 70% of the population. Explaining the complexity of labour situations El-Tayeb wrote:

"On the one hand, being hired by the owner of the means of production, the labourer is a source of surplus value; on the other hand, being the owner of his own farm, on which hired labour is employed, he is an appropriator of surplus value created by others. Furthermore, in so far as part of such a labourer's subsistence is supplied by the home farm, the total cost of his labour power, and, indeed, the cost of reproduction of his labour power, are not met by the capitalist wage bill, but are partly supplied by the product of the direct labour of his wife and his children as well as by the labour of those who are hired on the farm". (El-Tayeb, G., 1984, p.31).
The above complexity of labour situations in rural Sudan does not make easy the task of describing accurately the social structure. Without underestimating this difficulty we shall proceed to classify the social formation into three broad social classes: the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, and the working class.

(a) The Agro-Commercial Classes

Colonial agricultural policy in the Sudan activated social differentiation among the peasantry and aided the formation and development of an agricultural bourgeoisie.¹ This class accumulated wealth from pump-irrigated schemes during and after the colonial rule and later moved into mechanised farming.

By the early 1960s there was pressure to indigenise trade and soon agricultural capital moved into trade, finance and industry. Commercial capital expanded under the May regime and flourished in the wake of the "open door" policy and the penetration of foreign capital. It is not possible, however, to speak of a homogenous agro-commercial class. The complexity of the social formation and the uneven development of the economic structure produced several economic interests operating at different locations in the economy.

¹. In pursuit for local allies the colonial government granted religious and tribal leaders and traders licences (and finance) to grow cotton in pump-irrigated schemes in central and northern Sudan.
(b) The Petty Bourgeoisie

The Marxian tradition limits the term "petty bourgeoisie" to those who own means of production and neither sell their labour power nor purchase that of others. Given the complexity of labour situations, which we noted above, some social strata in Sudan bear the characteristics of the petty bourgeoisie but do not fit neatly its labour situation. El-Tayeb (1984) suggested that the petty bourgeoisie be seen as forming a continuum between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, exhibiting, in varying proportions, the defining characteristics of both. Adopting this approach, it will be possible to situate civil servants and peasants at certain points in this proletariat-bourgeoisie continuum.

(i) The Bureaucracy

The bureaucracy resembles the proletariat in being property-less but approximates the bourgeoisie in ideology, life style and aspirations. The Sudanese bureaucracy developed in direct response to the needs of the colonial economy. Initially its members were drawn from the families of religious and tribal leaders and traders but with expansion in education it attracted members from diverse social origins. Occupants of higher echelons particularly in the army, the Party, the Cabinet, public corporations and local government had the opportunity to use state resources to accumulate wealth.1

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1. Some of them invested in trade, others in mechanised farming, eg. see Mohmoud, op.cit., p.68 and Kursany, op.cit., pp.16,17.
Middle and lower level functionaries - ranging from professionals to clerical staff - increased in number under the May regime (see Appendix 3.2). Most of them were hard hit by inflation during the 1970s, and many sought migration to oil rich Arab countries.

(ii) Peasants

Over 70% of the country's population are peasants. Their incomes vary according to the form of agricultural production and farm size.

In irrigated agriculture such as Gezira, rich peasants owned ten feddans or more, middle peasants owned between five and ten feddans and poor peasants owned less than five feddans (Kursany 1982, (I), pp.17,18). By contrast, farms in mechanised farming ranged between 1000 and 1500 feddans. It was reported that most of the scheme owners in mechanised farming practiced farming as a subsidiary activity and were mainly engaged in trade (ibid, 1982, II, p.11). The expansion of mechanised farming increasingly displaced small peasants and forced them into less fertile land and into wage employment.

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1. Rich peasants usually hired labour for all agricultural operations and engaged in other activities such as trade and cattle production. Middle peasants participated in 20% of the production process - poor peasants performed most of the farming by themselves and their families, and rarely hired wage labour (ibid).
(iii) A third stratum of the petty bourgeoisie is that of the self-employed. It consists of small traders, sub-contractors and owners of small businesses in the tertiary sector. This social group has multiplied in urban areas in proportion to the rate of urban growth.

(c) Workers

Historically the working class in Sudan has developed, not in the manufacturing industry, but in the government services sector (rail transport). The size of the working class grew steadily in the post-independence period as private and state capital moved into manufacturing during the 1960s and the 1970s. But generally the size of the urban working class is small compared with agricultural labour.

The marked expansion in agriculture during the 1970s increased considerably the number of agricultural wage labourers. The total number of migratory labourers alone was put at slightly less than one million (Khalafalla, op. cit., p.59). Part of those displaced by mechanised farming tended to migrate to urban areas. In September 1981 about 14,000 were evacuated from the capital for being "idle". It is believed that the majority of them were displaced peasants looking for urban wage-employment.
2.3.3 Dominant Interests and the State

(a) The Nature of the Sudanese State

Approaches to the nature of the post-colonial state in the Sudan usually look at the social content of policy output and the class affiliations of state functionaries. The state is, thus, rightly, described as representing the interests of the indigenous agro-commercial classes and those of international capital (eg. O'Neil, op. cit.; Khalafalla, op. cit.; Mahmoud, F., 1983, and Kursany, I., 1983 (both in ROAPE, 1983); and Mahmoud, F. 1984).

The search for the social character of the state has often addressed the link between dominant economic interests and the political parties. The social bases of the parties that controlled political power during the two parliamentary periods 1956-58 and 1964-69 were found to be largely drawn from the agro-commercial classes. Both the Umma Party (UP) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) were made up of big agricultural business, tribal leaders and senior bureaucrats. Each Party was affiliated with a religious sect - Ansar and Khatmiya respectively - which provided the ideological supports for the political organisation. The patrons of both parties accumulated wealth in agriculture and trade with the direct aid of the colonial government. The social support of the National Unionist Party (NUP), on the other hand, mostly came from urban and semi-urban areas: merchants, traders, gentleman farmers and middle level bureaucrats. The composition of the
Party's leadership changed, however, during the second half of the 1960s and became dominated by big merchants. By the late 1960s capitalists had invested in various fields, ranging from agriculture to trade finance and industry, such that it became difficult to classify their political affiliations by type of economic activity.¹ A broad agro-commercial class thus developed, investing in mechanised farming, export-import trade, insurance, banking, real estate and industry. It does not constitute, however, a homogeneous group of individuals. It has different, sometimes conflicting, interests.²

In answering the question of which class or classes used the state to serve its interest, research has mostly focused on major policy areas and issues. Most often quoted policy issues are: private cotton schemes, mechanised farming and trade.

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¹ In a recent study (1978) of about a hundred leading businessmen in the country, Mahmoud found that 38% belong to the Umma Party, 30% to the People's Democratic Party, 16% to the National Unionist Party and 16% classified as others. Of those involved in mechanised farming 68% belonged to the UP, 14% to the PDP and 10% to the NUP. The same pattern of political affiliations was found in industry (Mahmoud, 1984, pp.143,144).

² For the conflict between the bourgeoisie over the loans of the Agricultural Bank, and conflict between industrialists and importers over the policy of restricting imports to protect local industry see Khalafalla, op.cit., pp.51-56.
Private Cotton Schemes

Private cotton schemes on the White Nile started in 1929 (Abdel-Salam, op.cit., p.51). It was from these schemes that Al-Mahdi family - of the Umma Party - began to accumulate wealth. The period 1949-54 witnessed a sharp rise in the number of private pump-irrigated schemes (Nudalla, 1973, p.243). During that period, the Umma Party shared power with the colonial government in the legislative Assembly; while the Ashigga Party (the predecessor of the NUP and the PDP) and the labour movement boycotted the Assembly. Another sharp increase in these schemes occurred under the coalition government of the UP and the PDP (1956-58). It was reported that most of the licences went to the supporters of the ruling parties.

The sharp fall in cotton prices in the late 1950s and after made the financiers hesitant to finance private cotton schemes (Khalafalla, op.cit., p.52). The UP-PDP coalition sponsored a bill establishing the State Agricultural Bank to finance private cotton production. As cotton prices

1. Following the launching of the Gezira Scheme the Government started offering licences to private individuals to grow cotton. Among early beneficiaries were the religious leaders: Abdel-Rahman Al-Madi, Ali Al-Mirghani and Al-Hindi. All three of them became the patrons of major political parties: the Umma Party, the People's Democratic Party and the National Unionist Party.

2. Abdel-Rahman Al-Mahdi was given the wood contract for the construction of the Sennar Dam. He used the capital acquired therefrom to establish pump-irrigated schemes on the White Nile. His acreage increased from 200 feddans in 1928 to 1500 feddans in 1935. He received financial aid - in terms of grants and loans - from the colonial government and exploited virtually costless labour. He established Al-Mahdi Estate, which invested in finance, commerce and agriculture (Khalafalla, op.cit., p.46).

3. Outstanding loans advanced by the Bank to cotton growers increased from £5.9 million in 1959/60 to £9.7 million in 1961/62. Loans to non-cotton growers were in the average of half a million for the period 1962-69 (thid).
showed no improvement, the UP-led-government interfered in 1967 to safeguard the interests of cotton growers and transferred the schemes to the public sector. Despite being indebted to the tenants, to the government and to the Agricultural Bank, scheme owners were adequately compensated. They subsequently moved their capital to industry and mechanised farming.

Mechanised Farming

During its early development in eastern Sudan (1943-54), mechanised farming experimented with a system of participating cultivators in which income from 28 feddan-plots was distributed equally between cultivators and the government (Shepherd, A., 1983, pp.300-302). But a Ministry of Agriculture Report (1954) concluded that the aforementioned system was inefficient. The Report counselled against the development of state farms and recommended developing 1,000 feddan plots. As Shepherd noted, it was not difficult to read into such a report the underlying interest of big merchants. The system of participating cultivators was partially ended in 1953 in favour of developing private capitalism.

The state supported the expansion of private mechanised farming during the 1960s and the 1970s, providing bank finance, agricultural machinery and research (Mahmoud, 1984, p.49). Studies on the social origin of scheme owners found

1. Government provided mechanised land preparation, sowed the sorghum seed and threshed the harvest, while the cultivators provided labour for other operations.
that they predominantly came from the "higher strata of the society". These capitalist farmers provided a strong rural base to the May regime (O'Neil, op.cit., p.8). They managed to penetrate the regional political organisations and dominate the Party-affiliated tenant unions.

Trade:

During the two parliamentary regimes, import-export licencing was reportedly used extensively by the ruling parties for political gain (Nugdalla, op.cit., pp.249-254). The NUP and the PDP interchangeably occupied the Ministry of Trade. The trial of the Minister of Trade (NDP member) in 1969 revealed that the NDP adopted a partisan policy in the issuance of trade licences.

The nationalisation and confiscation of foreign firms under the May regime (1970) paved the way for the economic ascendancy of Sudanese merchants (O'Neil, op.cit., p.7).

In early 1971 President Nimeiri told the representatives of the private sector that:

1. Kursany classified scheme owners in mechanised farming in Southern Kordofan into: (a) Big merchants who were historically connected with the sector; (b) big cattle owners; (c) sons of native administrators who were educated abroad in business administration; (d) ex-civil and military officers; and (e) senior bureaucrats from the Party, local government and National Assembly. Studies of mechanised farming in Eastern Sudan reached similar findings (Kursany, 1982(II), p.17).

2. The NUP and PDP merged into one party in 1968, the National Democratic Party (NDP).
"the nationalisation and acquisition decisions were not meant to detract from the role ideally played by the private sector, or to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability for this sector". (Quoted by Taha, A., 1976, p.117).

Following the "open door" policy (1972) further opportunities became available to Sudanese businessmen. Merchants constituted an important political base for the May regime and were able to make use of the opportunities made available by the regime, to expand in the import trade and real estate.

(b) Determinants of Public Policy

The preceding discussion reveals that most studies on the social character of the post-colonial Sudanese state have centred their analysis on the social content of the state's policy. The link between the social structure and public policy has been explained in terms of the direct influence of capitalists or their representatives on the policy process and of the close affinity between state functionaries and the dominant economic interests.

While class analysis is indispensable for explaining major policy issues such as those reviewed above, it encounters certain difficulties when dealing with non-major policy issues and those policy areas in which capitalists have no overt class interest. But this limitation can be overcome by extending class analysis to the internal organisation of the state, and analyse - in class terms - those internal policy determinants which are active when dominant
class interest is not at stake. In order to discover internal policy determinants we will need to analyse the social content of the institutional organisation and of policy process from the end of policy planning to the stage of implementation.

We would like to propose an analytical distinction between the social character of policy makers - as one determinant of policy - and that of the internal organisation of the state. Internal state organisation is not a neutral "impersonal" set of administrative arrangements. It can and does carry social interests, and sustain them even after a change of the social character of policy makers. It is better conceived as a set of sedimented selection rules laid down through a long historical process to maintain the interest of dominant classes (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980, pp.501,503). It therefore provides an additional "internal selection mechanism" for those policy issues which do not cause an overt class conflict or those which do not command a consensus between the different fractions of the capitalist class.

Institutional analysis is necessary if we are to uncover these internal selection mechanisms and establish how they quietly mediate social interests in the policy process. Institutional analysis will not, however, substitute a class analysis of the policy makers, nor replace a structural analysis of the political economy. Its value lies in discovering the hidden mechanisms which dominant interests
use without needing to resort to overt action by political decision-makers. In this manner the institutional approach can complement a class analysis of policy makers and a structural analysis of the social formation.

2.3.4 Conclusion

We addressed in this section the relation between public policy and the dominant interests in the Sudan. We highlighted the class character of the Sudanese state. We then outlined the susceptibility of the internal organisation of the state to class influence and its potential role in the policy process and argued that an institutional approach to policy analysis should be incorporated in a broad class analysis of the state.

2.4 GENERAL CONCLUSION

The main objective of this chapter has been to describe the main features of the Sudanese economy and to give an overview of the underlying social forces. It consisted of two main sections.

At the beginning of the first section, we provided a historical note about the evolution of the economy and considered the way the structure of the economy was transformed under Condominium rule. We then classified the post-colonial economy into non-capitalist and capitalist forms of production and outlined the main features in each form.
We noted that the pre-capitalist forms of production were being slowly modified and incorporated in the capitalist economy.

Proceeding to the capitalist economy, we focused on the sectors of agriculture, industry, trade and transport and communications. There was a continuity in major structural features of the economy throughout the post-independence period. We noted the increasing involvement of the state's capital in the economy during the 1970s, and the concomitant rise in the share of foreign capital. We concluded the section by highlighting major structural weaknesses in the economy.

We addressed, in the second section, the question of the interests underlying the prevailing economic structure and how they influenced the state's policy. We considered the nature of the Sudanese state. We argued that the internal organisation of the state represented an important mediator of social interest in policy process. Its potential impact on the policy process must be appreciated and investigated, using institutional analysis, within a broad structural framework of analysis.
CHAPTER THREE

THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE
STATE AND POLICY FORMATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

We have proposed above that the social content of the state policy can be sought in the internal organisation of the state, and that the influence of the social structure on the state actions can operate internally from within the state organisation. To examine this proposition we will analyse in this chapter the dominant model of policy formation in the Sudan in the light of the ideology of the May regime, the institutional organisation of the state apparatus and the social character of the policy makers. We will argue that the bias in socio-economic planning toward the merchant class and the state bureaucracy is explicable in terms of the prevailing policy model and is inherent in the ideology underlying the formation of the state organisation.

We will deal with the above proposition at three stages. In the following section we will examine the ideology of the May regime in order to illuminate the main themes underlying the formation of the state apparatus. Then, a description of the state apparatus and its operation follows in the third section of the chapter. The intra-institutional balance of power and the pattern of social representation in the state apparatus are hypothesised to reflect closely on the process of policy formation. We note a marked concentration of power
in the Presidency and, a strong influence of "technocrats" in senior political institutions. We adopt the concept of "technocracy" to describe both the social character of the state apparatus and the institutional approach to policy formation. In the fourth section of the chapter we will examine the relation between "technocracy" and policy formation, focusing on the sphere of economic planning.

We will conclude that the institutional structure of the state and its mode of operation constitute a vantage point for understanding the incidence of social interests in the process of policy formation. The dominant policy model - the "technocratic" model - is instrumental, in this respect, for analysing the social character of the state's policy and its social implications. The institutional structure of the state represented an important instrument for mediating the interests of the merchant class and those of the state bureaucracy.

3.2 **THE IDEOLOGY OF THE MAY REGIME**

3.2.1 **General**

The May regime came to power as a result of a military coup in 1969.1 It deposed the previous parliamentary regime.

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1. The coup was initiated by non-communist members of the Free Officers' organisation (FOO). The FOO, which had been active within the armed forces in opposition to the first military rule (1958-64), mainly comprised nationalist, Arab socialist and communist officers. After initial caution, the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) worked to mobilise popular support to defend the new regime.
annulled the constitution, dissolved the political parties and established a one-party state, supposedly based on a socialist orientation. Following a communist-supported abortive coup in 1971, the regime's policy departed radically from its earlier Leftist postures to the right. It is our view that those earlier ideological assumptions had substantially informed and guided the formation of the state's internal organisation and are, therefore, most relevant for understanding the characteristics and mode of operation of the state's organisation. It will also be seen that the seemingly sudden swing of the regime to the right in the post-1971 period was foreseen in the regime's ideology and its conceptual underpinnings. What happened in the post-1971 period could be interpreted as a shift in power-alliances within the prevailing ideology.

Ideology is conceived in this study as the system of ideas, beliefs and sentiments which claims to give a complete theory of man and society, and provides a programme of political action (Scruton, R. 1982, p.213).

The National Charter, which was hotly debated during the period 1969-1971 and officially endorsed in January 1972, condensed the regime's ideological project and its political strategy. In the preamble, the charter outlined a broad

1. The SCP was already banned in 1965, under the parliamentary regime.
2. In examining the principal ideological precepts, for the purpose of this study, of the May regime we will rely, in the main on: (a) Interpretation of the National Charter, the Constitution and other authoritative writings; (b) Presidential speeches and statements, and (c) writings of the late Dr Bakheit, G., who was the principal ideologue of the regime as we will explain below.
strategy that included the following:

1 - "Liberat(ing) the will of citizens from all forms of economic exploitation, administrative, tribal, sectarian and ideological oppression, placing power - on all its levels - in the hands of the people, through application of the new democracy ..."

2 - Chang(ing) all obsolete laws and replac(ing) them by new laws concomitant with the new social relations ..., (guaranteeing) basic liberties ... and safeguard(ing) the supremacy of law and the independence of the judiciary ...

3 - accelerat(ing) economic development relying on modern scientific planning ...

4 - liberat(ing) rural areas from ... backwardness by putting into force a drastic agrarian reform ... (and) ... changing production relations for the benefit of poor farmers, agricultural workers and nomads ...

5 - reconstruct(ing) state organs on a scientific and patriotic basis to promote ... efficiency and effectiveness " (National Charter, 1972, pp.5-9).

These objectives were later incorporated in the permanent constitution, subsequently promulgated in May 1973. This political strategy represented, however, - during the drafting period - a consensus formula, which was less precise both on specific substantive issues and on empirical strategies (Shaw, 1971-103). One implication of its generality was its liability to differing interpretations. Despite this generality, however, one line of interpretation of the main concepts and their empirical imports was evident from the inception of the regime in 1969 and until the mid-1970s, the formative period of the regime's institutional structure. This line of interpretation can be traced and defined in terms of its social origin and its theoretical orientation,
through an exposition of three basic elements in the May ideology. These elements are, the view of the regime about the nature of social organisation, its concept of power and change, and its concept of social representation in the polity. In what follows we briefly examine these three aspects in the ideology of the May regime.

(a) The Nature of Social Organisation

Reading the literature of the May regime one cannot fail to note an emphasis on social cohesion and harmony as a definitive characteristic of Sudanese society, built around the family. There was also comparable distancing from secondary forms of social organisation, namely economic ones. Addressing the founding conference of the Party in January, 1972, the President defined the regime's perspective of classes:

"... the May socialist revolution broke in our country and the classes are still in embryonic state; ... it is characterised by class looseness and not the crystallising of classes, ... and (our) socialist orientation ... endeavours to dissolve the differences between (groups) not to reinforce them to develop into contradicting class interests..." (The Institute of Socialist Studies, 1976, p.10).

The rejection of class as an organising concept was seen by Dr Bakheit as:
"conforming to the social nature of the Sudanese people...; and since the interests of the ordinary Sudanese are associated with the family any class advocacy... faces opposition"*(Bakheit, 1974).

The rejection of class as a basis for social organisation was partly a product of the confrontation between the regime and the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) in the early 1970s. Yet principally this rejection has its roots in the Sudanese brand of petty-bourgeois socialism (Mahmoud, 1984. p.11).¹

For instance, in its economic analysis, the National Charter depicted the Sudanese society as composed of contradictory modes of production, including:

"closed subsistence economy... (producing ... outside the circle of the national economy), and semi-feudalism (where old production relations prevailed)... (and) a modern economy" (National Charter, op.cit., Chapter 3.).

While the Marxist notion of the mode of production was used - as an analytical category - there was an obvious conceptual difficulty in comprehending how classes and class relations relate to the production process within a particular mode of production. Classes were seen to exist independent of the mode of production. Thus, the inevitability of class contradictions and class conflict were assumed away. The President stated that: "We will not favour one group or one class at the

* Denotes my translation.

1. This brand of thought did not categorically deny the existence of classes. It believed that, although classes might exist, their antagonisms need not be resolved through class struggle.
expense of the others. We will look at the interests of the whole people . . . the revolution is for all the country" (1974, quoted in Al-Battahani, A., 1976, p.77). The underlying assumption was one of an inherently cohesive society whose constituent parts were held together by solidarities which overrode class antagonisms.

The rejection of class as a form of social organisation and of class struggle as an instrument of change led to the adoption of an alternative framework of analysis based on non-economic units of social analysis and to conceiving of change as an induced and incremental process. A perspective of orderly, conflict-free and controlled social change was to dominate the process of building the state's institutional structure. An exposition of the regime's view of power and change should illuminate this point.

(b) The Concept of Power and Change

In line with the perspective of an inherently harmonious society, based on non-economic social organisations, noted above, power was conceived by the May regime as a product of control of political institutions rather than the means of production. Power relations in society were decided by the domination of such institutions like political parties, tribal and religious institutions as it was the case under the parliamentary regime 1964-69 (National Charter, op.cit., p.21). A change in the balance of power would involve eliminating old power institutions.
The above interpretation of power disregarded the economic basis of political power and held the state institutions as the exclusive foundation of power. The regime's concept of power was partial and typical of the one-dimensional approach to power already criticised in the literature on community power (e.g. see Lukes, S. 1974). Following this line of critique, the incidence of power does not necessarily occur in association with a visible control of political institutions. Conceived as a social relation, power may exist and be exercised outside political organisations. Thus, whether political parties or "native administrations" were to be abolished this should not necessarily mean that their power-bases had been eliminated.

The one-dimensional approach to power, characteristic of the ideology of the May regime, had important implications for the regime's strategy of change and for the form which change-agents would take. At one level, after eliminating old institutions the state would become the locus of power and would act as an arbiter between social groups and interests.\(^1\) It is all too easy to detect the assumption of the neutrality of the state vis-a-vis social classes: the state was above all classes. At another level, the state

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1. Dr Bakheit wrote: "The state in the Sudan was created as a partisan tool used to promote interests of certain groups. It was not used as a compromise apparatus; a national apparatus to synthesise between conflicting cultures and groups; because its ability to resist pressures has been very weak" (El-Sahafa Daily, 23.9.74, quoted by Al-Battahani, A., 1976, p.75). The implication of the above interpretation is to strengthen the power of the state so that it was able to manage effectively social change. This pattern of analysis was close to the thinking of the Development Administration Movement, discussed in Chapter One (1.2.2.(b)).
would plan social change in a way that safeguards "the harmony and cohesion" of society. Class, ideology and conflict, which underlined the political process during the parliamentary regime, were regarded as disruptive and irrational methods for effecting "orderly" change.\(^1\)

The alternative method was bound to be "rational". Social organisation and tools of change were to be based on "scientific" understanding of society as against an ideological or political perspective of society.

"The idea of political and social change, its tools, factors and implications", wrote Dr Bakheit, "is no longer a literary concern that everybody can undertake; it became an academic specialisation ..., with its basis and rules ... which enable the researcher, without being a prophet or a fortune-teller, to ascertain the direction of change and possibilities of success or failure" (Bakheit, 1969, pp.6,9).

This perception of a new approach to social change was also acknowledged in the National Charter:

"The basis of this change is social planning, ... based on in-depth studies ... which classify problems, outline their nature, set strategies ... and specify the means for realising revolutionary change", (National Charter, op.cit., p.52).

Two important developments grew from this pattern of analysis of society, power and change. First, a major role was assigned to the state in effecting change, through a

\(^1\) Hence the emphasis in the regime's literature on an alliance between the "revolution's social forces - Workers, farmers, intellectuals, soldiers and national capitalists - around the aims of national unity and development."
massive process of institution-building and social planning. Second, a rationalist conception of change was envisaged, to be based on scientific method and technical expertise. Both these aspects pose the question of social representation or the relative roles of different social groups in effecting social change and in the polity. To this point we now turn.

(c) The Concept of Social Representation

We noted at the beginning of this section the emphasis in the National Charter on putting power into the hands of the people, through the application of the "new democracy". The institutional arrangement which would facilitate the delivery of power to the people was the Party, the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU). The party was conceived as an alliance for "the people's working forces", comprising: workers, farmers, intellectuals, soldiers and national capitalists. Although the social structure of the party was formally planned on an occupational basis, actual participation was organised in such a way that a strong occupational presence was prevented or controlled.

We referred earlier to the regime's emphasis on the family as the basic unit of social organisation and the rejection of the concept of class. This type of thinking led to the adoption of the residential or geographical unit as the main basis of political representation as opposed to work place or industrial organisation. Dr Bakheit explained
this choice in the following way: The May revolution was able to:

"distinguish conceptually between social and industrial groupings such that the latter category should not constitute the institutional (form) of the former. If the SSU were formed according to an industrial basis of social forces it would have become a front for sectional groups, lacking the spirit of national unity" (Bakheit, 1974).

In the process of eliminating the power of institutions of the parliamentary regime, Dr Bakheit suspected that trade unions could constitute a strong power-centre outside the state's control. To avert this situation he promoted the idea of a non-occupational basis for social representation. He defended his position saying:

"We do not call for obliterating the identity of unions, but we see no reason for transforming the trade union movement from an occupational and professional movement into a political movement which would control the SSU, divide it into entities and change the (Party's) national framework into a sectional one". (Ibid).

The actual basis of participation seemed, therefore, to contradict the formally proclaimed structure of the SSU - the alliance of the people's working forces. To overcome this contradiction in the pattern of representation, the "people's working forces" - workers, farmers, soldiers, intellectuals and national capitalists - were required to function in the party, not from the bottom of the organisation upward, but rather to join the SSU at its higher levels, from the provincial level and above. 1 Below the provincial level, 1. This arrangement should not mean that trade unions, below provincial levels were autonomous; the regime dissolved trade unions in May 1970 and subsequently replaced them by organisations affiliated to the Party.
the party principally functioned according to residential location. Similar controls on occupational representation obtained in relation to the National Assembly.

Notwithstanding the practical limits on occupational representation, the question of social representation also posed certain conceptual problems. The regime's programme of change and its instrument presupposed a massive social planning operation and, therefore, large numbers of expert cadres. The only viable source for providing the required cadre was the state bureaucracy. A new perspective of bureaucracy was, therefore, to be instituted; one that would go beyond the conventional bureaucratic role of economic and social administration to embrace tasks of social change, political development and nation-building.¹

Requirements of popular representation envisaged in the National Charter and the Constitution were to be subordinated to the imperatives of social change. The pattern of social representation in the state's institutions was, therefore, structured to give leadership and control to state bureaucrats - civil and military - as against popularly elected representatives. The significance of the bureaucracy's role in the polity will be taken up in the third and fourth sections of the chapter.

¹. On the role of the bureaucracy in change see Bakheit, 1971.
3.2.2 Conceptual Sources of the May Regime Ideology

Although subsequent policies of the May regime departed radically from the 1969 pronouncements, the basic ingredients of the ideology, noted above, remained basically unchanged throughout the 1970s. The pattern of political theorising underpinning the regime's ideology was not dissociated from conventional political and social theory. Two strands of thought are often quoted as main sources for the May regime ideology: Arab socialism, particularly "Nassirism", and the political tradition of the Sudanese left (Bechtold, P., 1976, p.260). The group of Arab socialists was non-Marxist in orientation, advocating patterns of political and economic development based on Egyptian experience. The second ideological source was represented by a group who had broken away from the Sudanese Communist Party in August 1970, on the issue of the kind of support which the party should have given to the new regime; they called for dissolving the SCP in favour of working within the Sudanese Socialist Union, the regime's new political organisation (Niblock, 1974-412). Reading into the preamble of the National Charter one can easily detect the influence of these two strands of thought in shaping the broad strategy of the May regime.

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1. A split within the SCP appeared as early as 1966 over whether the Party should support progressive coups in the absence of mass mobilisation and whether it should merge with other organisations for tactical gains instead of maintaining its organisational autonomy. Those members of the Party who favoured supporting progressive coups - some of whom were on the central committee - eventually defected to Nimeiri's camp (Collins, C., 1976, pp.13,14; O'Neil, 1978,p.16).
However, as one moves beyond the preamble, to more substantive and definitive issues, a third influence of different theoretical orientation becomes strongly evident. We shall label this brand of analysis "techno-rationalist" and explain the connotation of the term as we establish the theoretical content of this tendency. It is not our intention, however, to question the epistemological basis of this form of analysis at this stage; we are rather interested in its conceptual roots and the implications of its assumptions for the formation of the state's institutional structure and the process of policy formation.

The three elements of the regime's ideology analysed above, and their empirical import, had close affinity with systems analysis and the modernisation school.\footnote{Cf. Chapter One, Section 1.2.} The link is explicable from an early article written by Dr Bakheit in December 1969. Subsequent recurrence of ideas and concepts from that article in the regime's political literature testifies to the influence of Dr Bakheit's thinking on the ideological project of the May regime.

Although the title of the article, "Administrative Effectiveness and the Trend of Change in Sudan", implied a narrow focus on public administration, Dr Bakheit wanted essentially to develop a model for understanding and explaining the "political event of May 25th, 1969". His search for an explanatory model for political and social change in Sudan
partly arose from discontent with the then prevailing patterns of analysis, which, in his view were:-

(a) Characterised by ideological bias. "The trend of change in Sudan ... had been emotionally observed and analysed along literary lines ...,

(b) Lacking in scientific method. "Understanding the trend of change is no longer an analytic pattern associated with static ideologies. It is rather an objective reading into events and deducing of theories and patterns which regulate these events...,

(c) adopting inadequate definitions of the Sudan's problems "... conceptual splitting and doctrinal dispute have meaning when ideology has an effective role in setting the quality of change or in broadening its extent or in speeding its pace. However, most of the Sudan's problems... (relate to) obtaining political, social and economic systems that suit the needs of modern life, the creation of objective values to support these systems ... (and, improving) the performance in the various sectors (of) ... services and production, where there is no place for doctrines and where the criterion is technical experience, occupational and professional talent. (Bakheit,
Although at the time of writing Dr Bakheit was a senior bureaucrat not formally involved in politics, the implicit target of his criticism was the SCP and its reservations towards the new regime. In contrast to the political analysis adopted by the SCP, Dr Bakheit called for a non-political model. He saw the Sudan's problems as, "problems of modernisation ... whose resolution depends on administrative rather than political theorising" (ibid, p.12).

His recommended model related to systems analysis and social systems theory (ibid, pp.9,10). The Sudanese society was conceived as a system containing a number of sub-systems, represented by political, economic and social sectors of society (ibid, p.16). Each system performed specific functions, important among them were system-maintenance and integration functions. Any functional discrepancy among system components was likely to impair system performance and must be eliminated.

Dr Bakheit attempted to use this model to study the political event of May 25th, 1969. He proposed that "the revolution of May 25th constitutes a system of numerous units, ... combined in a united form according to ... (specific) relations; ... (these relations) assume a particular order, which, if changed, affected the whole system and its parts, and affected the structure of the revolution and the nature of its direction" (ibid, p.15).

1. This definition was borrowed from systems analysis. See Almond and Powell, 1966, p.19.
Adopting this model, Dr Bakheit believed that any attack on a particular revolutionary segment constituted an attack on the revolution. The model should also permit the identification of those social sectors who had stakes in the revolution. However, this should not mean that other social sectors had no "functional" role in the system. "Modernising forces are not the only ones capable of effecting political and social change ... The traditional forces undertake, as well, the same duty" (ibid, p.18).

Through its emphasis on societal integration, interdependence and consensus, systems analysis was, therefore, consistent with the regime's assumptions about the nature of the Sudanese society. The adoption of social system theory to understand the nature of society and change was seen by Dr Bakheit as grounding social research on a firm scientific basis. By contrast, a Marxist perspective of society was considered ideologically biased, political and hence less "rational". Systems analysis was conceived as a rational method for comprehending social change, but it was also to be used in a technical capacity to engineer social change. Within this framework of analysis, once the system's components, functions and interrelations were identified and classified, social problems would be adequately dealt with, given the right techniques and an expert cadre.
From the above reading into Dr Bakheit's analysis we can detect a positivistic conception of society which attempted to ground social analysis on a narrow scientism, leaving no room for ideology, values and social conflict. Dr Bakheit's contribution belonged, therefore, to a "techno-rationalist" pattern of social analysis, that appealed to science and technology to legitimise the political ideology of the May regime. While social system theory represented an important source for Dr Bakheit's thinking, his long experience as an administrative officer, brought up under the paternalistic tradition of colonial administration, had infused into his thinking a belief in a dominant role for the state in society. His long professional experience strengthened his views on the role of technical experts in change.

We noted at the beginning of this section, the impact of other sources on the regime's ideology. We find no basic contradiction between the conceptual framework derived from social system theory and the other two brands of thought - Arab socialism and the break-away group of the SCP - to the extent that the latter groups de-emphasised social conflict, adopted a consensus model of society and propagated a national compromise ideology. Their ideology fits comfortably Hudson's description: "propagating an ideology of nationalism, neutralism and state capitalism called socialism" (Hudson, M., 1977, 336). Thus, although these two groups belonged to a different political tradition, their approach to change and their empirical strategies were, nevertheless, "techno-rationalist"
in orientation, in the sense of substituting science and technology for politics and conflict. This point will be elaborated in the third and fourth sections of this chapter.

3.2.3 Conclusion

We conducted in this section an exposition of the main ingredients, for the purpose of this study, of the ideology of the May regime and traced its main conceptual sources. The purpose of this exercise was to bring out the main themes in that ideology which informed the formation of the state's institutional structure. We argued that certain elements in that ideology fostered a large role for the state in social change, to be accomplished through modern organisation and technology. The central role assigned to the state and the massive institutional framework envisaged posed the question of how social representation in the state apparatus was to be achieved. Contrary to the claims of popular representation dominant in the regime's literature, the concepts of power and change adopted made it necessary that the state apparatus be controlled and led by bureaucrats. In the following section we relate the foregoing interpretation of the ideology of the May regime to the actual process of institutional formation.
3.3 THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE MAY REGIME

3.3.1 General

The internal structure of the state in Sudan was largely a legacy of the second colonial state 1898-1956. Following independence in 1956, the state apparatus basically provided for a "Westminster" political model which prevailed during the two parliamentary periods, 1956-58, 1964-69.

Although the intervening period of the first military rule, 1958-64, witnessed the suspension of the parliamentary system, generally the basic assumptions underlying the state apparatus remained intact. By contrast, the May regime, 1969, introduced a massive reorganisation of the state apparatus and changed its basic premises. From the above overview of the regime's ideology the main assumptions behind the reorganisation process can be stated as the following:-

(a) A dominant role for the state in social change, involving the concentration of power in the Executive in contrast to legislative and judicial organs.

(b) Reorganising the institutional structure on a "scientific" basis and expanding it both horizontally and vertically to integrate the state's action and ensure its efficacy.
(c) A belief in a "rational-scientific" model of socio-economic planning required placing technical cadres in the leadership of policy planning and implementation institutions.

The process of state reorganisation was to involve, therefore, a change in the power balance among state institutions and, in the balance of social representation in them. In what follows we examine the reorganisation process in terms of

(a) the concentration of power in particular state institutions and,

(b) the social character of dominant state organs.

3.3.2 The Concentration of Power in the Executive

Most of the reorganisation process took place during the period 1969-74. While the early part of this period witnessed the dissolution of the institutions of the previous regime and the formation of provisional ones, the latter part marked the evolution of the permanent structures of the state. Except for the National Charter, whose first draft was completed in 1969, most of the other institutions emerged in the second half of 1971 (Niblock, 1974-408). These included the reorganisation of local government, the formation of the Party, the enactment of the provisional constitution and the promulgation of the presidency. The
significance of the time sequence of the reorganisation process was its synchronisation with the growing influence of the proponents of the "techno-rationalist" perspective, following the break in relations between the regime and the SCP in November 1970. The influence of the former group was to be particularly felt in the pattern of the organisation that was adopted.

The permanent constitution provided for five national institutions which constituted the main pillars of the political system. These were the Party, the Presidency, the Assembly, the Judiciary and local government. Of all these institutions, the Presidency emerged as the most powerful in terms of executive, legislative, judicial and political powers.

The Constitution established a presidential system of government. The President was to be nominated by the Party and elected by a plebiscite for a six-year term. The constitution concentrated great authority in the head of state (Holt and Daly, 1979, 205). He could rule by decree and declare a state of emergency under which he assumed sweeping powers. Following an abortive coup in 1975, the Constitution was amended to give the President more powers - Articles 81 and 82 of the Constitution. The amendments rendered inoperative clauses of the Constitution which safeguarded civil and individual liberties during emergency situations (Malwal, 1981, 161).

1. For the structure of the political system, see Appendix 3.1.
The Constitution vested legislative powers both in the Assembly and the President. The President could legislate by decree to be passed later by the Assembly. He could annul any bill passed by the Assembly, but the Assembly could, in theory, overrule his annulment if a two-thirds majority were against the annulment. However, the structure of representation in the Assembly made a two-thirds majority vote against the President very unlikely. He could dissolve the Assembly and call for a new election. Apart from emergency powers, his legislative powers were far greater than those of the Assembly.

In his executive capacity the President was the head of the Executive. He had the power to appoint and remove ministers, who were accountable to him and not to the Assembly. However, the Assembly was allowed to question ministers and to force, by a two-thirds majority, a minister to submit his resignation, but it could not compel the President to accept that resignation. The President was the supreme commander of the army and the head of the civil service. He had the power to appoint and remove officers of the army, senior officials in the public service and officers in the security forces. Except for two brief periods in 1970 and 1976 the President assumed the premiership throughout the 1970s.

1. The Assembly consisted of 250 members, 25 of whom were appointed by the President, 125 were elected directly by geographical constituencies, 70 were elected by functional and occupational associations, and 30 were selected by Provincial People's Councils. All candidates (up to 1978) must be approved by the Party.
Local government was another institution which was used extensively to promote the power of the President and the Executive. The 1971 local government reorganisation expanded dramatically the institutional structure of local government and increased its functions and powers.\footnote{The build up of the new structure of local government was completed in 1974. There were 3993 village councils, 737 town section councils, 281 nomads councils, 78 market councils, 15 industrial area councils, 90 town councils, 35 sub-province councils and 10 province executive councils. By contrast, the previous system of local government had a total of only eighty six town and rural councils.} These new powers and functions were located in provincial councils, whose leaders - the commissioners - were personally appointed by the President and accountable to him. Within provincial councils, commissioners were granted veto powers over a number of decisions if they were judged to be contrary to the public interest or the general policy of the state.\footnote{For critical assessment of the reorganisation of local government see Report of the Select Committee, National Assembly, 1976; Norris and Pickering 1980; Rondinelli, D., 1981.}

The Judiciary was directly responsible to the President. He appointed and removed the president and judges of the Supreme Court, the judges of the Courts of Appeal and judges of the other courts. Although theoretically independent, accountability to the President constrained judicial independence in practice. The membership of the Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court in the Party's Political Bureau weakened the argument that the judiciary was independent.
The fifth institution to be considered here is the Party - the SSU. Although students of government would not include political parties as government institutions, the role envisaged for the SSU in the regime's ideology, its heavy reliance on government sponsorship and its close involvement in the policy process made it more a parastatal agency than an autonomous political organisation. Conventional functions of interest aggregation, interest articulation and mobilisation of public opinion usually associated with political parties appeared to be a secondary priority to the Party's involvement in public administration.

The Party had a pyramidal structure that ran parallel to the structure of government. At the national level the Party had five institutions: the National Congress, the General Secretariat, the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Presidency.\(^1\) Representation in all these institutions was overwhelmingly influenced by the president of the Party who was the President of the country.\(^2\)

1. When the First National Congress of the Party was held in January 1974, there were 10 provincial units, 34 district units, 325 section units and 6,381 basic units of the SSU in the country.

2. For instance, the National Congress consisted of the following categories:
   (a) Elected representatives of provincial conferences.
   (b) Members of the Central Committee, part of whom were appointed by the President.
   (c) Secretaries of the Party's specialised committees, who were directly appointed by the President.
   (d) Incumbents of constitutional bodies, all of whom were appointed by the President.
   (e) Members of the Supreme Court, who were appointed by the President.
   (f) Representatives of the army, also were appointed by the President.
   (g) Ex-Officio members, and
   (h) Other members selected by the President who should not exceed 10% of the members of the Congress (SSU, 1977, pp.49-50).
The influence of the President tended to increase at the highest organs of the Party. The significance of the sweeping powers of the leader of the Party, for this study, is that he was able to mobilise expert cadres from the state bureaucracy into the Party, through political pressure as well as by offering lucrative job opportunities. Apart from weakening the argument that there was popular representation through the Party this process helped to promote the influence of the Executive in the SSU. The implication was that the process of political decision-making in the Party was often dominated by members drawn from the civil service.

3.3.3 The Institutional Practice

Architects of the May regime institutions saw a strong presidency as the solution to the political instability experienced under the parliamentary system. Furthermore, given the role of the state in change envisaged in the regime's ideology, a strong presidency was seen as necessary for ensuring a continuity in planning and implementation of development. The assumption was that, policy would be thoroughly debated in the Party and alternative policy options presented to the Executive. The Assembly would check on the Executive's performance and legislate measures required to execute policy. The Judiciary would, among other things, ensure that institutional practice did not contravene the provisions of the Constitution.
Institutional practice did not, however - in a number of significant cases - conform to the above arrangement. To have a brief look at institutional practice we will refer to the work of Malwal (1981) who was a prominent participant in these institutions during the 1970s.¹

Despite the huge constitutional powers wielded by the President, he ignored, in many important situations, institutional rules and made decisions on matters of "far reaching consequence" without seeking the advice of those institutions most immediately concerned. Referring to specific cases, Malwal wrote:

"It is not necessary to shuffle a whole cabinet in secrecy, or to appoint a member of the Central Committee of the SSU within one day, or even to announce a general amnesty ... without advance discussions in the political and constitutional institutions concerned" (ibid, 171).

The President apparently did not like to abide by institutional procedures.

"President Nimeiri is not a bureaucrat, but a very strong-minded person who wants to see things done at once... he is interested in the accomplishment of things ..., and not in the methods used to accomplish them". (Ibid, 169, 165).

The concentration of power in the Presidency gave patronage to the Executive and enabled it to overshadow other institutions. There was also another process of power

¹ B. Malwal was a member of the Political Bureau of the SSU and Minister of Culture and Information during the period 1972-1977.
they have wielded for years and they have no desire to relinquish it ..." (Ibid, p.169 emphasis added). At the level of national development policy, it was reported that some ministries, especially those with powerful ministers were taking unilateral action in executing development policy and even seeking external finance in their own way. This behaviour, argued the Director of the National Planning Commission, has partly led to a continuously widening gap between total commitment and available resources, (Abdel Wahab, 1976, in El-Hassan, 1976, pp.230,233).

We deduce both from the formal arrangement of the state apparatus and the institutional practice that power was concentrated in specific institutions and that its exercise was dependent on coalitions and alliances obtaining in those institutions. The process of policy making is expected to follow closely the pattern of power distribution within and between these institutions. Without overlooking the impact of broad "structural" constraints on policy direction, the social character of dominant power coalitions within the state apparatus is seen here as significantly important for understanding the immediate factors underlying certain policy approaches and for explicating possible linkages between policy formation and specific social interests. In the following part we examine the social character of dominant state institutions and attempt to relate it to evolving policy approaches.
3.3.4 The Social Character of the State Apparatus

The social composition of leading state institutions in Sudan contrasted markedly between the pre- and post-1969 periods. The majority of state top functionaries under the first military rule were military officers (Holt and Daly, op.cit., p.171). During the parliamentary period 1956-58, 1964-69 the lawyer/businessman stereotype was dominant (Nugdallah, 1973, Ch.6).

The social character of the May regime was different. Seen against the backdrop of the regime's ideology, the state's internal structure presupposed the following principles:

(a) The adopted model of social change would require placing of technical cadres in the leadership of policy-making agencies.

(b) Popular participation envisaged in the regime's ideology must be subordinated and confined to non-policy related agencies.

(c) A system of cooption should be maintained to facilitate the incorporation of those social sectors whose support/acquiescence might be necessary.
These principles characterised more or less the process of political recruitment under the May regime. Incumbents of senior state institutions can be classified into three main categories on the basis of occupation and relative proximity to the process of policy-formation. The first category can be labelled the "university group". Its members mostly came from universities or international organisations. Most of them were drawn from an academic background and held distinguished academic qualifications. The government ministers in the group are mostly specialists in the field relevant to their ministries; many have spent a long time outside Sudan working for a variety of international bodies." (Niblock, op. cit., 415).

The second category included bureaucrats who, having identified with the new regime, held senior political position after a fairly long career in the civil or military service. The third category is a residual one, including lawyers and businessmen.

The lawyer/businessman cabinet image which prevailed during the parliamentary period was replaced, under the May regime, by a coalition of military and civilian bureaucrats and academics and international managers. Within this power-coalition, we propose that a "techno-bureaucratic" group was clearly dominant, as far as policy formation was concerned. In what follows, we define the term technocracy, outline the circumstances which fostered its rise in the Sudan and consider the presence of technocrats in the May
regime.

(a) "Technocracy"

Our use of the term "technocrat" draws on a body of writings on technocracy in Europe and Latin America. In order to clarify the circumstances which fostered the rise of technocracy to political power in the Sudan we shall refer first to the historical experience of Europe.

The early development of the concept of "technocracy" can be traced back to the intellectual doctrines of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, notably the Saint Simonian school which was in favour of government by technologists (Meynaud 1968, pp.144-199). However, the term "technocracy" was first coined in the USA after the First World War to describe a system of economic thought inspired by the kind of rational analysis at the basis of physical sciences (ibid). During the 1960s the term gained wider currency in France and used by writers such as Meynaud (1968) to argue that "real power" had shifted from the elected representatives to the technical experts (Bullock and Stallybrass, 1977, 625). The term seems, therefore, to have gained various meanings at different times. In contemporary literature "technocracy" appears to denote many different things:
"a new social group, perhaps even a new ruling group, a new style of rule, a new dominant ideology and even a new phase of social organisation" (Larson, M, 1972/73, p.1).

In a historical perspective, the rise of "technocracy" has been associated with the convergence of two processes: the growth of industrial capitalism and the correlated advance of functional rationality and; the concentration and centralisation of power in society (ibid, p.11). Rationality is a fundamental basis of "technocracy". For Max Weber, the process of rationalisation had three principal and interconnected historical expressions: industrial capitalism, bureaucratic domination and modern science. (Ibid, p.2). It appears, therefore, that the historical process underlying the growth of rationalisation constituted a favourable condition for the rise of technocracy in the West.

Besides these structural aspects, "technocracy" is seen to involve an ideological aspect (ibid, p.7). The introduction of "technical rationality", characteristic of academic and scientific work, into the political process - as technical experts assume political office - is seen to lend legitimacy to purely political decisions and provide a cloak of "ideological" support to the "structure of domination".

From the Western historical experience, the rise of technocracy can, therefore, be associated with three aspects: a change in the structure of production and growth of scientific knowledge, bureaucratisation, and centralisation of power
in society. However, there are important variations between Western historical experience and the complex of economic and political institutions currently obtaining in Third World countries.

A number of studies have noted the rise of technocracy in Third World countries, particularly in Latin America (eg. Larson, op.cit., Collins, C., 1982, O'Donnell 1973). Emergence of technocracy in these countries was seen to correspond to a new phase in relations of dependence with dominant world economies (Larson, op.cit., p.10). Describing the formation of technocratic roles in Brazil, O'Donnell (1973) wrote:

"Larger organisations engaged in more complex production, the effects of industrialisation upon communications, marketing, publicity and information-processing services, as well as the need for coordination of more diversified social units and activities - all require an increasing "input" of persons who have gone through prolonged training in techniques of production, planning and control" (O'Donnell, quoted in Collins, 1982, p.123).

In addition to the impact of international capital on local production structures, the rise of technocracy also relates to internal balance of power and interests in each country. Existence of a "strong" state seems to represent an important condition for the rise of technocracy. However, a "strong" state does not necessarily presuppose a change in the internal structure of production as in the case of Latin American countries. While change in production structures generates technocratic
roles the rise of technocrats to political power in the
Third World may be closely associated with changes in the
balance of political power.

(b) The Rise of Technocracy in the Sudan

In Sudan "technocracy" may be seen as a political trend
arising not so much from changes in the structure of the
economy as from changes in the structure of political power,
resulting in new social alliances within the "structure of
domination". Its emergence during the early 1970s can be
related to three interrelated developments:

First, it has to be seen in relation to the political
circumstances preceding the inception of the May regime in
1969. The period 1965-69 was marked by continuous political
instability and factional disputes within the dominant
parties. The Umma Party (UP) - the representative of the
agro-commercial business - split into two factions in 1966.¹
The NUP and the PDP merged into one party, the National
Democratic Party (NDP) in 1968. They exploited the split
in the UP, shifting alliance from one faction to the other.

¹. One faction was led by Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi and advocated
reforming the party to broaden its base of political support;
the other faction was led by his uncle, Al-Hadi, the patron
of the party, who opposed the proposed reform. The split
reflected a struggle between the religious leaders repre­
sented by Al-Mahdi family and the commercial bourgeoisie
and other petty bourgeoisie who demanded more participation
in the party (Khalafalla, E., 1981, p.69).
The process of political restructuring was further accentuated by the emergence of regional political groupings. In the Red Sea Hills of eastern Sudan, the Beja Congress was formed; in western Sudan the Nuba Mountains Federation was created. The emergence of these organisations, together with the southern groupings endangered the rural vote of the dominant parties and heightened contest among the latter parties to recruit the support of regional associations.

At another plane, the period 1965-69 witnessed a tense confrontation between the three dominant parties and the radical movement, led by the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). The SCP emerged after 1964 October "revolution" with a good support among the urban proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie.  

The UP, NUP and the Moslem Brotherhood passed a bill in the Parliament in November 1965 banning the SCP and unseating its members in Parliament, on the ground that Marxist doctrines were anti-Islamic.

The political situation was further compounded by the escalation of the civil war in the south. There was a mounting frustration among the lower and middle classes,

1. In the 1965 Parliamentary elections eleven communist-supported candidates were elected out of the 15 special Graduates Constituencies. The SCP received 17.5% of all votes (ibid, p.74).

2. The Supreme Court ruled in December 1966, that the decision of banning the SCP was unconstitutional, but the Parliament proceeded with the ban, leading to a deep rift between the Judiciary and the Parliament.
with political factionalism, and a declining faith in party politics. The scene was set for the growth of an ideology that saw politics and conflict as irrational and irrelevant to problems of development and modernisation. Our earlier exposition of the main themes in the May ideology revealed this trend of thinking.

Second, the political turbulence reflected negatively on the economy. The continuous change of governments undermined the capacity of the state to effectively manage the economy. The drain on resources by the civil war in the south, consuming 20-30% of the budget, and the decline in foreign aid and loans after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War led to chronic budget deficit. The government resorted to borrowing from local banks, and internal borrowing soared from $11 million in 1966 to $131 million in 1969 (Collins, C., 1976, p.12).

The rate of national and public investment declined during the period 1965-69. Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation dropped from 15.8% of GDP in 1964/65 to 12.1% in 1968/69 (Hamid, G., 1977, p.135). The implication was

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1. As Abdel-Rahim noted, there "was a state of general disillusionment in which the main topic for consideration in clubs, private discussions and even university tutorials, was the idea that the question for the Sudanese people was no longer whether or not the existing set up could ever be saved but what the alternative should be" (Abdel-Rahim, M., 1978, p.23).

2. It was less than the 15% minimum recommended by the UN for serious development (ibid).
a slowing down of capital accumulation (Khalafalla, op.cit., p.69). Obviously, the state suffered from two weaknesses typical of competitive accumulation:

"first, the economic weakness of being unable to produce the necessary inputs of accumulation through accumulation itself; and second, the weakness that the ruling class ...is unable to develop a class consciousness containing consented and workable directives as to how the state should operate" (Offe, C., 1975, p.134).

Although the bourgeois-dominated parties controlled the state they were unwilling to operate it in the collective interest of the capitalist classes. This is partly because the dominant economic interests were spread over many political parties and each fraction of capital strived to maintain its own economic interests.¹ The national bourgeoisie was not united in a single party in order to develop a policy that would secure its collective economic interest. There was, therefore, a need for a strong organisation which would synthesise the common interests of the capitalist class; strong enough to outweigh the political muscle of individual factions of capital and force them to comply to imperatives of the common interest of capitalist class. There was a need for a strong state which would halt the slowing down of the accumulation process and make a strategic decision to accelerate capital accumulation. But to provide these conditions the leadership of the state must not come from the bourgeois classes (Al-Battahani, A., 1976, p.66). The scene was therefore set for the emergence of a strong

¹ We noted the intra-bourgeois rivalries in Ch.2, Section 2.3.3.(a).
authoritarian state in 1969 led by petty bourgeois army officers and civil servants.

Third, the rise of technocracy in the Sudan can also be related to the problem of legitimacy which the May regime had to confront during its first three years in office. Having been cut off both from the Right - in 1970 - and from the Left - in 1971 - the regime had to search for an alternative ideological platform. Technocracy was perceived by the May regime as an apolitical policy approach which would appeal to a wider section of the middle and lower classes, under the notions of development and national unity. It would also be instrumental in soliciting the support of foreign capital in the wake of the "investment strike" by the indigenous capital during the early 1970s.

Sudanese Technocrats

Two categories of technocrats in the May regime can be identified. The first category is the "university group". This group was technical in its professional orientation in the sense that its training and occupational practice has been based on a technical or scientific basis, whether in natural or social sciences. This group is usually present

1. It must be noted that the term "technocrats" is used here loosely as members of this group may not think of themselves as belonging together, and by the virtue of their place in the social structure they are bound to adopt different views on various issues.
in academic institutions, international specialist organisations and few specialised public and private agencies in Sudan. The presence of members of this group in government is seen to be based primarily on their expert knowledge and technical know-how.

Although some members of this group might have held political views similar to those advocated by the May regime, nevertheless, they primarily saw themselves as technical experts in the first place. Most of them would consider themselves as politically neutral. Niblock noted that a number of them had been together as students at the University of Khartoum, and in 1955/56 had belonged to the "Neutralist Block" which had sought to occupy the middle ground between right and left in the Students' Union politics (Niblock, op.cit., p.415). Another younger generation of the group were members of the "Socialist Union", a centre-left student group in the University of Khartoum during the 1960s; most of the leaders of the "Socialist Union" became prominent figures in the May regime.

A common ground for the "university group" is what Larson (1972/73) noted that,

"They view themselves as sharing an objective and universal rationality based on superior knowledge. Their concept of reason stands above political lines and, in certain cases, conflicts with the politicians' criteria for decision making" (Larson, N. 1972/73, p.19).
The tendency towards involving the "university group" in government is a recent development in the recruitment of political elite in the Sudan, started by the May regime. Although their involvement with the regime followed closely the deterioration in relations between the regime and the SCP, their presence did not become conspicuous until the post-1971 period as the regime's new institutions were set up.

During the period 1969-85, 28 university lecturers took ministerial posts in the national and regional governments. The majority came from the Faculties of Agriculture and Arts, University of Khartoum. While the agriculturalist consistently supplied ministers and deputy ministers for Agriculture, Arts lecturers mostly took senior posts in the Presidency and in the Party.

A group of similar orientation to university lecturers was that of international managers. We found that about ten of the ministers of the May regime worked previously for international organisations and multinational companies. These included the IMF, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, Arab League, African Development Bank and private firms in the UK and Kuwait.

The second category of technocrats consisted of civil servants and army officers. Like the former category, this group also underwent university or college training. But

1. 32% came from Agriculture, 22% Arts, 14% Veterinary, 11% Engineering, 2% Economics, 2% Law and 2% Medicine.
unlike it, it worked in bureaucratic organisations for a reasonable length of time. Though it would think of itself, like the former category, as politically neutral, it was more politicised in outlook and orientation than its predecessors of the 1950s and 1960s who had been brought up under colonial notions of a non-political public service. In its political persuasion it identified more with wider nationalist issues such as national unity and development than with narrow political ideologies.

The presence of both categories of technocrats in government was, more or less, stable during the 1970s, as the following table illustrates. The share of civil servants in junior ministerial posts increased, however, in the late 1970s. Thus, in 1981 there were eleven state ministers, eight of whom were civil servants, two from university and one from the military.
Table 3.1: Previous Occupations of the Members of Cabinet and Political Bureau in 1974 and 1981

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Militarymen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;University Group&quot;</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: The Middle East and Africa, 1974/75 pp. 642, 643, and 1981/82, pp. 716, 717; and biographies of ministers compiled by the writer.

3.3.5 Conclusion

This section focused on the institutional structure of the state in the Sudan. We examined two features of the reorganisation of the state apparatus during the 1970s. First we noted the concentration of power in the Executive and the Presidency. Institutional practice indicated that certain power-coalitions within the Executive were dominating the process of policy formation. Second, we attempted to analyse the social character of the state's dominant institutions. In contrast to previous regimes, technocrats were significant at the level of policy formation during the 1970s. It must be stressed, however, that their prominence should not imply that they had "autonomous" power in relation
to dominant economic interests. The considerable power of the President was an important limitation on technocrats. Furthermore, legitimacy needs of the regime necessitated, at times, departure from technocratic policy prescriptions, leading at times to cabinet reshuffles. The significance of the ascendancy of Sudanese technocrats to political power is better comprehended in relation to the process of policy formation, policy models adopted and the social character of that policy. The relation between technocracy and policy formation is examined in the following section.

3.4 TECHNOCRACY AND POLICY FORMATION

3.4.1 General

Our approach for understanding the process of policy formation and its impact on the social content of policy centres mainly on analysis of the institutional structure and its mode of operation. The pattern of institutional arrangement and the social character of major policy institutions signify, for this study, a strong presence of a "technocratic" policy model in the Sudan during the 1970s. In this section we trace, broadly, the technocratic influence on the pattern of economic planning in Sudan. An exposition of the notion of "rationality" adopted in the technocratic planning model should help us in understanding the social character of planning policy. The technocratic policy model is seen to have biased socio-economic programmes to the interest of a narrow sector of the population to the
detrimen of wider sectors in urban and rural areas. The social impact of this pattern of planning is discussed in Chapters Four, Five and Six.

We defined in the preceding section the meaning of technocracy adopted in this study and outlined the historical context for its rise. The significance of technocracy for policy formation may be examined by considering basic elements in technocratic thinking in relation to substantive policy areas. The next step will be to assess how far these elements informed the process of policy formation.

Studying writings of three Brazilian technocrats, Collins (1982) identified the following as recurring themes in technocratic thought:

(a) Emphasis on "development" as the taken-for-granted ultimate goal of society, with minimal consideration for socio-political cost, conflict, moral questions and ideology.

(b) A recognition that the state has a fundamental role in achieving the aforesaid objective of development.

(c) A belief in functional rationality as combining substantive rationality.

(d) Planning is viewed as a rational necessity of
government action.

(e) Political stability is seen as a sine qua non for effective planning and implementation of development (Collins, op.cit. pp.125-136).  

These themes bear close resemblance to elements of the ideology of the May regime we discussed above. Emphasis on development, to be carried out through central planning, under conditions of political stability and national unity, was the dominant feature of state policy in Sudan during the 1970s. The notion of rationality implicit in planning activity is taken for granted, in technocratic thinking, as instrumental to the effective realisation of developmental goals. However, a universal relevance of this notion of rationality to the formulation of broad objectives of social change has yet to be established.

Two categories of rationality were identified in the literature: functional rationality and substantive rationality. (Diesing, P., mentioned by Larson, 1972/73, p.3). The former category refers to techniques and processes of action, the latter is concerned with the content of final goals and societal objectives. Rationality, however, possesses a contradictory element in the sense that functional rationality could work against substantive rationality. Weber, for instance, saw technical rationality as inevitably contradicting substantive equality and substantive

l. Cf. Ilchman's analysis, mentioned above, Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3(b).
democracy (Larson, op.cit., p.3). K Mannheim expressed this contradiction in the following way:-

"(I)n industrial rationalisation served to increase functional rationality ... but offered far less scope for the development of substantial rationality in the sense of the capacity of independent judgement ... (F)unctional rationalisation is, in its very nature, bound to deprive the average individual of thought, insight and responsibility and to transform these capacities to the individuals who direct the process of rationalisation". (Ibid, p.4, emphasis in original).

The root of this contradiction partly lies in that certain societal goals and values such as equality and social justice do not meet the specific requirements of technical rationality. The problem arises when, in the absence of an objective rationalisation of societal goals, instrumental strategies based on technical criteria of rationality, become goals in themselves. As a consequence, functional rationality constitutes the basis for setting up goals of public policy, hence substituting for substantive rationality. This substitution process is likely to become more pronounced as technocratic elements assume a central role in policy formation. But technocratic involvement in the policy process involves two contradictory dimensions as we noted earlier:

1. One way to overcome this contradiction and approach substantive rationality in the formulation of societal goals and objectives may be through removing restrictions on communications. As Habermas (1970) put it:- "Public, unrestricted discussion, free from domination, of the suitability of action orientating principles... at all levels of political and repoliticised decision-making processes is the only medium in which anything like "rationalisation" is possible". (quoted in Hearn, op.cit., p.44).
"On the one hand, the immediate efficiency of the technique is based on growing specialisation; on the other hand, the type of expertise called for ... is not specialised but functionally polyvalent ... (and) ... extend(ing) ... over the broad range of ... policy planning". (Larson, op. cit., p.11) emphasis in original).

In considering issues of a socio-economic and political nature policy models must go beyond the bounds of functional rationality, simply because the bases of technical rationality are too narrow to deal with wider social issues. However, in the absence of an alternative policy model and by the nature of their orientations and training, technocrats tend to treat substantive policy areas using models based on functional or technical rationality. One implication of this policy approach is that socio-economic and political issues are dealt with to the extent that they lend themselves to technical treatment. This is because prevailing models were unable to assign appropriate weights for social factors such as asset and income distribution, balanced regional development, social mobility etc. (Thavaraj, M., 1984, p.526). Those policy problems which do not fit into the technocratic model are likely to be considered residual issues and therefore assume secondary importance in the planning process.1 Technical terms like 'natural advantage', 'absorptive capacity', 'critical thresholds' and 'rates of growth' were often used to explain away the regional discrepancies created by development (Ilchman, 1972, p.244).

Another implication of the technocratic policy model is that

1. The above approach to planning was reportedly central to the "ideology" of planners in the Third World (eg. see Chapter One, Section (1.2.3.(b))).
it does not encourage active participation by the people concerned in plan preparation and implementation, leading often to a gap in communication between planners and the people for whom development is being initiated.

3.4.2 A New Policy Approach

We noted in the second section of this chapter emphasis in the May regime ideology on societal consensus and dismissal of politics and ideology as irrational. The tendency was to promote planning as an alternative method of effecting change. A change in the mode of operation of the institutional structure of the state was taking place from the early 1970s. It was manifested in two processes:-

(i) In contrast to a political model of policy formation which prevailed during the parliamentary period a technocratic model was adopted by the May regime. In the latter policy model, technical and scientific approaches to planning were to constitute the basis of policy formation. Both in the National Charter and the Constitution clear emphases were laid on scientific planning and,

"the role of scientific research, universities and higher institutes in providing frameworks for economic projects ... (and) applying science in all fields of production".
(National Charter, op.cit., pp.43,44).
The institutional dimension of this shift in policy approach was soon reflected in the formation, for the first time in the modern history of the Sudan, of a wide network of planning organs (see Diagram 3.1). At the highest level of the state, there was a Supreme Council for Planning under the direct supervision of the President and responsible for setting the broad planning objectives. A National Planning Organisation, an advisory political body, was to ascertain views of the different sections of the population in relation to major development objectives. The Ministry of Planning, formed as early as 1969, was in charge of administering and coordinating the planning and implementation of projects. The National Planning Commission, formed in 1971, was responsible for detailed programming of national planning objectives into actual projects. Below this level, there was a myriad of planning units in various ministries and departments at central, regional and local levels.
Diagram 3.1: The Institutional Structure of National Planning 1969-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Unit</th>
<th>Institutional Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Supreme Planning Council</td>
<td>Presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. National Planning Organisation</td>
<td>A nationwide political body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ministry of Planning</td>
<td>Central Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. National Planning Commission</td>
<td>Administrative Unit of Central Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Planning units in central, regional and local departments</td>
<td>Administrative units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The formation of this planning network fostered a surge of technocratic roles at various institutional levels of the state hierarchy. Emphasis in development policy on scientific planning and therefore the need for planning expertise meant that technical cadres with high academic qualifications assumed more significance in the process of policy formation. This tendency was reflected in the concentration of highly qualified personnel in the National Planning Commission, the key planning institution, as Appendix 3.3 illustrates. The import of the new policy approach was the centralisation of the planning process and the increasing use of "rational" planning systems in the policy process (e.g. see Rondinelli, 1982). 

Shortly we will examine the impact of the new policy model on economic planning.

(ii) Another manifestation of the change in the mode of operation of the state was the expanding involvement of the state in the economy since the early 1970s and hence the increasing need for central planning. In contrast to the pre-1969 regime, the growth of the public sector under the May regime, whether measured by the size of public sector employees, or by the magnitude of public sector spending or by the extent of government involvement in total economic activity, was considerable. We already outlined in Chapter Two, Section 2.2.3(b), the extent of public sector's involvement in the economy. (See also Appendix 3.2).

One implication of this quantitative expansion of the state sector was the spread of bureaucratic forms of (large-scale) organisation as the principal instrument for implementing development and change. This implementation strategy came to influence the process of policy planning, orientating it towards large-scale production units, the relevance of which to certain socio-economic problems is questionable, as we explain below.
To recapitulate, we noted above the basic elements of technocratic thought and then criticised the notion of rationality employed in the technocratic policy model. The shift in Sudan towards a technocratic policy model was pointed out. In the remaining part of this chapter we examine briefly the impact of this policy strategy on the pattern of economic planning in the Sudan during the 1970s.

3.4.3 Economic Planning

We already underlined in Chapter Two the structural imbalance in the Sudanese economy. This imbalance is closely reflected in the regional distribution of development. More than 90% of the irrigated land is in Kassala and the former Blue Nile provinces (of central Sudan); almost 90% of mechanised farming takes place in these provinces (ILO, 1976, p.11). Elsewhere the modernisation of agriculture has been barely felt, leaving regions of western and southern Sudan with poor peasant economies. Moreover, the provision of public services such as education, health, power and transport has also been concentrated in the higher income areas, thereby accentuating the disparity (ibid).

This pattern of investment distribution is originally inherited from the second colonial state. Yet, it has been substantially consolidated under the post-colonial governments.¹ The early 1970s saw the propagation of the idea of

¹ A note on these Development Plans is available in Appendix 2.2.
Sudan becoming a "bread-basket" for the Arab world, by blending Arab money, western technology and Sudan's natural and human resources. This idea was developed in the Extended Five Year Plan, 1970-77, and subsequently elaborated in the Six Year Plan, 1977/78-1982/83. However, underlying planning philosophy which would bring about perceived economic change was not questioned. Assumptions of the prevailing model of economic planning were taken for granted. The model underlying this pattern of economic planning has two principal characteristics relevant for our analysis. These are:

(a) the assumption of the existence of a dual economy and the association of development with the expansion of "modern" sector into peasant economy, and,

(b) emphasis on the use of large-scale production units to modernise the "traditional" sector.

These two aspects bear close affinity to elements of technocratic thinking discussed earlier, as we explain below.

(a) The Concept of Development

Economic policy in the Sudan identified development as the progressive expansion of the "modern" sector of agriculture. According to the Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83, "modern" agriculture, providing more than half of the country's agricultural production, was more productive

The linkages between the two parts of the economy were considered to be weak as in the theory of theistic economy which assumes the existence of two less separate economies (Oesterdiefkhoff and Wohl 1983, p.37). However, the assumption of weak linkages characteristic of Sudanese development planning, questionable. There are important links between sectors, relating to labour, trade and production processes, which undermine the dualist thesis.

Historically, the "traditional" sector supplied seasonal labour to irrigated agriculture in central Sudan (M. El-A.G. El-Din, 1978). Furthermore, the "traditional" sector was made to bear the costs of maintaining the worker's family, providing a replacement for him when he became ill, unemployed (O'Brien, 1979, p.166). The social expenditure paid by the "traditional" sector for the reproduction of the "modern" sector represents a transfer of value from the former sector to the latter.

The two sectors are also linked together through production processes. For instance, the live produced in the "traditional" sector contributed 9.9% of the total GDP and 25.3% of the agricultural product (Mahmoud, 1981, p.13). Trade in meat and
put at more than £S 120 million annually. The
in the "traditional" sector were integrated in
"modern" sector of the economy through commerci
and production for exchange as well as through
on animals and crops (ibid, p.15). Against th
of physical output of all major exports from th
"modern" sector of agriculture during the 1970s
portionate contribution of the "traditional" se
the total value of exports has increased. Thu
sesame and livestock - products largely of the
sector - contributed almost 50% of the total v
exports during the period 1974-1981 (ROAPE,198:

What emerges from the concept of developme
in Sudanese development planning is that the ma
economic growth in the "modern" sector of the e
However, development as a process is not synon
economic growth (Colman and Nixon, 1978, p.5).
missible that average GNP, as an indicator of e
might rise, while at the same time income inequ
and negative progress is made to other developm

It may be argued that economic growth can throu
the "traditional" sector. Following it
Sudan, the ILO argued that traditional agricult
animal husbandry were capable, in the long term
returns to investment than either mechanised re
gated agriculture (1976). ¹

¹. For a useful comparison of productivity in t
Emphasis on economic growth and down-playin
development goals such as social equality and en
security are notable characteristics of technoc
ing. This attitude can be partly related to the
their method of analysis, being based on technic
ity. Mostly planners have been trained economic
discipline is to keep non-economic factors outs:
purview of analysis (Thavaraj, op.cit). But it
be argued that personal convenience may underly
concern for economic growth. Shepherd suggested
Sudanese bureaucracy preferred investment in la:
irrigated farming in central Sudan because it was
source for revenue when compared with the diffi
taxing the peasant produce in western and southe
(Shepherd, 1982, p.4). Imperatives of the tech
model and personal interest may reinforce each o
favour of economic growth.

(b) The Use of Large Scale Production Units

Development policy in the Sudan has been ch
by the wide use of large-scale public sector orz
for implementing development programmes. We a
this trend in Chapter Two. Although the use
of implementation strategy in agriculture achie
of "success" in central Sudan, its relevance to
the peasant economy in western Sudan has been qu
Given adequate evidence for its failure in weste
continued recurrence of this implementation stra
partly explained by a strong presence of technocratic elements in the planning machinery, whose interests are served by this type of implementation arrangement.¹

The origin of large-scale production units in the Sudan goes back to colonial agricultural policy. Outside the general administration, finance and service sectors, the public corporation became the dominant implementation strategy in central Sudan, where agricultural investment has been concentrated. The association between the public corporation and agricultural investment was consolidated in the 1960s with the increase of acreage in the Gezira project, the construction of the Khashm Al-Girba Scheme and the establishment of the public corporation of Agricultural Production in 1967. A major boost to large-scale production units, however, came in the 1970s as the public sector involvement in the economy increased dramatically under the Five Year and the Six Year Plans.

The relevance of this type of production system to the peasant economy in western Sudan was found neither ecologically desirable nor technically suitable. (Adams and Howell, 1979, p.511). Suitability of soil, land-use patterns and costly technical inputs constituted important barriers against replicating large-scale production units in western Sudan. For the government, however, modernising

¹. Other interests behind development of large-scale production units include agro-commercial classes in mechanised farming and international aid agencies (see Shepherd, 1983, pp.300,301).
"traditional" sector meant constructing large-scale projects to mechanise "traditional" agriculture, the establishment of modern ranches, the establishment of large-scale agricultural cooperatives and the development of close relations between "modern" agricultural schemes and neighbouring "traditional" agricultural areas (Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83).

It is suggested that the persistence of this policy approach despite its obvious limitations had particular professional and career roots (Adams and Howell, op.cit., p.516). Three main factors can be identified:

First, the historical bias of development towards large-scale irrigated agriculture in central Sudan structured policy planning towards export-crop production and hence gave the Ministry of Agriculture an important leverage in development policy. Early "development units" which guided development policy in the early 1950s were located in the Ministries of Finance, Irrigation and Agriculture (Abdel-Wahab, op.cit., p.220). This institutional arrangement must have been a strong influence on the agenda of development policy, leaning it towards export-oriented irrigated agriculture. By the time the Ten Year Plan 1961-1971 had been promulgated the Ministry of Agriculture was already an influential institution in national planning. The heavy reliance of the country on cotton for its foreign earnings ensured the importance of that institution.

Second, the career structure in the Ministry of Agriculture was leaning towards those trained in irrigated cash-
crop farming and related fields. Promotion and lucrative secondment were going to those who remained nearest the professional network based on the ministry and the major schemes such as Gezira and Rahad (Adam and Howell, op. cit., p. 517). By contrast law career status was accorded to general agricultural service in the ministry. Thus resource management and rural development planning were accorded a relatively low priority, as against crop science and agricultural engineering (ibid).

Third, the bias towards irrigated agriculture reflected on patterns of training and research in agriculture. While the Sudan has one of the best trained cadres of senior agricultural staff in Africa, few of them worked in western provinces (Howell, J., 1977, p. 105). In the Gezira Scheme and Research Station alone there were fifty Ph.D. holders in agriculture in the mid-1970s, mostly trained in the needs and problems of irrigated agriculture. Thus, agricultural research mainly developed in response to the needs of irrigated cash-crop farming and its results have predominantly benefited the "modern sector" (ILO, op. cit., p. 38). On the other hand, scant research was available on "traditional" agriculture. Consultants on the Southern Darfur Development Plan have reported that a review of hundreds of research results in the Sudan have turned up nothing relevant to the

1. Agricultural research in Sudan dates back to 1902. Most of the research is under the control of the Agricultural Research Corporation (ARC). By 1979 the ARC had 164 research scientists with Ph.D. or M.Sc. degrees, 139 assistant research scientists (B.Sc. levels), 625 technicians and 4,000 permanent labourers (FAO, 1982, p. 78).
problems of "traditional" farming in that province (ibid). Training and research orientations were, therefore, another significant factor biasing policy structures towards irrigated agriculture and implementation strategies developed in central Sudan.

It is obvious, therefore, that, although the bias towards large-scale production units had its origin in colonial agricultural policy, it was progressively consolidated through technocratic practice both at levels of planning models and organisational strategies of implementation. While dependence on cotton as a major export crop constituted a major "structural" limitation on alternative production systems, the Ministry of Agriculture and related departments, with their expert cadres, were instrumental in perpetuating the use of large-scale production units in implementing development programmes directed towards the peasant economy in western Sudan.

3.4.4 Conclusion

Our central concern in this section was the impact of technocracy on policy formation. We outlined first what might be the basic elements of technocratic thought in relation to development. We focused on the notion of rationality as a fundamental aspect in technocratic planning. We argued that limitations inherent in the notion of functional rationality and its potential contradiction with needs of substantive rationality are important considerations
for understanding the social character of the technocratic policy model.

We noted the shift to a new policy approach in the Sudan during the early 1970s. Adoption of a technocratic policy model was reflected in: (a) the formation of an expansive planning network and the ascendancy of technocrats in the policy formation machinery, and (b) the proliferation of large-scale production units as a dominant implementation strategy.

We focused, in the third part, on the impact of the technocratic policy model on the pattern of economic planning in Sudan. An exposition of the concept of development employed by techno-bureaucrats revealed a central concern with economic growth and minimal consideration for other developmental goals. Another feature of the technocratic policy model was the wide use of large-scale production units in the implementation of development programmes. Technocratic influence in proliferating and sustaining this implementation strategy was outlined.

While emphasis on economic growth and the use of large-scale production units associated closely with the pattern of technocratic policy analysis, they were also related to other distant factors. Important among these was the role of the international market in sustaining the current structure of the economy. Secondly, any dramatic change in the present distribution of development expenditure might be
resisted by certain privileged groups who continued to benefit from the status quo. (Shepherd, op. cit.). Given the correspondence between technocratic policy prescriptions and the interest of international and indigenous capital, identified earlier in Chapter Two, we may conclude that the technocratic policy model served to extend "structural" constraints into policy process.

Finally, emphasis on productivity and growth, characteristic of the technocratic policy model, were equally dominant in other policy areas such as urban housing, as we explain in the following chapter.

3.5 GENERAL CONCLUSION

We proposed at the beginning of this chapter that the institutional structure of the state could be an important instrument mediating social interest in public policy. In order to examine this proposition we selected three aspects of the institutional structure of the state, in Sudan, for analysis. These were: the main ideological assumptions underlying the formation of state apparatus and informing institutional goals and practice, the formal institutional structure, institutional practice and the social character of dominant institutions, and the evolving policy model.

An exposition of the main themes in the ideology of the May regime, in the second section, revealed an emphasis on a large role for the state in social change, to be
accomplished through modern organisation, science and technology. This change-strategy involved placing expert cadres in the leadership of state institutions and therefore compromising the regime's claims of popular participation.

Looking at the formal institutional arrangement and institutional practice in the third section, we noted an excessive concentration of power in the Executive and the Presidency. Policy formation was much dependent on power-coalitions and alliances obtaining in the Executive. In contrast to previous regimes, technocrats were found to have had very important roles in the process of policy formation under the May regime. Circumstances fostering their ascendancy were briefly outlined.

The fourth section of the chapter focused on the relation between technocracy and policy formation. We identified first the basic elements of technocratic policy-model. Examining the notion of rationality, we noted a contradictory dimension which we hypothesised to reflect on technocratic policy analysis and on the structure of policy prescriptions. Secondly, we attempted to apply our analysis of the technocratic model to policy models in the Sudan. We noted the shift in policy approach during the early 1970s towards a technocratic policy model. We proceeded to examine the impact of this new policy approach on the pattern of economic planning. An exposition of the concept of "development" adopted in technocratic planning revealed a central concern with economic growth and minimal
consideration for other developmental goals. We noted also a wide use of large-scale production units despite their limited applicability. Both the emphasis on economic growth and the use of large-scale production units were explained in terms of the dominant technocratic model.

Undoubtedly, the institutional structure of the state in Sudan has influenced considerably the pattern of policy planning and, therefore, the content of socio-economic policies. The part played by the institutional structure in the process of policy formation did not occur, however, independently of the conditions of class conflict. The trend towards establishing a "strong" state in the Sudan in the early 1970s, and therefore the change in the mode of operation of state structure, is seen here to have been fostered by the conditions of the accumulation process rather than in isolation from or in contradiction to those conditions, as we explained in Section 3.3.4 above. Our analysis of the prevailing policy model served to pinpoint how "structural" constraints acted upon the policy process. It also points to the significance of the institutional approach for structural analysis of the state policy.
CHAPTER FOUR

URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN GREATER KHARTOUM

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The subject matter of this study is the constraints on implementation of urban social policy. Our perspective of limitations on implementation, as stated in Chapter One, goes beyond the conventional view of organisational problems to deal with limitations which might arise in connection with institutions and processes outside immediate administrative control. We proposed above that both the form of the state in Sudan and the concomitant economic programme constituted broad limits on effective implementation of social policy. The previous chapter outlined the pattern of economic development pursued in Sudan, and pointed out its limitations.

In this chapter we address the social implications of the Sudanese model of economic planning. We consider the relation between national economic policy and urban growth, on the one hand, and the impact of both aspects on urban housing and patterns of land disposal in the capital, on the other. First, it will be shown that the processes underlying migration and rapid urban growth in Greater Khartoum were essentially generated by the adopted model of economic development. Far from consolidating rural economies and checking undesired rural emigration, the pattern of development has been destabilising the peasant economy and accelerating emigration in Western Sudan. Second, we argue that, together with those
national factors affecting urban growth and the demand for residential land in the capital, another set of influences, internal to urban political economy, have been active during the last decade, changing significantly the structure of land disposal. Central to these influences was the process of urban land commercialisation and its attendant implications. We argue that a careful consideration of land market dynamics is necessary to understand the limitations on urban housing, land policy and allocation patterns.

The chapter consists of three main sections. The following section provides an overview of urbanisation characteristics in the Sudan, exploring the main factors underlying urban growth. It focuses on the relation between regional development policy in Western Sudan, emigration and urban growth. The implications of urban growth on housing in Greater Khartoum are dealt with in the third section. The adequacy of housing strategies in the capital is assessed too. The fourth section examines the policy of land commercialisation and assesses its likely effect on access to residential land in the city.

4.2 URBANISATION PATTERNS IN SUDAN

4.2.1 General

Urbanisation has been a world wide phenomenon during much of this century. Its features in Third World countries, however, differ markedly from those experienced in western industrialised countries (World Bank, 1979). In the former countries, urbanisatio
is occurring far more rapidly, against a background of higher population growth, lower incomes and uneven distribution of resources within countries. A more or less similar pattern can be discerned in Sudanese urbanisation. In this section a description of the main characteristics of urbanisation in Sudan is provided. The increasing rate of urban growth is explained with reference to a flawed strategy of regional development and excessive concentration of resources in the capital. The section consists of two sub-sections. The first one outlines the main features of Sudanese urbanisation. The second sub-section examines the impact of the strategy of regional development on urban growth.

4.2.2 Main Features of Urbanisation

The history of urbanisation in Sudan dates back to the pre-historic period (El-Bushra, 1971). However, the pattern of urbanisation that followed the Anglo-Egyptian occupation of the country in 1898 was distinctively different from early urbanisation. The political and economic measures introduced by the condominium regime altered radically the pattern of distribution of resources and population in the country. The colonial economic system defined which regions have been linked to the monetary economy and which regions remained largely outside the monetary economy with a large proportion of their population engaged in the subsistence economy (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981-192). The large-scale cotton production established in central Sudan turned the peasant economies in Western, and to a lesser degree Southern Sudan, into the
main suppliers of agricultural labour and food, and fostered the growth of urban centres in North-Central Sudan. The population movement that had been created was kept circulating between areas of production in central and eastern Sudan, and rural areas in the western region (El-Din, M., in Pons, V., 1980, p.427). It was not until the Second World War that urbanisation began to assume a more visible and systematic pattern.

At the eve of independence the first population census revealed that 8.3 per cent of the country's population was living in urban areas. The urban population was growing at an average annual rate of 6.5 per cent during the period 1955/56-1973/74, as Table 4.1 shows. The pattern of urban growth was variable. While the period 1955/56-1964/65 recorded an average annual growth rate of 5.2 per cent, the rate of growth was faster during the period 1965/66-1973/74 (Al-Arifi, in El-Bushra 1972). By 1973/74 urban population was 17.4 per cent of the total population with an average annual growth rate of 7.2 per cent (US Agency for International Development (1978-App.A-39)). The urban population of Sudan is expected to reach 31 per cent in 1985 (Ibid-App.A-3). The following table depicts urbanisation in Sudan in the period 1955/56-1985.

While levels of Sudanese urbanisation seem modest by international or even by African standards, the dynamics of the urbanisation process as well as its implications have had serious effects in both rural and urban areas. In what follows we outline the main features associated with urbanisation in the Sudan; these are: regional imbalances in resource distribution
Table 4.1: Growth of Urbanisation in Sudan, 1955/56-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan population</td>
<td>10,262,536</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>14,758,346</td>
<td>20,348,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population</td>
<td>853,872</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2,605,895</td>
<td>6,345,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of Greater Khartoum</td>
<td>245,736</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>784,300</td>
<td>1,771,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Khartoum as % of Sudan</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Khartoum as % of urban Sudan</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Migration, and primacy of the capital.

(a) Regional Imbalance in Resource Distribution:

We emphasised in the preceding chapter the imbalance in the structure of the economy between the "modern" agricultural sector and the "traditional" sector of subsistence agriculture and livestock production. This economic structure influenced the pattern of distribution of investment and development, generating marked regional disparities. Regions of capitalist production and centres of exchange and finance attracted more
resources, infrastructure and services. At the eve of independence the following pattern of resource distribution was reported: (see Map, Appendix 4.1).

Table 4.2: Gross Domestic Investment of Regions in 1955-56

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total Investment (000)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A - Khartoum, Northern and Kassala Provinces</td>
<td>11,906</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B - Blue Nile Province</td>
<td>4,178</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C - Darfur and Kordofan Provinces</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D - Southern Provinces</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>21,233</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: R.A. Henin, 1963-119

The bias in investment distribution in favour of regions "A" and "B" was sustained in subsequent development plans. The main departure in those plans was the encouragement of private mechanised agriculture in the clay plains of Western Sudan. Agricultural production in the "traditional" sector received very little government support, with the Western and Southern regions of the country in particular, deprived not only of agricultural investment but also of physical infrastructure and social service spending (Adams and Howell, 1979, 506).
This investment disparity was reflected in employment, incomes and social services. There is very scanty data on income distribution in Sudan. While the 1967/68 Household Budget Survey is the major source of information, its findings cannot be generalised to the whole country since it excluded the nomadic population and the population in the Southern region. Notwithstanding these limitations, the survey results reflected a pattern of regional disparity in incomes and expenditure favouring central Sudan as the following table illustrates.

Table 4.3: Average Annual Income and Expenditure per Household in Rural Areas (1967/68)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Average Income (£S)</th>
<th>Average Expenditure (£S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan)Western</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur )Region</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ILO, 1975, 506.

The low level of incomes in the Northern province is attributed to a natural scarcity of investible resources and this has often been supplemented by remittances from urban areas. The gap in incomes between central Sudan, and western and southern regions is further widened by the pattern of
distribution of infrastructural services; this point is dealt with in sub-section (c) below. Variations in incomes and social services provided a strong stimulus for migration from poor regions to central Sudan.

(b) Migration

Two types of migrational patterns which are commonly observed in Sudan are rural to rural migration and cityward migration. We shall look first at the former type of migration.

Historically, the pattern of population movement between different regions of the country has been associated with levels of socio-economic development in those regions. For instance, the western and northern regions have been losing population to the more developed regions of central Sudan. This pattern of population movement is illustrated in the following table.

The pattern of inter-provincial migration shows that the provinces of Kordofan, Darfur, Bahr El-Ghazal and Northern province were losing population mostly to Khartoum, Red Sea, Kassala and Blue Nile provinces in central and central-eastern Sudan. Concentration of investment and employment opportunities in the latter regions constituted a significant "pull" factor for potential migrants in the former regions. Rapid population growth, declining incomes and increasing cash needs were among major "push" factors in poor regions. The
Table 4.4: Pattern of Inter-Provincial Migration (1973 Census)\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>In-Migrants (Per cent)</th>
<th>Out-Migrants (Per cent)</th>
<th>Net-Migration (Per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>1,018,544</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>+ 28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>267,031</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>+ 12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>776,551</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>+ 10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>2,686,239</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>+ 7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>791,603</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>+ 5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatoria</td>
<td>667,298</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>+ 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahr El-Ghazal</td>
<td>1,310,382</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>- 1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>1,617,163</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>- 12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>1,677,076</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>- 13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>959,071</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>- 23.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1. Nomadic populations in all regions and cotton pickers in Blue Nile Provinces are not included.

High rate of emigration in the Northern province was not due so much to lack of investment as to the limited agricultural potential and extreme fragmentation of landholdings. Besides the Northern province, the provinces of Kordofan and Darfur stood as the main sources of migrant labour in Central Sudan.

Until the Second World War rural labour circulated between the capital and the agricultural areas of Central Sudan, (M. El-A.G. El-Din in Pons, 1980, 427). The post-war period marked a reversal of pre-war income balance between town and country in favour of the former (ibid). The increase in urban
wages, however, did not include casual labour. The Northern province, with a long tradition of emigration, with a well-established system of education, with acute land shortage, and a high rate of natural population increase supplied proportionately more migrants to the capital city than any other region (Ibid, 437). The 1964-66 Population and Housing Survey revealed the following regional distribution of the capital's population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Greater Khartoum</th>
<th>Rural Khartoum</th>
<th>Northern Blue Nile</th>
<th>Kassala</th>
<th>Kordofan</th>
<th>Darfur</th>
<th>Southern Sudan</th>
<th>Outside Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population %</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Since the early 1960s, however, the contribution of Western Sudan to migration to Khartoum increased rapidly. The expansion in the Gezira project, the increase in acreage of mechanised farming and the extension of railway lines to Darfur province accelerated the already established emigration in Western Sudan. On the other hand, the initiation of import substitution light industry in the capital, during the same period, increased the demand for industrial labour. The second half of the 1960s marked a rise in the number of migrants from Western Sudan living in the capital.¹

¹ The intensity in migration from western Sudan to the capital during this period was partly caused by deliberate vote-hunting campaign in Khartoum.
A survey of urban households in Greater Khartoum, conducted by the ILO in 1974, found that the majority of migrants came from the Northern province (24.7%) followed by Kordofan (22.9%), the Blue Nile (16.6%) and Darfur (16.6%), (ILO, 1976, 352). Compared with the 1964/66 figures the last survey showed a marked rise in the proportion of migrants originating in western Sudan (Kordofan and Darfur). Taken together, their proportion exceeded that of emigrants coming from the Northern province. Thus, in both, inter-provincial migration and cityward migration the western region was supplying more migrants than any other region in the country. The disparity in the regional distribution of resources is an important explanatory factor behind this migratory process. Concentration of resources in Greater Khartoum is another significant factor.

(c) The Primacy of the Capital

A significant feature of Sudanese urbanisation is the high degree of concentration of political and economic activities and population in the capital city. The primacy of the capital is partly a colonial legacy. Policies of the post-independence period accelerated concentration in Greater Khartoum.

The city's population grew from 81,880 in 1904 to 202,381 in 1931 (McLoughlin 1970, 105). Its growth slowed down until the Second World War (ibid). The dramatic growth took place, however, in the post-independence period. The city's population
increased from 245,736 in 1955/56 to 438,890 in 1964/65 (MEFIT, 1975, p.9). By 1973/74 the population of the capital reached 784,300. According to MEFIT study, migration was the major source of the city's growth during the period 1955-1973. In 1980 the capital's population was put at 1.2 million (Sudanow, 1980-55), containing 31 percent of the country's urban population (Misra, H.N., 1983-162).

This high concentration of population in Greater Khartoum is largely a post-war development resulting partly from the high concentration of social and economic activities. The attainment of independence in 1956 enhanced the city's political role. The expansion of government machinery shortly after independence led to a disproportionate concentration of skilled manpower in the capital and therefore an urban-biased policy of social spending. The over-concentration of social service facilities in Greater Khartoum is illustrated in the following table.¹

The concentration of educational and health facilities in the capital became pronounced when compared to population. Thus, while the province's population formed 7.7% of the country's population in 1973, it received 11.1%, 10.9%, 23.9% and 4.3% of primary education, secondary education, health centres and dressing station facilities respectively. In contrast, Darfur province which formed 14.4% of total population received fewer services. The southern region —

¹ The population of Greater Khartoum was 74% of the province population in 1973/74.
Table 4.6: National Distribution of Selected Social Services (1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Percentage of Primary Schools 2</th>
<th>General Secondary Schools (%) 2</th>
<th>Health Centres (%)</th>
<th>Dressing Stations (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>3,740,405</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>957,671</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala¹</td>
<td>1,547,475</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>1,145,921</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan</td>
<td>2,202,345</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>2,139,615</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>836,263</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatoria</td>
<td>791,738</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahr El-Ghazal</td>
<td>1,396,913</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,758,346</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Kassala Province includes the present Kassala and Red Sea provinces.
2. Data on education were compiled for the six northern provinces only.


Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr El-Ghazal - which contained 20.3% of the country's population got even fewer health centres than Darfur.

The primacy of the capital is also reflected in the concentration of industrial establishments and associated economic activities. Thus, over 66% of the industrial establishments in the country were reported in Khartoum province in 1978 (Misra op.cit. 168). It employed 62% of industrial labour and 48% of industrial capital in 1971.
The capital also had 85% of all commercial companies, 80% of the banking activities and almost all insurance facilities (El Bushra, 1972-7). The trend towards industrial concentration in the capital was increasing until 1977 (El Tom, M. and El Tayeb, G., 1981-97). The sharp rise in the number of banks in the capital during the late 1970s, on the other hand, consolidated the commercial primacy of Greater Khartoum, as witnessed by the expansion of commercial sector employment. The primacy of the capital, therefore, constitutes a significant "pull" factor in the migratory process. Unless there is a reversal in the industrial-location policy\(^1\) and an increase in regional social spending the trend will continue, and so will its impact on migration.

4.2.3 The Strategy of Regional Development:

Awareness of a symbiotic interdependence between rural and urban areas prompted recent studies on Third World urbanisation to emphasise the need to situate urban policies within a national policy framework that takes account of the impact of national and regional policies on urban problems (e.g. UN Habitat Conference 1976, World Bank 1979, 1980 among others). A common theme in this literature is the call to decentralise development and resources to deprived regions, and the stimulation of regional growth poles that would limit rural emigration and therefore help check rising urban growth rates.

---

\(^1\) Although the Development and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act, 1972, provided that new enterprises should be located in rural areas, they were mostly located where infrastructural facilities were available, that is in major urban centres of central Sudan, such as Greater Khartoum, Port Sudan and Medani, (Mahmoud, 1984, pp.66,67).
Three methods are used by governments in this respect. Direct investment in basic services; public investment in new economic activities, and the use of public funds to encourage private investment, (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1981,212).

This decentralisation strategy received much publicity in the Sudan. Both the Ten Year Plan 1961/62-1970/71 and the Five Year Plan 1970/71-1974/75 were criticised for neglecting the question of regional equity in resource allocation and for their over-concentration on the sectoral development of the economy, (Al-Arifi, 1972,66; The Six Year Plan 1977/1983, Vol.1,211, among others). Thus the long term Development Plan 1977/78-1994/95 called for equitable regional distribution of resources and for closing the gap between agricultural and non-agricultural incomes (Six Year Plan, ibid, 40). These aims were eventually formulated into specific targets to be achieved by the Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83. The realisation of those targets was to be accomplished through modernisation of traditional agriculture and improvement of regional infrastructure.

We outlined in Chapter Three the critique of the model of "development" adopted in Sudanese economic planning. The Six Year Plan adopted the same model in its strategy of regional development. The Plan proposed that regional backwardness, particularly in Western Sudan, could be alleviated by the expansion of mechanised agriculture, on the one hand, and modernisation of traditional agriculture on the other hand.
The absorption of the "traditional" sector into the "modern" sector was seen by the Plan as the best way to effect regional development.

The Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 allocated (32 per cent) £S 425 million of the public sector investment and £S 290 million of the private sector investment to agriculture. The share of agriculture in both public and private investment, amounted to 27 per cent (£S 715 million) of the total development investment in the Plan. The public sector investment in agriculture was allocated in the following pattern.

Table 4.7: Sectoral Distribution of Public Sector Investment in Agriculture (in SYP) £S 000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investment Sector</th>
<th>Amount £S</th>
<th>Percentage %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Services</td>
<td>71,274</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crops</td>
<td>143,380</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>155,177</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Production</td>
<td>55,169</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>425,000</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The pattern of sectoral distribution of public sector investment in agriculture shows that the bulk of investment, over 80 per cent, went to "modern" sector agriculture, which is mostly concentrated in central Sudan. The "traditional"
sector received very little in the public sector investment, namely the 12.9 per cent allocated to livestock production. The Plan, therefore, anticipated that most of private sector investment would go into modernising "traditional" agriculture, mainly through expanding mechanised farming.

A number of studies indicated that the expansion of capitalist agriculture in Western Sudan had adverse effects on the peasant economy (Shepherd, 1982; Kursany, 1982). It has been argued that progressive commercialisation of agriculture has pushed small producers into less fertile land or simply forced them to migrate. The expansion of mechanised agriculture has also reduced the pastures available for the animal population, thus forcing many nomads to seek wage employment.

At another level, the argument goes, mechanised rain-fed agriculture has failed to absorb the displaced labour into the production process. The capacity of the peasant economy to employ more people was being undermined by the expansion of modern agriculture and hence more people were joining the migratory process. Since fewer work opportunities were available in agriculture, the majority of displaced migrants seek non-agricultural jobs, mostly in towns, as the following table indicates.
Table 4.8: Absorption of Migrating Male Workers by Occupational Category 1971-75 (Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Transport, Communication and Utilities</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Factories</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Government and Unclassified Labour</th>
<th>Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>12.63</td>
<td>54.04</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-35</td>
<td>18.34</td>
<td>13.19</td>
<td>44.20</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>7.65</td>
<td>13.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-55</td>
<td>21.84</td>
<td>21.84</td>
<td>32.18</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>13.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-65</td>
<td>00.00</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>04.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The strategy for regional development adopted by the Six Year Plan seems reminiscent of past economic planning experiences. This is particularly true with reference to the Plan's conception of the mechanism for regional distribution of resources. The Plan assumed that benefits accruing from mechanised agriculture would eventually "trickle down" to the local population in the form of wages and local investment. While the job-creation capacity of this capital-intensive production is limited, the likelihood of profits being reinvested in the region was very slim. A number of studies have shown that there was a tendency for capital to migrate to central Sudan (e.g. Mahmoud, 1984; and Kursany, 1982). Most of this capital went into tertiary activities such as trade, transport and urban real estate.
The only remaining option for regional development is direct government investment in infrastructural services. We already indicated above that the social spending policy has always been biased to urban centres. While the regionalisation measures introduced in 1980/81 provided institutional structures for regional representation and political leverage in central government, the huge administrative costs of these new organisations might endanger the meagre services already in existence.

4.2.4 Conclusion

This part of the chapter outlined the main characteristics of urbanisation in Sudan. We identified three basic attributes of the urbanisation process: uneven distribution of development, a rapid flow of migration particularly from the Western Region, and the excessive concentration of resources and population in the capital. We examined the current strategy for regional development and concluded that the adopted model of development did not break away from past planning patterns. The objectives of the Six Year Plan for achieving a balanced development and closing the gap between agricultural and non-agricultural incomes was difficult to realise. The development strategy could well precipitate further regional inequalities, which would accelerate the migratory process. The implication of such inadequacies in regional policy would be an increasing growth in urban areas and mounting pressures on urban amenities.
4.3 HOUSING POLICIES AND PROBLEMS IN GREATER KHARTOUM

4.3.1 General

Negative effects of urban growth often reflect sharply on the housing situation. Housing problems, however, can be caused by inappropriate planning of shelter needs as much as by uncontrolled urban growth. In this section, we examine critically the housing policy in the capital. We argue that because of inadequate definitions of housing need, lack of an integrated approach to housing, rapid urban growth and rising housing costs, the current housing strategy cannot deal effectively with the problem. The likely outcome is an increasing commercialisation of the housing market and further intensification of housing problems. This section consists of three parts. The first one describes the main housing supply systems. The second section examines the recent trend of comprehensive planning of housing in the capital. The third section assesses the relevance of current housing strategies.

4.3.2 Main Housing Supply Systems

Provision of urban housing in Sudan, as in many other post-colonial societies, was considerably influenced by the legacy of colonial urban policy. Colonial housing supply systems in urban Sudan were confined to: (a) sale of open plots and, (b) the provision of state-built staff housing. The post-independence era witnessed the evolution of other systems. Now there are four principal systems of housing
provision in Greater Khartoum:

(1) The distribution of serviced plots to different income groups
(2) State-built low-cost housing for low income groups
(3) State-built staff housing
(4) Upgrading of illegal settlements

The distribution of sites and services plots and upgrading of illegal settlements constituted, since the early 1960s, the major system of housing provision in Sudan. This housing provision strategy places Sudan among the few Third World countries which did not opt for a conventional housing provision approach as a major policy. Since the early 1970s conventional housing came under criticism, and "self-help" housing was alternatively advocated, mainly by the World Bank and the United Nations specialised agencies. "Self-help" housing is widely considered more realistic and affordable in the Third World (Bamberger, M. 1982). The experience of Sudan, therefore, may well provide some insights into the adequacy and efficacy of this housing approach in easing problems of urban shelter in poor countries.

Though predominantly oriented to a "self-help" housing strategy, urban housing policy in Sudan can still be criticised on three counts:— First, it leaned heavily towards government employees and those in "formal" employment to the detriment of those engaged in the "informal" sector. This bias permeated
definitions of housing need, housing standards and building codes; it precluded the access of the majority of those who, in ideal circumstances, would be the target of "self-help" housing policy. This point is discussed at some length in the next chapter.

Secondly, the housing policy made little budgetary allocation for the provision of infrastructural services in sites-and-services programmes. Public sector housing investment in the Ten Year Plan 1961/62-1970/72 was allocated in the following pattern.

Table 4.9: The Housing Budget in the Ten Year Plan 1961/62-1970/71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investment Category</th>
<th>Allocated Budget £S Millions</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - Serviced plots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a - Supply of water and Electricity</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b - Loans for Government Officials</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - State-built Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a - Staff Housing</td>
<td>3.957</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b - Low Cost Housing</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14.357</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While serviced plot schemes provided about 32,000 residential plots during the period 1960-1970 only 29.8 per cent of public sector housing investment was allocated for the provision of basic services. On the other hand, 27.8% of public investment in housing was used to finance housing units in staff housing schemes. The meagre funds assigned to serviced plot schemes meant that whole neighbourhoods had to wait for a number of years without infrastructural services.

Thirdly, urban housing policy in Sudan lacked a comprehensive approach to housing problems. There was no urban development strategy that directed and informed housing policy. In the absence of a comprehensive urban development plan the housing question was managed in isolation from other urban processes. At institutional level there was very little coordination between housing agencies and other relevant urban institutions. The outcome was a piecemeal distribution of urban land, oversized housing plots, exceedingly wide roads and large open spaces (Ahmed, M., 1978,p.32). At the level of the urban environment the result has been an excessive horizontal expansion of the city, with constantly rising costs for the provision and maintenance of the infrastructure. In social terms, official housing output was lagging behind housing demand in the capital. While the total output of urban housing, through various forms of supply did not exceed 70,000 units/plots in the country as a whole during the Ten Year Plan period, actual housing demand in 1968 was put at 124,000 units. In terms of the quality of housing, out of
the 70,000 units/plots mentioned above, 40,000 plots remained without basic and necessary services until the early 1970s (National Housing Policy 1975-7). In Greater Khartoum the housing deficit stood at 15,926 units in 1975/76, and about 24,979 of the capital's housing stock was classified as sub-standard dwellings needing improvements (ibid, 17).

The Sudanese experience with "self-help" housing indicates that such a strategy could be as inadequate and inaccessible as conventional housing in the absence of a comprehensive settlement policy and the material and political support of the state. The success of such policy does not only require the integration of housing strategies into a national development policy but equally important is the formulation of a comprehensive urban development strategy that takes account of the impact of "externalities" of national development policy on the urban scene. In the following section we examine the Sudanese efforts towards comprehensive planning in the housing sector.

4.3.3 Experiments with Comprehensive Planning:-

Four conceptions of urban planning are dominant in urban planning literature (Roberts, M., 1974, 28). These are traditional planning, structure planning, systems approach planning, and advocacy planning. Both structure and systems approach planning emphasise the relation between physical environment and the various processes that underlie urban growth and development as significant factors in the planning
process. This broader perspective of urban planning can be seen, as well, in the Habitat Conference recommendations, that policies on human settlements must be integrated within national development strategies and should be comprehensive (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, op.cit. 207). This means that a successful urban housing strategy must not only relate to a national housing policy but equally ought to integrate into a comprehensive urban development strategy. These two broad objectives represent a benchmark against which housing strategy may be examined.

The Five Year Housing Plan 1970-75

The trend towards comprehensive planning in the housing sector emerged in Sudan in the late 1960s with the inception of the May 1969 Regime. It was influenced by the proclaimed ideology of the new regime's "socialism", which presupposed state-controlled socio-economic planning. The formulation of directed town and country physical plans, and setting of a national housing policy were the main objectives of the newly created Ministry of Housing, formed in 1969. The Five Year Plan, however, was sectoral in nature and housing and physical planning received a low priority.

Three major housing programmes were carried out in the capital during the Plan period 1970-75. They included an upgrading programme in Omdurman city, two squatter resettlement projects in Khartoum and Khartoum North cities, and allocation of plots in middle and upper income housing
Despite the institutional integration of housing and planning agencies in the new Ministry, for the first time in the history of Sudan, the above-mentioned housing projects were planned and carried out in the absence of a comprehensive urban development plan. The outcome was fairly predictable: weak coordination between housing agencies and service institutions produced prolonged delays in services provision; conventional definitions of housing need, standards and building codes were upheld, limiting the access of a wider sector of urban population; a comprehensive urban strategy was lacking; and expanding housing need encouraged squatting and occupation of public land. Thus comprehensive planning of shelter needs in the city remained only a policy target that was not realised during the Plan period.

The Six Year Housing Plan 1977/78-1982/83

The strategy for comprehensive planning was reiterated in the Six Year Plan too. Housing policy envisaged a two-phase programme. The first phase extended over the Plan period - 1977/78-1982/83 and was to provide housing in major urban centres of more than 20,000 persons. The second phase, which followed the first one, was to deal with smaller settlements. The bulk of housing supply envisaged in the first phase was to be provided through sites-and-services and upgrading schemes, as the following table illustrates.
Table 4.10: The Six Year Housing Plan, By Supply Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sites and Services</th>
<th>Upgrading</th>
<th>Low-Cost Housing</th>
<th>Modern Flats</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of units/plots</td>
<td>129,000</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The total housing investment in the Plan was £424.5 million, of which the State would contribute £26.5 million only. The rest of the investment was to be financed by private sector and individual beneficiaries. In fact, most of the state contribution to housing investment was to go into conventional low-cost and high-class housing. This pattern of investment distribution is reflected in Table 4.11 below.

Table 4.11: Housing Investment in the Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 (£S Million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investment Category</th>
<th>Public Investment</th>
<th>PEWC(^1)</th>
<th>Private Investment</th>
<th>Total Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sites-and-Services</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>197.8</td>
<td>225.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Cost Housing</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxury Housing</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>160.0</td>
<td>180.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading of Settlements</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>424.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Public Electricity and Water Corporation. These are short term investments by PEWC immediately repaid by the beneficiaries.

The Plan also budgeted about twelve million pounds for preparation of master plans in thirteen major towns (£S 320,000) and for the consolidation of service structures in the capital (£S 11.3 million). (Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83, Vol.II, p.190).

The share of Greater Khartoum in the Housing Plan was not spelled out in detail in the Plan, but according to various sources the following programme was planned for the period 1977/78-1982/83.

Table 4.12 : Greater Khartoum Housing Plan, By Supply System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Provision</th>
<th>Sites-and-Services</th>
<th>Upgrading of illegal settlements</th>
<th>Low-cost housing</th>
<th>Modern Flats</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of units/plots</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>1,473</td>
<td>56,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. "Statement by Deputy Commissioner of Khartoum Western District", El-Sahafa Daily, 3.6.78

Data on the housing programme reveal that the bulk of housing supply was to be made through "self-help" housing, 87% of the national programme and 96.8% of the planned target in Greater Khartoum. The question of meeting housing needs, therefore, relied almost entirely on the potential
capacity of the "self-help" strategy. Before we examine the viability of the "self-help" strategy in the Sudan, a brief description of the scale of housing needs at national and metropolitan levels is imperative.

Projection of Housing Needs

Compared with the Ten Year and Five Year Plans, the Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 was the first one to explicitly state an estimate of urban housing needs. It projected an overall housing need of 375,000 units in thirteen major urban centres during the period 1977-1985. In Greater Khartoum the need was put at 159,000 over the same period. Details of needs are reproduced in the following table.

Table 4.13: Projected Housing Need for Major Urban Areas and the Capital 1977-1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components of Housing Need</th>
<th>New Households</th>
<th>Backlog</th>
<th>Sub-Standard and unserviced units</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major Urban Centres</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>375,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Khartoum</td>
<td>114,400</td>
<td>19,600</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>159,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. El-Sahafa Daily, 3.6.78.

The Housing Plan envisaged the provision of 194,000 units/plots, far less than the projected need of 375,000. Against an estimated need of 159,000 units/plots in Greater
Khartoum only 56,832 units/plots were planned. Moreover, it was not certain that actual provision matched planned targets, either nationally or in the capital. In 1977 16,000 plots were planned in Greater Khartoum as the first stage of the housing plan. Some 430,000 applications were filed and 125,000 families qualified (Sudanow, June 1983, p.44).

It is not our purpose, however, to argue on whether and how the gap between projected needs and planned targets can be bridged. We are rather interested in (a) whether the housing programme was based on a realistic understanding of the shelter needs of various sectors of urban population and (b) whether planned housing targets were accessible and affordable for the target group. In fact, both concerns are central to the current debate on the capacity of "self-help" housing to contain shelter problems in the Third World (Ward, P. 1982). Both issues will be highlighted below.

4.3.4 : Relevance of Current Housing Strategy

Despite institution-building experiments and technical innovations introduced in formulating housing policy during the 1970s, the present housing strategy hardly constituted a break-away from past housing practice. This argument is particularly plausible in relation to the comprehensiveness dimension of the housing strategy.
Firstly, reference has been made in Chapter Three to the sectoral nature of the Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 and its emphasis on expanding the "productive" sectors of the economy - agriculture and industry. The pattern of regional development pursued in the Plan is seen to have negative social effects on the peasant economy that reflected on urban housing, as we argued in Section 4.2.3 above. Neither did the development plan provide mechanisms whereby those "externalities" of development could be mitigated, nor did the housing strategy anticipate the likely effects of such "externalities" on urban housing.

Secondly, the formulation of the objectives of the housing strategy reflected an explicit bias to urban settlements; rural areas, where 80% of the country's population live, were not included as immediate targets of the housing strategy. Thus, instead of attempting to reduce the negative effects of national development policy, through providing and consolidating rural infrastructure, the national housing strategy embarked on tackling the after-effects of development, but long after they matured and were manifested in urban areas. In this sense, the housing strategy was, in fact, dealing with shelter problems in remarkable isolation from the processes underlying migration and urban growth.

At the urban end, an integrated approach to urban housing presupposes definition and calculation of needs in relation to the totality of urban processes that relate to housing. It
also presupposes anticipation and careful monitoring of reciprocal links between housing and other related urban processes. In this sense, planning of urban housing must be conceived of as a process rather than a preparation of separate sectoral plans.

The structure of the Housing Plan was typical of that of the Six Year Plan, as it approached urban housing in isolation from other urban processes. The process whereby the Housing Plan was formulated rested on two elements: First, the projection of housing needs according to a certain growth rate (6.8% for Sudan and 7.0% for the capital), a fixed family size (5.8) and an estimated housing stock; second, the setting of housing standards and levels of service provision on the basis of a triple classification of would-be beneficiaries according to their incomes. The Plan was not based on a structure or master plan for the capital that would organise land-use according to present and future needs. The master plan which was contracted to MEFIT engineering consultants in 1974 was not adopted by the authorities until October 1982 (Mazari, S. 1982). In the absence of a comprehensive physical plan, the 1977/78 Housing Plan was reduced to separate housing programmes geared to housing different income groups.

An important consideration that the Housing Plan neglected was the likely effect of urban market forces on the housing strategy. Housing and construction relate symbiotically to land, labour and building materials markets. These aspects can determine the accessibility and affordability of shelter.
Their impact on the Housing Plan was either considered favourable or was not fully realised. Since the next section focuses on the impact of the land market on housing we will make a brief comment below on the likely effect of labour and building materials markets on housing.

Housing problems do not simply arise from the quantitative deficit in housing stock, but more importantly from the high cost of housing relative to income earnings of the beneficiaries. The Housing Plan admitted this difficulty and proposed to overcome it by earmarking 80 per cent of planned plots to households making less than £5 600 per year i.e. the low income group. In Greater Khartoum the Plan devoted 70 per cent of the planned output to this group (Agency for International Development, op.cit. 111,27). This measure, however, presumed that once a low-income family was allotted a plot then its shelter problem would be solved. This view underestimated that the bulk of the housing demand would occur among those coming from the rural areas. In fact, of the 7.8 per cent population growth rate in Greater Khartoum, 5.6 per cent was contributed by migration. The majority of emigrants had less earning ability and poor employment prospects.

The ability of this group to build for itself is not only constrained by its employment situation. The policy of property development initiated by the Government in 1974, the rapid expansion of the construction sector and rising inflation rates contributed to a dramatic increase in the price of building materials, both local and imported. Construction labour rates,
on the other hand, increased considerably since 1973, probably far more than other sectors of the economy. Thus, even if the 70 per cent of planned housing in Greater Khartoum was to go to lower income groups as planned, and this is not certain as we argue in Chapter Four, the problem of affordability would still have to be confronted.

4.3.5 Conclusion

We conclude from the above discussion that, although a strategy for comprehensive planning of urban housing was proclaimed from the early 1970s, actual housing policy was not integrated into national development planning. Given past levels of implementation, comprehensive planning meant the aggregation of projected housing needs in thirteen major towns with little consideration for the impact of other sectors of the economy on the distribution of population, on employment and on the scale of housing needs.

The lack of an integrated approach to urban housing was conspicuous in the capital. There was no master plan. Projection of needs took no adequate consideration of the likely effects of other urban processes on plan implementation. Most important in this respect was the impact of the Government intervention in the property market on housing as we will find in the following section. In the absence of comprehensive planning of housing, the prospect that "self-help" strategies would effectively solve problems of low-income housing becomes unwarranted.
4.4 URBAN LAND POLICY IN GREATER KHARTOUM

4.4.1 General

The preceding sections shed light on the impact of the national development policy on the urban growth and housing in the capital. The pressures generated by migration continued to shape the demand for residential land in the capital throughout the post-independence period. Another set of influences, however, internal to the urban political economy, appear to have been active in shaping land disposal patterns. Central to these influences is the process of commercialising urban land and its implications for a host of other factors that relate to urban land. In this section we identify these influences and attempt to clarify the link between them and the national political economy. We also outline how the commercialisation process affects access to residential land in the capital.

This section consists of three parts. The first one describes land policy during the period 1956-1969. The second part examines the policy of land commercialisation in Greater Khartoum. In the third part we assess the effect of commercialisation on access.

4.4.2 Pragmatic Urban Planning and Land Policy

A number of aspects affect the formation and development of urban land policy. Important among these are: the prevailing
mode of economic organisation of production, land tenure, government commitment to providing housing and the administrative arrangement for that provision. In Sudan both the mode of economic organisation and the system of land tenure substantially influenced land policy. The organisation of the economy along capitalist lines under the second colonial state (1898-1956) brought about basic changes in land tenure and stimulated a change in the status of urban land from a use-value commodity to a commercial commodity. Obviously, land policy was arranged to account for changes in the concept of land and to regulate its use and transactions, as we will explain below. The commitment of the state, in the post-independence period, to housing provision and the way this was organised shaped the patterns of land policy. In what follows we comment briefly on land tenure in the Sudan, and then outline the main facets of urban land policy during the 1956-1969 period. This historical note is necessary for understanding the circumstances surrounding the process of land commercialisation during the 1970s.

(a) Land Tenure in Greater Khartoum

There are two types of land ownership in Sudan: individually-owned land and state-owned land. The total area of the country is 596.6 million feddans, of which six million are privately owned;\(^1\) the rest is owned by the state (Awad, M.A., 1971, 218). Communally-held lands are state lands subject to mere usufruct rights vested in a tribal or village community (ibid). The state-owned land, therefore, amounts to 98.9% of the total area of the country.

\(^1\) Feddan = 1.038 acres = 0.42 hectares.
In urban areas the proportion of privately owned land is markedly higher than the national average, particularly in Greater Khartoum. The main reason for this variation is that, during the settlement of land claims early this century, land titles were granted freehold and settlement campaigns were mostly confined to towns and riverain lands. Secondly, the colonial government sold large tracts of urban land to individuals, on a freehold basis, during the period 1900-1907. From 1910 onwards a mixed system of landholding was introduced and by 1947 a leasehold system was adopted as the principal basis for disposal of state land. This variation of tenure systems is reflected in the pattern of landholding in the capital.

In Khartoum town, except in the Mogran area, the land between the railway station and the Blue Nile is in general freehold, part being owned by Government. The land in the south of the town is leased, except for 122 privately-owned plots in El Qoz. The area east of the Airport is leased except for half of the plots in Burri El-Mahas, which are freehold (Doxiadis Associates 1959,108). In Khartoum North town, the old settlements of Khogali and Hamad to the west and south-west of the town respectively, and part of the land in Shambat and Halfaya in the North-west are freehold. Otherwise, all recent extensions are leasehold. In Omdurman, most of the land in the old town is privately owned (ibid.). All extensions from 1947 onwards are leasehold. Land tenure in the capital can be summarised as follows:

---

1. See Map, Appendix 6.1.
Land Tenure in Greater Khartoum (Per Cent) 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Freehold</th>
<th>Leasehold</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omdurman</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum North</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The current expansion of the city is mostly taking place on communal lands which were either under seasonal agriculture or grazing. Thus as the capital grows land tenure tends to approximate the structure of national tenure, as long as the expansion occurs away from rivers, whose lands are mostly privately held. In the latter case, the state would have to invoke its acquisition powers to extend public control over riverain lands.

Modes of Land Acquisition

There are four laws that organise land acquisition between the state and private individuals in Sudan.¹ These are: the Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance, 1925; the Prescription and Limitation Ordinance, 1928; the Land Acquisition Ordinance, 1930, and; the Unregistered Land Act, 1970.

¹. There are other modes of acquisition that relate to land transactions between private parties - see El-Mahdi, S., 1979, Chapter IV.
(1) The Land Settlement And Registration Ordinance 1925

This Ordinance was a consolidation of earlier ordinances relating to land, which were issued during the period 1899-1925. The Ordinance established state ownership over all waste, forest and unoccupied land unless a claimant proved the contrary. Claimants had to produce necessary documents to prove their rights to full ownership. This law was not, however, available for every person who had a claim to land. For both institutional and economic reasons only few areas of the country were settled under the 1925 Ordinance (El-Mahdi, 1971,8).

(2) The Prescription and Limitation Ordinance 1928

According to this Ordinance, unregistered land in the presumptive ownership of Government as well as private land can be acquired by prescription. Thus Section (3) of the Ordinance provided that "ownership of land may be acquired by peaceful, public and uninterrupted possession thereof by a person not being a usufructuary for a period of 10 years..", "... provided that if ownership be claimed as against the Government, the period shall be twenty years instead of ten". The 1928 Ordinance, therefore, provided leeway for those who did not have access to the Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance 1925. Title to and rights over land were accessible via a civil court if a settlement process was not available.
(3) The Land Acquisition Ordinance, 1930

Under Sections 4 and 5 of this Ordinance the Government can acquire ownership of land compulsorily for public purposes or for an individual to use it for local development, subject to the payment of fair compensation (El-Mahdi, S., 1979, 93).

(4) The Unregistered Land Act, 1970

This Act transferred the presumptive ownership of Government over unregistered land, established under the Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance 1925, into full ownership. Thus Section (4) of the 1970 Act reads "all land of any kind whatsoever..., which is not registered before the commencement of this Act shall, on such commencement, be the property of the Government and shall be deemed to have been registered as such, as if the provisions of the Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance have been duly complied with". Section (5) of the 1970 Act prohibited the establishment of any easement and the acquisition of any right or title by prescription over any land which has been registered in the name of Government or which is deemed to be so registered under Section (4). The 1970 Act, therefore, limited the applicability of Section (3) of the Prescription and Limitation Ordinance 1928, mentioned above, as far as Government Land is concerned. However, the 1970 Act exempted persons who had been using Government Land for a long time from the acquisitive effects of the Act subject to the approval of the President. The Act made the state the biggest landlord in the
country and gave it a dominant position in the property market.

The above review shows that both the Land Settlement and Registration Ordinance, 1925, and the Unregistered Land Act, 1970, facilitated in varying degrees the control of the state over land. The Land Acquisition Ordinance, 1930, gives the state access to private land as need arises. Compared with other Third World countries, particularly where land is overwhelmingly privately held, the above legal framework seems most appropriate for the development of an effective urban land policy.

(b) Urban Land Policy 1956-1969

One of the main objectives of any urban land policy would be to organise the supply of land for various uses, including residential use. The control of the state in the Sudan over land seems to facilitate the process of stable and orderly provision of residential land. However, the main problem in this respect was the lack of any clearly defined objective or strategy for urban land policy. We have noted above the absence of an urban development strategy. Because of that inadequacy, urban land policy came to be mainly geared towards meeting piecemeal housing targets. Thus the pragmatic approach of housing policy became characteristic of land policy too. The main focus of policy and practice centred around the preparation and distribution of residential land, the administration of replanning and upgrading schemes,
and the routine discharging of land-related problems, such as processing of land transactions and authorising of different land-uses. The principal policy measure followed in this respect was the operation of legal controls such as planning, zoning and building regulations. These measures often have little or no effect in promoting an effective land strategy (Devas, N., 1983, 210).

Another limitation of the land policy was organisational. Urban land administration did not have the organisational and technical resources conducive to developing an effective land policy. Typical of former British colonies, land control and administration was separate from land-use planning. Land-use planning was seen as a technocratic function, while land control and allocation were regarded as either political or an administrative task (United Nations, 1973, 42). This schism in the approach to urban land hindered the emergence of definitive land objectives.

Land Policy and Property Development

In contrast to the state role in urban development during the 1950s and 1960s, there was little participation by the private sector, save the personal efforts of individual beneficiaries in sites-and-services schemes. Three main reasons can be given: First, land disposal policy discouraged the involvement of the private sector in housing and property development. The replacement of an open-auction policy by closed auction after independence directed the bulk of
allocated plots to civil servants, as we argue in Chapter Five. The alternative option for the private sector was to develop privately-owned land whose price and cost of development was prohibitive relative to expected returns in the housing or property markets of the 1960s. Secondly, the size and technical ability of property capital at the time was limited. Most of the capital accumulated in agriculture during the 1930s and 1940s was reinvested in burgeoning import substitution industries in Khartoum in the 1960s (Mahmoud, 1978, 228). Commercial capital was originally expatriate until the late 1960s and was mostly transferred abroad. However, still a large slice of private capital went into housing and buildings during the period 1956-1970. As expatriates leaving the country at the time of independence hurriedly sold their properties, Sudanese merchants scrambled to buy them (Ibid, p.138). 1 Furthermore, residential land allocations of the 1960s also attracted a certain amount of private capital in the construction of homes in the sites-and-services schemes. 2 A third reason for the insignificant role of the private sector in property development during the 1950s and 1960s was the absence of an urban land market. In addition to the fact that government is the biggest property owner, the main institutions of an urban land market were lacking, namely, the real estate agency and the mortgage finance institution.

1. Apart from being a symbol of wealth and status, house ownership is a basic collateral for bank finance.
2. Construction was partly financed from state loans to civil servants which we referred to in Section 4.3.2 above.
A small number of real estate and auction agencies existed. Their owners essentially worked in trade and took real estate as a secondary occupation (Balula, A., 1967,20). Despite their existence, most land/house transactions were conducted outside them, on a personal basis between buyers and sellers.

The main difficulty for the land market, however, was the absence of finance institutions. Government and commercial banks were the only lending institutions. While access to government loans was confined to civil servants, commercial banks gave priority to business finance. Thus over 60 per cent of total advances of commercial banks, during the period 1958-1967 went into financing foreign trade, (Saeed, O.H., 1970,20). The Estate Bank, Government-owned, was established in 1968 to provide housing finance and invest in property development. While its capital was limited - £S 10 million - about 70 per cent of its housing loans went to civil servants (US Agency for International Development, 1978, 111,40,43).

Given the above reasons, private involvement in property development was confined to the efforts of individual plot owners. Absence of an effective property market also conformed to a popular conception that considered land as a consumption commodity which was prized for its use value. It seems that state policy of allocating plots for nominal rather than economic price consolidated this attitude towards land. By the end of the 1960, however, urban growth in the capital
was running at a 7.8% annual rate and the housing deficit was building up so that much pressure came to bear on urban land. A tendency for realising economic value from the urban property was emerging.

4.4.3 The Policy of Land Commercialisation

The process of commercialising land in Sudan, which began in the early 1970s, can be attributed to the desire of the government to improve its revenues, as well as to an "investment strike"¹ on the part of commercial capital in the period 1969-1971, and its eventual swing to real estate. In what follows we look first at the factors behind the new land policy and then examine the response of the private sector to land commercialisation.

(1) Factors Underlying the Sale of State Land

As early as January 1971, El-Sahafa Daily addressed the idea of encouraging private investment in property development, following an interview with the Minister of Housing (El-Sahafa Daily, 11th and 12th January 1971).² At that time such a proposition contradicted stated housing objectives limiting the commercial construction of costly villas and directing private capital into productive spheres (Five Year Plan 1970, Vol.1, p.115). Three years later, the

1. The term is borrowed from Offe, C., 1975,143.
2. At the time of writing newspapers in Sudan were state-owned and controlled by the party (Sudan Socialist Union).
Minister of Local Government, Housing and Community Development announced a new land policy whose cornerstone was the effective utilisation of state land for both commercial and service uses. He stated that government land in the capital and the regions was to be put up for sale (People's Local Government Journal, Vol.2, No.2, 1974,72). The new policy was subsequently incorporated in the Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83. Since 1974 large tracts of urban land were auctioned. In the budget estimates of 1978/79 returns from the sale of public land were put at £5 16 million.

Urban land was considered a lucrative source of revenue that could be used to finance the rising costs of administration, particularly following the massive expansion in state administration during the early 1970s. Financial strains on local government were particularly severe in the aftermath of the 1971 reorganisation. This situation was aggravated by a considerable fall in local government revenues during the period 1969-1971.

Another consideration behind the new land policy was the Government's intention to mobilise the financial remittances of Sudanese expatriates working in oil-producing Arab countries. This measure was considered beneficial to the balance of payments, and as a way of improving government revenues and of redirecting expatriate money into a useful purpose instead of it being spent on importing luxury commodities. One thousand plots were designated for this purpose in Khartoum town alone in 1978 (El-Sahafa, 1978,17,6). Sudanese expatriates were
promised handsome land concessions if they invested in agricultural, commercial or industrial ventures in the Greater Khartoum area.¹

A third factor behind the new land policy was government's need to encourage the private sector to invest in high class housing. The expansion in state administration, especially in its upper echelons, as well as the influx of multinational companies, following a move towards an "open-door" economic policy in 1972, stimulated the growth of demand for high class housing in the capital. The Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 was quite explicit about the role assigned to the private sector in the Housing Plan, as we noted in Section 4.3.3 above.

The commercialisation policy also received an enthusiastic response in the Housing Department. It was seen as an opportunity that would enable the Department to develop as an autonomous public corporation and invest in the housing sector on a commercial basis (National Housing Committee, 1981).²

Taken together, the factors underlying the new land policy relate broadly to the political circumstances surrounding the inception of the May regime in 1969, its ideology and institutional form. They equally relate to the regime's subsequent

1. A two-tier exchange rate introduced in September 1979 was attracting about $300 million a year from remittances of Sudanese expatriates (Africa Guide, 1982, p.349).
2. In contrast to central and local government institutions the public corporations in the Sudan had a prestigious status and lucrative salaries.
transformation in 1971, in terms of its social and economic programme. This link between the new land policy and the political process is elaborated in Section 7.3 of Chapter Seven.

(II) Response of the Private Sector to the New Land Policy

We argued earlier that the inception of the May regime in 1969 triggered an "investment strike" by private capital, especially after the nationalisation and confiscation measures of 1970. The announcement of socialism as a goal and the apparent radical nature of the new regime frightened the capitalists and private investment declined drastically in 1969/70 (Mahmoud, 1984, p.140). Commercial capital began to move into real estate, since it was generally considered a politically safe investment area, was taxed at a low rate and provided a protection against inflation. Moreover, it was, then, economically attractive in view of the growing demand for housing in the capital during the early 1970s.

The post-1971 economic policy of liberalising the economy provided much assurance to private capital to operate openly. Thus following the allocation of high-class housing in 1972, there was a boom in building activity and expansion in the building materials trade. As the new land policy was inaugurated in 1974 private sector investment in urban property and construction was already underway. There is no detailed data on the sectoral allocation of private investment during the period 1970-1975. However, the following table on the share
of the private sector in Gross Fixed Capital Formation during the Five Year Plan period serves to reflect a gradual rise of private investment in housing.¹

Table 4.15: The Share of Private Sector in the Gross Fixed Capital Formation During the Period 1970-1975 (£S millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Housing Investment</th>
<th>Other Investment</th>
<th>Total Private Investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Private housing investment during the Five Year Plan 1970-1975 represented 86 per cent of the Plan's total housing investment (£S 130.9 million), and 18.9 per cent of the Plan's overall investment (£S 595.8 million). Apart from investment in housing and buildings, most of the rest of the private sector investment during the Five Year Plan went into trade and transport.

¹. The fall of the private investment in housing in 1974/75 was partly due to the completion of construction on the land which was allocated in the 1970 Housing Plan. It was also due to a shift in private investment to other sectors of the economy.
Given the absence of property-finance institutions, until about 1975 property finance came mainly from Sudanese capital, originating in agriculture or commerce. The period 1976 onwards witnessed the opening of foreign banks in Sudan, most of them branches of Arab banks. This development enhanced the property and construction sector as finance was made available. Some of these financial institutions, namely Faisal Islamic Bank, entered the property market as developers as well.

The property boom was also stimulated by the municipal policy of modernising the town centres of Greater Khartoum, during the period 1974-1978. Open market traders, street hawkers and pavement sellers were removed from town centres and placed in newly created stall-markets located on outer zones in each town. The same period witnessed the prohibition of prostitution in the capital and the eviction of prostitutes from inner city slums. These policy measures fostered a sharp rise in property values in the city centre as demand for commercial buildings was growing. The business district expanded both horizontally and vertically. This process also encouraged owner-occupiers in the inner city areas to sell dear and move out into cheaper property. Although there is no data to gauge the exact magnitude of this process, the conspicuous physical growth of the business district and its expansion into residential quarters is a significant indicator.
High returns from real estate, from foreign trade and from distribution swung the balance of investment in favour of commerce and property deals, and against agriculture and industry (Barbour, 1980, p.92). This economic pattern was reflected at a macro-level in changes in the shares of economic sectors in GDP (see eg. Appendix 2.1).

The foregoing analysis reveals that private capital has responded favourably to the new land policy, investing in both commercial and residential property. Private capital also benefited from the availability of foreign finance in the post-1975 period. On the other hand, the Government had the opportunity to increase its revenues from the sale of lands and to a lesser extent from property taxes. Urban land and housing strategy assumed that the new land policy, by relieving the Government from investing in high-class housing and increasing its revenues, would enable housing authorities to take care of low-income housing. In the following section we review this assumption as we consider the implication of the commercialisation policy on access to land.

4.4.4 The Impact of the Commercialisation Process on Access to Residential Land

Broadly speaking, there are three areas where the commercialisation process might constrain the access of low-income groups to urban shelter. These are: (a) the effect on the stock of residential land, (b) the effect on the ability
of beneficiaries in state-allocation programmes to consolidate their ownership, and (c) the indirect impact on illegal settlements.

To begin with the first area, we argue that the sale of public land for investment purposes might have a high opportunity cost as far as future housing needs are concerned. The fact that the state owns 99 per cent of the country's land has always underpinned urban land policy, and fostered an attitude that much public land can be disposed of without significantly affecting Government's ability to meet low-income housing needs. This assumption is difficult to sustain for two reasons: First, the supply of urban land is physically limited. The urban catchment area can only provide optimal mobility within certain spatial limits, beyond which urban functions become costly. We noted above, (Section 4.4.2) that most river lands are privately held so that any future expansion can only occur away from rivers, unless acquisition powers were to be invoked. Moreover, some state land that lies immediately outside the metropolitan boundaries has been leased from 1974 onwards to indigenous and foreign developers. Thus in both private and state land, encumbrances would have to be resolved at some cost which must be weighed against returns from current sales of public land. Secondly, this misconception about the abundance of Government land presumes that any piece of land can be readily put to specific use as need arises. Accordingly, the differential cost of future land development was assumed away. This understanding is not true, because each piece of land is unique and its value for use depends on its location.
The current disposal of state land for investment purposes would preempt future residential location in the city and could increase the cost of mobility for those who would live in new locations. This proposition is very likely since the new land policy and consequent land programmes were neither based on a comprehensive urban development strategy nor on a long term physical plan. The present land policy, therefore, leads to material reduction in the stock of residential land and could result in increasing the cost of mobility for residents of new locations.

The second area where the impact of the commercialisation process might be serious, at least in the short term, is the effect on the ability of beneficiaries in state housing programmes to consolidate their possession for a reasonable length of time. It has been frequently stressed in the literature on low-income housing that the root of the problem is affordability. Housing policies may be described as effective when target groups are capable of constructing their houses and of consolidating ownership. As we consider the impact of land commercialisation in Greater Khartoum the potential for consolidation seems uncertain. An obvious consequence of the commercialisation policy in the capital was a sharp rise in land values. The gap between land's original price in Government programmes - and its resale price was immense. Government normally provided plots in sites-and-services schemes for a nominal price which included the cost of land development. The following table

Table 4.17 : Prices of Officially-Sponsored Plots in Khartoum Town 1960-1977

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Land</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Price £S</td>
<td>Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Class</td>
<td>800m²</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>800m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Class</td>
<td>600m²</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>600m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Class</td>
<td>300m²</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>300m²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to property dealers, land prices in the capital have increased dramatically since the early 1970s. In Khartoum town prices peaked at £S 250-300 per square metre in the town centre, which is first class land (El-Ayyam Daily, 16.8.1978). Values declined the greater the distance from the centre. Thus prices of £S 200 and £S 150 per square metre were reported in Khartoum east and Khartoum west respectively (Ibid). While the former neighbourhood is first class land the latter is partly second class land. Prices then declined as one left the old town southward across the railway station to £S 60 per square metre in Khartoum No.2, a second class area, and £S 35 per square metre in Khartoum No.3, an adjacent third class area (Ibid). In third class neighbourhoods, recently distributed in the city outer zone, plots were being sold for £S 3000-4000 (US Agency for International Development 1978,
III,31). A similar pattern of land values was reported in Omdurman and Khartoum North towns (El-Ayyam Daily, 16.8.1978).

This property boom had a sharp impact on building materials and construction labour. The distribution of imported building material has been controlled by a public corporation since 1973, and when construction materials were "officially" available access was extremely limited. The alternative was the "black market" where prices were considerably higher. For instance, while the official cement price was £S 40 per sack in 1977, it was supplied at £S 140 by commercial distributors (US Agency for International Development, op.cit. 111,50). The price of bricks, though substandard both in size and quality, increased from £S 5.0 per 1000 bricks in 1973 to £S 48 in 1980. A half lorry-load of building soil - commonly used to construct mud walls in third and fourth class areas - shot up from £S 0.45 in 1973 to £S 15 in 1980. The same increase applied to other building materials as well as labour costs.

Construction costs consequently rose considerably. According to local architects and contractors, for an average third class house the cost per square metre has increased from £S 20 to £S 60 during the period 1973-78 (ibid). A minimum house in a third class area with a roofed area of 50 square metres, comprising a bedroom, a verandah, a kitchen and a toilet was estimated to cost about £S 3000 in 1978, exclusive of site-and-services cost.
Wages have not kept pace with the increase in the cost of living. Annual average wages of workers were £223.6 and £280.8 in the private and public sectors respectively in 1973 (Masloum, 1974, quoted in Mustafa, 1976). Government wages were increased in 1975 by 12% for high wage earners and 18% for low-wage earners (US AID, op.cit. pp.11-24).

Given this magnitude of rise in construction costs, rising land values in the property market, and a decline of wages in real terms, as a result of inflation, some beneficiaries in state-sponsored housing programmes will certainly be tempted to reap the considerable difference between the official land price and the market price. One indicator that such a process has already taken place is the increasing number of high-rise buildings in third class areas, adjacent to first and second-class neighbourhoods. This process frustrates the objectives of the housing strategy since dispossessed families are added to the number of people in housing need as their plots pass into the property market.

The third area where the impact of the commercialisation process may be examined is illegal settlements. Here the effect may be conceived in two ways:- (a) the effect of population movement from legal residence to illegal settlements on living standards and occupancy rates, (b) the outcome of

1. The increase in the cost of living was erratic, with 1971 and 1976 showing virtually no inflation while the cost of living in 1974 and 1975 increased by 25% and 22% respectively. It showed a 17% increase in 1977. In 1978 it was 13% for high income families and 12% for low income families (US.AID 1978, pp.11-24).
extending land and housing commercialisation into illegal settlements.

As for the first process, we already pointed out above the effect of rising land values on the consolidation of ownership and the possibility of owners ending up in illegal residence. It was reported that many immigrant workers who were settled in older areas of the capital had sold their smaller plots to purchase larger ones on the outskirts of the city (Ahmed, M., 1978).

Another group of residents, more directly affected by rising land values, were tenants, especially those living in town centres where the occupancy rate is the highest in the country. In our sample survey in the Unity illegal settlement of Omdurman town (Chapter Six) 17.8 per cent of the respondents last lived in the inner city areas in Omdurman and Khartoum towns. The rental market was tightened also by the reformulation of the Rent Restriction Ordinance 1953. It was argued that the Ordinance in its previous form had favoured the tenant and inhibited private investment (Sudanow, 1977, 10). The new arrangement increased rent rates in third class and parts of second class areas, but exempted first class and part of second class areas from the provisions of the Ordinance, so that their rents were to be fixed by the market. This policy underestimated the "spiral effects" of rents in high class housing on the whole rental market. As more people - whether home-consolidators or tenants - move into illegal settlements, greater overcrowding and deterioration in living
standards would follow.

The commercialisation process might also lead to the integration of the informal land market into the formal one, with serious implications for communal land-users, tenants in illegal settlements and the Government.\(^1\) Already an informal land market operated in village lands on the metropolitan boundaries since the 1960s. These lands were theoretically state lands under effective communal use and administered by "native administrations". As cityward migration picked up in the latter half of the 1960s and demand for residential land grew, both "native administrators" and villagers began to deal in communal land (Abdel-Bagi, \textit{op. cit.}, 23). By 1975 illegal settlements formed on those lands accounted for 29 per cent of the capital's population. Although the Unregistered Land Act 1970 confirmed Government legal control over these lands, it did not prevent speculation and land occupation.

The penetration and commercialisation of the informal land market has adverse effects on rents in illegal settlements. The process of sub-dividing plots for rental purposes is common in illegal settlements. The commercialisation of the rental market accelerates this process of subdividing plots, at the expense of average space standard and an overall decline in living standards for both tenants and owners.

\(^1\) See Burgess, R., 1977.
The expansion of the informal market means the transfer of more communal lands from agricultural and grazing use into residential use.\textsuperscript{1} It is beyond the scope of our study to consider the effect of this process on "traditional" landholders. But the ultimate effect will be a reduction in the stock of urban land and the transfer of public land to land markets at considerable cost to the community and little material return to the Government.

4.4.5 Conclusion

We proposed at the beginning of this section that the commercialisation of urban land in the early 1970s affected significantly the pattern of land disposal in the capital. This proposition is examined against the background of previous urban land policy in the Sudan. The structure of land tenure gave the state a leading role in urban development with an insignificant contribution from the private sector. Evolving land policy, however, lacked clearly defined objectives and was mostly pragmatic.

The value of urban land changed drastically during the last decade, as land entered the market as an economic category. The background of this change relates to the political circumstances of the early 1970s and to the economic needs of the regime. Eventually, a vigorous property market emerged with serious implications for access to land. We proposed

\textsuperscript{1} This process is exemplified in the Halfaya neighbourhood of the Khartoum North city during the period 1969-1977, according to an interview with the leader of the town council, 1977-1979, (18.12.1982).
that the commercialisation process would reduce the stock of residential land at a high cost, it would weaken the capacity of plotholders to consolidate their ownership, and it would have negative implications on the squatter population.

4.5 GENERAL CONCLUSION

We proposed in this chapter that national development policy in the Sudan had significant and identifiable limitations on the implementation of urban social policy, namely the distribution of residential land. These limitations can be traced in two spheres: the pattern of urban growth and its underlying dynamics, and the policy of land commercialisation in the capital.

In the first section of the chapter we attempted to explain the rising rates of urban growth in relation to regional development policy and the increasing primacy of the capital. We argued that a pattern of uneven regional distribution of investment and development, inherited from the colonial state, has been maintained and strengthened by successive development plans. This pattern of resource distribution produced regional variations in incomes, employment and social services, between the regions in central Sudan and those in western and southern Sudan. The result was a continuous flow of migrants, mainly from the western region, into central regions and the capital.
The implications of rapid urban growth on housing were dealt with in the third section of the chapter. In addition to the negative effects of uncontrolled urban growth on housing, we argued that the current urban housing strategy was itself inadequate in two respects: the housing strategy was neither effectively integrated in a national settlement policy, nor was it based on a comprehensive urban development plan. The fact that housing planning was conducted in near-isolation from other urban processes and without adequate appreciation of the possible effects of market forces on housing, undermined the proclaimed objectives of the housing strategy and tightened the housing situation.

The second sphere where the effect of national policy on implementation was pronounced was the new land policy proclaimed in 1974. This was examined in the fourth section of the chapter. It was shown that urban land development was dominated by the state throughout the 1950s and 1960s, while the private sector had little participation. Evolving land policy was pragmatic and mostly oriented to meet piecemeal needs of the housing policy. Access to land was regulated by the state, as the real estate market was almost non-existent during the period 1956-1969.

The early 1970s witnessed, however, the evolution of a vigorous property market in conjunction with a new land policy proclaimed in 1974. Factors behind the new land policy as well as the response of the private sector were outlined. The likely outcome of the commercialisation process was examined. We
proposed that the commercialisation process would reduce the stock of residential land needed to house low-income groups, it would weaken the capacity of new plotholders to consolidate their ownership, and it would affect negatively the squatter population.

The important result of the commercialisation process for our study, was the establishment of a third channel for the distribution of residential land, besides the Government-sponsored allocation programmes and the illegal housing market. Since Government-sponsored allocations are intended to benefit the low-income population who cannot buy their dwellings in the market, the implicit assumption of the new land policy was that the newly established real estate market would not interfere with Government-controlled allocations. We argued that the "spiral effects" of the property market already permeated rental markets, Government-sponsored residential plots and squatter settlements. The assumption of separating the real estate market from Government-sponsored allocations cannot, therefore, be sustained.

Policy assumptions behind the new land policy were not dissimilar from those underlying regional development policy. In both cases, there was an over-emphasis on the economic returns of policy (capitalist agriculture - land sales) and less concern with the social implications for target communities. In both situations, policy was conceived in sectoral terms as far as national economic planning was concerned, but the social implications of policy were not treated likewise.
The "externalities" of development policy were not conceptualised in institutional terms at the national planning level so that they may be adequately dealt with. This inadequacy at the level of national policy interacted, in varying ways, to affect the pattern of urban land disposal and the access of various groups to residential land. For this reason we argue that the limitations on policy implementation can be traced back to the national policy process rather than being treated as an isolated phenomenon at the level of implementing organisations.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE STRUCTURE OF ALLOCATION
OF URBAN RESIDENTIAL LAND

5.1 INTRODUCTION

We will focus in this chapter on the specific agencies and processes of the allocation of residential land in Greater Khartoum. We present two main arguments about the nature of the allocation process and its outcomes. We argue that the allocation structure does not provide all urban families with equal access to residential land. The rules of land, planning and service provision contained built-in biases against the access of the urban lower classes. Secondly, we maintain that the operation of the allocation structure in practice tended to generate further obstacles to access.

The chapter consists of three sections. We present an overview of the institutional structure of the housing agencies in the first section. In the second section we examine critically the allocation rules relating to land, urban planning and service provision. Finally, we focus in the third section on the operation of the allocation structure in practice and consider its distributive effects.
5.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF HOUSING AGENCIES IN GREATER KHARTOUM

5.2.1 General

This section presents an overview of the agencies responsible for land, planning, housing and service provision in the capital. A description of the institutional setting of housing is a necessary background to the analysis of the allocation rules in the following section (5.3). It will also highlight issues of administrative fragmentation, multiplicity of jurisdictions, and overlapping of decision-centres that bore closely on the allocation process as we explain in Section 5.4 below.

The institutional structure of the housing agencies underwent two basic changes during the 1970s. First, following reorganisation of the local government in 1971, responsibility for land disposal, housing and urban planning was shifted from the central government to provincial administration. Second, the central government recovered control over these jurisdictions in 1973/79. But, before we outline these developments and their concomitant institutional changes we will describe briefly the housing institutions during the first phase of the post-independence period.
5.2.2 Housing Administration 1956-1969

Although legislation on land, urban planning and housing existed from the early days of the Condominium rule in Sudan (1898), urban planning institutions did not appear until after the Second World War. A town planning unit and a Central Town Planning Board were formed in 1946. Statutory powers over urban land and planning were vested in the Governor-General and carried out by a number of central departments. These included: the Town Planning Unit and the Directorate of Lands, both in the Legal Department; the Central Town Planning Board and the Surveys Department and the Popular Housing Unit in the Labour Bureau of the Intelligence Department. A host of other departments were also involved in urban development either through the provision of housing for employees or by carrying out construction and related activities for other departments. These included departments such as Construction and Public Works, Education, Health, Defence, Civil Aviation and Sudan Railways.

Following independence in 1956 the inherited institutional structure was preserved with minor modifications. But the number of governmental units multiplied and the responsibilities of the housing agencies increased considerably. More coordination was called for, within and between housing agencies.

Shortly before independence a Ministry for Local Government was established (1954). It included the departments of Popular Housing, Town Planning and the Directorate of Lands.
The Surveys Department went to the new Ministry of Industry and Mining while the Lands Registry remained in the Judicial Department.

The Central Town Planning Board was the institution responsible for organising urban planning and coordinating the activities of the various departments and units involved in urban development. It consisted of representatives from the ministries/departments of Local Government, Construction, Surveys, Health, Housing, Lands and Town Planning. The record of the Board contained a number of limitations. Weak coordination within and between respective departments was reported (e.g. Ahmed, 1978, p.47). Centralisation of the planning process and remoteness from the implementing agencies was also underlined (e.g. Zein, K., 1978, p.216; and Mazari, S., 1982). Generally, planning of urban housing remained centrally controlled throughout the period 1956-1969.

5.2.3 The Reorganisation of Housing Institutions: 1969-1982

(a) The First Phase, 1971-1977

The year 1969 marked the formation of the first ministry of housing in the history of the country. It integrated housing and urban planning which were scattered over a number of departments. The Central Town Planning Board was dissolved and its functions were divided between the Minister of Housing and the provincial authority. However, following the promulgation of the 1971 Local Government Act, urban housing, land

1. According to the provisions of the Town and Village Planning Act 1956.
use and urban planning functions were assigned to provincial administration. The Ministry of Housing was subsequently dissolved (1973) and the Departments of Housing and Lands were annexed to the Ministry of Local Government.

Under the 1971 Act the Province Executive Council (PEC) became the planning authority. Each council had a committee on building, planning and housing, responsible for:

1. The control and regulation of building activity;
2. Implementation of town and village planning and replanning regulations;
3. The disposal of governmental land;
4. The preparation and upkeep of maps of residential areas, and,
5. The provision of housing (The Establishing Warrant of the People's Executive Council of the Khartoum Province, 1973, Ministry of Local Government).

The committee consisted of three categories of persons: councillors, general administrators and technical officers.

Field agencies such as local land and planning units came, after the 1971 Act, under the direct control of provincial administration. Thus, the distance between policy planning - at provincial level - and implementation was narrowed down with the same personnel participating, more or less, in the two processes. This arrangement should have improved coordination and policy follow up, but the 1971 Act
provided for a dramatic expansion of the administrative levels and units. Under the 1951 Local Government Ordinance Khartoum Province was divided into four administrative units: three municipal councils and one rural council. Following the introduction of the 1971 Act the administrative levels and units mushroomed into: 31 local town and village councils, six district councils and a province executive council (see Fig. 5.1). The result was a complex vertical and horizontal network of communication and considerable brakes in the policy process.

Outside the structure of the urban administration there were a number of autonomous agencies providing specific urban services. These included the Public Electricity and Water Corporation, the Ministry of Construction and Public Works and the Estate Bank.

Another institution closely involved in urban administration was the Party, that is the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU). The Party had a hierarchical structure running parallel to that of the local administration, at the national, regional and provincial levels. It participated in the policy process both directly through its delegates sitting in the administrative agencies, particularly in the Province Executive Council - the senior policy-making organ - and indirectly by sponsoring councillors for different levels of urban administration.
This complex institutional structure of urban administration fostered considerable coordination problems among the administrative units within levels, across levels and between the provincial administration, on the one hand, and the central agencies and the public corporations on the other. Implementation of the 1977 Housing Plan represented a test-case for the effectiveness of the structure of urban administration. In Section 5.4 below, we will consider some of the problems which have arisen in this respect.

(b) The Second Phase, 1977/78-1982

The period 1977 onwards witnessed certain political developments that facilitated a return of the housing, land and urban planning jurisdictions to the central government. Paradoxically this renewed centralisation at the metropolitan level occurred through a process towards decentralisation (regionalisation) at the national level. The latter culminated in the Regional Government Act, 1981, that established five regional governments in Northern Sudan in addition to the regional government in Southern Sudan, already in existence since 1972.

The new reorganisation of the urban administration was subsequently enacted in the Khartoum Administration Act, 1980. It amounted to a full swing return to the 1951 Ordinance in which central agencies controlled the housing functions. Under the 1980 Act housing and urban development became the responsibility of the national Ministry of Construction and Public
Fig. 5.1: The Structure of Khartoum Province Administration Under 1951 Ordinance and 1971 Act

1951 System:

- Central Government
- Province Authority
- Four District Councils
- Field Agencies

1971 System:

- Central Government
- Province Executive Council
- Six District Councils
- 31 Town & Village Councils
- Field Agencies

Fig. 5.2: The Structure of Housing Administration in Greater Khartoum, 1982

- Ministry of Construction and Public Works
  - General Directorate of Housing and Lands
  - Other Departments in the Ministry

- Lands Directorate
- Department of Housing
  - Town Planning
  - Housing Projects
  - Lands Surveys
  - Sewerage Admin.
  - Research Unit

- Provincial Administration
Works. Housing policy was prepared centrally by the Ministry in conjunction with the ministries of Planning and Finance. Implementation was the responsibility of the Department of Housing and Directorate of Lands, both coming under the Ministry of Construction and Public Works. The Department of Housing consisted of five main sections: Lands survey, Town Planning, Sewerage, Housing Projects and Research Unit. The Directorate of Lands comprised a central office and three regional units in the cities of Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North (see Fig. 5.2). Other central agencies involved in urban development such as the Water and Electricity Corporation continued to operate independently of the structure of the urban administration.

In contrast to problems of administrative fragmentation and multiplicity of jurisdictions which characterised the institutional structure of the housing agencies during the first half of the 1970s, the new structure of urban administration seemed to have generated a different set of problems. The centralisation of housing and urban development functions brought an increase in the responsibilities of the housing agencies disproportionate to their actual resource capabilities. In section 5.4 below we highlight the implications of the centralisation measures for the access of different groups to urban housing.
5.2.4 Conclusion

We have provided above a brief description of the institutional structure of the housing agencies in Greater Khartoum during the 1970s. Changes in the structure and functions of these agencies followed closely the changes in the urban administration and in the local government system. During the first half of the 1970s the functions of housing and urban development were assigned to provincial administration under the 1971 Local Government Act. Central government recovered control over these functions in 1977/78. Reorganisation of urban administration during the two phases generated institutional changes in the structure of housing agencies and produced a different set of problems and challenges in each phase. The policy implications of these changes and their outcome for access to housing will be discussed in Section 5.4 below.

5.3 THE SOCIAL CONTENT OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR LAND PLANNING AND SERVICES PROVISION

5.3.1 General

The main argument in this section is that limitations on access to residential land may be traced back to the basic laws and regulations which organised and continue to organise urban development in Greater Khartoum. An underlying notion of a socially stratified city was built into the legal framework of urban development which in turn prevented equal access. We shall argue first that, being
initially premised on a capitalist notion of land allocation, land disposal laws and regulations did not envisage preferential access for the economically weak sector of urban population under the colonial state. However, when preferential allocations were introduced in the post-independence period most benefits went to the state bureaucracy. Secondly, we argue that urban planning laws consolidated the limitations on access set by the land disposal system, and served to maintain the benefits going to the state bureaucracy. Finally, we show that the association between the class of land and levels of service provision resulted in unequal access to basic municipal services. By virtue of their place in the land classification system, poor families qualified for sub-standard levels of services. We will consider first the land disposal laws and regulations, then we will examine critically certain aspects of the urban planning laws and regulations; and finally, we will assess the impact of land and planning laws on levels of provision of basic urban services in the city.

5.3.2 Land Disposal Laws and Regulations

Urban land in the Sudan is classified into three classes that vary according to location, space and building specifications (see sub-section 5.3.3. below). Land disposal was governed until 1982 by the 1923 Land Rules. According to these Rules eight regulations were issued, under the colonial state, to control and organise the disposal of governmental land for towns, villages, religious places, clubs, petrol
stations, private schools, private hospitals and cinemas.

The basic rule for disposing of town lands for residential, commercial, industrial or leisure uses was that land must be put up for sale in a public auction, after being approved by the Central Town Planning Board. Until 1947, government land was disposed of through a variety of special arrangements according to the particular uses applied for. A national scheme was introduced in 1947 to control and organise urban land disposal for different uses. This scheme continued in operation, with important modifications—until the time of my research (1982).

The Towns Lands Scheme 1947

The 1947 scheme cancelled previous land disposal arrangements. The most important change the scheme introduced was that it established the leasehold system as the main basis for land disposal (see Chapter Four, Section 4.4.2(a) above). The terms of leases were worked out according to the class of land. Thus three different tenures were provided in the scheme:

First Class land: 50 years renewable for 30 years.
Second Class land: 30 years renewable for two periods, 20 years each.
Third Class land: 20 years renewable for two periods, 10 years each.
Variation in tenure was based on the durability of buildings in each class of land. Building specifications vary from one class to another as we explain in sub-section 5.3.3 below.

The main thrust of the 1947 scheme, however, was the organising of land-disposal on a market basis. An overview of the text of the scheme shows that it was more concerned with boosting government revenues from sales of public land than it was with how the land disposal process contributed to solving housing problems.

Paragraphs 9 to 16 and 21 to 30, in the text of the scheme, focused entirely on the auction procedures. In paragraph 12 the legislator requested that "... in general, plots should not be dribbled onto the market so as to force high premium bids". Paragraph 29 warned that "too many plots should not be offered at a single auction".

On entry conditions, paragraph 15 provided that a bidder must prove his financial ability to build according to the specifications associated with the particular class of land. The Land Inspector in charge was required to verify the aforementioned condition and exclude those who seemed ineligible.

While one of the main aims of this scheme was to regulate the disposal of government land for residential use, the emphasis on financial returns seemed to dissociate land allocation from the housing question. Obviously, the scheme
anticipated that recipients of land would be financially capable of building for themselves and for others. It was, therefore, basically designed to promote urban developments on capitalist lines with the state simply disposing of land to private developers. The latter would resolve the housing problem through putting more dwellings on the market. This strategy was particularly attractive in the light of a marked economic prosperity and rising housing demand in the capital in the immediate post-World War II period.

Given the above perspective about the aims of land disposal, the 1947 scheme contained a limited concept of preferential allocation. Preferential allocation was deemed permissible only in two situations:

(a) "For persons who, in the interest of planning, are giving up some interest in land..." and

(b) for cooperative societies... (para 17).

It is obvious from the foregoing review that the concept of state-subsidised housing or subsidised residential plots was completely absent in the scheme. Provision of urban housing was left to the market system and the financial ability of consumers. This approach to land disposal provided the foundation for other legislation relating to urban development, such as the regulation of physical planning and

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1. Paragraph 16 reads "In no case will auctions be restricted by Lands Inspector requiring a financial or other qualification unless the consent of the Commissioner of Lands is first obtained. Such consent will only be given in very exceptional circumstances". (1947 Towns Lands Scheme).
service provision as we explain below.

The system of land disposal was changed in the post-independence period and a closed-auction system was introduced which subsequently became the predominant system (see Chapter Four Section 4.3.2). However, the differentials in land classes and associated advantages central to the previous land disposal system (i.e. Market system) were kept intact. Thus, both the urban planning laws and the regulations of levels of service provision still maintained the same structure of advantages and disadvantages inherited from the 1923 Land Rules and 1947 scheme. The main difference was that the criteria of land disposal were no longer mainly economic as we explain in the following sub-section.

As the 1947 scheme focused mainly on land disposal through public auctions it included no provisions for conditions of entry to closed-auctions. Although the closed-auction became the main system of land disposal during the post-independence period, there was still no consensus on entry rules as we find out in Section 5.4 below. We will argue that the absence of legislation on these rules and their vagueness made them open to differing interpretations and manipulation.
5.3.3 Urban Planning Laws and Regulations

We argue in this sub-section that urban planning laws and regulations did not facilitate equal access to residential land for all the urban population. The differential access generated can be traced in the quality of sites and the size of plots. Although the underlying capitalist basis of the land disposal system (discussed above) was modified in the post-independence period, the discriminating aspects of the previous system of land disposal were maintained in the planning legislations. State bureaucracy benefited most from the presence of these differentials.

Three basic laws govern urban planning in the Sudan. These are: the Town and Village Planning Ordinance 1956, the Town Replanning Ordinance 1950, and the Town Planning Regulations 1957. The 1956 Ordinance defines the planning aims and objectives, and specifies the planning authority, its powers and functions. The 1957 regulations, on the other hand, spell out the details of land-use, residential classes, and plot and street spaces. We will examine below the distributive effect that planning regulations fostered in relation to residential location and plot space.

(a) The Effect of Planning Regulation on Site Quality

According to the provisions of the 1957 Town Planning Regulations urban land is classified into three classes: First, second and third class land. Site location has been
one of the underlying criteria of classification, along with plot space and building specification (see point (b) below in this sub-section).  

The location of various classes of land in Greater Khartoum was basically determined by two criteria: the relative proximity of land to the waterfront and land altitude. Both first and second class land in Khartoum were located close to the waterfront of the Blue Nile and extended south easterly. Third and fourth (slum and illegal settlements) class land mostly occupied the west and south-western part of the city. The same criteria applied to site distribution in the cities of Khartoum North and Omdurman. In the latter city, first and second class categories were only introduced during the 1940s. Thus, first and second class land were located near the waterfront of the main Nile, whereas third and fourth class land spread mainly to the west, south-west and north-west of the city.

As for the criterion of altitude it is more visible in Khartoum city which was the object of early planning legislation. The land to the north and east is higher (about 378 metres) and thus better drained and healthy. 

Land in the west and south-west of the city, on the other hand, 

1. The initial rationale for classifying land according to these criteria is examined critically in Chapter Seven Section 7.3.3(b) below. 
2. See map on location of residential classes, Appendix 5.1. 
3. See map on altitude, Appendix 5.2.
hand, is low, shallow, muddy and subject to inundation by high floods of the White Nile (Hamdan, G., 1960, in Pons, op.cit., p.235). It is also exposed to the devastating autumn torrents and to the strong winds and sandstorms of summer. The criterion of altitude applied equally to the city of Khartoum North, but not to Omdurman city where land is relatively flat and dry.

A basic feature of the Sudanese system of land classification, therefore, is that the class of land indicates the physical quality of the site and determines its economic value. We noted in the preceding sub-section that access to better quality land was linked to the economic ability of applicants. After independence, land disposal has been conducted in closed auctions in which access to first and second class land depended, in the main, on occupation. Civil servants and, to a lesser extent, private sector managers were the main beneficiaries of high class land allocations during the period 1960-1973, as the following cases illustrate. Rules of access discriminated against merchants, traders and those employed in the "informal" sector, as we discover in Section 5.4 below.

In 1960, the Khartoum New Extension was planned as first and second class residential quarters. The project consisted of 1,312 plots allocated in a closed auction exclusively for senior civil servants, and 810 plots offered for market allocation in an open auction (Memo. Ministry of Housing, 1975). Another high class residential scheme carried out in the
capital in 1972 included 1,380 first and second class plots. Most of these went to senior civil servants and private sector managers. While 68.8% of allocated plots went to the two latter groups, only 31.2% of plots were offered to merchants and businessmen (ibid).

Preferential treatment for the State bureaucracy generated obvious limitations on the access of other groups as far as better quality sites were concerned. Such subsidised access land had two further specific implications for housing opportunities for lower income groups in the city.

The first implication concerns the effect of the policy of preferential treatment for bureaucracy on budgetary allocations for low-income housing. Because of the high cost of construction in first and second class residential areas, beneficiaries in closed auctions often sought construction loans, either from the government or from commercial banks. ¹ Housing loans given by the government in the Ten Year Plan (1961/62-1970/71) amounted to 36.2% of the public sector housing budget (see Table 4.9, p. 198 above). These housing loans went to civil servants only. ² Such a large allocation to housing loans has reduced the finance available for other aspects of housing, particularly those relating to provision of the infrastructural infrastructure.

¹ The 1957 Planning Regulations stipulate that all buildings on first class land and at least the perimeters of buildings on second class land must be built of brick, stone or concrete. Buildings on third class land may be built of mud.

² The other main source of housing finance was the Estate Bank. It was reported that about 70% of its housing loans went to civil servants (AID, 1978, para. 111-43); for the distribution of housing loans according to income level during the 1970s, see Appendix 5.3.
services in third and fourth class residential areas.

Some of the beneficiaries of high class housing who failed to secure construction loans had to sell their plots and buy cheaper ones elsewhere. In this case subsidised access to land was used by some civil servants to generate income. As this income was spent on buying land in the market it affected the prices of land in the city, and this brings us to the second implication of bureaucrats' preferential access for the housing opportunities of low-income groups.

House location is now an important status symbol in Greater Khartoum. Bias against merchants and businessmen in allocations of high class land stimulated a movement by the wealthy into middle and lower class areas adjacent to high class residential quarters. This process was particularly evident in Khartoum city in Al-Geraif neighbourhood, which is adjacent to Riyadh town, a peculiarly high class area (e.g. see El-Sahafa Daily, 26.10.82). It was also noticeable in the rapid spread of multi-storey buildings in the eastern flank of Eastern Deims (one of the poorest third class quarters in Khartoum) that faces Khartoum's New Extension, the first high class area built in the post-independence period.

The result was an immediate rise in land prices during the 1970s in these third class areas. Some resident families were tempted to sell dear and move to outer zones. We argued in Chapter Four, Section 4.4.4, that the activation of the
land market has tightened the rental market and stimulated an outward movement to illegal settlements.

From what has been said above, we may conclude that civil servants had preferential access to the best sites in the city. Their access to high class land qualified them for big housing loans at the expense of budgetary allocations to low income housing. We also noted that the bias against the business class in the distribution of high class housing impelled them to buy into middle and lower class areas that were adjacent to high class areas. This process induced an upward rise in the land prices with negative implications for the housing opportunities of low income families.

(b) The Effect of Planning Regulation on Plot Space

We point out in this subsection that planning regulations determine plot space according to the class of land; the higher the class the larger the space. Preferential allocation of high class land to civil servants gave them access to larger plots. This pattern of allocation seems to contradict both the earlier economic basis of land disposal and the criterion relating to the minimum space standards per person.

The Town Planning Regulations 1957 provide for the following minimum dimensions of plots:
Planning experience both under the colonial state and in the post-independence period persistently maintained the differences in plot space between the three residential classes of land. On the other hand, no consensus has been reached about specific space standards for each residential class.

In Khartoum's New Extension, the plot spaces granted in 1960 for first and second class land were 873m$^2$ and 600m$^2$ respectively. Twelve years later another high class allocation carried out in Khartoum City provided plot spaces of 880m$^2$ and 650m$^2$ respectively.

By comparison, in Khartoum's Third Class Extension allocated in 1963, plots of 300m$^2$ were granted. Another project in third class land implemented in 1972 provided plot spaces of 360m$^2$.

Most commentators on space standards in urban Sudan considered that the spaces granted were over-sized. Yet, while most of these studies have recommended a reduction in the minimum plot space, they seem to have approved of maintaining space differentials between the three residential classes.¹

¹. Exceptions to this statement are Elias, E. 1970, and Hijazi, N. 1981.
An early study of the space standards in the Sudan was conducted by Doxiadis Associates (1960). The study was concerned with the effect of the size and shape of urban plots on urban economics. It recommended the following table for determining minimum and maximum plot spaces for different income groups:

Table 5.1: Relation of Plot Size to Income Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income groups</th>
<th>Space in square metres</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
<th>Lower-Middle</th>
<th>Higher-Middle</th>
<th>Highest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>594+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td></td>
<td>135</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>594</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Doxiadis Associates 1960, p. 302.

A subsequent study (Ahmed, 1974) provided another model for space determination. The same model was endorsed in the Interim Housing Plan 1975:-
Both of these models initially based their calculations of space standards on family income. But the second model left the determination of the exact plot space to be fixed according to criteria of:

(a) Family size, age and sex structure
(b) Family growth propensity, and
(c) Family income (National Housing Plan, 1975, p.23, Ministry of Housing).

Although the latter model introduced new criteria for calculating plot space, nevertheless it grounded space determination, in the final analysis, on family income. Its proposed space
ranges, therefore, conformed to the established pattern of land classification.

The above models seem to downplay or overlook family size as an important determinant of space standards. Average family size is usually larger among low-income families and therefore their space needs per family are more than those of middle and upper income groups. However, according to the prevailing regulations, poor families still get less space as the following tables illustrate.

Table 5.2a: Minimum Plot Space According to Land Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Land</th>
<th>Minimum Plot Space (sq.m.)</th>
<th>Average Family Size</th>
<th>Area per Person (sq.m.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Class</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Class</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Class</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Housing Plan, 1975, p.19, Ministry of Housing

Table 5.2b: Occupancy Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Land</th>
<th>Persons per Room</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First and Second Class</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Class</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Class</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In practice, as a result of sharing and sub-letting most low-income families lived in areas far below the minimum standards. Given family size, it is obvious that low-income families qualify for larger plots if space standards were based on space needs per person. But low-income families cannot afford the economic price of larger plots, since these are designed as first and second class land whose price is high and building specifications are difficult to meet.

Yet the preferential access of the bureaucracy to high class land contradicts the same economic logic that deprived low income families from having larger residential plots. First, civil servants acquired plots at subsidised prices either in closed auctions (as in the 1960 allocations) or in a lottery at a low fixed price (as in 1972 allocations). A study by the US Agency for International Development found the following differences between subsidised prices and the market value of government-allocated land in Greater Khartoum (1977).

Table 5.3: Lost Revenue on the Sale of Land

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Plot</th>
<th>Price of Land £S</th>
<th>Estimated Market Value £S</th>
<th>Lost Revenue £S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Class</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Class</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Class</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Excluding cost of development.

Second, civil servants were able to meet the building specifications as a result of state housing-loans. Thus, both land price and construction were most likely to be subsidised from public funds.

We may conclude that limitations on access to better sites and larger plots were rooted in the underlying economic bases of planning regulations. But these criteria did not apply to civil servants in the post-independence period. The above limitations mostly affected the access of urban poor families.

5.3.4 Impact of Urban Planning on Access to Municipal Services

We will focus in this sub-section on the effect of the land classification system on the levels of service provision for different groups of urban families. We note that levels of provision decline, the lower the class of land. Whereas the basis of service provision is essentially economic, the preferential access of the state bureaucracy to high class land guaranteed it a further advantage of higher levels of service provision. On the other hand, because of their place in the land classification system, lower income groups were assigned lower levels of provision. Actual provision levels seldom reached the official standards. We shall examine first the official standards of provision and then consider actual performance.
(a) **Official Standards of Services:**

By municipal services we mean the basic utilities such as water and electricity and the infrastructural services such as site preparation, drainage system and roads. In Sudan all these services are part of the housing package and their cost is usually paid in advance by beneficiaries before they receive their plots. Each class of land is associated with a specific level of service. These services vary from one class to another. For instance, third-class land is assigned the following services:

1. Preparation of the site for construction;
2. Construction of embankments;
3. Digging of open drains;
4. Installation of lights in main streets and public parks;
5. Connecting water mains to plots;
6. Installation of electricity lines;
7. Compacting main roads;

All the above services obtain in second class residential areas plus:

8. Paving all main streets and compacting internal roads;
9. Provision of sewerage network or construction of a common septic tank for every two houses;

All the aforementioned services apply to first class areas in addition to the following:
10. Compacting and paving of all streets;
11. Construction of covered drainage network, and,

The above enumeration shows how levels of provision change with the class of land. We may note that only the early economic basis underlying the land disposal system can explain these differential levels of services provision. Yet the bureaucracy was exempted from those economic conditions by virtue of its preferential access to high class land. In fact, the real levels of provision in first and second class land were higher than those stipulated above (ibid). The 1975 Housing Plan deliberately reduced them in order to bring down the service costs to the financial abilities of civil servants. At the same time, the prescribed levels of provision for third class areas were markedly higher than what was actually provided, as we find out below.

(b) The Actual Levels of Services Provision

We noted above that the regulations earmarked a low level of services to low income groups. However, actual levels of provision seldom reached even these official standards. Limitations on performance occurred mainly due to lack of coordination among respective agencies and financial difficulties in meeting the cost of services. The outcome was that third class areas often had to wait for many years before they got basic services, as the following case illustrates.
In early 1967 some 22,000 third class residential plots were allocated in Greater Khartoum. The cost of the urban services within this development was put at £S 9,380,168 including water, electricity, drainage, roads, health and security services. Since these services were normally provided by several agencies costs were supposed to have been budgeted separately by each department and then submitted to the Ministry of Finance for approval. However, the respective agencies did not include the project's cost in their budgetary estimates, and the allocated plots remained without services until the early 1970s (Five Year Plan, 1970, pp.2-4).

Such coordination problems increased during the 1970s following the process of the administrative reorganisation which we referred to in Section 5.2 above. There were cases of overlap between agencies. One implication was that beneficiaries were double charged for urban services. For instance, the Water and Electricity Corporation demanded that beneficiaries in a Khartoum low-cost housing project (1978) paid a sum of £S 89,000 prior to installing water and electricity networks. In the meantime, beneficiaries had already paid these costs, though at a lower rate, to the Housing Department as part of the initial land price. After heated communications between the two agencies and protests from beneficiaries, it was decided that the beneficiaries should pay the outstanding bill (Memo. Ministry of Housing, undated).
Another source of difficulties on the provision of the prescribed levels of urban services was their rising cost and the decline in the municipal revenues since the early 1970s. The expansion in the structure of local government during the 1970s inflated the bill of administrative costs and fostered a decline in the expenditure on urban services. This trend is illustrated by the following table.

Table 5.4: Local Government Expenditure in Khartoum Province (in £ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1974/75</th>
<th>1975/76</th>
<th>1976/77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The decline in the municipal revenues and the rise in the cost of urban services called for a reconsideration of revenue sources and for a review of the costing arrangements of urban services. As early as 1970, the deputy Under-Secretary of Local Government warned that neither the central nor the Local Government had the funds to subsidise the level of urban services that was envisaged in the Five Year Housing Plan (Memo. Ministry of Local Government, 1970). In a joint letter to provincial commissioners, the Ministers of Housing and Local Government laid down a policy that beneficiaries in land allocations must pay the full economic cost of basic services (Ministry of
nousing 1970). In contrast to a system of subsidised urban services that prevailed during the 1950s and the 1960s a new trend towards cost-conscious housing policy emerged during the early 1970s.

This "economic" approach to urban services was subsequently reflected in the Interim Housing Policy 1975 (Ministry of Housing, 1975, p.25) and following housing programmes (see eg. Report of the Housing National Committee 1981, p.55). This latter committee recommended that the average annual inflation rate should be added as a percentage to the total economic cost of urban services and charged to beneficiaries. The trend towards rationalising urban services brought a new dimension to the problem of the low level of urban services assigned to third and fourth class areas. Within the specified level of services, access came to depend on the economic ability of different wards or neighbourhoods to pay collectively for the installation of the service network.

But as the provision of urban services was increasingly required to meet costs, the preferential access of civil servants to high class housing and subsidised services came increasingly into contradiction with the trend towards cost-effective service provision. The 1975 Interim Housing Policy highlighted this contradiction when it stated that levels of services in first and second class areas were deliberately reduced in order to bring down their cost to the financial abilities of civil servants (National Housing Plan 1975, pp.25, 26). The standard of infrastructural services provided in
high class housing areas undoubtedly absorbed scarce funds and contained a high foreign component. Because of this latter point the subsidy on urban services going to civil servants had a further inequitable effect in the disproportionate allocation of hard currency to the needs of higher income groups.

We may conclude from the foregoing discussion that the level of provision of urban services for different income groups in the city was predetermined by the class of land rather than by the relative need of individual families. This pattern of distribution was prescribed by the official service provision regulations. The preferential access of the state bureaucracy to high class land gave it subsidised access to better urban services. As access to services became increasingly based on economic ability, low income families would find it difficult to sustain a minimum level of urban services. On the other hand, the subsidised access of bureaucracy to these services contradicted the new policy of rationalising service provision on a cost-effective basis.

5.3.5 Conclusion

We argued in this section that limitations on access to residential land in Greater Khartoum were basically rooted in the content of the allocation rules. We selected for detailed examination rules relating to land disposal, urban planning and service provision.
Focusing on the land disposal system, we outlined how it was initially set up to allocate residential land along capitalist lines and provided the foundation for other legislation on urban planning and service provision. Despite the introduction of the closed auction system in the post-independence period, the structure of advantage and disadvantage of the old system survived. The state bureaucracy benefited from the existence of differential access to residential land.

The rules of urban planning generated differential access in relation to the quality of sites and sizes of plots. We noted that better quality sites and larger plots mostly went to the state-bureaucracy. Low-income families, on the other hand, were frequently assigned smaller plots located in inferior sites. Moreover, the preferential access of the bureaucracy to high class land gave it access to large housing loans at the expense of budgetary allocations to low-income housing.

The level of service provision varied according to the class of land; the higher the class of land the better services it received. By virtue of its access to high class land, the state bureaucracy enjoyed higher levels of urban services. By contrast, residents in the third and fourth class areas were assigned lower levels of services, and actual provision levels lagged behind the official standards. Moreover, the recent trend towards rationalising services provision on an economic basis would make it difficult for many low-income families to
maintain a minimum level of urban services.

The above analysis showed that the limitations on access to residential land were rooted in the content of the allocation rules. These limitations were not devoid of social meaning as they consistently operated to the advantage of a particular social group - the state bureaucracy - and to the disadvantage of a multiplicity of other social groups and classes. The limitations on access generated at this level, can be seen as internal to the allocation rules themselves - i.e. rules governing land disposal, urban planning and the provision of basic urban services.

5.4 ALLOCATION PROCESS AND THE GENERATION OF BIAS

5.4.1 General

In the preceding section we outlined how the land classification system organised access to land along income lines, associating each income group with a certain package of housing benefits or penalties. The resulting limitations on access to land operated between different income groups, although the state bureaucracy got most benefits on a non-income basis.

In this section we will focus on the operation of the allocation structure in practice and investigate whether any further limitations on access were generated in the process. Firstly, we will argue that further limitations on access are identifiable, and that these operated mainly within income groups or housing classes rather than between them. Thus,
the main effect of these limitations was to improve or obstruct the access of applicants in a certain category of housing such as first, second or third class housing. These limitations related to the interpretation and application of the entry rules, and to the organisation of the reception desk. Secondly, we will examine whether there was any systematic basis to the discrimination in access to residential land. Besides the dominance of the state bureaucracy in the allocation of benefits, we note the increasing influence of the merchant class. Among those who least benefited from land allocations in the capital the majority was originally from Western Sudan.

5.4.2 Bias in Eligibility Rules

We noted in Section 5.3.2 above that the 1947 Towns' Lands Scheme did not specify the conditions for entry to closed auctions. These rules were formulated in the post-independence period and increasingly relied on precedent, prevailing circumstances and the discretionary power of the Director of Lands and his deputies. These rules kept changing over the years, as we explain shortly. They manifested a continually running bias toward applicants in formal employment.
(a) Bias to Formal Employment

We mentioned above the absence of permanent rules for entry to housing allocations. So, in order to explain the bias toward formal employment we will refer to specific housing programmes to illustrate the point.

1 - The New Deims Settlement, 1949–1953

In the absence of permanent eligibility rules it seems that precedent increasingly influenced the formation of the entry rules in the post-independence period. The resettlement of the New Deims of Khartoum during the period 1949–1953 is illustrative in this respect because it was the first non-market allocation of government land to be carried out in the post-World War II period.¹ As the old settlement was relocated into a new site, plots were allocated to:

1. All owner-occupiers
2. All tenants who (i) had been residing in the Old Deims for the previous ten years, and (ii) had their families living with them, and
3. Those who had permanent employment in Khartoum (Fawzi, S. 1954, p.519).

According to Fawzi, most of those residents were "essentially workers ... in government departments and private establishments" (ibid, p.515).

¹ Since the turn of the century only two similar allocations were carried out in the capital in 1912 and 1930. See Fawzi (1954), and Arther (1954), both in Pons, 1980.
The condition of permanent employment was introduced to control the demand for land. Against 5,777 dwellings in the old settlement, housing 30,000 persons, only 3,873 plots were allocated in New Deims (Arthur, 1954, pp.527, 532). It was also meant to check on the massive wave of migration that began following the end of the war. In fact many people were repatriated during this period (eg. McLoughlin, 1970, 117). We may, therefore, argue that the eligibility conditions were largely influenced by the government's labour policy.¹ This emphasis on employment seems to have influenced the entry rules in the post-1956 period as it became central to the allocation rules in subsequent housing programmes. Yet it was less so in the 1947 Towns' Lands Scheme and other previous land disposal arrangements.

2. The Khartoum North Low-Cost Housing Project

This project was carried out in the period 1963-1967. Its purpose was to provide housing for low-income families on a hire purchase basis.² The entry conditions stipulated, among other things, that the applicant must be an employee of the government, industrial firm, bank or commercial company, receiving a monthly salary, provided that the remaining years of his service did not fall short of ten years at the time of application (Ibid).

¹. The project was initiated in the Department of Labour.
². The project produced 1,000 units at a cost of £S 0.9 million (Farghali, 1977, pp.93,97).
Given the hire-purchase aspect of the project the financial considerations for the repayment had priority in deciding who should benefit. Low-income families in "informal" employment were not, therefore, eligible to apply.

3. Khartoum North Middle Income Housing Project:

This project was carried out in 1967 to provide residential plots to middle-income families in the capital. The entry rules provided that: the applicant must be a permanent official in government or in a private company, among other conditions (see eg. Minutes, Permanent Town Planning Committee, 1967).

Emphasis on the condition of formal employment was central to the allocation rules of the high class housing until the early 1970s. This condition mostly operated in favour of civil servants and private sector managers. It discriminated against small scale traders and those employed in the "informal" sector. As this condition was relaxed in the allocations of third class land during the 1960s, most of those whose income level qualified them for high class housing but could not apply because of the condition of formal employment competed for third class allocations (ibid). This often resulted in tense competition and narrowing of the housing opportunities for low-income families. The persistence of the condition of formal employment in the entry rules may be related to:
(1) The precedent of colonial housing policy;
(2) Administrative convenience in processing information on applicants in formal employment;
(3) The small size of the urban "informal" sector compared to the (formal) governmental sector might have influenced administrative definitions of housing demand and its incidence among different groups.¹
(4) The political strength of white collar groups and the weak political leverage of those employed in the "informal" sector.

(b) Changing Nature of the Content of Eligibility Rules

We have already noted above the absence of permanent entry rules. As these rules kept changing under different regimes, emphasis also shifted in relation to the criteria for ordering applicants and determining their eligibility. This changing pattern in the content of eligibility rules made them open to differing interpretations and susceptible to manipulation.

It has been the tradition in the Sudan that a points system is employed for deciding priority among applicants (Mohamoud, F., 1974, p.51). Each criterion in the eligibility rules is assigned a certain number of points such that those

¹. The ILO Report (1976) estimated the "informal" sector employment in Greater Khartoum to range from a low of 52,500 to a high of 58,000 (1976, p.332). By contrast, the "modern" sector employment was put at 100,000 (ibid, p.365). One expects that the size of the "informal" sector was much smaller during the 1950s and the 1960s.
applicants with the highest score of points had priority over others. The structure of the point system kept changing over time, as the following table illustrates.

Table 5.5: Change in the Structure of the Points System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wife</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Other Wife</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each Child</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Each other wife</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Each Child</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each dependent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Each child</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bachelor Status</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility Score</td>
<td>9+</td>
<td></td>
<td>Each dependent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Renting or living</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 years to retirement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>in government premises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 years to retirement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Choice of home town</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Choice of home town</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Choice of town of permanent residence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Choice of town of residence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eligibility score</td>
<td>23+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Memo. Ministry of Housing, 29 June, 1969; Memo, Ministry of Housing, 1975; and Adam, M., 1979, p.27.

The change in the structure of the points system from the 1960s through the 1970s underlies two trends. First, the uplifting of the condition on formal employment at the end of the 1960s was compensated for by points on the number of years left before retirement as the preceding table showed. Points accrued as a result only benefited those in "formal" employment, as those employed in the "informal" sector cannot produce similar evidence. Since private sector firms, generally did not have retirement policies akin to those in government, the state bureaucracy was the sole beneficiary of points given
for this reason. Second, the inclusion of points for choice of home town reflected the government's concern about rural-urban migration from the late 1960's onwards. By awarding more points to those who chose to apply for land in their place of origin, the government hoped to discourage migration to the capital. It rewarded those who were born in the Greater Khartoum area and put those originating in other areas at a disadvantage.\(^1\) However, this does not seem to have the desired effect, because house ownership had little effect on the decision to migrate to the capital (eg. see M.El-A. G. El-Din, 1974, pp.20-22).

The above discussion shows that the entry rules as well as the methods of determining eligibility contained certain biases against those employed in the "informal" sector and those originating outside Khartoum Province. The main beneficiary group was that of the civil servants.

5.4.3 Difficulties at the Reception Desk

Apart from problems of the entry rules and those relating to the content of the eligibility rules, another set of limits on access arose at the reception desk. These limits related mainly to the manner in which the reception desks were organised. The organisational instability discussed above (5.2) had a direct effect on the way the allocation rules were implemented. Two main phases of the institutional change may be delineated to trace the impact of the institutional

\(^1\) We will consider the regional bias in the allocation structure in sub-section 5.4.3 below.
context on the operation of the allocation rules and procedures.

The first phase of organisational change started shortly before the introduction of the 1971 Local Government Act and extended up to 1977/78. At the beginning of this period, "ward committees, consisting of politically non-infected citizens" (Memo. Ministry of Housing, 1970) were established to process application forms at the local level. At that stage, the political party (SSU) was not yet formed and there was no other political organisation that guided or controlled the work of those committees. Their work was, therefore, open both to political and personal initiative.

By the promulgation of the 1971 Act responsibility for urban housing passed into the hands of the provincial administration (see Section 5.2 above). The political circumstances which surrounded the 1971 local government reorganisation are important for understanding the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that were built into the structure of the local government system (eg. see Howell, J., 1974, pp.65,75). The pattern of representation was geared to be responsive to certain interests, namely those who were not associated with past political parties and who were willing to give political support to the regime. Thus, from the outset, specific institutional constraints were built into the structure of the allocation agencies at the local level.¹

¹ A senior participant in the reorganisation of the local government system noted that "it requires considerable acrobatic skill for a local citizen to escalate upward from his village or neighbourhood to acquire membership of a Province Executive Council, or even a local council at District level or rural or town level" (Khalifa, M.O., 1980, p.44, in Norris and Pickering, 1980).
Besides the politicisation of the local government system, there were considerable organisational limitations on access to allocation agencies. The organisational structure of the new local government system (Fig. 5.1 above) "generated a large volume of administrative, financial and accounting traffic along unidentified and not always straight lines across the different administrative levels, which makes the whole (administrative) process complicated, unpredictable and confused", (Khalifa, M.O., 1980, p.42). Furthermore, the characteristic vagueness of the 1971 Act on the division of labour between administrative and political roles, on the one hand, and the unclarity of the "ordering" rules, on the other hand, provided ample opportunity for dominant interests in local councils to interpret the rules to suit themselves.

The numerical strength and leading positions that councillors acquired under the 1971 Act gave them a dominant role in the implementation process. On balance, they often acted in alliance with the administrative officers to the near exclusion of the technical officers (Sidahmed, 1974, p.59). The councillors' power was manifest during the implementation of the 1977 Housing Plan. Local councils were assigned the distribution, collection and endorsement of application forms and their supporting documents. The operation gave the local councils a patronage asset that turned them, at one time, into centres for local conflict. The housing stake drew many local agencies and groups into a tense competition (e.g. see Chapter Six). Cases of misallocation were widely reported in many parts of the country.¹

Limitations on access during this phase were mainly due to the politicisation of the allocation agencies, the fragmentation of the administrative system, and the multiplicity of decision centres. In the absence or weakness of local representation, citizens would try to mobilise extra resources to help them to relate to the allocation agencies. The multiplicity of administrative levels and agencies was an advantage to those applicants who had sufficient bureaucratic connections. But it could be an insurmountable obstacle for those who, lacking bureaucratic connections, had to follow the official access channels.

The second phase of the reorganisation of the urban administration started in 1977/78, when the planning, housing and land disposal jurisdictions were taken by the central government (see Section 5.2 above). The allocation process which was previously carried out by 27 town and village councils and six district councils, and controlled by the Province Executive Council, had to be undertaken by the Central Directorate of Lands. The massive demand for residential land that was stimulated during the 1970s put heavy pressure on the already meagre manpower resources of the Directorate.¹

During my fieldwork in 1982 the Lands Directorate embarked on the implementation of the second phase of the 1977 Housing Plan which involved processing 20,000 applications, competing

¹. The administrative instability of the housing agencies undermined career expectations and lowered staff morale. As much as 65% of the manpower employed in housing and town planning migrated to oil-rich Arab countries during the last decade (Sudanow, 1983, Jan., p.44).
for some 14,000 residential plots. The project included applicants who had already filled applications in the 1977/78 housing programme, but their names failed to appear at the time. They were required now to identify their names in the displayed lists, fill a new landform and come before an interviewing committee to establish their eligibility to land. I compiled the following observations about the difficulties that faced applicants at the reception desks.

Names of the applicants were displayed on three separate sets of lists. Each set included the names of the applicant from one of the three cities that make up Greater Khartoum. In each set, names were classified into three separate lists, each corresponding to one class of land i.e. first, second and third class.

There were three reception desks and applicants from each city were assigned a separate counter. These were open from 9.00 am to 1.00 pm. Each applicant was required to quote his/her serial number in the displayed lists, present identity papers and pay a certain fee before collecting the application form.

The major problem that faced the applicants was how to locate names on the advertised lists. There was no general serialisation of names, neither for the three sets of lists combined nor for each separate set. Names were only serialised for each class of land. Thus, in every set of lists there were three serialisations corresponding to the three
classes of land i.e. nine serialisations for the project. Thus, the most commonly recurring difficulty was that of duplication of names and serial numbers between applicants.

A second source of inconvenience was the way the lists of names were displayed. There was no special display board. Lists of names were displayed without protection on outside walls of buildings and on broken pieces of wood laid in the open air under a tree. Unprotected from rain, wind and human contact some lists faded quickly and became unreadable.

Those applicants who could not locate their names because lists were unreadable, or those whose names were incorrectly written or those seeking any other information faced considerable difficulty in finding out the right source of information. There was no general enquiry desk. The three reception desks noted earlier only dealt with those whose names were included. In search for information, hopefuls were storming every office in the building including the Director's. Difficulties observed at the reception desk may be summarised as the following:

(1) The near absence of an information service which would help the ordinary, illiterate citizen through the maze of regulation and procedures.

(2) The confusing nature of the advertised lists of names, both in terms of the manner of
compilation of the names and the method of display.

(3) The overlapping of responsibility between the central Directorate of Lands, the Provincial Lands Section and the District Council.

These organisational difficulties caused considerable pressure on the limited human resources of the Lands Directorate. They opened a door for bureaucratic corruption and fostered an army of brokers, dealing between applicants and allocation agencies. These difficulties often victimised those who lacked financial resources, information and bureaucratic connections.

5.4.4 Basis of Discrimination in the Allocation Structure

We identified above two sets of limitations on access to residential land in Greater Khartoum. The first set related to the content of the allocation rules: the land-disposal, urban planning, and the service provision laws and regulations (Section 5.3). The second set of limitations derived from the way allocation rules were implemented, as we outlined in the preceding sub-sections. Given these limitations, we will examine in this sub-section whether there was any systematic basis to these inequalities in access.

1. Traffic in illegally produced documents was widespread around land offices and only the economically weak were less able to benefit from it (eg. see El-Sahafa Daily, 30th October, 1982).
We argued in Section 5.3 above that the allocation rules generated differential access to residential land in terms of quality of sites, size of plots and levels of urban services. Until the early 1970s the state bureaucracy, particularly in its middle and upper levels, benefited most from the presence of these differentials. It also used its preferential access to land to obtain further access to state loans. Considering the second set of limitations on access relating to eligibility rules and reception desks, the state bureaucracy was least affected. We noted that most eligibility rules suited civil servants more than other groups of applicants.

Besides their advantage over other applicants in public programmes, civil servants had access to special housing programmes restricted to influential institutions such as the army, the Judiciary, the university, the public corporations, the Party, the National Assembly and certain ministries. These special allocations were in operation until 1982 (see El-Ayam Daily, 29th December 1981). This marked influence of civil servants on the benefits of land allocation suggests that occupation and income, and therefore education, were the main bases of discrimination in the allocation of residential land in Greater Khartoum.

The dominance of bureaucrats in the allocation of residential land has been increasingly challenged from the early 1970s by the business class. There were two indicators for this trend. First, the monopoly of the bureaucracy over
closed auctions of high class land came to an end from 1972 onwards, and businessmen and merchants were allowed to compete in closed auctions. Secondly, the trend toward rationalising urban housing policy on a cost-effective basis led to a marked increase in the price of high class land. We referred in Chapter Four (4.4.4) to the marked increase in prices of construction materials during the 1970s. Thus, fewer civil servants have been able to afford the land price and the construction costs. And, due to the deteriorating financial situation of the country, fewer housing loans were made available. We anticipated that many of the civil servants who acquired land in high class areas were tempted either to sell to businessmen and move out, or to sell part of the plot and live in the remainder. As businessmen replace civil servants as the main beneficiaries of the land programmes, economic ability, we argue, will constitute the main basis for access to residential land.

The allocation rules discriminated against urban lower classes in relation to the quality of sites, size of plots and levels of urban services, as we pointed out in Section 5.3 above. Further limitations on access occurred in relation to the eligibility rules and at the reception desks. Most of those discriminated against were employed in the "informal sector", who probably had little or no education, least bureaucratic connections and lower incomes.
Another basis for discrimination in the allocation of residential land in the capital was regional origin. There was a trend towards a high representation of beneficiaries from central Sudan in high class allocations compared with a low representation for those originating in Western and Southern Sudan. The opposite trend occurred in illegal settlements in the capital where the majority of residents were originally from Western Sudan (and to a lesser extent, from Southern Sudan at least in the city of Khartoum). A comparison of regional origin between the beneficiaries in the allocations of high class land (1970) and residents of the National Unity Illegal Settlement will illustrate the above point (Table 5.9).

Table 5.6: Distribution of Regional Origin Between Two Residential Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Beneficiaries in High Class Land Allocations (1970) %</th>
<th>Residents in National Unity Settlement (1982)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First Class</td>
<td>Second Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan (Western)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur (Southern)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The underlying basis for discrimination in the allocation structure was mainly income and occupational status. Most people who earned high incomes and held prestigious occupations tended to come from central Sudan. Thus, the country’s senior civil servants, ministers, army officers and businessmen of substance overwhelmingly have their origins in the Northern Province (Hale, 1981, mentioned in: Shepherd, A., 1982). On the other hand, the majority of those who least benefited from the allocation structure worked in the "informal" sector, had little or no education and predominantly originated in Western Sudan.

5.4.5 Conclusion

We examined in this section the limitations on access that arose during the allocation process, and considered the underlying bases of discrimination in access to residential land in Greater Khartoum.

We noted that the difficulties in access to land that arose from the allocation procedures operated mainly within the housing classes or income groups rather than between them. In this sense they did not affect the content of what was allocated but mainly limited the access of certain individuals or groups to an already predetermined package of housing. We classified these limitations into two categories, one related to the eligibility rules and the other related to the organisation of the reception desk.
Examining the entry rules for land allocation, we underlined a bias toward those employed in the "formal" sector. The recurring change in the structure of the eligibility rules was noted. It showed a built-in bias against those employed in the "informal" sector and those whose origin was outside Greater Khartoum. The state bureaucracy was the group who benefited from the existence of these limitations on access to residential land.

Another source of difficulties for applicants was the way in which the reception desks were organised. We examined these organisational limitations in the two phases of the reorganisation of urban administration during the 1970s. The first phase 1969-1977 was characterised by political interference in the allocation process and administrative fragmentation of decision centres. Applicants who lacked political or administrative connections faced considerable difficulties in reaching the allocation agencies. The second phase of reorganisation witnessed the centralisation of the housing and land operations. This generated mounting pressures on the meagre resources of the allocation agencies and strained their ability to process applications for land. There was a lack of a general information service to applicants; names of prospective candidates were displayed in a confused and inconvenient way; and there was a degree of in clarity about the division of responsibility between the various departments involved in the allocation process.
Finally, we considered the underlying basis of discrimination in access to residential land in the capital. We suggested that income and occupational status were the main criteria for access to urban residential land. We noted that most of those who satisfied this requirement came from central Sudan. Lower income, low occupational status and minimal education were common characteristics among those who least benefited from the allocation operations. Most of the latter group originally came from Western Sudan.

5.5 GENERAL CONCLUSION

We set out in this chapter to analyse the allocation structure of residential land in Greater Khartoum and to uncover how it affected the access of different urban groups to land. We proposed that the allocation structure did not provide access for all urban families. Two sources of constraints were identified: at one level constraints on access derived from the content of the allocation rules, and at another level they arose from the implementation process. The chapter was organised into three main sections.

In the second section we presented an overview of the institutional context of the housing agencies. We delineated two major institutional changes during the 1970's which had an important impact on the powers, functions and problems of the housing agencies. The first change came in 1971 when the jurisdictions of land, housing and urban planning were delegated
to the provincial administration. The second change occurred in 1977/78 as these jurisdictions were recovered by central government. The policy implications of these changes in relation to access to residential land were considered in the fourth section of the chapter.

We examined critically, in the third section, the allocation rules relating to land, urban planning and service provision. The land disposal system, initially introduced under the colonial state, established a differential access to land based on the economic ability of applicants. Despite a change in the system of land disposal in the post-independence period, the structure of advantages and disadvantages of the old system was maintained in the rules and regulations of urban planning and service provision.

We found that the rules of urban planning generated differential access in relation to the quality of sites and size of plots. High class housing was located in better sites and assigned spacious plots. By contrast third and fourth class housing was located in inferior sites and assigned smaller plots. The provision of services followed closely the class of land. The higher the class, the more urban services it received. Low income families were provided with lower levels of services. The state bureaucracy benefited most from these differentials in access to residential land and associated services. We argued, therefore, that the limitations on access were rooted in the rules of land, urban planning and service provision.
We examined another source of limitation on access - the allocation process - in the fourth section of the chapter. We argued that the limitation occurring at this level operated within housing classes rather than between them. We identified two types of limitations: those emanating from the content of the eligibility rules, and those relating to the organisation of the reception desks. We found that the state bureaucracy was least affected by the existence of these limitations.

Finally, we considered the underlying basis of discrimination in access to residential land in the capital. We suggested that income, occupation and regional origin were important determinants for access to residential land. Most of those who met these criteria were originally from Central Sudan. Those who least benefited from the prevailing allocation structure of residential land had low incomes, worked in the "informal" sector, had minimal education and predominantly came from Western Sudan.

We may conclude that the allocation structure contained two mechanisms that operated in a biased way against certain urban groups: the content of the allocation rules i.e. rules of land disposal, urban planning and service provision; and the rules of procedure which organised access at the distribution points. The bias generated by the former mechanisms was more detrimental to the least benefited groups than that of the latter mechanism.
The import of the foregoing analysis poses two further considerations. First, to the extent that the allocation rules and techniques were used to mediate certain social interests in the allocation process then their "conventional" status as "objective" and "rational" organisational techniques becomes untenable. We will examine critically the assumption of the neutrality of these techniques in Chapter Seven below. Second, we argued that the allocation structure had been used by the state bureaucracy to protect its housing benefits by blocking the access of other social groups and classes. We may also consider the possibility that the allocation structure might be used to achieve objectives other than housing benefits. In the following chapter we consider whether the housing problem in illegal settlements was used for political purposes.
CHAPTER SIX


6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on a case study of an upgrading project in the National Unity Settlement of Omdurman City. The case study will be used to illustrate three dimensions of the limitations on access to residential land in the capital.

First, we will argue that regional origins of the residents reveal a close link between the model of regional development (Chapter Four) and the growth of illegal settlements on the outskirts of the capital. We will also argue that housing conditions in the settlement illustrate the inadequacies in the allocation structure which were already outlined in the preceding chapter. Second, the case study will be used to illustrate the constraining effect of political intervention in housing policy on the access of low income families to legal housing. Third, it will be shown that administering of the upgrading process generates a variety of other obstacles on access at the distribution points.
6.2 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SETTLEMENT

6.2.1 General

The growth of illegal settlements in the Sudan mostly took place in the post-war period (see F. Zahir, 1972; and Elias and Bedawi, 1972, both in El-Bushra, 1972). As the rate of urban growth picked up during the second half of the 1960s and because of difficult access to official housing programmes, illegal settlements began to constitute a fundamental means to urban shelter. By 1975 they housed about 29% of the capital's population.

The process of development of these illegal settlements in Greater Khartoum followed different patterns. For instance, in Khartoum and Khartoum North cities, "cardboard" settlements developed during the 1960s through direct occupation of vacant Government Land around industrial areas. In Omdurman city, the National Unity Settlement grew as an offshoot of the larger settlement of Umbudda during the 1970s on village communal land through a process of illegal land transaction. However, despite the variations in their patterns of growth there were important common characteristics between most of the residents in these settlements relating to their regional origins and socio-economic attributes. These common features will be highlighted below.

The National Unity Settlement is located on the western boundaries of Greater Khartoum (see Map, Appendix 6.1). It stretches in a north-south direction on the western border of Umbudda town. The growth of the settlement followed closely
that of neighbouring Umbudda, which was itself an illegal settlement until 1968. As the replanning process was underway in the settlement of Umbudda during the late 1960s people began to move into the location of the present day Unity Settlement. The replanning of Umbudda stimulated the growth of the Unity Settlement in two ways: first, the demarcation of the western boundary of Umbudda settlement resulted in the exclusion of some residents who had expected their plots to be included in the replanned area. This group of residents constituted the hard core of the Unity Settlement. Second, the replanning of the settlement of Umbudda encouraged many people to take up land in the Unity Settlement in anticipation of replanning. Thus, the settlement grew from some 500 dwellings in 1970 to about 24,000 dwellings in 1982. This section of the Chapter will examine the socio-economic profiles of the population and the housing conditions in the settlement.¹

6.2.2 The Socio-Economic Profiles of the Population

(a) The Origins of the Residents

According to our sample survey (1982) the majority of the residents in the settlement originally came from the western region of the country. As Table 6.1 shows, the two western provinces of Kordofan and Darfur provided 58.3% of the residents. This ratio could even be higher because some of those who came from the central region were originally from western Sudan. Historically, the western region supplied

¹. The following information is based on a sample survey conducted by the writer in the settlement during the period October-December 1982. For the survey procedure and the interview schedule see Appendices 6.2 and 6.3.
and continued to supply agricultural labour to the agriculturally rich areas of central Sudan from the time of colonial rule.¹

Table 6.1: The Regional Origins of the Residents in the Settlement (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>% of Household Heads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Region</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum Province</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan Region</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur Region</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Region</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high proportion of residents in the settlement coming from the western region conformed to the results of the research conducted in the "cardboard" settlement in the city of Khartoum North (Zahir, op.cit., p.229). Illegal settlements in the south of Khartoum city and in Al-Ghamayir and Zagaluna in the city of Omdurman reflected a similar pattern of regional origins though this is not yet documented. The high representation of residents coming from the western region in illegal settlements corresponds closely to the pattern of rural-urban migration and the high incidence of emigration from the western region, which we noted in Chapter Four.

¹. For the history of the movement of agricultural labour from the western region to central Sudan see El-Din, M., 1973.
Although the southern region is considered an economically depressed area, only 1.7% of the respondents came from there. Historically, colonial educational policy in the south, colonial restrictive measures on population movements and difficult transport routes discouraged southern labour from migrating northward. Secondly, the contemporary migratory trend from the southern region has often been of a circular type. Thirdly, southern emigrants in the capital mostly worked in the construction industry and lived on the construction sites too (see Kamir, El-W., 1980, on the southern emigrants in the capital, in Pons., op.cit., pp.449-485).

The National Unity Settlement attracted residents from various districts of Greater Khartoum. Most of the respondents in the sample came from Omdurman city (73.4%) whereas fewer residents came from the cities of Khartoum and Khartoum North (12.3%). Within the city of Omdurman, the majority of the respondents last lived in the neighbouring town of Umbudda (48.3%). The relatively low rents in the area, compared with inner city areas, the presence of relatives and the availability of information about access to land were important factors underlying the high proportion of residents coming from Umbudda town. Most of the residents in Umbudda town initially moved in from the inner areas of Omdurman city during the 1960s (Abdel-Rahman, 1977). We found that 17.8% of the respondents in the Unity Settlement had previously lived in the inner city areas of Greater Khartoum. The movement from these areas into illegal settlements partly signified
the impact of the process of property development in the former areas on the housing markets, which we emphasised in Chapter Four. Table 6.2 shows the distribution of the respondents according to the previous place of residence.

Table 6.2 : The Distribution of the Sample According to the Previous Place of Residence (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Omdurman City</th>
<th>Khartoum City</th>
<th>Khartoum North City</th>
<th>Outside the Capital</th>
<th>No Response</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unity Settlement</td>
<td>Khartoum No.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Al-Sha'abiya</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Umbudda</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>Al-Rimailah</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Shambat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abbassiya</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Al-Shajarah</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Hillat Kuku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Moradah</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Al-Usharah</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-A'rradah</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Arkaweet</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Omdurman City Centre</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Al-E'shash</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wad-Nubawi</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Burri</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Thourah</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zagalona</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(See the map for the location of these areas).

The fact that 14% of the respondents came from outside the capital points to the significance of the Unity Settlement as a first stop to some emigrants.
(b) The Family Characteristics

Out of 300 heads of households 264 were males and 36 were females. Over 86% of the interviewees were married. About 53% of the respondents had families with six to eleven members, as the following table illustrates.

Table 6.3: Sex, Marital Status and Family Size (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Family Size</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Less than three</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>3-5 members</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6-8 members</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9-11 members</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12-14 members</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More than 14</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Education, Occupation and Income

As regards education, we found that 40.7% of the household heads were illiterate, 19.7% had religious education below the elementary level and 29.0% had elementary education (four years of schooling). Only 10.7% had post-elementary education (Table 5.5).
Table 6.4: Educational Attainment of the Heads of Households (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Khalwa</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of heads of households</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asked about the number of working members in their households, 77.3% reported having only one earning member, 14.3% had two earning members, and 6.7% reported more than two working members.

The pattern of occupational distribution of the heads of households indicates that the majority were in the categories of self-employed, skilled and unskilled labour. Most of the recurring occupations in the sample belonged to the tertiary sector of the urban economy, particularly the "informal" sector. Few respondents were employed in the "formal" sector in public administration, manufacturing, construction and transport. The occupational distribution is produced in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Occupational Distribution of the Heads of Household (%) 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Employment</th>
<th>Professional, Managerial &amp; Clerical jobs</th>
<th>Small Industrial or Commercial employers</th>
<th>Self-Employed</th>
<th>Skilled Labour</th>
<th>Semi-Skilled Labour</th>
<th>Unskilled Labour</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Heads of Households</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The following describes the jobs in each of the above categories:

(a) The category of professional, managerial and clerical jobs included those with secondary and post-secondary school training such as teachers, managers, clerks and bookkeepers.

(b) Small employers were those who employed less than fifty workers such as owners of small commercial stores, industrial workshops, bakeries and livestock merchants.

(c) The self-employed were those who employed no workers and were not using expensive capital equipments. They included tailors, barbers, small grocers, carpenters, butchers, drivers of horse-drawn carts and street vendors.

(d) Skilled labour refers to those in manual activities, which require training and experience. Most respondents in this category attained some elementary education. It included workers in factories, construction and services sectors such as drivers, electricians, builders, soldiers (some) and semi-technical workers in veterinary and medical professions.

(e) Semi-skilled labour included those whose work involved some minimum of training; it refers to semi-skilled workers in factories and construction, watchmen, messengers, machine attendants in filling stations and soldiers (most).

(f) Unskilled labour refers to those whose jobs required no special training such as construction labour, porters etc.

(g) The category of others mostly refers to the housewives and the unemployed. In arranging these occupational groups I drew on the classifications mentioned in Stacey, M., 1969, Chapter Four.
The stated income of households ranged from under £50 to over £600 per month.\(^1\) About 60% of the sample had their monthly incomes in the range of £50 - £150. Only 25 respondents reported below £50 monthly income. Thirteen respondents reported over £250 monthly income and three respondents had more than £400 income per month (Table 5.7).

Table 6.6: Distribution of Monthly Income in the Sample (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>Under £50</th>
<th>£50-£100</th>
<th>£101-£150</th>
<th>£151-£250</th>
<th>£251-£400</th>
<th>£401-£600</th>
<th>Over £600</th>
<th>No Response</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Heads of Households</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compared with the officially prescribed minimum monthly wage (£50), the majority of the respondents did not seem to be worse off. However, given the continuous rise in the cost of living and the fact that the residents were paying more for basic services than those in other neighbourhoods, they could only with great difficulty sustain a minimum standard of living.\(^2\)

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1. £1 = £5.13 (November 1982).
2. The cost of living index for low income groups in the capital increased from 100 in 1970 to 643.5 in 1981 (Economic Survey, 1981/82 p.91).
6.2.3: The Housing Conditions in the Unity Settlement

(a) Type of Accommodation

Most of the households in the sample were owner-occupiers (88%), while the rest were either tenants or non-rent paying lodgers (Table 6.7).

Table 6.7: Type of Accommodation (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Accommodation</th>
<th>Owner-Occupier</th>
<th>Tenants</th>
<th>Staying in Relatives Property</th>
<th>Other type i.e. charity or guard</th>
<th>No response</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of households</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We asked owner-occupiers about the method they had adopted to acquire land. Most of them (81.3%) said they acquired land through squatting, and only 6.7% said that they acquired land through other methods. According to our investigation, land was mostly acquired through purchase from other residents who subdivided their plots, or from landbrokers. Rented and lodging accommodation, 11.6% of the dwellings in the sample were mostly owned by either landbrokers or by landlords who, for lack of services in the settlement, lived in better serviced residential areas. Most of the owner-occupier respondents claimed that they acquired land through squatting, knowing that obtaining land through purchase would disqualify their claim to ownership.
(b) Housing Conditions

Dwellings in the Unity Settlement were built with sun-burnt mud bricks and clay soil, and roofed with thatch and wood. The construction process was usually carried out and mostly completed during weekends or public holidays to escape detention by watchmen of the local authority. Family labour was widely used as the following table illustrates.

Table 6.8: Method of Construction (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Labour</th>
<th>Family Labour</th>
<th>Self-help and Hired Labour</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
<th>No Response</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Households</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51.6% of the households in the sample lived in one-room dwellings, 29.7% had two rooms, 14.7% had three rooms and 3% lived in four-room dwellings.

Only 33.3% of the households had private pit latrines, and 9% had both latrine and bathrooms. 57.7% had no toilets. Some of these used their neighbours’ toilets whereas the majority used a nearby dry water course as a public toilet.
(c) **Urban Services**

The most outstanding feature of the Unity Settlement was its lack of basic urban services. There was virtually no piped water, electricity, health service, transport service nor security service in the settlement.

Until 1978, water was brought by private distributors to the settlement from five public taps installed on the western boundary of Umbudda Town. Water prices in the settlement oscillated according to the intensity of construction and frequency of demolition campaigns in the settlement. Following the establishment of the Committee for Spontaneous Housing Project (CSHP) in 1978, and the formation of the Party local branch in the settlement during the same period,¹ the residents made successful demands for the installation of three water tanks in the settlement. Two of these were in operation in 1982. Water was sold by the authorities to distributors at a rate of 20 piastre for a 44-gallon barrel.² The distributors sold it to residents for one pound a barrel in normal circumstances.

The settlement did not have health centres and residents either walked to Umbudda Town (about one to two km.) or travelled to the city centre (about four to five km.) for medical treatment. We asked the respondents where their families

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¹ The relevance of these developments to the case study is explained in the following section.
² 100 piastres = one pound.
normally went for medical treatment. The following table shows their response.

Table 6.9: Place of Medical Treatment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Treatment</th>
<th>Umbudda Town</th>
<th>Omdurman City</th>
<th>Khartoum &amp; Khartoum North Cities</th>
<th>The Settlement</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Households</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Five unlicensed clinics operated by nurses or medical assistants were reported in the Settlement. The above table reflects the heavy pressure which the residents in the Unity Settlements put on the few health centres in neighbouring Umbudda Town.

There were only three elementary schools in the settlement, built by self-help and lacking in staff and in equipment such as books and furniture. Only 16% of the respondents had their children studying in the settlement. The majority of the households sent their children to schools outside the settlement (Table 6.10).

Table 6.10: Place of Schooling of the Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of schools</th>
<th>The Settlement</th>
<th>Umbudda Town</th>
<th>Omdurman City</th>
<th>Khartoum &amp; Khartoum North Cities</th>
<th>Outside the Capital</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Households</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There was no regular transport service in the settlement. Residents walked 1-2 km. daily to neighbouring Umbudda Town where the transport routes terminated. The settlement had no police station. In fact, it was often depicted by the media as harbouring criminals, thus becoming a target for police raids as we see in the next section.

6.2.4 Conclusion

We highlighted in this section the process of development of the Unity Settlement, the socio-economic profiles of the residents and their housing conditions. We found that a high proportion of the residents originally came from the western provinces of Kordofan and Darfur. The large number of residents from the latter provinces conformed to the regional pattern of rural-urban migration, which we noted in Chapter Four. Most of the residents moved into the settlement from Umbudda town and from the inner city areas of Greater Khartoum. The movement from the inner city areas generally reflects the impact of the policy of urban development on the housing market.

The majority of the households in the sample had families with six to eleven members. The level of education of most respondents did not exceed the elementary school. Looking at the occupational distribution, the majority of the respondents fell into the categories of the self-employed, skilled and unskilled labour. The recurring occupations belonged to the tertiary sector of the urban economy. Monthly
earnings ranged from under £S 50 to over £S 600 with about 60% of the respondents falling in the income range of 50-150 pounds per month.

We found that most of the households in the sample were owner-occupiers (88%). They built their dwellings from locally made materials using mostly family labour. Over half of the households lived in one-room dwellings and over one quarter had two-room dwellings. The majority of the households had no private toilets. Public urban services such as piped water, electricity, health, transport and security services were lacking. The residents suffered both physically and financially to provide for some of these basic necessities.

6.3 POLITICAL SETTING OF THE UPGRADING PROJECT

6.3.1 General

The preceding analysis indicated that the access of different urban groups to urban residence was structured, on the one hand, by some broader issues relating to models of national and urban development, and on the other hand, by the content of housing policy. Another factor affecting access to housing was the degree of political support or opposition which a particular housing project could attract. In this section we look at the political bases of government action in the National Unity Settlement. We argue that the absence of a clearly defined policy on squatter housing made administrative action
in the settlement increasingly contingent on the political will of the incumbent regime. The process of the development of the settlement during the period 1970-1982 reflected few occasions when government action was initiated by administrative agencies on the basis of an independent administrative assessment. The following discussion is organised in a chronological order, starting with the efforts to legalise the settlement in 1970, the freezing of the administrative action during the period 1971-1981, and concludes the section by considering the political implications of administrative inaction.

6.3.2 The Fight for Legitimation 1970/71

Historically government policy on illegal housing assumed a reactive and eclectic approach. During the 1960s, unauthorised housing was considered by the authorities as an encroachment on public land and often called into action the agencies in charge of protecting public property (e.g. Elias and Bedawi op.cit., p.221; Zahir, op.cit. p.229). The promptness of government action depended primarily on the administrative agencies involved, on the location of the encroachment and whether it was under an urban or rural jurisdiction, and on the prevailing balance of power at national and local levels. In the absence of a clearly defined policy on illegal settlements politics came to play a dominant role in shaping the administrative response. The impact of politics can be seen in the differential administrative response to the "Cardboard"
settlement in the city of Khartoum North and to Umbudda Settlement in Omdurman city during the 1960s (for the location of these settlements see map, Appendix 6.1).

Whereas the squatters in the former settlement were predominantly drawn from the western region, the stronghold of the Umma Party (UP), the residents in the planned area surrounding the settlement as well as the members of the town council were mostly supporters of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The second half of the 1960s witnessed an unprecedented contest between the two parties to win squatters' votes (see Mahmoud, F., 1974, pp.67ff; Elias and Bedawi, op.cit. pp.213,221; Zahir, op.cit., p.238). The persistence of demolition campaigns directed at the "Cardboard" settlement and the delay in deciding on upgrading or resettlement was partly because the DUP-controlled town council had no interest in serving the squatters who supported its opponent, the Umma Party.

By contrast the residents in Umbudda settlement were originally drawn from central and northern Sudan (Abdel Rahman, op.cit. p.31). The local power structure was dominated by the

1. The UP and the DUP dominated the parliamentary politics in Sudan. The UP was associated with a semi-feudal class of private scheme owners, sectarian leaders, tribal leaders and top bureaucrats. The DUP mainly comprised merchants, middle-class peasants, small property holders and the intelligentsia (see Nugdalla, S., 1973, p.160). While the political support of the two parties in the rural areas was more evenly spread, the DUP had more support than the UP in urban areas, and particularly in the capital.

2. When the municipal council was considering relocating the settlement in an area belonging to the Khartoum rural district council the representative of the latter council in the municipal council opposed the proposal arguing that his district was under customary court jurisdiction which would be difficult to apply to these "strangers" (ibid, pp.239,240).
supporters of the DUP. The area MP was a top party functionary and a senior minister during the second half of the 1960s. In 1967 Umbudda was granted approval for upgrading, thereby escaping the application of the Town and Village Planning Act (Mahmoud, F., op.cit. p.70). The "Cardboard" settlement had to wait until 1970/71 to obtain official recognition under a new political regime.

We noted in the previous section that the population in the National Unity Settlement was predominantly drawn from the Western Sudan. However, being an offshoot of Umbudda Settlement, the local power structure in the whole area during the 1960s was dominated by the "native administration", merchants and religious leaders, who represented the local base of the DUP. The growth of the Unity Settlement provided the "native administration" with a lucrative source of money from the clandestine sales of land. However, the rising proportion of settlers from the western region was likely to improve the political strength of the UP in a constituency which traditionally had been the domain of the DUP. The local power structure did not, therefore, encourage support for the residents in the Unity Settlement as far as upgrading was concerned. The site of the settlement was earmarked by the land authorities as a relocation area for those who were affected by the replanning process in Umbudda Settlement (Report of the Deputy Replanning Officer of Umbudda, 1970).
The inception of the May regime in 1969 created a radically different situation in the Unity Settlement. First, the new regime promised a shift in the social base of the state from one traditionally anchored to tribal, sectarian and partisan support to a new social base in the popular sectors of Sudanese society. The "liquidation" of "native administrations" by the new regime represented for the residents in the settlement a break away from the control of an antagonistic local power structure. Second, as early opposition to the May regime came from the rural areas, the urban middle and lower classes became the regime's target for political mobilisation. Urban popular support was urgently needed in the wake of souring relations between the regime and both the Right and Left in 1970/71. Since urban housing was one of the resources which could be used for political patronage, a valuable opportunity was availed to the residents of the settlement to establish clientelist relations with the new regime. The proclamation of a massive urban housing programme in 1970 and the progress in the replanning of Umbudda Settlement raised expectations of the residents in the National Unity settlement and enticed them to enlist their support to the May regime.

1. The ideology of the May regime is outlined in Chapter Three.
2. The immediate housing benefits which the regime offered to the urban population in 1970 included:
(a) A reduction in house rents;
(b) Earmarking of 60% of the 1969/70 budget of the newly formed Ministry of Housing for the improvement of urban services;
(c) The immediate release of the names of eligible applicants to some 10,000 residential plots in a project of low-income urban housing;
(d) The consideration of the middle and upper income housing project in the capital, (Memo. Ministry of Housing, 17th March, 1970).
(e) The decision to upgrade and resettle "cardboard" settlements of Khartoum and Khartoum North cities (A Statement on Low, Middle and Upper Income Housing, Ministry of Housing, April 1970).
The progress in the replanning operation in Umbudda Settlement encouraged many land seekers to move into the Unity Settlement. As construction intensified, the Khartoum Commissioner sent his bulldozers into the settlement and began a demolition campaign in mid-1970. Meanwhile a counter campaign was organised by the residents and protesters travelled in trucks across the white Nile to the Presidential Palace in Khartoum City.\(^1\) A seven-man delegation representing the residents was received by a member of the Revolutionary Command Council who was, at the time, the Minister of Local Government. The meeting resulted in: (a) an immediate halt to demolition; and (b) a promise to upgrade the settlement on condition that the residents shouldered the costs of the upgrading operation. By 1971 replanning teams arrived in the settlement.\(^2\) A field survey was conducted in which dwellings were numerated and registered. This survey later became the principal official reference to eligibility to land in the settlement.

What is significant in the above account is that the decision to upgrade the settlement originated at the top of the political executive and was initiated by someone who was not in charge of the housing portfolio. The assumption that the May regime wanted to use squatter housing for political gain was plausible for two reasons:— First, following a

1. From an interview with the leader of the SSU section in the Unity Settlement.

2. Rural development committees were assigned the task of collecting a replanning fee of ten pounds per dwelling from residents. Payment of this fee later became a principal condition for inclusion in the subsequent stages of the upgrading process. Some residents did not pay the replanning fee because they did not have money at the time. Others were politically opposed to the collecting agencies. A third group thought that the development committees were not serious enough or honest to be entrusted with public money.
bloody confrontation between the regime and right-wing opposition in March 1970, the regime was anxious to prevent the squatter population (who were predominantly from the Western Sudan, the stronghold of the UP) from being mobilised by the right-wing opposition. Second, the regime perceived that the break in its relations with the left in August 1970 would cost it the mass support which the Communist Party (SCP) commanded in the capital. The regime sought to build up its own social support beginning with the middle and lower urban classes. We already noted in Chapter Three the massive institution-building strategy which the May regime envisaged to generate political support.

The response of the urban population to this mobilisation campaign varied between enthusiasm, scepticism, and rejection. Residents in the Unity Settlement generally sought to secure maximum advantage from the prevailing opportunity. In the process of forming their local organisations they managed to bring into the settlement senior political leaders of the regime. They succeeded for a time in establishing a vertical structure of clientelism with the regime. The newly established links by-passed both the previous local power structure and the existing housing agencies. The residents managed to halt the demolition campaigns and to obtain a political support for upgrading. However, the implementation of the upgrading

1. The residents were allowed to form rural development committees, as affiliates of the Party, but not local Party units or local councils as was the case in other areas of the city. Compared with local Party units, development committees had little impact in effectively promoting local interests through the Party organisation.
took over ten years to be realised, as we explain below.

6.3.3 The Stalemate 1971-1981

The above discussion sought to emphasise the political nature of the initial administrative action in the Unity Settlement. The housing problem was defined more in conformity with the legitimacy needs of the May regime than according to the actual shelter needs of the residents. Absence of a positive administrative action in the settlement during the period 1971-1981 followed closely a decline in the political appeal of the squatter problem and its eventual recession into the realm of local administration. However, occasionally it surfaced on the national political scene as a security problem engendering penalties on residents.

Following the communist-supported abortive coup of July 1971, state legitimacy came to depend more on organised force than on social support. This basic shift in the pattern of political activity meant that the politics of clientelism of 1969-71 in which squatters support assumed certain political weight was over. As the implementation of the 1971 Local Government Act was in progress, housing and illegal settlements came under the control of the Commissioner of Khartoum and the previous demolition policy was revived.¹

¹  The Commissioner of Khartoum told the 7th Meeting of the Secretariat of the Party for the Khartoum District that local councillors and popular organisations were party to encroachments on government land, and that his policy of demolition would not discriminate between councillors and ordinary citizens occupying public property (Minutes of the General Secretariat of SSU, Khartoum District, 3.7.1973).
The period 1974-1976 marked a resurgence in government action in the National Unity Settlement. The right-wing opposition mounted a series of attempts to topple the regime in 1974, 1975 and 1976 (see Wai, D., 1979, pp.86-87). In most of these attempts the Unity Settlement was accused of harbouring dissidents. After the July 1976 abortive attempt, the settlement was cordoned off by the army and door-to-door searches were conducted. The media portrayed a picture of the settlement as a centre of subversion in the capital. The upshot of these events was that the regime's policy of incorporation of 1969-71 gave way to one of exclusion from the political system.

The 1971 housing survey in the settlement was not followed by a serious move towards upgrading until 1976. Starting his election campaign for his second term in office in October 1976, the President promised in a public rally in Omdurman, that he would solve the problem of illegal housing within one year (Sudanow, November 1976, p.8). Eventually a committee was formed by the Commissioner to process claims to land in the settlement (Abdel-Rahman, op.cit.). Conditions of eligibility were set up and a housing survey was carried out in the settlement. Names of eligible candidates were published in a special supplement in the local press. By mid-1977 the incumbent Commissioner was removed and the whole project came to a standstill.

Another national event which, in our view, had some bearing on administrative action in the settlement was the
National Reconciliation Agreement (NRA) of 1977/78 between the regime and the right-wing opposition.¹ The Agreement transformed the atmosphere of confrontation as members of the National Front were absorbed into the Party and a sizeable group was elected in 1978 to the National Assembly.

The Unity Settlement benefited from the apparent reopening of the political system. It was allowed, for the first time, to form its own local units of the Party and to send delegates to section conferences. It was also in 1978 that the Commissioner of Khartoum set up a committee to settle the claims of candidates established as eligible by the 1976 survey. A permanent Land Office was opened in the settlement to house the Committee for the Project of Spontaneous Housing (CPSH) and eligible applicants were asked to come before the committee to verify their claims. 8,000 names were later declared eligible to their plots but no distribution of titles took place. The project was postponed until June 1982.

One explanation for the postponement of the 1978 housing project in the Unity Settlement was the beginning of the reorganisation process of the metropolitan administration during the period 1978-1980 which culminated in the Khartoum

¹. The NRA was signed between the regime and the National Front in 1977. It provided for a number of liberalising measures which the regime would institute in return for the support of the opposition. The key elements in the government were:
(a) the release of all political prisoners;
(b) the revision of the Party structure to allow elections at every level and permit more debate and participation;
(c) the revision of the Constitution; and
(d) A more neutral foreign policy.
Administration Act 1980. The new Act returned the jurisdiction of urban planning, housing and land disposal back to central government. The Ministry of Construction and Public Works replaced the provincial administration as the agency responsible for urban housing. The 1978 housing programme in the Unity Settlement was therefore stopped pending an initiative from the new housing agency, the Ministry of Construction and Public Works.

Meanwhile another national event brought renewed political attention to the National Unity Settlement. In September 1981 news broke out that a large opposition force had infiltrated the country from a neighbouring state in order to bring down the Government. Eventually a mass-arrest campaign started, directly mainly towards those whose origin was in western Sudan. In October, a "Committee for Evacuating the Capital of the Unemployed and Idle Persons", was formed to deal with some 14,000 detainees. Following the arrest, a

1. See Chapter Five, Section 5.2.

2. Besides the official version of events, there were other theories: one theory asserted that because of a deteriorating economic situation and a desperate need for external aid, the story of an external invasion was created to attract the attention of the Reagan Administration and solicit USA aid. Another interpretation was that the threat of an external invasion was a cover-up for a policy to reduce population pressure and hence consumer demand in the capital, especially since the retrenchment programme initiated in 1979, at the behest of the IMF, began to have adverse social and political effects by mid-1981. A third explanation was that the September events were staged by the National Security Administration to promote its position in a power struggle among state institutions.

3. Over 50% of the detainees came from the Western Region as the following table shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Origin</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Region</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Region</td>
<td>3393</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td>1443</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kordofan Region</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur Region</td>
<td>2383</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Region</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13709</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

demolition campaign was started in Wards 16 and 17 of the Unity Settlement in mid-November 1981. About 3,000 families faced the winter of 1981 without shelter.

Political and administrative factors interacted to facilitate the demolition operation of November 1981 in the Unity Settlement. At the administrative level, the committee responsible for rehousing those who were affected by the replanning in Umbudda Town (formed in 1975) earmarked a strip of land cutting across Wards 16 and 17 of the Unity Settlement as a relocation area in January 1978. Although that decision was approved by the Planning Committee of the province (for Omdurman area), implementation was deferred by the Commissioner. The process of returning housing and lands jurisdictions to central government during the period 1978-1980 partly contributed to the delay in the implementation of the decision.

The issue of national security which engendered the evacuation campaign created a favourable atmosphere for demolition. Agencies involved in the evacuation campaign communicated to the public a distasteful picture about residents in the

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1. 4,201 rooms, 1,363 structures and 788 toilets were demolished. El-Ayyam Daily, 11.12.1981.
2. Residents in the affected wards tried to pre-empt the decision by appealing to the Party organisations, to the area MP and to the President in October 1977. The residents collected documented evidence about their right to have equal treatment with the rest of the residents in the settlement, and on the impropriety of the compensation list for which their wards were demolished. (An interview with the leader of the residents committee in the demolished wards, 15.12.1982).
3. It is also possible that the Government postponed the decision under pressure of the residents and in an attempt to avoid jeopardising the national reconciliation process which was underway.
demolished areas. The media consistently presented the area as harbouring criminals, prostitution and an illegal liquor industry (eg. El-Ayyam Daily, 11.12.1981). On these occasions the press mostly collected information from the police. The Inspector-General of the Police who was the Chairman of the Evacuation Committee, maintained that residents of the settlement, "...from there... move about the three towns (ie. the capital) committing theft, robbery or even extortion" (Sudanow, January 4, 1982). 1

The above claims strengthened the argument of the land authorities for demolition. Asked what had become of the residents in the demolished areas, the Deputy Director of the Lands Directorate replied that "the demolition campaign should continue daily ... All these people (ie. the residents) came from their own villages. They must go back" (ibid). Implicit in this reply is the admission that the demolition was undertaken not only to protect public property but also to force illegal settlers back to their villages. It is not difficult to see how the presumed security problem permeated the perceptions of the housing agencies and shaped their definitions of the housing problem in the Unity Settlement. For the Minister in charge of housing, the eradication of the illegal housing was the main prerequisite to guaranteeing proper land-use planning in Greater Khartoum. 2 The period 1970-1981 saw little

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1. A member of the residents committee in the demolished areas rejected this claim by saying: "it is expected that he would say so. We are working, almost all of us have working papers" (ibid).

2. An interview with the Assistant Director of the Housing Research Unit, Housing Department, the Ministry of Construction and Public Works, Khartoum, 25.8.1982.
progress toward giving land titles to the residents in the Unity Settlement. Some of the families in Wards 16 and 17 had their dwellings demolished and their breadwinners detained or expelled from the capital.

6.3.4 The Political Significance of Administrative Process

The development of the National Unity Settlement was marked by considerable political intervention under the May regime. At the beginning the regime was bent on incorporating squatters' support, thus enabling them to secure immunity from demolition and to gain an initial promise of upgrading. Following the 1971 abortive coup, the development of the settlement became increasingly dependent on the confrontation between the regime and the right-wing opposition. The regional origin and sectarian loyalties of residents rather than their shelter need mostly shaped government action in the settlement. Political criteria for inclusion in state benefits replaced administrative ones as the housing service was used to reward supporters and penalise opposition groups. Apart from denying the residents access to land titles, administrative action (or inaction) was bound to have further implications:- First, the
administrative exercises in the settlement in 1971, 1976 and 1978 were likely to have increased the vulnerability of residents to political demands of the regime. The process of numerating dwellings, filling forms, publishing names, interviewing candidates, etc., were effective ways of raising expectations, of creating credibility for administrative action and of perpetuating the dependency of residents on the incumbent regime and on its political initiatives. Thus, while the difficult housing situation of residents made them susceptible to political mobilisation, the administrative process was an important mechanism whereby their dependency on the May regime was institutionalised and consolidated.

Second, the stalemate period 1971-1981 allowed the state a moratorium on social spending. Had land titles been awarded in 1971 the state would have been obliged to finance an extensive and costly network of urban services in the settlement. The administrative exercises noted above helped in different ways to contain social demand for urban services:

(i) The assignment of the collection of replanning fees in 1971 to the regime's political organisations - rural development committees - instead of to a specialised administrative agency amounted to forcing residents to enrol in party organisations. The implication of this policy was to replace the then existing social organisations (political, social, religious or otherwise) with the regime's own
organisations. Eventually this process would have deprived residents of their initial sources of identification and solidarity which had inspired them in the first place to settle in the Unity Settlement. Once disconnected from their previous forms of organisation and enrolled in the Party local units, the capacity of residents to initiate a serious social protest for social services would be considerably reduced.

One implication of this incorporation process was the depoliticisation of the housing problem (see Schaffer, B., 1977, pp.38-44). The administrative process was bound to convey to residents, rightly or wrongly, a sense of fairness, objectivity and justice. As these perceptions of the administrative process were deepened and ingrained among residents the propensity of housing problems to generate political protest would be defused.

(ii) Following the emasculation of the previous forms of social organisation through legislation and the incorporation process, administrative action in the settlement served to individuate the collective power of residents through the simple operation of administrative process. For the

1. This process conformed to the regime's conception and strategy of social change which we discussed in Chapter Three, Section 3.2 above.
purpose of upgrading residents were classified into different categories such as, owners of rooms and those of structures; of registered rooms and of non-registered ones; those who attended the 1971 survey and those who did not; those whose names were published following the 1976 and 1978 programmes and those whose names were not; those who were in the appeal list and those who failed to appeal; etc. Each of these categories carried with it specific would-be rights and penalties. Stratifying residents into a structure of advantage and disadvantages, the administrative process made inroads into communal strength and solidarity in the settlement.

The above process was vividly portrayed in Ward 16, the sample ward of this study. In contrast to the peaks of militancy of 1970/71, the residents in the demolished areas found themselves in the winter of 1981 fighting alone the might of the state. They failed to obtain effective support of the political organisations in the settlement because only parts of two wards out of the settlement's eight wards were affected. Representatives of the six other wards did not want to jeopardise their chances of legalisation. Even within Ward 16 the political organisations split over the issue of demolition along geographical lines. Being over-represented from the eastern part of the ward which was
outside the affected area, the local Party unit declined to stand against demolition. Members of the parent council and of the committee of the cooperative society followed suit. Only the Youth Unit, with its membership being mostly drawn from the affected area, stood firmly against demolition. Eventually residents in the demolished area found themselves cut off from the local power structure and from popular support in the settlement which sustained their contacts with the regime during the early 1970s. They had to rely on their own efforts to fight demolition without success.

6.3.5 Conclusion

The foregoing discussion about the political setting of government action in the Unity Settlement showed how the issue of squatter housing was used by the May regime to extract political support. The administrative process was instrumental in serving the political aims of the regime. It served to individuate the collective action in the settlement and depoliticise the housing problem; but it also gave the residents the false impression that their interests were being considered. The above analysis sensitises us to the political significance of the administrative process. As Cleaves suggested: "The analyst needs to be sensitive to the extent to which policies serve as symbols rather than design for execution ... as a means of system preservation despite the negative effect ... (this) ... may have on achieving stated policy goals" (Cleaves, 1980, p.286).
6.4 THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

6.4.1 General

We outlined in Chapter Five the limitations on the access of low income groups to housing which arose during the allocation process. The discussion in that chapter has been broad and general. In order to specify the constraining affects of those procedures we need to have a close look at their operation in practice. In this section we describe the implementation process of the upgrading project in the Unity Settlement. We begin by outlining the organisational structure of the project and the rules of allocation. Then we examine the resulting access arrangements and consider the sources of constraints.

6.4.2 The Structure of the Project

The upgrading project in the Unity Settlement was closely associated with the new Minister of Construction and Public Works, who took office in December 1981 shortly after the demolition measures in the settlement. The project, furthermore, followed the return of urban planning and land allocation powers from provincial administration to central government.

1. The following information is based on (a) the Ministerial Order No. (4) 1982, the Minister's Office, the Ministry of Construction and Public Works; (b) Minutes of the Steering Committee of the Project of New Omdurman Housing, National Unity Extension; and other relevant records in the local Land Office in the settlement; (c) the Report of the Second Work Committee, 25.10.1982, Research Unit, Housing Department, Ministry of Construction and Public Works; (d) Interviews with various participants in the project, and the results of the sample survey (1982); and (e) Direct observation of the administrative process.
The project represented, therefore, a centralist approach to the problem of illegal housing in contrast to the policies of provincial administrations during the period 1971-1978.

(a) The Administrative Organisation:

On 6th June 1982 the Minister issued an order establishing six committees to implement the Ministry's plan for resolving the problem of unauthorised housing in Greater Khartoum, within the general framework of the national housing plan. The ministerial order specifically required the committees:

"(1) To commence their work after taking the oath.
(2) To use a particular land form in discharging their responsibility.
(3) To examine, scrutinise and sift application forms, and compare them with lists of previous housing programmes in order to exclude any person who owned land in Greater Khartoum.
(4) To report cases of fraud to courts.
(5) To seek help from the following persons:-
   (a) The Chief Land Inspector of the City of Omdurman.
   (b) The Replanning Officer of Umbudda Town.
   (c) The Chairman of the Committee on combatting unauthorised housing.
   (d) A number of local representatives".

Five committees were set up to carry out the main task of deciding the eligibility of applicants. The sixth committee considered appeals and controversial cases that came before the five other committees. A small "Publicity and Guidance" unit was formed later. The local Land Office, which was opened in the settlement in 1978, was chosen
as the project headquarters and its staff provided clerical support to the project. At the apex of the project there was a small steering committee which reported directly to the Minister. The following diagram depicts the formal organisation of the project (Figure 6.1).

The composition of the project administration was weighted to technical officers as opposed to the generalist administrators and councillors who dominated housing programmes during the period 1971-1978. The steering committee was chaired by the Minister's adviser on housing, and consisted of the leaders of the six other committees as members. Each work committee consisted of six members. Except for one, all the committees were chaired by engineers drawn from the headquarters of the Ministry of Construction and Public Works. Membership of each work committee included a town planner, a housing researcher, a land inspector and two local representatives, one from the district council and the other representing the Party branch in the settlement. The appeals committee included a representative from the Attorney General's chamber, a housing researcher, two social care officers and a representative of the Party's Omdurman branch. The publicity unit was predominantly drawn from the Research Unit of the Housing Department. The local Land Office was headed by a Land Inspector and included two land officers and four clerical staff. In addition, each work committee had two clerical staff, a clerk and a bookkeeper, who were seconded to the project from the headquarters of the Ministry of Construction and Public Works. There were five policemen and
the project did not land. It was left to the group of experts at the end of July 1982 following conditions:
"(1) The applicant must be Sudanese
(2) He/she should be supporting a family
(3) He/she should be living in the same plot applied for
(4) He/she must demonstrate a connection with Khartoum province
(5) Neither applicant nor his wife should be in ownership of a residential plot in the Khartoum province
(6) Where the applicant was a female she must be either divorced or a widow".

Having decided the eligibility conditions, the steering committee then set rules of procedure according to which applicants saw interview committees. These consisted of the following:

"(a) The applicant should be present in person before the respective committee.
(b) If the applicant was absent a proxy should produce a valid authorisation from the relevant Shar'a court or from a Sudanese Embassy if the applicant is abroad.
(c) Proxy certificates issued on or after the 15th June 1982 would be considered invalid, particularly those issued in Khartoum province.
(d) The applicant should swear an oath as to the validity of the information given in the
application form except for that concerning personal income.

(e) Each applicant should be accompanied by the witness mentioned in the form.

(f) Each applicant should come before the committee according to his/her priority in the list of names.

(g) Where husband and wife were linked together in the general list and a divorce had taken place subsequently, both should come before the respective committee.

(h) Where husband and wife were linked together in the general list and one of them later died a death certificate should be produced.

(c) **Volume of the Project Work**

According to official statistics, there were 24,800 claimants to plots in the settlement. 12,800 of these were classified as owners of rooms, and the remaining 12,000 were owners of structures. The project was to be executed in two phases. The first one dealt with listed room-owners. Out of 12,800 listed room-owners 9,300 were selected as eligible candidates whose claims to land were to be processed in the first phase.

As the settlement consisted of eight wards the work-load was divided among the work committees, such that three committees were assigned two wards each, and the two
remaining committees took one ward each. The administrative process was organised into four main stages. In the first stage the names of candidates were displayed on the noticeboard in the local Land Office and candidates were asked to collect a particular land form, complete it and return it at a later date. The second stage consisted of receiving completed land forms and of checking on supporting documents. In the third stage, applicants were interviewed by their respective committees. Finally, each committee reviewed in a closed session, information on each case and decided on its eligibility to land.

6.4.3 The Administration of Access

The project was officially launched on 15th June 1982 but there was no immediate response from applicants. Residents had certain doubts about the credibility of the project. First, there was uneasiness about the requirement to fill in a new land form. Residents argued that they had already filled in forms in 1971, 1976 and 1978 programmes in the settlement. They believed any further demands for filing another landform were tantamount either to questioning their eligibility or creating more obstacles on their way to land.

Second, the residents were not happy about the contents of the land form. They were particularly sceptical about its reference to the home origin of applicants in Section A(3) of the form. They took it to imply a possible intention by the Government to exclude those applicants whose origin

1. A translated copy of the land form is available in Appendix 6.9.
was outside Khartoum province.\textsuperscript{1} They suspected that Section (E) on whether an applicant or a member of his/her family had a dwelling anywhere in the country would be used to disqualify those who owned dwellings outside Greater Khartoum. Obviously some applicants owned houses or part of houses in their home towns and villages. Section (E) required that applicants swear an oath as to the validity of information given in the form. Irrespective of whether an applicant gave true or false information, swearing on the "Koran" is considered by many Sudanese Muslims an unpleasant act which should be avoided.\textsuperscript{2}

Third, land authorities recommended a plot size of 250 m\textsuperscript{2}. But, during the 1971 survey the layout of the settlement was designed such that each plot had an area of 500 m\textsuperscript{2}. Residents believed that the project should provide for a 500 m\textsuperscript{2} area for a plot.\textsuperscript{3}

Fourth, the residents considered the land price unrealistic and beyond their means. In the 1971 survey the

\textsuperscript{1} These fears were probably grounded in the evacuation and demolition measures, which we highlighted in the preceding section.

\textsuperscript{2} One committee reported that oath-taking enhanced its performance and forced applicants to tell the truth even when it was against their interests. Although oath-taking has a long tradition in Sudanese legal practice it is a recent import in the administration of social service.

\textsuperscript{3} The 1977 Housing Plan recommended an area of 128-200 m\textsuperscript{2} for 3rd and 4th class areas (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3 (B)). Residents had on their minds the experience of the replanning in neighbouring Umbudda town where minimum plot area was 500 m\textsuperscript{2} and where many residents were granted plots of 1000 m\textsuperscript{2}. (See the memo of Umbudda Replanning Officer, undated (1970?)).
recommended price was £S 75 per plot. The same price was reiterated during the 1976 and 1978 programmes. Now the recommended land price in the project was £S 783 per plot.

These problem areas kept many applicants away from the Land Office. Thus some publicity work had to be done. Besides advertising on public noticeboards, in the press and on the radio, the Minister appeared many times on the television to convince residents that urban services would not be forthcoming except through a successful implementation of the project. By early August 1982 the work began. In the description of the project which follows, we focus mainly on situations where access to the project was constrained or blocked. Constraints were monitored at the following levels:

(a) The Organisation of the Reception Desk

There were five work committees and therefore five reception desks. The rules of procedure stipulated that each applicant should come before the respective committee according to his/her priority on the list. However, applicants did not arrive in the Land Office according to the order of names on the advertised list, and much time was wasted calling for hundreds of people who did not turn up.
A second organisational formula was devised to facilitate the smooth operation of the reception desk. Names of candidates were allocated over weekdays such that each group of applicants was assigned a specific day in the week. This strategy had two problems: First, a candidate had to pay an initial visit to the Land Office to know the particular day when he should see the committee. Second, if a candidate failed to come on the prescribed day he/she had to wait until the work-table was completed, which often took a period of three to five weeks. Three out of the five work committees adopted this strategy for organising their reception desks.

A third strategy was to receive applicants according to their order of arrival - first come first served. Two work committees employed this strategy.

In fact, the three strategies had problems. The first one of receiving applicants according to their priority in the advertised list presumed that the displayed list was available to all applicants. This was not true because, having been displayed without protection on an inside wall or the perimeter of the Land Office the lists of names were soon erased and became unreadable. The first strategy also presumed that applicants could easily identify their priority on the list. We found in our sample survey over 40% illiteracy among the respondents. Thus, many applicants were not able to identify their names in the displayed list and had to seek the help of the clerical unit. Later, we consider the response of the clerical unit. In the second strategy, some of
those who lost their priority because they were late or absent often tried to ameliorate their position by breaking the queue through personal contacts. Though seemingly smooth and practical, the third strategy placed undue authority in the person who organised the queue, the policeman. Whereas the first and second strategies placed the organisation of access on the "impersonal" priority list, the third strategy located it in the hands of a visible "gatekeeper", and ultimately in the nature of his profession.

The organisation of access to the project presupposed that applicants had more or less equal resources to reach the reception desks. However, applicants varied considerably in terms of their awareness of the rules of access and of their ability to use these rules. Differential access deriving from the operation of different organising strategies at reception desks encouraged some applicants to employ extra-administrative resources to improve their access. The pattern of administrative arrangements at reception desks was, therefore, an important factor in facilitating or constraining access to the project. Imbalances in access created at this level of the administrative process were likely to reflect on the subsequent stages of the upgrading programme.
(b) The Operation of the Allocation Rules

As the project went on it put under test a number of eligibility and counter rules. Some of these rules antagonised some applicants and had to be waived. Some rules were differently interpreted by work committees. Another set of rules, though causing inconvenience to some applicants, remained unchanged. We refer below to some illustrations of these cases.

The most important change in the allocation rules occurred in relation to the third rule of eligibility which required applicants to be living in the same plot that they claimed. All work committees waived this condition and accepted rent certificates from non-resident applicants as evidence that they did not own the residence where they were living.¹ Many absentee landlords who lived in better serviced neighbourhoods (mostly in the city of Omdurman and in Umbudda Town) were treated on an equal basis as residents in the settlement. In fact, absentee landlords had a better chance than residents on a list of structure-owners who would be considered in the second phase of the project (in January 1985 this phase had not yet started). We estimated the group of absentee landlords to have represented 11.7% of our sample as the following table shows:

¹ A committee member objected in writing that accepting candidacy of non-resident applicants contravened the provisions of eligibility. But her objection was refused by the appeal committee.
Table 6.12: The Distribution of Residents According to Tenure and Eligibility (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Residents</th>
<th>Eligible Owner-Occupiers</th>
<th>Non-Eligible Owner-Occupiers</th>
<th>Non-Eligible Residents (Tenants and Non-Rent Paying Lodgers)</th>
<th>No Response</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Residents</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, since 13% of dwellings in the ward were found unoccupied we estimate that the number of absentee landlords could be much higher.

Difficulties arose in relation to the rules of procedure. For instance, in the case of an absent applicant his/her proxy had to provide a valid authorisation. But proxy certificates issued on or after the 15th of June, the date when the project commenced, were considered invalid. In fact, this particular provision was issued two weeks after the project started. (Letter of the Rapporteur of the Steering Committee to members, 31st August, 1982). Apparently the backdating of this provision was meant to deter applicants who did not want, for some reason, to take an oath and would rather pay somebody to replace them as proxy.

While recognising the effort of the project administration to prevent foul play, this particular provision overlooked genuine cases where applicants for legitimate reasons, (such as ill health, age and absence from the capital) could
not come before the committees. The lack of effective administrative procedure for verifying information made oath-taking a central mechanism for checking statements of applicants. Those applicants who failed to come in person became suspects. The stringency created by the above provision led one committee to accept proxy certificates issued beyond the prescribed date outside the Khartoum province.

In the case of an emigrant applicant a proxy had to have a valid document from a Sudanese Embassy in the country of residence. We observed in a number of cases that the project clerk insisted that such documents should also be certified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although this demand was not so specified in the rules of procedure. It was extremely difficult for families of emigrants to reach the Certification Department of the said Ministry in the city of Khartoum at a time when an influx of Sudanese workers migrating to oil-producing Arab countries were flooding the Ministry to certify their papers.

The main import of the foregoing discussion is that the allocation rules underwent certain changes as the project came into operation. These changes affected both formal authority structure and access arrangements and opportunities in the project. To this point we now turn.
(c) The Restructuring of Administrative Process and Access Opportunities

The formal structure of the project, discussed in Section 6.4.2 above, implied a pattern of access arrangement in which applicants would comfortably identify their priority in the candidates' list, approach the relevant reception desk, collect landforms, complete and return them, and finally present themselves for interview on the prescribed date. In practice, the structure of the project operated differently producing important changes in access arrangements.

With the increase in the volume of work following the beginning of the second and third stages of the administrative process in September/October 1982, the workload of the committees began to overflow into the clerical unit. As work committees became increasingly involved in the interviewing stage, the distribution and collection of landforms gradually came to be handled by the clerical office. The overspill was not only caused by the increase in the volume of work. The work committees became less regular in working a full week. Sometimes members of the teams abstained for personal reasons.¹ At other times all committees failed to turn up because of lack of transport,² leaving the clerical

¹ Two members of different committees reported that attendance on their committees was on average 50%. This estimate was confirmed by the results of our sample survey.

² Shortage of petrol in Greater Khartoum was particularly acute during the period June-December 1982.
unit as the only authority available. ¹

With the recurrence of absenteeism among members and committees it was difficult to obtain quorum sessions in work committees. As a result of fewer working sessions and declining output, a backlog built up disrupting the usual work schedule and inviting pressures from applicants. In a number of cases we observed individual members of some work committees processing cases, while their committees were in recess, with help from the clerical unit. Meanwhile, members of the clerical unit also became involved in processing work in the absence of supervision by the work committees. ² The looseness of control and supervision was so noticeable that at times the policeman in charge and even the officer worker, had the opportunity to check files and answer applicants' inquiries quietly outside the office.

The increasing involvement of the clerical unit in executive work was a manifestation of a restructuring process in the project organisation. Although formally work committees were in charge of the final decision on eligibility to land, that decision depended primarily on information available on application forms, on supporting documents, and on information recorded from the 1971, 1976 and 1978 programmes. This information was normally kept in the clerical unit. With the

¹ Most members of work committees lived in Khartoum city and assembled every morning in the Housing Department in Khartoum to be transported by a Government vehicle to the project site. Members of the clerical unit mostly lived in neighbouring Umbudda town or in Omdurman city.

² In an interview with one committee member he rejected the possibility that the clerical unit could distribute or collect a land form without instructions from the relevant committee.
deconcentration of some executive powers to that unit, extra access channels to the project were opened up. But this extra access was not organised in the way reception desks were. It was mostly dependent on the discretion of the clerical unit and on the ability of applicants to make contact with them, as we point out below.

Access to the clerical unit was supposed to have been open for all persons because, in ideal circumstances, it was the general information desk. Given the fact that most lists of eligible candidates which were displayed on the office perimeter were either unreadable or completely damaged, the clerical office was the last resort where an applicant could find relevant information. But this was not usually the case. We noticed that the policeman often prevented entry into the office without any instruction from clerks and according to his own timing. He frequently told applicants that a meeting was in progress in the office, whereas there was not any meeting at those particular times. Resident-applicants often needed one of three resources to reach the clerical office: (a) a connection with the policeman; (b) a connection with a member of the clerical unit; (c) a connection with one of the local representatives. Non-resident applicants often

1. Building connections with bureaucracy is now an important aspect of the administrative culture in Sudan. Zein K., identified the following as the prevailing attitudes of citizens towards administrators in Sudan:

(1) "(the citizen) knows that he has no access to bureaucratic rules and regulations...
(2) He is aware that the administrator has discretionary authority.
(3) He believes in influencing the administrator's decision through another person who has authority, status or relationship with the administrator". (Zein, K., 1978, pp.205,206).
approached members of work committees especially land officers to connect them with the clerical unit. The need of both categories of applicants to reach the clerical unit did not necessarily have to be for unscrupulous purposes because applicants sometimes wanted answers to simple questions about the project.

The significance of the restructuring of the project organisation lies in the fact that the clerical unit, because of its newly acquired powers, relegated its primary function of supplying free information to the public to a secondary place. As it became involved in executive work, access to it was restricted. Whereas access to work committees was, at least formally, organised according to specific criteria, this did not apply to the clerical unit. The criteria of entry into the clerical unit depended on the discretionary power of the staff and the ability of applicants to bring in extra administrative resources. ¹ To sum up this point, the restructuring process produced two possibilities for access opportunities:

First, the involvement of the clerical unit in executive decisions was likely to influence the agenda of the work committees and affect decisions on eligibility.

¹. The literature on street-level bureaucracy points to control of information by street-level bureaucrats as a source of power that renders them relatively immune from hierarchical control, e.g., M. Lipsky 1980, and J. Prottas, 1979, mentioned by S. Barrett and M. Hill, 1984, pp.227,228.
Second, the clerical unit was in a position to use the servicing of general information to the public for patronage or for bargaining in return for certain benefits.

We do not propose here a conspiracy theory to analyse administrative behaviour. Rather, we have been trying to establish a point about how the formal structure of the project was reconstructed and moulded in the daily practices and mundane activities of participants. Access arrangements provided for in the formal organisational structure were disturbed as a result of the restructuring process. Questions of why the restructuring process took place and who was likely to benefit or lose and on what basis relate to the balance of power and interests inside and outside the implementing agency.

6.4.4 Conclusion

We described in this section the implementation process of the upgrading project in the National Unity Settlement. First, we outlined the formal structure of the project looking at the administrative organisation, the allocation rules, the rules of procedure and the volume of the project work.

Then we examined the operation of the administrative process and its impact on access arrangements. We identified a number of limitations on access at the levels of the reception desk and of the operation of allocation rules. We interpreted changes in the counter and entry rules as
indicators of a restructuring process in administrative and access arrangements away from the arrangements prescribed by the formal structure of the project. The involvement of the clerical unit in executive work contravened the officially prescribed authority structure.

The impact of the restructuring process on access opportunities was delineated in two areas: Firstly, the clerical unit was able to indirectly influence decisions on eligibility to land, thus disturbing the balance of access established by the formal structure of the project. Secondly, the access of individual applicants to general information on the rules of access was restricted, thus affecting their opportunities in subsequent stages of the project.¹

We conclude from this section that in addition to the limitations of the allocation rules already discussed in Chapter Five above, further constraints on access arose at the level of project implementation. The organisation of reception desks and the manner of interpreting and applying allocation rules produced differential access opportunities. Constraints arising at this level of the allocation structure turned administrative implementation into yet another net² through which only those applicants

¹. By the end of my field work in December 1982, the project was not yet through stages of demarcating plots, opening through-roads and awarding titles were yet to be accomplished.

². Other nets include the structural factors operating at the level of the national and urban economies discussed in Chapters Three and Four respectively; and the nature of the allocation rules outlined in Chapter Five.
who had adequate information, bureaucratic connections and resources could filter through.

6.5 GENERAL CONCLUSION

The main objective of this chapter has been to examine the implementation process of the upgrading project in the National Unity Settlement of the City of Omdurman.

We looked first at the socio-economic profiles of the population and at the housing conditions in the settlement. We found that a high proportion of residents originally came from the western regions of the country. The regional origin of residents in the settlement was in line with patterns of regional emigration to the capital. The majority of respondents in the sample had families of six to eleven members. The level of educational attainment in the settlement was low. Most of the respondents were either self-employed or worked for others in manual jobs in the service sector. Their monthly earnings ranged from under £5 50 to over £5 600 with about 60% of respondents falling in the income range of 50-150 pounds per month.

Most heads of households in the sample were owner-occupiers (88%). Over half of the households lived in one-room dwellings and over one quarter had two-room dwellings. Most of these dwellings had no toilets. Services of piped water, electricity, health, transport and security were non-
existent in the settlement. Residents had to pay a lot more than those living in officially planned residential areas to provide for some urban services. The land tenure of these citizens seemed to be the immediate obstacle blocking their access to urban services.

In the third section of the chapter we examined the political background of governmental action in the settlement. We argued that the absence of a clearly defined policy on illegal settlements made administrative actions increasingly contingent on political initiatives and on the prevailing balance of power at the national and local levels. The development of the Unity Settlement in the early 1970s was partly stimulated by the regime's policy of political incorporation. Administrative actions in the settlement were influenced by the political conflict between the regime and the right-wing opposition groups. It was partly due to this conflict that positive administrative action in the settlement was held up for over ten years. The political undercurrents of administrative action seemed, therefore, to be more important in defining the housing problem in the settlement than were the actual shelter needs of the population. We argued that the administrative process represented an important mechanism whereby policies of incorporation and exclusion were operated. The content of administrative procedures and routines was of considerable importance in controlling demand for social services as well as in individuating and breaking protests in the settlement.
The examination of the actual administrative process in the upgrading project was conducted in the fourth section of the chapter. We described first the organisational structure of the project, outlining the administrative organisation, the allocation rules and the volume of work in the project. We noted a high representation of technical officers in the project administration and a centralist approach to the upgrading process.

Then we proceeded to examine the administrative process and its impact on access opportunities. We identified some problem areas at the levels of counter and allocation rules. As these rules came into operation they were differently interpreted or reconstructed or changed. We interpreted changes in rules as a manifestation of a restructuring process in the project administration. There was a deconcentration of power from work committees to the clerical unit which was not provided for in the formal structure of the project. We then suggested the possible implications of the restructuring process for the access of applicants. We concluded that the administrative process represented an important source of constraints on access of applicants to urban land.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONSTRAINTS ON BUREAUCRATIC ACTION:
TOWARDS AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The main focus of this study has been the constraints on the allocation of urban residential land in the Sudan. We have outlined in the first chapter a number of theoretical positions which purport to explain inadequacies in the implementation of public policy and pointed out their limitations. We then conducted an exposition of a variety of factors, at different levels of state policy, which seemed to constrain the bureaucratic allocation of residential plots in Greater Khartoum. (Chapters Two, Three, Four, Five and Six). These factors ranged from limitations in national planning policy, to pressures arising from the urban political economy, to incompatibilities in the organisational structures and processes of housing agencies.

We proposed above to move the analysis beyond the identification of unrelated sets of constraints on policy implementation toward constructing an integrated explanation; one that is capable of accounting for the social forces and processes underlying these constraints, and of explaining how they effectively impinge on administrative process. In this chapter, we pull together the threads of the preceding analysis of constraints, and synthesise them in a broad integrated explanation to problems of policy implementation.
This will be conducted in two stages. First, using the material presented in preceding chapters, we will summarise constraints on housing policy into three categories: organisational problems, problems deriving from the urban political economy, and those originating in the national political economy. Second, we will advance a broad interpretation of the source and incidence of constraints on urban policy implementation. Our explanation will consist of two main ingredients: the identification of the social forces underlying the political economy, and the discovery of the mechanisms whereby social interests act upon administrative process. Combining structural and institutional analysis we hope to contribute to an adequate understanding of problems of policy implementation.

7.2 SOURCES OF CONSTRAINTS ON HOUSING POLICY

7.2.1 General

The preceding analysis sought to expose the basic limitations on access to residential land in Greater Khartoum. Several problem areas were identified, relating to different spheres of state policy. We will summarise below the basic limitations on access to residential land according to the level of their incidence. Three levels of the state's activity are delineated: the institutional level, the urban political economy level, and the level of national planning policy.
7.2.2 The Institutional Setting

At the level of housing agencies we identified above a number of aspects which seemed to limit access to residential land in the capital. These aspects related to the organisational structure, technology, and the operational process of housing agencies. We will briefly re-state these aspects.

(a) The Organisation Structure

Three main aspects were identified at this level:

First, the administrative fragmentation which characterised the first phase of the post-independence period precluded the evolution of a clearly defined housing policy. The content of the colonial social policy was mostly carried over, with little alteration from the point of view of social need and equity. As a result, a socially stratified housing system has been sustained. Public bureaucracy remained the prime beneficiary of the housing service throughout that period.

Second, the reorganisation of local government in 1971 affected the structure and operation of the housing agencies in two ways: firstly, the previously centrally-controlled functions of housing were devolved to the provincial administrations. The political motives behind the reorganisation scheme fostered the institutionalisation of certain
exclusionary measures in the system of representation in the local administrations. These discriminatory mechanisms gave councillors, Party functionaries and their friends, access to the administrative process. Secondly, the reorganisation process generated numerous levels of decision-making without adequately specifying the powers and responsibilities at each level. As a result of the unclarity of the authority structure of the new local councils and of the rules governing land allocation (Chapter Five) dominant interests in local administrations, who were mainly drawn from merchants, small-traders and professionals, were able to interpret allocation rules to their own liking.

Third, the administrative instability of the housing agencies within the structure of the Government, moving at one time between different central ministries and at another time between central and local governments, affected negatively the morale of the staff and undermined career expectations. It also stimulated departmental and professional rivalries within the housing agencies and between them and other related departments. Such an uneasy atmosphere overshadowed the evolution of genuine concern about inequities in the distribution of residential land.

Administrative fragmentation, instability and political intervention represented a danger to the institutional viability of the housing agencies. Their activity domain came under attack from local councils, central departments and public corporations. Each of these institutions competed,
in their different ways, to claim a share in housing activity. This inter-organisational competition brought heavy pressures on the system of land distribution.  

(b) Organisational Technology

By organisational technology we refer to urban planning codes relating to land classification, plot size, and level of municipal service. These are the technical methods whereby housing demand is processed into standardised housing packages. Each package relates to a specific class of land with standard plot space and standard level of urban service. A number of limitations arose from these standardised housing packages.

1 As the class of land indicated the physical quality of the site and determined its economic value, residents on third and fourth class land in Khartoum and Khartoum North towns were located in sites of inferior quality and bad drainage. By contrast, most of those who gained access to better quality sites in these towns did so more on the basis of their occupation in Government than because of their economic ability. The criteria for access to good sites was biased towards civil servants, until 1970

1. For example, as we argued in Chapter Five, local councils distributed urban land according to their own criteria and without coordination with other planning institutions such as in the famous case of Khartoum industrial area land. At the level of central government, ministries and public corporations competed for land for employees' housing and frequently used political pressure to gain access to land.
when merchants were permitted to apply for high class housing.

(2) The class of land determined the plot size and larger plots were usually assigned to first and second class land. Although poor applicants usually have larger families than rich ones the former could not gain access to large plots. The determinants of space needs were based on income and occupation criteria with less consideration for the family size.

(3) The level of urban service was associated with the class of land. The higher the class of land the more the service provided. Despite the presumed economic rationale governing the provision of urban service, the convenient access of the civil servants to high class land guaranteed them higher levels of service at a subsidised cost.

These three aspects, i.e. the classification of land according to income and occupation, the differential plot space and differential levels of urban service, constituted the core of the organisational technology of housing agencies. Our discussion in Chapter Five revealed a strong commitment by these agencies to the aforementioned planning principles despite their apparent contradiction both with economic rationale and with the imperatives of social need and equity. The land classification system and its implications for plot
size and for the levels of service provision have been often accepted by the housing agencies and the public as an unquestioned technical necessity. In Section 7.3.3(b) below we examine critically these claims and suggest an alternative interpretation to the technical rationalisation of differential access to urban land.

(c) The Organisational Process

The way the housing agencies operated represented another source of limitations on access:

(1) The absence of basic information affected the capacity of applicants to understand the access situation, namely eligibility rules, method and place of forwarding applications, and ways of follow-up.

(2) The vagueness of rules governing the "ordering" of applications and their openness to different interpretations gave some applicants better access to land than others.

(3) The operational strategies employed by the housing agencies at reception desks resulted in differential access opportunities.

(4) The poor staffing of the housing agencies and the excessive centralisation of the allocation operations in the headquarters of the Lands Directorate created
considerable difficulties both for the staff and applicants, and stimulated the growth of an army of brokers acting between officials and applicants at the various levels of the allocation operation.

Obviously some of these operational difficulties are common features of most public bureaucracies. Others, however, were related to the institutional context of housing agencies. For instance, difficulties arising from poor staffing, centralisation of land operations and unclarity of the "ordering" rules cannot be isolated from the reorganisation process of the local government system in 1971 and 1977, and its political undercurrents. Similarly, the heavy pressure of applicants on housing agencies arose from the rapidly growing urban property market which was closely associated with the 1974 new land policy as well as from the meagre organisational resources of these agencies. Adequate understanding of these operational problems requires, therefore, the careful isolation of independent factors from those contingent on other processes internal or external to the organisation.

7.2.3 The Urban Political Economy

The pattern of urban politics under the May regime took the form of an increasing use of state resources - including physical force - to mobilise political support, create acquiescence, or punish opponents. This was manifested in two policy areas: squatter housing and commercialisation of governmental land. In the former case, upgrading
policy was used at one time to generate political support for the regime and to punish its opponents at a later time. In the latter case, the policy of land commercialisation was partly introduced to stimulate political support among the propertied classes at a time when the regime broke its relation with the radical movement, while the merchant classes were hesitant to give it support. Both policies generated constraints on access to urban housing in the capital.

(a) The Politics of Housing

We have argued in Chapter Six that from the mid-1960s onwards, the provision of housing in the capital was increasingly used by the political parties to reward supporters or penalise opposing groups. This trend has intensified under the May regime, in the sphere of squatter housing. According to our earlier analysis political intervention in the provision of urban housing had two profound implications for access opportunities: first, it made planning decisions on where, when and how much resources to allocate for urban housing more dependent on the political needs of the regime than either on the administrative criteria of provision or on the urgency of the shelter problem.

The political intervention in housing was vividly depicted by the zigzagging pattern of the relations between residents in the Unity Settlement of Omdurman and the housing agencies during the period 1970-1982. Although
the Settlement won official approval of upgrading in 1970 its subsequent development became increasingly contingent on the regime's political conflict with the right-wing opposition groups, with whom the majority of the Settlement's population had strong regional and sectarian ties. Only after a political accommodation between the May regime and these opposition groups was reached in 1978, was a serious effort made to upgrade the settlement.

The constraints on access arose from the use of administrative process for narrow political objectives. The outcome was the denial of access to shelter and to basic urban services for a sizeable section of the urban population because of their ideological beliefs and regional background.

(b) The Policy of Property Development

A second source of constraints on access to residential land, at the level of the urban political economy, was the policy of land commercialisation, introduced in 1974. Broadly speaking, there were three areas where the commercialisation process seemed to have constrained the access of low income groups to urban shelter.

(1) The sale of public land for investment purposes reduced the stock of land to be allocated for low-income housing. The cost of reclaiming privately-held lands in the future outweighed
the revenue gained from the current land sales. Moreover, the disposing of central locations resulted in high transport costs in locations assigned to lower-income housing.

(2) The commercialisation process fostered a sharp increase in land values and the market price reached ten times that of the government subsidised plots in third-class residential areas.\(^1\) High land values tempted some beneficiaries in government-sponsored housing programmes to sell their plots and move into cheap property, mostly in illegal settlements. The commercialisation process seems, therefore, to have undermined the capacity of low-income groups to consolidate their ownership.

(3) The illegal settlements provided a fundamental means of access to shelter for the urban poor, housing 29 per cent of the capital's population in 1975. The commercialisation process accelerated the movement from the inner city areas into illegal settlements, thereby increasing overcrowding over already meagre services. The penetration of the informal land market by commercial speculators had two other effects: it increased rents, thus encouraging the subdivision of plots at the expense of the urban poor.

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1. Land values were partly accelerated by the strong demand for residential plots from Sudanese expatriates working in oil-producing Arab countries, and also due to imperfections in the property market.
of space standards and an overall decline in the standards of living. Secondly, it stimulated encroachment into communal lands to the loss of the "traditional" landholder.

Officially the policy of land commercialisation was intended to increase Government revenue in order to finance low income housing. In practice the resulting property boom put more strain on official and non-official housing markets. As both markets became steadily commercialised more low-income groups had progressively less access to urban shelter.

The politics of housing and the policy of land commercialisation generated real limits on the access of some urban groups to residential land. Yet the processes underlying both policies belonged to forces outside the organisation responsible for the allocation of residential land, as we explain in the next section of this chapter.

7.2.4 The National Policy Model

We examined in Chapter Three the Sudanese model of socio-economic planning. According to our analysis, this model portrayed the following features:

(1) Moral issues and social values underlying societal goals were incorporated as developmental objectives to the extent that they
lent themselves to technical analysis.

(2) Development was defined in terms of economic growth in the modern sector of the economy, with minimal consideration for other developmental goals such as equity in the distribution of resources.

(3) Emphases were laid on technology and modern management systems as the most appropriate methods for modernising the society, particularly the "traditional" sector of the economy.

This planning strategy relates to our analysis of the constraints on access to urban shelter in two ways: first, the emphasis on economic growth to the neglect of the 'externalities' of development alert us to the interrelations between the planning model, regional development, migration, urban growth and shelter problems in the capital. Second, the model's preoccupation with growth and productivity appear to have underlain the government's approach to social policy. The policy of land commercialisation and the cost-effective approach to urban services was analysed in that context. We will consider these two points below.
(a) Regional Development and the Shelter Problems in the Capital

The pattern of economic planning in the Sudan has been biased towards "modern" sector agriculture in central Sudan to the neglect of the peasant economy in the western and the southern regions of the country. The subsequent expansion of mechanised agriculture in western Sudan had adverse effects on the peasant economy. Social spending, on the other hand, followed closely the pattern of development expenditure, concentrating much of the infrastructural services in central Sudan.

The resulting regional disparities in incomes and social services stimulated a strong migratory process from the western region to the capital from the second half of the 1960s, as we pointed out in Chapter Four. Because of their employment situation and the difficulty of gaining access to official housing (Chapter Five) the majority of the migrants from that region joined the illegal settlements on the outskirts of the capital (Chapter Six). Any adequate explanation of the housing situation of these citizens and of the failure of administrative action to cater for them must, therefore, take into account the political and economic processes underlying the economic planning model (see Section 7.3 below).
(b) The Trend of Rationalising Urban Social Policy

The concern for economic growth and productivity, characteristic of the Sudanese model of planning, seems to have considerably influenced urban social policy during the 1970s. In contrast to predominantly centrally financed urban services in the pre-1969 period, the 1970s witnessed the move towards making these services self-financing. The new trend was exemplified by the 1974 land policy and that of pricing urban services on a cost effective basis.

We have outlined in Chapter Four the reasons behind the policy of land commercialisation. Because of the rising cost of urban government due to the expansion in the state administration, and a decline in local government revenue, it was thought that urban governmental land could help finance the housing budget and possibly contribute to the general budget. Hence, the 1974 land policy was launched.

We noted in Chapter Four that the government began to review the costing arrangement and the financial sources of urban services in 1970. Subsequent housing programmes reflected this trend. Although, when compared with their actual economic costs the rates of these services were still subsidised, the underlying trend was to remove the subsidy in line with the government's programme of economic austerity which was launched in 1977. However, the state's indirect subsidy to the bureaucracy in the form of larger plots and higher levels of urban service contradicted the policy of
rationalisation. The continuity of this indirect subsidy to the bureaucracy also meant unequal distribution of the negative effects of the rationalisation process.

The above analysis emphasised that shelter problems in Greater Khartoum were intricately related to the prevailing model of national planning. The pattern of national planning seems to have limited the capacity of certain social and regional groups to qualify for the requirements of official housing. It is ironical that those regional groups most affected by the negative effects of the "development" model in rural areas benefited the least from the process of rationalising social policy in urban areas. This particular outcome of the state's policy underlines the significance of the relation between the prevailing planning models and social interests to the study of constraints on policy implementation.

7.2.5 Conclusion

We have classified above the main constraints on access to residential land according to the level of their occurrence. These levels were the institutional setting, the urban political economy and the national political economy. We noted a number of examples where the constraints at one level were underwritten by processes at another level of the state's activity. At the institutional level the problems arising from the organisational structure and technology were closely related to political and historical processes external to
the housing agencies. At the level of the urban political economy, the constraints on access derived from the politics of housing and the policy of property development, both of which belonged more to the national political economy than to the housing agencies per se. The prevailing model of planning at the national level was insensitive to the social implications of "development" both in rural and urban areas.

It should be clear by now that any investigation of the constraints on access to residential land which is limited to one level of the analysis or that stops short of dealing adequately with the other levels will be unsatisfactory. What is needed is a broad perspective of the ecology of administrative action; one that accounts for the interdependencies between economy, social structure and the state, as far as public administration is concerned.

7.3 AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON HOUSING POLICY

7.3.1 General

In our exposition of dominant approaches to policy implementation in Chapter One, we concluded that they did not give adequate consideration to the impact of wider environment - namely power and social structure - on policy process. Hence their explanations of constraints on policy implementation were considered unsatisfactory. The analysis we conducted in Chapters Two to Six revealed a number of
factors and processes which constrained urban social policy. These were summarised into three categories in the preceding section of this chapter.

Two aspects of constraints on policy implementation remained to be clarified. First, we need to outline systematic links between the three aforementioned categories of constraints, and point out the way they operate in practice. Second, we need to establish how constraints on policy relate to the social structure. Put differently, we intend to clarify the source and incidence of constraints on urban social policy. We shall deal with the above question in two parts. First, we will consider the relation between the abovementioned categories of constraints and the social structure. Second, we will outline how constraints effectively impinge on the implementation process of urban social policy: the allocation of urban residential land.

7.3.2 Urban Housing Policy and the Social Structure

We classified above the main constraints on urban housing policy according to three levels of state activity: national political economy, urban political economy, and the organisational level of allocation agencies. At each level we singled out specific processes and policies as positive sources of constraints on housing policy. We proposed earlier to move analysis of policy implementation beyond identification of separate sets of constraints at various policy levels, toward constructing an integrated
explanation that accounts for links and interdependencies between different levels of public policy, as in Diagram 1.1.

(a) **The Impact of Political Economy**

A first step towards an integrated explanation of policy problems is to specify the link between the economy, housing problems and administrative response. Our exposition of the country's political economy has revealed that specific structural features in the economy led to an intensive specialisation in capitalist production of primary agricultural products, a disarticulation between non-capitalist and capitalist parts of the economy, and weak intersectoral linkages in the capitalist sector. As a consequence, development spending concentrated disproportionately on central Sudan, the capacity of the peasant economy to support its population was weakened, and the schism between the city and countryside widened, weighing heavily in favour of urban areas. The implications of these developments for urban housing were manifold: rapid urban growth; soaring housing demand; a trend to cut down state-subsidy to housing and urban service; a policy to commercialise government land to raise money to pay for the rising cost of urban administration; and a trend of political intervention in housing policy to regulate and/or control demand.
(b) The Social Structure

The exposition of structural features of the economy allowed us to understand how broad economic processes circumscribed urban housing. Addressing the links between housing policy and the social structure should clarify the source of constraints on policy and explain why they occurred and what were the underlying forces and social interests.

Looking at the national political economy, three principal categories of dominant interests can be identified.

First, there were the interests of international capital in sustaining the production of primary agricultural products and securing markets for goods produced abroad. Second, there were the interests of agro-commercial classes in mechanised farming, import and export trade, and real estate. Third, there were the interests of the state bureaucracy in sustaining stable and reliable sources of revenue, through irrigated agriculture, supporting private rainfed capitalist farming to provide food (i.e. national security), and foreign earnings, managing a stable level of public spending in urban areas, and maintaining mutual relations with private sector, international aid agencies and donor countries.
Despite the multiplicity of these interests, they were skilfully accommodated at the political level by the May regime, as we suggested in Chapter Two. Economic analysis of the technocratic policy model - analysed in Chapter Three - coincided conveniently with the economic interests of both foreign and indigenous capital. It can be safely argued that dominant economic interests were mediated through the policy planning machinery and were institutionalised in the policy process. The social implications of the consequent development patterns were disastrous in both rural and urban areas as we argued in Chapter Four.

At the level of urban political economy, the spectrum of relevant interests included: (a) commercial interests in property development, building materials trade, construction and bank finance. Both foreign and indigenous capital invested in these fields. (b) The interest of the state bureaucracy in raising money to meet rising costs of urban government, in reducing urban housing pressures, in encouraging the private sector to invest in property development, in maintaining the housing benefits of bureaucracy, and in seeking revenue-generating opportunities for individual bureaucrats in real estate, trade etc.

Urban housing policy tried to respond to these interests. At one level, the "conventional policy of releasing, occasionally, government land to reduce housing pressures was followed. Large-scale site and services schemes were launched in the
capital in 1970, 1972, 1977 and 1982, as we explained in Chapter Four. Merchants were permitted, for the first time, to apply for high class land in closed-auction allocations, previously monopolised by bureaucracy. At another level, the idea of raising money from government land, and, at the same time, encouraging the private sector into property development, became a reality in the 1974 Land Policy. At a third level, the state subsidy to land price and to urban services was relatively reduced. Finally, political intervention in urban housing intensified during the 1970s and the early 1980s to control demand and depoliticise social protest in lower class areas; at times residents in illegal settlements were forcefully evacuated from the capital (1981).

We have already presented the main features of urban housing policy in Chapter Four. We may note here that the shift from bureaucracy to the merchants as the main beneficiaries of the allocation system generally reflected the national trend in which agro-commercial interests increasingly dominated the state during the 1970s. However, bureaucracy managed to preserve most of its benefits, eg. through the provision of a special land allocation to senior employees of certain state departments. But generally the conflict of interests between merchants and bureaucrats was not pronounced, and some bureaucrats were moving into trade and business.
The foregoing discussion indicates that the social forces and interests underlying national and urban political economies were, more or less, the same. The strong presence of these interests in the state explains why, despite their obvious harmful social implications, national and urban development models were sustained. It explains the interrelatedness between constraints on housing policy arising from the national economy and those deriving from the urban economy. In the following section, we will outline how these constraints were internalised in the structure of housing agencies and sustained in administrative process.

7.3.3 Reconceptualising the Organisational Structure

The preceding discussion established that access to residential land in Greater Khartoum was contingent on specific processes flowing from national and urban political economies. What is central now is the manner whereby these contingencies impinged on administrative action. It would be difficult to envisage a situation where we can record a direct visible encounter between these constraints and administrative action. This is simply because the most basic of these constraints occurs at levels distantly located from the locus of administrative action.

An alternative approach to the study of the incidence of constraints may be developed, following the recent work of radical organisational sociology which we presented in
Chapter One, Section 1.3.3. The central theme in that work is that major organisational features should be seen, not as inherently rational entities, but as socially constructed devices which are capable of reflecting patterns of interactions and conflict, and the balance of power within organisations and across society. Thus, organisational goals, design, technology and process, all could be tactics and resources in a contest between competing social interests.

By conceiving of organisational structure as an outcome of conflicting social processes and interests, it is possible to enquire about the nature of social interests which are predominantly represented in housing agencies and to uncover how they managed to reproduce and sustain their interest in administrative process. In what follows, we will re-examine the institutional structure and organisational technology of housing agencies in the Sudan.

(a) The Institutional Structure of Housing Agencies

We outlined the critique of mainstream organisation theory in Chapter One Section 1.2.4. The import of that critique is that the presumed rationality of organisational structure is unwarranted. Organisational structures are socially produced and as such they contain multiple rationalities corresponding to the number of social interests involved, i.e. owners of capital, managers, professionals, workers etc. Two implications arise from this proposed pattern of analysis.
(1) Organisational structures are to be analysed as an outcome of a social process involving conflicting interests inside and outside organisations.

(2) The presumed rationality of organisational structures is a partial one, hence the actual criteria underlying the formation of these structures are yet to be discovered.

A first step in examining the social construction process of the institutional structure of Sudanese housing agencies is to establish the "modes of rationalities" (Clegg and Dunkerley, op.cit., pp.502,511) underlying their formation. The second step will be to isolate the prevailing social context of these agencies from the historical one, to find out whether the existing institutional structures have been maintained, reconstructed or changed and to specify the processes, mechanisms and interests involved.

Social policy in general and urban housing in particular did not have a significant place in the agenda of the Condominium state. Conceived as structures of advantage and disadvantage, the institutional structures of the housing agencies, their technical rules, and the legislation controlling urban planning, housing provision and land tenure were primarily created to meet the needs of the expatriate community and, later, of the small westernised indigenous
elite. Extension of housing services to the indigenous population would have:

a. increased social expenditure at the expense of capitalist investment,

b. encouraged urban growth and stimulated demand for more social spending,

c. had undesirable political implications since more social spending would improve political consciousness and stimulate the growth of political protest movements. The basic underlying rationale of housing provision was, therefore, discriminatory as we explain below.

With its limited scope and narrow institutional base the colonial housing policy was carried unchanged into the post-independence period, except for the introduction of the closed auction system which gave the bureaucracy easy access to residential land (Chapter Five). Housing expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure was small (two per cent of the GDP during the 1960s). The effects of the expansion on the economy, of the growing rate of urban growth and of the expansion in the state's apparatus during the post-independence period, on urban housing did not become manifest until the late 1960s. The marked spread of the squatter settlements and the proliferation of clandestine sales of the government's urban land revealed the insensitivity
of housing agencies to the rising urban housing problems as much as the strength of the social interests represented in them. The institutional structures of the housing agencies continued, throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, to sustain the colonial bias to the state's employees as against other social groups.

A radical change in the institutional structure of the housing agencies occurred in the post-1969 period. A number of questions arise here in relation to the reasons behind that change, whether it altered the "mode of rationality" inherited from the colonial state, and if it did, what was the resulting balance of social interests in the housing agencies.

In contrast to the relative political insignificance of urban housing under the colonial and the first phase of the post-colonial state, the 1969-regime sought the political support of the urban masses using, among other things, the issue of housing. Both housing policy and housing institutions were used for political gain, as we explained in Chapter Six. Under the 1971 reorganisation of the local government system the institutional structure of the housing agencies was arranged to provide the maximum possible mobilisation of the urban rank and file. Local councils were engaged in the implementation of the 1977 Housing Plan (Chapter Four).
As urban housing became politically attractive to the May regime, certain modifications in the "mode of rationality" of housing institutions were entailed.

First, the near monopoly of bureaucracy over high class housing was reduced, although some of its benefits were maintained through special allocations earmarked to specific departments of the state. Second, access to closed-auction housing was opened for the business community who were not allowed to compete in the pre-1969 period. Third, the 1974 land policy provided ample access to private developers. Fourth, upgrading projects in illegal settlements provided an opportunity for a few more people to own urban property.

The balance of social interests in housing agencies seemed, therefore, to have changed in the post-1969 period to include business interests. Increased local representation in housing agencies and the implementation of some upgrading programmes in illegal settlements provided "conditioned" access to some low-income urban groups too. The "mode of rationality" governing the institutional structure of housing agencies was, therefore, modified to accommodate business interests and interests of the petty bourgeois elements who enrolled in the Party and in local councils. However, the technical rules that stratified beneficiaries of land allocations into three housing classes, remained unchanged. To this point we now turn.
(b) The Organisation's Technology

Organisational technology is often regarded in conventional administrative studies as essentially a socially-neutral device. Its relevance to the study of constraints on administrative action mostly arises in relation to its applicability to a set of problems. The propensity of these techniques to mediate social interests and hence acquire some explanatory significance in the study of social constraints on administration is scarcely addressed in the literature.

We have outlined earlier the objections to the conventional view that accepts organisational features as objective scientific categories (Benson, 1977(a)). A parallel criticism of close relevance arose in the field of urban planning (eg. Marc Los, 1981; J. Simmie, 1974). The acceptance of the objectivity of facts, problems, models and theories of urban planning has been equally challenged.

The positivist view of urban planning, the subject of the above critique, is fairly characteristic of Sudanese urban planning, in which planning techniques have often been taken for granted as inherently objective and unproblematic in themselves. Following the perspective of radical organisation theory outlined above, we may re-interpret these techniques as historical constructs that were originally produced to satisfy a specific social need.
By uncovering the processes underlying their formation it would be possible to reconstruct the historical situation which produced them, define their social character and establish how they mediated social interests despite their seemingly neutral character.

The limitations on the access of urban lower classes to better quality sites, to adequate plot space and to a "reasonable" level of urban service basically originated in the land classification system, the kernel of Sudanese urban planning. To understand the rationale behind this differential access to urban housing one must refer to the initial assumptions of the classification system itself.

Contemporary urban planning in the Sudan grew out of the planning structures and practices of the colonial state. The present pattern of land classification was first introduced in the layout of Khartoum town, designed in 1898. Three main factors influenced the then emerging pattern of land classification.

The first factor was the climate and the "fact that ... a portion of the population are not in their natural zone, and are not therefore in adjustment with the environment" (McLean, 1913, pp.225).

According to Dr McLean, the first municipal engineer of Khartoum town, the effect of tropical sun on whitemen was injurious. It was, therefore, thought that the proximity
from the water front, high altitude, the presence of
gardens (ie. larger plots), green open spaces, and wide
shaded streets in the European quarter would modify the
harsh climate of Khartoum. By contrast, since the
"natives" were in their natural environment, it was
thought that they could live comfortably in much more
crowded circumstances (ibid, 226).

A second factor was the need to segregate the
"native" population to avert the incidence of tropical
diseases and epidemics. The high standards required by
the new building regulations deterred the indigenous
population from building in the newly designated high
class areas. Most of them sold out, benefiting from the
then prevailing property boom, and moved elsewhere.
Eventually, the "native lodging areas" were laid out in
1912 on the outskirts of the town to house the overspill.

Thirdly, the colonial state wanted to increase its
revenues through the sale of its urban land during the
period 1900-1905 (Warburg, 1970, pp.161, 163). The classi-
fication system was instrumental in the regulation and en-
hancement of land values and generally for stimulating the
growth of the urban property market.¹

¹. In contrast to the functional values of urban land which
had prevailed in 19th century Sudan, the 1900-1905 land
policy could be the earliest attempt in the Sudan to
commoditise urban land and assign it an ascriptive value,
contingent on location and rent. (For a comparison of
land values between pre-capitalist and capitalist cities
see Vance, 1970).
Although the land classification system was initially premised on the variations in the shelter needs of different ethnic communities economic criteria gradually became the main basis of access to the best sites, large plots and high levels of service provision. The post-independence era witnessed a significant departure from the established economic basis of access to land, as civil servants began to gain more access than other social groups. The implications of the classification system for the site, space and the package of services associated with the class of land remained more or less the same thereafter (as in Chapter Five).

The bases of the land classification system were not questioned by successive housing plans in the post-independence period. They were mostly accepted as technically necessary. The National Housing Committee (1979) explained the relevance of the prevailing land classification system by stating that first class housing should use concrete and since some people could not afford this standard the third class was appropriate for them (The Report of the National Housing Committee, 1981, p.44). Another official view was that the segregating element of the classification system was socially desirable, because if rich people built in a poor neighbourhood this would foster social disharmony in that neighbourhood. ¹

We may conclude that the basic premises of the land classification system were geared to narrow urban interests.

¹ An interview with the Deputy Director of the Research Section of the Housing Department, Ministry of Construction and Public Works, Khartoum, 25th August 1982.
under the colonial state. The same classification system was carried into the post-independence period and has been maintained under the guise of technical imperatives. The unqualified preferential access to urban residence which the bureaucracy continued to enjoy under this system of land classification suggests that the technical rules, far from being socially neutral, were socially biased against lower urban classes. These planning techniques gave bureaucracy and later - in the post-1970 period - the merchants easy access to the best quality sites, larger plots and high levels of urban service.

7.3.4 Conclusion

We proposed in this section an alternative approach to the study of constraints on urban housing policy. It consisted of two dimensions: identifying sources of constraints at the level of political economy, and establishing how constraints impinge effectively on housing agencies.

Taking the first dimension, we outlined the relations between national political economy and housing problems in the capital. Dominant social forces at the levels of national and urban political economies were found to be similar. Circumscribed by the interests of commercial classes and the state bureaucracy, urban housing policy failed to provide all the urban population with access to residential land.
The second dimension in our approach addressed the way constraints acted upon housing policies. We employed the notion that organisational structures are socially constructed and are, therefore, capable of extending and internalising social interests into administrative process. Using this perspective, we investigated the criteria underlying the institutional structure and organisational technology of housing agencies. We concluded that the "rules of action" governing the institutional structure and the system of land classification operated in the interest of bureaucracy and, recently, merchant classes. The organisational structure of housing agencies has acted, therefore, as mediator to those social interests that dominated at the level of urban political economy.

7.4 GENERAL CONCLUSION

The specific objective of this thesis has been to analyse and explain the constraints on the allocation of urban residential land in Greater Khartoum, Sudan. We proposed in the first chapter to extend the study of constraints on policy implementation beyond the narrow focus of behavioural and organisational analysis, and to address other pertinent issues in the environment of implementation - namely the development pattern, power and the social structure. We promised to advance a broad and integrated explanation of why and how constraints on policy implementation occur. The framework of analysis we adopted blended structural analysis of the political economy with institutional
analysis of policy and organisational processes.

We started our analysis by an exposition of the main features of the Sudanese economy and underlying social forces in the second chapter. We associated the persistence of particular features of the economy throughout the post-independence period with the marked presence of agro-commercial classes, bureaucracy and metropolitan capital at the political level.

The link between social structure and policy output was explicated in the third chapter through a political analysis of the dominant model of policy planning, under the May regime. Examining the model against the ideology of the May regime, the institutional organisation of the state, and the social character of policy makers, we detected a technocratic orientation whose policy prescriptions conformed with and fostered the pattern of development we already outlined in Chapter Two. This conformity between the nature of the dominant model and policy output indicated that the social interests underlying the political economy were, by and large, institutionalised in policy-making agencies. This seemed to be the case also in the policy of urban development, examined in Chapter Four.

We proceeded from structural and political analysis to institutional analysis in Chapters Five and Six. The aim was to delineate organisational constraints on access to residential land, which related to institutional structures,
allocation rules and administrative process. We identified two main categories of constraints on access at this level: one category derived from the technical rules of allocation, and operated mainly between housing classes differentiating between one housing class and another. The other category derived from operational rules of allocation and differentiated between applicants within each housing class.

After analysing constraints on housing policy at different levels of state policy, we classified them in this chapter, into three categories, relating to the institutional setting of housing agencies, urban political economy, and national political economy. Then we tried to synthesise these constraints in a broad explanation, which has two basic ingredients: identification of social forces underlying the political economy of urbanisation; and explication of the institutional mechanisms through which social influence acted upon administrative process.

The marked presence of commercial and bureaucratic interests at the political level was considered as a vital explanatory variable for the persistence of national and urban development models, despite their widely-known limitations. Identifying these social interests was, therefore, necessary for understanding the link between the social structure and housing policy. Sociological analysis of policy models, organisational design, techniques and process was equally necessary to describe accurately how social forces managed to sustain their interests in administrative
process. Constraints on housing policy were therefore seen to emanate from the social structure and extend into the practice of organisations from within their structures.
# Appendix 2.1: Composition of GDP by Economic Sectors 1969/70 - 1979/80 (Percentages)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Communications</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity &amp; Water</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Services</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Figures do not add up to 100.
2. Percentage shares of mining and quarrying were added to "other services" from 1975/76 on.
* Provisional Figures.

### Appendix 2.2: Development Plans 1961/62 - 1982/83 (£S million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Investment</td>
<td>Public Sector</td>
<td>Private and Semi Private Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>120 21%</td>
<td>90 32%</td>
<td>30 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing1</td>
<td>107 19%</td>
<td>42 15%</td>
<td>65 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and</td>
<td>95 17%</td>
<td>63 21%</td>
<td>32 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>150 27%</td>
<td>90 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
<td>Reserve Fund</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>472 84%</td>
<td>285 100%</td>
<td>187 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacement</td>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>93 16%</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>565 100%</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
<td>- - - -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Shares of Public and Private Sectors</td>
<td>60% 40%</td>
<td>56% 44%</td>
<td>58% 42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Including Power and Mining
## Appendix 2.3: Imports, Exports and Balance of Trade 1970-1979 (£S million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>103.9</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>124.4</td>
<td>152.2</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>152.5</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>230.2</td>
<td>202.3</td>
<td>232.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>115.4</td>
<td>117.9</td>
<td>151.3</td>
<td>247.6</td>
<td>360.1</td>
<td>341.3</td>
<td>376.5</td>
<td>449.5</td>
<td>477.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Trade</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-125.5</td>
<td>-207.6</td>
<td>-148.3</td>
<td>-146.3</td>
<td>-247.2</td>
<td>-244.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 3.1: The Structure of the Political System in Sudan (1976)

(a) Increase of Civil Servants 1955-1977 (Selected Years)¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1955/56</th>
<th>1965/66</th>
<th>1976/77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>12,127</td>
<td>31,283</td>
<td>119,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Corporations</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>65,125</td>
<td>132,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>157,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(for 1966/67)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>176,408</td>
<td>408,716</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Defense and Police personnel are excluded.
N.A. Not available. Source: Sudanow, December 1977, p.11.

(b) Growth in Government's Current Expenditure 1955-1981 (Selected Years) (£S million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense and Security</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>132.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Admin.</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>252.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Services</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous¹</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>287.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Repayment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>130.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>150.4</td>
<td>303.2</td>
<td>872.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹. These include: expenditure to meet deficit of some corporations; payments to universities; Price Stabilisation Fund; IMF; General Reserve (Chapter Two); Exchange Tax; and transfers to Southern Region.

### Classification of Staff Qualifications in the National Planning Commission 1973/74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Level</th>
<th>Director-General Deputy &amp; Assistant Directors</th>
<th>Senior Inspectors</th>
<th>Inspector and Assistant Inspector</th>
<th>Other Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Director General</strong></td>
<td>1 Ph.D. (Agriculture)</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Secretary, Secondary School Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Economic and foreign aid</strong></td>
<td>2 Ph.D. (Economics) 1 MA (Economics)</td>
<td>3 MA's (Economics) 1 MA (Economics) 1 MA (Engineering) 1 B.Sc. (Engineering) 1 Dip. (Planning)</td>
<td>1 Ph.D. (Economics) 1 MA (Project Evaluation) 2 Univ. Degrees + Diplomas 13 University Degrees</td>
<td>11 Secondary School Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Follow-up and annual budget</strong></td>
<td>2 MA's (Economics)</td>
<td>1 Ranker Accountant</td>
<td>2 MA's (Econ.Stats.) 1 Diploma 3 University Degrees</td>
<td>6 Secondary School Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Economic Coordination</strong></td>
<td>1 MA (Economics)</td>
<td>1 MA (Economics)</td>
<td>1 MA (Economics)</td>
<td>1 Secondary School Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Administrative Office of the Commissioner</strong></td>
<td>...</td>
<td>1 MA (Economics)</td>
<td>1 University Degree</td>
<td>3 Secondary School Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. Administration and Personnel</strong></td>
<td>1 University Degree</td>
<td>2 University Degrees</td>
<td>1 University Degree</td>
<td>4 Secondary School Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8. Typist, Librarian and others</strong></td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>2 Secondary School Librarians 5 Typists; 10 Car Drivers and 30 Workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Adapted from MEFFIT, Vol.1, Phase 1, September 1974, Appendix A, pp.41-43.*
Appendix 4.1: The Sudan: Regional Units (1975).
Appendix 5.1 : Location of Residential Class in Greater Khartoum 1965

---

Source: [Citation]
Appendix 5.2 The Physical Setting of Greater Khartoum.

### Appendix 5.3: Estate Bank Loans for the Period 1970 - 1980 (£000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Low Income Group</th>
<th>Medium and High Income Groups</th>
<th>Commercial Loans</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of Loans</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
<td>No. of Loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1388</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>2225</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Economic Surveys 1977/78; 1979/80; and 1981/82.

Sources: MEPIT, 1975; and Farghali, 1977.
Appendix 6.1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Khartoum City</th>
<th>Khartoum North City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Soba West</td>
<td>1. Docks and Barracks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Al-Gereif</td>
<td>2. Hillat Hamad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Al-Riyadh, Al-Tayif, and Erkaweet</td>
<td>3. Hillat Khogali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Burri</td>
<td>4. Al-Danagla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Nasir Extension (Burri)</td>
<td>5. Deims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Al-Mogran</td>
<td>6. Al-Sha'abiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8 Eddubasin and Wad Agib</td>
<td>7. Al-Khatmiya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Al-Shajarah</td>
<td>8. Al-Amlak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Al-Azozab</td>
<td>9. Al-Mazad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Al-Lamab</td>
<td>10. Al-Safya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Industrial Area</td>
<td>15. Al-Wihda Extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Railways Complex</td>
<td>16. Carton Settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Khartoum No.3</td>
<td>17. Shambat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Khartoum No.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Khartoum East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Khartoum West</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Al-Saggana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Al-Mygoma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Deims</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Khartoum New Extension</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Tuti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Al-Ushara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Al-Sahafa Extension</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Khartoum Central</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Al-Qoz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Al-Hilla Al-Gadida</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Al-Remaila</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Omdurman City

| 1. Al-Thourah                                     |                                         |
| 2. Al-Mahadiya                                    |                                         |
| 3. Wad Nubawi                                     |                                         |
| 4. Al Masalma, CBD and Al A'rd                      |                                         |
| 5. Beit Al-Mal and Abu Roaf                        |                                         |
| 6. Al-Mulazmin and Al Morada                      |                                         |
| 7. Abu Anga and Abbassiya                          |                                         |
| 8. Abu Si'id and Al-Fiteihab                       |                                         |
| 9. Umbudda and Unity Settlement                     |                                         |
Appendix 6.2: A Note on the Sample Survey

The choice of National Unity Settlement for study was influenced by the research's twin objectives of examining the relation between the policy of regional development and the housing problem in the capital, and of studying the problems of policy implementation in a live allocation context. As for the first objective, National Unity Settlement was the fastest growing in the capital during the 1970s, increasing from 500 dwellings in 1970 to some 24,000 dwellings in 1982. This rapid rate of growth was a manifestation of the general effect of rural-urban migration. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of the regional origins of resident, in contrast to the exclusive regional origins in other illegal settlements, enabled us to assess the impact of the "push" factors on the growth of the settlement. Second, the decision of the authorities to upgrade the settlement in June 1982, gave us a valuable opportunity to study closely the implementation process.

There was no reliable official record of the names of the residents or of the owner-occupiers in the settlement from which we could have taken our sample. Even had such a list existed, it would have been extremely difficult to reach the persons to be interviewed because neither did the streets carry any signs nor did dwellings bear identification numbers or names. The only available option was to select the sample in the actual place of residence.

The settlement consisted of eight residential wards with an estimated 24,000 dwellings distributed in the following way:

Total Dwellings in the Settlement, Distributed by Wards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wards</th>
<th>Official Estimate of Dwellings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ward 11</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward 12</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward 13</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward 14</td>
<td>10,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward 15</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward 16</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward 17</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ward 18</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Records of the Committee of New Omdurman Housing Project, the Unity Settlement, 1982.
Within the constraint of time, money and the available information, we decided to conduct a sample survey in one of the eight wards, after ensuring that there was a degree of homogeneity in the socio-economic attributes of the population in the eight wards. We then chose randomly Ward 16.

While the official record accounted for only 1,600 dwellings in the Ward the local Party organisation put the number at 2,500. During our preliminary investigations we came to know that a strip of dwellings located on the western edge of Ward 16 was demolished in 1981 but most of its residents (about 500 households) had continued to live on it. Neither the official record nor the local party unit included the demolished area as part of Ward 16. We decided to treat the demolished strip as part of Ward 16, thus putting the number of dwellings in the Ward at 3,000. We then selected 300 dwellings as the size of the sample. We divided the Ward into ten blocks. Nine field investigators were used and each was assigned one block and instructed to choose every third dwelling in the block.

We used a structured interview schedule to collect information from heads of the households in the selected sample (see Appendix 6.3). An interview to fill in the schedule took on average 30 minutes. The interviewing was conducted during the period 11th to 21st of December 1982. Interviews usually took place in the afternoons between 3.00 and 5.30 pm when the heads of households returned from work. Completed schedules were reviewed and checked on the same day of the interview and provision was made to complete unfinished ones the following day.
Appendix 6.3 : The Interview Schedule

(a) **Basic Information on the Socio-Economic Status of Respondents:**

1. Sex
2. Marital Status
3. Family Size
4. Place of Origin
5. Length of Stay in the Capital
6. Education
7. Occupation
8. Monthly Income
9. Number of Working Members in the Family
10. Monthly Rent
11. Property Ownership

(b) **Information on Housing Conditions:**

12. Place of Last Residence
13. Type of Last Residence
14. Incidence of Change of Residence
15. Reasons for Changing Last Residence
16. Length of Stay in Present Residence
17. Type of Present Accommodation
18. Number of Rooms
19. Number of Available Conveniences
20. Use of Conveniences
21. Method of Building Residence
22. Method of Financing the Construction
23. Place where Respondents' Children Receive Education
24. Place where Respondents' Families Receive Medical Treatment
25. Most Urgently Needed Services in the Settlement

(c) **Information on Housing Programmes:**

26. Previous Applications for Residential Land
27. Result of Previous Applications for Land
28. Location and Use Made of Land Previously Allocated to Respondents
29. Reasons for Having Not Been Allocated a Plot in Previous Land Allocations
30. Reasons for Not Applying in Previous Land Programmes
31. Opinion about the Present Upgrading Programme
32. Whether Respondent is Included in the Upgrading Programme
33. Method of Completing the Land Form
34. Problems Faced in Obtaining or in Completing or in Returning the Land Form
35. Whether Applicant Met the Interview Committee
36. Number of the Committee's Members Present
37. Applicant's Opinion of the Committee's Procedure
38. Whether Applicant Swore the Oath
39. Reasons for not Seeing the Interview Committee
40. Whether Applicant Thinks that there are Other Ways for Obtaining Land Without Having to See the Committee
41. Applicants' Opinion about the Price that Government Set for Land in the Settlement
42. How Would Applicants Provide the Money to Pay for His/Her Plot?

(d) Information on Local Organisations in the Settlement

43. Membership in Local Party and Other Organisations
44. Whether and How Local Organisations Help in Solving Housing Problems in the Settlement
45. The Role of the Party's Local Unit in the Present Upgrading Programme
46. Whether Respondents Participated in Elections Prior to the Inception of the May Regime in 1969
47. Party Affiliations of Respondents Under the Previous Parliamentary Regime
Appendix 6.4: A Sample of the Land Form Used in the Upgrading Project (1982)*

Ministry of Construction and Public Works

Do you have a previous Land Form? .......
No. of Land Form ............ Date of Application ............
Place of forwarding application ....... Other remarks concerning a previous application ............

The Unit of Combatting Spontaneous Housing
A Land Form for the Entitled, and Affected Persons

The following statements are to be completed by the applicant accompanied by certified supporting documents for Sections A(2,3,4,5,9,10,12,13), B,C,D. Any application which is incomplete or does not arrive at the specified time will be excluded.

(A)

1. Name .... 2. Place and date of birth ... 3. Place of Origin ....
4. Occupation ... 5. Place of Work ... 6. Annual income ....
7. Address .... 8. Next of Kin: Name and Address ..... 
9. No. and date of issue of the Identity Card ..... 
10. No., date, and place of issue of the Nationality Certificate ...... 
11. Town(s) where you lived during the last 10 years ....
12. Where and how do you live now, and when have you moved into your present accommodation?
13. Give names and addresses of your previous landlord(s) ..... 
14. Have you built rooms or structures or seized governmental land which was not legally allocated to you? .... State place ...... date ...... neighbours ...... witnesses ...... and how you obtained it (land) ......
   If those buildings were demolished, state the circumstances and relevant information which can be referred to.

(B) Social Condition


(C) Family of the Applicant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of wife/wives</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Dependents</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>...................</td>
<td>.....</td>
<td>.........</td>
<td>...........</td>
<td>.............</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(D) Other exceptional and social cases which may be considered .......

(E) Do you or your wife or a member of your family own a house or a part of a house (complete or otherwise) or a plot of land, registered or unregistered, in Khartoum Province or in any other province? ....

1. State its location ... 2. Plot No. .... 3. Block, ward and area ......
4. Registered or unregistered .... 5. Complete or partially built ....
5. Method of acquiring it: a closed auction, a housing plan, inheritance, purchase, a gift.

6. Have you applied for housing in the Housing Plan (or for departmental housing)?

    Comments of the Planning and Settlement Committees in the area
    Comments of the People's Council concerning the validity of information, following the investigation, evaluation and displaying of the application in the public noticeboard for 15 days.

(F) State in the order of preference town and class of land where you prefer to live: Khartoum - Omdurman - Khartoum North - third class - fourth class with basic services: First choice Second choice Third choice

    Signature of the Administrative Officers

(G) Following oath-taking of applicant before the committee, it may decide:

1. Points obtained
2. Endorse the application
3. Recommend the referral of application to the Committee on exceptional cases
4. Recommend granting applicant a suitable plot of land in the fourth class
5. Recommend rejecting the application
6. Recommend criminal prosecution, and state offence

    Signature of head of the committee (magistrate status).
    Signature of representatives (2) of the District Council
    Signature of representative of the Directorate of Lands
    Signature of representative of the Department of Housing and Physical Planning.

(H) I, the undersigned, declare that the above information is correct, and if it turns out, at anytime, to be otherwise ... I will be liable to prosecution under Article 154 of the Sudan Penal Code, the violation of which may expose offender to the penalty of imprisonment for a maximum of six months and fine; and also Article 408 (forgery); and the application will be cancelled; also I declare that if it turns out, at any time in the future, that I have obtained land on false information, the Government will have the right in retaking it, (and) in protecting its rights by any available legal procedure.

Also I declare not to dispose of land by sale, grant or mortgage except to Government or the institution in which I work ...

Date Place

I, the undersigned, according to my personal knowledge of the applicant, testify that the information provided is correct, and if it turns out to be otherwise I will be liable to legal penalties under Article 109.

Signature of witness Address Identity Card No.

Issued in Date
(I) Comments of the technical committee on the possibility of planning and allocating land of a suitable class without encumbrances ....
Signature of representative of the Department of Housing and Physical Planning ....
Signature of representative of the Directorate of Lands ....

(J) Recommendations of the General Director of Lands ....

(K) Decision of the Minister (or his proxy) ....

* There are four other paragraphs for office use which I excluded. Certain parts of the original Arabic version were vague, and for the sake of clarity I had to reformulate them.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title and Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Ayyam Daily</td>
<td>Khartoum; a number of issues.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hudson, M.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>World Bank, 1979</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;World Development Report&quot;.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
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