SHOULD PATRIOTISM BE TAUGHT IN STATE SCHOOLS?

by

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ABSTRACT

The teaching of progressive patriotism, as an inclusive, open-ended and interpretive project, is needed in state schooling to counter significant threats to modern liberal democracies. This thesis argues that various forms of civic education, with a particular focus on England over recent decades, have not been adequate. It is argued here that these conceptions of civic education have all, in various ways, failed to provide enough vital force to engage the young in our increasingly complex and demanding plural democracies. An important affective dimension has been missing. Recent civic education has also failed to be sufficiently liberal by promoting an exclusive sense of national solidarity. It is argued here that these failures need to be addressed given the levels of informed, critical democratic engagement needed in our complex modern democracies and the real and growing threats they face. For example, our increasingly diverse and unequal liberal societies, operating within an era of globalisation, have spawned a rise in chauvinistic and emotionally potent conceptions of exclusive national identity. What is needed to counter this threat is a conception of patriotic education that adheres to liberal principles whilst developing affective affiliation to the country through a liberal, multicultural, democratic national building project.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my beloved Krešimir, Katie and Luka
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Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
Why the need for patriotic education? ................................................................................... 6
How I address the argument ................................................................................................. 15

CHAPTER 1: A REVIEW OF UK GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION .................................................................................................................. 19
Citizenship education: a contingent concept and contested terrain .................................... 24
Some historical context to the civic education agenda ........................................................ 32
Civic education 1970s to 1997 ............................................................................................. 42
New Labour and citizenship education: 1997-2005 ............................................................ 46
Citizenship education 2005 - 2010: a greater emphasis on nation building ....................... 60
Coalition and Conservative approaches to civic education 2010 – 2016 ............................ 73
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 79

CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS PATRIOTISM? ......................................................................... 82
An overview of three views on the definition of patriotism .................................................. 84
What kind of love is patriotic love? ...................................................................................... 88
What is the object of patriotic love? ..................................................................................... 98
One’s country ..................................................................................................................... 104
A defence of the traditional definition: love of one’s country ............................................ 107

CHAPTER 3: WHY DOES LIBERAL DEMOCRACY NEED PATRIOTISM? ............. 109
What are the qualities of liberal democratic citizens? ....................................................... 110
Minimal tolerance of patriotism within liberal democracies .......................................... 112
Can liberal democracy’s need for patriotism be justified on remedial grounds? ?.............. 117
Liberal democracy’s reliance on pre-political, civic bonds ............................................... 120
Pre-political civic bonds .................................................................................................... 122
Civic bonds as liberal patriotic bonds ............................................................................... 127
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 128

CHAPTER 4: WHAT KIND OF PATRIOTISM IS NEEDED FOR FLOURISHING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY? ? ............................................................ 130
Tribal patriotism that threatens liberal democracy ........................................................... 132
Blind patriotism: our country right or wrong .................................................................... 134
Trait-based patriotism: loving one’s country only for its loveable qualities ..................... 135
Belligerent patriotism: love of country that comes at too high a price .............................. 137
Constitutional and civic patriotism .................................................................................... 140
Liberal nationalism ............................................................................................................ 148
Patriotism as a national-cultural dialogue ........................................................................ 152
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 155

CHAPTER 5: IS PATRIOTIC EDUCATION COMPATIBLE WITH LIBERAL EDUCATION? ? ............................................................................................ 157
Two broad conceptions of liberal education: education that ‘liberates’ and politically liberal education ................................................................. 158
The first broad conception of liberal education: liberating education ............................. 160
The second broad conception of liberal education: liberal political education .......... 169
INTRODUCTION

Patriotism, as a topic in philosophy and political theory was relatively neglected until the 1980s. This decade saw a vibrant debate emerging about the moral and intellectual legitimacy of patriotism. Reasons for this flourishing within philosophy have been attributed to ‘the revival of communitarianism, which came in response to the individualistic, liberal political and moral philosophy epitomised by John Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971) […]’ and Alasdair MacIntyre’s 1984 lecture *Is Patriotism a Virtue?* can be seen as the beginning of this sea change’ (Primoratz, 2007, p.1). Within the political sphere there was also a resurgence of nationalism in various parts of the world, not least the disintegration of the USSR and the wars in Former Yugoslavia. The rise of Scottish Nationalist Party and UK Independence Party, the vote to leave the European Union (June 2016) also serves to illustrate this phenomenon within Britain. Since the 1990s there has been a lively debate about the nature and extent to which liberal political theory can be compatible with some forms of patriotism and nationalism. Advocates for what might be called liberal nationalism have included, for example, Tamir, 1993; Miller, 1995; and Callan, 1997. And there has been lively debate about whether patriotism should be taught in schools (Archard, 1999; Ben-Porath, 2006; Brighouse, 2006; Callan, 1997, 2006; Galston, 1991; Hand, 2011; Kateb, 2006; Keller, 2005; Soutphommasane, 2012; White, 1996, 2001) and, certainly in the UK, more politicians from both sides of the political spectrum suggesting, that is some form, it should (Brown, 2006; Gove, 2010). Pride in Britain’s heritage captures the Conservative proposals, whilst a redefined, unifying sense of ‘Britishness’ was Labour’s version of proposed content for part of citizenship education.
Many plausible reasons have been put forward to explain the phenomenon of renewed interest in patriotism, namely: Britain’s declining global and economic power; terrorist threats from outside the UK; and terrorist attacks from within by alienated British citizens. Broadly, liberal democracy is perceived to be under significant threat (Taylor, 1996; Callan, 2006; Gray, 2016) and it is a worldwide phenomenon. Whilst global dependency increases, it appears that national solidarity in the form of retrenchment or assertion increases with it. Where there is a perceived existential threat, either in time of war or heightened insecurity, the demand for national unity emerges in various forms (Ben-Porath, 2006). At the time of writing an illiberal, white supremacist has been elected as President of the USA (November 2016), populist parties of the far right (and left) across Europe have been gaining strength, and ‘anxiety about immigration and multiculturalism has increasingly been expressed as virulent nationalistic pride’ (Soutphommasane, 2012, p.2). According to Ruchir Sharma in his recent book *The Rise and Fall of Nations* (2016) the twenty largest democracies leaders are at their lowest popularity and anti-establishment sentiment is sweeping the globe ¹. Deepening inequalities globally, and within many liberal democratic states most notably ‘staggering levels’ in the UK and USA (Lagarde, 2015), have given rise to concerns about the relationship between growing inequality and subsequent declining political stability.

The deregulation of national economics and freeing up of international trade, hallmarks of ‘neoliberal’ or laissez faire policies, have provided the context for these rising levels

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¹ This lack of popularity has been used to explain (in part) Donald Trump’s election as President of the USA. Although it is important to note that he did not secure a majority of the popular vote.
of deep inequalities. Since the 1990s, ‘neoliberalism’ has been the world’s dominant
economic paradigm, ‘stretching from the Anglo-American heartlands of capitalism to
the former communist bloc all the way to the developing regions of the global South’
(Steger and Roy, 2010, p.xi). Its historical roots lie with such classical liberal
economists as Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek. However, many commentators, not
only on the Left but also from more political liberal traditions (Helleiner, 2014) view
‘neoliberalism’ as a significant threat to current liberal democracy as a result. It has
come under severe scrutiny since the global financial crash of 2007, having, ‘been
shaken to its core by the worst financial calamity since the 1930s’ (ibid.). It, arguably
however, remains a significant threat to modern liberal democracies, in that, whilst the
economic foundations may be disintegrating, its broader political and social influence
remains powerful and tenacious (Hall et al, 2013). Global economic dependency, within
an ideological context of free trade, has had inevitable consequences for national
governments. Whilst they - currently - remain critically important institutions, they are
not always perceived as such by all members of national populations. There are those
who may question the relevance of national institutions – or indeed their own efficacy
within this national context - given the power of global economic forces. Others argue
that national institutions need strengthening and argue for more regulated trade
agreements and protected border controls. Neo liberalism or market fundamentalism is a
complex phenomenon and it is not the task of this thesis to examine it in depth. Others
have done that admirably (see for example the bibliography, Steger and Roy, 2010).
What is notable here is that, whatever the complexity of the causes, anti-globalisation
movements have gathered force, political alienation has increased and democratic
participation has decreased in many countries. Furthermore, many forms of nationalism,
including a form of ethnic exclusionism and blind, distorted versions of patriotism have become stronger.

As Ben-Porath suggests, many modern liberal democracies appear to be involved in various protracted conflicts and ‘unlike in World War Two, for example, the conflict is more blurry in goals and modus operandi and this creates unique challenges for civil society’ (Ben-Porath, 2006, p.13). The recent vote in Britain to leave the European Union (EU) has revealed some internal divisions in the country and also raised many questions about the state of liberal democracy in the UK. In relation to democratic processes, Professor Michael Dougan, (cited in Yeung, 2016) accused the organisers of the campaign to leave the EU of causing ‘untold damage to our democracy’, suggesting that ‘whatever else happens, by normalising and legitimising dishonesty on an industrial scale as a tool for winning votes, Leave have inflicted untold damage upon the quality of our national democracy’. And in relation to more virulent forms of patriotic pride, at the time of writing (November 2016), the Institute of Race Relations record of ‘post Brexit2 racism’ shows that there has been a significant increase in reported racists ‘hate’ crimes; 76% of which have involved verbal abuse and 14% involved threatened or actual physical violence. The murder of Arkadiusz Jóźwik, a Polish man living in Harlow in Essex, is currently being investigated as a racist attack (Krupa, 2016), as is the murder of Jo Cox MP (June 2016), a prominent Remain campaigner in the European Union referendum. The suspect in Jo Cox’s murder will undergo a ‘terrorist trial’3 given his alleged associations with neo Nazi causes. The recent election of Donald Trump as

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2 ‘Brexit’ became the phrase coined to describe the British exit of the European Union
3 Terrorist trials are deemed necessary where an act of terrorism has been involved where terrorism is defined as an action, threat or violent act “made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause” according to Section one of the Terrorism Act 2000
President of the USA (November 2016) has given rise to many fears that there is a
global trend towards illiberalism including right wing nationalism and populist
autocracy. Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front, a far right, national-
conservative party in France has declared that she is poised to win the French
presidency in 2017. As Kauffman stated (November 2016) ‘Just as a Trump candidacy,
let alone a victory, was unthinkable a year ago, most French experts had dismissed the
possibility of the far-right leader’s winning the Élysée Palace in 2017. Brexit and Mr.
Trump have changed that”4.

Given the unprecedented challenges facing many established liberal democracies the
philosophical and political questions being wrestled with here appeared to be both
interesting and important. And the need to equip the young with good citizenship
education is pressing. My personal interest in this question arose when I moved to
Croatia with my (Croatian) husband and two children in 2004. There were two sides to
my growing personal and academic interest in the notion of promoting patriotism in
schools. One the one hand I had never felt more English than when I no longer lived in
England. My (initial) inability to participate in a cultural or political community pulled
me ‘inwards’ and I experienced a sense of alienation, which felt, at times, like an
existential threat. I felt detached. On the other hand, I was witnessing my children
participating in a school curriculum that positively promoted national pride in the new
post-communist, post-war Croatia. Given the horrors of the recent war, and the
centuries-long struggles within the country under various forms of imperial and political
occupation, it felt entirely reasonable for citizens of Croatia to engage in a nation-

4 Since completing the thesis, Macron secured a victory in the French election with 66.1% of the vote. Le
Pen secured 33.9% of the national vote.
building project. State schooling also felt like an appropriate place to start. This raised several questions. As someone who has been committed to liberal values within a social democracy and its educational aims some initially uncomfortable ideas were surfacing. Is the essential liberal value of autonomy a victim of this nation-building project? Was my narrowing sense of my own nationality unreasonable, petty and small-minded? How could I feel justified in ‘loving my country’ whilst denying its reasonableness elsewhere? But, how can the tension between the essential, constitutive element of education, truth, and imbuing loyalty to particular patriae, be resolved? Should it? Surely, detached critical reasoning and the cultivation of autonomous persons, are the bedrocks of any good education? But, what was especially interesting to me was that the usual recourse to traditional liberal arguments about the ‘telos’ of education being about truth failed to satisfy these strong feelings of my own and my observations of strong feelings in others. These responses seemed to be more reasonable then mere base desires or a defensive reaction to an existential threat. Upon our return to the UK in 2007, I became interested in the growing interest in patriotic education in Britain as articulated by Gordon Brown and expressed in the Ajegbo Report of 2007. It seemed that the need for patriotic education as part of national renewal was not confined to new democratic nations, like Croatia. And, furthermore, a progressive, noble, inclusive patriotism may be possible; necessary even.

Why the need for patriotic education?

This brings us to the central argument of this thesis, which is to explore the extent to which patriotic education is needed in state schools to support the continued flourishing of modern liberal democracies. The thesis examines whether progressive patriotic
education, that ensures that young people learn to love their essentially multicultural liberal democratic nation and are motivated and equipped to participate in its continuous national renewal through an open, interpretive, national dialogue, is necessary, desirable and possible.

It is argued here that current civic education in state schools in liberal democracies limits individual children’s options, does not contribute sufficiently well to the continued flourishing of free national societies and limits liberal democratic influence at a global level. What is especially lacking is sufficient motivation for citizens, and especially those from minority sub national groups, to participate in liberal democratic processes and to feel a genuine sense of efficacy. There is urgency to the debate given the current, complex threats to liberal democracies and the inadequacies of educational responses to date. Adequately and appropriately nurturing children’s and young people’s affective affiliation at the national level, whilst retaining respect for truth, is the vital missing element of much civic education.

Commonly the goals for civic education in many liberal democracies are to equip children with knowledge and understanding about the core principles and features of liberal democracy; to pass on liberal democratic values; to cultivate certain liberal democratic dispositions and to develop skills to participate in the nation’s political life. These are important goals and it is not the purpose of this thesis to condemn them. What the argument here sets out to do is to add an important dimension to civic education that overcomes the current limitations of this approach. Given the challenges facing modern, highly complex, plural, modern democracies – not least rising inequality, globalisation and populism, the rise of chauvinistic nationalism, as well as mass immigration in more
recent decades - modern democracies need a high number of citizens who understand and care deeply enough about issues at a national level to influence, co-develop and participate in continual liberal democratic nation building. Given the diverse nature of most modern democracies there are many strong cultural, religious, familial and institutional affiliative attachments at the sub national cultural level that a citizen may have that seem entirely legitimate and appropriate. It is also possible - even desirable - to cultivate and hold affective affiliations at the cross-national level, for example, for a religious group or an international organisation. What is being argued here is that sentiment, as well as knowledge, understanding, values and skills, needs to be cultivated at the national level to strengthen national level governance, which still remains all important. Critical decisions affecting both local communities, intra-national communities and the global community are taken at the national level. Liberal democracies need critical and affectively engaged citizens in order to ensure that decisions are reached that lead to good lives for individuals, help create just national societies and contribute to a more just world. It is argued here that cultivating national affiliation is instrumental in this. National communities need to be ‘imagined’, as Anderson argues (1991). They are not accessible directly in the way that many small communities might be. Providing knowledge and understanding of the value and importance of national institutions and developing skills for democratic participation are valuable. But what is lacking, it is argued here, is the sufficient emotional engagement at the national level to give this understanding and these skills vital force at the otherwise relatively remote national level. This emotional attachment at the national level needs to fuel motivation but it also needs to be subject to critical scrutiny and leave plenty of room for individual autonomy. This thesis aims to justify the need for progressive patriotism that takes the form of an open, interpretive, national dialogue.
where citizens care deeply about its outcomes and, as such, are motivated to participate within the many forms of democratic life. The scholarship of Eamonn Callan (1997), Sigal Ben-Porath (2006) and Tim Soutphommasane (2012) has greatly contributed to the final proposals made here.

It is important to acknowledge that, whilst most stop short at explicitly ‘promoting patriotism’, most civic education systems try to foster the idea and practices of civic virtue that need to be diffused amongst the citizenry in order to sustain healthy levels of participation in modern democracies. Broadly there have been two categories of attempts at this important goal. Both fall short, it is argued here. The first involves the promotion of liberal civic friendship and the second involves promotion of national values or a common national identity. According to adherents of the ‘civic friendship’ approach, it is enough to teach children to know about and understand the history and key features of their country and its democratic institutions; to know why it is important as well as how to participate politically; to impart certain values and to try to cultivate dispositions of neighbourliness, volunteering, and skills of empathic deliberation, for example. This civic curriculum can be taught through the history curriculum, specific citizenship lessons and/or through whole school or extracurricular projects. Through this educational provision it is expected that children will, for example, acquire values, understand the rationales for their adoption, and therefore apply this understanding in their adult lives as good democratic citizens. Citizenship education of this kind that promotes ‘civic friendship’ through local volunteerism, cultivating behaviours with peers and so on may succeed in cultivating a sense of responsibility and participation at the local level but it is not so clear, for example, how this kind of education leads to the acquisition of virtue or a sense of obligation to participate at the all-important national
level. There seems to be an assumption that children will acquire a sense of duty or virtue but how they acquire it and why they might have any sense of duty at the national level is not clear. The strong motivation to be involved seems to be lacking, especially when local communities may be the location of the extracurricular learning, for example, and local communities are not representative of the multicultural nation as a whole. Modern plural democracies are socially constructed national groups, or as Benedict Anderson (1991) describes them, ‘imagined communities’. Nations are imagined by the people who see themselves as members of that community. Children, and indeed adults, require some support for making this imaginative leap at the national level, especially when their sub national community bears little resemblance to other sub national communities or to their perception of the national community as a whole. What is needed, arguably, is some means of nurturing affective affiliation at this national level in order that future citizens care enough and feel that their participation – even at the level of casting a vote - genuinely counts.

The second attempt at cultivating civic virtue or obligation to participate in national political life is to be explicit about strengthening the sense of national community through the promotion of a common national identity or shared set of national values. This approach can be divided into two distinct types of response. The first of these involves a rejection of what might be described as multiculturalism in favour of a narrower, ‘muscular’ version of national identity; a conservative nationalism. Given its tendency for a more aggressive assimilation of minorities, this approach is found wanting and is ultimately dismissed by arguments presented in this thesis. It lacks sufficient adherence to fundamental liberal principles of autonomy, fairness and tolerance. The second approach to strengthening national solidarity can be described as
liberal nationalism, as opposed to, conservative nationalism. This approach aims to
develop a more inclusive sense of shared civic identity. It is argued here that this
approach holds more promise but remains limited. Its promise lies in its response to the
centrifugal pressure on modern democratic states; namely, that the emergence of plural
societies heightens the potential for conflict between solidarity and diversity and that
cultivating a shared civic identity seems a reasonable response to this. The cultivation of
this shared civic identity, rather like the ‘civic friendship’ approach discussed above,
involves elements of democratic deliberation and openness about the ends of this
deliberation. And like the civic friendship approach, its limitations also lie in the fact
that it is difficult to see why, for example, many members of minority or sub national
groups - or currently those alienated from or sceptical about national politics - would be
motivated to participate in a debate about shared identity if the chances of being able to
genuinely shape any outcomes of this deliberation remain very small. If the purpose of a
shared nation identity is to help secure the ends of a liberal democracy this approach, as
Kymlicka argues, ‘seems to favour those who are unquestionably part of the liberal
moral ontology and are viewed as individual members of a particular community for
whom cultural membership is an important good […] Members of minority cultural
communities may face particular kinds of disadvantages with respects to the good of
cultural membership (Kymlicka, 1989, p.162).

Given the fact that modern liberal democracies are increasingly diverse and many
citizens have strong affiliations at sub national and/or transnational level or feel strongly
that they have no voice in traditional democratic politics, it seems important to
acknowledge these sentiments rather than subsume them. Appiah has recently argued
(2016) that the mythology of the ‘romantic’ state was the idea of ‘one people’ and that
this idea is a simple ideal to coalesce diverse people. The modern liberal state has an equivalent mantra of ‘we shall work it out together’. This is harder to get passionate about. It is hard to gain affective commitment to the common liberal project given its complexity. What is being argued here is that it is very important to develop feelings of affection for the liberal nation. The suggestion is not to replace these sub or transnational affective affiliations. And, indeed it is worth noting that not every citizen has - or indeed should have - affective affiliations for a specific sub national community either. The suggestion is to overcome feelings of alienation or cynicism, however, with a feeling of genuine efficacy. And what is being argued is that, currently, national level decisions are still highly important and where we exercise our democratic rights. Decisions taken at the national level are critically important and these national level decisions affect us all, and other nations around the world. Empirical evidence points to two worrying phenomena as discussed above. The first is the increase in emotionally potent forms of ethnic and exclusive national pride. The second points to a worrying disconnect between large numbers of citizens and their national community and its political institutions in many liberal democracies along with scepticism about citizens’ levels of genuine influence on political outcomes. What will be argued here is that caring deeply about one’s national community, as well as believing that one has efficacy in shaping decisions about its future, are two critical ingredients that civic education in most liberal education systems do not currently provide.

This is not unproblematic of course. What, for example, is one being encouraged to love at the national level when the idea of a national community is not clear or straightforward in our increasingly diverse liberal democracies? How can one be taught to believe that one has efficacy at a national level, especially if one is a member of a
minority or economically disadvantaged group that believes it has not been well served by the national democratic institutions? And a critical question is how teaching children to love their country can remain an essentially liberal enterprise with outcomes that serve the future of liberal democracy?

These questions are at the heart of this philosophical inquiry. The aim is to step back from the currently non-ideal situation and to examine concepts at more abstract level in order to arrive at some principles for effective citizenship education in liberal democracies. These principles are developed and discussed in relation to some historical context, contemporary education policy and school conditions, especially in developed liberal democracies and especially England at that. There is also discussion of education policy and schooling in contexts where liberal democracy is under threat or is being newly established in challenging conditions in order to test the universality of the principles being proposed. My aim is normative; I am interested in drawing up a case for how we ought to act and what sorts of education systems we ought to develop when we live in liberal democracies whose flourishing is under threat or could be enhanced. The thesis arrives at a proposal for patriotic education that highlights our shared fate in a common project that really matters to us as individuals and for our smaller communities, our national community and at a global level. This patriotic education does not replace education that encourages citizens to be cosmopolitan, ethical members of a global community. It does, however, explicitly, develop knowledge and understanding of the importance of our essentially diverse national community and nurtures a love of that national community which involve citizens in understanding, valuing and upholding the very best of liberal democratic principles and practices within the context of a shared, interpretative national project. Liberal national sentiment should
be engendered that finds expression in enhanced commitment to democratic participation, accountability and deliberation. This patriotism should also find expression in a national project that reflects the content and character of the national community itself and sees this process as a collective act involving interpretation in an open ended, generous, imaginative and critical way. The advocacy of this national-cultural dialogue is explicit about the fact that any liberal democratic nation’s cultures and identities are inevitably and necessarily forged through deliberation, dissent, compromise, rejection of some practices, assimilation of minority groups and integration of ethnic groups. It is also explicit that, over time, there will be adoption of some immigrant values, practices and influences on the national language and culture. Modern English, for example, owes much of its substance to the influence of Germanic tribes, the Angles and Saxons, migrating to England in the 5th and 7th centuries. The Huguenots were part of an 18th century wave of French Protestant immigration that ‘transformed London’ (Tonkin, 2015). And, of course, there are many more examples of this kind. Human migration began over two million years ago and is unlikely to stop any time soon.

In this nuanced version of liberal patriotism as a national dialogue, migration and diversity are understood as a welcome inevitabilities and are to be critically embraced in the shaping of the nation’s shared fate. Citizens’ feelings towards and interests in the outcomes of democratic deliberation and dialogue will give this project some vital force.

How I address the argument

The argument is developed incrementally, chapter by chapter. In the first chapter, it is established that there is a case to be made for more patriotic education in state education.
within the UK given the limitations of previous citizenship curricula. This initial chapter focuses in some substantial detail on previous and recent attempts to develop a national citizenship programme in state schooling in the UK through an examination of education policy over the last 25 years. The UK approach to democratic citizenship education is contrasted to some other established liberal democratic contexts. The chapter concludes that successive British governments, from each side of the political spectrum, have missed an opportunity to develop the most efficacious citizenship programme and that an explicit patriotic, interpretative dimension to national identity would enhance state education – and engage previously alienated sub national or minority groups, for example. There is a case to be made for improved citizenship education in the UK and it is proposed that a more explicit progressive patriotic dimension to it will enhance this provision.

Next, a number of key definitional and conceptual terms are clarified and various arguments tested for their validity before outlining the normative case for progressive patriotic education. Patriotism is defined in the second chapter given the fact that patriotic education is being advocated in liberal democratic schooling, it is important to clarify what is meant by the term. This chapter explores the core definition of ‘love of country’ to assess its relevance for the purposes of this thesis. Alternative and more qualified definitions of patriotism are examined. The chapter concludes that the core definition - love of country - is adequate for the purposes here. Chapter Three tests the

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5 As it relates to England in particular for the purpose of this analysis
claim that a more patriotic citizenry will better support the maintenance and flourishing of liberal democracy. The chapter concludes that national affiliation has always bolstered liberal democracy and that there is a strong instrumental argument that can be made for further enhancing national sentiment. Patriotism, when harnessed to self-governing virtues, can invigorate liberal democratic states and it is concluded that, thriving liberal democracies depend upon a patriotic citizenry.

Chapter Four explores the particular kind of patriotism that contributes best to liberal democratic flourishing. A version of patriotism is defended that encourages different groups to give expression to their distinctiveness and takes the form of a practice: a public dialogue of deliberation. This national dialogue is essentially and necessarily informed by liberal principles. Citizens of liberal democracies, au fond, share membership of a political community defined by liberal civic values and practices. The patriotic dimension of this national interpretive project ensures that citizens are deeply committed to maintaining and shaping, the national context of their shared fate. Chapter Five defines liberal education and examines a number of claims that suggest it is incompatible with patriotic education. The claims that patriotic education is necessarily indoctrinatory, distorted, and anti-cosmopolitan are examined and defeated. The suggestion that, given the reasonable, contested value of patriotism it should be taught as a controversial subject is also found wanting. This chapter concludes by defeating these arguments and affirming its compatibility with liberal education. Thus far, the compatibility of liberal democracy and patriotism is established, as is the compatibility of liberal and patriotic education. It is concluded that there is a case for enhancing patriotic education within liberal democracies, and in fact, there is some necessity for doing so.
Given that the instrumental case is the strongest argument for enhancing patriotic education, there is an examination of patriotic education in more urgent liberal democratic national contexts. The claim that patriotic education may be more suitable or appropriate in post conflict or otherwise fragile democratic contexts is examined. The assumption behind this claim is that it may be necessary to strengthen national solidarity as a precursor to achieving the desired liberal ends in nascent or fragile contexts. Nation-building education policies are examined in a number of post-conflict, emerging liberal democracies, namely, in Croatia, Lithuania and Lebanon. The conclusion of this examination is that patriotic education in fragile liberal democracies is best conceived of as a deliberative, open-ended democratic project where national identity is construed as sharing national fate rather than a more singular cultural or ethnic identity. Even though the case for strengthening national solidarity in these contexts may be urgent, there are no grounds upon which short term, and arguably illiberal, patriotic means serve this context better. In fact, it is concluded, that this approach may inflict long-term damage on emergent democracies, as well as in more established liberal democracies (the UK and USA) seen as under various threats. Chapter Seven sets out a normative case for patriotic education in liberal democracies. Its necessity is reiterated and a series of recommendations at level of principle and practice are made. This chapter provides a defence of patriotic education within established liberal democratic contexts, outlining how affective national affiliation can be engendered through an expansive cultural dialogue, which enhances liberal democratic virtues, deliberative abilities and is simultaneously critical, imaginative and generous. It concludes by making the case that this nuanced version of progressive patriotic education is necessary and worthwhile in all liberal democratic contexts.
The thesis concludes with a proposal for patriotic education that highlights our shared national fate in a common project that really matters to us. Rather than replacing education that encourages citizens to be cosmopolitan, ethical members of a global community, this proposal enhances the likelihood of more just national, as well as sub and cross national, communities. Progressive patriotic education explicitly develops knowledge and understanding of the importance of our essentially diverse national community and nurtures a love of that national community which involves citizens in understanding, valuing and upholding the very best of liberal democratic principles and practices within the context of a shared, interpretative national project. Liberal national sentiment should be engendered that finds expression in enhanced commitment to democratic participation, accountability and deliberation. This patriotism should also find expression in a national project that reflects the content and character of the national community itself and sees this process as a collective act involving interpretation in an open ended, generous, imaginative and critical way. The advocacy of this national-cultural dialogue is explicit about the fact that any liberal democratic nation’s cultures and identities are inevitably and necessarily forged through deliberation, dissent, compromise, rejection of some practices, assimilation of minority groups, integration of ethnic groups and - over time - the wholesale adoption of some immigrant values and practices. In this nuanced version of liberal patriotism as a national dialogue, diversity is understood as a welcome inevitability and is to be critically embraced in the shaping of the nation’s shared fate. Citizens’ deep feelings towards and interests in the outcomes of democratic deliberation and dialogue will give this project vital force.
In recent decades in the UK Citizenship education policy has stopped short of explicitly promoting patriotism. Since 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government issued guidance to schools requiring British values be respected but no suggestion that they needed to be explicitly encouraged. Within the last two years, however, it has become a requirement that all schools in Britain actively promote British values. The stronger obligation to foster British values came from the, then, Education Secretary Michael Gove. It was partly due to his concerns about allegations that some Birmingham schools, who had recently become academies and therefore freed from some governmental scrutiny and accountability, had been infiltrated by ‘ideologues and zealots aiming to promote a strand of Sunni Islam and who were antipathetic to the beliefs of anyone outside their circle’ (Muir, 2014). This became an infamous and controversial case known as the Trojan Horse affair and the Education Secretary came under considerable criticism for his handling of it. An inquiry did, nonetheless, find that there was some cause for concern whilst the more extreme allegations were disproven. Peter Clarke, the inquiry report’s author suggested that the investigation found there to be:

No evidence to suggest that there is a problem with governance generally nor any evidence of terrorism, radicalisation or violent extremism in the schools of concern in Birmingham, but there was evidence that there are a number of people, associated with each other and in positions of influence in schools and governing bodies, who espouse, sympathise with or fail to challenge extremist views (Clarke, 2014).

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6 As it relates to England in particular for the purpose of this analysis
A more recent study, (Mogra, 2016) set out to investigate the frequency. This study shows evidence of some aspects of the affair being exploited for political purposes and a certain amount of distorted targeting of a segment of the Muslim community for political purposes. Mogra’s conclusions do however echo those of Clarke above; as he says here:

The findings show an absence of a systematic and coordinated plot to take over these schools and of any concerted and deliberate plot to promote radicalisation and violent extremism of Muslim children in these schools or elsewhere. However, the reports did find a coordinated, deliberate and sustained action, carried out by a few associated individuals, to introduce an intolerant and aggressive Islamic ethos into a few schools in Birmingham [...] Importantly, if nothing else, the affair has highlighted the imperative of providing a broad and balanced curriculum – however this is conceptualised – which is rich, imaginative and gives a wide range of experiences both inside and outside of school to young Muslims (p.462).

As a result of this affair, along with wider concerns about countering extremism in British schools⁷, and wider concern about decline in societal cohesion, there have been additions to the Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural (SMSC) development standard set out in the Education Regulations. These are intended to ensure that schools: ‘encourage pupils to respect specified fundamental British values; do not promote extremist views, or partisan political views, through their curriculum and/or teaching, and offer pupils a balanced presentation of views when political issues are brought to their attention.’ (DfE, 2014, p.4).

Wider concern about societal cohesion and, in the words of David Cameron the UK Prime Minister (2010-2016), ‘a slow-motion moral collapse’ led to developments in

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⁷ As evidenced in the HM Government’s report ‘Countering Extremism Strategy’, October 2015
what has been termed character education (Arthur et al, 2015 p.8). The call for character building in UK schools increased in 2011 as riots took place in many parts of the country. David Cameron claimed that people ‘showing indifference to right and wrong’ and having ‘a twisted moral code’ caused the riots. He mentioned schools as part of a solution to counter this ‘slow-motion moral collapse’ (ibid.). Cameron’s former Director of Policy, James O’Shaughnessy, drew on the work of the newly formed Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, at Birmingham University, for policy guidance on curriculum guidance for schools on character education. The Jubilee Centre was formed in 2012 by Professor James Arthur, who aimed to set up an interdisciplinary research centre with a focus on practical impact in relation to promoting a healthier society. As he says here:

A key conviction underlying the existence of the Centre is that the virtues that make up good character can be learnt and taught. We believe these have largely been neglected in schools and in the professions. It is also a key conviction that the more people exhibit good character and virtues, the healthier our society. As such, the Centre undertakes development projects seeking to promote the practical applications of its research evidence (Arthur et al, 2015 p.2).

Its inauguration, and name, was linked to the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth II, thereby giving it clear association with notions of national unity and patriotism. The substance of its research, policy and curriculum recommendations, however, has so far stopped short of promoting patriotism explicitly. The focus was clearly on reviving good character understood in Aristotelian terms as: ‘moral virtues such as honesty and kindness, civic virtues such as community service, intellectual virtues such as curiosity and creativity, and performance virtues such as diligence and perseverance’ (ibid. p.4). The promotion of these virtues were echoed by James O’Shaughnessy, Cameron’s
Director of Policy, when he participated in a round table discussion on developing character education in the UK. He described it as, ‘a set of strengths or virtues that individuals can develop which contribute to leading a happy and successful life with four component sets of virtues namely intellectual, performance, moral and civic’ (EIF, 2014, p.1). And by 2014, there was a broad cross-party consensus on the inclusion of character education in schools. The then Labour Shadow Education Secretary Tristram Hunt commented that character can and should be taught in schools (2014). He argued that character and resilience are vital components of a rounded education and good preparation for a career. In the summer of 2014, the Conservative Secretary of State for Education Nicky Morgan said that ‘for too long there has been a false choice between academic standards and activities that build character and resilience’, which she said, ‘should go hand in hand’ (cited in Arthur et al, 2015 p.8). The cross party consensus welcomed character education, understood as including a broad range of educational approaches such as whole child education, social-emotional learning, and civic education, as a response to perceived threats to societal values and cohesion.

Citizenship education\textsuperscript{8} policy in England, over recent decades, has responded in various ways to the perceived threats and challenges to liberal democratic values and practices. Successive Conservative, Labour and Coalition governments have introduced education policy that has both reflected their respective political views and responded to a number of external demands by increasingly emphasising a shared British identity or adherence to British values of some sort, along with an education that teaches the principles and practices of good character within democratic societies. This chapter provides an overview of a number of government reports and subsequent policies aimed at

\textsuperscript{8}Citizenship education is a term used throughout the thesis to include civic and relevant aspects of character education
educating future English citizens. It shows that policies took various forms in the light of the circumstances each government worked within and reflected ideological differences in relation to the extent or nature of state intervention in crafting future citizens in liberal democracies. All policies wrestled with the challenges of how to encourage healthy levels of public participation in an increasingly diverse society, alongside the evidence of growing levels of alienation from many forms of public life. Responses have tended towards the traditionally minimalist view whilst others have been more interventionist in terms of promoting a common civic morality. And some have been a mix of the two.

None of these policies, it is argued here, has responded adequately to the needs of liberal democracy in modern Britain. The recent publication (DfE, 2010) of an extensive eight-year longitudinal study on the nature and impact of citizenship education in England and Wales reported that, despite more than ten years of mandatory citizenship education in state schools, some potentially disturbing attitudes are reported, for example:

Attitudes towards equality and society have hardened with age: over time, the cohort have become less liberal and more conservative particularly in their attitudes towards refugees and immigrants, but also in their attitudes towards jail sentences, benefit payments, and some environmental policies. [...] Citizenship attachments have weakened with age: there has been a gradual and steady weakening of the cohort’s attachment to their communities (be they local or national or European) [...] and distrust in politicians has increased (p.8).

And whilst the evidence from this is not entirely negative, for example the cohort has reported that it has become markedly more supportive about human rights and women’s
rights, it is evident that ‘as these youngsters approached adulthood they were still only moderately likely to feel that they, as individuals, could influence the political and social institutions that shape their lives’ (ibid.). Levels of alienation from national democratic life are still high. The recent European Union referendum (June 2016) voter turnout reflected moderately healthy levels of political participation amongst the young but they still lagged behind older age groups. As a London School of Economics study revealed:

The results found that 64% of those young people who were registered did vote, rising to 65% among 25-to-39-year-olds and 66% among those aged between 40 and 54. It increased to 74% among the 55-to-64 age group and 90% for those aged 65 and over (Bruter et al, 2016).

Current citizenship education in the UK has not adequately equipped the young for participation in their evolving and complex modern liberal democracy. The chapter concludes that the recent focus on promoting common national values, which has been coupled with an emphasis on character education and enhancing political literacy, is an inadequate response to both the needs of individuals and the needs of liberal democratic societies in the current world. It also determines that, whilst previous policies came much closer to a full and adequate approach to citizenship education, none has harnessed the important dimension of nourishing affective affiliations to the national community. This factor, it is argued throughout the thesis, is what is needed to give vital force to liberal democracies as they continue to evolve.

Citizenship education: a contingent concept and contested terrain
There is a strong, and complex, relationship between the notion of citizenship, civic education, government policy and the wider socio-political context. As Kerr (2003, p.2) states:

Citizenship is a contested concept. Indeed, Davies (1999) has counted over 300 known definitions of democracy associated with citizenship education. At the heart of the contest are differing views about the function and organisation of society. The periodic redefinition of citizenship education is a by-product of a much larger, wide-ranging debate concerning the changing nature of citizenship in modern society and the role of education within that society.

The political responses to what citizenship education should comprise in England are no exception. Although there is a broad agreement that citizenship education should be part of young peoples’ schooling, there is no such agreement about its purpose. As Wolmuth argues: ‘The aims of citizenship education are essentially contested because the concept of citizenship is definitively bound up with our vision of society and individuals’ relationships with it’ (2007, p.1). At one end of the spectrum there are some Conservatives who believe that ‘Liberalism is a theory about the rightful limits of state power, not about content of education for children’ (Feinberg, 1990, p.88) and at the other end of this spectrum, in some Labour policy, those who believe that citizenship education should involve a comprehensive doctrine outlining an agreed civic morality. And, some aspects of Labour policy aimed to create a critically engaged citizenry that would actively reshape society and notions of Britishness. The debates about civic education have been vigorous throughout recent decades and especially after the introduction of the National Curriculum for England and Wales in 1988.
McLaughlin (1992) distinguishes between a ‘minimal’ and ‘maximal’ conception of citizenship somewhat along the lines outlined above. On the ‘minimal’ view, citizenship education is focused on providing information, for example, about the legal and political system and the ‘development of virtues of local and immediate focus’ – such as those relating to voluntary activity (ibid. p.237). In contrast, the ‘maximal’ interpretation of citizenship education ‘requires the development of a critical understanding of societal structures and processes, in order that they might be questioned, and ‘virtues’ that would empower students to change them’ (ibid. p.238). These maximal and minimal conceptions do not, however, map neatly on to the differing political ideologies and philosophical traditions. It might be expected, for example, that the various Conservative governments would align more readily to the minimal conception of citizenship education. Culturally, in this country there has been ‘a strong conviction that government-run civic education would be a dangerous threat to the freedom of the individual and here the Protestant tradition of dissenting was no doubt strongly influential’ (Citizenship Foundation, p.1). This Protestant tradition of limiting state intervention has been reflected in state education policies since it began in England and arguably some nervousness about the wide scope or central control of civic values remains intact. However, Conservative governments from 1979-1997, for example, oversaw the introduction of the highest levels of centralising education policy in the UK, with the introduction of the National Curriculum and much more centralised testing regimes. And, arguably, the statutory requirement to promote British values introduced in 2014, shows high levels of state intervention in education. These cannot be described as ‘maximal’ in the way McLaughlin defines this above. They are better categorised as highly interventionist. And likewise, where one might expect a Labour government, with its traditions in communitarianism and the core values of collective responsibility
within the English socialist, democratic tradition, to oversee more maximal versions of
citizenship education, in fact, they too could be described as interventionist, rather than
maximal in the way McLaughlin intends it. Maximal citizenship education involves
explicitly enabling the young to question current institutional power structures and it is
not clear that Labour’s education policy was designed to achieve this.

Several commentators argue that the 1997 citizenship agenda remains firmly in
McLaughlin’s minimalist citizenship category and does not advocate a more radical
transformative agenda. Although, importantly, McLaughlin himself, whilst
acknowledging that the official curriculum documents relating to earlier attempts to
introduce citizenship education in schools (1991) tended to interpret citizenship in
‘minimalist ways’ stated that the Crick Report ‘does contain evidence of ‘maximal’ or
‘active’ elements’ (McLaughlin, 2000, p.550). This combination of minimal and (some)
maximal elements was partly a result of a new set of principles adopted by the Labour
leadership. The Labour government of 1997, under Tony Blair’s leadership, loosened its
ties with its socialist past and claimed to be carving a new ideology. New Labour, as it
described itself, characterised the relation between citizens and the state in what became
commonly referred to as the ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 1998). The citizenship agenda was
characterised by the importance of the civic responsibilities of the individual in partnership with the state. The new Labour Government urged individuals to act as
caring people aware of the needs and views of others and motivated to contribute positively to wider society. This new approach has been criticised by some
commentators (e.g. Ball, 2007; Cunningham and Lavalette, 2004) suggesting that the
‘Third Way’ political discourse leaves the structure of society uninterrogated and is
thereby devoid of important, critical maximal elements of citizenship education.
Overall, then, the policy responses of recent decades have contained elements of both minimal and interventionist (rather than strictly maximal) features and some aspects of civic education policy has contained evidence of what McLaughlin describes as the maximal critical dimensions of citizenship education.

What all governments have in common is that each has explicitly aimed to define or redefine citizenship given the challenges in modern liberal democracies. These challenges arise from the fact that we live in increasingly socially and culturally diverse communities given the era of mass immigration and a global economy, which encourages new international or transnational kinds of citizenship. An increasingly interdependent world gives rise to new forms of economic social rights which may cross national borders and has enlarged aspects of democratic participation and legal accountability, for example, the European Union\(^9\), too. There is evidence from many established liberal democracies that there is an increasing breakdown of political trust and the traditional respect for representative democracy. There has been a rise of populism and anti-establishment movement as a response to growing inequalities and a real sense of disempowerment from large sectors of the population.

Starkey and Osler (2006, p.5) set out a broad framework for the context of the citizenship debate and include the fact that ‘there is, internationally, a broad recognition of a need to address through education the challenges presented by continuing injustice and inequalities in the word expressed, for example, in the initiative to set up the UN Decade for Human Rights Education (UN, 1994)’. On a more local scale a study into

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\(^9\) At the time of writing, whilst Article 50 has since been triggered post the EU referendum the UK remains legally a member of the EU at this point (September 2017)
the state of democracy in Britain over the last decade (The Guardian, 2012) warns it is in ‘long-term terminal decline’ due to rise in corporate power and as such politicians become less representative of their constituencies. The changing nature of work and ways in which families live have loosened and changed the nature of more traditional family bonds. Growing forms of social media are changing the way we interact and participate in communities. The list could go on. Social fragmentation has many root causes and is changing the way we interact and participate – or do not participate - politically. As Starkey and Osler suggest (op. cit. p.2):

In both established democracies and newly established democratic states, such as those of Eastern and Central Europe and Latin America, there is a recognition that democracy is essentially fragile and that it depends on the active engagement of citizens, not just in voting, but in developing and participating in sustainable and cohesive communities.

And, David Kerr agrees suggesting that at the national, political level much of the concern about declining forms of stable citizenship focuses on concerns that national societies are threatened by the ‘decline in traditional forms of civic cohesion: which has been termed a democratic deficit’ (2000, p.4). And he adds:

This was supported by increasing calls for action to address the worrying signs of alienation and cynicism among young people about public life and participation, leading to their possible disconnection and disengagement with it. Such signs are apparent in a number of industrialised nations across the world (ibid. p. 3).

It is worth noting here that whilst the facts of some declining participation in the formal aspects of public life are indisputable, there are those who question its extent and nature,
as well as the fact it is used to justify certain citizenship agenda. Cunningham and Lavalette (2004), for example, suggest that reports of declining participation casts the young as alienated rather than society as in need of reform. And, Stephen Ball (2007) for example, questioned some of the evidence presented to justify the approach to citizenship education, post 1998, suggesting that it had was selected to suit the ‘Third Way’ political discourse which leaves society’s main structures unquestioned. Recent high levels of participation in demonstrations across Britain attest to fairly high levels of youth engagement in demonstrating against aspects of government policy past and present (for example, the rise of Momentum, demonstrations post EU referendum results; demonstrations post publication of Chilcott Inquiry\(^\text{10}\)).

But, what is clearly indisputable is that liberal democratic citizens and governments are facing a number of real challenges and that commentators debating aspects of citizenship education are suggesting that some are in need of review. And, as was suggested at the outset of this chapter, citizenship education will always be contingent, contested and evolving. This has been the case since the thinking of those who have pioneered mass public education in the UK. In the nineteenth century, before the 1870 Education Act, ‘education reformers establishing local schools for the children of the working classes were generally clear that part of their aim was to instil a moral sense of responsibility as well as to teach basic skills. The Bible was often used as a basic literacy reader for this reason.’ (The Citizenship Foundation, Birkbeck, 2010, p.1).

\(^\text{10}\) ‘Momentum’ was formed as the successor to the campaign to get Jeremy Corbyn elected as leader of the Labour Party. It aims to transform Labour into a more ‘membership-led’ party (http://www.peoplesmomentum.com): July 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) 2016, mass protest in London at the referendum result. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2016/jul/02/brexit-news-live-thousands-march-for-europe-in-post-referendum-protest: July 6\(^{\text{th}}\) 2016 after the publication of the Chilcott Inquiry into the Iraq War there were protests, blockades and walk outs (http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/stop-the-war-bliar-protest-chilcot-report_uk_577cd697e4b0e9460801b6ea)
Political traditions dating back to Greek and Roman conceptions of citizenship as ‘involvement in public affairs’ have had some influence on curriculum developments and education policy for at least two centuries in this country (QCA, 1998, p.10). And, whilst the Victorian stress on educating the majority of the population for servile obedience to its leaders has been replaced by a ‘thoroughly modern discourse based on full legal and political equality for all’ (The Citizenship Foundation, Birkbeck, 2010, p.1) there remain live debates about the purpose, nature and scope of citizenship education.

Kerr relatively recently identified four themes in need of stronger emphasis in modern civic education emerging from an international review, namely: ‘rights and responsibilities; access; belonging and other identities’ (2000, p.3). These four dimensions are clearly inextricably linked and have been dubbed by some commentators as the 'new dimensions' of citizenship, which are in most need of redefinition (ibid.). It is not a straightforward enterprise and it is not the intention of this thesis to imply that it is easy. Clearly there are tensions in marrying the demands of liberal principles with the need to educate the young in relation to these principles. Liberal societies need good outcomes of citizenship education, whatever form it takes; but good liberal societies cannot dictate these outcomes. Eamonn Callan describes the challenges facing liberal democratic education policy makers well:

A necessary feature of free societies is the extension of a particular set of rights to all citizens, including rights to liberty, association, and political participation. But so far as citizens use their rights to protect or advance the different ways of life they cherish, any such society is also pluralistic in ways that may pose a threat to liberal democracy. If the role of state education is to keep faith with its constitutive morality, a path must be found between the horns of this dilemma (1997, p.9).
The rest of this chapter continues by providing some historical context for civic education policy from the 1960s onwards, including commentary on the significance of racial rejectionism and Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, the rise of the New Right with its one nation agenda built on ‘colour-blindness’, the response of the Left in proposing alternative narratives of English nationalism and a discussion of the role of the popular press in defining ‘common sense’ notions of patriotism. The chapter then proceeds by exploring the ways in which citizenship education policy over the last three decades in England has managed the dilemma Callan articulates and the twin goals of promoting universal liberal virtues with an adequately robust conception of national civic membership.

Some historical context to the civic education agenda

*The rise of ‘racial rejectionism’ of the 1960s*

Britain’s population has included many settlers from around the world across the centuries and recent decades. For example, before the Second World War, there were significant communities of migrant Irish and Jewish settlers. After the war, people from the Caribbean and Indian sub continent became the largest groups of settlers, invited as they were by the government given the pressing needs of the labour market in the UK. For the first time in UK history, being ‘non-white’ became a marker of one’s immigrant status (Bonnet, 1993, p.17). The non-white skin marker of one’s immigrant status arguably heightened problems associated with immigrant integration, for both locals and the new arrivals themselves. As William Deedes, Minister in the Conservative government that introduced the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1962 stated many years after the Act became law:
The Bill’s real purpose was to restrict the influx of coloured immigrants. We were reluctant to say as much openly. So the restrictions were applied to coloured and white citizens in all Commonwealth countries – though everybody recognised that immigration from Canada, Australia and New Zealand formed no part of the problem (Deedes, 1968, p.10).

Alastair Bonnet (1993) argues that an ideology of ‘racial rejectionism’ in Britain was on the rise in the 1960s and was given coherent expression by the Conservative Member of Parliament Enoch Powell. Powell’s infamous *Rivers of Blood* speech at a meeting of the Conservative Political Centre in Birmingham, UK, 1968, caused some political uproar and led to his dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet by the Conservative leader, Edward Heath and ultimately led to Powell’s marginalisation from mainstream politics. However, his ideas took hold in popularising the ‘anti-Black’ stance to immigration in parts of the population as Powell positioned himself as ‘he, and he alone, was speaking for, and to, an objective, coherent subject; the ordinary Briton’ (Bonnet, 1993, p.21). This extract gives the essence of his message:

In this country in fifteen or twenty years’ time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man. I can already hear the chorus of execration. How dare I say such a horrible thing? How dare I stir up trouble and inflame feelings by repeating such a conversation? [...] We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependents, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre [...] As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see “the River Tiber foaming with much blood” (Powell, 1968).

Powell’s ‘racial rejectionist’ themes were not especially original and articulated well-established nationalistic and racial themes within a reasonably recognisable vision of a so-called authentic British/white experience. His contribution, as Bonnet (1993) argues
however, was to set this construction of the British white against the ‘equally well-worn notion of immorality and disorderliness of the ‘non-British’ and the ‘non-white’ (p.21). Powell became a defining politician of the Right after 1968 and the theme of racial rejectionism in relation to the immigrant population found expression, not least in the popular press, and in the form of government policy after 1970 when Heath became Prime Minister. A new immigrant act in 1971, for example, reduced primary immigration from India, Pakistan and the Caribbean to ‘a trickle’ (Bonnet, 1993, p.16) and government immigration policy was disguised, if only thinly, behind what has been described as a façade of ‘colour-blindness’. (We shall return to a more nuanced version of colour-blindness below). Echoes of Powell’s racial rejectionism live on – as does the mobilising myth of the white British bloodline. A recent Daily Mail article (Cohen, 2016) stated that ‘in 2014 Nigel Farage said that the basic principle behind Enoch Powell’s notorious speech was right’.

The rise of the New Right

Enoch Powell was one of the first politicians on the New Right, as it came to be called. The rise of the New Right was characterised by the replacement of the Conservative’s traditional ‘one nation’ ideology with an ideology characterised by individualism, belief in a free economy with a strong state and some traditional sources of authority, for example, traditional family, traditional approaches to morality and support for a national culture rather than multiculturalism. New Right thinking grew in significance within the Conservative party under Margaret Thatcher after her election victory in 1979 and became consolidated after her second election victory in 1983, coming as it did just after the Falkland’s War in 1982. Its significance for the civic education context is the way in which the post war consensus over Britain as a One Nation community with (a
broadly) shared commitment to the expansion of the welfare state, full employment and improvements in health and housing as responsibilities of the state came to an end. Thatcher in 1978 argued that there was something ‘natural’ about the British way of life in stark contrast to being ‘swamped’ by immigrant peoples who were set to destabilise the existing commonalities between British people (Nayak, 2003, p.156). The national agenda was defined more along lines of a strong market economy alongside more, arguably, backward-looking notions of British culture and nationhood defined in terms of its imperial past and with foundations on a definition of Britishness based on an appreciation of common historical roots and ‘natural’ bonds (Sherman 1979). These ideas were prevalent and promoted by New Right think tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs, The Adam Smith Institute and The Centre for Policy Studies and their significance grew throughout the 1970s.

However, it was the Falklands War of 1982 that significantly paved the way for Margaret Thatcher to enact the New Right ideological reforms. Some commentators have categorised Thatcher’s handling of the Falklands war as a ‘lucky gamble’ (Badsey et al, 2005 and Jenkins, 2012) and even Thatcher herself admits in her memoirs that she would not have been re-elected for a second term without it (Jenkins, 2013). Her first administration was in some trouble after only three years in office. As Jenkins states here:

> After fewer than three years in office, Thatcher had achieved little beyond tax cuts for the rich and spending cuts for the poor. Cabinet colleagues were in open revolt and the new

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11. There has been some debate about the extent of this consensus and there were clearly important policy differences between the parties. However, for the purposes of comparison with what followed, it is a useful description of the Conservative party thinking as part of the post war consensus that prevailed largely up to the late 1960s.
Social Democrats were experiencing the strongest third party surge in half a century (2012, p.1).

Many of her closest advisers, including her then Secretary of State, John Nott, counselled caution about invasion to recapture the Falkland Islands after the new Argentinian junta’s forces, under General Galtieri, had captured them in April 1982. However, it was the last minute and strategic intervention by the head of navy, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, that changed her mind. He suggested that he could recapture the islands in a very ‘gung-ho way, which appealed to Thatcher’ (Jenkins, 2012, p.2). The sub text was that Leach was apparently determined to fight navy cuts being imposed by John Nott.

After the victory, a much more confident Thatcher felt licensed to implement the new right ideology that became known as Thatcherism. She would often invoke the Falklands spirit as she did this. As she states here at a Conservative rally (Thatcher, 1982a):

> We have ceased to be a nation in retreat. We have instead a new found confidence - born in the economic battles at home and tested and found true 8,000 miles away … And so today we can rejoice at our success in the Falklands and take pride in the achievement of our task force. But we do so, not as at some flickering flame which might soon be dead. No – we rejoice that Britain has rekindled that spirit which has fired her for generations past and which today has begun to burn as brightly as before.

Her speech at the Conservative party conference in the same year included the phrase: ‘It has been said that we surprised the world, that British patriotism was rediscovered in those spring days’ (Thatcher 1982b). It was a particular kind of patriotism, arguably built on - and ‘stalling’ - the end of a long period of post imperial decline in Britain. Arguably, the Falklands war contributed to the fact that British governments have become much more ready to intervene globally and are often ‘ready to punch above their weight’
(Jenkins, 2012). A narrative of a plucky island reunited with its mighty imperial past was reignited. There was an emboldened sense of restoring a more traditional nation of national culture and a relatively explicit notion of Britishness as defined by what could be described as racial rejectionists. A Conservative election poster in 1983 raised a very interesting issue in relation to what it meant to be British and a member of a racial minority in post-1982 Britain. The poster shows a picture of a well-dressed, suited, young Afro-British male with the main caption “Labour Say He’s Black. Tories Say He’s British’. As Bonnet (1993) observes:

    The admission of the suited youth to Britishness is made on the understanding that he has accepted and internalised the kind of cultural clichés of what it is to be an authentic, ordinary Briton constructed by rejectionists. The law-abiding, decent, everyday kind of Britishness that was developed as a national image by Powell is offered both as a role model and the price of white tolerance (p.27).

However, this is something of a departure from the extremes of Powell’s mobilisation of the ‘race as defined by bloodline’ view. It implies that a kind of British colour-blind nationalism is possible so long as minority groups are prepared to become culturally British. Norman Tebbit’s ‘cricket test’ (1990) implies the same conditions. This colour-blindness though, strips away important notions, such as, narratives of oppression and important aspects of culture.

The kind of populist patriotism that Thatcherism invoked led to some responses from those on the Left of British politics. As Paul Rich notes:

12 Norman Tebbit’s (a Conservative MP) cricket test was simply ‘which side do you cheer for?’ Only if fans cheered for the English cricket team – and not, for example, India or the West Indies – were they ‘proper’ Britons.
For historians on the Left, there has been an additional task of trying to explain the unforeseen success of the Thatcher government in mobilising a populist patriotism, which many radicals educated at universities in the 1960s believed to be a dying phenomenon in British politics (1989, p.1).

Raphael Samuel, a socialist historian and founder of the History Workshop¹³, produced three volumes on patriotism (Samuel, 1989) deriving from a History Workshop symposia and were, as Samuel himself says, ‘born out of anger at the Falklands War, and consternation at the apparent failure of the anti War half … to assert itself’ (Vol. 1, preface). What was notable about Samuel’s interest in patriotism is that he rejected the notion that British, and more especially English, patriotism ‘is a pure invention of the ruling class as a part of a wider strategy of social control’ (Rich, 1989, p.2). The many essays within the three volumes create a picture of the making and unmaking of British identity (the subtitle of the volumes) and affirm the continuity of diversity of experience and identity within the British polity. The collection offers an image of England (there are limited essays on other parts of the UK) as a rich tapestry; a country made up of a wide range of different experience and sentiments. The volumes came under some criticism for not offering any theoretical analysis of patriotism or addressing the patriotic sentiment and phenomena explored in the extensive volumes in any way that was at all generalizable. However, what the volumes do – and did at the time – is to affirm patriotism as a legitimate subject of interest on the Left and offer a challenge to the limited notion of patriotism as constructed by the New Right and Thatcher’s government (with echoes that are alive and well today). And whilst Samuel et al do not

¹³ The History Workshop was founded in 1976 to bring the boundaries of history closer to people’s lives and make history a more democratic activity
espouse an abstract model of national identity, they do challenge the following view of national identity espoused by Thatcher as described by Smith (1994) here:

> Instead of proposing an abstract model of British society, the Thatcherites responded directly to popular concerns – including anxiety about race and sexuality – and constructed a new and yet already partially normalized common sense (p.28).

As noted above, references to British national identity and patriotism mask a distinction that is worth highlighting. Tom Nairn, for example, who has been described as ‘the intellectual godfather of modern Scottish nationalism’ (Maxwell, 2016) defends some kinds of nationalism against those who associate it with the Right but challenges the view that the English conception of nation is akin to the Scottish one. Nairn describes Scottish national as internationalist but definitely anti imperial, whereas English nationalism has always been associated with Empire (Nairn, 2016). (See Chapter 2 on further discussion of differences between English and Scottish nationalism). As the journalist Neal Ascherson writes in 2000: ‘The perception that Great Britain was a multinational state and not a united nation has never quite been lost over the centuries. But it was [Tom] who almost single-handedly hammered this truth into the skulls of British intellectuals and campaigners until it became - and is today – practically uncontested by the political class’ (Ascherson, 2000). In a recent interview on the implications of the British vote to exit European Union (Brexit) in June 2016, he gave his views on ‘Brexit as symptomatic of a deeper struggle about England’s place in the world, its national purpose and its identity’ (Maxwell, 2016). Nairn (2001) describes it thus:

> England has always been the problem in that sense. It has been too big for its boots since the day before it was born,
and now it faced with the problem of becoming just another nation, and assuming some kind of local, limited identity, which ends at the Scots Dyke, among other places, and they don’t know what to do about it. [...] Whole generations, one generation after another, have been brought up to believe that externally directed growth – The Empire! – was always the answer (p.2).

In an article entitled ‘Farewell Britannia’ written in 2001, Nairn comments on the growing recognition of Britain as a multi national state and those who hark back to notions of ‘Enoch Powell’s inscrutable mystery of Englishness that belongs is a museum of Social Anthropology’ (p.65) by suggesting that ‘Any new or negotiated Britain … has nothing to do with ethnicity. It is entirely a matter of politics and the altering character of statehood in the new post-Cold War world. To put it another way: it is entirely a matter of civic and constitutional nationalism, and not of ethnic, pseudo-ethnic, fake ethnic or (frankly) non-existent-ethnic national identify’ (ibid.).

The popular press and its contribution to ‘common sense’ notion of patriotism

The popular ‘common sense’ notion of patriotism that Nairn is railing against for its falsehood around ethnicity and its assumption that British denotes what is ultimately a very different phenomenon in Scotland (or indeed Wales and Northern Ireland), has undoubtedly been fuelled by the popular press over the years. The ‘naturalisation’ of certain forms of popular patriotism, and the explicit attempt to characterise immigrants as ‘the other’ and to be feared, that characterised the Thatcherite era, is a message that has certainly been promulgated in certain parts of the popular press. The most notable examples of newspapers communicating this message are, for example, The Daily Mail and The Daily Express. This sample of Daily Mail headlines gives a flavour of a typical message about immigration for example:
‘Asylum: you’re right to worry’ (7/2/2005) [...] ‘There are too many immigrants’ (14/12/14) [...] ‘The swarm on our streets’ (31/7/15) [...] ‘Enemies of the people’ (4/11/16) [the picture of the judges that was very similar to one from Nazi Germany] [...] ‘Britain’s broken borders’ [21/1/16].

*The Daily Express* has similar headlines, for example; ‘Immigrants bring more crime’ (17/4/2008) and ‘We must stop the immigrant invasion’ (9/6/13). Columnists such as Roger Scruton, Richard Littlejohn and Peter Hitchens have contributed to the newspapers above and articulated what can be described as a particular kind of narrow British (essentially English) patriotism. As Hitchens writes in the *Daily Mail* (2016):

> All Britain needs is patriotic leaders. [...] The only way out of the EU was to replace the Tories with a genuinely patriotic Conservative party that could win an election.

And Littlejohn in the Mail adds to these sentiments:

> The way patriotism is sneered at makes you ashamed to be British! [...] According to a new survey, just one-third of people say they are ‘very proud’ to be British. Whether or not that figure is accurate, or simply made up like most of the other ‘surveys’ which masquerade as news stories these days, it certainly speaks volumes about the prevailing mood. Even if people are patriotic, they are afraid to say so publicly for fear they will be howled down as ‘racists’ or ‘xenophobes’ or ‘Little Englanders’. The offensive smear ‘Little Englanders’ is especially relevant in this context. While Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalism is revered in fashionable circles, any indication of English patriotism is considered conclusive evidence of head-banging BNP sympathies (Littlejohn, 2014).

The anti-Muslin sentiment of many of these papers’ headlines is notorious too. They are, however, popular reads14 and whilst it difficult to ascertain the impact of their ideology

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14 According to recent statistics (March 2017) The *Daily Mail* has the second widest readership in the UK. The Sun has the largest.
and messages on popular votes, it is fair to say that they need to be taken into account in formulating any civic education programme - and in particular one that advocates progressive patriotism. Many existing civic education programmes (as outlined below) include the notion that the media should be scrutinised alongside a discussion of the idea that there should be freedom on the press, as well as alongside an understanding that there are laws prohibiting racism and so on.

Concluding the historical contextual discussion

The popular press and paper discussed above have certainly commented on the recent refugee crisis of 2015, which forms a new and significant backdrop to discussion of nation identity, patriotism and civic education. David Miller has recently published an important work entitled ‘Strangers in our Midst’ (2016) where he defends a just immigration policy whilst making an increasingly, needed, clear distinction between economic migrants and refugees. This recent book builds on his previous arguments (Miller, 1995 for example). He posits the view that being received into a country as a potential citizen does more than bestow benefits: it also imposes responsibilities. This view certainly echoes many of the sentiments of this thesis with some important differences in relation to a version of progressive patriotism proposed in Chapter Seven. This brief historical overview has set out some of the important contextual factors at work that shaped and informed the various manifestations of civic education over the last few decades.

Civic education 1970s to 1997
Global pressure on the economy exerted considerable influence over government policy in the 1970s and there was a marked shift to the right of the political spectrum. As George Monbiot argues in a recent article (*The Guardian*, April, 2016):

> Keynesian policies began to fall apart and economic crises struck on both sides of the Atlantic, neoliberal ideas began to enter the mainstream. As Friedman remarked, “when the time came that you had to change ... there was an alternative ready there to be picked up”. With the help of sympathetic journalists and political advisers, elements of neoliberalism, especially its prescriptions for monetary policy, were adopted by Jimmy Carter’s administration in the US and Jim Callaghan’s government in Britain.

And, whilst this shift to the right of the political spectrum in education policy is most often associated with Thatcherism, James Callaghan, the Labour Prime Minister from 1976-1979 had already launched a policy discussion, which prompted far greater governmental interest and intervention in education. As Sheldon, (2011, p.1) says here:

> The ‘Great Debate’ launched by Callaghan originated in global economic shifts which were by the late 1970s challenging the British economy and putting pressure on government revenues at a time when education was requiring considerable investment (the school leaving age had been raised in 1973 and university education had been expanded). As Callaghan made clear, ‘Public interest is strong and legitimate and will be satisfied. [...] Callaghan proposed a ‘core curriculum’ and ‘national standard of performance by schools in their use of public money’. Thus the era of public accountability in education was launched.

Once the Conservative government was elected in 1979, this era of public accountability became a reality. The government presided over the greatest levels of curriculum control ever seen in British state schooling. The National Curriculum
brought in by this same government in 1988, prescribed content and assessment procedures for most subjects at unprecedented levels of centralisation. But, in line with much neoliberal policy, the government simultaneously introduced policies reflecting the wider neoliberal agenda, which encouraged the primacy of market forces, greater private ownership and the privacy of consumer rights in all areas of life, including within education. So, greater individual choice, freedoms and privacy were framed within very high levels of accountability to the government.

In relation to civic education, the emphasis on was on ‘championing the individualism of the free market and placing the emphasis on the importance of civic obligation or active citizenship’ (Kerr, 2000, p.3). Given Thatcher’s famous remark that there is ‘no such thing as society’ it is unsurprising that the civic dimension of the curriculum was informed by the Conservative ideological emphasis on urging individuals to take up their civic responsibilities rather than leave it to the government to carry them out. As Margaret Thatcher said in an interview with Woman’s Own magazine in 1987:

[People] are casting their problems at society. And, you know, there's no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look after themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then, also, to look after our neighbours.

In contrast to the high levels of prescription in relation to other subjects, citizenship education remained at the level of a cross-curricular theme and its outcomes were integrated within wider aims or other subjects (HMSO, 1988). But this belied a fairly strong national identity-forming agenda through the History curriculum. In England it
can be safely argued that the Conservative political agenda has been pretty consistent in advocating a curriculum that, amongst many other things, instils pride in Britain’s heritage and achievements. As Sheldon (2011) argues:

Since 1988 the citizenship agenda was mostly confined to the History curriculum. The changing nature of Britain as a plural democracy has always been acknowledged within these Conservative curriculum prescriptions. However it would be accurate to say that the emphasis has remained on a core British identity that immigrants, as well as everyone else, have a responsibility to acknowledge and respect.

*History from 5 to 16*, published in 1988, argued for history in schools on the basis of its role in the ‘transmission of heritage and an appreciation of human achievements and aspirations’ (HMSO, 1988, pp.1-3). It also stressed the need to ensure students understood ‘the values of our society’ as well as learning about ‘the major issues and events in the history of their own country and of the world’ (*ibid*).

There are much fuller accounts of this fascinating period in British history than can be offered here (see for example, Slater, 1989, Lee, 1992). These discussions cover the fact that despite Margaret Thatcher’s efforts for a much more ideological ‘lionising Britain’ version of the history curriculum, in fact, a much more nuanced version came into being which preserved some elements of historical interpretation and, whilst British history dominated provision there were still considerable elements of world and European history that were also mandated. This compromise was not achieved easily but represented what might be described as a somewhat typically British pragmatic approach. The acknowledgement of this more moderate solution to the content and purposes of the history curriculum does not detract from characterising this period as
promoting a minimalist version of civic education, which was framed by a broad, interventionist agenda to instil pride in Britain. And whilst there are high levels of governmental intervention in the Conservative policy of this period, it cannot be described as a maximal approach to civic education in the sense that McLaughlin intended it. Certain things, including the nature of British identity, were not up for discussion. Overall, in this period, 1970-1997, schools were required to provide opportunities for civic education through ‘citizenship’ as a cross curricular theme but the subject did not have statutory status and was not formally assessed. History teaching was the main means by which a strengthened sense of common British identity was to be nurtured.

New Labour and citizenship education: 1997-2005

The Labour Government, when it came to power in 1997, fostered a different approach to citizenship itself and citizenship education with a much more significant emphasis on what might be described as civic morality. It was under the leadership of the Secretary of State for Education under Labour, David Blunkett that the citizenship education agenda was raised to new prominence in this period. He commissioned Bernard Crick to conduct a review and to set out new proposals for a renewed citizenship curriculum in state schools across England and Wales. The resulting report, commonly known as The Crick Report of 1998 (QCA, 1998), remains an important landmark in citizenship education in this country. From 2002, Citizenship became a compulsory subject in the National Curriculum to age 16. And this addition was one amongst many additions to the national education agenda, which Sheldon (2011) describes as,
the products of a ‘social’ education agenda. For instance, *Every Child Matters* was superimposed on the National Curriculum with an obligation that schools focus on five key broader aims for children (‘be healthy, stay safe, enjoy and achieve’, etc.) as well as delivering the curriculum.

The Labour government took the National Curriculum in the direction of various social purposes and increasingly responded to issues in society (such as declines in voting participation and youth crime) by locating new priorities within the school curriculum. However, it did so within the ‘Third Way’ ideology, which aimed to reframe the relationship between citizens and the state, by assuming an enhanced responsibility for citizens themselves, whilst retaining a progressive social democratic agenda. There were echoes of the previous Conservative agenda in so far as, (as Callan describes the 1980s’ government agenda) a ‘spirit of public service was needed to be invoked to offset some of the suffering and social dislocation that followed in the wake of the shrinking welfare state (1997, p.7). The relationship with the state as characterised by socialism was rejected. However, the government was explicit about addressing wider societal concerns with a social democratic approach located within an updated, coherent, rational ideal of modern citizenship within a liberal democracy. This approach was located within the civic republican approach to citizenship and citizenship education and aimed to carve a ‘Third Way’ between liberal individualism and communitarianism.

Bernard Crick, the academic chosen by David Blunkett to lead this review of citizenship education, was a self-declared civic republican. In a recent publication (Crick and Lockyer, 2010) Crick describes how civic republicanism is a strong alternative to more traditional liberal approaches to citizenship, and is a ‘corrective to what it sees as the
overly individualistic, litigious and inactive nature of contemporary life' (op. cit. p.1). Civic republicanism, it was argued (Kerr, 2003, p.4), was the best choice for New Labour’s citizenship approach, as it placed some reasonable restraints on both individual and collective behaviour but allowed a fairly high degree of individual autonomy within that framework, and claimed to be capable of organising individual human endeavours in constructive ways to advance the public good. It differed from communitarianism, which contends that individuality is a product of community relationships rather than individual traits. It differs from some forms of orthodox liberalism in which individual autonomy is both the source and desired outcomes of human flourishing and that the state should remain as neutral and non-interventionist as possible wherever possible. Civic republicanism aimed to justify a new paradigm that remains essentially liberal but which acknowledges the importance of collective identity and behaviour. As David Kerr states:

The Group's final working definition was deliberately founded on the best of past approaches updated to meet the needs of modern democratic society. The definition was centred on 'civic participation' and based on the 'civic republican' concept of citizenship. It provided a workable 'third way' between the competing 'liberal-individualist' and 'communitarian' concepts of citizenship. It was based on the three elements of citizenship - namely the civil, the political and the social - contained in T.H. Marshall's classic definition (Marshall 1950). [...] It also placed considerable emphasis on the values and community action approaches, in line with the thrust of 'civic morality'. The Crick Group agreed that 'effective education for citizenship' consists of three strands interrelated but also distinct, which combine to make up such an education (op. cit. p.4).
The commission agreed on the civic republican understanding of citizenship but added some contemporary features to Marshall’s three elements: the civil, the political and the social. As Kerr continues: ‘Discussing the first element, the commission put greater stress on the reciprocity between rights and duties; and more than Marshall, on welfare being not just provision by the state but also what people can do for each other in voluntary groups and organisations, whether local or national’ (ibid.). The Crick Report recommendations combined traditional calls for active individual participation along with idea that citizenship education must give people ‘confidence to claim their rights and to challenge the status quo while, at the same time, make plain that with rights come obligations. It should foster respect for law, justice and democracy. It should nurture concern for the common good at the same time as it encourages independence of thought’ (Lord Chancellor (Presentation to the Law Society, 27th January 1998).


We aim at no less than a change in the political culture of this country both nationally and locally: for people to think of themselves as active citizens, willing, able and equipped to have an influence in public life and with the critical capacities to weigh evidence before speaking and acting; to build on and to extend radically to young people the best in existing traditions of community involvement and public service, and to make them individually confident in finding new forms of involvement and action among themselves.

*The Crick Report – an ideological and pragmatic response*

The Crick Report was commissioned in light of concerns about declining quality of citizenship in England. In September 1997 a Citizenship 2000 group was formed, following initial discussions by representatives of the Citizenship Foundation, the
Association for the Teaching of the Social Sciences, the Secondary Heads Association and the Hansard Society. This group put out an agreed statement that expressed concern about ‘rapidly changing relationships between the individual and government; the decline in traditional forms of civic cohesion; the new political context of Britain in Europe; and rapid social, economic and technological change in a global context’. The statement argued that Citizenship education in schools and colleges was too important to be left to chance in the light of recent research that has underlined the weakness of civic discourse in this country. It concluded:

Citizenship education is urgently needed to address this historic deficit if we are to avoid a further decline in the quality of our public life and if we are to prepare all young people for informed participation, not only in a more open United Kingdom, but also in Europe and the wider world, as we move into the next century. This will not happen unless there is a firm political and professional commitment to education for citizenship (cited in QCA, 1998, p.14).

*The Crick Report* (1998) reported that, in light of the evidence examined, there were worrying implications for the health of democracy in Britain. It drew on a number of research studies, including a DEMOS study by Wilkinson and Mulgan, 1995. These authors concluded that ‘The overwhelming story emerging from our research, both quantitative and qualitative, is of an historic political disconnection. In effect, an entire generation has opted out of party politics’ and they found evidence of ignorance and political apathy which led to their conclusion that there is a ‘powerful case that there should be a legal obligation to teach civic education alongside personal and social education and for some central responsibility for civic and political education, as in
Australia and Canada’ (p.85). And as Crick himself added: ‘They could also have cited all other countries in the EU’ (QCA, 1998, p.15).

The Crick Report of 1998 also acknowledged the importance of fostering national identity in the light of what was perceived as a loss of social cohesion. As it reported here:

There are less tangible but wider social questions that constitute a broader aim for citizenship education. The Citizenship Foundation put the case to the National Commission on Education of 1992 in terms of: ‘the increasingly complex nature of our society, the greater cultural diversity and the apparent loss of a value consensus, combined with the collapse of traditional support mechanisms such as extended families...’. ‘Cultural diversity’ raises the issue of national identity. (p.17).

The Report argued for a restoration of common citizenship but also to ‘find or restore an inclusive national identity that is secure enough to find a place for the plurality of nations, cultures, ethnic identities and religions long found in the United Kingdom. Citizenship education creates common ground between different ethnic and religious identities’. It continued: ‘Majorities must respect, understand and tolerate minorities and minorities must learn and respect the laws, codes and conventions as much as the majority – not merely because it is useful to do so, but because this process helps foster common citizenship’ (p.17). The importance of citizenship education’s part in fostering this national identity is acknowledged, as is the complexity of the task within plural societies. A national survey conducted in 1997 and cited within the Crick Report recommended that ‘an explicit idea of multi-cultural citizenship needs to be formulated for Britain’ and that ‘a more plural approach to racial disadvantage requires forms of
citizenship which are sensitive to ethnic diversity and offer respect both to individuals and to the social groups to which they feel they belong’. The Report’s response was non-committal on the idea of a distinct multi-cultural citizenship idea *per se* but reinforced that:

We all need to learn more about each other. This should entail learning not only about the United Kingdom – including all four of its component parts – but also about the European, Commonwealth and global dimensions of citizenship, with due regard being given to the homelands of our minority communities and to the main countries of British emigration (p.18).

This clearly stops short of fostering an explicitly multicultural British identity through citizenship education or addressing the issue of racial disadvantage explicitly either. What it does do is place the issue of renewing national identity within its European, Commonwealth and global context.

*Crick’s Recommendations*

The Report’s recommendations included making Citizenship a compulsory national curriculum subject in its own right. The commission authors suggested that: ‘It can no longer sensibly be left as uncoordinated local initiatives which vary greatly in number, content and method. This is an inadequate basis for animating the idea of a common citizenship with democratic values’ (QCA, 1998, p.9). This was a radical departure from the more minimalist (or mixed) approaches in the past. The benefits of citizenship education were laid out too. For pupils there was to be ‘an entitlement in schools that will empower them to participate in society effectively as active, informed, critical and responsible citizens’ *(ibid.* p.9). Teachers would benefit from ‘advice and guidance in
making existing citizenship provision coherent, both in intellectual and curriculum terms, as part of stronger, coordinated approaches to citizenship education in schools’ (ibid.). Schools would gain ‘a firm base to coordinate existing teaching and activities, to relate positively to the local community and to develop effective citizenship education in the curriculum for all pupils’. And society as a whole would benefit from ‘an active and politically-literate citizenry convinced that they can influence government and community affairs at all levels’ (ibid.).

The Report sums up the three-pronged approach thus:

So our understanding of citizenship education in a parliamentary democracy finds three heads on one body: social and moral responsibility, community involvement and political literacy. ‘Responsibility’ is an essential political as well as moral virtue, for it implies (a) care for others; (b) premeditation and calculation about what effect actions are likely to have on others; and (c) understanding and care for the consequences (ibid. p.13).

The aim and purpose of the new curriculum was summarised as follows: ‘The purpose of citizenship education in schools and colleges is to make secure and to increase the knowledge, skills and values relevant to the nature and practices of participative democracy; also to enhance the awareness of rights and duties, and the sense of responsibilities needed for the development of pupils into active citizens; and in so doing to establish the value to individuals, schools and society of involvement in the local and wider community’. And further: ‘Democratic institutions, practices and purposes must be understood, both local and national, including the work of parliaments, councils, parties, pressure groups and voluntary bodies; to show how formal political
activity relates to civil society in the context of the United Kingdom and Europe, and to cultivate awareness and concern for world affairs and global issues. Some understanding of the realities of economic life is needed including how taxation and public expenditure work together’ (ibid. p.41).

Evidence of the ‘Third Way’ civic republican was clear in the thrust of the three strands as they were expanded upon (ibid. p.41):

**Social and moral responsibility** - Children learning from the very beginning self-confidence and socially and morally responsible behaviour both in and beyond the classroom, both towards those in authority and towards each other (this is an essential pre-condition for citizenship). **Community involvement** - Pupils learning about and becoming helpfully involved in the life and concerns of their communities, including learning through community involvement and service to the community. **Political literacy** - Pupils learning about and how to make themselves effective in public life through knowledge, skills and values.

There was recognition of the responsibility for understanding and action remaining with the individual; a kind of spontaneous voluntarism as outlined above in the phrase ‘Pupils […] becoming helpfully involved in the life and concerns of their communities’. And simultaneously there was a clear message about individual responsibilities towards the whole community, to those in positions of authority as well as to each other. There was an expectation that greater respect and care for each other at the community level would enhance collective action and therefore the quality of our lives as active responsible citizens. (And presumably take some pressure off the welfare state too in line with other ‘Third Way’ or New Labour policy). There was also explicitness about the fact that this was a curriculum that aimed to educate for citizenship as well as *about*
citizenship. The values and skills, as well as knowledge and understanding that young people were expected to acquire, were spelled out. Values and skills were to be taught, not simply acquired. There was less explicitness around the ways on which value acquisition would be measured as such. However the learning outcomes relating to skills and aptitudes and knowledge and understanding respectively were detailed and explicit. For examples, at Key Stage 2, pupils were expected to ‘participate in a questions and answers session in which a member of the local community offers an expert opinion and answers questions prepared in advance by pupils’ (p.47).

The commission’s members were aware that the statutory requirement to inculcate values might be vulnerable to indoctrinatory practices as well as to accusations of indoctrination in the citizenship education proposals. As such they included a section on ‘teaching controversial issues’, which stopped short of claiming that the curriculum itself was controversial but that gave advice to teachers on ways of handling controversy in the classroom. The commission also recommended the establishment of an independent monitoring body to oversee the work of citizenship education. As the authors state: ‘Because of the novelty of the venture and its political sensitivity, there should be a standing Commission on Citizenship Education to monitor its progress and when necessary to recommends amendments to the entitlements, learning outcomes, methods of inspection and teacher training as appropriate’ (p.24). The recommendation was that, although the Secretary of State for Education should appoint the Commission, it should have cross party representation.

In summary then, the Citizenship Education curriculum as outlined by the Labour Government’s commission, aimed to respond to some of the needs of the UK’s modern
liberal democracy by taking a more proactive and interventionist approach to state education including unprecedented levels of government accountability in relation to citizenship education. They also aimed to produce a curriculum that would create knowledgeable and caring citizens who would be confident in their individuality and individual efficacy as well as sensitive and caring towards and responsible for members of their wider communities whether they be local, national or global. Individual responsibilities and social participation were given rather more emphasis than individual or collective national rights and entitlements.

Critical responses after implementation of Crick’s recommendations

Criticism, both at the time and after the report’s findings had been implemented for some time, fell into two broad camps. The first group of critics suggested that that the recommendations were too pro establishment and did not allow any criticism of societal structures. The second argued that there was an insufficiently explicit nation-building, patriotic element to the report.

Critics within the first group argued that the report’s recommendations located problems of liberal democracy within the young themselves or that problems fell at the feet of monitory groups, rather than locating them in structural inequalities. For these critics the statutory curriculum that followed Crick’s recommendations remained too light touch and minimalist both in practice and in ideological terms. The ideology of the ‘Third Way’, according to some critics, failed to adequately satisfy either liberal or communitarian traditions, by restricting autonomy to question and challenge society’s structures or by failing to locate responsibility for societal development within these structures. Wolmuth (2007), for example, argued for a more maximal approach to
citizenship education and suggested that the Crick Report is essentially a pro-establishment, conservative and remedial response to the alleged sense of alienation amongst the young. The report, according to Wolmuth, failed to develop a real sense of agency in students and its recommendations, in effect, worked to integrate the younger generation into the system and bring about conformity to it. She argues that there was a missed opportunity to develop citizenship as ‘the practice of freedom in order to develop young people’s ability to deal critically and creatively with the system’ (2007, p.4).

Osler and Starkey (2006, p.8) also draw attention to what they describe as the deficit model of citizenship inherent in The Crick Report in relation to what they describe as ‘the youth and minorities deficit’:

The emphasis on citizenship education is closely linked to a tendency, in many countries, to blame youth for the problems and challenges facing society as whole [...] and to assume that migrants to Europe are likely to be ignorant of democratic practice and procedures [...] Indeed, the government-commissioned Crick report implies that minorities are in greater need of citizenship education than the majority population.

The second group of critics focused on what they saw as the report’s inadequacies in building national cohesion. Dina Kiwan (2007, p.7) argues that Crick’s recommendations did not respond adequately to the needs and entitlements of marginalised groups and therefore failed to harness participation from minority groups thereby failing to develop adequate social cohesion. As she says here:

Whilst diversity is inherent to Crick’s conceptualisation of a participatory democracy, [...] unequal power
relations, or unequal access to resources and information, and its implications for motivation remain unquestioned'. She continues: The focus of the original Crick Report (QCA, 1998) and subsequent Programmes of Study and Schemes of Work (QCA, 2000; QCA, 2001) on the accessibility to information and developing participatory skills is certainly necessary, but it is not sufficient, as it does not address the impact of differential power between groups' (ibid.).

This, she argues, would lead to disempowerment and lack of motivation to participate for those historically marginalised groups. Unless there is explicit engagement with these issues, what may result is a failure of citizenship education to achieve a more substantive participation of young people of different ethnic and religious identities.

One of the Labour government’s significant priorities, at the time of the Crick Report’s commission, was ‘community cohesion’. Critics have suggested that this aspect of the new citizenship agenda failed in two ways. First, that whilst the underlying rationale for the commission and subsequent curriculum lay in need to rejuvenate participation by strengthening national civic ties, the actual content and learning outcomes themselves represent a rather a weak cosmopolitan stance. The curriculum content fell short of explicitness around the values that were to be inculcated and how the success of learning these values were to be measured. In the report’s introductory section much is made of the urgency of becoming a ‘nation of engaged citizens’ but the actual prescriptions and curriculum guidance takes a relatively indirect route to this. National identity inculcation sits firmly alongside the local and global context: ‘[The purpose of citizenship education is …] to show how formal political activity relates to civil society in the context of the UK and Europe, and to cultivate awareness and concern for world affairs and global issues’ (p.40). It could almost be said on a close reading of this phrase
that care and concern are primarily assigned to the global context whilst knowledge and understanding will suffice at the national level. Callan and Taylor (2007, 2002 respectively) claim that this explicitly cosmopolitan stance of the report is weakened by the absence of a more explicit patriotic dimension.

Charles Taylor argued for a more explicit liberal patriotism agenda within the citizenship agenda but one that combined it with cosmopolitanism to make it better and more robust in order to combat racism. Taylor argues that:

> The most important is this: the societies that we are striving to create; free, democratic, willing to some degree to share equally, require strong identification on the part of their citizens. It has always been noted in the civic humanist tradition that free societies, relying as they must on the spontaneous supportive action of their members, need that strong sense of allegiance that Montesquieu called "vertu". This is if anything even truer of modern representative democracies, [...] (2002, p.1).

And, he continues by suggesting that it is not only a sufficient condition of a thriving democracy, but a necessary one too:

> Indeed, the requirement is stronger just because they are also "liberal" societies, which cherish negative liberty and individual rights. A citizen democracy can only work if most of its members are convinced that their political society is a common venture of considerable moment, and believe it to be of vital importance that they participate in the ways they must to keep it functioning as a democracy. This means not only a commitment to the common project, but also a special sense of bonding among people working together in this project (ibid.).
Taylor indicates that there is a sense of urgency to this by suggesting that liberal democracies are ‘highly vulnerable to the alienation which arises from deep inequalities, and the sense of neglect and indifference that easily arises among abandoned minorities’. He suggests that robust democratic societies cannot be too unequal if they are to survive and that this means ‘that they must be capable of adopting policies with redistributive effect (and to some extent also with redistributive intent). And such policies require a high degree of mutual commitment’ (Taylor, 2002, p.2). There is the suggestion here that liberal democracies require a great deal from their members and that this demands a greater bond or sense of solidarity with fellow nationals or compatriots than with wider humanity. Taylor also imports a sense of urgency in that the albeit imperfect political system of liberal democracy is better than all the alternatives so there is an added urgency to make a patriotic and cosmopolitan citizenship agenda work. Some of Taylor’s concerns about the need for a greater nation-building agenda in citizenship education were explicitly incorporated into the Ajegbo Review, which was commissioned by the Labour government under the leadership of Gordon Brown who succeeded Tony Blair in 2007. It is to this period we now turn.

Citizenship education 2005 - 2010: a greater emphasis on nation building

There remained some internal divisions about citizenship education within the Labour Party. According to some sources the Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was personally unconvinced about citizenship’s statutory status and ambivalent about some of the content. There were ideological grounds for some of the coolness. Blunkett was more of a self-confessed interventionist on these matters, whereas Blair was a stronger advocate of limiting state responsibility along the lines of the ‘Third Way’. One of the central
premises of the ‘Third Way’, he has argued in his book of that title, is that the state is relatively impotent in the economic sphere in these globalised times (Blair, 1998, p.14). This is where the role for the *enabling*, rather than the *providing* or the *guaranteeing*, state comes in. The state helps people ‘improve their own performance’ and responsibility for economic renewal is thus shifted away from the state in the same way that some responsibility for social renewal is (*ibid.*).

It was arguably a wider political crisis that convinced Blair of citizenship’s more central place in the curriculum. As the Citizenship Foundation, Birkbeck (2010, p.4) states:

> Tony Blair himself was reportedly cool towards the proposed new subject fearing that schools might be distracted from the renewed emphasis on ‘standards’ but Blunkett won the day and it would be not until much later, in 2006, (after the London bombings) that Tony Blair would finally declare citizenship to be a central part of the curriculum ‘given the current debate about integration and social responsibility’ (*Guardian Unlimited*, 19th October, 2006).

This bears out the view that; ‘attempts to redefine citizenship and per se citizenship education, are often borne out of perceived crises in society at large’ (Kerr, 2000, p.2). And there is no doubt that there has been a growing impetus for what has been described as a more muscular political approach to citizenship across much of the liberal democratic world. This political impetus seems to be fuelled by concerns of several democratic governments worldwide that the recent decades of unprecedented change is putting some of the traditional boundaries and expectations of citizenship under intolerable strain. Some academic commentators too have suggested that a watershed had been reached namely the redefining of traditional forms of liberal
democratic society in the light of the onset of a less certain world and that citizenship and citizenship education has similarly reached a point of urgent redefinition (Callan, 1997, Crick, 2000, Kymlicka, 1995, Soutphommasane, 2012).

The increase in terrorist attacks on liberal democracies had a significant bearing on developments on the subsequent citizenship curriculum developments. Since the 9/11 attacks in the USA the political agenda for citizenship education in many liberal democracies had acquired an increased impetus. And in the UK this sense of urgency increased significantly after July 7th 2005, when self-proclaimed Islamists, who were British citizens, attacked the London underground killing fifty-two people. Partly, in response to this, Gordon Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, called for the development of a stronger sense of common patriotic purpose in a speech to the Fabian Society. He argued that:

And just as in war time a sense of common patriotic purpose inspired people to do what is necessary, so in peace time a strong modern sense of patriotism and patriotic purpose which binds people together can motivate and inspire... [W]e should not recoil from our national history – rather we should make it more central to our education. I propose that British history should be given much more prominence in the curriculum – not just dates, places and names, nor just a set of unconnected facts, but a narrative that encompasses our history (2006).

The subsequent changes to the citizenship curriculum (QCA, 2007) took on this idea and incorporated it within a revised National Curriculum for Citizenship programme. The new History National Curriculum (Key Stage 3 only was revised at the end of 2007 by a committee of history specialists) included a new concept called ‘Cultural, ethnic
and religious diversity’ which had to be delivered within the topics of study between ages 11-14. The curriculum was also amended to give more prominence to topics such as ‘the impact through time of the movement and settlement of diverse peoples to, from and within the British Isles’ (*ibid.*). These changes were as a result of a review of citizenship education commissioned by the Labour government and conducted by Keith Ajegbo. *The Ajegbo Review*, as it became known, introduced a fourth strand to the citizenship curriculum in addition to Crick’s original three strands outlined above. This fourth strand was entitled: *Identity and Diversity: Living Together in the UK* and was explicitly directed at cultivating a greater sense of belonging for all UK citizens.

*The Ajegbo Review 2007*

As Sir Keith Ajegbo, the chair of the review says here: ‘Motivation for citizens to participate in society is logically predicated on a sense of belonging to, or identification with, the context where they are participating’ (*Ajegbo et al.*, 2007, p.95). The Review’s authors also acknowledged Gordon Brown’s call for more prominence of an inclusive but strengthened national story through studying British history. The fourth strand aimed to develop the ‘use of contemporary history in teachers’ pedagogy to illuminate thinking about contemporary issues relating to citizenship’. This emphasis on national history included ‘critical thinking about ethnicity, religion and ‘race’ […] and an explicit link to political issues and values’ (*ibid.* p.12). Features of the national history included the following: a contextualised understanding that the UK is a ‘multinational’ state, made up of England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales; Immigration; Commonwealth and the legacy of Empire; The European Union; Extending the franchise e.g. the legacy of slavery, universal suffrage and equal opportunities legislation (*ibid.*).
The Report acknowledged a cosmopolitan version of citizenship, for example, stating that ‘Fundamental to their ability to fulfil these outcomes is pupils’ exploration and understanding of the whole range of their own identities: personal, local, national and global; and those of the wider community’ (ibid. p.24). However, there was also a much more explicit focus on citizenship education’s responsibility to strengthen national cohesion. As the authors argue:

The changing nature of the UK and potential for tension to arise now makes it ever more pressing for us to work towards community cohesion, fostering mutual understanding within schools so that valuing difference and understanding what binds us together become part of the way pupils think and behave (ibid. p.16 emphasis added).

The authors acknowledged that the influence of ‘major international events, such as 11 September 2001 and the London bombings in July 2005, have contributed to the debate on community cohesion and shared values, particularly because the latter were perpetrated by British-born Muslims’ (ibid.). The report also acknowledged that community cohesion has become a major focus for Government. As it outlines:

Since November 2006, for example, a new statutory requirement, the Education and Inspections Act 2006, has been introduced, imposing a duty on schools to promote community cohesion. The notion of citizenship has also been brought to the fore. Home Office initiatives have seen the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the new naturalisation requirements incorporating language and citizenship classes and a citizenship test. (p.18).
The Ajegbo Report authors acknowledged that there were some problems with the abstract notion of Britishness and advocate an approach that emphasises *experience of living in the UK*, contextualised in relation to recent history, rather than abstract notions of ‘Britishness (*ibid.* p.93). They also stated some wariness about the notion of inculcating shared British values. The authors acknowledge that ‘There is considerable debate about what ‘shared values’ are, as well as whether they are indeed specific to the UK – and whether it matters if they are also shared by other nations. We must also be wary of using ‘shared values’ to somehow challenge or question the acceptability of the expression of diversity’ (*ibid.*).

Lord Parekh is cited within the report stating that: ‘we can refer to British shared values only in so far as we can say that the UK has decided to commit to these values and in this sense takes ownership of them’. He also suggests that ‘it is not the role of education to try and ‘inculcate’ these values in the abstract, but rather that debates about values only become interesting to pupils when they consider real examples where values are in tension with each other’ (*ibid.*).

There is acknowledgment, within the Report’s recommendations, that integrating the teaching of values within the explicit outcomes of ‘skills and attributes’, in the way the Crick Report outlined initially, is an appropriate way of dealing with this controversial aspect of any state curriculum. However, there is some more explicit emphasis on critical literacy than the Crick Report prescribed. The Ajegbo Review states that:

> Our vision defines one aspect of education for diversity as focusing on critical literacy, which allows pupils to reflect on their own cultural traditions and those of others. Pupils need to develop an understanding of how language constructs reality and the different perspectives they use to make sense of the world around them. It is crucial for education for diversity that pupils
are given the skills to challenge their own assumptions and those of others. There needs first to be development and discussion about pedagogical approaches if such skills are to be developed so that education for diversity can be effective.

There is however a bit more explicit acknowledgement of the need to empower young people through engagement with a more critical dimension to any dominant narrative in the Ajegbo Report than was evident in the Crick Report. As one contributor states: ‘The character of Citizenship must retain its critical and practical focus. Citizenship is about grey areas. It’s not about whether I’m right or wrong, it’s about me trying to understand my own explanations and explain those to others.’ (ibid. p.95 emphasis added). And (not unlike the Crick Report) the Ajegbo review argues: ‘We are certain that the process of dialogue and communication must be central to pedagogical strategies for Citizenship. Professor John Annette (2007) emphasises the importance of developing ‘civic listening’ in citizenship in order that we all learn to listen to and evaluate the views and arguments of others. It is important not to marginalise or silence voices if we aim for an inclusive, democratic and participative citizenry’ (ibid.). Arguably, the Crick commission was less explicit about those on the margins and the ‘silent voices’ referred to here.

The Ajegbo Report does make more explicit commitment to actively solving society’s problems and some distancing from what might be described as the ‘Third Way’ minimal interventionist approach. As the Ajegbo authors say here in relation to learning to evaluate the views of others: This is not to say that we bend to a ‘woolly liberalism’, nor is it ‘relativism gone mad’; there clearly must be ground rules about the process of discussing important issues and as a means to solve society’s problems’ (ibid. p.96). This more interventionist stance is echoed throughout the Ajegbo Report in its critique.
of the ‘light touch’ dimension to Crick’s recommendations. The light touch approach is praised as a first stage in the implementation of a new national citizenship curriculum but, it is argued, the more mature system needs something a little more firm. As is stated here:

We acknowledge that a ‘light touch’ was initially helpful for providing flexibility within the curriculum. But as the subject matures – and to ensure its future development and credibility – there needs to be a more concrete approach, with content, standards and links between curriculum subjects delineated in more detail. (ibid. p.82).

Many of the Ajegbo Report recommendations were adopted and the fourth strand was adopted and incorporated within the National Curriculum for Citizenship in 2007 (QCA, 2007).

_Critiques of the Ajegbo Review_

Commentator on and critics of the Ajegbo recommendations came from all sides of the political spectrum. At the extreme end of party politics, the British National Party used the Report to emphasis the alienation of indigenous white working class pupils (quoted in Osler, 2008, p.13). A critical view from _The Times_ newspaper (26th January 2007) emphasised the need for essentially so-called British values to be made more paramount:

We have to be clearer about what it means to be British, what it means to be part of this British nation of nations and, crucially, to be resolute in making the point that what comes with that is a set of values. Yes, there is room for multiple and different identities, but those have to be accepted alongside an agreement that none of these identities can take precedence over the
core democratic values of freedom, fairness, tolerance and plurality that define what it means to be British.

And The Daily Telegraph (26th January 2007) adopted a similar line whilst emphasising the role of History in the curriculum and questioning the need for citizenship education at all:

The teaching of history in our schools is, unaccountably, not compulsory after the age of 14. If it were, there would be no need for extra instruction in citizenship. It is through the teaching of history that citizens of this country learn about the society in which they are now living. It is arguable that, without the foundation of decent historical knowledge, citizenship lessons will in any event be built on sand...Even the schools minister, Lord Adonis, has admitted that comprehensive education has been a mistake. Rectifying that will take an immense effort, but a start could be made not by introducing nebulous new courses on citizenship but by ensuring that all school pupils spend their whole classroom careers learning about this country and what made it — and them.

Anti-racist commentators also found the Report’s recommendations wanting. Trevor Phillips from the Commission on Racial Equality argued that the report placed too much emphasis on multiculturalism, which, as commonly understood, is not always helpful because it privileges cultural difference and underplays structural inequalities. In his words, albeit from an earlier critique of multiculturalism, (Phillips, 2004):

Integration only works if it both recognizes newcomers’ differences and extends complete equality. Celebrating diversity, but ignoring inequality, inevitably leads to the nightmare of entrenched segregation. ...There can be no true integration without true equality. But the reverse is also true. The equality of the ghetto is no equality at all. Multiculturalism is in danger of
becoming a sleight of hand in which ethnic minorities are distracted by tokens of recognition, while being excluded from the real business.

Osler takes a similar line in arguing that Ajegbo did not go far enough in tackling inequalities and underlying institutional racism and suggesting that while the report ‘gives impetus to teaching about diversity, it fails to adopt a critical perspective on race or multiculturalism or adequately engage with young people’s lived experiences of citizenship within a globalised world’. She adds (2008, p.14):

My fear is that the Ajegbo report and the addition of a fourth strand on ‘identity and diversity’ may prove to be a new placebo. If schools promote a depoliticised multiculturalism which does not encourage political literacy or critical analysis there is a real danger that this will leave unchallenged (and possibly disguise) the considerable inequalities within schools, while allowing individual institutions to assert they are fulfilling their duty to promote community cohesion. Equally worryingly, students may be left vulnerable to the propaganda of ethno-nationalist and xenophobic parties. [...] Ironically, a government concerned with violent extremism appears to have overlooked the vulnerability of some young people to racist extremism and violence.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see the truth in Phillips and Osler’s insights and warnings. At the time of writing (October 2016) there has been plenty of evidence of continued alienation of some minority groups in Britain and, arguably, evidence that some citizens fell for the propaganda propagated by an ethno nationalist, xenophobic campaign by the UK Independence Party (UKIP) during the EU referendum. But, to be fair, the new curriculum was implemented for a few short years before the new Coalition government was elected and secondly, one cannot lay the blame for
citizens’ behaviour at its door especially given that a limited number of students who would have experienced its provision.

There were, however, many laudable elements to the Ajegbo Review and recommendations. Of all the citizenship curricula discussed so far it, arguably, comes closest to aligning liberal democratic values with a specifically liberal democratic nation building agenda. It did this by construing the British national community as located in a sense of shared fate, as opposed to a common national identity agenda, and explicitly incorporated educational goals aimed at developing students’ critical faculties.

Goldsmith 2008

However, whilst the implementation of these recommendations represented a shift towards a more potentially effective kind of citizenship curriculum they clearly did not go far enough for some critics and importantly for some members of the government at the time, albeit for rather different reasons. In 2008, only a year after Ajegbo’s Review, a further review was commissioned by the Labour Government and The Goldsmith Report: Citizenship: Our Common Bond was commissioned and published. The Report’s title conveyed its emphasis, that is, an even greater explicitness regarding national cohesion and identity. The Goldsmith Report recommendations took the idea of developing a modern sense of Britishness much further than its predecessors. Lord Goldsmith said his proposals would ‘make it clearer what it means to be a citizen’ and would set up ‘practical measures that may help enhance a sense of shared belonging’ (The Guardian, March 11th 2008). The plans included making pupils participate in citizenship ceremonies and there were proposals for a new public holiday to celebrate ‘Britishness’. This evidently more robust approach to integration also included
recommendations for ‘council tax discounts for volunteer work, changes to current categories of citizenship, language loans for new immigrants to learn English, a type of community service to enhance "citizen education" and special ceremonies for school-leavers’ (ibid.). In his own words, Lord Goldsmith stated:

I do not assume that there is a crisis about our sense of shared citizenship. Levels of pride and belonging in the UK are high. However, we are experiencing changes in our society, which may have an impact on the bond that we feel we share as citizens. I propose a range of measures that may help to promote a shared sense of belonging and may encourage citizens to participate more in society. [...] There is no doubt that we have a rich suite of national symbols in this country. So the question is not to change what we have but to consider ways in which to add to it. I propose that further consideration should be given to a narrative, non-legalistic statement of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship; and a national day – introduced to coincide with the Olympics and Diamond Jubilee – which would provide an annual focus for our national narrative (Goldsmith, 2008, p.7).

These recommendations represented a significant shift away from anything experienced before in the UK, and indeed a shift from the thrust of both Crick and Ajegbo’s more nuanced recommendations. Goldsmith drew heavily on the Australian model of citizenship as a model of good practice in tackling the growing challenges of social fragmentation (Goldsmith, p.94). Whilst the Goldsmith recommendations seemed to chime with the rhetoric of leading government figures at the time (for example, Gordon Brown, Lord Adonis) those recommendations relating to education in particular were not implemented. The public and media reaction was very critical. The Goldsmith Review seemed to go too far for most and yet not far enough for some who viewed this report as a bridge too far away from a more cosmopolitan and global notion of
citizenship. Its narrow patriotic purpose seemed to alienate the public and politicians from both sides of the political spectrum. Darcus Howe of *The New Statesman* sums up the reaction well: ‘If there is something called Britishness, it is the tendency to resist this interference by the State. (*The New Statesmen*, 19th March 2008). This resistance did not last, however, or perhaps the tendency to resist it was overstated by Howe above. The current civic education agenda includes the requirement that all schools in Britain ‘actively promote’ British values (DfE, 2014) and the direction of this policy was set by the Coalition Government comprising a majority Conservative Party with Liberal Democratic support who were elected in May 2010.

Before moving on to look at the Coalition and Conservative citizenship agenda, it is worth taking stock of the shifting requirements for schools over the course of the Labour Government’s terms in office since 1997. Labour education policy consistently required schools to give greater emphasis to a shared sense of civic morality and promotion of a ‘social’ education agenda and citizenship education became a statutory requirement for the first time in 2002. After 2005, there was also a strengthening of the idea of a shared national identity - albeit an inclusive identity - included in recommendations to schools. By 2007 the History curriculum had been revised to include a strengthened element of the national story through an additional citizenship strand. It was entitled: *Identity and Diversity: Living Together in the UK* and was explicitly directed at cultivating a greater sense of belonging for all UK citizens. Further attempts to strengthen the explicit national identity agenda, through the Goldsmith Report after 2008, were not incorporated into formal education policy.
Coalition and Conservative approaches to civic education 2010 – 2016

With the change of UK Government in 2010 to a Conservative - Liberal Democratic coalition there was, perhaps, an unsurprising return to the policy direction and rhetoric of the previous Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s. Citizenship was to remain a discrete subject, with the emphasis on developing knowledge and understanding of core liberal values. This was accompanied by a return to a narrower definition of Britishness as Michael Gove, Secretary of State for Education outlined in a party conferences speech entitled: ‘All pupils will learn our island story’ (2010).

Significantly however, the scope of the curriculum changed. The Coalition Government aimed to make the vast majority of school academy schools in the future and these schools would be independent of any national curriculum prescriptions. So whilst the curriculum contained much that anyone would expect a modern democratic state curriculum to include, for example (DfE, 2013, p.1):

Political, legal and human rights, and responsibilities of citizens; the roles of the law and the justice system and how they relate to young people; key features of parliamentary democracy and government in the constituent parts of the UK and at local level, including voting and elections; freedom of speech and diversity of views, and the role of the media in informing and influencing public opinion and holding those in power to account; [...] The changing nature of UK society, including the diversity of ideas, beliefs, cultures, identities, traditions, perspectives and values that are shared; migration to, from and within the UK and the reasons for this; the UK’s relations with the European Union and the rest of Europe, the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the world as a global community.

However, there was no legal obligation on most schools to follow this curriculum. And whilst there was some explicit acknowledgment of diversity and inclusion, for example,
‘pupils should explore the diversity of groups and communities and examine the changes that occur. They should also explore things that unify us, including the shared values that UK society is committed to, and what groups and communities have in common as we live together in society’, the vast majority of students would not be subject to these prescriptions. The Coalition agenda returned to arguably a more neo liberal approach and aimed to introduce greater market freedoms within education. Although the plans to make every school in England an academy have faltered, and the expected expansion of Free schools has not been as widespread as initially forecast, there has been legislation introduced that makes all schools (maintained, free, academies, private schools) accountable for their provision of Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural (SMSC) development. This is now the locus of citizenship education. Through their provision of SMSC, schools should (DfE, 2014, p.5):

- enable students to develop their self-knowledge, self-esteem and self-confidence;
- enable students to distinguish right from wrong and to respect the civil and criminal law of England;
- encourage students to accept responsibility for their behaviour, show initiative, and to understand how they can contribute positively to the lives of those living and working in the locality of the school and to society more widely;
- enable students to acquire a broad general knowledge of and respect for public institutions and services in England;
- further tolerance and harmony between different cultural traditions by enabling students to acquire an appreciation of and respect for their own and other cultures;
- encourage respect for other people; and
- encourage respect for democracy and support for participation in the democratic processes, including respect for the basis on which the law is made and applied in England.

And since 2014 the words ‘respect for’, for example, the basis upon which law is made and applied in England (see above) has been replaced by a requirement for schools to promote British values. As a recent government directive states: ‘Schools should
promote the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’ (DfE, 2014, p.5).

The list below describes the understanding and knowledge expected of pupils as a result of schools promoting fundamental British values (DfE, 2014, p.6.)

An understanding of how citizens can influence decision-making through the democratic process; an appreciation that living under the rule of law protects individual citizens and is essential for their wellbeing and safety; an understanding that there is a separation of power between the executive and the judiciary, and that while some public bodies such as the police and the army can be held to account through Parliament, others such as the courts maintain independence; an understanding that the freedom to choose and hold other faiths and beliefs is protected in law; an acceptance that other people having different faiths or beliefs to oneself (or having none) should be accepted and tolerated, and should not be the cause of prejudicial or discriminatory behaviour; and an understanding of the importance of identifying and combatting discrimination.

Michael Gove, Secretary of State for education, justified this shift of emphasis saying that, ‘It is critical that we ensure that our traditions of liberty and tolerance are protected so that everyone, whatever their background, can feel that sense of pride in this nation and allegiance to other citizens, which all of us would want to celebrate as the best of British’ (2010). And as the official guidance outlines: ‘Actively promoting the values means challenging opinions or behaviours in school that are contrary to fundamental British values. Attempts to promote systems that undermine fundamental British values would be completely at odds with schools’ duty to provide SMSC’ (DfE, 2014, p.6).
According to Ofsted *(op. cit. p.7)*, 'Fundamental British values are democracy; the rule of law and individual liberty'.

**Critiques of promoting British Values**

There has been some disquiet about the directive to promote British values. Those within and outside education have expressed disquiet. Chris Husbands, director of the Institute of Education and professor of education, said these debates are all too familiar. He reminded readers that we had been here before in 1989 with the Speaker’s Commission and in 1999 with the Citizenship report, which both attempted to describe British values. He stated: ‘No politician of whatever party should assume a monopoly of the civic values of the education system. It needs to be done in an open and wide consultation’ *(Husbands, 2014)*. And, many teachers fear political interference in this area, as John D. Clare explained:

> Many of the people who want us to teach national identity have a hidden agenda that they want to teach Englishness, which they see as being under siege from an influx of immigrants, and I think they see Englishness as something which is dying, and they want to use history to protect it, to get across a certain political agenda with the children. And if that is the thing, then I instinctively revolt against that; that is not my job as a teacher *(2010, p.2)*.

Mark Easton, a BBC journalist, has argued that demands on schools to promote British values could damage the ability of young people to understand a multi-cultural democracy *(2014, p.2)*:

> The phrase is fraught with ambiguities and seems almost designed to bring home the UKIP cheerleaders
rather than clarify its own purpose. Is that what teachers should do? We may hold these values dearly. We may believe they offer the best chance for a stable and happy society. We may regard them as superior to all others. But should children be told that as a matter of fact? […] Would a teacher who drew pupils' attention to the weaknesses of democracy be in breach of his duty to promote it? Would promoting the rule of law make it more difficult for schools to teach about civil disobedience? […] And when it comes to mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs, how respectful and tolerant should one be?

Whilst in the policy it is consistent, in a wider sense the phrase ‘British values’ is open to multiple interpretations. For some, it might denote British as opposed to foreign values, reflecting more traditional conservative dispositions of the population. For others, it is about shared values of tolerance and broadmindedness within a multicultural society, a progressive ideal. These two definitions are not compatible. One is a singular fixed identity; the other is an evolving concept. Arguably, you cannot have both at the same time. And, Andy Thornton (Head of the Citizenship Foundation of the UK) is critical of what he deems an oversimplified conception of current civic education. As he argues here:

Instead of introducing the coming generation to the necessary knowledge of their democracy; instead of introducing critical thinking around public life; instead of helping students prepare for the responsibility of running this country in the face of the most uncertain future we might possibly imagine, we have near-silence. We need another racket in the silence. The growing roar of disbelief from those like you [Gove] who know how hard it is to make a complex modern multi-cultural democracy work. Of people getting to their feet and demanding that British values are systematically and intelligently integrated into our children’s education rather than remaining a catchphrase to berate a minority (Thornton, 2014).
Cross party consensus on character education 2014

As discussed above in the introduction to this section, there has been resurgence in academic and political interest in character education in the UK in recent years, and certainly since 2011 in political terms. Character education has not created the divisions described above that relate to the introduction of British Values in UK schools. There has been a considerable amount of cross-party support for the idea and practice. And, notably, although certainly not universally, character education has been known for its alleged uncritical conformism and conservatism (Kristjánsson, 2010, p.397) This was partly as a result of the appointment of Nicky Morgan as Secretary of State for Education in 2014 replacing Gove who was moved to the position of Chief Whip. In her short time in the post, Morgan replaced Gove’s emphasis on academic subjects with more ‘whole child’ approach and gave significant amounts to schools to fund character education. The Jubilee Centre, at Birmingham University, who developed a Framework for Character Education in Schools (2013) and has produced substantial curriculum guidance, supported this policy drive. Character education was characterised by four distinct virtues: moral, intellectual, civic and performance. Research into the state of character education in UK schools carried out by The Jubilee Centre (Arthur et al, 2015) found that, whilst it was broadly welcomed by teachers and parents, the emphasis to date had been more on the performance virtues (for example, resilience, being goal oriented) rather than more substantial moral, intellectual and civic virtues and makes recommendations to remedy what it describes as the overemphasis on performance goals to the detriment of other virtues (p.10).
Conclusion

Since the 1970s, citizenship education in England has remained high on the policy agenda but has not yet arrived at an adequate approach to meet the considerable challenges facing modern liberal democracies and their citizens. This chapter has provided an overview of UK government civic education policy and has found that it has taken on various curricular forms in relation to societal needs and pressure and has reflected the various ideological positions of each government. The Conservative approach to citizenship education has been broadly ‘minimal’ in relation to an explicit ‘civic morality’ and a limited role for the state in taking responsibility for individuals’ lives, but has remained highly interventionist in relation to promoting a strong version of shared British Identity. This promotion of shared values has been high at the level of exhortation to accept these shared values but has stopped short of an explicitly patriotic agenda. There has been no explicit exhortation for children or young people to learn to love their country. Under various Labour governments, a broadly civic republican approach has been evident in civic education policy. The state has been deemed to have significant responsibility for individual and societal welfare, and citizens have been seen to have entitlements and rights. However, these rights have been coupled with a strong promotion of individual and community responsibility. The civic republican approach has promoted the idea, and devised policy to ensure that, citizens are educated and supported - and sanctioned when they fail - to take greater responsibility for their own welfare.

It is argued here that neither of these approaches yet meets the needs of either individual citizens or modern liberal democratic society. The challenge for liberal democracies and
civic education is a tough one. It is worth citing Callan again here to capture this dilemma:

A necessary feature of free societies is the extension of a particular set of rights to all citizens, including rights to liberty, association, and political participation. But so far as citizens use their rights to protect or advance the different ways of life they cherish, any such society is also pluralistic in ways that may pose a threat to liberal democracy. If the role of state education is to keep faith with its constitutive morality, a path must be found between the horns of this dilemma (1997, p.9).

Promoting the ‘liberal way of life’ could, in principle, breach its own values. But, this is a dilemma that needs to be overcome. Too much is at stake, as has been argued above, and a way through needs to be found that both preserves fundamental liberal values and creates enough of a ‘common’ project that motivates citizens enough to participate and continue to shape and renew modern plural liberal societies. It has been argued here that the imposition of a shared identity in the manner promoted by Conservative policy fails to satisfy the liberal principles of autonomy, tolerance and fairness. And, furthermore, this approach does not work adequately in practice given that it is likely to alienate - or at least fail to engage - many minority or alienated groups. It has been argued here that the important sense of national solidarity should come from the concept of ‘shared fate’ rather than ‘common identity’. The Ajegbo proposals, implemented by the Labour government in 2007, came close to integrating a sense of shared fate within a plural, multi-cultural national community whilst retaining the essentially liberal virtues of cultivating critical rationality. But, as argued above, even this approach did not adequately describe why young people would engage with their national community. What is needed, in order to develop a more fitting and effective civic education policy is
a more explicitly patriotic dimension to the curriculum. This would provide the necessary affective motivation for young people to engage with liberal democratic processes. Patriotic education could, if done appropriately, ‘systematically and intelligently’, to borrow the words of Thornton above, provide vital force to the preservation of plural liberal democratic communities. It could educate the young to view their national community as necessarily diverse, loveable as such and theirs to shape and it could provide the motivation to engage with liberal democratic processes. If it is conceived of as an open-ended project with liberal principles at its core, it goes a long way to providing the way though the challenge of reconciling the need to keep faith with liberal democracy’s essential morality and safe guarding – perhaps improving – its future prospects. It is the task of the following chapters to outline how progressive patriotic civic education could overcome the shortcomings of existing policies and create the path ‘between the horns of this dilemma’.
CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS PATRIOTISM?

Patriotism, according to common definition, is love of one’s country. The purpose of this chapter is simply to establish agreement on the term itself and to test the traditional definition ‘love of one’s country’ for its adequacy. The core question is: do each of these components, ‘love’, ‘country’ and ‘one’s’ amount to the necessary and sufficient conditions of the term patriotism? Different views on the definition of patriotism will be examined and each will be discussed in relation to each of these core components (‘love, ‘country’ and ‘one’s’). In arriving at a defensible definition of patriotism it is important to consider the meaning of the constituent terms. As Soutphommasane states:

After all, what must such a ‘love’ involve? And what precisely must ‘country’ mean? Whether patriotism is merely an emotion or more similar to a reasoned attitude; whether it is a product of the authoritative demands of tradition or of considered reflection; whether it should be directed at one’s physical homeland, fellow citizens, republic or nation; whether it is oriented towards improving one’s country or expressed against people outside it – not all such questions can be answered by declaring ‘pro patria’ (2012, p.19).

Patriotism can take many forms as this quotation implies. The enactment of its meaning can involve a noble, generous civic pride or equally a belligerent, narrow chauvinism. It can be used to serve progressive social democratic ends by motivating citizens to vote for tax policy to support a thriving public sector in spite of personal financial loss. There are also many contemporary examples of love of country being used to justify limiting individual liberties or to fuel racism. But clearly it would be a mistake to simply conflate patriotism with racism. A liberal democrat may love her country as
much as a fascist. Whilst it is important to consider the various forms patriotism takes in
defence of its place within liberal democratic education, this chapter restricts itself to
arriving at an agreeable definition only. Subsequent chapters will explore the various
forms of patriotism and their desirability or compatibility with liberal social
democracies.

Three views on the definition of patriotism will be explored here. The first view can be
described as the wide, traditional dictionary definition of patriotism, that is, love of
one’s country’. Proponents of this view (for example, Callan, 2006, Hand, 2010,
Sparrow, 2007) argue that no further qualification or adaption is needed to the most
common dictionary definition. The second view is defined here as the ‘narrower,
qualified dictionary view’. This view suggests that the traditional definition is too open
and vague. Proponents of this view suggest, for example, that the term ‘love of country’
does not adequately communicate special concern for compatriots (for example,
Primoratz, 2006, Soutphommasane, 2012). The third view can be described as the
‘adapted view’. Here, proponents (for example, Kleinig, 2007) suggest that there is a
need to replace the phrase ‘love of’ with ‘loyalty towards’. Each of these views on the
definition of patriotism will be assessed in relation to an exploration of the many and
various interpretations of what it means to love, what the object of that love is and what
it means for the object of love to be a person or entity comprising persons. In the
discussion of the object of patriotic love, the differences between patriotism and
nationalism are also explored. The chapter concludes with a defence of the wide,
original definition, ‘love of one’s country’, as an adequate definition of the term
patriotism for the purposes of this thesis.
An overview of three views on the definition of patriotism

Igor Primoratz (2007) and Tim Soutphommasane (2012) are proponents of the ‘narrower, qualified dictionary view’ of patriotism and argue that, while love is a necessary term within the definition of patriotism, it is not sufficient. Here, Primoratz suggests that patriotism is:

Love of one’s country, identification with it and a special concern for its wellbeing and that of compatriots (2007, p.18).

Here, Primoratz appears to see the need for qualifications of what patriotic love for a country may entail: that is ‘identification with it’ and ‘special concern’ for it. Furthermore, he indicates the need to make explicit that this ‘special concern’ includes a special concern for compatriots as well as the country itself. Primoratz also worries about the potential vagueness of the phrase ‘the country’ and suggests that ‘if one is to be a patriot of a country, the country must be his in some significant sense; and that may be best captured by speaking of one’s identification with it’ (ibid.). This identification can be expressed in pride and shame for achievements and lapses, which, by definition, involves others who also identify with it, that is, compatriots. Love of country is too broad a definition of patriotism for Primoratz. He argues that love within any definition of patriotism requires further explanation. To love a country in a patriotic way means developing or possessing a special concern for it and identifying with it beyond simple membership by birth or citizenship. Furthermore, for Primoratz the term ‘country’ within patriotism does not necessarily entail the idea of compatriots. Loving a country - without his qualifications - could involve having strong sentiments in terms of its

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15 Andrew Mason (1997) makes a case that there should be special concern for long-term residents and fellow citizen - not just compatriots.
geography, landscape and history without any necessary emotional feeling towards fellow inhabitants. Primoratz finds this to be unacceptable as an understanding of patriotism and therefore adds the idea of compatriots within his narrower and more qualified definition. Tim Soutphommasane argues along similar lines by stating the following: ‘Patriotism refers to an identification with one’s political community, and a special concern for its welfare and the welfare of one’s fellow citizens (Soutphommasane, 2012, p.19). As such, Soutphommasane is suggesting that the term ‘country’ itself does not necessarily connote the political community of that country. He continues with qualifications of the notion of patriotism by suggesting that patriotism can be understood as having three dimensions: ‘as a mode of loyalty, as a moral stance and as an expression of citizenship’ (op. cit. p.20).

John Kleinig (2007) captures the ‘adapted view’ of patriotism. He concurs with Soutphommasane in relation to the idea of loyalty but argues that the common characterisation of patriotism as love of one’s country is not only inadequate but potentially misleading (2007, p.43). He argues thus:

It is frequently said that patriotism is ‘love of one’s country’. I am not altogether comfortable with that as a general account, even though patriots frequently do love their countries. Some part of my hesitation stems from the multiple ambiguities of ‘love’. [...] Although love may be critical/tough, the informal or popular focus on love as expressive of devotion and positive emotional support too easily allows for a misleading exploitation of patriotic identification when characterised as love of country. [...] [...] it seems less misleading to construe patriotism as a form of loyalty (toward country) than love for country (ibid.).
Hand provides us with a defence of the traditional or dictionary view. He suggests that the core definition of patriotism as ‘love of country’ will suffice. He states that it is therefore ‘a certain kind of emotional attachment to a certain kind of object’ (2010, p.2).

The ‘certain kind of object’, that is, a country ‘comprises a national community and the land on which it resides’. Hand provides a description of what unites the idea of a national community and its land:

The unity of these elements lies in the fact that nations are conceptually connected to their homelands: a constitutive and distinguishing feature of national communities is a shared sense of belonging to a particular geographical place (ibid.).

Eamonn Callan (2006) also accepts the wide, traditional dictionary definition of patriotism as love of one’s country. Whilst Callan clarifies what is meant by each term within this definition, he is satisfied with this broad understanding that patriotism mean loving one’s country. His explanation of each of the terms within the phrase ‘love of one’s country’ serves to defend its adequacy for the job. Callan’s definition of the term ‘country’ in relation to patriotism includes the ideal of belonging to and concern for both the place and the people within it – past, present and future. As he suggests: ‘[Country is] a certain kind of territorially concentrated, intergenerational community to which the patriot belongs and whose survival and prosperity she values deeply’ (2006, p.533). Callan’s choice of language in this explication of the term ‘country’ suggests that love of it should in some way motivate a person towards certain kinds of action, that is, to enact the value of caring about one’s country’s towards maintaining its survival and contributing to its prosperity in some way. It would be contradictory to value the survival and prosperity of something and not, in some way, actively support
its continuance and flourishing. Hand, on the contrary, argues for more minimal connotations in suggesting that a patriot can love her country for the sense of belonging to a national community and shared geographical space it engenders. This love of country may engender certain behavioural responses but does not necessarily connote behaviours to actively promote its flourishing. But both Callan and Hand would agree that, regardless of how this love is enacted, and towards what object precisely, the core definition will suffice.

The different interpretations and definitions of patriotism between these scholars suggest that there is further examination and explication required of the definition and the constituent terms within it. For example, as a retort to Primoratz and Soutphommasane’s narrower definition of patriotism, it could be argued, as Hand implies, that if we love a place we feel we belong to, does this not in itself imply an identification of sorts with it and a care for it and by definition an amount of loyalty towards it? And Callan’s notion of valuing deeply the survival and prosperity of one’s country defined as ‘an intergenerational community’ also implies that there is also some special concern for compatriots, as well as loyalty towards country, built into the definition. However, it may be that what Hand or Callan mean by the term ‘belonging’ is not akin to the phrase ‘identification with’ that Primoratz and Soutphommasane use. Does their use of phrase ‘identification with’ mean that something is partly constitutive of my identity in that, for example, I would not really be me if I were not English? The terms ‘belonging’, ‘attachment to’ and ‘identification with’ need further conceptual clarity. Furthermore, the notion of ‘country’ as the object of patriotic love or loyalty also requires further explanation. Does it refer to the geographical space, the national community and/or the political community and/or the state?
Primoratz and Soutphommasane, from the narrower, qualified dictionary view, suggest that the solution to this complexity is to restrict and qualify the definition to explain not only what this love comprises (special concern) but to whom - or towards what - it should be directed (country as nation and state institutions as well as compatriots). Kleinig’s response is to do away with the notion of love, as it is too complex to be useful within the idea of patriotism – and to propose an adaptation to the definition. Hand and Callan, on the other hand, are satisfied with the essential definition of patriotism as love of country. They argue that there are variations in types of patriotism but that the essential definition remains fit for purpose. The task ahead, therefore, is to take each component of the common definition of patriotism and to assess its meaning and in turn its necessity and sufficiency within a defensible definition of patriotism.

What kind of love is patriotic love?

Let us start with love. Hand, amongst others, above clearly argues that there is a clear enough definition of love that should suffice in defining patriotism a love of country without further explanation. Proponents of the ‘narrower qualified’ or ‘adapted’ definition of patriotism imply that the different types of love and that its many ambiguities render it problematic for this purpose. There is clearly some conceptual work to be done given the everyday language use of the term. It is quite reasonable for a person to state that she loves chocolate, red wine, her dog, her children, her spouse and her country. It is also quite plausible for a person to state that, as a Christian for example, she loves her neighbour. As such it seems sensible to organise these kinds of love into different categories as, for example C. S. Lewis does in his book *The Four
Loves (1960). He identifies the following four different kinds of love: *storge* (affection through familiarity or brotherly love); *philia* (love between friends); *eros* (romantic love) and *agape* (charitable, unconditional love).

John Wilson agrees that it is possible to identify different logical constituents of different kinds of love. As he states here:

> [...] there are indeed different kinds of love – *eros, philia, agape*, ‘passion’, ‘affection’, ‘charity’ and so forth. [And] we may then happily go on to identify different logical constituents of each (1995, p.13).

However, he suggests that it is also quite possible to defend an overarching core concept of love. And he goes on to suggest that it is worth attempting to define love in terms of its core concept (if there is one) before looking at different categories. He continues:

> I think there is a basic concept, which appears in the English verb ‘love’ and which parallels in many other languages (*aimer, lieben, amare*, etc.). One may be indifferent to an object, quite like it, like it a lot, and love it; and one can love it *du tout, un peu, passionément*, or *à la folie*. The fundamental and simple idea is that one finds pleasure in the object and gets pleasure out of it; and hence (since one cannot do that all the time in an immediate and practical way) one is strongly attached to it in one’s mind and heart, seeks it out, and wishes to preserve it’. [...] to love something is just to have a fairly permanent kind of intensity of desire for it and attachment to it (*ibid.* p.14).

To love something means that a person derives pleasure from the object of love and that there is a strong feeling of attachment to it. Furthermore, that declaring love for something requires more than fleeting feeling and thereby there is an implication of a
certain level of steadfastness involved. Love is more than a passing fancy or casual whim. Here love can be differentiated with mere ‘want’. As Wilson explains:

I may want food when I am hungry at a particular time (perhaps quite a long time); but if I say that I love food, that suggests a more permanent disposition – a permanency of desire or want is directed towards food in general; I am greedy, or perhaps a gourmet. And furthermore, I may want food for a special purpose (I am hungry or I am about to have a dinner party) but if I love food and am asked what do you love food for? I could reply ‘Well I just love it’ (op. cit. p.20).

If we can give a reasonable answer to the question ‘Why do you love x?’ as ‘Well I just do’, as Wilson does above, it follows that that love is not entirely dependent on the merits of the beloved object or entity. As Callan says (2006, p.525) ‘We unashamedly love unremarkable cats and dogs’. And he argues that love cannot be determined by some kind of neutral assessment of the object of love. If that were the case, we would have to withdraw love or give more love depending on the changing merits of the beloved. As Callan suggests: the very existence of love seems to require a certain emotional generosity toward its object independent of what any dispassionate evaluation of the object’s merits could warrant’ (ibid.).

Hand is in agreement here and argues that it is right ‘to reject the cognitive theory that requires all emotions to have constitutive thoughts. Most emotions […] are constituted in part by thought about their objects, but a few are not; and love is an instance of the latter. There is nothing that could be true of any of the things I love in the world that would make my love for them representationally inappropriate’ (2012, p.11). More knowledge of the beloved object does not, according to Hand here, necessarily affect
one’s love for it. In fact, he suggests that cognitive understanding of the beloved is a side issue.

In arriving at an understanding of love within the definition of patriotism, the object of love may be significant – and clearly is significant for Primoratz and Soutphommasane. Could it be argued that loving chocolate or football does not convey the same meaning of love itself when we use the word to describe loving one’s children or loving your neighbour? Wilson suggests that there may be further light shed on the idea of love itself when one looks further at the object of love. As he states here: ‘Any moralising or indeed any conceptual analysis should start with the basic concept of love in relation to its object.’ For example, in relation to love towards a person or people: ‘here we have to ask what is involved in loving a person, as well as what is involved in loving a person’ (op. cit. p.15). Callan takes this idea forward in arguing that there are ‘species of love’ (2006, p.527): moralised love as opposed to ethically neutral kinds of love. For Callan loving a person or persons, or indeed patriotic love, is a species of love that is ‘moralised’ as opposed to ‘ethically passive’ and he describes the difference between them thus:

It is not the same kind of love as, say, love of Beethoven which is an ‘ethically passive’ kind of love and could be abandoned relatively easily for a new love, say, Mozart. Patriotic love - or love of a spouse or child - requires devotion or at least some general willingness to incur significant cost for the sake of the beloved (2006. p.528).

This does not imply that a person’s love of Beethoven is not felt deeply at the time of loving or intended to be long lasting, according to Callan. Rather, it is the fact that moralised love may involve the kind of devotion and self-sacrifice to someone or
something that continues through challenging times and despite a variety of similar and potentially lovable alternatives. We can love other people’s children but it is virtually unthinkable, for example, to most of us to transfer our parental love for our own child to someone else’s. Arguably one could transfer love of red wine to love of some other drink over time. And it is difficult to imagine what sacrifices one would make for red wine or chocolate. It may be possible to consider what I would sacrifice to obtain some red wine or to buy chocolate, for example, giving up an important activity in order to buy before the shops close. This is not making a sacrifice for the object of love. It is merely sacrificing something to obtain the object of love. These objects of love do not have their own interests. But we may consider making considerable sacrifices at some cost to us for children we love and many parents would consider making the ultimate sacrifice of giving their lives for their own children.

On the other hand, one can imagine a scenario where lovers of Beethoven or wine or chocolate would make considerable sacrifices if the object of their love were in some way fundamentally under threat. There have been cases where certain kinds of music are deemed politically inappropriate (local folk songs or songs in a native language which is being eradicated) or where consuming alcohol has been illegal (prohibition for example). People have gone to the ultimate lengths to preserve certain aspects of culture that they love in these cases. Kleinig in arguing for the replacement of love with loyalty argues that love can indeed animate us in ways that are beyond our control. I have some sympathy with this view as I think I would be very likely to jump in a dangerous, fast moving river after my dog without giving my actions much thought – and may as a result deprive my very beloved children of a mother. Furthermore, Kleinig argues, love is too vulnerable to distortion as it can lead to otherwise reasonable people being over
generous about their beloved. Its emotional nature, he argues, makes it vulnerable to this kind of manipulation. A better definition of patriotism would be to replace the notion of love with something more akin to a reasoned attitude or a learnable virtue like loyalty according to Kleinig (2007, p.52). Virtues can be developed and manifest themselves in excellence of character rather than as emotional preferences, it is argued. And, furthermore, there is a potentially troubling element of emotions that associates them with hot bloodedness as opposed to cool headedness. As Adlai Stevenson, a Democratic politician, says here in relation to the kind of patriotism that needs to be cultivated in 1950s USA:

A patriotism which is not short, frenzied outbursts of emotion, but the tranquil and steady dedication of a lifetime (1952, cited in Davis, 1967).

George Kateb agrees with some of Kleinig’s concerns and likens patriotic love to the worship of a false god (2006). Patriotic love, according to Kateb, inevitably leads to an act of bad faith as our love blinds us to reason and the exercise of objective judgement (op. cit. p.901). In effect it robs us of our autonomy. Whilst this may be acceptable in loving individual persons it is not, according to these commentators, acceptable in loving countries. The implication here is that patriotic love is an emotion that is difficult to subject to reason or the will. Many ordinary language definitions contribute to this understanding of the emotions as beyond reasonable control. Here is one definition of emotion from the Oxford English Dictionary: ‘A strong feeling deriving from one’s circumstances, mood, or relationships with others’ followed by this sample sentence ‘she was attempting to control her emotions’. A further example confirms this: ‘Instinctive or intuitive feeling as distinguished from reasoning or knowledge’ with the
sample sentence, ‘responses have to be based on historical insight, not simply on emotion’ (OED, 2016).

There is considerable debate about the nature of emotion and, on the face of it, the range of emotions do appear to defy easy categorisation. What, for example, does a mood (for example a free-floating feeling of despair or ennui) have in common with indignation that is accompanied by plenty of supporting evidence to justify the anger? This is not the place for a comprehensive analysis of emotions here. It is enough to state the fact that emotions are, by definition, passionate, but not to the point of being beyond subjugation to the will. We can - and should - often exercise control over these strong feelings. Furthermore, some scholars (see for example, Sartre, 1948; Kenny, 1963; Nussbaum, 2001) suggest that it is a fallacy to suggest that emotions have no place in critical reason and that they can be steady, long-lived feelings. A person can feel sustained justified anger or understandable guilt and so on, according to this view. Furthermore, the suggestion here is that the cultivation of emotion may not necessarily be subject to abuse. Indeed, surely, some emotions - joy, shame, love - should be cultivated by parents, for example. Aspects of a curriculum may involve children learning to manage their emotions, for example, anger or jealousy; others should be experienced whilst at school, such as joy. And so on.

Love, understood as an emotion, can of course be prone to pathological distortion. But, surely, so too can loyalty, understood as a virtue. It is quite easy to imagine a loyal Nazi running an effective death camp or an abused wife who remains loyal to her murderous husband. But like loyalty, love can also be the product of calm deliberation and the exercise of choice. It can also be nurtured and learned. And, like loyalty, it can be
withdrawn. Love, like loyalty, also involves judgement. It might diminish if the beloved is deemed to be, say cowardly or selfish. And indeed it might not diminish if the lover can exercise some imagination about future possibilities for the beloved and the beloved is open to change. And it may continue despite flaws and imperfections in the beloved.

Where does this leave us in relation to the three definitions of patriotism, ‘wider traditional’, ‘narrower qualified’ and ‘adapted’, and the use of the concept of ‘love’ within each? Is it necessary, as for example Kleinig suggests, to replace love with loyalty? Or to expand the notion of love to include its responsibilities (special concern) and its objects (compatriots) as Primoratz suggests? It has been argued above that whilst there are many different kinds of love there are some common constituents of it that render the concept meaningful within the definition of patriotism. To repeat John Wilson’s words (op. cit. p.25): ‘to love something is just to have a fairly permanent kind of intensity of desire for it and attachment to it’. Other common features of love suggest that love is non-instrumental and emotionally generous - which is not to say it is blind. It has also been argued here that love is an emotion that can be subjected to reason and the will. Therefore, in the light of this examination, we can safely dismiss the idea that love should be replaced with loyalty because of the vulnerability of emotions to distortion. Furthermore, it has been argued that the concept of love includes a steadfastness and intended longevity that contains the notion of loyalty within it. Whilst it is possible to imagine that loyalty can be - and often is - accompanied by love it is not necessarily so. I am a loyal member of the Labour Party but I cannot honestly say that I love it. I defend my childhood hometown vehemently when it is criticised but, again, I cannot say I love it. I left it as soon as I could. On these grounds then we need not accept the ‘adapted definition’ of patriotism suggested by Kleinig.
We have argued that love can be distorted, it can be steadfast, it can be learned, lost, and subject to judgement. Love can motivate us to actions that may feel beyond our control. It can also motivate us to conscious acts of self-sacrifice. As we stated above: to love something means that a person derives pleasure from the object of love and that there is a strong feeling of attachment to it. The important issue for our definition of patriotism is to ascertain whether we need to be explicit that love in the term ‘love of one’s country’ requires qualification in the ways that Primoratz and Soutphommasane suggest. Two issues arise here. First, Primoratz and Soutphommasane appear to suggest that loving a country is a moralised kind of love rather than an ethically neutral kind of love, to use Callan’s phrase. As such they perceive the need to add the qualification to the definition that ensures this is understood. Love, in the case of patriotism, involves ‘special concern for compatriots’, for example. Here they imply that the term ‘love’ alone does not necessarily involve special concern for the object of love. It would not make sense to say, for example, that I have ‘special concern for chocolate’ even though I love it but it might make sense to add the qualification in the case of a country. Furthermore, the aspect of love that connotes a strong feeling of attachment to the beloved requires spelling out further according to Primoratz and Soutphommasane. This strong feeling of attachment (love) requires ‘identification with country and compatriots’ suggesting that the special concern is more likely to arise if it is accompanied by some kind of bond with one’s homeland and with those who also, in some way, belong to it – and are connected to the patriot.

The second issue that arises here is whether the narrower, qualified definition that these scholars offer is a definition of what it means to be a good - as opposed to a weak or bad
- patriot, rather than simply arriving at a core definition of patriotism regardless of the form it takes. Is the distinction between moralised notion of love as opposed to the love that is associated with an ethically neutral great interest or pleasure in something helpful to our definition of patriotism as love of country? Arguably not. Some people may call themselves patriots and may take great pleasure in aspects of national life and take a keen interest in them but do not see any burden of responsibility falling upon them and do not in any meaningful way identify with the country or compatriots. Paying required taxes may be deemed sufficient to this patriot, as opposed to any significant self-sacrifice, let alone the more historical notion of making the ultimate patriotic sacrifice for one’s country as captured in the well-known phrase, *dolce et decorum est pro patria mori*. The former group may not be the noblest patriots but they are surely, nonetheless, patriots. There are many different kinds of patriots and it is arguably not the job of the core definition to narrow its description in order to exclude all but the acceptable forms. This is what Primoratz and Soutphommasane seem to be doing here. As such, we can also dismiss the ‘narrower qualified dictionary’ view in relation to the concept of ‘love’ within our definition of patriotism.

So far it has been argued that narrowing, qualifying or adapting the term love in the core definition of patriotism, suggested by Primoratz, Soutphommasane and Kleinig respectively, is not needed. The wider, traditional dictionary view remains intact. We shall now turn our attention to the object of patriotic love: one’s country.
What is the object of patriotic love?

Simply declaring *pro patria* does not easily address the question of what one’s patriotic love should be directed towards. Should it, for example, be directed to ‘one’s physical homeland, fellow citizens, republic or nation?’ as Soutphommasane asks (2012, p.18). One ontological argument dismisses the possibility of loving an abstract entity such as a county or nation. Countries do not exist as objects and therefore cannot be objects of love. Benedict Anderson (1991) describes countries as ‘imagined communities’ not in an ontological way, but in the sense that the relationships and interactions go beyond the interpersonal and face-to-face and require an act of imagination on the part of the participants. One’s country can arguably be understood as the landscape and familiar scenes or features of one’s homeland. In relation to England one may conjure up images of the countryside, cricket, marmalade and so on. Or as John Major says: ‘long shadows on the county grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and … old maids cycling to Holy Communion in the morning mist’ (cited in Paxman, 1999, p.142).

However, according to Soutphommasane, a person who only cares for the landscape or lifestyle associated with her country, could not rightly be considered a patriot: ‘to talk of one’s country is not simply to refer to the spot on earth where one is born or lives, but also that polity of which one is a member’ (*op. cit.* p.19). And Primoratz concurs: ‘[…] in modern usage, the patriot’s love of his country is not restricted to the land and those living within it, but also encompasses the state and its citizens. Patria is not merely a geographical term but also a political term’ (2007, p.18). In the distant past, even when the patria was clearly associated with a city on a hill, say, a love of country was ‘tied less to the specific locale of the city and more to an idea, whether it was the polis of the
Athenian city state or the laws of the Roman Republic (Dietz, 2002, p.202). According to Soutphommasane patriotism is the love attached to the political form of one’s country. As he states here:

That patriotism is political in character may sometimes be obscured. Patriotism derives from the etymological root, patria – the native city or fatherland – but its meaning can often take on a naturalistic flavour (2012, p.19).

Whilst Welsh patriots may rightly disagree with the inclusion of the state in any notion of patriotism as described by Primoratz above, and Palestinians may find the notion of country and state problematic, we can acknowledge that the etymology of the word patriotism suggests that there is some merit in the argument that the notion of country can include its political institutions. However, if we limit patriotic love only to certain political forms of the country alone (and we should acknowledge that neither scholar above is in fact doing this) we could find ourselves being reduced to a Habermasian version of ‘constitutional’ patriotism (2001). Here it is the constitution of a country that is the object of love. Superficially this, for example, denies the British or New Zealanders any rights to be patriots, as Great Britain and New Zealand do not have a formal constitution. It would also enable someone to love a similar constitution in a country other than his or her own and be called (nonsensically) a patriot.

Similarly, it would not be adequate to define the object of patriotic love as the government of a country. It is quite possible to love and defend your country against a particular government. Government does not define a country. Arguably expanding the definition of government to include the institutions of the state may go somewhat
further in defining the object of patriotic love. The state is a wider concept than government. State institutions can be the result of historical traditions and outlive individual governments and can be used to displace governments or government leaders. For example, the US congress investigated claims made against President Nixon between 1972 and 1974, which led to his resignation in the face of impeachment charges. Anarchists may object to this definition of country as ‘the state’ or indeed the expanded notion of state institutions. For anarchists, social (national) life is possible in the absence of the state, and further, that justice is best served by the abolition of the state. But politics does not begin and end with the state and as Robert Sparrow argues: ‘The anarchist objection to patriotism collapses if love can be directed towards a non-state political community’ (2007, p.212).

Arguably though the approach that suggests the patria as the political form of a country misses the point at a more fundamental level and denies patriotism its roots in, or reliance on, pre-political cultural ties at the national level. If we deny patriotism any grounding in nationhood we may be left with a rather limited notion of patriotism grounded only in loving the polity as defined as the political constitution. Our ‘sense of belonging’ stems from our belonging to the polity, rather than to each other, in this case. This, however, may not constitute patriotism in any commonly understood sense, in that, if a patriot loves the polity as defined by the constitution then it would be quite easy to transfer or expand that same love for any similar constitution. Something significant about the ties to each other as part of belonging to a country has been lost in this version of patriotic love. And, as Soutphommasane argues, these ties are essentially national and cultural, rather than purely political (op. cit. p.5). Welsh patriots love their country in the absence of a Welsh state. Welsh nationalists, whilst they may well be patriotic,
want more political independence from the UK. This is not the same thing. Palestinian patriots love the idea (past and future) of their country in the absence of a nation or state.

It may be useful at this point to distinguish between nationalism and patriotism in the interest of clarity for arriving at a core definition of the latter. There have been several descriptions of the differences between nationalism and patriotism. Lord Acton has suggested that nationalism is merely physical and patriotism is more moral (1972). Richard Aldington, the English poet concurs (1950): ‘Patriotism is a lively sense of collective responsibility. Nationalism is a silly cock crowing on its dunghill’. And George Orwell agrees that they are not the same phenomenon too, albeit in different ways:

Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. Both words are normally used in so vague a way that any definition is liable to be challenged, but one must draw a distinction between them, since two different and even opposing ideas are involved. By ‘patriotism’ I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality (1968, p.362).

Whereas Elie Kedourie (1993) argues the opposite and suggests that nationalism has greater moral credentials than patriotism, which is based on a superficial sentimentality. He argues that patriotism is a mere emotional underpinning of nationalism, which is
understood as a political ideology or theory. And aside from these commentators, Soutphommasane presents another perspective here:

Many consider the two terms as belonging to two distinct historical traditions of political thought, and as expressing very different ideas about membership. It is argued that the language of patriotism is drawn from republican thought, and concerns the love of common liberty and the practice of good government, while the language of nationalism descends from the spiritualist romanticism and is used to justify cultural homogeneity (2012, p.5).

One other way of resolving this debate and distinguishing between nationalism and patriotism is to distinguish between what the object of love is in each case. Arguably, both nationalism and patriotism involve love of and attachment to a certain entity. What we could do is to separate out the entities, namely nation and patria. As Primoratz suggests: In the case of patriotism the entity is the patria, one’s country; in the case of nationalism that entity is natio, one’s nation in the ethnic/cultural sense of the term (2007, p.18). In this way nationalism and patriotism are not distinguished by the strength or the nature of the beliefs associated with them, but are more usefully, distinguished in terms of their objects.

However, a more useful distinction may be that nationalism is quite different to patriotism in its nature. Nationalism is a political cause as opposed to patriotism, which is an emotional attachment to one’s country. It seems quite plausible, as argued above with regard to Wales, that one could be a Scottish patriot without being a Scottish nationalist. Nationalism is a political movement; patriotism is not. And as Billy Bragg
argues whilst nationalism is clearly a political movement there are different kinds of beliefs associated with this nationalist cause (2006, p.6):

There are clearly two different strains of nationalism. How else do you account for the diametrically opposed policies of the far-right British National Party and the left-of-centre Scottish National Party? While the BNP campaign vociferously for an end to immigration, the SNP are currently calling for an increase in migration to Scotland to help reverse the country’s alarming declining population. The BNP declares on its website that it exists to ‘secure a future for the indigenous peoples of these islands in the North Atlantic which have been our homeland for millennia’. The SNP’s stamen of values on its website could not be more different. It begins: ‘No one country and no human being is worth more or less than any other’.

These strains of nationalism are clearly different but they are both recognisably strains of the same phenomenon, that is nationalism which is a political movement for self-determination. Nationalism can be understood as the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination. Nationalism aims to lead to the creation and maintenance of a fully sovereign state. Patriotism does not. Patriotism is love of one’s country rather than a political movement towards sovereignty. Archard (1999) concurs:

Patriotism is love of country or nation, and this love is, in terms of the ideal, prescribed to act in certain, often self-denying and self-sacrificial ways, on behalf of one’s country. Nationalism is, as a political theory, a normative claim about the proper sovereign statehood and that states are political communities, which should be bound together by a single national identity: states should be nations and nations should be states (p.159).
Where does this get us to in term of how we define the term country in any common understanding of patriotism? The argument above has attempted to show that the term ‘country’ in any definition of patriotism quite evidently refers to more than landscape or lifestyle. The term patria is political as well as geographical. It should also be clear from the discussion above that loving a country is more than merely loving a constitution but that national and cultural dimensions are crucial to it too. Let us return to Callan’s definition of country as ‘a certain kind of territorially concentrated, intergenerational community to which the patriot belongs and whose survival and prosperity she values deeply’ (2006, p.533). This definition of country seems to satisfy all the conditions - geographical, cultural, historical and political - outlined above. Furthermore, it allows for the fact that there is something continuous or constructed about the idea of a country as a nation. Callan’s definition is not just about national preservation. He allows for an intergenerational community working together to actively value a nation’s ongoing prosperity. This is important. Nation building is by definition a construction but nonetheless important or significant for that (John White, 1993). We may love a country for what it is, or was or could be. We can also love the ideal of a country. Contemporary Palestinian patriots and anti-apartheid South African patriots during the apartheid era (1948 – 1994) come to mind here.

One’s country

Loving any country is not patriotism. I may love Denmark more than the UK in many ways but I could never describe myself as a Danish patriot because, quite simply, I am not Danish. So what do we mean by loving one’s country? In what sense is the country mine? The core ideas of membership and belonging are important here. At its most
minimal there is something about automatic membership by dint of being born somewhere or a default position of belonging somewhere through parent’s nationality or citizenship. I was born in Nairobi, Kenya but both my parents are British. Although I can honestly say that I love Kenya I have never thought of myself as Kenyan in any serious way, especially as we left when I was nine years old. I have no sense of having a Kenyan national identity. I am a British citizen. For example, I know that if I am working overseas temporarily and I die, my body would be repatriated to the United Kingdom. No choice is being exercised here.

Both Primoratz and Soutphommasane, want a narrower, qualified definition of patriotism, and see the need to be explicit about ‘identification with’ one’s country is a fuller sense than the view that the country is simply ‘one’s’ through membership of it. The phrase ‘loving one’s country’ is too open and vague for these scholars. In their qualified definition of patriotism, both imply an element of declared membership or conscious belonging involved in being patriotic; in other words, a patriot would actively defend her membership of a country or declare her belonging publicly (clearly not the same thing as political activism). And stronger still, a patriot would surely be content to be associated with her national community in some way. She may even want this.

Whether her love of her country constitutes a fundamental part of her identity, however, is quite another matter altogether. Charles Taylor, along with Primoratz and Soutphommasane, argues that patriotism involves ‘an identification with’ one’s political community (Taylor, 2002, p.2). What does it mean to identify with something? Does it mean that as patriots we have a shared identity? Ben-Porath (2006) argues that while
there are some advantages to it there are also significant problems with the idea of the formulation of any citizenship as identity:

Regarding oneself as a member of a nation by identity, and not by virtue of interest or choice, is conducive to political cooperation among members of the national community. [...] [However] democratic societies are better served by a public and educational focus on what citizenry shares as related to individuals’ fate rather than to their personal or communal identities (p.27).

She argues that we are in a unique set of circumstances and place that bind us together. The shared fate notion does not ‘describe membership as evident but rather as an individual and communal, interpretive project that is a central aspect of civic life’ (2006, p.29). The assumption here is that these national affiliations are necessarily provisional rather than rigid and that patriotism understood as ‘identity’ implies something more rigid.

Arguably though, Taylor, Primoratz and Soutphommasane are suggesting the terms ‘identification with’ in compatible ways to the idea of shared fate. They are not arguing for identification as something that is essentially constitutive of my identity, in the sense that I may identify with England in the sense that I think that I could not really be me if I were not English. They are arguing that patriotism involves a strong identification with the fate of that community. Whatever happens politically or nationally affect me too. As Taylor puts it:

Patriotic love means more than an adherence to a converging set of moral principles; it is about a common allegiance to an historical community (op. cit. p.3).
However, whilst this may be convincing as one view of patriotism, it is quite plausible
that someone could love her country whilst maintaining a very weak identification with
an historical community or having very little connection or compassion for her
compatriots. Furthermore, a patriot’s love may not involve adhering to a set of
converging moral principles as Taylor states above. The minimal patriot we described
above falls into this category. This patriot pays her required taxes and takes great
pleasure in aspects of national life but does not see any burden of responsibility falling
upon her and does not in any meaningful way identify with the country or her
compatriots. It seems quite reasonable to suggest that this patriot’s country is hers
through membership and belonging alone. Primoratz and Soutphommasane, as well as
Taylor in this instance, are narrowing the definition of patriotism in order to arrive at a
definition of acceptable patriotism in their view. However, for the purposes at arriving
at a core definition of patriotism itself the notions of identification and allegiance that
have been added to refine the definition are superfluous. Thus we can be satisfied with
the notion of a country simply being ‘one’s’ for the purposes of our core definition.

A defence of the traditional definition: love of one’s country

Having examined each of the components of an understanding of patriotism, it seems
that there is no case for qualifying and narrowing the most common definition, love of
one’s country. The traditional dictionary view stands. It has been argued here that love
can be distorted, steadfast, learned, lost, and subject to will and judgement. It can also
motivate us to actions that may feel beyond our control as well as to conscious acts of
self-sacrifice. However, as we stated above: to love something means that a person
derives pleasure from the object of love and that there is a strong feeling of attachment
to it and, as such, the broad concept of love is adequate to cover patriotic love. And by accepting Callan’s definition of ‘country’ we have an idea of country that needs no further qualification in relation to patriotic love either. If a country is ‘a certain kind of territorially concentrated, intergenerational community to which the patriot belongs and whose survival and prosperity she values deeply’ (2006, p.533), this seems to satisfy all the necessary conditions; geographical, cultural, historical and political. There does not seem to be any need to add any qualification about the fact that the term country comprises compatriots too. Furthermore, the minimal sense of what is means for a country to be ‘one’s’ will suffice for our core definition of patriotism. The idea of membership of a country, in the sense of officially belonging to that country, is enough to convey the sense that patriotic love is not love of any country but one’s own country.

The qualifications and adaptation of the definition of patriotism that some important scholars have undertaken do not serve us in arriving at this core definition. Their work does however, provide important contributions to the question: what does it mean to love your country well and in the context of liberal democracy (Callan, 2006). This is the issue to which we shall now turn.
CHAPTER 3: WHY DOES LIBERAL DEMOCRACY NEED PATRIOTISM?

If we are to develop a case for patriotic education in state schools in liberal democracies it is an important step to examine the value of a patriotic citizenry to liberal democratic nations’ flourishing. Therefore, the claim that liberal democracies need patriotism in order to survive and flourish in the modern world will be examined and defended in this chapter. It will be argued that patriotism does not have intrinsic value but that patriotism, when well conceived, contributes necessary instrumental value to modern liberal democracies. The arguments suggesting that patriotism is essentially an anti-liberal concept are set out and defeated. The chapter concludes with the view that thriving liberal democracies depend on a patriotic citizenry.

The starting point of this chapter is to explore the qualities of liberal democratic citizenry in order to judge what patriotic belief and behaviour may or may not add to these. The chapter will then examine some arguments questioning whether patriotism and liberal democracy are indeed compatible in any way. This is followed by an examination of the different kinds of relationships between liberal democracy and patriotism. These include: patriotism as an urgent remedial means to securing the future of increasingly threatened liberal democracies; patriotism as a tolerable feature of healthy democracies; and patriotism as essentially compatible with liberal democracy. Patriotism as a foundational concept in liberal democracy is also explored, as are the ways in which patriotism might enhance modern liberal democracies. Arguments propounding patriotism as an instrumental means for securing the ends of healthy democracy are examined in the light of those suggesting that patriotic liberal democracies are ends in themselves. The conclusion of the chapter will defend
patriotism’s value to the survival as well as the continued flourishing of modern liberal democracies.

**What are the qualities of liberal democratic citizens?**

Freedom of speech, thought, conscience, private property and due process of law would be recognisable features of any liberal society. Protecting and enhancing the freedom of the individual is one of the central features of liberal governance. In the Gettysburg Address of 1863, Abraham Lincoln used the phrase summarising liberal democracy as ‘government of the people by the people for the people’. This phrase still contains the essential features of modern democracy and therefore informs the characteristics of contemporary liberal citizens. Liberal democratic governments are elected and funded by the people. As such there are high levels of responsibility and accountability in both directions. Liberal democratic citizens would be expected to accept certain rights, responsibilities and duties, such as, paying taxes, complying with the justice system, participating willingly in the electoral process. Liberal citizens would be expected – and would expect of themselves – to follow certain rules based on reciprocity such as respect for others and tolerance. In return liberal citizens would expect and demand freedoms to make choices about how to live their lives within a broad conception of a ‘common good’.

Furthermore, liberal societies would incorporate protection of citizens against potential abuses of government - or other dominant groups within society - and provide people some freedoms to challenge laws and to enable them to work towards changing them. As such liberal citizens would typically adhere broadly to the maxim ‘live and let live’
and would act to prevent themselves or other individuals being crushed under the wheels of what ‘the majority’ or other ‘majorities’ want.

As Callan states here (1997, p.18):

The centrality of individual freedom to any recognisably liberal policy is incompatible with a comprehensive reinforced ordering of values. An authentically liberal moral doctrine could not dictate the content of the good life in all its fine detail. What liberal doctrines characteristically indicate is something of the style or manner with which we should conduct our lives, without insisting on the priority of any particular ends.

Liberal democracies are political systems that attempt to accommodate people’s varying conceptions of what it means to lead a good life. They have to incorporate diverse groups with competing religious and moral doctrines. However, the inevitable pluralism within liberal democracy requires a degree of wider voluntary, social cooperation.

Liberal theory, according to Rawls (1993, pp.2-3) relies on ‘a willingness to propose fair terms of social cooperation that others as free and equal might endorse, and to act on these terms, provided others do, even contrary to one’s own interests’. A just (liberal) society is one where individuals deliberate through ‘the fair terms of social cooperation’.

It is not sufficient however, according to Gereluk, to say that social cooperation means that community is constitutive of liberal theory: ‘The notion of community must be qualified […] in adhering to the principles of justice, and those that specifically assist toward the development of reciprocity and mutual respect, as citizens as free and equal persons under a fair system of social cooperation’ (2006, p.84).
Given this emphasis on individual freedoms and choice, along with a qualified notion of community within liberal doctrine, it may seem that patriotism with its concomitant expectation of an emotional attachment to the national collective may not align well with these values and behaviours. We shall now turn to address this.

**Minimal tolerance of patriotism within liberal democracies**

On the face of it liberalism and a certain kind of patriotism seem fundamentally incompatible in both moral and political terms. Liberalism privileges personal autonomy, individual liberty and self-government whereas one view of patriotism aligns it to permit, or encourage, a kind of tribalism where the needs of the collective majority trump and repress any non-conforming individual values, views or behaviour. The values and dispositions associated with governance in liberal democracies typically include the need for neutral, dispassionate judgements and minimal state interference. The need for citizens to possess faculties of critical reflection, that require a high level of detachment, seem to preclude many kinds of patriotism.

Kantian moral doctrine is at the bedrock of liberal political philosophy. Universalism is critical and would appear to rule out any notion of the moral privileges for local or partial attachments or exemptions that patriotism warrants. The central tenet of Kant’s critical philosophy is human autonomy and that moral laws apply unconditionally, and to everyone in the same way. So the idea that we owe more to our countrymen, or that we are expected by the state to have greater responsibility towards them, appears to run counter to the fundamental liberal idea that human rights are universal. As Wood says here:
It is an important tenet of Kantian doctrine that ethical duties are laid on each person autonomously by that person's own reason, that the proper incentive for their fulfilment is the person's own inner motive of duty, and that it is wrong and improper for others, or for society in general, to attempt to compel us to fulfil them (1999, p.172).

Patriotic duty, with its sense of collective association – and some would say collective responsibility and even identity – seems to run counter to classical liberal tenets. For Kant, for example, morality’s concern is with the promotion of human perfection and happiness through voluntary conduct motivated by autonomous reason and duty. For Kant, morality begins with one innate right every human possesses simply in virtue of their humanity or rational nature – the right to freedom, or independence of being constrained by another's arbitrary will. And further,

To this right belongs also the right of equality – immunity from being bound by others to more than one can bind them – the right to being one’s own master, and the right of being “beyond reproach”, that is, considered to have done no wrong to others as long as you have not done anything to diminish what is theirs by right (quoted in Wood, p.173 original emphasis).

On the face of it these fundamental rights are the inviolable tenets of liberalism and an assertion of the primacy of an individual’s rights over any claims made by any community, let alone a nation or patria. Other liberal moral philosophers would concur (for example, Rawls) and would agree that the separateness of persons, as opposed to fundamental human-relatedness, is the basic fact for morals. And as such, a liberal democrat’s primary allegiance, according to this view, should be to the community of human beings in the entire world rather than to her compatriots. The political form
assumed by these moral principles is best captured by the notions of negative and positive liberty (Berlin, 1958). An individual can pursue self-mastery (positive liberty) only through minimal state intervention (negative liberty) where laws provide a sort of neutral, non-aggression pact between individuals within a national community, and at their strongest perhaps only the duty to uphold the law protecting these freedoms.

Understandably, from a classic liberal position, patriotism (as conceived in a narrow tribal sense) is not simply illiberal but can been subjected to severe moral criticism. Critics have argued that, ‘it is an arbitrarily exclusive and ultimately egocentric position, is incompatible with universal justice and common human solidarity, and unrestrained by moral considerations’ (this view cited in Primoratz, 2006, p.83). These scholars (for example, Kateb) have also pointed at the historical record of patriotism, which shows that it makes for international tension, conflict, and war. Soutphommasane suggests that some kinds of patriotism can be manipulated to fuel fanatical racism and to support dubious wars in foreign lands. Furthermore, and perhaps most illiberal of all, it can be used to justify government restrictions of individual liberties (2012, p.1). For all these reasons, several liberal scholars (although not Soutphommasane himself) have suggested that it is prudent to discard all patriotism, ‘to think of ourselves as human beings first and last, and to act accordingly’ (Nussbaum, 1996, p.2). In one case, George Kateb argues that it is ‘a mistake twice over: it is typically a grave moral error and its source is a state of mental confusion’ (2006, p.3). He argues that a country is not in any way a ‘discernible collection of discernible individuals’ but is rather an abstraction ... a compound of few actual and many imaginary ingredients’ (ibid.).

These varying ‘ingredients’ within liberal democratic states include many and sometimes competing conceptions of what it means to lead a good life. For this reason,
one of the principles of liberalism, at its purest, is to view context as irrelevant. Whereas communitarians argue for the primacy of context both philosophically and politically, liberals argue for the neutrality of government amongst the competing conceptions of the good life in order to respect persons as free and individual selves capable of choosing their own ends. The central tenet of Rawlsian liberalism is the importance of impartiality through the application of the *veil of ignorance* in arriving at liberal regulations, which also looks entirely incompatible with the inevitable partiality that love for one’s country and compatriots involves, especially in liberal democracies with high levels of immigration and diverse ethnic populations. This neutrality and detachment is also important, for some scholars, in terms of acquiring one’s moral principles. Whereas for communitarians, like Alasdair MacIntyre (1986) patriotism is an essential moral virtue, one’s societal context - or moral community - is the very source of morality. As Primoratz (2006, p.7) states here:

> On the liberal view where and from whom I learn the principles of morality is just as irrelevant to their contents and my commitment to them, as where I learn the principles of mathematics is irrelevant to their contents and my adherence to them. For MacIntyre, where and from whom I learn my morality is of decisive importance both for my commitment to it and for its very contents.

This distinction goes to the heart of the contradictions between classical liberalism and patriotism understood as a necessary and foundational civic virtue.

However, not all liberals deny the importance of community and surely a core liberal principle would be to tolerate patriots living within any liberal democracy. Furthermore, only the most extreme laissez-faire liberals would argue that being part of a democratic
polity involves no sense of belonging or attachment to a civic community at all. Many liberal scholars of a more moderate persuasion argue that some form of civic responsibility, beyond a non-aggression treaty, is certainly not contradictory to liberal principles (for example, Williams, 1985). Many liberal scholars suggest that it is a requirement to secure the flourishing of liberal democracies. The proto modern liberal theorist, Rawls himself, gives community a central place in modern liberal theory according to several scholars (for example, Gereluk, 2008, Wood, 1999). According to these scholars, liberals value community and see them as a meaningful part of many people’s lives. Communities *per se* cannot be judged either good or bad. A liberal conception of community, according to Gereluk, ‘provides an evaluative mechanism for discerning communities that may be detrimental’ (p.177). As she states here:

> The basic structure of society is underpinned by the fair terms of social cooperation. Liberal theory identifies reciprocity and mutuality as necessary communal dispositions for the stability of a well-ordered society. [...] Communities must observe the constraints of justice ... [and] respect and protect individual interests.

Whilst these scholars may not embrace patriotism as an important virtue, idea or practice worth having or inculcating within liberal democracies, they would certainly a.) tolerate patriots and b.) agree that some notion of a moralised sense of community and citizenship is not only acceptable but part of what it means to be a liberal democracy. Rawls’ liberal theory can be understood as implying a form of political community.

The inculcation of civic virtue in liberal democracies is important and necessary, according to these scholars. However, they would be likely to stop short of accepting
patriotism as a principle of liberalism and also deny its remedial value in preserving liberal democracies.

Can liberal democracy’s need for patriotism be justified on remedial grounds?

Do our increasingly diverse democratic societies force a rethink of this position? Liberal democracies are faced by two, essential and related challenges. Toleration of those with different worldviews is one key liberal principle. However, there are opponents of liberalism who use this principle against it. For example, some groups seeking to undermine liberal democracy use the right to free speech to express their own intolerant views, or further, to incite hatred. The second challenge is that it is difficult to create the ‘common’ project for individuals to coalesce around given that individual autonomy and choice are prized features of liberalism. Procedural liberalism, as the common project, appears to be too weak to inspire people’s loyalty or love. Given these challenges, there has been a rise in attempts, in both European and North American liberal democratic politics, to introduce, resurrect or strengthen patriotism and harness it for the preservation of a liberal agenda. Many of these attempts have been borne out of concerns that in the wake of mass migration and examples of home grown terrorist attacks on home ground, our increasingly diverse democracies need to emphasise the value of national solidarity more explicitly through citizenship programmes and immigration policies. These efforts have come from governments of different ideological persuasions. Some examples include Gordon Brown’s ‘Britishness’ project, the introduction of citizenship tests in the UK, banning the burqa and niqab veils in public places in Belgium and France, the USA Patriot Act 2001 in the post September 11th context. These political decisions have usually been justified ‘in relation to civic solidarity and national values’ (Soutphommasane, 2012, p.2) and sometimes as a
pragmatic reaction to fear of the rise of more virulent and nastier forms of nationalism bordering on xenophobia. They are seen as preventative measures. Whatever the principled objections for patriotism as an illiberal concept there are those who argue that modern liberal democracies are in a state of crisis and argue that some form of patriotism is needed to preserve them in the light of mass immigration, external threats and the centrifugal forces of pluralism (Callan, 1997). In short, patriotism is needed to save liberalism from existential threats.

Charles Taylor goes so far as to state: ‘We cannot do without patriotism in the modern world’ (2002, p.2). The first part of his argument emphasises the remedial importance of patriotism in a world where liberal democracy is highly vulnerable to various threats. One of these threats, according to Taylor is inequality. As he states here (emphasis added):

A citizen democracy is highly vulnerable to the alienation that arises from deep inequalities, and the sense of neglect and indifference that easily arises among abandoned minorities. That is why democratic societies cannot be too inegalitarian. But this means that they must be capable of adopting policies with redistributive effect (and to some extent also with redistributive intent). And such policies require a high degree of mutual commitment. [When this is absent...] this is perhaps the point at which most contemporary democracies threaten to fall apart. (ibid.)

A further concern expressed by several liberal scholars (such as Callan, 1997, Nussbaum, 1996, Soutphommasane, 2012, Tamir, 1993 and Taylor, 2002) is the rise of some virulent forms of chauvinism and racism, which threaten emerging as well as more established democracies. Strengthening national identity and nurturing patriotism
is an important defence against this threat, in their view. As Taylor argues here (2002, p.2).

The present drive towards Hindu chauvinism of the BJP comes as an alternative definition of Indian national identity to the Nehru-Gandhi secular definition of India. And what in the end can defeat this chauvinism but some reinvention of India as a secular republic with which people can identify? I shudder to think of the consequences of abandoning the issue of Indian identity altogether [...].

The pressure of ever increasing pluralism within liberal democratic states, and greater cross border power in the hands of global elites, are further threats. As Eamonn Callan argues, ‘Centrifugal forces and pressures of pluralism should make us worry about the durability of any overlapping conception of justice and the state needs to nourish associative ties’ (1997, p.10). The traditional bonds that held such democracies together are weakening or disappearing, he argues, and this requires even more societal solidarity to support democratic self-government. Taylor concurs by arguing that modern liberal states are very demanding ‘common enterprises in self-rule’. Liberal democracies require a great deal of their members and this requires ‘much greater solidarity towards compatriots than towards humanity in general’ (Taylor, p.2). He summarises the severity of the threat thus: ‘We cannot make a success of these enterprises without strong common identification. And considering the alternatives to democracy in our world, it is not in the interest of humanity that we fail in these enterprises’ (ibid.). And Callan adds a further warning, (1997, p.96) ‘Even if pluralism does not transform democracy into a kind of tribal warfare, democracy may yet perish through a process of affective withdrawal as citizenship becomes a tedious distraction from the real business of living’.
However, from a part of the word where national existential threats are all too real, Israel and Palestine, Yael Tamir warns against justifying nationalism or patriotism on remedial grounds. She argues that, whilst providing a remedial justification one might bring about a good outcome, there are dangers in pursuing this route. Whilst acknowledging that Tamir’s examples come from a context where the state of Israel, and the stateless Palestinians, experience frequent violence, she suggests one always needs to find universal justification for the compatibility of liberalism and nationalism otherwise remedial actions will always rely on contingent features of a particular country’s needs and there can be dangerously illiberal consequences in pursuing this route. Likewise, arguably, there could be illiberal consequences in harnessing the short term benefits of patriotism to serve the survival needs of liberal democracies by suspending or compromising some core principles. For example, the USA Patriot Act 2001 dramatically expanded government powers to stop and search, to conduct secret searches of communication, homes, and medical and financial records (Soutphommasane, p.2).

**Liberal democracy’s reliance on pre-political, civic bonds**

However, whilst the arguments above suggest that patriotism is needed as a response to existential threats to liberal democracies, it can also be argued that liberal democratic states have always relied on pre-political bonds between their members. In other words, the ends of liberalism have always needed some form of civic bonds to be instrumental in these ends. The kinds of democracies that liberal democrats are striving to create, that
is, free, democratic, willing to some degree to share equally, require strong, arguably patriotic, identification on the part of their citizens. As Taylor argues:

A citizen democracy can only work if most of its members are convinced that their political society is a common venture of considerable moment, and believe it to be of vital importance that they participate in the ways they must to keep it functioning as a democracy. This means not only a commitment to the common project, but also a special sense of bonding among people working together in this project (2002, p.120).

More authoritarian states can rely on forms of coercion to mobilise citizens. However, liberal democracies need citizens to commit and respond voluntarily and spontaneously. This level of response is both necessary and not easily achieved without some kinds of identification with common causes, and national ones at that. Taylor and Callan defend the role of patriotism is serving the ends of deliberative democracy which needs trust. It is the affective dimension that patriotism brings that builds the necessary bonds, they argue. This does not preclude critical engagement in a liberal democracy. In fact, Callan would argue that these bonds, which build trust, serve the necessary process of critical engagement.

So, whilst the remedial arguments for liberalism’s needs for patriotism may be too costly, patriotism can be viewed as instrumental in serving the needs of liberal democracies and, according to this line of argument, can be theoretically and universally defended as such. Liberal democracies do not need a mere ‘boost’ of patriotism to support their survival in a crisis but, arguably, they invariably need patriotic citizens for their essential flourishing. Could the citizenry’s love for the national community be, in principle, a necessary component of a fully flourishing liberal democracy?
We do not have to embrace full-blown communitarianism to acknowledge the importance of social relationships in liberal democracies. Within liberal scholarship there is acknowledgment at various levels of the importance of social relationships and the importance of interaction within democratic life. Bernard Williams states that any human being is embodied and lives a social life (1985) and sums up where liberalism differs from communitarianism when he suggests that liberals have ‘a shared requirement to live rather than a requirement to live a shared life’ (p.115). Charles Taylor argues along similar lines when he defends the notion of the autonomous, self-determining individual within liberalism but acknowledges the requirement for the individual to function within a social matrix (Taylor, 1985, p.14). The question remains; what kind of social matrix and is patriotism, in principle, critical to the formation of this matrix?

Pre-political civic bonds

There is a substantial body of political theory that has articulated the civic dimensions of liberalism – and who would not necessarily see the need for patriotic attachments in liberal democracies. Individual liberty and public justification needs some measure of civic bonds amongst the citizenry, it is argued (Macedo, 1995, Mason, 1997, Rawls, 1971). This idea has a long tradition. Mill’s concept of ‘fellow feeling’ is invoked as necessary for the success of a liberal polity: ‘It, and it alone, will sustain the acceptance by the citizenry of the state’s constitutive principles of justice, will motivate their allegiance to its rule of law and define the democratic public culture in which all must participate’. 
Some commentators have described two kinds of bonds between citizenry: thick and thin which may or may not be described as patriotic bonds. Social matrices in this ‘thin’ conception of community are essentially legally-based, participatory and procedural. Dianne Gereluk (2006) describes these as *Gesellschaft* communities requiring minimal interactions other than those needed for economic and political necessity and perhaps individual advantage. Proponents of this view would maintain their belief in the value of individual autonomy but they would also have to acknowledge that the notion of autonomy within liberal democracies is important but already circumscribed in many ways. Even within this ‘thin’ conception of community, there are necessary limits to individual freedoms in light of other liberal values of fairness, mutual respect and reasonableness, for example. Furthermore, there will be limits to individual freedoms when liberal societies have to protect their own pre-conditions and as a result laws limit the choices and behaviours of illiberal groups of racists or mafia members and so on. And, self-evidently, the kind of self-direction that characterises liberal democracies requires some collective decision-making that necessitate compromises and some surrender of individual autonomies. As Tamir suggests (1993) property rights, press freedoms and rights of association all require a fine and at times messy set of compromises.

Furthermore, and as a result of acknowledging the limits of individual autonomy that this entails, proponents of the thin notion of community within participatory liberal democracies also take a measured stance on the notion of impartiality within liberalism. But how far can the idea of impartial detachment be taken without it becoming
impossible? To argue that there is a perfect Archimedean point from which to make entirely rational and detached judgements would involve liberals becoming overly detached. And if the idea of liberal neutrality were taken to extremes we would be left with a potentially very destructive and unmanageable culture of legalism and conflict. Neutrality is not apolitical.

The thin notion of community and social interaction within liberal democracies raises an important point of principle in relation to the nature of liberal principles. Arguably there is nothing contradictory in maintaining liberal principles of generality, universalizability and impartiality whilst maintaining their particularity in a local or even national community. As Stephen Nathanson (1993) argues, the conflict between impartiality and partiality, the universal and the particular, is not as deep as it may appear. As he argues here:

Morality allows for both types of considerations, but at different levels. At one level, one is often justified in taking into account one’s particular attachments and commitments, including those to one’s country. At another, higher level, one can and should reflect on such attachments and commitments from a universal, impartial point of view, delineate their proper scope and determine their weight. It turns out that universal, impartial justice allows everyone to be partial to their own within appropriate limits; universal human concern is best promoted if everyone takes care first of their own (cited in Primoratz, 2006, p.96).

Here Nathanson is suggesting that participatory democracy is well served by some kind of arguably patriotic common civic concern. Fair play and tolerance do not exhaust the possibilities of dispositions that liberal democrats can ask of their citizens; a sense of well-judged and critical partiality to compatriots is, arguably needed too. And David
Miller concurs suggesting that good citizenship within democracies must be reciprocal and requires two things. ‘First, citizens must know who their fellow citizens are and must expect them to act as citizens. Second, each must know enough about the others to know which outcomes are ones that they could possibly accept or not…’ (1995, p.10). So, in sum, even in light of a ‘thin’ notion of community, the condition for a successful participatory model of democracy is a strong identification with the fate of that community and the community in question here is the national one.

This raises the question about just how ‘thin’ this sense of community actually is – and indeed just how thin or thick it needs to be to serve the ends of liberal democracy. Rawlsian liberalism’s duty of fairness, and each individual’s moral duty to abide by laws and to act as reasonable and rational citizens, arguably involves some fairly strong sense of a moral community. It seems clear that civic bonds are needed for liberal democratic flourishing. What is not yet fully argued is whether these civic bonds are stronger and contribute more if they are patriotic bonds.

The concept of civic republicanism arguably captures the idea that successful liberal democracies depend on an essential element of some degree of national belonging as felt by the citizenry. As Sandel argues: ‘The notion of liberty depends on self-government and self-government requires citizens capable of deliberating about the common good, capable of sharing meaningfully in self-government and self-rule’ (cited in Phineas Upham, 2002, p.101). It is worth pausing here to consider whether a defence of these pre-political bonds take us into communitarian as opposed to liberal territory. In ideal terms, what the liberal holds is that the highest political good is freedom. But the liberal might concede that community loyalty is needed to make freedom possible.
because it binds people together into a common liberal project. Community is instrumentally valuable for the traditional liberal. By contrast, communitarians hold that community, or what the community values, is the ultimate political good. Community is intrinsically valuable. Some communitarians may even value the fact that we have built up a democratic system in our community (democracy is part of the British way of doing things, say). But the reason why communitarians value democracy is because it is our way of doing things. It is perfectly possible to take a kind of patriotic pride in our democratic system. And Alistair MacIntyre, the proto communitarian, for example, argues that patriotism is actually the foundational virtue in thriving democracy (1987).

The communitarian defence of patriotism cannot be swallowed whole if we are to maintain a defence of the value of patriotism for the survival and flourishing of specifically liberal democracies. According to the communitarian view the individual is not independent of her community and as such can have no sense of moral right and wrong independently of her community. She can only become a moral agent when informed as such by her community. So an individual can only thrive as a moral agent as a member of a community and her identity is inextricably bound up with the community’s traditions and collective hopes and so on. According to MacIntyre this kind of patriotism allows for patriots to shape their country’s political institutions towards its ‘true’ nature and aspirations. This line of reasoning accords, to some extent, with some other defenders of patriotism as one of the cornerstones of a good, functioning liberal and democratic society (Southphommasane, 2012, Primoratz, 2006). But MacIntyre parts company with them when he makes it clear that there are some aspects of love of and commitment to a patria that require a kind of uncritical stance. Some if its ‘large interests’ are beyond critical scrutiny and MacIntyre admits that true
patriotism involves a ‘fundamentally irrational attitude’ (op. cit. p.13). Placing anything as important as patriotism beyond critical scrutiny does indeed rule out a defence of patriotism along communitarian lines for its place within liberal democracies.

Civic bonds as liberal patriotic bonds

Callan, for one, does not want to place patriotism beyond political scrutiny but he does argue there is a parasitical dimension to some claims that underplay the importance of pre-political bonds of trust and shared values and that in fact liberal democracies depend on shared bonds and sense of attachment to country and each other in order to flourish (2006). This line of reasoning is plausible and suggests that there is a foundational, ethical importance to social relationships within liberalism. Arguably, Rawls’ principle of justice as fairness is moral not just a modus vivendi and that the principle of the good of a well ordered society is a desirable, collective end. This suggests that the kind of social cooperation that Rawls describes in fulfilling the principles of justice and conception of the good require a conception of ethical communities. The social cooperation required for enacting the principles of justice and fairness describes socially coordinated activity not merely social association. This in itself implies a ‘thick’ sense of moral community rather than one based on necessary exchanges for legal or procedural decisions. And Callan, along with others, would argue that, whilst Rawls and others do not use the language of patriotic bonds they are in fact relying on them for the successful functioning of liberal communities. Viroli makes the point explicit by suggesting that ‘patriotism, well understood, is the foundation of a healthy, dynamic, open liberal society’ (1995, p.9).
This line of reasoning suggests that some form of patriotism might be a more valuable component of liberal democracy in its ability to require and engender collective moral responsibility and shared ownership of the structures and processes of democracy. As Primoratz (2004) states:

In a democracy, sovereignty rests with the people. [...] It is the people who are ultimately responsible for those laws and policies. When they are unjust or inhumane, the moral responsibility for the injustice or inhumanity lies with the people. [...] If I am a full-fledged citizen of a democracy, I have a reason to show concern about such laws and policies different and, other things equal, stronger than my concern about immoral laws and policies of other countries. For they are laws and policies of my polity, designed and put into effect on my behalf too. They generate collective responsibility of all citizens, myself included. (Cited in Kleinig et al, 2015, p.1).

Marcia Baron concurs and calls for ‘an expanded understanding of patriotism as a special concern for the flourishing of one’s own country, including its “moral flourishing”’ (1989, p.75). The concern for the moral flourishing of one’s country, she suggests, should be seen as an additional manifestation of patriotism, and one that should make it even more acceptable to adherents of universal, liberal morality. And Martha Nussbaum argues along similar lines suggesting that giving ‘one’s sphere special concern is justifiable in universal terms’ (1996, p.12).

**Conclusion**

Patriotism has been defended in this chapter as an important component in the survival and flourishing of liberal democracies. The remedial argument for giving liberal democracy a much needed boost of patriotism given the existential threats many
democracies feel themselves to be living under have been dismissed. These arguments fail on two counts. First, some of the remedial arguments can be accused of deploying a crude version of patriotic loyalty, which justify illiberal practices in order to defend the longer-term goal of preserving liberal democracy. Second, they do not give sufficient weight to the continuous instrumental value of patriotism within any flourishing liberal democracy. Civic bonds are important for liberal democracy’s flourishing and it has been argued that democratic politics is impossible without some sense of trust and loyalty among citizens. As Soutphommasane argues: ‘Why else would you listen to other individuals and groups in your society, or cooperate with them, unless you could assume that all parties share at least some common goals and aspirations?’ (2012, p.33). These important civic bonds rely on a form of patriotic attachment and serve liberal democracy well.
CHAPTER 4: WHAT KIND OF PATRIOTISM IS NEEDED FOR FLOURISHING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY?

It has been established in Chapter Two that patriotism is love of one’s country and a patriot can be described as someone who has a deep emotional attachment to a nation, which they recognise to be their homeland. This chapter examines the different forms that the nature, form and precise object of this love can take. A tribal, xenophobic, fascist patriot may love her country as much as a social democratic civic patriot but, to use Callan’s term, they may not love their country well (2006, p.527). A constitutional patriot believes the political form of her country is the object of love whereas a MacIntyrean communitarian believes that her national community to be the source of her very moral identity. The work of this chapter is to assess several forms of patriotism and then to describe and defend a kind of patriotism that best contributes to liberal democratic survival and flourishing. Some forms of patriotism are easily ruled out, as their qualities are destructive of liberal democracy, or can be dismissed as essentially illiberal. Tribal, blind or belligerent patriotism will be examined briefly and dismissed, as will trait-based patriotism. Several kinds of patriotism have defensible characteristics and aim to promote liberal democracy’s survival and thriving. This chapter will examine the following defensible versions of patriotism: constitutional and civic patriotism; liberal nationalism and patriotism as a national cultural dialogue. These versions of patriotism will be examined for the way and extent in which they are the best kind of patriotism possible in promoting the health of modern liberal democracies.

The chapter concludes that there are many commendable features in constitutional or civic patriotism, namely; its compatibility with liberal values, its instrumental value, and
its integrity in relation to the kind of love of country expressed. However, it will be found wanting for two reasons. First, it fails to acknowledge the potency of national culture and the pre-political bonds that a vibrant modern democracy relies upon. Second, it emphasises the unifying civic dimensions of the modern liberal polity, which aim to minimise the centrifugal force of diversity, to the detriment of proper recognition of minority groups. This, it will be argued, makes it inadequate to the task of serving the liberal democratic cause as well as possible. Liberal nationalism will be examined as a version of patriotism that does give explicit recognition to the role of the national cultural community in serving the ends of liberal democracy. Its many commendable features will be examined but it too will be found lacking in some important respects, including its inadequate response to the effects of mass migration and effects of increasingly complex *multicultural* national cultures.

The version of patriotism that shall be defended, as that which best serves liberal democracy in the face of current challenges, adopts many of the features of civic and liberal nationalism but adds an important dimension: cultural difference is regarded as a political resource and of intrinsic value. This version of patriotism encourages different groups to give public expression to their distinctiveness and takes the form of a practice; a public dialogue of collective interpretation. Whilst liberal patriots and liberal nationalists give central importance to deliberative democracy as a means of negotiating differences, it is only this cultural version of patriotism that gives enough motivational force for the necessary participation in this important democratic dialogue. It does this by understanding the national culture as pluralistic in its very character and loveable as such. The maintenance of this diverse national culture involves citizens being motivated to participate in the public realm not only by their political responsibility but by their
sense of attachment to their national community through their cultural recognition and their sense of personal belonging as well. This version of patriotism views national culture as an outcome of politics as well as a means to the achievement of political justice.

**Tribal patriotism that threatens liberal democracy**

Patriotism is a many-faced phenomenon and some of its forms serve to undermine or destroy liberal democratic values. There is one face of patriotism as vice, a dubious form of loyalty that can only be described as racist. Our contemporary experience offers many examples of love of country being used to fuel racist violence. For example, in 2006 four white men repeatedly stabbed an Afghan immigrant, who had fled the Taliban regime, outside a London tube station. They laid an England flag over his dead body before running off. Billy Bragg describes this incident in his book *The Progressive Patriot* and he goes on to describe how the fact that people like this, along with his observation of the growing phenomenon of the National Front party in the 1970s made Bragg question his own patriotism.

Any residual patriotism I harboured was eventually knocked out of me by the sight of neo-Nazi National Front marching through the streets in the 1970s, using the Union Jack as a symbol of their bigotry. The image of football hooligans rampaging through foreign cities, chanting my country’s name, didn’t help either. If these people were patriots, as they claimed to be, then I knew for sure that I wasn’t (p.9).

However, as the book title suggests, Bragg has reclaimed his patriotism since the 1970s and has embarked on a project to rehabilitate patriotism in support of a progressive cause. Bragg is a different (better) kind of patriot to the neo Nazis who can still,
however, be described legitimately as patriots, given that they claim to (and probably do) love their country. Eamonn Callan describes this kind of bad patriotism as ‘not a case of misplaced love or lack of love – but a case of departure from the proper conduct of love’ (2006, p.530).

This sort of tribal patriotism involves two kinds of errors with the same root cause. The first involves a kind of delusion about the object of your love. England is, and has been for millennia, a nation comprising many ethnic groups as a result of migration and conquest. The proper conduct of love involves honesty about the beloved and clearly the neo-Nazis patriots are not being honest about this fact. The second error involves a kind of love that ‘sets a false god above the dignity of individual human beings which alone deserves our moral reverence’. As Callan states: The fatal error of those who revere a quasi-deified nation is not their love of country but their idolatrous disregard for the proper reverence for human lives both within and outside the nation’ (op. cit. p.531).

The root cause of this error is also about the proper conduct of love. Idolatry – in the sense Callan uses the term here – involves deifying the object of love, which will always involve some departure from the truth. This is a kind of blindness. In the case of the 2006 murder described above, this false worship involved viewing immigrants as an existential threat to the deified nation and had terrible consequences for the Afghan man. The neo Nazi patriots love their country but value tribal loyalty and defence over honesty or respect for other people and in some cases the lives of others. This is a case of loving badly and as such clearly fails to meet the requirements for the kind of patriotism being advocated in support of progressive and just democracy.
Blind patriotism: our country right or wrong

Another kind of patriotism that may be ruled out is the state-led variety advocated first by Machiavelli in the 16th century when he advises leaders (princes) to ‘break promises, to deceive, to dissemble, and use violence, sometimes in cruel ways and on a large scale, when political actions require such actions’ (1518 (1998), p.515). He continues:

When the safety of one’s country wholly depends on the decision to be taken, no attention should be paid either to justice or injustice, to kindness or cruelty, or to its being praiseworthy or ignominious (ibid.).

In this extreme form of state-led patriotism the interests of one’s country are supposed to override any moral considerations. According to Machiavelli (1525 (1906), Vol. 1, p.175) some citizens of Florence were willing to sacrifice their souls for the sake of their city. Whilst this kind of love of patria is extreme, various manifestations of it in our modern world are, perhaps not as rare as one might hope. ‘Our country right or wrong’ captures the essence of this kind of blind patriotism. Although the original quotation, ‘Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong’ is more nuanced, the thrust of the argument is clear. Whilst there is nothing in this version of patriotism to contradict our core definition, it is ‘a love of country’ that is exclusive, uncritical and unconditional. Not much more needs to be said of the appropriateness of this kind of patriotism, as it amounts to a rejection of liberal morality as well as a departure from the proper conduct of love. “Our country, right or wrong” ‘cannot be right’ (Primoratz, 2006, p.7).

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16 Attributed to Stephen Decatur, a US naval officer, in an after dinner speech in c.1816.
Trait-based patriotism: loving one’s country only for its loveable qualities

The kinds of tribal or blind patriotism described above require patriots to love their country because it is *their* country. Trait-based patriotism is a kind of love of country that requires patriots to love their country because it has *loveable* qualities. Trait-based patriotism results from one’s experience of particular qualities or traits that your country happens to have. It involves love or pride in one’s country’s achievements or qualities. A patriot of the former kind will resort to the special values and merits of her country when asked why she is a patriot. A British patriot may identify with her country’s sense of tolerance and fair play and a French patriot may identify with her country’s revolutionary republican ideals, for example. This kind of value-based patriotism seems more reasonable than the egocentric and immoral nature of tribal or blind patriotism. It seems entirely plausible that one could be expected to love something with loveable qualities. Or as Edmund Burke commented, ‘To make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely’ (1790, Para 130). It also might seem reasonable to suggest that one could cease to love something if these loveable qualities are lost. If Britain lost all its sense of fair play and tolerance it might very well be hard to maintain one’s love for it – if indeed this was the reason one loved it in the first place.

However, there are some problems with this view. Loving a country is not the same as loving a brand of chocolate or wine for example. It would be quite understandable if one ceased to love the chocolate or wine if it lost the beloved qualities and changed beyond all recognition through, say, new ownership or as a result of updating a brand. Some British patriots might say that the neo-liberal policies pursued by the current government in the UK threaten the heart of British culture; the fundamental values of the country they love are being undermined. It might feel to these UK citizens that they
feel like they are living under an occupation (new branding, new management). But this should not – if one is to argue that good patriotism involves loving your country well – mean these patriots cease to love the UK. Many black South African patriots continued to love South Africa during the apartheid years, when, arguably, their country was under occupation. These patriots continued to love their country for what it was and what it could be again. They do not cease to love it because it has lost some of its loveable qualities.

If a patriot loves their country because it has praiseworthy features it seems to be the values or an ideal, not the country itself, which are the objects of love. If this is the case, a trait-based patriot has to be concerned with any country that has similar values. As Soutphommasane (2012, p.20) suggests here:

Let us say that the impartial patriot values her country (P) because it embodies certain features (say because it is a liberal democracy). If her country and another (Q, which, let us say, is not a liberal democracy) were to exchange features, it follows that the impartial patriot should then support Q rather than P.

Leaving aside, for now, whether there can be such a thing as an impartial patriot, it does seem odd at the very least that patriotic love is only based on ideal, loveable qualities. I may love Denmark and its political values but I cannot reasonably describe myself as a Danish patriot. Loving one’s country seems to demand more than this. The proper conduct of love, again to use Callan’s helpful phrase, involves two features that are absent from this kind of trait-based patriotism. The first is that patriotic love involves something that transcends temporary disaffection. Suppose one of the qualities that one loves about your country is blemished or threatened. Some British patriots may view the
neoliberal policies of the current UK government as an erosion of an equitable welfare state funded by progressive taxation policies. A just social welfare system may be a beloved quality of their country. However, if they cease to love their country as a result of current policies this would seem to contravene the normal conduct of love. Loyalty through thick and thin describes love of one’s country more aptly. Love of the ‘proper’ kind may involve some genuine sadness; heartbreak even; active opposition perhaps. The phrase “My country, right or wrong; if right, to be kept right; and if wrong, to be set right”\(^{17}\) may seem apt to patriots that love their country well. The second absent feature is that trait based patriotism seems to privilege that which is loveable in some objective sense above that which just is. If all the things and people we love had to possess qualities that are somehow objectively loveable we may find very little to love. Real countries, as opposed to ideals of a country, are always going to have some unlovely features. This does not make them unlovable.

**Belligerent patriotism: love of country that comes at too high a price**

The phrase ‘belligerent citizenship’ describes the kind of patriotism that emerges when democracies feel threatened and suggest that it manifests as a growing sense of patriotic unity, a growing support for security measures even when they conflict with civil liberties and a reduced tendency to deliberation (Ben-Porath, 2006). Belligerent citizenship, Ben Porath argues, can be viewed - although she does not - as advantageous for a society in times of war or other kinds of existential threat because it helps the citizens survive the hard times and respond to them constructively. It fosters a mutual sense of belonging and supports endurance during hard times. ‘This is an attack on all

\(^{17}\) Attributed to Carl Schurz (a German revolutionary and later US congressman) in 1872.
Americans’ declared President Bush in one of his first responses to the September 11 attacks and shortly after the attacks declared that ‘our people are together and we will prevail’ (cited in Ben-Porath, p.13). A sense of solidarity, and a common cause are regarded by political psychologists as part of the required attitudes for enduring an intractable conflict. As Bar-Tal (1996, p.24) notes:

The purpose of beliefs in unity is to provide a sense that all members of the society support the goals of the conflict and their leaders. They act to strengthen the solidarity and stability. … [A] lack of unity, on the other hand, creates the polarization and internal tensions that hamper the struggle with the enemy.

The patriotic unity that is a distinctive feature of belligerent citizenship comes at a price as it often carries some problematic consequences, for example, the viewing of minority groups with suspicion. Note some of the negative treatment – some violent - towards Arab Americans after the September 11 attacks. During the so-called Global War on Terror, ‘Arabs and Muslims have come under increased scrutiny, serving as targets for public and institutional scorn in which they have often fallen victim to discrimination and hate crime (Parker, 2009, pp.97-8).

There are many recent examples of this kind of ‘responsive’ or ‘reactive’ patriotism in mainstream liberal democracies in response to what may be characterised as various existential threats: mass migration, globalisation and terrorism. David Cameron, the former Conservative UK Prime Minister, called for a rejection of a doctrine of multiculturalism in favour of ‘muscular’ British values. In April 2011, the French parliament introduced a ban on wearing the burqa and niqab in public places after

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18 Comments made in a speech at Munich Security Conference, 5 February 2011
Nicolas Sarkozy, the President at the time, instigated a debate about what it meant to be French. The practice was not confined to Conservative leaders. The former Labour Prime Minister, Gordon Brown in 2007 introduced a debate on ‘Britishness’ in the wake of the deadly attacks on the London Underground by British born self-proclaimed Islamist terrorists. He also coined the then controversial phrase ‘British jobs for British workers’ as part of a campaign to reduce reliance on immigrant labour in the UK. The USA Patriot Act, passed after the September 11 attacks, significantly increased government powers to, for example, carry out secret searches of people’s communication, homes, and medical and financial records (Soutphommasane 2012, p.2).

It is clear that this kind of special, ‘generated’ patriotic solidarity fulfils a remedial purpose in being seen to protect some aspects of democratic society when they are seen to be under threat, as argued in Chapter Three above. The cost, however, is arguably too high for the continued flourishing of liberal democracies. As Ben-Porath says here: ‘A sense of unity can generate alienation among members of groups that do not feel that they are appropriately represented in the public political discourse’ (op. cit. p.17). A concentration on the common enemy, for example, phrases used by politicians such as, ‘An attack on all Americans’; ‘we are all Jews’; ‘native Britons are under attack’19, is a weak kind of solidarity. As Ben-Porath says here (p.21):

First, this unity is thin, elusive and exclusionary, and therefore cultivates intolerance toward various sub groups. [...] This cost is mainly borne by minorities, who are either excluded from the national solidarity or refuse to participate in the rites of patriotism. It is borne by democracy itself. This kind of social unity and

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19 ‘An attack on all Americans’ - President Bush 2001; ‘We are all Jews’ - cited in Ben Porath p.17; ‘Native Britons under attack’ - Nick Griffin of the English Defence League.
solidarity comes at the cost of political stagnation – an inability to envision and support change in the political circumstances.

It is recognised that wartime – or indeed other kinds of existential threat – creates a need to protect democratic values and practices whilst responding to the particular challenges of the threat or war. In several Western democracies, a certain notion of solidarity has shaped public responses to cultural diversity and perceived threats from outsiders. As Soutphommasane says: ‘[Here] Liberal citizenship is seen as something to be protected from subversion by certain minorities, even if this should mean illiberal outbursts or heavy handed public policy’ (op. cit. p.3). Generating a belligerent citizenry by exploiting understandable feelings of insecurity is not, however, an adequate response to the perceived or indeed real threats to liberal democracy. Although this kind of muscular or belligerent patriotism can certainly include a demonstrable love of one’s country and serves some remedial ends to a genuine crisis in many liberal democracies it is clearly incompatible with, and will also serve to undermine, liberal values. Battening down the hatches in some way may actually serve to exacerbate the threat to liberal democracy as may be demonstrated by recent attacks in Brussels by Belgian nationals acting on behalf in the so-called Islamic State (March 2016).

**Constitutional and civic patriotism**

One response to counter the moral dubiousness of tribal patriotism, and which avoids the limitations of trait-based patriotism and the threats to liberal values of belligerent citizenship or engendering patriotism though falsifying sentimentalism, is constitutional patriotism. This form of patriotism aims to detach patriotic loyalty from the dominant culture thereby making allegiance to the community a political kind. Jürgen Habermas
is the original proponent of this view (*Verfassungspatriotismus*) and has argued that patriotism can be legitimate in liberal democratic contexts so long as it is directed at universalist-oriented political constitutions (1989; 1999). Thus the patriotic allegiance becomes independent of an individual’s ethnic or cultural origins. Arguably, many patriots in the USA love the constitution in this way. Cecile Laborde (2002) comments on constitutional patriotism noting that:

... the relationship between patriotism and cultural diversity is problematic only if, as in nationalist rhetoric, the focus of patriotic loyalty is the dominant culture. If, instead, patriotism is seen as fostering citizens’ commitment to the ‘abstract procedures and principles’ outlined in the constitution, it becomes compatible with a variety of cultural beliefs and practices (2002, p.593).

So by this view, as Ferry states here: The social bond in a liberal-democratic state should be ‘juridical, moral and political, rather than cultural, geographical and historical’, (1992, p.174). By this view then citizens need not share a bond based on a shared history or, religion, mother tongue, or culture. It is sufficient that citizens share membership of a political community defined by liberal civic values and practices. As Soutphommasane expands: ‘This may involve identification with a love of liberty as embodied in the laws and institutions…it may involve a post nationalist allegiance to the norms, values and procedures of a liberal democratic constitution’ (2012, p.6).

Whilst the focus, in relation to constitutional patriotism, is by definition the political constitution of the country, Habermas himself did not go quite so far in recommending allegiance to abstract principles alone. He acknowledged that constitutional patriots must show ‘loyalty to the common culture’ not simply to abstract principles (1994, p.134) and
more recently (1998, p.308) he has defined constitutional patriotism as a ‘patriotism based upon interpretation of recognized, universalistic constitutional principles within the context of a particular national history and tradition’. Constitutional patriots do not uncouple politics and culture entirely. Indeed, it is not possible to uncouple politics and culture in any neat form and there are a host of positions on the so-called spectrum between the ‘civic’ and the ‘ethnic’ pole of national identity. And although it is safe to argue that constitutional patriots argue for ‘thinner’, more political, social bonds between citizens focusing on what we share and do together rather than what we essentially are (Laborde, p.598), they - at least those who read Habermas’ proposition carefully - nonetheless acknowledge that citizens can share a commitment to universal principles and to the particular institutions which enact them.

However, there is a remaining resistance to include the broad culture and ways of life within a narrow version of a constitutional patriot’s normative definition of national identity. According to this view ‘regardless of whether citizens feel they do indeed share these things (or even ethnic traits), liberal-democratic governments would be wrong to appeal to them as legitimate bases for social cohesion’ (Laborde, p.598). There appear to be several reasons for this resistance. First, there is only a very thin notion of common culture in plural democracies given the variety of ways of life within them. Second, this diversity means that voluntary patriotism does not seem likely and thirdly, the promotion of a stronger common culture would appear to threaten essential liberal values.

This version of patriotism, by directing the love of country towards the legitimate constitution and promoting commitment to moral and judicial achievement of a society rather than nationalism overcomes some of the challenges of types of patriotism discussed so far. However, it has its own limitations. One very practical and
straightforward criticism comes from Callan. He argues as follows: ‘If a political constitution is the object of love then one cannot be a republican and a patriot in Canada\textsuperscript{20} but in USA patriotism requires republicanism and liberalism’ (2006, p.537). Furthermore, Kurds or Palestinians cannot be patriots by this definition because they have no state, and as such, no constitution. Within the UK, the Welsh and Scots do not have their own constitution or their own sovereign governments. Their constitution is, whether they like it or not, the constitution of the UK. So, on the constitutional view, this would mean that if you are, for example, a Scottish patriot you should love and be loyal to the UK constitution. The problem with this literal interpretation of constitutional patriotism is that it is inherently conservative or deferential to the current constitution. It is hard to see how one can be a constitutional patriot and still want one’s country’s constitution to change or at least, change radically. But then Callan makes the point that ‘if a country is loved well then the question of whether the constitution befits that love is irrevocably open’ (\textit{op. cit.} p.537). This line of argument suggests that a country is substantially more than its political constitution and it would be quite legitimate, required even, for a patriot to love it even if the constitution (currently) lacked worthy, lovable qualities.

Arguably, constitutional patriots may make the legitimate retort that this is a somewhat wilful narrow interpretation of the constitution. However, perhaps a more significant criticism may lie in constitutional patriotism’s limitations in acknowledging the very important ties between the political and the cultural. For Habermas ‘the identity of the political community … is primarily anchored in the political culture and not on an ethical cultural form of life as a whole’ (1998, pp.513-14). Any democratic right to self-

\textsuperscript{20} Although Canada has a Constitution Act, (1982) parts of the constitution itself remain unwritten
determination ‘includes the right to preserve one’s own political culture, which forms a concrete context from right to citizenship, but it does not include the right to self-assertion of a privileged cultural form of life (ibid.). But as Soutphommasane argues, Habermas elsewhere seems to be defending a much more explicit connection between the political and non-political identities. Habermas contends that ‘ethical-political decisions are an unavoidable part of politics and their legal regulation expresses the collective identity of the nation of citizens’ (1994, p.125).

Whilst this version of patriotism has much to commend it in relation to contributing to liberal democracies flourishing it is not as full an account of ideal patriotism for this purpose as it could be. A more explicit acknowledgment of the ways in which citizens have attachment to each other - in all their diversity - as well as the polity is required. Arguably what is needed to sustain a liberal political community is an explicit recognition of the need for a shared national identity - which is multicultural - among citizens motivating reciprocity and co-operation. And whilst constitutional patriotism attempts to avoid any imposition of identity or excluding those that do not confirm to a single ethnic group, there does seem to be an attempt to manage differences as neutrally as possible rather than viewing difference as an asset in a modern liberal democracy.

A version of patriotism where the object of love is broader than the constitution but remains essentially political rather than explicitly ethnic or cultural is civic patriotism. According to this conception of patriotism compatriots, as well as the constitution, are the objects of patriotic love in the form of moral duties or associative obligations. In constitutional patriotism the collective identity becomes ‘based on public interpretations in the light of norms, rather than on “pre-political” criteria’ (Müller, 2007, pp.31-32),
whereas civic patriotism may be expressed as a common love of liberty (Viroli, 1995, p.102) and its key component is arguably that of participatory self-rule. The distinction between the two kinds of patriotism (constitutional and civic) is a fine one but as Soutphommasane outlines, civic patriotism or as he classes it, republican patriotism ‘is concerned with restoring the basis of patriotism in a political love of the republic, rather than in the universalistic principles of a constitutional culture’ (2012, p.64). And as Viroli adds, any national solidarity should be based on ‘good government and well-ordered participation in the many instances of civil society and in the political decision-making process’ (op. cit. p.176). People identify with their compatriots because they belong to the same polity, not primarily because they share a history or culture.

This conception of patriotism can be traced back to some of Kant’s writing and also, arguably, has roots in Rawls seminal work *Theory of Justice* (1971), although it is important to note that Rawls does not use the language of patriotism. It is argued here that his theory of justice in fact amounts to a defence of civic patriotism. As, these philosophers are the forefathers - albeit from different centuries - of modern liberalism it should be evident that this version of patriotism meets the requirement of compatibility with liberal values. Given that the fundamental idea of Kant’s critical philosophy is human autonomy and that moral laws apply unconditionally, and to everyone in the same way, it is perhaps surprising that some philosophers (e.g. Cavallar, 1999; Kleingeld, 2003; Wood, 1999) claim that Kant advocates patriotism as a moral duty. Kant’s commitment to - and defence of – civic patriotism needs to be understood as inextricably linked to his views of republicanism, and often in contrast to despotism, according to Kleingeld. (It is perhaps worth stating here that we must, of course, understand Kant’s comments on patriotism within the context of the 18th century and the
relative infancy of many nation-states. German unification and the birth of the German
nation-state did not happen until the mid 19th century, for example). Kant does not argue
that the existence of a state represents a limitation of freedom even though a state
possesses power to control the external freedom of citizens through force. Kant argues
that rather than the state being an impediment to freedom it is actually rather the means
to freedom. By participating and exercising their rational will, within and towards state
institutions, individuals are truly autonomous. The danger of the state coercing
individuals to recognise their subjection to state power against their will is overcome
since Kant defines ‘will’ as ‘practical reason itself’ (Groundwork, 4 412). Arguably then
Kant’s view of patriotism is that it serves, and is inextricably linked to, practical reason.
The duty of civic patriotism then is to promote the functioning and improvement of the
republic as an institution of justice. It is not a duty simply to promote the
institutionalization of justice in their own state but to support one’s compatriots.

This view echoes Rawls’ view that a ‘public conception of justice’ constitutes the
fundamental character of well-ordered human association (1971, p.4). The associative
obligations that derive from common citizenship define and preserve major institutions.
Importantly, the major institutions that Rawls refers to here include the political
constitution but go further to include a well-ordered society’s ‘principal economic and
social arrangements’ (op. cit. p.6). Members of the (national) community value these
institutions and as such have obligations towards their preservation and to each other. As
he says here:

The well-ordered society is a social union whose institutionalized forms are prized as goods in
themselves by those who grow up and live in a world structured by them [...] The distinctive motivation of
principled morality is the desire to act on the natural duty to advance just arrangements for the good of the larger country (1971, pp.474-6).

Civic patriotism has much in common with constitutional patriotism given its essentially political nature. However civic patriotism more explicitly acknowledges the need for social bonds and cooperation between citizens. As Laborde (op. cit. p.592) states here:

It emphasises the motivational prerequisites of democratic governance, stresses the need to preserve existing ‘co-operative ventures’, and demands that existing political cultures be democratically scrutinized and re-shaped in an inclusive direction.

Like constitutional patriotism, it promotes a mainly political identity and its mainly political content enables it to remain compatible with a variety of citizens’ practices and beliefs. Social cooperation is valuable as a means to preserving the institutions but remains a relatively thin ‘particularistic form [which] justifies citizens’ commitment to specific institutions’ (ibid.).

So, does civic patriotism fulfil all the requirements of the kind of rehabilitated patriotism needed for the flourishing of liberal democracies in the early part of the 21st century? It certainly meets the liberal requirement as outlined above. Like constitutional patriotism, it minimises the prospect of unjustly imposing some sort of common identity on all citizens. It fulfils some of the requirements to serve as an instrumental good for the flourishing of liberal democracy. However, it is not entirely clear how either constitutional or civic patriotism can flourish without some reliance on the pre political bonds and trust that emerge from a national, shared history and shared national culture.
Liberal nationalism

In the version of patriotism, described as liberal nationalism, the central place of the nation beyond its political form is key. Liberal nationalists are explicit in their recognition that where citizens have an attachment to their compatriots and political community, it is because there is a sense of national belonging underpinning it. Those who belong to a nation will have a sense of belonging together. This belief does not arise from nowhere. As Yael Tamir, a key proponent of this view, (1996, p.90) states:

Where a sense of national belonging exists, it does so because people share – and critically believe that they share – with other nationals ‘objective’ features such as a distinctive shared culture, language, history and way of life.

There are clearly dangers here. Can liberal nationalism be prevented from veering towards an ethnic nationalist imposition of national culture? As Soutphommasane asks:
‘If the object of love of one’s country should be that of a community shaped by a national culture (and hence a particular ethnic community’s history), does that not mean that it must involve defending what is ultimately an ethnic identity from subversion by cultural diversity?’ (op. cit. p.74). But Tamir rejects the idea that national culture has to be essentialised as ethnicity. She argues that those who subscribe to it actively reinterpret a national culture. Membership of a national culture implies ‘an aspiration to have a communal domain that is construed not only as an arena of cooperation for the purpose of securing one’s individual interests, but also as a space where one communal identity finds expression’ (1993, p.74). Similarly, Will Kymlicka (2001, p.211) suggests that liberal nationalists typically ‘want a societal culture that is rich and diverse’ and
that borrows whatever it finds worthwhile in other cultures, integrates it into its own practices, and passes it onto the subsequent generations’. As Tamir argues:

Why are the Jewish practices of a New York Reform community less authentic than those of an eighteenth century Orthodox community in Eastern Europe? Why is American-Italian culture less authentic than Italian culture in Milan? Is it because it is heavily influenced by American culture? But was not Italian culture influenced by neighbouring cultures? (op. cit. pp.52-3).

And David Miller echoes many of the same sentiments when he argues that,

... when assessing national identities, we need not only to look at what identity presently consists in - what people believe it means to be Italian or Japanese – but at the process by which it has all arisen. To the extent that the process involves inputs from all sections of the community, with groups openly competing to imprint common identity with their own particular image, we may justifiably regard the identity that emerges as an authentic one (1995, p.40).

This deliberative, dialogical quality ensures, he implies, that national identity evolves more or less spontaneously. But Miller argues further, that the nation plays a largely instrumental role in democratic deliberation within a political community. ‘States’, he argues, ‘require citizens to trust each other if they are to function effectively as democracies; in particular if they are guided by the ideal of deliberative democracy’. This in turn ‘depends on common identification of the kind only nationality can provide’ (op. cit. p.96 and p.140). Tamir adds that one fulfils one’s national obligations ‘not through self-sacrifice, or by subordinating one’s well-being and interests to the welfare of the collective, but rather by participating in a cultural dialogue’ (op. cit. p.89). There are variants of the form this deliberative democratic process should take. Some suggest
that it necessitates a critical stance towards established power structures (Dryzek, 2000, p.8). Others locate it within existing liberal democratic institutions (Guttmann and Thompson, 2004, p.7). Essentially, however, there is shared belief that collective self-determination requires open debate in which citizens address each other as equals and on the basis of mutual respect and that the debate is grounded in a common understanding of national culture (Soutphommasane, p.77).

And for liberal nationalists the national culture is defined in terms of a public or societal culture. As Kymlicka argues, here:

By a shared culture I mean a territorially concentrated culture, centred on a shared language that is used in a wide range of social institutions, in both public and private life (schools, media, law, economy, government etc.). I call it a societal culture to emphasise that it involves a common language and social institutions, rather than common religious beliefs, family customs, or personal lifestyles (2001, p.25).

And there are those who juxtapose a national culture with a private one. Whereas a public culture involves a set of understandings about the nature of a political community - its constitutive principles, public institutions and civic norms - a private culture encompasses all those beliefs and preferences that are likely to be shared within a family, an ethnic group or, what Miller describes as a ‘lifestyle enclave’ (1995, p.158). Therefore, when a minority group seeks cultural recognition, its spokespeople need ‘to step outside their culture and appeal to values the wider society itself subscribes to or can be persuaded to share’ (op. cit. p.151).
It seems, then, that liberal nationalism, whilst explicitly including the nation as an essential and underlying feature of patriotism, has much in common with other kinds of liberal patriotism in the privileging of the public institution of culture and by relying on reasonable public debate to settle differences and to accommodate new practices. As it stands is it adequate enough to stand the test of being the best form of patriotism possible for providing the much-needed support for liberal democracies?

It falls short in some ways. Can deliberation along with the separation of public and private culture lead to liberal nationalism becoming a sort of Trojan horse for cultural assimilation? As Young argues, the ideal of deliberative democracy offers too narrow a conception of intercultural dialogue because it continues to privilege an ideal of the ‘common good’ and insists on putting aside or transcending partial or particularist differences’ (2000, p.108). As Soutphommasane suggests:

Only when difference is regarded as a political resource – when identity groups are encouraged to give public expression to their distinctiveness – can there be dialogue that takes cultural differences seriously without consigning them to the private realm’ (2012, p.83).

It is also arguable whether there is enough motivation to participate in a deliberative democracy when one’s minority differences are not fully recognised but rather managed or minimised in the common public sphere. It begs the following question: why would enough citizens be motivated to participate in this national dialogue? What Soutphommasane argues is that there needs to be a more explicit cultural nationalism that recognises cultural differences publicly. This cultural recognition is both more
worthy and accurate but, he argues and I agree, it will also motivate fuller participation in this important debate.

Patriotism as a national-cultural dialogue

This brings us to the kind of patriotism that is needed for flourishing liberal democracy and the kind I want to defend. Patriotism that advocates cultural recognition – rather than minimising difference - is key to preserving liberal democracy and will contribute to its flourishing. Adding the notion of cultural recognition is an important addition to the forms of civic, constitutional and liberal nationalist versions of patriotism outlined above. What this addition achieves is to understand patriotism as a love of country that values the country’s public institutions and to view a multicultural national identity as an (open ended) outcome of politics. As Soutphommasane argues (2012, p.230):

> If nationalism denotes some relationship between state and nation, then cultural nationalism involves understanding the maintenance of a national culture as an end of politics (in contrast to statist nationalism, which views national culture as primarily a means to the achievement of political justice). This logic of cultural nationalism is a presupposition of the liberal nationalist argument: how else could it explain why a national conversation will have vital force and cohesive power?

Immigrant cultural groups often seek rights in ways akin to the way minority nationalists seek self-government rights. As such the approach to recognition advocated here goes beyond mere tolerance of diverse groups and beyond the assertion of an individual right against discrimination on national, racial, ethnic or religious grounds. Soutphommasane again (op. cit. p.45):
Rather there must be public endorsement of cultural identities by the political community; there must be a positive role on the part of the state to respect cultural identity and ensure equal treatment for members of minority groups. Multiculturalism derives from a philosophical idea about an individual’s flourishing being tied to their recognition by others.

Charles Taylor, along similar lines suggests that ‘we define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us …Our identity is in part shaped by recognition or its absence such that a person can suffer real damage, real distortion if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves (1994, p.25). Demands by minority groups for the recognition of their cultural identity necessarily challenge a political community to reflect as much on its own values and practices as those of the minorities seeking recognition.

So if there is something real at stake – genuine recognition of a right, or achievement of a legal compromise, or agreement that a requested change in the law is denied – there is serious motivational value in this conception of a public patriotic dialogue. Clearly not all desired rights of all minority groups can be acknowledged in the law and the practicality of achieving a public dialogue of this kind is not easy. Recognition is not by any mean guaranteed. There will be struggles and disappointments and compromise – as well as triumphs. Public reasonableness as defined in liberal terms should trump unreasonable demands. But love still plays an important part. Otherwise we would be satisfied with advocating civic virtues rather than patriotic ones. This dialogue requires patriotism defined as a generous, constant, imaginative, yet critical love of country. This
adds an important affective dimension to the practice but does not descend into Galston’s more sentimental approach to instilling patriotism (1991, See Chapter 5).

Patriotism as a national-cultural dialogue builds on other liberal forms of patriotism. In one sense it could be argued that civic patriotism relies on social and cultural bonds rather more than it admits and that liberal nationalism is just a more explicit articulation of that. It could also be argued that much of the content of constitutional patriotism - and liberal nationalism - involves deliberative debate and public dialogue. Although constitutional patriotism emphasises the political form of the nation it cannot operate in a national vacuum – and no constitutional patriot would claim that.

What a national-cultural patriotic dialogue adds is to suggest that any modern liberal democracy is inevitably multicultural and its national identity is enriched by this fact. This is not to deny a nation’s shared history, language and culture. The dialogue advocated here needs to be conducted in the language broadly defined by a national tradition. The advocacy of a national-cultural dialogue is to be explicit about the fact that liberal democratic nation’s cultures and identities are inevitably forged through deliberation, dissent, compromise, assimilation of minority groups, integration of ethnic groups and - over time - the wholesale adoption of some immigrant values and practices. Given the current crisis in some forms of liberal democracy and increasing numbers of alienated citizens it seems timely to invigorate this national-cultural debate. And to be clear, this is not intended as a means of integrating minority groups. It is of benefit, it is argued here, for all members of the nation. A national project that reflects on the content and character of national identity itself and sees it as a collective act involving interpretation in an open ended, generous, imaginative, critical way appears to capture
the best of civic and liberal nationalist patriotism, whilst giving it some vital force. This will not happen spontaneously and involves a significant degree of nation-building though education and other public policy. As Ben-Porath argues:

Working to preserve rather than contain diversity is an educational aim that can better be met through teaching citizenship as a form of shared fate [...] Learning to conceive of citizenship as shared fate can cultivate a more open and inclusive form of national affiliation. In a way that may initially seem contradictory, the pluralistic and open-ended nature of this form of nationalism can in fact be more unifying than the more rigid conception of nationalism as identity [...] The aspects of the actual and conceptual network that holds society together are open to change and evolvement (2006, p.26 and p.120).

This is a defensible and much needed version of patriotism.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored a number of kinds of patriotism. Some of these have been easily dismissed as illiberal or not serving the needs of liberal democracy well; blind, tribal and trait based forms. The version of patriotism that was ultimately defended, as that which best serves liberal democracy in the face of current challenges, adopts many of the features of civic and liberal nationalism but adds the dimension that cultural difference is regarded as a political resource and of intrinsic value. This version of patriotism takes the form of a public dialogue of collective interpretation. Whilst, it was seen above that liberal nationalists also give central importance to deliberative democracy as a means of negotiating differences, it is only the cultural version of patriotism that gives enough motivational force for the necessary participation in this important democratic dialogue. It has been argued that it does this by understanding the
national culture as pluralistic in its very character and loveable as such. The maintenance of this diverse national culture involves citizens being motivated to participate in the public realm not only by their political responsibility but by their sense of attachment to their national community through their cultural recognition and their sense of personal belonging as well. This defensible and worthwhile version of patriotism is needed for liberal democracy to flourish and as such has instrumental value. Whilst it is not argued here that patriotism is intrinsically valuable, this version views a multicultural national culture as a worthwhile outcome of politics as well as a means to the achievement of political justice.
CHAPTER 5: IS PATRIOTIC EDUCATION COMPATIBLE WITH LIBERAL EDUCATION?

Thus far a version of patriotism has been outlined and defended that contributes well to modern liberal democratic survival and flourishing. Patriotism, which takes liberal democratic national culture as open and pluralistic and loveable as such, it is argued, gives motivational force for necessary participation in deliberative liberal democracy. This kind of patriotism takes the form of a collective, national dialogue where the desired outcomes remain, to a significant degree, open. In this chapter it will be argued that this requires relatively high levels of participation from educated citizens and is predicated on some form of patriotic education. It is commonly claimed that liberal education and patriotic education are necessarily incompatible. It is the job of this chapter to set out and defeat arguments that suggest that liberal education in state schools is incompatible with some form of education involving the acquisition of knowledge, skills, values and dispositions that cultivate a sense of national sentiment and prepare students for participation in an interpretive national-cultural dialogue.

A liberal education that, rightly, sets a high bar of rationality, reasonableness, independence and impartiality does not seem immediately compatible with an education for patriotism, which, amongst other things, is aimed at partial attachment and geared towards instilling love for a national community. In order to show that there is a possibility – and even desirability – of patriotic education within a liberal education framework, this chapter begins by setting out the essential characteristics of liberal education. It then outlines the arguments suggesting that patriotic education is necessarily illiberal. Finally, it defeats these arguments thereby paving the way for a conception of progressive patriotic education.
that aims to benefit students in state schools and liberal democracy more generally.

Two broad conceptions of liberal education: education that ‘liberates’ and politically liberal education

It is important to state at the outset that there are different forms of, and aims for, liberal education just as there are different forms of liberal democracy. And furthermore that it can be somewhat hijacked to convey different meanings for different ideological purposes. As Paul Hirst suggests (1974, p.30):

The phrase ‘liberal education’ has today become something of a slogan which takes on different meanings according to its immediate context [...] Whatever else a liberal education is, it is not a vocational education, not exclusively scientific education, or not a specialist education in any sense’ (original emphasis).

This chapter explores two broad conceptions of liberal education. The first conception is essentially apolitical and equates liberal education with education that aims to liberate, both individuals and the mind itself. There are divisions within this broad conception of liberal education. For some commentators, this conception of education allows only for the teaching of academic subjects. For others, academic disciplines are privileged but there is a role for some aspects of moral, emotional and character education too. However, this view is explicitly apolitical. The second broad conception of liberal education is associated with politically liberal education. There are divisions within this broad conception too. On the one hand, there are those who propose that schooling must remain neutral about any form of comprehensive doctrine, whilst inducting children into
essentially Rawlsian liberal principles. Others, within this broad conception, argue that the liberal democratic state has a role and a responsibility to nurture good citizens.

The chapter concludes its discussion by suggesting that there is no irreconcilable conflict within either of these two conceptions of liberal education and arriving at a broad inclusive definition is quite possible. It is concluded that liberal education can justifiably nurture certain aptitudes and dispositions beyond academic disciplines. Children can be taught *how* to live to some extent. Furthermore, children need to be helped to navigate knowledge to uncover truth in rather more direct ways than Hirst suggested in 1974. It is also concluded, in relation to liberal political education, that a genuinely liberal education should prioritise the development of a capacity for self-rule and enhance an individual’s freedom to live a good life and, as such, this kind of education can permissibly inculcate certain values and behaviours. The liberal neutralist view is rejected. But, it is argued here, a liberal civic society aims not to simply ‘echo the patterns instilled by others, whether by parents or the state or some other party’ (Soutphommasane, 2012, p.168). Liberal education ultimately aims to eliminate the possibility of manipulation of beliefs.

The chapter then turns to an analysis of ways in which patriotic education may be commonly viewed as opposed to this conception of liberal education. Four aspects of potential incompatibility with patriotic education are explored, namely: the indoctrination problem; the distortion problem; the requirements of global justice (or cosmopolitanism) and the claim that patriotism should be taught as a controversial issue in liberal state schooling. The chapter concludes with a rebuttal of each concern given the emerging conception of patriotic education being proposed here.
The first broad conception of liberal education: liberating education

_Liberal education as apolitical and purely academic_

One of the most extreme conceptions of apolitical, ‘liberating’ liberal education, the first broad conception, suggests that there is no place for any kind of formal education in anything other than the pursuit of academic knowledge and ideas. This kind of liberal education would eschew any kind of state soul craft or character education assuming that, through the relentless, uninhibited pursuit of knowledge and truth the liberal character would be assumed and developed. According to this view, any explicit promotion of particular character traits, even liberal ones, would undermine the essential purpose of education which is to allow students to access and assess knowledge rigorously and freely. State control over curricula would also be anathema to this conception of liberal education given its inevitable, constraining agenda. This view of liberal education is propounded by, for example, Claire Fox, who is the director and founder of the think tank the *Institute of Ideas*, an institution dedicated to the promotion of free speech. This view suggests that transmission of knowledge is of paramount importance and this may, or may not, lead to people leading richer and fuller lives. Responsibility for improving the quality of life is beyond what education can or indeed should take on, according to this view.

_Apolitical liberal education as characterised by Hirst and Peters_

The version of liberal education outlined above certainly has strong echoes in the work of Paul Hirst and Richard Peters but differs in its explicit absence of what could be described as moral development or cultivation of habits of the mind that ensure children lead a good life. But like Fox, Hirst and Peters agree that any truly liberal education
should also be essentially apolitical and that education is needed ‘whose definition and justification are based on the nature and significance of knowledge itself, and not on the predilections of pupils, the demands of society, or the whims of politicians’ (Hirst, 1974, p.32). Liberal education in this view is the ultimate form of education and the only limits to it are imposed by ‘those necessarily imposed by rational knowledge’ (op. cit. p.43). Basing liberal education on a foundation of rational knowledge, according to this view, serves the twin purposes of providing freedom for the mind which allows individuals to pursue their own good and also to guarantee a level of objectivity which is an important bulwark of liberal values. This objectivity is achieved when ‘what is being justified is both ‘intelligible under publicly rooted concepts and is assessable according to accepted criteria’ (ibid.). Hirst states this further here:

For it is a necessary feature of knowledge as such that there be public criteria whereby the true is distinguishable from the false, the good from the bad, the right from the wrong. It is the existence of these criteria which gives objectivity to knowledge; and this in turn gives objectivity to the concept of liberal education (ibid.).

This view of liberal education is predicated on an understanding of certain forms of knowledge, to use Hirst’s own term, which amount to a publicly derived and accepted ‘framework of knowledge’ (op. cit. p.50). These forms of knowledge are the essential articulation of all human experience to date and, as such, both an achievement of the human mind and also the source of future endeavour and exploration.

What this amounts to is a suggestion that education should provide children with opportunities to seek knowledge, which in turn will reveal truth. This truth in turn
should enhance our capacity for good. And this is where Hirst and Peters part company from Fox. Acquiring knowledge is the means by which we develop as critical, rational beings and expand our minds through the proper acquisition of knowledge. As he says here:

To acquire knowledge is to become aware of experience as structured, organised and made meaningful in some quite specific way, and the varieties of human knowledge constitute the highly developed forms in which man has found this possible. To acquire knowledge is to learn to see, to experience the world in a way otherwise unknown, and thereby to come to have a mind in a fuller sense (op. cit. p.41).

This kind of education does not narrowly socialise children but rather initiates them into what it means to be more fully human. Such knowledge acquisition is based on a concept of truth that goes beyond uncertain opinion or temporary value. Liberal education, according to this view, aims to ensure that children lead a good life through the pursuit of academic knowledge and the cultivation of the intellect.

Bruce Ackerman (1980, p.159) captures what this form of education might entail for students and by implication for teachers and policy makers:

The entire educational system will, if you like, resemble a great sphere. Children land upon the sphere at different points, depending on their primary culture; the task is to help them explore the globe in a way that permits them to glimpse the deeper meanings of the dramas passing on around them. At the end of the journey, however, the now mature citizen has every right to locate himself at the very point from which he began – just as he may also strike out to discover an unoccupied portion of the sphere.
And part of this task, as described above, would be to support children in navigating the vast terrain of human knowledge and to induct them into understanding how to, for example, assess validity of information or to make moral judgments. Hirst acknowledges that there is a dialogical or conversational dimension to supporting our growing knowledge and cultivation of our minds. He cites Oakeshott (op. cit. p.52) describing education as an initiation into a conversation in which we:

[L]earn to recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation. And it is this conversation, which, in the end, gives place and character to every human activity and utterance.

Hirst does however suggest that Oakeshott is being more literal in this passage above than he would like to be. Hirst sees the conversation metaphor as more a form of visualising the forms of knowledge themselves in some sort of dialogue. The learner has to make sense of the connections and differences between these various forms of knowledge. According to this view it would be doing a disservice to children and young people - and ultimately to liberal society - to provide them with any specific political education.

*Liberal education: more than the unfettered pursuit of knowledge?*

The contribution of Paul Hirst, and Richard Peters (Hirst and Peters, 1970), to the field of education is viewed as seminal in contributing to debates on the nature and purposes of state education. However, the view that inducting children in education via the pursuit of knowledge alone has been challenged over recent decades by those who see that as too restricting a definition of liberal education. These commentators would still
see themselves as staunch defenders of liberal education. John White, in a paper critiquing the liberal education theory proposed by Hirst and Peters (2009) suggests that there are several problems with this conception of a liberal education, not least, its lack of acknowledgement that ‘the disciplines stand in need of thoroughgoing interdisciplinary investigation and critique. His [Peters] attitude seems to be that they are self-correcting and should be trusted absolutely’ (White, 2009, p.6). And furthermore, on a more practical level, that by demanding that children engage with all forms of knowledge they seem to asking an awful lot of children. It certainly raises many questions about how to develop this capacity for ‘self-rule’ with no imposition of ideas or practices in order to ensure that children ‘acquire intellectual and moral habits’ as Oakeshott suggests above. It is worth stating here that children’s experience of schooling goes beyond the formal curriculum and that any conception of liberal education should take account of the range of learning that schooling comprises, inside and outside the classroom. It should be acknowledged, at this stage, that Hirst himself did not preclude other kinds of education. As he says here:

Certainly liberal education as is here being understood is only one part of the education a person ought to have, for it omits quite deliberately for instance specialist education, physical education and character training (op. cit. p.51).

However, several commentators, including White, have argued that liberal education itself can legitimately include greater guidance for children regarding practical education or in educating for particular virtues and so on. As Hand, another defender of a broader conception of liberal education, says here:
Inquiry into the meaning of life ... is not merely an intellectual exercise, not an academic activity insofar as this implies disinterestedness and detachment from practical concerns. It is certainly focused on truth, on finding the best ‘general theory of the universe’, but it is equally concerned with how to live, with what ultimately matters and what that requires of us. It is a form of inquiry that makes hefty emotional and intellectual demands: inquirers risk losing their grip on their most taken-for-granted assumptions, and must be open to changing not only their understanding of the world but also the way they ‘determine themselves thereto’ (2014, p.9).

Arguably, liberal education can have a primary focus on cultivation of the intellect whilst also recognising the importance of practical knowledge and education for action – including some kinds of induction in education for leading good individual lives and an understanding of what it means to be part of a wider society. The means of ensuring that children cultivate practical skills or virtuous dispositions or are capable of moral enquiry, and so on, seems to go beyond solely cultivating of the intellect through the acquisition of academic knowledge.

Given the enormity of existing human knowledge and the short time children spend in formal education, organisational structures and criteria for selection have always been necessary in creating curricula and wider goals for state schooling. In liberal democracies public criteria for devising this policy structure or making necessary selections are important. Inevitably these structures and selections are made on the basis of values and in liberal democracies these foundational educational values are debated, negotiated and (variously) democratically arrived at. It is therefore quite possible that liberal education can retain its foundation in objectivity - as Hirst argues above – whilst conceptualising the educational experience beyond unfettered exploration of knowledge.
Arguably children need adult guidance on what truth is, on recognising truth, on choosing paths of inquiry, on debating reasonably contestable issues and so on.

*Educating the ‘whole person’*

Some commentators, within the first broad conception of liberal education, argue that the education of the ‘whole person’ is a legitimate aim of liberal education and as such involves explicit emotional, moral and even spiritual dimensions to the curricula (see for example, Callan, 1997; White, 2009; Hand, 2014). And whilst there is an inevitable variety in the exact content of, say, moral education in any liberal democracy’s national curriculum we can mostly agree on its content and that we should teach this content to children along with the rational justification for it. It is in the interests of the individuals and the broader liberal society that we do so. As Hand states:

> For one thing, children’s lives will go better if they know, see the point of, and comply with, basic moral rules. For another, it is in the interests of everyone to ensure that each new generation submits to the authority of morality (2014, p.5).

The requirement of objectivity in any liberal education is met by teaching students explicitly how to choose intelligently between competing perspectives on a range of issues and by including an engagement with the rational justification of aspects of content.

And what of educating emotions? The important liberal values of, say, a capacity for detachment and objectivity, do raise important questions about this aspect of liberal education. And as Hand suggests above, educating the emotions has a more than
legitimate place in the curriculum; liberal education itself places ‘hefty academic and emotional demands on us’. Surely there is no necessary conflict between high bar for rationality and reasonableness, respect for telos of truth to a high degree, justified belief, promotion of autonomy and self-rule with a certain kind of education of the emotions. And in fact it is not easy to separate out what we might describe as an affective thought or an academic process as, say, Hirst might claim. Educating emotions is not the same as manipulating emotions to the detriment of an individual’s autonomy. There are many emotional attachments and responses that benefit children and as such good reasons can be found to nurture them. Children are rightly taught to care for others, respect others, be tolerant, develop empathy and so on. They are also taught to understand and respect difference. Furthermore, supporting children to manage their emotions - when and how to nurture them, when to give vent to them, when to suppress them, when to question them - is an important capability that most liberal schools would see as a duty of care. As Hand puts it: ‘Emotional education is defensible insofar as it consists in offering pupils good reasons and effective techniques for fostering or suppressing particular emotions’ (2011, p.4).

What of love as one of the important emotions that liberal education must acknowledge? Galston, a staunch defender of one kind of liberal education, makes an interesting point when he states that there is some difference between teaching and instilling love of learning. As he puts it:

> Ordinary language is suggestive: we speak of “teaching” a subject but of “instilling” a love of learning. The latter typically occurs through the power of example rather than through cognitive instruction. While Aristotle may well be correct that we all by nature desire to know,
we come to love learning in the presence of those who compellingly exemplify the worth of lives guided by that love (2010, p.1).

He is suggesting here that the power of ‘compelling exemplification’ is sometimes greater - and as such should be deployed within liberal education systems - than cognitive instruction. This opens up some interesting fissures between the likes of Galston and those who argue that any kind of compelling exemplification may jeopardise the very capabilities that a liberal education is trying to cultivate (for example, Archard, 1999). Love is an interesting category of emotion. Love of learning for example does seem to be a very obvious and worthwhile outcome of any liberal education. Love of country may be more problematic and we shall examine this in more depth below where I examine the arguments against patriotism as a state school aim. For now, it is important to acknowledge that some kinds of affective as well as cognitive elements are well within any common understanding of what liberal education comprises.

So, it is also clear at this point that liberal education involves engaging children with certain kinds of key curriculum content or school experiences that involve the acquisition of ideas as well as certain kinds of dispositions and capacities for enacting ideas. Moral and emotional education are included within this content or experience: for example, understanding, valuing and applying ideas of justice, tolerance, fairness and respect are worthy aims in any liberal education.
The second broad conception of liberal education: liberal political education

The second broad conception of liberal education is liberal political education. Within this view the principles of liberalism as a political doctrine and way of life are imparted. There are different conceptions of the nature and extent of this political education, however, and the extent to which the state should take on or promote any particular comprehensive doctrines.

Liberal neutralism

At the extreme end of this broad camp, there are those who see the importance of liberal political education but who express reservations about the dangers of state sponsored civic education (See for example, Ackerman, 1980; Clayton, 2002; Feinberg, 1990). By this view, civic education effectively shapes - and in some ways can be seen as indoctrinating - children into particular kinds of citizens and as such fails as the true aim of liberal education, which is to promote autonomous development. It also fails in treating people with equal respect by promoting one worldview over another. The state’s role in education, according to this view, should remain as neutral as possible in relation to conceptions of the good. As such, these liberal neutralists would argue that any kind of civic education would in effect be some kind of justification or endorsement of one kind of life above another. Matthew Clayton (2002) in his work on liberal equality and ethics, suggests that liberalism demands that the state be neutral about any form of comprehensive doctrine, because it is only if the state is neutral about competing claims about what the good life is that it can be fair to all citizens. He argues that schooling can inculcate essentially liberal principles and practices only – and that

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21 See Mozert vs. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F 2d. 1058 (6th circular 1987) for an interesting case illustrating parental views regarding alleged illegitimacy of civic education
this involves avoiding the promotion of any other comprehensive doctrines. Some liberals insist upon the protection of the realm of privacy and individual liberty suggesting that governments should have no authority to interfere directly with the ways in which children are brought up. According to most proponents of this view, it should be the responsibility of parents\(^\text{22}\), if not their duty, to decide how their children should be educated.

**Limits of the liberal neutralist position**

But these arguments seem weak. First, the neutralist position seems to justify the strong promotion of liberalism itself – which is not strictly a neutral position. And second, these arguments appear to rest on an implicit assumption that people will be good citizens and that the state has no responsibility for what it allows to happen – albeit negatively by not explicitly nurturing particular values and behaviours. This seems precarious. Most liberal commentators suggest that a stable and legitimate political order can be more easily sustained where there is some form of civic education, or means of cultivating habits of citizenship among the young. Macedo suggests that political order is not the product of a felicitous invisible hand but ‘rather …a construction for discernible collective ends and purposes, including the preservation of a broad swath of liberty (2003, p.5). Arguably, any liberal democratic order needs to ensure that its public institutions promote and secure the preconditions of engaged and active citizenship. According to Soutphommasane (op. cit. p.168):

> This is true even of minimally liberal states (which are concerned only with maintaining the rule of law and

\(^{22}\)There are those who argue that parents should not impose their own world view on their young either and there are extensive debates on the right of children to their own opinion (see Feinberg, 1980; Morgan, 2006).
protecting individual rights) and neutral liberal states (in which the state refrains from favouring any conception of good over others), let alone deliberative political communities characterised by mutual respect, public reason and patriotism.

Stevens also argues against the neutralist position suggesting that liberal education should properly ‘focus on teaching for understanding and application of ideas such as democracy, equality, fairness, justice, rights, responsibilities, and cooperation …’ (1999, p.366 emphasis added). Many national curricula in liberal democratic states aim to develop understanding of core liberal principles, such as universalizability, fairness, reasonableness, autonomy, impartiality and democratic self-determination, along with the explicit development of key capabilities and dispositions. And Amy Gutmann (1999, p.288) suggests that agreement on the civic dimensions of liberal education can be achieved by dividing authority between the state and parents and viewing civic education as ‘best viewed as a shared trust of parents, citizens, teachers and public officials’. This protects against any one civic agenda being hijacked by any one government.

There are inevitable tensions in liberal principles of self-rule and objectivity alongside the explicit need to cultivate liberal individuals and societies. Liberal education typically aims for high levels of justification and debate over what the good life means in the liberal state curriculum. This, however, does not negate the idea that there are necessary limits to individual freedoms in liberal democracies, which need to be understood and enacted upon by most liberal citizens. To argue that there is a perfect Archimedean point from which to make entirely rational and detached judgements is problematic and as Callan argues (1997, Chapter 2), if the idea of liberal neutrality were
taken to extremes we would be left with a potentially very destructive and unmanageable culture of legalism and conflict. State education cannot be neutral about promoting some core ideas and values. According to one of the founding fathers, Rawls, liberalism’s duty of fairness, and each individual’s moral duty to abide by laws and to act as reasonable and rational citizens, involves some fairly strong sense of a moral community (1971). Furthermore, Rawls argued for education that preserves liberal democracy, and as such any form of education that does this, even one including some kinds of state induction into citizenship is justifiable. Clayton’s view of state neutrality seems to fall down on this argument and further, it fails to accord enough responsibility to the state in terms of negative actions. The state could, according to his view, legitimately allow liberal democracy to weaken because of lack of good citizenship education.

The idea of the nation as a moral community - and the challenge of neutrality - seems especially important in most modern liberal democracies with their high levels of diversity. The precise nature of liberal education will vary in countries where there is more of an assimilationist approach to diversity as opposed to policies aimed for integration and higher levels of retention of original cultures and appreciation of difference. The French education system exemplifies an assimilationist approach which takes as central the three values of liberté, égalité and fraternité through ‘state neutrality with respect to religious difference; a perfectionist state committed to individual autonomy; a communitarian state fostering a civic sense of loyalty’ (Southphommasane, 2012, p.60). The USA takes a similar approach. In the UK the state is not neutral on questions of religion and takes a more integrationist approach. Religious education, for example, in England and Wales includes the study of the world’s religions and moral
themes. However, the curriculum must reflect the predominant place of Christianity in religious life and therefore Christianity represents most of the content. Parents can withdraw a child from religious education, but schools must approve this.

**Interpretive, deliberative civic education**

What assimilationist and integrationist approaches to civic education have in common is the preparation of the young for life as productive and responsible citizens within their respective liberal democratic societies. This entails a focus on the value of, and skills to enact, democratic participation in order that the young are well equipped (but are not forced) to play an active part in society. As one set of curriculum recommendations expressed it (Crick Report, 1998,): ‘Young people … learn to develop their own sense of belonging and self-esteem’ and ‘young people need learning that enables them to explore, to take action, to collaborate etc.’ And in many of these curricula the means of delivering the curriculum, for example, via independent inquiry, questioning, research and critical discussions is important. The message of the curriculum, for example, rights and responsibilities of individuals and societies; about principles like freedom and equality of opportunity; democracy, law, wealth creation and public services is learned through discussion, interpretation and deliberation. Furthermore, the idea that incommensurable ideas are an inevitable part of plural democratic culture means that the *capacity* for deliberation, critical inquiry and reflection (as opposed to an understanding of these ideas alone) are important outcomes of any national education within liberal democracies. As such liberal education is understood as interpretative, deliberative and to some extent open in relation to its outcomes.
A further, arguably more contentious, concern of liberal education is the extent to which education plays its part in cultivating the widespread feelings of ‘fellow feeling’ seen by many liberals as necessary to animate liberal democratic states (see Chapter 4). This takes us into interesting territory where discussion of what it means to be a citizen within one’s national community is pertinent alongside the aim of liberal education to promote equal respect for all people. Most commonly liberal civic education curricula will acknowledge that civic education inevitably takes places within a national context - national citizenship - alongside the promotion of ideas and dispositions relating to cosmopolitan or global citizenship. The national dimension of the curriculum is often seen as historically and politically important rather than the source or object of the fellow feeling and/or that if any feelings are to be aroused then they should be directed at the polity rather than the nation itself (Stevens, p.368). There is, of course, variance across liberal education systems about the nature of democracy and this has an impact on the significance of the ties that bind citizens. Arguably, where democratic education is seen as educating citizens for a largely representative system the significance of civic bonds may be perceived as weaker. Here the emphasis may be placed on civic duties towards the polity first and other citizens only in relation to those duties. Where there is stress on participatory and deliberative democratic education then emphasis on, and initiation into, forming civic bonds that facilitate deliberation and dialogue is likely to become more significant. The latter approach to liberal education does not necessarily amount to cultivating national sentiment but might, for example, outline what civic bonds or even ‘civic friendship’ might look like and design a curriculum for its cultivation.
Reconciling the broad conceptions of liberal education

So, let us take stock. Thus far I have discussed two broad forms of liberal education. The first conception involves liberal education as apolitical and liberating. Within this conception there are differing views on the primacy of academic knowledge and the extent to which the primary educational aims are to equip students with capacity for navigating the options and having the capacity to judge for themselves. This broad conception contains differing views on extent to which liberal education privileges the role of academic knowledge in promoting wisdom and truth as necessary components of a good life. There are also debates within it about how far liberal education can provide guidance, including moral education and the education of the emotions. Proponents of liberal education within this group also debate what has been called the education of the ‘whole person’, which amounts to greater levels of explicit inculcation of certain aptitudes and dispositions to equip children for a good life within liberal democracies – and for the sake of the liberal democratic society itself. This raises the question about how essentially apolitical this conception actually is. This leads us to the second conception of liberal education, which places political education for liberal citizenship much higher on the agenda. Within this group there are those who argue for the importance of inculcating liberal values and principles but argue against the state’s role in doing this. There are others that suggest that it is quite legitimate for the state to educate future citizens if it retains a high threshold for differing views and competing conceptions of the good life. Many commentators have agreed that some kind of civic dimension to any liberal education is perfectly acceptable, even desirable and necessary, within its broad conception. Most of these commentators would argue that civic education of this kind is, in fact, a subset of a broader liberal education. There would be
no conflict in teaching academic disciplines in apolitical ways alongside this kind of civic education.

So, there are clearly some differences among the conceptions of liberal education discussed here in relation to, for example, the precise content and delivery of the curriculum or the extent of ‘soul’ or ‘state craft’ therein. However, reconciliation of one broad conception of liberal education could legitimately contain an explicitly high bar for the development of critical reasoning and the pursuit of truth along with the development of moral values, civic dispositions and abilities as well as some form of educating the emotions in a non-manipulative way. Liberal education needs to retain no tolerance for any forms of indoctrination. As such it needs to include means by which young people are equipped to debate and assess ideas critically. All these forms of liberal education have key components in common; the importance of objectivity, rational inquiry, acquisition of key forms of knowledge, the importance of students making independent and well informed choices. What they do not have in common is any sense that patriotic education is compatible with their aims. In fact patriotic education is typically met with a considerable amount of concern to many liberal educators. I now aim to show that neither conception of liberal education discussed above excludes the kind of patriotic education that I want to defend.

Arguments claiming that patriotic education is illiberal

Before setting out the claim that patriotic education is necessary for the survival of liberal democracy, and as such is an important element within liberal education, it is important to set out what the concerns are for many liberal educators. The cultivation of
patriotism through state schooling is often seen as not simply incompatible with liberal education but antagonistic to its aims. For example, as argued above, a liberal neutralist such as Clayton (2002) would say that, even if it could be done well, the state should stay out of promoting a substantive view of what is good in life and that would include the view that children should be taught to love their country. Others would claim that patriotic education cannot be done well; it is necessarily indoctrinatory (for example, Keller, 2005; R. Miller, 2007). Other commentators would argue for a lesser charge against patriotic education but nonetheless a fatal one, namely, that patriotic education cannot help but distort the truth (for example, Brighouse, 2006). Some liberal commentators suggest that patriotic education is necessarily opposed to the more appropriate educational aim of teaching about global justice and universal human rights (Starkey and Osler, 2006). And finally, Hand (2010) argues that given the reasonable disagreement over the benefits or otherwise of patriotism it is appropriate to teach it as a controversial issue. These concerns are set out below.

Is patriotic education any more than indoctrination?

Any form of education that sets a high bar for rationality, impartiality and critical reason has to have a good justification for elements of that education which sets out to instil values or promote particular attitudes and behaviours. In the forms of liberal education set out above there are some safeguards in place which aim to subject moral, emotional and civic education to the high standards of rigour akin to those within academic disciplines. These safeguards include providing children with objective, public criteria by which to make judgements, providing children with justifications for their beliefs, encouraging critical inquiry, providing alternative world views and so forth. It can certainly be argued that there is a fine line between inculcating values and behaviours in
children and indoctrinating them but given the safe guards in place the dangers of indoctrination can be avoided and arguably the line here is pretty clear.

As Hand argues (2014, p.2):

Indoctrination is considered a significant harm because of the difficulty of shifting beliefs one has come to hold non-rationally. Insofar as one holds one’s beliefs on the basis of evidence and argument, they are open to revision and correction. One is prepared to modify or relinquish them in the light of fresh evidence, or fresh appraisals of old evidence. Insofar as one’s beliefs are held non-rationally, on the other hand, they are highly resistant to reassessment. Because they are not founded on evidence, the discovery of counter-evidence has little or no effect on them. …Indoctrinatory beliefs are generated by by-passing or subverting a child’s capacity to think rationally...

Indoctrination is the antithesis of liberal education and can cause serious harm to individuals and wider society. As Wilson (quoted in Hand) puts it: ‘For here we have taken over, or put to sleep, a central part of the child’s personality - his ability to think rationally in a certain area. To put it dramatically: there is always hope so long as the mind remains free, however much our behaviour may be forced or our feelings conditioned. (Wilson et al., 1967, pp.174-5). The main defence against indoctrination is the ability to retain a critical reasoning faculty, which includes the will to find and evaluate new information about a previously held belief and the capacity to revise one’s views.

There are those that suggest that inculcating patriotism in children falls into the indoctrination category given its potential for disengaging rational thought and lack of
attention to evidence. As Keller argues here (2005, p.581) ‘A society in which patriotism is regarded as a virtue will be one in which people, especially children are given special encouragement to view their country with pride and reverence and to have the associated descriptive beliefs supported by the relevant evidence or not’. The core of Keller’s argument that patriotism is likely to be a vice lies in the patriot’s non-neutral defence of their country’s special qualities. Keller suggests that it is acceptable for a parent to claim special talents for her child and to simultaneously admit likely bias. But if a patriot did the same, for example, by stating ‘As a patriot, I think my country stands for freedom and equality, but I’ll admit I’m biased’ it would ‘be difficult to hear this statement except as the speaker’s taking a step back from his own patriotism’ (op. cit. p.590). Therefore, Keller claims, the patriot will be strongly motivated to maintain her belief in the special qualities of her country. Patriotic loyalty will force her not to admit bias. Therefore, she falls into bad faith, which is morally defunct:

Driven by her loyalty to country, the patriot will hide from herself the true nature of the procedure through which she responds to evidence that bears upon the question of what her country is really like (op. cit. p.580).

Sartre captures the notion of bad faith in his well-known existentialist treatise Being and Nothingness: ‘The one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a displeasing falsehood’. Bad faith is an existential condition of self-deception; it is dehumanising because we get some illicit satisfaction in performing some of our societal roles (like the famous waiter who performs like a robot and seems to revel in his ‘performance’). But we are in fact being turned into quasi automatons because, as Wilson suggests above, we have put to sleep one of our most precious and crucial
human faculties; the capacity for critical reason. And Martha Nussbaum (1997, p.1) adds weight to these concerns when she argues that:

One of the greatest barriers to rational deliberation in politics is the unexamined feeling that one’s preferences and ways are neutral and national. An education that takes national boundaries as morally salient too often reinforces this kind of irrationality by lending to what is an accident of history a false air of moral weight and glory.

In response to critics who suggest that it is possible to teach children to objectively evaluate one’s country and still remain patriotic, Keller argues for the impossibility of this:

Moving away from an instinctive attitude to your country of the form “This is my great/beautiful/free/ … country” and toward the recognition that your country, like any other, needs to be critically evaluated and that the patriotic picture of it held by you and others could well be illusory. In coming to this realisation, you come to take a perspective on your country that is too detached to co-exist with genuine patriotism…” (p.584).

And others agree. Richard Miller argues forcefully for the need for the US education system to help children urgently ‘unlearn patriotism’ (2007). He suggests that instilling patriotic love in children involves selective memory and viewing the country through rose-tinted spectacles: ‘A love that must constantly be nursed along with amnesia, wishful thinking and inattention to morally urgent interests is not steadfast and deep but obsessive and stultifying’ (p.14). He continues: ‘Since our loves make our world valuable to us and are not changeable at will, it sometimes makes sense to preserve the residue of amorally burdensome love’. He cites the case of white Southerners in the 1960s who genuinely opposed Southern racism but also acknowledged that their way of
life involving gentility and grace ‘were bred in slavery and depended on black labor’ (p.13).

The distortion problem

Education involving indoctrination involves significant manipulation of the learner and results in bad faith. Historical distortion for patriotic purposes is, arguably, a lesser crime but can come close to doing the same. In one US school history textbook, Build Our Nation, the descriptions of US conduct in some countries are brief and arguably highly distorted. US involvement in Vietnam is described, without any reference to civilian casualties as a defence of ‘South Vietnam which like South Korea, opposed communism’ attacked by communist North Vietnam. The brief narrative is followed by ‘Lesson Review - Critical Thinking: Compare. How would helicopters be helpful during the war? When would planes be more useful?’ (Bednarz et al., 2003, pp.573 and 575).

And in similar vein as Ben-Porath describes:

In the summer of 2002, Israeli high school students took their final exams ...At age seventeen or eighteen, just before gaining their voting rights and beginning mandatory military service, these students were confronted with the following question on their civic studies exam: “Explain why conscientious objection is subversive”.

Harry Brighouse (2006) coined the phrase the ‘distortion problem’ in his discussion of the legitimacy of patriotic education and argues that it has two dimensions. First, ‘when the state uses its agency (the education system) to promote patriotism it will wrongly influence the character of the vision of the country that children come to have’. Second, state schools ‘should avoid using history as the vehicle for fostering patriotic loyalty,
since even the most honest, clear-sighted, unsentimental attempts to teach national history [for patriotic purposes] are likely to degrade and undermine the other purposes that teaching history properly has … the truth is often inconvenient and may suffer in pursuit of patriotic sentiment’ (op. cit. p.112). And even those in favour of some form of patriotic education would agree that the idea that history should be taught partly for patriotic ends is extremely repugnant to most history teachers. As White suggests: ‘They will point to the corruption of school history under the Nazis, to the indoctrination [via distorted history teaching] of pre-war British children into the imperial myth and the rites of Empire Day’ (p.339). And 58% of a sample of state school History teachers when polled in UK in 2007 disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement: ‘It is proper for state funded schools to promote loyalty to the state’. Leave aside the phrasing of the statement, which equates patriotism with ‘loyalty to the state’ not ‘love of one’s country’ the point is clear. David Stevens concurs with this view suggesting that curricula can include an examination of the historical significance of nationality but should not tackle its ethical significance because ‘the emphasis on nationality and national sentiment is both morally dangerous and ultimately subversive of the worthy goals such as justice and equality of respect’ (p.368, emphasis added).

There are some liberal commentators who acknowledge the distortion problem but who nonetheless argue that - to some degree - it is an instrumental necessity in preserving liberal democracy’s conditions for survival. William Galston is one such commentator suggesting that the process of education needs to be more rhetorical than rational. He claims that the emphasis on rational argument or critical engagement can itself be a negative force in achieving the proper aims of liberal education. Galston defends a more
sentimental civic education to counter the apparent destructive force of detached critical reason. As he says here (1991, pp.243-244):

On the practical level, very few individuals will come to embrace the core commitments of liberal societies through a process of rational inquiry. If children are to be brought to accept these commitments as valid and binding, it can only be through a process that is far more rhetorical than rational. For example, rigorous historical research will almost certainly vindicate complex ‘revisionist’ accounts of key figures in American history. Civic education, however, requires a more noble, moralizing history: a pantheon of heroes who confer legitimacy on central institutions and constitute worthy objects of emulation.

But although this sentimental approach to history aims to serve the ends of liberal democracy, it arguably comes at too high a price. Archard describes it as a ‘falsifying national sentimentalism’ and Callan suggests that it sustains three moral problems, namely: a truncated historical imagination; a propensity to filter complex political problems through a network of mutually supportive moral fictions (secondary falsehoods to protect the primary lie of national purity); and a debased conservatism which regards an inherited past as incapable of improvement (Callan, 1997, p.106). And arguably, whilst there may be short term gains at the level of schooling, these liabilities also create problems for sustaining liberal democracy given that this kind of sentimental education might instil dispositions that cannot be reconciled with those that should underpin liberal democracy. For example, a capacity for critical reasoning does seem to be fairly crucial to liberal democracy’s survival and flourishing.

Keller argues even more forcefully against any instrumental claims for patriotic education. He acknowledges that patriotic education may galvanise liberal democratic
citizens but also points out that ‘there are also reasons to suspect that patriotism leads to war, intolerance, bigotry, and stupidity – and is hence of instrumental disvalue’ (p.591). He argues that patriotic education is not just wrong but also dangerous stating that, ‘…the patriot is likely to be drawn toward unrealistically rosy pictures of her country’s people and history, the principles for which it stands, or the way it operates. All of this could well turn out to be influential when it comes to her making morally significant decisions: decisions about whether to support or fight in a war, about who gets her vote, about whether to make certain significant sacrifices, and so on’ (p.588). And David Stevens agrees, warning that we ‘should be wary of the Siren call of nationality that promises to do our work for us. The emphasis on nationality and national sentiment is both morally dangerous and, ultimately subversive of the worthy goals, such as justice and equality of respect, that its defenders set out to serve’ (p.368).

\textit{Is patriotic education incompatible with global awareness and responsibilities?}

Some critics of patriotic education suggest that it needs to be subjected to what may be called the ‘global justice’ critique. This argument suggests that patriotic education at best fails to support sufficiently - or at worst contradicts – the principle of equal respect for all persons. If one’s allegiance is to humanity in a global sense then, according to these scholars, patriots’ special concern or loyalty towards compatriots violates a universal moral standard of treating all people with equal concern (for example, Nussbaum, 1996; Appiah, 2006\textsuperscript{23}). Liberalism is based on a universal ethic and patriotism militates against that, so, it would be reasonable to assume that patriotic education would also militate against the aims of liberal education. Nussbaum outlines the origins and essence of cosmopolitanism thus and argues that it is this global

\textsuperscript{23} Although Appiah does defend a version of Cosmopolitan Patriotism in his 2016 Reith Lecture
community that is, most fundamentally, the source of what she describes as ‘our moral obligations’ (1994, p.3):

Asked where he came from, the ancient Greek Cynic philosopher Diogenes replied, "I am a citizen of the world." He meant by this, it appears, that he refused to be defined by his local origins and local group memberships, so central to the self-image of a conventional Greek male; he insisted on defining himself in terms of more universal aspirations and concerns. The Stoics who followed his lead developed his image of the kosmou politês or world citizen more fully, arguing that each of us dwells, in effect, in two communities -- the local community of our birth, and the community of human argument and aspiration that "is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun" (Seneca, De Otio) (ibid.).

The main point here is that our main allegiance should be given to the human community, not to any form of government or other source of authority. As Nussbaum states here: ‘The idea of the world citizen is in this way the ancestor and source of Kant's idea of the "kingdom of ends," and has a similar function in inspiring and regulating moral and political conduct’ (1996, p.7).

Osler and Starkey also make the case specifically for cosmopolitan education, arguing that patriotic education wrongly focuses on difference and cultural barriers and should instead focus on ‘citizenship [that] starts from our common humanity’ (2015, p.1). Cosmopolitan education thereby allows for pupils to celebrate a number of ‘identities’ or loyalties’ within this common framework of our shared humanity.

_Patriotism as a controversial topic within liberal education_
Hand (2011, p.35) suggests that patriotism has meaning in national and global affairs and in individuals’ lives, but that it should be taught as a controversial subject. As he states here, patriotism is a part of our lives:

Patriotic sentiment has manifestly played, and continues to play, a significant role in national and international affairs. Vast swathes of history and substantial areas of contemporary political discourse would be incomprehensible in the absence of some understanding of patriotic feeling and nationalist conviction. Moreover, few pupils will pass through life without experiencing at some point the tug of patriotic attachment, or coming under pressure from others to cultivate such an attachment. So it will not do for schools just to avoid the subject, to abdicate responsibility for equipping pupils with an understanding of patriotism and the wherewithal to make reasoned judgments about its value.

However, he goes on to argue that there is legitimate and reasonable disagreement about its desirability and, as such, it should not be promoted in schools. He is particularly concerned with the possibility of losing truthful perception of the object of love in patriotism. In many cases it does not have particularly dire consequences if people have a distorted view of their beloved spouse, dog, favourite novel and so on. However, it is potentially disastrous if large numbers of people have distorted view of their nation state – and cultivating an emotional attachment to a country has the potential to do this. As he states here: ‘In very few cases of loving attachment does the loss of truthful perception matter as much as it does when the object of love is a liberal democratic nation-state’ (ibid. p.34). But neither should patriotism be ignored. Given that it is a phenomenon that we are highly likely to encounter in some ways in our lives we need to learn about it and how to make good judgements about it. Therefore the reasonable approach to
teaching patriotism is to include it in the curriculum as a controversial topic and handle it accordingly. As Hand argues here:

Our responsibility as educators is not to endorse a position in the debate about patriotism, still less to ignore that debate: it is to acquaint pupils as even-handedly as possible with the benefits and the drawback of loving one’s country and encourage them to decide for themselves how to handle this aspect of their emotional lives (ibid. p.36).

So, let us sum up the criticisms of patriotic education thus far. For some scholars, patriotic education is incompatible with the more appropriately global concerns of liberal education. For others patriotism itself is rationally defensible but patriotic education is not compatible with liberal education and should be taught accordingly as a controversial issue. For others it is at best distorting and threatens to undermine liberal education’s more worthy aims. At its worst, critics claims that it is morally dangerous and threatens, not only children’s capacity to think rationally and critically but, the foundations of liberal society itself.

**Patriotic education as liberal education**

This concluding section of the chapter takes each of the criticisms of patriotic education above showing that they are either wanting in some way or flawed. The liberal neutralist objection to any state promotion of a comprehensive doctrine, including patriotism, was defeated above by suggesting that the liberal state can be held responsible for its non-intervention in working for the interests of its citizens and that a principled stance can be achieved by ensuring that any form of civic education is deliberative and open ended to some degree. It was argued that any liberal democratic order needs to ensure that its
public institutions - including schooling - promote and secure the preconditions of engaged and active citizenship. Furthermore, liberal civic education should provide opportunities for children and young people to understand - and deliberate over - the rationales for including particular curricular content and educational aims. So, having argued that there is legitimacy in civic education itself within liberal educational principles, this next section argues that patriotic education can align with those same principles.

*Patriotic education indoctrinationary or distorted*

Whilst patriotic education of a certain kind can certainly lead to bad faith through manipulation and distortion it does not have to. One response to the charge that patriotic education is necessarily indoctrinatory is to show that there are a.) benign versions of patriotism and b.) it could be encouraged amongst other values and dispositions that we owe it to children to encourage. According to this rebuttal, patriotic education should not trump other kinds of liberal education that encourage critical reasoning and so on. Clearly there are dangers in encouraging any feelings beyond a certain point through state education so, as White argues, ‘national sentiment could be encouraged as one value among many without according it a privileged place’ (p.328). If, like other kinds of moral education, the rationale for its place on the curriculum is openly debated with learners and justifications for its value offered for critical debate, it ceases to be indoctrinatory. This, if you like is a weak (but legitimate) defence and shows how patriotic education - or encouraging national sentiment – can add value to any curriculum and empower children in important ways to value, understand and participate in their liberal national community in benign, reasonable and constructive ways.
There is also a stronger argument against those who level the accusation of indoctrination at patriotic education. Callan, for example, argues convincingly that loving one’s country does not automatically lead to bad faith and, as such, patriotic education does not need to be indoctrinatory. Rather than suggesting, as White does, that national sentiment is one of many values and dispositions instilled in children, Callan suggests that there is a way of instilling love as well as teaching children to subject it to critical reasoning. Whilst he does not deny the importance of other values he argues more forcefully for the importance of instilling love of country as part of liberal democracy’s survival. Whatever its instrumental value it is also important, however, to show that the manipulative or distorting possibilities of some kind of patriotic education can be countered. For example, nostalgic, ‘blind’ attachment is not the same as love, clearly. Love involves something much less sentimental, harder and worthier and as Callan puts it: ‘Emotional generosity and sentimentality are not the same thing’ (1997, p.118). One can subject one’s love to critical interrogation if one loves well, for example, but this does not have to result in a kind of ‘complete’ critical detachment. Callan argues that critical reason alone can be destructive and corrosive of liberal institutions and values – and is incompatible with loving these institutions. He argues that critical reason is not the same as ‘implacable scepticism’, which is a kind of detached view from nowhere which eschews all partialities and commitments to any particular community (p.161).

So, for Callan we need both some sort of emotional (unsentimental) engagement and scrutiny of that engagement. Sentimental education of the kind, for example, that Galston expounds above, comes through misrepresentation of reality in some way and
affects the judgments that can be made about the subject (in this case the nation). These are unearned emotions according to Callan (op. cit. p.105). Instead we need to teach children how to explore their ‘nation’s history seriously and imaginatively in an unsentimental spirit, and whatever public emotion can survive that process is emotion that one has paid for…” (ibid. p.107). And one way of doing this in practice is to use the best and worst of national traditions and to hold them up to scrutiny together, using the best of a nation’s traditions to interrogate those occasions when it failed to live up to its best.

Patriotic education can be consistent with liberal education and not fall foul of bad faith or necessarily involve distortion when there is a deeper understanding of what it means to love a country well and that this necessarily involves critical scrutiny as well as some kind of imaginative generosity about how it may become better and some emotional engagement that is unsentimental.

**Patriotic education compatible with cosmopolitan aims**

Richard Rorty argues for the inherent weaknesses in the cosmopolitan view suggesting that ‘cosmopolitan civic virtue seems no more than a philosopher’s figment unless citizens have empathetic imaginations powerful enough to sustain a sense of common fate with culturally distant compatriots’ (1997, p.85). And Yael Tamir concurs quoting the eighteenth century French philosopher, De Maistre, as follows:

I have seen, in my times Frenchmen, Italians, and Russians. I even know, thanks to Montesquieu, that one may be Persian; but as for Man, I declare I have never met him in my life; if he exists, it is without my knowledge (in Tamir, 1993, p.13).
Theresa May, the British Prime Minister, recently stated at the Conservative Party Conference that: ‘If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere’ (May 2016). These views come from quite different ideological perspectives. Rorty, for example, is arguing for a reclaiming of patriotism for the political left in the USA and May is, arguably, aiming to appeal to nationalists who voted for a British exit from the European Union. But, what these views have in common is the view that a reasonable locus for our common fate - that has reasonable cultural proximity and where our political decisions count and have consequences – is the national one. This does not preclude global concerns. Indeed, more connectedness, care and participation at the national level might actually support more just global policy. Other scholars have suggested convincingly along these lines and suggest that there is no necessary conflict between patriotism and cosmopolitanism in principle. Marcia Baron puts it in its weakest form arguing that: ‘citizens can retain their ‘particularity’ while learning to think and behave from perspectives of generality’ (Baron, 2002, p.72). And many other commentators have suggested that patriotism can actually enhance or ‘actualise’ cosmopolitanism. Charles Taylor, for example, has forcefully argued that what is urgently needed in liberal education is both patriotism and cosmopolitanism: the former does not necessarily counter the potential of the latter. Indeed, he - and others - argues that national loyalty education enhances cosmopolitan potency and efficacy (for example, Appiah, 2016). Soutphommasane, (2012, p.159) agrees suggesting that global concern can easily feature within patriotic deliberation and can be described as a pre requisite for any feelings of global solidarity. Liberal patriotism can take the form of an expansive rather than narrow moral aim and project. As argued in the introduction to the thesis, patriotic concern allows citizens to transcend their local and parochial bonds and
embrace other citizens, who are otherwise strangers, as fellow members of an imagined community (Anderson, 1993). The reason for cultivating a shared nationality could surely be understood as ‘an equally compelling reason for cultivating humanity’ (Tan, 2004, p.104). And as Soutphommasane argues: ‘If national pride is something worth having, it must be open to global justice in addition to social justice at a national level’ (op. cit. p.161). Any nation to be proud of should do its part for global justice and be open to criticisms from outside its borders.

Patriotism as an uncontroversial topic in liberal state schooling

Hand, as argued above, is concerned that when you love something or someone you tend to see the good points and you do not always see the bad points of the beloved person or object as clearly as a more objective person might. Love can cloud our judgement and this is especially worrying when we are educating young people to love their country. The risks associated with clouded judgment about one’s country are higher than with our love for a spouse or child, he argues. So if our objectivity can be clouded in this way then the goodness of patriotism is at the very least controversial. But love does not necessarily have to cloud our judgement. We argued in Chapter 2 that truthful perception of the beloved is, in fact, a facet of loving something or some one well. This truthful perception can be accompanied by a degree of emotional generosity but this does not have to lead to clouded judgement. As Callan has argued, love can involve truthful perception alongside a sense of constancy that means one can continue to love a person – or indeed a country – through thick and thin. We argued above that moralised love may involve the kind of devotion and self-sacrifice to someone or something that continues through challenging times and despite a variety of similar and potentially lovable alternatives. Declaring love for something requires more than
fleeting feeling and therefore a certain level of steadfastness involved. This should of course require us to teach patriotic education in a way that involves teaching what it means to love a country well – and to maintain a truthful perception of it.

If we conceive of patriotic education as a progressive project that ensures that young people learn to love their essentially multicultural liberal democratic nation and are motivated and equipped to participate in its continuous national renewal through an open, interpretive, national dialogue we diminish the risks of clouded judgement. The advocacy of this national-cultural dialogue is explicit about the fact that any liberal democratic nation’s cultures and identities are inevitably and necessarily forged through deliberation, dissent, compromise, rejection of some practices, assimilation of minority groups, integration of ethnic groups and - over time - the wholesale adoption of some immigrant values and practices. This is not about promotion of a rose tinted view of a nation. The danger of nurturing a distorted love of country is averted if we take this view of patriotic education. As such there is nothing controversial about it. The bar for the liberal values of respect for truth, critical scrutiny and individual’s autonomous choices can remain high.

Conclusion
We have argued here that despite the different broad conceptions of liberal education, it is quite possible to arrive at a view of liberal education as possessing some key features. Liberal education - as I defend it here - explicitly sets a high bar for the development of critical reasoning and the pursuit of truth along with the development of moral values, civic dispositions and abilities as well as some form of educating the emotions in a non-manipulative way. Safeguards against manipulation or indoctrination have to be in place.
These safeguards include providing children with objective, public criteria by which to make judgements, providing children with justifications for their beliefs, encouraging critical inquiry, providing alternative world views and so forth. And, whilst on the face of it patriotic education seems to contradict many of the tenets of liberalism, we have argued here that it need not. The understandable fears of some liberal commentators have been set out and defeated above. Patriotic education, when done well, appears to be entirely compatible with liberal education. Nurturing love of country does not have to be indoctrinatory or distorted. It can be compatible with, and even a prerequisite for, global awareness. It can complement liberal values and furthermore, a national (shared) project which is open to interpretation - as indeed is the national community within which it operates - is not only compatible with liberal principles but could strengthen liberalism. The nurturing of underlying commitment to the shared national community is important and the genuinely open nature of the renewing of the nation as a project may secure strong affective commitment from a diverse range of citizens. Self-rule, individual autonomy and critical reasoning are preserved and valued as part of this formative project.
CHAPTER 6: PATRIOTIC EDUCATION IN CONTEXTS OF STRUGGLE FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

This chapter examines the nature and purpose of patriotic state education in contexts where liberal democracy is fragile or otherwise under threat. Important questions regarding the kind of patriotic education that can justifiably take place in newly formed, war torn or otherwise fragile contexts are explored. For example, does the urgency or instrumental necessity of liberal democratic nation building justify illiberal means? Is it in principle permissible to pursue liberal ends using illiberal means? On the face of it, it seems less problematic to see the instrumental value of patriotic education in a post-conflict context. Arguably, emergent or struggling nations can justify some, arguably temporary, policy measures to bring new compatriots together in order to build the conditions for liberal democracy. There is an understandable temptation, perhaps, to view more belligerent forms of patriotic education as more necessary where liberal democracy is perceived as vulnerable or embryonic. It could be argued that some forms of patriotic education that might otherwise be viewed as incompatible with liberal education might be justified for the sake of urgent creation or reinforcement of national unity. These issues are explored here in the context of a variety of nations explicitly aiming to develop national solidarity or engaged in renewing elements to their citizenship or patriotic education agenda. Overall the argument, that it may be justifiable to tolerate more illiberal elements of patriotic education in the short term for the sake of either building, renewing or defending a liberal democratic state, is explored and defeated. A form of patriotic education based on the concept of ‘shared fate’ rather than patriotic education that aims to create a common national identity is proposed as a viable alternative to more belligerent patriotic education in all liberal democratic contexts.
Croatia, Lebanon and Lithuania’s educational responses to nation building are explored first. The challenges facing new or fragile national systems aspiring to liberal democracy are acknowledged and are not underestimated. At this point I should declare a direct interest in Croatia having lived there, with my Croatian husband and our two children, from 2004 to 2007. The considerable damage of the war of independence, which ended in 1995, was very much in evidence in material as well as socio-psychological and political terms. The nation state was in early stages of its construction. My children went to local state schools and, as such, I had some direct experience of the relatively newly formed national curriculum. Croatia’s educational response to post-communist and post conflict nation building for democracy manifests many of the challenges new nation states face when tackling the twin goals of creating national solidarity after a bloody (internal and external) conflict whilst simultaneously creating democratic citizens. Initially there was emphasis on a more ethnic sense of national identity through the history curriculum at the expense of more civic virtues. Since 2010 however there have been considerable moves towards a more civic-based citizenship education and more nuanced teaching of history with deliberative practices that conforms more to liberal educational purposes.

The reason for including Lebanon in this analysis is twofold. First I have direct experience of working on a recent nation building World Bank education project involving the creation of national state school standards for teachers and leaders. Second, Lebanon presents an interesting case of a post conflict nation aspiring to

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24 The Lebanese Ministry of Education working with the World Bank since 2013 – present (October 2016) on a national school improvement, leadership capacity building project
democracy in the Near East region. As Quaynor (2012, p.11) states: ‘[According to a global security report in 2010] Only the constitutional republic of Lebanon qualified as a democratic ‘post-conflict’ country, as the other countries involved in conflict in the region have been classified as continuously actively involved in conflict’. There will be those that argue, convincingly, that Lebanon continues to be rife with conflict and is understandably struggling to cope with the enormous influx of Syrian refugees since 2011, which has seen its population increase by a third. An analysis of the Lebanese government’s educational response to nation building, in its protracted fragile and vulnerable state, makes it a good test case for the extent to which illiberal means are justified by the aspired-for liberal ends. The third country in this category of newly formed or fragile nations, Lithuania, is included as a post-communist nation developing as a new democratic state. I have no personal connection with, or experience in, Lithuania. However, there is some good scholarly research exploring the civic and ethnic tensions within its nation building liberal education programme which draws out the challenges of nation building and democratic education within previously undemocratic states (McLaughlin, 2002).

The analysis of these three countries concludes that each has faced considerable challenges in promoting a new, or strengthening an existing, sense of national solidarity alongside education for democracy in previously undemocratic contexts. Part of the challenges in Croatia and Lithuania led to some initial emphasis on developing a shared national identity rather than the civic elements of progressive patriotic education. However, each country, in different ways, has resisted the continued or sole emphasis on shared ethnic national identity and has journeyed towards more explicit education for civic virtues. The challenge in Lebanon has been the lack of liberal principles in telling
the national story, which has actually undermined chances of national solidarity. The argument is made that the inclusion of liberal democratic values and practices early on in any post conflict patriotic education is both more liberal and more efficacious in sustainable liberal nation building.

This chapter also explores the extent to which, and ways in which, nation building patriotic education remains a significant feature of Israel and the USA through the work of Sigal Ben-Porath (2006). She describes both nations as experiencing what she calls ‘citizenship under fire’: Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the USA in the post 9/11 context. Both nations, she argues feel some sense of existential threat. The value of what she describes as ‘belligerent patriotism’ in this context is contrasted with education that construes nation building for democracy as an ongoing project in which citizens develop a sense of ‘shared fate’ rather than the more problematic sense of shared, common national identity. This ‘expanded’ education retains its liberal and patriotic elements and, Ben-Porath argues convincingly, is suitable for democratic nations at war or currently experiencing domestic social conflict, as well as those emerging from recent conflict, either international or domestic. As such this chapter touches on the ways in which even more established liberal democracies, such as the UK, face some specific challenges to their democratic processes and, as such, some of the arguments about urgent patriotic education for nation building may apply to them. For example, a ‘nation healing’ agenda has been promised by the UK’s new Prime Minister, Theresa May (July 13th 2016), after the considerable social and political divisions exposed by the EU referendum, as well as the alarming rise in racist attacks and apparent legitimisation of anti-immigration rhetoric since the ‘Leave’ vote won by a
small margin\textsuperscript{25}. As May said on her first day as UK Prime Minister: ‘Now, more than ever, we need to work together, to deliver on Brexit, to build a country that works for everyone, and to truly unite our party and our country’ \textit{(The Guardian, July 13\textsuperscript{th} 2016)}.

The Trump presidential victory has revealed deep divisions in US society, as well as some threats to liberal democracy contained within the president-elect’s own conservative-nationalist agenda. May’s words are being echoed in the US too.

What all these nations share, albeit to significantly varying degrees and in varying forms, is the sense that a national commitment to liberal democracy needs to be built from its foundations or an established democracy is under some specific or significant threat. This chapter explores the kind of patriotic education that is required in these circumstances and examines whether its instrumental value in these more uncharted, threatened or extreme conditions justifies its existence – or influences the legitimate form it may take - any more than in what might be described as peacetime conditions in long established liberal democracies. It concludes with the view that patriotic education needs to be construed as an open, participatory project, which provides affective glue that creates common bonds between liberal democratic citizens, not construed as a shared national identity-forming project. This kind of patriotic education has value within all liberal democracies or nations aspiring to liberal democracy in that it creates the much needed affiliative connection at the important level of national community where important decisions are made and which have consequence for citizens at subnational and transnational levels. Any nation building liberal democratic project is arguably more about strong, shared, democratic participation and civic virtues within a national context than it is about containing or managing diversity within a constructed

\textsuperscript{25} UK European Union referendum: 52\% of voters chose to leave the European Union and 48\% voted to remain.
‘national identity’. The chapter concludes that, if patriotic education, at any point in a liberal democracy’s history or formation, focuses on creating a strong national identity it is more likely to display tendencies towards bad faith and tendencies towards indoctrination. As such it is illegitimate and will fail. Patriotic education always, and in all circumstances, needs to pass a high bar for truth claims, rational deliberation and moral justification.

What is nation building?

Liberal democratic nation building, to varying degrees, is a feature of the countries explored here so it is important to be clear what we mean by it, particularly as there is a certain amount of what might be described as ethical baggage that comes with the term within a liberal democratic context. As Kymlicka suggests, it can appear - but does not have to - to smack of some forms of social engineering (2007, p.62). Ernest Gellner, one of the most influential scholars of nationalism in the 20th century suggests that the nation usually follows the state, rather than the other way around (2006, Ch. 1). On the surface this may seem to contradict some core liberal ideas of freedom, choice, openness and rational deliberation; hence Kymlicka’s expression of potential ethical discomfort. However, it is difficult to argue against the view that to some extent all states bear signs of ‘nationalist efforts at self-determination, efforts, that is, to determine the content of national life’ (Soutphommasane, 2009, p.95). And as Amy Gutmann (1987, p.15) says: ‘Political socialisation of citizens is one of the functions of education’. As such, there are, and always have been, some inevitable ideological elements of nation building. A classic Old World example is the way in which the French Third
Republic in 1870 explicitly expressed its aim of ‘transforming peasants into Frenchmen’ (Soutphommasane, 2009, p.94).

Nation building, expressed at its simplest is the political means to reinforce and shape society. It also involves the use of public policy to reinforce, promote and shape a national identity, as Norman expresses it (2006, Chapter 2). And this national identity is not to be understood in overly crude ethnic or mono-cultural terms. A nation’s sense of itself may involve the extent to which citizens enjoy and protect very high levels of robust, democratic participation. In one sense this may be construed as a national identity of sorts. However, it is more helpful to view shared fate patriotism in contrast to national identity forming patriotism. A nation’s cultural sense of itself as an open participatory democracy that values pluralism is a desired outcome of this endeavour. However, this is not equivalent to sharing a common ‘identity’. And there are clearly different contexts and different purposes of nation building, from the formation of new nations to the continuous nation building elements that inform many state education programs in established liberal democracies. Established democracies do not take citizens’ commitment or democratic participation for granted. State education usually involves some elements of citizen soul craft, as we argued in Chapter 5. In relation to liberal nation building specifically, this, arguably, involves states in taking on more of a democratically elected designer or negotiated facilitator role than what might be described as a state architect and builder role associated with more authoritarian models. As a result of this, the shape liberal democratic national identity takes can be influenced by public deliberation and its final outcomes remain, to some extent, open.
Norman’s definition, which serves us reasonably well here, suggests that nation building involves using policy, including state education, to reinforce, promote and shape a nation’s collective sense of itself. However, clearly, the precise form of any nation-building project will vary according to context. Newer, liberal democratic nations may have some urgent priorities in creating the very notion of national solidarity from societies recently riven with civil war or international conflict and, as such, may need to begin with a more modest legal agenda for mutual tolerance of each other or minority groups. Representative multicultural democracies, as opposed to more participatory multicultural ones, may have more explicit reinforcing aims for national solidarity in mind through assimilating minority groups, for example. Other liberal democracies may choose an approach, which emphasises accommodating minorities or more explicit recognition of difference as part of the national culture and therefore a more integrationist approach. As Neil Burtonwood (2006, p.112) says here:

There are several types of nation building. There is ‘reprioritization’ of national identity that calls for members of sub-national groups to identify more closely with the wider national community. [...] reprioritization [...] does call for some level of identification with a pan-state identity. Then there is ‘reconfiguring’ which aims to make an existing national identity more inclusive and therefore more hospitable to immigrant minorities.

As one illustration of ‘reconfiguring’ aims, a British Labour government minister said in 1997: ‘When we try to understand our national culture and sense of identity, let us remember first and foremost that diversity is one of the key ingredients of both that culture and that identity’ (cited in Burtonwood, 2006, p.112). Established liberal democracies, as illustrated here, may need to reinvigorate their state nation-building
policies at times when there are strains or cracks appearing in national unity or sense of shared purpose. As argued in Chapter 4 above, these strains are now endemic and as such, nation-building elements of state education programmes are, arguably, more explicit and instrumentally essential. Part of this agenda may involve nation-building patriotic education, which can support de-sentimentalising aspects of any national curriculum or even, as Soutphommasane argues, ‘re-moralising it’ (2012, p.208). This may involve state education programmes ‘unlearning’ some aspects of previously held false beliefs or as Ben-Porath describes it, undergoing some form of ‘reverse forms of patriotism’ (2006, p.114). This involves ‘reversing’ the forces of belligerent patriotism and driving towards a more inclusive, noble form of liberal patriotism.

We shall now turn to an examination of various examples of nation building in different contexts where patriotic education has been harnessed for that purpose.

**Teaching for war**

State education for nation building can be harnessed for many national purposes and it is worth ruling out the use of patriotic education in preparation for war or for the purpose of ‘knowing one’s enemies’. In Chapter 4 the notion of belligerent patriotism was ruled out as compatible with liberalism, even in wartime. We can do the same for belligerent patriotic education. As Ben-Porath states (*op. cit.* p.34):

> When the education is conscripted to teaching belligerent citizenship, it turns education into part of the war culture; through facilitating the use of belligerent rather than democratic perspectives, education becomes war by other means.
Sometimes democratic values have been subordinated to, or sacrificed for, immediate survival needs in liberal democracies. As one policy commission, What the Schools Should Teach in Wartime in the US decreed in 1943: ‘Long range values … must be subordinated to the life-and-death needs of today and tomorrow’. And, arguably the USA Patriot Act (2001) suspended some key liberal principles and practices for short-term security needs in education settings amounting to harnessing aspects of education to a ‘war on terror’ culture. There are plenty of British examples of similar practice. David Archard, in his article Should We Teach patriotism? (1999, p.157), traces some examples of British imperial patriotism, which was designed to give children a sense of Britain as:

A country who does not have to cheat in order to succeed whilst others do, which is confident of victory but temperate in enjoyment of its triumph, a country, in short, which both always plays by the rules and always wins […] [A] belief in an Empire on which the sun never sets, guardian of a glorious past and protector of the values of civilization against Teutonic barbarism…

These examples of patriotic education are a version of ‘teaching for war’ during wartime or other kinds of protracted struggle (even if protecting British imperial interests may not have been viewed as a ‘struggle’ at the time). There are also examples of state education as teaching for war or for developing essentially bellicose attitudes in the young as an essential, preventative measure to ensure national survival. The emphasis here is for the young to love their nation but also to know their enemies. As one commentator puts it: ‘[For some nationalists] the point of teaching wartime history in school is to instil patriotism, and to convey that in a dangerous world the survival of any nation depends on its ability to win its battles’ (A European Stability Initiative
Report, 2015 p.1). Whilst the concept of knowing one’s enemies may be more explicit in authoritarian contexts, there are certainly some more sub-textual examples in relatively recent history of textbooks in established liberal democracies. The teaching of Irish history in late twentieth century England has been called into question. Since the 1960s the conflict between Northern Ireland’s state forces and Protestant Unionists against chiefly Catholic unionists claimed over 3,500 lives and caused over 50,000 casualties. Some English textbooks, up to the early 1980s, framed this as ‘The Irish Problem’ - rather than its current phrasing ‘The Irish Question’ - conveying the Republican Irish as, in some sense, an enemy of the UK.

Harnessing history education, which emphasises hostility towards a nation’s traditional or potential adversaries, for the purposes of national stability or survival is clearly an illegitimate use of patriotic education for liberal nation building.

Post conflict liberal democratic nation building and patriotic education

This section explores the significant survival challenges and potential threats facing nations recovering from war or conflict whilst simultaneously aiming to become liberal democratic states. The nature and extent of conflict can, of course, vary in what are known as post conflict states. Some have been ravaged by protracted war and are trying to establish a peace in the context of a fragile truce declared with former enemies, both external and internal, as well as a democratic future; for example, Lebanon. Others have emerged from, often unwanted, oppression by a majority group as in the case of many post-communist nations; for example, Lithuania. Some countries are nation building for
democracy after civil, as well as external, conflict and are also what are described as post-communist states; for example, Croatia.

Facing continued existential threat and nation building for democracy are extremely challenging twin goals. There are no easy answers and it is by no means my intention, in providing some normative analysis, to oversimplify this difficult and important process. Post conflict and emergent nations often face inordinate hurdles and this can certainly lead to extraordinary civic relations. A sense of continued national vulnerability will result in an inevitable focus on immediate survival. Physiological safety will be paramount. This can amount to short-term policies that curtail the freedoms of citizens. Curfews and other kinds of travel restrictions are not uncommon in early stages of peace settlements. Other limitations of civic liberties are common where very delicate negotiations have to be managed, for example, returning to damaged homes that have been in the hands of the former enemy. ‘Repossessing’ property on a large national scale is neither straightforward ethically or legally; nor can it happen quickly. In the immediate aftermath of war, post conflict countries often restrict or violate civil liberties that may be taken for granted on peacetime. Psychological damage, of returning soldiers and the wider civilian population, will be a national priority too. This inevitably takes a great deal of delicacy, patience and time. All this amounts to some inevitable distortion ‘of the relations of individuals and states – their expectations, their commitments, their rights and obligations’ (Ben-Porath, p.10).

These post conflict challenges inevitably influence the educational response of any new national government. New national curricula, in contexts where liberal democracy is being built, convey long-term goals expressing eventual, desired outcomes. Indeed, this
is true of most national curricula; ideals are captured and communicated. The post conflict, emergent democratic nation faces many practical challenges to attaining these ideals, especially in the immediate aftermath of war involving internal ethnic divisions. An extensive literature review examining the experiences of teachers and students in citizenship studies in post conflict schooling (Quaynor, 2012) identified four common themes. First, teachers’ and students’ attitudes towards teaching and schools were permeated by a fear of violence reoccurring. The review reported on studies conducted in a number of countries including Bosnia-Herzegovina (Hromadzić, 2008), Croatia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Serbia (Plut et al., 2002), where teachers, students and curriculum content emphasised the need to be faithful to one’s own ethnic group and evade others perhaps out of fear. As Quaynor reports here (p.43):

For example, teachers and parents expressed the need to manage classroom talk in order to avoid controversial issues. There was an avoidance of interethnic contact based on this fear. In Rwanda, participants stressed the desire to avoid talking about ethnicity overall. The fear of future violence led to considerable mistrust of other persons and institutions.

The second theme facing education in several post war nations, identified by this extensive literature review, was a lack of trust in political parties or the political system itself. Distribution of power among different ethnic groups was often an understandable concern. The study captures participant responses: ‘Groups in power seemed to desire preserving the control they enjoyed, whereas groups who had lost power desired maintaining some type of power, from the need to preserve a group identity to the need to regain political power’ (op. cit. p.44).
And, third, these tensions over distribution of power and fear of returning violence affected responses to the content of the curriculum itself. Again in the words of the report (*ibid.*):

Depending on the side of the conflict that their group was on, some wanted to teach about the conflict and some wanted to omit it from the curriculum. In Rwanda, the government did not permit teachers to present the genocide as an ethnic conflict – rather, teachers were to highlight how the conflict was a result of colonialism.

The fourth theme to emerge from this review of the post conflict citizenship education literature was the legacy of authoritarianism in many post conflict contexts, even those intending to become liberal democracies. As Quaynor puts it here (*op. cit.* p. 45):

In a surprising number of studies, both teachers and students scored high on measures of valuing authoritarianism. Both teachers and students in countries in the Balkan region exhibited authoritarian tendencies, and in Mozambique, students were highly critical of democracy, associating democracy with violence.

The common features of the post conflict education environment identified above have tended, in some cases, towards some suspension of liberal principles for the sake of guaranteeing security or promoting national solidarity. As Ben-Porath argues when citizenship is under fire or is being newly formed, an emphasis on the ‘unique role of ethnicity and retreat into ethno nationalist citizenship is more likely in acute situations’ (2006, p.15). Plut *et al* (2002) analysed content on the presentation of democracy in history and mother tongue language textbooks, soon after the war, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then Serbia. They found that a belligerent ethnic tone prevailed in many cases.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, textbooks stressed loyalty to one’s own ethnic group over peace education, and included the subject of basic civil defence in the eighth grade curriculum. Rights were presented in a negative form, giving students examples of persons who had been deprived of their rights. National independence was presented as a positive value and described as the right to resist aggressors. For example, the Serbian fifth grade reader stated that it is ‘better to die once than to serve a foreigner forever’ (2002, p.123).

Whilst this bellicose content is not typical of all post conflict states, it is safe to conclude that national solidarity can become an overriding concern in post conflict environments. As Smith, (2003) suggests, in other - sometimes bitterly - divided societies, state education has involved ‘creating a national story of peoplehood that minimizes, or even overlooks, division and conflict in order to promote a form of association in which the claims of “the people” or nation take primacy over the claims of groups or over histories that might divide the people’ (cited in Staeheli and Hammett, 2009, p.6). In the short term, these stories can exert a powerful unifying influence, and can sometimes have positive influence in peace building. But if oppression or conflict remains unexamined, this may have longer-term consequences for the health and sustainability of any future democratic state. Arguably, where textbooks included no substantial content about democratic principles or practical information about democracy, there are inevitably some significant consequences for civic education.

However, there are also several studies that suggest this retreat into ethnic identity or avoidance of teaching about and for democracy is not a universal response in post conflict environments. The Quaynor literature review showed that, although students in
some post-conflict societies seemed to desire avoiding controversial issues and politics, this was not universally true. As she reports here (op. cit. p.46):

Studies from Northern Ireland and Lebanon cited students who desired increased political literacy and wanted a more active citizenship education curriculum than they experienced (Akar, 2007; Lomas, 1999; Watling and Arlow, 2002). In studies from [some parts of] Bosnia-Herzegovina [and] Indonesia and South Africa, a democratic classroom climate and the use of participatory methods increased students’ civic engagement, participatory skills and knowledge about democracy (Finkel and Ernst, 2005; Mapiasse, 2007; Soule, 2000).

In a similar vein, Christopher Gunness, spokesman for UNHCR on Palestinian education, has defended the teaching of Shakespeare as part of refugee education. As he declared: ‘Using the phrase ‘Once more unto the breach’ does not amount to an incitement to war and in liberal education everyone has a right to learn about Shakespeare’ (2016).

The liberal educational nation building journeys of Croatia, Lebanon and Lithuania reflect many aspects of what may be described as both typical and more desirable in post conflict or emergent states.

**Patriotic education for nation building in Croatia**

Croatia embarked on its nation-building journey in 1995 after it was established as a parliamentary democracy following the bloody dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the demise of communism in Europe. As such, Croatia faced the nation-building challenges shared by many former communist countries as
well as having to address the consequences of emerging from a difficult and costly war of independence. Serb military aggression followed Croatia’s proclamation of independence in June 1991. A few months later almost all major cities suffered some damage, a third of the territory was occupied and ethnic cleansing led to the displacement of half a million people. In 1992 the Bosnian war involved Croatia in further fighting and by 1996 there were 300,000 refugees living in Croatia whose original total population was just over four million. The complex history of the dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia is a study in its own right. I am not examining the causes here; I am focusing on the outcomes of this conflict in order to place the nation building educational strategy in its appropriate context.

The fact that Croatia is a ‘nation forged in war’ is highly significant as Tanner (1996) suggests in his book of that title. It would be fair to say that the immediate post war context was one of hardship and threat and that this is significant in understanding why the first government of the newly independent Croatia (HDZ26) was, for all the stated commitment to democracy, in practice authoritarian. Its emphasis was on maintaining national independence through the promotion of cultural homogeneity and spiritual renewal. National survival made little room for democratic changes in the first instance. Spajić-Vrkaš, (2003, p.3) argues that the autocratic government of the HDZ bungled ten years of transition, aided by inappropriate international pressure to speed up reform. She suggests that the HDZ over emphasised the need for homogenisation at the expense of wider human rights. Nepotism was widely practised; there was an opaque and vague legal system. Economic recovery from the war was a disaster and, somewhat ironically, the middle class disappeared. They had been quite strong under the old (non-Soviet)

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26 Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union)
Yugoslav system. A new class emerged - the nouveau riches (dubbed the *mafiocracy*) and there were a large majority of impoverished citizens.

Spajić-Vrkaš, suggests that the post-war situation in Croatia and the handling of the transition period was symptomatic of a lack of what she implies is a lack of social maturity in the region and failures of those in authority to fill the ‘compliance gap’ (*op. cit.* p.4). This view is challenged robustly by Kymlicka and Opalski, 2001, and in Kymlicka’s further writing in 2002. These scholars question the view that a democratic maturity continuum exists or that liberal democratic models from the West can easily be transferred to central and eastern European countries (CEEs). It is not, in their view, that this part of the world in not ‘ready’ for liberal democracy and that this part of the world are relics of pre modern or pre liberal tribalism but that other complex factors abound. New national governments should not be judged on their ability to ‘comply’ with traditional democratic models. One of the most prominent factors differentiating CEE country responses to liberal democratic nation building, in their view, is the treatment of minority groups. As Kymlicka (2002, p.20) says here:

> In CEE countries many dominant groups throughout the region feel they have been victimized by their minorities acting in collaboration with foreign enemies. (Slovakia re the Hungarian minority; Baltics re the Russian minority; Croatia re the Serbian minority; Bulgarians re the Turkish minority).

There is therefore an understandable concern that minorities may be disloyal, that a strong state requires relatively weak and disempowered minorities and that therefore the treatment of national minorities is a matter of national security. Kymlicka suggests that there is a sort of ‘zero sum game’ understanding of the relations between minorities and
states in this situation and whilst he does not suggest it is the most constructive view, and can in fact cause damage to minority-majority relations in the long term, he does suggest that it is at some level a reasonable view given the historical context. Whatever the reasons for the authoritarianism and quasi-autocratic governance in the immediate period after independence, education policy in Croatia reflected this focus on short-term survival and containment of national minority views. Whilst Education for Democratic Citizenship (EDC) and human rights were accepted as key goals in the immediate post war education context or the early 1990s, it is debatable how far these ideas were really implemented in practice in the earlier years of independence. It is worth noting here that the very fact that human rights and democratic aims had such high status in the stated aims of the new government is not to be trivialised. The stated aims did go beyond mere rhetoric, even if the practice took some time to catch up.

There were tensions, then, between the curricular liberal democratic ideals and the practice at school and classroom level. There were also mixed messages being conveyed through the content of the civic curriculum and the mostly didactic, authoritarian means by which it was delivered. There were, however, also tensions at the level of principle at curricular level. The History curriculum was chosen as the primary source of building national solidarity whilst the civics curriculum was the source for developing children’s democratic knowledge and dispositions. What emerged was a fairly narrow conception of civic virtue in these early years and a fairly formidable sense of Croatian national identity based on some deliberate historical revisionism.

Several scholars worked on the content of history textbooks in post war Croatia, most notably, Ivo Makek, Josip Adamcek, Agneza Szabo and Ivo Perić. Ivo Makek’s
textbooks remained in schools in the early days of independence and were updated with the help of Josip Adamcek. (Cited in ESI, 2015). Their purpose did seem to be directed towards reviving or creating a sense of the ancient rights of Croatians and the thousand-year claim to statehood being thwarted by enemies, including the Serbs. As one Serb scholar, in a very critical article about Croatian textbook history, suggested: ‘[here] Malek probably stated the greatest untruth in the whole textbook: that from the 10th to the 20th century, during a stormy millennium, from the Drava to the Adriatic Sea there was only one state – Croatia’ (cited in ESI, 2015). Other examples of politicised history in the early years of history education abound. Agneza Szabo, an influential actor in President Tudjman's campaign, was appointed special consultant for history textbooks at the ministry and her stated aim was to foster ‘healthy patriotism’ among the young. Many accusations of distortion to portray Croatia as heroic, innocent and victims of Serb oppression have been levelled at her. However, at the time President Tudjman was happy with Szabo’s curriculum and awarded her a presidential decoration declaring that he appreciated that ‘Croatia's new nationalist history offered a sense of orientation to a generation growing up in a country at war’ (ESI, p.12). Ivo Perić has been accused of similarly distorting national history for patriotic purposes, for example, in relation to what is known as the Bleiburg incident. At the end of the Second World War, tens of thousands of Croatian officials, soldiers and civilians had fled to the border town of Bleiburg in southern Austria. They were handed over by British troops to the Yugoslav Partisans. Thousands were executed on the spot. Perić's textbook emphasised that towards the end of the war many (Serb) Chetnik fighters joined the Partisans: ‘Those former Chetniks/Partisans hated anything Croatian and Catholic … and showed it everywhere, committing crimes: theft, maltreatment, killings’ (p.11). No mention, for
example, is made of the responsibility of Tito (who was half Croat) or of other senior communist leaders.

In recent years, however, some Croatian historians, teachers, students and some parents, have vigorously challenged these nationalist distortions. Krešimir Erdelja, a history teacher at a Zagreb primary school, describes the need for ‘adult history’ teaching as opposed to nationalist history teaching in Croatian schools. And when the national curriculum was revised in 2000 this gave some other authors the opportunity to produce History textbooks in ‘an open society to prepare students for citizenship in a world where values clash and where all institutions are imperfect – a world where, unnervingly, even those we admire may be responsible for crimes’ (ESI, p.iii). Erdelja and Igor Stojaković, submitted a manuscript that broke new ground. In their book, they included atrocities committed by the Ustasha regime, by communist partisans, by Serbian forces against Croats in the early 1990s and by Croatian forces against Serb civilians in 1995. In the relatively new Croatian nation this aroused some debate. As the ESI report states here (op. cit. p.3):

This elicited criticism from the former curriculum developers... For Szabo and her colleagues, it was not sufficient that [Erdelja] referred to crimes committed by Serbian forces in earlier passages of his book. They wanted to preserve the image of Croats as victims and Serbs as perpetrators at all times. [An] open letter called for the textbooks by Erdelja ... to be withdrawn.

This attempted suppression of new history textbooks failed. Other historians signed the open letter defending Erdelja against Szabo and her colleagues. The HDZ-led ministry of education agreed to allow the continuation of these textbooks and by 2011 the most
widely used book was the one by Krešimir Erdelja and Igor Stojaković. This progression and signs of strengthening democracy seem set to continue. In June 2016 there was a large demonstration in Zagreb, attended mostly by teachers, students and parents, asking for a ‘party politics free’ curriculum and better quality textbooks that align to contemporary liberal democratic standards.\footnote{25,000 people gathered in central Zagreb, and in several other Croatian cities, to call for a politics free curriculum against the staunchly conservative group in the government who wants its views reflected in teaching materials about controversial social issues. The slogan used by demonstrators is ‘Croatia can do better’.}

This development in nation building patriotic education has, of course, taken place within wider societal developments and a political context including Croatia’s membership of EU membership since 2013. The most recent national curriculum, devised in 2010, explicitly privileges lifelong learning competencies alongside a continued emphasis on patriotism, which is stated as the second most important educational goal. As the Croatian National Curriculum Framework states here (Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, 2010, p. 15):

Educational Goal 1: providing a systematic method of teaching students which fosters and enhances their intellectual, physical, aesthetical, social, moral, and spiritual development in keeping with their abilities and aptitudes. Educational Goal 2: developing student awareness regarding the preservation of Croatian national identity as well as the material, spiritual, historical, and cultural heritage of the Republic of Croatia.

Over the last two decades Croatia’s nation-building education agenda has moved from a more civic nationalist approach away from a more ‘ethnic’ nationalism. As Michael Ignatieff says here, (1994, pp. 3–6):
Civic nationalism is democratic in character, envisaging the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, patriotically attached to a shared set of political practices and values. In contrast, ethnic nationalism sees national identity as based on ethnicity rather than citizenship and law. Whilst civic nationalism can be rational, flexible, pluralistic and morally rich, ethnic nationalism is tempted by irrationality, fanaticism and authoritarianism.

And, arguably, Croatia has gone further than this and moved towards a more nuanced version of patriotic education that includes an emphasis on democratic values alongside national affiliation understood as ‘shared fate’ rather than national identity (Ben-Porath, p.35). The question remains whether there were some lost years in the early transitional stage and whether the country might have moved faster towards this to greater effect in terms of its democratic development as well as national building agenda. Its immediate recourse to nationalist identity-building education may have been an unwarranted distraction and arguably counter-productive. We shall return to this question below. But before that we shall focus on Lebanon as another interesting test case of patriotic nation-building education.

Patriotic education for nation building in Lebanon

The nation-building educational project in Lebanon has had a longer, more protracted and more complex history than Croatia’s. It is not possible to do the country’s history justice here but others have done this admirably (e.g. Lebanese historians: Fattah, 2007, Salibi, 1988 and Traboulsi, 2012 and non-Lebanese historians: Fisk, 2001, Harris, 2012). I shall provide some high level background only as this will be necessary to understand modern day Lebanon and its continuing nation-building educational challenges.
After the First World War the emergent nation’s boundaries were set by colonial powers.

As Salami (2014) says here:

The demographics of Lebanon were profoundly altered in 1919, as the added territory contained people who were predominantly Muslim or Druze: Lebanese Christians, of which the Maronites were the largest subgrouping, now constituted barely more than 50% of the population, while Sunni Muslims in Lebanon saw their numbers increase eightfold, and the Shi‘ite Muslims fourfold. The Modern Lebanon's constitution, drawn up in 1926, specified a balance of power between the various religious groups, but France designed it to guarantee the political dominance of its Christian allies (2014, p.30).

And the terms set on the difficult road to independence in 1943, under a then Vichy government in France as France was still under Nazi occupation, are still evident in remaining divisions today. For example, the nation compromised five distinct groups in 1943 and many of the tensions between these religious and culturally distinct groups remain evident today. The French-backed Maronite Christian groups dominated politics after 1943 and to an extent continue to do today. Considerable tensions remain between the more economically advantaged Sunni Muslim groups and the politically active, through more economically disadvantaged Shia’a Muslims. The formation of Israel on Lebanon’s southern border in 1948 had profound consequences for the country. For example, during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Lebanon played no active role in it but was profoundly affected by its aftermath when Palestinians used Lebanon as a base for attacks on Israel. Thousands of refugees have sought refuge in Lebanon since the 1960s. There has been a very damaging civil war in Lebanon 1975-90 started when Christian militia attacked Palestinians, which led to retaliations. There continue to be Christian-
Muslim tensions, not least because some Lebanese Christians welcomed the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982 as defence against the increasing power of Syrian-based Hezbollah. Lebanon is also a crucial battleground that falls between Iran and Israel’s interests. The Syrian conflict that began in March 2011 spilled over into Lebanon in deadly clashes between Sunni Muslims and Alawites (a branch of Shi’a) in Beirut and Tripoli. And finally the Syrian war has led to a huge refugee population increase since 2013 seeing the overall population rise from approximately 4.5 million to over 6 million in a very short space of time. This creates overwhelming human challenges, not least for educational infrastructure.

This protracted, complex and devastating conflict is an extremely challenging context for nation-building education. There are certainly no easy answers, especially given the lack of infrastructure and resources. Indeed, these material challenges might be viewed as quite enough alone for policy makers and government ministers to manage. However, some Lebanese educationalists are critical of the failures of the state nation-building education programme and its inability to diminish the strong sub national identities. Nabil Constantine, in his doctoral thesis on multicultural education in Lebanon (2012), argues that unfortunately loyalty to the nation always comes second to citizens’ sub group identity and that this helps perpetuate historical divisions. Whilst social cohesion has been one of the key stated goals of education in Lebanon over the last few decades, Constantine argues that the policy and curriculum reforms have not contributed adequately to this goal. For example, the Ta’if agreement that ended the civil war in 1990 entrusted the Educational Centre for Research and Development (ECRD), a government department, with developing a history curriculum and textbook in an effort
to provide ‘united, post-civil war national identity’ (Volk, 2008, p.309). But the consensus is that it failed.

Hassan M. Fattah has written a history of history teaching in Lebanon entitled ‘A Nation with a Long Memory, but a Truncated History’ (2007), where he points to many of the distortions involved in this enterprise - and their consequences. Whilst his first claim about the universal purposes of History teaching may be contentious, the point he makes about Lebanon’s truncated history teaching remains salient. As he says here:

History classes across the globe serve two purposes — they educate the young and they shape national identity. They also often sidestep controversy to avoid offence. It is the same here [in Lebanon] as elsewhere, but the controversy being avoided is the vicious, 15-year civil war that started in 1975. [...] The bizarre results are evident in any schoolbook here — history seems simply to come to a halt in the early 1970s, Lebanon’s heyday. With sectarian tensions once again boiling here, some educators fear that the failure to forge a common version of the events is dooming the young to repeat the past, with most of them learning contemporary history from their families, on the streets or from political leaders who may have their own agendas.

And a former director of the ECRD, Nemer Frayha, concurs when she states that ‘America used the school to create a melting pot; we used it to reinforce sectarian identity at the expense of the national identity [...] From the start, I am forming the student as a sectarian person, not as a citizen’ (cited in Fattah, 2007, p.1). And other policy failures further contributed to this lack of common curricula purpose when a stated commitment to revise and unify the content and purposes of the civics and history curriculum was reneged upon. As Fattah says here (op. cit. p.2):
Under the 1989 Ta’if accords that ended the civil war, Lebanon agreed to unify its history and civics curriculums with the hope of building a national consensus and a more solid national identity. Nearly two decades later, however, the history and civics curriculums are the only subjects that have not been revamped, and are still seen as the third rail of Lebanese politics.

Milhem Chaoul, a professor of sociology at the University of Lebanon provides some insight into the reasons for the challenges over the history curriculum in Lebanon. ‘Typically the victor writes the history and the problem with the civil war was that nobody won, and you still can’t write its history because we are still not at peace.’ (ibid.)

Practitioners and students in many Lebanese schools feel this sense of uneasy peace. I have experienced this first hand in my work in the country in 2014 – 15, when I conducted focus groups of head teachers and staff in order to inform the content and delivery of a capacity building leadership programme and the development of new national standards for head teachers. And this is borne out by a recent empirical study in five primary schools in Lebanon. Van Ommering (2015) found that history teachers frequently sought to avoid or silence discussions of the civil war arguing that teachers operate in a ‘complex web of power relations’ which he described as consisting of ‘students’ interest in understanding the society in which they live; the limited contents of the national history curriculum; the didactic outlook that radiates from history textbooks and teacher training; the pressure exerted by political parties to endorse their interpretations of the past; and, finally, the personal conflict histories that teachers bring to the classroom, shaping their capacities and perceptions’ (p.204). There is also some evidence that students themselves are frustrated by the omissions, knowing they are
getting a distorted view of the past. ‘We keep asking them when we’re going to learn the real history,’ says Fatima Taha, a ninth grader at Hara International College, a secondary school in Beirut’s southern suburbs. ‘The history just suddenly stops.’ (Fattah, 2007, p.3). One principal lays the blame with the policy makers and curriculum planners arguing that ‘If they would just give us a national history, this country’s entire outlook would change […] the kids need realities, a history they can believe in, otherwise, they will never learn the meaning of citizenship’ (ibid.). The stated goals of education include promoting a unified Lebanese identity, developing social skills, and reinforcing the importance of democracy in a diverse country. Such a goal is clearly articulated in the Lebanese government’s 1994 Plan for Educational Reform, which states explicitly that schools should contribute to ‘the formation of a citizen who . . . recognizes the long national Lebanese history that, emancipated from extremist beliefs, will attain a unified, open and humanistic society’ (as cited in Frayha, 2003, p.85).

The practice has yet to catch up with the stated aims and the conditions under which practitioners – and indeed policy makers and curriculum planners – are working in Lebanon are by no means easy, as I have witnessed. Some remarkable, tenacious and committed people, representing all sides of the conflict, are collaborating in the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) to improve nation building policy and practice. New national standards for schools and leaders have been developed as part of the project I worked on. These standards aim to reflect a nation building liberal agenda aiming to strengthen the national community as well as contributing to creation of global citizens too. As an excerpt of the leadership standards framework expresses it (2015, p.7):
Principals work within the social, political and local circumstances as well as contribute to the future of the national and global community. Successful principals are highly resilient and resourceful professionals who continuously strive to improve their schools, and the lives of their students, in the face of challenges. Successful principals harness opportunities and build upon success. They embrace change that improves the lives and opportunities for their students and their community. Lebanon’s Principals Standards Framework has been collaboratively developed to embrace these ideas and to support their realisation.

There is clearly some political will to strengthen the educational nation building agenda, which sets out to strengthen democracy and national solidarity. However, whilst the history curriculum remains unreformed this task may be harder. And, as in the case of Croatia’s nation building curriculum, some more comprehensive and truthful historical content along with deliberative, democratic teaching methods may have expedited the process.

**Patriotic education for nation building in Lithuania**

Lithuania, like Croatia, has a complex national history involving periods of conquest, independence, division, occupation and invasion. Whilst its recent independence was not ‘forged in war’ to the extent Croatia’s was it has had difficult legacies to content with. Terry McLaughlin captures these here (2006, p.28):

In 1795 Russia absorbed most of Lithuania. In 1863 there was a national uprising against Tsarist rule, which led to forced emigration, and to increased repression. Although the uprising failed, it led to a revival of Lithuanian language and tradition. Lithuania was occupied by Germany in the First World War from 1915. In 1918 Lithuanian independence was declared. [...] During the Second World War, Lithuania was
subjected first to Soviet and then to Nazi occupation. From 1944, after the return of Soviet troops, Lithuania was incorporated into the USSR. Over 250,000 Lithuanians were deported to the Gulag. A guerrilla war waged by Lithuanian partisans continued until 1953. [...] In 1989, on the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, over two million Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians joined hands in protest in a human chain stretching from Vilnius to Tallinn.

Lithuanian Independence was declared in 1990 after the first free elections since 1940 were held. Before its full acceptance by Russia and the wider world, this declaration of independence was followed by a blockade by the USSR and a number of violent incidents between Soviet troops and civilians. In common with many countries in the former USSR, Lithuania has had to contend with long periods of domination and oppression and its current process of democratisation has to confront these along with current geo-political and economic challenges.

As with the Croatian nation building journey, there are many aspects of their context that have made an ‘ethnic’ rather than a ‘civic’ conception of national identity more tempting. As McLaughlin and Juceviciene (1997) say: ‘The long history of domination and oppression, for example, has heightened rather than diminished Lithuanian national sentiment, which has survived in circumstances of adversity for many centuries’ (p.30). This strengthened national pride, coupled with a lack of confidence in politicians and political processes, has contributed to an emphasis on strengthened national identity and somewhat ‘inhibited the evolution of Lithuania into democracy and into developing a ‘civic’ national identity rather than civic processes’ (op. cit. p.32). However, a number
of developments since 1991 have supported the promotion of a ‘civic’ conception of national identity.

The Science Council of Lithuania is currently encouraging universities to accept the additional responsibility of education for citizenship. Recent initiatives from other quarters convey a similar message to schools. The Lithuanian ‘General Conception of Education’ was formulated in 1992. This conception, at least at the level of principle, seems markedly similar to the conception of liberal democratic education [and] contains a mixture of ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ elements (op. cit. p.33).

The ‘universal’ elements are reflected in the underlying principles of freedom and responsibility of individuals and the primacy of democratic aims and values. Principles reflecting the ‘particular’ side convey a commitment to nurturing Lithuanian culture, identity and historical continuity, whilst simultaneously ‘emphasising the values of pluralism (in relation, for example, to minority groups) and the need for a critical acceptance of change’ (ibid.). This laid the foundation for education for Lithuanian national identity to be seen in ‘civic’ terms, which has been borne out by subsequent developments in policy and curriculum development. As Irena Zaleskene (2011, p.76) comments in her analysis of citizenship education developments in Lithuania:

In recent years [Citizenship Education] has been a movement towards strengthening schools based on civic education that emphasizes instruction in the fundamental processes and instruments of democracy and government. Lithuanian developers of Citizenship Education look for new approaches reflecting needs of the contemporary global world. One of such approaches is Service-learning which could be described as an approach that combines a community service experience with classroom instruction and reflection; it has been suggested as an opportunity to bring to life
important political and social issues and thereby encourage youth activism and engagement.

Illiberal means to desired liberal ends?

Arguably all three nations discussed above deployed illiberal means to achieve liberal ends and in all three cases it has been more or less problematic. In the Lithuanian and Croatian nation building journeys, resurgent nationalism was one of the most important legacies of both countries at the outset of their independence. At the state policy level, given that both countries were set on becoming democracies, there was explicit commitment to both the civic and national elements of the curriculum. Despite this, and unsurprisingly perhaps, some aspects of the curriculum and at the level of practice, a more ‘ethnic’ national identity was promoted in the early years of independence. Whilst some elements of this ‘common nationality’ agenda remain, policy, curricula revisions and practice have developed in both countries, towards a more ‘civic’ version of national solidarity. But policy makers initially fell prey to the problems identified in Chapter 5 concerning legitimate forms of progressive patriotic education. Croatia and Lithuania both wrestled with elements of the distortion problem and enhanced the ethnic rather than civic features of national solidarity. Lebanese education planners did this as well where the absence of a strong national culture remains problematic. Patriotic education in Lebanon has so far failed to overcome strong sub identities which continue to undermine the fragile democratic state. This failure has been, at least in part, attributed to the distortion problem too. The history curriculum has been distorted and fallen short of telling a full and truthful story of the nation’s past. And, along with those in Lithuania and Croatia, Lebanese curriculum developers have fallen prey to what Archard described as ‘falsifying national sentimentalism’ with at least two of the
concomitant problems that Callan identified which can flow from this, namely a truncated historical imagination and a propensity to filter complex problems (see Chapter 5). It seems too that initially in Croatia and Lithuania policy makers did not heed the ‘global justice’ critique. Patriotic education in these contexts did not give sufficient attention to the principle of equal respect for all persons, by privileging some ethnic groups over others. And, arguably in Lebanon, the curriculum has not been developed sufficiently to allow the nation to be ‘emancipated from extremist beliefs’ (see above) which denies students the opportunity to develop as critical, rational inquirers.

It seems important to state again that I do not underestimate the challenges in these contexts and do not want to come across as unreasonably critical. My aim is to show that illiberal patriotic education has not been efficacious in delivering the desired national solidarity as the foundation or liberal democracy in these cases. My contention is that if patriotic education had passed the liberal test outlined in the previous chapter the benefits to these societies may have been greater or at least the pace of change faster.

We now turn, briefly, towards nations with more established democratic traditions in which citizenship is considered to be - to some degree - ‘under fire’ (Ben-Porath, 2006) and where these challenges have also been met with illiberal educational responses.

‘Citizenship under fire’ in more established democracies

Ben-Porath in her book Citizenship Under Fire (2006) defends a role for patriotic education but critiques the common tendencies of societies in conflict to limit educational opportunities for the young, that both damages the individuals and the
societies themselves. She focuses on the response of the USA since 9/11 suggesting that there are remarkable similarities in the way Israel and the USA have responded educationally to albeit very different kinds of national threat. There are aspects of the response in the USA that equate to being in a state of war, she argues. As a consequence, the USA, like Israel, has tended to unite ‘around common values such as narrower forms of patriotism and suppression of other forms of ideological difference’ (*op. cit.* p.5). There is also a tendency for the public agenda to narrow and limits to be placed on what might be ‘taken for granted’ civic freedoms. As such, she continues: ‘Expectations of good citizenship are hence related more to compliance and support of the basic needs of society as those are constructed through the lens of security threats’ (p.14). A further democratic casualty of this is that certain kinds of public deliberation have been suspended or limited. As she says here: ‘Deliberation is far less encouraged in a state of war than in other times or the ideal that democratic models aspire to’ and a more worrying consequence of this narrowing public debate is tolerance of contradictory views which can take the form of ‘self-censorship, the subsiding tolerance in the public for hearing corresponding with a variety of perspectives and for the silencing effect of this intolerance’ (p.15). This, more belligerent, form of patriotic education, Ben-Porath argues, has been the response of these two nations in the face of their different threats.

The purpose of including the USA within this analysis of patriotic education for nation building is to suggest that there are some important lessons to be drawn from an established democracy that sees its liberal traditions or national cohesion being substantially undermined. It, like some newly independent post conflict, post-communist or threatened nations, has responded to threats by introducing what Ben-Porath describes as more ‘belligerent’ forms of patriotic education (*op. cit.* p.2). The
remarks of a Yale University historian and professor emeritus, Donald Kagan, who gave a talk entitled ‘Democracy Requires a Patriotic Education’ in the week after the 9/11 attacks illustrates this point:

In the long and deadly battle against those who hate Western ideals, and hate America in particular, we must be powerfully armed, morally as well as materially. To sustain us through the worst times we need courage and unity, and these must rest on a justified and informed patriotism (2001).

This approach, focused on the formation of a kind of belligerent unity, comes at too high a price for the long term preservation or health of democracy even when the threat to a nation is imminent or prolonged. Nation building where education is overly focused on patriotic education for unity comes at too high a price. As Ben-Porath argues (p.21):

Beware a thin veil of unity in post conflict education - it threatens the existence of meaningful public space. First this unity is thin, elusive and exclusionary and therefore cultivates intolerance towards various sub groups [...] Cultural content relevant to minorities are often not reflected in the public sphere. This cost is mainly borne by minorities but also borne by democracy itself.

In other words, shaping civic memory, however urgent the context, should not fall into bad faith – as we argued in Chapter Five. This kind of public manipulation ultimately threatens people’s capacity for rational deliberation and will inevitably build shaky foundations for future democratic nation building. Avoiding or eliminating controversial topics will store up trouble in the long run. Issues that have been ignored or suppressed ‘could rise into the public sphere with a vengeance’, Ben-Porath argues, and ‘against the backdrop of a decline in the commitment to democracy that characterises periods of
conflict this situation could be perilous to social cohesion’ (p.18). This seems particularly prescient given the recent election results in the USA. Many respected public figures, including Republican politicians, are arguing that their new President-Elect is being financially and politically backed by white supremacists such as the Ku Klux Klan and some are calling for the reversal of the controversial appointment of Steve Bannon, a former head of the online racist platform ‘Breitbart’ as Trump’s senior adviser. Republican strategist John Weaver has stated that ‘the racist, fascist extreme right is represented footsteps from the Oval Office’ (Jones, 2016).

And Richard Rorty concurs that the shaping of civic memory should not fall into bad faith. He suggests that, for example, sugar coating history for the purpose of national solidarity produces very high and destructive levels of cynicism when youngsters get older (1997, p.11). The UK’s citizenship agenda too, as we saw in Chapter One, has recently shifted towards a more muscular focus on common and shared British values which have to be actively promoted since 2014, rather than simply ‘respected’. This shift has raised considerable concern from commentators (see Chapter One) as well as school leaders and teachers. It came explicitly from the then Education Secretary’s fear that ‘ideologues and zealots [were] aiming to promote a strand of Sunni Islam’ in a number of British schools. Even well established liberal democracies, then, can resort to what might be described as illiberal responses when under a real or perceived threat to certain liberal freedoms. Actively promoting British values in British schools could be seen as falling prey to the distortion problem. For example, ‘British values’ are not seen as contributing to an evolving concept of what it might mean to be British but to a single identity best accessed through an understanding of ‘our island story’, as proposed by Gove (2010).
Is cosmopolitan education the answer?

One alternative to belligerent or sugar coated patriotic education is to present a case for cosmopolitan citizenship in both fragile new democratic contexts as well as established ones, as we discussed in Chapter Five. This approach arguably supports teachers presenting a more global conception of humanity when they are faced with the real challenges of conducting classes where children are victims of recent civil war, have lost family, have parents currently serving in the military and so on. Osler and Starkey suggest that cosmopolitanism is an alternative to these potentially divisive features of patriotic education. As they argue here (2015, p.1):

Rather than focusing on differences and cultural barriers to be overcome, education for cosmopolitan citizenship starts from our common humanity. Teachers are professionals who should ground their actions and judgments in the normative standards of human rights law such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). This provides a language for identifying and naming injustices and discriminations and enables dialogue across difference. Rather than having a primary sense of belonging focused on membership of a nation-state, education for cosmopolitan citizenship accepts that learners celebrate multiple identities and loyalties.

However, whilst this approach has appeal - and one would not want to exclude this kind of global awareness and justice agenda - it does not address the fact that war time creates a greater need to foster and enhance civic relations among members of the nation, to expand the public agenda, to encourage participation and engagement and to support an inclusive conception of citizenship. And, furthermore, on a separate but important note, it may be questioned whether the idea of global citizenship is a valid
one. Citizenship incurs certain legally enforceable rights and responsibilities but the concept of global citizenship does not seem to acknowledge or incorporate this idea.

Ben-Porath suggests that abandoning the patriotic purpose to nation building education may weaken perseverance when citizens are under stress and, perhaps worse, that papering over divisions ‘can create antagonism and it may backfire or it may render the civic education effort detached and irrelevant’ (2006, p.52). For various purposes, but perhaps especially for nation building, affective attachments to the nation itself and to fellow citizens are, arguably, important pre requisites. This does not, however, equate to teaching for common national identity in some straightforward way. Whilst encouraging citizens to regard themselves as members of the nation by identity can be helpful in promoting cooperation and solidarity, it also has its dangers. It can also require an assumption, and potentially political backing too, that, as Macedo says, ‘diversity be kept in its place’ (2003, p.3). It may amount to a mere containment of diversity rather than a generous tolerance or even a means to embrace it. Instilling civic affiliations in the form of national identity through state education could, therefore, unintentionally damage the cause of democratic nation building.

**Patriotic education where citizenship is based on concept of shared fate**

Ben-Porath suggests a way out of this difficulty. Democratic societies, she suggests, ‘are better served by a public education focusing on what the citizenry shares … rather than their personal or communal identity’ ([op. cit.](p.27)). This concept of ‘shared fate’ does not describe social membership as evident. Instead it suggests that ties among members of the community and mutual effects are as a result of their common context
and political choices. As Billy Bragg puts it, national identity based on ‘place and space not race’ (2006, p.281). Citizenship as shared fate can be based on a shared cultural identity, much like citizenship as identity, but it also involves a shared sense of national belonging based on institutional linkages, such as representative government, material linkages, and ‘seeing our own narratives’ as enshrined with those of others’ (Williams, 2003, p.231). As Ben-Porath argues:

> Conceptualising citizenship as ‘shared fate’ offers a more persuasive understanding of citizenship as well as a more promising educational endeavour [...] it encourages the students and teachers to understand and identify with their nation and with its complex history, to own it and thus be willing to amend what needs to be amended (p.53).

Harnessing education to the purposes of building peace requires, what Ben-Porath describes as, ‘expansive education’. It aims to protect, and arguably build, democracy and citizens’ entitlements to liberal education against a narrowing agenda that often accompanies war or social conflict. And importantly, she argues convincingly that it is unwise to ignore the emotions and feeling that accompany this desire to contract into a more solid national culture or to restrict debate and so on. These emotions need to be harnessed into a more nuanced version of patriotic education where people ‘learn to feel and be united as a nation but also learn democratic principles, practices and commitment’ (op. cit. p.31). Constructing national identity as shared fate makes it possible for patriotic education to take on essentially deliberative and interpretive components. There is an underlying assumption that one can reinterpret one’s national group over time. Indeed, some reinterpretation may need to happen at the outset of an educational endeavour of this kind. What Ben-Porath describes as ‘reverse patriotic education’ may need to take place when a national identity has been overly
mythologised. This kind of education can still focus on the nation but not solely on its mythic status. As she puts it: ‘Having a sense of ourselves as members of a community of fate entails telling ourselves (true) stories about how we came to be connected’. And further:

The objective of this process is not the unquestioning endorsement of one’s nationality. To the contrary it is the understanding of the open flexible and contingent nature of national and communal affiliations as a shared project... Rather it is a demand for an active participation in the construction of an historic community that is not constrained by a final vision of the good and the social life or common good (p.120).

Deliberation about diverse and competing views would inevitably be a part of this kind of nation building project.

Conclusion

Given the limits of the educational responses and consequences therein of all the countries explored above, an alternative conception of patriotic education for nation building or national renewal does seem to be needed. It is clear that the kind of interpretative project that Ben-Porath is advocating should certainly be seen as a long-term investment, and will require time, patience and hard intellectual work. There is no suggestion that it the easy route to take, but it is probably the best one. The short term gains of patriotic education that distorts national history, avoids historical truth and quashes diversity - even in the face of terrible post conflict divisions - does not pay off in the long run. Conceiving of a national identity as shared fate, acknowledging the emotions of emergent or threatened national sentiment and harnessing these to a collective, interpretative project seems to serve the building and preservation of liberal
democracies better than any of the alternatives. Any nation-building project for liberal democracy needs to fulfil certain conditions and satisfactorily pass some test of principle – whether in conditions of war or peace. These include the requirements that, as we argued in Chapter Five and as Soutphommasane says here:

Nation building policies should not violate basic individual rights: they should not discriminate against persons on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion, or coalesce persons into abandoning their identity in a way that denies them a right to free conscience, expression for association (2012, p.208).

Furthermore, nation-building policies need to be justified in relation to what might be described as public reason. There should never be attempts ‘to mislead or misrepresent the public about either certain minorities or the particular national identity that is being promoted. It would be unacceptable, for example, for public authorities to fabricate claims about immigrant groups being prone to higher levels of criminality or welfare fraud in framing their policies on integration’ (ibid.). And finally, in any liberal democratic nation-building project, in war or peace, it should be possible for minority groups to genuinely affect the outcomes of the shared national identity. The temptation to resort to illiberal means to achieve liberal ends is a temptation to be strongly resisted. A nuanced version of patriotic education for nation building is required as much in post conflict or warring context as it is in established liberal democracies given the threats they face.

Overall the argument, that it may be justifiable to tolerate more illiberal elements of patriotic education in the short term for the sake of either building, renewing or defending a liberal democratic state, has been examined and defeated in this chapter. A
form of patriotic education based on the concept of ‘shared fate’ rather than national identity is proposed as a viable alternative to more belligerent patriotic education in all liberal democratic contexts. The next chapter will outline this version of patriotic education more fully.
CHAPTER 7: WHAT KIND OF PATRIOTIC EDUCATION IS NEEDED IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES?

This chapter sets out a normative case for including patriotic education in established liberal democracies and provides recommendations for its form and content as well as the optimal pedagogical approach for its delivery. The case is made for patriotic education to take the form of a national education project or national conversation that involves collective, open and deliberative participation. Progressive patriotic education also involves teaching children and young people about the importance of love in relation to loving one’s country and providing ways for them to develop a kind of tough love towards their plural, ever-evolving nation. Patriotic love, like any kind of love, can be prone to pathological distortion, as discussed in Chapter Two. As we saw in Chapter Four, a tribal, xenophobic, fascist patriot may love her country as much as a social democratic civic patriot but, to use Callan’s term, they may not love their country well (Callan, 2006, p.527). The kind of teaching of patriotic love promoted as part of progressive patriotic education involves learning to love your country well. This kind of love includes important features of any kind of love, including a sense of deep care and some constancy. It is worth repeating John Wilson’s description of how love manifests itself towards an object: ‘One is strongly attached to it in one’s mind and heart, seeks it out, and wishes to preserve it’ (Wilson, 1995, p.14). Patriotic love, as part of progressive patriotic education within a liberal context, has these universal features but is also about rigorous truthfulness and a capacity for criticism, as argued in Chapter Four. It has been argued throughout the thesis that a sense of affiliative attachment (defined here as patriotic love) provides an important additional ingredient to civic education programmes in motivating people to engage in an open-ended, liberal nation-building project. The normative case for patriotic education set out here suggests that
patriotic love can be explicitly taught about and that the means of teaching through an open-ended dialogue about desired outcomes of a plural, liberal nation will engender trust and a sense of efficacy that leads to some form of patriotic love. And, finally, that engaging with a truthful and critical versions of national history, taught with a degree of emotional generosity, can instil affection and also motivate us towards greater national engagement.

Thus far in the thesis it has been established that liberal democracies have an instrumental need for patriotic citizenry. The version of patriotism that has been defended, in Chapter Four, encourages different groups to give public expression to their distinctiveness and takes the form of a practice; a public dialogue of collective interpretation. Whilst liberal patriots and liberal nationalists give central importance to deliberative democracy as a means of negotiating differences, it is only this national-cultural project version of patriotism that gives enough motivational force for the necessary participation in this important democratic dialogue. It does this by understanding free societies’ national culture as pluralistic in its very character and loveable as such. This love may not be instant but it can be nurtured by engaging with a genuine sense of efficacy about shaping national outcomes. It has also been established, in Chapter Three, that any flourishing liberal democracy requires relatively high levels of affective national affiliation and participation from educated citizens and that this is predicated on some form of patriotic education. This proposed version of patriotic education accepts that national governments and liberal democratic institutions remain very important and yet levels of participation remain relatively low, as does faith in national politicians. Alienation from national politics, and party politics in particular, is high. A patriotic education that supports the necessary feat of imagination needed to
relate to an essentially diverse national community, and that engenders affection for this pluralism, is required. The patriotic education being advocated here conceives of its citizens sharing a common fate with the feeling and belief that they can genuinely shape the national community through reasonable deliberation. Care for the national community will be engendered through this sense of efficacy and via inclusive representations of the nation as worthy of emotional generosity as well as truthfulness. Citizens’ affective national affiliation and sense of efficacy at the national level will give liberal democracy vital strength. It has also been established that this form of patriotic education is compatible with liberal education.

It has also been argued that the educational responses of many established liberal democracies has been wanting in various ways. For example, the focus on the current English policy context over several decades has shown that various governments have responded by emphasising a shared British identity or adherence to British values - albeit with different values being promoted by more centre-left and right wing parties. This focus on common national values has been coupled with an emphasis on enhancing political literacy and latterly, including some character education, but with an emphasis on performance rather than moral or civic virtues (Marshall et al, 2015). It has been established that civic education predicated on a common national identity or set of common cultural values and character education with an emphasis on performance virtues has not been an adequate response to the complexity of modern plural liberal democracies. The previous chapter established that patriotic education, under fragile liberal nation building conditions, needs to be construed as an open, participatory project, not a shared national identity-forming project, and that it has greater value as such. This chapter sets out a normative case for including patriotic education in
established liberal democracies, arguing that it too should take the form of a collective interpretive project. It is also argued that the educational means for achieving good patriotic citizens needs to mirror its desired outcomes. If, what is needed is a form of patriotism that is open, inclusive and interpretative, then the educational means to achieve this need to take a similar form.

**Does patriotism need to be taught?**

Before embarking on setting out the state educational case for including patriotic civic education, it is important to address the suggestion that patriotism is acquired without the aid of an explicit patriotic education programme. David Archard sets out the case that patriotic education is necessarily distorting which we addressed and defeated in Chapter Five. He makes a further point suggesting that, by definition, education is particularistic (national) in many ways and national understanding and affiliation is likely to rub off on us without it being explicitly promoted. As he continues: ‘In a very obvious sense every particular state-based education teaches a national, though not nationalist, curriculum. British children learn about the history of Britain, the lives of British people …’ (*op. cit.* p.168). And further, that there are many influences beyond the school that will lend weight to enlarging people’s capacity for patriotism. ‘Education plays its proper part not in teaching us to be patriots but in teaching us what it is that we are, as we may be so inclined by our natures to be patriotic about. It does not *commend* our identity to us so much as *clarify* that identity for our own extracurricular commendation …’ (*ibid.* emphasis added). His claim amounts to the suggestion that state schooling conveys a national agenda anyway and that beyond the school’s influence we are all subjected to a number of external factors and stimuli that
will shape our national affiliation. Some may suggest that his claim also points to the
impossibility of teaching love in any way apart from directing students towards those
matters that are subject to evidential enquiry and hoping that any sentiment in relation to
them (in this case, love) is somehow ‘caught’ as a result. This view can be challenged.
As argued in Chapter 5, (a) liberal education places both academic and emotional
demands on us and (b) educating emotions is not the same as manipulating them.
Children can (and should) be taught to care for others, respect others, be tolerant,
develop empathy and so on. And, the claim that a version of patriotism that is
defensible by critical reason and that will be of benefit, as Archard suggests above, will
emerge through broadly national curricula and other extracurricular factors is highly
questionable. Stephen Macedo (2003, p.5) suggests that it is morally acceptable and
important to guide this kind of education albeit within what he describes as a ‘broad
swath of liberty’. He suggests that it is not best left ‘to an invisible hand’ and that it is
necessary to agree and construct discernible collective ends and purposes. Others have
agreed, as we saw in Chapter Five, that any liberal education project can quite
legitimately guide and shape students’ responses and indeed that this is necessary for
most educational outcomes. There is empirical evidence to back up the claim that
teaching citizenship, if not patriotism, had significant impact on student outcomes from
a review of citizenship education in England spanning nine years (DfE, 2010). As the
study reports here:

The format, timing and duration of the citizenship learning experience are crucial variables: the CELS
[Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study] analysis has indicated that the cohort was more likely to have high(er) levels of ‘received citizenship’ (and by extension, better citizenship outcomes) if they have attended a school where citizenship education is: delivered in a
A discrete slot in the timetable of over 45 minutes per week; developed by the teachers who are delivering the citizenship curriculum rather than the school’s PSHE coordinator; formally examined (e.g. as part of the GCSE in Citizenship); delivered regularly and consistently throughout the cohort’s educational experience (Keating, 2010, p.4).

The study reported that students who had higher levels of what is defined here as ‘received citizenship’, that is formal teaching of citizenship, indicated higher levels of personal efficacy as citizens, for example. There is no denial that outside factors are important in shaping civic identity and levels of participation, too, but what is not in doubt is its importance on the curriculum. If we accept that the outcomes of the kind of patriotic education are needed in our students then it is safe to conclude that it needs to be explicitly taught.

The limits of existing civic education

And, indeed, some form of citizenship education is on most national curricula across the liberal democratic world. As outlined in Chapter One, the content and delivery of the citizenship education, and its patriotic components, vary considerably across different liberal democracies. As we discussed, McLaughlin (1992) distinguishes between a ‘minimal’ and ‘maximal’ conception of citizenship. From the ‘minimal’ perspective, citizenship education is focused on providing information, for example, about the legal and political system and the ‘development of virtues of local and immediate focus’ – such as those relating to voluntary activity (op. cit. p.237). Whilst the ‘maximal’ interpretation of citizenship education ‘requires the development of a critical understanding of societal structures and processes, in order that they might be questioned, and ‘virtues’ that would empower students to change them’ (op. cit. p.238). In many contexts civic education lies somewhere on the spectrum between minimalist
and maximalist views and in some cases involves a rather mixed bag of each. The English citizenship curriculum could be described as essentially minimal with its focus on the practices involved in increasing political literacy but highly interventionist at the level of exhortation regarding promotion of British values. This is not the same as a maximal approach given that McLaughlin’s maximal definition involves students developing a critical understanding of societal structures. The current UK citizenship curriculum does not encourage that level of criticality towards British values.

The introduction of promoting national solidarity into the education agenda has been a common response in preserving liberal democracy in response to significant threats. Several other liberal democracies have also recently wrestled with introducing a more nationalist element to civic education (for example, France, Belgium and the USA). The manifestations of these attempts have varied considerably and reflect the particular culture and political systems of each liberal democracy. In 2011, the French parliament introduced a ban on wearing the burqa or niqab in public places, including schools, as part of an official national debate about what is meant to be French following a similar move by the Belgian parliament in 2010 (Soutphommasane, 2012, p.2). This forceful expression of commonality can, arguably, lead to less reflection on cultural differences in a way that is needed and consistent with the demands of a deliberative political community. As Meira Levinson argues: The French model of education ‘shifts the brunt of liberal education from teaching toleration of private others to inculcating mutual respect for public similars (1999, p.125, original emphasis). The USA Patriot Act (2001) has, arguably, politicised the curriculum in many US States where, for example, there have recently been moves to revise school history, sociology and economics textbooks in order to ‘portray conservative ideas and movements in a more positive light and
emphasise the role of Christianity in the nation’s founding (Macedo, 2011, p.420). So, whilst the manifestation of the nationalistic element to civic education may vary, many commentators agree, the purposes are clear: the democratic nature of many free societies is in need of bolstering against a number of centrifugal forces that threaten to diminish or even destroy it (Ben-Porath, 2006; Callan, 1993; Soutphommasane, 2012; Taylor, 2002). This purpose is not in question here. What is being challenged is the adequacy of the educational responses that have been introduced thus far.

Before outlining a more robust and efficacious educational response to these challenges it is important to state that, clearly, the blame for liberal democratic societies’ current vulnerabilities or failings cannot be laid squarely at the door of the education system. Globalisation with its growing economic inequalities, the rise of populism, mass migration from war and want and terror attacks are factors that are having significant consequences in many European liberal democracies. The recent decision of the British people to leave the European Union (June 23rd, 2016) has given rise to a number of pressing democratic questions. There is considerable evidence to suggest that perceptions of overly high levels of immigration motivated large numbers of ‘Leave’ voters (Lordashcroftpolls, 2016). The analysis of voting patterns suggested that the least educated, oldest and poorest British citizens were far more likely to vote Leave (ibid.). The campaign tactics of the Leave campaign are being legally challenged at the time of writing (November 2016) for being undemocratic and motivated by bad faith. Examples of this include the fallacious claim that the national health service would gain £350 million a week in extra funding; that Turkey was about to join the EU and a poster depicting hundreds of desperate refugees at the Croatian-Slovenian border was presented in a highly misleading way as Britain’s immigration problem and its breaking
point. The very fact that a referendum was called in the first place has been questioned with regard to its liberal democratic legitimacy. Referenda, the ‘nuclear weapons’ of democracy are not the typical responses to gauging or forming opinion on highly complex issues in most representative liberal democracies (Kinsman, 2016, p.1). David Cameron, the Prime Minster at the time and the instigator of the referendum, has been accused by many commentators of using this short-term tactics, and fuelling populism, to gain the support of the more ‘Eurosceptic’ right wing elements of the Tory party before the 2015 general election.

What is being argued, however, is that there needs to be a stronger and more appropriately educational response to these challenges, which may at best contribute to their diminution or at the very least support people’s capacity to deal adequately with these very real threats. What is needed is a citizenry that, as Callan argues, is not susceptible to the cleverest sound bites uttered by politicians via their speechwriters or campaign managers but a population that is mostly willing and capable of evaluating the best arguments (1997, p.111). And in deciding upon the best educational response to this, and other challenges, Callan argues that we need to focus on what is urgently needed rather what, ideally, the liberal education agenda might be open to. The instrumental case for including some national affective loyalty is overwhelming he suggests (op. cit. p.112) and ‘the issue is not about what educational processes a liberal society should be open to; it is about what processes it cannot do without to preserve and enrich its public culture’.
A principled case for patriotic education in liberal democracies

Having established an instrumental need for patriotic education it is worth reiterating that it is of paramount importance that the form of patriotic education proposed here retains its integrity in relation to liberal values. As was argued in Chapter Five above, self-rule, individual autonomy, pursuit of truth and critical reasoning are preserved and valued alongside the cultivation of patriotic love to one’s country as an ongoing, formative endeavour. It is the aim of this section to describe these educational processes in a form of progressive patriotic education that is efficacious as well as ethical. A number of scholars have contributed to this undertaking and I shall explore some of the main themes therein, borrowing and adopting aspects from some scholars (for example, Callan, 1997; Tamir, 1993; Ben-Porath, 2006; Soutphommasane, 2012).

Patriotic education as a centripetal counter force to challenges of pluralism

Eamonn Callan’s contribution to the normative debate on progressive patriotic education is an obvious place to start. He suggests, as implied above, that the pluralism of free societies makes urgent the task of creating citizens who share a sufficiently cohesive identity. The increasingly powerful centrifugal forces of modern plural societies, he argues, require a centripetal counter force, namely, the development of citizens’ affective loyalty to a common liberal culture. As he says here (1997, p.131): ‘Patriotism as a moral resource we would do well to cherish and encourage in our children and in the world’. This would encourage people to understand and act upon their moral obligation to improve their own patriotic inheritance, he continues. Callan strongly defends the idea of affective loyalty as one of the - currently weak - preconditions of flourishing liberal democracies and argues that it needs to be cultivated.
This national sentiment should not be founded upon sentimentality and needs to be cultivated carefully and with strict regard to liberal principles and practices. For example, in relation to teaching about the past he suggests (op. cit. p.118):

The kind of historical sensibility [I advocate] combines an exacting commitment to reason with a generous susceptibility to those public emotions that bind us to the body politic.

Whilst teaching about and for liberal democracy in terms of civic virtues without the affective national dimensions can be entirely worthy and appropriate, it simply will not work without the more affective dimensions, Callan argues. In liberal society citizens’ understanding of regulative principles themselves cannot guarantee the survival of democracy as there is a dependence on some kind of shared trust in institutions, people operating within these intuitions and between citizens. Given this, Callan argues, these affective bonds are needed for the flourishing of liberal democracy and therefore, any educational project needs to cultivate this affective capacity in its young. If a civic education programme, or indeed the educational project as whole, is too essentially neutral, critical or detached this much needed capacity for sentiment is threatened. Patriotic education needs to be both civically engaged and uplifting while remaining genuinely critical. There is an urgent educational need to engender national sentiment, without resorting to illiberal sentimentality, which will motivate a more engaged citizenry in maintaining the liberal project.

Yael Tamir argues along similar lines. She argues that traditional kinds of liberal civic education are outdated or inadequate and there is a principled, instrumental, need to add a national dimension. In Liberal Nationalism (1993), she traces the history of civic
education suggesting that it had its purpose at a particular time when the notion of universal rights of citizen and state neutrality served a particular function. This conception of civic education no longer holds true given the geopolitical demands of our times. As she says here: ‘This alliance among neutrality, universality, assimilation came to an impasse’ (1993, p.xxv). She suggests that the combination of civic and national education is indeed complex but that that should not daunt us. Many aspects of liberal society and education are as complex, for example, property rights when understood alongside concept of equality (ibid.). Tamir, like Callan, argues for the importance of national as well as civic education in a liberal democracy but further that the education for national identity is a fundamental foundation to effective civic education. She suggests that there is a need to place national thinking within the boundaries of liberalism without losing sight of either. And, like Callan, Tamir argues that whilst it is assumed in liberal democracies that individuals may have multiple identities, ‘their liberal identity is expected to trump, ideally, conflicting demands from other identities with which they associate themselves (cited in Ben-Porath, p.24). And further:

The affective attachment to fellow citizens, for example, should serve as a barrier to the demands of secession by sub-groups within the nation state. National identity in its desirable liberal form – admittedly not the only form generated by national attachments throughout history – supersedes other forms of identity, to the extent that the various groups and individuals that make up the regime all regard themselves as integral and willing parts of it (ibid.).

So, both Tamir and Callan, whilst encouraging and allowing for substantial liberal practices within their normative education aims - and more of these below - do propose
a strong identity-forming agenda. And John White (1996), who expresses some sympathy with Callan and Tamir’s arguments, concurs that fostering national sentiment could contribute to the fulfilment of liberal aims and suggests that the nature of the national identity would be up for some renegotiation. As he says here: ‘The promotion of national sentiment as an educational aim is not incompatible with liberalism and, more strongly, may be desirable for reasons of personal and cultural identity as well as for redistributive reasons’ and furthermore he proposes ‘a remodelled conception of British national identity to replace the traditional one’ (p.327).

Patriotic education as an interpretative, open ended, collective dialogue

Even if progressive patriotic education is seen as an endeavour - as the commentators above do – along with the creation of an ideal, it can be argued that an overly strong emphasis on any notion of forging a common national identity presents some challenges; not least in terms of the need, by definition, to keep diversity in its place. Might patriotic education be better conceived of as a continuous and fluid aspect of personal and public life in that it reflects not a given feature of the social fabric or personal character, but rather an ongoing task of reconciling collective commitment with democratic principles? This view concurs with Ben-Porath’s argument for conceptualising patriotic nation building and citizenship as ‘shared fate’ (2006, p.27). Whilst she develops this argument in the context of ‘citizenship under fire’, as we argued in the previous chapter, it applies equally it is suggested here, to any civic education project. Thus conceived, the processes and outcomes of patriotic education align towards caring deeply about the fate of one’s nation within a context of a shared, undetermined fate. Patriotic education can therefore engender affective affiliation to this
interpretative project by accommodating a variety of perspectives and by requiring citizens to negotiate about acceptable forms of national culture within liberal parameters.

Tim Soutphommasane argues along very similar lines albeit in the context of established liberal democracies (2009; 2012). He suggests that patriotic education needs to comprise a national education project or national conversation that involves collective, open and deliberative participation. This is not an added extra or desirable aspect of healthy liberal democracies, but a critical component of their survival given the challenges that face them, he suggests. He argues that many of the usual arguments suggesting that civic education leads to a sense of responsibility to participate in a self-directing society assume that the reasons for this participation are self-evident and assumed. Soutphommasane suggests that there is an assumption in existing liberal nationalist arguments that democratic participation and social responsibility flow from knowledge and an understanding of liberal principles and practice. He argues that participatory democratic practices do not necessarily flow from knowledge of them and argues that an even more truly liberal response would be to introduce patriotic virtue as part of any national curriculum. This would involve taking part in a nation-renewing discussion in which young people are educated to value and care about their country and to see themselves as active agents within it and capable of shaping it in new ways. Furthermore given the multicultural nature of most liberal democratic nations, this national conversation and education project should develop patriotic virtues and a sense of shared national responsibility, which balances solidarity and diversity. As he says here:

The right balance of solidarity and diversity depends on the character of citizens and therefore any
This suggests a version of patriotic education that responds with proper recognition of human diversity and is inclusive and dynamic. It is inclusive in that it explicitly welcomes diversity – in a sense of going beyond tolerance – and it is dynamic in that it suggests that these communities will influence national identity over time – as they always have done. This interest in actively shaping the character of one’s nation is likely to be greater if people feel that investment in shaping the nation in their own, collective, diverse, evolving image can pay off in terms of recognition and empowerment. As was argued in Chapter Four above, the maintenance of a diverse national culture involves citizens being motivated to participate in the public realm not only by their political responsibility but by their sense of attachment to their national community through their cultural recognition and their sense of personal belonging as well.

Two main criticisms need to be met and defeated here. One relates to the notion of shared fate that could be efficacious in motivating children to care but, arguably, does not have to be patriotic. The second relates to what might be described as the problem of the gap between our knowledge of moral issues and our motivation to act in accordance with them. This latter criticism is concerned, furthermore, that filling the gap by instilling feelings of love may subject patriotic education to inevitable indoctrination.
Let us turn to the first criticism regarding the notion of shared fate and its relationship to the necessity or otherwise of patriotic love. Critics of patriotic education - and reasonable ones at that - may suggest that children could be encouraged to see their fate as wrapped up, or shared, with their country in the form of a social contract rather than patriotic love. These critics might suggest that it is entirely appropriate to view the liberal project as akin to us all being in the same boat but this does not mean we have to love the boat. For these critics communicating the importance of a social contractual commitment to children could be accompanied by the encouragement to generate some sort of moral feeling for their fellow human beings along with a valuing of pluralism, dialogue and deliberation. All these potential and positive ingredients for civic education could, arguably, stop short of advocating love of country. This argument falls in line with versions of civic education that promote national civic engagement, along with the principles and practices of civic friendship. There are commendable aspects of this approach, as argued in Chapter One and, clearly, there is no logical connection between the notion of shared fate and patriotic love. However, the dismissal of sentiment or affective affiliation at the national level ignores the ways in which teaching children to care deeply about their (ever-evolving) nation may act as an intrinsic motivational factor - and deepen the impact and their efficacy as future citizens – rather than, say, engaging with a more detached (even objectifying) form of a social contract. The patriotic love engendered by progressive patriotic education is not a fiery passionate kind, clearly. It is a love that, through education, is likely to grow and strengthen the more the children and young people see the potential and reality of their efficacy in shaping national culture and influencing national politics. And, however openly a social contract is expressed, it necessarily signifies being locked in and bound by a contract, rather than encouraging what could be a more constructive, engaging
loving relationship. Expressing the terms contractually could also limit the levels of engagement and trust needed - perhaps especially for the most alienated youngsters. Furthermore, generating some moral feeling for fellow human beings may be made easier by communicating the affective attachment to the nation within patriotic education in relation to the collective (and open-ended) enterprise of nation-building. The teaching of patriotic love does not prevent any possibility of social commitment or fellow moral feeling (as these are clearly important) but it may enhance their likelihood.

These same critics might argue that affection for the nation (or patriotic love) should not be encouraged because it is not an unquestionable truth that the country deserves this love. In response to this point we can provide two objections. The first relates to the nature of love. As was argued in Chapter Two, love is not always directed at something entirely or necessarily deserving of our love. We are quite capable of loving well in relation to a flawed person or indeed country. Loving well involves us in being quite honest about the flaws and judging when, how and, indeed, if to intervene. Loving something or someone well is more likely to make us enact our love in various ways. The second rebuttal relates to the particular notion of patriotic education being espoused here. This kind of patriotic education specifically expresses the nation as an evolving, open-ended project. Therefore, the love being engendered is directed at an object that is not fixed or determined and can be influenced and shaped by committed, affectionate citizens.

Let us now turn to the second criticism, namely; the problem of the gap between our knowledge of moral issues and our motivation to act in accordance with them. And, further, the possibility that filling the gap with emotional education may be prone to
indoctrination. There has been some helpful literature on what might be described as the ‘gappiness problem’ in moral education. Augustus Blasi (1980; 1999) has contributed significant insights into the role of emotions and moral motivation. Blasi is clear that if actions arise unintentionally they cannot be described as moral. He also accepts that emotions arise spontaneously but disagrees that they *unintentionally* produce a will to act - as argued by many moral psychologists (1980, p.5). He also points to the limits in cognitive-developmentalism, which suggests that emotions can be subjected to reason and judgement in a way that is rationally detached. Blasi rejects the notion of ‘judgmentalism’ in relation to a solution to the problem of the gap between our moral understanding and moral acts (*ibid*. p.6). He defends a view that emotions can be evaluated and justified by the average person as ‘reasonable and fitting’ (Blasi, 1999, p.7). As he suggests here:

> My claim is not that emotions have little or nothing to do contribute to morality. This conclusion may agree with the standard interpretation of Kant, but runs counter to normal intuition and common sense. There is another way of looking at emotion and its relation to moral motivation and moral action. Here, spontaneously elicited emotions lack the intentionality and the specific moral meaning that would be necessary for them to produce moral motivation, but the *agentic* regulation of spontaneous emotions would then be emphasised and become the force of the explanation (p.15, original emphasis).

Emotions can be consciously accepted, owned and integrated into the person’s moral concerns; they can be shaped and directed by the agent’s regulatory processes and since this kind of regulation is consciously motivated, it can be guided by concerns that are specifically moral. Ethical action, then, is about how one puts into practice the outcomes of one’s moral judgement and desires. There is an element of ‘willpower’ and self control involved and Blasi suggests that one’s self definition is important in terms of
achieving some internal consistency which requires self awareness, self organisation (1980, p.40).

Kristjánsson (2010) also contributes usefully to the debate within what he describes as ‘the post-Kohlbergian era of moral education, [where] a ‘moral gap’ has been identified between moral cognition and moral action. Contemporary moral psychologists lock horns over how this gap might be bridged’ (p.397). Kristjánsson acknowledges the useful contribution of Blasi to this contentious debate but adds a critique of what he calls the limited conception of education as an existential quest. As he says here:

For Kohlbergians, moral education was primarily a rational quest, best attained via the training of critical faculties of judgement. For the moral-self theorists, moral education is primarily an existential quest in which role-model education (the emulation of moral exemplars) and focus on the existential ‘what-kind-of-person-do-I-want-to-be’ questions of adolescence play a fundamental role. For moral-emotions theorists, moral education is primarily a conditioning process of emotional sensitisation in which children are made to internalise proper reactions to diverse situations through early parent-child inter-action, subsequent service learning and other guided activities (Kristjánsson, 2010, p.407)

Arguably the normative proposal for progressive patriotic education offered here involves some aspects of what, Kristjánsson has described as the rational, existential and conditioning processes. Moral education is a constant work in progress, clearly. More needs to be done (see below in sub-section ‘Further research’). However, the normative proposals here offer a version of progressive patriotic education that aims to instil feelings of national affection and care that motivate young people to engage with
their evolving plural nation in constructive and efficacious ways. The proposals also suggest that young people develop a greater sense of efficacy and worth and finally, that these issues and feelings are subjected to some rational inquiry and objective scrutiny. Critics may argue that the ‘conditioning’ element of the project and the ‘instilling of feelings’ in the young cannot be done in an educationally defensible way. These same critics may worry, therefore, about indoctrination. As argued extensively in Chapter Five, these worries can be met in a number of ways. As Callan argued for example, (1997, p.118), ‘one can subject one’s love to critical interrogation if one loves well’. As such there is no chance for ‘blind love’ to thrive and, equally, this critical scrutiny does not have to lead to a kind of critical detachment either. The version of progressive patriotic education offered here, which sets itself firmly within a concept of liberal education, argues for significant safeguards to be in place to guard against indoctrination and subjects moral, emotional and civic education to the high standards of rigour akin to those within academic disciplines. These safeguards include providing children with objective, public criteria by which to make judgements, requiring children to provide good justifications for their beliefs and feelings, encouraging critical inquiry, providing alternative world views and so forth. Risks against love instilling what might be called ‘clouded judgement’ have been addressed too. We argued above, in Chapter Five, that moralised love might involve the kind of devotion and self-sacrifice to someone or something that continues through challenging times and despite a variety of similar and potentially lovable alternatives. Declaring love for something requires more than fleeting feeling and therefore a certain level of steadfastness involved. This requires us to teach patriotic education in a way that involves teaching what it means to love a country well and this involves a certain amount of what Callan describes as
emotional generosity but it also means that one has to maintain a truthful perception of it.

Patriotic education as a practice

Patriotic education in practice will have its challenges. Nothing about the normative proposals here are easy or without challenges. What is certain, however, is that participation and open-endedness in the concept of progressive patriotic education offered here needs to mirror its intended outcomes for a flourishing liberal democratic society. It is essentially liberal in that it requires exacting standards of critical acuity and respect for fundamental liberal principles including a high bar of rationality, reasonableness, independence and impartiality. But it does this alongside the idea of a collective practice that requires citizens to be open, critical, emotionally generous, and deliberative as well as to develop affective affiliation to the nation. It has some echoes of the MacIntyrean idea of a practice in that, as MacIntyre (2002, p.53) says:

What the patriot is committed to is a particular way of linking the past which has conferred a distinctive moral and political identity upon him or her with a future for the project which is his or her nation which it is his or her responsibility to bring into being.

However, whereas MacIntyre suggests that this national allegiance should be unconditional (ibid.), it is suggested here that it is not that any national tradition should be exempted from criticism – or is in some way beyond rational criticism as MacIntyre suggests. Rather it is suggested that, as Soutphommasane does, that it is ‘one’s attachment to the national tradition must enjoy a certain immunity’ - not the national culture itself (2012, p.131). There should be commitment to the endeavour of nation
building, it is proposed here, and this collective enterprise should engender feelings of care and affective affiliation both to the project itself and to others engaging in the project. The liberal character of this suggested practice is retained in many ways; for example, there is no attempt to ‘seal certain determinate values into a future society’ as Bernard Williams warns against in any truly liberal education project. And it also aims, as he advocates, to promote self-understanding through deliberation, analysis, reflection and so on rather than more illiberal tendencies of persuasion (1985, p.183).

The demands of this kind of patriotic education are not to be underestimated and several commentators have suggested that this kind of educational endeavour requires less traditional educational approaches. Seyla Benhabib, for example, suggests that this kind of democratic discourse in a diverse society requires a capacity for ‘enlarged thought’ (1988). This is a concept describing the ways in which knowledge emerges from collective, deliberative reflection in groups that comprise many differing views. As she says here: ‘The more human perspectives we can bring to bear upon an understanding of the situation, the more likely are we to recognise its moral relevance or salience’ (cited in Ben-Porath, 2006, p.121). Ben-Porath argues in a similar vein that a concept of ‘expanded education’ is necessary to capture the complexities and demands of a collective, patriotic, educational dialogue. As she argues, expansive education requires patience and intellectual effort and ‘repeated exercise of emotional and cognitive capacity’ (p.128). And, both these ideas are echoed and exemplified by Callan’s proposition that this approach to citizenship education combines an ‘exacting commitment to reason with a generous susceptibility to those public emotions that bind us to the body politic’ (1997, p.122). He argues that we need to teach future citizens in
ways that can be both civically engaged and uplifting while remaining genuinely critical – and suggests that this is no easy task (*op. cit.* p.221).

**Critical and emotionally generous**

The kind of patriotic education being proposed here, then, requires what Callan describes as the melding of powerful emotion and critical acuity and that this depends on a certain way of looking at the past that is both generous and imaginative. As he puts it (1997, p.119-120):

> At first glance, the idea that we could learn to look at the past of a political community with emotional generosity might seem to be a euphemistic way of recommending sentimental political education. But that is not so. Emotional generosity and sentimentality are not the same thing. [...] Looking to the past without the easy consolations of sentimentality means confronting the story in which evil may loom larger than good, and the good that is perceptible is not instantiated in anyone or any thing in pristine radiance. Readiness to be effectively engaged by the good in that setting requires a certain interpretive generosity, and corresponding resistance to the meanness of spirit that goes with insisting that the good must be perfection if it is to be good at all.

Callan suggests that we interpret historical events by asking what might be the best in a tradition rather than what might be the most powerful forces at work within it. This requires some imaginative ability but it allows a deeper scrutiny of historical narratives and allows us to hold, simultaneously, a critical perspective alongside exerting the effort to find something of worth within it too. And he further suggests that literature may serve this purpose rather better than some kinds of traditional history teaching given that literature invites us to experience issues, to empathise and to imagine. He cites the
example of the story by Eudora Welty (1980) about the murder of a civil rights activist in the 1960s. And whilst he acknowledges that ‘a story such as this is no substitute for dispassionate social analysis’, he also suggests that:

Becoming adept and knowledgeable at scholarly analysis is not the same as coming to see and feel about racism in the way that Welty asks us to, and in the context of political education, the latter may be of greater moment (p.123).

This seems an appropriate approach to teaching about the past in any nation building patriotic endeavour – and does not preclude teaching historical scholarship in its own right too. This ‘generous and imaginative’ approach does not restrict us to either glorifying or vilifying a national past and allows for a respect for historical truth with a capacity to retrieve the best from the historical narrative for the purpose of building the future. As Callan says, the way in which Picasso paid great tribute to the artist Velazquez whilst utterly transforming his artistic form is one way of exemplifying this point. There is evidence of both homage to the past and transformation for the future in this approach – and having just visited an exhibition of Picasso’s interest in, and debt to, Velazquez in Barcelona I can attest to the power of this analogy. And, neither is truth sacrificed for this purpose. Honest analysis and reflection is a necessary ingredient of this process. As Levine suggests in his study of the future of democracy in the USA, ‘Truth and patriotism may have a complex and contingent relationship, but they are not enemies’ (2007, p.149).

Using this approach, and especially in the context of patriotic education viewed as an interpretive, collective project towards unknown ends, love for a national historical culture is not at odds with the idea that the national culture can be further shaped to
even greater ends. As Ben-Porath argues, too, nation-building education of this kind can be respectful of the present context and the past whilst looking to the future. As she says here (2006, p.115):

At heart, the public education system is an institution that needs to continuously balance the present and the future - to respond, in its vision and the sum of its actions, both to the demands of the socio-political context in which it functions and to the broader forward-looking commitment to the basic values of society's political traditions and visions.

Combining critical acuity with a capacity for empathy, generosity and a degree of imagination, in analysing the past is also required in deliberation about contested views of what a current good life may comprise. The incommensurability of values is at the heart of democracy and therefore many of the structures and processes of democracy are about an acknowledgement that controversy exists and finding reasonable and fair ways of managing this. Good citizenship is defined as much by negotiating differences as by conforming to common, shared values. And, further, the survival and flourishing of many liberal institutions depend on an acknowledgement of competing values and a trust that democratic processes have ways of negotiating fairly, deliberating hard and arriving at fair conclusions. Any patriotic educational endeavour needs to develop both an appreciation of the importance of this as well as the capacity to carry out its practices. This too requires a capacity to empathise without sacrificing truth.

We must be careful to strike the right balance between truth-telling and empathic identification with others in any deliberative educational project, especially one where different values and beliefs can be passionately held. Our capacity to identify with and
care for a person with whom we are debating should not suppress what Callan describes as ‘the authority of truth as a dialogical norm’ (op. cit. p.203). Callan takes issue with Nell Noddings here, who advocates a norm of care for the person engaging in the debates in any interpersonal reasoning. As she says here: ‘Perhaps most significantly of all, in ordinary conversation, we are aware that our partners in conversation are more important than the topic’ (1994, p.115). But as Fullinwider, (1993, p.109) warns:

Intellectual charity should not be confused with tactfulness, politeness or mildness. Charity requires giving our opponent the benefit of the doubt; it does not mean downplaying his real and specific errors. Intellectual charity does not foreclose sharp and pointed dissent. It does not block vigorous and robust argument. We do not have to be nice to one another’.

And, whilst Callan suggests that teaching children to act with intellectual charity may require a good deal of niceness (op. cit. p.243) the point is well made, that is, that confusing intellectual charity with intellectual evasiveness is a bad mistake.

A capacity for robust but charitable deliberation about divisive issues is a key component of the patriotic education project outlined here and is also an important means of promoting independence of thought and therefore autonomy. A commitment to the shared, collective nation-building project above is needs to be accompanied with an important respect of liberal autonomy and a capacity for individuals to pursue a self directed life. As Soutphommasane argues (2012, p.172):

Civic education should nurture among the future citizens qualities that are consistent with individual autonomy. The capacity to consider the views of others, to weigh evidence, to respect difference and to reflect upon one's own beliefs - these are the same capacity is
required for individual self-rule out of the participation in deliberative democracy. Civic education should not involve moulding citizens without an accompanying attention to autonomy.

If we are advocating a truly liberal education then, as was argued in Chapter Five, the outcomes for each individual cannot be dictated. However, where individual citizens choose autonomously to opt out of their civic responsibilities, Meira Levinson suggests that the stability and perpetuation of the liberal state is a public good and as such, ‘it cannot violate children’s developing autonomy to teach them not to free-ride’ (1999, p.106) and leave them to draw their own conclusions from this.

It is important to stress, as indeed Levinson does (ibid.), that not all children and young people participating in this patriotic education will become - or indeed should become – political activists. What is being proposed is that by locating national identity in a sense of shared fate rather than common identity formation, and by cultivating, harnessing and directing patriotic love expressed as affective affiliations towards a plural, liberal, democratic nation building project, the chances of greater personal and political efficacy will increase. This in turn will serve to shore up precious liberal democratic institutions and processes, which are essential for human flourishing.

The desired outcomes and broad scope of patriotic education

The kind of patriotic education advocated here proposes that children are educated to understand the importance of their national community and to value and care about it – to learn to love it well. This education would also ensure that children see their compatriots as sharing a common fate and as partners in a collaborative project. It is
argued that this form of education serves to better underpin liberal democratic values and processes and, further, that children who are taught in the way proposed here will have a richer educational experience than those who currently experience civic education in many established liberal democracies. This education requires providing children and young people with opportunities for exercising ‘enlarged thought’, for participating in demanding collaborative projects, for conducting rational inquiries, for exercising empathy alongside generous as well as critical interpretations of history and cultural differences, for maintaining high standards of integrity and truth telling. It aims to develop cognitive and emotional capacities in new and demanding ways which should lead to children and young people towards developing a strong understanding of - and genuine commitment to preserving and enhancing - their country’s liberal democratic values, institutions and processes. It should also encourage and nurture care and concern for one’s own country and compatriots, whilst developing capacities for debating difference within a context of mutual respect. It should lead to young people participating in genuinely open deliberation about aspect of the country’s renewal and identity. And it should enhance individuals’ sense of autonomy and efficacy in preserving and shaping their own national community. This will mean that it should also accommodate multiple expressions of love of country within the context of a shared affective affiliation to the enterprise of liberal democratic nation building itself.

As such lessons or learning opportunities would have explicit outcomes of ensuring, for example, that:

- Children understand - and care deeply about (love well) – the origins and current nature of their shared liberal democratic national context
- Children understand that any liberal democratic community, including the very important national one, requires citizens to participate (in some way) within it – liberal societies cannot survive if rule is not collective self-rule in an important and fundamental way by the many – not a few

- Individual freedoms are critical to the health of any liberal democracy and we are free to contribute and deliberate over the future of our shared nation

- Children understand that we are all persons of equal worth with others globally but we have special responsibilities to compatriots because we share space and responsibilities with them

- The identity of the nation is an on-going project and that politicians alone do not dictate the outcome of patriotic education.

Given these desired outcomes of patriotic education, the curriculum would need to instil certain knowledge, understanding, skills and dispositions, alongside a capacity to learn about what loving well means, subjecting it to some scrutiny and putting it into practice.

**What knowledge, skills and dispositions should patriotic education instil?**

It would, for example, be important that children know about some key aspects of national history - as well as global history. As discussed above through Callan’s persuasive proposition it would be important that this, necessarily selective, history is not distorted and is approached with truth as well as generous imagination. Billy Bragg, in his book *The Progressive Patriot* (2006), provides a useful example of what this kind of history teaching might comprise. He cites the myth that the UK was ‘all alone’ in 1940 fighting the might of the fascism and that this sense of British defiance has, to some degree, been captured as a defining sense of ‘who we are’ (p.249). He cites the
example of a political cartoon by David Low from the London *Evening Standard* that came out in June of 1940 aiming to capture the essence of Churchill’s ‘finest hour’ speech. He describes it here (*op. cit.* p.250):

A lone British Tommy stands on a wave-swept out-crop, defiantly waving his fist at oncoming Luftwaffe bombers. The caption reads ‘Very well, alone’.

Bragg then goes on to describe how, a month later, *Punch* published a cartoon by Cyril Bird, which ‘wryly sought to offer a truer perspective on Britain’s lone stance against Nazism’ and depicted,

Two Tommies sit on a cliff top, one reading the paper, the other smoking a pipe gazing across the Channel towards France. One says to the other, ‘So, our poor old Empire is alone in all the world.’ ‘Aye, we are,’ the other replies. ‘The whole five hundred million of us’ (*ibid.*).

Knowledge of the many nationalities of the pilots who took part of the Battle of Britain is another aspect of this period of history that might serves to illuminate and expand national understanding. There were 141 Polish pilots, of whom 29 were killed in combat, 86 Czechs, 29 Belgians, as well as 103 New Zealanders, 90 Canadians and 29 Australians as well as 25 South Africans (7 of whom were killed in action) (*op. cit.* p.251). An expansive, patriotic education approach to this history might involve children in finding out about how Britain had drawn on manpower and resources from her Empire since the beginning of the war. This would not be with the intention of diminishing or even demeaning the national effort but about expanding it - *truthfully*. The reasons behind the creation of the political cartoons and a generous, imaginative and critical interpretation of this may also serve children well. And, as Callan
recommends, it may be quite possible to give fuller historical analyses of less glorious or downright immoral aspects of a nation’s past without inculcating disrespect for a nation’s history as a whole. It should be quite possible to tackle history in a critical way whilst inculcating appreciation for the complexity of the situation or the challenges facing people in the past. And furthermore, children could be encouraged to study more redeeming aspects of national history through which critical comparisons could be made with the less than glorious aspects of national history.

It is beyond the scope of this discussion to provide a patriotic education curriculum as such - or indeed any indicative history curriculum. The Second World War example above is just one possible focus. However, it may be worthwhile setting out some further suggestions that align to the desired outcomes of good patriotic education. Clearly, it would be important to instil knowledge and understanding of democratic political institutions and the processes, as well as some foundational knowledge and understanding of national law, alongside knowledge, understanding and appreciation of national history. It would also be important that children acquire key skills and dispositions, including for example, the following: the ability to deliberate, debate, reflect, assume some critical distance, be assertive, compromise and so on. Children should be able to inquire critically, weigh evidence, interpret data and assess validity of information. Formal traits, like a capacity for ‘determination’, can be developed but so too more substantive morally substantive traits like ‘compassion’. Other dispositions and values that should be instilled could include a capacity for openmess, generosity, empathy, critical distance, care for each other within a diverse but common national context, the capacity to develop a sort of ‘tough love’ towards one’s country and compatriots and themselves, kindness and honesty. Cultural literacy would also be
important. This would equip children in knowing how to ‘read’ the culture and would be especially helpful for children from minority groups. As Soutphommasane puts it (2012, p.188):

This is the kind of literacy that allows an Australian to appreciate that Waltzing Matilda has nothing to do with a girl called Matilda, an American to understand a reference to ‘Four score and seven years ago’ as being from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, an Englishman to know immediately the provenance of ‘And did those feet’, and so forth.

An understanding of and a capacity for ethical deliberation would also be important priorities for any expression of patriotic education. An understanding that there are different moral perspectives would be crucial, as would an appreciation and valuing of these differences.

Any patriotic education curriculum would also need to provide the justifications for the inclusion of many of its aspects in order to provide children with good rationales for aspects of the curriculum as well as some critical faculties to examine them. So, for example, it would be imperative that children understand the importance of interpretation, critical inquiry, controversy, differing moral perspectives and the role of emotions in rational choices as well as being able to enact this understanding. As such patriotic education should have all the elements of any good traditional liberal education but with additional explicit understanding that key values, skills and dispositions are required for committing to this kind of nation building project. The underlying rationales and justifications would need to be explicitly shared and subjected to critical scrutiny too. Furthermore, this kind of patriotic education would support children in
developing a responsibility to understand the importance of - as well as to shape - national solidarity as a foundation for liberal democracy. And what finally differentiates this curriculum from traditional civic education is the fact that knowledge, understanding, skills and values are instilled within a context of *appreciation* towards the national project. This does not amount to uncritical inculcation of love for the nation as it is. It does however foster love towards the national project itself as well as appreciation of national history and institutions alongside a sense of personal and collective efficacy in further shaping these institutions. It also fosters a respect and care for a diverse range of compatriots in the context of the shared fate.

**How should patriotic education be taught?**

The pedagogical approach to this patriotic education is important. It would need to be essentially dialogic and would involve children and young people participating in, for example, debates, research projects, inquiries, role plays, presentations, storytelling, story writing, problem solving, modelled dialogue, group dialogue, interrogating sources, interpreting evidence and so on. Pedagogical approaches to developing affective affiliation would need to be handled with a degree of care and sophistication. What is not being proposed here is the kind of patriotic education that encourages daily pledges of allegiance or patriotic songs and so on. What is being proposed is that children and young people are encouraged to understand what it means to love well; why a national project is worth caring deeply about; the importance of loving well and not badly. The deep care and affection for country may - and the contention here is that is much more likely to - come through engagement with these ideas and practices. It cannot be imposed.
Some interesting examples of developing affect and virtuous practices in children and young people have been developed and tried out by the work of researchers at The Jubilee Centre at Birmingham University. The Centre takes an Aristotelian approach to teaching character and the development of affect and emotional education form part of the suggested curriculum. It offers some very useful approaches to cultivating affective states and feeling in children through legitimate and defensible practices. Before exploring the valuable contribution the Centre makes to educational practice in the field it is perhaps worth articulating a reservation. The Centre has focused much of its initial work since 2012 on the virtue of gratitude. This has involved students and teachers engaging with virtue of gratitude conceptually as well as practically in the attempt to instil good practices (for example, writing thank you letters and reading them out to recipients). The ‘gratitude’ resources include a film entitled ‘Gratitude in Britain’ (Hark Pictures, 2015) which explores attitudes and practices in relation to gratitude in parts of the UK. One might worry that a focus on the concept of gratitude, in such a structurally unequal society as Britain, was not the best place to start in terms of empowering young people and their moral characters. One might also speculate how the concept of gratitude may be explored in the context of a dialogic progressive patriotic education curriculum, where for example, the concept of gratitude in relation to structural inequalities (zero hour contracts, for example) might be examined, along with ways in which young people could understand the history of these practices as well as explore ways of influencing policy at a national level. Whilst the Jubilee Centre’s teaching resources, associated with gratitude, do encourage some critique of the concept and its relative worthiness as a virtue, and explore the notion of the grateful slave, for example, one might still wonder at the choice of gratitude - given all the other possible virtues -
as the starting point of the research. However, with this reservation to one side, as stated
above, the Centre work has advanced practice in the field of moral education and
tackled tough issues in relation to what this involves – defensibly – in practice. One unit,
(Wright at al, 2015) for example, explores how to develop virtuous practice, including
affective and emotional dimensions, in young people and proposes that young learners:

Recognise that we are in a moral situation; recognise the
emotions, desires and feelings triggered by the situation;
identify the virtue which educates the mention; perceive the
morally relevant features of the situation; Practise acting out
the virtue; Examine how it went; Plan what we need to do to
get better at the virtue (p.14)

The Centre has developed an approach and some useful practical ideas to get children to
acquire new, desirable feelings without falling prey to manipulation. This approach
offers some useful templates for consideration for the conceptual progressive patriotic
education proposals offered here.

A further thought, now, on how patriotic education might be organised or timetabled
within an existing curriculum. Empirical evidence from a number of citizenship
education reports (see for example; DfE 2003, 2005, 2009) suggests that impact on
students of a curriculum such as the one proposed in this thesis is likely to be greater if
taught through discrete timetabled lessons that are assessed formally. It may make sense
to teach patriotic citizenship as a ‘subject’ in this way. However, the precise form and
delivery of patriotic education remains debatable. What is important however is that its
purpose is not distinct from the rest of the curricular aims. It would make no sense, for
example, to teach a belligerent form of history in one lesson, followed by patriotic
education conceived of as this open, deliberative project in the next lesson. There
should at least be some coherent curriculum planning at policy levels alongside whole school coordination in relation to its delivery.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has reiterated the limited responses to civic education thus far and argued that, give these limitations and growing threats to liberal democracy, there needs to be a suitable educational response. Various justifications for progressive patriotic education have been examined. The centripetal identify-forming agenda proposed by Tamir and Callan has things to commend it - as has John White’s proposal that a remodelled sense of British identity could become part of a patriotic education agenda in schools. However, the potential for a shared identity-forming dimension to constrain and limit diversity was found to be a less desirable aspect of this conception of patriotic education. The arguments put forward by Ben-Porath and Soutphommasane, for rejecting this identity-forming aspect of patriotic education and replacing it with a more fluid and continuous approach to democratic nation building and renewal, were found to be more convincing. Patriotic education that teaches children a form of tough love of their country and engages them emotionally, intellectually and practically in shaping its national culture, is recommended. As such patriotic education is conceived of as an open ended, interpretive dialogue – not as a bonus to mainstream education but as an essential feature of it. The chapter has explored what this might involve in practice and concluded that the broad outcomes of a progressive patriotic education should ensure that children and young people understand - and care about – the origins and current nature of their shared liberal democratic national context. Patriotic education outcomes should also ensure that it is understood that individual freedoms are critical to the health
of any liberal democracy and that we are free to contribute and deliberate over the future of our shared nation. It is also important that children understand that we are all persons of equal worth with others globally but we have special responsibilities to compatriots because we share space and responsibilities with them. This kind of patriotic education will enhance a sense of individual and collective efficacy, which it is suggested here, will strengthen liberal democratic institutions and practices. These outcomes, it is proposed, can be achieved through a variety of curriculum and pedagogical means. History is deemed to be crucially important and a truthful, expansive, critical and generous teaching of the national story is recommended. Liberal democratic, civic knowledge, skills and dispositions are seen to be part of this patriotic education agenda. Ethical deliberation is a central part of it too.

The kind of patriotic education needed in established liberal democracies has been outlined and recommendations for its form and content as well as the best pedagogical approach for its delivery have been made. The contention is that it is possible to educate children about their nation as well as teaching them to love their own nation well, construed as a collective geographical historical cultural political entity and as a continuous project. This requires the development of some specific affective as well as cognitive capacities as outlined above. Within this collective nation-building project, each individual has an autonomous role to play in this renewal. Self-rule and collective self-rule are still vitally important. Objective and critical reasoning are still of paramount importance. By teaching for the development of this kind of patriotic virtue the ends of liberal education become more secure.

Further research
This is by no means an easy or straightforward enterprise. This thesis has set out a normative case for progressive patriotic education. This is just the beginning. Clearly extensive empirical work would need to be done in terms of trying it out. This would certainly include exploring questions about how we get children to work on real national, democratic issues and whether the dialogic approach does in fact instil a sense of efficacy and, importantly, affection. Work from the field of educational psychology will be useful here in exploring how one gets a child to acquire a feeling that they currently do not have. Ways of creating new and desirable progressive patriotic feelings in children and young people would have to be explored and trialled – and of course evaluated for their effectiveness. Effectiveness, of course, is only one part of the story. The educational value of the practices will also have to be judged. As such evaluation may involve further normative research. Once workable practices have been identified it will be important to judge their educational worth and whether they are defensible.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has set out to justify the inclusion of patriotic education in state schooling in liberal democracies. The kind of patriotic education that has been advocated aims to ensure that young people learn to love their essentially multicultural liberal democratic nation and are motivated and equipped to participate in its continuous national renewal through an open, interpretive, national dialogue. Citizens will see themselves as sharing a common fate rather than a shared national identity. Minority groups within our increasingly diverse and unequal liberal societies will be motivated to contribute to national renewal through participation in this project, given that their contributions will have the potential of shaping the national community. They will no longer see themselves as being merely assimilated or integrated within a fixed national culture but will see themselves as equal citizens in a liberal, collective interpretive project. The core liberal values of the culture will be the non-negotiables and will include a high level of critical reasoning and a high bar for individual autonomy. Through this education, all members of the nation will be taught to value the nation as a collective enterprise. The genuine open-endedness of the project, along with a sense of urgency about creating a truly effective national democratic culture that animates democratic institutions that affect us all and can be affected by us all, will contribute to affective affiliation for the nation.

It has been argued that affective affiliation at the national level is what has been absent from many efforts to provide good citizenship education, particularly in the UK. Previous efforts to develop strong citizenship education in the UK have fallen short in particular ways. The Ajegbo Report 2007 came closest to characterising citizenship
education in the UK as an interpretive project and was explicit about cultivating a sense of belonging for all members. But it, along with other curricular attempts, lacked any sense of genuine equality for newcomers and failed to adopt enough of a critical stance on race or multiculturalism. It was not clear why citizens from minority groups would be sufficiently motivated to participate in, or contribute to, liberal democratic processes. The current mandatory promotion of British values, along with citizenship education that aims to encourage political literacy, falls short in even more significant ways. British values are conceived of in an arguably charged political fashion and, by conceding of them as British values rather than values themselves, only serve to entrench certain minority views that do not obviously cohere with a somewhat narrow conception of ‘Englishness’.

It has also been the aim of this thesis to assess why traditional civic education programmes that aim to create civic bonds but stop short of promoting patriotic civic bonds will not suffice in the current context of modern liberal democracies. Why the need for national affective affiliation? Why won’t knowledge, understanding, skills and some broad liberal dispositions like neighbourliness, civic friendship and so on suffice? The following contextual observations have been made throughout this thesis to support the claim that what is needed, more than ever before, is some form of patriotic education.

An important starting point is to acknowledge that national governments and liberal democratic institutions remain very important and yet strong levels of informed critically engaged political participation are low and faith in national politicians and institutions are low too. Alienation caused by deep inequalities, globalisation, the rise of
neo-liberalism, the impact of immigration and the rise of populism threaten national liberal democracies. It seems important to remedy this situation sooner rather than later.

The second observation is to grant that, given the nature of our highly diverse modern liberal democracies, it requires a feat of imagination to understand the nature and purpose of a shared democratic national community. Is it not immediately obvious how many young people would understand the core values of a national community or what elements of it are open to renewal or change or how local decisions affect national policy and so on. Currently an education system that conveys knowledge, understanding and skills and tries to nurture democratic dispositions through either an attempt to increase political literacy and/or by exhorting pupils to respect common national values does not adequately address the need for citizens to be more fully engaged in finding out about it, renewing, preserving and developing aspects of liberal democratic tradition. The feat of imagination needed requires some support and furthermore requires young citizens to be sufficiently motivated to make this imaginative leap. It is unlikely to happen spontaneously and in its absence there may be further retreat into more local or sub national cultural affiliations and/or dominant groups asserting their superior claims to defining of national community.

The third observation is that modern liberal democracies are under certain kinds of fairly serious threat and in these circumstances feelings can run high, such as feeling of alienation, powerless, loss, frustration. Interestingly, the BBC reported on November 16th 2016 that ‘Oxford Dictionaries has declared "post-truth" as its 2016 international word of the year, reflecting what it called a "highly-charged" political 12 months. It is defined as an adjective relating to circumstances in which objective facts are less
influential in shaping public opinion than emotional appeals’. Which leads to the fourth point: channelling generous emotion towards a national community is not easy given its complexity and the extent of the imagination required to conceive of it fully. However, it is also safe to conclude that, in general, harnessing affective affiliation and emotional attachment can motivate people to contribute to collective projects or institutional goals and as such liberal democratic citizens who deeply care about their nation are more likely to participate in political life. If the sense of alienation or apathy runs too deep, as Callan argues (1997), liberal democracy shall be in a serious crisis.

There are important questions that arise from these contextual observations and the thesis has aimed to tackle these questions and arrive at some normative principles for addressing the non-ideal reality confronting us. First: What kind of education would help citizens understand, appreciate and contribute to the national community and ensure that it is properly accountable, representative, and so on, given the deep sense of alienation and powerlessness experienced by many citizens? A further question asks: How might harnessing emotional attachments and affective affiliation to the nation be generated given the difficulties in imagining the increasingly diverse national community? And, how might harnessing emotional attachment towards a national community avoid the pitfalls of distortion or manipulation that may result in bad faith and other illiberal consequences? And finally, how might an education aimed at generating affection for the nation, in order to enhance democratic commitment and participation maintain minority cultural affiliations, remain cosmopolitan and meet standards of global justice?
This thesis has addressed these questions and proposed a version of citizenship education that provides reason to participate by harnessing and nurturing affective feeling towards the national community and its practices. The kind of patriotic education recommended here mirrors its intended outcomes for a flourishing liberal democratic society. It is essentially liberal in that it requires exacting standards of critical acuity and respect for fundamental liberal principles including a high bar of rationality, reasonableness, independence and impartiality. But it does this alongside the idea of a collective practice that requires citizens to be open, critical, emotionally generous, and deliberative as well as to develop affective affiliation to the nation.

The thesis concludes that it is possible to educate children about their nation as well as teaching them to care deeply about their own nation construed as a collective geographical historical cultural political entity and as a continuous project. This requires the development of some specific affective as well as cognitive capacities. Within this collective nation-building project, each individual has an autonomous role to play in this renewal. Self-rule and collective self-rule are still vitally important. The outcomes of this national project are not fixed. By teaching for the development of this kind of patriotic virtue the ends of liberal education become more secure. This is not an easy task. It is however an urgent one.
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292


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