THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CENTRE AND PERIPHERY IN THE OTTOMAN ERA OF EXPERIMENTATION WITH AND ADAPTATION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR FISCAL DEMANDS: THE CASES OF KOZANI, SERFICE, AND VELVENDOS, CA.1690-CA.1820

by

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A Thesis submitted to
The University of Birmingham
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies
School of History and Cultures
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October 2017
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is an attempt to describe and analyse the history of the relationship between the imperial centre and a minor peripheral area, but also the first step towards a more complete understanding of the history of the areas of Kozani, Serfice, and Velvendos during the 18th century, on the basis of both Ottoman and Greek primary sources, in an attempt to replace the old and, rather obsolete, nationalist narratives prevalent in the writings of the local amateur historians. Through the examination of the tax-farming system, on the one hand, and the timar system, on the other, in the areas under study, this dissertation addresses the developments that occurred at a local level in a period of Ottoman history marked by great changes and experimentation with new fiscal practices. It is also the aim of this dissertation to prove that the centre was represented locally by the local magnates and notables, who, by serving the interests of the absentee Istanbul-based élite, acted as representatives of the centre in their localities, and formed factions which vied for supremacy and served their respective interests at a local level. Thus, it supports the idea that the centre made the local notables, for as long as local notables made the centre in their given society and locality.
To my mom and dad, always grateful for making this possible
This dissertation is the result of a long research and studying of a considerable number of primary and secondary sources, which allowed me to examine the history of a relatively unexplored area and, in accordance with the revisionist theories dominating the modern Ottomanist historiography, confront the traditional schemes of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the tyrannical rule of the Ottomans over their subject populations. Now, after four long years my research is finally complete and I feel the need to express my gratitude to all those who assisted me on my arduous and lengthy course. My vision and ideas would have never been expressed and realised, had the Centre of Byzantine, Ottoman, and Modern Greek Studies of the University of Birmingham not offered me the opportunity to become part of its scholarly community. I also need to express my gratitude to the University of Birmingham for the financial support which I was provided with for parts of my research at the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul.

I am grateful to my two supervisors, Dr Rhoads Murphey and Dr Archibald Dunn, who assisted me from the very beginning of my course and encouraged me to express my ideas and thoughts. Moreover, I need to thank them both for their patience and their contribution to the amelioration of my research and academic skills, which I have experienced under their meticulous supervision. Dr Murphey helped me put my thoughts in due order and set, therefore, the foundations on which this dissertation was later structured and built, whilst Dr Dunn, by proposing and instructing me as to the combination of the information provided by the Ottoman and Greek documents, contributed to my final approach to the large number of sources at my disposal. His remarks and corrections were
always of paramount importance and determined the final shape and form of this dissertation.

I am also grateful to Dr Seyyed Muhammad Tagi Shariat-Panahi, whom I initially met as a tutor, but proved a true friend. By sharing with me his knowledge of the secrets of the science of the Ottoman diplomatics, he introduced me to the particularities of the Ottoman bureaucracy and documentation. His advice and admonitions helped me find my way and take the great decision of leaving Greece. Thus, I thank him for all of the time, which he devoted as a scholar and, above all, as a true friend. I would like also to thank Dr Georgios Liakopoulos for his lessons and discussions that we had together, long before I had taken the decision to leave Greece and move to Birmingham. As I came to realise, his experiences proved of invaluable help. My thanks go also to Dr Konstantinos Kambouridis, Dr Georgios Salakides, Dr Chariton Karanasios, Dr Georgios Tsotsos, and Dr Konstantinos Ntinas, who welcomed me into the community of the scholars who study the history of Western Macedonia and introduced me to the history and particularities of the Kozanite microcosm. All of them stood by me as true scholars, companions, and friends.

I also am deeply indebted to the directory and staff of the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul, who always responded promptly to my demands and needs, whilst their interest in my project and assistance at a time when I lacked the necessary skills and experience for conducting research in the maze of the Ottoman Archives rendered my working in the archives a fruitful and pleasurable experience. The same feelings do I reserve for the staff of the Gennadeios Library of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, who always responded in the most positive manner and assisted me on my research and exploration of the plentiful collections preserved in the Gennadeios Library.
I also need to express my gratitude to my professors, Stephanos Papageorgiou and Alexandros Koutsis, who instilled at an early stage of my undergraduate studies into me the passion and love for the Ottoman Empire and history of Early Modern Greece and Middle East. I would like also to thank Dr Sophia Laiou and Professor John Alexander who assisted me at the earliest stages of this project, before I had made the great decision to move into the UK and the University of Birmingham. I am deeply grateful to both of them.

I am also grateful to my friends, whose contribution is also necessary to be remembered. They were always eager at discussing my research and, through exchanging of opinions and lengthy discussions, each one of them contributed in every possible manner to the completion of this project. Yannis Tzortzis and Onur Usta are the best example of such good friends and scholars, for they never rejected my calls to discuss and analyse my ideas. Thus, I need to thank them both for all of the time and energy that they devoted, whenever I called for their assistance and counselling, sometimes even at the expense of their own research. I also thank for all their good advice and help Alex M. Feldman, Maria D. Petropoulou and Georgia Michael.

Last, not least, and above all I need to express my deepest feelings of gratitude to my family. My parents and my brother always supported me and never hesitated to show their understanding of and their patience and stamina to endure the vicissitudes characteristic of this lengthy and tiresome process. My parents proved a real treasure, not only because they allowed me to attempt to realise my dreams and vision, but also because they assisted me throughout this four-year-long period, which coincided with a period of an unprecedented financial and socio-economic crisis in Greece, a fact that further magnifies and intensifies their sacrifices and contribution. Therefore, I can only stand in awe before
them and thank them for all the sacrifices that they have done, sometimes at the expense of their own welfare and quality of their life. Thus, for all their hopes, visions, love, endurance, and perseverance I dedicate wholeheartedly my dissertation to my mother, Maria, and my father, Kostas.
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Abbreviations


AE Ali Emiri

BiD.HSK Bab-ı Defteri Hasslar Kalemi

BiD.MKF Bab-ı Defteri Mevkufat

C.ADl Cevdet Adliye

C.AS Cevdet Askeriye

C.DH Cevdet Dahiliye

C.EV Cevdet Evkaf

C.ML Cevdet Maliye

C.SM Cevdet Saray

C.TZ Cevdet Timar

C.ZB Cevdet Zaptiye

D.BŞBM Bab-ı Defteri Başmuhasebe Kalemi

D.BŞM.EMK Bab-ı Defteri Başmuhasebe Emlak-i Hümâyun

D.BŞM.MHI Bab-ı Defteri Başmuhasebe Muhallefat Halifesı

D.BŞM.MLK Bab-ı Defteri Başmuhasebe Malikane Halifeliği

D.CMH Bab-ı Defteri Cizye Muhasebesi

D.HSK Bab-ı Defteri Hasslar Kalemi

HAT Hatt-ı Hümâyun

İ.E.HR İbnülemin Hariciye

İ.E.ML İbnülemin Maliye

İ.E.TCT İbnülemin Tevcihat

KK Kamil Kepeci

MAD Maliyeden Müdevver

ML.VRD.TMT Maliye Nezareti Varidat Kalemi Temettuat

TS.MA Topkapı Saryı Müzesi Arşivi
Note on Transliteration

Ottoman to English:

In this dissertation I have chosen to use a simple system of transliteration, which does not discern among the various forms of consonants and vowels, predominant in the Arabic Ottoman script, but follows the modern Turkish orthography. Therefore, I have adopted the simplest possible version of transliteration, with the only addition being the letter ‘ayn (‘) which I denote with a reversed apostrophe (‘). I have chosen to use the modern Turkish orthography for names, whilst Ottoman toponyms and place names are always followed by their modern-time equivalent. Whenever possible, I used the English form of some Ottoman terms, such as pasha, janissary etc., but whenever there was no such an equivalent the Ottoman terms used in my text are always followed by a footnote which explains the meaning of this respective term.

a, ã اء
b ب
p پ
t ت
s ñ
ç ج
ç ج
h ح
h خ
d د
z ذ
r ر
z ظ
j ز
s س
My Greek to English transliteration system is also a simplified version which aims at rendering reading of Greek transliterated texts as easy and fast as possible. The sole exception to this system are the cases where I refer to names of modern Greek authors, who have chosen and forward their own transliteration of their names. Otherwise, the transliteration of the titles of the books from Greek to English is exclusively mine and follows the system presented below.
<table>
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Note on Date Conversion and Calendars

The Ottomans used two different calendars for conducting the affairs of the state: a) the hicri calendar and b) the mali/rumi calendar. The former, which was based on the provisions of the Shari’a and comprised 12 months in a year of 354 or 355 days, was a lunar calendar used in religious documents and documents pertaining to the annual period of fasting and the proper time for the pilgrimage to Mecca. The latter, which is also known as fiscal calendar, was a solar-based calendar which followed the Julian calendar used in Europe at the time. The Ottomans applied this calendar to civic matters, payment of taxes, tax-farming, state expenditures and payment of salaries, and dealings with government and civil officials.

I have converted all of the dates expressed in both calendars to their Gregorian counterpart. Thus, all “AD” dates appearing in the text of this Thesis are expressed in the modern Gregorian calendar, which has a difference of 13 days from its Julian counterpart.
Glossary

This is a list of the terms used throughout this dissertation. Their translation is based on the meaning that they acquired from the context which they were used in. My aim is not to provide a full explanation of their meaning throughout the Ottoman history.

*a’ala*: the high category of poll-tax paid by the non-Muslims

*ağa*: title given to people of a military background, or provincial members of the Janissary corps, as opposed to efendi

*ahali*: inhabitants, people of a given area, town, or village

*akçe*: small silver coin, which came to be seen as a subdivision of the kuruş. During the 18th-century the akçe had disappeared from circulation and was merely a unit of account

*altı bölük halkı*: members of the six divisions of the imperial cavalry

*arabacı/top arabacı*: cannon carriage driver

*archon*: lord

*armatolos/martolos*: Christian guard of mountainous passages, Christian provincial security forces

*armatolık*: the area under the authority of a band of irregulars entrusted with the safeguard of mountainous passages

‘arzuhal*: petition

‘askeri*: the military, ruling, class, who were tax-exempt, as opposed to the re’aya, also known as ehli-ı seyf, namely “men of the sword”

‘ases*: night watchman in a town

‘asǝsbǝşi*: chief night watchman

*aşiret*: tribe, nomadic groups

*a’varız*: extraordinary taxes levied in cash

*a’yǝn*: provincial notable

*a’yǝnlik*: the institution and office of the a’yǝn, which was officially recognised and instituted by the administration in the 18th century, when the provincial notables reached their apogee

*bab-i ali*: the Sublime Porte, which came to represent the Ottoman administration and government

*baltalık resmi*: he right of the inhabitants of a village or settlement to cut firewood in a certain district

*baş a’yǝn*: head a’yǝn

*başdefterdar*: chief financial official

*bâş muhasebe kalemi*: chief accounting and budget bureau

*bazdar*: imperial falconer

*bedel-i nüzül*: extraordinary tax assessed in kind, but paid in cash

*bekçi*: night watchman in a town

*berat*: imperial diploma of appointment to an office or bestowal of a timar
bey: title given to military commanders
beylерbeyи: “bey of the beys”, governor of a province
beytү‘-mal: the fisc and the section of the treasury dealing with inheritances
bırүн: the outer service of the palace
bostancı: gardener, member of the corps of the imperial palace guards
bostancıbaşı: head of the bostaniyan corps
bostani hasekiler: palace guard officers
bölük: regiment
bölükbaşı: one of the six commanders of the regiment formed of the commanders of the Janissary regiments, also a commander of irregulars entrusted with security and implementation of law and order in a given locality
buyuruldu: decree or order issued by the provincial authorities
cebeci: armourer
cebelү: the armed retainer that the timar-holding sipahi was obliged to despatch to the army
celebkeşan bedeli: the sheep-tax which was paid by the tax-payers to sheep drovers and secured the provisioning of Istanbul and other urban centres with meat
cizye: the poll-tax levied on and paid by all the non-Muslims
çavuş: halberdier of the bodyguard of the sultan and messenger
çelebi: title of respect given to educated people
çeribaşı: the officer responsible for rounding up at the beginning of and leading during the campaigning season the timar-holders living in his kaza
darbhane-i ‘amire: imperial mint
defter: register, account book
defter emini: the head of the defterhane-i ‘amire, also known as defter-i hakani, namely the bureau responsible for conducting surveys, tracking timar transactions, and recording all timars within the Ottoman realm
defterdar: the chief financial officer of the Ottoman Empire, sultanic exchequer
defterhane-i ‘amire: the chief financial office headed by the defterdar
defterdar-ı şıkk-ı sanı: the defterdar of Anatolia
defterlü: individual enrolled in special registers
derbend: mountainous passage
derbendat nazırı: overseer of the mountainous passages
derbendci: a guard of mountainous passages, in the 18th century the derbendcis were also known in certain Christian areas as armatoloi
dirağat: field guard
divan-ı hümayun: the imperial council comprising the chief military officers and officials of the Ottoman administration
dizdar: warden of a fortress
edna: the low category of the poll-tax paid by the non-Muslims
efendi: title given to bureaucrats and literate people
ehl-i İslam: the Muslims

ehl-i zimmet: the non-Muslims of a Muslim state

ekabir: the greatest and most important individual

emasil: most eminent individual

emin: state agents entrusted with the collection of the taxes

enderun: the inner service of the palace

esham: shares

esnaf: guilds

eskiya: brigands, rebels

esraf: noble, honourable or rich individual

evsat: the middle category of the poll-tax paid by the non-Muslims

eyalet: province, the highest-ranking administrative unit in the post-classical Ottoman system of provincial administration until 1864

exarchos: special patriarchal agent

ferman: imperial edict or order

gediklü: palace official or member of the central administration that held a grant as remuneration for long and meritorious services in the form of a provincial gedik timar

hacı: a person who had been to pilgrimage in Mecca (Muslim) or Jerusalem (Christian)

hane: household, fiscal unit used in the payment of the ‘avariz and nüzül extraordinary levies and the poll-tax before the empirewide reform of 1691

harac: tax paid by the patriarchate as lump-sum on an annual basis

harc-ı aklam: money for the expenses made by the bureau responsible for the compilation of the poll-tax registers

harc-ı boğça: expenses for the collection sacks of the poll-tax

harc-ı muhasebe: expenses due for balancing and settling the accounts of the tax-farm

hass: imperial estate, prebend of value higher than 100,000 akçes given to high-ranking military officers and officials

hatib: public preacher in Friday mosques

havale: income assignment

havass-ı hümâyün: imperial crown lands

hazine: treasury

hazineşor: treasurer

hizmetgâr: personal servant of a provincial magnate or pasha

humbaracı: bombardier

hüccet: document, affidavit issued by a kâdi court

hükm: order, decree

ibtida timarları: initial timars granted to sons of timar-holding sipahis

ihitsab: the office of the market inspector

ihtiyar: elder, chosen

i’lâm: judicial decree
iltizam: short-term tax-farming of state revenues
imam: leader in public worship and teacher of Islamic Law
irad-i cedid-i hümâyun: the treasury of the new imperial revenues
irsaliyye: fee paid to state officers responsible for delivering the income to Istanbul
ispence: traditional tax levied in rural areas on households of villages

kadi: Islamic judge
kalem: pencil, administration: bureau
kalfa: guild master
kalbezanlık: coinage counterfeiting
kalgay sultan: one of the two heirs to the throne of the Crimean Khanate
kalyoncu: sailor of the ships of the line
kanun: Sultanic law or code of laws outside the scope of the Shari’a
kapicibaşı: head of the palace doorkeepers
kapikulu: member of the Janissary corps comprising the sultanic standing army and of the sultanic household, soldier directly salaried by the suştan and the imperial treasury
kapu çuhadar: representative agent of a provincial magnate or pasha in Istanbul
karakulak-i kethüda-yı: confidential messenger of the steward of the Grand Vizier
sadri ‘ali: confidential messenger of the steward of the Grand Vizier
karye: village
kassab başı: the title of the official responsible for the collection of the sheep-tax in a certain locality
kassam: official charged with the registration of properties escheatable to the state
kaymakam: place holder or lieutenant, by the latter parts of the 18th century denoted also the deputy governor
kaza: the lowest-ranking administrative unit in the post-classical Ottoman system of provincial administration, a sub-division of a sancak, a county or judicial district under the authority of a kadi
kefil: guarantor
kese: a purse or bag, an amount of 500 ğuruş
kesedar: purse-bearer and treasurer
kethüda: steward
kethüda bey efendi: steward of the Grand Vizier
kilç: the predefined official value of a timar
kiptiyân: Gypsies
kitabet: the tax paid as a salary to the scribe and/or secretary of the voyvoda
kocabaşi: Christian notable, head of a Christian community
kuruş: silver coin which during the 18th century equalled 40 para and 120 akçes
lağımci: sapper
ma‘as: salary and means of subsistence
mahalle: neighbourhood, quarter, ward
mahsuben: by way of account
mahlul: vacant, unoccupied
mahzar: collective petition
maktu‘: lump-sum payment
mal-i miri: annual payment
malikâne: life-term tax-farming
malikâneci: life-term tax-farmer
manastır: monastery
manastırlar rüşumu: taxes levied on monasteries
masarraf: annual expenses
meclis: council, often judicial
mevacib: wages
mevkuf: sums that accrued from suspended payment and were kept for paying local expenses
mezra’a: deserted village and its fields which were periodically under cultivation and exploitation
mirahur: high-ranking officer in the imperial stables
mirahur-i evvel: the officer at the head of the Palace officers who were entrusted with the administration and accommodation of expenses, due for the palace animals and the horses bred and raised in the imperial stable
miralay: deputy officer of the sancakbeyi, high-ranking timar-holding officer
miri: the state treasury, whatever belongs to the state
mitrepolid: metropolitan
mitrepolidlik: taxes paid by the flock for the metropolitan molla: high-ranking judge
mu’accele: down payment
mubaya’a: wholesale purchase of goods by the state
muhaфиз: commander of a fort
muhasibe: balancing and settling of accounts, budget
muḥassıl: fiscal officer and farmer of taxes belonging to the state
muhtar: chosen or elected community headman
mukata’a: tax-farm, any outsourced source of revenues
mustahfız: fortress guard
mutasarrıf: governor of a sancak
mübaşır: special agent appointed by the Porte
müezzin: functionary charged with calling Muslims to prayer
mühtesib: collector and assessor of excise taxes, and inspector of weights and measures
mülażım: low-ranking sipahi officer, lieutenant
mültezim: short-term tax-farmer
mütesellim: representative of and substitutes for a beylerbeyi or a sancakbeyi müsadere: the sultanic prerogative of confiscation of the properties of individuals accused of high treason
müsteredik: jointly held timar or stipend
müşterik: joint holder and beneficiary of a timar or a stipend
müteferrika: palace officer at the retinue of high-ranking governmental officers, such as the Grand Vizier, and high-ranking military and financial officers

mütevelli: trustee of a vakif

nahiye: adminstrative sub-division of a kaza presided over by a na‘ib deputy judge

nazır: superintendent

na‘ib: deputy judge

nikahlar rüşumu: taxes levied on the marriages of the Christians

nişancı: the officer entrusted with the duty of inscribing the Sultan’s imperial monogram (tuğra) on imperial edicts and decrees, also known as tevki’i

nizam-ı cedid: the New Order, the set of reforms introduced by Selim III in the 1790s

nureddin sultan: one of the two heirs to the throne of the Crimean Khanate

ocak: hearth, corps, used for the Janissary corps

ocaklık: a stipend which was paid, for the upkeep of their households and to ensure their subsistence in place of regular salary, to fortress guards or prominent individuals residing in urban centres, and was inheritable to the offspring of its beneficiary

oikonomos: ecclesiastical official responsible for managing the accounts and property of a bishop or bishopric

‘örf: customary law, prerogative of the sultan as opposed to the Shari’a

panayırlar rüşumu: taxes levied on fairs

papa: priest

para: small coin in between the ǧuruş and the akçe

parisiyya ve portası: borrowed from the Greek parrisia and prothesis, the payment of a small fee by the relatives of deceased people for prayers to be read in their names for the deceased’s eternal rest at the gravesite

pasban: nighth watchman in a town

paşa: the highest rank used for both civil administrators and military officers, in English parlance known as Pasha

patrik: patriarch

patriklık: taxes paid by the flock for the patriarch

piskopos: bishop

piskoposluk: taxes paid by the flock for the bishop

piskopos mukata’ası kalemi: the bureau of the revenues and tax-farms of bishops and metropolitans

peşin: advance payment

pişkeş: tax paid by the patriarch on the occasion of the installation of a new sultan or patriarch

proestos: Christian notable

protosygkellos: chief secretary of a bishop or metropolitan
rehin: hostage
re‘aya: flock, the tax-paying peasants, artisans, and merchants, both Muslim and non-Muslim, as opposed to the ‘askeri
rikâb-i hûmayun: soldiers holding the stirrups of the Sultan, when he was present on horseback on state occasions, and operating as his bodyguards
ruz-i Kasım: the day of St Demetrius on 26 October each year, the date that marked the end of the campaigning period, as opposed to the ruz-i Hızır, namely the day of St George on 23 April each year, which marked the beginning of the campaigning period
ruznamçe: bureau containing the records on an empire-wide scale of the daily records of the defter-i hakani and the bestowals of timars
rüsum-ı ‘örfiyye: taxes imposed in accordance with customary laws
rüsum-ı şer‘iyye: taxes imposed in accordance with the religious laws
rü‘us: heads, individuals
sağ kol: the right branch of the Rumelian provinces and the local timar-holding cavalry forces
salyane: annual stipend
sancak: the middle-rank administrative unit in the post-classical Ottoman system of provincial administration, between the eyalet and the kaza
sarraf: moneylender, banker
sekban: irregular mercenary soldiers who were raised locally on campaigns
sekban akçesi: special subsidisation for the upkeep of the personal élite guard of the Tatar Khan
ser‘asker: commander-in-chief
serbestiyyet: the status enjoyed by certain tax-farms, which stipulated that the tax-farm would be managed and administered freely without any outside intervention on behalf of governmental authorities and state officials
serdar: military or Janissary commander
sicil: register of a kadi court
silahdar: member of the palace cavalry guards, since the early 18th century ceremonial term for the swordbearer, which was granted by the provincial pashas to members of their retinues
silahşor: a senior member of the first regiment of the kapikulu household cavalry of the Porte, a high-ranking member of the Janissary corps, and member of the equestrian guards serving in the retinue of the Sultan
sipahi: cavalryman, either a timar-holding provincial cavalryman or a member of the Porte and imperial palace cavalry divisions
sipahiler ağası: commander of the cavalrymen who formed the first regiment of the kapikulu household cavalry
sol kol: the left branch of the Rumelian provinces and the local timar-holding cavalry forces
subaşı: timar-holding local police officer
tahsil: collection of taxes
tahsildar: tax-collector
tahvil: a letter of assignment, or the office charged with the issuance of berats
takrir-i ‘ali: official draft
taksit: instalment
tapu tahrir defteri: written survey of the population for tax purposes and timar assignments, the name of the register containing the resûsts of the survey
tasadduk akçesi: charity money and almsgiving by the congregation after Sunday mass
tebardar: halberdier
telhis: memorandum from the Grand Vizier to the sultan
temessük: document acknowledging a debt, a receipt
tevzi’ defteri: register of tax apportionment
tezkere: note, receipt
timar: prebend with nominal value of less than 20,000 akçes
timarlu: timar-holding soldier, beneficiary of a timar grant
tefavüt: the amount resulting from the disparity caused by the revaluation of the Ottoman currency
tercüman: interpreter
teşrifat: donations on the occasion of the ascension of a new Crimean Khan to the throne and the nomination of a new heir-presumptive
tevcih: appointment, bestowal
tirkeş bahası: donations to the Girays Tatars to participate in Ottoman campaigns
tzormpatzis/çorbacı: Christian notable, term used in a derogatory manner for the wealthy merchants and landowners, who were accused by the common people of serving the interests of the Ottoman ruling élite
vakıf: religious endowment
vali: governor of a province, synonymous with the term beylerbeyi
voyvoda: representative of the malikanè-holder, the appointed administrator of the tax-farm on behalf of the malikaneci and tax-collector
voyvodalık: the office of the voyvoda
‘ulema: men of religious training, Muslim clergy
‘ulufe: regular salary paid in cash from the treasury
vekil: proxy, representative
vilayet: province
vücu: notable persons
yahudi: Jew
yaşakçı: janissary or çavuş who served in conformance to the imtiyazat principles of protection of high-ranking officials as their guards
yazici: scribe
yed-i vahid: monopoly
yelü: local, used for the provincial Janissaries
yevmiyye: daily ration paid to Janissaries and irregular mercenary soldiers
**zabit:** police officer, also used for the *voyvoda* whenever he assumed the duties of a police officer

**zabt temessükü:** receipt of control and management

**zade:** son, in the 18th century it was used as a suffix for the offspring of grand *a’yan* families

**za’im:** holder of a *zi’amet* prebendal grant

**zarar-i kassabiyye:** meat tax, the obligation of the Patriarch to pay on an annual basis a substitute fee to cover the excessive demands of and secure the provision of the imperial gardeners with meat

**zi’amet:** prebend with nomina value from 20,000 *akçes* to 99,999

**zitiyye/ziteiai:** fundraisings and voluntary contribution of the Christian flock
CHAPTER I

Introduction

The aim of this Thesis is to shed some light on a virtually unknown area and explore its historical course in a period of Ottoman history (c.1700 - c.1820) marked by great changes and experimentation with new fiscal practices, which culminated at the beginning of the 19th century in the collapse of the imperial centre’s control over the periphery and the complete domination of the Ottoman peripheral magnates in their localities.

The area that I have chosen to study is located at the southwestern part of the modern prefecture of Kozani, in Greek Western Macedonia, which corresponds to the Ottoman-period kazas of Eğri Bucak, Serfice, and Çaharşenbe. More precisely, the Thesis examines certain aspects of centre-periphery relations in the light of the participation of the central-imperial and local élites in the administration of the malikâne life-term tax-farming system, as it was applied in the towns of Kozani, Serfice, and Velvendos. It explores the relations formed between Muslims and Christians, and it clearly shows that factionalism was not determined by, nor restricted to, linguistic or religious parameters, but was predominantly based on the practice of crossing identity and cultural boundaries, which allowed for mixed-membership factions to emerge, whose principal aim was, on the one hand, to serve and promote the interests of their members, and establish a monopoly over the revenue-raising mechanisms and, on the other, wipe their respective adversaries out. My study also explores the role of the beneficiaries of prebendal timar grants, who did not participate in the system of tax-farming, but, due to their privileged ‘askeri status,
constituted a distinct élite, with its own characteristics and interests, which survived in the countryside as a relic from the time-honoured 16th-century “Golden Age”. Last but not least, since the last three decades covered in the Thesis coincide with the period of the ruthless and complete domination of Ali Pasha over the area under examination, I have devoted an important part of my research to the emergence of Ali Pasha’s agents throughout the area under examination and their relationship with their overlord, on the one hand, and the local population, on the other.

The main sources used are the Ottoman unbound documents preserved in the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) in Istanbul and the Kobentareios Library of Kozani. These documents comprise copies of, or original excerpts from taxation registers, reports (‘arzes), petitions (‘arzuhalı), imperial orders (hüküms) and rescripts (fermans), and diplomas of appointments (berats), which provide a first-hand experience of the opinion of the imperial centre vis-à-vis a remote area situated at the periphery of the Ottoman polity. Unfortunately, I was unable to locate any surviving 18th-century kadi registers (sicils) for the kazas of Eğri Bucak, Serfice, and Çaharşenbe, which could provide us with a deeper insight into the everyday life, communal affairs of the aforementioned peripheral localities, and the penetration, or lack thereof, of the imperial centre therein. I have also used a small number of Greek unbound ecclesiastical documents, whose copies one may locate registered in the codices of the bishopric of Servia and Kozani. Although most of these documents and codices had been published half a century ago, they have never been used, either alone, or blended with the available Ottoman primary sources, to create a cohesive narrative of the history of the area under examination. As a result, the information contained therein has thus remained completely unexploited and overlooked.
The ecclesiastical documents provide us with invaluable information on the status of the church and the relationship that the clergy of the local bishopric had developed with the Ottoman administration, the tax-farmers, and their representatives, on the one hand, and the Ecumenical Patriarch, on the other. The latter was acknowledged by the Ottomans as the head and sole representative of the Orthodox Christian flock before the Ottoman administration. Thus, it was only natural that he played a major role in the administration of their affairs, especially whenever great economic, fiscal or dogmatic crises broke out, which threatened the very survival of the beleaguered peripheral metropolises and bishoprics. I have used also the recently published Greek Archive of Ali Pasha, which contains a large number of documents that provide information on the methods that Ali Pasha used in order to establish his domination over and administer his polity. Of particular interest is the information on Ali Pasha’s relationships with the local élites and minor notables, who were used by him as his agents in their respective localities. Last but not least, I have used the works of three local amateur historians, Konstantinos Gounaropoulos, Panagiotis Lioufis, and Michalis Papakonstantinou, because they contain a large number of local oral and written traditions, which a historian cannot find in any other official document or register. Of supplementary value, though equally invaluable, are the contemporaneous reports of travelers, such as William Martin Leake and François Pouqueville, who traveled at the beginning of the 19th century around the polity of Ali Pasha and recorded the situation that they faced there. Thus, I have included their descriptions of the area under examination in the list of the primary sources that I studied.
This chapter constitutes an introduction to the historical context and the contents of the Thesis. It initially presents an outlining of 18th-century Ottoman history, whilst section 2 contains a short outlining of the contents of the Thesis.

1.1 The Ottoman 18th century: A period of experimentation and modernisation

The Ottoman 18th century was a period of adaptation of the Ottoman polity to the demands of the time through constant experimentation with a variety of economic, fiscal, and governance practices. Adaptation must be seen, therefore, as a sign of flexibility and pragmatism, and not of decline.¹ The Ottoman polity’s historical trajectory is dominated in this period by two inextricable macrohistorical events, namely the tendency towards decentralisation of the control exercised by the imperial centre over the provinces and the rise in prominence of peripheral magnates and oligarchs who became so powerful that threatened the very existence of the Ottoman polity. Ottoman economic and fiscal history saw the expansion and complete domination of tax-farming as the most efficient revenue-raising method. The class of the a’yan succeeded in imposing their control over the most lucrative tax-farming contracts, which conferred upon them unprecedented socio-economic and political power. The a’yan were also allowed to bypass traditional landholding regulations and by investing their wealth in land and commerce succeeded in forming extensive landed estates, known as çiftlik, which they exploited to maximise their profits by turning their estates into rationalised and export-oriented enterprises. This process resulted in the dispossession of re’aya peasants of their holdings, which during the Classical Period

the state bestowed upon them to cultivate and exploit. In other words, the prospective çiftlik-holder sought after usurpation of the fields held by peasant households under tapu conditions, as well as the pastures, woods, and lands used in common by peasant communities, in order to dispossess them and eradicate their traditional rights of usufructuary landholding granted by the state. According to Bruce McGowan, we should distinguish between two forms of dispossession, namely the titular and physical dispossession of peasants. In the case of titular dispossession the peasants were left intact and allowed to cultivate their holdings, but under new and harsher conditions imposed by the new çiftlik-holder, known as either sahib-i 'alaka (interested party) or sahib-i çiftlik (possessor of the çiftlik estate). In the case of physical dispossession, the çiftlik-holders subjected the peasants to compulsory and deliberate expulsion from their holdings, which they seized and manned with fugitive peasants. This theoretical scheme explains the rise in prominence of the peripheral magnates who took advantage of the loosening of the control exercised by the administration over the provinces and the grim position of the peasantry who found themselves at the mercy of rampaging bandits and greedy state officials and tax-collectors.²

At the same time, the a’ yans rose as almost exclusive suppliers to the state of military forces. They took advantage of the disintegration of the Janissary corps, whose members were allowed to transform into a kind of militia that melted into population and the guilds, thus becoming advocates and supporters of the interests of the artisans and

merchants, and the state’s dire need of mercenary infantry soldiers, owing to the changing nature of warfare in Central and Eastern Europe after the Military Revolution which resulted in the gradual obsolescence of feudal cavalry and its replacement with infantry soldiers of peasant origins. Thus local notables emerged during the “Age of the Ayans” as powerful financial and military contractors, who were acknowledged by the imperial centre as “Partners of the Empire”. In this period the survival of the Ottoman polity was secured through intricate negotiations between the imperial centre and the peripheral magnates, who, by taking advantage of the daunting needs of the state administration for cash and troops, succeeded in imposing their will and securing their position within the Ottoman imperial system. I will examine in more detail the tax-farming methods used by the Ottoman state and the various approaches to the a’yan phenomenon in Sections 2.1 and 3.1, respectively. In what follows I will present certain aspects of the Ottoman 18th century which testify to the ability of the Ottomans to adapt to new demands and experiment with innovative ideas and techniques of governance in the course of this eventful period.

The Ottomans experienced in the first half of the 18th century a cultural movement known in the modern revisionist bibliography as the Ottoman Enlightenment, which advocated the communication of the Ottomans with the West and adoption of Western cultural, political, and military knowledge which they could apply in their attempts to modernise their administrative and military apparatus. The most noteworthy representative

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3 The term “Partners of the Empire” was used by Ali Yayıncıoğlu in his latest monograph on the Ottoman 18th-century Partners of the Empire, The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), whilst the term “Age of the Ayans” was initially used by Bruce McGowan in his homonymous contribution, to the collective work An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), which was edited by Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert. On the meaning of these terms and their authors’ arguments, see: Section 3.1, pp. 94-106.
of this early 18th-century movement was the polymath İbrahim Müteferrika, who is best known for his introduction of the printing press into the Ottoman realms.⁴

The communication between the Ottomans and the West was sparked by the passion of the Ottoman élites during the Tulip Era (1718-1730) for European, especially French, art, furniture, clothes, architecture, and tulips, a period marked by frivolity and dissemination spirit of a spirit of luxury among the Istanbul high society. This period was brought to an end by the infamous Janissary-led Patrona Halil uprising, which came as a result of the depressed economy, the extravagance and conspicuous consumption of the élites, which caused socio-economic polarisation, and the Ottoman defeat in the war with Iran and the hardships that this defeat inflicted upon the population. Nevertheless, and despite the dreadful impact of the uprising on the regime that had sponsored the tulip mania, it proved impossible to prevent the diffusion of Western ideas into the Ottoman realms.⁵

This movement brought about the emergence of a critical evaluation of the Ottoman past and the state of Ottoman affairs in the middle of the 18th century. There emerged, therefore, a group of enlightened Ottoman statesmen and military officers, who realised the Ottoman polity’s urgent need for reforms and modernisation of its socio-economic and political apparatus. This brought about further experimentation in fiscal practices and modernisation of the tax-farming system, upon which relied the fiscal system of the

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⁴ On İbrahim Müteferrika and a critical evaluation of his work, and an analysis of the term Ottoman Enlightenment, see: Vefa Erginbaş, “Enlightenment in the Ottoman Empire: İbrahim Müteferrika and His Intellectual Landscape” in Geoffrey Roper (ed.), Historical Aspects of Printing and Publishing in Languages of the Middle East, Papers from the Third Symposium on the History of Printing and Publishing in the Languages and Countries of the Middle East, University of Leipzig, September 2008 (Leiden; Boston: E.J. Brill, 2014), pp. 53-100.

⁵ On the Patrona Halil uprising and its comparison with the preceding Edirne Event that occurred in 1703 and the events that occurred during the uprising against Selim III in 1807, and the events that ushered in the signing of the Sened-i İttifak in 1808, see: Barkey, Empire of Difference, pp. 205-224.
Ottoman state and the payment of salaries to Ottoman statesmen, bureaucrats, and military. The Ottoman economy showed, at least until the outbreak of the catastrophic war against Russia in 1768, rapid development and witnessed the introduction in domestic manufactures of new technologies, such as glass, soap, sugar, gunpowder, and paper.\

Moreover, foreign consultants and military officers were called for the first time from abroad to propose and supervise reforms of the Ottoman military forces. The two most prominent figures who instigated a series of reforms with long-lasting effects were Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha, the well-known French aristocrat, strategist, and convert to Islam, Claude-Alexandre Comte de Bonneval, who transformed the bombardiers (humbaracıs) and sappers and miners (lağımcıyan) into a separate collateral corps under the jurisdiction of and subject to the regulations of the Janissary corps, and the Hungarian-born French consul in Istanbul, Baron François de Tott, who served as military adviser to reform-minded Sultans Mustafa III (1757-1774) and, briefly, Abdülhamid I (1774-1789), and assisted in the organisation of the Ottoman artillery forces and introduction through the establishment of a new foundry of modern methods of casting ordnance and mobile artillery units into the Ottoman military. Though these reform attempts were left to lapse after the death of Comte de Bonneval and the departure of Baron de Tott from Istanbul, we could argue that they constituted the precursor of the great Nizam-ı Cedid reforms of Selim III, who followed in his predecessors’ footsteps.

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6 Bruce McGowan, “The Age of the Ayans” in İnalcık and Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, II, pp. 637-638.

The need of military reforms became a grim reality after the successive crushing defeats of the Ottoman armies at the hands of the Russians and Austrians in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 and the Russo-Austrian – Ottoman war of 1787-1792, which came as a result of the complete neglect of the Ottoman military forces and supply system during the deceptive period of peace that lasted for three decades, after the signing of the treaty of Belgrade (1739), which terminated a successful war against the Austrians, the first after a series of catastrophic Austro-Ottoman wars in the preceding half century starting with the unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1683. These defeats wreaked havoc on the Ottoman economy, whilst the Ottoman experienced for the first time the loss of Muslim territories on the northern shores of the Black Sea, namely the Tatar Khanate of Crimea that had been for four centuries an Ottoman vassal state and ally, to their Christian adversaries. The Muslim public opinion was shocked and dismayed by these adversities, which caused the dissemination among them of staunch anti-Western and anti-reformist sentiments, which the Janissaries exploited adroitly in their attempts at annihilating the proponents of military and socio-economic reforms, which threatened their interests and position within the Ottoman imperial system.

In the provinces local magnates, such as Tepedelenli Ali Pasha in Ioannina and Osman Pazvantoğlu in Vidin, took advantage of the chaos ensuing in Istanbul and developed their own autonomous polities, which almost broke away from the Ottoman realms. The power of the provincial a’yan would become apparent in the events after the downfall of Selim III. A coalition of powerful Rumelian a’yan led by Mustafa Bayrakdar, the a’yan of Rusçuk and champion of the reformers, invaded Istanbul and, after they had exterminated the ringleaders of the rebellion against Selim III, enthroned Mahmud II (1808-1839), who
was made to acquiesce to the signing in 1808 of the *Sened-i İttifak* agreement, which imposed on the sultanic prerogatives a series of considerable and unprecedented checks and balances. The cycle of bloodshed and violence ended a few months later with the extermination of Mustafa Bayrakdar and his supporters by the Janissaries and the imposition of their rule over Istanbul and the sultan, who would have to wait for another 18 years until he could rid himself of the Janissaries.⁸

We should remember that such a chaotic situation was during the 18th century the exception rather than the rule. The Ottoman statesmen were prone to preserving peace both at home and with their neighbours, whilst they were keen in opening channels of dialogue with the West. Thus yet another example of the modernisation of the Ottoman polity was the development of diplomatic relations with the West, which proved invaluable in the decades that followed the severe crises of the 1790s and early 1800s. The Ottomans had been since the early 18th century well acquainted with modern methods of diplomacy, because of the participation of Ottoman delegates in the negotiations that led to the signing of the treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Passarowitz (1718). Moreover, the delegation of Yirmisekiz Mehmed Çelebi Efendi by Sultan Ahmed III as ambassador to the court of Louis XV in 1720-1721 was the first step towards establishing a regular diplomatic service, which was followed by the latter’s son, Yirmisekizzade Mehmed Said Pasha’s delegation to Paris, Sweden, and Poland in 1742, Ahmed Resmi Efendi’s embassy to Vienna in 1758 and Berlin in 1763, and Ebubekir Ratıb’s embassy to Vienna in 1791-1792, for the ratification of the newly

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⁸ For a comprehensive and revisionist description of the events that led to the signing of the *Sened-i İttifak* in 1808 and the events thereafter, see: Yaycıoğlu, *Partners of the Empire*, pp. 157-238.
signed treaty of Sistova terminating the involvement of Austria in the Russo-Austrian–Ottoman war of 1787-192.⁹

These were all temporary embassies, if not completely ceremonial affairs, through which the Ottomans meant to gather first-hand information on their Western neighbours, which they aspired to use in their attempts at reforming and modernising their military and administrative apparatus. The first permanent Ottoman embassy was that of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London in 1793, immediately after the promulgation of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms, which was followed by the permanent embassies to Vienna, Berlin, and Paris in 1797. These embassies inaugurated a radically new period in the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the West. For the first time in their history, the Ottomans had adopted officially the Western-European principles of conducting diplomacy and aspired at being accepted as equal members in the club of the “civilised” nations. At the same time, due to the acceleration of the information on the West transmitted from these embassies to the Ottoman realms, the Ottoman society, especially the upper levels of the Ottoman government and administration, were exposed to the western style and culture. At the time western influence remained the privilege of a small and undistinguished minority of Ottoman statesmen, because of the almost-complete domination of the Janissaries and the conservative religious and economic establishments, who reacted against the “infidel” Selim III and his counsellors, and finally deposed him and replaced him with Mustafa IV (1807-1808). Nevertheless, the incessant permeation of western culture and influence into the Ottoman society and administration would prove the decisive factor for the extermination

of the Janissaries in 1826, and the promulgation and implementation of the *Tanzimat* reforms immediately thereafter.\(^{10}\)

The Ottoman 18th century must be seen, therefore, not as a period of decline of the moribund “sick man of Europe”, as the traditional historiography treated the Ottoman Empire, but rather a period of experimentation with new methods and techniques of governance and modernisation through realisation of the weaknesses of the Ottoman polity vis-à-vis its Western-European neighbours. Furthermore, it has now become apparent that this realisation was the result of the work of a small minority of enlightened Ottoman statesmen and polymaths who were cognisant of the principles and ideas of western, especially French, Enlightenment, which they adapted to the circumstances and needs of the Ottoman society and polity. The adherents to the movement of the Ottoman Enlightenment must also be seen as original products of the Ottoman world and not naive imitators of Western-European culture.

### 1.2. The Thesis

This Thesis comprises five chapters. Chapter I is a presentation of the contents of and subjects examined in the Thesis, which aims at introducing the reader to the scope of my research of and approach to the institutions and events that I have examined. Chapters II and III focus on the history of Kozani, which emerged after the middle of the 18th century, and remained until its annexation by Greece after Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, the largest

\(^{10}\) On the pre-1793 diplomacy and the first permanent embassies in Europe, see: Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, pp. 224-228. The first permanent embassy to London has been examined in detail by Mehmet Alaadin Yalçınkaya in his monograph *The First Permanent Ottoman Embassy in Europe: The Embassy of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London (1793-1797)* (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2010).
and most important settlement in the area under examination, terminating thus the
domination and precedence of the old Byzantine fortress-town of Servia/Serfice. I have used
the information provided by the Ottoman documentation, in order to present a case-study
of the settlement of Kozani during the 18th century, wherein the tax-farming system was
applied and affected its traditional socio-economic structures, triggering therefore changes
that totally transformed this rural settlement. Chapter II examines the structure and the
functionality of the tax-farm of Kozani, after the introduction of the malikāne tax-farming
system, whilst Chapter III examines the administrators of the tax-farm, their duties, and the
frequent feuds that tended to erupt among them for the control of the tax-assessment and
revenue-collection mechanisms, a phenomenon which gave the impetus for the formation
of organised factions vying for supremacy and control over the Kozanite community and tax-
farm. Accordingly, this chapter examines the role of local Christian élites in the
administration of the communal affairs of Kozani and their relations to their Muslim
counterparts. These two chapters cover the period c.1750-c.1820, which starts with the life-
term outsourcing of the tax-farm of Kozani to a minor member of the ruling Ottoman
dynasty, and, after c. 1800, explores the incorporation of Kozani into the polity of Ali Pasha,
whose rule over Kozani lasted until his downfall and execution in 1822.

Chapter IV explores the application of tax-farming to two settlements located in the
vicinity of Kozani and provides additional examples of the wider phenomenon of
decentralisation in 18th and early 19th-century Ottoman Empire. The first part of Chapter IV
examines the application of tax-farming to Serfice and Velvendos, with its focal point being
the role that local and central imperial élites played in these procedures. Of particular
importance I deem the participation of members of the Giray dynasty, rulers, then ex-rulers,
of the Crimean Khanate, in the revenue-raising and collection mechanisms in the town of Serfice. The overall aim of this chapter is to show that in both cases, namely Serfice and Velvendos, tax-farming exerted strong influence upon both the settlements and the people directly partaking or being directly touched upon by it as taxpayers. Nevertheless, the lack of Greek primary sources does not allow for a study, as complete as in the case of Kozani and its community, of the role of the local Christian élites therein. The second part of this chapter refers, again, to the period of Ali Pasha’s domination through the examination as a case study of the career of Serficieli Halil Ağa, who was one of Ali Pasha’s most loyal supporters and agents. Whenever possible, I try to compare Serfice and Velvendos with Kozani, so that the reader is able to form a comprehensive idea of the historical circumstances prevalent throughout the broader area during the 18th and early 19th centuries.

Chapter V presents and analyses some basic aspects of the structure of the timar system and the class of timar-holders in the kaza of Serfice during the 18th and early 19th centuries. Although there are analytical monographs on 16th and 17th-century Ottoman military organisation, its 18th-century counterpart has been totally neglected or understudied. The reader should, thus, keep in mind that this chapter is the product of original research of primary sources, with my conclusions being of a preliminary nature, because there are no available monographs on the structure and operation of the timar system during the 18th century. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section presents the fundamental terminology pertaining to the timar system. The second section is a presentation of the timar system in the kaza of Serfice during the 18th century, whilst the third section contains an analysis of the process of petitioning for and bestowal of timars in
the area under examination, on the basis of unpublished Ottoman documentation. Finally, the fourth section covers the period of Ali Pasha’s domination and focuses on the fate of the timar system during a period of great upheavals and turmoil. My primary aim is to show that the timar system, in contrast to the general opinion that prevails amongst Ottomanist historiography, which stipulates that it had ceased to operate and was totally neglected by Istanbul, was, still in the 18th century in full operation and closely supervised by the Porte, in spite of the fact that it served different needs from its 15th, 16th, and 17th-century counterparts.

The Thesis closes with Chapter VI, which constitutes a final evaluation of the findings of my research and introduces the future opportunities for further research on subjects, such as the issue of the emergence of the çiftlik land-ownership paradigm and the role of the local monasteries, which I was unable for various reasons, such as the word limitations or the lack of the necessary documentation, to explore and analyze here.

It is my hope that it will become apparent that the intermixture and interplay between the imperial centre and the periphery fabricated a delicate balance of power, which moulded the very structure and form of the society in the area under examination. It is also my hope that it will become obvious that, as a result of this intricate relationship, the state recognised and confirmed the local notables and magnates, who vied for supremacy and control, in their communities and localities, but that the latter also were a direct embodiment of the state amidst their localities and respective communities, as the latter were defined by faith. Thus, it will become apparent that the imperial centre and the local notables provided to one another the necessary legitimisation for each one’s role and actions in their respective localities and communities. This feature would finally provide the
impetus for the rise of organised factions, which, as it will become apparent in the case of the two major factions fighting over control of the Kozanite community, were not restricted by the religion of and language spoken by their members, but were organised and operated on the basis of defending their common interests and neutralisation, or even complete annihilation, of their adversaries.
CHAPTER II

Tax-farming in Kozani, c. 1750 – c. 1820

My aim is in the following two chapters is to use the information provided by Ottoman documentation, in order to present a case-study of a village-like settlement in the 18th-century Ottoman Rumelia, wherein the tax-farming system was applied and affected its traditional socio-economic structures, triggering therefore changes that totally transformed this rural settlement. In the present chapter, I will examine the structure and the functionality of the tax-farm of Kozani and, in the next chapter, I will examine the administrators of the tax-farm, their duties and the frequent feuds that tended to erupt among them for the control of the tax-assessment and revenue-collection mechanisms. This phenomenon gave the impetus for the formation of organised factions vying for supremacy and control over the Kozanite community and tax-farm. Accordingly, I will try to examine the role of local Christian élites in the administration of the communal affairs of Kozani and their relations to their Muslim counterparts.

2.1. Ottoman tax-farming methods and the Ottoman 18th century

Before we delve into the examination of tax-farming in 18th-century Kozani, an introduction to the Ottoman tax-farming methods and terminology seems in order. Tax-farming means the selling by auction and the outsourcing by the state to private interests of the right to collect taxes and dues in return for a sum of money held to represent the expected and anticipated yield of the outsourced revenue source. It is a high-risk and high-
yield investment that attempts to maximise state revenue through competitive bidding and auction. Furthermore, it simultaneously transfers all risks to the tax-farmer who is burdened with tax-collection and also is obliged to pay in advance substantial sums, even if the farmed-out sources fail to yield them. The advance payment was usually calculated as 6 months of the value of a three-year contract.\textsuperscript{11}

Before further proceeding into examining the tax-farming systems that prevailed in the Ottoman Empire, we should briefly explain the meaning of the terms \textit{mukata’a}, \textit{iltizam}, and \textit{malikâne}. Literally \textit{mukata’a} means “something divided or cut in pieces” and refers to the division of state revenues into portions and their distribution in return for a predetermined price. Thus the term \textit{mukata’a} ought to be translated as “tax-farm”. \textit{Mukata’as} could comprise different revenue sources, such as agricultural lands and various kinds of taxes, such as the \textit{cizye} poll-tax, customs dues, tolls, crime and wedding taxes, and governmental monopolies and state enterprises, such as mints, mines and saltworks. Large prebends (\textit{hasses} and \textit{zi’amets}) also could, due to the nature of their revenues and their size, form parts of tax-farms. Therefore, a \textit{mukata’a} was the outsourced revenue unit, whereas \textit{iltizam} and \textit{malikâne} refer to the tax-farming method.\textsuperscript{12}

The \textit{iltizam} was used in earlier periods of ottoman history by the Ottoman state, as a method of managing its revenue sources, and especially was applied on sources that were difficult to manage directly. There are mentions of outsourcing of \textit{mukata’as} in Istanbul and other principal urban centers, and outsourcing of mints, mines, and saltworks’ revenues in

\textsuperscript{12} Darling, \textit{Revenue Raising}, pp. 123.
Rumelia, already in mid-15th century. This method secured reliable and recurrent cash flow into the central treasury and allowed central state to exactly compute its revenues on an annual basis, thus facilitating the upkeep of its bureaucracy and regular military forces. In late-16th century, when the ottoman state faced an unprecedented fiscal crisis and complications in tax-collection, followed by severe deficits, the iltizam system was broadly applied as a tool for solving these problems.

The system involved state officials who contracted revenue collection for specific periods of time, usually for a period of one to three years, plus an additional percentage as their salary. In the cases of Istanbul-based tax-farmers and extensive mukata‘as covering large areas, the contractors used to hire as intermediaries their protégés, most often people who had ties with the region where the outsourced revenue source was located and were entrusted with tax-collection. Both primary and secondary tax-farmers exercised total control over the contracted revenue sources and always endeavoured to maximise their returns. If the revenues collected were insufficient, they had to pay the deficit from their own pockets, thus suffering losses, otherwise they enjoyed the profits accruing from their investment. If they were unable to pay the deficits and failed to forward the predetermined sums to Istanbul, they were prosecuted and risked confiscation of their estates, imprisonment and execution. Another reason for their feeling insecure and being opportunistic was the total lack of guarantee for security and protection of their investments from all possible means of usurpation.

Tax-farmers were regarded by the central state as short-time lenders from whom the state borrowed funds on a short-term basis. Tax-farming can be seen as a way of

bringing together central and peripheral élites. Tax-famrers, and especially provincial secondary tax-famrers, stood somewhere between central-state élites and the peasants (re’aya) and played the role of intermediaries. At the same time these officers used their knowledge of local affairs and their experience as a way for establishing permanent relations with Istanbul magnates. They used these relations as a means of amplifying their influence, by serving central state needs and their own interests.

The central state tried to oversee tax-farming and revenue-collection procedures in any way possible. When the control was finally lost and it was made impossible for the state to monitor tax-farming and prevent illegal impositions, a new method of tax-farming was introduced, known as malikâne. Late 17th century was indeed a period of interlocking military and fiscal crises. Continuous warfare against the Sacred League, with the Ottomans compelled to fight four adversaries simultaneously (Austrians, Russians, Polish and Venetians), and the catastrophic defeats which followed the failed attempt in September 1683 to capture Vienna, depleted the central treasury, which had already lost control of flowing incomes, due to its inability to control the chaotic iltizam system. At the same time, strong opposition and challenge was raised against the Köprülü faction, which had governed the Ottoman Empire since 1656 and had effectively imposed a real monopoly on politics and policy formulation. For this reason, it was essential for the ruling élites to take measures and proceed with reforms that could reassert the domination and legitimisation of the Köprülü regime and ensure the constant and safe flow of revenues for the continuation of the war.¹⁴

Three major reform attempts were undertaken during the last decade of the 17th century. The first was the reform of poll-tax (cizye) collection method; the second was the reform in the taxation status of the Yörüks Rumelia, and the third was the introduction of the malikâne. The first two reforms do not fall within the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that these reforms were related to the prevailing Kadizadeli movement, a conservative Islamic movement with tremendous popularity among ruling élites at the time, and were applied according to the imperatives of the Shari’a. Thus, in the case of poll-tax, the hane (household) based collection was abolished and a new method, based on the individual adult male taxpayer (nefer) and his economic status, was introduced, following this way the steps of the first Islamic states.15 The reforms of the Yörük organisation in 1691 are one of the most understudied aspects of Ottoman history. It was obvious that, by the end of the 17th century, Yörüks were no longer needed as a fighting force and their role had been reduced to carrying out merely auxiliary duties. They were for this reason deprived of the privileges and tax-exemption that they had enjoyed since their initial settlement in Rumelia, and were by this moment onwards regularly and normally taxed, though again at a reduced rate compared to the common Muslim re’aya. In return, the flattering name “sons of the conquerors” (Evlad-ı Fatihan) was attributed to them.16

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16 M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, Rumeli’de Yörüklar, Tatarlar ve Evlad-ı Fatihan, İÜ Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınlarndan, 748 [Yörüks, Tatars, and Sons of Conquerors in Rumelia, From the Publications of the Faculty of Literature, University of Istanbul] (İstanbul: Osman Yaşar Matbaası, 1957). This is the only detailed study of the organisation of the Yörüks and Evlad-ı Fatihan of Rumelia, but is somewhat outdated and obsolete.
Reforms in tax-farming were applied in 1695. With a sultanic decree the *iltizam* was abolished, all short-term tax-farming contracts were annulled and the *mukata’a*’s were sold under the new system, the *malikâne*. The *malikâne* was meant to be a corrective to the old-style tax-farming methods, devised as a way of securing the influx of large amounts of money into the imperial treasury and at the same time to redress the abuses and harmful practices under the old regulations. In contrast to the older tax-farming regulations, the *malikâne* was a life-term revenue tax-farm sold by the state in return for a down-payment in cash (*mu’accele*) and the annual fixed payments (*ma*l), which the buyer was responsible to pay for the duration of his contract. In addition, the *malikâneci* enjoyed tax immunity and protection from state interference (*serbestiyyet*) with the *malikâne* being now seen as private property.¹⁷

Tax-farm units available to be sold as *malikâne* were put on public auctions and were sold to the highest bidder. This system shows the pragmatism of the Ottoman administration which forwarded market competition and market relations, which culminated in the creation of large partnerships when large tax-farms were auctioned. Coupled with the life-term ownership and private ownership rights of the *malikâneci*, the new practices facilitated the circulation of money and development of market economy, which secured the influx of cash into the imperial treasury. At the same time, life-term ownership and security of ownership rights induced the tax-farmer’s involvement in long-term investment, which secured the welfare of the peasants under their control. The tax-farmer was now naturally motivated to increase his *malikâne*’s profitability and enjoy the profits of his investment, without any risks of illegal interference.

The advantages of the new system were obvious. Since down payments were calculated at the rate of between two and eight times the amount of annual returns, the contracts brought immediately large amounts of cash to the imperial treasury. Moreover, the contracts were less risky and ensured a steady and easily computed income. Nonetheless, due to the unpredictability of the duration of life-term contracts, there were limitations to the system. We should not forget that annual payments were always calculated at a fixed rate, which caused revenue losses to the imperial treasury, especially when a tax-farm flourished and generated higher than the anticipated revenues. Another reason for revenue losses was the selling without the state’s approval of malikânes from aging tax-farmers to younger ones. The state found multiple ways of intervention and control, either by confiscating and then reselling malikânes to their previous owners with reduced down payment, by considerably increasing yearly payments or by manipulating and expanding the fiscal network of malikânes, by adding new kinds of taxation and varieties of revenues which were turned into tax-farms, thus adding new leases to the pool.

The groups of malikâne-owners initially comprised members of the military class, but were soon extended to the ülema, the bureaucrats, members of the imperial family, and finally provincial notables. Because of the nature of the system and its institutions, contracts were dominated during the 18th century by Istanbul-based magnates, who were patronised by high-ranking members of the palace and bureaucratic establishments. Thus central-state élites, by securing the largest and most lucrative malikânes, dominated the financial and credit nexus. Due to their political contacts and easier access to credit, they were better informed on the profitability and risk averseness of each tax-farm, whilst they were uniquely positioned to exploit the opportunities presented. The contracts offered permanent sources
of revenue for the military élites, whilst the state perceived the new system as a means of legitimisation and securing the support of the central military and provincial élites, in a period of endemic economic, fiscal, and military crises.

Life-term tax-farming played a significant role in the reshaping of intercommunal relations. Muslim and non-Muslim (Greeks, Armenians, Jews) investors formed partnerships of considerable endurance, strength, and variety. Many investors, in order to diversify their portfolios and reduce risk, were prone to purchasing shares in various tax-farms. Non-Muslims were not allowed to hold *malikânes*, but they continued to participate in revenue-collection as secondary tax-farmers. They invested in tolls, customs dues and excise taxes, whilst their primary investment lay in commerce. They operated as moneylenders and creditors, being in fact the lubricant of the *malikâne* credit machine, and often stood as guarantors (*kefîls*) to *malikânecîs*.\(^{18}\)

*Malikânes* located in the periphery were outsourced to local entrepreneurs cognisant of local affairs and socio-economic conditions who could maximise returns. These local entrepreneurs operated both as *malikânecîs* and *malikâneci* agents, known as *voyvodas*, directly appointed by their absentee employers. The term *voyvoda* is of Slavic origin and originally meant the “army leader” or “the sub-commander” and was synonymous with the term *ağa*.\(^{19}\) By mid-15\(^{th}\) century it was used by the Ottomans for the governors of the autonomous Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under the Ottoman suzerainty. By late-17\(^{th}\) century, when the *malikâne* system was introduced as a method of tax-farming and revenue-raising, this term was used for the representative of the absentee *malikâne*-beneficiary in a certain locality, who was held

\(^{19}\) Pakalin, *Dictionary of Expressions and Terms*, III, p. 598.
responsible for tax-collection and the administration of the tax-farm on his/her behalf. The voyvoda’s post in the Ottoman nomenclature is known as voyvodalık, which is formed by the addition of a Turkish suffix.\textsuperscript{20} As we will see below, the first voyvoda was installed in Kozani in c. 1760, when the malikâne system was applied for the first time and Fatma Hanım Sultan became the life-term contractor for the tax-farm of Kozani. The most typical example of such an entrepreneur voyvoda is the case of Manço Osman Ağa in late-18th-century Kozani, who was a local magnate who operated in Kozani in his capacity as Fatma Hanım Sultan’s agent, who was the absentee owner of the malikâne of Kozani.

The outsourcing of the contracts and life-term tax-farms to local secondary tax-farmers and/or agents, who were used by the malikânecis as organs of administrative and managerial (but not judicial) control and means of exercising their property rights, in effect reproduced traditional patterns prevalent in the period before the introduction of the malikâne. The crucial difference was, however, that they were under the supervision and control of the malikâne-owners, who aimed at the long-term flourishing of their investments. Therefore, local entrepreneurs could not break the limits imposed on them and exploit the peasants, in order to extract short-term gains.\textsuperscript{21}

The malikâne system was introduced to satisfy the needs of the treasury in cash and for the mobilisation of the funds at the disposal of central and peripheral élites. The military class above all was the group benefited from the new regulations, because it was regarded as the ideal agent for defending law and order and protecting the state’s integrity and borders. The military showed their willingness to invest in the state and prevent its

\textsuperscript{20} Ariel Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire, Rival Paths to the Modern State (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2004), pp. 128-129. For a general depiction of the post and duties of the voyvoda of Diyarbekir during the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, see: \textit{ibid.}, pp. 155-156, 163-168.

\textsuperscript{21} Darling, Public Finances, p. 126.
imminent bankruptcy. The state also recognised the a’yans’ role, who, although they did not belong officially to the class of government officials and central decision-makers, were recognised as members of an extended and modernised state apparatus.

The new system contained certain characteristics rendering it extremely profitable and effective. The state was totally risk averse, as all risks were transferred to the malikâneci, who, in order to gain long-term profits and remit the annual payments, had to invest in his mukata’a and secure its welfare, otherwise he risked losing his malikâne and with it the money he had invested as down payment at the beginning of his contract. For this reason, the mu’accele down payment can be seen as a collateral for the continuing payment of mals. The malikâneci enjoyed, as long as he paid the mu’accele and secured annual payments, almost proprietary rights over his malikâne. He was totally free to manage and enjoy all the benefits of his investment without any interference from third parties. The only exception was when he failed to secure the mals and thus risked confiscation of his malikâne. These property rights extended to tenure rights as well, since the state could no longer intervene and replace the tax-farmer, in response to higher bids. Last but not least, the malikâne offered retirement profits to its holder. This of course was a highly acceptable profit for the military class involved in tax-farming. Since in the Ottoman system there were no institutionalised retirement benefits or pension schemes, the malikâne could be received as such, because it could yield profits even when a military or a statesman had retired from service. This is one of the reasons why the new system was
initially dominated by the military. Furthermore, the state could replace direct payment of salaries, by using *malikâne* profits as a salary.²²

It is worth mentioning the parties operating in the *malikâne* system. The first party was the central state, which had introduced the new system as a means of increasing its revenues and received the down payment and the annual payments from the *malikâneci*, who was the second party. He was the person who purchased and administered for his lifetime the *malikâne*. The third party was the *voyvoda*, who can be considered secondary tax-farmer administering the *malikâne* on behalf of an absentee *malikâne*-owner. He was a local magnate and entrepreneur who was able to gain wealth and prestige, and gradually, through the entrenchment of his authority, could prove indispensable to the absentee *malikâne*-owner. The last party was the *sarraf*, who functioned as a source of cash and credit, and lent money to *malikânecis* and their *voyvodas*. The *sarrafs* were in their vast majority non-Muslims, who were according to the law ineligible for obtaining *malikânes*. They were, however, members of Jewish and Christian élites, who invested in the system and aimed at maximising their profits through financing local Muslim *malikânecis* and *voyvodas*.²³

A further reform in tax-farming methods was introduced in 1774, as a response to the results of the disastrous Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774. The catastrophic defeats of the Ottoman armies and the exhausting war indemnity, which the Ottomans were called upon to pay to the Russians, made it necessary to identify new revenue sources which would secure the influx of cash into the imperial treasury. A solution to this problem was a

further reformation of tax-farming methods. The new system, in contrast to *malikâne*, where a whole tax-farm was sold on a life-term basis, provided that only the anticipated annual profit of a revenue source would be sold, realised in shares (*esham*). According to the new system, the estimated annual profit was divided into a large number of shares, which were sold to the prospective investors at five to six times the anticipated annual profit. The revenue was then collected either by a state agent or secondary tax-farmers, who defrayed to the shareholders the dividends due from the specific source. This caused an increase in returns from revenue sources and subsequently an increase in the number of shares sold. As shares multiplied and free and broad transactions among shareholders occurred, the state imposed a 10% tax on such transfers and turned shares into bearer’s shares, thus facilitating transfers and broadening the group of people lending to the state by operating in the sector of public finance and tax-farming. It is worth mentioning that under the new system women and non-Muslims were allowed for the first time to purchase shares. The *esham* system was tantamount to long-term loan on behalf of the state. The new system regulations were initially applied on all vacant and empty *malikânes*, namely *malikânes* whose owners had died and no heirs had been found, which were gathered by the state and put on market under the new system. The long-term plan was the gradual elimination of the *malikâne* system.\(^{24}\) In 1792, however, after the termination of another disastrous war against the Russians and Austrians with the signing of the treaty of Sistova, it became more than profound that, if the Ottoman state were to survive, a thorough and complete reform of the Ottoman fiscal, economic, and military systems was paramount.\(^{25}\)


The *irad-i cedit-i hümayun hazinesi* (the treasury of the new imperial revenues) was founded in 1793 to be used for the reorganisation and modernisation of the Ottoman military forces. The reformed forces, trained and organised on Western-European standards were given the name *Nizam-i Cedid* (New Order) and were financed from the new treasury. The latter was financed with *malikâne* shares of 5,000 ǧuruş or more, which were to be retracted and escheated to the new treasury, immediately after the death of the contractor, regardless whether there were any heirs, or not. In fact, the *mevkuf* system and the practice of *müsadere*, under which the state had the right to confiscate or claim the fortunes of statesmen or officers dying without any heirs, was set in motion anew. Yet its target was an overall elimination of *malikâne* contracting and the intervention of the state in the prerogatives of the *malikâncis*. This was one of the basic reasons for the resistance by a coalition formed by groups with vested interests in the old order, namely the Janissaries and magnates of the Balkan provinces, to the new institutions and the reform edicts issued by Selim III (1789-1807), who was finally deposed and executed in 1807.²⁶

Tax-farming was the backbone of the Ottoman finance and survived as such until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, despite the repeated attempts of the Ottoman administration during the period of the *Tanzimat* reforms to abolish tax-farming altogether and replace it with a system of direct collection of taxes and dues by salaried state agents. Thus the Ottoman statesmen soon realised that the economic power and

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influence of tax-farmers in the provinces rendered them a power to be reckoned with and an integral part of the Ottoman polity.\textsuperscript{27}

\subsection*{2.2. Kozani during the 16th and 17th centuries}

Kozani was during the 16th and 17th centuries a typical rural settlement of negligible size without any special characteristics presaging its later development into an important urban centre and the seat of a metropolis, with a famous school and characteristics typical of an urban centre. Until 1613, when the last land-tax survey (\textit{tahrir defteri}) was compiled, Kozani belonged to the \textit{kaza} of Serfice and formed part of the \textit{timar} system,\textsuperscript{28} in which the revenues of a village were attributed to a mounted soldier in return for military service. By mid-16th century Kozani formed part of larger prebends, known as \textit{zi'amets} and was finally incorporated in 1613 into the imperial crown lands (\textit{havass-i hümâyun}). As is known, only the most lucrative revenue sources formed part of the prebends given to high dignitaries and those reserved for the Sultan himself. This could be an implicit evidence of Kozani’s development and growing importance. Another important aspect of this event is the fact that the beneficiary of the prebend was an absentee figure who did not immediately participate in everyday life and in revenue and tax-allocation and collection. It is also well known that the revenues of such prebends were collected either through a salaried officer called \textit{emin} or through outsourcing and tax-farming, in which case the revenues of the settlement were collected by the tax-farmer and accordingly forwarded to their actual beneficiary. We could therefore argue that tax-farming was introduced and applied in


\textsuperscript{28} For the terminology pertaining to the \textit{timar} system, see below Section 5.1, pp. 259-270.
Kozani sometime in the mid-16th or early-17th century. Unfortunately, there are no extant documents providing us with direct evidence of such activities in such an early period. Nevertheless, there are three mid-16th century documents\textsuperscript{29} mentioning the farming out of revenues and tax-collection in Serfice, which at that time also was part of the imperial crown lands, something that could support the aforementioned assumption. During the 17\textsuperscript{th} century there are few documents referring to Kozani.\textsuperscript{30} These documents are excerpts from poll-tax and ‘avariz registers, which mention that Kozani paid its poll-tax and other taxes in the form of a prearranged lump-sum, known as \textit{maktu’}. This is an indication of the growing ability of the community of Kozani to self-government and self-administration, a condition that triggered the development of autonomous feelings and the emergence of a group of community leaders, who were held responsible by the state for managing the tax-collection procedures and the administration of their community’s affairs. At the same time, Kozani was during the 17th century a \textit{hass}, which, as was the case with all the sultanic, imperial

\textsuperscript{29} For additional information, see: BOA, MAD.d..00118, p. 99; BOA, D.BŞBM.d..00087, pp. 4-5, 8-13; BOA, D.BŞBM.d..00088, pp. 1-3. The first document is a copy from the judicial records of the \textit{kadi} of Edirne and is dated 1 \textit{Zilka’de} 958 AH / 31-10-1551 AD. The other two documents are excerpts from synoptic registers which record the anticipated revenues that were to be generated in 985-986 AH / 1577-1579 AD from the tax-farm of the \textit{hasses} of Serfice and its dependencies.

\textsuperscript{30} For additional information, see: BOA, MAD.d..00059, p. 180; BOA, MAD.d..15230, p. 2; BOA, MAD.d..15521, p. 23; BOA, MAD.d..15040, p. 3. The first document is a compilation of various 17th-century ‘avariz registers. The second document is a synoptic poll-tax register dated 1086 AH / 1675-1676 AD. The third document is an analytical poll-tax register of the \textit{kaza} of Serfice dated 1087 AH / 1676-1677 AD, in which Kozani is recorded as paying in the form of a lump-sum the unspecified equivalent of 350 individuals (\textit{nefera}). The fourth document is a synoptic poll-tax register dated 1098 AH / 1686-1687 AD, in which Kozani is recorded as paying in the form of a lump-sum the equivalent of 250 households (\textit{hane}), namely 110,250 \textit{akçe}s. It is also worth mentioning that, as the first analytical poll-tax registers compiled after the reformation of the assessment and collection of the poll-tax in 1691 show, the policy of lump-sum payment of the poll-tax was abandoned and the Kozanites were now expected to pay their poll-tax on the basis of the newly-introduced system of tripartite classification. For the reformation of the poll-tax implemented in 1691, see: Marinos Sariyannis, “Notes on the Ottoman Poll-Tax Reforms of the Late Seventeenth Century: The Case of Crete”, \textit{Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient}, 54/1 (2011), pp. 39-61.
family, and vizieral *hasses*, was farmed out on a short-term basis, in most cases with triennial contracts on the basis of the *iltizam* tax-farming system.\(^\text{31}\)

During these two centuries Kozani remained a modest rural settlement. As the 16th century registers show,\(^\text{32}\) its economy was largely based on cereal cultivation and secondarily on the production of silk and wine. Its population, being exclusively Christian and overwhelmingly Greek, with small groups of Albanians and Vlachs among them, never surpassed the levels of a large village, containing between 250 and 350 taxpaying households. In 1691, when the empirewide reform in the process of the assessment and payment of the poll-tax took place, its population comprised 150 male individual poll-tax payers, a clear indication of either population decline, or widespread tax-evasion, or an increase in the members of the Kozanite community who were exempt from payment of the poll-tax.\(^\text{33}\)

Last but not least it is worth mentioning the fluidity during the 17th century of the administrative boundaries in the region where Kozani was located. The early 17th-century revenue-raising reforms imposed the fragmentation of the pre-existing large *kazas* into smaller and thus more easily manageable, because the spreading of tax-farming created new needs and the local administrative structures were in need of reform, so that tax-collection and money circulation could be improved. In the case of the judicial district of Serfice this must have occurred sometime between 1613, the date of the compilation of the

\(^{31}\) The first 17th-century document recording Kozani as a sultanic *hass* is the last *Tapu Tahrir* register which is dated 1613. In the first poll-tax register after the 1691 empirewide reformation of the allocation and collection of the poll-tax, Kozani was recorded as a *hass* of the Grand Vizier. For additional information, see: BOA, TT.d..0720, ff. 526-528; BOA, MAD.d..04374, ff. 272-274.

\(^{32}\) These registers are preserved in the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul and are classified as follows: BOA, TT.d..0986 (c. 1500), pp. 75-157; BOA, TT.d..0070 (1519), pp. 187-196; BOA, TT.d..0424 (1527-1529), pp. 429-531; BOA, TT.d..0167 (1530), pp. 146-151; BOA, TT.d..0433 (1543), pp. 588-690; BOA, TT.d..0479 (1569), pp. 156-274; BOA, TT.d..0720 (1613), pp. 511-612.

\(^{33}\) For additional information, see the registers mentioned in fns. 3, 4, and 5.
last *tapu tahrir* register, and 1646, the date of the first post-*tahrir* 17\textsuperscript{th}-century register. After the fragmentation of the original *kaza* of Serfice, in the place of the pre-existing one there emerged three distinct judicial districts, namely the *kazas* of Serfice, Sarı Göl/Çaharşenbe, and Eğri Bucak. Kozani did not have during the 17th century a stable position within this newly-founded system; it belonged to the *kaza* of Sarı Göl, whenever it came to poll-tax collection, but at the same time it could form part of Eğri Bucak whenever *'avarız* taxes were assessed and collected. As will be shown, this trend continued during the 18th century and Kozani did not fall within the circumscription of a particular judicial district. What follows is a description of the structure of the tax-farm of Kozani between 1750 and 1820.

### 2.3. The tax-farm of Kozani during the 1750s

The first Ottoman document referring to the tax-farm of Kozani is a report which the Orthodox Christian Patriarch Kyrillos V (1748-1751) submitted in 1750 to the Porte and notified the Ottoman authorities about some problems that had arisen in the collection of the taxes of the ecclesiastical tax-farm of Kozani. The Orthodox Patriarch had been held responsible for the administration of the affairs of his Christian flock, according to the regulations which were issued in mid-15\textsuperscript{th} century during the reign of Mehmed II (1451-1481) when he bestowed a series of privileges upon Gennadios Scholarios (1454-1464), the first Orthodox Patriarch after 1453.\footnote{Gunnar Hering, “Das islamische Recht und die Investitur des Gennadios Scholarios (1454)” [The Islamic Law and the Investiture of Gennadios Scholarios], *Balkan Studies*, 2 (1961), pp. 231-256.} The Ottomans came into close contact with the Christian Church and its hierarchy since the early days of the existence of the Ottoman state...
and tried to take advantage of the experience which the Church had accumulated during its longstanding function as an administrative arm of the Byzantine state.\textsuperscript{35}

Although we still lack enlightening monographs on the role of the Church in the Ottoman Empire, especially in the financial administration and revenue-raising sectors, we can only assume that the Church participated in the tax-farming system and profited from its expansion during the 17th and 18th centuries.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{35} Similar regulations were issued for the Armenians and the Jews, who obtained their own administrative officialdom, separate and distinct from the Christian Orthodox one. For an analysis of the position of the Patriarchate and Orthodox Church in the Ottoman polity and a general introduction to the Church hierarchy during the Ottoman period, see: Georgios Salakides, Sultansurkunden des Athos-Klosters Vatopedi aus der Zeit Bayezid II. und Selim I., Kritische Edition und wissenschaftlicher Kommentar [The Sultanic Documents of the Athonite Monastery of Vatopedi from the Time of Sultan Bayezid II and Sultan Selim I, Critical Edition and Academic Commentaries], (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1995) and Paraskevas Konortas, Ottomanikes Theoriseis gia to Oikoumeniko Patriarcheio [Ottoman Views of the Ecumenical Patriarchate], (Athina: Ekdoseis Alexandria, 1998).

\textsuperscript{36} This 18th-century document is instructive in the way the Church hierarchy is depicted. The supreme ecclesiastical official was the Patriarch, who was always expected to act canonically and in accordance with the Sinodos Endimousa, namely the Holy Synod consisting of the metropolitans who resided permanently in Istanbul or happened to be there temporarily to settle their cases with the Patriarchate or the administration. The Patriarch was until 1763, when the system of gerontismos was established, assisted in his duties by the Holy Synod, which played a role of consulting body without any official power over the patriarch. After the establishment of gerontismos, namely the rule of the prominent elder metropolitans, which transformed the institution of the Patriarchate into a corporate body, the patriarch’s status was restricted to that of a primus inter pares official who depended on the goodwill and decisions of his partners, namely the gerontes or elder members of the Holy Synod. Tellan argues in his pioneering monograph, the basic reason behind the transition to the system of gerontismos was the grim reality of the accumulation of arrears, due to the, theretofore unchecked, financial mismanagement. For the next century, until the mid-19th-century Tanzimat reforms and the abolition of the system of gerontismos and its replacement in 1860 with the system of the General or National Regulations (in Greek: Genikoi / Ethnikoi Kanonismoi), the affairs of the patriarchate would be administered and officially represented by the corporate body of the gerontes, namely the Patriarch, constituting its symbolic figurehead, and the elder members of the Holy Synod, which was restricted to a numerus clausus membership and comprised exclusively the metropolitans from six metropolises geographically adjacent to Istanbul. It is worth mentioning that the gerontes checked and balanced the powers of the patriarch, for whom they acted guarantors in person for his lawful and canonical conduct and behaviour, which allowed for a part of the responsibilities and powers of the patriarch to be transferred to and bestowed upon the gerontes metropolitans, hence the name of the reformed system. For an analytical description of the process of the transformation of the administration of the Patriarchate, the transition to the system of gerontismos, and the disputes this reformation produced, see: Elif Bayraktar Tellan, The Patriarch and the Sultan: The Struggle for Authority and the Quest for Order in the Eighteenth-Century
All the metropolitans, regardless of their status either as privileged members of the Holy Synod or ordinary prelates, were considered according to the ecclesiastical canon law representatives of the Patriarch in their metropolises, whilst the bishops represented in their bishoprics both the patriarch and their immediately superior metropolitan, by whom a bishop was always chosen and appointed. In our case, this can be clearly seen in the fact that the bishop of Servia and Kozani always appears in the available documentation as the representative of the metropolitan of Thessaloniki (Salonica), who appointed the bishop of Servia and Kozani, with the latter being therefore not elected, but chosen directly by the metropolitan of Thessaloniki. The importance of this dependency relationship for the status and role of the bishop of Servia and Kozani in the communal affairs of Kozani will be discussed in the next chapter. Suffice it to say for now that this relationship constituted the cornerstone of the process of the emergence of factions and factional disputes which tormented the Kozanite community during the second half of the 18th and first quarter of the 19th centuries. As becomes apparent, for the appointments of the metropolitans and bishops to be valid, it was a prerequisite that the patriarch and the metropolitans of the Holy Synod, who petitioned the Ottoman administration to issue the necessary documentation, namely berats and ferman of appointments of metropolitans and bishops, granted their approval and ratification. These documents were issued by and recorded in

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registers kept by the bureau of the revenues and tax-farms of bishops and metropolitans (piskopos mukata’ası kalemi).37

In the municipal library of Kozani there are preserved two ferman of appointment, which were issued on 16 Şevval 1199 AH / 22-8-1785 AD and 15 Şa’ban 1230 AH / 23-7-1815 AD respectively and fall within the period covered by this study.38 These ferman are an invaluable source of information, because they define in a detailed manner the role, rights and prerogatives, and duties of the local prelate, who played the role of a) the spiritual and religious leader of his flock, b) the judge and notary to his community and flock, and c) a state and ecclesiastical tax-collector entrusted with the collection of the numerous state and ecclesiastical taxes that were levied on the flock. I will return to the examination of the contents of these two documents in the next chapter, when I will examine the status of the institution of the bishop of Servia and Kozani vis-à-vis the status of the Kozanite lay archons.

Suffice it, for the time being, to emphasise the fact that the bishops were generally recognised in the berats and ferman of their appointments as local ecclesiastical tax-farmers. This was the reason why in these two documents the metropolitan of Thessaloniki and the bishop of Servia and Kozani were mentioned as mültezims. These terms pertaining to tax-farming contracts and institutions were used already in the earliest extant Ottoman documents pertaining to appointments of patriarchs and metropolitans. It is obvious that this terminology had been by the earliest parts of the 18th century standardised and the documents issued during the 18th century merely reproduced the texts of their earlier

38 These two ferman were published initially by Salakides. For their original Ottoman text and a translation in Greek, see: Salakides, Sultanic Documents, pp. 23-40, 205-209, 217-221.
counterparts. Based on this, we could argue that the Ottoman administration considered the Church a huge tax-farm, which was outsourced by the state to the actual newly-appointed Orthodox Patriarch, who stood therefore as the primary tax-farmer of the ecclesiastical / patriarchal tax-farms. What is more, the patriarch cut, on the basis of the structure of the ecclesiastical administrative system, the huge patriarchal tax-farm into smaller pieces, namely the metropolises and bishoprics, which he then subleased to local prelates. We could furthermore argue that the metropolitans and bishops represented the patriarch, whom we could identify as a “classical” absentee tax-farmer, and operated as subcontractors, a fact which resembles faithfully the classical non-ecclesiastical Ottoman tax-farming iltizam and malikâne systems, in which every primary contractor was allowed to sublease parts of his extensive tax-farms for which he had initially contracted to subcontractors. It thus becomes obvious that each bishop acted as representative and subcontractor of his superior metropolitan, by whom he was appointed to represent him in his ecclesiastical periphery, a fact which rendered each bishop in relation to the metropolitan a secondary tax-farmer, whilst in relation to the patriarch he was merely a tertiary tax-farmer. It goes without saying that the metropolitans and bishops, despite their status of patriarchal subcontractors, operated in their ecclesiastical peripheries as primary tax-farmers, who were appointed not only with the consent of the patriarch and the Holy Synod in Istanbul, but the Ottoman administration as well.

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40 On the Ottoman, ecclesiastical tax-farming system and the role of the Patriarch, the metropolitans, and bishops therein, see: Papademetriou, *Tax-Farming and the Orthodox Patriarchate*, pp. 125-171.
At the time when the report under examination was drafted, a certain “monk Gavril”, eventually Gavril III Kalimachis (1745-1752) was the actual metropolitan of Thessaloniki. He in his turn had subleased the tax-farms of the bishoprics within the circumscription of his metropolis to his bishops. As far as the Bishopric of Servia and Kozani is concerned, the actual bishop at that time was a certain “monk Meletyos”, eventually the Bishop of Servia and Kozani Meletios o Katakalou (1745-1752). It is not a mere coincidence that Meletios was appointed as Bishop of Servia and Kozani in 1745, which is the date of the transfer of the seat of the bishopric from Servia to Kozani and the date of the beginning of Gavril Kalimachis’ incumbency. Before that, namely for the previous 11 years which cover the incumbency of Gavril’s predecessor, namely the Metropolitan Ioakeim II (1734-1745), Meletios had served as the bishop of Servia, only, namely the original Byzantine seat of the bishopric, and resided in Serfice. Nevertheless, the seat of the bishopric was transferred in 1745 to Kozani, certainly under the mediation of the Metropolitan Gavril, who regarded Kozani as a lucrative and a more profitable place for the seat of his representative administrator of the tax-farms of the diocese of Kozani. The first two bishops of Kozani, namely Meletios o Katakalou and Ignatios o Katakalou (1752-1785), were protégés of the metropolitan of Thessaloniki and were appointed by him, in terms of clientele and patronage relationships, to act as his delegates there. Apart from that, Ignatios, the second bishop, was Meletios’ nephew and his own protégé and chosen successor. As local amateur historians argue, Kozani was in that period a highly developing settlement, although it

41 BOA, C.ADL..4150: İstanbul ve tevabi’i Rumiyan patriği Kirilos nam rahib der sa’detime memhur ‘arzuhal edüb patriklığına dahil Selanik metropolidi kadımden Serfice kazasında sakın re’aya ta’ifesinin mal-i miri ve rūsumat-i sa’ire cem’ ve atilerin rů’yet eden gelmekle bu def’a tarafından Meletios nam rahib vekil nasb ve ta’yyin edüb
lacked the prestige of Servia, its Byzantine rival, which had been since the mid-9th century the seat of the local bishop. The opening of mercantile channels in Central and Eastern Europe gave the opportunity to the people of Kozani to invest money in companies created in Hungary, Austria and South Russia and thus gather wealth and experience, which they brought with them when they returned to their homeland. In addition to that, we can observe a severe decrease since mid-17th century in the Christian community of Servia. This decline is apparent from the information that one receives from the Ottoman poll-tax registers compiled in the same period.

As the document states, Kozani was at that time part of the kaza of Sarı Göl and constituted an ecclesiastical tax-farm, which had been farmed out as usual, on a short-term basis, to the metropolitan of Thessaloniki, who appointed in his turn as representative of his own a certain “papa Yorgi Konomoz”, eventually the priest Georgios Papastamos, or the Oikonomos, who, as a priest and permanent resident of Kozani, was charged with the collection of the annual returns of the taxes levied upon the Christian inhabitants of the village of Kozani. The term Oikonomos, which is an official ecclesiastical title, whose bearer is responsible for managing the accounts and property of a given bishop or bishopric,


43 For a thorough though outdated analysis of the Orthodox Ottoman merchants’ relationship with the Hapsburg monarchy, with the German states and with Russia during the 17th and 18th centuries, see: Traian Stojanovic, “The Conquering Orthodox Balkan Merchant”, *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jun., 1960), pp. 234-313. For the Greek Orthodox merchants see: *ibid.*, pp. 273-279.

44 For numerical data on the Christian population of Servia one has to examine the existing 17th-century poll-tax registers, especially those compiled after the 1691 reforms. For additional information, see: BOA, MAD.d..15521, pp. 12-13; BOA, MAD.d..04374, pp. 182-183; MAD.d..03421, pp. 190-191; BOA, D.CMH.d..26671, pp. 2-3.

45 BOA, C.ADL..4150: *bu kulları İstanbul ve tevabi’i Rum patriği olub patriklığında dahil Selanik metropolidinin iltizamında olan Sarı Göl kazasında Kozana nam karyede sakın re’eya ta’ifesinden mal-i rüşumatları cem’ ve tahsil eyelemek için yine karye-i mezbura sakın papas ta’ifesinden Konomoz papa Yorgi nam papas metropolidi mesfur tarafından vekil nasb ve ta’yyin olunub
further enhances this argument. We could assume that, since the Bishop Meletios of Kozani was the appointed representative of the Metropolitan Gavriil in Kozani, and since Kozani and the bishopric of Servia and Kozani were under Meletios’ authority and charge, it was natural that the appointment of Georgios the Oikonomos had been initially proposed to Gavriil by Meletios, who supported his appointment to such a sensitive post, because the latter was, as local amateur historians claim, the man who mediated for the transfer of the bishop’s seat from Servia to Kozani. He was a close friend and assistant of Meletios, with Georgios being therefore chosen by him and appointed to the post of the representative of both the Metropolitan Gavriil and the Bishop Meletios in Kozani, because he was a prestigious figure and a permanent resident of Kozani cognisant of the local conditions.

Unfortunately, the document remains silent regarding the constitution of the tax-farm, for it does not present either the taxes or the overall amount of money which Georgios was supposed to collect on behalf of, and deliver to, Bishop Meletios. The two aforementioned fermans, however, present in more detail the duties of the bishop when operating as tax-collector, and the levies and taxes which he was expected to collect and deliver both to the imperial treasury and to his superiors.

The bishop was held responsible for the collection of two distinct categories of taxes, namely the state and ecclesiastical taxes, from the tax-paying members of the flock. The first group of taxes are characterised in the documents as compulsory annual state taxes (senevi lazım gelen miri rüsumlar), which constituted the share apportioned by the

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46 Adamantios Korais, *Synekdimos Ieratikos, Periechon tas Dyo pros Timotheon, kai tin pros Titon, Epistolos tou Apostolou Pavlou, me Dyo Koinas Metafraseis, kai Eksigiseis Dieksodikas* [Hieratic Travel-Companion, Containing the Two Epistles of Paul to Timothy, and the Epistle of Paul to Titus, alongside Two Vernacular Translations, and Thorough Interpretations], (Paris: Chez Eberhart, 1831), pp. 336-337.
Patriarchate to each bishopric or metropolis from the *mal-i miri* annual payment, which the Patriarch had to pay each year into the imperial treasury. The share apportioned to each bishopric and metropolis was collected by the local bishop or metropolitan, who in his turn defrayed this sum to the Patriarchate in Istanbul. The state taxes also included the *zarar-i kassabiyye*, which can be translated as “meat tax” and corresponds to the obligation of the Patriarch to pay on an annual basis a substitute fee to cover the excessive demands of and secure the provision of the imperial gardeners with meat. We should note that the *zarar-i kassabiye* had been initially an empirewide excise tax of 1% levied on trade commodities, in order to provide meet for the Janissaries, which was farmed out on the basis of the *iltizam* system as an ordinary tax-farm. In the 18th century, the *zarar-i kassabiye*\(^{47}\) defrayed to the imperial treasury by the church corresponded to the altered version of the traditional *pişkeş*, which the patriarch had until the late 17th century to pay exclusively on the occasion of the ascension of a new Ecumenical Patriarch to the throne of Saint Andrew or a new Sultan to the Ottoman throne, but was turned in the late 17th century during the war against the Holy League (1683-1699) into an annual payment to the imperial treasury. It is obvious that it also corresponded to a share of the provincial hierarchs’ contributions to the annual obligations of the patriarch *vis-à-vis* the Porte.

An 18th-century register, which is dated 1 Muharrem 1118 AH / 15-04-1706 AD and was recently published by Phokion Kotzageorgis, includes the shares of the *pişkeş* that were due to be paid by a certain number of bishoprics and metropolises. Kotzageorgis mentions that the Church paid two distinct taxes, namely the *pişkeş* and the *harac*; the first was paid on the occasion of the installation of a new sultan or patriarch, whilst the second was paid

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as lump-sum on an annual basis. Both taxes were paid not only by the Patriarch, but also by his hierarchy. As an example, the share of the pişkeş of the bishop of Servia, Ioannikios, who had succeeded the deceased bishop Symeon and ascended the throne of the Bishopric of Servia on 22 Şa‘ban 1079 AH / 25-1-1669 AD, amounted to 1,440 ğuruş. Kotzageorgis argues, therefore, that this system was a kind of ecclesiastical tax-farming, according to which the pişkeş corresponded to the mua‘çcele, which in iltizam and malikâne contracts was paid in advance as collateral by the short- or life-term contracting tax-farmer, and the harac to the mal-i miri annual payment, which was calculated and agreed upon before the finalisation of the contract. In the late 17th century, however, the character of the pişkeş was significantly altered, because due to the catastrophic war against the Holy League it was

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48 In the Ottoman jurisprudence, according to its codification by the 16th-century şeyhülislam Mehmed Ebussu‘ud Efendi during the reign of Süleyman I Kanuni (: 1520-1566), the miri state-owned lands could be distinguished in two categories. On the one hand, there were the haraci lands, which had been left after their their conquest by the Muslims in the possession of the non-Muslims in exchange for the regular payment of a poll-tax and land taxes (cizye and harac), which were considered a type of rent or ransom, which allow the non-Muslims to retain the rights of possession and usufruct over their lands. On the other hand, there were the öşri lands, which had been distributed after their conquest among the Muslims, who paid as a rent a predetermined tithe amounting to one-tenth of the produce of their lands. Based on this theory, we could argue that the term harac, which is mentioned also in the Greek sources as basilikon charatzion, whenever used in the ecclesiastical context, means the regular, annual payment made by the patriarch to the state as a condition to remain in his office. This payment resembled the payment of a rent or ransom, which allowed the patriarch and his hierarchy to acquire and maintain their offices, operate as tax-farmers, tax collectors, and possess miri state-owned lands in the way that the other Christian re‘aya did. Therefore, the harac paid by the patriarch and the church should not be confused with the Greek term charatsi, which was used to denote the poll-tax paid by the non-Muslims, known as cizye. Nevertheless, the term harac was used in the Greek sources interchangeably for both the ecclesiastical tax and the poll-tax paid by the re‘aya taxpayers, because, according to its legal background, in both cases it meant a charge against the right of the non-Muslim population to retain their pre-conquest rights over their lands and properties. For the ecclesiastical harac, see: Konortas, *Ottoman Views*, pp. 170-174. For the theories of land ownership in the Ottoman Empire, and especially their codification by Ebussu‘ud Efendi, see: Halil İnalcık, “State-owned (miri) lands” in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), I, pp. 103-119.
turned into an annual payment that would cover the excessive demands of and secure the provision of the Imperial gardeners with meat.  

The second group of charges included the taxes which were reserved for the church, and levied upon and collected from the Christian flock. These taxes were primarily the *patriklik*, *mitrepolidlik*, and *piskoposluk* taxes, namely taxes for the Patriarch, the metropolitan, and the bishop. Each married individual from the flock of the bishopric of Servia and Kozani was required to pay 12 *akçes* as tax for the patriarch and another 12 *akçes* as tax for the local bishop, whilst the priests were required to pay in total two gold coins (*altun*) for the two aforementioned taxes. The ecclesiastical taxes included also charity money and almsgiving by the congregation after Sunday mass (*tasadduk akçesi*), taxes levied on fairs, marriages (first, second, and third) of the Christians, and monasteries (*panayırlar ve nikahlar ve manastırlar rüşumu*), the fundraisings and voluntary contribution of the Christian flock, considered synonymous with alms (*zitiyye*, taken from the Greek ζητείαι (: ziteiai)⁵¹), the *parisiyya* and *portasi* fees, two terms borrowed from the Greek παρρησία (: parrisia) and πρόδεσις (: prothesis), which denoted the payment of a small fee by the relatives of deceased people for prayers to be read in their names for the deceased’s eternal rest at the gravesite, and last but not least taxes levied on the money boxes of the

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churches.\textsuperscript{52} I think that the most important issue is the reference to the metropolitan of Thessaloniki and the bishop representing him in the bishopric of Servia and Kozani as \textit{mültezims} holding their offices in the form of a tax-farm outsourced to them on the basis of the \textit{iltizam} short-term tax-farming system. This proves that the Ottoman administration perceived the church officials as ordinary state officials, who were entrusted with tax-farming and tax-collecting duties.\textsuperscript{53}

As becomes clear, the local prelate was not involved in the collection of the taxes that formed typically part of tax-farming contracts, namely levies and taxes on the agricultural produce and other economic activities of the local population, the poll-tax, the sheep-tax (\textit{bedel-i ağnam-ı celebkeşan}), and the \textit{‘avarız} and \textit{nüzül} extraordinary taxes. Due to a lack of primary sources on the period preceding the integration of Kozani into the \textit{malikâne} tax-farming system, which occurred in the early 1760s, it is, for the time being, impossible to say whether Kozani had been converted into a \textit{malikâne} tax-farm before the first available primary sources dating from the early 1760s, namely in the period following the initial empirewide application of the long-term tax-farming contracts in 1695, or retained its \textit{hass} status and thus remained part of the \textit{iltizam} tax-farming system.

\section*{2.4. The tax-farm of Kozani during the 1760s}

The tax-farm of Kozani was introduced into the long-term \textit{malikâne} tax-farming system sometime in the early 1760s. Although there is no information about the precise date of this significant change, a document dated 1761 refers for the first time to Fatma

\textsuperscript{52} This appears in the patriarchal \textit{fermans} and \textit{berats} as \textit{kilise ve karyelerine göre bankaları}. See: Tellan, \textit{The Patriarch and the Sultan}, p. 160.
\textsuperscript{53} Salakides, \textit{Sultanic Documents}, pp. 75-79.
Hanım Sultan as the life-term beneficiary (malikâneci) of the tax-farm of the hasse of Kozani.\textsuperscript{54} It is noteworthy that despite the aforementioned administrative fragmentation, we observe at the same time a concentration of fiscal control into the hands of a small number of individuals. Fatma Hanım Sultan was a granddaughter of Sultan Ahmed III (1703-1730), namely daughter of Saliha Sultan, who was daughter of Sultan Ahmed III, and of Sarı Mustafa Pasha, son of Deli Hüseyin Pasha.\textsuperscript{55} In 1762 she is attested as the trustee (mütevelli) of the religious endowment (vakıf), which her grandfather Deli Hüseyin Pasha had founded in Sphakia, on the island of Crete, shortly after the conquest of the western part of the island undertaken by him. This endowment consisted of 11 villages of the district of Sphakia where revenues were attributed to financing the expenses of Mecca and Medina. It was an evlatlık vakfı, which means that the post of its trustee was inherited by the offspring of its creator in direct bloodline. For this reason, when Deli Hüseyin Pasha died his son Mehmed Ağa became the vakif’s trustee and administrator, and after his death the office was inherited by his brother Sarı Mustafa Pasha, then his offspring, daughter Fatma Hanım Sultan.\textsuperscript{56} Fatma Hanım Sultan’s husband was Hatibzâde İbrahim Bey, who was brother of Hatibzâde Yahya Pasha.\textsuperscript{57} More research is required on the activities of the members of the imperial family and their relationship with the great élite households of Istanbul during the

\textsuperscript{54} BOA, C.SM..6-3697: ‘an tahvil-i Fatma Hanım Sultan ‘an akçe-i mukata’a-i hassha-yi Kozani

\textsuperscript{55} For Fatma Hanım Sultan, see: Mehmed Süreyya, Sicil-i Osmani, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları 30, 1996), I, p. 13; For Saliha Sultan, ibid., pp. 37-38; For Sarı Mustafa Pasha, ibid., IV, p. 1205; For Deli Hüseyin Pasha, ibid., III, p. 720. For Fatma Hanım Sultan’s brief genealogical tree, see: A. D. Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), p. 172, Genealogical Table XLI.


\textsuperscript{57} Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, III, p. 743. For İbrahim Bey’s brother Yahya Pasha, see: Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, V, pp. 1675-1676.
18th century. It is nevertheless clear that their activities were complex and included a large-scale repertoire, ranging from administration of large pious endowments to ownership of large and lucrative life-term tax-farms, which they administered and enriched with the assistance and collaboration of the most prominent members of the great élite households of Istanbul.

Turning our attention back to Kozani and the role of Fatma Hanım Sultan as the beneficiary of its *malikâne*, there is a document dated 1794 which is today preserved in the Kobentareios Library of Kozani and states that in 1761 Fatma Hanım Sultan handed over (literally: enrolled) her *malikâne* to a certain Mehmed, who was the clerk and herald of the corps of the armourers. Although the document does not refer to the terms under which this transaction had taken place, we could assume that Fatma Hanım Sultan had subleased the collection of the revenues accruing from the tax-farm to Mehmed, who found it difficult and unwelcome to go to this remote provincial village and preside over tax-collection and revenue-raising. For this reason, he had appointed as his representatives the first two *voyvodas* of Kozani, mentioned in two account registers of the tax-farm of Kozani, dating from 1766. The duration of Mehmed’s tenure remains unknown, whilst it is impossible to

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58 This document and all the Ottoman documents preserved in the Kobentareios Library in Kozani were studied, translated and published by Georgios Salakides. For additional information, see: Georgios Salakides, Sultanic Documents, pp. 139-141, 157-160, 212-213.
59 Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* [Dictionary of Expressions and Terms of Ottoman History], (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1993), I, p. 263. The Ottoman text in the original document reads as follows: *cebeciler ocağının kâtibi olan Mehmed*. For more information, see: Salakides, *Sultanic Documents*, pp. 139, 212.
60 BOA, TS.MA.d..06642; BOA, TS.MA.d..04826. The first document was recently published by Salakides. For more information, see: Georgios Salakides, “To Othomaniko Systima tou Malikiâne (Malikâne) stin Kozani [The Ottoman System of Malikâne in Kozani]” in Chariton Karanasios, Kostas Ntinas, Dimitris Milonas, Dimitris Skrekas (eds.), *KOZANI, 600 CHRONIA HISTORIAΣ: Genesi kai Anaptykies mias Makedonikis Metropolis, Praktika B’ Synedriou Topikis Istorias, Kozani 27-30 Septembriou 2012* [Kozani, 600 Years of History: The Genesis and Development of a Macedonian Metropolis, Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium of Local History, held in Kozani, 27-30 September 2012] (Kozani: Dimos Kozanis, Organismos Athlitismou, Politismou, kai Neolaias, 2014), pp. 87-112.
say whether there has been somebody else benefiting from the *malikâne* of Kozani after him. We can nonetheless be sure that Fatma Hanım Sultan was by 1765 again the beneficiary of the *malikâne* of Kozani and her tenure lasted until her death in c. 1795.

Two Ottoman documents dating from 1758 and 1761 respectively show that Kozani’s revenues, accruing from the *avarız* and *nüzül* extraordinary taxes, were used for paying the salaries of the Ottoman soldiers, who served as guards in the fort of Vidin, and for the soldiers who served as armourers in the imperial armory in Edirne. In the first case, Mehmed was, as clerk and herald of the corps of cannon carriage drivers, the officer responsible for the transfer of money from Kozani to Vidin and for the payment of the salaries to the guards, serving at the fort. In the second case, the document does not refer to the person who was responsible for delivering the money and paying the soldiers. Perhaps this person was again Mehmed, since the aforementioned document, which is preserved in Kozani, says that Mehmed was by 1761, three years after commencing his initial service, the scribe and clerk of the corps of armourers. Be it as it may, I think that the most important information that we retrieve from these two documents is the fact that a magnate from Istanbul, who was also a high-ranking military officer and member of the military oligarchy, participated in the *malikâne* system and contracted for the most lucrative tax-farms. Mehmed succeeded in obtaining the tax-farm of Kozani from its initial beneficiary, who was a member of the Ottoman dynasty, and held it, even for a short period.

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of time, in his possession. The transaction was completed when the *malikâne* tenure returned to Fatma Hanım Sultan.\(^62\)

The two account registers of the tax-farm of Kozani, both drafted sometime in February 1766, provide useful information on the structure of the tax-farm in the early 1760s, its administration, and the revenue-raising and tax-collection methods applied in that period. The structure of the tax-farm has the appearance typical for all the *malikâne* tax-farms. Atop stood Fatma Hanım Sultan, who was a typical absentee *malikâne*-beneficiary, and she was followed by her representative, who was appointed directly by her, with the duty of collecting the taxes from the population and delivering or forwarding accordingly the collected amounts to her purse. The *voyvoda*, as was the title of the appointed administrator and tax-collector, collaborated during his incumbency with local notables and other local authorities and used to appoint his own tax-collectors, who were charged with the duty of collecting the assigned fees and then forwarding the sums to him. These people were in the case of Kozani local Christian inhabitants, who were cognisant of the situation and the affairs of the community and could work as the intermediaries between the *voyvoda* and the indigenous population. As these registers state, they contain the amount of the taxes, fees, and disbursements that were known to and accepted by the population, and were defrayed with their consent. The people were not present during this procedure, but they used to elect their proxies, who were responsible for bargaining with the *voyvoda* and the other tax-farm officials. The proxies were also held responsible for the acceptance or the rejection of the proposed taxes, which the community was required to pay. Their names

\(^{62}\) BOA, AE.SMST.III..172-13527: Kozana karyesinin ‘avanz-ı nüzül maktu’u akçelerinden hisaben dokuz yüz doksan dört akçe yevmiyye ile Vidin kal’ası muhafazasına me’mur olunmuş yedi nefer dergâh-ı mu’allam top ‘arabacılarının mustehakk oldukları / top ‘arabaciları çavuşu Mehmed zide kadrühü yedinden
BOA, C.SM..6-3697: mevacib-i ba’z cebeciyan-ı dergâh-ı ‘ali hafızan-ı cebehane-i Edirne
were publicly known and their number and duties were determined by the imperial order, which the voyvoda carried with him, in order to prove his legal claims over the post. The account balance register was in both cases written by the judge of the judicial district, in which the settlement belonged (in our case, the judicial district of Eğri Bucak), with the knowledge and in the presence of the voyvoda, the remaining tax-farm officers and the population’s proxies.

As I have already discussed above, Kozani was a self-governing entity already in the mid-17th century, when its population began to pay their poll-tax and extraordinary levies ('avarz and nüzül) in the form of a lump-sum. This event provided the Koza"nite community with the experience of organising and administering its affairs, evading as much as possible intervention from extra-communal officers or state authorities. This same pattern was used by the voyvodas during the 18th century for the administration of Kozani and its tax-farm. For this reason, the Muslim administrators, who were dispatched to Kozani as delegates and representatives of the absentee and remote malikâne-beneficiary residing in Istanbul, had to assert their control over pre-existing structures. As will be explained in the next chapter, the voyvodas formed alliances with local notables and participated, thus, in the feuds often erupting among competing parties formed by rival factions of local Christian notables. Although scarce, the information provided from the documentation can reveal the depth of the socio-economic and political bonds forged between local Muslim and Christian élites. Since Kozani was a predominantly and overwhelmingly Christian settlement, wherein Muslims were a tiny minority, Muslim voyvodas needed the collaboration of the Christian magnates and in exchange they provided them with their institutional support.
According to these two account registers, between 1760 and 1764, there were two voyvodas in Kozani. Osman Ağa or Manço the bölükbaşı\textsuperscript{63} was appointed initially as voyvoda in 1760. He was replaced in late 1761 by Doyranlı Emin Ağa (literally “from Doyran”, modern Doyrani in Northern Greece), who in 1762 was in his turn replaced by the aforementioned Osman Ağa, who held his office for another 2 years until late 1764. Manço Osman Ağa would emerge as the predominant figure in local Kozanite affairs; he would remain Kozani’s voyvoda for the next 15 years until his death in 1781. I will refer in more detail to his career in the next chapter.

These two account registers of local expenses\textsuperscript{64} were produced by the voyvodas in 1766, when their tenure was over. They both contain the taxes, fees, and disbursements assessed on and paid by the community of Kozani. It is highly significant that each voyvoda applied a different method of tax-collection from his predecessor’s. For this reason, a presentation and a brief analysis of these taxes, fees, and disbursements would be useful, so that we may understand the structure of the tax-farm and the relations among the Kozanites.

\textsuperscript{63} Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, I, p. 242. A bölükbaşı was one of the six commanders of the regiment formed of the commanders of the Janissary regiments. Thus, he was a high-ranking Janissary officers and one of the most prominent figures in Ottoman military hierarchy. During the 18th century the bölükbaşı could also be appointed a commander of irregulars entrusted with security and implementation of law and order in a given locality.

\textsuperscript{64} These registers reveal the amounts of cash that each judicial district had to pay to various officials. They were compiled on a yearly basis or every six months, according to the needs of the locality. For more information about their structure and usefulness to modern historians, see: Antonis Anastasopoulos, Imperial Institutions and Local Communities: Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-1774, Unpublished PhD Dissertation (University of Cambridge, March 1999), pp. 47-51. Salakides supports the idea that these registers were drafted during the auditing of the voyvodas after the expiration of their annual tenure, which was conducted by the representatives of the community of Kozani, the special agent despatched to Kozani from Istanbul (mübaşir) to supervise the auditing on behalf of the administration, the zabit of Kozani who was entrusted with various administrative and policing duties, which allows us to consider the term zabit synonymous with the voyvoda, and the judge of the kaza of Eğri Bucak. For additional information and Salakides’ analysis of the contents of these registers, see: Salakides, The Ottoman System of Malikâne in Kozani, pp. 100-110.
During the tenure of Osman Ağa the community had to pay three different kinds of taxes and fees: 1) taxes and fees for the imperial treasury and the *malikâne*-beneficiary, 2) wages and expenses of the tax-farm officers and 3) taxes and fees for communal affairs. In the first category we can include: A) the **tax-farm annual returns**, the amount of money accruing yearly from the ordinary and extra-ordinary taxation and levies assessed on the population, which was delivered to the tax-farm beneficiary, B) the **public annual returns**, the amount of money paid on an annual basis into the imperial treasury, C) the **lump-sum of the annual poll-tax**, the tax paid each year by the Christians as capitation tax, D) the **wage of Janissary foot-soldiers and gunsmiths** (*cebeciler*), a small amount of money paid into the imperial treasury, which was used by the government for the payment of Janissary wages and E) **stipends paid to mercenary irregular soldiers** under Janissary leadership residing in Kozani as local guards.

In the second category the following fees are included: A) the **voyvoda’s wage**, the annual wage of the administrator of the tax-farm, paid by the local population, B) the **tax-farm officers’ fees**, fees paid by the local population for the expenses of local tax-farm officers, such as the voyvoda’s scribe and clerk, C) the **expenses of the public governmental officer**, the expenses of the officer who remained in Kozani as governmental representative, D) the **fees defrayed to the tax-collector for collecting taxes in arrears** and E) the **annual expenses for the mansion of the bey**, namely the permanent residence of the voyvoda during his tenure.

In the third category we can include the following fees: A) the **disbursement for an imperial order decreeing the serbestiyyet of the tax-farm**, namely a fee paid for an imperial order, which stipulated that the tax-farm would be managed and administered freely
without any intervention on behalf of governmental authorities and state officials, B) the interest paid to a moneylender (sarraf) in four months for a communal loan, C) the money for a communal loan offered by Osman Ağa, D) the interest for the arrears of taxes from the previous year, E) the interest paid by the community until the day of Saint Demetrius, F) the interest paid by the community between the day of Saint Demetrius and the beginning of March. All the aforementioned taxes, fees, and disbursements that were collected in Kozani, between 1761 and 1764, are presented, arranged on an annual basis, in the table found in Appendix 1.65

The most important conclusion, which we can reach based on this table, is the growing indebtedness of the Kozanite community. This is easily perceptible by the fact that each year the community owed taxes in arrears from previous years, for which it had to pay an interest, and by the fact that it resorted to communal loans offered either by moneylenders (sarrafs) or by the voyvoda himself. As far as the role of Jewish moneylenders is concerned, there is only one enigmatic case of two Jewish individuals, a certain Yasef son of İshak and a certain Avram, the latter’s agent and representative, who were recorded in two reports,66 which Koca Abdi Pasha, the then governor-general of Rumelia, submitted in late August 1786 for examination to the Sultan and the Porte, as having lent an unspecified sum to the Kozanite community and asked, immediately after the death of Ignatios, the bishop of Kozani, in 1785, for the repayment of the loan on the basis of receipts held by

65 BOA, TS.MA.d..06642, ff. 1-2.
66 BOA, AE.SABH.I..162-10832, f. 2: dergâh-i ‘ali gediklüerinden me’murîyyetle ‘avdet eden Ahmed Ağa kullarının getürdîği kâğıdîların hulasasîdîr fi 28 Şa‘ban sene 1200 salifu’z-zikr Kozana karyesi maddesi mübaşîr-i mumâ-iley kullarının takrirînden ma’lum ‘aleyye buyurulacağın mışarûn-iley mezkur mektûbunda ı’s’ar eder
them. \(^67\) The two documents simply state that a *gediklü* Porte official, a certain Ahmed Ağa, \(^68\) was despatched to investigate this case, accompanied by a man of Abdi Pasha’s, but their investigation produced no concrete results. \(^69\) For this reason, and since the two Jews insisted on the repayment of the debt of the Kozanite community, Ahmed Ağa asked for the interference and support of the Sultan and the Porte authorities. \(^70\) More research is required if we are to reach a consensus regarding the role of the Jewish moneylenders in the affairs of small communities, like the community of Kozani, and their participation in the administration of the tax-farm of Kozani. \(^71\)

There is one additional document that testifies to the deep indebtedness of the Kozanite community. This document is a petition, which a certain Hüseyin submitted to the Porte. Although the petition is undated, the two marginal notes accompanying it, which are dated 6 Cimaziyyülevvel 1196 AH / 19-4-1782 AD and 8 Cemaziyyülevvel 1196 AH / 21-4-1782 AD respectively, imply that it was drafted and submitted to the Porte sometime in early April 1782. As Hüseyin states in his petition, the Kozanite community collectively owed

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\(^67\) BOA, AE.SABH.I..162-10832, f. 2: Kozana karyesi ahalileri zimmetlerinde ber muceb-i temessükât ma’lumü’l-mikdar alacakları olduğu inha olinmağa

\(^68\) Ahmed Ağa was a holder of a *gedik*, namely he received remuneration for his services in the form of a provincial *gedik timar* grant. He was therefore a *timar*-holding palace official and member of the central administration.

\(^69\) BOA, AE.SABH.I..162-10832, f. 3: mübaşir ta’yyin buyurulan dergâh-ı ‘ali gediklülerinden Ahmed Ağa kulları ma’rifetiyle şer’an tahlil ve ihkak-i hakk olinmak babinda şeref-rız vurud eden iki kit’a emr-i ‘ali ve emirname-i veliyyû’n-nu’malari muceblerince buyuruldu tahrir ve adamım kulları terfik ve mehallerine irsal olunub

\(^70\) BOA, AE.SABH.I..162-10832, f. 3: Kozana karye maddesi mübaşir-i muma-ileyh kullarının takririnden mehatt-i ‘alem-i ‘âlem ara-yi veliyyû’n-nu’maneleri buyuruldukdâ ol-babda

him, according to a receipt in his possession, the extravagant sum of 30,000 ğuruş. When he made use according to the Shari’a of his right to demand for this sum to be paid by the Kozanite community back to him, the Kozanites refused and, with sheer violation of the provisions of the Shari’a, refused to pay their debt and, as he claimed, “showed a profound inclination to injustice and violation of his rights”.

Hüseyin entreated, therefore, the authorities to issue an Imperial Order which would command the governor-general of Rumelia to and examine his case according to the Shari’a before the local court, and coerce the Kozanites into the payment of the aforementioned sum without any unnecessary deficiencies or delays. The two marginal notes accompanying the petition mention that the Imperial Council issued an Imperial Order and a decree which commanded that this affair be examined according to the Shari’a before the local court.

This document is particularly important, because it proves that the Kozanite community was in the long run deeply indebted, not only to Jewish moneylenders, but also to Muslim ones. Although there is no available information on the identity of Hüseyin, we could assume that he was a local wealthy Muslim, who had lent extravagant amounts to the leaders of the community and/or the local Voyvoda, who borrowed these sums on behalf

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72 BOA, AE.SABH.I..89-6123: devletlü ‘inayyetli sultanım hazretleri sağ olsun bu kullalarının Alasonya’ya tabı’ Çahtarşenbe kazasında Kozana nam karyeden ma’lumü’l-’esm zimmetlerinde ber muceb-i temessük otuz bin ğuruş cihet-i şer’den alacak hakkım olub meblağ-i mezkuru taleb eylediğimde hilaf-i şer’-i şerif edada te’addi ve muhalefet ve ibtal-i hakk ve ğadar da’yesinde olmalarıyla merahim-i ‘aliyelerinden mercudur ki mehallinde şer’le görilüb mezkurların zimmetlerinde olan meblağ-i merkum hakkım bi’t-tamam tahsil ve bi-kusur alverilüb icra-yı hakk olnmak babında Rum-İli valisine hitaben ferman-i ‘alileri niyaz olinur baki emr ve ferman devletli ğuruş-i inayyetli sultanım hazretlerinin sadık bende-i Hüseyin

73 BOA, AE.SABH.I..89-6123: husus-i mezbur için divan-i hümayun tarafından emr-i şerif verildiği kaydi olmuştur ferman-i devletli sultanım sene 1196 mehallinde şer’le görilüb buyuruldu 8 Cemaziyyü’l-evvel sene 1196
and in the name of the community of Kozani. As we will see in the next chapter, this period was extremely turbulent and marked with fierce communal strife between two opposing parties led by the then-voevoda Manço Osman Ağa and his adversary, Ebu Bekir Bey. Thus, it seems plausible that the two adversaries borrowed in the name of the community large sums, which they spent in the financing of the activities of their parties and against their opponents. This is further certified by a similar affair that occurred just two months prior to this affair, when in early February 1782 there was issued an order, which decreed that some Christians, who were all permanent residents of Kozani, had to repay a debt of 5,000 ğuruş to four Muslims. It is interesting that in this case these Christians were all members of the defeated faction of the recently deceased Osman Ağa, namely the previous powerful voevoda of the malikâne of Kozani. We could therefore place these events in a broader context of a face-off between the members of the two opposing factions, instigated by the defeat of the faction of Osman Ağa and the subsequent victory of the faction led by Ebu Bekir Bey. I will present these events in a more analytical manner in the next chapter.

Turning our attention to the role of local voevodas, we could argue that it is not a mere coincidence that the general balance of the tax-farm for the years during Osman Ağa’s tenure as voevoda is negative and deficient. Perhaps Osman Ağa and/or his appointed tax-collectors were ineffective administrators. Equally plausible could be the assumption that the community faced many economic problems, being as a result deprived of its ability to fulfill its tax obligations. Unfortunately, we lack further documentation and the extant documents offer no additional information. However, it is especially important to observe the note at the end of the document, which says that the community of Kozani paid the taxes and fees, which its members could afford, and there were finally no remnants to be
paid. It seems plausible that the state authorities recognised the difficulties that the community faced and wrote off the debts of the community.

The register written on behalf of Emin Ağa is slightly different from the previous one, in the sense that, although it is a balance register, it contains many fees and taxes that were not included in Osman Ağa’s register and thus they cannot be compared with the fees and taxes paid by the community during Osman Ağa’s tenure. We can demarcate 4 categories of fees and taxes that the community was expected to pay: 1) fees and taxes paid for the annual tax obligations of the community, including the poll-tax, the ordinary and extraordinary levies and traditional feudal rents, 2) fees and wages paid to the voyvoda, to the tax-collectors and various Ottoman officers or officers of the tax-farm, 3) wages paid to Ottoman regular and irregular military corps and 4) money given for settling communal debts.74

In the first category we can include: A) the tax-farm annual returns, which were collected and delivered to Emin Ağa by three different tax-collectors, B) the fees paid for the expenses and repairs of the mansion of the bey, C) the fee paid by the community on behalf of dispersed citizens, i.e. the inhabitants who had left Kozani and whose obligations fell on the Christian inhabitants of the village, D) the money given for the provincial extraordinary levies (‘avarız and nüzül), according to the tevzi’ register of the province, and the money given for the extraordinary levies of the tax-farm, E) the money given for the clarified butter and other disbursements, F) the money given to an unspecified timar-holding cavalry soldier (sipahi), for the right of the inhabitants of Kozani to cut firewood in a certain district (baltalık resmi), G) the money paid for the wool, which is given to the

74 BOA, TS.MA.d..04826, f.1. The amounts of these taxes are presented, arranged on an annual basis, in the table found in Appendix 1.
travelers passing from Kozani to mend their cloths, and H) the annual poll-tax of the Christians and the Gypsies (kiptıyan), with the latter being mentioned separately and for the first time as residents of Kozani.

In the second category we can include: A) the amount of money given as present to the governor-general of Rumeli, residing in Manastır (modern day Bitola, in FYROM), B) the wage given for one year to a certain “son of Coco”, who is otherwise a totally shadowy figure, C) the fee for the services of the appointed officer, who came to Kozani for settling the problems of the community, D) the wage paid to the tax-collector Barela (literally “the cooper”), E) the money given as wage to a certain “son of Istamuli (Stamulis) Gacimat”, another shadowy figure, F) the fee paid to the deputy judge for examining a communal matter and for issuing his judicial decision, G) the fee paid to the agent, who was appointed by the poll-tax collector Huseyin Ağa, H) the wage paid to the agent of Ali Ağa and a certain “Christian dyer”, both are shadowy figures, I) the wage paid to a certain “son of Mecdan”, J) the money paid as a fee to the invited foot-soldier messengers, who came to the feast organised by the deputy governor of the village on the occasion of his marriage, K) the money given for the honourary gift of the steward of the governor-general of Rumelia, L) the fee paid to the agent, who was appointed by the collector of the poll-tax of the Gypsies, M) the fee paid to the Janissary officer, who was assistant of the voyvoda, N) the wage of the tax-collector Molla Ahmed, O) the wage paid to a certain “son of Toyko”, who was resident of Istanbul, P) the wage of the tax-collector Tomya, Q) the wage of the son of Simo Nikola, who was tax-collector in that year, R) the money paid into the account of Papa Harisino, for an unknown purpose, and S) the money for the honourary gift presented to the deputy judge.
In the third category we can include: A) **one-year salary paid to irregular Christian soldiers (armatoloi)**, to their wardens, and to field guards (**dirağat**, from the Byzantine Greek word **dragatis** (: δραγάτης)) and B) **six-month wages defrayed at once to the field guards**, the irregular Christian soldiers, their steward, and their wardens.

In the fourth category we can include: A) **the money paid by a certain “son of İço” to a certain Mustafa “the patched”, for settling up a communal debt**, B) **the interest given to Mustafa “the patched” in two installments with a receipt for a communal debt**, C) **the interest paid to Ali Ağa from Alasonya, for a communal debt**, D) **the interest paid to Huseyin Bey**, E) **the interest paid by the community, for the taxes owed by the dispersed taxpayers, who had left Kozani**, F) **the interest paid to Manço the Janissary officer, the previous and, as it would be, next voyvoda of Kozani, who had lent money to the community**, G) **the interest paid to Molla Ahmed**, for a communal debt and H) **the various disbursements, which were made by the voyvoda and his officers, on behalf of the community, and counted as communal loans.**

The 1762 balance showed a considerable surplus, which was returned to the community after all communal obligations had been met. It is, however, worth mentioning that the community of Kozani continued to be strikingly indebted. During 1761-1764, each year between 25% and 35% of the money, which the people had to pay in taxes and fees, was defrayed for settling up and meeting communal debts, owed to the tax-farm officers, such as Emin Ağa or Osman Ağa, or to extra-communal lenders, such as the aforementioned Ali Ağa from Alasonya. Although there is no clear mention in the documents, we could assume that keeping a community indebted made it easier for local administrators and tax-

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75 The amounts of these taxes are presented, arranged on an annual basis, in the table found in Appendix 1.
farm officers to impose their authority over the community, since communal debts could not be that easily written off and the community had to pay them in return for communally held fields and pasture lands.\textsuperscript{76}

Apart from that, the reference to Gypsies living in Kozani and paying their taxes there is an important aspect of the development of Kozani during early 18th century. Local amateur historians place the settlement of Gypsies in Kozani in the second half of the 18th century and say that a separate neighbourhood, in the southernmost part of Kozani, was granted to them to reside.\textsuperscript{77} They settled there with their families and they were gradually incorporated into the Kozanite society. Their neighborhood was known, until mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century, as “Ta Gyftika”, namely the “Gypsies’ neighbourhood”. They were blacksmiths and farriers, who provided the community as well as passing travelers, merchants, peddlers, and carriers with supplies and equipment, necessary for their activities and travels.

As I have already discussed above, Kozani owed its development primarily to the opening of commercial arteries, which traversed Macedonia and were used by Macedonian, Epirote, and Thessalian merchants, carters and muleteers, in order to traffic their goods from and to the Northern Balkans, Hungary and the German States in Central Europe. Kozani stood amid and was an important cargo terminal, a fact that offered its population

\textsuperscript{76} For the Ottoman land regime in the 16th century, its transformation in the 17th and 18th centuries and the numerous methods used by notables and magnates to gather land into their possession and impose their rule over the peasantry, through usurpation of communal land and dispossession and enserfment of the peasants, in return for settling up communal debts, see: Bruce McGowan, \textit{Economic Life in Ottoman Empire: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land} (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 45-73.

\textsuperscript{77} In the first codex of revenues and expenses of the Metropolitan church of Saint Nikolaos in Kozani, which is preserved in the Kobentareios Municipal Library of Kozani, it is recorded that in 1747 some Gypsies pay a rent for some houses owned by the church. It is thus logical to assume that the first Gypsies moved to Kozani and settled in the “Gyftika” neighborhood during the 1740s. For more information about this codex and the Gypsies, see: Michael Kalinderis, \textit{Ai Syntechniai tis Kozanis epi Toukokratias} [The Guilds of Kozani during the “Tourkokratia”] (Thessaloniki, 1958), pp. 13-17.
the possibility to enrich themselves, as commercial intermediaries, and furthermore to
develop their own firms and companies. For this reason, the community had to pay a fee to
local irregular soldiers, in return for their collaboration and their armed protection. We
should not forget that, by the 18th century, local Christian irregular troops had broken the
monopoly of the Ottoman ‘askeri class over bearing arms and had developed into a factor to
be reckoned with. Since Kozani was placed in a remote area and was surrounded by Muslim
settlements, inhabited by the descendants of the Turkish raiders (Yörüks) who had
conquered Macedonia in the late 14th century, and who were not always peaceful and
tolerant, Kozani needed their assistance and protection against both their Muslim
neighbours and other armed bands of roaming brigands. The armatoloi would gradually
develop their separate structure and organisation and, by late 18th century under the
administration of Ali Pasha in Ioannina, their role would develop into a semi-autonomous
armed entity selling their services to the most prominent and promising warlord. 78

The two voyvodos, Osman Ağa and Emin Ağa, used local notable figures as their
appointed tax-collectors. Indeed, during Osman Ağa’s and Emin Ağa’s tenures, the majority
of the taxes and fees were collected by their tax-collectors and thereafter were delivered to
them. Osman Ağa appointed Ali Ağa, referred in Emin Ağa’s register as the “one from

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78 There is lack of complete and modern approaches to the institutions of klephs and armatoloi, and all monographs referring to them are inspired and guided by the traditional 19th-century romantic Greek historiographical trends. There are, nevertheless, two monographs which are worth mentioning. Nikolaos Kasomoulis’ memoirs on the Greek Revolution are a source of invaluable first-hand information on the overall activities of the various and numerous clans of Klephs and armatoloi throughout Macedonia, Thessaly, Epirus, and Sterea Ellada, especially in the latter part of the 18th and early part of the 19th centuries. For additional information, see: Nikolaos Kasomoulis, *Enthymimata Stratiotika tis Epanastaseos ton Ellinon, 1821-1833* [Military Memoirs of the Revolution of the Greek People, 1821-1833], (Athens: Ekdoseis Vergina, 2005), pp. 64-222. Another noteworthy work on the Western Macedonian klephs and armatoloi is John Vasdravellis’ monograph, *Klephs, Armatoles, and Pirates in Macedonia during the Rule of the Turks* (Thessaloniki: Etaireia Makedoniwn Spoudon, 1975). Vasdravellis’ approach is based on primary Ottoman sources, which are preserved in the *Istorika Archeia tis Makedonias* (Historical Archives of Macedonia).
Alasonya (today: Elassona, in the prefecture of Larissa, in Thessaly)

this role was given to Toyo, Evrad, and Manol, in 1762-1763 to a certain “son of Itimyo (Thimios)”, and in 1763-1764 to Toyo, Dina son of Foti, Foti himself, and to a certain “son of Dimiški”. Emin Ağa appointed in 1761-1762 as his primary tax-collectors the Christians Simo son of Nikola and Yani Barela (namely, “the cooper”). Emin Ağa appointed as their assistants Molla Ahmed, perhaps the deputy judge of the judge of Eğri Bucak who lived in Kozani and served its small Muslim community, and Mihal son of Toma, another Christian inhabitant of Kozani and member of the community. Unfortunately, the information provided by the documentation is too scant and no safe conclusions can be extracted, as to the identity of these people, what their position in the community was, and which power and administration networks they might have been members of. However, it becomes obvious that they were influential and commonly accepted personalities who assisted and supported their appointers in the administration of the tax-farm and in tax-collection and revenue-allocation, since they were prominent members of the community and were cognisant of its peculiarities and problems from within. To sum up, the voyvoda, who was appointed by the absentee malikâne-beneficiary to administer the tax-farm, stood atop the local hierarchy and was assisted in his administrative and tax-collection duties by influential, prestigious members of the community, in order to impose his management over the tax-farm, to administer its revenue sources, and solve any problems that might arise. As will be shown in the next chapter, this relationship was the basis for the formation of competing factions in Kozani, which constantly vied for supremacy in and control over the communal affairs.

Thymios is the Western Macedonian dialect’s way of saying the name “Efthymios”.

61
2.5. The tax-farm of Kozani between 1770 and c. 1795

By 1770 the tax-farm of Kozani was formally and officially incorporated into the malikâne system, which by the early 18th century was the most prevalent method of farming on a life-term basis the revenues of a settlement or a group of revenue-producing units out to a single individual or to a group of individual investors. The documents covering this period are fragmentary and they refer almost always to feuds erupting between competing factions and voyvodas. Yet they offer some valuable information on the tax-farm of Kozani, namely its structure and revenues, and about Kozani per se.

The first document of this period is a report submitted by the voyvoda of Kozani, Osman Ağa, in which he requested that the farming out of the collection of the poll-tax of the Christians and Jews of the tax-farm of Kozani, for the year 1186 AH / 1772-1773 AD, be assigned to him. Osman furthermore asked for an imperial diploma (berat) and the poll-tax papers (cizye evrakları) for the collection of poll-tax to be despatched to him, so that he could proceed promptly. He reported also that he was awarded the collection of the poll-tax of Kozani and its dependent villages for the same year, directly and without an auction (der ‘uhde), after he had paid by way of account (mahsuben) the down-payment of the overall sum, which he was expected to collect (cibayet peşini), and had presented a reliable guarantor (mu’temed ‘aleyhü kefili ile). For this reason, he demanded that an imperial order be issued, so that his imperial diploma and the poll-tax papers could be despatched to him as soon as possible.80

80 BOA, C.ML..27391: devletlü sa’detlü sultanım hazretleri sağ olsun bin yüz seksen altı senesine mahsuben Kozana ve tevabî’i cizyesinin cibayeti peşini ve mu’temmed ‘aleyhü kefili ile kullarna der ‘uhde olunub berat ve evrâki verilmek babında ferman-ı devletlü sa’detlü sultanım hazretlerinindir bende-i El-Hacc Osman voyvoda-ı Kozana halen
The answer given by the imperial-treasury officers, refers to the fact that, according to the marginal note of the registered incomes of the poll-tax of Kozani, there are 495 poll-tax papers to be paid for and the annual payment (mal). The latter’s collection and forwarding to the imperial treasury was, as a fixed condition, always undertaken, directly and without an auction, by the voyvoda of Kozani. This payment amounted to 2733½ ğuruş, without the tax defrayed to the collector as his salary and means of subsistence (ma’as), and also without the tax paid as a salary to the scribe and/or secretary of the voyvoda (kitabet).

As was also the case with the aforementioned 17th-century poll-tax registers, the people of Kozani were again exempted from paying these two minor taxes. 81

Osman Ağa had previously submitted a petition (‘arzuhal), wherein he demanded the account and collection of the poll-tax of Kozani for the year 1186 AH / 1772-1773 AD be undertaken by him. As was the common practice following previous sultanic orders and decrees, this could be done only if the petitioner paid the annual returns of the tax-farm in advance and forwarded this amount of money into the imperial treasury. Osman Ağa followed these regulations, and by having fulfilled the prerequisite conditions, the task of collecting Kozani’s poll-tax in 1186 AH/ 1772-1773 AD was recorded in the registers as his own responsibility.

The original document is accompanied by a marginal note, written down by the officers of the imperial treasury. The note refers to the number of poll-tax papers (cizye

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81 BOA, C.ML.27391: ‘arz-ı bendeleridir ki
Kozine kalemi cizyesinin der-kenar olunduğu üzere dört yüz doksan beş ‘aded evrakı ve ğayr ez ma’aş ve kitabet iki bin yedi yüz otuz üç buçuk ğuruş mali olub bi-her sene cibayeti voyvodasına der ‘uhde olunması meşrut olmağla yüz seksen altı senesine mahsuben cibayeti kendüye der ‘uhde olunmak ricasiyla ‘arzuhal eder ma’lum devletleri-buyuruldunda sabiki mucebince meblağ-ı mezbür ber vech-i peşin teslim hazine-i ‘amire olunmak şartıyla ‘uhdesine kayd olunub berat ve evrakı verilmek babında ferman-ı devletli sa’detli sultanım hazretlerinindir
evrklari) to be distributed among the taxpayers in 1186 AH / 1772-1773 AD according to their economic situation, according to the tripartite revised system of poll-tax collection, which was still in application. There were recorded 49 papers for those taxpayers considered as high-class (a’ala), 397 papers for the middle-class (evsat), and 49 for the lower-class (edna) taxpayers. Their overall number amounted to 495 papers worth 342,870 akçes, but the tax delivered to the collector as his salary and means of subsistence (ma’as), and the tax given as a salary to the scribe and/or secretary of the voyvoda (kitabet) were not included. Thus, the overall sum that the taxpayers had to defray amounted to 328,020 akçes or 2,733½ ğuruş. Since the advance payment forwarded to the imperial treasury was 2,733 ğuruş, we can deduce that the voyvoda had to pay in advance almost all the anticipated poll-tax revenue, in order to farm out and obtain the right to collect the poll-tax of Kozani.82

The document does not clarify, whether the poll-tax of Kozani formed part of the taxes and fees included in the malikâne contract of Fatma Hanım Sultan or was independent, yet the reader should keep in mind that the poll-tax was a miri state tax, which was collected by agents of the imperial treasury and reserved for state expenses.83 Although the poll-tax was normally collected by state agents (emins), it seems that in the case of settlements, which were farmed out on the basis of malikâne contracts, its collection was subleased by the state and the imperial treasury to the voyvoda representing

82 According to the sums presented in the document, the ğuruş-to-akçe rate was 1/120. This was the official rate, which had been fixed in 1703 at the scale of 1 ğuruş equalling 40 paras or 120 akçes. For additional information, see: Şevket Pamuk, An Economic History of the Ottoman Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 159-161; Evtychia Liata, Floria Dekatessera Stenoun Grosia Saranta, I Kykloforia ton Nomismaton ston Elliniko Choro, 15os-19os ai. [Fourteen Florins Equal Fourty Piasters, The Circulation of Coins in the Greek Lands, 15th-19th centuries], (Athens: Kentro Neoellinikon Erevnon Ethnikou Idrymatou Erevnon, No. 58, 1996), p. 199.

the absentee *malikâne* contractor. As becomes apparent, both the state and the absentee *malikâne*-beneficiary entrusted a local figure with the collection of the poll-tax, for which the concrete knowledge and uninfluenced perception of the condition and circumstances of the local population was a prerequisite. It is, therefore, not a coincidence that the two tenures, namely the tenure of the post of the *voyvoda* of the *malikâne* of Kozani and the *voyvoda*’s tenure as short-term *müftezim* tax-farmer of the poll-tax of Kozani, lasted exactly for one economic year, after which they had to be both renewed with the knowledge and approval of the state and the *malikâne*-beneficiary. As the case of Kozani proves, there were during the 18th century two distinct tax-farming systems and two separate tax-farms in operation in Kozani, namely the tax-farm of the *malikâne* of Kozani, which had been farmed out on a life-term basis to the then-life-term contractor Fatma Hanım Sultan, and the tax-farm of the poll-tax of Kozani, which was farmed out on an annual basis according to the regulations of the *iltizam* system.

The most striking information, however, is the reference to Jews among the taxpayers of Kozani.\(^8^4\) The note explicitly says: “the poll-tax of the unbelievers (*gebran*: Christians) and Jews (*Yahudiyan*) of the bureau (*kalem*) of Kozani and its dependent villages”.\(^8^5\) It is the very first reference to Jews among the tax-paying population of Kozani. According to the documents at my disposal, in Kozani there were only Christians and very

\(^{84}\) I presented for the first time the information on the existence of a Jewish population in Kozani during the 18th century in a Conference on the history of Western Macedonia that was held in October 2014 in Grevena. For this contribution to the issue of the Jewish population of Kozani, see: Dimitrios Lamprakis, “Oi Ebraioi tis Kozanis sto Telos tou 18ou Aiona vasei dyo Othomanikon Eggrafon” [The Jews of Kozani at the End of the 18th Century, on the Basis of Two Ottoman Documents] in Chariton Karanasios, Kostas Ntinas, Dimitris Milonas (eds.), *I Dytiki Makedonia stous Neoterous Chronous, Praktika A’ Synedriou Istorias Dytkis Makedonias, Grevena 2-5 Oktobriou 2014* [Western Macedonia in the Modern Period, Proceedings of the First Symposium on Local History of Western Macedonia, held in Grevena, 2-5 October 2014] (Grevena: Etaireia Dytkomakedonikon Spoudon, 2016), pp. 167-190.

\(^{85}\) BOA, C.ML..27391: *cizye-i gebran ma’ yahudiyan-i kalem-i Kozina ve tevabi’ha vacib-i sene 1185*
few Muslim officials and tax-farmers. Perhaps some Jews (their exact number remains unknown) came and settled in Kozani taking advantage of the conditions which resulted directly from the need for cash and credit due to the development of foreign trade with Central Europe and the imposition of short-term and life-term tax-farming. Unfortunately, the document does not offer any further information on this group of Kozanite Jews. Highly enigmatic is their initial location, where they came from and settled in Kozani, even for a short period. There was already since the late-16th century a small but thriving community of Jews of Sephardic origins in neighboring Servia (Serfice), who came from Thessaloniki and settled there with their families, but there were also old, numerous, and thriving communities of Hellenophonic Romaniote Jews in Kara Ferye (today: Verroia) and Kastoria, large and cosmopolitan urban centres in Macedonia, since the Byzantine period, whose members could have left their homes in search of opportunities for and possibilities of enrichment. Local written and oral traditions deny steadfastly the settlement of Jews in Kozani, with a series of anecdotes and stories about Jews who attempted to settle in Kozani but never managed to be incorporated into the local society and participate in communal affairs. Be that as it may, and since we lack at the moment an adequate quantity of primary sources, it is sufficient to argue for the time being that there was an attempt of Jews to settle in Kozani and profit from participating in local economic and mercantile activities. As it seems, this attempt was unsuccessful and their settlement was short-lived, although we are not aware of the exact reasons of their failure and abandonment of Kozani.

In the next document informing us about the collection of the poll-tax in Kozani for the year 1204 AH / 1789-1790 AD noteworthy changes are to be detected. This document is a copy from the original register of the poll-tax of certain judicial districts in Rumelia. The

86 BOA, C.ML..15738.
amount of money collected from these districts, referred to in the register, was spent for the payment of the wages of the soldiers in Istanbul and especially for the soldiers holding the stirrups of the Sultan, when he was present on horseback on state occasions, and operating as his bodyguards (rikâb-ı hûmayun).\(^{87}\)

In the economic year 1789-1790, the Christians of Kozani were assigned 504 poll-tax papers. There were 50 papers for those taxpayers considered as high-class, 404 papers for the middle-class, and 50 papers for the lower-class taxpayers. However, there were no Jews included in the taxpayers. The Jews reappear in a document issued in 1795, which is a letter written by Ali Ğarik Bey Efendi, chief accountant of the poll-tax, testifying that the voyvoda of Kozani has farmed out the poll-tax for that year and promised to forward the down-payment due for the renting into the imperial treasury.\(^{88}\) In this document the people of Kozani were counted for 558 poll-tax papers, with 56 papers for those taxpayers considered as high-class, 446 for the middle-class and 56 papers for the lower-class taxpayers. A comparison between the numbers of the two documents allows us to suppose that the members of the Jewish community of Kozani did not exceed 50 individuals.\(^{89}\) The small increase in the number of tax papers testifies to a plausible small increase of the population of Kozani, but we should always bear in mind that the numbers are technically written down in these documents and that these numbers do not provide any exact and concrete information on the population itself.

\(^{87}\) Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, III, p. 45.
\(^{88}\) BOA, AE.SSLM.III..120-7324.
\(^{89}\) I should remind the reader that in the BOA, C.ML..15738, where the Jewish population of Kozani is omitted, the overall number of the Kozanite re’aya subject to the payment of poll-tax amounted to 504 individuals and in the BOA, AE.SSLM.III..120-7324, where the Jewish population reappears, this number amounted to 558 individuals. We can therefore assume that the male Jewish population of Kozani subject to the payment of poll-tax did not exceed 50 individuals. Of course, it is impossible to make any estimations based exclusively on this type of documents about the overall size of the Kozanite Jewish community.
Once more, the people of Kozani were exempted in 1789-1790 from paying the *ma‘as* and the *kitabet*. The total amount that the people of Kozani were required to pay was 3,783½ *ğuruş* and the amount that had to be paid in advance, for farming out the right over the collection of the poll-tax, was 2,783½ *ğuruş*. Last but not least, there was a small amount of 300 *ğuruş*, whose payment had been suspended (*mevkuf*). The *mevkuf* sum was usually paid by people who were poorer than lower-class taxpayers. For this reason, its payment was suspended and, whenever it was defrayed, it was kept in the locality where it originated from for the payment of local expenses of various types. Another category of the population, which was not included in these documents, were the people exempted from paying poll-tax, either because they were below 12 or older than 65 years old (these were the normal age limits for the non-Muslim population liable for paying poll-tax), or because they were mentally or physically incapacitated, or they were unemployed and had no means of subsistence (these were included in 17th-century poll-tax registers under the terms ‘amel *mande*, namely invalided and unable to work, and *a‘ama*, namely blind). In the 18th-century registers, these categories are only exceptionally recorded and, for this reason, there is no reliable information on their numbers. Be that as it may, we could support the assumption that, during this period, the active tax-paying population of Kozani appeared to be increasing, with new elements being added into the pre-existing population, although we cannot be sure about long-term population trends and we cannot attempt any detailed analysis of the population and the society.

There is also one more document which shows that, apart from the poll-tax, the sheep-tax (*bedel-i ağnam-i celebekeşan*)\(^90\) was farmed out separately as a *malikâne*. This

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\(^{90}\) On the system of the *celebekeşan*, see: A. Greenwood, *Istanbul’s Meat Provisioning: A Study of the Celebekeşan System*, Unpublished PhD dissertation (University of Chicago, 1988), which is the only
document is a petition dated 23 Şevval 1190 AH / 5-12-1776 AD, which was submitted to the Porte by a certain Mehmed Sadik Efendi, the then life-term beneficiary of the malikâne of the sheep-tax of the bureau of Sophia (mutasarrıf-ı malikâne-i bedel-i ağnam-ı celebkeşan-ı kalem-i Sofya), namely the bureau based in the seat of and comprising all the areas within the territory of the sancak of Pasha, in the eyalet of Rumelia. The petition states that the substitute fee (bedel) for the sheep-tax corresponding to the share of the malikâne of Kozani, a dependency of the malikâne of the sheep-tax of the bureau of Sophia, amounted to 163 ğuruş and 70 akçes, for which there had been laid as a condition to be collected and paid to the beneficiary of the aforementioned malikâne in the form of a lump-sum annual payment (mal-i maktu’) by the actual beneficiary of the malikâne of Kozani. Therefore, since Fatma Hanım Sultan, the then-beneficiary of the malikâne of Kozani, had already defrayed to Mehmed Sadik Efendi the aforementioned lump-sum annual payment, which had been allotted by way of account to the malikâne of Kozani for the year 1190 AH / 1776-1777 AD, Mehmed Sadik demanded that a copy of the receipt and record testifying to this transaction be issued by the Imperial Treasury and handed over to him. 

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91 There are three individuals named Sadık Mehmed Efendi in Süreyya’s Sicil-i Osmani, who lived in the second half of the 18th century and served in high-ranking offices of the kulemiyye branch of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Unfortunately, due to lack of concrete information on the career and identity of the individual appearing in this document, it is impossible to identify who among these three individuals our Mehmed Sadık Efendi might have been. For more information, see: Süreyya, Sicil-i Osmani, V, p. 1418.

This document is a palpable proof of the complexity of the 18th-century malikâne system. As becomes clear from the information contained in this petition, Kozani formed part of two overlapping malikâne tax-farms, namely the malikâne of the sheep-tax of the bureau of Sophia, whose limits coincided with the limits of the eyalet of Rumelia, and the very much smaller malikâne of Kozani, which covered solely the settlement of Kozani and appertained to the collection of the taxes levied on the economic activities of the population and the separate tax-farm of the poll-tax levied on and payable by the non-Muslim population of Kozani. Furthermore, it was arranged for the share of the sheep-tax allotted to Kozani to be defrayed in the form of a lump-sum (which, as had already been discussed, was undoubtedly in the best interest of the community) by the beneficiary of the malikâne of Kozani, who acted therefore as a mediator between the Kozanite community, on the one hand, and the powerful beneficiary of the malikâne of the sheep-tax of the sancak of Pasha and his agents, on the other.

The petition is accompanied also by two extensive marginal notes which provide useful information on the structure of and relationship between the beneficiaries of the malikânes of Kozani and the sheep-tax of the bureau of Sophia. The first note is dated 26 Şevval 1190 AH / 8-12-1776 AD and presents synoptically the names of the four joint shareholders and beneficiaries of the malikâne of the sheep-tax of the bureau of Sophia and its dependencies, and the sums that they had to defray to the imperial treasury as the prearranged annual return of their tax-farm. To begin with, the malikâne of the sheep-tax of the bureau of Sophia had been outsourced directly and without an auction to and was owned jointly by Mehmed Sadik Efendi, a certain Nu’man Efendi son of an unnamed individual who bore, however, the title of the purse-bearer and treasurer of a high-ranking
office (kesedarzade), and a certain Es-Seyyid İbrahim Efendi. All three beneficiaries of the malikâne of Sophia were Ottoman civil functionaries in the scribal services in the Ottoman bureaucracy and government. They were also members of the Istanbul-based aristocracy comprising, as has been already discussed, the households of the powerful oligarchs who monopolised through intermarriage and economic alliances the systems of the iltizam and malikâne tax-farming.

The annual returns of the malikâne tax-farm of Sophia, which comprised the sheep-tax collected from the taxpayers living in the territory of the tax-farm, the amount resulting from the disparity caused by the revaluation of the Ottoman currency (tefavüt), the previous increases in the sheep-tax (zamm-ı kadime), and the amounts paid in the form of

93 There are two individuals named Seyyid İbrahim Efendi in Süreyya’s Sicil-i Osmani, who lived in the second half of the 18th century and served in the high-ranking offices of the kalemîyye branch of the Ottoman bureaucracy. One of them is most probably the Es-Seyyid İbrahim Efendi appearing in this document, for his career bears striking similarities to the career path of the father of the second beneficiary of the malikâne of Sophia. According to Süreyya, Seyyid Mehmed Efendi started as purse-bearer and treasurer of the Ottoman Chief Budget Office (başmuhasebe kalemî) and was afterwards transferred to the office of life-term tax-farming records to serve as junior clerk (malikâne halifesî). He died on 28 Cemaziyyülahir 1206 AH / 24-2-1792 AD. For more information, see: Süreyya, Sicil-i Osmani, III, p. 762.


cem’an 24,973½ ğuruş 44 akçe
00,352 00 maktu’e-i karye-i Kozana ve maktu’at-ı sa’ire
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25,326½ 44

vech-i meşruh üzere Paşa sancağında vaki’ Sofya ve tevabi’i bedel-i ağnam-ı celebkeşan mukata’aşının senevi ma’ tefavüt ve zamm-ı kadime ve maktu’at ol-mikdar ğuruş mali olub mumallelichenin ber vech-i ithirak malikâne ‘uhdelerinde olduğu defterde mukayyedir ferman-ı devletli ınayetli sultanım hazretlerinindir fi 26 Şevval sene 1190
lump-sum (*maktu’at*), which the beneficiaries of the *malikânê* were supposed to pay into the imperial treasury, amounted to the overall sum of 25,326 ğuruş and 99 akçes.

The second marginal note, which is dated 28 Şevval 1190 AH / 10-12-1776 AD presents the amount of the sheep-tax which had been allotted to the community of Kozani in 1189 AH / 1775-1776 AD. As has already been mentioned, this sum amounted to 163 ğuruş and 70 akçes, which corresponded to the total value of 300 sheep. After Mehmed Sadık Efendi had received this amount from the *voyvoda* of Kozani, representing also the beneficiary of the *malikânê* of Kozani, Fatma Hanım Sultan, he gave a sealed proof of payment to Fatma Hanım Sultan and arranged for this receipt to be enrolled into the imperial registers of taxation. As becomes apparent, the real protagonists in the administration of the tax-farms were the agents who were appointed by the *malikânê*-beneficiaries to act as their financial agents and supervisors. Since the latter constituted in fact a large class of absentee landlords, they delegated the handling of all issues related to the administration of their tax-farms and collection of all accruing tax revenues to individuals who were familiar with and deeply cognisant of the peculiarities of the localities in which they were assigned to operate. In the Ottoman parlance, those individuals who were appointed as agents in a *sancak* were known as *mütesellims*, and those in a *kaza* were

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95 BOA, AE.SABH.I..167-11214: mukata’â-ı bedel-i ağnam-ı celebkeşan-ı karye-ı Kozana tabi-ı kaza-ı Eğri Bucak der liva-ı Paşa vacib-i sene 1189 ber muceb-i defter-i hazine-i ‘amire ağnam 300 rü’us fi 60 akçe
fi sene 18,000 akçe fi her ğuruş 110 akçe
163½ ğuruş 15 akçe

96 BOA, AE.SABH.I..167-11214: bi-her sene kalem-i mezburun malikânê mutasarrıfları taraflarına edası meşrut olmağa bin yüz seksen dokuz senesine mahsunen karye-i mezburun ol-mikdar ğuruş maktu’u mali mukata’â-ı mezbur mutasarrıfı Fatma Hanım Sultan taraflarından voyvodası yedinden ahz ve kabz eylediğini müş’er malikânê mutasarrıfı Mehmed Sadık Efendi memhuren temessûk vermeğin imâdî mehalline kayd
known as voyvodas.⁹⁷ We could assume, therefore, that in this case the voyvoda of Fatma Hanım Sultan was the individual who defrayed in person the sheep-tax allotted to the tax-farm of Kozani, namely the sum of 163 ǧuruş and 70 akçes, to the mütesellim appointed by Mehmed Sadik Efendi. What is more important is the ascertainment of the existence of a third separate tax-farm in Kozani, which operated side-by-side with the malikâne of Kozani, held as has already been mentioned by Fatma Hanım Sultan, and the tax-farm of the poll-tax of Kozani, which was customarily subleased every year to her acting voyvoda. If we add to these three Ottoman state tax-farms the ecclesiastical tax-farms outsourced to the local bishop, it is clearly significant that there were in the 18th-century Kozani four distinct types of tax-farms, which made for a complex and, sometimes perplexing, structure of overlapping agents and officials. Each one was charged with the collection of the taxes attributable to the tax-farm held by his employer, who, as we have already seen, could be the patriarch, an absentee malikâne-beneficiary, or the imperial treasury.

Most of the documents at our disposal refer to feuds between Christian factions and Muslim magnates, vying for the post of voyvoda. I will analyze the nature and structure of these factions and the participation of Muslim dignitaries in their feuds in the next chapter. For the present, I will confine myself to a brief analysis of the procedure, which was followed when a voyvoda was accused of oppression and had to be replaced, or when a voyvoda died during his tenure. I will use two documents, of which the first refers explicitly to the replacement of Manço Osman Ağa, in 1779, after he was accused of being oppressive.
and incapable of administering the tax-farm, and the second to Osman Ağa’s death, in 1781, during his tenure.98

As is evident from the documents, the voyvoda of Kozani99 held his post for a fixed term of one year and, after his tenure was over, he had to present the malikâne-beneficiary with a balance and a financial report of the tax-farm, for the year he had held the post. If the balance was considered accurate, if his administration was just, efficient and productive, and if there were no accusations against him, either from his collaborators or from the population living in the areas comprising the tax-farm, he could be allowed to renew his tenure for one more year. However, the malikâne-beneficiary could follow the opposite direction, since he/she retained for him/herself the right to dismiss his/her representative and deprive him from his rights over tax-collection and involvement in the administration of the tax-farm. All the available documents mention explicitly that “the voyvoda was appointed by the beneficiary of the malikâne [of Kozani]” (malikâne sahibi tarafından voyvoda nasb ve ta’yyin olunub), without providing, however, any additional details as to the terms and conditions of this appointment. We do not know whether the voyvoda of Kozani was appointed by the absentee malikâne-beneficiary merely to supervise the process of the collection of the taxes and dues levied on an annual basis on the local population, or he subleased the post on the basis of the iltizam system, which would turn him automatically into a secondary tax-farmer. Given the present circumstances, this question must remain, for the present, unanswered.

98 BOA, C.ML..27345; BOA, C.ML..27436.
99 For a contemporaneous example in the voyvodas of the neighbouring town of Kara Ferye (today, Verroia) and their status and role within the cycles of the local community and society, see: Anastasopoulos, Ottoman Karaferye, pp. 39-42.
In 1779 the people of Kozani accused Osman Ağa of being corrupt and oppressive, and petitioned for his replacement. Fatma Hanım Sultan dismissed Osman Ağa and replaced him with the Janissary palace guard Ismail “the halberdier” (teberdar). Osman Ağa felt wronged and considered that these accusations were pure calumnies. For this reason, he submitted a written report and petition, wherein he entreated Fatma Hanım Sultan for the annulment of his dismissal and replacement. However, Fatma Hanım Sultan and the responsible Ottoman authorities declined his request and affirmed, through an imperial order, his dismissal and replacement by Ismail.

The document states that Osman Ağa had farmed out the post of voyvoda in the previous two economic years, namely 1191 RC / 1777-1778 AD and 1192 RC / 1778-1779 AD, and he was appointed to the voyvodalık for a third consecutive year, namely for the economic year 1193 RC / 1779-1780 AD, from the beginning of Mart 1193 RC / 12-3-1779 AD until the end of Şubat 1193 RC / 11-3-1780 AD. Osman Ağa claimed in his report that he had paid in advance 16,000 ğuruş to Fatma Hanım Sultan, in order to obtain, directly and without an auction, the right to be the rightful voyvoda, and he had collected and forwarded into the imperial treasury the total sum of the surplus accruing from his contract for the tax-farm (mal-i fa’iz-i mukata’a), the poll-tax (cizye), and the sheep-tax (resm-i celebkeşan). He had received a sealed receipt from the imperial treasury, which testified to the fulfillment of his obligations, and used this receipt as a further proof to verify that he was the original contractor, that he had fulfilled all his obligations, and there was therefore no reason for his dismissal.100

100 BOA, C.ML..27345: bir senelik Martı ibtidasından Şubatı ‘ayyına de chiffin zabt eylemek üzere halan mutasarrıfı ‘ıftellü ‘asmetlü Fatma Hanım Sultan hazretleri tarafından bu kullarına der ‘uğde ve iltizam ve mal-i fa’iz ve cizye ve celebkeşanı tamamen eda ve teslim ve yedime memhuran temessük
Furthermore, he stated that, although he had paid the poll-tax annual returns with a deficiency of 1,000 ğuruş, he managed to cover it and finally paid not only these 1,000 ğuruş, but also an additional amount of 197 ğuruş for the expenses for the collection sacks of the poll-tax (harc-i boğça). The investigation in the imperial registers, undertaken by the imperial-treasury officials, showed that the annual returns of the poll-tax, which was linked with the revenues of the tax-farm and the tax-farm itself, were worth 2,733½ ğuruş without the ma’aş. In addition, the taxpayers had to pay another 300 ğuruş, which accrued from suspended payment and were kept for paying local expenses (mevkuf).

The imperial order, which was issued for Osman Ağa’s dismissal and his replacement by the new voyvoda, stipulated explicitly that the newly appointed voyvoda, a certain Ismail, had to forward to the judge of Kozani the money that Osman had paid in advance into the imperial treasury for the annual returns of the poll-tax, the money of mevkuf taxes (in total, 3,033 ğuruş), the money for the expenses made by the bureau responsible for the compilation of the poll-tax registers (harc-i aklam), and all other necessary expenses (masarrif-i sa’ire), in order to receive from him the poll-tax sacks and the certificate for the collection of the poll-tax, which he was holding as the initial contractor for the economic year 1193 RC / 1779-1780 AD. Accordingly, the judge was instructed to hand the aforementioned sum over to Osman and receive from him the poll-tax sacks and the certificates. Then he had to deliver them to Ismail and assist him in the just allocation, assessment, and collection of the poll-tax, and the remaining fees and taxes. Osman was ordered to follow the requirements of the imperial order and, furthermore, not to interfere

i’ta olunmuşken ve bundan ğayrı mal-i cizye hazine-i ’amireye tamamen eda ve teslim eylemediğinden bin ğuruş noksan teslim etmekle bu kulları muceddedan bin ğuruşu dahi teslim hazine-i ’amire ve harc-i boğça yüz doksan yedi ğuruş ve boğça ahz olunmuşken şimdi sene-i mezkuru ‘asmetüha bu kullarından bi-haber mukata’a-ı mezburu ahara iltizam ve zabtiyçün bir kit’a emr-i’ali isdar etdirüb bu kulları ğadr-i küllü ve cebu’azim etmekle
in the allocation and collection of the taxes and fees, which were by that moment the duty of the new voyvoda.\footnote{101}

As becomes clear, Osman had to be compensated for the damage to his dignity and his pocket, since, although he had been dismissed from his post and duties, the Istanbul authorities and the malikâne-beneficiary showed a particular interest in securing his rights over economic and ethical compensation. For this reason, the overall amount that he had paid in advance had to be refunded to him, before he delivered the poll-tax sacks and the certificates for the collection of the poll-tax to the new voyvoda. Additionally, if this sum was not delivered to Osman, the new voyvoda could not proceed into assuming legally his duties and everything Ismail was about to do, concerning the collection of the poll-tax and the revenues of the mukata’a, would be therefore against the imperial laws and the Shari’a.

According to a petition, written by Fatma Hanım Sultan on 3 Rebi’ulevvel 1195 AH / 27-2-1781 AD, Osman Ağa mediated, in 1781, the contraction for the administration of the tax-farm of Kozani, for the economic year 1195 RC / 1781-1782 AD, on behalf of his two

\footnote{101} BOA, C.ML..27345: Kozana süukkanından Manco Osman nam kimesne doksan bir ve doksan iki senelerine maḥsukan bir takrib ile iltizam edüp ancak mültezim-i merkum zalemenden olduğunu mukata’a-i mezbure re’ayasi taraf-i müşarûn-ileyhayı ihtiyar ve inha etmeleriyle merkum Osman voyvodalıktan ‘ażl ve teberdar-i merkum voyvoda nasb ve ta’yyin olunub lakin mukata’a-i merkumenin cizyesi dahi ötedenberü hatt-i hümâyün mukata’a-i mezbure merbut olduğu cihatden doksan üç senesine mahsukan cizye-i merkumenin boğça berati merkum Osman tarafından ahz olunmağa kaydi re’f’ ve boğça-i mezbure yedinden ahz ve voyvoda-i merkum teberdar Ismail zide kadruhüye teslim etdirlemesi müşarûn-ileyha tarafindan inha ve istid’a olunduğu ecilden hazine-i ‘amirem defterleri tettebu’ etdilerekde cizye-i mezbure mukata’a-i mezbure merbut olmağa ğayr ez ma’as iki bin yedi yüz otuz üç büyük ğuruş mali ile üç yüz üçyüz ğuruş mevkifu voyvoda-i sabik-i merkum Osman tarafından hazine-i ‘amirem tamamen teslim ve berat ve evrak boşçası yedine teslim olunmuş olduğu cizye muhasabesinden der-kenar olmağa bu surette merkum Osman’ın hazine-i ‘amirem teslim eylediği mal-i cizye ve mevkifu olan meblâğ-i mezbur üç bin otuz üç büyük ğuruş ile verdiği harç-i aklam her ne ise voyvoda-i merkum Teberdar Ismail tarafından eda ve teslim bir-le merkum Osman’ın yedinde olan cizye-i merkmeme boşçası ve berati yedinden ahz ve voyvoda-i lahika teslim ve ma’rifetiyle ğuşad ve tevzi’ etdirlemek fermanım olmağın

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sons, Halil Ağa and Ahmed Ağa, who had received a receipt of control and management (zabt temessükü) securing their rights. In order to secure their post even further, Osman and his two sons had forwarded to Fatma Hanım Sultan (she was still the absentee malikâne-beneficiary) 11,000 ğuruş from the surplus of the tax-farm. In the meantime, Osman Ağa died and it became immediately evident that his two sons did not possess the ability to hold and securely manage the tax-farm. Fatma Hanım Sultan ordered their dismissal and replacement by a certain Ebu Bekir Bey, who was the muhtar\textsuperscript{102} of Kozani, and responsible for public security and decorum within Kozani. Ebu Bekir became the new voyvoda and was also given a receipt of control and management.\textsuperscript{103}

The imperial order, which was issued to ratify the appointment of the new voyvoda, commanded that the amount of 11,000 ğuruş and any other revenue collections, which had been done until that moment by Halil Ağa and Ahmed Ağa, be accounted in the account of the new voyvoda. Accordingly, there were required 11,000 ğuruş, plus any other justifiable amount that they would ask, to be extracted from his account and be defrayed by him to the two previous voyvodas as compensation for their disbursements, during their brief tenure. However, a new Order was issued after the death of Osman Ağa, which was

\textsuperscript{102} For the term and office of muhtar see: Salzmann, Tocqueville, p. 159. For a contextualisation of this term, as used to denote a local Muslim notable, and juxtaposition with the Christian kocabaşı, see: Section 3.2.2., pp. 116-123.

\textsuperscript{103} BOA, C.ML..27436: mukaddem Manço Osman Ağa ma’rifetiyle ağulları Halil Ağa ve Ahmed Ağa kullarına ilzam ve yedlerine bir kit’a zabt temessükü i’ta olunmuşu bu esnada Manço Osman Ağa vefat ve ağulları merkuman kullarının zabt ve rabt mukata’a’ya ‘adam ıktidarları dergär olduğunu ve mukata’a-ı mezbura Ebu Bekir Bey nam kimesneye ilzam oluna cümlesinin amn ve istirahatlara ba’as ve badi olacağını re’anya fukarasi tarafımıza ne-i mezbure iltizami merkumanın rakımlarından mir-i muma-ileyhe verilmesini cuyende iltica olmalarıyla mukata’a-ı mezburenin sen-i mezkure iltizami merkuman Halil Ağa ve Ahmed Ağa kulları überlerinden ref’ ve Ebu Bekir Bey kullarına ihale-i tefviz ve yedine bir kit’a zabt temessükü i’ta olunmağıla merkuman kullarının fa’iz-i mukata’a olarak tarafımıza verdiği on bir bin ğuruş için derun mukata’adandı bu ana kadar tahsilatı herne ise voyvoda-i lahik ile hesabını rü’yet ve tahsilatı on bir bin ğuruşdan füzünihade ve tenzil ve baki ne-mikdar mebaoğ verilmesi ıktiza eder ise voyvoda-i lahik-i sabıklara eda ve teslim ve mir-i muma-ileyh kulları doksan beş senesine mahsusan yedinde olan zabname mucervice mukata’a-ı mezbureyi zabt ve rabt eylemesi için bir kit’a emr-i ‘ali ısdar buyurılmak
followed by a thorough investigation by the state of the deceased Osman’s property. A certain Süleyman, who was a silahşor\textsuperscript{104} in the Palace of Topkapi, was appointed and sent to Kozani, with the unique and exclusive duty of investigating the accounts of Osman and his two sons, and the implementation of the terms of his covenant.

As the investigation revealed, the money that Osman had forwarded to Fatma Hanım Sultan, in 1781, allegedly accruing from the surpluses of the tax-farm, formed in reality part of his own property. Süleyman was ordered to interfere and set out the execution of the sultanic orders, whereby, and according to the practice of müsadere, all his cash and estates would be confiscated and escheated to the state. Moreover, it was explicitly set forth that the abovementioned sum of 11,000 ğuruş and all the tax-farms that he had obtained during his lifetime would be also returned to the possession of the state. Süleyman testified in his report that Osman, before he had passed away, paid the sum of 11,000 ğuruş in cash to him, in order to secure his rights over the voyvodalık. After that, the right to farm out and manage the collection of the revenues of the tax-farm of Kozani and the collection of its poll-tax was, as linked with the malikâne, delivered by the state to Osman, with the condition that he would submit on predetermined opportune occasions, after the account of the tax-farm was settled and was ratified by the people of Kozani, the full amount of the annual returns of these revenues and the tax paid for the compilation of the registers.

\textsuperscript{104} A silahşor was a senior member of the first regiment of the kapikulu household cavalry of the Porte, high-ranking member of the Janissary corps, and member of the equestrian guards serving in the retinue of the Sultan. For additional information on this term, see: Pakalin, \textit{Dictionary of Expressions and Terms}, III, p. 226. In Redhouse’s dictionary the term silahşor has the generic meaning of an armed man or a knight. For additional information, see: Redhouse, \textit{A Turkish and English Lexicon showing in English the Significations of the Turkish Terms} (Istanbul: 1890), pp. 1069-1070.
Osman, in his turn, used his influence as a means of bequeathing his rights to his two sons, who briefly succeeded their father in the post. We can therefore deduce that Osman Ağa was ill and frail, and aspired to secure, before his forthcoming death, his post for his male offspring. We should not forget that he had served almost continuously as voyvoda for 20 consecutive years and it is highly plausible that he desired and aspired to use his influence and experience, which he had obtained during his long tenure, as a way to pass on his fortune and estates to his sons and evade their confiscation by the state, a very common measure used by the state, when a prominent notable died after years of service. However, in contrast to grand landlords and a’ıyans, such as the Karaosmanoğlu or the Canıklızades in Anatolia, who managed to evade or survive repeated waves of confiscation of their properties, and pass on their posts and fortunes to their offspring, establishing therefore real semi-autonomous polities ruled by their dynasties, small-scale notables, like Osman Ağa in Kozani, were not successful and it was very rare for their rule to survive more than one generation.\(^{105}\) As will be explained in the next chapter, not all of Osman Ağa’s property was confiscated by the state; a small portion was reserved for his infant children and grandchildren and for his widow, but his family was prohibited from taking part in communal affairs and in the administration of the tax-farm.

The new voyvoda Ebu Bekir Bey was ordered to pay, immediately and under any circumstances, the sum of 11,000 ğuruş for the sake of the state, by forwarding this sum to central state authorities and the imperial treasury. Furthermore, it was ordered that the accounts of the inexperienced Halil and Ahmed be checked according to the requirements of the Shari’a and whatever sums collected by them as revenues for the economic year 1195

RC / 1781-1782 AD were found in their possession, had to be delivered to the new voyvoda. Subsequently, since Ebu Bekir was acknowledged by the state authorities as the sole contractor of revenue-collection for one year the tax farm of Kozani, everybody else was prevented and prohibited from interfering in the management of the tax-farm and in tax collection. The officially recognised lawful new voyvoda was placed under the protection of the local authorities.

The tax-farm of Kozani was administered as a malikâne until c. 1795, when Fatma Hanım Sultan passed away, and the malikâne system was abolished and short-term tax-farming (iltizam) was reinstated. Before that, however, a tax-farm register dated 1786 states that the tax-farm of the hasses of Kozani was farmed out in 1786, for five years, to an unspecified person. Since the tax-farm remained in Fatma Hanım Sultan’s possession, we could suppose that either the state had farmed out the collection of certain taxes and fees, which were not included in and were independent from Fatma Hanım Sultan’s malikâne, or she outsourced her tax-farm to a subcontractor, in order most probably to cover a deficit in her accounts or because the offer surpassed the expected annual revenues generated by the tax-farm of Kozani. Be that as it may, the register explicitly says that the tax-farm of Kozani was farmed out for five economic years, namely from 1 Mart 1201 RC / 22 Cemaziyyülevvel 1201 AH / 12-3-1787 AD until the end of Şubat 1206 RC / 28 Receb 1207 AH / 11-3-1792 AD. The tax-farm’s annual returns amounted at that time to the overall sum of 13,080 ğuruş. From this amount 12,821 ğuruş were delivered to third parties through the method of havale (income assignment) and 259 ğuruş remained (el-baki) as normally collected revenue. We could thus assume that the voyvoda of Kozani had to collect on an annual basis the overall sum of 13,080 ğuruş and then forward, through income assignment

106 BOA, D.HSK.d..25801.
to his superior *malikâne*-beneficiary or to other beneficiaries the sum of 12,821 *ğuruş*, whilst he was expected to keep the remaining 259 *ğuruş* for local disbursements and/or his salary.

The last document explicitly referring to Fatma Hanım Sultan as the beneficiary of the *malikâne* of Kozani is a note, which is dated 1 Zilhicce 1206 AH / 21-7-1792 AD. The note states that the *hassa silahşor* Yusuf, who was also Fatma Hanım Sultan’s steward, submitted to the imperial council a petition written by Fatma Hanım Sultan herself. Fatma Hanım Sultan demanded through her petition the examination of the reports of the Kozanites about the imposition by state officials and tax-collections of a series of arbitrary and additional levies on the prearranged and recorded amount of the ‘avarız’ extraordinary taxes levied on the Kozanite community. She emphasised that this illegal levying of taxes on the taxpayers of her *malikâne* violated profoundly the *serbestiyyet* of the *malikâne* of Kozani and her prerogatives. We do not know what the results of this report were, but we could assume that Fatma Hanım’s interference might have acted to the benefit of the community, which succeeded in retaining the privileged *serbestiyyet* status that its members enjoyed under her administration and protection.107

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107 BOA, AE.SSLM.III..239-13909: Eğri Bucak ve Alasonya kazalarının kazilerine hüküm ki
Fatma Hanım Sultan damet ‘asmetühanın kethüdaları *hassa silahşorlar*’ndan Yusuf dame müdehünün divan-ı hümayunuma takdim eylediği ‘arzuhalı mefhumunda Hanım Sultan-ı müşarının-leyhanın ber vech-i *malikâne* ‘uhdelerinde olan Rum-ıli’nde vaki’ Paşa sancağında Eğri Bucak kazasına tabi’ Kozana karyesi ahalisi elli ‘aded’ *avarız* hanesiyle mukayyed olub bi-her sene üzere edası lazım gelen hisse-i tekhâfiyelerin eda etmeleriyle ziyade şey mutalebesiyle te’addi ve recinde olmaları icab etmez iken kaza-yı mezbür ahalileri hilaf-ı şurut ve muğayır-ı riza nisfiyyet üzere hisse tarhıyla kavye-i mezbür te’ayaları te’addi ve recindeden halı olmadikları beyan birle kavye-i mezburenin mukayyed olduğu hane-i ‘avarızların’ ziyade tekhâf tarh ve tahmiliyle recinde etdirilmemek üzere bir kit’a emr-i şerifim suduruunu tahrir ve istid’a-yı ‘inayet eyledüğü ecelden hazine-i ‘amiremde mahfuz mevkufat defterlerine nazar olandukda zikr olunan Eğri Bucak kazasının üçyüz yıgarı iki buğuc ‘aded’ *avarız* hanesi olduğu ve halen umur-ı şer’iyyesi Alasonya kazasında olan Kozana kazasının dahî elli ‘aded’ *avarız* nüzül haneleri mukayyed-i senevi dörtlüz doksan üç *ğuruş* yigirmi akçe mal-i maktu’ları olduğu mukayyed olub kaza-yı mezbura tabi’ kura ahalileri üzerelerinde
2.6 The tax-farm of Kozani between c. 1795 and c. 1820

The period stretching between c. 1795 and c. 1820 is dominated by the overwhelming figure of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, who, after the imposition in 1787 of his domination over Ioannina had managed to gradually expand his dominions into Albania, Epirus, Western Macedonia, Thessaly, and Southern Greece. For Kozani, this period began with the death of Fatma Hanım Sultan sometime in 1796, after the end of the two-year-long uprising of Georgios Avliotis, and after a 35-year-long holding of the malikâne of the tax-farm of Kozani, and ended with the defeat and execution of Ali Pasha, in 1822. I will use here four documents, of which three were retrieved from the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul and one was published by Salakides.

The first document is a draft text of an imperial order, which is dated 1212 AH / 1797-1798 AD. The document is completely undated, but a posterior note, presumably handwritten by an officer of the Prime Minister’s Archive of Istanbul, informs us that it should be dated that year. The document itself is an official draft (takrir-i ‘ali) of an imperial rescript (hatt-i hümâyun) concerning the deceased Fatma Hanım Sultan. The takrir states that after Fatma Hanım Sultan had passed away, the tax-farm of Kozani remained vacant and without a beneficiary. As the stipulations of the New Order required for all the tax-
farms worth more than 5,000 ğurus, it was escheated to the treasury of the new imperial revenues (irad-i cedid-i hümayun hazinesi).

Before Fatma Hanım Sultan’s death, whilst this tax-farm was ascribed to her and was in her possession, it had always been a freely-managed and administered tax-farm (mukataa-i serbest) and its free status was protected and ratified by the constant issuing of imperial orders. The latter confirmed that, apart from the officers appointed by the beneficiary of the tax-farm, no viziers, governors-general (beylerbeyis), district governors (sancakbeyis), deputy lieutenant-governors and local tax-collectors (mütesellims), or other civil officers were allowed to interfere in the administration of the tax-farm, or in the allocation and collection of taxes. For this reason, after the tax-farm had been attached to the new imperial treasury, there was required a renewal of the free status, through the issuance of a new imperial order.  

The imperial order was issued on 5 Rebi’ulahir 1213 AH / 16-9-1798 AD. It ratified the status of free administration of the tax-farm of Kozani, which, furthermore, ceased to be farmed out on life-term basis, as a malikâne. As the order states, after Fatma Hanım Sultan’s death, the malikâne tax-farm of Kozani was introduced to the esham system, and the 2/3


(note: in bold text are presented erased parts of the original text, whilst in underlined text parts that were added later)
share of the tax-farm were placed under the possession of the new imperial treasury, whereas 1/3 was to be held jointly by Ahmed Salim Bey and Hüseyin ‘Izzet Bey. Nevertheless, the administration of the tax-farm was the duty of the chief treasurer of the new imperial treasury, who, as the order implies, appointed a representative to administer tax-collection and to pay the collected taxes into the new imperial treasury and the pockets of the two abovementioned beys. Although there is no clear reference to the method which was applied for the outsourcing of Kozani’s revenues, we could suppose that Kozani was incorporated into the esham system, in application already since 1774. According to its regulations, the tax-farm was divided in a determined number of shares, which were farmed out on a long-term basis to any interested investor, in return for a prearranged annual payment, which was much higher than the malikâne annual returns. Accordingly, the shareholder enjoyed total freedom in the administration of his portion, which was considered as a quasi-private property. This system was applied in the tax-farm of Kozani by 1798, which was divided into 3 shares.111

In 1801, according to an imperial order issued on 20 Zilka’dé 1215 AH / 4-4-1801 AD, Ali Pasha was accepted and declared as the legal tax-farmer of the revenues of the tax-farm of Kozani. Ali Pasha,112 the then-governor-general of Yanya (today: Ioannina) and superintendent of the mountainous passages and armatoliks of Rumelia, farmed out, directly and without an auction, for one economic year the poll-tax and the extraordinary

111 This ferman is today preserved in the Kobentareios Library of Kozani. For its original Ottoman text and its translation in Greek, see: Salakides, Sultanic Documents, pp. 142-144, 214-215.
levies of the 2/3 of the tax-farm of Kozani, namely the two shares held by the new imperial treasury, in return for the sum of 25,556 ǧuruş, including the tax-farm’s annual returns, its office fees and expenses, and the fee substitute for the value of the leasing transaction. Ali Pasha’s tenure was arranged to begin from 1 Mart 1215 RC / 27 Şevval 1215 AH / 13-3-1801 AD and last a whole economic year, until the end of Şubat 1215 RC / 12-3-1802 AD. The imperial order secured and ratified the free and monopolistic administration (serbestiyyet ve yed-i vahid üzere) of the tax-farm by Ali Pasha and his representatives in Kozani. It also imposed that the poll-tax, ʿavarız, and whatever revenue is further produced, after 1 Muharrem 1216 AH / 14-5-1801 AD, would be, as the old secular law and the common practice required, collected and delivered to the imperial treasury. Nobody else had the right to interfere in the administration of the tax-farm and the collection of its revenues, since it was a monopolistically and freely administered tax-farm. Furthermore, the order commanded Ali Pasha to deliver and pay into the new imperial treasury all sums that would accrue from tax-collection due for the economic year 1215 RC / 1801-1802 AD. An official sealed receipt of debt (memhur deyn temessükü) was deposited in the new imperial treasury by its treasurer, El-Hacc İbrahim Reşid. The order acknowledged the right of tax-collection and administration to the officers, whom Ali Pasha would appoint as his representatives, and to the local judicial authorities, who were commanded to help Ali Pasha and his representatives in the just allocation and collection of taxes, preventing therefore anyone from illegally interfering in the procedure.\(^{113}\)

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\(^{113}\) BOA, C.ML..18398: mukata’at-ı miriyyeden sülüşan hissesi irad-ı cedid-i hümayunum hazinesi tarafından zabt olunan Paşa sancağında vaki’ hassa-yi Kozana ve tevabî’i mukata’ası ötedenberü yed-i vahidden idare olunugelmekle el-haleti hazihi mukata’a-ı mezburu iki yüz on beş senesi Martı ibtidasından ve cizye ve ‘avarızı ikiyüz on alto senesi Muharremi şurresinden bir sene-i kâmile zabt ve rabt eylemek üzere iltizamına talib ve raqib olan halan Yanya sancağı mutasarrıfı destur-ı mükerrem müşir müfahhım nizamü’l-alem vezirizm Debedelenli Ali Paşa adam Allah te’ala aclalahû ya ma’hû
It becomes evident that Ali Pasha used his influence on certain Istanbul officials and managed to secure for himself the leasing of the tax-farm of Kozani. As will be explained in the next chapter, in Kozani there was a strong faction supporting Ali Pasha, already since the mid-1780s. At that time, Ali was still at the beginning of his career and was a prominent and influential low-ranking official and military officer, leader of a large group of irregular soldiers of Albanian (primarily) and Greek origins. His initial tenure lasted, as the document shows, for merely one economic year, but he succeeded afterwards to dominate the political landscape of Kozani and impose his long-term rule over the settlement and the community, which lasted for almost 20 years.

The last document referring to the activities of Ali Pasha in Kozani is a receipt (temessük) written on behalf of Ali Pasha by the superintendent of the imperial mint (nazır-darbhane-i ‘amire), Es-Seyyid Abdurrahman Bey. It bears the date 7 Rebi’ulevvel 1234 AH / 4-1-1819 AD and refers to the tax-farm of Kozani and its leasing by Ali Pasha. As the document states, this tax-farm was always monopolistically held and freely administered.
(serbestiyet üzere) by its tax-farmers; hence it was given, directly and without an auction, under Ali Pasha’s jurisdiction under the condition that it would be monopolistically and freely held and controlled by its tax-farmer, for a whole economic year, namely from the beginning of March 1234 RC / 13-3-1819 AD until the end of Şubat 1234RC / 12-3-1820 AD. Ali Pasha contracted for the administration and collection of the poll-tax and ʻavarız, attached to this tax-farm, which, alongside the annual returns, the fees of the bureau participating in the transaction, the bureau expenses, the farming-out fee, and all accruing interests, amounted to the overall sum of 29,425 /lgurus/. Ali Pasha (or rather his representative in Istanbul) delivered to the treasury of the imperial mint this sealed receipt, in order to pay his debt and deliver the aforementioned sum at the proper and predetermined time. In return for his services, Ali Pasha was allowed to keep any additional produce of any kind, and any dues and tolls, which would accrue during his tenure from the activities of the people, as the old secular law and common practice required.¹¹⁴

As is evident, the tax-farm of Kozani remained under the jurisdiction and administration of the new imperial treasury until 1807, when a Janissary-lead revolution

deposed Sultan Selim III (1789-1807), who was replaced by Mustafa IV (1807-1808), and abolished the New Order and all institutions related to its funding. After the new imperial treasury was abolished, the tax-farm of Kozani passed into the jurisdiction of the imperial mint. The 2/3 of the tax-farm, which had been theretofore administered by the new imperial treasury, passed into the jurisdiction of the imperial mint and 1/3 was jointly held by an unspecified number of investors. Thus, Kozani continued to be administered under the regulations of the esham system and was divided again in 3 distinct shares, 2 of which were administered by the imperial mint and were farmed out on its behalf and 1 which was given to an unspecified number of private investors. Ali Pasha seems to have continued his farming out on a short-term (annual) basis the revenue sources which corresponded to the 2/3 shares, namely those under the possession and jurisdiction of the imperial mint. In 1813, in a register of Ali Pasha’s personal accounts, which records the dealings of Ali Pasha with a certain Gasparis, who was his chief banker stationed at Istanbul, there is a reference that Ali Pasha purchased the remaining uncontracted and unclaimed share of the 1/3 of the tax-farm of Kozani worth 21,581 ğurus and 20 akçes, in order to obtain the right to fully control the tax-farm without any interference of other external parties.

We do not possess any further information about the way Ali Pasha administered Kozani and we do not know who his representatives and appointed tax-collectors were. However, based on the information we possess about earlier periods, we could suppose that Ali Pasha entrusted tax-collection to local notable personalities, who were of course the most prominent among his local supporters. In 1820, when he was officially declared a rebel

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and all his property and tax-farms were confiscated by the state, he presumably lost also control over Kozani and its dependent tax-farms, which returned into the control and direct administration of the imperial mint and, later on, the imperial treasury and its bureau of the imperial \textit{hasses}.

\textbf{2.7. Conclusion}

This chapter provided an insight into the development of the fiscal status of Kozani in a period of empirewide radical changes and reforms. In the early 18th century, Kozani was a \textit{hass} tax-farm subject to the regulations of the \textit{iltizam} system; yet, the \textit{mukata’a} of Kozani was gradually incorporated into the \textit{malikâne} system, a fact which altered significantly its internal fiscal structure, but, as we will see in the next chapter, also determined the intra-communal political landscape and the system of the administration of the Kozanite communal affairs.

This chapter also proved that in Kozani operated four distinct tax-farms. The most important was the \textit{malikâne} of Kozani, which remained for almost 35 years in the possession of Fatma Hanım Sultan, who was a member of the imperial dynasty and the Istanbul-based aristocracy that controlled and manipulated the \textit{malikâne} tax-farming contracts and transactions. The introduction of the \textit{malikâne} brought about the installation

\textsuperscript{116} A \textit{ferman} which is dated 12 Şa‘ban 1249 / 25-12-1833 and is preserved in the Kobentareios Library of Kozani testifies to the fact that the tax-farm of Kozani was at the beginning of the 1830s under the administration of the imperial treasury and the bureau of the imperial \textit{hasses}, and was farmed out on the basis of the \textit{iltizam} system. As an example, in 1248 AH / 1832-1833, the tax-farm of Kozani was outsourced to the then-\textit{vali} of Rumelia, Hüseyin Pasha. Therefore, it seems plausible that the \textit{malikâne} and \textit{esham} systems of tax-farming were abolished in Kozani immediately after the downfall of Ali Pasha. For the original Ottoman text and the Greek translation of this \textit{ferman}, see: Salakides, \textit{Sultanic Documents}, pp. 147-148, 224-225.
of a new official, namely the *voyvoda*, who was always appointed by the absentee *malikâne*-beneficiary to represent her in Kozani, secure her interests, and administer the tax-farm on her behalf. The second most important type of tax-farming comprised the ecclesiastical tax-farms, which were organised on the basis of the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In our case, Kozani was part of the ecclesiastical tax-farms of the bishopric of Servia and Kozani, which covered the territory that had been part of the original *kaza* of Serfice, as the latter appears in the 16th-century Ottoman *tapu tahrir* registers. The poll-tax of Kozani also formed a separate tax-farm, which was directly linked with the *malikâne* of Kozani and was always farmed out on an annual basis and according to the regulations of the *iltizam* system to the *voyvoda* appointed by Fatma Hanım Sultan. Last but not least, Kozani formed part of the extensive tax-farm of the sheep-tax of the bureau of Sophia. This situation proves the complexity of the 18th-century realities and the delicate balance that had taken shape among its constituent parts.

Kozani was also affected by the late-18th-century fiscal reforms, when the *esham* system was introduced during the reign of Selim III, which was an upgraded, but also far more centralised and state-controlled, version of the original *malikâne* system. Ali Pasha exploited in an elaborate manner this new system and succeeded to impose his undisputed domination over Kozani, which was terminated only after his downfall in 1822. Thus, although Kozani was incorporated into Ali Pasha’s domain, the community, despite the strict control exercised by its overlord, succeeded to retain its fiscal integrity and autonomy in the administration of its affairs.

As will be seen in the next chapter, this period of recurring reforms and changes gave impetus to the emergence in Kozani of organised factions, which were set up on the
basis of long-term alliances between Muslim and Christian notables from Kozani and the surrounding areas, who vied for supremacy and control over the affairs of the Kozanite community, with bloody and violent conflicts sometimes erupting among themselves, which gave space for the interference of extra-communal parties into the affairs of the Kozanite community.
CHAPTER III

Communal affairs and bilateral factionalism in Kozani, c. 1750 – c. 1820

In the previous chapter I attempted a description of the structure of the tax-farm of Kozani, which I have examined as a fiscal and administrative unit. In the present chapter I will examine Kozani as a political and social unit. Based on Ottoman primary sources, my aim is to present a thorough analysis and description of the local tax-farm administrators. Accordingly, I will trace the reasons for the formation of factions which vied for supremacy and delved into, sometimes violent and bloody, feuds, which afflicted local society and hampered the local administrative and economic activities.

Furthermore, I will use some published, but to my knowledge heretofore unexploited, Greek sources, in order to trace the position and status of the local Christian notables within the Kozanite society. The latter appear only partially and exceptionally in the Ottoman documents and their role in the feuds among the Muslim officials is not clear. Both Ottoman and Greek documentation provide us with meagre information on the relationship between Muslim and Christian local notables, the schemes of cooperation and/or antagonism forged by them, and how these schemes were used by them to achieve

117 These sources are some unbound documents and two codices of the Metropolitan Church of Agios Nikolaos in Kozani, which are preserved today in the Kobentareios Municipal Library of Kozani. They were initially identified, edited, and published by the Kozanite scholar and amateur historian Michail Kallinderis. For more information see: Michail Kalinderis, Simeiomata Istorika tis Dytikis Makedonias [Historical Notes of Western Macedonia], (Ptolemais: Eparchiaki Phoni, 1939); Michail Kalinderis, Grapta Mnimeia apo ti Dytiki Makedonia Chronon Tourkokratias [Written Monuments from Western Macedonia in the age of the “Tourkokratia”], (Ptolemais: Eparchiaki Phoni, 1940); Michail Kalinderis, Ta Lyta Eggrafa tis Dimotikis Bibliothikis Kozanis, 1676-1808 [The Unbound Documents of the Municipal Library of Kozani, 1676-1808], (Thessaloniki, 1951); Michail Kalinderis, Ai Syntechniai tis Kozanis epi Tourkokratias [The guilds of Kozani during the “Tourkokratia”], (Thessaloniki, 1958).
supremacy and domination over their rivals. Yet, I will try to prove that Kozani was during the 18th century the epicentre of long-term bilateral factionalism,118 with long lasting alliances being formed between Muslims and Christians, and that the factions, which existed and constantly vied for control and supremacy over the tax-farm and the community of Kozani, were formed and directed by Muslims and Christians alike. These factions succeeded to combine forces for each party to achieve its goals and superseded, therefore, any religious and ethnic boundaries.

The Ottoman documents contain more concrete, and thus more easily manageable, information on the feuds among Muslim officers, who vied for the post of the voyvoda and the subsequent control of the tax-farm and the accruing revenues. For this reason, and because Ottoman documents constitute the bulk of my primary sources, I will use them as the foundation of my narration of the events and I will combine, accordingly, their content with that of the Greek sources, in order to decipher the reasons for the creation of the factions.

As will become apparent below, the Kozanite society comprised two distinct groups: a) the Christians who were led by a small but powerful élite of wealthy merchants and the ecclesiastical authorities, represented by the bishop of Servia and Kozani and his agents, and b) a small, but also wealthy and influential, group of Muslims who served as voyvodas of Kozani.

118 I have borrowed this term from Jane Hathaway, who uses it to describe the factional feuds in 18th century Egypt. She calls bilateral factionalism the situation in which “a political culture is dominated by two rival blocs (factions) with no third available”. According to her definition, “membership of these factions is not exclusive to élites, nor are the factions equivalent to households led by élites, rather they incorporate non-élites, notably soldiers and notable members of the community”. These factions rather dichotomise the society and they are inclusive corporations, rather than elitist exclusive organisations. For more information, see: Jane Hathaway, “Bilateral Factionalism in the Ottoman Provinces” in Antonis Anastasopoulos (ed.), Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire, Halcyon Days in Crete V, A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 10-12 January 2003, (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2005), pp. 31-39.
The Kozanite society was a society where all groups coexisted and came into close contact and conflict, which sometimes could be bloody and extremely violent. Furthermore, alliances between Muslim and Christians were commonplace. In order to outmaneuvre their co-religious rivals, each party defended its own interests, but also the interests of their allies of different faiths.

At the same time, since the imperial centre was always absent from local everyday political and economic life, it was only natural that it would attempt to establish strong bonds with the aforementioned factions, Muslim and Christian alike, via the tax-farming system. This allowed imperial magnates to choose a member of the community to act as their representative and responsible for the management of their tax-farm on their behalf and accordingly the payment into their pockets of the annual instalments, which accrued from their investment. Thus, it will be shown that, whilst local notables retained undisputed leadership of their community, as chosen representatives of the imperial centre, the imperial centre was the most predominant paragon of legalisation of the economic and administrative activities and status of the local notables.

3.1. 18th-century Ottoman notables and magnates in modern bibliography

Before we present the protagonists in the Kozanite communal affairs, an outlining of the basic theories on 18th-century Ottoman notables and magnates seems in order. During the last three decades modern scholarship made pioneering and brave efforts to revise the decline model, which supported the idea of the irreversible decline of the Ottoman Empire, and establish a new paradigm that would offer new ways of interpretation. What follows is a presentation of the major opinions about local notables as they are expressed in the works of the most prominent scholars who have dealt with the local notables and their rise in
prominence during this transitional period. Each scholar’s approach offers the potential of a unique interpretation of the events that led to the domination of local notables and made the central state recognise them as the protagonists in provincial politics.

In the last two decades scholarship has witnessed the publication of two prominent collective works on Ottoman and Turkish history. The first was initially published in 1994. Inalcik and Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). This work is a pioneering effort of a group of the most prominent Ottomanists to analyze and present a thorough examination of the six centuries long economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, taking into consideration all new revision theories concerning the creation and evolution of the Ottoman governmental, socio-economic and political structure of the Ottoman state.


I do not intend to present the content of these four volumes, because such an effort is outside the scope of the present study. I am going to refer only to the contributions made by Deena R. Khoury, Fikret Adanir and Bruce Masters examining the emergence of local notables and semi-autonomous forces in the Ottoman provinces.

119 Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Deena R. Khoury presents a critical analysis of the bibliography on local notables.\textsuperscript{121} She calls the strengthening of local notables “localisation”, by which term she means a reproduction of the organisation and structure of imperial models of political rule in the Ottoman periphery. This should not to be viewed in strictly fiscal and administrative terms, but rather as a bipolar relationship between the state and local provincial élites, which legitimised their role and position in the Ottoman polity. This resulted eventually in the “Ottomanisation” of the peripheral élites, which was the reason why the Ottoman periphery remained a part of the Ottoman Empire, despite the loosening of the administrative control exerted by Istanbul.\textsuperscript{122}

Fikret Adanir’s contribution examines the rise of a’ýans in Rumelia and Anatolia.\textsuperscript{123} According to his ideas, the most important factor favoring the development of local autonomy was collective liability, which means the obligation of an individual to act in solidarity with other members of a corporate community through which he acquired legitimate civil status. Such corporate societies, whether they were urban or rural, communal or occupational, Muslim, Jewish or Christian, created an ineluctable social cohesion. These societies were represented by their elected leaders and an elected body of elders, who defended the rights of their community vis-à-vis the central state authorities and the provincial administrative officers. Thus, they acquired a certain degree of respect, prestige and wealth, which allowed them to develop in times of crisis their own policy. For Adanir, Rumelian a’ýans and local notables (Muslim and Christians alike) gained in prominence due to the privileged position as representatives of their communities. Thus,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{121} Dina R. Khoury, “The Ottoman centre versus provincial power-holders: an analysis of the historiography” in \textit{Cambridge History of Turkey: The Later Ottoman Empire}, pp. 133-156.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Khoury, \textit{The Ottoman centre}, pp. 136-137, 155-156.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Fikret Adanir, “Semi-autonomous provincial forces in the Balkans and Anatolia” in \textit{Cambridge History of Turkey: The Later Ottoman Empire}, pp. 157-185.
\end{itemize}
because they were recognised by the state as intermediaries between the state and the common people they were allowed to participate in the tax-farming system from which in turn they gained wealth and power. Moreover, the a’yan distinguished themselves as responsible leaders of the communities that they represented, whilst they were the only trustful personalities upon whom Istanbul could rely for revenue collection and participation in wars with their armed retinues. Thus the most two important factors for the a’yans’ acquiring a protagonist role in the Ottoman political landscape during the 17th and 18th centuries were the autonomous feelings that the local communities had developed as corporate and self-governed entities, and the participation of local community leaders and local notables in the tax-farming and revenue-collection systems.124

Bruce Masters describes and analyzes the formation of semi-autonomous forces in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, a vast and diverse part of the Ottoman lands whose character was determined by geography and historical precedent. During the 18th century every province witnessed a rise in the influence of personalities who challenged the Ottoman monopoly of power. He divides these personalities in four distinct and broad categories: 1) tribal/ clan-based groups, 2) neo-Mamluks, 3) Ottoman military forces, and 4) local a’yans. All these local power figures gained significant autonomy, but neither total nor permanent independence from Istanbul. The basic reason for their impotence was their inability to construct an effective political base or to resist the interference of Istanbul in local interests and their lack of an ideology independent from the Ottoman imperial ideologies.125

124 Adanir, Semi-autonomous provincial forces, pp. 162-172.
For comparative purposes, it would be useful to present the contents of Jane Hathaway’s monograph on 17th and 18th-century Egyptian history, which examines the characteristics and structure of the Qazdağlı household/faction, the undisputed protagonist in Egyptian politics at the time.\textsuperscript{126} Hathaway considers the Qazdağlis a product of the hybrid administrative system applied by the Ottomans after their conquest of Egypt, which had incorporated elements from both the pre-Ottoman late Mamluk and the classical Ottoman military establishments. According to Hathaway’s narrative, the basic pillar of 17th and 18th-century Egyptian politics was the household and the vertical and horizontal relations formed among its members, but also the relations of the household with various institutions, such as the Porte and the chief black eunuchs of the imperial harem who were exiled to Egypt. Hathaway emphasises that it was not the individual figures who played the decisive role in 17th and 18th-century Egyptian politics, but the households as collective institutions. This resembles the image that we have for the grand Anatolian a’yans, who also formed their own dynasties and households in order to promote their interests and establish their domination over extensive areas. Yet, in Egypt the household was a development of a centuries-old institution which had flourished long before the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517. Hathaway’s examination of the structure of the Qazdağlı household sheds light on the mechanisms of reproduction of its members and the relations formed among themselves within the household. The author thus proves that the Egyptian households were complex and hierarchically organised entities which promoted their interests and established their domination through multifaceted alliances and confrontations with other households and institutions.

The second collective work is the An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, from which I will refer to Bruce Mc Gowan’s contribution to the subject of the rise of the local notables.\(^{127}\) His initial monograph on the a’yan is his seminal Economic Life in Ottoman Empire: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, where he tried to describe the transformation of the Ottoman economy during the 17th and 18th centuries and to prove, under the influence of Immanuel Wallerstein’s theories, that the transformation of the Ottoman landholding regime was a result of the incorporation of the Ottoman economy into the European world economic system. The local magnates gathered into their hands by legal and illegal means the most fertile land and formed huge enclosed landholdings (çiftlik) where they produced what the Western European economies demanded as raw material to be exported, often in violation of Ottoman regulations and laws. The wealth that they accumulated from their mercantile activities was used as capital invested in landholding and for financing the bankrupt central imperial treasury and thereby obtaining total control over the imperial decision making.\(^{128}\)

In the Age of the Ayans he returns to the same subject and describes the conditions that contributed to the empowerment of local magnates in the Rumelian, Anatolian and Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. According to McGowan’s narrative, the crisis in and decline of the Janissaries and other military corps of the Ottoman army and the change in the nature of the provincial governors, who by the beginning of the 18th century ceased to be individuals with a military background, were the basic reason for the rise of local notables and magnates. This development signaled a shift of gravity towards provincial urban centers, where the most prominent a’yans resided.

\(^{127}\) Bruce McGowan, The Age of the Ayans, pp. 637-758.
The basic trait of the Ottoman 18th century was the blurring of existent dichotomies and career backgrounds, and the violation of all rules concerning and regulating landholding, with a general assault on state-owned (miri) lands. Local provincial élites and newly-formed central élites achieved domination by participating in the tax-farming system. In this way a’yans and bankers, who financed the tax-farming system and were indispensable for its smooth operation, managed to take over from older élites and to become the real 18th-century protagonists.

McGowan also makes a distinction between the two generations of a’yans. First he describes the first generation of lesser a’yans, who were by-products of tax-farming and of interference in the management of their communities. These people were the intermediaries between central state authorities and their communities, as they undertook the responsibility for tax collection and money-lending to villagers and poor urban centre dwellers, something that helped them gain prestige, respect and power. From the ranks of these lesser local notables emerged a second generation of local magnates who formed a select group of grand a’yans who were warlords, since they gained power by force and quasi-official networks. This second generation made its appearance in the late-18th century catastrophic wars against Russia and Austria, when they mustered their own militias, formed of men residing in their territories, and offered them to the central state to fight its external enemies. They thus managed to establish direct communication links with Istanbul and exploit the desperate needs of the Ottoman state for soldiers. For this reason, by saving the Ottoman state, they seized total control over vast territories, thus accelerating the decentralisation of political power.¹²⁹

Robert Zens’s article on the provincial power holders and their importance in defining 18th-century Ottoman history is also worth mentioning. In this article Zens criticises the methods traditionally used by older scholars to analyze the *a’yan* phenomenon and proposes a model for the study of local notables according to their common characteristics regardless of the space they lived in. As Zens says, we should always keep in mind that *a’yan* come in all shapes and sizes. By the early 18th century this term became significant and begun to be applied to people who were much more than notables in a certain neighborhood, in a certain city or even in a certain district but rather exercised empirewide political influence.

During the 18th century two different groups existed and carried the title *a’yan*. The first and the most widespread were small local notables who through their wealth, their local influence and power bases could stand apart from the rest of the local population and serve as intermediaries between the *reaya* (taxpayers) and state officials or Istanbul central authorities. However, by the mid-18th century, most of them were under the control of large-scale *a’yan* who totally dominated the historical landscape. Most of these lesser *a’yan* were easily recognisable because they held a certain name (*nisba*) which denoted their ethnicity, family or geographic origin, occupation or a personal trait. This was the case with the late 18th-century Muslim notables of Kozani who bore the titles *ağa*, *bey* and *teberdar*. The second group is the grand *a’yan* who exerted influence over extensive territories and networks of power, and received official recognition by the state and gradually transformed into dynasties.

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A’yan held some basic characteristics which offered them recognition and respect by the central state. The first and most important was an a’yan’s attachment to the Ottoman land tenure, revenue-raising and tax-farming systems. Another important aspect of the a’yan’s role was their being indispensable as the front line of the defense for the state, since they were the only ones who had the means to gather armies and lead them to the battlefields. They used this ability to achieve and receive legitimacy in the eyes of the central government and also within their localities and societies. The a’yan were also used and were accepted as the basic organs for just administration and providers of security within their localities against oppressive policies of local and state officials.

Canay Şahin’s dissertation on one of the most prominent a’yan families of 18th-century Anatolia is also a revisionist attempt at examinign the history of 18th-century Ottoman notables.131 Şahin’s essay examines not only the fortunes and history of the Caniklizâde family, but also focuses on the position of this grand a’yan family in the general context and the relations of this family with Istanbul and lesser a’yan. The latter were acting as partners of the broader network or as associates and financial administrators and stewards of the Caniklizâde properties. Şahin analysed the role of iltizam and malikâne tax-farming in the emergence of the a’yan, and presents two distinct ways of the emergence of notables, namely the “ayanization” of officials who came to a locality from outside and emerged as its leading figures and the “officialization” of local a’yan who acquired posts and offices in the Ottoman administrative and state hierarchy.

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The next work worth mentioning is an article written by Deena R. Sadat in 1972.\textsuperscript{132} It is a brief essay referring to the reasons of the rise of the local notables in Rumeli in the 18th century. Sadat worked, just like Bruce McGowan, under the influence of Immanuel Wallerstein’s theories of socio-economic dependence, core/periphery relationship, and the theories of the world-economy systems.\textsuperscript{133} She argues that the basic reasons for the empowerment of the local magnates was the chaotic situation in Rumeli, the decline of central authority and the incorporation of the Ottoman economy into a broader and dominated by the economic system of the Western European states, which gave local notables the opportunity to enrich themselves and dominate the political and socio-economic landscape. She also describes the process of the emergence of the çiftlik extensive landed properties controlled by the a’yanls, the relationship between the a’yanls and the local populations, and the relations among a’yanls.

I have also examined two fairly recent monographs which encapsulate the critical and revisionist spirit of modern Ottomanist historiography. The first monograph is Karen Barkey’s Empire of Difference, The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective\textsuperscript{134}, which presents thoroughly the Ottoman history as a product of the relationship between the centre and periphery, and of the role of the central state as an adroit broker through mediation and negotiations among the numerous competing networks of power. Barkey defines the Ottoman Empire as a “negotiated” enterprise where each locality was approached and handled in a different fashion and always according to its needs and traditions.

\textsuperscript{133} The two most prominent monographs presenting Emmanuel Wallerstein’s theories are his The Capitalist World-Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) and Historical Capitalism (London: Verso, 1983).
\textsuperscript{134} Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference, The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
Consequently Barkey’s perception of the Ottoman 18th century is a period of transformation and adaptation to new needs, through a renegotiation and new interpretation of the patterns of governance which defined the Ottoman centre-periphery relationship. Barkey argues that the spread of tax-farming, especially after the introduction of the life-term malikâne contracts in 1695, and the commercialisation of the Ottoman economy during the 18th century with the emergence of an indigenous Ottoman merchant class that comprised both Muslims and non-Muslims resulted in the empowerment of the periphery and strengthening of its position vis-à-vis the centre. The latter accepted the local actors, both merchants and notables, as the protagonists in the process of reworking the élite networks. The notables redefined their relationship with the centre through the acquisition of de facto leadership of their communities, tax-farming concessions, and the exploitation of their newly-formed extensive landed properties and trade opportunities. The notables were characterised in the 18th century by a somewhat “transitional modernity”, which was coupled with the modernisation and development of various sectors of the Ottoman governance and economy. It becomes clear that Barkey realised the 18th century as a period of modernisation and experimentations initiated by the redefined and modernised centre-periphery relationship.\textsuperscript{135}

The second monograph is Ali Yaycioğlu’s \textit{Partners of the Empire, The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions}\textsuperscript{136}, which attempts a holistic and radical reading of the history of the Ottoman Empire in a tumultuous period dominated by the collapse of the domination of the centre over the periphery. Yaycioğlu argues that the local notables and magnates were by-products of their very Ottomanism, which they could not break away

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{135} Barkey, \textit{Empire of Difference}, pp. 226-263.
\end{footnotesize}
from, nor follow a path outside the 18th and early-19th-century Ottoman cosmos. Therefore, although they profited from the profound weakness of the centre they defended the integrity and existence of the Ottoman polity, because the latter constituted the only environment in which they could realise themselves. This power vacuum was the factor that allowed them to rise in prominence and in the end determine in a decisive manner the path of the Ottoman Empire towards modernity, vis-à-vis the advent of nationalism among its subjects, whilst producing their own political culture through patronisation of the arts and letters in their localities. According to Yaycioğlu’s narrative, the history of the Ottoman polity in this period was not a linear process leading to the unavoidable collapse of the Ottoman Empire, but the result of continuous negotiations between the centre and the periphery. Moreover, it was the product of conscious choices made conjointly by the centre and the periphery that led to the experimentation with, and adoption or discarding of, a large variety of theories of governance. It is also worth mentioning that Yaycioğlu considers tax-farming concessions and the emergence of çiftlik not a result of the decline of the control of the centre over the periphery, but rather a direct expression of the periphery’s autonomous political and economic role.\footnote{Yaycioğlu, \textit{Partners of the Empire}, pp. 117-156.}

It is now acceptable that these two monographs express the new revisionist ideas of modern Ottomanist historiography in that both Barkey and Yaycioğlu perceive the events of this turbulent period not as a sign of decline and unavoidable succumption of the Ottoman polity to the superiority of the West, but as an internal process of the Ottoman polity, which showed signs of autonomous historical development and depth in concordance with its historical traditions and not by sheer and maladroit imitation of Western patterns of governance. This approach is in stark contrast to the approaches of
earlier adherents to orientalism, who advocated the “profound inferiority and backwardness” of the East vis-à-vis the West.

3.2. The structure of the local communal administrative mechanism

It is now time to proceed with the analysis of the profile of the protagonists in the events that will be examined below. The community of Kozani was led, administered, and represented before the administration by a triumvirate which comprised three individuals who represented three distinct institutions of high prestige and exalted status. These institutions were a) the local voyvoda, who represented and defended the interests of the absentee beneficiary of the malikâne of Kozani before the local community and the state authorities and officials, b) the local bishop, namely the supreme ecclesiastical authority within the limits of the Kozanite community, and c) the kocabaşi of Kozani, who was a layman elected by the community to administer the affairs of the community, whilst he was expected also to represent the interests of the community before the state and church officials. The members of the communal triumvirate based their status and power on their wealth and prestige which they accumulated from their economic and administrative activities. In brief, we could argue that the triumvirate constituted the highest-ranking functionaries in Kozani and comprised, of course, the wealthiest, most prestigious, and most powerful elements in the Kozanite society.

I have already examined the function and role of the vovyvoda of Kozani in the previous chapter, which revealed the importance and complexity of his role as the representative of the absentee malikâne-contractor and regulator of the process of the allocation and collection of the taxes and dues levied on an annual basis on the Kozanite population. Suffice it to repeat here that the vovyvoda was in fact the highest economic and political authority in Kozani and was, for this reason exactly, answerable for his actions directly to his superior malikâne-beneficiary. In reality, the vovyvoda functioned outside the official state hierarchy, for, even in cases that he was accused of misbehavior or mismanagement by the local kadı or the community, it rested always with Fatma Hanım Sultan to choose whether her vovyvoda would be sacked and chastised or retain his position and authority. Nevertheless, as will be shown immediately below, if a given vovyvoda were to survive and perpetuate his tenure, he had to develop a harmonious relationship and work together with the church and its chief representative, the bishop, as well as the community and its elected leader, the local kocabaşı.\(^{139}\) I will now immediately proceed to the presentation of the role which the local bishop and the Christian kocabaşı notable and communal leader played in the local socio-economic and political arena, as they appear in the available documentation.

3.2.1. The role of the bishop of Servia and Kozani

The role and status of the local bishop are presented in the two ferman of appointment, which, as I have already mentioned in the previous chapter, were issued on

\(^{139}\) Anastasopoulos, *Ottoman Karaferye*, pp. 25-26, 39-42, where we see the same for the vovyvoda of Kara Ferye.
16 Şevval 1199 AH / 22-8-1785 AD, for the Bishop Theofilos, and 15 Şa’ban 1230 AH / 23-7-1815 AD, for the Bishop Veniamin, respectively. Because *fermans* were documents that were produced by the Ottoman chancellery, they reflect the point of view of the Ottoman administration, which always sought to define in more detail the role, the rights and prerogatives, and the duties of the functionaries representing it. We should keep in mind that the high-ranking church officials, such as the patriarch, the metropolitans, and the bishops were in the eyes of the administration Ottoman state functionaries and tax-farmers. As the documents show, the bishop of Servia and Kozani operated as a) spiritual and religious leader of his flock, b) judge and notary to his community and flock, and c) state and ecclesiastical tax-collector entrusted with the collection of the numerous state and ecclesiastical taxes that were levied on the flock. I have already mentioned, in the previous chapter, the duties that the bishop performed when he operated as ecclesiastical tax-farmer within the limits of his diocese. I have also presented the taxes that he was expected to collect from his flock and pay, either directly or through his superior metropolitan of Thessaloniki and the patriarch in Istanbul, into the imperial treasury. I will refer here to the first two categories, which prove that the bishop operated also as an ecclesiastical leader and a civil functionary, entrusted with a set of tasks related to the unrestrained performance of his religious and spiritual duties towards his flock and the smooth operation of the socio-economic life of his community.

According to the two *fermans* under examination, the duties, privileges, and prerogatives of the bishop of Servia and Kozani can be described as follows:

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140 For the tax-farming duties of the bishop of Servia and Kozani, see: Section 2.3., pp. 33-44.
141 For the original texts and Greek translation of these two *fermans*, see: Salakides, *Sultanic Documents*, pp. 23-40, 205-209, 217-221. Salakides provides a transliteration and translation of the
1) As spiritual and religious leader, the bishop was entrusted with the performance and observance of the canonical correctness of the religious habits of his flock (icra-yi ayınleri). The bishop was responsible for the maintenance of the existing churches, monasteries, and other religious foundations, whose expropriation by the local authorities, officials, and military officers, unless the administration issued a relevant document expounding the reasons of and decreeing their expropriation, was strictly forbidden. The bishop was also expected to oversee the construction of new churches and religious foundations, and communicate such cases to his two superior ecclesiastical authorities, namely the metropolitan of Thessaloniki and the Orthodox patriarch in Istanbul, who would in his turn secure the issuance of a ferman decreeing and ratifying their construction. The bishop also supervised the religious validity of the marriages and divorces of his flock, which whenever committed without his approval were deemed invalid, whilst meddling of other Christian laypeople or non-Christian officials therein was strictly forbidden. Furthermore, certain sacraments, such as baptising of sickly infants and marriages of members of the flock, were allowed to take place at their homes, provided always that “they did not raise their voices and use swear words”. Ultimately, the bishop was proclaimed the defender of his flock, because any attempts at violent and compulsive conversion of members of the flock to Islam was officially denounced and prohibited. This shows also the desire of the

original texts of these two fermans. I did not have access to the original documents and, since their text has not yet been published elsewhere, I relied exclusively on Salakides’ reading and translation. \footnote{The conversion of non-Muslims to Islam was not, of course, forbidden, but was controlled and, even, discouraged, because the administration was always afraid of losing control of its taxation basis, due to the loss of non-Muslim taxpayers who were burdened with a series of taxes that the Muslim population was not expected to pay. The most typical example of such a tax was, of the poll-tax (cizye). For a modern approach to this issue and the phenomenon of the conversion to Islam during the 17th century, see the pioneering monograph of Marc David Baer, Honored by the Glory of Islam, Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).}
administration to protect its non-Muslim subjects and thus preserve its taxation and revenue base.\textsuperscript{143}

2) The bishop was officially recognised as the judge and notary of the community and entrusted with the responsibility of the examination and judging of their cases falling within the domain of the Roman civil law, which was applied in the marriages and divorces, contracts, and generally in the intra-communal dispute resolution system. This is further established if one examines the contents of the 18th and early 19th-century codices of the bishopric of Servia and Kozani, which include a large variety of contracts agreed upon by members of the flock, promissory and dowry notes and letters, and the regulations pertaining to the operation of the guilds of Kozani, which formed the cornerstone of the economic and commercial life of Kozani and its surroundings. All these documents, before they were recorded in the episcopal codices, had been submitted to, read, and undersigned by the bishop and his counselors as explicit sign of his approval. We could thus argue that the bishop did not merely serve as a judge and notary to his flock, but he was in reality the regulator of the economic life of the community which he presided over.\textsuperscript{144}

3) The bishop of Servia and Kozani enjoyed also a series of privileges and prerogatives which highlighted and further strengthened his leadership position within the cycles of the bishopric and the local community, whilst they shielded him from slander or any meddling into his affairs from laypeople or antagonist clerics aspiring to dethrone him and occupy his post. The bishop enjoyed the exclusive right to chastise any subordinate clerics, such as parish priests, monks, nuns, and abbots, whenever they violated the canon law and church regulations. As examples of such an anti-canonical behaviour we could cite a) the

\textsuperscript{143} Salakides, Sultanic Documents, pp. 72-73, 79-80.
\textsuperscript{144} Salakides, Sultanic Documents, p. 71.
commotion and upheaval caused by wandering monks and nuns in search of funds, who were to be chastised and sent promptly back to their monasteries, b) the refusal of clerics to pay state taxes, who could then face removal from office, and c) the mismanagement of church and monastic property, with the bishop standing as guarantor of its integrity, which could lead again to removal of office and imprisonment of those held responsible thereof. The bishop was also exclusively responsible for the imprisonment of clerics and laypeople found guilty of punishable violations of the ecclesiastical or state laws and regulations, because, even in cases where such clerics and laypeople were sentenced by Islamic courts, the bishop was entrusted with the enforcement of their imprisonment and the observance of the conditions and circumstances of their detention. The bishop was also expected to inform the authorities about their mental condition and, when their correction was deemed complete, he could demand and arrange that they be set free.145

Whenever the bishop was involved in cases as a defendant accused of committing an offense against the ecclesiastical or state law, he enjoyed a series of privileges which protected him from slander or conspiracies for his dethronement. The bishop was officially declared independent and unaffected by local judicial and administrative authorities. His status was further emphasised by the fact that any imperial decrees and orders, which had been issued by the administration after his prosecutors had asked for the issuance of such an order or decree, were not to be applied until the case of the bishop had been presented and examined before the imperial council (divan-i hūmayun). Furthermore, the bishop was to be summoned in person and examined exclusively before the imperial council, especially in cases where he was accused of offenses against the Shari’a. Last but not least, the local judicial and administrative authorities were commanded to pay attention to problems, such

145 Salakides, Sultanic Documents, pp. 73-75.
as intrigues for the succession of the bishop and disputes among lower-ranking clerics, which might arise due to the, sometimes prolonged, absence of the bishop from his diocese to Istanbul or whatever place the imperial council was to meet.\textsuperscript{146}

The bishop was also protected from any interference in his affairs and the imposition of undue fees, dues and taxes from the military cycles in return for armed protection or money. This provision addressed the janissaries and çavuşes who served in conformance to the intiyazat principles of protection of high-ranking officials as his guards (yaşakçis). The administration also recognised to the bishop a privilege granted to the members of the ʿaskeri class, namely the right to ride freely and tour his diocese on horseback. This could be considered a great offense by Muslim conservative circles, who did not welcome the idea of a non-believer riding a horse and thus enjoying the same rights as they did. The importance of the use by the hierarchs of symbols of their status and authority is further emphasised in the provision which stipulates that, whenever the bishop “holds in his hand the crosier designating his rank, the beylerbeyis, sancakbeyis, the mütesellims (representatives of and substitutes for the latter two), the mütevellis (trustees of pious foundations), the nazîrs (superintendents), the voyvodas (representatives of malikâne-holders) and zabits (police officers) of villages, and the janissary commanders (serdars) and palace guard officers (bostani hasekiler) ought not meddle into his affairs or interfere with and hamper the performance of his duties”. To that end, the bishop was also protected from high-ranking Ottoman officials and tax-collectors, who when visiting the areas within the limits of his diocese demanded that they lodge in his, often excessively luxurious, residence. Another important prerogative which the bishop enjoyed was the protection from the creditors of his predecessors, who were not allowed to interfere in any way with his affairs and demand

\textsuperscript{146} Salakides, \textit{Sultanic Documents}, pp. 74-75.
him to pay off the loans, which they had agreed upon with his predecessors and remained in
arrears.\footnote{Salakides, \textit{Sultanic Documents}, p. 82.} We will examine below a characteristic case of such demands, namely the
dispute between the creditors of the bishop Ignatios and his successor, Theophilos, who was
asked by the creditors to acquit his predecessor’s debts immediately after Theophilos’
ascension in 1785 to the throne.

The bishop was also responsible for the handling and administration of the property
of the Orthodox clerics, and monks and nuns residing in monasteries within the limits of his
diocese, who died without heirs. It is a well-known fact that the members of the families of
the Orthodox clerics were allowed to inherit the properties of their deceased relatives, who
were in any case allowed to determine through their will the entailing of their estates and
possessions. The situation could be perplexed, however, in cases where clerics died without
heirs. The pre-Tanzimat Ottoman legal system, which comprised both the Shari’a and the
sultanic \textit{kanun}, provided that in cases where an individual passed away without heirs, this
individual’s property was considered unoccupied and ownerless, and passed under the
authority of the \textit{mevkufat} bureau, through which it was either escheated to the state or
bestowed on a pious foundation (\textit{vakıf}). The two \textit{ferman}s under examination stipulate
explicitly that the bishop and the church were entitled to inherit the properties of the
deceased heirless bishops, priests, monks, and nuns, and, whenever the bishop or his
representatives took control of these properties on behalf of the state, the officials of the
fisc (\textit{beytü’l-mal}), the \textit{kassams} (officials charged with the registration of properties
escheatable to the state), the trustees of the pious foundations, the heads of the \textit{mevkufat}
bureau, the superintendents, the local \textit{voyvodas} and \textit{timar}-holding police officers
(subaşı\textsuperscript{148}), and their men were denied any right of meddling into the details of this procedure, which they did really often, by arguing that such properties had been recorded in the registers of the imperial treasury as their own income sources. This clause further emphasises the role of the bishop as protector and trustee of the ecclesiastical and monastic property located within the limits of his diocese, for, as has already been mentioned above, the bishop was held responsible and accountable to his flock, the Patriarchate, and the administration for its preservation and perpetuation. The state, on the other hand, aiming always at the maximisation of its revenue base entrusted the local prelate with the duty of the preservation and exploitation of the ecclesiastical property located in his diocese, because the wise exploitation of the ecclesiastical property was expected to bring about an augmentation in the revenues of the bishopric and thus to the tax, which the bishop paid every year through his superior metropolitan and the patriarch into the imperial treasury. The preservation and augmentation of the ecclesiastical property was further encouraged by the clause which stipulated that all the wills of deceased laypeople in favour of the church and high-ranking clergy were to be executed without undue delays or deficiencies, and despite the protests of the heirs. Whenever disputes arose between the clergy and the heirs of the deceased bequeathers, such disputes were to be examined in the local Muslim courts, where the testimonies of the Christians were to be heard and accepted equally with those of Muslims. This was extremely important, because, as is well-known, in Ottoman Muslim courts the non-Muslims were seldom allowed to testify, and, even in such cases, their testimonies were only reluctantly accepted as a secondary source of information.\textsuperscript{149} As becomes apparent, the bishop was, due to his

\textsuperscript{148} Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, pp. 51, 154.
\textsuperscript{149} Salakides, Sultanic Documents, pp. 74, 81.
multifaceted role, a powerful figure, who stood at the pinnacle of the intra-communal hierarchy.

3.2.2. The role of the kocabaşı as the leader of the Kozanite community

The kocabaşı secured the smooth functioning of the socio-economic life and tax-collection system, but was only occasionally recognised by the Ottoman administration. The kocabaşı played the role of the leader of his community, which he represented before the authorities and administration. We should keep in mind that in the Ottoman Empire terms such as “community”, “communal institutions” and “representative administration” did not exist and were thus not used by the Ottoman bureaucrats. Nevertheless, the administration recognised the existence of communities, for which there was used the term ahali, which means literally “the population”, and communal leadership, which was denoted through a variety of terms depending on the religion, scale of participation, and importance of the communal leader, among which we could cite the terms ihtiyar, muhtar, eşraf, vücuh, ekabir, and emasil.¹⁵⁰ The most common term, however, was the a’yans, which means literally “the eyes”, but in the Ottoman administrative jargon came to denote during the 18th century the most powerful provincial notables. As has already been discussed, the a’yans monopolised the tax-farming contracts and accumulated wealth and prestige, which they invested in their attempts at enhancing their positions. Thus, by taking advantage of the

¹⁵⁰ These terms, despite their synonymy with the term a’yans, also have their own special meaning. Thus, ihtiyar can be translated as elder or chosen, muhtar as a chosen or elected community headman, eşraf as noble, honourable or rich individual, vücuh as notable person, ekabir as the greatest and most important, and emasil as most eminent. It is obvious that all these terms denote the supremacy and pre-eminence of their bearers. For additional information, see: Shariat-Panahi, Aspects of the Society of Thessaloniki, p. 255; Redhouse, Turkish and English Lexicon, pp. 43, 120, 169, 193, 1773, 2129.
loosening of the state control over the provincial administration during the 18th century, they distinguished themselves as responsible leaders and \textit{de facto}, if not \textit{de jure}, protectors of the communities, which they came to represent. Furthermore, the Porte was well aware that these individual leaders, apart from protecting their communities and villages, were the only trustworthy personalities to rely upon for the organisation of the collection of taxes and revenues, and participation in wars with their armed retinues. Thus, we could argue that the \textit{a’yan} notables were the “eyes and ears” of the Porte in the provinces, operating as the organ responsible for the observation of the smooth organisation of their communities.\footnote{Adamir, \textit{Semi-autonomous Provincial Forces}, p. 172; Shariat-Panahi, \textit{Aspects of the Society of Thessaloniki}, p. 255-256.}

The bibliography on the Christian notables is deficient, if non-existent, because the vast majority of the monographs examining the 18th-century Ottoman notables focus on the Muslim grand \textit{a’yans}, whilst the lesser ones are either overlooked altogether (especially the Christian ones), or presented without an in-depth analysis of their characteristics.\footnote{For an exception to this rule see the following monographs which focus on and expound the institution of the Christian notables and headmen during the 18th century: Giorgos Kontogiorgis, \textit{Koinoniki Dynamiki kai Politiki Avtadioikisi, Oi Ellinikes Koinotites tis Tourkokratias} [Social Dynamics and Political Self-Administration, The Greek Communities of “Tourkokratia”], (Athens: Nea Synora, A.A. Livanis, 1982); Athanasios Fotopoulos, \textit{Oi Kotzampasi tis tes Peloponnisou kata ti Deveri Tourkokratia} (1715-1821) [The Kocabaşis of the Peloponnese during the Second “Tourkokratia” (1715-1821)], Unpublished PhD dissertation (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 1995); Dimitrios Papastamatiou, \textit{Oikonomikokoinonikoi Michanismoi kai to Prouchontiko Fainomeno stin Othomaniki Peloponnisou tou 18ou Aiona: I Periptosi tou Panagioti Mpenaki} [Socio-Economic Mechanisms anf the Phenomenon of Communal Leadership in the 18th-Century Peloponnese: The Case of Panagiotis Mpenakis], Unpublished PhD Dissertation (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2009). The latter monograph is to my knowledge the only study that focuses on a single-case study of a prominent 18th-century Peloponnesian notable, namely Panagiotis Mpenakis, who was the undisputed leader of the community of Kalamata and, through his intimate relations with other Christian and Muslim notables, emerged as a force to be reckoned with and paramount paragon of stability among the Peloponnesian aristocracy of wealth and power. See, also \textit{ibid.}, pp. 27-46, for an analysis of the phenomenon of the emergence of the provincial notables during the 17th and 18th centuries, and a review of the bibliography.}
order, before we proceed with the examination of the data on the notables of Kozani. Kontogiorgis’ seminal monograph on the Greek communities during the period of the Ottoman domination over the Greek lands provides us with an extremely useful theoretical scheme on the categorisation of the Greek communities. Kontogiorgis distinguishes between two major categories of communities, namely the rural communities and the urban communities, which, as was the case with Kozani, presented an image radically different from their rural counterparts, for their societies were based on the principles of politicisation and their economy presented features of capital accumulation and clash of interests, which led often to factional strife. The urban communities were headed by the local headman (kocabaşı), who was chosen on an annual basis by the community among his peers and was assisted and checked in his duties by the local prelate, wealthy members of the community, and the leaders and members of the guilds. We should keep in mind that the guilds formed the nucleus of the economic life of each community that presented an advanced degree of socio-economic organisation.153

Each religious group under the Ottoman domination and administration was administered and represented by its own leaders; the Muslims were led by the a’yans and muhtars, the Christians by the kocabaşi, and the Jews by groups of rabbis and wealthy laymen. In the Greek lands, the Christian communal leaders and headmen were called proestoi (notables), kotzampasides, archontes (lords), and çorbacıs/tzormpatzides (notables).154 We could, therefore, argue that the kocabaşi were the Christian equivalent to

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153 Kontogiorgis, The Greek Communities, pp. 149-151, 176-226. For a critical presentation of Kontogiorgis’ approach, see also Anastasopoulos, Ottoman Karaferye, p. 58.
154 The term tzormpatzides was broadly used during the 18th and 19th centuries in Rumelia and denoted in a derogatory manner the wealthy merchants and landowners, who were accused by the common people of serving the interests of the Ottoman ruling elite and receiving in return for their services tsormpa. This term, which is an adaptation in Greek of the Turkish çorba and literally means
the Muslim *ittiyyar* and *muhtar*; they were the middlemen between the administration and the Christian *re’aya* taxpayers, whilst they represented and protected the interests of the communities that they led. The *kocabaşi* were elected by their communities and their election was afterwards ratified by the administration with the issuance of an order, which expounded their duties and obligations vis-à-vis the state officials, a fact which shows that they formed somehow part of the official administrative hierarchy. As we will see below, when the case of the struggle between the *Alifrones* (Ali Pasha’s supporters) and *Dimokratikoi* (the “Democrats”) will be examined, it was common for the Christian elders and headmen to bypass the procedure of the election and the use of democratic procedures, which allowed for them to establish their rule with the use of arms, proscriptions against and prosecution of their rivals, and, more often than not, the support of and their coalignment with Muslim notables, *voyvoda*, and state officials, who were prone to forming an alliance to defend their common interests. It goes without saying that the church was a powerful mechanism of ideological sanctification and vilification, which

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Svetlana Ivanonova mentions in her study of the definitions and various functions of the institution of the *varoş* during the 17th and 18th centuries that the term *corbacı* was used throughout the Bulgarian lands to denote in a generalising manner the Christian notables in the urban and rural environments. The Bulgarian *corbacı* played in their capacity as local notables and leaders of their community the role of the intermediaries between and representatives of the Orthodox Christian population of their localities before the Ottoman administration, accommodated Ottoman functionaries and foreign travellers, and managed the topical problems of the date. Owing to their status, the Bulgarian *corbacı* were acknowledged as *de facto*, if not *de jure*, leaders of their communities and enjoyed the high esteem and respect of the local population. For additional information, see: Svetlana Ivanova, “*Varoş*: The Elites of the *Reaya* in the Towns of Rumeli, Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries” in Antonis Anastasopoulos (ed.), *Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire, Halcyon Days in Crete V, A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 10-12 January 2003*, (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2005), p. 231.
used a variety of means and arguments, such as excommunications and prohibitions, to impose its will and defend its interests. The local prelates played an important role in this scheme; hence, the self-evident position of the bishop of Servia and Kozani within the communal triumvirate.¹⁵⁵

According to Shariat-Panahi, the duties and responsibilities of the notables can be summarised as follows. The notables were, above all, the chief representatives of their communities before the administration and officials, charged with the presentation of the demands of the community and the arrangement of taxation and intra-communal issues. They were also responsible for the allocation and supervision of the collection of the taxes levied on an annual basis on the population, which was coupled with their undertaking of administrative posts, which allowed them to mix with and be assimilated to the officially recognised administrative hierarchy. Since the notables were cognisant of the local conditions, they were also appointed to posts related to the enforcement of local law and order, through the formation of security forces and the upkeep and repair of walls, fortresses, and ports.¹⁵⁶

Although the documents at my disposal remain absolutely silent as to the role and duties of the Christian Kozanite kocabaşis, it will be shown that the Kozanite notables were keen in forming factions that vied for supremacy over the administration of the affairs of the Kozanite community. They also alliances with prominent Muslim officials and Muslim notables, who claimed for themselves the post of the voyvoda and participated actively in

¹⁵⁵ Anastasopoulos, Ottoman Karaferye, pp. 53-76. For the constitution of the mid-18th-century communal organisation of Kara Ferye, see: ibid., pp. 78-89. For the constitution of the communal leadership patterns in mid- to late-18th-century Thessaloniki, which, when compared to Kozani and Kara Ferye, was a completely different, far larger and, thus, profoundly more complex urban centre, see: Shariat-Panahi, Aspects of the Society of Thessaloniki, pp. 256-284.
¹⁵⁶ Shariat-Panahi, Aspects of the Society of Thessaloniki, pp. 259-262.
the socio-economic and political life of Kozani. Thus, I propose that we examine them through the analysis of the same phenomenon in an area where the institution of the Christian kocabaşılık and Muslim a’yanlık appear in full maturity.

As Fotopoulos argues, during the 18th century, there was applied in the Peloponnese a tripartite hierarchically organised system, according to which there were three layers of communal leadership:

a) The lowest level comprised the elders of the villages, towns, and cities, who were elected by the community on annual basis to represent and lead the community, arrange for the allocation and collection of the taxes and dues levied annually on the population of the village, and supervise the repair and construction of roads, bridges, aqueducts, churches and schools. In villages with Muslim population the administration appointed Muslim elders called a’yanş. These elders exercised their authority solely within the limits of their community, or for the communication and resolution of disputes between two, or even among more than two, communities.

b) The middle level comprised the group of notables who were elected on a kaza level by and among the village elders, who convened once a year in the administrative centre of the kaza to that end. Their election denoted in reality the takeover of administrative duties for the whole of the kaza, which was officially ratified by the local authorities and the governor-general of the eyalet of Mora, who issued the necessary documentation testifying to their appointment. These were the notables known as kocabaşis and their duties and responsibilities were basically similar to those undertaken by the village elders; yet, the kocabaşis were also entrusted with the allocation and payment of tax arrears,

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157 Fotopoulos, The kocabaşis of the Peloponnese, pp. 8-21.
administrative expenses, and a variety of judicial powers. They were also held responsible for the enforcement of the law and order in their kazas, for which they hired armed irregulars, who were known as kapoi and served the kocabasîs as their personal retinue and guard. They were also responsible for borrowing on behalf of their communities to secure the payment of their taxation. Moreover, it was a prerequisite that they expressed their opinion upon and ratified the levying of any type of taxation upon their communities, be it ordinary or extraordinary, local or general.

c) The highest level comprised the group of the moragiannides (“a’yan of Morea”), namely the notables who were members of the general Peloponnesian assembly, known as Peloponnisiaîki Gerousia (divan-i vilayet-i Mora), which was convened twice a year at the seat of the governor-general of the eyalet of Mora. The assembly elected among its members two individuals, who participated, alongside two Muslim a’yan and the dragoumanos of Morea (tercüman: interpreter), in the administrative council of the governor-general, which was entrusted with the supervision of the administration of the affairs of the local population and its representation before the Porte. Its members were also responsible for auditing the accounts of and investigating reports against Christian and Muslim officials.

This scheme of provincial administration and participation therein of Christian notables and elders was applied exclusively in the Peloponnese, where there emerged during the 18th century a powerful and influential class of Christian landowners. The latter gradually succeeded, due to their wealth and elevated status among the local population, to be acknowledged by the administration as integral parts of the local and provincial administrative hierarchy. In the case of Macedonia, and Kozani in our case, this scheme
seems rather inapplicable, because the available sources do not mention a general provincial assembly, such as the *Peloponissiaki Gerousia*, whilst the existence of *kaza* assemblies, where the *kaza kocabaşı* convened for the allocation of the taxes levied upon the communities that they represented, is a matter open to various interpretations. Bruce McGowan has suggested that in the case of the *kaza* of Manastır the *tevzi’* registers, which recorded the shares of the taxation levied on each community according to their size and economic power, were produced by such an assembly, where the local *kocabaşi* convened and discussed this issue by the middle of the 17th century.\(^{158}\)

Despite the fact that there is no mention whatsoever in the available sources of Christian Kozanite elders and *kocabaşi* and their roles, the level of the development of the Kozanite society, in terms of its population and socio-economic life, and the fact that Kozani was, as the seat of the bishop of Servia and Kozani, also a centre of the local ecclesiastical administration, allow us to suppose that Rouiss Kontorousis, Georgios Avliotis, and their prominent supporters, who were the protagonists of the factional feuds and leaders of the two prominent factions of the *Alifrones* and *Dimokratikoi*, were in fact the *kocabaşi* of Kozani, namely the heads of the Kozanite community entrusted with the administration of the affairs of the community. The validity of this argument is further enhanced by the fact that these individuals had transcended the boundaries of their religious and national identities, which allowed them to transact and form long-term alliances with Muslim notables and officials,\(^{159}\) a fact which was rejected by local amateur nationalist historiography as inconceivable.

\(^{159}\) For an analytical description of the characteristics of these alliances, see: Section 3.3.2., pp. 129-146 and Section 3.3.3., pp. 146-169.
3.3. Disputes and factional feuds in Kozani, c.1750 – c.1820

3.3.1. The Oikonomos dispute (1163 AH / 1749 - 1750 AD)

Georgios Oikonomos, as I have already discussed in the previous chapter, was appointed by the Bishop Meletios as his deputy for the collection of the revenues accruing from the tax-farm and the taxes levied upon the people of Kozani. He was an inhabitant of Kozani, a prominent member of the community and the man who mediated for the transfer of the bishop’s seat from Servia to Kozani. The text of the petition, which the Patriarch submitted to the Ottoman authorities, provides an insight into the events. The petition states that, although there was no reason or need for other parties to interfere in the tax-collection procedures, some Muslims and Christians, whose identity remains unspecified, pressed and forced the deputy, with violence and dubious pretentions, which were not proved and settled legally, to share with them the sums, which he collected and which they claimed to be theirs, being thus accused of causing troubles to the community. They threatened him by saying to him that “he owed his post to them and due to his lack of compliance with their demands they pressed and entreated him to abandon Kozani”.

As is clear from the context of the text, they had been committing illegal acts and harmful deeds, in violation of the terms of the berat, which Oikonomos had obtained from the authorities, in order to fulfill his duties. When this situation became intolerable he addressed his
complaints to the bishop Meletios, who in his turn despatched his appeal to Istanbul to be examined by the administration.161

The Patriarch interfered as well, because this dispute was also an ecclesiastical affair, and submitted his own report, through which he asked from the administration to intervene in order to prevent these people from breaking the laws and, accordingly, enforce their compliance with the terms of the berat, which had been granted to Meletios when he was appointed Bishop. Furthermore, he demanded from the central authorities to forbid their illegal demands of money from the representative of the local bishop and to dissuade them from hurting and interfering in the affairs of the local craftsmen without reasonable cause. Furthermore, he assumed that they intended to continue their false claims, with the use of even more violent means. Thus he asked, according to the terms of the berat, which provided that every kind of trial was to be brought in front of the imperial council (divan-i hümayun) and not be heard in local courts, for a sultanic order to be issued, which would stipulate that this case be examined before the imperial council and these people be punished for their crimes and illegal acts. To that end, the Patriarch demanded finally that the local judge of Kozani forward to Istanbul his legal opinions on these events.

The Ottoman documents at my disposal contain no information on the result of this case and the actions undertaken by the authorities. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that the Ottoman authorities acted in favor of the Patriarch and the local bishop, for the Church applied its prerogative to petition the imperial authorities and defer the examination of its cases to Istanbul, where they would always be examined in its favour, due to the influence

161 BOA, C.ADL..4150: Kozana nam karyede sakın re’aya ta’ifesinden mal-ı rüşumatları cem’ ve tahsil eylemek için yine karye-i mezburda sakın papas ta’ifesinden Konomoz papa Yorgi nam papas metropolid-i mesfur tarafından vekil nasb ve ta’yyin olunub
on and close ties of the Patriarch and his circles with Ottoman administrative circles. The events described in the petition of the Patriarch cannot be dated accurately, but since the petition and the marginal notes accompanying it were written in 1750, we could assume that these events begun immediately after the installation of Meletios in Kozani, which took place in 1745, when the seat of the bishopric was officially transferred from Servia to Kozani. We can assume also that it took some time before the tension escalated and Meletios resorted to the protection and interference of his superiors, namely the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki and the Patriarch of Istanbul.

Local amateur historians, and especially the most prominent among them Panagiotis Lioufis, 162 testify to the creation and domination of a certain “faction/party of Thessaloniki” (komma tis Thessalonikis) over the affairs of the Kozanite community, which was formed and managed by the two initial bishops of Servia and Kozani, Meletios and Ignatios, immediately after the seat of the bishopric had been moved from Servia to Kozani and their installations as bishops in Kozani. As has already been discussed, since the bishopric of Servia and Kozani fell within the territory of the Eparchia (Metropolis) of Thessaloniki, both individuals had been protégés of the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki Gavriil, whilst Ignatios, who was the second bishop of Servia and Kozani after the transfer of its seat to Kozani, had been Meletios’ nephew, a fact that gives an even stronger taste of nepotism and cronyism in the affairs and administration of the bishopric.

It seems highly probable that after the transfer of the seat of the bishopric, there occurred a series of noteworthy changes in the Kozanite society, since new church officials and dignitaries, always an elitist element in a given Christian locality and society, came to

162 Lioufis, History of Kozani, pp. 52-80.
Kozani and contested the preeminence and primacy of the older local élite. Since the latter part of the 17th century, Kozani had been under the domination of a group of people who emerged as powerful elements in the local society, through their commercial activities in Hungary and the Habsburg dominions in Central Europe. We could assume, therefore, that these people, who had comprised the Kozanite élite long before the ecclesiastical élite had moved to Kozani, reacted against the potential threat of losing their privileges and being superseded by a new élite, which was forming around the newly-established bishopric.

Thus, a secret agreement between Meletios and the merchants of Kozani for joint action sounds plausible; this agreement would allow them to transfer the seat of the diocese from Servia, whose Christian population was, as 17th-century poll-tax registers certify, under constant decline in terms of wealth and numbers, to Kozani. It seems also probable that the merchants were hoping for the installation of a higher and prestigious Christian authority in Kozani, which could play a leading role in the organisation of social and economic activities of their locality. Later 18th-century articles of association organising the function and the status of the guilds in Kozani testify to the aforementioned assumption, since the Bishop and the ecclesiastical authorities always appear as endorsers and guarantors of the order and the regulations of the guild organisation in Kozani. We should, therefore, argue that the merchants of Kozani sought after a guarantor for their newly established guilds, which in mid-18th century were making their infantile steps.\footnote{163}

The people accused in the Patriarch’s report were therefore the protagonists of local Kozanite economic life, who had mediated for the transfer of the bishopric in their locality, which was a highly developing and more lucrative place than the older residence of the

\footnote{163 For the earlier stages of the history of the guild organisation in Kozani and its development, according to ecclesiastical documents, see: Kalinderis, \textit{The Guilds of Kozani}, pp. 22-30.}
bishop of Servia. They expected, in return, to play a leading role in the organisation of the
guild system in Kozani, in order to assure for themselves tax benefits, which guild leadership
always offered, and a surety for the activities and the interests of the merchants, who were
active outside Kozani, either in the Ottoman realm or in the Habsburg realms and in Central
Europe. When they claimed for themselves the right to interfere in the activities originally
bestowed on the bishop and the church, and even dared to threaten their authority,
Meletios reacted decisively and used his prerogative, which allowed him to resort to the
central authorities in Istanbul, in order to assert his domination and primacy over other
wealthy and powerful local dignitaries, Christians and Muslims alike.

The importance of this document lies in the testimony to the guild organisation, or at
least the attempt for the establishment of guilds, in Kozani in a period far earlier than any
other document has ever referred to. The earliest extant Greek document referring to the
guilds of Kozani is a letter of Bishop Ignatios dated 1768, which addresses the leaders of the
guilds of Kozani and calls for the adjustment of official public holidays according to local
traditions and religious regulations. However, the aforementioned Ottoman document
proves the existence of an embryonic guild organisation in Kozani, since at least the mid-
1740s. Even more interesting is the depicted collaboration and concerted actions taken by
Christians and Muslims, in order to secure their interests and achieve their goals. Although
the document does not give any specific information on the identity of the actors, the
reference to inter-religious collaboration proves that the local socio-economic life was not,
as local amateur historians contend, organised in complete segregation and indifference,
with a complete lack of communication between the two religious communities. We should
realise that in certain cases members of both religious communities came into close contact and acted jointly for the defence of their interests and rights.

3.3.2. The Hacı Oğlu incident (1188 AH/1774 – 1775 AD) and the dispute between Manço Osman Ağa and Teberdar Ismail (1193AH/1779 – 1780 AD)

In 1774 Kozani was upset by the Hacı Oğlu incident. The only available information comes from a summary of a judicial notification dated 16 Safar 1188 AH / 28-4-1774 AD, which was despatched to the Porte by the judge of Eğri Bucak. The document states that the bishop, his chief secretary (protosygkellos), and the leader of the Kozanite community (kocabaşı) were charged with treachery against the state and the laws, because during the spread of the Hacı Oğlu incident they erected barricades and earthworks resembling forts,

164 The first explicit reference to the existence of a kocabaşı of Kozani comes from an analytical poll-tax register dated 1104 AH / 1692-1693 AD. In this register, there was recorded a certain Marko portoğer. The Greek term protogeros is the exact translation in Greek of the Turkish term kocabaşı. For additional information, see: BOA, MAD.d..03421, f. 174. There is also one more document dated 27 Rebi’ulahir 1106 AH / 15-12-1694 AD, which is a hücet written by the judge of the kaza of Eğri Bucak. It states that a certain Rusa son of a certain Şişman Yorğo, who was most probably the kocabaşı of Kozani and representative of the people of Kozani, went to the court (meclis-i şer‘) and asked for a receipt that would include the total payment of the taxes of the community of Kozani and a record of the payment of the price for and the delivery of 10 oxen to the Danubian front in the war against the Russians, which had been demanded last year by the Ottoman authorities. A certain İbrahim Ağa, the then-representative the state official collector of the avarız and nüzül extraordinary taxes (muhassil-i emval), Hasan Paşa, wrote a report where he mentioned that all orders had been executed without undue delays or deficiencies, and the 10 oxen had been delivered to the kassabbaşı. Therefore, their value was to be deducted from the avarız and nüzül taxes which the people of Kozani would be expected to pay for the year 1106 AH / 1694-1695 AD. It seems plausible that this enigmatic Rusa was the kocabaşı of Kozani and was entrusted with the duty of presenting before the administration the demands and affairs of the Kozanite community.
in order to defend themselves from their opponents and, most importantly, the state authorities.\textsuperscript{165}

At the same time, Manço Osman and a certain İbrahim “the scribe” (yazıcı), who had been Kozani’s voyvodas for the last three-four years and were favorites and protégés of Hüsnü Hüseyin Efendi, the official appointed for collecting the money for the tax of the mubaya’a, had issued large quantities of counterfeit and clipped coinage, which was then used by middlemen and moneylenders in their transactions. The counterfeit coinage was spread in many directions and due to the high quality of the counterfeiting, the counterfeiters managed to pocket 250,000 ğuruş. However, these mischief-makers went even further and they interfered in the process of the just allocation of the poll-tax due for that year, committing in this process many illegal acts.\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{165} BOA, C.ZB..5-209: Eğri Bucak kazası tarafından gelen i’lamin hulasasidir fi 16 Safar sene 1188 kaza-yi mezbur tabi’ Kojana karyesi mütemekkinlerinden öteden berü ha’-in-din ve [de]vyet olan piskopos ve protosingelo nam rahibler ve sa’ir kocabaşlar Hacı Oğlu vak’ası şuuya’unda karye-i mezburede tabiya misali meteriler tertib eylediklerini mubaya’aya me’mur Hüsnü Hüseyin Efendi’nin manzuru olmakdan naşı bundan ma’-ada uç dort seneden berü voyvodaları olan Manco Osman ve yazıcı İbrahim nam müfsidin ittifakıyla külliyyetli kalb akçe kat’ ve semsalar tedarik ve iddihar eyledikleri kalb kaçeleri etrafa neşr ve kalbezantik san’ati fa’ikindan dort besyüz kise akçe iddihar eylemişler iken ana dahı kana’at eyleme’yüb bu sene-i mübarekede Kojana karyesi re’ayalarına verilecek cizye kâgidlerin Muharrem hululundan iki üç gün mukaddem tevzi’ ve bunun emsali derun-ı i’lамда tasrîh olunan mevadd’ı menhiyata ic’tisar eyledikleri ma’lum-ı ‘ali buyuruldukdँ zikr olunan tabiya ve külleler hedd ve tahrib olunmak üzere bir mu’temmed mübaşır kalları ta’yyin ve ‘ibreten li’l-ghayri li-eclî’t-te’dib merkuman Manco ve yazıcı İbrahim ve mesfurun rahibler ve kocabasılardan olub bundan akdem Rum-ıli ka’imakami habısa mahbus olan semsalar ordu-yi hümayuna ihzarları babinda bir kit’a emr-i ‘ali idar ve ırsal buyurulmasın kaza-yi mezbur kazisi bir kit’a i’lамında tahrir eder merkum Manco Osman ta’yyin olunan mübaşır ma’rifetiyle meşta-yi hümayuna ihzar olunmak babinda sahh buyuruldu 17 Safar sene 1188

\textsuperscript{166} BOA, C.ZB..5-209: üç dort seneden berü voyvodaları olan Manco Osman ve yazıcı İbrahim nam müfsidin ittifakıyla külliyyetli kalb akçe kat’ ve semsalar tedarik ve iddihar eyledikleri kalb kaçeleri etrafa neşr ve kalbezantik san’ati fa’ikindan dort besyüz kise akçe iddihar eylemişler iken ana dahı kana’at eyleme’yüb bu sene-i mübarekede Kojana karyesi re’ayalarına verilecek cizye kâgidlerin Muharrem hululundan iki üç gün mukaddem tevzi’ ve bunun emsali derun-ı i’lамda tasrîh olunan mevadd’ı menhiyata ic’tisar eyledikleri
For this reason, the judge asked for a trustworthy official to be appointed with the duty of destroying and demolishing the aforementioned barricades and fortified mansions. Furthermore, the judge requested that this officer arrest Manço, İbrahim, the two priests, and all those notables, who had collaborated and conjoined their crimes. Moreover, they were called upon to appear before the imperial army in order to be judged for their crimes, inflicting in that manner an exemplary and dissuasive punishment against all those breaking the Shari’a and secular laws, regardless of the social, economic or political power of the protagonists. Finally, the judge requested that the appointed officer deliver an order to the deputy governor-general of Rumelia, which would stipulate that the middlemen and moneylenders who had spread the counterfeit coinage and were at that moment imprisoned be immediately tried and severely punished for their crimes. We do not know how this case ended. However, we could suppose that, since we meet Manço Osman and the other mischief-makers as protagonists in later communal affairs and disputes, all of them managed, due to their influence and power, to be acquitted.

Some five years after the events described above a series of communal and factional conflicts came to perturb Kozanite social and political equilibrium. The events started with the dismissal of the voyvoda of Kozani Manço Osman Ağā from his post and the appointment of a new voyvoda, who was appointed and despatched to Kozani through the intercession of Fatma Hanım Sultan. In a very short period of time the crisis spread and included the most prominent members of the community and finally contributed to the initial appearance of the two prominent and organised factions, which were destined to dominate the political and socio-economic landscape of Kozani in the last quarter of the 18th century, namely Rousis Kontorousis’ Alifrones and Georgios Avliotis’ Dimokratiko
factions. In this section, I will present the initial phase of the crisis corresponding to the
dispute between the two voyvadas and the role of the leaders of the community in these
events. In the following section, I will examine the later phase of the events corresponding
to the feud between the two Christian leaders vying for supremacy and control over
Kozanite communal affairs.

The crisis started with the dismissal of Manço Osman Ağa from the post of voyvoda
and the appointment of a new voyvoda immediately thereafter. In his petition (‘arz) 167
written on 2 Muharrem 1193 AH / 20-01-1779 AD, in which he addresses the Ottoman
authorities in Istanbul, Osman Ağa expresses his disappointment and anger for the “totally
absurd dismissal”, despite the fact that he had honoured the terms of the contract that he
had signed with Fatma Hanım Sultan, when he had initially farmed out the office of the tax-
farm administrator on behalf of its absentee beneficiary and had been appointed voyvoda of
Kozani. Furthermore, he reports that Fatma Hanım Sultan outsourced the mukata’a of
Kozani to somebody else, without any notification and for no good reason. Immediately
thereafter, she had asked for a new imperial order to be issued, which would secure the
rights of control over the tax-farm and revenue-collection activities of the new voyvoda,
thus depriving Osman Ağa of his power and any means to defend his rights, whilst it was
certain that he would lose all the expenses in terms of time and money, which he had made
during his tenure. For this reason, he sent this petition, through which he asked for his case
to be investigated, the imperial order for the new voyvoda to be written as a marginal note
and then be annulled. He demanded also to be granted the right to control and collect the

167 BOA, C.ML..27345: sene-i mezkuru ‘asmetüha bu kullarından bi-haber mukata’a-ı mezburu ahara
iltizam ve zabtiycün bir kit’a emr-i’ali isdar etdirdüb bu kullaraına ğadr-i küllü ve cebu’azim etmekle
Osman Ağa’s case was examined by the authorities, but the imperial order written down as marginal note accompanying the original text of his petition shows that the decision went against him. The authorities recognised the rights of Osman Ağa over the voyvodalık, since he had in the previous two years, namely 1191 AH / 1777-1778 AD and 1192 AH / 1778-1779 AD, farmed out the post of the voyvoda and obtained the right to collect the revenues of Kozani and manage its accounts. However, the people of Kozani reported in a previous report of theirs that Osman Ağa gradually became a “tyrannical oppressor”; they therefore despatched a petition to Fatma Hanım Sultan and asked for her protection and intervention. For this reason, Osman Ağa was dismissed from his post and a certain Ismail “the halberdier” was appointed new voyvoda. The procedure followed for the implementation of this order and the replacement of Osman Ağa by the newly appointed voyvoda was already discussed in the previous chapter. Suffice it to remind the reader that Osman Ağa had to be compensated for the damage that he had suffered to his dignity and pocket. For this reason, all the money that he had paid in advance for farming out the collection of the revenues accruing from the tax-farm would be refunded to him, otherwise the new voyvoda would not be allowed to proceed with assuming legally his duties, rendering thus all of Ismail’s future actions completely illegal, and null and void. By

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168 BOA, C.ML..27345: bu kullarına der ‘ühde ve iltizam ve mal-i fa’ız ve cizye ve celebkesânî tamamen eda ve teslim ve yedime memhuren temessük i’ta olunmuşken ve bundan ğayrî mal-i cizye hazine-i ‘amireye tamamen eda ve teslim eylemediğinden bin ğuruş noksan teslim etmekle bu kulları muceddeden bin ğuruşu dahtı teslim hazine-i ‘amire ve harc-i boğça yüz doksan yedi ğuruş ve boğça ahz olunmuşken şimdî sene-i mezkuru ‘asmetüha bu kullarından bi-haber mukata’a-i mezburu ahara iltizam ve zahteycin bir kit’a emr-i’ali idar etirdüüb bu kullarına ğadr-i küllü ve cebu’azim etmekle

169 On the halberdiers and their duties in the army and the Palace, see: Bayerle, Pashas, Begs and Effendis, p. 16; Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, III, pp. 429-430.
compensating the previous voyvoda the authorities aimed at the swift enforcement of law and order, whilst at the same time aspired to deprive him from any claim, which he could bring forward as a pretext to justify any future interference in the duties and activities of his successor. However, this proved to be far from feasible, since Osman Ağa managed to be reinstalled as voyvoda of Kozani in the next year, during the turmoil which was caused by the constant and recurring communal feuds.  

Immediately after Ismail Ağa had assumed the office and taken over as voyvoda of Kozani a new crisis erupted, which beset the Kozanite community, due to the fact that the bishop of Servia and Kozani, and his chancellery took sides in the dispute. The events were described in detail by the chamberlain and representative of the Sublime Porte, Veliyyüddin Ağa (dergah-ı mu’alla gediklülerinden mehteri Veliyyü’-din Ağa), and the deputy judge of Alasonya (el-müvella-hilafe bi-medine-i Alasonya), Ahmed Hammadi, in their reports. They both presented a similar testimony to the events and for this reason I will hereby

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170 BOA, C.ML..27345: Kozana sükünindan Manco Osman nam kimesne doksan bir ve doksan iki senelerine mahsuben bir takrib ile ilitim edüp ancak mültezim-i merkum zalemenden olduğunu mukata’a-ı mezbure re’ayısi taraf-i müşarun-ilehya ihtiyar ve inha etmeleriyle merkum Osman voyvodalıktan ‘azl ve teberdar-ı merkum voyvoda nasb ve ta’yyin olunub lakin mukata’a-ı merkumenin cizyesi dahı ötedenberü hattı hümayun mukata’a-ı mezbure merbut olduğulu cihatden doksan üç senesine mahsuben cizye-i merkumenin boğça berati merkum Osman tarafından ahz olunmağa kayda ref’ ve boğça-ı mezbure yedinden ahz ve voyvoda-ı merkum teberdar Ismail zide kadrühüye teslim etdirlemesi müşarun-ilehya tarafindan inha ve istid’â olunduğu ecilden hazine-i ‘amirem defterleri tetebbu’ etdirledikde cizye-i mezbure mukata’a-ı mezbure merbut olmağa gayr ez ma’as iki bin yedi yüz otuz üç büyük çuruş mali ile üçyüz çuruş mevkufu voyvoda-ı sabik-ı merkum Osman tarafından hazine-i ‘amirem tamamen teslim ve berat ve evrak boğçası yedine teslim olunmuş olduğu cizye muhasebesinden der-kenar olmağa bu surette merkum Osman’ın hazine-i ‘amirem teslim eylediği mal-ı cizye ve mevkufu olan meblağ-ı mezbur üç bin otuz üç büyük çuruş ile verdiği harc-i aklam her ne ise voyvoda-ı merkum teberdar Ismail tarafından eda ve teslim bir-le merkum Osman’ın yedinde olan cizye-i merkume boğçası ve berati yedinden ahz ve voyvoda-ı lahika teslim ve ma’rifetiyle kądık ve tevzi’ etdirilemek fermanım olmağın  

171 Veliyyüddin Ağa was a holder of a gedik, namely he received remuneration for his services in the form of a provincial gedik timar grant. He was therefore a timar-holding Palace official and member of the central administration. 

172 BOA, AE.SABH.I..97-6558.
follow the narrative of Veliyyüddin who acted as an especially appointed agent charged with the investigation of the case (mübaşır).

Veliyyüddin addressed the steward of the Grand Vizier (kethüda beyg efendi hazretleri) and refers to the following events: according to an older written petition addressing the Sublime Porte, a certain Yani, obviously a Christian, who was inhabitant of Kozani and member of the guild of tailors (derzi esnafı), had been previously held on the accusation of counterfeiting the coinage, perhaps a reference to the previously examined events of counterfeiting committed by Manço Osman and his collaborators, for which crimes it had been arranged, as his punishment, for him to be imprisoned. This Christian mischief-maker had as accomplice in his crimes his guild master (kalfa), who escaped detention, ran away, and hid in Kozani, where he was found when Veliyyüddin’s petition was written and submitted to the Porte.

For this reason, Veliyyüddin was appointed with an imperial order special agent to investigate and reveal the means and methods of counterfeiting used by these people, in order to elucidate their incentives and aims. The names of the people held responsible for these crimes were reported in the imperial order. Although Veliyyüddin did not mention them in his report, the deputy judge of Alasonya in his own report mentions that “he acted so that the role of the bishop, his chief secretary, the secretary of the treasury of the bishopric, of a certain priest Yani, and of five other Christians, namely a certain Manoli

173 On the kethüda beyg, see: Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, p. 120.
Akzoti, a certain Yorgi the goldsmith, a certain Yorgi Ağora, a certain Rusi Mezdan, and a certain Yorgâki Mezdan, is further investigated and all of them are interrogated.

Veliyyüddin apprehended Yani and escorted him to Kozani. They went there passing through the judicial district of Cum’a and they stayed in the mansion of the a’yan of Cum’a, a certain Yakub Ağa. During their stay there, they met the voyvoda of Kozani, teberdar Ismail Ağa, who was there with a certain İlço Mihal and a certain Payko İstefani, two “scoundrels” (eşirrasından) from Kozani. Neither Veliyyüddin nor the deputy judge refer to the reason for Ismail Ağa’s presence there. We could assume however that he was notified about the events and tried to interfere in order to facilitate the authorities in their efforts. Both İlço Mihal and Payko İstefani said to Veliyyüddin that they did not intend to leave that place and that they preferred to be killed rather than be arrested and be brought to justice. For this reason there was no way for him to arrest them, since both enjoyed the wholehearted protection and full support of Yakub Ağa.

After that, Veliyyüddin handed Yani over to Yakub Ağa, commanding him to protect and keep an eye on him. Accordingly, he went secretly to Alasonya. Since Kozani at that moment formed part of the judicial district of Alasonya, he discussed the matter with the local judge and his deputy, and reflected upon the actions needed to locate and arrest the fugitives. The judge wrote a legal opinion and sent his deputy to accompany Veliyyüddin

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175 BOA, AE.SABH.I..97-6558: bundan ma’ada kalbezan ta’ifesinden despoti ve putuşingelo ve sakelari ve Manoli Akzoti ve pap[a] Yani ve Yorgi kuyumcu ve Yorgi Ağora [ve] Rusi Mezdan ve Yorgâki Mezdan nam zimmilerin keyfiyyet-i halleri teharrî ve tecessüs ve istifsar olunub kalbezanlık alatları daha zahire ihrac olunmak

176 The judicial district of Cum’a lied in the region where modern Ptolemais is. It coincides with the Northern half of modern Kozani prefecture. Ptolemais is located 45 km. north of Kozani.

177 BOA, AE.SABH.I..97-6558: Yani zimmi ile ma’an gelür iken rah-i rastımız olan Cum’a kazasına dahil ve a’yani Yakub Ağa’nın konağına nüzul etdikde Kozana voyvoda teberdar Ismail Ağa ile karye-i mezbur eşirrasından İlço Mihal ve Payko İstefani nam müfsidleri gördükde ben bundan öte gitmem beni katl eyle deyüb bir vechle bu kulları imkanını bulamayub

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back to Kozani. Without affording any pretext and by following judicious means in order to arrange the situation, as the Porte had commanded, the agents who were appointed by the judge of Alasonya and Velıyıuddin asked from Yakub Ağa and the other ağas of the region to hand over Yani and the aforementioned Kozanite mischief-makers to them. Yakub Ağa and the other ağas of the region refused, however, and told them that they had escaped once more and that Yani was now in the kaza of Ağustos (today: Naoussa) at the side and service of the chief elder and notable of Naoussa, Zafir. He was there secretly, accompanied by the mischief-makers Konomo, İlço Mihal, and Payko Istefani. Accordingly, Velıyıuddin and the deputy judge of Alasonya went to Ağustos/Naoussa and apprehended all of them.

They repeatedly interrogated Yani for the incentives of his crimes, but he always testified that “he was a salaried servant and had no idea about the deeds and crimes of his superiors”. He was then imprisoned and the aforementioned mischief-makers were summoned before the local court. When the imperial order was read and its sense was explained openly and clearly, they argued that “anyone among the residents of their village

178 This Zafir is probably the famous Zafirakis Naousaïos who later collaborated with Ali Pasha, in order to consolidate his dominance over Naousa and its surroundings. He was also a member of the Filiki Etaireia and took part in the initial stage of the Greek Revolution in 1821 by stirring up the revolution in Naousa in collaboration with the movement of Emmanuel Pappas in Chalkidiki. He was arrested and executed by the Ottomans after the revolt in Naousa had been quelled and Naousa had been destroyed. Unfortunately, we do not possess any thorough study about Zafirakis’ life and activities. The Greek archive of Ali Pasha contains useful information not only on Zafirakis in Naousa, but also on many Greek notables in many cities and towns in Western Macedonia and Epirus. For the initial phases of the Greek Revolution in 1821 in Western and Central Macedonia, see: Nikolaos Kasomoulis, Military Memoirs of the Revolution of the Greek People, 1821-1833. Especially the first volume of Kasomoulis’ memoirs contains invaluable information on the armatoloi and armatoliks in Macedonia, Thessaly, Epirus, and Sterea Ellada, as well as the initial stages of the Revolution in Macedonia. There is also a brief description of the events in Naousa and the destruction of the town and the execution of its kocabaşı Zafirakis, and the events in Chalkidiki, where the movement of Emmanuel Pappas took place.

179 BOA, AE.SABH.I..97-6558: el-an Ağustos kazası koca başısı Zafir yanında sırran şerren Konomo ve İlço Mihal ve Payko İstefani nam müfsidler ile anda olduğuunu haber vermeleriyle ve asitane-i ‘aliyyeden firar
and community had never until then committed, neither individually nor collectively, such abominable crimes, which they were accused of, being therefore completely innocent”. Furthermore, they claimed that “they were loyal non-Muslim subjects of the sultan and respectable servants and subjects of the Porte, and all these accusations were sheer calumnies and pure lies against their integrity”.\textsuperscript{180}

After that, they left the court and Veliyyüddin went back to Kozani accompanied by the deputy judge. As was proper, an investigation in their homes was carried out, after which the mischief-makers were put under house arrest, where they remained in custody until new evidence came to light. However, the investigation brought to light no apparent signs or witnesses concerning the instruments of counterfeiting and other abominable crimes, which they had been repeatedly accused of. Veliyyüddin thus wrote a report, where he observed that it was evident that a profound slander against their rights has been committed and all these accusations were calumnies, which meant that they were innocent. The deputy judge of Alasonya confirmed this conclusion in his own report.\textsuperscript{181}

We know nothing about the reaction of the Porte to these reports, since there are no other extant documents concerning this case. The events are scrambled and the information provided by the reports raise more questions than they provide us with definite

\textsuperscript{180} BOA, AE.SABH.I..97-6558: 
\textsuperscript{181} BOA, AE.SABH.I..97-6558:
answers. The first and most striking event is the omission of any reference to Fatma Hanım Sultan who, since she was the *malikâne*-beneficiary, should have been notified of and allowed to decide on the resolution of the dispute described above. However, there is no reference to her or any of her representatives. We could assume, however, that this case started through accusations of criminal activity of some of the members of the community as an ordinary communal affair or small dispute, in which there were involved some Christian members of the community. Moreover, we could assume that the community resorted initially to the interference of Fatma Hanım Sultan, through Ismail Ağa who was her legal representative in Kozani, since he was her *voyvoda*. Later on, the case evolved into a serious crisis, because the guilds of Kozani and the church authorities were involved and accused of committing crimes and of collaborating with the initial mischief-makers. Then the bishop made use of his prerogatives, which allowed him to forward any cases concerning him and his entourage to the imperial council, through the mediation of his superiors, namely the metropolitan of Thessaloniki and the patriarch. Thus it is highly plausible that the imperial council examined the case and, after it had taken under consideration the seriousness of the situation, appointed as its agent Veliyyüddin and charged him with the investigation of the events, totally bypassing therefore Fatma Hanım Sultan and her agents. It seems possible that local officers were commanded to cooperate with Veliyyüddin and assist him in the investigation and any further actions undertaken by him.

The role of the bishop Ignatios and his entourage in this crisis is another important aspect, which, however, is not thoroughly examined in the reports of Veliyyüddin and the deputy judge of Alasonya. Veliyyüddin does not refer to them at all and the deputy judge only calls for their role to be investigated. However, none of them mentions whether this
investigation took place or not. We cannot preclude the possibility that they were separately interrogated and that a separate report was written and sent to the Porte. However, since no other documents were found in the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul and there is no reference to such documents in the reports I have at my disposal, this must remain for the present an assumption.

The identity of the protagonists is also obscure. Yani was a member of the guild of tailors, but apart from that we do not know anything additional about him. The same applies for the two principal mischief-makers, namely İlçə Mihal and Payko İstefani. Although the report provides their family names, I was unable to locate them in any other Ottoman or Greek document available to me. Nevertheless, Kostas Ntinas informs us that the family name Paikos originates from the Slavic pajak, which can be translated as “spider” and “weaver”.

It seems, therefore, that Yani “the tailor”, who was the orchestrator of the events, and Payko İstefani, who was a weaver, or at least came from a family whose background was related to that profession, had formed a close relationship, which was based on their closely related professional backgrounds. The bishop’s entourage, accused of taking part and playing a prominent role in the events, consisted of five Christians who, apart from Georgios Agora, are due to lack of documentation completely unknown to me. However, Georgios Agora was a prominent member of the Kozanite community and a rich and successful merchant, whose firm was based in Budapest, at that time in the Austrian realms. He came back to Kozani in 1775 and settled there with his family. During his long career in the communal administration he managed to obtain the most important offices

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and he was repeatedly elected as Kozani’s *kocabaşı*.\(^{183}\) We also know that he was a prominent member of the Kontorousis faction and had close ties and relations with all of the bishops of Kozani, especially Ignatios and his successor Theophilos.

As I have already mentioned, the deputy judge called for the bishop, his chief secretary, and the secretary of the treasury of the bishopric to be interrogated for their involvement in the aforementioned events. His *oikonomos* was also attested as collaborating with the two principal mischief-makers, İlço Mihal and Payko Išefani. An episcopal letter dated 1768 addressing the leaders of the guilds of Kozani for the adjustment of the official public holidays provides us with valuable information about the identity of these people. The *oikonomos* of the Bishop Ignatios, namely the man appointed by the bishop with the duty of the administration of the bishopric’s financial affairs, was a priest named Georgios, most probably the same Georgios Papastamos, or “the Oikonomos”, who had participated in the aforementioned events that took place almost thirty years before, immediately after the transfer of the seat of the bishopric from Servia to Kozani. Georgios Papastamos, or “the Oikonomos”, had by that time promoted to the post of *sakellarios*, which was used by the secretary of the treasury of the bishopric who was entrusted with the safekeeping of the documents and title deeds of the Bishopric. Although there is a gap of 11 years we can be sure that these two individuals remained in their place until the death of Ignatios, since they were his most trustworthy assistants. Apart from that, there are certain later letters, which refer to them after the appointment of Ignatios’ successor as still occupying their offices. Ignatios’ chief secretary (*protosygkellos*) was a certain priest

Kallinikos, who would be later lynched and slaughtered by the supporters of Georgios Avliotis during the latter’s initial uprising and attempt to become the undisputed master of Kozani in 1780.\textsuperscript{184}

The events discussed above coincide with a series of scandals, which were caused by the interference of the bishop Ignatios in non-ecclesiastical affairs and his constant activity as factional leader. In two contemporaneous episcopal letters, both dated 3 May 1785, which were drafted by the bishop of Kampania and address the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki and his chief secretary respectively, the Bishop Ignatios is described as a leader of a faction loyal to him, who used his influence as an organ for interfering in communal affairs and especially in the feuds for the office of the kocabaşı of Kozani. What is more, he had borrowed exorbitant amounts of money from bankers and moneylenders in Istanbul, in Thessaloniki, and prominent Muslim notables living within the circumscription of his diocese, by putting as guarantors the Christian flock of his bishopric. Ignatios spent this money not for ecclesiastical purposes and to cover the needs of his flock, but to finance the faction which he had organised around him and was supported by. Apart from that, Ignatios was accused of nepotism, simony, corruption, and other crimes, which the bishop of Kampania does not describe, because, as he mentions in his letters, “they were scandalous and known to everybody living under Ignatios’ rule”.\textsuperscript{185}

Ignatios’ tenure was a period marked by severe crises caused by the issuing in 1772 of an imperial order by the Austrian Empress Maria-Theresa, which forbade any uncontrolled and unjustifiable exportation of money by non-Austrian citizens outside the Austrian realm and banned the presence of foreign companies on Habsburg territory. This

\textsuperscript{184} Lioufis, \textit{History of Kozani}, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{185} Kalinderis, \textit{Unbound Documents}, pp. 60-63.
order formed part of a broader plan aiming at the centralisation of the administration of financial, legal, and religious affairs throughout the Habsburg realm. In economic terms, it marked the turn of the Austrian policy towards mercantilism, which imposed the protection of the bullion reserves of the treasury and accordingly forbade extended imports and favoured exports of native ready goods. Since the treaty of Belgrade (1739), a large diaspora of Ottoman Christian commercial companies had been established in the Habsburg realms. These companies flourished by taking advantage of the stimulus that the liberal clauses of the treaty and the policy of the Habsburg regime at the time offered them. However, as a result of this austere policy, most of the foreign families residing in the Austrian Empire lost their privileges and declared bankruptcy or they were forced to accept Austrian citizenship, in return for renouncing their origins and settling permanently in the Austrian realms, thus cutting all ties with their homelands and ceasing all financial activities there. As was natural, the implementation of this order brought about a severe crisis in Kozani as well, for the Kozanite community was funded by the investments of Kozanite merchants who resided in the Austrian realms, especially in Hungary, and were active members of the flourishing trading and commercial companies.¹⁸⁶

During the 1760s there erupted also a feud between the representatives of the Kozanite community, whose members resided in Austria and were active as merchants and bankers, and the Bishop Ignatios. The merchants used to finance, through the gains accruing from their mercantile and banking activities, the school of Kozani, on the condition that they had to refer to the bishop giving an account for their activities and that the bishop should

not interfere in the administration of the school. The money for the functioning of the school was deposited for safety reasons in the common purse of the guilds of Kozani. In 1769 Ignatios asked for a financial control to be undertaken, due to alleged mismanagement of the school, and he confiscated the money deposited for the operation of the school. The representatives of the merchants refused to obey Ignatios’ orders and, after they had officially repudiated him, they founded their own school, which they named the “School of the Company” (Scholeion tis Kompanias). This school was closed in 1772, namely two years before the Hacı Oğlu incident, due to a lack of money required for its operation, caused by the aforementioned order issued by Maria-Theresa. This incident provided, however, Ignatios’ opponents with the pretext they sought, to repeatedly accuse him of scandalous interference in the financial and administrative affairs of the Kozanite guilds.\footnote{Lioufis, History of Kozani, pp. 58-59.}

In 1775, during the Hacı Oğlu incident, Ignatios and his secretary Kallinikos were accused of bribery, simony, and the appointment of laymen as parish priests of certain parishes. They were furthermore accused of having spent the money accruing from these transactions to finance the activities of their own favourite candidates for the office of kocabaşı of Kozani, Servia, and Velvendos, namely the three most prominent and important settlements within the see. When this case was reported to the metropolitan of Thessaloniki and the patriarch, the latter despatched in 1776 to Kozani a certain priest named Timotheos, who was charged with the duty to investigate, as the representative of the patriarch (patriarchikos exarchos), the case and enforce the ecclesiastical law. Timotheos’ investigation brought to light the scandalous behaviour of Ignatios and confirmed the
validity of the accusations against him. The patriarch despatched a letter in which he scorned Ignatios and commanded him to cease all of his uncanonical activities.  

Another important communal feud erupted in Kozani in 1776, when Markos Charisis, a rich and powerful landowner of Kozani, was appointed to the office of kocabaşı with the support and sponsorship of Ignatios and Kallinikos. Markos Charisis used his power as community leader to break former agreements, which he had concluded with Emmanuel Takiatzis, who was a rich merchant and prominent member of the community, for the purchase of a garden worth 500 ğuruş. Charisis was supported by the bishop and the faction financed by him and Takiatzis by the opponents of the bishop Ignatios, among whom the most prominent was Georgios Avliotis, the leader of the future Democrats faction. This feud is known in local Kozanite historiography as “the garden dispute”.  

How can these events be related to the events described in the Ottoman documents? It seems extremely plausible that Ignatios was accused during his tenure of being the source of all scandals and feuds that erupted in Kozani. All contemporary sources describe him as an extremely ambitious figure, who used to interfere in all communal affairs, even in affairs lying outside his official jurisdiction as ecclesiastical leader. For this reason, the case of “the counterfeiting of the coinage”, allegedly committed at the instigation of the Bishop Ignatios and his close associates by Yani “the tailor” with the support of his guild master and some other Kozanite “mischief-makers and scoundrels”, seems to be merely another case, among many, in which the bishop participated during his long tenure. Since he acted, according to the communal regulations, as guarantor of law and order in the Kozanite guilds, and since all guild regulations had no legal validity without his

188 Lioufis, History of Kozani, pp. 60-61.
189 Lioufis, History of Kozani, p. 61.
signature and verification, Ignatios could and, in fact, did, whenever he considered it appropriate, interfere in guild affairs, in order to strengthen the faction openly supported and championed by him, and to extract the money that he needed for the financing of his factional activities. Last but not least, the fact that, in the affair of the counterfeiting of the coinage, the bishop resorted to the patriarchal protection, the ensuing interference of the Porte, and the despatch of a special agent to investigate the case and enforce law and order prove that this case was rather important and had caused much trouble not only to the bishop, but the community as well. Thus, it was more than profound that the guild organisation, which constituted the real basis of the economic life of the Kozanite community, was subject to constant injuries and, thus, subjected to severe danger. It seems likely that this environment of constant tension and feuding contributed decisively to the amalgamation and formation of the two principal political factions of Kozani, whose rivalry would dominate Kozani’s communal life for the next thirty years.

3.3.3. The dispute between Manço Osman Ağa’s sons and Naslıcalı Ebu Bekir Bey and the formation of the Alifrones and Dimokratikoi (1194 – 1200 AH/1780 – 1785 AD)

This period is marked by the intense factional strife over the management of the communal affairs and the undisputed monopoly of a given faction over the tax-farm of Kozani. This strife swelled into a major crisis in which different factions took part, namely Muslim officers vying for the office of voyvoda and Christian notables claiming the unofficial, but nonetheless highly influential, office of kocabaşı. The crisis started with the death of the voyvoda Manço Osman Ağa, after a long and successful career, which created a power vacuum which his sons, although they inherited their father’s fortune and office, were
unable to fill. Consequently, Manço Osman Ağa’s opponents took advantage of the situation and tried to disinherit his sons and replace them with members of their faction, by collaborating with the newly-formed faction of the Dimokratikoi, which opposed the party of Rousis Kontorousis who traditionally supported Manço Osman Ağa and his cause. As the events show, this was not the first time that Muslim and Christian parties combined respective interests and objectives and worked together in order to achieve their aims; nevertheless, this was the first time that a communal feud reached the point of civil strife, which almost broke apart the community. This crisis dominated the process of the election and appointment of the new Bishop of Servia and Kozani, after Ignatios’ death in 1785, and was only terminated after the Alifrones faction led by Rousis Kontorousis had defeated their opponents and imposed their undisputed domination over the administration of the tax-farm and the management of the communal and ecclesiastical affairs of Kozani.

As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, Manço Osman Ağa’s two sons Halil Ağa and Ahmed Ağa had farmed out with their father’s intervention the management of the tax-farm of Kozani for the year 1195 AH / 1780-1781 AD and they had obtained a receipt of control and management (zabt temessükü). In the meantime, Manço Osman Ağa died and it became evident that his sons did not possess the ability to hold and securely manage the tax-farm. Thus, the people of Kozani petitioned Fatma Hanım Sultan and demanded that the tax farm be contracted to Naslıcalı Ebu Bekir Bey, by arguing that this replacement would contribute to their security and prosperity. Furthermore, they asked for protection from the “abominable” practices of the current tax-farmers and demanded that Halil and Ahmed be prevented from interfering in the administration of the tax-farm. For this reason, Halil Ağa and Ahmed Ağa were deprived of their rights over the tax-farm and the voyvodalık. Ebu
Bekir Bey was thus appointed to voyvoda of Kozani for the year 1195 AH / 1780-1781 AD on the condition that he pays from his own pocket to his dismissed predecessors as compensation a sum equal to their expenses.\textsuperscript{190}

There is no additional documentation on Osman Ağa’s family and especially his sons. The only document that I have located in the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul is a report that had been despatched to Istanbul by Süleyman the silahşor, the officer who was appointed and came to Kozani with the duty of mastering and managing the estates and money left by the deceased Osman Ağa.\textsuperscript{191} Literally he was appointed as supervisory executor of his testament, since he was ordered to open his will and, after he had settled the debts of the deceased, to justly and equally divide among his family members all remaining estates and money.

The report under examination is dated 13 Rebi’ulahir 1195 AH / 8-4-1781 and states that Osman’s three sons, namely Hüseyin, Halil and Ahmed, his wife, his nephew, namely a certain Abdullatif, who was the individual most cognisant of the deceased Osman Ağa’s secrets and his confidant, and other unspecified people were summoned before the şer’iat court in Serfice, which was presided over by a certain Hakimulvakt Efendi. All the aforementioned individuals were cross-examined, with the use of a mixture of words at one time threatening at another time consoling. Osman’s debts, his estates, his numerous houses, which were located inside and outside Serfice and Vanıca,\textsuperscript{192} and the dowry of his

\textsuperscript{190} For an analytical description of the appointment of Naslıcalı Ebu Bekir Bey, see: Section 2.5., pp. 62-83.

\textsuperscript{191} For Süleyman the silahşor and his mission, see: Section 2.5., pp. 78-80.

\textsuperscript{192} I would like to remind the reader hereby that Serfice is the modern-Greek town of Servia. During the Ottoman period, there existed two villages named “Vanica”, a “Small Vanica / Küçük Vanica” and a “Large Vanica / Büyük Vanica”. They still exist but during the aforementioned process of Hellenisation of the names of settlements both villages were in 1928 renamed Kato Komi and Ano Komi respectively. Alexandros Drakakis and Stylianos Koundouros, Archeia Peri tes Systaseos kai
wife, were all recorded in a sealed register, which was drafted by Süleyman. This register also comprised a debt of Osman’s to the voyvoda of Kara Ferye, Musa Ağa, amounting to 7,750 ğuruş and another debt of Osman’s amounting to 32,540 ğuruş, which the latter owed to the people of Kozani, as proved by a receipt in the community’s ownership. Furthermore, Süleyman investigated reliable and trustworthy possessors of information and tried to settle the case. Apart from the aforementioned information, Süleyman declared that he did not know whether there were any other debts or estates that were kept secret and were, thus, not included in the register. However he attested that it was obvious that all those who were trully cognisant of and testified to the case, by saying that Osman Ağa had a sizeable property and estate, were acting for their own private ends and each one endeavored to secure his own interests.  

For this reason, Süleyman demanded that the case of Osman’s infant orphans, his other children, and his widow be taken under the consideration of the Porte and the administration. Süleyman requested the calculation of the value of Osman’s landed property and his chattels, after the dowry of his widow had been subtracted, and for its liquidation, so that Osman Ağa’s debts to private lenders and to the state be paid off. After that, all remaining money was to be distributed, according to the Shari’a, among the members of his family.
It becomes obvious that Osman Ağa died after a long career in the management of the tax-farm of Kozani and left behind him a disproportionate amount of debts, which his heirs had to acquit. Osman Ağa, as his first name always accompanying him in the extant Ottoman documentation testifies (Manco/Manço), was of Christian, most probably Greek or Vlach, origins. Although we do not possess adequate information about the early stages of his career, it seems plausible that he entered at some point the Janissary corps, after he had converted to Islam, and formed part of a local Janissary contingent, which brings us to the conclusion that he was, most probably, a yerli yeniçeri and not a kapıkulu yeniçeri salaried by the Porte. He was thus a prominent figure in the local society with strong links to the leading group of local Janisaaries, since, as has been discussed in the previous chapter, he was a Janissary bölük ağası, and with high-ranking Janissaries in Istanbul. His being a member of the Janissary corps thus facilitated his upward social and political movement, and enabled him to access firsthand information about tax-farming opportunities in his locality and secure, therefore, the most lucrative post for himself. As was natural, he became a long-term administrator of the most promising tax-farm of his locality, namely voyvoda of the malikâne of Kozani, a post that he kept in his possession for

195 In Macedonia the name Mantzios or Mantsios was used as an alternative for Manthos, which was a diminutive for Matthaios (: Matthew), or diminutive of Adamantios. Ntinas argues, furthermore, that Mantzios comes from the Vlach mandzu, which means the “foal” or “colt”. It seems, therefore, plausible that Mango Osman Ağa was of Vlach origins. Ntinas, Kozanite Family Names, p. 169-170; Nikolaos Tachinoslis, Morfes tou Konstantinos (19os Aionas-1913) [Forms of Konstantinos (19th Century-1913)] [Unpublished PhD dissertation (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2005), p. 13.

at least 20 years, since his initial appearance in the balance sheet of 1760-1761. In 1771-
1772, when he contracted the collection of the poll-tax of Kozani for that year, he
undersigned his petition as El-Hacc Osman Ağa, showing thus his intention to be considered
a respectful member of his community. Although Süleyman’s report he is officially
attested to as inhabitant of Serfice (Serfice sakinlerinden Manco Osman Ağa), who had been
born in Serfice and originally registered there, his permanent residence was most probably
Kozani.

We could thus assume that during his long tenure Osman Ağa had developed
patronage affiliation with many local prominent Christian magnates and notable
personalities. Moreover, we could assume that Osman Ağa had established his own
household in which he gathered all those local personalities that were bound to his cause
through patronage and protection or sharing common interests. The information provided
by the available documentation on the structure of Osman Ağa’s household or the relations
among the members of his household is scarce. Yet, if we use as a benchmark the
Caniklizâde household in Anatolia and the Qazdağlı household in Egypt, which were
extremely complex and hierarchically organised entities with hundreds, if not thousands, of
members and clients, who promoted their mutual interests and established their
domination through multifaceted alliances against their adversaries, Osman Ağa’s
household would appear rather mediocre and tiny.

Canay Şahin described the Caniklizâdes as a powerful family of grand a’yan who
established in the course of the 18th century a complex network of relations with the

197 I would like to remind the reader that the titles of “el-hacc” and “hacı” testified to their Muslim
bearer’s fulfillment of his most sacred duties, namely the pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of Mecca and
Medina.
imperial centre and other minor a’yan families throughout the areas under their control. They even appointed as stewards to administer their household affairs members of two minor families, namely the Hazinedarzâdes and the Şatirzâdes. They also imitated the structure of the households of grand Istanbul-based oligarchs by appointing individuals as their kapı kethüdas, namely household stewards who carried out mostly bureaucratic transactions, and sarrafs who were the financiers of the tax-farming transactions of the Caniklizâdes with the state. Thus the Caniklizâde household was particularly complex and based on a network of hierarchically organised relations among its numerous members, who were connected to one another through their patron and protector, namely the head of the Caniklizâde family.  

The Qazdagli household structure was even more elaborate because its members dominated over the far more complex Egyptian society, where local pre-Islamic traditions went hand in hand with the Mamluk and Ottoman institutions and traditions that had taken root into the Egyptian society under these two regimes. Eventually, the Qazdagli household succeeded through a system of marriage alliances and patronage relations to impose its domination over the Egyptian society and economy, which its members perpetuated by reproducing this policy for a long period following the death of the founder of the Qazdagli beylicate. Of particular importance was also the close relationship which the Qazdagli household enjoyed with the Chief Black Eunuchs, former heads of the Imperial Harem, who

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were sent to exile and lived in Egypt, where they sought protection from local magnates in return for their connections with the Porte and other institutions in Istanbul.

Based on the sources at our disposal, we could argue that Osman Ağa’s household comprised three concentric circles with Osman Ağa at their centre. Within the inner circle we should place a) Osman Ağa himself, b) his three sons, Hüseyin, Halil, and Ahmed, c) his unnamed wife, whose origins are otherwise completely unknown to us, d) his nephew, Abdullatif, who was Osman Ağa’s confidant and most trustworthy agent, and e) Osman Ağa’s sarraf, who, despite the fact that he was not a member of his family, was a pivotal figure because he provided Osman Ağa with the necessary funds to finance his activities. Within the middle circle we should place Osman Ağa’s close associates and collaborators, who comprised Muslims and Christians of local origins, such as Rousis Kontorousis and members of his faction, who were Osman Ağa’s direct associates. Within the outer circle we should place personalities outside the local scope, who were only coincidentally related to Osman Ağa, owing to the latter’s relationship with the Janissary corps and his being an agent and protégé of Fatma Hanım Sultan, and thus member of her own extensive household. Despite Osman Ağa’s close relationship with Fatma Hanım Sultan, the latter must be placed within the outer circle of the former’s household, because Fatma Hanım Sultan was always an absentee figure that did not play a decisive role in the formation and structure of Osman Ağa’s household. Yet, she was the personage that secured its flourishing and survival, due to the trust that she placed in Osman Ağa to act as her representative in Kozani.

199 On the structure of the Qazdagli household, the role of Qazdagli women, and the relationship between the Qazdaglis and the exiled Chief Black Eunuchs, see: Hathaway, *The Rise of the Qazdağlis*, pp. 109-164.
As becomes apparent, Osman Ağa’s household was for various reasons not so extensive and distinguished as the Caniklizâde and Qazdagli households. First, Osman Ağa was a local minor notable, who did not aspire, and was unable, to expand his influence to the extent that his Anatolian and Egyptian counterparts did. His influence was restricted to Kozani and its vicinity, where he operated during his long career as Fatma Hanım Sultan’s appointee and trustworthy agent entrusted with the administration on her behalf of a tax-farm located in a relatively mediocre and faraway area of the Ottoman periphery. Second, Osman Ağa’s enterprise was doomed to die with its founder, for, as we will see immediately below, after Osman Ağa’s death his successors proved incapable of following in their father’s footsteps, which ushered in the dissolution of his household and network of alliances, in stark contrast to the case of the Caniklizâdes who succeeded in evading or surviving repeated waves of confiscation of their properties (müsadere), and pass on their posts and fortunes to their offspring, establishing therefore real semi-autonomous polities ruled by their dynasties. Thus, as becomes clear, Osman Ağa’s endeavour was hampered by lack of spatial diffusion, endurance, and longevity.

Be that as it may, the scheme presented above could help us approach and explain the relations among multifarious netorks, the role of the central figure (in our case Osman Ağa) as a broker among these disparate networks, the activities of minor provincial notables and their households, their relationships with major, more influential, notables, and the relationship of the peripheral notables with the Istanbul-based oligarchs and magnates. We should keep in mind that what Ottomanist historiography lacks is not thorough examinations of the enterprises and households of grand Istanbul oligarchs and provincial
magnates, but those of minor ones, whose micro-histories tend to disappear before the influence and glamour of their more distinguished counterparts.

To return to the fate of Osman Ağa’s enterprise, after Osman Ağa’s death, an important power vacuum was created that neither his sons nor any other member of his family or household could fill. His opponents found the opportunity to remove his supporters and collaborators from their offices and reap their benefits for themselves. For this reason, the dismissal of Osman Ağa’s sons from the voyvodalık of Kozani under the pretext of incompetence and impotence should be seen under the light of the instability due to Osman Ağa’s death. As will be shown later, it was furthermore a movement of Georgios Avliotis’ faction against Rousis Kontorousis and his supporters.

A summary of some petitions regarding the affairs of the malikâne of Kozani, which were submitted to the Porte by Fatma Hanım Sultan, provide us with invaluable information about a later stage of this crisis. The summary is dated 23 Cemaziyyülevvel 1196 AH / 6-5-1782 AD.²⁰⁰

The first part of the summary refers to factional feuds in Kozani among its inhabitants. It says that a few years previously (as a matter of fact two year earlier in 1780) some “mischief-makers” made their appearance and obtained power in the administration of the tax-farm of Kozani with the accord of the former voyvoda of Kozani Ebu Bekir Bey,
who had formed an alliance with them. Their only aim and strong desire was to make money and they constantly used a series of different pretenses and pretexts. Although this situation had been repeatedly reported by Fatma Hanım Sultan to the Porte, the administration was not watchful, and did not pay attention to the problems of the Kozanites. For this reason, the aforementioned individuals persisted in “their wretchedness and crimes and continued to work by infringing the rights of the people and by oppressing them”. The current voyvoda (whose name is not mentioned but as will be seen was a certain Osman Ağa, not to be confused with his namesake predecessor, who was appointed as voyvoda after the victory of the Kontorousis faction) has not delivered to them until the time of the report a single akçe (literally nothing), either from the revenues of the tax-farm or from the annual returns of the tax-farm of the poll-tax and the ispence, or any other tax.

Nevertheless, this time the judge despatched an urgent notification, where the circumstances of their case were exposed and explained in more detail. This judicial report demanded that, after the case of these mischief-makers had been investigated and the result was the apparently expected one, namely the revealing of their crimes, their punishment be executed as the law required. Fatma Hanım Sultan asked through her official report for an imperial order to be issued and her son-in-law, Abdurrahman Bey son of Nu’man Pasha (Nu’man Paşazade Abdurrahman Bey), who was a high ranking official in the imperial palace, to be entrusted with the execution of this duty, namely the

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201 BOA, C.DH..15091: mütenebbih olmayub kemafiyıyü’s-sabik şakavetde israr ve enva’-i muzalim ve te’addiane ıbitidar eyledüklerinden
202 The ispence or resm-i ispence was a traditional tax levied in rural areas on households of villages. This tax appears most frequently in 15th and 16th-century tax registers (tapu tahrir defterleri). For additional information, see: Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, II, pp. 88-89.
investigation of the case, the activities, and the crimes that the mischief-makers have allegedly committed against the people of Kozani.

The mischief-makers’ names are included in the second part of the summary. There appears one Marko, who was probably the leader of this group and permanent resident of Kozani and his collaborators and partners who came from Girbene (today: Grevena). Among them the most prominent names are that of a certain Biro Avl[i]oti, who was probably a relative of Georgios Avliotis’, a certain Başa Simo, a certain Biro “the farrier”, and a certain Nikola. The identity of these individuals is, with the exception of Başa Simo, otherwise completely obscure.

Kostas Ntinas, based on the tradition reproduced by Lioufis, mentions that the family of Mpasiasimos (: Μπασιασίμος) was one of the most ancient Kozanite families and had emigrated into Kozani from Epirus sometime in the late 14th century. At the same time, the name Mpasias was used in Kozani for another prominent family, namely the family of Mpasiagiannis, whose founder was Ioannis Trantas, who was a semi-legendary figure and father of Charisios Trantas. The latter appears in local traditions as the first kocabaşı of Kozani and the individual who succeeded to acquire on behalf of the community the spectacular privileges, which the Kozanite community allegedly enjoyed since the latter part of the 17th century. The term mpasias denoted in the Kozanite dialect the headman of the community and was the diminutive of the term kotzampasis. In the Vlach dialect, however, the mpasias denoted a generally respectful elder figure and the chief shepherd, known as tseligkas, who was elected among a certain number of confederate Vlach clans specialising

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204 BOA, C.DH..15091: Kozana karyesi mütemekkinlerinden Marko ve rüfekası Girbene kazasından Biro Avloti ve Başa Simo ve Biro na’lband ve Nikola nam müfsidler
205 Ntinas, Kozanite Family Names, p. 184; Lioufis, History of Kozani, p. 36.
in transhumant animal husbandry to lead them, represent the confederation (*tselikato*) before the state authorities, administer their activities and resolve internal disputes, and secure the sale of their products, and the lowland winter and highland summer pastures necessary for the grazing of their cattle.\(^{206}\) We could thus assume that the Başa Simo mentioned in this document belonged to a prominent Kozanite family of Vlach origins, who, as the local legends have it for the semi-legendary Trantas family, had immigrated into Kozani with their cattle and at least one of its members served as *kocabaşı* of the community.

As the report implies, these people acted with the purpose of stirring up trouble and disorder.\(^{207}\) They demanded aggressively and presumptuously from 30-40 of “the poor and broke taxpayers” of Kozani (perhaps these taxpayers formed part of the faction opposing Kontorousis’ faction) to each make monthly payments and a down-payment of 10 ğuruş per taxpayer. They have also brought with them 10 of the most trustful men of the previous *voyvoda*, Ebu Bekir Bey, who were members of the Janissary corps as hound-keepers, and were placed next to him as his custody to act as local gendarmerie, which would walk and ride about bearing arms and impose Ebu Bekir Bey’s control over Kozani. They seized the

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\(^{207}\) BOA, C.DH..15091: *ikaz-i fitne zımında*
mansion of the governor of Kozani and prevented the tax-collectors from collecting the annual payments of the poll-tax and the traditional toll on the rural households. As their crimes tended to increase day-by-day, they inflicted injuries on the poor taxpayers and they persisted on their “deliberate” damages and offenses. For this reason and under these circumstances the collection of the state taxes was impossible and the poor people’s quietness and comfort had been “seized as spoil”.

The judge of Serfice and the judge of Çaharşenbe submitted, therefore, this report in order to ask for help and assistance from Nu’man Paşazade Abdurrahman Bey. They asked on behalf of the people for him to act promptly, so that their injustices could be ended and the public disorder suppressed. The taxpayers and people of Kozani submitted also a petition, through which they asked for an imperial order to be issued commanding the removal of the injustice that the mischief-makers had caused, in order to prevent them from strengthening their position in Kozani and at the same time help the local authorities in establishing the security of the “poor and weak” Kozanites.

The aforementioned mischief-makers acted with the incitement of a certain Ali Ağa who had been previously appointed voyvoda of Kozani. The investigation of this case

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208 BOA, C.DH..15091: fukaranın rahatları meslub olmağla
210 The documents provide us with no additional information about him. This is the very first and only mention of him in the documents. Was he perhaps a collaborator of Ebu Bekir Bey? It seems probable, however, that since the documents at our disposal stop referring to Ebu Bekir Bey after Ali Ağa’s initial appearance, Ali Ağa was Ebu Bekir Bey’s successor. But this assumption raises many
proved that Ali Ağa was a source of trouble and instability. He put, with his scandalous
behaviour, the viability of the tax-farm in real danger. Thus, Ali Ağa had to be expelled from
Kozani and at the same time a new officer be appointed with the duty to hold and control
firmly the tax-farm of Kozani and administer its affairs with rectitude. 211

Last but not least, in the fourth part of the summary there is an order addressing the
governor-general of Rumelia and the judge of Alasonya. It is dated evahir (: the last ten
days) of Safar 1196 AH / between 2 and 12-2-1782 AD. The order states that some
Muslims, 212 namely a certain Bekir, a certain İbrahim, a certain Mustafa, and a certain
Mesih, had submitted a report to the Porte concerning an amount of money owed to them
by some Christians, namely Marko (the aforementioned leader of the mischief-makers), a
certain Hariz (most probably, Harisios), a certain Karaca 213, a certain Dina 214, a certain Mihal,
a certain Yanaki, another Hariz, and another two people (whose names are not mentioned),
all permanent residents of Kozani. These individuals owed since the year 119* 215 the
aforementioned Muslims the amount of 5,000 ḡuruş according to a receipt in their
possession. This amount was rightfully theirs, but these mischief-makers repeatedly,
whenever the Muslim creditors asked for their money back, reacted with “pretentions and

other questions about the fate of Ebu Bekir and his relationship to Ali Ağa. These questions must
remain, for the present, unanswered.

211 BOA, C.DH..15091: zikr olunan müfsidler mukaddema ta’yyin olunan Ali Ağa’nın içvasıyla ber
vech-i muharrer harekat-i na-hemvare cesaret eyledüklerinden bahsla merkum Ali Ağa ol-tarafdan
ref’ bir-le mukata’a-i merkume ta’yyin olunan zabita zabt ve rabt etdirilüb zikr olunan müfsidlerin
dahi te’ribleriyle ref’-i ihtilal ve te’min-i fukara hususuna mübaderet

212 Apart from their names there is no other information about them. We can deduce however by
the lakab (title) “zide kadrühüm” (“May their power increase”) accompanying them that they were
officials or notable personalities, perhaps tax-farmers in Alasonya, for the order was addressed to
the judge of Alasonya.

213 Karatzias was the name of an old Kozanite family; the very first mention to its name dates from
1774. For additional information, see: Ntinas, Kozanite Family Names, p. 142.

214 Ntinas was the name of an old Kozanite family; the very first mention to its name dates from
1768. For additional information, see: Ntinas, Kozanite Family Names, p. 201.

215 The exact date is missing in the Order.
mischiefs” showing opposition to the provisions of the Shari’a. For this reason, an imperial order was issued, for justice to be enforced and their rights be secured. The imperial order commanded that the aforementioned amount of money be given to them without any shortfall.\footnote{BOA, C.DH..15091: Rum-İli valisine ve Alasonya kazisine hüküm ki Bekir ve İbrahim ve Mustafa ve Mesih zide kadrüşüm şidle-i sa’adetime ’arzuhal edüb bunların kaza-yı mezbure tabi’ havass-i hümayunum karyelerinden Kozana nam karye mütemekkinklerinden Marko ve Hariz ve Karaca ve Dina ve Mihal ve Yanaki ve diğer Hariz ve [...] ve [...] nam zimmiler zimmetlerinde bin yüz doksan [...] senesinden berü ber meceb-i temessük beş bin ğuruş alacak hakları olub defa’atiyla taleb eyledüklerinde mesflurlar miferr ve mefsedet iken hukuk-i şer’-i şerif vermeğin ta’llül ve muhalefet ve ḍadr-i küllüh ve i błal-i hakk sevdasında oldukları yıldrub ber-mceb-i temessük mesflurların zimmetlerinde olan al-mikdar ğuruş alacak hakları tamamen tahsil ve bi-kusur gözlere aldırılub hukuk-i şer’-i şerif ta’llül ve muhalefet etdirilmeyüb ihkak-i hakk olunmak babinda emr-i şerif rica eyledükleri iclaf mehallinda şer’ görülmek üçün emr-i ’ali yazılmışdır}

The facts show that Ebu Bekir Bey collaborated with the faction that opposed the supporters of his predecessor, in order to achieve control over the tax-farm and the town of Kozani. He used some Janissaries as his guard for his own protection and for the imposition of his rule. His supporters, namely the faction led by Georgios Avlioti, had borrowed a large amount of money from four Muslim notables of Alasonya, in order to finance their activities. However, after they had imposed their rule over Kozani, they embarked on extensive proscriptions of their opponents, which caused as a result an outcry against them and their collaborators. Ebu Bekir Bey and his successor Ali Ağa were thus removed and expelled from Kozani and their Christian supporters were punished. Once more the chain of events caused a severe crisis, whose gravity is confirmed by the fact that the malikâne-beneficiary, Fatma Hanım Sultan, appointed as her agent for the investigation of the case and for the enforcement of law and order her son-in-law, who was at the same time a high-ranking palace officer.
When the details presented in the Ottoman documents are juxtaposed with the information provided by the local amateur historians, the events become clearer. Lioufis provides us with a concise description of the events that took place in Kozani at the same period with the events described above and, although he does not refer to the disputes between Muslim officers about the voyvodalik of Kozani, he delineates the structure and the ideology of the two Christian factions that were formed and clashed for domination over the community.217

The first faction was the Kontorousis’ faction, named Alifrones after the support that its leader and members received from Ali Pasha of Ioannina. Literally the term Alifrones means “those who support and advocate the ideas of Ali [Pasha]”. It was used as disparaging characterisation, since Ali Pasha was equated in that period, and later all the more, with the notions of tyranny, oppression, falsehood, and deceit. Thus, his supporters, real and alleged ones, were coloured by their opponents with dark colours, as equally tyrannical, oppressive, and deceptive as their patron and master. The second faction was formed and led by Georgios Avliotis and was named by its opponents “the faction of the Dimokratikoi (Democrats)”, as a reflection of their ideas of a more equal and fairer organisation and management of the communal affairs. However, it is a well-known fact that, during the 18th century, the idea of Democracy was synonymous with overthrowing the traditional time-honoured status quo. The 18th-century Kozanite élite, which comprised a great number of Kozanite families engaged with commercial activities through their firms, which were based in important Western- and Central-European emporia, were acquainted with modern Western ideas, which they communicated through their contacts with local

217 Lioufis, History of Kozani, 61-63.
élites and the rising bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{218} They were used, therefore, to communicate various circulating ideas and theories on politics, economy, and religion. Apart from that, we should not forget that during that same period the school of Kozani hosted great thinkers as teachers, some of whom, the most shining example being Evgenios Voulgaris, acted as primary vectors for the ideas of Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{219} Thus, we could suppose that the Alifrones were an elitist and conservative faction defending the status and wealth of its members and the Church, always concurring with the Bishop and defending his interests. On the other hand, the faction of the Dimokratikoi was formed by members of the Kozanite community belonging to less prestigious social strata and families whose members were considered by their adversaries as upstarts, most probably due to the fact that they had immigrated into Kozani from neighbouring areas and were thus not members of the indigenous élite. The most typical example is, of course, the surname Avliotis, which denotes “someone from the village of Avles”, which was always recorded in the Ottoman documents as Havlılar.\textsuperscript{220} Be that as it may, the leading members of both factions were rich Kozanites, who had studied medicine or law abroad, received a broad education based on the ideas of the

\textsuperscript{218} On the rise of a bourgeois class in the Ottoman Empire see the excellent and groundbreaking monograph of Fatma Müge Göçek, \textit{Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire, Ottoman Westernization and Social Change}, (Oxford; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), where the author analyses the emergence in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries of Ottoman bureaucratic and commercial bourgeoisie in response to contemporaneous military and fiscal reforms, and the contacts with Western Europe, which resulted in the penetration of Western ideas into the Ottoman lands.

\textsuperscript{219} Lioufis, \textit{History of Kozani}, pp. 175-278. Lioufis presents an analytical history of the school of Kozani and provides us with valuable information about the teachers who served in the school during the three centuries of its operation. However, there is not any updated monograph on the role of the school of and education, in general, in Kozani or in other important urban centers of the Greek lands during the same period. Furthermore, it would be worth studying the role of these figures in the development and enrichment of the ideas of the Ottoman Enlightenment mentioned in Chapter I. Was there a relationship between these provincial “enlightened” figures and the Istanbul-based statesmen and polymaths who expressed the ideas of the Ottoman Enlightenment? And, if we are able to testify to the existence of such a relationship, how close was this relationship and what were the channels of communication?

\textsuperscript{220} Ntinas, \textit{Kozanite Family Names}, pp. 103-104.
Enlightenment, and were rich and successful merchants, who were mostly based in Vienna, Budapest, and Bucharest. They all aimed, regardless of the theories and ideas that they propagated, at the management of the affairs of Kozani, through their status, wealth, and power.

Avliotis organised in 1780 a rebellion against Ignatios and the faction of Kontorousis. His supporters slaughtered Ignatios’ chief secretary, the protosygkellos Kallinikos, because they considered him as the source of all scandals scourging the community. They immediately afterwards imposed their rule and persecuted all the officials of the bishopric, who had been previously involved in communal scandals, and the supporters of Kontorousis. A written petition which, was submitted to the Porte by the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Holy Synod, sheds some light on the persecutions that must have taken place after the victory of Avliotis and his faction. Although this document is not dated, the original petition is accompanied by a note which cites that according to this petition a decree was issued on 15 Şa‘ban 1194 AH / 16-8-1780 AD. For this reason, we could estimate that the petition was written sometime in early August 1780, namely in the period that followed the uprising of Avliotis.222

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221 BOA, C.ADL..3868: ‘arzuhalı mucebine sahh buyuruldu fi 15 Şa‘ban sene 1194
222 BOA, C.ADL..3868: devletli ‘inayetli merhametli sultanım hazretleri sağ olsun
The petition expounds the case of a Christian from Kozani, namely a certain Dimo Toloğlu / Dimos son of Tolis. This man was a permanent resident of Kozani; yet, since he was never occupied, quiet and inoffensive, with his own concerns, but he was rather always an “idle” person, devoid of a permanent salaried occupation providing him and his family the necessary means of subsistence, he was a “mischief-maker and a constant source of trouble”. He always applied “improper and obscure methods in his life, especially when it came to make some money, and he had even dared to resort to heretical practices opposing the Orthodox Christian beliefs”. Although some people tried repeatedly to admonish, exhort, and advise him, all these efforts had not produced the slightest effect, for he obstinately persisted in his “shameful” acts and crimes, with all reprimands and chastisements proving pointless and ineffective.

The bishop of Kozani had despatched to the Patriarch a letter as a further proof of Dimo’s “scandalous” behaviour, and asked for the patriarch’s interference in this affair. The patriarch asked that this mischief-maker, due to his being a person of non-permanent way of life, be arrested, in whichever place he might be found, by the officer of the Janissaries of that location. He were be sent with his intervention to and imprisoned in the monastery of Varlaam, which was located in Kalambaka, kaza of Tirhala (today: Trikala), with the hope that this would act as a deterrent example to other mischief-makers and criminals in the

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223 Ntinas mentions that the first record to the family name of Tolis dates from 1760 and, by following Lioufis’ blurred and confused narrative, argues that this family had migrated sometime in the early 17th century from Agraфа into Kozani. For additional information, see: Ntinas, Kozanite Family Names, p. 245; Lioufis, History of Kozani, p. 43.

224 BOA, C.ADL..3868: vazifesi olmayan na-hemvareye süluk eyledüğünden
225 BOA, C.ADL..3868: da’ima kendü halinde durmayub vazifesi olmayan na-hemvareye süluk eyledüğünden başka ayyinimize muğayir nice harekata cesaret eyledüğünden
226 BOA, C.ADL..3868: müfsid-i mersuma defa’atyla pend ve nüşh olundukda ser mu isfa etmeyüb harekât-ı kabıhasında israr ve vücühla sezavar güş-mal olduğunu
area. The patriarch did not clarify the period of Dimo’s imprisonment, or the exact date of his release, arguing that Dimo was to be held in custody there until his “defective soul was put into a better and amended condition”.  

This example, which is the only case that is documented and can be related directly to the events of Avliotis’ uprising, reveals that Avliotis and his supporters resorted to an extensive series of proscriptions and persecution of the supporters and agents of the faction led by Kontorousis. What is more, the people persecuted did not only belong to the Kozanite élite, but were also common people and petty criminals. This allows us to suppose that the proscriptions made by Avliotis and his supporters were far broader than those assumed and described by Lioufis and the other amateur local historians. The same would be repeated 15 years later, on an even greater scale, during Avliotis’ second uprising that would almost tear Kozani and the Kozanite society and community apart.

Returning to the narration of Lioufis and Kalinderis, Avliotis and his supporters asked for and were granted a patriarchal letter, which commanded Ignatios to deprive his two closest associates, the priests Georgios “the Oikonomos” and Charisios “o Sakelliou”, of their privileges and the income that they received from the parish churches under their jurisdiction. When the rebels resorted to violence and proscriptions against the leading families of the Kontorousis faction, Ignatios responded by requesting the interference of the patriarch and of the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul. The patriarch despatched immediately a patriarchal letter to Kozani, in which he commanded the immediate termination of the feuds and the ending of the uprising. The disputing factions were commanded to

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227 BOA, C.ADL..3868: ‘ibreten li’l-ğayr ıslah-ı nefs edinceye değin
228 Kalinderis, Historical Notes, p. 17. The Patriarchal letter concerning the case of Georgios “the Oikonomos” and Charisios “o Sakelliou” is dated July 1781.
immediately seek mutual conciliation; otherwise the community would be punished with ecclesiastical prohibition and excommunication.\textsuperscript{229} Finally the patriarch sent a special agent (\textit{exarchos}) and the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul sent the aforementioned Abdurrahman Bey\textsuperscript{230} who enforced the ecclesiastical and secular law and order. While Avliotis left Kozani, escaping punishment, and resorted to his family firm in Budapest, his supporters were persecuted and severely punished. As a result, the Bishop and Rousis Kontorousis’ faction established their undisputed domination over the Kozanite community. Their domination was further consolidated by the expulsion of all Muslim officers who had assisted Avliotis in his uprising and the appointment by Fatma Hanim Sultan of a new and trustworthy \textit{voyvoda}.

The Greek archive of Ali Pasha contains a report which the notables despatched to Fatma Hanim Sultan (\textit{Sultana Hanum Fatme}, in the original Greek text), in order to thank her for the appointment of a certain Osman Ağa as \textit{voyvoda} and \textit{zabit} of Kozani. They asked from her to protect him from his opponents who, as they attested, would use “any kind of lies and calumnies to discredit him, aiming at his dismissal and replacement”. Furthermore, they asked her to issue an order which should stipulate that no one could interfere in Osman Ağa’s duties and activities, because Kozani was already in a precarious condition, due to the recurring factional feuds and the recent uprising led by Avliotis. The letter is dated 13 February 1784 and is the first official document after the suppression of the uprising of Avliotis. For this reason, we may securely assume that the 11 notables undersigning the report are all members of the Kontorousis’ faction, since it seems natural that, after the events that the supporters of the faction of the \textit{Dimokratikoi} had caused

\textsuperscript{229} Kalinderis, \textit{Historical Notes}, p. 16. The Patriarchal letter is dated August 1781.
\textsuperscript{230} Lioufis, \textit{History of Kozani}, p. 62. Lioufis refers to him with the general term of \textit{kapucu}, namely doorkeeper (\textit{estali ek Konstantinoupoleos kapoutzis pros katapaysin tis staseos}). As already mentioned, Abdurrahman Bey was a high-ranking palace officer bearing the title of the chief imperial-palace doorkeeper (\textit{kapicibaşi}).
during their uprising, they would never be allowed again to take part in the management of communal affairs.²³¹ Osman Ağa, the new voyvoda of Kozani, must not be confused with his namesake predecessor, who had been dead since early 1781. He was a figure who made his appearance in Kozani after the uprising led by Georgios Avliotis and his supporters. In a letter addressing the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki after the death of the Bishop Ignatios in 1785, Osman is still mentioned as the voyvoda of Kozani. He was a close supporter and partner of Rousis Kontorousis and was for this reason closely affiliated with his supporters and their faction.²³²

Yet, this letter reveals something extremely enlightening for the years that followed and the history of Kozani. The fact that the letter was found in Ali Pasha’s personal archive testifies to the support that he provided to the Alifrones. This early testimony to the relationship between Ali Pasha and Rousis Kontorousis reveals the interest and interference of Ali Pasha in Kozanite affairs, but also his increasing strength and fame, which allowed him to be called upon by a relatively distant locality, which was far from the centre of Ali Pasha’s operations, to act as referee in its communal feuds and patron of one of the two factions vying for supremacy. Ali pasha was well aware of the fact that the serbestiyyet of the malikâne of Kozani and the fact that the malikâne was contracted by and outsourced to a member of the reigning dynasty rendered for the time being any claims of interference into

²³¹ These are the names of the 11 notables undersigning the report: Ioannis Papalouia, Rousis Misiou, Latzkos Dimou, Rousis Kontorousis, Georgios Theodorou, Georgios Michail, Markos Zisi, Kiro Stefani, Ioannis Georgiou, Georgios Agora and Ioannis Charisis. Since most notables are signing with their father’s name and not their family name it is impossible to shed light on their identity. Yet, the family names of the most prominent members of the Kontalous appear in the document, namely Rousis Kontorousis himself, Ioannis Papalouia, Rousis Misiou, Georgios Agora, and Ioannis Charisis, who were all rich merchants running family firms and companies based in Budapest and Bucharest. For these families, see: Ntinas, Kozanite Family Names, pp. 210, 254; Lioufis, History of Kozani, pp. 334-337.
and ownership over Kozani ungrounded and unrealistic. It is also a matter of question whether Ali Pasha had any ability to spread his influence over such an extensive area, for he was in the early 1780s nothing more than a petty Muslim Albanian warlord, without any real basis of operation. To obtain such a basis, he would have to wait until 1787-1789, when in only two years he would succeed, initially, to be officially proclaimed by the Porte the superintendent of the mountainous passages of Rumelia and, immediately afterwards, obtain the paşalık of Yanya (today: Ioannina) for himself. Be that as it may, this early bond would later prove decisive, for, as we will see immediately below, when the malikâne of Kozani became, after Fatma Hanım Sultan’s death, part of the esham system, Ali Pasha succeeded with the support of the Alifrones to impose his undisputed rule over Kozani, which was secured by the close relationship which he had developed with the Alifrones and the multifaceted support that he provided to them, whenever need arose.

3.3.4. The domination of Rousis Kontorousis and Ali Pasha over Kozani (1785 – c. 1820)

This period begins with the death of Bishop Ignatios and the appointment of his successor Theofilos in 1785, and ends with the downfall and execution of Ali Pasha in 1820, when he was proclaimed a traitor and stripped of all his possessions, property, and tax-farming rights. The period is marked by the harsh rule of the Alifrones, the crisis of the uprising of Avliotis’ supporters in 1795-1797 and, finally, the gradual sidelining of Kontorousis by Ali Pasha, after the imposition of his direct rule over Kozani in 1801, and his replacement in the leadership of the community by more temperate members of his faction, who were more acceptable by the community, but always Ali Pasha’s obedient instruments.
Bishop Ignatios died after a brief illness on 20 April 1785. Consequently, the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki Iakobos III immediately set in motion the procedures for his successor’s election. Two candidates were proposed: Maximos, the former Patriarchal commissioner and secretary of the deceased bishop, and Theofilos, the chief secretary of the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki. Theofilos was deemed more suitable, because it was acknowledged that he was a mature and temperate politician and a man who possessed a high degree of ecclesiastical and secular education, in contrast to Maximos who was considered a corrupt priest devoid of the level of knowledge and experience that a man was expected to possess. Theofilos was thus elected and, as the Ottoman regulations stipulated, after he had been officially presented before the Ottoman authorities, he was appointed officially through the issuance of an imperial diploma of appointment. The imperial diploma (berat-i ‘alişan) which was issued by the Ottoman authorities is dated 16 Şevval 1199 AH / 22-8-1785 AD. As Lioufis cites, Theofilos was warmly welcomed by the community of Kozani and his flock all over his diocese, especially by the leaders of the community of Kozani, namely Rousis Kontorousis, who had personally mediated for Theofilos’ election, Georgios Sakellarios, and Logothetis Ioannis Louïas.

Theofilos came from Veroia, hence his nickname “Verroievs (: Βερροιεφσ)”, and was a protégé of the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki Iakobos III. Under his protection and due to his high level of education, Theofilos managed to climb the echelon of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and, after he had served for a long period as Iakobos’ chief secretary, he was appointed Bishop of Servia and Kozani. He was the first bishop that was not a scion of the Katakalou family that had monopolised the bishopric’s seat since its transfer from Servia to

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Kozani in 1745. His election reassured the strong bonds between the bishopric of Servia and Kozani, and the metropolis of Thessaloniki, and certified the right of the metropolitan of Thessaloniki to elect and appoint the bishop as his subordinate. It came as a natural consequence that the party of Thessaloniki, founded and managed by Meletios and Ignatios, in 1785 ceased officially to exist and power fell into Kontorousis and his supporters’ hands, who from that time onwards would dominate the Kozanite political arena.

As the composition of the first community synod and the ecclesiastical synod of the priests (synodos ton iereon) after Theofilos’ election reveals, Kontorousis and his faction were the exclusive representatives of the community and the remaining factions were blocked from participating and expressing their opinions. Their members belonged all to the Alifrones and were close partners and collaborators of Rousis Kontorousis. The most urgent issue for the new Bishop was the precarious condition of his diocese and especially of Kozani, which came as a result of the constant violent factional feuds and the debts of his predecessor who, as I have already mentioned, used to borrow large amounts of money in the name of the community on usurious terms and spent in financing the activities of his protégés. Theofilos acted immediately and refused to pay the money owed to the creditors of his predecessor. The creditors, who were not only Christians, but Muslims and Jews as well, threatened him that they would address their demands to the Ottoman judicial authorities and furthermore blackmailed him that they would ask for his dismissal from his office. Theofilos managed to obtain a legal opinion from the local court, which confirmed that a bishop was not to be held responsible for paying off the debts of his deceased or

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235 Lioufis, *History of Kozani*, p. 64. He refers to a congratulatory letter of the people of Kozani addressing Theofilos on the occasion of his appointment as Bishop of Servia and Kozani, which contains the names of the notables of Kozani who undersigned the letter. For more congratulatory letters of the people of Kozani and the diocese of Servia and Kozani congratulating Theofilos on the occasion of his appointment as their bishop, see: Kalinderis, *Unbound Documents*, pp. 60-73.
dismissed predecessor. However, the creditors persisted in their threats and blackmails. For this reason, Theofilos made use of the term that allowed him, through the mediation of the metropolitan of Thessaloniki and the patriarch, to bring the case before the imperial council and be examined, accordingly, by the authorities in Istanbul. Theofilos asked for a ferman to be issued that would stipulate that neither he nor his flock were to be held responsible for paying off Ignatios’ debts, the aforemenioned creditors be prohibited from threatening and blackmailing Theofilos, and enforce their compliance to the clause of his diploma of appointment, which stipulated that all litigations of the bishop should be brought and examined before the imperial council. The authorities in Istanbul investigated the case and issued an imperial order which reassured that the acting bishop was not to be held responsible for his predecessor’s acts and debts, whilst it ordered Ignatios’ creditors to abstain from threatening and blackmailing Theofilos. Accordingly, they were asked to forward any petition and complaints against him to the imperial council in Istanbul.²³⁶

We have no further information on the administration of Kozani and the feuds that erupted for the domination of a given faction over its rivals. The Ottoman documents provide us with no information on the administration of the tax-farm during the latest part of Fatma Hanım Sultan’s tenure as malikâne-beneficiary, which faction she supported, or who he had appointed to act as her representative in Kozani. As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, Fatma Hanım Sultan died sometime in 1796 and the tax-farm of Kozani was incorporated into the resources which were used for financing the nizam-i cedid reforms undertaken by Sultan Selim III. At the same time a major crisis erupted in Kozani in 1795 in an uprising orchestrated by Georgios Avliotis. Although we have no documents

²³⁶ Salakides, Sultanic Documents, pp. 91-92, 126-127. This ferman is still preserved in the Kobentareios Municipal Library of Kozani.
providing us with concrete information on this, the events show that Avliotis organised a rebellion to overthrow Kontorousis and his regime.

A letter of Theofilos, which addressed the Metropolitan of Thessaloniki and is reproduced by Lioufis, contains his testimony on the events that followed. Lioufis says that during the 1780s and 1790s Tepedelenli Ali Pasha showed openly his interest in the affairs of Kozani and until 1795, when Avliotis returned to Kozani after he had been in exile for 13 years, Rousis Kontorousis had governed Kozani undisputedly, by collaborating with the voyvodas of Kozani who were all supported and financed by Ali Pasha. At the same time, Kontorousis had imposed his quasi-tyrannical regime and levied heavy and illegal taxes and dues on the families that had previously supported Georgios Avliotis, during the events of 1781-1782 and could oppose the absoluteness of his power. Although Lioufis does not refer to the source of his information, he provides us with the names of the persecuted families that had left Kozani in an attempt to save their lives and fortunes. They were the Kondis, Boukos, Lousianis, and Oikonomos families. Avliotis, permanent resident of Budapest since 1782, was informed by them about the tyrannical persecution of his supporters by his archrival and was thus convinced to go to Istanbul. It was expected that he could obtain there an imperial order which would provide him with the right to overthrow Kontorousis and establish himself as the new ruler of Kozani and representative agent of Fatma Hanım Sultan. Lioufis just informs us that Avliotis came back to Kozani bearing with him an imperial order and a letter written by Fatma Hanım Sultan, which announced that he had been appointed the new kocabaşı of Kozani. It goes without saying that this triumphant
comeback of Avliotis provided, to him and his supporters, the excuse to persecute and punish Kontorousis and his supporters.\textsuperscript{237}

Lioufis informs us that since 1793 the voyvoda of Kozani was an Albanian, without mentioning, however, his name or identity, but overtly assuming that he was an agent of Ali Pasha’s, despite the fact that this voyvoda, like all his predecessors, had been appointed by Fatma Hanım Sultan, who was still the beneficiary of the malikâne of Kozani. This Albanian was, always according to Lioufis’ narrative, an “oppressive, tyrannical, and corrupt hireling of Ali” and the people of Kozani resorted, for this reason, to Fatma Hanım Sultan’s protection and asked from her to send one of her agents to Kozani to protect them and enforce law and order. Fatma Hanım Sultan responded by sending to Kozani an agent to check the accounts of the community and the activities of the “oppressive” voyvoda. However, according to Lioufis’ narrative, the Albanian was supported by “other darker forces”, overtly implying that he was supported by Kontorousis, a fact that allowed him to refuse any control and furthermore renew his tenure for one more year. Fatma Hanım Sultan sent thus to Kozani her own steward (kethüda: eksapesteile ton idion tis Kechagia, in Lioufis’ words) with the duty of enforcing law and order, and restoring the proper administration of her tax-farm.\textsuperscript{238}

Although Theofilos states in his letter that Georgios Avliotis arrived coincidentally at Kozani, immediately after the arrival of Fatma Hanım Sultan’s steward, we could assume that he had been in regular communication with Fatma Hanım Sultan and had obtained her approval and permission to act jointly with her steward. Avliotis was thus installed as the new kocabaşı and immediately indulged in the persecution of the Alifrones supporters of

\textsuperscript{237} Lioufis, History of Kozani, pp. 69-78.
\textsuperscript{238} Lioufis, History of Kozani, pp. 71-72.
Kontorousis. When, however, he tried to arrest the Albanian voyvoda and indict him, the Albanian threatened to invade Kozani, assisted by his private army consisting of irregular Albanian soldiers, destroy the settlement, and exterminate the population. Thus, when Avliotis refused to yield to his objections and demands, the Albanian ex-voyvoda invaded Kozani assisted by his bodyguards, who Ali Pasha had offered him for his own protection. A real battle between Avliotis’ supporters and the Albanian irregular forces ensued, which ended with the defeat of the voyvoda, his arrest and his imprisonment in Manastır (today: Bitola), the usual place of residence of the governor-general of Rumelia, where he was tried and executed. Kontorousis escaped and went to Ioannina, where he sought the protection of Ali Pasha.

Avliotis remained kocabaşı of Kozani for the next two years. He imposed a harsh regime aiming at punishing and deporting from Kozani all of Kontorousis’ supporters. Kontorousis managed to gradually gather them in Ioannina, where he organised his counterstrike under the auspices of the “Epirotan Tyranny”. Kontorousis returned to Kozani in 1797 backed by Ali Pasha, who offered him the necessary funds and soldiers. He invaded Kozani escorted by his Albanian irregulars and arrested Avliotis, who was executed without trial. His most prominent supporters were executed as well, and their properties were confiscated and offered as booty to Ali Pasha’s soldiers. It seems more than suggestive that, with Fatma Hanım Sultan’s death in 1796, the tax-farm of Kozani had ceased to be her malikâne and did no longer enjoy the status of the serbestiyyet. Ali Pasha found the opportunity to interfere in the affairs of Kozani and overtly set hands on its revenues. As has been already discussed in the previous chapter, Ali Pasha farmed out the tax-farm of Kozani in 1801, officially imposing in this way his domination over the town and its community.
As the testimony of Theofilos and Lioufis’ narrative imply, these events took place under the guidance and the instigation of Rousis Kontorousis who was supported and financed by Ali Pasha, who aimed in his turn at the expansion and strengthening of his influence towards Western Macedonia and especially the region of Kozani, where, as will be discussed in the next chapter, Ali Pasha had made his initial appearance in 1791, when Serficeli Halil Ağa, Ali’s most trustworthy agent in the area, was appointed a’yăn of Serfice. On the other hand, Theofilos’ narrative proves that the bishop sympathised with Avliotis’ case and secretly supported him, since he considered these events as an opportunity to rid himself of the domination of Kontorousis and his supporters, to whom he was heavily indebted, because he owed his election to their open support.239

After the execution of Georgios Avliotis and the suppression of his revolt, Rousis Kontorousis became a real dictator in Kozani, under the auspices of his patron and powerful protector Ali Pasha. He established a regime of violence and lawlessness, which allowed him to govern Kozani unopposed. He even killed by poison his son-in-law240 and his most prominent supporter Logothetis Ioannis Louïas,241 because he believed that they were organising a conspiracy to overthrow him. He was gradually set aside by Ali Pasha, because he considered him too dangerous for the security of his domination over Kozani, for Kozani’s prosperity and social peace, and completely incapable of administering the tax-farm of

239 Although Lioufis testifies that Theofilos owed extravagant amounts of money to members of the Kontorousis’ faction, I was not able to locate any primary sources testifying to his claims, neither Ottoman nor Greek. It seems however plausible that the precarious condition of his diocese and his flock, always apparent in communal documents, had contributed to Theofilos’ inability of paying the ecclesiastical taxes and dues that he had to defray on an annual basis to the metropolitan of Thessaloniki and the patriarch in Istanbul). It seems, therefore probable that, aside from the moral obligation, he had borrowed large amounts of money to pay off his debts and serve his needs.
240 Lioufis does not provide us with the name of this “son-in-law”, but most probably he was Rousis Misiou, one of the oldest supporters of Kontorousis’ cause.
241 He was a member of one of the oldest Kozanite families, which, according to the local traditions, had immigrated to Kozani from Epirus in times immemorial. For additional information, see: Ntinas, Kozanite Family Names, p. 166.
Kozani on his behalf. We should not forget that by 1801 Ali Pasha was the tax-farmer of the *mukata'a* of Kozani, which obliged him to pay into the imperial treasury the annual installment (*mal*) of the revenues accruing from his investment. For this reason, Rousis Kontorousis was replaced in 1806 by Ioannis Avgoustinou.\(^{242}\) When the latter died in 1810, Ali Pasha appointed Ioannis Papadopoulos\(^{243}\) and his brother Georgios as *kocabaşı* of Kozani. These two brothers were known as the “sons of Papadia (wife of a priest)” and were sons of a certain Papa-Dimitrios who served as priest in Kozani during Bishop Ignatios’ tenure. They were more temperate than Rousis Kontorousis and they aimed through the establishment of a fair and moderate administration at healing the wounds of the internecine social strife and continuous factional feuds. Nevertheless, they were loathed and openly accused by the Kozanites of supporting Ali Pasha’s “tyranny” and acting as his hirelings. Their tenure was marked by the reopening of the School of Kozani, which had been since 1780 closed due to the lack of proper funding, and the affirmation of the bishop’s role as guarantor of the socio-economic stability of the community. In 1820, after Ali Pasha’s downfall, they were deposed and tried by the community, and were consequently sentenced to lifelong exile and confiscation of their property.

Apart from this brief narrative provided by Lioufis, there are very few documents covering the period of Ali Pasha’s domination over Kozani. As discussed in the previous chapter, there are only two extant Ottoman documents confirming and renewing his rights over the collection of the revenues accruing from and the administration of the tax-farm of

\(^{242}\) He was also known as Ioannis Stinou or Stinoulis. He was one of the prominent Kozanites who sent an official congratulatory letter to Theofilos, when he was appointed Bishop of Servia and Kozani in 1785. His letter is dated 23 May 1785. For the full text of the letter and information about Ioannis Stinoulis, see: Kalimderis, *Unbound Documents*, p. 73; Lioufis, *History of Kozani*, p. 291; Ntinas, *Kozanite Family Names*, p. 232.

\(^{243}\) He was also known as Kyr-Nannos. “Nannos” in the Kozanite dialect is the alternative of the name Ioannis.
Kozani. The first is dated 1801 and covers his initial appointment and the second is dated 1819 and refers to a renewal of his tenure for the next year. Even Ali Pasha’s Greek archive, which is a real mine of invaluable information regarding his activities remains almost silent about his tenure as tax-farmer and administrator of Kozani. From the information at our disposal we can deduce that Ali Pasha ruled Kozani through his agents who were absolutely dependent on his support and thus loyal to his cause. It seems plausible that Kozani enjoyed a privileged status which provided the community with the right of the administration of its affairs by its local notables, who were of course loyal to Ali Pasha. We could also suppose that Kozani was also frequently visited by Serficeli Halil Ağa, who was, as we will see in the next chapter, for thirty years the most trustworthy agent of Ali Pasha in the broader area of Serfice and Velvendos. Serficeli Halil Ağa must have played the role of a supervisor, who interfered in the Kozanite communal affairs whenever need arose and was commanded by his overlord, Ali Pasha. Furthermore, we could argue that Ali Pasha aimed at imposing a system of unified supervision and administration of the area that coincided with the administrative limits of the diocese of Servia and Kozani, namely the area that was within the limits of the kazas of Serfice, Çaharşenbe, and Eğri Bucak. The stability of this area was extremely important for Ali Pasha, because Serfice and Velvendos were located at the crossroads of the armatoliks of Mount Olympos and at the opening of the most important mountainous passage, the Sarantaporos passage, which controlled the traffic between Western Macedonia and Thessaly. For this reason, it is only natural to assume that Kozani was also included in this system of controls, because we should keep in mind that Kozani was the most important and wealthiest settlement in the broader area.\footnote{On the issue of the armatoliks of Mount Olympos and the area of Serfice, and the career of Serficeli Halil Ağa, during the period of Ali Pasha’s domination, see: Section 4.2., pp. 238-256.}
we can be sure that Ali Pasha considered the community of Kozani directly and exclusively accountable to him, which entitled him to administer on the community’s behalf and make unilateral decisions on the affairs of the Kozanite community.

As an example, I could cite the case of Ali Pasha’s acquittal of the debts of the Kozanite community, which accrued from the loans that the community had concluded on a collective basis with prominent creditors and moneylenders in Ioannina. This he did in order to achieve an undisputed and complete control of the community by merging the Kozanite communal debts into his personal account, making use therefore of the vicious circle of indebtedness and dispossession of the community lands. Another case is presented in a petition of the Kozanite community addressing Ali Pasha. The people stated in their petition that they had borrowed 2,100 ğuruş (grosia aslania, in the Greek text) from Ali Pasha to pay the fee of a certain Mustafulis Konitziotis who was zabit (police officer) and voyvoda of Kozani during the period of the great factional and communal feuds. There is no available information on the identity of this Mustafulis Konitziotis, his factional affiliation and support, nor the exact date of his tenure. As his name implies, he must have been a Muslim Albanian from Konitza and an agent of Ali Pasha’s. Be that as it may, the report states that the people of Kozani made up their relations and solved their differences. For this reason, they asked from Ali Pasha to pay back only the capital they had initially borrowed and not the annually accruing interest. Furthermore, they reported that


Mustafulis, resident of Istanbul at that time, had spent this money for his own purposes and interests in Istanbul and paid nothing for the needs of the community. Yet the most important aspect of this case is, apart from eventual details, the ability of the community of Kozani to converse directly with Ali Pasha and the anticipation by Ali Pasha that the Kozanite community was a legal entity with its own rights and obligations.

The period of Ali Pasha’s domination was also marked, in stark contrast to the preceding period, by the peaceful tenure of local bishops. Theofilos, as has already been mentioned, sympathised with Avliotis, but succeeded to hide his sympathies and, despite the pogrom against Avliotis’ supporters, retained his post. When he died in 1811, he was succeeded peacefully by Dionysios, whose short tenure ended with his sudden death in 1815. Dionysios was also peacefully succeeded by Veniamin Karipoglou (: 1815-1849), an offspring of an old and wealthy family from Thessaloniki, who experienced during his long tenure the great changes, which the events of the downfall of Ali Pasha in the early 1820s and the great reforms during the 1830s and 1840s, known today in the Ottomanist historiography as the Tanzimat reforms, brought about.247

Ali Pasha’s rule over Kozani was terminated in 1820, when he was declared a traitor and the Porte declared war against him. Kalinderis has published three copies of two patriarchal letters and a letter of the Bishop Veniamin addressing the patriarch248 dated May 1820, referring to the downfall of Ali Pasha. The first letter refers to the new governor-

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247 On the ecclesiastical history of Kozani during this period, see: Nikolaos Delialis, Episkopika Kozanis [Episcopal Affairs of Kozani], (Kozani, 1972), pp. 19-21. For a modern approach to the ecclesiastical history of the bishopric/metropolis of Servia and Kozani, and a comparison with the neighbouring bishopric/metropolis of Sisanio and Siatista, see: Anastasios Dardas, “Synopsis ekklesiastikis storias se Servia, Kozani kai Siatista” [Summarisation of the ecclesiastical history of Kozani, Servia, and Siatista] in Karanasios et al., Kozani, 600 Years of History, pp. 149-162.

248 The letters are included in the Codex of the Bishopric for the years 1815-1831. This codex is now preserved in the Municipal Library of Kozani. For the full text of the letters, see Kalinderis, Written Monuments, p. 70.
general of Tırhala and superintendent of the mountainous passages of Rumelia, the infamous Dramalı Mahmud Pasha, who replaced the deposed Veliyüddin Pasha, son of Ali Pasha. The second letter refers to the downfall of Ali Pasha and commands the bishop and his flock to provide support to the sultanic forces and authorities, whilst it forbids any provision of support to Ali Pasha during the campaign against him. The third letter is the response of the Bishop of Servia and Kozani Veniamin to the patriarch. He reports that, after he had delivered the sultanic commands to the notables of his diocese, he was assured by them personally, and on behalf of the population, that the flock of his diocese would support the sultan and would immediately inform the authorities on the activities of Ali Pasha’s agents. Ali Pasha was arrested and executed on 24 January 1822, but his domination and rule over Kozani had been in fact terminated already by September 1820, when his forces abandoned their posts and, whilst the vast majority of them surrendered without fighting, a small minority, who were Ali Pasha’s élite and most loyal warriors, retreated hastily to Ioannina to assist in its defense against the sultanic forces led by Hurşid Pasha.\footnote{We still lack a complete monograph with a modern approach to the events that led to Ali Pasha’s downfall and the events during the sultanic campaign against him. Thus, it is mandatory to base our analysis of the events on Spyridon Aravantinos’ old-fashioned 19th-century narrative. Aravantinos was a 19th-century Greek scholar and educator, who is most famous for his work the \textit{Istoria tou Ali Pasa tou Tepelenli} [History of Ali Pasha from Tepelen], a work that remained unfinished and unpublished during his lifetime, due to his untimely death in 1870, at the age of 59. The work was completed and published in 1895 by his namesake son, another Spyridon Aravantinos, who aspired at writing a modern, according to the standards of that time, history of Ali Pasha’s venture, which would be based upon a critical analysis of all available primary sources, namely 18th and 19th-century travelogues, histories, stories, and folk songs related and referring to Ali Pasha, and, unlike all previous monographs on Ali Pasha’s life, would be totally void and free of lyricism and dramatisation, as well as of sanctification or vilification of its protagonist figure of Ali Pasha. The fact that this work still remains a classic and indispensable guide for and handbook on Ali Pasha’s venture, testifies to the long-term success of Aravantinos’ project, but also the long-term lack of interest of the modern scholars and historiography in Ali Pasha’s life and career. For a brief review of the most noteworthy 19th-century monographs on Ali Pasha, see: Spyridon Aravantinos, \textit{Historia tou Ali Pasa tou Tepelenli}, syggrafeisa epi ti vasei anekdotou ergou tou Panagiotou Aravantinou} [History of Ali Pasha from Tepelen], written on the basis of an unpublished work of Panagiotis Aravantinos] (Athens, 1895), pp. κδ’-με’ [24-45]. For the downfall of Ali Pasha, see: Aravantinos, \textit{History of Ali Pasha}, pp. 267-338.}
At the same time Kozani entered a new era, because, after the outbreak of the Greek Revolution in March 1821, a new national centre emerged in Southern Greece and began its transformation to an independent state, which would gradually turn into a counterweight and rival to the old and time-honoured Ottoman order of things.

3.4. Conclusion

During the 18th and early 19th century Kozani was a multilingual and multireligious entity within the vast Ottoman cosmos. Contrary to common belief, supported and reproduced until today by local amateur historians and Greek nationalist historiography, which advocated the scheme of a heroic and romantic semi-autonomous self-administration of Kozani by its, allegedly, “pure Christian community”, always ruled by Christian local notables, the Ottoman documents that I have used allow us to form a different picture for the Kozanite society during the 18th century. The introduction of the tax-farming system, and especially malikâne life-term tax-farming, reshaped the pre-existing local economic and social patterns. The tax-farming methods of revenue-raising provided opportunities and space to a small prosperous group of Muslims to settle in and around Kozani, where they played a prominent role in the administration of their tax-farm, always on behalf of the


See also: K.E. Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha’s Greece*, (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), for a brief review of Ali Pasha’s career and his downfall. This monograph focuses upon Ali Pasha’s diplomatic relations with Britain, France and Russia, and the ways his polity was formulated in order to cope with the late-18th- and early-19th-century developments in diplomacy and war-making.
absentee overlord who resided in Istanbul. On the other hand, the Christians exploited the opportunities, which their commercial activities within the Ottoman realm and abroad, especially in Hungary, Austria, and the autonomous Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, presented them with, to amass large fortunes, which they then invested in various ways in their locality. Thus, they formed a new élite of wealth and power that aspired to manage communal affairs.

We can thus distinguish two different groups in Kozanite society: a) the Christians who were led by a small but powerful élite of wealthy merchants and the ecclesiastical authorities, represented by the bishop of Servia and Kozani and his agents, and b) a small, but also wealthy and influential, group of Muslims, among whom the most prominent was Manço Osman Ağa who served continuously for 20 years as voyvoda of Kozani. The Greek sources concentrate on local communal affairs and their administration by the Christian élite, whereas the Ottoman sources emphasise the administration of the tax-farm of Kozani by the aforementioned élite of Muslim administrators and officials. However, when one delves into an attempt to compare, contrast, and combine the information that the available sources contain, it becomes obvious that the Kozanite society was not a segregated entity consisting of groups of individuals acting independently for their own aims and interests. It was rather a society where all groups coexisted and came into close contact and conflict, which sometimes could be bloody and extremely violent. Furthermore, alliances between Muslim and Christians were commonplace. In order to outmanoeuvre their co-religious rivals, each party defended its own interests, but also the interests of their allies of different faiths. This became obvious when we examined the dispute between Manço Osman Ağa and Ebu Bekir Bey, during which each one of those two Muslims vying for the
post of the *voyvoda* forged an alliance with the leader of the two rival Christian factions, vying for supremacy over the community, with Osman Ağa coalescing his interests with Rousis Kontorousis’ faction and Ebu Bekir Bey with Georgios Avliotis’.

At the same time, the imperial centre, being always absent from local everyday political and economic life, nevertheless established strong bonds with the aforementioned factions, Muslim and Christian alike, via the tax-farming system, which allowed imperial magnates to choose a member of the community to act as their representative, who was held responsible for the management of their tax-farm on their behalf and accordingly the payment into their pockets the annual instalments, which accrued from their investment. Thus, local notables retained undisputed leadership of their community, as chosen representatives of the imperial centre. Yet, the imperial centre played at the same time the most prominent role, since it was the most predominant paragon of legalisation of the economic and administrative activities and status of the local notables. For this reason, I believe that the motto advocated by Deena Khoury, which supports the idea that “according to the theory of the localisation of the power of the local notables, the centre made the local notables, for as long as local notables made the centre in their given society and locality”, is fully applicable to the case of Kozani.250

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CHAPTER IV

Tax-farming in Serfice and Velvendos during the period of decentralisation, c.1700-c.1820

My aim in this chapter is to present the application of tax-farming in two settlements located in the vicinity of Kozani and provide additional examples of the phenomenon of decentralisation in 18th and early 19th-century Ottoman Empire. In the first section of this chapter I will present the application of tax-farming in Serfice and Velvendos, whilst focusing on the role that local and central imperial élites played in these procedures. My aim is to show that in both cases tax-farming exerted strong influence upon both the settlements and the people directly partaking or being directly touched upon by it as taxpayers. In the second part of this chapter, I will refer to the period of Ali Pasha’s domination through the examination as a case study of the career of Serficeli Halil Ağa, who was one of Ali Pasha’s most loyal supporters and agents. Whenever possible, I will try to compare Serfice and Velvendos with Kozani, so that the reader is able to form a comprehensive idea of the historical circumstances prevalent throughout the broader area during the 18th and early 19th centuries.

4.1. Tax-farming in Serfice and Velvendos (c. 1700- c.1800)

Serfice was at the beginning of the 18th century the seat of a kadi and administrative centre of the homonymous kaza. As a result of the diminution in the size of the Christian population during the 17th century, the 16th-century demographic balance was totally reversed. According to the first poll-tax registers compiled after the introduction of reforms
in poll-tax assessment and collection in 1691 the Christian population of Serfice was only 350-400 male adult individuals subject to poll-tax payment, namely an overall number of only 800-1,000 people.\footnote{For more exact information, see: BOA, MAD.d..04374; BOA, MAD.d..03421; BOA, D.CMH.d..26671. These three registers were compiled in 1692, 1693, and 1694 respectively. They contain useful information about the poll-tax classification of the population and its overall structure.} At the same time, Serfice was a hāss of the Tatar Khan of Crimea,\footnote{BOA, MAD.d..04374, p. 182: kaza-yı Serfice nefs-i Serfice hāss-i Tatar Han.} a fact that, as we will see immediately below, played a decisive role in the fiscal and administrative status of the tax-farm of Serfice. A series of documents\footnote{We still lack a comprehensive narrative and monograph on the history of the Khanate of Crimea. There is a large number of 18th and 19th-century monographs, whose scientific and academic value is disputable, for they are defective in terms of modern academic standards. To my knowledge, there are only three studies which can provide their reader with a credible analysis and information on this understudied and neglected polity that dominated the north shores of the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and the Ukrainian steppes for more than four centuries. All three monographs were written by Alan W. Fisher. The first monograph examines the process and series of events that led to the annexation of the Crimean Khanate by the Russian Empire in 1783. The second monograph examines the history of the Crimean Tatars during the period of the Ottoman sovereignty over the Khanate of Crimea and the period after the annexation of Crimea in 1783 by Russia, until the pogrom against and the deportation of the Muslim Crimean Tatars organised and carried out in 1944 by the Soviet Union during the grim events of the World War II. The third monograph contains a series of articles and essays on the history of the Crimea, the Crimean Khanate, and the Crimean Tatars from the 15th through the 18th centuries. For additional information, see: Alan W. Fisher, The Annexion of the Crimea 1772-1783 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Alan W. Fisher, The Crimean Tatars (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978); Alan W. Fisher, Between Russia, Ottomans and Turks: Crimea and Crimean Tatars (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1998).} issued in 949 AH / 1542-43 AD and 958 AH / 1551-52 AD, respectively, indicate that short-term tax-farming was in full application in Serfice at least since the mid-16th century, when for the first time there is reference to the hāsses of Mehmed Pasha in and around Serfice being outsourced directly and without an auction for three years to a certain Hasan son of Nasuğ from the town of Kara Ferye (today: Verroia), in return for the amount of 745,431 akçe to be paid in three annual installments of 248,479 akçe each.\footnote{BOA, MAD.d..00118, p. 182: mukata’a-i Serfice ve tevabi’ha ki ‘an tahvil-i Mehmed Paşa hāssdir iltizam edüb der ‘uhde-i Hasan bin Nasuğ ‘an nefs-i Kara Ferye fi sene 248,479 akçe fi selase senin 745,431 akçe.} This amount included only the
tithes and fees that were registered in the *tapu tahrir* registers and did not include the poll-tax or the ‘*avarız* and *nüzül* extraordinary levies. However, after tax-farming became the primary means of tax-collection the poll-tax and extraordinary levies of Serfice passed into the *iltizam* system and were farmed out through auction also on an annual or three-year basis to the highest prospective bidder. Velvendos followed the trend that dictated for major settlements and large villages in the countryside to be included in the tax-farming system. Thus, as becomes apparent, both Serfice and Velvendos followed the general trend and tax-farming became during the 17th century the prevalent and dominant method of tax-assessment and collection. Serfice was an important pre-Ottoman urban centre and seat of a Muslim judge which, as a major settlement and due to its long history and socio-economic importance, retained in the 18th century a relative predominance over its surroundings. Velvendos, on the other hand, was in reality a large village which was characterised by rapid demographic growth and swift economic development due to the efficiency of its population in commercial activities in Central Europe.

We should begin our analysis with Serfice, where we could distinguish between two broad categories of tax-farming, namely a) tax-farming transactions with the participation of members of the Crimean Tatar Giray dynasty and b) tax-farming transactions with the participation of local notables and Istanbul-based magnates, other than the members of the Giray dynasty.

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255 For further information about the *tapu tahrir* registers of Serfice and their contents, see: Kostas Kambouridis and Georgios Salakides, *I Eparchia Servion ton 16o Aiona mesa apo Othomanikes Piges* [The Province of Servia during the 16th Century through Ottoman Sources], (Thessaloniki: Ekdotikos Oikos Ant. Stamouli, 2013), pp. 22-51.
4.1.1. The role of the Giray dynasty in tax-farming transactions in Serfice

Before we delve into the examination and discussion of the available documentation on the role and participation of members of the Giray dynasty in tax-farming transactions in Serfice, we should say a few words about the status and structure of the Giray dynasty, in order for the role of its members participating in local tax-farming transactions to be adequately clarified.

The Crimean Khanate was founded in mid-15th century by Hacı Giray Khan and lasted until its annexation by the Russian Empire in 1783 and encompassed the northernmost shores of the Black Sea and the steppes of modern-day Ukraine. The Khanate was nominally a vassal state under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire, but in reality enjoyed a privileged status within the Ottoman socio-economic and political landscape and was, therefore, by no means identical to its other counterparts, namely the vassal Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, and the Principality of Transylvania. This was vividly expressed by the prerogatives that the Crimean Khans retained for themselves, since they were allowed a) to retain their independence in their diplomatic relations with their northern neighbours, namely the Russian Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, b) the right to mint their own coinage which bore the most important symbol of suzerainty and steppe sovereignty, namely the Genghisid seal known as tamga, and c) above all the fact that, whereas all other vassal principalities were subject to payment as sign of their vassalage of an annual tribute, the Crimean Khanate received from the Ottomans financial

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support in various forms. This later aspect of the privileged relationship between the Crimean Tatars and the Ottomans constitutes the focal point of my discussion of the participation of members of the Giray dynasty in tax-farming transactions in the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{257} The privileged relationship of the Crimean Khanate with the Ottoman state was due to the high prestige that the ruling Giray dynasty enjoyed from its direct physical and genealogical descent from Genghis Khan. This descent was the object of deep respect by the Ottomans who used always the epithet \textit{Cingiziyye}, which means Genghisid, whenever they addressed in their official correspondence to the members of the Giray dynasty. As a consequence thereof, there emerged in the middle of the 18th century a rumour fabricated by Westerns, which supported the idea that the Girays were the most appropriate and sole heir to the House of Osman, in case the latter died out, a fact that in the second half of the 18th century seemed for various reasons more imminent than ever before. Nevertheless, although this possibility had never been discussed or considered a serious prospect by the Ottoman administrative, political, and socio-economic \'{e}lite, it was broadly supported by the public opinion, which recognised the elevated status of the Giray dynasty.\textsuperscript{258}

The Ottomans paid exclusively to male members of patrilineal descent of the Giray dynasty, which comprised ruling and deposed Khans, and their male relatives of various degrees, annual stipends (\textit{salyanes}), which accrued from a variety of sources, such as the customs duties levied on the commercial activities in ports, the poll-tax payable by the non-Muslims, the sheep-tax, and irregular \textit{'avariz} taxation levied in various areas throughout the Ottoman realm. They also granted \textit{hasses} in the provinces to members of the Giray dynasty, who were kept in Istanbul, Eastern Thrace, and Eastern parts of modern-day Bulgaria as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{257} Fisher, \textit{The Crimean Tatars}, pp. 13-14.
\item \textsuperscript{258} Fisher, \textit{Between Russians, Ottomans and Turks}, pp. 28, 81-82.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
hostages (rehins), for the upkeep of their household and retinue. These hostages, who were male members of the Giray dynasty and deposed Khans, played an important role in the perpetuation of the integrity of the special relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate, because they safeguarded on the one hand the security of the ruling Khan at home, whilst they secured the submission and obedience of the less cooperative Khans, who aspired to a greater degree of autonomy, or even independence from the Ottoman suzerainty.\textsuperscript{259} To a lesser extent, these grants included donations on the occasion of the ascension of a new Khan to the throne and the nomination of a new heir-presumptive by the Khan (teşrifat), donations that accompanied the proposals, and not orders, in stark contrast to other vassal principalities, to the Girays to participate in Ottoman campaigns (tirkeş bahasi), and special subsidisation for the upkeep of the personal élite guard of the Khan (sekban akçesi). Last but not least, the Girays were also allowed to collect as a recognition of their rights of sovereignty over the steppe the customary annual “Tatar yoke” tribute from Russia and Poland, which right they had inherited from the Gooden Horde after the latter disintegrated in mid-15th century into several smaller khanates, and a similar tribute from Christian Ottoman subjects in the Danubian Principalities.\textsuperscript{260} It becomes, thus, apparent that the Crimean Khanate was in a privileged and special relationship with the Ottoman Empire and operated more or less as a buffer state that was allowed to organise its administrative apparatus and conduct foreign relations and warfare almost independently from the Ottoman Empire. The Khanate’s basic role comprised the defense of the northern European borders of the Ottomans, who could, thus, focus undistracted on the

\textsuperscript{259} Fisher, \textit{Annexation of the Crimea}, p. 8.  
\textsuperscript{260} Fisher, \textit{Between Russians, Ottomans and Turks}, pp. 21-26.
Hungarian and Iranian side of the Empire’s extensive borderline, and the provision of Istanbul with agricultural commodities that were produced in the Ukrainian steppes.  

The Giray family constituted the nominal overlords over the Crimean Khanate, which was in reality a mosaic of multifarious tribes and clans, which were governed by their own beys and enjoyed their own income that accrued from tribal lands allotted to each clan on the basis of a set of traditional customary laws. The Giray dynasty was characterised by an internal hierarchy of positions, which included a) the ruling Khan, b) the two heirs-presumptive, known as kalgay sultan, who was in most cases the eldest younger brother of the ruling Khan, and nureddin sultan, who although they were in theory the nominal heirs to the Khan and were nominated by him, these two positions were in reality rather honorific and did not secure their holder’s accession to the throne, for the Khan was always elected by the kurultay tribal assembly, which was dominated by the beys of the four most important and powerful clans, known as karaçi beyleri, who counterbalanced and neutralised the power and influence of the Khan, and ratified by the Ottoman Sultan, who as time passed tended to interfere increasingly in the election and nomination of the Khan, and c) the group of Giray sultan princes, which comprised all male members of the Giray dynasty of patrilineal descent who did not hold the top three positions and constituted the pool for the selection and nomination of all kalgay and nureddin sultans.  

It is now time to proceed with the analysis of the available primary sources on the role and participation of members of the Giray dynasty in tax-farming transactions in Serfice. The available documents on this issue cover most of the 18th century, namely the
period when tax-farming, and especially malikâne, reached its apex. The first available sources explicitly referring to this issue in the 18th century are a series of reports addressed to the Porte, concerning the status of the tax-farm of the hasses of Serfice. These reports are undated, but from their contents we can assume that they were submitted to the imperial authorities around 1715-1716.

The first report states that the hasses of Serfice formed a unified hass that had been bestowed upon the deceased Tatar prince Azamet Giray Sultan, who was son of Khan Hacı Selim Giray I and had served as nureddin for seven years before his death, thus continuing the tradition which I have already referred to, namely the bestowal of the hasses of Serfice to the reigning Tatar Khan of Crimea or members of his family. When Azamet Giray Sultan died sometime in 1691, his two sons, the Giray princes Hüssam Giray Sultan and İslam Giray Sultan, who were most plausibly retained in Istanbul as rehin hostages, inherited the rights of their father over the hasses of Serfice and were ordered to possess them and enjoy their income jointly as partners. However, shortly after this adjustment, Hüssam Giray Sultan passed away and, since the half share of the hasses remained empty, it was escheated to the state as bona vacantia. In 1128 AH / 1715-1716 AD, namely some 20 years after his brother’s death, İslam Giray Sultan applied and asked to be allowed to possess the totality of the hasses and accordingly an imperial order was issued and given to

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263 Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, II, p. 343. Süreyya refers that Azamet Giray Sultan served as nureddin for eight years, initially for one year during the short reign of Haci Giray II (1683-1684) and another seven years during the second reign of his father, Hacı Selim Giray I. After Azamet Giray’s unexpected death, his father, the Khan Hacı Selim Giray I, deeply saddened by this unfortunate situation resigned from the khanate and sought solace in the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. For additional information, see: Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, II, p. 552; Süreyya, Sicill-i uosmani, V, p. 1489.

264 Süreyya, Ibid. Haci Selim Giray I was son of the Khan Bahadir Giray I (1637-1641). He served as Khan four times between 1671 and 1704, namely 1671-1678, 1684-1691, 1692-1699 and 1702-1704.

265 İslam Giray Sultan was son of Azamet Giray Sultan. Süreyya refers that he served as nureddin during the reign of his uncle, Saadet Giray IV (1717-1724), who was also son of Haci Selim Giray I. Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, V, p. 1409.
him. However, someone else, a certain Zeynülabidin Ağa, contrary to the imperial order, managed to turn the hasses of Serfice into his own malikâne, by farming out on a life-term basis the incomes accruing therefrom.\textsuperscript{266}

İslam Giray Sultan considered this a defective and faulty action and petitioned the authorities in Istanbul for the annulment of this arrangement. He requested Zeynülabidin’s deposition from his life-term holding and accordingly asked for the share of his deceased brother to be added to the share held by him, therefore allowing him to control and possess as his own hass the totality of the hasses of Serfice. Thus, he asked for a new imperial order to be issued, which would confirm these rights.

The second report states that, Kaplan Giray I, the then-Tatar Khan of Crimea\textsuperscript{267}, personally petitioned in 1715 the Porte and requested that the tax-farm of Serfice, which had been farmed out on a life-term basis by Zeynülabidin Ağa, be taken away from him and put anew under the control of its initial hass-beneficiary. Furthermore, he demanded for the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{267}] Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, III, p. 867. Kaplan Giray I was one of the sons of Hacı Selim Giray I. He served as Khan three times between 1707 and 1736, namely 1707-1708, when he succeeded his elder brother, Ğazi Giray III, 1713-1716 and 1730-1736. As becomes clear, Kaplan Giray was brother of Azamet Giray and thus uncle of Hüüsım Giray Sultan and İslâm Giray Sultan.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}

However, the authorities in Istanbul did not accept this request. According to an imperial order which was issued to rectify the fiscal status of the tax-farm, half of the fee paid in advance upon validation of the act of renting the tax-farm (mu’accele), amounting to 500 ğuruş, and the fee paid to state officers responsible for delivering the income to Istanbul (irsaliye) had to be paid into the imperial treasury, whilst at the same time the annual returns of the hass were to be given to the hass-beneficiary. Zeynûlabidin Ağa was reappointed for the year 1130 AH / 1717-1718 AD as tax-farmer of the tax-farm and a marginal note was written down that referred to him as beneficiary of the malikâne of the tax-farm of Serfice. Furthermore, it was determined that Zeynûlabidin Ağa could not be deprived of his rights over the malikâne of Serfice, but the share of the deceased Hüssam Giray Sultan, and especially its ırsaliye amounting to 825 ğuruş, was to be added and collected along with the share of İslam Giray Sultan. In its latter part, the order defines the way the income accruing from the hasses would be apportioned between Zeynûlabidin Ağa and...
and İslam Giray Sultan. It states that every year the former, as the malikâne-beneficiary, had to forward to the latter, who was the initial hass-beneficiary, the annual returns of the tax-farm, namely 1,600 ḣuruṣ, in four instalments and pay in the proper place and time for the office-fees (kalemiyye) and for the expenses due for balancing and settling the accounts of the tax-farm (harc-ı muhasebe).

The two reports are accompanied by a marginal note which refers to Zeynûlabidin Ağa and his appointment as the lessee of the tax-farm of Serfice, with his tenure having been arranged for to begin from 1 Mart 1130 RC / 12-3-1718 AD. Zeynûlabidin Ağa was reappointed directly and without an auction to the post and was established as lessee, after he had appointed his brother Hasan Ağa as his guarantor. He received his appointment diploma on 22 Ramazan 1129 AH / 30-8-1717 AD.²⁶⁹


malikâne fi sene
ma’ kalemiyyye
诼uruş
1550
0050 zamm ’an sene 1129

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1600
beray-ı
hass-ı İslam Giray
Sultan
诼uruş
775

vech-i meşruh üzere mukata’a-ı mezbûr mukaddema ber vech-i malikâne merkumun ‘uhdesinde iken bin yüz yiğirmi sekiz senesinde malikâneler ‘umumen ref‘ ve han-i ‘alişan iltimasıyla yiğirmi sekiz senesi hass tarafından zabt ve dokuz senesini dahi ahira iltizam olunmağa sadir olan hatt-ı hümayun-ı şevketmakrun mucebince nisf mu’acellesini olan beşyüz zuruş teslim hazine ve hass malin hass tarafına eda ve irta-yeyen hazine-i ‘amireye teslim eylemek şartıyla yüz otuz senesi Mart’ından zabt eylemek üzere ‘uhdesine ibka ve tarih-ı mezbûrdâ berat verildiği defterde mesturdur ferman devletli sultanım hazretlerinindir fi 4 Cemaziyyü’l-evvel sene 1129
The **malikâne** produced an annual income of 1,600 **ğuruş** including the revenues accruing from the tax-farm and the office-fees which the people had to pay to the lessee, although their amount is not cited in the note. The income was allocated as follows: 775 **ğuruş** should be retained by İslam Giray Sultan as his personal income accruing from his **hass** and 825 **ğuruş** should be forwarded by him into the imperial treasury as **irsaliyye**. The amount of half of the advance payment was 500 **ğuruş**, which means that the total advance payment, which was paid as lump-sum at the moment of the initial leasing of the tax-farm, reached the amount of 1,000 **ğuruş**, or else 62.5% of the tax-farm’s annual returns.

The note adds, however, that although the tax-farm had previously been Zeynülabidin’s **malikâne**, in 1127 AH / 1714-1715 AD the **malikâne** system was abolished altogether and all **malikâne** contracts were annulled. This might be a palpable explanation as to why the Tatar Khan interfered in 1128 AH / 1715-1716 AD and petitioned the authorities in Istanbul for the tax-farm of Serfice to be returned to the status of **hass** and bestowed accordingly upon himself as his personal **hass**. However, as I have already mentioned, the authorities rejected this request. Instead, the administration decreed that Zeynülabidin Ağa would remain the beneficiary of the tax-farm, as long as he paid half of the advance payment and accordingly the annual returns of the **hass** and its **irsaliyye** were paid

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*hass malini senede dört taksitiyle İslam Giray Sultan’a ve ırsaliyyesin hazine-i ‘amireye eda eylemek üzere berat verildiği defterde mestur dur ferman devletli sultanım hazretlerinindir fi 3 Muharrem sene 1130*

270 **Malikâne** contracts were indeed retracted in 1715, due to conservative Muslim criticism against the innovations brought about by abuses committed in the implementation of the newly adopted system, but were restored again in 1717 by the then Grand Vizier, Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Pasha. Strangely enough, this was not the case for the tax-farm of Serfice, because the **malikâne** system was not abolished altogether, but it was replaced by the **hass-malikâne** method of tax-farming and tax-farm outsourcing. For more information on the **hass-malikâne** system, see: Çizakça, A Comparative Evolution, pp. 165-169. On the abolition of the system of **malikâne** in 1715, see: Fariba Zarinebaf, John Bennet, Jack L. Davis, A Historical and Economic Geography of Ottoman Greece: The Southwestern Morea in the 18th Century, (Athens: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2005), p. 33; Suraiya Faroqhi (ed.), The Cambridge History of Turkey, III, pp. 127-28.
into the imperial treasury. After the first year in office, Zeynülabidin Ağa’s tenure was renewed for one more year and it was arranged for his new tenure to begin from 13 March 1718. The *berat* confirming the renewal of Zeynülabidin’s tenure was issued on 4 Cemaziyâyülvel 1129 AH / 16-4-1717 AD and was enrolled in the registers kept by the imperial treasury. Finally, on 3 Muharrem 1130 AH / 7-12-1717 AD a new *berat* was issued and given to Zeynülabidin Ağa which ordered him to forward the *hass* annual returns to İslam Giray Sultan on four instalments and the overall sum of the *irsaliyye* accruing from the *hass* into the imperial treasury. This was also recorded in an imperial order which was delivered to him after it had been registered on 7 Muharrem 1130 AH / 11-12-1717 AD.271

We should consider the relationship between Zeynülabidin Ağa and İslam Giray Sultan a typical example of a *hass-malikâne* relationship between an Istanbul-based absentee magnate contractor and a provincial magnate, who was a wealthy and prestigious member of the local élite in Serfice.272 Hence, it becomes clear that the Istanbul authorities played the role of broker between the two conflicting individuals, in an attempt to satisfy the interests of both parties. This reminds us of the theoretical scheme proposed by Karen Barkey, which tends to perceive the Ottoman state as an adaptable broker among various networks of power and prestige, a role that the state retained throughout its long history.273 Thus, based on the principle of the *hass-malikâne* relationship, Zeynülabidin was recognised as malikâne-beneficiary with a secured legal and fiscal status. At the same time it was arranged, for a share of the income accruing from his investment to be delivered to İslam Giray Sultan, the initial *hass*-beneficiary, as recognition of his seniority as a high-ranking imperial dignitary and due to the principle of the anteriority of his rights over the *hass* of

271 BOA, İE.HR..778: emr dade fi 7 Muharrem sene 1130 kayd
272 On the *hass-malikâne*, see: Çizakça, A Comparative Evolution, pp. 177-178.
273 Barkey, Empire of Difference, pp. 3-27.
Serfice. In essence, both Zeynülabidin and İslam Giray Sultan obtained the right of participating in the administration of the tax-farm of Serfice, with the latter being the absentee party and the former the active one, acting as İslam Giray Sultan’s comptroller and manager. In stark contrast to the case of Osman Ağa in Kozani, who was Fatma Hanım Sultan’s voyvoda, namely merely an appointed representative of hers in and administrator of her malikâne, Zeynülabidin Ağa was a malikâneci with full rights of administering and controlling the progress of his investment in the tax-farm of Serfice, with the supplementary obligation to deliver to his partner, İslam Giray Sultan, all revenues accruing from his share, which Zeynülabidin administered on his behalf. Thus, we can easily discern the differences between the two ways of applying the malikâne tax-farming method in two distinct cases, even though both settlements were in close geographical proximity and presented comparable socio-economic development.

Another document, namely a receipt dated 10 Muharrem 1132 AH / 23 November 1719 AD, shows that this arrangement continued even after Zeynülabidin Ağa’s death, which occurred sometime in 1719. İslam Giray Sultan submitted this receipt to the Porte and declared that, since he had received the annual returns for the economic year 1131 RC / 1720-1721 AD due from his share of the hass of Serfice, amounting to 1,600 ğuruş, he renounced any claims for additional payments vis-à-vis his co-sharers, namely Mürteza Ağa, the son of the deceased Zeynülabidin Ağa, and the aforementioned Hasan Ağa, Zeynülabidin Ağa’s brother and guarantor. İslam Giray states that Zeynülabidin Ağa had defrayed, before his death, 800 ğuruş to him as down-payment and the remaining sum of 800 ğuruş was after Zeynülabidin’s death defrayed by his successors, namely the aforementioned Mürteza Ağa and Hasan Ağa, to his representative in Serfice, a certain bölükbaşı El-Hacc Ömer. As
becomes clear, after Zeynülабidin had passed away, his son, Mürteza, succeeded his father as beneficiary of the *malikâne* of Serfice and inherited his father’s obligation to pay İslam Giray the sum of 1,600 ǧuruş, which corresponded to the annual returns destined to be defrayed to the latter due to his status as a co-sharer and initial beneficiary of the *hasses* of Serfice. The role of Hasan Ağa is obscure, but it seems plausible that besides his acting as guarantor to his nephew Mürteza Ağa, as had been done with his brother before his death, he now participated directly in the administration of the tax-farm and, as the text of the receipt implies, the payment of its annual returns to its beneficiary, İslam Giray. The latter, as has already been discussed, kept for himself the amount of 775 ǧuruş and paid into the imperial treasury the remaining sum of 825 ǧuruş as *irsaliyye.*

It is worth mentioning that, in stark contrast to Osman Ağa’s sons in Kozani, who after their father’s death were deprived of the right of inheritance over their father’s property, Zeynülабidin Ağa’s son and brother succeeded in inheriting their deceased relative’s *malikâne*. It seems plausible that Mürteza Ağa became İslam Giray Sultan’s new partner, whilst Hasan Ağa stood, as had been previously the case with his brother Zeynülабidin, as guarantor for his nephew. We could assume, therefore, that Hasan Ağa played the dual role of guarantor and *sarraf*, and provided his brother and nephew with the necessary funds to finance their investments in outsourcing of the *malikâne* of Serfice.

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The next document referring to the participation of members of the Giray dynasty in the tax-farming transactions in Serfice dates from 1792. This document is an undated petition which Ahmed Giray Sultan son of Mehmed Giray submitted to the Porte regarding the issue of his receipt of the annual stipend of 45,000 akçes, which he was entitled to due to his status as one of the “Genghisid Sultans”\(^ {275} \) and a member of the Giray dynasty. Although the original petition is undated, the two marginal notes accompanying the original text, which are dated 9 Şa’ban 1206 AH / 2-4-1792 AD and 16 Şa’ban 1206 AH / 9-4-1792 respectively, allow us to assume that it was drafted and submitted to the Porte sometime in late March 1792.\(^ {276} \)

Ahmed Giray Sultan states in his petition that he was entitled to an annual stipend which was defrayed to him directly from the imperial treasury in the form of an ocaklık\(^ {277} \) and comprised parts of the annual returns accruing from the sheep-tax of Yanbolu (today: Yambol, in Bulgaria) and the tax-farm of Serfice. Ahmed Giray Sultan demanded from the imperial treasury an official certificate of income and expenditure\(^ {278} \) by way of account for the previous year, namely 1205 AH / 1790-1791 AD, which would record in detail the constituent parts of his stipend. As the marginal note accompanying the original petition

\(^{275}\) BOA, C.AS..814-34588: [sela]tin-i cengiziyyeden Ahmed Giray Sultan’ın senevi kırk beş bin akçe salyanesi
\(^{276}\) BOA, C.AS..814-34588: devletli ‘inanetli sultanım hazretleri sağ olsun Yanbolı ‘adet-i ağnamı ve Serfice mukata’ası mallerinden ber vech-i ocaklık ve ‘an hizane vechiyle mutasarrıf olduğum salyanemin bin ikiyüz beş senesin mahsuben hazine tezkeresi i’ta olnmak babında ferman devletli ‘inanetli sultanım hazretlerinindir bend-i Ahmed Giray
\(^{277}\) The term ocaklık denotes a stipend which was paid in place of regular salary to fortress guards or prominent individuals residing in urban centres. As the term implies, this stipend was paid to these individuals for the upkeep of their households and to ensure their subsistence, and was inheritable to the offspring of its beneficiary. The ocaklık stipends could comprise state income which accrued from various sources, such as the tithe levied on the agricultural production of the peasants, the poll-tax paid by the non-Muslim population, and levies on weighing of silk and other various customs duties. For additional information, see: Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, II, pp. 712-713.
\(^{278}\) BOA, C.AS..814-34588: senevi kırk beş bin akçe salyanesi [ocaklıkdan] irad ve masraf tezkereleri verilmek
states, the certificate, which Ahmed Giray Sultan received, was a copy of the original receipt of income and expenditure which had been granted to him in the previous year, namely on 5 Şa’ban 1205 AH / 9-4-1791 AD, by the treasury in the form of a certificate.\textsuperscript{279} Ahmed Giray’s stipend comprised a part of the annual returns of the sheep tax of Yanbolu, amounting to 18,750 akçes. As has already been mentioned, Giray princes, who were held as rehin hostages, possessed estates and resided in the vicinity of Yanbolu during their exile. Ahmed’s stipend also comprised a part of the annual returns of the tax-farm of Serfice, amounting to 9,000 akçes, and an additional sum of 17,250 akçes, which accrued from unspecified sources. The overall sum of Ahmed Giray’s annual stipend, thus, amounted to 45,000 akçes,\textsuperscript{280} due for the economic year 1205 which began on 1 Mart 1205 RC / 7 Receb 1205 AH / 12-3-1791 AD and ended on 28 Şubat 1205 RC / 17 Receb 1206 AH / 11-3-1792.\textsuperscript{281}

This document is in many ways instructive as to the destiny of the members of the Giray dynasty after the dissolution of the Crimean Khanate and its annexation by the Russian Empire in 1783. As the case of Ahmed Giray Sultan implies, the male members of the dynasty retained their privileged status and rights over the annual stipends that they received as a recognition thereof. It seems plausible that, after the collapse of the Ottoman-Crimean relationship, those Giray émigré princes who found refuge in Istanbul proved

\textsuperscript{279} BOA, C.AS..814-34588: \textit{tezkere dade el-vaki’ fi 5 Şa’ban sene 1205}

\textsuperscript{280} BOA, C.AS..814-34588: \textit{fi sene sağ akçe}
\begin{align*}
18,750 & \quad \text{‘an mal-i mukata’a-i ‘adet-i ağnam-i Yanbolu} \\
09,000 & \quad \text{‘an mal-i mukata’a-i Serfice} \\
17,250 & \\
\text{--------} & \\
45,000 & \\
\end{align*}

\textsuperscript{281} BOA, C.AS..814-34588: \textit{vacib ‘an evvel Mart el-vaki’ fi 7 Receb sene 1205 ile ğayet-i Şubat-i sene-i [mezbure]}

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capable of exploiting the opportunities offered them by their elevated status and descent.282

As far as Ahmed Giray Sultan is concerned, he was the beneficiary of an annual salyane stipend of 45,000 akçes or 375 ǧuruş, which the government had granted to him as an ocaklık for the upkeep of his household and was paid to him directly from the imperial treasury. It is impossible to determine on the basis of merely one document the duration and extent of Ahmed Giray Sultan’s grants. It is equally impossible to attempt a detailed analysis of his life and career. The name of his father, however, provides insight into his descent from Hacı Selim Giray Khan and his relationship with İslam Giray Sultan. Süreyya states that there were two princes named Mehmed Giray Sultan who lived in the second half of the 18th century.283

282 This turbulent period started with the great Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774, which was terminated by the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which stipulated among others the independence of the Crimean Khanate and its eventual transformation into a Russian puppet state, which led finally to the annexation of Crimea by the Russians in 1783. This event led to the phenomenon of the mass immigration of Tatars into the Ottoman Empire during the late-18th and the 19th centuries, which was of paramount importance for the demographic changes that occurred in the course of the 19th century. At the same time, the participation of the Tatar émigrés in the Ottoman military and administrative apparatus proved during the 19th century catalytic, especially in the internal politics and the implementation of the Tanzimat reforms, and the shaping of the Ottoman diplomatic relationships with the Russian Empire, and to a lesser extent with Great Britain and France. On this period and an analytical presentation of the events during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774, the stipulations of the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, and the intra-dynastic strife and prolonged civil war after the proclamation of the Crimean independence until the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783, see: Fisher, Annexation of Crimea, pp. 29-151.

283 For a depiction of the complicated genealogical relationships of these two princes, see: Appendix 2.
The first Mehmed Giray Sultan, who was a brother of Bahti Giray Khan, namely the last nominal Crimean Khan and pretender to the Crimean throne between 1789 and 1790, who lost his life in Moldavia during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1787-1792, was appointed by and served his brother as kalgay during his short reign. Therefore, since both Bahti Giray Khan and Mehmed Giray Sultan were sons of Kirim Giray Khan, who was a grandson of Haci Selim Giray I from his son Devlet Giray II, they were both great-grandsons of the latter’s. The second Mehmed Giray Sultan was son of Maksud Giray Khan, another grandson of Haci Selim Giray I from his son Selamet Giray II, and thus great-grandson of the latter’s, who was killed in 1790 at the siege of the fortress of Ismail by the Russians led by General Alexander Suvorov, during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1787-1792. It becomes obvious that in both cases Mehmed Giray Sultan was a great-grandson of Haci Selim Giray I and Ahmed Giray Sultan was great-great-grandson of the latter. Furthermore, and on the basis of the two aforementioned assumptions, we could argue that Azamet Giray Sultan was a great-grand-uncle of Ahmed Giray Sultan whilst Hüsam Giray Sultan and İslam Giray Sultan were both first cousins twice removed of his. This complex genealogical relationship proves that Serfice and the revenues generated from its tax-farm were always reserved for and allotted to male descendants of Khan Haci Selim Giray I, with these allotments being characterised by long-term continuity in the course of the 18th century. Although there is a

286 Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, II, p. 419. Devlet Giray II served on two occasions as Crimean Khan, in 1699-1702, when he succeeded his father to the throne of the Crimean Khanate, and 1708-1713.
288 Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, V, p. 1486.
significant gap in the available documentation on the fate of the *malikâne* of Serfice after
the establishment of the agreement between Zeynûlabidin Ağa and his heirs, on the one
hand, and Islam Giray, on the other, it seems plausible that the male descendants of Hacı
Selim Giray I succeeded in retaining their allowances and stipends, which were defrayed to
them directly from the imperial treasury on the basis of the revenue generated from specific
revenue sources of the *mukata’a* of Serfice.

4.1.2. The role of local and Istanbul-based magnates in tax-farming in Serfice

In order to realise the role of local and central élites in the tax-farming transactions
in Serfice and the relationship that was developed between them, it would be ideal if we
could examine a typical example of a tax-farming contract including both groups.

A good example is the case of the appointment in 1731 of a certain Ali as the leader
in public worship and teacher of Islamic Law (*imam*) in the Friday Mosque of the deceased
Sultan Bayezid²⁹⁰ at Serfice and the payment of his salary from the annual returns of the tax-

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²⁹⁰ There is no information who was the sultan who had built the Friday Mosque of Serfice. All
documents referring to the mosque call it as “the Friday mosque of the deceased Sultan Bayezid”. However, it is not sure whether the Friday mosque of Serfice had been built by Bayezid I “the Thunderbolt” (1389-1402) or by Bayezid II “the Saint” (1481-1512). It seems unlikely that the Friday Mosque of Serfice had been built by Bayezid I for various reasons, with the most important being the short duration of the initial phase of domination of the Ottomans over Serfice. Serfice was initially conquered by the Ottomans in the early 1390s, but after the disastrous defeat of the Ottomans at the hands of the Mongols at the battle of Ankara (1402), Serfice was recovered by the Byzantines and was conquered anew by the Ottomans in 1426. Thus it seems more likely that the Friday Mosque of Serfice was built by Sultan Bayezid II. Unfortunately, the building and its founding inscription do not exist anymore and there are no available archaeological findings concerning the case. Furthermore, Evliya Çelebi explicitly refers that the Friday Mosque of Serfice had been built by Beyazid II and was thus named after him. On that issue, see: Vassilis Demetriades, *I Kentriki kai Dytiki Makedonia kata ton Evligia Tselempi* [Central and Western Macedonia according to Evliya Çelebi], [Thessaloniki: Makedoniki Biliothiki/Etaireia Makedonikon Spoudon, 1973], p. 205. For the conquest of Serfice by the Ottomans, see: Vassiliki Kravari, *Villes et Villages de Macedoine Occidentale (Réalités Byzantines 2)*, (Paris: Editions P. Lethielleux, 1989), p. 56; Demetriades, Central
farm of the weighing of silk in Serfice. The sole source at our disposal is a report of Ali the local judge of Serfice. The report is dated 3 Cemaziyyülahir 1144 AH / 3-12-1731 AD and mentions that the previous imam, a certain Mehmed Halife had passed away and the office of the imam remained vacant. Since Mehmed’s trueborn son, Ali, had every lawful pretention and right to succeed his father to the office of imam, the aforementioned Ali was installed as the new imam with the same fixed daily salary as that previously enjoyed by his father, namely 4 akçes. A marginal note, which is dated 19 Ramazan 1144 AH / 16-3-1732 AD, mentions that, after all necessary investigation had been conducted in the archives, Ali’s appointment to the office of the imam was lawful and had to be immediately validated and his diploma of appointment (berat) be despatched to him promptly.

As becomes clear from the information cited above, the annual revenue accruing from the leasing of the tax-farm of silk-weighing in Serfice was used for the payment of the salary of the imam serving at the Friday mosque of Serfice. Thus, the administration used a part of the annual revenue accruing from one of the state itlizam tax-farms, in order to pay the daily wage of a state official. We do not know whether the annual returns accruing from

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and Western Macedonia according to Evliya Çelebi, p. 200; Kambouridis and Salakides, The Province of Servia, pp. 15-16, where they second Demetriades’ idea that Serfice, after its initial conquest by the Ottomans in 1393, was recovered by the Byzantines after the Ottoman defeat at the battle of Ankara in 1402, only to be reconquered by Murad II in 1426.

291 Ali the son of the previous imam should not be confused with his namesake judge (kadi) of Serfice, the consignor of the report under examination.

292 BOA, C.EV..494-24964: mucebine tevcih olnmak buyuruldu 19 [Ramaza]n sene 1144


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the aforementioned tax-farm were spent to cover the payment of the wage of other officials as well, or what other purpose they might have been spent on. We also do not know the exact amount that the tax-farmer and the state generated from this particular tax-farm, let alone the details and terms and conditions included in the contract which the tax-farmer had signed, in order to lease this tax-farm.294

From the information that we receive from the document under examination, it is questionable whether the office of the imam at Serfice was hereditary or not, and whether the fact that Ali had succeeded directly his deceased father to the office of imam was a usual phenomenon, or it had occurred exceptionally due to lack of other local officials who could have contested Ali’s rights over the office of the imam. The terms mahill and mustahikk, which were used by the kadi in his report, solely depict Ali as someone lawfully entitled to the office of imam and, thus, lawful claimant of his father’s inheritance, but do not clarify at all the legal nature of this act. As a general rule, we can say that offices in the Ottoman Empire were not hereditary and whenever this occurred it was an exceptional phenomenon. The appointment of each officer at whichever office was checked and validated by the central state authorities, through a series of meticulous and lengthy

294 The bibliography about the religious officialdom in 18th-century Ottoman Empire is scarce. For some preliminary remarks on the Ottoman religious and judicial authorities in 18th-century Ottoman Empire, see: Madeleine C. Zilfi, “The Ottoman Ulema” in Suraiya Faroqui (ed.), Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 209-225; Faroqui, “Crisis and Change” in İnalçık and Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, II, pp. 557-561. As is commonplace in the examination of 18th-century Ottoman officialdom, the focal points in most monographs are the members of élite institutions. The Ottoman ulema is not an exception to this rule. Additional information on the élite members of the judicial and religious officialdom can be found in: Madeleine C. Zilfi, “Elite Circulation in the Ottoman Empire: Great Mollas of the Eighteenth Century”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1983), pp. 318-364; Joel Shinder, “Career Line Formation in the Ottoman Bureaucracy, 1648-1750: A New Perspective”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 16, No. 2/3 (Dec., 1973), pp. 217-237. We still lack a monograph on provincial kads, deputy judges, imams and the various members of provincial religious and judicial authorities based on primary and archival sources that describes their status in the society where they served in, as well as vis-à-vis the central state authorities.
procedures. Thus, since in this case the Istanbul authorities validated Ali’s appointment, after a series of reports had been despatched by the local judge (kadi) and deputy judge (na’ib), we could assume that the office of imam of the Friday mosque at Serfice was not hereditary, but rather it was bequeathed exceptionally by the deceased former imam, Mehmed Halife, to his son, most probably due to the lack of any other candidates contesting Ali’s rights.295

The daily wage of Mehmed Halife and Ali in return for their service as imams in Serfice was the meager amount of 4 akçes, accounting thus for an overall yearly amount of 1,460 akçes or approximately 10.14 esedi ğuruş.296 Again we lack a monograph dedicated to the wages and purchasing power of Ottoman subjects and officials in the Ottoman Empire, a fact that hinders any attempt at evaluating the power of the salary of the imam of Serfice through juxtaposition to other economic figures and comparison between them. The only

295 On Ottoman, civil officialdom, the social status of its members and their overall position within the Ottoman administrative and governmental systems, see: Carter Vaughn Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). Although this monograph examines the branch of the civil officers and the process of the evolution of the archaic Ottoman scribal corps to a modern civil bureaucracy during the period of the Tanzimat and post-Tanzimat reforms, it also covers an important part of the 18th-century Ottoman history, whilst at the same time the comments made by Findley in the introductory chapter of his monograph can be applied to earlier periods of the history of the Ottoman bureaucracy, as well as on other sectors such as those of religious and judicial officialdom.

296 Since the salaries of Ottoman officials were paid according to the financial year (sene-i maliyye), I have counted the salary of the imam of the Friday mosque in Service as follows: I have multiplied the daily salary by 365, namely the days of the Ottoman financial year, and counted his overall yearly salary at 1,460 akçes. To convert this amount to esedi ğuruş, the most commonly circulating currency in the Ottoman realm in the early and mid-18th century, I have taken under consideration the official government exchange rate which had been set in mid-18th century at 1 ğuruş / 144 akçes. Yet, I would like to remind the reader that the rates of exchange between the akçe and ğuruş was not stable. As we have seen in Section 2.5., fn. 82, p. 64, the official rate had been fixed in 1703 at the scale of 1 ğuruş equalling 40 paras or 120 akçes and was applied in the conversion of the annual returns of the tax-farm of the poll-tax of Kozani due for the year 1186 AH / 1772-1773 AD. According to Liata, however, in mid-18th century 1 ğuruş equalled 150 akçes, which means that, if we take this rate under consideration, the salary of the imam amounted to 9.73 ğuruş. On the issue of the late-17th and early-18th-century Ottoman coinage, see: Pamuk, Monetary History, pp. 131-171 and Liata, The Circulation of Coins, pp. 197-202, where the 18th-century exchange rates of the ğuruş vis-à-vis various Ottoman and foreign coins are also presented.
study on this issue is the seminal article of Süleyman Özmucur and Şevket Pamuk that presents condensed data about real wages and standards of living in Istanbul in the period 1489-1914.\textsuperscript{297} According to the findings of the two authors of the aforementioned article, the amount of 4 \textit{akçes} that the \textit{imam} of the Friday mosque in Serfice received as daily wage in 1732 was extremely low compared to the amounts that both skilled and unskilled workers received in Istanbul at the same period.\textsuperscript{298} It is very difficult to provide an explanation for such an important divergence between the figures appearing in the source pertaining to Ali’s case and the figures presented in the article of Özmucur and Pamuk. The most plausible explanation seems to be the fact that the prices in the provinces, and especially in remote areas such as the location of Serfice, were far lower than in Istanbul, wherein population density and concentration brought about an augmentation in prices due to high demand in commodities. This in its turn resulted in the augmentation in the nominal and real values of the wages of workers active in Istanbul at that period. However, we should note that a comparison between workers and members of judicial and religious officialdom is risky, since the economic and social status of the two groups was totally different and insusceptible to comparisons.

To sum up, I would argue that the most important feature in this case is the fact that public and state revenues, accruing from the leasing of state sources of revenue to private individuals, were used to finance the sector of public servants and state officials. Thus, it is of primary importance to recognise the fact that public and private sectors were closely intermixed through the relationship formed between the state and tax-farmers, which

\textsuperscript{298} Özmucur and Pamuk, \textit{Real Wages}, p. 301. An unskilled worker received a daily wage of 30.6 \textit{akçes} and a skilled worker 44.8 \textit{akçes}. Thus, we could deduce that the \textit{imam} in Serfice received 1/8 of the wage of an unskilled worker and 1/10 of a skilled one.
brought about the “privatisation” of the public sector as a result of the influence exerted upon it by influential individuals and tax-farmers.\textsuperscript{299}

We should now turn our attention to a late-18th-century contract, which expounds the circumstances of the leasing of the given tax-farm and the details of the contractors. Such a case is the detailed contract of the leasing of the tax-farm of the customary levy on sheep of Serfice and its dependencies (‘adet-i ağınam-i Serfice ve tevabi’i mukata’ası) in 1205 AH / 1790-91 AD. The contract depicts the role of a local magnate, namely Serficeli Halil Ağa, in the local socio-economic life and the power that he had obtained through his relationship with the circles of influential Istanbul-based magnates. The document also shows the antagonism that was developed between Halil Ağa and another influential figure, namely Hacı Ismail Pasha, for the control over and leasing of the tax-farm of the customary tax on sheep of Serfice and its dependencies. Despite his initial failure to obtain the tax-farm, Halil’s influence and contacts among the members of the Janissary corps secured him the support of Ali Pasha, who appointed him in 1791 to the post of the a’yan of Serfice, which Halil would retain for the next 30 years, until his overlord’s downfall and execution. The sole available source on the leasing of the aforementioned tax-farm is the draft text of a mandate which was issued by the Grand Vizier as a summary of the procedures followed in the aforementioned case. The document is not dated, but the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives date it around 1205 AH / 1790-91 AD. Furthermore, from the two officials

\textsuperscript{299} On the notion of “privatisation” and the procedure that led towards the domination of private individual tax-farmers over state in 18th-century Ottoman Empire, see: Ariel Salzmann, “An Ancien Régime Revisited: “Privatization” and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire”, \textit{Politics & Society} 21/4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 393-423.
mentioned in the document, namely Ismail Pasha and Halil Ağa, we could date the document under examination around 1790-91.300

The mandate states that the tax-farm of the customary tax on sheep of Serfice and its dependencies was previously farmed out by Hacı Ismail Pasha, who had been recently deprived of the rank and title of vizier, because, being commander of the imperial troops in Moldavia, he failed to defend the fortress of Bender, which was occupied by the Russians.301

At the auction held to that end, half of the aforementioned tax-farm had been leased by and bestowed upon Ismail Pasha, on condition that he defrayed at the conclusion of the bargain as down payment (mu’accele) the sum of 14,000 ğuruş. Notwithstanding the fact that the mu’accele had been fully paid and delivered to the imperial mint, after Ismail Pasha had been demoted and his property had been confiscated, the aforementioned tax-farm was auctioned anew amidst imperial-army officers. The Grand Vizier notified the administration of the bestowal of the aforementioned tax-farm upon a certain Halil Ağa302 for 14,500 ğuruş.

300 BOA, HAT.0185-8612: şevketli kirametli mühabetli kadrelti veliyyü’n-ni’met efendim pa’dişahım merfu’u’il-vizare Ismail Paşa’nın ref’ olunan mukata’atından ‘adet-i ağnam-ı Serfice ve tevab’i mukata’asının nisf hissesi bundan akdem lede’l-müzayedede on dört bin ğuruş mu’accele ile talebi üzerinde karar ve mu’accelesi eğerçi darbhan-i amireye teslim olunmuş olub lakin mukata’a-ı merkume ordu-yi hümayunda dahi müzayedede olunub hala sipahiler ağası Halil Ağa üzerinde on dört bin beşyüz ğuruşa karar dade olduğu sadr-ı aşamları tarafından tahrir olunduğunundan ve bu suretde rikâb-i hümayunda verilen mu’acceleden ordu mu’accelesi beşyüz ğuruş ziyade olduğundan ‘atebe-i ‘ulyalarına ‘arz olundukda ziyade kim verüb miriye enfe’ ise ana verile deyüb mübarek hatt-ı hümayunları şerefyafte-i sudur olmuşdı bina’en ‘aleyhi mukaddema bu tarafda ‘ühdesinde karar eden kulları keff-i yed etmeyüb mukaddem verdiği on dört bin ğuruşun üzerine bin ğuruş daha zamm ve ma’ zamm on beş bin ğuruşa kabul eylediğin ve mukaddema darbhan-i amireye teslim eylediğin on dört bin ğuruş darbhan-i ‘amreden verilen kalyoncu mevacibine tertib olunmuş olduğundan bir habbesi darbhan-i ‘amriede kalmayüb ru-yi ıktıza ederse darbhaneden verilemeyceği der-kenar olunduğun defeterdar efendi kulları bir kit’a takirriyle beyan etmekle husus-i merkuma da’ır evrak-ı sa’ire ile cümlesi ma’ruz ‘atebe-i şahaneleri kilinmişdir manzur-ı hümayunları buyurulduğun ve ferman-ı şevketli kirametli mühabetli kadrelti veliyyü’n-ni’metim efendim pa’dişahım hazretlerininindir

301 Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, III, p. 833.

302 Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, II, p. 570. There is one Hacı Halil Ağa who is referred to as Serfiçeli, namely from Serfice. Süreyya does not refer whether he had ever obtained the title of the commander of the cavalrymen who formed the first regiment of the kapikulu household cavalry.
a sum which he had already defrayed. Thus, because in this way the second mu’accele paid by the army official was 500 ğuruş more than the first mu’accele, which Ismail Pasha had initially defrayed on the occasion of the Sultan’s presence on horseback (rikâb-i hûmayun), a petition was submitted to the Sultanic Court to examine the case. Accordingly, a Sultanic mandate was issued and sent to the Grand Vizier, which decreed that it was indispensable to be clarified who had defrayed the additional sum and, in case this sum was most profitable for the state and did not cause further ramifications and friction among officers, it had to be accepted and received by the state authorities.

Consequently, the party which had initially secured the tax-farm, namely Ismail Pasha, did not withdraw his claims, but, since he added another 1,000 ğuruş to the amount of 14,000 ğuruş which he had already defrayed, the state received and collected the overall amount of 15,000 ğuruş. Additionally, the sultanic exchequer (defterdar efendi) explained with an official report that a marginal note was required to be written down which would explicitly report to that, because the initially defrayed amount of 14,000 ğuruş had been withdrawn from the imperial mint and dispensed on payment of the wages of the sailors of the ships of the line (kalyoncu mevacibine tertib). In case Ismail Pasha demanded a refund, it would be impossible for the imperial mint to deliver and return the said amount to him. Thus, the document concludes, all documents related to this issue, alongside all additional ones, were presented and submitted to the sultanic court for further examination.
Although we do not know the result of this procedure, we could suppose that Ismail Pasha finally prevailed over Halil Ağa and retained the tax-farm, because he defrayed as prospective bidder the highest down payment. Due to the extremely strenuous circumstances brought about by the war which the Ottomans waged on two fronts against the Russians and Austrians (1787-1792), and due to the need of the imperial treasury for cash to pay for war expenses, the administration accepted without delay Ismail Pasha’s offer. Moreover, as the imperial treasurer had declared, the treasury had already spent to the payment of wages the amount, which Ismail Pasha had already paid in advance and forwarded to the imperial treasury to secure possession of the tax-farm of the customary tax on sheep in Serfice and its dependencies. Thus, a refund was deemed impossible.\footnote{On the 1787-92 war against Russia and Austria, see: Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, I, pp. 258-260.}

What is of particular importance in this affair is Halil Ağa’s role as a protagonist figure. It is mandatory to indicate that what follows is based on the assumption that the Halil Ağa referred to in this document is the same with the one appointed by Ali Pasha as a’yan of Serfice and referred to as Serficeli in Süreyya’s Sicilli-i Osmani. As the nickname Serficeli suggests, Halil Ağa originated from Serfice. The title ağa suggests that he was a senior Janissary officer, whilst the titles silahşor, kapicibaşı, and sipahiler ağası, which he had been decorated with during his career, allow for the assumption that he was a kapikulu Janissary who served in the Topkapı Palace. Halil Ağa entered the kapikulu household cavalry of the Porte and joined the first regiment that was recruited from sons of Ottoman beys and sipahi timar-holders.\footnote{Bayerle, Pashas, Begs and Effendis, p. 137.} The title silahşor was attributed to him as a mark of
seniority amidst his younger comrades. Later on, he was given the title of “chief-doorkeeper (kapıcıbaşı)” and was appointed commander of the gatekeepers serving at the gates of the Topkapı Palace. In 1790-1791 he was serving as sipahiler ağası or sipahi oğlanları ağası, namely as commander of the first regiment of the kapıkulu household cavalry of the Porte.

We can, thus, argue that Serficeli Halil Ağa was an officer who, most probably due to his father’s ‘askeri status, and his wealth and acquaintances to influential officers, had managed to enter the imperial palace and follow the career paths offered to all individuals who entered the palace career, either as servants and slaves of the Sultan or as freeborn Muslims. Thus, Halil Ağa, followed the career path offered to all kapıkulu Janissaries, i.e. the career of an officer who was based in Istanbul and salaried directly by the state. This was in stark contrast to the career path followed by his almost contemporaneous voyvoda of Kozani, Osman Ağa, who exploited his status as a yerli Janissary to build up his prestige and influence and succeeded in emerging as a protagonist figure in communal affairs and politics in Kozani. By serving in the household cavalry of the Sultan, Halil Ağa managed to climb the echelons of the imperial palace hierarchy and reached a particular level of prominence and prestige, which he would have been totally unable to achieve with the

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305 On the title and duties of silahşor, see: Redhouse, Turkish and English Lexicon, pp. 1069-1070; Pakalin, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, III, p. 226. As I have already referred to in previous chapters, a silahşor, named Süleyman, had been appointed in 1781 by Fatma Hanım Sultan and sent to Kozani to examine the case of Kozani’s late voyvoda, Osman Ağa, and his two sons and implement the terms of Osman Ağa’s will.


limited opportunities that occurred within the provincial reality. It seems probable that he tried to use his influence and power to obtain on a short-term basis the tax-farm of the customary tax on sheep in Serfice and its dependencies, in order to obtain a base that he would use later to establish his control over his native town. Ismail Pasha’s hardships presented an unprecedented opportunity which Halil Ağa could not let go untapped, for openly to antagonise such a powerful military officer as Ismail Pasha would have been otherwise unimaginable. As we will see in the second part of this chapter, despite his initial failure to obtain control of the tax-farm of the customary tax on sheep in Serfice and its dependencies, Halil Ağa joined Ali Pasha’s faction and just a few months later was appointed by his new patron to the post of the a’yan of Serfice.

4.1.3. Various forms and aspects of tax-farming in 18th-century Velvendos

The 18th-century documents on the village of Velvendos are scarce and provide us with a limited amount of information on its fiscal status and communal affairs between 1695 and 1790, namely the period between the initial introduction of malikâne on an empirewide scale and the imposition of Ali Pasha’s domination over the area from c. 1790. Thus, I will refer below to two cases which provide a solid basis for the analysis and evaluation of the application of life-term tax-farming and thus permit appropriate comparisons between Kozani and Velvendos.

The first case concerns two Muslims, Ali Ağa and Ahmed Ağa, who were the life-term contractors of the tax-farm of the hasses of Velvendos. The only available source for this case is a report of the two aforementioned Muslims, which they submitted as written
petition to the Porte authorities in order to call for their intervention and assistance, because they were prevented from collecting the taxes levied on the populace living within the limits of their tax-farm. The report is not dated, but from a marginal note that accompanies it we can assume that it was written and submitted in 1140 RC / 1140-1141 AH / 1728-1729 AD.\[^{309}\]

The report states that the village of Velvendos and its dependencies constituted a tax-farm, which Ali and Ahmed had leased some months before the submission of this report on a life-term basis, and had been placed since then under their charge. It also states that since olden times it was usual for Velvendos’ tax-farmers to gather and collect the lump-sum of the annual payments of the Evlad-I Fatihan who resided in the villages of the judicial district of Çaharşenbe and formed part of this tax-farm. Furthermore, as Ali and Ahmed testified, it was their duty, as tax-farmers and beneficiaries of the tax-farm, to forward this lump-sum into the imperial treasury alongside the tax-farm’s other annual returns. Until that year there had been no harmful immixture or interference by external sides, but when Ali and Ahmed attempted to gather and collect the taxes of the Evlad-I Fatihan some people reacted forcefully and opposed the payment of their share.

For this reason, Ali and Ahmed reported this incident and petitioned the Porte authorities asking for their interference. They asked for a marginal note to be written down, which would contain the fixed amount of the annual payments of the Evlad-ı Fatihan villages of the kaza of Çaharşenbe. Furthermore, they asked for the issuance of an imperial order which would stipulate that the lump-sum annual returns of the taxes of the Evlad-ı Fatihan were to be collected in the prescribed manner and according to the requirements of the previous year. Furthermore, they demanded than an additional clause be added, which would stipulate that, for the sake of the normality of the tax-collection procedure, taxes were to be collected without hindrance, whilst it was mandatory that all sorts of opposition against individuals responsible for the collection of the taxes be avoided.

The original report is accompanied by a marginal note written down by the bureau responsible for the administration of the imperial hasses. The note includes the terms and conditions under which the two aforementioned Muslims had farmed out on a life-term basis the tax-farm of Velvendos and its dependences. The terms had been registered as part of the contract between the two leaseholders and state authorities on 11 Cemaziyyülahir 1140 AH / 13 Kanun-ı Sani 1139 RC / 24-1-1728 AD. The note states that the tax-farm of the hasses of Velvendos and its dependences had been farmed out on a life-term basis by Ali Ağa and Ahmed Ağa, both permanent residents of Serfice, and it was given under their charge starting from 1 Mart 1140 RC / 30 Receb 1140 AH / 12-3-1728 AD. The annual returns of the tax-farm amounted to 3,000 guruş for the Christian population and 2,430 ğuruş for the lump-sum payment of Evlad-ı Fatihan of the villages within the limits of the tax-farm. Thus, the tax-farmers had to collect on an annual basis the overall sum of 5,430 guruş. Moreover, the note says that all Evlad-ı Fatihan villages in the judicial district of
Çaharşenbe were annexed to the aforementioned tax-farm. It was also recorded that it was a prerequisite for the lump-sum paid on a yearly basis by the Evlad-ı Fatihan in return for exemption from military service to be collected by the contractors of the tax-farm of Velvendos and its dependencies, and paid into the imperial treasury alongside the annual returns accruing from the tax-farm.\footnote{BOA, İE.ML..92-8714: hasslar der-kenar mukata’a-i hassha-yı Velvendos ve tevabi’ha der liva-yı Paşa ‘an evvel Mart sene 1140 der ‘uhde-i Ali Ağa ve Ahmed Ağa sakınan-ı Serfice ber-vech-ı malikâne fi sene ğürüş 3000 2430 maktu’-i evlad-ı fatihan-i kura-yı mukata’a-i mezbure --- 5430 vech-i meşru üzere mukata’a-i mezbur ber-vech-i malikâne muma-ileyhenin ‘uhdelerinde olub mukata’a-i mezbure mulhakatından olan Çaharşenbe kazasında sakın evlad-ı fatihan ta’ifesinin bi-her sene ıktiza’ eden bedel-i mu’afiyetleri ber-vech-ı maktu’ mukata’a-i mezbure mutasarrıfları tarafından cem’ ve tahsil ve mukata’a-i mezbure mali ile ma’an teslim hazine-i ‘amire olunmak üzere mehalline kayd ve emr-i şerif verildiği defterde mestur ve mukayyeddir ferman-ı sa’detli sultanım hazırlretlerinindir fi 11 Cemaziyyü’l-ahir sene 1140}

This case is of particular importance because it is a typical example of the introduction and application of the system of the malikâne tax-farming on a rural settlement that showed rapid economic and demographic growth. There is no concrete information on the exact date of the initial introduction of the malikâne system to Velvendos. Since this is the very first reference to the application of the outsourcing of the tax-farm of Velvendos on a life-term basis, 1728 should be considered as a terminus post quem for the transition from the method of iltizam to that of malikâne. Furthermore, 17th-century sources remain silent regarding the fiscal and administrative status of the tax-farm of Velvendos, with the exception of a poll-tax register dated 1691-1692, in which Velvendos
is recorded as *hass* of the Grand Vizier.\footnote{BOA, MAD.d..04374, pp. 190-91: *kaza-yi Service karye-i Vel[v]endos havvas-i sadr-i ‘ali*} We could therefore assume that Velvendos was included since the early 17th century in the category of *hasses* which were property of the sultan or other administrative and military dignitaries, and was leased on a short-term basis according to the regulations of the *iltizam* system. In 1728, as the first available 18th-century source indicates, Ali Ağa and Ahmed Ağa formed a partnership and leased on a life-term basis the tax-farm of Velvendos. There are no additional sources on the background of the two aforementioned leaseholders and it is uncertain whether they were local high-ranking Janissaries, as was Osman Ağa in Kozani, or they used the title *ağa* as merely a means of enhancing their prestige as members of the local élite in Service. Be that as it may, it is clear that Ali and Ahmed used their ‘*askeri* status and invested their wealth in outsourcing the tax-farm of Velvendos on a life-term basis and thus obtain all privileges and benefits accruing from the application of the method of *malikâne* tax-farming.

The area of the jurisdiction of the tax-farm of Velvendos consisted of two distinct parts which were as sources of revenue very different in nature. On the one hand, the tax-farm encompassed the village of Velvendos itself, which was inhabited by a vivid and wealthy non-Muslim community, whose members, similarly to their Kozanite neighbours, had strong commercial ties to Central Europe.\footnote{For concise information about the history and the spectacular development of Velvendos during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, based on 16th-century Ottoman land survey registers (*tapu tahrir defterleri*) and 16th and 17th-century Greek ecclesiastical registers, see: Maria-Christina Chatziioanou, *I Istoriki Ekseliksi ton Oikismon stin Periochi tou Aliakmona kata tin Tourkokratia: O Kodikas ar. 201 tis Monis Metamorphoseos tou Sotiros Zabordas* [The historical development of the settlements in the area of Hallacmon during the “Tourkokratia”: the codex No. 201 of the Monastery of the Transfiguration of the Savior at Zaborda], (Athens: Kentro Neoellinikon Spoudon-E.I.E, 2000), pp. 28-30, 37-38; Kambouridis and Salakides, *The Province of Servia*, pp. 122-23, 662, 671, 678, 732-733.} On the other hand, the tax-farm comprised Velvendos’ dependencies, namely all *Evlad-i Fatihan* villages of the *kaza* of Çaharşenbe,
which were exclusively inhabited by Muslim Yörüks. The causes of this jarring combination of two technically incompatible sources of revenue and the equation of two altogether dissimilar groups, under the sway of the partnership formed by two Muslim *malikâne*-beneficiaries, remains a mystery. The only plausible explanation seems to be an attempt of the central authorities at imposing strict control over the administration of the *Evlad-ı Fatihan* in the area of the kazas of Çaharşenbe and Eğribucak, who are characterised in the available sources as an insubordinate and troublesome group of individuals. Although they were detrimental and outdated in military terms, they enjoyed various and numerous privileges, as well as exemptions from military service in return for insignificant fees.

A report dated 12 Zilka’dé 1153 AH / 29-01-1741 AD contains useful information on the reasons behind the abolition of the *Evlad-ı Fatihan* contingents in the kazas of

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313 On the installation of Yörük tribes in the area of Service and its colonisation by them, as well as on the demographic characteristics of the Yörük settlements in the area during the 16th century, see: Kambouridis and Salakides, *The Province of Servia*, pp. 15-21, 136-180. We should note, however, that the bibliography on the history and structure of Yörük and *Evlad-ı Fatihan* is limited and practically outdated, because the most important and complete work is Gökbilgin’s pioneering monograph *Rumeli’de Yürüklər, Tatarlar ve Evlad-ı Fatihan*, İÜ Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınlarından, 748 [Yürüks, Tatars, and Sons of Conquerors in Rumelia, From the Publications of the Faculty of Literature, University of Istanbul] (Istanbul: Osman Yalçın Matbaası, 1957), which was published almost 60 years ago. For a brief critical analysis of classical and modern trends on the examination of the Yörük and *Evlad-ı Fatihan* groups, see: Harun Yeni, “The Utilization of Mobile Groups in the Ottoman Balkans: A Revision of General Perception”, *Oriental Archive*, 81 (2013), pp. 183-205.

314 As two series of documents dated 1152 AH / 1739-1740 AD and 1153 AH / 1740-1741 AD reveal, the *Evlad-ı Fatihan* of the kazas of Service and Çaharşenbe were stripped of their privileged taxation status and demoted to the status of common Muslim *re’aya* taxpayers. This change was implemented by the authorities as chastisement for their insubordination, complete disorganisation, and avoiding of their military duties. This change was reversed and the *fatihanlık* status of these villages was reinstated sometime in the late 18th century, because in later documents, dated 1800-1830, we come across *Evlad-ı Fatihan* villages in the two aforementioned kazas. Unfortunately, the sources remain silent on this issue. For more information, see: BOA, BiD.HSK.d..25710 and BOA, BiD.MKF.d..29589, where the circumstances of this reform, and the decisions and measures taken by the administration are presented in more detail.

315 On the overall status and administrative system of the *Evlad-ı Fatihan*, as well as the progressive disorganisation of this system during the 18th century, see: Pakalın, *Dictionary of Expressions and Terms*, I, pp. 571-2; Gökbilgin, *Yürüks, Tatars, and Sons of Conquerors*, pp. 255-256.
Çaharşenbe and Eğribucak and the procedure followed therein. The report explicitly indicates that the authorities, after repeated and numerous ineffective attempts at reorganising the administrative structure of the Evlad-ı Fatihan of the kazas of Çaharşenbe and Eğri Bucak, proceeded to the radical step of their abolition. According to the report, the Muslims living in the two aforementioned judicial districts experienced relegation to the status of ordinary Muslim re’aya taxpayers. The Evlad-ı Fatihan of the kazas of Çaharşenbe and Eğri Bucak were charged with protracted rebelliousness and complete insubordination. They were also accused of behaving in “an absolutely violent and arrogant way”, whilst at times of war they obstinately objected to fulfilling their duty of participating in the campaigns, whenever summoned with the issuance of imperial decrees, and the payment of campaign fees. Last but not least, they were engaged in a series of “murders and various seditious, rebellious, and sinful acts”\(^\text{316}\), which was a direct result of their ignoring the orders and commands of their officers and commanders. They were thus stripped of their Evlad-ı Fatihan status, alongside any concomitant privileges and tax exemptions. They were enrolled, as the rest of the Muslim re’aya taxpayers, into taxation registers, which denoted their introduction into and subjection to the regular payment of the extraordinary ‘avarız, nüzül, and celepkeşan taxes.

Mehmed Pasha, the then-beneficiary of the malikâne of the lump-sum substitute fee of military exemption, payable by the Evlad-ı Fatihan,\(^\text{317}\) and the deputy judge of Thessaloniki submitted a report and notification on this affair. Immediately thereafter Seyyid Hüseyin Ağa, the then-comptroller of the customs office of Thessaloniki, who had farmed out by way of ıltizam the post of the chief officer of the Evlad-ı Fatihan, was

\(^{316}\) BOA, BiD.MKF.d..29589: ahkâm-i şerifeye ‘adem-i ita’at ve zabitan ve çeribaşlarına izhar-i huşunet ve katı-nüşüs ve sa’ır enva’-ı fesad ve şakavete tesaddi ve mübaderet eyledükleri

\(^{317}\) BOA, BiD.MKF.d..29589, f. 6: bedel-i mu’afiyyet-i maktu’larna malikâne mutasarrif olan sa’adetlü Mehmed Paşa hazretleri

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appointed registrar\textsuperscript{318} and Ahmed Efendi, the then-treasurer of the bureau of the hasses, was appointed in Seyyid Hüseyn Ağa’s retinue as his scribe and secretary.\textsuperscript{319}

An analytical imperial order was issued thereafter, which stipulated that the \textit{Evlad-ı Fatihan} of the two aforementioned kazas were to be deprived completely of their privileged status, whilst \textit{avarız hane} accounting units were to be allocated to them on the basis of each household’s economic circumstances. At the same time, the order decreed, the occurring gaps in the ranks of the \textit{Evlad-ı Fatihan} were to be filled with other Muslims, who lived in 21 neighbouring Rumelian nahiyes and kazas, where the \textit{Evlad-ı Fatihan} system was still in full operation, but had been theretofore outside the official record books (\textit{haric ez defter bulunan}).\textsuperscript{320} These individuals were to be recorded and integrated into the system and organisation of the Rumelian \textit{Evlad-ı Fatihan}. Seyyid Hüseyn Ağa acted according to the stipulations of the imperial order and, despatched with Ahmed Efendi to Istanbul a signed and sealed register, containing the results of Seyyid Hüseyn Ağa’s investigation and registration of the local Muslim, population.

The contents of this register were recorded also in the registers of the bureau of the hasses, so that the process of the conversion of the \textit{Evlad-ı Fatihan} of the kazas of Çaharşenbe and Eğri Bucak into ordinary Muslim \textit{re’aya} taxpayers, could be completed and the new arrangement put into practice after 1 Muharrem 1154 AH / 19-3-1741 AD.

\textsuperscript{318} BOA, BiD.MKF.d..29589, f. 6: \textit{ta’ife-i merkumenin iltizamen zabitı olan halan Selanik gümrüğü emini Seyyid Hüseyn Ağa kulları muharrir}

\textsuperscript{319} BOA, BiD.MKF.d..29589, f. 6: \textit{hasslar kalemi keysedarı Ahmed Efendi dahi ma’iyyetine katib ta’yyin}

\textsuperscript{320} Harun Yeni has studied the structure of the \textit{Yörük} contingents and reached the conclusion that there was a large number of “off-the-register” \textit{Yörük} households scattered throughout the Rumelian and Anatolian provinces, which were used as a reserve whenever the administration detected gaps and deficiencies in the \textit{Yörük} system and military organisation. Yeni calls these “off-the-record” households \textit{haymâne Yörûks}. It seems plausible that this trend was also applied on the \textit{Evlad-ı Fatihan} system after the great reforms undertaken in 1691. For additional information, see: Yeni, \textit{The Utilization of Mobile Groups}, pp. 195-198.
Although the available documents do not provide any additional information on the circumstances and reasons for this reform, the report explicitly states that this imperative reform was a preemptive strike that attempted to prevent the “spirit of crimes and sins” of the Evlad-I Fatihan of the kazas of Çaharşenbe and Eğri Bucak from spreading amongst the rest of the Evlad-I Fatihan, who lived in Selanik (: Salonica) and in the surrounding areas. As a result, all ties between the predominantly Christian village of Velvendos and the contiguous hinterland, which was inhabited by an exclusively Muslim population of Yörük origins, were drastically cut off for the next fifty years. Yet, as we will see below, Velvendos would be unified again with its hinterland after Ali Pasha’s imposition in the early 1790s of his domination throughout the area.\footnote{BOA, BiD.MKF.d..29589, ff. 6-7: ‘arz-i bendeleridir ki vilayet-i Rum-lli vakı’ Yörük ta’bir olunan Evlad-ı Fatihan ta’ifesinin sakın oldukları kazalardan Eğri Bucak ve Çaharşenbe kazalarında sakın Evlad-ı Fatihan ta’ifesı kemal mertebe şiddeti ve ru’unet üzere olub seferler vuku’nda ihrac ferman olunmuş olan eskıncilerini ihracda ve evamir-i’aliiyye ile matlub olan tekâlîf-i seferiyeyi edada muhalefet ve ahkâm-i şerifeye ‘adem-i ita’at ve zabitan ve çeribaşlara izhar-i huşunet ve katlı nüfus ve sa’ir enva’-i fasad ve şakavete tesaddi ve mübaderet eyledükleri cihetden Selanik ve atraf-i havalisinde vaki’ Evlad-ı Fatihan fukarası kendülerini eskiya-yı mezburunun şırayet-i töhmet ve şakavetlere karısın için kaza ta’ifesini mezburunun Evlad-ı Fatihan kaydaları ref’ ve terkin ve re’aya-yı sa’ire misillii hane-i ‘avraz kayd ve idhal olunmasın ‘umuman iltimas eyledükleri ta’ife-i mezburunun bedel-i mu’afiyet-i maktu’larına malikâne mutasarrıf olan sa’detli Mehmed Paşa hazretleri ve Selanik na’ibi başka başka ‘arz ve ‘ılam eyledüklerine bina’en müşarın-ileyh tarafından ta’ife-i merkumen iltizamen zabiti olan halan Selanik gümürği emini Seyyid Hüseyin Ağ’a kulları muharrir ve hasslar kalemi keysedari Ahmed Efendi dahı ma’iyyetine kâtib ta’yyin olunub kaza ta’ifesini külüyyeven fathanîkandan ihrac ve tahammülere göre überlerine hane-i ‘avariz kayd ve anlar yeralerine sa’ir yigirmi bir ‘aded Fatihan nevahi ve kazalarında haric ez-defter bulunan Fatihan’dan neferer tahrir ve tekmil olunmak için mufassal ve meşruh emr-i serif verilmişidir muceb-i emr ‘ali üzere muharrir-i muma-iley izik olunan Çaharşenbe ve Eğri Bucak kazalarının Evlad-ı Fatihan neferatını külüyyeven fathanîkandan ihrac ve enmak ve araçlere göre überlerine hane-i ‘avariz kayd ve tahrir eylediğini muş’ar kâtib-i merkum yediyile gündürdüğü memhr ve munza defterdin kaza ta’iye-i mezburunun fi’l-osl yediyüz altımı bir nefer piyadesi olub tahrir-i cedidde altı nefer ziyade olmağıla cümlesi yediyüz altımı yedi nefer ve perakende kura neferatıyla yediyüz seksen altı baliq olmağını bu mikdar neferat dörtbin beşyüz seksen beş guruş bedel-i mu’aşiyet-i maktu’ ikizı edüb bu def’a neferat-i mezbur überlerine kayd olmasını lazım gelen hane-i ‘avariz ve celebekânın ağnami malleri kalemlerinden hisab etdirdikde yüzük doksan üç hane hesabıyla mal-i ‘avarızlara üçbin altıyuz otuz altı guruşu ve beşbin ikiyüz iki buçuk re’s ağnam hesabına dahi mal-i celebekânın ağnamları bin yediyüz otuz dört guruşu ki cümlesi beşbin yüzük yetmiş guruşu baliq olduğu hisab olunmuşdur bu suretde kaza ta’ifesini mezburunun Evlad-ı Fatihan’ı fathanîkdan ihrac olunmak takribi ile bedel-i mu’aşiyet-i maktu’lan maline kesr gelmeyüb
Furthermore, these events and circumstances allow for the assumption that a notion of strict control over the Evlad-ı Fatihan at that time could only be achieved through the energetic intervention and participation in the administration of the Evlad-ı Fatihan affairs of officers who were cognisant of local conditions. Ali Ağa and Ahmed Ağa were most probably considered by Istanbul authorities as the most appropriate officers to handle this delicate issue. They were permanent residents of Serfice and prestigious members of the local élite, which means also that they possessed all necessary means of attaining the smooth administration and regular collection of the taxes and fees, imposed on the Evlad-ı Fatihan communities by the remote central administration. At the same time, the two leaseholders followed the rule of portfolio diversification, which allowed them to expand their control and influence over a large area, whilst at the same time they could invest their wealth in differentiated sources of income and thus mitigate investment risks and potential threats of bankruptcy.322

As far as Velvendos is concerned, the available sources on the nature and exact date of termination of Ali Ağa and Ahmed Ağa’s malikâne contracts, or the identity of their successors, are scarce, almost non-existent. Temporally, the next available source is an imperial order dated in the last days of Şa’ban 1177 AH / 23 February - 3 March 1764 AD, which addresses the governor-general of Rumelia, the judge of Serfice, and the warden of

322 On the application of the rule of portfolio diversification on the Ottoman tax-farming system, see: Barkey, Empire of Difference, pp. 233-235; Salzmann, Ancien Regime Revisited, pp. 403-404.
the fortress of Blatamona (today: Platamon in Pieria, Greece) for the imprisonment in the aforementioned fortress of two Muslims accused of embezzlement and other relevant offenses. More precisely, the order states that the people of the kazas of Serfice and Çaharşenbe, and Hibetullah Hanım Sultan and a certain Ali, a Porte official and beneficiary of a gedik timar, who were both at the time joint beneficiaries of a malikâne in the area, had submitted collectively to the Porte a report, accompanied by a judicial report undersigned by the judges of the two aforementioned kazas. The two reports stated that the people of the two kazas had paid in full the fees and taxes allocated to them, on the basis of the previously issued imperial orders and taxation registers, to the appointed tax-collectors.

Although there was no need or reason for any oppressive behaviour or wrongdoing to be committed against them, two “oppressive” Muslims, namely a certain Büyük Ali Ağa and his son, Mustafa, who were both permanent residents of the kaza of Serfice, caused with their offenses great disquietude. The reports emphasised their tyrannical manners and described them as some of “the most tyrannical and iniquitous persons” in the broader area, who

323 BOA, C.ZB..89-4413: Rum-İli valisi vezire Serfice ve [...] kazilerine ve Blatamona dizi darına hüküm ki seyyidetü’l-muhaderrat inklileti’l-muhsenat tacü’l-mesturat Hibetu’l-lah Hanım Sultan damet ‘asmetüha ile dergah-i mu’allam gediği herdenin Ali zide mecadühün ber veç-i malikâne berat-i şerifime ‘uhdelerinde olan Serfice ve Çaharşenbe kazaları ahalileri südde-i sa’detine ‘arzuhal ve mahzar gönderüb mezbururlar evamir-i ‘aliyyemle varias olan tekâliflerin emr ve defter mucebince cemente me’muru eda edüb zülm ve te’addi olmalarını icab etmez iken Serfice kaza sakinlerinden zalemeden Büyük Ali Ağa demekle ma’ruf kimesne ile oğlu Mustafa kendü hallerinde olmayub cebabireden olmalarıyla re’aya fukarasına haddan efüzün cevr ve zülm ve te’addilerinden ğayri yüz yetmiş senesinden berü her tekâlîf tevzi’inde emr ve defterden ziyade kendü nefesleriyçün onar ve on beşer kise akçe salyane ve cem’ ve tahsil ve ekl ve bule’ ve hevalarına tabi’ ikişüze nefer mikdari Arnavud eskiyasını hanelerinde meks ve zülm ve te’addilerinin nihayeti olmayub yüz yetmiş dört ve yetmiş beşer kise akçe salyane ve cem’ ve tahsil ve ekl ve bule’ ve hevalarına tabi’ ikişüze nefer mikdari Arnavud eskiyasını hanelerinde meks ve zülm ve te’addilerinin nihayeti olmaları icab etmez iken Serfice kazası sakinlerinden zalemeden Büyük Ali Ağa demekle ma’ruf kimesne ile oğlu Mustafa kendü hallerinde olmayub.
always behaved with “immoderate injustice, tyranny, and oppression” against the poor re’aya and had committed repeatedly a variety of execrable offenses to satisfy their “insatiable greed”.  

More precisely, the two aforementioned individuals were accused of imposing from 1170 AH / 1756-1757 AD onwards, in an overtly oppressive manner, additional sums on the levies, which were to be apportioned among the taxpayers and had been recorded in the respective imperial orders and registers of apportionment. They, thus, embezzled on an annual basis 10 and 15 purses, namely 5,000 and 7,500 ğuruş, each. Furthermore, they installed in their houses an armed retinue of 200 Albanian bandits of the same sort as their employers. Although the authorities had issued in 1174 AH / 1760-1761 AD and 1175 AH / 1761-1762 AD two imperial orders in defense of the rights of the re’aya taxpayers, which decreed that the two aforementioned culprits were to be exiled from Serfice and imprisoned in the fortress of Blatamona, the latter succeeded due to their insubordination and disobedience in getting away with no penalty. Since they remained unpunished, their crimes increased and the circumstances of the peasants deteriorated at a steady pace. For this reason, the people of Serfice and Çaharşenbe demanded that a new imperial order be issued and its implementation be closely supervised by the authorities, so that the law and order could be enforced, justice be done to the poor peasants, and the two culprits be imprisoned in the fortress of Blatamona, so that their wickedness and crimes be prohibited and stopped. As a result, the authorities issued this imperial order, which commanded the

324 BOA, C.ZB..89-4413: kendü hallerinde olmayub cebabireden olmalarıyla re’aya fukarasına haddan eфzün çevr ve zülm ve te’addilerinden gayri
325 BOA, C.ZB..89-4413: kendü nefesleriçün onar ve on beşer kise akçe salyane
326 BOA, C.ZB..89-4413: hevalarına tabi’ ikiyüz nefer mikdanı Arnavud eşkiyasını hanelerinde meks
governor-general of Rumelia to supervise the arrest of Büyük Ali Ağa and Mustafa. After the sums which they had expropriated from the poor peasants had been removed from them, even by force if need arose, they were to be brought before the agents despatched by the governor-general, who would also be entrusted with their collection in full and delivery to their beneficiaries. After that, the two culprits were to be imprisoned and detained for rehabilitation in the fortress of Blatamona. The imperial order is also accompanied by two brief marginal notes, which refer to the imprisonment of Büyük Ali Ağa and Mustafa in the fortress of Blatamona and their release after almost nine months of detention. The notes state that the two culprits were imprisoned in the aforementioned fortress “sometime in 1177 AH”, obviously after the issuance of the aforementioned imperial order, but were released in the last days of Cemaziyyyulahir 1178 AH / 14-24 December 1764 AD, under the condition that they thenceforth would be occupied with their own concerns, quiet and inoffensive. Their release was achieved with the intervention of Hibetullah Hanım Sultan and the judge of Serfice, who despatched a relevant notification to Istanbul.\(^\text{327}\)

This document contains useful, though vague, information on the process of the administration of malikâne tax-farms in the periphery of the Ottoman Empire. To begin with, there were recorded two joint beneficiaries of a malikâne tax-farm in the broader area, namely Hibetullah Hanım Sultan, a member of the Ottoman imperial dynasty and relative of Fatma Hanım Sultan’s, and a certain Ali, who, although the document does not contain any concrete information on his identity, most probably was the same Ali Ağa mentioned previously as one of the two joint beneficiaries of the malikâne of the hasses of

\(^{327}\) BOA, C.ZB..89-4413: fi-ma ba’d kendü hallerinde olmaları şartıyla Serfice kazisinin i’lamıyla ‘akd ve itlakları için emr-i şerif yazılmışdır fi evahir-i Cemaziyyyûl’ahir sene 1178

BOA, C.ZB..89-4413: merkum Ali ve oğlu mukaddema ahalinın ’arz ve mahzarlanyyla ve malikâne mutassarifsâsi Hanım Sultan hazretleri ittimasıyla yetmiş yedi Şa’bani’nda kal’abend olunmuşken bu def’a kadı i’lami ve muma-ileyha Hanım Sultan ittimasiyla itlak olunmuş
Furthermore, the document does not record the exact location and extent of the area that fell within the boundaries of the *malikâne* tax-farm held by Hibetullah Hanım Sultan and Ali.

As we will see immediately below, although Ali disappears from the sources, Hibetullah Hanım Sultan is mentioned 15 years later as sole beneficiary of the *malikâne* of Velvendos. Therefore, we could assume that Ali Ağâ, along with his partner, Ahmed Ağâ, were the initial beneficiaries of the *malikâne* of Velvendos and sometime between 1729 and 1764, namely the interim between the first and second available documents, Hibetullah acquired under obscure circumstances the share previously held by Ahmed and established herself as joint beneficiary. This partnership was terminated no later than 1779, when Hibetullah is mentioned as sole contractor of the tax-farm of Velvendos.

Parallel to that, the document does not refer to the identity of the two leading figures in this case, namely Büyük Ali Ağâ and his son, Mustafa. These two Muslims are simply recorded as permanent residents of Serfice who were involved in the process of tax-collection in the aforementioned tax-farm. Their post is not stated in the document, but the document informs us that, by exploiting in an oppressive and greedy manner this unspecified post, they succeeded to embezzle in seven years a considerable sum through the imposition of illegal and unauthorised levies on the *re’aya* taxpayers of the *kaza* of Serfice and Çaharşenbe. The document states that they pocketed on an annual basis 25 purses, namely 12,500 *ğuruş*, which means that the overall embezzled sum amounted to

175 purses, namely 87,500 ğuruş, which they spent for their purposes and to hire for their own protection a band of 200 Albanian mercenaries. It seems plausible that Büyük Ali Ağa was a local notable and magnate who had been the voyvoda of the malikâne held jointly by Hibetullah Hanım Sultan and Ali. He could simply constitute another local official and notable, who exploited the weaknesses of the administration and the peripheral authorities, and their inability to reach and control the provinces. We should keep in mind that such a situation was aggravated in cases of malikâne tax-farms, whose beneficiaries were always absentee tax-farmers and, thus, incapable of on-site supervision of the administration of their property. This is vividly apparent in the fact that the people, before their call for assistance was answered, had submitted twice reports and petitions, through which they demanded protection against them. Moreover, although the authorities had issued two imperial orders decreeing their arrest and imprisonment, the latter defiantly ignored these orders and were allowed for two years to continue their activities unopposed. It is also interesting that their arrest did not last long, because they were released, only nine months thereafter, with the knowledge and direct intervention of Hibetullah Hanım Sultan, a fact which proves that Büyük Ali Ağa had indeed been the voyvoda of Hibetullah and Ali’s malikâne. Although the document does not mention anything regarding Büyük Ali Ağa and Mustafa’s fate, we could assume that after their release, the former was reappointed voyvoda, after he and his son had promised that they would mind their own business and avoid any oppressive behaviour.

Hibetullah Hanım Sultan reappears in a document dated 1193 AH / 1779-1780 AD, which deals with a series of events that occurred in Velvendos that year and affected the smooth operation of and tax-collection in this tax-farm. The first document is a report of
Hibetullah Hanım Sultan, the then-life-term sole contractor and beneficiary of the tax-farm of Velvendos, addressing the Sultan and the Porte for the affairs of her malikâne. It is not dated but from the two marginal notes, which accompany the report and are dated 5 Şevval 1193 AH / 16-10-1179 AD, we could estimate the date of its submission at the beginning of October 1779.329

Hibetullah Hanım Sultan reported that the majority of the taxpayers of the village of Velvendos were non-Muslims and the poll-tax, which had been allocated to them, consisted of a lump-sum that corresponded to a number of poll-tax tickets previously allocated to their ancestors. Yet, although they lived in a state of tranquility, there occurred a state of mutual opposition and dispute between them and the collector of their poll-tax. More precisely, the tax-farm of the poll-tax of Velvendos was annexed, without good reason, to the bureau of Kesriye (today: Kastoria) and was, accordingly, outsourced on an annual basis to a prospective contractor, through the application of the system of iltizam, through

bende-i Hibetîl-łah
auction and contraction to the highest bidder. The contractor who had farmed out the tax-farm for the year 1193 AH / 1779-1780 AD committed various sorts of oppression and vexation against the taxpayers, the most notable and abominable being the distribution of poll-tax tickets to young children not entitled to payment of poll-tax. Hibetullah Hanım Sultan interfered and petitioned the Sultan for retribution and support of the taxpayers. As she emphasised, her interests were put into grave danger and, if the situation did not change for the better, the taxpayers of Velvendos would scatter and abandon the village, and they would secede from cultivating their lands. By extension, this would bring about a serious diminution and deficiency to her means of subsistence and income. To avoid this, she urged, a rearrangement of the situation of the taxpayers was in due order.

Furthermore, as a malikâne-beneficiary, Hibetullah Hanım Sultan was entitled, on the basis of the principle of serbestiyyet, to absolute monopoly of authority within the limits of the hasses under her jurisdiction, which at the same time prevented all external parties from opposing and violating her commands. Thus, as she claimed, it was necessary for the taxpayers of the village of Velvendos to be allowed to pay their poll-tax at a reduced rate, after the extraction of a certain amount of poll-tax tickets from the original amount, whilst at the same time new poll-tax sacks containing the reduced amount of poll-tax tickets were to be despatched to Velvendos. Furthermore, the necessary and prearranged amount of the poll-tax annual returns were to be delivered to the imperial treasury, whilst the voyvoda appointed and sent to Velvendos by Hibetullah was to distribute and collect the poll-tax with his knowledge and means.

As becomes apparent, Hibetullah Hanım Sultan asked for the abolition of the annexation of the tax-farm of the poll-tax of Velvendos to the poll-tax bureau of Kesriye, the
cessation of its annual contraction and subleasing through auctions and according to the regulations pertaining to the iltizam system to the highest bidder, who was to operate as the collector of the poll-tax. He also demanded his replacement by a trustworthy agent of her own, who would be appointed and despatched to Velvendos by Hibetullah to collect the poll-tax with his own knowledge and means, and accordingly pay the prearranged amount into the imperial treasury. In other words, Hibetullah Hanım Sultan sought after the elimination of all kinds of interference from external parties in her own affairs and demanded the replacement, in the process of the collection of the poll-tax, of the centrally appointed poll-tax collector, who operated as a tax-farmer on a short-term basis (mültezim), with her voyvoda, who was totally dependent on and appointed by her, thus, annexing the tax-farm of the poll-tax of Velvendos to the voyvodalık of her malikâne. This resembles faithfully the administration and collection of the poll-tax of Kozani by the active voyvoda of the malikâne, whose appointment to his post was, as has already been mentioned, ratified with his parallel appointment at the beginning of each economic year to the post of the collector of the poll-tax of the malikâne of Kozani.  

Hibetullah Hanım Sultan’s petition is accompanied by two marginal notes which were written down by the officers who examined Hibetullah Hanım Sultan’s initial petition. The first marginal note was written by the bureau of poll-tax accounts and it refers to the status of the tax-farm of the kaza of Velvendos. It says that the poll-tax due from the village and the kaza of Velvendos formed part of the bureau of Kesriye and for the year 1194 AH / 1780-1781 AD the collection of the poll-tax of that office had been registered under a

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330 See: Section 2.5., pp. 62-83.
The second marginal note is the copy of an order which was related to the issue under examination and had been issued previously, on 21 Şaban 1188 AH / 27-10-1774 AD. The order states that since olden times the non-Muslim taxpayers of the tax-farm of Velvendos were entitled to pay for the amount of 154 poll-tax tickets. Due to the particular greed of those who were responsible for the collection of the poll-tax, they were subject to numerous violations of the terms cited in the appointment diplomas bestowed upon the poll-tax collectors, to demands of payment for additional poll-tax tickets, and infringement of their rights. Henceforth, it was deemed appropriate to bind the required value of the aforementioned poll-tax certificates to a separate poll-tax sack, with the term that this amount would be paid in advance to the imperial treasury. Furthermore, apart from that, Hibetullah asked officially with a petition of hers for the implementation of normal and smooth collection of all taxes within the geographical limits of the aforementioned tax-farm. To that end, the aforementioned tax-farm was registered as *malikâne*, with Hibetullah and a certain El-Hacc Mehmed being its two joint beneficiaries and its annual returns amounting to the overall sum of 3,011 ğuruş, whilst the *kaza* of Serfice was annexed to the poll-tax bureau of Kesriye. However, since no separate registers recording the poll-tax of the *kaza* of Serfice and Velvendos were given to the poll-tax collectors appointed by the Kesriye.

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331 BOA, C.ML.320-13151, f.1: *karye-i mezküre kangı kalemi cizyesi mulhakatindandir cizye muhasebesinde* derun-i ‘arzuhalda zikr olunan Velvendos kazası cizyesi Kesriye kalemi mulhakatından olub doksan dört senesine mahsuben kalem-i mezburun cibayeti Mehmed Ağa’nın ‘uhdesine kayd olunub berat ve evraki verildiği mukayyeddir ferman-i devletli sa’detli sultanım hazretlerinindir fi 5 Şevval sene 1193

332 I was unable to find any information about El-Hacc Mehmed’s identity, because all available bibliographical sources remain silent. However, it is plausible that El-Hacc Mehmed was Hibetullah Hanım Sultan’s very close associate and partner of hers in her tax-farming activities and transactions.
bureau, the exact number of the poll-tax tickets due from each of the two aforementioned tax-farms was unknown. Furthermore, as was stated in the imperial order, issued previously in 1171 AH / 1757-1758 AD, the overall annual returns and number of poll-tax tickets due for the totality of the bureau of Kesriye was registered without any further analysis or breakdown, a fact that rendered the figures of the two aforementioned tax-farms ineligible and unknown. Moreover, the payers of poll-tax in Velvendos refused to pay their poll-tax and receive in return their poll-tax tickets from the poll-tax collectors, despite the fact that the latter had been despatched from an office that was considered of equal rank. They argued that they were taxpayers either supervised by a voyvoda or residing within the limits of a malikâne, and for this reason they should pay their poll-tax and receive poll-tax receipts from a supervisor of a charitable foundation or a voyvoda. Furthermore, the zabits and voyvodas who were sent by the malikâne-beneficiaries as their representatives insisted, against the terms and conditions of the operation of the poll-tax collection system, upon selling secretly and at a low price poll-tax receipts from the poll-tax sacks that they took under their charge, to taxpayers of equal income and rank. Because of that, every year a large number of poll-tax receipts were distributed at a very low value and at the same time the whole poll-tax assessment and collection system was under a profound state of disorganisation and paralysis.

333 BOA, C.ML.320-13151, f. 1: bizler voyvoda ve yahud malikâne re’ayasiyuz vakif zabiti tarafindan ve voyvodadan tezkere
334 BOA, C.ML.320-13151, f. 1: husus-i mezkure da’ir mukaddema verilen ferman der-kennar oluna Serfice ve Levendos kazalarinin kazilerine ve cizyedarlarina hukum ki Hibetu’l-lah Hanim Sultan damet ’asmetuhanin Paşa soncağında Serfice kazasinda vaki’ malikâne ‘uhdesinde olan Levendos mukata’ası re’ayasinin ez kadim yüz elli dort cizye evraki olub ziyade talebiyle te’addi olunmak iktiza etmez iken cizyedar olanlar tam’a-ı haslarindan nası gerek ger evrak-ı mezkurdan ve gerek şurut-ı beratdan ziyade ta’lik ve mutalebe ve te’addiden hali olmamalariyla fima-ba’d mezkur ol-mikdar evrakin iktiza eden bahasi ber-vech-i peşin hazine-i ’amireye teslim olunmak şartıyla başkaca boğça rabt ve mukata’a-ı mezbure tarafindan cibayet etdirilmesini
The order also mentions the case of the village of Valteşinik (today: Valtesiniko/Βαλτεςινίκο⁴³⁵) in Mora (: the Peloponnese) which was property of Esma Sultan,⁴³⁶ who was daughter of Sultan Ahmed III and thus a relative of Hibeṭullah Hanım Sultan, as part of her malikâne. The poll-tax of the re’aya of the aforementioned village had been appended to the collection undertaken by the poll-tax collector of the kaza of Karitena (today: Karytaina/Καρφταινα). However, after a series of unfortunate accidents similar to the case of Velvendos examined here, the poll-tax collector of the kaza of Karitena was forbidden from interfering in the poll-tax collection procedure and the collection of the poll-tax was assigned to the timar-holding police magistrate (subaşı) of the village of Valteşinik, who was to carry out the collection of the poll-tax of Valteşinik with his own means and

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³³⁶ Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, I, p. 12; Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*, p. 172, Genealogical Table XLI.
knowledge, since most probably, apart from being a timar-holder, operated as Esma Sultan’s voyvoda in Valteşinik. All collected amounts were to be delivered thereafter to the initially appointed poll-tax collector of the kaza of Karitena.

Thus, the imperial order concluded that the poll-tax of the re’aya of the tax-farm of Velvendos had to be collected, according to the prevailing principle, with the means and knowledge of the life-term leaseholder or the voyvoda representing him/her, under the condition that, in case an additional number of non-Muslim taxpayers was to be found, the additional poll-tax tickets would be provided by the initial and original poll-tax collector of the kaza. Furthermore, all collected amounts were to be handed over to the kaza poll-tax collector, whose responsibility was to deliver and pay them into the imperial treasury in Istanbul.

As becomes apparent, Hibetullah Hanım Sultan had petitioned repeatedly the Porte authorities on the issue of solving the conflict between her authority and the authority of the centrally appointed poll-tax collectors. This conflict was, as it seems, chronic and occurred persistently due to the grey zones and the ambiguous operational rules of the system of poll-tax collection, on the one hand, and the malikâne system, on the other. Although serbestiyyet was the basic and fundamental prerogative of the life-term leaseholder when possessing the tax-farm which he had contracted for, because the yearly revenues accruing from the poll-tax were reserved for the imperial treasury, poll-tax

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337 The reader should keep in mind that serbestiyyet and its preservation or violation by external parties was one of the fundamental fields upon which Kozani’s 18th-century history was written and all factions had made use of to build upon their legitimacy and the lack of legitimacy of their opponents, during the protracted communal strife that characterise Kozani’s internal history. Fatma Hanım Sultan, as contractor and beneficiary of the malikâne of Kozani, made repeatedly use of her prerogative to protect the members of those factions that aligned with her interests. For that, see the previous two chapters.
collection was carried out by functionaries appointed by the administration. Thus, since the latter interfered in the administration and affairs of the malikâne tax-farms, the prerogative of serbestiyyet was clearly violated. In response to the violation of her rights and privileges, Hibetullah Hanım Sultan petitioned the Porte and protested in favour of her interests and the interests of the taxpayers residing within the limits of the tax-farm under her charge. The solution proposed and forwarded by the Porte was an obvious attempt to reach a middle ground solution, since the new mode of poll-tax collection in the tax-farm of Velvendos would allow for Hibetullah Hanım Sultan’s agent to collect every year the poll-tax due from the non-Muslim re’aya of Velvendos, without thus violating the prerogative of serbestiyyet. At the same, her agent would deliver the amounts collected to the poll-tax collector appointed by the poll-tax bureau of Kesriye. Yet, the bureau of Kesriye would retain a supervisory role, by being kept informed about any increases or decreases occurring in the number of the poll-tax tickets due for distribution every year. Furthermore, it was explicitly stipulated that any additional poll-tax tickets would be provided to Hibetullah or her voyvoda exclusively by the Kesriye bureau.

Thus, since Hibetullah was as a member of the reigning dynasty a prominent member of the privileged Istanbul-based élite of wealthy magnates, she used her power and influence to forward her interests and protect her long-term investment and expenses, both to her benefit and that of the state, by addressing the covert threat of a possible devastation of the settlement and its abandonment by its inhabitants, which by extension would bring about a serious loss of revenue both to the life-term leaseholder and the state. Because this unfortunate event would be detrimental to the state in both practical and ideological terms, since the state would forfeit necessary annual revenues, on the one hand,
whilst this event would inflict a serious blow to the ideology of the renowned and praised “Circle of Justice”\textsuperscript{338} which was the most prominent ideological tool of legitimisation of its domination over subject populations, the Porte made strenuous efforts to solve this problem. Thus, Hibetullah by showing explicit acumen in the manipulation of the mechanisms of the Ottoman system of administration and legitimisation achieved her objective of securing and protecting her long-term interests and investment.\textsuperscript{339}

After Hibetullah Hanım Sultan’s death in 1780, the sources remain silent as to the fate of the \textit{malikâne} of Velvendos. We do not know whether the tax-farm remained part of the \textit{malikâne} system, which means that it was outsourced anew to another member of the Ottoman dynasty or a member of the powerful oligarchy of the Istanbul-based magnates, or, just like the \textit{malikâne} of Kozani after Fatma Hanım Sultan’s death, formed part of the revenue sources that financed the reforms of Sultan Selim III and was introduced to the \textit{esham} system.

We only know that in 1792-1793 the system of the \textit{malikânê} was still in application on the allocation and collection of the sheep-tax of Velvendos. According to an excerpt from a synoptic register of the arrears of unpaid debts of various tax-farms for the year 1207 AH / 1792-1793 AD, which was issued by the bureau of the tax-farms of \textit{hasses}, half of the tax-farm of Velvendos and its dependencies was the \textit{malikâne} of a certain ‘Arif Ali Bey Efendi,\textsuperscript{340} who was a high-ranking official, namely one of the master-clerks of the government services

\textsuperscript{338} On the concept of the Ottoman Circle of Justice, see: Linda Darling, “Islamic Empires, the Ottoman Empire, and the Circle of Justice” in Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), \textit{Constitutional Politics in the Middle East: With Special Reference to Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan} (London: Hart Publishing, 2008), pp. 11-32.


and the then-deputy of the defter emini. His life-term contract begun on 1 Mart 1207 RC / 29 Receb 1207 AH / 12-3-1793 AD and the register states that the sum of 413½ ḡuruş, which was the arrear of the tax-farm for the year 1207 AH / 1792-1793 AD, was credited on 1 Zilhicce 1208 AH / 30-6-1794 AD with a letter of credit to ‘Arif Ali Bey Efendi as a reimbursement for his unspecified expenses. This is the last reference to the application of the malikâne regulations, not only in Velvendos, but also in the broader area. We should also keep in mind that the malikâne was applied on the sheep-tax of Velvendos and not the ordinary annual returns of the agricultural produce and the economic activities of the population.  

4.2. The period of Ali Pasha’s domination and the career of Serficeli Halil Ağa (c. 1790 - c. 1820)

The period c. 1790 – c. 1820 was marked by the total domination of Ali Pasha throughout the area under study. As was the case with Kozani, Serfice and Velvendos were brought gradually under his sway, where they remained until his downfall and execution in 1822. Due to the confusion covering the last two years of Ali Pasha’s life and career, which was brought about by the continuous campaigns, revolts, and total disorganisation of the administrative system that he had meticulously erected in his 30-year long career, the exact date marking the end of Ali Pasha’s presence in Serfice and Velvendos is unknown. For this

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341 BOA, D.HSK.d..25817, f. 5: defter-i zimem-i bekaya tabi’-i kalem-i hasslar vacib-i sene 1207 mukata’a-i hassha-yi Velvendos ve tevabi’ha vacib ‘an evvel Mart-i sene 1207 hisse-i nisf der ‘uhde-i ‘Arif Ali Bey Efendi ber vech-i malikâne
fi sene ḡuruş
413½
413½ havale şüdde fi ǧurre-i Zîl’-hicce-i sene 1208 ‘an eda-yi i’anet-i masarrifat-i ‘Arif Ali Bey
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reason, 1820 is merely an approximative date that needs to be treated and perceived as a symbolic temporal limit. In this part I will refer to the career of Ali Pasha’s most trusted agent in the area of Serfice and Velvendos, Serficeli Halil Ağa, after his appointment in 1791 as a’yan of Serfice. Halil Ağa’s case constitutes a typical example of the participation of a member of the local élite in local political processes and can be used ideally for an analysis and descriptions of the methods that Ali Pasha used throughout the territories under his control in his attempts at strengthening, consolidating, and expanding his rule over as large as possible a geographical space.

The reader should bear in mind that Serficeli Halil Ağa was a high-ranking kapikulu, who served in the Palace of Topkapı in Istanbul and had attempted and failed in 1791 to seize from Ismail Pasha, a high-ranking military and administrative official, the tax-farm of the customary tax on sheep in Serfice and its dependencies. Despite his failure Halil Ağa was appointed in the same year by Ali Pasha a’yan of Serfice. The only source for Halil’s appointment is a promissory letter dated 17-09-1791 which was sent by the notables of Serfice on behalf of the population of Serfice to Ali Pasha. The re’aya of Serfice along with the notables of Serfice representing them agreed upon and promised to accept Halil Ağa’s appointment as the active a’yan of the vilayet of Serfice. In case they broke this agreement, by supporting somebody else aspiring to the post of a’yan, and inflicted damage to Halil Ağa’s interests, and thus by extension to the interests of Ali Pasha himself, they promised to defray as compensation to Ali Pasha the amount of 5,000 ğuruş.\(^{342}\) As the letter explicitly

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\(^{342}\) I should remind the reader hereby that Ali Pasha’s archive is written almost exclusively in Greek and thus all terms referred to in the document of the archive are exact translation of their Ottoman Turkish counterparts. Thus, the term a’yan of the vilayet (in Greek: ἀγιάνης του δήμαρχου/ayanis tou vilaietiou) should be exact translation of the renowned Ottoman Turkish term a’yan-i vilayet, which denotes the chief and primary notable of a given locality. For additional information, see: Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, I, pp. 120-122.
states, Halil Ağa was appointed a‘yan of Serfice with Ali Pasha’s intervention and his appointment and smooth installation in his post was supervised and executed by a supervising agent (nazir) of Ali Pasha’s, who had been dispatched to Serfice especially to that end, and whose anonymous note appears on the back side of the letter and testifies that all duties entrusted upon him had been fulfilled.343

As becomes apparent, Halil Ağa, immediately after his unsuccessful attempt to obtain for himself the tax-farm of the customary tax on sheep in Serfice and its dependencies, aligned himself with Ali Pasha and with his support was appointed chief notable of Serfice. Thus, he became Ali Pasha’s protégé and representative in Serfice with the duty of protecting and promoting Ali Pasha’s interests in Serfice and its vicinity. Halil Ağa would retain this office almost undisputedly until Ali Pasha’s downfall, when all his agents would be ousted and expelled from their posts and offices. Thus, Serficeli Halil Ağa achieved his aims and emerged as a protagonist figure in the place of his origin, whilst Ali Pasha, by providing support to a high-ranking palace official and notable figure in Serfice, obtained a prominent ally and trustworthy supporter of his cause. We should not overlook the fact that the three kazas of Serfice, Çaharşenbe, and Eğri Bucak were located in a complicated area which included within its geographical and administrative limits a variety of settlements, populations, and administrative institutions. We should note here the derbends guarding the strategic mountainous arteries that led from Macedonia to Thessaly and vice versa, the Turkish settlements which were inhabited by the Evlad-ı Fatihan and located in the Eordaia Basin, North of Serfice and Kozani, and the Christian settlements, amongst which the most prominent was Kozani, which was still in the early 1790s Fatma Hanım Sultan’s malikâne and thus out of Ali Pasha’s reach. Thus, Ali Pasha with the appointment of Halil Ağa as a‘yan of

Serfice avoided disturbing the delicate balance prevailing over the complicated and cumbersome landscape of the countryside around Serfice. Furthermore, by creating a basis of operations, he made a decisive step towards imposing his domination and bringing the area under his rule.

Although the available sources are few in number, they provide adequate information on Halil Ağa’s activities and duties during his 30-year long tenure and testify to his catalytic role in the political and economic affairs of Serfice and its vicinity. I will use here two reports which he personally despatched to Ali Pasha to inform him on various issues pertaining to Serfice and its surroundings. According to the first report, which is dated 25 September 1801, Halil Ağa states that in that year he was acting in the broader area of the left bank of river Aliakmon as the a’yan of Serfice and Ali Pasha’s special agent in the two kazas of Serfice and Çaharşenbe (in the Greek text: Tziarsampas/Τζιαρσαμπάς). He also states that by operating in the area as Ali Pasha’s trusty agent he had arrested a number of notables from the Christian settlements in the area and dispatched them to Ioannina, where they would remain in custody as Ali Pasha’s prisoners. Unfortunately, Halil Ağa does not provide in his report any details pertaining to this delicate issue, hence it is impossible to verify the exact number and identity of the notables arrested by him. However, as Halil Ağa refers, he acted as a’yan of the vilayet of Serfice, which means that he was the chief notable not only of Serfice proper, but also of the whole of the homonymous kaza. Thus, it seems probable that, although the identity of the aforementioned notables is unknown, they came from within the limits of that kaza and had been arrested because their compatriots and
relatives opposed the prospect of pledging fully and officially their allegiance to and supporting Ali Pasha.\footnote{Panagiotopoulos, The Archive of Ali Pasha, I, pp. 195-96.}

A plausible explanation can be found in two almost contemporary reports that had been dispatched by the people of Velvendos and the local armatolos Siaperas in early July 1801. The two reports refer to the activity of a band of klephts, led by the Piziotades\footnote{Both Piziotades and Siapers, who was sent by Ali Pasha to investigate this case and if need arose to engage with the bandits led by the Piziotades, were typical examples of leaders of small armed bands that lived through an unstable and turbulent career which included both the opportunity to be called, as armatoloi, to the service of local Muslim and Christian notables and magnates as well as the potential threat to be deprived of their posts and salaries and thus resort to banditry, in which case they turned into klephts. The bands led by the Piziotades and Siapers had been initially part of the famous band of the Macedonian arch-klepht Nikos Tsaras. During the 1787-92 war between the Ottomans, and the Russians and Austrians, the band of Tsiaras operated in Macedonia as a band of Klefts and succeeded through its ceaseless and energetic activity to receive from the Ottoman authorities a set of armatolikia alongside various and numerous privileges, in return for their submission and cessation of their activities. The Piziotades and Siapers received two neighbouring armatoliks, namely the Piziotades received the armatolik of Serfice, whilst Siapers received the armatolik of the areas on the right bank of river Haliacmon, North of Serfice and South of Kozani. We could thus assume that there was a covert antagonism between the two, which escalated to open war when the Piziotades were deprived of their armatolik and returned to banditry. As a consequence, it was only natural for Ali Pasha to send the band of Siapers to investigate the case and, if need arose, to fight their former companions. On the clan of Tsiaras, see: Kasomoulis, Military Memoirs, pp. 91-92, 115-125, 135-136, 142-147. On the clans of the Piziotades and Siapers, see: Kasomoulis, ibid, pp. 124-125.} brothers, who plundered the settlements in the area of Serfice and Velvendos. The klephts, after they had made an agreement with the notables of Katafygi, had established their hideout in the village of Katafygi, a mountainous settlement located on Mount Pieria. The klephts were allowed to stay in the aforementioned village and in return for shelter and accommodation they were expected to provide to the village and its inhabitants armed resistance against any kind of external threat. Thus, it seems plausible that Ali Pasha, by making once more use of his office of derbendat nazırı, commanded an urgent mobilisation of the bands of armatoloi located in the surrounding areas in an attempt to subdue what he perceived as acts of sedition and defiance of his commands and domination. Of course, if
this pressing issue remained unattended, it could develop to a bad example for others to follow, thus causing severe complications in his domination throughout Ali Pasha’s realms.\textsuperscript{346}

Hence, we could assume that Halil Ağa presided over and supervised the operations against the Piziotades and the notables of Katafygi, whom he arrested and dispatched, along with their families and relatives, to Ioannina for the intimidation and submission of the Katafygiote community to Ali Pasha’s sway and will. Thus, Halil Ağa was used by Ali Pasha as a means to interfere in the affairs of the community of Velvendos, which was not yet at that point Ali Pasha’s property. Ali Pasha took profit of his post of derbendat nazırı, which placed him at the centre of the cycle of rural violence and insecurity. He mobilised the armed band of the armatolos Siaperas, who was placed and active on the mountainous passages of Olympos and Pieria mountain ranges, and used this affair to interfere in local affairs and impose his rule, on the pretext that he provided security against and protection from the depredations of the klephts and brigands harrying the countryside near Velvendos.\textsuperscript{347} Thus, we should consider this case and the subsequent interference of Ali Pasha into the affairs of Velvendos as the decisive step towards reaffirming and consolidating his rule not only over Velvendos, but also in the broader area. Moreover, Ali Pasha set a clear example of his implacable treatment of aspirants to separation and disregard for his authority.\textsuperscript{348}

\textsuperscript{347} For examples on Ali Pasha’s interference in cases similar to the case examined hereby, as well as for a short analysis of the structure of the fiscal machinery he had established on the lands under his rule, see: Dimitris Dimitropoulos, Aspects of the Working of the Fiscal Machinery in the Areas ruled by Ali Paşa, pp. 61-72.
\textsuperscript{348} The most typical example of this relentless behaviour of Ali Pasha against bandits, klephts, and mountainous settlements that ignored his power and prerogative is the war against the Souliots. For a contemporary detailed and analytical eyewitness of the war, see: Christoforos Peraivos, Istoria tou Souliou kai tis Pargas [History of Souli and Parga] (Athens, 1857).
In the second report, which is dated 4 May 1808, Halil Ağa states that he operated in the broader area around Serfice and Velvendos as Ali Pasha’s appointed inspector and informer, with the specific task of gathering and dispatching to Ioannina information and news about the activities of certain families and clans of klephts active in the areas of Platamon, Alasonya, and Domeniko.349 As the available bibliography on Ali Pasha’s venture informs us, the period 1807-1809 is marked by Ali Pasha’s onslaught on the klephts of Western Macedonia, Thessaly, and Epirus, in an attempt to subdue the clans that refused to abide by his commands.350 As becomes clear, Halil Ağa had become by that time a substantial agent within the administration of the derbends and, more precisely, he was responsible for inspection and surveillance operations within the limits of the armatolık of Serfice that encompassed the passages traversing the Olympos and Chasia mountain ranges and led from Macedonia to Thessaly and vice versa.351 Thus, Halil Ağa’s status was gradually upgraded and over the years Ali Pasha conferred upon him multifarious tasks that were closely related to the smooth function of the administration of and security in the area

349 On the klephts and armatoloi of Western and Southwestern Macedonia during the 18th century, and especially the clans of Lazaioi, Biziotaioi, and Tsareai (or Tsaras brothers), which Halil Ağa refers to as being the primary subject of surveillance, see: John Vasdravellis, Klephths, Armatoles, and Pirates in Macedonia, pp. 55-75. Vasdravellis is recognised as one of the first Modern Greek historians who used Ottoman primary sources in their research and narrative. Vasdravellis was the first Greek historian who translated into Greek the Ottoman kadi sicilleri of Thessaloniki and based his monographs on the data which they provided him with. The collection of Vasdravellis’ studies and monographs bear the name Historical Archives of Macedonia and were all published by the Association of Macedonian Studies in Thessaloniki.

350 For a vivid and direct account of the events of the 1807-1809 Ali Pasha’s onslaught on the klephts of Macedonia and Western Greece, see: Kasomoulis, Military Memoirs, I, pp. 115-125, 135-147.

351 For more information on the armatoliks of Olympos and Chasia, see: Kasomoulis, Military Memoirs, I, pp. 85, 115-125, 138-173. Unfortunately, there is lack of complete and modern approaches to the institutions of klephths and armatoloi, and all monographs referring to them are inspired and guided by the traditional 19th-century romantic Greek historiographical trends. However, Nikolaos Kasomoulis is a valuable source of invaluable first-hand information on the overall activities of the various and numerous clans of klephths and armatoloi throughout Macedonia, Thessaly, Epirus, and Sterea Ellada, especially in the latter part of the 18th and early part of the 19th centuries. For the general onslaught by Ali Pasha against the klephths in 1807-1809, see: Vasdravellis, Klephths, Armatoles, Pirates, pp. 65-69.
under his control. Along with the post of the chief notable of Serfice and its vicinity, which he firmly retained under his possession since 1791 Halil Ağa occupied various other posts and assumed an additional number of duties, whose fulfillment consolidated Ali Pasha’s domination throughout the area of Serfice and Velvendos, whilst enabled Halil Ağa’s protracted and undisputed preeminence over his rivals and competitors.352

Halil Ağa’s career and fortunes, however, followed those of his protector and master. In 1815, due to the rise of strong and highly influential voices which opposed not only Ali Pasha, but all separatist magnates, and staunchly supported the idea of reforms and modernisation of the Ottoman political, economic, and administrative apparatus, Ali Pasha’s venture entered a phase of crises that marked the beginning of the end of his long and successful career. Suddenly Ali Pasha found himself playing a passive role and defending his cause against his enemies. Halil Ağa, who had been until that time the undisputed protagonist of all socio-economic and political affairs in Serfice and the broader area, became the object of severe criticism due to his close relationship and identification with Ali Pasha and his interests.

Two reports of Hüseyin Bey, who was Ali Pasha’s representative agent (kapu çuhadard) in Istanbul, dated 14 and 18 November 1815 respectively, reveal the unfavorable atmosphere against both Ali Pasha and Halil Ağa, regarding their relationship with the Porte and central state authorities. The first report informed Ali Pasha on the decision taken by the Porte regarding Halil Ağa’s stripping of his offices and titles, and subsequently his exile to the island of Lesvos. As Hüseyin Bey reported, the vali of Rumelia had proposed this penalty to be imposed on Halil Ağa, after the people of Serfice had repeatedly denounced

him and submitted reports against his seditious and lawless activities and overall behaviour. The Porte endorsed the vali’s proposal, sanctioned its full application and issued a warning against any potential opposition against their decision. As Hüseyin Bey emphasised in his report, the decision stipulated that, in case Ali Pasha or Halil Ağa demurred at the decision made by the Porte and the imperial council and the punishment imposed on Halil Ağa, the tax-farm of Serfice, which Ali Pasha had farmed out in previous time and had sublet to Halil Ağa, would be irrevocably confiscated by the Porte and imperial treasury authorities, whilst further sanctions would be adjunctively imposed on both Ali Pasha and Halil Ağa. Hüseyin Bey claimed that the situation was far worse than anticipated, because Halet Efendi exerted vast influence on the members of the imperial council against Ali Pasha and his supporters, and, thus, there were required delicate manoeuvres on this complicated issue, if this adverse climate was to be reversed.

In the second report, Hüseyin Bey explicitly presented Halet Efendi as the mastermind behind and instigator of the decisions made in the last meeting of the imperial council against Ali Pasha and Halil Ağa. Halet Efendi insisted upon Halil Ağa’s exile to the island of Lesvos and his immediate departure from Serfice, so that both Ali Pasha and Halil Ağa demonstrated tangible and practical respect for the imperial orders and the Sultan’s prerogative. Accordingly, as Hüseyin Bey reported, Halet Efendi, due to his closeness to the

353 Mehmed Said Halet Efendi was during the early part of Mahmud II’s reign the most influential and prominent figure and leader of the conservative elements in Ottoman politics. Since 10 September 1815 he was the steward of the Sultanic court and nişancı of the imperial council. Thus, he was Sultan Mahmud II’s closest political and military adviser, who assisted Mahmud on all issues pertaining to military campaigns and ideological propaganda against the provincial notables and secessionist magnates in Rumelia, Anatolia, and the Arab Provinces. Halet Efendi would organise and orchestrate inter alia Ali Pasha’s eradication. However, he opposed staunchly all efforts at modernisation and especially reform of the Janissary corps. Hence, he had built and led a coalition of conservative political, religious, and military figures. On Halet Efendi, see: Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II, p. 8; Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, II, pp. 564-565.

Sultan and his prominent role within the Sultanic Court, would immediately initialise the process of annulling the imperial order which stipulated Halil Ağa’s exile to the island of Lesvos. Thus, as Hüseyin Bey exhorted Ali Pasha, it was of vital importance for him and his trusty agent to demonstrate practical and tangible respect for the officials in power and obedience to their commands and orders. To that end, Halil Ağa had to go promptly to Lesvos and then petition both local and central authorities for his immediate release, whilst Hüseyin Bey promised that he would forward Halil’s petitions to the officials responsible for handling this delicate issue.\textsuperscript{355}

There is no additional information or details about this important issue. We are totally unaware of both Ali Pasha and Halil Ağa’s reaction to the Porte’s order and for this reason it is impossible to say whether Halil Ağa actually went into exile to the island of Lesvos. Be that as it may, I think the most important fact in this issue is that for the first time the Porte officials expressed openly their opposition and enmity towards Ali Pasha, even though not directly against him, but against one of his close supporters and trusty agents. We should keep in mind that Halil Ağa operated in an area whose control, due to its strategic location, was of vital and utmost importance for both Ali Pasha and the imperial authorities, especially in case open hostilities between the imperial centre and the separatist provincial magnate broke out. Thus, this case should be considered one amongst many preemptive strikes, which the Porte authorities dealt in their attempts to gradually and progressively weaken Ali Pasha and his followers, before the final onslaught on them was launched.\textsuperscript{356}

\textsuperscript{355} Panagiotopoulos, The Archive of Ali Pasha, II, p. 628.
\textsuperscript{356} Ali Pasha’s archive contains a variety and large number of reports submitted to him by his kapu çuhadars residing in Istanbul. All reports testify unanimously to the fact that, despite Ali Pasha’s
As far as Halil Ağa is concerned, he retained Ali Pasha’s trust and, until his downfall, operated in the region of Serfice and Velvendos as his trusty agent. According to a report of the people of Velvendos, dated 26 December 1817, Ali Pasha had delegated to Halil Ağa the authority to assess and, accordingly, collect all taxes and levies due from the community of Velvendos, but the people accused him of oppressive behaviour, corruption, and embezzlement, and as a result he was immediately dismissed from his duties. After that, he made in 1818 an unsuccessful attempt to purchase with the support of Ali Pasha the malikâne of Kaisaria, a small village that was located on the right bank of the river Haliacmon. In 1819 Veli Pasha, son of Ali Pasha, subleased to Halil Ağa the right of collecting the fees and taxes due from the community of the village of Küçük Vança, which was a çiftlik of his, whilst Ali Pasha bestowed upon him the prerogative to act as the exclusive representative of the village for all communal affairs pertaining to the assessment and collection of taxes. Thus, it is apparent that although Halil Ağa remained loyal to Ali Pasha, as a profound consequence of the persecution he had suffered after 1815, he had been deprived of the post of the a’yan of Serfice and his prestige had diminished severely. Now he tried to expand and build upon the privileges that he had accumulated during the previous years of his long career.

efforts to convince the Porte and the Sultan’s courtiers of his good intentions and loyalty, their esteem for Ali Pasha was gradually and progressively diminishing, especially after 1815, when as is known the imperial centre on the instigation of Halet Efendi decided upon eliminating Ali Pasha and all separatist magnates within the Ottoman realm. For more information on this issue, see: Panagiotopoulos, The Archive of Ali Pasha, volumes II and III, where all reports can be found and read in their prototype form, alongside useful comments added and provided by the editors of the published version of Ali Pasha’s archival documents. For additional information on the political landscape and the preparation of the onslaught on notables and separatist magnates in Rumelia, Anatolia, and the Arab Provinces, see: Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II, pp. 6-19.

These arrangements must be placed within the context of a forlorn attempt of Ali Pasha to retain his control and domination over the area, which marked the easternmost boundaries of his polity. A receipt which was issued by Es-Seyyid Mehmed, the then-superintendent of the affairs of the governor of the sancak of Tirhala (today: Trikala), provides a useful insight into this argument. The receipt contains information on the subleasing to Velîyyüddin Pasha, the then-governor of the sancak of Tirhala, of three tax-farms, which had been originally farmed out jointly by Esma Sultan, a certain Mehmed Himmet Ağa, and a certain Ahmed Ağa. Although the receipt is undated, since the contract of the sublease of the tax-farms to Velîyyüddin Pasha was dated 1 Mart 1234 RC / 16 Cimaziyyûlevvel 1234 AH / 13-3-1819 AD, we could argue that this date is also a *terminus post quem* for the date of the issuance of this receipt.361

As the receipt mentions, Velîyyüddin Pasha subleased on the basis of the *iltizam* system the tax-farm of the hasses of Alasonya and its dependencies, and the tax-farm of the sheep-tax of Serfice for a whole economic year, namely for the period between 1 Mart 1234 RC / 13-3-1819 AD and 28 Şubat 1234 RC / 12-3-1820. Moreover, Velîyyüddin Pasha subleased, again on the basis of the *iltizam* system, the tax-farm of the poll-tax of Alasonya and the village of Köleler (today: Anthotopos), which was attached to the other two tax-

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360 Esma Sultan was daughter of Sultan Abdülhamid I (1774-1789) and sister of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839). For additional details regarding her life, see: Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, I, p. 12.


362 Köleler must not be confused with its almost namesake Kileler, which became famous in the latter part of the 19th century for the great peasant uprisings against the Thessalian çiftlik-owners and, for this reason, retains until today its original Turkish name, in stark deviation from the rule of complete Hellenisation of the toponyms and names of settlements with profoundly Turkish and Slavic names, applied in 1927 throughout Greece. Drakakis and Koundouros, *Documentation*, II, p. 559.
farms, for the whole lunar year 1234, namely the period between 1 Muharrem 1234 AH / 31-10-1818 AD and 29 Zilhicce 1234 AH / 19-10-1819. As was usual in such cases, the formal possession of the subleased tax-farms and the right of the collection of the taxes was left to the subleasing party. Furthermore, Esma Sultan received an imperial order, which cited these terms and certified the sublease of the three aforementioned tax-farms to Veliyyüddin Pasha.\(^{363}\)

As Es-Seyyid Mehmed mentions, this receipt was written and given to Mehmed Sa’id Bey Efendi, the then-steward of Esma Sultan as a formal recognition of Veliyyüddin Pasha’s obligations \textit{vis-à-vis} the three aforementioned primary contractors. Veliyyüddin Pasha recognised that it was his obligation to pay his debt, amounting to the overall sum of 172,880 \(ğuruş\), to the three aforementioned individuals. This sum consisted of a) the interest that was to be generated in that year from the shares of each one of the three primary contractors, b) the equivalent of the leasing fee of the tax-farm of the sheep-tax of Serfice, c) the ordinary annual payment for the maintenance of the sacred places of Mecca and Medina, and d) the annual returns of the poll-tax of the tax-farm of Alasonya and

\(^{363}\) BOA, C.ML.462-18755: 
Köleler, along with the fees of the bureau participating in the leasing of the aforementioned tax-farm and all remaining expenses, with the exception of the share of the imperial mint. Moreover, the sublessee recognised his obligation to pay at the proper time the aforementioned sum, completely and perfectly, to the personal treasuries of Esma Sultan and the other beneficiaries.

Immediately after an examination of the accounts of the participating parties, the necessary official promissory notes were to be delivered and given to Esma Sultan. It is also worth mentioning that the receipt is accompanied by a sealed marginal note dated 17 Muharrem 1234 AH / 16-11-1818 AD, which mentions that the undersigned, whose identity is, due to damage that renders his seal illegible, unknown, had declared his intention to stand as guarantor for Veliyyüddin Pasha, regarding the complete and timely payment of the aforementioned sum.\(^{364}\)

As far as the tax-farm of the sheep-tax of Serfice is concerned, the overall equivalent of its leasing fee amounted to 11,000 ּguruş, which were to be paid to two beneficiaries, namely a certain Osman Ağa and a certain Mehmed Salim Ağa. Their relationship with Esma Sultan, Mehmed Himmet Ağa, and Ahmed Ağa is not explained in the document, but it seems plausible that they were sublessees, who had outsourced their right of collecting the sheep-tax to Veliyyüddin Pasha. We also do not know where they came from, but, we could assume, that if they were natives of Serfice, then they were also acquaintances of Serficeli Halil Ağa’s and worked in full concert with him. Yet, this is merely a logical assumption, which is not based on extant documentation. Be that as it may, according to the note

\(^{364}\) BOA, C.ML.462-18755: derun-ı temessükde muharrer meblağ-ı mezkurun vakt-ı taksitleri duhullarında tamamen edasına ben dahı kefil bi’il-mal olduğum ecilden işbu mehalle şerh verilüb temhir olundu fi 17 Muharrem sene 1234
mentioning each one’s share, Osman Ağa was beneficiary of the sum of 8,000 ğuruş and Mehmed Salim Ağa of the remaining 3,000 ğuruş.365

This rearrangement did not last long, however. As Lioufis states, when the properties of Ali Pasha and his sons were confiscated in the course of the sultanic campaigns against them, Halil Ağa abandoned his overlord and asked with the mediation of Veniamin, the then-bishop of Kozani and Servia, to be pardoned officially and appointed to the post of the derbend ağası of the armatoliks of Servia, Chasia, Elassona, Kailaria, and Grevena. Lioufis also presents a letter dated July 1820, which Halil Ağa despatched to Veniamin to announce his appointment by Hüseyin Pasha, the governor-general of Rumelia, to the aforementioned post and declare his faith in the Sultan and his government.366 Since there are no available Ottoman documents referring to these momentous events, it is impossible to determine their exact date and the details of Halil Ağa’s abandonment of Ali Pasha’s cause. It seems plausible, however, that when Halil Ağa realised that his overlord was doomed, he communicated the Ottoman government and declared his intention to betray his master, but only if he were allowed to retain a certain part of his fortune and the office of the derbend ağası of the areas which he had administered personally and dominated over for almost three decades. Therefore, since Ali Pasha’s resistance collapsed by late 1820, we can assume that Halil Ağa, betrayed Ali Pasha’s cause and joined the Ottoman government forces a few months earlier, most probably, as his letter points out, in June or July 1820. It goes without saying that the fast collapse of Ali Pasha’s forces in Thessaly and Macedonia

365 BOA, C.ML.462-18755: beray-i bedel-i iltizam-i mukata’a-i ʿadet-i ağnam-i Service sene 1234 der Mart ğuruş 8,000 hisse-i Osman Ağa
3,000 hisse-i Mehmed Salim Ağa
366 Lioufis, History of Kozani, p.84.
contributed to the capitulation of his supporters. We should not forget that at that time Ali
Pasha’s forces abandoned their posts and, whilst the vast majority of them surrendered
without fighting, a small minority, who were Ali Pasha’s élite and most loyal warriors,
retreated hastily to Ioannina to assist in its defense against the sultanic forces under Hurşid
Pasha’s leadership.

Halil Ağa did not succeed to retain his post for long. From a report dated 3 Şa‘ban
1239 AH / 3-4-1824 AD, which the governor-general of Rumelia and commander-in-chief of
the Ottoman Rumelian army, Derviş Mustafa Pasha,367 addressed to the Sultan to report on
Halil Ağa’s activities after the downfall of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, we learn that Halil Ağa had
fled some time ago to Thessaloniki where he attempted to communicate with the central
and local authorities in an attempt to apologise for his overall behaviour and thus secure a
post within the provincial administrative apparatus.

The report explicitly states that Halil Ağa had committed during his long career and
during the period of Ali Pasha’s domination over Serfice all kinds of fraud and execrable acts
against the poor and weak people under his supervision and administration. The report does
mention the agreement between Halil Ağa and the government in 1820, for it states that,
after Ali Pasha’s execution, Halil had fled to Thessaloniki and somehow managed to regain
for himself the post of the derbend ağası in the area of Serfice and its dependencies.
However, due to his strained past record and because he had always been one of Ali Pasha’s
closest and most loyal agents, he was finally deemed by the authorities untrustworthy and
incapable of fulfilling his duties. Furthermore, the sultan delegated to the authorities the
immediate procurement of the tranquility and ease of the poor people, and the elimination

and chastisement of all those servants of Ali Pahsa who, like Halil Ağa, were deemed detrimental to public and social order. Therefore, the implementation of all necessary measures for the punishment of Halil Ağa, as well as the appointment in his place of a suitable official as *derbend ağası*, was delegated by the Sultan’s authority for immediate execution. However, whilst the authorities pondered the method of the execution of Halil Ağa’s chastisement and substitution, it became apparent that if Halil was punished at that very time, it would provoke serious concerns and fears for their lives to a large number of people, who like Halil Ağa had been members of Tepedelenli’s party and his supporters, but were still free and active. For this reason, and in order to avoid detrimental complications and any convulsive reactions from the aforementioned former supporters of Ali Pasha, the authorities decided that it would be preferable to set aside and postpone provisionally the execution of Halil’s punishment, until a more appropriate occasion occurred.\footnote{BOA, HAT.0872-38754: devletlü ‘inayetli übbehetlü ‘atifetli merhametlü veliyyü’n-ni’am kesirü’l-lutf ve’il-kerem efendim sultanım hazretleri Serfici Halil nam kimesnenin mukaddema Tepedelenli zamanında bulunduğuna mehallerin fukara ve zu’afasına etmedik fesad ve mel’aneti kalmamış ve merkum Tepedelenli i’damından sonra Selanik’e gelüb Serfice ve havalisi derbend ağalı’nnı bir takrib tahsil eylemiş ise de merkum lazimü’t-te’dib olduğu sahihan taraf-i bediiyyü’ş-şeref-i asafanalerine haber verilmiş olmaga cemi’ zamanda bu misili muzir ‘ıbad olunaloglu ref’ ve te’dibleriyle istihsal-i asayiş-i fukara lazimesini icra mukteza-yi mülkdariden olduğuına bina’en yerine ahar münasibi derbend ağası ta’yyin kilinarak merkum Halil’in icra-yı lazyme-i te’dibi mukaddema ‘uhde-i çakeriye ihale buyurulmuş ve ol-babda sahife-pira-yı sudur olan emr-name-i ‘aliyyeleri mantuku üzere derbendat-i mezkure ahar münasibine ihale olnarakan merkum derbend ağalı’nnın çıkarılması ve tıbk-i irade-i ‘aliyyeleri üzere icra-yı te’dibi sureti her cend te’ekkür olunmuş ise de Tepedelenli takımından bunun gibi ba’zileri dahi olmak hasebiyle şimdi merkumun icra-yı te’ dibine ibtidar olunsa sa’ırlarının vesveseye zahib olmalarını muceb olarakça’ta merkum Halil’in icra-yı te’ dibinden şimdilik sarf-i nazara vakt-i merhununa ta’ilk olunmuş olduğu’nun ‘azır ve ifadesi vesile ibraz-i levazim-i sadakat ve ‘ubdieuyetim olmuşdur inşal’lah te’ali lede es’adü’l-vusul bu babda ve her halde emr ve ferman-i devletlü ‘inayetli übbehetli ‘atifetli merhametli veliyyü’n-ni’am kesirü’l-lutf ve’il-kerem efendim sultanım hazretlerinindir fi 3 Ş’a’ban sene 1239 bende-i Derviş Mustafa vali-i Rum-îli ve ser’-asker}

It seems plausible that Halil Ağa, in his attempt to find protection and shelter from his rivals in Serfice and Istanbul, went to Thessaloniki, because he could count on the
support and assistance of the then-governor of Selanik, Kör İbrahim Pasha, who was a Topkapı palace graduate who had occupied some of the highest ranks within the palace service. As Süreyya informs us, İbrahim Pasha, before he obtained administrative posts in the provincial administrative hierarchy, had served at the initial stages of his career in the Topkapı palace bostancıyan corps, then became bostancıbaşi and immediately afterwards was promoted directly to the post of mirahur-ı evvel. We should bear in mind that, before he became involved in the provincial affairs and administration of Service, Halil Ağa had been at the initial stages of his career a prominent and high-ranking palace official. Thus, we could argue that the bonds of fellowship, which all officers serving at the imperial palace acquired during their service and bore with them during the later stages of their career, and sometimes until the very end of their life, must have played a decisive role in this case.

Thus, according to a marginal note written on the aforementioned report, İbrahim Pasha supported wholeheartedly Halil Ağa, by placing him in his own retinue and appointing him kassab başı in Thessaloniki. The details of the later years of Halil Ağa’s life and his

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369 Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, III, p. 786.
370 The bostancıyan served as guards at the imperial palaces, especially guarding the gardens of the imperial palaces, where they were entrusted with guarding the pavilions of the Sultan and his household. They were headed by their oldest and most senior member, the bostancıbaşi. On the bostancıyan and the bostancıbaşi, see: Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, I, pp. 239-240; Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, pp. 84, 350-351.
371 The mirahur-ı evvel was the officer at the head of the Palace officers who were entrusted with the administration and accommodation of expenses, due for the palace animals and the horses bred and raised in the imperial stables. For more information, see: Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, II, p. 542; Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, p. 355.
372 On the issue of the life, training, and relationship amongst male officers and staff of the Ottoman imperial palaces, see: İlber Ortaylı, Private and Royal Life in the Ottoman Life (New York: Blue Dome Press, 2013). For their female counterparts see the pioneering monograph of Leslie Peirce’s, that covers the issues of the organisation and structure of the female microcosm within the complicated universe of the imperial palace. For more information, see: Leslie P. Peirce, The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
373 Kassab başı was the title of the official responsible for the collection of the sheep-tax (reşm-i ağnam-ı celebekşan) in a certain locality. By extension this title was also given to the director of the office of the sheep-tax. Redhouse, Turkish and English Lexicon, p. 1455.
relationship with İbrahim Pasha are a mystery, with the exception of the exact date and location of his death, which, as Süreyya points out, occurred in Istanbul, on 30 June 1833.\textsuperscript{375}

\section*{4.3. Conclusion}

The eighteenth century was a period of experimentation on various sectors of the Ottoman economy and politics. The introduction of the \textit{malikâne} tax-farming and the empowerment of provincial notables and magnates at the expense of the state can be seen as the two factors that define and demarcate 18th-century Ottoman history. In this chapter, we examined the case of two settlements which, although they were located in the Ottoman periphery, were deeply influenced by the trends that prevailed throughout the Ottoman realm. Based on an adequate number of primary sources, I have examined the methods of application of the tax-farming procedures in Serfice and Velvendos, and the role of wealthy and influential members of local élites in this fiscal and administrative system, where decentralisation of power exerted by the imperial centre and active participation of the imperial periphery were two vital prerequisites for its proper function.

As the case of Zeynülabidin Ağa proves, local notables could play a catalytic role in the process of the formation of a system of balances within the delicate and complex system of tax-farming. Zeynülabidin constitutes a typical example of the emergence of local loci of power within the Ottoman periphery, which exerted strong influence on the decisions made by the imperial centre and negotiated constantly their position within the Ottoman reality. The case of Halil Ağa, on the other hand, depicts the zenith of power and

\textsuperscript{374} BOA, HAT.0872-38754: \textit{Selanik mutasarrıfi dahi ma’yyetine merkum Halil Ağa’nın kassab başı nasbini iltimas eylediğine}.

\textsuperscript{375} Süreyya, \textit{Sicill-i Osmani}, II, p. 570.
influence, which this group of notable individuals had succeeded in acquiring during the course of the 18th century. As we have seen, Halil Ağa succeeded in enhancing his status and secured, thus, his protagonist role within the affairs of the community of Serfice and its surroundings. In contrast to previous periods, in late 18th and early 19th century this new sort of influential individuals had developed strong ties and a close relationship of dependence with powerful peripheral magnates, such as the relationship between Halil Ağa and Ali Pasha, and through them secured undisputed domination over their rivals and protection vis-à-vis the imperial centre. This situation lasted until the early 1820s and was terminated after the imperial centre entered the path of eliminating the provincial magnates and implementing a large set of reforms aiming at concentrating power and decision making prerogatives at the hands of central imperial élites.
CHAPTER V

The timar system in the kaza of Serfice during the 18th and 19th centuries
(c. 1700 – c.1820)

My aim in this chapter is to present and analyse some basic aspects of the structure of the timar system and the class of timar-holders in the kaza of Serfice during the 18th and early 19th centuries. Although there are analytical monographs on 16th and 17th-century Ottoman military organisation, its 18th-century counterpart has been totally neglected or understudied. The reader should keep in mind that this chapter is the product of original research of primary sources, with my conclusions being of a preliminary nature, because there are no available monographs on the structure and operation of the timar system during the 18th century. Consequently, I have chosen to proceed with a careful analysis of the information and data provided by the available primary sources. I will use as drivers of my analysis the only three available analytical monographs.\textsuperscript{376} Two of these monographs focus on the classical and post-classical timar system and examine on the basis of primary sources its structure and functioning, through the examination of its radical transformation in the later decades of the 16th and early decades of the 17th century. The third monograph provides the typology of the Ottoman timar system.

The chapter is divided in four sections. In the first section I will present the fundamental terminology pertaining to the timar system. I will comment on the meaning of

\textsuperscript{376} These three monographs are the following: Nicoara Beldiceanu, \emph{Le timar dans l’ État ottoman: Debut XIVe-debut XVIe siècle} (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassovitz, 1980); Douglas Howard, \emph{The Ottoman Timar System and its Transformation, 1563-1656}, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Indiana University, 1987; Muhsin Soyudoğan, \emph{Reassessing the Timar System: The Case Study of Vidin (1455-1693)}, Unpublished PhD dissertation, Bilkent University, Department of History, June 2012.
the term *timar* and the basic categories of *timars*, in terms of their functioning and utilisation. After that, in the second section, I will proceed with the presentation of the *timar* system in the *kaza* of Serfice during the 18th century. I will present the various categories of *timars* and the classes of *timar*-holders, whilst, in the third section of this chapter, I will attempt to present and analyze the process of petitioning for and bestowal of *timars*, on the basis of unpublished Ottoman documentation. Finally, the fourth section will cover the period of Ali Pasha’s domination and focus on the fate of the *timar* system during a period of great upheavals and turmoil. My primary aim is to show that the *timar* system, in contrast to the general opinion that prevails amongst Ottomanist historiography, which stipulates that it had ceased to operate and was totally neglected by Istanbul, was still in the 18th century in full operation and closely supervised by the Porte.

### 5.1. The *timar* system: Preliminary remarks on its structure and operation

The term “timar” is of Persian origins and literally means “care” or “attention”. In Ottoman documents, we often come across it with the Turkish equivalent term “dirlik” which means “livelihood”. This term was used by the Ottoman bureaucrats to denote all non-hereditary prebends that were allotted in lieu of salary and in return for mandatory military or civil service to the class of *timar*-holders to sustain an army of light cavalry and the military-administrative hierarchy in the core provinces of the Ottoman Empire.  

Furthermore, the *timar* system with its closely supervised structure and organisational patterns was during the Classical Age the catalyst for the preservation and perpetuation in

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the core provinces of the Ottoman Empire of the *miri* status of land. The latter stipulated that all lands in the Ottoman Empire were state-owned and under the supervision and exploitation of the state, aiming at the protection of the status of the peasants.\(^{378}\) The *timar* system has been repeatedly compared by Marxist historians with Western European feudalism and has been characterised as a type of Oriental feudalism.\(^{379}\) However, this description fails to take into account the basic difference between Western feudalism and Ottoman prebendalism. Although in both cases land was allotted to beneficiaries remunerated for their military services offered to their overlord, in the Ottoman Empire the land, with the exception of privately-owned land (*mülk*) and mortmain properties owned by inalienable charitable religious endowments (*vakif*), was fully owned, closely supervised, and exploited by the state. The *timar*-holder enjoyed solely the *usufruct*, in order to provide all necessary equipment to him and his retainers, and go to war whenever called upon by the sultan. Furthermore, all *timar* allotments were revocable, since, in case their beneficiaries failed to fulfill their obligations, they could be deprived of their prebend, and in some cases they could even be deprived of their ‘*askeri*’ status and be demoted to the status of ordinary taxpayers (*re’aya*). Thus, the *timar*-holder was by no means identical to the Western European feudal lord. Whereas the latter was the full owner of the land included in his fief and had inherently the right to bequeath his land to his male offspring, the former could bequeath to his offspring solely his ‘*askeri*’ status pertaining to the class of *timar*-holders.\(^{380}\) I will now present the structure of the *timar* system at the stage of its full

\(^{378}\) Halil İnalcık, “State, Land, and Peasant”, in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, I, pp. 103-178.


maturity, namely in the period of the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Lawgiver (1520-1566).  

The *timar* system was divided on the basis of the revenue allotted to each and every prebend-holder into three hierarchically organised categories, namely *timars*, *zi’amets*, and *hasses*. The *timars* were prebends with annual returns of up to 19,999 *akçes*, which were bestowed on the class of the *sipahi* cavalrymen. Since the vast majority of prebends fell within the category of *timars*, the overall system of prebendal allotments was named after them. The *zi’amets* were prebends with annual returns of between 20,000 and 99,999 *akçes*, which were reserved for high-ranking and experienced *sipahis* who, alongside their military duties, played an administrative and supervisory role. As a typical example of such an officer we could cite the *alaybeyi*, who was typically elected among the *zi’amet*-holders and was responsible for all matters concerning the affairs of the *sipahis* of a *sancak*. The *alaybeyi* was the deputy officer of the *sancakbeyi* and operated in the retinue of his superior *beylerbeyi* with the responsibility for marshaling the *timar*-holders residing within his circumscription.  

We could also cite the *çeribaşı*, who was responsible for rounding up


382 The term *alaybeyi* or *miralay* means the deputy officer of the *sancakbeyi*. Each *alaybeyi* was holder of a *zi’amet* and operated in the retinue of his superior governor-general with the responsibility for marshaling the *timar*-holders residing within the limits of the area he was held responsible for. Due to the decentralisation of the Ottoman administration during the 17th and 18th centuries, the *alaybeyi* became gradually the official responsible for the bestowal of vacant *timars* within the limits of the area under his supervision, whilst he notified the central authorities.
at the beginning of and leading during the campaigning season the timar-holders living in his kaza. Thus, the zi’amet-holders were all commanding military officers who bore as distinction the title of bey. The hasses were prebends with annual returns of more than 100,000 akçes. These prebends were of two types, namely the havass-i hūmayun, reserved for the upkeep of the sultanic household and the public treasury, and the havass-i vüzera ve ümera, which were bestowed on members of the government (viziers), and governors of provinces (beylerbeys) and districts (sancakbeyis). These prebends encompassed the most lucrative and most reliable sources of revenues and were, thus, distinguished from all other categories of prebends.

The timars can also be divided on the basis of the service owed by the beneficiary timar-holder into two categories, the military or “generic” timars and the civil or non-military timars. The military timars, as their name implies, were bestowed on individuals in return for military service, according to which we could divide them in three sub-categories. There were timars bestowed to sipahıs in return for military service on horseback, timars thereupon through reports that he dispatched to Istanbul. Furthermore, due to the large size of the sancak of Pasha in Rumelia, this sancak was divided in three branches, with every one being administered by an alaybeyi. For more information, see: Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, I, p. 45; Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, p. 51.

383 Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, I, pp. 353-54; Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, p. 51.

384 For more information on the various categories of prebends on the basis of the allotted revenue, see: Inalçık, Timär, pp. 502-3; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 193-4. Inalçık refers that this categorisation should be made on the basis of their function, because the three aforementioned categories of prebends were bestowed on the timar-holders to sustain their functions as members of the askeri class of the ruling élite. However, the basic criterion for classifying a prebend as a timar, zi’amet, or hass was not the function of their holders, but the income allotted to each and every one respectively.

385 The majority of Ottomanist historians use the term “military timars” for the prebends allotted to the class of timar-holders in return for military service. Muhsin Soyudoğan, however, refers to this category by characterizing them as “generic timars”, because they were the most representative type of prebendal allotments. See, Soyudoğan, Reassessing the Timar System, pp. 42-43.
bestowed on wardens and guards of fortresses (dizdars and mustahfizes),
cannoneers, bombardiers, and miners, and timars bestowed on sipahis charged with naval military
service (kürekçiler). On the other hand, civil timars were bestowed in return for non-combatant service to civil officers, such as night watchmen in towns ('asesses, pasbans, bekçis), high-ranking officers in the imperial stables (mirahurs) and imperial falconers (bazdars),
collectors and assessors of excise taxes and inspectors of weights and measures (mühtesibs), judges (kadıs), leaders of public prayers in Friday mosques (imams),
public preachers in Friday mosques (hatibs), and functionaries charged with calling Muslims
to prayer (müezzins). We should note that timars were bestowed not only on Muslim
religious functionaries, but also on high-ranking members of the Orthodox clergy, such as
metropolitans and bishops.388

Another feasible classification of the Ottoman prebends could be one on the basis of
the hierarchical organisation and control mechanism within the overall timar system. We
can, thus, distinguish between free (serbest) and ordinary “generic” or dependent (ğayri
serbest) timars. Although the organisational regulations of the timar system provided timar-
holders, for the preservation and subsequent maximisation of their revenues, with a relative
autonomy in the administration and management of their prebends, the same regulations
had established a system of surveillance by, and dependency of lower-ranking timar-holders
on, higher-ranking cadres. Thus, whilst on the one hand there were timars, which were
totally exempt from all kinds of external intervention, there were also timars, whose holders
were compelled to share certain excise fees and taxes with the holders of free timars, who

386 For additional information on the timars bestowed on fortress wardens and guards, see:
Soyudoğan, Reassessing the Timar System, pp. 46-47.
387 For additional information on the timars bestowed on Imperial falconers, see: Soyudoğan,
were naturally seen as superior to the holders of dependent *timars*. Consequently, whilst all *hasses*, *zi’amets*, and those *timars* allotted to Porte officials and experienced *sipahis* who had not yet received a promotion to a *zi’amet*, fell within the category of free *timars*, all remaining *timars* were seen as ordinary dependent *timars*. ³⁸⁹

Based on the criterion of annual returns, we could also distinguish between fiscal and physical *timars*. According to this categorisation, the fiscal *timars* must be considered as a sort of revenue of a distinct and predetermined value, rather than a land unit. Thus, each *timar*-holder was merely beneficiary of the wealth accruing from the land included within the geographical limits of his *timar* and could by no means claim rights of ownership over the lands whence he appropriated his revenue. Each *timar*-holder was entrusted with a fiscal *timar* on the basis of a contract that on the one hand stipulated his obligations vis-à-vis the state, but also protected the *timar*-holder from the arbitrariness of state agents and high-ranking *timar* officials.³⁹⁰ Furthermore, each fiscal *timar* had a predefined official value (*kılıç, icmallü timar*) which was inalienable and indivisible. A *timar*’s official value served a variety of purposes, since the state was able to control *timar* transactions and available resources, whilst, at the same time, by prohibiting bestowal of more than one *kılıç* on a given *timar*-holder and its division among his offspring, obstructed the creation of a landed aristocracy of wealth and military power.³⁹¹

³⁸⁹ The Ottoman regulations, known as *kanunnames*, presented in a detailed manner the criteria which decided whether a prebend would be *serbest* or *ğayri serbest*. The categorisation presented above was based primarily on the works of Soyudoğan and Beldiceanu. For additional information, see: Soyudoğan, *Reassessing the Timar System*, pp. 50-52; Beldiceanu, *The timar in the Ottoman State*, pp. 36-38.

³⁹⁰ Soyudoğan, *Reassessing the Timar System*, pp. 24-29, 41-42.

Physical *timars* were the embodiment of fiscal *timars* in terms of production and relations of production on the basis of the population living within the limits of the *timar* and, above all, the economic activities that they performed for their subsistence.\(^{392}\) As becomes apparent, fiscal *timars* denoted exclusively the relationship between a *timar*-holder and the state, whilst physical *timars* denoted solely the relationship between the *timar*-holder and the producers living and being economically active on the land within a *timar*.\(^{393}\) This distinction between fiscal and physical *timars* served a purpose of primary importance for the state, since *timar*-holders were seen as entitled solely to a salary in return for their services, which did not allow them to develop long-term bonds of interest with the lands under their possession or the population. Thus the *timar*-holders could not express any kind of claims of ownership over the lands allotted to them by the state. As a result, as has already been discussed, *timar*-holders could not directly bequeath to their male offspring the physical *timar* that they held, but solely their ‘*askeri sipahi*’ status and a small portion of their fiscal *timars*, namely the revenue they held at the time of their death or retirement, which was then considered as the basis upon which their offspring received their initial *timars* (*sipahizadeler ibtida timarları*).\(^{394}\) Thus, the *timar*-holders were totally prevented from turning themselves into a hereditary class of landed aristocrats, unlike Western European Medieval feudal lords.\(^{395}\)

*Timars* can also be classified on the basis of the nature of the income allotted to their beneficiaries. According to the classical Ottoman fiscal system, taxes were divided in three categories, namely those imposed in accordance with the religious laws (*rüsum-i*

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\(^{393}\) Soyudoğan, *Reassessing the Timar System*, p. 50.

\(^{394}\) Soyudoğan, *Reassessing the Timar System*, pp. 54-55.

\(^{395}\) For additional information on the heredity regulations prevalent throughout the *timar* system, see: Beldiceanu, *The timar in the Ottoman State*, pp. 65-70.
şer’iyye), those imposed in accordance with customary laws (rüsum-i ‘örfiyye), and extraordinary levies (‘avariz-i divaniyye). To begin with, we should note that the latter did not form part of the timar system and were reserved in their totality exclusively for the imperial treasury. Thus, a timar-holder could enjoy an income that accrued from the two former categories of taxes, namely either from both categories at the same time or one of them. We can, accordingly, distinguish between three categories of timars, namely integral timars, timars of the malikâne-divani type, and diverse timars, whose beneficiaries enjoyed solely şer’iyye levies. In the first category the beneficiary was entitled to receive both categories of religious and customary taxes, with the exception of the poll-tax, which was paid entirely to the imperial treasury. There were, however, some exceptional cases in which the Porte granted to beneficiaries the right to collect the poll-tax for themselves and for the upkeep of their retinues.

In the second category the beneficiary was allowed to collect solely the customary levies, whilst all religious taxes were collected by and sent to the imperial treasury. This was a peculiar type of timar which was located only in Eastern Anatolia, namely in the areas previously under the domination of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum. In the third and most exceptional type of prebends the beneficiary was entitled to collect solely religious taxes, of which the most important was the tithe levied on the agricultural production.

396 Beldiceanu, The timar in the Ottoman State, pp. 58-62.
397 These timars are characterised by Soyudoğan as pseudo-timars, because on the one hand the state could all but occasionally and partially interfere in the processes of tax-collection and on the other their beneficiaries were real owners of the land, without any commitment to and obligation for military or other service to the state. For more information on pseudo-timars, see: Soyudoğan, Reassessing the Timar System, pp. 48-50.
398 Beldiceanu, The timar in the Ottoman State, pp. 33-34. On the category of the malikâne-divani prebends, see: İnalçık, State, Land, and Peasant, p. 128.
Last but not least, Ottoman prebends can be classified on the basis of the economic origins of the income allotted to their beneficiaries. We can, thus, distinguish between rural, urban, and mixed timars. In the first category, the revenue allotted to the timar-holder accrued from the agricultural taxes, among which the tithes were the principal source of incomes, paid by peasants who lived and were economically active in the Ottoman countryside. The revenues accruing from rural areas can in their turn be divided in five distinct sub-categories. There were revenues accruing from towns (nefses), which, although sometimes presenting a number of functions pertaining to the urban milieu, due to their status as administrative centres of rural kazas must be considered as part of the Ottoman countryside. There were also revenues accruing from villages (karyes, kasabas), deserted villages and their fields which were periodically under cultivation and exploitation (mezra’as), rural monasteries (manastirs), and tribes and nomadic groups (aşirets, cema’ats).  

In the second category, the revenue allotted to the timars accrued solely from economic activities occurring in the urban centres. Urban timars can be divided in two sub-categories. There were timars bestowed upon officials living in and charged with the supervision of life and economic activities within the cities. Such officials were the chief night watchman (‘asesbaşı), the mühtesib, religious officers, and fortress guards, whose basic characteristic was that, since their revenue accrued from economic activities within the urban centres, such as levies on weighing of agricultural products and rents on public premises, their holders did not possess a territorial basis, like the holders of rural prebends.

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399 Soyudoğan, Reassessing the Timar System, pp. 37-38.
400 The bibliography on Ottoman cities and large urban centres is limited, if non-existent. For a comprehensive introduction, see: Nikolai Todorov, The Balkan City: 1400-1900 (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1983).
In the second sub-category we should include all of the prebends reserved for the upkeep of the sultan and imperial treasury which formed an integral part of the havass-ı hümâyun.

The prebends included in the third category were a combination of the two above-mentioned categories, since they comprised revenues accruing from both the countryside and urban centres. These timars were in most cases reserved for high-ranking timar officers and provincial administrative officers, such as subaşıs, sancakbeyis and beylerbeyis.401

This was the situation by the end of Süleyman the Lawgiver’s reign, one which had reached a high degree of complexity and differentiation in its structure. However, the sweeping crises that occurred in the last quarter of the 16th century dealt a series of decisive blows to the organisation and supervision of timar bestowals. The timar-holders, especially the low-ranking sipahi cavalrymen, fell victim to the Military Revolution of the 1580s and 1590s, which, since it enhanced the importance of infantry in warfare, brought about a diminution in the role of cavalry forces. Another factor for the falling of the timar system into disarray was the recurring debasement of the silver akçe during the 1580s, which resulted in a staggering diminution in the real value of the revenue allotted to timar-holders. Due to the fact that their revenues were counted and registered in inflexible terms, lacking completely the flexibility and adaptability characterising the salaries paid by the imperial treasury in ready cash, the revenues allotted to sipahis did rise, but so slowly that it was impossible to match the inflationary pressures exerted by the flow of silver from the New World and the recurrent debasement of the silver akçe.402 Furthermore, as time passed, the Ottoman bureaucracy, due to the loosening of the control exerted by the imperial centre over the periphery, caused by factional strife in Istanbul and recurring

401 Beldiceanu, The timar in the Ottoman State, pp. 34-36.
402 McGowan, Economic Life, pp. 56-57; Pamuk, Monetary History, pp. 112-148.
rebellions in the provinces, ceased to carry out periodical surveys of the total yield produced by the peasants, which as a result brought about a total lack of reliability of the data available to Ottoman bureaucrats. Consequently, by the early 17th century surveillance of timar transactions and tracking of the timar-holders had evolved into an irrational and abstract procedure, which the Ottoman state continued to follow and apply for another two centuries on the basis of the data provided by late-16th and early-17th-century registers.  

This process led to the emergence of three additional types of timars, which by mid-17th century came to dominate the landscape of prebendal grants and bestowals. The first category comprised the sepet timars (literally, “timars in the basket”). These were prebends that had remained vacant after the death of their beneficiaries and had not been bestowed anew upon worthy sipahis. Instead, they were seized by provincial administrative officials, and provincial magnates and notables, to be bestowed by them on sipahis who had entered their private service as members of their retinues and were labeled as their personal servants (hizmetgârs) and slaves (kuls), whilst enrolled in special registers (defterlûs).  

The second category comprised the promotional timars, which were all those prebends whose official base had fragmented and disappeared and had been converted to supplements that were bestowed upon timar-holders in accordance with the practice of physical expansion of timars. This was seen as a means of reinstating the real value of the revenue of a timar through the augmentation of the nominal value that had been severely

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404 Soyudoğan, Reassessing the Timar System, pp. 222-225; Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, III, p. 175.
affected by the debasement of the *akçe* during the 1580s. The third category comprised the abolished *timars*, namely *timars* that had ceased to be operative and were no longer granted to *sipahis*, because their revenues had been detached from the *timar* system and had been transferred to the tax-farming system.

We should keep in mind that the emergence of the three new types of *timars* occurred in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. As a result of the lack of monographs dealing with the history of the *timar* system in late 17th and 18th centuries, it is impossible to delineate the historical development of the system in this period, whilst it is not known whether there emerged other types of *timars*, or the way the pre-existing types of *timars* survived and continued to be bestowed on worthy beneficiaries. It is now time to proceed with the analysis of the operation of the *timar* system in the area under examination during the 18th century.

5.2. The *timar* system in the kaza of Serfice during the 18th century (c. 1700–c.1800)

The *timar* system in the kaza of Serfice seems at first glance to have remained unaltered throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, the period of empirewide changes in the military and administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, if one examines more carefully the structure of its operation and the group of 18th-century *timar*-holders, one will realize that both went through a series of significant alterations that transformed the very

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405 Soyudoğan, *Reassessing the Timar System*, pp. 221, 237-239. This term was initially introduced by Soyudoğan and is a scholarly term used in the secondary bibliography when referring to the 17th-century *timar* system.

406 Soyudoğan, *Reassessing the Timar System*, p. 221. Again this term is a typological invention of Ottomanist historiography, which is used by Ottomans referring to the 17th-century transformation of the classical *timar* system and its substitution with *iltizam* and *malikâne* tax-farming institutions.
essence of their existence and operation. In this section my aim is to present initially the structure of the prebends in the area under examination, to form an image, as accurate as possible, of the overall system. In the second part of this section I will refer to the class of timar-holders on the basis of a prosopographical approach, which will allow us to form a general idea of the procedures that led to the transformation and devolution of the timar system to a decentralised mechanism.

5.2.1. The structure of prebends in the kaza of Serfice during the 18th century

Although the timar system followed in general terms an empirewide trajectory of degeneration that led to its total disorganisation and disintegration, to such an extent that in some areas its abolition by the government was deemed imperative, bestowal of prebendal grants in the kaza of Serfice continued unabated throughout the 18th century. Unfortunately, with the exception of a small number of isolated and disparate references to the existence of timar-holders in 17th-century registers of extraordinary levies (avarız defterleri) and poll-tax registers (cizye defterleri), there is no available information on the operation of the timar system during the 17th century. As the most comprehensive, and, thus, most important source on the late 17th-century timar system in the kazas of Serfice, I could cite the very first poll-tax register, which was compiled immediately after the implementation in 1691 of the empirewide reform in the system of the assessment and

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407 As an example we could cite the case of Vidin, where the timar system was abolished in 1693, after the area had been recaptured from the Habsburgs in 1690 during the 16-year-long war against the Habsburgs, Venetians, and Russians. The area of Vidin had been ravaged to such an extent by continuous military operations that the Ottoman government decided to abolish the timar system in that area, annex all prebends to the imperial hasses, and apply the system of tax-farming. For more information on this issue, see: Soyudoğan, Reassessing the Timar System, pp. 239-242.
collection of the poll-tax paid by non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{408} This register is not a proper register of timars and timar-holders, since it bears no resemblance, both in terms of its function and the information recorded therein, to 15th and 16th-century tapu tahrir defters. Yet, it provides us with invaluable information about the fiscal and administrative status of the recorded settlements, with certain limitations, however, of which the most important is the lack of any reference to Muslim settlements, due to its being a device for recording the amount of poll-tax assessed upon and paid by each and every non-Muslim individual taxpayer. Furthermore, the author of the registers fails to provide us with information on the reason for recording the status of each settlement within the mechanism of timar system. We could assume, however, since this was the first centrally organised attempt in almost a century at a general record of the tax and fiscal status of the non-Muslim population on the basis of the income and wealth generated by each individual taxpayer, that it was also a suitable opportunity for the Ottoman government to delineate the obscure and blurred circumstances under which the timar system was still operating in these remote and peripheral areas of the Ottoman realm. Thus, each settlement was accompanied by a brief note which declared whether it was a hass, zi’amet, or timar without mentioning, however, either the name or the identity of the prebend-holder in whose possession it was. The notable exception to this trend were the Grand Vizier and the Tatar Khan of Crimea (who were both holders and beneficiaries of a hass). The register records the settlements that formed part of the prebendal units bestowed upon them, though without any reference to their official base and the supplementary amounts added.

\textsuperscript{408} This register is classified in the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul as BOA, MAD.d..04374. From an analytical introductory note on its cover, we can date it 1102 AH / 1690-1 AD.
Consequently, although one can form a basic idea about the status of each and every settlement within the timar system, it is impossible to construct a clear picture of the structure of the timar units and of their holders. But we can proceed with the assumption that, since there is no reference in any available source to the abolition of the timar system in these areas, and since timar-holders continue to appear in these documents, however coincidentally they may do so, the timar system continued its operation throughout the 17th century and into the 18th century.

As I have already mentioned, the scarcity of available registers delineating the 18th-century timar system is a serious impediment to the study of this important institution. In any case, chronologically the first available document, which delves in detail into the structure of prebendal grants and their beneficiaries, is a petition of a certain İbrahim, who was a timar-holder in the kaza of Serfice, addressing the Porte on various issues pertaining to the holding and exploitation of his timar. The petition is not dated, but, since it is accompanied by two brief notes, written by the Porte officials during the process of its examination, of which the first one is dated 9 Muharrem 1200 AH / 12-11-1785 AD and the second 22 Muharrem 1200 AH / 25-11-1785 AD, we could assume that it was submitted sometime in early November 1785.

I will present the content of this petition in the following sections of this chapter. In this section, I will present and comment upon the report that was written down by the

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409 In the kaza of Serfice there were recorded 19 settlements, of which four were recorded as parts of hasses, three were recorded as zi’amets, and 12 were recorded as timars. For additional information and for a more analytical presentation of the classification of the settlements in the kaza of Serfice, see: BOA, MAD.d..04374, pp. 182-197, and Appendix 3.1.

410 BOA, AE.SABH.I.61-4292.
defter emini\textsuperscript{411} in the form of an extensive marginal note,\textsuperscript{412} which can be considered as a peculiar synoptic register of timars, because it records all timars that were located at that time in the kaza of Serfice. The note can be divided into two parts, with the first one comprising the initial shares of İbrahim and his joint beneficiaries (müşterikler), and the second referring to the new shares, as they were initialised after the new apportionment had taken place. The initial and revised apportionments and share-outs in the income of the timar-holders in the kaza of Serfice are presented in Appendix 2, Tables 1a and 1b.\textsuperscript{413}

According to the initial apportionment\textsuperscript{414} there were in the kaza of Serfice 35 fiscal timars, whose prescribed official base values (icmals) were allotted and distributed to 49 timar-holders. In other words, the revenue accruing from each settlement was initially divided into shares, which composed the aforementioned fiscal timars. The latter operated as a peculiar kind of accounting units, which in their turn were divided into shares among the various timar-holders. Thus, as becomes clear, there was in operation a complicated system of two distinct layers of timar organisation and revenue apportionment. Since the nominal value of each and every prebend recorded in this marginal note had been preserved unaltered since 1613, which is the date of the last tapu tahrir register, this apportionment was based on the data provided by the long-obsolete late-16th and early-

\textsuperscript{411} The defter emini was the head of the defterhane-i ‘amire, also known as defter-i hakani, namely the bureau responsible for conducting surveys, tracking timar transactions, and recording all timars within the Ottoman realm. For more information on the defter emini and the defterhane-i ‘amire, see: Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, I, pp. 418-9; Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, pp. 127-129.

\textsuperscript{412} Due to the extent of this marginal note, I have placed it, for the convenience of the reader, at the end of this Thesis in a separate Appendix. For the full text of this marginal note, see: Appendix 3.2.

\textsuperscript{413} BOA, AE.SABH.I..61-4292.

\textsuperscript{414} The exact date of this apportionment is unknown. Despite that, since the earliest record of a timar bestowal is dated 1130 AH / 1717-1718 AD, after which there is a gap of 45 years, with next recorded bestowal dated 1176 AH / 1762-63 AD, and the latest one is dated 1198 AH / 1783-84 AD, we can assume that this apportionment was implemented gradually, whilst it replaced an older one, which existed on the basis of even older bestowals of prebendal grants.
17th-century land registers or a posterior register of land revenues and timars.\footnote{The still undiscovered register that was compiled during the empirewide attempt to reform the timar system in 1632-33 or an even later register could have been the documents which the imperial registry authorities based their decisions upon. There still is required additional research to prove or disprove the validity of this assumption.} In the new apportionment of late 1785, however, the previous method of partitioning the revenues accruing from each settlement into shadowy icmals was abandoned and each one of the 19 villages of the kaza of Serfice was converted into a single and distinct account unit, bringing thus the number of fiscal timar units to 19. Accordingly, each new timar unit was divided into shares which were bestowed upon every respective timar-holder. Tables 1a and 1b, in Appendix 3.2., display the shares granted to each timar-holder before and after the new share-out had been initialised, which provide a comprehensive and condensed image of the operation and structure of the timar system in the kaza of Serfice during the last quarter of the 18th century.

According to the initial share-out, which remained in force until its abolition in 1785, there were in total 48 prebendal units, namely 42 timars and 6 zi’amets. After the implementation of the new apportionment, the total number of prebendal units dropped to 45, because three timars were abolished. Furthermore, there were recorded 10 prebends, namely 7 timars and 3 zi’amets, whose baş köy\footnote{Baş karye or baş köy was the leading settlement in terms of income. For this reason, it was numerically the very first village or settlement on a timar record, which defined the address and location of that particular prebend. See, Soyudoğan, Reassessing the Timar System, p. 39.} was located outside the kaza of Serfice. One timar was recorded in the kaza\footnote{The author of the marginal note uses, instead of the term kaza, its synonymous term nahiye to denote the administrative unit which these prebends were located in. This term had been used since the foundation and initial stages of the operation of the timar system for the lowest-ranking administrative unit in the timar system hierarchy, but was replaced by the term kaza at the end of the 15th century, at a time when the role of the kadi was upgraded and was entrusted with the surveillance of timar transactions and records.} of Kesriye (today: Kastoria), one in the kaza of Cum’a Pazari (today: Charavgi), one in the kaza of Bersebe (known also as Perşenbe, it was a
shadowy kaza which was located 30 km west of Kozani), one in the kaza of Hurpişte (today: Argos Orestikon), one in the kaza of Filorine (today: Florina), and two timars in the kaza of Köriçe (today: Korçë, in Albania). There were also one zi’amet in the kaza of Berkofça (today: Berkóvitsa, in Bulgaria), one zi’amet in the kaza of Varna (in Bulgaria), and one zi’amet in the kaza of Filorine. Last but not least, there was one müsterek timar,\(^{418}\) which was jointly bestowed on two timar-holders, who were brothers and each one enjoyed half of the income allotted to that prebend. The table shows also that the settlements, which were located in the countryside in the vicinity of the town of Serfice, formed the bulk of the sources, whence there accrued the greatest part of the revenues allotted to prebendal grants. As has been already discussed in Chapter IV, the town of Serfice was part of a hass that was farmed out on the basis of the iltizam and malikâne systems and was, for this reason, no longer considered part of the timar system. This can be seen clearly in the fact that, in this comprehensive and analytical marginal note, apart from the revenue which accrued from the collection of fees paid in the marketplace of Serfice and fees imposed on summons that were paid in local courts (ihtisab ve ihzariye-i nefs-i Serfice), no other revenues accruing from the town of Serfice were included in any of the two recorded timar apportionments.

Furthermore, the example of the town of Serfice proves to a certain extent that the vast majority of the less developed and secondary settlements in the Ottoman countryside remained part of the timar system. Tax-farming was applied there solely upon the assessment and collection of extraordinary levies and the poll-tax paid by non-Muslims, with the revenue accruing on a regular basis from the economic activities of the local population being still allotted to prebendal units. On the other hand, the more developed and wealthier

\(^{418}\) On müsterek timars, see: Soyudoğan, Reassessing the Timar System, p. 42.
towns and large villages, as was the case with the hasses of Kozani, Serfice, and Velvendos, were integrated with large hasses, which were granted to the highest-ranking Ottoman dignitaries and statesmen, who, in their turn, resorted to outsourcing on the basis of the iltizam system. During the 18th century, after the introduction of the malikâne system in 1695, these hasses were transformed into life-term tax-farms, which passed into the hands of the Istanbul-based oligarchy of the malikâne-owners, who gradually turned their possessions into quasi-private property. So, whilst the hasses ceased to be an active part of the timar system and were not included in timar bestowals, the zi’amets and low-ranking timars remained an integral part of the timar system, which by the late 18th century comprised the Ottoman countryside in the vicinity of developed settlements, which in demographical, socio-economic, and political terms exerted strong influence and determined the identity of the areas surrounding them.

5.2.2. The class of timar-holders in the kaza of Serfice: a preliminary approach

The timar-holders were individuals who belonged to the ‘askeri class and were beneficiaries of prebendal grants. In this part, I will attempt a preliminary approach to and analysis of the characteristics of the group of timar-holders in the kaza of Serfice in the late 18th century. I will begin with the evaluation and analysis of the data contained in the aforementioned marginal note, which provides a snapshot image of the identity and characteristics of the class of holders of timar benefices in the last quarter of the 18th century, and I will then present individual cases of timar-holders, on the basis of the group of which each individual was member.
As already discussed, in the kaza of Serfice there were, in 1785, 48 individual prebend-holders, who, in terms of religious affiliations, were without exception Muslims. Furthermore, in all 30 cases where timar-holders are recorded with their patronym, they are without exception sons of Muslim fathers. According to Linda Darling, this group comprised the sons of timar-holding sipahis who inherited from their fathers their prebends and ‘askeri status. On the other hand, those individuals who were recorded without either the name of their fathers or any other trait or official title, which could assist us in tracing their origins and socio-economic status, comprised the group of “sons of nobodies”\(^419\), namely individuals who had not any previous relationship with the palace hierarchy or the timar system, but had been rewarded with the bestowal of a timar for their services and overall performance in the imperial campaigns, where they participated as volunteers (gânüllü serdengeçtiler).

As it becomes apparent, the process of conversion to Islam of the class of timar-holders, which had commenced already in the early 16th century, was by the late 18th century completed.\(^420\) It is also interesting to note that, among those 30 timar-holders whose record comprised a patronym, there were recorded only 4 individuals with the same military specialisation as that of their father’s. It is impossible to say with precision whether the remaining timar-holders had followed an alternative path in their careers, or such

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On the composition of the class of timar-holders and for a synoptic view of the overall structure and organisation of the timar system in the region of Service in the same period, see: Kambouridis and Salakides, *The Province of Servia*, pp. 235-279.
omissions were merely a result of deficiency in the records. We could argue with all due reservation that such a differentiation between these two generations of timar-holders must be attributed either to the fact that the younger generation of recorded timar-holders were more skilled than their fathers or to a tendency of the defterhane-i ‘amire officials to record the identity of each individual prebend-holder in as many details as possible and far more accurately than in olden times. This reflects to a certain extent the spirit of early- and mid-18th-century reforms in the administration of the Ottoman military forces, both central and provincial ones.\footnote{For a general introduction to the issue of the attempts of the Ottomans to reform and modernise their military forces, see: Stanford J. Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807} (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 3-11; Shaw, \textit{History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey}, I, pp. 225-259; Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, \textit{A Military History of the Ottomans, From Osman to Atatürk} (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2009), pp. 109-128; Murat Çınar Büyükaçka, \textit{Ottoman Army in the Eighteenth Century: War and Military Reform in the Eastern European Context}, (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2007), pp. 88-109; Virginia H. Aksan, \textit{Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged} (London: Pearson Longman, 2007), pp. 186-206, where Aksan discusses Selim III’s attempts at reforming the Ottoman military forces and compares them to previous 18th-century attempts at reforms.}

In terms of specialisation within the Ottoman military and administrative apparatus, there were 17 prebend-holders whose records included the post and offices that they held alongside the prebendal grants which they were entitled to. Among them, we can identify the warden of the fortress of Serfice (dizdar-ı kal’a-ı Serfice), a müteferrika of the Porte, and former Palace official in the service of the sultanic privy chamber (fi da’ire-i hane-i hassa-ı salif müteferrika-i dergâh-ı ‘ali), a müteferrika of the Porte in the service of the sultanic treasury (hazine-i hûmayun müteferrika-i gâh-ı dergâh-ı ‘ali), a çavuş in the payroll of the eyalet of Rumelia (‘an çavuşan-ı defter-i eyalet-i Rum-İli), two individuals recorded in the payroll of the retinues of two pashas (Vidin muhafızı vezir Ebu Bekir Paşa’nın
deftərlülerinden / Sayda valisi vezir Cezzar El-Hacc Ahmed Paşa’nın defterlülerinden\(^{422}\), a son of a müteferrika in the service of the sultanic privy chamber (veled-i müteferrika İsmail hane-i hassa), a son of a retired Janissary (veled-i müteka’id), five bombardiers (humbaracı\(^{423}\)), and four sappers who were sons of sappers (lağimci veled-i lağimci\(^{424}\)).

\(^{422}\) The term defterlü denotes in this case either the regular members of the Janissary corps, who were recorded in the lists of membership preserved by the corps, or individuals who had been attached to the retinues of Ottoman high-ranking officials, such as viziers and provincial governors, and received salaries and benefits from them as their protégés in return for the services that they provided to their overlords. Pakalin, *Dictionary of Expressions and Terms*, I, p. 426.

\(^{423}\) The bombardiers were soldiers entrusted with the construction and use of grenades and bombshells fired from mortars. They did not comprise a separate corps, but were allocated to the corps of the gunners and the corps of the armourers, on the basis of their functions. Those who operated the mortars belonged to the gunners, whilst those trained in and entrusted with the construction of the humbaras worked with the armourers. For their services, they were remunerated both with the payment of a regular salary from the imperial treasury and with the assignment of timar grants, which were bestowed upon those who served in provincial fortresses. However, the 17th-century crises diminished their role in Ottoman military forces to such an extent that by early 18th century they had become an extinct organisation, which existed only on paper. For this reason, they were deemed by Ottoman modernisers the ideal field upon which they could apply their reformatory ideas. The modernisation of the bombardiers and sappers was entrusted to and undertaken by Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha, the well-known French aristocrat, strategist, and convert to Islam, Claude-Alexandre Comte de Bonneval, who transformed the humbaracis into a separate collateral corps under the jurisdiction of and subject to the regulations of the Janissary corps. This corps was, alongside the corps of the miners and sappers, the subject of the earliest known 18th-century attempts at reforming and modernising the Ottoman military forces on Western European models. The reforms were allowed to lapse, however, after Bonneval’s death in 1747 and were repeated only during the reign of Selim III.


\(^{424}\) The lağimciyan corps consisted of soldiers and mining technicians entrusted with the duty of undermining the fortresses under siege by the Ottoman armies. Just like the humbaracis, the lağimciyan were a collateral corps under the jurisdiction of and subject to the regulations of the Janissary corps. The miners and sappers comprised two groups, namely those who served under the cebecibâşı head armourers and formed part of the sultanic household army salaried regularly and directly from the imperial treasury, and those who served in the provinces and were remunerated for their services with timar grants. The miners and sappers were also included into the forces which were to be reformed in the early 18th century by Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha. The reforms, as was the case with the bombardiers, lapsed after the death of Bonneval and were revived during the reign of Selim III. Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, p. 68.

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Thus, as becomes apparent, the majority of the *timar*-holders in the region of Serfice did not bear any particular military or other title, since only 17 out of 48 individuals had been recorded with a title or other trait that differentiated them from the rest of their colleagues. However, the information at our disposal indicates that most of the *timar*-holders in the kaza of Serfice, if not all of them, were members of the Janissary corps, either directly or recorded in collateral corps under the jurisdiction of the Janissary corps, such as the bombardiers and miners. There were also members of the Janissary corps who served at various posts within the imperial palace in Istanbul and the Sublime Porte, and received as remuneration for their services *timar* grants, either in lieu of regular salary ('ulûfe) or as supplement to their regular salaries.\(^{425}\) It is also noteworthy that some individuals, regardless of whether they were members of the Janissary corps or not, had received *timars* due to their close relationship with and dependence upon influential and high-ranking Ottoman officials, such as Ebu Bekir Pasha\(^{426}\) or Cezzar El-Hacc Ahmed Pasha.\(^{427}\) Three categories of *timar*-holders, namely the warden of the fortress of Serfice, the members of the corps of sappers and bombardiers, and high-ranking Porte officials, deserve, each for various reasons, a special and more analytical reference.

5.2.2.1. The warden of the fortress of Serfice

The record of a *timar*-holding warden, who was entrusted with the protection and upkeep of the fortress of Serfice, reveals the attempts of the Ottoman government and authorities to wipe out banditry and enforce rural law and order in the vicinity of Serfice,

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For the structure of the corps of miners and sappers, see: Ágoston, *Guns for the Sultan*, pp. 41-42; Pakalin, *Dictionary of Expressions and Terms*, II, pp. 347-352.\(^{425}\)

For the practice of *timar* grants being used as a form of regular salary or salary supplement, see: Soyudoğan, *Reassessing the Timar System*, pp. 24-29.\(^{425}\)

Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, II, p. 432.\(^{426}\)

Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, I, p. 205.\(^{427}\)
which was located at a point of strategic importance for the administration and its communications with Istanbul. The fortress of Serfice was abandoned sometime in late 17th century, since, when Evliya Çelebi visited Serfice in 1661, he noticed that, although an appointed warden was stationed at its fortress accompanied by 20 guards, the inner part of the fortress was in a state of disuse and dereliction, totally deserted by its guards and stripped of its armaments, military stores, and guns.\textsuperscript{428} Thus, it seems that the abandonment of the fortified complex and the old town had already by the mid-17th century progressed to an advanced point, whilst the town of Serfice was being gradually transferred to its modern location, outside the walls of the old Byzantine fortress. The role of the preservation of peace and security in the countryside and protection of the main highways was, however, assigned to \textit{derbend} villages, which were strategically located for this task. Since we still lack monographs focusing on the history of this paramount institution, it is, for the present, impossible to reach safe conclusions about the chronology of the establishment of the \textit{derbend} villages and their gradual replacement by the \textit{armatoliks}, namely bands of irregulars entrusted with policing the countryside and tackling banditry.\textsuperscript{429} Suffice it to say here that in the \textit{kaza} of Serfice, this duty was assigned throughout the 17th century to the village of Kaldat, which was located 7 km SW of Serfice.

\textsuperscript{428} Demetriades, \textit{Central and Western Macedonia according to Evliya Çelebi}, pp. 199-206.

\textsuperscript{429} As already discussed, the only monograph focusing on the institutions of \textit{derbends} and \textit{armatoliks} was written by John Vasdravellis. For additional information, see: Vasdravellis, \textit{Kleths, Armatoles, and Pirates in Macedonia during the Rule of the Turks}. There is also a Turkish monograph by Cengiz Orhonlu, which is, for a variety of reasons, hard to access. See: Cengiz Orhonlu, \textit{Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Derbend Teşkilati} [The Structure of \textit{Derbends} in the Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul: Eren Editions, 1990\textsuperscript{2}).
at the entrance of the mountainous passage of Sarantaporos that controlled direct movements between Thessaly and Macedonia.\textsuperscript{430}

It seems plausible that in the late 18th century, at a time when banditry had emerged as an endemic phenomenon, which resulted in the rapid increase in the importance of armatoliks, this duty was entrusted anew to a centrally appointed official who retained the traditional appellation dizdar and was responsible for the enforcement of Ottoman laws and regulations, and the security of communications and movement of goods through this extremely important mountainous passage. We could argue that this officer was no longer a typical warden of fortress, since the fortress of Serfice had been long deserted and abandoned. He was most probably an official who oversaw the function of the network of the strategic mountainous passages (derbends) and the bands of irregulars entrusted with their safeguard (armatoliks) in the area of Serfice and was under the commands of the general inspector of the derbends of Rumelia (Rum-lli derbendat naziri). Such an officer appears in William Martin Leake’s travelogue, when Leake visited the town and the then-ruined old fortress of Serfice. Leake noted that close to the old fortress resided a derbendci appointed by and in the service of Ali Pasha, who, as has already been mentioned, was since 1787 the Rum-lli derbendat naziri. This man was of Albanian origins and had been appointed by Ali Pasha to guard the mountainous passage of Sarantaporos

\textsuperscript{430} On the issue of the emergence of privileged settlements in the kaza of Serfice in late 16th and early 17th centuries see: Dimitrios Lamprakis, “ Förologikes Elafrynseis kai Apallages sti Periochē Servion katan 17o Aiona [Tax Reliefs and Exemptions in the Area of Servia during the 17th Century]” in Karanasios et al., Kozani, 600 Years of History, pp. 113-132. There were three settlements in the immediate vicinity of Serfice, namely Kastania and Agios Minas, whose population was entrusted with the upkeep of water reservoirs and pipelines, which supplied the town of Serfice with fresh water, and Kaldat, whose population had assumed the duty of guarding the mountainous passage of Sarantaporos. The villages enjoyed a privileged fiscal status, according to which their population were exempted from the payment of avarız extraordinary levies and paid their poll-tax at a considerably reduced rate.

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which led from Thessaly to Macedonia, via Elassona. He was stationed at Portes, which was the toponym of the highest position and endpoint of the Sarantaporos defile, whence he supervised all movements in and around the narrow mountainous passage. Furthermore, Portes was at that time the most important station on the post road from Larissa to Monastir, while there were another two stations, one in Kayalar and one in Florina. It is, thus, obvious that the Ottoman authorities had endeavored, in the light of the outburst of banditry in the Macedonian countryside, to establish centralised control over the mountainous passages which dominated the channels of communications and administration of the remote Macedonian provinces.

A report dated 17 Zilka’de 1149 AH / 19-3-1737 AD, which was submitted by the judge of Serfice to the Porte regarding the issue of the petition of a certain Seyyid Ahmed, who demanded that the authorities proclaim him warden of the fortress of Serfice as successor to his deceased father, reveals some aspects of the peculiar character of this post during the 18th century. The report states that Seyyid Mustafa son of Ahmed, the former warden of the fortress of Serfice, had died, and his post and his gedik timar became

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432 On the issue of the outburst of banditry in Ottoman Macedonia during the 18th century, see: Vasdravellis, *Klepths, Armatoles, and Pirates in Macedonia during the Rule of the Turks* and Kasomoulis, *Military Memoirs*. I have referred in previous chapters to the lack of analytical monographs on the issues of banditry and the structure of the system of armatoliks, which were established by the Ottomans in their attempts to subdue banditry. As has already been mentioned, the seminal role and importance of these two works lies in the fact that Vasdravellis makes in his work extensive use of Ottoman primary sources, whilst Kasomoulis was of Macedonian origins and a contemporary observer of the events which he describes in his memoirs.
433 The gedik timars were prebends that were permanently assigned to their non-sipahi beneficiaries for a specific service. Thus, wardens and guards of fortresses belonged to this category, because they were remunerated for their services with timars in lieu of payment of proper salary: Bayerle, *Pashas, Begs, and Effendis*, p. 69. Soyudoğan supports the idea that gedik was equivalent to regular salary (’ulüfe), which took the form of a prebendal grant that was reserved for special posts and positions. Hence, the gedik timars were called also positional timars. Howard supports the idea that whenever administrative personnel in general received timar benefits in lieu of their regular salary,
vacant. After that, Es-Seyyid Ahmed, who was Mustafa’s adult legitimate son, submitted a petition to the judge whereby he stated that he was a worthy and capable officer, and asked for the post of the warden of the fortress of Serfice, alongside the *gedik timar*, which was assigned to every warden of the aforementioned fortress, to be assigned to him, and a diploma of appointment to be issued on his behalf and despatched to Serfice.\(^434\)

The petition is accompanied by two marginal notes which contain the names and dates of appointment of the two former wardens of the fortress of Serfice. The first marginal note states that the post of the warden had been initially bestowed on 8 Şa’ban 1135 AH / 14-5-1723 AD on Ömer son of Osman, who replaced the previous warden, a certain Hüseyin son of Mustafa, who had been dismissed because he had abandoned the castle and neglected his service.\(^435\) According to the second marginal note, when Ömer passed away, the post was bestowed on 1 Zilhicce 1143 AH / 7-6-1731 AD on Seyyid Mustafa, who retained his post until his death, only to be succeeded by his son.\(^436\) This

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Es-Seyyid Ismail el-kazi bi-medinet-i Serfice

\(^{435}\) BOA, İE.TCT..24-2524: timar-i Ömer bin Osman dizdar-i kal’a-i Serfice der nahiye-i Serfice der liva-yı Paşa ’an tahvil-i Hüseyin veled-i Mustafa terk-i kal’a ve hizmet kerde kärve-i Lavaniça hisse 3,000 akçe fi 8 Şa’ban sene 1135 fevтивden Seyyid Mustafa’ya verilmişdir fi 29 Rebi’ül-evvel sene 1143 ba-’arz-i Mevlana Seyyid Ali na’ib-i kaza-yı Serfice kayd süde fi ğurre-i Zı’l-hicce sene 1143

\(^{436}\) BOA, İE.TCT..24-2524: timar-i Seyyid Mustafa dizdar-i kal’a-i Serfice der nahiye-i Serfice der liva-yı Paşa ’an tahvil-i Ömer bin Osman el-müteveffa
allows us to assume that under normal conditions the post of the warden of the fortress of Serlice was bequeathed from father to son, after the former’s death. The wardenal of the fortress of Serlice were recorded in the two marginal notes as beneficiaries of exactly the same *gedik timar* with annual returns of 3,000 *akçes*, which accrued from the village of Lavaniça. Unfortunately, this document contains no records of guards entrusted with the task of guarding the fortress beside and under the command of their superior warden. Thus, it is, for the present, questionable whether the warden was accompanied in his tasks by guards under his commands or not. Yet, we could argue that the considerable number of *timar*-holding members of the corps of sappers and bombardiers, who received normally salaries from the central treasury, but were granted *timars* in the provinces whenever they served as guards in provincial fortresses, suggests that they served as guards in the fortress of Serlice, or at least assisted the warden in his duties whenever need arose.

5.2.2.2. The members of the corps of sappers and bombardiers

As already discussed, the sappers and bombardiers were members of two collateral corps under the jurisdiction of the Janissary corps. Thus, they enjoyed certain privileges accruing from their status as Janissaries, of which the most important were the inheritability of their membership, which meant that a father could bequeath to his male offspring his post within the corps, and their operation under special regulations circumventing laws and regulations applicable to other *‘askeri* groups. As an extension thereof, the *timar*-holding

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437 For some cases of inheritability of similar posts and offices in Thessaloniki and its vicinity during exactly the same period, see: Shariat-Panahi, *Aspects of the Society of Thessaloniki*, p. 63.

members of these two corps enjoyed the same privileges regarding their rights over their benefices.\textsuperscript{439} This becomes immediately apparent when one examines the available documentation on cases of bestowal of prebends on sappers and bombardiers.

The first available document is a report which was submitted to the Porte by Mustafa, the deputy commander of the corps of miners, regarding the issue of the bestowal of a vacant timar upon a member of the corps. This report is undated, but, from a marginal note accompanying the report, which is dated 4 Cemaziyyülahir 1132 AH / 13-4-1720, we could estimate that the report was submitted to the Porte sometime in early April 1720. The report cites that, Hüseyin, who was a member of the corps of the sappers and beneficiary of a timar with annual returns of 12,300 akçe\textsuperscript{s} accruing from the village of Adil Obası and other villages, in the kaza of Serfice, had passed away and his timar remained vacant. For this reason, his legitimate son, a certain Seyyidi, who was also a member of the corps of miners, submitted a petition to Mustafa, whereby he asked for his father’s timar to be bestowed upon him. Thus, as becomes clear, by making use of the bonds of collegiality among members of the corps of miners, Seyyidi asked for the interference of his superior in the process of the bestowal of the aforementioned timar upon him.\textsuperscript{440}

The next available document is a report dated 25 Cemaziyyülahir 1169 AH / 27-3-1756 AD, which was submitted to the Porte by Hasan, the head of the corps of miners, regarding the issue of the bestowal of a timar upon the sons of a certain Hüseyin, who was a

\textsuperscript{439} On the privileged status of the members of the Janissary corps, see: Aksan, \textit{Ottoman Wars}, pp. 48-53.


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deceased member of the corps and son of the aforementioned Seyyidi. The report states that Hüseyin the miner, who was a beneficiary of the aforementioned timar, had passed away and his timar had become vacant. For this reason, his two adult legitimate sons, İbrahim and Ömer, asked for the timar of their deceased father to be bestowed on and held jointly by them, and for a diploma of appointment ratifying and securing this bestowal to be issued. Apparently, all timars reserved for and bestowed on members of the corps of sappers and bombardiers, were heritable, in stark contrast with the practice which was followed during the Classical Period and explicitly forbade the heritability of prebendal grants.441

In the next available document, which is a report submitted to the Porte by Ali, the head of the corps of sappers of the Sublime Porte, we see the process that was followed whenever timars bestowed on members of the corps of sappers and bombardiers remained vacant, because their holders died without male issue. Although the report is undated, from the marginal note accompanying the original report, which is dated 2 Cemaziyyülâhir 1206 AH / 27-1-1792 AD, we can assume that the report was submitted to the Porte sometime in mid-January 1792. Ali reported that a certain Mehmed son of Ömer, who was member of the corps of sappers and beneficiary of half of a zi’amet in the kaza of Serfice, with total annual returns of 27,200 akçes accruing from the village of Kalyani, passed away without male offspring and his share remained vacant. At that time, a certain Mustafa son of Ali,
who was a veteran and loyal member of the corps, asked for the vacant share of the aforementioned zi’amet to be bestowed on him. Ali examined Mustafa’s petition and decided that he was by all means eligible for and deserving of this bestowal. He, therefore, seconded Mustafa and requested that the vacant share of the aforementioned zi’amet be bestowed on Mustafa.  

The marginal note accompanying the report cites that, according to the operational regulations, whenever members of the corps of sappers died without male issue, their timars and zi’amets were never to be bestowed on foreigners, but rather they should be bestowed on veteran lieutenants and members of the aforementioned corps, through a notification and report submitted jointly by both the head of the corps of sappers and the comptroller of Rumelia. In a second marginal note accompanying the aforementioned report regarding the case of İbrahim and Ömer, we find the stipulation that, whenever members of the corps of sappers and the corps of bombardiers passed away, the timars and zi’amets bestowed on them were not to be given by any means to outsiders, but rather to legitimate sons of the deceased members of the two aforementioned corps, through a report of their commanders and a notification of the comptroller, which was to be

442 BOA, AE.SSLM.III..52-3106: ma’ruz-i kullaridir ki
443 BOA, AE.SSLM.III..52-3106: lağımcı ocağı neferatından bila veled fevt olanların zi’amet ve timarları ecnebiye verilmeyüb kangi tahsile mestur ocağı emekdar mülızimlerina lağımcı başı ‘arz ve baş defterdar sa’detli efendi hazretlerinin i’lamiyla tevcih olinması şurut-i mer’iyyelerindendir ferman-i devletli sultanımdır

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submitted to the Porte to be taken into consideration.\textsuperscript{444} Furthermore, another marginal note accompanying a report submitted to the Porte by member of the corps of bombardiers sometime in early June 1807, states that the operational regulations of the corps of bombardiers stipulated that the bestowals of timars on members of the corps were to be supervised in every way by the superintendent and the ağas of the corps of Janissaries, who should submit jointly their reports and official notifications.\textsuperscript{445}

To sum up, it becomes apparent that the operational regulations of the corps of sappers and bombardiers stipulated that, whenever timar-holding members of the corps passed away, their prebends were to be inherited by their legitimate sons, excluding their illegitimate offspring, and in case they died without male issue, their timars would be bestowed on veteran members of the corps, strictly and explicitly forbidding their bestowal on foreigners and outsiders. The application of these regulations was entrusted to the heads of the two corps and the comptroller of Rumelia, whilst it was supervised by the nazir and ağas of the corps of Janissaries.

5.2.2.3. High-ranking Porte officials

Bestowal of timars on Porte officials was not something unusual, since it was an established practice already in the initial stages of the history and operation of the timar system. As discussed already, in 1785 there were recorded in total three individuals, who were members of the administrative apparatus of the Porte and remunerated for their

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{444} BOA, C.TZ..105-5246: \textit{şurutu der-kenarı humbaracı ve lağimci neferatlarından fevt olinların zi’amet ve timarları ecnebiye verilmeýüb evladlarına ağaları ’arz ve ’izzetli baş defterdar efendi i’lamıyla verilmesi şurutlarında ferman-i devletli sultanimindir}
\item \textsuperscript{445} BOA, C.TZ..31-1525: \textit{humbara hane ocağının men küle’l-vüçuh tevcihatı ocağ-i ’amire naziri efendi hazretleri ve ağalarının bi’l-ıştirak ‘arz ve i’lamlariyla olması nizamları şurutundandır ferman-i devletli sultanım hazretlerinindir}
\end{itemize}
services through prebendal grants. The documents at our disposal do not state whether these individuals received a regular salary from the imperial treasury, a fact that renders deductions regarding the character of these bestowals precarious. Thus, for the present, it is impossible to say whether the timar benefices bestowed upon the aforementioned Porte officials were their fundamental source of income or merely a supplement to their salaries.

As we will see immediately below, however, the Porte officials were responsible for the outspread and domination of tax-farming in the countryside.

The first available document after 1785 is a copy of an excerpt taken from the synoptic imperial register of crown lands which was written in the first ten days of Muharrem 1215 AH / between 25-5 and 3-6-1800 AD. According to a marginal note which accompanies the registration, the copy of the excerpt was written on 8 Muharrem 1215 AH / 1-6-1800 AD, which is a terminus ante quem for the exact date of the compilation of the original register. The marginal note states that a zi’amet with annual returns of 22,500 akçes, which accrued from the village of İslamlu and other villages, located in the nahiye of Serfice, had been bestowed on a certain Mehmed, who was a gedikli müteferrika of

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446 For analytical information on the origins of and prebends bestowed on these individuals, see: Appendix 3.2., Table 2.
447 BOA, D.BŞM.MLK.d..14200: suret-i defter-i cedid-i icmal-i hakani budur ki nakl olindi tahriren fi eva’il-i şehir-i Muharremü’l-haram sene hams ‘aşar ve mi’eteyn ve elf
448 According to the list presented in the excerpt taken from the synoptic imperial register of crown lands, the following shares were assigned to Mehmed’s zi’amet: from the village of İslamlu: 5,250 akçes, from the village of Karamohor: 2,850 akçes, from the village of İzicko: 3,000 akçes, from the customs dues and excise fees and fees for summons at the court of Serfice, excluding the fairs held in the town of Serfice: 4,350 akçes, from the village of İslatine, a dependency of the kaza of Kesriye: 6,300 akçes, from the village of Karacalar: 375 akçes, and from the village of İskolari: 375 akçes.
449 The müteferrika were palace officers who served at the retinue of high-ranking governmental officers, such as the Grand Vizier, and high-ranking military and financial officers. Their majority consisted of sons of active and deceased state officers who received the primary and fundamental education pertaining to all future officials who were about to man governmental posts in the palace, and in central and provincial administration. There were two categories of müteferrika: those who were directly salaried by the state (ülüfeli) and those who were remunerated for their services with
the Porte and confidential messenger of the steward of the previous Grand Vizier. This zi’amet proved unsound and unproductive. Since Mehmed was qualified for a reassessment and review of the terms of possession and administration of this prebend, Mustafa Reşid, the actual comptroller of the imperial army, asked through an official report for the aforementioned zi’amet to be annexed to the crown lands and be subsequently entrusted anew to Mehmed as his malikâne. It was arranged that Mehmed would pay to the imperial treasury as annual returns the sum of 50 ġurus/6,000 akçe and a down-payment of 150 ġurus/18,000 akçe, namely the equivalent of three-year’s annual returns paid in advance. At the same time, another zi’amet of exactly the same value was to be bestowed, in the form of a gedik prebendal grant upon Mehmed, as a compensation for the losses in his personal annual income.

The aforementioned zi’amet was, thus, appended to the crown lands after the bureau of the tevki’i examined the existing enrollments in the registers kept in the imperial archives. Furthermore, conformably to the issued imperial edict and according to the stipulations of the regulations and the sultanic laws, it was deemed necessary for certain alterations to be applied on the components of this zi’amet, in order to be annexed completely and fully to the crown lands and be accordingly farmed out as a malikâne. As the

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450 Mehmed is referred to as being a karakulak-i kethüda-yi sadr-i ‘ali-i sabik. For more information on the meaning of the title karakulak see: Bayerle, Pashas, Begs, and Effendis, p. 94; Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, p. 351.

451 There is no explicit reference to the identity of this previous Grand Vizier. If we take the text literally, and since it refers to the sadr-i ‘ali-i sabik, which means “the preceding former Grand Vizier”, then the text most probably refers to Zağferanbolu Izzet Mehmed Pasha, who served as Grand Vizier in 1794-98. See, Süreyya, Sicili-i Osmani, VI, p. 849.

452 The reader should keep in mind that 1 ġurus was equal to 120 akçe.

453 The tevki’i was the officer entrusted with the duty of inscribing the Sultan’s imperial monogram (tuğra) on imperial edicts and decrees. He was also known as nişancı. For more information on the nature of his office and his duties, see: Pakalin, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, II, pp. 697-700; III, p. 484; Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, pp. 124-126.
document states, the disparity between the solar and lunar years was to be covered by an increase of 10% in the initial nominal value of this prebend, with its upgraded annual returns being thus arranged at 25,524 akçe, whilst the quantity of the down-payment paid for and at the beginning of the leasing of the *malikâne* would be accordingly estimated and fixed before the commencement of the *malikâne* lease contract. After these alterations were fixed and carried out, on the basis of the records in the synoptical imperial register, this prebend would be bestowed immediately upon Mehmed as his *malikâne*. Thus, a directive was issued by the imperial council, which decreed that the aforementioned prebend was to be posthaste appended to the crown lands and be outsourced as a *malikâne* with annual returns of 50 ğuruş / 6,000 akçe and a down payment of 500 ğuruş / 60,000 akçe, namely 350 ğuruş / 42,000 akçe more than Mehmed Reşid’s initial proposal. The register containing all detailed information pertaining to this issue were to be forwarded to the authorities entrusted with the finalisation of this deal.

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454 The text reads as follows: “*on akçede bir akçe ile zamm*”, which literally means “an increase of 10 akçe every 100 akçe”. On the issue of 10% *zamm* and *terakki*, both term meaning an “increase” or “supplement” to the recorded value of a prebend, see: Soyudoğan, *Reassessing the Timar System*, pp. 33-34.

455 There seems to be a serious mistake in the valuation and assessment carried out by the officials who served at the Ottoman imperial chancery. Since the initial value of this prebend was 22,500 akçe, and since there had been decreed an increase of 10%, the revised annuity must have amounted at 24,750 akçe. However, according to the text the value of the upgraded annuity was set at 25,524 akçe. This assessment denotes a significant disparity of 774 akçe, which I was totally unable to justify in the light of the data at my disposal.

Four years later, a beneficiary of a *zi’amet* in the *kaza* of Serfice, namely a certain Seyyid Abdurrahman Rif’at Efendi son of the deceased Ebu Bekir Ref’i’a Efendi, the former *defterdar* of Anatolia (ṣikk-i sani defterdan), submitted a report to the Porte to ask for his prebend to be appended to the imperial crown lands and bestowed anew on him as his *malikâne*. The report is undated, but, since the marginal note accompanying the original report is dated on 8 Receb 1219 AH / 13-10-1804 AD, we could assume that this report was submitted to the Porte sometime in early October 1804. Abdurrahman Efendi reported that his *zi’amet*, which had been previously held by his father and had been bestowed on him after Ebu Bekir’s death, was unsound and unproductive. Abdurrahman took advantage of his enhanced status, due to the fact that he was an audible servant of the state and, at the same time, son of a renowned and respected civil functionary. He asked for *celebkeşan* sheep-tax levies on his *zi’amet*, which were generally imposed and collected regularly on *liva* level, to be deemed neither permissible nor lawful and, since the overall income return from his *zi’amet* was extremely short, he requested that, by analogy to other precedents, his *zi’amet* be appended to the imperial *hasses* and then be bestowed anew on him in the form of a

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457 On the Ottoman finance department and historical development of the *defterdarlık* it comprised, see: Darling, *Revenue Raising*, pp. 49-80.

458 I was unable to find any information on either Ebu Bekir Ref’i’a or Abdurrahman Rif’at Efendi. On Ahmed Sadik Efendi, see: Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, I, p. 224.

459 Abdurrahman’s *zi’amet* consisted of the village of Vaniça-ı Küçük end other villages and had recorded annual returns amounting to 28,600 akçe.s.
malikâne. The amount of its down payment and annual returns were to be fixed beforehand, with the overall transaction and new bestowal being certified through the issuance of an imperial diploma.460

The marginal note accompanying the report states that the aforementioned zi’amet was initially bestowed on Abdurrahman after his father’s death, on 27 Muharrem 1209 AH / 24-8-1794 AD.461 The note adds that this prebend had been, already at the time of its bestowal on Abdurrahman, unsound and unproductive. Thus the Porte concluded, at that time, that it was paramount to be ascertained, through on-site investigation and communication of its results to the Porte, whether the annual returns of the zi’amet sufficed for the upkeep of an armed retainer or not. Because at the time of the bestowal Abdurrahman was a minor, he had to despatch, whenever need arose, an armed retainer to participate in imperial campaigns in his stead.462

An official note dated 8 Şa’ban 1219 AH / 12-11-1804 AD, which was submitted to the Porte by Hacı İbrahim Efendi,463 the defterdar of the new imperial revenues, stated that

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460 BOA, C.TZ..96-4763: devletlü ‘inayetlü merhametlü sultanım hazretleri sağı olsun Paşa sancağında Serfice nahyesinde Vıranca-ı Küçük (sic: Vaniça-ı Küçük) nam karye ve ğayriden yigirmi sekiz bin altıyüz akçe zi’amet pederim haseğän-ı divan-ı hümayundan sabika şıkk-ı sani defterdari Ebu Bekir Refî’a veled-i kâtib Ahmed Sadîk’in fevtinden zi’amet-i mezkur çürük ve bi-hasıl olduğundan bu bendeleri hizmet-i ricaldan mer’îyyü’l-hatır kimseninin bendezadesi olub tahtî livaya celeb hususu reva görülmemesi ricasi ve zi’amet-i mezkuremin neması ğayet kalımla merahim-i aîliyelerinden mercudur ki bir mikdar mal ve mu’accele takdiriyle emsalına kiyasen havass-i hümayuna tashih ve malikânelik vechiyile berati yedime i’ta buyurulmak babinda emr ve ferman devletlü ‘inayetlü merhametülü sultanım hazretlerininindir bende-i Seyyid Abdurrahman Rif’at veled-i müteveffa Ebu Bekir Refî’a
462 BOA, C.TZ..96-4763: Seyyid Abdurrahman Rif’at zide kadırhûye kanun üzerê cebelû bedelliyesiye eğerçi tevcîh ve berat olunub lakin zi’amet-i mezbur çürük ve bi-hasıl ancak cebelüsüne vafi olduğu bi’l-ihbar tahkik
463 On Hacı İbrahim Efendi, see: Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, III, p. 757.
Seyyid Abdurrahman Efendi was holder of the aforementioned zi’amet, but, due the fact that this prebend was unsound and unproductive, he had been unable to appear and participate in the imperial campaigns. However, since he was son of a respectful civil functionary, he deserved to be pardoned and enjoy the sultanic mercy. Furthermore, Abdurrahman had asked officially for his zi’amet to be appended to the imperial hasses and, in return for a predetermined sum of annual returns and down payment, be granted to him as his malikâne. Therefore, an imperial order was issued, which decreed that, according to the requirements of cases such as this, an i’lam was to be made and submitted to the Porte for further examination. When the records kept in the imperial treasury were examined, it was found that the aforementioned zi’amet was bestowed on Abdurrahman, whilst there was found no other registration stating that it had been bestowed to another sipahi. Furthermore, an imperial rescript issued previously, in Zilhicce 1217 AH / between April and May 1803 AD, stipulated that it was absolutely forbidden for a timar to be appended to the imperial hasses, whilst appending of a zi’amet to the imperial hasses was to be executed solely in case the Porte deemed it absolutely necessary and unavoidable, and only after its produce had been investigated and verified by the treasury of the new imperial revenues. After this procedure had been followed, the treasury of the new imperial revenues would receive as down payment the quantity appropriated to five-years produce and foreordain the annual returns to be received according to the zi’amet-holder’s ability to pay. Thus, the defterdar of the treasury of the new imperial revenues despatched an official note to ask for information on the produce and revenue generated on an annual basis by the aforementioned zi’amet. When an investigation was carried out, it proved impossible to verify with accuracy the amounts of the annual produce and revenue of Abdurrahman’s zi’amet. For this reason, the defterdar stated, the decision over whether this zi’amet was to
be appended to the imperial hasses or not was delegated to the sultan himself and his counselors. The defterdar submitted to the Porte an i‘lam, which contained the results of the investigation and communicated to the Porte that the annual produce and revenue generated by the aforementioned zi’amet amounted to 400 ğuruş.

Therefore, in case the sultan and his advisers decreed, on the basis of the i‘lam and the marginal note accompanying it, that Abdurrahman’s zi’amet was worth appending to the imperial hasses and then be returned to him in the form of a malikâne tax-farm, Abdurrahman would be required to pay in advance the amount of 2,000 ğuruş, namely the amount of the annual produce of his zi’amet multiplied by five, into the imperial treasury. The treasury clerks would accordingly enroll Abdurrahman’s payment to the treasury registers, and, after the amount of its annual returns had been fixed and agreed upon, the newly-formed malikâne would be recorded and put under his charge. Last but not least, for the overall transaction to be valid and perfectly executed, the note concludes, the issuance of an imperial order was required. The order would stipulate that the record pertaining to the status of the aforementioned zi’amet kept by the imperial cadastre, would be confirmed and cross-checked by the provincial nişancı bureau,464 which would, thus, append the zi’amet to the imperial hasses and dispatch to the Porte the synoptic cadastral register containing the new information.465

464 The provincial nişancı bureau functioned exactly on the same basis as its counterpart in Istanbul. Moreover, the term nişancı was an alternative appellation of the tevki‘i.
A third case of a conversion of a timar into a tax-farm occurred in 1806. According to a receipt dated 23 Zilka’dé 1220 AH / 12-2-1806, which was submitted by Es-Seyyid Feyzullah, the defterdar of the new imperial revenues, to the Porte, the annual returns of the timar under examination, whose last beneficiary had been a certain Mustafa son of İbrahim, amounted to the sum of 11,450 akçes, which accrued from the village of Büyük Lozani and other villages. After the death of Mustafa the timar remained vacant and it was arranged, according to the regulations to be bestowed on Mustafa’s mülazım. For this reason, the intermediate produce for the year 1220 AH / 1805-1806 AD passed into the control of the fisc, which handed over the administration of the aforementioned timar by way of account for that year to the treasury of the new imperial revenues. Thus, this timar was given under the charge of and outsourced, directly and without an auction, and in return for a contraction fee of 500 ğuruş, to a certain Ahmed Efendi. The latter had petitioned the Porte and demanded this timar be given under his charge and outsourced to him, so that he could perfectly place it under his control for a whole year, namely from the beginning of Mart 1220 RC / 13-3-1806 AD until the end of Şubat 1220 RC / 12-3-1807 AD.
After Ahmed Efendi’s demands had been accepted by the Porte, he succeeded to farm out for a whole economic year this timar and he defrayed in full to the treasury of the new imperial revenues the aforementioned sum of 500 ğuruş, which corresponded to the advance payment of the tax-farmer for the ratification of his tax-farming agreement and contract with the Porte. Thus, the Porte decreed that Ahmed Efendi would control by way of account for the aforementioned economic year the timar under examination, whilst, according to the old laws and common practice, all accruing agricultural produce, fees, and tolls would be collected and possessed by Ahmed Efendi. At the same time, the Porte emphasised, any meddling into the collection of the annual agricultural produce and taxes by other parties were not to be tolerated.466

These three cases are typical examples of the participation of central imperial élites in Ottoman political and economic life. They are particularly important, because they depict clearly the means which central administrative cadres had at their disposal, due to their position and proximity to the imperial centre, to exploit the various ways of generating wealth and enriching themselves. They also prove their paramount ability to participate, more than any other group, in the formulation and administration of the Ottoman taxation system, in which in late 18th and early 19th centuries tax-farming, both in its iltizam and

466 BOA, C.TZ..164-8199: ba’ıs-i terkim-i huruf oldur ki

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malikâne forms, preponderated over the conception of direct assessment and collection of levies by state officials. In the first case, the protagonist figure was Mehmed, an Istanbul-based, high-ranking Porte official and holder of a gedik zi’amet located in the kaza of Sefice, in the second case the protagonist figure was Abdurrahman, son of the former defterdar of Anatolia, namely one of the most influential posts in Ottoman administrative hierarchy, and in the third case the protagonist was an efendi, namely a Porte or palace scribal official.467

In the first two cases, the protagonists succeeded, by taking advantage of their status and through petitioning the administration, in exchanging their unproductive and, thus, economically disadvantageous prebends, which they held as their sole beneficiaries, for more productive ones. At the same time, they achieved the annexation of their unproductive prebends to the imperial crown lands, their subsequent conversion to mukata‘a tax-farms, and finally their bestowal upon themselves as their personal malikânes, in return for the payment of a considerable sum in advance, at the beginning of the contract, and a predetermined moderate annual fee for maintaining their rights of occupation. Thus, they both achieved their upgrade from timar-holding salaried officials of the Porte to malikâne-holders, which meant that they were admitted to the economically, socially, and politically powerful élite group of the Istanbul-based malimânecis who dominated Ottoman socio-economic and political life during the 18th century. In the third case, Ahmed Efendi succeeded in obtaining the right to outsource on the basis of the iltizam system for one economic year a vacant timar, which, instead of being bestowed, as the regulations stipulated, on the mülazim of its deceased previous beneficiary, was conversed

467 The title efendi was used for educated people, especially scribes, who were products of the traditional medrese education. For additional information, see: Bayerle, Pashas, Begs and Effendis, p. 44; Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, I, pp. 505-506.
into a tax-farm. We could argue, therefore, that for high-ranking Porte officials, bestowals of *timar* and *zi’amet* benefices were the steppingstone to their introduction to the tax-farming system, where they could participate as full members and ensure a steady and secure flow of income into their own purses.

### 5.3. Post-classical petitions for and bestowals of *timars* in the *kaza* of Serfice

The process of petitioning the authorities for and bestowal of prebendal grants in the post-classical period has not been studied adequately and it is, for this reason, very difficult, if not impossible, to discern differences and similarities between the classical and post-classical periods. In the third section of this chapter, I will attempt, in the light of the information provided by the available documentation, a preliminary analysis of the process which was followed in the 18th century, either as a result of a vacancy in a *timar* grant or a demand for the authorities to interfere and resolve a dispute between two conflicting parties. For the convenience of the reader, I will initially present a sketch of this process on the basis of the information provided by the seminal monographs of Douglas Howard and Muhsin Soyudoğan and afterwards I will proceed with the analysis of the data collected from 18th-century petitions and reports.

There were two distinct ways of petitioning the authorities for the bestowal of prebendal benefices, namely either through high-ranking provincial administrative officials and military officers, such as the *sancakbeyi* and the *alaybeyi*, or through the central administration in Istanbul. The first method was used most often by sons of *sipahis* claiming their initial *timar* grants (ibtida *timarları*) and *sipahis* on rotation, namely *timar*-holders who
had relinquished or had been deprived of their benefices and sought after a new timar in return for their services and efforts in battle. The second method was used most often by members of the ‘askeri class, such as scribes, çavuşes, müteferrikas, and members of the six divisions of the imperial cavalry (altı bölük halkı), who occupied a post in the palace service or in central administration and received from the central imperial treasury a remuneration in the form of regular salary (‘ulüfe), which they aimed at exchanging at a standard rate for a timar grant in the provinces. This method was used also by officials in the structures of provincial administration, who, by serving and being trained in the outer (birun) and inner (enderun) service of the imperial palace, had progressed at the beginning of their careers through the ranks of the palace educational system and acquired, through the çıkma system of periodical matriculations, a post in the highest ranks of provincial administration. Last but not least, this method was used by non-tactical members of the ‘askeri class whom the government deemed worthy to be granted a timar benefice. These non-tactical ‘askeris were recommended for such a grant by officials who, by submitting official proposals and petitions on their behalf, acted as their patrons and intermediaries between them and the government. A separate case of petitions addressing the central administration were those that provincial timar-holders submitted to the Porte to ask officially for the intervention of the authorities in a problematic situation regarding the bestowal and possession of a timar benefice.469

468 On the structure of the imperial palace educational system, see: Imber, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 128-53.
469 Howard, The Ottoman Timar System, pp. 90, 105-108. Soyudoğan presents a more complicated image of the process of petition for and bestowal of timars, which covers, however, the period of great alterations in early 17th century. I think that Howard’s more simplified description serves best the purpose of introducing the reader to this complicated and still unexplored process of post-classical bestowals of timar benefices. On Soyudoğan’s ideas and opinions, see: Soyudoğan, Reassessing the Timar System, pp. 211-215.
In the case of petitions submitted to the authorities through provincial administrative officials and military officers, the latter ones acted as intermediaries between the petitioner and the government, since every petition was drafted by them, and the information provided was verified and attested by them. Even the sancakbeyis and alaybeyis were held responsible before the government for the validity of the information presented in such petitions. At the same time, the provincial authorities were entrusted with the task of tracking and recording the origins, the situation, and achievements of all provincial timar-holders and petitioners for timar grants.\footnote{Howard, \textit{The Ottoman Timar System}, pp. 90-92.}

The central administrative authorities issued all their responses to petitions submitted to them, in the form of directive orders (hükm-i şerifs), which ordered for or forbade the bestowal of timar benefices on petitioners, or demanded further examination of those cases pertaining to grievances or deficiencies in the process of bestowal of timars. Furthermore, the imperial council had the sole right to issue the definitive certificate of bestowal and possession of a post or benefice, which was known as imperial diploma (berat-i ‘alişan). The berat presented a thorough reference to the annual returns and location of the bestowed timar, and identified the new holder by making a concise reference to his physical characteristics, age, and qualifications. As a sign of its validity, the berat was sealed by the nişancı on its top with the imperial monogram (tuğra).\footnote{Howard, \textit{The Ottoman Timar System}, pp. 108-112.}

The process of petitions having been described, we can examine the available documentation. In order to achieve some clarity about the characteristics and content of each document, the examination and evaluation of the information provided by these documents will be carried out thematically. I will refer to a) the terms and conditions under
which *timars* were bestowed on *sipahis*, b) the criteria for the appropriateness of *sipahis* for prebendal grants, and c) the process of the authentication of the identity of petitioning *sipahis*, as they are presented in the available 18th-century documents. In the last part of this section, I will refer to the process of bestowal of prebends on *müşlüzim sipahis*, who formed a distinct category of high-ranking *timar*-holders.

5.3.1. Terms and conditions of *timar* bestowals in the *kaza* of Serfice in the 18th century

The available bibliography on the *timar* system informs us that the terms and conditions of *timar* bestowals stipulated that the *sipahi* who was granted a prebendal benefice was to reside in the *sancak*, where his *timar* was located in, and participate in time of warfare in imperial campaigns under the banner of his *alaybeyi*. The same terms were also applied in cases of bestowal of *timars* on minor sons of deceased *sipahis*, with the difference that, because they were minors, they were compelled to pay a fee for substitute armed retainers (*cebeli bedeliyyesi*), until they reached maturity. From that time onwards, if they did not appear under their commander’s flag and evaded performing their duties, their absence would be reported to their officers, who would be obliged to investigate and, if need arose, chastise them.

There are three available documents including the terms and conditions of bestowals of *timars* on minor *sipahis*. The first document is a *berat* which is dated 20 Zilhicce 1189 AH / 11-2-1776 AD and was issued in Istanbul on behalf of a certain Salih son.

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472 The only two documents at my disposal which explicitly include these terms are the following: BOA, AE.SOSM.III..38-2700, which is again draft of a *ferman*, issued by the Porte on 18 Ramazan 1170 AH / 6-6-1757 AD, and BOA, AE.SMST.III..198-15563, which is a draft of a *ferman*, issued by the Porte on 19 Cemaziyülevvel 1175 AD / 16-12-1761 AD. Both *ferman* decree the bestowal of a *timar* on prospective *timar*-holders. The Ottoman text reads as follows: *sancağında sakin olub alaybeyisi bayrağı altında sefere eşmek.*
of Hüseyin, who was at the time of bestowal approximately 3 years of age. The second document is a directive, which was issued by the Porte on 7 Receb 1203 AH / 3-4-1789 AD for the bestowal of a timar on a certain Veli son of Ahmed, a boy of approximately 6 years of age. The number of armed retainers dispatched to participate in imperial campaigns depended on the revenue assigned to each prebendal grant. Therefore, from the third document, namely a marginal note accompanying a report, which, as has already been discussed, was submitted to the Porte on 2 Cemaziyyülahir 1206 AH / 27-1-1792 AD, for the bestowal of a vacant share of a zi’amet on a certain Mustafa son of Ali, we learn that, because this prebend was a zi’amet with annual revenue of 27,200 akçes, its two former minor beneficiaries were obliged to pay a fee for and dispatch 5 armed retainers to participate in imperial campaigns.

Thus, as becomes clear, the terms imposed on beneficiaries of timar grants, were identical to the terms that the government imposed on timar-holders during the classical period. The terms stipulated explicitly that the timar-holder had to reside in the sancak where his prebendal grants were located, that is in our case in the sancak of Pasha, in the beylerbeylik of Rumelia, and participate in person in imperial campaigns in times of war. Whenever a timar was bestowed on a minor sipahi, the terms accentuated that during the period of his minority, whenever need arose and a call to arms was declared, he was

473 BOA, AE.SABH.I..74-5151: kanun üzere cebelü bedeliyyesyle kendüye tevcih ve tahvil hükmüyle üzerinde iken sancağında sakın olub alaybeyisi bayrağı altında sefere eşmek şartıyla timar-i mezbur tarih-i merkumdan müceddedan tevcih olunmak
474 BOA, AE.SABH.I..49-3528: sancağında sakın olub kanun üzere bi-her sene ıktiza eden bir nefer cebelü bedeliyyesin canib-i miriye eda ve teslim ve ayreleşüb tüvana oldukda cebelüsü kaydı ba’dü’r-ref’ alaybeyisi bayrağı altında mevcud olunmaz ise rifa’atdan mülazima ‘arz olunmak şartıyla.
expected to pay from the annual returns assigned to his *timar* for the fee for a substitute armed retainer, until he reached adulthood.\(^{476}\)

As has already been mentioned, in case a *timar*-beneficiary failed to fulfill his duties, he was stripped of his prebend and lost all his rights over the annual returns accruing therefrom. There is only one available case of confiscation of a *timar* from a *timar*-holder in the *kaza* of Serfice which occurred in 1788. A report submitted on 9 Ramazan 1202 AH / 13-6-1788 by İbrahim Sa’id, the then-miralay of the *sol kol*, to the Porte informs us that a *timar* with annual returns amounting to the overall sum of 3,000 *akçes* accruing form the village of Nihor and other unspecified villages was confiscated that year from its holder, a certain Ahmed. The latter was found to having neglected systematically for more than fifteen years his duties, whilst, in that year particularly, when he was called upon by the sultan to participate in the campaign against Austria, it was found again that he had not appeared under the banner of his commander.\(^{477}\) He was, therefore, accused of neglect of his duties, which incurred the immediate confiscation of his *timar*.\(^{478}\)
5.3.2. The criteria for the appropriateness of sipahis for prebendal grants

The criteria, according to which the defterhane-i ‘amire officials decided for or against bestowals of prebends on sipahis and heirs of sipahis, were intrinsically linked with the capability of a given individual for military service, which was accounted on the basis of his military records and his overall career in the service of the Porte. We could also argue that heritability of timars was also a decisive factor in this procedure, since legitimate sons of sipahis were the primary nominees for the prebends, which had been previously bestowed on and held by their deceased fathers. There are five available documents citing explicitly these criteria. To begin with, the first document is the aforementioned report of the deputy commander of the corps of miners, which was submitted to the Porte sometime in early April 1720. The report cites that Seyyidi submitted a petition, whereby he asked for the timar of his father to be bestowed upon him, taking under consideration that he was legitimate son of a deceased sipahi and his ability to perform fully his military duties, and confirms the petitioner’s claims, and his worthiness.\footnote{BOA, C.TZ..37-1850: sulbi kebir tüvana kasca kadir oğlu olmağla}

The same criteria were taken under consideration when, as has already been discussed, the same prebend was bestowed on the two grandsons of Seyyidi, a certain İbrahim and a certain Ömer, in 1756. On that occasion, the head of the corps of sappers submitted a report to the Porte assuring that the two aforementioned sipahis were strong, healthy, serviceable, faithful, and old servants and worthy members of the corps of miners, with remarkable aptitude for issues pertaining to the art of war. Thence thwy were by all means lawful and rightful beneficiaries of the prebend, which their father, grandfather, and great-grandfather had held before them.\footnote{BOA, C.TZ..105-5246: İbrahim ve Ömer tüvana yarar ve emekdar ve fenninde mahir isti’dadları olub her vechle muhell ve müstehhikk ve sezavar-i ‘inayet olmalaryila}

The head of the corps of sappers played a crucial role in the examination of petitions...
submitted to him personally or the Porte, for bestowal of *timars* to members of the corps. This becomes apparent from another report, which, as has been discussed above, was submitted to the Porte sometime in mid-January 1792 by Ali, the head of the corps of the sappers of the Sublime Porte. This report contained Ali’s opinion on and response to a petition, which had been submitted to him by a member of the corps of sappers who asked for a vacant share of a *zi’amet* in the *kaza* of Serfice to be bestowed on him. Ali examined Mustafa’s petition and decided that he was by all means eligible for and deserving of this bestowal, because the petitioner was a veteran and loyal member of the corps, and a serviceable, strong, and healthy soldier. Ali, thus, seconded Mustafa and requested that the vacant share of the aforementioned *zi’amet* be bestowed on Mustafa and a diploma of appointment be issued.  

In another case, as we learn from a report submitted in 1788 to the Porte by Seyyid Yusuf, the *miralay* of the *sağ kol*, after a certain Murad, who was a beneficiary of a *zi’amet* with annual returns of 20,000 *akçe*ş, accruing from the village of Kalyani and other villages, had passed away. His prebend remained vacant and a certain Ahmed, who claimed that he was Murad’s legitimate son, appeared before a gathering of prebend-holders, who all came from the same *sancak* and *kaza* as the deceased Murad, to ascertain that Ahmed was a serviceable and healthy servant, acute in military matters, and, thus, worthy and suitable for being granted his deceased father’s prebend. As we will see below, this was part of the standard procedure that was followed whenever a *timar*-holder passed away and one or

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481 BOA, AE.SSLM.III.52-3106: *ocağımız emekdarlarından fünunda mahir güçlü ve tüvana işbu ba’is-i ʿarz-i ʿubudiyyet Mustafa veled-i Ali kulları her vechele şayeste ve muhelli ve müstahakk olmağla*

482 BOA, AE.SABH.I..82-5662: *Paşa sancağında Serfice nahiyesinde Kalyani nam kârî ve ğayriden yigîrîmî bin akçe zi’amete mutasarrîf Murad fevt timari ol-vechle mahlul olmağla sancaklu ve nahiyeülêleriyle müzakere ve müşavere olundukda müteveffa-yi mezburun sahîh sulbi oğlu işbu ba’is-i ʿarz-i ʿubudiyyet Ahmed kulları yarar ve tüvana harb ve darba kâdir her vechele timara şayeste ve sezavar kullarından olduğuunu ve müteveffa-yi mezkurin sahîh sulbi kebir oğlu olduğunu*
more individuals, by propounding that they were his legitimate sons, claimed the prebend previously held by the deceased sipahi for themselves.

5.3.3. The authentication of the identity of petitioning sipahis

There are three available documents which describe in a very comprehensive manner the process of authentication of the identity of individuals petitioning the Porte for consideration of their claims and rights over prebendal grants and benefices. The first document is a report dated 28 Rebi’ulevvel 1164 AH / 24-4-1751 AD, which was submitted to the Porte by Hüseyin, the alaybeyi of the sağ kol. The report states that after the za’im Mustafa son Osman had passed away and his prebend remained vacant, a certain Abdi was declared, through the testimony and eye-witness of his çeribaşı, four za’ims, and ten timar-holders, legitimate son of the deceased Mustafa, and, thus, eligible for being granted his deceased father’s prebend, as his own means of subsistence. In another report submitted to the Porte by Ahmed, the alaybeyi of the sağ kol, we learn that a certain Hüseyin was declared, through the testimony and eye-witness of two za’ims and ten timar-holders, who were all from the liva of Pasha, legitimate son of a certain Beşir, who had been until his death holder of a timar in the kaza of Serfice. The aforementioned Hüseyin thus became eligible for his deceased father’s prebend and to replace him as legitimate holder of the

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aforementioned *timar*.\(^484\) Last but not least, as the aforementioned report of Seyyid Yusuf, the *miralay* of the *sağ kol*, states, Murad, namely the individual who claimed his deceased father’s prebend for himself, appeared before a gathering of prebend-holders, who all came from the same *sancak* and *kaza* as the deceased Murad. As was customary in such cases, three *timar*-holders and the deceased Murad’s *çeribaşı* communicated and testified to the authorities that Ahmed was indeed Murad’s adult legitimate son. According to the report, the three *timar*-holders undertaking this task were a certain Rüstem, beneficiary of a *timar* with annual revenue of 3,000 *akçe* accruing from the village of Çobanlu and other villages, a certain Kösele,\(^485\) beneficiary of a *timar* with annual revenue of 3,000 *akçe* accruing from the village of Uluğ Altı and other villages, and a certain Hasan, beneficiary of a *timar* with annual revenue of 7,000 *akçe* accruing from the village of Karacılıar and other villages.\(^486\)

Although the process of authentication of the identity of *sipahi*s presents minor differences from case to case, with the number of witnesses depending, most probably, on the size and type of the prebend under examination, it was based on the bonds of collegiality among various *timar*-holders operating in a given *sancak* or a *kaza*. Thus, it was


\(^485\) In the text, the *timar*-holder is called Kösele, which was the name of a village in the *kaza* of Serifce. The most plausible explanation is that Seyyid Yusuf or the scribe responsible for drafting the report confused the name of the *timar*-holder with that of the aforementioned settlement located in the same *kaza* where his *timar* was located in. For the time being, the original name of this *timar*-holder is unknown.

\(^486\) BOA, AE.SABH.I..82-5662: ba-hatt-ı hümayun verilen nizam-ı cedid ve şurut-ı müstahsene üzere sancaklu ve nahiyelülerile müzakere ve müşavere olundukda nahiye-i mezburdan Çobanlu nam karye ve ğayriden üç bin akçe timara mutasarrıf Rüstem yine Uluğ Altı nam karye ve ğayriden yedi bin akçe timara mutasarrıf Kösele yine Karacılıar nam karye ve ğayriden yedi bin akçe timara mutasarrıf Hasan ve çeribaşları veçh-i meşruh üzere ihbar ve şehadet etmeleriyle
only natural that, whenever a timar-holder passed away, his companions and colleagues examined the claims of his legitimate sons and testified to the eligibility and correctness of the claims presented before their gathering. All this testifies to the tendency in the 18th century towards decentralisation of timar transactions and, although the Porte retained the final say in all timar bestowals, it is obvious that the participation of the periphery in the administration of the timar system was deemed by the centre mandatory and essential.

5.3.4. Bestowals of prebends on and prerogatives of mülazım sipahis

The term mülazım was used in Ottoman documents for low-ranking sipahi officers and can be translated as lieutenant. There are two documents which present the role and prerogatives of mülazım. The first document is a report dated on 17 Receb 1217 AH / 1311-1802 AD, which was submitted to the Porte by Süleyman, the miralay of the sağ kol. The report refers to the issue of the promotion of a timar-holder, a certain Hasan son of İbrahim, to lieutenant, who would be responsible for commanding a force of 10 timar-holding cavalrymen in imperial campaigns. The report cites that the new law and approved regulations, which had been published in a previously issued imperial rescript expounding on the issue of appointments of zi’amet and timar-holders, stipulated that in very ten timar-holding light cavalrymen one was to be appointed and command them as their lieutenant. When the elder chiefs of the sancak of Pasha deliberated and talked over this issue, Hasan

487 The term mülazım should be translated in English as “lieutenant”, which agrees with the translation provided in Redhouse’s dictionary. From the available documentation, however, it becomes apparent that the mülazım was the commander of a squad of ten light cavalrymen. We could, for this reason, use the obsolete terms “doyen” and “decarch”. In order to avoid entanglement in the maze of terminology, I will follow Redhouse’s translation and I will simply translate the term mülazım as “lieutenant”. For more information, see: Redhouse, Turkish and English Lexicon, p. 1962; Pakalin, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, II, pp. 611-12.
son of İbrahim, who was born in and permanent resident of Serfice, in the sancak of Pasha, submitted a handwritten report, through which he expressed his desire to be promoted to mülazim. The elders testified and communicated to the authorities that Hasan was a serviceable, courageous, and acute servant of the state, who was, furthermore, a man of noble and gentle birth, and, thus, perfectly worthy and deserving the honour of being promoted to mülazim. Thus the elders of the sancak of Pasha and the nahiye of Serfice submitted to the Porte a judicial protocol containing their officially undersigned statements. This report was immediately thereafter submitted to the Porte alongside the aforementioned judicial protocol, asking for one of the vacant prebends located in the sancak of Pasha to be bestowed on Hasan. The Porte officials were to take under their consideration that Hasan would be promoted to mülazim and, thus, the prebend which he would receive should match his elevated rank. At the same time, the bestowal had to be accompanied by an imperial order decreeing Hasan’s promotion to mülazim.488

The report is accompanied by a marginal note which cites that, in respect of records kept by the Porte officials, a ferman was issued on 3 Şevval 1217 AH / 27-1-1803 AD, which stipulated that the holder of the aforementioned report and judicial protocol would be

bende-i Süleyman miralay-i sağ kol halen
promoted to mülazım, namely he would be the ninetieth mülazım of timar-holding light-cavalry forces. A second marginal note cites that the new law stipulated that in every ten timar-holders one had to be selected to command them as their lieutenant and in case of war each mülazım had to campaign under the banner of his superior alaybeyi. To that end, the new timar operational regulations stipulated that, in order to be immediately recognisable, the characteristics of each mülazım, and the names and titles, by which he was known, were to be enrolled in special registers. Accordingly an imperial order decreeing his promotion had to be granted to him forthwith.

The second document presents a far more complicated case, in which the protagonists were a lieutenant sipahi and the corps of the bombardiers. This document is a report submitted to the Porte by a certain Mehmed ‘Arif, who was member of the corps of bombardiers. The report is undated, but from a marginal note accompanying it, which is dated 30 Rebi’ulevvel 1222 AH / 7-6-1807 AD and commands the superintendent of the grenade factory and school of bombardiers to examine the content of this report and write an official notification, we can assume that it was submitted sometime in early June 1807. Mehmed ‘Arif reported that he was a timar-holding member of the corps of bombardiers, who had been granted a timar with annual revenue of 11,450 akçes accruing from the village of Büyük Lozani and other villages. Although there was no reason for other parties to interfere in the bestowal, possession, and administration of his prebend, some “malicious individuals who violated reports and decrees issued by the Porte achieved for no good

489 BOA, AE.SSLM.III..356-20413: kuyudata nazaren işbu sahib-i ‘arz ve mahzar doksanıncı mülazım olmak ferman-i sultanımındır fi 3 Şevval sene 1217
490 BOA, AE.SSLM.III..356-20413: her sancağın kaydinin ’aşri mikdari mülazımlar intihab ve sefer ve hazzarda bayrağı altında mevcud olmak üzere eşkâl ve isim ve şühretleri izah olınarak yedlerine mülazemet emri verilmesi kanun-i cedid sürutundandır ferman-i sultanımındır
491 BOA, C.TZ..31-1525: humbara hane nazırı ‘ızzetlü efendi görüb muktezasını i’lam eyleyesin deyü buyuruldu fi selh-i Rebi’u’l-evvel sene 1222
reason the removal of half of the aforementioned timar from him”. This Mehmed ‘Arif perceived as “sheer oppression”. So he asked for the illegally removed half of his timar to be restored to him, and a new berat be issued, to protect himself against any malicious meddlers in his affairs.492

The report is accompanied by a marginal note dated 2 Rebi’ulahir 1222 AH / 9-6-1807 AD, which cites that a timar worth 5,725 akçes, and not 11,450 akçes, had indeed been bestowed on Mehmed ‘Arif in 1221 AH / 1806-1807 AD. The same amount had been granted to another member of the corps of bombardiers, a certain Mustafa son of Salih. The two timars had been bestowed one by one and were held separately by each timar-holder with imperial berats, whilst at the same time there were found no other records citing that these two prebends had been bestowed on other timar-holders as well.493

As has been already discussed, bestowals of timars on members of the corps of sappers and bombardiers were to be supervised in every way by the superintendent and the ağas of the corps of Janissaries, who would, in cases such as this, submit jointly their reports

492 BOA, C.TZ..31-1525: devletlü ’inayetli merhametli efendim sultanım hazretleri devlet ve ikbal ile sağ olsun ’arzuhal-i kullarındır ki humbaracı erbab-i timarından olub ba-berat-i şerif-i ’alişan mutasarrıf olduğum Paşa sancakında Serfice nahiyesinde Büyük Lozani nam karye ve şairinden on bir bin dört yüz elli akçe timarını bir vechle daha ılbán etmez ıkem ba’az aşhab-i ağrazın hilaf-i inhasına mebni timar-i mezburun nısi bir takrib üzerinde ref’ olunmuş olduğundan bu kullarına ’azım ve zulm-i sarih olduğu ma’lum devletleri buyuruldunda merahim-i ’aliyye-i kerimanlerinden mercu ve mutezara’dir ki hak-kı mezkurü’l-atın ref’inden ke-ma kân bu kullarına ibka ve tevcih ve yedime müceddel berat-i ’alişan sadaka ve ihsan buyurulmak babında ırazhul cesaret olındı baki emr ve ferman-devletli ’inayetli merhametli efendim sultanım hazretlerinindir bende-i humbaracı Mehmed ‘Arif

493 BOA, C.TZ..31-1525: der-kenar şüde . fi 2 Rebi’u’l-ahir sene 1222

 timar-i humbaracı Mehmed ‘Arif veled-i Abdi der nahiye-i Serfice der liva-yı Paşa
karye-i Büyük Lozani ve şairi 5,725 akçe fi sene 1221

timar-i humbaracı Mustafa veled-i Salih der nahiye-i Serfice der liva-yı Paşa
karye-i Büyük Lozani ve şairi 5,725 akçe fi sene 1221
der-kenardında mestur Büyük Lozani nam karye ve şairinden beş bin yedi yüz yigirmi beş akçe timar humbaracı Mehmed ‘Arif veled-i Abdi ve yine karye-i merkumeden ol-mikdar akçe timar dahı humbaracı Mustafa veled-i Salih’in başka başka beratıyla üzerinden olub ahara tahvıl verildiği kaydan bulunmamışdır ferman-i devletli sultanım hazretlerinindir
and official notifications. On the basis of this note, a joint report, undersigned by Mehmed ‘Arif himself and a certain Süleyman, was written down immediately below the original report. The joint report cites that according to a ferman the timar under examination, which had total annual revenue of 11,450 akçes accruing from the village of Büyük Lozani and other villages, had remained vacant after its last beneficiary, a certain Mustafa son of İbrahim, had passed away without male issue. Thus, Mehmed Emin, the previous alaybeyi of the sağ kol, bestowed on 17 Rebi’ülahir 1221 AH / 4-7-1806 AD this timar on Mehmed ‘Arif, on account of his rank within the corps of bombardiers, and the fact that he was one of the lieutenants of the sancak of Pasha. Yet, the aforementioned Mustafa son of Salih asked formally, as a result of duplication and falsification of certain records, for the bestowal of the aforementioned timar on Mehmed ‘Arif to be reviewed and half of Mehmed ‘Arif’s timar to be bestowed upon him. Mustafa claimed that he deserved this bestowal, because he was an exalted military servant of the state and the highest-ranking lieutenant in the sancak of Pasha. Thus half of the aforementioned timar was taken away from Mehmed ‘Arif and granted to Mustafa. Nevertheless, although half of the timar was taken away from Mehmed ‘Arif and given to Mustafa, there was in reality no offense committed by Mehmed ‘Arif that could justify this confiscation, for Mehmed ‘Arif lived a good life, always looking after his personal affairs in perfect correctness, whilst he was, at the same time, an exalted military servant of the state.

For this reason, it was evident that a confiscation of a timar based solely on alleged duplication and falsification of some records would be a condition that could bring about further impediments and disorder. At the same time, it was accentuated that Mustafa was the highest-ranking lieutenant in the sancak of Pasha. Hence, if he continued serving under
the commands of the sancak authorities, exactly as he did up to that moment, it was highly likely that he could find another, far more profitable, timar to be bestowed on him. Thus, the two authors of this joint report asked for an imperial order addressing the alaybeyi of the sağ kol to be issued, which would command him that the first somehow lucrative vacant timar that would appear in the sancak be immediately reported to the corps of the bombardiers, in order to be bestowed on Mustafa. Last but not least, the two authors asked for the removed half of the aforementioned timar to be returned to its initial holder, Mehmed ‘Arif, and be bestowed on him by being annexed to the remaining half under Mehmed ‘Arif’s possession. A new berat had to be issued and all necessary proofs and receipts had to be delivered to the comptroller of Rumelia and the corps of bombardiers.\textsuperscript{494}

It seems plausible that this case was a deadlock between two members of the corps of bombardiers, who were at the same time high-ranking lieutenants in the timar troops of the liva of Pasha. Each of the two protagonists, namely Mehmed ‘Arif and Mustafa, made

Mehmed ‘Arif
‘abide-i Süleyman

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thorough use of his means of power and influence. Mehmed ‘Arif endeavoured to prevent the confiscation of his timar and Mustafa longed for, at least a part of, the timar initially granted to Mehmed ‘Arif. The two parties exploited the system and regulations of operation and bestowals of prebendal grants, to achieve their goals. We do not know how this case ended. Despite the general vagueness of available documentation, we could argue that the lieutenant sipahis formed a group of highly influential individuals, who enjoyed the prerogatives of being granted the most lucrative timar benefices in a given sancak and commanding a small contingent of light-cavalry troops.\footnote{In reality, since the rank of mülazim was the lowest-ranking officer post within the hierarchy of timar-holding troops, promotion to mülazimlik was the first step towards the higher and highest ranks of the Ottoman timar troops. A mülazim could be next promoted to çeribaşi, namely commander of all troops on a kaza level, and accordingly, after years of faithful and continuous service, reach the rank of alaybeyi and command all timar-holding troops in a sancak, and ultimately the two highest-ranking offices of provincial administration, namely sancakbeyi and beylerbeyi. Of course the latter two offices were reserved in the 18th century exclusively for palace officials, who followed a distinct career path, totally different from the path of timar-holding sipahis. However, since, as has been already discussed above, a large proportion of timars were bestowed on sappers and bombardiers, who were in reality members of, and subject to, the regulations of the Janissary corps, we could assume that individuals, such as the aforementioned Mehmed ‘Arif and Mustafa, were more likely to reach the highest-ranking posts in the army and provincial administration.}

When a timar was confiscated, the administration offered, according to the timar-system regulations, this timar on a hierarchical order to the first lieutenants (mülazım-ı evvellər). If the first lieutenants showed no particular interest in acquiring this timar, the administration offered it, accordingly, to the lower-ranking mülazıms. Moreover, the regulations stipulated that those mülazıms, who were granted confiscated timars, were also allowed to retain their rank. The aforementioned case of Ahmed, who was stripped of his timar due to the systematic neglect of his duties, is indicative to this point. The confiscated timar was initially offered hierarchically to the first lieutenants, but, when it remained due to a lack of interest undisposed of, a certain mülazım Hüseyin petitioned the authorities through his superior alaybeyi of the sol kol and demanded that this prebend be bestowed.
upon him. The authorities responded positively and, after they had ratified the bestowal, informed Hüseyin that he would be allowed also to retain his mülazimet.\(^{496}\)

5.4. The period of upheaval and turmoil: The timar system in the kaza of Service during Ali Pasha’s domination (c. 1800 – c. 1820)

This section covers the period, which, as has already been discussed, started sometime around 1790 and ended around 1820. Its predominant characteristic was the complete disorganisation and weakness of the Ottoman system of provincial administration, which resulted in the unprecedented rise in prominence of ambitious magnates who dominated for three decades the Ottoman socio-economic and political landscape. In the area under examination, this role was played by Ali Pasha and his protégés, who enjoyed for nearly 30 years unchallenged institutional independence from the state mechanisms of law enforcement and coercion. After Ali Pasha’s downfall, however, the ensuing power vacuum was filled by a reinvigorated spirit, which was promoted by the Porte and propagated the ideas of Westernisation and modernisation of the state and its administrative apparatus. Consequently, the old institutions that resisted change had to be eliminated and replaced by new ones, which would operate as catalysts of the new ideology. Thus it becomes apparent that the army was immediately affected by these ideas, since the period of reforms started

\(^{496}\) BOA, AE.SABH.I..269-18129: mülazım-ı evvellere yegân yegân teklif olundukda rağbet edüb rağbet eden mülazımlarından emr-i ‘ali mevcud olan merkum Ahmed’den ref’ ve mülazım Hüseyin kullarına tevcih ve yedine berat-ı ‘alişan sadaka ve ihsan buyurulmak babında

işbu alaybeyi ʿarzi mucebince na-mevcud ve terk-i hizmetinden mülazimeti hıfz ve mülazım-ı evvellerinin ʿadem-i rağbetlerinden tevcih-i nizam-ı müstahsene şurutuna mutabıkdır ferman-ı devletli sultanım hazretlerinindir

mucebince mülazimet bereti hıfz şartıyla tevcih olunmak deyû buyuruldu fi 11 Ramazan sene 1202

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in 1826 with the abolition of the obsolete Janissary corps, whilst timar grants and benefices followed suit in 1831.

As has already been discussed, the timar system was still in operation at the beginning of the period of Ali Pasha’s domination. Ali Pasha imposed gradually his rule over the kazas of Serfice, Çaharşenbe, and Eğri Bucak in the 1790s. The process started with the appointment in 1791 of Serficeli Hacı Halil Ağa as a’yan of Serfice and was completed with the purchase of the tax-farm of Kozani in 1801, when he emerged as the sole ruler of Kozani and its vicinity. Therefore, it becomes obvious that by 1801 Ali Pasha succeeded to impose his incontestable domination over the area under examination, which, coupled with the inability of the imperial centre to exert its control over the periphery, means that bestowals of timars passed essentially under his control. The available Ottoman documents provide no reference to the interference of Ali Pasha into or his exploitation of the process of timar bestowals. On the other hand, Ali Pasha’s personal archive comprises a small number of documents which cover the period, though not the area, under examination. These documents allow for conclusions to be drawn on the ways that Ali Pasha handled the timar system, whilst, whenever necessary, he did not hesitate to abrogate it.

Although the bibliography focuses on the aspect of the formation of Ali Pasha’s extended landed property in the areas under his domination, through extensive çiftlik-formation from free villages, we could argue that the methods described in the available monographs could also be applied on the methods that Ali Pasha employed to control the timar system.497 It is known that Ali Pasha based his domination on a combination of ruthless administration and accumulation of wealth that was generated by his extensive

497 Ahmet Uzun, Ali Pasha and His Fortune, pp. 1035-1077; Dimitris Dimitropoulos, Aspects of the working of the fiscal machinery in the areas ruled by Ali Paşa, pp. 61-72.
landed property and his interference in and control over trade routes throughout his polity. There is still great debate among historians regarding the methods that Ali Pasha used to establish and expand his enterprise, which allowed him to bypass the Ottoman land-ownership regulations for the conversion of a considerable number of free villages into his own çiftlik. They concur though to a certain extent that Ali Pasha, in order to satisfy his obligations vis-à-vis the Porte, made extensive use of a combination of legal and semi-legal means to impose his will and terms on the populations that inhabited his dominions. Ahmet Uzun summarises his methods of accumulation of cash as follows: a) imposition of heavy and extraordinary levies and taxes on the communities under his domination and trade activities throughout his dominions, in clear defiance of the tax regulations and limits implemented by the Porte, b) hoarding and selling of foodstuffs and provisions at higher prices than their market values, c) confiscation of the properties of those who died without male issue, violating, thus, the inheritance laws, which stipulated that female issue could inherit the fortune of their deceased fathers, d) acceptance of extensive bribes by members of his entourage and protégés, and e) extensive plunder of the areas ruled by adversaries of his, especially whenever he was at war against them. As becomes apparent, Ali Pasha’s long-term aim was to establish, on the basis of traditional fiscalism, an autonomous polity that would generate vast amounts of wealth, which would, in its turn, accrue from the various sorts of taxes and levies imposed on the economic activities of the population under his domination.

As far as the process of the transformation of free villages into çiftlik is concerned, Dimitris Dimitropoulos summarises Ali Pasha’s methods as follows: a) participation, either personally or in the name of his relatives and supporters, in the Ottoman fiscal and tax-

498 Uzun, Ali Pasha and His Fortune, p. 1056.
farming systems, in an attempt to monopolise tax-collection in his dominions and prevent
the rise of competitors, b) arrangements through his agents or village delegations
despatched to the Porte for their communities, which were under his domination, to pay
their taxes under the maktu’ system, because the latter method, which was based on the
payment of a fixed lump sum, instead of payment on the basis of the actual economic and
demographic situation of a community, allowed him to compute in advance the annual tax
obligations of each village and strengthen his ties with the village notables, who preferred
the application of this very system, c) attempts at controlling the financial administration of
tax liabilities of the communities under his domination, especially through consolidation of
their debts and tax liabilities into a single debt payable exclusively to him, and d) manipulation of the violence and insecurity-prevention machinery, by making use of his
position of overseer of the mountainous passages (derbendat nazırı) to coerce
insubordinate villages into submission, whilst he provided to the more docile communities
protection from banditry and any neighbouring competitors. Furthermore, Ali Pasha was
frequently called upon to play the role of referee in disputes over çiftlik ownership among
members of his own entourage and his protégés.499

The reader should keep in mind that, since the timar system was applied exclusively
on free villages which formed part of the state-owned miri lands, the transformation of free
villages into çiftlik must have affected undoubtedly the timar system as well. We can
therefore assume that the methods which Ali Pasha employed to control the operation of
the timar system in his dominions did not differ from those discussed above. As has already
been discussed, Ali Pasha interfered in various ways in the political, economic, and military
life within the circumscription of his dominions. We can argue therefore that he

499 Dimitropoulos, ibid.
endeavoured to control and meddle in the affairs of the *timar*-holders living under his jurisdiction. Ali Pasha’s archive contains an overall number of 15 documents pertaining to the operation of the *timar* system in his dominions, which contain invaluable information on the methods which he employed to handle it in various districts. I will use here six documents which elucidate his approach to the *timar* system and the class of *timar*-holders.

The first document, which refers to the case of a certain Derviş Süleyman who asked Ali Pasha in 1802 to lend him the sum of 5,000 ǧurüş, which he would pay as deposit for his appointment as *alaybeyi*, proves that Ali Pasha used to lend money to impoverished and indebted individuals to assist them in their efforts to purchase prebends or ranks in the prebendal army. Sometimes Ali Pasha interfered directly in the process of bestowals of *timars*. 500

The second document, which is a petition of a certain Ömer Demi, an Albanian Muslim, dated 1804, reveals that Ali Pasha was able to secure for his protégés *timars* which were unclaimed and vacant (*mahlul*). We do not know in what capacity he did that, which means that it is completely unknown whether he had acquired from the state the right of granting *mahlul timars* that were located in his dominions to his followers and protégés, or this was merely an arbitrary act. In this case, it seems plausible that Ali Pasha acted as an intermediary powerbroker between Ömer Demi, an unimportant provincial, and the authorities in Istanbul, by setting into motion his own influence mechanism to obtain this prebend on behalf of a loyal follower of his. 501

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The third document, which is a short order of Ali Pasha dated 1808, addresses a certain Sali Goro from Delvino, his Muslim Albanian agent operating in Central Greece, and commands him to act without undue delay and collect the necessary fees from some individuals who held or had leased timars in Sterea Ellada and Euboea. Based on this information, we could assume that Ali Pasha was also charged with the ratification of bestowals of timars on various individuals, which allowed him to collect in return the fees which all newly-appointed beneficiaries had to pay as deposit to secure their rights over their prebends.  

The fourth document, an order dated 1814, indicates that Ali Pasha forced oftentimes timar-holding lieutenants to retire from and abandon their timars, which he would afterwards arrange, after they had been cross-checked and approved by him personally and the local alaybeyi, to be bestowed anew upon them, or granted to his followers and clients. He succeeded therefore to eliminate the old officers and replace them with trustworthy individuals dependent exclusively on his benevolence and goodwill.

Nevertheless, the most scandalous feature of Ali Pasha’s manipulation of the timar system was his arrangement of bestowals of prebends on non-existent and fictitious individuals. There are two cases which prove the extent of the paralysis and corruption of the state administrative mechanism in the heyday of Ali Pasha’s power. The first case was the bestowal in 1815 of a timar on the son of a certain Hasan son of Kasım. When the latter passed away, Ali Pasha provided the defterhane-i ‘amire, which as has already been discussed above was the bureau responsible for handling timar surveys and bestowals, with the particulars of an individual who was supposedly son of the deceased Hasan, but was in

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reality a non-existent person. It becomes obvious that Ali Pasha bribed the officials charged
with issuing of berats and obtained therefore the prebend that Hasan had held prior to his
death for himself.\textsuperscript{504} Something similar occurred in the case of a timar that was in the
possession of Salih Pasha, who was Ali Pasha’s younger son and governor of İnebahtı
(today: Navpaktos) and Avlonya (today: Vlorë, in Albania). The treasurer (kesedar) of the
defterhane-i ‘amire informed Ali Pasha’s agents at the Porte that Salih Pasha’s record had to
be reexamined and the prebend be recorded in someone else’s name, for the bestowal of
this timar on Salih Pasha was profoundly defective and against the regulations of bestowals
of timars. This case again provides us with the initiative of arguing that the administration
had retained its rights of supervision of timar bestowals in the provinces, which allowed it to
interfere, whenever need arose.\textsuperscript{505}

The cases presented above demonstrate Ali Pasha’s interest in meddling in various
ways in the affairs of the class of timar-holders. We do not have any information about his
dealing with the group of timar-holders in the kazas of Serfice, Çaharşenbe, and Eğri Bucak.
Nevertheless, we can suspect a not-so-different approach from the one discussed above.
Furthermore, another report dated 1818 states that Ali Pasha attempted to meddle in and
manipulate bestowals and removals of some unspecified timars which were under the
supervision of the superintendent of the grenade factory at Üsküdar. This report allows us
to assume that, since a considerable part of the timar-holders in the kaza of Serfice were
active members of the corps of sappers and bombardiers, Ali Pasha should have established
a channel of communication between himself and the superintending officers of both corps,
through which he could manipulate and affect the bestowals on or removals of timars from

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{504} Panagiotopoulos, The Archive of Ali Pasha, II, p. 539.
\footnote{505} Panagiotopoulos, The Archive of Ali Pasha, II, p. 599.
\end{footnotes}
members of both corps. We could also argue that Serfici Hacı Halil Ağa, whom we have met already operating in various capacities as Ali Pasha’s most trusted agent in the area under examination, was also the official charged with the observance and valuation of the timar-holders in the kazas of Serfice, Çaharşenbe, and Eğri Bucak.\(^{506}\)

It is also feasible to perceive the extent of Ali Pasha’s interference in the timar system through a comparison between the villages which formed part of timar transactions and the villages which were recorded as Ali Pasha’s çiftlikş and part of his extensive landed property. We should turn, therefore, our attention to a synoptic register recording the emlak-i hûmayun villages, mezra’as, and mills which were leased on the basis of the iltizam system by a certain silahşor Rüstem Bey, a magnate and member of one of the most prominent families in Manastır, for the whole economic year 1239 RC, namely from 13-3-1824 AD until 12-3-1825 AD.\(^{507}\) We should note that the emlak-i hûmayun, known also as sultanic freehold property, was a new type of land ownership, which was formed on the basis of the prerogative of müsadere.\(^{508}\) Furthermore, the introductory note atop the first page of the register states that these villages, before their annexation to the sultanic freehold property, had been under the control and administration of the imperial mint, exactly in the same way as the mukata’a of Kozani after Fatma Hanıım Sultan’s death in


\(^{507}\) BOA, D.BŞM.EMK.d..14238: işbu otuz dokuz senesi Martı ibtidasından sene-i merkume Şubatı ğayetine değin bir sene-i kâmile zabt ve idare olunmak üzere Manastır hanedanından ve silahşoran-i hassadan Rüstem Bey ‘ühdesine iltizamen ve maktu’an ihalesi

The register is preserved in the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul.

\(^{508}\) The term müsadere means the confiscation by the state of the movable and immovable property of those individuals who either passed away without offspring or of the landed property of magnates and provincial notables who were accused of high treason. On the practice of müsadere, see: Pakalın, Dictionary of Expressions and Terms, II, pp. 624-626.
The following villages were recorded as Sultanic freehold property in the kazas of Serfice, Çaharşenbe, and Eğri Bucak: a) in the kaza of Serfice there were recorded four villages, namely Rimnoz, Valtoz, Lazarat, and Mokroz, b) in the kaza of Çaharşenbe there were recorded seven villages, namely İhten, Kalyani, Keraşa, İftilar, Butras, Yeniköy, and Radovişta, and c) in the kaza of Eğri Bucak there was recorded only one village, namely the village of Ciciler. As Tables 1a, 1b, and 2, presented in Appendix 3, show, in the late 18th century the timar system was still in full operation in the villages of İhten, Kalyani, Keraşa, Podorazde/Butras, and Radovişta, which were after Ali Pasha’s downfall recorded as parts of his çiftlik assets and were annexed consequently to the newly-formed emlak-i hümayun.

This preliminary finding proves not only Ali Pasha’s interference in the operation of the timar system, but also his undeniable intention to manipulate the system and, whenever opportunity arose, to uproot it altogether, resulting therefore in the eradication of miri land ownership and the subsequent transformation of free villages into his own çiftlik properties.

Since there is no available information about the properties of members of Ali Pasha’s entourage and his closest counselors, collaborators, and protégés, it is, for the present, impossible to ascertain whether the latter were allowed to retain their movable and immovable properties and, if so, under what circumstances. Three temettuat

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510 This is a list of the old and modern names of the villages appearing in the Filitas list and the Ottoman register: İhten (today: Ktenion), Kalyani (today: Aiani), Keraşa (today: Kerasia), İftila[r] (today: Ftelia), Butras/Portoraz (today: Protochorion), Yeni Köy (today: Argillos), Radovişte (today: Rodia), Rimnoz (today: Rymnion), Valtoz (today: Tranovaltos), Lazarat (today: Lazarades), Mokroz (today: Livaderon). On the names of the villages, both older and modern ones, see: Drakakis and Koundouros, Documentation, II, pp. 511, 513, 519, 522, 530, 532, 534; Krüger, Names, pp. 164, 173, 182, 240, 270, 284, 349, 449, 455, 459, 509.
registers,\textsuperscript{511} which were compiled in 1846, show that there was in all three kazas under examination a number of çiftlik villages, namely Labaniça, Lozani-i Kebir/Büyük Lozani, İzisko, Havlılar, Milutin, İzdani, and Ğraçani, which never formed part of Ali Pasha’s çiftlik system and, although they were in the late 18th century recorded as free villages wherein the timar system was still in full operation, they appear in the 1846 temettuat registers fully converted and deprived of their previous status. However, the case of a certain Hasan Bey son of İliyas Silahdar Poda can strengthen the argument regarding the participation of Ali Pasha’s supporters in the exploitation and eradication of the timar system in the area under examination. This individual, who was the son of one of the key supporters of Ali Pasha and his right-hand officer in the military operations against Souli,\textsuperscript{512} was recorded as owner of the çiftlik village of Lozani, which has never been a çiftlik of Ali Pasha’s. It seems plausible, however, that Silahdar Poda succeeded, in his capacity as one of Ali Pasha’s most trusted agents, to amass a considerable fortune, which after his overlord’s downfall he bequeathed to his son, solely because he betrayed his master and, like Serficeli Hacı Halil Ağa, joined the government forces in their campaign against Ali Pasha.\textsuperscript{513} We should note, however, that we do not know whether Silahdar Poda had other sons, whilst the exact size and constitution of his fortune remains for the present completely unknown. Be that as it may, these findings

\textsuperscript{511} The three temettuat registers are preserved in the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul and are classified by the Directory as follows: BOA, ML.VRD.TMT.d..11455 (for the kaza of Serfeç), BOA, ML.VRD.TMT.d..11417 (for the kaza of Çaharşenbe), and BOA, KK.d..6077 (for the kaza of Eğri Bucak). For more information on the structure of this type of registers and the information that they contain, see: Hayashi Kayoko and Mahir Aydı (eds.), The Ottoman State and Societies in Change, A Study of the Nineteenth Century Temettuat Registers (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), pp. 3-45.

\textsuperscript{512} For additional information about the career and role of Silahdar Poda as commander of Ali Pasha’s forces in the wars against the Souliotes, see: Aravantinos, History of Ali Pasha, pp. 142-145, 148-160; Vasso D. Psimouli, Souli kai Souliotes [Souli and the Souliotes], (Athens: Bibliopoleion tis Estias, 2006\textsuperscript{4}), pp. 411, 428-429.

\textsuperscript{513} Silahdar Poda’s betrayal is mentioned only by Lioufis. For additional information, see: Lioufis, History of Kozani, p. 84.
show that Ali Pasha’s supporters and protégés, at least some of them, if not all, should have participated in the process of the eradication of the *timar* system and the subsequent transformation of free villages into *çiftlik* estates. Their properties were, most probably, recorded in separate registers, which lie for the present undiscovered in the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul.

To recapitulate we should keep in mind that Ali Pasha imposed throughout his dominions a system of ruthless and undisputed administration, which he supervised personally with the assistance of only some of his most trusted agents and supporters. The basic motive behind Ali Pasha’s behaviour was the maximisation of his revenues and neutralisation of any potential impediments to the unconditional implementation of his rule. Therefore, it was only natural that his methods comprised among others the replacement of *timar*-holding beneficiaries, whose loyalty he deemed questionable, with more trustworthy individuals, or even non-existent persons, whilst, wherever he deemed it necessary or profitable, he aimed at the abolition of the *timar* system altogether. In addition to that, Ali Pasha and his supporters aimed at and succeeded in turning mainly indebted and unprotected villages into *çiftlik* estates, where the native population was compelled to work the land as sharecroppers, peons, and agricultural labourers. As has already been discussed above, the process of the gradual disintegration of the *timar* system and the formation of large *çiftlik* estates in Ali Pasha’s dominions were two closely correlated phenomena, which transformed radically the socio-economic landscape of the area under examination. This process formed, of course, solely a small part in the empirewide process of the spread of
çiftlik ownership and the conversion of indebted free village communities into çiftlik estates.\textsuperscript{514}

### 5.5. Conclusion

The development of the timar system after the end of the 17th century has been the subject of incessant disregard and neglect by Ottomanist historians. We lack, therefore, an understanding of its history during the 18th century, a period which was characterised by experimentation in various sectors of the political and socio-economic life. The historians adhering to and being under the influence of the decline paradigm, instead of examining the timar system within its historical context, have been hitherto content with an ahistorical description of the incessant decline of the timar system. Alongside the decline of the other great classical-period pillars of the Ottoman polity, namely the Janissaries and the palace education and service systems, the decline of the timar system was the primary reason for the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Due to this prevalent idea and perception of the historical course of the timar institution, Ottomanists have heretofore failed to examine the timar system within the context of the 18th-century changes and reforms in the military, administrative and taxation system. Moreover, they have completely misunderstood and disregarded its transformation into an alternative method of remunerating state functionaries for their services to the state.

\textsuperscript{514} For a thorough discussion of the theories on the formation of çiftlik estates during the 18th century, see: Gilles Veinstein, “On the Çiftlik Debate” in Çağlar Keyder and Faruk Tabak (eds.), Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 35-53. See also the seminal monograph of Bruce McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe, Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800, where the overall process is examined and presented in detail, on the basis of Immanuel Wallerstein’s theory of World-Systems.
In this chapter, through the analysis and evaluation of the data provided by original documentation, I have attempted to provide a preliminary depiction of the system, as it operated in the *kaza* of Serfice during the course of the 18th and early 19th centuries, until Ali Pasha’s downfall. It is, of course, needless to say that we still need further and more thorough research to be carried out on the basis of additional data that will shed light on the structure, organisation, and administration of the post-classical *timar* system on an empirewide scale, in order to be able to perceive accurately its use by the Ottoman central and provincial administration.

As becomes apparent from the cases examined above, the central and provincial administrative mechanism supervised and interfered in the operation of the *timar* system, through the accurate and systematic record of all *timar* transactions, validation or cancellation of *timar* bestowals, and immediate and direct intervention in the disputes arising among conflicting *timar*-holders aiming at resolving them promptly and effectively. Since the importance and role of provincial cavalry forces in Ottoman warfare had been diminished after the Military Revolution in the late 16th century, the provincial *timar*-holders were degraded into an auxiliary force of secondary importance. This force was in the 18th century manned with provincials, whilst it was observed an ever-increasing tendency to the assignment of *timar* grants to “peasant” Janissaries, or members of collateral corps under the jurisdiction of the Janissary corps, who were remunerated for their services with *timar* grants, instead of the payment of a regular salary paid to them directly from the imperial treasury. The *timar*-holding cadres operated like a police force.

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515 I would like to remind the reader that the term “peasant” Janissaries was introduced recently by Evgeni Radushev in his seminal article “Peasant Janissaries?”, *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Winter 2008), pp. 447-467. It denotes the local, *yerli* in Ottoman Turkish, Janissaries who were trained and served in the provinces and were not the products of the palace educational service.
with the duty of enforcing law and order in the localities where their timars were located. Some of them were, furthermore, entrusted with the special duty of guarding the countryside and the communications through the mountainous passages and highways. They, thus, supervised the operation of and kept in check the system of armatoliks in the vicinity of the town of Serfice, thus complementing the policing duties of the Christian armatoloi. We have also seen that there were also timars which were bestowed on high-ranking Palace officials and members of the Ottoman provincial and central administration, on the one hand, and protégés of influential viziers and pashas, on the other. All of these individuals were absentee beneficiaries of the wealth generated by the socio-economic activities of the local indigenous population and was thence allotted to their prebends.

We could, therefore, argue that the timar system was converted in the course of 18th century into a mechanism for the payment of salaries, in the form of benefices that consisted of revenues which were generated in the provinces, to state officials and individuals dependent on the state. This mechanism operated parallel to the system of remunerations defrayed by the imperial treasury in cash. The basic difference between these two systems was that whilst the timar was calculated on an annual basis and consisted of fixed and non-fixed levies on estimated annual agricultural yields and the economic activity of the taxpayers, the ‘ülüfe was calculated on a daily basis and paid regularly by the treasury in cash, three or four times a year. Last but not least, as the two cases of Mehmed and Abdurrahman imply, the timar system could be combined with or replaced by tax-farming, especially in cases of unproductive and deficient prebends, which the state farmed out to individuals willing to invest their funds in the long-term development and efflorescence of remote provincial places. All this proves that the timar
system in the 18th century was neither dead nor moribund, but rather alive and in full operation, with its longevity proving its ability to reshape and adapt to new realities and demands.

It is for the present impossible to determine the proportion of “active” to “titular” or “honorary” timar-holding soldiers. As discussed above, the Porte still imposed prior to the ratification of each timar grant specific obligations and duties on the respective timar-beneficiary, which he was liable to perform in full. The case of Ahmed examined above proves that the administration was, sometimes with considerable delay, prone to strip of their timars those timar-holders, who either neglected their duties or performed them in an insufficient manner. Unfortunately, I was unable to locate in the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives any 18th-century ruznamçe timar registers, which, as their 16th and 17th-century counterparts, should record on an empirewide scale the daily records of the defter-i hakani. These records constitute a chronological record of bestowals and confiscations of timars, the makeup of the revenue of each prebendal unit, and the circumstances of the occurring vacancies, either due to the death of the beneficiary or confiscation of his grant. Therefore, this issue must remain open for a later assessment and evaluation, when additional sources will be discovered.516

I have also traced the survival of the timar system throughout the period of Ali Pasha’s domination. The timar system proved its flexibility and adjustability to the demands and standards of the early 19th century and survived until 1831, when, as a result of the

516 On the importance of the ruznamçe registers for the analysis and examination of the timar system in both its classical and post-classical form, see: Howard, The Ottoman Timar System, pp. 42-53; Douglas Howard, “The BBA ‘Ruznamçe Tasnifi’: A New Resource for the Study of the Ottoman ‘Timar’ System”, Turkish Studies Association Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 11-19, which is a seminal article that presents the contents and methods of exploitation of the information provided by this type of registers.
initial attempts of the imperial centre at sweeping changes in and reformation of the Ottoman military forces, it was abolished alongside the other elements of the Ottoman ancien régime. This is, however, only a preliminary step into a thorough understanding and evaluation of the role which the timar system played in the post-classical Ottoman polity and governance. Therefore, there is still an imperative demand for monographs, which on the basis of systematic study of primary sources will examine in greater depth and detail the structure and functioning of the post-classical timar system.
CHAPTER VI

Conclusion

The Ottoman 18th century was a period of remarkable changes and experimentation with various fiscal and administrative practices, with the first attempts at reforming the Ottoman military, fiscal, and economic apparatuses according to Western European models. The tulip mania, the first embassies to European capitals, the modernisation of the Ottoman military forces by the French adventurer Comte de Bonneval and the Hungarian-born French consul in Istanbul, Baron François de Tott, and Selim III’s Nizam-ı Cedid are all instances of the movement of the “Ottoman Enlightenment”. This movement exerted strong influence on the Ottoman statesman presiding over the administration of the Ottoman realms, whilst it galvanised the conservative cycles led by the ülema and the Janissaries, into fierce reaction against all things European, which they thought of as a threat to their vested interests in the market and the guild organisation of the Ottoman capital. In this context, the spread of itltizam and malikâne tax-farming should be seen as an attempt of the state to mobilise the investment of private capitals into the public sector. In other words, tax-farming was a method of internal borrowing and servicing of public debt, which the state achieved through what Ariel Salzman has called the “privatization” of the public finances and Ottoman political economy.

Another instance of the history of the Ottoman 18th century was the emergence of a distinct group of wealthy and powerful individuals in the Ottoman provinces who took advantage of the great opportunities that tax-farming offered them. Thus they assumed the responsibility of administering the affairs of their localities as both representatives of the
communities which they presided over, but also to operate as officially recognised agents of the state in their localities. The “Age of the Ayans” constitutes thus a period worth studying and its contribution to the later periods of the Ottoman history is worth evaluating.

Much ink has been spilt over the role of these powerful and influential notables in determining the course of Ottoman history, not only in the 18th century, but also afterwards. The representatives of the revisionist Ottomanist historiography, who broke away from the decline paradigm (which supported the idea of the inexorable decline of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the emergence of the powerful notables in the provinces and the triumph of the ideas of nationalism in the periphery, on the one hand, and the rot of the administrative mechanisms, on the other) have argued that the notables legitimised the state in their localities, as long as the state legitimised their role therein, producing thus a paradigm of mutual legalisation and legitimacy.

Karen Barkey argues that the 18th-century Ottoman polity was the product of the relationship between the centre and periphery, and of the role of the central state as an adroit broker through mediation and negotiations among the numerous competing networks of power. Barkey defines the Ottoman Empire as a “negotiated” enterprise where each locality was approached and handled in a different fashion and always according to its needs and traditions. Ali Yaycioğlu referred in his recent monograph to the Ottoman provincial notables and magnates as “Partners of the Empire”, supporting the idea that late 18th-century centre-periphery relations were based on deals and contracts, agreed upon by mutual consent between the central administration and peripheral magnates. The latter possessed the paramount know-how concerning the administration of local and communal affairs, and could also legitimise the decisions made by Istanbul in the eyes of the
communities that they led. At the same time, peripheral magnates could count on legitimacy and status conferred upon them by state recognition, with which they could outmanoeuvre their adversaries.

All this became apparent with the examination of the numerous cases of factional strife in Kozani and the appointment of local notables as voyvodas and administrators of the malikâne tax-farms of Kozani, Serfice, and Velvendos on behalf of their absentee beneficiaries. The state operated in Kozani as a broker among the various factions and local networks of power, whilst promoting its interests and securing secure inflow of annual revenues accruing from the tax-farms of Kozani, Serfice, and Velvenods into the imperial treasury. Thus the state also promoted the interests of the absentee malikâne-beneficiaries who depended on the interference and support of the state to achieve the fruition of their investments in financial enterprises located in remote, and virtually unknown, areas of the Ottoman realms. On the other hand, local notables, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, formed cross-confessional partnerships, aiming at outmanoeuvring their adversaries and imposing their control over the Kozanite tax-farm and community, the paramount sources of wealth and power. Yet, whenever communal and factional strife reached a climax that threatened the very existence of the community, the conflicting parties resorted always to the arbitration of the state, which was called upon to intervene and solve the dispute. We could argue, therefore, that the local notables had established a close relationship with the state, in which they operated as close partners with the administration, though not always on equal terms. Local notables were heads of households and factions, which were the embodiment of local networks of power, wealth, and prestige. The state operated as broker among the local and Istanbul-based networks that based their existence on the functioning...
of the tax-farming system, which bound together during the 18th century the centre and the periphery. To sum up, I could argue that the role of the state as broker and arbitrator conferred legitimacy on the factions that vied for supremacy over their communities, which they were entrusted to lead and administer as partners of the Istanbul-based oligarchs and the state.

Moreover, peripheral magnates and notables were, according to Yaycioğlu’s argument, by-products of their very Ottomanism, which they could not break away from, nor follow a path outside the 18th and early-19th-century Ottoman cosmos. Thus, although they profited from the profound weakness of the Ottoman state in the 18th and earliest part of the 19th centuries, they defended the integrity and existence of the Ottoman polity, because the latter constituted the only environment, in which they could realise themselves. This power vacuum was the factor that allowed them to rise in prominence and in the end determine in a decisive manner the path of the Ottoman Empire towards modernity, vis-à-vis the advent of nationalism among its subjects. At the end of the 18th century, the crises that the state was faced with contributed to the loosening of the control of the state over the periphery and allowed for powerful notables to emerge in the provinces and claim for themselves an autonomous economic and political role. In our case this role was played by Ali Pasha, who succeeded in the progressive establishment of his rule over a mosaic of communities in an extensive area that stretched over Epirus, Western Macedonia, Thessaly, the Peloponnese, and parts of Southern Albania. Ali Pasha imitated the role of the state, which he aimed at supplanting by assuming for himself the role of broker and arbitrator among the various factions and networks in his realms. He thus imposed his rule by promoting the interests of his supporters who slavishly defended his cause and served
him faithfully. This occurred in Kozani when Ali Pasha supported the Alifrones led by Rousis Kontorousis, who retained their grip over the Kozanite community for almost two decades, and the appointment of Serficeli Hacı Halil Ağa as a’yan of Serfice.

Set in this context, this Thesis was an attempt at rewriting the history of an area whose Ottoman past remains virtually unknown. Kozani’s history was written by local amateur historians, such as Gounaropoulos, Lioufis, and Papakonstantinou, who, despite their contribution with monographs that contain invaluable information about local oral traditions and microhistory, were always restricted by their ardent support of nationalist ideas and concepts. Thus, Kozani was according to their narratives the eternal bastion of Hellenism in Western Macedonia, which never succumbed to the attacks of its neighbours, be they Muslim Turks or Christian Bulgars, who always surrounded Kozani and machinated against its integrity and existence. The recurring factional strife, which dominated the life of, and almost broke apart, the Kozanite community at the end of the 18th century, is described by them as a series of unfortunate events, which again depict the determination of the Kozanite community to overcome the adversities and survive.

The revision of the history of the area of Kozani and its vicinity was initiated some years ago, however, with the publication of two monographs of primary importance. The first monograph is Georgios Salakides’ “The Sultanic Documents of the Municipal Library of Kozani”, where the Ottoman sultanic documents, which are still preserved in the Kobentareios Library of Kozani, were published, translated, and commented upon. The second monograph is Kostas Kambouridis and Georgios Salakides’ “The Province of Servia during the 16th Century through Ottoman Sources”, which contains a publication and translation of the earliest extant Ottoman tapu tahrir register and a critical evaluation of all
of the surviving 16th-century *tapu tahrir* registers of the *kaza* of Serfice. These two monographs are the first attempt by Ottomanists to introduce and broadly use Ottoman primary sources in the examination, evaluation, and writing of the history of the area of Kozani. As a direct *continuation* of the two aforementioned works, I hope that my study will also contribute to that direction.

Kozani was during the 18th century a lucrative tax-farm which the Ottoman state outsourced to members of the Istanbul-based *malikâne*-holding oligarchy. The most typical representative of this group in local context was Fatma Hanım Sultan, who was a minor member of the ruling Ottoman dynasty and held the *malikâne* of Kozani under her possession for three decades. Fatma Hanım Sultan was an absentee *malikâne*-beneficiary who depended on the network of local administrators, known as *voyvodas*, who were directly appointed by her and acted as her representative agents, entrusted with the administration of the tax-farm and the collection on her behalf of the annual revenues generated therefrom. Of course, this pattern was different from that in cases where *malikâne*-beneficiaries were local figures, because *voyvodas* were far more independent and played a decisive role in defending the rights and prerogatives of their employers, who lived and operated outside the narrow limits of the *malikâne* that he had contracted for with and had been bestowed upon him by the state. Therefore, in the case of both Kozani and Velvendos though the *malikâne*-beneficiaries, namely Fatma Hanım Sultan and Hibetullah Hanım Sultan, were well-connected with the circles of influential Istanbul-based magnates, their influence in local affairs was limited and depended on the capabilities and skills, or lack thereof, applied by their agents in the administration of their tax-farms. Thus,
it becomes apparent that the voyvoda was the cornerstone in the administration of malikâne tax-farms held by absentee beneficiaries.

In our case, the most typical example of such an agent was Manço Osman Ağa, a Muslim notable of Christian origins, who retained his protagonist role in the Kozanite political and socio-economic life for two decades and constituted, alongside Rousis Kontorousis, the leader of one of the two most prominent factions that vied for supremacy and control over the Kozanite community. Manço Osman Ağa established his own household which comprised the members of his family, his sarraf, and all of his collaborators and partners. Yet, as became apparent, Manço Osman Ağa’s household was compared to the grand a’yan households of Rumelia, Anatolia, and Egypt (e.g. the household of Ali Pasha, the Caniklizâdes, and the Qazdaglis) mediocre and unimportant. This must be attributed to the fact that Manço Osman Ağa was a peripheral notable of secondary importance, whose power base was confined to the limits of Kozani, a small town in the Ottoman periphery. For this reason, Manço Osman Ağa’s household, and his enterprise in general, lacked spatial diffusion, endurance, and longevity. When he passed away his sons, who came to inherit their father’s position, proved incapable of administering the tax-farm of Kozani and lead the Kozanite community, which ushered in their deposition from the post of the voyvoda of Kozani and fading into obscurity. Thus, in stark contrast to the case of the Caniklizâdes, who survived repeated onslaughts from both state authorities and local adversaries, Manço Osman Ağa and his successors proved incapable of establishing a long-term power base in Kozani and its vicinity.

As was clearly shown, the two factions of the Alifrones and the Dimokratikoi were, in stark contrast to the ideas and narratives produced by the local amateur historians, mixed-
membership, cross-confessional groups wherein both Muslims and Christians aligned their common interests and, by forming long-lasting alliances, endeavoured to overpower and annihilate their adversaries. Such cases were the alliance formed between Manço Osman Ağa and Rousis Kontorousis, which proved the cornerstone of the establishment of the faction of the Alifrones, and the alliance between teberdar Ismail Ağa, Ebu Bekir Bey, and Georgios Avliotis, which ushered in the establishment of the faction of the Dimokratikoi. These two factions were founded on the basis of the antagonism among local Muslim notables for the control over the tax-farm of Kozani and the post of voyvoda. Yet, these antagonisms concurred with intra-communal strife among local Christian notables for the post of the local kocabaşı and the subsequent control over the Kozanite community. The situation was further aggravated by the interference of the local bishop Ignatios in communal affairs, whose administration was characterised by cronyism and nepotism. The two factions developed their own mechanisms of influence and clashed violently and without restraint, in both ideological and physical terms. In two cases, the strife ushered into open civil strife, which almost broke apart the community. The crises cast their shadow over the Kozanite community and the administration of communal affairs, and was only terminated in 1797, when the Alifrones obliterated their opponents and imposed their undisputed domination over the administration of the tax-farm and the management of the communal and ecclesiastical affairs of Kozani.

The information provided by the Ottoman documentation is not adequate to create a clear image of the activities of the overall social spectrum of the Kozanite community. Since the available primary sources focus on the local Christian and Muslim notables and administrators of the tax-farm of Kozani, the information that we extract compels us to
focus, for the present time, on the Christian and Muslim Kozanite élite. In the local branch of the general state archives of Greece (Genika Archeia tou Kratous/G.A.K.) there are preserved some Greek documents, which are collectively known, from the notary Dimitrios Prassos, who preserved them in his personal archival collection, as the Prassos Archive, and which date from 1796-1914. These documents are a series of wills, dowry deeds, and contracts made by the people of Kozani, Servia, and Velvendos, which were recorded by the communal registrars and notaries of the local bishopric. These documents could help us further explore the everyday life and status of, not only the élite, but also the ordinary, non-privileged, strata of the Kozanite society. Furthermore, the branch contains a series of 19th-century Ottoman documents, namely a register of the tithe levied on the agricultural produce of the villages of the kaza of Kozani, due for the year 1864, and a series of two kadi registers from the religious court of the kaza of Eğri Bucak, dated 1836-1843 and 1858-1870 respectively. Since these registers contain copies of the orders which the Porte despatched at that time from Istanbul to Kozani, but also contracts and deeds agreed upon before and ratified by the court, as well as records of events that occurred locally and the reaction of the administration to these events and their protagonists, they can provide an insight into the everyday life of the area of Kozani and its vicinity just before and after the implementation of the Tanzimat reforms. Another important source of information are the three temettu’at registers for the kazas of Serfice, Çaharşenbe, and Eğri Bucak, which are preserved in the Prime Minister’s Archives in Istanbul. As is known, these registers were compiled on an empirewide scale in 1845-1846 and constitute the sole attempt of the late Ottoman administration to obtain a clear image of the income and profits generated by its subjects. They thus constitute an invaluable source of information about peripheral societies, such as the Kozanite. Of paramount importance are also the Ottoman 19th-
century census registers, known as *nüfus yoklama defterleri*, which started to be compiled in the early 1830s and provide a satisfactory, if not perfectly accurate, image of the size and structure of the Ottoman population during the 19th century. All these documents can be the basis for a more thorough understanding of the history of Kozani and its vicinity in the middle of the 19th century, before and after the promulgation and implementation of the *Tanzimat* reforms.

Serfice and Velvendos present another opportunity to study the imperial centre-periphery relationships during the 18th century. The fortress-town of Servia, known as Serfice to the Ottomans after their conquest of it in the late 14th century, was the old administrative and religious centre of the area under examination, which was gradually superseded by Kozani. Yet Serfice retained its economic importance and, since it was a lucrative tax-farm, enjoyed the benefits of the application of the *malikâne* tax-farming sometime before 1715-1716, when Serfice was mentioned for the first time as a *malikâne* tax-farm outsourced to Zeynûlabidin Âğa. The latter was a local Muslim notable, who, just like his Kozanite counterpart, Manço Osman Âğa, exploited his status and wealth, which he used in his attempts at turning the *hasses* of Serfice into his own *malikâne*. Nevertheless, what was particularly important in the case of Serfice was the participation of members of the Giray dynasty, rulers, then ex-rulers, of the Crimean Khanate in the administration of the tax-farm of Serfice. Starting with Hüssam Giray Sultan and İslam Giray Sultan at the beginning of the 18th century and ending with Ahmed Giray Sultan at the beginning of the 19th century, a series of Giray princes, offspring of the late-17th-century Crimean Han Hacı Selim Giray I, were beneficiaries of annual stipends which accrued from the annual revenues generated from the tax-farm of Serfice. This scheme created a triangular relationship among
the Ottoman administration, the beneficiaries of the *malikâne* tax-farm of Serfice, and the Giray princes, which presents a rare opportunity to study the role of and relationship between the absentee beneficiaries, on the one hand, and the local magnates, who undertook the duty of the day-to-day administration of the tax-farm and fair apportionment of the revenues generated therefrom among their various beneficiaries.

Since Velvendos’ socio-economic history and demographic figures presented profound similarities with Kozani’s, it can be seen, and is often mentioned as such by local amateur historians, as the chief antagonist of Kozani during the 18th century. The available sources allow for a limited approach and estimation of Velvendos’ economic and demographic size. Yet, due to the lack of primary or secondary sources on its population and intra-communal politics, it is impossible to say anything on the formation, or lack thereof, of factions which vied for supremacy and clashed, as was the case with the factions of Alifrones and Dimokratikoi in Kozani. At the present stage of my research, I could argue that, just like Kozani, Velvendos was a rural settlement, which, due to the intense mercantile activities of the Velvendiotes in Central Europe, developed at a fast pace, and its population succeeded in accumulating considerable wealth that they invested in the welfare of their community. It was thus only natural that it was turned into a *malikâne* and was farmed out to Hibetullah Hanım Sultan, another minor member of the Ottoman dynasty, who appointed local agents to preside over the administration of the tax-farm and collection of the revenues generated therefrom. Yet, the case of Velvendos is also of particular importance, because until 1741 the tax-farm of Velvendos contained as dependencies the Evlad-ı Fatihan villages in the area, which were exclusively inhabited by Muslim Yörük s. Additional research is required before we can reach safe conclusions on the relationship between Velvendos and the
Muslim Yörüks in the period preceding their separation in 1741, when the Evlad-ı Fatihan were relegated to the status of ordinary Muslim re’aya taxpayers and formed a separate tax-farm. The same applies to the socio-economic development of Velvendos during the 18th century and the reason why, despite its profound economic and geographical similarities with Kozani, it never reached the latter’s high standards and was unable to compete for administrative and episcopal primacy.

The terra incognita explored by this Thesis is undoubtedly the study of the 18th-century timar system in the area under research. It was realised that the timar system survived as a relic from the Suleymanic “Golden Age” and was converted in the course of 18th century into a mechanism for the payment of salaries, in the form of benefices that consisted of revenues which were generated in the provinces, to state officials and various individuals dependent on the state. This mechanism operated parallel to the system of remunerations defrayed by the imperial treasury in ready cash. The timar-holding beneficiaries were still expected, in return for the benefices that they were allowed to hold, to fulfil certain duties and obligations vis-à-vis the state and the Sultan. Furthermore, as was shown above, the Ottoman administration kept a close eye on the bestowal of timar benefices, whilst it intervened to resolve any disputes that broke out among timar-holders or chastise those beneficiaries who failed to fulfill their obligations. This is another instance of the role of the state as broker among the various local networks of power. The state appointed, rewarded, fired, and chastised at will the timar-beneficiaries, whilst intervening as arbitrator to solve disputes arising among them. The timar-beneficiaries constituted a distinct élite, which served the interests of the state and performed a large variety of duties, from policing the countryside to guarding of communications through the mountainous
passages and highways, complementing the duties of and keeping a close eye on the always unreliable Christian *armatoloi*. There is no available bibliography on the 18th-century *timar* system at an empirewide scale, which comes as a natural consequence why it is a *terra incognita* worth exploring. Again, additional research is required, before we can reach safe conclusions on the survival and operation of the *timar* system on an empirewide scale during the 18th century.

This Thesis also examined the period of Ali Pasha’s domination and his methods of interference in the affairs of the communities under his rule. Most typical were the financing of competing factions, such as his open support for the *Alifrones* in Kozani, and the appointment of local people as his agents, who were responsible for serving his interests at a local level and were answerable directly to him. The most typical example of such an agent was Serficeli Halil Ağa, who was for three decades one of Ali Pasha’s most loyal supporters and agents in the area under examination. The Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul and Ali Pasha’s Greek Archive contain a large number of unexploited documents, which could contribute to our further understanding of Ali Pasha’s career and the historical course of his polity.

I would like also to refer to two phenomena of particular importance, namely the phenomenon of the emergence of the *çiftlik* land ownership and the role of the monasteries, which for various reasons I was unable to study here. As far as the *çiftlik* s are concerned, the available documentation covers the 16th century, the earliest parts of the 17th century, and the period after the downfall of Ali Pasha, whilst there is a noteworthy lack of documentation on the 18th century. It is worth mentioning that from the landed property confiscated from Ali Pasha and his supporters, a new type of land-ownership
emerged, known as *emlak-i hümâyun* sultanic properties. Due to the inherent defects and dysfunctionality of the new system, the state resorted in the 1830s to selling the *emlak-i hümâyun* sultanic properties off to prospective investors, through auctions and the issuance of imperial title-deeds (*mülkname-i hümâyun*). Unfortunately, the available documentation remains completely silent as to the 18th-century process of the formation of *çiftlik* in the area of Kozani and its vicinity. For this reason, I decided to omit the examination of this phenomenon from my Thesis and cover it at a later stage of my research.

The socio-economic and political role of the monasteries in the Ottoman world also forms a subject of scrutiny by the Ottomanist historiography. In the area under examination there were during the Ottoman period a small number of monastic foundations, namely the monastery of Hosios Nikanor or Zamborda, the monastery of the Panagia Zindaniotissa or Zindani, and in adjacent areas the monasteries of Timios Prodromos in the *kaza* of Kara Ferye (today: Verroia), and Olympiotissa and Sparmos in the *kaza* of Alasonya (today: Elassona), which need to be studied and their relationship with the area under examination clarified. Since the Prime Minister’s Ottoman Archives in Istanbul provide scant documentation on this issue, their prospective researcher needs to access the monastic archives and the archives of the local bishoprics. There it is more than plausible that documents pertaining to the functioning of these monasteries during the Ottoman period, and the 18th century as far as this Thesis is concerned, may be located and provide the necessary information.

In a comparative perspective, my findings have many things in common with studies of other districts of Greece in the 18th century. A brief comparison with two studies which examined the centre-periphery relationship in the 18th-century Ottoman Macedonia would
suffice to prove this point. Anastasopouls argues in his dissertation that the a’yans of Kara Ferye (today: Verroia) were the middle ground between the local community and the state officialdom, whilst their peculiar status rendered them both dependent on and independent from both. Furthermore, he argues that the the a’yans of Kara Ferye served predominantly personal interests, whilst it is highly questionable whether they had developed a “class” consciousness. As we have seen in the case of the Kozani, the local Kozanite notables participated actively in the communal affairs and formed factions, which vied for supremacy and served the interests of their members regardless of their religious affiliations. He also argues that the state was not a distant abstraction, for it materialised through the imperial decrees, and the mūbaşırs and other state agents despatched to the provinces, as a response to petitions of the local population, to redress their needs. This is also observed in the cases of Kozani, Serfice, and Velvendos examined above. In our case, however, we have noticed also that the close relationship between the state and the periphery was also strengthened through the bonds between the absentee malikâne-holders and the voyvodas representing them at the local level. Last but not least, Anastasopouls observed that, despite the fact that, due to the structure of the Ottoman administrative mechanism, official communications among neighbouring kazas were limited, contact through unofficial channels was commonplace. This was observed in our case as well, as was the case with the Ḥacı Oğlu incident and the activities of Serficeli Halil Ağa.

Shariat-Panahi’s dissertation, just like Anastasopouls’ dissertation, highlighted successfully the role of the local Thessalonian a’yans as intermediaries between the state and the local communities and their relationship with each respective community. In the countryside around Thessaloniki the situation closely resembled the situation of the
peasantry in the areas of Kozani, Serfice, and Velvendos, because the countryside was not affected by the penetration of Salonica by foreign agents and merchants. He argues that debt bondage and perennial indebtedness of the peasants, which tormented the peasants during the 18th century and were further aggravated with the outbreak of the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman war, led to the gradual disappearance of the independent peasantry and the emergence of the çiftlik system. The peasants were now legally, or even physically, dispossessed by their creditors, who were in most cases the same city-dwelling notables, who were absentee landlords alienated from their landed property in the countryside. Although we lack 18th century documentation on the emergence of the çiftlik system in the areas of Kozani, Serfice, and Velvendos, we can assume, from the available 19th-century sources that the situation might not have been radically different.

As becomes clear, further research is required, before we attempt a comparative analysis of these phenomena. For all these reasons, however, I think that this Thesis is not just another example of the history of the relationship between the imperial centre and a minor peripheral area, let alone merely the first step towards a more complete understanding of the history of the areas of Kozani, Serfice, and Velvendos. I would argue that dissertations focusing on the examination of local histories could help us prove or disprove the claims and arguments of the new revisionist historiography, as they appear in general monographs, which focus on the imperial centre and the big image. Thus one could use the modern revisionist theories to rewrite the history of this area. The fact remains that we need additional documentation, both Greek and Ottoman, which one could use in order to shed some light onto those areas which still remain uncharted and unexplored. Yet, the examination of the history of local communities during the period of the Ottoman
domination on the basis of grand narratives and arguments, such as those proposed by Karen Barkey and Ali Yay cio ğlu, could provide an example for future attempts at doing the same in other areas of the Ottoman periphery, or even an example for rewriting the history of the Ottoman 18th century or the Empire as a whole.
**APPENDIX 1:**

Table 1: The taxes, fees, and disbursements that were collected in Kozani, between 1761 and 1764, on the basis of the two account registers (BOA, TS.MA.d..06642; BOA, TS.MA.d..04826).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>fees/taxes</th>
<th>1760-1761</th>
<th>1762-1763</th>
<th>1763-1764&lt;sup&gt;517&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tax-farm annuity</td>
<td>8500</td>
<td>8500</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public annuity</td>
<td>1780</td>
<td>1780</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>money given to Janissary foot-soldiers and gunsmiths, for the governmental account</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lump sum of the poll-tax</td>
<td>3250</td>
<td>3122</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tax-farm officer fees</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expenses of the public officer and remaining disbursements</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>726</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest paid to the moneylender in four months</td>
<td>680</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disbursement for issuing an imperial order commanding the serbestiyet of the tax-farm</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voyvoda's wage</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interest for unpaid taxes in</td>
<td>2345</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>2573</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>517</sup> In that year the tax-farm annuity, its public annuity, its office fees, the money for the expenses of the public officer, for the annuity of the poll-tax and for the interest paid for communal debts, until the day of Saint Demetrius, were classified together and amounted to 15420 ᵃṟuş.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Previous Year</th>
<th>Stipends to Irregular Mercenary Soldiers under Janissary Leadership</th>
<th>300</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Loan, Offered by the Voyvoda</td>
<td>582</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly Expenses for the Mansion of the Bey</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Paid by the Community Until the Day of Saint Demetrius</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees Given to the Tax-Collector for Collecting Remaining Taxes</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Paid by the Community Between the Day of Saint Demetrius and the Beginning of March</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2:

The genealogical tree of Ahmed Giray Sultan on the basis of the first hypothesis:

The genealogical tree of Ahmed Giray Sultan on the basis of the second hypothesis:
Note: These genealogical trees were constructed on the basis of the information provided by Mehmed Süreyya’s *Sicill-i Osmani* and the genealogical tree presented in the *Islâm Ansiklopedisi*. For additional information on the *Sicill-i Osmani* entries, which I have used to construct these trees, see the respective footnotes in Chapter IV. For the *Islâm Ansiklopedisi* entry, see: Halil İnalcık, “Giray” in A. Adivar, R. Arat, A. Ateş, İ. Kafesoglu, T. Yazıcı, *Islâm Ansiklopedisi, İslâm Âlemi Tarih, Coğrafya, Etnografya ve Biyografya Lûgati* [Encyclopedia of Islam, A Historical, Geographical, Ethnographic, and Biographic Dictionary of the Islamic World] (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1964), IV, pp. 783-789, where one can find appended the genealogical tree of the Giray dynasty.
APPENDIX 3:

Appendix 3.1.

This is an analytical list of the settlements of the kaza of Serfice, on the basis of their classification as *timars*, *zi’amets*, and *hasses* recorded in the poll-tax register MAD.d..04374, pp. 182-197.

Kaza of Serfice:

1- The town and administrative centre of Serfice: *hass* of the Tatar Han of Crimea

2- Lazarat: *timar*

3- Kaldat: *hass*

4- Valtoz-ı Kebir: *zi’amet*

5- Metakşa: *zi’amet*

6- İnehor: *timar*

7- İzisko: *timar*

8- Velvendos: *hass* of the Grand Vizier

9- Mokroz: *timar*

10- Maçkohor: *timar*

11- Rimnos: *hass* of the Grand Vizier

12- Lojani: *timar*

13- Valtos-ı Sağır: *timar*

14- Delvinos: *timar*

15- Vitivyani: *timar*

16- Kestanelik: *timar*

17- Katafi: *timar*

18- Paloğluçan: *zi’amet*

19- Rahoz: *timar*
Appendix 3.2.

This is the full text of the marginal note accompanying the petition, which İbrahim submitted to the Porte and demanded the examination of his records and redress for the violation of his rights. The marginal note, which is taken from the document classified as BOA, AE. SABH.I..61-4292, contains all timars located in the kaza of Serfice in 1785, reads as follows:

Serfice nahiyesine tabi’ yigirmi sekiz bin akçe yazar Vanca-ı Büzürg bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun on dört bin akçesi sahib-i ‘arzuhal lağımcı İbrahim veled-i Süleyman ve yedi bin akçesi lağımci Ali veled-i Hüseyin ve ol-mikdarı lağımci Osman veled-i Hüseyin ve yine Serfice nahiyesine tabi’ neferat ve çiftlik ile karye-i İvrahova hasıl tahtı ispence ve gendüm yekun ve ğayrihi otuz üç bin üç yüz akçeye yazu ile defter-i mufassalda muharrir kalemiyle tahrir ve defter-i icmalda otuz üç bin akçeden sekiz bin beşyüz akçesi ikrar ve bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun bin yüz akçesi lağımci İbrahim veled-i Süleyman ve beşyüz elli akçesi lağımci Ali veled-i Hüseyin ve ol-mikdarı lağımci Osman veled-i Hüseyin ve yüz elli akçesi İslam veled-i Ömer ve ol-mikdarı Hasan veled-i Hasan ve altı bin akçesi Mustafa ve karye-i merkumun iki bin sekiz yüz akçesi daha ikrar ve yine nahiyesinde iki bin sekiz yüz akçeye yazar karye-i Yoncalar ve bin akçe yazar karye-i Kidonya ve bin ikiyüz akçe yazar Gornıça karyesiyle birikdirilüb yekun sekiz bin ikiyüz elli akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezkurun üçyüz elli akçesi lağımci İbrahim veled-i Süleyman ve yüz yetmiş beş akçesi lağımci Ali veled-i Hüseyin ve ol-mikdarı lağımci Osman veled-i Hüseyin ve altı bin akçesi Ali veled-i Yakub ve bin beşyüz akçesi eyalet-i Rum İli’nin za’im müteferrika eden İliyas veled-i Abdi ve karye-i merkumun üç bin beşyüz akçesi daha ikrar ve nahiyesinde üç bin akçe yazar karye-i Küçük Lozani ve iki bin beşyüz akçe yazar Radovişte karyesiyle birikdirilüb yekun dokuz bin akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezkurun yediyüz elli akçesi lağımci İbrahim veled-i Süleyman ve üç yüz yetmiş beş akçesi lağımci Ali veled-i
Hüseyin ve ol-mikdari lağımcı Osman veled-i Hüseyin ve altı bin akçesi Ali ve yedi yüz elli akçesi humbaracı Mustafa veled-i Ahmed ve ol-mikdari humbaracı İsmail ve karye-i mezburun bin akçesi dahı ikrar ve yine nahiyesinde Graçani nam karye ve ğayrihi ile birikdirilüb yekun ma’ ğayrihi yigirmi bin akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun on bin akçesi humbaracı Mehmed Yusuf Murad Bey ve ol-mikdari humbaracı Selim ve karye-i mezburun bin akçesi dahı ikrar yine Graçani karyesiyle birikdirilüb ol-dahi yigirmi [bin] akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun on altı bin akçesi humbaracı Hüseyin veled-i İsmail ve dört bin akçesi Suleyman ve karye-i merkumun üç bin akçesi dahı ikrar ve yine nahiyesinde Karamohor nam karye ve ğayrihi ile birikdirilüb yekun ma’ ğayrihi üç bin sekiz [yüz] akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun bin dokuz yüz akçesi Veli veled-i Ahmed ve ol-mikdari Ali veled-i Ömer ve karye-i merkumun beş bin beşyüz akçesi dahı ikrar yekun ma’ ğayrihi altı bin akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezbur tamaman Hasan ve karye-i merkumun iki bin akçesi ikrar ve Körice nahiyesinde Alyani nam ve ğayrihi ile birikdirilüb yekun ma’ ğayrihi dokuz bin beşyüz akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun üç bin akçesi Suleyman veled-i Salih ve beşyüz akçesi Ahmed veled-i müteferrika İsmail hazine-i hassa ve altı bin akçesi Osman veled-i Suleyman ve karye-i merkumun altı bin akçesi dahı ikrar ve yine Serfice nahiyesinde altı bin beşyüz akçe yazar karye-i İhten ve ikiyüz akçe yazar Şaraka karyesiyle birikdirilüb yekun on iki bin yediyüz akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun üç bin akçesi lağımcı İbrahim veled-i Suleyman ve bin beşyüz akçesi lağımcı Ali veled-i Hüseyin ve ol-mikdari lağımcı Osman veled-i Hüseyin ve altı bin akçesi Mehmed veled-i Mustafa ve yediyüz akçesi dergâh-i ‘ali müteferrikalarından Ömer hazine-i hümayun ve Serfice nahiyesine tabi’ on dört bin akçe yazar Büyük Lozani karyesinin beş bin beşyüz akçesi ikrar ve sekiz bin beşyüz akçe yazar Balıoğlu Graçani karyesinin bin akçe ikrarıyla birikdirilüb yekun altı bin beşyüz akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun ikiyüz elli akçesi lağımcı İbrahim veled-i Suleyman ve yüz yigirmi beş akçesi lağımcı Ali veled-i Hüseyin ve ol-
mikdarı lağımci Osman veled-i Hüseyn ve altı bin akçesi Yakub veled-i Abdi ve karye-i Büyük Lozani el-mezburen sekiz bin beşyüz akçesi dahi ikrar ve karye-i Balyoğluçani el-mezburen yedi bin beşyüz akçe ikrarla birikdirilüb yekek ma’ ğayrıhi yigirmi bin akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburen on bin akçesi Vidin muhafızı vezir Ebü Bekir Paşa’nın defterlûsünden olmak üzere kaydi meşruh İbrahim veled-i Abdü’l-kerim ve ol-mikdarı Sayda valisi vezir Cezzar El-Hac Ahmed Paşa’nın defterlûsünden olmak üzere kaydi meşruh Ali ve Serfice nahiyesine tabi’ yetmiş beş bin beşyüz akçe yazar Kalyani nam karyenin yigirmi bir bin beşyüz akçesi ikrar ve bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburen yediyüz elli akçesi İslam veled-i Ömer ve ol-mikdarı Hasan veled-i Hasan ve yigirmi bin akçesi Murad ve karye-i merkumun kirk bin beşyüz akçesi ikrar ol-dahi bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburen dokuz yüz akçesi lağımci İbrahim veled-i Süleyman ve dörtüz elli akçesi lağımci Ali veled-i Hüseyn ve ol-mikdarı lağımci Osman veled-i Hüseyn ve sekiz bin dokuz yüz dokuzyüz akçe İslam veled-i Ömer ve ol-mikdarı Hasan veled-i Hasan ve yigirmi bir yediyüz akçesi Mustafa ve Mehmed lağımçısıyan venda-i lağımci Abdi ve karye-i merkumun altı bin beşyüz akçesi dahi ikrar ol-dahi bir icmal ol-dahi tamaman merkumun Mustafa ve Mehmed lağımçısıyan venda-i lağımci Abdi ve karye-i merkumun altı bin akçesi dahi ikrar ve bir icmal ve tamaman Salih veled-i Ibrahim ve Serfice nahiyesine tabi’ on bin akçe yazar ihtisab ve ihzariye-i nefs-i Serfice ve yine nahiyesinde on üç bin akçe yazar İzıçko karyesinin altı bin akçe ikramyla birikdirilüb yekek on altı bin akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburen iki bin yüz akçesi lağımci İbrahim veled-i Süleyman ve bin elli akçesi lağımci Ali veled-i Hüseyn ve ol-mikdarı lağımci Osman veled-i Hüseyn ve iki bin dokuzyüz akçesi Veli veled-i Ahmed ve ol-mikdarı Ali veled-i Ömer ve altı bin akçesi Zakarya ve Kalyani el-mezburen bin akçesi dahi ikrar ve Lavanica nam karye ve ğayrıhi birikdirilüb üç bin akçe Serfice kal’ası dizdarına muhassas bir icmal ve tamaman Ömer ve karye-i İzıçko el-mezburen yedi bin akçesi dahi ikrar ve Goblıça karyesinin iki bin yüz akçe ikramyla birikdirilüb dokuz bin
yüz akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun bin üçyüüz akçesi lağımcı İbrahim veled-i Süleyman ve altyüz elli akçesi lağımcı Ali veled-i Hüseyin ve ol-mikdari lağımcı Osman veled-i Hüseyin ve iki bin akçesi Veli veled-i Ahmed ve ol-mikdari Ali veled-i Ömer ve iki bin beşyüüz akçesi Mustafa Ağa fi da’ire-i hane-i hassa ve salif-i zikr karye-i Goblıça el-mezburun üç bin akçesi ikrar ve bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun bin beşyüüz akçesi Derviş veled-i müteka’id Hasan ve ol-mikdari Zeynel veled-i Mustafa ve karye-i merkumun üç bin dokuzyüz akçesi ikrar ve bir icmal ve tamaman Ali ve iki bin sekizyüüz akçesi dahi ikrar ve bir icmal ve tamaman İbrahim ve Serfice nahiyesine tabi’ çiftlik ve neferat ile karye-i Havlılar hasıl tahtı çift ve hinta ve şa’ir yekun ma’ ğayrihi dokuz bin ikiyüüz akçe yazar ile defter-i mufassalda muharrir kalemiyle tahrir ve defter-i icmalda dokuz bin akçeden beş yüz akçesi ikrar ve yine Serfice nahiyesinde sekiz bin yediyüüz akçe yazar Çernişte karyesinin üç bin akçe ikrarıyla birikdirilüb üç bin beşyüüz akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun ikiyüüz elli akçesi lağımcı İbrahim veled-i Süleyman ve yüz yigirmi beş akçesi lağımcı Ali veled-i Hüseyin ve ol-mikdari lağımcı Osman veled-i Hüseyin ve üç bin akçesi Maksud ve karye-i Çernişte el-mezburun bin beşyüüz akçesi ikrar ve Havlılar karyesinin dokuz yüz akçe ikrarıyla birikdirilüb iki bin dörtyüüz akçe bir icmal ol-dahi tamaman Maksud ve Goblıça karyesinin beş yüz akçesi ikrar ve Bersebe nahiyesinde İzdani nam karye ve ğayrihi ile birikdirilüb yekun iki bin akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezbur tamaman eyalet-i Rum-ıli’nin defteri çavuşlarınndan Yusuf veled-i Mustafa ve karye-i Goblıça el-mezburun yedi yüz akçesi dahi ikrar ve Evrenoslu nam karye ma’ ğayrihi ile birikdirilüb yekun ma’ ğayrihi altı bin akçe bir icmal ol-dahi tamaman Ali ve karye-i Çernişte el-mezburun dört bin ikiyüüz akçesi ikrar ve bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun bin ikiyüüz akçesi Mustafa veled-i Mehmed ve üç bin akçesi Ahmed veled-i Abdullah ve karye-i Havlılar el-mezburun beş yüz akçesi dahi ikrar ve karye-i Varvari ve ğayrihi ile birikdirilüb yedi bin beşyüüz akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun altı bin beşyüüz akçesi Mustafa ve bin akçesi müteferrika İlyas veled-i Abdi ve karye-i
merkumun üç yüz akçesi ikrar ve Katafi nam karye ve ğayrihi ile birikdirilüb altı bin sekizyüz akçe bir icmal ve tamaman Ali ve karye-i merkumun bin akçesi dahı ikrar ve Lavanica nam karye ve ğayrihi ile birikdirilüb yeke'n üç bin akçe bir icmal ve tamaman Mustafa ve karye-i merkumun üç bin beş yüz akçesi dahı ikrar ve bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun üç bin akçesi Mehmed veled-i Osman ve beş yüz akçesi Mustafa veled-i Mehmed ve karye-i merkumun beş yüz akçesi ikrar ve Kastanya nam karye ve ğayrihi ile birikdirilüb yeke'n ma' ğayrihi iki bin akçe bir icmal ve tamaman Hibbet veled-i Süleyman ve karye-i merkumun üç yüz akçesi ikrar ve Keraşa nam karye ve ğayrihi birikdirilüb üç bin yüz akçe bir icmal ve tamaman Mustafa ve İbrahim ve karye-i merkumun bin üç yüz akçesi dahı ikrar ve Keresye nahiyesinde İslate'n nam karye ve ğayrihi ile birikdirilüb yeke'n ma' ğayrihi on dört bin beş yüz akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun dört bin iki yüz akçesi Veli veled-i Ahmed ve ol-mikdarı Ali veled-i Ömer ve altı bin akçesi Yakub veled-i Ali ve yüz akçesi Abdür-resül veled-i Süleyman ve karye-i merkumun yedi yüz akçesi dahı ikrar ve Serfice kal'asi måstahfızanına mahsus bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun beratlu kaydı olan mındığın ecvüesı dahı zühr 'arzuhalında tahrir ve Serfice nahiyesine tabı' beş bin yüz akçe yazar karye-i Hlutinin ve üç bin akçe karye-i Aya Para(z)skeva ve iki bin beş yüz akçe yazar Kerası-ı Büzürg karyesiyle birikdirilüb yeke'n on bin altı yüz akçe bir icmal ve icmal-i mezburun dört bin altı yüz akçesi lağımçı İbrahim veled-i Süleyman ve altı bin akçesi İbrahim veled-i Hasan kaydlerdedir

518 sic: Milutin
### Appendix 3.2. / Table 1a:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>icmal / timar core value</th>
<th>total revenue in akçes</th>
<th>timar-holder(s)</th>
<th>shares in akçes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vanıça-ı Büzürg</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>İağımı İbrahim son of Süleyman</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>İağımı Ali son of Hüseyin</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>İağımı Osman son of Hüseyin</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Mustafa</td>
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<td>Ali son of Yakub</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>İliyas son of Abdi müteferrika of the za’im of the eyalet of Rumelia</td>
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<tr>
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<td>humbaracı Ismail</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>İvrahova Graçani and</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>humbaracı Mehmed Yusuf Murad Bey</td>
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<td>19,000</td>
<td>humbaracı Mehmed Yusuf Murad Bey</td>
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</table>

\(^{519}\) Although the note states that the share of the village of Kidonye is 1,000 akçe, we should upgrade it to 1,450 akçe so that the overall value of this timar reaches the prescribed amount of 8,250 akçe.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village/Municipality</th>
<th>Humbaracıs</th>
<th>Humbaracıs (Son of)</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
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<td>Hüseyin (Son of Ismail)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Süleyman</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İvrahova, Karamohor and other villages</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Veli (Son of Ahmed)</td>
<td>3,800</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Ali (Son of Ömer)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Hasan</td>
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</tr>
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<td>500</td>
<td>Süleyman (Son of Salih)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>lağımcı Osman son</td>
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<td>İslam son of Ömer</td>
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<td>Hasan son of Hasan</td>
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<td>lağımcıyan sons of</td>
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<td>the lağımcı Abdi (jointly)</td>
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<td>Havlılar Keraşa and other villages</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abdürresül son of Süleyman 100</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>700</td>
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<td>Ibrahim son of Hasan 6,000</td>
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### Appendix 3.2. / Table 1b:

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<th>Share</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Warden of the fortress of Serfice</td>
<td>Sons of the lağımcı</td>
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<td>27,200</td>
<td>Ömer Ağa in the service of the sultanic privy chamber</td>
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<td>Milutin 5,100</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Aya Paraskeva 3,000</td>
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<td>İbrahim son of Hasan</td>
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<td>Keraşa-ı Büzürg 2,500</td>
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<td>İağimci İbrahim son of Süleyman</td>
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<tr>
<td>İbrahim son of Hasan</td>
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</table>
### Appendix 3.2. / Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timar-holder, and date and type of grant</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Shares according to the initial apportionment</th>
<th>Shares according to the new apportionment</th>
<th>New total nominal values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ömer warden of the fortress of Serfice bestowed upon him in 1179 AH / 1765-1766 AD</td>
<td>Lavanıça, Kalyani</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali son of Ömer bestowed upon him in 1197 AH / 1782-1783 AD</td>
<td>İslamlu, Karamohor, Iziçko</td>
<td>[4,000] (^{520})</td>
<td>2,626</td>
<td>6,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Islatine, dependency of the kaza of Kesriye</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>1,813</td>
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<td>İvrahova, Gobliça, Havlılar</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>376</td>
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<td>Yakub son of Abdi bestowed upon him in 1196 AH / 1781-1782 AD</td>
<td>Küçük Lozani</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Büyük Lozani, Balyoğraçani</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{520}\) The brackets denote amounts that were not recorded in the marginal note and which I have reached after I had subtracted the recorded values from the total nominal value of the prebend. The settlements, for whose share there was no recorded value, were not included in the kaza of Serfice, but were parts of other kazas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nominal Value</th>
<th>Timar</th>
<th>Zi'amet</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1195 AD</td>
<td>11,450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1195 AH</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1195 AD</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1195 AH</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1197 AH</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1197 AD</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1195 AH</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1195 AD</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1195 AH</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1197 AD</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- **Timar** denoted Kalyani.
- **Zi'amet** included market fees and fees for summons of the town of Serfice.
- **Timar** included market fees.
- **Zi'amet** included fees for summoned of town.
- **Timar** included market fees.
- **Zi'amet** included fees for summoned.
- **Timar** included market fees.
- **Zi'amet** included fees for summoned.

---

521 Villages in *italics* denote names of settlements that were illegible either due to deficiencies in the handwriting of the author of the marginal note or due to damage to the document, which hampered my reading of this name.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>zi’amet in the nahiye of Berkofça</strong></th>
<th><strong>Total Nominal Value</strong></th>
<th><strong>Notes</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mustafa son of Mehmed</strong> bestowed upon him in 1196 AH / 1781-1782 AD</td>
<td><strong>62,297</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,199 zi’amet in the nahiye of Berkofça</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mehmed son of Osman</strong> bestowed upon him in 1196 AH / 1781-1782 AD</td>
<td><strong>9,105</strong></td>
<td><strong>Maksud</strong> bestowed upon him in 1196 AH / 1781-1782 AD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hibbet son of Süleyman</strong> bestowed upon him in 1195 AH / 1780-1781 AD</td>
<td><strong>5,100</strong></td>
<td><strong>Notes</strong></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Timar</strong></th>
<th><strong>Havlılar</strong></th>
<th><strong>Total Nominal Value</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maçkohor</strong></td>
<td><strong>Çernişte</strong></td>
<td><strong>[6,499]</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Havlılar</strong></td>
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<td><strong>500</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Okçilar</strong></td>
<td><strong>Havlılar</strong></td>
<td><strong>[6,105]</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>3,000</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Karamohor</strong></td>
<td><strong>Çernişte</strong></td>
<td><strong>[5,000]</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Çernişte</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,000</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>4,072</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>1,328</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Sari Halil</strong></td>
<td><strong>Kastanya</strong></td>
<td><strong>[3,100]</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Havlılar</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,000</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>500</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- **zi’amet** is a type of land tenure in the Ottoman Empire.
- The years mentioned correspond to the AH and AD systems used in the Ottoman period.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Timar</th>
<th>Nominal Value</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Havlilar</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Havlilar</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>timar in the nahiye of Kesriye</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>İbrahim son of Hasan</td>
<td>İzv(ol)or</td>
<td>[2,600]</td>
<td>1,698</td>
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<td>1,500</td>
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<td><strong>total nominal value</strong></td>
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<td>1,500</td>
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<td>Place of Service</td>
<td>Timar Value</td>
<td>Construction Value</td>
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<td>İhten İvrıhova Şaraka</td>
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<td>3,072 2,834 96</td>
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<td>Ömer in the service of the sultanic treasury, a müteferrika of the Porte</td>
<td>Hasan Depe İhten İvrıhova Şaraka</td>
<td>[26,296]</td>
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<td>3,000 3,000</td>
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<td>nefs-i Şişan Işılatine, in the nahiye of Kesriye Havlılar</td>
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<td>Timar</td>
<td>Total Nominal Value</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,800</td>
<td>2,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ali bestowed upon him in 1197 AH / 1782-1783 AD</td>
<td>Evrenoslu</td>
<td>6,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Yusuf son of Mustafa from the çavuşes on the payroll of the eyalet of Rumelia bestowed upon him in 1194 AH / 1779-1780 AD</td>
<td>Griçani</td>
<td>[13,599]</td>
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<td>15,599</td>
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<td>İlçeler</td>
<td>Vanıca-ı Büzürg</td>
<td>(İv)Rahova</td>
<td>ZİAMET</td>
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<td>1,085</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>İlçeler</th>
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<tr>
<td>İvírahova</td>
<td>7,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>175</td>
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<td>Büyük Lozani</td>
<td>7,000</td>
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<td>Kalyani</td>
<td></td>
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<td>İziçko</td>
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<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,313</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Milutin</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidonya</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gorniça</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Radovişte</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balyoğluçani</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şaraka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gobliça</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havlılar</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerasa-ı Büzürg</td>
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İlavet: İbrahim, oğuz-ı Süleyman

İlavet: Ali, oğuz-ı Hüseyin

Total nominal value: 28,600
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Nominal Value</th>
<th>Küçük Lozani</th>
<th>Büyük Lozani</th>
<th>Kalyani</th>
<th>Market Fees and Fees for Summons of the Town of Serfice</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12,004</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>125</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,004</strong></td>
<td><strong>125</strong></td>
<td><strong>450</strong></td>
<td><strong>656</strong></td>
</tr>
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<table>
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<th>Village</th>
<th>Market Fees</th>
<th>Fees for Summons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İziçko</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İhten</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çernişte</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoncalar</td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidonya</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorniča</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radovişte</td>
<td></td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balyoğraçani</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Şaraka</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gobliça</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havlılar</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>7,000</td>
<td>11,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İhten</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ɪv)Rahova</td>
<td>175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Küçük Lozani</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*lağımci* Osman son of *lağımci* Hüseyin bestowed upon him in 1195 AH / 1780-1781 AD
| 12,004 | Büyük Lozani | 125 | 106 |
|        | Kalyani      | 450 | 450 |
|        | market fees  | 1,050| 656 |
|        | and fees     |      |     |
|        | for summons  |      |     |
|        | of the town  |      |     |
|        | of Serfice   |      |     |
|        | İziçko       | 650 | 894 |
|        | İlten        | 1,500| 768 |
|        | Çernişte     | 125 | 107 |
|        | Yoncalar     |      | 59  |
|        | Kidonya      |      | 29  |
|        | Gornića      |      | 25  |
|        | Radovişte    |      | 104 |
|        | Balyoğraçani |      | 19  |
|        | Şaraka       |      | 24  |
|        | Koblıça      |      | 150 |
|        | Havlılar     |      | 18  |

İslam son of Ömer
bestowed upon him
in 1197 AH / 1782-
1783 AD

| 8,999 | 9,749 | 9,899 |
| Kalyani |      |      |
| another share from the village |      |      |
| of Kalyani | 750 | 750 |
| İvrubahora | 150 | 150 |

Hasan son of Hasan
bestowed upon him
in 1197 AH / 1782-
1783 AD

<p>| 8,999 | 9,749 | 9,899 |
| Kalyani |      |      |
| another share from the village |      |      |
| of Kalyani | 750 | 750 |
| İvrubahora | 150 | 150 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timar</th>
<th>Village(s)</th>
<th>Total Nominal Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa</td>
<td>Ivrahova, Ververi, Lavanica other village(s) not recorded</td>
<td>18,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali son of Yakub</td>
<td>Rahova, Yoncalar, Kidonya, Gorniça</td>
<td>9,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>Küçük Lozani, Goblica, Ivrahova, Radovişte, Ali</td>
<td>16,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İliyas son of Abdi müteferrika</td>
<td>Zeliçişte, Ververi, Rahova, Yoncalar, Kidonya, Gorniça, Havlılar</td>
<td>16,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süleyman</td>
<td>Amoni, Ğraçani, Ivrahova</td>
<td>16,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Nominal Value</td>
<td>Timar in the Nahiye of Filorine</td>
<td>Timar in the Nahiye of Koriçe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleyman son of Salih</td>
<td>Libonik, Alyani, Ivrahova</td>
<td>[6,800]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bestowed upon him in 1196 AH / 1781-1782 AD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed son of Muteferrika Ismail, a servant of the sultanic privy chamber</td>
<td>Katranica, Alyani, Ivrahova</td>
<td>[78,383]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bestowed upon him in 1196 AH / 1781-1782 AD</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>78,883</td>
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<tr>
<td>Osman son of Suleyman</td>
<td>Alyani, Ivrahova</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bestowed upon him in 1172 AH / 1758-1759 AD</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>27,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mustafa ve Mehmed Lagimci sons of Lagimci Abdi</td>
<td>Kalyani</td>
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<tr>
<td>humbaracı</td>
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<td>Place</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa son of Ahmed</td>
<td>Podorazde Küçük Lozani</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Küçük Lozani İvrahova</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radovişte</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail</td>
<td>Podorazde Küçük Lozani</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Küçük Lozani İvrahova</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radovişte</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Mehmed Yusuf Murad Bey</td>
<td>Graçani İvrahova</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>İvrahova</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selim</td>
<td>Graçani İvrahova</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>İvrahova</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hüseyin son of İsmail</td>
<td>Kastanya Graçani</td>
<td>12,514</td>
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<td>Graçani İvrahova</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veli son of Ahmed</td>
<td>İslamlu</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>timar</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Total Nominal Value</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>bestowed upon him in 1194 AH / 1779-1780 AD</strong></td>
<td>Karamohor</td>
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<td>market fees and fees for summons of the town of Serfice</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>İslatine</td>
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<td>5,500</td>
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</table>
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