

**Ottoman Egypt in the mid eighteenth century- Local Interest Groups and Their
Connection with and Rebellions against the Sublime Porte and Resistance to State
Authority**

by

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ABSTRACT

This research is an attempt to understand the relations between the Ottoman imperial government and the local administrators of Egypt, namely the mamluk beys. Gaining more financial and political power, the mamluk beys commenced to challenge the authority of the Ottoman governor of Egypt in the mid-eighteenth century alongside the incessant struggles between each other. Using a variety of Ottoman archival documents and contemporary narrative sources, I examine the factors behind the mamluk beys' authority expansion that resulted in uprising of Ali Bey al-Kabir (Bulutkapan).

Throughout the dissertation I pursue two arguments, which address key issues in Ottoman political historiography. The first argument concerns with the underlying causes of the mamluk beys' extended authority. I show that short-tenured governors encountered with financially and politically powerful local components, which may be considered as a result of the decentralized administration system of the Ottoman Empire. Mamluk beys' ambition to accumulate more financial income led them to contact European consuls directly in order to open Suez trade for them.

The second argument concerns the centre-periphery relations of the Ottoman Empire. I show that, although they gained power and challenged the pasha, the mamluk beys did not establish an autonomous administration during the eighteenth century. The Ottoman Empire managed the short-term uprising of Ali Bey quickly by taking due precautions. However, the mamluk beys' ambition and struggles resulted in semi-autonomous local administrators during the next century, although they continued to stay under the Ottoman administration.

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Notes on Transliteration

Both Ottoman Turkish and Arabic sources are used in this study. The names and titles of Ottoman officials, institutions and local offices and also the titles of books in Ottoman Turkish as well as transliteration of the parts from the archival documents are rendered according to transliteration system of Ottoman Turkish. The titles of Ottoman officials (*i.e.*, *vali*), institutions (*i.e.*, *sancakbeyliği*) and local officials (*i.e.*, *şeyhülbeled*), and technical terms such as *irsaliye* or *defterdar* have been italicised in the thesis. However, some terms that are common enough to have entered the English language and frequently repeated words such as sultan, vizier, bey or mamluk are not italicised. Bey is capitalized when it is used as a part of title. Also, the word of mamluk is capitalized when it refers to a dynasty or institution as in the Mamluk sultanate, Neo-Mamluk or Mamluk households. But on its own, mamluk or mamluks, or mamluk beys are left without capitals.

Egyptian place names and titles of books in Arabic that are cited in the bibliography and footnotes are rendered according to Arabic transliteration system. However, I have employed rules for Turkish and Ottoman transcription elsewhere in the thesis and for the rendering of some proper names, *e.g.*, Mehmed, İbrahim and Rıdvan. When it comes to titles, I preferred Arabic transliteration for Ali Bey al-Kabir, since Ali Bey is known in the literature mostly with the descriptor al-Kabir. However, his mamluk Mehmed Bey's title is referred in Turkish transliteration as Ebu'z-Zeheb.

ABBREVIATIONS

M	Muharrem
S	Safer
RA	Rebiülevvel
R	Rebiülahir
CA	Cemaziyelevvel
C	Cemaziyelahir
B	Receb
Ş	Şaban
N	Ramazan
L	Şevval
ZA	Zilkade
Z	Zilhicce
MD	Mühimme Defter Series
MMD	Mühimme-i Mısır Defter Series
T SMA	Topkapı Palace Museum Archives
BOA	Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the local administrators of Egypt, ‘the mamluk beys’, their relationship with one another and with the central government, by focusing on Ali Bey al-Kabir’s “uprising” against the Porte between 1768 and 1772.¹ The topic requires an assessment of the political and financial administration of Ottoman Egypt in the mid-eighteenth century using a multi-perspective approach. The political milieu of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire was composed of a three-partite society: state power, provincial notables, and the people (namely *reaya*). This research, depending on empirical data drawn from the Prime Minister’s Archives in Istanbul, reveals a complex and complicated network of relationships between the imperial government and provincial notables of Egypt, which cannot be captured by simple explanations and standard clichés. This study will scrutinize the mamluk beys, who formed the local administration body of Egypt in order to shed light on mid-eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt and make a convincing interpretation of actual power relations.

The study aims to be a part of a growing body of scholarship on eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt by focusing on its position within Ottoman provincial administration in the mid-eighteenth century. Ali Bey’s uprising, which took place in the second half of the eighteenth century in a distant province, comprises of some key aspects of the provincial administration of the Ottoman Empire. The ascendancy of the local notables in the provinces and their actions, which included occasional challenge against the administration of the central government of the empire, is subject of numerous studies. Positioning these local notables in the frame of the Ottoman provincial administration and assessing their situation

¹ Ali Bey was among the most powerful local figures of the eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt. He was the leader of Kazdağlı household, and was known in Turkish sources as Bulutkapan (cloud catcher). In this study he will be referred as Ali Bey al-Kabir, as he was known in Ottoman Egypt and his contemporary Egyptian chronicler al-Jabarti referred to him.

within the context of Ottoman legality has been a problematic theme in the historiography. Evaluating Ottoman Egypt in the mid-eighteenth century within the context of decentralization paradigm, this research aims to answer a number of questions about the motivations behind Ali Bey's uprising. These issues mainly revolve around the relationship between the imperial and provincial administration, which consequently indicates the ascendancy of local notables, the focus of power in the province, as well as financial concerns, and foreign relations.

The first question of this research is about the conception of rebellion in the second half of the eighteenth century. A number of case studies on the local notables in the seventeenth and eighteenth century suggest that acting against the central government was not always perceived as a rebellion by the central government. While a number of local notables were forgiven and were bestowed administrative positions, Ali Bey was labelled as a rebel by the central government. Therefore, the question is when and where did Ali Bey cross the line of legality and was announced as a rebel. This thesis will investigate Ali Bey's and his counterparts' activities and their network of relationships in terms of provincial politics, foreign relations and influence on the province, and finance. Exploring the motivations of Ali Bey, another issue about his rebellion is finance. The archival evidence suggests that the mamluk beys were in the effort of channeling financial sources to their household. This point reveals the question of the financial and economic position of the province and mamluk beys' effort to acquire more wealth. Did mamluk beys have a control over the financial sources? Was there a shift between the holders of the revenue source in the second half of the eighteenth century? Another point that deserves to be focused is holding the authority in the province. It is known that the mamluk beys occupied high positions such as *şeyhülbeled* and *emirulhadj*. Through these prestigious positions, the mamluk beys acquired enormous wealth

and authority in the province. This research will try to answer whether mamluk beys in high positions challenged the authority of governor appointed by the central government. In addition, Egypt was at crossroad of commercial centres, and a number of European countries consuls inhabited and traded in certain cities of Egypt. Did the agents of the European countries have any influence on the local notables' resistance to state authority? Did the French- British rivalry on the Mediterranean and Indian trade have an encouraging influence on the mamluk beys' action? The study will examine the aforementioned topics in the time period between the 1740s and the 1780s by centring on Ali Bey's tenure of office as *şeyhülbeled* between 1760 and 1772.

This time period has two significant aspects due to the process that the Ottoman Empire experienced, and Ali Bey's actions in Egypt, which consequently contributed to the political instability experienced in Egypt in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. First, it was before and during Russia-Ottoman war between 1768-1772, which had undeniable negative effects on the empire. The second issue is about the Ottoman provincial administration in Egypt before the French expedition, which had consequently major effects on Ottoman Egypt's political fabric. Existing historiography mostly focuses on the nineteenth century Egypt. However, in order to evaluate the nineteenth century's developments, it is crucial to understand the second half of the eighteenth century. For this reason, this study will focus on the mid-eighteenth century, from the 1740s to 1770s. The latter part of Ali Bey's rule overlaps with the Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774), which is often claimed to have consequently had a great influence on the Ottoman Empire's manpower and financial sources in the late eighteenth century.² During this period the imperial government's relationship with

² A war is a huge organizational task that requires a large amount of money. For this war, which lasted a period of four years and two months, the Ottoman Empire spent around 33 million *guruş* [1 *guruş* equals to 40 *paras*] whereas the annual budget of the empire was running on 14-15 million *guruş*. For a detail see Virginia Aksan, "Whatever Happened to the Janissaries? Mobilization for the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War", *War in History*, 1998; 5; 23, p. 27-30.

provincial notables, who supported the Empire in meeting demands of manpower and finance, is a topic of central importance.

The Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 had a momentous impact on state-province relations both during and after the war. During the war, when the central government focused on the problems that the war brought, the provincial elites had the opportunity to test their limits in the provinces. In fact, it was in the form of a temporary enjoying of a power vacuum in the province rather than a structural administration flaw or an incessant political conflict. It can be suggested that the financial and political milieu of war produced an appropriate environment for rebellions and uprisings. It was not the first time that the Ottoman Empire had been forced to confront such problems. For example, in the early seventeenth century the central government was trying to cope with two on-going war fronts when the famous Celali revolts broke out, which agonized the empire for long years in the early seventeenth century. However, historians claim that the empire's defeat had a transformative influence after the Russo-Ottoman war, on central government's relationship with provincial notables, which had formerly depended on a relationship of mutual benefit.³ It strengthened provincial elites' hand against the Porte. But still, the Ottoman central government maintained its strong political and economic influence on the provinces.

It is important to highlight that the time period and data that study aims to investigate is beyond the debate of modernisation and globality framework. First of all, it was still pre-modern age and transportation means were restricted in terms of pace and the limit of cargo in the mid-eighteenth century. Mainly, the developments such as invention of steamships and its employment in the Indian Ocean's trading, as well as occupation of Aden by the Britain

³ Quataert and Khoury mention the impact of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 on the relationship between the central government and provincial elites: Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, (Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 49; Dina Rizk Khoury, "The Ottoman Centre versus provincial power-holders: an analysis of the historiography" in Suraiya Faroqhi ed. *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 135

made an impact on the globalisation of the trading systems. However, this study covers the period before such developments until the 1780s. Therefore, the theories and paradigms about these new trends in the world's trade are beyond this study. Instead, the ascendancy of local elements against the Ottoman central government's representatives and paradigm of centralization/decentralization will be employed in the study as in this period the Ottoman imperial centre and provinces have been a stage for power struggles between the interest groups.

In our case in eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt, mamluk beys were actively involved in the local administrative and financial establishments of Ottoman Egypt until the French expedition (1798). As is well known, the term mamluk meant slave and referred to young men who were born outside of Egypt, enslaved through wars or invasions, and brought to the province. High-ranking mamluk beys brought in this manpower. Mamluks were recruited into households where they were trained in administrative and military skills. In accordance with their talents and skills, these mamluks were manumitted and continued to serve their masters. For the modern individuals, the term mamluk gives the impression of real slaves being employed in the Ottoman administrative ranks. However, the administrative terminology of mamluk in the context of the Ottoman Egypt indicates a *de facto* component of the provincial administrative system charged with overseeing financial and political affairs. "Mamluk", whose literal meaning is 'slave', was only a word that referred to their origins and did not include any meaning of restriction in their activities in provincial politics.⁴ These people acted and lived as a powerful part of the Ottoman provincial administrative system, rather than being real slaves, and they were promoted to the highest ranks in the provincial administration. During the time period that this study covers, most of the significant local

⁴ P. M. Holt, "The Cloud-Catcher": Ali Bey The Great of Egypt", *History Today*, 1959, 9, 1, pp. 48-58.

administrative positions including the posts of *emirulhajj*, (hajj commander), *defterdar*, (chief treasurer), *kaşif* and *sancak beyi* (governors of the sub provinces) were occupied by manumitted mamluk beys of the Kazdağlı household. Mostly, the regimental officers were among the mamluk beys as well. The military system was intertwined with the mamluk households.⁵ Those mamluk beys were in key positions, having influence on provincial politics, and sometimes their influence extended beyond Egypt. For example, emirulhajj had a control on the coffee trade between Jidda and Egypt as he was assigned the tax, which was collected from the coffee trade. He also, as a result of his duty, was in contact with the semi-autonomous administration of the Hijaz. For example, in one instance, the *sherif* of Mecca increased the tax rate of coffee and as a result coffee prices increased in Istanbul. The Porte demanded Ali Bey al-Kabir, as he was the *emirulhajj*, to meet with the *sherif* and to discuss decreasing the tax.⁶

Mamluk beys were an inseparable part of the bureaucracy in Cairo and they were actively involved in the central government's policies regarding Egypt. Their positions in the Ottoman Egypt's bureaucracy offered them a large share from the province's wealth. Nevertheless, mamluk beys mostly developed good relations with the Porte so that they could keep their interests coming from different income sources such as tax farming or commanding the hajj caravan. However, their involvement in the provincial politics occasionally led mamluk beys to test their limits with the central government. Ali Bey al-Kabir who held the position of *şeyhülbeled* in Egypt in 1760, eliminated his potential rivals and lobbied for the dismissal of two governors of Egypt that were appointed by the central government in the years 1766-68. After strengthening his position in Egypt, Ali Bey extended his political and financial ambitions outside Egypt: first Hijaz, then Syria. Ali Bey's involvement in other

⁵ Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of households in Ottoman Egypt The Rise of Qazdağlıs*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997), p. 84

⁶ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 325 (date early L 1178/late March 1765)

provinces' politics was regarded by the Porte as a gesture of "rebellion" at the time, and required an intervention by the central government. His closest mamluk, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zehb betrayed Ali Bey and took over the administration in Cairo. After Mehmed Bey's death in 1775, Cairo became a scene for instability, which required an imperial intervention in 1786. Environmental factors such as famine and plague contributed to this instability as well and the eighteenth century ended with the French expedition.

A considerable part of the historiography produced before the 1990s tended to propose that, during Ali Bey's tenure of the office of *şeyhülbeled*, there was 'objection and protest' against Ottoman sovereignty in Egypt. Some historians claim that Ali Bey's political and financial policies manifested a 'counter stance' and produced an alternative administration.⁷ Contrary to the claim put forward in the existing historiography, which positions Ali Bey al-Kabir as a local rebellious administrator who tried to become independent from the Ottoman Empire, my thesis contends that Ali Bey was a political figure of eighteenth century Egypt, who tested his limits and took advantage of the decentralized administration of the empire. This study investigates Ali Bey's action in terms of decentralization of Ottoman administrative system, redefines it, and scrutinizes its causes and results. An exhaustive research will help to illustrate the motivations behind Ali Bey's resistance to the Porte, and his desire to extend his sphere of influence outside Egypt.

Without exception, the imperial historians, *i.e.* Enveri, considered Ali Bey's extension of his authority outside Egypt as an insurrection and rebellion against the Porte in the eighteenth century. However, some modern historians have added the notion of "an

⁷ This argument is suggested by following authors: Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt: a study of the regimes of 'Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab, 1760-1775*, (Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1981), p. 6; See also, D. Crecelius, "Egypt in the Eighteenth Century" in M. W. Daly ed., *Cambridge History of Egypt, Vol. 2: Modern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 59-86; Michael Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule 1517-1798*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 25; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

attempt to re-establish the Mamluk Sultanate”⁸, despite the fact that contemporary historiography does not make any reference to a Mamluk revival in Ali Bey’s activity.⁹ This study seeks to deconstruct this hypothesis through a detailed examination of the relationship between central government and provincial administration.

Measuring the real-world limits of Ali Bey’s authority in Egypt, and making a proper assessment of his “uprising” against the Porte requires a detailed scrutiny of four aspects of power-sharing that were faced by the central government in Istanbul and provincial administrators in Cairo. The first aspect revolves around the relationship between political actors of Egypt and central government; namely, Ottoman governor, *şeyhülbeled*, local gentry of Egypt including ulema, merchants, and mamluk households. The change of the local administrators’ command on the provincial sources can be considered as a distinctive motive and result in this relationship. The second issue centres on the financial situation of the province before and during Ali Bey’s authority. The political environment of the Ottoman Empire including internal and external politics is considered as the third component of approach for this study. Finally, the European countries’, especially Britain and France’s rivalries, especially over the trade in India and their ambitions to establish colonies in the long run during the second half of the eighteenth century had an influence of their attitude towards Egyptian local elites. All four aspects are to be explored under the light of state-province relations. Every chapter of this study is underlying and explaining one of the decisive components of eighteenth century Egypt’s politics and all aspects revolve around the relationship between the central government and provincial society.

⁸ Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt*, p. 8; Winter, *Egyptian Society*, p. 25; Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt*; Andrew James McGregor, *A military history of Modern Egypt From the Ottoman conquest to the Ramadan War*, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 33; Muhammad Rif’at Ramazan, *Ali Bey al-Kabir*, (Cairo, 1950), p. 15

⁹ For my thesis I consulted Abdurrahman b. Hasan al-Jabarti as the local historian and his account: *Aja’ib al-Athar fi’l-Tarajim wa’l-Akhbar*, Abdurrahim Abdurrahman Abdurrahim, ed., (Cairo, 1997), and Enveri Sadullah Efendi as the imperial historian and his account: Muharrem Saffet Çalışkan, (*Vekayinüvis*) *Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. cildinin Metin ve Tahlihi (1182-1188/1768-1774)*, Unpublished PhD thesis, (Istanbul, 2000).

Instead of concentrating on the discourse of decline, the modernization paradigm or the proto-nationalist approach, this study will evaluate Ali Bey's uprising and the mid-eighteenth century through the lens of decentralization, which will help us to see whether his action was a stance against the Ottoman Empire's imperial attitude and sovereignty, or merely an enjoyment of the extended boundaries of the Empire's administration.¹⁰

Analysing and clarifying the political aspect of the uprising as well as reviewing the socio-political dynamics of the province in an era of conflict among the local authorities will put forward a new perspective to understanding mid-eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt. This study aims to provide a coherent illustration of the era before the French expedition in 1798 and Mehmed Ali Pasha's rule in the beginning of the nineteenth century, which put an end to the Mamluk administration in Egypt. By examining the financial registers and decree records that externalize the relationship between the province of Egypt and the central government, this analysis aims to be the first detailed research to focus on the essential foundations of Ali Bey's "uprising" against the Porte. In addition to providing a first-hand account and realistic factual data, the archival documents help to position Egypt as a province of the Ottoman Empire rather than an autonomous principality.

Decentralization and emergence of regional elites

The thesis that the eighteenth century was the decline period for the Ottoman Empire is now mostly discredited. One of the most significant characteristics of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire's political history and historiography is recently shaped by, and

¹⁰ About decentralization see Halil Inalcik, "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration" in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, eds., *Studies in eighteenth century Islamic History*, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977); Leslie Peirce, *Morality Tales Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab*, (University of California Press, 2003) Salzman proposes 'centripetal decentralization': Ariel Salzman, "An ancient regime revisited: privatization and political economy in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire, *Politics & Society*, 21/4 (1993), 393-423; Bruce Masters, "Power and Society in Aleppo in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries", *Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Medirettanee* 62, 4 (1991), 151-8; Khoury claims that the decentralization paradigm has its own deficiencies in explaining the better integration of the provinces with the imperial government in the eighteenth century: Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and provincial society in the Ottoman Empire, Mosul 1540-1834*, (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 9; James E. Baldwin, *Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo*, (Edinburgh University Press, 2017), p. 141

focuses on the notion of decentralization. By the late sixteenth and seventeenth century, decentralization of the imperial administration system resulted in the emergence of strong local elites all around the empire. Inalcik explains the emergence of local elites as a result of changes in the land tenure system. When the governors appointed local elites as operative factors in the provinces for their *arपालiks*, this strengthened the position of local elites.¹¹ On the other hand, the central government's new land administration policy, life-long tax farms called *malikane* caused an increase in the numbers of local notables.

Egypt passed through a period of administrative and political transformation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the eighteenth century Egypt politics, the mamluk beys became active. The factional conflicts fed the households as well as shifting the provincial revenues, in the case of eighteenth century Egypt, from the Ottoman officers to local officers. Because of the political rivalry and financial expediencies, mamluk beys vied with each other and with the central government. These confrontations sometimes evolved into disobedience and uprisings in the eighteenth century.¹²

Nevertheless, it should be recognized that such changes were not peculiar to the province of Egypt. In other provinces of the empire, change and transformation were also in progress; Syria, Iraq, Cyprus, Aintab, Balkans, as well as the imperial capital.¹³ The political power shifted from the sultan in person to sultanic households such as those maintained by

¹¹ Inalcik, "Centralization and Decentralization", p. 31

¹² Two examples for rebellious administrators in the eighteenth century are Çerkes Mehmed Bey in the 1730s and Ali Bey al-Kabir in the 1770s.

¹³ For Cyprus see Marc Aymes, *A Provincial History of the Ottoman Empire: Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean in the nineteenth century*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) and Antonis Hadjikyriacou, "The Province goes to the center: the case of Hadjiyorgakis Kornesios, dragoman of Cyprus" in Christine Isom-Verhaaren and Kent F. Schull eds., *Living in the Ottoman Realm: Sultans, Subjects, and Elites*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016); For Balkans see F. F. Anscombe, *State, Faith, and Nation in Ottoman and Post-Ottoman Lands*, (Cambridge University Press, 2014); For Iraq see Dina Rizk Khoury, *State and provincial society in the Ottoman Empire, Mosul 1540-1834*, (Cambridge University Press, 1997); For Syria see Karl Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus 1708-1758*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980)

valide sultans, vezirs and pashas.¹⁴ This shift imposed important influences in the provinces. Provincial notables dominated all over the empire; however, decentralization had different features in different provinces. In what follows, the large provinces in the south of the empire will be compared with Egypt.

In the eighteenth century the relationship between the central government and provincial elites depended on mutual need, which causes and also explains the interesting and complex interaction amongst them. Meeting the central government's need for soldiers (or the need for cash in Egypt's case) provided provincial notables an advantage against Istanbul. Yet, their need of state's approval and support against their rivals in the province made them dependant on the Porte. Considering this mutual need between the Porte and provincial notables, it seems that it worked like the balancing of a pair of scales. The greater the advantage offered by provincial elites the more negotiation rights they acquired. On the other hand, *malikane*, the life-long tax farming system, helped the imperial government to maintain authority over the provinces. Moreover, vizier households controlled over the *iltizam*, tax farming, auctions in the provinces, thus the shared financial interest added more complexity in the association between the centre and provinces.

A new governor arrived at Egypt with a large entourage from Istanbul or another province of the Empire. The people in the governor's entourage integrated in the provincial administrative, commercial and political cultural system, and established ties with the local households. Likewise, the local groups were eager to relate with the governors' household in order to extend their communication with the centre after they had left Egypt. This enabled the local groups to attach themselves to the imperial household and other provincial administrations as well as to protect their mutual interest afterwards. This connection between

¹⁴ Toledano refers these power centres as '*kapi*' and mentions that local *kapis* modelled themselves the *kapi* of sultan see Ehud R. Toledano, "The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research", in Moshe Ma'oz and Ilan Pappé eds., *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History From Within*, (London, 1997), p. 156

the Empire and Egypt continued for centuries. Quataert claims that this relationship depending on mutual benefit continued until the Ottoman-Russo war of 1768-1774. The war after a long peace period made the imperial centre undersupplied in terms of manpower and finance, which strengthened the hand of provincial elites.¹⁵

Thomas Naff describes eighteenth century's complexity as varying with respect to time, place, traditions, and conditions, and observes that the *ayan* would be merchants, artisans, guildsmen, government functionaries, land owners, religious authorities, legists and military officers. The common point that gathered these different types at one point was: urban residence and wealth. The *ayan* controlled the local revenues and security forces, which eventually led to challenge, or in some cases replaced, the Ottoman representatives in the provinces. However, the *ayans* needed the approval of the central government for legitimacy. In this sense, the *ayans* became recourse for both the central government and the *reaya* in some cases.¹⁶ In order to maintain their power in the provinces, 'close relationship with the central government or support of the local community' were the two means that *ayans* depended on. Investigating the possibility of creating a model *ayan*, Robert Zens mentions that *ayans* used either means, however, suggests that the mamluk beys were the exception in this case.¹⁷ It can be suggested that the mamluk 'households' did not need to use either means in order to maintain their position, as they were an essential element of the local administration in Egypt. However, it is for sure that mamluk beys referred to the central government's support while positioning themselves in (or outside) the province. Three characters in the mid eighteenth century and their relationship with the central government proves the situation. The first example is Firari Osman Bey, who was compelled to leave

¹⁵ Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 48

¹⁶ Thomas Naff, "Introduction" in T. Naff and R. Owen, eds., *Studies in eighteenth century*, (Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), p. 7-8.

¹⁷ Robert Zens, "Provincial Powers: The Rise of Ottoman Local Notables (*Ayan*)", *History Studies*, volume 3/3 2011, pp. 433-447, p. 447

Egypt by his rivals in the 1740s. He left Cairo and moved to Istanbul. In the meantime, his rivals in Cairo claimed him responsible for the unpaid annual tribute. Being held responsible by the central government, Osman Bey made an effort to clear his name. With a successful lobbying in the imperial palace not only did he get rid of the accusations he also earned an *arpalık* in Rumelia.¹⁸ The second example is Ali Bey Gazzawi (1758-59), who was a counterpart of Ali Bey al-Kabir. Gazzawi took the support of the governor of Egypt, Kamil Ahmed Pasha (r. 1760), in the competition for being appointed *şeyhülbeled* when he was carrying out the duty of *emirulhajj* in the Hijaz. Kamil Ahmed Pasha provided him a support of lobbying in the imperial palace and managed to have a decree to be sent to Cairo about encouraging Gazzawi appointment as the new *şeyhülbeled*. However, their lobbying failed, as Gazzawi could not return back to Cairo.¹⁹ Finally Ali Bey's closest man, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb (1772-75) appears as an ally of the central government in the second half of the eighteenth century. Mehmed Bey turned his back to his master after a short time he invaded Syria, and fought back. After eliminating his master, Mehmed Bey was appointed as the new *şeyhülbeled* by the central government and also even a decree was sent that addressing Mehmed Bey as Mehmed "Pasha".²⁰ These three examples demonstrate that the mamluk beys in Egypt shared some features in common with typical *ayans* in that they all, from time to time, relied upon the central government's help and support.

Although it is claimed that central government could not control and manipulate provincial actors from Istanbul,²¹ the eighteenth century witnessed complex conflicts and agreements between the central government and the local administrators that occasionally demonstrates the opposite. This complexity cannot be explained based on random and single

¹⁸ See below chapter IV on the governor, p. 202

¹⁹ See below chapter I on the rebellion, p. 69

²⁰ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 694 (date late R 1189/late June 1775)

²¹ Quatert, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 49

instances. Nevertheless, recent historiography contradicts Quataert's hypothesis of uncontrollable provincial elites. Moreover, we should be mindful of the risk that reducing eighteenth-century Ottoman history to a decentralization paradigm, which may distort our understanding of the actual political environment in the provinces.

Khoury discusses centralization/decentralization paradigm in her study mentioning that the government's success in imposing effective controls challenges the validity of the decentralization paradigm in the eighteenth century.²² Her research of Ottoman Mosul from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries reveals that the urban and rural society of Mosul actually became better integrated into the Ottoman system in the eighteenth century, the so-called century of decentralization. According to Khoury, the central government's power and authority was more evident in Mosul in the eighteenth century than in any other period. Her study highlights that the central government managed to organise the provincial provision and manpower effectively with the cooperation of local notables in the borderlands with Iran during this period.²³

In addition, Baldwin's research reveals the strong ties of the Egyptian people with the central government's bureaucracy where he shows that Egyptians did not hesitate to make legal applications to the Porte for resolving their problems.²⁴ Depending on inexhaustible sources of sharia court records, Baldwin introduces a large number of examples on how Egyptian people cemented close connections with the central government via jurisdiction, when they thought the provincial legal and administrative body failed to help them. For disputes between *reaya* and administrators as well as in between *reaya*, Egyptian people applied to the *Divan-ı Humayun* in relation to a wide range of issues including, debts,

²² Khoury, *State and provincial society*, p. 8. For more detail, see below, pp. 18-20

²³ Khoury, *State and provincial society*, p. 213, 214

²⁴ Baldwin, *Islamic Law*, p. 142

property, endowments, inheritances and even quarrels between neighbours. Baldwin mentions that the unlimited jurisdiction of *Divan-ı Humayun* proves the sultan's control and authority.²⁵

Comparison of the Pattern of Decentralization in Egypt with that found in other regions

In the first half of the eighteenth century, the emergence of a strong local elite characterizes the Ottoman Empire's provincial administration. The literature relating to this aspect of Ottoman provincial life in the eighteenth century is both vast and varied; some of it focuses on governance in its local and microcosmic context while other authors are principally interested in identifying generalized trends and paradigms.²⁶ In her study focusing on an earlier period, Hülya Canbakal points out that rise of local elites represented "a new mode of centre-periphery integration".²⁷ Strong and loyal to the central government in the first half of the century, existing historiography suggests that the loyalty bonds of those elites loosened in the second half of the century. Egypt experienced a decentralized period with powerful military grandees in the seventeenth century and with mamluk households that controlled the domestic politics in the eighteenth century.²⁸ The households kept their importance as mamluks, both men and women, continued to arrive in Ottoman Egypt and to acculturate and localize in these households. These households mostly established strong ties with military regiments, and had influence on local politics as well as military and economic affairs. Mamluk beys and their households formed the group of local notables in Egypt. The Kazdağlı household was the leading household that had a command of Egypt's political and

²⁵ Baldwin, *Islamic Law*, p. 59

²⁶ For an account of broader regional trends prevailing in the Arab provinces, see Dina Khoury, "The Ottoman centre versus provincial power-holders: an analysis of the historiography", *The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol. 3: The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.133-156

²⁷ Hülya Canbakal, *Society and Politics in an Ottoman Town 'Ayntab in the 17th century*, (Brill: Leiden, Boston, 2007), p. 6. Hülya Canbakal examines emergence of provincial elites in the seventeenth century in Aintab, a typical, relatively small and less important province between Anatolia and Arab provinces.

²⁸ Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of households*, p. 1

financial environment. Strong mamluk beys such as İbrahim Kethüda, Rıdvan Kethüda and Abdurrahman Kethüda were actively involved in the financial and administrative organisation in Cairo. The Ottoman Empire had to approve some of them as *şeyhülbeleds*, an important component of the provincial administration. The *şeyhülbeled* was often addressed alongside the governor in the firmans issued by the Ottoman sultan. Whether a member of military regiments or a *şeyhülbeled*, mamluks beys were loyal to the imperial government and acted under the control of the central government.

Other provinces of the empire in the south such as Aintab, Syria and Mosul were also administered by strong provincial elites, yet, in different forms. These provinces had a common point with Egypt since they were located in close regions. Thus, they were affected by the Empire's general political situation, yet each experienced their own special circumstances.

Pattern of Decentralization in Syria:

Syria is an important case for the eighteenth century provincial administration of the Ottoman Empire. Karl Barbir's research reveals characteristic features of a southern province of the empire in the first half of the eighteenth century. From 1714, the central government appointed the governors of Damascus from the same family, al-Azm. As a local element, the Azms provided power from their local roots in Damascus and used it in line with the central government's desire. They had long tenure of offices and also, other members of the family were appointed to the neighbouring provinces.²⁹

Although a specific family's domination in the governorship demonstrates the decentralized administration of the Ottoman Empire, which led to a local autonomy in the province, detailed research demonstrates that the Porte appointed them because the Azm

²⁹ Karl Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus 1708-1758*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980) p. 45

family administered the province in line with the central government's expectations. The Azm family's half century long rule in Damascus was not the beginning of the province's gradual separation from the Empire. Instead, the Azm family served a useful instrument for the central government, as they reorganized Damascus's administration for the benefit of the Empire. Barbir considers al-Azm family as representing a skilful blend of Ottoman and local traditions, rather than being an alternative to the central government's administration. Also, appointing a local figure as a governor, succession of the family members in a province, or having another family member to a neighbouring province was neither a new development in the Ottoman administrative system in the 1710s, nor it was not peculiar to Damascus.³⁰

Syria was important for the Porte as it sustained a hajj caravan every year. As an organisation, it was not as large as Egypt's hajj caravan. However, it was significant as it conveyed dynasty's members, aside from the fact that it represented the sultan as the servant of the holy cities. In the end of the seventeenth century, the organisation of the hajj caravan of Syria failed due to the increasing cost of pilgrimage, the increasing attacks of Bedouins and some greedy hajj commanders. Since this situation damaged the empire's sovereignty and prestige, the Porte tried to solve the problem by appointing different local figures, even one certain *sherif*, as *emirulhajj*, until 1708. In 1708, the Porte attempted to try a new combination, and gave the duty of *emirulhajj* to the governor. The governor of Damascus was assigned the duty of the *emirulhajj*, commander of the annual pilgrimage, a very important duty as the Ottoman sultan considered himself as the servant of the Haremeyn: Mecca and Medina. Thus, the organisation of the caravan was connected to the Porte via the governor.

By assigning the duty of *emirulhajj* to the governor, the Porte changed the administrative duty of governor as well. It was limited outside of Damascus and centralized in

³⁰ Barbir, *Ottoman Rule*, p. 57-63

the province.³¹ First, the governors of Damascus were no longer expected to attend war outside of Syria, and in addition they were not appointed as grand viziers in Istanbul any more. In addition, a number of sub provinces were directly attached to the governor's administration. Barbir asserts that during this period the governor of Damascus had a considerable authority in the province; in the meantime, he was being monitored by the central government in his communication with the elite, (*ayan*), businessmen, (*tujjar*), and people, (*reaya*).³² The central government gave this authority to the governor, as well as appointing him as *emirulhadj*, in order to control three local groups in the province: notables, janissaries, and tribes.³³

Nasuh Pasha (1708-1713) was the first governor that carried out the duty of *emirulhadj*. With the help of the daring and severity of his personal character, Nasuh Pasha controlled the Bedouins, fulfilled the safety of caravan and gained a surplus. He had a large retinue and troops. The central government renewed Nasuh Pasha's governorship five times, as he was a capable person. However, at every turn, Nasuh Pasha requested a different *sancak* of Damascus for one of his retainers. When he requested Tripoli and Sidon in December 1713, the central government terminated his office, and his life.³⁴ By 1714, the Porte appointed the governor from a local family, the Azms. Thus, the tenure of office, which would last for some sixty years, of the Azm family started. The five-year long governorship of Nasuh Pasha and the half-century long governorship of the Azm family serves as a good reflection of the Ottoman Empire's approach to the administration of local figures. The Porte's dismissing of Nasuh Pasha and appointing subsequent governors from a local family

³¹ Barbir, *Ottoman Rule*, p.13. The centralised administration in the hand of the governor in Damascus is claimed to have positive effects on the commerce in Damascus. See Mohannad Al-Mubaidin, "Aspects of the economic history of Damascus during the first half of the eighteenth century", in Peter Sluglett with Stefan Weber, eds., *Syria and Bilad al-Sham under Ottoman Rule*, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010), p. 137

³² Barbir, *Ottoman Rule*, p. 20

³³ Barbir, *Ottoman Rule*, p. 45

³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 54

shows us that the central government required a certain arrangement in the provincial administration during this period. This certain arrangement of the Porte suggests that the central government supported the groups, which provided what the central government wanted. On the other hand, it ceased the administration of those who acted according to their self-interest instead of the central government, and those who focused on increasing their personal authority in defiance of the central government.

Barbir claims that the first half of the century contrasts with the second half, as the central government was reluctant to attempt another reorganization.³⁵ This claim is compatible with the proposition of Khoury for Mosul, which mentions that the time period after the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 witnessed a loosening of the central government's administration in the provinces. In the time period after the 1770s, Syria was affected a number of incidents, which seriously influenced the central government's position in the province. First, it was the target of an invasion by Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb. Then, because of Wahhabi-Saudi alliance, Bedouin tribes were displaced and moved to near Damascus, and caused pressure. Finally, Zahir al-Umar appeared as a local authority in Palestine. He was made inactive in 1775 by the central government; however, Jezzar Ahmed Pasha's rise did not take so long to substitute him. Gürcü Osman Pasha (1760-1771) and Mehmed Pasha al-Azm (1772-1783) both held long tenures as governors of Damascus for long period of time; however, neither managed to achieve a strong stance on behalf of the central government. Barbir claims that the imperial government could not manage to administer the province after 1783. It gave a lot of discretion to the governors, used the notables as an intermediary between the government and populace, and ignored the problems as long as they were not crucial.³⁶

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 178

³⁶ Barbir, *Ottoman Rule*, p. 177

One can observe some similarities in the political culture of Syria and Egypt in the eighteenth century. In the first half of the century, as in the case of Egypt, there was violence between local factors in Syria as well; still, it was not in the form of rebellion against the central government. On the contrary, local factors were trying to affirm their place in the province's politics. However, in the second half of the century, the imperial government failed to maintain the provincial system that had established in the beginning of the century. Barbir states that these local factors changed their direction from the rivals to representatives of the central authority, which affected the central government's authority after the 1760s.³⁷

On the other hand, there are significant differences between Egypt and Damascus in terms of local notables and governorship. First of all, the tenure of office of the governor of Egypt was significantly shorter, mostly only one year, than his counterpart in Damascus. Also, there was no concentration of control in one family like the Azms. While the governor of Damascus was appointed from a local family, the governor of Egypt was appointed among the imperial elites. In Syria, the governor centralized the provincial politics in his sole hand by attaching the neighbouring *sancaks* to himself and commanding the hajj caravan. The central government appointed the governor of Syria as *emirulhajj* in order to prevent the local groups to become autonomous. Damascus's centralized provincial administration in the hand of the governor from a local family, with the organisation of the hajj caravan contrasts to the situation in Egypt. The mamluk beys commanded the hajj caravan during the entire century. The central government never changed the mamluk beys' responsibility, as they were capable to command the caravan in terms of finance and authority, and could provide safety against the Bedouins, except for a few instances. However, we see that, towards the end of the

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 67

century, the *emirulhaji* of Egypt challenged the central government via the governor in order to be assigned more financial sources.³⁸

Pattern of Decentralization in Northern Iraq: The Case of Mosul:

Khoury examines a long period of Mosul, from mid-seventeenth century to mid-nineteenth century. Her study helps us to take a step back and see how the political, social and economic aspects of the Ottoman provincial life changed in an Ottoman province located in southeast. Being a frontier province and a centre for mobilization of troops for wars against Iran, Mosul had a distinctive position for the central government. The central government took advantage of the local elements in order to meet manpower and provision of the army in Mosul. The central government's approach to the province helped local notables to emerge as households and getting a stronger position against their rivals in the province depended, of course, on the level of their collaboration with the central government. In the first half of the eighteenth century, Mosul experienced an economic expansion and population increase by the Kurdish and Turkish soldiers due to war. Those military members were attached to one or another janissary regiment, and new comers had conflicts with older ones.³⁹

Provincial notables were in cooperation with the imperial centre from the second quarter of the century. Similar to Syria, the central government co-operated a local family in Mosul, the Jalilis, and maintained the provincial administration as well as deployed the provincial sources for the imperial army. A bilateral agreement continued until the second half of the century. When the Jalilis guaranteed to sustain the imperial army in terms of financial and military support in the war against Iran, the Porte appointed the Jalilis as

³⁸ See below chapter III on the *irsaliye*, p. 178

³⁹ Khoury, *State and provincial society*, p. 65

governors. The Jalili family played an important role in revitalizing the trade in the region and manipulated it in Ottoman Empire's interest.⁴⁰

Khoury mentions a transformation in the relationship between the state and provincial society in Mosul in the second half of the eighteenth century. The local elites were reluctant to cooperate as closely with the central government, as they had during the first half of the eighteenth century. The Jalili family worked accordingly to the mutual benefit of each side, and mobilized the troops and provisions until the Russian war. However, during the period after Russo-Ottoman war the relationship between this provincial elite and the central government broke down and never recovered in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

Nevertheless, the military instability of the imperial army due to the success and failure - the defeat in Belgrade in 1715 and victory ended up with new tax farms being created in the Iranian borderlands. As a result, Mosul notables were left in an ambivalent situation. Yet, they preserved their loyalty with the help of new tax farms in the Iranian border regions. However, the relationship between the provincial elites and the central government became tense after the Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774), as the local notables' trust in the imperial elites' military policies weakened and they hesitated to support the central government any more.

Khoury claims that the uprisings of Ali Bey al-Kabir and Zahir al-Omar reinforced the violent confrontation between two Jalili households.⁴¹ In addition to trust issues, the other reason for the tense relationship was the tax monopolization of the Mosuli elite. Khoury states that while the central government was busy dealing with the war and uprisings, the

⁴⁰ Khoury, *State and provincial society*, p. 57-58. Khoury confirms Quatert's claim by saying that the connection between state and Mosuli elites was effective until 1768. However, the provincial elite and the central government broke up in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

⁴¹ Khoury, *State and provincial society*, p. 69

Mosuli elite had enough time to seize the superiority in rural industry and pastoral production.⁴²

The Case of Egypt: Typical or Exceptional?

The administrative system in Egypt was different from the aforementioned provinces, as the governor appointed by the central government kept its presence until the early nineteenth century. Under the governor's management, however, households had a significant control on the finance and land administration of Egypt besides their political influence. They challenged and tried to change the regulations according to their interests. For example, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the members of the households drafted illegal agreements in order to hold a tax farm in the household's possession. Some mamluk beys did not hesitate to fabricate testaments for a deceased person in order to keep the revenues from villages, which were appointed for the central treasury. However, during the second half of the eighteenth century, the central government detected those agreements, voided them and endeavoured to keep the income of its treasury.⁴³

Existing historiography claims that mamluk households gained more power against less authoritative governors by the end of the eighteenth century. With the influence of European travellers, some historians claim that the governor became, practically, only the representative of Ottoman Sultan with a small number of soldiers in his entourage, but especially outsiders considered the mamluk beys as the real administrators in Egypt.⁴⁴ Anis mentions that the European travellers and merchants, who were not familiar with the decentralized administration system of the Ottoman Empire, had difficulty in relating to the existence of the Ottoman governor alongside the mamluk beys in Egypt in the late eighteenth

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 70

⁴³ See below, chapter III on the *irsaliye*, p. 179-184

⁴⁴ Luigi Mayer, *Views in Egypt*, (London, 1801), p. 59

century.⁴⁵ However, correspondence between Cairo and Istanbul proves that, although the central government included *şeyhülbeled* in the administration from the 1730s, the Ottoman governor in Egypt held the authority over the mamluk beys until the last quarter of the century.

Al-Jabarti's and Damurdashi's accounts give us a detailed history of mamluk beys' struggles in Cairo.⁴⁶ While supplying us an intricate account of the relationship between mamluk beys, these narratives' focusing on the struggles provides a false impression for today's readers about past political environment. The narration of incessant conflicts between mamluk beys has led the modern reader to perceive the eighteenth century Ottoman Egyptian provincial political milieu as revolving solely around the internal politics of the mamluk beys in Cairo, and to see this arrangement as unstable and insecure for the indigenous people as well as foreigners. However, recent historiography and chapters of this research as well, which based their research on archival documents, demonstrate that the eighteenth century's provincial politics, provincial administration and management, and relationship with the central government was not solely dependent on the mamluk beys and their struggles. To the contrary, the mamluk beys and their conflicts seem not to have had a very strong impact on Egyptian people's everyday lives. One would be hard pressed to find a provincial political crisis that affected Egyptian people more than the French expedition at the end of the eighteenth century, or Mehmed Ali's drastic policies in the early nineteenth century. Even during Ali Bey's uprising and central government and Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb's counteraction against him, the correspondence proves that the operations and organisations including public constructions continued to function as they were supposed to.

⁴⁵ M. A. Anis, *Some Aspects of British Interest in Egypt in the Late 18th Century (1775-1798)*, unpublished PhD thesis (University of Birmingham, 1950), p. 93.

⁴⁶ Abdurrahman b. Hasan Al-Jabarti, *Aja'ib al-Athar fi'l-Tarajim wa'l-Akhar*, Abdurrahim Abdurrahman Abdurrahim, ed., (Cairo, 1997); Daniel Crecelius and Bakr Abdalwahhab, *Al-Damurdashi's chronicle of Egypt 1688-1755: Al-durra al-musana fi akhbar al-kinana*, (Brill, 1991)

In his article on Fayyum, Alan Mikhail helps us to re-locate mamluk beys and their authority and influence in Egypt and relieves us of the necessity of perceiving mamluk beys as the “only” political actors of Egypt.⁴⁷ Mikhail proposes, from his research on repairs of dams, that mamluk factions had little influence in some of the sub provinces such as Fayyum. He is deducting this claim from the correspondence between the small town, Fayyum - provincial capital, Cairo - and the imperial capital, Istanbul, as people of villages were the main performers and addressees of the central government correspondence.

It is possible to carry Mikhail’s proof/determination from the Fayyum case and generalise for the whole of Egypt, as Egyptian people including Cairenes lived free for the most part from the disturbances that characterized political struggle between the mamluk beys. The situation was the same in the neighbouring provinces. When a disagreement happened, the central government usually chose to negotiate with local elites and mamluk beys via the governors.⁴⁸ Disagreements between mamluk beys and the central government or governors did not cause political crisis, even if mamluk beys succeeded in engineering the dismissal of an Ottoman governor. When Ali Bey managed to have Hamza Pasha dismissed in 1766, the Porte appointed Rakım Mehmed Pasha as the new governor. The central government neither started a war against mamluk beys like a dictatorship, nor left the administration of Egypt to mamluk beys like a weak state.

Collaborating with mamluk beys and other gentry, the governor of Egypt was the actual administrator in Cairo in the mid-eighteenth century. Although mamluk beys could dismiss the governors, this did not mean that they did not come to an agreement with the new ones. Even during the exceptional time period of Ali Bey’s uprising (1768-1772), Ali Bey

⁴⁷ Alan Mikhail, “An irrigated empire: The view from Ottoman Fayyum”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 42 (2010) No. 4, pp.569-590, p. 570

⁴⁸ The anecdote in Khoury’s state and provincial society (p. 1) is a good example for the negotiation between the governor and local elite.

never cut his relationship with Istanbul. Unlike his later successor Mehmed Ali Pasha, Ali Bey did not try to separate the province from the empire in the areas of agricultural production and trading. The ships from Alexandria, Rosetta and Damietta continued to operate to other parts of the empire including Istanbul. During Ali Bey's uprising, everything functioned as before, except for the *irsaliye-i hazine*. Ali Bey did not send the annual tribute, however, this was not the first time that central government failed to receive it in time.⁴⁹

Egypt occupied an important place in the organisational system of the Empire. It was the producer and supplier of a number of food products, exotic herbs and coffee needed in the domestic market, especially in Istanbul. Although the area around the Danube was the first supplier of grain for the imperial capital and its surroundings, Egypt produced a considerable amount of commodities such as rice and sugar, which was consumed in a wider geography including especially Mecca and Medina. The absence of the food products from Egypt caused price increases in Istanbul's market. As a concerned government, which attached importance to providing the peoples' everyday needs and basic foods, the central government paid attention to Egypt's market as well. The prices of food products and their abundance in the market were always in the agenda of the government, and controlled via the governor, *şeyhülbeled*, and seven regiments' officers.⁵⁰

There are a number of features that separate Egypt from other provinces and create its own unique circumstances. First, Egypt was a lucrative province, which provided a wealth of agricultural production for the Haremeyn and for Istanbul, as well as its cash support to the sultan's treasury via the annual tribute. Egypt's separation from the empire would make a deep impact far greater than other provinces. For this reason, the central government was

⁴⁹ Many times the governor of Egypt and mamluk beys failed to send *irsaliye* in time; yet, it was not about political or economic crisis. Also, see below appendix IX, pp. 270-274

⁵⁰ The decrees regarding the coffee and rice supplies MMD, vol. 8, nr. 426 and 427 (date mid CA 1180/mid October 1766). Regarding the market price inspection of rice MMD, vol. 8, nr. 221 (date late Z 1177/ late June 1764)

always cooperative towards mamluk beys, though, it did not legitimate mamluk beys as governors. Both in Syria and Mosul, the local elites were appointed and approved as governors. In our case, in Egypt, it was not the same. The central government continued to appoint the governors of Egypt amongst the high-ranking pashas and experienced statesmen. In this sense, Egypt contradicts the general pattern.⁵¹ In some cases (*i.e.* Ali Bey al-Kabir's uprising) mamluk beys challenged the governor's authority. For this reason, it is claimed that the governors were a counter balance to strong mamluk figures. However, one aspect that makes Egypt unique compared to other provinces is the presence of the *şeyhülbeled*. The *şeyhülbeled*, the notable of the country, was a title that was used by the most powerful mamluk bey in Cairo. In the 1730s, when this title was first used, the central government did not approve; however, in time, it had to accredit the title and include him in the province's administrative system.

On the other hand, as a province of the Ottoman Empire, mamluk beys and their approach towards the central government shares a similar pattern with that found in other provinces. Until the 1760s, while local notables administered the provinces in line with the government's desire, they centralized the provincial financial and political affairs in their hands. However, after the 1760s, the local notables became reluctant to cooperate with the government. In Egypt's case, we see that mamluk beys began to create a pressure on the governor starting after 1764.⁵² Ali Bey dismissed Hamza Pasha in 1766. Against Khoury's suggestion of weaker government emerging after the Russian war concluded by the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, the actions of the mamluk beys in Egypt proves that they started to challenge the central government via the governor before the Russian war.

⁵¹ Hathaway connects Ali Bey's uprising and aggressiveness to this situation as his counterparts were governors but he was *şeyhülbeled*. See *Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1517-1800*, (Harlow, 2008)

⁵² See below chapter III on the *irsaliye* and chapter IV on the governor

Ali Bey's authority had undeniable effects on the administration of Egypt. His political ambitions changed the fabric of political life of the province. Ali Bey's authority came to an end with his closest mamluk ally, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb's betrayal. After the termination of Ali Bey's authority, the central government collaborated with Ebu'z-zeheb and confirmed his authority as the governor of Egypt; nevertheless Ebu'z-zeheb died shortly thereafter.⁵³ After Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb's leadership, the political milieu in Egypt continued in a more chaotic and turbulent mode until the French expedition.

Ali Bey played a determining role in the dismissal of two governors; Hamza Pasha (r. 1179-1180/1765-7) and Rakım el-Hac Pasha (r. 1181-1182/1767-68). It is obvious that he was not the first local administrator that dismissed the governor appointed by the central government. However, since he eliminated all his potential rivals, bought numerous new mamluks from Caucasia for his household, and established his own army, Ali Bey caused dramatic changes in the political landscape of Egypt.

Ali Bey's authority had a dual effect for Ottoman Egypt; one was about the province itself, and the other concerned the central government of the Ottoman Empire. Regarding the first effect, the local administrators in Egypt were interested in attracting more European ships in the Red Sea ports in order to increase their income. So they started to disregard the central government's rules about foreign trade and welcomed the European ships in the Upper reaches of the Red Sea. Therefore, they extended their authority over foreign affairs. The second effect was the empire's need for Egypt's support as well as the beginning of administrative restlessness while the Empire was at war with its rival, Russia. Ali Bey's "uprising" coincided with Russo-Ottoman war between 1768-1774. Before this war, the Ottoman Empire experienced a long period of peace for 30 years.

⁵³ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 694 (date late R 1189/late June 1775): "*Sabikan Mısır kaimmakamı olub bu defa ... eyalet-i Mısır-ı Kahire kendiye tevcih ve inayet kılınan Ebu'z-zeheb Mehmed Pasha'ya hükümki* "

The State of the Field in Research on Ottoman Egypt

Since the 1960s Ottoman Egypt has been a research subject for the scholars writing about the Middle East. Based on primary sources such as archival documents, contemporary historians' chronicles and travel accounts, a considerable body of research has been accumulated. However, a large body of research has been devoted to nineteenth century Ottoman Egypt, as Mehmed Ali Pasha's rule in Egypt is mostly considered as an incipient separation from the Ottoman Empire. The eighteenth century history of the province has suffered neglect compared to the later periods. On the other hand, in order to properly interpret nineteenth century and post-Ottoman Egypt, the eighteenth century deserves serious scholarly attention.

Although modern historians tend to examine the nineteenth century Egypt separately from the Ottoman Empire's history, Egypt remained as a province until the British mandate. In the nineteenth century *Eyalet-i Mümtaze Evrakı* replaces the defter series of *Mühimme-i Mısır*, which provide us a great amount of information about Egypt's politics, economy, and land administration in the eighteenth century. However, the central government was still active in seeking solutions to the provincial problems such as plague. Mikhail mentions that Egypt under the rule of Mehmed Ali Pasha was still a part of the Ottoman Empire and the entire conflict between Mehmed Ali and the central government was a power struggle in the internal frame. Although he challenged the empire, his administration stayed, bureaucratically and legally, in the Ottoman Empire's frame.⁵⁴ Recent historiography put forth in the light of empirical data shows that neither Mehmed Ali nor Ali Bey had the goal of separating the province and establishing a new sovereign state. Nevertheless, the documents prove that they

⁵⁴ Alan Mikhail, *Nature and Empire in the Ottoman Egypt: An environmental history*, (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 160

were only ambitious political figures that tried to accumulate more power and leverage against the central government and their counterparts.

The French expedition has a distinguishing place in the history of Egypt. The time period before this historical case must be examined in detail in order to properly understand subsequent developments during Mehmed Ali Pasha's governorate. Until recently, the historians who approached Egypt with proto-nationalist paradigm claimed that Egypt exhibited a sudden development in terms of economic and political progress after the French expedition. Bonaparte's invasion was thought to have brought independence as well as development in science and art. Ze'evi criticises the proposition of Ottoman decline paradigm and westernization/modernization of Egypt after the French expedition and points out that the Ottoman Empire was experiencing transformation outside the influence of the West and would complete this transformation without it.⁵⁵ Modernization and colonization both are topics of the nineteenth century, which is beyond the scope of this study.⁵⁶ However, more investigation on the second part of the eighteenth century reveals more details and saves us from repeating clichés about the periods that came afterwards. The studies of Alan Mikhail and James Baldwin contribute to the existing historiography on eighteenth century Egypt. Especially, Mikhail's study investigates the transition period of the province from the eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth century. He mentions that the existing literature distorts our understanding of the period by an anachronistic attempt to evaluate the

⁵⁵ Dror Ze'evi, "Back to Napoleon? Thoughts on the Beginning of the Modern Era in the Middle East", *Mediterranean Historical Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, June 2004, pp. 73-94

⁵⁶ Christopher A. Bayly's research *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: global connections and comparisons*, (Oxford, 2004) proposes a global approach to the history and trading networks in the Mediterranean. Bayly's work is theoretically interesting; however, the focus of this study falls in a later period from the current study. It is difficult to connect his findings to the mid-eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt, since he describes a different world order from that present. However, the trading of the colonial coffee from the Carribeans to the European market, which affected the Mediterranean market by the 1770s can be an exception. Still, since this trading did not dominate the market, I exclude this development in my evaluation of the trade in Ottoman Egypt and its influence on the local notables' actions. For detail on colonial coffee trade William Clarence-Smith and Steven Topik eds., *The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 1500-1989*, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

period through the lens of chronologically inappropriate categories of analysis such as colonialism, reform movements and modernisation.⁵⁷

For this reason, more research focusing on the provincial administration of Egypt, its relationship with the central government and European countries will reveal more information about the period before and after the French expedition. Although there are a number of studies that shed light on Egypt's relationship with the European countries between 1775-1798, there is still few researches being conducted that focuses in detail on Egyptian provincial realities in the mid-eighteenth century.⁵⁸

P. M. Holt and S. J. Shaw's pioneering studies are among those that examined Ottoman Egypt in depth and reveal the principal aspects of Ottoman provincial administration in Egypt.⁵⁹ While Holt's research depends on the Arabic chronicles, Shaw relies on the Ottoman archival documents in the Prime Minister's Archives in Istanbul. While Holt revealed the political networks between the mamluk beys, Shaw examined the establishment of the Ottoman administration in Egypt. Holt's *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent* is a good reference for understanding the political milieu of the Ottoman Egypt in detail. Jane Hathaway aimed to complement Holt's book with her *Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule*. Unlike Holt, Hathaway approaches the Ottoman Egypt from the perspective of change and transformation, and examines the era by putting the decentralization of the empire and existence of the *ayans* in their appropriate context. Her study reveals a more realistic perspective regarding the important events of the era.

Daniel Crecelius focused on Ali Bey al-Kabir's and his client mamluk Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb's authority in Egypt however he considers their authority in Egypt as "the re-

⁵⁷ Mikhail, *Nature and Empire*, p. 160

⁵⁸ For example M. A Anis, *Some Aspects of British Interest in Egypt in the Late 18th Century(1775-1798)*, unpublished PhD thesis (University of Birmingham,1950); Rosemary Janet Said, *George Baldwin and British interests in Egypt 1175-1798*, unpublished PhD thesis (University of London, 1968)

⁵⁹ P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922: A Political History*, (London: Longmans, 1966); S. J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization of Ottoman Egypt* (Princeton, 1962)

emergence of an autonomous mamluk beylicate in Egypt”.⁶⁰ Crecelius claims that Ali Bey attempted to revive the medieval Mamluk Empire.⁶¹ Although it is a detailed study, the author displays deficiency in positioning Egypt as a province of the Ottoman Empire and Ali Bey’s uprising as a local notable. After the Ottoman conquest, Egypt turned into a province from a sultanate and from an imperial capital, Cairo turned into a provincial capital. Crecelius’s study fails to take this point into consideration while positioning Cairo and mamluk beys in the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire’s history. Also, Crecelius’s evidence concerning the motives and policies of mamluk beys is less detailed. The difficulty with his approach is the reader may perceive Egypt as an autonomous state, despite the fact that recent historiography relying on the archival documents demonstrates that Egypt and its administrators were closely monitored by the central government during the eighteenth century.

Further, Ottoman perspectives of Egypt should be well understood and the circumstances around Egypt and Red Sea must be examined. For example, Crecelius handles the period before and after the Ottoman conquest in a mistaken way; as if Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean and threatened the Red Sea trade “*dramatically*” after the Ottoman conquest;⁶² yet, we know from chronicle of Ibn Iyas that Ottoman Empire helped the Mamluk Sultanate in making the Mamluk navy stronger against the Portuguese by sending military and material help with Selman Reis.⁶³

Unlike Crecelius, Hathaway implements a broader focus and mentions the actual reasons behind the Ottoman conquest of Egypt. She reflects the Mamluk sultanate’s attitude towards the presence of the Portuguese in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The central Ottoman government approached to Egypt as a means of protection of both the Holy Lands

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6

⁶² Crecelius, *The Roots of modern Egypt*, p. 14; McGregor, *A military history of modern Egypt*, p. 18

⁶³ M. b. Ahmed Ibn Iyas, *Bada’i’ al-zuhur fi waqa’i al-duhur*, Muhammed Mustafa, ed., (Beirut, 2010)

(Mecca-Medina) and Ottoman trade in the Indian Ocean, considering its financial proceedings a secondary matter. Hathaway also emphasizes the place of Egypt in the Ottoman Empire and its prominence as a cornerstone of Ottoman geo-strategic concerns.⁶⁴

Winter handles Ottoman Egypt under a wide spectrum of institutions and centuries covering a long span of time in his book. He starts with the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517, explaining the conquest and earlier periods briefly, then proceeds to summarise developments up to the French expedition, telling us about Ottoman Egypt's social, political and military history via its military and religious institutions. Winter's approach is too general and he examines a period too wide. Also, Marsot provides a brief summary of eighteenth-century Ottoman Egypt as well. Her approach includes "the impact of French revolutionary ideas" in the history of Egypt. Despite its brevity, Marsot's study outlines many important events in their context of contemporary causation, however, these two work provide shallow works as they examined the whole "Ottoman period" of the province throughout the time period between 1517-1798.⁶⁵

On the other hand, Nelly Hanna's research sheds light mostly on commercial and social aspects of Ottoman Egypt, and Andre Raymond's research illuminates other aspects, such as the population of Egypt, and Cairo's urban construction during the Ottoman period.⁶⁶ Mary Ann Fay's works on the women of mamluk households and Hathaway's work on marriage alliances are notable and reveals the role of women in the eighteenth century.⁶⁷ The

⁶⁴ Hathaway, *The Politics of Households*, p. 5-7

⁶⁵ M. Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule 1517-1798*, (London: Routledge, 1992); A. L. Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1985)

⁶⁶ Nelly Hanna, *An Urban History of Bulaq in the Mamluk and Ottoman Periods*, (Le Caire: Institut Francais d'archeologie orientale, 1983); Nelly Hanna, *Construction Work in Ottoman Cairo (1517-1798)*, (Cairo, 1984); Andre Raymond, *Cairo*, translated by Willard Wood, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 2000); Andre Raymond, *Yeniçerilerin Kahiresi: Abdurrahman Kethüda Zamanında bir Osmanlı Kentinin Yükselişi*, (Istanbul, 1999).

⁶⁷ Mary Ann Fay, From Concubines to Capitalists: Women, Property and Power in the Eighteenth Century Cairo", *Journal of Women's History* 10 (3) 1998 pp. s118-140; Mary Ann Fay, "Women and Waqf: Toward a Reconsideration of Women's Place in the Mamluk Household", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 29 (1997) pp. 33-51; Jane Hathaway, "Marriage Alliances among the Military Households of Ottoman Egypt", *Annales Islamogiques*, 29 (1995) p.133-149

marriage bound and mamluk women in this sense were crucial in terms of transferring wealth and legitimacy from mamluk masters to their manumitted servants.

The earlier research tends to approach Egypt from a narrow and proto nationalistic aspect. They perceive and show Egypt as a stagnant periphery until the French expedition, which subsequently flourished thanks to the influence of the modern west. Ze'evi points out this situation in his article about modernism and the incorrect periodization of the history of the Ottoman Empire, and argues against the hypothesis that the West brought modernisation to Egypt after the expedition.⁶⁸ On the other hand, more recent research, depending on the records of the imperial, or/and provincial archives, suggests more convincing and credible information about the Ottoman Egypt. Not being content with broad generalizations, they offer sophisticated combinations of the imperial and provincial transformations, and political and financial circumstances.

The outline offered above suggests that former authors were influenced by the nationalistic methodology and approach Egypt as if it was a province that did not have any communication and connection with other geographical entities. A number of researchers ignored the fact that Egypt was a province of the Ottoman Empire and was administered according to the administrative system of the central government. In the relation of centre and province, Egypt and Istanbul took advantage of mutual benefits. On the contrary, recent historiography⁶⁹ considers Egypt in the context of the history of the Ottoman Empire, as they depend on archival documents.

Depending on the recent historiography, one can relocate the province according to the findings in the light of provincial and imperial archives. While Khoury questions in her *State and Provincial Society* the compatibility and convenience of the

⁶⁸ Ze'evi, "Back to Napoleon", p. 89

⁶⁹ Jane Hathaway, *The Arab Lands*; Hathaway, *The Politics of households*; Alan Mikhail, *Nature and Empire in the Ottoman Egypt: An environmental history*, (Cambridge University Press, 2011); James Baldwin, *Islamic Law*

centralization/decentralization paradigm on the eighteenth century Mosul, Alan Mikhail rejects the centre-periphery model in the context of a small Ottoman town, Fayyum. Alan Mikhail examines Egypt's environmental history and locates Egypt as a centre and a periphery thanks to the connection between the imperial and provincial bureaucracy. His study on environmental history undertakes Egypt's environment in the long eighteenth century, which proves that Ottoman central government, continued its involvement in the provincial administration, and shows the transition period in the province in the beginning of the nineteenth century.⁷⁰ Confirming that there was not any disconnection between the imperial government and Egypt in the eighteenth century, Mikhail puts the rule of Mehmed Ali Pasha in the Ottoman context and mentions that Mehmed Ali remained an Ottoman governor even though he ambitiously challenged the central imperial government.

Focusing on the importance of irrigation system for the agricultural production in Egypt, he highlights the organizational relationship between Istanbul, Cairo and other sub provinces of Egypt. His research on dam repairs, shipbuilding and timber transportation, Mikhail brings a new perspective to Egypt historiography, which was previously mostly confined to the politics of mamluk factions. He emphasizes that peasants were actively involved in the imperial correspondence as the main actors who witnessed and experienced any infrastructural disrepair, as well as local Egyptian and imperial actors. Mikhail's study expands the standpoint of the reader of Ottoman Egypt's history, which had focused only on mamluk factions and provided a misconception of a province filled and administered solely by mamluk beys. He asserts that Ottoman central government left the maintenance of irrigation works to the experts and first hand users, namely Egyptian peasants, and provided them a capable and professional bureaucratic system (a subject that James Baldwin's research

⁷⁰ Alan Mikhail, *Nature and Empire*, p. 141

also points out), so that they could seek imperial intervention and mediation whenever they had a problem with other villagers. Far away from being oppressive, the central government let Egyptian peasants guide and canalize their efforts during the repair and maintenance processes.

A review on the existing literature shows that recent studies provide more detailed research depending on the archival records, and tends to position Egypt as a province that was affected by the central government's changing circumstances and policies. Hathaway's research focuses on political structure of Egypt, explains households and demonstrates many aspects of mamluk administration in Cairo. On the other hand, Mikhail's environmental history and Baldwin's legal history focus on the daily life and problems of the Egyptian people and society, and reveal the people's relatively strong and close relationship and communication with the imperial government. Ultimately, these studies save the history of Ottoman Egypt from unhelpful generalizations and inappropriate clichés.

This study aims to be part of this trend by focusing on Ali Bey's uprising during the Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774). The detailed examination of the decree records will reveal mamluk beys' engagements in provincial administration and their activities in land administration.

Sources and Structure

To explore the history of Ottoman Egypt between the 1730s and 1780s and to contribute to the current historiography as an academic work, this study is based upon primary sources such as chronicles of the contemporary era and archival documents in the Prime Minister's Archive in Istanbul. The archive provides a mass of empirical data for the study of eighteenth century Egypt. In addition to the correspondence of the Ottoman central government with Egypt, contemporary chronicles will help to shed light on the era.

Comparing the historiography sustained by the central government and chronicle of the Egyptian historians such as al-Jabarti's *Ajaib* will bring a nuance to the study. Beginning with the Egyptian chronicles, Abdurrahman al-Jabarti's History of Egypt, *Ajaib al-Athar fi'l-Tarajim wa'l-Akhbar* offers a detailed account on Egyptian internal politics. It will serve as our indigenous source. Al-Jabarti's Ottoman-Turkish counterparts are Enveri and Şem'danizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi. Their works will provide the perspective of the central government.

Narrating how and why Ali Bey rose against the central government, Enveri penned his chronicle in the war headquarters during the Ottoman-Russo war (1768-1772). Extraneous to both Ali Bey and the Egyptian society, Enveri provided us a short, narrow and biased narration, in which he demonstrated the perception and judgment of the Ottoman sultan and ruling elite towards Ali Bey's uprising.

Istanbul-based chronicles did not focus on either the details of Ali Bey's period of rule as "a self-proclaimed sultan" of Egypt, or the perception of Arabic and Turkish speaking Egyptian people who were impacted by his actions. On the other hand, closely related with the Egyptian ruling elite and society, al-Jabarti witnessed the uprising of Ali Bey and all the social and political incidents of the period. His narration provides a diverse and in-depth knowledge/information, as he witnessed the incidents, and knew how the Arabic and Turkish speaking audience received the actions of Ali Bey.

Although some researchers have claimed the uprisings' aim turned into one of re-establishing the Mamluk Sultanate or the constructing of a new national state, examining contemporary chronicles and archival documents, we cannot detect any expression of a desire for independence on the part of mamluk households.

The Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi* -BOA) provides a huge documentation concerning eighteenth century Egypt. The *Mühimme-i Mısır Defterleri* series offers the decree records of the Porte from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century. These records are the principal official sources that this research is based on. They provide numerous details about the central government's close relations with Egyptian administrative elite and society. The decrees are generally addressed to the heads of executive and jurisdiction: to the governor and the *kadı*, in addition to *umera-i misriyye* and seven regiments' officers. Certain *firman*s were addressed additionally to the *ulema-i ezheriyye*- the scholars of Azhar and the *sâdât-ı bekriyye*. The Porte held, mostly, the governor, *kadı* and *şeyhülbeled* responsible for the issues.

The composition of the decrees informs us about the primary concerns and demands of the Porte from the Egyptian administrators, including the officials and the local interest groups. The mid-eighteenth century decrees are mostly focused on the financial duties of the province towards the imperial capital and the Haremeyn. In addition, there is a large documentation regarding the repairs and maintenance of various places in Egypt. The problems confronted during the execution of a demand are echoed in the archives as well. The financial and military records are kept as well.

Among the other series in the Prime Minister's Archives, the *Cevdet Tasnifi* has also been consulted. The financial documentation, mostly detailed and condensed statements of *irsaliye-i hazine* are consulted from the defter series of *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi* (TSMA-Topkapı Palace Museum Archives). The extensive use of archival documentation contributes a wider perspective for our understanding of the relationship between the local administrators and the central government.

This study will examine the uprising of Ali Bey in the frame of financial and political factors. Both factors are bi-directional. The economic situation of Egypt provided the province a huge income that the local administrators had the lion's share of it in the mid eighteenth century. The central government had been taking the benefit of this income via taxation as well.

The research on the answers of the questions about local notables' ascendancy are embedded in the chapters of this dissertation. The methodological approach and a wider historiography are explained in the Introduction. Chapter I will examine the process and the details of the uprising from the perspectives of the Ottoman and the Egyptian contemporary historians. One of the most important variables is the economic condition. Chapter II examines the economic position of Egypt and the financial power that provided for its people and thus its administrators. Also, the European countries commercial interests and their connections with the local notables of Egypt is examined in this chapter. Chapter III is on financial administration of the province and aims to reveal the revenue share of the various parties. Depending on financial opportunities and motivations, the political milieu is examined from both domestic and foreign perspectives. The annual tribute was one of the largest benefits that the central government acquired from Egypt. Regularity/irregularity in the delivery of the annual tribute, and changes in the amount caused alerts in the imperial capital and resulted in a close scrutiny of the accounts of Egypt. The relationship between the annual tribute and rebellion is enclosed in this chapter. Chapter IV focuses on domestic politics: mainly the governors, their duties and positioning in the province, and the conflicts they had with the mamluk beys.

By examining the decree records that were sent to Egypt by the imperial government, this study aims to contribute to the existing literature in financial and political history of the

mid-eighteenth century. Mamluk beys' activities and attempted changes in the *malikane* system in order to increase their interests, the pattern of the annual tribute and mamluk beys' involvement with disruptions during the preparation of the annual tribute, political relationship between governor and the mamluk beys and the central government's close inspection of all these issues is fully revealed in this body of documentary evidence.

Chapter I: Rebellion

The period between 1740 and 1775 is a peculiar fragment of time in the history of eighteenth-century Ottoman Egypt, which witnessed a dramatic change in the balance of authority of local political actors. This 30-40 year period in the middle of the century enables us to reveal the direction and limits of political change. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire enjoyed financial stability, which was also apparent on the political stage. After a long period of disorder, Egypt too enjoyed the stability of the political milieu, which brought along prosperity and an undisturbed economy during Ibrahim Kethüda and Ridvan Kethüda's duumvirate (1744-1754). In addition, until the mid-1760s Cairo underwent rapid urban development with numerous construction projects undertaken by Abdurrahman Kethüda (d. 1776). However, in the second half of the century, the politics of Egypt witnessed an "uprising". A powerful mamluk bey, Ali Bey al-Kabir (1760-1772), extended his authority outside Egypt, where his authority conflicted with the other local elements and the Porte. Selecting the previous lands that once were occupied by the Mamluk Sultanate, Ali Bey's campaigns on the Hijaz and Syria were interpreted as an attempt at revival of the Mamluk Sultanate.

This study contends that it was the existing political environment and sources of financial interest for the local administrators of Egypt, Ali Bey in our case, which led him to seek to hold authority in his hand, but not the desire to revive the previous regime or to establish a new country independent from the Ottoman Empire. Ali Bey's motivation was aimed at acquiring more financial gain and competent authority more than a desire to become independent from the Ottoman Empire. The research on Ottoman Egypt's economy demonstrates that Egypt's economy did well in the eighteenth century and most of the

economic sources of the province were under the administration of mamluk beys. Ali Bey held a strong and powerful position as a *şeyhülbeled* in the province. However, the governor appointed by the central government was still the strongest political figure in Egypt. After deposing Rakım Mehmed Pasha in 1768, Ali Bey acquired the title of *kaimmakam*, acting governor, and merged it with his title of *şeyhülbeled*. Thus, he held the whole Egyptian administration in his own person.

Forming his local power centre, Ali Bey eliminated his opponents in Egypt first. Holt claims that Ali Bey was preparing for his independence while he was eliminating his rivals.¹ In contrast to Holt's independence argument, Hathaway points out that Ali Bey's main starting point was to be the principal authority holder, *i.e.*, taking on the role of a governor in Egypt, rather than reviving the Mamluk Sultanate and being independent from the Ottoman Empire.² Hathaway's argument is logical as the mamluk household system was not peculiar to Egypt. This type of households and ruling families were common in neighbouring Arab provinces such as Syria and Iraq. The ruling households of Syria, the Azm family, and of Mosul, the Jalili family were locally based in the provinces and took over the office of governor by negotiating with the central government at the expense of realizing the Porte's needs and interests in the province. When we look at these provinces, whose governors Ali Bey might consider as his counterparts, we see that the governors in these provinces, of Caucasian –or more specifically Georgian- origin just like Ali Bey, were a part of the local households in the provinces and they were ruling as the empire's governors in Iraq and Syria rather than accepting representative being sent from Istanbul. It is difficult to determine whether Ali Bey desired to be recognized as the governor of Egypt who was appointed by the central government. However, it is certain that he desired to be the principal ruler of the

¹ P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922: A Political History*, (London: Longmans, 1966), p. 93-99.

² Jane Hathaway, ““Mamluk Revivals” and Mamluk Nostalgia in Ottoman Egypt”, in Winter M. and Levanoni A., ed., *Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society*, (Brill, 2004), p. 57.

province, and he did not hesitate to send his troops to neighbouring provinces, even though he knew that his actions would attract the wrath of sultan.

Ali Bey enlarged his authority over the neighbouring provinces of Syria and Hijaz, which were in former times two dependent provinces of the Mamluk Sultanate, while the Ottoman Empire was at war with Russia. The contemporary historians confirm that Ali Bey was engaged in rivalry with Syria's governor Gürcü Osman Pasha.³ With this information in mind, it can be speculated that his motivation to send his troops to Syria might have been due to his competition with his counterpart but the question of his motivation for interfering with Hijaz's internal affairs seems to be unanswered. However, a quick academic research shows us that the governors of Egypt had the right to extend their authority to the Arabian Peninsula, to places such as Yemen, just as was in the case of Hadım Süleyman Pasha, Hasan Pasha, Özdemir Pasha and the like since the sixteenth century.⁴

Ali Bey might regard himself as the holder of the right since he held the titular headship of Egypt. On the other hand, Egypt's administrators had been in rivalry in the Red Sea trade with the *sherif* of Mecca.⁵ This rivalry comes to the fore especially during the authority of İbrahim and Murad Bey and the opening of Suez trade to European ships, so as to gain more profit than the Meccan *sherif*. Ali Bey's expanding his authority over the Hijaz can be explained as cause and effect due to rivalries between the provincial administrators in eighteenth century Ottoman Empire to acquire a greater share of the income from the Red Sea trade. As will be explained in detail in the next chapter, the aim of opening the upper Red Sea to foreign ships was the desire on the part of the mamluk beys of the last quarter of the eighteenth century to enhance their income. However, it caused a decrease in the revenue of

³ Muharrem Saffet Çalışkan, (*Vekayinüvis*) *Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. cildinin Metin ve Tahlili (1182-1188/1768-1774)*, unpublished PhD thesis, (Istanbul, 2000) p. 232

⁴ See below chapter IV on governors, p. 210

⁵ See below chapter II on economy and European interest p. 135

semi-autonomous ruler of Mecca and resulted in his complaint to the Porte. Ali Bey's action in 1770 raised tensions between the administrators of the two provinces.

Ali Bey was not the first Egyptian grandee to challenge and disobey the central government's demands. Even his patron, İbrahim Kethüda (d. 1754) declined to obey every demand of the central government. Nevertheless, Ali Bey was the first grandee that extended his ambitions outside Egypt. In addition, he had his own economic and military sources independent from the imperial centre, as was the case of contemporary *ayans* in other Ottoman provinces.⁶ After engineering the dismissal of two governors in 1767 and 1768, the historians claim that Ali Bey established his rule by allowing the *hutbe*, the Friday sermon, to be read in his name after the Ottoman sultan's name and instead of the Ottoman governor and had his name struck on the Egyptian money. It is noteworthy that the narrator of the Friday sermon, al-Jabarti, makes no mention of insistence by Ali Bey on his name being used in the sermon. Furthermore, he narrates that Ali Bey punished the imam for his mention. In addition, he narrates that Ali Bey's name was not read in place of the sultan's name during Friday sermons but merely alongside it.⁷ Evidence here supports the case that would challenge the argument of Ali Bey's revival of the Mamluk Sultanate. It is certain that Ali Bey acted against the Porte's demands; yet the claim that he intended to revive the Mamluk Sultanate seems excessive.

The Friday sermon can be considered as the first evidence that Ali Bey did not attempt to take the place of Ottoman sultan as al-Jabarti narrates only one controversial instance, in which he had an imam, (prayer leader), first beaten and then forgiven.⁸ On the other hand, another matter is that historians such as Holt and Crecelius demonstrate an overreliance on the statements of al-Jabarti about Ali Bey's interest in the Mamluk Sultanate's

⁶ Jane Hathaway, *The Arab Lands Under Ottoman Rule, 1517-1800*, (Harlow, 2008), p. 79, 86

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁸ See below in this chapter p. 54-55

history.⁹ Apart from Ali Bey's reference to the Mamluk sultans just once, we cannot trace any other emulation and aspiration to resemble them by Ali Bey.

Alongside the aforementioned points that over-exaggerate Ali Bey's standpoint and mind-set by modern historians, the terminology of rebellion is another problematic when analysing local notables in the eighteenth century. Even though Ali Bey's Ottoman contemporaries branded him as a brigand and rebel, his activities tell us another story, as he did not openly struggle with the central government. This chapter aims to investigate Ali Bey's "uprising" in the context of the central administration of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire.

Although the contemporary historians labelled Ali Bey as a rebel, the modern terminology of rebellion does not match with the actions of Ali Bey, as he neither despoiled the Egyptian people nor did he raise the banner of rebellion against the Ottoman sultan. The context of rebellion in the eighteenth century has been researched by a number of historians.¹⁰ It is obvious that Ottoman historians and contemporaries used the term rebel for individuals that somehow disputed the regular order while struggling for power. In the eighteenth century, Ottoman imperial government dealt with a number of *ayans*, who sought to expand the boundaries of their actions and tested their limits as they tried to redefine their place within the central administration. The government's view was that such individuals were 'brigands', and intervened to discipline them. The definition of the term 'rebellion' did not include the plundering of peasants or seizing palaces in the eighteenth century. Yet, there was an invisible line that some local notables crossed by engaging in acts of doubtful legality.

⁹ Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan al-Jabarti, *Ajaib al-Athaar fi'l-Taradjim wa'l-Akhbar*, Abdul Rahim Abdul Rahman ed., (Cairo, 1997)

¹⁰ On the rebellion in eighteenth century Ottoman Empire see Palmira Brumett, "Classifying Ottoman mutiny: the act and vision of rebellion", *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, 22/1, 1988, pp. 91-107; Jane Hathaway ed., *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire*, (Wisconsin, 2004); Marios Hadjianastasis, "Crossing the line in the sand: regional officials, monopolization of state power and 'rebellion'. The case of Mehmed Ağa Boyacıoğlu in Cyprus, 1685-1690", *Turkish Historical Review* 2 (2011), pp. 155-176

Other rebellions before Ali Bey's uprising

Ali Bey's uprising was not the first; Egypt experienced a number of revolts before that of Ali Bey. The first one was after the death of Hayır Bey in 1522. After Hayır Bey's death, some mamluk beys questioned Ottoman suzerainty in Egypt. Two of them, Janım al-Sayfi, the *kaşif* of al-Bahnasa and Fayyum, and Inal, the *kaşif* of Ğarbiyye went to Şarkıyye (Sharqiya) north of Cairo in order to cut communication between Cairo and the Mediterranean coastline. Mustafa Pasha's expedition terminated their uprising against Ottoman rule in Egypt.¹¹

Hain Ahmed Pasha's (r.1524) rebellion: Holt mentions that Ahmed Pasha was of Caucasian origin, which connected him with the mamluks.¹² His governorate lasted eight months before he announced his "sultanate". Because of the fact that his deputy remained loyal to the Ottoman sultan in secret, his 'sovereignty' did not last long, only twelve days.

As the second important vizier, Ahmed Pasha had been seen as the chief coordinator of Süleyman's conquests of Rhodes and Belgrade. While expecting the grand vizierate, Ahmed Pasha was disappointed as were his fellow statesmen, when Süleyman I appointed İbrahim - his *hass odabaşı*, head of privy chamber, as the grand vizier. Although he was discontented with his new rank, the governorship of Egypt, Ahmed Pasha introduced himself as a just administrator in Egypt, and made new regulations. Nonetheless, he was harsh towards the rich and military officers; he confiscated the wealth of notables and put high officials to death.¹³

According to Diyarbekri, the contemporary chronicler, Ahmed Pasha changed everything that he considered dysfunctional in the Ottoman system, and was disrespectful

¹¹ Holt, *The Fertile Crescent*, p. 49.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

towards the former Mamluk establishment. Ahmed Pasha was trying to show his audience that he had a different mentality from his predecessors and the Ottoman sultan.¹⁴

When his deputy took action against his rebellion, Ahmed Pasha feared for his life and took refuge with one of the Arab tribes, shaykhs-Bakroğlu of Sharqiya. Refusing to kill Ahmed Pasha themselves, the elder people of the tribe turned Ahmed Pasha in. In the end, Ahmed Pasha was killed and the Ottoman rule was established in Egypt once again. Holt observes that one of Ahmed Pasha's mentors was of *shi'i* origin, Kadızade Zahiruddin al-Erdebîlî. Looking through this angle one can connect Ahmed Pasha's rebellion to Shah Ismail. Unlike Ahmed Pasha's rebellion, later revolts undertaken in the seventeenth century stemmed largely from discontent on the part of members of the military.

In the beginning of the eighteenth century, Egypt was a stage for another rebellion. This time it was similar to Ali Bey's as the rebel sought the help of a European country. **Çerkez Mehmed Bey**, a mamluk of İbrahim Bey Ebu Shanab (d. 1718), started a rivalry with İsmail bey son of İvaz Bey. İvaz Bey was *khushdash*, (brother in arms), of İbrahim Bey Ebu Shanab.¹⁵ Collaborating with Zülfikar, Çerkez Mehmed Bey eliminated İsmail Bey. Their rivalry was stamped on the political life of the 1720s' Egypt. After Ismail Bey's removal, former allies Zülfikar and Çerkez Mehmed became opponents.

As a result of the general attitude of the eighteenth century competing mamluk beys, Çerkez Mehmet Bey was driven out of Cairo by Zülfikar. Normally a mamluk bey who was driven out would go to Istanbul and lobby through his contacts in the imperial *divan*. Instead of choosing the usual method, Çerkez Mehmed used his contacts in Algeria, and via Algeria, seeking the support of the Austrian King Charles VI; he went to Trieste, and then to Vienna.

¹⁴ Side Emre, "Anatomy of a Rebellion in Sixteenth-Century Egypt: A Case Study of Ahmed Pasha's Governorship, Revolt, Sultanate, and Critique of the Ottoman Imperial Enterprise", *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, XLVI (2015), 77-129.

¹⁵ The word of '*khushdash*' indicates fellow mamluks in the same group. For detail interpretation see Jane Hathaway, "Osmanlı'nın Çerkez Mehmet Bey'in İsyanına Verdigi Tepki:", in Jane Hathaway, ed., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İsyan ve Ayaklanma*, (Istanbul, 2007), p. 165.

The Habsburg Empire had been the chief foe of the Ottoman Empire since the sixteenth century. Thus, Çerkez Mehmed Bey's attempt to seek its support and protection enraged the Porte. A diplomatic letter expressing the Porte's anger was sent from the imperial *divan* of Istanbul to Vienna prompting Çerkez Mehmed Bey to leave Vienna. This time Çerkez Mehmed Bey arrived at Trablusgarb, where he managed to go back to Egypt and gather a troop from bedouin Arabs. Mehmed Bey's ambition to fight with Zülfikar Bey prepared his own end. He died on the banks of the Nile, when he was trying to escape from his opponent. Çerkez Mehmed Bey's uprising turned into a high treason, when he received protection of the Empire's "infidel" adversary. He was, simply, a local administrator, unlike Hain Ahmed Pasha who had attempted to revive the Mamluk Sultanate, or Ali Bey al-Kabir who extended his authority outside of Egypt. He had been forced into exile because of his rivals. Nevertheless, his playing of the 'Austria card' against the Ottoman Empire rendered his action more problematic.

A number of military revolts took place against the governors during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Egypt. The first revolt against the authority of the governor of Egypt was in 1586. When the governor made an investigation into the military members who had organised a *coup d'état*, the military members suspended him. The successor of the governor was dismissed as well, as the result of another revolt. They pillaged the properties of the governor and killed his retinue and other notables. The *defterdar*, the judge of Egypt of the time and other notables gathered in Sultan Hasan mosque in order to find a solution, yet they had to yield to the demands of the rebels. The third revolt was not long delayed, in 1598 and then another followed in 1601. For short periods, the military revolts challenged the governors' authority in Egypt. Until the rule of Kulkıran Mehmed Pasha (1607), who took precautions that decreased the strength of the regiments, the restlessness continued. During

these revolts the regiments of *müteferriqa* and *çavuşan*, which were weaker compared to others, remained loyal to the governor. The governors had to seek the beys' support and protection.

By contrast, in the eighteenth century politics, the *sipahi* regiments, namely *gönüllüyan* and *tüfenkjiyan*, were the most disaffected elements. They rose against the governor, because their position was not as favourable as their counterparts barracked in Cairo. They served in the rural areas and were not as well paid as the *müstahfizan* and *azeb* regiments. Kulkıran Mehmed Pasha abolished the tax of *tulba* (request), which had been a valid tax in the Mamluk Sultanate and was revived by the *sipahis* for use by the Ottoman administration. This caused a bigger revolt in 1609. The rebels gathered at the tomb of Ahmad al-Bedouin, announced one of their members as the new sultan and moved towards Cairo. The governor quickly suppressed this rebellion.

This was a more serious action compared to the former revolts, as they proclaimed a sultan. The tomb of Ahmed al-Badawi provided a religious reference. This was the second significant rebellion after Hain Ahmed Pasha's attempt. The contemporary chroniclers observe Kulkıran Mehmed Pasha's suppression as the reaffirmation of the Ottoman dominion as it was the last attempt with regard to the revival of the Mamluk Sultanate. Furthermore, the *sipahi* revolts came to an end, and the abolishment of the *tulba* and *kulfa* promoted rural prosperity. Kulkıran Mehmed saved the imperial and provincial treasury from the exploitation of powerful local groups and individuals for a while.

Yet the conflicts between the governor and the local groups continued. In 1623, the members of the Cairo garrison refused to accept a new pasha for the first time. Subsequently, in 1631, Musa Pasha ventured to kill Qaytas Bey, who challenged his authority, but it ended in failure as the other beys built a coalition, killed him and chose among their own

membership one to serve as *kaimmakam*. Subsequently, they informed Istanbul of the events. In 1659, Muhammad Bey, after his revolt, was appointed as the governor of Abyssinia but he rejected the appointment and was suppressed by an army mobilized from the centre. In 1711, an armed struggle broke out within the Egyptian military. After this struggle, the mamluk beys dominated in the politics of Egypt, and a significant challenge against the governor was not experienced until Ali Bey.

The Porte assigned powerful governors that suppressed the revolts. In the eighteenth century, although the Porte claimed that all the governors it appointed were capable, there was no military intervention made by the governors in order to discipline mamluk beys, unless we count Gazi Hasan Pasa's intervention to quell Murad and Ibrahim Beys' authority in 1786.

Holt observes that between 1711 and 1798 "two themes dominate the history of Egypt: the factional struggle, and, within each faction, the struggle of individuals for the *ri'asa*".¹⁶ The first half of the eighteenth century had been the scene for many quarrels between two factions, the qasimi and faqari, but after the death of Ibrahim Kethüda (d.1754), who had dominated politics in the years between 1743 and 1754, the Kazdağlı household maintained its dominant position up to the French invasion. It would be naive to think that throughout this period, competition or quarrels did not occur. On the contrary, personal rivalry continued among the Kazdağlı beys during the time of their ascendancy.

In this period, the first competition was between Ali Bey Ghazzawi, who was eliminated by Ali Bey al-Kabir (Bulutkapan) and a very able and ambitious bey.¹⁷ Winter considers the latter as the second person, who desired to separate Egypt from Ottoman rule and re-establish Mamluk sultanate after Hain Ahmed Pasha.¹⁸ Ali Bey al-Kabir prepared

¹⁶ Holt, *The Fertile Crescent*, p. 90.

¹⁷ Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt: a study of the regimes of 'Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab, 1760-1775*, (Minneapolis: Chicago, 1981), p. 38.

¹⁸ Winter, *Egypt Under Ottoman Rule 1517-1798*, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 25.

thorough and ruthless plans that were composed of assassinations and prohibitions. He got rid of many beys and factions, amongst whom were some of his former allies and supporters such as Jezzar Ahmed Pasha (d.1804) or Abdurrahman Kethüda (d. 1776). Ali Bey raised an army, which included mamluks, North African mercenaries, Druzes, Bedouins, Shi's and Christians, and equipped them by utilizing gunpowder technology and by buying cannons from Russia, who were enemies of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹

Besides suppressing the mamluk beys in Cairo, Ali Bey overcame the bedouin shaykhs.²⁰ After establishing the full authority in Egypt, Ali Bey attempted to extend his influence outside of Egypt. The next step was to extend his political ambitions to the Hijaz by appointing his favoured nominee as *sherif* against the Porte's wishes. It is suggested that the motivation behind the Hijaz move was to increase the commercial activities and thus tax income by permitting European ships to enter the Red Sea. The last step was to expand his area of control to Syria, where his closest mamluk stabbed him in the back. Ali Bey's motive to intervene in Syria was mostly likely due to his rivalry with Gürcü Osman Pasha, the governor of Damascus. Although Ali Bey's mamluks İsmail Bey and Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb defeated Ottoman forces and were about to seize Damascus, they returned to Cairo in the autumn of 1771, fought against Ali Bey and defeated him. Marsot considers this scene as repetition of history since the Ottomans had also bribed the second commander of the Mamluk Sultanate, Hayır Bey, during the conquest in 1517.²¹ Winter mentions that, all in this process, Ali Bey had two supporters, one of them was Zahir al-Omar, governor of Safed, and the other was Russia. When Ali Bey was defeated as the result of Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb's defection, he had to take refuge with Zahir al-Omar.²²

¹⁹ Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 49.

²⁰ Winter, *Egypt Under Ottoman Rule*, p. 26, 107.

²¹ Marsot, *A Short History*, p. 49.

²² Winter, *Egypt Under Ottoman Rule*, p. 26.

It is suggested that Ali Bey's claiming independence from Ottoman rule and asserting his intent to re-establish the rest of the Mamluk Sultanate were based on Ali Bey's desire to combine former Mamluk lands such as Jidda and Mocha in the south and Syria with its ports on the Levantine coast, which eventually would help him to incorporate those places' lucrative commercial volume.²³ Broadly speaking, Crecelius handles Ali Bey al-Kabir and Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb's reign in terms of the financial, administrative and military organization, the emergence of the Kazdağlı household, and makes comparisons between Mehmed Ali Pasha and Ali Bey al-Kabir. He has important findings and reveals some hidden aspects of the developments such as the timing of Ali Bey's revolt to coincide with the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774.²⁴ This consideration may open a new window in discussing Ali Bey's revolt. Accordingly, one should examine the effect of Russia or the other European countries on the revolt and nationalistic discourses in the eighteenth century. During this examination, English and French impact on the rebellions should not be excluded, as the two states made efforts to obstruct Russian expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

However, writing from an orientalist perspective, Crecelius names Ali Bey's campaigns to the Hijaz and Syria, as "foreign wars", disregarding that they were provinces of the same empire. Moreover, he regards Ali Bey's attempts to have a say in the administration of these lands to increase his personal income as 'the recreation of the medieval Mamluk Sultanate which fell in the face of Selim I'.²⁵ It is obvious that Ali Bey attempted to take advantage of his political position in order to widen the administrative right given by the central government and to have more financial power. However, this does not prove that he wanted to recreate a Sultanate "in the direction of nationalistic sentience" and this case makes

²³ Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt*, p. 65.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

a researcher contemplate whether the motives of the “rebel” were nationalistic/political as some have claimed or actually economical and commercial in nature.

Ali Bey had a radical financial policy, took illegal taxes from European merchants, Copts, Jewish officers in customs, and other wealthy people. These taxes became a subject of imperial decrees, since the taxes taken from European merchants were determined by the *ahidname*-agreements made between the Ottoman Empire and European countries. Jews also suffered from Ali Bey’s policies in another way, because Ali Bey replaced them with newcomer Syrian Christians as officers in the Customhouses, in the Mint and the money-changing offices.²⁶ Marsot points out that Ali Bey did not trust the Jewish officers as they were in close alliance with regiments.²⁷

Ali Bey removed the Ottoman governor in 1768/69. He also refused to send the *irsaliye-i hazine* to Istanbul, and had his name proclaimed in the Friday sermon and struck on coins. At this point, some questions must be asked: did having his name proclaimed in the sermon and struck on coins in a restricted area mean his acceptance by all the people including the ulema and other beys? If it was so, how was this incident responded in the imperial capital? The most important indicators of the independence of Ali Bey should be examined carefully to understand Ali Bey’s period. A witness of Ali Bey’s authority in Egypt, al-Jabarti, narrates the Friday sermon in a different way. He narrates that when the imam prayed for Ali Bey after the Ottoman sultan, Ali Bey beat the imam due to having his name prayed in the sermon. However, he sent presents and gifts to his house the day after. This narration makes it difficult to believe that Ali Bey deliberately had his name recited in Friday sermons.

²⁶ Winter, *Egypt Under Ottoman Rule*, p. 26.

²⁷ Marsot, *A Short History*, p. 49.

The central government used alternative ways to deal with the rebels, so as not to damage manpower potential or the products and the revenue coming to Istanbul. Sometimes this political manoeuvring worked, other times it did not. For example, when Muhammed Bey (governor of Jirja) proclaimed his independence from Egypt's governor in 1659, before the pasha struggled with him, the Porte realized that Muhammed Bey's desire was to become independent. The Porte tried to solve the problem by appointing him as the governor of Abyssinia, but he rejected the appointment. After his rejection, a big military power was sent to Menfelut to suppress his rebellion. Winter considers Muhammed Bey's rebellion as a different in character from other rebellions.²⁸ He claims that in general the beys who mutinied against the governor, used to get on well with Istanbul, since they were aware of the fact that, earning the sultan's displeasure would put to an end to their career. Nonetheless, Muhammed Bey rebelled not only against the governor, but also against the Porte. At this point a question emerges: what is rebellion and what does it mean in the eyes of those who rebelled in the eighteenth century and those who have examined their rebellions in later centuries?

The conception of the uprising in Egypt: Rebellion, Mutiny, or Uprising: All or None?

One of the problematic questions that this research investigates is the issue of categorizing Ali Bey al-Kabir's movement against the central government. When did Ali Bey cross that invisible line between the legality and brigandage? It is for certain that by failing to send the annual tribute and Holy cities' cereal and expanding his authority over neighbouring provinces, Ali Bey succeeded in attracting the wrath of the imperial government. Moreover, he interfered with the Hijaz and Syria. Although it was in war with Austria and Russia, the Porte had to send troops under the command of Numan Pasha along with Kilis governor Halil

²⁸ Winter, *Egypt Under Ottoman Rule*, p. 36, 52.

Bey in 1772 in order to eliminate Ali Bey.²⁹ Also, the Porte sent a decree to the *sherif* of Mecca demanding them to be cautious should Ali Bey send his men to the Hijaz and create a disturbance.³⁰ However, for the central government, it took three years to label him as a rebel and issue a fatwa in order to eliminate Ali Bey.

Examining the terminology of rebellion, Hadjianastasis mentions that it became “synonymous” with the Ottoman Empire’s period of decline, as rebellions are generalised as the weakening of the central government.³¹ Defining the frame of the Porte’s perception of rebellion “*ısyān*” - rebellion, and “*şakavet*” - brigandage, Hathaway observes that all those who failed to fulfil the demands of the Porte were considered rebels by the Porte. However, being labelled as a rebel was not a point of no return for local notables. Rather, the Porte was willing to sit at the table for negotiation. Refusing requests to send supplies for the imperial kitchen and shipyards, cereal for Holy cities and most importantly the annual tribute could render the administrators “*şaki*” – brigands in the eyes of the imperial government. Ali Bey was not the first administrator that failed to fulfil his duties towards the Porte. Many mamluk beys had attracted the wrath of the Porte before. Nevertheless, the difference between them and Ali Bey was that the former were willing to negotiate and had good agents in Istanbul lobby on their behalf. This, of course at the outset, was done with the intention of gaining the Porte’s consent. Good lobbyists not only disconnected a mamluk bey from rebellion, but also could provide him with a proper post in any corner of the empire. The only thing required was a good agent in Istanbul who was capable of showing the good will of the former “*şaki*” to the Porte in order to recover his credibility in the eyes of the Porte.³²

²⁹ C. AS 51/2389 (date late Z 1184/early April 1771) The Porte allocated 4.000.000 *paras* for the budget of the campaign, and demanded the remainder from the bequest of deceased governor of Egypt, Rakım Mehmed Pasha. In addition, the Porte appointed the governors of İçil, Musul, and Haleb. However, the governor of Haleb, Abdurrahman Pasha, failed to achieve the duty due to an unknown reason. C. AS 57/2661 (29 M 1185/14 May 1771) and C.DH 71/3532 (29 M 1185/14 May 1771).

³⁰ C. DH 9/410 (20 Rebiulevvel 1185/3 July 1771).

³¹ Hadjianastasis, “Crossing the line”, p. 155

³² Hathaway, “Osmanlının Çerkez Mehmet Bey’in İsyânına Verdigi Tepki”, p. 168

The case of Zülfikar Osman Bey reveals some clues about the on-going practice. Despite the fact that he was considered as a rebel at first, the Porte excused Osman Bey after he paid his debts to the Porte. Osman Bey even managed to acquire a *sancakbeyliği* in Edirne after a two-year lobbying period.³³ Failing to follow ‘the current procedure’ like his predecessor Ali Bey, Çerkez Mehmed Bey had descended to the level of treachery and betrayal by taking refuge in the Habsburg Empire in the 1730s as well. A rebel or a bandit could make amends through the mediation of agents in Istanbul; however, a traitor had to pay the price with his life.

In Ottoman Egypt of the second half of the eighteenth-century, the expectation of the Porte from the mamluk beys was that they should fulfil two primary duties: to protect the revenues of the “*bayt al-mâl*”-the public treasury and uphold the “*nizam-ı kadim*” – the established old regulations and good order. The Porte emphasized in numerous decrees that fulfilling these duties would save them from wrath and punishment both in “this world and the next one”. Ignoring the duties, which they were charged with, resulted in warnings and condemnation.³⁴ It is difficult for us to trace the further reaction of the Porte towards “*asi* and *şaki*- rebel and bandit” mamluks. The decree registers in *Mühimme-i Mısır defter* series is silent during the time period coinciding with Ali Bey’s rebellious activity.³⁵

The mamluk beys’ perception of the central government is as significant as the Porte’s approach and perception of mamluk beys and rebellion. Hathaway mentions that the relationship between the Porte and mamluk beys depended on negotiation and a give and take attitude on sources and personnel, rather than a rivalry between two competitors. She draws attention to the fact that “the Arab *ayans*” controlled the fiscal, human and regional sources in

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

³⁴ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 114 (date late B 1176/ early February 1763). The decree is accusing mamluk beys’ degenerating the order in Egypt and questioning their reason of existence.

³⁵ There is a four-year gap in decree records of *mühimme-i Mısır defter* series during the uprising. See MMD, vol. 8, nr. 645 (date late M 1184/mid-May 1770), and nr. 646 (late S 1188/ early May 1774). These successive decrees were sent with four-year time gap.

the Arab provinces of the Empire. The crucial point in this sense is whether the “Arab *ayans*”, mamluk beys of Egypt in our case, felt oppressed by or conversely empowered by the Porte.³⁶ This assessment seems convincing as some decrees prove that the Porte’s approach was always rather that of “superintendent” over the mamluk’s administration. The mamluk beys were in need of, and had, the central government’s legitimization for their position in Egypt, just like their counterpart *ayans* in other provinces of the empire. On the other hand, a case in 1767 shows us that they started to test their limits in the second half of the century.

The *emirulhajj* of Egypt had taken extra money, which he claimed was required in order to fulfil his duty to protect the pilgrims’ safe journey, causing the Porte to develop a sharp attitude towards the mamluk beys. These particular actions caused the annoyance of the Porte on the issue of the *emirulhajj*’s taking money from the *irsaliyes* of the years of 1169/1755-6, 1170/1756-7, 1172/1758-9 and 1173/1759-60 without permission from the central government.³⁷ The Porte considered the revenues assigned for the *emirulhajj*, which consisted of a sum of money from the *irsaliye* and the coffee taxes, were more than enough to meet the *emirulhajj*’s expenses. The *emirulhajj* took from the *irsaliye* a huge amount of money. The total extraction from the four-year *irsaliye* amounted to 15.000.000 *paras*. The Porte’s reaction is therefore understandable since it did not want to share the revenues with another strong character in Cairo, as the post of *emirulhajj* was prestigious in addition to being profitable. The total revenue of the *emirulhajj* in 1200/1786 from legal sources was 21,425,000 *paras*; 16,750,000 of it was coming from the *irsaliye-i hazine* and 4,675,000 of it was from the charges that *emirulhajj* was allowed to take in the port of Suez.³⁸ Since the *emirulhajj* had a command over the coffee trade as well³⁹ which resulted in an increase in

³⁶ Hathaway, *The Arab Lands*, p. 112-113.

³⁷ For central government’s remonstrance about the expenses without see chapter III on *Irsaliye and Rebellion* p.165-178.

³⁸ S. J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt* (Princeton, 1962), p. 247.

³⁹ Hathaway, *The Arab Lands*, p. 84.

financial power, this was seen to have a direct influence in bringing greater political power, as well. This indicates that the mamluk beys held the authority of the administration in Egypt and evaluated every opportunity to become stronger financially. Ultimately, financial means was the key to political power and authority.

However, caution must be taken in attributing this ambition to Ali Bey exclusively. Whilst all the mamluk beys were struggling for the financial power and authority, Ali Bey was the most ambitious and intelligent figure, who managed to eliminate his ‘potential’ rivals among mamluks and officers and succeed in acquiring supreme authority. In return, the Porte did not hesitate to show the mamluk beys its iron fist. The *şeyhülbeled* Ali Bey al-Kabir applied and requested a pardon of the aforementioned amount with the excuse of the high number of the pilgrims of that year and the threat of an attacking the Harb, a bedouin tribe. Although the Porte accepted a small part of the request of Ali Bey and excused only 150.000 *paras* due to the threat from the bedouins, the Porte continued to accuse the mamluk beys of devouring the revenues of *bayt al-mal* with ambition and demanded them to manage the financial administration according to the previous order.⁴⁰

The central government’s strong and rigid stance against Ali Bey’s “request” is noteworthy. Ali Bey as the *şeyhülbeled* sent a petition requesting to be excused of the amount of 3.750.000 *paras* every year. Yet in return, the central government, which was desperately in need of cash, threatened abolishment of the regiments. Albeit the threatening, the Porte was open to negotiation. It is remarkable that the central government did not reject the petition outright and agreed to pay 150.000 *paras*. On the other hand, in order to prevent further appeals, the Porte questioned the *raison d’etre* of the seven regiments, which then resulted

⁴⁰ “ ... *hazine-i misriyyeyi ekl ü bel’e kemal-i hırs ve izlerinden neş’et eyledikleri zahir olup ve umur-ı misriyyenin tertibat-ı kadime ve mevzuat-ı dirinesini mülâhaza eyleyeler ...* ”MMD, vol. 8, nr. 114.

with the threat to abolish them.⁴¹ It was stated in the decree that during the Mamluk Sultanate and after the conquest of Egypt by Selim I, the regiments were maintained in order to preserve the East Mediterranean from the Christian nations' attacks. Yet in time, as a result of *ahidnames* and other agreements, military attacks by the European countries were eliminated. Moreover, the Ottoman maritime power in the Mediterranean assured the province's safety. Thus, the mamluk beys and the military power they offered in Egypt were not essential or required any more. The decree mentioned that they did not even deserve the *mevacib*, their salary, and other incomes since they undertook only one or two duties such as leading the pilgrimage caravan. Thus, charging extra money was a waste for the treasury. The Porte mentioned that the abolishment of the regiments was rational and lawful according to Islamic law, sharia. The damage they caused was far beyond their benefit.

However, the central government's approach to the mamluk beys who were enlarging their share in the political authority day by day by circumventing the governors and failing to send the revenues did not go beyond the rethorical stage or turn into direct action until the 1780s. It can be concluded that the Porte was making a "power demonstration" by emphasizing that the mamluk beys were still dependent on and still maintained close relations with the central government. The decree is, furthermore, complaining about the "degenerated" administrative system of local administrators in Egypt, which shifted the revenues from the central government treasury to their own accounts. The Porte always proposed preserving the previous order instead of generating and applying new regulations. In addition, the Porte encouraged both the ulema and military officers (*zabitan*) who had the right to speak in the

⁴¹ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 114 (date late B 1176/ early February 1763).

administration in order to work harmoniously with and act according to the governor's opinion.⁴²

The correspondence between the central government and the administrators of Egypt reveals the approach of the imperial administration towards the fiscal and administrative body of Egypt. Imperial decrees demanded that the governor, local administrators and notables such as *şeyhülbeled*, chief officers of the seven regiments and ulema should comply with the regulation made by the central government. The principal regulation, which the imperial expected to be complied with, was *kanunname-i Mısır* alongside other regulations, which were made in the first half of the eighteenth century.⁴³

Another warning was sent after this decree in order to inform the interest groups of Egypt which consisted of local administrators, ulema, notables and elites of Egypt- "*bi'l-cümle ümera-i misriyye ve sadat-ı bekriyye ve ulema-i ezheriyye ve yedi ocağın zabitan ve ihtiyarları*" about the appointment of the new governor, Rakım Mehmed Pasha. After Hamza Pasha, Rakım Mehmed Pasha was the second governor to be dismissed through Ali Bey's intervention. It emphasizes that the mamluk beys sent a petition promising the Porte in ten articles that they guaranteed their obedience to the Porte and its representative, the governor and vowed to fulfil what was expected of them. Consequently, in a threatening manner, the Porte warned the mamluk beys to obey the demands in the sultanic decrees as well as to the governors appointed by the central government and to give up the behaviours that will ruin them in "this world and the next world".⁴⁴ Furthermore, the Porte emphasized that only

⁴² 'Ecdad-ı izam ve aba-i kiramım -nevverallahu merakidehum- hazretlerinden mevrus olan iklim-i Mısır'ın nizam-ı umurunun tertibat-ı kadime ve mevzuat-ı dirinesi üzere rüyet ve idaresi zımında taraf-ı şahanemden nasbolunan vüzeraya-yı celilü'ş-şamımın rezinlerine muvafakat ve mümaşat olunarak tedbir-i umur-ı misriyyede medhali olan ulema ve zabitanın cümlesi cemi'-i akval ve hareketlarını ulu'l-emrin emr ve rızasına ve valilerin re'yine tatbik ile' MMD, vol. 8, nr.488 (date late Z 1180/late May 1167).

⁴³ A decree points out that a regulation was made in 1147/1735 see MMD, vol. 8, nr. 376 (date mid Ş 1179/late January 1766).

⁴⁴ 'imdi ba'de'l-yevm selamet-i haliniz lazım ise evamir-i padişahaneme kemal-i itaat ve inkiyad ederek bais-i hüsrân-ı dünya ve ahiret olacak evza' ve hareketdan istiğfar ve ihtiraz vücuda umur-ı misriyyede valiniz müşarun-ileyhin emr ü nehy ve re'y-

through obedience as they had promised would the Porte forgive their crimes and show mercy and pity.

Although the Porte did not take a *de facto* action after the dismissal of Hamza Pasha, the discourse of the decree referred to the mamluk beys' displeasing actions towards the governors and emphasized the fact that the Porte had only postponed punishing them. Had the mamluk beys regarded the Porte as an equal power, rather than contesting it, it is highly likely that not only Ali Bey but also all the other mamluk beys would have shown an indication of their intention to bring the Porte in line, just as they had been doing with respect to one another. At any rate, a violent opposition towards the new governor or other activities including snubbing or humiliation would be enough to show that they were not subjects of the empire but rather they were viewed to be as powerful as the Porte. In this sense, the mamluk beys' first aim was not to challenge the Porte in terms of holding the authority but to find a firm place and to enlarge their command on financial institutions, enabling them to embody their collaborators' authority as well. The mamluk beys were aggressively trying to be involved in the Ottoman administrative system. However, it was difficult for the historians of the twentieth century, who had a nationalistic mind-set, to understand the mamluk beys' desire.⁴⁵

Ali Bey was not alone when he crossed the line between being an *ayan* and rebel in 1768.⁴⁶ A counterpart in Palestine, Zahir al-Omar had been building his leadership for years as well. Starting his career as a tax-farmer, Zahir al-Omar established his leadership in Sayda from the 1740s onwards by using diplomacy, marriage alliances, violence, negotiation and

i tenbihine kalben ve kaliben cümleliz mümaşat ve imtisal' 've sair temşiyet ve ikmalleri murad-ı mülukanem olan kaffe-i umur ve hususun ala ma yurad temşiyet ve tanzimlerine' MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date late Z 1180/late May 1167).

⁴⁵ P. M. Holt, "The Cloud-Catcher": 'Ali Bey The Great of Egypt', *History Today*, 1959, 9, 1, pp. 48-58, p. 57

⁴⁶ For detail about Zahir al-Omar see A. Sabbagh, *al-Rawd al-Zahir fi Tarikh Dahir*, Manuscript at SOAS Library; A. H. Joudah, *A History of the Movement of Shaykh Zahir al-'Umar al-Zaydani (1690?-1775)*, unpublished PhD thesis, (The University of Michigan, 1971)

intimidation.⁴⁷ He struggled with the governors of Damascus from time to time.⁴⁸ The central government sent decrees to the governor of Damascus ordering him to collect tax from Zahir. Emecen claims that those decrees prove that the central government approved his administration in his territory.⁴⁹ Zahir's activities help the urban development in the territories that were under his authority. Under his administration, Safed, Sayda and Akka expanded and flourished since Zahir gave weight to agriculture and commerce. He improved the conditions of peasants.⁵⁰ While Akka was not larger than a village previously, Zahir invested in the town and urbanised it. The population rose. He traded cotton and grain in the port town. The French merchants had a more suitable environment for commerce in Akka. Just like the governors of Damascus, Zahir assigned his sons to neighbouring towns that he administered. Until the 1760s, he always showed his loyalty to the central government, albeit having conflicts with the governors of Damascus.

His being located in a port town helped Zahir al-Omar to connect and cooperate with Ali Bey al-Kabir and the Russians.⁵¹ Ali Bey al-Kabir and Zahir had met, when Ali was exiled from Egypt in 1766 and they maintained their relationship afterwards.⁵² Joudah states that Zahir al-Omar had similarities with Ali Bey in terms of political, commercial and local conditions, since both rose against the central government and allied with the Russians. Although there are similarities between the two, there were a lot of differences as well. First of all, Ali Bey was a member of household in an already commercially developed and flourishing province, which had a strategic and financial importance for the central government. Unlike the mamluk beys of Egypt and governors of Damascus, Zahir had to establish his rule on his own with his ambitious endeavours, as he was not a member of an

⁴⁷ Joudah, *A History of the Movement*, p. 20-65

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 62

⁴⁹ Feridun Emecen, "Zahir el-Ömer", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 44, p. 90-91

⁵⁰ Emecen, "Zahir", p. 90

⁵¹ Joudah, *A History of Movement*, p. 9-10

⁵² Sabbagh, *al-Rawd al-Zahir*, p. 16a

established household. In addition, Zahir developed the agricultural and commercial conditions in the districts under his administration. The primary sources tell nothing about increase and development during Ali Bey's rule in Egypt compared to the time period before him. The only thing Ali Bey accomplished was to "canalize" the revenue to his household.

Joining forces with Ali Bey when he sought refuge in Palestine and fighting against the central government's troops, Zahir associated himself closely with the sponsors of rebellion. He was eliminated in 1775 by the forces of the central government and Jezzar Ahmed Pasha replaced him in the region.

Jezzar Ahmed Pasha arrived in Egypt in the retinue of Hekimoğlu Ali Pasha in 1756. Affiliating himself with the household of Ali Bey al-Kabir, he became a mamluk and stayed in Cairo.⁵³ During this period he familiarised himself with the social and administrative condition of Egypt and penned a report on Egypt in 1780.⁵⁴ Taking over a number of offices such as *mütesellim* of Beirut, beylerbeyi of Rumeli and *mutasarrıf* of Karahisar, he finally became a vizier and was assigned as the governor of Sayda in 1775 after Zahir was eliminated.⁵⁵ Jezzar Ahmed Pasha kept his position in the region until his death in 1804. During his period of office he maintained a close relationship with the central government and showed his loyalty all the time. However, strengthening his position in Damascus was considered disturbing and worrisome by the central government, as he might have rebelled like his predecessors. Jezzar Ahmed Pasha resided in Akka during his tenures of office in Damascus and Sayda. The commercial and agricultural position continued to develop in Akka and Sayda during his term of office. Growing stronger in financial terms helped him to be politically powerful.⁵⁶ The most important military success of Jezzar Ahmed Pasha was his

⁵³ al-Jabarti, *Ajaib*, p. 224 Jezzar Ahmed was known as Bosniak Ahmed during his mamlukship career in Egypt.

⁵⁴ S. Shaw, *Ottoman Egypt in the eighteenth century: Nizamname-i Misr*, (Oxford, 1962)

⁵⁵ Feridun Emecen, "Cezzar Ahmed Pasha", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 7, pp. 516-518

⁵⁶ Emecen, "Cezzar Ahmed Pasha", p. 517

defence of Akka against Napoleon's army in 1799. However, even this success could not earn him appointment to Egypt as he wished.

Although some of his actions attracted the anger of the central government, Jezzar Ahmed Pasha's career was not affected, as he was an able politician who managed to maintain the balance in a cosmopolite region, which was inhabited by a wide of range of people from Arab tribes to the French merchants. Albeit the central government considered assigning him in different regions several times, they did not want to put the region's political stability at risk. Notwithstanding, unlike Ali Bey and Zahir al-Omar, Jezzar Ahmed did not cross the line of legality and stayed loyal to the central government.

Notions and titles: Being a *şeyhülbeled* in the beginning and at the end of the century

Use of the title of "*şeyhülbeled*" appeared in the beginning of the century as a praise that implied the holder of this title grasped the authority. The time and actor of the first usage of the title is controversial. While Holt, who was unfamiliar with the Ottoman Turkish sources observes that Jabarti used the title in order to refer a servant of Kazdağlı İbrahim Kahya for the first time⁵⁷, Shaw mentions that according to the *mühimme-i mısır defter* series, Çerkez Mehmed Bey called himself *şeyhülbeled*.⁵⁸ Hathaway's commentary also seems to corroborate Shaw's claim as she mentions that the Porte perceived his use of the title of *şeyhülbeled* as a part of Çerkez Mehmed Bey's rebellion. The title of *şeyhülbeled* began to represent a holder of authority against the Porte in this period. In this sense, we can say that the rebel Çerkez Mehmed Bey was the first mamluk bey that used this title in order to emphasize his power and authority against the Porte.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Holt, *The Fertile Crescent*, p. 92.

⁵⁸ Stanford J. Shaw, *Ottoman Egypt in the age of the French Revolution*, (Cambridge, 1964).

⁵⁹ Hathaway, "Çerkez Mehmet Bey'in İsyanı", p. 168.

The title of *şeyhülbeled* played an important role in representing the mamluk beys' discourse regarding the pronouncement of their authority. In the beginning, the Porte regarded this title as a sign of rebellion but later on willingly addressed the authoritative mamluk bey as *şeyhülbeled*. When a powerful mamluk bey such as Çerkez Mehmed Bey entitled himself as the *şeyhülbeled* of Egypt, the Porte considered this action as rebellion. However, by 1746, the central government started to use the title and addressed Zülfikar Osman Bey as *şeyhülbeled*.⁶⁰ Existing decrees show us that Osman Bey, Halil Bey and Gazzawi Ali Bey were also addressed as *şeyhülbeled* before Ali Bey's tenure.

Hathaway points out that normalization of the use of the title of *şeyhülbeled* explains the Ottoman Empire's provincial policy. When Çerkez Mehmed Bey sought refuge in Austria, he established himself as *şeyhülbeled* causing his actions to be viewed as rebellion. Yet, after the confirmation of Cairo's ruling elite, the Porte itself started to entitle some mamluk beys, especially those it accepted as its interlocutors in Egypt. The Porte's provincial policy was based on its institutionalizing of threat elements that had confronted it and diplomatically adding them to its own body.⁶¹ Therefore, the post of *şeyhülbeled* in Egypt is an example of the Ottoman Empire's 'mechanism of legitimisation', by which Suraiya Faroqhi mentions that the Empire ensured its existence for a long time.⁶²

Since the second half of the sixteenth century, mamluk beys conspired to dismiss a number of governors just as their counterparts did in the imperial capital.⁶³ Supporting the governors who acted in line with their benefit and preventing new governors' from interfering

⁶⁰ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 279 (date early CA 1178/late October 1764).

⁶¹ Hathaway, "Çerkez Mehmet Bey'in İsyanı", p. 169.

⁶² See Suraiya Faroqhi, *Yeni Bir Hükümdar Aynası*, (Istanbul, 2011)

⁶³ Lusignan depicts the messenger, the way he wore and behaved when he went to Istanbul in order to deliver the request of Cairo's grandees of dismissal of a governor. S. Lusignan, *A history of the revolt of Ali Bey Against the Ottoman Porte Including an account of the form of the government of Egypt together with a description of Grand Cairo and of several celebrated places in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria: to which are added, a short account of the present state of the Christians who are subjects to the Turkish government, and the journal of a gentleman who travelled from Aleppo to Bassora*, (London, 1784), p. 34

with and diminishing their revenues were the primary motivations for dismissing the governor appointed by the central government. Especially in the seventeenth century, cavalry regiments were malcontent since they thought their revenue was low and they resented they were being assigned to rural areas away from the provincial capital. The eighteenth century dismissals were similarly motivated by the financial concerns of the grandees in Cairo. Time to time, the local administrators transgressed the line between themselves and sultan's representatives when they interfered with the local administrators' financial and occasionally political interests. Hamza Pasha's tenure of office (r. 1179-1180/1765-67) witnessed many transgressions and instances of overbearing behaviour by the mamluk beys until he was dismissed by them in 1767. One example of this overbearing concerned forcing Hamza Pasha to petition the Porte and to ask for the charge of expenses for the repair of the governor's palace. The response of the Porte points out that governors were forced by the mamluk beys to claim the amount under the cover of the maintenance fee from the *irsaliye-i hazine* and then used this money for themselves.⁶⁴ The response to the petition also mentioned that while the absorption of his palace's repair befitted the governor's dignity, requesting its payment from the Porte was unacceptable. Another concern was the amount of *caize* to be paid by governor of Egypt to the sultan and other interest groups of the central government.⁶⁵

The central government did have a concern due to aforementioned pressures of the mamluk beys on the governors. It is mentioned in the decrees that the local administrators' transgressions resulted in the fall of the post of governorship in Egypt from grace. The Porte stated that the "oppressors" of Egypt, the mamluk beys, outbalanced the governors with tyranny so whenever a vizier was offered governorship of Egypt, he preferred another

⁶⁴ "vülat-ı müsriyye ümeranın tahrik ve iğfal ve ibramlarıyla muğayir-i kadim peyderpey müteakiben saray tamirâtı namıyla birer mikdar akçe mahsub etdirmege egerçe mecbur ve mecbul olub" MMD, vol. 8, nr. 228 (date early M 1178/early July 1764).

⁶⁵ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 228 (date early M 1178/early July 1764).

province even though the latter was generating less income.⁶⁶ Searching the motivating reason of the mamluk beys' hostility towards the governors, the Porte mentioned the severe rivalry and competition among the mamluk beys. The Porte emphasized that they were laying plots, manipulating and cheating in order to eliminate the rivals⁶⁷ and furthermore they charged what they had been making on the governors.⁶⁸ The phrases that used in the decrees reflect the approach and reaction of the Porte towards Ali Bey's involvement in the dismissal of the governors in Egypt.

Political events that prepared the way for Ali Bey's enlarged authority

The phenomena of rivalry of factions that existed in the Arab lands during the decentralized period of the Ottoman Empire was manifested in a changed form since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Holt observes that the factional struggle dominated the mentioned time period and within each faction, the struggle of individuals for the *ri'asa*, (precedence), prevailed between 1711 and 1798.⁶⁹ After İbrahim Kethüda and Rıdvan Kahya's duumvirate (1743-54), the domestic political milieu of Egypt did not settle down and the incessant conflicts between the mamluk beys continued. Before Ali Bey held authority, Halil Bey was the *şeyhülbeled* and continued to hold onto his authority until Gazzawi Ali Bey plotted against him. After assassinating his predecessor the *şeyhülbeled* Halil Bey in 1757, Gazzawi Ali Bey gained supremacy in Cairo. In 1760, he left Cairo as the *emirulhacj* and thereupon continued to plot another assassination against Abdurrahman Kethüda (d. 1776),

⁶⁶ 'mütegallibe-i Mısır'ın valilerine tağallüb ve özürleri ne derecelere resin ve münteha olmuşdurki tevliyet-i Kahire-i Mısır vüzera-yı izamından birine teklif olundukda kalilü'n-nema edna bir livayı iklim-i Mısıra tercih ile Mısır valiliğinden istifa ederler. MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date late Z 1180/late May 1167).

⁶⁷ "valilerinden iştika eylemeleri su-i efallerini ve kızb-i ihtiyarlarını iş'ar mesabesinde değil midir vülat-ı Mısırın min ciheti'l-mal Mısırlu'ya teaddi şaibesinden oldukları delail-i mebsutadan bedidar olduğundan gayrı mütekellimin-i Mısırın zeharif-i dünya için birbirlerini hedm edemeyub bazıı baz-ı ahar hakkında bir hileyi hafr ile ihlakına tesaddi" MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date late Z 1180/late May 1167).

⁶⁸ "izhar eyledikleri fitne ve fesadları valilerine özür ve isnad edegeldikleri cay-ı eşkal değildir" MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date late Z 1180/late May 1167).

⁶⁹ Holt, *The Fertile Crescent*, p. 90.

who was seen as the currently most powerful grandee in Cairo.⁷⁰ When Abdurrahman Kethüda learned about the conspiracy, he offered to the other grandees his resignation from the administration and proposed to leave Cairo. In his place he nominated a younger mamluk, Bulutkapan Ali Bey as the new *şeyhülbeled*.⁷¹ Once Gazzawi Ali Bey was notified about the agreement, he could not return to Cairo and he sought asylum in Gazza.⁷²

Bulutkapan Ali Bey came to the stage after Gazzawi left Cairo. al-Jabarti emphasizes that Ali Bey was a man of great strength and gives an example that once he was informed that the grandees of Cairo were debating whether to appoint him as an *emir*, with the support of one and the opposition of other, he said “*I assume the office of emir only by my sword, not by anybody’s support.*”⁷³ This debate might be concerned with the appointment of the *şeyhülbeled*. The archival documents demonstrate that Gazzawi Ali Bey had a successful lobbyist in both Istanbul and Cairo when he was in Gazza.⁷⁴ He communicated with the current governor, Kamil Ahmed Pasha (r. 1760) who was willing to ally himself with Gazzawi Ali Bey in order to eliminate Halil Bey and Bulutkapan.

Kamil Ahmed Pasha managed to provide the support from the Porte in bringing Gazzawi Ali Bey back to Cairo and make him *şeyhülbeled*. Kamil Ahmed Pasha had the Porte’s consent in this endeavour. Furthermore, the Porte sent a decree to Gazzawi Ali Bey praising him and confirming its support of Gazzawi Ali Bey in being named *şeyhülbeled*. In the decree, Ali Bey Gazzawi’s performance was praised as an accomplished *emirulhadj* who brought the caravan to the Hijaz safe and sound.⁷⁵ Gazzawi Ali bey was described by Kamil

⁷⁰ For Abdurrahman Kethüda’s building activities in Cairo see chapter II on economy, p.117

⁷¹ For the details of proceedings about Ali Bey’s appointment see, Abdurrahman b. Hasan al-Jabarti, *al-Jabarti’s History of Egypt*, Jane Hathaway, ed., (Princeton, 2009) p. 104.

⁷² Holt, *The Fertile Crescent*, p. 93.

⁷³ Hathaway, *al-Jabarti’s History*, p. 103.

⁷⁴ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200 and nr. 201 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761). Although the decree was sent to Ali Bey and Kamil Ahmed Pasa in 1174/1761, it was recorded in early Sh 1177/early February 1764, since the decree was “*mektûm*” – confidential.

⁷⁵ “... *sa’y-ı meşkurun ve harekatın Haremeyn ahalisinin ve huccac-ı müsliminin mahzuziyetini ...*” MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761).

Ahmed Pasha as a loyal officer who did his part perfectly as the *emirulhadjj*. Gazzawi Ali Bey was planning to use the decree as a return ticket to Egypt. By Kamil Ahmed Pasha's mediation, Ali Bey was "appointed" as the new *şeyhülbeled* of Egypt.⁷⁶ Another point that was mentioned in the decree was Gazzawi's endeavour to "apply and execute" the Porte's demand in Egypt, highlighting his benevolence towards the poor and the needy.⁷⁷ By mentioning his good manner, it was noted that his employment in Cairo would be necessary.⁷⁸ Ali Bey was expected to carry out the Porte's demands in Egypt essentially to maintain law and order in Egypt. This decree suggests that Kamil Ahmed Pasha, the governor who entered in a struggle with the local mamluk elements in Egypt as soon as he arrived, recognized Ali Bey Gazzawi as a potential ally for the Porte. His main aim was to break the power of the mamluk beys and subject them to the authority of the Porte. After some time, Gazzawi Ali Bey died in Gaza due to unknown causes and the plans about his appointment in place of Bulutkapan came to nothing.⁷⁹ This correspondence between the Porte, Kamil Ahmed Pasha and Gazzawi Ali Bey is one of the few documents we have regarding the negotiation between the central government and mamluk beys. The Porte's support of Gazzawi Ali Bey in return for his loyalty to the Porte and fulfilling the requirements of an administrator suggests that the Porte had other attempts for negotiation with other mamluk beys during the century.

Ali Bey al-Kabir's adventures in struggling with his fellow mamluks contain multiple examples of treachery and defection. Once Ali Bey started his career, he started to wipe out his potential rivals without considering allies or enemies. He was aware that one day

⁷⁶ "hala Mısır valisi Kamil Ahmed Pasha -edamellahu teala iclaluhu- tarafından der saadetime tahrir olunduğuna binaen seni Kahire-i Mısıra Şeyhülbeled nash u tayin eylemek üzere mahsus emr-i şerifimle müşarun-ileyhe tevcih ve tenbih olmağın ilam-ı hal için sana dahi işbu emr-i şerifim ısdar ve müşarun-ileyh vesatatiyle tarafına irsal olunmuşdur" MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761).

⁷⁷ "bi'l-husus Mısır'da oldukça sadır olan evamir-i şerifemin infazıyla tahsil-i rıza-yı mülukanem ve himayet ve siyanet fukaraya cümleden ziyade sarf-ı cehd ve makderet ve bezl-i tab u takat eylediğin yakinen ve tahkiken ve tahriren ma'lum-ı şahanem olub" MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761).

⁷⁸ "senin gibi mücerrebü'l-etvar ve müstakimu'l-ef'al olanların bu hilalde Kahire-i Mısırda mevcut olmaları lazime-i halden idugu." MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761).

⁷⁹ A decree identifies Gazzawi by mentioning him as follows: "...müteveffa mirulhac Ali bey..." MMD, vol. 8, nr. 325 (date early L 1178/24 March-4 April 1765).

they could overthrow him just as they had done with his predecessor. Ali Bey's first policy was to eliminate potential opponents and fill the posts with his men. He even exiled Abdurrahman Kethüda, who had made him *şeyhülbeled*, to the Hijaz, where he spent the rest of his life.

A question about the uprising of Ali Bey was whether the Porte was expecting it. The correspondence that arrived in Istanbul just before the uprising of Ali Bey does not suggest any imlications of uprising, as the decrees sent in 1769 reflect on the ongoing endeavour of the Porte to maintain order in Egypt for years. This was carried forward by demanding from the administrators to put the mint in Egypt in order, to refund the revenues from the deceased mamluks' villages from their colleagues and to receive the grain for imperial kitchen and supplies for the imperial navy in good condition.

Similarly, for the imperial army operating at the frontier during the Ottoman-Russo war, the Porte demanded in Şevval 1182/ February 1769 from Egyptian administrators to prepare sufficient quantities of *peksimit*, a dried biscuit as ration for the Ottoman soldiers in the campaign in addition to rice for the imperial kitchens which had they not previously sent.⁸⁰ Considering Ali Bey's action as an open rebellion, one can assume that Ali Bey would not have sent the demanded food and soldiers as he was preparing to rise up against the Porte. However, the records of *irsaliye* indicate that the Egyptian administrators charged the *irsaliye* with the expenditures of *peksimit* and the soldiers who attended to the Russian war, which confirms that the demands of the Porte were sent during Ali Bey's authority.⁸¹ Nevertheless, in another decree that praises Ali Bey's good service to the central government, it is mentioned that since Ali Bey became the *şeyhülbeled*, the imperial supplies were being sent regularly compared to the previous years. The same order encouraged the governing authority

⁸⁰ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 620 and nr. 622 (date late L 1182/late February 1769).

⁸¹ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A

in the province to continue sending the demanded supplies with haste.⁸² From the official correspondence of the central government, it is difficult to trace the flow of events between 1184/1770-1188/1774. The *mühimme-i Mısır defterleri* series does not provide any detail about the Ali Bey's activities during his uprising. However, some documents under the classification of Cevdet tasnifi offer us some detail from the Porte's side.

Taken as a whole, the decrees sent to Egypt addressing the governor, *kadı*, *şeyhülbeled*, *yedi ocak zabitan ve ihtiyarlari* in general imply that local administrators in Egypt (mamluk beys) were getting stronger day by day. A detailed examination in archival documents demonstrate that in the time period especially after the 1760s, the mamluk beys were trying to snatch more financial income from the Mint of Cairo, the governor's income and trying to keep *iltizam* revenues in their hands. The central government was monitoring Egypt's administration closely and sending *mübaşirs*, officers, in order to preserve the previous order in the organisational and administrative system.⁸³ The mamluk beys' endeavour to shift the governor's and *kadı*'s revenues to their own households was carried out at times with brute force and occasionally by bargaining with the governor under-the-table and forcing them to act according to their wishes. Such actions demonstrate the expanding limits of the local administrators' authority in late eighteenth-century Ottoman Egypt. However, this phenomenon was not limited to Ali Bey al-Kabir's activities. Before Ali Bey and after him, mamluk beys continued to snatch what they could from the Porte both in terms of authority and financial resources.

From the perspective of the imperial government, governors' task was to prepare a decisive military expedition and limit the mamluk beys' authority. Nevertheless, the eighteenth century's decentralized administration in addition to incessant wars between the

⁸² MMD, vol. 8, nr. 624 (date mid ZA 1182/ mid March 1769).

⁸³ See below chapter III on *irsaliye* and chapter IV on governor for detail

Porte and Austria, Russia and Iran together with a diminished treasury prevented the realization of such a campaign.⁸⁴ In contrast, we cannot claim that the Porte was helpless or that they were necessarily overpowered by the local administrators of Egypt. On the contrary, the Porte used both negotiations as a velvet glove on its iron fist. The central government used force when needed and in accordance with the circumstance. For example, the effort of the Porte for retrieving the revenues that had been allocated for the officers appointed by the central government is noteworthy. The province of Egypt was of utmost importance for the government and almost every governor who was appointed, or so the central government claimed, served as able, capable and loyal statesmen in their capacity as governors of Egypt. Thus, there was an expectation for them to re-organize the degenerated administrative and financial system.

The contrasting narratives of the contemporary sources: The Rebellion of Ali Bey al-Kabir in the Chronicles

Apart from the archival documents, we have the chance to access information about eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt from contemporary chronicles as well as European travellers. Enveri, Şem'danizade, Vasif and Cevdet Pasha are the Ottoman historians who inform us about Ali Bey's al-Kabir's rebellion. Al-Jabarti and Corci Zeydan are the Egyptian historians who narrate not only the rebellion but also the eighteenth century's significant events and biographies of important individuals in detail. Al-Jabarti's and Enveri's chronicles are prominent for this research as they witnessed the time period when the rebellion took place. The two sources enable us to observe the events from different perspectives. Enveri's official history book displays the central government's perception of Bulutkapan's uprising while al-Jabarti's peerless work provides us with much more details as well as an educated Cairene person's perspective.

⁸⁴ Thomas Naff, "Introduction" in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, ed., *Studies in eighteenth century*, (Southern Illinois University Press, 1977) p. 10.

Official Historiography of the Ottoman Empire

In order to see the uprisings from the perspective of the imperial administration, we must refer to the official historiography of the Ottoman Empire. *Enveri Tarihi*, composed by the official historiographer Sadullah Enveri Efendi during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774, is one of the primary principal sources that contain detailed information about the eighteenth century. By making use of the original correspondence, Enveri provides reliable information pertaining to the uprising of Ali Bey. Ahmed Vasıf Efendi's *Mehasinu'l-Asar ve Hakaiku'l-Ahbar*, Şem'danizade Efendi's *Mur'î't-Tevarih* and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's *Tarih-i Cevdet* are also among the primary sources available but less detailed than Enveri's work. Although Vasıf Efendi is considered as having used Enveri's work as a primary source, Vasıf Efendi writes about Murad Bey and İbrahim Bey's activities as well. On the other hand, Şem'danizade studies a wider spectrum of time covering the period between the 1730s and the 1770s.

Moving on to Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's chronicle, "*Tarih-i Cevdet*" should be mentioned here as well. Although he authored his text in the nineteenth century, his work can be considered useful for the reason that he mentioned in his chronicle: "*It is hard for a historian to write the events he witnessed free from rancour. Since the chronicles penned by the chroniclers are written with grandiloquent words ..., it is quite time consuming to edit and form a trustworthy history.*"⁸⁵ Ahmed Cevdet Pasha used Enveri's, Şem'danizade's, Vasıf's and al-Jabarti's chronicle whilst writing his own. Therefore, *Tarih-i Cevdet* can illustrate how the Bulutkapan's uprising was perceived in the next century from a different viewpoint. For example, instead of contemporary Ottoman historians, Cevdet Pasha mentions that Ali Bey used to read about the Mamluk Sultanate and imagined that "*Once upon a time while they*

⁸⁵ Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, (Istanbul, 1977) II vol. p. 412

were servants like us, they became rulers”, and dared to revolt against Ottoman Empire with the encouragement of Russia while the Ottoman Empire was at war with Russia.

Enveri’s chronicle will be the first account that we will refer in this chapter. One should note that Enveri wrote his chronicle while he was on military campaign. Therefore, the information he acquired was delivered from Istanbul and other parts of the empire during his time away from the imperial capital and Egypt. For this reason, the information he gives about Ali Bey’s uprising is not as detailed as al-Jabarti’s chronicle; nonetheless Enveri, as the imperial official historian, had the chance to see the original documents which were delivered to the grand vizier. In addition to the uprising of Ali Bey al-Kabir during the Ottoman-Russo war, there were the events of Mora’s situation, Ottoman fleet’s being destroyed by Russia in Çesme, the death of the Meccan *sherif*, the conflict between Janissaries and the soldiers of the galleons in Galata, and finally the death of *şehzade* Bayezid.

Prior to giving a detailed account of the events, Enveri first chooses to narrate the rumours of Ali Bey’s death in 1185/1771-72: “... *In 1185, on the 15th day of Rebiulahir (28 July 1771), the news of the rebel Ali Bey’s death came from the ‘rikab-ı hümayun’ to the ‘canib-i serdar-ı ekrem’ at the military encampment. Since this rebel’s inconvenient furore made everybody terrified and astonished, receiving of the news of his defeat relieved the people and delighted them. But after a while, the news of his injustice and banditry rose once again and people realized that it was a ruse, he had not died. They began once again praying for the death of Ali el-Kebir constantly. Everybody continued to worry about the problem as previously. Hopefully, the remainder of Ali Bey’s circumstances will be given in detail later in the narrative.*⁸⁶”

Enveri refers neither to Ali Bey’s seizing power in Egypt nor to his activities in Upper Egypt and the Hijaz. Rather he starts to narrate the Syria campaign. While narrating Ali Bey al-Kabir’s rebellion, Enveri first refers to the problem between Ali Bey and the governor

⁸⁶ Muharrem Saffet Çalışkan, (*Vekayinuvis*) *Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. cildinin Metin ve Tahlili (1182-1188/1768-1774)*, Unpublished PhD thesis, (Istanbul, 2000) p. 246.

of Damascus, Gürcü Osman Pasha. He mentions that the central administrators had been worrying about the pilgrims' safety in a case of potential conflict between Ali Bey and Osman Pasha until the pilgrims' safe arrival in Damascus was confirmed.⁸⁷ Both parties had been sending letters to Istanbul complaining about each other.

The verification of the correspondence containing allegations in hope of punishment of the guilty continued. In the meantime the powerful and prosperous Egyptian faction rebelled. Enveri mentions that while the sultan was struggling with the enemy of religion, Ali Bey prepared his army and munitions, and sent them to Gazza and Ramla several times to contend with Osman Pasha's soldiers. In fact, Zahir al-Omar, who was the administrator of Sayda and was famous for his wealth and the multitude of his soldiers, turned his face away from Osman Pasha for personal benefit and changed sides to help Ali Bey. The troops of Ali Bey and Zahir al-Omar entered Damascus and surrounded the castle. Therefore, Gürcü Osman Pasha was unable to resist and consequently chose to flee.

Enveri goes on narrating us the details: *"This events made the sultan get angry and he ordered to prepare an army on Syria to solve the problem. ... By the time this army arrived at Urfa, Ali Bey al-Kabir's troops with the head of them one of the Egyptian emirs, entered Damascus and surrounded the castle. The ağa of the janissaries, who guarded the city, was really brave and defended the castle. Meanwhile, the news of Ali Bey's death has spread among the Egyptian soldiers and for this reason they returned back to Egypt as if they flee. ... As the unsuitable wording of the governor of Şam and his hostility to Ali Bey, and his commitment that led to sedition were the reason of this event, he was deposed from governorship of Şam and appointed as governor of Karaman. In place of him, Azmzade Mehmed Paşa became the governor and Mirulhac of Şam. Also Osman's two sons, Mehmed Paşa and Derviş Mehmed Paşa were appointed as administrators of Niğde and Akşehir sanjaqs."*⁸⁸

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

⁸⁸ Çalışkan, *Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihi*, p. 268-269.

Enveri presumably did not know that the name of the Egyptian *emir* who joined the Syrian campaign was Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb, whom he praises later on for his opposition to Ali Bey. Also, unlike other sources, Enveri is the only source that attached the departure of the Egyptian troops from Syria to the rumour of Ali Bey's death. Moreover, unlike the European sources, Enveri causes Ali Bey's Syria campaign only to the hostility between him and Gürcü Osman Pasha; he does not refer to Ali Bey's authority expansion. Another noteworthy point is that Enveri finds Gürcü Osman Pasha guilty. He states Osman Pasha's hostile attitudes led events to this point:

"... Gürcü Osman Paşa had the approval of the sultan and performed this duty successfully for a while. He was of Georgian origin and managed to acquire a considerable wealth. Since he lived in the same place for a long time and had a familiarity and friendship with the people and the merchants of the place, willingly or unwillingly, he acquired power. Also, his two sons had the rank of 'mirimiranlik' by the grace of the sultan. Due to both his rank and wealth, he meddled in some issues outside his duties and he developed hostility with Ali Bey, şeyhülbeled and emirulhajj of Egypt. Each side sought to eliminate the other and to achieve this, both wrote reports and their correspondences including complaints arrived in Istanbul.⁸⁹"

Enveri's causation relates the hostility between the two local administrators to self-assurance and conceit. Those two characters were a result of the power that was provided by the rank and wealth; mainly the two features that made a local figure an *ayan*. Enveri extends his account of Ali Bey:

"Concerning Ali Bey's situation in detail and his rebellion's state of affairs: We heard about Ali Bey as he is famous for being İbrahim Kethüda's servant. As time passed, he became a leading figure among the other amirs and 'şeyhülbeled' of Egypt. He achieved what he wanted in a short time and had complete independence. Sometimes he even outbalanced the governor of Egypt and dismissal

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

of some of them was caused by his opinion. For these reasons, the governors were fed up with his deceit and deception, and they discussed about how to achieve his expelling swiftly and easily from Egypt. As a result, in 1177/1763-64 the governor of Egypt, Gürcü Mehmed Paşa (Kethüda Mehmed Pasha (1762-64)) became aware of Ali Bey's behaviour that gave rise to mischief and caused problems and damage among the people in the province. He discussed the situation with wise counsellors of Egypt and made a decision. Mehmed Paşa commissioned Ali Bey with the duty of 'emirülhajjlik' and sent him to the Hijaz (as a part of his plan to eliminate him). But since dismissal of Gürcü Mehmed Paşa coincided with his and the other pilgrims' return, Ali Bey managed to return to Egypt with his followers and went on carrying out his previous cruelties. Yet, because some amirs, who were brave, courageous and coequal to him, opposed to him in the administration, he could not act as he wished. To eliminate his opponents, he hired some men to kill them in a secret way. It was a known thing that the Egyptian amirs were killing each other to be able to enjoy full authority on their own. But his opponents managed to learn his secrets by the agency of their spies and came to an agreement; they took Ali Bey out of Egypt forcibly in the beginning of the year of 1178/1764-65, sent him away and did not let him enter Egypt any more. Ali Bey travelled around Sa'id and Humam for a while and crossed the desert and asked for help from the shaykh of Humam. The shaykh helped Ali Bey to return to Egypt on condition that he obeyed the order and decrees of the Ottoman sultan."⁹⁰

Enveri points out that Kethüda Mehmed Pasha discerned Ali Bey's bad temper. Consequently, he plotted against Ali Bey by sending him to Hijaz as *emirulhaji*, and despite Pasha's efforts, he failed to eliminate Ali Bey due to the end of his tenure in Egypt. Also, it is interesting to see that Enveri claims that shaykh of Humam helped Ali Bey only on condition of his obeying of the sultan. As it is obvious that shaykh would care about only his interest rather than Ali Bey's obedience to the sultan.

"Ali Bey managed to return to Cairo during the period of the governorship of Rakım Mehmed Paşa and take his revenge from his opponents. He killed most of those who claimed the right

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 271

to be chosen “şeyhülbeled”, exiled the rest out of Egypt and confiscated all their belongings. So he went on with his treachery. The governor of Şam, Osman Paşa, reported the discomfort and disturbance of the Egyptian people from Ali Bey to the central government. The Sublime Porte sometimes attempted to give the duty of the disciplining and chastening of Ali Bey to the governors of Egypt, and sometimes to Osman Paşa himself. But every time an obstacle occurred and they were unable to go on campaign against Ali Bey.”⁹¹

Enveri states that although there was hostility between Ali Bey and Osman Pasha, the Porte attempted to give the duty of disciplining Ali Bey to Osman Pasha. A decree record confirms that the Porte asked Gürcü Osman Pasha to provide the food stocks and logistic means, mainly camels, for Numan Pasha’s troops.⁹²

In another part of his narrative Enveri wrote: “Ali Bey learned the issue and to guard himself, gathered soldiers and supplied other requirements. To enable this, he confiscated the goods and money of some wealthy people; shackled or killed those who did not follow him or did not help him. The end of 1182/1768-69: Ali Bey used to take care of hiding his cruelty and ensuring that news of it did not reach the Sublime Porte. In those days, the Sublime Porte was at war with Russia and Ali Bey exploited this opportunity and rebelled against the central government.” Here Enveri suggests that Ali Bey intentionally rebelled during the war, as he was aware that the central government would not intervene to punish his actions. Enveri continues with the Hijaz campaign’s details:

“To make a fortune and gather all the authority in his hands, Ali Bey publicly spilled blood and ransacked people’s belongings. According to the correspondence of Şerif Ahmed bin Mesud, the Emir of Mekke-i Mukerreme, Ali Bey did not content himself with all these cruelties. Also, in the beginning of the year of 1184/1770-71, he spread his fierceness to the Holy Land and dismissed the

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p.330.

⁹² C. AS 57/2661 (29 M 1185/14 May 1771) The Porte threatens Osman Pasha not to fail his duty: ‘... şöyleki senden matlub-ı hümayunum olan hususat-ı merkumede hilaf-ı memul kusurun zuhur etmek lazım gelür ise bu dağdağanın vehameti sana raci’ olacağını cezmen ve yakinen bilup ana göre her hususa fevka’l-memul mezid ihtimam ve dikkat ...’

şerif from his duty. To appoint şerif Abdullah as the 'şerif' of Mekke and Hasan Bey as the governor of Jidda, he gathered more than ten thousand rebels and about one hundred cannons, arms and ammunition and sent them with the command of his son-in-law Ebu'z-zeheb Mehmed Bey and Mustafa Bey to the Hijaz. Mehmed Bey and Mustafa Bey spread the news of the dismissal of the şerif of Mekke by disseminating a fraudulent edict. Since there were some rumours about the dismissal of 'şerif' before in Mekke, the şerif could not oppose, but had to trust the news and complied with it to avoid causing a mischief. He left Batha lands and the house of Allah. ... After they appointed Hasan Bey as customs officer, they said they were done and returned to Egypt and right after that turned their attention to Şam to expel Osman Paşa. Meanwhile, Şerif Ahmed bin Mesud realized that the decree was fake and all these plays were trickery of Ali Bey so he gathered an army and returned to Mekke. Şerif Abdullah and his supporters left Mekke as they were like summer friends. When this news arrived in Egypt, instead of realizing that the bad things he had committed never would be maintained, Ali Bey was unashamed and continued in his cruelty. He sent his men to Şam and in order to make things easier, wrote down an Arabic decree and sealed it like vezirial decrees.”⁹³

Like other contemporary sources, Enveri emphasizes that Ali Bey's aim was to gather all the authority and financial sources in his sole hands. He provides a detailed narrative about the Hijaz campaign of Ali Bey's troops; it is highly likely that he examined the correspondence from the *sherif* of Mecca, which arrived at the divan of the grand vizier. Here Enveri provides a copy of the correspondence of Ali Bey sent to Damascus. It can be seen in this letter that Ali Bey simulated sultanic decrees. The letter begins with a praise dedicated to himself: '*miru'l-livai'ş-şerif al-sultani ve alem al-munifi'l-hakani miru'l-hajj al-sabik ve kaimmakam-ı Mısır hâlâ*'. We can evidently see in the aforementioned quote that Ali Bey does not claim himself as a sultan, but rather deputy of Egypt. The target addressee of the letter is the people of Damascus. In the letter, Ali Bey approaches to the Damascene people emphasizing that Osman Pasha behaves cruelly towards the people, merchants, pilgrims and

⁹³ Çalışkan, *Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihi*, p.331.

claims that he comes to Şam to save them from Osman Pasha's cruelty and for the victory of the 'religion of Islam'. Enveri's narration about the Syria campaign's details continues as follows:

*“With a scrap of paper Ali Bey wrote to his men from among the amirs of Egypt: İsmail Bey, Tantavi Ali Bey and Habeş Ali Bey who cooperated with the Arab shaykh Zahir al-Omar. They took over Nablus, Cuneyn, Gazza, Ramla and Yafa forcibly and appointed as administrators for these places his own followers.”*⁹⁴

The governor of Damascus, ulema in Damascus and the Hijaz, and the *sherif* of Mecca reported the news about the details of Syria and Hijaz campaigns and the turbulent political environment in these provinces. Enveri states that as a result of the campaigns, the customary contribution of grain for sustaining the Haremeyn failed:

*“Consequently, the usual sending of crops from the foundations of Haremeyn in Egypt was stopped and the people of Mekke and Medine were in hardship. Having this report, the wise men of the state and the ulema consulted and negotiated the issue. They reached a consensus view that; by sending the fake decree to Şam, acting in contravention to Allah's consent and terms of the sharia, abusing and disturbing the people and towns, and sending his brigands. Ali Bey had and it was required that he should removed immediately.”*⁹⁵ Due to the aforementioned reasons, the statesmen of the central government decided that Ali Bey “reached the top of rebellion, depravity and cruelty” and “hereafter he would not behave wisely”. Here we see the invisible line that Ali Bey crossed resulting in his being branded as a real rebel on the contrary to his counterparts. For some, as Hathaway suggested, the rule of “being a rebel was not a point of no return” was not applicable. At this point, the central government sent the governor of Sivas Numan Pasha as the governor of Egypt together with Raqqah province supported by his retinue, the governors of Aleppo and Mosul, and the *mutasarrifs* of Kilis and I'zaz against Ali Bey in order to

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 332

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 332

punish him “according to the fatwa and eliminate the strife and sedition” in the beginning of Şevval 1184/18-28 January 1771.

*“Numan Paşa headed to Raqqah, gathering the soldiers appointed to his army. Meanwhile, Ebu’z-zeheb and other men of Ali Bey reached Damascus and the governor of Şam left the city, and conflict between the guards of castle and Ali Bey’s soldiers broke out. Ebu’z-zeheb did not intend to be in conflict with Damascus’s people but he had to, since he was the son-in-law of Ali Bey. Although he started the conflict grudgingly, after thinking carefully, he concluded that with the punishment of the sultan his life would be woeful. Once the news of the death of Ali Bey spread among them, Ebu’z-zeheb Mehmed Bey left Şam and returned to Egypt.”*⁹⁶

Although the Ottoman troops did not encounter Ali Bey’s troops directly, when they entered Syria, their presence was enough to dissolve the allied forces of Zahir al-Umar and Ebu’z-zeheb Bey. It also discouraged İsmail Bey to attack Syria’s hajj caravan, which had been part of Zahir’s strategy for attacking Osman Pasha.⁹⁷ Also, it is worth noting that, once again Enveri praised Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb and portrayed him as a character who, in nature, would never oppose sultan’s law, but did so because he was compelled to by Ali Bey. In relation to Ebu’z-zeheb’s return from Damascus, information provided by Cevdet Pasha found in neither Jabarti nor Enveri indicates that İsmail Bey persuaded Ebu’z-zeheb to give up fighting for the conquest of Syria and return to Egypt. He was worried about Ebu’z-zeheb’s success engendering the scorn of the other *emirs*. Enveri narrates their return to Egypt as follows:

“Ali Bey’s expulsion and deportation from Cairo: The ‘sirdar’ of the Egyptian ‘amirs’ who were sent to lands of Şam by the aforementioned brigand, Mir Ebu’z-zeheb returned to Egypt quickly and met and had secret conversations with the ‘ulema’. He gave advice by saying to them: “It is doubtless to say that the way this rebel follows is not the right path. His riot will provoke the anger of

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 333. For detail about Ebu’z-zeheb’s campaign to Damascus see Joudah, *A History of Movement*, p. 140-160

⁹⁷ Joudah, *A History of the Movement*, p. 130

the Sublime Porte and he will not be able to escape from the state, which will last forever. In accordance with the imperative of holy edict- Qur'an: "And incline not to those who do wrong, or the Fire will touch you ..." complied with the metaphor of this verse. Those who gave the control to this kind of whim owners' foolish words and weak wishes, and who broke the wand of obedience into two pieces cannot retrieve their collar, run away from the punishment of the excellent shadow of Allah and be safe. Praise to Allah, I am tired and penitent from all what I did and did not do. I will never follow these brutes and rebels any more. I am scared of the immediate and deferred punishment" and stated that he turned his face of rebel aforementioned and all of them agreed that he deserved to be annihilated."⁹⁸

Al-Jabarti does not tell about Ebu'z-zeheb's conversation with the ulema.

*"Ebu'z-zeheb's advice was persuasive. Once he received their approval, the people of Egypt surrounded Ali Bey's palace that was the equivalent of that of Haman and Şeddad. When the brigand Ali Bey saw the siege and realized that it is the time of "the earth closed in on them in spite of its vastness" and that if he waited even for an hour it would be his end and annihilation, he immediately took his cash money and as much of his possessions as he could, and ran away from Egypt with his companions and supporters."*⁹⁹

In contrast to al-Jabarti's and Ahmed Cevdet Pasha's narratives,¹⁰⁰ only Enveri mentions that Ali Bey was surrounded by Ebu'z-zeheb. On the other hand, Enveri's comparison of Ali Bey's house to Hâmân's and Şeddad's house is noteworthy. According to the holy book of the Muslims, the Quran, Haman is referred to as the assistant of the pharaoh in ancient Egypt, who was the enemy of believers and the prophet Moses. Şeddad was referred to as another "infidel", who built the incredibly beautiful gardens of 'Irem' and

⁹⁸ Çalıřkan, *Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihi*, p. 335.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 335

¹⁰⁰ Also Cevdet Pasha mentions that Ebu'z-zeheb was popular among the Egyptian people and conversely they were said to hate Ali Bey. See Çalıřkan, *Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihi*, p. 415.

claimed that he built the same beauty of Paradise on the earth, in a way, comparing himself to God.

The document about the fight between Ali Bey and Ebu'z-zeheb Mehmed Bey arrived on 26 Safer/ 10 June 1771 and made the *serasker* overjoyed. In order to show his joy, he ordered drums and flutes to be played, had the cannon fired and also rewarded the herald abundantly, which made his peers jealous of him.

*“By the way, it was suggested by Ebu'z-zeheb Mehmed Bey to invite Osman Bey, who was among the Egyptian umera and had to leave Egypt and take refuge in Mekke during Ali Bey's period, to give him the governorship. Osman Bey was invited to Egypt and Numan Paşa was ordered to follow Ali Bey and to annihilate him wherever he should find him.”*¹⁰¹

Osman Bey was appointed as the governor by the central government when Ali Bey organised the campaigns against the Hijaz. Osman Bey must have been an appointed officer in Cairo when he was informed that he was assigned as the governor. However, he had to leave Cairo and stayed in Damascus while corroborating with the new governor of Damascus Mehmed Pasha and waiting for the state's army in order to fight against Ali Bey.¹⁰² Holt mentions Osman Bey's presence summer in Cairo in the summer of 1769.¹⁰³

“The murder of Ali Bey: As mentioned before, Ali Bey was expelled from Egypt with the effort of the people of Cairo. He escaped to Yafa, being abandoned he travelled around for about one

¹⁰¹ Çalışkan, *Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihi*, p. 335.

¹⁰² The central government assigned Osman Bey as the new governor and *serasker* of Egypt and ordered him to fight against Ali Bey until defeat him and go back to Egypt as the governor. He was ordered to stay at Damascus and corroborate with the new governor of Damascus, Mehmed Pasha until he eliminates Ali Bey: “*Bala-yı kaimede beyan olunduğu vecihle müşarun-ileyh Osman Paşa hazretlerine taraf-ı hümayundan i'ta buyurulan istiklal ancak avn-ı hakla mevadd-ı misriyyenin tanzimi ve Zahir Ömer ve Ali Bey'in birer takribiyle idam ve izaleleri maslahatına mebni olub her çend cenab-ı düsturilerinin umuruna müdahale ile memur olmadığı muhtac-ı beyan değildir Lakin müşarun-ileyh hasbe'l-hal umur-ı memuresine suret-i nizam verinceye dek müsafireten cenab-ı saadetlerinin mansabı derununda ikamet eylemesi muktezi olmağla ... umur-ı memuresi hitamıyla aktar-ı şamiyeden fekk-i alaka-i müsaferet edinceye dek kendiyeye musafat ve muvalat izharıyla istihsal-i rıza-yı hümayuna her halde himmet buyurulub ...”* However, the correspondence between the central government suggest that Mehmed Pasha begrudged Osman Bey and there has been a problem between the two: “*... müşarun-ileyh Mehmed Pasha hazretleri müşarun-ileyh Osman Paşa hazretlerinin zahiren suret-i istiklalini istiksar ile temkin-i vizaret ve rüşd ü rütbe mügayir harekete tasaddi ve ibtida-yı emrde eşhas-ı na-puhte misillü izhar-ı münafese ve siluk-ı tarik-i münakaşaya ibtidar eyleyüb ...”* TSMA.E 0249 (date 7 CA 1186/6 August 1772)

¹⁰³ Holt, “the cloud-catcher”, p. 55

year and in the end he joined up with Zahir al-Omar, another brigand who was famous for rebellion and opposition. Ali Bey left Yafa and headed to Cairo, in order to take revenge on Ebu'z-zeheb Mehmed Bey and other of his opponents who had expelled him from Egypt. Along the way, he spread what happened to him in Egypt and numerous bandits joined him. Day-by-day their force became stronger as they moved on. In the meantime, Ebu'z-zeheb Mehmed Bey was busy preparing the grain that was traditionally sent to Haremeyn, sending the revenue to Istanbul, and taking care of the issues of huccac/pilgrims, which was the most important thing.”¹⁰⁴

In this context, Enveri's prejudiced narrative can be seen interlineally since he draws a portrait of Ali Bey as a cruel man attacking an innocent loyal man, namely Mehmed Bey who is doing his assigned duty, preparing the grain contributions for Haremeyn.

“When it came to the two brigands {Ali Bey and Zahir al-Omar}, they were helping and cooperating with each other and by gathering more men, getting stronger and stronger. Learning that they were coming with the intention of plundering Egypt, Ebu'z-zeheb Mehmed Bey consulted with the umeras, who were steadfast in obeying the reign of padişah on the issue and got a fatwa from ulema of el-Ezher. The fatwa was recited in front of the council and its content was announced. Then they got prepared for the armed struggle. When Mehmed Bey heard that they were approaching to Egypt by traversing the desert, it was the fifth day of Saferu'l-hayr/20 May 1773, Thursday, Mehmed Bey's army pitched their tents in Salihyye and got prepared for the struggle. By the way, Ali Bey and his supporters were bragging of their number and equipment of war, they pitched in Kanatır, four hours distance from Salihyye. The next day, on Friday after Mehmed Bey informed Ali Bey about their fatwa, being in a battle formation, they started contesting. They outbalanced Ali Bey's army and won the struggle. They enslaved and chained who ever they managed. Tantavi Ali Bey, Murad Bey, Kaytas Bey, Hamza Bey, İsmail Bey, from the kethüdas of Azeb; Ali and İsmail Kethüda, three odabaşı, five kaşifs, the son of Zahir al-Omar, the son of Mutavele shaykh, many other factious ones who among those captured and the head of the devils, Ali Bey al-Kabir; sustained four serious injuries and could

¹⁰⁴ Çalışkan, *Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihi*, p. 335

not manage to escape. Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb returned to Egypt victorious with 1200 soldiers of Ali Bey. Mehmed Bey reported what had happened to İstanbul, and from there, the report reached the encampment on the twenty-second day of Rebiulevvel/5 July. As aforementioned, Ali Bey's mischief and sedition was rumoured and spread, and everyone was suffering from him even more than the enemy of the religion. The Serdar-ı ekrem became so delighted that mehterhane performed cannon and rifle salutes and rewarded the herald excessively.¹⁰⁵

Şem'danizade informs us about Ali Bey's death as follows: "*Mehmed Bey did not kill Ali Bey out of respect for the right of blessing, but imprisoned him. After one month, he died. The religion and the state became secure from his harm. If it is surveyed, infidel did perform such a treachery as this faithless one did to the religion and the state. During the military campaign of Moscow both from sea and land, Egyptian soldiers failed to join the imperial army. In addition, instead of joining the imperial army forty or fifty thousand soldiers were sent to Egypt for his rebellion in addition to the financial cost.*"¹⁰⁶

Both Jabarti and Şem'danizade independently mention that Ebu'z-zeheb did not kill Ali Bey out of his respect for him and added that Ali Bey died as a consequence of his injuries. Moreover, al-Jabarti makes no reference to Ali Bey's Yafa incident nor does he comment on Mehmed Bey's preparing of revenue for İstanbul and grain for Haremeyn. It is also notable that we do not have any evidence about the role of the army ordered to be prepared by the central government in the South-eastern Anatolia and Syria.

Unlike other sources, Enveri states that Ebu'z-zeheb proposed the Sublime Porte to summon the previous governor of Egypt, who escaped to the Hijaz, in order to reappoint him as the governor. Although there is insufficient evidence, it is highly likely that Ebu'z-zeheb made an agreement with the Porte when he was in Syria. He must have had a hidden agenda about being the next governor of Egypt. On the other hand, Enveri's narration about the

¹⁰⁵ Çalışkan, *Enveri Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihi*, p.379.

¹⁰⁶ Munir Aktepe (ed.), *Şem'danizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi Tarihi Mür'î'tevarih*, 3vol., (İstanbul Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1976)

Porte's demand to search for Ali Bey particularly from Numan Pasha is unique. Other sources do not mention this. Lastly, unlike the other sources' timing of one week, Enveri mentions that Ali Bey died after one month.

All the chroniclers agree that after Ali Bey's death, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb gained authority; he sent both the *irsaliye* to Istanbul and *değişe*, cereal, to Haremeyn. Although a certain Osman Pasha was appointed as the governor of Egypt in 1772, we cannot trace his destiny after his contention with the governor of Damascus Mehmed Pasha. After Ali Bey's elimination, the records in the *Mühimme-i Mısır* defter series continues and they show us that Ebu'z-zeheb was rewarded with the governorship of Egypt. But somehow decrees issued later refer him as the *şeyhülbeled* and a certain Halil Pasha as the new governor. However, since the contents of decrees address Ebu'z-zeheb, it can be concluded that while Ebu'z-zeheb enjoyed the full authority while Halil Pasha's governorship was in appearance only. On the other hand, Ebu'z-zeheb must have been worried about the possibility of Zahir al-Omar's revenge, as he sent letters to the central government telling that Zahir al-Omar should have been punished for helping the rebel, Ali Bey, and that he too might rise against the central government.

In conclusion, Enveri's chronicle is a primary source depicting key events from the perspective of the central government. Examining Enveri's and other Ottoman historians' chronicles enables us to see how the incidents in Egypt and Syria were perceived by the central government, especially while the state was at war. On the other hand, referring to a local chronicler, al-Jabarti, will provide us an insight of Cairo during the events.

Local Chronicles

For the period of decentralization of the Ottoman Empire, contemporary historians studying Ottoman Egypt have comparatively fewer Arabic chronicles to examine this era. For

the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, there are several chronicles available: Ahmad al-Damurdashi's '*al-Durra al-Musana fi Akhbar al-Kinana*'¹⁰⁷, Ahmad Shalabi Abdul Ghani's '*Awdah al-Isharat fiman Tawalla Misr min al Wuzara wal Bashat*'¹⁰⁸, and Muhammad Ibn `Abdul Mu`ti al-Ishaqi's '*Kitab Akhbar al-Uwal fiman tasarrafa fi Misr mi Arbab al-Duwal*' that narrate the political atmosphere of the period from 1600 to approximately 1750 and provide the reader with a comprehensive picture. However, only al-Jabarti (1753-1826) has authored a source that pertains to Egypt in the late eighteenth century. His book '*Ajaib al-Athar fi'l-Taradjim wa'l-Akhbar*'¹⁰⁹ gives an account of the events between the years of 1688-1821. He began to compile the factual information on which he later based his history around the year 1190/ 1776-77 when he was in his mid-twenties and he narrates the events of that period and the immediately preceding decade in considerable detail, benefiting from oral history (narrations from elderly people), official documents and tomb inscriptions.

While examining al-Jabarti's work, it is possible to imagine the scenery of that period described in Egypt's history. His work opens a door for the modern day historian to the structure of the administration of Egypt in the past, the network of the mamluk beys' relationships, and social structure of the province. From al-Jabarti's narrative, one can easily discern the centre of authority among the administrative class. While reading al-Jabarti's chronicle, the historian travels between the pages and is able to see the passion for power and authority, and loyalty and disloyalty. One can see in the accounts that the mamluks obeyed the *seyhülbeled*, the present leader of the mamluks, unquestioningly. Sometimes they killed a colleague who shared the same household without a moment's remorse for him, or, on the

¹⁰⁷ Edited by Daniel Crecelius and Abdul Wahab Bakr, (Leiden, 1991).

¹⁰⁸ Edited by Abdul Rahim Abdul Rahman, Cairo, 1978.

¹⁰⁹ Edited by Abdul Rahim Abdul Rahman, Cairo, 1997.

contrary, formed alliances against him. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind the fact that al-Jabarti does not provide us a chronicle that is free from prejudice, bias and preconception.

Even so, it can be said that the present-day historians can learn the details of political events and interpret them based on his chronicle. However, al-Jabarti sometimes interprets certain events in a way that we are not accustomed to in the modern day. For example, after the death of scholar shaykh al-Hafnawi on 23 August 1767 al-Jabarti makes an interpretation: *“From that day on it began to rain trouble and affliction on the country, and the situations of Egypt became in turmoil and turbulence. Accuracy of the words of vezir Rağib Paşa became apparent as he said before: “without doubt existence of shaykh Hafnawi is a safety and shelter for Egypt from the troubles.” ... This is because he came out openly with the truth, and he ordered the good things and prohibited bad things.”*¹¹⁰

Al-Jabarti did not hesitate to express personal opinions, especially in relation to the occurrences after Ali Bey al-Kabir became *şeyhülbeled* and started to get rid of his competitors by killing them after a “friendly meeting” or sending them into exile. It is quite possible that he implied Ali Bey’s activities served as a cause of turbulence and chaos for Egypt. As modern historians, we can take advantage of insights into events provided by an Egyptian individual. One can realize this when reading about Ali Bey’s personality and activities in six pages, as opposed to reading about Ottoman sultan Mustafa III in only eight lines. As al-Jabarti lived in the political milieu of pashas, *şeyhülbeleds*, and mamluks, he narrates as an insider, and in turn enables us to see the real political role and effectiveness of figures in a more realistic way in Egypt of those times compared to the imperial historians. He gives more information about the personalities and character traits of important figures. Also, we see the events passing through al-Jabarti’s Egyptian identity as he lived in that society. al-

¹¹⁰ Al-Jabarti, *Ajaib*, p. 479-481.

Jabarti narrates the activities of mamluk beys in detail. Unlike the Ottoman official historians, he refuses to describe the actions of mamluk beys as uprisings against the Ottoman sultan.

After detailing Ali Bey's struggle with other mamluk beys about how he sent them to exile and seized their wealth, or killed them, al-Jabarti gives an exact date, on 23 July 1768, for a visit by an officer from Istanbul who brought a decree, a sword and a caftan for Ali Bey al-Kabir. Moreover, three days later the governor was invited to Ali Bey's house for lunch and the Pasha offered Ali Bey gifts.¹¹¹ In the meantime, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb, the closest mamluk of Ali Bey, removed potential threats, emanating from other mamluk beys whether from his household or not, and aimed against Ali Bey's authority. It can be seen how Ali Bey achieved all his dirty work using Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb as his agent. It is Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb who went to Upper Egypt and fought against bedouin Arabs, defeated them and forced them to act in accordance with the interests of Ali Bey al-Kabir. Ali Bey used all available opportunities to further his personal interest.

An *ağa*, officer, came from Istanbul and notified the order of the central government requesting troops to support Imperial army. After a divan meeting organized in the castle, they sent Süleyman Bey Şaburi, the head of the soldiers, to the battlefield.¹¹² On 17 Receb 1182/27 November 1768, it is recorded that the governor of Egypt had concerns about Ali Bey's activities. He wanted to organize a military response however Abdullah Kethüda informed Ali Bey about governor Mehmed Pasha's intended action. Consequently Ali Bey had the doors of the castle closed, and caught Mehmed Pasha and placed him under surveillance in the house of Küçük Ahmed Bey. On 11 December 1768 Ali Bey took on the proxy and began eliminating the other beys by execution¹¹³.

¹¹¹ Al-Jabarti, *Ajaib*, p. 486.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 489.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 490.

On 10 Ramadan 1182/ 18 January 1769 Ali Bey wrenched away from Ishaq, a Jewish officer in the Bulaq customhouse, 40.000 golden coins and applied torture until he died. He repeated this with other merchants as well. In Shevval 1182/February 1769, Ali Bey prepared a lot of presents including good breeds of horses and sent them to the sultan and the statesmen in Istanbul. Alongside these presents, he complained about the governor of Şam (Syria) Azmzade (Gürcü) Osman Pasha and requested his dismissal by claiming that he helped exiles from Egypt in their struggle against him. In the meantime, Ali Bey, in a specific manner, exiled a group of *umera*, most of whom were the *ağas* of military regiments. First he used to seize their wealth, then took them out of Cairo, seized their tax farms, and distributed the proceeds to his followers.

Al-Jabarti narrates Ali Bey's having proclaimed his name in the Friday sermon as follows: "*On 1 Ramadan 1183/29 December 1769, Ali Bey went to Dawudiyye mosque in order to pray, and the imam prayed for him after praying for Ottoman sultan. After the prayer, the imam came to Ali Bey and Ali Bey asked: why did you pray for me in the minber? Are you told that I am the sultan? The man answered: yes, you are the sultan and I pray for you. Thereupon, Ali Bey got angry and ordered his men to beat him. They beat him. He returned his home by riding his donkey. He was really painful and said that: "Islam began strange, and it will become strange again just like it was at the beginning". The next day, Ali Bey begging for forgiveness from him, sent him money and clothes*¹¹⁴." al-Jabarti does not mention this event as an indicator of Ali Bey's independence.

We see the issue of the *sherif* of Mecca from another perspective in al-Jabarti's chronicle. As has been mentioned before, after death of the Meccan *sherif*, his brother Ahmed and son Abdullah contested the succession to authority. Ahmed took the administration and Abdullah took refuge in Egypt. Ali Bey showed hospitality to him and met all of his needs, considering this situation as an opportunity. Then he prepared for the military campaign

¹¹⁴ Al-Jabarti, *Ajaib*, p. 529.

against *Şerif* Ahmed. The garrison went to the Hijaz under the command of Ebu'z-zeheb and Hasan Bey. The Egyptian soldiers defeated the Arabs in Yenbu' and went to Mecca, *Şerif* Ahmed escaped and Ebu'z-zeheb seized the *sherif's* house. Abdullah became the new *sherif*, Hasan Bey went to Cidde and became *emir* of Cidde, in place of the Ottoman pasha. After a few days, Ebu'z-zeheb returned to Egypt. The *emirs* in Cairo welcomed him in Birketu'l-haj located outside of Cairo. Ebu'z-zeheb entered the city with a really glorious parade; scholars, and prominent people greeted him, and poets composed encomiums for him. From this we learn that prominent people in Egypt did not consider this campaign as disobedience towards the Ottoman sultan.

After the Hijaz victory, Ali Bey sent troops to Syria. The first troop was led on to Gazza by Abdurrahman *ağa*; next, Ali bey sent soldiers to Damascus in series. Ali Bey borrowed a significant amount of money from the *emirs* and refused to pay it back, and on top of that imposed extra taxes on villagers. In addition to that, he extorted money from Coptic Christians and Jews. Al-Jabarti narrates the events that occurred during and after the Syria campaign as follows:

*“In 1772, a big army prepared by Ali Bey surrounded Yafa, and captured the city after a challenging battle and reached as far as Haleb. When this news reached Cairo, the city staged celebrities. The emirs boasted amongst themselves, sang songs, and lit candles. Ali Bey became really arrogant and did not content himself with this victory. He ordered Ebu'z-zeheb to apportion the newly captured cities among the mamluk beys, without letting them have a rest. That was the last straw. Ebu'z-zeheb gathered the other beys together and made an alliance against Ali Bey. They returned to Cairo and two months later Ali Bey ordered Ebu'z-zeheb to organize another military campaign to Syria. With this order, the hate dwelling inside them was revealed. Ali Bey al-Kabir conspired with Tantawi Ali Bey against Ebu'z-zeheb on 4 Sevval 1185/ 10 January 1772.”*¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Al-Jabarti, *Ajaib*, p. 573.

Al-Jabarti does not mention about the imperial army led by Numan Pasha sent to Damascus in order to take the current incident under control. Most likely he did not know about it. On the contrary to the opinion expressed by imperial historians, al-Jabarti says that Ali Bey surrounded Ebu'z-zeheb's house, but Ebu'z-zeheb escaped towards the south and took refuge with Eyub Bey, the administrator of Jirja. However, Eyub Bey corresponded with Ali Bey despite Ebu'z-zeheb seeking refuge with him. When Ebu'z-zeheb realized that, he killed Eyub Bey and formed an alliance with all the other exiles and Qasimi *emirs* against Ali Bey. As soon as Ali Bey discovered that, Ebu'z-zeheb prepared a military troop lead by İsmail Bey. When the two troops met, İsmail Bey permeated and formed a unity with Ebu'z-zeheb. When only few soldiers returned to Cairo, Ali Bey was infuriated. This time Ali Bey equipped another troop led by Tantawi Ali Bey and other *sancak emirs*.

*“At the beginning of Muharrem 1186/ April 1771, Ali Bey's troops headed south. The two sides engaged on 15 Muharrem/18 April, the good fighters of Qasimis determined the result of the war. Ali Bey was defeated and escaped to Cairo. It is said that Ali Bey was going to surround the castle, but instead, he collected his all belongings and escaped towards Syria with his men on 25 Muharrem/28 April. On 26 Muharrem/ 29 April Ebu'z-zeheb came to Cairo and became the şeyhülbeled. The first thing he did as a şeyhülbeled was to kill the officer, Abdullah Kethüda, who was responsible for the mint and declared the invalidity of the coins minted in the era of Ali Bey.”*¹¹⁶

Ali Bey came to Egypt with a troop and the children of Zahir al-Omar. Ebu'z-zeheb got prepared for encountering him. He established his tent outside of Cairo and waited for Ali Bey. The troops of Ebu'z-zeheb and Ali Bey came across in Salihyye in 8 Safer/ 1 May. Ali Bey was defeated again and suffered a serious injury. They took him to tent of Ebu'z-zeheb. Ebu'z-zeheb welcomed him outside of the tent, kissed his hand and helped him to go into the tent by linking his arm, but killed Tantawi Ali Bey and other emirs. They went to Cairo after a week, took Ali Bey to his house in

¹¹⁶ Al-Jabarti, *Ajaib*, p. 581-582.

Azbakiyye. Doctors came to house for healing Ali Bey but he died seven days later after they arrived Cairo on 15 Safer 1187/ 8 May 1773. They said he was dead because of his injuries.”

It is remarkable to state that al-Jabarti does not narrate any negative anecdote about Egyptian people’s daily life being affected by the political unrest. Nevertheless, al-Jabarti mentions that he did not include all the details of Ali bey’s story and he indicates that he narrated the events “*by failing memory and by a mind weakened and distorted by accumulated worries, grieves, political disturbances, the decay of states, and the rise of base persons.*” al-Jabarti continues by adding his good will: “*Perhaps the withered branch will turn green again; the star which has set will rise again; fate will smile after glowering at us, and will notice us again after feigning ignorance.*”¹¹⁷

Both chronicles of Jabarti and Enveri provide us first-hand information about Ali Bey’s rebellion. It is possible to acquire significant impressions from their narratives despite some elements of bias and their limited narrations. From Enveri’s narrative, it is clearly seen that Ali Bey’s action was regarded as a rebellion against the central government and the Ottoman sultan. Ali Bey is seen as rebellious and bluntly opposed to sharia law. However, it seems that the central government did not regard Ali Bey as a local administrator determined to gain his autonomy and extend his authority to other provinces of the Empire. Instead, he was regarded as an unruly local administrator. The central government was concerned about the conflict between two local figures; insomuch as the Porte was worried that if their conflict continued, it would jeopardize the security of pilgrims. Thus, the Ottoman side perceived Ali Bey’s Syria campaign as a conflict between himself and the governor of Syria, Osman Pasha, rather than a local administrator’s extension of his sphere of authority.

¹¹⁷ Hathaway, *al-Jabarti’s History*, p. 109. It seems that the task of writing down of his history up to the year 1805 took place in that same year (1220/1805) when Jabarti was in his early fifties; see Ayalon, “Djabarti”, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, Vol.2, pp. 355-357.

Nonetheless, Ali Bey as a disloyal mamluk to the central government did not aim to establish a new country by separating his province from the Empire. However, he was considered almost a perfidious individual who stabbed his master in the back during his war against the ‘infidel’. Enveri only complained about Ali Bey’s greediness, which led to a disruption in the good order and oppression of the people of Haremeyn.

Moreover, Enveri provides the letter that Ali Bey sent to the people of Damascus. One can read from this letter a self-reflection of Ali Bey coupled with an explanation of his motives against Gürcü Osman Pasha. The letter describes Osman Pasha as a man who ruined the lives of people, their property and honour. Enveri’s script adds that merchants, pilgrims as well as travellers suffered from Gürcü Osman Pasha’s cruelty and he claims himself as their redeemer.

On the other hand, the phrase of “*miru’l-hajj-ı sabık ve kaimmakam-ı Mısır hâlâ*” indicates that Ali Bey did not claim himself as an establisher of a new country by separating Egypt, Hijaz and Syria from the Ottoman Empire. Instead of the sultan or emperor, Ali Bey refers to himself as ‘*kaimmakam-ı Mısır* / deputy of Egypt province’, a title given by the central government to the *şeyhülbeled* of Egypt during the absence of a governor in Egypt. At this point, both chronicles mention that Ali Bey dismissed the present governor of Egypt, Rakım Mehmed Pasha, when he discovered that Rakım Mehmed Pasha was in the process of preparing an intervention. Had his aim been to establish a new rule in Egypt by excluding Ottoman imperial authority, he would have dismissed the governor long before and in a strategic manner. Neither of the chronicles provides us with concrete information about Ali Bey’s preparations for a planned dismissal.

Chapter Conclusion

The Ottoman chronicles give no sign that Ali Bey was considered by the central government as a local administrator who attempted to establish a separate government. Neither the Friday sermons nor his letter to Damascus implies that Ali Bey intended to withdraw Egypt, Syria and Hijaz from Ottoman rule. However, Ali Bey was viewed as a rebellious local administrator who caused troubles in several ways whilst the Empire was in war with “infidel”: Ali Bey prevented the Egyptian soldiers from attending the campaign between Russia and the Empire; moreover, the soldiers were sent to Syria in order to suppress his attempt; and all of these caused extra cost during the financially difficult times of the empire. The Ottoman chronicles regarded Ali Bey as a disobedient person, who disrespected both the sultan’s and the sharia law, and disturbed the people and towns by ordering military campaigns. However, he was not regarded as separatist who attempted to establish his own government and country. The signs showing that his prior aim was to gain authority in Egypt and surrounding territory rather than an independence from the Empire can be summarized in three points:

Ali Bey’s disobedience included his failing to send the annual tribute to Istanbul. Ali Bey neglected to send the *irsaliye-i hazine*; however, this was not happening for the first time in Egypt. There were examples of his predecessors who kept back the *irsaliye* for even longer times. Therefore, it may be difficult to interpret it as a sign of an intention to found an independent state. Some researchers suggest that Ali Bey had his name invoked in the Friday sermons, yet, we do not have clear evidence on this point. In support of this, al-Jabarti’s narration makes no reference to Ali Bey attempting to have his name being mentioned in the Friday sermon.

In addition to the abovementioned points, there is not sufficient evidence of Ali Bey giving himself the title of “sultan” of Egypt. Although a simple narration about him being fond of the history of Egypt and perhaps envious of the Mamluk sultans, he never claimed himself as a sultan, even in the letter that he sent to Damascus, in order to persuade the people to obey his suzerainty. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to interpret that when Ali Bey was the *şeyhülbeled* of Egypt, he was the most powerful administrator of his town and he enjoyed a full authority in Egypt between 1769 and 1772. He deposed the governors. By using the titles of ‘*şeyhülbeled*’ and ‘*kaimmakam* of the governor’ given by the central government and the local administrators and elites he claimed all the authority in his person. Ali Bey gained his full authority by eliminating all his potential opponents, including those who carried him to his current post.

We can also assert that Ali Bey was such an ambitious local authority in the second half of the eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt that while having full authority in his hands in Egypt, he attempted to extend it to both the Hijaz and Syria. Yet still after examining the existing documents, we do not come across any discourse referring to Ali Bey’s being the sultan of his periphery, or declaring war against the central government nor do we see him claiming himself as the holder of sultanic authority.

It is also noteworthy that the decrees and financial documents show that the public life of Egypt was affected to a minimum level. The maintenance work of *sedds*, dams, bridges and other public buildings continued, and this demonstrates that social life was not affected to a great extent. Although the Ottoman historians labelled Ali Bey as “‘*asi-rebel*”, there is no evidence of Ali Bey being oppressive and tyrannical towards Egypt’s urban and peasant population. On the other hand, there is not any sign by Ali Bey of directly opening a banner of rebellion. It is true that there were some struggles and conflicts between Ali Bey and the

central government's representatives. Ali Bey tested his limits and sought to extend his authority to neighbouring provinces. The hierarchical relationship between Egypt and the central government was, at least temporarily, disconnected. There was no acting governor in Egypt, state control, fell far short of what it is "ideally" expected to be and this state of affairs persisted throughout the period between 1768 and 1772. However, it is clear that one cannot detect a prolonged breakdown of state control in the region and it bears remembering that the period of "state breakdown" corresponds almost precisely to the duration of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768 to 1774. Moreover, the daily lives of the Egyptian people were affected to a minimum level, as al-Jabarti does not mention a narration of hardship being suffered by the people. Trade and agriculture were also not seriously affected. Although there was a short period of loss of control, the central government managed to handle the situation.

CHAPTER II: Economic conditions and European commercial relationships and interests in Egypt

Positioning Egypt in the world and, of course, in the Ottoman Empire's economy is crucial in understanding the actions of the local notables of Egypt. Economic conditions are determinative on both human behaviour and the fate of states. To be able to examine the uprising of Ali Bey al-Kabir and his position against the central government during the Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774), we have to consider the economic status of Egypt during the eighteenth century. Strengthening their position day-by-day mamluk beys had a control on the administrative posts such as *şeyhülbeled*, *emirulhadj* and *defterdar*. It is important to evaluate the extent of the economic opportunities their posts offered them. Ascertaining whether the people and the local administrators experienced prosperity, or eighteenth century Cairo was a scene of a poverty, famine and depression in its economic status will be an indication of motives behind Ali Bey's and other ambitious mamluk beys' actions. Also, unravelling the priorities of the central government in terms of its encouragement of agricultural productivity and a thriving economy in Egypt and, more importantly, the nature of the central government's attitude and protectiveness towards Egypt in this sense will bring to light key aspects of the political and social life of eighteenth century Egypt. The income levels and standard of living enjoyed by local administrators and merchants will be revelatory in terms of prevailing economic conditions in the province and will show us whether the economic conditions of Egypt in the eighteenth century was weak as it is suggested by some historians or was it reverse.¹

¹ S. J. Shaw, *Ottoman Egypt in the eighteenth century: Nizamname-i Mısır of Jezzar Ahmed Pasha*, (Harvard U. P., 1962)

On the other hand, Egypt's position in the world economy and politics during the pre-colonial period is another problematic that this study aims to investigate. A number of researchers have sought to highlight British and French interest in Egypt in the last quarter of the eighteenth century in one hand², and speculated about Russian involvement in the eastern Mediterranean during the Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774) and Russia's ambitions and intentions in the context of Tsarina Catherine's policy of encouraging local administrators to rise against the Ottoman Empire's central government³. The relationship between the mamluk beys, especially Ali Bey al-Kabir and Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb, and consuls and/or commanders who represented the governments of the Britain, France and Russia is interesting and deserves to be investigated, as Egypt was in these countries' agenda for political and/or commercial reasons. The reason that connects this topic to current study is the point of local elites that foreign countries concentrated on in order to position Egypt separately from the imperial government's sphere and achieve their political or commercial goals. The main motivation of Britain and France was to open up the upper part of the Red sea to foreign trade. Since they failed to achieve their aim through normal diplomatic channels, they opted for negotiation with the local administrators of Egypt, *i.e.*, the mamluk beys. Current literature suggests two different approach styles from these countries towards the mamluk beys:

² Despina Vlami, *Trading with the Ottomans: the Levant Company in the Middle East*, (London, 2015); Christine Laidlaw, *British in the Levant: Trade and Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century*, (London, New York, 2010); Ralph Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square English Traders in the Levant in the eighteenth century*, (London: Macmillan, 1967); Daniel Crecelius "A Late Eighteenth Century Austrian Attempt to Develop the Red Sea Trade Route", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Apr., 1994), pp. 262-280; M. A Anis, *Some Aspects of British Interest in Egypt in the Late 18th Century (1775-1798)*, unpublished PhD thesis (University of Birmingham, 1950); I.S. Russell, *The Later History of The Levant Company 1753-1825*, unpublished PhD thesis (The Victoria University of Manchester, 1935); Rosemarie Janet Said, *George Baldwin and British interests in Egypt 1775-1798*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, (University of London, 1968); Alfred C. Wood, *History of the Levant Company* (Oxford, 1935), p. 125. While Vlami's study provides an up-to-date account on the Levant Company, the dissertations of Russell and Anis provide detailed information on the British-French competition in Egypt depending mostly on the National Archives in London.

³ Constantin Panchenko, "Russian sources on the history of Ottoman Egypt 16th-18th centuries", in Daniel Crecelius and Mohammad Husam al-Din Ismail, eds., *Abhas al-Mutemer al-Salis li al-Dirasat al-Uthmaniyya fi Misr*, (Cairo, 2004), pp. 1-13; Daniel Crecelius, "Russia's relations with the Mamluk Beys of Egypt in the Late Eighteenth Century", in Farhad Kazemi and R. D. McChesney, ed., *A Way Prepared Essays on Islamic Culture in Honor of Richard Bayly Winder*, (New York Press, 1988), pp. 55-67.

Positioning the *şeyhülbeled* and mamluk beys as an alternative to the imperial administration, they sought to attract their support by promising them huge revenues. For the aforementioned reasons, this chapter will focus on the economic condition of the province and European commercial relationships with and European countries' interest in Egypt, in order to further investigate the role of foreign influence on Ali Bey's uprising.

Section 1: The economic condition of Egypt in the eighteenth century

On the one hand, Egypt was a key component of both global and Ottoman economic interests in the eighteenth century. Settled at the crossroads of Asia and Africa, Egypt has always been a centre of attraction for centuries and known as *umm al-dunya*, mother of the world, because of its fertility and prosperity.⁴ Previous research has revealed that it had a crucial position in the circulation of goods destined for the domestic market of the empire as well as between Asia and Europe.⁵ For Egyptian merchants, it was a connection point, whose branches stemmed from Cairo and reached to Venice, Goa, Aleppo or Nigeria. On the other hand, Egypt was the biggest province of the Empire in terms of revenue potential, due to its productivity and its unique position between east and west. Egypt's agricultural products such as grain, cotton, tobacco, and sugar cane not only supplied the imperial pantry, and holy cities of Mecca and Medina, but also occupied a significant place in Istanbul's market, which, in times of dearth caused crisis and required the central government's intervention in order to keep prices for urban residents under control.

⁴ Faruk Bilici, *XIV. Louis ve İstanbul'u Fethi Tasarısı Louis XIV et son Projet de Conquete D'Istanbul*, (TTK: Ankara, 2004), p. 45 Bilici mentions that Egypt had always been subject to competition for authority and domination by the imperial powers due to its fertility and geo-strategic position. Even XIV. Louis was advised to conquer Egypt by his advisors.

⁵ Daniel Panzac, "International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th Century", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 24, No. 2, (May 1992), pp. 189-206; Nelly Hanna, *Making big Money in 1600 The Life and Times of Isma'il Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian Merchant*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998); Andre Raymond, *Arab cities in the Ottoman Period: Cairo, Syria and the Maghreb*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); Michael Reimer, "Ottoman Alexandria: The Paradox of Decline and the Reconfiguration of Power in Eighteenth-Century Arab Provinces", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1994) pp. 107-146

The products from the fertile lands around the Nile and the coastal area of the Mediterranean served as the central food source for the people in Istanbul and *Haremeyn* besides Egypt's people, and its geographic position allowed both the local merchants and administrators to acquire a generous income. Rather than supporting the central government in their military aspects, Egypt provided the central government with large quantities of grain and tax revenue. For this reason, it can be suggested that in general, Istanbul did not expect significant armed support from Cairo, but always wanted the surplus of the treasury.⁶

The Ottoman Empire had a huge economic and financial advantage with the acquisition of Egypt in the sixteenth century. Land and urban taxes along with customs dues from the ports of the Nile, Red Sea and the Mediterranean filled the treasury of Egypt. After covering the expenses of the annual hajj caravan, and the grain and financial supports for the people of *Haremeyn*, the surplus of the treasury was sent to the central government in Istanbul. One year after the Ottoman conquest, the amount of the *irsaliye-i hazine* reached 16 million *paras* and it increased to 20 million *paras*. With the introduction of new regulations, political and economic stability was accomplished by the end of the century.⁷ Furthermore, Egypt supplied the imperial kitchen and pantry with various products and foodstuffs such as rice, sugar, lentils and coffee. In addition, military supplies like gunpowder, twine and cord were sent annually for use by the army and navy. From time to time, *peksimit*, which is a dry biscuit for soldiers and sailors on campaign, was provided in large quantities by Egyptian people. Numerous sultanic decrees were issued on crop, military supplies and *peksimit* transport in the *mühimme-i Mısır defter* series. Between the years 1739 and 1790, 96.200 *qantars* of *peksimit* was provided for the Ottoman army from Egypt via the port of

⁶ The number of soldiers that the central government asked from the Egyptian governor was not usually more than 3000 according to *Mühimme-i Mısır Defter* series in BOA (for example, see MMD, vol., 4, nr. 12 (date mid B 1139/early March 1727))

⁷ Michael Winter, "Ottoman Egypt, 1525-1609", in Martin W. Daly, ed., *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. II: *Modern Egypt: From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 5

Alexandria.⁸ 557,5 *qantars* of twine and wick were sent to imperial shipyard between 1763 and 1768. In addition, it is recorded 50 *qantars* of gunpowder was supplied from Egypt in 1740.⁹

Considering all the goods were sent from Egypt to Istanbul, it might be thought that the Ottoman Empire exploited Egypt as a province, but in fact it was the reverse. Egypt's integration into a vast empire, which established a stable rule over its territory compared to contemporary regimes, provided a peaceful environment for its tax-paying residents (*reaya*), which allowed Egypt to experience a long period of prosperity.¹⁰ Bruce Masters, while looking for an answer to the question of: "Why did Arabs accept the Ottoman sovereignty and did not revolt?", finds the response in the economic arena. He mentions that the Ottoman sovereignty provided a prosperous milieu in which the Arab merchants developed their trade.¹¹ In addition to a peaceful milieu, the Porte did not leave Egypt on its own but sustained and supported all the production and construction needs of the province. There are numerous examples and cases where the Porte spent large sums on conserving agricultural areas of the coast of Mediterranean, and reconstructing and rebuilding important public buildings in different areas of Egypt.¹²

During the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period, Egypt always served as a crossroads where commercial goods were bought and sold. Its location between Asia and Europe allowed it to serve as an entrepôt for Indian goods, especially fabrics and spices, while

⁸ 1 *qantar* equals to 56,449 kg

⁹ For peksimit; 20.000 *qantars* in early L 1151/12-22 January 1739 MMD, vol. 5, nr. 445, {25.000 *qantars* in early CA 1156/23 June-2 July 1743 (MMD, vol. 6, nr. 56), 1.200 *qantars* in late Sh 1171/early May 1758 (MMD, vol. 7, nr. 461), {40.000 *qantars* in late S 1188 in early May 1774 (MMD, vol. 8, nr. 646), 10.000 *qantars* in 24 C 1204/11 March 1790 (C.BH, 9582), for twine and wick; 187,5 *qantars* in 1763 (D.BŞM.MSR, 7/30)}, 50 *qantars* in early M 1179/late June 1765 (MMD, vol. 8, nr. 338), 320 *qantars* in mid RA 1182/ early August 1768 (MMD, vol. 8, nr. 588), for gunpowder, 50 *qantars* in early C 1153/late August 1740 (MMD, vol. 5, nr. 557).

¹⁰ Winter, "Ottoman Egypt", p. 6

¹¹ Bruce Masters, *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire 1516-1918: A Social and Cultural History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 8

¹² Research on construction and maintenance of dams, canals and bridges see Alan Mikhail, "An irrigated empire: The view from Ottoman Fayyum", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 42, No. 4, pp.569-590; Mücahide Güneş, *XVII. Yüzyılda İskenderiye Limanı*, unpublished master dissertation (İstanbul University, 2009)

Alexandria, Damietta and Rosetta on the Mediterranean coast, Suez, Tur and Qusayr on the Red Sea, and Bulaq on the Nile, served as transit zones for Asian goods.¹³ Before the Ottoman conquest during the Mamluk Sultanate, the transit trade passing through Egypt was also vibrant. However, after the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope and the weakening of the Mamluk sultanate, the trade migrated to the south for a short period. Because of the Portuguese activity and harassment of commercial traffic in the Indian Ocean, Muslim merchants' commerce whose trade had made Egypt a trade centre decreased considerably.¹⁴

Ibn Iyas, the last historian of the Mamluk Sultanate, reports that in the years 1514-1515 the port of Alexandria was desolated and no goods came to port. Besides other conditions, the high customs imposed by the Mamluk sultan also played a role in the decline of trade. At the same time, the port of Suez was empty for the last five-six years because of Portuguese pressure.¹⁵ The financial and political instability of Egypt alongside deficiency in the ability to cope with rivals in the Indian Ocean were the main factors that caused decrease in commercial activity of the region. According to some historians¹⁶, the decline of Egyptian industries, especially sugar and textiles, the depopulation of urban and rural areas and the reduction of agricultural revenues indicate the extent of the decrease in the economy. However, Nelly Hanna opposes this hypothesis of a sharp decline by claiming that the extent of the decrease was not that influential on the trade and asserts that if the overall picture were as bad as claimed by some researchers, Bulaq would not have survived as a commercial centre between 1450-1600. According to Hanna, the decline did not cover every branch of the

¹³ Abdülhamid Hâmid Sulayman, *Tarikh al-mawâni' al-Misriyah fi al-'asri al-'Uthmâni*, (Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-Misriyah al-Âmmah lil-Kitâb, 1995) p. 18

¹⁴ Salih Ozbaran, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Hindistan Yolu", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, vol. 31, pp. 65-146

¹⁵ Ibn Iyas, *Badâ'i' al-Zuhûr fi Wakâyi' al-Duhûr*, V vols, (Beirut, 2010) vol. IV, p. 320 and vol. V, p. 128

¹⁶ Ahmad Darrag, *L'Égypte sous le regne de Barsbay* (Damas:Institute Francais de Damas, 1961); Michael Dols, *The Black Death in the Middle Ages*, (Princeton, 1979)

economy and was temporary in many fields. She supports her claim with the information from travellers' that visited Cairo at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century, and mentions the number of warehouses built by Sultan Qaytbay as an indication of commercial prosperity.¹⁷

In the first decade of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire sent assistance to the Mamluk Sultanate in order to deal with the Portuguese navy in the Indian Ocean by sending both equipment and soldiers under the command of Selman Reis, the Turkish mariner. However, the weakened Mamluk sultanate could not cope with expansionist European forces. The Mamluk Sultanate's situation generated a valid reason to organise an expedition. In 1517, Ottoman forces defeated the Mamluk sultan at the battle of Ridaniye and conquered Egypt. From that day onwards, Syria, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula were under Ottoman rule and the new ruler of these lands fortified the borders. As a sacred land of Islam, the Ottoman sultan regarded the Hijaz region as a restricted zone and banned European ships from entering the area north of Jidda. The Ottoman-Portuguese conflict continued up until the last quarter of the sixteenth century. During this period, Muslim merchants continued to trade with India, as their profits were high and consequently pushed the Ottomans to undertake efficient policies for promoting the trade of the Red Sea and Egyptian ports. These ports gained importance once more and trade began to increase.¹⁸ The political and economic stability attracted European merchants to Egyptian ports, particularly to Alexandria. Both Egyptian merchants and the government recognized the profit from the coffee trade, which began in the beginning of the sixteenth century, and took the place of the spice trade by the end of the century.

¹⁷ Nelly Hanna, *An Urban History of Bulaq in the Mamluk and Ottoman Periods*, (Le Caire: Institut Francais d'archeologie orientale, 1983) p. 18-19. A number of European travellers such as Fabri, Berterino and Thenaud mentioned Cairo as a great city and a meeting point for the merchants from Europe, India, Turkey and Africa. Also, al-Sahawi tells us that six commercial warehouses were constructed by Sultan Qaytbay.

¹⁸ Özbaran, "Hindistan Yolu", p. 97

It is most likely that being incorporated within the Ottoman Empire enhanced Egypt's economic status and strength since, by 1500, Mamluk control over the region had weakened because of its sprawling territories that stretched from Persia to Morocco and it was no longer in a position to resist the expansionist policies of European countries such as Portuguese activities in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, under Ottoman protection, Egypt was able to maintain its economic status as a key region of commodity exchange between East and West. Cairo was a junction point in which imported goods were distributed to the Delta and Upper Egypt. In addition, it was an international commercial centre, and its zone of economic activity covered as far as Arabia and India via the Red Sea; Abyssinia and Central Africa¹⁹ via the Nile; and Europe and other provinces of the Ottoman Empire via the Mediterranean. The numerous entrepôts built in Cairo, Rosetta and Bulaq demonstrated that trade increased during the Ottoman period.²⁰ It can therefore be inferred that the first contribution of Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt demonstrated itself by bringing stability and a secure environment for conducting trade within a strategic commercial zone that was having difficult times due to weak Mamluk rule.

Bulaq is a significant example of the results that were achieved for the growth of Egypt's economy in the eighteenth century. It was widened as an urbanized area and joined to Cairo during the eighteenth century. The urban development of Bulaq started in the late thirteenth/ early fourteenth century during the reign of the Mamluk sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Ḳalāwūn (*regn.* 693/1293-4, 698-708/1299-1309, 709-41/1310-41), when Bulaq began to play a role in the grain trade; but because of geographic obstacles it could not

¹⁹ The traditional two products brought from Central Africa to Cairo and sent to European countries were gold powder and slave. Because of lack of safety in Sahara routes, or more probably Central Africa trade migrating to Europe and America, slave and gold trade between Egypt and Central Africa sharply reduced in the eighteenth century. It can be supposed that Europe affected Egyptian, therefore Ottoman economy in a quite early period (Andre Raymond, *Arab cities*, p.184)

²⁰ Raymond, *Arab cities*, p.182

flourish until the fifteenth century.²¹ The shifting of the trade route for spices from Aden and Aydhab to Jidda and Suez in the fifteenth century contributed to Bulaq's development. The commerce with European merchants also enabled Bulaq to develop. The roads to Cairo were maintained and improved, and some manufacturing structures such as a sugar refinery, grain mills and leather works were established here. In addition, the elites were building their palatial houses near Birkat al-fil, Azbakiyya or Bulaq. Abdurrahman Kethüda's glorious palace covered 10.550 square meters.²² Bulaq housed 24.000 people towards the end of the eighteenth century.²³

Bulaq served as a station for wholesale trade between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea after the decline of the port of Misr (old Egypt) by the fifteenth century. It became the most important port of Cairo. Commercial activities were the primary factor that constituted Bulaq's new urban form. It experienced a structural change day by day according to the needs of the trading group. The customhouse was the building needed in the beginning. Subsequently, new areas underwent urbanization to accommodate the growing population. The area between Cairo and Bulaq urbanized day by day by the incorporation of residential quarters into the commercial areas.

Commerce was the primary factor behind the urban development and expansion of Bulaq as well as the distribution of buildings in the town. The most active and the wealthiest area was near the river, where the goods arrived, were unloaded and taxed. The *wakalas*, the commercial entrepôts, were also located there. Moreover, this area was favoured for building mosques, *sebils*, and caravanserais. Bulaq was a busy commercial location like Qasaba in Cairo, but unlike Qasaba, Bulaq's architecture was commercial. According to a late eighteenth century source, the *Mısır Nizamnamesi* written by *Cezzar Ahmed Pasha*, Bulaq had

²¹ Andre Raymond, *Cairo*, (Harvard University Press, 2002) p.126, 164

²² Raymond, *Cairo*, p. 278

²³ Raymond, *Arab cities*, p. 180, 282

more than ten thousand houses and agriculturally fertile lands, and confirmed that there were big caravanserais, public bathes and mosques in Bulaq.²⁴

From the days of the Mamluk sultanate to the end of the Ottoman reign, rulers always invested in Bulaq and constructed buildings. Among the Ottoman governors, Süleyman Pasha (1525-1535) and Sinan Pasha (1569-1571) built or bought caravanserais in Bulaq and even after finishing their duty in Cairo they continued to manage their investments in Egypt. Süleyman Pasha financed the construction of over 25 buildings. Davud Pasha (1537-38), İskender Pasha (1556-1559), Hasan Pasha (1580-1582), Ali Pasha (1558/1559), Hafız Ahmed Pasha (1591-1594), Mehmed Pasha (1596-1598) and Bayram Pasha (1626-1628) were among the other Ottoman governors who erected buildings or had properties in Bulaq. They did not hesitate to invest in Bulaq even though they stayed in Egypt for only a short term, perhaps two or three years, because it did not impose financial risks. The architecture of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries stands out as the best example of the Ottoman period; as monuments were built by the people who held the political and economic power in their hands. A mosque, a public bath, part of a *qaysariyya* and several caravanserais are still standing as the monuments of the early Ottoman period construction. Hanna gives detailed information about the number of buildings. She counts nine caravanserais, and other *hans*, mosques, public baths and shops built by the early Ottoman governors and mentions that Bulaq reached its largest expansion during this period.²⁵

After the sixteenth century, merchants, officials, and aristocrat families replaced the governors as new builders of Bulaq. The Asi family was one of the earliest and outstanding families that constructed buildings in Bulaq. Abdulqawi al-Asi attained the title of

²⁴ Ayşe Emecen, *Suriye Bölgesinde Bir Osmanlı Valisi ve İmajı: Cezzar Ahmed Paşa (TSMA, nr E.4079daki Takrir ve Nizam-name-i Mısır adlı iki raporun neşir ve tahlil denemesi)*, unpublished Masters Dissertation, (Marmara University: Istanbul, 1994)

²⁵ Hanna, *An Urban History*, p. 56

shahbender al-tuccar of Bulaq and Misr al-qadima (old Egypt) in 1580. Also, the Hasabs were another family who also invested in Bulaq. In addition to these two families, many other merchants or officers, who al-Jabarti calls *ayan-ı Bulaq*, took part in constructing new buildings such as caravanserais, mills, grinders, shops, *sabils* (public fountains) and mosques in Bulaq. To a lesser extent, constructions included industrial facilities such as sugar presses and cloth-dyeing workshops. Although they are not recorded in detail in sources, the construction was also active in the late Ottoman period. Over 25 *wakalas* were built between 1600-1798.²⁶ The apogee of Bulaq was during the Ottoman period. By the nineteenth century, railway systems were introduced in Cairo and it abolished both river traffic and the customs house.

Against the hypothesis of dramatic reduction in trade in Egypt as a direct result of Yavuz Sultan Selim taking the artisans and merchants to Istanbul after the conquest of Egypt, Raymond mentions that the men who Yavuz Selim took to Istanbul in fact returned to Egypt after a short time, hence this could not have led to a dramatic reduction in trade.²⁷ In addition, it is claimed that by becoming a province of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and especially its capital Cairo, was adversely affected in terms of economy and trade. However, it can be said that although the production of luxury goods and artisanal products for the sultans and their palace personnel decreased and migrated in part to Istanbul, Egypt became an enormous market that opened up to the empire's other provinces, especially *Der-saadet*, the imperial capital Istanbul.²⁸

Cairo was the centre for manufacturing and consumption. Besides its population density, Cairo was the place of residence for the politically and socially high-ranking and rich people who made up the dominant mamluk beys, important traders and the ulema class. It was

²⁶ Hanna, *An Urban History*, p.56

²⁷ Raymond, *Arab cities*, p.180

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.182

these groups in particular that drove consumer demand for luxury goods. The decisive commodities for the Egyptian trade were coffee and spices. At least 62 caravanserais were designated to the sale of these two commodities in Cairo.²⁹ Besides the Indian and European trade, being incorporated into a huge empire resulted in a reinvigoration of the activity of Egypt's ports. In addition, domestic trade was also being realized in huge volume between other ports of the empire in the Mediterranean and the Aegean. The small amount of manufacturing in the coastal areas of the Mediterranean and the large quantity of agricultural products surrounding the Nile delta were in demand in Istanbul. Domestic trade played an important role in economic well-being and integrity to the empire.³⁰ Raymond considers the sixteenth century as a difficult period of transition, the seventeenth century as a development period, and regards the eighteenth century as the peak of oriental commerce for the broad range of Egyptian trade.³¹

Egypt's continuing importance for the domestic trade of the Empire in the eastern Mediterranean is demonstrated by the fact that in 1783, more than two and a half centuries after the Ottoman conquest, 77% of the total trade in Alexandria was realized with other Ottoman ports.³² Panzac states that the merchants who carried out commerce in Egypt and other Ottoman ports were mostly Muslims and Turks (Alexandria: 92.7%, Istanbul: 71.7%, Algeria: 79.5%, Crete: 91.6%).³³ On the other hand, the ports of Egypt attracted many ships from European countries, which were given capitulations by the Ottoman sultan. In the eighteenth century, France, Dubrovnik and Venice were the three trading partners that conducted commerce in Alexandria, which was Egypt's biggest port and the gateway to

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.180

³⁰ Daniel Panzac, "18.Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Bölgesel ve Milletlerarası Deniz Ticareti", *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 2000, vol. 5, p. 368

³¹ Raymond, *Arab cities*, p.184

³² Idris Bostan, "An Ottoman Base in Eastern Mediterranean: Alexandria of Egypt in the 18th Century", in Cengiz Tomar, ed., *Proceedings of the International Conference on Egypt During The Ottoman Era* (İstanbul, 2010), p. 68

³³ Panzac, "Bölgesel ve Milletlerarası Deniz Ticareti", p. 384

Europe. English, Neapolitan and Russian ships were the other participants who conducted trade in Egypt. In addition to commerce, the European ships were employed by the central government for shipment of Egyptian goods to the imperial capital.³⁴ Panzac states that 50% of the total trade between Alexandria and Istanbul is accounted for by European ships.³⁵

We can also learn about the commercial volume of Egypt from Panzac. In 1783, the trade recognized in Alexandria port was worth 60.914 *livres tournois*; 77% of it took place within domestic ports and 23% with European ports. Due to natural factors, Egypt lacked some basic raw materials like iron, copper, coal and wood, and had to import some of their requirements from Europe and others from different parts of the Empire. It is estimated that the total value of the imports from Europe was about 36 million *paras* in 1798.³⁶ Another issue that had an effect on Egypt's economy was the 'structural harmony between basic urban activities, handicrafts, and commerce'.³⁷ At the beginning of the eighteenth century, half of the population of Cairo was involved in artisan activities, one third was involved in commercial activities, and the rest were involved in service industries such as transportation, water carrying and entertainment.³⁸

The ports of Egypt had a significant place in the commercial activities in eighteenth century Levant. Mamluk beys were in one way or another involved in Egypt's commercial activity through their relationship with officers in customhouse or merchants. A huge volume of trade, and artisanal or commercial activities were being realised under the surveillance or with participation of mamluk beys, which ultimately provided a huge profit for them. In the so-called decentralization century, the archival documents provide a solid proof of that the imperial government monitored the commerce in the ports of Egypt, and tried to keep it under

³⁴ Güneş, *İskenderiye Limanı*, p. 60

³⁵ Panzac, *Bölgesel ve Milletlerarası Deniz Ticareti*, p. 379.

³⁶ Raymond, *Arab cities*, p.181.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.184.

³⁸ Raymond, *Arab cities*, p.188.

its control. The commercial goods from Egypt supplied a considerable amount of merchandised goods in the markets of Istanbul, Aegean islands and Anatolian ports. Different reasons such as an increase in the tax due to misconduct of customs officers or greediness of the *sherifs* of Mecca, or lack of goods due to environmental problems resulted in an intervention by the central government. Such situations show us that Istanbul maintained a close relationship with the Egyptian administrators, not solely the governor but also the local administrators as well. Numerous decrees were addressed to the governor alongside with the *şeyhülbeled*, *kadı* and seven regiment officers, which were demanding application of solutions suggested by the central government including forbidding sale of goods to European merchants, and in some cases to the provinces. At these times, the main concern of the imperial government was to keep the prices at an affordable level in Istanbul, the biggest market in the empire. Mehmet Genç points out that the central government had established a strong traditional policy basing on three priorities: “provisioning of the urban economy”, “fiscal revenue-tax collection”, and “preservation of the traditional order”.³⁹ The central bureaucracy did not hesitate to intervene in local and long distance trade in order to maintain these priorities and to make sure of the availability of the goods for the military, the palace and the urban economy. Although the early Ottoman sultans tended to be more interventionist, in the early modern period (1450-1750) the central government had to be more selective when intervening in the trade. Pamuk states that despite the fact that the central bureaucracy in the eighteenth century managed the economy of the empire based on negotiation with the local notables and merchants, domestic producers did not have enough power to pressure the central authority to change the traditions that the central government

³⁹ Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*, (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 12

had established earlier.⁴⁰ Istanbul applied a pragmatist approach towards *ayans* by involving them in tax revenue collection.⁴¹

As was the case for the rest of the empire, Egypt's provincial monetary system was affected by the circulation of foreign currencies. Especially because of the *bunduqi*, the Venetian ducat and the Spanish *riyal*, the *para* was devalued from the late sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century. However, the Ottoman currency did not devalue continuously. The currency exhibited a more stable situation in the eighteenth century, at least until the 1780s, and the central government strengthened the monetary linkages with the empire's peripheries.⁴²

Contrary to the decline paradigm, Pamuk asserts that the time period after the sixteenth century should be seen as a reorganisation period during which the empire adapted itself to the changing circumstances in Eurasia pragmatically.⁴³ His research reveals that during this period, the central government maintained the control on monetary linkages in Egypt. One of main concerns of Istanbul was to keep the rate of silver in *para* that was minted in Egypt at the same level as the one minted in Istanbul.⁴⁴

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not go easily for the empire's economy. Silver *para* coins used in daily transactions were progressively devalued by a total of three fourths between 1670 and 1798. As a consequence, the movement of gross prices increased. Raymond states that the price of one *irdeb*⁴⁵ of wheat increased from 69.7 *medins* (i.e., *paras*)

⁴⁰ Pamuk, *Monetary History*, p. 11 Also for the economy of the Ottoman Empire see An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1600-1914, Suraiya Faroqhi, ed., vol. 2, (Cambridge University Press, 1997); Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, (Istanbul, 2000); Edhem Eldem, *French Trade in Istanbul in the eighteenth century*, (Boston: Brill, 1999)

⁴¹ Şevket Pamuk, "The evolution of financial institutions in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1914", *Financial History Review*, 11.1 (2004), 7-32, p. 19

⁴² Pamuk, *Monetary History*, p. 18-20

⁴³ Pamuk, "The Evolution of financial institutions", p. 8

⁴⁴ Pamuk, *Monetary History*, p. 173

⁴⁵ *Irdeb* is a measurement used for measuring grain. Kallek states that 1 *erdeb* equals to 198 litres in modern Egypt Cengiz Kallek, "Irdeb", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 22, p. 440-3

in 1690 to 360.1 *medins* in 1791, *qantar* of butter increased from 300 *medins* in 1687 to 1.900 in 1797 and coffee increased from 977 *medins* in 1690 to 3.313 in 1798.⁴⁶

The economic turmoil resulted in a number of economic and social difficulties. From 1690 to 1736, the province experienced a persistent subsistence crisis and a variety of monetary difficulties.⁴⁷ During the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth century, chronicles mention at least 16 large price increases and 13 monetary crises, however the forty years that followed generated a period⁴⁸ of recovery and prosperity. Nevertheless, right after that recovery period, people suffered from unprecedented price increases and a bout of epidemics, plagues and famine in the late eighteenth century. Even if agriculture flourished, economic problems persisted due to political disorders and the mamluk beys' exactions. While Raymond claims that the characteristic features of Egypt's economy in the eighteenth century were determined firstly by the dispute between mamluk *beys* and fiscal demands imposed on the subjects, and secondly by deteriorated administration⁴⁹, Pamuk mentions that the central government managed and incorporated rebellious social groups by negotiation during this period. The central government adapted to changing circumstances not only in military affairs but also in financial institutions.⁵⁰

From the seventeenth century, the *ağas* of the seven regiments began to establish their dominance, and the late seventeenth century witnessed the rise of the households. The conflict between Kazdağlı and Fiqari followers continued during the century, as well. In the eighteenth century mamluk beys became the most powerful figures in the province of Egypt and, therefore it fell chiefly to them to manage matters involving money and authority in the

⁴⁶ Raymond, *Arab cities*, p.188 (note: *medin* is another term for the *para*)

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 189

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.188-189

⁵⁰ Pamuk, "The evolution of financial institutions", p. 8 Pamuk states that pragmatism, adaptiveness and flexibility were the key words that helped the Ottoman Empire survive the economic problems.

province.⁵¹ Contemporary historians depict Egypt as a scene of incessant conflicts between those who desired to acquire authority. Although they associate eighteenth century Egypt with the continuing tyranny of military establishments, the outbreaks of violence between rival military households and the episodes of the plague, the Egyptian economy did well throughout the eighteenth century. The years 1736-1780 were considered as abundant times by al-Jabarti. By mid-century, thanks to political stability, especially during the tenure of *şeyhülbeled* of İbrahim Kethüda (d.1754), Abdurrahman Kethüda (d.1776), Bulutkapan Ali Bey (al-Kabir) (d.1773) and Ebu'z-zeheb Mehmed Bey (1775), the economy provided prosperity for the middle and upper classes.⁵²

Among them, Abdurrahman Kethüda was the most significant one who used some of his vast fortune⁵³ in restoring or building new religious and public works. Raymond mentions that Abdurrahman Kethüda had 32.9 million *paras* that he inherited from his father, apart from his other revenues. Abdurrahman Kethüda spent his fortune bringing to Cairo an Ottoman aspect. He built or restored 21 religious monuments, seven fountains and two bridges.⁵⁴ Raymond considers Abdurrahman Kethüda as the person who brought the tulip period to Egypt and made Cairo “Ottoman”.⁵⁵ The new architecture style that was introduced by Abdurrahman Kethüda between 1739 and 1765 brought to Cairo a new image that was similar to Istanbul’s style: Wealthy neighbourhoods were established near lakes or river and garden and promenade habitats and fountains and Ottoman style minarets were introduced.

⁵¹ Jane Hathaway, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of Qazdaglis*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997)

⁵² Daniel Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth Century”, in Martin W. Daly, ed., *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol.II: *Modern Egypt: From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 59.

⁵³ For detail see Andre Raymond, *Yeniçerilerin Kahiresi: Abdurrahman Kethüda Zamanında bir Osmanlı Kentinin Yükselişi*, (Istanbul, 1999). Turkish translation of *Le Caire des Janissaires: L'apogee de la ville ottomane sous 'Abd al-Rahman Kathuda* (Paris, 1995)

⁵⁴ Andre Raymond, *Cairo*, p. 205.

⁵⁵ Andre Raymond, *Yeniçerilerin Kahiresi*, p. 12.

Abdurrahman Kethüda (d. 1776) constructed 12 mosques, 14 fountains, and three *zaviye* (monasteries) between the years 1744-1765, not including the restoration of existing buildings. The first and one of the most beautiful ones is the *sabil* (fountain) of Beyne'l-Kasreyn, which was built in 1744 and viewed as one of the most important buildings in Cairo's architectural history.⁵⁶ The mosque of Mutahhar (1744), the restoration of Mosque of al-Azhar (1751-1756), the mosque of Şevazliyye (1754), *zaviye* (monastery) in the Mugarbiliyyin street (1754) are the other buildings he constructed.

Besides the male administrators and nobles who had the authority and power, or merchants who had the financial power, female investors were also active in trade and investments in Ottoman Cairo. By the commandment of the Holy Qur'an, Muslim women had the right of ownership, administration and inheritance of property. Mary Ann Fay's research depending on sharia court documents on *vakıfs* demonstrates that women were also economic participants in Cairo's lively commercial life.⁵⁷ Besides their pious aim, *vakıfs* used to be considered a means of investment that removed constraints such as the unequal inheritance sharing of women. Of the 496 newly founded *vakıf* records, women endowed 126 of them in the eighteenth century according to the ministry of Awqaf in Cairo.⁵⁸ A wide range of building types including shops, warehouses, caravanserais, gardens, apartment houses, public baths, mills, waterwheels, watering troughs, productive agricultural lands, springs, courtyards and coffee houses were endowed by women in the eighteenth century Cairo.

We encounter some women of the mamluk households in this study as well. The daughter of Rıdvan Agha, A'isha Hanım endowed all of a *wakala* in Bulaq as well as

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.135.

⁵⁷ Mary Ann Fay, "From Concubines to Capitalists: Women, Property and Power in the Eighteenth Century Cairo", *Journal of Women's History* 10 (3)1998 pp. 118-140

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 132

waterwheels, a mill, a baking oven and other places in 1758.⁵⁹ Also, Zeyneb Hatun, a freed slave of the deceased *emir* İsmail Bey, endowed a considerable property including three *wakalas*, a coffee house, two shops, and a workshop for making and selling bread. Zeyneb Hatun's shops were in the most prestigious places of the city; one in the east bank of Elephant lake, which was inhabited only by the members of mamluk households, and one on the western side of the city's main canal, which housed middle rank mamluks. Fay proves in her study that women of the eighteenth century Cairo invested their capital in income generating properties. From the existing historiography, we can see that the eighteenth century economy in Egypt was prosperous and mamluk households as well as ulema and merchants derived benefit from it.

Raymond displays in his studies that the Ottoman period Egypt could measure up to the period of the Mamluk Sultanate in terms of quality of architecture and quantity of buildings. He mentions that the number of buildings constructed between 1517 and 1798 was 199, almost as many of as the number of major buildings, which is 233, built over the full extent of Mamluk rule.⁶⁰ The population of the Ottoman Egypt increased as well, in Cairo and in the port cities where the trade was being realised such as Damietta and Rosetta. Many buildings including mosques, public fountains, schools, bathhouses, and warehouses were erected by the wealthy merchants and administrators.

However, in the second half of the century and as a long-term effect of European economic expansion, the Egyptian economy underwent contraction, since European merchants introduced coffee and rice that they brought from the New World. Although these products were of poor quality, they were bought because they were cheap. Nevertheless, we observe that despite the effects of these long-term economic trends, Egypt was still a province

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁶⁰ Raymond, *Yenicilerin Kahiresi*, p.128.

that the central government invested in and was in close relationship with. The new edifices that were built by two Ottoman sultans in the mid-eighteenth century demonstrate this. A fountain and a monastery (*tekke*) were erected by Sultan Mahmud I (1730-1754) in 1750, and two fountains were built by Sultan Mustafa (1757-1777) in 1757 and 1759⁶¹. However, in the years that followed, architecture was neglected, especially during the period of Ali Bey al-Kabir's authority at which time al-Jabarti complains that the maintenance of streets was ignored, let alone witnessing the construction of new buildings.⁶²

Crececius claims that the new ruling beys in the second half of the eighteenth century including Ali Bey al-Kabir and those who succeeded him, contributed to the ruin of the economy, because they were short-sighted, ruined both the foreign and domestic merchant communities, left the countryside in chaos, and provoked two military expeditions of 1786 and 1798, which undermined the foundations of the system that had provided the leadership of the province for centuries.⁶³

To conclude, after becoming a part of the Ottoman Empire, the economic potential of Egypt was revealed. The domestic and international trade flourished in the sixteenth century. The economic stagnation of the first half of the century was replaced with a thriving economy in the second half. Compared with the other provinces of the empire, the Egyptian people acknowledged the Ottoman sovereignty more easily, because they shared the same religion with the new rulers. However, sharing same religion was not the sole reason that made the Egyptian people accept Ottoman rule. The new prosperous economic conditions that the Empire provided for Egypt were among other notable factors that made it easier to yield to Ottoman sovereignty. Beginning from the mid-sixteenth century, Egypt offered a risk free investment opportunity for wealth holders. Even the Ottoman officials who served in Egypt

⁶¹ Raymond, *Cairo*, p. 226.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 229.

⁶³ Crececius, "Egypt in the eighteenth century", p. 60.

for three or four years made investments during and after their period of office in Egypt. Not only the officials won in this situation, but also the local people and neighbourhoods benefited from these investments. The foundation and growth of Bulaq as a commercial centre is an indication of the development of Egypt during the Ottoman rule. Therefore, the spread of wealth and prosperity among the people of Egypt through direct and indirect ways may have contributed to the acknowledgement of Ottoman sovereignty.

The economic development continued in the seventeenth century and as opposed to previous claims that Ottoman rule reduced Egypt's economic prosperity, recent studies have proven that the architecture and population of the province increased regularly, despite some difficulties associated with the process of transformation during this century. Like Bulaq, Azbakiyya can be shown as another example of urban renewal in this period. Azbakiyya was founded during the Mamluk Sultanate rule, but continued to develop and became a neighbourhood for notables; members of the Bakri family and shaykhs belonging to the Bakriyya dervish order and for mamluk beys, for example Ali Bey al-Kabir in the Ottoman period.⁶⁴ One important factor that contributed to the flourishing of Egypt under Ottoman rule was its location. Egypt's unique place at the crossroads of Middle Eastern trade, for example, offered great opportunities, and the local administrators had the chance to take advantage of this situation and acquire wealth during their tenure in positions of authority. Besides the local administrators, the central government also took advantage of Egypt's favourable position with regard to agricultural products and military goods. However, this should not be interpreted in such a way that central government became the only beneficiary of this economic prosperity. People and traders of Egypt had an opportunity to export goods to different parts of the empire and thereby generated revenue for themselves.

⁶⁴ Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Azbakiyya and its Environs from Azbak to Ismail, 1476-1879*, (Le Caire: Institut francais d'archeologie orientale, 1985), p. 49-61.

When it came to the eighteenth century, the prosperous condition of Egypt continued for a certain period. The women of Egypt, on the other hand, were visible in the economy of the province in the eighteenth century. The number and the variety of buildings increased in this period in Egypt as well as the population and the economic volume. It may be the case therefore that these investments in Egypt during the Ottoman rule aimed at contributing to the well-being of Egypt rather than subjecting Egypt to economic decline. It may also therefore be suggested in this study that Egypt's economy did quite well in the eighteenth century. However, it should also be noted here that, with the influence of environmental factors such as famine and plague, it did not last to the end of the eighteenth century.

During the period of change and transformation in the political arena, the officers of military regiments came forward in the provincial administration in the seventeenth century Egypt, and the mamluk beys took over the authority in the eighteenth century. They were part of the military regiments and were also close to the local people. The wealthy local people such as villagers and merchants owned mamluks. The military regiments were intimate with the mamluk households. The mamluk beys therefore became local actors who played a role in political and economic life.

Raymond's research on the wealth of the notables in Cairo at the end of the seventeenth century demonstrates that a mamluk bey's wealth was four times more than an average merchants', and twice as much as that of a major merchant's (*tujjar*) wealth. On the other hand, the wealth of a military officer such as *agha* and *kethüda* was greater than that of a merchant. In the last quarter of the seventeenth century, whilst a bey owned on average 1.809.482 *paras*, a janissary *agha* had 543.896 *paras*.⁶⁵ Abdurrahman Kethüda's personal fortune also proved that being a mamluk bey in the eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt was a

⁶⁵ Andre Raymond, "The Wealth of the Egyptian Emirs at the end of the seventeenth century", in Winter M., Levanoni A., ed., *Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society* (Leiden: Brill, 2004) p. 361.

profitable position and it was worth the struggles, even going up against the central authority. The contemporary historians and narratives show us that the real reason of mamluk beys' struggle was the desire for acquiring wealth and authority. Thus, the transition from an economy in which both the central government and local authorities and people in Egypt benefited in the sixteenth and seventeenth century to a more self-interested economic comprehension in the second period of the eighteenth century could be a reason why the positive atmosphere in Egypt with regard to the economy turned negative.

Unlike others, mamluk beys such as Ali Bey al-Kabir concentrated the wealth and power that they acquired on their own personal prosperity. Ali Bey and those who succeeded him channelized all the wealth to their households rather than investing in the province. They altered the structure of commercial communities, which resulted in more European influence. Ali Bey also monopolized the authority in his hand by eliminating his rivals. The competition between Ali Bey and the governor of Syria, Gürcü Osman Pasha, and his endless ambition to raise revenues especially in the ports of the Red Sea, and his determination to extend his authority outside of Egypt also indicate a change in the local ruling order. In order to increase his revenue for raising an army, Ali Bey, for example, imposed extra taxes on the customs holders and various communities in Egypt. Mainly Copts and Jews were affected by these reforms. Especially positioning the Christian Syrian community instead of the Jews in the customhouses resulted in more Europeans in Egypt that were in position to influence Ali Bey's policies.

In the light of these governing practices of Ali Bey, which seemed to be derived from personal-interest, it can be concluded that there was no intentional policy on the part of the central government to leave Egypt in poverty. On the contrary, the words of prosperity and expansion are more suitable to define Egypt in the mid-eighteenth century. It would be

difficult to expect such a move from the central government with regard to economy while the economy served as one of the most important factors which persuaded the people of Egypt to acknowledge the sovereignty of Ottoman Empire together with both sides' sharing the same religious beliefs. On the contrary, it can be interpreted as evident that it was the self-interest of the local authorities such as Ali Bey, which marked a negative turn in the economy resulted in a breakdown of the ties between the central government and the people of Egypt. However, this loss of mutual trust and cooperation lasted a very short time, essentially confined to the period of the Russo-Ottoman war.

During this period, especially after Ali Bey al-Kabir dismissed the Jews from the customhouses and brought in Syrian Christians, the trade between European merchants and Christian residents of Egypt increased, while at the same time the political influence of Europe on Egypt increased. From the first conquest onwards, the Ottomans had provided a defensive shield against European penetration and colonization. After they repelled the Portuguese from the Red Sea in the sixteenth century, the Ottomans maintained their relationship with Europe via the Mediterranean. European merchants could only live in caravanserais, the buildings that were built for trading and use of merchants in Cairo and the main port cities. They maintained their commercial enterprises via their few contacts among the native population. Looking from today's perspective, their activity was really restricted, but they had the opportunity to get accustomed to a different society.

The second half of the eighteenth century Egyptian trade history is to be researched by keeping in mind the British-French competition. Their influence on Egypt's administrators and advisors cannot be denied. The short-sighted beys and their advisors always focused on the increase of revenues, and thus encouraged the European merchants to come to the Red Sea ports. Baldwin, the British trader, made the most effort to open the Red Sea ports for

European merchants, especially British merchants, who worried that the French would obtain the key to the earth's trading centre, Egypt, before them. The British traders were worried because France had already started doing trade in Egypt in larger volumes than Britain.⁶⁶

While European merchants were bargaining with mamluk beys in Egypt, their ambassadors were simultaneously negotiating with the central government in Istanbul in order to bring their ships to Suez. There was a bargaining between the European merchants and the local administrators because the European merchants were liable to the exactions that the local administrators were collecting from them. However, these domestic exactions were in contravention to the treaties (*ahidname*) signed between the Ottoman Empire and various European countries. Therefore, many decrees were sent to Egyptian ports ordering their officials to avoid any exactions apart from the agreed tariffs in order to deal with the complaints of the European merchants.⁶⁷

To sum up, administrators in eighteenth century Egypt had a great opportunity for enjoying enormous power through trading between Asia, India and Europe, thanks to Egypt's geopolitical location and abundant revenues received from taxes. It was the profit to be gained by the flourishing commercial activities and great amount of land tax that encouraged ambitious mamluk beys such as Ali Bey al-Kabir and foreign countries such as Britain, France and Russia from the mid-eighteenth century onwards in the wake of decentralization of the Ottoman Empire, to seek to seize full authority over Egypt.⁶⁸ Local administrators were always open to external collaborators such as Russia who might support their stance against the central government.

⁶⁶ For more information about Baldwin's activities see Rosemary Janet Said's unpublished doctoral dissertation, *George Baldwin and British interests in Egypt 1775-1798*, University of London, 1968.

⁶⁷ For example A.DVN.DVE, 148/6; A.DVNS.AHK.CZRK.d, vol. 2, 1215; C.HR, 2897; In some cases the Porte ordered the officers to return the illegal exactions C. BH, 11171

⁶⁸ Bashir Zein al-Abdin, *the Political System of Ottoman Egypt (1099-1143/1687-1730)*, unpublished PhD thesis, (School of Oriental and African Studies, 1999), p. 62.

Crecelius claims that mamluk beys restricted themselves to Egyptian domestic issues, and concerned themselves only with increasing their income. Following the basic logic of a merchant, they were unaware of the factors that made Europeans “formidable competitors” in both the war and commerce sectors.⁶⁹ The same shortcoming can be suggested not only for the mamluk beys, but also for most Ottoman officials. They were so concerned with their personal interests that they could not do anything to compete with the Europeans, even when they realized the situation that the empire was in.

Section 2: European commercial relationships and interests in Egypt

Section 1 aims to demonstrate economic conditions of Egypt and its place in the empire’s economy in the eighteenth century. The ports of Egypt and Cairo alongside the ports on the Nile were crowded with indigenous and international merchants and their agents conducting trade with the Ottoman Empire’s domestic ports and/or European ports. The mamluk beys were quite involved in this commercial activity. The commercial activities between Ottoman Egypt and European states are worth consideration during the tenure of *şeyhülbeled* of Ali Bey al-Kabir (1760-1772) and Mehmed Bey Ebu’z-zeheb (1772-1775). In these activities, Crecelius emphasizes the influence of Ali Bey’s relationship with indigenous Christians, Copts, and European Christians, and claims that it was the first time that a bey interacted with them that closely.⁷⁰ However, Zens asserts that it was not peculiar to mamluk beys to establish close relationship with foreigners in the eighteenth century but it was a typical feature of *ayans* to make agreements with Europeans.⁷¹ In the eighteenth century the trade with Egypt and the Levant was busy and in demand by the European merchants, so much so that there was a stiff competition between the European nations. From the beginning

⁶⁹ Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 68.

⁷⁰ Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 66

⁷¹ Robert Zens, “Provincial Powers: The Rise of Ottoman Local Notables (Ayan)”, *History Studies*, volume 3/3 2011, pp. 433-447, p. 447

of the century, France, Britain and the Dutch Republic had been competing for more profit in their trade with the Levant. Towards the end of the century, when Russia joined the group, the rivalry became contentious. Benefits of the trade of the Levant in the eighteenth century did not revolve around a favoured nation of the Ottoman Empire, as was the case in previous centuries; instead, a broader group of European countries engaged in the commercial activities in the ports of Ottoman Empire.⁷² By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Egypt was a stage of rivalry for European nations as far as commerce and politics was concerned. However, during this period, which can be named pre-modern or pre-colonial, as well as pre-industrial, one should not consider Egypt under a direct influence of the European countries, as European expansion was still in beginning phase. Colonization activities were in their infancy and the French-British rivalry for India had entered a quiescent phase by the time of Ali Bey's tenure of office (1760-1773).⁷³ Transportation was still slow and not yet, until the mid-nineteenth century, in a position to realize the advantages gained by widespread use of faster steam ships with larger cargo capacities. This consequently limited the quantity of goods that could be transferred in a single voyage.

However, the volume of the trade that were realized in Egypt and its position as a crossroad in the middle of the continents made it an important economical and political sphere for European competition especially in the late eighteenth century. Egypt's location linking trade of the Suez to the Mediterranean via land route inspired European consuls to shorten the route from India to Europe via the port of Suez in the upper Red Sea. For this reason, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the European merchants made a lot of effort on this issue so that they could have gotten ahead of their rival in the Levant and India commerce.

⁷² Rhoads Murphey, "Conditions of Trade in the eastern Mediterranean", *Journal of the Economic and the Social History of the Orient*, vol. 33 No. 1 (1990) pp. 35-50, p. 38

⁷³ The period of most intense Anglo-French rivalry in India is usually associated with the period of Robert Clive's first governorship in India (1755-1760), which overlapped with the contest for global domination of trade during the *Seven Years' War* (1756-63). By 1769 France had largely lost interest in India favour of its lucrative trade with the West Indies.

The efforts of British consul George Baldwin who communicated with the mamluk beys and encouraged them to open the upper Red Sea for the European trade are significant. Despite the fact that the central government did not allow European ships in the upper Red Sea, the European merchants convinced the mamluk beys to make commercial agreements, which allowed them to trade in the Suez. This topic has importance and is relevant with the current study as the rivalry and ambition of the European countries led their merchants and consuls to make agreements directly with the mamluk beys persuading them to act against the regulation of the imperial government. Although these endeavours did not serve for the advantage of the European merchants, not yet, they are important as they show the earlier stages of ambitions and rivalry of the Britain and France on Egypt.

The Ottoman Empire included Egypt under its hegemony and established a traditional organisation, inclusive of all aspects of administration, between 1517 and 1717. The time period that this study examines between the 1720s and 1770s was not radically different from the empire's classic period. The two most important commercial goods, coffee and spices dominated Egypt's commerce, and domestic trade outbalanced international trade. We see considerable endeavours by the European consuls and merchants to carry Egypt's trade on an international basis by entering the upper reaches of the Red Sea in the last quarter of the century, however their full penetration of these seaways was not achieved until the 1820s.

Being far from war fronts, Egypt's commercial zone was sustained in the eighteenth century.⁷⁴ The numerous wars between Iran and the Ottoman Empire added to the demand in the empire for the European trade of cloth and even coffee.⁷⁵ The need and the demand of the Ottoman populaces for clothes that the European nations provided, and the requirement in

⁷⁴ Zein al Abdin, *The Political System of Ottoman Egypt*, p. 57

⁷⁵ Murphey, "Conditions of trade", p. 46. The war between the empire and Iran resulted with the increased European trade in the empire.

Europe, for raw materials to manufacture led to an active market in the Ottoman ports, especially in the Levant. Egyptian and Levantine ports attracted many merchants from various nations in Europe who actively engaged in the trade. That is to say that not only Syrian, Yemeni and North African merchants but many European merchants also carried out commercial activities in Egypt. In addition to those, a considerable number of people moved to Egypt from the Kazdağ region of the western Anatolia. These people, along with engaging in the military, took part in commercial activities as well with tobacco being their main commercial good.⁷⁶ One can suggest that their connection with homeland must have shaped the commercial relationship and network of Egypt with other parts of the Middle East. Furthermore, we can see that, this Anatolian faction, being a cosmopolitan component of the empire, found a strong place in the organisational management of the military as well. The importation of wood from Kazdağ region of Anatolia for the ship construction in Suez provides a telling example of this situation.⁷⁷

On the other hand, the Russian elements that were enslaved during the Russo-Ottoman wars were brought to Egypt for military service as well. Crecelius mentions that they represented “a distinct social group in the mamluk ranks particularly in the household of Ibrahim Bey (1786-1798) during the last decade of the eighteenth century, which seems to indicate that they had a considerable influence on the actions of the mamluk beys.”⁷⁸ It also seems plausible that this cosmopolitan trading and ruling middle class might have had an impact upon the politics of Egypt in the late eighteenth century. The wide array of commercial goods that Egypt offered was more than enough to satisfy the group of foreign merchants in Egypt. The Red Sea and Egyptian trade offered them Chinese porcelain, Indian

⁷⁶ Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 64

⁷⁷ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 138 (date mid L 1176/late April 1763)

⁷⁸ Crecelius, “Egypt in the eighteenth century”, p. 64

spices, cloth, and Persian silks besides Yemeni coffee and Egyptian goods.⁷⁹ French and English interest in Egypt produced more *wakalas/* entrepot in the province. Large companies were formed for trading goods such as sugar, rice, leather, textiles, coffee and rugs, which were the chief goods for the international market.

It is clear that, before and during the tenure of *şeyhülbeled* of Ali Bey, Egypt experienced a prosperous commercial and economic life. When we are looking for motivations of Ali Bey to rise against the central government, we find a prosperous economic condition that mamluk beys were involved in and took advantage of that prevailed during the period in which he lived. So, unlike our modern perception of the close relationship between the ‘economic stagnation’ and the terms of ‘uprising and rebellion’, eighteenth century Egypt offers us a different scenario. Instead of a deteriorated financial market, the primary sources suggest an active milieu in which the merchants competed to sell, buy and earn more; and from time to time economic boundaries applied by the commercial treaties, namely *ahidnames*, clashed with the political ambitions of the European merchants and mamluk beys. Without a doubt there is a relationship between Ali Bey’s endeavour to extend his authority over the Hijaz and Syria and the active economy of the Egyptian market. Moreover, the sources suggest that the financial activities may have been an attraction for the local administrators to have the lion’s share; so to say, the abundance of the commercial revenue encouraged the local administrators to rise up against the central government.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Porcelain trading was profitable as Indian goods and Persian silk, yet few sources mention it. For more information about porcelain trading in the eighteenth century, see Cheryl Ward, “The Sadana Island Shipwreck: An Eighteenth-Century AD Merchantman off the Red Sea Coast of Egypt”, *World Archaeology*, vol. 32, No. 3, Shipwrecks, Feb 2001, pp. 368-382. Foreign traders were active in Egypt, nevertheless, the Ottoman domestic trade had greater significance over the trade with Europe see for detail, Daniel Panzac, “International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th Century”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 24, No. 2, (May 1992), pp. 189-206.

⁸⁰ Zein al-Abdin also asserts this situation in *the political system*, p. 59,

By the end of the eighteenth century, the leaders of the Levant market amongst the other European countries were the French merchants with their cheaper and colourful cloths.⁸¹ The British merchants' trade was not as profitable as that of their French counterparts; yet, even the modest profits they gained made it worthwhile to maintain their business in Egypt.⁸² Also, Dutch merchants were involved with a growing profit in the Levant market.

The estimated trade volume between the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe was around 110 million *livres tournois* by the end of the 1780s. Approximately 50 million *livres tournois* of this trade was realized between the empire and its main partner, France.⁸³ From 1724 to 1789, the trade between the two countries increased by 190%, which equals to an average increase of 2.91% per year.⁸⁴ In the beginning of the eighteenth century, around 50 French merchants were operating in Cairo, and as many more were based in Rosetta and Alexandria. On the other hand, only two British merchants were operating in Cairo and one in Alexandria.⁸⁵ Also, while in the beginning of the century the value of the French trade was one third of the English, by the mid-century they were equal, and at the end of the century Britain's share of the Egypt trade had shrunk to the equivalent of their French rival's position at the beginning of the century.⁸⁶

As time progressed during the century, Egypt became prominent in terms of both commerce and politics for all the European nations including Russia. The forerunners of Napoleon had appreciated the value of Egypt as a bridge to India: especially since the Ottoman Empire's defeat against Russia was an indication of its weakness, and in the case of the empire's complete collapse, France did not want to lose Egypt and made attempts to secure it as its own share.

⁸¹ Vlami, *Trading with the Ottomans*, p. 90

⁸² The British established a consulate in Cairo long after France. See Wood, *History of the Levant Company*, p. 125

⁸³ Panzac, "Maritime Trade", p. 192. (Note: Livres is the French currency)

⁸⁴ Murphey, "Conditions of Trade", p. 47

⁸⁵ Anis, *Some Aspects*, p. 13

⁸⁶ Russell, *The Later History of The Levant Company 1753-1825*, p. 102-108

On the other hand, George Baldwin, who was a British agent active in Egypt after 1773, wrote his superiors in London in order to point out the strategic importance of Egypt for Britain; “*She is the Magazine of all the trade of Yemen, the mart of all the coffee and rich gums of Yemen, the extrepot of all the interior parts of Africa, producing gums, gold dust, ivory, senna and drugs*” and warns: “*France in possession of Egypt would possess the Master Key to all the trading nations of the earth*”⁸⁷ It is clear that Baldwin appreciated the value of the Egyptian trade’s profit; however, it was not easy for him to obtain recognition by his superiors of the seriousness of the threat posed by the French.

In addition to its significance in terms of the commercial activity, Egypt was a subject of a rivalry due to several advantages that its geographical position offered. Connecting the Red Sea trade to the Mediterranean, and thereby to Europe, was the most significant advantage that geography gave to Egypt. This advantageous position also made Egypt a province concerning which the political ambitions of various European nations overlapped. The possibility of having the chance of administrating Egypt in line with their interests would serve the benefit of three countries in the late eighteenth century, *i.e.*, France, Britain and Russia. Beyond the advantages offered by quick communication and transportation, having Egypt in their sphere of influence would provide those countries a greater market for the goods they bought from India. On the other hand, Russia had succeeded in establishing its naval presence in the Mediterranean against the Ottoman Empire, which made it another component of the rivalry in the region.

Despite the existence of the European nations’ competing aspirations, the Ottoman Empire had closed the Red Sea trade route to European merchants by reason of the need for protection of the Holy cities, and claimed that the Red Sea was open only for the

⁸⁷ Crecelius, “The attempt by Greek Catholics to control Egypt’s trade with Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century”, in Abdeljelil Temimi, ed., *La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes a l’epoque ottomane*, (Zaghouan, 1988), p. 128

transportation of pilgrims.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the *sherif* of Mecca broke this rule in order to gain more customs revenue.⁸⁹ On the other hand, the Porte demanded from Yemeni administrators, even though it had weak relations with them in the eighteenth century, not to sell coffee to the European merchants directly,⁹⁰ as it decreased both the empire's customs revenue and the coffee supply in the Ottoman domestic market, especially in Istanbul.⁹¹

Opening the Suez trade to European merchants was one of the elements that gave shape to the European nations' policy towards Egypt in the second half of the eighteenth century. The English-French rivalry in India and their plans for shortening the voyage between homeports and their colonies in India made Egypt, especially its ports on the Red Sea, the chief frontline in this race.⁹² Both countries were eager to seize the opportunity that Red sea ports, especially Suez, offered for a better communication and a more profitable trade with India. Managing to get in the Red Sea trade was on the agenda of France and Britain from the beginning of the seventeenth century⁹³, yet it gained prominence with Ali Bey al-Kabir's uprising and reached its climax with the French expedition of 1798. Enabling European merchants to trade in upper Red Sea the port of Jidda formed the main agenda of the European nations at the end of the century.

Some British politicians considered taking control over the Red Sea trade as a protection from the Russian element in the Mediterranean. The British politicians were

⁸⁸ By doing so, the Porte prevented accumulation of the customs duty revenues in a relatively remote province, which would make the local components of the administration rich and powerful.

⁸⁹ Although the European merchants paid 3% customs duty as a requirement of the agreement, '*ahidname*', the *sherif* was receiving 14% in addition to an anchorage tax.

⁹⁰ Name-i Humayun N.MH 6, nr. 265-266 (date early R 1131/late February 1719) On Yemeni-European commercial relationship in the eighteenth century, see; Ayşe Kara, *XVII. ve XVIII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı Yönetiminde Yemen ve Kasımiler Dönemi*, unpublished Masters dissertation, (Istanbul University, 2011), pp. 75-85, and Ebtisam al-Gerafi, *al-Alakat al-Ticariyye beyne'l-Yemen wa'l Britaniyye*, unpublished Masters dissertation, (University of Sana'a, 2005).

⁹¹ MMD, vol. 1, nr. 567 (date early L 1130/early September 1718), MMD, vol. 8, nr. 262 (date R 1178/September 1764), C. ML 3013 (date 29 Z 1120/11 March 1709)

⁹² While the shortest journey between Calcutta and London took 150 days via Good Hope Cape, it was 63 days via Suez. A.C. Wood, *The History of the Levant Company*, (Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 167

⁹³ In 1708, French merchant/consul Merveille, and in 1711 La Lande convinced local administrators to sign agreements in Mocha, which would enable French merchants to become involved in the Red Sea trade directly. Zein al-Abdin, *The political system*, p. 305

worried that Russia's potential threat of seizure of Alexandria might affect British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, being active in eastern politics could compensate for what Britain had lost in the war of independence in America. Preservation and extension of the Ottoman Empire against Russia and claiming the tutelary possession of Egypt would be beneficial for Britain. Some ideas came up in the parliament such as keeping Egypt as a province of the Ottoman Empire and paying an annual tribute, which the mamluk beys were reluctant to provide, in return for a British military station, which controlled the India trade.⁹⁴ In the meantime, European consuls made attempts to open the Suez trade for European merchants. Whilst embassies were in contact with the grand vizier in Istanbul, consuls tried to reach agreements with local authorities.⁹⁵ Crecelius mentions that the British government did not support their agents in Egypt in order not to endanger the commercial activities in other Ottoman ports.⁹⁶

Although it was the local administrators and officials with whom the European merchants generally had problems, they carried on the negotiations with the local administrators and officers, since the Porte was reluctant to allow European trade in Suez.⁹⁷ On the other hand, the mamluk beys were interested in negotiating with European merchants and diplomats, because opening the port for trading directly with the Europeans meant more customs income. Indeed, this restriction was broken even before Ali Bey's control in the region. In 1764, three ships that flew the British flag arrived at Suez port. British authorities claimed that those were corsair ships that were flagged with English flags.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Anis, *Some Aspects*, p. 242

⁹⁵ Crecelius, "An attempt by Greek Catholics to control Egypt's trade with Europe", p. 69

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 69

⁹⁷ Central government received countless complaints about the customs officials in the provinces who did not abide with the treaties (*ahidnames*), or charged miscellaneous taxes, which the European merchants were not supposed to pay. The autonomy of the provincial officers prevented the Porte to protect the European merchants from the harassment of the officers. Murphey, "Conditions of trade", p. 36

⁹⁸ Raif Ivecan, *XVIII. Yüzyılın II. Yarısında Kızıldeniz'de Ticaret*, unpublished Masters dissertation, Marmara University, 1998, pp. 17-18

During his control over Jidda and Mecca, Ali Bey al-Kabir got in touch with English vessels, which frequented Jidda and penetrated the forbidden waters.⁹⁹ After Ali Bey, in 1774, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb too had some agreements allowing English vessels access to the Suez.¹⁰⁰ Crecelius refers to the agreements between mamluk beys and British merchants as “a reawakening of Egyptian regional ambitions and a motive for change in economy”.¹⁰¹ However, it was a premature attempt and Crecelius's definition is over exaggerated since complaints from the *sherif* of Mecca, who was worried that agreements would affect his income in Jidda, made the Porte take action and send decrees forbidding the approach of European vessels to Suez once again.¹⁰² English merchants stepped back fearing that this cheaper channel would damage their trade in the Levant, namely, Aleppo.

While causing an international rivalry, opening the Suez trade to the European merchants triggered a domestic rivalry within the Ottoman Empire as well. Both the mamluk beys of Egypt and *sherif* of Mecca were trying to gain the highest quantity of tax revenue by attracting the European merchants' trade to their nearby ports. While the agreement, *ahidname*, between the European countries and the Ottoman Empire required a 3% tax the *sherif* of Mecca enjoyed 14% tax in addition to an anchorage fee. Nevertheless, in order to compete with the *sherif*, the mamluk beys asked for an 8% tax rate without the anchorage fee.¹⁰³ In the struggle between its subordinates: the *sherif*, and the mamluk beys, the Porte's action lent its support to its semi-autonomous subordinate: the *sherif* of Mecca.¹⁰⁴ Due to this

⁹⁹ Ahmed H. Joudah refers to Ali Bey's contact with the Europeans in order to open Suez trade for them. See A. H. Joudah, A. H. Joudah, *A History of the Movement of Shaykh Zahir al-'Umar al-Zaydani (1690?-1775)* unpublished PhD thesis, (The University of Michigan, 1971), p. 129

¹⁰⁰ Wood, *The History*, p. 167.

¹⁰¹ Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt: a study of the regimes of 'Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab, 1760-1775*, (Minneapolis: Chicago, 1981), p. 3

¹⁰² The Porte always cared about the *sherif* of Mecca and his people. For example, in some years, the Porte asked from the governor of Egypt to send 'caize' in order to prevent their financial suffering. MMD, vol. 8, nr. 9 (early Z 1174/early July 1761)

¹⁰³ Crecelius, Daniel, “A Late Eighteenth Century Austrian Attempt to Develop the Red Sea Trade Route”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Apr., 1994) pp. 262-280.

¹⁰⁴ MMD, vol. 9, nr. 331 (date early Z 1192/late December 1778)

conflict, the revenue of the port of Jidda decreased, and the *sherif* of Mecca complained to the Porte immediately. In order to prevent the mamluk beys from becoming stronger the Porte prohibited European trade in the port of Suez. The real motivation behind the Ottoman prohibition of the Suez trade to the European merchants was the same as that which influenced their decision not to apply the *ikta* system in Egypt.¹⁰⁵ The Ottoman central government prevented the local authorities of this rather distant province from becoming stronger and asserting its independence from the empire.

Nevertheless, in 1775, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb negotiated with English merchants, and granted them the liberty to frequent the Suez port and to trade in Egypt. The European ships arrived at Suez annually for the next four years, until the Bedouin attack in 1779.¹⁰⁶ Local administrators and merchants were happy with the results of this trading. Despite the Porte's protests and notices, the English trade prevailed until the French expedition.¹⁰⁷

During the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries French merchants were superior in the Egyptian market, compared to other European nations. After the second half of the eighteenth century, Britain, Russia, and even Austria took an interest in the Egyptian trade. In fact, both the commercial and strategic standing of Egypt resulted in this interest. France became more competitive after other European nations' involvement in Egypt, and it ended with the French expedition of 1798. During this period, the British were the chief rivals of the French. French authorities attentively tracked the English travellers who visited Egypt. They translated their

¹⁰⁵ See chapter III on Income Sources and Order p. 124 and Stanford J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt*, (Princeton, 1962), p.30

¹⁰⁶ Daniel Crecelius, "Damiette and Syrian-Egyptian Trade in the second half of the eighteenth century" in Peter Sluglett with Stefan Weber, eds., *Syria and Bilad al-Sham under Ottoman Rule Essays in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq*, (Brill: Leiden, Boston, 2010), p. 169

¹⁰⁷ For detail see Wood, *The History*, pp.168-176. The Porte even employed bedouins, by banditry and seizing their properties and themselves, in order to end the English trade at Suez. Yet, the English found the way to pass over this barrier by negotiating with all the local elements including bedouins.

work on Egypt into French immediately.¹⁰⁸ In most respects, the French surpassed the others. Their trading volume was greater than Britain's by a considerable margin.¹⁰⁹ Yet, when it came to some political initiatives, they could not beat the British. For example, the French signed commercial treaties with the mamluk beys in 1784, which was more than a decade after their British counterparts.

In addition to its commercial significance, Egypt always had a special place for eighteenth century educated men of France as well. The French knew about ancient Egypt, which was a rich, prosperous country and mother of art and science, and considered it as a heritage for modern European science and art.¹¹⁰ In addition, French media usually followed up Levantine politics especially during the more important times for Europe such as the Seven-Year's War. In the early years of the second half of the eighteenth century, the average number of the oriental newspapers in France was around 4-5. However, when it came to the 1770s, this number rose to around 40-50. These newspapers worked as modern news agencies. A correspondent reported the events from Aleppo, Smyrna or Cairo by mail.¹¹¹ Ali Bey al-Kabir's uprising¹¹² attracted the close attention of Europe. This time, a land close to Europe, and the key to the future of the Arab people was on the agenda. In addition, the developments would change the European merchants' interests in the Middle East. The port of Suez would be opened for the European trade, which made the Indian trade easier and closer to Europe. For these reasons, some travellers suggested that Ali Bey's attempt would

¹⁰⁸ The number of English traveller in Egypt increased at the end of the eighteenth century. Mostly, English travellers were officers of the company or merchants in India. Henry Laurens, *Les Origines intellectuelles de l'expédition d'Égypte. L'orientalisme islamisant en France (1698-1798)* (Istanbul, 1987). See Arabic translation by Bashir al-Saba'i, *al-Usul al-Fikriyye lil-hamlah al-Fransiyye al-Istishraq al-muteeslime fi Fransa (1698-1798)*, (Cairo, 1999) p. 105

¹⁰⁹ Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, p. 38

¹¹⁰ Laurens, *al-Usul al-Fikriyya*, p. 97

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 157 Laurens mentions that Savary summons for a direct European intervention, *al-usul al-fikriyya*, p. 101. Some traveller claim that the laziness of Turks resulted with a decreased cultivable land. The author claims that Paul Lucas, Savary and Maillet suggest that the bad political administration caused all those, and unless a alteration happens it will not change. *Al-usul al-fikriyye*, pp. 98-101. French travellers' observations were without doubt far from those they had read about ancient Egypt. Regret of French travellers, in time, turn into a call for a "retrieve" Egypt from barbaric and indolent Turks. *Al-usul el-fikriyya*, p. 105

¹¹² Henry Laurens called it "adventure".

have indirect effects on Europe, which would make European merchants richer.¹¹³ Ali Bey appointed a European merchant named Balthasar as the officer of the Jidda customs house, which encouraged more European merchants to visit the region.

At this point, it is worth noting that the French described Ali Bey as: sultan, and the successor of the pharaohs, the liberator of Mecca and the promised lands.¹¹⁴ Europeans had a high opinion of Ali Bey and his adventure. They consistently monitored it. It was important for European people because this event revealed that the Ottoman Empire had a weak point. This sort of crisis would be the Achilles heel of the empire. However, the Meccan *sherif's* return with *bedouin* soldiers and the defeat of Ali Bey's subordinate in Mecca reversed the situation. As time proceeded and European merchants' profits decreased, their fascination with the topic decreased as well.¹¹⁵

In the late eighteenth century, French diplomats and travellers asserted about Egypt that it was out of the authority of the central government, that the authority and power of the governor was less than that of the mamluk beys' and that the Porte's involvement in Egypt was minimal, whilst the control of the taxable land was under the mamluk beys' authority.¹¹⁶ In addition, French travellers especially noted what they perceived as the Egyptian people's lethargy and lack of ambition, by which it was implied that a potential expedition would be easier. Merchants and subservient people with an ephemeral administration made the province vulnerable.¹¹⁷ The French travellers' illustration of the Ottoman administration partly represented late eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt. It is a fact that decentralized Ottoman rule had prevailed in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire since the late sixteenth century. The

¹¹³ Laurens, *Al-usul al-fikriyya*, p. 160.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 161

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 160

¹¹⁶ It is a fact that the Porte had to struggle with ambitious *mamluk* beys about the taxable lands. See chapter III on Income Sources and Order, *irsaliye* p. 131 and chapter IV on governor, p. 193 Yet, the Porte's involvement in the administration of Egypt is controversial. It must be evaluated under the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire. The administrative perception of the French travellers might misunderstand the situation in Egypt.

¹¹⁷ Laurens, *al-usul al-fikriyya*, p. 105

connection of the province and the Porte depended on fulfilling reciprocal conditions of give and take. As Shaw explains in his *Financial and Administrative Organization of the Ottoman Egypt*, as long as the mamluk beys provided the Porte's demands, they were accepted as sufficiently cooperative agents by the Porte. Although it may have caused some problems during the late eighteenth century, it was the same procedure that had been operating for some time. The administrative perception of the French travellers, without a doubt, was different from this procedure; as contemporary counterparts of the Ottoman Empire, they did not fully understand the administrative system. Another point here might be travellers' desire to show Egypt as a separated province from which France might obtain numerous advantages such as the creation of a financial and political sphere of influence in order to encourage a potential expedition into Egypt.

The travellers claimed that the Ottoman administration ignored the reconstruction of the province, as well. Yet, some of their claims about this issue contradict the archival documents we have. In addition, Raymond's investigation provides a comprehensive research about the expansion of urban construction in Cairo during the period of Ottoman rule.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, the correspondence between the Porte and Egypt's governor and notables proves how important the Porte considered reconstruction of dams and seawalls along the Mediterranean coast to be.¹¹⁹ Although Egypt was not as important as the imperial capital, Istanbul, the correspondence between the central government and provincial administration proves that the Porte attached considerable importance to the needs of Egypt and its

¹¹⁸ Andre Raymond, *Cairo*, p. 216-225

¹¹⁹ About the repair and maintenance of dams and seawall see MMD, vol. 4, nr. 137 (date mid RA 1141/ mid October 1738), MMD, vol. 6, nr. 37 (date mid RA 1156/ mid May 1743), nr. 69 (date late CA 1156/ mid July 1743), nr. 300 (date late RA 1159/ mid April 1746), nr. 431 (date early ZA1160/ early November 1747), MMD, vol. 7, nr. 144 (early CA 1167/ early April 1754), nr. 150 and nr. 151 (date mid CA 1167/ early April 1754), nr. 179 (date late M 1168/ early November 1754), nr. 184 (date mid RA 1168/ early January 1755), MMD, vol. 8, nr. 544 (date early N 1181/ late January 1768), nr. 570 (date early S 1182/ late June 1768), C. NF, 644 (date 28 N 1190/ 10 November 1776), C. NF, 2363 (date 15 RA 1153/ 10 June 1740), C. MTZ, 226 (date 25 CA 1181/ 19 October 1767), C. MTZ, 596 (date RA 1168/ January 1755), D.BŞM.MSR, 7/30, A.DVN.MHM 112, nr. 319 (date early Ş 1113/ early January 1702). Some materials and equipment for the repair, which were not available in Egypt, were brought from other provinces; IE.ADL, 323 (date 7 CA 1113/ 10 October 1701)

population. The necessary precautions were taken for preserving the cultivable lands of Egypt and maintaining the water supply of the coastal cities such as Alexandria. The Porte preserved the cultivable land, even by sacrificing its revenue in-cash from its annual tribute when it was most needed during the eighteenth century.¹²⁰

When it comes to the British, their commercial activities in Egypt decreased during the century, as they did in the Levant generally. The eighteenth century was a time period during which the Levant Company's income fluctuated before its demise.¹²¹ Since the second half of the seventeenth century, the English trade in Levant had lost nearly one third of its capacity.¹²² The main reason for this decrease was the progress that France had made. In addition to the Spanish card, French merchants knew their market and customers well and did their trade accordingly. The French produced cheaper clothes, which were more suitable for the needs of the customers in Levant. French dominance in the market, even Dutch commercial revival and rivalry, and the scarcity of the raw silk in the market due to Russia-Iran wars were the main problems that English merchants had to deal with. Exchanging woollen clothes for raw Iranian silk in Aleppo was the most profitable means of trade for the Levant Company's merchants. The change in the amount of the Persian silk in the market due to reasons of Russian seizure of Iranian cities, Nadir Şah's activities, rebellion in Shirvan, and Ottoman-Iran wars influenced English trade in the Levant in a negative way.¹²³ In the mid eighteenth century, the Dutch especially took the advantage of English policies against the plague. The English vessels withdrew from the Levant ports in case of plague, even if it was

¹²⁰ The expenses were met from the annual tribute. For further reconstructions in Egypt see Mikhail, Alan, "An irrigated empire: The view from Ottoman Fayyum", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 42, No. 4, pp.569-590; M. Güneş, *XVIII. Yüzyılda İskenderiye Limanı*, Unpublished Masters dissertation, (Istanbul, 2009) pp. 10-31.

¹²¹ Laidlaw, *British in the Levant*, p. xiii. For the main causes of the decrease of the Levant Company's trade, see Wood, *The History*, pp. 136-178 and Anis, p. 14. Although English merchants did not make much profit in Cairo until 1730s, Egypt became a growing market for English goods in 1750s. Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, p. 202.

¹²² Wood, *The History*, p. 141.

¹²³ Abdul-Karim Mahmud Gharaybeh, *English Traders in Syria, 1744-1791*, Unpublished PhD thesis, (University of London School of Oriental and African Studies, 1950), p.122-123

only a rumour, until forty days after the end of outbreak. In these cases, Dutch merchants enjoyed conducting trade in the absence of any rival.¹²⁴ Whilst trading with 15 bales of cloth in 1754, their merchandise reached 100 bales in 1765. They influenced French trade as well. Already at the early date of 1744, the number of French vessels operating in Ottoman waters was as much ten times greater than the number of English vessels.¹²⁵

English woollen cloth exports to the Ottoman market and raw silk imports were the main commercial material in British-Ottoman trade. In 1753, the cloth exports of Britain to the Ottoman market accounted for £126,027 of the total exports valued at £131,792.¹²⁶ The trade in English cloth for Ottoman silk decreased in the eighteenth century for a variety of reasons.¹²⁷ Whilst cloth exports in the 1770s were around £99,586 per annum, in 1792 it declined to £41,074.¹²⁸ Towards the end of the century, the issue of the American war of independence (1775-1783) became another distraction for England from the Levant trade. The lowest level of the income of the British import in the Ottoman Empire was between 1774-1783. The incessant wars negatively affected British trade.¹²⁹

Whilst looking for a new trading path and area in Russia, the war between France and Spain gave Britain the chance to re-establish its existence in the Mediterranean.¹³⁰ Introducing colonial goods to the Ottoman market such as fur, indigo, logwood, foreign dyes, spices, pepper, cochineal, brazil wood, pimento, Swedish iron and amber, and India goods, helped British merchants to compensate their losses in the cloth trade especially after the end

¹²⁴ Laidlaw, *British in the Levant*, p. 26

¹²⁵ Russell, *The Later History*, p. 92

¹²⁶ In 1780s while the British export to Turkey was around £103,000, the French export was £18-19 million. Anis, *Some Aspects*, p. 14

¹²⁷ Ralph Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, p. 42. In 1666, the number of broad clothes exported to Turkey by English merchants was 13,672, and decreased to 3,618 in 1765. Also, they bought 216,318 lbs of raw silk from Turkey. This trading also decreased to 112,142 lbs in 1761.

¹²⁸ Russell, *The Later History*, p. 30. In order to balance the trade, English merchants embarked on the raw material (tin, brass, iron, earthenware, pewter, leather) and watch trade.

¹²⁹ Michael Talbot, *British Diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire During the Long Eighteenth Century*, unpublished PhD thesis, (London: SOAS, 2013), p. 116

¹³⁰ Wood, *the History*, p. 147

of Seven Year's War.¹³¹ Unlike French cheaper and lighter French cloths, expensive English cloth and fur that were brought from the colonies were bought by the upper layer of Ottoman society. High quality English watches were also bought by a small number of people in the society.

There were several reasons for the French acquiring commercial superiority in the Levant market. Having ready money and rather good diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire gave French merchants another advantage.¹³² Financial support provided the opportunities for research and enterprise among clothiers, and therefore they were able to produce the right product that the customers liked. The French government supported the French merchants financially. Due to the English monopolistic nature and low economic standards, they could not compete with the French merchants.¹³³ In addition, lowering the prices, the closer distance between the Levant and France¹³⁴, and cheap labour made French merchants forerunners in the Ottoman market.

The French had the option to compete with English woollen clothes in quality. Yet, more cleverly, they produced the clothes that appealed to the taste of their customers.¹³⁵ The colour of French cloth was the most suitable to the taste of the Levantine people. On the other side, although English cloths did not satisfy the needs of Ottoman market, we have no records showing any endeavours to enhance the colour. The Levantine customers' two expectation from the fabric were not shrinking and not fading. Putting aside the production of cloths with vibrant colours, the colour of English clothes was faded by the seawater even before the vessels arrived at the Levant ports.¹³⁶ Although the company's officers found the solution in

¹³¹ Russell, *the Later History*, p. 34.

¹³² Laidlaw, *The British in the Levant*, p. 17

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 18-24; Vlami, *Trading with the Ottomans*, p. 21

¹³⁴ While the English merchants' journey to the homeland lasted 6-8 weeks, French colleagues arrived one third of this length.

¹³⁵ Davis, *Aleppo and Devonshire Square*, p. 30

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 96

dying the clothes in the Levant workplaces, it did not serve the aim of carrying the British to the front in their competition with the French.

French domination constricted the English presence in the Ottoman market. Nevertheless, English merchants leaving the Levant market in the 1790s, whilst the French focused on the domestic problems and ignored the Levant trade.¹³⁷ It can be said that Britain was overly passive in pursuing its rivalry with France. Although they were rivals with France, we cannot see a considerable British challenge in the region in terms of politics and strategy until the French expedition. In fact, the British had noticed the geographical importance of Egypt for British India, yet the French expedition heightened Egypt's significance.¹³⁸

The decreasing import and export business of Britain in the eighteenth century suggests that the British government's policies stayed active in the Egyptian politics only for the purpose of coping with the French. British's main policy in Egypt was not to let the French occupy a geo-strategically important point in the Ottoman Empire. The only effort in the sense of commerce was Baldwin's, the consul of Britain in Cairo. His disagreement with British embassy in Istanbul, Ainslee, explains the inconclusive situation. In addition, the British foreign policy was orthodox and was far from taking the merchants' views into consideration about Egypt. The only thing that kept the British engaged in the Egypt issue was the French activities in the region.¹³⁹ The British had focused on French attempts to open their India trade via Egypt and the British put all the effort into securing to failure of French initiatives.

The Levant Company played some part in causing the poor performance of British trade in the Levant contributing to lack of individual enterprise, and the cumbersomeness of

¹³⁷ Anis, *Some Aspects*, p. 14

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 135. Anis claims that the British approached Egypt independent from the Ottoman sovereignty, and took the initiative in staging an expedition, before the French. The British planned to use Egypt as a communication and a trade means with British India.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.136

its joint-stock financial organization. The argument of legal regulations' being inhibitive is commonly cited as a further limiting factor on the development of trade as well as financial burdens such as the consulage tax. Even though it was suggested that the French merchants had freedom compared to the English merchants, their burden was not lighter than English merchants. In France, the trade with the Levant was in the monopoly of the chamber of commerce of Marseille. Both consulage tax and the tax that they paid to Leghorn which the French authorities required of French merchants to transfer their goods via Leghorn, in addition to rigid supervision of the products during manufacturing put French merchants under pressure as well.¹⁴⁰

Nevertheless, British merchants had an impact in the Ottoman financial organization by supplying credit for local tax farmers in Syria, the *mültezims*. Türkhan suggests that the Ottoman central government's need for cash affected the provincial economies as well. The *iltizam* system led the local administrators to use the loan system extensively. Especially the British merchants in Aleppo were actively involved in lending money to creditors most of whom were either the producer groups of the Empire or tax farmers. Thus, the British merchants had the chance to permeate the local economy. In order to preserve their interest, they monitored the economic situations of their borrowers, inspecting income and expenses. English capital was in Ottoman financial circulation, and more importantly, the British merchants had the right to become involved in the process of cultivating commercial agricultural products.¹⁴¹

Whilst French rivalry influenced British exports, though more rarely, it also affected British imports as well.¹⁴² An Aleppo factor of the Levant Company mentioned in his letters

¹⁴⁰ Vlami, *Trading with the Ottomans*, p. 90

¹⁴¹ M. Sait Türkhan, *18. Yüzyılda Doğu Akdeniz'de Ticaret ve Haleb*, unpublished PhD thesis, 2014, p. 288

¹⁴² English merchants mostly imported raw material for textiles such as raw silk, mohair, cotton, dyestuff, medicinal drugs and perfumes, and groceries.

that the scale of French merchants' buying up the raw material in cash left no raw material available in the market.¹⁴³

In 1754 the Levant Company withdrew their consul in Egypt on the plea that the political unrest of the province made trading hazardous. The risk of trading in Egypt increased the establishment's expenses. Thus, trading in Egypt was no longer profitable for the Company, because of 'uncertain success' and 'certain great and growing annual charge attending it'.¹⁴⁴ Until the end of the century, the Company did not appoint a consul in Egypt. However, the merchants related to the company continued doing business in Egypt.

Until İbrahim Kethüda died in 1754, Egypt had experienced rather a long period of political stability under his duumvirate with Ridvan Kethüda. After his death, the rivalry amongst the mamluk beys revived. The coincidence of the consul's withdrawal from Cairo with the death of İbrahim Kethüda is significant. Nonetheless, the aforementioned factors of the decrease of the English trade during the century in the Levant explain the situation in a more comprehensible way. Towards the end of the century, however, Egypt became important due to India factor, which gave it an international significance.

The East India Company, independent from the Parliament and the Levant Company, became invested in the Persian market for raw silk and this resulted in a decline in the revenues of the Levant Company.¹⁴⁵ The presence of the East India Company in this market affected the Levant Company in three ways: 1. They violated the Levant Company's legal rights, 2. The raw silk prices would decrease since the East India Company would damage the land trade from India to Persia, and 3. The East India Company would introduce the Indian goods more cheaply to the Ottoman market. Moreover, it was the East India Company that

¹⁴³ Russell, *The Later History*, p.102

¹⁴⁴ Anis, *Some Aspects*, p. 16

¹⁴⁵ Although the Levant Company officially did not take the responsibility of the merchants who traded in Egypt, it charged the tax from them. The east India company invested money as early as 1769 see for detail; Gharaybeh, *English Traders in Syria*. p. 130

attempted to open Suez port to the European trade. However, the Levant Company was not pleased with the presence of the East India Company in its territory even though they themselves were not in a position to gain any profit from it.¹⁴⁶

Whilst the rivalry continued between the two companies, the East India Company managed to negotiate with the mamluk beys about the right to trade in Suez but not with the Porte.¹⁴⁷ Yet, in a short time they realized that it was useless due to mamluk beys' untrustworthiness and they decided to end it, as the British parliament did not approve it in order not to endanger the trade in other Ottoman ports. In the meantime, George Baldwin, the former consul of the Levant Company, was trading in the Red Sea with the cooperation of the East India Company. They were exchanging goods of Germany, Italy and France for Indian goods illicitly. Russell claims that the Porte could not cope with this trading activity and thereby found the solution in sending the bedouins against the caravan of Baldwin and other merchants. Some merchants were killed; Baldwin escaped to India and then returned to England as a bankrupted man.¹⁴⁸

This incident came out in the Porte's correspondence with the governor of Egypt. Mentioning the repeatedly stressed ban of the European ships in the Suez, it emphasized that the presence of European ships in Suez imposed a number of "administrative and religious" inconveniences. In order to prevent European ships from entering the port of Suez, the Porte used religious means to propagandize that Suez was the entrance hall of the Holy cities – '*Haremeyn-i muteremeynin dehlizi mesabesinde*'.¹⁴⁹

The Porte reproached the governor Raif Ismail Pasha with being negligent and lazy by condoning the fact that the mamluk beys Ibrahim and Murad had entered into agreements

¹⁴⁶ Vlami, *Trading with the Ottomans*, p. 88

¹⁴⁷ Ali Bey al-Kabir and Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb signed an agreement with the English merchants. Andre Raymond, *Artisans et Commerçants*, p. 153

¹⁴⁸ Russell, *The Later History*, p. 119; Crecelius, "Damiette and Syrian-Egyptian Trade", p. 169

¹⁴⁹ C. DH, 260/ 12969 [late Z 1193/early January 1779]

with Europeans that allowed them in Suez, and reminded him that his connivance required punishment. Unlike Russell's narration, the correspondence adds some imprisoned European merchants and seamen were released by İbrahim and Murad Beys with their merchandise, despite the fact that the Porte had ordered them to send the prisoners and commodities to Istanbul in order to hand them over to the English ambassador. Also, the Porte notified the governor about the intelligence of newcomer European ships approaching Suez and strictly warned him that he would be held responsible if they were allowed in Suez port.¹⁵⁰

As for Baldwin, he used his connections and after a couple of years in Britain he returned to Egypt as a consul of the Crown. In the beginning, the Levant Company protested by claiming that the East India Company did not have the right to trade in the Levant, yet, they realized that Aleppo was entering in the sphere of influence of the East India Company as well, and that the conditions were changing. That is to say that the existence of the East India Company was not only commercial but political as well. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the relationship of the two companies became cordial.

The British consul in Egypt, George Baldwin, dedicated a considerable effort in order to persuade the British ambassador in Istanbul and statesmen in London about the importance of the Red Sea trade route. The personal conflict between Baldwin and the ambassador prevented Baldwin's efforts from gaining results. For this reason, Baldwin did not hesitate to contact other European nations in order to realize his aspiration. He contacted his French and Austrian counterparts in secret. Austria, which was willing to become involved in the Red Sea trade compromised with George Baldwin, although he was British consul of Cairo. Baldwin offered Austria a more ambitious promise, by means of a possible war, to eliminate the Ottoman ships in the Red Sea, and also advised the Austrians to

¹⁵⁰ C. DH, 260/ 12969 [late Z 1193/early January 1779]

encourage the local administrators in Egypt and Yemen to be independent; as the food supplies of these two provinces were crucial for the imperial capital.¹⁵¹

On the other hand, Russia entered the Mediterranean sphere only after 1711 when they established their embassy in Istanbul, yet it was a rapid entry. Nevertheless, if we put the Mediterranean aside, Russia was always in contact with Orthodox Christian population in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵² From the sixteenth century until 1728, Russian travellers went into Ottoman provinces and communicated with Orthodox Christians. In fact, these travellers' journeys were diplomatic. They financially aided Orthodox churches and told them about the achievements of Russian tsars.¹⁵³ In the eighteenth century Russia used this connection in order to support small uprisings in the Ottoman Empire. Russia supported the uprising of Ali Bey al-Kabir, as it supported other minorities' revolutions such as those of the Greeks.

For instance, Tsarina Catherine sent agents in order to communicate with Ali Bey al-Kabir during his uprising and promised him support.¹⁵⁴ After Russia set the Ottoman navy on fire in Çeşme, the Russian fleet arrived in the southern Mediterranean. By that time, Ali Bey had sought refuge with Zahir al-Omar in Sidon. Ramadan mentions that Ali Bey met two captains from the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean during this period and sent a letter to tsarina with his messenger, Zülfikar Bey alongside presents to tsarina, and gave a promise to allow Russian trade in the upper Red Sea when he regained his former position in Egypt.¹⁵⁵ Yet, Ali Bey al-Kabir was impetuous and could not wait for the promised support. So, he was

¹⁵¹ Crecelius, "A Late Eighteenth Century Austrian Attempt", p. 270

¹⁵² W. Miller claims that Britain warned the Porte about Russia might attempt to provoke Orthodox Christian minorities for uprising. W. Miller, "Europe and the Ottoman Power before the Nineteenth Century", *The English Historical Review*, vol. 16, No. 63, (Jul., 1901), pp. 452-471.

¹⁵³ Panchenko, "Russian sources on the history of Ottoman Egypt", p. 6. The author claims that the close relations in this sense between Alexandria - Sinai monastery and Russia weakened in the eighteenth century.

¹⁵⁴ Crecelius, "Russia's relations with the Mamluk Beys", p. 60.

¹⁵⁵ M. R. Ramadan, *Ali Bek al-Kabir*, (Cairo, 1950), p. 224; The British traveller James Bruce claims that Russians had the opportunity to separate Syria and Egypt from the Ottoman Empire; however, Russian commanders in the Mediterranean did not know what extent their army and government was successful during the war, so they could not attempt to go further with the local administrators in Syria and Egypt. James Bruce, *Travels to discover the Source of The Nile*, In the years 1768, 1769, 1770, 1771, 1772, and 1773, 5 vols., (London, 1790), p. 29

unable to secure any concrete support from Russia and got wounded in the battlefield, which resulted in his death soon afterwards.

Close relations between Russia and mamluk beys came forward in a later period, during the rule of Ibrahim Bey (1786-1798) as well. Ramadan mentions that Russian messengers encouraged Ibrahim and Murad to separate their administration from the Ottoman Empire and have full support of Russia.¹⁵⁶ Crecelius asserts that Russia used the relatives of the mamluk beys to further its interests.¹⁵⁷ A Georgian man who claimed to be a relative of Ibrahim Bey had an influence on him; he even fled to Upper Egypt with Ibrahim Bey. Agents such as him had a strong effect on the mamluk beys. They might have promised mamluk beys support should they gain their full autonomy.

Although agents had an influence on the mamluk beys in terms of thought, it seems that mamluk beys could not get a solid external assistance from them. Hasan Pasha's expedition suggests that a concrete support and service of Russia did not materialise during that period. Ibrahim and Murad Beys' request from the Pasha to cancel the expedition in return for paying the former unpaid levies suggests that if Ibrahim and Murad Bey were willing to get their independence, and get foreign support, they would not have preferred to compromise. Keeping all of the incomes and revenues of the province instead of sharing with central government was a strong motivation for the mamluk beys to rise up and claim independence. Yet, their willingness to compromise suggests that Murad and Ibrahim Beys did not get significant foreign support.

¹⁵⁶ Ramadan, *Ali Bek al-Kabir*, p. 234

¹⁵⁷ Daniel Crecelius and Gotcha Djaparidze, "Relations of the Georgian Mamluks of Egypt with Their Homeland in the Last Decades of the Eighteenth Century", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. 45, No. 3 (2002), pp. 320-341. The Authors claim that mamluk beys retained their native language, received frequent visits from the family members and sent them gifts and money, even to build structures, and they were aware of the politics in the Caucasus region.

Chapter Conclusion

We can conclude that during the second half of the eighteenth century, Egypt was a major player in the domestic trade of the Ottoman Empire; however, the agents and consuls of the European countries had already started to devote their efforts in order to locate Egypt in an international position and take bigger portions of the pie. Yet, it would take another fifty years for them to get involved in this trade. The profit that domestic trade provided Egypt's local elite was satisfactory, however, European agents did their best to get mamluk beys' cooperation for higher profits.

I contend that the interests of the foreign consuls in Egypt had an impact on the local administrators by encouraging them to act independently from the imperial government. When examining the relationship between the mamluk beys particularly Ali Bey al-Kabir and his predecessors (*i.e.* Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb and Ibrahim Bey) and the representatives of the European nations that were trading in Egypt, we can see some evidences about the influence of financial motives and international trade on politics.

The behaviour and attitude of the European merchants in their negotiations with the Porte and with the mamluk beys may give us some idea of the foreign components' approach and their perception about the positioning of mamluk beys and the Porte within the existing political milieu. First, it is clear that the other European states did not support the uprising of Ali Bey against the central government as directly and openly as Russia. The main reason might be that Russia was in a war with the Ottoman Empire and trying to increase the perimeters of its interest in the Mediterranean and the Middle East to their maximum. To secure more interests, Russia made contact with Ali Bey and promised to support him in the case of a rebellion. Having had the support of a foreign country, Ali Bey and his allies must

have felt more confident in attempting to canalize their endeavours of usurping more authority and power from the Porte.

Another important point arising from the above discussion is that Austria also contacted Ali Bey and his mamluk consultants and customs officers in order to open the Red Sea trade route. It is claimed that Austria was willing to encourage the mamluk beys to claim their independence from the Porte. It had welcomed another rebellious mamluk, Çerkez Mehmed Bey, in the 1730s after all, and supported him until Mehmed Bey caused a political crisis between Austria and the Porte. However, we lack sufficient evidence whether Austrian factors stepped into concrete action in this sense and helped Ali Bey or not.

On the other hand, I contend that the British and French competition had an encouraging influence on the acts of mamluk beys and their ambition of authority extension in the province as well. During the mid-eighteenth century the mamluk beys had seized the revenues of the ports on the Mediterranean and the Nile from the governors via the janissary regiments. It is known that the mamluk beys were promoting the presence of the European merchants with the ambition of increasing their revenues. We can say that this was in line with the aim of the European merchants to trade in Suez given that at the beginning of the 1760s, the competition between the British and French nations' emerged from their efforts to have the permission for trading in the Suez and that they compromised with both the mamluk beys in Cairo and the Porte in the capital to do this.

Furthermore although developing a more direct connection with the local administrators in the region, European nations were trying to be cautious as well in order not to displease the Porte and not to endanger their trade in other ports of the empire. However, the unstable mamluk regime prevented the European merchants from depending only on

agreements consolidated with them.¹⁵⁸ Since it was the local elements that enabled them to trade in the Suez, it is highly likely that the Europeans encouraged the mamluk beys to become independent.

Nevertheless, none of the beys claimed that he was the only administrative body in the region. Likewise, none of them demanded that the European nations should withdraw from their commercial treaties, *ahidnames*, with the Porte, or to form new agreements with them. ‘Enlarging the limits of the existing agreements with the Porte’ may be more explanatory for the local administrators’ approach. On the other hand, the mamluk beys’ loyalty to the imperial government in Istanbul provided them protection from the intrusion of Britain, France and Russia in the eighteenth century.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ Crecelius, “Austrian attempt”, p. 264

¹⁵⁹ Hathaway, *The Arab Lands*, p. 112-113

CHAPTER III: *Irsaliye* and Uprising

Introduction

This chapter aims to investigate the relationship between the provincial finance of Egypt, the revenues and expenditures of the state in Egypt, and the local notables' interference with it in the mid-eighteenth century. Although the central government's supervision continued on the incomes and expenditures, the interference of the mamluk beys' in the finances of the province in the second part of the eighteenth century is remarkable. Occupying in the most important provincial administration positions such as treasurer, *emirulhajj* and *seyhülbeled*, the mamluk beys had a command in the financial administration. Since this study focuses on the motivations of mamluk beys for disobeying the regulations of the central government and the reason they challenged state authority, examining the financial institution forms a crucial dimension of this research.

The way leading to maintaining power passes from financial supremacy. The chapter on economic conditions of Egypt demonstrated that a mamluk bey had an enormous income in the late eighteenth century. The archival evidence suggests that mamluk beys tried to keep the maximum number of the tax farm in their hands and they made a lot of effort to canalize certain revenue sources to their households. These revenue sources included Cairo Mint and certain financial sources that were assigned for the governor and *kadı* of Egypt. On the other hand, it is evident that the mamluk beys endeavoured to gain more financial income at the expense of violating the system of *malikane* like their *ayan* counterparts in other provinces, and failing to send the annual tribute, *irsaliye*, in time and in full. The mamluk beys tried to keep the tax farms in their hands via inheritance and to canalize high amounts of cash from the *irsaliye* to their household. While the mamluk beys tried to seize the income sources, the

effort by the central government to keep the financial order in the province is noticeable. The extent of the mamluk beys' command on the financial situation, and central government's effort to keep the sources under its command will be the focus of this chapter.

The two main income sources of Egypt depended on agriculture and commerce. The first one depended on Egypt's fertile lands. The Sublime Porte generated a large amount of revenue through the taxation of rural areas. The second one was the commercial activity, which Egypt's geographically distinct location afforded it. Not only goods produced in Egypt such as sugar, rice, and leather, but also imported commodities such as spices, coffee, and textiles used to pass through Egypt and created tax revenue for the Sublime Porte. The tax, which was taken through the customs houses, was the second important item for tax revenue. These two features of the province were behind the Empire's wealth and provided an enormous income both for the province itself and for the imperial Ottoman treasury. From the Ottoman conquest onwards, miscellaneous revenues derived from those income sources that had flowed to Cairo until 1517 had to change their way towards the imperial capital, Istanbul. Even though all the revenue was not transferred to the imperial treasury, the Sublime Porte used to keep the records of the accounts until the nineteenth century. This shows us that the Porte tracked Egypt's financial records meticulously in the eighteenth century and made the local administrators stay in line, at least up to a point. This situation contradicts the hypothesis of autonomous Mamluk administration in Egypt and confirms the close relationship between the imperial government and mamluk beys.¹

In this chapter, the financial revenue sources and expenditures of the province of Egypt will be examined. Archival evidence will help us to locate mamluk beys' position in

¹ For a discussion of the historiography on the Egypt's positioning in the Ottoman Empire see above Introduction. Baldwin contends that Egypt maintained a close relationship with the central government in the eighteenth century and considers law and legal practice as the central element in the relationship between the central government and province James Baldwin, *Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo*, (Edinburgh University Press, 2017), p. 1.

the financial administration of Egypt. The income of a member of the local elite in Egypt, whether he was a merchant or a mamluk bey, was huge.² On the top of it, the mamluks of the second half of the eighteenth century did not contend themselves with their revenue and tried to channel other revenue sources to their households. Namely, there was a connection between the state finance and political opposition and violation of the rules. However, it is noteworthy that the central government followed up the financial records and sent numerous decrees ordering the governor, *şeyhülbeled*, and other administrators to keep the financial order as it was. Making new regulations and setting new standards, the central government made an effort to keep its revenue safe from the mamluk beys in Egypt. Thoroughly explaining the revenue and expenditure items, this chapter will highlight whether or not there was a relationship between “uprisings” and the revenue share of the province. The distribution of the provincial revenue between the local administrators and central government will suggest new theories about the relationship between financial conditions and uprisings. The amounts of the incomes and the expenditures in Egypt, the sum sent to Istanbul as annual tribute and the regularity of tax revenues sent to the central government will highlight the financial relations between Egypt and the Porte. This chapter will also discuss whether or not we can detect any reason for the discontent of the mamluk beys against the central government during the tax collection process or whether the reason for the discontent was because of the financial interests of the mamluk beys. I contend that the increased ambition of the mamluk beys’ towards acquiring financial sources to their household induced them to violate the financial and administrative system of the province that had been established since the Ottoman conquest.

² Nelly Hanna, *Making big Money in 1600 The Life and Times of Isma'il Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian Merchant*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998); Andre Raymond, “The Wealth of the Egyptian Emirs at the end of the seventeenth century”, in Winter M., Levanoni A., ed., *Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society* (Leiden: Brill, 2004) p. 361.

The Annual Tribute: *Irsaliye-i hazine* and Rebellion

The administrative team of Egypt were expected to deliver a sum of annual balance, an annual tribute, to the central government, which was referred to as *irsaliye-i hazine* in the archival documentation. After the conquest by the Ottomans, Hayır Bey, the former governor of the Mamluk Sultanate in Aleppo and new governor of the Ottoman Empire in Egypt, used to send gifts and cash (a portion of the tax revenues) to the sultan every year. While Mahmud claims that *irsaliye* was not a regular and organized type of levy that was sent to the Porte until the governorship of Hadım Süleyman Pasha (931-941/1525-1535), Shaw implies that the exact amount of the *irsaliye* was already determined during the reign of Selim I as 28.3725.815 *paras*.³ However, according to the records in Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi, Seyyid Mahmud elucidates that the first organized annual levy, amounting to 299,591 golden coins, was sent to the Porte on 18 Rebiülevvel 933/ 23 December 1526.⁴ During the long term of his governorship, Hadım Süleyman Pasha (931-941/1525-1535) succeeded in applying Pargalı İbrahim Pasha's reform. Rather than depending solely on the land and financial records inherited from the Mamluk sultanate, Süleyman Pasha's officers measured the cultivable lands. *Miri*, *evkaf* and other lands were registered in different *defters*, according to which Egypt's financial situation was arranged.⁵

In the sixteenth century, Egyptian administrators were never expected to send more than they were able to.⁶ However, during and after the era of change and transformation of the institutions of the empire, the Porte needed *irsaliye-i hazine* more than ever, especially during wartime. Another interesting point that highlights the importance of *irsaliye-i hazine* for the Porte is shown in the reasons for dismissal from office. In the beginning, a governor was

³ Shaw, *Ottoman Egypt*, p. 55

⁴ Seyyid Muhammed es-Seyyid Mahmud, *XVI. Asırda Mısır Eyaleti*, (Marmara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1990), p. 61-62

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 93. Thus, the administrators did not need to suppress the Egyptian people in order to collect the annual tax, and a peaceful administration was realized in this period.

mainly dismissed based on his administrative failures. However, after a while, they came to be fired due to a failure to send the expected amount of the *irsaliye-i hazine*.⁷ According to the central government, the success of a governor was directly proportional to the sum of the *irsaliye-i hazine* that he sent to Istanbul.⁸ During the sixteenth century the amount sent to Istanbul was between 16.000.000 *paras* (400.000 gold coins) and 20.000.000 *paras* (500.000 gold coins). The *irsaliye* was spent on the expenses of the *divan* and palace in Istanbul and sometimes used for *cülus-ı hümayun bahşisi* when a new sultan acceded to the throne.⁹ Afterwards, as the financial needs of the central government increased, the amount of the *irsaliye* was increased to 24.000.000 *paras* (600.000 gold coins) and then 28.000.000 *paras* (700.000 gold coins).¹⁰ Nevertheless, in the eighteenth century as the political and administrative problems increased, the amount of the *irsaliye* that was sent to Istanbul decreased and failed to be delivered in time.¹¹

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, with wars and the loss of taxable agricultural lands in Europe, the Ottoman government concentrated on maintaining the rest of the Empire, especially the biggest province, Egypt. Thus, *irsaliye-i hazine* gained added importance. It was very important for the Porte that when it arrived to Istanbul, the officers in treasury were given *ihsan akçesi*, a bonus payment.¹² Equally to its importance for the central government, *irsaliye* was an important source for mamluk beys as well. In the eighteenth century, it is evident that they channelled large amounts of money to their households from the *irsaliye-i hazine* by pressurizing the governors or extracting money without permission from the central government.

⁷ Seyyid Mahmud, *Mısır Eyaleti*, p. 124

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 115

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 119 Seyyid Mahmud states that Husrev Pasha, who was in office between the years of 941-943/1534-1536, sent 40.000.000 *paras* (1.000.000 gold coins) to Istanbul in 942/1535 as *irsaliye-i hazine*. The sultan did not accept this and ordered not to send more than 20.000.000 *paras* (500.000 gold coins).

¹⁰ Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, p.285

¹¹ Seyyid Mahmud, *Mısır Eyaleti*, p. 120

¹² TSMA, D. 2352 – 473 (1120/1708)

Irsaliye-i hazine was an annual tax, the amount of which was determined by the treasurer of Egypt, and it had been always important for the Porte. In the sixteenth century, it can be suggested that the *irsaliye-i hazine* supported the main treasury in Istanbul and the Porte was anxious to go into debt. At the end of the seventeenth century, during the power shift between the military and mamluks, the central government regarded some mamluk beys who had directly and sometimes secretly contacted with them as loyal helpers and supporters in securing the *irsaliye-i hazine*.¹³ The relationship of the people in Egypt and the central government depended on a net of mutual responsibilities and expectations. These responsibilities and expectations can be considered as connections that were tying the central government to the Egyptian people and local elite as such. For example, the central government was expected to provide maintenance of irrigation dams so that the agricultural production in Egypt could be sustained. On the other side, the Egyptian people were responsible to pay their tax, and the governor and the *şeyhülbeled* were expected to pay the annual tribute to the central government. In the eighteenth century, the issue of sending annual tribute was an important agenda topic in the correspondence between the central government and the provincial administration of Egypt. The decrees that were sent in the second half of the eighteenth century provide us a number of illustrations on the extent of mamluk beys intervention into the share of the central government.

In order to determine the motives behind the uprisings of the mamluk beys, the *irsaliye hazinesi* should be scrutinized. Receiving the *irsaliye-i hazine* in time and in good order was a priority for the central government in Istanbul and a mandatory objective for administrators of Egypt: the governor and the *şeyhülbeled*. There was a mutual need between the central government and the mamluk beys in Egypt. Although the Porte used mamluk beys

¹³ Bashir Zein al-Abdin, *The Political System of Ottoman Egypt, 1099-1143/1687-1730*, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of London SOAS, 1999, p. 83

to secure the obligations in Egypt and Hicaz, mamluk beys only accepted this in order to fulfil their income sources. At the end of the century, however, neither of the two groups would continue to realize the objectives of the Porte: whether or not the mamluk beys and governors were in conflict, or whether there existed a single full strength tyrant.¹⁴

The *Irsaliye-i hazine* was delayed several times due to political issues, such as the 1711 crisis¹⁵, or Ali Bey al-Kabir's authority between 1760 and 1772 during the eighteenth century.¹⁶ The *irsaliyes* during the years of 1178/1764-65 and 1179/1765-66 were not sent, although the obligation due for the year of 1180/1766-67 was approaching. Upon this, the Porte sent a decree that in early M 1181/June 1767 in order to demand the *irsaliyes* and warn the officers.¹⁷ The years of 1765-66 are important, as Hamza Pasha was the governor then; the conflict between Ali Bey and his counterparts rose, and Ali Bey was exiled with Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb. The Porte accused governors of being ignorant and careless, and mamluk beys of being shiftless, rude, rough and stubborn. According to the Porte, although they had been given an undertaking, mamluk beys and governors were responsible and guilty, and they would be punished if they would not send it immediately. A decree addressed to the Egyptian governor, *kadı* and *şeyhülbeled* Ebu'z-zeheb Mehmed Bey, instructed him to send the *irsaliye* in the same manner as before the uprising; by tracing through the documents in the archive it can be observed that Ebu'z-zeheb sent the *irsaliye-i hazine* of the years in which uprising had occurred.¹⁸

Until 1742/1155, the Porte expected 31,719,055 *paras* as the annual levy in the beginning of the eighteenth century. The fixed and mostly extra expenditures reduced the

¹⁴ Shaw, *The financial and administrative Organization*, p. 8

¹⁵ Zein al- Abidin, *The Political System*, p. 93

¹⁶ C. DH 12264 (date 29 ZA 1187/11 February 1774) “ ... ve şaki-i mezburun tuğyanı sebebi ile bir kaç seneden beri tehir olan irsaliye hazinesinin tedarik ve tesyiri ... kullarımın sa'y ve gayretleriyle meram-ı hümayunum üzere nizam ve tetmimlerine ...”

¹⁷ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 492 (date early M 1181/30 May-9 June 1767)

¹⁸ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16903 and C. MTZ 7/329 (29 Zilhicce 1186/23 March 1773)

amount. In the first half of the century, in general, the Porte was paid two third of the *irsaliye* and the rest was spent for the miscellaneous expenditures. Between the 1740s and 1760s the *irsaliye* was increased to 35,381,948 *paras*. By 1766, it was decreased to 25,182,427 *paras*. Ali Bey failed to send the *irsaliye* after 1766. After defeating Ali Bey, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb sent 126.992.801 *paras* (5079 *kese* 17801 *para*) for the *irsaliyes* of the years between 1766-1774.¹⁹ Ebu'z-zeheb's payment is remarkable as it shows us the amount that a member of the Egyptian elite could afford to pay to the central government.

There were two routes that the officers had to follow while taking the *hazine* to Istanbul; either by ships through port of Alexandria or overland through Damascus to Istanbul.²⁰ The *irsaliye-i hazine* was generally sent overland, as it was considered safer compared to sea.²¹ An officer among the *çavuşes* and *müteferriqas* of the *dergah-ı mualla* was appointed to transport the *irsaliye-i hazine*; however, it was not always an appointed officer who transported the *irsaliye*. When the term of office of a governor came to an end, he used to take the *irsaliye* to Istanbul with him. Sometimes a *sancak beyi*, sometimes a *defterdar*, or an *azeb ağası* was appointed as the “*hazine serdari*”, the head officer that was responsible from the *hazine* transport. The *hazine serdari* was tasked to keep the soldiers in the guard of *hazine* in order, and to ensure that a guard protected the *hazine* from “*urbans*”, *i.e.*, Arab Bedouins, and bandits.

When the *irsaliye* reached Damascus, a ceremony was arranged in its honour.²²

When the *hazine serdari* transported the *hazine* to Istanbul safely, he was promoted.²³ The

¹⁹ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A

²⁰ The overland route was passing through these halting places: Adliye, el-Hankah, Ba Lubeys, Karin (Kureyn?), es-Salihiyye, Beyru Duveydar, Kutub (Kastab), Beyru'l-Iyd, Ummu'l-Hasen, Ariş, ez-Za'ka, ed-Deyr, Gazze, Mecdel, er-Remle, Re'su'l-ayn, el-Akum, Lucevven, Aynu'n-neccar, el-Birketu'l-muntene, Cese Yakub, el-Kunaytira, Sa'sa'a, el-Dimask. (TSMA D. 10477).

²¹ Seyyid Mahmud, *Mısır Eyaleti*, p. 122.

²² Dana Sajdi, “In Other Worlds? Mapping Out the Spatial Imaginaries of 18th-Century Chroniclers from the Ottoman Levant”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal Ottoman Studies*, XLIV (2014) pp. 357-392, p. 363. Ibn kannan stated when *irsaliye* arrived. Al-Hallaq stated additionally when it delayed. p. 365.

²³ Seyyid Mahmud, *Mısır Eyaleti*, p. 122. The promotion was between 30.000 – 50.000 *akce*.

annual levy, (*irsaliye-i hazine*) was delivered to Istanbul by a crowded group of seven regiment soldiers. For example, 369 soldiers escorted the *irsaliye*, which consisted of 10,645,327 *paras* in the year 1172/1758.²⁴ The soldiers were promoted as well.²⁵ The *irsaliye-i hazine* was prepared in the Egyptian *divan* by the officers of treasury. *Sarrafs* would measure the *paras* and the *defterdar* would seal the boxes they put the *paras* in. In the presence of the members of the *divan*, the *kethüda* would deliver the *irsaliye* to *hazine serdari*. The governors and *sancak beys* who were in office on the route of *hazine* were sent decrees, ordering that the needs of the soldiers and officers carrying the *irsaliye-i hazine* were met.²⁶ Once the *irsaliye* was delivered to the imperial treasury, *defters* and monies were inspected. If it was without defect, the governor of Egypt was sent a *hilat*. If it was incomplete, an inspection was instigated.²⁷ Unlike centralized Ottoman rule, from the end of the sixteenth century, the malpractice of *emins* and *mübaşirs* made it difficult for the state's money in their debit to be collected; as a result deficiencies in the *irsaliye-i hazine* became apparent. The Porte found a solution for this issue by advising governors not to give *mukataas* and *iltizams* to those who were poor and did not have a guarantor.²⁸

Before proceeding to examine the financial and administrative order in Ottoman Egypt, it is necessary to refer to the Coptic calendar, which was used in agriculture and thus taxation. In calculating the financial and agricultural issues, the Ottoman administration continued to use the Coptic solar calendar in Egypt after the conquest.²⁹ *Tut* is the first month of this calendar, which coincided with the flooding of the Nile at the end of September. The

²⁴ The number of the soldiers from each *ojaq* may be a clue about their dominance: 122 *müstahfizan* (janissaries), 50 *müteferrikagan*, 60 *çavuşan*, 51 *azeban*, 33 *gönüllüyan*, 30 *tüfenkçıyan*, 23 *çerakise*. (Kamil Keçeci *defter series*: KK.d 4789; D.BŞM.MSR.d 16896, D.BŞM.MSR.d 16892)

²⁵ *Müteferriqas* and *çavuşs* were given one *para*, and the others were given one *akçe*. Seyyid Mahmud, *Mısır Eyaleti*, p. 123.

²⁶ Seyyid Mahmud, *Mısır Eyaleti*, p. 123

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 124

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 117

²⁹ Özen Tok, "Osmanlılarda Kıpti Takviminin İdari ve Mali Alanda Kullanımı", *Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* vol. 21 year: 2006/2 (pp. 365-379) p. 370.

flooding of the Nile in September was a key point at the agricultural production and thus financial administration of Egypt, as it was this flooding that resulted with the major annual harvest. The central government was monitoring the flooding because it was essential for producing the grain that fed the Haremeyn, paid the tax revenue alongside the annual tribute. The production therefore taxing was connected to the flooding of the Nile in Egypt.³⁰

The Ottoman administration referred to Coptic solar calendar as *sene-i tutiyye*, and the accounts and calculations were made accordingly. Likewise the calculation of incomes and expenditures of the province, collection and delivery of the *irsaliye-i hazine*³¹ were also conducted according to the Coptic calendar. In the beginning of every Coptic year the governor, *vali*, the *ruznameci*, clerk in charge of financial transactions, the *muhasebeci*, chief accountant, and the *mukataaci*, tax farmer, reviewed the accounts and reported the expenditure and income to the central government. The tax collections and expenditures were formulated based on this calendar.

On the other hand, the *hijri* calendar was used in *cizye* and Haremeyn proceedings, such as *surre*, due to religious issues. Also, the remaining balance of previous years' uncollected tax was then collected in the new *tut* year's incomes. Due to the difference of calendar usage in accounts, in order to prevent confusion between expenditures and income, the Porte asked the Egyptian governors to send every 33 years this redundancy of the eleven-day period of each year, which is called *hilaliyye*, or *tefavut-i sene-i hilaliyye* as another *irsaliye* of Egypt.³² According to Shaw, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries six extraordinary *irsaliye-i hazine* arrived at *ceyb-i humayun* in 1038/1628-29, 1071/1660-61,

³⁰ Alan Mikhail, *Nature and Empire in the Ottoman Egypt: An environmental history*, (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.10

³¹ *Irsaliye-i hazine* was a type of levy that was sent annually to the Porte from Cairo after spending the provincial expenditures from the tax income of the province of Egypt.

³² MMD, vol. 8, nr. 8 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761)

1104/1692-93, 1137/1734-35, 1170/1756-57, and 1203/1788-89.³³ The issue of this extraordinary *irsaliye* was called *tedahiil*, which means in Ottoman Turkish delay of payment, and the extraordinary *irsaliye* was referred as '*sene-i mutedahile*'.³⁴

Although the annual levy, *irsaliye-i hazine* was a type of tax, numerous expenses of Egypt and *Haremeyn* were disbursed from this levy. In the earlier stages of the Ottoman rule in Egypt, those expenses were met by the provincial treasury. However, later, since mamluk beys' canalized the Egyptian treasury for their households in the eighteenth century, the public expenses were met by the *irsaliye-i hazine*.³⁵ The repair and maintenance of numerous bridges, water channels, mosques, public buildings and market places in Cairo and Upper Egypt, and the maintenance of the dams near the Mediterranean were provided by the levy. It was spent not only on the expenses of the province itself, but also on the demand and necessities of *Haremeyn*, and the soldiers in Jidda port, who were in guard of the Holy cities Mecca and Medina. In addition, a certain amount was provided for the pilgrims' security, and to arrange a greeting ceremony to welcome them. Besides, some supplies of the imperial kitchen such as sugar and rice, and the oakum supply of the imperial shipyard were sustained by Egypt's annual levy. The equipment of the three thousand Egyptian soldiers who joined the wars between the Empire and Russia or Iran was also covered by the levy. The ammunition for Jidda and some other castles near Egypt were also paid out of this levy. Benefactions for some scholars in Haremeyn, the holy cities Mecca and Medina, food supplies, especially crops, repair and renovation of the markets and common buildings like mosques or the Holy Kabe were compensated by Egypt as well.³⁶ Wicker, beeswax, oil, and

³³ Stanford J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt*, (Princeton, 1962), p. 309

³⁴ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 8 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761)

³⁵ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16879, D. 5432 - 001

³⁶ TSMA.d 2230 (Z 1164/November 1751).

other needs of Haremeyn were sent to the Hijaz on a yearly basis.³⁷ In addition, there were a few *kalyate* ships in Suez that were used for the transportation of grain to Haremeyn. The wages for the staff worked for the ships, and other expenses were also met by the levy.³⁸ The Porte agreed to meet the repair and maintenance expenses of public buildings, which served for the good of the civilians in Egypt and the Hijaz. On the other hand, occasionally, the *aghas* of regiments or viceroys spent for the repair expenditures of their residences and palaces from the *irsaliye*. However, the Porte hardly ever permitted them to use the money from the *irsaliye-i hazine*, as it considered that it was their duty to repair their own residences.³⁹

Excessive expenditure

All these expenses show that the mamluk administrators used the *irsaliye-i hazine*, rather than Egypt's provincial treasury, for the expenses of Egypt and the Holy cities. On the other hand, in the decentralized period, this indicates that the Ottoman central government considered important the maintenance of facilities in Egypt and its vicinities, as well as Haremeyn. Nevertheless, the Porte required a *mahzar*, petition, from the governor or local administrators requesting permission before spending money on these issues. The Sublime Porte had rejected the use of *irsaliye-i hazine* without a direct order or permission issued from them. For any expenses that were planned to be compensated by *irsaliye-i hazine*, the local authorities had to apply to the central government. Every year's levy was to be sent with a detailed account register; every *guruş* that was spent and all surplus revenues that were to be sent to Istanbul were recorded in that account register. Numerous decrees, which were sent from Istanbul, state that the Egyptian administrators could not spend anything from *irsaliye*

³⁷ For example MMD, vol. 8, nr. 62 (date mid Ş 1175/early March 1762).

³⁸ D. 2378 – 002, D 6136 - 001

³⁹ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 228 (date early M 1178/early July 1764) and nr. 477 (date late L 1180/late March 1767)

without permission. In one of these decrees, the central government asked local authorities not to use even one penny from *irsaliye-i hazine*.⁴⁰ The phrase "even one penny" demonstrates the importance of the issue. Nonetheless, the Porte could not prevent the spending of *irsaliye-i hazine* without permission.

Nonetheless, numerous protests about "excessive expenses" spent from the '*irsaliye-i hazine*' were delivered to Egyptian administrators by the central government.⁴¹ It is stated in a decree that all responsible officers should be careful, not to waste the '*hazine*'; according to the decree, the 'greed of tyrants', and 'laziness and over-leniency of the governors' were the primary factors that led to the increase of expenses and the decrease of incomes.⁴² It is claimed in the decree that all the over-leniency caused chaos in the good order of the Empire. According to a later decree, a former regulation had been re-introduced in 1695 and it was required that all expenses should be spent according to this regulation.⁴³ In some cases, reactive precautions were undertaken through the carefulness of *katips*, clerks, in Istanbul. Mainly, these *katips* checked whether all expenses were authorized by the central government by checking the records one by one. For example, a decree that was sent to the *defterdar* and *ruznameci* of Egypt is a good example of their operation. In this decree that was issued on early N 1175/2 late March 1762,⁴⁴ firstly, the central government informed Egyptian authorities about the deficit of six different items which were spent in 1173/1760 without permission. Since the expenses were incurred without permission, the Egyptian officers were asked for re-payment of the full amount, which was 1,366,510 *paras*, as well as the expenses made in 1172/1761 for the full amount of 13 items, which cost 1,459,050 *paras*. The use of

⁴⁰ MMD, vol. 8, nrs. 116 and 121 (date late C 1176/early January 1763)

⁴¹ For example see MMD, vol. 8, nrs. 153, 154, 156, and 157 (date early S 1177/mid August 1763)

⁴² MMD, vol. 8, nr. 171 (date mid C 1177/mid December 1763)

⁴³ A. DVN. MSR 5/34 (early M 1180/ early June 1766)

⁴⁴ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 64 (date early N 1175/late March 1762)

word “immediately” in the decree demonstrates that the Porte was strict in this issue of asking Egyptian officers to fulfil the obligations as soon as possible.

The *katips* of the central government were not only cautious about the articles on which the money was spent, they also examined and adjusted the budget to account for those articles. In a decree that was issued on 7 January 1763, which was sent to the governor, *kadı*, *umera*, *defterdar* and *ruznameci*, the receivers had been informed about the over-budgeting of one of the expense items, which was the restoration of *kisve-i şerife*, the cover of Holy Kabe.⁴⁵ The Porte issued permission for the Egyptian authorities to use 100,000 *paras* from the *irsaliye-i hazine* for one certain restoration. However, there were three restoration projects for the building, which cost 522,535 *para*; Egyptian authorities had not asked for permission to the Porte to use the money from *irsaliye-i hazine* for the other two projects. Thus the Porte asked for the repayment of the price difference, which was 422,535 *paras*; the Porte asked for a reimbursement of the money spent without permission. In another decree, which was sent in June 1745, the previous governor Yahya Pasha was ordered to pay for the expenditure that he had deducted from the *irsaliye*, which was not ordinarily counted as an expense item.⁴⁶ Furthermore, in 1160/1747, the amount that had been spent on the repair of the palace of the janissary agha, which was paid from *irsaliye*, was reimbursed by the *ağa*.⁴⁷

As mentioned above, there are numerous decrees that highlight these problems. Their main common point is that expenses from *irsaliye-i hazine* were allowed only with the permission of the Porte; if unauthorized expenditure occurred immediate re-payment was requested. The decrees are significant as they demonstrate the strict attitude of the Porte and the cautiousness of the *katips* who worked in Istanbul. A decree sent in 1762 was relatively

⁴⁵ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 116 (date late C 1176/early January 1763)

⁴⁶ AE. SMHD. I. 183/14244 (CA 1158/ June 1745)

⁴⁷ D. 2413 - 0056

more detailed than others.⁴⁸ In that decree, the Porte accused Egyptian authorities of being fraudulent and of embezzling money from the *irsaliye-i hazine*. As understood from the decree, Egyptian authorities deducted money from *irsaliye-i hazine* for one article of restoration but for two consecutive years. Egyptian authorities were accused of fraud as the Egyptian authorities received money three times for one repair. As highlighted in previous decrees, the Porte asked for them to fulfil the amount and re-pay. Also, it is mentioned that the Porte warned the Egyptian authorities about trying to cheat and deduct money from the *irsaliye* by inscribing the expenditures in the next year's *irsaliye-i hazine* records. A *hucet-i şeriyye*, a legal document, which shows the mamluk beys would act along the lines drawn by the Porte, is mentioned for emphasizing that they had guaranteed the Porte according to the Porte's rules.⁴⁹ The decree mentions that no matter how the Egyptian administrators tried to cheat, they would not succeed as the records were carefully scrutinized. In this decree, there is another issue about the records and a deficit. In 1175/1762, there was an enormous over-spending without proving much detail on the logistics of the grain in-kind sent from the religious foundations in Egypt to the Hijaz.⁵⁰ Examining the earlier records, the Porte claimed that a recent raise was already made for the Arabs work on logistics and requested that the deficit money to be taken from the responsible people and sent to the Porte.⁵¹ Likewise, there are numerous decrees that try to minimize the deficits of *irsaliye-i hazine* and ask for the over-expenditure. Such cases that the *katips* of the central government detected and sent to Egypt shows us that although the local mamluk administration deducted money unlawfully, the Porte was monitoring all the revenues and expenditures in Egypt.

⁴⁸ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 67 (date early N 1175/ late March 1762)

⁴⁹ Another referral to the *hucet-i şeriyye* was made in a decree condemning the mamluk beys for the dismissal of Hamza Pasha. See chapter I on rebellion, p. 68 and MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date mid Z 1180/mid May 1767)

⁵⁰ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 72 and 73 (date mid N 1175/ early April 1762)

⁵¹ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 65 (date early N 1175/late March 1762)

The *irsaliye* of the year of 1155/1742 was especially problematic. Another amount of 2,000,000 *paras* was spent on some repairs in and outside of Egypt, and on other expenditures, but without permission from the Porte. The Porte demanded the amount from the responsible two governors; Yahya Pasha and Yedekçi Mehmed Pasha.⁵² The Porte was meticulous when it came to *irsaliye* and was never tolerant towards governors or local administrators. The previous year, there was another correspondence about the expenditure from the *irsaliye* of the year of 1154/1741 without permission of the Porte. The Porte demanded an investigation from the governor, in order to detect whether the previous governor legitimated the expenditure, or mamluk beys spent it without a *buyruldu*, a permission paper, from the governor.⁵³

In such cases, if further investigation was required, an officer, a *mübaşir*, was sent to Cairo in order to inspect. For this case, former *sipah ağası* Mustafa was sent to Cairo. According to his investigation in the *divan* of Egypt, he was informed that Yahya Pasha (1154-55/1741-42) and Yedekçi Mehmed Pasha (1156/1743) gave permissions for those expenditures, and he was shown the registers in *defters* as proof. As a result, the two governors were sentenced to pay 1,538,290 *paras*, and mamluk beys were sentenced to pay 532,818 *paras*.⁵⁴ Another decree complaining about expenditures without permission illustrates the situation. The excess cost for transport of the *gilal* (grain contributions) of 248,934 *paras* was registered and collected in the *irsaliye* of the *hijri* year of 1173. In addition, another excess amounting to 530,903 *paras* was added in the *irsaliye* of 1174 as transport cost for the *gilal* of 1173. In total, 779,837 *paras* were spent on transport in both cash and in-kind of *gilal*. Although, it is emphasized in the decree that the administrators in

⁵² MMD, vol. 6, nr. 179 (date late L 1157/early December 1744)

⁵³ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 105 (date mid L 1156/early December 1743)

⁵⁴ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 240 and 241 (date late CA 1158/ late June 1745)

Egypt could not unilaterally deduct the transport fee for *gilal* paid in cash,⁵⁵ Egyptian authorities continued to claim the transport fee in the years that followed the issuing of the decree. However, they were warned again about not counting up previous years' expenditures in the following years' *irsaliyes*; Egyptian administrators did not give up doing this either.

In another example, a logistics expenditure incurred in 1174/1760-61 was counted up in the *irsaliyes* of 1176 and 1177/1763-4. This logistic expenditure referred to the grain, which was annually sent from Egyptian grain foundations to the Holy cities Mecca and Medina. The grain, which was from these foundations, was traditionally sent to Holy cities either in-kind or in cash. The officers charged the price of the transport of the grain of 1174/1760-61, which was carried first by animals and then by ships, from the *irsaliye* of the years of 1176-77/1763-4. The *irsaliye* of 1176/1763 was debited 3,444,738 *paras* for transport expenditure while in 1177/1764 a sum of 2,480,000 *paras* was charged from the *irsaliye* of that year as transport costs. An interesting and somewhat amusing side note to this case highlighting the suspect actions of the administrators was that they counted and charged the grain in-cash as if it was in-kind and charged it as "transport expenditure" as well. In the decree, it was demanded from the governor to gather all the officers including the *şeyhülbeled*, the *defterdar*, other mamluk beys, the seven corps' officers, the *ruznameci*, and other responsible officers of the *irsaliye*, and declare that not more than twelve and a half *para* would be paid for the price of transport of each *irdeb*⁵⁶ of the grain in kind and there would be no payment for the grain in cash. If it had been paid, those responsible would be found and payment would be collected from them.⁵⁷

It is possible to find numerous complaints and repayment requests cases in the *Mısır mühimme defter* series in the Prime Minister's archives. These decrees show us that the

⁵⁵ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 117 (late C 1176/early January 1763)

⁵⁶ The *irdeb* (*irdabb*) measure was the equivalent of roughly 70 kg.

⁵⁷ MMD, vol. 8, nrs. 149, 150, 151 (date early S 1177/mid August 1763), and h.404 (date early M 1180/early June 1766)

central government could detect the irregularities and unlawful deductions and demanded the local administrators to obey the regulations. The Porte continued to send decrees and to put the *irsaliye* issues in good order as it had been in the past and to prevent its decrease by means of unauthorized external expenditures. Ignoring the orders sent from the Porte, the administrators of Egypt continued to do whatever they considered best for their own interests. While the Porte was struggling in order to secure the revenues at their previous level, the mamluk beys' and governors' endeavours to make their portion bigger from the incomes of Egypt, in fact they had to reimburse the central government sooner or later, during the last half of the eighteenth century. Despite in tug of war and persistent struggle for the achievement of 'good order' in the finances of Egypt, it has to be said that overall the government's aims were, sooner or later, mostly realized in the mid-eighteenth century.

It is claimed in the decrees that when the Porte asked for the repayment of the expenditures debited without permission, the administrators of Egypt tried to find ways in order to avoid these repayments. The Porte demanded from Egyptian administrators for repayment of expenditures amounting to 1,361,443 *paras*, which had been deducted without permission and charged against the *irsaliyes* of the years 1173-1174/ 1759-60-61. The Egyptian officers claimed in their response that 461,443 *paras* of that amount had been spent with the permission of deceased previous governor Mustafa Pasha and they could not repay it. The Porte considered this response and their claim as an attempt to cover up their fault by using the deceased governor. However, the Porte found the solution in demanding that amount from *kethüda* of the aforementioned governor, and was still persistent in demanding the rest of the amount, 904,885 *paras*, from the officers, namely, the mamluk beys.

Similar cases, for example the *irsaliye* of the year 1175/1761-62, show that the Porte demanded restitution of 1,143,835 *paras*, which had been spent on seven-items of

expenditure. In addition, more than 1,275,000 *paras* was not sent, which was recorded as “illegal” by the previous governor Ebubekir Rasim Pasha (1175/1761-62). When the officers in Egypt pursued the 1,275,000 *paras* in order to collect it from those responsible, they revealed that Bulutkapan Ali Bey had in his possession 800,000 *paras* of that amount. Ali Bey promised to send that amount with the *irsaliye* of the year of 1176/1762-63, and it is documented that he kept his promise. However, the Egyptian officers did not send the total amount due of 2,534,430.

In Z 1133/September 1721, the governor Receb Pasha made an extraordinary deduction from the *hulvan*. Receb Pasha requested deduction of 183.500 *paras* from the *hulvan*; he claimed that he used the money in order to defeat rebels. Yet, his request was met with a repulse due to the fact that since the conquest of Egypt, previous governors had never requested a payment for such a reason.⁵⁸ The Porte warned the Egyptian authorities, as they deserved punishment; leaving aside a reference to payment of this amount, they continued to deduct expenditures from the *irsaliye* without permission. Meanwhile, the officers were asked to demonstrate a commitment in order to find those responsible for contravening the sultan’s orders and compel them to repay the expenditures.⁵⁹ Despite its persistent sending of decrees to the Egyptian authorities, including the governor and *şeyhülbeled*, asking them to ensure the regularity and the fixed amount of the *irsaliye*, it cannot be said that the Porte achieved very much success. The mamluk beys made the best of their authority and power in order to channel the financial sources to their households. They tested their limits. On the contrary, it is difficult to suggest that these decrees successfully fulfilled the object of enabling the Porte to get the annual income from Egypt regularly and in higher amounts as the central government requested.

⁵⁸ MMD, vol. 3, nr. 240 (date mid ZA 1133/mid September 1721)

⁵⁹ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 406 (date early M 1180/ early June 1766)

By eliminating his rivals from the very day he was appointed as a *şeyhülbeled* in 1760, Ali Bey centralized the power and authority in his hand. During the Ottoman-Russo war he rose up against the Ottoman Empire. His attempts at independence by not sending the annual levy, *irsaliye-i hazine*, to the Porte, his interference in Syria's and Hijaz's politics, and the betrayal of his closest mamluk and son-in-law, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb by his collaboration with the central government forced him to flee to Sayda. In the meantime, Ali Bey al-kabir cooperated with the governor of Sayda, Zahir al-Omar, and the Russians against the Ottoman Empire. Although Ali Bey achieved his goal by conquering Damascus, his closest man Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb changed his side and fought back with Ali Bey. One week after Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb caught and imprisoned Ali Bey, he died. Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb became the *şeyhülbeled* and established the previous order in Egypt until the latter died in 1775. After he died, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb's mamluk Murad Bey returned from the Upper Egypt and took over the authority in Cairo, and his comrade Ibrahim Bey became the *şeyhülbeled*.

Ali Bey's disobedience was followed by Ebu'z-zeheb Mehmed Bey's loyalty and short period of his ascendancy. During this period of time, an order that the central government approved was fulfilled in Egypt. Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb sent the *irsaliye-i hazine* that had not been delivered during the ascendancy of Ali Bey to the Porte. After Ebu'z-zeheb, Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey rose to power. Non-payment of the *irsaliye-i hazine* prompted a punitive expedition led against Ibrahim and Murad Bey's authority by Gazi Hasan Pasha in 1786. Gazi Hasan Pasha's expedition enabled a temporary stability in terms of the commitment of Egyptian local administrators. Nevertheless, after a short period, the mamluk beys who ran away to Upper Egypt during the expedition seized the authority. Day by day,

local authorities became stronger and continued struggling to gain a bigger portion from the wealth of Egypt.

The political and financial situation of Egypt was not unique. *Ayans*, local administrators, dominated on politics in other provinces of the empire, as well. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, it can be suggested that far away from the imperial centre, Egypt remained in the hands of ambitious mamluk beys struggling for financial power and authority. This fight may have worsened the financial situation of the Egyptian people. Yet, it is hard to discover to what extent the financial situation of the ordinary people was affected by the struggles between the local notables. Despite all these fights occurring as street combats among the mamluk beys, daily life still continued as normal. This fact can be deduced from the detailed records of the *irsaliye-i hazine* of the years between 1180-1188/ 1766-1774. It is stated in these records that restorations of some mosques, dams near the Mediterranean, and bridges continued even during the politically unstable years of Ali Bey's "uprising".⁶⁰ In 1185/1771, the expenditure of thirteen different restorations was cut off from that year's *irsaliye*. Besides the daily life of the locals being unaffected by the uprisings, according to these records, some official duties of Egyptian administrators were realized regularly. For example, the grain was sent to Haremeyn, and the castle Ajrud, which was an important hosting stage for the pilgrims during the holy journey, was repaired; even soldiers from Egypt who fought in the Ottoman-Russo war and their *terakkis* were compensated from the *irsaliye*.⁶¹ However, it is obvious that financial problems developed during these years. Especially after 1780, the crisis was felt deeply. First, *para* currency lost its value, after a couple of years famine and plague struck Egypt, and destroyed the economic situation of the people. English-French competition for Egypt, and Russian hostility due to the Ottoman

⁶⁰ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A (date Z 1179/mid May 1766)

⁶¹ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A (date Z 1179/mid May 1766)

Russo wars might have played a role in the political instability of Egypt towards the end of the eighteenth century.

Nevertheless, the correspondence between the central government and the governor of Egypt suggests that the Porte made an effort in order to maintain its authority and continue to take the benefits from Egypt while at the same time meeting the needs of Egypt and the Hijaz. The failure to send the *irsaliye* was unacceptable by the central government. It was an unchanging regulation and was expected to be fulfilled by the provincial administrators of Egypt. At the beginning of the year of 1180/June 1766, the Porte sent a decree demanding implementation of the customary regulations for the governance of Egypt in their proper form. The clerks at the Porte had taken the *defters* from the archives and examined the regulations. It was mentioned in this decree that the primary duty of officers in Egypt was to send *irsaliye-i hazine* fully without wasting even one coin, and on time. At the same time they were charged with sending full in amount and ordered to refrain from spending it recklessly. The central government mentioned in these decrees that it previously sent numerous orders to Egypt in order to secure stability and did not hesitate to call the local administrators “tyrants”.⁶²

The central government attempted to apply new regulations or insisted on keeping the previous order in the financial administration of Egypt. In order to put the *irsaliye* in order, the *defters* dating from seventy years earlier for the year 1107/1695 were examined, and revenues and expenditures identified in detail. According to those records: *salyane*, *mevacib*, *ceraye* and *alík* were given from *mahlulat* (the properties that were transferred to the treasury because of a lack of heir), not from *irsaliye*. Even if this was approved with an explicit order, it would not be registered in *defters*. Even when the duty of a governor terminated, all the

⁶² MMD, vol. 8, nr. 410 (date early M 1180/early June 1766)

officers that worked on *irsaliye* should check the records meticulously. *Kaimmakams* should not give *mahlulat* to people and include it in the treasury accounts. The informers should notify *mahlulats* to the governor directly. The crops and revenues of winter should be collected in the winter and not be delayed till summer.

The decree that reminded the regulations to the local administrators of Egypt was addressing directly to the governor and encouraged him by saying: “*You, the vezir, have endeavour and loyalty in your heart and as a requirement of this, you should work with your heart and soul in order to put to an end all these deteriorations in Egypt. You and all the officers, who are responsible for the irsaliye, should inspect previous defters, and arrange and clean up expenses and revenues according to their example. Unless you organize these accounts according to the previous order, nobody is permitted to take any salyane, mevacib, ceraya and alik. Even if you decide to give, do not register them in the irsaliye defters.*”⁶³ Moreover, an examination of the *ruznames* (daily account records) was demanded alongside identification of subsequent expenditure items; and the officers were charged with finding out the reasons behind the expenditure items, how they emerged, and why they were not met according to the old system with other revenues? Unapproved expenditures were to be revoked afterwards, and in case of a need, they were to be met from *mahlulat* or *irad-ı cedit* revenues as previously.

Another issue was about idle villages and *mukataas*. This decree forbade officers to reflect falls in revenue deriving from idle villages in the *irsaliye* levy. They were instructed to compensate such revenue decreases from *mahlulats*. The governors were asked not to give any *buyruldus*, which were in compatible with this order. If they did so, their decisions (*buyruldus*) would bind themselves (*şeyhülbeled* or *defterdar*) to compensate the treasury at the end of their term of office.⁶⁴ It is strongly emphasized in the decree that there had been

⁶³ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 410 (date early M 1180/early June 1766)

⁶⁴ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 410 (date early M 1180/early June 1766)

connivance and lack of compliance for 30-40 years, and it had become incumbent on them to put the financial affairs of Egypt in their previous order by recording all the revenues and the expenditures and complying with the decrees/demands. In this way, the plan of the Porte was to keep the *irsaliye* in good order and maintain its amount and regularity by sticking to the old system. The governors and mamluk beys were to obey the rules and keep the old system, or face punishment.⁶⁵ The Porte identified some reasons about *irsaliyes*' delay and decrease in amount, and demanded from the governors to fix them: The Porte accused governors of being ignorant and carefree, thereby causing the *irsaliye* to be delayed, and incomplete.⁶⁶ The causes of delays and decreases were identified and a considerable effort was shown to eliminate barriers preventing full and on time *irsaliye* payments. One of the reasons for the delay of the *irsaliye* was that the *mukataat*, both cash and grain, were not collected in time during the year. Normally in order to avoid delays, the newly appointed governors had agreed to pay for their predecessors' debts. However, frequently, governors refused to pay predecessors' debt in accordance with their promises. The governors kept it in their debit. During the dismissal of a governor and the appointment of a new one, the accounts got mixed up making it impossible for the *irsaliye* to be collected in full and on time.⁶⁷ For this reason, the central government demanded the governors not to carry over the debts of their predecessors.

The second problem that the central government identified was about promissory notes that the provincial administrators sent to Istanbul. *Irsaliye* used to be sent in cash and/or in promissory notes. These notes, which were taken from Egyptian merchants, who had commercial partners in Istanbul, were mostly included with *irsaliyes*. Evaluating the relationship between the imperial capital and Egypt, the promissory notes demonstrate that

⁶⁵ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 410 (date early M 1180/early June 1766)

⁶⁶ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 465 (date late N 1180/ mid February 1767)

⁶⁷ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 465 and 514 (date late C 1181/mid November 1767)

interactive commercial, economic and cultural relationship continued actively in the eighteenth century. Egyptian merchants had strong commercial ties with the imperial capital as well. This proves that during the period of Ottoman sovereignty the province of Egypt, rather than being an occupied and colonized place was an integrated part of a greater Empire, which supported it, and lived on it. The officers in Istanbul collected money from Egyptian merchants' counterparts in Istanbul. However, sometimes, problems occurred during the collection of the money from Egyptian merchants' partners in Istanbul. The Porte determined that the Egyptian administration chose unknown and bankrupt merchants, instead of credible, well-known and wealthy ones. When the officers went to collect money, on occasion some merchants did not acknowledge their partnership with their counterparts in Egypt or claimed that they were not informed about certain issues, thus, did not pay the promissory notes.⁶⁸ This became a problem from time to time; the officers in Istanbul had to send back some of the notes to Egypt in order to secure their collection in Egypt. Yet, the officers in Egypt ignored or they were still unable to collect and thus the *irsaliye* incurred losses. The *irsaliye* was considered different and special from other revenues of the central government and it was claimed that because of ignorance of the governors, the revenues were wasted for years. The government insisted that the Egyptian administrators send *irsaliyes* in cash. If they had to send it as promissory notes, they were expected to choose merchants among the wealthy and credible. Besides, the maximum amount of a promissory note provided by a single merchant should be no more than 1000-2000 *paras* instead of accepting credit promises in big amounts such as 8, 000 -10,000.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 107 (early ZA 1156/mid December 1743)

⁶⁹ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 464 (date late N 1180/ mid February 1767) and 513 (date late C 1181/mid November 1767)

The *emirulhadj* and *irsaliye*

In the mid-eighteenth century the Egyptian authorities took 3,750,000 *paras* without permission in the years of 1169/1755-56, 1170/1756-57, 1172/1758-59 and 1173/1759-60 for the *emirulhadj*'s expenses.⁷⁰ Although the central government did not accept the charge and demanded a repayment, it had to make this addition formal and legal. So, the Porte had increased the salary of the *emirulhajjs* of Egypt by adding the customs of coffee in the port of Suez and another addition amounting to 3,750,000 *paras* from *irsaliye-i hazine* during the reign of the governor Kamil Ahmed Pasha, in the eve of Ali Bey's rise to the post of *şeyhülbeled*.⁷¹ After this arrangement was agreed to, it was strictly forbidden to take any extra money offset against the *irsaliye*. Our next case will show the mamluk beys' noncompliance and their unamenable behaviour, when it came to money matters. The mamluk beys managed to get whatever they wanted by deterring and placing pressure on the governors. A short time after Hamza Pasha arrived in Cairo and took on the governorship, the *emirulhadj* Hasan Bey came in front of him and said that he would not leave for the pilgrimage, unless he was given 2,500,000 *paras* as a support from the *irsaliye*. Moreover, he insisted on taking money from members of the military corps, with the condition that they were to be paid out of the *irsaliye* later, if the Porte refused to give him that money. Due to Hasan Bey's insistence, the new governor Hamza Pasha had to give a *buyruldu* sanctioning the commitment of the mamluk beys for payments from the corps (*ocaklu*) to be offset against the *irsaliye* payment for the year 1180/1766-67. Obviously, the Porte found this unacceptable, as *emirulhadj*'s revenue was considered adequate without such external support. It was commanded that the *buyruldu*, which was taken from Hamza Pasha by force and with a high hand, was invalid and 2,500,000 *paras* was to be charged to those who had secured the money in the beginning, *i.e.*, the

⁷⁰ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 58 (date late B 1175/mid February 1762)

⁷¹ MMD, vol. 8, nrs. 57-58 (date late B 1175/mid February 1762)

ocaklu, not from the *irsaliye*.⁷² These cases demonstrate that the central government chose to negotiate with the mamluk beys in order to keep its control on the provincial revenues rather than taking more strict measures and excluding the mamluk beys from the boundaries of imperial control. Toledano refers this point as ‘employing various tactics to ensure a certain measure of control over revenues’ and claims that the redefinition of imperial boundaries was misinterpreted as Ottoman decline.⁷³

The Triangle of Interests: *Irsaliye-i hazine*, *Mamluk Beys* and *Governors*

The land taxation that the Ottoman Empire applied in the eighteenth century did not produce a yield in the long run because of the fact that the central government could not regain the control of the revenue sources after *iltizam* holders’ death.⁷⁴ One can see that *mültezims*’ heirs were a big problem in this case. The *mühimme defter* series provide numerous examples about the conflict between the heirs and the administrators, as mamluk beys disagreed to give up the *iltizam* and insisted on they were the heir of deceased mamluk beys. It can be suggested that the revenues of Egypt, which were canalized to *irsaliye-i hazine*, was a stage of conflict and struggle between the Porte, mamluk beys and governors. We can reach some cases through the correspondences between the Porte and Egyptian authorities, which give us a cross section about the topic.

The case of Çavuşlar Kethüdası Çerağı Hasan Bey and issues relating to his estate: One of the *mamluk* beys, *çavuşlar kethüdası çerağı* (assistant of *çavuşlar kethüdası*) Hasan Bey was killed by one of his enemies (presumably Ali Bey al-Kabir) in Kasr Ayn in 1180/1767. The information about Hasan Bey and his huge estate was delivered by Tatar

⁷² MMD, vol. 8, nr. 497 (early S 1181/late June 1767)

⁷³ Ehud R. Toledano, “The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research”, in Moshe Ma’oz and Ilan Pappé eds., *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History From Within*, (London, 1997), p. 157

⁷⁴ Şevket Pamuk, “The evolution of financial institutions in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1914”, *Financial History Review*, 11.1 (2004) pp. 7-32, p. 17

Ahmed, who was on duty in Egypt for some governmental obligations.⁷⁵ At the time of his death, Hasan Bey had accumulated tremendous wealth. Apart from cash money and other properties, he owned annual revenue, which was worth more than 2,000,000 *paras*. It was known that he was extremely wealthy and his nickname was a proof of this: *Ebu'z-zeheb*-father of gold. The source of his wealth was the villages, which had been *mahlulat*, and were supposed to belong to the *bayt al-mal*, *i.e.*, the state treasury. The conflicts and struggle of gaining the superiority among mamluk beys had been leading them to embezzle *mahlulats* and the Porte was aware of it. In this case, we see that the Porte tried to reclaim the *mahlulats*, even if it was a little bit after the fact.

In the decree, which was sent to the governor and other officers in Egypt, it was mentioned that according to the latest arrangements,⁷⁶ the *hulvan* that belonged to those who were murdered or were runaways derived from *musalehe*. That means even if other people bought the villages, which had belonged to Hasan Bey, the auction held was invalid by that time. The villages that were already supposed to belong to state's treasury were now to be claimed back. The Porte appointed a "reliable" *mübaşir*, an officer that carried out all the work, in order to identify all the villages and properties that Hasan Bey had owned by using registers, *ruzname defters* in the castle of Cairo. After detecting the people who took over Hasan Bey's villages and properties, the *mübaşir* was supposed to reclaim them on behalf of the state, and sell them in auction and transfer the proceeds to the Porte.⁷⁷ A short time after Hasan Bey was murdered, it was revealed that mamluk beys also forced Mehmed Bey and another Hasan Bey to flee to Jidda, and *çavuşlar kethüdası* Süleyman Bey, the boss of

⁷⁵ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 466 (date early L 1180/early March 1767)

⁷⁶ The last arrangement about *musalehe* was realized in N 1149/Ocak 1737. (a reference made about it is in MMD, vol. 8, nr. 483 (date early Z 1180/late April 1767, which demands Egypt governors and other administrators to apply the issues of *musalehe* according to that decree.)

⁷⁷ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 466 (date early L 1180/early March 1767)

murdered Hasan Bey, to Dimyat.⁷⁸ The runaway mamluk beys owned a huge amount of *gilal* (grain), which was to be sent to the Haremeyn, and a number of state properties, as well. *Şeyhülbeled* Halil Bey, who was one of the mamluks of İbrahim Kethüda, previous *emirulhadj* Hüseyin Bey and Cüce Hasan Bey proposed to pay 9,900,000 *paras* to the governor Hamza Pasha in exchange for the *gilal* and state properties, and 2,500,000 *paras* for the *hulvan* villages of those who had been murdered and run away. Hamza Pasha had to give them a *buyruldu*, which confirmed the transfer, although it was contrary to the law. The Porte found this transfer unacceptable, as they paid less than the real-market value for all these properties. It was mentioned that let alone the others' properties and *hulvans*, the *hulvan* of murdered Hasan Bey was worth 2,000,000 *paras*.

On the other hand, it was suggested that the 'murdered' Hasan Bey was the assistant of the 'runaway' Süleyman, so both had embezzled the state's property and Süleyman must have had much more money and property than Hasan Bey. In addition, Mehmed Bey and other Hasan Bey were well known with their wealth and the multitude of their villages. The revenue of each of these mamluk beys from villages was estimated at approximately between 2,500,000-3,000,000 *paras*. The Porte was well aware that *şeyhülbeled* Halil Bey and other mamluk beys attempted to cheat and buy all these properties at prices well below their true market value. The *mübaşir* demanded identification of these four mamluk beys' property, cash, *gilal* (the crop that was sent to Haremeyn) and other state property (*mal-ı miri*), and arrangement of an auction to sell them for *değer baha*⁷⁹ (the exact market price of the properties and villages), and then bring back the cash to Istanbul.⁸⁰

According to surviving correspondences, it appears that the previous governor Hamza Pasha was dismissed and a decree was sent to the newly appointed governor Rakım el-

⁷⁸ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 476 (mid L 1180/late March 1767)

⁷⁹ This request proves that previously the villages and properties were sold cheaply in these auctions.

⁸⁰ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 476 (date mid L 1180/late March 1767)

Hac Mehmed Pasha.⁸¹ During the governors' duty change, this case was ignored and the *mübaşir* did not work on it. Yet, the new governor reported that the previous governor had secured the villages and other properties for the *şeyhülbeled* Halil Bey and other mamluk beys in return for 38 items of *kaime*, accounts. In addition to that, previously, the villages of Ali Bey were kept in return for 10 *kaimes*. In total, the value of 48 *kaimes* was 7,500,000 *paras* annually and the Porte claimed them for the treasury.⁸² However, there is no indication as to whether or not they were sent.

Another example in the archives highlights the struggle for benefits between mamluk beys, governors and the Porte: the case of Canım/Hayati Yusuf Bey. Yusuf Bey was one of the strongest figures among mamluk beys in Cairo, and was in charge of financial issues including collection of *irsaliye-i hazine*. This case is a good example of the misconduct of mamluk beys and governors, and their connivance in sharing the revenues and ignoring the central government's demands and requirements.

The Case of Gönüllüyan çorbacı Canım Yusuf Bey: A member of the corps of the *gönüllüyan*, *çorbacı* Canım Yusuf Bey, who was reputed to be domineering and brutal in his treatment of Egyptians, was operating the provincial finances and dealing with state fiscal matters and properties. As a result of the combination of his ambition and lack of work ethics, being in charge of the financial office and being stronger than the other beys, he was able to collect a huge amount of personal wealth. He illegally took money and property from both the provincial treasury and the *irsaliye*. In addition to that, he extorted huge amounts of money and permitted others to do so as well. He was responsible for the decay of orderliness in the sending of the *irsaliye*.

⁸¹ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 483 (date mid Z 1180/late May 1767)

⁸² MMD, vol. 8, nr. 496 (date early S 1181/late June 1767)

After his death, correspondence was sent which stated that all his properties, villages and money belonged to the Porte in return for his extortion, as he was responsible for the problems relating to the *irsaliye's* failure, such as delays and decreases in the amount dispatched. The decree demanded from the *mübaşir*, the officer who was sent from Istanbul to handle these issues in Cairo, to identify the properties and cash Yusuf had owned, and make a list of all the property in order to sell them and send the money to the Porte. The *mübaşir* was warned about the aforementioned illegal *musalehe* as well⁸³. Besides the *mübaşir*, the governor and other officers were ordered to ignore this kind of *musalehe* as it was not valid any more and accordingly they were instructed to do what was demanded of them.⁸⁴ Yet, when the decree arrived in Cairo and was read by those who were in charge, they said that customarily the estate of a mamluk who died a natural death was given to the governor. For this reason, Yusuf bey's *hulvan* was given to Kethüda Mehmed Pasha, the governor at the time. At that time, Mehmed Pasha had been appointed as the governor of Sayda and was preparing to head to Sayda, his new duty position. When the *mübaşir* informed him about the situation, Mehmed Bey not only hesitated to repay the *hulvan* money immediately but also misinformed the *mübaşir* about the amount of the money he gained from *hulvan*. Although he had 1,500,000 *paras* from this *hulvan*, he claimed that he had 625,000 *paras* and he was ready to pay whenever he got a decree, which was addressed to him by name to pay the amount. Another decree was sent to the governor mentioning that since Yusuf Bey did not earn his inheritance and it was obvious that he had gained all his wealth via the position he was in charge of through extortion, all his property including the *hulvan* that the governor took, belonged to the Porte and it should be sent to them in its entirety.⁸⁵

⁸³ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 171 (date mid C 1177/late December 1763).

⁸⁴ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 231 (date early S 1178/early August 1764), nr. 248 (date mid R 1178/mid October 1764), nr. 270 (date early CA 1178/late October 1764), and nr. 278 (date late CA 1178/mid November 1764).

⁸⁵ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 318 (date mid N 1178/mid March 1765).

The Porte also sent decrees to Sayda where the Mehmed Pasha was the new governor. Mehmed Pasha was rebuked; he was accused of being an ally with those who perpetrated misconduct in Egypt and of sending away the *mübaşir* without giving him the money. In addition, in the correspondence it was claimed that he misinformed the Porte about the amount and allowed his *kethüda* to take 250,000 *paras* from that *hulvan*.⁸⁶ Mehmed Pasha was ordered to pay the amount immediately and warned that he would be punished if he acted otherwise. It is not clear whether Mehmed Pasha repaid that *hulvan* money or found an excuse and refused to pay. Yet, it is obvious that this was not his only confrontation with the Porte about fiscal issues.

The Case of Ali Bey and Kethüda Mehmed Pasha: In another case, a petition by Ali Bey el-Kabir (with the title of previous *emirulhajj*) was sent to the Porte claiming that Kethüda Mehmed Pasha unlawfully took a large amount of money from the *irsaliye-i hazine* in addition to the travel expenses assigned to him, at the time he was appointed as the governor of Sayda. It was claimed that in addition to 3,400,000 *paras*, which was the travel expense assigned for him; he borrowed 9,201,815 from the *irsaliye* of the year 1176/1762-63, and 9,453,662 *paras* from the *irsaliye* of the year 1177/1763-64. In total, Mehmed Pasha was accused of taking 18,655,477 *paras* from the *irsaliye-i hazine* in return for two pieces of ‘*deyn-i divan temessük*’. *Irsaliye-i hazine* was ready to be sent to the Porte and Mehmed Pasha’s taking money caused delay. After this petition, the Porte sent a decree to the Egyptian governor Hamza Pasha, in order not to depend only on Ali Bey’s petition but to ask for an investigation to find out the truth, as well as affirming that nobody could borrow money from the *irsaliye-i hazine*, even the governor himself. A decree requesting information about the issue was also sent to Kethüda Mehmed Pasha himself, as well.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 319 (date mid N 1178/ mid March 1765).

⁸⁷ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 334 (date early Z 1178/early June 1765)

“to Mehmed Pasha, the governor of Sayda,

According to the information we got from Egypt, you borrowed from *irsaliye-i hazine* 18,655,477 *paras*. Although the revenues obtained in Egypt is adequate for a governor, it is strange for you to take all that money. Is it true that you borrowed all that money? If it is, what did you spend it on? Please inform immediately!”⁸⁸

All these cases prove that governors were more concerned about their personal interests than those of the Porte. It is highly likely that Mehmed Pasha did not repay this amount but his response to the Porte is interesting in that it reveals the governors’ point of view and conditions that they had to handle during their duty in Egypt. Mehmed Pasha responded to this decree, when he was the governor of Karaman. He summarized the situation, revenues and expenditures in his report, stating that as a governor in Egypt the revenues did not meet the expenditures and he spent the mentioned money to cover his normally recurring expenditures. Mehmed Pasha’s report is important, as it demonstrates the revenues and expenditures of the governor of Egypt and more importantly the financial conflicts and struggles between the governor and mamluk beys in eighteenth century Egypt. In his petition to the Porte,⁸⁹ Mehmed Pasha, complains of shortage of revenues, and the problems that prevented him from gaining them, stated his revenues as follows: 875,000 *paras* from *küşufiyye* of governor of Egypt, which he could not obtain. Spice customs from the port of Suez. (Mehmed Pasha claimed that he had given more than 1,375,000 *paras* to the soldiers in Jidda when he went and came back to Jidda as subsequent tax). *Hulvan* revenues in Egypt (he claimed that Egyptian *mamluks* took it).

However, the expenditures of a governor of Egypt were larger: The price of the furcaftan for Egyptian statesmen, which cost around 7,500,000 *paras*. A huge amount of

⁸⁸ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 335 (date early Z 1178/early June 1765)

⁸⁹ In fact, a decree sent to governor of the time, Kamil Ahmed Pasha in mid Ş 1174/mid March 1761 touches the issue about the mamluk beys’ extortion of governors’ revenue sources for detail see MMD, vol. 7, nr. 756 (date mid Ş 1174/mid March 1761)

expenditure to support governor's employees and entourage, '*kapi halki*', for their essential requirement, *bahşış*, and *ulufe* for a year. In addition to *terakkiyat*, annual *divan* debt under the name of *mevadd-i meçhule*, which cost 15,150,000 *paras* (The mamluk beys forced the governor to pay this amount by showing *buyrulduş* of previous governors)

Consequently, at the end of the period of two-year duty, the amount of *divan* debt, and *terakkiyat*, *alikat*, *ceraya* given to the employees in the *divan* cost 37,500,000 *paras*, excluding the other expenditures. The revenues from *küşufiyye*, *hulvan* and spice customs did not compensate the expenditure cost of 37,500,000 *paras*, and it became a custom for mamluk beys (*umera and ocaklu*) to gather and force the governor to issue a *temessiik*, a kind of debt invoice, offsetting to *irsaliye-i hazine* and pay the rest of the debt.⁹⁰

Based on Mehmed Pasha's report, the Porte asked for an investigation by current governor Hamza Pasha, in order to ascertain whether Mehmed Pasha had spent the money that he borrowed from the *irsaliye* for provincial expenditures. Hamza Pasha was to carry out his investigation, by scrutinizing *ruznamce defters*, in order to respond to the following questions: 18,655,477 *paras* that Mehmed Pasha peculated derived from which revenues? Identify item by item. During his two-year duty, for which expenditures did Mehmed Pasha borrowed money from *irsaliye*? What was the amount of Mehmed Pasha's *hulvan* and other revenues? Did he spend the money that he borrowed for the issues he claimed?

It is notable that the Porte did not ask for the money from Mehmed Pasha directly although it desperately needed the money from Egypt by that time, but advised the current Egyptian governor to find out whether his predecessor spent the money for Egypt's expenditures or not, and whether what Mehmed Pasha said and what he did were consistent. Shaw claims that governors collected as much tax revenues as possible for both themselves

⁹⁰ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 341 (date early S 1179/late July 1765)

and the sultan by exploiting the conflicts between mamluk beys;⁹¹ however, the documents prove that generally governors considered their interests first.

Taxation of the land in Ottoman Egypt and the Provincial Society

The main question that this chapter aims to determine is the relationship between the state finance and the reasons for the mamluk beys' discontent and uprising. It is important to position the mamluk beys in the financial administration of Egypt in the second half of the eighteenth century. For this reason, brief information about the land taxation will be explained. Land was the main source of wealth in Egypt and provided a large volume of revenue for the Porte; therefore, it was important that the Porte should seek to maximize its agricultural output. The Ottoman policy was to keep cultivators (*fellahs*) on the land, encouraging them to exploit the land, to produce and to pay the tax. The Porte organized and operated a land system in order to fully exploit the land held in the possession of the sovereign and increase the flow of revenue into the imperial treasury. The tax coming from Egypt and Syria formed one of third of the imperial revenue.⁹² Just like the Islamic states before it, the Ottoman Empire used an intermediary through the institution of *mukataa*. The authority in *mukataa* was assigned in different ways: *Timar*, *emanet*, and *iltizam*. Unlike the Mamluk Sultanate, the Ottoman Empire did not use the *ikta* system in Egypt: instead, during the period that Ottoman government rule was centralized, a system of *emanet* trusteeship was employed. After the seventeenth century, with decentralization and the increasing need for cash to finance frequent wars, the *iltizam* system was employed. In his book on Egypt's financial administration, Shaw explains the reason for the Ottoman's adoption of a system different from elsewhere in the Empire and from that used by their predecessors in Egypt as follows: 1) the Ottoman military system had begun to use "new corps of infantry supported by salary alone, to provide a more

⁹¹ Shaw, *The financial and administrative Organization*, p. 39.

⁹² James Jankowski, *Egypt A short history*, (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000), p. 53

united trained obedient and available military force” from Mehmed II’s reign onwards, 2) the need to keep the military forces united, as they were small in number, in case of a probable attack from *mamluks* and Arab bands and 3) the fact that Egypt had a unique place, as it was a granary, to serve as a base for soldiers and supplies in the southern parts of the Empire.⁹³

The introduction of the *timar* system would have alienated the grains and provisions that the Empire needed from Egypt.⁹⁴ Thus, in the sixteenth century, imperial possessions in Egypt were divided up between civilian *emins*, (trustees, imperial officers) who were paid fixed annual salaries. When an *emin* assigned responsibility for a number of adjacent *mukataas*, he was named a *kaşif*, just like in the system of the Mamluk Sultanate. In time, due to the administrative and political necessities, the *iltizam* system was introduced into Egypt.⁹⁵ In the *iltizam* system, the *mültezim* was required to pay the tax as a lump sum in cash. The tenure of usage was indefinite in length. The *mukataa* contracts were usually agreed for specified terms, but the *mültezim* had the right to renew the contract so long as he fulfilled the requirements. Lands or villages were often offered at auction in return for *bedl-i iltizam* or *hulvan*.⁹⁶ All the officers were free to undertake tax-farm contracts through auctions except for the “*dellalbaşı*”, who was the officer that administered the auction in Cairo *divan*, and his assistants; this is due to the fact they held a key position for the awarding of *iltizams*.⁹⁷

Today, we do not have a record of the actual income potential of *mukataas*; instead, we have the record of the value of the contracts sold at auction. Shaw mentions that the conductors of the auctions were not aware of the consequent value of the *mukataa* and were also uninformed about its level of probability.⁹⁸ He states that the buyers, who knew the real value, were raising the prices until it reached the true value in order to create competitive

⁹³ Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, p.29-31.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁹⁵ For detail information about this progress see Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, pp. 32-35.

⁹⁶ Hulvan was a fee paid to the treasury for the right to a tax farm

⁹⁷ Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 34.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

bidding. It is generally accepted that only about one-eighth of the consequent value of given *mukataa* was realized when sold at auction. The decline of the Porte's authority and the increase of the rule of mamluk beys affected the revenues from the vacant *mukataas* and their sale progress and *hulvan* revenues.⁹⁹ These revenues were a manifestation of the increasing authority of the mamluk beys in the finance and administration of Egypt. The imbalance between Ottoman authority and the mamluk hierarchy was highlighted in the financial realm. The more effective sultans were able to reclaim a portion of their dwindling budgets by repossessing and selling the vacant *iltizams*.

The revenue gained from tax farming was the central dynamic of Egyptian politics. In order to protect their own financial basis, competing mamluk beys wanted to ensure the assignment of *mukataas* to other mamluks in their respective households. In order to accomplish a smooth transfer and accumulation of financial authority in their own household, the *mültezims* turned over their right of possession to other mamluks, whom they wanted to succeed them. When a *mültezim* died, the treasury came forward to make arrangements for the transfer of the *iltizam*. Once the new holders showed their deeds, the officers had to withdraw the *mukataa* from sale.¹⁰⁰ If a mamluk *mültezim* died unexpectedly before arrangements for his *mukataa*'s transfer had been formalized, claimants commonly used force to compel the governor to prevent the village being included in a public auction. In return for an under-the-table payment delivered directly to the governor, the mamluk beys used to secure the village for themselves.

In contrast to *hulvan*, this action, transfer of an *iltizam* without public auction, was considered as *musalehe*, and the money paid to the governor was called *bedl-i musalehe*. On average the *bedl-i musalehe* was three times the annual profit of a tax farm, while the *bedl-i*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

hulvan was seven times the annual profit. For this reason, powerful beys used to inherit their masters' or other mamluk beys' *iltizams* through *musalehe*, whether they fulfil the requirements of the Porte or not. The term *hulvan* is mistakenly used for *musalehe* as well. The Porte was trying to limit *mukataa* transfer through *musalehe*. Therefore, a solution was implemented as follows: the *mültezims*, who died by means of execution, flight or war did not have the right to bequeath their *iltizams*, but those who naturally died and made specific requests in their wills were granted the right to bequeath their *iltizam* to those who could meet the requirements demanded of a *mültezim*. Nevertheless, this solution did not work in practice; usually the mamluks were able to secure their masters' *iltizam* by *musalehe*.¹⁰¹ However, the Porte had been able to take possession of some *iltizams*, even if they were sold by *musalehe*.

There are several cases of the Porte intervening and taking the *iltizam* back: one of these cases recorded in the Prime Minister's archives records (BOA) refers to a villager dying without an heir. According to laws, when an officer or a wealthy villager died without an heir, all his property including his cash, belongings, estates, and villages under his *iltizam* would be sold, and the cash alongside a detailed list of the properties sold be sent to the Porte. In 1754 after the death of a wealthy villager named Salih, the Sublime Porte requested that his estate be sent in its entirety to Istanbul. The governor Kethüda (Gürcü) Mehmed Pasha and *kadı*, judge of Egypt, replied to Istanbul with a petition stating that when the first decree arrived in Egypt, the governor, *kadı*, *defterdar*, *umera*, seven regiment officers, freed slaves and employees of the deceased gathered. After they heard the decree, they were asked about the amount of the deceased's estate and were made aware of the imperial order commanding truthfulness. Thereupon, the governor and other officers were told that Salih legally bequeathed his villages and other properties to his freed slaves in the regiments before his

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

death. In addition, his legal heirs, his wife and two cousins, were given a share of his other belongings. Therefore, Salih's estate was already apportioned before his death, and his beneficiaries had previously reported the situation to the officers. Nevertheless, the Porte decided to pursue its case, as it was expected by the central government that mamluk beys would on occasion hide the deceased's property.

After the investigation, it was discovered that Salih's beneficiaries conspired with the officers to illegally share Salih's property. Interestingly, the governor who made the correspondence was involved in the illegal share. Salih's beneficiaries gave to the governor Kethüda Mehmed Pasha 3,750,000 *paras*, to the governor's *kethüda* 750,000 *paras*, to the *şeyhülbeled* Ali Bey (Bulutkapan) 3,000,000 *paras*, to the *mübaşir* 125,000 *paras*, and to the *kadı* 100,000 *paras* as hush money.¹⁰² In the decree, it is indicated the Porte was aware that this case was not unique, and unlawful proportioning of a deceased person's estate was habitual in those from Egypt. Also, it is stated that although they deserved punishment, they would only receive a warning. As a result of the investigation, the Porte was able to reclaim the hush money of 5,000,000 *paras* from the governor and *kethüda*, and continued with the investigation in order to reclaim all of the illegally proportioned money, and *muhallefat*, bequest, of deceased villager Salih.¹⁰³ At the end, the Porte had to accept this *de facto* situation and had to resign themselves to it. Although the law bound mamluk beys theoretically, in practice they usually got what they wanted; sometimes with cooperation but mostly by forcing governors.

In practice, by the end of the eighteenth century, the lands assigned at auction became private property, even though they remained imperial lands in theory. To make what

¹⁰² MMD, vol. 8, nr. 174 (date late C 1177/late December 1763)

¹⁰³ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 147 (date early S 1177/mid August 1763), nr. 246 (date early October 1764) and nr. 268 (mid CA 1178/early November 1764)

existed in legal theory corresponds with what existed in fact, a fourth way was found that *mukataa* could be held. The name of this method of tenure was the *malikane* system. Indeed, *malikane* system was principally the same as the *mukataa* in its basic features. The only difference was the right of passing it to a designated heir, which after arranging the *musahale* with governor became a mere formality. Under the *malikane* system, the right to transfer possession had been given to the *mültezim* with lifetime tenure, who was responsible for managing the land. This system could be considered as *iltizam*, management rights which can be inherited.

These *mukataas* were considered as *malikane* not as *iltizam* after 1179/ 1765-6. In 300 years of Ottoman rule, imperial lands in Egypt were alienated as different successive forms of tenure: *emanet*, *iltizam* and *malikane* (for the half century before Bonaparte's expedition). Shaw claims that all of them reflected the stages of progressively weakened power of the Ottoman Empire in Egypt.¹⁰⁴ At the end of the eighteenth century, in 1797, military men owned 59% of existing tax farms, tribal shaykhs owned 19%, women had 13%, and ulema had 7%.¹⁰⁵ In the eighteenth century, tax farming was considered as private property; it was sold, bought, mortgaged, and inherited. It is suggested that statistics gathered by the French indicate that the central treasury was receiving only one-fifth of the land tax collected from rural areas whilst most of the rest remained in the hands of tax farmers.¹⁰⁶

Not the all types of lands were transferred into *malikane* in Egypt. For example, *hass-ı vüzerâ*, which was given to governors of Egypt as they were ranked as viziers, was out of *malikane*. Revenues of *hass-ı vüzerâ* were separate from the imperial treasury's income; the tax revenues from these villages were directly allocated to governors. Governors had been managing these villages by using *kaşifs*, who were considered as the personal entourage of the

¹⁰⁴ Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 39.

¹⁰⁵ Jankowski, *Egypt*, p. 56.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

governors. The duty of the viziers' *kaşifs* was similar to the duty of the *kaşifs* of the Mamluk Sultanate. There were many *kaşifs* in the sixteenth century, however their numbers were significantly reduced after *iltizam* lands were extended throughout the country. These *hassa* villages were called *küşufiyye* and their revenues were called as *mal-ı küşufiyye*.¹⁰⁷

In the sixteenth century, provincial governors were administered through the *emanet* system, which meant the holders received a fixed salary and gave the full *küşufiyye* revenue directly to the governor. Once the governorships transferred to *iltizam* status, their salary was abolished. In its place, *küşufiyye* villages were added into *iltizam* revenues. In theory, the governor as the holder of the right of full produce, used to give a part of it to *kaşifs* in return for exploiting his land. In other words, in the case of the *küşufiyye* villages, provincial governors acted as *mültezims* for the governors rather than the imperial treasury. Provincial governors promised to deliver a certain amount of *mal-ı küşufiyye* and keep the surplus. In time, *küşufiyye* lands started to include all the lands except for the lands that were alienated by temporarily transferring to *iltizam*, and permanently transferring to foundations. All the lands, which were previously *iltizam* or *vakıf*, religious foundations; and somehow fell into idleness because of the absence of *mültezims* could provide money and labour to cultivate it. In addition, the cultivable lands that were not alienated and newly created by, for example, as a result of the flooding of the Nile were considered as *küşufiyye*. The provincial governors were directly responsible for their direction. It was the governors' duty to sell these lands by auction to *mültezims* when the land became profitable, and transfer the revenue to the imperial treasury.¹⁰⁸

In the seventeenth century, it was observed that the mamluk beys began to hold *iltizams*. Beginning from this period of time, mamluk households began to shift the provincial

¹⁰⁷ Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 40

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 40-41.

treasury to their expenditures, wages and other payments, and transferred obligation burdens, and the expenditures in Egypt and the Holy cities, to the *irsaliye-i hazine*.¹⁰⁹ The Sublime Porte failed to fulfil its financial aims both by taking advantage of conflicts between mamluk beys to raise the revenues from *mültezims*, and preventing the mamluks from diverting the revenues that reached the provincial treasury to their private expenditures.¹¹⁰ Thus, their aim of controlling *mültezims* through hiring capable and powerful mamluks did not work, since the Sublime Porte could not control mamluk beys because of their endless ambition. In fact, mamluk beys worked hard to ensure the *mukataa* system functioned well and increased the treasury revenues; however, they took the benefits for themselves, instead of the Porte. For that reason, the Porte created a new way for securing its objectives by combining previous attempts: the Porte supported the mamluk leader who promised to send the greatest amount of *hulvan*; in return these mamluk leaders had the right to take defeated rivals' possessions. An officer, called *mübaşir*, was appointed in order to collect *hulvan* and bring it to the imperial capital. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, most of *irsaliye-i hazine* was being used for the obligations and expenditures of Egypt and Holy cities; thus, *hulvan* became an item that made the most contribution to *irsaliye*.

Revenue of the central government from the Urban Wealth:

The state acquired five principal *mukataas* in urban areas 1- customs, (the total revenue of customs of the port of Alexandria was 5,405,705 *paras*. Bulak and Old Cairo's customs revenue was around 3,516,436 *paras*. Revenues from Damietta's customs was 1,564,530 *paras*.¹¹¹) 2- Police (Şurta) 3- Regulation of trade and industry 4- Centralization and control in specialized warehouses for the rural areas and 5- Regulation of navigation in

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8

¹¹¹ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16893 (1173/1759-1760)

the Mediterranean and the Nile.¹¹² The annual total fixed revenue of the imperial treasury in Egypt was 58,934,502 *paras* in 1004/1595-6, and it rose to 115,254,440 *paras* in 1212/1797-8.¹¹³ Agricultural tax was two thirds of the total tax amount. The remaining, one third of tax was formed from customs duties, other levies on commerce, fines imposed for violations of commercial regulations, license fees on urban crafts, and the poll tax collected from non-Muslims.¹¹⁴

The Expenditures of Egypt's Imperial Treasury

Expenditures for Egypt: 1) Salary for the officers 2) Wages (Mevacib) 3) Other expenditure (*Teslimat, ihracat, adat*).¹¹⁵ According to the system the Selim I established, 50.735.299 *paras* were allocated for the salary and wages, and 7.618.634 *paras* assigned for the other expenditure of Egypt.¹¹⁶

Expenditure for Pilgrimage and Holy Cities: 15.981.220 *paras* were sent to Haremeyn as *surre*. For other expenses of Haremeyn, 14.903.475 *paras* were allocated.

Expenditures for the Porte: 1) Kitchen 2) Dockyard¹¹⁷

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, the revenues and expenditures of the Egyptian treasury have been examined. By examining the documentation in the Ottoman archives about Egypt in the eighteenth century, it can be deduced that two main problems occupied the Sublime Porte's agenda regarding Egypt: proper and legal exploitation of the land in order to provide revenue for the Sublime Porte and securing the tax in an agreed amount to the Porte without excuses or pretence. During the long eighteenth century Egypt occupied an important place in the

¹¹² Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 98.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

¹¹⁴ Jankowski, *Egypt*, p. 55.

¹¹⁵ Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 184.

¹¹⁶ Stanford J. Shaw, *Ottoman Egypt in the Age of the French Revolution by Huseyn Efendi*, (Cambridge, 1964), p. 55.

¹¹⁷ Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 272.

Porte's financial agenda. Especially repeated wars with the Hapsburgs (1715-18, 1735-39, 1787-91), Iran (1723-1727, 1730-32, 1735-36, 1742-46, 1775-79) and Russia (1735-39, 1768-74, 1787-92) exhausted the imperial treasury. For this reason, the annual tribute coming from Egypt became more crucial. During the mid-eighteenth centuries the governors and the mamluk beys sent the *irsaliye* to Istanbul except for some omissions. Nevertheless, these omissions were being compensated by the successors a couple of years later. However, towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Porte had some difficulties in receiving the annual tribute from Egypt on time and in full.

More wealthy and authoritative mamluk beys, as the generation of decentralized period of the Ottoman administration, began to channel the imperial revenues to their households. The financial power was the backbone of the authority of a mamluk household. Being aware of this fact, the mamluk beys first seized the governors' revenues taking benefit of their short tenures in Egypt. From the 1760s onwards the task for the mamluk beys was to generate more income from the *irsaliye*. The *emirulhadj* was the chief actor in doing this. The mamluk beys forced the governors to issue *buyruldu*s and provided more revenues. Moreover, by generating untrustworthy promissory notes for the *irsaliye-i hazine*, they tried to cheat the imperial treasury.

A better financial support helped Ali Bey to realize his ambitions. He acquired mamluks who were loyal to him, eliminated his counterparts in Egypt, and built his military troop including 10.000 soldiers from different backgrounds. In order to generate more income via the Red Sea trade, he interfered with the Hijaz's politics and made agreements with the European merchants. He struggled with his counterpart in Syria, with whom he cherished enmity. I contend that the financial power was the principal mediator of Ali Bey in realizing his ambitions and it enabled him to strengthen his authority and extend it. In line with this, Ali

Bey began to seize the annual tribute, not bluntly but without being noticed, under cover of expenditures without permissions from the Porte. The central government protested and pursued the excessive expenditures via the governor and mostly achieved the reimbursement. However, Ali Bey's authority damaged the execution of the regulations. Even though Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb compensated the Porte's loss during his authority, his successors were reluctant to sustain regularity in their payments of the *irsaliye*.

CHAPTER IV: Representation of the Central Government in Egypt:

Governors

Governors were the most powerful political actors in Egypt and represented the central government's interest in the province alongside their responsibilities such as maintaining order and providing a peaceful environment that would help the peasants and urban residents to produce and pay their taxes. From the Ottoman conquest to the French expedition, the Ottoman governors, who were appointed directly from the imperial capital, administered Egypt for almost 300 years. Throughout this period, the central government's expectation from the governor of Egypt was that he should regularise the Ottoman domain, utilise both human and material sources in favour of the Empire, and support the religious institutions and groups to maintain Islamic culture and traditions. However, during that long period of administration, the power and authority of the governor was affected by changes in the imperial government. This chapter, therefore, aims to analyse the position of governor of Egypt in the mid-eighteenth century and explore the relationship between the governor and local notables and determine whether the latter were being empowered at the former's expense. It is important to explore the position of the governors and their relations with local notables because the governor was an important political figure as he was representative of the central government and head of the provincial administration. For this reason his relationship with the local notables, namely mamluk beys, was important as well. The expansion of mamluk beys' administrative and financial limits played a determining role in defining the governors' position in the province.

Current historiography suggests that in the sixteenth century the governors were the most powerful political actors.¹ However, the change in the empire's administration and land taxation system caused the governor to lose authority against the local notables.² Some historians such as Crecelius claim that governors' losing authority resulted in a power vacuum, which caused ascendancy of conflicts and struggles in the military regiments and 'meanwhile the mamluk beys struggled to expand their tax farms and get the higher positions in the corps, while the governor did not do anything'.³ The difficulty with this statement is that it is too simplistic and over generalising. An in-depth examination of the primary sources of the mid-eighteenth century shows that the relationship between the governors and mamluk beys was more complicated. For example, the governorships of Rağib Mehmed Pasha (r. 1744-48) or Kethüda Mehmed Pasha (r. 1762-63) prove that generalisations are far from explaining the relationship nexus of mid-eighteenth century Egyptian administrators. In order to discuss the motivations behind the uprising of Ali Bey al-Kabir and other mamluk beys' becoming more assertive, it is essential to look at the relationship between the mamluk beys and the governors of Egypt. There is a historiography in which the theory was established that governor's powers were nominal in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Egypt. According to this theory, the governor of Egypt was an insignificant officer who left the administration mostly to the mamluk beys.⁴ Holt suggests that late seventeenth century Ottoman Egypt was a province administered by strong mamluk beys, and he draws a picture of governors as weak

¹ Seyyid Muhammed es-Seyyid Mahmud, *XVI. Asırda Mısır Eyaleti*, (Marmara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1990), p. 105

² Dina Rizk Houry, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire Mosul 1540-1834*, (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 141

³ Daniel Crecelius, *The Roots of Modern Egypt: a study of the regimes of 'Ali Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab, 1760-1775*, (Minneapolis: Chicago, 1981), p. 5.

⁴ Farahat, Muhammad Nur, *al-Tarikh al-ijtima'i li'l-qanun fi Misr al-haditha* (Kuwait: Dar sa'ad al-sabah, 1993) p. 191; P. M. Holt, "The Career of Kuchuk Muhammed (1676-94)", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, (1963), vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 269-287; Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot claims the same "weak governors" notion see Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot, "Power and Authority in Late Eighteenth-Century" in *Society and Economy in Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean 1600-1900 Essays in Honor of Andre Raymond*, Nelly Hanna and Raouf Abbas, eds., (Cairo, New York: American University in Cairo Press, 2005); G. Wiet, "'Alī Bey", in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 22 October 2016 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_0520> First published online: 2012

and temporary political figures. Egypt is viewed as a province that was formally a subordinate of the Ottoman Empire, but was administered by the mamluk beys *de facto*.⁵ Marsot shares the same idea as her colleagues.⁶ However, the decree records show that the central government had a close connection in Egypt and tasked the governor firstly, and following him the *kadı*, the grandees and members of the seven regiments, and *şeyhülbeled*, among other officials to implement its policies in Egypt.⁷ I contend that the governor of Egypt was an active policymaker and executer of the central government until Ali Bey's authority. However, the "nominal governor" definition belonged to the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and was produced by the European travellers who visited Egypt during Murad and İbrahim Beys' tenure of office. Travellers' accounts are important as they provide us information of the Egyptian society as an eye from outside. However, since they are the eye from outside, their statements can be limited and biased.

Crecelius claimed that the governors in the eighteenth century were weak and powerless, that they had to instigate grandees of mamluk beys against each other, and he mentions that Rağıb Mehmed Pasha was one of them.⁸ He claims that Rağıb Mehmed Pasha instigated İbrahim Çavus, the *kethüda* of the corps, against Qatamish Beys in order to balance the local factions.⁹ On the other hand, the Porte described Rağıb Pasha as loyal and quick of comprehension, behaving desirably towards the central government, truthful,¹⁰ a worthy,

⁵ Holt, "The Career of Kuchuk Muhammed", p. 272

⁶ Marsot, "Power and Authority", p. 41-42

⁷ Most decrees recorded in the *mühimme-i mısır* defter series are addressed to '*Mısır valisine ve kadısına ve şeyhülbeled ve ümera-i mısriyyeye ve yedi ocak zabitanına*' /the *kadı*, grandees of seven regiments, *şeyhülbeled*, and *ümera-i mısriyye* – Egyptian *amirs* following the governor.

⁸ Daniel Crecelius, "Egypt in the eighteenth century", in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. II: *Modern Egypt: From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, Martin W. Daly, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1998), p. 74

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 74

¹⁰ MMD, vol. 6, nr.17 (date late RA 1157/early May 1744) "*harekat-ı matbûası nezd-i humayun-ı hüsrevânemde merğûb ve makkûl ve kemal-i sadâkat ve dirâyet ile mevsûf ve meshûr mücerrebü'l-etvâr sadık-ı kavvâl olmağla avâtıf-ı aliyeye-i mülükânemden şerefbahş-sudur olan hatt-ı humayun merfifet-makrûnum mücebince rütbe-i, vâlâ-yı vezârete is'âd ile isar kılınan vezirim Rağıb Mehmed Paşa ...*"

estimable statesman, and the most well guided and well directed among all the viziers.¹¹ Al-Jabarti mentions Rağib Mehmed Pasha's literary and scholarly side, as well.¹² He stresses that Rağib Mehmed Pasha had an excellent understanding, and used to converse with the ulema and had academic debates with them.¹³ Mehmed Süreyya Bey, the author of *Sicill-i Osmani*, also mentions about Rağib Mehmed Pasha and he points out that he was a religious and strong man carrying out his duties well.¹⁴ He was talented and adept, and prominent among his fellows.¹⁵ He was well educated both in science and politics, and was also a good translator.¹⁶ Rağib Mehmed Pasha proves that he deserved the praise since the documents also suggest that he was Rağib Mehmed Pasha who fixed the problems regarding the *irsaliye* dating from the tenure of previous governors, Yahya Pasha and Yedekçi Mehmed Pasha, and was mostly successful in collecting their debts from the mamluk beys. Also, he solved the issues about the Haremeyn's grain. Rağib Mehmed Pasha's tenure coincides with İbrahim and Rıdvan Kethüda's strong authority in Cairo. It is remarkable that although the years that fall within Rağib Mehmed Pasha's tenure in office are the prosperous times of Egypt that al-Jabarti mentions, the *gilal* of Haremeyn, cereal for the holy cities, and *ocaklık* (revenues for special purpose) of the *kiler-i amire*, sultan's imperial kitchen, was not sent for a while, and was a persistent problem.¹⁷ While the grain was not sent to Haremeyn for almost nine years, a couple of decrees mention that the officer embezzled the grains.¹⁸ Therefore, it was Rağib

¹¹ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 198 (date mid S 1158/late March 1745) “*vüzeraya 'izâmin erşed ve ercümendi olup*”

¹² Abdurrahman b. Hasan Al-Jabarti, *Aja'ib al-Athar fi'l-Tarajim wa'l-Akhbar*, Abdurrahim Abdurrahman Abdurrahim, ed., (Cairo, 1997), vol. 1, p. 421. Rağib Mehmed Pasha had three *divans*, poetry books, in Turkish, Persian and Arabic.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 421

¹⁴ Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, Nuri Akbayar, ed., (İstanbul, 1996) 6 vol., vol. 4, p. 1340

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1340

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1341

¹⁷ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 284 (date late M 1159/mid February 1746) The Porte gives a religious meaning to the grain of Haremeyn, points out that the people of Haremeyn's prayers are crucial for the government's survival, demands the governor to send the grain immediately; nr. 304 (date mid R 1159/early May 1746 and nr. 337 (date mid B 1159/late July 1746) the decree suggests that the grain was not sent in 1158-1159/1745-46; nr. 386 (date mid CA 1160/late May 1747); in 1160/1747 the Porte canalized the ships of grain from Egypt to the Aegean islands as the islands were suffering from famine nr. 361 (date mid Z 1160/mid December 1747) and to Istanbul nr. 362 (date mid Z 1160/mid December 1747)

¹⁸ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 372 and 373 (date late RA 1160/early April 1747)

Mehmed Pasha who collected the grain, which was owed by Zülfikar Osman Bey and the *sefer serdarı* Mustafa Bey¹⁹, and ultimately managed to send it.²⁰

Another issue that Rağib Mehmed Pasha had to deal with was the mamluk beys, who were exiled from Egypt by their rivals, and their debts or properties. As a result of the conflict between mamluk beys, some of them had to run away from Cairo and leave all their properties to their rivals.²¹ Normally the Porte rarely got involved in such cases unless mamluk beys influenced imperial interests. In 1157/1744, the *emirulhaji* Zulfikar Osman Bey and some of his followers had to flee Cairo, leaving their properties behind. The point that is relevant to the topic of this chapter is that Osman Bey and some of his followers had remarkable amounts money of *irsaliye-i hazine* of the year of 1155/1742 in their accounts. Although Osman Bey claimed that he had paid the amount in full, the *irsaliye* received was incomplete. The subject expected amount was 11.818.894 *paras*.²² The Porte did not accept any excuses, as the loss to the treasury ran to a significant amount. So Rağib Mehmed Pasha was demanded first to check the *ruzmançe defters*, to see whether Osman Bey told the truth or not, and then to collect the money from Qatamish İbrahim Bey and his fellow mamluks, since they held the properties of the fugitive Osman Bey and his fellows.²³ Also, the Porte did not neglect to threaten the previous governors Yahya Pasha and Rağib Mehmed Pasha. They were ordered to pay the amount if they had shown leniency that resulted in the failure to collect the money due.²⁴ The decrees offer a hint about how the Porte motivated the governors in order to

¹⁹ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 406 (date mid B 1160/late July 1747)

²⁰ MMD, vol. 6, h. 364 (date M 1160/January 1747)

²¹ Osman Bey claimed that he and his followers paid that amount of money and their payments were registered in the *ruzmançe defters*. Also, they kept the receipts in their houses, yet, since they had to flee, they did not have with them. Also, Qatamish İbrahim Bey and his fellow mamluks seized Osman Bey's property, animals in the barns and all his belongings.

²² Although the *irsaliye* for the year of 1155/1742 fell in the period in which Yahya Pasha ruled, it was under the responsibility of Yedekci Mehmed Pasha, as he had sealed the account. Mistakenly, the Porte hold Rağib Mehmed Pasha responsible about sealing the *irsaliye-i hazine*, once sent to Istanbul. The testimony of Hacı İbrahim, the *Kethüda* of Yahya Pasha and *sehir havalesi* under his rule, which proved that Yahya Pasha was not the governor when Osman Bey ran away, freed Yahya Pasha from the responsibility for the payment of all of the debts.

²³ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 176 (date mid L 1157/late November 1744), nr. 177 (date late November 1744)

²⁴ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 178 (date late L 1157/early December 1744)

collect the mamluk beys' debts. During the investigation, the Porte found Yedekçi Mehmed Pasha was responsible as well, as he sealed the *irsaliye* when sending it to the imperial capital. In the beginning, although the Porte sent a decree demanding payment in full the aforementioned amount of 11.818.894 *paras* owed from Yahya Pasha (6.825.000 *paras*) and Yedekçi Mehmed Pasha (5.000.000 *paras*), from the mamluk beys.²⁵ However, the mamluk beys submitted a petition requesting the amount to be reduced to 7.500.000 *paras*.²⁶

The Porte's approach proves us that the divan in Istanbul had control and a close eye on Egypt's governor in the mid-eighteenth century. The ambition of the Porte to receive the cash tributes on time was a strong motivation to follow the governors closely. Keeping peace in the province and collecting the tribute, which the Ottoman Empire desperately needed, were the principle duties the Porte expected from the governors. The governors' administrative success was considered according to their success at managing to collect the required sum of the annual tribute and their ability to handle the local administrators who were in an incessant conflict with each other. The detailed activities of governors reveal the close connection of the central government with administrators of Egypt and this refutes the assumption of the governor as a 'shadowy and passive spectator'. The four-year rule of Rağib Mehmed Pasha in Egypt contradicts this claim.²⁷ Rağib Mehmed Pasha's office in Egypt ended when Ibrahim Kethüda and his colleagues lobbied for his dismissal in 1748.²⁸

Egypt was more prominent for the Porte compared to other provinces in terms of being a financial support for the imperial treasury, and the importance of Egypt makes its governors prominent as well. It offered a huge potential in terms of its financial support to

²⁵ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 182 (date late ZA 1157/mid December 1744)

²⁶ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 250 (early B 1158/ early August 1745)

²⁷ Rağib Mehmed Pasha maintained his governorship career after a year of *nişancılık* in Istanbul. After that, he was appointed as governor, respectively, of Aydın, Sayda, Rakka, and Aleppo until his appointment of grand vizier in 1170/1757. He died in 1176/1762-63. *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. 4, p. 1340-41.

²⁸ Daniel Crecelius, "The Problems of Abd al-Rahman Katkhuda's Leadership", in *Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society*, Winter M., Levanoni A., ed., (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 381. MMD, vol. 8, nr. 8 (early Z 1174/early July 1761).

Istanbul, every year, by providing tax in-cash for the imperial treasury and making in-kind payments for the imperial kitchen and the imperial shipyard, in addition to occupying a strategic position as a link between the central government and the Red sea, the Hijaz and the Indian Ocean. Therefore, the governorship of Egypt was a prestigious post in the imperial hierarchy. The classical pattern of career progression of the governors of Egypt usually passed from being grand vizier before or after the office in Egypt. Mostly governors of Egypt returned to Istanbul as grand vizier. Therefore, this case shows us the importance of the post of governorship in Egypt. It can also give us a clue about governors' motivation to collect more wealth for *pişkeş*, a gratuity for the sultan. Winter mentions that Egyptian governors' concern was not political but financial.²⁹

The Porte also gave greater importance to the appointment of the governor for Egypt as the governor was chosen among those who had close relations with the imperial palace and who were referred as competent administrators. Thus, the administration style in the capital reverberated in Egypt. The centralized approach of the sixteenth century was echoed in Egypt as well; the Egyptian governors managed the province's affairs in a centralized manner. Indeed, the administration system worked well, or in other words it went in favour of the central government. Establishing a strong administrative body in Egypt helped the empire to extend its authority to the Yemen and therefore to the Indian Ocean trade.

The office of governorship in Egypt was always competitive due to the high revenue it provided. In addition, in time, the worsening financial situation started to have an influence on the selection of the governor for Egypt because the nominees for the governorates were supposed to pay money, which is called *pişkeş*. There was an increasing need for cash in the central government, and this resulted in a tendency of the imperial administrators to see these

²⁹ Michael Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule 1517-1798*, (Routledge, London, 1992), p. 50.

positions as a revenue source. The new nominees were expected to provide more money for the posts. For example, the previous *defterdar* of Egypt, Sinan Bey (1584-1587), was appointed as the new governor of Egypt in exchange for his offer of 600.000 golden coins; whereas the previous governor had offered 400.000 golden coins for his appointment.³⁰ In the eighteenth century, the governor of Egypt paid 90.000 gurus (3.600.000 *paras*) in return for his appointment. Despite helping the preservation of financial and political stability in the province, however, the long-term tenures left their place to one-year tenures.

Inalcik claims that the central government shortened the tenure of office of governors in order to keep their power under control in the provinces.³¹ However, these short-term tenures (*i.e.* one-year term of office) resulted in some drawbacks for the administration. For example, short time office in Egypt prevented the governors from getting familiar with the province and the administration, and it limited governors' efficiency in carrying out the tasks that were very important for the central government such as the readying of the *irsaliye-i hazine*.³² Holt highlights the aforementioned situations as the cause of the corruption of the administrative system in Egypt since they created politically "weaker" governors.³³ In addition to this, he observes that the shorter-term tenures resulted in the lack of continuity in provincial policies, and the lack of motivation for improving the province.³⁴ Winter claims that since they occupied the office for only around one year³⁵, the governors of Egypt seldom

³⁰ es-Seyyid Mahmud, *XVI. Asırda Mısır Eyaleti*, p. 105

³¹ Halil Inalcik, "Centralization and decentralization in Ottoman Administration" "Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration", in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, D. Naff and R. Owen eds., (Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), p. 30

³² James Jankowski, *Egypt A Short History*, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2000), p. 54

³³ P. M. Holt, *Egypt and The Fertile Crescent 1516-1922*, (London: Longmans, 1966), p. 64.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

³⁵ This was not a peculiar situation to the governors solely. It was a wider phenomenon which was applied in appointment of Greek Orthodox patriarchs as well see Molly Greene, *The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 1453 to 1768: the Ottoman Empire*, (Edinburgh University Press, 2015)

attempted to create projects that they themselves could see through to a beneficial outcome, and they were also reluctant to make investments after the sixteenth century.³⁶

From another point of view, however, short-term tenure clearly gave the central government the opportunity to increase the income acquired from these offices, which could be seen in the numbers of the governors who were appointed in the sixteenth as compared to the eighteenth century. While in the first century of the Ottoman conquest (between 1517 and 1617) 38 governors served in Egypt, this number almost doubles in the eighteenth century with 32 governors being appointed during a half-century (between 1720 and 1770).³⁷ Furthermore, since the governors had to pay huge amounts for the new office, it is claimed that they looked for ways to compensate their losses and to amass fortunes for their next office, presumably the office for the grand vizierate. The tax revenues were allocated as a salary for the governors by the central government. Although it is claimed that the governors were motivated to amass a fortune from the tax revenues, by the second half of the eighteenth century, the mamluk beys had seized these revenue sources, mostly by force. The central government strived for the return of the governors' revenues, which mainly consisted of the custom taxes and of those from the grain villages and the provincial mint.³⁸

Nevertheless, in reference to the former argument, the correspondence of the mid-eighteenth century suggests that the administrators and the new system did adapt to each other since we observe that large maintenance projects were carried out without problem, except for few corruption cases.³⁹ As for the latter argument, Abdurrahman Kethüda's construction activities demonstrate that the local interest groups took over the task of improving the

³⁶ Winter, *Egypt Under Ottoman Rule*, p. 35.

³⁷ Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. 6, p. 1812-13 see appendix I list of the governors of Egypt.

³⁸ See above chapter IV on governor p. 218

³⁹ For the details of the maintenance see Mücahide Güneş, *XVIII. Yüzyılda İskenderiye Limanı*, unpublished master dissertation, (University of İstanbul, 2009) chapter I. For the latter: an example; during the rule of Yedekci Mehmed Pasa the bridge in Fayyum was repaired. The estimated maintenance cost was 2.265.00 *paras* (87 misri kese 9000 para) but the governor did not repair all parts of the bridge and kept the remaining money in his personal account. MMD, vol. 6, nr. 238 (date mid CA 1158/mid June 1745).

province. The correspondence between the central government and Egypt proves that a considerable amount of money was assigned from the *irsaliye-i hazine* for the maintenance and repair of bridges⁴⁰, dams and *sedds*⁴¹, canals⁴², archways⁴³, and water wells.⁴⁴ The central government allocated large amounts of money for the construction in Egypt, and inspected the maintenance organization via the governor. In addition, Shaw mentions that the central government appointed authoritative governors in the 1760s in order to realise a number of reforms in Egypt.⁴⁵ The local chroniclers state that they usually concentrated on raising the living standards of Egypt's people, rather than interfering with the mamluk beys' struggles.

Hekimzade Ali Pasha was appointed Egypt twice in 1740 and 1756-1758. When he first came to office in 1740, he promised the mamluk beys that he would not interfere in their affairs. He addressed all of the local administrators and military men in the *Karameydan*, and told them that he did not intend to provoke a crisis, or execute mamluk beys, but that he wanted to pursue his duty such as collecting the tax, and sending the grain to *Haremeyn*.⁴⁶ This implies that Hekimzade Ali Pasha protected the mamluk beys from his intervention in local affairs such as to execute or to urge the assassination of powerful household leaders.⁴⁷ By the same token, *Damurdashi's* narrative suggests some hints about a mid-eighteenth century governorship using Hekimzade Ali Pasha's career.⁴⁸ Once Ali Pasha got complaints from the public about the high price of wheat in the local market, he took action immediately

⁴⁰ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 66 (in 1175/1761), nr. 137 (in 1176/1762), and nr. 425 (in 1180/1766).

⁴¹ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 71 (in 1175/1761), nr. 148 (in 1177/1763), nr. 276 (in 1178/1764), nr. 323 (in 1178/1764), and nrs. 544, 545, 546, 565, 570 (1181/1767).

⁴² MMD, vol. 8, nrs. 139, 468, 556, 558 (in 1181/1767).

⁴³ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 172 (in 1177/1763).

⁴⁴ MMD, vol. 8, nrs. 197, 279, 290 (in 1178/1764).

⁴⁵ S. J. Shaw, *Ottoman Egypt in the eighteenth century: Nizamname-i Mısır of Jezzar Ahmed Pasha*, (Harvard U. P., 1962), p. 8

⁴⁶ According to *Damurdashi*, Süleyman Pasha aimed to kill four of mamluk beys' grandees in order to get the central government's gratitude, as the previous governor Azmzade Süleyman Pasha was dismissed because he had tried to meddle with the mamluk beys before. *Al-Damurdashi's chronicle of Egypt 1688-1755: Al-Durra al-Musana fi Akhbar al-Kinana*, Crecelius, Daniel and Abdalwahhab Bakr, eds., (E. J. BRILL, 1991), p. 327

⁴⁷ Crecelius, "Egypt in the eighteenth century", p. 72

⁴⁸ *al-Damurdashi's chronicle*, p. 340

and appointed a capable officer, *eminulihisab*, Yusuf Ağa.⁴⁹ He inspected the prices and punished some of the suppliers.⁵⁰

Kamil Ahmed Pasha was another example that was appointed as the governor in 1760.⁵¹ Al-Jabarti describes Kamil Pasha as strong, brave, sharp-witted, and a respected man.⁵² In a decree addressed to him, the Porte emphasised that he was educated in the sultan's palace for forty years and he was known for his piety and truthfulness.⁵³ Kamil Ahmed Pasha was meticulous in applying the orders; he did not always remain in the castle, but rode and walked about among the warehouses and fields. In order to assure the stability in administrative issues, he mentioned in a petition to the Porte that he spent a lot of money.⁵⁴ A decree about buying ships for '*gilal*' transfer in the Red Sea highlights the Porte's experiences and approaches to both its governor and local administrators in Egypt.⁵⁵ The *gilal* foundation of Egypt lacked sufficient ships for transportation of grain from Suez to Jidda and Yenbu, so during Kamil Ahmed Pasha's governorship in Egypt in 1174/1760-61 an agreement took place between Egypt and the Porte to purchase ships from the merchants operating in the Red Sea. The Porte demanded that the governor buy one big and two small ships. The later correspondence revealed that Kamil Ahmed Pasha charged the price of one of the ships from the *irsaliye*; nevertheless, he did not proceed to buy the ship and then he was dismissed.⁵⁶ The Porte demanded the current governor Ebubekir Pasha to investigate the issue, and refund the money.⁵⁷

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 340

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 340

⁵¹ MMD, vol. 7, nr. 676 (mid ZA 1173/late June 1760). However, al-Jabarti claims Kamil Ahmed Pasha came to Egypt as the governor at the end of 1174/1760

⁵² al-Jabarti, *Ajaib*, vol. 1, p. 405

⁵³ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 8 (early Z 1174/early July 1761): '*Senki vezir müşarun-ileyhsin otuz-kırk seneden beri devlet-i aliyye ... perverişyab olub sıdk u diyanet ile ma'ruf ve evza' ve kavanin-i miriye ve mülkiyeyi kemal-i idrak ... olduğuna binaen*'

⁵⁴ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 9 (early Z 1174/early July 1761): '*... ve Mısırın tahsil-i nizamı için mesarif-i kesireye mübtela...*'

⁵⁵ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 68 (mid N 1175/early April 1762)

⁵⁶ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 68 (mid N 1175/early April 1762)

⁵⁷ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 68 (mid N 1175/early April 1762) "*Kamil Ahmed Paşa'nın yetmiş dört senesi irsaliye hazinesinden katıy vafır mebalih ahzından bahs ile Haremeyn gıvali nakliçün iştirası ferman olunan sefayinden bir küt'asının bahasını müşarun-*

In this decree, the approach of the Porte shows that the mamluk beys were not trusted, and implies that numerous incidents were experienced connected to trickiness and untrustworthiness of the local administrators in Egypt.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the mamluk beys allied against Kamil Ahmed Pasha and dismissed him.⁵⁹ In place of Kamil Ahmed Pasha, they appointed the former governor, Mustafa Pasha, as the new governor.⁶⁰ Mustafa Pasha sent his treasurer to Jidda as his deputy. The mamluk beys sent a petition to the central government explaining the situation. The grand vizier Rağıb Mehmed Pasha ordered Kamil Ahmed Pasha to be sent to Kandiye, and Mustafa Pasha to Aleppo.⁶¹ One of the reasons behind the mamluk beys' dismissal of Kamil Ahmed Pasha might be that Kamil Ahmed Pasha re-captured the customs revenues, which initially had been assigned as the governors' revenue source but had been captured by the mamluk beys.⁶² On the other hand, Kamil Ahmed Pasha communicated confidentially with Gazzawı Ali Bey against the grandees at the time, Abdurrahman Kethüda and Ali Bey al-Kabir, and presumably this issue was connected with his dismissal, as well.⁶³

In fact, we should also understand how the position of Egypt relates to the Ottoman Empire in order to understand the importance and prominence of governors of Egypt. Due to its privileged position with geographical and economic advantages, Egypt had been a leading country in the region since the period of Mamluk Sultanate. The Ottoman Empire benefited from this distinct position of Egypt by using it as a link between the imperial capital, Istanbul, and the Middle Eastern lands of the Empire. Egypt became more eminent in the Porte's

ileyh irsaliye hazinesinden ahz etmişken sefineyi iştirâ eylemedi deyu tastir ve bu def'a gelen yetmiş dört senesi irsaliye hazinesi suret ruznamçesinde dahi sefine bahası olmak üzere beş misri kese tahrir etmeleriyle hulasası 'atebe-i 'ulya-yı şehinşahaneme ba'de'l-'arz meblağ-ı mezburu nefsü'll-emr müşarun-ileyh kabz edüp sefineyi iştirâ etmemiş ise andan tahsil ve eger Mısırlu hud'a-yı kadimeleri üzere meblağ-ı mezburu alıb töhmeti müşarun-ileyhe isnad eylemişler ise Mısırludan tahsil olunmak iktiza etmekle

⁵⁸ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 68 (mid N 1175/early April 1762)

⁵⁹ However, conversely to what Jabarti narrates, one can easily detect that the decrees were addressed directly to Kamil Ahmed Pasha until Muharrem 1175/ August 1761, when we check the *mühimmes*.

⁶⁰ The mentioned Mustafa Pasha here might be Bahir Mustafa Pasha. Although Jabarti does not narrate his rule, Sicill-I Osmani states that Bahir Mustafa Pasha was the governor in 1171.

⁶¹ Jabarti, *Ajaib*, vol. 1, p. 405

⁶² MMD, vol. 7, nr. 756 (mid Ş 1174/late March 1761) sent to *vali, kadı, ümera-i Mısır* and *yedi ocak zabitan ve ihtiyarları*

⁶³ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200 and 201 (date early Z 1174/early July 1761)

political activities in the Middle East; it was a military base for the Porte and was used for the activities against the Portuguese in the Red sea and the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, for the conquest of Yemen and the support and maintenance of Ottoman authority there, the support was provided by the statesmen and with the supplies from Egypt.⁶⁴ Therefore, the governor of Egypt was the chief political actor in the region in the beginning years of Ottoman rule. For this reason, the officer to be appointed as the governor of Egypt was chosen carefully among the senior administrators who had gained experience in the sultan's palace as it has been stated previously. These governors were called *beylerbeyi* in the sixteenth century and were chosen among those loyal to the sultan.

Selecting the governor from among the palace men enabled the central government to maintain a close relationship with the governor of Egypt, a relatively remote province of the empire. Although most of the criteria of the sixteenth century remained limited to this century and were changed and transformed afterwards, we can suggest that some governors in the mid-eighteenth century, which this study covers, were among those who also gained experience in the palace. For example, Silahdar Mehmed Pasha (r. 1144/1731-32), Silahdar Ebubekir Pasha (r. 1147/1734-35), Boynueğri Abdullah Pasha (r. 1163/1750), and Baltacızade Mustafa Pasha (r. 1166/1753) were among those who started their career in the *Enderun*, the school of the Sultan's palace.⁶⁵

On the other hand, in the sixteenth century, holding governorship in Egypt was one step towards appointment as grand vizier as well. In fact, the abundant revenue of the governor of Egypt in this period was a good opportunity for governors to get prepared in their career path towards becoming a grand vizier. We find that the same trend was acceptable in

⁶⁴ For details about the military and financial support from Egypt to Yemen see Sadettin Baştürk, *Telhisu'l-Berku'l-Yemani/Ahbaru'l-Yemani (Tahlil ve Metin)*, Unpublished PhD dissertation, (Atatürk Üniversitesi, 2010) p. 322-367.

⁶⁵ *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. 4, p. 1189, vol. 1, p. 80, vol. 2, p. 432, vol. 4, p. 1033

the eighteenth century.⁶⁶ However, when we look at eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt, we find that some grand viziers were appointed as the governor of Egypt after their term of office in Istanbul. For example, Şehla Ahmed Pasha (1162/1749) served as grand vizier between 1153-1155/1740-1742, and was appointed as the governor of Egypt on 19 N 1161/ 12 September 1748. Boynueğri Abdullah Pasha was also appointed as grand vizier in Ş 1160/ August-September 1747 and worked as the governor of Egypt two years later in 1164/1750-51. Said Mehmed Pasha (1170/1756-57) held the post of grand vizier for six months before he was appointed as the governor of Egypt, serving from 19 M 1169/ 7 October 1755 until 1 B 1169/ 1 April 1756. Mustafa Pasha was a former grand vizier, when he was appointed as the governor of Egypt in 1171/1758. The unique position of the governorship in Egypt within the career chain reminds us once again the value of researching this topic in detail.

The governorship in Egypt was a rewarding and high-status post. The Porte called the post “*hasretü'l-vüzera*”, the longing of the viziers.⁶⁷ In the beginning of the sixteenth century, in general, the governor of Egypt was appointed among the *kubbe* viziers, one of the top viziers of the sultan. In the sixteenth century, the governor of Egypt was granted extensive powers to sustain the central government’s reign and authority in the newly conquered province. The governor represented the Ottoman sultan. Thus, he was entrusted with the absolute administrative and military authority in the province. Experienced officers who served in the sultan’s palace, previous *beylerbeyis* in different provinces, or viziers used to be appointed as the governor of Egypt with the title of *beylerbeyi*. Due to his strategically

⁶⁶ For example, Rağib Mehmed Pasha was appointed as *sadrızam* on 20 Rebiulahir 1170/12 January 1757, 13 years after his governorship in Egypt in the year 1157/1744. Also, Silahdar Hamza Pasha (governor of Egypt in 1179/1765-66) was appointed as grand vizier after serving in Egypt as governor. We can see this trend continuing until the end of the century; Zaferanbolulu İzzet Pasha was the governor of Egypt in 1205/1791, and then appointed as grand vizier two years later.

⁶⁷ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 484 the decree that was sent to the governor of Egypt Rakım el-Hac Mehmed Pasha in mid Z 1180/mid May 1767. “... *hasretü'l-vüzera olan tevliyet-i Mısır-ı Kahire* (the governorship of Egypt, which is longing of the viziers) *avatif-i aliyye-i tacdaranemden şeref-afza-yi sudur olan hatt-ı humayun mevhibet makrunum mucbine işbu 1181 senesi tutundan zabt olunmak üzere sana ihsan u tevcih ve iklim-i Kahirenin kaffe-i umur ve hususı uhde-i der-i ben ve der-i atine ihale ve taklid kilinmagin ...*”

important post, the governor of Egypt was not expected to attend the imperial wars; instead, he was asked to pay. For example, in 1151/1739, Acemzade Süleyman Pasha requested for permission not to attend the campaign. He was exempted, and was asked to pay 6.000.000 *paras*, instead of attending to the campaign. The Porte wanted him to make a financial contribution as he earned a large fortune in his former post, in the province of Damascus.⁶⁸ The reports sent by the governors displayed the financial and administrative affairs of the province. Also, every governor used to examine the financial registers and records of his predecessor's office. Thus, the central government monitored the province's circumstances and governors' achievements or inefficacy.⁶⁹ Collection of the *irsaliye-i hazine* and transporting it to the central government was of critical importance for the Porte. Therefore, governors were chosen for the service based on their ability to complete the task without instigating any problems.

On the other hand, in the eighteenth century, some governors' tenure was extended because of financial problems. The central government's pragmatic approach appears in such cases. For example, in 27 R 1151/14 August 1738, the governor Mustafa Pasha was appointed for the following year as well, since the central government thought that he would not be able to pay his debts and levies that he was supposed to pay as the governor of Egypt in the case of dismissal.⁷⁰ After the government restored the *caize*, a type of levy relating to senior appointments amounting to approximately 3.600.000-4.000.000 *paras*, that the governor of Egypt was supposed to pay to the central government, Mustafa Pasha (1151-1152/1738-39) found himself incapable of sending the *irsaliye-i hazine* in full. In order to preserve their mutual interest, the Porte extended the term of office of Mustafa Pasha and applied pressure

⁶⁸ MD, vol. 145, nr. 1677 (date mid Z 1151/late March 1739)

⁶⁹ es-Seyyid Mahmud, *XVI. Asırda Mısır eyaleti*, p. 126

⁷⁰ MD, vol. 146, nr. 296 to "Mısır valisi vezirim Mustafa Paşa'ya/ to the governor of Egypt, my vizier Mustafa Pasha" [on 27 Rebiulahir 1151/14 August 1738]. About the controversy between the governor and mamluk grandees in financial issues, see chapter III on Income Sources, p. 152 about Kethüda Mehmed Pasha's correspondence.

on him to pay fully and in time. Being in a war against Russia and Austria required ready cash and the central government tried to solve its cash flow problems by closely monitoring the levies from Egypt. The central government tried to redirect the revenues to the imperial treasury from expenditure to meet local objectives. Demanding the levies in full and on time, the decrees were addressed to the governors and seven regiment grandees more frequently. Therefore, the Porte proposed to Mustafa Pasha that he should resume the collection of the revenues from the customs of Damietta and Bulaq, which had customarily been earmarked as revenue sources for the governor, but had fallen into the hands of the *müstahfizan* (janissaries) grandees in recent years. Mustafa Pasha's case reveals once again that the revenue sources of the governor were captured by grandees of the *müstahfizan* (janissary) regiment, and how that affected the decision making progress of the Porte. Although the controversy continued, it seems that the mamluk beys kept the revenue from the customs until the end of the century.

The new governors usually travelled to Egypt by ship, arriving at the port in Alexandria. Usually the Kapudan Pasa was responsible for the transportation of the governor, his family and retinue. Although the governor was sent decrees regarding the issues of Egypt immediately after he was appointed, the central government approved his governorship after the new governor arrived at his residence in the citadel in Cairo. The journey of the governor from Alexandria to Cairo, when he first arrived in Egypt, provided an opportunity for networking between the newly appointed governor and people from outside of Cairo, especially for those who were willing to be appointed by the governor of Egypt as administrators of the sub provinces in the rural parts of Egypt. This networking opportunity can be considered important, as the governor, generally, did not leave the citadel once he arrived at his post. So, from the aspect of the merchants and local administrators who were willing to fill the posts in the sub provinces, this was a rare chance for a connection with the

governor. These connections included discussions about financial issues such as the administration of payments and debts,⁷¹ or engaging with the governor and establishing political ties before he reached Cairo in order to sort their problems out. Al-Jabarti narrates an anecdote about the beginning of Şehla Ahmed Pasha's office in Egypt. Before Ahmed Pasha reached Cairo, a mamluk bey called Omar Bey went to Ahmed Pasha. He entered his service immediately, provided horses for the Pasha and his men, and camels for their belongings and prepared food for them. In the meantime, he told the Pasha that his master was dead. Upon this, the Pasha dressed him with a *hilat* and secured him his master's *sancak beyliği* without paying *hulvan*. Meeting the governor in Alexandria and earning his appreciation helped Omar to acquire a *sancak*. All this happened before the welcoming committee arrived in Alexandria. When all this was heard in Cairo, it caused a discontent among the other beys. They criticized the governor by saying that Omar Bey was a weak person and did not deserve a *sancak beyliği*. When this was said to Pasha, in order to silence them, he said: do you contradict my decisions before I even arrive in your town?⁷² This narration suggests that in the middle of the eighteenth century, a governor had enough authority to make the mamluk beys respect his decisions although his decision contradicted custom and law.

The governors' responsibilities

The governor was responsible for the administrative, financial, legal and military duties of the province but the foreign politics of a province was subject to the central government. In the eighteenth century, the Porte expected from the governor of Egypt to provide public order and security in Cairo; to send grain and other needs to *Haremeyn* in time and good quality; to send *irsaliye*, *hulvan*, *cizye*, and *ocaklık* on time and in its full amount to

⁷¹ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 322 (date mid N 1178/ early March 1765).

⁷² Al-Jabarti, *Aja'ib*, vol. 1, p. 315

the Porte; to apply the imperial orders in Egypt according to request of the Porte⁷³; and to supervise the restorations of dams, bridges and water channels to be carried out expeditiously in order not to aggrieve the people.⁷⁴ Ultimately, the central government's demands from the governor of Egypt were: to send the *irsaliye-i hazine* on time and in full and to maintain the needs of the Haremeyn. As Shaw mentions, the central government could reach terms with anyone who fulfilled these duties.⁷⁵

When it comes to *irsaliye*, for the years between 1740-1785, we can divide it into three periods: Although İbrahim Kethüda (d. 1754) failed to send it regularly, we see that until 1767, the *irsaliye* was sent on a regular basis, the remaining sum after expenses which amounted to between 10.000.000 and 20.000.000 *paras*. Ali Bey did not send the *irsaliye* from 1767 until 1773. After eliminating Ali Bey, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb sent the total arrears from the previous six years and the two relating to his own tenure (1773-75) in a single remittance.⁷⁶ After 1775, the accounts are confused; it is difficult to determine whether they were paid regularly. The regularity of the *irsaliye* payment suggests that the governors or mamluk beys provided the Porte's number one requirement until the last quarter of the eighteenth century, except for the six-year period that Ali Bey rose against the central government. Nevertheless, Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb repaid this six-year *irsaliye* during his tenure.⁷⁷

The detailed investigation of the decree records in the Prime Minister's Archive suggests that the governors had occasional conflicts and struggles with the mamluk beys. The

⁷³ In a decree, which was sent to Kethüda Mehmed Pasha in early M 1176/ late July 1762, it was mentioned that he was appointed as the governor of Egypt as he was considered that he was an able vizier who was capable of performing the aforementioned duties. MMD, vol. 8, nr. 90.

⁷⁴ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 90 (date late Z 1175/mid July 1762) '*nizam-ı umur-ı Kahirenin istihsaliçin bi'l-husus haremeyn-i muhteremeyne gidecek gıal ve levazım-ı sairenin tahsiline ve enderun-ı hümayunuma gelecek irsaliye hazinesinin ve ocaklık zehayirinin tahsillerine ve levazım-ı şerifemin murad-ı hümayunum üzere*'

⁷⁵ S. J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt*, (Princeton, 1962), p. 8.

⁷⁶ Examining the detailed account registers recorded in *Baş Muhasebe defterleri* of Egypt (D.BŞM. MSR. d), we see that the cost of some repairs in both Haremeyn and Egypt were paid from *irsaliye* in 1768, 1769 or in 1770. This shows us that during the uprising of Ali Bey the social life of local people were never affected.

⁷⁷ See for detail "the table" in appendix IX.

mamluk beys united against the governor in order to preserve their authority and financial income. In short, it was their financial interests that motivated them. Despite this, the mamluk beys of Egypt in the eighteenth century mostly came from the same roots, namely Georgia;⁷⁸ nevertheless, their unity cannot be explained in terms of nationalism or proto-nationalism. If we take the proto-nationalist approach, we cannot explain why Ali Bey eliminated his rivals instead of cooperating with them. It is more accurate to state that the mamluk beys' unity was based on preserving their own interests, as opposed to preserving their fellow countrymen or any concern for reviving the ancient Mamluk sultanate.

The most significant influence of the mamluk beys on the governor was on finance. The mamluk beys shifted governor's revenue to their households. Shaw explains the revenue sources and expenditures of the governor of Egypt as follows:

Revenues of the governor: The governors had two types of revenue: the *hass* revenues, which were given by the sultan in return for their service, and other revenues that were assigned to them by the *divan* and treasury of Egypt.⁷⁹ The *hass* revenues were *küşufiyye* revenues which consisted of land taxes from *küşufiyye* villages. While revenue of the governor from *küşufiyye* was approximately 7,309,032 *paras* in 1086/1675-6, by 1212/1797-8 it had decreased to 4,949,959 *paras*. The revenue of the governor from *küşufiyye* decreased by approximately 2,359,073 *paras*. The *küşufiyye-i sağir* revenues were paid by the officers in the *divan* and treasury in return for their appointment. The governor's revenue from the *küşufiyye-i sağir* was more than 10,000,000 *paras* annually. After the reform in 1082/1671-72, most of this revenue was shifted to the imperial treasury. In the eighteenth century, the governor had around 4,000,000 *paras* as the *küşufiyye-i sağir* as revenue from the

⁷⁸ Daniel Crecelius and Gotcha Djaparidze, "Relations of the Georgian Mamluks of Egypt with Their Homeland in the Last Decades of the Eighteenth Century", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. 45, No. 3 (2002), pp. 320-341.

⁷⁹ Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 318

mint of Cairo. The governor had the right to gain 1,135,000 *paras* annually. Ali Bey al-Kabir seized this revenue, and after him, *şeyhülbeleds* continued to enjoy this revenue, instead of the governors.⁸⁰ In total, the governor's income from *hass* revenues was 13,000,000 *paras* in the beginning of the eighteenth century; however, it decreased to 9,000,000 *paras* at the end of the century.

The revenues of the governor other than *hass* were as follows: In the seventeenth century, the governor of Egypt held a salary in the amount of 1.500.000 *paras*. Yet, in the eighteenth century, their salary was reduced to a symbolic amount of 1.095 *paras*. In addition to the salary, the governor and his retinue had the benefit of grain for themselves and fodder for their animals, which were paid in cash. Before the French expedition in 1798, governors received 7,741,000 *paras* annually as the cost of grain and fodder. Secondly, there was the revenue from customs. In the eighteenth century, the mamluk beys seized all of the customs revenues apart from the Suez via the janissary regiment.⁸¹ In 1110/1698-9, the governor gained from the Suez around 4.543.196 *paras*. In 1759/60, the Porte estimated the amount that the governor had from the Suez as 8.750.000 *paras* annually.⁸² In 1791, Murad and Ibrahim Beys gave 6.585.000 *paras* to the governor. Shaw states that the governor earned from customs around 7.500.000 *paras*. Until 1671, *hulvan* was considered as a part of the *hass* revenues. After that year, the governor was asked to pay to the central government what he gained from *hulvan* revenues. In the eighteenth century, the governors' income was considerable, amounting to between 15,000,000 and 25-30,000,000 *paras*. Shaw estimates

⁸⁰ Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, p. 323

⁸¹ "Janissaries undertook to pay the taxes owed to the treasury for them by the valis, and kept the customs profits for themselves in return for fixed annual payments to the valis." In the seventeenth century, customs of revenue from Alexandria-Rosetta, Damietta-Burullos and Bulaq-Old Cairo was 2,089,000 *paras*. Yet, in the eighteenth century custom revenues increased and 2,089,000 *paras* became only a smaller proportion, compared to what janissaries gained. Although the governors were encouraged by the central government to take over, and even they endeavoured, they could not get the customs revenues back. Instead, the governors were paid an amount between 1,250,000-2,500,000 (Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization*, p.325 (MMD, vol. 7, nr. 374 (date late B 1173/early March 1760))

⁸² Governor tried to show that they gained 6,500,000 *paras* from Suez (MMD, vol. 7, nr. 759 on 13 ZA 1173/27 June 1760), but the Porte (MMD, vol. 7, nr. 551 (date early C 1172/early February 1759)) and Cezzar Ahmed Pasha estimated around 8,750,000 *paras*.

that the amount that the governor earned in the beginning of the eighteenth century was 47.741.000 *paras*.⁸³ This amount decreased to 25.741.000 *paras* a decade before the French expedition of 1798. In addition to the revenues, the governor received miscellaneous bribes and gifts.⁸⁴

Expenditure of the governor: The post of governorship of Egypt required high levels of expenditure. There were financial sources that were peculiar to the governors of Egypt. It is apparent that governorship in Egypt offered the governors opportunities to collect income across a broad range of categories. However, since the expenditures were higher, they had problems. In 1166/1752-53, the governor used to spend approximately 207.332 gurus (8.275.457 *paras*) for his regular expenditures for six months.⁸⁵ In addition, the revenue shift from the governors to mamluk beys left the governors in serious debt. The Porte reproached the governors by implying that their income shifted to the mamluk beys as a result of their own neglect. When a governor was dismissed from Egypt and appointed to another post, he was often significantly in debt to the central government. The governors tried to compensate their debt, by borrowing from the *irsaliye*.⁸⁶ Therefore, they compromised the *irsaliye* revenues. In order to protect the governors and *irsaliye*, the Porte demanded governors to take over their previous revenue sources, the *mukataa* of Alexandria, Bulaq and Damietta customs. The decree that ordered the governors to resume control over the customs was addressed to all components of Egypt political milieu such as *ümera*, *sâdât-ı bekriyye* and *kadiriyye*, *yedi ocak zabitani* and *ihdiyarlari*.⁸⁷ In this decree, the Porte demanded from the governor to re-establish

⁸³ Shaw, *Financial and Administrative Organization*, p.327

⁸⁴ Shaw mentions that Evliya Çelebi states the gifts that the governor of Jirja presented to the governor of Egypt, and he also adds that the governor of Egypt charged 2.000.000 *paras* from the hajj caravan. Nevertheless, Shaw points out “during the eighteenth century, however, the quality and quantity of gifts given to the valis declined in direct relation to the decline of their powers and authority at that time.” *Ibid.*, p. 327

⁸⁵ C. MTZ 7/318 (date 29 Z 1166/27 October 1753)

⁸⁶ During wars, the central government was desperately in need of cash. *Irsaliye-i hazine* of Egypt was a big proportionate of sultan's personal treasury, *ceyb-i humayun*.

⁸⁷ MMD, vol 6, nr. 236 (date mid CA 1158/late June 1745)

the former order by Shaban 1158/September 1745. However, it is known that it was not applied until after the governorate of Kamil Ahmed Pasha (r. 1173/1760). Since Kamil Pasha himself was dismissed at the prompting of the mamluk beys due to his insistence on re-establishing the former order.

In addition to other expenses, the governor had to have an adequate number of soldiers in order to keep the peace and punish crimes. In fact, the head of every unit of administration had a number of soldiers in his retinue according to his rank. While a provincial official had a dozen or so men, and a district governor about a hundred or so, the governor pasha had several hundred. The pasha had to have enough income in order to provide financially for his retinue.⁸⁸ In terms of solving the struggles between governors and mamluk beys, the system of short office tenures, usually for only one year, might have prevented the governor from bringing and implementing solutions for the long-term problems such as reclaiming their revenue sources from the mamluk beys. Given the limited sources of revenue available to local administrators, during their years in office, the governors seem to have concentrated their efforts on amassing funds to meet the cost of assuming a new post in following year, which sometimes involved becoming a vizier in Istanbul. Thus, one-year office tenure makes it complicated to evaluate the governors' efficiency. In this sense, some long tenures such as that of Koca Rağib Mehmed Pasha (r. 1157-1161/1744-48) make it easier to evaluate the relationship between mamluk beys and governors in a more revealing way.

By the seventeenth century, the decentralized period, as in all provinces, Ottoman officials in Egypt experienced a declining influence over local administrative staff.⁸⁹ This

⁸⁸ Metin Kunt, "Turks in the Ottoman Imperial Palace", in *Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires: A Global Perspective*, Duindam, Jeroen and Artan, Tülay and Kunt, Metin eds., (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2011), p. 290-91.

⁸⁹ Crecelius, "Egypt in the eighteenth century", p. 62

demonstrated itself in janissary grandees sharing the income sources that were assigned to the governor. Taking possession of selected revenue sources, the mamluk beys never paid the revenue to the governor or transferred it to the local military grandees and their households.⁹⁰ The corps of the *müstahfizan* (janissaries) was the most important military section of the seven regiments in Cairo. They were responsible for the city's security, and they attended military campaigns with the imperial army. They always outnumbered other regiments. In 1664, 4899 soldiers were registered in the regiment of *müstahfizan* (janissaries). This number rose first to 5263 in 1709 and then to 6893 in 1797. Forging a strong regiment made them an influential, pushing and aggressive force in the politics of Egypt.⁹¹ The grandees of the janissary regiments owned ships that brought coffee from Yemen; this provided them with huge revenues and a command over the commerce of the Red Sea.⁹²

In the seventeenth century, during the reforms of Defterdar Ahmed Pasha, the salary of the janissary regiment, *mevacib*, was reduced.⁹³ This cut encouraged the janissary grandees to compensate for their loss by seizing a portion of the income sources of the governors of Egypt, such as the customs of Bulaq and Damietta.⁹⁴ Although the Porte urged the governors to retake the customs, *müstahfizans* continued to challenge the governors,⁹⁵ and the central government's pressure on governors did not result in a positive outcome. They encountered various conflicts with the mamluk beys, many of which concluded to the governors' disadvantage, especially the taking of revenues from *mahlul* villages. Kamil Ahmed Pasha made a considerable effort to take control; however, the mamluk beys engineered his

⁹⁰ See chapter III on Income Sources, Kethüda mehmed Pasha's petition about governors' income inadequacy p.184-86

⁹¹ *Al-Damurdashi's chronicle of Egypt*, p. 24

⁹² Jane Hathaway, "The Ottomans and Yemeni Coffee Trade", *Oriente Moderno, Nuova Serie*, Anno 25(86) Nr. 1, The Ottomans and Trade, 2006, pp. 161-171, p. 169 Hathaway points out that the ships that janissary grandees traded were usually Indian ships. Either the officers bought them, or established partnership with overseas merchants.

⁹³ James Baldwin, "The Deposition of Defterdar Ahmed Pasha and the Rule of Law in Seventeenth- Century Egypt", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları/The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, XLVI, 2015, pp. 131-161, p. 142

⁹⁴ (TSM) D. 06840-00003

⁹⁵ A decree that states the customs of Bulaq and around belongs to the governor's revenue: MMD, vol. 6, nr. 236 (date late CA 1158/late June 1745)

dismissal in 1173/1759. The pressure of the Porte about this issue over the governors destabilized the balance between the mamluk beys and the governors.⁹⁶

Ghazaleh states that the military, legal and commercial spheres were intertwined in the eighteenth century, and this was used as leverage over the governors.⁹⁷ The most noticeable and palpable pressure placed on the governors by the mamluk beys was in compelling him to release *buyruldu*s that enabled mamluk beys to take extra revenues from the *irsaliye*. Mostly, the *emirulhadj* alleged that more financial support was needed in order to provide for the safety of pilgrims. This had a negative effect on the Porte's income by decreasing the amount of the *irsaliye*, in addition to inflating the mamluk beys' personal wealth. On the other hand, the governors were still held responsible by the Porte for the compensation of the full amount.⁹⁸ The governors of Egypt mostly went to their next post indebted, or found another way to compensate it from the *irsaliye* in the same manner as occurred in the case of Kethüda Mehmed Pasha.⁹⁹ The Porte pursued such cases mostly in order to maintain financial order. For example, the levies and tax of *jizya* of the years between 1168-1175/1755-1762 were not sent to Istanbul. The Porte was left devoid of a total amount more than 84.720.000 *paras*.¹⁰⁰ According to correspondence between the Porte and the governors of Egypt in the Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives, the demands of the Porte for compensation were met by the governors of Egypt with delays up to five years;¹⁰¹ however, accurate details about who was charged are unknown.

⁹⁶ The Porte had been forcing the governors to retaking the *mukaataas* for a while. Mustafa Pasha (1738-39) was also forced to retake the revenues from Bulaq and Damietta *mukaataas* from regiment of *müstahfizan*.

⁹⁷ Pascale Ghazaleh, "Trade in Power: Merchants and the State in 19th century-Egypt", *Int. J. Middle East Stud.* 45 (2013), 71-91 p. 85

⁹⁸ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 340 (date early S 1179/late July 1765) "*bu akçelerin cümlesi vülata cebr ve kürh ve desise ve hüd'a ile tahmil olunmuş akçelerden olmakdan naşi valilerin medyun olmalarına ve kesr ve mazarratı irsaliye hazinesine ve vüür ü hiyaneti Mısırluya aid ve raci' olub*"

⁹⁹ See chapter *irsaliye* p. 160

¹⁰⁰ MMD, vol 8, nr. 340 (date early S 1179/late July 1765)

¹⁰¹ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16890 (Z 1169/August 1756)

The chapter on the *irsaliye* demonstrated that the central government monitored the provincial administration in order to prevent mamluk beys' extracting money from the *irsaliye-i hazine*. However, the Porte's endeavour was not limited to the monitoring *irsaliye*, as the mamluk beys also had managed to seize the governors' other revenue sources, such as the grain from the tax-farm villages. By forcing the previous governors to issue *buyruldu*, a share of the grain was allocated to several mamluk beys. Orders were sent by the Porte to return those revenues belonging to the governors, in order to save them from debt. The previous *buyruldu* were cancelled, and for new requests it was ordered that applications could be made to the Porte directly.¹⁰² The mamluk beys' dominance over governors in shifting their revenues to themselves and households affected the provincial mint and fineness of the coin minted in Egypt as well.¹⁰³ In order to acquire more benefits from the *küşufiyye* of the mint, which had been assigned for the governor by the central government and then captured by the mamluk beys, the fineness of the coin issued in the mint house of Egypt was reduced. The central government sent a decree in order to set right the debased currency.

During the centralized period, the cause for a change of governor was mostly based on reports by the *sancak beys*. However, in the decentralized period of the empire, one of the factors in a new governor's being appointed to Egypt was reign change. From the end of the sixteenth century onwards, usually a new sultan acceding to the throne resulted in a new governor for Egypt. In addition, members of the military in the seventeenth century and mamluk beys in the eighteenth century influenced the tenure of office of the governors. They lobbied against the governors they did not like or found incompatible. The dismissal of the governor through the interference of the mamluk beys was not a rejection of the central

¹⁰² MMD, vol. 8, nr. 185 (early B 1177/early January 1764)

¹⁰³ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 408 (date early M 1180/ early June 1766) “*Darbhanes-i Mısır'da darb olunan altının ayar ve vezni asitane-i saadetim darbhanesinden darb olunan altının ayar ve veznine muvafik ve mutabik olması kavaid-i meriyye-i kadimeden iken Mısır'da darb olunan altının ayar ve vezni nakıs ve mağşuş olmasının ilel ve esbab-ı sairesinden biri dahi vülat-ı Mısır'ın küşufiyyesi ziyadece ihtilas için hakk nezareti ifaya adem-i mübalatı olmakdan naşi sikke-i hümayunun gâşşına badi olan ilel ve mevani'in külliyyen ref' ü def'i*”.

government's legitimacy. Baldwin's research revealed that the mamluk beys knew that the governor's acting was restricted by the law, and they used the legal institutions in order to enforce the limits of the governor's authority.¹⁰⁴

In a case of dismissal, it is possible to observe how the Porte reacted to the mamluk beys. The Porte accepted the ulema and military officers as a part of the administrative body in Egypt.¹⁰⁵ The mamluk beys requested the dismissal of Hamza Pasha (1179-1180/June 1765 to May 1767) in May 1767. As custom required, they sent a petition to the Porte informing the Porte that they wished the current governor to be replaced along with their reasons. A decree in response to their petition indicates how the Porte approached the dismissal of a governor in the period prior to Ali Bey's uprising. Calling them "*mütegallibe-i Mısır*", the Porte reproached the mamluk beys for being overbearing towards the governors, seizing their revenues and causing the governors to become indebted to the tune of approximately 16.000.000-20.000.000 *paras* when they left Egypt at the termination of their duty. Instead of execution of their duties such as sending *irsaliye* to Istanbul and *gilal* to Haremeyn, the mamluk beys were accused of behaving in an overbearing manner in accordance with the coarseness of their personality: "*mukteza-yı huşunet*" and wickedness of their character "*hubs-ı tıynet*" which led them to seek to dismiss their governor. The Porte chided the mamluks for their action. It is noteworthy that the Porte did not select a name or a group but mentioned those who conspired to dismiss the governor as "*mütegallibe-i Mısır*" – usurpers of Egypt.

Once the governor was dismissed, he was required to assign a trustworthy *kaimmakam*, (deputy), for his position, or remain governing until the new governor arrived. In

¹⁰⁴ Baldwin, "The Deposition of Defterdar Ahmed Paşa", p. 132

¹⁰⁵ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date mid Z 1180/mid May 1767)

the eighteenth century, *şeyhülbeleds* were assigned as *kaimmakam*. If the governor died in office, both the *kadı* and *defterdar* took over the duty of *kaimmakam* in tandem.

When a governor died in office, after paying his debts and distributing bequests to his heirs, all his belongings were sent to the Porte. An officer called *mübaşir* was employed to handle this duty. The *mübaşir* usually supervised and oversaw while the belongings of the deceased governor were being collected and carried to a safe place in the castle, for transport to the sultan's palace in Istanbul. Since because this was a government duty, during the legal procedure, the *kadı* or other officers were not supposed to take money as tax from the *mübaşir*, but often those restrictions were ignored. In the imperial decrees from the eighteenth century the *kadı* was also demanded not to take money as tax during the procedure.¹⁰⁶

The governors and local interest groups: a conflict or pursuit of financial power and authority?

Egypt was like a mirror of the imperial capital: the reflections of the orderliness of the reign of Kanuni Sultan Suleyman, and/or the change and transformation of the seventeenth century was immediately reflected in Egypt. It can be suggested that the stability in the management of the province was related to the components of the administration, and their authority share in the province. After dominant governors, certain military members' gained power and authority and impressed their stamp on seventeenth century Egypt. As a result of the transformation process of the seventeenth century, the power balance changed in Egypt. Current literature draws a picture of prosperous Egypt with powerful, dominant and strong governors before the seventeenth century and of a chaotic Egypt with weak and less dominant governors in later periods. In fact, it is difficult to distinguish those periods of time as black and white. Local notables, in our case the mamluk beys, filled the gap left by

¹⁰⁶ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 241 (early R 1178/late September 1764) After the death of Ahmed Pasha, his bequeath was demanded to be sent to Istanbul immediately. The *kadı* was warned not to charge tax as the proceedings was official.

governors in the eighteenth century. The decentralized administration with local administrators was viable, if not perfect. The mamluk beys fostered a good relationship with the central government, like their counterpart *ayans* in other provinces, and this helped them to enlarge their manipulation of Egypt's politics and provincial administration, as they earned the central government's legitimization while they were offering their loyalty and service.

It is a fact that periods of prolonged peace led the armed soldiers to make their way to Egypt, and with the devaluation of the currency, military members were interested in the commerce and tax-farming more than military service; or they found a way to gain easy money under the disguise of trade.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, mamluk beys, becoming wealthy, began to seize the revenue sources, and the desire for wealth encouraged mamluk beys to integrate themselves further into the administration. Last of all, the mamluk beys who joined mamluk households were considered the real administrators of Egypt at the end of the eighteenth century.¹⁰⁸

Crececius claims that the governors were sent to Egypt from Istanbul with a hidden agenda to challenge the authority of the mamluk beys.¹⁰⁹ Acting on secret orders, the governors were expected to do their best to bring down the dominant local grandees.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, the decrees, recorded in the *mühimme-i Mısır defter* series, suggest that the Porte considered mamluk beys as local administrators who helped the governor in carrying out the orders and duties. The mamluk beys were not referred as tyrants who seized the state's authority in Egypt, as long as there was not an obvious disobedience. So to speak, the Porte

¹⁰⁷ For detail see Andre Raymond, *Artisans et Commerçants, au Caire au XVIIIe siècle*, (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 1973-1974) The military felt the devaluation of silver money disastrously. From 1624 to 1798, Egyptian *para* lost four-fifths of its value. Among the soldiers, trading was common. From the Ottoman conquest on, the janissaries sold things in shops. (see Ibn Iyas, *Journal d'un Bourgeois du Caire: Chronique d'ibn iyas*, transl. G. Wiet, (Rennes: Armand Colin, 1955-1960) transl. G. Wiet, vol. 2, p. 290) Raymond mentions that, looking for other sources, the soldiers started to exploit the city dwellers and trading. They did not had difficulty in trading because it was the occupation of some of them before joining the military, and also, ruling cast did not have any prejudice towards trade. Andre Raymond, "Soldiers in Trade: The Case of Ottoman Cairo", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.18, No. 1, 1991, pp. 16-37

¹⁰⁸ Luigi Mayer, *Views in Egypt*, (London, 1801) p. 59

¹⁰⁹ Crececius, "Egypt in the eighteenth century", p. 60

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 60

was giving the local administrators their personal space to govern in the province; yet, it always mingled with the administration of Egypt. While authorizing the mamluk beys in practicing their authority in the administration, the Porte was providing a superior surveillance on the provincial administration. For example, the central government was managing and pursuing the larger organisations such as shipbuilding in Suez, or maintenance of seawalls on the coast of the Mediterranean.

Before Ali Bey's uprising, in the 1760s when the mamluk beys extended their authority over the governors to an excessive degree the Porte remonstrated with them bluntly. Although it did not take action immediately by sending troops, the Porte put its reaction into words. Rakım el-Hac Mehmed Pasha's tenure of office (1181-1182/1767-68) is important as it coincides with Ali Bey's tenure of *şeyhülbeled*. In the decree, which announces that Rakım Mehmed Pasha was appointed as the governor, his personality and his mastering of the state's issues were mentioned.¹¹¹ The generosity, patriotism, and shrewdness in his personality and his desired actions were praised, and he was expected to maintain his good behaviour.¹¹² In other decrees, Rakım Mehmed Pasha's loyalty, truthfulness, and sagacity were praised.¹¹³ In the beginning of his office in Egypt, it can be said that Rakım Mehmed Pasha supported Ali Bey al-Kabir in his struggles with the other mamluk beys. The *şeyhülbeled* Halil Bey, who was in charge before Ali Bey al-Kabir had a struggle with Ali Bey and his followers on 20 Cemaziyelevvel 1181/14 October 1767. He was defeated and came back to Cairo and requested from the governor Rakım Mehmed Pasha the banishment of Ali Bey, and 5.000.000

¹¹¹ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 484 (date mid Z 1180/ mid May 1767)

¹¹² MMD, vol. 8, nr. 484 (date mid Z 1180/ mid May 1767): '*Senki vezir-i müşarun-ileyhsin zatında olan cevher-i fütüvvet ve hamiyet ve lem'a-i kiyaset ve dirayet muktezasınca öteden beri memur olduğun umur-ı devlet suretyab ve şuhud olan hareket-i pesendidenden başka be-tahsis-i devlet-i aliyemden ihraz ile hasıl-ı desdar-ı saltanat ebed müddetim olduğunun vaktinden beru salik-i mesalik-i sadakat ve istikamet in ve istihsal-i rıza-yı yümn-i padişahanemden haiz-i fasl-ı esbak eksa-yı metalib-i ve amal olub fimabad dahi senden dab-ı devlet-i aliyeme layık ve namus-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeme muvafık hareket-i saide ve me'ser-i hamiyet melhuz-ı tab*'

¹¹³ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date mid Z 1180/ mid May 1767): "*müddet-i medideden beri devlet-i aliyeye-i daimü'l-kararımın menasib-ı samiyesinde sadakat ve istikamet ve hüsn-i tedbir ve dirayet ile maruf ve mücerreb olan vezir müşarun-ileyh intihab ve sizi tarik-i müştekime delalet için rütbe-i vala-yı vezaret ile size vali nasb ve irsal olunmağla*"

paras in order to defeat him. The Pasha declined to do that and the struggles ensued. Eventually *şeyhülbeled* Halil Bey escaped from Egypt.¹¹⁴ On 2 Cemaziyelahir 1181/26 October 1767, Ali Bey al-Kabir went to the castle and Rakım Mehmed Pasha dressed him with *hilat* and announced him as the *şeyhülbeled*. This date is the beginning of Ali Bey's prolonged period of influence over the affairs of Egypt.¹¹⁵ On 17 Receb 1182/ 27 November 1768, Rakım Mehmed Pasha released a statement proclaiming his concern regarding the situation. He wanted to take action against Ali Bey and break his authority. Yet, al-Jabarti claims that Rakım Mehmed Pasha's closest man was a betrayer.¹¹⁶ The *kethüda* of the governor Rakım Mehmed Pasha, Abdullah Bey, informed Ali Bey about the governor's plan. Ali Bey occupied the gates of the castle and deposed the governor. Mehmed Rakım Pasha stayed at Küçük Ahmed Bey's house like a prisoner.¹¹⁷ However, from al-Jabarti's aforementioned narration, in early N 1181/21 January- 1 February 1768, it would appear that Rakım Mehmed Pasha was still in control of the office, as the decree is addressed to him.¹¹⁸ The author of the *Sicill-i Osmani* mentions that the central government dismissed Rakım Mehmed Pasha for the reason that his old age caused Ali Bey's disobedience.¹¹⁹ Rakım Mehmed Pasha died in Egypt in 1183/1769-1770, most probably before he managed to go to his new position in Jidda. Al-Jabarti states that it is highly likely that he was poisoned.¹²⁰

During Rakım Pasha's governorship the repair and maintenance of the dams and water channels is significant, as they show us that in the second half of the eighteenth century, Ottoman central government was concerned with and engaged in Egypt's order and needs. Also, the repair processes were realized in an imperial style, which contradicts the notion of

¹¹⁴ al-Jabarti, *Ajaib*, vol. 1, p. 416

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 418

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 418

¹¹⁷ al-Jabarti, *Ajaib*, vol. 1, p. 490

¹¹⁸ MMD, vol. 8, nr. 537 (date early N 1181/late January 1768)

¹¹⁹ *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. 4, p. 1346

¹²⁰ al-Jabarti, *Ajaib*, vol. 1, p. 525

Egypt as an autonomous province. The required equipment for the repairs were sourced, and bought in Egypt or brought from other provinces.¹²¹ All of the repair processes were planned by the central government in Istanbul, and the expenses were met by the annual levy, the *irsaliye-i hazine*. The Porte met the cost of repairs by *irsaliye*; it preserved the villagers' cultivable lands, and met the needs of *reaya*, and supported life, agriculture and trade in the province. Likewise, it conserved the province from chaos and disorder.

It is suggested, however, that in the eighteenth century Ottoman Egypt, the central government lost its ability to direct Egypt's affairs. The members of the mamluk households took the leading positions in the administration and military regiments. The representatives of the central government, the governor, chief judge and black eunuch, could do little to prevent mamluk beys penetrating the provincial administration and endeavouring to change the flow of Egypt's extensive revenue from imperial to local objectives. Since they did not have the power to control the local grandees, the governors found different means in order to maintain control such as supporting weaker households against the dominant ones, or giving consent for one household to eliminate another in return for *hulvan*.¹²²

Putting aside the notion of balance and decline of authority, further archival research challenges the discourse that insists on the characterization of governors as 'weak' or ineffectual. It can be said that the governors did their best to prevent income sources from remaining in the grip of the mamluk beys. This was arguably motivated by their desire to leave Egypt more prepared for their next post by maximizing their own financial sources. However, detailed archival research contradicts the notion of the weak governor, at least until the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

¹²¹ For example, Egypt lacked of the wood, which was needed during the maintenance process. The imperial orders demanded it to be brought from South-west Anatolia [Kazdağı] by ships. For the importance of irrigation, the repair of dams and lack of wood see Alan Mikhail, *Nature and Empire in the Ottoman Egypt: An environmental history*, (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 8-18

¹²² Daniel Crecelius, "Egypt in the eighteenth century", p. 60

Nevertheless, a conflict and a struggle proceeded between the two components of the provincial administration in the eighteenth century Egypt. As the mamluks got stronger in terms of financial and administrative authority, the revenues from major financial sources, notably from the tax farms, passed to mamluk beys.¹²³ In this sense, the incomes of *hulvans* of a deceased mamluk bey had frequently become problematic. Terminologically called *mahlul*, these *hulvans* were among the income sources of the governor of Egypt. Mamluk beys persisted in trying to disengage the governors, thereby preserving their households' revenue. In general, the mamluk beys used the procedure of "*musalehe*"¹²⁴, which kept the cost of villages lower, while taking over their predecessors' tax farms, in addition to the times that they found a way to circumvent the governors.¹²⁵

Occasionally issues about the *hulvan* cases between mamluk beys and governors were brought to the attention of the Porte. In one case, Yahya Pasha (1154-55/1741-42) raised a remonstrance about mamluk beys who prevented him from gaining his authorized income source, *hulvan* from a deceased mamluk, Rezzaz Hasan Kethüda.¹²⁶ In response, the Porte sent a decree to Rağib Mehmed Pasha (1157-1161/1744-48), the governor at that time, and demanded the price of some villages that Yahya Pasha was entitled to.¹²⁷ Hasan Kethüda, who was a senior of the Azeban corps, died in Ramadan 1154/ November 1741. While some of his villages were being sold as *musalehe*, the followers of the deceased kept the rest of the

¹²³ Nelly Hanna "Culture in ottoman Egypt", in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. II: *Modern Egypt: From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, Martin W. Daly, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1998), p. 92

¹²⁴ *musalehe* or *musalaha*: an arabic word meaning 'compromise reached by negotiation between opposing interests.

¹²⁵ See for detailed information chapter II on Income Sources and Order, p. 125

¹²⁶ Yahya Pasha raised a complaint about the issue two years after his office was terminated in Egypt, when he was asked for his duties and burdens for the central government such as *caize*, *cizye* and other *avaids*, which are cost of his post as the governor of Egypt.

¹²⁷ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 23 (date early R 1157/ mid May 1744) and MMD, vol. 6, nr. 173 (date mid L 1157/late November 1744). According to regulations, when a holder of a tax farm died, if the village is registered on his name, an auction must have taken place, and the village must have been sold at its normal price, as *bedl-i hulvan*, which was seven times of its annual profit. But if the village was registered on a follower of the deceased mamluk bey, it was sold cheaper than the normal price, as *bedl-i musalehe*, which was three times of annual profit. And the amount that was obtained from the sale was the revenue of the governor, which he used to spend in general on soldiers of *hazine*, the burdens of *divan*, and *caize*, which is a burden that the governor had to pay as the cost of his post in Egypt.

villages, hoping that they could buy them at a very low price after Yahya Pasha left; they also did not allow other aspirants to buy them until Yahya Pasha (r. 1741-42) left Cairo.¹²⁸

At this point, one can raise some questions about Yahya Pasha's highlighting of this issue after the end of his office. We do not have any evidence about Yahya Pasha's demanding the value of villages from the followers of Hasan Kethüda. Did he demand the price from the followers? Did he use his full authority to enable the collection of the price? Was he convincing enough to obtain the price of the villages, arrange the auction and sell the rest of the villages? Or was it because of the fact that he was reluctant to deal with mamluk beys because of a probable conflict with them? Moreover, it is a subject of curiosity whether Yahya Pasha intentionally delayed the collection of the money after he evaluated the issue when he was still the governor of Egypt; perhaps he assumed that the latter governors would collect the amount instead of him. Alternatively, did he believe that he could pay his burdens to the Porte with his other incomes? Whatever the case may be, Rağib Mehmed Pasha (1157-1161/1744-48) was instructed to collect the price of those villages from the mamluk beys and send it to the Porte as the payment for Yahya Pasha's burden to the Porte. As a result of this order, Rağib Mehmed Pasha had to confront the mamluk beys. It is highly likely that the mamluk beys would not be easy prey and would not be eager to pay the money; it was proven that this was the case.¹²⁹

When Rağib Mehmed Pasha raised the issue in the divan, followers of Hasan Kethüda claimed that by the time Hasan Kethüda died, the villages were held as a pledge. After he died, the holders of the villages paid whom and became *mutasarrıf* of the villages again; they then showed the references in front of the members of divan.

¹²⁸ Yahya Pasha could not manage to take the revenues of those villages from the followers of Hasan Kethüda. After two years, when he was asked for his duties such as *cizye* and *caize* from the time of his office in Egypt, he raised his *kavaim*, the documents which proved that he could not collect his revenue, and requested the collection of that amount in the place of his debts.

¹²⁹ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 23 (date early R 1157/ mid May 1744)

The correspondence took place between Belgrad, where Yahya Pasha was currently in office, Cairo and Istanbul.¹³⁰ In the end, the Porte found the mamluk beys' responses to be lacking in credibility, and advised Rağıb Mehmed Pasha not to credit the mamluk beys justification/defence, and to proceed to collect the aforementioned disbursements. The Porte considered any other solution as unjustness towards Yahya Pasha, and something that might serve as a bad example and precedent for successor governors of Egypt.¹³¹

This correspondence shows us that the central government was quite concerned with ensuring that the administrative mechanism worked properly in its relatively remote provinces.¹³² Although the prosecution about the deceased's *hulvan* was prolonged for a few years, still the law case was pursued. If there was a problem, the correspondence found the governors in their current posts and they were expected to contribute to the solution.¹³³

During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Porte never asked the governors to break the mamluk beys' power and dominance until Gazi Hasan Pasha's military campaign on Egypt in 1786. Instead of dealing with powerful mamluk beys, each of the governors was ordered to meet the Haremeyn's needs without fail, and to ensure that the *irsaliye* and other levies such as *hulvan* and *caize* were sent to the imperial treasury. There is no evidence that the Porte considered mamluk beys in a different way, than that of their being local administrators in the province. Although the governors were the main holders of the most important post and appointed by the central government in Istanbul, they were not the one and only addressees of the central government; mostly the central government directed their

¹³⁰ Yahya Pasha pointed out that in general mamluk beys never let the governor have the *kavaim*, the documents of villages; they captured them in a way, even with fake documents. He explained that the reason that he had *kavaim* was that mamluk beys were very busy with Osman Bey's family.

¹³¹ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 243 (date late CA 1158/late June 1745) One year later another decree was produced which mentions the amount was not sent. The Porte deduced from the delay that the Egyptian local administrators behaved according to their non-ethical behaviours: "... *Mısır'ın taahhüd ve iltizamlarında televvün-i hal ve kizb-i akvallerini ...*" (MMD, vol. 6, nr. 311 and nr. 312 (early CA 1159/late May 1746)).

¹³² MMD, vol. 6, nr. 243 (date late CA 1158/late June 1745).

¹³³ MMD, vol. 6, nr. 244 (date late CA 1158/late June 1745).

decrees regarding different issues in or around Egypt to the officers at the head of seven corps, the *kadi*, the *şeyhülbeled*, the most powerful mamluk bey in Cairo, as well as the governor.

The Prevalence of Change and Transformation: The Adjustment of the Governor's Authority in Egypt

Holt claims that one of the most easy and peaceful times was during the period following Canım Seyfi, and İnal's, and then Hain Ahmed Pasha's challenge to the new Ottoman regime, and reaffirmation of Ottoman authority by Pargalı İbrahim Pasha and his *kanunname-i Mısır*, for the regulation of the governorship of Egypt.¹³⁴ The centralized administrative system of the empire was echoed in Egypt as well. The governor was a powerful figure in Cairo, holding undisputed authority until the end of the sixteenth century. During these years the governors did not face any opposition against their authority. After this stable period, an increasing restlessness developed in Egypt that was related to the problems within the central government. The devaluation of currency, which resulted in unrest among the military establishment across the Empire due to the reduced buying power represented by the soldiers' wages, caused population mobility. Mercenaries and other soldiers who were released from the battlefields of the western frontier moved to Anatolia and Egypt. As a result of the devaluation of the *akçe* and end of the expansion of the borders, the revolts of soldiers became common. Meanwhile, in the countryside, inflation and overpopulation pushed landholding cavalry officers and peasants off the land; this was to be called the 'great flight'.¹³⁵

In Egypt, *sipahis*, whose main duty was to assist *kaşifs* in small provinces in order to collect taxes and maintain order, challenged the government. In fact, some military revolts

¹³⁴ Holt, "the Beylicate", p. 216

¹³⁵ Suraiya Faroqhi, "Economic Crisis and Partial Recovery" in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1914*, Halil İnalcik and Donald Quataert ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1997), pp. 433-441

took place at the end of the sixteenth century. Even the Egyptian governor İbrahim Pasha (1013/1604) died in one of these revolts.¹³⁶ Kulkıran Mehmed Pasha, who succeeded İbrahim Pasha investigated the death of the latter in order to identify and punish the perpetrators. Although this resulted in a larger revolt, Mehmed Pasha quelled it. In addition, he abolished the tax called *tulba*, in order to promote rural prosperity. These relatively successful actions of Kulkıran were limited achievements in terms of the future of the province, as they were not the solution in the long term.

Kulkıran's successor Kara Mehmed Pasha (r. 1016-1020/1607-1611), searched for a solution to the underlying problems. He found out that extra tax and some misconduct by administrative staff were the cause of the problems, and he took action in order to fix those deficiencies. He determined the problems and tried to fix them by introducing the following measures: The tax of *küşufiyye* cost 100.000 gold coins, which was collected by a newly appointed governor from the *kaşifs*. He abolished this practice, as it was a burden for the administrators and the people as well. The *iltizams* were managed by *kaşifs*. He shifted the *iltizams*' management to the divan of Egypt. He dismissed the *kaşifs* and *emins* who ruined the orderliness of the province. He abolished the Mamluks' system for land measurement, and applied the *tarbii* system.¹³⁷ He improved the adjustment of *sikke*. He improved the warehouses belonging to the government, and appointed trustworthy administrators. He gathered *kaşifs*, *emins*, *sancak beys*, and military members and told them that he would pursue the reforms according to the sultan's orders. After his announcement about the abolishment of the extra taxes such as *tulba*, the soldiers from *gönüllüyan*, *tüfenkçıyan* and *çerakise* rose up

¹³⁶ Holt, "the Beylicate", p. 217

¹³⁷ The square measure *tarbii*, for measuring land was held to be a more accurate basis for land registration and taxation. The Ottomans carried out a comprehensive land survey in Egypt according to which square measure was made the standard means for land measurement replacing the Mamluk system of land measurement.

and killed the *kaşif* of Ğarbiye. When the governor Kara Mehmed Pasha sent a large army to suppress their uprising and compromised with the bedouins, they had to surrender.¹³⁸

It can be suggested that Kara Mehmed Pasha's measures and solutions were not applied or were of minimal effective use in the long term. The perception of "maintaining the order" was the same as the eighteenth century perspective: abolishing the innovations, and restoring and re-establishing the institutions of the era of Süleyman the Magnificent was the action plan of both the governor and the central government. The central government was not interested in grasping the underlying economic factors, which resulted in the current situation. Nevertheless, Kulkıran's end of tenure in Egypt was followed by the rise of beylicate in Egypt.¹³⁹ These revolts revealed that the governors of Egypt were devoid of the support of the military regiments in Egypt.

The costly battles with the Hapsburgs challenged the empire. In order to cope with the Hapsburg's firepower, the Ottoman Empire armed the peasants with rifles. After their return from the war, peasants with rifles spread throughout the countryside and the result was civil unrest called the Celali rebellions. The Ottoman Empire responded to that crisis by "*transforming itself from a military conquest state into a bureaucratic state and bastion of Sunni Islam.*"¹⁴⁰ In this sense, the sultan's control over the Hijaz and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina became eminent in his new role.¹⁴¹

While the state treasury expenditures and revenues were well adjusted in the middle of the sixteenth century, the expenditures rose to triple the amount of the revenues by the end of the century. When expenditure and revenue fell out of balance, new revenue sources were sought and the *irsaliye-i hazine* of Egypt became a prominent source of ready cash. The

¹³⁸ es-Seyyid Mahmud, *XVI. Asırda Mısır Eyaleti*, p. 100

¹³⁹ Holt, *The Fertile Crescent*, p. 75-77

¹⁴⁰ Jane Hathaway, "Egypt in the Seventeenth Century", in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, vol. II: *Modern Egypt: From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, Martin W. Daly, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) pp. 34-58

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 35

irsaliye-i hazine was expected, more than ever, to be full and complete, and greater in amount. In order to gain more dues and imposts in the course of new appointments or renewals, governors or other officers were dismissed more frequently. As a result of those changing circumstances, Egypt's importance for the Empire shifted from being a staging area to a supplier of revenue to the imperial treasury and equipper of the Holy cities.

Another issue in the financial administration was the military members. The number of some corps' members increased in the seventeenth century and insufficient salaries encouraged or led them to take over financial and administrative duties. The cavalry members introduced some new types of tax such as *tulba* and *kulfa*.¹⁴² Intervening of the soldiers in administration started one of the biggest political problems in seventeenth century Egypt. In time, they interfered and rose against members of *divan*, even against the governor. Military members began to usurp the authority of governors.

The end of the sixteenth century was also a turning point for the mamluk beys. They gained back authority, took *kaşifliks* by *iltizam*, and enabled their subordinates and sons to take office in the military corps. Sub district administration began to become corrupt. Thus, previous misconduct dating from the days of the Mamluk Sultanate returned. While they were the supporting force for the governor against the soldiery rebellions in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the mamluk beys began to challenge the governor's authority henceforth.¹⁴³

Crecelius claims that, in the change and transformation period of seventeenth century, Ottoman central government lost the ability to efficiently direct Egypt's affairs.¹⁴⁴ Some incidents support his claims as follows; in 1032/1623, the military members did not

¹⁴² '*tulba*' and '*kulfa*' was a type of tax which was collected by the soldiers for administrative expenses connected with tax collecting. Although Kulkıran Mehmed Pasha (1015/1607) abolished illegal taxes such as *tulba*, *kulfa* and *küşufiyye*, especially *küşufiyye* was continued to be collected in the eighteenth century. [EI², Groot A. H. de, Mehmed Pasha, Öküz]

¹⁴³ Hathaway, "Egypt in the Seventeenth Century", p. 41

¹⁴⁴ Crecelius, "Egypt in the eighteenth century", p. 59

accept the new governor sent by the sultan, and insisted on the continuation in office of Kara Mustafa Pasha (1032/1623). Then in 1040/1631, by dismissing Musa Pasha (1040/1630-1) and enabling a formal deposition decision from the Porte, the *Mısır kulu* had become a precedent for those who came after them.¹⁴⁵

By the same token, some mamluk beys such Rıdvan Bey (1631-1656) revived the notion of beylicate.¹⁴⁶ Rıdvan Bey's dominance and influence both in Cairo and Istanbul challenged three governors, who wanted to break his authority. Holt claims that during military revolts, governors and *sancak* beys appeared in the beginning to be in close cooperation against the fractious elements among the military classes.¹⁴⁷ However, in time, *sancak* beys gained power and became audacious, and during the seventeenth century, they began to compete with the military in this sense.

Although the incidents of mamluk beys' dismissing governors was an administrative problem in terms of the central government, for more than a century, until Mehmed Ali Pasha's governorship in the nineteenth century, the Porte handled the affairs of Egypt in a mostly competent way. It can be assumed that the Porte perceived the problems in the administration in Egypt mostly as financial problems, consisting of incomplete and delayed *irsaliye-i hazine* payments. Competition among the mamluk beys and its reflection on the Egyptian political environment finds a place in the decrees, for example in the case of the problems in the administration of tax farms and villages.

In conclusion, seventeenth century Ottoman Egypt was a scene of demographic, fiscal and military transformation, as a part of a wider trend witnessed throughout the Empire. Although the expansion was slower, the aforementioned military and economic crisis resulted

¹⁴⁵ Holt, *The Fertile Crescent*, p. 218

¹⁴⁶ Holt explains the "bey" as a rank holder and mentions that it did not characterize with a specific office or function. Holt, "the Beylicate", p. 220

¹⁴⁷ Holt, "The Beylicate", p. 219

in migrations within the empire. Egypt was an important destination in this sense. Thus, transformed demographic, military and fiscal conditions continued to nurture household political culture in the eighteenth century.¹⁴⁸

Chapter Conclusion

Egypt played a strategically important position in the Ottoman Empire's integrity as a link between the central government and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina as well as in the trade between the Red Sea and Indian Ocean where the Ottoman Empire supported its religious legitimacy and commercial wealth. Furthermore, Egypt, as a province, provided an enormous wealth for the Empire as already discussed in the previous chapters. Taken together, the aforementioned reasons brought up the governorship of Egypt to a special position where the governors acquired a large wealth and they could advance to the post for the grand vizierate in the career chain. The Porte paid special attention that the governors appointed to Egypt were capable and loyal to the central government. The decrees that announce a statesman's governorship in Egypt included, in general, the phrases about the new governor's loyalty, truthfulness, and capability for the post.¹⁴⁹ This was a way for the Porte to announce that the new governor was worthy and clearly deserving of this significant post.

Although modern historians suggest that the governor in Egypt was nominal like an ambassador, the archival documents prove that the term of "ambassador" does not fit in with the governors of Egypt during the mid-eighteenth century. The two-way correspondence

¹⁴⁸ Hathaway, "Egypt in the seventeenth century", p. 58

¹⁴⁹ For example to Hamza Pasha: MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date mid Z 1180/mid May 1767); to Kethüda Mehmed Pasha: MMD, vol. 8, nr. 90 (early M 1176/late July 1762); to Rakım el-Hac Mehmed Pasha MMD, vol. 8, nr. 484 (date mid Z 1180/ mid May 1767)

between Ottoman Egypt and the Porte shows that the governors were active figures in Egypt's politics during that period.¹⁵⁰

In addition to shorter tenure in office, the dominance and seizing by mamluk beys' of a greater share in the authority and more revenue sources in Egypt, including those belonging to the governors, made eighteenth century Egyptian governor weaker compared to his counterparts in the sixteenth century. Nevertheless, the decree records in the Prime Minister's Archives suggest that the governor of Egypt was more than a shadowy figure or nominal presence in the Egyptian administration and politics. It was obvious that, like many other provinces of the Empire, the decentralized Ottoman system was reflected in Egypt as well. "Ayanlık", and "ayans" (terms used for the local administrators) had become a reality for all the Empire. It can be said that the activities that mamluk beys' were engaged in were more or less the same as those of the administrators in other provinces, except that Egypt was a rather remote province.

Ottoman empire's decentralized administrative system was concentrated on running the administration in Egypt in good order, and on receiving the revenues in full and on time, rather than on strengthening the role of the governor as representative of the central government. This pragmatic approach allowed compromise with the mamluk beys so long as they acted in accordance with the central government's requirements such as keeping the prices low in the market or sending cereal to Haremeyn annually but more importantly providing the imperial treasury with the *irsaliye-i hazine* as the empire was desperately in need of cash.

It could be inferred that on some occasions the governor, rather than executing his decisions, had to validate the decisions of mamluk beys. A clear example of this is seen in the

¹⁵⁰ Baldwin, *Islamic law*, p. 31-74. For detailed information about Ottoman Egypt's jurisdiction system in the eighteenth century see: James Baldwin, "Petitioning the Sultan in Ottoman Egypt", *Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies*, (2012) 75, 3, pp. 499-524.

situation of Hamza Pasha's rule (1179-1180/1765-67).¹⁵¹ However, the Porte was not late in its intervention; it tried to turn the situation in favour of the people and the state by sending decrees and officers to execute its demands.

From the central government's point of view, providing the revenues from Egypt and keeping the province in the compass of the empire were crucial; thus the details of struggle in the Egyptian internal politics was a matter of secondary importance. When we try to consider the situation from the point of view of the Egyptian people, including elites and Ali Bey's mamluk counterparts, how would the situation look? Given that the policies pursued in the period of Ali Bey's authority (*i.e.* imposing more taxes on the people) led to financial difficulties for people, we can suggest that the conditions might have been better for them if the central government had enjoyed greater authority over Egypt.

During the centralized administrative period, the Empire had a control mechanism on the governor of Egypt; however, after the sixteenth century, the tenure of office decreased to one year. Furthermore, the governors tended to care more about collecting for *pişkeş* for their next post, which caused the governor's authority to weaken in Egypt. Gaining power over time, the mamluk beys filled the authority vacuum; they had authority over the governor as well and seized his revenue sources. Therefore, in the 1780s, the revenue of the governor decreased by 50% compared to the beginning of the century. The Porte intervened in the issue; that is to say that in order to regain the governors' revenue and to receive a regular annual tribute payment it sent several decrees that threatened the mamluk beys. Nevertheless, until Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb's death in 1775, the governors of Egypt held the authority despite the challenges mounted by the mamluk beys.

¹⁵¹ See chapter III on Irsaliye and Rebellion, p. 179

When looking at the governors in office during the period in which Ali Bey held authority, we can see that the governors who were in office in Egypt were experienced and skilled statesmen; but that they could deal with mamluk beys' dominance only to a certain extent. Mamluk beys were looking for the gaps in the authority, which could put the governors into a difficult position; they sometimes took advantage of old age or death, and sometimes dismissed the governors. Put in other words, they sought for the possible ways of having influence over the governors. However, Ali Bey al-Kabir gained enough power to challenge their authority with his young retinue and huge wealth that he acquired from his rivals' assets. When it comes to the positions of the governors in the eighteenth century, we should consider that they not only needed to be competent and to have a strong and dominant character but they also needed enough time and financial power in order to cope with the aforementioned activities of the mamluk beys, who gained power over time and in succession. The tenure of office for only one-year period clearly did not offer enough time for the governors to establish "local" authoritative administration. In order to advance in their pathway of career, they might have seen the choice of completing their one-year duty as reasonable and considerable given that it was an easy task to deal with the mamluk beys to reduce their authority in the province. An example case could be that of Kamil Ahmed Pasha (1173/1759-60), who tried to keep the mamluk beys in line in an attempt to weaken their dominance but had to face up to their attempts to dismiss him.

I contend that the central government did not force the governors to struggle with the dominant mamluk beys in order to seize the authority until Gazi Hasan Pasa's campaign against Murad and Ibrahim Beys in 1786. It is likely that the governors did not want to encourage confrontation with the mamluk beys unless they were ordered to do so. One could suggest that they might have preferred to focus on their other tasks, which could bring more

benefits in their efforts to advance to the next post. Given that this next post in the one-year tenure was an important step in their career, this assumption seems to be plausible.

In addition, we know that Egypt was once popular among the statesmen for a governorship post since it provided a great amount of revenue as was also admitted by the Porte. However, in the second half of the eighteenth century it was obvious that statesmen preferred to be appointed in the provinces that provided less revenue than Egypt. The chief cause for this lies in the fact that the mamluk beys' brute force over the governors had resulted in loss of revenue and excesses of debt for the governors. Hamza Pasha's experience with *emirulhadj* Salih Bey is an example of this phenomenon.¹⁵² In an attempt to address the issue, the Porte sent decrees to Egypt, as already discussed, which informed and warned the mamluk beys about their behaviour and attitudes. Although these had numerous repercussions in Istanbul and the mamluk beys were consequently rebuked and threatened with punishment, it seems that these steps taken against them did not fully resolve the problems. Therefore, once again, it could be suggested that the acts of mamluk beys had a considerable impact on both the policies of the governors in Egypt and their willingness to offer their candidacy for this once-coveted post.¹⁵³

¹⁵² MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488 (date mid Z 1180/mid May 1767): “*müddet-i vafireden beri tevliyet-i Kahire Mısır'dan munfasıl olan vüzeranın müddet-i zabtlarına göre hin-i infisallerinde kiminin 1000 kese ve kiminin 800 kese deyni zuhur edub hasretü'l-vüzera olan iklim-i Mısır'a vali nasb olunan vüzera mansıbının menafi'i ve fevaidinden bi-behre kaldıklarından başka*”

¹⁵³ MMD 8, h. 488 (date mid Z 1180/mid May 1767): “*bu güne medyunen ma'zul olmaları mütegalibe-i Mısır'ın varidat-ı valiyi hod be hod ihtilas ve zabt tasaddi ve cüretlerinden naşi idiği malum-ı ilm-i alem-şumül-i şehinşahanem değil mi zann olunur*”

General Conclusion

This study examines the uprising of a local notable, Ali Bey al-Kabir between 1768 and 1772 during the Russo-Ottoman war. In order to reveal the causes behind Ali Bey's uprising against the central government, and to understand the relationship in between the local administrative groups, Ottoman Egypt is examined in the light of the financial, political, and commercial activities of the mid-eighteenth century. Existing historiography suggests that Ali Bey's "uprising" was a counter stance against the Ottoman sovereignty and it aimed to establish an independent nation. This study challenges previous historiography and makes a unique contribution to the literature in several aspects. First of all, an exhaustive research relying on the primary sources based on the archival documents and contemporary chronicles strongly suggests that Egypt remained as a crucial component of the imperial government in the second half of the eighteenth century. As already discussed throughout the study, the central government monitored the provincial administration closely during this period, and from time to time intervened in the financial administration in order to protect the order that it had established earlier. However, it is a fact that the breakdown of a four-year period, as indicated in the decree records in *mühimme-i Mısır defter* series, overlaps with the period of Ali Bey's expansionist movements towards the neighbouring provinces. Also, the subsequent documentation clearly shows us that this breakdown was a short period, and it did not take too long for the central government to resume control.

The original contribution of the current study to the field lies mainly in the detailed archival research on the provincial finance and politics of Egypt and in the facts that have been uncovered in the light of these. Throughout thesis different archival documents alongside the subsequent records have been deployed to demonstrate that all the functions of

the provincial administration including the maintenance works were realised by the operators from Egypt who were appointed by the central government, and that these continued in Haremeyn in the same way it had traditionally been before Ali Bey took temporary control over Egypt between 1768 and 1772. Also, the daily life of the Egyptian people was not affected by this period. Although the delivery of the annual tribute for the central government failed during Ali Bey's authority, Ebu'z-Zeheb Mehmed Bey sent the annual tribute for the previous eight years, which is, at the same time, an indication of the volume of the economic wealth the local administrator in Egypt controlled.

In addition, it has been argued in this study that Ali Bey's uprising was not a stance against the sovereignty of the central government and that Ali Bey never raised openly the banner of rebellion against the Ottoman sultan. Neither the chronicles nor the official documents support the hypothesis that Ali Bey intended to establish a new government, which would be the foundation of a nationalist state. Rather, they suggest that Ali Bey's attempt was a mere enjoyment of the extended boundaries of a local administrator whilst the central government was at war against Russia. It has been proposed in this study that Egypt's prosperity and Ali Bey's financial power enabled him to extend his authority outside of Egypt, which, however, resulted in a confrontation with the central government's authority in Syria.

One of the most important facts that this study has uncovered is that the mamluk beys channelled the state's financial revenue sources to their households instead of meeting the central government's requirements. Egypt had always been a cash supplier for the personal treasury of the Ottoman sultan via the *irsaliye-i hazine*. This meant an in-cash financial support for the expenses of the imperial government, which was already weakened by the costs of the war in the second half of the eighteenth century. However, the rivalry

among the mamluk beys for superiority in Cairo impeded the expectations of the central government, and delayed the *irsaliye-i hazine* and other supplies customarily sent for the imperial pantry and imperial shipyard. On the other hand, Egypt was responsible for sending cereals annually to the Haremeyn and this clinched the Empire's authority in the Arab peninsula. Sending cereals to the Haremeyn was important in terms of strengthening the Ottoman legitimacy in the Hijaz. During the period covered by this study, it was clear that the central government faced several problems in receiving Egypt's payments. In some cases, for example, even if the central government received the annual tribute and other payments, the local administrators were charging some extra expenses from the *irsaliye* without the permission of the central government, thereby causing delays and decreases in the amount of cash received.

Furthermore, the short tenure of governors' office in Cairo also resulted in authority gaps. Filling the vacuum, local elements gained more financial and political power in the province. Examining the primary sources, we observe that the mamluk beys showed insubordination towards the governors in some cases. Especially during the period after 1765, it could be observed that particularly the *emirulhadjj* and the *şeyhülbeled* exerted pressure on the governors in order to have *buyrulduş* issued for their personal financial benefit. In this sense, I argue that Ali Bey as the *şeyhülbeled* of the time, increased his pressure after Kethüda Mehmed Pasha's rule (r.1762-64), which consequently made successor governors politically and financially weaker. However, the Porte protested the mamluk beys' dominance by sending the decrees one after another. During Ali Bey's authority, the insubordination of the mamluk beys increased in the political environment of Egypt. For example, Ali Bey dismissed the governors who were appointed by the imperial government, although dismissing a governor was not peculiar to Ali Bey. The mamluk beys appropriated the

revenues peculiar to the governor of Egypt such as customs and mint house's *mukataas*. Having lost such revenues, most governors left office with payment arrears at the conclusion of their term of office.

It has been argued that Ali Bey's action was motivated by ambition for greater financial power. In this sense, the opening of the Red Sea trade route to the European merchants was a significant initiative. Encouraging the foreign ships in the upper Red Sea would clearly increase the revenues of the local administrators that were obtained from customs. Seemingly it was a profitable route for the foreign merchants as well; the profit that the European ships made via this route was enough to encourage them to carry on a bilateral negotiation method: with the Porte and with the mamluk beys. We know that the mamluk beys had enough authority to allow European ships into Suez. However, the European nations were reluctant to damage the commercial treaties that they had acquired from the Porte. Still, the European merchants made commercial agreements with Ali Bey for Suez trade although they did not have full trust in him. This led Ali Bey to become the first local administrator that allowed the European presence in the upper Red Sea. However, neither Ali Bey nor his successors denied the Ottoman administration in Egypt and did not encourage the European countries to communicate and make agreement directly with them instead of the central government. Still, it can be deduced that mamluk beys attempted to broaden the limits of existing commercial treaties.

Further, the findings obtained from the archival evidence in Istanbul do not provide enough information to suggest that Ali Bey's uprising was intended to separate the southern regions of the empire and to establish a new state. It is known that Ali Bey was considered as an "*asi*"- rebel that caused certain troubles whilst the empire was in a war with Russia. Certain measures that Ali Bey introduced during his period of authority and short term

uprising in Egypt between 1760 and 1772 caused some changes in Egypt's politics. In addition to eliminating his local opponents and dismissing the Ottoman governors, he raised a big military force composed of ten thousand soldiers. It is not out of place to observe that Ali Bey's activities were motivated by his he increased power and the greatness of his ambition; however, the end result of this was his betrayal by his closest mamluk. The consequence of these activities and Ali Bey's self-claimed authority was a less stable economy and political atmosphere in Egypt as well as weaker Ottoman governors. Moreover, the mamluks who succeeded him in the office of *şeyhülbeled* continued to concentrate their power on promoting their personal interests, instead of channelling the finances on the welfare of the city as their predecessors such as Abdurrahman and İbrahim Kethüda had done, and thus political chaos increased after Ali Bey's period of ascendancy in Cairo. Nevertheless, it is impossible to isolate the political situation of Egypt from the Ottoman Empire's. During the reign of Abdulhamid I, because the Porte failed to cope with Russian expansion in Caucasia, Crimea and the Mediterranean simultaneously, the political problems of the central government echoed in Cairo as well. It created a power vacuum in the province, which Ali Bey and other mamluks took advantage of. The political milieu of the central administration allowed Ali Bey and his mamluks to concentrate on fulfilling their interests and ignoring the duties assigned by the Porte. This resulted in turbulence in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and was followed by the French expedition at the end of the century as well as semi-autonomous administration of Mehmed Ali Pasha in the nineteenth century.

On the other hand, pushing the limits and disobeying the rules that the central government had set was not unique to Egypt. A number of similar activities were proceeding in other provinces of the empire, especially, during the Russo-Ottoman war (1768-1774), which have been the subject of numerous academic studies. The uprising of Zahir al-Omar (d.

1775) must be an important one as it is correlated to Ali Bey's activity at close by location. Another example is that of Zahir's successor, Jezzar Ahmed Pasha, who established his authority in Palestine in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Those activities are a part of a wider historical narrative in the Ottoman realms. However, it is difficult to argue that Ali Bey's authority was as influential as either Zahir's or Jezzar's, since the former's activities did not have a direct and sudden effect on Egypt's commercial and political milieu as the others had. Zahir's authority developed Akka from a small town to a port city, and Jezzar defended the city against Napoleon's expedition. Their regimes provided prosperity and protection for the indigenous people.

When it comes to the case of Ali Bey in Egypt, his uprising lasted for a short period and it is difficult to claim that it caused significant changes in the provincial administrative institutions in Egypt that would influence Ottoman administration and organisation in the province, or life standard of Egyptian people. It is understood that Ali Bey fell far short of establishing his autonomous administration as his uprising continued only for a short time and, more importantly, his closest mamluk Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-Zeheb betrayed him by acting in accordance with the Ottoman Empire's interests. During much of his period of ascendancy Ali Bey was occupied with the campaigns in Syria and the Hijaz and he did not attempt to make any change in the provincial administration system during his uprising. The most noticeable and apparent influence can be the challenged authority of the governor office in the province. The *seyhülbeleds* after Ali Bey's authority continued to dominate the provincial administration. The governors appointed by the central government seem to have remained weaker between 1775 and 1798 compared to their predecessors. In addition, Ali Bey's elimination of his potential rivals in Egypt led to the presence of few competitors in Cairo after Ali Bey's defeat. This situation had a determinative effect on the provincial politics of

Egypt in the last quarter of the century and consequently affected the relationship between the provincial administration and the central government. Other than that it is difficult to claim that Ali Bey's uprising had a causative influence on the administrative organisation of Egypt in the beginning of the nineteenth century. However, the last quarter of the eighteenth century is the key for the developments in the political life of nineteenth century Egypt. The period from 1775 after death of Ebu'z-Zeheb to the French expedition in 1798 can be subject of another research and shed light on the history of Egypt under the Ottoman Empire at the end of the eighteenth century.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

The governors of Egypt in the mid-eighteenth century:¹

1- 1153/1740	Hekimzade Ali Pasha
2- 1154/2741	Yahya Pasha
3- 1156/1743	Yedekçi Mehmed Pasha
4- 1157/1744	Rağıb Mehmed Pasha
5- 1161/1748	Yedekçi Yeğeni Ali Pasha
6- 1162/1749	Şehla Ahmed Pasha
7- 1163/ 1750	Hasan Pashazade Abdullah Pasha
8- 1166/1753	Mehmed Pasha
9- 1166/1753	Baltacızade Mustafa Pasha
10- 1169/1755-56	Hekimzade Ali Pasha
11- 1170/1756-57	Azmzade Sadeddin Pasha, Said Pasha
12- 1171/1757-58	Bahir Mustafa Pasha
13- 1173/1759-60	Kamil Ahmed Pasha
14- 1175/1761-62	Ebubekir Rasim Pasha
15- 1176/1762-63	Ahıskalı Mehmed Pasha
16- 1177/1763-64	Hacı Ahmed Pasha
17- 1178/1764-65	Hacı Hasan Pasha
18- 1179/1765-66	Silahdar Hamza Pasha
19- 1180/1766-67	Çelebi Mehmed Pasha

¹ *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. 6, p. 1812-13

20- 1181/1767-68	Rakım Mehmed Pasha
21- 1182/1768-69	Köprülüzade Ahmed Pasha
22- 1183/1769-70	Kelleci Osman Pasha
23- 1186/1772-73	Vekil Osman Pasha
24- 1187/1773	Kara Halil Pasha
25- 1188/1774	Hacı İbrahim Pasha
26- 1189/1775	Şehrî İzzet Pasha

Appendix II

Şeyhülbeleds of Cairo in the mid-eighteenth century

İbrahim Kethüda and Rıdvan Çavuş	1743-1754
Abdurrahman Kethüda ¹	
Şeyhülbeled Halil Bey	1757
Ali Bey Gazzawi	1758-1760
Ali Bey al-Kabir	1760-1772
Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb	1772-1775

¹ Influential figure in Cairo between 1754 and 1760 but never officially appointed *şeyhülbeled*

Appendix III

(MMD, vol. 8, nr. 114/folio 28a)

[Bulutkapan Ali Bey took 15 million *paras* from the *irsaliye* without permission.]

(1) Mısır valisi vezir Kethüda Mehmed Paşa'ya ve ümera-yı Mısıra ve sadat-ı bekriyye ve ulema ve meşayih-i ezheriye ve yedi ocak zabitan ve ihtiyarlarına hükümki:

(2) Beher sal tarik-i Mısriyyeden azimet eden huccac-ı müsliminin zihab ve iyablarında tahsil-i esbab emn ü refahları ve mirilhajj-ı mısır olanların mesariflerine medar ve ianet olmak için

(3) irsaliye hazinesinden ala vechi'l-mutad verilegelen akçeden ve kahve tüccarından tertib olunan birer findık altuni resimden maada bila-izn-i humayun (11)69 ve (11)70 ve (11)72 ve

(117)3 (4) seneleri irsaliye ruznamçelerinden beher sene 150şer keseden ianet-i mirilhac namıyle 600 kese akçe masraf tahrir olunmakdan naşi mahsubiyetine musaade-i mülukanem olmayub istirdadiçün sadır (5) olan emr-i alişanım vezirim Kamil Ahmed Paşa'nın eyyam-ı

hükümet-i Mısıra vusulunde bu madde için cevap olmak üzere gerek müşarun-ileyh tarafından gelen tahrirat ve gerek ümera ve ulema-i (6) mısriyye ve ocaklar zabitan ve

ihtiyarlarından gelen mahzarlarında (11)74 senesi ibtidasında fima bad cümle mukataat-ı mısriyye üzerine ianet-i mirilhac olmak üzere beher sene 150şer kese (7) akçe muzaf-ı cedit

namıyle zam eylediklerini ve bu husus cari ve düsturu'l-amel tutulmak şartıyla (8) nizam verildigini inha ve fima bad mutaddan ziyade ianet-i mirilhac için akçe mutalebesinden olmak

şartıyla salifu'z-zikr 600 kesenin afvını istida eylemelerinden naşi mahzarları mucebince bi't-terazi beynlerinde ihtiyar eyledikleri nizam-ı mezbur-ı mısır ruznamçesine kayd ve ba'de ezin

mugayir-i rıza-yı hümayunum irsaliye (9) hazinesine iras-ı kesr ve noksan eder mutalebatdan/metalibatdan mucanib olunmak hususu iktiza edenlere tefhim olunmak üzere

hatt-ı hümayunumla muanven sadır olan emr-i şerifim (11)75 senesi Receb-i şerifinde (10) irsal olunmuşdu

Senki vezir müşarun-ileyhsin bu defa der aliyyeme gönderdiğin kağıdlarından mirulhajj-ı mısır Keşkeş Hüseyin (dame izzuhu) yediyle geçen sene hajj-ı şerifden kfile-i huccac ile

avdetinde Harb urbanı (11) huccac-ı müslimine isal-ı hasar kasdıyla sedd-i rah eyledikde vaki olan muharebede harb urbanı şeyhi ve biraderi ve oğlu ve sair akrabave a'vanından 24 nefer

eşkiya-yı urban i'dam olunmağla urban-ı (12) mezkurun mecbul oldukları habaset muktezasınca bu sene-i mübarekede ahz-ı intikām kasdıyla huccac-ı müsliminin kat'-ı tarikine

ve isal-i mazarratlarına müteheyyi ve müteşemmir oldukları ve sene-i sabıkadan ziyade tedarike (13) muhtac olduğu emir-i Mekke-i Mükerrreme tarafından şeyhülbeled-i Mısır Ali Bey -dame izzuhu-ya tahrir olunmağla sinin-i saireye sirayet eylememek şartıyla bu sene-i mübarekede taraf-ı hümayunumdan i'net olunmak ricasıyla ulema (14) ve ümera-yı mısriyye taraflarından tahrir olunan mahzar ve mısır mirilhaclarının irad ve masrafını mübeyyin terkim eyledikleri vafir bu tarafa irsal olunduğu ve mesullerine müsaade-i şahanem erzani (15) kılınmasını istida olunmuş mütekellimin-i Mısırın işbu istianetleri 7-8 mah mukaddem bi'l-ittifak vaki olan taahhüd ve misaklarına münafı ve münakız olduğuna binaen şayeste-i itibar ve müsaade olmadığından (16) kat'-ı nazar işbu hila'ına cesaretleri mücerred hazine-i mısriyyeyi ekl ü bel'a kemal-i hırs ve azlarından neş'et eyledikleri zahir olup ve umur-ı mısriyyenin tertibat-ı kadime ve mevzuat-ı dirinesini (17) eger cüzî mülâhaza eyleyeler bu makule zuhur eden maddelerde taraf-ı devlet-i aliyyemden istianet lafzını kaleme getürmekden tehzip-i kuvvet-i nazar-ı aliyye eden ulema-yı mısriyyeyi dahi tağlit ile (18) bu emr-i müstağrib kendülere teşrikden şerm ü hicab ederler idi

Bu vecihleki zaman-ı çerakisede yedi ocak tertibinin ve neferat ve zabitanına mevacicib tayininin serd-i hikmeti hakim-i Mısır olanlar (19) memleketlerini selatin-i maziye-i Rumdan ve müluk-ı nasaradan tahaffüz ve hırsat maslahatı olub tevfiq ve inayet-i subhaniye ile cennet-mekan firdevs-aşıyan ceddin sultan Selim Han (aleyhirrahmetu (20) ve'l-gufran) hazretleri Mısır feth ile memalikini kabza-i tasarrufa aldıktan sonra zikr olunan ocakları tertibat-ı muayyene ile ibka eylemesi tesellut-ı düvel-i nasaradan hırsat ve bu makule zuhur eden (21) umur-ı mühimmede eda-yı lazime-i hizmet ve ubdiyyet eylemeleri maslahatına mebni olub biraz müddetden sonra ekser düvel-i nasaradan hasbe'l-muahade tesellutları fikri dahi ber taraf ve fakat devlet-i (22) aliyyem ile muzafat üzere olmayan bir kaç devlet-i nasaranın teaddisinden sevahil-i mısriyyenin muhafazası için beher sene donanma-yı hümayunum kalyonlarından bir kaç kıtası ol havaliye memur kılınmağla bu cihet ile (23) dahi Mısır ocaklarının hizmetleri kalmayub divan-ı Mısırdan müretteb olan mevacicblerine cihet-i istihkakları fakat zuhur eden bazı hidemat-ı devleti aliyyede olmağa münhasır ve bu makule hidemat-ı hadiseye (24) kıyam için mevacicblerinden fazla arz ve talebinde olurlar ise asl-ı mevacicblerine cihet-i istihkakları kalmadığına binaen şer'an ve aklen ref'leri caiz olmağla ocakların ukala ve ehl-i insafı bu manayı (1) fikr edip ahara dahi bend ü nush ile vakit vakit zuhur eden hidemat-ı devleti aliyyemden eda-yı lazime-i şükr-ü nimete ibtidar etmeleri lazım iken huccac-ı müslimini bazı senelerde istikbal için (2)tecerrüde ihracı lazım geldikten bu

madde için irsaliye hazinesine itale-i dest-i hasaret edegeldikleri bi'd-defeat sebkat etmekle hakikat-i hal mukaddema bu mertebe izah u beyan olmaksızın (3) tahrir-i masrafının men'-i babında ala vecih'l-icmal evamir-i şerifem ısdar olunub bu defa huccac-ı müsliminin tahsil-i esbab-ı emn ü selametleri için iktiza eden ianet maddesinden ümera ve mütekellimin-i Mısır marifetleriyle (4) her ocakdan bila terakki kifayet mikdarı neferat tertibi ve müntefi'-i baha-yı kura-yı mısriyyeye mutasarrıf olanlar dahi neferat-ı mezburenin levazım tariklerini ruyet-i inayet ile bu kadarca hizmet (5) mukabelesinden beher sene beytü'l-mal-ı müsliminden ahz eyledikleri emvala cihet-i istihkak tedariki kendülere vacib iken der saadetime mesarır-ı miriilhac defterini dilhahları üzere tertib ile (6) istimdad eylemeleri nebezan-ı örf-i hamıyyeti hüsrevaneme badi olub bu vecihle kendülerinin -ma vudı leh-lerini kendülere bildirip içlerinde diyanet ve insafdan behre-ven olanları mütekallibe-i (7) beyguranı tarik-i hidayete delalet ve hususan ulema-i mısriye bu babda lazıme-i hakkaniyetine riayet ile semt-i salah kendülere iradet etmek için işbu emr-i şerifim ısdar ve ... ile irsal olunmuşdur

(8) İmdi vusulünde senki vezir müşarun-ileyhsin ümera ve ulema-yı Mısriyyeyi ve yedi ocak zabitan ve ihtiyarları divan-ı Mısıra cem' ve ferman-ı hümayunumu (9) kıraat ve mazmun-ı münifi ilan ve işaat eyledikten sonra hüccac-ı müsliminin emin ve salimin zıhab ve iyabları kendülerden matlub-ı hümayunum idigini ve (11)43 tarihine gelince (10) irsaliye hazinesinden umur-ı hajja imdad olunmuş değil iken ol vakitden sonra refte refte ianet umur-ı hajja mebalığ-i vafireye balığ olub karibu'l-ahd de taahhüdleri üzere bir minval-i sabık (11) nizam verilmekle bu seneden sonra nizam-ı sabıktan maada taraf-ı hümayunumdan ianet ve murad olunması havene-i beytülmalin beyhude ekl u bel'lerine ruhsat ve cevaz kabilinden olduğuna binaen emr-i muhal olduğunu (12) gereği gibi ifade ve ifham ve mukaddemat-ı sabıkamın eda-yı matviyyesi sana zahir olmağla iktızası üzere iskan ve iltizamlarına ihtimam edüp ocaklardan kifayet mikdarı (13) neferat tertibi ve kesiru'n-nema kura masraflarının imdad ve muavenetleri ile rekb-i hajjin techiz ve tanzimi bimennihi teala avdetlerin tecerrüd ihracı iktiza ederse anı dahi bu üslub üzere tertib (14) ve tesviyeye dikkat ve mübaderet ve irsaliye hazinemden muayyen olan mikdardan ve bu seneye tahsisen imdad olunan 300 rumi keseden ziyade bir akçaya itale-i dest tecavüz eylemelerine ruhsat ve cevazdan mübaadet eylesin ve sizki (15) ulema-yı mısriyyesiz siz dahi mukteza-yı şer'-i kadim üzere işbu emr-i şerifimin mazmun-ı münifini icrada vezirim müşarun-ileyhe mütabaat ve suret-i inkar ve muhalefette olanları şer'en lazım ve gerek ne (16) mübaderet ve inadında ısrar edenlerin cezaya istihkaklarını iftâ ile ifa-yı mukteza-yı hakkaniyetine riayet ve sizki ümera ve zabitan

ve ihtiyarlarsız dareynde selamet- hal size lazım ise (17) akıbet-i karınızı fikr ve mülahaza ile ferman-ı hümayunum üzere amel ve hareket ve hilafından cümleliz tevakki ve mücanebet eylemeniz babında ferman-ı alışanım sadır olmuşdur

late B 1176/ early February 1763

Appendix IV

(MMD, vol. 8, nr. 200)

[The decree about Gazzawi Ali Bey's appointment as *şeyhülbeled*]

Mucebince amel oluna deyu unvanına hatt-ı hümayun şevketmakrunum keşide kılınmıştır

Mektum olmak sonradan kayd olunmuştur early Ş 1177/early February 1764

Ümera-yı mısriyyeden hala Gazze'de ikamet üzere olan mirülhac-ı sabık Ali dame izzuhuya hükümkî;

(1) Senki Mir-i müma-ileyhsin (11)73 senesinde Mısır mirülhaclığı hamiyetine bend ü talik olundukda mukteza-yı memuriyetin üzere Mısır'dan huccac-ı müslimini istishab edup mezid refah (2) ve itminan ile eda-yı fariza-i hac ve ziyaret-i ravza-yı mutahhara etdürüb huccacın emnen ve salimen Mısır'a isalinden sa'y-ı meşkurun ve hareket-ı Haremeyn ahalsinin (3) ve huccac-ı müsliminin mahzuziyetini ve bi'l-husus Mısır'da oldukça sadır olan evamir-i şerifemin infazıyla tahsil-i rıza-yı mülukanem ve himayet ve sıyanet fukaraya cümleden ziyade sarf-ı cehd (4) ve makderet ve bezl-i tab u takat eylediğin yakinen ve tahkiken ve tahriren ma'lum-ı şahanem olub Mısır'dan tard u teb'idine bir dürlü sebep ve illet yoğiken avdet-i hacda Mısıra (5) karib geldiğinde Mısırın mütegalibeleri Mısıra duhulden seni men u def etmeleriyle kat'an .. Gazzeye sıdk-ı/sarf-ı zimam hareket ve elyevm Gazzede meks u ikamet üzere olduğun malum-ı (6) hümayunumdur Lakin sen ümera-yı mısriyye beyninde eda-yı merasim-i ubudiyet ve rıza-yı hümayunumun tahsili ile serfiraz olub daima hareket-ı memduha ve hidemat-ı cemile izharı zımnında (7) temşiyet-i umur-ı mısriyyeye ihtimam ve ikdamın ve tahsil-i rıza-yı hümayunum ser maye-i iftiharın olduğu nezd-i mülukanemde mütehakkik olub senin gibi mücerrebü'l-etvar ve müstakimu'l-ef'al olanların (8) bu hilalde Kahire-i Mısırda mevcut olmaları lazime-i halden idugu hala Mısır valisi Kamil Ahmed Paşa edamellahu teala iclaluhu tarafından der saadetime tahrir olunduğuna binaen (9) seni Kahire-i Mısıra Şeyhülbeled nasb u tayin eylemek üzere mahsus emr-i şerifimle müşarun-ileyhe tevcih ve tenbih olmagın ilam-ı hal için sana dahi işbu emr-i şerifim (10) ısdar ve müşarun-ileyh vesatatiyle tarafına irsal olunmuştur İmdi keyfiyet-i malumun oldukda müşarun-ileyh ile

mükatebe ve muhabere merasimine riayet ve her ne vecihle kağıdı (11) gelir ise ve ne vakit seni taleb ve Mısıra celb ederse tahriri üzere amel ü hareket ve bi-avnihi teala Mısıra duhulünde makam-ı şeyhülbeledlikde kıyam ve müşarun-ileyhin (12) emir ve re'yi üzere hareket-ı sedide ve etvar-ı hamiyet ibrazıyla ferman-ı hümayunum olduğu üzere def'-i ihtilal-i vilayete ve tahsil-i nizam-ı Mısriyyeye senden memul-ı (13) şahanem olunduğu veçhiyle bi'l-ittifak ve sarf-ı cehd-i mâlâ-kelam eylemen babında

early Z 1174/early July 1761

Appendix V

(MMD, vol. 8, nr. 488/folio 126a)

[The decree that the central government questions *raison d'etre* of mamluk beys]

(1) Mısır valisi vezirim Rakım el-hac Mehmed Paşa'ya ve Mısır kadısına ve bi'l-cümle ümera-i mısriyye ve sadat-ı bekriyye ve ulema-i ezheriyye ve yedi ocağın zabitan ve ihtiyarlarına hükümki;

(2) Ecdad-ı izam ve aba-i kiramım nevvallahu merakıdehum hazretlerinden mures olan iklim-i Mısır'ın nizam-ı umurunun tertibat-ı kadime ve mevzuat-ı dirinesi üzere rüyet ve idaresi zımında (3) taraf-ı şahanemden nasbolunan vüzera-yı celilü'ş-şanımin rezinlerine muvafakat ve mümaşat olunarak tedbir-i umur-ı mısriyyede medhali olan ulema ve zabitanın cümlesi cemi'-i akval (4) ve hareketlarını ulu'l-emrin emr ve rızasına ve valilerin re'yine tatbik ile gerek hazine-i irsaliyenin vakt u zamanıyla irsalinden ve gerek Haremeyn-i celileye muayyenu'l-irsal olan (5) gılal ve cerayanın bila bekaya aynen mahallerine irsal ü teslim-i hidmet-i bahiru's-saadetinden ve sair sıyanet-i varidat-ı beytülmal-ı müslimin ve muhafaza-i nizam-ı kadimde ve idare ve temşiyet-i kaffe-i hutub (6) ve imla-i cüziyye ve külliyyede merasim-i ubudiyet ve istikameti ifaya her biri riayet ve mezid-i sa'y u gayret-i birle saye-i hümapaye-i şehinşahanemden nail ve malik oldukları nimet ve ihsanın (7) hakk-ı şükürünü edaya müsaraat eyledikleri halde '*fi'd-dünya ve fi'l-ahireti*' nedamet ve vehametden vareste ve asude olub taraf-ı hümayunumdan muaheze olunmak değil haklarında muamele-i hasene (8) zuhur edeceği içlerinden ulu'l-ebzar olanların yakınleri iken beynlerinde şükr-i nimeti eylemeyub ve rıza-yı ulu'l-emri derk etmeyub küfran-ı nimet olan mütegallibe makuleleri (9) kendi meram-ı mefsedet-encamlarını icraya mübaderet-i birle muvafık-ı rıza-yı hareketi terk ve sairleri dahi yecibu'l-vakt mecburen veyahut tama'an ol misillülere murafakat ve mutabaat ve kendülerin (10) suret-i salaha tergeb iradesinden olan valilerini tekdîr ve ızrara ve hod be hod mesned-i hükümetden hal' ve tenzile ve hazine-i irsaliyeyi ve gılal-i haremeyni ta'til ve te'hire cesaret (11) ve sair hilaf-ı rıza-yı hümayunum nice hareket-ı na-mülayemeyi irtikab ve hatta on maddeyi haviye mukaddema gönderilen hüccet-i şer'iyyede mestur olan uhud ve peymanlarını ez-vakitde (12) kırmış ve yine hilaf-ı uhud be iman-ı evza' ve hareketi izhar ve

vali-i sabık Hamza Paşa dahi ol misillüleri mümkün mertebe tehdid ve suret-i istikamet ve salaha celb ü terğib (13) iradesinde olduğundan mukteza-yı huşunet ve hubs-ı tıynetleri icrasından birbirleriyle ittihad ve müşarun-ileyhi makam-ı hükümetden tenzil için bir vak'a-yı garibe ihdas ve meramlarını (14) intacdan sonra kendü töhmet ve kabahatlerini valilerine özr ve nisbet ve güne irad-ı enva' bahane ve illet ederk mukaddemce bir kıta mahzar dahi tertib ve der aliyeme tesyir etmişler (15) mahzarlarında tahrirleri üzere zahir halde iddiaları olan istikamet-i ma fi'z-zamirlerine muvafık olmak lazım gelse mukaddema mevaddı mübaşir ile der saadetime gönderilen hüccet-i mezkur (16) taahhüdlerini ibka birle ol vakitden beri hususat-ı lazımevi muhtevi sadır olan evamir-i şerifemi niçün icrada tekasül ve rehavet ve hazine-i irsaliyeyi ve gılal-i Haremeyn-i şerifeyni (17) ne illete binaen te'hir ve tesvik ederler ve valilerinden iştikaları dahi mukaddemat-ı kazibe üzerine mebni olduğu bundan zahir oldurki müddet-i vafireden beri tevliyet-i Kahire (18) Mısır'dan munfasıl olan vüzeranın müddet-i zabtlarına göre hin-i infisallerinde kiminin 1000 kese ve kiminin 800 kese deyni zuhur edub hasretü'l-vüzera olan iklim-i Mısır'a (19) vali nasb olunan vüzera mansıbının menafi'i ve fevaidinden bi-behre kaldıklarından başka bu güne medyunen ma'zul olmaları müteğallibe-i Mısır'ın varidat-ı valiyi hod be hod (20) ihtilas ve zabt tasaddi ve cüretlerinden naşi idiği malum-ı ilm-i alem-şumül-i şehinşahanem değil mi zann olunur el-halet hazihi müteğallibe-i Mısır'ın valilerine tagallüb ve özürleri (21) ne derecelere resin ve münteha olmuşdurki tevliyet-i Kahire-i Mısır vüzera-yı izamımdan birine teklif olundukda kalilü'n-nema edna bir livanı iklim-i Mısıra tercih ile Mısır (22) valiliğinden istifa ederler bu keyfiyet vali-i Mısır olanların Mısırluya taaddisinden mi neş'et eder yoksa havene-i rical-i Mısırın valilerine tegallüb ve özrlерinden mi iktiza (23) eder edna mülahaza ve teemmül ile malum olacak keyfiyyatdan iken valilerinden iştika eylemeleri su-i efallerini ve kizb-i ihtiyarlarını iş'ar mesabesinde değil midir me'a haza (24) vülat-ı Mısırın min ciheti'l-mal Mısırlu'ya teaddi şaibesinden berıyyussaha oldukları delail-i mebsutadan bedidar olduğundan gayrı mütekellimin-i Mısırın zeharif-i (25) dünya için birbirlerini hedm edemeyub bazısı baz-ı ahar hakkında bir hileyi hafr ile ihlakına tesaddi ve çok geçmeyub bazı aharı dahi makam-ı mücazatda anlara teaddi (26) edup bu vecihle vakit be vakit tahrk ve izhar eyledikleri fitne ve fesadları valilerine özür ve isnad edegeldikleri cay-ı eşkal değildir 'eti'ullahe ve eti'u'r-rasul (27) ve uli'l-emre minkum' ferman-ı rabbanisiyle amel ve ulu'l-emrin emrine ve vükela ve vüzerasının re'yine mutavaat etmeyub irsaliye hazinesine itale-i dest-i hiyanet ve gılal-i ahali-i Haremeyni (28) itlak ve izaat ve hususat-ı saireyi muhtevi sadır olan evamir-i şerifemin icra

ve infazına mümanaat ve mefsedet eden havene-i rical-i mısriyyenin (29) ezmine-i sâlifeden beru be's-i sebk ileyhden halas olamadıkları ahlakın meşhudları olur iken muteber ve olmayub bast u beyan olunan emval ve hizmet encamı (30) anlar dahi irtikab ve icrada selefleri eserine iktiza eylemeleri ve taahhüdlerine adem-i vefa birle adat-ı me'lufelerini icra kaydında olmaları vakit vakit manzar-ı kahr u gazab-ı (31) subhani olmalarını iktiza eylediği erbab-ı basiret indinde olmağla bu ana dek maktul ve matrudunun meşhudları olan ukubat-ı elime bi'l-cümle kesb-i eydi-i (32) zamirleridir bu defa zuhur eden habaset ve mefsedetlerinin ifa-yı mücazatı bu mertebe .. vazıhadan ittiaz ile semt-i salaha meyl ü ibtidar ederler melhuzuyla rehin (33) mevki' imhal ve Kahire-i Mısırdaki bulunan sadat ve ulema ve aceze ve zuafaya merhameten nebezan-ı ırk-ı hamıyyet-i hüsrevanem karin nev'-i itidal olub müddet-i medideden beri devlet-i aliyye-i (34) daimü'l-kararımın menasib-ı samiyesinden sadakat ve istikamet ve hüsn-i tedbir ve dirayet ile maruf ve mücerreb olan vezir müşarun-ileyh intihab ve sizi tarik-i müstakime delalet etmiş (35) rütbe-i vala-yı vezaret ile size vali nasb ve irsal olunmağla cümlelerinizi ikaz ve inbah için işbu emr-i hümayun şevket-makrunum ısdar ve irsal olunmuşdur imdi ba'de'l-yevm (36) selamet-i haliniz lazım ise evamir-i padişahaneme kemal-i itaat ve inkiyad ederek bais-i hızı ü hüsrân-ı dünya ve ahiret olacak evza' ve hareketden istiğfar ve ihtiraz-ı vücuda (37) umur-ı mısriyyede valiniz müşarun-ileyhin emr .. ve re'y-i tenbihine kalben ve kalıben cümleleriniz mümaşat ve imtisal ile muayyenü'l-irsal olan Haremeyn-i şerifeyn gılalini bila bekaya senesi içinde aynen ve ceyb-i hümayunuma (38) mahsus olan irsaliye hazinesini vakit ve zamanında tamamen irsale ve sair temşiyet ve ikmalleri murad-ı mülukanem olan kaffe-i umur ve hususun ala ma yurad temşiyet (39) ve tanzimlerine ve mukaddema Mevla ve mübaşir marifetiyle vaki olan taahhüd ve misakları muhtevi der aliyyeme gönderdiğiniz hüccet mestur mevaddım cümlesini muahedeniz üzere yerli yerinde icra (40) ve infaza her biriniz azdan ve can sıdk-ı tab ve tuvan ederek cerayim-i sanihanızın nisyanıyla Hakkınızda zuhur-ı şefkat ve inayet-i şahanem medar olunacak etvar ve asarı izhar ve selamet (41) darını tahsil eylemeğe bezl takribine vüs' ve mecal eyleyesiz ve senki vezir müşarun-ileyhsin ba avn-ı hüda valisi olduğun Kahire-i Mısıra vasıl olduğunda işbu emr-i şerifimi divan-ı Mısır'da (42) cümle ümera ve ulema ve sadat ve ocaklu zabitan ve ihtiyarını muvacehelerinden kiraat ve mazmun-ı vacibü'l-imtisalini her birine gereği gibi tefhim ve işaat ve bi'l-cümle tenbihat ve vesaya-yı (43) şahanemi kema hüve hakkuhu tenfiz ve icrasına ziyade sa'y ve dikkat ve mukaddema gönderilen hüccetde mestur muahedelerinin hilafı ve şerefyafıta-i sudur olan evamir-i

şerifemin muğayiri kema fi's-sabık (44) icra-yı mel'anet ve mefsedet ısdar ile zahiren iradet suret-i itaat ve batınen yine me'luf oldukları tagallüb ve habaseti icra kaydında olanların ihlallerine gereği gibi tahsil-i vufuk edup sıhhati üzere (45) der aliyyeme ilam-ı mübaderet ve diğer emr-i şerifim mucebince selefin Hamza Paşa'nın mezid hakkaniyet ve adalet veçhiyle hesabı ru'yet ve kat' olunduktan sonra arz ve vakarı ve izzet ve itibarı ile (46) savb-ı memura tahrik ve tesyiri hususuna dahi bezl ü vüs' ve kudret edup zinhar ve zinhar evamir-i şerifemin hulasa-i sermed-i vaz' ve harekete cevaz ve ruhsatdan ve edna kusur ve betaetden (47) ziyade tehaşi ve mücanebet olunmak babında

Fi mid Z 1180/ mid May 1767

Appendix VI

(C. DH 260 / 12969)

[The Red Sea is forbidden for the English ships]

Hala Mısır valisi vezirim Raif İsmail Paşa'ya hükümki;

Süveys benderine iyab ve zihab eden İngiltere gemilerinin bender-i mezkure amed şede i'tiyadları mülkî ve dinî mehazir-i adideyi mütezammın olduğundan süfün-i merkumenin men' u def'lerini muhtevi kerraten ba'de uhra celalziz Sudur olan evamir-i mufassala-i şahanemden başka dergah-ı muallam kapıcıbaşlarından mirahur-ı evvelim payesiyle Mısır'a memur mir Hasan dame mecduhu ile tesyir olunan hükmi celilü'l-kaderimde ba'de ezin sefayin efrenciyyeden birisinin Süveyse duhulüne ruhsat verilmemesi tekid ve tasrih olunmuş iken ol evanda bir kıta İngiltere sefinesinin hamulesinin Mısır'a idhaline irade-i ruhsat-ı birle sefine merkumenin akabinde iki kıta gemi dahi vürud ve emtialarını Mısır'a nakl iradesiyle Süveys'den develere tahmil ve Mısır'a teveccüh ve hilal-i rahda taife-i urban yollarını kat' ve emval ve meta'-ı mezkureyi garet ve bir kaç neferini idam eyledikleri leda'l-istima' Mısır'dan bir mikdar asker tayin ve ber vech-i suhulet Süveys'de mevcut sefayinin ? mellah ve tüccarını ve içlerindeki yolcular zabt ve Mısır'a ihzar olundukda mahmiye-i mezkurede mukim İngiltere ve sair efrenc tacirleri aralığa tevessut ve şayet efrenc gemileri ruy-i deryada Süveys ve Yenbu'a amed şed eden Mısır sefinelerine isal-i mazarr ederler fikriyle emval ve mahbuslar bi-tamamiha mersumune redd ve bender-i Süveys'e süfün-i efrenciyye gelmemek ve Süveys ve Cidde benderlerinde emval-i Mısriyyeye taarruz olunmamak üzere iki kıta efrenciyyü'l-ibare kulnameler mucebince karar verildiği senki vezir müşarun-ileyhsin varid olan tahriratında münderiç olduğu ecilden husus-ı mezburda tabiatıyla zuhur eden keyfiyet-i mezkure tamam-ı İnfaz-ı emr-i şerifime ... vesile iken İbrahim Bey ve Murad Bey'in mücerred celb-i menafi' zımnında tahrir ve iğvalarına mebni sabıku'l-beyan tacirlerin kelimat tasannu' .. meyl ü rağbet ve leğv-i mahz olan taarruzlarına itimaden mugayir-i ferman Süveys'e gelen efrenc gemilerinin emval-i mazbuta ve mellah ve mahbusalarını itlak be teslimi tecvizin senden me'mul-ı teyakkuz ve basirete mugayir bir keyfiyet olmağla İngiltere gemilerini iktisab-ı menafi' mülahazasıyla Süveyse gelmeğe sevk ve tergib eden Mısırlunun ekval-i bimallarına ferika olmayub madde-i mezkurenin bir mantuk-i emr-i ali

rabitasına bi'n-nefs kıyam-i mübaderet ve sebilleri tahliye olunan mahbusundan iki neferin bi eyyi veçhin kan der saadetime tısyarı sadriazam ve efham ve vekilü'l-mutlak sadakat şeyhim canibinden kaime ile sana iş'ar olunmuş idi

bu mertebe vesaya ve tekidatdan sonra tekrar bu evanda efrenc gemilerinden bir kaçı Süveys'e varid olmak üzere oldukları köşküzar-ı hidivanem olduğuna binaen vaki'da süfün-i merkumenin rıza-yı şahane ve evamir-i padişahaneme münafi Süveys'e gelmeleri mahza infaz-ı ahkamda senin te'ami ve tekasül ve iğmaz ve rehavetinden neş'et eylediği ve bunun zımında dergar olan ikab ve ceza-yı saire mevadda olan tekasül ve isaet mücazatdan eşedd ve eşne' olacağı bî iştibah olmağın imdi bu ârızanın indifa'ı ve sefayin-i efrencin bilkülliyeye Süveys'den inkita'ları cezmen ve kat'a senden matlub-ı hidivanem olduğu cihetden ne tarikle olur ise süfün-i mezburenin bir dahi Süveys benderine uğramaları ve ... istihsaliyle telafi-i mâ fâta bezl-i cedd-i müknet eylemen babında tekiden ve ikazen işbu emr-i şerifim ısdar ve ile irsal olunmuşdur Mısırlunun bu kaziyede mefsedetleri dergar ve gayret-i islam ve diyaneti külliyyen kırmış ve Haremeyn-i muhteremeynin dehlizi mesabesinde olan bahr-ı Süveys'e melel biganenin iyab ve zihablarına hükkam-ı dünyeviye ceri zımında taife-i mesfureyi terğib ve teşvikleri akıbetkarda mazhar-ı kahr-ı kahharı olmalarını icab eder kazayadan idigi ve kusuret-i hakdan gelerek sebep-i akva-yı infaz-ı ali olan mahbusların itlakına tüccar efrenci tahrik etmeleri fesad-ı batınlarına delil olduğu zahir iken kelimat-ı ... Havale-i sem'-i itibar-ı birle emval-i ... ve mellah ve tüccar-ı mahbusenin geriye itasına ibtidarın tehyiç gazab-ı tacdaranemi mucceb-i halatdan olduğu malumun oldukda ber vech-i muharrer tarik ve ilacını olub Süveys'den efrenc sefinelerinin külliyyen inkita'ma azl ü bezl-i kudret ve bade ezin taife-i mesfurenin mahall-i mezbure bir tekneleri geldiği mesmu' olmak lazım gelür ise mazhar-ı ikab-ı şedid olunacağını mukarrer bilip ana göre amel ü hareket ve hilafından hazer ve mücanebet eylemen babında

Fi late Z 1193/late December 1779

Appendix VII

(MMD, vol. 8, nr. 340/folio 83b-84a)

[About delayed *irsaliyes*]

(1) Mısır valisi vezir Hamza Pasa'ya ve Mısır kadısına ve ümera-yı mısriyyeye ve sadat-ı bekriye ve ulema-yı ezheriye ve yedi ocak zabitan ve ihtiyarlarına hükümki:

(2) Beher sene Enderun-ı hümayunum hazinesine canib-i Mısır'dan gönderilegelen irsaliye hazinesinin senesi dahilinde bir saat evvel Adiliyye'ye .. ve bu tarafa sevk ve tesyirine (3) ihtimam ve dikkat olunmak mütekellimin-i Mısır'ın vazife-i ubudiyetleri olduğundan başka bundan akdem rical-i Mısriyyenin cerağ-ı sabıkalarına itirafen ve isti'tafen irsaliye hazinesini (4) ve cizyenin iktiza eden mal-ı irsaliyesini senesi içinde asitane-i aliyyeme isale ve irsaliyye hazinesinden ferman-ı hümayunum sadır olmadıkça bir akçe ve bir habbe sarf olunmamağa (5) ve bir senenin mal-ı mirisi sene-i uhraya geçmiş olunur ise tashih ve tekniline ve dahi nice mevadda ahd-ı vesik ve misak-ı ekidi muhtevi verilen hucec-i şer'iyye ve ulema ve sadatın (6) arabı ve ümera zabitan ve ihtiyarların terki mahzarları divan-ı hümayun kaleminde hıfz olunub uhdat-ı mezbure düsturu'l-amel tutulmak ve ezmine-i sabıkada deyn-i divanın teksirine (7) badi ve bi'l-ahire ve irsaliye hazinesine hasarete müeddi olan tenzilât maddesi için bir takrib ile eslaf valilerinin verdikleri buyrulduklarına amel ü itibar olunmayub kaydları (8) ruznamçe-i Mısır'dan lağv ve ilga ve cümlesi ihrak olunmak üzere hatt-ı hümayunumla muanven 173 senesinden mufassal ve meşruh evamir-i şerifem sadır olmuş iken (11)76 ve (11)77 (9) ve (11)78 seneleri irsaliye hazineleri ve cizyelerin mal-ı irsaliyeleri henüz varid olmayub evamir-i şerifem adem-i mutavaat ile nizam-ı umur-ı mısriyyeye tatarruk haleli muceb olur (10) Mısırlı ricalinin etvar-ı na?ları yevmen fe-yevmen mahsus ve zahir olmakdan halî olmayub vülat-ı mısriyyeye muayyen olan iraddan kesr ve zarar namıyla vafir akçe ezmine-i (11) maziyyede selefler mahsub ve inam edegelmeleriyle halefe dahi mahsub edek deyu cebren ve hah na hah asi urban misillü yedlerinden temessük ahz ve irsaliye hazinesine akçe yerine (12) vaz' u irsal olunub hatta 168 senesi irsaliye hazinesinden 300 kese-i mısri ve küsur para ve 169 senesi irsaliye hazinesinden 1006 kese-i mısri (13) ve küsur para ve 70 senesinde 229 kese-i mısri ve küsur para ve 72 senesinden 274 kese-i mısri ve küsur para ve

73 senesinden (14) 299 kese-i mısri ve 74 senesinde 453 kese-i mısri ve kûsur para ve 75 senesinde 825 kese-i mısri (15) ve kûsur paraki min haysü'l-mecmu' 4236 kese-i rumi ve kûsur guruşa baliğ olan akçelerin temessükatı akçeye bedel irsaliye hazineleriyle (16) irsal olduğu baş muhasebe defterlerinde mukayyed ve bu akçelerin cümlesi vülata cebr ve kürh ve desise ve hüd'a ile tahmil olunmuş akçelerden olmakdan naşi (17) valilerin medyun olmalarına ve kesr ve mazarratı irsaliye hazinesine ve vizri ve hıyaneti Mısırluya aid ve raci' olub bu etvar-ı kabihalarından hicab ve istihya (18) eylemek lazıme-i gayret-i islamiyye ve vacibe-i uhde-i ubudiyetleri iken kendülerine kat'a ... olmayub 3 senelik irsaliye hazinesini ve cizyenin 3 senelik iktiza eden (19) mal-ı irsaliyesini ekl ü itlaf daiyesiyile henüz vasıl olmayub bu güne iğmaz ve tekasülleri bais-i ta'cil ve istiğrab olmakla sinin-i mezburenin mal-ı irsaliyelerinden (20) hatt-ı hümayunumla muanven evamir şerifemle havale olunan akçeler 3 senelik irsaliye hazinesinden tenzil olunub maadası 3 senelik cizyenin iktiza eden mal-ı irsaliyesiyle (21) mean lazım gelenlerden tahsil ve ala eyyi hal der aliyyeme muaccelen irsal ve tesyir olunmak babında ferman-ı hümayunum sadır olmağın ihtimamen ve isticalen işbu emr-i şerifim ısdar ve ile (22) irsali olunmuşdur muntazırü'l-vurud olan hazain-i merkumenin irsalinde özr ve illete cay-ı kalam kalmayub bu gûneyi .. vaz' u hareket ile hazain mezburenin (23) tehir ve tavik olduğuna kat'a rıza-yı padişahanem olmamağla bundan sonra bir saat tevkif ve tesvik olunmayub mukaddema olan taahhüdlerine riayet ve misaklarından durup (folio 84a/1) ve bila emr-i şerif bir akçe ve bir habbe masrafa idhal ve eslaf buyruvdularıyla valilere cebren akçe mahsub olunmayarak (2) ve evamir-i şerifemle havale olunan akçeler mahsub olunarak zikr olunan 3 senelik kusur kalan irsaliye hazine akçeleri ve sinin-i mezbure cizyelerinin iktiza eden mal-ı irsaliyeleri lazım gelenlerden ala eyyi hal bir gün mukaddem tahsil (3) ve der aliyyeme sevk ve tesyire bi'l-ittifak sa'y u ihtimam ve .. ikdam ve sizki sadat-ı bekriye ve ulema-yı ezheriye müma-ileyhimsiz mukaddema gelen arabi mahzarda sizin dahi (4) kefaletiniz olmağla ve 'evfu bi'l-ahdi inne'l-ahde kane mes'ûle' nazm-ı kerimi muktezası üzere bu babda tegafül ve tesamühü tecviz etmeyub mukteza-yı taahhüdlerini icraya ve şurut (5) ve uhud-ı mültezimelerini ibka etdirmege bi'l-ittifak ihtimam ve dikkat ve sizki ümera ve sair müma-ileyhimsiz mugayir-i ahd u mîsâk vaz' ve hareketden hazer ve kusur kalan (6) sinin-i mezbure emvalini birbirinize müsabakat ile cem' ve edaya ve muaccelen der aliyyeme irsaliye .. cehd ve mekennet ederek aklınızı başınıza düşürüb telafi-i ma fâta (7) müsaraat ve emr-i şerifime imtisal ve itaat ve hilafından hazer ve mücanebet eylemeniz babında

early S 1179/late July 1765

Appendix VIII

(MMD 8, h. 649/folio 172b)

[To Mehmed Bey Ebu'z-zeheb]

(1) Sabıkan Mısır kaimmakamı olub devlet-i aliyye-i ebed-müddetime hüsn-i sadakat ve istikamet ve gayreti mücerreb olan Ebu'z-zeheb Mehmed Bey'e hükümki;

Senki mir-i müma-ileyhsin sadakat-ı semir müma-ileyhsin zatında mezkur ve tıynetinde mermuz olan kabiliyet ve reşad ve sıdk ve sedad muktezasınca taraf-ı saltanat-ı seniyyeme merbut rabıta-i ihlas ve taviyet ve zabıta-i kaviyye hususunda (2) ve ubudiyetinin .. zuhur eden me'ser-i mergube ve hidemat-ı makbulenden bazer ve bedidar ve nahiye-i halinden her vecihle ezva-i diyanet ve envar-ı kıyaset-i lami' ve tabdar olub ala'l-husus mukaddema etba'-ı .. şeytani (3) ve imtisal .. nefsani ile Ali Bey'in irtikab eylediği sû-i hareketi takribiyle vuku'bulan halat reddiye ve keyfiyat-ı nâ-merdıyyenin indifâ'ı emrinde devlet-i aliyyeme ve 'ibadullaha etdiğin hidmet bi-mennihi teala (4) sana dünya ve ahiretde sermaye-i iftihar ve itibar ve ila intiha-i'z-zaman mesâ'î-i meşkûren elsine-i kaffe-i alempane-i dâmen-i Muhammed'de haber esna ile .. tekrar tekrar olacağı zahir ve aşıkâr (5) olduğundan gayri bu defa derbar-ı adalet-kararıma tevarüd eden tahriratın rikab-ı müstetab-ı hüsrevaneme arz u telhis ve ref' ü takdim olunub ve din-i Mübin ve haber-i hahan saltanat-ı seniyye-i İbrahim (6) olanların cümlesine vacibe-i zimmet-i vilayete/dirayete uhde-i muvaza olan gılal-i ahali-i Haremeyn-i muhteremeyn ve ceraya-yı sekene-i beldeteyn-i mükerrermeteyn vakt u zamanıyla irsal ve tesyirinde vücuda gelen ilzam-ı tam ve sair (7) ifa-yı levazim hulus ve ubudiyet babında celveger mecla-yı zuhur olan sa'y-ı mâ lâ kelâmın ve kan be kan malum-ı mekarim mersum-ı padişahanem olub hakkında tezayüd-i teveccüh-i şahane ve .. inayet (8) çendaranemi muceb olmağla davet-i seri'u'l-te'sir-i mülukaneme nail ve mazhar olmuşsundur berhudar olasın min külli'l-vücuha ibraz eylediğin hidemat-ı pesendiden ve hareket-ı bergüziden nezd-i ferd-i hümayunumdan makbul ve meşkur (9) ve meşhud olan etvar-ı müstahsenen .. kabul ve tahsin-i hüdavendigaranemle melhuz ve manzur olduğuna binaen seni akran ve emsal beyninde imtiyaz-ı birle ikfa ve ihdanın meyanelerinde bais şeref ve iftiharın olmak için (10) avatıf-ı aliyye-i hidivanemden sana inayet ve ihsan-ı şehriyaranem

olmağın inşaallahu teala atabe-yi behiyye-i cihandaranemle müftehir ve ser efrac olduğundan (11) ifa-yı şükür ve mahmedet nimet ve eda-yı rüsum ubudiyet ve sadakate kema yenbeği riayet ve her halde tahsil-i rıza-yı meyamin-i intima-yı şehinşahaneme nesar-ı vüs' ve kudret eylemek babında taltifen ve ikramen ve sünuh (12) eden hidemat-ı makbuleni istihsanen işbu ferman-ı celilüllisan mekremet unvanım ısdar ve ile irsal olunmuşdur devlet-i aliyye-i ebediyyü'l-istimrarıma sadakat ile hizmet ve taraf-ı vazıhu'ş-şeref-i hüsrevaneme (13) ibraz-ı ihtisas ve ubudiyet edenlerden ni'am-ı iltifat .. tacdaranem .. olunmayub saye-i atufet vilaye-i dilaveranemde avn ü inayet bari ile izhar eylediğın istikamet ve sadakat (14) dahi nice nice mükafat-ı cemilesine neyl ile kâmkâr ve kâmrâd olunacağında ıştıbah eylemeyub ataya-yı celile-i hüdavendigaranemin vech-i layıkı üzere te'diye ve teşekkür .. kıyama ve mübaderet ve tarafına olan (15) itimad ve teveccüh-i hümayunumun ruz be ruz terakki ve tezayüdünü müstelzim olur asar-ı cemile ibrazına teşmir said mekennet eyleyesin seni ve senin gibi din ve devletime sadıkane hizmet ve eda-yı hukuk nan ve (16) nimet edenleri hak teala .. ber murad eyleye göreyim seni bundan böyle dahi damen-i gayret ve hamıyyeti dermiyan ve Haremeyn-i şerifeyn ahalilerinin vakt ü zamanıyla gılal ve cerayaları tesyirinde ve hazain-i mısırye (17) bekayasının irsalinde ve sair umur-ı mühimme ve mesalih-i cüz'ıyye ve külliyyenin dilhah-ı şahaneme mutabık ve irade-i samiyyeme muvafık suretler ile tesviye ve tanziminde hala mısır valisi (18) vezirim Mustafa Paşa'nın ittifak ve ittihad ederek ihtimam ve dikkat ve iktisab nam istihsal mehasin teveccühât-ı şehriyaraneme sarf-ı mekennet ve takat eylemek babında

Late B 1188/late September 1774

Appendix IX

YEAR	AMOUNT OF THE IRSALIYE	EXPENDITURE	THE AMOUNT TO BE SENT (Lazimu'l-irsal)
1144/1731 ¹	31.719.055 <i>paras</i>	21.502.8699 <i>paras</i>	10.331.150 <i>paras</i>
1145/1732 ²	31.719.055 <i>paras</i>	13.155.483 <i>paras</i>	18.582.366 <i>paras</i>
1146/1733 ³	31.719.055 <i>paras</i>	8.190.210 <i>paras</i>	23.643.639 <i>paras</i>
1148/1735 ⁴	31.719.055 <i>paras</i>	6.582.414 <i>paras</i>	25.251.435 <i>paras</i>
1149/1736 ⁵	31.719.055 <i>paras</i>	12.732.182 <i>paras</i>	19.101.667 <i>paras</i>
1150/1737 ⁶	31.719.055 <i>paras</i>	6.648.548 <i>paras</i>	25.185.301 <i>paras</i>
1151/1738	31.719.055 <i>paras</i>	11.938.170 <i>paras</i> ⁷	19.491.774 <i>paras</i>
1152/1739	31.719.055 <i>paras</i>	14.954.875 <i>paras</i>	16.878.974 <i>paras</i>
1153/1740	The irsaliya of this year is not delivered to Istanbul. The governor is previous sadrazam Serasker Ali Pasa. In the document the record says: “it is required to be checked from “ <i>Enderun-i hümayun defterleri</i> ”. The amount is determined as: 23.894.582 <i>paras</i> ⁸		
1154/1741	31.719.055 <i>paras</i>	19.166.427 <i>paras</i>	6.057.126 <i>paras</i>
1155/1742	35.496.742 <i>paras</i>	15.983.743 <i>paras</i>	19.562.999 <i>paras</i>
1156/1743 ⁹	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	13.072.786 <i>paras</i>	20.693.572 <i>paras</i>

¹ D. 2378 - 005

² D. 2378 – 005, D. 2378-003, D.2378-001, D.2378-002, D. 2378 – 006

³ D. 4969 - 0001

⁴ D.2381 – 005, D. 675 - 001

⁵ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16879

⁶ D. 5432 – 001 until 1156

⁷ more than 16 purses are Ebubekir Ağa's debt.

⁸ D. 2844 - 0002

⁹ D. 5432 – 001 until 1156/1743-44

1157/1744 ¹⁰	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	18.860.913 <i>paras</i>	16.635.829 <i>paras</i>
1158/1745 ¹¹	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	14.062.052 <i>paras</i>	21.434.690 <i>paras</i> ¹²
1159/1746 ¹³	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	12.751.349 <i>paras</i>	22.759.368 <i>paras</i>
1160/1747 ¹⁴	-	-	33.179.816 <i>paras</i> ¹⁵
1161/1748 ¹⁶	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	11.323.112 <i>paras</i>	24.173.630 <i>paras</i>
1162/1748-49 ¹⁷	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	14.081.165 <i>paras</i>	21.415.577 <i>paras</i>
1163/1749-50 ¹⁸	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	14.878.710 <i>paras</i> ¹⁹	20.618.032 <i>paras</i> ²⁰
1164/1750 ²¹	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	14.649.939 <i>paras</i>	27.398.984 <i>paras</i>
1165/1751 ²²	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	21. 832.326 <i>paras</i>	see below
1166/1752 ²³	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	13.098.672 <i>paras</i>	see below
1167/1753 ²⁴	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	10.724.468 <i>paras</i>	60.834.760 <i>paras</i> of last 3 years
1168/1754 ²⁵	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	36.516.683 <i>paras</i>	11.480.059 <i>paras</i>

¹⁰ D. 675 – 003, D. 2391 – 005, D. 2392 – 005, D. 2392 – 006, D. 2392 – 007, D. 2392 – 0011

¹¹ D. 2392 – 005, D. 2392 – 006, D. 2392 – 007, D. 2392 – 011

¹² D. 3161 - 0001 (565 kese 565 para is the certain amount that is arrived at Enderun-ı hümayun hazinesi. D. 2392 – 005, D. 2392 – 006, D. 2392 – 007, D. 2392 – 011)

¹³ D. 2393 – 003, D. 2393 – 006, D.2393 – 007, D. 2393 – 008, D.2393 – 011, D. 2393 – 012

¹⁴ D. 2394 – 001, D. 2394 – 005, D. 2394 – 008, D. 2413 – 0056, D. 2413 – 0057, D. 2413 – 0058, D. 2398 - 008

¹⁵ The certain amount that is arrived at Enderun-ı hümayun hazinesi, the remaining amount might have arrived either.

¹⁶ D. 2394 – 011, D. 2395 – 002, D. 2395 – 003, D. 2395 – 004, D. 2395 – 006, D.2395 – 0008, D.2395 – 0010, D. 2395 – 0011, D. 2396 – 001, D. 2396 – 003, D. 2396 – 005, D. 2396 – 007, D. 2397- 001, D. 2397 – 008, D. 2399 – 0008, D. 2398 – 008, D. 2394 – 012, D. 2398 - 0004

¹⁷ KK. D 2348

¹⁸ D. 2398 – 001, D. 2396 – 009, D. 2398 – 008, D. 2399 - 008

¹⁹ D. 4123 - 002

²⁰ D. 2604 - 0002

²¹ D. 2230 – 001, D. 2230 – 001, D. 2394 – 012, D. 2398 – 004.

²² D.BŞM.MSR.d 16889

²³ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16889

²⁴ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16889

1169/1755 ²⁶	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	17.958.337 <i>paras</i>	see below
1170/1756 ²⁷	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	21.000.000 <i>paras</i>	57. 251.609 <i>paras</i> of last 2 years
1172/1758 ²⁸	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	18.711.587 <i>paras</i>	10.645.327 <i>paras</i>
1173/1759 ²⁹	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	26.625.705 <i>paras</i>	see below
1174/1760 ³⁰	35.381.948 <i>paras</i>	27.765.278 <i>paras</i>	25.489.921 <i>paras</i>
1175/1761 ³¹	-	-	3.600.170,5 <i>paras</i> ³²
1176/1762 ³³	45.058.590 <i>paras</i>	34.589.997 <i>paras</i>	10.468.593 <i>paras</i>
1177/1763 ³⁴	43.303.852 <i>paras</i>	25.497.337 <i>paras</i>	762 kese 23293 para
1178/1764 ³⁵	46.188.734 <i>paras</i>	21.849.575 <i>paras</i>	-
1179/1765	-	-	-
1180/1766 ³⁶	25.182.427 <i>paras</i>	13.572.724 <i>paras</i>	-
1181/1767 ³⁷	25.182.427 <i>paras</i>	14.761.430 <i>paras</i>	see below
1182/1768 ³⁸	25.182.427 <i>paras</i>	2.358.418 <i>paras</i>	see below

²⁵ D. 2887 - 0001

²⁶ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16890

²⁷ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16890

²⁸ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16896, D.BŞM.MSR.d 16892.

²⁹ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16894

³⁰ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16894

³¹ D. 0077 - 0001

³² The certain amount that is arrived at Enderun-ı hümayun hazinesi the remaining amount might have arrived either

³³ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16899

³⁴ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16899

³⁵ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901

³⁶ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A

³⁷ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A

1183/1769 ³⁹	25.182.427 paras	1.333.310 paras	see below
1184/1770 ⁴⁰	25.182.427 paras	16.476.950 paras	see below
1185/1771 ⁴¹	25.182.427 paras	8.266.909 paras	see below
1186/1772 ⁴²	25.182.427 paras	16.494.783 paras	see below
1187/1773 ⁴³	25.182.427 paras	11.451.623 paras	see below
1188/1774 ⁴⁴	25.182.427 paras	13.882.895 paras	140.867.801 paras of last 8 years
1189/1775	25.182.427 paras	-	-
1190/1776	25.182.427 paras	-	-
1180-1190/1766-1776			71.340.000 paras ⁴⁵
1191/1777 ⁴⁶	25.182.427 paras	23.325.280 paras	-
1192/1778 ⁴⁷	25.182.427 paras	25.276.141 paras	1.7633.433 paras
1193/ 1779 ⁴⁸	25.182.427 paras	15.449.241 paras	9.920.258 496 paras
1194 ⁴⁹	25.182.427 paras		
1193-1200/1779-1785 ⁵⁰	-	-	182.208.748 25.182.427 paras

³⁸ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A

³⁹ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A

⁴⁰ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A

⁴¹ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A

⁴² D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A

⁴³ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A

⁴⁴ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16901 A

⁴⁵ D.BŞM.ZMT.d 13837

⁴⁶ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16903

⁴⁷ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16903

⁴⁸ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16906 A

⁴⁹ D.BŞM.MSR.d 16906 A

1203 ⁵¹	28.855.815 <i>paras</i>	28.855.815 <i>paras</i>	-
1206 ⁵²	no payment due to drought	-	-

⁵⁰ D. 2888 - 0001

⁵¹ D.BŞM.d 5645

⁵² HAT 117-4744

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Cevdet Tasnifi

Askeriye [C. AS]

Bahriye [C. BH]

Dahiliye [C. DH]

Maliye	[C.ML]
(Eyalet-i Mümtaze	[C. MTZ]
Nafia	[C. NF]
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