DECLINE IN ANCIENT EGYPT? A REASSESSMENT OF THE LATE NEW KINGDOM AND THIRD INTERMEDIATE PERIOD

by

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Abstract

The late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period (1215-650 BC) have been, and continue to be, interpreted as periods of decline and dramatic change within ancient Egyptian history. This thesis challenges such views through an analysis of those interpretations and the evidence used to support them. In so doing I have evaluated if these periods do reflect a decline from previous periods and if the changes were as all-encompassing as previously suggested.

In order to carry out this evaluation three key processes have been examined through detailed analysis of related datasets. These will establish the complexity of the periods, and the potential for nuance within specific datasets which is masked by the current descriptions. Reference has also been made to cross-cultural comparisons and ethno-archaeological theories as many of these processes have been identified in other societies and discussed outside Egyptology.

This has led to some clarity regarding the complexity of the periods, recognising the extensive level of continuity and possible explanations for the changes visible, and thus an alternative to the ‘simplistic’ interpretation of decline and decay.
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1: INTRODUCTION

‘Modern Egyptologists still largely present a negative image of the First Intermediate Period. It is characterised as a period of chaos, decline, misery, and social and political dissolution: a ‘dark age’ separating two epochs of glory and power. This picture is only partly based on an evaluation of sources contemporary with the period.’ (Seidlmayer 2000, 108)

Whilst the above quote is outlining the issues with many of, even relatively recent, descriptions of the First Intermediate Period, it could equally be describing many of the interpretations of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period. These periods have generally been associated with a decline of Egyptian power and society in the wider scholarly literature,¹ a description extending from the earliest academic histories of Egypt (Brugsch 1879, 195-196) through to current scholarship (Dodson 2012, 2). Much of the most recent scholarship has focused on the periods many unresolved chronological issues and this has, as a result, left the established narrative of decline largely in place. Despite this long tradition for the description of these periods as ones of decline, the processes behind that decline continue to be poorly explained, if at all. This has resulted in a gap between the ever-increasing amount of primary evidence for the two periods and the interpretation placed on it by Egyptologists. The lack of revision or reassessment of this tradition has also ensured the continued presence of early scholars’ bias, further clouding our understanding of both periods. Indeed, despite some attempts at revision led by scholars such as Leahy, O’Connor, and Ritner and an ever-increasing amount of published evidence, the language used to describe both periods continues to display many of the influences found in earlier histories, apparent in the titles of Aidan Dodson’s two recent books Poisoned Legacy (Dodson 2010).

¹ For example, as they are described in Gardiner (1961, 316-317), Kitchen (1986, 245-254), and Dodson (2012, 2-15). For more detail see 1.3.
and *Afterglow of Empire* (Dodson 2012) describing the late New Kingdom and the Third Intermediate Period respectively.

This thesis, therefore, contains an analysis of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period and their associated descriptions and explanations, by reviewing some of the supposed key dynamics of the periods through the examination of specific associated datasets.²

1.1 Aims and Objectives

This thesis has a number of aims and objectives with regards to interpretations of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period. My primary aim is to show that the prevailing descriptions of these periods as one of ‘decline’ and/or ‘decay’ are outdated assumptions based on the model of the decline and decay of civilisation originally outlined by Gibbon’s *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1836) and expanded upon by Wittfogel’s *Oriental Despotism* (1957), and are therefore in need of revision. I will demonstrate that such a ‘blanket’ description for nearly six hundred years of Egyptian history is not an accurate reflection of the complexity of the periods. This description of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period will be shown to be significant oversimplification through discussion of key economic, social, and political dynamics of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period. These are economic and environmental conditions, changes to royal religious authority, and the cultural landscapes of the Third Intermediate Period.

² The use of late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period to describe the periods under study is merely for ease of reference within this introduction. In all subsequent chapters more specific and less negative terms will be used, as outlined in 1.2, with these terms merely used for convenience to refer to the entire period of history encompassed by within this thesis.
This complexity will be highlighted by demonstrating the possibility for nuance within specific datasets associated with the above dynamics. For environmental and economic conditions these are the Nile Level Records (NLR) from the Third Intermediate Period, the available paleo-climatic evidence, and the amounts in royal donation texts. For royal religious authority they are stelae, royal iconography, and the monumental constructions of the Libyan and Kushite rulers and for cultural landscapes the dataset is are the tomb groups from Aston’s (2009b) recording of burials with associated grave-goods from the Third Intermediate Period. By demonstrating the nuance within the various datasets I will not only be able to reveal the complexity of these periods, but also strike a balance between the existing divisions within current explanations as to whether the changes were the product of ‘deterministic’ factors, such as economic or environmental change, or were the result of cultural changes within Egypt, as with the supposed influence of the Libyans on Egyptian society.

As part of creating a more balanced understanding of the dynamics of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period I will also aim to restore a measure of agency to the individuals, and especially the rulers, of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period. In many of the current descriptions of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period individuals, including the kings and elite, are mostly passive passengers to larger forces of history with the changes of these periods being presented as a product of forces beyond the comprehension of individuals, let alone a product of their actions. An important method for highlighting the presence of such agency will be through the application of cross-cultural comparisons with other past societies and ethno-archaeological theories since many
of the processes apparently identified within the Third Intermediate Period have also been proposed and discussed outside Egyptology.

As a secondary aim I intend to develop these demonstrations of complexity and nuance within this thesis into an alternative explanation of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period, one that is framed around adaptation and continuity. This will build on similar changes to the interpretations of evidence from the other intermediate Periods of Egyptian history, particularly to those of the First Intermediate Period. The ability to demonstrate that a process of adaptation and continuity provides a better understanding of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period will be enhanced by examining the two periods together as I do in this thesis. This will allow for a clearer demonstration of what dynamics, if any, continued to be important across both periods and help to identify whether changes in the Third Intermediate Period were being foreshadowed in the late New Kingdom.

Ultimately, the research in this thesis is intended to move the discussion of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period away from discussions of chronological issues and the self-reinforcing searches for evidence of decline towards discussion of how and why the modifications within these periods occurred and what the available evidence indicates about the extent of the changes to Egyptian society.

1.2 Definitions of key terms and phrases

Throughout this thesis there will be frequent use of a number of key terms and phrases which have many different meanings and associations, both within Egyptology and in other disciplines. It is important, therefore, that I clarify what these terms and phrases will mean in
the context of their use within this thesis. This section includes these definitions and the
reasons behind their selection over the alternatives, particularly the choice of terminology to
describe the different sections of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period.

1.2.1 Collapse and Decline

Two of the most important terms used within this thesis are ‘collapse’ and ‘decline’. These
are used frequently across a large number of disciplines, including Egyptology, without
sufficient clarification as to their exact meanings in relation to ancient societies. Many
scholars seem to follow the meaning given to these terms by Gibbon’s *The History of the
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1836), a significantly outdated understanding of these
terms. Within this thesis I will make use of a more up-to-date anthropological definition of
collapse formulated in one of the most recent general volumes on the subject, where
‘collapse’ is a purely political event that deals with the collapse of a political system rather
than a civilisation (Yoffee 1988, 15; Cowgill’s 1988, 256). ‘Collapse’ will therefore be taken to
mean a sudden, rapid loss of social-political complexity with major changes to the political
organisation of a state. I will need to make occasional reference to the alternative meaning
of collapse, that of an entire civilisation, but on the few occasions where this will be
necessary it will be made clear that the definition meant is different. In contrast a ‘decline’,
again following Yoffee’s (1988, 14) interpretation, will be taken to mean a long term gradual
reduction in social complexity and also suggests that there is an element of moral or
aesthetic corruption occurring. It does not, however, imply an end to any aspect of a
civilisation.
1.2.2 ‘Libyan’

Throughout Egyptian history two terms were traditionally used to refer to the inhabitants of the western desert, Tjenhu (出境) and Tjemeh (境), appearing in Old Kingdom texts such as the Biography of Weni onwards (Strudwick 2005, 354). Whilst these terms continue to be used sporadically within the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period they no longer appear to refer to specific groups, assuming that they ever had done so (Haring 1993, 163). These groups are instead described as the Meshwesh/Ma or Libu/Rebu, for example in Merneptah’s ‘Great Karnak Inscription’ where the invaders are the Rebu (Reb; Manassa 2003, 23: 13). The continued use of such terms into the Libyan Period shows that these held some meaning in describing different sections of ‘Tjehnu’ society. It is unclear to what extent that Tjehnu referred to a specific group, as implied in the inscription of the Year 11 invasion in Ramesses III’s reign, or had become a generic term to refer to anyone from the western desert. As such it will be considered as interchangeable with the term ‘Libyan’ for all occasions when the latter is definition is meant, i.e. to refer to anyone from or whose origins were the groups in the western desert. Where it appears that Tjenhu has been used to refer to a specific group then that term will be used in order to avoid confusion, as with the use of ‘Ma’ and ‘Libu’ in titles or wherever those groups have been specifically mentioned.

1.2.3 Late New Kingdom

In order to restrict the negative associations often found in the terminology to refer to this section of Egyptian history I will be adopting Leahy’s (1985) suggestion to change the terminology used to describe the sections of the periods. In his article Leahy noted that the current terminology of the ‘End New Kingdom’ and ‘Third Intermediate Period’ was
reinforcing unfavourable impressions with the preceding period of centralised government and presenting an image of a period of chaos and civil war.

When describing the second half of the Nineteenth and whole of the Twentieth Dynasties, I will continue to use the phrase ‘the late New Kingdom’, as I have referred to it elsewhere in this chapter. Otherwise I will attempt to refer solely to the dynasty in which the events take place to avoid such impressions. This is an unsatisfactory solution; unlike the Libyan and Kushite Periods, the term used to distinguish the period, ‘Ramesside’, refers to the entirety of both the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties, thus including reigns outside the period of study. The term is also bound up with the negative impressions for the period, particularly of the Twentieth Dynasty kings and the art of the period. Consequently, I will avoid using the term ‘Ramesside’ to describe these dynasties and instead use restrict myself to referring to the individual dynasty to avoid such impressions, only using the phrase ‘the late New Kingdom’ for discussing them more generally.

1.2.4 Libyan Period

This term will act as a collective term referring to a period beginning with the start of the Twenty-First Dynasty and ending with Piye’s defeat of Tefnakhte, thus c.1077 to c.726 BC. These boundaries are based on there being increasing clear evidence of a Libyan presence within the Twenty-First Dynasty. This influence is apparent even prior to the first king with a Libyan name, Osorkon ‘the elder’, in the middle of the dynasty, with a number of those listed as Herihor’s children on the wall of the temple of Khonsu at Karnak also having Libyan names (OIP 100, 11-13; Kitchen 1986, 540; Leahy 1985, 55; Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 79). As a result, it is clear that for the Libyan Period to cover the period in time where the Libyans were most
influential it must begin with the Twenty-First Dynasty (Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 93). I have chosen to mark the end of the period with Piye’s defeat of Tefnakhte as this reflects the first time that Kushite rule was acknowledged over all of Egypt, however briefly, and thus the first occasion that the Libyan rulers had their authority over all parts of Egypt challenged. Whilst there remained Libyan local rulers long after this period, they were no longer the dominant authority within Egypt and Kushite influence became increasingly important from this point onwards until Psamtik I’s reunification in 664 BC.

1.2.5 Kushite Period

As with the end of the Libyan Period, I will be taking the start of the Kushite Period to be Piye’s defeat of Tefnakhte and the acceptance of Kushite control, at least for a brief period, over all of Egypt. It could be argued that the start of the Kushite Period should be dated to earlier in Piye’s reign when he was in control of Upper Egypt at least as far as Thebes (Morkot 2000, 179-180), or indeed from his father Kashta’s reign who may have been the first to control any part of Egypt, reflected by the presence of his name at Elephantine and the probability that it was he who had Amenirdis I installed as Shepenwepet I’s successor (Morkot 2000, 158; Ritner 2009a, 459-460). The division used within this thesis, however, would appear to roughly reflect the periods of dominance by both the Libyans and Kushites and thus provide a clearer understanding of their impact on Egypt. For both alternative start points for the Kushite Period there would be an overlap between the Kushite and Libyan Periods. Whilst this overlap is probably a better reflection of the realities of this period of history, in order to preserve clarity in what the terms ‘Libyan’ and ‘Kushite’ Periods refer to,  

3 For more detail regarding this debate see Chapter 2 n.141.
the two periods here will not overlap. Thus the Libyan Period will be considered to include
everything up to Piye’s victory over Tefnakhte and the Kushite everything beyond.

Unlike the start point the event taken to mark the end of the Kushite Period is
relatively uncontroversial as it will be the point when Psamtik I’s rule was accepted in
Thebes and thus over the whole of Egypt.

1.3 Overview of issues with evidence and of the selected datasets

There are a number of issues with the available evidence from the late New Kingdom, Libyan
and Kushite Periods, including looting of sites, limited excavation, and problems of survival
of particular types of evidence. Such issues with the survival of the primary evidence are
inevitable when dealing with an ancient civilisation. What remains is only a very small
proportion of the original evidence and this is further skewed by the fact that the vast
majority of the evidence that survives from both periods comes from Middle to Upper Egypt,
particularly from the region around Thebes. This is partly due to reasons connected with the
Delta region, including climate, population and excavation, but also partially with early
Egyptologists’ preferences.

The most significant factor is that the amount of excavation carried out in the Delta is
much smaller than elsewhere in Egypt. This is, in part, because of the expense involved due
to the frequent need to pump water off the site (Spencer J. et al. 2001, 4). Even where
excavation has taken place, much less has been found than at excavations further south as a
result of issues with survival of evidence. The climate of the Delta region is much wetter,
with a higher water table (as the mouth of the Nile), than that found in southern Egypt. This
has ensured that organic material, particularly papyrus and wooden objects, has not
survived to anything like the same extent in the north of Egypt as it has in the south of the country. Combined with this is the damage done by a much higher level of population settlement which has resulted in the covering of important sites with later settlement, damage from agriculture, and destruction by locals digging at Delta sites (Wilson 2011, 185; EES Delta Survey 2015.). There is, therefore, a much reduced survival of evidence of even the largest sites in the Delta which has prejudiced the views, especially those of Egyptologists in the first half of the twentieth century, of the region in comparison with Upper Egypt. An increase in excavation in Lower Egypt has only taken place in the latter part of the twentieth century, particularly through the Egypt Exploration Society’s Delta Survey (EES Delta Survey 2015.), although there continues to be clear disparity in the evidence available from the north and that available from the south. This meant that early histories of the end of the New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period, which established the interpretation of decline, were written before much of the archaeological evidence for Lower Egypt had been brought to light, for example those of Brugsch (1879), Breasted (1909, 1924) and Gardiner (1961). As the amount of evidence has expanded, the key issue has increasingly become a lack of synthesis of the archaeological evidence, with Leclère’s (2008a; 2008b) recent analysis of urbanism in the Delta in the First Millennium a notable exception to this.

1.3.1 Overview of selected datasets

The datasets utilised within this thesis have all been selected because they provide the best quantity of available evidence, if possible from across Egypt. Wherever quotes from Egyptian texts have been provided within this thesis these translations are my own.
For the review of environmental and economic conditions (chapter 3) the included datasets are paleo-climatic evidence, the NLR found at the quay at Karnak, and the surviving records of royal donations to temples. The currently available paleo-climatic evidence is based on archaeological surveys of sites and regions, analysing the stratigraphy of the appearance of aeolian material which have been dated using carbon and optically stimulated luminescence, as well as scientific analysis of samples taken from both individual locations and across regions examining the levels of a number of compounds and microscopic material, including pollen, in order to establish the presence of periods of climatic change (or low Nile floods). This evidence, whilst limited, will allow me to establish whether the drought-like conditions argued to exist through textual interpretations and circumstantial evidence, such as an apparent lack of construction being carried out by the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period rulers, is supported by the scientific evidence.

The surviving NLR were found inscribed on the quay at Karnak when excavated by Leigrain (1896a; 1896b; von Beckerath 1966). In total there are forty-five records for the entirety of the Libyan and Kushite Periods, approximately four-hundred years, providing only a very limited snapshot of the actual levels of the Nile floods. Fortunately some of them come from successive years allowing some analysis to be carried out. Whilst some are fragmentary and no longer have the original height of the flood, all the records were measured to be above or below the floor of the Hypostyle hall by Leigrain (1896b) again allowing for comparison of the respective heights of the floods. Despite these issues the NLR provide contemporary Egyptian evidence with which to correlate evidence from the modern scientific surveys as to the presence of low Nile floods during the Libyan and Kushite Periods. By being able to compare these datasets I will not only be able demonstrate whether the
paleo-climatic evidence corresponds to actual conditions within the time period under study, but also demonstrate the significant volatility in the annual flood levels. This is significant for if there was always variation in the flood levels, then Egyptian society would need to have developed mechanisms to cope, potentially making it less vulnerable to climatic change. This will highlight the nuance within the existing environmental evidence, as well as providing an indication of Egyptian society’s capacity for adaptation and continuity.

Finally for environmental and economic conditions, I have compiled the amounts donated in various royal donation texts from the Twentieth Dynasty through to the start of the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty. These range from large donation texts added to monuments, often specifically to record such donations, to those which appear on stelae or within other inscriptions which often detail the donation of spoils of war. Although many are extremely fragmentary, particularly those of the Libyan kings, this provides relatively accurate records of the donations kings were making to temples and individuals across the entirety of the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods. This will allow me to compare the amounts and types of good donated by the kings, allowing me to determine if there are any trends within that information. In particular it will allow me to locate any indications of economic decline during the late New Kingdom and into the Libyan and Kushite Periods, and for any signs of the supposed economic recovery during the Kushite Period, and thus whether this description as decline is valid.

For the examination of the ways in which religious authority was secured (chapter 4) the key datasets are stelae, royal iconography, and the monuments constructed during the Libyan and Kushite Periods. Stelae are a ubiquitous form of Egyptian evidence, small monuments produced by both the kings and members of the elite and generally set up at
temples, although also found in tombs and other locations. They typically include a lunette which depicts one or more deities who are receiving the items being donated or guaranteeing the individual who ordered the stela’s position in the afterlife, with the king almost always in front of the gods making the offerings or placating the deity(ies) on behalf of the individual in the New Kingdom. The king would also often appear prominently in the associated texts. The advantage of stelae is their appearance in significant numbers throughout the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods as well as their adherence, generally speaking, to a generic format. This makes changes to how the king appears over time relatively simple to spot and possible to track, and thus provide clear evidence for the significance of the king and their connection to the gods.

This is also true of the second dataset in this chapter, royal iconography. Egyptian kings were prominently depicted on existing monuments and on monuments constructed by both the kings and members of the elite. As with stelae this will provide a widespread body of evidence which should give clear indications of changes to the way in which royal religious authority was being secured during the Libyan and Kushite Periods. The depiction of the king on Egyptian monuments followed a relatively strict decorum that had developed over several thousand years from the pre-dynastic period (Hendrickx and Förster 2010, 851). As a result, any differences in how the king was represented will indicate changes to how the king’s religious authority was being secured. It will also provide an indication of the agency of those rulers or those creating the depictions since any significant diversion from the decorum of how the king was represented must have been intentional. It should also give greater insight into the differences between the ways that religious authority was being secured by the Libyan and Kushite rulers, given the differences in the way that those two
groups of rulers were depicted. This will not only give an opportunity to provide the rulers with some level of agency in the ways that they secured their religious authority, but also for the adaptation of Egyptian customs by the Libyan and Kushite rulers to fit their circumstances.

The final dataset examined for the ways in which religious authority was secured during the Libyan and Kushite Periods is the monuments built by the kings of those periods. The construction of monuments, especially temples, was an important element of an Egyptian king’s responsibility to preserve Maat, itself a core component of the king’s role and key to their securing divine authority. Adding monuments to an existing built landscape also ties their builder into the social and ideological concepts expressed by that landscape, as well as the construction of large monuments being a significant and largely permanent demonstration of that ruler’s political authority. Monuments remain, at least for Upper Egypt, some of the best surviving evidence from the periods under study. As a result they provide relatively clear evidence for the rulers’ attempts to secure their religious authority and any changes in how monuments were used to secure that authority. Assessing the size, numbers, and locations of the monuments built by both the Libyan and Kushite rulers should not only reveal how significant those kings’ additions to the built landscape were, but also give some indication of how closely they were following the patterns of monumental construction of New Kingdom kings. Any changes in the focus of monumental construction may also give an indication in alterations in the ways in which royal religious authority was being demonstrated and secured, and whether this shows any continuity from the New Kingdom.
Two datasets are used in the chapter on the possible cultural landscapes of the Libyan and Kushite Periods (chapter 5). The first are the 1045 tomb groups detailed by Aston in his comprehensive survey of funerary material from the Third Intermediate Period (2009b). The tomb groups recorded by Aston comprise burials with their associated grave goods, even where those goods were not originally found in the tomb but were located through Aston’s research of museum and private collections (2009b, 19-20). The tomb groups come from a significant number of sites providing one of the few types of evidence that definitively comes from across Egypt, although there remains a significant preponderance of evidence towards sites in Upper Egypt. The tomb groups also include burials from all levels of Egyptian social hierarchy, from kings down to some of the poorest members of society. Such an extensive and widespread dataset allows an examination to look for evidence of the appearance of a number of possible cultural landscapes during this period, notably regionalisation between a more ‘Libyan’ north and ‘Egyptian’ south and for any indication that there was increasing competition for status and wealth. Many of these changes to the cultural landscape have been identified in the funerary material culture of the First Intermediate Period and so, by using Aston’s tomb groups, I am able to make direct comparisons between similar bodies of evidence to examine whether the conditions identified for the First Intermediate Period, especially increasing competition over wealth and status, were repeated in the Libyan and Kushite Periods. This will make clear whether there was a decline within Egyptian society through fragmentation and blurring of social divisions, as well as allowing assessment of whether there were significant modifications to Egyptian material culture. It will also allow examination of whether Egypt’s intermediate
periods followed a particular pattern, and this should be considered similar phenomenon or not.

The final dataset is the evidence for the political fragmentation that occurred during the Libyan Period and continued, to an extent, into the Kushite Period, and the possibility that this was a product of the Libyans’ cultural background. This evidence for this comes from a number of sources, including the proliferation of king’s names, texts such as Piye’s ‘Victory Stela’ which records a number of different rulers all ruling co-currently, and from the evidence that a Libyan cultural identity continued to be held by members of the elite and kings of the Libyan Period, demonstrated by Libyan names and titles. This dataset allows me to review the debate as to whether the Libyans retained at least some of their original cultural identity and thus the explanations for the causes for the political fragmentation. Political fragmentation remains one of the clearest examples for a decline taking place in the Libyan and Kushite Periods, and so this re-examination of possible causes will have a significant impact on any description of the periods as ones of decline. Likewise, the current division between ‘deterministic’ and ‘cultural’ explanations for the fragmentation provides an opportunity to develop a new interpretation which accounts for the nuance within the available evidence.

1.2 Historiography of the Late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period

Explanations and interpretations of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period have existed since the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and their inclusion in the first academic histories of ancient Egypt. Indeed the two periods were included in both the
first history of the civilisation by Brugsch (1879), and its successor by Breasted (1905) which was to remain in print until the 1940s and early 1950s. These histories presented the late New Kingdom as a political and moral decline from the earlier New Kingdom, particularly with the loss of Egypt’s external territories, whilst the Third Intermediate Period was an anarchic period of chaos symbolic of Egypt’s decline with foreign invasions and rulers (Brugsch 1879, 234-237; Breasted 1909, 523).

Whilst these explanations were based on the limited evidence that was available when they were written, they were also heavily influenced by the racist and colonialist social and political views prevalent at the time they were written (Morkot 2000, 131; Ambridge 2013, 22-29), and this had a clear impact on Brugsch and Breasted’s assessment of the two periods. These assessments were also based on a strongly skewed set of evidence with almost all of it coming from Upper Egypt and very little from the Delta where many of the most important sites in the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period were located (Morkot 2000, 106; Myśliwiec 2000, xiv). Even where excavations revealed more information about the events and individuals of the periods, for example Reisner’s excavations at Gebel Barkal, el-Kurru and Nuri between 1916-1919 (Morkot 2000, 25), this did not lead to

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4 There was a reprint of the second edition in 1945 and again in 1948, an edition that was originally published in 1909. There was also a reprint by a different publisher in 1951. It has also now been reprinted as of 2015, although this is a copy of the 1905 first edition.

5 As an example see Breasted’s description of these periods in his history of Egypt; ‘The Decline: Merneptah and Ramesses III’, ‘The Fall of the Empire’ and ‘Priests and Mercenaries’ (1909, 464; 503; 522).

6 As some examples of this, Brugsch described the origins of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty as being Theban priests who fled there from Shoshenq I and who were able to influence the inhabitants of Nubia a process he described as ‘the minds of an imperfectly developed people must needs, under skilful guidance, soon show themselves pliable and submissive to the dominant priestly caste’ (Brugsch 1879, 235). Breasted meanwhile described the origins of the Libyans as ‘This crossing to Africa by the northern Mediterranean peoples is just one of the many such ventures which in prehistoric ages brought over the white race whom we know as Libyans’ (1909, 467).
revisions to Breasted’s history with the publishers simply reprinting the 1909 second edition for all subsequent reprints up to the one in 1951.

The histories written by Brugsch and Breasted were written as part of the process of professionalisation that took place within Egyptology at the end of the nineteenth century. One result of process of professionalisation was the acceptance of the division of Egyptian history into the periods of centralisation and division described by these early histories, such as Steindorff’s coining of ‘Third Intermediate Period’ in 1946 (Aldred 1956, 7), and particularly the adoption of the terminology used by them (Lichtheim 1963, 34; Morkot 2000, 35-36). As well as this acceptance of the nineteenth century organisation of Egyptian history into specific periods of centralisation and division, the process of professionalisation is also seen to have led to greater specialisation within the discipline and the development of sub-disciplines within Egyptology (Lichtheim 1963, 31; Wilkinson R. 2008b, 2; Schneider 2012, 58). This increased specialisation has meant that fewer scholars had the relevant background to make use of the totality of evidence now available (Grimal 2003, 13-14), leading to a reliance on the older general histories, helping to reinforce the acceptance of those histories’ interpretations amongst the wider discipline. Even the histories written to finally replace Breasted’s ‘outdated’ work (Gardiner 1961, vii; Lichtheim 1963, 39) in the 1950s and 1960s suffer from this specialisation with Gardiner acknowledging a strongly philological emphasis over other forms of evidence (Gardiner 1961, vii). As a result the presentation of the late New Kingdom, particularly the Twentieth Dynasty, as a decline from the heights of the Eighteenth Dynasty and the Third Intermediate Period as a mere addendum to that process remained current well into the later twentieth century. This is best demonstrated by Gardiner’s *Egypt of the Pharaohs* which skimmed over the Libyan
dynasties to focus on the Kushite and Assyrian confrontations and the re-unification under the Saite kings (1961, 316-334).

These views of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period were reinforced not only by the perpetuation of interpretations and terminology influenced by the social and political views of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but also by more recent social and political views that had had a significant impact on Egyptology. These were the social and political views associated with the rise and rule of the Nazi Party and whilst they clearly had their greatest effect on Egyptologists within Germany, their work and interpretations helped spread such views throughout the discipline. Recent studies have clearly shown the impact of the social and political views associated with the Nazi party filtered through into the work of those Egyptologists who ascribed to them (Raulwing and Gertzen 2013, 45; Schneider 2013, 206-207). Even those who did not have such views were influenced by the Nazi regime’s political and social impact, with Egyptian rulers noticeably beginning to be described as ‘totalitarian’ following the end of the Nazi rule (Breger 2005, 139). 7

These views, whilst especially affecting interpretations of the Amarna period (Breger 2005, 154-156), also had a visible impact on the study of the periods included within this thesis. In particular they influenced the interpretation of the late New Kingdom, through the analysis of that period by Walther Wolf, a scholar described by Steindorff as a ‘terrible Nazi’ (Schneider 2013, 146). 8 Wolf’s political views had a clear effect on his interpretations of

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7 This change is also associated with the appearance of the Stalinist regime in Russia and, later, much of Eastern Europe although this will be addressed in more detail later in this section.
8 This was in a letter from Steindorff to John Wilson providing three lists of German Egyptologists, those who had refused to collaborate ‘Men of Honor’, those who had been Nazi supporters ‘I accuse...’, and a final group
ancient Egyptian history, going as far as using the Nazi slogan of ‘Blood and Land’ to describe the principles of ancient Egyptian culture (Schneider 2013, 206-207). In Wolf’s explanation of the Twentieth Dynasty such views are apparent not in his analysis of the reasons for a political decline, but in his argument that there was a simultaneous decline in the culture of ancient Egypt as a result of loss of vitality which led to ossification and the death of the civilisation (Lichtheim 1963, 43). This view is reminiscent of the attitudes towards the Third Intermediate Period expressed in the general histories written by Brugsch and Breasted and demonstrates the persistence of this interpretation of the evidence through much of the twentieth century. This impression was only reinforced by the understanding of the decline of civilisations that had been established by Toynbee’s work ‘A Study of History’, which included ancient Egypt, as being the product of a collapse of the associated culture and the isolation of the elite from the rest of the society (Yoffee 1988, 3-4; 2005, 131-132). As a result of such influence explanations centred on the inevitable decay of all civilisations remained common until the 1960s (McIntire and Perry 1989, 4-5).

The Third Intermediate Period continued to receive little attention throughout much of the twentieth century, even following the creation of the term by Steindorff in 1946. Indeed Lichtheim, in her historiography of Egyptology published in 1963, was able to note that the division of Egypt into periods which had marked three peaks of political strength had resulted in them drawing the majority of research, leaving the ‘Late Period’ in particular neglected (1963, 34-35), with only one published political history of the period. By this who were believed to be dead or too old to be important. Wolf was described by Steindorff as a ‘terrible Nazi’ despite being believed to be dead and thus in the third group (Schneider 2013, 145-147).

9 Kienitz’s Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. Bis zum 4. Jahrhundert vor der Zeitwende and even this did not fully improve understanding of the period as it only covered from the seventh to fourth Centuries BC (Lichtheim 1963, 42).
point, however, this had already begun to change with the publication in 1961 of Yoyotte’s important monograph on the Delta under Libyan rule finally beginning to assess the evidence for this period (Yoyotte 1961; Perdu 2012, xii). This was followed by an increasing number of studies and publications examining the Third Intermediate Period, which was only further spurred by the publication of Kitchen’s Third Intermediate Period, the first comprehensive assessment of the evidence from the Twentieth Dynasty through to the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty, in 1972. As a result of these two publications there has been much more extensive research into the Third Intermediate Period within the last forty years (Myśliwiec 2000, 44; Niwiński 2003, 416). Much of this research has focused, however, on resolving the complicated chronology that follows the late Twentieth Dynasty, for example the updated editions of Kitchen’s monograph (1986 and 1996), as well as his other publications (2006; 2009) and the publications by Thijs (2003), Hornung, Krauss and Warburton (2006), Aston (1989, 2009a, and with Taylor 1990), and Broekman (2002, 2005, 2006, 2011b; 2012a; 2012b).

This specific focus on the chronological issues or on the publication of more primary evidence has left many of the impressions and interpretations of specific kings and events created in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century relatively unchallenged well into the late twentieth century. This is particularly noticeable when it comes to comprehensive studies of individual kings’ reigns which remain almost entirely restricted to examinations of the reign of Ramesses III. The impression of Ramesses III as the last ‘great’ king of Egypt created in the early general histories of the Egypt (Breasted 1909, 505; Gardiner 1961, 294), has only been reinforced by his reign receiving two major studies within the last twenty years (Grandet 1993; Cline and O’Connor 2012) whilst only two other
kings from the late New Kingdom have received such attention, Ramesses IV (Peden 1994b) and Merneptah (Servajean 2014), and one of those only very recently. This lack of study is mirrored for the Third Intermediate Period with only one from the entirety of that period and that covering a king, Herihor, at the crossover from the Late New Kingdom to the Third Intermediate Period (Gregory 2014). Such restricted focus on the activities of a limited number of kings has only reinforced the legacy of early interpretations that the majority of kings, particularly those in the Third Intermediate Period, made little or no impact on the historical record. This is a view that has only been supported by some scholars’ comments regarding kings of these periods whose reigns have little surviving evidence, such as Kitchen describing Takeloth I as a ‘nonentity’ (1986, 311).

These pre-existing biases have been joined by more recent influences on the interpretations of the evidence from the social and political environment of the late Twentieth Century. The totalitarian regimes of the late twentieth century were particularly explained through reference to Egyptian kings, as visible in Wittfogel’s Oriental Despotism (1957), as well as being used to understand the political and social structure of ancient Egypt (Breger 2005, 157). The effect of such external influences on interpretations of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period are especially visible in Myśliwiec’s history of the period, The Twilight of Ancient Egypt, which describes the New Kingdom conquest of nearby states as an abandonment of traditional ancient Egyptian values that were not restored until the reunification by the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty (2000, 14-17); a description clearly influenced by his background as a Pole from Soviet-Occupied Poland. With the publication of Bernal’s

10 Although it could be argued that Herihor belongs to the late New Kingdom, as that is when his career starts, based on the chronology followed in this thesis (see n.83) his kingship belongs to the Twenty-First Dynasty and thus the Third Intermediate Period.
Black Athena where he specifically noted the role that the external influences have had on the interpretation and perception of ancient Egypt (1987, 258; 269) the presence of these influences have become more widely acknowledged within Egyptology (Morkot 2000, 34-35; 2003, 167-168). As a result there have begun to be attempts to not only acknowledge the specific presence of such influences within histories of Egypt, but also to investigate how individual scholar’s backgrounds have affected how they have interpreted or presented information about Egypt (Murnane 2003, 16; Schneider and Raulwing 2013).

Another aspect of earlier histories of the late New Kingdoms that has persisted despite more specific studies of the periods is the terminology typically used to describe the period. Indeed, prior to Steindorff coining the term ‘Third Intermediate Period’ in a publication of 1946 (Aldred 1956, 7; Fazzini 1997, 113), that period was instead described in terms like Breasted’s ‘The Decadence’ (1909, xix), in contrast to the New Kingdom (known as the ‘Empire Period’ in many of these early histories; Breasted 1909, xviii). Even with the development of the term ‘Third Intermediate Period’ which removed some of the more egregious disparagement of the period by scholars, issues remained with the terminology describing them. Lichtheim commented as early as 1963 on how the periods following the New Kingdom have been described either as the ‘Late Period’ or ‘Period of Decline’, allowing them to be stereotyped or misused to prove arguments (Lichtheim 1963, 34). Despite some attempts at revision led by scholars, for example Leahy (1985, 52-53), and an ever-increasing number of published documents and monuments, the language used to describe both periods continues to display many of the influences described by Lichtheim and found in earlier histories. Examples of this continuation include the titles of Myśliwiec’s book on the Third Intermediate Period, The Twilight of Ancient Egypt (2000), and Dodson’s two recent
books ‘Poisoned Legacy’ (2011) and ‘Afterglow of Empire’ (2012) which cover the end of the New Kingdom and the Third Intermediate Period respectively. This influence is even apparent in books specifically intended for an academic audience, such as Cline and O’Connor’s Ramesses III: The Life and Times of Egypt’s Last Hero (2012) and Barwik’s analysis of the textual sources of the reign of Ramesses XI, The Twilight of Ramesside Egypt (2011). This is despite a recent reaffirmation that the terms used to describe these periods have important effects in how those periods are perceived and interpreted (Morkot 2003a, 167-168; Redford 2003, 5; 2008, 24), and an attempt to change the Third Intermediate Period into the Libyan and Kushite Periods (Leahy 1985, 53).

Whilst there has been considerable continuity in aspects of the histories of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period the late twentieth century also saw the development of new forms of history within Egyptology, such as economic or social histories, by making use of methodologies from other historical disciplines (Redford 2003, 2-3; Schneider 2012, 58), especially Trigger, O’Connor, Kemp, and Lloyd’s (1983) Ancient Egypt: A Social History. These have provided detailed insights into developments or specific elements within Egyptian society, in particular in the application of systems theory (Redford 2003, 3). However, there not only remains some debate as to how useful these approaches are to the discipline (Redford 2003, 3-4; Grimal 2003, 12; Redford 2008, 26), but they have also been applied within the framework of interpretations created by the earlier general histories. An example of this process is that whilst there have been a number of economic studies of the late New Kingdom (Janssen 1975a; 1975b; Warburton 2000; 2007; 2010; Hikade 2006), almost all of these have accepted the interpretation that there was a political decline during
this period and have, therefore, looked at the economic evidence for causes of this decline (Warburton 2000, 77; 92; Hikade 2006, 165).

The most recent developments in the study of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period have been the increasing use of scientific data and the new emphasis on more interdisciplinary approaches (Wilkinson R. 2008b, 2; Schneider 2012, 59). These have led to a growing appreciation for the role of the environment in causing the possible economic decline of the late New Kingdom (Butzer 2012; Finkelstein et al. 2013). In so doing they have built upon the conclusions of the recent economic histories by providing an underlying cause for the economic decline that they had apparently detected in the sources. The increase in interdisciplinary studies has reinforced this by tying the discussion of decline within Egypt more firmly into the wider debate over the collapse of the Late Bronze Age (LBA) societies of the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly with the current focus on widespread climate change at least facilitating this collapse (Finkelstein 2013; Cline 2014). Such studies remain limited in number however. As a result, despite there being an introduction of a number of different methodologies and increased use of scientific data, the descriptions of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period have continued to be shaped by those included in the general histories of the twentieth century.

Despite the increased levels of research into the late New Kingdom and the Third Intermediate Period within the last few decades there continue to be considerable issues with how both periods are explained and understood within Egyptology. Firstly, there still remains a strong bias in the origin of much of the material towards Upper Egypt despite more extensive excavation of the Delta (Niwiński 2003, 416). The continued bias in the evidence has helped to retain the original interpretations for the political decline under the
late New Kingdom and the limited building activities of the Libyan kings, both of which were conceived as a result of this bias in the histories written in the early twentieth century and largely retained into the present. Additionally, the knowledge that any history written about either period can only be provisional as a result of both the current limitations of evidence and the likelihood of new discoveries contradicting any conclusions, has helped to push academics into following the ‘well-trodden paths’ of certain topics (Redford 2008, 23). A debate has also still yet to be held within Egyptology as to the relative weight to be placed on large impersonal forces, such as changes to the environment, or on the ‘great men’ of history, such as individual kings, with regard to their roles in the events of Egyptian history (Redford 2008, 25). The effect of this can be seen in the debate over the causes of the supposed economic decline under the Twentieth Dynasty, with explanations alternating between seeing the kings’ gifts of land to the temples as key, and the changing environment with reduced harvests as the most significant (Warburton 2000; Butzer 2012). 11 Finally, the division of Egyptian history ‘into golden ages and alleged times of crisis’ (Schneider 2012, 59), continues to focus research onto the supposed periods of centralisation which, combined with many Third Intermediate Period scholars’ focus on chronological issues and a general lack of evidence, has allowed older interpretations of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period to persist.

11 This debate will be examined in more detail in chapter 3.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the main events and chronology of the periods. In order to achieve this the time period will be broken down into blocks, some of which conform to existing divisions and others not, with each section accompanied by details of the available evidence and a brief commentary on the political, economic and social processes at work. This will then provide a framework for my discussion of the case studies examined in the following chapters. As this history is intended to act as a framework for the rest of the thesis it only includes what I perceive to be the major events or evidence of the various kings’ reigns. This clearly leaves out lots of specific pieces of evidence, some of which will be introduced in other chapters where necessary, but should otherwise present an accurate outline of the history of the periods.

2.1 Late Nineteenth Dynasty (c.1215-c.1188 BC)

2.1.1 Outline of the evidence for the period

The evidence for the late Nineteenth Dynasty is largely consistent with that available for the earlier New Kingdom. There are monumental remains and their associated inscriptions, as well as other royal and official inscriptions, for example those found at the quarrying and mining sites, and the remains of some official documents, such as the Gurob fragments (RAD 30-33). The royal tombs in the Valley of the Kings have also survived, as well as some private tombs, and the mummies of most of the kings found in the mummy caches. Tawosret’s is still not definitively identified, however.\textsuperscript{12} The official records are supplemented, as they are

\textsuperscript{12} See note 30.
for most of the New Kingdom, by the records and other documents from the workers’ village at Deir el-Medina. These become increasingly important towards the end of the dynasty as other sources become scarcer. The surviving evidence does come from areas across Egypt, but the majority of it comes from Upper Egypt and Thebes in particular, as well as from the Levant and from Nubia.

As the dynasty progressed some of these forms of evidence become less available. It appears that Merneptah’s mortuary temple was the last successfully completed (whilst the construction of Tawosret’s appears to have been completed, no decoration or inscriptions were added to the walls (Wilkinson R. 2010, 10). Few monuments are known to have been constructed by the rulers who followed Merneptah. Neither official nor private documents survive to the extent known from the Twentieth Dynasty outside Deir el-Medina, leaving us reliant on inscriptions in tombs, on sculpture, and on stelae for much of the evidence of the period.

2.1.2 Chronology of events of the Nineteenth Dynasty

Early in his Year 67 Ramesses II died (Gurob Fragment L: RAD 30, 10) and was buried in his tomb in the Valley of the Kings (KV 7). His eldest surviving son, Merneptah, ascended to the throne in c.1213 BC (his Year 1). Shortly after his accession he may have launched a military campaign to the Levant, suggested by the epithet ‘One who subdues Gezer’ which appears on his stela at Amada temple (Davies 1997, 191: 2), and the record of the subdued towns on the ‘Israel Stela’ (Cairo JE 34025 verso, 2; Davies 1997, 173-188). This is further supported by evidence of destruction at the sites mentioned on the latter, particularly at Gezer (Hasel 1998, 187). Certainly by Merneptah’s Year 3 Egypt’s Palestinian possessions appear to have
been secured, with a note from a border official in that year listing despatches sent to garrison commanders and other significant individuals of the region, including the Prince of Tyre (Gardiner 1961, 274). Probably at around the same point in his reign, and certainly by his Year 5, Merneptah organised for some shipments of grain to be sent to the Hittites to alleviate a famine that was occurring there (KRIt VI 2:10-12:6; Manassa 2003, 34; 37 n.g).  

In Merneptah’s Year 5 Egypt faced a major invasion by the Libu into the western Delta region. It was led by a named Libu chief, Mariy, who also received assistance from several groups traditionally included in the ‘Sea Peoples’: the Sherden, Shekelesh, Aqawasha, Luku and the Turshu (Manassa 2003, 23). Together they proceeded through the Farafra oasis into the western Delta, threatening the south-eastern area near Memphis, Bubastis and Heliopolis. At this point the Egyptian army engaged and defeated them, with Mariy fleeing and abandoning both his camp and family. Other records of the campaign include a fragmentary copy of the ‘Israel Stela’ from the Cour de la Cachette at Karnak, the ‘Athribis Stela’ (KRIt IV, 19-22) and a victory column at Heliopolis. Stelae found at four Nubian temples, Amada, Amara West, Wadi es-Seboua and Aksha, mention the defeat of the Libu as occurring at the same time as a revolt in Upper Nubia (Wawat).

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13 Line 24 of Merneptah’s Great Karnak Inscription, ‘In order to vivify this Hittite Land I have caused grain to be sent in ships.’ (hieroglyphics in Manassa 2003, pl.6). This activity must take place prior to Merneptah’s Year 5 as they are recorded in his Great Karnak Inscription which recorded the Libyan invasion in his Year 5.

14 The exact location of the battle is currently undetermined, with a range of locations within the western Delta suggested. As the attack is known to be threatening Memphis and the south-eastern Delta (Manassa 2003, 14-16) it is likely that the battle location is somewhere nearby. Davies suggests that the ‘district of Per-Irw’ (Davies 1997, 151: 30) is to be identified as the area around Heliopolis, supported by the epithet ‘who avenges Heliopolis’ on the ‘Israel Stela’ (Cairo JE 34025 verso: 15-16; Davies 1997, 173-188). However, Manassa (2003, 27) notes ‘the range of locations for Perire seems to be limited to the southern part of the western Delta, and until further evidence is found, a more precise location within that range appears impossible to determine’.

15 This may have been deliberately co-ordinated in the same way that had been attempted by the Hyksos and Kerma during Kamose’s reign (Gardiner 1961, 167-168; Manassa 2003, 96-97). This revolt was defeated, presumably by the king’s son of Kush, with those who survived punished harshly; ‘...fire was thrown at their
Following these victories there is no evidence for any further military campaigns. Merneptah completed his mortuary temple, partially through the reuse of blocks from Amenhotep III’s at Kom el-Heitan (including the stela used for the ‘Israel stela’) and also carried out some construction at Pi-Ramesses and Memphis. His cartouche is attested at the Gebel el-Silsila quarry, the Sinai turquoise mine at Serabit el-Khadim, and the copper mines at Timna (KRIlt IV, 41:1-42:15; VII 217). His last attested regnal year comes from P. Sallier I (3,4; Caminos 1954, 303-329) for a Year 10 (c.1203 BC), during which he may well have died and been buried in his tomb (KV 8).\(^{16}\)

He was succeeded by the crown prince, Sety-Merneptah (A) as Sety II, who was in Thebes when he became king (o. Cairo CG 25560; KRIlt IV, 302). There is limited evidence from the first year or so of his reign, with the most significant events of this period being the start of the king’s tomb (KV 15) in Year 1 (KRIlt IV, 298), and his wife Tawosret’s tomb (KV 14) early in Year 2 (KRIlt IV, 404). By the middle of Sety II’s Year 2 (after IV prt on a stela at Gebel el-Silsila; KRIlt IV, 273-274) another king, Amenmesses, was attested in the south. The background for this king is disputed, with him being either the son (Dodson 2010, 40) or half-brother of Sety II (Yurco 1979, 28).\(^{17}\) Dodson also equates Amenmesses with Merneptah’s great ones in front of their companions. Those left over had their hands cut off on account of their crimes. Others had their ears and eyes taken away and they were taken to Kush, and made into heaps (of corpses) in their cities’ (KRIh IV, 1-2; 33-37: 7-9).

\(^{16}\) Whilst clearly not an exact measurement of the actual reign length of any king, as is clear from the continual updating of the reign lengths of the Libyan kings and, indeed of Tawosret, the last known year for any king will be taken within this thesis as the year in which they died. For the New Kingdom this will be more accurate than for later periods as a result of the more extensive surviving records, particularly those from Deir el-Medina which often recorded the announcement of a king’s death and then the date of his successor’s accession (Hornung 2006, 197-198).

\(^{17}\) Yurco’s (1979, 28) suggestion that Amenmesses was the half-brother of Sety II is based on the titles of Queen Takhat whose title of ‘King’s Mother’ (mw.t nsw.t) was modified to ‘King’s Wife’ (hm.t nsw.t) on Karnak statue 2 and on CG 1198 remained unaltered as ‘King’s Daughter and King’s Great Wife’ (s3.t nsw.t hm.t nsw.t wr.t)). He suggests that they are the same woman and this is also the same as one of Ramesses II’s daughters listed as
king’s son of Kush, Messuy, which possibly explains the clear concentration of the surviving evidence of Amenmesses in Upper Egypt.\textsuperscript{18} Certainly for 4 years,\textsuperscript{19} in the middle of Sety II’s reign (Years 2-5), much of Upper Egypt and all of Nubia seems to have been outside his control, with nothing in these areas dated using his regnal dates (Hornung 2006, 213). The fallout of this apparent rebellion is demonstrated by Papyrus Salt 124 which recorded how one of the chief workmen, Neferhotep, was killed by the ‘enemy’ (P. BM 10055 1: 2; Davies 1997, 343-54) during the time of Sety II.

It remains unclear what happened to Amenmesses, but Sety II was attested throughout Egypt and Nubia from his Year 5 onwards and a campaign of eradication and usurpation of Amenmesses’ monuments occurred, particularly the erasure of all the reliefs and names in Amenmesses’ tomb (KV 10). There was also a purge of officials who had served under Amenmesses, although the High Priest of Amun (HPA) Roma-Roy remained in office throughout the whole period. His desire to pass on his title to his son, however, was thwarted with the appointment of Mahuhy by Sety II late in his reign (\textit{KRIt} IV, 289-92). Sety II’s limited building projects, such as the bark shrine at Karnak and the lack of almost any evidence for a mortuary temple, are suggestive that the king had access to either limited

\textsuperscript{18} Dodson’s (1987, 226; 2010, 40) suggestion that there is still one woman, but instead it is Sety II’s wife seems to me to make more sense of the evidence. I agree with him that the maintenance of the titles on CG 1198 make it likely that, unless there are two Queen Takhats, the woman on CG 1198 had the same relationship with the original owner as the usurper (Sety II) and thus it is likely it was originally a statue of Sety II. Combined with the re-carving of the titles of Takhat in Karnak this would suggest that the woman was also the mother of Amenmesses and thus likely that he is the son of Sety II (Dodson 2010, 40-41).

\textsuperscript{19} This is the highest known year for Amenmesses with a Year 4 from Deir el-Medina (o. Cairo CG 25784; \textit{KRIt} IV, 227:6).
resources or time. The evidence from Sety II’s own tomb suggests that time was a factor, with the decoration restarted after the interregnum much further inside the tomb and of a simpler, and thus faster, style than before (Dodson 2010, 79). Early in the middle of his Year 6 (c.1197 BC) Sety II’s death was announced to the workers at Deir el-Medina (o. Cairo CG 25515; KRIt IV, 315-322) and he was interred in his tomb (KV 15).

It appears that the king who succeeded him, Ramesses-Siptah, did so with difficulty, indicated by ‘chancellor’ Bay’s comments, ‘I caused the king to be established on the seat of his father’ on a relief near Aswan (KRIh IV, 363-64). This has helped reinforce the identification of Bay as the Syrian ‘Irsu’ from Papyrus Harris (P. BM 9999=P. Harris I, 75: 4; Grandet 1994a, 335) who is held responsible for the chaos and disorder in Egypt prior to Sethnakhte’s takeover. One reason for the possible difficulty of Siptah’s accession may have been his young age, possibly as young as 10 (Callender 2004, 87), with Queen Tawosret and ‘chancellor’ Bay acting as regents for the young king (von Beckerath 1962, 73; KRIt IV 366). Another possible explanation for a difficult transition between Sety II and Siptah is the identification of Siptah’s father as Amenmesses, based on the evidence of a statue at Munich (Gl.122; von Beckerath 1962, 70-74; Aldred 1963, 45-46).

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20 Von Beckerath (1962, 71) has suggested that ‘Irsu’ could be Siptah himself and that he was the child of Sety II and a Syrian woman from his harem. However the lack of damage to his name during the Twentieth Dynasty is not suggestive that he should be identified with someone who was as disliked as was ‘Irsu’ (Dodson 2010, 90).
21 The evidence for this is based on the identification of Tawosret as the ‘the Great Noblewoman of Every Land’ (t3 iryt-pr‘ n t‘ nb) on Cairo JE 43341 (Callender 2004, 88) and the depiction in the early decoration from her tomb (KV 14) of her with Siptah where she retains the title ‘King’s Great Wife’ (hmt nswt wrt) in a style similar to Hatshepsut (Dodson 2010, 97).
22 Certainly he was not a son of Sety II, as there is no evidence to connect them and it is unlikely a legitimate successor would have needed such unusual assistance to secure the throne, or would have been so clearly removed from the list of legitimate kings by the Twentieth Dynasty (Aldred 1963, 43-45; Dodson 2010, 89; Servajeane 2014, 99). The statue has a young Siptah seated on a figure that has been completely hacked out leaving just the figure who was originally seated on a royal throne. The identity of this missing figure as Amenmesses is suggested by Aldred (1963, 45-46) and Dodson (2010, 91-93), and leads to their identification
Despite the apparent doubts about his accession the reign started routinely with Siptah’s tomb (KV 47) started early in his Year 1 (o. Cairo CG 25515; KRI IV, 315-322) along with the installation of a new king’s son of Kush (Dodson 2010, 104). In Siptah’s Year 2 Paneb, the Chief Workman at Deir el-Medina, whose alleged crimes were detailed in Papyrus Salt 124 by Amennakht (Davies 1997, 343-54), stops being attested in the record from Deir el-Medina with his last recorded appearance on an ostracon from Deir el-Medina (o. Cairo CG 25521; KRI IV, 397-402).  

In Year 3 Siptah changed his name from Ramesses-Siptah to Merneptah-Siptah, and his prenomen from Sekhaenre (sxai.n-ra) to Akhenre (’h-n-r*) (KRI IV 363-364). Siptah’s new name is attested at Gebel el-Silsila; probably quarrying stone for his mortuary temple of which only the foundation trenches with Siptah’s and Bay’s names survived (Dodson 2010, 105-106). This again demonstrates the extent of Bay’s influence, culminating in Siptah’s Year 3 when Bay was granted a tomb in the Valley of the Kings (KV 13) (o. Cairo JE 72451; KRI IV, 404). This was an honour not normally granted to those of non-royal birth, and the size and design of Bay’s tomb was unlike any except those of the kings themselves. This unusual distinction for Bay did not last long, however, as in Siptah’s Year 5 an announcement was

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23 It is known from a later letter that Paneb was put on trial for the theft of the stones recorded by Amennakht (McDowell 1990, 211; 1999, 192-193) which suggests that his disappearance from the historical record might have been a result of his punishment (Davies 1997, 354). Bierbrier (2000, 53) has recently suggested that many of the alleged crimes may have been invented by Amennakht in an attempt to secure the Chief Workman position for himself.
made to the workers at Deir el-Medina that ‘the king, l.p.h., has killed the great enemy Bay’ (o. IFAO 1864; text in Grandet 2000, 341).

It is clear from the mummy of Siptah that he suffered from a disability. His left leg was considerably shorter than his right and his foot angled straight down, resulting in only his toes touching the ground. This has been taken as evidence of a range of diseases from polio (Elliot Smith 1912, 71; Callender 2004, 87) to cerebral palsy (Dodson 2010, 103). Any of these could have led to premature death in ancient Egypt and so Siptah’s death either late in his Year 6 or early in his Year 7 (c.1192/1 BC) need not be ascribed to suspicious motives as Dodson does (2010, 109). On his death he was buried in KV 47, but his cartouches were erased, although they were replaced in a later reign.

Due to Siptah’s young age it is unsurprising that there does not appear to have been a suitable male heir and, consequently, Queen Tawosret succeeded to the throne adopting full royal titulary. The modification of her appearance into that of a king seems to have taken place slowly, best reflected in the gradually changing depictions of Tawosret inside her tomb (Dodson 2010, 111). She dated her regnal years, however, either as a continuation from Siptah’s reign, or as if she had ruled solely since Sety II’s death (perhaps explaining the removal of Siptah’s cartouches from her tomb and their replacement with Sety II’s), with her first sole year listed as Year 7 as found on foundation blocks from her mortuary temple (Wilkinson R. 2008a, 7).

Tawosret’s name is attested at the Sinai sites and on a faience vessel from Tell Deir Alla in Jordan (KRI IV, 351). Her highest known regnal year is a Year 8 on a pair of ostraca from Deir el-Medina (o. IFAO DM 594; o. Cairo CG 25293; KRI IV, 407-408; Altenmüller 1982, 114) and the top of the dated foundation block from her mortuary temple (Wilkinson R. 2008a, 7).
2008a, 7). The dating of the foundation deposits and blocks has been taken as evidence that Tawosret died before the completion of her temple, at some point in her Year 8. Excavations, however, have revealed that the temple structure was complete or nearly so, although without decoration (Wilkinson R. 2010, 10). As the foundation deposits are definitely dated to her Years 7 and 8, for the temple to have been completed Tawosret would have ruled into a Year 9 and possibly a Year 10 (Wilkinson R. 2011, 8). As a result of this evidence, Tawosret probably died and was buried in her tomb (KV 14) at a point late in her Year 9 (c.1188 BC). Her death ended the Nineteenth Dynasty with her successor, Sethnakhte, the first ruler of a new dynasty, the Twentieth.

2.1.3 Political, social, economic, and environmental commentary

Following the relative stability of Merneptah’s reign, which saw the defeat of rebellions in Nubia and the Levant, and the defeat of a large Libyan migration/invasion supported by some groups of the ‘Sea Peoples’, the late Nineteenth Dynasty was marked by succession problems and internal divisions. Whilst Merneptah’s son Sety II appears to have succeeded him without apparent issues, with the appearance of the rival king Amenmesses in Sety II’s Year 2 the succession became increasingly problematic. Irrespective of whether Amenmesses was the son or half-brother of Sety II it is clear that his rebellion would have split the Nineteenth Dynasty royal family. In the course of the civil war between them for control of the country, Sety II’s named crown prince, Sety-Merneptah B, may have been killed (Dodson 2010, 44; 76). Certainly Amenmesses gained control over the Theban region,

24 As the temple was demolished in antiquity, there is no dated section to prove this, but based on the archaeological evidence I have extended her rule into a Year 9 with no interregnum between her and Sethnakhte to account for the evidence that her mortuary temple had been completed.
and possibly as far north as the Fayyum (Dodson 2010, 37), removing both Sety II’s and Merneptah’s cartouches from monuments. Amenmesses’ dislike of Merneptah is suggested by Dodson (1997, 47-48; 2010, 25-26; 42-43) to be the result of his removal from the position of king’s son of Kush in a possible reshuffle of royal officials that he argues Merneptah carried out in his Year 7 or 8. Sety II’s victory in the civil war also appears to have brought ‘chancellor’ Bay to prominence, indicated by his depiction behind Sety in the Karnak bark shrine. Bay also played a significant role in placing Siptah, who was almost certainly the son of Amenmesses, on the throne. This indicates that there were issues with finding a suitable successor to Sety II, and indeed to Siptah following his death, with Tawosret (Sety II’s great royal wife) subsequently taking the throne. Whilst it is clear that the dynasty appears to have had problems in producing suitable male heirs after Sety II, it is not clear what brought about the Twentieth Dynasty’s takeover. There is still very limited evidence to suggest a civil war took place, but there is a similar lack of evidence to suggest that Tawosret had nominated Sethnakhte as her successor in the way that Horemheb had done for Ramesses I at the end of the Eighteenth Dynasty.

Throughout the late Nineteenth Dynasty it is clear that the important political centres continued to remain at Pi-Ramesses, Memphis, and Thebes with all of the rulers (bar Amenmesses) attested at those sites and them receiving the majority of construction carried out throughout during this period. Thebes also continued to remain important as the site for the royal tombs and mortuary cults, with all of the rulers from this period dedicating tombs in the Valley of the Kings including Amenmesses and Tawosret. Officials continued to be

25 This is based on an inscribed jar, with Amenmesses’ names on it, found in Cemetery C at Riqqa near the mouth of the Fayyum (UC16064: Kitchen 1987, 23-25; Dodson 2010, 37 n.22).
26 See n.22.
appointed by the king, with Sety II appointing an unrelated official, Mahuhy (KRI IV, 289-92), rather than the son of Roma-Roy as HPA and Siptah appointing a new king’s son of Kush early in his reign. Despite this, one of the most notable political and social events is the rise and subsequent fall of ‘chancellor’ Bay. It is unclear exactly why he originally became so powerful, but his later importance appears to have been related to his role in placing Siptah onto the throne, followed by his position as co-regent with Tawosret after his accession. This resulted in him being granted considerable privileges including a tomb in the Valley of the Kings. His execution by Siptah, along with the king’s continued control over appointments, shows that considerable power remained with the kings and royal family.

Outside the royal court, the record from Deir el-Medina gives us some indication of the wider impact of the civil war between Sety II and Amenmesses with the death of the foreman Neferhotep, and the appearance of Paneb. Despite the accusations of Paneb’s criminal activities in P. Salt 124 (Davies 1997, 343-54), and his apparently escaping punishment for some time, it is known that he was put on trial and his absence from the Deir el-Medina records after Siptah’s Year 2 suggest that he was eventually punished for them.

Economically and environmentally the late Nineteenth Dynasty seems to have been a continuation from the earlier New Kingdom. The construction of monuments is present across the period and across Egypt, although predominantly under Merneptah. The apparent lack for the subsequent rulers is likely due to political reasons, such as Sety II’s lack of control over Upper Egypt, and short reigns rather than lack of resources, demonstrated by the fact that Tawosret appears to have completed her mortuary temple, albeit without decoration. All of the rulers certainly completed the excavation of their tombs in the Valley of the Kings, although often not the decoration. From Merneptah’s reign there are a couple of references
to famine occurring outside Egypt, firstly as explanation for the Libu invasion in his Year 5, and secondly as to why he had sent grain to the Hittites. There are no indications for the presence of famine within Egypt, but this is not surprising considering the official nature of the majority of the sources for this period. With Egyptian control over the Levant and Nubia being maintained throughout the late Nineteenth Dynasty the Egyptians would have continued to have had access to the resources and materials of those regions, especially the Nubian gold mines. Additionally all of the late Nineteenth Dynasty rulers are attested at the Sinai mining sites, as well as at various other quarrying locations, especially Gebel el-Silsila.

2.2. The Twentieth Dynasty (c.1188–c.1067 BC)

2.2.1 Outline of the evidence for the period

The Twentieth Dynasty is one of the best evidenced periods of Egyptian history, with the same categories of evidence available for the late Nineteenth Dynasty: monumental, funerary, and the records from Deir el-Medina, supplemented by a much larger quantity of surviving official and private documents. These documents give insight into the administration and key events of the Twentieth Dynasty, especially ones which detail events normally not included in the monumental records. The private documents, especially the late Ramesside letters, supplement the official record from Deir el-Medina and provide a slightly wider understanding of some of the key events of the period, although these date mostly from the very end of the dynasty. There are two issues even with this greater quantity of documentary evidence however, firstly that it is still only a small proportion of what must have existed and so may be skewing our understanding of the period with the
records of a few, exceptional, events and, secondly, that this evidence almost entirely comes from Upper Egypt and from Thebes in particular. This is also true of the other main forms of evidence, with monumental remains and funerary evidence, along with the evidence from Deir el-Medina, also overwhelming concentrated in the south. This means it is almost impossible to know how representative these records are of the whole of Egypt, or if they merely show the state of affairs in the south. As the main political centres were now based in the north this is highly problematic for reconstructing the state of the central administration during the Twentieth Dynasty.

Despite this there are some trends that can be determined from the evidence that is currently available. Monumental evidence becomes increasingly uncommon as the dynasty continues, with much of the known monuments dating to Ramesses III (although this is affected by the loss of key sites in the north such as Pi-Ramesses). Likewise funerary evidence becomes increasingly scarce, as the dynasty progresses, even in Upper Egypt (Cooney 2011, 7; 9-10). This is true even for the royal burials in the Valley of the Kings, with Ramesses VIII, X, and XI all apparently not buried there, despite having tombs carved there. The evidence from Deir el-Medina also becomes increasingly patchy towards the end of the dynasty, particularly following its movement within the walls of Medinet Habu. This lack is, however, supplemented by the late Ramesside letters found there which provide some insight into the state of affairs at the very end of the village’s existence. Finally, there is also a loss of the evidence from both the Levant and Nubia as those territories were lost or abandoned during the course of the Twentieth Dynasty, removing an important source of information for the activities of the Egyptian kings and administration, particularly from Nubia.
2.2.2 Chronology of events for the Twentieth Dynasty

Little is known about Sethnakhte, the first king of the dynasty, or his family connections, but there are two historical records which suggest that his takeover was not entirely peaceful.\textsuperscript{27} In a stela found at Elephantine and dated to Sethnakhte’s Year 2 there is a description of his violent defeat of an enemy who had hired Asiatic mercenaries (Drenkhan 1980, 64-75; \textit{KRlt} V, 671-672) which, combined with the description of his ‘takeover’ in Papyrus Harris (I, 75; Grandet 1994a, 335) reinforces the impression of the chaos that was brought to an end with his coronation.\textsuperscript{28} Whilst it is unclear exactly how Sethnakhte became king, it is clear that he did not have a long reign. Other than the Elephantine stela, there is a stela from Serabit el-Khadim dated to a Year 3 (Hornung 2006, 214), as well as a recently discovered stela by the HPA Bakenkhonsu dated to a Year 4 (Boraik 2007, 125). It is probable that he died early in this year (c.1187 BC) given the limited number of his recorded activities, which are primarily restricted to the restoration of Siptah’s cartouches in KV 47, the construction or decoration of Chapel D at Deir el-Medina, and the start of the excavation and decoration of KV 11 up to its collision with KV 10. His death came too early for KV 11 to have been completed and KV

\textsuperscript{27} He is often suggested to be a scion of the Nineteenth Dynasty based on the presence of the god Seth in his name. Most probably, following Dodson and Hilton (2010, 186), he was a grandson (or further) of Ramesses II from one of the latter’s many children. Against this is the lack of any mention of royal descent in his surviving records and a strong emphasis on his selection by the gods (Kitchen 2012, 2).

\textsuperscript{28} Dodson (2010, 120-122) has noted, however, that the formula of a period of chaos which is ended by the accession of a new king is a traditional way of legitimising the rule of a new royal line and that these descriptions do not provide evidence for a violent takeover. Tawosret’s mummy has not been conclusively identified as the one from KV 35 under Sethnakhte’s coffin lid (although it could have been destroyed by looters in antiquity) and Callender (2004, 103-104) has noted that an ostracon, o. Cairo CG 25125, found in KV 9 and depicting an Egyptian pharaoh fighting a woman wearing costume and headdress could be a depiction of Tawosret fighting Sethnakhte.
14 was rapidly converted for his burial with the images and names of Tawosret simply plastered over.29

Sethnakhte was succeeded by his son, Ramesses III (ḥq3-iwnw) (c.1183 BC). He acceded to a country seemingly not much changed by the internal difficulties at the end of the Nineteenth Dynasty. Items from his early years have been found at key sites in the Levant, with objects datable to his Year 3 at Lachish (KRIt VII, 251) and Tell esh-Shar‘a (KRIt VII, 252), and from his Year 4 onwards at the copper mines at Timna (KRIt V 251-7; KRIt VII 259-260). It is during these first few years that the possible campaigns in the Levant and Nubia are suggested to have occurred, although it still remains unclear if the reliefs of these at Medinet Habu were simply copied from the Ramesseum.30

In Ramesses III’s Year 5 there was a major invasion by a coalition of groups from the western desert, with the Libu, Seped, and Meshwesh mentioned specifically in the Medinet Habu record (Peden 1994a, 13: 26). The invasion was, allegedly, a result of Ramesses III’s attempt to place a child puppet ruler as chief of the Libyans (Temehu),31 in response to requests from the Libyans (Temehu) themselves for his assistance in the selection of a new

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29 It is unclear what happened to his mummy afterwards, however; although he was originally buried in KV 14, his inner coffin (made from cartonnage only) was found in KV 35 with the mummy of Merneptah inside it (Dodson 2010, 127). Both Tawosret’s and Sethnakhte’s mummies have been suggested as some of the unidentified mummies from KV 35, with Tawosret’s being the female one found on Sethnakhte’s coffin lid (Cairo CG 61082; Smith 1912, 81-84) and Sethnakhte as the ‘mummy on the boat’. Both are unlikely since this would mean that Tawosret remained in her tomb after Sethnakhte’s usurpation and the non-royal posture of the other almost guarantees that it is not Sethnakhte (Dodson 2010, 128).

30 Of the two campaigns only the Nubian one has more evidence than just the relief at Medinet Habu. Most is still circumstantial, however, with mentions of Nubian captives in Papyrus Harris (10: 15; Grandet 1994a, 235) and on a stela from Chapel C at Deir el-Medina (KRIt V, 90-91). It is proposed that this was a rebellion similar in style to the one in Merneptah’s reign and was thus suppressed by the king’s son of Kush. For the campaign to the Levant the re-evaluation has been based on Ramesses III’s undoubted control over the Levant (Kitchen 2012, 12-14) and is otherwise attested by a set of reliefs from Medinet Habu (Edgerton and Wilson 1936, 95-96) and a short section in the Year 5 Libyan campaign record (Peden 1994a, 11).

31 This term, along with Tehenu, was a traditional name used to refer to the inhabitants of the deserts west of Egypt and may not have referred to any specific tribe by the New Kingdom (Haring 1993, 163).
chief (Peden 1994a, 13: 28-31). The Libyans (Temehu) rejected Ramesses III’s choice and invaded Egypt somewhere in the western Delta, where Ramesses met and, according to the Egyptian records, heavily defeated them. Captives were then branded with Ramesses’ names and settled in fortresses within Egypt (Peden 1994a, 15: 40; 67).

Also datable to Ramesses III’s Year 5 is a major quarrying effort at Gebel el-Silsila (Peden 1994a, 77-80) almost certainly for the construction of his mortuary temple at Medinet Habu which was begun the year before (Kitchen 2012, 15). The quarrying at Gebel el-Silsila would continue further into his reign in order to supply the stone for his construction of the one of the temples he built at Karnak, the North Temple in the First Court (Mojsov 2012, 288).

The next reliefs and inscriptions at Medinet Habu record the next major event of Ramesses III’s reign: in his Year 8 a confederation of ‘Sea Peoples’, the Peleset, Tjekker, Shekelesh, Danuna and Weshesh (Peden 1994a, 29: 18) attempted an invasion of Egypt by land and sea. In the record on the walls of Medinet Habu (north side of the Second Court,

32 Exactly where this took place is unclear from the Medinet Habu inscriptions, but the references to earlier transgressions by the Libyans ‘who were damaging Egypt daily’ and ‘treading Egypt which was wasted’ (KRIt V, 14:15-15:5) suggest the south-western Delta.

33 Indeed the records of the collection and counting of the remains listed over 20,000 killed, including all of their named chiefs, ‘Our seed is not, namely Didi, Mashakanu, Mariyey, together with Wermaru and Tjetmar’ as well as thousands of captives (KRih V, 15:10-15:15).

34 This was a standard practice of the New Kingdom and established the foreign contingents depicted in Egyptian army scenes, such as the Sherden troops attested in Ramesses III’s army (Edgerton and Wilson 1936, 36).

35 This perhaps explains why one of the records of the Year 5 Libyan invasion includes a small section at the end detailing a victory over the invading Peleset and Tjekker divided into two groups: ‘they were thr-soldiers on land and another (group) was on the great green’ (KRih V, 25:5-25:8). These details are from the invasion of the ‘Sea Peoples’ in Ramesses’ Year 8, suggesting that the construction and decoration of the temple had reached as far as this point, the Second Court, by Year 8 with the depictions of the Year 8 invasion being added to the outside of the Second Court as the Year 5 text was added to the inside (Kitchen 2012, 14).

36 By contrast his South Temple in the Precinct of Mut was constructed out of reused blocks which were re-carved with new reliefs (Mojsov 2012, 289).
exterior wall) the ‘Sea Peoples’ are described as ‘making a conspiracy in their islands’ (KRit V 39: 14) before causing destruction across the eastern Mediterranean, including on Cyprus, in Syria, at Carchemish and in the Hittite Empire (Peden 1994a, 29: 16-17). After pausing to construct an encampment in ‘Amor’ they proceeded towards the Egyptian border where Ramesses III’s army, including contingents of Sherden along with vassal troops and garrisons from Levantine possessions (Peden 1994a, 31: 19), defeated the land invasion. Meanwhile the water-borne attack was checked by ships blocking the various mouths of the Nile (Peden 1994a, 31: 20-21) supported by archers behind stockades on the river banks (Peden 1994a, 31: 23). Once again Ramesses III settled captives in strongholds in Egypt (P. Harris I, 76-79; Grandet 1994a, 335-339). It is unlikely that this accounts for all of the surviving ‘Sea Peoples’ from the two battles and many probably settled in the coastal cities of what became known as Philistine (Weinstein 2012, 163), believed to be named after the Peleset group.

As a result of this victory, Egyptian control appears to have been maintained over the majority of southern Palestine with datable pottery fragments recording tax deliveries of grain from a variety of sites, including Lachish (Year 10; Kitchen 2012, 13), and Tell esh-Shar’a (Year 22; Weinstein 2012, 166). This is combined with a variety of undated evidence from sites in north and south Palestine: Megiddo (statue), Beth Shan, and Gaza (both of which have a range of archaeological evidence for the presence of an Egyptian garrison), and

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37 'Irs, 'Irəw, krmš and hṯ respectively in the original text (Peden 1994a, 28: 16).
38 The reliefs depicting these engagements reveal some interesting details. In the land battle the ‘Sea Peoples’ are accompanied by ox-carts carrying women and pots, suggesting a migrating people moving with their possessions, and it also shows Sherden (in their distinctive horned helmets) fighting on both sides (OIP 8, Pl.32). The depiction of the sea battle alone is intriguing as it is the oldest surviving depiction of a naval battle (OIP 8, Pl.37).
39 It is unclear whether their seizure of the coastal towns occurred on their way towards Egypt or during their retreat, but it is more likely that it is the former as they would have, otherwise, needed to pass fortified settlements, some with Egyptian garrisons, without engaging them (Weinstein 2012, 163).
more grain collection bowl fragments from Tell el-Farâh, Haror, and Deir el-Balah (Weinstein 2012, 164-171). There was also a minor campaign carried out against the Shasu Bedouin in the Sinai which further secured Egyptian control of the region. Papyrus Harris (1, 76:9-11; Grandet 1994a, 337) suggests that it occurred after the victory over the ‘Sea Peoples’ (Kitchen 2012, 18), although as it is undated it may have taken place later in the reign.41

By Ramesses III’s Year 11, there was another invasion by the inhabitants of the western desert, led by the Meshwesh,42 and it appears that they had already been infiltrating the Delta for a few years. Papyrus Harris’ records of the Year 11 campaign states that they were in ‘control of the towns of the Western Tract, from Memphis to Keroben’ (P. Harris 1, 76:11-77:6; Grandet 1994a, 337) as well as raiding other towns in the western Delta. The Meshwesh were trying to head further into Egypt when Ramesses III met them, probably at the Canopic branch of the Nile but the exact location is unclear from the texts. Wherever the battle took place, Ramesses III claimed to have won a decisive victory, capturing the leader of the group Meshesher, son of the Chief Keper, and killing and

40 Weinstein (2012, 172) suggests that the Canaanite cities under the control of the ‘Sea Peoples’ were surrounded by Egyptian garrisons to prevent their expansion. Whilst these garrisons may have been there to prevent the expansion of the Philistine cities they could, equally, have been there to maintain Egyptian control over the wider area. It seems unlikely that Ramesses III would not follow up his victory over the ‘Sea Peoples’ by establishing his over-lordship of the area (Kitchen 2012, 17; Morris 2005, 705; Mushett Cole 2014, 40-41). Whilst the ‘Sea Peoples’ cities probably helped bring about the end of Egyptian control of the Levant, I do not believe that the evidence suggests that this started under Ramesses III.

41 The suggestion for it being placed at this point rests on its position in the historical record in Papyrus Harris between the campaign of Year 8 and the next major foreign crisis of Ramesses III’s reign in his Year 11 (P. Harris 1, 76: 9-11; Grandet 1994a, 337).

42 The Meshwesh are described as attacking the Libu beforehand to force them to join the campaign against Egypt in the Medinet Habu inscription (Peden 1994a, 41: 14) as well as being joined by several other tribes; the Isbet, Qayqasha, Shaytep, Hasa and Baqana (Peden 1994a, 217).
capturing many Libyans.\textsuperscript{43} Again, as in the style of previous campaigns, the captives were settled in Middle Egypt or the eastern Delta within strongholds and branded with Ramesses III’s name as a mark of ownership (Peden 1994a, 61; 67).\textsuperscript{44}

With the defeat of this second invasion of westerners, there is no evidence of further major foreign invasions for the remainder of the dynasty. Around Year 12 the construction of his mortuary temple at Medinet Habu was completed, after having the records of Year 11 added to the walls. Around the same time the south temple at Karnak in the precinct of Mut was completed as it also has a version of the Year 11 campaign on one of its walls (Mojsov 2012, 290). Papyrus Harris (1, 77: 6; Grandet 1994a, 338) mentions other events from this period of Ramesses III’s reign, beginning with the construction of a desert well at ‘Ayana, as well as an expedition\textsuperscript{45} to Punt.\textsuperscript{46} This was a major undertaking down the Red Sea to Punt before returning with goods, in particular incense, via Coptos (P. Harris 1, 77: 6-78: 1; Grandet 1994a, 338).\textsuperscript{47} Mining at Timna and Serabit el-Khadim continued in Ramesses III’s

\textsuperscript{43} Keper tried to plead for his son to be returned, depicted on the walls of Medinet Habu along with a mention in the accompanying ‘poem’ (Edgerton and Wilson 1936, 91-92; KRIt V, 70:4- 70:6). He was unsuccessful and it appears that his attempt to surrender ended with him also being captured and his accompanying troops slaughtered (Edgerton and Wilson 1936, 92; KRIt V, 70:8- 70:13).

\textsuperscript{44} The number of references to women and children as also being among the captives (Peden 1994a, 43; 61) suggests this may have been closer to a migration than to a military invasion.

\textsuperscript{45} This expedition is again undated, but is recorded in Papyrus Harris after the well construction at ‘Ayana (P. Harris 1, 77: 6-8). This has led to a suggestion by Kitchen (2012, 18) that, as Ramesses III’s campaigns were recorded in chronological order, this listing reflects the historical order of these events. I have not adopted this here as there no other evidence to prove or disprove this assertion.

\textsuperscript{46} Although this is the first expedition known to have been sent to Punt after one recorded in Ramesses II’s reign, it is not unlikely that others had taken place in between. Ramesses III would have been keen to emphasise that he was the first since Ramesses II, the king he wished to emulate, but the evidence from Mersa Gawasis on the Red Sea coast suggests that the contact with Punt was a fairly regular occurrence until the late Second Millennium BC (Fattovich 2012, 14).

\textsuperscript{47} This is probably located in the Horn of Africa and probably corresponds to the Kingdom of Aksum (Phillips 1997, 425).
reign; there was an expedition to Timna for copper (P. Harris 1, 78: 1-5; Grandet 1994a, 338) and also to the turquoise mines of Hathor (P. Harris 1, 78: 6; Grandet 1994a, 339).

In Year 15 Ramesses III instituted an inspection of the temples and, as part of this inspection, doubled their endowments. Only the records of the inspections of the temples of Upper Egypt by Penpato have survived but it is likely that they were carried out across Egypt. This is supported by two stelae dated to his Year 20 from the Cour de la Cachette at Karnak, recording a conversation between Ramesses III and the gods in which he described his efforts to supply the temple granaries and treasuries as well as sending officials to check on the priesthoods in both the north and south (Peden 1994a, 115-132). Small-scale building work was carried out across Egypt (Kitchen 2012, 18-20), except in the Theban region where three major temples were constructed, two at Karnak and the mortuary temple at Medinet Habu. In Ramesses III’s second decade the third of these, the North Temple at Karnak in the First Court, was probably completed as the first dates found at the temple date to his Year 20 (Mojsov 2012, 288). Work also began on the Khonsu temple at Karnak, although only the sanctuary was completed (Snape 2012, 432).

In Ramesses III’s Year 28 there are records of ‘foreigners’ appearing in western Thebes (P. Harris I, 57: 11-59: 3; Grandet 1994a, 303-306), via the desert roads from the western oases. This led Ramesses III to fortify the temple enclosures in Middle and Upper Egypt, at Siut, Abydos (Kitchen 2012, 11), Hermopolis, Asyut, and This (Snape 2012, 421), all towns where the desert roads from the oases reached the Nile valley. In his Year 29 there

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48 Based on the belief that the location described as ‘Atika in Papyrus Harris (1, 78: 1-4; Grandet 1994a, 338) is the same as Timna and that the turquoise land of Hathor (P. Harris 1, 78: 6; Grandet 1994a, 339) should be identified as Serabit el-Khadim (see Grandet 1994b, 261-263 n.943). This seems likely as there is lots of evidence for Ramesses III at Timna and Serabit el-Khadim, including dated stelae such as that of Ramesses III’s Year 23 from Serabit el-Khadim (Weinstein 2012, 171).
was the unusual appointment of the southern vizier, Ta, over the whole country (o. Berlin 10633; *KR*It V, 529:15-530:3).

This was followed by a series of strikes in Ramesses III’s Year 29 by the workmen at Deir el-Medina. Whilst the strikes were for a number of reasons, including corruption (Frandsen 1990, 185-186), the majority were because rations had not been delivered. This caused them to protest at several of the mortuary temples in order to get their rations, as recorded in the Turin Strike Papyrus (*RAD* 45-58; Frandsen 1990, 183; 189). Eventually the vizier, Ta, secured some rations from the mortuary temple of Horemheb but still not the total shortfall. It has been suggested that he was unable to resolve the issue as, being the only vizier for the whole country, he was busy organising Ramesses’ Sed-festival (Grandet 1993, 91; Higginbotham 2012, 78), in particular collecting the statues of the gods for the ceremony from their various temples (*RAD* 15.5; *KR*It V, 430).

Ramesses III celebrated his Sed-festival in his Year 29, rather than his Year 30, as noted in two stelae: an addition to the bottom of the Year 23 stela from Serabit el-Khadim and on another from Coptos (*KR*It V, 248; 250-1). Ramesses III ruled into his Year 32 (c.1156 BC) (Hornung 2006, 215), but his death may have been premature due to a conspiracy within the harem to change his successor (Peden 1994a, 195). Whilst the plot failed to change the succession, with the crown prince Ramesses acceding as Ramesses IV, and the conspirators tried and punished (Turin Judicial Papyrus; Peden 1994a, 195-210), it is unclear whether it

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49 This is typically suggested to have been because of a rebellion as apparently recorded in a section of Papyrus Harris I (59: 11 - Grandet 1994a, 307; for example by Breasted 1909, 497) or gross mismanagement by the northern vizier (Helck 1958, 331). Grandet (1994b, 194-195 n.803) has noted, however, that there is no evidence for such a rebellion. Current scholarship, therefore, leans towards the vizier attempting to resolve issues at the temple and Ta’s appointment being to facilitate the arrangements for the upcoming Heb Sed jubilee festival after the death of the northern vizier in office (Grandet 1993, 91; Higginbotham 2012, 78).
succeeded in killing Ramesses III. The conspirators’ prosecution reveals the extent of the conspiracy, encompassing a range of senior officials from the harem, palace and army (Peden 1994a, 195). Whether assassinated or not, Ramesses III was buried in the completed KV 11, originally started by his father Sethnakhte (Mojsov 2011, 273).

Ramesses IV (ḥqj-Maʿāt), therefore, acceded to the throne in confused circumstances (c.1151 BC). It was under these conditions that Papyrus Harris was written, partially proclaiming Ramesses III’s piety and partially confirming Ramesses IV’s legitimacy (Peden 1994a, 211). Ramesses IV began immediately to try to equal Ramesses III’s works with his mortuary temple at Assasif laid out on a larger scale than his father’s in his Year 1. This is mirrored by Ramesses IV’s ordering two large expeditions to the Wadi Hammamat to quarry bhn-stone in his Year 1, followed by further expeditions in his Year 2 and an even larger one in his Year 3 (Peden 1994b 24-27), presumably all to provide stone for the construction of his mortuary temple. Also in Ramesses IV’s first years there was a continuation of the supply issues for the workmen at Deir el-Medina (o. Berlin 12631; KRIt VI, 110; 111; 117), which

50 The Turin Judicial Papyrus has an introductory speech by the king suggesting that he survived the assassination attempt (Vernus 2003, 109), although this could easily have been written after his death. A recent re-examination of Ramesses III’s body discovered a large cut across his throat containing an amulet associated with healing (Hawass et al. 2012, 2) leading the authors to decide that he was assassinated by the conspirators. This cut might, however, have been made post-mortem during the embalming process, and thus is still not conclusive evidence for his death in the plot. The fact that Ramesses IV became king in Thebes as his accession was announced to the workers at Deir el-Medina, the day after the announcement of Ramesses III’s death (P. Turin 1949+1946; KRIt VI, 880) (Hornung 2006, 215), suggests that Ramesses III was in Thebes when he died, and thus that these events took place at the palace attached to Medinet Habu.

51 It also includes the trial and conviction (as well as one acquittal) of several of the judges, who had caroused with the general Pais and accused women of the harem (Peden 1994a, 207-209).

52 This did not prevent, however, the appointment of a new vizier, Neferonpet, or the commencement of construction work (Peden 1994b, 56: 49).

53 This is dated by his Festal Wall-Stela from the Cour de la Cachette at Karnak which mentions offerings donated by the king’s temple on the west bank (Peden 1994a, 143-149). This was not to be his actual mortuary temple as it was incomplete at his death. Instead there appears to have been another temple next to Medinet Habu although the remains for this are under the Twenty-First Dynasty expansion of the temple of Amenhotep son of Hapu (Peden 1994b, 50 n.2).
were finally resolved in Year 3/4 (Peden 1994b, 46 n.2). The workforce at Deir el-Medina was also doubled to 120 people in Ramesses IV’s Year 2 (P. Turin 1891; Peden 1994b, 102-103; *KRI VI*, 76-77), suggestive of an attempt to speed the construction of his tomb.

The copper mines at Timna and turquoise mines at Serabit el-Khadim continued to be exploited throughout Ramesses IV’s reign (Peden 1994b, 28-32) and his name is attested by a number of scarabs found at sites in the Levant, such as that at Tel Del Hamiga (Weinstein 1992, 146), reflecting continued control over the region during his reign. There is also a record of commodity prices from the end of Ramesses III’s reign into Ramesses IV’s, recorded in Papyrus Mallet (Louvre 1050; Peden 1994b, 117-119). His tomb and sarcophagus appear to have been rushed towards the end of the reign and, despite his request for a long reign in his Year 4 Abydos stela (Peden 1994a, 155), Ramesses IV died early in his Year 7 (c.1144 BC) (o. Deir el-Medina 207; *KRI VI*, 149:1-149:5) and was buried in his tomb (KV 2).

He was succeeded by his son Ramesses V (*imn-hr-hps.f I*) (c.1144 BC), who experienced several incursions of Libyans at Thebes early in his Year 1 (P. Turin 2044 verso; McDowell 1999, 228). He continued the work on the mortuary temple at Assasif as his name was found on some of the inscribed blocks (Peden 1994b, 50), also suggested by the presence of his name at the quarry at West Silsila (*KRI VI*, 224-225). Whilst mining continued at Timna and Serabit el-Khadim during Ramesses V’s reign, he is the last

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54 This included the founding of a chapel to the king’s cult within the precinct of the temple of Hathor at the site in his Year 5 (*KRI VI*, 27; Peden 1994b, 29).

55 There is a damaged stela from the temple of Amara West dated to a Year 3, believed to be that of Ramesses IV, which suggests some form of military conflict occurring in Ramesses IV’s reign (Peden 1994a, 71). The stela is badly damaged and when originally found may have had mentions of a naval and night battle suggestive of fights against the ‘Sea Peoples’, but the damage is too extensive to draw any conclusions (Peden 1994a, 69).

56 His tomb is much smaller than most of those of the Twentieth Dynasty kings, and workmen’s chambers appear to have been plastered to turn them into the requisite storerooms (Peden 1994b, 46).
Twentieth Dynasty king attested at Timna, suggesting the beginning of the Egyptians’ withdrawal from their external territories (Weinstein 1992, 146).

In his Year 4, two long-running corruption cases appear to have been brought to trial, that of Penanqet, a w′b-priest at the temple of Khnum at Elephantine, and that of Khnumnakht, a ship’s captain responsible for the delivery of the barley harvest to the same temple (Turin Indictment Papyrus=P. Turin 1887; Vittman 1996, 45-56).\(^57\) In the same year the Wilbour Papyrus was composed, a land and tax survey of a section of Middle Egypt, which revealed a number of military settlements, particularly of foreign groups such as the Sherden (Eyre 2012, 108-109).\(^58\) Shortly after this and still in his Year 5 (c.1139 BC), Ramesses V appears to have succumbed to smallpox (Elliot Smith 1912, 91), and died.

As Ramesses V has no known children (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 190), there was a break in the succession, since Ramesses VI (imn-\textit{hr-hps}, f II) (c.1139 BC) was one of the younger sons of Ramesses III. Ramesses V’s burial did not actually take place until Year 2 of his successor (KR/It VI, 35),\(^59\) possibly due to further incursions through the desert roads by Libyans into the west bank at Thebes (Peden 1994b, 21 n.5). Their presence may have led Ramesses VI to undertake a minor campaign against such Libyans in his first year. This is supported by his choice of aggressive names (Amer 1985, 68), a surviving statue where he

\(^{57}\) Their crimes may have started under Ramesses III’s reign, but were certainly occurring under Ramesses IV (Peden 1994b, 70) and include, for Penanqet, the sale of sacred Mnevis calves, adultery, theft, assault and entering the temple whilst impure (Vernus 2003, 99-102) and for Khnumnakht the theft of 5,004 sacks of barley (Vernus 2003, 103).

\(^{58}\) It also appears to show large holdings by the temple of Amun at Karnak in the region and has been taken as a sign of the growing power of the HPA (Gardiner 1961, 297), but it has been noted that it is difficult to assess what proportion of cultivated land it represents, even of Middle Egypt, and there seems to be a distinction between land the temple owned and land it administered (Eyre 2012, 111; 131).

\(^{59}\) It has been suggested that there might have been a double burial in KV 9 of both Ramesses V and Ramesses VI (Peden 1994, 21 n.5). It is more probable that Ramesses V was not buried in KV 9 at all as there is no decoration relating to Ramesses V remaining in the tomb, it all being usurped by Ramesses VI who could not have done so if Ramesses V was already interred within the tomb (Amer 1985, 67).
grasps a Libyan captive (Cairo CG 42152; KRIt VI, 286-287), and his depiction on Pylon II at Karnak smiting enemies (Peden 1994b, 21). By Ramesses VI’s Year 2, the Libyan threat, at least at Thebes, appears to have subsided as work at Deir el-Medina returned to normal (o. Deir el-Medina 403; KRIt VI, 366:15; P. Turin 1923; McDowell 1999, 64). Also in Ramesses VI’s Year 2 there was a reduction in the Deir el-Medina workforce back to pre-Ramesses IV levels (KRIt VI, 344-345), and the appointment of his daughter Iset (E) as God’s Wife of Amun (GWA) (KRIt VI, 321-2).51

Ramesses VI is the last attested king at Serabit el-Khadim in the western Sinai (KRIt VI, 279) and is also the final king of the dynasty recorded anywhere in the Levant, with an undated statue base of his from Megiddo (KRIt VI, 278), suggesting that it was during his reign, or shortly afterwards, that the Egyptian imperial possessions in that region began to be lost.63 Nubia, however, remained securely under Egyptian control with a new viceroy,

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50 Ramesses VI’s usurpation of Ramesses V’s tomb, KV 9, is probably the reason for this as it would require fewer workmen to complete the tomb in time.

51 This appointment of a single GWA is possibly the first appearance of a tradition that was to become common in the later Libyan Period and continue into the Late Period (Gosselin 2007, 206-207; Ayad 2009a, 8-9).

52 The statue base may have come from one of the many statue cults that Ramesses VI is known to have established (Amer 1985, 69), possibly in lieu of major construction works which are almost unknown except for attempts to complete the mortuary temple at Assasif (Peden 1994b, 50).

53 This is one suggestion for the date of the ultimate end of Egyptian control of the Levant. Although the context for the statue base is confused and it could easily have been transported from somewhere else (Weinstein 1992, 147), it is now generally accepted that it reflects some form of Egyptian presence into Ramesses VI’s reign, even by Weinstein (2012, 173). The process by which the empire was lost is dependent on when a scholar sees the first (or all) of the destruction and abandonment of Egyptian sites in Levant occurring. Weinstein (1992, 146; 2012, 173) has the empire as it was under Ramesses III continuing under Ramesses IV, based on the evidence of Ramesses IV’s scarabs at a number of sites across the Levant e.g. Beth Shan and Tel del Hamiga. It then collapses in two phases, the destruction of political and military sites on the death of Ramesses IV followed by the abandonment of the Sinai mines and vassal states under Ramesses VI (Weinstein 1992, 147). This seems unlikely as it would require Egyptian control north of areas that had already been abandoned. Instead, I prefer to see this first phase of destruction of Lachish, Beth Shan and other key sites as occurring at the same time as the abandonment of Megiddo by the Egyptians (Dever 1992, 102), during or just after Ramesses VI’s reign. I do accept Weinstein’s causes for the loss of the territories being a result of the coastal settlements of the ‘Sea Peoples’ which restricted Egyptian access to the north and added competitors.
Siese, appointed during Ramesses VI’s rule.\(^{64}\) Ramesses VI’s highest known regnal year is his Year 8 (Hornung 2006, 216) (c.1131 BC) in which year he presumably died and was buried in the usurped tomb of Ramesses V (KV 9).

He was succeeded by his son, Ramesses VII \((it-\text{mun})\) (c.1131 BC), who ordered expeditions to the eastern desert in his Years 1 and 2 to collect gold and galena (P. IFAO; Document A, recto 1: 11-2: 15; Peden 1994a, 101-106). Also in Ramesses VII’s reign is a record of the increase in the price of grain from the end of Ramesses VI’s reign through to his Year 7 (P. Turin 1907; 1908; \textit{KRIt VI}, 403:14-409:10). Other than these, there is no evidence of significant events occurring in Ramesses VII’s reign until his death in his Year 8 (c.1123 BC) and his burial in his tomb (KV 1).\(^{65}\)

Again there appears to be a break in the succession because the next king, Ramesses VIII \((st\text{-hr-hps.f})\) (c.1123 BC), was another son of Ramesses III, as demonstrated by the addition of cartouches to his image in the procession of princes at Medinet Habu (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 188). This king, as a son of Ramesses III, must have been quite elderly at his

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\(^{64}\) This broke one family’s hold over the position which had started in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Hori I had been in his position since Year 6 of Siptah \((KRIt IV, 364-365)\) and survived the change of dynasty with his son, Hori II, inheriting the position, but probably only by being appointed to it, late in Ramesses III’s reign. He was succeeded in the role, however, by an unrelated high official, Siese, (Peden 1994b, 62) confirming the kings’ prerogative over appointments of high officials.

\(^{65}\) This has been disputed but I follow Hornung’s (2006, 216) acceptance of Eyre’s (1980, 168-170) dating of P. Turin 1883 and 2095 to Ramesses VII’s reign.
accession and only has dates known from a Year 1. The location of his burial, following his death early in his Year 2, is unclear with no current tomb or funerary objects known.

The relationship of his successor, Ramesses IX (𓊍𓊓𓊐𓊩-𓊭𓊝𓊭𓊝𓊐), to the rest of the dynasty is unclear. In his Year 2, he organised a campaign against the Shasu Bedouin in the Eastern desert (P. Egyptian Society of Papyrology: Document C, 8-19; Peden 1994a, 73-76). Also from his Year 2 was a request from the royal household in the north for better quality eye-paint to be sent north by the HPA in a letter sent directly to the HPA Ramessesnakht (P. Egyptian Society of Papyrology: Document B; Peden 1994a, 107-110).

Ramesses IX is attested over a much wider area than many of his recent predecessors with some undated objects with his names found at Gezer, probably indicating Egyptian trade with the Philistine-controlled Levant rather than direct Egyptian control of the area (Dever 1992, 102), along with a statuette from Gebel Barkal in Upper Nubia, and the presence of his name at the Dakhla Oasis (Dodson 2012, 4). His building activities are also more extensive than his recent predecessors with work carried out at Heliopolis (KRI VI, 449-450), and at Karnak (KRI VI, 451-55), including a royal stela in the court of Pylons III and IV (Peden 1994a, 175).

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66 Hornung (2006, 216) argues that he must have survived into a Year 2 based on the known date for the accession of Ramesses IX, which I have accepted.
67 It has been suggested that KV 19 was originally his tomb, but was abandoned once he became king and then being usurped later by a prince of Ramesses IX, Montuhiirkopshef (C), making it likely that he was buried in a different tomb (Reeves and Wilkinson 1996, 167).
68 He has been suggested as a nephew of Ramesses VIII by one of the younger sons of Ramesses III, one Montuhiirkopshef (B) (Kitchen 1984, 129-130). Alternatively he may be a son of Ramesses VI (Dodson 2012, 3).
69 The importance of this document is that it demonstrates that, despite Ramessesnakht’s accrual of responsibility over much of the administration in Upper Egypt since his appointment as HPA under Ramesses III/IV (where he succeeded his probable brother Usimarenaht (Peden 1994b, 66)): he is very clearly under the authority of the king based in the north. This is the last record of this official and his son Amenhotep inherited his position as HPA, possibly following his brother Nesamun, (Dodson 2012, 16). This could reflect a limit of royal power in the south, or a reward for a particularly loyal family but events of Ramesses XI’s reign suggest the latter rather than the former.
From Ramesses IX’s Year 8 through to his Year 15 there was disruption to work on the royal tomb with inactivity recorded due to the presence of ‘foreigners’ near the workers’ village at Deir el-Medina in Years 8, 10, 11, 13 and 15 (KR/It VI, 608-609; 637-638; 641-644). The level of disruption is reflected in the decoration of the royal tomb, KV 6, where there are signs of interruption in the work, particularly the change from painted relief to simple painted decoration after the second corridor (Dodson 2012, 6). Despite these repeated incursions of the Meshwesh there is no evidence of any action being taken against them, as under Ramesses VI.

The most significant known event of Ramesses IX’s reign was the investigation of tomb-robberies at the west bank at Thebes. The first was a robbery of Ramesses VI’s tomb recorded in Papyrus Mayer B which probably occurred before Ramesses IX’s Year 9 (Peden 1994a, 259-265). The investigations of the other robberies took place in his Year 16 after specific accusations by the ‘mayor’ of east bank of Thebes, Paser, about robberies of the royal tombs. The investigation found that one royal tomb, Sobekemsaf II’s, had been broken into and looted along with a variety of other nobles’ tombs (P. Abbott=P. BM 10221; Peden 1994a, 225-244). The thieves were quickly produced by the ‘mayor’ of the west bank of Thebes, Pawero, tried (P. BM 10054 recto; KR/It VI, 489:15-497:4), convicted and

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70 This dating is due to a graffito dated to his Year 9 found in the tomb of Ramesses VI and left there by several workmen. They are assumed to have been there as part of the inspection team that found the looting and were restoring the tomb afterwards (Aldred 1979, 92).

71 Specifically suggested by one of the thieves who dated the formation of their ‘gang’ to Ramesses IX’s Year 13 (P. Leopold II-Amherst, 1: 15-16; Peden 1994a, 245-258).

72 Of the royal tombs investigated a total of seven were entirely intact, two had efforts to break into them and one had been looted (see above) (P. Abbott, 2: 12-18; Peden 1994a, 225-244). Of the non-royal tombs investigated two of the tombs of the Chantresses of the Estate of the Divine Adoratrix of Amun-Re had been looted along with an uncounted number of private tombs (P. Abbott, 3:17-4:4; Peden 1994a, 225-244).
handed over to the HPA Amenhotep for imprisonment awaiting the king’s decision on their punishment (P. Leopold II – Amherst; Peden 1994a, 245-258). 

In spite of their arrest and punishment, probably death by impaling (Dodson 2012, 5), another investigation was carried out a year later in Year 17 to re-examine Queen Iset (D)’s tomb (QV 51) which was discovered to have been looted (P. BM 10053, recto: 1-7; KRIt VI, 506-514). This is despite it being declared to be intact in the original investigation (P. Abbott, 5: 8-10; Peden 1994a, 225-244), although this could have been simply because only the seals were inspected in the previous investigation (Peden 1994a, 225). This investigation was launched after eight Deir el-Medina workmen had been interrogated and arrested (KRIt VI, 560-98), and stolen items from her tomb recovered (P. BM 10068 recto; KRIt VI, 497:5-505:15). In the same year, the Deir el-Medina workmen stopped work due to hunger (KRIt VI, 570-74), possibly as a result of issues with delivery of their rations. This increase in problems at the end of Ramesses IX’s reign may have spread to Nubia, resulting in a withdrawal from Upper Nubia, as no viceregal monuments are found in that region after his reign (Morkot 2000, 134; Spencer N. et al. 2012, 40). Within a year or so, in his Year 19 (Hornung 2006, 216) (c.1102 BC), Ramesses IX died and was buried in his tomb (KV 6).

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73 Vernus (2003, 9) has suggested that there was corruption amongst the west bank officials, some of whom are included in Paser’s accusation, and that they were not only aware of the robberies but also profited from them, reinforced by the comment by one of the thieves that he was arrested and bribed a scribe to release him (P. Leopold II-Amherst, 3:2-6; Peden 1994a, 245-258).

74 It appears that the viceregal centre of Amara may have been systematically closed down as if being abandoned (Shinnie 1951, 11; Spencer P. 1997, 220-221; Edwards 2004, 111; Spencer N. et al. 2012, 40-42), possibly as a result of changing environmental conditions (Spencer N. et al. 2012, 41-42), with a Year 6 of Ramesses IX being the last royal date in Upper Nubia (Binder M. et al. 2011, 47). There is increased activity at the forts at the second cataract at the same time (Morkot 2000, 134) suggesting that the border had been redrawn at the second cataract.
The relationship with his successor, Ramesses X (\textit{imn-hr-hps.f} III), is just as unclear as his own connection with the earlier kings of the dynasty.\textsuperscript{75} The problems of Ramesses IX's reign appear to have continued into Ramesses X's with records from Deir el-Medina in his Year 3 recording a much-reduced work rate due to lack of food (Eyre 2012, 136) and also due to the presence of foreigners (\textit{KRI} VI, 633-44). Ramesses X did not long outlive this difficult year, dying in his Year 4 (c.1098 BC). His tomb (KV 18) had not reached beyond the start of the second corridor at his death and it is unlikely that he was buried in the tomb as no remains or funerary objects have ever been found (Dodson 2012, 8).

His successor, Ramesses XI (\textit{h'r(m)-W3st II}), may have been the son of Ramesses X.\textsuperscript{76} The first years of his reign appear to have been calm with no records suggesting the disruptions present at the end of the reigns of Ramesses IX and Ramesses X. Libyans continued to be an issue, although the Egyptians now appeared content to merely monitor their actions and location (P. Louvre 3169; \textit{KRI} VI, 523).\textsuperscript{77} In his Year 8 and 9 the HPA Amenhotep was ousted from his post by an, as yet, unknown opponent and was only restored after an appeal to the king (Line 21 from the bark shrine of Thutmosis III at Karnak, in Wente 1966, 78-84), who ordered the viceroy of Nubia, Panehsy, to restore him (Wente

\textsuperscript{75} It is normally assumed to be a father-son succession, with Queen Tyti the wife of Ramesses X (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 191), but there is very limited evidence for this.

\textsuperscript{76} I have not followed either Dodson's or Thijs' suggestions for the re-ordering of the kings at the end of the dynasty. They suggest either co-regencies/ overlap between Ramesses IX, X and XI (Gasse A. 2001, 92; Thijs 2003, 292) or for these kings to have been ruling separate segments of the country prior to re-unification under Ramesses XI (Dodson 2012, 10-13). The evidence is unclear but, I believe, does not support either suggestion, particularly as there is a lack of evidence for the division of the country prior to the supposed date of the \textit{Tale of Wenamun} (P. Moscow 120; Ritner 2009a, 87-99). Kitchen's (1984, 127-134) reconstruction of the family relationships of the late Ramessides seems to be the most probable based on the current evidence, with the succession being one of father to son.

\textsuperscript{77} Although originally dated to the reign of Ramesses IX, this letter has now been widely accepted as dating to the reign of Ramesses XI as followed by Wente (1990, 53), Haring (1993, 162) and Barwik (2011, 214).
Panehsy then oversaw investigations into thefts from the Ramesseum and Medinet Habu (P. BM 10053 verso; KRIt VI, 755:10-763:15) as part of his

For this dating I follow Aldred (1979, 94), Wente (1966, 84-85), Kitchen (1986, 247) and Peden (1994a, 265) who see the suppression of the HPA taking place before Year 12. I agree with Palmer (2014, 8) that it is a specific individual who replaced Amenhotep, and that there was not an uprising as suggested by Kees (1964, 2-6) or the suppression of the HPA following a challenge to the king’s authority (Gardiner 1961, 301). The evidence for the latter, in particular, long based on Amenhotep’s depiction of himself larger than Ramesses IX has been effectively refuted by S. Binder (2008, 250-251). I side with Aldred (1979, 93), however, that Panehsy was present in Thebes originally to restore Amenhotep, not to suppress him as Jansen-Winkeln (1992, 28), Dodson (2012, 15) and Palmer (2014, 8), amongst others, argue. This is because I accept Aldred’s (1979, 94-95) argument that the events of Ramesses XI’s reign split into two distinct episodes; ‘the war of the high priest’ (P. BM 10052, 13:24; KRIt VI,767:5-803:9) of Years 8/9 and the ‘war in the northern district’ (P. Mayer A, 13:2; KRIt VI, 803:10-828:8) of Years 18/19. The evidence from the Turin Taxation Papyrus (P. Turin 1895 and 2006; KRIt VI, 851) shows Panehsy was responsible for collection of taxes in the Theban area in Ramesses XI’s; unlikely if he had suppressed the HPA and an unusual role for a viceroy of Nubia under normal circumstances (Peden 1994a, 114). Equally he is attested at Thebes in Year 17 when he receives a command from Ramesses XI (P. Turin 1896; Peden 1994a, 111-115), suggesting that he remained in control of, at least, the Thebaid region in addition to Nubia. Both of these support Aldred’s (1979, 93) suggestion that Panehsy was called north to help restore order over the region, which is why it has been adopted here. Whilst it is possible that the suppression of Amenhotep was carried out by Panehsy after this year, as argued by those mentioned above, this leaves no reason for Panehsy’s presence in Thebes prior to Amenhotep’s suppression when the HPA should have been responsible for the collection of taxes for the region. Also the re-dating of P. BM 10053 verso to Year 9 of the wHm-msw(t) on the basis that it is mentioned in P. Ambr, as Thijs does (2003, 291), could also mean that it was written in Year 9 prior to that period, as Aldred suggests (1979, 94). Its presence in P. Ambras merely means that the papyrus existed prior to Year 6 of the wHm-msw(t) when P. Ambras was written, supported by the fact that all the other papyri recovered date to before Year 9 of the wHm-msw(t), P. BM 10068 (Year 17 of Ramesses IX); P. Abbot (Year 16 of Ramesses IX); P. Leopold II-Amherst (Year 16 of Ramesses IX) (Peden 1994a, 277). If the investigation of the robberies of Medinet Habu and the Ramesseum in P. BM 10053 was dated to Year 9, then it suggests that the ‘suppression’ of Amenhotep led to general disorder of the area which would explain why the viceroy remained in Thebes afterwards. If it is to be dated to the wHm-msw(t) era then it is another sign of the disorder that occurred before the declaration of the wHm-msw(t) and does not prevent the suppression of the HPA Amenhotep being dated to at least earlier than Year 12. It would also suggest more of a local dispute involving Amenhotep such as a ‘coup’ within the temple with him being replaced, perhaps by his brother Nesamun, as suggested by Thijs (2010, 350-351). The division into two separate episodes also correlates better with the evidence from excavations at Dra’ Abu el-Naga which have revealed that the HPA Amenhotep was buried in K 93.12 (Rummel 2014, 385), and shortly after this his tomb-temple (and one built by his father nearby) was destroyed (Rummel 2014, 387). Rummel (2014, 389) suggests that this meant that Amenhotep was restored mid-way through the civil war with Panehsy and then died before Panehsy’s withdrawal from the north and the destructions of the Theban region. This reconstruction makes little sense, however, as this would mean that Amenhotep would have undertaken a large building project in the midst of a civil war, and that a royal army was apparently able to bypass Panehsy whilst he was in the north in order to capture Thebes and thus cut him off from his power base in Nubia, but was seemingly unable to prevent his retreat back south to Nubia following his defeat in the north. Instead it reinforces the explanation that the suppression of Amenhotep and the civil war should be considered as separate events, with Amenhotep
assumption of a range of the administration roles over Upper Egypt. This is reflected in his roles as supervisor of collection of taxes in the Theban region for the supply of the workers at Deir el-Medina and overseer of the granaries of the King in Ramesses XI’s Year 12 (Peden 1994a, 114). The last mention of Panehsy at Thebes occurs in Ramesses’ Year 17 when he received a royal decree requesting that he help a royal butler, Yenes, with his mission to Nubia to collect precious items to be sent to the king in the north (P. Turin 1896; Peden 1994a, 111-115).

At this point, the record becomes unclear with only a few vague lines in papyri written years later to indicate what may have happened. It appears that Panehsy, for reasons that are still unclear, launched an attack into Middle Egypt and destroyed Cynopolis (P. BM 10052, 10; 18; KRIt VI, 767:5-803:9). This seems to have been part of a clash between Panehsy and, presumably, the king’s forces in the north of the country described as the ‘war in the northern district’ (P. Mayer A, 13: 2; KRIt VI, 803:10-828:8). The result of this war seems to have been general anarchy in the Theban region, with large-scale looting of tombs and temples, often carried out by Nubian troops (Barwik 2011, 95-99), possibly as part of a systematic effort to fund the conflict or as part of a retreat after Panehsy’s defeat (Aldred 1979, 95-96; Barwik 2011, 100). This ‘war’ took place between the Year 17 letter and Year 19 when Ramesses XI is again in control of Upper Egypt, Panehsy presumably having retreated to Lower Nubia. The restoration of the king’s authority over Thebes led to the establishment of a new dating system, the $whm-\text{msw}(t)$, as well as large-scale investigations and trials of marking his restoration after the first with the inscription on the walls of Karnak before dying at some point before the end of the second which allowed his burial to occur shortly before Panehsy’s troops destructive retreat through the Theban region.

79 As visible in some of the tomb and temple robbery papyri which make reference to foreigners being involved; ‘the foreigners came and seized the temple’ (P. Mayer A, 6: 4; KRIt VI, 803:10-828:8).
those involved in the chaos of the previous two years. The seriousness of these crimes can be seen not only in their scale and location (the Ramesseum, Medinet Habu and many of the tombs in the Valley of the Kings), but also in the fact that Ramesses XI was present in person at Thebes to oversee the trials and restoration of order (P. BM 10383, 1: 10; 3: 5; KRI VI, 833:10-836:5). The majority of the investigations date to Year 1 or 2 of the wHm-msw(t), with the trials of the ‘thieves of the necropolis’ (P. Abbott Dockets, 8A: 1-2; KRI VI, 764-765) appearing to occur in Year 1 (P. BM 10052; KRI VI, 767:5-803:9) and those connected with the robberies of Medinet Habu and the Ramesseum (probably amongst others) lasting into Year 2 (P. BM 10383 - KRI VI, 833:10-836:5; P. BM 10403 - KRI VI, 828:10-828:8). This process may have continued throughout the wHm-msw(t) period with a possible further trial in Year 9 (P. BM 10053 verso; Peden 1994a, 265-270; KRI VI, 755:10-763:15) (see n.78), and a record from Year 6 detailing the purchase of a series of papyri looted from the temple at Medinet Habu (P. Ambras=P. Vienna 30; Peden 1994a, 277-280), including P. BM 10053, 10068, P. Abbott, and P. Leopold II-Amherst.

It is unclear what happened to HPA Amenhotep during this period of unrest, but it appears that he died before it was resolved as his tomb at Dra Abu el-Naga was destroyed, presumably by Panehsy’s troops (Rummel 2014, 387). There is no mention of a HPA throughout the early years of the wHm-msw(t) period leaving it unclear as to who might have

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80 I agree with Goelet (1996, 126) and Palmer (2014, 12) that it was the king who instituted this new system based on his known presence in Thebes at the start of the wHm-msw(t) and dates on the Abbot Dockets where the dating ‘Year 1...corresponding to Year 19’ (P. Abbott verso, 8A; 1; KRI VI, 764:1- 767:4) is recorded.

81 Dated to Year 1 is P. Abbott verso, P. BM 10052 and P. Rochester MAG 51.346.1. Dated to Year 2 is P. BM 10383, 10403. The date of P. Mayer A is unclear, but is probably within these two years.

82 Although it is unclear how, or exactly when, Amenhotep died, he was buried inside his tomb before it was destroyed as is clear from the remains of his funerary equipment found during excavations of K.93.12 (Rummel 2014, 385), and thus his death was probably before the end of Panehsy’s rebellion as suggested by Rummel (2014, 389).
replaced Amenhotep following his apparent death. The first mention of a HPA is a General Piankh in Year 7 of the $whm-msw(t)$ in an oracle on the wall of Amenhotep II’s Festival Hall (Nims 1948, 157-159). The last known reference to Piankh is in a series of letters dated to Year 10 of the $whm-msw(t)$, where he communicated with his scribes, Dhutmose, Butehamun and Tjaroy, and a few others (Wente 1990, 182-202). Several of these attest to Piankh carrying out a campaign in Nubia from Elephantine (LRL 20, 4, 8, 9, 16; Wente 1990), even naming his opponent as ‘Panehsy’ (LRL 4; Wente 1990). Also in this Year 10 is Piankh’s order for Chief of the Harem of Amun Nodjmet, Tjaroy and an ‘agent’ Payshuuben (LRL 21, 34, and 35; Wente 1990) to capture two Medjay, interrogate them and kill them. This, and particularly the comment in LRL 21, ‘as to Pharaoh, l.p.h., how will he ever reach this land? And further, as to Pharaoh, l.p.h. of whom is he above in the end?’ (hieroglyphs in Černý 1939, 36), has been taken as indicating that Piankh was acting outside the authority of  

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83 I am following the order of Piankh succeeded by Herihor for the position of HPA as suggested by Jansen-Winkeln (1992, 22-37), Taylor (1998, 1143-1155) and Palmer (2014, 1-18). The Year 6 date of Herihor on the dockets from Sety I’s and Ramesses II’s coffins (Ritner 2009a, 100) is not explicitly in Ramesses XI’s reign and is much more plausible for Smendes’ reign (Demidoff 2008, 103-105; Palmer 2014, 4-6) as well as it being highly unlikely that Herihor would have adopted royal style whilst Ramesses XI was still alive as he was depicted as HPA with him in reliefs in the temple of Khonsu and carrying out the instructions of the king (OIP 103, Pl. 162B-175A; Pl. 153B: 1-2; Jansen-Winkeln 1992, 25). The other evidence for Herihor being the predecessor of Piankh, namely a Year 5, appear in the Tale of Wenamun, which is almost certainly a work of fiction loosely based on a real report and was probably written much later in time, up to 150 years later according to Sass (2003, 253), and thus its date cannot be taken as firm evidence. It is clear that Herihor did order a new bark for Amun, but the lack of evidence for Ramesses XI in the story suggests that it was written in the early Twenty-First Dynasty, after Ramesses XI’s death, particularly as Herihor is depicted as king in the reliefs accompanying the text about the new bark (OIP 100, Pl.21; 103, Pl. 144D).

84 This campaign appears to have been unsuccessful as Panehsy’s titles in his tomb at Aniba remained intact (Török 1997, 107), with the result of this failure the loss of Lower Nubia above Elephantine and the First Cataract.

85 Although LRL 21 only says to kill them if, after getting ‘to the bottom of their speech’ they ‘determine what they say is true then put them (in) two baskets and throw them (in) the water at night’ (hieroglyphs in Černý 1939, 36), it is clear that this was carried out as in both 34 and 35 the commands are simply to interrogate the Medjay and then to kill them (Wente 1990, 183).
Ramesses XI and was carrying out the campaign in Nubia without his approval.\textsuperscript{86} His replacement as HPA was another general, Herihor, who appears to have governed Upper Egypt for the last years of Ramesses XI.\textsuperscript{87} Herihor seems to have cemented his position over the administration of Upper Egypt as HPA, viceroy of Nubia and overseer of the granaries by the time he had the record of an oracle, in which Khonsu grants him extended periods of time in his offices, depicted on the wall of the temple of Khonsu (Peden 1994a, 181-186). Probably in Year 12 of the whm-msw(t) (c.1067 BC), Ramesses XI died. However, he was never interred in his tomb in the Valley of the Kings (KV 4) and his actual burial place remains unknown.

2.2.3 Political, social, economic, environmental commentary

During the Twentieth Dynasty a number of political trends can be seen. The first is that following the death of Ramesses III, possibly by assassination, the political centres were increasingly concentrated in the north at Pi-Ramesses and Memphis. This is clear from the lack of references to the presence of the king at Thebes, following Ramesses IV’s accession in the city, until Ramesses XI’s attempts to restore order at the start of the whm-msw(t), and that the royal commands known from the surviving evidence appear to have been sent from

\textsuperscript{86} Whilst the campaign may not have been carried out with Ramesses XI’s approval, I disagree that this suggests that Piankh was in active rebellion against the king as Dodson suggests (2012, 20). Instead, following Thijs (2003, 301-2), it is likely this statement is a reflection that the king was the only superior of Piankh and that his orders would be sufficient when dealing with local officials. The fact that he makes several mentions that the news of these events are not to be revealed to anyone (‘but don’t let anybody in the land find out’, repeated in all three letters), suggests that even Piankh still fears that discovery by the king would result in severe punishment and thus emphasises that the king maintains some authority at least over the entire country (Palmer 2014, 11).

\textsuperscript{87} Whilst I do not accept Thijs’ (2003, 290) re-dating of the Turin Taxation Papyrus to the whm-msw(t), I accept the reasoning that his reign probably lasted for at least a year or so after the last known date of Year 10, as suggested by Hornung (2006, 475) and possibly demonstrated by Kitchen’s (2009, 193) re-dating of LRL 41 to Year 12 of the whm-msw(t) due to its reference to West Theban graffito No.1393.
the north. The second is that officials in Upper Egypt seem to have become increasingly powerful, gaining significant new responsibilities until the HPA was largely responsible for the entire region, something which may well reflect a trend that developed into the (semi-)independent Upper Egyptian state in the first half of the Twenty-First Dynasty. Despite some unusual successions, with a number of Ramesses III’s younger sons becoming king due to the older sons’ lack of descendants, there is no indication of the divisive split that appeared within the late Nineteenth Dynasty. This apparent stability is somewhat undermined by the evidence of the possibly successful assassination attempt on Ramesses III and the attempt to place a different son on the throne.

Early in the dynasty there were a number of invasions/migrations into Egypt, with two by Libyan groups and one by the ‘Sea Peoples’ being repulsed under Ramesses III. Following this there is some evidence for limited military campaigns being carried out, but nothing on the scale of the earlier New Kingdom, or even those of Ramesses III. This was followed by low-level Libyan migration through the oases and desert roads which lasted throughout the rest of the dynasty, as is clear from the records from Deir el-Medina.

In social terms the surviving records reveal some large-scale criminal activities, notably those of Penanqet, Khnumnakht, and the gangs involved with the tomb-robberies at Thebes. Within these records are some indications of official corruption. There was disruption to the workers’ schedule at Deir el-Medina due to protests about lack of rations or criminality, but as the dynasty progressed the main cause of this disruption was the presence of ‘foreigners’ in the area around the village. There are also indications that there were changes in funerary practices with the movement away from monumental tombs. Finally, the powerful, local officials towards the end of the dynasty may have been acting
increasingly independently of royal supervision and control, with both Panehesy and Piankh seen to be carrying out activities without permission of the king.

What evidence for the Egyptian economy is available for the Twentieth Dynasty suggests that the economy may have developed problems as the dynasty progressed. There is evidence for significant proportions of grain being collected as tax in the Levant prior to the loss of that territory, around the same time that Papyrus Turin 1907 and 1908 recorded a large rise in grain prices (KRI VI, 403:14-409:10). The loss of Upper Nubia during the reign of Ramesses IX, followed by the loss of Lower Nubia under Ramesses XI, would also have had an impact on the resources available as a result of the loss of the Nubian gold mines. Similarly, only the kings up to Ramesses VI are attested at most of the Sinai mining sites, and only Ramesses III, IV, and V are attested at the main quarry sites such as the Wadi Hammamat. There are indications that temples, especially those at Thebes, became increasingly responsible for its administration, seemingly shown by the details of Papyrus Harris I and Papyrus Wilbour. As with the Nineteenth, there is no direct evidence for the environmental conditions during the dynasty, with no known surviving NLR. The disruption in supplies to Deir el-Medina, rise in grain prices, and mention of famine in the reign of Ramesses XI have, however, been taken as evidence of environmental problems.

2.3 The Twenty-First Dynasty (c.1067-c.944 BC)

2.3.1 Nature of the evidence for the period

The amount of evidence available for the Twenty-First Dynasty is substantially less than that for either of the previous two periods. Whilst what survives comes from the same
categories, monumental, funerary, and textual, the quantities of all of these are significantly lower than that available for both the late Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties. The remains of some of the royal tombs of the Twenty-First Dynasty from Tanis provide some indications regarding the wealth of the dynasty, as well as royal funerary practices, whilst in the south, the mummy caches and the few private tombs of the period provide similar evidence along with a number of funerary papyri. The loss of the workers’ village of Deir el-Medina at the end of the Twentieth Dynasty, however, removed an important source of information for both the general framework of the period and the details of events within it. The loss of this important source and the patchy nature of the wider evidence mean that even the length of many of the reigns of the Twenty-First Dynasty kings is uncertain as is, to some extent, the order of succession.

The evidence that is available comes from across the entirety of Egypt, with some monumental and funerary evidence coming from key northern centres such as Tanis, as well as from Thebes and the rest of Upper Egypt. There remains, however, a concentration of evidence in Upper Egypt. This is reflected in the fact that the limited documentary evidence which has survived, such as the Tale of Wenamun, the limited number of private letters, and key records such as the KPA, all come from this region. As a result these provide much of the detail about the (semi-)independent Upper Egyptian state at the start of the Twenty-First Dynasty, but provide almost no information about the state of the country in the north.

2.3.2 Chronology of events for the Twenty-First Dynasty

Ramesses XI was the last king of the Twentieth Dynasty and the next king, Nesubanebdjet (Smendes), with unknown family origins, is taken as the first of the Twenty-First ‘Tanite’
Dynasty. His rule was not necessarily over a unified country with the HPA Herihor also adopting royal style within his reign. Under Herihor, the construction of the court of the temple of Khonsu was completed and it was decorated with scenes depicting himself as king (OIP 100, pl.5-108; 103, xviii; Morkot and James 2010, 245). The division of the country under these two rulers appears to have been recorded in the Tale of Wenamun with both seemingly placed on an equal footing beneath Amun. Smendes was connected to the previous dynasty through his wife Tentamun, mentioned in the Tale of Wenamun, who was a daughter of Ramesses XI, whilst Pinudjem I’s wife, Henttawy (Q) may have been another daughter of Ramesses XI (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 200), or a daughter of Smendes (Kitchen 1986, 56).

Smendes is only rarely attested throughout his reign, but he had some control or influence over the south as he is recorded in a stela at Dibabieh quarry near Gebelein in southern Egypt as having sent an expedition there from Memphis to help quarry stone for the repair of Luxor temple after severe flooding (Ritner 2009a, 101-103), and a relief of him was carved into the gateway of Thutmose I in the Monthu precinct at Karnak (Kitchen 1986, 256).

The dates of Smendes’ reign, as recorded by the HPA, particularly from the records of the reburials of the mummies from the Valley of the Kings, provide some additional information. In Smendes’ Year 6 Herihor renewed those of Ramesses II and Sety I whilst, a

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88 The suggestion that Smendes is related to Nodjmet through the chief of the harem of Amun Hrere is based on her also having the title king’s mother (Dodson 2012, 38). I have not adopted this here as there is no surviving evidence that specifically mentions Smendes’ parents and it seems unusual that someone almost entirely based in the north would have a mother solely attested in the south.

89 Despite adopting royal style, such as enclosing his name in a cartouche, there is no evidence of Herihor using his own regnal years, as suggested by Jansen-Winkeln (1992, 34-37). This has been demonstrated to be
very short time later, the new HPA Pinudjem I moved Thutmose II and Amenhotep II. In Smendes’ Year 12 the mummy of Amenhotep III was moved, likewise Ramesses III in Year 13, and in Year 15 Ramesses II was moved into Sety I’s tomb; all were moved by the HPA Pinudjem I.

Despite these attestations of Smendes, the evidence from the south demonstrates that the division of Egypt that occurred at the end of the Twentieth Dynasty endured beyond Herihor’s death. Thus in Smendes’ Year 6, evidenced by Pinudjem I’s ‘accession’ as HPA. In the first phase of his career, to which the aforementioned reburials are to be dated, Pinudjem I is described only as HPA. During this phase of his career the outside of the pylon of the temple of Khonsu was completed, with the final elements of decoration added after he adopted royal style, in either Year 15/16, passing his title of HPA to his son Masaharta (A). There is clear evidence for this process because in Year 16 Amenhotep I was moved by the HPA Masaharta (A), recorded as the son of a ‘King Pinudjem’ (Kitchen 1986, 78).

Smendes was succeeded in the north by a king Amenemnisut (c.1041 BC), who may have been his son (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 200). There is very limited evidence for Amenemnisut’s reign, except for two bow caps where his names are paired with those of Psusennes I (Dodson 2012, 47). It is likely, however, that Amenemnisut is the king for the second date in the Banishment stela (Ritner 2009a, 124), mentioned above, when the oracle incorrect for Pinudjem I (another HPA who adopted royal style), by Kitchen (1986, 78) making it less likely that Herihor had his own dates.

90 See n.83.
91 I have used the term accession here as there is no evidence to suggest that Smendes appointed Pinudjem to his post as HPA.
92 Unlike Herihor, for whom the only evidence of his kingship is from the temple of Khonsu at Karnak and his depiction as king in the lunette of a papyrus buried with his wife Nodjmet (Morkot and James 2010, 245), Pinudjem I is definitely attested as king at other sites in Upper Egypt, e.g. Coptos (Cairo JE 71902; Ritner 2009a, 117-122).
agreed with Menkheperre to allow the ‘exiles’ to return from the oases. Probably early in his Year 4 (c.1037 BC) Amenemnisut died, but his burial remains unknown.93

Amenemnisut was succeeded by Psusennes I, who was probably the son of Pinudjem I and Henttawy (Q) (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 202). Pinudjem I is last attested in Year 8 of this king’s reign with the renewal/reburial of Ahmose I and his son. Shortly after this event Pinudjem I died and was buried in a tomb on the west bank at Thebes, although his mummy was found in the cache in DB 320 (Dodson 2012, 50). Following Pinudjem I’s death, his son, the HPA Menkheperre, appears to have begun to have his name enclosed in cartouches but, like Herihor, adopted only his title of HPA as his prenomen. This is clear from a number of stamped bricks found at sites across Upper Egypt, including el-Hibeh, Thebes, and Gebelein, the remains of a major building campaign by Menkheperre, many of which are stamped with his names in the royal form (Kitchen 1986, 269; Ritner 2009a, 135).

Psusennes I also carried out construction work, building the first datable elements of the temple of Amun at Tanis as well as its first enclosure wall (Dodson 2012, 58). Little else is known of his reign, except for further works carried out by Menkheperre, including the inscription of an oracular property settlement added to a column in the temple of Khonsu (Ritner 2009a, 130-135). Psusennes I’s Year 48 is recorded in Menkheperre’s construction of a new enclosure wall for the temple of Amun at Karnak. This is the last attestation of the HPA Menkheperre and it would suggest that he died during Psusennes I’s Year 48, with his son Nesubanebdjet II (Smendes II) succeeding him. In the north there was a co-regency between Psusennes I and his, probable, son Amenemope, beginning in Psusennes I’s Year

93 The Year 4 dating is based on Manetho (fr. 59), the only source of a reign length for Amenemnisut (Jansen-Winkeln 2006a, 227), other than the one recorded in the Banishment Stela.
46, as recorded on some mummy bandages from Bab el-Gasus (Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009a, 108), and ending with Psusennes I’s death in his Year 49 (c.988 BC). He was buried in NRT III, which had been constructed during his reign. The HPA Smendes II appears to have died shortly after donating objects for the burial of this king (Dodson 2012, 65) and was succeeded by his brother Pinudjem II.

Thus, in his Year 5, Amenemope began his sole rule of Egypt. Indeed from his rule onwards the primacy of the Tanite Twenty-First Dynasty was asserted over the whole country (to a greater or lesser extent) as no HPA would again adopt royal style. In Amenemope’s Year 5 the burial of the mummies in the second cache at Deir el-Bahri took place (DB 320). Little else is known about him, but he probably survived until early into his Year 10 (c.983 BC). After his death he was originally buried in a tomb he constructed for himself, NRT IV, but was moved shortly afterwards into a side room of his father’s tomb NRT III.

His successor is an oddity: the only one with a distinctly Libyan name, Osorkon ‘the elder’. His reign is barely attested, bar a reference in the Karnak Priestly Annals (KPA) to his

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94 I accept Kitchen’s (1986, 32-34) and von Beckerath’s (1994, 15-17) deduction, as does Dodson (2012, 68), that the piece of mummy trappings from Bab el-Gasus reading ‘(...) the King of Upper and Lower Egypt Amenemopet, Year 49 (...)’ (text in Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009a, 108), indicates a co-regency as no regnal date ever immediately follows the name of a king and that this must be the date of a second king with the only likely one being Psusennes I.

95 The wealth found in Psusennes I’s burial demonstrates that the Twenty-First, whilst perhaps not as wealthy as the Twentieth Dynasty, was nowhere near as poor as many early assessments had declared (Breasted 1909, 524).

96 As Kitchen (1986, 272) noted ‘his authority as king was undisputed - no less than nine burials of the Theban clergy had braces, pendants or badges inscribed in the name of Amenemope as pharaoh’. This is contrary to von Beckerath (1992, 17-19) who has the HPA Psusennes III adopt royal titles.

97 Although the linen wrappings on the mummy of Pinudjem II dated to Amenemope’s Year 10 could belong to Siamun’s reign (Kitchen 1986, 421), I agree with Jansen-Winkeln (2006a, 227) that, even if it does, Amenemope should be assigned 9 years. This is because all surviving versions of Manetho agree on Amenemope ruling for 9 years (Manetho fr. 59; Dodson 2012, 69), a rare instance of such agreement and thus making it likely that the original document had Amenemope ruling for 9 years.
Year 2 (Text 3B: 1-3; Ritner 2009a, 50: 1-6). He was, however, related to the later Twenty-
Second Dynasty, demonstrated by a genealogy inscribed on the roof of the Khonsu temple.\textsuperscript{98} 
Manetho (fr. 58-59) records 6 years for this king, but, without further monuments, it is 
impossible to confirm this.

The king who succeeded him in c.977 BC, Siamun, appears to have been unrelated to
Osorkon as his Egyptian name contrasts with all the known Libyan names of Osorkon’s 
family. His reign is one of the best documented from the Twenty-First Dynasty with his name 
found across Egypt. This is a reflection of his widespread building activities with evidence of 
construction at Tanis, Memphis, and his names being inscribed at Heliopolis and at Karnak. 
Siamun’s construction at Tanis included a depiction of him in the classic royal imagery of 
smiting enemies with a mace (Ritner 2009a, 162-163).\textsuperscript{99} As a result, he could be the king

\textsuperscript{98} The genealogy on the roof of temple of Khonsu at the induction of Ankhefenkhonsu lists his ancestors back 
nearly 250 years including Nimlot (A), the father of Shoshenq I of the Twenty-Second Dynasty. As a result, 
Yoyotte (1976-77, 45-46) was able to demonstrate that both Nimlot (A) and Osorkon ‘the elder’ had the same 
mother and thus that Osorkon ‘the elder’ was directly related to the kings of the Twenty-Second Dynasty. 
Intriguingly, the genealogy could also explain why Osorkon ‘the elder’ was able to become king as his, and 
Nimlot’s, mother Mehet(em)weskhet (Yoyotte 1976-77, 45) was a descendant of a half-sister of the HPA 
Menkheperre (Ritner 2009a, 13-16), and thus he was directly related (albeit distantly) to the other kings of the 
Twenty-First Dynasty.

\textsuperscript{99} Whether Siamun actually carried out a campaign is strongly disputed by Ash (1999, 46), arguing that this 
depiction is merely a piece of royal iconography. Whilst it is clear that such scenes were an important part of 
royal iconography, his argument that it therefore cannot record an actual campaign seems to me too sweeping. 
I agree that it is probable that the double-headed axe supposedly in the depiction does not represent a 
Philistine. I do agree, however, with Green’s (1978, 366) comment about images of kings smiting their enemies 
that ‘such reliefs were usually associated with Pharaohs who went to war’. Ash’s (1999, 43) evidence that 
Herihor is depicted in the smiting pose in the temple of Khonsu and that this disproves Siamun’s campaign is of 
limited value as Herihor is barely attested as king and only controlled Upper and Middle Egypt, whereas Siamun 
is clearly attested as in control over the whole country. There is also the possibility that Herihor did carry out 
some sort of campaign in Nubia, possibly completing or ending Piankh’s campaign there. Although I have 
accepted Ash’s argument that the double-headed axe does not represent a Philistine enemy, I have kept the 
location of the campaign as the Levant as it is the most logical location for a king who was undoubtedly based 
in the Delta. Having the Levant as the location for the campaign is also supported by archaeological evidence of 
a destruction layer at Gezer in the early tenth century BC (Dever 1993, 37) and the biblical references to a king 
of Egypt campaigning in the region (1 Kings 9:16).
described in 1 Kings 9:16 as the Pharaoh who captures Gezer and gives it to Solomon as dowry with his daughter.¹⁰⁰

Siamun’s control over the whole country is demonstrated in the use of his name and regnal year in various burials on the west bank at Thebes. These include on the papyri buried with Neskhons (A), wife of HPA Pinudjem II, in his Year 5 (P. Cairo 58032; Ritner 2009a, 145-158), and the renewals and reburials of royal mummies; Ramesses IX in Year 7, Ramesses I, Sety I and Ramesses II’s move to Queen Inhapi’s tomb in Year 10, before their removal into DB 320 shortly afterwards (Ritner 2009a, 158-160), and in the burial of Pinudjem II himself, again in Siamun’s Year 10 (Ritner 2009a, 160-161).¹⁰¹ Pinudjem II was succeeded by his son Psusennes (III). It is also possible that some other royal reburials in KV 35 took place during his reign, but there is no surviving datable evidence. Siamun’s last attested year is in a text dated to his Year 17 (KPA Text 3B: 3b; Ritner 2009a, 50: 1-6), and, at an unknown point in his Year 19 (c.958 BC),¹⁰² he died and was buried, probably in NRT III (Dodson 2012, 80).

The next king was the last of the dynasty, Psusennes II, who was formerly the HPA Psusennes (III).¹⁰³ There is little evidence of any major works being carried out during

¹⁰⁰ The biblical reference to Solomon marrying a daughter of the king of Egypt appears unlikely as this would be the first marriage of an Egyptian princess to a foreign ruler. However, there is evidence of royal daughters marrying foreigners within Egypt during this period and so it may not be unlikely as it first appears (Kitchen 1986, 282).

¹⁰¹ The cache was then sealed after his burial and was re-opened in Shoshenq I’s reign to add a burial (Kitchen 1986, 320).

¹⁰² This date is based on Jansen-Winkeln’s (2006a, 228) proposal that the 9 years of Manetho should be corrected to 19 due to Siamun’s reign being clearly longer, despite his Year 17 being his last attested.

¹⁰³ Although this is still not confirmed, Jansen-Winkeln’s (2006a, 221-223) reading of the evidence seems to me to be the most plausible, rather than von Beckerath (1992, 17-19) who sees them as separate individuals with the HPA Psusennes III also adopting royal titles. Rather than create two extra Psusennes as Dodson (2009, 106-107; 2012, 79) suggests, the fact that the inscription in the Ptah chapel of Sety I’s temple at Abydos shows the king, Pasebkhanut Tutuheperre (Psusennes II), with not only the title of HPA but also a military title, h₂wty pr-거래, that only appears in association with Theban HP and military commanders (Jansen-Winkeln 2006a, 222) seems convincing that the two are the same person. Effland (2012, 78; 2013, 36)
Psusennes II’s reign, despite a reign of similar length to Siamun. The key events of Psusennes II’s reign relate to his succession. Only one child is known from surviving monuments: a daughter Maatkare (B), from an oracular decree preserving her property inscribed on the west wing of the northern face of Pylon XII at Karnak (Ritner 2009a, 163-166). She was married to the son of the great chief of the Ma Shoshenq (B), the future Osorkon I. Around the same time Shoshenq (B) and Psusennes II were recorded in a stela at Abydos (Cairo JE 66285; Ritner 2009a, 166-172) instituting a statue cult for Shoshenq (B)’s father Nimlot (A). The creation of this statue cult at a location strongly associated with divine kingship may have conferred some legitimacy on Shoshenq (B)’s family, possibly easing his succession of Psusennes II as Shoshenq I. A Year 13 of Psusennes II is known from the KPA (Text 3B: 6; Ritner 2009a, 50: 1-6), which correlates with Africanus’ version of Manetho (fr. 58) which records a reign of 14 years. Thus, at some point in his Year 14 (c.944 BC), Psusennes II has noted that this is not conclusive and proposes that the graffito from the temple of Sety I at Abydos might list Psusennes II as king and a separate HPA Psusennes (probably III). Despite this his (2012; 2013) publications of fragments from Umm el-Qaab have indicated that the HPA Psusennes III had a presence outside the Theban region and, as this is an area where Psusennes II is also particularly well attested, this is suggestive of a single individual for whom Abydos was particularly important. The dates from the Bab el-Gasus bandages are unclear and so cannot be used to rule out the connection as Dodson (2012, 79) does, but could indicate either that a Psusennes IV exists who was HPA under Psusennes II/III, or that Psusennes II/III officiated over these burials only as HPA even whilst king.

Psusennes II’s name itself is not preserved in the remains of the stela, but the references to an unnamed king must be the last king of the Twenty-First Dynasty who is currently accepted to be Psusennes II. Dodson’s (1993, 268; 2000, 10) suggestion of a co-regency between these two kings based on a block from Bubastis has been conclusively disproved by Effland (2012, 81).

Psusennes II’s reign has been suggested to be much longer on the basis of the dating of the Greater Dakhla stela to his reign, leading him to have a reign possibly as long as 24 years on the basis of a correction of Manetho’s 14 years (Kraus 2006, 412). This dating of the Greater Dakhla stela is disputed, however, with some scholars preferring to assign Shoshenq III rather than Shoshenq I to the Year 5 and Psusennes I, not Psusennes II for the Year 19. The evidence, as noted by Leahy (2010, 45-53) is unclear for either suggestion, with only Jacquet-Gordon’s (1979, 180-182) original argument for Shoshenq III on the basis of the use of the title pr-rersy actually disproved. Accepting that it could refer to Psusennes I’s reign as there is no evidence for when Nesubast’s mother died or whether she was, instead, a more distant relation from him such as grandmother.
died and was interred in NRT III next to Siamun (Sagrillo 2009, 356 n.122), ending the Twenty-First Dynasty.

2.3.3 Political, social, economic, and environmental commentary

The key political process that occurred during the Twenty-First Dynasty is the appearance of a (semi-)independent Upper Egypt governed from Thebes. During the early Twenty-First Dynasty there was a series of kings based in Thebes who were also HPA, in addition to kings based in the north at Tanis. There is currently no evidence to suggest that there was conflict between any of the northern and southern rulers, indeed some of the northern rulers are attested in the south and it is probable that their regnal dates were used by the southern rulers. Gradually the HPA stopped adopting royal attributes, with the rulers in the north apparently reasserting their authority, although the country was ultimately reunified under Psusennes I who was a descendant of the family of HPA. An aspect of this (semi-)independent state may have been the increasing importance of Amun, and his elevation to

(Leahy 2010, 52-53), I have assigned the Year 19 to Psusennes I’s reign, particularly as a result of there being no surviving evidence from within the Nile valley to support a longer reign for Psusennes II.

106 This year is suggested by Krauss (2006, 411) based on his dating of what, he sees, as the lunar festival of Seth that takes place in the Greater Dakhla stela (Ashmolean 1894.107a: 8; Ritner 2009a, 173-178) and a subsequent correction of Manetho’s record of 14 years for Psusennes II to 24 years. As Kitchen (2009, 167) and Leahy (2010, 52) have noted, there is no evidence to confirm that this festival was a lunar one and thus the movement of the start of Shoshenq I’s reign to c.944/943 BC cannot be supported. Whilst I do not accept Krauss’ new date based on the lunar evidence, I do accept Kitchen’s (1986, 74-75) and Jansen-Winkeln’s (2006a, 232) argument that, as the dating of Shoshenq I’s Levantine campaign to c.926/5 BC is relatively well fixed through synchronisms with Assyrian and Biblical chronologies, if Shoshenq I’s campaign took place several years before the Year 21 Gebel el-Silsila stela (Gebel el-Silsila Quarry Stela No.100; Ritner 2009a, 187-192) then the start of his reign could have begun later than c.946/5 BC traditionally stated (Jansen-Winkeln 2006a, 232-3). I have accepted that this is probable considering the evidence of depictions of the campaign at both el-Hibe as well as Karnak, the likelihood that construction at Karnak also took place prior to Year 21, that the first section completed and decorated is the Bubastite Portal with Shoshenq I’s campaign record (suggesting that the campaign had taken place prior to this construction, even if it was built in Year 21).

107 See n.89.
the kingship of Egypt, and thus that the Theban state was a form of ‘theocracy’, although it is unclear to what extent this reflects the reality of the period.

From the middle of Psusennes I’s reign onwards there were no longer kings based at Thebes, with all dated texts now having the names of the northern rulers. There were a number of key centres during the Twenty-First Dynasty; Tanis was a key political centre throughout the dynasty, but the significance of the others, including Thebes and Memphis, fluctuated. Thebes held some significance during the early part of the dynasty along with el-Hibeh, where the evidence suggests that many of the HPA/kings were actually based, but again appears to have lost some of its political importance as the dynasty progressed and the rulers were once again based in the north.

The succession continues to be unclear, with those following Amenemope not clearly related to the Theban-originating family of Psusennes I. Among the later kings is also the first king with a distinctively Libyan name, Osorkon ‘the Elder’; however, there is not enough evidence to suggest how he became king or whether those that followed him were related to him.

Some interesting social developments seem to take place during the Twenty-First Dynasty. There is the appearance of Libyans in the highest echelons of Egyptian society, as with Shoshenq (A) described as a general at the end of the dynasty, and of course the king Osorkon ‘the Elder’. There is a clear shift in style and location of burials, as reflected in the royal tombs at Tanis, but also in the developing cemetery within the enclosure at Medinet Habu. It is also demonstrated by the almost complete end of the excavation of monumental tombs on the west bank at Thebes during the Twenty-First Dynasty (Cooney 2011, 16-20). This was accompanied by the creation of the mummy caches, with the royal burials of the
New Kingdom gradually moved into the two main caches during the early part of the dynasty. There was also an increasing use of oracles, perhaps as part of the establishment of Amun as king of Egypt, with their use appearing not only in minor matters but also in key political decisions including the recall of exiles by HPA Menkheperre and the establishment by Shoshenq (A) of a statue cult to his father Nimlot at Abydos.

The state of the Egyptian economy during the Twenty-First Dynasty is difficult to determine. There is limited evidence for construction, although it is clear that more was carried out in the north, especially at Tanis, than in the south. There is also very little evidence for activity at the main quarrying and mining sites, although small-scale work might have continued. What little documentary evidence remains suggests that the conditions that existed in the late Twentieth Dynasty continued into the Twenty-First Dynasty. This is supported by the remains of the royal burials at Tanis which show that considerable wealth remained available to the royal family.

For the first time within the periods under study there are some indicators of the environmental conditions within Egypt. In the stela that Smendes added to the walls of the limestone quarry at Dibabieh it states that the expedition was sent there for stone to repair damage to Thebes following a high flood. Unfortunately, unlike the following periods, there are no surviving NLR with which to establish exactly how high this flood was nor how much higher than the normal levels it was. Outside this mention of a very high flood, however, the only possible indication of the environmental conditions is the silting up of the Pelusiac branch and the shift from Pi-Ramesses to Tanis which was completed during the early part of the Twenty-First Dynasty.
2.4. Early Twenty-Second Dynasty (c.944-c.835 BC)

2.4.1 Outline of the evidence for the period

Much of the evidence available for the early Twenty-Second is the same as that for the Twenty-First Dynasty, in greater quantities, however, than that found in the Twenty-First Dynasty, bar private documents which are effectively unknown from this period. Almost none of the burials are known for the kings of the early Twenty-Second Dynasty, including that of the founder of the dynasty, Shoshenq I, with only Shoshenq IIa’s, Takeloth I’s and Osorkon II’s located. Monumental evidence is much more apparent both in the south and north of the country, and indeed is a reflection of the spread of evidence across Egypt during this period with sites in Upper, Middle, and Lower Egypt all producing evidence.

There are far more surviving inscriptions from this period than from the Twenty-First Dynasty as well, including the continuation of key records such as the KPA, providing much greater detail on the events during the early Twenty-Second Dynasty. Despite this, however, there are a number of rulers whose burials are known, but who have no known evidence from their reigns, including no known regnal dates. There is some evidence from outside Egypt for the first time since the end of the Twentieth Dynasty, but is limited to a few statues and the fragments of a stela of Shoshenq I.

2.4.2 Chronology of events for the early Twenty-Second Dynasty

The new king, Shoshenq I, was the first king of the Twenty-Second Dynasty, establishing an entire dynasty with Libyan names and a period of Libyan dominance of the upper echelons
of the Egyptian hierarchy.\textsuperscript{108} Despite the attempts to legitimise his succession at the end of Psusennes II’s reign, it appears that in his first years he still was not accepted at Thebes with the KPA from his Years 1 and 2 recording Shoshenq I still as great chief of the Ma (Text 4: 1-3; Ritner 2009a, 51: 1-4). Shoshenq I, however, appears to have worked quickly to establish his authority across the country, sending representatives to the oases to restore order (Ashmolean 1894. 107A: 3-4; Ritner 2009a, 173-178). As part of this process, to help enforce his authority over Upper Egypt, he appointed his second son, Iuput (A), as HPA before his Year 10 (Iuput (A) is named as HPA in Shoshenq I’s Year 10 on a mummy bandage on Cairo CG 61097; Ritner 2009a, 178-179). This broke the chain of father-son inheritance that had been in place since the end of the Twentieth Dynasty and probably led to Shoshenq I being recognised as king by the next surviving KPA in his Year 13 (Text 4: 4; Ritner 2009a, 51: 1-4).

Shoshenq I also conducted a more active foreign policy than his immediate predecessors, with a statue of him sent to Byblos (Kitchen 1986, 292-93; Ritner 2009a, 219-220).\textsuperscript{109} He also carried out a campaign in the Levant, probably between his Year 13 and Year 20.\textsuperscript{110} This campaign may well have been an attempt to re-establish Egyptian control or

\textsuperscript{108} This was already visible with the presence of the HPA Masaharta (A) (von Beckerath 1992, 17) and their dominance of the senior military positions, reflecting their probable origins as Libyan captives adopted into the Egyptian army. This has led some scholars, particularly Sagrillo (2009, 341-360), to suggest the origins of the dynasty were not Bubastite as recorded in Manetho (fr. 60-61), but from the area around Herakleopolis where a large cemetery of the period has been found (Pérez Die 1988-1989, 158-161; 2009, 303). Payraudeau (2009, 397-406) has demonstrated, however, that the current evidence is not comprehensive enough to abandon the Manethonic record, particularly as Libyans are also known to have been settled in the eastern Delta in the region around Bubastis (Payraudeau 2009, 401-403).

\textsuperscript{109} It is unclear exactly why this statue was sent to Byblos; particularly as the Phoenician text added by the King of Byblos, Abibaal, claims that he caused the statue to be brought from Egypt (Ritner 2009a, 220). This is unlikely and the statue’s presence certainly does not reflect a conquest of Byblos, suggesting that it was possibly sent as part of a diplomatic/trade mission for wood in a similar way to those of the Ramesside kings.

\textsuperscript{110} There is still some debate over the exact route of Shoshenq I’s campaign and whether it can be identified with that of the Pharaoh ‘Shishak’ mentioned in the Bible as having destroyed Jerusalem (1 Kings 14: 25-26; 2 Chronicles 12: 1-12). Jerusalem has not been identified with any of the towns listed by Shoshenq I as having
dominance over the area (Finkelstein and Fantalkin 2006, 26), as evidenced by the stela dedicated by Shoshenq I at Megiddo (Rockefeller Museum, Jerusalem No.I.3554; Ritner 2009a, 218-219), although any control established appears to have been short-lived (Finkelstein 2002, 129; n.31). This campaign helped Shoshenq I fund a range of large construction projects with activity at Memphis, el-Hibeh, and Thebes, where he added the First Court and possibly a pylon to the temple of Amun at Karnak, with smaller projects carried out at Tanis, Bubastis, Athribis and Heliopolis. The scale of these activities led to the re-opening of the Gebel el-Silsila quarry in Shoshenq I’s Year 21, specifically for carrying out the building works at Karnak (Gebel el-Silsila Quarry stela No.100: 46-50; Ritner 2009a, 187-192). This is the last year recorded for Shoshenq I and probably early in his Year 22 (to allow for the construction of the court to have been completed) he died and was buried in an unknown location.111

been captured in the campaign, but the relief has much in common with other, earlier victory reliefs and it has been suggested by some to have limited or no value in identifying the route of Shoshenq I’s army (Wilson K. 2005, 65). K. Wilson’s (2005, 97) assertion that the surviving evidence only supports a punitive campaign against Jerusalem has not taken into account the evidence provided by Finkelstein (2002, 111-112), where he notes that the Jerusalem contemporary with the period of the campaign (mid to late tenth century BC) was a small settlement with no monumental construction making it highly unlikely to have been the target of major raid by a king of Egypt. Overall I follow Finkelstein (2002, 129), Ash (1999, 52-54), and Kitchen’s (1986, 296-299) analysis that the names are divided into three groups probably reflecting the routes taken by the three ‘divisions’ of Shoshenq I’s army and, therefore, it is likely that he is the king referred to as Shishak, but that Jerusalem surrendered and was not taken (Kitchen 1986, 298) or not significant enough to mention in the records (Finkelstein 2002, 111-112), or is a confused oral memory of Shoshenq I’s campaign (Finkelstein 2002, 113). Dodson’s (2012, 89) suggestion that there may have been a series of campaigns throughout Shoshenq I’s reign and that the surviving record is only a reflection of the earliest ones which did not include Jerusalem is intriguing but impossible to prove without further evidence, and the cartonnage of Hor only mentions one expedition (Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge E.8.1896; Ritner 2009a, 227-228); although this does not conclusively rule out other campaigns.

111 Although Manetho lists the Twenty-Second Dynasty as Bubastite in origin there is only one attestation of Shoshenq I at that city (Ritner 2009a, 173) and so it is unlikely that his burial was there. One item of Shoshenq I’s funerary equipment, a canopic chest (Berlin 11000; Ritner 2009a, 229), survives but there is no provenance for the object removing any assistance from it for the identification of Shoshenq I’s burial. Scholars have suggested a number of locations, in a second royal necropolis at Tanis (Dodson 1989, 229-31) and the
Shoshenq I was succeeded by his son Osorkon I (c.922 BC), who was married to the daughter of Psusennes II, Maatkare (B). During his first four years Osorkon I made large donations to the major Egyptian temples: Re at Heliopolis, Amun-Re at Thebes, Thoth at Hermopolis, Bast at Bubastis, along with others whose record is too badly damaged to tell the amount or location. These were all recorded on a pillar at his temple of Atum at Bubastis (Lange 2008, 135; Ritner 2009a, 252-254) and supported by graffiti at the temple of Khonsu at Karnak (Ritner 2009a, 258; OIP 103, 20-21).\textsuperscript{112} A statue of Osorkon I has also been found at Byblos (Louvre AO.9502; Ritner 2009a, 233-234), but he does not appear to have carried out a campaign to the Levant. Osorkon I continued his father’s construction projects, adding reliefs to the Bubastite Portal and to the back wall of the temple at el-Hibeh to complete Shoshenq I’s decoration (Ritner 2009a, 235-237). He also continued his father’s policy with regards to appointing sons to senior positions, placing his eldest son Shoshenq (Q) as HPA in an unknown year.

Osorkon I carried out building work of his own at Bubastis, adding a gateway and hypostyle hall to the temple of Bast, and a small temple to Atum (Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009b, 49-52; Ritner 2009a, 235-237). His Year 12 is recorded in the Nile Level Record (NLR; von Beckerath 1966, 44; Ritner 2009a, 35) No.2 with a Year 23 dated by a mummy bandage of Khonsumakheru (Hamburg C3835-6; Altenmüller 2000, 128-129) along with a bandage on enclosure of the Ptah temple at Memphis (Sagrillo 2005, 99-100; 2009, 357). Both of these are possible, but the probable remains of a mortuary temple next to the temple of Ptah (Sagrillo 2009, 358) which is mentioned in an oracular decree from Karnak (Ritner 2009a, 213-215) suggests that the Memphite location may be more probable.

\textsuperscript{112} This inscription also has the first detailed explanation of the Twenty-Second Dynasty’s policy of placing sons into the key religious, political and military positions in order to ensure the dynasty’s domination and preservation, as well as highlighting the concept of brother-brother succession (Lange 2008, 137; see n.115). These included the HPA, great chiefs of the Meshwesh, prince/foremost of the foreigners and ruler of all lands (Lange 2008, 137).
another mummy, Nakhtefmut’s, suggesting that he survived at least until a Year 33 (Ritner 2009a, 262-264). Another bandage on Nakhtefmut dated to a Year 3 suggests that Osorkon I may have had co-regency with his son, Shoshenq (Q) as Shoshenq IIC (M3-hpr-Rc) (Jansen-Winkeln 2006b, 236).\textsuperscript{113} Certainly Shoshenq (Q) pre-deceased his father as another of Osorkon I’s sons, Iuwelot, was appointed HPA. Shortly after the death of his eldest son, although possibly as late as Year 35 (on a correction of Manetho’s 15 years), Osorkon I died and was, like his father, buried in an unknown location.

He was succeeded by two further Shoshenqs, hq3-hpr-Rc (Shoshenq IIa) and twt-hpr-Rc (Shoshenq IIb), both of whom have no surviving dates and possibly did not rule for more than a couple of complete years each, although one, hq3-hpr-Rc Shoshenq IIa, was reburied in the tomb of Psusennes I (NRT III) at Tanis.\textsuperscript{114} With their deaths a third son of Osorkon I, Takeloth I, acceded to the throne (c.881 BC).

\textsuperscript{113} This is not certain and is disputed by Dodson (2012, 96; 261 n.88), but would explain why on the inundation statue donated by Shoshenq (Q) as HPA he enclosed his names in a cartouche (British Museum 8; Ritner 2009a, 264-267) and results in a satisfactory explanation of one of the three ephemeral Shoshenqs known from the early Twenty-Second Dynasty (Jansen-Winkeln 2006b, 238).

\textsuperscript{114} Again this placement is based on Jansen-Winkeln’s (2006b, 237-238) analysis of the early Twenty-Second Dynasty, who argues that the simplicity of the names guarantees their placement prior to Osorkon II, supported by Aston (2009a, 4-5). This, combined with the evidence from the copy of Manetho preserved by Africanus which records ‘three other kings’ in between Osorkon I and Takeloth I (Manetho fr.61) strongly suggests that their placement in the chronology should be here. As there remains not a single regnal year for either of these kings I have attempted to limit the amount of time assigned to them, in order to avoid such long reigns, as in Aston’s (2009a, 26) chronology where they are deemed to have ruled for over a decade between them, in order to prevent large gaps in time within the chronology. Despite this there are a few years which are currently not included in the reign of any king as a result of the relatively fixed date for Shoshenq I’s reign and the recent reduction in the date of the death of Shoshenq V as a result of the reversal of Shabaka and Shabataka (Payraudeau 2014a, 127 and see n.150). Whilst these may well belong to other kings, for example Osorkon II may well have ruled for a few more years and Payraudeau (2014a, 13 n.82) suggests extending Pamiu’s reign from 8 to 16 years, for simplicity I have assumed that both of these kings lasted into at least a second year, a result not that improbable considering that it is known to be true for some of the elderly kings of the Twentieth Dynasty.
The evidence from Takeloth I’s reign is limited, but his position in the sequence of the Twenty-Second Dynasty is guaranteed by his mention in the genealogy recorded on the Pasenhor stela from the reign of Shoshenq V (Louvre IM 2846 Cat. No.31; Ritner 2009a, 17-21). Much of the evidence comes from the NLR at Thebes which show a succession of HPA during Takeloth I’s reign with his brother Iuwelot being replaced, by Takeloth I’s Year 8, by another of his brothers, Smendes III (NLR No.17; von Beckerath 1966, 46; Ritner 2009a, 35-36). His last recorded year is again from the NLR (No.18; von Beckerath 1966, 46; Ritner 2009a, 36), as well as a possible Apis Bull burial (Dodson 2012, 100; Ritner 2009a, 281), and dates to a Year 14 during which year (c.867 BC) he died and was buried at Tanis.

His son, Osorkon II, known from both the Pasenhor stela and from the inscriptions in NRT I for his reburial of Takeloth I, followed him as king. Osorkon II appears to have been a much more active king than his father, building a new court and pylon for the temple of Amun at Tanis, several chapels at Karnak, as well as construction at Leontopolis and Bubastis. Shortly after his coronation he dedicated a statue at Tanis explicitly detailing the dynasty’s policy of appointing princes to the most important positions of state (Philadelphia E 16199 + Cairo JE 37489; Ritner 2009a, 283-288).\textsuperscript{115} This was begun immediately with the appointment of his son Nimlot (C) to be high priest of Heryshef and general, and Shoshenq (D) to high priest of Ptah (HPP), but the appointment of a HPA had to wait for the death of Osorkon II’s uncle Smendes III. In Osorkon II’s Year 16, Nimlot (C) was still in charge at

\textsuperscript{115} Lange (2008, 138-139) has noted that this statue parallels an earlier inscription also at the temple of Bubastis by Osorkon I, although Osorkon II’s is dedicated to Amun and not Bast. In both the king asks the deity to ensure that his sons will succeed him and that they will fill the highest offices as well as that the inheritance should be brother-brother (Lange 2008, 139). This emphasis on brother-brother succession in both Osorkon I’s (Lange 2008, 137) and Osorkon II’s inscriptions (Lange 2008, 139) has led to the suggestion that the Libyans may have had a more avuncular style of succession rather than patrilineal (Lange 2008, 138-137; Broekman 2010, 86-87).
Herakleopolis (Cairo JE 45327; Ritner 2009a, 344-346), but soon after this, on the death of Smendes III, Nimlot (C) became HPA until his own death later in Osorkon II’s reign.

Osorkon II also had a more active foreign policy, not only maintaining relations with Byblos,\footnote{Demonstrated by the presence of a statue of him there (Ritner 2009a, 288), again likely to have been part of diplomatic/trade mission to secure wood (see n.109). He was, however, the last known Libyan king to send such a statue in the Libyan Period.} but also sending 1,000 troops to assist in the coalition against the Assyrian king Shalmaneser III at Qarqar (as recorded on the Kurkh Monolith (BM 118884: 92; Oppenheim 1958, 189-191)), in c.853 BC (Kitchen 1986, 323), or Osorkon II’s Year 14. In Year 22 of Osorkon II’s reign, he celebrated the Heb-Sed jubilee festival recorded in a unique series of reliefs on a monumental gateway built by Osorkon II at the temple of Bast at Bubastis (Gozzoli 2009, 38-39; Ritner 2009a, 291-341).

The later years of Osorkon II’s reign saw the first manifestation of the divisions that he was concerned about in his coronation statue (Philadelphia E 16199+ Cairo JE 37489: 12; Ritner 2009a, 286), with the appearance of a king Horsiese (A) in Thebes. It is clear that he was contemporaneous with Osorkon II from the appearance of their names on the same statue (Cairo CG 42208; Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009b, 141-144) and he was probably the son of the HPA Smendes III (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 212).\footnote{The parents of Horsiese (A) are still subject of debate, although all agree that he was related to the ‘main’ line of the Twenty-Second Dynasty in some way, giving him a reason for adopting royal style, except for Aston (1989, 142) who originally viewed him an independent Theban king. Ritner (2009b, 337) proposes Horsiese (A) as a son of Shoshenq Ila, but I have, instead, followed Jansen-Winkeln’s (2006b, 241 n.61) proposal that he is the son of the HPA Smendes III, subsequently supported by Dodson (2012, 106) and Aston (2014, 20), on the basis of Smendes III’s wife holding the title of $mwt	ext{ }nfr$ designating her the mother of a king, for whom the most likely candidate is Horsiese (A).} Horsiese (A) is attested as king outside Thebes with a monument from Coptos (Cairo JE 37516; Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009b, 155-156) mentioning him and his son the new HPA, Pedubast (Dodson 2012, 107). It appears from his remains, found in a tomb at Medinet Habu (MH 1), that Horsiese (A) may have
suffered from ill health, as his skull was found with a hole typical of trepanning (Hölscher 1954, 10) and thus died soon after becoming king. Certainly towards the end of his reign Osorkon II was again recognised in the Theban region with Nimlot (C)’s son Takeloth (F) appointed as HPA and the construction of the chapel to Osiris-\textit{wp išd} at Karnak (on which Takeloth (F) is mentioned as HPA, Dodson 2012, 108). Soon after this appointment, however, Takeloth (F) also adopted royal style, becoming Takeloth II and instituting Aston’s Theban/Herakleopolitan Twenty-Third Dynasty (c.835 BC) and thus dividing Egypt.

2.4.3 Political, social, economic, and environmental commentary

Politically the early Twenty-Second Dynasty was a period of centralised rule overwhelmingly based in the north at sites such as Tanis, Bubastis, and Memphis. Significantly it is the first dynasty of the periods under study which is exclusively comprised of individuals with non-Egyptian names, with all the kings now holding Libyan personal names. Shoshenq I’s accession as king may not have been accepted in the Theban region during his early years, but this seems to have been short-lived. Following the acceptance of Shoshenq I’s rule across the whole country there were no political divisions until the appearance of Horsiese (A), and then Takeloth II, late in Osorkon II’s reign.

The lack of internal issues may have been a product of the dynasty’s administrative style which saw members of the royal family placed in the key positions across Egypt, as elaborated in Osorkon I and II’s inscriptions regarding their desire for their sons to inherit all of the major positions. This not only acted as a political trend in securing the rule of the dynasty across the country but was also an important social process as it spread ‘Libyans’ both across the country and throughout the social hierarchy of Egypt. There continued to be
a trend for Egypt to be ruled from Thebes, or for Upper Egypt to be independent from the north, with a delay in the acknowledgement of Shoshenq I’s accession at Karnak, and with the subsequent appearance of Horsiese (A) and perhaps also Takeloth II.

Egypt under the early Twenty-Second Dynasty had more interaction with the surrounding areas than the evidence suggests for the Twenty-First Dynasty, with Shoshenq I’s Levantine campaign and him, Osorkon I, and Osorkon II sending statues to Byblos. In contrast, burial styles appear to have remained unchanged from the previous dynasty, with them largely within temple enclosures and small in scale, as with the further royal burials at Tanis, Horsiese (A)’s in Medinet Habu, and the cemetery found at Herakleopolis (Perez Die 2009, 304).

Economically there was an increase in the number of monuments under construction, with large-scale building at a number of sites including Karnak, Bubastis, Tanis and el-Hibeh. There is also some evidence that the quarry sites were being used to provide the stone for this construction, rather than the reuse of existing monuments. Along with the evidence for increased building work were the records of large-scale donations by Osorkon I recorded at Bubastis to all of the main cult centres across Egypt. There is also the first definitive Egyptian evidence for the state of the environment, with the NLR from the quay at Karnak providing clear indications of the height of the Nile floods during this period and their fluctuations.
2.5 The Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Dynasties (c.835-c.746 BC)

2.5.1 Outline of the evidence for the period

The evidence which survives from this period is relatively widespread across Egypt, with some regions which had provided little in the way of evidence prior to this period, for example the western Delta, becoming increasingly well represented in the record. Royal monuments became less common than in the early Twenty-Second Dynasty, although smaller monuments continued to be constructed throughout the period. There is an increase in the number of private monuments, particularly donation stelae. Despite this, there are considerable gaps in the evidence, particularly regarding the order and number of rulers. The poor survival of what monumental and inscriptional evidence there was has also complicated this, leaving a very confused chronological structure for much of this period. An important source of information for the chronology is the Serapeum, which also provides significant evidence for the holders of a number of key positions within the Egyptian hierarchy. The information that it provides, however, is almost exclusively with regard to conditions in the north and the rulers and officials based there and is supplemented by the surviving donation stelae and genealogies from that region.

In contrast, many of the important inscriptions, such as the Chronicle of Prince Osorkon and the KPA, which give some indications of the events occurring within Egypt and detail the important local officials and families, are largely from the south. This has meant that there are significant discrepancies between the evidence available in Upper Egypt for the presence of individuals and institutions, and in the north where such information is much patchier. As the period continues the evidence for the various rulers becomes
increasingly fragmentary and reliant on single objects. This is not helped by the loss of some funerary evidence, especially the burials of the kings based in the south of the country.

### 2.5.2 Chronology of events of Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Dynasty

Despite the previous position of Takeloth II, the founder of the Theban/Herakleopolitan Dynasty, as HPA at Thebes, it appears he was not immediately accepted as king in Thebes. The HPA Horsiese (B) dedicated a statue inscribed with Osorkon II’s names (Cairo CG 42225; Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009b, 135-139), and NLR No.14 was inscribed in Osorkon II’s Year 29 (Broekman 2002, 174). In his Year 34 (c.832 BC), following a probable Sed-festival (Kitchen 2006, 301), Osorkon II died and was buried at Tanis (NRT I).

His successor in Lower Egypt was his son, Shoshenq III (c.832 BC) who continued to be acknowledged by Horsiese (B) as king with NLR No.23 dated to his Year 6 by the high

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118 For the second half of the Libyan Period I follow Aston’s chronology (1989; and Taylor 1990) in its (2009a) revised form as supported and amended by Leahy (1990), Broekman (2002; 2005; 2006; 2011a), Jansen-Winkeln (2006b) and Dodson (2012) in which the line of Takeloth II is a separate Herakleopolitan/Theban dynasty and, as such, not the alternative chronology proposed by Kitchen (1986; 2006; 2009). For the dates involved, as a result of the reduced gap between the death of Shoshenq V and the removal of Bakenrenef by Shabataka which has been proposed since Aston’s chronology (for details of this as a result of the reversal of the order of Shabaka and Shabataka see n.150), I have created a relative chronology based on the highest reignal years known for each king and following the currently accepted ordering and overlaps of the various kings of the later Twenty-Third Dynasty. Unlike Aston’s chronology I accept Leahy’s (1990, 188) proposal to maintain the start of the Twenty-Third Dynasty with a Pedubast before Osorkon IV as in the Manethonic record. This is to prevent Osorkon IV from having an exceptionally long reign, which seems improbable considering the almost total lack of dated evidence for him, unlike Iuput II where we have a definite Year 21. Likewise I have not awarded, as Aston (2009a, 26) does, more than a few years for Shoshenq Ila, Iib or Iic as the lack of evidence, particularly from a section of the period when the kings are relatively well attested, suggests that none of them ruled for long especially if Shoshenq Ila died during his co-regency with Osorkon I (Jansen-Winkeln 2006b, 236).

119 Aston (1989, 148) has proposed a much longer reign for Osorkon II, around 40 years, although more recently he has acknowledged that this may be too long (2009a, 21). He does still support a longer reign for Osorkon II preferring the thirty-four years proposed by Broekman (2006, 246) rather than the thirty/thirty-one years proposed by Krauss (2006, 412) and Kitchen (2006, 301). I have accepted Broekman’s proposed reign length here as it appears that Osorkon may well have lived longer and this length corresponds best to the rest of the relative chronology established in this thesis.
Priest (von Beckerath 1966, 46; Ritner 2009a, 37). Shoshenq III is relatively well attested, carrying out building work at Tanis including a monumental gateway reusing blocks from Pi-Ramesses (Ritner 2009a, 390-392). During Shoshenq III’s Year 14, his son Bakennefy (A) set up a donation stela at Heliopolis.¹²⁰

In Upper Egypt, Horsiese (B) was replaced as HPA by Takeloth II’s son, Osorkon (B).¹²¹ By Takeloth II’s Year 11 (Year 8 Shoshenq III), however, this had caused a rebellion in Thebes and the establishment of a new king, Pedubast I, possibly the son of Horsiese (A). On this occasion Osorkon (B) put the rebellion down harshly, burning some of his opponents alive and remaining as HPA (Chronicle of Prince Osorkon (CPO) 1: 22-43 - Ritner 2009a, 354-356; Louvre E.336 - Ritner 2009a, 377-379; KPA 26 and 27; Ritner 2009a, 59). Only a few years later though, in Takeloth II’s Year 15 (Shoshenq III’s Year 12), a major rebellion again broke out at Thebes with Pedubast I again recognised as king with NLR No.24 dated to his Year 5 as well as Shoshenq III’s Year 12 (von Beckerath 1966, 46-47; Ritner 2009a, 37).¹²² Pedubast I also re-appointed Horsiese (B) as HPA (NLR No.24; von Beckerath 1966, 46-47; Ritner 2009a, 37) showing two factions forming over the control of Thebes. Pedubast I and Horsiese (B)’s control over the Theban region lasted for several years as described by Osorkon (B): ‘years passed when there was no preventing one from seizing his other (CPO 2. 21, 2: 7; text in OIP

¹²⁰ He appears to have predeceased his father Shoshenq III as that king was ultimately succeeded by Shoshenq IV, assumed to be a junior son, and later by another son Pamiu (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 218).
¹²¹ In the Chronicle of Prince Osorkon, he mentions his appointment as being prior to Takeloth’s Year 11 (CPO 1: 18-22; Ritner 2009a, 348-377). For the following ordering of the events I follow Jansen-Winkeln (2006b, 249-252), although I do not accept his argument that Pedubast I (sḥḥ ʾṣr) is the same as Pedubast (sḥḥ Bʾṣrt). Despite them having the same highest regnal year (23), it is highly unlikely that the former would have been able to gain support beyond the area controlled by his rivals in Herakleopolis and so, following Muhs’ (1998, 223) argument that the epithets distinguish dynastic affiliations, I see Pedubast (sḥḥ Bʾṣrt) as the first king of the northern Twenty-Third Dynasty (see n.118).
¹²² This may have been recognition of Shoshenq III’s senior tribal or hierarchical position (see discussion in 5.3), or giving the defeated faction someone to refer to without referencing Pedubast I’s direct rival Takeloth II.
7, pl.21: 7), and from the dating of KPA Texts 1 and 2 which are dated to Years 7 and 8 of Pedubast I with Text 2 also mentioning Horsiese (B) (Ritner 2009a, 48-49). The rebellion appears to have been ended through a conciliation agreement in Takeloth II’s Year 24 with Osorkon (B) leading an expedition to Thebes to provide offerings for Amun (CPO 2. 21: 11-20-22: 1-7; Ritner 2009a, 364-366).

In Takeloth II’s Year 25 (Shoshenq III’s Year 22), Osorkon (B) added a donation stela (Cairo JE 36159; Ritner 2009a, 379-380) for his daughter, Karoama, to the Karnak temple of ‘Osiris p3 dd ‘nh nb d.t’ (Ritner 2009a, 379). This is the last reference to Takeloth II with his death presumably occurring during this year. Despite his father’s death Osorkon (B) seems to have remained as HPA, making donations to the temple of Amun over the next few years (CPO 2. 22: 12-21; Ritner 2009a, 371-375). These were all dated to the regnal years of Shoshenq III. This can only be because Osorkon (B) did not acknowledge the king(s) who were ruling Upper Egypt at this point, Takeloth II’s successor, Iuput I, and Pedubast I, both of whom are known to have been ruling at the time from NLR No.26 (von Beckerath 1966, 47; Ritner 2009a, 38).\(^{123}\)

The settlement allowing the parallel reigns of Iuput I and Pedubast I, with Osorkon (B) as HPA, remained intact for several years, until Pedubast I’s Year 18 (Iuput I’s Year 4, Shoshenq III’s Year 25) when Horsiese (B) is again attested as HPA on NLR No.28 (von Beckerath 1966, 47; Ritner 2009a, 38), whilst in the CPO there appears to be a third ‘rebellion’ where Osorkon (B) was left ‘alone, so it happened that not one friend was (there with him?)’ (text in OIP 7, pl.22: 2). It appears that Horsiese (B) broke the agreement,

\(^{123}\) Which records, ‘the inundation in year 16 of the King of Upper and Lower Egypt Pedubast-meryamun, which is year 2 of the King of Upper and Lower Egypt Iuput-meryamun’ (text in Legrain 1896a, 114).
presumably with the support of Pedubast I, and Osorkon (B) lacked the support of Iuput I. While Horsiese (B) remained as HPA until Pedubast I’s Year 19 (NLR No.27; von Beckerath 1966, 47; Ritner 2009a, 38), he may have died by Pedubast I’s Year 21 (Iuput I’s Year 7 and Shoshenq III’s Year 28) when Osorkon (B) was again HPA as he was making donations to the temple of Amun in Shoshenq III’s Years 28 and 29 (CPO 2. 22: 17; 3: 22; Ritner 2009a, 3718-375). It is possible that it was at this point that the Oracular Text against Horsiese (B) was added to the Pylon III at Karnak (Dodson 2012, 122). In Pedubast I’s Year 23, his last attested year, Osorkon (B) appears to have been replaced as HPA again, by Takeloth (E), as recorded by NLR No.29 (von Beckerath 1966, 47; Ritner 2009a, 38), suggesting that Pedubast I continued to appoint alternatives as HPA.

On Pedubast I’s death in his Year 23 he was succeeded by Shoshenq VI, presumably a relative. His reign was short, however, with his highest known regnal date a Year 6 recorded in NLR No.25 with Takeloth (E) still as HPA (von Beckerath 1966, 47; Ritner 2009a, 39). Iuput I appears to have continued to rule throughout the transition to Shoshenq VI with his last known regnal year being a Year 12 (Jacquet-Gordon 2003, 85), corresponding to Shoshenq VI’s Year 3. Indeed, it would appear that both survived in place until the same point, Shoshenq III’s Year 39 (Iuput I’s Year 18 and Shoshenq VI’s Year 9) because in this year Osorkon (B) is HPA in NLR No.22 (von Beckerath 1966, 46; Ritner 2009a, 38). KPA No.7 (Ritner 2009a, 52-54) suggests that Osorkon (B) and his brother Bakenptah violently overthrew Shoshenq VI and the HPA Takeloth (E), neither of whom are subsequently attested. This may have occurred after the natural death of Iuput I as that would have allowed Osorkon (B) to carry out the expedition (Jansen-Winkeln 2006b, 252; Dodson 2012, 126-127).
In the north, meanwhile, Shoshenq III continued to rule uninterrupted, but with an increasingly reduced role. In his Year 22 a great chief of the Ma Hornakht replaced him as the intermediary between the beneficiary and the gods on a donation stela (Brooklyn Museum 67.118; Ritner 2009a, 386-388). A similar replacement occurs in a stela dedicated for the Apis Bull burial in Shoshenq III’s Year 28 (Pedubast I’s Year 21 and Iuput I’s Year 7), where the HPP Padiese acted as the intermediary with the gods (Louvre S. IM 3749; Ritner 2009a, 388-390). In Shoshenq III’s Year 31 there was also the first appearance of the western Delta chiefdom which would become increasingly important during the end of the Libyan period (Moscow I.1.a.5647; Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009b, 203-3).

Shoshenq III’s Year 39 is his last known year and he probably died during this year (c.793 BC), and was buried in the tomb he had constructed at Tanis, NRT V. Shoshenq IV, his successor, was probably one of his sons (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 218). He was an ephemeral king with little datable material from his reign, bar a donation stela from the western Delta dated to his Year 10 with the great chief of the Ma, Niumateped (A), again appearing in the lunette in the position of the king (Hermitage 5630; Ritner 2009a, 393-394). It is likely that he survived until a Year 13, but probably died during that year (c.789 BC) and was buried alongside his father in NRT V, identified by the remains of the canopic jars inscribed with his name (Dodson 1994, 93-94; Ritner 2009a, 392-393).

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124 Not only does Padiese replace the king in the stelae he dedicated at the Serapeum, as well as inducting the bull himself in a further usurpation of royal roles (Jurman 2009, 119), he is also depicted in the style and dress of a Libyan chief with his eldest son depicted as HPP behind him, reflecting Libyan attitudes to the importance of their Egyptian titles in relation to their Libyan ones.

125 Following the chronology established by Jansen-Winkeln (2006b, 244).
Shoshenq IV was succeeded by another son of Shoshenq III, Pamiu, who buried the Apis Bull (No. XXX) in his Year 2 that was the successor to the one buried in Year 28 of Shoshenq III’s reign. During his Years 3-7 Pamiu recorded a series of donations to the temple at Heliopolis in a set of annals inscribed on a wall at the temple (Ritner 2009a, 44-46). At some point early in his Year 8 (c.771 BC), Pamiu died and was buried at Tanis in NRT II, with his son Shoshenq V succeeding him. He buried an Apis Bull (No. XXXII) in his Year 11 (Porter and Moss III, 787) and there were further donation stelae set up by a succession of great chiefs of the Libyans from the western Delta: in Year 8 by Niumateped (B) (Ritner 2009a, 77-78) and in Year 15 by Titeru (Brooklyn Museum 67.119; Ritner 2009a, 407-408).

Meanwhile, in Upper Egypt, Osorkon (B) had finally become king as Osorkon III. To maintain his control in Thebes Osorkon III immediately appointed his son, Takeloth (G), as HPA, as demonstrated by his presence in the record of an exceptionally high flood in

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126 This relationship is known from a stela when Pamiu was still a great chief of the Ma (Cairo CG 9430; Ritner 2009a, 69). This has been challenged by Yoyotte (1988, 171-174) on the basis of inaccurate copying of the text, arguing that it refers to a member of a dynasty at Herakleopolis (1988, 173), but I follow Ritner who argues that the traces on the original stela support the original translation (Ritner 2009a, 69).

127 With a stela (Louvre IM 3697, Cat. No.22; Ritner 2009a, 394-396) donated by the same HPP Padiese who donated one at the Apis Bull burial in Shoshenq III’s Year 28, showing that these two dates cannot be that far away in time. Padiese again subordinates his role as HPP to his son depicting himself in Libyan style with hair, the Meshwesh feather and titles associated with his position in the Libyan hierarchy (Ritner 2009a, 394-395).

128 This relationship is clear from a stela from the Serapeum which explicitly names Pamiu as Shoshenq V’s father (Louvre Stela IM 3049; Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009b, 280-281).

129 This is disputed as it would give Osorkon (B)/III a very long life c.75-80 years depending on how long before his father Takeloth II’s reign started he was born (Kitchen 2009, 184-185). Despite this I have followed Baer’s (1973, 18) proposal, subsequently affirmed by Leahy (1990, 192), Jansen-Winkeln (2006b, 243), and Dodson (2012, 127) that they are the same person. Although the evidence is not conclusive, the use of the title HPA by Osorkon III at Akoris (Ritner 2009a, 421-423) strongly suggests that they are the same person, particularly as Osorkon III is the only king currently known to hold the title HPA in the Twenty-Second/Twenty-Third Dynasty (Jansen-Winkeln 2006b, 243).
Osorkon III’s Year 3 (NLR No.5; von Beckerath 1966, 44-45; Ritner 2009a, 39). Also at the start of Osorkon III’s reign was the appointment of Shepenwepet I as GWA.

A few years after the accession of Shoshenq V in the north, in Osorkon III’s Year 24 (Shoshenq V’s Year 2), Osorkon III made his son Takeloth (G) co-regent as Takeloth III, appointing Osorkon (F) as HPA. During the period of this co-regency the chapel of Osiris-ḥq3-ḥt at Karnak was constructed and decorated with depictions of both kings as well as the GWA Shepenwepet I. In Osorkon III’s Year 28 there was another very high flood, recorded on NLR No.13 with the regnal years of both Osorkon III and Takeloth III (Year 5; von Beckerath 1966, 45; Ritner 2009a, 39-40). This was Osorkon III’s last year (c.765 BC) with Takeloth III becoming sole ruler on his death, as is evident from NLR No.4 which is only dated to Takeloth III’s Year 6 (von Beckerath 1966, 44; Ritner 2009a, 40).

Takeloth III’s reign is poorly attested despite his last known year being a Year 13 (Shoshenq V’s Year 17) from a donation stela at the Dakhla Oasis (Kaper and Demarée 2005, 22-32; Kaper 2009, 150). His death was probably within this year and his burial is also unknown (although probably close to Osorkon III’s burial). He was succeeded by his

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130 This led to a unique graffito being left on the walls of the temple of Luxor reproving Amun for allowing such a disastrous inundation to have occurred, which flooded the temple at Luxor and the city of Thebes, despite the required temple construction and rituals having taken place (Ritner 2009a, 415-420).

131 Ritner dates NLR No.14 with a Year 29 to Osorkon III (2009a, 40); I have not added this year to Osorkon III’s reign, as this year would have been Takeloth III’s Year 6 which is known from another NLR (see above) and it is very unlikely that two separate records at different heights would be recorded for the same flood.

132 Osorkon III’s burial location is unknown, but it could have been within the temple enclosure at Medinet Habu where Horsiese (A)’s burial was found and where the GWA were buried (Dodson 2012, 132), or at Herakleopolis in the large Libyan Period cemetery there (Sagrillo 2009, 348). The mentions of a tomb of a king Osorkon on the west bank at Thebes in a number of later papyri has led to an acceptance that his tomb was located there (Aston 2014, 21).

133 It has, however, recently been suggested that he may have been buried at Abydos, as a result of evidence for posthumous references to that king there (Payraudeau 2007, 1478-1480). On the basis that this could also be references to the presence of a chapel built by the same king rather than necessarily his tomb I have not adopted it here.
brother Rudamon who is known from a series of items from Hermopolis,\textsuperscript{134} including a statue (Perdu 2002a, 169),\textsuperscript{135} and his cartouches were painted onto the walls of room 3 of the chapel of Osiris-\textit{hq3-dt} at Karnak (Ritner 2009a, 427-428). It is possible that the Year 3 in NLR No.43 should be dated to his reign (Broekman 2002, 177-178), but his reign was clearly not long. Taking the possible Year 3 as his last year, he was then succeeded by Shoshenq VIa. Another poorly attested king, his only known regnal year is a Year 5 (Shoshenq V’s Year 25) from NLR No.3 (Broekman 2002, 176-177).

2.5.3 Political, social, economic, and environmental commentary

From the appearance of Takeloth II towards the end of the Osorkon II’s reign there was increasing political fragmentation throughout this period. Takeloth II’s reign itself was punctuated by a series of rebellions which resulted in a new line of kings appearing at Thebes, whilst Takeloth II continued to rule from Herakleopolis/el-Hibeh and the Twenty-Second Dynasty from Tanis. As the period progressed other local rulers also began to adopt royal attributes, and appear to have considered themselves increasingly independent of the various kings, with monuments such as donation stelae often omitting the name of any of the kings; on some, local rulers replaced the king. The chronology becomes increasingly

\textsuperscript{134} The order of succession following Takeloth III is unclear and it is possible he was succeeded by Shoshenq VIa, followed by Rudamon, as suggested by Broekman (2002, 178). I have followed Aston’s (2009a, 24) suggestion that Rudamon succeeded Takeloth III rather than any of that king’s known sons as they were too young to take the throne, thus explaining why they survive into the last quarter of the eighth century BC.

\textsuperscript{135} The concentration has led to a proposal that on Takeloth III’s death he formed a sub-kingdom based at Hermopolis (Jansen-Winkeln 2006b, 256) which became the one ruled by Nimlot (D) on Piye’s victory stela (Cairo JE 48862; 47086; 47089). As Broekman (2009, 96-97) notes, if Rudamon had only been ruling from Hermopolis then the presence of his cartouches in the chapel at Karnak is difficult to understand. As a result I agree with Perdu’s (2002a, 170) assessment that Rudamon was simply maintaining the interest that his father Osorkon III had shown in the city.
complicated as a result, with a large number of kings often only attested on isolated blocks or single objects making it very difficult to create a coherent picture of how the state was structured during this period. As a result the number of important centres gradually increases as this period continues, with Tanis, Thebes, and Herakleopolis/el-Hibeh joined by sites in the western Delta and Hermopolis.

This diffusion of political power amongst the wider elite was accompanied by increasing ‘Libyan’ influence on Egyptian society, although this is more apparent in the north than the south. Important officials increasingly had names of Libyan origin, held non-Egyptian titles, especially ‘great chief of the Ma’, and were depicted in Libyan dress. Positions within Egyptian institutions became inherited fiefdoms of the main local families with their inheritance recorded in surviving genealogical records. Significantly, Osorkon III reintroduced the dormant position of GWA for his daughter, and by giving her much of the responsibilities of the HPA seemingly placed her in control of the Theban region. Archaistic tendencies also became increasingly visible as this period continued, particularly in the use of older royal names.

Despite there being very limited evidence for monumental construction during this period, some small works appear to have continued across Egypt with evidence coming from both Thebes and Tanis (amongst other locations). There is, however, no evidence for activity at any of the main quarrying sites. Moreover, monumental tomb construction of the scale of the New Kingdom by either members of the royal family or the wider elite is largely absent. The records of the large donations made by Prince Osorkon (B) in the Chronicle of Prince Osorkon and by several Twenty-Second Dynasty kings at Heliopolis, however, indicate that there remained considerable wealth available to the kings in both the north and south of the
country. NLR from the Karnak quay continue to give some indication of the environmental conditions, at least of the annual flood levels. The graffito from Luxor temple about the very high flood in Osorkon III’s Year 3 also helps to indicate what height of flood should be considered exceptional, with the NLR of this flood (No.13; von Beckerath 1966, 45; Ritner 2009a, 39-40) being the second-highest inscription. The continued use of the quay to mark NLR shows that the conditions, or at least the depths of the annual floods, continued to be about the same as those in the earlier part of the Twenty-Second Dynasty.

2.6 The end of the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Dynasties, and the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Dynasties (c.746-656 BC)

2.6.1 Outline of the evidence for the period

The evidence for this period is relatively geographically widespread, but much of it is very limited in nature which does little to clarify the exact nature of the period. There continued to be rulers attested by only single objects or inscriptions, often without regnal years. This is further complicated by the increasing use of older titulary, some of it used earlier within the Third Intermediate Period, making it difficult to distinguish in the evidence for some kings whether a title indicates a single ruler, or several rulers making use of the same names.

From Egypt, the categories of evidence largely remain the same, until the appearance of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty. There are funerary remains from various sites across Egypt, including Thebes, Herakleopolis, and Tanis, supplemented by minor monumental remains and stelae. An important source of information throughout the whole of this period continues to be the Serapeum burials. Other important records such as the KPA and the NLR
also continue, although these are concentrated in the south. In the north there is increasing evidence for activity from the western Delta.

The evidence from Egypt is gradually supplemented by that from Nubia, as the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty increasingly took control of Egypt. Unfortunately, however, the evidence for how the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty came into existence, where they originated from, and the process by which they secured Nubia and ultimately Egypt is affected by a lack of early evidence and the subsequent destruction of many of the key Twenty-Fifth Dynasty sites by Psamtik II during the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty. Following the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s takeover of Upper Egypt several forms of evidence which had been absent from the preceding periods reappear, in particular monumental tombs on the west bank at Thebes. There is also relatively widespread evidence for monumental construction, including royal tombs, but much of this is concentrated in Nubia and is fragmentary in nature; the royal tombs have limited or no inscriptional content and all have been robbed in the past. Egypt also increasingly appears in the records of other, contemporaneous civilisations during this period, especially those of the Neo-Assyrian Empire. These records often form the only record of some of the key events that occurred towards the end of this period, especially the invasions of Egypt by the Neo-Assyrians, making it difficult to determine their accuracy.

2.6.2 Chronology of events from the end of the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Dynasties, and the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Dynasties

In the north, during Shoshenq V’s Year 20 another king, Pedubast II (sA B3tt), appeared. Pedubast II was the first king of the Bubastite Twenty-Third Dynasty, and is attested at
Memphis in a Year 6 (Cairo JE 45530; Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009b, 209-12). Shoshenq V celebrated a Heb-Sed jubilee in his Year 30 as remains of a jubilee gateway or chapel have been found at Tanis (Kitchen 1986, 315), added to the temple he had constructed there. In his Year 37 he buried an Apis Bull (No. XXXIII) at Saqqara (Dodson 2012, 136). The last years of his reign saw the further rise in power of the great chiefs of the Ma from the western Delta. The great chief of the Ma and chief of the Libu, Tefnakhte, set up a series of donation stelae dated to Shoshenq V’s reign, in his Year 36 (Abemayor Stela; Ritner 2009a, 436-437) and in his Year 38 (Ritner 2009a, 437-438), but with blank cartouches instead of Shoshenq V’s names. This loss of control by Shoshenq V towards the end of his reign is also emphasised by the appearance of another new king, Iuput II, at Leontopolis. Year 38 is the last attested year of Shoshenq V and his death may have occurred during that year (c.732 BC), with his burial either in NRT I or NRT VII (Dodson 2012, 136), thus ending the Twenty-Second Dynasty.

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136 This organisation follows Kahn (2006a, 21-40), who proposed that this Pedubast II was different from Pedubast I (s3 s3t), contra Jansen-Winkeln (2006b, 250-252) and Muhs (1998, 223). It also follows von Beckerath (1995, 9-13) by having Pedubast II (s3 B3stt) also precede Sehetepibra Pedubast in the chronological order. This still, ultimately, follows Leahy’s (1990, 188) proposal that a Pedubast should be placed in the chronology at this point, following Manetho’s order of the Twenty-Third Dynasty.

137 Indeed, in the stela dated to Shoshenq V’s Year 38, Tefnakhte refers to himself as ‘great chief of the entire land’ (line 3; text in Yoyotte 1961, 48) and ‘ruler of the nomes of the West’ (line 4; text in Yoyotte 1961, 49).

138 It has been suggested that he should be considered the successor of Shoshenq V, following his use of the s3 B3stt epithet which appears to show a connection with the Twenty-Second Dynasty (Muhs 1998, 223). There is no recorded evidence of Iuput II mentioning a relationship with Shoshenq V and, other than Leontopolis, he is attested only at Buto on some bracelets (Hartung el al. 2009, 98), whilst Shoshenq V was definitely buried at Tanis as funerary equipment was found there (Dodson 2012, 136) so I have not followed Muhs’ (1998, 223) proposal.

139 This date is based on the assumption that the Apis Bull was twenty years old when it was buried by Bakenrenef in his Year 6 (approximately c.712 BC; Kitchen 2006, 301) right before his removal by Shabataka (see n.153; n.154). Whilst this is older than some suggestions for the age of this bull (see Banyai 2013, 91; Payraudeau 2014a, 126) it is well within the its possible lifetime as the previous bull had been installed in Shoshenq V’s Year 11 and thus must have survived for around 27 years, and another from the reign of Taharqa also lasted for over twenty years. Having the bull this old also does not preclude there being a missing burial in
There is little datable evidence for the years following Shoshenq V’s death with Peftjauawybast (A) attested in a donation stela dated to his Year 10 (Cairo JE 45948; Ritner 2009a, 424-426) (Pedubast II’s Year 19). After this the next key date is Pedubast II’s death during his Year 23 (c.728 BC), his last attested year (Florence 7207; Ritner 2009a, 414), and his succession by Osorkon IV (Dodson 2012, 150).

Turning to Upper Egypt, following Shoshenq VIa’s death it is likely that control of the Theban region passed to a new dynasty, the Twenty-Fifth, emerging from Nubia, with king Kashta having his daughter Amenirdis I adopted by Shepenwepet I as her successor as GWA (Morkot 2000, 158). Kashta’s control over the area is suggested by the remains of a stela at Elephantine (Cairo JE 41013; Ritner 2009a, 459-460), a bronze aegis supposedly found at between these two dates and thus the bulls living much shorter lives as Payraudeau (2014a, 126-127) has in his reconstruction.

140 The origins of the family that became the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty are still unclear and the cause of some dispute amongst scholars. Although not necessary for the above history, I consider the suggestion that local elites of Upper Nubia were the origins of the later dynasty, particularly from the area around Kerma, as proposed by Dixon (1964, 130) and Morkot (2000, 135-136), or el-Kurru as suggested by Török (2009, 305; Smith 2013, 96-97), the most probable solution. I also accept that the formation of the Napatan state was a violent process, as emphasised by Darnell (2006, 62-63) in his understanding of the inscription of Queen Katimala at Semna where she overcomes the enemy ‘Makaresh’ (Darnell 2006, 41) after fighting in the ‘mountains of gold’ (Darnell 2006, 26). Her kingdom was possibly the precursor or, at least, the model for the later Napatan dynasty, particularly its devotion to Amun (Morkot 2000, 153) and ascribing victory to strict adherence to that god (Darnell 2006, 63). This belief may explain Piye’s insistence that his army purify itself before it could enter the temple of Amun at Karnak on its way north to fight Tefnakhte (Ritner 2009a, 479: 13-15). Darnell’s (2006, 48) re-examination of Queen Katimala’s inscription also suggests the process behind the development of the Napatan state began much earlier than previously argued, dating her inscription to the Twenty-First Dynasty or early Twenty-Second Dynasty, thus reinforcing the idea that it was the local elites of Upper Nubia, egyptianised to a greater or lesser extent, who were behind the formation of the Nubian state (Török 2009, 305; Smith 2013, 100).

141 I accept Morkot’s (2000, 158) argument that as all other GWA’s were installed by their fathers it is likely that Kashta did so for Amenirdis I, particularly as she makes no reference to Piye on her surviving monuments and there is some evidence for Kashta’s control of Upper Egypt, despite some scholars’ arguments to the contrary (Banyai 2013, 93). This interpretation is also supported by the re-interpretation of the reliefs from the temple of Mut (Broekman 2012a, 250-251), with the recognition that there is not a Year 5 date in the text, as demonstrated by Perdu (2010, 151-156), and that the original reliefs, therefore, do not show the adoption of Amenirdis as originally interpreted by Broekman (2009, 101).
Thebes, and the fact that KPA No.31 was dated to his Year 1 (Ritner 2009a, 60). It is unclear if this was the year that Kashta adopted full royal style or was simply his first year of rule, but by Shoshenq V’s Year 25 (c.746 BC) he had been succeeded by his son Piye and had been buried in either K.8 or K.1 at el-Kurru.142

Following his accession, Piye led several campaigns to re-affirm Nubian control over Upper Egypt and perhaps to extend it further into Middle Egypt, suggested by two stelae from the temple of Amun at Gebel Barkal. The first, from Piye’s Year 3 (Shoshenq V’s Year 28), has Piye stating that he is the one who appoints chiefs and kings whilst he was appointed by Amun of Thebes (Gebel Barkal No.26: 18-20; Ritner 2009a, 461-464). The second text, from Nos.29 and 30 dated to Years 3 and 4 (Ritner 2009a, 464-465), specifically mentions Piye’s army stopping at Thebes to celebrate the Opet festival before heading north against the ‘armies of the Northland’ (Berlin Fragment 1068; text in Priese 1970, 28-30). It is possible that during these campaigns Nubian control over Hermopolis and Herakleopolis was established with Piye confirming Nimlot (D) and Peftjauawybast (A) respectively as rulers over them.143

Piye’s victory stela at Gebel Barkal (Cairo JE 48862, 47086, 47089; Grimal 1981), dated to his Year 21 (c.726 BC), records a campaign that took place the previous year to counter Tefnakhte’s attempt to secure control over the rest the country, which may have

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142 This is based on the relative chronology of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty back from the accession of Taharqa in 690 BC, created using the highest known regnal years of the various kings combined with the various synchronisms with the Neo-Assyrian chronology such as the Tang-i-Var inscription. With such limited information about Kashta it is currently impossible to locate him more accurately than through such calculations.

143 I do not accept Morkot and James’ (2009, 27-44) suggestion that this Peftjauawybast (A) is to be identified with the one who was HPP under Shoshenq III, as this has been demonstrated to be inaccurate (Broekman 2011a, 75). His connection to Rudamon through his wife, identified as Rudamon’s daughter on Berlin Coffin Plank 2100, emphasises that he should be located close in time to that king.
been precipitated by Pedubast II’s death. This stela records the divided nature of Egypt at the end of the Libyan Period providing a chronological fixed point of the various kings across Egypt. The stela has Nimlot (D) as ruler of Hermopolis, Peftjauawybast (A) at Herakleopolis, Iuput II at Leontopolis, Tefnakhte at Sais and Memphis, and Osorkon IV at Bubastis, along with a series of great chiefs and chiefs of the Ma and Libu (Grimal 1981, 2-3).

With this campaign Piye not only defeated Tefnakhte, halting his expansion southwards, but also, albeit briefly, had himself acknowledged as ruler of Egypt. Following this victory Piye withdrew south back to Nubia, stopping at Thebes to have his daughter Shepenwepet II adopted by Amenirdis I as her heir as GWA. This created a power vacuum in the north, allowing Tefnakhte to adopt royal style and perhaps re-establish his control over much of the Delta, demonstrated by a donation stela from the eastern Delta (the Michailides stela, Ritner 2009a, 441-442). The extension of the control of the western Delta over the north may also be reflected by the disappearance of some of the dynasts mentioned in the Piye stela, with the Michailides stela coming from an area recorded as being under the control of the great chief Patchenfy, and the lack of evidence for a successor to Iuput II (Dodson 2012, 150; Spencer P. and Spencer A. 1986, 199-201) after his death in

144 This is despite Amenirdis I probably not yet inheriting the position from Shepenwepet I at this time. The adoption may also have occurred on Piye’s campaign north (Morkot 2000, 185). However, the identification of the boat procession on the ‘Piankhy Blocks’ as the procession bringing Amenirdis I to Thebes, apparently confirmed by the presence of a Year 5 (Broekman 2009, 101) has been conclusively disproved by Perdu as a misreading of the sign for hnsw (2010, 155-156), which has been accepted by Broekman (2012a, 250-251). This leaves it unclear as to when Shepenwepet II’s adoption actually took place and thus the most probable occasion is during Piye’s northern campaign (see n.141).

145 This stela, and another (the Athens Stela) naming a king Shepesre Tefnakhte, have been suggested as naming Tefnakhte II (Baer 1973, 23-4; Perdu 2002b, 1215-1233; 1242-1243), the possible ancestor of the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty (Ryholt 2011, 123-127). It seems unlikely that a ruler of Sais would adopt royal style following his predecessor Bakenrenef’s probable execution by Shabataka, and Kahn (1999, 123-125; 2009, 139-148) has demonstrated that the evidence is strongly in favour of identifying king Shepesre Tefnakhte with the ‘great chief of the entire land’ Tefnakhte after Piye’s withdrawal southwards.
his Year 21 (Geneva Inv. No. 23473; Ritner 2009a, 432-434).\(^ {146}\) Despite this expansion of power by the rulers of the western delta following Piye’s withdrawal it appears that Osorkon IV should still be identified at the ‘So King of Egypt’ whom Hosea asked for help against Shalmaneser V in c.725 BC (II Kings 17.4; Dodson 2012, 151). Later, Osorkon IV sent troops under a general Re’e to assist the latest coalition against the Assyrians under Sargon II, but they were defeated at the battle of Raphia (Onasch 1994, 6). The next campaign of Sargon II in c.716 BC reached as far as the eastern borders of Egypt, with reference to the ‘city of the Brook-of-Egypt’ (Morkot 2000, 128), after which the Assyrians recorded a tribute of horses by an Egyptian ruler, ‘Shilkanni’, probably Osorkon IV again (Onasch 1994, 7). This is the last possible mention of Osorkon IV and it may be at this point that he was succeeded by the two ephemeral kings known from Tanis, Sankhtawy Sekhemkare and Gemeneefkhonsbak (Aston 2009a, 23).

In the south, Nimlot (D) was succeeded by Thutemhat, a succession suggested by his two known monuments where he is strongly connected with Hermopolis and Thoth (Spencer P. and Spencer A. 1986, 199).\(^ {147}\) Piye maintained his control over the area, with the smaller Dakhla stela dated to his Year 24 (Ashmolean Museum 1894. 107B; Ritner 2009a, 492-494), but the lack of Piye’s presence in Upper Egypt allowed the Upper Egyptian kings to re-establish themselves with a King Iny,\(^ {148}\) probably a successor to Thutemhat, appearing in...

\(^ {146}\) This is the highest attested date of Iuput II and whilst it is his only known date, as with other kings, I have taken this as his final year. The extremely limited evidence for Iuput II means that it is currently impossible to determine whether he ruled longer, and the lack of evidence for any possible successors at Leontopolis further hampers any possible conclusions about Iuput II’s reign length.

\(^ {147}\) Following Aston (2009a, 20), although I have not followed his suggestion that they are the successors to Peftjauawybast (A) as Nimlot (D) is clearly his contemporary and there is, as yet, no evidence of Thutemhat at Herakleopolis.

\(^ {148}\) Although originally placed around Osorkon III in the chronology of the later Libyan Period (Kitchen 1986, 98), it has been conclusively shown by Yoyotte (1989, 116) that Iny belongs after that king, indeed after Rudamon,
Piye’s Year 25 (Tefnakhte’s Year 5 and Osorkon IV’s Year 7). In Nubia Piye carried out large construction work at the temples of Amun at Gebel Barkal, including moving a series of sculptures from Amenhotep III’s temple at Soleb to be placed in the forecourt of the main temple (Morkot 2000, 197).

At Sais Tefnakhte recorded a Year 8 (c.718 BC) on a donation stela (Ritner 2009a, 439-441), his last attested year. During this year he was probably succeeded as king by Bakenrenef, whom Manetho (fr. 64-65) records as the only king of the Twenty-Fourth Dynasty. Bakenrenef continued to expand the control of the Saite dynasty with his name possibly identified on a block from Tanis (Kaper 2009, 148).

Piye’s last attested year, a Year 30 recorded on a piece of votive linen from Thebes (BM EA6640; Baer 1973, 7; Kitchen 1986, 379 n.732), which was two years after the probable date of Tefnakhte’s death.149 During this year or, more likely, early in his Year 31 he died and was buried in his tomb at el-Kurru (Ku.17) to be succeeded by Shabataka.150

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149 It has been suggested that it could instead read Year 40 as stated by Baer (1973, 7), but this has been rejected with further examinations of the linen which reveal a trace, accepted as another ‘10’ sign, after the visible two ‘10’ signs and then simply blank space (Kitchen 1986, 370 n.732; Parkinson 1999, 97).

150 The reversal of Shabataka and Shabaka has recently been proposed by Banyai (2013, 51-86), and subsequently supported, albeit with reservations concerning the rest of Banyai’s proposals, by Payraudeau (2014a, 115-127) and Broekman (2015, 17-30). Following these assessments of the various elements of the evidence supporting the reversal of the two kings, which resolve a number of existing issues in the current evidence, particularly regarding the Tang-i-Var inscription, I have adopted this revision to the chronology here. This reversion, however, leaves some issues regarding the relationship between the various kings and so it is unclear whether Shabataka was a son or brother of Piye. Manetho (fr. 67) also records that the third king, Sebichos, was the son of the second, Sabakon. This, however, is unlikely to have been the case as there is considerable evidence that Shabaka was the brother of Piye (see n.156), and Shabataka cannot have been the son of Shabaka now that he preceded him. It is probable that Shabataka was a son of Piye (Kitchen 1986, 150; Broekman 2015, 30), but it cannot be definitively ruled out that he was another son of Kashta and thus Piye’s brother.
Possibly taking advantage of the change of ruler in Nubia, Iny expanded his control from Hermopolis to Thebes, demonstrated by a graffito, number 11, on the roof of the temple of Khonsu which records his Year 5 rather than Shabataka’s regnal year (Yoyotte 1989, 115; Ritner 2009a, 63).

This may have been the action that prompted Shabataka to move north in his Year 2/3, as most of Iny’s monuments (Louvre C.100 and Cairo CG 18948; Yoyotte 1989, 117-122) have his name and figure chiselled out signalling official disapproval of him.\footnote{It has been suggested on the basis of this, and his unusual epithets ‘creator of the arts’ and ‘multiplier of gallant warriors’ (Yoyotte 1989, 127-130) that Iny was either a ‘rebel king’ in Thebes during the rule of Osorkon III’s family line (Takeloth III etc.) or was a later ruler who attempted to resist the Napatan conquest of Egypt (Yoyotte 1989, 131). The latter explanation has been preferred here as a result of the similarities between some of Iny’s titulary and those of Osorkon III and his sons (Yoyotte 1989, 125).} That Shabataka was not in control of Egypt in these first years of his reign is suggested by the Tang-i-Var inscription, as in it he was recorded by Sargon II as the ruler of Meluhha and not of Musri (Egypt) (Frame 1999, 40: 19).\footnote{This inscription recorded another coalition that had formed against the Assyrians in c.712 BC led by a new king of Ashod, Yamani, who appealed to a king of Egypt for help. When Sargon sent an army to restore order Yamani fled to Shabataka for asylum.} Thus, Shabataka is unlikely to have been ruler of any of Egypt prior to this date (Broekman 2015, 24) and as the first, and only, regnal date known from his reign is a Year 3 in NLR No.33 it seems probable that this should date to around the period of his re-conquest of Egypt.\footnote{In particular this makes sense of Shabataka’s emphasis of his Theban coronation which also appears to have taken place in his Year 3 and thus is probably the year that Shabataka re-established control over at least Upper Egypt and ultimately over the rest of the country (Payraudeau 2014a, 125-126).}

Further north, in his Year 6 Bakenrenef oversaw the burial of an Apis Bull, No. XXXV (Louvre stelae IM 1258 Cat. No. 91; IM 2704 Cat No. 92; IM 3424 Cat. No. 93; IM 2680 Cat. No. 97; IM 3592 Cat. No. 101; Ritner 2009a, 444-447), but at this point Shabataka’s campaign...
reached the north.\textsuperscript{154} Manetho (fr. 66) records that Shabaka (now Shabataka) burnt Bakenrenef alive and the sudden disappearance of that king, previously relatively well attested, is certainly suggestive of his sudden removal.

Shabataka’s reign is poorly attested, apart from a possible Apis Bull burial in his Year 4 (Dodson 2012, 159), some construction at Memphis, and through the construction of an outer courtyard of the chapel of Osiris-\textit{hqa3-dt} and another chapel at Karnak (Berlin 1480; Ritner 2009a, 501-505). Possibly also in his Year 4, Shabataka appears to have called members of his family, including Prince Taharqa, and troops north (Merowe Museum No. 52: 12-15 [Kawa IV]; Ritner 2009a, 535-539), whether for his conquest of Lower Egypt or for activities in the Levant is unclear (Pope 2014, 148-149; Broekman 2015, 29-30).

In the Tang-i-Var carving dated to c.706 BC,\textsuperscript{155} Sargon II records that Shabataka returned Yamani in chains (Frame 1999, 40: 20-21), suggesting that Shabataka handed over the exile to reset Assyrian-Egyptian relations, perhaps following his takeover of Lower Egypt. This may well have been one of the last acts of Shabataka with his death probably occurring in the following year (c.705) and his burial at el-Kurru (Ku.18). He was succeeded by Shabaka, who was a brother of Piye.\textsuperscript{156} Sargon II’s death in c.705 BC and the rebellions that followed

\textsuperscript{154} The argument that this is marked by a graffito dated to Shabaka’s Year 2 is based on a misreading by Vercoutter and thus cannot be used as a fixed point in the chronology of the period (Payraudeau 2014a, 119), and whilst it is still probable that a Kushite king removed Bakenrenef in his Year 6 that king does not have to be Shabaka, nor in that king’s Year 2.

\textsuperscript{155} In this dating I follow Jansen-Winkeln (2006b, 259-261) and Dodson (2012, 157) who argue that whilst this is the date of the inscription, not the events, any gap between the two is likely to have been short. I also do not accept that there was a co-regency between Shabaka and Shabataka, as suggested by Yurco (1991, 45), following Dodson (2012, 157) and Kahn (2007, 291), because, as Morkot (2000, 224) notes, ‘there is no clear evidence to support the idea’.

\textsuperscript{156} Shabaka is known to be a son of Kashta, like Piye, as Amenirdis I refers to him as her brother on a block from the chapel of Osiris-\textit{nh sMh} at Karnak (Dodson 2012, 145; Payraudeau 2014a, 117-118; Broekman 2015, 30) and thus is probably at least a half-brother of Piye. This is not considered definitive by some scholars (Broekman 2015, 30-31) and so it is possible he should be regarded as the son of Shabataka thus preserving the description
may well have changed the assessment of Shabaka from that of his predecessor, leading to
greater Egypto-Kushite involvement in the Levant. In his first years Shabaka may also have
had to campaign in the north, as his later construction projects at Karnak were recorded as
being funded by a campaign there (Ritner 2009a, 498). Certainly Shabaka seems to have had
direct control over parts of the Delta for at least a short period with two donation stelae
from Buto dated to his Year 4 and his Year 6 (Moscow Pushkin Museum I.1.a.54646 - Jansen-
Winkel 2007-2009c, 29; MMA 55.144.6 - Ritner 2009a, 497-498).

In c.701 BC, Shabaka’s Year 5, Sennacherib launched a campaign against the
rebellious states in the Levant, led by Padi of Ekron and Hezekiah of Judah (Chicago/Taylor
Prism). Shabaka sent Nubian and Egyptian troops along with Prince Taharqa to assist this
collection, but at the battle of Eltekeh the coalition was defeated and the Egypto-Kushite
army withdrew south (Onasch 1994, 12). Also during Shabaka’s reign, prior to his Year 12,
Shepenwepet I died and was buried in a tomb in the enclosure of the temple at Medinet
Habu, being succeeded by Amenirdis I as GWA as recorded in the Wadi Hammamat graffito
from Shabaka’s Year 12. Shabaka carried out relatively extensive building works throughout
his reign with a chapel constructed at Memphis, restoration of Pylon IV and the construction
of a colonnade north of the hypostyle hall at Karnak, work at Luxor, Pylon II of the small
temple at Medinet Habu, and at temple B at Kawa, as well as chapels at Abydos, Esna and

recorded in Manetho (Banyai 2013, 78-83), although again this is rejected by others (Payraudeau 2014a, 117). The structure of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s succession process is still disputed, as the relationship between Shabataka and Piye is currently unknown and, following the reversal of Shabaka and Shabataka, Shabaka was apparently succeeded by his nephew Taharqa.

157 Following Kitchen (1986, 386 n.823), Morkot (2000, 211) and Dodson (2012, 158-159), I argue that there was only one campaign in the west by Sennacherib and that the title ‘King of Kush’ given to Taharqa merely reflects that at the time the biblical account in Isaiah (37:36) was written Taharqa was king of Egypt, as there is no evidence to suggest a second campaign by either side.

158 The restoration is recorded as being directly funded by Shabaka’s re-conquest of the north (Ritner 2009a, 498).
Edfu, and possibly one at Dendera (Dodson 2012, 155; Arnold 1999, 316). Shabaka was also responsible for the dedication of the ‘Memphite Theology’ (BM EA 498; Lichtheim 1973, 51-57; Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009, 2). Shabaka is attested on a block statue dated to his Year 15 (BM EA 24429; Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009c, 30), but as Taharqa’s accession is known to have taken place this year (690 BC), it is unlikely that he survived the year and was buried in the cemetery at el-Kurru (Ku.15).

His successor, Taharqa, is believed to be the son of Piye as Shepenwepet II calls him her brother (Cairo JE 36327; Ritner 2009a, 575-582) and his accession in 690 BC is the first secure date in the absolute chronology. In his Year 1 he began the restoration of the temple of Gematon and the construction of temple T at Kawa. For the next 10 years Taharqa recorded donations to the temple (Kawa III [Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek AEIN 1707; Ritner 2009a, 527-535] and VI [Meroe Museum 53; Ritner 2009a, 545-553]). These donations included the ‘maidservants from among the wives of the chiefs of Lower Egypt’ (Kawa VI [Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek AEIN 1707] line 22; text in Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009c, 140) in his Year 8 which, combined with the representation of Taharqa as a sphinx crushing Libyan enemies on the rear wall of the First Court in a copy of a Sixth Dynasty precursor, emphasised the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s dominance over the remaining Libyan rulers (Ritner 2009a, 524-527).

Taharqa also carried out a range of construction work across Egypt, completing the Medinet Habu works of Shabaka, adding a colonnade before Pylon II, the ‘Edifice of Taharqa’ at Karnak, rebuilding the temple at Athribis, and a range of smaller projects at Tanis,

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159 This is because his reign length can be calculated accurately on the basis of the evidence from the Apis Bull burials to 26 years allowing scholars to work back from the death of Psamtik II to produce the date of 690 BC (Kitchen 1986, 161-163; Depuydt 2006, 468-469), along with establishing a day-exact chronology for Psamtik II’s death using Ptolemy’s Royal Canon, Serapeum stelae and the cuneiform record (Depuydt 2006, 464-467).
Memphis, Hermopolis, and Akhmin (Dodson 2012, 163). This construction work may have been funded by an exceptionally good harvest after the inundation recorded in Taharqa’s Year 6 (NLR Nos.34 and 35; von Beckerath 1966, 47-48; Ritner 2009a, 41), the highest flood recorded at Karnak.\textsuperscript{160} The early part of his reign saw the succession of Shepenwepet II as GWA and Amenirdis I’s burial next to Shepenwepet I at Medinet Habu with Taharqa installing his daughter Amenirdis II as the successor to Shepenwepet II as GWA. Taharqa also appointed new second and fourth prophets of Amun, the latter of whom was also the ‘mayor’ of Thebes Montuemhat.\textsuperscript{161}

The later years of Taharqa’s reign saw a gradual escalation of the conflict with Assyria, possibly as a result of the former’s increased involvement in the Levant (Kahn 2001, 11-12) following the murder of Sennacherib in 681 BC (Taharqa’s Year 10) and the civil war that followed (Leichty 2011, 6: 34-38). In 679 BC Esarhaddon marched through the Levant to the ‘Brook-of-Egypt’ where Tiglathpileser III had set up a statue (Pritchard 1969, 290: 2-11 obverse). Only two years later Esarhaddon had to make another campaign to the Levant to end a rebellion by king of Sidon (Grayson 1975, 83: 4) securing Assyrian control over the region.

\textsuperscript{160} The great advantages of this flood were recorded in a series of stelae set up across Egypt at Kawa (Kawa V [Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek AEIN 1712]), Coptos (Cairo JE 48440), Mataana (Cairo JE 38269) and Tanis (see Ritner 2009a, 539-545).

\textsuperscript{161} Under the Kushite kings there was a reintroduction of the tradition of the king appointing officials to their positions, with the appearance of new officials unrelated to the families who had previously held them, for example Kelbasken as fourth prophet of Amun and ‘mayor’ of Thebes (Morkot 2000, 237), breaking the hereditary hold on key offices particularly at Thebes (the family of Nakhtefmut in Kelbasken’s case). Kelbasken’s successor Montuemhat was also unrelated to him and appears to have lost the title of vizier when appointed (Morkot 2000, 237). In the Delta, however, Libyan dynasts continued to persist throughout the Kushite Period undermining the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s control over the country. Indeed, it appears that the Saite dynasty were able to re-establish themselves at Sais during Taharqa’s reign, or even earlier, with a Tefnakhte II believed to have ruled there before the attested Nekau I (Morkot 2000, 232; Perdu 2002b, 1215-1233).
By Taharqa’s Year 17 (674 BC) Esarhaddon had apparently decided that, in order to secure Assyrian control over the Levant, he would have to invade Egypt. In that year the Babylonian Chronicle (ABC 1) recorded that ‘the army of Assyria was defeated in a bloody battle in Egypt’ (BM 92502: 16; Onasch 1994, 18-20). Although the Assyrian sources, unsurprisingly, make no mention of this defeat (BM 25091: 20; Onasch 1994, 21-23), it is reasonably certain that Esarhaddon attacked Egypt and Taharqa had defeated him. This victory may have led Taharqa to become even more active in the Levant, inciting a full rebellion of the various kingdoms in the years following his Year 17 (Morkot 2000, 265-267).

Esarhaddon, meanwhile, spent a year preparing for a second invasion which he launched in Taharqa’s Year 20 (671 BC). The campaign proceeded down the Levantine coast, capturing Tyre and Gaza before crossing the Sinai desert (Pritchard 1969, 291-292). The Egypto-Kushite army led by Taharqa met the Assyrians at Ishkhupri but was defeated and retreated towards Memphis, fighting several battles on the way (Pritchard 1969, 293: 37-53). At Memphis the Egypto-Kushite army made a stand but Taharqa, possibly wounded (Morkot 2000, 268; Dodson 2012, 165), abandoned the city and withdrew south towards Thebes (BM 92502: 26-27; Onasch 1994, 18-20). With the capture of Memphis and the Delta Esarhaddon re-appointed the Libyan rulers of the Delta: Nekau was re-appointed ruler of Sais and

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162 The Assyrian capture of Memphis was clearly unexpected as within the city were large numbers of the Kushite royal family including the crown prince ‘Ushanukhuru’ (Grayson 1975, 85: 26-27; Meyrat 2012, 47), although this is a corruption of his original Kushite name (Meyrat 2012, 52).
Memphis, Pakrur of Per-Soped, Bakennefi (C) of Athribis and Sehetepibre Pedubast III at Tanis, the last king of the Tanite Twenty-Third Dynasty (Kahn 2006a, 35).

With this Esarhaddon withdrew back to Nineveh, taking the loot taken at Memphis and a number of high ranking captives with him. His withdrawal allowed Taharqa to recapture the north and he was in control of Memphis again by his Year 22 (Morkot 2000, 276; Onasch 1994, Prism A, I: 53-60). Hearing of this Esarhaddon began to march south to re-conquer Egypt, but became ill and died in Palestine in the same year (669 BC) (BM 25091: 28-30; BM 92502: 30-33; Onasch 1994, 18-20; 21-23). With his death Taharqa gained several years free of Assyrian invasions, during which he buried an Apis Bull (No. XXXVI) in his Year 24. In this same year, however, Esarhaddon’s son Ashurbanipal launched a new campaign to re-conquer Egypt, defeating Taharqa’s army and forcing Taharqa to flee Memphis for Thebes again (Onasch 1994, Prism A I: 83-88). As Ashurbanipal was heading south to defeat Taharqa, he discovered that several of the northern Libyan dynasts were plotting to ally with Taharqa, forcing him to return to the north (Onasch 1994, Prism A I: 118-134 and II: 1-7). The Libyans’ towns were raided and they were executed; the only two to escape were Pekrur of Per-Soped and Nekau I of Sais whose son, Psamtik, was appointed ruler of Athribis (Onasch

163 Nekau is listed by Manetho as a king of the Twenty-Sixth Saite Dynasty and is the first name in his list that can be recognised with certainty, with ‘Stephinates’ suggested as Tefnakhte II (Kitchen 1986, 589; Ryholt 2011, 123-127).

164 These are listed on a chronicle from early in Esarhaddon’s successor Ashurbanipal’s reign, but are recorded as having been appointed under Esarhaddon (Onasch 1994, Prism A I: 90-113). The list also includes a possible grandson of Nimlot (D) at Hermopolis (Nimlot (E) - Dodson 2012, 166), the vizier Nespamedu at Thinis, and Montuemhat at Thebes but there is no evidence that Esarhaddon or Ashurbanipal had any control over Middle or Upper Egypt during Taharqa’s reign. Indeed, later texts from Ashurbanipal’s reign specify that only Memphis and the Delta were under Assyrian control (Morkot 2000, 273).

165 Kahn (2006b, 259) proposes that some part of the Assyrian army continued southwards and reached Thebes where it was defeated by Taharqa, explaining why Ashurbanipal did not attempt to take Thebes whilst Taharqa was still alive (Onasch 1994, 119, 89).
1994, Prism A II: 8-18). Taharqa survived for two further years with a Year 26 attested as the induction year of the next Apis Bull known from a stela for its burial in the reign of Psamtik I (Louvre IM 3733, Cat. No. 192; Ritner 2009a, 587-588). On his death he was buried in a new royal cemetery he had established at Nuri (Tomb 1) and was succeeded by a nephew Tanwetamani (664 BC).

Immediately after his accession as king, Tanwetamani travelled north, stopping at Elephantine and Thebes to celebrate festivals of the gods, before heading to Memphis to reconquer the north (Cairo JE 48863: 10-16=‘Dream Stela’; Breyer 2003, 114-134). Here the Libyan dynasts attempted to halt his progress, ‘the sons of weakness hastened to fight there with his majesty. His majesty made a great slaughter among them’ (‘Dream Stela’: 17; text in Jansen-Winkeln 2007-2009c, 238) after which, as he advanced further into the Delta, and led by Pekrur of Per-Soped, they surrendered (‘Dream Stela’: 26-39; Breyer 2003, 154-166; 175-192; 196-210). During the resistance it appears the other senior Libyan leader, Nekau I of Sais, was killed, whilst his son fled to Syria after the surrender (Kahn 2006b, 263). As Piye had done before him, Tanwetamani dedicated a stela commemorating his victory at the

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166 This suggests that the ruler listed for Athribis in the earlier record, Bakennefi (C), had died in the interval, was killed during the Assyrian’s suppression of the rebellion, or was one of the rulers who had been executed, despite not being listed in the Rassam Cylinder as one of the conspirators. [There are 3 options, so you can’t use ‘either’.] On the cylinder the key plotters are named as Nekau, Pekrur and Sharruludari, who was in charge of a key border fortress (Onasch 1994, Prism A I: 134; Morkot 2000, 274).

167 This relationship is expressed in the Assyrian records, which describe him as the son of Shabaka (Onasch Prism A II: 22). Due to the loss of members of the royal family with the capture of Memphis by Esarhaddon, Morkot (2000, 291-292) suggests that there might have been an issue with the succession, with the army and priesthood of the temple at Amun at Gebel Barkal being involved in the process. In his ‘Dream Stela’ Tanwetamani seems to have travelled from Egypt to Napata where he was proclaimed king (Cairo JE 48863: 6-8; Breyer 2003, 108-114), suggesting that he may have been with the army in Upper Egypt and this is how he secured the throne (Morkot 2000, 295).

168 Kahn (2006b, 263) suggests that he may have been executed by Tanwetamani, due to the phrase ‘May you kill whom you like and let live whom you like’ spoken by Pekrur in the ‘Dream Stela’ (Cairo JE 48863: 37; Breyer 2003, 202-205), but this is based on Kahn’s 2006b, 260 n.58) belief that Nekau I was never awarded Memphis by the Assyrian king.
temple of Amun at Gebel Barkal, with the ‘Dream Stela’ dated to his Year 1. This was to be the limit of Tanwetamani’s control of Egypt, with Ashurbanipal invading in 663 BC, towards the end of Tanwetamani’s Year 1. From the Assyrian records, it appears that Tanwetamani fled Memphis for Thebes (Onasch 1994, Prism A II: 29-31) and, when Ashurbanipal advanced towards Thebes, Tanwetamani abandoned that city for Nubia, allowing Ashurbanipal to sack Thebes (Onasch 1994, Prism A II: 34-48).

This ended effective Kushite control over Egypt, although Upper Egypt continued to date by Tanwetamani’s rule. In the north, Nekau I’s son, Psamtik I, restored to his position by the Assyrians, dated the beginning of his rule to his father’s death during Tanwetamani’s conquest (664 BC). From his domain of Sais, Memphis and Athribis he extended his control over the north, taking advantage of the Assyrian Empire’s increasingly inward focus (Morkot 2000, 299). By his Year 4 this extended as far as Herakleopolis with the new ‘master of shipping’ Somtutefnakht (Leahy 2011, 197) educated at the royal court (Morkot 2000, 299).

The last known reference to Tanwetamani in Upper Egypt is a Year 8 (656 BC) from a donation stela from Thebes (Cairo JE 37888; Ritner 2009a, 573-574). This was immediately followed by Psamtik I’s control over Upper Egypt being recognised, secured with the adoption of his daughter Nitocris I as the successor of Shepenwepet II and Amenirdis II as GWA (Cairo JE 36327; Ritner 2009a, 575-582). The relief added by Piye to the wall of the

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169 An act for which some Egyptologists have never forgiven him (Kitchen 1986, 394-395) and which was used by biblical prophets as a sign of catastrophe (Nahum 3: 8-10).

170 The evidence currently suggests that Amenirdis II never took office as GWA as her name is never found in connection with that title (Pope 2014, 210), and there is also no evidence for her burial amongst the other GWA at Medinet Habu. By the end of Psamtik I’s reign only Shepenwepet II and Nitocris I were recognised in an inscription at the Wadi Gasus (Dodson 2012, 170-171; Ritner 2009a, 576). This argument is not accepted by all, and Graefe (1994, 96-97) in particular has argued that Amenirdis II must have become GWA in order to prevent Shepenwepet II from having an excessively long life, and Amenirdis II has also been identified as the unknown GWA named Meritefnut (Kitchen 1986, 391). Not only has the amount of time Shepenwepet II must have lived
temple of Mut was adapted to show Nitocris I’s arrival at Thebes, as part of a flotilla carrying her father’s troops led by Somtutefnakht (Broekman 2012a, 245). Although Psamtik I left senior officials from the Kushite Period in position, particularly Montuemhat as second and fourth prophet of Amun, ‘mayor’ of Thebes and overseer of Upper Egypt (Ritner 2009a, 556-564), their previous power was curtailed by their having to make large donations to Nitocris I’s estate (Cairo JE 36327: 17-31; Ritner 2009a, 575-582), marking Psamtik I’s control over the whole country.

2.6.3 Political, social, economic, and environmental commentary

Politically this last section of the Third Intermediate Period is marked by the final phase of political fragmentation, with further rulers appearing in a number of the key towns across the Delta, as well as the further rise in power of the western Delta including the appearance of the ‘Chiefs of the West’, then Tefnakhte and the Twenty-Fourth Dynasty, and ultimately Psamtik I and the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty. It is also marked by the appearance and gradual increase in control of the Kushite Twenty-Fifth Dynasty with them gaining control of Upper Egypt at the start of this period and gradually increasing this across the entirety of Egypt. This extension of control brought them into conflict with Tefnakhte and the powerful rulers of the western Delta and Memphis, who may have been attempting their own form of reunification as Piye’s account of the conflict opens with Tefnakhte attacking the rulers of Middle Egypt. As a result the number of important centres expanded dramatically. In the

been significantly reduced, however, by the reversal of Shabataka and Shabaka, and indeed was one of the reasons for accepting the change (Payraudeau 2014a, 120-121; Broekman 2015, 26), but also Graefe’s arguments have been conclusively answered by Pope (2014, 220-221) as well as demonstrating that the GWA Meritefnut cannot be Amenirdis II (Pope 2014, 211-213). As a result it remains unclear exactly what happened to Amenirdis II following the Saite takeover.
north the key centres were Tanis, Memphis, Sais, Bubastis, and Leontopolis whilst in the south Herakleopolis, Hermopolis, and Thebes (although Thebes was largely restricted to religious rather than political importance) were joined by a number of Nubian sites, particularly Napata.

The Twenty-Fifth Dynasty eventually established their control over the entire country; however, this control was lost as a result of the increasing conflict with the Neo-Assyrian Empire which began with the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty sending troops into the Levant to support rebellions against Assyrian control, and culminated in Assyrian invasions and conquest of Egypt. Although both Taharqa and Tanwetamani briefly regained control of Egypt, the Assyrians remained nominally in control until Psamtik I reunited the country. These invasions, as did the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty ones before them, saw damage and destruction at a number of the major centres, but particularly at Thebes and Memphis.

In the Delta, many of the local dynasties and rulers persisted despite the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s nominal reunification under their authority. In Upper and Middle Egypt the local rulers of the preceding period appear to have been removed, or died out, during the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty. Certainly there was an increased presence of individuals who appeared to be of Kushite origin, particularly those connected to the royal family and in positions associated with the cult of Amun. As part of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s securing control of Upper Egypt and the cult of Amun their daughters were placed as the successor to the GWA, Shepenwepet II. The placement of these Kushite officials appears to show at least a partial restoration of the king’s role in appointing high officials for the first time since the early Twenty-Second Dynasty. This accompanied a re-emphasis of the position of the king in general, and certainly the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty kings’ connections to Amun. As part of this
there was a shift of emphasis with Amun of Napata presented as senior to Amun of Thebes. There was also an increasing trend towards archaism, particularly in the choice of royal names, but also in inscription style and artistic representations amongst others. Whilst this had begun to appear in the previous period, it becomes much more present during this period.

The evidence for the Egyptian economy remains reliant on circumstantial evidence. As such, there was large-scale monumental construction in Nubia, particularly at Napata, Sanam, and Kawa, along with some more limited construction across Egypt but particularly at Thebes and Memphis. Alongside this evidence for construction, the Assyrian records of the sack of Thebes provide an indication of the quantity of wealth that was present during this period, as do the donation amounts imposed on the Theban elite at Nitocris I’s adoption as Shepenwepet II’s successor as GWA. Similarly, the restarting of monumental tomb construction at Thebes, particularly by Montuemhat, indicates that something had changed socially leading to a return to large monumental tombs, but also that the elite were now prepared or able to spend the resources on their creation. The evidence for the environmental conditions is again almost entirely restricted to the NLR, but again we have an indication of their context through the stelae recording the very high flood in Taharqa’s Year 6 which corresponds to the highest flood marker on the quay at Karnak.
This first case-study examining the economic, political, and social dynamics of the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods will focus on the economic conditions of the three periods. Contained within this discussion will be an assessment of whether environmental changes were a significant factor behind the economic conditions of the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period. Firstly, however, there will be a brief outline of the two key reconstructions of the Egyptian economy and their significance in creating the impression of economic conditions as an important dynamic of the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods.

3.1 Structure of the Egyptian economy

There are two main reconstructions of the Egyptian economy, the first that it was based on redistribution and the second that there was, at least some, private enterprise. Both have argued that economic conditions were an important dynamic for the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period, specifically that an economic decline beginning during the late New Kingdom and continuing until the end of the Libyan Period limited the resources available to the kings and central administration. This restriction is used to explain the apparent reduction in the quantity of monumental construction and military campaigns, as well as to suggest that the Libyan rulers did not have access to the resources needed to re-unify the country. Some descriptions view environmental problems as the primary cause for these economic problems, particularly for the late New Kingdom (Butzer 2012, 3634-3635),
whilst others focus on the redistribution of wealth to institutions such as the temples (Warburton 2000, 96; 2007, 194 n.68).

The traditional structure for the ancient Egyptian economy is that it was at least significantly, if not totally, based on redistribution by the state (Wilson J. 1951, 272-275; Janssen 1975a, 139; 1975b, 557-560; Castle 1992, 270-271; Bleiberg 1995, 1373-1375; Baines and Yoffee 1998, 228; Hikade 2006, 165; Monroe 2009, 189). In this system all resources were manufactured or collected by the Egyptian state before, at least the surplus, being redistributed to the population in proportion to their rank (Janssen 1975a, 167). With this structure it is clear that any reduction in the amount of food being produced and collected due to environmental change, the loss of resources from Egypt’s external territories, or even the lack of plunder through an absence of military conquests, would have directly impacted the Egyptian state’s ability to feed the population and carry out large-scale projects (Butzer 1984, 104; Redford 1992, 283-284; Hassan 1997a, 59). The lack of income from conquests, external territories or poor harvests would have further reduced the resources to finance expeditions, maintain control over foreign territories, build monuments and ‘pay’ temple staff, or to alleviate the effects of low Nile floods, creating a feedback loop where the income of the Egyptian state would rapidly have become severely limited.

This model of the Egyptian economy, therefore, appears to explain the lack of recorded military campaigns, quarrying expeditions or major building work for the Twentieth Dynasty after Ramesses IV, the Twenty-First Dynasty, and in the later Libyan Period. The large expenditures on these activities early in the Twentieth Dynasty are, in fact, seen by some scholars as causing the breakdown of the entire system by emptying the state’s reserves just as the economic decline became more severe. Hikade (2006, 165) argues this
occurred as a result of Ramesses IV's large expeditions to the Wadi Hammamat, whilst others see this occurring under Ramesses III (Vernus 2003, 122; Butzer 2012, 3634; 3636).\textsuperscript{171} The failure to recapture Lower Nubia at the end of the Twentieth Dynasty and the loss of the region’s gold mines could have further impoverished the state and helped cause the division of the country, with destitute kings in the north unable to assert their authority in the south (Breasted 1909, 524-525; Gardiner 1961, 317). A similar situation may have existed during the later Libyan Period; as the country became increasingly fragmented each king no longer had the resources with which to gain supremacy over the country or to carry out large building projects (Hüneberg 2003, 72),\textsuperscript{172} although these conditions may also have existed earlier with the divisions at the start of the Twenty-First Dynasty.

An important element of the redistribution model’s explanation for the importance of the economy as a dynamic in the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods is that it was the product of the effects of environmental change on Egypt. The late New Kingdom has most often been associated with environmental problems, partially because environmental change is used as an explanation for the collapse and disappearance of several civilisations across the Eastern Mediterranean at the end of the LBA (Bryson et al. 1974, 47-50; Weiss 1982, 184-185; Kaniewski et al. 2010, 211-213; Drake 2012, 1866-1867; Kaniewski et al. 2013, 4-8; Finkelstein et al. 2013, 165-169), in the same chronological time period as the late New Kingdom (c.1200-1100 BC). On the basis of the evidence available, some, notably

\textsuperscript{171} Although the large-scale construction and military operations of Ramesses III’s reign could conceivably have used much of the state’s reserves, it seems highly unlikely that the few quarrying expeditions under Ramesses IV could have had the same impact, especially as the majority of the expenditure would merely have been in grain supplies.

\textsuperscript{172} This, however, is based on the impression of the later Twenty-Second Dynasty and the Twenty-Third Dynasty rulers’ building activities created by the bias in the surviving evidence towards Upper Egypt, something that will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Butzer (1984, 104; 2012, 3634) and Hassan (1997a, 59; 2000, 136), have proposed that a series of low Nile floods led to economic problems (Rohling et al. 2009, 5) and a series of internal crises which the economically-weakened kings were unable to deal with. Environmental issues are also perceived as aiding the rise of the temples’ power as a result of their apparent control over large tracts of land and agricultural storage (Butzer 2012, 3635), reflected by the HPA’s later responsibility in supplying the workers at Deir el-Medina. This interpretation of the evidence is influenced by a parallel with the end of the Old Kingdom (Butzer 2012, 3633-3634), for which climate change and low Nile floods followed by a severe famine are held, at least partially, responsible (Bell 1971, 21; O’Connor 1974, 16; Kemp 1989, 180-181; Seidlmayer 1990, 440; Hassan 2007, 360-365).

In the alternative structure for the Egyptian economy, redistribution, or wages, for the elite and those directly employed by the state are balanced with private enterprise, markets, profits, and subsistence (Kemp 1989, 308; Castle 1992, 245-248; Haring 1997, 16; Eyre 1998, 185; Warburton 2000; 2007; 2010). For scholars who see the Egyptian economy in this form the explanation of economic decline described above is invalid as it is based on a misunderstanding of the Egyptian economy’s mechanics. There is disagreement about the level of private enterprise in Egyptian society, however (Castle 1992, 270; Warburton 2000, 74) as well as how economically independent institutions, and particularly temples, were within the Egyptian state. Some argue that they were extensions of the state (Janssen 1975a, 181; Kemp 1989, 256) whilst others see them as becoming effectively economically

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173 Whether this view is valid or not, will be assessed in detail later in this chapter.

174 This explanation is not accepted by all (Moreno Garcia 2015, 80-81), with Moeller (2005, 165-166) in particular rejecting climate having any role in the end of the Old Kingdom. This is despite accepting that there was a change in the climate of the period which led to a reduction of Nile levels during the end of the Old Kingdom and First Intermediate Period (Moeller 2005, 156-157).
independent, even if not administratively (Haring 1997, 396; 1998, 80; Warburton 2007, 186). Their explanations for economic decline are, as a result, different and centre on declining consumption caused by the lack of large projects and the increasing control over the economy by the major temples (Warburton 2000, 96; 2007, 194 n.68). Most, although not Kemp (1989, 346), still see economic decline as a key factor for the end of the New Kingdom, with the alterations to the economic system that had occurred maintaining this economic weakness, especially of the king, until the beginning of the Saite Period under the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty.

For Warburton (2000, 71, 77, 92; 2010, 169), the breakdown in what had been a stable economic model, based on consumption of grain through expenditure on the workforces required for temple construction, military campaigns or large-scale economic expeditions, occurred under Ramesses III. His supposed transfer of large quantities of resources and land to the major temples, as apparently recorded in the donations list in P. Harris (1, 2-74; Grandet 1994a, 225-332), is seen to have fundamentally altered the structure of the Egyptian economy, seemingly indicated by various temples being the largest landholders in P. Wilbour’s survey of a section of Middle Egypt (Gardiner 1948b, 124-157). This transfer apparently reduced royal tax intake by placing these resources under the control of the temples (de Spens 1998, 108; Warburton 2000, 93; Eyre 2012, 139).\footnote{For the purposes of detailing the current explanations Warburton’s assumption that the temples of Egypt acted as separate institutions will not be challenged here, but in the discussion section below (see 3.4).} Warburton’s conclusion is seemingly supported by P. Wilbour where the temples are recorded as the largest landowners for a section of Middle Egypt (Gardiner 1948b, 11; 124-157). With the king having increasingly limited resources and unable to increase consumption through state projects, the economy gradually became based on redistribution.
as the temples’ control was consolidated (Warburton 2000, 93; Eyre 2012, 130-131). Included within this interpretation of the economy is also a specific rejection of the idea that low Nile floods would have had a severe impact on the Egyptian economy; as the tax system was based on plots rather than production this created an incentive to over-produce which would have limited any impact of low Nile floods on the economy as a whole (Warburton 2000, 88).

Both current explanations for the decline of the Egyptian economy, and thus the state, suffer from the same flaw, by viewing the state and temples as two entirely separate institutions (Redford 1992, 288; Warburton 2000, 92). There is no evidence that they existed as distinct administrative units until Ramesses XI’s reign, with the appointment of Piankh and Herihor as HPA, and even then probably not until after Ramesses XI’s death. The impression of a division between ‘temple’ and ‘state’ is strongly based on understandings of both modern institutions with clearly defined areas of control (Moreno Garcia 2013a, 100), western medieval society (Janssen 1975a, 181), and how they existed during the Late Period (Agut-Labordère 2013, 1020). The reality probably involved substantial overlap between the two (Kemp 1989, 248; 308; Assmann 1989, 56; Haring 1997, 20; 382; 1998, 80) and, even if the temples should be not considered an element of the Egyptian state (Haring 1997, 396), they remained under the king’s authority. The existence of such administrative overlap is suggested by records of royal officials both cultivating land administered by temples in P. Wilbour (Gardiner 1948b, 20-21) and supervising temple shipping (Castle 1992, 242-243). Whilst their economic independence appears to have grown during the Twentieth Dynasty (Haring 1997, 18-20), they remained subject to royal authority, with a ‘chief taxing master’ recorded taking items from a number of temples in Upper Egypt in P. BM 10401 (Janssen
HPA Amenhotep giving royal officials the items they requested promptly and recording this on the walls of Karnak (Haring 1997, 18), and royal redistribution of temple lands (Haring 1997, 19).

The major temples, therefore, appear to have been economically self-sufficient, but had responsibilities within the wider state administration (Haring 1997, 12; 1998, 80), suggested by P. BM 10401 (Janssen 1991, 90), their role as administrators of non-temple land (Gardiner 1948b, 201-203), and suppliers of the rations for Deir el-Medina (Haring 1997, 381-382). The temples were also distinct from one another; there was not a single ‘Domain of Amun’ under the authority of the HPA (Haring 1997, 385-391) and thus any increase in economic significance would have been much more fractured than is usually portrayed. This is compounded by the temples’ landholdings being scattered across Egypt, meaning that there was no concentration of land holdings in the hands of a single landowner other than the king (Baines and Yoffee 1998, 223). It is also unclear to what extent the temples controlled the land that was donated to them, with Haring (1998, 84-84) suggesting that they were transferred the revenues but not the land itself, reducing their political importance as that land was not subject to their authority. Consequently, whilst their administrative role may have changed during the Twentieth Dynasty there remains insufficient evidence showing that the economic role of temples had changed in the same period (Haring 1997, 20), or that their apparent economic wealth was at the king’s expense.

With these differing structures in mind we will now examine the available evidence for economic conditions in the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods beginning with the evidence for deteriorating environmental conditions during those periods.
3.2 Environmental evidence

An important aspect of the interpretation of economic decline as an important dynamic during the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods is that the environmental conditions of Egypt changed in those periods. Whilst some of the evidence for the changes in those conditions overlaps with that discussed in the following section, there is also considerable evidence which only relates to this explanation and it is this which will be examined below.

During the LBA, a series of states around the Eastern Mediterranean, including Ugarit and Mycenaean Greece, collapsed whilst others, such as the Hittite Empire, disappeared as civilisations altogether. In order to explain the wide range of geographical locations and short time period for these events, it has been suggested that rapid climate change (RCC) occurred. Specifically, a change in the Inter-Tropical zone caused the climate to become drier (Krom et al. 2002, 71-74), leading to widespread drought conditions across the Eastern Mediterranean from c.1200 BC onwards (Kaniewski et al. 2013, 9). This severely reduced agricultural production, making the various LBA states increasingly unviable (Bryson et al. 1974, 47-50; Weiss 1982, 184-185; Kaniewski et al. 2010, 211-213; Drake 2012, 1866-1867; Kaniewski et al. 2013, 4-8; Finkelstein et al. 2013, 165-169). This proposal is supported by paleo-climatic evidence from a range of sites across the Eastern Mediterranean, from Ugarit (Kaniewski et al. 2010), to Assyria (Neumann and Parpola 1987), and Greece (Bryson et al. 1974; Weiss 1982; Drake 2012). Such conditions are also indicated by some texts from within Egypt itself and specifically from Merneptah’s victory inscription at Karnak. In that inscription he describes the Libyan invasion as being a result of famine amongst the Libyan tribes of the western desert, ‘(22) Daily they spend their time wandering and fighting to fill
their bellies. They come to the land of Egypt to seek the requirements of their mouths’ (text in Manassa 2003, pl.6). There is also a brief statement that he had sent grain to the Hittites, ‘(24) I caused grain to be taken in ships to feed this land of Hatti’ (text in Manassa 2003, pl.6). Drews (1993, 79) has suggested that this was included in the text to provide a sharper contrast to the wealth, stability and productivity of Egypt. That Egypt was providing large shipments of grain to the Hittites and the Near Eastern states is, however, corroborated by a letter from Merneptah found at Ugarit which details shipments of grain from Egypt to that city specifically to help relieve famine there (Cline 2014, 144).

This increased aridity in the Eastern Mediterranean should have had little impact on Egypt’s agricultural output, which was almost entirely based around the annual Nile flood. A reduction in the levels of the Nile flood, however, would have directly affected the agricultural production of Egypt (Krom et al. 2002, 72; Rohling et al. 2009, 5) and thus, following the environmental explanations, weakened the central government causing an internal crisis, as is apparently visible in records from the Old Kingdom, (Butzer 1984, 104; 2012, 3633-3635; Hassan 1997a, 59). The increasing aridity suspected for the Eastern Mediterranean in the LBA (Bryson et al. 1974, 47-48; Weiss 1982, 194-196; Kaniewski et al. 2010, 207-208; 2013, 9) does appear to have been mirrored by reduced rainfall in the Ethiopian Highlands (Butzer 1976, 33; Hassan 1997b, 221; Krom et al. 2002, 72). The lakes in these mountains are the source for the Blue Nile, which in turn provides the majority of the

176 It is, however, believed to have had a severe effect in Libya, where it caused the final stage of the desertification of the region west of Egypt. This transition in the area to hyperaridity prevented any substantial level of food production everywhere, including along the coast, except the oases (Rohling et al. 2009, 5). This is seen as confirming Merneptah’s explanation of his Libyan invasion as being as a result of famine in Libya (see discussion above). There are, however, no mentions of famine of environmental problems in Ramesses III’s descriptions of his Libyan invasions and this has led some scholars to reject it as a cause for Libyan movement into Egypt (O’Connor 1990, 91-93).
annual flood (Lamb et al. 2007, 288), so any reduction in these lakes' levels has a significant impact on the annual flood. Reduced levels in key lakes in the Ethiopian Highlands recorded in sediment layers from the lake beds (Butzer 1976, 33; Gasse F. 1977, 42; Hassan 1997b, 219-220), demonstrate that there was a period of low Nile floods between c.1500 and c.900 BC (Rohling et al. 2009, 5). The results of isotopic analyses of the river bed of the Blue Nile also show that there was a decline after 3100 BP [c.1150 BC] (Krom et al. 2002, 72). They also show, however, that there was considerable variation in the levels of the annual floods throughout the whole survey period, 4200 to 2000 BP [c.2250-50 BC], despite an overall trend of decreasing levels from 3100 BP onwards (Krom et al. 2002, 71-74).

Archaeological evidence from Nubia provides further evidence for the dry period suggested in the lake levels. Surveys of the Nile channels in Nubia reveal that the Alfreda and Seleim channels dried up during the same time frame, c.1500 to c.900 BC, dated by aeolian sands found in both channels (Mackin et al. 2013, 697). These surveys also show that the low floods were particularly severe between c.1200 BC and c.900 BC (Mackin et al. 2013, 697-698), the dates for the late New Kingdom and Libyan Period. At Amara West the increased amount of sand found in archaeological levels for these dates indicates that more sand was being blown into the town, a product of the smaller, northern, paleo-channel no longer being perennially flooded from c.1270 onwards, although the date range is 1485-1055 BC (Spencer N. et al. 2012, 39). Such a sustained period of low Nile floods as indicated by the evidence from Nubia is believed to have had a severe impact on Egyptian agricultural production (Hassan 1997a, 69). The paleo-climatic evidence for such a reduction in flood levels from Egypt itself is, however, restricted to two tests from the Delta (Bernhardt et al. 2012; Flaux et al. 2013). Both demonstrate that there was a period of phase of low Nile flow
from 3.5 ka BP [c.1550 BC] (Bernhardt et al. 2012, 617; Flaux et al. 2013, 29-30), but only one has data actually showing a reduction in vegetation as a result of decreased Nile floods during the late New Kingdom, through measured reductions in the levels of Cyperaceae pollen, (Bernhardt et al. 2012, 616-617).

It has been suggested that the Hekla III eruption in Iceland might have been the cause for this climatic change through its secondary effect on global climates (Yurco 1999). It was large enough to be described as a Plinian-Krakatauan eruption (Yurco 1999, 457),\textsuperscript{177} ejecting an enormous amount of ash into the atmosphere (Strothers et al. 1989, 3). This ash is known from data on recent eruptions to have a cooling effect on the global climate of up to 15°C, by reflecting solar radiation back into space (Rampino et al. 1988, 82-89). Such a large drop in temperatures would have a severe effect on agricultural production, causing crop failures and aborted growing seasons (Rampino et al. 1985, 74; Strothers et al. 1989, 7). As the Hekla III eruption is dated to between c.1159 and c.1140 BC (Yurco 1999, 457) and thus to the middle of the Twentieth Dynasty, it might have had an influence on Egyptian agriculture just as possible problems in the food supply appear in the Egyptian record (Yurco 1999, 457-458).\textsuperscript{178} Indeed, Yurco uses this eruption’s possible global climatic effects as an explanation for the collapse, in both senses of the word, of the LBA civilisations and city-states (1999, 458). The effect of these volcanoes on the global climate, particularly the Hekla III eruption, and their ability to create a so-called ‘volcanic winter’ has been, however, disputed (Gratton 2006, 10-18), as has the C14 dating of the eruption itself (Dugmore et al.

\textsuperscript{177} This term is used to describe eruptions that have the characteristics and scale of the eruptions of Vesuvius and Krakatoa and is the second most explosive form of volcanic eruption (Alexander 1999, 91).

\textsuperscript{178} These textual references will be discussed in detail below.
1995, 276). As such, it is extremely unlikely that the eruption had any impact on the global climate and certainly cannot be claimed to have had one on that of ancient Egypt.

There is no direct evidence for the levels of the annual floods during the late Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-First Dynasties (Seidlmayer 2001, 13), with the only possible evidence the shift of the city of Pi-Ramesses to Tanis at the start of the Twenty-First Dynasty, as a result of the former’s Nile channel drying up during this period (Bietak and Forstner-Müller 2011, 25; Eyre 2012, 107). No NLR have come to light dated to the reigns of any of the kings of those three dynasties, making any direct comparison of the Nile flood levels across the entire late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period impossible.

The first possible reference to a Nile flood within the timeframe of this thesis is in the record of the expedition Smendes’ sent to the Dibabieh quarry, at Gebelein, in his Year 21. In this text Smendes receives a report whilst at Memphis that a canal has collapsed at Thebes causing Luxor temple to be severely flooded. Smendes then sends an expedition to the quarry in order ‘to make heaps (of stones)’ (text in Daressy 1889, 135-136), to provide for the repair work that needed to be carried out (Ritner 2009a, 101-103). Due to the damage to the stela, which is almost entirely lost now, it is unclear what caused the canal to collapse, and so it may not be a reference to a high flood. It does indicate that not only was the northern king, Smendes, deemed at least partly-responsible for affairs in the south, but he was also able to organise expeditions to that region to produce material for projects.

From the start of the Twenty-Second Dynasty through to Psamtik I’s reign, however, there are surviving NLR marking the height of the annual flood and dated to specific kings’ reigns from the Karnak temple quay (von Beckerath 1966; Ritner 2009a, 35-41). These allow us to get some sense of what the heights of the floods were like during this period, and
provide detail on the level of variation in that height. Although many of the NLR do not have
the Egyptian measurements of the height of the flood, their height was measured relative to
a zero point taken as the level of the floor of the Hypostyle hall (Legrain 1896b, 119). This
provides a clear measurement of the difference in height of each record, and allows us to
measure their relative heights and the variation between them. The heights show a huge
range from -0.92m to +0.84m compared to the level of the Hypostyle hall (Legrain 1896a,
111-118), giving a mean height of +0.016m and a median of +0.09m across the Libyan and
Kushite Periods. There are not records from every year across the whole of the Libyan and
Kushite Periods, with only forty-five remaining for the three-hundred-year period when
originally examined by Legrain (1896a, 111-118; see Table 4 at end of chapter), which does
complicate any possible conclusions drawn from these records about environmental
conditions in these periods. In particular, without being able to compare these with
equivalent records from earlier periods these records cannot demonstrate whether flood
levels had declined from the late New Kingdom. They do indicate that the ‘average flood’
was above the level of the floor of the Hypostyle hall, and thus should probably be
considered as ‘good’ floods since they would probably have flooded a considerable portion
of the flood plain as a result. Despite the fact that they are measured from the floor level of
the Hypostyle hall the NLR do not provide us with enough information to clarify which floods
might have been considered poor. Although the ‘negative’ floods failed to reach the level of
the temple floor that provides us with no indication of how much of the floodplain would
have been inundated.

Significantly, however, they can demonstrate the extensive level of variation during
the Libyan and Kushite Periods. This is because there are some reigns which have a number
of records dated to them, providing an indication of the extent of the variation within shorter timeframes, whilst the spread of the NLR across the whole of the Libyan and Kushite Periods, and into the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty does provide some indication of that variation across the wider period. For example, the six records currently dated to Takeloth I’s reign contain a range from -0.92m to +0.67m in NLRs 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21. Not only do they have such a large range in a reign which only lasted around fourteen years, but the variability between the individual measurements is also extensive, with the heights in chronological order corresponding to +0.16m, +0.67m, +0.10m, -0.38m, -0.59, and -0.92m (see Table 1). Although there appears to be clear trend of declining flood levels from Takeloth I’s reign, there is no such clear trend in the data across either the Libyan or Kushite Periods with large and rapid fluctuations in levels between different reigns and years, with the third highest recorded flood of +0.715m in Osorkon III’s Year 28 and Takeloth III’s Year 5 (NLR 13), followed immediately in Takeloth III’s Year 6 by one of the lowest floods in the whole period of -0.355m (NLR 4), a difference of over a metre (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: NLR from Takeloth I’s reign</th>
<th>Height above/ below floor of Hypostyle hall (m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year 5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year ?</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year ?</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year 8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year 14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year ?</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(m)
Table 2: NLR from Osorkon III and Takeloth III’s reigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NLR no.</th>
<th>Height above/ below floor of Hypostyle hall (m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon III Year 3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon III Year 5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon III Year 6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon III Year 28 and Year 5 of Takeloth III</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth III Year 6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That the NLR whose levels were above the floor of the Hypostyle hall should be considered ‘good’, at least in terms of the amount of flood plain covered, is supported by some additional texts which relate to the two highest records, those of Osorkon III’s Year 3 (NLR 5) and Taharqa’s Year 6 (NLR 34). Both describe these floods covering a large area of the country with Taharqa’s describing it in the Kawa V stela as flooding the entire country (Ritner 2009a, 544), and the graffito from Luxor temple stating that Osorkon III’s flooded buildings across Thebes and thus presumably an extensive portion of the flood plain (Ritner 2009a, 418-419). These texts, however, provide differing attitudes to the size of their respective floods. The graffito from Luxor temple in Osorkon III’s reign described the flood as a disaster, with floods filling the temples of Thebes (Ritner 2009a, 415-420), whilst in contrast those recording the even higher flood of Taharqa’s reign declared it to have been ‘a thoroughly good cultivation’ (Ritner 2009a, 544). This is, at least in part, a product of where these inscriptions were located, and the form they took. The graffito was a private inscription added by an individual priest, Nakhtefmut, to the walls of Luxor temple, whilst the various stelae which Taharqa set up were official records and thus subject to the decorum of Egyptian royal inscriptions which cannot refer to disasters unless these were solved by the king or proved to be beneficial. Such a ‘twisting’ of the narrative is apparent in the flood
inscriptions from Taharqa’s reign. The inundation is described as solving all of the problems that normally occur with such floods, eliminating the rats, snakes and locusts (lines 12-13, Ritner 2009a, 544), but the text does not detail the extensive damage that must have been done by a flood that was higher even than the one Nakhtefmut had complained about.

Another possible environmental cause of economic issues was a large earthquake in the late New Kingdom centred on the west bank at Thebes (Karakhanyan et al. 2010, 214-218). This is suspected to have caused widespread damage to the buildings located there, including many of the major mortuary temples. This again links with explanations for the end of the LBA, in particular with Nur’s (1998, 144-145) suggestion of earthquake ‘storms’ that caused the destructions across the Eastern Mediterranean during this time (Nur and Cline 2000, 48).

Egypt does not have any sites listed as possibly being destroyed or damaged by such earthquake ‘storms’ at the end of the LBA (Nur and Cline 2000, 44 Fig. 1; Drews 1993, 9), although sections of the Nile Valley are included in Nur’s maps as being vulnerable to high intensity earthquakes (1998, 142 Fig.4). Indeed, the only suspected earthquake within late Egyptian history was one supposed to have damaged the colossi of Memnon in 27 BC. This earthquake, however, has been widely dismissed due to a lack of archaeological evidence and the reliance on a single reference from Strabo (Geog., 17.1.46). Archaeological excavations at Kom el-Heitan and surveys of the west bank, however, have changed this

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179 This term describes a large number of earthquakes occurring across a series of fault lines over a period of up to 50-60 years (Nur and Cline 2000, 46). As one earthquake occurs it releases the pressure on its section of the fault increasing the pressure at a point further down the fault and thus causing another earthquake there (Nur 1998, 144-145).
understanding. In particular, the damage and evidence of two phases of repair\textsuperscript{180} to the northern colossus of Memnon has indicated a powerful earthquake occurred between c.1211 and c.901 BC, and probably after c.1150 BC.\textsuperscript{181} (Karakhanyan et al. 2010, 214-218).

This is further supported by evidence of soil liquefaction and lateral vertical cracks in the geological terrace upon which many of the southern, west bank mortuary temples stand (Karakhanyan et al. 2010, 208-213). It is possible, based on the relatively secure dating of the earthquake, that there may have been more than one earthquake, as it is difficult to imagine that Merneptah would have used stones from Kom el-Heitan in his mortuary temple unless it was not already severely damaged, with a second earthquake occurring in Ramesses III’s reign as reflected in the damage to temples dating to his reign.

Such an earthquake may have occurred at the same time as an earthquake ‘storm’ across the Eastern Mediterranean (Nur 1998, 144-145; Nur and Cline 2000, 45-46) which is suggested as one of the factors in the collapse of the LBA states (Nur and Cline 2000, 61).\textsuperscript{182} This is because any attempts to repair such widespread damage would have required a significant outlay of resources, in grain for workers and stone to replace damaged sections, in combination with the damage to both the production and storage of resources, weakening the central government (Nur 1998, 146). Although Nur and Cline (2000) do not

\textsuperscript{180} One of these, making use of iron clamps, fits with the known repairs undertaken by the Romans, as described in Philostratus’s \textit{Life of Apollonius} (Bowersock 1984, 23), but the first occurred during the pharaonic era as the holes for the clamps are of a standard pharaonic shape and were larger for the use of wood or stone clamps (Karakhanyan et al. 2010, 207).

\textsuperscript{181} The dates for this earthquake are based on the dating of the layers underneath the destruction levels in the temple of Amenhotep III, radiocarbon dates, and the evidence of damage to a range of temples, including Medinet Habu (Karakhanyan et al. 2010, 214) which was only completed in Year 12 of Ramesses III (c.1175 BC), as well as the shrine to Meretseger and Ptah near the Valley of the Queens which was built as late as c.1150 BC (Karakhanyan et al. 2010, 218) and which was very badly damaged by the earthquake.

\textsuperscript{182} There is still a dispute as to whether the LBA destructions can be assigned to these earthquakes (Drews 1993, 37-47), or if they were as widespread as proposed by Nur (1998). Following Middleton (2010, 40-41) I have accepted the evidence put forward by Nur and Cline (2000) for earthquake damage at some of the listed sites, but do not see all the destructions as being a result of them, nor their being responsible for the collapse of an entire society something which even Cline (2014, 142) now accepts.
propose earthquakes as the sole cause for the end of the LBA states, the lack of reconstruction at many sites suggests that the effect of these earthquakes was severe (Cline 2014, 142). The existence of such earthquakes and the interpretation of archaeological evidence in support of them is still disputed (Drews 1993, 47; Middleton 2012, 283-284). Additionally, in Egypt there are clear signs of reconstruction during the pharaonic period, particularly of the colossi of Memnon (Karakhanyan et al. 2010, 207), again demonstrating that the Egyptian state, even if only locally, was still capable of acting. Indeed, depending on the date of the earthquake(s), these reconstruction efforts might explain the limited amounts of construction on the west bank during the second half of the Twentieth Dynasty as resources were channelled into the repair of existing temples. 183

3.3 Evidence for the state of the Egyptian economy in the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods

The majority of surviving textual evidence for the economy in the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods comes from the late New Kingdom and is largely used to demonstrate the presence of economic problems. This collection of mostly textual evidence consists of the strikes at Deir el-Medina (RAD 45-58; KRIt VI, 110; 111; 117; Vernus 2003, 69), the rise in grain prices from Ramesses VII to Ramesses IX (Černý 1933, 173-178) and the single reference to famine in Ramesses XI’s reign (P. BM 10052, 11: 7-8; KRIt VI, 767:5-803:9).

183 An issue with this explanation for the destruction of Amenhotep III’s mortuary temple is that stonework was already being reused by Merneptah in the construction of his mortuary temple, such as the stela on which the ‘Israel stela’ was recorded (Wilkinson R. 2000, 187; Dodson 2010, 20). Amenhotep III’s temple may have, however, already been in disrepair as a result of its construction on the flood plain (Wilkinson R. 2000, 188), or there may have been an earlier earthquake which would have allowed Merneptah to remove the statuary and blocks from the temple, without being forced to re-date the major earthquake to his reign.
The earliest of these records were the strikes by the workers at Deir el-Medina and the loss of work due to the non-delivery of rations as recorded in the village’s day-book and in the Turin Strike Papyrus from late in Ramesses III’s reign and dating to the first years of Ramesses IV’s reign (RAD 45-58; Frandsen 1990, 183; 189; KRIt V, 528:12-530:4; 535:1-536:2; VI, 108:15; 117:5-117-12). During these strikes the workers travelled to the nearby mortuary temples in an attempt to collect the shortfall, but were often told that they held no grain either (Frandsen 1990, 183; 189). Even when rations were procured, for example from the temple of Horemheb in Ramesses III’s Year 29 (O. Berlin P.10633: KRIt V, 529:15-530:1), they were not the full amount ensuring that the protests continued sporadically from Year 29 of Ramesses III through to Year 4 of Ramesses IV (RAD 45-48). Although these supply issues appear to have been resolved at this point, with no similar records in the day-books covering subsequent reigns, the problem reappeared under Ramesses IX and continued into the reign of his successor Ramesses X (KRIt VI, 570-74; Vernus 2003, 65-66; Eyre 2012, 136). As such, these supply issues could be considered a re-occurring problem throughout the Twentieth Dynasty, but with the loss of the village’s records following the abandonment of the Deir el-Medina at the end of the dynasty it is impossible to know if such conditions might have continued into the Libyan Period. It is also unclear from the records themselves as to whether these supply problems were the product of wider issues with the economy, or if they actually reflect issues with the administration of the period instead (O’Connor 1983, 229). Some of the strikes in the Turin Strike Papyrus were also protests against corruption (Frandsen 1990, 185-186), emphasising that there were a number of reasons behind them and perhaps indicating that they were not related to the wider economy.
The large rise in grain prices during the mid-Twentieth Dynasty has also been taken as demonstrating increasing problems with food production, and thus economic problems. The prices come from a number of papyri across the entire dynasty and reveal an increase in the value of grain which did not stop and eventually level off until the reign of Ramesses VIII/IX (Černý 1933, 176-177; Janssen 1975b, 114; 122; O’Connor 1983, 220). These records seem to demonstrate that grain had become scarce and expensive which, as this was the basis for the wider economy (Haring 1997, 13), suggests that there were economic problems during the uncertainty of the later Twentieth Dynasty. The majority of these prices come from the village of Deir el-Medina and, other than a possible increase in the price of oil (Janssen 1975b, 522), there is no indication of an increase in the price of any of the other commodities known from the village (Janssen 1975b, 553).

Apparently supporting the interpretation of food supply problems is the only reference to famine during the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods. This comes from the reign of Ramesses XI, in his Year 19 (Year 1 of the whm-mswt), from the recto of P. BM 10052; ‘She said, ‘I received it as payment for barley in the year of hyenas when people were hungry’ (Peet 1977, Pl. XXII; KRIh VI, 791:5-9). This reference to famine, however, forms part of a record of the trial of those who had robbed tombs during the previous few years, a period when Egypt was undergoing a civil war between Panehsy the king’s son of Kush and Ramesses XI. This conflict had a clear impact on the economy of the Theban region, demonstrated by the looting of the temples of Medinet Habu and the Ramesseum described in P. BM 10403 and P. BM 10383, as well as the wider tomb robberies. As a result of the evidence in the robbery papyri, it cannot be conclusively determined whether this famine
was a product of the decline of the economy, or simply the devastation to the Theban region caused by the civil war.

The impact of this civil war on the Theban region, and at the very least the economy in that region, suggests that the other various conflicts that took place throughout the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods would have had similar immediate effects. All of these could have affected the economy through the diversion of resources from building, destruction or requisition of crops for military efforts and the destruction and/or looting of cities and temples. That these conflicts would have an impact on the economy is supported by statements from Piye’s ‘Victory stela’ where he describes ordering repairs to the damage done to Memphis following his capture of the city (Grimal 1981, 104-105), and from some of the accounts of the loot taken in Neo-Assyrian invasions of Egypt under Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal (Onasch 1994, Prism A II: 34-48). Whilst these would have caused an immediate effect, however, there is limited evidence for a lasting economic impact (Kemp 1989, 346), with Ramesses III not apparently affected by the civil wars at the end of the Nineteenth Dynasty. Similarly, the Assyrian invasions under the later Kushite rulers appear not to have affected the economy, judging by the large donations for the installation of Psamtk i’s daughter as GWA (Ritner 2009a, 575-582). The incidence of conflict during these periods is also far too sporadic to have caused long-term effects to the economy and there remains no evidence to suggest that they brought about lasting changes.

There is also some evidence which suggests that there may have been some price fluctuations at the end of the Nineteenth Dynasty (Janssen 1975b, 122). In particular, the evidence for the depreciation of the value of silver in relation to copper under the late Nineteenth Dynasty (Janssen 1975a, 178; Haring 2009, 8) may indicate problems in sourcing
these materials, possibly because of Cyprus’ collapse and subsequent disappearance from LBA trade networks (Wilson J. 1951, 274; Haring 2009, 8; Capellini and Caramello 2010, 30). That trade generally declined or even collapsed during the LBA destructions is widely accepted, along with recognition that this would have adversely affected the Egyptian economy (Wilson J. 1951, 274; Liverani 1987, 69; Redford 1992, 283-284; Gunder Frank 1993, 403; Moreno Garcia 2013b, 95). For Egypt the disintegration of international trade would have limited access to silver, copper, tin, wood, resin, and other items unavailable in Egypt itself (Redford 1992, 283-284; Kitchen 2012, 20; Haider 2012; 154; Moreno Garcia 2013a, 95, Jurman 2015a, 59), along with the loss of markets for its main exports (Warburton 2000, 96). The loss of Palestine and Nubia would have increased this effect, by cutting Egypt off from the overland trade routes to Africa and Mesopotamia, as well as losing the supply of gold from Nubia (Elat 1978, 25). Egypt was either unable to provide these resources at all or in insufficient quantities for its needs, this being particularly true of copper and silver (Capellini and Caramello 2010, 29-30; Jurman 2015a, 59). If trade broke down completely in this period, then it would certainly have become harder to import these materials. The LBA was a high point of international trade, with even bulk goods such as grain being shipped around the Eastern Mediterranean by vessels from a number of different states (Sherratt and Sherratt 1991, 372-373; Holladay 2001, 182; Vidal 2006, 269). The collapse of the states around the Eastern Mediterranean at the end of the LBA would have resulted in the loss of overseas trade posts and partners which, coupled with a proposed rise in piracy across the region (Warburton 2000, 96), disrupted LBA trade networks (Liverani 1987, 69; Monroe 2009, 295-296; Finkelstein et al. 2013, 166-167). The

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184 A proposal based primarily on texts from Ugarit, supported by the Tale of Wenamun, detailing threatening ships off the coast, as well as ones near Cyprus (Singer 1999, 721; 728).
breakdown of this network is argued to have severely impacted not only the Egyptian economy, but also those of other states due to the highly integrated nature of the LBA world system, with the loss of even one member causing the collapse of the entire system (Gunder Frank 1993, 385; Sherratt and Sherratt 1993, 418; Morris 2005, 693-694; Monroe 2009, 295-296; Cline 2014, 165-166).

The significance of the loss of international trade is indicated by the fact that the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s foreign policy of countering Assyrian influence in Syria and Palestine appears to have been, at least partially, motivated by Assyrian attempts to restrict and control the region’s trade with Egypt (Gunder Frank 1993, 403; Sherratt and Sherratt 1993, 418; Liverani 1987, 69). This control was achieved by banning Levantine and Phoenician ports under Assyrian control from trading with Egypt and setting up a trading centre at the ‘Brook of Egypt’ (Elat 1978, 26-27), located somewhere on the main land route from Egypt to the Near East the ‘Ways of Horus’ (Morkot 2000, 124). This, combined with the fact that the Kushite kings were prepared to instigate rebellions in Syria and Palestine, reinforced by Egyptian armies, to maintain their access to the region (Elat 1978, 34), gives a clear indication of the importance of this trade and suggests it could have been similarly important in earlier periods.

The surviving textual evidence from this late New Kingdom, Libyan and Kushite Periods does not provide any direct references to trade, but there are, however, mentions of contact between Egypt and other states in one of the few literary works dating to these periods, the Tale of Wenamun (Ritner 2009a, 87-99). This text clearly indicates that there

185 It is unclear exactly where the ‘Brook of Egypt’ is located, and indeed it may refer to a number of locations (Hooker 1993, 207). The traditional suggestion that it should be identified with the Wadi el-Arish is disputed, but it is clear that its location was in the area surrounding Raphia and may have moved within that area depending on the Assyrian records (Hooker 1993, 207-208)
was trade between Egypt and the Levant at the start of the Twenty-First Dynasty, with the Prince of Byblos specifically mentioning that both Egyptian and foreign ships were conducting trade between the two (1: 50-2: 2; Ritner 2009a, 94). The brief mention of trade in the *Tale of Wenamun* is supported by evidence from the Cape Gelidonya shipwreck, dated to the reign of Ramesses III or IV (Giveon 1985, 101). The cargo found on that shipwreck demonstrates contacts with several Eastern Mediterranean regions including Cyprus, Greece, and Syria (Bass 1961, 271-275; Haider 2012, 154-156), and therefore strongly suggests that Eastern Mediterranean trade was occurring under the Twentieth Dynasty. It seems, therefore, that whilst there may have been a short period where trade declined or disappeared at the time of the LBA collapse, around the time of the end of the Nineteenth Dynasty, by the time of the late Twentieth or early Twenty-First Dynasty some trade networks had been re-established. Certainly the evidence of foreign pottery from burials throughout the TIP and across Egypt seems to indicate that trade continued with the rest of the eastern Mediterranean during the eleventh and tenth centuries BC (Aston 2009b, 348). Indeed, it is not entirely clear that a decline occurred even during the end of the Nineteenth Dynasty as evidence from Ugarit shows that large-scale trade occurred right up until its destruction at a point roughly around the reign of Siptah (Lackenbacher 1995, 77-83; Cline 2014, 152).

It is not only the surviving evidence which is used to suggest economic conditions during the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite periods. The absence of inscriptional

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186 Although the *Tale of Wenamun* is not a historical text but a work of fiction (see Chapter 2 n.83 for details), it is probable that it records the political situation at the time it was written (Egberts 1998, 94; 108), at some point in the Twenty-First or Twenty-Second Dynasty (see Chapter 2 n.84), and thus also reflects the trade relations of the time.

187 The destruction of Ugarit, an important trade partner especially for the grain trade to the Hittites, is currently dated to Siptah’s reign (Yon 1992, 120).
evidence for some important activities present during the late New Kingdom has also supported the interpretation that the economy was a key dynamic behind the changes during the Libyan and Kushite Period. In particular the absence of inscriptions recording a key activity of New Kingdom kings, military campaigns, is seen as reflecting the decline in economic power of the kings. The textual evidence for military campaigns is overwhelmingly concentrated in the late New Kingdom and indeed to the reigns of Merneptah and Ramesses III. Even in the late New Kingdom, outside these reigns there is very limited evidence with the very fragmentary remains of a stela from the reign of Ramesses IV (Peden 1994a, 69-72) and mention of an expedition under Ramesses IX against the Shasu in the eastern desert in a letter sent to the HPA (P. Egyptian Society of Papyrology: Document C 8-19: Peden 1994a, 73-75). Following this there is no further textual evidence for a military campaign organised by a king until Shoshenq I’s major expedition into the Levant, as recorded on the walls of Karnak. This marks a significant shift from the earlier Nineteenth Dynasty where Ramesses I, Sety I, and Ramesses II all organised large campaigns into the Levant to secure Egyptian control.

This may be, at least in part, due to the product of the poor survival of the key political centres in the north. There may well have been other campaigns whose records have been lost, due to the fragmentary remains of key cities such as Pi-Ramesses and Tanis. What textual references to campaigns that have survived all come from Upper Egypt and Nubia. It possibly also reflects that the Egyptians had a change in attitude towards the role of military campaigns following Ramesses II and Hattushili III’s peace treaty. The known campaigns following this point were designed to suppress rebellions as with the Levantine campaign in Merneptah’s ‘Israel’ stela, or to protect Egypt from large-scale incursions, as
apparent in Merneptah’s Karnak Inscription and Ramesses III’s Year 5, 8 and 11 inscriptions, rather than to expand the territory under Egyptian control. This suggests that there might have been a shift in the importance of military campaigns for Egyptian kings; a possibility in a period where the ideology of Egyptian kingship underwent significant alterations (Baines 1995, 34; 37).

This lack of evidence for military campaigns being conducted by the rulers of the late New Kingdom and Libyan Period is mirrored by a similar lack of evidence for monumental construction for much of those periods. Following Ramesses III’s reign there is very limited evidence for any construction being carried out by the Twentieth Dynasty kings, bar the royal tombs in the Valley of the Kings and attempts to complete the Assasif mortuary temple by Ramesses IV, V, and VI (Peden 1994b, 50), with it suggested that there was a similar dearth of construction following the large-scale construction under the Twenty-Second Dynasty (Perdu 2003, 137-138; Kitchen 2012, 20; Eyre 2012, 139). This supposed lack of temple construction following Ramesses III, and again after Shoshenq I, could indicate there were issues regarding the funding of large projects, and indeed has been interpreted as such by Butzer (2012, 3634), Hassan (2000, 136), Hikade (2006, 165), and Warburton (2000, 92). This interpretation, however, may well be the result of bias within the surviving evidence towards the south, especially since the Delta was where the majority of later dynasties were based (Leahy 1985, 52). There is evidence of large-scale construction work at Tanis, Bubastis, and el-Hibeh (amongst others) under the Twenty-First and Twenty-Second Dynasties, with Psusennes I constructing the first dateable elements of the temple of Amun at Tanis, and Osorkon I and II adding temples to Bubastis and Tanis during their reign. Even later kings carried out some level construction, with Shoshenq V adding a monumental gateway to
Tanis (Arnold 1999, 41). Building work was, therefore, occurring throughout the periods under study, but it was no longer focused in Upper Egypt where monuments have better survived leading. During the Libyan and Kushite Periods most important centres were located in either the north or in Nubia and as these probably received the vast majority of construction this has led to this false impression of a hiatus in construction,

Alongside this evidence for supply issues, or economic deterioration, some of the surviving evidence appears to show the structure of the Egyptian economy changing during the late New Kingdom. In particular, the Harris and Wilbour papyri are interpreted by some scholars as demonstrating the growing wealth and economic control of the temples (Gardiner 1961, 297; Warburton 2000, 93). P. Harris records an enormous quantity of donations, especially of land, to the temples of Egypt by Ramesses III, as well as works that king had carried out those temples (P. Harris 2-74; Grandet 1994a, 225-332). This shows that the temples of Amun at Thebes received the largest share of his donations, followed by those at Heliopolis and Memphis (P. Harris 2-56; Grandet 1994a, 225-302). This evidence for this apparent large-scale shift of resources from royal to temple control appears to be supported by the evidence from P. Wilbour showing the temple of Amun at Thebes, among others, in control of large portions of land in Middle Egypt by the reign of Ramesses V (Gardiner 1948b, 197). Such economic importance is also partially suggested by the Libyan dynasts of the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Dynasties placing sons as HPA and, later, daughters as GWA in order to have control over the region and its resources. This may also have been a product of the political importance of the temple of Amun and the prestige of those positions, or a combination of the two.
There are a number of issues with this interpretation of the Harris and Wilbour papyri. It is unclear to what extent the records of donations in P. Harris reflect new donations, rather than simply the re-assigning of land from one temple to another or the restoration of older endowments (Eyre 2012, 110-112). It has been suggested, for example, that Ramesses III’s temple at Medinet Habu was transferred part of the estate of the Ramesseum, rather than receiving new land donations (Haring 1998, 393; Muhs 2016, 123).

It is also unclear to what extent the temples actually ‘controlled’ the land they were given or whether they were simply transferred an area’s revenues (Haring 1998, 84-85), making suggestions that these donations reflect a shift in the structure of the economy problematic.

Likewise, P. Wilbour does not provide definitive evidence of the temples distinct control over land, with it recording royal officials cultivating land administered by temples (Gardiner 1948b, 20-21).

This interpretation is also affected by evidence for the wealth of the kings of the Libyan and Kushite Periods. The Tanite royal burials, in particular, provide a useful indicator of the state of, at least, the royal finances during the Libyan Period. Their radically different structural style in comparison to the royal tombs of the New Kingdom has been suggested as a product of a lack of resources to produce the large monumental tombs of the New Kingdom (Breasted 1909, 524-525; Gardiner 1961, 317; Perdu 2003, 138; Cooney 2011, 5). Their contents, however, counter this impression of the northern rulers having access to limited resources, with Psusennes I and Shoshenq IIa found in solid silver internal coffins, and numerous other gold and silver objects found in the burials (Aston 2009b, 41-60), as does the contents of other elite burials such as Padiese (A)’s at Mit Rahina with its silver coffin (JE 86109: Aston 2009b, 80). As a result, the change in burial style was probably more
connected to changing attitudes towards burials during the Third Intermediate Period (Aston 2009b, 397; Cooney 2011, 4-5), rather than a lack of access to resources.¹⁸⁸

Whilst there are limited surviving economic records from the Libyan Period, with much of that coming from the Twenty-First Dynasty, those that have survived indicate that the economic conditions from the Twentieth Dynasty continued into the Twenty-First Dynasty (Kemp 1989, 346; Dembitz 2010, 43-44). In particular, in an oracular inscription on a column in the temple of Khonsu, the HPA Menkheperre recording Amun’s approval of his purchasing some land for the temple, Amun decreed that that the value should be one silver equal to sixty deben, with an additional forty deben to be added by the HPA (Dembitz 2010, 42). One deben of silver had equalled one hundred deben of copper during the reign of Ramesses II, but the value of silver actually stated by Amun, of sixty deben of copper, was what it was under Ramesses IX (Janssen 1975b, 106). As a result, it is clear that the value of silver normally used was the same as it had been under the late Twentieth Dynasty, certainly suggestive that economic conditions were the same into the Libyan Period (Dembitz 2010, 44). Mentions of land belonging to temples of Amenhotep III, Ramesses III, and Ramesses IV in the remains of a land registry document, P. Ashmolean 1945.94 and Louvre AF 6345, dated to the Twenty-First/ Twenty-Second Dynasty (Haring 1997, 333-334; 340-341; 392), further suggests that some of the late New Kingdom economic institutions were operating throughout the intervening period of time.

There is one form of economic evidence, however, which could provide a clearer indication of changes in economic conditions, or at least of the state of royal finances, throughout the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods. These are royal donation

¹⁸⁸ The changes to burial structure and style will be examined in more detail in chapter 5.
texts, examples of which are known from across the entire time period, and indeed from across the country (Perdu 2003, 137-138). As a result, they are perhaps the best available evidence for providing any coherent indications of whether economic conditions should be considered as a dynamic within the late New Kingdom and into the Libyan and Kushite Periods.

Texts recording royal donations survive from the reigns of Ramesses III, Ramesses IV, Osorkon I, Takeloth II, Pamiu, Taharqa, and Psamtik I. The donation lists from Ramesses III and Shoshenq I’s reigns, however, are mostly within inscriptions detailing military campaigns and victories which means that these inscriptions provide little to no evidence for the state of royal finances, but rather the success of that king’s campaign and the loot gained from it. There are also issues with making use of the record of Ramesses III’s temple donations listed in P. Harris. Firstly, this is by far the most comprehensive record of donations, including temples across Egypt and covering the entirety of Ramesses III’s thirty-year reign. This means that its totals are likely to be far above any of the other surviving records, which are often for only a few years and to a single, specific temple. As mentioned above, it is also unclear, particularly for donations of land, whether these were ‘new’

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189 In the inscriptions recording Ramesses III’s victories over the Libyans in his Year 11 (KRit V, 50:5-54:10), as well as the extensive record of donations to the temples of Egypt carried out during his reign in P. Harris (1, 2-66; Grandet 1994b, 225-332), and in a donation stela from Medamud (KRit V, 227:1-227:14).
190 This comes from a stela in the British Museum, BM 500, recording a donation given by the king to a member of the court (KRit VI, 83:15-85:8).
191 These were recorded on a pillar in the temple of Atum at Bubastis constructed by Osorkon I (Ritner 2009, 249-258).
192 Osorkon (B)’s donations are listed in the CPO, whilst the donation on behalf of Karoama was inscribed on a small stela added to the chapel of Osiris pl dd ‘nh (Cairo JE 36159; Ritner 2009a, 379-380).
193 As part of the ‘Heliopolitan Annals’, which although probably also included donations by both Shoshenq III before him and Shoshenq V after, only Pamiu’s have survived in a legible condition and even his are very fragmentary (Bickel et al. 1998, 31-39; Ritner 2009a, 44-46).
194 These come from Taharqa’s extensive Kawa records, specifically Kawa III and VI, (NY Carlsberg Glyptotek 1707 and Merowe Museum 53: Ritner 2009a, 527-535; 545-552).
195 From the ‘Adoption Stela’ recording the adoption of Psamtik I’s daughter as heir to the GWA (Cairo JE 36327: Ritner 2009a, 575-582).
donations, restatements of existing donations including those of Ramesses III, or reassignments from other institutions (Eyre 2012, 110-112). As the donations are listed as ‘annual allocations’ (P. Harris 32a: 9; Grandet 1994a, 267-268), even simply selecting one of the temples to try and avoid the issues raised due to the better preservation of the records in P. Harris is insufficient to balance the information available as there is no detail on whether these ‘annual allocations’ actually represent annual donations, or an average of what was given annually during Ramesses III’s reign, in order to be sure of comparing it with the Libyan and Kushite records on an equal basis.

A further issue is that many of the Libyan and Kushite records include completely different items, with particular items often added depending on the nature of the donation. Metals, however, do provide a relatively good item for comparison, as they are often listed as an item being donated, and other donated items were often given a value in deben of silver and gold, probably relating to the amounts of those metals included (Jurman 2015a, 60). For the purposes of the discussion here the relative significance of the various metals, copper, gold, and silver, is not relevant. The suggestion that silver may have become more valuable than gold, or at least changed its cultural value, during the Third Intermediate Period has also recently been examined by Jurman with him concluding that there is insufficient archaeological or textual evidence to support such an argument (2015a, 56-59). This does not take into account the other goods, particularly lapis lazuli or incense measured in deben, or amounts of grain, or clothing that were often included in these donations, nor the many items which were not given a specific value. Despite this, by comparing a single type of donation as a measurement of value across the whole time period it does avoid the
difficulty of the lack of available prices or values for the majority of these goods during the
Libyan and Kushite Periods.

Neither the donation stela from the reign of Ramesses III nor that of Princess
Karoama, or the text recording the adoption of Nitocris record any amounts of metal being
donated. Instead these record the donation of land, 50 arourae (KRlt V, 227:10), 35 arourae
(Ritner 2009a, 380: 3), and 3300 arourae (Ritner 2009a, 582: 30), respectively. As a result it is
possible to argue that the rulers and royal families remained able to dispose of land and
reorganise its ownership throughout the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods, as
these records date to the reigns of Ramesses III, Takeloth II, and Psamtik I and thus across
the entire time period. An issue with this interpretation is the known reduction of the role of
the king on other donation stelae from the Libyan Period (Yoyotte 1961, 30-31; Leahy 1985,
59; Jansen-Winkeln 1999, 17; Moje 2014, 5; 107), such as S. Abemayor which did not name
Shoshenq V despite being dated using his regnal years (Ritner 2009a, 436-437). As a result,
the royal texts perhaps reflect those ruler’s individual resources or control rather than a
pattern across the entire time period. The significant differences in the purposes of these
texts; a royal donation to an individual from Ramesses III’s reign (KRlt V, 192), the
establishment of a dowry from Takeloth II’s (Fazzini 1988, 16) and the creation of an estate
to support the new heir to the GWA from Psamtik I’s (Ritner 2009a, 575-582), also raises
issues as to whether these texts can be compared.

The texts containing donations of silver do not have such issues, with them all
recording royal donations to temples, often over a number of years. One, that of Osorkon I,
merely contains all the donations that took place during the first four years of his reign and
so may well be to a number of institutions and should thus be excluded from the
comparison. This leaves the donations carried out by Osorkon (B) under Takeloth II and Shoshenq III at Thebes, Pimay’s donations at Heliopolis, and Taharqa’s at Kawa. These all contain donations of the three main metals, copper, silver, and gold, in varying amounts. Osorkon (B) donated 156 deben and 3 kite of gold, 535 deben and 6 kite of silver, and 1000 deben of copper over a period of around decade. From the small section of Pamiu’s records that can be read he donated 56 deben of silver over the course of around four years. Finally Taharqa donated 18,975 deben of silver, 1182 deben and 9 kite of gold, and 9360 deben of copper over a period of eight years.

These amounts suggest a number of possible economic trends in the Libyan and Kushite Periods in terms of the amount being donated. There is some evidence for a decline in amounts from Osorkon (B) to Pimay, but the latter’s records are so fragmentary that it is impossible to say for certain. The metal amounts donated by Osorkon (B), however, largely include the value weight of large objects donated, such as a ‘silver offering table’ which was given a value of 200 deben (CPO 2: 11; Ritner 2009a, 371). Jurman has noted, however, that such weights do not necessarily reflect the weight of the metal given but rather the weight of the statue or temple furniture that they had been applied to (2015a, 58-59). Certainly the evidence of silver and gold fragments and objects from Pamiu’s tomb at Tanis does not support an interpretation of a decline in royal fortunes, especially as the tomb was robbed in antiquity (Aston 2009b, 60 [TG 10]). Indeed, this conclusion is further supported by the probable existence of donations of Shoshenq III, IV, and V recorded alongside Pamiu’s (Bickel

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196 It would probably also have to be excluded on the grounds that Osorkon I’s reign immediately followed that of Shoshenq I and thus the very large quantities listed in his donations, of at least 2,041,620 deben of silver for example (Ritner 2009a, 254-255), may well have been affected by the loot taken by Shoshenq I on his campaign (Kitchen 1986, 303).
1998, 42; Ritner 2009a, 44) and the looted remains of Shoshenq III and IV’s burials at Tanis (Aston 2009b, 59).

The only other possible trend is the clear increase in the amounts donated by Taharqa as suggesting a significant improvement in economic conditions during the Kushite Periods. The amounts of metals donated by Taharqa were far greater than those given by either Osorkon (B) or Pimay, certainly appearing to support this interpretation. There is one issue with this interpretation, however, which is that Taharqa’s donations were designed to establish a cult at a temple which he had ordered constructed (Welsby 2002, 34), something that would require far more material than those of an annual donation to an already established cult like those of Osorkon (B) and Pimay. This difference in the nature of the donations is probably reflected in the fact that Osorkon (B) donated a large quantity of grain, 11,766 khar, as part of his donations, and Pimay’s records specifically mention providing cooked food, and daily food and beer offerings, as well as 15 khar of wheat (CPO 2: 12-18 - Ritner 2009a, 371-32; Bickel et al. 1998, 36-38; Ritner 2009a, 45). In contrast Taharqa’s records do not mention any grain donations, with the focus on items needed for establishing a cult, including astrologers (Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek AEIN 1707 [Kawa III]: 6; Ritner 2009a, 527-535) and clothes for the temple staff (Kawa III: 9 - Ritner 2009a, 527-535; Merowe Museum No. 53 [Kawa VI]: 13 - Ritner 2009a, 545-552). Such a difference in purpose of these donations may well explain some of the discrepancy between the amounts donated by Taharqa and those of Osorkon (B) and Pimay. Despite this, it is certainly possible that the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty saw an increase in the wealth of the country due to their control over

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197 This is something that is also suggested in connection with the environmental conditions during the Libyan and Kushite Periods as discussed in the first section of this chapter.
the Nubian gold mines, with this perhaps reflected in the greater amounts of precious metals being donated by Taharqa.

There is similarly no evidence of a trend in the types of items being donated, with most items being given by at least some rulers even if not all.\footnote{For example, lapis lazuli is listed in various amounts as being given by Osorkon I (Ritner 2009a, 252-253:4-6), Osorkon (B) (Ritner 2009a, 371:7), and Taharqa (Kawa III: Ritner 2009a, 533:9), whilst grain is listed as an item in those of Ramesses IV (KRit VI, 84:8), Osorkon (B) (Ritner 2009a, 373-374), Pimay (Bickel et al. 1998, 37-38), and Psamtik I (Ritner 2009a, 580-582).} This variation in itself demonstrates the issues with the argument that economic decline was a key dynamic of the Libyan and Kushite Periods. Despite the incomplete status of the majority of the records from the Libyan Period it is clear that royal donations were occurring on a relatively regular basis, and could be of a considerable size even quite late in the Libyan period and thus by rulers, or members of royal families, who did not control the whole of Egypt. For example Osorkon (B)’s donation in Takeloth II’s Year 24, with 208 deben of silver, 151 deben 3 kite of gold, and 1,000 deben of copper was larger than any of those carried out by Taharqa at Kawa from his Year 2 until his Year 6. Unfortunately Pimay’s records and those of his immediate predecessors and successors are too fragmentary to get a clear sense of the scale of their donations. What little is intelligible, however, does show that throughout the Libyan Period the Libyan kings were making repeated donations containing at least some quantity of precious metal, possibly as demonstrations of their privilege and piety (Perdu 2003, 137-138; this possibility will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter).
3.4 Commentary, including cross-cultural comparisons

Economic conditions are not only suggested as being an important dynamic within Egypt, with them appearing in connection with a number of societies, from the LBA Eastern Mediterranean to Mesoamerica. These provide some comparative examples, some of which have been used to support interpretations regarding the Egyptian economy. Others, however, not only help our understanding of the surviving Egyptian evidence, but also support the rejection of some interpretations of the economic evidence. This section will comment on the interpretations that see the economy as a key dynamic in the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods, making reference to both the evidence previously discussed and to relevant comparative examples.

As outlined above, the evidence for changing environmental conditions in Egypt during the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods is limited, with the low levels in Ethiopian lakes supported by surveys of the Nile channels in Nubia, and two paleo-climatic studies. Alone this is not enough to argue definitively that Egypt was suffering from a period of drought during the late New Kingdom and Libyan Period, especially in light of a similar lack of evidence revealing the effects of such a drought despite the large quantity of evidence from the Twentieth Dynasty. This interpretation, therefore, is significantly supported by comparisons with the drought’s effect on the wider LBA Eastern Mediterranean and through comparisons with the end of the Old Kingdom. There remain issues with both of these comparisons however.

Whilst it is still unclear to what extent environmental change actually occurred in the Eastern Mediterranean as a whole (Weiss 1982, 195), it has become increasingly disputed that it was actually the cause for the collapse of the Mycenaean or Hittite societies (Drews
This reassessment of environmental problems as the prime cause of collapse is part of a wider reconsideration of their impact (Maher et al. 2011, 3), which has occurred over the last few decades, through reference to a range of societies previously associated with such explanations, including the Lowland Classic Maya and the Third Dynasty of Ur (Lucero 2002; Yoffee 2010, 180-181). This is because, despite evidence for climate change or environmental damage, many theorists see such explanations as inherently deterministic, removing the possibility of action by states or individuals, or presenting them as unsophisticated and thus unable to appreciate their effect on the environment or to solve such problems when they arise (Tainter 2005, S98; Middleton 2012, 258-259). This is particularly true of explanations that employ catastrophes as an explanation for collapse and decline, using them as deus ex machina (Cowgill 1988, 259; Tainter 2000a, 336; Middleton 2012, 266).

Theorists attempting to generate a general theory of collapse and decline originally began this reassessment, with Tainter (1988, 50-51; 2000a, 337) being particularly critical of assigning prime cause to environmental problems. The recent rise in popular histories of environmental collapse, connected to the increasing discussion of climate change, such as Ponting’s ‘A New Green History of the World’ (1996) and Diamond’s ‘Collapse’ (2005), has led to further assessments of the validity of environmental problems as a cause for ancient societal collapse (McIntosh R. et al. 2000, 1-44; Lawler 2010, 907-909; Yoffee and McAnany 2010, 1-20; Middleton 2012) and a general rejection of them as a primary trigger for collapse. Complex societies were probably very good at adapting to environmental changes (Tainter 1988, 50), through their ability to marshal resources and labour. These criticisms have led to attempts to understand environmental changes within the context of the society
that faced them. This shift in approach recognises that environmental change takes place against a background of choices made by social actors and it is these that impact the society’s ability to cope with or influence environmental changes (Eisenstadt 1988, 239; McIntosh R. et al. 2000, 2-3; Freidel and Shaw 2000, 292; Tainter 2000a, 337; Middleton 2012, 285).

These modifications are illustrated by the progression of explanations proposed for the collapse of the Lowland Classic Maya, a civilisation which developed in a much more environmentally unstable environment than ancient Egypt (Gunn and Folan 2000, 237; Webster 2002, 239). These have evolved from the collapse simply being caused by widespread drought (Culbert 1988, 99-101; Hodell 1995, 391-394; Haug et al. 2003, 1731-1735) to Freidel and Shaw’s (2000, 287) argument that the Mayan kings played a key role in mitigating the risks of crop failure, and Lucero’s (2002, 815-817; 822) analysis that problems of water supply directly undermined the ideology of the rulers of the lowland Mayan states.

This change in approach has yet to occur for the late New Kingdom, other than Butzer’s (2012, 3635) proposal that the military campaigns in Ramesses III’s reign would have overburdened an Egyptian economy weakened by low Nile floods. This still leaves no explanation as to why the Egypt’s rulers did not undertake measures to alleviate the effects of any drought such as large scale irrigation projects, as local officials recorded themselves doing in the supposedly similar circumstances of the First Intermediate Period. In several texts from the First Intermediate Period the authors, all nomarchs, describe how they carried out irrigation works or built dams to feed the people under their rule (Bell 1971, 10). Such actions are particularly clear in the tomb inscriptions of the nomarch Khety at Asyut; ‘(3) I blocked up a water course of ten cubits, digging it out for plough-land... (6)I made a
water-way for this town, when Upper Egypt was [in difficulty],\textsuperscript{199} when no water could be seen’ (hieroglyphs in Griffith 1889, Plate 15). It is difficult to explain how the kings of the Twentieth Dynasty could not have carried out similar projects with access to the resources of the entire country rather than a single nome. This is particularly significant as Dean (2000, 96) has demonstrated that societies’ initial responses to systemic stress caused by environmental change is technological responses such as new techniques, tools, and crops.

An important aspect that influences how a society reacts is the social memory of that society, particularly with regard to the environment. This is because it is increasingly clear that humanity does not react to changes to the environment itself, but rather to their perceptions of it (McIntosh R. et al. 2000, 6-7; Freidel and Shaw 2000, 280). Regular variability in environmental events creates or reinforces memories of them, and thus creates a store of knowledge about how to cope with their effects (Dean 2000, 106). As well as regular occurrences and their variations societies also deliberately preserve information about extreme events, such as droughts, floods, and insect outbreaks, and how to minimise their effects (McIntosh R. et al. 2000, 25; Dean 2000, 107), and particularly rare events may even enter the social consciousness of the society involved (Dean 2000, 107; Hassan 2000, 121). In the absence of surviving records detailing the effects of low Nile floods on Egypt awareness of their impact can be detected through references to earlier problems, possibly visible in the reference to an event of Thutmosis III’s reign in the ‘flood graffito’ from Luxor temple from Osorkon III’s reign (Ritner 2009a, 419: 41), or through indications of their significance in the wider Egyptian culture.

\textsuperscript{199} The meaning of the final word of this sentence \textit{pghw} remains unclear (Lichtheim 1988, 29).
For ancient Egypt a key element of the social memory about the environment would have been the volatility of the height of the annual floods (Hassan 2000, 134). Such volatility is clearly apparent in any of the surviving records of the annual floods, such as those from Old Kingdom recorded at Aswan which had a range of over one metre (Seidlmayer 2001, 81-89), or those on fragments of the Palermo stone (Kemp 1989, 64). This volatility could lead to severe effects both with extremely high and low Nile floods, although these extremes do not appear to have occurred that regularly (Seidlmayer 2001, 104). Despite the limited number of NLR from the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods this volatility is clearly apparent both within short periods, as in the respective heights from Takeloth III’s Year 5 (+0.715m) and Year 6 (-0.355m), but also across the entire period. The range is significant with the highest and lowest records differing by nearly two metres, from the low of -0.92m in Takeloth I’s reign to +0.84 in Taharqa’s reign. The standard deviation within the surviving NLR also shows this extensive volatility in the heights of the annual flood, with a figure of 0.37.200 Interestingly, however, it seems that despite there being extensive variation in the level of the floods, very few of these were either extremely low or extremely high. This is apparent in the fact that eleven of the records, five ‘low’ and six ‘high’ fall outside one standard deviation away from the mean (0.3876), only 27.5% of the total surviving NLR (see Table 2). Such results correlate with similar results that Seidlmayer found in his analysis of records from the Old Kingdom, Greek, and Roman Periods (2001, 105), further suggesting that the annual floods within the Libyan and Kushite Periods were representative of ‘normal’ environmental conditions. This is only further supported by Psamtik I’s NLR (nos. 39, 40, 41, and 42) which shows that similar conditions continued, at

200 The higher figure the greater the average deviation from the mean, and thus indicating considerable variation within the data set.
least, into the early Twenty-Sixth Dynasty. The evidence from the NLR also shows that the Egyptian administration would have had to manage constant variation in the flood levels, and understood how to cope with both extremely high and low floods since there was a one in four probability (based on the data from the Libyan and Kushite NLR) that the flood would be very low or very high. Whilst the consequences of such floods would probably have been preserved in records, they would also have left an imprint on the Egyptian social memories of the environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reign and year date</th>
<th>NLR</th>
<th>Height measured from floor of Hypostyle hall (m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year ?</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year 8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year 14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year ?</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedubast I Year 18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-0.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedubast I Year 23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon III Year 3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon III Year 28 (Year 5 of Takeloth III)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabataka Year 3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taharqa Year 6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psamtik I Year 10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The volatility of the annual flood and particularly a succession of low Nile floods, as may have occurred at the end of the Old Kingdom and during the First Intermediate Period, would have been important elements of Egyptian social memories of the environment. That the probable consequences of such events were known even in the New Kingdom is clear
from the existence of copies of earlier texts which detailed the consequences of low Niles, particularly the copy of the *Lament of Ipuwer* known from the later New Kingdom (Enmarch 2005, 10). Although these accounts were often literary and thus propagandistic in nature, demonstrating the importance of the king (Moeller 2005, 165-166), the presentation of the disastrous consequences of the failure of the annual flood would still have acted as a warning. Such accounts of the serious consequences of a drought caused by low Niles would have formed an important aspect of the Egyptians’ approach to the environment (Hassan 2000, 136-137). This in turn would have informed later responses as to how to alleviate those problems if they reappeared (Assmann 2011, 37).

That the Egyptians did not appear to undertake any of the solutions carried out in the First Intermediate Period is strongly suggestive that they did not perceive the conditions during the late New Kingdom to require them. The currently available climatic data also shows that the period of increased aridity and low Niles began in c.1500 BC and was thus a factor (to a greater or lesser extent) for the entirety of the New Kingdom (Rohling et al. 2009, 5; Eyre 2012, 107). There have been, therefore, inadequate attempts to explain why the conditions of the late New Kingdom were sufficiently different from earlier in the same period that the state would have been unable to cope with a climatic effect that had been present for nearly three centuries.

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201 That these record a period of actual famine is disputed by a number of scholars (Coulon 1997, 128-132; Moeller 2005, 165-166; Coulon 2008, 2-3). They have noted that such phraseology is tied up with the ideological associations of the king as ‘nourishing the land’ and thus that the use of famine texts reflects the social anarchy of the period (Coulon 2008, 2-3) and the new role of the nomarchs as ‘dispensers of food’ (Coulon 1997, 128-132; Moeller 2005, 165-166; Coulon 2008, 3; Contardi 2015, 18). Whilst it is likely that the descriptions of famine might well have been exaggerated by the nomarchs in their biographical inscriptions, even Moeller notes that they do reflect a period of food supply problems (2005, 166; Contardi 2015, 16-17). As a result whilst I accept that there may not have been widespread famine, I would argue that it is unlikely that such a motif would be so prevalent without at least severe food supply problems being present, as events in such biographies are often exaggerations of actual events, acknowledged by Coulon (1997, 128), and especially considering that this explanation for the failure of kingship did not reappear during later Intermediate Periods.

202 See previous note for details of some of the activities apparently undertaken by the nomarchs of the First Intermediate Period to alleviate the problem of low Niles.
The shift away from a focus on environmental explanations has been accompanied by re-evaluations of evidence for societal collapses, many of which have direct parallels with those of the late New Kingdom. For example the supposed abandonment of the lowland areas as a result of the Lowland Classic Maya collapse (Abrams and Rue 1988, 381-382), used to demonstrate that the deterioration of the environment had gone too far to support any level of Mayan society (Webster 2002, 328-337; Diamond 2005, 175). This has been rejected on the basis of increasing evidence for the continuation of rural Maya settlement throughout the collapse phase (Aimers 2007, 350-351). In Egypt this is paralleled by the new evidence for the continued, albeit reduced, habitation of settlements in Nubia after the Egyptian withdrawal during the peak of low Nile floods (Welsby 2010, 48-50; Spencer N. et al. 2012, 40; Smith S. 2013, 96-97),203 refuting prior explanations of massive population decline and lack of settlement of the area until the Napatan period (Adams W. 1964, 107).

Beyond possible environmental changes, there were a number of events during these periods, but particularly during the late New Kingdom, which could have provided an impact on the Egyptian economy. These include the various civil wars and invasions throughout the period, the withdrawal from Nubia and the Levant under the Twentieth Dynasty, and the supposed disappearance of the LBA trading networks during the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Dynasties. All of these, however, only provide evidence of short-term effects as noted in the discussion of the evidence for them above. The rejection of a lasting impact for these is supported not only by the lack of evidence for such an associated effect, but also similar events lack of impact for other past societies. A lasting impact for warfare has been rejected for societies which had much higher instances of warfare than the Libyan and

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203 This is also suggested by the inscription of Queen Katimala found at Semna which may indicate that this town remained inhabited (Darnell 2006, 61; Török 2009, 298).
Kushite Periods, particularly for the Lowland Maya. Whilst it appears that warfare had become endemic in the later Classic Mayan period and this had a clear immediate impact, such as the destruction of the city of Tikal (Webster 2002, 192-193), there is significant evidence for the revival of previously defeated and even destroyed sites including Tikal (Webster 2002, 227), so it remains unclear whether invasions would have had a lasting impact on an economy.

Similarly, it is unlikely that the collapse of trade would have significantly hurt royal expenditure. Although some still suggest that foreign trade was a royal prerogative (Janssen 1975a, 163; Bleiberg 1995, 1373), a variety of institutions, private individuals and foreigners were actually conducting Egypt’s trade in the LBA (Kemp 1989, 317-319; Castle 1992, 254; Haring 1997, 15; Warburton 2000, 85; Vidal 2006, 269; Monroe 2009, 192) with the king probably taking a proportion as tax. Royal expenditure was based on the ability to feed the corvée labour required for projects (Warburton 2000, 71), rather than to pay for materials directly and it is likely that there was access to sufficient supplies to outlast any temporary decline of foreign trade, perhaps demonstrated by the quantity of copper Ramesses III brought back from Timna (P. Harris 1, 78: 1-5; Grandet 1994a, 338). It is clear from evidence for large expeditions, including Ramesses IV’s to Wadi Hammamat, Ramesses VII’s to the eastern desert, and Ramesses V’s and Shoshenq I’s to Gebel el-Silsila, that there were sufficient resources for such projects in the Twentieth Dynasty and Libyan Period, making it highly unlikely that the end of LBA trading had a significant effect on the Egyptian economy.

The lack of significance of long-distance trade in ancient economies has also been argued for other societies, including the Hawaiian chiefdoms and Maya (Earle 1997, 75-89; Webster 2002, 231-232), since, as such exchanges are not necessary for the emergence or
maintenance of complex societies as they often focus on prestigious items, their
disappearance cannot therefore be responsible for societal decline or collapse as it did not
affect the majority of the population.

This is also true of the loss of Egypt’s external territories. Despite the large quantities
of grain being recorded as taxation on bowls found at sites, such as Lachish, in the Levant
from the reigns of Ramesses III and IV (Goldwasser 1984, 84-87; Weinstein 2012, 164-171)
and the importance of the Nubian gold mines, this would still have required the Egyptian
economy to have become reliant on the resources that those territories provided. Such
reliance is not apparent from the available evidence, with Libyan kings who had no control
over Nubia donating large sums of both gold and grain to temples across Egypt, for example
those of Osorkon (B) with 156 deben of gold and 11,766 khar of grain. It is also unclear as to
how the Egyptian economy could have become reliant on such resources since it was almost
certainly based on the production of grain within the Nile Valley (Warburton 2000, 71) and
gold was still available from eastern desert, as is clear from Ramesses VIII ordering
expeditions there to retrieve it (P. IFAO; Document A, recto 1: 11-2: 15; Peden 1994a, 101-
106).

Far from supporting a significant deterioration in economic conditions, the available
economic evidence from the Libyan Period appears to show the continuation of the
conditions of the late New Kingdom into at least the Twenty-First Dynasty, specifically the
value of silver to copper and the continued existence of temple estates into the Twenty-
Second Dynasty. Even though the individual donations that were made by the Libyan rulers
appear to have been quite small in comparison to those made by Taharqa, based on the
amounts from surviving inscriptions, it is clear that they were being made on a regular basis.
Whilst it is possible that there was an improvement in economic conditions associated with the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s takeover of Egypt, as indicated in the significantly greater amounts of both gold and silver donated by Taharqa in Kawa III and VI, the differences between the purposes of the various donations does not mean that this can be definitively asserted.

3.5 Summary

The limited evidence for the economic conditions of the Libyan and Kushite Periods makes drawing any definitive conclusions about their role as a key dynamic of the periods difficult. This is compounded by a lack of agreement of how Egypt’s economy would have appeared in ‘normal’ circumstances. The loss of Palestine during the middle of the Twentieth Dynasty may have reduced the income available to the state and the further loss of the remaining territory in Lower Nubia at the end of the dynasty could have compounded this. They cannot, however, have caused the complete breakdown of the Egyptian economy as this would mean that they had been fully integrated into the Egyptian system and that the economy had become reliant on their resources, something for which there remains no evidence. Likewise, the evidence for the wealth of the Libyan and Kushite rulers, reflected in the contents of the royal burials at Tanis, the continuation of New Kingdom economic institutions (Haring 1997, 392), their temple donations, and the apparent stability in many prices from the end of the Twentieth into the Twenty-First Dynasty (Janssen 1975a, 179-180; Dembitz 2010, 44), suggest that any economic decline was short-lived. Indeed, the most significant change in the economy during this period may have been the increasing administrative responsibilities of institutions from the late New Kingdom onwards, such as
the major temples (Haring 1997, 391; 396; 1998, 80; Moreno Garcia 2013b, 13) which, even if not outside state control (Kemp 1989, 256; Haring 1997, 395; 1998, 80), when combined with the rise of powerful local elites could have helped bring about the political division of the country.

Similarly, the evidence for the effect of changing environmental conditions on the Egyptian economy remains far from certain. Despite this my argument should not be seen as a complete dismissal of the idea that declining Nile floods would have presented a challenge or imposed stress on the Egyptian political system. Rather, it rejects viewing changing climate conditions as a definitive answer for the failure of a socio-economic system, as many environmental historians have (Manzanilla 1997, 157-158). There is no direct evidence from Egypt for it being severely affected by the climate change proposed for the late New Kingdom and certainly not at the extent suspected for other LBA states or even itself at the end of the Old Kingdom. Whilst environmental change was certainly a factor throughout the history of ancient Egypt, as is clear from the significant variation in the heights of the surviving NLR, any explanation of events using climate change as a direct cause requires more explanation as to why it was so important at those specific points (Middleton 2012, 272), particularly when the available paleo-climatic data shows that many of these periods of climate change had been occurring for several centuries.

As a result, economic conditions on their own cannot yet be taken as a dynamic behind the alterations that occurred late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods as the surviving evidence is unclear exactly how, when, or for how long an economic decline occurred, because we do not fully understand the structure of the Egyptian economy or how
large it would have been normally, making it difficult to tell whether the changes visible are a product of economic weakness or changes in ideology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reign and year date</th>
<th>NLR no.</th>
<th>Height above/ below floor of Hypostyle hall (m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shoshenq I Year 5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoshenq I Year 6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon I Year 12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year 5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year ?</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year ?</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year 8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year 14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth I Year ?</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon II (or III?) Year 12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon II (or III?) Year 13 (?)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon II (or III?) Year 21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon II (or III?) Year 22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon II (or III?) Year ?</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-0.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon II Year 29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoshenq III Year 6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoshenq III Year 12 and Year 5 of Pedubast</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoshenq III Year 39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedubast I Year 16 and Iuput I Year 2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedubast I Year 18</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-0.435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedubast I Year 19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedubast I Year 23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

204 Of the forty-five records that Legrain recorded two are duplicates (nos. 8 and 35) recording a flood level before the flood peaked and so have not been included here. The remaining three (nos. 43, 44, 45) have very fragmentary inscriptions, particularly a lack of royal or HPA names, to place them chronologically in the period, making them impossible to use to understand chronological changes in the flood levels through the Libyan and Kushite Periods and so have been excluded here.

205 For these I have used the heights as added by Legrain (1896a), rather than Ritner as in the latter he has differs from those written by Legrain with no explanation as to why.

206 Although Ritner (2009a, 40) places this in Osorkon III’s reign, but this cannot be correct as the NLR from Osorkon III’s Year 28 is also dated to Takeloth III’s Year 5 (no. 13) and NLR 4 is dated to Takeloth III’s Year 6 leaving no gap for Osorkon III to be used to record a NLR alone and must therefore date to Osorkon II’s reign.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shoshenq VI Year 6</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>0.23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon III Year 3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon III Year 5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon III Year 6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osorkon III Year 28 and Year 5 of Takeloth III</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeloth III Year 6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabataka Year 3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabaka Year 2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabaka Year 4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabaka Year ?</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taharqa Year 6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taharqa Year 7</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taharqa Year 8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taharqa Year 9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psamtik I Year 10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psamtik I Year 11</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psamtik I Year 17</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psamtik I Year 19</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It has been argued that during the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods there were extensive changes to the ways in which royal religious authority was understood and expressed (Leahy 1985, 58; Baines 1995, 32-33; Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 178-182; Assmann 2002, 297-298). In this chapter these will be examined to identify the processes by which royal religious authority was presented and structured following the end of the New Kingdom.

4.1 The religious authority of the king in the Libyan and Kushite Periods

Much has been made of the apparent decrease in the prestige and power of the king during the Libyan Period, especially following the fragmentation of the country under a number of different rulers (the possible reasons for which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter’s discussion of regionalisation), with that institution’s position only partially restored by the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty (Assmann 1977, 774; 2002, 332; Kitchen 1986, 368; Silverman 1995, 49). Such a change in the way that Egyptian kingship was practised, and understood, can be seen not only in the differences in how the kings and royal families represented themselves, but also in the spread in the use of royal attributes by members of the wider elite, especially the usurpation of the king’s position of mediating with the gods (Yoyotte 1961, 140; Leahy 19875, 59). These changes to the status of the king were mirrored by alterations to the ideology and iconography of Egyptian kingship. In particular, the way the king’s religious authority was structured changed, with the appearance of the Theban
‘theocracy’ of the Twenty-First Dynasty, the political fragmentation of the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Dynasties, and the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s re-emphasis on the king’s association with Amun. Underlying the changes that occurred, however, were also elements of continuity of both the ideology and iconography of Egypt.

During the New Kingdom the ideology of Egyptian kingship had become firmly associated with the maintenance of $MAat$²⁰⁷ through the rule of a single king over a united Egypt who was the main intermediary with the gods (O’Connor 1983, 189-191; Baines 1995, 6; Teeter 1997, 10-11; Smith S. 1997, 85; Grajetzki 2010, 190; Gregory 2014, 113). The king’s role was also to act as intermediary between the gods and the rest of humanity, holding a unique position as a result within Egyptian society (Baines 1995, 10; 26; Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 158). The importance of the king’s religious role was also demonstrated by his joining the other deities upon their death and becoming a god himself, with the large royal cults on the west bank at Thebes established to continue the worship of kings after their death (Baines 1995, 10-11; Silverman 1995, 69). During the New Kingdom there was an increased emphasis on the importance of the divine kingship, represented especially at Luxor temple (Bell L. 1997, 137-180), and on the unbroken line of the succession of kings for the maintenance of Egyptian society and the cosmos, represented in the king-lists of the period, and thus the necessity of its existence for the continuation of Egyptian society (Baines 1995, 43; Gregory 2014, 146). During the late New Kingdom, however, this divine aspect of Egyptian kingship was increasingly pushed upwards, to the gods and to Amun in particular with the king increasingly humanised as a result (Assmann 1989, 266; Baines 1995, 32-33;

²⁰⁷ $MAat$ is taken here to mean the principles of world or cosmic order (Teeter 1997, 1-3; Gregory 2014, 92), with the king’s role in preserving it reflected in the presentation of the image of the goddess to the gods, a common image in New Kingdom monumental royal depictions (Teeter 1997, 3; Gregory 2014, 107-110).
Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 158; 174; Assmann 2002, 305-306). These changes occurred at the same time that elite individuals were increasingly prepared to contact the gods directly. This change is apparent in auto-biographical texts on statues (Perdu 1995, 2252), as on that of Djedkhonsefankh where he makes a direct appeal to the gods (Cairo 559; Lichtheim 1980, 13-17). It is also clear in imagery, with Imiseba, head of the temple scribes in the reign of Ramesses IX, appearing before the gods to make offerings in his tomb (TT65: Porter and Moss I.1, 129-132), and HPA Herihor appearing on a donation stela before the gods without the king in the reign of Ramesses XI (Leiden v 65: Haring 2012, pl. 14).

These changes do not demonstrate a complete alteration in the understanding of the king’s religious role during the later New Kingdom, however, with Ramesses III (Khartoum Museum 3061; KRIt VI, 383:5-383:10), IV (BM 588; KRIt VI, 83:15-84:15), and VIII (Stela Berlin 2081; KRIt VI, 439:5-440:10) all represented on donation stelae before the gods and Ramesses XI appearing before the gods in the reliefs added to the temple of Khonsu (OIP 103, pl. 157-183). The kings of the Twentieth Dynasty continued to construct monuments to house their cults on the west bank at Thebes, with the last known possible evidence for one coming from the reign of Ramesses IX (Bács 2011, 5), revealing a continuation in the ideology of the kings’ role upon their death. Likewise, HPA Ramessesnakht and Amenhotep’s monumental constructions at Dra’ Abu el-Naga (K.93.11 and K93.12), clearly designed to associate themselves with the burials of Seventeenth and early Eighteenth Dynasty kings (Polz 1998, 258; Rummel 2014, 396-397), show that some form of authority and prestige still derived from the inheritance of, or association with the holder of, the kingship of Egypt.

Following on from the theological developments of the position of the king in relation to the gods in the late New Kingdom, this ‘theocratic’ status appears to have been
put into political reality in the Twenty-First Dynasty. Amun was now the ‘true’ ruler of Egypt and the king merely his mortal representative (Römer 1994, 81-84; 454-457; Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 154-156), with the HPA now just as important as the king. This change in status is apparent in the titulary of many of the Theban kings of the first half of the Twenty-First Dynasty. Herihor included his title of HPA within a cartouche (as on the walls of the temple of Khonsu; *OIP* 100, pl. 5-20; von Beckerath 1984, 251: T), as did Menkheperre (von Beckerath 1984, 256: T; Ritner 2009a, 135-136), and Psusennes I (Von Beckerath 1984, 253: T4; E4). Psusennes I also included it as part of his titulary, as on a collar clasp from his tomb (Ritner 2009a, 129-130), whilst Psusennes II had HPA as part of his titulary recorded on the wall of the Ptah chapel at Abydos (Jansen Winkeln 2006a, 222; 2007-2009a, 158). This blurring of the roles between HPA and king is also visible in Pinudjem I’s usurpation of a statue of Ramesses II in the first court of Karnak (Ritner 2009a, 113-114), and having himself depicted in a standard royal pose of kneeling and offering two jugs whilst wearing the nemes headdress, both whilst still HPA (Cairo JE 42191; Ritner 2009a, 112-113). It is also reflected in the literature of the period, with the *Tale of Wenamun* making it clear that it was Amun, and not the king, who ordered him to collect wood from Byblos (Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 154), as well as in the names of the kings and royal family. *Imn-m-nsw* was the name of the second of the Tanite kings (Amenemnisut – ‘Amun-is-king’; von Beckerath 1984, 253: E2)) and Psusennes I and II’s name (*Pš-bḥ-ḥn-nwt*; von Beckerath 1984, 254: E1-2; 255 E1-4) meaning ‘the star who has appeared in Niut (Thebes)’ also showing their connection to Amun through his city. Most clearly, however, it is apparent in the way that even important political decisions were now put before the oracle of Amun at Thebes for approval, as is made clear in both HPA Menkheperre’s ‘Banishment Stela’ where Amun approves the return
of the exiles from the oases (Louvre C.256; Ritner 2009a, 124-128), and in great chief of the Ma Shoshenq (B)’s stela from Abydos, which established a cult for his father Nimlot (A) there after the approval of Amun (Cairo JE 66385; Ritner 2009a, 166-171).

The institution of this ‘theocracy’ during the Twenty-First Dynasty, however, may be a reflection of the need by the new rulers of the country to secure their religious authority in a society where the position of the king had begun to change, and who did not have the automatic legitimacy or authority that came from direct inheritance of the position of king (Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 172-173). By creating a mechanism where all important decisions were approved directly by a deity through an oracle, these rulers would have been provided with direct divine approval and thus unshakeable religious authority to carry out those decisions (Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 174). That the increased role of Amun and his gaining of many royal aspects in the Twenty-First Dynasty did not reflect a complete abandonment of the previous period’s ideological role of the king is apparent in the maintenance of much of the iconography of the Ramesside Period and the dating of inscriptions to the reigns of the Tanite kings (Palmer 2014, 6). For example, in the Ramesside Period an important motif representing the king’s ideological role in preserving of $MA\text{a}t$ was the presentation of $MA\text{a}t$ to the gods, especially Amun, a motif almost entirely restricted to royal usage (Teeter 1997, 15-16). The continuation of this ideological role from the late New Kingdom is apparent in Herihor and Pinudjem I’s decoration of the temple of Khonsu where the reliefs show clear continuity from the Ramesside Period in the depictions of the preservation of $MA\text{a}t$ and its

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208 Whilst Jansen-Winkeln has argued that the Theban kings used their own regnal dates (1992, 34-37; followed by James and Morkot 2010, 250-257), there remains no conclusive evidence to support this. Indeed the dates used by Pinudjem I to mark the movement of the royal mummies strongly suggest that they did not, with him attested in a Year 15 as HPA and in a Year 16 as king (Kitchen 1986, 78), so the dates used in the Theban inscriptions must belong to the Tanite rulers.
presentation to the gods by the king (Teeter 1997, 12; Gregory 2014, 160-166). Thus Ramesses XI is depicted presenting $M\overline{H}$ to Amun-Re in the hypostyle hall of the temple of Khonsu ($OIP$ 103, 43; pl.161), and Herihor is depicted also offering $M\overline{H}$ to Amun-Re in a relief in the architrave of the portico in the court ($OIP$ 103, 26; pl.141). Whilst the political realities of the Twenty-First Dynasty did not always mean that this was actually the case, the preservation of $M\overline{H}$ by a sole king remained a key ideology for rulers of the country with the titulary of the kings continuing to emphasise this with them all using the title $nsw(t)\ bit(y)$. By using a title which explicitly called them ‘king of Upper and Lower Egypt’ the rulers of the Twenty-First Dynasty maintained the understanding that the country was supposed to be united under the rule of a single king as Egyptian ideology required for the maintenance of the $M\overline{H}$ (Gregory 2014, 92-93; 107-108).

Whilst the kings of the Twenty-First Dynasty maintained some elements of the ideological role of the king, such as the preservation of $M\overline{H}$, they had secured their religious authority by elevating many aspects of royalty onto Amun. In contrast, the early kings of the Twenty-Second Dynasty seemingly maintained the New Kingdom and Twenty-First Dynasty traditions of Egyptian kingship (Jurman 2015b, 181), especially the iconography (Baines 1996a, 379; Morkot 2007, 161) and titulary (Bonhême 1987, 272), but rapidly abandoned much of the ‘theocratic’ format that the kingship had held in the Twenty-First Dynasty. Thus kings no longer included the title of HPA in their titulary or cartouches, nor were names such as $Imn-m-nsw$ attested amongst the royal family (Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 174-175).

The presence of ethnically Libyan rulers on the throne, however, had an increasingly significant effect on the ideology of kingship. The appearance of both Horsiese (A) and Osorkon II’s names on the statue of Nakhtefmut (Cairo CG 42208; Jansen-Winkeln 2007-
2009b, 141-144) shows that core parts of the original ideology of Egyptian kinship, that there should be one king of a united Egypt, were largely ignored (Leahy 1985, 58). This is supported by Osorkon I and II’s desire for their sons to inherit all the important positions of Egypt, suggesting that the kingship had become just another important title (Lange 2008, 137; Ritner 2009b, 336; Broekman 2010, 86). A similar symbol of the kingship’s reduced importance amongst the elite is the limited presence of basilophorous names using the Libyan kings’ personal names, in stark contrast to their presence in the New Kingdom (Leahy 1992, 146-147). All of these factors suggest that the king was now only first among equals (Leahy 1985, 59; Jansen-Winkeln 1999, 19-20; Broekman 2010, 87).

The ideology of New Kingdom Egyptian kingship had become largely irrelevant, reflected by the fragmentation of the country under the later Libyan kings (Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 95). This lack of significance of the ideological role of the king is also suggested by the adoption of royal prerogatives by members of the elite, notably the depiction of local Libyan rulers on land donation stelae in front of the gods (Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 93; Ritner 2008, 312). For example, in HPP Padiese (A)’s Serapeum stelae he was depicted before the Apis Bull in the lunette scene, appearing in the position of the king between his son who is given the title of HPP and the god himself (Louvre S. IM 3749: Ritner 2009a, 388-389). This is in stark contrast to such stelae in the New Kingdom where the king’s role was explicitly emphasised. The king was not only normally represented between the individual and the god, as Ramesses V did on the general Heqmare-nakht’s stela at Qurna (KRIt VI, 231:5-232:15). Often they donated material on an individual’s behalf to a god or royal statue or provided revenue to the individual’s funerary cult, or ‘gifts’ to that individual, who donated land to the god or royal statue as on Stela Strasbourg 1378 from Ramesses I’s reign (Muhs
2016, 128) or in the entrance texts from Pennut’s tomb chapel at Aniba (KRIt VI, 350:6-353:15). Such disregard for the role of the king is not even apparent on similar stelae from the Twentieth Dynasty, supposedly a period where the king’s authority dramatically weakened. The king continued to make offerings on behalf deceased individuals, as on the Viceroy of Nubia Hori (ii)’s stela from Buhen dating to Ramesses IV’s reign (BM 66668; KRIt V, 80:10-81:14), or was the subject of a dedicatory stela to secure the king’s support with a deity for an individual, as on the vizier Wennefer’s inscription and relief on the back wall of the rear chapel of the temple of Jeshu in Karnak North from the reign of Ramesses XI (KRIt V, 840:10-841:13).

The donation stelae of Padiese (A) therefore show a significant change in how the religious authority of the king was understood. Indeed in a further usurpation of royal religious authority Padiese (A) also showed himself inducting the bull (Jurman 2009, 119). Towards the end of the Libyan Period the king’s role was even further reduced on private monuments with cartouches left blank, as on Stela Abemayor where great chief of the Ma Tefnakht appeared alone in the lunette before the gods and Shoshenq V’s names were absent from the inscription entirely (Ritner 2009a, 436-437).

Despite this, the Egyptian political system of the New Kingdom which had largely continued into the Twenty-First Dynasty (Gregory 2014, 63) was not completely lost. The concept that the king was the pinnacle of society was retained, along with his legitimacy being guaranteed by his relationship with the gods (Baines 1995, 34; Ritner 2008, 310). This is because previous political systems, especially their imagery and iconography, continue to be able to provide legitimacy for rulers even if that system itself no longer held any political power (Eisenstadt 1963, 313-314). The iconography of Egyptian kingship is noticeably
maintained by the Libyan kings, as it had a practical use in presenting them as legitimate rulers to the wider population and emphasising their continuation of the tradition and past of Egypt that they had no direct connection with (Leahy 1985, 57; Ritner 2008, 310). This could be the product of the continued existence of a landscape expressing Egyptian culture and ideology, something that will be discussed in further detail in the next section of this chapter. Whilst the existence of such a landscape does not prevent alterations, it does place constraints on the extent to which a culture can be modified (Parker Pearson and Richards 1994a, 5).

As the Libyan kings of the Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third, and Twenty-Fourth Dynasties still needed the legitimacy that came from demonstrating their position’s connection to the gods, but were no longer making use of many of the ‘theocratic’ elements that had appeared during the Twenty-First Dynasty, this led to alternative methods for securing this authority. Thus, during the Twenty-Second Dynasty there was a clear attempt to establish religious authority from ‘dynastic deities’, as outlined in the texts of Osorkon I which emphasised his connection to Bast (Lange 2008, 131; 141), and through the maintenance or re-establishment of royal donations to cult centres, which were recorded in inscriptions set up in the major temples, such as Osorkon I’s at Bubastis and the Heliopolitan records of Shoshenq IV and Pamiu (Perdu 2003, 137-138; Ritner 2009a, 44-46). This association with the most important local deities instead of the previous main state god has direct parallels with the actions of the local elites during the First Intermediate Period. These rulers association with the cults of key local deities rather than Ra, as in the Eleventh Dynasty’s patronisation of Monthu – apparent in the use of the name Montuhotep by some of the kings of the dynasty (Montw-htp; von Beckerath 1984, 193: E1), allowed them to link
their power with the moral authority of those cults (Seidlmayer 2000, 123). This secured their position as ruler and provided justification for their actions and their role as ruler (Seidlmayer 2000, 125), as Ankhtifi did in his autobiography with his references to Horus of Edfu placing him in his position to restore order (Lichtheim 1976, 85-86).

Not all the ‘theocratic’ elements of the Twenty-First Dynasty were entirely removed, with oracles continuing to be used for decision-making, but they were no longer concentrated on Amun of Thebes, spreading the centres which could provide religious authority northwards away from Thebes (Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 175). The rule of Upper Egypt also remained in the hands of representatives of Amun throughout the Libyan and Kushite Periods, first the HPA and later the GWA (Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 181-182). These not only secured the Libyan kings’ political control over Upper Egypt, but also their ideological control by securing the support of Amun through control over his cult, emphasising the king’s position above the priesthood as it had been in earlier periods of Egyptian history (Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 177).

In contrast, the Kushite rulers of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty placed significant emphasis on the traditional elements of Egyptian kingship, including the role of *Maat* (Smith S. 2013, 98). They also promoted the ideology and iconography associated with the unification of Egypt (Myśliwiec 2000, 73) and the role of the king as the sole ruler of a unified country, an aspect of Egyptian ideology which had largely been abandoned under the later Libyan kings (Myśliwiec 2000, 56; Smith S. 2013, 84). There was also an increased emphasis on Amun’s role in providing legitimacy for the king (Török 1997, 263-264; Assmann 2002, 321-322; Gozzoli 2009, 52), particularly through the assertion of the Kushite king as the son of Amun (Török 1997, 207), a return to the ideology present in the late New Kingdom and
Twenty-First Dynasty. Indeed, the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty ascribed their supreme position as a result of their connection with Amun (both of Napata and Thebes), presenting victory as a product of strict adherence to him (Assmann 2002, 326-327; Darnell 2006, 63). Such an attitude is apparent in Piye’s insistence that his army purify itself before it could enter Thebes on its way north to fight Tefnakhte (Ritner 2009a, 479: 13-15). The Kushite kings’ connection with Amun was maintained through the appointment of Kushite officials to positions associated with the temple of Amun, such as HPA and Chief Steward of the Divine Adoratrice of Amun (\textit{im\text{-}ry\text{-}r} pr \textit{wr n dw\text{-}t ntr n Imn}), with that institution receiving the large majority of such appointments, especially of members of the royal family (Exell and Naunton 2007, 100-104; Pope 2014, 202; 280).

Despite the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s kings’ emphasis of their place as sole rulers of Egypt, some Libyan rulers remained in the Delta and continued to hold the title of king (\textit{nsw}), as is clear from Piye’s ‘Victory Stela’ where four are listed as \textit{nsw} (Grimal 1981, 2-3). Whilst the Kushites’ securing of their religious authority through demonstration of their connection to Amun enhanced their legitimacy, it was not a full adoption of the ideology of Egyptian kingship as it had existed in the New Kingdom with other rulers still able to hold royal titulary without fear of being removed. Similarly Piye’s exclusion of some of the Libyan kings from his presence due to their ‘impurity’ in his ‘Victory Stela’ (Ritner 2009a, 490) is unheard of in earlier Egyptian history, but by marking his ritual practices as more orthodox than the Libyan rulers he demonstrated the superiority of his sacred authority (Assmann 2002, 329). This suggests that, like the Libyan kings, the use of Egyptian ideology by the Kushite kings was due to their need to legitimise their rule over Egypt. Indeed the Kushite kings’ emphasis on their religious authority through their connection to Amun may well have been a product
of their political system, where local rulers were largely left in place provided they acknowledged the Kushite rulers’ supreme position. This conforms to the form of a ‘segmentary state’, as argued by Pope (2014, 277-278), where a sole ruler occupies a supreme, often quasi-religious, position relying on a series of local rulers to carry out the actual governance of the territory (Southall 1988, 68-69; Pope 2014, 276). Thus, the Kushite rulers’ promotion of their connection to Amun and thus their divinely mandated authority, unlike the Libyan rulers’ limited attempts to secure such authority, was a way of securing their position as supreme rulers of Egypt.

Some scholars have attempted to explain the Libyan and Kushite rulers’ use of traditional ideology and iconography as a product of their background within Egyptian society or an area that had been under Egyptian control, or because of their need for legitimacy for their rule of Egypt (Kitchen 1990, 21; Hüneberg 2003, 68–70). It has been argued coherently by Leahy (1985, 57) and Jansen-Winkeln (1999, 93), amongst others, that it cannot be assumed that the Libyans had become ‘egyptianised’, despite their settlement in Egypt,\textsuperscript{209} and this is equally true of the Kushites (Török 1997, 166; Smith S. 2013, 84; 100). Both clearly retained elements of their original ethnic identity, with the Libyan elite not depicting themselves as Egyptian (Morkot 2007, 162), as apparent on Padiese (A)’s Serapeum stelae (Ritner 2009a, 388), and in the Kushite kings’ retention of a distinctively different physiognomy in iconography (Russmann 1974, 24; Morkot 2003b, 84), radically unlike previous periods (Baines 1996a, 376). This represented the Kushites with different physical features, including emphasis of the flat and wide shape of the nose (Russmann 1974 14-16; 21; 24; Myśliwiec 1988, 36; Török 1997, 195; Gordon 2009, 174-175) and protruding

\textsuperscript{209} The evidence for the Libyans’ lack of ‘egyptianisation’ and the possible impacts of this on Egyptian society will be discussed in more detail in a section of the next chapter (5.3).
lips (Myśliwiec 1988, 39; Gordon 2009, 175) as visible in particular in Shabaka’s reliefs in his Naos at Esna (Myśliwiec 1988, pl. XXXII).

The adoption of Egyptian cultural traditions regarding the expression of their religious authority was clearly, therefore, not a result of either the Libyans’ or Kushites’ ‘egyptianisation’, but of their political need to secure the legitimacy of their rule through establishing connections to the gods (O’Connor 1983, 243; Török 1997, 166; Smith S. 2013, 100; Jurman 2015b, 214). Indeed, a number of unusual iconographic elements were introduced by the Kushite kings, including several ram’s head ornaments, such as neck amulets like those which appear on a statue of Taharqa (Cairo JE 39403; Leclant 1965, pl. LXIV) and earrings such as those worn by Tanwetamani in reliefs on the temple of Osiris-Ptah (Leclant 1965, pl. LXIX), and the double uraei (Russmann 1974, 25-27; 43). These may have been designed to demonstrate those rulers’ connection to various deities in the Egyptian pantheon. The ram’s head ornaments were probably representative of Amun, as well as possibly Monthu (Russmann 1974, 26-27), and both Monthu and Osiris were depicted with the double uraei, for example in a relief from the temple of Osiris-Ptah in south Karnak where Monthu was depicted embracing Tanwetamani with both wearing the double uraei on the western wall of Room A (Leclant 1965, pl. LXX; Russmann 1974, 40-42).

In the competition between the Libyan and Kushite rulers for religious authority, and thus ultimately for legitimacy as rulers of Egypt, both increasingly emphasised their connection with the past, presenting themselves as a continuation of the line of Egyptian kings from the formation of the country, in order to demonstrate their status as ‘true’ kings of Egypt (Török 1997, 190-191; Ritner 2008, 306; Smith S. 2013, 102; Jurman 2015b, 177; 212). The earlier Libyan and Kushite rulers both made use of iconography that established
their connection to the periods immediately, or closely, preceding theirs (Morkot 2007, 142; Jurman 2015b, 203).

This adoption of previous cultural traditions is not simple imitation, but reflects a careful selection of the elements that offer the most legitimacy whilst still providing a ruler with the ability to carry out their political goals (Eisenstadt 1963, 14; Schwartz 2006, 12; Sims 2006, 118; Smith S. 2013, 99). Such ‘invention of a tradition’ (Hobsbawm 1983, 1-4) through careful manipulation of both religious and historical traditions and ideology is clearly visible in the Kushite Period (Pope 2014, 17; 56-58), with the Kushite kings gradually associating themselves with the historical consciousness of the Egyptians through their presentation of themselves as the legitimate successors of the last kings of the ‘Theban’ Twenty-Third Dynasty (Ayad 2009b, 48-49; Adams M. 2011, 34), such as through Shabataka’s addition of himself to reliefs to the Twenty-Third Dynasty chapel of Osiris-ḥk3 ḏt (Ayad 2009b, 48-49; Adams M. 2011, 36-37). In contrast, such attempts by the Libyan kings to link themselves to the proceeding periods through the use of ideology and iconography is only apparent in Shoshenq I’s reign and his establishment of the cult for his father Nimlot (A) at Abydos and Karnak.

Increasingly, however, as the periods progressed older cultural forms began to be used, again indicating the Libyan and Kushite kings’ selection of elements that would offer the most legitimacy. Both the Libyan and Kushite kings chose to abandon Ramesside forms of depiction and titulary after the first few reigns in order to adopt iconography, throne names, and styles of titulary from the Old and Middle Kingdoms (Ritner 2008, 307-308; Jurman 2015b, 193-194). Similarly, older versions of rituals such as Osorkon II’s form of the Sed festival were deliberately chosen for use, connecting them with Egypt’s past (Gozzoli
As part of this process there was a renewed use of Middle Egyptian under the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty, and of older artistic styles (Baines 1996b, 172-174; Ritner 2008, 308), again highlighting the kings’ connections with earlier periods and thus the continuity of the institution of kingship. The adoption of older Egyptian cultural styles also reveals a continuation of Egyptian artistic forms and, to an extent, the knowledge associated with them. Indeed, archaism itself was not a new concept and has been argued to be a continuous tradition within Egyptian culture (Morkot 2003b, 79; Jurman 2015b, 177-178).

The appearance of these older forms towards the end of the Libyan Period seems to have been a product of the competition for legitimacy between the various political groups at that time (Jurman 2015b, 213-214). The kings attempted to associate themselves iconographically with the Egyptian past to enhance their legitimacy (Jurman 2015b, 213). Indeed, the archaic styles produced by both the Libyans and the Kushites appears not to have tried to achieve a specific cultural ‘purity’, but rather through the use of a variety of older styles created a non-specific ‘ancient style’ (Jurman 2015b, 207), connecting them to a non-specific Egyptian past. This is apparent on Piye’s pedestal in temple B 520 at Gebel Barkal where Old Kingdom spellings and grammar were merged with contemporary versions to create an archaic effect without the style of the Ramesside Period. Similarly, the use of pyramidions over the Kushite kings’ tombs at el-Kurru and Nuri also refer back to older Egyptian royal practices, rather than to the Libyan Period burials within temple enclosures, or even the New Kingdom rock-cut tombs.

In direct contrast to the Libyan and Kushite rulers’ use of Egyptian ideology and iconography, the Assyrian kings appear to have made no attempt to have themselves depicted or identified as Egyptian kings, although this may have been a factor of their short
period of control over Egypt. Adopting the existing cultural traditions not only provided a ruler with an important form of legitimacy through a connection to images of political stability, but it also meant that those were denied for anyone else to use (Kertzer 1988, 38-40). Thus, the Assyrians’ failure to have themselves portrayed as traditional kings of Egypt gave other rulers, or rebels, an easy way to demonstrate their own legitimacy in contrast to them, suggesting why Psamtik I was accepted so quickly as their replacement.

Existing traditions could be used for these purposes because they created a template for how a legitimate ruler should be presented, immediately restricting the ideology and iconography that ensured a ruler would be perceived as legitimate (Eisenstadt 1963, 19). Ideology and iconography form such a powerful method of legitimising rule because they unite a particular image of the world with a strong emotional attachment to that image (Kertzer 1988, 40), thus adopting existing traditions associates a ruler with that emotional support. This provides a motivation for the Libyan and Kushite rulers’ adoption of the Egyptian cultural traditions associated with kingship, which would have been further increased with each new, foreign, dynasty’s acceptance that rulers must follow those traditions in order to appear legitimate.

Similar processes are apparent in other civilisations which had similarly long cultural traditions that subsequent new elites adopted rather than removed, such as Mesopotamia (Baines and Yoffee 1988, 240; Yoffee 2005, 153-154) and China (Eisenstadt 1963, 331-332; Fukuyama 2011, 149), but also in cultures with shorter traditions, such as the Maya (Masson and Peraza Lope 2006, 206). It would appear that this was true even where the cultural traditions alone were observed and not the specific political structure with which it was associated, as occurred during the Libyan Period. Again there are examples from other
cultures, with Bronze Age Mesopotamia in particular alternating through periods of unification and fragmentation but maintaining a tradition of a unified culture (Baines and Yoffee 1998, 240; Yoffee 2005, 153-155).

The Libyans’ limited use of the ideology of Egyptian kingship reflected their lack of interest in maintaining that system. This allowed the Kushites to demonstrate their legitimacy by emphasising their adherence to the ideology of Egyptian kingship, as well as the divine support for their kingship. As a result the Kushite kings appear to have carefully selected both ideology and iconography that not only supported their role as traditional Egyptian kings, but also sought to portray the remaining Libyan rulers and their predecessors as illegitimate. They made use of older imagery which portrayed the Libyans as the thnw, such as Taharqa’s reuse of Sahure’s relief of the king as a sphinx crushing Libyans (Ritner 2008, 307), and thus as one of the ‘Nine Bows’, one of the traditional enemies of Egypt thereby challenging their legitimacy as rulers of Egypt (Ritner 2008, 306). That this was a careful selection of pre-existing imagery for primarily political purposes is clear from their overlooking the numerous similar depictions of Kushites. Such a decision may have been because of their position as rulers of a ‘segmentary state’, as such rulers monopolise ritual suzerainty to contrast their super-ordinate status with the political sovereignty of local rulers (Southall 1988, 52; 68-69; Pope 2014, 285-287; 290).

Indeed, the Kushite kings of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty appear to have better adapted both Egyptian ideology and iconography to ensure that it portrayed them as legitimate rulers of Egypt. The most effective symbols of legitimacy within human societies are religious in nature (Kertzer 1988, 45), but new rulers need to select the iconography and ideology that best supports their rule (Eisenstadt 1963, 14; 19).
Such a selection is visible in the Kushites’ portrayal of their conquest of Egypt as a re-unification of the country from Upper Egypt/Nubia (Török 1997, 166; Smith S. 2013, 98) and themselves as unifiers in the classic mould of earlier Upper Egyptian, and specifically Theban, kings who had reunified the country (Morris 2006, 70; Gozzoli 2009, 52-53). This was combined with the increased use of imagery depicting the unity of Egypt for maximum effect (Myśliwiec 2000, 73). The Kushite kings also emphasised in the texts detailing their victories, as on Piye’s Victory stela and in Tanwetamani’s ‘Dream Stela’, that Amun had not only ordered that they carried out this re-unification but that he was the one who ensured its success, thus demonstrating the divine legitimacy of their rule (Assmann 2002, 329-334). This is particularly true of Tanwetamani’s campaign which emphasises that he carried out offerings at the key sites he visited as he travelled northwards, and the joy expressed that he will restore the temples and priesthoods to their proper state (Ritner 2009a, 570-571: 8-16). There was also an increased focus on Memphis, the traditional capital of a unified Egypt, with Shabataka, Shabaka and Taharqa all associating themselves with the city (Pope 2014, 257; 263-264). Additionally there was a re-affirmation of the kings’ connection with Amun and his role in granting divine kingship to a sole king (Török 1997, 161-162). Whilst this continued the traditions established at the end of the New Kingdom and early Libyan Period, it was now Amun of Napata who granted divine legitimacy, whilst Amun of Thebes was relegated to granting the kingship of Egypt (Török 1997, 264; Gozzoli 2009, 52), reflecting a conscious modification of an existing tradition.

That the Kushite kings modified the traditional representation of Egyptian kingship to suit their own specific needs is perhaps best illustrated by the later treatment of the double uraeus found in many of their representations. These were carefully removed by the
Twenty-Sixth Dynasty kings in order to appropriate their depictions (Myśliwiec 2000, 88). This is suggestive that they were perceived as distinctly Nubian or at least incompatible with the structure of kingship under the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty, which has been argued to have become much more ‘secular’ than it was under the Kushite rulers (Assmann 2002, 337). In a similar break from the traditional methods of securing legitimacy there was an increased emphasis on gods associated with Nubia over those of Egypt, again emphasising the Nubian kings’ divine associations (Gozzoli 2009, 53; Smith S. 2013, 99), and thus helping to affirm their status at the top of the political system.

Outside Egyptology the use of pre-existing state ideologies and iconography is understood to have assisted states’ rapid expansions, particularly through areas controlled by the original state and with a surviving political landscape, as happened during the rise of the Incan empire (McEwan 2006, 96). This provides a direct comparison with the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s rapid expansion through Lower Nubia and Upper Egypt, as both had had long exposure to Egyptian ideology and iconography and contained the remains of an associated ideological landscape. By adopting this existing cultural structure the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty were provided with a pre-prepared political system and cultural identity which established them as legitimate rulers over both regions. Pope (2014, 55-58) has even proposed that the rapid expansion of the Kushite state over these regions was instrumental in the creation of the segmentary nature of the Napatan state as this allowed the state to gain the support of the newly conquered local elites. Indeed the Kushite kings may have developed the traditions and ideology associated with their rule through the use of existing Egyptian forms merged with Kushite political realities as part of their ‘invented tradition’. This is best indicated by the continued addition of sites for coronation, what Török (1997, 233) describes
as the ‘ambulatory kingship’, such as Kawa by Taharqa, as a method of creating a tradition that fitted within an existing and developing cultic landscape (Pope 2014, 58).

There was another way, however, in which kings could secure their religious authority through demonstrating their connections and support for the gods: by building temples and other monuments to them. The next section will examine whether the ways in which the Libyan and Kushite kings modified the built landscape of Egypt reveals differences in how those kings secured religious authority.

4.2 The built landscape

The later New Kingdom largely saw the final stages of the creation of a socio-political landscape which had been developed through the preceding centuries following the establishment of the Eighteenth Dynasty (O’Connor 2012, 213; 219), and arguably long before that with sections of the Theban necropolis, among other elements of the landscape, dating back as early as the Eleventh Dynasty in the Middle Kingdom (Winlock 1915, 7-10; Arnold 1997, 74-75). Certainly by the reign of Merneptah, the start point for the time period covered in this thesis, continued additions, especially his father’s extensive constructions at Thebes and elsewhere (Kitchen 1983, 115-122),210 had created a monumental landscape across Egypt which expressed the ideology of the New Kingdom, especially with regard to its form of Egyptian kingship (Bell L. 1997, 137; Gregory 2014, 20). This was only further supported by the additions made by the kings of the late New Kingdom, with Merneptah,

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210 For examples Ramesses II’s addition of a court to Luxor temple, completing the hypostyle hall and the ‘Eastern’ temple at Karnak, the Ramesseum, all at Thebes (Porter and Moss II, 41-58; 302-311; 431-441; Nims 1971, 107-111), plus his temple at Memphis (Porter and Moss III.2, 843-845), and those at Abu Simbel (Porter and Moss VII, 95-116), amongst many others.
Tawosret, Ramesses III, and Ramesses IV all completing temples for their cults on the west bank at Thebes (Peden 1994b, 50-51; Wilkinson R. 2010, 10; O’Connor 2012, 209-211; Servajean 2014, 241-245). There was additional work by Merneptah at Memphis and Heliopolis (Servajean 2014, 260-275), a bark shrine by Sety II at Karnak (Servajean 2014, 282-285), and two temples by Ramesses III at Karnak (Mojsov 2012, 286-292). From the evidence available, however, it would appear that as the Twentieth Dynasty progressed there was little or no monumental construction carried out, bar the excavation and decoration of the royal tombs in the Valley of the Kings, and Ramesses XI’s additions to the temple of Khonsu at Karnak (Gregory 2014, 24-25). The attempts of Ramesses IV, V, and VI to complete the temple at Assasif, the ground plan of which indicates that it would have been larger than Medinet Habu by approximately half again (Peden 1994b, 49-50), suggests that there was no lack of desire to carry out monumental construction until the latter half of the dynasty. Even this may be a poor representation of what may have at least been planned due to the subsequent relocation of many of the monuments of Pi-Ramesses to Tanis (Leclère 2008b, 403), as it is possible that royal work was increasingly concentrated in the north, whilst HPA Ramessesnakht and Amenhotep’s monument at Dra Abu el-Naga and Amenhotep’s additions to Karnak show that ‘private’ work continued to be carried out towards the end of the dynasty (Rummel 2014, 390; 396-7).

This apparent lack of royal monumental construction appears to have continued into the early Twenty-First Dynasty. Evidence for such work is restricted to Herihor and Pinudjem I’s completion of the temple of Khonsu at Karnak, Menkheperre’s addition of enclosure walls to a number of sites, such as El-Hibeh and Thebes (see table 5; Redford 1981, 17; Kitchen 1986, 269), and the sole evidence for work by Smendes coming from the stela from Dibabieh.
regarding the quarrying of stone for repairs at Thebes (Ritner 2009a, 101-103). Despite such a lack of evidence it is clear that some work must have taken place in the north with the establishment of Tanis, despite Psusennes I’s building at the temple of Amun there remaining the earliest dateable construction and largely the only evidence for such activities in Tanis in the early Twenty-First Dynasty (Arnold 1999, 3; Dodson 2012, 58). Thus by the appearance of the first Libyan king in the Twenty-First Dynasty there was an extensive built landscape across Egypt containing a large number of monuments, especially temples.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Herihor</th>
<th>Pinudjem I</th>
<th>Smendes</th>
<th>Amenemope</th>
<th>Menkheperre</th>
<th>Psusennes I</th>
<th>Siamun</th>
<th>Psusennes II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Egypt</td>
<td>Thebes: Karnak</td>
<td>court of temple of Khonsu</td>
<td>pylon, sphinx avenue and bark basin of temple of Khonsu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enclosure wall (possible)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thebes: West Bank</td>
<td>tomb (probably)</td>
<td>tomb</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El-Hibeh</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enclosure wall</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lower Egypt</td>
<td>Memphis</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>royal cult chapel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanis</td>
<td></td>
<td>tomb (probably)</td>
<td>tomb</td>
<td></td>
<td>temple of Amun (38m x 50m) and enclosure wall (20m thick), tomb</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>temple of Anta and enclosure wall (probable), enlarged temple of Amun with addition of colonnaded court (40m x75m) and Third pylon, tomb</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tomb</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
4.2.1 Built landscape contextualised in terms of political and religious authority

The monumental landscape in existence at the end of the New Kingdom demonstrated the king’s political and religious authority in several ways. The construction of large monuments is one of the clearest expressions of a ruler’s power, because of the resources and labour that must be expended in order to complete them (Trigger 1990, 127; Earle 2001, 108). These monuments also reflected a ruler’s political power by providing a physical demonstration of that authority which made a permanent alteration to the existing landscape, making such power visible long after the initial exercise of construction. Monuments are also usually the most enduring statements of power as it is very rare for previous monuments to be completely demolished (Trigger 1990, 126), although Akhenaten’s and Hatshepsut’s are notable exceptions to this (Van Dijk 2000, 283). Moreover, monuments’ location, in prominent positions within settlements, often right at the heart, particularly for the temples to the main deities of Egypt, thus acted as an important projection of the king’s power (Baines 1995, 8; Wilson P. 2010, 782). These are strong incentives for rulers to construct monuments to show their power not just to the elite but also to the wider population. Construction of monuments also served to establish a king’s legitimacy by reaffirming the importance of the position of the king and the institution of kingship as displays of royal power and authority (Baines 1995, 7; Gregory 2014, 63).

Additionally, pre-existing monuments represent a social landscape associated with particular ideologies (Parker Pearson and Richards 1994a, 2-3; Earle 2001, 110; Smith A. 2003, 272). Adding monuments to this landscape would, therefore, have helped to establish a ruler as legitimate, by associating him with the ideology expressed by the landscape and
tying him to the history of that culture, whilst also defining and reinforcing the social relations within a society (Parker Pearson and Richards 1994b, 58; Earle 2001, 124).

This religious authority, or legitimacy, was represented within in the built landscape of the New Kingdom in the monuments constructed by kings for the cults of various Egyptian deities. This showed the king to be both the heir of the gods, and their most important servant and intermediary between them and the rest of humanity (Baines 1995, 26; Wilson 2010, 781). Through the construction of the monuments to the gods the king also fulfilled an important aspect of the preservation of $M\text{\textsuperscript{3}}$t (Shafer 1997, 5-8), ensuring his divine legitimacy to rule. Indeed, the construction of temples was an important part of the Egyptian king’s role as a way of preserving $M\text{\textsuperscript{3}}$t within Egypt and honouring the gods (Wilkinson R. 2000, 86; Wilson 2010, 781). Thus the built landscape which had been created over the course of the New Kingdom presented an image of the king’s religious authority and his divine legitimacy to rule Egypt, with the preservation of $M\text{\textsuperscript{3}}$t marked out in physical form on the landscape of Egypt. Indeed, the continuous building and re-building of the monuments to the various deities of Egypt would have served as a constant demonstration of the king’s actions to preserve $M\text{\textsuperscript{3}}$t throughout the New Kingdom.

The king’s religious authority was also represented in the built landscape in the construction of temples for the cult of the deceased king(s), especially at Thebes. This granted the king religious authority in a different way to the construction of monuments to the other deities. Whilst the latter marked the king’s religious authority as a product of his maintenance of $M\text{\textsuperscript{3}}$t and as the gods’ heir and primary servant, the former demonstrated his authority as an aspect of the pantheon himself, an equal to the other gods as a form of Osiris or Amun (Silverman 1995, 62-63). These monuments reinforced the religious authority of
New Kingdom kings by establishing their special status in relation to both the deities and the rest of Egyptian society (Baines 1995, 10), again marking out their divine legitimacy and thus their religious authority to rule. The king’s position and role, and thus the religious authority behind his rule, was also established through temples to the cult of divine kingship, such as that constructed at Luxor by Amenhotep III and added to by various other New Kingdom kings (Baines 1995, 26; O’ Connor 1995, 276-279; Bell L. 1997, 137-180; Gregory 2014, 113).

Both the mortuary temples with their cults to deceased kings and the temples dedicated to the cult of divine kingship emphasised the unique position of the king in Egyptian society, as above the rest of humanity and more or less equal with the gods (Baines 1995, 10-11; Silverman 1995, 67).

The continued addition of monuments by the kings of the New Kingdom also established a built landscape that would have demonstrated the continued, unbroken line of divine kingship into the past. This fiction of an unbroken line of succession from the first king Menes and beyond (Baines 1995, 14; Silverman 1995, 67) demonstrated that they were the ultimate successor of the king who had first ‘mythically’ unified Egypt. This would have conferred religious and political legitimacy onto any king who added to that landscape by connecting them to this past, thus demonstrating their legitimacy as king (Baines 1995, 24). Indeed, even kings who had made little or no additions to the existing landscape were able to draw on the legitimacy provided by the existing landscape through references to the monuments of past kings and any cults which were associated with them (Baines 1995, 25).

The process of the creation of this landscape during the New Kingdom is seen to have ended towards the end of the Twentieth Dynasty. Baines (1995, 32-33) argues that the lack of achievement and display of royal power during this period brought the king to the same
level as the rest of humanity, removing the position’s religious authority. This led, at the end of the Twentieth Dynasty and in the early Twenty-First Dynasty, Baines (1995, 33-35) argues, to the shift towards a theocracy in which religious authority was no longer directly an aspect of the kingship itself, but rather something conferred by the priesthood who served the gods. During the Third Intermediate Period this meant that the king could only have the religious authority that the position had held in the New Kingdom if he retained political power and was able to demonstrate his connection to the gods (Baines 1995, 34-35).

It is perhaps more likely, however, that the actual cause of the paucity of evidence for monumental construction in the Twentieth Dynasty was not a lack of resources (something for which there is debatable evidence anyway as reviewed in the last chapter) or changes to the principles associated with monumental construction and the religious authority of kingship, as argued by Baines (1995, 34), Silverman (1995, 49), and O’Connor (2012, 212). Rather, it was due to the short reigns of the kings of the middle of the Twentieth Dynasty. This is supported by fact that it would have taken many years to complete such projects; Ramesses III, for example, took twelve years to complete Medinet Habu (Kitchen 2012, 15), a longer period of time than the reigns of Ramesses IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, and X. Moreover, the evidence for the structure of the known monuments built at the start of the Libyan Period, in the early part of the Twenty-First Dynasty, follow the same characteristics as those from the late New Kingdom. As an example, the layout of the structures at Tanis, many of which were first constructed in the early Twenty-First Dynasty, appears to have developed out of the traditions established at the Amun complex at Karnak (Wilson 2010, 788). Thus it would appear that any divergences from the style of structures and construction patterns of the late New Kingdom might indicate changes to the way in
which the king(s) were utilising the built landscape to secure their political and religious authority. With this in mind, we will now look at the ways in which the Libyan and Kushite kings modified the existing built landscape.

4.2.2 Assessment of the Libyan and Kushite rulers’ modifications to the built landscape

Any ruler or dynasty who wishes to demonstrate both their political and religious legitimacy can do so through the construction of monuments added to a pre-existing cultural landscape (Parker Pearson and Richards 1994b, 39-40; Spence 2001, 284). By the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods Egypt had an extensive built landscape expressing the ideology of New Kingdom kingship and the kings’ associated religious authority which had been gradually built up over several centuries through additions by most of the kings of the earlier New Kingdom. As such one of the simplest ways for any of the rulers to establish their religious, and thus ultimately their political, legitimacy and authority was through similar monumental additions to this existing landscape.

Some of the first modifications to the built landscape of Egypt by the various invasions of the Libyans, Kushites and Assyrians would have been largely destructive. For the Libyan invasions during the New Kingdom it is unclear exactly what impact they had, but descriptions by both Merneptah and Ramesses III mention raiding and attacks on towns in both the Delta and, later, the Theban area (Peden 1994a, 215; Davies 1997, 155; Manassa 2003, 28; 99). The Kushite and Assyrian invasions would also have had a significant destructive effect on the landscape of Egypt, particularly at Memphis where fighting inside the city occurred under both Piye and Esarhaddon (Grimal 1981, 102-103; Glassner 2004, 203). Such damage would, however, have been largely concentrated in the Delta, bar the
Assyrians’ sack of Thebes, and there is still a debate as to whether the Kushite takeover of Upper and Middle Egypt was peaceful (Török 1997, 149-150), or if a more violent seizure of power is apparent from the early stelae of Piye at Gebel Barkal (Nos. 26, 29 and 30; Ritner 2009a, 461-465; Adams M. 2011, 29-30).

The ransacking of Egyptian towns and temples by the Assyrians would have had a particularly detrimental impact on the landscape of Egypt, reflected in the large quantity of loot taken from Memphis by Esarhaddon (Spalinger 1974, 304-307; Glassner 2004, 203) and from Thebes by Assurbanipal (Morkot 2000, 296). These impacts on the landscape of Egypt were likely to have been short-lived, however, as repairs would probably have been undertaken. Possible repairs are indicated in Piye’s ‘Victory Stela’ where he recorded the cleansing of the temples in Memphis following his storming of the city (Grimal 1981, 104-105), and Montuemhat’s claim to have carried out repairs and renovations across Upper Egypt, possibly following Ashurbanipal’s sack of Thebes (Ritner 2009a, 556-564; Spencer N. 2010, 479), although there remains no evidence for this outside Thebes. Indeed this can be seen particularly from the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s building projects where they often repaired or rebuilt temples which had been neglected (Myśliwiec 2000, 8-89; 93), for example Taharqa’s extensive reconstruction of the temple at Kawa (Morkot 2000, 253-255; Ritner 2009a, 527-553), Sanam and at Memphis (Pope 2014, 58; 264). Indeed, such ‘repairs’ or ‘renewals’ of older temples were often employed as an ideological tool to demonstrate not just the kings’ divine legitimacy through their upholding of MAat, as with Taharqa’s work at Kawa. They are also a way of delegitimising the reign of a predecessor, as is apparent in

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211 The sheer quantity of plunder taken by the Assyrians is best demonstrated by the list provided by Ashurbanipal following the sack of Thebes: ‘Silver, gold, precious stones, all the possessions of his palace, many-coloured clothing, great horses, two obelisks of electrum, the doorposts of the temple door I took from their bases and removed to Assyria. Great booty, beyond counting, I took away from Thebes’ (Onasch 1994, Prism A II: 34-48; translation from the German in Morkot 2000, 296).
Tutankhamun’s ‘Restoration Stela’ and Horemheb’s ‘Great Edict’, both of which make reference to temples having fallen into ruin in earlier reigns and being restored (Leprohon 1985, 97-102; Murnane 1995, 212-214; 235-240; Reeves 2001, 182).

There is one effect of these invasions, however, which had a much more prolonged impact than one of simple destruction. During the late New Kingdom, Libyan and Kushite Periods there appears to have been the fortification of temples across Egypt, as recorded in the Harris Papyrus following the Libyan invasions and migration (Haring 1993, 162; Grandet 1994a, 305; Kitchen 2012, 19). This had a lasting impact on Egypt not just because a number of locations seem to have received fortifications for the first time, for example This, Abydos and Asyut (Grandet 1994a, 304-306), but also because it appears to have led to the development of temple enclosures as fortified strongholds without the fortification of the rest of the town (Kemp 2004, 275-276). That these fortifications remained into the Kushite Period is clear from Piye’s ‘Victory Stela’ where he describes towns being under siege (Grimal 1981, 50; Ritner 2009a, 480-481), impossible without them having some form of defences. Archaeologically, however, there is little evidence for these walls as many enclosure walls were replaced in the Thirtieth Dynasty due to damage as a result of the various invasions of the Third Intermediate and Late Periods (Arnold 1999, 105).

It is important at this point to address the debate as to whether the kings of ancient Egypt were actually involved in, or ordered, the construction projects which named them. As a result of the clear evidence for elite involvement (Spence 2001, 285-286; Spencer N. 2010, 456-461), it is likely that members of the elite may well have carried out construction, and

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212 Whilst it appears that some Egyptian towns had been fortified during the Pre-dynastic Period, Old and Middle Kingdoms (Moeller 2004, 264-265), there is currently no evidence for similar wall construction during the New Kingdom (Spence 2004, 270), and there is also no evidence for walls even at major cities such as Thebes and Pi-Ramesses (Spence 2004, 265).
particularly decoration, at sites across Egypt and simply named the reigning king, especially outside the major centres (Spence 2001, 285; Spencer N. 2010, 444-456). Indeed it has been noted that this may have been particularly evident during periods of political instability (Spencer N. 2010, 445). For the Libyan Period, at least, this phenomenon is less problematic for assessing the Libyan rulers’ impacts on the built landscape due to the nature of the political system of that period. As the territories controlled by the Libyan kings were mostly small in size and they appear to have had limited authority outside those territories it is probable that the majority of construction would have been ordered and supervised by those kings. Certainly the evidence for elite involvement in such construction is much more limited than for the periods either side of the Libyan Period (Spencer N. 2010, 444 n.17), suggesting that at least the presentation of such elite involvement had fallen out of favour. 213

For the Kushite rulers it is much more difficult to single out actual royal initiatives, in particular due to those kings’ policy of leaving the local rulers in place and the evidence for the involvement of powerful individuals such as Montuemhat (Spencer N. 2010, 479). Construction projects in Nubia can probably be safely attributed to the Kushite kings, particularly given the lack of any clear Kushite ‘bureaucracy’ in that region (Pope 2014, 150), but for Egypt the assignation of building work to a king should probably be restricted to the major centres, except in cases of explicit evidence for either royal or private involvement. Large-scale projects should probably also be accepted as evidence for royal involvement due to the quantities of resources required for such constructions and, especially, the manpower need to collect those resources (Spencer N. 2010, 474).

213 This was perhaps a factor of the increasingly Libyan nature of the upper elite who may not have been interested in carrying out such construction projects for an ideology that they did not hold to.
Having now clarified what additions to the built landscape were probably organised by the Libyan and Kushite rulers, it is now possible to review the modifications that they made to the built landscape. At first it appears that the Libyan rulers made only limited alterations to the landscape they ‘inherited’ from the late New Kingdom and Twenty-First Dynasty. This is, however, a result of the fact that most surviving monuments are in Upper Egypt. Much of any construction that was carried out in the north has been lost (Arnold 1999, 29; Leclère 2008a, 16-18; 2008b, 577), especially that carried out in limestone, due to the high water content and destruction of monuments for burning for lime (Leclère 2008b, 617; Quirke 2015, 22). Even major cities such as Sais and Tanis provide almost no archaeological evidence for monumental work carried out (Leclère 2008a, 159-164; 2008b, 393).

Most of the surviving monuments, therefore, are in Upper Egypt. Shoshenq I is known to have carried out large-scale building work in Upper Egypt, adding the First Court, the ‘Bubastite Portal’, and a monumental gate now part of the First Pylon at Karnak, a new temple at el-Hibeh (Arnold 1999, 35-36), and reopening the quarry at Gebel el-Silsila (Gebel el-Silsila Quarry stela No.100: 46-50; Ritner 2009a, 187-192). Evidence for work by the Libyan kings who followed him in Upper Egypt, however, is largely restricted to the chapel of Osiris-\(hk\text{3}\) dt built by Osorkon III and Takeloth III (Kitchen 1986, 357). Throughout the earlier Libyan Period a large proportion of the building work being carried out was taking place in the Delta, especially at Bubastis, Herakleopolis, and Tanis (Leahy 1985, 52; Arnold 1999, 315-316; Kitchen 1986, 303-304). Under the early kings of the Twenty-Second Dynasty there were major additions of large, granite buildings to temples in the north, with Shoshenq I, Osorkon I, and II all building at Bubastis and Tanis (see table 6; Arnold 1999, 32-39; Lange
This level of construction continued after Egypt began to fragment with Shoshenq III adding a monumental gateway to the temple of Amun at Tanis and forecourts and pylons at Tell el-Balamun, the First Pylon of which was 75m in breadth and thus larger than the 68m First Pylon built by Ramesses III at Medinet Habu (Arnold 1999, 40; Leclère 2008b, 619). Even Shoshenq V added a jubilee gateway and a temple to the Theban triad at Tanis (Kitchen 1986, 315; Arnold 1999, 41; Leclère 2008b, 425). The Libyan kings, therefore, had an extensive impact on the landscape of Egypt, but following the fragmentation of Egypt after Osorkon II this was even more concentrated in the north where they developed the temples of the major towns of the Delta, which have been largely lost.

There also appears to have been another change to the landscape during the Libyan Period, with a shift away from large necropolises towards family or group burials associated with temples (Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 85-86; Aston 2009b, 399). Examples of such ‘group’ burials within temple enclosures are present in the large Third Intermediate Period cemetery at Herakleopolis (Perez-Die 2009, 304), and in the royal burials at Tanis, Mendes, and Athribis (Leclère 2008b, 640-643), as well as the cemetery in the Medinet Habu enclosure (Stadelmann 1971, 111-123).

Whilst the Kushite rulers carried out some construction across Egypt, the majority of the dynasty’s large-scale building work was carried out in Nubia, including all of Piye’s known monuments (see table 7). Piye rebuilt the great temple of Amun at Gebel Barkal (B500; Reisner 1917, 224-225; Dunham 1970, Plan V; Kitchen 1986, 369) and Taharqa added to the main temple (B500; Dunham 1970, Plan V) and built a new temple there (B300; Dunham 1970, 12). Taharqa also added temples to Kawa, Tabo, and Sanam and had work carried out
at Buhen, Qasr Ibrim, and Semna-west (Kitchen 1986, 390; Arnold 1999, 59-61). In Egypt the Kushite kings’ construction was largely focused at two sites, Memphis and Thebes, with Shabaka, Shabataka, and Taharqa all making additions to the temples in both cities (Kitchen 1986, 381; 389; Ayad 2009b, 48-49; Dodson 2012, 155; Pope 2014, 261-264). All the Kushite kings made additions to the Theban landscape: Shabataka added chapels, Shabaka added porticos to Karnak and Luxor and rebuilt the smaller temple at Medinet Habu (Arnold 1999, 47-49), but Taharqa in particular carried out a significant quantity of building at Karnak. He added a kiosk before the Second Pylon of the temple of Amun, a small temple to the deification of the king within the Amun enclosure, a chapel in the Monthu complex, a hypostyle hall to the Mut temple, and a portico and colonnade to the Mut temple (Arnold 1999, 51-58).

One of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s greatest impacts on the landscape of Egypt was the shift of the primary royal residence back to Memphis (O’Connor 1983, 243; Myśliwiec 2000, 93; Pope 2014, 257). This may have been a reflection of the fact that many of the Delta towns remained, nominally at least, under the control of local Libyan rulers, but it also emphasised the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s association with the unified Egypt of the past (Adams M. 2011, 31). Combined with this reaffirmation of the traditional ‘capital’ of Egypt the Kushite kings also carefully selected throne names which are found on large numbers of standing monuments (Ritner 2008, 307-308).

The Kushites are normally perceived in scholarship as more powerful rulers than the Libyans and more closely aligned with Egyptian ideals (Török 1997, 163; 179; Myśliwiec 2000, 85; Ritner 2008, 306-308). Indeed, as noted in the first section, the Kushite kings made much more of their association with the gods, and thus one would expect them to have
carried out more construction to further demonstrate those connections. An examination of the record of the two groups’ constructions, however, indicates that many of the Libyan kings built more extensively within Egypt than the Kushite kings. This should perhaps be expected as many of the Libyan kings ruled for more than twenty years, including Shoshenq I, III, and V, Osorkon I, II, and III, and Takeloth II, whereas, of the Kushite kings, only Piye and Taharqa ruled for more than two decades. Such an expectation is mitigated, however, by the fact that after the first few kings of the Twenty-Second Dynasty the Libyan kings ruled only segments of the country, whereas the Kushite kings were able to call upon the resources of the whole of Egypt and Nubia. Additionally, both Piye and Taharqa had reigns comparable to many of the longer reigned Libyan kings (thirty and twenty-six years respectively) and yet carried out only relatively minor additions, such as the construction of chapels and porticos largely focused at Karnak, unlike the large-scale temple construction both carried out in Nubia. Indeed, it is clear from the monuments built by Osorkon I and II in the Delta, and Piye and Taharqa in Nubia, that both the Libyan and Kushite kings had the resources to make significant additions to the built landscape and yet the Libyan rulers made only limited additions to the landscape of Upper Egypt and the Kushites very limited additions at all, except for at Thebes and Taharqa’s additions at Karnak. In order to explain such an apparent contradiction, it is necessary to examine how the Libyan and Kushite rulers’ different attempts to secure their legitimacy are revealed by the level of their impact on the landscape.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: 22nd/23rd Dynasty works</th>
<th>location</th>
<th>Shoshenq I</th>
<th>Osorkon I</th>
<th>Osorkon II</th>
<th>Shoshenq III</th>
<th>Osorkon III</th>
<th>Shoshenq V</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thebes: Karnak</td>
<td></td>
<td>First court (81.01m x 101.11m), 'Bubastite gate' and gate in First Pylon (10m x 27.50m)</td>
<td>small chapel</td>
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<td>Chapel of Osiris heqa-djet</td>
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<td>Thebes: West Bank</td>
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<td>El-Hibeh</td>
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<td>temple of Amun (17.65m x 30m)</td>
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<td>Atfih</td>
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<td>extension of Hathor temple</td>
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<td>Memphis</td>
<td></td>
<td>monumental gate</td>
<td>chapel for Bastet and Horus</td>
<td>minor additions and repairs</td>
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<td>Tell Balala</td>
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<td>temple of Osiris (probable)</td>
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<td>Lower Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanis</td>
<td></td>
<td>minor additions to temple of Amun</td>
<td></td>
<td>'Eastern temple' (probable), two forecourts and pylons for temple of Amun (c.80m x 85m)</td>
<td>gate at temple of Amun (7m x 12.85m), tomb</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bubastis</td>
<td></td>
<td>temple of Bastet, extension of temple of Amun, renewed temple</td>
<td>Mihos temple, hypostyle hall with sed-festival gate (8m x 15m), naos and propylon for temple of</td>
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### Lower Egypt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Temples/Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leontopolis</td>
<td>Mihos temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pithom</td>
<td>new temples for Atum, Shu, Tefnut, Re-Horakhte and the Theban triad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tell el-Balamun</td>
<td>forecourts of temple of Amun and two large pylons (linked by a double row of columns in the first court: First pylon: 75m, Second pylon: 53m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tell Umm-Harb</td>
<td>replaced pre-existing Ramesside temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Bindaria</td>
<td>construction of temple (probable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kom el-Hisn</td>
<td>Sekhmet-Hathor temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mendes</td>
<td>renewal of existing temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper Egypt</td>
<td>Thebes: Karnak</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thebes: East Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thebes: West Bank</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Esna</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edfu</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Abydos</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lower Egypt</td>
<td>Memphis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nubia</td>
<td>Qasr Ibrim</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Buhen</td>
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<td>Semna-West</td>
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<td>Kawa</td>
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<td>Tabo</td>
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<td>Sanam</td>
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<td>Nubia</td>
<td>Gebel Barkal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuri</td>
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Whilst the construction of monuments tends to be associated with centralised control it is apparent that periods of strong centralised rule also have significant periods with only limited construction (Baines and Yoffee 1998, 229). The construction of monuments is thus connected to presentations of power and authority, but is not necessarily a reflection of the political situation in a state, as has often been assumed for Egypt. These are strong incentives for rulers to construct monuments to show their power not just to the elite but also to the wider population. An existing monumental landscape also defines and reinforces the social relations within a society (Parker Pearson and Richards 1994b, 58; Earle 2001, 124). Adding monuments to this landscape would, therefore, have helped to establish a ruler as legitimate, tying them to the history of that culture, especially over a region and population which adhered to a very different ideology than the new rulers.

The use of pre-existing landscapes to enhance the legitimacy of a state’s authority over new territory is also attested in other societies; it is particularly apparent under the Inca during their conquest of the territory of the former Wari Empire (McEwan 2006, 96). The Incan Empire’s early conquests were over regions which had been heavily exposed to the ideology of the Wari and Tiwanaku states, and could, therefore, be relatively easily incorporated into the new Incan state whose ideology had itself developed out of those of the Wari and Tiwanaku empires and their influence over the Incan heartland (McEwan 2006, 96-98). This is similar to the expansion of the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty, whose early conquests were to the north, and ultimately Egypt, rather than to the south which appears to have been added much later (Pope 2014, 31-34). The Inca not only appear to have made use of the pre-existing infrastructure and ideological landscape, but also imported craftsmen from a previous imperial capital to their core regions in order to carry out construction of their
larger monuments (McEwan 2006, 98), a direct parallel with Taharqa’s similar transfer of craftsmen from Memphis to work on the construction of his temple at Kawa as recorded in Kawa IV (Ritner 2009a, 538).

The different impacts of the Libyan and Kushite kings on the built landscape reveal, therefore, aspects of how the different dynasties demonstrated their religious and political authority and legitimacy across Egypt. As a result of their internal rise the Libyan kings needed to demonstrate their authority, particularly to members of the elite who might have challenged their rule. By carrying out large building projects they were able to associate themselves with the social relationships encapsulated within the landscape, but most importantly were able to demonstrate their individual power and authority to a wide audience (Trigger 1990, 127; Baines and Yoffee 1998, 254). With the changes that had taken place to Egyptian kingship during the late New Kingdom and into the Libyan Period, with the position losing much of its religious authority to the temples and to the gods themselves (Baines 1995, 33-35), in order for the kings to secure religious authority they needed to emphasise their connection to the gods (Baines 1995, 34). One of the clearest ways to do so was through the construction of monuments to them, and in this light the Libyan rulers’ construction projects make further sense. Their focus on the construction of temples in the north, largely to the key gods of that region, demonstrated their religious authority as rulers to the elites of that area. It also marked a clear shift away from the way New Kingdom kings had demonstrated their religious authority. Temples dedicated to the cult of the deceased king on the west bank at Thebes ceased to be built from the end of the Twentieth Dynasty onwards, and the large building works on behalf of Amun at Karnak and across Thebes which had marked the New Kingdom also disappeared bar a brief resurgence under Shoshenq I.
Despite the fact that both Osorkon I and II clearly had the resources to carry out significant projects in the north, with Osorkon I building a temple of Bast at Bubastis and Osorkon II adding small temples at both Bubastis and Tanis as well as a number of courts and pylons to the temple of Amun at the later (Arnold 1999, 36-38), neither appears to have carried out any work at Thebes. This suggests that, at least for the Libyan kings, Thebes was no longer an important location for the king to demonstrate either his religious or political authority, and that the nature of the king’s religious authority had changed with the abandonment of the establishment of cults to deceased kings.

The Kushite kings, on the other hand, had less need to demonstrate their power, having militarily defeated their main rivals, the remaining Libyan rulers. Combined with their adoption of the Egyptian ideology of kingship the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty kings are perceived by scholars as better fitting the role of legitimate Egyptian rulers (Myśliwiec 2000, 73; Ritner 2008, 306; Smith S. 2013, 98). The Kushite kings carefully manipulated Egyptian ideology and iconography to legitimise their rule within temple contexts, and this is reflected in their limited construction being focused where it would associate them best with the ideology of that landscape and tie them into the version of Egypt’s past presented by its monuments. Examples of this process are the Kushite additions to Osorkon III’s chapel of Osiris-ḥk3 dt with Shabataka adding a new front to the chapel which has been suggested as establishing the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty as the successors to the Theban Twenty-Third Dynasty (Ayad 2009b, 48-49; Adams M. 2011, 36-37). Similarly, Taharqa’s ‘edifice’, the small temple he built by the sacred lake at Karnak, appears to have been designed to emphasise not only the

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214 There are the remains of a small gate at the processional approach to the Monthu temple. Since the surviving inscriptions on the few blocks found indicate that it was dedicated by Osorkon II’s son, Nimlot (C), as HPA then it is reasonable to presume that this, limited, work was carried out by Nimlot (C) rather than Osorkon II.
Twenty-Fifth Dynasty’s connection with Amun but also the return to the New Kingdom role of the king as intermediary between the gods and humanity (Cooney 2000, 45-47).

The Kushites’ large monuments were instead built in Nubia, a region that had a more limited social landscape associated with the ruling ideology and thus required the kings to emphasise their power and authority (Smith S. 2013, 102). This follows a pattern apparent for other states which expanded rapidly over a number of different territories. Indeed, for several Peruvian civilisations, such as the Wari and Inca, it is clear that the largest post-conquest investments in infrastructure occurred where the pre-existing infrastructural landscape was limited and so could not be co-opted and re-used (Schreiber 1992, 17-26; McEwan 2006, 80).

The Twenty-Fifth Dynasty was also able to manipulate power relations through use of aspects of those traditions encapsulated in the landscape in order to weaken the position of the remaining Libyan rulers. The Kushite kings’ emphasis on purity allowed them to block access for the Libyan rulers to important places, visible in Piye’s conquest stela where only Nimlot (D) was allowed in his presence as he alone had abstained from eating fish (Baines 1995, 36; Ritner 2008, 306; Ritner 2009a, 490). This denial of access would have weakened the Libyan rulers’ connection with the political and sacred landscape, damaging their legitimacy as rulers of Egypt, whilst also enhancing the Kushite kings’ own divine legitimacy and their authority by marking out their practices as orthodox (Assmann 2002, 329). This shift in power relations reflects the Kushite rulers’ better use of traditional Egyptian ideology to support their position (Török 1997, 163). Thus, unlike the Libyans, whose lack of attachment to the ideology of Egyptian kingship appears to have led them to build large monuments as demonstration of their power and authority, the Kushite kings were able to
make such demonstrations through smaller, carefully situated additions, such as the kiosk added to Karnak by Taharqa (Arnold 1999, 51), which tied them into the existing landscape and the Egyptian past.

Indeed, unlike the Libyan kings, who actively appear to have shifted away from New Kingdom methods of demonstrating their religious authority by ending construction at Thebes, by concentrating their additions at Karnak the Kushite kings also emphasised their adherence to the New Kingdom form of kingship, with its connection to Amun for divine legitimacy. Taharqa even appears to have added a small temple within Karnak enclosure dedicated to the concept of divine kingship (Arnold 1999, 54), again showing a return to the form of kingship in the New Kingdom rather than the Libyan Period (Baines 1995, 26; 33-35). The key difference was that it was no longer Amun of Thebes who had the primary role in granting the Kushite kings their religious authority, but instead Amun of Napata (Török 1997, 264; Gozzoli 2009, 52). As a result this was where the largest monuments were built in order for the Kushite kings to establish their connection to Amun and thus affirm their religious authority as being granted by him (Morkot 2000, 304; Pope 2014, 145-146).

4.3 Summary

The ways in which the Libyan and Kushite rulers secured their religious authority, and thus their legitimacy as kings of Egypt, was partly, therefore, a continuity of Egypt’s cultural traditions, but also an adaptation of those same traditions for the elites’ own purposes. These modifications were used in ways that were applicable to their situation as rulers of a different cultural background. The impact that the Libyan and Kushite rulers had on the
landscape of Egypt was both significant and apparently contradictory. Far from there being a lack of royal display during the Libyan and Kushite Periods, as argued by Baines (1995, 34-35), there is clear evidence that construction was taking place and on a significant scale, especially in the Delta and in Nubia. In Upper Egypt, however, there was a lack of royal work, particularly at Thebes, a significant change from the New Kingdom where it had been the focus of establishing the king’s religious authority through association with Amun and the presentation of divine kingship, and had thus been the hub for much of the temple construction during that period.

The different levels of impact that the two sets of rulers had on the built landscape of Egypt were a product of how the Libyan and Kushite rulers required the landscape to support their religious and political authority. The Libyans, with a weaker association with traditional forms of legitimacy and stronger internal rivals, had a significant physical impact on the built landscape by carrying out large-scale building projects which would have effectively demonstrated their power and authority. In contrast the Kushite rulers made a comparatively limited physical impact on the landscape of Egypt, especially outside Thebes, although they had a much larger effect on the landscape of Nubia which instituted a political structure that lasted long after the end of the dynasty (Morkot 2000, 304; Pope 2014, 145-150).

Thus, probably as a result of the political situation, the kings of the Twenty-First Dynasty maintained and enhanced the ‘theocratic’ tendencies that had begun to appear during the late New Kingdom in order to secure their legitimacy. By emphasising that Amun granted them authority, through the use of oracles confirming their decisions and including the HPA title within their names or titulary, the kings were able to demonstrate their
connection to the divine and thus enhance their religious authority. This led to the limited construction of monuments, including mortuary temples, which had been important demonstrations of New Kingdom traditions of divine kingship, instead concentrating on establishing a new base for Amun in the north at Tanis, along with some limited work at Thebes.

The later Libyan rulers, from the Twenty-Second Dynasty onwards, quickly moved away from many of these ‘theocratic’ elements, securing their religious authority in different ways, such as through installing members of the royal family as HPA or GWA. Their most significant impact was a gradual abandonment of the Egyptian ideology of kingship, but at the same time the preservation of the associated iconography. This was balanced, however, by extensive monumental construction across the remainder of the Libyan Period and at many of the main sites in the north, establishing their connection to the gods in physical modifications to the landscape.

Shoshenq I’s additions to Karnak appear to have tried to continue the landscape and legitimising system of the late New Kingdom and the Theban kings of the Twenty-First Dynasty (Arnold 1999, 35). This is perhaps a legacy of his need for the acceptance by the elite of that region as king, possibly reflected in the use of the oracle of Amun by Psusennes II to grant Shoshenq I permission to establish a cult to his father at Abydos (Ritner 2009a; 168-169) and in the fact that the first few KPA from his reign (in text 4; Ritner 2009a, 51: 1-4) listed him only as ‘great chief’ not king (Ritner 2009a, 51). Following his death, however, there was no further major construction carried out at Thebes by a Libyan king, and Shoshenq I’s additions appear to have remained unfinished as HPA Osorkon (D) was able to add his texts to the Bubastite Portal. This is surprising considering that Osorkon I did
complete Shoshenq I’s temple at el-Hibeh (Kitchen 1986, 304), and both he and Osorkon II clearly had the resources to carry out building work at Thebes if they had so desired. This, therefore, suggests a fairly rapid shift towards establishing their religious authority and legitimacy based on their connection to the deities of the cities of the Delta, including Amun of Tanis and the various ‘dynastic deities’ such as Bast (Lange 2008, 131; 141).

The Kushite kings, in contrast, restored many elements of the ideology of Egyptian kingship, particularly the concept of sole rule over a united country, but modified them for their specific political requirements. This included an emphasis on the Kushite kings’ connection to the gods, and particularly Amun, both iconographically with them depicted with items that related them to a number of deities, such as the ram’s head amulets and earrings, and ideologically with a clear emphasis in Kushite texts on the role of Amun and his approval of the king. This allowed the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty to rapidly expand its control over Nubia and then Egypt, and to establish their divinely appointed super-ordinate position over the various local rulers within the different regions of the Kushite state.

Their restoration of many of the elements of the kingship of the late New Kingdom is also apparent in the locations that the Kushite kings carried out their monumental construction. Whilst the Libyan kings carried out almost no construction at Thebes following the death of Shoshenq I, the Kushite kings did build there and on a level not known (bar Shoshenq I) since the end of the New Kingdom. This would have served to mark their adherence to the New Kingdom form of kingship and its relationship with Amun (Gordon 2009, 149), something mirrored by their modifications to the iconography of Egyptian kingship, such as the amulets and earrings. They also carried out some limited work at Memphis, thereby demonstrating their connection to the two centres associated with the
key elements of the ideology of kingship as it was presented in the late New Kingdom. Through their works at Thebes the Kushite kings made clear their relationship with Amun of Thebes to the elite of Upper Egypt and thus to the guarantor of kingship in the late New Kingdom and Twenty-First Dynasty, whilst their monuments at Memphis helped to emphasise their association with the traditional understanding of the king ruling over a united Egypt.

By carrying out the majority of their large monumental constructions in the Delta and Nubia respectively, not only did the Libyan and Kushite kings create a landscape which demonstrated their political and religious authority in the regions where they were largely based and which mostly lacked an existing landscape, but they also emphasised the shift away from Upper Egypt, and Thebes in particular, in terms of both religious and political legitimacy. Even the Kushite kings, who emphasised their adherence to Amun, despite carrying out far more construction at Thebes than most of the Libyan kings, in reality carried out only very limited building work at Thebes, and may only have visited infrequently, as Amun of Napata was now key to granting divine legitimacy and their promotion of the symbols of the unification of Egypt led to their residing at Memphis and not Thebes (O’Connor 1983, 243; Myśliwiec 2000, 93; Pope 2014, 257).

The archaising policies of the later Libyan and Kushite kings reflect this combination of continuity and change. Unlike previous archaistic practices within Egyptian art, neither the Libyan nor the Kushite rulers adopted a single ‘pure’ style from an older period. Instead,

215 The only recorded visits are those that appear in Piye’s ‘Victory Stela’ (twice; Ritner 2009a, 479: 13-15), Taharqa once in Kawa IV (Ritner 2009a, 512) as well after his defeat by the Assyrians (Morkot 2000, 268), and Tanwetamani’s ‘Dream Stela’ (once; Breyer 2003, 121-127; Ritner 2009a, 571). Whilst this is not an exhaustive list, and it is likely that a significant number of visits remained unrecorded or have been lost, this is not a large number of visits to the home of Amun, considering his emphasis within Twenty-Fifth Dynasty texts.
both the Libyan and Kushite rulers carefully selected and merged cultural elements in order to enhance their legitimacy in a period of extensive political competition by creating motifs that associated them simply with the Egyptian past in general, rather than a specific period or ruler. This ensured that the artistic styles and iconographical elements associated with the depiction of Egyptian kingship and the ruler’s religious authority remained the ones that had been used throughout Egyptian history, providing an element of continuity with earlier periods and thus enhancing the Libyan and Kushite rulers’ legitimacy.

That these foreign elites used Egyptian ideology and iconography shows the continued power of the Egyptian cultural tradition that remained, supported by an entrenched elite. Similarly, despite the changes in how the built landscape provided the kings of the Libyan and Kushite Periods with their religious authority, its form and structure, and the fact that through carrying out monumental construction a king could show their connection to the gods and thus demonstrate their religious authority, remained unchanged. Indeed, despite the many changes that took place during the Libyan and Kushite Periods, arguably their most significant effect was the confirmation that for a king to be considered a legitimate ruler, and thus maintain control over the country, he must adopt significant elements of Egyptian ideology and iconography.
Regionalisation is often argued to be a process which was inherent within Egyptian society; something that was liable to appear whenever central state control weakened and/or provincial officials gained too much power (O’Connor 1974, 15; Kemp 1989, 336-337; Seidlmayer 1990, 439-440; Gregory 2014, 3). A product of the royal administration’s reliance on local leaders to enact its decisions, which provided them with significant power (Eyre 2011, 709; Moreno Garcia 2013a, 99-100; 2013c, 1032-1033), this meant there was constant tension between the central authorities and powerful local rulers over the extent of the king’s control (O’Connor 1974, 15; Moreno Garcia 2013a, 90; 100; 2013c, 1040-1041). Such regionalisation is also apparent in the late New Kingdom, with Upper Egypt increasingly establishing an identity separate from that of Lower Egypt (Polz 1998, 92-93; Gregory 2014, 154), demonstrated by HPA Ramessesnakht’s and Amenhotep’s deliberate association with the tombs of Amenhotep I and Ahmose-Nefertari to highlight their Theban connections (Rummel 2014, 379-380).

Connected to this perception of underlying tension between the centre and provincial elite is an argument that whenever centralised control broke down this led to a widening of access to aspects of Egyptian culture previously restricted to the royal court and a general increase in wealth amongst the wider provincial population. The First Intermediate Period (FIP) in particular has seemingly demonstrated that this understanding is correct with the appearance of powerful provincial rulers and greater competition for status bringing about the adoption of funerary traditions previously restricted to the royal court, for example the appearance of the ‘Coffin Texts’ (Seidlmayer 2000, 110-111; 115-116).
Libyan and Kushite Periods are no exceptions to this argument, with suggestions that the spread of royal prerogatives amongst the wider elite reflects this broadening of social status and wealth away from the court centred around the king (O’Connor 1983, 237-238; Kitchen 1986, 345-347), and that the political fragmentation demonstrates the Egyptian state’s underlying tendency to fragment into two or more parts (O’Connor 1983, 232-238; Kemp 1989, 336-337).

This chapter will therefore examine the most comprehensive surviving archaeological material from the Libyan and Kushite Periods, the funerary material, to examine whether it reveals a cultural landscape of regionalisation during these periods and/or changes in the social status and wealth of individuals. It will also look at another cultural landscape in the Libyan and Kushite Period, that of political fragmentation, to see whether that also conforms to the explanations of regionalisation brought out by the presence of powerful local officials. Firstly, however, as the original model for this process of regionalisation and the spread of wealth away from the royal court is the FIP (Bell B. 1971, 19; O’Connor 1983, 18; Malek 2000, 107), it is important to briefly outline what the cultural landscape of that period has revealed.

5.1 The cultural landscape of the First Intermediate Period (c.2160-2055 BC).

The FIP is generally accepted as containing the Ninth and Tenth Dynasties and continuing until the middle of the Eleventh Dynasty, with the reunification of Egypt under Montuhotep II, corresponding to roughly a century (Seidlmayer 2006, 159). It is characterised by substantial changes to the political structures of Egypt, with the centralised administration that had been concentrated at Memphis during the Old Kingdom replaced by powerful
provincial rulers who largely ignored the new dynasties at Herakleopolis, especially those based in Upper Egypt (Bell B. 1971, 19; O’Connor 1983, 18; Malek 2000, 107; Seidlmayer 2000, 117-125; Willems 2010, 82-85; Moreno Garcia 2015, 83-84). Underlying these political changes, a number of significant alterations in the cultural landscape have been noted, especially an increasing level of regionalisation which mirrors the increasingly provincial nature of the political system as well as a markedly different distribution of wealth and other objects in graves across Egypt.

During the Old Kingdom, provincial cemeteries have proved to be relatively scarce within Egypt, with those that are known also being relatively small in scale (Seidlmayer 2000, 113). Towards the end of the Old Kingdom, however, and throughout the FIP these cemeteries grew rapidly in number and size, and also gained large monumental tombs for the first time (Seidlmayer 1987; 199-201; 2000, 110-112). Such changes are taken to reflect alterations in the pattern of consumption, away from the royal court at Memphis and towards provincial centres (Seidlmayer 1987, 199; 202; 1990, 429; Richards 2000, 38-39). This change in consumption is not just demonstrated by the appearance of monumental tombs and more extensive cemeteries, but also in the changes to the grave goods that appear in the tombs of the FIP (Seidlmayer 1987, 202; 1990, 427-429; 2000, 113-115; Morris 2006, 67). For the first time within these tombs were objects which had been produced specifically for funerary purposes, such as the wooden and stucco models, often replacing some of the everyday items that had been common in burials of the Old Kingdom, especially sandals and headrests (Seidlmayer 1990, 428). This was mirrored by the creation of provincial markets for funerary items, as is clear from coffins with blank spaces left for names to be added that are found at provincial centres (Seidlmayer 1990, 441), and the
adoption of previously royal funerary traditions by a wider group no longer centred on the
court (Seidlmayer 1987, 205; 1990, 429).

The increasing status of individuals in the provinces is also apparent not just in the
type of grave goods, but also their quantity and the materials they were made from. The
excavations of the burials at Qau and Badari revealed that the burials of this period were far
wealthier than preceding periods, with the most mirrors, beads and amulets, no reduction in
the number of alabaster vases from the numbers found in Old Kingdom burials, and all of the
alabaster headrests found at the site (Brunton 1927, 75-76; Morris 2006, 66). There was also
a far greater quantity of metal objects, including weapons (Morris 2006, 60), within the
burials at all hierarchical levels of the FIP, with even gold objects found within provincial
tombs (Seidlmayer 2000, 113; Richards 2000, 39). Brunton’s (1927, 76) analysis of the tombs
he excavated at Qau and Badari, none of which were royal tombs, shows that a significant
number contained gold objects, with forty of the fifty-eight dating from the Seventh to Tenth
Dynasties (and so the FIP), far more so than those known from the Old Kingdom (18 out of
58: 31%).

Finally, the spread of funerary culture that had previously been restricted to the royal
court and highest elite is also apparent in the ‘democratisation of the afterlife’ that took
place during the FIP (Seidlmayer 1990, 442; 2000, 115-116; Richards 2000, 39; Morris 2006,
67). This not only includes the appearance of the ‘Coffin Texts’, which had previously formed
parts of the ‘Pyramid Texts’, but also individuals addressing gods directly on their funerary
stelae (Richards 2000, 39-40). This has led to suggestions that within the FIP there was a
development of an ‘intermediary’ social class in Egypt between the court and individuals,
centred on the towns of the provinces (Seidlmayer 1990, 412; 2000, 112-113).
As well as these changes in the demonstrations of social wealth there are indications that the provinces of Egypt developed distinctively different material culture than both the centralised forms that had dominated since the Naqada Period and from each other (Seidlmayer 1990, 438-439; 2000, 113-114; Morris 2006, 64-65). This divergence is most readily apparent in the ceramic evidence that has survived from the FIP, with a clear distinction between the forms found in the north of the country and those found in the south immediately after the end of the Old Kingdom (Seidlmayer 1990, 432-433; 439). In the south the ovoid forms of pottery of the Old Kingdom were rapidly abandoned and replaced by elliptical and later ‘bag’ or ‘drop-shaped’ forms (Seidlmayer 1990, 434-435). In the north, by contrast, the ovoid forms of the Old Kingdom, with some modifications, continued well into the FIP and may not have been replaced until the ‘homogenisation’ of Egyptian culture under the Middle Kingdom (Seidlmayer 1990, 393; 396; 439). Whilst these ceramic traditions show a clear differentiation between the north and south, with the border in the area around Beni Hassan (Seidlmayer 1990, 394), there is a less clear differentiation within these two regions and it is not entirely clear that there were localised traditions in each of the nomes or at particular centres (Seidlmayer 1990, 439). This division into two main regions of the ‘north’ and the ‘south’, clearly apparent in the ceramic traditions of the FIP, noticeably does not follow the political divisions of Egypt which only really separate into ‘north’ versus ‘south’ under the early Eleventh Dynasty (Seidlmayer 1990, 439). This has led to arguments that this clear division of ceramic forms between Lower and Upper Egypt demonstrates a ‘natural’ division of Egypt and reveals underlying trends in the transmission of material culture within Egypt, particularly as it mirrors one that existed in the later Neolithic (Seidlmayer 1990, 439-440).
More localised traditions are, however, apparent in the architecture of monumental tombs (Seidlmayer 2000, 116-117). For example, in the Theban region the mastaba tomb developed into the ‘Saff’-tomb, a type of tomb only found within that region (Seidlmayer 1990, 400-402), whilst at Dendera the mastaba type common in the Old Kingdom was modified to have niched facades and long, sloping access corridors to subterranean chambers (Seidlmayer 2000, 116). Such a formal creation of a new form of tomb architecture may show the creation of regional identity during the FIP, and thus demonstrate the cohesion of local cultural identities in a way that was not apparent in the Old Kingdom (Seidlmayer 1990, 411). These ‘localised’ identities centred on a smaller region were reinforced by the local rulers demonstrating their connection to the key local deity, as Ankhtifi of Edfu did in his biography with repeated associations to Horus of Edfu and the early Eleventh Dynasty’s associations with Monthu of Thebes (Seidlmayer 2000, 123-125).

The differentiation between the material culture of the ‘north’ and ‘south’ can be overstated, however, with the two regions sharing a number of developments in funerary culture. Both regions saw the introduction of wooden models, cartonnage and family tombs during the FIP (Seidlmayer 1990, 386; 2000, 114). For some classes of object, such as stone vessels, scarabs, and button seal amulets, both Upper and Lower Egyptian craftsmen were drawing on the same models (Seidlmayer 1990, 434; 2000, 133). There is also the issue which plagues all comparisons between the material culture of Upper and Lower Egypt: the much reduced quantity of evidence from the north which may be masking similarities between the material cultures of the two regions (Seidlmayer 1990, 393). Likewise the break away from the culture of the Old Kingdom may be overemphasised. Many of the new elements of FIP funerary culture were based around aspects of Old Kingdom elite culture.
with inspiration for the wooden models found in tombs dating to the FIP, for example, coming from the scenes of daily life found on the walls of Old Kingdom mastabas (Seidlmayer 2000, 115).

Nevertheless, in both the pottery and the localised tomb architecture which developed during the FIP it is clear that there were distinct regional differences between the north and south of the country (Seidlmayer 1990, 438-440). This development of the regional styles was also mirrored by the appearance of much wider distributions of items signifying wealth in provincial cemeteries, for example gold objects (Seidlmayer 2000, 113; Richards 2000, 39), demonstrating a new level of competition for status not found in the Old Kingdom (Seidlmayer 1987, 199; Richards 1990, 38-39; Morris 2006, 61-63).

5.2 Cultural landscapes of the Libyan and Kushite Periods

5.2.1 Methodology

The Libyan and Kushite Periods lack Egypt-wide archaeological evidence for most specific object types, primarily due to limited material from Lower Egypt, as well as the disappearance of certain types of evidence, for example the monumental tomb architecture utilised for the FIP. One corpus of evidence that is definitively present at sites across Egypt is burials, and these have been further organised into tomb-groups by Aston (2009b) to include known grave goods. This provides a significant quantity of evidence from sites across Egypt: 1045 tomb-groups (henceforth TG), dated across the entirety of the Libyan and Kushite Periods allowing for not only regional comparisons, but also examination of changes over time. It also corresponds to the evidence used for the FIP, which was also largely funerary in
nature, allowing for better comparisons with that material and the conclusions drawn from
them.

There are, as with all archaeological evidence, a number of important issues with
Aston’s TG which complicate any conclusions that can be drawn from the evidence. Firstly,
as ever, the vast majority of evidence comes from Upper Egypt. Of the 1045 TG only 154 are
from sites in Lower Egypt (Aston 2009b, 39-86), just 14% of the total. This is in part due to a
lack of excavation at several key sites (Leclère 2008, 17-18), particularly Tanis, Bubastis and
Leontopolis, as well as the poor survival of those sites and others, such as Sais (Leclère
2008a, 16-18; 162-164; 363-367; 2008b, 396; 656; Aston 2009b, 19). This has meant that
non-royal cemeteries for the Libyan and Kushite Periods from a significant number of key
northern sites remain unknown or unexcavated (Leclère 2008b, 654-655). This lack of
cemeteries for many of the main northern towns has a significant impact in a number of
ways. It restricts our ability to compare the customs of the north with those in the south,
and to compare the royal tombs at Tanis with those of the kings based at other sites. Most
significantly, it means we lack evidence from some of the largest and most politically
significant urban sites of the Libyan and Kushite Periods (Leclère 2008. 581-582; 587-589).
There has also been extensive looting at some of the important sites in Middle Egypt, such as
Akhmin and Assiut (Aston 2009b, 19), as well as of the Libyan Period tombs behind the
Ramesseum at Thebes (Taylor 1985, 20; Aston 2009b, 308; 394). In both regions there are
also significant gaps in the chronological record, with few of the known and dated burials
from the north being securely dated to the eleventh and tenth centuries BC (only thirty-one
out of the 154), whilst those in the south (outside Thebes) largely date to the eighth and
seventh centuries BC (Aston 2009b, 397). Even at Thebes, which has by far the most
complete record, there is a gap during the ninth century BC due to the loss of the Ramesseum tombs. This makes it much more difficult to make regional comparisons and to detect chronological developments of the material culture within regions outside Thebes.

Despite these issues, Aston’s TG remain the most comprehensive form of archaeological evidence definitively associated with sites across Egypt and have therefore been used here to provide the evidence for the following analysis to reconstruct the cultural landscape of the Libyan and Kushite Periods.

5.2.2 The cultural landscape of status and wealth in the Libyan and Kushite Periods

It has been generally assumed that during the intermediate periods of Egyptian history the breakdown of centralised rule led to an increase in the level of wealth for groups outside the high elite (Kemp 1989, 308-309), as has been demonstrated for the FIP (as discussed above). As one of the key markers of this widening of social status in the FIP was the increasing presence of gold within ‘lower’ status burials, in order to determine whether there was such a widening of wealth and social status within the Libyan and Kushite Periods Aston’s TG are here examined for the presence of metal objects, specifically gold, silver, and copper and bronze. Attempting to compare other aspects, such as the presence of funerary papyri or the number of coffins, is complicated by the lack of many of the items which might demonstrate such status changes and either the total lack of such evidence from the north (in the case of papyri where all known come from Thebes; Aston 2009b, 308), or reduced survival due to environmental conditions.

Any tombs which contained metallic objects are here separated into three social ‘classes’: royal where the individual was a known member of a royal family up to the third
generation,\textsuperscript{216} ‘official or priestly’ where an individual has been attested with a title from any of the Egyptian institutions (following Aston 2009b, 396), and ‘non-royal’ which includes any individual without any attested titles and graves without wooden coffins. The TG were also divided by rough time period in order to see whether the spread of status may have changed across the entirety of the Libyan and Kushite Periods. The results of my analysis are as follows.

\textit{Gold}

In the FIP gold objects were found in non-royal provincial burials in considerable numbers (Brunton 1927, 76). From the Libyan and Kushite Periods a total of thirteen northern burials and thirty southern burials contained any golden objects (see table 8). These range from gold vases, mummy masks and jewellery to fragments of gold foil and single earrings. This is only a very small sample, even with the limited number of TG dating to the Libyan and Kushite Periods, with only 8.4\% of TG in the north and 3.4\% of TG in the south being found with any gold items in them. Despite the limited number of TG known to contain gold items, a number of trends can clearly be distinguished from the below analysis.

\textsuperscript{216} I have chosen to stop labelling descendants of royal families as ‘royal’ from the third generation onwards, unless they hold a specifically royal title, as after three generations an individual can be a considerable distance from the main line of descent. Moreover, almost none of these individuals are recorded as holding royal titles, instead often holding relatively simple titles, such as Osorkon I’s grandson Osorkon (D) whose only known title was ‘priest of Amun’ (\textit{hm-nfr n Imn}) (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 221) or Takeloth III’s grandson Padiamunet (ii) who was only a ‘priest of Monthu’ (\textit{hm-nfr n Mn_tw}) (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 230; Aston 2014, 29-30).
Table 8: Gold

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Lower Egypt (154 TG)</th>
<th>Upper Egypt (891 TG)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Royal</td>
<td>Official/priestly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th-10th centuries</td>
<td>2, 3, 4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th century</td>
<td>6, 7, 8, 9, 22, 135</td>
<td>136, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th-7th centuries</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of burials of this type in each region containing gold</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Firstly, it is clear that the vast majority of gold items are still found within royal tombs and that a far larger proportion of those burials contain gold than any of the other groups, particularly considering that many of the ‘official/priestly’ class were at least connected to the royal families of the period. For example, TG136 is actually the grandson of Osorkon II, as the son of HPP Shoshenq (D) (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 222) and thus a direct descendant of the Twenty-Second Dynasty. This is increasingly true if the number of gold objects in the royal burials, particularly those from Tanis, is taken into account. Ninety-four individual gold items were found in Psusennes I’s burial (TG2; Aston 2009b, 44-49), outnumbering all of the items found in all of the non-royal tombs put together.217 Even in Wendjebaendjed’s TG

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217 This does not include Wendjebaendjed’s TG since despite apparently not being a member of the royal family he was buried in a royal tomb, showing that he was considerably favoured by the king, reflected in the fact that the contents of his TG have more in common with the other royal burials than any other ‘official/priestly’ burials, with his again outnumbering all other non-royal burials in terms of the gold found as part of his burial (Aston 2009b, 41-43).
(TG1), there were still fewer gold items than in Psusennes I’s TG (71 in TG1 to 94 in TG2). All the royal burials contain items of gold jewellery, often along with gold mummy masks (in the Tanite royal burials such as TG1, 2, 3, 6, and 7), along with gold amulets and other adornments often placed directly on the body. In contrast, the gold items found in ‘official/priestly’ or non-royal TG are largely restricted to single gold amulets or earrings, and the non-royal burials indeed often only have an amount of gold foil within them, as in TG203 and 206 at Lahun (Aston 2009b, 100).

It is clear from the above analysis of the TG that gold clearly continued to hold a significant role in the funerary traditions of the royal families of Egypt. The significance of gold as part of the funerary tradition is apparent in its use for objects on the body itself, as well as the sheer number of gold objects in some of the royal tombs in comparison to the number of silver items, with Psusennes I having ninety-four gold items and only seventeen silver as part of his burial (TG2; Aston 2009b, 44-49; Jurman 2015a, 54-56). Also readily apparent from the above analysis is that there was no widening in the use of gold as discovered by Brunton (1927, 76) at Qau and Badari where 58 tombs contained gold, none of which were royal. In contrast, the sample from the Libyan and Kushite Periods is much smaller, forty-four TG in total, as well as from a far longer period, again suggesting that there was no widening of access. Indeed, the use of gold appears to have remained almost entirely restricted to members of the royal family, or their subsequent descendants amongst the ‘official and priestly’ class. Only very occasionally is gold apparent in entirely non-royal burials, many of which are anonymous and thus may well belong to one of the other classes (such as TG19, 203, 206, 222, 239, 265 amongst others). This is also apparent in the locations in which gold objects are found within tombs, with them overwhelmingly concentrated at
Tanis and Memphis in the north and Thebes and Herakleopolis in the south, all centres with royal connections during the Libyan and Kushite Periods. Only a few gold items have been located from outside those centres, such as TG203 and 206 from Lahun.

This situation seems to have remained stable across the entirety of the Libyan and Kushite Periods, although here the lack of burials dating to particular periods hampers any further extrapolation. Certainly, the pattern in the north with the royal burials providing the majority of gold objects is maintained across the entire Libyan Period (eleventh-eighth centuries BC). The exception to this is Thebes during the eleventh and tenth centuries where a significant quantity of ‘official/priestly’ TG contained gold items (see table 8). This would seem to suggest that there was a broadening of wealth and status immediately after the end of the New Kingdom in the Theban region, especially amongst the priesthood of Amun. There are a number of issues with this conclusion, however. The known royal burials from Thebes were not found intact and in their original tombs as were the ones at Tanis (Aston 2009b 224), and we are missing a key royal tomb in that of Herihor. Further, although they may have had similar numbers of gold objects to the royal family based at Thebes, they have nowhere near the amount of gold found in the royal burials in the north, suggesting that these objects do not indicate a significant change in status or wealth for non-royal individuals.

Silver

It has been argued by some that silver became increasingly important during the Libyan and Kushite Periods, with it even replacing gold in significance (Müller-Wollermann 2007, 1351-1359). Whilst Jurman (2015a, 56-57) has demonstrated this to be highly debatable, it is clear
that significant amounts of silver have been found in burials throughout Egypt and across the entirety of the two periods. This is apparent from the larger number of tombs found with silver objects in them, fourteen from the north and thirty-six from the south (see table 9).

The geographical spread is also larger, with burials at a number of more ‘provincial’ locations containing silver items, including Tell el-Retabeh in the north (e.g. TG124; Aston 2009b, 75), and Lahun (e.g. TG196; Aston 2009b, 98), Matmar (e.g. TG288; Aston 2009b, 115), Qau (TG561; Aston 2009b, 140), and Abydos (e.g. TG584; Aston 2009b, 146) in the south, no longer solely in the main centres of Tanis, Memphis, and Thebes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Silver</th>
<th>Lower Egypt (154 TG)</th>
<th>Upper Egypt (891 TG)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Royal</td>
<td>Official/priestly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th-10th centuries</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th century</td>
<td>6, 7, 8, 9, 135</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th-7th centuries</td>
<td>10, J2/67</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can only be dated to a 'post-New Kingdom' date</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of burials of this type in each region containing silver</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the distribution of gold objects found in Libyan and Kushite Periods, in the north a significant majority of tombs which contained silver objects were for members of the royal
family. This pattern is not repeated in the south, however, with a clear majority of ‘official/priestly’ and non-royal, rather than royal, burials containing silver objects. This immediately suggests that with silver, at least, there was a widening of access to objects of wealth and status in the Libyan and Kushite Periods, with the pattern in the south remaining relatively constant across the entirety of both periods. That silver objects were found in a wider number of locations is also indicative of a wider access to silver amongst the general population of Egypt during the Libyan and Kushite Periods, with their appearance in some numbers at sites outside the major centres in the north and Thebes in the south. This spread perhaps indicates the increasing wealth of the provincial centres as appears to have occurred in the FIP, something not apparent in the locations of the tombs with gold objects.

Once again, however, there are issues with the quantities of silver objects found in the tombs. The tomb of Psusennes I (TG2) contained seventeen silver objects, including a solid silver coffin, whilst that of Shoshenq IIa contained four miniature silver mumiform coffins representing the four sons of Horus along with a hawk-headed silver coffin. In contrast the non-royal burials contain simply silver jewellery such as earrings and amulets. So, whilst a single royal burial does not contain as many silver objects as all of the non-royal burials, the silver coffins found in the northern royal burials almost certainly outweigh all of the other silver objects in terms of the quantity of silver being used. Such a clear disparity between the quantities of silver found in royal tombs and in non-royal ones does not, however, suggest that there were significant changes in the balance of wealth and status towards the provinces, as there was in the FIP. Unlike for gold, there is also some indication of the prevalence of silver in the New Kingdom, albeit not from tombs, in the hoards from Bubastis (Jurman 2015a, 56-57). These show that there were certainly large amounts of
silver present in the New Kingdom, suggesting that silver was already more widely available within Egyptian society and thus that the pattern in the south during the Libyan and Kushite Periods does not, perhaps, demonstrate a widening of access to symbols of status and wealth but rather a continuation of pre-existing conditions. As with the gold objects, there is a noticeable difference in the number of silver objects that the royal burials in the north contained in comparison to those of the Theban kings and their extended families. This indicates that there may well have been a wealth disparity between the kings of the north and south, perhaps reinforcing the impression that Thebes no longer held as much significance. This conclusion must be treated with caution, however, due to the number of royal burials in the south which were moved from their original tomb, and thus their grave goods may well be incomplete, unlike those in the north.

Bronze and Copper

There are far more burials containing bronze and copper items amongst the Libyan and Kushite Period TG than for either of the other types of metal, and they are also the most widespread of the three groups, with them found in burials at most sites and in all classes. In the north twenty-eight tombs contain a bronze and/or copper item, whilst in the south sixty-one tombs were found with such objects (see table 10). As with the silver items, bronze and copper objects are found much more widely geographically with them present at almost every location where Libyan and Kushite Period burials have been located; this includes Tanis (e.g. TG2-3; Aston 2009b, 44-51), Tell Nebesheh (e.g. TG13-18; Aston 2009b, 63), Leontopolis (TG22; Aston 1009b, 65), Tell el-Yahudieh (e.g. TG27; Aston 2009b, 67), Saft el-
Henneh (e.g. TG100-105; Aston 1009b, 71-72), Tell el-Balamun (TG107-110; Aston 2009b, 73-73), and Tell el-Retabeh (e.g. TG127; Aston 2009b, 76) in the north, and Lahun (e.g. TG198-201; Aston 2009b, 98-99), Matmar (e.g. TG383-387; Aston 2009b, 125-126), Qau (e.g. TG562; Aston 2009b, 140), Abydos (e.g. TG574; Aston 2009b, 142), and Thebes (e.g. TG705-706; Aston 2009b, 168-169) in the south.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10: Bronze and Copper</th>
<th>Lower Egypt (154 TG)</th>
<th>Upper Egypt (891 TG)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Royal Official/priestly Non-royal</td>
<td>Royal Official/priestly Non-royal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th-10th centuries</td>
<td>2, 3, 5, 107, 108, 109</td>
<td>13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th century</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>57, 70, 100, 101, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th-7th centuries</td>
<td></td>
<td>22, 103, 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th-5th centuries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can only be dated to a 'post-New Kingdom' date</td>
<td></td>
<td>105, 145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of burials of this type in each region containing bronze and/or copper</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The wider geographical spread of bronze and copper objects across Egypt appears to be mirrored in the social levels in which these items were found, with a large majority of them found in ‘official/priestly’ or non-royal burials (see table 10). Indeed, very few bronze or copper objects have been found in royal burials, suggesting that bronze and copper objects were considered lower status and thus were more widely available than gold and silver objects for those outside the high elite. This is also implied by the fact that the bronze and copper objects have a much wider selection of types, including vessels, weapons, tools, earrings and amulets. Unlike gold and silver objects, however, these are the bronze and copper objects found even in the wealthier graves, showing much less stark disparities in the quantities of those materials and in the types of objects found in royal and non-royal tombs than with gold and silver.

**Summary**

Given the lack of intact New Kingdom funerary evidence it is difficult to conclude whether there was a significant widening of access to metal objects in the Libyan and Kushite Periods, and thus changes to the status and wealth of the wider Egyptian population. Using the burials from the earliest part of the Libyan Period (the eleventh and tenth centuries BC, roughly equivalent to the Twenty-First Dynasty) as a marker for late New Kingdom behaviour, however, would suggest that there were no significant changes. This lack of change in the access to social status and wealth is also supported by the limited evidence for significant change in the proportions of ‘official/priestly’ and non-royal burials containing gold, silver, and bronze and copper items across the Libyan and Kushite Periods. Caution must be used with this conclusion, however, as a result of the speed of the changes to
material culture during the FIP following the end of the Old Kingdom (Seidlmayer 1990, 439), which may mean that even the TG from the earliest part of the Libyan Period were very different from those that preceded them in the late New Kingdom.

Despite this, it appears that clear distinctions in access to items made from metal, especially of gold and silver, between the different levels of the Egyptian social hierarchy remained across the Libyan and Kushite Periods. Certainly there appears to be a distinct separation between the royal burials of the north and the rest of the country, with these burials containing far larger quantities of gold and silver than those of the other classes and locations (see tables 11 and 12). At least 50% of royal tombs in the north were found with gold and silver items within them, and even in the south a far higher percentage of royal tombs contained gold items than either of the other two ‘classes’ (26% to 5.6% and 1.2% respectively).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11: Presence of Precious Metal</th>
<th>Lower Egypt (154 TG: 17% of total)</th>
<th>Upper Egypt (891 TG: 83% of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of each tomb type in each region</td>
<td>Royal</td>
<td>Official/priestly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of tomb type in each region</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of burials containing gold</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of burials containing silver</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of burials containing bronze and/or copper</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, it is noticeable that tombs of the ‘official/priestly’ class contained more silver than non-royal tombs, for example 30% to 1.6% in the north (see table 11). Other than
for bronze and copper items it is also clear that only a very small proportion of ‘official/priestly’ and non-royal tombs contained metal items. So, despite the fact that these results are affected by past looting, 37.5% of royal TG contained gold items and 20% had silver items (see table 12). In contrast, just 6.1% of ‘official/priestly’ TG had a gold item and only 1.1% of ‘non-royal’ burials, whilst 4.3% of ‘official/priestly’ TG and 3.9% of non-royal TG contained a silver object. These low percentages strongly suggest that there was no widening of access to wealth within the Libyan and Kushite Periods and demonstrate that there remained clear differences between the different social levels of Egyptian society with the kings and their families very clearly still at the top.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12: Proportion of tombs containing metal</th>
<th>Egypt (1045 TG)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Royal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of tombs of each type</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of tomb type total</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of burials containing gold</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of burials containing silver</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of burials containing bronze and/or copper</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Such conclusions are supported by Aston’s analysis of the other grave good types. Jewellery with precious stones is only found as part of the royal tombs in the north or those of the HPA in the south, whilst poorer burials simply have necklaces or bracelets made from beads (Aston 2009b, 380). The differences are particularly stark in terms of coffin use, with wealthy burials having three or more wooden coffins by the eighth century BC (Taylor 1985, 442-446), whilst in the poorest burials the bodies were merely wrapped in reed mats or palm ribs, or placed in pots (as in TG147 and 148 at Saqqara, TG156-177 from Meidum, and TG278 and 546 from Matmar; Aston 2009b, 84-85; 90-91; 114; 138). Wealthier burials also were generally found with shabtis and canopic jars, either dummy or real (Aston 2009b, 299), whilst poorer burials were often found with greater number of amulets and pottery (Aston 2009b, 396-397). Thus it is possible to distinguish royal burials from those of the ‘official/priestly’ group, and those in turn from poorer members of society through the grave goods that appear in each, with the poorest receiving no grave goods at all (Aston 2009b, 396). There appears to have been little differentiation between the grave goods included in burials within ‘class groups’ as well, again providing limited evidence for status competition as it appeared in the FIP (Aston 2009b, 397). It would appear that unlike the FIP, therefore, there was no significant spreading of wealth amongst the wider provincial population, nor a widening of access to objects of higher social status during the Libyan and Kushite Periods.

5.2.3 Regional and localised landscapes in the Libyan and Kushite Periods

The development of regional identities has been seen as an important process of the late New Kingdom, Libyan and Kushite Periods, in particular the understanding that during these periods a perception was established that Upper Egypt, at least, should be ruled from
Thebes (Polz 1998, 292-293; Gregory 2014, 3-4; 154; Payraudeau 2014b, 359). Within the Libyan Period increasing regionalisation has been suggested to be both a product of and a cause of the political fragmentation of that period, often in comparison with the process known to have taken place during the FIP (O’Connor 1983, 238-239; Hüneberg 2003, 73). Indeed, there is often argued to be a divide between the more ‘Libyan’ north and the ‘Egyptian’ south in a number of cultural traditions, including language (Leahy 1985, 59; Jansen-Winkeln 2001, 157; Payraudeau 2014b, 284-287).

Identifying aspects of regionalisation or localisation within the TG is complicated by the chronological gaps in the funerary traditions of the north and south, as well as the limited number of TG from the north. Nevertheless, as with the archaeological materials of the FIP, it is possible to draw a number of conclusions regarding the existence of regional or localised material culture traditions within the archaeological record.

Specifically, Aston (2009b, 353; 393-394) has identified a significant and dramatic change to all aspects of tomb furniture at Thebes, including coffin styles, the introduction of cartonnage, Aston’s Type K shabtis, Osiris figures, and the replacement of Osiris on stelae by Re-Horakhte, between c.950-930 BC, which he equates to the introduction of ‘northern control’ under Shoshenq I (Aston 2009b, 399). Of these it is clear that Taylor’s Theban Type II coffins appeared at Thebes during the reign of Shoshenq I with them only found in tombs that date to after c.940 BC (Taylor 1985, 491; Aston 2009b, 275). This coffin type has significant differences from the preceding Theban coffin types and whilst there are a few examples to suggest there were Theban precursors for some elements of the decoration.

218 Indeed Gregory even suggests that Amenmesses’ rebellion in the late Nineteenth Dynasty is the first manifestation of this process of regionalisation (2014, 148-149), however as I follow Dodson’s reconstruction of Amenmesses’ family relationship with Sety II (See Chapter 2 n.17) I also see his rebellion as an internal dynastic struggle for the throne.
their physical shape is unprecedented at Thebes (Taylor 1985, 429-430; 2009, 378). These have been identified as the product of ‘northern’ influence, itself the result of the appointment of individuals from the north by Shoshenq I to prominent local positions (Van Walsem 1997, 351; Taylor 2009, 378-379; Aston 2009b, 277). Similarly, cartonnage may well have been a northern introduction based on the technical quality of the earliest examples from Thebes which date to the reign of Osorkon I, whilst at Tanis cartonnage was already in use by the early Twenty-Second Dynasty (Aston 2009b, 277). Later forms of coffins, from the Twenty-Second to Twenty-Fifth Dynasties, seem to have a distinct divergence between the types common at Thebes and Akhmin, and those found further north, between Memphis and Speos Artemidos (Taylor 2009, 397-398), and possibly as far as the Delta (Taylor 2009, 393). Significant differences in the way the human form was modelled between northern and southern coffins, such as the representation of crossed hands appearing only on northern coffins, and the limited iconographic representation and inscriptions on northern examples, strongly suggest that there was a ‘northern’ tradition that was distinct from its ‘southern’ contemporary even though they shared some basic similarities (Taylor 2009, 400).

Funerary papyri, and the Osiris figures in which they were normally placed, are also identified as ‘northern’ in cultural origin (Aston 2009b, 308). For Osiris figures this is because they appeared during the later Ramesside Period when rule of Egypt was based in the north, whilst for funerary papyri this is a product of the only other known funerary texts appearing on the walls of the royal tombs at Tanis and their disappearance during periods of Theban independence and re-appearance once northern control was reasserted under the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty (Aston 2009b, 308). In contrast, the identification of metal weapons and tools being included in burials as a ‘northern’ cultural tradition is based on the vast majority of
them being found in the Delta at Tanis (TG1-3; Aston 2009b, 41-50), Tell el-Retabeh (TG127, 76), and Tell Nebesheh (TG13-16, 20-21; Aston 2009b, 63), and at Memphis (TG137; Aston 2009b, 80).

The identification of some of these traditions as ‘northern’ is complicated, however, by the lack of evidence for many of them in the north. The lack of surviving wooden coffins from the eleventh and tenth centuries BC in the north makes it currently impossible to identify the supposed precursors to Taylor’s Type II (Taylor 2009, 377; Aston 2009b, 288). Indeed, even for the later coffins where there is clearer evidence of two distinct regional forms these do not correspond to any of the known political divisions of Egypt during the Libyan Period (Taylor 2009, 399), nor even to the division between northern and southern pottery forms of the FIP where the boundary was at Beni Hassan (Seidlmayer 1990, 394). Finding the precursors to the type of coffin identified by Taylor as ‘northern’ is thus equally hampered by the lack of surviving wooden coffins with secure dates from the north (Taylor 2009, 399), as well as the complexities in creating a certain typology for coffins in these periods (Amenta 2014, 496). There is also evidence for the presence of ‘northern’ features on coffins made and used in the south, suggesting that there was a transmission of cultural forms between the two ‘regions’ (Taylor 2009, 398-399), something not attested in the pottery of the FIP until the Eleventh Dynasty (Seidlmayer 1990, 396). Likewise, the lack of surviving Osiris figures from the north, despite their introduction during the late Ramesside Period when the country was ruled from the north and the complete absence of funerary papyri from that region makes locating the cultural origin of these funerary traditions just as difficult to discern (Aston 2009b, 308). The identification of inclusions of metal weapons and tools in burials in the north, in contrast to the south, as a ‘northern’ tradition’ is complicated
by the looting of the Theban tombs, as well as the presence of some weapons in Upper Egyptian burials, notably TG195 at Lahun and TG574 and 608 at Abydos (Aston 2009b, 98; 143; 149; 382). Indeed, it is possible that the ‘northern’ burial traditions of the earlier Libyan Period were actually more widespread than is currently understood, with unpublished tombs from El-Ahaiweh appearing to be similar to those found at Tell Nebesheh dating to the eleventh-tenth centuries (Aston 2009b, 397).

This suggests, therefore, that in order to identify whether there was a distinctive regional divide between the north and south as there was in the FIP, we need to turn to more widespread evidence, such as pottery types, as were used for the FIP (Seidlmayer 1990, 348-397). The most widespread form of evidence was shabtis with them found in burials across Egypt throughout the Libyan and Kushite Periods (Aston 2009b, 385). Pottery, however, has not been identified in many tombs south of the Delta, although this is probably a result of the older forms of excavation and the pottery’s similarity to New Kingdom types (Aston 2009b, 317). For shabtis Aston’s types are common across Egypt, with all of them found in burials in both the north and south (Aston 2009b, 361-363). The divide between north and south may be more subtle than simply different types. It is clear that the shabtis produced in the north were of higher quality than those in the south, and so when better quality shabtis appeared in the south after c.850 BC, clearly modelled on northern examples, this should perhaps be taken not only as an example of ‘northern’ influence, but that the material cultures of the two regions were producing at least subtly different traditions (Aston 2009b, 363).

For the pottery of the Libyan and Kushite Periods the corpus shows little or no variation between the north and south until the final phase between c.775/725-650/625 BC
(Aston 2009b, 317). This final phase fits with a series of later changes to the corpus of grave goods found in the Theban region, and indeed further afield, which reflects the archaistic practices of the Kushite and early Saite Periods. Indeed, the changes to other grave goods seemed to attempt to emphasise traditional ‘Egyptian’ religious beliefs - with the adoption of the qrsw-coffin in this period clearly meant to recall the tomb of Osiris at Abydos (Aston 2009b, 399-400). These items are almost entirely found in Upper Egypt (Aston 2009b, 289), with qrsw-coffins only attested at Abusir (TG179; Aston 2009b, 93), Lahun (TG185, 187-190; Aston 2009b, 95) and Thebes (TG688, 838-844, 847-849, 851, 854-864 amongst many others; Aston 2009b, 166; 204-209).

Unlike the Upper Egyptian pottery of the FIP, however, the pottery of the Libyan Period from across Egypt shows lots of continuity from the New Kingdom. For example, types 11-14 (dishes with rounded bases), which are directly related to New Kingdom types, and types 30-38 (bowls with pointed bases), which developed out of the small drinking cups of the Nineteenth Dynasty, are both found at sites in the north and south (including at Tell Nebesheh, Tell el-Yahudieh, Tell el-Retabeh, Saqqara, Lahun, Gurob, Matmar, and Thebes; Aston 2009b, 321-322). Many of these pottery styles were used throughout the entirety of the Libyan and Kushite Periods, particularly types 11-14 and 30-38, even as differences appeared between the two regions in coffin design, suggesting that the divide between the material cultures of north and south may not have been as stark as in the FIP, if it was present at all (Aston 2009b, 397).

That the funerary culture of north and south may never have been significantly different from each other is also suggested by the number of funerary traditions that are shared across the entire country. This is particularly apparent in the widespread provision of
bead necklaces and bracelets in poorer burials across Egypt, but also in the deposition of shells in such burials in both the north and south (Aston 2009b, 385). For example cowry shells are found as part of burials at Tell el-Yahudieh (TG24, 34-39 amongst others; Aston 2009b, 66-67), Saft el-Henneh (TG98; Aston 2009b, 71), Tell el-Retabeh (TG115, 120; Aston 2009b, 74-75), Saqqara (TG144, 152; Aston 2009b, 84-85), Abusir (TG179; Aston 2009b, 93), Lahun (TG194, 198, 200, 211 amongst others; Aston 2009b, 96; 98-99; 101), Matmar (TG282, 283, 287, 414-419 amongst others; Aston 2009b, 115; 128-129), Abydos (TG621, 626, 628, 630; Aston 2009b, 150-151), and Thebes (TG963; Aston 2009b, 245). Amulet types are also common across Egypt with neither the north or the south showing a preference for a particular type or types, although this is complicated by the fact that of the eighty-six different types found in the seven hundred tombs which contained amulets only seven forms occur in more than twenty-five TG (those of Sekhmet, cats, Bes, ḫnḥt-eyes, Ptah-Sokar, Isis and sows; Aston 2009b, 374-376).

Whilst it appears there was not the distinctive regional divide between the north and south that is visible in the FIP archaeological record, with the exception of later Libyan Period coffins, it is possible that there were more localised traditions visible in the TG of various sites. There are several items or customs that are only found in the archaeological records of specific sites, strongly suggesting that they were traditions only practised at those locations. Thebes remains the only site from where leather braces on the mummies is known, suggestive of a purely Theban tradition (Aston 2009b, 380-381). Likewise the wooden stelae included in Theban burials are not currently attributed to any burials outside the Theban region and so again were probably a purely Theban custom (Aston 2009b, 349). Outside the Theban region evidence for such traditions is more limited, in part because the
Theban necropolis is the best recorded, but at Matmar a number of burials were found with non-inscribed bricks placed on or around the coffin. Whilst only twenty-eight of the 276 burials found at Matmar have been found with such bricks, only one burial not at Matmar has been found with similar non-inscribed bricks placed around it, at Saft el-Henneh (TG98; Aston 2009b, 71). This perhaps suggests that this particular custom was peculiar to Matmar, possibly only for a specific period of time as the Matmar burials cannot be accurately dated beyond the tenth-eighth centuries BC (Aston 2009b, 115-116).

Some apparently local funerary customs, however, may only appear as such as a result of the poor survival of particular types of material in the archaeological record. Floral garlands, for example, which are almost exclusively known from Thebes bar one example from Abydos in the tomb of the vizier Nespamedu (TG582; Aston 2009b, 145), would have decayed in the Delta making it impossible to determine if this is a purely Theban tradition. They are, however, depicted on ‘northern’ coffin types suggesting that floral wreaths as a funerary tradition was a practice at least simulated in the north (Taylor 2009, 388). Similarly, Osiris shrouds, for which all the provenanced examples come from Thebes, might appear to be a Theban-only custom. There are unprovenanced shrouds, however, which have other deities depicted on them and thus they may not have been a purely Theban traditions (Abdalla 1988, 163; Aston 2009b, 381).

Thus, from the currently available archaeological data from the TG there is no clear evidence for large-scale regional divisions appearing in the material culture of the Libyan and Kushite Periods. Only in Libyan Period coffins is there evidence to suggest that there were two ‘regional’ styles with a ‘northern’ tradition located between Memphis and Speos Artemidos, and possibly the Delta, and a ‘southern’ one between Akhmin and Thebes. These,
however, still have a number of similarities between the different types and, with features of one region appearing in the other, show evidence of cultural interaction between the north and south, in stark contrast to the situation apparent in the archaeological record from the FIP. There are also only a limited number of cases where localised funerary traditions can be definitively identified, suggesting that the cultural landscape of the Libyan and Kushite Periods was not marked by extensive regionalisation in the way that the FIP had been.

5.2.4 Landscapes of cultural change in the Libyan and Kushite Periods

The final cultural landscape that might be visible in the archaeological record is related to the cultural change supposedly brought about by the increasing numbers of Libyans within the Egyptian elite and their supposed disregard for Egyptian traditions in general.²¹⁹

From the start of the Libyan Period onwards there are a number of very noticeable changes to Egyptian funerary practices, especially in tomb architecture. Monumental tombs of the scale constructed in the late New Kingdom disappeared almost completely (Cooney 2011, 4-5), and were replaced by stone-lined, multi-chambered tombs designed to hold members of an extended family (Aston 2009b, 411). In other instances no tomb was constructed at all, with a large number of burials located in simple shafts, sometimes hastily created, with small superstructures located above them (Aston 2009b, 411-412). These burials were no longer located as part of a distinct necropolis, but were now largely found within temple enclosures, and even within temples themselves with burials found beneath the floors of Hatshepsut’s temple at Deir el-Bahri and Ramesses III’s temple at Medinet Habu (Aston 2009b, 398-399; 416). Poorer burials were largely made within pre-existing tombs,

²¹⁹ Some aspects of this will be discussed in more detail in the final section of this chapter.
with the large numbers of named individuals appearing on shabtis found within them showing their use as family or communal burials, although the very poorest were simply interred in shallow graves in the surface sand (Aston 2009b, 416).

This general lack of new tombs, and the many that were being built hastily and possibly posthumously (Perez Die and Vernus 1992, 50), has been argued to be a product of the lack of Libyan concern for burial customs (Leahy 1985, 62; Aston 2009b, 397-398). This is because it is clear that Egypt remained wealthy enough, in principle, to construct such tombs, and thus the change must reflect new ideas or beliefs as to how funerary traditions should be carried out. It is noticeable, for example, that there was no attempt to remove the previous names and texts from the re-used blocks that were used to line the new tombs, and in tombs at Tanis and Herakleopolis there were not even attempts to re-carve the blocks (Aston 2009b, 397; 404; 408). This supposed influence of Libyan attitudes on funerary customs is also seen as explaining the presence of weapons in burials, as they are almost entirely located in the north (Aston 2009b, 384), and particularly at sites in the eastern Delta such as Tell Nebesheh (TG13-16 and 20-21; Aston 2009b, 63) where Libyan influence is believed to have been strongest (Payraudeau 2009, 401-403).

Despite this apparent impact of Libyan influence on Egyptian funerary culture, there is clear evidence for the persistence of many of the funerary customs of the late New Kingdom, in both Upper and Lower Egypt. The Libyan rulers and elite appear to have followed Egyptian funerary traditions with them being mummified and interred within coffins and buried with items symbolising Egyptian funerary beliefs such as canopic jars, found in Shoshenq Ila’s (TG6; Aston 2009b, 53), Takeloth I’s (TG7; Aston 2009b, 54-55), and Takeloth B’s tombs (TG136; Aston 2009b, 80). Several of the royal tombs at Tanis which have
preserved decoration on their walls have reliefs from a number of the Books of the Netherworld, including the Book of Amduat, the Book of the Dead, the Book of the Day and Night, and the Book of the Earth, which shows a clear continuation of the tradition established in the rock-cut tombs of the late New Kingdom in the Valley of the Kings (Aston 2009b, 402-404). Indeed, even in the coffins of the Libyan Period, which show some evidence of regionalisation, there is continuity in the forms from the late New Kingdom especially in those of the Twenty-First Dynasty (Theban Type I; Taylor 1985, 129; 418). Similarly Aston’s (2009b, 293-295) Type I canopic jars which are known from across both the Libyan Period and Kushite Periods, although mostly from the earlier Libyan Period, show clear stylistic continuities from the New Kingdom and may therefore reflect the continuation of New Kingdom funerary traditions (Aston 2009b, 298). Likewise, the appearance of weapons in tombs is complicated by the fact that many of those from the Libyan and Kushite Periods come from royal tombs, especially those at Tanis (Aston 2009b, 382), and weapons may well have always been included in royal burials, as they were in Tutankhamun’s (Carter No.582 which included a scimitar; Griffith Institute online Howard Carter archives). Certainly it is extremely difficult to extrapolate any customs from royal burials which, as has been established earlier, contained the widest selection of grave goods (Aston 2009b, 391-392).

There is also no apparent introduction of what might be described as ‘Libyan’ forms of pottery, i.e. new forms that show no relation to prior Egyptian models, despite much of the pottery evidence coming from the Delta (Aston 2009b, 317), with all the known foreign pottery having clear connections or origins in the Levant, Cyprus, and occasionally Nubia (Aston 2009b, 318-319).
The appearance of family tombs is also not equivocal evidence for Libyan or ‘nomadic’ influence as has occasionally been suggested, for example by Leahy (1985, 61-62) and Jansen-Winkeln (1994, 93). Whilst such tombs are generally ascribed to family, or clan, organised tribal societies in wider ethnological studies (van der Steen 2007, 96-97), ‘family’ tombs are apparent as a phenomenon in the FIP as part of a trend towards individuals identifying themselves with their families rather than the state (Seidlmayer 1990, 386). It is clear from the presence of genealogical records in the Libyan and Kushite Periods that demonstrating an individual’s connection to their family was also important during these periods, perhaps limiting their connection to Libyan influence.

One of the most significant and clearest changes in funerary customs during the Libyan Period was the switch to burial within temple walls. This has been suggested to be a product of the uncertainty of that period (Kemp 1989, 358; Arnold 1999, 31; Snape 2012, 424-425). It is more likely, however, to have been the development of the increasing connection between individuals and deities that is also apparent on stelae and statuary from the late New Kingdom and Libyan and Kushite Periods (Aston 2009b, 398), perhaps reflected in the apotropaic inclusion of parts of temple walls in some burials at Gurob and Matmar (tombs 6, 37, and 473, and TG381 and 526; Aston 2009b, 387). Indeed the shift within temple walls may well have started during the late New Kingdom with the last kings of Twentieth Dynasty suggested to have been buried within a temple enclosure at Pi-Ramesses as they were clearly not buried at Thebes (Schneider 2000, 104-108). The association of burials with the main temples of key local cults has parallels with the FIP, where it is clear that local rulers also emphasised their connections to the important local deities as a
method of demonstrating their relationship to one of the foundations of local society (Seidlmayer 2000, 123-125).

One possible difference from the cultural landscape of the New Kingdom appears to be evident in the type of individuals who received the most grave goods and even specific types of object, especially in terms of amulets. There is a clear gender and age bias of grave goods towards female and child burials amongst poorer burials with those burials containing far more amulets and other objects than male burials (Aston 2009b, 396), and it is particularly apparent in the comprehensively excavated cemetery at Matmar (Aston 2009b, 139). Indeed, it is very clear that child burials received far more amulets irrespective of their social status with Osorkon II’s son who died as a child, Hornakht C, given many more amulets than the other burials in the royal cemetery at Tanis (TG8; Aston 2009b, 55-58). This is very unlike the FIP where the objects found in graves were gender-neutral (Seidlmayer 1990, 429), and it is unclear if this reflects differences from the New Kingdom due to the limited number of intact burials from that period.

One final possible cultural influence on the funerary landscape of Egypt was the effect of the increasing archaism of the late Libyan and Kushite Periods, during the eighth and seventh centuries BC. This may have led to a renewed emphasis on traditional ‘Egyptian’ funerary traditions, and thus would explain the final phase of change apparent in the archaeological material between c.750-675 BC (Aston 2009b, 399-400). During this period there was a reappearance of canopic chests (Aston 2009b, 301-302), and canopic jars also appear to have come back into use to store the viscera during Taharqa’s reign (Aston 2009b, 299). Noticeably larger quantities and types of pottery also date to this period possibly as part of a new emphasis on the provision of food offerings (Aston 2009b, 348), for which
evidence across the Libyan and Kushite Periods is otherwise lacking (Aston 2009b, 379-380). Along with this evidence for a re-adoptions of older funerary traditions, the appearance of bead nets in c.750 BC, which may have developed out of Nubian funerary customs (Bosse Griffiths 1978, 106), may show the impact of Kushite rule on the Thebaid region (Aston 2009b, 399).

5.2.5 Summary

Making use of Aston’s TG there are several conclusions that can be made regarding the cultural landscapes of the Libyan and Kushite Periods, especially in comparison with those of the FIP.

Firstly, in the Libyan and Kushite Periods there was no apparent widening of access to symbols of wealth and status nor a blurring of the lines between individuals of different social ranks. It is very clear from the analysis carried out above that gold overwhelmingly remained a royal material, demonstrated by its presence almost entirely in royal burials at Tanis and Thebes, and that silver was probably also largely only available to members of the royal family or the ‘official/priestly’ elite. Whilst copper and bronze is found in a much wider selection of burials and locations within Egypt, individuals with objects made from these materials were clearly of lower status than those who had silver or gold objects. As in the FIP, the burials of the very poorest members of Egyptian society show relatively little change at all (Seidlmayer 1990, 441), with them still largely interred without coffins or grave goods of any kind.

During the Intermediate Periods of Egyptian history Egypt often appears to have fragmented along ‘regional’ lines, and this has been suggested as being an underlying
problem inherent within Egyptian society (O’Connor 1974, 15; Kemp 1989, 336-337; Seidlmayer 1990, 439-440; Gregory 2014, 3). The presence of regional factions and competition between the centre and periphery for authority is clearly attested in many societies, such as the Inca and Mayan states (D’Altroy 1994, 180-181; Byland and Pohl, 126-130), and suggests that this tension continued throughout the history of ancient states, occasionally culminating in outright conflict (van Zantwijk 1994, 104-109). As a result, conflict and competition between the centre and periphery could be a key part of social change (Kowalewski 1994, 135-136); for example, extensive competition between different regions, recorded in monumental iconography, inscriptions, and later texts, is suggested to have brought about the end of Classic Maya society (Pohl and Pohl 1994, 138). Unlike the FIP where this form of regional competition does appear to have been present following the decline of central control (Seidlmayer 1990, 411-412; 442), this does not appear to have been the case in the Libyan and Kushite Periods. There is little evidence to suggest that the material culture traditions of the north and south were as entirely divided as they were in the FIP, or that peripheral regions had highly localised traditions as part of a developing sense of local identity. This also suggests that the political divisions of the Libyan and Kushite Periods had little if any impact on the material culture of the period, reinforcing the conclusion that their effects should be restricted to the political sphere.

Although coffin types of the Twenty-Second to Twenty-Fifth Dynasties reveal some level of development of regional forms, with different types appearing around Thebes to Akhmin and in the north between Memphis and Speos Artemidos (Taylor 2009, 397), the areas where these were found do not correspond to the known political divisions of the Libyan and Kushite Periods. They also show that there was interaction and an exchanging of
features between the two regions with a number of examples that show transmission of cultural features from the other area. Thus, whilst there are clear differences between the two there also must have remained cultural interaction between the north and south, something not attested for the FIP (Seidlmayer 1990, 396). Similarly, the pottery found in burials across Egypt shows that types, particularly those which evolved out of New Kingdom forms, were common across Egypt suggesting there remained a relatively homogenised material culture during the Libyan and Kushite Periods.

Whilst a number of changes to the funerary traditions in the Libyan Period have been ascribed to ‘Libyan’ influence, the archaeological evidence for this remains unclear. The appearance of weapons in burials in the north may reflect Libyan influence as the burials which contain them, even excluding royal tombs, are almost entirely concentrated in the north. Changes in both tomb type and location, whilst they have been associated with Libyan influence, are more probably the result of the changing relationship between individuals and deities during the Libyan and Kushite Period and may well have started in the late New Kingdom with the last burials of the Twentieth Dynasty. Similarly, although the archaism in Theban funerary practices in the later Libyan and Kushite periods is possibly reflective of Kushite control of that region, it is certainly indicative of the increasing level of archaism in Egyptian art in those periods. A significant quantity of the grave goods included in burials throughout the Libyan and Kushite Period developed from forms present in the New Kingdom, as did the funerary texts added to the walls of the royal tombs at Tanis. The only item introduced into funerary practices that can probably be attributed to outside influence may well be the bead nets that appeared post-c.750 BC and which may have been Kushite in origin.
There is one cultural landscape, however, which may demonstrate a much clearer level of non-Egyptian influence. That is the political landscape of the Libyan Period, and especially its fragmentation during the latter half of that period.

5.3 The political landscape of the Libyan Period

During the Twentieth Dynasty an increasing number of Libyans moved into Egypt, most being concentrated in first the eastern and later the western Delta (Leahy 1985, 55; Payraudeau 2009, 401-403), but with evidence in the Egyptian record for their appearance in the Theban region and elsewhere in the Nile Valley. Additionally, there was a practice of settling captured prisoners-of-war in fortresses and forming them into units of the Egyptian army, as outlined in P. Harris (P. Harris 1, 76; 77; Grandet 1994a, 336-338; Mushett Cole 2015, 113). This created a large Libyan population within Egypt who, some suggest, were not as thoroughly egyptianised as other captured peoples had been (Leahy 1985; Jansen-Winkeln 1994; Ritner 2009b; Broekman 2010; Mushett Cole 2015, 113).

The political divisions visible under the later Twenty-Second and Twenty-Third Dynasties are seen as being a product of the Libyans’ lack of assimilation, not just because they divided the country, but also because the Egyptian concept of a sole king was unimportant for rulers of this period (Leahy 1985, 59; Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 95; 1999, 19-20; Broekman 2010, 91). During the Twenty-First Dynasty, despite the adoption of royal style by Herihor, Pinudjem I and Menkheperre, the concept of sole rule was maintained; the northern kings were often acknowledged in the south and the country was reunited by Amenemope’s reign (Mushett Cole 2015, 114; see n.96). In spite of this re-unification, there
is increasing evidence for a number of kings, great chiefs and chiefs of the Ma from the middle of the Twenty-Second Dynasty onwards. Unlike previous Egyptian periods of political division (Moreno Garcia 2015, 83-84), however, there is very limited evidence for conflict between the various regions, with no apparent restrictions on local leaders becoming king. This change to the understanding of kingship is visible on the statue of Nakhtefmut which dates to the middle of the eighth century BC. The statue is inscribed with the titles of Horsiese (A), who granted him the statue, and those of Horsiese (A)’s northern contemporary Osorkon II, with no indication that this was unusual (Broekman 2010, 91). On Piye’s ‘Victory stela’ four kings are recorded, at Hermopolis, Herakleopolis, Leontopolis and Tanis respectively, along with a number of great chiefs and chiefs of the Ma and Libu (Grimal 1981, 2-3), reflecting the direct opposite of the traditions of Egyptian kingship.

Even local leaders who did not assume a form of Egyptian kingship appear to have appropriated a number of royal attributes. Donation stelae from the later Libyan Period provide some of the best examples of this, with the local Libyan ruler depicted in the traditional place of the king (Yoyotte 1961, 30-31; Leahy 1985, 59; Jansen-Winkeln 1999, 17; Moje 2014, 5; 107), even though the stelae were still dated to a specific king’s reign. In some instances the king’s cartouches were even left blank (Yoyotte 1961, 32-33; 58-59; Moje 2014, 144-145). This loss of significance for the role of the king(s) is also shown by the importance of genealogies which demonstrated an individual’s inheritance of their titles from their ancestors (Lange 2008, 140; Moje 2014, 125-126), reflecting the king’s lack of control over the appointments to most positions.

In addition to the changes to the status of kingship during the Libyan Period, it is clear that there was a considerable retention of Libyan culture in names, titles and in
depictions of individuals which continued into the Kushite Period (Leahy 1985, 57; Ritner 2009b, 332; Moje 2014, 125). The names of the kings and much of the elite during the Libyan Period do not conform to Egyptian styles, instead being distinctly Libyan in origin, such as Shoshenq, Takeloth, Nimlot, and Osorkon (Leahy 1985, 54-55; Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 93). Unlike previous groups of foreigners who adopted Egyptian names, or gave them to their children, and thus assimilated into the wider population, the Libyans continued using distinctively Libyan names, with some popular throughout the entire Third Intermediate Period (Leahy 1985, 55). This lack of assimilation is also apparent in the continuation of Libyan titles, such as great chief and chief of the Ma/Libu (Leahy 1985, 57). During the Libyan Period these titles were often deemed more important by an individual than their Egyptian titles (Ritner 2009b, 336; Broekman 2010, 90). This is best demonstrated by Padiese A’s Serapeum stelae where, despite having an Egyptian name, he not only replaced the king before the gods, but was depicted with only his Libyan titles and attributes, with his title of high priest of Ptah instead attached to his son Peftjauawybast (Louvre IM 3749). This trend is clear even at the top of the Egyptian hierarchy; Osorkon II desired that his sons would become ‘great chiefs’ (Lange 2008, 138-139), an unusual request for an Egyptian king whose sons were much higher in the Egyptian social hierarchy than a foreign chief could be (Lange 2008, 139; Ritner 2009b, 336). This desire of Osorkon II indicates clearly the extent of the change in importance of the role of the Egyptian king during the Libyan Period.

There are other ‘Libyan’ elements which appear to confirm the Libyan elite’s retention of an ethnically Libyan identity. Despite individuals being depicted with traditionally Egyptian features, several items were added, in particular the ostrich feather on the head, which do not conform to the conventions of Egyptian depiction (Leahy 1985, 57;
Such items appear in Egyptian depictions of the inhabitants of the western desert, as in the reliefs accompanying Ramesses III’s Libyan invasions inscriptions at Medinet Habu (OIP 9, pl. 73-78). That these elements should be taken as markers of Libyan ethnic identity, however, is supported by their appearance on rock art across the western desert of Egypt, particularly representations of people wearing the ostrich feathers on their head in the styles attributed to both the Meshwesh and Libu (Ritner 2009c, 48-49). There was also the appearance of genealogical inscriptions, often recording the inheritance of a specific set of titles by an extended family line. The most notable of these are those of Basa (Ritner 2009a, 25-31), the Memphite priests (Ritner 2009a, 21-25), and most importantly that of Pasenhor (Ritner 2009a, 17-20). Their importance is argued to be an indication of the need for the previously nomadic Libyan elite to record and display their lineages, something common to many tribal societies (Leahy 1985, 55; Jansen-Winkeln 2005, 139; Ritner 2009b, 335; Broekman 2010, 86).

It is difficult to distinguish ethnicity in the past, especially within the archaeological record (McGuire 1982, 163), and particularly for ancient Egypt where text and imagery conventions concealed such ethnic backgrounds (Leahy 1985, 54; Booth 2005, 6), as is clear from attempts to locate the ethnicity of the various ‘Sea Peoples’ (Drews 1993, 62-72). Differences from those conventions within the Libyan Period make it clear that the Libyans’ level of egyptianisation continues to be overstated (Leahy 1985, 57). These differences, including the continued use of Libyan names, titles and status markers such as the ostrich feather, suggest they perceived themselves as different from Egyptians and wished to mark this. That a group wanted to distinguish themselves from other members of a society

\[220\] For examples of such overstatement see Kitchen (1990, 21) and Hüneberg (2003, 68-70).
reflects a clear preservation of an ethnic identity and its boundaries (McGuire 1982, 166; Dever 2007, 51). Other changes show the Libyans not only maintained elements of their ethnic identity, but also did not adopt Egyptian cultural norms, with dramatic changes in burials from large necropolises to ‘family’ burials, argued to be a product of the importance of ‘family’ to the Libyans (Leahy 1985, 61-62; Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 93), in the use of the hieratic script on monuments (Leahy 1985, 60), and in the increased importance of women (Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 92-93). Moreover, individuals viewed their Libyan titles as more significant than their Egyptian ones, as visible on Padiése’s Serapeum stelae (Ritner 2009a, 388-390). These changes are apparent from early in the Twenty-First Dynasty, even before the first Libyan king Osorkon ‘the elder’, in the family names of HPA Herihor, in the reference to the ‘other great ones of Egypt’ in the Tale of Wenamun, and in changes in the burial practices of the kings (Leahy 1985, 61; Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 92-93; 1999, 19; Broekman 2010, 89).

A significant proportion of the first Libyans to arrive in Egypt may have been prisoners-of-war who were subsequently settled in forts together, possibly as part of the Egyptian army, and supposedly indoctrinated in Egyptian culture and language (Leahy 1985, 56). Not only does the forced conversion to a new identity and culture often lead to the development of a distinctive ‘counter identity’ to resist such changes (Assmann 2011, 134-135), but settling the Libyans in groups away from others would have made it easier for them to maintain their ethnic identity (Leahy 1985, 56; Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 88; Ritner 2009b, 332).221 This often happens when a smaller, possibly newer, ethnic group clusters, or

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221 This is particularly true if Ritner’s (2009b, 332) retranslation of the relevant section of P. Harris (I, 75: 5) is correct, ‘I settled their leaders in strongholds in my name. I gave to them captains of archers and elders of the tribes’. 
is clustered, together within a different society forming an ‘ethnic enclave’ (Duncan and Waldorf 2009, 11; The Economist 2013, Special Report, 11). Such enclaves may also have developed, or even have been perpetuated, as a result of the low-level migration into the western Delta and Nile Valley via the oases that occurred during the Twentieth Dynasty, as recorded in the Deir el-Medina journal (Vernus 2003, 6; KRI VI 609: 5-10; 687: 10; 688: 15), and the Libyan Period (Yoyotte 1961, 43-44; Leahy 1985, 55). This is because new ‘migrants’ often settle in areas where there are others from their own ethnic and cultural background, as these enclaves provide them with support networks (Massey 1990, 68-70). With the Libyans’ increasing political power and wealth there would have been ever less incentive to assimilate into Egyptian culture in order to achieve high office (Leahy 1985, 56).

Despite this evidence for the continuation of Libyan cultural practices, several scholars have argued that the Libyans’ ethnicity was not responsible for the political fragmentation during the Libyan Period. In contrast, they have argued that Libyan society became increasingly complex during the New Kingdom and, therefore, that Libyans did not have a ‘tribal’ government structure when they settled in Egypt (O’Connor 1983; 1990; Hüneberg 2003, 67-68; Moreno Garcia 2013a, 97). Following Khazanov (1984, 198-227), who argues that nomadic societies adapt to contact with sedentary societies through the development of more social differentiation, this more complex Libyan society was the result of contact with Egypt (Hüneberg 2003, 67). Whilst still accepting that the Libyans were largely nomadic, O’Connor (1990, 106-107), and more recently Hüneberg (2003, 67), have argued that Libyan society had developed into Khazanov’s (1984, 228-233) ‘nomadic state’ immediately prior to their arrival in Egypt. A ‘nomadic state’ has more rigid hierarchies and is often led by a ‘Paramount Chief’, a leader with other semi-independent rulers ruling
various sub-divisions of the society. These ‘Paramount Chiefs’ are suggested to be the named leaders of the Libyan invasions during Merneptah’s and Ramesses III’s reigns. Indeed, O’Connor (1990, 107) suggests that these rulers’ need to maintain their position was one of the motivations behind the invasions. The rule of such ‘Paramount Chiefs’ is often feudalistic in nature (Khazanov 1984, 298), reliant on the support of lower chiefs who have their own forces, and is highly dependent on the individual ruler’s ability to retain control. Such a structure is clearly visible for the Hawaiian chiefdoms, known ‘Paramount Chiefdoms’, where each island had a single ‘Paramount Chief’ with other, lesser, chiefs below him (Earle 1997, 35-36).

It is possible to identify circumstantial evidence for ‘Paramount Chiefdoms’ within the Libyan Period. Shoshenq I and the first kings of the Twenty-Second Dynasty successfully established their authority over the country and placed members of the royal dynasty in important positions as a way of ensuring the maintenance of their control (Yoyotte 1961, 26). In this they acted in the style of ‘Paramount Chiefs’ by monopolising power under the control of one key family (O’Connor 1990, 104). Additionally, from Osorkon II onwards multiple rulers appeared who all acknowledged one ruler as their technical superior, as in the chiefdoms of Hawaii. The clearest example of this is the choice by the HPA Osorkon (B) to date some of his donations at the end of the Chronicle of Prince Osorkon to the reign of Shoshenq III rather than either of his local rivals (CPO 2: 17-21; 3: 22; Ritner 2009a, 370-375). This strongly suggests there may have been a ruler who was perceived as, at least nominally, the superior of other Libyan rulers (Mushett Cole 2015, 117). Such an interpretation has parallels in the integration of a tribal political system into that of the second millennium BC state of Mari in Syria (Fleming 2004, 230–231; 2009, 233-234; Mushett Cole 2015, 117).
Hüneberg (2003, 68–69) in particular has argued that, as a result of the increased complexity and the development of an institutionalised hierarchy, by the time the Libyan elite came to power they were quite Egyptianised, especially the former prisoners-of-war. For those like Hüneberg who argue that the changes during the Libyan Period were not the product of the Libyans’ ethnic background (O’Connor 1983; 1990; Hüneberg 2013, 71-74; Moreno Garcia 2013a, 97), the divisions that followed Osorkon II’s reign were the result of the Libyan kings’ own policy of placing royal sons in senior positions (O’Connor 1983, 238-239). This policy may have been an attempt to secure the country under the rule of a single dynasty when it was implemented at the beginning of the Twenty-Second Dynasty (O’Connor 1983, 235). Unlike the princes appointed by Ramesses II, however, the Libyan princes appear to have created their own dynastic lines associated with their positions enabling them to establish power bases in the regions to which they were appointed (O’Connor 1983, 240-241). In this they were assisted by the continued inheritance of titles, with HPA Shoshenq (C) being succeeded by two brothers, and with Takeloth (F) being ‘appointed’ HPA as successor to his father Nimlot (C) (Dodson 2012, 108). In this explanation the adoption of royal attributes by the various Libyan dynasts is because of their membership of the royal family, unlike the elite of the late New Kingdom, coupled with an understanding that adoption of royal style would have made gaining the support of Egyptian subjects easier (O’Connor 1983, 240-241; Leahy 1985, 57; Broekman 2010, 88).

A significant problem with the explanation of the political fragmentation of the Libyan Period being the result of the placement of members of the extended royal family in positions of power (O’Connor 1983, 240-241), is that this had occurred throughout the New Kingdom, especially under Ramesses II (Dodson and Hilton 2010, 170-175), but also during
the Twentieth Dynasty (Hüneberg 2003, 69). Neither of these earlier examples provides evidence for that policy’s supposed effect of political fragmentation. There must, therefore, have been a new factor in the Libyan Period which allowed the sub-dynasties to resist attempts to enforce central control. For O’Connor (1983, 238-239), supported by Hüneberg (2003, 73), this new factor is the Libyans’ military background, which had allowed their rise within the Egyptian hierarchy. Large numbers of the Libyan elite held military titles (Moje 2014, 87), reflecting their likely origins as prisoners-of-war conscripted into the Egyptian army (Leahy 1985, 56). So Shoshenq I and Osorkon I are first attested as military commanders (Ritner 2009a, 169; Payraudeau 2014b, 28-29), and most of the Libyan elite continued to hold such titles into the later Libyan Period, often combined with the high priesthood of the local temple (Jansen-Winkeln 1999, 16-17; Moje 2014, 87-88). This background may also have meant they controlled their own military forces, thus providing each of these local leaders with the means of resisting others’ authority and asserting their own (Yoyotte 1961, 30; Hüneberg 2003, 74), in a similar course of events to those of the FIP (Seidlmayer 2000, 118). This description has a clear correlation not only with the FIP, but also with Dodson’s (2010, 42-43) interpretation of Amenmesses’ rebellion, particularly Merneptah’s supposed removal of Amenmesses as viceroy of Nubia in order to prevent a member of the royal family from having access to a position from which to challenge the king.

This interpretation, however, fails to explain how several rulers were able to adopt Egyptian kingship and yet peacefully rule concurrently. Despite the ‘Libyan anarchy’ description (Yoyotte 1961, 29), there is very limited evidence for infighting amongst the various rulers (Moje 2014, 88). This is in contrast to previous periods of political
fragmentation in Egypt (Leahy 1985, 58), especially the FIP. Whilst military titles were common to both periods, unlike the FIP where weapons are commonly found in burials (Morris 2006, 59), few burials dated securely to the Libyan and Kushite Period contain weapons. Many of those that do are royal burials and difficult to incorporate into any general trend (Aston 2009b, 391-392).\textsuperscript{222} The remaining burials which do contain weapons are almost entirely located in the north (Aston 2009b, 396), which is not suggestive of a breakdown of order and conflict between north and south. It is also noticeable that despite being the type of title most widely held by the Libyan elite, military titles were not considered the most important titles as they were often listed after ‘religious’ or ‘political’ titles and particularly after Libyan ones (Moje 2014, 87-88).

It is also different from Amenmesses’ rebellion against Sety II which was to establish who was king, not where they were king (Mushett Cole 2015, 117). It is also unlike known ‘Paramount Chiefdoms’ where violence between rival leaders was prevalent, as in the Hawaiian Islands (Earle 1997, 132). Viewing the fragmentation as a product of the appointment of members of the royal family to important positions also forces us to ignore the presence of Libyan influence in the Twenty-First Dynasty, and the fact that many important Egyptian traditions had already changed by this point (Mushett Cole 2015, 117). This is best demonstrated by the first records of Shoshenq I in the KPA recording him not as a king, but only as a great chief of the Ma, without a cartouche (Ritner 2009a, Text 4: 1-3). There is also no clear evidence for ‘Paramount Chiefs’ from O’Connor’s (1990, 106-107) ‘nomadic state’ reconstruction, from Libya or Egypt (Ritner 2009b, 330-332). References to

\textsuperscript{222} This is because they were the richest graves and so are likely to have contained many more items than any other burials, increasing the chances of finding any particular type of object within them. Also the king was a unique figure who combined several roles within Egyptian society, making it almost impossible to extrapolate wider trends from his burial goods (Aston 2009b, 237).
named chiefs leading the Libyan invasions is probably a reflection of sedentary societies’ desire to recognise defined leaders in their opposition (Sahlins 1968, 38), and thus was more important to the Egyptians than to the Libyans.

The alternative explanation is based on the anthropological study of tribal societies, especially the idea of segmentary lineages (Ritner 2009b, 333-336; Broekman 2010, 86). Under this system an overarching ‘tribe’ is subdivided into a series of segments based around descent groups, or lineages, which maintain a balance of power amongst each other, with these further broken down into sub-lineages (Middleton and Tait 1958, 6; Sahlins 1968, 15). Each of these lineages is in direct competition with all of the others making the system inherently unstable (Ritner 2009b, 334). As a result the king was only first among equals, as each lineage group had its own head that was considered the equal of the others, a direct result of the concept of the social equality of extended kinship members (Leahy 1985, 59; Jansen-Winkeln 1999, 19-20; Broekman 2010, 87).

The possible segmentary nature of the Libyan ‘tribe’ is thus important not only as a cause for the fragmentation in Egypt, but also explains why multiple rulers adopted royal style. Not only did they remain ‘Libyan’ and thus view kingship differently from Egyptians, but also the idea of social equality between ‘brothers’ meant that it was acceptable for local rulers to raise themselves to the same level as the king (Lange 2008, 137; Ritner 2009b, 337-338; Broekman 2010, 88), particularly if this ensured that the different lineages remained in balance. This reconstruction appears to make sense of events such as Takeloth II making himself king in Upper Egypt at the same time that his uncle Shoshenq III inherited the throne from his father (and Takeloth II’s grandfather) in the north, as well as why the different polities in the Libyan Period co-existed peacefully despite their conflicting titles. Another
trend clearly visible during this period is that the local ruler was also the high priest of the local cult. This is, perhaps, a reflection that tribal societies often do not have distinct ‘religious’ institutions, with these roles concentrated in the same person and lineage (Sahlins 1968, 15; Ritner 2009b, 337).

That a nomadic society can retain its identity and its social structure after it becomes sedentary, even when that is within a different culture, is becoming increasingly clear (Szuchman 2009, 2-3; Porter 2009, 209-211; 2012, 326). For example, whilst the towns of the Kerak Plateau were the main political centres in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries AD, their social organisation and hierarchical structure reflected that of the nomadic groups resident on the plateau (van der Steen and Saidel 2007, 3; van der Steen 2007, 93-94). Indeed, the political and social structures of the tribes that resided on the plateau affected the spatial organisation of the town, creating distinct areas associated with each group and marking the continuation of the tribal divisions on the plateau, something possibly apparent in the archaeological record of some Bronze Age towns, especially Numeira (van der Steen 2007, 94-95).

There is a range of evidence for the continuation of the Libyans’ societal structure after their arrival in Egypt. The common references to brothers or ‘brotherhood’ in Libyan Period texts, such as Osorkon I’s block from Tell Basta (Lange 2008, 137; Broekman 2010, 87) or Osorkon II’s prayer to Amun (Lange 2008, 139), suggest that the Libyans may have held to a form of ‘classificatory kinship’. In such systems relatives at the same kinship level within a descent group hold the same social status (Middleton and Tait 1958, 7; Sahlins 1968, 11; 21) resulting in brothers, cousins and even distant relatives having the same social standing and therefore treating each other as equals (or ‘brothers’), each the leader of a politically equal
descent group (Ritner 2009b, 333). Hüneberg (2003, 70-74), despite rejecting the ‘tribal’ influences in the Libyan Period, has noted that the best explanation for peaceful coexistence between the different Libyan territories and rulers, and for the lack of reunification, is that a ‘balance of power’ existed between the various parties. His description, however, matches the structure of equality between lineages as outlined above for ‘segmentary lineages’ (Middleton and Tait 1958, 7; Sahlins 1968, 21). Whilst there has been some criticism of lineage theory within anthropology (Kuper 1982, 91-93), it remains a useful tool for discussing the social and political organisation of both modern and ancient tribal societies (Szuchman 2009, 4). This is immediately apparent for Mari in the Middle Bronze Age where the existence of a lineage system is apparent in the extensive surviving textual record (Fleming 2004, 9; 24).

The proposed social equality between brothers could provide an explanation for the sudden expansion in the number of examples of brother-brother succession (Lange 2008, 137), with Pinudjem I’s sons systematically inheriting the HPA from each other in the Twenty-First Dynasty (Broekman 2010, 89-90). Similarly, the increased significance of genealogies, reflected in their presence across Egypt (Lange 2008, 140; Ritner 2009b, 335), indicates that kinship had become more important within Egyptian society. All of this suggests that the concept of lineage remained significant for Libyans within Egypt, allowing Ritner (2009b, 334-335) to propose the model of a ‘segmentary lineage system’ for the structure of Libyan society, both before and after their arrival in Egypt.

A key factor in describing the Libyans’ political structure as being formed of segmentary lineages is that such social systems are inherently unstable (Sahlins 1968, vii-viii; 51). Whilst groups can temporarily come together to form larger units in response to
particular events, such as Tefnakhte’s coalition against Piye or Nekau’s against Tanwetamani, each group is equally likely to subdivide into smaller units (Baştuğ 1998, 103; Fukuyama 2011, 56-57). A system of segmentary lineages appears to provide a clear explanation for the fragmentation under the Libyan kings. It also suggests a possible motivation for that fragmentation; as each of these lineage segments was in constant competition with the others, each one needed to assert their status by establishing their rule over a distinct territory. A parallel to this process can be drawn with ethnographic studies of modern Bedouin tribes in Libya where each lineage segment had a strong connection with certain geographical or ecological regions (Peters 1960, 30). The retention of titles such as great chief or chief of the Ma/Libu by local rulers across Egypt suggests that the Libyans maintained such a political structure after their rise to power in Egypt.

These titles were probably connected with lineage rather than administrative positions, as is suggested by the fact that each of the different segments was led by a chief or great chief (Ritner 2009b 336; Broekman 2010, 86). This perhaps explains why Libyan kings saw them as important titles for their sons to inherit, with both Osorkon I and II recording their desire for their sons to inherit these titles (Lange 2008, 139; Broekman 2010, 86-87). Indeed, the titles’ connection with lineage is demonstrated by the evidence that they were apparently always inherited from a close relative. The occasional appearance of the word ms instead of wr to denote a chief is indicative not only of the Libyans’ nomadic backgrounds, but also that title’s lineage role through its similarities to the Berber title mes (Yoyotte 1961, 4).

223 Also, unlike some of the other titles listed in the inscriptions of Osorkon I and II, such as the HPA, there is no surviving evidence to suggest that either king ever appointed their sons to one of these titles (Lange 2008, 137-139).
The ‘tribal state’ of Mari under Zimri-Lim provides a parallel for the ruler’s lack of control over both appointments to lineage positions and those who held them (Mushett Cole 2015, 119). Zimri-Lim was likewise not consulted about the appointment of heads of the segments of the two tribal confederations, particularly for his own nomadic Sim’alite group whose leaders, the two Mergûms, viewed themselves as almost his equal (Fleming 2004, 75; 78-80; 168). Indeed, these two officials appear to have operated almost entirely outside the administrative structure of the state, with Zimri-Lim often receiving letters from governors of his towns asking for him to intervene with the Mergûms as they had no authority to do so (Fleming 2009, 234). The king also appears to have had only limited knowledge of the activities, or even the location, of the Mergûms (Fleming 2009, 234). The role and attitude of the Mergûms reveals an interesting parallel with those of the later Libyan rulers, especially those who had adopted Egyptian kingship.

Both the Sim’alite and Yaminite segmentary groups of Mari appointed their own leaders (sugagum for Sim’alites and ‘kings’ for Yaminites) who acknowledged Zimri-Lim’s authority over them, although this was more a factor of his military power than any ideological influence of his position as king (Fleming 2004, 24). This lack of recognition for the king’s ideological importance within Mari society has a strong correlation with the later Libyan Period, when holding the title of king no longer provided the justification for sole rule that it had previously, and probably still did for the Egyptians (Moje 2014, 36-38). It remained an important marker of socio-political status, however. In societies whose culture emphasises the importance of specific ‘aristocratic symbols’, particularly as a means of asserting a ruler’s legitimacy, this increases the incentive for other groups to adopt those symbols to improve their own social status (Eisenstadt 1963, 150). A group would therefore
want to adopt royal titles to mark their status in relation to other segments, under the idea of the political equality of brothers, particularly if they were connected to the royal family (Mushett Cole 2015, 119). Indeed, it has been suggested that the adoption of royal style during the later Libyan Period was restricted to those who were related to one of the main dynasties (Twenty-Second or Twenty-Third) marking their privileged position within society (Moje 2014, 104). Moje (2014, 40; 109) also suggests that the Libyans adopted royal attributes in order to ensure the loyalty of their Egyptian subjects, possibly at the suggestion of important local Egyptians.

The product of both of these suggested explanations is the impression that during the later Libyan Period a form of feudalism\(^\text{224}\) was instituted by the Libyan elite in Egypt, in a parallel to the situation of the early Middle Kingdom (Jansen-Winkeln 1994, 81; 1999, 16-17; Callender 2000, 141; 162-163; Broekman 2010, 87). The Libyans became a landed military elite with access to their own military forces, helping to cement the divisions of the country. That they were often also high priest of the local cult gave them access to the resources necessary to support such troops as well as an element of ideological legitimacy (Jansen-Winkeln 1999, 16-17; Moje 2014, 87). At the same time, not only did some adopt royal style directly, but members of the elite rapidly co-opted previous royal prerogatives, such as appearing on donation stelae, emphasising their position as semi-independent rulers in their own fiefdoms (Yoyotte 1961, 30-31; Leahy 1985, 59; Jansen-Winkeln 1999, 17; Moje 2014, 5; 107). Rule was ultimately based on the personal style and ability of the ruler, much as was

\(^{224}\) The use of the term ‘feudalism’ here follows Jansen-Winkeln’s (1999, 10) general definition of the term for use in reference to ancient Egypt, and not the already specific definition describing the political situation in medieval western Europe. As a result the term refers here to the presence of a privileged military elite, supported by land under their control, the structure being dominated by more personal forms of rule and a close association between the state and religious institutions.
the case in medieval Europe; kings who possessed more charismatic authority were able to hold the system together more effectively than others, a result of the disappearance of the civil administration of the New Kingdom (Jansen-Winkeln 1999, 18-19; Lange 2008, 140; Ritner 2009b, 339-340; Broekman 2010, 88; Jansen-Winkeln 2012, 617; Moje 2014, 5).

Irrespective of whether the Libyans retained a ‘tribal’ structure or not once they were established as the rulers and elite of Egypt, it is clear from the surviving evidence that they maintained some elements of their ethnic identity. This clearly had a significant impact on both their perception of the role of kingship and central government, with neither following traditional Egyptian forms. It was no longer important for there to be a sole king of Egypt, or for the country to be unified under their rule, for the first time in Egyptian history. Indeed it was now possible for several kings to peacefully rule simultaneously. This is because, for many Libyans, the Egyptian traditions held no real importance (Leahy 1985, 59), due to their retention of much of their ethnic identity. As a result, O’Connor’s and Hüneberg’s arguments regarding the level of egyptianisation for the Libyans can be rejected on the basis of the survival of so many markers of a distinct Libyan ethnic identity. It is possible to explain the political fragmentation of the Libyan Period as a result of the spread of military power away from the king, and this was certainly an element of the subsequent fragmentation. This does not explain why Shoshenq I was able to use military power to secure his authority over the entire country, but later Libyan kings were not. It also cannot explain the continuity of Libyan names and titles, the perception that those titles were more important than Egyptian ones, as well as the increased significance of lineages. These changes could only have been caused by the Libyans’ radically different understanding of political processes, something for which the ‘segmentary lineage’ model currently offers the best description. Under this structure it
is clear how it was possible for multiple kings and great chiefs to peacefully co-exist, and for their numbers to increase through the importance of maintaining social equality between the different social lineages and the competition between them.

O’Connor’s (1990) suggestion for the existence of ‘Paramount Chiefs’, however, cannot be entirely dismissed. Whilst evidence for their presence remains only circumstantial and reliant on Egyptian sources, without any corroborating evidence from Libya itself, HPA Osorkon (B)’s choice to date a section of his inscription to the northern king Shoshenq III rather than either of the two local alternatives, one of whom may have been related to him, does suggest that there may be some validity to his suggestion (Mushett Cole 2015, 120). This therefore raises the issue of how two, apparently conflicting, societal structures could be identified for a single society, and how a ‘tribal’ system of segmentary lineages could become part of the hierarchical political system within Egypt.

The rejection of a ‘tribal’ social and political structure for the Libyans after their arrival in Egypt (O’Connor 1983; 1990; Hüneberg 2003, 67-69; Moreno Garcia 2013a, 97) is a result of the impression that this describes a ‘mode of organisation opposed to that of a centralised state’ (van der Steen 2007, 93; Szuchman 2009, 4; Porter 2012, 9-10). In order to rule such a state, therefore, any nomadic society would have to adopt a more hierarchical structure, such as Khazanov’s (1984, 228-233) ‘nomadic state’. Research on the actual structure of tribal societies, however, has increasingly demonstrated that not only is the above definition of a tribal system false, but that both hierarchical (such as ‘Paramount Chiefdoms’) and corporate political and social systems (like segmentary lineages), can be present within the same society (McIntosh S. 1999, 19; Fleming 2004, 179-180; 2009, 228; Szuchman 2009, 4-5). Indeed, the existence of such ‘mixed’ political systems has been
identified in several African societies, including the Yoruba (McIntosh S. 1999, 15), as well as for an ancient society, Mari, where it is clear that a tribal structure was integrated into that of a centralised kingdom (Fleming 2004, 231; 2009, 236).

Thus both ‘Paramount Chiefs’ and segmentary lineages could well have been present within Libyan society both before and after their arrival in Egypt (Mushett Cole 2015, 120). The presence of a ‘mixed’ political system during the Libyan Period appears to solve the issues for both explanations, by providing a reason for the political unity under the early Twenty-Second Dynasty kings, despite their Libyan background, with Egypt remaining unified under powerful, charismatic rulers such as Shoshenq I in the style of ‘Paramount Chiefs’. The presence of segmentary lineages, meanwhile, explains how non-violent competition between various local rulers who were the heads of such lineages could lead to the fragmentation of the country and the increasing use of royal attributes by such rulers, as they perceived themselves to be equals of the kings. Whilst there is currently not enough evidence to confirm the existence of such an integrated organisation for the Libyans prior to their arrival in Egypt, it is clear that whatever system the Libyans retained was integrated into the centralised Egyptian political system. Whether it formed a completely separate administrative system as occurred at Mari (Fleming 2009, 233-234), or was more effectively combined with the Egyptian system is impossible to know from the current evidence. It was this amalgamation of two systems, however, which led to the alterations to the structure of the Egyptian socio-political system and the way that it was understood by those who ruled Egypt.
6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Summary

The research and analysis carried out within this thesis has revealed a number of details regarding the processes that took place in the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods. The lack of direct evidence for the economic conditions in the Libyan and Kushite Periods means that it is difficult to make any definitive statements regarding their function as a key dynamic of those periods. Nevertheless it is apparent from my review of the currently available evidence that a number of conclusions can be made about the role played by economic factors in these periods.

Firstly, my analysis has demonstrated that environmental conditions may have been at least a minor factor during the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods, but certainly not to the extent that they have been employed in previous explanations. The current paleo-climatic evidence indicates that there was a change in the climate during the time period covered by the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods (c.1500-900 BC), and there are even some indications of lower Nile floods having an impact on vegetation. What is clear from the NLR at Karnak, however, is that this effect was neither consistent nor necessarily long-lasting, which is in turn made apparent by the largely ‘good’ NLR.

Secondly, these records show that extensive variation was common in the flood levels, even from year to year. This is something supported by the surviving records from earlier periods and indicates that Nile flood levels would have been highly variable throughout Egyptian history. Egyptian society, and particularly the state, would therefore have had some awareness that this volatility was an issue, possibly indicated by the
descriptions of the effects of famines caused by low Nile floods from the Middle Kingdom, and that measures would needed to have been taken to reduce the impact of such volatility. The lack of any evidence of attempts to mitigate the effects of low Nile floods, such as those activities supposedly carried out by the provincial rulers of the FIP, indicates the probable lack of significance of the possible environmental changes.

A wider economic decline is equally unsupported by the available evidence. Whilst it is true that there was a reduced level of construction during the late New Kingdom this probably has far more to do with reign lengths than a lack of resources, considering the continued desert expeditions in the Twentieth Dynasty. Similarly, whilst there is evidence for economic problems in the late Twentieth Dynasty, including the only reference to famine, there are a number of other equally valid explanations, not least the destruction likely caused by the civil war between Ramesses XI and Panehsy. The evidence for the wealth of the Libyan Period kings from the royal tombs at Tanis, for the continuation of monumental construction throughout the Libyan Period, and especially the evidence for regular royal donations to temples does not suggest that royal access to resources was significantly restricted. Likewise, whilst trade was probably never a key aspect of royal revenue, claims of its disappearance during the Late Bronze Age have been significantly overstated with evidence for trade right up to and after the end of the Late Bronze Age.

What little economic evidence is available for the periods following the end of the New Kingdom indicates that the prices of the late Twentieth Dynasty persisted into at least the early Twenty-First Dynasty, suggesting that wider economic conditions also likely continued. The most significant change probably remains the increasing administrative responsibilities of institutions such as the major temples from the late New Kingdom.
onwards. Ultimately, however, not enough is known about what ‘normal’ conditions for the Egyptian economy may have been to draw definitive conclusions about the significance or the cause of the alterations, but it does not appear to have been as significant a factor as has been previously suggested.

Unlike economic and environmental conditions, where the evidence does not appear to show much alteration from the late New Kingdom, the ways in which the kings of the Libyan and Kushite Periods secured their religious authority does show significant changes. A number of methods appear to have been utilised by the various rulers to secure their connection to the gods and enhance their legitimacy, with the ‘theocratic’ structure of the Twenty-First Dynasty, the association with key local deities by the Twenty-Second Dynasty, the restoration of the king’s connection with Amun by the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty, and the archaism of the later Libyan and Kushite Periods. Early in the Libyan Period the king’s religious authority appears to have been secured by pushing aspects of kingship upwards to the gods, and particularly to Amun. This ‘theocracy’ gave the kings divine approval for their actions, by making them merely the enactors of the god’s wishes. This ‘theocratic’ approach appears to have been largely abandoned by the kings of the early Twenty-Second Dynasty. Instead these kings appear to have increasingly associated themselves with the gods of the key cults in the north and established them as dynastic deities, as with Bast in the inscriptions of Osorkon I and II. This has strong similarities with the actions of the local rulers of the FIP who also associated themselves with local deities as a way of linking their power to the religious authority of those cults.

Such a shift in the way that these rulers secured their religious authority is supported by the analysis of the monumental construction carried out by the Libyan rulers, which even
before the fragmentation of Egypt in the middle of the Twenty-Second Dynasty was overwhelmingly concentrated in the main towns of the north. The Twenty-Fifth Dynasty saw the restoration of a number of key aspects of Egyptian kingship as it had appeared in the New Kingdom, especially the connection to Amun. Their connection to Amun is reflected in the fact that Thebes, and particularly Karnak, received the vast majority of the Kushite kings’ construction. Changes still appeared though, with a shift to Amun of Napata rather than of Karnak as the ultimate arbiter of kingship, again indicated by the largest pieces of monumental construction by the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty being at Gebel Barkal. Indeed, whilst the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty emphasised more ‘traditional’ aspects of Egyptian kingship such as their connection with Amun and the importance of the unity of Egypt, this is counterbalanced by their use of the double uraeus, which had divine associations, and the continued presence of many of the Libyan rulers long after the Kushite takeover.

What is clear from the analysis of the ways that both the Libyan and Kushite rulers broke away from New Kingdom traditions, such as the Kushite kings’ different physiognomy, is that both groups’ adoption of Egyptian cultural traditions was a product of their need to secure legitimacy for their rule of Egypt and not of their ‘egyptianisation’. Despite both groups of rulers building monuments, both made their largest contributions to the landscape in regions with relatively limited pre-existing landscapes and away from Thebes which had previously seen the greatest share of such additions. Additionally, whilst the Libyan kings were securing their religious authority through construction and establishing connections to local deities the elite of the period were usurping that authority by replacing them on stelae. Thus whilst Egyptian cultural traditions did continue through the Libyan and Kushite Periods, they were adapted and modified by the Libyan and Kushite rulers for their own purposes,
specifically to secure their position as legitimate rulers by demonstrating their religious authority. The kings’ adoption of Egyptian traditions, however, ensured that for a foreign ruler to appear as a legitimate king they had to adopt significant elements of Egyptian ideology and iconography, something adhered to by all later rulers.

My analysis of Aston’s tomb groups demonstrates that there is no clear evidence for the presence of several cultural landscapes, and especially many of those attested in the FIP. Unlike the FIP, where there is considerable evidence for increased competition for wealth and status, the funerary evidence of Aston’s tomb groups does not show significant, or even minor, changes in the access to metal objects during the Libyan and Kushite Periods. Almost all of the gold objects and significantly greater quantities of silver items come from royal tombs, and especially from the tombs of the royal families at Tanis. Only bronze and copper objects show any signs of being available outside the elite, but as the least prestigious of the metals this is perhaps not surprising. Such a division is also apparent in other funerary objects, such as coffin style and number, and the inclusion of items such as canopic jars and shabtis. There is also little differentiation between burials of the same classes across different sites, further suggesting that there was not the competition for status found in FIP burials.

Likewise, there is little indication of distinctive regionalisation for the majority of funerary objects, in direct contrast to the pattern of the FIP. The exceptions to this are Libyan Period coffins which show a relatively clear separation into two regional styles, one in the south between Thebes and Akhmin and one further north between Memphis and Speos Artemidos. Even these, however, show cultural interaction between the northern and southern traditions, something that is absent in the regional pottery styles of the FIP. They
also do not correspond to any of the known political divisions of the Libyan Period, just as the pottery traditions of the FIP do not correspond to the political divisions of that period. Both therefore are perhaps indicative of underlying cultural tensions or divisions within Egypt that would reappear without the centralising administration of periods like the New Kingdom. There is some suggestion of more localised traditions, such as leather mummy braces and wooden stelae at Thebes or the placement of uninscribed bricks on coffins at Matmar. The lack of evidence from a number of sites in the north and for particular types of evidence, especially organic evidence, outside Thebes means that these cannot be definitively identified, especially for some possibilities like the provision of floral garlands. Ultimately, however, the data from Aston’s tomb groups shows that there was considerable unity in the funerary culture across Egypt with pottery forms and shabti types in particular appearing at sites across Egypt, in direct contrast to the evidence from the FIP.

The evidence for cultural change in the surviving funerary material is also complicated by the limited evidence, especially from the north. Some of those changes previously ascribed to Libyan influence, such as the shift to burials within temple walls or ‘family’ burials, cannot be shown to be exclusively connected to Libyan influence. The lack of attention paid to burials, and particularly to the construction of tombs, may have had some connection to the Libyans’ nomadic background, and the overwhelming concentration of weapons in northern burials may also reflect Libyan preferences. Similarly Kushite influence may be restricted to the introduction of bead nets in c.750 BC and the appearance of some Nubian pottery in southern tombs. Whilst it is difficult to identify ‘new’ introductions, it is clear that much of the funerary culture of the Libyan and Kushite Periods evolved out of New Kingdom traditions or even was simply a continuation of them. The coffins of the Libyan
Period appear to have developed out of those of the late New Kingdom, as did a significant number of pottery forms, whilst the funerary texts reproduced on the walls of the royal tombs at Tanis show clear continuity from the royal tombs of the end of the New Kingdom.

The political fragmentation of the Libyan Period remains the clearest demonstration of outside cultural influence on Egyptian society during both the Libyan and Kushite Periods. There is considerable evidence for the Libyans’ retention of an ethnic identity distinct from that of the Egyptians, with them being depicted wearing markers of non-Egyptian identity and retaining Libyan names and titles. This ethnic identity may have been retained as a product of their settlement together as prisoners-of-war through the rise of a ‘counter-culture’ within such groups or through the creation of ‘ethnic enclaves’ within Egypt. The probability of continued Libyan migration into the Nile valley throughout the late New Kingdom and Libyan Period would only have reinforced such enclaves, as migrants have joined their compatriots in similar enclaves in the modern era. The explanation of political fragmentation as being solely caused by the presence of ‘Paramount Chiefs’ and the militarisation of Egyptian society can therefore be rejected, as there is no evidence for the former and only limited evidence for the latter. It also fails to account for this retention of non-Egyptian identity.

The alternative, based on the ethnographic theory of segmentary lineages, currently provides a better explanation for both the divisions and for the fact that several individuals held the title of king simultaneously without causing a civil war. I have, however, proposed in this thesis a third explanation based on comparisons with other centralised states which had incorporated tribal influences, in particular that of Mari under the king Zimri-Lim. These show that both the corporate political structures common to tribes and the hierarchical ones
common to states can be present within the same society. Thus, both ‘Paramount Chiefs’ and ‘segmentary lineages’ could have existed alongside one another, perhaps explaining how the early Twenty-Second Dynasty kings retained control of the entire country, but later kings faced increased fragmentation and the adoption of royal attributes by other members of the Libyan elite. Even if both of the currently suggested political structures of the Libyans were not present after their arrival in Egypt, certainly the tribal structure of the Libyans, as clearly present in their maintenance of Libyan titles and other ethnic markers, was merged with the pre-existing Egyptian hierarchical structure. This intermingling of the two different political and social systems is what caused the modifications to the socio-political structure of Egypt.

6.2 Concluding remarks and future avenues for research

There were two main aims for the research in this thesis: to demonstrate that the existing description of the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods as those of ‘decline’ and ‘decay’ were false assumptions and to present an alternative narrative based instead around adaptation and continuity.

The first of these has been achieved with considerable success, as is apparent from the summary above. My research has clearly demonstrated that the ‘decline’ and ‘decay’ descriptions do not accurately describe these periods and are the legacy of an outmoded understanding of civilisation. That this is the case is apparent from the way such descriptions hide the complexity of what actually occurred within these periods, as I have made visible through my analysis of the distinct datasets included within this thesis. This process has also
allowed me to demonstrate that the complexity of a period of Egyptian history can be usefully revealed through nuanced interpretations of specific datasets associated with key processes within wider social, political, and economic contexts. Thus through a more nuanced approach to the available environmental and economic data within the late New Kingdom, Libyan, and Kushite Periods it is possible to both accept that there may have been environmental changes during those periods, but also to recognise that this was mitigated by the fact that there was constant variation in Nile flood levels throughout Egyptian history which would have required the Egyptian state to be able to cope with a level of volatility in flood levels. Likewise, whilst there were clearly changes to the status of the king, certainly amongst the elite of Libyan origin, something apparent in the alterations in the king’s role on stelae of the Libyan Period, this did not lead to changes in the division of wealth with the evidence from Aston’s tomb groups showing that this remained overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of the royal family and the upper elite. Similarly, whilst there appears to have been extensive political fragmentation, possibly as a product of the Libyans’ cultural background, this was not mirrored by the development of regional styles of funerary culture nor significant evidence for Libyan influence on Egyptian material culture. Through the analysis of all of the datasets it is clear that what has previously been viewed as a decline is not so clear-cut, but instead a far more complex process of revision, continuity, and adaptation.

As part of this process of demonstrating that ‘decline’ did not provide an accurate description of these periods, this thesis aimed to bring out the individual agency behind the events. This has been relatively successful, for example through demonstrating the different ways in which the Libyan and Kushite kings manipulated and adapted Egyptian traditions of
ideology and iconography to secure their religious authority. Equally, I have challenged a number of the more deterministic explanations, such as those associated with environmental and economic conditions, through comparing the various datasets with the records from other periods of Egyptian history and with other past societies, as well as through the application of ethno-anthropological theories. This has only been partly successful, however, because of the continuing problems with the available evidence, especially from the Delta. Despite even the most recent studies, such as Leclère’s (2008a; 2008b) work on Delta urbanism in the first millennium BC, there remain large gaps in the evidence, especially from the Delta including key sites such as Leontopolis and Sais, something acknowledged by both Leclère (2008a, 16-18) and Aston (2009b, 19). This makes it very difficult to trace the origins of many of the changes to funerary customs and thus to establish whether they were the product of ‘Libyan’ influence or of underlying cultural divisions within Egyptian society. It is equally difficult to establish whether there were disparities in the wealth of the various later Libyan rulers due to the loss of burials from sites including Leontopolis, making it unclear if they all had the same status, as might be expected under the segmentary lineage system, or if there was a hierarchy that would fit with the system of ‘Paramount Chiefs’. In spite of this, my research has made the Libyans in particular appear much more as actual agents, especially through their choices to maintain their non-Egyptian ethnic identity either as a ‘counter-culture’ to Egyptian indoctrination, or through ‘ethnic enclaves’ supported by subsequent migration.

The second main aim for the research within this thesis was to provide an alternative description based around continuity and adaptation. This has also achieved reasonable success, although there remains more that could be done through further detailed study
concentrating on some of the specific social, political, and economic processes present in the
three periods. Demonstrating the presence of continuity or adaptation is also hampered by
gaps in the available evidence, as with highlighting the level of individual agency, as this
minimises the body of evidence with which to identify both continuity and adaptation and
makes it difficult to discern whether changes have occurred or how sudden and severe they
were. Thus, the origins of the development of the different regional styles of coffins in the
Libyan Period is difficult to trace as to whether it was a product of underlying regional
differences in Egyptian material culture, or modifications brought about by new cultural
influences during the Libyan Period, due to the loss of earlier northern coffins.

Nevertheless, for all three of the processes examined within this thesis, there is
evidence for the presence of both adaptation and continuity. The evidence from the
environmental records suggests that environmental conditions may have shown only limited
change from the late New Kingdom into the Libyan and Kushite Periods, whilst Nile level
volatility was almost certainly an issue throughout Egyptian history, causing the Egyptian
state to need to adapt to rapid fluctuations like those seen in the Libyan and Kushite Period
NLR. Thus my demonstration of the large changes in annual flood levels, even from year to
year, provides an example of the continuity of environmental conditions throughout
Egyptian history and the requirement therefore for adaptation by the state or society to
such volatility. The economic data shows similar continuity, with Libyan and Kushite kings
continuing to build monuments and make sizeable donations to temples. Similarly, the
funerary evidence from Aston’s tomb groups reveals that far from radical change to the
social order of Egypt, as has been assumed from the changes to Egypt’s political system, the
existing Egyptian social hierarchy remained in place. Wealth continued to remain
overwhelmingly in the hands of the royal family and the highest elite, and much of the material culture appears to have developed out of New Kingdom examples with little evidence for the sudden appearance of new models based on outside cultural influences.

In contrast the evidence for how the Libyan and Kushite kings secured their religious authority shows far more evidence of adaptation than of continuity, with the two groups of rulers modifying and adapting existing Egyptian traditions of kingship to suit their differing needs or requirements for demonstrating their legitimacy. Thus, whilst the underlying necessity of having a king as the head of the Egyptian socio-political system was maintained, there were significant differences in how the Libyan kings secured their religious authority, whether through the ‘theocracy’, large-scale monumental construction, or dynastic deities, from how the late New Kingdom kings maintained theirs. This, in turn, differed again from how the Kushite kings emphasised their divine associations, such as through their connection with Amun. Indeed, the Kushite kings’ use of the iconography of Egyptian kingship, alongside their preservation of a non-Egyptian physiognomy in the same representations, provides a clear example of the simultaneous process of adaptation and continuity. Similarly, the political fragmentation of the Libyan Period is the product of the adaptation of the Egyptian political system to incorporate aspects of non-Egyptian social and political structures. The peaceful nature of this fragmentation emphasises its differences from other periods of fragmentation within Egypt, and thus forces us to look for alternative answers. As it is apparent from other societies that ‘tribal’ or nomadic social and political systems can be absorbed into existing centralised structures, a possible explanation based around the adaptation of Libyan and Egyptian political systems into a single entity seems to provide a more coherent understanding.
It is important to remember that many of these examples were occurring simultaneously. This not only demonstrates these periods’ complexity, but also that the concept of ‘continuity and adaptation’ provides a pragmatic political tool for understanding such a complex period where there was clear evidence for both continuity and change. It particularly accounts for change that was not necessarily a radical break from the situation of previous periods, but instead gradual or even sudden modification of existing customs to suit new circumstances and therefore provides a more balanced explanation of complex situations. It also provides a measure of agency to those making such changes, seeing these changes as a product of choices regarding the way existing traditions were to be adapted to suit the new situation and the requirements of those making such changes. Thus the Libyans are no longer simply semi-foreign rulers unable to control their compatriots and who ruled with ever declining economic and political power from towns in the north. Instead they are a group who in spite of their non-Egyptian identity preserved many elements of the existing Egyptian social structure, but also adapted those traditions to ensure that they supported the Libyans’ legitimacy as Egyptian kings and used the seemingly extensive resources available to them to support that legitimacy through extensive construction and temple donations. Similarly, the Kushite kings are no longer the blind ‘restorers’ of traditional Egyptian ideology, but instead actors who were competing for legitimacy as kings with the remaining Libyan rulers through adaptation of Egyptian customs to secure their position. Thus the evidence showing that their ‘restoration’ of Egyptian traditions was neither complete nor as ‘traditional’ as once thought again provides some indication of the agency behind the continuity and adaptation.
There are a number of potential avenues for future research that would build upon the research undertaken within this thesis and develop its conclusions in order to further highlight the balance of continuity and adaptation that was taking place during the Libyan and Kushite Periods, and to explore in greater depth the individual agencies behind the appearance of both of these aspects.

Firstly, a detailed study of the ways in which the Libyan and Kushite rulers used the iconography and ideology of \emph{MAat} should be carried out. This would provide more detail on how both the Libyan and Kushite kings secured their religious authority through adaptation of existing Egyptian traditions and institution of newer practices, as well as also demonstrating how each groups’ adaptations differed from the others as a result of their distinct requirements for legitimacy. Such a study would reveal much more about how the two groups of rulers interacted with something that was a core component of the religious authority of New Kingdom Egyptian kingship, an aspect that was only partially discussed in this thesis. A detailed study of the uses of \emph{MAat} in texts and iconography would help reveal not only the differences in how the Libyan and Kushite kings demonstrated their religious authority, but would also provide some indication of how they understood the role of king. Any differences between the ways in which \emph{MAat} was used might provide clarity on their level of adherence to Egyptian concepts of kingship, as well as allowing us to examine the nuance between the different ways in which the Libyan and Kushite kings secured their religious authority through demonstrations of their ‘egyptianisation’.

My research has created a more nuanced portrayal of the Libyans as individual agents who utilised aspects of their own culture and non-Egyptian identity in addition to adapting existing Egyptian traditions to secure their position as kings and the elite. To
continue to examine the ways in which a group of foreign rulers managed to maintain their position for such a considerable period of time it would be useful to make a direct comparison between the Libyans and the Hyksos kings of the Second Intermediate Period. Such a comparative study might reveal interesting similarities and differences in the ways that both of these ‘foreign’ groups adopted Egyptian customs to some extent but also blended that adoption with retention of distinctly non-Egyptian cultural elements and markers. A comparison of the surviving monuments, iconography, texts, and material culture of these groups and periods might uncover interesting aspects of how these foreign groups were able to secure their rule over a country whose culture was inherently xenophobic, and did so successfully enough that both were deemed acceptable to be included in later official records such as king-lists. By understanding how ‘foreign’ rulers were able to secure their position at the pinnacle of Egyptian society, such a comparison might also help to explain why the Hyksos faced native challenges to their rule, whilst the Libyan kings appeared not to have suffered the same challenges.

Ultimately, my research within this thesis has successfully shown that far from being the ‘twilight of ancient Egypt’, as the late New Kingdom and Third Intermediate Period have continued to be portrayed, these were complex periods in which Egyptian culture was simultaneously maintained and adapted in a pattern similar to that known for other periods of Egyptian history. It has highlighted the nuance within even specific datasets, revealing the wider complexity of the periods, as well as bringing to light the possible agencies that may have been behind the examples of continuity and adaptation. Further investigations will continue to demonstrate in more detail the mechanisms behind this maintenance and
adaptation, and especially the agency, which will build on the research and conclusions in this thesis.
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