A postcolonial critique of the production of unequal power relations by the European Union

by

Corina Domnina Filipescu

A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science and International Studies
School of Government and Society
College of Social Sciences
University of Birmingham
September 2015
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation.

Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.
Abstract

This thesis argues that the limited application of postcolonial perspectives in European Union (EU) enlargement studies, and especially in studying power relations, has led to a failure to properly identify and examine the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. Current studies of enlargement are largely based on mainstream positivist theories and thus overlook the importance of a post-positivist, critical and interpretivist research framework in understanding the EU and power relations. In contrast, by adopting postcolonialist perspectives and applying them to the case of the Romanian enlargement, the thesis presents a critical discourse analysis of the EU enlargement monitoring reports and interviews with officials of the EU and Romanian negotiating teams in order to demonstrate the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations through instances of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry that have so far been identified and discussed by postcolonial scholars. Each of these three perspectives has so far been obscured to a large extent from the enlargement literature, as a result of the limited application of postcolonial approaches in EU studies. This thesis aims therefore to address this gap and advance the postcolonial research on the EU and unequal power relations.
For my parents,

Corina Silvia Filipescu and Petru Filipescu

For my grandparents,

Silvia Arzoiu and Ion Arzoiu

For my uncle,

Dan Arzoiu
Acknowledgements

Writing these acknowledgements has been an emotional roller-coaster, as the many names I have listed here reminisced me of the many stages of my PhD, but also the great people, who have been part of this process and whom each and every one of them deserves a thank you.

First and foremost I thank my supervisors, Dr David Bailey and Dr Nicola Smith, who in my opinion, are the best supervisors any PhD student can ever have. I know most of us would acknowledge the same about our supervisors, but I can honestly say that both Dr Bailey and Dr Smith have been very supportive at every stage of my thesis and of my conference attendance, job search, academic publication, etc. Their guidance has taught me the true meaning of excellent supervision and I have learned from their expertise and professionalism. I feel this thesis is as much my work as theirs, as every chapter, argument and page reminds me of their support and encouragement.

Second, I thank my first supervisor Professor Thomas Diez for trusting my initial proposal and giving me the opportunity to put my ideas down on paper. Professor Diez has been an inspiration to me since my MA days as a student. Thank you for guiding me during my initial stages of the PhD and for showing support of the project that I had in mind.

A big thank you goes to all the interviewees, who have agreed to participate in shaping this thesis. I am forever grateful for your kindness and expertise. Thank you for sharing your thoughts, experiences and opinions with me. I am also thankful to the various people, who facilitated access to the above interviewees, in particular Senator Ion Mihai Dumitrescu.

I would like to thank the Department of Political Science and International Studies (POLSIS) at the University of Birmingham for taking me on board as a PhD student, providing conference funding, allowing me to develop my teaching experience and preparing me for an academic career. Within the department, a number of people have helped me throughout my time here: Tricia Carr, Veta Douglas, Chereece Ebanks and Mark Levasseur. My students, whom I taught in POLSIS and Priorsfield: you have made me very proud!

Thank you to the staff members at the School of Language and Social Sciences at Aston University. I am especially indebted to Professor Simon Green, Dr Lucian Leuștean and Dr Uwe Wunderlich for giving me the first opportunity to lecture. It started small, but that first experience has helped my confidence enormously, ending up teaching bigger classes and more challenging subjects. It was only later that I realised what a learning curve this opportunity has been. And I also realised that standing in front of people is actually more fun than scary. I thank you for trusting me.

I thank especially two of my closest friends in POLSIS, Dr Basak Alpan and Dr Francis Espinoza Figueroa. Thank you for your friendship, for the laughs, serious chats, free concerts and expensive meals. Thank you Francis, for your comments on some parts of my thesis. I knew I could trust your expertise, honesty and support.

I also like to say thank you to other friends in POLSIS: Saban Akca, Dr Onder Cakir, Zhiting Chen, Veysal Erdemli, Dr Ivan Farias, Dr Flor Gonzales, Dr Sabrina Luk, Lamisi Mbillah, Barbara Morazzani, Dr Saori Shibata and Yogi Suwarno Subki, for bringing the world closer to me. I may have not have said it often, but I do value your friendship.
To the staff at Computer Science, especially Ceinwen Cushway, Sarah Fleming, Melissa Fletcher, Samantha Furamera, Julie Heathcote, Helen Whitby and Caroline Wilson, what a team you are! You have made me feel welcome and I have had the best time working with you! Bryan Fryer, Professor Jonathan Rowe and Professor Xin Yao, it has been a pleasure working with you.

Around the campus, thank you Hilary Brown, Diane Cornfield, Gail Horton, Marilyn Nash, Julie Newman, Victoria Panton and Philip Treece.

To ViX (Victoria Perks), thank you for bringing some crazy, artistic, loud singing fun into my academic life. I will never forget my first time singing in front of people (okay, one person and that was you), sweating and not even knowing who I was any longer, but actually enjoying the whole experience. I am sure you thought I would not last, but guess what? I loved it then and still love it now.

To my friend, Ana Quintanar, thank you for being such an amazing friend through so much and so many years. Heshika Dissanaike, you are one kind of a friend. Monica and Sebastian Andersson, I have always praised you as a couple, but truly, your friendship is priceless. Alison Griffith, you and your family are some of the most amazing people I have ever met and I am forever grateful to how wonderful you have all been. To Carlos Dourado, my Canterbury friend, hugs and kisses to you always, thank you for being such a good friend.

To the friends that I have known all my life and grown up with, you mean so much to me. Thank you for always being there and always treating me as the girl, you have always known me to be: Roxana Alistair, Ion and Emilia Coșmeleșața, Dan Luncu, Annemarie Malischitz, Oana Popescu, Ana Maria Radu and Daniela Radulescu.

To my extending family spread all over Europe and the rest of the world, with the most amazing family stories someone could ever hear, you are a wicked, adorable bunch and I could not think of any better family to have. You rock!

To my uncle Dan Arzoiu, thank you for teaching me so much about everything that you possibly could. Honestly, you would have loved researching this topic of mine. It would have given you new opportunities to question and challenge. Though I am sure at one point you will.

Thank you to my beautiful grandmother Silvia Arzoiu for showing me what it means to be independent and strong. You taught me to be proud of who I am and of what I want. And without even trying, I know I am so much like you. And to my grandfather Ion Arzoiu, thank you for bringing your wisdom and adventures into my life and for making me feel so proud to be your granddaughter. Thank you for raising me and taking care of me. More than anything, I want you to be here with me. I miss you enormously and I think of you always.

My biggest thank you goes to the people who have been there for me from the day I was born: my parents Corina Silvia Filipescu and Petru Filipescu. I know that for my parents this thesis has been the longest process I could have ever committed myself to. Despite asking me over and over again, when my “essay” will be finished, I hope that this now completed work will make you proud. Regardless of how long it has taken, you have been there for me always, supporting me in the best possible way. For me you are invincible and your constant love, support, encouragement, parental guidance and being my friends have made life so
much fun and have inspired me to try my best and make you proud. And more than anything, thank you for believing in me.

If anyone would ever ask me who I would invite to the once in a lifetime party, all the people above would be on the invitation list. I do not know how they would get along, how big the party would be, what or who they would try to sneak into the party or what crazy things they will be up to, but I could not think of a better crowd to celebrate life with and of course the submission of my PhD thesis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 1

CHAPTER 1 – A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ENLARGEMENT LITERATURE .......................... 17
1.1. The fifth enlargement scholarship ................................................................................................. 19
1.1.1. Asymmetry in the fifth enlargement ......................................................................................... 23
1.1.2. Candidate agency capacity in the fifth enlargement ................................................................. 26
1.2. Post-positivist theories in the fifth enlargement scholarship ....................................................... 29
1.2.1. Critical theories ......................................................................................................................... 31
1.2.2. Discourse in critical theories .................................................................................................... 33
1.3. Postcolonial scholarship ............................................................................................................... 34
1.3.1. The EU as colonial and imperial power ..................................................................................... 38
1.3.2. The fifth enlargement as imperial and colonial product .......................................................... 41
1.3.3. The orientalist reading of the EU ............................................................................................. 43
1.3.4. Discourse analysis in EU focused postcolonial research ....................................................... 45
1.4. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 50

CHAPTER 2 – THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF POSTCOLONIALISM .................... 52
2.1. The emergence of postcolonial scholarship .................................................................................. 55
2.2. Recognizing a postcolonial present .............................................................................................. 57
2.2.1. Power relations in the postcolonial present ............................................................................ 59
2.3. Understanding the postcolonial present through a bottom-up approach ..................................... 60
2.3.1. Subalternity ............................................................................................................................. 61
2.4. Understanding the postcolonial present through colonial discursive analysis .............................. 63
2.4.1. Orientalism ............................................................................................................................. 65
2.4.2. Mimicry .................................................................................................................................. 69
2.5. The postcolonial relevance to the study of EU enlargement ....................................................... 72
2.6. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 75

CHAPTER 3 – ADVOCATING THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK .................................. 77
3.1. The three-dimensional critical discourse analysis model ............................................................... 79
3.1.1. Description ............................................................................................................................. 81
3.1.2. Interpretation .......................................................................................................................... 83
3.1.3. Explanation ........................................................................................................................... 84
3.2. Relevance of the three-dimensional model to the study of power relations .................................. 86
3.3. Interviewing technique ............................................................................................................... 88
3.3.1. Selecting interviewees ........................................................................................................... 88
CHAPTER 7 – ANALYSING THE DISCOURSE PRACTICES OF THE REPORTS ........................................ 205

7.1. Outline of the interpretation dimension ............................................................................ 206
7.2. Applying the interpretation dimension ........................................................................... 207
7.3. Producing discourse types ............................................................................................... 211
  7.3.1. What is going on? ........................................................................................................ 211
  7.3.2. Who is involved? ....................................................................................................... 215
  7.3.3. In what relations? ..................................................................................................... 218
7.4. Interpretation of the situational context ........................................................................... 219
  7.4.1. What is going on? ..................................................................................................... 220
  7.4.2. Who is involved? ..................................................................................................... 222
  7.4.3. In what relations? ..................................................................................................... 224
7.5. Production and interpretation of the intertextual context ................................................ 226
  7.5.1. Presuppositions ....................................................................................................... 227
7.6. Establishing a postcolonial relationship ......................................................................... 230
  7.6.1. Subalternity .............................................................................................................. 231
  7.6.2. Orientalist discourse ................................................................................................. 232
  7.6.3. Mimicry .................................................................................................................... 233
7.7. Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 235

CHAPTER 8 – ANALYSING THE SOCIOCULTURAL PRACTICES OF THE REPORTS ........................................ 237

8.1. Outline of the explanation dimension ............................................................................. 238
8.2. Applying the explanation dimension ............................................................................. 239
8.3. Power relations at institutional level ............................................................................... 242
8.4. Power relations at societal level ..................................................................................... 249
8.5. Power relations at situational level ................................................................................ 253
8.6. Establishing a postcolonial relationship ........................................................................ 255
8.7. Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 257

CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................. 259
## List of tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. The three CDA dimensions and the three corresponding discourse facets</th>
<th>Page 81</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 2. Elements of discourse, which can be controlled and constrained (Source: Fairclough, 2001:39 and 61.)</td>
<td>Page 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3. The Reports.</td>
<td>Page 93-94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4. Recurrent instances of the words Eastern and Central and Eastern Europe in the Regular Reports.</td>
<td>Page 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5. Recurrent instances of the words Eastern and Central and Eastern Europe in the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports.</td>
<td>Page 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6. Instances of the word European as related to the EU and the Romanian enlargement (and the fifth enlargement).</td>
<td>Page 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7. Formal vocabulary of the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports.</td>
<td>Page 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8. The number of modality verb instances used in the Reports.</td>
<td>Page 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9. The production and interpretation of the situational context.</td>
<td>Page 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 10. What power relations at the situational, institutional and societal levels shape discourse? (Source: Fairclough, 2001:138).</td>
<td>Page 241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>The explanation dimension (has also been reproduced in Chapter 8 on page 241)</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The foundation of this thesis has its origins two decades ago, in an obscure question that I asked myself when observing a poster in 1994, when the referendum vote for joining the European Union (EU) was prepared in Sweden. The poster in question (see National Library of Sweden, 2008) captured the slogan *Ja till Europa* (Swedish for “Yes to Europe”), suggesting that Sweden’s EU accession\(^1\) was a way of entering Europe. However, this slogan made me question when did Sweden ever leave Europe and when did the EU become the embodiment of Europe? My understanding had always been that Sweden was a European country regardless of any EU accession, while the EU was a union of states and unrelated to any entry to Europe.

The opacity that this slogan created was rooted in my own personal background. Born in a family with origins in most (of what one may call) European countries and raised in both the so called Eastern and Western Europe, I had personally never been exposed to an understanding that Europe was anything else apart from a continent formed by a number of countries. Yet, the process of EU enlargement introduced this discourse, which implicitly indicated a process of exclusion from and inclusion in Europe based on EU membership. During the years that followed and especially through my academic studies, I came across this kind of analogy several times, for instance when Italy captured a similar motto, *Entrare*

---

\(^1\) The act of joining the EU upon satisfactorily completing accession negotiations and thus becoming a member state (European Union, 2015c).

However, it was not until the fifth enlargement\(^2\) when I noticed an extensive use of slogans and especially statements, which made references to EU accession as an entry ticket to Europe. For instance, the Hungarian pro-EU accession campaign encouraged a “return to Europe” (Andor, 2000:2), while Romanian President Traian Băsescu declared on the day of Romania’s EU accession (1 January 2007) that “We arrived in Europe. Welcome to Europe” (BBC, 2007). And during the most recent EU enlargement round, Croatia’s pro-EU slogan captured “Europe or the Balkans”, with President Ivo Josipovic declaring after the Croatian positive EU referendum that “Today’s decision determined Croatia as a European nation” (NineMsn, 2012). Furthermore, European Commission President Romano Prodi also rendered Europe to the ideals and visions of the EU in his publication *Europe as I see it* (2004), while the more recent *State of the Union 2012 Address*\(^3\) (European Commission, 2012) by European Commission President José Manuel Durão Barroso captured the close congruence between Europe and the EU, when concluding that “a better, stronger and a more united Europe” can only be built upon “the values that are at the heart of the European Union”.

In response to the above and in contrast to the Swedish and Italian campaigns mentioned previously, slogans and statements produced during the fifth enlargement seemed to attach a stigma of difference between applicants\(^4\) and the EU to a larger extent, especially slogans and statements produced by the EU and its member states. For instance, in 2003 French President

---

\(^2\) Refers to the fifth round of EU enlargement, which started in March 1998 when the accession process was launched (European Union, 2007).

\(^3\) Annual speech on the state of the EU by the European Commission President.

\(^4\) A state, which has submitted an application for membership to the EU and its application is under examination (European Commission, 2013m).
Jacques Chirac called some of the then acceding\(^5\) and candidate states\(^6\) as "badly brought up" (The Irish Times, 2003) and some of their actions as "infantile" and "dangerous". Chirac’s purposive statement suggested that as non-members of the EU, these countries did not know how to behave. The stigma of difference was clearly implied when Chirac concluded that "when you are in the family ... you have more rights than when you are asking to join and knocking on the door" (CNN, 2003). Prodi endorsed Chirac’s statement, stating that the candidate and acceding states did not seem to understand the meaning of the EU: "I have been very, very sad, but I am also patient by nature, so I hope they will understand that sharing the future means sharing the future" (The Irish Times, 2003). As indicated by Maria Mälksoo, such statements provide clear evidence that the EU rendered the fifth enlargement applicants as children in no position to take decisions, but who needed the guidance of the EU (2009:66). In the same vein, Boris Buden indicates that the applicants were regarded as being “in diapers” (2010a:4) and as “a landscape of historical ruins that is inhabited only by children, immature people unable to organize their lives democratically without guidance” (2010a:5), in contrast to the EU, who represented “the better world”, which applicants should emulate (2010a:4).

The above discussion deserves closer attention because it suggests that during the fifth enlargement the EU may have produced discourses based on alterity between the EU as Europe and applicants as the Other. What is distinctive about this is the fact that the EU seemed to have revived the Enlightenment discourse about the existence of the superior Europe and the inferior Other. Such a discourse has been covered by numerous scholars...
(Delanty, 1995; Wolff, 1995; Neumann, 1996, 1999:207; Wilson and van der Dussen, 1996; Malmborg and Stråth, 2002; Kuus, 2004:475; Best, 2006:186; Kármán, 2010). In particular, Larry Wolff’s *Inventing Eastern Europe* presents how Western European Enlightenment thinkers created images of an immature, backward and Eastern Other (1994:356), which was regarded as “standing somewhere between barbarism and civilization, evaluated with respect to a standard set in Western Europe”, which was identified as mature, developed and superior (1994:95). In the same vein, Maria Todorova’s *Imagining the Balkans* provides an insightful examination of how Western Enlightenment thinkers shaped the image of the Balkans as “a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the “European” and the “West”’ was produced (1997:188; see also Bakic-Hayden, 1995:917-918; Stenning, 2005:378). Real or imaginary, the Enlightenment discourse aimed to identify the existence of a superior and distinctive Europe, who distributed her knowledge to what was considered a backward non-European Eastern Other. This inevitably created power asymmetry, by establishing a sense of European superiority over the inferior Other (Pagden, 2004b:41 and 50-51).

In the same way, it seems to that the EU also created discourses in which the Union and the candidates existed in opposition to the other, which inevitably constructed “an unequal dichotomy” (McLeod, 2010:49). Thus, based on my original question that I asked at the beginning of this chapter and the above reflections, these raised questions of why and how are such discourses created, to whose benefits and what impact do they have? Most importantly, it made me question the extent to which these EU discourses frame relations of power and in particular produce unequal power relations. And if such unequal relations are produced, could these relations be changed and how? An interest in both the production and change/emancipation of power relations has been in particular raised by Stephen Bates
Bates engages with the argument that power is not only about understanding for instance production of domination, but also understanding how emancipation of the dominated can occur (2010:373). In other words, studies of power can therefore sustain an understanding of how structures are power phenomena that constrain, but also of structures as power phenomena that can lead to change and emancipation (2010:374).

**Literature review and research questions**

The vast literature on the EU provides a useful framework in which different aspects of the Union have been examined (Dinan, 1999, 2004, 2014; McCormick, 1999, 2011; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Nugent, 2006, 2010; Hix, 2008; Bomberg et al., 2012a; Kenealy et al., 2015). In particular EU enlargement has attracted a great deal of interest (Baun, 2000; Kaiser and Elvert, 2004; Nugent, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Schneider, 2012; Gateva 2015). Especially when discussing enlargement policy, which has often been discussed in terms of asymmetrical relations (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008; Avery, 2012; Gateva, 2014), the bulk of enlargement studies are largely dominated by positivist approaches (Moravcsik, 1993, 1995, 1998; Heinemann-Grüder, 2002; Ortino et al., 2004; Schmitter, 2005; Burgess, 2009, 2010; MacMillan, 2009; Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Niemann with Schmitter, 2009; Hill and Smith, 2011; Tatham, 2011; Franchino, 2012; Bochsler and Szöcsik, 2013).

Nevertheless, in recent years, post-positivist research on the EU has expanded, especially through the publication of the EU focused postcolonial scholarship, which has in particular examined EU enlargement and power relations (Böröcz and Kovács, 2001; Engel-Di Mauro, 2001, 2006a; Böröcz, 2005; 2006a, 2009; Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005; Zielonka, 2006, 2008; Behr, 2007; Bhambra, 2007; Hooper and Kramschi, 2007; Mälksoo, 2009; Fisher Onar and
Nicolaïdis, 2013; Hansen and Jonsson, 2014). However, although these studies have added value to EU literature, there is still a dearth of postcolonial research into understanding the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. Such unexplored avenues include broader application of postcolonial perspectives and of adequate research methods, as well as engagement with the postcolonial examination of the 2007 enlargement\(^7\). Thus, this thesis argues therefore that the literature is missing adequate applications of post-positivist theories (Geyer, 2003; Rosamond, 2007; Manners and Whitman, 2016), in particular postcolonial perspectives, in studying power relations, which has led to a failure to properly identify how the EU produces unequal power relations.

Thus, while EU focused postcolonial scholarship constructs a partial picture of EU enlargement and power relations, I propose that the literature has been silent about the following research questions, which this thesis will aim to answer:

- To what extent can a postcolonial examination demonstrate how the EU produces unequal power relations in the enlargement context?
- How can we reveal such unequal power relations?
- In which way does a postcolonial examination contribute to our understanding of EU enlargement and the production of unequal power relations?

Here, my understanding of unequal power relations as used in this current thesis is based on Norman Fairclough’s definition of power relations, as the interaction between two or more actors, but which can become unequal when actors (known as dominant bloc or powerful

\(^7\) Also known as the second wave of the fifth enlargement, it refers to the process of enlargement of Bulgaria and Romania and which culminated in the accession of both countries in 2007 (European Union, 2007).
participant) exercise control and constraint of contributions and discourses of other actors (known as non-powerful actor) (Fairclough, 2001:27 and 38-39).

Thus, by building upon the current postcolonial literature, and in particular EU focused postcolonial scholarship, and asking the above research questions, this thesis aims to introduces the application of three postcolonial perspectives, subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, in order to critically explore and rethink the way we understand the EU as a postcolonial space in which unequal power relations are produced and thus contribute to the expansion of postcolonial research on EU enlargement.

**Case-study: the Romanian enlargement**

In order to demonstrate the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations, this research will focus on one case-study, the Romanian enlargement. In this current thesis, the Romanian enlargement refers to the enlargement process, which took place between March 1998 when the accession process was launched with Romania and January 2007 when Romania accessed the EU and became a member state (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:40 and 72). The reason for choosing this case-study is two-fold. First, although the fifth enlargement is regarded as a major source of academic scrutiny and interest (Hall and Danta, 2000; Ingham and Ingham, 2002; Poole, 2003; Dimitrova, 2004a; Kuus; 2004; Verdun and Croci, 2005; Önkol, 2009; Daborwski and Rostowski, 2012; Yoji, 2015), its second wave of enlargement has been less researched (Phinnemore, 2006b; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:123). In other words, studies of the Romanian enlargement are curtailed (Henderson,

---

8 The actual accession negotiations began first in February 2000.

9 Due to the complexity of the fifth enlargement, it was decided early in the process that this enlargement would take place in waves, meaning that applicants would access at different periods based on their ability to fulfil the accession criteria. The first wave culminated in the accession of ten countries in May 2004. The second wave culminated with the accession of two countries in January 2007 (Phinnemore, 1999:73; European Union, 2007; O’Brennan, 2007:34).
1999; Farrell et al., 2002; Gallagher, 2005, 2009; Pridham, 2007a). Such a scholarly gap has been explained as an effect of the big-bang excitement that the first wave of enlargement brought and which drew more academic attention (Phinnemore, 2006a:43, 2011:92). However, the fact that the Romanian enlargement is under-studied is in itself highly indicative of an exclusion of this particular enlargement from the literature. This thesis argues therefore that a postcolonial examination of the Romanian enlargement is instrumental in demonstrating that this enlargement is not “a minor area of curiosity”, but merits “serious attention on the same terms” as other enlargements (McLeod, 2010:18).

Moreover, as EU enlargements are “individualised and personalised” processes, the focus on the Romanian enlargement can be enlightening of any distinctive dynamics between the EU and the production of power relations (see Vromen, 2010:255). This relates to the argument that although the steps in an enlargement process are applied in similar ways to all applicants, every enlargement is also subjected to individual and personalised processes (Bojkov, 2004; Sadurski, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004; Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2009). For instance, scholars have drawn attention to the fact that Romania’s lengthier and stricter enlargement process has been infused with unprecedented requirements and thus was different than for example the 2004 enlargement. Such a different pattern of enlargement has led to questions of the extent to which this process impacted upon EU-Romania relations (Blokker, 2008:266; see also O’Brennan, 2006; Pridham, 2007a:353 and 351; 2007c:534; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Andreev, 2009; Ashbrook, 2010; Lawrence, 2010). In light of the above, the Romanian enlargement can therefore be particularly indicative of what postcolonial assumptions can be identified in the production of unequal power relations (see McLeod, 2010:179).
Second, another aspect that makes the Romanian enlargement a pertinent case-study is Romania’s constitution as an Other and a subaltern during the enlargement process, which has been identified by a range of scholars (see for instance Burgess, 1997:107; Deltcheva, 2000; Böröcz and Kovács, 2001; Pagden, 2004a; Kamińska, 2005; Vachudova, 2005; Engel-Di Mauro, 2006a; Sellar et.al., 2009:255; Kovačević, 2012). Such an understanding originates primarily in the EU’s representations of Romania as a laggard in comparison to other applicants (Baun, 2000:126; Phinnemore, 2006b; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004, 2008; Verdun, 2005:12-13; Pridham, 2007a:350, 2007c:527; Chiva and Phinnemore, 2011a).

This aspect has not gone unchallenged by a number of scholars, who have observed that these representations produced processes of othering and subalternity (Kuus, 2007; Buden, 2010a). For instance, Merje Kuus indicates that Romania’s othering was enabled through its demarcation “as not-yet-fully European” (2004:474 and 477, 2006:227; see also Kürti, 1996; Burgess, 1997:22 and 62; Agnew, 2001; Sjursen, 2002:506; Mayer and Palmowski, 2004:574-575; Stenning, 2005:378; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:13; Lazarus, 2012:122), while Lucian Boia maintains that Romania’s othering could be observed in the EU’s representation of the country as an “exotic land: somewhere ‘out there’, on the margins of Europe” (2001:8). Similar interpretations are also to be found in the results of Amprenta României (Footprint Romania), a study, which presents perceptions of Romania in Brussels six months prior to Romania’s accession to the EU. The study identifies that Romania was perceived as old-fashioned and as something of an exotic appearance on the European scene, despite its proximity to EU accession (Euractiv, 2006; Pridham, 2007c:533). Moreover, Judit Timár raises concerns about subalternity, arguing that during the fifth enlargement EU experts emerged as the voice/s of the candidates, but which Timár regards as “ignorant of the region and the country which they are supposed to study” (2004:535; see also Csepeli et. al., 1996:497; Velickovic, 2012:164). According to John Thieme, the effect of such a practice
could be regarded as an “equivalent of the culturally underrepresented colonies of the late nineteenth-century European empires” and thus in “danger” of airbrushing “off the map” the candidates’ voices (2005:3). On these grounds, EU representations can be identified as important referents in shaping Romania as an Other and a subaltern.

Research methods

In order to gain in-depth understanding (Vromen, 2010:255; see also Kvale, 2007:x-xi) of the ways in which the EU produces unequal power relations and extract observations of aspects of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry and thus demonstrate how different postcolonial perspectives inform the analysis, this thesis relies on the qualitative research methods of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and interviews. The quantitative method of content analysis has been briefly employed in order to provide an additional element of data-collection and thus support the findings of CDA and interviews.

Critical discourse analysis was employed because it engages specifically with examining production of unequal power relations (Fairclough, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2011; Wodak, 1995, 2007; Van Dijk, 2003; Weiss and Wodak, 2003; Wodak, 2007). This thesis proposes that the most relevant CDA model for the purpose of this current research is Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA (Fairclough, 2001, 2010). This model draws particular attention to the production of unequal power relations “through focusing upon language” (Fairclough, 1989:4, 2001:34; Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2009:27; Fairclough et. al., 2011:358) and aims to change unequal power relations and emancipate subordinated groups (Jones, 2007:356; see also Sidaway, 2000:594; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2001:89-90; Fairclough, 2001:2; Weiss and Wodak, 2003:14; Fairclough et. al., 2011:357; Gee, 2011:9). It should be noted that
Fairclough distinctly refers to language as discourse (2001:17 and 18-19) and thus language and discourse will be used interchangeably throughout the current thesis.

The correlation between power relations and language is explained through Fairclough’s argument that one way of producing unequal power relations is by controlling discourses and contributions and constraining what is said and done, what relations are enacted and what positions are determined in and behind discourse\(^{10}\) (2001:36 and 38-39). Furthermore, Fairclough’s CDA model, which is based on three dimensions of discourse analysis, viz. description, interpretation and explanation, is applied upon three dimensions of discourse, viz. text, discourse practices and sociocultural practices. The contribution of the three-dimensional CDA is that it engages with a comprehensive analysis of the production of unequal power relations in and behind discourse, by examining text (micro level), how text is produced and interpreted (meso level) and how context affects and is affected by discourse (macro level)\(^{11}\) (Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012:181).

The research method of conducting interviews was employed to answer the research questions due to the fact that using interviews in conjunction with the three-dimensional CDA model ensures “a more balanced approach” (Grix, 2010:126-127; see also Pierce, 2008:46), especially as CDA is a method that is influenced by the interpretation/s of the researcher, such as what the researcher “‘sees’ in a text, what one regards as worth describing, and what one chooses to emphasize” (Fairclough, 2001:22). Furthermore, as the interview method will introduce the experiences, understandings, interpretations, etc. of individuals, who had been involved in the Romanian enlargement, the interview material will familiarize us further with the dynamics between the EU and the production of power.

---

\(^{10}\) The aspects of in and behind discourse will be discussed in Chapter 3.

\(^{11}\) Each of these elements will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
relations, seen through the interviewees’ eyes (see Vromen, 2010:258; see also Kvale, 2007:8; Pierce, 2008:45; Grix, 2010:121; Bryman, 2012:213 and 471).

In order to examine how the EU produces unequal power relations with a focus on the Romanian enlargement, the method of CDA will be applied to the language of two sets of EU monitoring documents, the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Report\(^\text{12}\) (see Vromen, 2010:262), which include the EU’s assessments of the Romanian enlargement progress (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:274). The interview material will be examined as an observation of how the interviewees’ perspectives support or differ from the CDA findings.

**Contributions**

The contributions of this current research are three-fold. While the first two aim for an ontological and epistemological contribution through the expansion of post-positivist theories to the study of EU enlargement and unequal power relations, the third is a methodological one (see Manners and Whitman, 2016:14). First, the thesis contributes to the advancement of postcolonial research on EU enlargement, by introducing a critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU as a postcolonial space in which unequal power relations are produced. The thesis argues that although the bulk of enlargement studies is vast, enlargement has largely been discussed from the perspectives of rationalist-objectivist mainstream theories. However, by providing a postcolonial springboard for the investigation of the EU and power relations, this research aims to make an important theoretical contribution, which will consolidate the application of post-positivist perspectives and reduce the postcolonial void that exists in EU studies (Tlostanova, 2012:130; see also Huggan, 2008;

\(^{12}\) When referring to the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, I will spell Report/Reports with capital letter in order to distinguish these from other reports.
Second, another contribution is specifically related to EU focused postcolonial scholarship. Although this scholarship provides substantial research on the EU and in particular the fifth enlargement and power relations, the literature has been largely discussed from the viewpoint of one specific postcolonial perspective, orientalism. Even though orientalism offers a solid rationale within which the EU and power relations can be understood (see Bryman, 2012:20), by including two additional postcolonial perspectives, subalternity and mimicry (alongside orientalism) this thesis will capture a broader postcolonial analysis, by expanding our understanding of the extent to which postcolonial perspectives can provide a framework within which the EU’s production of unequal power relations can be examined.

Third, although the work of for instance Thomas Diez (e.g. 2001, 2014) and Ben Rosamond (e.g. 2013, 2014) are ground-breaking when it comes to the study of enlargement through the application of discourse analysis, this thesis argues that we can further expand EU research by applying the method of critical discourse analysis, which aims to “critique, expose, deconstruct, counter and … transcend” unequal power relations (see Sidaway, 2000:594). As previously mentioned, CDA not only examines the extent to which unequal power relations are produced in and behind discourse through the application of a micro, meso and macro level of analysis, but it also aims to attain change and emancipation.

**Thesis outline**

The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 argues that although the study of EU enlargement has attracted vast scholarly interest, the mainstream literature has so far
neglected engaging with postcolonial approaches, thus offering a limited post-positivist understanding of EU enlargement and unequal power relations (see Rosamond, 2010:106). The chapter maintains therefore that postcolonialism can be a fruitful avenue to employ when examining enlargement and the production of power relations. In recent years however, an EU focused postcolonial literature has emerged, which has offered an abundant bulk of studies engaging with the EU and unequal power relations, although there are some apparent gaps, which Chapter 1 will discuss. In sum, the chapter argues that ultimately, the application of postcolonial perspectives is crucial in introducing a critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU as a postcolonial space and how unequal power relations are produced in EU enlargement.

Chapter 2 argues that in order to address the research questions and move beyond the gaps identified in the previous chapter, engaging with three postcolonial perspectives, subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, is pivotal in adequately demonstrating the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. The chapter is therefore setting out a preliminary discussion of how these perspectives might be applied to the examination of EU enlargement and unequal power relations. In sum, the chapter argues that by drawing upon a postcolonial framework, this current research has the potential to make three significant contributions by offering new ways of theorizing and displaying a new critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand EU enlargement.

Chapter 3 argues that employing Fairclough’s three-dimensional critical discourse analysis model and the interviewing technique will help examining the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. The method of content analysis was briefly employed in order to provide an additional element of data-collection. The chapter also addresses the
reasons why these research methods will be applied to the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Report. Potentialities and limitations encountered during field work will be discussed, as well as how these may have impacted upon the research results and how they have been dealt with (see Grix, 2010:32). The chapter concludes that by engaging with the above research framework, this current research will aim to make important methodological contributions to our understanding of the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations.

Chapter 4 presents the contextual background of the Romanian enlargement and accession negotiations. The chapter is divided into two main sections, a first one, which provides a general history of the enlargement process and a second, more detailed history of the accession negotiations. The overall aim of the chapter is to reveal the extent to which the enlargement process and in particular the accession negotiations set out a context in which an “unequal encounter” (Fairclough, 2001:36) took place between the EU and Romania. More importantly, the chapter argues that the monitoring Reports played a determinative role in the Romanian enlargement. Additionally, the chapter considers the fact that although we may speak of the EU as a unitary actor in its interaction with candidate states or when producing unequal relations, a variety of EU institutions are involved, which play a significant role in the enlargement process. The section will also address the fight against corruption, which was regarded as one of Romania’s main problems in fulfilling the accession criteria and which impacted upon the Reports, negotiations and Romania’s accession. Overall, the chapter will present key positions of the EU and Romania during the enlargement process, how these are reflected in the Reports and flag up some of the key analytical points that will be made in the empirical chapters.
Chapters 5 to 8 argue that by engaging with the three-dimensional CDA, interviews and content analysis, the current research will aim to demonstrate the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations, with a focus on the language of the Romanian monitoring Reports. The application of the CDA dimensions is different for each chapter: Chapter 5 analyses the vocabulary and Chapter 6 examines the grammar through the application of the description dimension; Chapter 7 analyses the discourse practices through the interpretation dimension; Chapter 8 examines the sociocultural practices through the explanation dimension. All four chapters follow a similar structure, which includes a brief outline of what each respective CDA stage entails and how the dimension has specifically been applied to the Reports\textsuperscript{13}. Furthermore, each chapter includes the CDA findings of the Reports and which are discussed in order to reveal the extent of the production of unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship to the elements of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry. The in-depth (semi-structured) interviews will enable the voices of EU and Romanian officials, who have been involved in the Romanian enlargement, to be heard and to introduce their own perspectives on enlargement, power relations and inequality. Additionality, the interview material will be discussed in relation to the three postcolonial elements of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry. As a concluding remark, each chapter summarizes in which ways the corresponding CDA dimension and interview material extract observations of interest to the postcolonial analysis and sets out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.

The Conclusions summarize the findings of this research, its contributions and limitations, as well as recommendations for further research. More importantly, the conclusions will address the extent to which future research can be based on the contributions of this current thesis.

\textsuperscript{13} As grammar is analysed in a similar way to vocabulary, the outline of the description dimension is not included in Chapter 6.
CHAPTER 1

A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ENLARGEMENT LITERATURE

Although the study of EU enlargement has attracted vast scholarly interest (McCormick, 1999; Dinan, 2004, 2014; Nugent, 2010; Kenealy et al., 2015), this chapter argues that there is a dearth of postcolonial applications in the literature and in particular in examining the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. As a response to this, this chapter aims to develop a critical assessment of EU enlargement literature, with a focus on studies of the fifth enlargement, by presenting key arguments, considering contributions and identifying gaps (see Dunleavy, 2003; Grix, 2010; Bryman, 2012:101). In sum, the chapter argues that by building upon postcolonial literature and in particular the EU focused postcolonial scholarship, this thesis will advance the application of postcolonialism to the study of how the EU produces unequal power relations, by bringing to the fore an engagement with postcolonial perspectives.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section maintains that the fifth enlargement literature is a substantial scholarship, which has focused to a larger extent on the first wave of enlargement, while overlooking the second wave. When it comes to the study of power relations and enlargement, two strands can be identified, one which has been dominated by
studies of asymmetry and a second, contrasting one, which demonstrates the candidates’ agency capacity in the fifth enlargement

The second section argues that although the enlargement literature offers a considerable theoretical richness, the bulk of studies tend to be studied from the perspectives of positivist theories and thus the literature has been less responsive to the application of post-positivist approaches. In particular, postcolonialism has been overlooked in assessing the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations, which are similar to the legacies of colonial and imperial unequal power relations that have so far been discussed by postcolonial scholars (Fanon, 1963; Memmi, 1967; Cabral, 1972; Rushdie, 1982; Spivak, 1988; Bhabha, 1997; Loomba, 1998; Said, 2003). The section argues therefore that an inclusion of post-positivism\textsuperscript{14} perspectives into the literature would introduce “an ever more faceted and nuanced picture of the European Union” (Diez and Wiener, 2009:21) and in particular in understanding the EU and unequal power relations (see Rosamond, 2010:106). In line with the focus of this current thesis, the section also discusses how critical theories are highly involved with using discourse in their analysis of unequal relations, domination and asymmetry.

The third section argues that postcolonial scholars have established a solid body of literature. One of the most distinctive postcolonial scholarships is the EU focused postcolonial literature, which has proven to be a fruitful research avenue, by taking postcolonialism to new levels in the study of the EU. Nevertheless, there still remains a dearth of postcolonial research in this particular literature, due to limited application of postcolonial perspectives.

\textsuperscript{14} In this thesis, post-positivist theories will also be called reflectivist and critical theories.
overlooking the examination of the second wave of enlargement and using a limited research method.

1.1. The fifth enlargement scholarship

The European Union has undergone continuous widening and deepening following its establishment as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by six founding member states\(^\text{15}\) in 1951 (Dinan, 2004, 2014; Kaiser and Elvert, 2004). One of its most successful integration policies has been initiated through the enlargement policy, which refers to the act through which applicants, who have applied to EU membership, eventually become member states (European Commission, 2014b). From 1951 onwards, the EU has enlarged seven times\(^\text{16}\), although the latest three enlargement rounds (2004, 2007 and 2013) are often referred to as belonging to one round, the so called Central and Eastern European enlargement or the fifth enlargement (European Union, 2007).

Studies of the enlargement policy and the evolution of individual enlargements have produced a large scholarship (Baun, 2000; Kaiser and Elvert, 2004; Nugent, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Schneider, 2012; Gateva 2015). In particular, the fifth enlargement has attracted a significant amount of scholarly interest (see Schimmelfennig, 2001; Mattli and Plümper, 2002; Sedelmeier, 2002; Kassim and Menon, 2003; Raik 2004; Piedrafita, 2007). Research of the first wave of enlargement has been prominent (Dinan, 1999, 2004; Baun, 2000; Curzon Price et.al., 2001; Kaiser and Elsevert, 2004; Nugent, 2004; Verdun and Croci, 2005; O’Brennan, 2006; Heidbreder, 2011; Michalski, 2014), perhaps due to the more challenging nature of enlargement in comparison

\(^{15}\) Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein, Italy and the Netherlands.

to previous rounds (Verdun, 2005:12-13; Zielonka, 2013:43). In contrast, studies of the second wave are curtailed, although in recent years we have seen a growing number of research (Bojkov, 2004; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Andreev, 2009; Chiva and Phinnemore, 2011; Gateva, 2015).

One of the most substantial researches of the fifth enlargement is John O’Brennan’s *The Eastern enlargement of the European Union* (2006), which brings attention to an analysis of concepts and institutions and highlights the impact of this round of enlargement upon EU institutions involved in the process and discusses reasons why the enlargement took place. The volume significantly contributes to the field of enlargement studies in numerous ways, by introducing how “normative and ideational factors” were the driving factors behind enlargement (2006:5) and how the EU’s internal institutional politics “shaped the eastern enlargement process” (2006:7). Published in 2006, just before the second wave of enlargement, the volume focuses to a larger extent on the candidates of the first wave, missing out on a more detailed research of the 2007 candidates (although Romania and Bulgaria are discussed accordingly).

On the other hand, Cristina Chiva and David Phinnemore’s *The European Union’s 2007 Enlargement* (2011a) pays particular attention to the second wave of the fifth enlargement. Chiva and Phinnemore offer a significant understanding of what has happened to the candidates of the second wave, by for instance discussing the process of enlargement and outcomes of accession negotiations and in particular placing Romania and Bulgaria within the wider context of past and future EU enlargements (Chiva and Phinnemore, 2011b:2). Their volume substantially contributes to the curtailed research of the second wave, by bringing attention to its significance, the implications for both the EU and the candidates and
as Chiva and Phinnemore maintain, “provide partial correctives to established scholarly perspectives on enlargement” (2011:3)

A considerable bulk of the fifth enlargement scholarship has focused on examining individual applicant countries, although as pointed out previously, the applicants of the first wave appear more prominent in the literature in contrast to the second wave members (Andor, 2000; Böröcz, 2000; Wilga, 2006; Korek, 2007; Bochsler and Szöcsik, 2013). As part of the second wave, studies of the Romanian enlargement have remained rather reduced, though a number of scholars have engaged with this particular enlargement (Henderson, 1999; Boia, 2001; Farrell et.al., 2002; Phinnemore, 2006b; Ortino et al., 2004; Gallagher, 2005, 2009; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008; Chiva and Phinnemore, 2011a; Bochsler and Szöcsik, 2013). In particular, three pieces of research have extended our understanding of the Romanian enlargement. First, Dimitris Papadimitriou and Phinnemore’s *Romania and the European Union* (2008) captures a substantial account of this enlargement, which includes an overview of the historical chronology of the enlargement process, while diverting the last chapters to discussions of the structural changes in Romania. The volume brings to light details about the failures and the successes of Romania during enlargement, addressing both the influential role of the EU and the rather negligent attitude of Romania towards EU demands regarding justice and home affairs (2008:140-141).

Second, Tom Gallagher’s *Romania and the European Union. How the weak vanquished the strong* (2009) addresses how and why Romania managed to achieve its accession target despite severe challenges and lack of significant progress. Gallagher maintains that Romania joined the EU on rather relaxed accession criteria (2009:261), as the EU did not pay “major attention” or at least not the same attention as it did to the 2004 candidates (2009:5). Even in
situations when the EU did pay attention and reprimanded Romania, the Romanian government tended to immediately “present revised reform strategies” in order to insure the EU that progress was under way, but such strategies were never sustained for long (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:124). Overall, Gallagher sees the Romanian accession as an EU failure, as the latter “mishandled” the Romanian membership application by allowing a rather under-developed state, who did not satisfactorily fulfill the membership criteria, to find “itself inside the Union” (2009:263). As it will later be discussed in Chapter 4, European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn also raised concerns that although all negotiation chapters had been closed with Romania in December 2004, the country had not successfully implemented the accession criteria by the time of its accession (2009:172-173).

Third, Phinnemore’s *The EU and Romania. Accession and Beyond* (2006) is of particular strength in the literature, as unlike most research, it provides insights and voices from a number of Romanian officials, academics and parliamentarians, alongside non-Romanian officials, who had been involved in the Romanian enlargement. For instance, Phinnemore included chapters written by Romania’s key Chief Negotiators, Leonard Orban and Lazăr Comănescu, where both reveal their own reflections on Romania’s road to accession, the actual accession, the effects of membership and the implications with the South-Eastern European region after accession (2006:XIV). Following Eli Gateva’s criticism of the enlargement literature (2014), Phinnemore’s volume is of importance, as it acknowledges the opinions of what Gateva calls the “EU hopefuls” (2014:1), meaning the candidate countries. In Gateva’s words, these countries are extensively overlooked in EU enlargement studies, as the literature significantly focuses on the voices of the EU or the member states (2014:3).
Following from the above, two different literatures stand out when examining the fifth enlargement and power relations and which will be discussed below. One strand has predominately focused on power asymmetry between the EU and the applicants, highlighting the EU’s leverage in the fifth enlargement. Another strand stands in contrast to the previous one, as it presents the applicants’ agency capacity in the fifth enlargement, challenging the perspective that applicants were powerless actors in the enlargement process.

1.1.1. Asymmetry in the fifth enlargement

A large number of scholars agree that EU-candidates interaction in the fifth enlargement is an element of importance, in particular during accession negotiations, as such a conduct was asymmetrical and the EU was always in “the stronger bargaining position” (Avery, 2012:171; see also Baun, 2000; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2002:43; Nugent, 2004:53-54; Pridham, 2006a:397; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:9; Michalski, 2014; Magone et al., 2016). As negotiations were identified as a process in which each candidate country tried to satisfy the EU regarding the Copenhagen criteria (Nugent, 2004:53), the candidates had “little choice, but to accept the acquis and procedures of the Union” (Michalski, 2014:284). It was within this context that scholars observed an unequal encounter between the EU and the candidate countries. In particular, studies of the Romanian enlargement have engaged with criticism regarding the stricter enlargement process that Romania endured and which led to questions of the extent to which this process impacted upon EU-Romania relations (Blokker, 2008:266; see also Pridham, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore 2008; Andreev, 2009).

One branch of the literature has addressed that the application of the conditionality principle in the fifth enlargement raised serious concerns regarding asymmetry, as the principle was
identified as preconditioning any candidate country to accept the so-called European values\textsuperscript{17} in “a non-egalitarian way” (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011:132; see also Grabbe, 2002; Poole, 2003; Pridham, 2007a, 2007c; Blokker, 2008; Gateva, 2015), as well as accept the EU’s demands and apply all the EU’s rules, “without exception or modification” (Avery, 2009:267). For instance, Heather Grabbe argues that due to the conditionality principle, the candidate countries became client states and observers, while the EU enjoyed a powerful bargaining position (2002:266; Poole, 2003:10). In particular, in the case of Romania, the conditionality principle “was more sustained” than in previous enlargement rounds (Pridham, 2007a:354), exposing Romania to “an ‘even more rigorous system of conditionality’” (Blokker, 2008:266), especially “in the final stage of accession” (Pridham, 2007a:353 and 351; 2007c:534; see also Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005:160). This created “profound power asymmetries between the negotiating parties” (Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:6), as the leverage of the EU forced Romania into an unequal partnership. This questioned therefore whether Romania joined a group of equals or whether Romania’s accession was a matter of control and power asymmetry (Bellier, 2004:146; Phinnemore, 2006c:17, 2007a:347; Zielonka, 2008:476).

Another set of scholars particularly address the asymmetrical relations that can be identified in the monitoring reports (Pridham, 2007a:354; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:36; see also Baun, 2000:126; Maniokas 2004:28; Raik, 2004:579; O’Brien, 2006:83; Lass-Leennecke and Werner, 2009:272-274; Düzgit and Suvarierol, 2011:470), which were also regarded as “new instruments for furthering conditionality” (Pridham, 2007a:351-352). Despite being recognized as helpful tools and gaining significant importance in the enlargement process, scholars argue that the production of the monitoring reports was a one-

\textsuperscript{17} Such as human rights, good governance, the open market economy and parliamentary democracy (see Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011:141).
way process, monopolised by a small group of Commission officials (Bellier, 2004:145), which allowed the EU to control the trajectory of negotiations and enlargement (Pridham, 2007c:531; see also Raik, 2004:579-580). Another criticism raises concern that such reports concealed, denied and played down the EU’s leverage in the enlargement process and the subordinate position of candidate countries (Raik, 2004:580-581; Pridham, 2006a, 2007a:353; Kuus, 2007:161; Zielonka, 2008:476; Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:272-273; Avery, 2012:166). Grabbe also points out that for instance the Regular Reports were too general and often too vague to give the Council of Ministers and the European Councils a detailed analysis on which the former could base their decisions regarding candidates’ negotiations, highlighting therefore that the Reports were not as reliable as they were made to be (2001:1022, 2002:265).

One insightful aspect in the debate of asymmetry in the fifth enlargement is O’Brennan’s discussion of how a discourse analysis of the Regular Reports identifies how the EU controlled the enlargement process and maintained power. Such an analysis reveals how different mechanisms in enlargement allowed the EU and the member states to be “‘regime-makers’ and applicants ‘regime-takers’” (2006:129-130; see also Grabbe, 2002:266; Poole, 2003:10; Pridham, 2006a:397). The distinctive aspect that O’Brennan identifies here is an asymmetrical distribution of power between the EU (large, powerful entity) and the candidates (small, vulnerable entities) (2006:129). O’Brennan particularly argues that this asymmetric power relation was most obvious in first, the EU’s demands of the candidates to fully accept the acquis, which was non-negotiable and unprecedented and second, the EU’s introduction of a conditionality principle, which was employed as “a key instrument of EU negotiating strategy” (2008:129-130; Zielonka, 2008:476).
Furthermore, another substantial study, which examines discourse and power relations is O’Brennan’s discussion of the European Commission’s discursive framing of the fifth enlargement (2006:83-87), which O’Brennan identifies as producing asymmetric power relations. This “discursive framework” was characterised by “a special responsibility” towards the candidate states due to “shared historical experience, a common cultural repertoire, and the sense of kinship” (2006:85) with the EU and which foregrounded three distinctive discourses (2006:84). First, the fifth enlargement is regarded as an “expansion of the EU value system and legal and democratic norms to Eastern Europe”, which transformed “Eastern Europe” according to the EU norms. Second, the enlargement is seen as a solution to “Eastern Europe”’s desire to return to Europe, but which was achieved under the conditions of the EU. Third, the enlargement is regarded as a “‘win-win’ scenario” for all actors involved once the economic system of the EU was imported to “Eastern Europe” and therefore the infiltration of the EU economic values was completed (2006:83-84). What O’Brennan’s study reveals is the identification of the EU’s leverage in the fifth enlargement and the asymmetrical power relations between the EU and the candidates, by analyzing the enlargement discourse and demonstrating the importance of discourse in understanding inequality in power relations. Further in the chapter, the importance of discursive analysis in the study of power relations will be raised.

1.1.2. Candidate agency capacity in the fifth enlargement

In contrast to the research on asymmetry discussed above, other scholars have studied the agency capacity of the candidates in the negotiation and enlargement process, arguing that although asymmetry may have occurred, the candidates were not totally powerless (Schimmelfennig, 1999; Baun and Marek, 2001; Pridham, 2006b, 2007c; Wilga, 2006; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Gateva 2014, 2015).
An interesting study by Frank Schimmelfennig reveals how the EU’s enlargement rhetoric can be identified as a key element in understanding “under which conditions” the EU took the decision to launch the fifth enlargement, but also how the candidates exploited the EU’s rhetoric in attaining accession (see 1999:1 and 39-40). On the one hand, Schimmelfennig maintains that the enlargement language rhetorically entrapped the EU to commit itself to enlargement, as by denying membership to candidates could have clashed with the EU’s own “ideology and basic norms of its international community … and put at stake its “European” reputation, i.e. its credibility and legitimacy as a community member” (1999:39; see also Schimmelfennig, 2003:272-278; Risse, 2009:157). On the other hand, the candidates exploited such a language and entrapped the EU through a “rhetorical action” (2001:48). What this meant was that as long as the candidates followed “the liberal norms of the community” and implemented the acquis as required, the EU was rhetorically entrapped and could not deny the candidates accession (1999:44). This demonstrates that the candidates did not helplessly wait for the EU to invite them in, but used different opportunities to influence the enlargement policy.

In a sense, Schimmelfennig’s study may explain the later “subtle and at times significant shifts … in the language and rhetoric of the EU” in future enlargements (Phinnemore, 2006c:15). For instance, Phinnemore suggests that in the newer round of accession negotiations with the south-eastern candidates18 the EU is avoiding “the explicit use of the words “‘membership’”, “becoming ‘members’” or referring “to ‘accession’ in a way reminiscent of the Copenhagen commitment to the CEE countries and subsequent statements”. The preferred vocabulary includes expressions such as “‘its determination to

---

18 The Western Balkans.
continue the process it has engaged with the candidate countries, thus contributing to Europe’s prosperity, stability, security and unity”, which implies “a weaker commitment to south-eastern enlargement compared to eastern enlargement” (2006c:13; see also Phinnemore, 2005, 2006c:15). This can be identified as a mechanism in deterring the rhetorical entrapment discussed by Schimmelfennig and thus acknowledges the candidates’ agency capacity in enlargement.

Another significant examination of the agency of the candidates is addressed by Gateva (2014, 2015), who convincingly argues that the enlargement scholarship has one-sidedly focused on the agency of the EU, while overlooking the candidates’ power in the fifth enlargement. Gateva’s comparisons of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements bring to light the agency of the candidates in two different ways. First, Gateva maintains that the EU’s membership conditions and conditionality agenda were influenced by key challenges that the applicants and later candidates faced as future EU member states (2014:19). She claims that especially in the case of Romania and Bulgaria, the EU’s application of “differentiated and targeted conditionality” (country specific conditions) was put into place in order to prepare these two candidates for a smooth transition to EU membership (2014:20). Based on such findings, Gateva concludes that indirectly the “profile of the candidate countries has a substantial impact on the scope of the EU conditions” (2014:20). Her second major finding reveals that group dynamics played an important role in the candidates’ agency capability. For instance, Gateva demonstrates how the group dynamics of the twelve candidate countries put pressure on the EU to establish clear “timetables and target dates”, especially in the case of Romania and Bulgaria. As an outcome, the EU was pressured into establishing 2007 as the target year for Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accessions (2014:12).
Similar to Gateva’s second finding about group dynamics, Gergana Noutcheva and Dimitar Bechev maintain that although applicant states had “a narrow scope for maneuvering in the accession process” (Gateva, 2014:19), they shaped the EU enlargement agenda through group pressure (2008:119). For instance, Noutcheva and Bechev argue that the candidates belonging to the Visegrád group\textsuperscript{19} put “pressure on the EU to show commitment to the enlargement process and to reinforce the credibility of the incentives” for accession. This led to the establishment of for instance the EU’s accession conditions for the fifth enlargement (2008:119), demonstrating therefore the candidates’ ability of agency and leverage in the enlargement process through group dynamics.

While the above has looked at the enlargement literature, identifying two contrasting strands in which power relations have been discussed, the below section will examine the theoretical aspect of enlargement literature, arguing that departing from positivist mainstream approaches and bringing to the fore an engagement with post-positivism will advance the application of such approaches and will introduce an alternative understanding of the production of power relations in the enlargement context.

1.2. Post-positivist theories in the fifth enlargement scholarship

Theoretical studies of EU enlargement have come a long way since May 1950 when French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presented the Schuman Declaration as a first building stone towards a united and integrated Europe. In the same way as the Schuman Declaration stated that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan” (European Union, 2015b), the enlargement literature has been gradually built on a diverse theoretical spectrum of research. We can certainly identify this considerable theoretical richness in the

\textsuperscript{19} Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Fitzmaurice, 1998)
literature of European integration theory (Rosamond, 1995, 2000, 2006; 2007; McCormick, 1999; Nelsen and Stubb, 2003; Kaiser and Elvert, 2004; Nugent, 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Wiener and Diez, 2009; Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2010; Hill and Smith, 2011; Bomberg et al., 2012a; Saurugger, 2013). Identified as “the field of systematic reflection”, which helps to explain and understand different aspects of the Union (Diez and Wiener, 2009:4), Diez and Antje Wiener refer to the collection of theories of European integration theory literature as “a mosaic”, suggesting that each approach can be identified “as a stone that adds to the picture that we gain of the EU” (2009:19). Two of the most established volumes of such mainstream theories are Rosamond’s *Theories of European Integration* (2000) and Diez and Wiener’s *European Integration Theory* (2009), where both volumes demonstrate the “explanatory, analytical, and constructive” role of rationalist and reflectivist theoretical debates (Diez and Wiener, 2009:7; see also O’Brennan, 2006:4-5).

However, in a recent special edition20, Ian Manners and Richard Whitman (2016) argue that positivist theories have been more widely applied to the study of the EU, which has led to “reducing the pluralism of research, excluding critical voices and diminishing the ability of scholarship to recognise and address the causes and symptoms of EU crises” in the past 15 years (2016:5). In particular, the two scholars maintain that post-positivist theories remain “largely excluded from core EU journals and discussions of the EU (Manners and Whitman, 2016:9), to which postcolonialism also belongs to. For instance, in the case of postcolonialism, with the exception of a handful scholars (Kovács, 2001; 2006; Kelertas, 2006; Bailey, 2011; Zielonka, 2013), whose work have minimized the postcolonial void in EU enlargement studies (Tlostanova op.cit, p.130), the involvement of EU scholars with postcolonial perspectives is rather limited. Thus, the theoretical literature of EU enlargement

---

20 *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54 (1).
is lacking a wider engagement with postcolonial perspectives. Instead most scholars, who have considered the EU as a postcolonial space, belong to other disciplines, such as geography (Engel-Di Mauro, Kuus), international politics (Behr), sociology (Bhambra, Böröcz) and predominantly English and literary studies (Alexandru, Bottez, Cornis Pope, Kołodziejczyk, Lazarus, Simms). Ultimately, what Manners and Whitman advocate is the expansion of post-positivist theories to the study of the EU.

1.2.1. Critical theories

Due to a range of changes in the EU, particularly in the 1990s, which witnessed the emergence of new processes of enlargement and integration, significant changes to the structure of the EU, as well as transformations of the power balance in Europe, EU scholars faced new ontological and epistemological questions, which required new ways of understanding and explaining (Diez and Wiener, 2009:10). It was during this time that critical theories, which apply a reflectivist paradigm, provided “a new and intriguing ontological and epistemological foundation” in studying the EU (Jørgensen, 1997; Geyer, 2003:15-16; Jørgensen et al., 2007; Rosamond, 2007, 2013; Bailey, 2011; Bache et al., 2014:64; Saurugger, 2014; Lynggaard et al., 2015; Haughton, 2016; Manners and Whitman 2016:4). Owen Parker underlines that adopting a critical approach does not mean rejecting mainstream theories, which rely on a positivist approach, but recognizes the different questions that these are posing, which could offer a broader and alternative understanding of the EU (Parker, 2016:46).

Overall, critical theories focus on the study of unequal power relations and of those groups that are subordinated by these unequal relations, as well as of ways to emancipate the subordinated and transcend these unequal relations (Bailey, 2011:39). Due to such a focus,
critical theories emerged as a new way, which could capture the reality of the EU and the “much broader range of” voices, which never got captured by positivist theories (Parker, 2016:38). In particular, post-positivist scholars maintain that such approaches are important to the study of the EU, as they highlight the significance of power relations in understanding the Union (Manners and Whitman, 2016:8 and 13-14) and can develop “more robust scholarship on the EU” (2016:10).

The different types of critical theories seek to identify a particular type of unequal power relation affecting subaltern actors and advocate different means by which emancipation and change can be attained (Bailey, 2011:39). Such critical theories can be identified in the frameworks discussed by Marxism, feminism, normative theory, poststructuralism and postcolonialism, just to mention a few (Bailey, 2011:39; Manners and Whitman, 2016:9). For instance, a key contribution of critical theories to the study of power relations and EU enlargement has been provided by feminism (Watson, 2000; Kronsell, 2005, 2016; Weiner, 2009; Wiener and Diez, 2009; Brianson, 2016). In particular, Annica Kronsell argues that feminism can answer questions about “masculine underpinnings of power” within the context of enlargement, underlining the importance of gender power (2016:104). Kronsell acknowledges that he strength of feminist analysis lies in its understanding of how power hierarchies, which are rooted in gender, are operationalized in the practices of the EU and are organized and embedded in the institutions of the EU (2016:106).

In particular, critical theories are interested in the study of discourse, as a mechanism through which unequal relations can be understood. Especially as “discursive forms of power are less visible than legal and material ones”, it becomes important not to discount the significance of discourse in the production of inequality in power relations (Ryan, 2006:23-24).
1.2.2. Discourse in critical theories

Discourse has been a preferred element of analysis by critical theories, when examining power relations in the EU (Shore, 1993; Jørgensen, 1997; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; Wæver, 2009; Bailey and Bossuyt, 2013; Biegon, 2013; Schmidt, 2013, 2015; Larsen, 2014; Beauguitte et. al., 2015; Lynggaard et. al., 2015; Musliu and Orbie, 2015; Blanco, 2016). For instance, Beauguitte et al. (2015) engage with a textual analysis of seven official EU documents, which include the latter’s opinions on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) (2015:853). Beauguitte et al. suggest that a textual analysis is significant in exploring the usefulness of discourse analysis in revealing how the EU produced power relations to its immediate neighbourhood (2015:871).

In particular, poststructuralism has been largely involved with the examination of power relations “inherent in discursive articulations” (Borg and Diez, 2016:138; see also Diez, 1999a; Rutazibwa, 2010; Kurki, 2011; Stern, 2011; Matin, 2011; Merlingen, 2011; Biegon, 2013; Staeger, 2016) and has aimed to reveal how unequal power relations are produced “through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside”, a “self” from an “other”, a “domestic” from a “foreign”” in discourse (Arkan, 2016:136). In particular, the special issue of Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 18 (2), published in June 2010, opens up about the importance of discourse in understanding and explaining the EU from the perspective of a range of critical theories. In one of the articles, Olivia U. Rutazibwa examines from both a post-colonial21 and poststructuralist perspective the EU’s discourses in the Joint Africa–EU Strategy (JAES) and the Cotonou Agreement (2010:2014). With the help of discourse analysis, Rutazibwa demonstrates that the EU’s normative power

21 Rutazibwa’s own use of the spelling, as this thesis will apply the un-hyphened spelling (postcolonialism). A discussion about the significance of the spelling of the term will follow in Chapter 2.
creates unequal power relations, by constructing opposing images of the EU and Africa (2010:215-216) through the perpetuation of colonial “unequal”, “inferior” “incapable” representations (2010:217). Similarly to Rutazibwa, Ueli Staeger’s postcolonial and poststructuralist examination of Normative power Europe discourses reveals how such discourses shape Africa–EU relations (2016:987). In particular, Staeger demonstrates that as these EU discourses create a certain (orientalist) knowledge about Africa, while African voices are not heard, a distinction between the EU as the entity embodying “imperial moral superiority” and Africa as “the Other” is being produced (2016:981 and 985). A common thread in the above poststructural contributions is the fact that scholars identify discourse as a place in which “structures and patterns” control and produce power relations (Wæver, 2009:165).

The above discussion has shown that a specific advantage of critical theories is that they offer new and different “possibilities and understandings” (Manners and Whitman, 2016:4) of EU enlargement and in particular address production of unequal power relations (2016:8). The next chapter will therefore assess the postcolonial scholarship, in particular the EU focused postcolonial literature, arguing that such an examination of EU discourses in the Romanian enlargement will reveal an unequal encounter between the EU and Romania. This thesis aims therefore to make a theoretical contribution to the post-positivist and postcolonial enlargement studies.

1.3. Postcolonial scholarship

The postcolonial scholarship provides a voluminous literature when it comes to addressing unequal power relations and in particular legacies of colonial and imperial inequality in

22 Which will be discussed further in section 1.3.1
present power relations (Chakrabarty, 2000:5). Largely, the key argument of postcolonial perspectives is the recognition of the present as postcolonial (Bhabha, 1992:437; Spivak, 1993:280; Ahmad, 1994:204, 1995:8; Dirlik, 1994:332; Slemon, 1994:16-17; Ashcroft et.al., 2010:168; Quayson, 2000a:1; Sharp, 2009; McLeod, 2010:6), as scholars identify that colonial and imperial traces are “still very much with us today”, continuing to function and therefore producing a postcolonial present (McLeod, 2010:39; see also Williams, 1994:3; Childs and Williams, 1997:103; Ashcroft et.al., 1998:187, 2002:2, 2010:64; Young, 2003:3; Heywood, 2014:200; Sylvester, 2014:185). Thus, postcolonial scholars engage with different approaches, which analyze how power structures of the present are influenced by colonial history (Manzo, 2014:330).

The main research interest of the literature has primarily focused on postcolonial experiences of the non-European world (Loomba et.al., 2006:3; see also Fanon, 2008; Memmi, 1967; Rushdie, 1982; Prakash, 1995; Bhabha, 1997; Loomba, 1998; James, 2001; Escobar, 2004; Grovogui, 2007; McLeod, 2007a; Kaiwar, 2014). Such a preference has raised questions regarding what Anne McClintock refers to as the “plurality of postcolonialisms” (1995:10-11; see also Young, 2001:63, 2003:7; Sharp, 2009:7), which calls for a wider employability of postcolonialism to so called non-traditional colonies (Ahmad, 1995:9; McClintock, 1995; Young, 2001; Hiddlestone, 2009; Sharp, 2009; Epstein and Jacoby, 2014; Jabri, 2014). In particular, John McLeod argues that although postcolonial studies focus on “locations with a history of colonialism … it is not a field of study which is exclusive to selected nationalities, cultures or races” (2007b:6), as the postcolonial is to be found “everywhere” (Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:5). Moreover, D.C. Moore maintains that postcolonial scholars cannot only “privilege” the postcolonial experiences of former European colonies, which is often the case (2001:123; see also Childs and Williams, 1997; Sethi, 2011:8), as imperial and colonial
processes can be identified in many parts of the world, “so that everyone gets the privilege, sooner or later, at one time or another, of being coloniser, colonised and postcolonial - sometimes all at once, in the case of Australia, for example” (Ahmad, 1995:9).

Following on from the above, this has raised concerns that the postcolonial scholarship overlooks broader examinations of unequal power relations (see Hooper and Kramsch, 2007:528). In particular by overlooking “the experiences of colonialism in a wide variety of situations” (Ashcroft, 2001:13), this indicates that postcolonial experiences can only be studied in relation to the history of colonial and imperial European powers and their colonies (McClintock, 1995:10-11). Such an aspect may become problematic as, although different European states have been identified as leading imperial/colonial powers in global history (Wesseling, 2004; Hart, 2008), the degree of colonial and imperial hegemony differed amongst European powers and not all European states have been empires/colonizers (Hooper and Kramsch, 2007:532; see also Moore-Gilbert et al., 1997b:5; Sharp, 2009:27; Lazarus, 2011:16).

In contrast to the above concerns, in recent years, the postcolonial scholarship has bifurcated (Young, 2003:7), allowing a broader application of its key arguments to “a heterogeneous set of subject positions, professional fields, and critical enterprises” (Slemon, 1994:16; Deltcheva, 2000:589; Wilson et al., 2010). Yet, some postcolonial scholars have been vocal that such a bifurcation can develop an “increasingly unfocused use of the term ‘post-colonial’”, which may produce “a danger of it losing its effective meaning altogether” (Ashcroft et al., 2006:2). Nevertheless, two distinctive growing bodies of postcolonial scholarships established themselves in the 1990s, suggesting that postcolonialism can be usefully employed to examine power relations in non-traditional areas.
First, a central contribution to postcolonial scholarship is the literature on the colonial and imperial implications of Soviet power in Europe during the communist years (Kołodziejczyk and Șandru 2012:114; see also Barkey and von Hagen, 1997; Sakwa, 1999; Alexandru, 2000; Lefter, 2001; Deltcheva, 2000:590; Moore, 2001:123; Groys, 2004; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2004; Kelertas, 2006; Chari and Verdery, 2009:15-17; Korek, 2007; Kovačević, 2010; Andreeescu, 2011; Bottez, 2011; Kangilaski, 2011; Fătu-Tutoveanu, 2012; Popescu, 2012; Terian, 2012). In particular, Henry F. Carey and Rafal Raciborski argue for an identification of imperial domination and colonization process imposed by the Soviet Union upon the satellite states in Europe, but accentuate that due to differences to traditional colonies, the satellite states can be identified as arguable colonies or semicolonies (2004:210; see also McClintock, 1995:12; Sidaway, 2000:596). Even though such a scholarship has been met with disagreements (Szporluk, 1994; Said, 1993:xxv, Alexandru, 2001:6; Cornis-Pope, 2012:146; Owczarzak, 2009; Todorova, 2010; Kangilaski, 2011:23; Lazarus, 2012:119; Ștefănescu, 2012; Tlostanova, 2012:132), the literature has had an impact on the recognition of the “plurality of postcolonialisms” as discussed by McClintock and thus has enabled a break from the image that postcolonialism is largely suitable for the examination of postcolonial experiences in the non-European world (see Deltcheva, 2000:589).

Second, a significant scholarship, upon which this research is built, is the EU focused postcolonial scholarship, which examines the EU as a postcolonial space (Hooper and Kramsch, 2007:526; Horký-Hlucháň and Kratochvíl, 2014). Even though some scholars have claimed that such a literature is “rare” and “tentative” (Kuus, 2004:482; Kovačević, 2012:363), the EU focused postcolonial scholarship has been fruitful in theorizing

---

postcolonial experiences in the context of the EU. Notably, the literature captures four main contributions. First, one assesses the EU as a colonial and imperial power (Mezzadra, 2005; Bechev and Nicolaïdis, 2010; Fischer Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013). Second, one recognizes the fifth enlargement as an imperial product and colonization process (Böröcz and Kovács, 2001; Engel-Di Mauro, 2006a). Third, one distinctive area of research engages with the postcolonial perspective of orientalism in order to make sense of postcolonial experiences in the EU (Kelertas, 2006; Alexandru, 2011). Fourth, one engages with the examination of EU language as a way through which unequal power relations might operate (see Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:253). The below subsections will present key arguments, consider contributions and identify what gaps still exist and which this thesis will aim to rectify.

1.3.1. The EU as colonial and imperial power

Three academic branches signpost the study of the EU as a colonial and imperial power. The first one aims to reveal the colonial and imperial power of the EU, drawing upon similarities to traditional colonial and imperial powers (Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005; Zielonka, 2008; Gravier, 2009; Marks, 2012; Foster, 2013; Simms, 2013a, 2013b; see also Hansen and Jonsson, 2014). Such a literature has drawn a great deal of interest in the last two decades with scholars revealing colonial and imperial similarities between the EU and for instance the Austro-Hungarian and Roman empires respectively (Brague, 1993; Mourier, 1993; Farago, 1995, cited in Wæver, 1997, p.65) and the Holy Roman Empire (Simms, 2013a, 2013b). More recently, the seminar *The Dark Side of EU-ropo: ‘Imperium Europaeum’?*, held at the University of Birmingham in December 2014, draws attention to existing parallels between the EU and the late Roman Republic (Brunkhorst, 2014) and thus highlights a continuing interest in postcolonial applications to the study of the EU.
The second branch takes a different turn, by addressing how legacies of European colonialism and imperialism directly “continue under the auspices” of the EU, especially in EU enlargement, embarking on an acknowledgement of the continuity of the past into the present (Kovačević, 2012:361; Deltcheva, 2000; Sidaway, 2000; Böröcz and Kovács, 2001; Böröcz, 2005; 2006a, 2009; Mezzadra, 2005; Engel-Di Mauro, 2006a; Behr, 2007; Bhambra, 2007; Hooper and Kramsch, 2007; Mälksoo, 2009; Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013; Kinnvall, 2015). In particular, such scholars argue that, as some of the EU member states are heirs to former imperial and colonial powers, which at one point “have literally carved up the rest of the world for centuries” (Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005:162; Carey and Raciborski, 2004:228), it is only “natural” to expect the formation of a colonial and imperial EU “elite pact” (Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005:159). For instance, studies of how “current processes of EU enlargement replicate earlier practices of continental imperialism” (Hooper and Kramsch, 2007:526; see also Engel-Di Mauro, 2006b:7) have illuminated how the 19th century “standards of civilizations” survived in the Copenhagen criteria\(^{24}\) and the *acquis communautaire*\(^{25}\) (hereafter *acquis*) (Behr, 2007:247; see also Delanty, 1995:6 and 67; Engel-Di Mauro, 2001:119; Zielonka, 2008:476).

Third, one particular group of scholars, who have engaged with the imperial character of the EU, are the critics of normative power Europe literature\(^{26}\) (NPE). According to these scholars, the practices of NPE can be usefully employed to highlight the EU’s camouflaging European imperialism and colonial “mission civilatrice” (civilizing mission) (Forsberg,

---

\(^{24}\) Also known as accession criteria or conditions, these refer to the fulfilment of political and economic criteria and the adoption of the 80,000 pages of the *acquis communautaire* before accessing the EU (Pridham, 2004:524-525, 2007c:530; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:115; Lass-Lannecke and Werner, 2009:272-273; European Commission, 2014a).

\(^{25}\) The *acquis* refers to the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU member states. The rights and obligations, which are binding for EU member states (European Commission, 2014c).

\(^{26}\) Employs the key argument that the EU is a promoter of its norms in external relations (Manners, 2002:236), known as normative power, “power of opinion”, *idée force*, or “ideological power” (Manners, 2002:239, 2006; Haukkala, 2008; Keene, 2013).
2011:1184 and 1187; see also Rosecrance, 1998; Diez, 2005; Hooper and Kramsch, 2007; Bachmann, 2013; Horký-Hlucháň and Kratochvíl, 2014). For instance, Richard Rosecrance raises the argument that “the continent which once ruled the world through the physical impositions of imperialism is now coming to set world standards in normative terms” (1998:22), implying that the EU’s normative power is a camouflage for imperial activities. While NPE scholars reject that NPE can be anything imperial (Manners, 2002:253; Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005), critics have found such a defense somewhat inconsistent (Lundestad, 1998; Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2004; Diez, 2005; Chandler, 2008; Figueroa, 2010; Arfire, 2011; Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011; Haukkala, 2011; Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013:284; Silander and Nilsson, 2013). Especially research on EU enlargement suggests that NPE was an imperial instrument, which was driving the enlargement process (Chandler, 2008:71) by building “asymmetrical power relationships” (Arfire, 2011:6; Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011:141; see also Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005:15; Haukkala, 2008), similar to the ones produced by mission civilatrice (Arfire, 2011:5). However, even though concerns have been raised that NPE may simply be “an expression of Eurocentric imperialism” (Sjursen, 2006:241-242 and 248), the postcolonial examination of the NPE has been rather tentative than assertive (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2004; Arfire, 2011; Silander and Nilsson, 2013), especially as in recent years we have seen a decline in studies of NPE and asymmetrical power relations (Haukkala, 2008:1601; see also Hooper and Kramsch, 2007:532; Forsberg, 2011:1184).

In contrast, other scholars have challenged the study of the EU as an imperial and colonial power (McClintock, 1995:13; Wæver, 1997; Lundestad, 1998; Cooper, 2002, 2004; Delanty, 2006; Zielonka, 2006; Chandler, 2007a; Colomer, 2007; Haukkala, 2008; Todorova, 2010:179; Hansen and Jonsson, 2012; Marks, 2012:2; Ungureanu, 2012:16). Often, these
scholars argue for an imperial dimension, but which is unlike traditional empires. For instance, in the early 1990s Jürgen Habermas suggested that “Europe as a whole is being given a second chance”, referring to an upcoming empire, but which Habermas saw as a far cry from “the power politics of yesteryear” (cited in Heffernan, 1998, p.242). More recently, Barroso indicated that “sometimes I like to compare the EU as a creation to the organisation of empire. We have the dimension of empire”, but clarified that the EU is “the first non-imperial empire” (cited in Waterfield, 2007; Zielonka, 2008:584). The rejection of the EU as a traditional empire, but which is showcasing an imperial dimension, has been supported by several scholars, arguing for instance that the EU is a post-imperial empire (Delanty, 2006:199), a neo-medieval empire (Zielonka, 2006), a reluctant empire (Haukkala, 2008:1610), a soft empire or hegemony (Wæver, 1997:86), a cooperative empire (Cooper, 2002:7; Cooper, 2004:72), a cosmopolitan empire (Beck et.al., 2007, cited in Henry, 2010, p.268), an innovative empire, but without displaying the behaviour and ideology expected from a traditional empire (Ungureanu, 2012:15).

1.3.2. The fifth enlargement as imperial and colonial product

Another branch of the EU focused postcolonial scholarship, which has attracted a great deal of interest in recent years, examines the fifth enlargement as an imperial and colonial product of the EU, in particular by highlighting that EU practices towards candidates were a clear “pattern of both renewed imperialism and colonialism”, which maintained and reproduced past colonial and imperial unequal power relations (Engel-Di Mauro, 2001:112, 2006a; Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005:158-159; Stenning, 2005:37; see also Burgess, 1997:107). One of the most outstanding supporters of this argument, József Böröcz, suggests that especially EU practices in the fifth enlargement “replicate earlier practices of continental imperialism” (cited in Hooper and Kramsch, 2007, p.526). In a more critical vein, H. Van Zon indicates a
“‘perverted colonial attitude’: ‘the EU and other Western states and institutions are imposing their model on South and on Eastern Europe’” (cited in Domanski, 2004, p.378), implying a transfer of EU norms, similar to the way in which past empires dictated the transfer of norms to colonies.

Moreover, two substantive contributions, Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro’s *The European’s Burden* (2006a) and Böröcz and Melinda Kovács’ *Empire’s New Clothes* (2001), also signpost this literature. In particular, the above two studies suggest that the persistence of colonial and imperial strategies in the fifth enlargement was “more present here than in previous enlargements” (Sher, 2001:239). For instance Attila Melegh argues that the EU’s categorization of the candidates on a “civilization slope” was a clear reminder of the practices of *mission civilatrice* (2006a:167 and 169, 2006b; see also Bakic-Hayden, 1995:918; Wæver, 2000:263; Sher, 2001:236; Kuss, 2004:479 and 480, 2006:231; Zielonka, 2013:37), which indicates the perpetuation of past colonial and imperial practices.

By contrast, not all scholars agree with the idea that the fifth enlargement is a colonization process (Deltcheva, 2000; Alexandru, 2001:6; Bottez, 2011; Lefter, 2001; Cornis-Pope, 2012:146; Lazarus, 2012:119; Ştefănescu 2012; Tlostanova, 2012:130). Perhaps the central defence of such scholars is the argument that candidate countries are not entering the enlargement process by “the traditional means of conquest, but … by means of invitation” (Haukkala, 2008:1610; see also Lundestad, 1998; Miles, 2004:255) and that the application to EU membership is a “voluntary movement” of the applicants (Cooper, 2002:7; Cooper, 2004:72).
Although the above body of work has engaged with a postcolonial examination of how unequal power relations are produced in the fifth enlargement, such studies focus predominantly on the postcolonial experiences of the first wave of the fifth enlargement, while little research appears to have reached down to the postcolonial experiences of the second wave. Such a gap restricts the literature in presenting a broader examination of unequal power relations in the fifth enlargement. On the other hand by taking into consideration the 2007 enlargement, this research aims to contribute to a more nuanced examination of postcolonial experiences in the fifth enlargement (see Diez and Wiener op.cit., p.21). Nevertheless, in recent years we have seen a slow, but growing interest in the application of postcolonialism to the second wave of the fifth enlargement (e.g. Bojkov, 2004; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Andreev, 2009), which suggests that there is an overt interest in such perspectives and that the research of this current thesis will be fruitful in furthering our understanding of postcolonial experiences in this particular enlargement round.

1.3.3. The orientalist reading of the EU

When it comes to the examination of the EU and the fifth enlargement, EU focused postcolonial scholars predominantly discuss power relations through the concept of orientalism (Bakic-Hayden, 1995; Neumann, 1999; Böröcz, 2000, 2001a; Kovács, 2001, 2006; Kovács and Kabachnik, 2001; Kuus, 2004, 2006; Best, 2006; Melegh, 2006a, 2006b; Velickovic; 2012). Orientalism, which will be further presented in the next chapter, was coined by Edward Said, who largely argued that orientalism is an imaginative discourse, based on binary representations between Western (Occidental) superiority and Eastern (Oriental) inferiority, which was created by Western colonial and imperial powers in order to justify domination of the Orient (Said, 2003:42).
One of the most established orientalist debates has concerned the employment of the word “East” or “Eastern” as an “orientalizing tool” in the fifth enlargement (Böröcz, 2001a:6; see also Böröcz, 2000; Kovács and Kabachnik, 2001:173; Zielonka, 2013:38-39). Scholars have argued that the EU created binary representations, by establishing knowledge that the candidates were part of an inferior Eastern Europe (Kovács and Kabachnik, 2001:147) and thus distant from the superior Europe (Sharp, 2009:12), while the EU was conceptualized as the European “idealised self” (Kovács, 2001:196, 2006:215). The correlation between orientalism and unequal power relations is that EU discourses produced alterity by representing the EU as the superior Europe and Eastern Europe as the inferior Other (Knight, 2000:76; see also Kürti, 1996; Neumann, 1999:207; Böröcz, 2001a:6; Kovács and Kabachnik, 2001; Best, 2006; Kuus, 2004:474-475, 2007:152 and 155; Mayer and Palmowski, 2004; Pagden, 2004a; Moisio, 2002; Rovisco, 2010:242; Šarić et al., 2010; Lazarus, 2012:122).

Although such studies are important in conceptualizing orientalism in the context of EU enlargement and in demonstrating the manifestation of postcolonial experiences in the present, one apparent dearth is that this research is mainly done without references to other postcolonial perspectives. For instance, while it is fruitful to engage with orientalism, the perspective alone does not adequately and fully explain postcolonial experiences in the EU and thus provides a limited postcolonial examination. This thesis maintains therefore that the broader applicability of different postcolonial perspectives, such as ambivalence, mimicry, subalternity, etc., still constitutes a largely unexplored field within the EU focused postcolonial scholarship. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that scholars have tentatively engaged with these postcolonial perspectives, such as mimicry (Kovačević, 2010; Alexandru, 2011; Bottez, 2011; Ștefănescu, 2012; Tlostanova, 2012) and subalternity (Csepeli et.al.,
1996:497; Timár, 2004:535; Thieme, 2005; Böröcz, 2006b:163; Mälksoo, 2009:655; Buden 2010a:4-5; Kovačević, 2010:147; Deltcheva, 2000:590; Kolodziejczyk and Şandru, 2012; Velickovic, 2012:167), but to a limited extent. This thesis argues therefore that in order to achieve an adequate postcolonial examination of the current research, broader applications of different postcolonial perspectives will introduce “an ever more faceted and nuanced picture of the European Union” (Diez and Wiener, op.cit, p.21).

1.3.4. Discourse analysis in EU focused postcolonial research

A large number of EU focused postcolonial scholars favor the method of discourse analysis in order to examine postcolonial experiences in the EU context (Sher, 2001; Bellier, 2004; Phinnemore, 2006c; Zielonka, 2013). This aspect is shared with other critical theories, as discussed earlier in the chapter. Fundamental to these scholars is the argument that language is “a pre-given reality … located at the centre” of the colonial and imperial power (Ashcroft et al., 2002:88) and a tool through which colonial and imperial unequal power relations are produced in the present (Ashcroft et al., 2002:7 and 88; Said, 2003). Therefore examining language, in the form of for instance written texts or oral speeches, is pivotal as language may include representations, which produce unequal power relations (Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:253).

Within this literature, a substantial part of research has focused on the discourse analysis of the Regular Reports, which scholars have identified as significant in revealing and understanding the EU’s “imperialistic and colonizing strategy” in the fifth enlargement (Engel-Di Mauro, 2006b:7; see also Kovács, 2001:228, 2006; Sher, 2001; Bellier, 2004; Raik, 2004; Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009; Villalba, 2008; Avery, 2009; Joenniemi, 2012). For instance, Kovács has contributed two studies, which have examined power relations between
the EU and Hungary during the Hungarian enlargement process. Kovács’ first study, which analyzed the political criteria in the 1998 and 1999 Hungarian Regular Reports, reveals that a discourse analysis of the EU language of these reports indicated that Hungary was excluded from Europe based on a discourse of inferiorization and backwardness, in comparison to the EU (2001:212), which was illustrated as “an idealised self” (op.cit., p.215). Her second study on the other hand exposes a different view. Kovács argues that the study of the political criteria in the later Hungarian Regular Reports (published 2000-2002) demonstrates an approach in power relations between the EU and Hungary (2006:212 and 220), which contradicts the inferiorization of Hungary identified in earlier Reports. Although these studies are pivotal in understanding the production of unequal power relations, as an examination of the Regular Reports opens up the manifestation of inequality in language, this research has been done with mainly references to Regular Reports, especially the earlier Regular Reports (as in the case of Kovács). This thesis argues that a broader examination of these reports will bring the analysis of EU language a step forward in adequately understanding postcolonial experiences.

Another group of scholars have particularly focused on how words and grammar in EU enlargement documents can be analyzed in order to reveal the EU’s hidden agendas, which perpetuate colonial and imperial legacies in the fifth enlargement (Raik, 2004:580-581; see also Schimmelfennig, 1999, 2001, 2003; Bellier, 2004; Pridham, 2006, 2007a:353; Kuus, 2007:161; Villalba, 2008; Zielonka, 2008:476; Avery, 2009, 2012:166; Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:272-273; Joenniemi, 2012). For instance Jan Zielonka brings to the attention the preservation of the “imperial discourse” in the wording of the Copenhagen criteria (2013:35; see also Böröcz, 2000:869-870, 2001a:18, 2001b:52), while Helmut Behr suggests that the Copenhagen criteria and the acquis are new forms through which colonial and
imperial dictation of European standards as the benchmarks for civilization are implemented (2007:240, 242, 244 and 250). In the same vein, Geoffrey Pridham raises concerns that the Copenhagen criteria gave unprecedented power to the EU in controlling who was included and excluded as part of the EU (2006a:376; Zielonka, 2008:476). Furthermore, Giuditta Caliendo and Antonella Napolitano have examined how EU grammar, such as nouns, adjectives and verbs, were applied in enlargement documents to produce the image that the enlargement process was “a ‘captivating product’ that everybody would wish for and aspire to” (2008:329). Moreover, the EU strengthened such an image with the use of grammatical comparatives and superlatives, which stressed the exceptional and unparalleled results of EU enlargement (2008:328). Finally, Böröcz argues that by studying the grammar of the EU’s communication strategy in the fifth enlargement, we can identify how the EU produced representations of the candidates as “distant, inferior, and disposable”, while the EU was represented as superior and authoritative (2000:871).

Furthermore, the EU’s conditionality principle\(^{27}\) has also attracted a great deal of scholarly interest in understanding how the application of this principle creates “profound power asymmetries between the negotiating parties” (Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:6; see also Gower, 1999:12; Schimmelfenning 2001:54; Scharpf, 2002; Böröcz, 2005:157-158; Pridham, 2007a:347 and 353). Scholars have in particular examined the extent to which the principle preconditions “a non-egalitarian way” of negotiations, which can be identified in the language of conditionality (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011:132). In particular, Grabbe has noted that the EU’s application of a vague vocabulary and “the substance technical” as part of the conditionality principle indicates that such a vagueness and technicality was not arbitrary, but had a hidden agenda in creating ambiguity, in order to consolidate the EU’s power in

\(^{27}\) Conditions for accession.
accession negotiations (2002:249 and 265). On these grounds, it is easy to understand why scholars raised concerns that the conditionality principle was “a new colonisation mechanism presented by a new empire called the European Union” (Boedeltje and van Houtum, 2011:140).

Other discourse analyses have brought to the fore the argument that processes of revamping (Kuus, 2006:225; Behr, 2007:247; Hooper and Kramsch, 2007:52 and 528) and remapping (Kuus, 2006:225 and 232; see also Deltcheva, 2000:591; Kamińska, 2005:192; Kuus, 2004:482; Raik, 2004; Stenning, 2005:378) have occurred in the language of the EU. This suggests that despite the postcolonial argument that continuity of “imperial and colonial practices” occurs in the present, such a continuity has also “continued to evolve, mutate and adapt across space and time” (Hopper and Kramsch, 2007:52; see also Stenning, 2005:378). For instance M. E. Kamińska argues that the Enlightenment discourse on Eastern Europe has continued to be applied in the fifth enlargement, but the location of Eastern Europe has been remapped through a process of migration to the East (2005:192). In the same vein, Merje Kuus suggests that a revamping of Eastern Europe has occurred in later years. This indicates that although the candidates of the fifth enlargement were still identified as distant from “the real Europe” (Kuus, 2006:231), candidates were also categorized as “on the doorstep of Europe” and more European than for instance non-applicants (Kuus, 2004:482, 2006:231; Raik, 2004). What we identify here is the fact that although a continuity of the exclusion of Eastern Europe from the real Europe has been maintained, closeness to Europe has also taken place in particular by transforming who (revamping) and where (remapping) Eastern Europe is.
On a final note, in a more recent study, Bailey and Fabienne Bossuyt (2013) borrow from postcolonialism in examining discourses and identifying mechanisms of domination in the EU’s trade policy discourses. Bailey and Bossuyt demonstrate that in contrast to the traditional EU image as “‘force for good’”, the EU is identified as a location in which domination is being produced and where one mechanism of such production is achieved via othering, identifying therefore the EU as a site of domination (2013:561). The application to such a study of discourse and the EU is identified as a way to broaden our understanding of the EU, its policies and the production of relations from a critical approach (2013:572).

Although the application of discourse analysis has been ground-breaking in the examination of how unequal power relations might operate in language, discourse analysis tends to largely describe “how the physical world works in order to understand it” and why it works that way (Gee, 2011:9). This thesis argues that in order to engage with the critical aspect of postcolonialism and attain a more adequate examination of unequal power relations, we need to not only describe what it is in language, but also engage in revealing problems, such as inequality in power relations and how to emancipate marginalized groups (see Galasińska and Kryzyżanowski, 2009). Such an aim can be achieved by applying for instance the method of critical discourse analysis. As previously mentioned, CDA not only examines the production of unequal power relations in and behind discourse, but also aims to reveal instruments of inequality in order to attain change and emancipation.

Overall, postcolonial scholarship is of prominent importance as it opens grounds for introducing postcolonial perspectives to the study of the EU and power relations. Especially the EU focused postcolonial literature has taken postcolonial perspectives to new levels by applying these to the study of the EU. Nevertheless, as discussed above there is a postcolonial
dearth within the literature, due to the limited application of postcolonial perspectives, overlooking the examination of the second wave of enlargement and using a limited research method. The thesis argues that tackling these gaps is of particular value for trying to come to terms with the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations and introducing a critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU as a postcolonial space.

1.4. Conclusions
This chapter has engaged with a critical assessment of EU enlargement literature, highlighting that so far the literature is missing adequate postcolonial perspectives. The chapter proposes that by building upon existing postcolonial research, this thesis will advance the application of postcolonial perspectives to the study of how the EU produces unequal power relations and bring to the fore an engagement with post-positivist, critical and interpretivist approaches and offer new ways of theorizing and displaying a new critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand EU enlargement.

First, the chapter argued that the enlargement literature provides a distinctive gap, as it appears to have so far overlooked the relevance of postcolonial perspectives, despite opening up for other post-positivist theories. The absence of postcolonial perspectives in the literature sustains a theoretical gap, by limiting the assessment and understanding of the EU and unequal power relations (Fisher Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013:284). In particular, given the importance of the study of power relations in EU enlargement, such a gap raises one particular question: why has a postcolonial approach not developed? This is a major theoretical caveat, as such an omission limits capturing a post-positivist understanding of the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations.
Second, the chapter maintained that although EU focused postcolonial studies offer a key scholarship to the study of the EU and power relations, such studies tend to include a limited application of postcolonial perspectives and research methods, as well as limited research interest in the 2007 enlargement. However, in order to move beyond these gaps and to address the research questions, this thesis will engage with different postcolonial perspectives in order to advance the application of postcolonialism to the study of the EU and power relations.

As the mobilization of a postcolonial examination provides a fruitful theoretical tool for conceptualizing postcolonial experiences in relation to enlargement and unequal power relations, the next chapter will introduce the framework of postcolonialism, providing a case for arguing that theoretical and empirical studies of EU enlargement and unequal power relations need to pay much closer attention to postcolonial perspectives. Thus, by providing a postcolonial springboard for the investigation of the EU and unequal power relations, this research aims to make important contributions to EU enlargement literature.
CHAPTER 2

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF POSTCOLONIALISM

This chapter argues that in order to address the research questions and move beyond the gaps identified in the previous chapter, engaging with postcolonial perspectives is pivotal in adequately demonstrating the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. To start with, as the previous chapter presented, the study of EU enlargement has been examined from the perspectives of a variety of theoretical approaches, which Diez and Wiener call “a mosaic” (op.cit., p.19), referring to the level of theoretical “heterogeneity” (Andreatta, 2011:22). Perhaps, the most applied have been those theories, which are accounted for by the European integration theory literature. These include mainstream theories such as the positivist liberal intergovernmentalism and the middle-ground social constructivism, as well as the less frequent applied post-positivist theories such as normative theory and gender approaches (Wiener and Diez, 2009; Hill and Smith, 2011). However, with the emergence of new developments within the EU in the 1980s and 1990s, a number of scholars started to question the assumptions on which mainstream theories were explaining and understanding the EU (Diez and Wiener, 2009:10). Such discussions opened up for new theoretical post-positivist contributions, which included a broader range of ontological, epistemological and methodological standpoints (Manners and Whitman, 2016:4; Parker, 2016:38). Thus, it was through such developments that postcolonialism was introduced into EU research as an alternative approach to the study of the Union.
In line with the above, this chapter argues that the application of three postcolonial perspectives, subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, will introduce a critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand EU enlargement and in particular in adequately understanding how unequal power relations are produced. As postcolonial scholars maintain that “it is not possible to engage with postcolonial studies without them”28 (McLeod, 2007b:13; see also Young, 1995:163; Ashcroft, 2001:7), the choice of the three perspectives is based on the contributions they have made to our understanding of inequality and power relations and on the development of postcolonialism as an academic framework. Moreover, apart from orientalism, which has been steadily applied, subalternity and mimicry have so far been obscured to a great extent from EU studies (see Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:26). Thus, examining EU enlargement from the standpoints of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry will set out a preliminary discussion of how these perspectives might be applied to analyze the EU and unequal power relations.

This chapter aims to outline key postcolonial arguments, consider contributions and more importantly, identify what these arguments and contributions can bring to the study of the EU and unequal power relations (see Dunleavy, 2003; Grix, 2010; Bryman, 2012:101). The chapter proceeds in a four-step engagement. First, after a brief outline of the emergence of postcolonialism, the following section presents the argument that the present is postcolonial due to the fact that the colonial and imperial past is somewhat “still very much with us today” (McLeod op.cit., p.39). What is central to this argument is the fact that postcolonial scholars maintain that “continuing, often covert” colonial and imperial traces are particularly making themselves noticeable in unequal power relations in the present (Young, 2001:58; McLeod,
Examining power relations will therefore contribute to an alternative understanding of how the past may influence the present and in particular inequality in power relations.

Second, as postcolonialism is concerned with the invisibility of marginalised groups and the need to represent these groups, scholars argue that paying attention to for instance “perceptions, motivations and beliefs” of such actors is important as it will allow their voices to be heard (Young, 2003:20; see also Bhabha, 1992:437; Sharp, 2009:5 and 7; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:241; Heywood, 2014:200) and their resistance struggles to be seen from the bottom-up (Childs and Williams, 1997:28; Boehmer, 2005:100; Grovogui, 2007:231; Heywood, 2014:519; Sylvester, 2014:188). As the chapter will aim to demonstrate, subalternity is one particular theorization of how the bottom-up approach can be applied in order to understand production of unequal power relations (McLeod, 2010:223). The contribution of subalternity is that its application enables attention to be given to groups whose voices and forms of resistance and struggles have been ignored (Young, 2001:354; see also Childs and Williams, 1997:28).

Third, the postcolonial interest in discursive analysis has been ground-breaking, as it has introduced an understanding that inequality can take place through language or what is commonly referred to as discursive domination (Young, 2001:383; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:253; Sylvester, 2014:185). This section will specifically turn to orientalism and mimicry, which are two ways of theorizing how colonial discourses function and impact upon power relations (McLeod, 2010:47). The application of such perspectives contributes in particular to our understanding of how discourses construct “objects of reality and the ways in which they are perceived and understood” (Young, 2001:388).
Fourth, this section argues for the relevance of the above postcolonial perspectives, subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, in accounting for the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. The section indicates that drawing upon the above, not only enables us to examine the EU in a postcolonial present, but also identifies the EU as a postcolonial space in which unequal power relations are being produced and thus will set out a preliminary discussion of how these postcolonial perspectives might be applied to the EU and power relations. In sum, this chapter maintains that drawing upon postcolonial perspectives is of paramount importance, as it offers new ways of theorizing and displays a new critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU and EU enlargement.

2.1. The emergence of postcolonial scholarship

Although postcolonialism has been “a site of disciplinary and interpretative contestation” (Ashcroft et.al., 2010:168; see also McClintock, 1995; Childs and Williams, 1997:6; Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:1 and 3; Young, 2001:57; Ashcroft, 2001:7; McLeod, 2007b:7, 2010:279 and 313), it has also offered an engaging framework for examining and understanding the world, in particular through three key perspectives, which will be discussed below. However, before examining the importance of these, let us first look at the origins of postcolonialism in order to better understand where its arguments originate from, the contributions it has made and more importantly how postcolonialism can be useful to the study of EU enlargement and the production of power relations.

Initially postcolonialism emerged as a reaction against (European) mainstream theories (Smith et al., 2014:6; see also Grovogui, 2013:250-252; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:232), which postcolonial scholars regarded as unable “to deal adequately with the complexities and varied cultural provenance” of countries with a history of European colonialism and
imperialism (Ashcroft et al., 1989:11; McLeod, 2010:12). Based on this critique, a range of scholars from largely the non-Western world established “a multiplicity of perspectives, traditions, and approaches” (Grovogui, 2013:248; Smith et al., 2014:6), which engaged with the study of postcolonial experiences of European colonies (Loomba et al., 2006:3; see also Fanon, 1963, 2008; Memmi, 1967; Cabral, 1972; Rushdie, 1982; Prakash, 1995; Bhabha, 1997; Loomba, 1998; James, 2001; Escobar, 2004; Grovogui, 2007; McLeod, 2007a; Sethi, 2011:5; Kaiwar, 2014; Manzo, 2014). In short, the key argument of postcolonialism is that “practices and consequences” of colonial and imperial traces have lingered into the present and thus impact upon power relations (Moore-Gilbert, 2007b:6). The aim of postcolonial scholars is to reveal such practices and consequences, change unequal relations and emancipate subordinated groups (see Bailey, 2011:39).

Although research has predominantly focused on locations identified as victims of Western European colonial and imperial aggression (see Childs and Williams, 1997:11; Ashcroft et al., 1998:187, 2002:2;), postcolonialism has not remained “a field of study, which is exclusive to selected nationalities, cultures or races” of the colonized world (McLeod, 2010:6; see also Ashcroft, 2001:12; Wilson et al., 2010:2; Heywood, 2014:16), but has expanded to various “historical, political, sociological and economic analyses” (Ashcroft et al., 2010:169; see also Deltcheva, 2000:591; Kamińska, 2005:192; Kuus, 2004:482, 2006:225 and 232; Raik, 2004; Stenning, 2005:378; Behr, 2007:247; Hooper and Kramsch, 2007:52 and 528). This development has been mentioned briefly in the previous chapter, when indicating a “plurality of postcolonialisms” and thus a wider employability of postcolonialism to non-traditional colonies (Ahmad, 1995:9).
It should also be noted that a number of scholars have questioned the application of postcolonialism outside the study of the experiences of European colonies (see Childs and Williams, 1997:11). For instance, Arif Dirlik argues that the application of postcolonialism to new areas breaks with what the framework is supposed to do, as scholars include “so much beyond” and exclude “so much of its own postulated premise, the colonial …” (1994:339). However, the postcolonial expansion to new areas of study coincided with a range of changes in the EU, particularly in the 1990s, which witnessed the emergence of new processes of enlargement and integration, significant changes to the structure of the EU, as well as transformations of the power balance in Europe. These changes faced new ontological and epistemological questions, which required new ways of understanding and explaining (Diez and Wiener, 2009:10). Based on alternative key arguments, which mainstream theories did not offer, postcolonialism became a fruitful avenue to take when examining the EU. Or, in the words of Siba N. Grovogui, postcolonialism offered “necessary steps to re-envisioning” (2013:250) our understanding of the EU. As the below three sections will aim to demonstrate, subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are in particular offering new ways of theorizing and displaying a new critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU and power relations in the present.

2.2. Recognizing a postcolonial present

One of the central points of departure in postcolonial research is the recognition of the present as postcolonial (Bhabha, 1992:437; Spivak, 1993:280; Ahmad, 1994:204, 1995:8; Dirlik, 1994:332; Slemon, 1994:16-17; Williams, 1994:3; Ashcroft et.al., 2010:168; Quayson, 2000a:1; Sharp, 2009; McLeod, 2010:6; Sylvester, 2014:185). In short, this refers to the argument that colonial and imperial traces are “still very much with us today”, continuing to function in today’s world and thus producing a postcolonial present (McLeod
op.cit., p.39; see also Childs and Williams, 1997:103; Ashcroft et al., 1998:187, 2002:2, 2010:64; Young, 2003:3; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:239; Heywood, 2014:200). For instance McLeod maintains that the contemporary postcolonial world can be recognized through the identification of “forms of colonial and imperial representations, reading practices, attitudes and values”, which persist to function in the present (2010:6 and 38).

The recognition of the present as postcolonial has been further solidified by a scholarly dispute, which has become “a source of vigorous debate” in postcolonialism (Ashcroft et al., 2010:169; see also Slemon, 1994:16; Loomba, 1998:7; Ashcroft et al., 2006:2). This is related to the debate of whether the spelling with or without a hyphen alters the meaning of how scholars articulate postcolonialism (Ashcroft, 2001:9-13; Ashcroft et al., 1998:186-187, 2010:168-169; Young, 2001:57; McLeod, 2007b:9, 2010:5-6; Sharp, 2009:4-5). Although interchangeably applied, a number of scholars argue that the spelling postcolonialism²⁹ has a different meaning to the hyphenated version of post-colonialism³⁰ (Shohat, 1992:101; Childs and Williams, 1997:1; Ashcroft, 2001:10; Sharp, 2009:4-5; McLeod, 2010:5-6). For instance, McLeod claims that post-colonialism refers to “a particular historical period or epoch” (2010:5) when colonial territories moved to formal independence (Sharp, 2009:4-5). On the other hand, postcolonialism refers to the persistence of colonial and imperial power systems into the present and the need in combating such legacies (Young, 2001:58). Consequently, such a scholarly dispute not only indicates an existing academic debate, but also draws attention to the extent to which colonial and imperial consequences and outcomes have configured the present into a postcolonial one³¹. Although such an academic debate is still ongoing, the common point for both postcolonial and post-colonial scholars is the argument

²⁹ Applied by e.g. Loomba (1998), Quayson (2000a) and Sharp (2009).
³⁰ Applied by e.g. Adam and Tiffin (1990), Slemon (1994), Childs and Williams (1997) and Ashcroft (2001).
³¹ In order not to complicate things further, in this thesis I will employ the spelling of postcolonialism and the meaning associated with such a spelling.
that these “continuing, often covert” colonial and imperial traces are particularly making themselves noticeable in unequal power relations in the present (Young, 2001:58; McLeod, 2007b:5). Such an argument has enabled scholars to engage with the correlation between power relations and inequality in the postcolonial present.

2.2.1. Power relations in the postcolonial present

One central aspect of postcolonialism is the argument that lingering colonial and imperial legacies are particularly making themselves noticeable in power relations and resistance/struggles to power in the present (McLeod, 2007b:5; see also, Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:26; Young, 2001:6; Ashcroft et.al., 2010:36-37). Thus postcolonial scholars are particularly interested in revealing how colonial and imperial legacies perpetuate in power relations and how they contribute to the production of power inequality and resistance struggles in the present (Sylvester, 2014:185; see also Ashcroft, 2001:11 and 16). This argument has been featured in the writings of various scholars such as Edward Said, who for instance was interested in understanding how inequality in power relations “transmit or reproduce itself from one epoch to another” (Said, 2003:15). In the same vein, more recent scholars, such as McLeod, have tackled unequal power relations by questioning in which ways colonial and imperial “historical and cultural consequences remain very much a part of the present and still have the capacity to exert ‘pressures’ today” (2007b:4).

One distinctive aspect raised in recent postcolonial studies is the fact that although we identify continuing and lingering colonial and imperial elements in the power relations of the present (Young, 2001:6; Greene, 2004:423; McLeod, 2007b:7), scholars have also observed that such features may have been “remoulded and refashioned in our contemporary world” (McLeod, 2010:313). Such an observation implies that the perimeters of postcolonial studies
have to some extent changed. For instance, Bill Ashcroft draws attention to the fact that in the present, unequal power relations may be “re-emerging in very different political and cultural circumstances” than those shared by colonized societies (Ashcroft, 2001:7; see also Hopper and Kramsch, 2007:52 and 528; McLeod, 2010:39). In the same vein, McLeod maintains that postcolonial spaces in the present may not be contained to a particular location, periodization or form, but postcolonialism can be applied to a variety of areas (2010:6). What we identify here is recognition that although colonialism and imperialism matter in analyzing power relations, the areas of study may have changed from how postcolonialism was applied in its earlier stages. In particular, the processes of remapping and revamping, which were discussed in the previous chapter, internalize the logic of how scholars may identify the persistence of colonial and imperial “relations of power in the contemporary world” (McLeod, 2010:279), but that such aspects could have evolved, mutated and adapted (Hopper and Kramsch op.cit., p.52).

2.3. Understanding the postcolonial present through a bottom-up approach

A second central point of departure in postcolonial research is the application of a bottom-up approach (Childs and Williams, 1997:21; Young, 2003:6-7; Bhabha, 2006:155; McLeod, 2007b:9, 2010; Bailey, 2011; Grovogui, 2013; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013; Heywood, 2014:71). The bottom-up approach embodies a very useful trait, which is also related to the postcolonial position as a critical theory, which not only aims to identify the effects of colonial and imperial traces in the present and in particular upon power relations, but also attempts to combat and change such relations and emancipate exploited groups (Young, 2001:58; see also Dirlik, 1994:352; Sharp, 2009:4-5; Bailey, 2011:39; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:245).
From a postcolonial perspective, a bottom-up approach can therefore be usefully employed to enable emancipation, as it allows scholars to examine the postcolonial present “from the position of its victims, not its perpetrators” (Young, 2001:58). By allowing voices of marginalized groups to be heard (Young, 2003:20) and their forms of resistance and struggles to be seen (Childs and Williams, 1997:28; Young, 2001:354), postcolonial scholars aim “to recover alternative ways of knowing and understanding – often talked of in terms of ‘other voices’ – in order to present alternatives to dominant western constructs” (Sharp, 2009:5; see also Moore-Gilbert et al., 1997b:4). Such a take is grounded in the objective of producing “a more just and equitable relation between the different peoples of the world” (Young, 2003:7; see also Quayson, 2000b:94). Thus, the bottom-up approach enables a transformation of “the conditions” of unequal power relations by allowing new knowledge, representations, views, voices, etc. to be heard and listened to (Young, 2003:6). One particular postcolonial perspective, which employs a bottom-up approach, is the subalternity framework, which will be discussed next.

2.3.1. Subalternity

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s subalternity is a salient point of convergence for adequately understanding the postcolonial present, as it enables scholars to correlate postcolonial experiences of subalternity with unequal power relations. Deemed “one of the most influential and notorious essays in postcolonialism” (McLeod, 2010:217), Spivak’s Can the subaltern speak? (1988) introduced the concept of subaltern, which is identified as a heterogeneous Other that comprises the marginalised groups of colonized societies, such as “subsistence farmers, unorganized peasant labour, the tribals and the communities of zero workers on the street or in the countryside” (Spivak, 1994:84). This categorisation of the subaltern was expanded by Spivak in later works, which came to include for instance women
Subalternity influenced the postcolonial examination of unequal power relations through notably two aspects, instruments of subjugation and muteness of the subaltern. First, Spivak identifies how instruments of subjugation, which are represented by “colonial representational systems”, render the subaltern mute (McLeod, 2010:221). Such representational systems are defined as any form of colonial and imperial representations, “which claim to identify and articulate subaltern consciousness” (McLeod, 2010:219). Although Spivak’s research initially focused on gender, the impact of instruments of subjugation upon the muteness of the subaltern is instrumental as it introduces an understanding of how subalterns are subjected to the hegemony of dominant classes (known as the elite) and reveals how such a subjection may create an imbalance in power relations (Ashcroft et al., 2010:198-199).

Second, it is against the above background that Spivak questions whether the subaltern can be “retrieved and restored to history” (McLeod, 2010:221), whether the subaltern is able to be heard, to be listened to and to have one’s experiences considered or whether the subaltern will always be spoken for by colonial representational systems (Spivak, 1994; Chakrabarty, 2000:102). Spivak concludes that the subaltern has “no history” and thus “cannot speak” (Spivak, 2006:32; see also Moore-Gilbert, 2000:453; Hiddlestone, 2009:156-157), but will...
remain mute. Rather than being heard, the subaltern’s voice is ventriloquized (Moore-Gilbert, 2000:453; see also Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:30) and “known, represented, and spoken for” by the elite (Moore-Gilbert, 2000:452; McLeod, 2010:27). Spivak has however been criticised for not allowing the subaltern to write back into history (Hiddlestone, 2009:162; McLeod, 2010:222), but instead replicating the same ventriloquism produced by colonial representational systems by concluding that the subaltern will remain mute and cannot be heard (Moore-Gilbert et al., 1997b:32; Parry, 2004:23).

Moreover, Spivak adds that the domination of the subaltern is not only a matter of not being heard, but also of “not being understood with accuracy and that others do “not know how to listen”” to the subaltern. The muteness of the subaltern is therefore a result of “a failure of interpretation and not a failure of articulation” (cited in McLeod, 2010, p.223). Thus, by remaining mute and having one’s voice ventriloquized, the subaltern is subjected to a marginalized position, which produces inequality in power relations between the subaltern and the elite.

Overall, as Spivak argues that traces of colonial and imperial representational systems have lingered into the present and enabled muteness as part of the postcolonial present (1994:104), the application of subalternity has the potential to make a significant contribution to the understanding of the way unequal power relations are produced in the present, but also how a bottom-up approach can restore voices of marginalized groups.

### 2.4. Understanding the postcolonial present through colonial discursive analysis

A third central point of departure in postcolonial research is the application of colonial discourse analysis, which emerged as a way of employing a discursive and linguistic
examination of colonialism and imperialism (Young, 1995:159; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:239). This method was ground-breaking in postcolonial studies as it introduced the prospect of colonial and imperial domination taking place through language or what postcolonial scholars commonly refer to as discursive domination (Young op.cit., p.383).

Colonial discourse analysis developed from the argument that language is “the medium through which a hierarchical structure of power is perpetuated, and the medium through which conceptions of ‘truth’, ‘order’, and ‘reality’ become established” (Ashcroft et.al., 2002:7). In other words, language is identified as a vehicle through which colonial and imperial traces, which impact upon unequal power relations, are perpetuated. In turn, such a perpetuation has implications upon discourse, which in postcolonial thought is identified as “a collection of statements … unified by the designation of a common object of analysis, by particular ways of articulating knowledge about that object” (Childs and Williams, 1997:98).

As postcolonial scholars maintain that colonial and imperial discourses are powerful as they create knowledge and the very reality that they appear to describe (Young, 2001:388), in order to identify colonial and imperial perpetuation, scholars often apply colonial discourse analysis to for instance texts in order to reveal how colonial and imperial beliefs inform both past and present power relations (Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:253). For instance, applying colonial discourse analysis to colonial and imperial documentation, which is regarded as “something more” than just text (Young, 1995:163, 2001:388), enables scholars to examine “concepts and representations used in literary texts, travel writings, memoirs and academic studies”, reveal “diverse ideological practices” hidden in discourses and identify the extent to which such ideological practices produce inequality in power relations (Young, 1995:159; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:253). Thus, the focus on language and discourse is of vital
significance as it highlights how knowledge can be “talked and written into existence” (Neumann, 1996:2) and thus offers an alternative way of identifying and examining power relations in the postcolonial present.

Although colonial discourse analysis has been largely applied on colonial and imperial locations, in recent years it has seen an ascent in examining Western European discursive domination in relation to Eastern Europe (Wolff, 1994, 1995:933; Bakic-Hayden, 1995:917-918; Delanty, 1995; Kürti, 1996; Wilson and van der Dussen, 1996; Burgess, 1997; Goldsworthy, 1998; Agnew, 2001; Pagden, 2004a; Stenning, 2005:378; Best, 2006:186; Franzinetti, 2008; Wallace, 2008; Šarić et.al., 2010; Lazarus, 2012). For instance scholars such as Todorova (1997) and Gábor Kármán (2010) have applied colonial discourse analysis on a selection of documents, revealing how Western Europe produced discourses about its superiority, while evaluating Eastern Europe as backward (Todorova, 1997:14; Kármán, 2010:560). Moreover, in recent years, colonial discourse analysis has seen an ascent in examining the discursive domination of the EU in the fifth enlargement, which was discussed in the literature review.

Two different ways of understanding the application of colonial discourse analysis is through the identification of orientalism and mimicry. The next two sections will therefore look at how these two opposed postcolonial perspectives (McLeod, 2010:65) account for unequal power relations in the present (see Young, 2001:6).

2.4.1. Orientalism

Edward Said’s orientalism, which is often regarded as the concept that “inaugurated the postcolonial field” (Bhabha, 1992:465; Ashcroft et.al., 2006:10), is a postcolonial perspective
examining how colonial discourses produced a “context that was decisive in paving the way for actual colonization” and for producing unequal power relations (Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:240). Considered by many as the personification of postcolonial thought (Young, 1995:163), “the work from which virtually all contemporary postcolonial theory derives” (Larsen, 2000a:45) and “the source book in our discipline” (Spivak, 1993:56), Said’s *Orientalism* (2003) was groundbreaking, as it changed the course of the study of postcolonial experiences and power relations. The book introduced the concept of orientalism, whose application aimed to reveal the existence of “a consistent discursive register of particular perceptions, vocabularies and modes of representation common to a wide variety of texts” (Young, 2001:387; Jackson and Sørensen, 2013:239). The centrality of such discursive registers was that they share “a form of knowledge that was developed simultaneously with its deployment and utilization in a structure of power, namely colonial domination” (Young, 2001:388). Based on the above, orientalism can then be understood as a discourse, through which European colonial powers produced “the Orient politically sociologically, military, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period” 33 (Said, 2003:3; see also Said, 1997:128; Todorova, 1997:188; Kovács, 2001:199). In the words of Said, orientalism is defined as:

> “a library or archive of information ... What bound the archive together is a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective. These ideas explained the behavior of the Orientals; they supplied the Orientals with a mentality, a genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed the Europeans to deal with and even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics” (Said, 2003:41-42).

In other words, orientalism enabled postcolonial scholars to question and to examine colonial and imperial language and to demonstrate how discursive registers included particular

33 In the writing of Said, the colonized is identified as the Orient.
“perceptions, vocabularies and modes of representation”, which created a particular knowledge about the Orient. However, in Said’s perspective, these registers were not innocent, but they created imaginative truths about the inferiority of the subjects they described, in order to control them, but also to gain credibility about the Western superiority (see Sharp, 2009:12; McLeod, 2010:19 and 279). Similarly, Homi Bhabha remarks that the colonial discourse was a vehicle “to construe the colonised as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and establish systems of administration and instruction” (2000:70; see also Sharp, 2009:12; McLeod, 2010:19). What both Said and Bhabha suggest here is the fact that the aim of colonial discourse was to produce certain knowledge in order to justify colonial domination and Western superiority (Sharp, 2009:12; McLeod, 2010:24).

Thus, based on the above, Said argued that this “library or archive of information” was simply a Western European imaginative discourse (Said, 2003:57; see also Young, 1995:160; Ashcroft et.al., 2010:153), particularly built upon binary representations, which became the norms against which the world was measured (Said, 2003:57; see also Said, 1993:44; Young, 1995:1616; Sardar, 1999:3; McLeod, 2007b:2). Said was resentful against the production and applicability of binary representations (2003:57; see also Said, 1993:44; McLeod, 2007b:2), because they created imaginative knowledge, which was often grounded in the discourse of the superior familiar (Europe, the West, us) and the inferior strange (the Orient, the East, them) (Said, 1993:44, 2003:42; Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:23). For instance Said highlighted how different binary representations exposed Europe as “powerful and articulate” (2003:57), “rational, virtuous, mature, “normal”” (2003:40) against the Orient, which was “diametrically inferior to a European equivalent” (2003:72), “childlike, or feminine,
incapable of looking after themselves … and requiring the paternal rule of the west for their own best interests” (Young, 2003:2).

More importantly, binary representations inscribed certain power relations between the colonial and imperial power and the colonized (Moore-Gilbert et al., 1997b:23), as the knowledge created by such representations produced inequality in power relations (McLeod, 2010:48). For instance Nathaniel Knight indicates that although orientalism may be an invention, this orientalist knowledge has a correlation to unequal power relations as:

“the power generated by orientalist knowledge is real and inescapable. At every level, the creation of alterity through orientalist discourse is inseparable from domination. Knowledge of the Orient is never innocent … Rather is it the mark of subordination, through which the universally inferior "other" embodies the full panoply of traits unworthy of civilized man” (Knight, 2000:76).

What Knight argues here is the fact that orientalist knowledge produces alterity in order to subordinate less powerful groups. It is in this respect that orientalism came to be associated with unequal relations of power (Said, 2003:5; McLeod, 2010:47) and identified as the discourse of power of the colonizer (Ashcroft et al., 2010:153; see also Young, 1995:160). In this vein, Said regarded orientalism as one of the most important mechanisms of colonial and imperial domination (Young, 2003:3; see also Williams, 1994:3) and his aim was to reveal this hidden part and what it represented (1989:211).

However, despite Said’s scholarly quest in identifying binary representations in colonial and imperial discourses, one of the main criticisms of Orientalism was that Said omitted to
include any alternative representations to the colonial and imperial ones\(^{34}\) (Sharp, 2009:5). Such an inclusion would not only have introduced alternative knowledge to the colonial and imperial representations (McLeod, 2010:57; see also Childs and Williams, 1997:107, Moore-Gilbert et al., 1997b:24-26; Hiddlestone, 2009:90, Sharp, 2009:27-28), but would have also enabled a bottom-up approach, by including the voices and forms of resistance/struggles of marginalized groups (Childs and Williams, 1997:145; Chowdhry and Nair, 2002:12 and 15).

Based on this, the application of orientalism is central to colonial discourse analysis as it examines how discourses produced knowledge about the Orient and which impacted upon power relations by dominating, restructuring and having authority over how the Orient was represented (Said, 2003:3). Moreover, especially as postcolonial scholars claim that colonial and imperial discourses “are still very much with us today, even if the political map of the world has altered through decolonization” (McLeod op.cit., p.39), Said’s orientalism can usefully be employed to illuminate the extent to which current discourses produce unequal power relations in the postcolonial present by questioning the knowledge they have produced and represent (see Said, 2003). As such, orientalism has the potential to make a significant contribution to the study of the EU and power relations in the enlargement context.

2.4.2. Mimicry

While Spivak and Said articulated ways in which subalternity and orientalism were used as instruments of power by the colonizer, Hommi Bhabha’s mimicry deals with resistance against for instance subalternity and orientalist discourses (McLeod, 2010:221). In other words, mimicry is the subaltern’s discourse to resist colonial and imperial unequal power

\(^{34}\) Although Said’s later publication *Culture and Imperialism* (1994) was a response to this criticism, where he acknowledged alternative representations (1994:xii; Hiddlestone, 2009:94).
relations (Ashcroft, 2001:3), by producing an “ambivalent relationship between colonizer and colonized” (Ashcroft et.al., 2010:124).

Mimicry was first introduced in Bhabha’s *The Location of Culture* (2000) and refers to a practice through which the mimic man\(^{35}\) becomes “entirely knowable and visible” (Bhabha, 2000:71). Mimicry can therefore be understood as the process through which the colonized is reformed and through which the colonized challenges the colonial and imperial power by essentially mimicking the colonial power (2000:86). However Bhabha argues that the process of mimicry produces a double characteristic of ambivalence, as the mimic man becomes “a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite” (2000:86; see also Bhabha, 1997:153). What this entails is that even though the colonized mimics the colonizer, the colonized will always maintain features of the colonized (Ashcroft et.al., 1998:118-119). The ambivalence rests upon the image that the colonized is almost the same as the colonizer, but not fully quite the same. Based on this ambivalence, mimicry is regarded as the intersection between the colonized and the colonial power (Ashcroft et.al., 2002:205), as the mimic man can be “both similar to and the other of the colonisers” (McLeod, 2010:65).

Moreover, Bhabha argues that this ambivalence or double articulation is “the most terrifying” aspect of mimicry (2000:90), as the appropriation of the mimic man to the colonial power becomes a threat to the latter (Bhabha, 1997:153; 2000:86). For instance, Ashcroft et.al. regard mimicry as “never a simple reproduction of” the colonial traits, but a new interpretation, which can mock or even become a threat to the colonial power (2010:125-126). In the same vein, McLeod underlines that:

\(^{35}\) In the writing of Bhabha, the colonized is identified as the mimic man.
“hearing their language coming through the mouths of the colonised, the colonisers are faced with the worrying threat of resemblance between coloniser and colonised … If civilization, learning, even (being) English can be learned by the colonised, then just how inherent and exclusive are these things to the colonisers?” (McLeod, 2010:66).

The above indicates that when the mimic man actually resembles the colonial power, this may be interpreted as a threat that the colonized imposes upon the colonial power. It is in this respect that Bhabha maintains that mimicry is a status of “both resemble and menace at once” (2000:86; see also Ashcroft et.al., 1998:118-119). The first is defined as “a difference that is almost nothing but not quite” and the second as “a difference that is almost total but not quite” (Bhabha, 2000:91).

In other words, mimicry is another way in which colonial discourse analysis can reveal discursive domination. However, in contrast to orientalism, mimicry engages with the discourses of the colonized, as it more likely to reveal a state of ambivalence of the mimic man (McLeod, 2010:65). Thus the goal with the application of mimicry is that regardless of how often the colonized mimics the colonial power, the appropriation to the latter, by becoming “almost nothing but not quite”, as well as “almost total but not quite”, becomes not only a threat, but also an empowerment of the colonized. Thus, mimicry is much more than just understanding a process of colonization (McLeod, 2010:66). Mimicry can be understood as a strategy of power of the colonized (Moore-Gilbert, 2000:459; see also Bhabha, 1997:156) and thus can be regarded as power of knowledge of the mimic man (Bhabha, 2000:89; see also Childs and Williams, 1997:129). Following on from the previous point, mimicry identifies therefore a flaw in the certainty of colonial dominance in controlling the colonized (Ashcroft et.al., 2010:125).
2.5. The postcolonial relevance to the study of EU enlargement

This section argues that by building upon the postcolonial perspectives of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, this thesis will enable new ways of theorizing and displaying a new critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand EU enlargement. It will also set out a preliminary discussion of the extent to which postcolonialism might be applied to the case of the EU’s production of unequal power relations.

The argument that the present is postcolonial has enormous value for the examination EU enlargement as it enables scholars to engage with the idea that the EU is a postcolonial space in a postcolonial present where systems “of economic, political and cultural domination” (Young, 2001:58) “that were established during the era of colonialism and imperialism have in many respects not declined” (Hardt and Negri, 2001:43), but have continued “under the auspices” of the EU (Kovačević op.cit., p.361). As discussed in the previous chapter, although EU focused postcolonial literature has taken tentative steps in examining the postcolonial present of the EU (see for instance Mezzadra 2005:4; Fischer Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013), there is still a dearth of postcolonial research. Nevertheless, the EU focused postcolonial scholarship has significant importance to the study of enlargement, as it embraces the crucial need to question the EU from a postcolonial perspective and better integrates the EU as a postcolonial space in the larger debate of the discipline. Such an expansion demonstrates that postcolonialism is not “caught behind the posts and unable to move to new and/or more promising re-/articulations”, as Carol Boyce Davies argues (1994:81).

The bottom-up approach has the potential to make a significant contribution to research on enlargement, as it moves beyond some of the gaps identified in the previous chapter and
furthers our understanding of the EU in two different ways. First, an extract from Harper Lee’s *To kill a mockingbird* accounts that “’you never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view . . . until you climb into his skin and walk around in it’” (2006:33). Similarly, a bottom-up approach mirrors the meaning behind this extract, as it allows an understanding of the EU and in particular unequal power relations to be represented from the perspectives of marginalized groups (see Sylvester, 2014:185). In particular, a bottom-up approach aims to enable the voices of these groups to be heard, which are missing in mainstream analyses and which so far has been “represented” by “the colonial voice of the EU” (Polat, 2011:1269). Second, a bottom-up approach not only introduces alternative representations and knowledge from the perspectives of marginalized groups, which have been invisible in many different ways in the context of enlargement studies (see Sylvester, 2014:190), but also questions the durability of truths created by the EU and challenges power relations inherent from EU practices and forms of representations and knowledge (see Childs and Williams, 1997:101 and 103).

By applying a bottom-up approach, subalternity can be of enormous value in examining enlargement. As discussed in the previous chapter, the existing postcolonial literature of the EU has developed largely without references to the notion of subalternity and thus its application will further the use of postcolonial perspectives to such studies. Consequently, subalternity enables scholars to engage with questions regarding the extent to which representational systems rendered marginalized groups mute and the ways in which instruments of subjugation impacted upon power relations within the enlargement context. Moreover, the application of subalternity also engages with the extent to which Spivak’s argument regarding the muteness of the subaltern can in fact be challenged, by finding ways of allowing the subaltern to speak, to be heard and to be listened to.
Colonial discourse analysis is of paramount importance to EU enlargement studies from two different perspectives. First, colonial discourse analysis expands the discursive and linguistic turn in EU studies (see Neumann, 2002; Torfing, 2005) and draws attention to an alternative way of understanding EU enlargement (see Diez, 2005:615; see also Diez, 1999a, 2001, 2006; Moisio, 2003:76). Second, colonial discourse analysis establishes a platform in which discursive domination can be examined in the postcolonial present. By applying this to for instance EU documents, such an analysis expands the examination of how language was used as a medium through which unequal power relations were produced (see Torfing, 2005:21-24). Moreover, colonial discourse analysis enables alternative forms of knowledge and resistance to be seen and heard (see McLeod, 2010:57-58). As stated in the previous chapter, the existing EU focused postcolonial literature has developed largely with reference to orientalism, which has revealed for instance how discursive registers of binary representations can mediate unequal power relations in the EU (see Moore-Gilbert et.al., 1997b:22; see also Young, 1995:159; Ashcroft et.al., 2010:37). The current thesis will therefore build upon previous orientalist studies and in particular further our understanding of the EU’s production of unequal power relations in the enlargement context.

Engaging with Bhabha’s mimicry is also instrumental, as mimicry opens up postcolonial spaces to new intellectual interpretations and thinking (McLeod, 2010:62). As discussed in the previous chapter, mimicry has rarely been featured in EU postcolonial literature, even though mimicry is paramount, as it engages with the EU on a different level than subalternity and orientalism. Mimicry advocates resistance to unequal power relations by acknowledging the mimicking of marginalized groups and how mimicry evokes both resemblance and threat to the dominant power, which indicates a flaw in the certainty of colonial dominance in
controlling the mimic man (Ashcroft et.al., op.cit., p.125). The centrality of mimicry lays in the fact that its application reveals a state of ambivalence of the mimic man and which can be regarded as a form of power strategy against the dominant power. Moreover, unlike orientalism, the application of mimicry recognizes a bottom-up approach and also encourages emancipation (see Ashcroft et.al., 2002:175-176; McLeod, 2010:67) by acknowledging how subordinated groups can be “knowable and visible” (Bhabha op.cit., p.71), unlike subalternity.

2.6. Conclusions

This chapter has argued that in order to address the research questions and move beyond the gaps identified in the previous chapter, engaging with postcolonial perspectives is pivotal in adequately demonstrating how the EU produces unequal power relations. In particular, the chapter indicates that three postcolonial perspectives, subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, are pivotal in achieving the aim of the thesis, by setting out how they are operating in the Reports.

The chapter maintained that first, postcolonial scholars recognize the present as postcolonial due to the fact that colonial and imperial traces are “still very much with us today”, producing a postcolonial present. What is central to this view is the fact that colonial and imperial traces are particularly making themselves noticeable in power relations. Second, as postcolonialism is concerned with emancipation and change of unequal power relations, these can be achieved by allowing marginalized groups to be heard through for instance the application of a bottom-up approach. A bottom-up approach not only introduces alternative representations and knowledge of marginalized groups, but also questions the durability of truths created by and challenges power relations inherent from the dominant power. One way of theorizing the
bottom-up approach is through the application of subalternity. Third, colonial discourse analysis has made a significant contribution to the understanding of the way unequal power relations are produced in the present by employing a discursive and linguistic examination. Orientalism and mimicry are two different ways of theorizing how discourses impact upon power relations in the postcolonial present.

Overall, this chapter argued that the application of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry has the potential to make a significant contribution to our understanding of how the EU produces unequal power relations in the enlargement context, by introducing a critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU and in particular in adequately understanding the extent to which unequal power relations are produced. In order to reveal the extent to which subalternity, orientalism and mimicry operate in the Reports, the next chapter will present the research framework of the thesis.
CHAPTER 3

ADVOCATING THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

This chapter argues that employing critical discourse analysis and the interviewing technique will aim to “shed the maximum light on” (Grix, 2010:121) examining the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. To start with, EU enlargement has been assessed through the application of different research methods. As mentioned previously, discourse analysis has been a ground-breaking research method, which has been largely pioneered through the work of for instance Diez (e.g. 2001, 2014) and Rosamond (e.g. 2013, 2014), just to mention a few. However, this thesis argues that by building upon this previous work, we can further expand enlargement research by applying the method of critical discourse analysis (CDA). Such a method primarily aims to “‘critique, expose, deconstruct, counter and … transcend’” unequal power relations (see Sidaway op.cit., p.594). As such, CDA addresses how unequal power relations are “expressed, constituted, legitimized ... by language use” (Weiss and Wodak, 2003:15; see also Fairclough, 1995:132-133, 2001:2, 2003b:135; Van Dijk, 2003:352; Fairclough et. al., 2011:357) and aims to change these unequal relations (Jones, 2007:356; see also Fairclough, 2001:2; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2002:89-90; Weiss and Wodak, 2003:14; Fairclough et. al., 2011:357). Moreover, especially as CDA is a method that is influenced by the researcher’s own interpretations, the method of conducting interviews was employed to ensure an appropriate level of reliability of the research results (see Pierce, 2008:46). The interview material will therefore introduce the interplay between the EU and power relations seen through the interviewees’ eyes (see Pierce, 2008:45;
Bryman, 2012:213). On a short note, it should be added that content analysis was briefly employed in order to provide an additional element of data-collection and support the research findings (Pierce, 2008:264; Grix, 2010:137).

The chapter proceeds in a two-step engagement. The first part discusses the relevance of CDA, interviewing technique and content analysis in answering the research questions. In particular, the chapter outlines Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA model, which entails three different dimensions (stages) that are applied to three corresponding facets of discourse in order to reveal the extent to which unequal power relations are produced in and behind discourse (see Table 1). Additionally, the chapter outlines the relevance of the interviews and interview material as part of the research framework. The practical application of CDA, interviewing technique and content analysis will be demonstrated in Chapters 5-8. The chapter also turns to a discussion of why examining the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports published during the Romanian enlargement will be examined in order to contribute to a better understanding of the EU’s production of unequal power relations in and behind discourse.

Second, by investigating potentialities and limitations encountered during field work (Grix, 2010:32), the chapter aims to reveal how these may have impacted upon research results, as well as discuss how they have been dealt with. The chapter concludes that applying CDA, interviews and content analysis to the examination of the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports is an appropriate research framework in order to assess the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations in the enlargement context.
3.1. The three-dimensional critical discourse analysis model

Although the research method of CDA covers “a variety of approaches, each with different theoretical models, research methods and agenda” (Fairclough et. al., 2011:357-358; see also van Dijk, 2003:353; Wodak & Meyer, 2009; Krzyzanowski, 2010; Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012:180), this method has been largely pioneered by the works of Teun van Dijk, Ruth Wodak and Norman Fairclough36 (Van Dijk, 2003:352, 2009:4; see also Wodak, 1995:209; Weiss and Wodak, 2003:15; Wodak, 2007:2; Fairclough; 2010). However, this chapter argues that the most relevant CDA model for the purpose of the research questions of this current thesis is Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA. The centrality of this model is sustained by bringing into perspective a research method, which engages with the production of unequal power relations “through focusing upon language” (Fairclough, 1989:4, 1995:132-133, 2001:2 and 34, 2003:135; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2002:89-90; Wodak, 2007:2; Krzyzanowski and Wodak, 2009:27; Fairclough et. al., 2011:358). More importantly, the three-dimensional CDA model contributes to the research questions through its engagement with the production of unequal power relations in and behind discourse at a micro, meso and micro level of analysis (Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012:181).

Thus, language or discourse is identified as an important element in investigating unequal power relations due to the ideological power hidden in language. Ideological power refers to “the power to project one’s practices as universal and ‘common sense’” (Fairclough, 2001:27). This is based on the argument that although language may “appear normal or neutral on the surface”, it can in fact hide ideologies (2001:2-3; see also van Dijk, 1990:10; Fairclough et al., 2011:358). Ideologies are identified as “practices which appear to be universal and commonsensical” and “which people draw upon without thinking”, but which

---

36 Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive model, Wodak’s discourse-historical model and Fairclough’s three-dimensional model.
can contribute to inequality in power relations (Fairclough, 2001:3) by controlling and constraining both discourses and participants\textsuperscript{37} (2001:59; Machin and Mayr, 2012:5). The most effective ideology is the one which appears to be the most common, neutral and is shared by most participants, but without participants being aware of the ideological power it may bring into discourse and how it impacts upon power relations (Fairclough, 2001:3; see also van Dijk, 1990:10; Fairclough et al., 2011:358).

As a consequence, it is through ideological power that language is “centrally involved in power, and struggles for power”\textsuperscript{38} (Fairclough, 2001:14; van Dijk, 2003:353). However, by making participants aware of how ideologies may work as instruments of inequality (Fairclough, 2001:3; see also van Dijk, 1990:10; Fairclough et al., 2011:358), change of unequal power relations and emancipation of subordinated participants may occur (Jones, 2007:356; see also Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 2002:89-90; Fairclough, 2001:2; Weiss and Wodak, 2003:14; Fairclough et. al., 2011:357). Hence, the centrality of the three-dimensional CDA lays in the fact that, as language has a close relationship to both power and ideology (Fairclough, 2001:14), analyzing discourse may reveal the extent to which ideologies are connected to the production of unequal power relations.

The three-dimensional CDA model is conveyed through the application of three stages (dimensions): 1) description, which relies on an analysis of text, 2) interpretation, which analyses the relationship between the productive and interpretive discursive practices and the text and 3) explanation, which examines the relationship between discursive practices and social practices (Fairclough, 2010:132). When applying this CDA model, the researcher uses the above three corresponding dimensions to three corresponding facets of discourse: 1) the

\textsuperscript{37} Refer to all agents that are involved in discourse.

\textsuperscript{38} Struggles for power or power struggles will be discussed further in the chapter.
text, which is regarded as a product of discourse practices, 2) the discourse practices, which are made up by the process of production of the text and the process of interpretation of the text and 3) the sociocultural practices, which are made up by situational, institutional and societal practices, which impact upon discourse practices (Fairclough, 2010:133; see also Fairclough, 2001:21). Furthermore, the application of each dimension to the corresponding discourse facet is performed at a micro, meso and macro level of analysis (Merkl-Davies and Kolelr, 2012:181). Each of these three CDA dimensions and three discourse facets (see Table 1) will be discussed further in the next three sub-sections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CDA dimensions</th>
<th>Discourse facets</th>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>Micro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation</td>
<td>Discourse practices</td>
<td>Meso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanation</td>
<td>Sociocultural practices</td>
<td>Macro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1. The three CDA dimensions and the three corresponding discourse facets.*

### 3.1.1. Description

The description dimension is pertinent to this research as it aims to identify ideologies hidden in the text of language and how such ideologies may control and constrain both discourses and participants at the micro level (Fairclough, 2010:132; Merkl-Davies and Kolelr, 2012:181). In short, as texts are regarded as places for ideologies to hide (2006:32), the description dimension analyses the formal properties of text, which consists of vocabulary (words), grammar and textual structures (Fairclough, 2001:92-93), in order to reveal ideologies and examine the extent to which they produce unequal power relations by controlling and constraining discourses and participants (2001:21 and 22).

*Table 2 indicates that powerful participants (dominant bloc) can constrain three types of elements in discourse, by controlling the formal properties in and behind discourse. To start with, powerful participants can constrain contents in discourse, referring to what is said and*
done. Furthermore, participants can also constrain relations, which refer to the relations that people enter into and are enacted in discourse. Finally, participants can also constrain positions, which refer to the positions that people occupy in and behind discourse (Fairclough, 2001:39 and 61).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of discourse</th>
<th>Control of and constraints upon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>what is said or done in discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations</td>
<td>relations participants enter into in discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positions</td>
<td>positions of participants in discourse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2. Elements of discourse, which can be controlled and constrained (Source: Fairclough, 2001:39 and 61).*

In order to analyze formal properties and identify what elements of discourse are being controlled and constrained, a researcher can ask a set of different questions (see Appendix 1). Although not all questions are applicable to all discourses, the aim of these questions is to reveal what elements of discourse that the ideological power in discourse controls and constrains and how this impacts upon power relations. For instance by asking *What relational values do words have?*, such a question aims to reveal the extent to which words in for instance a text create certain relations between participants in discourse and how those relations legitimate, reproduce, challenge, etc. inequality (Dijk, 2003:353). Thus, depending on what words are used, different relations can be produced, such as relations of trust, hostility or distance, which impact on power relations in different ways (see Fairclough, 2001:97). As an example, the use of a formal vocabulary in discourse can negotiate relations of distance and respect, which impact upon how participants relate to one another in and behind discourse, but also what power relations are produced and enacted in and behind discourse (2001:98).
3.1.2. Interpretation

The interpretation dimension aims to analyze discourse practices of production and interpretation of text at a meso analysis level in order to reveal how ideological power impacts upon power relations (Fairclough, 1989:26; 2001:21 and 118; 2010:132-133; Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2012:181). The importance of these two practices is based on the argument that the way participants produce and interpret texts is based on their “knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social world they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions” etc., which is referred to as members’ resources (MR) (Fairclough, 2001:20-21 and 74). First, in terms of the process of production, the MR of the producer will be used when producing a text and thus will influence text production (2001:118). Therefore, in the production process, the formal properties of text are regarded as “traces of the productive process” (Fairclough, 2001:20; Fairclough, 1989:26), as traces indicate what MR have influenced the text producer. It is when the producer’s MR are used in text production that ideologies can be reproduced and thus contribute to unequal power relations.

Second, similarly to the production process, in terms of the process of interpretation, the MR of the interpreter will influence how the interpreter will understand the text, but the text itself will also influence and shape the MR of the interpreter (see Fairclough, 2001:118; Titsche et al., 2003:150). Thus, in the interpretation process, the formal properties of text are regarded as “cues in the process of interpretation” (2001:20), as cues prompt the interpreter to use certain MR and interpret the text in a certain way. In the same vein as the process of production, it is when the MR are used as interpretative procedures that ideologies can be reproduced and thus contribute to unequal power relations, though interpreters and other participants are often not aware of this process (2001:2-3 and 118).

---

39 Participants in discourse practices produce and interpret discourse based on the situational context and the intertextual context (Fairclough, 2001:119), which will be discussed on Chapter 7.
3.1.3. Explanation

The explanation dimension is important to the understanding of how the EU produces unequal power relations because it engages with a macro-level analysis of how social structures\textsuperscript{40} at situational (the immediate social environment in which discourse occurs), institutional (such as court room, family, etc.) and societal (society as a whole) levels are reciprocally shaping and influencing discourse practices. This allows researchers to engage with how ideological power impacts upon discourses practices, taking into consideration how social structures are influencing and are being influenced (Fairclough, 2001:135; 2010:132-33; Fairclough et al., 2011:357; see also Fairclough, 1989:26, 2001:22 and 59; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999).

The explanation dimension is indicated in Figure 1. As it shows, social structures (power relations) affect MR and thus reproduce ideologies, which in turn shape discourses, which in turn sustain or change (social struggles\textsuperscript{41}) MR and which in turn sustain or change social structures (2001:135). In this interplay, ideologies can be reproduced or changed in social struggles (2001:31). The explanation dimension engages therefore with how discourse is affected by and affects power relations at situational, institutional and societal levels (Fairclough, 2001:30). Thus, in contrast to the interpretation dimension, which is concerned with how MR reproduce ideologies, the explanation dimension is concerned with both reproduction and change of ideologies (2001:135).

\textsuperscript{40} Refer to relations of power (see Fairclough, 2001:135).

\textsuperscript{41} The process in which participants in a discourse engage with other participants (Fairclough, 2001:28).
While it is during the explanation dimension that ideologies are reproduced or discontinued (2001:71), this reproduction or change occurs through social struggles. As discourse is identified as “the site of power struggles“ and “the stake in power struggles” (2001:61), power struggles are won by controlling formal properties and constraining contents, relations and positions in discourse (see Table 2). In other words, participants are struggling for controlling and constraining discourse as by doing so, they can win the site of power struggles, i.e. by controlling discourse and by winning such a control, they have won the discourse, which is the stake in power struggles. Thus, the participant, who has won control over discourse, is regarded as having “power in discourse and power behind discourse” (2001:36). Power in discourse refers to “controlling and constraining contributions of non-powerful participants” (2001:38-39), while power behind discourse is concerned with questions of “who has access to which discourses, and who has the power to impose and enforce constraints on access” to discourse (2001:52). Any participant will attempt to impose its ideologies on power relations in order to win or maintain power in and behind discourse (2001:71) at the situational, institutional and societal level (2001:59).
However, it should be noted that the dominant bloc has to continually restate its power in social struggles with non-powerful participants (Fairclough, 2001:38-39), as the latter also engage to win power (2001:59) and thus power in and behind discourse can be lost in social struggles (2001:61). It is essential to mention that by having power in and behind discourse, the dominant bloc also has power to decide the discourse type (2001:39), which also controls and constrains discourse (2001:25) and influences the production and interpretation of text and what MR will be used in these practices (2001:124). A discourse type is defined as the type of discourse within which participants interact.\footnote{Examples of discourse types can be for instance a witness interview, university lecture, medical appointment, EU negotiation, etc.}

3.2. Relevance of the three-dimensional model to the study of power relations

This section argues that by applying the three-dimensional CDA model, this thesis will set out a preliminary discussion of how CDA can be applied to examine the Reports in order to reveal the extent to which ideological power in EU language produces unequal power relations. In particular, this model has the potential to make a significant contribution to the understanding of the way unequal power relations are produced, as it engages with a complex analysis at the micro, meso and macro levels. Overall, the application of the three-dimensional CDA model will attempt to reveal what ideologies are hidden in the language produced by the EU and how ideologies impact upon power relations. Furthermore, identifying how the EU produces unequal power relations by focusing on language can raise “a critical consciousness” of the ideological power hiding in and behind discourse (Fairclough, 2001:3 and 34).

The description dimension is vital to the examination of how the EU produces unequal power relations because as texts are places for ideologies to hide, applying the set of questions (see
Appendix 1) to the formal properties of the Reports will aim to identify ideologies and how these produce unequal power relations. In other words, the description dimension targets to question how the Romanian enlargement was represented by the EU and what does this mean in relation to unequal power relations (see Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2010:181).

Understanding the correlation between the use of MR and the reproduction of ideologies through the practices of production and interpretation is important in examining how the EU produces unequal power relations. As formal properties of a text are traces of production and cues in interpretation, by questioning these practices, the interpretation dimension aims to indicate what MR might have influenced the EU to produce a certain discourse and how such a discourse impacted upon the MR of the interpreters. Such an examination aims to reveal the extent to which the production and interpretation of texts are mechanisms of reproduction of ideological power. In other words, the interpretation dimension aims to answer the question of why the Romanian enlargement was represented, why it was represented in a particular way by the EU and what does this mean in relation to unequal power relations (see Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2010:181).

The explanation dimension will aim to provide an understanding of how social structures (power relations) at three levels influenced the production and interpretation of EU discourses. This will be done by assessing how social structures may have impacted upon MR, which in turn shaped discourses, which in turn sustained or changed MR and which in turn sustained or changed social structures. By doing so, the thesis aims to show whether the EU restated its power by enforcing ideologies in social struggles, what forms these ideologies took and whether Romania engaged in social struggles and if so, at which levels could these social struggles be identified. Similarly to the interpretation dimension, the explanation
dimension aims to answer the question why the Romanian enlargement was represented, why it was represented in a particular way by the EU and what does this mean in relation to unequal power relations (see Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2010:181).

3.3. Interviewing technique

This section argues that by applying in-depth (semi-structured) interviews, the thesis will set out a preliminary discussion of how interviews can be applied to examine the Reports in order to reveal the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. As part of the research framework, the below sections will discuss the selection of the interviewees, as well as how the interview questions were set up and the interviews were conducted.

3.3.1. Selecting interviewees

In total, 10 officials, who had worked as part of the EU and Romanian negotiating teams during the Romanian enlargement, were interviewed, a number which is also regarded as essential in achieving a reliable study result (Kvale, 2007:44). The interviews, which were undertaken with 5 EU officials and 5 Romanian officials, were conducted in Belgium, Germany, Romania and the United Kingdom between 2013 and 2014 (see Appendix 2 for further details about the interviewees).

Identifying potential interviewees was achieved by accessing for instance public documents, official interviews, academic publications, etc. and familiarizing myself with potential respondents. The selection of the interviewees was based on their involvement in the Romanian enlargement, being part of either the EU’s or the Romanian negotiating teams. A list of potential interviewees was prepared and respondents were contacted by email, which was sent alongside a consent form and a participant information leaflet, which included
information about the research, purpose, benefits from participation and possibility to withdraw (see Kvale, 2007:27). Moreover, a number of interviewees were also approached through the help of gatekeepers, who introduced potential respondents. A second email was sent to the respondents, who had not replied to the first email. Once the interviews were granted and planned according to the interviewees’ availability (see Thomas, 1995:9), the interviews were conducted. Prior to starting the field work process, I conducted an ethical review process (see Grix, 2010:121), which was approved and on which the consent form and the participant information leaflet were based.

It should be noted that the interviews are categorized as non-elite and elite interviews. The non-elite interviews are defined as interviews conducted with individuals, who are not regarded as “prominent” in the area under examination (Vromen, 2010:258). Thus, the interviewees, who belong to non-elite interviews, were working as officials, who supported the work of the senior executives in the two negotiating teams. In contrast, elite interviews are defined as interviews conducted with “persons who are leaders or experts in a community, people who are usually in powerful positions” (Kvale, 2007:70; Vromen, 2010:258; see also Hertz and Imber, 1995). In line with the above definition, the elite interviewees exercised a high level of “influence on the outcome of” the Romanian enlargement and held what one can describe as senior positions in the EU and Romanian negotiating teams (see Pierce, 2008:119).

3.3.2. The interview guide and conducting interviews

Each interview guide⁴³ included a range of nine open-ended questions⁴⁴ (see Appendix 3), which aimed to reveal the interviewees’ own experiences and views of the Romanian

---

⁴³ Refers to the list of questions (see Bryman, 2012:468).
enlargement as a whole, as well as EU-Romania relations. A number of interviewees asked for the questions to be sent to them prior to the interview and such a request was granted. Although there are different principles to follow when setting up an interview guide, the questions were largely based on the below four criteria (based on Alan Bryman’s suggestions, 2012:470-471):

- Formulate questions that would help to answer the research questions.
- The question order has to flow, but also be prepared to alter the order and still be able to answer the research questions.
- Use language, which the interviewees understand.
- Avoid leading questions.

Each interview lasted approximately one hour (see Pierce, 2008:125). The interviews were in most cases audio taped, apart from three, which were conducted by email, one by phone and one, which was conducted face to face, but where the respondent requested for the interviewer not to record, but to take notes. The interviews were transcribed and the transcriptions were sent to each interviewee for approval. Moreover, a number of interviewees requested to be anonymous and the request was arranged (see Vromen, 2010:258). However, in order to maintain consistency, I took the decision to keep all participants anonymous. Therefore any data identifying the interviewees will not be included in the research (see Kvale, 2007:27) in order to protect the anonymity of the respondents (see Beach, 2005:14). The interviewees will be coded as interviewee 1, interviewee 2, interviewee 3, etc., largely following the chronology of the interviews44.

44 Question 1 has a sub question.

45 It should be noted that the interviews will not be cited in the text, but will be referenced in the bibliography, entering the following style of reference: Interviewee 1 (2013) Personal communication.
3.4. Relevance of the interviewing technique to the study of power relations

First, as mentioned previously, the research method of conducting interviews was employed in order to ensure “a more balanced approach” (Grix op.cit., p.126-127) in assessing how the EU produces unequal power relations, as CDA is a method that is largely influenced by the researcher (Fairclough op.cit., p.22). Thus, the interviews will enable alternative voices to be heard (see Pierce, 2008:45; Bryman, 2012:213), which can be used as a benchmark against which to compare the results of the critical discourse analysis of the Reports (Grix, 2010:133). In relation to the application of CDA, the interview material will also help in revealing whether the interviewees were aware of how reproduction of ideologies occurs through language and how such a reproduction contributes to inequality in power relations, as discussed by Fairclough (see 2001:2-3 and 118).

Second, the interview material will introduce the experiences, understandings, interpretations, feelings, etc. of the interviewees (Vromen, 2010:258; see also Kvale, 2007:8; Grix, 2010:121; Bryman, 2012:471) and thus allow access to information that otherwise would not have been available without conducting interviews (see Beach, 2005:14). In particular, by including officials from both the EU and the Romanian negotiating teams, such interviews will cover a broader representation of voices. As the interviewees have all been involved in accession negotiations during the Romanian enlargement, an analysis of their answers is significant in revealing how they perceived power relations and how such relations shaped the enlargement and EU-Romania relations (see Boyce and Neale, 2006:7). Questions 7-9 aim in particular to reveal the interviewees’ opinions and experiences of power relations during the different enlargement phases\(^\text{46}\), in order to identify whether the respondents identified inequality, but

\(^{46}\) To be discussed in Chapter 4.
also whether they detected any change in such power relations during the enlargement phases.

Third, the interview material will be discussed in relation to postcolonialism in order to provide empirical support for demonstrating the extent to which the discourses of the Reports are a place in which unequal power relations are produced through elements of subalternity, mimicry and orientalism. For instance, questions such as Question 5 (Were there any forms of resistance against EU demands during negotiations?) was a way in which the interviewees could discuss aspects of mimicry, but without directly being asked about mimicry or employing the word mimicry, which could have caused misunderstanding and even been identified as a leading question (see Bryman, 2012:470-471). Furthermore, the use of non-elite interviewees aims to include a broader representation of voices and thus enable “perspectives, and experiences of people who typically have been marginalized become a starting point for inquiry”, by being heard, understood and listened to (Browne et al., 2005:26; see also McLeod, 2010:223).

Fourth, employing in-depth (semi-structured) interviews allowed flexibility and the pursuit of unanticipated lines of enquiry (Grix, 2010:128; see also Kvale, 2007:8; Bryman, 2012:471), as the questions often stimulated responses, which inevitably invited further questions, which could elaborate on the interviewees’ answers. For instance, Question 1 (In your opinion how was Romania perceived by the European Union during the enlargement process?) often stimulated the respondents to relate to corruption, which became a key element in the critical discourse analysis of the Reports, thus allowing specifying or direct questions on the issue. However, as a rule of thumb, especially direct questions were asked towards the end of each
interview, in order not to influence the direction of the interview or the answers of the interviewees (see Bryman, 2012:473).

3.5. Content analysis

Based on the idea of triangulation, which refers to the use of more than one research method in order to for instance “getting better, more reliable data, and to minimize the chance of biased findings” (Grix, 2010:135), a third technique was introduced in the form of content analysis. Qualitative methods scholars are usually critical about the use of content analysis, as for instance it only counts the recurrent instances of a certain factor (Wilkinson, 2006:183) or the researcher is biased regarding the selection of the texts and key words, which are being calculated. However, this method was employed because it provides an additional element of data-collection and thus supports the research findings (see Pierce, 2008:264; Grix, 2010:137). In this current thesis, the method of content analysis was used to calculate the number of references of formal properties of language in the Reports, in order to reveal a “systematic and comprehensive” overview of how these properties may have produced unequal power relations (as part of the description dimension) (see Wilkinson, 2006:182-183).

3.6. Why the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports?

As discussed in Introduction, the three-dimensional CDA model will be applied to two sets of EU documents, the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Report, which are presented in Table 3. The below section will address why these texts have been chosen in order to demonstrate how the EU produces unequal power relations.

|--------------------------|------------------------------------------|
Table 3. The Reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Report 2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Report 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Report 2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Report 2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reason for choosing these two sets of Reports is two-fold. First, primary sources such as EU reports are regarded as more reliable than secondary sources, as for instance newspaper reports, as the latter are subjective and manipulated by producers, while primary sources tend to be a product of actual research and no interpretation (Rosamond, 2006:469; Grix, 2010:132; Vromen, 2010:261-262). Thus, in the case of the Reports, these mirror the EU’s interpretations of the Romanian enlargement “in their natural context” (Kvale, 2007:xi) and thus do not “have analyses in them” (Vromen, 2010:261-262), allowing us to question the EU’s established truths about the Romanian enlargement in the Reports through a critical and interpretivist research framework (see Kvale, 2007:xi).

Second, as illustrated by a range of scholars (Phinnemore, 1999:73; Grabbe, 2001:1022, 2002:266; Kovács, 2001:228, 2006; Bellier, 2004:140; O’Brennan, 2006:34; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:38; Villalba, 2008; Avery, 2009; Joenniemi, 2012), enlargement reports are a pivotal example in understanding the production of unequal power relations. This relates primarily to the scholarly criticism of the Regular Reports, which are identified as hiding, denying or playing down the EU’s leverage and the subordinate position of candidate countries (Raik, 2004:580-581; Pridham, 2006a, 2007a:353; Kuus, 2007:161; Zielonka, 2008:476; Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:272-273; Avery, 2012:166). Following this line of reasoning, this suggests that there is much more to these Reports than only monitoring the Romanian enlargement progress, as we can ask vital questions about how
unequal power relations were produced. Overall, considering the limitation highlighted in the Literature Review, that most studies of the Regular Reports have largely focused on the earlier Reports of the 2004 enlargement, a broader examination of Reports will further contribute to enlargement literature by adding valuable insights about how the EU produces unequal power relations.

3.7. Potentialities and limitations

The below sections discuss some of the key potentialities and limitations that have occurred during field work, how such aspects could have impacted upon the current research and how they were dealt with.

3.7.1. Role of researcher

The three-dimensional CDA is a research method that largely depends on the involvement of the researcher in engaging with the examination of inequality in power relations. CDA is influenced by a range of aspects such as what the researcher “’sees’ in a text, what one regards as worth describing, and what one chooses to emphasize” (Fairclough op.cit., p.22). For instance, when it comes to the interpretation dimension, the researcher also uses her own MR, ideologies, etc., which may influence the results through the researcher’s “capacity to herself engage in the discourse processes she is investigating” (Fairclough, 2001:138). However, as long as the researcher is aware of the implications of one’s MR, ideologies, etc. upon results, a certain level of objectivity is maintained, as the researcher is conscious of the conventions applied to research and is self-conscious of her involvement and the need “to explicate what she is doing” (2001:139). It should be noted that this current thesis has also

---

47 It should be noted that the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports have been cited in text by using the following format: for Regular Reports, it is cited as RR (as in Regular Report), year and page (e.g. RR 1998:1); for Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, it is cited as CMR (as in Comprehensive Monitoring Report), year and page (e.g. CMR 2005:1). By using this format, it will be clarified which Report was under examination.
employed the interviewing technique and the method of content analysis in order to minimize the chance of biased findings and attain more reliable data (Grix, 2010:135), as well as maintain the research findings as “sound or true as far as can be judged” (Pierce, 2008:74)

3.7.2. Accessing the Reports

As discussed previously, the thesis will analyze seven Regular Reports and three Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. Accessing the Reports was an informal task, as the Reports are available to the public in electronic versions on the European Commission Directorate General Enlargement website. The Reports were retrieved from the website, using a search for the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports for Romania. The Reports are also available to the public in paper format at the Central Commission library in Brussels (which was visited in January 2012 during a field work visit). Only the English versions of the Reports were analyzed due to the fact that as English is a widely spoken language, it might be more suitable for readers of this current research to read the original Reports in English, if required, than for instance read the Reports published in Romanian, which is a less spoken language.

3.7.3. Limitations during field work

When conducting the field work, three main limitations were identified, which could have impacted upon the results of the current research. First, due to limited accessibility to some of the elite interviewees, which may relate to the argument that “visibility is not the same as accessibility” (Thomas, 1995:4), I resorted to other forms of interview techniques, such as phone and email interviews. For instance, despite being aware of where to locate and how to contact interviewee 4, gatekeepers indicated that a face to face interview was not possible due to a busy schedule (see Thomas, 1995:8). As a solution, I was required to conduct a telephone
interview (see Useem, 1995:23). Similarly, the elite interviews with interviewees 8 and 9 were conducted by email, due to the respondents’ busy schedules. These forms of interviews have their strengths, such as being cost and time effective (Useem, 1995:20; Bryman, 2012:214 and 488) and even removing the bias (to a certain extent) of the interviewer’s characteristics and presence (Bryman, 2012:214). Their shortcoming however lays in the fact that such methods offer an impersonal technique and provide short and not expansive replies (Bryman, 2012:488 and 215; see also Useem, 1995:20-21; Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004; Irvine et al., 2010). In contrast, the material recorded in face to face interviews was lengthier and more elaborated (see Beach, 2005:14; Bryman, 2012:215). It should be noted that I could have opted out from conducting phone and email interviews, knowing the limitations, but since these interviewees had occupied central positions in the negotiating teams of the Romanian enlargement and could therefore enable a wealth of information “from the inside” (Kvale, 2007:x), I opted to conduct these interviews, but considered how such a choice may affect the data collected.

Second, in contrast to non-elite interviewees, elite interviewees had a tendency to control the interview situation in a variety of ways (see Ostrander, 1995:142). This was an interesting aspect to consider when reflecting how such a control may have affected the research. First, the elite interviewees decided the flow of the interview through interruptions or requesting to switch off the audio recorder during interviews. In other words, the elite interviewees decided to a certain extent how the interview was conducted and what and when was recorded. For instance, interviewee 2 requested at different occasions during the interview to stop and restart. The same procedure took place during the interview with interviewee 10, which was interrupted due to work commitments. Second, another interesting aspect was also that elite interviewees opted for anonymity, an aspect which was not requested by non-elite interviewees.
interviewees. Third, elite interviewees also seemed to control their responses to a larger extent than non-elite interviewees. For instance, such a control was noticeable when the initial interview material that was transcribed was amended by a number of the elite interviewees, but not by the non-elite interviewees. Furthermore, in particular interviewees 1 and 5 amended the transcripts to a large extent, although a large proportion of the amendments included clarifications or expanded on responses where the interviewees suggested that they had not been clear. Nevertheless, such circumstances questioned the extent to which the amended interviews include the accurate version of what happened or the experiences of the interviewees (Pierce, 2008:86), as well as the elite interviewees’ “capacity to control” the discourse, the contributions and the discourse type (see Fairclough, 2001:25).

Third, although all interviewees were advised that their participation would enable insightful contributions to the academic literature through this current research, a significant low number of Romanian officials, who were contacted, responded and indicated that they wanted to be part of the research. This attitude was consistent regardless of the position that the official had. Furthermore, a number of Romanian officials, who were contacted and did not respond or declined, had been active in contributing to past academic publications, workshops, conferences, etc. regarding their experiences of the Romanian enlargement. This in turn raised questions regarding their motives for not responding to or declining the interview request. For instance one of the potential interviewees declined the interview, explaining that he had only been in the position (of the Romanian negotiating team) for a short period of time (circa two years). He suggested that I should contact officials, who had been in the same position longer and could provide more information. Nevertheless, the same official had previously given interviews about his experiences as part of the Romanian enlargement team, though these interviews were conducted by established sources, such as
reputable academics and official invitations from recognized institutions (see Pierce, 2008:119). In contrast, all EU officials, who were approached, did consent to the interview and as mentioned previously, a number of them even introduced other potential interviewees, as in the case of interviewee 2, who was the gatekeeper for interviewee 3.

3.8. Conclusions

This chapter has argued that in order to address the research questions, engaging with CDA, conducting interviews and applying content analysis is pivotal in adequately demonstrating the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. The three-dimensional CDA model involves the application of three dimensions, which aim to reveal the correlation between language and unequal power relations (see Fairclough, 2001:21 and 22; van Dijk, 2003:363). The chapter argues that examining the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports through the CDA model will allow us to examine the extent to which unequal power relations were produced in and behind the discourse of the Reports. The three-dimensional model is a significant research method as it establishes an understanding of the link between the formal properties of the Reports, the production and interpretation of the Reports (discourse practices) and the sociocultural practices and the production of unequal power relations (see Fairclough, 1995:87). Furthermore, the conduct of interviews was chosen in order to ensure “a more balanced approach” (Grix op.cit., p.126-127), by including the experiences, understandings, interpretations, feelings, etc. of officials, who had been part of the Romanian enlargement. The interview material was also discussed in relation to postcolonialism in order to provide empirical support for demonstrating the extent to which the Reports’ discourses are a place in which unequal power relations are produced, exercised and enacted through elements of subalternity, mimicry and orientalism. Additionally, content analysis was briefly employed in order to provide an additional element of data-collection.
The reason for choosing the two sets of Reports was addressed. This was based on the fact that such primary sources are more reliable, as they are the product of the EU, without interference of interpretation by others (Rosamond, 2006:469). Furthermore, as academic studies have largely focused on the examination of earlier monitoring Reports, overlooking a broader scrutiny of such documents, which would also include later Reports, the current thesis can contribute to the enlargement literature by adding valuable new insights. Especially as Regular Reports have been criticized for hiding, denying or playing down the EU’s leverage and the subordinate position of candidates, the examination of these primary sources may provide further understanding about the production of inequality.

The chapter also discussed how potentialities and limitations encountered during field work may have impacted upon the research results and how these have been dealt with. The chapter concludes that by engaging with the above research framework, this current research aims to make important contributions to our understanding of EU enlargement and the production of unequal power relations. Before proceeding with the application of the above research framework, the next chapter will present the contextual framework of the Romanian enlargement in order to reveal significant analytical points that will be made in the empirical chapters.
CHAPTER 4

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE ROMANIAN ENLARGEMENT

This chapter argues that examining the contextual background of the Romanian enlargement will not only provide a history of the enlargement process and accession negotiations, but will also set out the context in which an unequal encounter was produced and thus reveal some of the key analytical points that will be made in the analysis of the Reports. To start with, the European Union has undergone continuous widening and deepening following its establishment in 1951 (Dinan, 2014). One of its most successful integration policies has been initiated through enlargement (Krasteva, 2009:119). As stated in Chapter 1, the enlargement literature often discusses the evolution of different enlargements, in which EU-candidates interaction is examined as an element of importance. Accordingly, this chapter will draw upon this literature in order to set out the contextual background of the Romanian enlargement.

The chapter is divided in two main sections. The first section provides a brief history of the Romanian enlargement, in order to set out the context in which the accession negotiations took place. Furthermore, a discussion of the annual monitoring Reports, the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, aims to highlight the Reports’ implication upon the Romanian enlargement and subsequently the production of an unequal encounter. Additionally, the section also clarifies that although we may speak of the EU as a unitary
actor in the enlargement process or when producing unequal power relations, a matrix of EU institutions are involved in such a process (see Hayes-Renshaw, 2012:69). It is therefore significant to highlight the roles and powers of these institutions as vehicles in shaping enlargement and through which accession negotiations are enforced (Peterson and Shackleton, 2012b:8 and 12).

The second section outlines a more detailed history of the Romanian accession negotiations in order to demonstrate that the EU’s practice of assessment monitoring and the monitoring Reports, as well as the involvement of EU institutions are significant to our understanding of how the EU produces unequal power relations. The section will also consider the fight against corruption, which was identified as one of Romania’s outstanding problems in fulfilling the accession criteria and which impacted upon the Reports, negotiations and EU-Romania relations. Overall, the chapter will present key positions of the EU and Romania during the enlargement process, how these are reflected in the Reports and flag up some of the key analytical points that will be made in the empirical chapters.

4.1. The Romanian enlargement

The building stone towards the fifth enlargement started at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 when the Council agreed on the Copenhagen criteria (European Council, 1993:13; Bardi et al., 2002:227), which stated that “the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union” (European Council, 1993:13). In a nutshell, the Copenhagen criteria included three important conditions that all candidate countries must satisfy in order to become member states: political criteria, economic criteria and the implementation of the acquis (European Commission, 2014a). The Copenhagen criteria established therefore the recognition that the
then European Communities (EC), which later was to become the EU, accepted new member states from the former Communist satellite states. On these grounds, in June 1995 Romania submitted its membership application (European Commission, 2013f; see also Phinnemore, 2006a:40; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:35-36).

The Romanian request to join the EU was perhaps not a surprising move. Already in the 1970s and despite heavy control by Moscow, the then Socialist Republic of Romania (the official name until December 1989) (Light, 2006:11 and 13) and the EC cooperated in a number of areas (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:18-19; see also Phinnemore, 2002:223; Dinan, 2014). With the fall of the Eastern bloc in 1989 (Turnock, 2000:241), the EC witnessed Romania’s determination to return to Europe and to integrate with the EC as a member state (O’Brennan, 2006:14; Avery, 2012:169). Despite initial hesitation (Gower, 1999:3; Poole, 2003:36; O’Brennan, 2006:15; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:19), the EC’s support to integrate Romania was first provided through pre-accession assistance such as the Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:23), as well as the signing of the Europe agreement (Association agreement)48 (Gower, 1999:5; O’Brennan, 2006:19-22). While the latter helped in establishing Romania’s position as an associated country49 (O’Brennan, 2006:19), the Europe agreement was criticised as a one-sided policy that benefited largely the EC (see O’Brennan, 2006:20-21), despite the associated countries’ request to be treated as equal partners (Poole, 2003:37).

Once the membership application was in, the Council of Minister requested the European Commission to compile an Opinion, which was to include the latter’s technical evaluation of

---

48 Agreement that the EC concluded with non-member states, setting up a framework to conduct bilateral relations and prepare for EU membership (European Commission, 2013d; European Union, 2016b).
49 Non-member state, who shares an agreement with the EC/EU (Gallagher, 2009:115).
Romania’s ability to fulfill the membership requirements (O’Brien, 2006:29-30). The Commission published the *Opinion* in July 1997 as part of the *Agenda 2000* report and presented its assessment to the Council of Ministers (European Commission, 2013b). The report was not a positive one, as the Commission recommended that “negotiations for accession to the European Union should be opened with Romania as soon as it has made sufficient progress in satisfying the conditions of membership defined by the European Council in Copenhagen” (European Commission, 1997b:114; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:36 and 38). In other words, Romania was not ready to become a candidate country.

It was not until December 1999 that the Helsinki European Council formally recognized Romania as eligible for EU membership (European Commission, 2013b) and recommended “to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences” (IGCs) (European Council, 1999, section I, point 10; Michalski, 2014:279). The actual accession negotiations started in February 2000 (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:46; see also Verdun, 2005) when the EU opened different negotiation chapters with Romania. These were closed once each chapter was approved on. Once all chapters were closed, the draft of the Treaty of Accession was agreed between the EU and Romania. This was followed by the Commission’s *Opinion* on the Treaty in February 2005 and the European Parliament’s consent to the Treaty. The EU member states and Romania signed the Treaty, after which all signatories ratified it, according to the different national processes. Once the Treaty was ratified, it came into force and Romania became a member state of the EU in January 2007 (Avery, 2012:169).

Throughout the Romanian enlargement, one particular matter often took center stage: the fight against corruption (Grabbe, 2006; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Vachudova, 2008:

---

50 Included detailed policy proposals, aiming to prepare the EU for the fifth enlargement (O’Brien, 2006:17).
51 Meetings between representatives of the governments of the member states and the candidate country, in which accession negotiations are discussed (European Parliament, 1998a; Gateva, 2015:17).
Gallagher, 2009). The high level of corruption in Romania was no surprise, as post-1989, the country had continuously been rated as corrupt, by for instance Transparency International, which had labelled Romania “the most corrupt country in Europe” (Pridham, 2006b:11, 2007a:355). Although attempts had been made to set up systems and campaigns against corruption (as the below sections will show), corruption was an extending problem in Romania. This was largely enabled by the fact that corruption was “strongly intertwined with political parties, the civil service and state agencies”, which governed Romania (Vachudova, 2009:44) and in particular by the coming into power of a “highly corrupt and unreformed former communist party”, which stayed in power until 1996 (Vachudova, 2009:45). Additionally, the absence of “a corruption-fighting acquis” within the EU meant that it took the Commission longer “to develop the tools to compel candidate states to work harder in addressing corruption problems” (Vachudova, 2009:50).

What is of significance here is the fact that corruption came to have implications upon the Romanian enlargement, as section 4.2. will demonstrate. For instance, when the Laeken European Council decided that Romania was not going to join the first wave of accession, such a decision also took into consideration the widespread corruption in Romania (Vachudova, 2009:52-53). Another important example in which corruption had a determinative role took place in 2006 when the EU realized “the extent of the corruption problem” in Romania and included a safeguard clause in the Romanian Accession Treaty, which subjugated Romania to unprecedented post-accession conditions (Vachudova, 2009:51).

Although the above description of the Romanian enlargement may sound straight-forward, the enlargement was actually a complex process, ran by various actors and with the
application of a variety of mechanisms through which Romania’s enlargement process was monitored and which helped in driving the negotiation accessions. One such mechanism was the monitoring Reports, which gained important significance in the Romanian enlargement, as often these Reports influenced accession negotiations and integration into the EU (Michalski, 2014:280).

4.1.1. The monitoring Reports

In order to better support the fifth enlargement and the successful integration of candidates, the end of the 1990s saw the adaptation of the EU’s administrative and institutional structure, in particular by setting up the Directorate-General Enlargement (DG ENLARG) and appoint a European Commissioner for Enlargement as part of the European Commission (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:277; see also Bellier, 2004:140; Nugent, 2004:45; O’Brennan, 2006:81 and 202; Meyer-Sahling and Goetz, 2009:329; Phinnemore, 2010:299; Michalski, 2014:294). The key role of DG ENLARG was to navigate the enlargement process and support the Council of Ministers handling enlargement issues (Nugent, 2001:8; Michalski, 2014:283). With such a new solidified structure, the EU also introduced regular publication of monitoring assessments52 of each candidate country (Baun, 2000:119; Grabbe, 2001:1022; Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:274), in order to observe and identify matters, which were significant to the accession negotiations (Nugent, 2004:45 and 51).

One set of such reports, which proved to offer the annual “regular up-dating and reporting on the candidates’ progress” that the EU needed (Michalski, 2014:280) were the Regular Reports, which were introduced in 1998 (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:279-280). These unprecedented, “extremely detailed” Reports (Nugent, 2004:45) included the Commission’s

---

52 Such documents included for instance Regular Reports, Strategy Reports, Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, Opinions, etc.
assessments of Romania’s implementation of the official membership criteria (the Copenhagen criteria) and the Accession Partnership\(^{53}\) (Grabbe, 2001:1022, 2002:262), as well as discussions regarding problems, solutions and recommendations (Ram, 2003:35; Nugent, 2004:45 and 51; Pridham, 2006a:380; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:121; Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:274). On a similar note, after signing the Treaty of Accession in 2005 and until September 2006, the Commission replaced the Regular Reports with the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, which similarly to the first set of Reports, continued the monitoring of Romania’s preparations for accession (European Commission, 2005b:3; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:61). Overall, the EU recognized the reporting system (monitoring Reports) as telling “the truth about the applicants’ present state” (Raik, 2004:579-580). For instance, in the 1998 *Presentation on Regular Reports to the European Parliament*, Commissioner for External Relations Hans van den Broek identified the Regular Reports as “expert, objective, impartial, and free of political prejudice”. The Commissioner pointed out how the Reports were “recognised as high-quality work” and how the assessments had improved the work of Commission officials, as the latter “know more and we understand better” the candidate countries (van den Broek, 1998:2).

Due to the “extremely detailed” assessment of each Report (Nugent op.cit., p.45), which offered a large amount of information, the Regular Reports became “a ‘key mechanism’” (Michalski, 2014:284) in the Romanian enlargement. The significance of these Reports rested on the fact that the December European Councils\(^{54}\) based their political decisions, which also included the directions of negotiations, on the Reports’ assessments (Grabbe, 2001:1022, 2002:261; Phinnemore, 2006a:41, 2010:292; Pridham, 2007c:530-532; Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:274; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:6). In other words, the Commission’s

---

\(^{53}\) Defines the framework of the accession process (European Commission, 2013I).

\(^{54}\) The Regular Reports were published prior to each December European Council (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:279).
assessments shaped the agenda of negotiations to a large extent, as the discussion on the Romanian accession negotiations in section 4.2. will reveal. Although the European Councils did not have to consider or follow the recommendations, in most cases, the Councils did (Nugent, 2001:315-316; Grabbe, 2001:1022; Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:47).

The production of the Reports was a rather complex process and involved a variety of EU and non-EU actors, as Appendix 4 reveals. Such a procedure involved the setting up of “a clear temporal pattern with fixed deadlines and a developed time-frame”, which the involved actors had to commit to (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:279-280). As part of each Report, the Commission clarified that although the monitoring Reports were a product of the European Commission, the assessments were based on “numerous sources of information” 55, which derived from the Commission’s officials, individual candidate countries and member states, other EU institutions, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, etc. (RR, 1998:5; CMR, 2005:6; see also Broek, 1998:2). This however highlights an important complication, which will be raised in the analysis: who was actually the producer of the Reports? Appendix 4, which looks at the time frame of and the agents involved in the production of the monitoring Reports, reveals that both the assessments and the production of the Reports were influenced by a variety of actors, questioning therefore who exactly had power in and behind the discourses of the Reports and subsequently produced unequal power relations. In particular, Chapter 7 will seek to identify who the producer of the Reports was and demonstrate that answering such a question may not offer a straight-forward answer (see Fairclough, 2001:42-46).

55 It should be noted that the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports are even vaguer about what sources have been drawn upon in order to compile the Reports in contrast to the Regular Reports.
Looking at the above, perhaps another important aspect, which needs to be addressed, is the involvement of different EU institutions in the monitoring, assessing and steering of the Romanian enlargement. By identifying these and their roles and powers, we can better understand the matrix of actors involved in enlargement and accession negotiations and the impact upon production of unequal power relations. Thus, while the next section will briefly identify these institutions and their roles in the enlargement context, section 4.2. will address the influential role that these institutions played in the Romanian negotiations.

4.1.2. The role of EU institutions

Largely, four EU institutions can be identified as key actors in the Romanian enlargement. These are the Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament\(^{56}\) (O’Brennan, 2006:55-56; see also Nugent, 2001, 2004, 2010; Best et al., 2008; Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2010; Bomberg et al., 2012a, 2012b; Peterson and Shackleton, 2012a; Buonanno and Nugent, 2013; Dinan, 2014). A fourth institution, the European Council, also played a significant role, but since the European Council became an official EU institution after the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 (McCormick, 2011:78; Corbett et al., 2012:50), we shall refer to the European Council as a body of the EU in the context of the Romanian enlargement.

As O’Brennan argues, enlargement is not a straight-forward process, but a rather complex one, where roles, tasks and powers of EU institutions’ can fluctuate, from being limited to becoming very influential. Furthermore, the complexity is also aggravated by the “multiplicity of institutional entities” of each EU institution (2006:58). This refers to the fact that although we speak of each as unitary bodies, this is a misleading image, as within each of...
these institutions there were “numerous formations organized by policy specialization”, interests, roles, seniority, etc., which dealt with the Romanian enlargement and accession negotiations (Lewis, 2010:142). The below discussion will therefore address “the multiplicity of institutional entities”, as well as their roles and powers in the enlargement context.

The Council of Ministers

To start with, the Council of Ministers 57, which is comprised by representatives of the member states’ governments (Hayes-Renshaw, 2012:84), may be regarded as the starting point of any state’s EU accession, as it is to the Council of Ministers that the applicant country will submit their membership application (European Council, 2016b). Primarily in the fifth enlargement context, the main role of the Council of Ministers was to negotiate the accession of candidate states, while representing the interests of the member states (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006:15). Such a role was not easy, largely because the Council of Ministers was the institution in which the interests and powers of the member states were played out (O’Brennan, 2006:59 and 72). One obvious episode in which a member state displayed their annoyance with a candidate country and fears of retaliation against the latter during the Council’s negotiations grew took place in 2003 when Romania decided to support US action in Iraq. French President Chirac criticized Romania’s decision, highlighting that their position at the negotiations table was “very delicate” (Gallagher, 2009:138). The European Commission however did not endorse France’s reaction, but instead, European Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen stressed that such a step was of strategic importance to the EU’s Eastern borders (Gallagher, 2009:139).

57 Since 1999 also referred to as the Council of the European Union (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006:14).
Although we speak of the Council of Ministers as a unitary body, the Council is formed by different working units, which form “a complex and variegated institutional construct” (Lewis, 2010:145). For instance, the Romanian enlargement and accession negotiations were not a matter taken care of by the Council per se, but it was largely handled by a division of three units, the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the European Union (COREPER II), the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) at the ministerial level and the Enlargement Working group, which included a number of middle-ranking officials of the permanent representations (O’Brennan, 2006:60-61; Michalski, 2014:283). Furthermore, all three can be regarded as “the tip of the iceberg”, as their work was supported by a large number of other officials, ranging from EU permanent representatives, expert working groups, national officials, national civil servant and policy specialists (Lewis, 2010:144). Here we can also add that the country holding the Presidency of the Council often played a significant role in setting the enlargement agenda, pushing for conclusions on various chapters and reaching agreements on problems in the enlargement process (O’Brennan, 2006:62; Michalski, 2014:283).

The European Council

While the Council of Ministers can be regarded as the start point of a country’s accession, the European Council can be regarded as the end point, as it is the Council that has the final saying in whether “the country meets all the necessary criteria for consideration as an official candidate for EU membership” and whether it can join as a member state (Tallberg, 2016).

---

58 For an in-depth understanding of the different layers of actors involved in the work of the Council of Ministers, see Hayes-Renshaw (2012:70-75).
59 Responsible for preparing the work of the Council of Ministers, it consists of representatives from the EU countries with the rank of ambassador to the EU and is chaired by the EU country, which holds the Council Presidency (European Union, 2016a).
60 Prior to 2002 the GAERC was known as the General Affairs Council (GAC). The GAERC, formed by member states’ foreign affair ministers (Lewis, 2010:143; European Union, 2016a), is one of the ten configurations under which the Council of Ministers meets (Corbet et al., 2012:54-55; European Council, 2016a, 2016b).
The European Councils are regular meetings of the Heads of State and Government of the EU member states, the European Commission President and the High Representative for foreign affair and security policy (and is assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council), where political directions are taken, guidelines are provided and enlargement priorities and agendas are shaped (Tallberg, 2008:685; Avery, 2012:60-6; Michalski, 2014:283; Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:47; European Union, 2016c; see also Tallberg, 2007).

Enlargement matters, such as negotiations, take place among senior officials, such as the permanent representatives in the case of the EU member states and the ambassador to the EU in the case of the candidate countries, which are in turn supported by a variety of other officials (Michalski, 2014:283). Often, the President of the European Council can have an influential role in the enlargement and negotiation proceedings (Tallberg, 2008:691; European Council, 2016c). The European Council works closely with both the Council of Ministers, which implements the decisions taken by the former and with the European Commission, which often provides solutions to existing problems as advised by the European Council (Düzgit and Suvarierol, 2011:470; Avery, 2012:166; European Union, 2016c). As the below will demonstrate, the European Councils are largely dependent on the work of the Commission, as enlargement decisions are often endorsed by the Commission’s assessments (Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:47).

**The European Commission**

The European Commission is often regarded as the key player in the enlargement and accession negotiation process and exercising more influence than any other EU institution (O’Brennan, 2006:56; Gallagher, 2009:30; Avery, 2012:166; Michalski, 2014:283; European
The main role of the Commission in enlargement is to assist applicants, candidates and acceding states in meeting the accession criteria, monitor and evaluate the enlargement process and support accession negotiations as defined by the European Councils (European Commission, 2016b).

The Commission’s involvement in the enlargement process and with the applicants is established early on, often during the pre-applicant phase and to a larger extent during the applicant phase (Nugent, 2001:316-317). In the case of the fifth enlargement, the Commission’s interaction with the applicants started via the PHARE assistance and later through the *Opinions*. In the case of PHARE, this gave the Commission the opportunity to shape the PHARE content, which included the initiating, management and implementation of the pre-accession program (O’Brennan, 2006:88). Furthermore, the twinning model, which was presented in 1998 by the Commission, expanded the latter’s role in the enlargement process (O’Brennan, 2006:89), by introducing a new instrument for institutional cooperation, which proved to be successful (Grabbe, 2001:1024; European Commission, 2016a). It should be noted that the introduction of twinning was criticized, as it was seen as enabling the Commission to colonize “important parts of the enlargement process” and thus, extending its leverage (O’Brennan, 2006:89; see also Grabbe, 2001:1026-1027, 2002:266; Poole, 2003:10; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004:625; Pridham, 2006a:397).

During accession negotiations and until the applicant joins the EU, the Commission maintains a continued dialogue via the delegation in the candidate/acceding state. Such a dialogue acquires “extensive expertise and knowledge” about each applicant and solidifies

---

61 In which twinning projects bring together expertise from member states to the applicant countries in order to achieve concrete operational results through peer to peer activities (European Commission, 2016a).
the Commission’s influence (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:36 and 38; Avery, 2012:163; Michalski, 2014:280). Especially in the case of the fifth enlargement, the production of the monitoring Reports enabled the Commission to gain knowledge about and interact with the candidate countries (Nugent, 2001:318), as well as shape the enlargement discourse (see O’Brennan, 2006:79). During the acceding phase when the Treaty is ratified, the Commission’s role is limited and almost replaced by the Council and Parliament, although the Commission still provides information to both institutions (Nugent, 2001:318).

Just like in the case of the Council of Ministers, although we speak of the European Commission as one body, the Romanian enlargement was not the responsibility of the Commission per se, but of DGIA\(^{62}\) (Nugent, 2001:136; Bretherton, 2002:15). With the reorganization of the Commission in 2000 during the presidency of Prodi, the Romanian enlargement was moved into the hands of DG ENLARG (Egebert, 2010:133). Furthermore, as the fifth enlargement came to include new actions and unprecedented measurements, special Enlargement Task forces were set, which also included the so called designated country desks (Egebert, 2010:133). The Romanian enlargement was therefore also handled by officials at Romania country desk (Gallagher, 2009:172). Moreover, European Commissioners for Enlargement often showed a high dedication to the enlargement process (O’Brennan, 2006:76), which meant that they got involved in the process to a large extent. As the section on the Romanian accession negotiations will demonstrate, Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen was in particular highly involved in the Romanian enlargement.

One salient aspect, which deserves closer attention and which has raised questions about the level of leverage in the EU (McCormick, 1999:84; Nugent, 2001:320; Egebert, 2010:128; 62 Directorate-General of external relations, with a focus on Europe and the new independent states, as well as common foreign and security policy and external missions (Nugent, 2001:136).
Hayes-Renshaw, 2012:70), is the Commission’s role as key enlargement advisor to the Council of Ministers and in particular the European Councils (Nugent, 2001:320; see also Bellier, 2004; Nugent, 2004; Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2010; Avery, 2012:166; Bomberg et al., 2012a; Peterson and Shackleton, 2012a). Such a position was established by Article 49 in the Treaty on European Union, which advised that the Council of Ministers and the European Councils shall consult with the Commission on EU matters, including enlargement (European Union, 2016d). As mentioned previously, although accession negotiations are in the hands of the Councils, the decisions are more than often based on the Commission’s assessments and recommendations, which are published for instance in the monitoring Reports (Avery, 2012:169; see also Düzgit and Suvarierol, 2011:470). The discussion on the Romanian accession negotiations will further provide an overview of the interplay between the Commission and the European Councils and the impact upon enlargement and negotiations.

The European Parliament

Although the European Parliament may not be involved in accession negotiations to the same extent as the Council of Ministers, the European Councils and the Commission, its power cannot be overlooked (O’Brennan, 2006:95; Corbett et al., 2011). First, one of the legislative roles of the Parliament is to decide on enlargements (European Union, 2016e). In particular, once the European Council has confirmed that a candidate state can join the EU, the Parliament’s key task is to “vote by an absolute majority at the end of the accession negotiations, in order to permit the ratification of each individual accession treaty” (O’Brennan, 2006:97). Second, due to its supervisory role, the Parliament is the institution, which enforces democratic scrutiny to a larger extent than any other EU institutions (European Union, 2016e). For instance, in the context of the fifth enlargement, the Parliament
insisted that the EU’s democratic norms were at the core of the enlargement and that the EU needed to apply equality of treatment of all candidates in the process (O’Brennan, 2006:98-99). Additionally, its supervisory role gives the Parliament power to question the Commission and the Council (Corbett et al., 2012:64; Hurka et al, 2015:1230; European Union, 2016e), by for instance debating enlargement progress and passing resolutions on the various documents released by the Commission and on the situation in every candidate country (Michalski, 2014:284).

Similarly to the Commission, the Parliament also monitors candidate countries through the Parliament’s own reports, which are compiled by the rapporteurs (Hurka et al, 2015). Such reports can be influential on a country’s enlargement and accession, as the discussion on the Romanian accession negotiations will reveal. Furthermore, just like in the case of Council and Commission Presidents, Presidents of the European Parliament can also become highly involved in the enlargement procedure. For instance Pat Cox enjoyed a close working relation with both Verheugen and the Enlargement Task force, as well as the Council of Ministers, due to their support of similar targets in the fifth enlargement (O’Brennan, 2006:106; see also Cameron, 2004:14; Napel and Widgrén, 2006).

O’Brennan identifies that in comparison to other EU institutions, the Parliament showed a more “consistent willingness to champion the macro goal of enlargement, while urging the accommodation of CEE preferences to the greatest extent possible within the process” in the fifth enlargement (2006:105). One such situation, which also benefitted the candidate countries, took place in 2002 when the Parliament opened “the chamber to candidate state

---

63 Contain proposals for resolutions or legislative amendments to be voted on by the Parliament. The reports are known by the personal names of the rapporteur, who drafts and presents them, i.e “the Nicholson report” (European Parliament, 2006).

64 MEPs, who write reports, are known by the French term “rapporteur” (European Parliament, 2006).
representatives before their accessions had been successfully negotiated”. O’Brennan emphasizes that such an act was unprecedented, as it allowed representatives of the candidate countries to be “included inside the European Parliament’s structures whilst negotiations on accession were still at a very delicate stage” (2006:105). Such an inclusion gave for instance the Czech Republic and Hungary the opportunity to negotiate and demand, on behalf of their countries, 22 seats in the European Parliament, the same number of seats that the member states of Belgium and Portugal were enjoying (2006:107; see also European Parliament, 2002a:4; Laursen, 2006).

While the above has briefly outlined an overview of the monitoring Reports and EU institutions, the next section will include a broader discussion of the implications of the Reports and institutions upon the Romanian accession negotiations and EU-Romania relations, in order to reveal the context in which an unequal encounter between the EU and Romania emerged and understand the production of unequal power relations.

4.2. The Romanian accession negotiations

This section argues that the Romanian accession negotiations are instrumental in understanding the extent to which the EU produced unequal power relations. The section will be discussed in terms of three distinctive phases of the Romanian enlargement process, where each phase marked the transition of Romania to the next stage in the enlargement process and accession negotiations: applicant phase (1995-2000), candidate phase (2000-2005) and acceding phase (2005-2007) (see also Nugent, 2001:316-319). The significance of the monitoring Reports and EU institutions will also be discussed, as well as the fight against corruption in order to identify implications upon negotiations and flag up some of the key analytical points that will be made in the empirical chapters.
4.2.1. Applicant phase

The applicant phase spans from the time of the Romanian submission of the membership application in June 1995 and until February 2000 when the EU opened the first accession negotiation chapters with Romania, becoming a candidate country (European Commission, 2013m).

Following the submission of membership to the Council of Ministers in June 1995 and the Madrid European Council’s request of an Opinion (also known as avis) (European Commission, 1997b:5), the Commission assessed Romania’s readiness to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. The work involved the efforts of all Commission’s DGs, but primarily, the assessment was done by the Enlargement Task force, through the help of a questionnaire sent in April 1996 and which the Romanian authorities had to complete and return within three months (Nugent, 2001:317; see also European Commission, 1997b:11). The aim of the questionnaire was “to enable the Commission to evaluate the extent of approximation of laws and present it with a picture of the extent of the country’s development” (Stawarska, 1999:827). The results were published in the Commission Opinion on Romania’s application for membership of the European Union (European Commission, 1997a) as part of Agenda 2000 in July 1997. The Opinion concluded that “Romania is experiencing serious problems in transposing the Community acquis” and recommended to only open accession negotiations after “sufficient progress to meet the accession terms” has been made (European Commission, 1997a:1, 1997b:114; Agnew, 2001:32; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:36-38). The Commission’s recommendation was also endorsed by the European Parliament’s Rapporteur Pierre Bernard-Reymond’s own conclusions that it would be "premature to open accession negotiations with Romania" (European Parliament, 1999).
Primarily, the recommendation of leaving Romania out was based on the Commission’s dissatisfaction with the fulfilment of the conditionality principle. The conditionality principle referred to the conditions for Romania’s accession to the EU and was based on “the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria” (Pridham 2007c:530, Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:115; see also Grabbe, 2001, 2002; Türkes and Gökgöz, 2006; Pridham, 2007b; Avery, 2012:163) and the adoption of the 80,000 pages of the acquis before membership negotiations were opened (Pridham, 2004:524-525; Lass-Lannecke and Werner, 2009:272-273; Chiva and Phinnemore, 2011a; see also Dimitrova, 2004b:8; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004:662).

Based on what Pridham deemed as a “cautious or pessimistic” Opinion assessment of Romania (2007c:535-536; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:14), the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 proposed that the accession process should be launched with all applicants in March 1998, but only “convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences” and thus begin accession negotiations with six applicant states, while continuing “preparation of negotiations“ with the remaining applicants to which Romania also belonged (European Council, 1997, point c27; see also Phinnemore, 2006a:41; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:121; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:38-39; Michalski, 2014:293). Such a decision shows not only that the European Council had power to decide whether Romania met “the necessary criteria for consideration as an official candidate for EU membership” (European Council, 2016b), but also that the Commission’s assessments and recommendations shaped the European Council’s decisions (Michalski, 2014:283).
Romania’s exclusion by the Luxembourg European Council raised concerns. Notably, the decision infuriated former Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea, who raised fears of discrimination and unequal treatment by the EU (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:38). Romanian Chief Negotiator Lazăr Comănescu explained that such a decision implied distancing Romania from Europe and maintaining the old division of East and West (Comănescu, 2006:96; see also Grabbe and Hughes, 1999:189; Phinnemore, 2006a:48). Moreover, Radio Free Europe correspondent Ron Synovitz described the omission of Romania as “splitting into packs” (Synovitz, 1997), suggesting that by leaving Romania out, the EU produced a distinction between candidates. Criticism grew amongst EU member states, as France, Italy and Greece raised concerns about a sense of isolation against Romania in the accession proceedings (Baun, 2000:120 and 122-123). Criticism also resonated in the European Parliament (Baun, 2000:124; Michalski, 2014:293), arguing that the EU’s strategy of dividing the candidate countries into an internal (made up by mostly the 2004 entrants) and an external buffer zone (made up by the 2007 entrants) created a “two-tiered” system of candidates, in which Romania as part of the external buffer zone enjoyed a “lower, third tier of rights” than the internal buffer zone (Böröcz, 2006b:154).

The EU also recognized that a successful implementation of conditionality could be implemented through the twinning exercise, which had been launched by the Commission in May 1998 (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004:620). For instance, the Commission sent a range of pre-accession advisers from the member states’ civil services to lead twinning projects within the Romanian Ministry of Interior. Although tensed at times (2004:624 and 630), the EU advisers enjoyed “a close working relationship with both the Head of the European Integration Directorate and the Secretary of State for European Integration” within the Ministry. The advisers reported that the Romanian officials had welcomed the twinning
projects and had showed tremendous efforts to commit to the success of such an exercise. However such a commitment was not always well received, as in the case of the Ministry of Development and Prognosis, whose officials were rather less keen in implementing the recommendations of the EU advisers (2004:631-632).

Following the Commission’s screening process\textsuperscript{65} of Romania, which was completed in April 1998 (Orban, 2006:90; Avery, 2012:163 and 169), the publication of the 1998 Regular Report was the first monitoring report to follow the \textit{Opinion}. The Report presented a negative image of Romania, which “fell far short of meeting the necessary economic criteria for membership” and underlined a deteriorating situation within the country since the membership application had been received by the EU (Baun, 2000:119 and 122). Similarly to the \textit{Opinion}, the Report concluded that Romania had “a long way to go … before the country would be able to assume the obligations of membership” (European Commission, 1998:51). Such a conclusion mirrored the decision taken at the Vienna European Council in December 1998, which welcomed “progress in preparation for accession negotiations”, but not to begin negotiations with Romania (European Parliament, 1998b, section V – ENLARGEMENT, point 60).

In contrast, the 1999 Report echoed Romania’s progress towards fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and adopting the \textit{acquis} (see European Commission, 1999:77-78). The Commission proposed opening accession negotiations with Romania, a recommendation, which was also seen as a solution towards the increasingly unstable situation in Eastern Europe due to the Kosovo conflict (Papadimitrious and Phinnemore, 2008:43). With much more positive assessments, the December 1999 Helsinki European Council formally recognized Romania as

\textsuperscript{65} Also known as the analytical examination of the \textit{acquis}, it includes the familiarizing process of the applicant state with the \textit{acquis} and identifies their level of alignment and need of progress (European Commission, 2013g; see also Beach, 2005:10; O’Brennan, 2006:35).
eligible for EU membership (European Commission, 2013b, 2013j, 2013m; see also Baun, 2000:127) and recommended “to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences in February 2000” (European Council, 1999, section I, point 10; see also Phinnemore, 2006b:25). Also, taken into consideration the Parliament’s criticism regarding the division of applicants in two groups, the EU revised “its enlargement strategy” and opened negotiations with Romania and the remaining five applicants, who had been left out in 1998, underlining that each candidate country was to progress towards accession based on concrete achievements and not based on a “two-tiered” system of candidates (Baun, 2000:124; Michalski, 2014:293).

Overall, the above shows that although negotiations were in the hands of the European Councils (Nugent, 2001:318), the Commission’s Reports played a significant role in the decisions taken by the former, for instance by setting the agenda for the first round of accession negotiations (Luxembourg) and by reconsidering and resetting a new agenda of accession negotiations (Helsinki) (see O’Brennan, 2006:61). Additionally, the criticism raised by the Parliament also impacted upon the revision of the enlargement strategy (see Baun, 2000:124).

On the other hand, the European Parliament’s Rapporteur Baroness Emma Nicholson criticized the Commission’s assessments of the Romanian fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria in the 1999 Regular Report and the Helsinki European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations in 2000 by adding that “the Commission would have to reconsider its evaluation of the political criteria”. What Nicholson meant was that in her opinion Romania had not fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria and thus questioned the Commission’s
assessments and the European Council’s decision to open negotiations (European Parliament, 2001:6-7).

During the applicant phase, one of the main poor credentials and shortcomings in Romania, which was raised in every monitoring Report and which remained, even after accession, a key concern, was the fight against corruption and the slow implementation of a functional anti-corruption policy (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:42; Gallagher, 2009:226; Phinnemore, 2010:295). While the 1998 Report dedicated two short paragraphs to discuss the situation of corruption and called the Romanian anti-corruption measures “incomplete” (RR 1998:10), the 1999 Report offered a more detailed discussion about this “widespread problem (RR 1999:13) and criticised Romania for not addressing the corruption problem with “sufficient determination” (RR 1999:14). The implication of corruption during the Romanian enlargement was that it affected EU-Romania relations, which in turn had an impact upon the accession negotiations. As the upcoming sections will demonstrate, corruption came to play a rather significant role in how negotiations came to be shaped.

4.2.2. Candidate phase

The candidate phase refers to the period during which accession negotiations were taking place in intergovernmental conferences between the EU and Romania (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:46). The period spans from February 2000 when Romania convened its first bilateral conference and until April 2005 when the Treaty of Accession was signed (Orban, 2006:78) and Romania became an acceding state.
According to Romanian Chief Negotiator Leonard Orban, the Helsinki European Council’s decision to formally recognize Romania as eligible for EU membership prompted Romania to work harder towards fulfilling the EU’s requirements. In line with the above, new developments emerged in Romania, such as the establishment of the Ministry of European Integration for the coordination of accession negotiations in 2001 (Orban, 2006:82; Phinnemore, 2006a:41; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:3). In February 2000 with the appointment of the first Romanian Chief Negotiator Aurel Ciobanu-Dordea, the Romanian government set 1 January 2007 as the target date for their EU accession (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:3). Furthermore, as the EU demanded “tangible results in reducing the level of corruption” (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:121), Romania established different mechanisms to help combatting corruption⁶⁶. In 2000 an anti-corruption and organized crime section within the Romanian Prosecutor-General’s office was set up (which the 2001 Report deemed as non-functional, see RR 2001:21-22), while in 2003 an anti-corruption legislation was set up by the Romanian government, but which was deemed incoherent as corruption continued to prosper (Gallagher, 2009:212-213). Neither did the 2004 zero tolerance against corruption campaign had much success as the EU’s European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) identified in their research, although a slight decrease in corruption had started to be noticed (European Anti-Fraud Office, 2003; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:86).

During the candidate phase, Romania opened and closed a variety of negotiation chapters. Primarily, negotiations were conducted by the Council of Ministers (Nugent, 2001:318; O’Brennan, 2006:56), while the European Councils played an important role in setting political directions, priorities and agenda for the Romanian enlargement (Avery, 2012:60-6; Michalski, 2014:283; Buonanno and Nugent, 2013:47; European Union, 2016c). The

---

⁶⁶ For further details see Noutcheva and Bechev (2008:137-138).
Commission’s Reports revealed a relatively smooth progress throughout the period (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:46 and 49), although concerns did emerge which led in December 2001 to the Laeken European Council’s decision, in agreement “with the report of the Commission” (the 2001 Regular Report) that Romania was not going to join the first wave of enlargement in accessing the EU in 2004 due to lack of progress (European Council 2001, section 1, point 8; see also Phinnemore, 1999:73; Moisio, 2002:91; O’Brennan, 2006:34; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:47 and 80-81).

Such a decision attracted criticism due to its exclusionary nature (Grabbe, 2002; Bellier, 2004; O’Brennan, 2006; Pridham, 2006a; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008). However, the Commission ensured Romania of “a continuous, inclusive and irreversible nature of the enlargement process” (European Council, 2002a:6; Phinnemore, 2006c:10). The Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 even suggested an anticipated accession date in 2007 (Council of the European Union, 2003a:4), while the June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council addressed that Romania’s accession negotiations could be concluded in 2004 (Council of the European Union, 2003b:10). The Prodi Commission and Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen also showed their support of Romania. For instance, in early 2003, Verheugen visited Bucharest in order to stress and reassure Romania of the continuous support of the EU towards accession. However, Verheugen underlined that the 2007 target year was only to materialize if Romania was fully committed to fulfill the accession criteria and the _acquis_ (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:54; see also O’Brennan, 2006:81-83).

Accordingly, the European Parliament President Cox showed his support of Romania’s accession in an address in November 2002, where Cox highlighted that regardless of the outcome of the December European Council, the fifth enlargement was to include the
accession of Romania, which he called “inclusive and irreversible”, even though such an accession would take place at a different time and in a different wave than other candidates. Cox also encouraged the European Council to consider 2007 as the target year for Romania’s accession, by highlighting that “it is my personal wish that this House and that the European Council in Copenhagen will commit the European Union to a headline date of 2007”. Cox visualized that such a target might give Romania incentives towards achieving the necessary transformations (European Parliament, 2002b).

The criticism raised in the 2002 Report led to the setting up of an Action Plan (became the preamble of the Roadmap) in order to support “the remaining criteria for membership by identifying the tasks ahead and providing increased financial assistance” (European Commission, 2002a:2; European Council, 2002b; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:51). The Roadmap67 was published in November 2002 and included the main steps that Romania needed to implement in order for the accession negotiations to be concluded (European Commission, 2002a:2-3). With the setting up of the Roadmap and its endorsement by the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, the latter opened all negotiation chapters with Romania (Papadimitrious and Phinnemore, 2008:4 and 49).

With regards to concluding the negotiations, there were several matters that Romania needed to address, in particular progress regarding the fight against corruption, on which the Reports and EU civil servants put pressure (see Open Society Institute, 2002:454; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:136). Although attempts had been made to combat corruption and anti-corruption policies had been enforced, the monitoring Reports revealed dissatisfaction with such a progress. For instance the 2001 Report highlighted that Romania needed to address the

67 Which Romania shared with Bulgaria.
problem of corruption if the country was serious about accessing the EU (RR 2001:22). The 2002 Report identified the corruption level as “a cause for very serious concern” (RR 2002:37), while revealing a complex and broad network of corruption activities at different national levels (Open Society Institute, 2002:454; Gallagher, 2009:207). The OLAF also continued to identify corruption as an impediment to Romania’s progress towards membership (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:86-87). Even Commissioner for Enlargement Rehn and Commission President Barroso recommended at one point not closing the last chapters with Romania (Phinnemore, 2010:302; see also Phinnemore, 2006a:45) due to growing apprehensions “on conditionality grounds” and “continuing disquiet over the political conditions”, where in both cases corruption was one of the seminal factors (Pridham, 2007a:359). The resignation in October 2003 of Romanian Minister for European Integration Hildegard Puwak, due to accusations of using EU funds for personal interests, did not help the image of the Romanian government as moving away from corruption (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:136).

Even reports produced by other EU institutions, endorsed the Commission’s corruption concerns. For instance, the European Parliament’s Rapporteur Nicholson reported in February 2001 that the main obstacles to Romania’s accession were “corruption, the problem of institutionalized children, the implication of the political into public administration” (Denechere and Scutaru, 2010:143). Notably, the Parliament’s 2004 report on Romania’s progress recommended to “reorient the accession strategy” (European Parliament, 2004:11) due to “serious difficulties”, including corruption (2004:5). Such pressure from various EU institutions resulted into the publication of Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Năstase’s To Do List (Lista cu priorități), which included 30 problem issues to be implemented by Romania
by July 2004 in order to ensure the EU that Romania was capable of joining (European Commission, 2013h; see also Anghel, 2004; Pridham, 2007a:357, 2007c:531-532).

Alongside the concern regarding the fight against corruption, the Parliament was also critical of the Romanian child protection policy. In particular, Nicholson condemned international adoption of Romanian children and blamed the Romanian state in how “these children can be swiftly drawn into a well-established, financially led international trafficking system whereby they are sold for profit under the guise of fake or inappropriate adoptions worldwide” (European Parliament, 2001:17). Nicholson worked closely with Verheugen, as the latter had also been critical about the situation of child protection in Romania (Michalski, 2014:71; see also O’Brennan, 2006:81; Gallagher, 2009:155-156). As an outcome, under EU pressure, Romania banned international adoptions of children in June 2001 (Euractiv, 2002). It should be noted that such concerns were important, as in the case of the Parliament, Romania needed the former’s assent in order for accession to take place (O’Brennan, 2006:56; European Union, 2016d).

Supported by the Roadmap and with pressure from France and Germany, the 2003 December Brussels European Council confirmed welcoming Romania as a member state in January 2007 (Papadimitriou and Phinemore, 2008:4). A year later, the 2004 Brussels European Council closed all negotiation chapters with Romania and established the 1 January 2007 as the official target year for accession. The Council also decided that the signing of the Accession Treaty was to take place in April 2005 (European Council, 2004:3; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:5 and 59; Avery, 2012:164-165). Such a decision was however not popular with members of the European Parliament, who showed dissatisfaction with the Commission, Verheugen and the European Council’s decision, on the basis that Romania had
not yet satisfied the accession criteria (Gallagher, 2009:159). Thus, as a precaution against “serious problems that may arise, as the case may be, before accession or in the three years after accession”, the Council introduced a range of preventing safeguard clauses (European Council, 2004:3), which will be discussed next.

4.2.3. Acceding phase

The acceding phase refers to the period following the completion of the accession negotiations (European Commission, 2013b, 2013j, 2013m). The period spans from April 2005 when Romania signed the Treaty of Accession and until January 2007 when Romania accessed the EU as a member state.

During the acceding phase the Commission continued its assessment of the Romanian enlargement through a new set of monitoring reports, the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. These were used as a tool of “monitoring Romania’s preparations for accession in order to ensure that this country can meet all duties and requirements of a full-fledged Member State” (European Commission, 2005b:3). As in the case of the Regular Reports, the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports also revealed concerns regarding Romania’s ability to comply with the accession requirements and thus the image of Romania as a laggard, which had started during the applicant phase, continued into the acceding phase (see Phinnemore, 2006b; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004, 2008; Verdun, 2005:12-13; Pridham, 2007c; Noutcheva and Bechev 2008; Lawrence, 2010; Chiva and Phinnemore, 2011a). For instance, the May 2006 Report revealed hesitation about Romania’s ability to join in 2007, followed by President Barroso’s warning to Romania of rolling up their sleeves (see Bilefsky, 2006). Even a June 2006 study of the image that Brussels officials, working with European affairs,
had of Romania six month prior to its accession highlighted that respondents linked the name of Romania with poverty, lack of modernity and corruption (Euractiv, 2006).

The Commission published three detailed Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, a practice, which was unprecedented, as the 2004 acceding states only had one report each (Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:11-12). Similar to the Regular Reports, the assessments of the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports impacted upon the Romanian negotiations. For instance, due to concerns about Romania still being “unreformed in crucial aspects” (Gallagher, 2009:263), the September 2006 Comprehensive Monitoring Report included four specific benchmarks to be monitored by the Commission post accession (European Commission, 2006b:10; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:14). The inclusion of the benchmarks in the final stage of an accession and which were to be monitored after accession (fourth benchmark) was unprecedented and differed from the first wave (Pridham, 2007a:351-354 and 361, 2007c:534; see also Grabbe, 2002:255; Pridham, 2004:523-524; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:9-12).

Evidently, one of the benchmarks was aimed at one of the main concerns, judicial reforms and fight against corruption. In particular, the September Report acknowledged the setting up of an unprecedented mechanism for continued monitoring post accession, in the form of the Cooperation and Verification reports (European Commission, 2006b:13; Phinnemore, 2011:98; European Commission, 2013n), which indicated that Romania would be observed for another year and a half after accession (Pridham, 2007a:360 and 353; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:60; Phinnemore, 2010:295 and 303; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:10). Such unprecedented implementations were identified as a tool through which the EU preserved leverage over Romania after accession (Pridham, 2007d:173). However, the EU
defended such an inclusion and justified this as a way to facilitate the Commission’s monitoring of Romania, in order to ensure the latter’s smooth transition into a functional member state (Michalski, 2014:294; see also Heidbreder, 2011; Holzer and Mareš, 2016).

During the acceding phase and following Finland’s concerns regarding Romania’s level of corruption, European Commissioner for Enlargement Rehn re-opened a number of key chapters, which had been closed with Romania in December 2004. He highlighted that satisfactory reforms had not been made during the term of Verheugen and demanded that further reforms needed to be implemented during 2005, stressing that Romania had to show significant progress by “the spring of 2006” in these areas. Two of the chapters were the competition policy and justice chapters (Gallagher, 2009:172-173). Rehn’s dissatisfaction with how the chapters had been concluded, can be related to an interview with a senior EU official, whose attempts to bring corruption in Romania to the attention of Verheugen were unsuccessful. Verheugen told the EU official that corruption in Romania was not much different from how things were in Bavaria. The senior EU official regarded such an episode as a circumstance in which Verheugen was overlooking and underestimating the problematic side of corruption (Gallagher, 2009:159).

Notably, due to the concerns raised in the Regular Reports prior to signing the Treaty, the Commission’s solution to an impending halt of accession was the inclusion of a safeguard clause in the Treaty. Although the first three provisions of the clause had been applied to all candidates of the fifth enlargement, in the case of Romania, a fourth unprecedented provision was added (see Article 39, Treaty of Accession, 2005). This latter provision comprised the possibility of postponing the date of accession “by one year”, if failures of meeting

---

68 Corruption was discussed as part of the justice chapter (see for instance CMR 2006a:35-36).
membership requirements by “1 January 2007 in a number of important areas” would take place (European Commission, 2005a:41, Article 39, point 1; Pridham, 2007a:360). Particularly, such a fourth provision had a notably “stringent” nature, as the activation method was much relaxed and so Romania was at larger risk to be excluded from the 2007 accession (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:93; see also Pridham, 2007a:360). In particular, the Commission had the power to decide upon the safeguard clause, apart from the postponement clause, which was in the hands of the Council, but “on the basis of a European Commission recommendation” (European Commission, 2005c). Again, this demonstrates the close working relation between the Commission and the Council in accession matters.

Another striking aspect of the safeguard clause was its “unprecedented extension of conditionality beyond the end of negotiations and the signing of the accession treaty” (Pridham, 2007a:360; 351 and 353; 2007c:534; see also Phinnemore, 2005). This related to the 11 points69 included in the safeguard clause “over which Romania would continue to be monitored for the following year and a half” post-accession (Pridham, 2007a:360). Such unprecedented conditions raised reservations of whether Romania was being singled out for special treatment in comparison to other acceding states (Pridham, 2007a:360; Phinnemore, 2005). It was however no surprise that one of the 11 points in the safeguard clause was aimed at “the acceleration of the fight against high-level corruption” in Romania (Pridham, 2007d:173, see also 2007a:360), which the Commission had identified as a persistent problem (Pridham, 2007a:357 and 360).

In February 2005 the Commission issued its Opinion on the Treaty, which was positive of Romania’s progress (Phinnemore, 2006a:46). In April 2004, the Parliament’s rapporteur

---

69 Four points on the competition chapter and seven on the justice and home affairs chapter (Pridham, 2007d:173).
Pierre Moscovici published the Parliament’s recommendation on the membership application of Romania. Moscovici, on behalf of the Parliament, confirmed that the latter gave its “assent to the application by Romania to become a member of the European Union”, while the Parliament President forwarded its assent to “the Council and Commission, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and Romania” (European Parliament, 2005; Phinnemore, 2006a:46). The Treaty of Accession was signed in April 2005 (Orban, 2006:78) and was ratified by the Romanian Parliament in May 2005, followed by all EU member states (Phinnemore, 2006a:46; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:62).

In June 2005, the Commission sent 7 early-warning letters (yellow cards) to Romania, indicating continuing poor credentials in a number of areas (Rehn, 2005; Phinnemore, 2006c:18; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008:126). Once more, corruption was identified as a problem, which endorsed the findings of Transparency International, who had positioned Romania as number 85 in the ranking of the most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2005; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:89). Finally, in December 2006, a few days before Romania’s accession, the Parliament approved Leonard Orban, who had once been Chief Negotiator for Romania, as the first Romanian member of the European Commission (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2008:6).

Despite hesitation, warnings, negative assessments and unprecedented measures, Romania became an EU member state in January 2007 (European Council, 2004:3; Gallagher, 2009:199).
4.3. Conclusions

This chapter has aimed to outline the Romanian enlargement process and accession negotiations and set out the background in which an unequal encounter was produced and thus reveal some of the key analytical points that will be made in the analysis of the Reports. Although such an unequal counter may be seen as conventional in enlargement politics, as Romania was asking to become member of an already established structure and thus the membership criteria needed to be fulfilled according to EU demands, it is significant not to discount the importance of how different elements of the enlargement could have impacted upon the production of unequal power relations.

First, the chapter captured a brief description of the Romanian enlargement, highlighting that monitoring Reports played a significant role, as not only did they include assessments of Romania’s progress in implementing the accession criteria, but the Reports were considered by the European Councils when negotiation decisions were taken. The chapter also engaged with the role of EU institutions. It was clarified that although we may speak of the EU as a unitary actor in the enlargement process or when producing unequal power relations, a variety of institutions and actors were involved in the Romanian enlargement and accession negotiations and which played a significant role in the production of power relations. The discussion of the monitoring Reports and EU institutions also raised the question of who was the producer of the Reports, questioning who had power in and behind the discourse of the Reports and subsequently produced unequal relations.

Second, the chapter looked at the Romanian accession negotiations in order to reveal the extent to which the EU’s practice of assessment monitoring and the monitoring Reports, as well as the involvement of EU institutions are significant to our understanding of how the EU
produces unequal power relations. For instance, the progress of the Romanian negotiations was dependent on the different institutions’ level of satisfaction of the accession criteria (Phinnemore, 2010:292). Furthermore, the monitoring Reports influenced “the political decisions at the European Council’s December summits”, which in turn impacted upon the “opening and closing chapters in the accession negotiations” (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:279).

Additionally, the chapter considered the fight against corruption, which was identified as one of Romania’s outstanding problems in fulfilling the accession criteria and which impacted upon the Reports, negotiations and EU-Romania relations. The Reports, as well as EU and non EU institutions continuously acknowledged corruption as a main problem, which could impend Romania’s accession. Inevitably, the unsuccessful establishment of a functional anti-corruption system led to a range of often unprecedented measures to be included in negotiations and finally in the Treaty of Accession. This demonstrates that corruption was a determinative element, which significantly impacted upon the relationship between the EU and Romania and on the enlargement process as a whole.
CHAPTER 5

ANALYSING THE VOCABULARY OF THE REPORTS

This chapter argues that analyzing the vocabulary (words) of the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports by applying the description dimension will demonstrate the extent to which the EU produced unequal power relations, as vocabulary is identified as a place where unequal relations are produced, exercised and enacted (Fairclough, 2001:36).

To explore the above argument, the chapter follows a four-step structure. First, the chapter will briefly outline the description dimension of vocabulary, establishing what this particular CDA stage entails when it comes to production of unequal power relations with a focus on language. Second, the chapter discusses how the description dimension has specifically been applied to the vocabulary of the Reports. Third, this section includes the findings of the analysis of vocabulary, interview material and content analysis. Fourth, the section presents a discussion of how the findings help us understand the extent of the production of unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship to the elements of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry. As a concluding remark, the chapter summarizes in which ways the description dimension can be applied to extract observations of interest to the postcolonial analysis and sets out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.
5.1. Outline of the description dimension

This section briefly summarizes what the description dimension entails (as discussed in Chapter 3) and the importance of this dimension in analyzing how vocabulary can be a place where unequal power relations are produced.

The description dimension involves an analysis of the formal properties of language, which include vocabulary (words), grammar and textual structures (Fairclough op.cit., p.92-93). This particular chapter will focus on the analysis of vocabulary, while Chapter 6 will look at the grammar of the Reports. The centrality of this dimension is related to the argument that although language may “appear normal or neutral on the surface”, it can in fact hide ideologies (2001:2-3), which are projected upon language and thus impact upon how language is produced and interpreted. As mentioned earlier, ideologies are practices, which appear commonsensical and neutral and which people often draw upon, but without considering that the ideological power may in fact shape how we perceive reality, events, people, etc. and thus can impact on the production of power relations (Fairclough op.cit, p.3).

More importantly, ideological power is held in and behind discourse by powerful participants, who control and constrain discourses and contributions of non-powerful participants through what is being said or done, what relations participants enter into and what positions participants occupy in and behind discourse. The control and constraint imply particular linguistic forms and vocabulary is one form that can be a place where unequal power relations are produced, exercised and enacted (Fairclough, 2001:38-39 and 59). Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 3, by identifying how unequal power relations are produced through vocabulary may not only raise “a critical consciousness” of the impact of
ideological power in and behind discourse, but may also allow change of and emancipation from such relations.

5.2. Applying the description dimension

This section discusses how the description dimension has been applied to the vocabulary of the Reports. The examination aims to reveal the correlation between vocabulary and unequal power relations by establishing that although the choice of vocabulary properties may have been automatic (see Fairclough, 2001:102), we cannot neglect the fact that this choice may also have been ideologically motivated (2001:100). In order to do so, each Report has been analysed by asking a set of questions of the vocabulary (see Appendix 1). The aim is to reveal who held power in discourse, by identifying through what vocabulary features participants controlled and constrained what is being said or done, what relations participants enter into and what positions participants occupy in and behind discourse. In other words, the description dimension aims to question how the Romanian enlargement was represented by the EU with a focus on vocabulary and what does this mean in relation to unequal power relations (see Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2010:181). Conducting interviews and content analysis were also employed to provide further support to the CDA findings.

In order to explore the extent to which vocabulary can reveal production of unequal power relations, this chapter builds upon four arguments, which are elaborated next. First, the chapter argues that the choice of the words Eastern and European in the Reports produced unequal power relations (see Fairclough, 2001:97-98) by shaping relations of distance and
solidarity (in the case of the word Eastern) and relations of distance, synonymy and similarity (in the case of the word European).

Second, as formality is identified as a way of constraining access to discourse, the chapter argues that the choice of formality in the Reports produced unequal power relations (see Fairclough, 2001:97-98) by limiting contents, positions and relations (these constraints are related to the elements of discourse in Table 2). Due to the fact that participants are often not aware of its impact (2001:54), formality is referred to as power behind discourse. In order to demonstrate the extent to which power behind discourse produces unequal power relations, researchers aim to question “who has access to which discourses, and who has the power to impose and enforce constraints on access” to discourse (2001:52). Closely related to formality are also the aspects of heightened self-consciousness and politeness. The first one refers to the expectation of applying the “‘correct’ grammar and vocabulary” in formal situations (2001:55 and 98), while politeness is a way of marking the position, status and “face”, power and social distance of participants in formal situations (2001:55).

Third, the chapter argues that the choice of vocabulary in the Reports produced unequal power relations by expressing negative representations of the Romanian enlargement, but which were counterbalanced with positive representations (see Fairclough, 2001:98).

Fourth, the chapter argues that the choice of visual aids (see Fairclough, 2001:41) in the Reports produced unequal power relations by controlling the representations of participants in the Romanian enlargement through the use of two distinctive forms of visual aids, bold style and repetitions, which trigger certain reactions with readers (2001:45). Although such

---

70 Synonymy here refers to the fact that the term European is regarded as the embodiment of the EU and they sometimes are used as synonyms (see Fugden, 2004a).
representations are usually produced through the use of more conventional visual aids such as photographs, the examination argues that as photographs are missing in the Reports, using bold style (when writing certain words in the Reports) or using repetitions of specific words can be regarded as additional forms of visual aids, which impact upon production of power relations by triggering certain reactions with readers, as for instance photographs would.

The findings of the analysis of vocabulary will be supported by the interview material in order to provide clear evidence of how vocabulary can be examined to extend our understanding of the EU’s production of unequal power relations. Furthermore, as mentioned previously the method of content analysis was employed, in order to reveal a more comprehensive overview of how the use of formal properties may have produced unequal power relations. The findings will be discussed in relation to postcolonial theory in order to provide empirical support for demonstrating the extent to which vocabulary is a place in which unequal power relations were produced, exercised and enacted through elements of subalternity, mimicry and orientalism.

Overall, in exploring the extent to which vocabulary can reveal production of unequal power relations, this thesis argues that the control and constraint implied particular linguistic forms and vocabulary is one form that can be a place in which unequal power relations are produced, exercised and enacted (see Fairclough op.cit, p.36). The findings therefore will reveal observations of interest to the postcolonial analysis and will set out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.
5.3. The word Eastern as referent

This section argues that the choice of the word Eastern\(^{71}\) in the Reports produced unequal power relations by controlling representations of participants in the Romanian enlargement and constraining contributions, which produced relations of distance and solidarity.

The findings of the analysis of the Reports argue that the application of the word Eastern produced relations of distance through expressions such as “East European applicant states” (RR 1998:6) or “Eastern European applicant State” (RR 2000:5). Such expressions indicate that the EU categorized Romania as East/Eastern European and thus the word Eastern is a cue in how the EU perceived Romania in the enlargement process. However, by making references to Romania as Eastern, the EU implies a distinction between the EU and Romania, as such expressions indicates that the EU and Romania belonged to different entities. As it was discussed in the Literature Review, a range of scholars have drawn attention to the fact that the word Eastern has often been used in order to differentiate between the EU and the candidate states, by reproducing the old distinction between the superior Europe and the inferior Eastern Other (Kuus, 2006:225). Thus by associating the Romanian enlargement with the term Eastern, such a choice brings in the “stigma of inferiority”, which Eastern Europe has been identified with (Kovačević, 2012:168). The choice of this vocabulary reaffirms not only that the Romanian enlargement was “framed by the geopolitical imagination of a progressive and secure Europe and a backward insecure East (of Europe)” (Kuus, 2007:150), but also that such a word had ideological power in the sense that it sustained the connection between Eastern and inferiority.

\(^{71}\) And its derivations, such as East.
One notable difference between the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports is that the latter Reports ceased to use the term Eastern, as well as Central and Eastern European\(^{72}\) (apart from one occasion), as the instances of the terms in *Table 4* and *Table 5* demonstrate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.* Recurrent instances of the words Eastern and Central and Eastern Europe in the Regular Reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vocabulary</th>
<th>CMR 2005</th>
<th>CMR 2006 May</th>
<th>CMR 2006 September</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.* Recurrent instances of the words Eastern and Central and Eastern Europe in the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports.

The lack of the terms Eastern and Central and Eastern European in the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, as indicated in *Table 5*, may relate to the changing status of Romania from a candidate country to an acceding state. As the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports were produced after the Treaty of Accession was signed, this change of vocabulary indicates that the EU produced a language, which was based on the then current relations to Romania. Furthermore, this implies that the vocabulary used in the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports enacted the then changing relations between the EU and Romania, which were no longer relations of distance as identified in the Regular Reports, but relations of solidarity, as Romania was now closer to EU membership in its position as an acceding state. In other words, the use of the term Eastern was not purposive for the relations that were shaped after the signature of the Treaty and thus the relations of distance were not enacted in discourse.

\(^{72}\) This term was included as it includes the word Eastern.
It should be noted that when references to the term Central and Eastern European were made in the Reports, Romania was not *per se* recognized as being Central or Eastern, but the vocabulary only indicated that Romania was part of Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless such a choice indicates an important implication, as it allows readers (interpreters of the Reports) to produce their own interpretations of the relations between Romania to the term Central and Eastern European. However, as it will later be elaborated in Chapter 7, such an act may impact upon power relations when interpreters rely on their MR, which reproduce ideologies.

The interviewees differed in their opinions on the implications of the word Eastern in two key aspects. First, a number of interviewees commented that its use was likely to shape a negative image of Romania. For instance, interviewee 10 had a negative association of the use of Eastern in the Romanian enlargement, as such a notion was identified as “ideological”\(^73\) and which according to the interviewee created separation between Romania and the EU. Interviewee 10 argued that Romania was “not part of East”, regardless of what the Reports and the EU said. Moreover, interviewee 5 maintained that “there is some baggage” associated with Eastern and thus, even though the word was “an understandable term”, its use suggested that the candidates of the fifth enlargement were identified as “a quite different phenomenon” to the EU. Interestingly, interviewee 5 pointed out that such a word was not “consciously used in that sense”. By this, interviewee 5 meant that Eastern was not applied to create relations of distance or inferiority, but it was just “normal EU usage”. However, this is exactly the point that the three-dimensional CDA tries to make. It is exactly the vocabulary, which people find “normal” and do not question that produces unequal power relations, as it prompts certain representations (inferior, distant, etc.) of the Romanian enlargement in

---
\(^73\) Here the word refers to political ideologies.
relations to the EU, but without considering how such a vocabulary prompted participants to connect the word Eastern to for instance inferiority, then to the Romanian enlargement and then to the understanding that Romania was distant from the superiority of the EU (Fairclough, op. cit., p. 3). In this sense, by using a certain vocabulary, the EU as the producer of the Reports shaped unequal power relations by influencing the way readers of the Reports may have understood Romania and the Romanian enlargement. As we will see in the next sub-section, the EU counterbalanced such an image by relating the EU to the word European, which prompted different representations.

Second, by contrast, other interviewees did not share the same negative connotation. For instance, although interviewee 2 expressed being “very much against it” (the use of Eastern when referring to the fifth enlargement as the Eastern enlargement), as Eastern Europe was understood as “a Marxist wording”, the interviewee argued that the use of Central and Eastern European enlargement was an appropriate term, as it was recognized as “the official wording of the Commission”. In other words, interviewee 2 agreed to the use of Eastern as part of Central and Eastern European due to its acceptance as the “official wording” of the EU. Similarly to respondent 2, interviewees 5, 6 and 8 suggested that the use of Central and Eastern European was appropriate as it belonged to EU terminology. Furthermore, interviewee 3 suggested that Romania was seen by the EU as an “other joining Europe”, but also maintained that “I do not think they were treated as second class countries”. Such statements indicate that the word Eastern as part of the term Central and Eastern European, which was produced by the EU, had credibility, as it belonged to EU terminology and as Interviewee 5 mentioned above, it was legitimized by its use in the Treaty of Accession as “standard usage in all EU documents”. As it will be discussed in Chapter 6, the credibility of
EU language may be related to the position of authority that the EU shaped in relation to Romania.

However, the application of the term Central and Eastern European does not mean that such a vocabulary is less problematic than when using Eastern. First, the use of Central and Eastern European not only continues the distance between the EU and the candidate states by emphasizing the existence of two different entities, but second, it also creates additional distance between the candidate states themselves, as these can be either Central or Eastern European. Thus it can be argued that the term Central and Eastern European negotiated further relations of distance not only to the EU, but also between the candidates (see Fairclough, 2001:97). Third, although the term Eastern (as part of Central and Eastern European) may seem as a commonsensical term that people drew upon without thinking, by not questioning the extent to which such a word impacted on how power relations is significant, as it proves the commonsensical implications of vocabulary.

5.4. The word European as referent

As noted above, as production of unequal power relations may be determined by controlling representations of participants and constraining contributions, the below section demonstrates how the choice of the word European in the Reports produced unequal power relations during the Romanian enlargement by shaping relations of synonymy, distance and similarity.

The findings of the analysis of the Reports argue that the EU applied the word European as a synonym of the EU. This has been indicated in Table 6, as content analysis signposts that the word European was largely correlated to the EU, but its application to the Romanian enlargement was sparse. This interchangeability has also been emphasized in the Literature
Review, as scholars often identify a synonymy between Europe and the EU and that “one could then not be a ‘real’ European without being an EU member” (Risse, 2009:154; see also Böröcz 2000:853, 2001b:65; Miošić-Lisjak, 2006:110; Behr, 2007:254; Orban, 2010). In particular, Kovács maintains that the language of the Regular Reports witnessed an extensive use of Europe as a synonym of the EU (2006:213). Additionally, Böröcz’s interpretation of the Internet address of the EU’s home page also correlates how the EU is producing synonymy between the Union and Europe. Böröcz acknowledges that the Internet address, http://europa.eu.int should be read as “int” (standing for “international organization”), “eu” (standing for the European Union) and the full name of the continent Europe, which is a different version of the Ancient Greek “europa”. Böröcz claims that such an identification is stressing that “being outside the “eu” and being part of “europa” is thus made logically impossible” (Böröcz, 2000:853, 2001b:65), stressing the synonymy between the EU and Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In relation to the EU</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In relation to the Romanian enlargement or the fifth enlargement</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6. Instances of the word European as related to the EU and the Romanian enlargement (and the fifth enlargement).*

On a more empirical side, expressions in the Reports, such as “in line with European practices” (RR 2000:16), “the Romanian authorities are completely willing to fulfil the European norms” (RR 2000:53) or “changes to bring Romanian law in line with European
standards” (RR 2000:21), imply that everything European was related to the EU in the shape of European practices, norms, standards, etc., while Romania lacked such features. Such a use of vocabulary indicates to relations of synonymy. The aspect of synonymy was in particular supported by interviewee 4, who maintained that “the EU and Europe are synonyms”, while interviewee 1 argued that Europe is “sometimes” used as a synonym of the EU. In particular, interviewee 4 identified that the reasons for Romania’s application to the EU was “to return to Europe”, implying a correlation between the EU and Europe. Furthermore, Interviewee 7 pointed out that the member states of the EU are European and that this appears to be part of the “mindset of people, at least in the Commission in Brussels”. Although instances where absolute synonyms between the EU and European are not to be found in the Reports, the above examples highlight an aspect in which “relations of near synonymy” between the EU and European can be identified (see Fairclough, 2001:96).

How were the relations of distance then being created? In most cases, the references to the term European were articulated in relation to something that Romania was missing, emphasizing its lack of European elements (see Tileaga, 2006:300). Examples such as “funding for RTD activities is low compared to many European countries” (RR 2001:75) or “the Romanian standardisation institution has continued its programme of transposing European standards” (RR 2002:56) are just two instances where Romania was declared incompatible with being European due to lack of certain features. Even if the first example does not directly suggest that Romania was not European, the comparison “to many European countries” expressed a “less” European position. The second example implies an explicit exclusion of Romania as not European, but on its way to become European due to the transposition of European standards. In both examples, such choices of words create relations of distance between Romania and the European as Romania is lacking “European elements”,

but also, as indicated previously, continues to shape relations of synonymy between European and the EU by exposing Romania as lacking such a feature.

Additionally, the use of European in the Reports also seems to create relations of similarity. For instance, by including the word European as part of the term Central and Eastern European, this implicitly suggests that Romania is identified as both Central/Eastern and European. What this implies is a “double framing” of Romania (see Kuus, 2006:232). On the one hand, Romania is either Central or Eastern (as such a position is not clarified), but on the other hand Romania is also regarded as European. The combination of the terms seems to indicate that Romania is “not quite European, but in Europe” (Kuus, 2006:232). It can therefore be argued that such a vocabulary identified relations of similarity, in that both the EU and Romania could be recognized as European, but at the same time the vocabulary produced relations of distance, as Romania was identified as Central/Eastern, but the EU could not be Central or Eastern. As discussed in the Literature Review, this double framing has an interesting implication, as it suggests a remapping of how Romania was perceived and represented by the EU.

A number of interviewees drew attention to the fact that the application of the word European produced a negative aspect of Romania. For instance, interviewee 10 highlighted that for Romania it was “one of the most shocking conclusions” that “Europe meant the European Union … We were shocked because we considered we are part of Europe”. Interviewee 10 argued that although Romania had a different history, it was not less European than any of the EU member states. In the same vein, interviewees, 2, 5 and 8 drew attention to the fact that using the word European as a synonym of the EU was not accurate, as, in particular as interviewee 8 argued, “to me Romania has always been a European state”. Nevertheless,
Interviewee 10 implied that in the end Europe will become a synonym of the EU, as the enlargement process has started a revival and a change of how such a term is used. Furthermore, interviewee 9 highlighted that there was a tendency amongst the Romanian negotiating team to mimic the EU in order to prove that Romania was willing to become European and to clearly show that the Romanians were Europeans. In contrast to the other interviewees, the statement of Interviewee 9 points to the fact that Romania was either in doubt of their European status or were aware of the fact that they were not considered European and thus needed to mimic the EU, which was regarded as European.

5.5. Impact of formal vocabulary

This section argues that as the Reports were part of a formal situation and thus the language applied demanded a level of formality, the choice of words in the Reports was constrained by formality, which in turn had constraining effects on the discourses of the Reports and on power relations. The below three sub-sections aim to identify how the formal vocabulary constrained what was said and done, the relations that were enacted and the positions that participants got in the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:98 and 54-55).

5.5.1. Constraints upon contents

To start with, the below maintains that the formal vocabulary in the Reports constrained contents, which refers to what was said and done (Fairclough, 2001:39), by imposing a fixed structure of contents and topics, as well as a formal vocabulary, which impacted upon power relations.
First, one noticeable aspect is that every Report followed a fixed structure of contents, which was maintained throughout, although the size of the contents became more complex and vast as the Romanian enlargement progressed. Each Report identified four chapters, viz. 1) introduction, 2) discussions on the political and economic criteria, 3) discussions of the *acquis* and 4) conclusions. Second, the topics, which were assessed within these four chapters, were constrained to only enlargement issues and mainly included the assessments of the EU regarding the Romanian enlargement. It can be argued that it was the formality of the enlargement process and of the Reports that demanded a certain structure of contents and certain constraints on what topics could be included in the Reports. This was suggested by interviewee 1, who maintained that the Regular Reports were part of “a formal exercise”, which dictated a certain routine of presenting regular information. However, as the structure of the contents and topics were mainly decided by the EU, such findings argue that the EU was the powerful participant, which constrained what was said and done in the Reports and thus who had the power to enforce constraints on contents and access to discourse. In particular, interviewee 5 noted that, “ultimately the Reports were … done by the Coordination Unit in DG Enlargement”, underlining that untimely the EU (or more exactly the Coordination Unit in DG Enlargement) was the participant, who had the power to constrain what was said and done in the Reports. This has implications for our understanding of unequal power relations, as it demonstrates how by constraining the Romanian access to discourse (by deciding what content structure and topics were to be included), the EU maintained power behind discourse, while Romania was excluded. This however raises implications for the production dimension, which will be discussed in Chapter 7.

---

74 The 1998 Regular Report has a somewhat different structure since it was the first Report.
75 The Regular Reports also included a section on the Accession Partnership and National Programmes for the Adoption of the *Acquis*: Global assessment, which was not part of the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports.
Third, due to the formal nature of the enlargement process, there was a certain expectation to apply a formal and appropriate vocabulary in the Reports. This is referred to as “a heightened self-consciousness” of applying the “‘correct’ grammar and vocabulary” in formal situations (2001:55 and 98). For instance, looking at the vocabulary of the Reports, it can be argued that the formal vocabulary can be divided into four categories, which are identified in Table 7. The first category, the general EU vocabulary, includes words that are broadly used in EU related matters, such as alignment, harmonisation, institutional capacity, provision, etc. The second category, the unique EU vocabulary, includes words that are unique to the EU, for instance *acquis communautaire*, euro, Eurobarometer, Copenhagen criteria, Directorates-General, etc. The third category, the fifth enlargement vocabulary, contains words that are applied largely to the fifth enlargement. Here we include words such as conditionality, leverage, twinning, Regular Reports, Action Plans, etc. A fourth category, the Romanian enlargement vocabulary, included vocabulary related to the Romanian enlargement, such as To do list, *TAROM*, *judets*, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General EU vocabulary</td>
<td>alignment, harmonisation, institutional capacity, free movement of people, benchmarking</td>
<td>Applied generally in any discourse related to EU enlargement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique EU vocabulary</td>
<td><em>acquis communautaire</em>, euro and its sign €, Eurobarometer, Directorates-General, accession criteria, Copenhagen criteria</td>
<td>Unique to EU language and often used in the enlargement discourses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth enlargement vocabulary</td>
<td>conditionality, twinning, Regular Report, Action Plan, benchmarking, safeguard clause</td>
<td>Applied to the fifth enlargement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian enlargement vocabulary</td>
<td>To do list, TAROM, Traian Băsescu, judets</td>
<td>Unique to the Romanian enlargement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7. Formal vocabulary of the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports.*
The findings reported in Table 7 suggest that the Romanian enlargement demanded the use of a formal vocabulary, as an alternative to an informal vocabulary. However, each of the four categories limited the relations that were shaped, as they constrained access to a larger and informal vocabulary in the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:56). More importantly, an aspect, which indicates to the correlation between unequal power relations and the formal vocabulary, is the fact that the Reports can be understood as including a “one-way flow of knowledge” (Billig, 2008:786). This relates to the argument that the above formal vocabulary was produced by the EU and thus recognizes a one-way flow of knowledge. Additionally, Chapter 7 will discuss further the implications of the “one-way flow of knowledge” upon the process of production. Furthermore, this allowed the EU to have access and to constrain access to discourse, as Romania was not participating in the production of such a vocabulary, while at the same time ensured that only EU vocabularies (as in Table 7) were distributed, through the dissemination of the Reports to readers (see Billig, 2008:786). In this way, formality enabled the EU to distribute their ideologies and representations about the Romanian enlargement, while excluding the voices of the Romanian negotiating team.

The formal vocabulary of the Reports can also be related to the interviewees’ statements. For instance when asked about the style of formality used in the Reports, interviewee 9 stated that the EU used a typical diplomatic and political style of language, which the interviewee regarded as “classical” for the situation. The interviewee suggested that in particular after the Treaty of Accession was signed in 2005, the “tone” of the EU language changed. Furthermore, interviewees 2 and 5 highlighted that the language of the Reports “was in pretty coded language” (quote taken from interviewee 5). In particular, interviewee 5 underlined that such a coded language “was to ensure there was consistent language” and not to frighten any applicant “by saying that Romania or indeed any other country - was a complete
disaster”. Additionally, interviewee 3 maintained that although the Reports were built upon “coded language”, there was no manual to clarify what words meant (“this you cannot find”), which suggested that there was no clarity in how the EU as the powerful participants held power behind discourse. Interviewee 2 also implied that the coded language was to mainly be found “in the assessment part” of each Report (this refers to the sections in each Report, which are known as overall assessment), although without reflecting over the implications of coded language upon power relations. The above discussion of the style and tone of language (interviewee 9) and coded language (interviewees 2, 3 and 5) can be related to the “heightened self-consciousness” described above, as the producer/s of the Reports had to maintain a certain level of “‘correct’ grammar and vocabulary” in such formal situations. The question however is in which way such an aspect of vocabulary produced unequal power relations.

5.5.2. Constraints upon relations

In light of the argument that the formal vocabulary of the Reports had a constraining impact on discourses and production of unequal power relations, the below paragraphs maintain that the formal vocabulary constrained relations, which refer to the relations that participants entered into in discourse (Fairclough, 2001:39), in two different ways: through the use of an austere and monotone tone (see Böröcz, 2000:857) and politeness in discourse (see Fairclough, 2001:55 and 98).

First, the language of the Reports presented the Romanian enlargement in an austere and monotone tone. Such an aspect has also been noted by Böröcz, who argues that the EU’s reports were written in a “cold, impersonal, official kind of style” (2000:857). Such a tone,
which is related to the formality of the enlargement process, can for instance be identified in the below paragraph:

“Romania shows a strong commitment to apply fully the State aid rules as regards the steel industry. Nevertheless, Romania must continue to ensure the correct implementation of the National Restructuring Programme. It must maintain further efforts as regards the recovery of restructuring aid granted to steel companies outside the National Restructuring Programme. The Commission will continue to monitor the steps undertaken in this respect.” (CMR 2005:90)

The above paragraph highlights that the austere and monotone tone or what Böröcz described as “cold, impersonal, official kind of style” is enabled by a vocabulary, in which the tone can be identified through concise, short sentences, impersonal vocabulary, addressivity in the third person and most importantly through a clear understanding of where the EU and Romania stood in relations to one another (Romania “to maintain further efforts and to continue to ensure” and the EU “to monitor the steps” taken by the first). Furthermore, the relations between the EU and Romania are also produced through vocabulary, by for instance suggesting who each participate is in the Romanian enlargement: Romania, as in need to commit to accession demands (“strong commitment”, “must continue”, “further efforts”) and the EU as a monitoring entity (“will continue to monitor the steps”). In other words, the EU controlled what relations were shaped in the Reports by producing a “cold, impersonal, official” tone, enabled by the formality of the Reports and the enlargement process.

Even in instances when the accession of Romania was inevitable, such as the September 2006 Comprehensive Monitoring Report and when a change in Romania’s position was unavoidable, the tone of the Reports maintained the same format as mentioned previously, as the paragraph below demonstrates:
“Overall, Bulgaria and Romania have made far-reaching efforts to adapt their legislation and administration to the laws and rules of the European Union. This has largely brought them into line with prevailing standards and practices within the European Union. Sustained support from the European Union will be available for addressing the remaining issues. Sufficient guarantees exist in the acquis and the Accession Treaty to ensure the proper functioning of EU policies and institutions. As a result of the progress made, Bulgaria and Romania will be in a position to take on the rights and obligations of EU membership on 1 January 2007. The Commission looks forward to welcoming Bulgaria and Romania as fully-fledged members of the European Union on this date” (CMR 2006b:13).

The above is not much different from the previous example. Here we identify a paragraph that includes limited information, is restrained in using individualized references (e.g. names of individuals) and uses a restricted, formal vocabulary. Such an example provides empirical support that the tone of the vocabulary not only maintained a level of formality, but also indicated what relations were shaped: the EU as a supporting entity (“will be available for addressing remaining issues”) and as a gatekeeper to membership (“looks forward to welcoming”), while Romania was described as a successful tutee (“made far-reaching efforts”, “brought them into line with prevailing standards and practices within the European Union”), but not equal to the EU (“sufficient guarantees exist in the acquis and the Accession Treaty”).

Second, another noticeable feature through which the formality of the Reports constrained relations in the Romanian enlargement was through the use of politeness, an aspect also highlighted by Böröcz, who argues that the EU maintained a level of respect in the enlargement documents by including a “professional jargon” (2000:867). As mentioned previously, politeness is a way of marking the position, status, power and social distance of participants. For instance politeness can be identified in the “consistent selection of ‘formal’ words” (Fairclough, 2001:56), such as using titles as President of Romania, instead of direct
names (RR 2002:28; CMR 2005). It can be argued that in a less formal situation, formality would have been replaced by a more casual vocabulary. It may be suggested that the EU chose to include a polite vocabulary, as a way to show respect to the respective status of the EU and Romania (see Fairclough, 2001:55 and 106). Although the above may be seen as conventional or standard practice in formal situations, it is the implications of the application of formality upon relations that is of importance here.

It should be noted that in a few situations, some of the Romanian words were misspelled. One such example is the name of the then Romanian Prime Minister Călin Popescu Târiceanu, but which in the 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report is spelt as Călin Pospescu Târiceanu (CMR 2005:7). Although this may be regarded as a minor vocabulary spelling mistake, we can question as to whether such a mistake was not identified because it was a foreign name, which the producer/s of the Report was/were not familiar with. Such an aspect has been raised by Böröcz, who addresses the EU’s mistakes in enlargement documents (2000:861). Although such mistakes may be regarded as “tiny”, Böröcz argues that this is not the case, but it only proves that the document and the candidate country in question did not receive the right amount of professional attention from the EU (2000:861). The implications indicate two issues. First, this may suggest that Romanian words may have created an image of foreignness, which impacted upon its correct spelling (see Alexandru, 2012:6). It can therefore be argued that the name Călin Popescu Târiceanu may have possessed an exotic nature, which caused problems for “the EU’s word processing software” (Böröcz, 2000:860). This raises questions of whether such a misspelling was a case of producing “aliennes” (Böröcz, 2000:860). Second, the misspelling of especially an official’s name of the Romanian government questions how politeness was maintained in the Reports. Would the producer/s
of the Report allowed a similar mistake of the name of an EU official or would a misspelling been identified before distributing the Report?

It should be noted that as the Reports amplified in size as the Romanian enlargement progressed, the constraints on relations also expanded. For example, the 1998 Regular Report includes 59 pages, while the last 2004 Report scaled to 163 pages. In contrast, due to their decreased size, the formality of the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports was restricted. It can therefore be argued that the EU exudes fewer constraints upon relations in the Romanian enlargement during the later stages of enlargement (see Fairclough, 2001:55). The size of the Reports was also highlighted by interviewee 1, who implied that previous enlargements were “smaller” and “simpler” because the acquis was reduced, but in the case of the fifth enlargement, the acquis was much “bigger” and thus the reporting became more complex. Interviewee 3 also supported such a statement by arguing that “we have the acquis more developed so we have more questions”, indicating that the fifth enlargement did encounter an increased level of the acquis.

5.5.3. Constraints upon positions

In this section it is argued that the formal vocabulary of the Reports constrained positions, which refers to the positions that participants can take in discourse (Fairclough, 2001:39), in two different ways: through translations and the choice of a vocabulary, which rigorously defined positions, impacting upon the production of power relations.

First, translations may be regarded as a way, which constrains positions. Postcolonial scholars claim that using foreign words in discourse creates an appearance of exoticism and foreignness, but by translating foreign words into a familiar language, the distance between
the foreign and the familiar becomes less obvious (Böröcz, 2000:860). In contrast, M.-S.D. Alexandru maintains that the use of foreign words is a way of bringing in “the feeling of a certain level of untranslatable authenticity that makes the English text all the more successful in communicating its meaning to an audience unfamiliar with Romanian realities” (2012:6), thus creating distance. For instance, in the Reports there were a few instances when Romanian words were not translated, but used in the Romanian language, such as *Banca Agricolă* (The Agricultural Bank) (RR 2001:34). In other circumstances, abbreviations adapted from Romanian were used, but the full spelling of the abbreviations were translated into the language of the Report (in this case English). For instance, one Report mentioned the *PNL*, which is the Romanian abbreviation of *Partidul Naţional Liberal*, followed in brackets by the English translation, National Liberal Party (CMR 2005:7).

The use of translations in the Reports can be related to interviewee 2:

> “The internal conditions of drafting and also because drafting documents in different languages is a very difficult exercise. And we were aware that that what we wrote would be under scrutiny in the European institutions. We had three different audiences, the European institutions, the member states and the candidate countries. So it is rather difficult to have one single wording for three so different audiences. You know so, and everything was then translated into this curious global English and sometimes there was one wording and behind the word there was something else”.

In other words, interviewee 2 seems to suggest that because of the different audiences of the Reports, the EU needed to find appropriate mechanisms to satisfy these audiences, but it was a rather difficult exercise to identify “one single wording for three so different audiences”. This may suggest that for instance translations were applied in order to acknowledge the presence of such varied audiences, but at the same time it raises questions of the extent to which such mechanisms constrained positions.
Additionally, the Reports also included instances of what can be identified as fusion words. These are not direct translations, but relate to words that were created by combining Romanian and English languages. Such an example is the word *judets* (RR 2001:80, RR 2002:29), which pronunciation reminds of the Romanian word *județ*\(^{76}\), but the spelling is not the Romanian one (as in *județ*). Thus, instead of using the Romanian letter ț, the producer/s of the Report has/have combined the letters t and s, which phonetically are pronounced similarly to the letter ț. So, what we identify in this example is a fusion between Romanian and English, which facilitated the pronunciation of the word *județ*. However this example raises questions of the extent to which such a spelling constrained the positions of participants in and behind discourse. What this relates to is Böröcz’s argument that by replacing unfamiliar letters or words with something more familiar (at least what most Europeans may find familiar) may be a sign of “alienness”. Böröcz identifies that such an act is actually not addressing the candidate country, as by omitting linguistic aspects, which are distinctive for the candidate, not only shows lack of respect, but it may also indicate that the producer/s of the Reports is/are not actually familiar with the candidate and feel distant. Looking at the above example, it can be argued that the EU does not seem to directly address Romania, by for instance incorporating “exotic” Romanian characters (see Böröcz, 2000:860). Omitting the correct spelling can be seen as a sign of erasing Romania or at least the importance of Romania from discourse (see Böröcz, 2000:862). It can therefore be argued that this is a subtle structure of addressivity, which identifies the Romanian position as not important. As long as the EU is able to convey the pronunciation of a “foreign” word through a vocabulary, which is familiar to everyone (who the EU believes is familiar to everyone), seems to suggest that the EU is actually not speaking to Romania, but about Romania (see Böröcz, 2000:860).

\(^{76}\) *Județ* means a larger county within Romania (in total there are 41). *Județ* is the singurlar form; *județe* is the plural form.
Second, another example in which formality was defining positions in the Reports is through the use of a vocabulary, which rigorously shaped positions. For instance, the below statement indicates such an example:

“It will be in a position to take on the rights and obligations of EU membership on 1 January 2007. The EU looks forward to welcoming Bulgaria and Romania as fully-fledged members of the European Union on this date” (CMR 2006b:13).

The above paragraph clearly indicates the position of the EU as the actor, which was to welcome Romania and of Romania as not yet a member, but on the way. It should be noted that the statement also suggests that Romania was “to take on the rights and obligations of EU membership”, which indicates to an aspect of transfer of EU knowledge. What is important to note in the above example is that the vocabulary used formulated sentences in which the positions of the EU and Romania were rigorously identified, as there is no doubt of what positions the two participants occupy. Using such a vocabulary aims to erase confusion about the positions of the EU and Romania in the Romanian enlargement. As it will be discussed in Chapter 6, the constraint upon positions in the Reports is also enacted through different grammatical formulations of verbs.

5.6. Negative and positive vocabulary

This section argues that the choice of vocabulary in the Reports produced unequal power relations by contributing negative and positive representations of participants in the Romanian enlargement. First, the negative vocabulary is produced by the use of words such as “no substantial progress”, “no progress can be reported”, “a considerable challenge”,

Page | 160
“marginal improvements”, “a cause of concern” and “considerable progress is necessary”\textsuperscript{77}, which produced negative representations of the Romania enlargement (see Fairclough, 2001:98), by creating the image of an inadequate candidate. This can largely be related to the image of laggardness that has been discussed in the previous chapters.

A second way of identifying the negative vocabulary of the Reports is through direct references to what Romania had failed in complying with when it comes to the \textit{acquis}. Examples such as “rules incompatible with … the \textit{acquis}”, “no progress concerning alignment with the \textit{acquis}”, “a move away from the \textit{acquis}” and “remains incompatible with the \textit{acquis}”\textsuperscript{78} permeated negative representations of the Romanian enlargement and further consolidated the image of laggardness.

A third way where the negative vocabulary can be identified is through the use of the fifth enlargement vocabulary (see \textit{Table 7}), as some words of this category produced negative representations. For instance, the word benchmarking prompted a negative representation of the Romanian enlargement. Even though the word itself does not entail any negativity, it is the association that people make to benchmarking in the context of EU enlargement that prompts a negative connotation. As for instance the September 2006 Comprehensive Monitoring Report reported (CMR 2006b:10), benchmarking was an EU mechanism, which required the EU to continue monitoring Romania post-accession. Such an unprecedented mechanism had been included due to the EU’s hesitation and negative assessments of the Romanian enlargement (Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2011:14). Benchmarking was therefore not a mechanism, which was associated with a positive evaluation of Romania. Such a choice of words implied not only production of negative representations and relations of difference

\textsuperscript{77} These examples have not been referenced as they are to be found throughout the Reports.

\textsuperscript{78} These examples have not been referenced as they are to be found throughout the Reports.
between the EU and Romania, but also between Romania and the applicants of other rounds of enlargement. As we remember from the previous chapter, the benchmarks and safeguard clauses included in the Romanian enlargement were unprecedented and of a “stringent” nature as a result of the EU’s position of Romania as a laggard.

This aspect can also be related to interviewee 5, who referred to the safeguard clause in the Accession Treaty as “a suitable “instrument of torture””, showing a correlation that words such as benchmarking and safeguard clause did not have a positive connotation. It can therefore be implied that readers of the Reports were prompted to relate benchmarking and the Romanian enlargement with unsatisfactory progress, concerns and shortcomings and create a negative image. Nevertheless, interviewee 7 highlighted that although such unprecedented measures (such as benchmarking) were only applied to a few candidates and in Romania’s case, were located in a “different position”, interviewee 7 saw this as a “good exercise for the Romanians themselves to make the necessary corrections”. However, such a statement of “necessary corrections” indicates that Romania was evaluated negatively and thus any unprecedented demands were identified as a way to rectify Romania’s shortcomings.

On a different note, interviewee 5 seemed to suggest that the negative evaluations of Romania depended to a large extent on the producers of the Reports. For instance, interviewee 5 compared the differences between the Romanian and the Bulgarian rapporteurs’ style of reporting, where the first was “heavily involved” with Romania’s shortcomings, while the latter was “much less rigorous in his assessment” of Bulgaria. In other words, as the Romanian enlargement had “a more rigorous monitoring by the EU institutions than did Bulgaria”, it affected production of negative representations of the

---

79 Interviewee 5 mentioned that this term was “one of my colleagues”. 
Romanian enlargement. This finding can also be related to the discussion in Chapter 4, where it was outlined that the European Parliament’s rapporteurs were highly engaged in the Romanian enlargement through a different monitoring mechanisms. In turn, this impacted upon the Reports, enlargement process and accession negotiations and thus influenced the production of power relations.

Within the Reports we also identify EU evaluations in which positive values were related to the Romanian enlargement. This includes examples such as “progress has also been made”, “has allowed initial steps”, “progress towards compatibility with the acquis” and “further steps forward continue to be made”\textsuperscript{80}. In contrast to the negative vocabulary, here we identify indications of satisfactory progress, implicitly referring to positive values in the Romanian enlargement. This positive vocabulary is significant, as it is counterbalancing the negative vocabulary, by suggesting Romania was “doing … certain things” (Fairclough, 2001:31), viz. being able to fulfil the membership requirements, which were required for a successful EU accession.

5.7. Visual aids

In this section it is demonstrated that the choice of visual aids (see Fairclough, 2001:41) in the Reports produced unequal power relations, by controlling the ways in which participants in the Romanian enlargement were represented. Such a control was identified in the use of two distinctive forms of visual aids: bold style and repetitions.

First, bold written words were often used in the Reports, such as the following examples: “the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services”, “financial services”,

\textsuperscript{80} These examples have not been referenced as they are to be found throughout the Reports.
and “information society directives” (RR 2001:47-48). Typing these words in bold grabbed the attention of readers and prompted an understanding that these areas are of importance to the EU’s evaluation of the Romanian enlargement. It can therefore be argued that the EU used this visual aid as a way of controlling what aspects were identified as important and included, but also controlling what aspects were excluded in the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:42). However, the implication of such visual aids is the extent to which they impact upon how interpreters will interpret the Romanian enlargement.

Second, repetition of words is another distinctive aspect, which can be identified as a form of visual aid. In particular words such as “challenge”, “instability”, “corruption”, “undermine” and “no improvements” were often used to describe the Romanian enlargement progress within the Reports and were repeated in each section of the Report. The importance of the consistent repetition of specific words in the EU’s evaluation of candidate countries is also emphasized by Raik, who claims that the first wave of enlargement was centrally governed by “the keywords of inevitability, speed, efficiency, and expertise”, alongside secondary but equally important “objectivity, conditionality, and competition”. Raik stresses that these keywords “came up time and again in the official documents throughout the enlargement process, constituting the core of the official discourse of enlargement/integration” (2004:574). Furthermore, Phinnemore also pays attention to “subtle and at times significant shifts … in the language and rhetoric of the EU” (2006c:15), but which impacted upon the enlargement process. Phinnemore suggests that in the newer round of accession negotiations with the south-eastern candidates, the EU is avoiding “the explicit use of the words ‘membership’, ‘becoming ‘members’’ or referring “to ‘accession’ in a way reminiscent of the Copenhagen commitment to the CEE countries and subsequent statements”. The preferred vocabulary includes expressions such as “‘its determination to continue the process it has
engaged with the candidate countries, thus contributing to Europe’s prosperity, stability, security and unity”, which implies “a weaker commitment to south-eastern enlargement compared to eastern enlargement” (2006c:13; see also Phinnemore, 2005). Phinnemore also draws attention to the Commission’s “failure” in *One Europe* in not referring to “any of the countries of the Western Balkans”, advocating that a lack of such wording mirrored the Commission’s “declining enthusiasm”, “less intense commitment” and “reluctance to make promises to” further enlargement (Phinnemore, 2006c:15; see also Phinnemore, 2005).

To exemplify Raik’s argument, let us look at one of the most repeated words in the Romanian Reports, the word corruption. As it was discussed in Chapter 4, corruption was perceived as one of the long lasting key challenges of the Romanian enlargement and a major concern to the EU throughout the accession negotiations (as well as post-accession). Although such a practice posed warning signs of the deficiency of Romania regarding anti-corruption policies and membership conditions (Noutcheve and Becheb, 2008; Gateva 2014), the choice of this particular visual aid (repetition) in the Reports controlled the way in which participants were represented and which impacted upon power relations.

The word corruption appears very early in the text of every Report (first in the contents page), indicating that an early introduction suggests that corruption was a significant matter in the EU’s assessment of Romania. Each Report included further evaluations of corruption, by detailing for instance negative consequences of corruption upon other enlargement issues, which were important for the enlargement process and the successful accession of Romania. Such issues included the legal system, the economy and public confidence in government” (p.21), civil and political rights (p.26), market economy (p.37), taxation (p.62), small and medium-sized enterprises (p.74), Justice and home affairs (p.84) and customs (p.90) (all these
examples are to be found in RR 2001). It is worth noting that even when Romania’s status changed in 2005, the repetition of the need to address corruption did not decrease. For instance, in the September 2006 Comprehensive Monitoring Report the word corruption appears 68 instances in a document with 52 pages\textsuperscript{81}. The May 2006 Report included 48 instances and the October 2005 Report included 74 instances. Interviewee 8, who had been highly involved with the Romanian enlargement process early on and had had close encounters with corruption as a problem in Romania, was very clear that this was a genuine problem, which needed to be handled, as the below suggests:

> “Other aspects which drew negative criticism were connected with organised crime and seemingly endemic corruption. These criticisms were valid ones, and the issues therefore needed to be addressed”.

Although, as also discussed in Chapter 4, corruption was a central problem in Romania, we cannot deny that the implication of the repetition of the word corruption is that the EU instills a negative representation of the Romanian enlargement, by positioning Romania as a corrupted candidate. Corruption was also one of the main aspects, which a large number of interviewees (2, 3, 4, 5 and 7) mentioned as producing a negative evaluation of the Romanian enlargement, in particular interviewee 8, who called corruption “endemic”. Furthermore, interviewee 4 argued that although the Romanian government was reluctant, they did realize in the end that corruption was a “major problem” and should be dealt with. However, interviewee 7 maintained that corruption was not only a problem of the Romanian enlargement, but that the EU actually prompted corruption:

> “for corruption you need two persons. The one that corrupt and the one that is corrupted and I think that the western Europeans despite the fact that they

\textsuperscript{81} This document also includes assessments of Bulgaria and thus the Report sometimes does not clarify if the assessments refer to Romania or Bulgaria.
complain a lot about corruption, they were one of the main factor of corruption. Because they came, Romania was very poor, poor people, badly paid people and stubborn sometimes and hesitant people and not working with very clear rules and then the Western European discovered that there is a way out, which is much easier, corrupt and this was working. So I think it was here a bit of hypocrisy. Ah, you are corrupted, you are very corrupt people. But then I follow this method …”.

Interviewee 7 seems to suggest that although corruption might have existed in Romania prior to its EU membership application, corruption also seems to have been triggered by the EU. Interviewee 7 also suggests that as the EU had a more powerful position than Romania in the enlargement process, the EU also seemed to have taken advantage of corruption as a way to perhaps facilitate their own interests, though the interviewee was not clear about what these interests might have been.

5.8. Establishing a postcolonial relationship

This section argues that although the choice of vocabulary discussed above may have been automatic (see Fairclough, 2001:102), we cannot neglect the fact that these choices may also have been ideological. Thus vocabulary may be identified as a place in which unequal power relations were produced, exercised and enacted. The below three sub-sections present therefore a discussion of how the findings help us understand the extent of the production of unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship and set out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.

5.8.1. Subalternity

This sub-section argues that the choice of vocabulary reveals aspects of subalternity, muteness, instruments of subjugation and ventriloquized voice, which produces unequal power relations.
First, formality can be identified as an instrument of subjugation, as it facilitated the EU’s power behind discourse and rendered Romania mute. The analysis indicated that formality constrained three aspects of discourse: what was said and done (contents) and what relations and positions were enacted in discourse. These constraints have implications on the production of unequal power relations because it implies that the EU was the main producer of the Reports and had control over discourse, while Romania was in a subaltern position and its voice was excluded. Significantly, it can be argued that the aspect of formality of the Reports allowed the EU to produce a so called “one-way flow of knowledge”, which referred to the fact that the EU had sole power to control and constrain the discourses of the Reports, as well as distribute such a knowledge, but Romania was rendered mute.

Second, as the EU had the sole power to control and constrain discourses, it can be argued that the EU ventriloquized the voice of Romania. This has important significance for the production of unequal power relations. In particular the use of negative and positive vocabulary can be identified as an instrument of subjugation, through which the EU ventriloquized the Romanian voice, as the EU spoke on behalf of Romania by producing representations of the Romanian enlargement, while Romania’s voice was not heard. Instead the Romanian enlargement was known, represented, and spoken for by the EU, which strongly indicates a case of the Romanian voice being ventriloquized. Thus, by remaining mute and having one’s voice ventriloquized, Romania was positioned as a subaltern and was subjected to a marginalized position, which produced inequality in power relations between the subaltern (Romania) and the elite (the EU).

Third, visual aids can also be regarded as another form through which vocabulary produced subalternity. It was suggested that the Reports included a number of bold written words and
repetition of words, which aimed to prompt an emphasis of what the EU found as important in the Romanian enlargement. Thus, as the EU had control to include and exclude what words were written in bold or were repeated, this rendered Romania mute as the EU’s voice articulated what the Romanian enlargement was about. We can identify that visual aids were used as instruments of subjugation and that by remaining mute, Romania was subjected to a marginalized position, which indicated unequal relations of power to the EU.

Fourth, this leads to the question of whether the subaltern can be heard or whether the subaltern will remain mute and be spoken for by the elite? In contrast to Spivak, who concluded that the subaltern has “no history” and thus “cannot speak” (2006:32), but will remain mute, the above findings suggest that this does not have to be the case. For instance, the Romanian voice was heard through the use of words, which were not translated and fusion words. However, as the EU had the control of what was included and excluded, this questions the extent to which the Romanian voice, as it was controlled and constrained by the EU.

Fifth, by including the interviewees’ perspectives on the Romanian enlargement, such material allows a bottom-up approach, which enables “to recover alternative ways of knowing and understanding” (Sharp op.cit., p.5). This is in particular achieved by including the voices of Romanian respondents, as part of the subaltern group, but also the inclusion of the non-elite interviewees, which in the enlargement process has less visibility than the elite ones. The interview material has therefore significant implications, as it allows new knowledge, representations, voices, etc. to be heard and listened to. In contrast to the understanding that the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, but will remain mute, the interviewees are facilitating Romania to write back into history and be heard.
Overall, the above findings are significant because they demonstrate that examining the EU and unequal power relations through the perspective of subalternity enables scholars to conceptualize new postcolonial experiences in the EU. In particular, since the existing literature has developed largely without references to this notion, subalternity becomes a paramount way in understanding the EU’s production of unequal power relations in the present and in expanding the postcolonial research on the EU and unequal power relations.

5.8.2. Orientalist discourse

The central issue to be examined in this sub-section is the argument that the choice of vocabulary in the Reports identifies aspects of orientalist discourse, which produces unequal power relations.

First, the findings suggest that the choice of vocabulary produced binary representations, which consisted of particular modes of creating alterity in the Romanian enlargement. For instance, the words Eastern and European worked as silent referents (Robinson, 2003:275) in producing unequal power relations, as they prompted alterity by indicating that Romania was Eastern and the EU European. Alterity was produced as the use of terms Eastern and European can be regarded as a continuum between the representations of an inferior non-European Other and the superior Europeans (Asher, 2005:136). This suggests that the words European and Eastern are significant for an understanding of how unequal power relations were produced through binary representations in the Reports, as such binary representations created knowledge about the Romanian enlargement. The significant aspect of the terms Eastern and European is the fact that these binary representations created a certain
knowledge, which seemed to be grounded in a discourse of the familiar (EU, European) and the strange (Romania, Eastern), which created alterity between the EU and Romania.

In particular the interviewees presented two contrasting opinions. Although the first group of interviewees did not reflect over it, their negativity against the word Eastern as creating relations of distance can be related to the understanding that Eastern was used as an Orientalizing tool by the EU in order to represent Romania as inferior. It should perhaps be highlighted that the interviewees, who were against the term, belonged to either the Romanian negotiating team or the EU team, but who had been based or spent long periods in Romania. For instance, interviewee 5 maintained that “at the end of the process I obviously had more understanding” (for Romania). Perhaps the closeness to the Romanian society and thus the closer relations that were shaped prompted an understanding that the way Eastern was applied by the EU was not compatible with Romania or as interviewee 10 argued, that Romania “was not part of East”. On the other hand, the second group of interviewees did not show any concerns about the use of Eastern. This may indicate to the word’s commonsensical nature, on which people drew, but without being conscious of hidden ideologies and how these can impact upon power relations.

Second, another form of vocabulary, which created binary representations, was through the use of negative and positive vocabulary. The findings supports the argument presented that the negative vocabulary in the Reports produced binary representations, as it related Romania to things that “it was … not doing” (Fairclough, 2001:31). In contrast, the positive vocabulary was highlighting things that Romania was doing and so counterbalanced the negative vocabulary. At the same time, the fifth enlargement vocabulary also implied a negative evaluation, as words such as benchmarking or safeguard clause prompted
correlations between negative representations and the Romanian enlargement. In particular, the negative vocabulary played a central role in producing an orientalist discourse, as such a vocabulary implied the production of a “register of particular perceptions, vocabularies and modes of representation” (Young op.cit., p.387) of the Romanian enlargement. The implication of binary representations upon unequal power relations took place through the knowledge created, which seemed to be grounded in a discourse of the familiar (EU, positive) and the strange (Romania, negative).

Third, visual aids can also be regarded as another form through which vocabulary produced binary representations, which impacted upon power relations. It was suggested that the Reports included a number of repetition of words, which aimed to prompt an emphasis of what the EU found important in the Romanian enlargement. The EU had the power to create the image of Romania as a corrupt candidate country, which was perpetuated particularly through repetitions of words. However, relating to interviewee 7, who suggested that the EU encouraged corruption to a certain extent, this questions the extent to which the EU produced imaginative truths about the Romanian enlargement (see Sharp, 2009:12). The implication of binary representations upon unequal power relations takes place through the knowledge that the EU created through the use of visual aids, which seemed to be grounded in a discourse of the negative (Romania, corrupted) and the positive (the EU, which was telling Romania how to handle corruption). As mentioned previously, Chapter 4 revealed that corruption was identified as a problem that Romania needed to deal with before accessing the EU. The analysis however does not question such an argument, but aims to reveal how visual aids can be employed as another instrument through which vocabulary produces binary representation and thus unequal relations.
From a postcolonial perspective the above findings are vital to our understanding of power relations, as their analysis demonstrates that examining the EU and unequal power relations through the aspect of orientalism enables scholars to conceptualize the production of binary representations and how such representations produce unequal power relations. Although existing literature has discussed orientalist discourses in EU enlargement, this study expands our understanding further.

5.8.3. Mimicry.

This sub-section argues that the implication of the above findings on the research questions is that the choice of vocabulary identifies aspects of mimicry, which produces unequal power relations.

First, one particular example, which may relate to mimicry is the changing status of Romania during the enlargement process. This relates to the fact that for instance the omission of referring to Romania as Eastern or Central and Eastern European after the Treaty of Accession was signed may reflect to the fact that as Romania was approaching its accession date, it also became “entirely knowable and visible” to the EU and so more familiar and perhaps even similar to the EU. Even instances when interviewees revealed that working close to Romania made one understand it better, can also be indications of how Romania became knowable and visible.

However, findings also seem to identify a double characteristic of ambivalence as Romania came closer to accession, as Romania seems to have become “a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite”. For instance, when discussing constraints upon relations, the findings demonstrate that the Reports maintained the same monotone and austere tone
throughout the enlargement process and which maintained distant relations between the EU and Romania, even when Romania was about to become a member state. Here we can perhaps identify that although Romania was very close to accession, the EU identified Romania as almost the same, but not quite like the EU. Romania might have become similar or familiar, but it was still an Other of the EU.

Second, one particular interviewee raised the issue of mimicry when stating that there was a tendency of the Romanian negotiating team to mimic the EU in order to prove that Romania was European. Such an act resembles a practice through which Romania, just like the mimic man, becomes “entirely knowable and visible” by mimicking the traits of the EU. The question remains of the extent to which the EU felt threatened by Romania becoming similar to the EU. Perhaps the inclusion of unprecedented measures, such as benchmarking, was a method through which the EU “experienced” that as a future EU member state, Romania was “both resemble and menace at once”. Especially in statements in the Reports, which indicated that Romania was to transfer EU knowledge in order to take on the rights and obligations of EU membership, this questions the extent to which the EU regarded Romania as “almost total but not quite”.

Third, the main question is the extent to which Romania’s mimicry can be understood as a strategy of power, as Romania became “both similar to and the other of” the EU. Overall, the enlargement process was an act through which the EU shared its knowledge with Romania and thus the expectation was for the latter to become as similar as possible to the EU. Such an act reflects that the EU had a powerful position in the enlargement, while Romania was marginalized and thus the encounter was unequal. At the same time, we should not forget that by actually accumulating EU knowledge and mimicking the EU, Romania gained power of
knowledge and thus could challenge the EU. In other words, the power relations between the EU and Romania could be challenged. This aspect relates to power struggles, which will be discussed in Chapter 8.

The above discussion is significant because it reveals that examining the EU and unequal power relations by applying mimicry enables us to conceptualize postcolonial experiences in the EU. In particular, mimicry is significant as it engages with the EU and unequal power relations on a different level than in particular Spivak’s subalternity, as mimicry acknowledges how subordinated groups can be “knowable and visible” (Bhabha, 2000:71) and evoke both resemblance and threat to the dominant participant. Since the existing literature has developed largely without references to this notion, mimicry becomes a paramount way in understanding the EU’s production of unequal power relations in the present and expands the postcolonial research on the EU.

5.9. Conclusions

This chapter has argued that unequal power relations can be identified in instances of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, which operate in the vocabulary of the Reports. Although the choice of vocabulary discussed above may have been automatic, we cannot neglect the fact that this choice may also have been ideological and produced unequal power relations. The implication of the unequal encounter between the EU and Romania is that the EU held power in and behind discourse by constraining the contributions of Romania and controlling what was said and done, what relations were entered and what positions participants occupied in the discourses of the Reports. The power being exercised here is the power to control and constrain discourses, contributions and even participants through vocabulary (see Fairclough, 2001:43). The control and constraint impact upon power
relations, as the EU is in the position to for instance speak on behalf of Romania (subalternity) and create knowledge about Romania (orientalist discourse). On the other hand, by imitating the EU and acquiring EU knowledge, Romania gained power of knowledge and thus could challenge the EU. In other words, this could have challenged the unequal encounter (mimicry). By identifying such postcolonial elements, this analysis helps in raising “a critical consciousness” of the impact of ideological power in and behind discourse, which may enable change of and emancipation from unequal power relations.

In a wider perspective, the above findings are significant because they question the extent to which vocabulary may affect interpreters of the Reports, but also what elements affected producers of the Reports to make certain choices of vocabulary. However, the analysis does not tell us anything about what elements impacted upon the interpreters and in particular producers. Before moving to examine how discourse practices produce unequal power relations, the next chapter will examine how grammar in the Reports is also identified as a place where unequal power relations are produced, exercised and enacted.
CHAPTER 6

ANALYSING THE GRAMMAR OF THE REPORTS

Based on a similar structure as Chapter 5, this chapter argues that analyzing the grammar of the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports by applying the description dimension, will demonstrate the extent to which the EU produced unequal power relations, as, just like in the case of vocabulary, grammar is identified as a place where unequal relations are produced, exercised and enacted (Fairclough op.cit., p.36). As such, the next section will specifically look at how the description dimension has been applied to grammar, followed by an extensive discussion of the findings of the critical discourse analysis, interview material and content analysis. The extent to which the findings help us understand the production of unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship to the elements of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, will be debated before the concluding remark.

6.1. Applying the description dimension

The application of the description dimension aims to reveal the correlation between the grammar of the Reports and the production of unequal power relations by establishing that we cannot neglect the fact that the choice of grammar may also have been ideologically motivated. By asking a set of questions of the grammar of the Reports (see Appendix 1), the aim is to identify who held power in and behind discourse, by identifying through what choices of grammar did the EU control and constrain what is being said or done, what relations participants enter into and what positions participants occupy in and behind
discourse. In order to explore the extent to which an examination of grammar can reveal production of unequal power relations, this chapter builds upon five arguments, which are elaborated below. Accordingly, in order to provide further evidence of how grammar can extend our understanding of the EU’s production of unequal power relations, the below findings will be supported by the interview material. On a last note, the findings will also be discussed in relation to postcolonial theory in order to provide empirical support for demonstrating the extent to which grammar is a place in which unequal power relations were produced, exercised and enacted through elements of subalternity, mimicry and orientalism.

First, the chapter argues how the choice of process types in the Reports may produce unequal power relations, by controlling and constraining the contributions of participants in how events in the Romanian enlargement were described and represented. Process types refer to sentences, which indicate to the sort of processes that take place in discourse and thus indicate what is being done and said. In discourse, three main process types (actions, events and attributions) can be identified, where each include a range of grammatical features such as subjects (S), verbs (V), objects (O), complements (C), adjuncts (A), etc. Depending on the order and format of these grammatical features, process types suggest how processes are described and represented in text (Fairclough, 2001:101).

Second, the chapter argues that the choice of participant types in the Reports may have produced unequal power relations, by controlling and constraining the representations of participants. Participant types refer to the types of participants that are represented in discourse and which can be described as either animate or inanimate (obfuscation of agency) (Fairclough, 2001:102-103). Similarly to process types, depending on how participants are
represented, this suggests how for instance acts of causality or responsibility are described and represented in discourse.

Third, the chapter argues that the choice of declarative and imperative modes in the Reports produced unequal power relations, by controlling and constraining relations and positions of participants. The declarative mode refers to how the speaker/writer is positioned as a giver of information and instructions, while the addressee’s position is of a receiver. The imperative mode refers to how the speaker/writer is positioned as asking something of the addressee, which is positioned as a compliant actor (Fairclough, 2001:104-105).

Fourth, the chapter argues that the use and spelling of the nouns “member states/Member States” and “candidate countries” may have produced unequal power relations, by enacting relations of solidarity, exclusion and power (see Fairclough, 2001:59 and 93). Although these relations are usually produced through the use of pronouns, such as we, they, you, us (Fairclough, 2001:106; Cramer, 2010), the findings indicate that as pronouns are largely missing in the Reports, nouns produce the same kind of relations. The implication of nouns upon power relations was also raised in Chapter 5 when discussing how the vocabulary of Eastern/European/Central and Eastern European created relations of solidarity, difference and similarity. The chapter will also examine the implications of simulated personal address towards anonymous readers of the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:106) and the standardization of the spelling Member States (see Fairclough, 2001:47-48) upon production of unequal power relations.

Fifth, the chapter argues how the modality verbs of “may”, “must”, “should” and “can” (see Fairclough, 2001:105 and 107) may have produced unequal power relations by positioning
the EU as an authority (2001:151). Modality is identified as a grammatical feature, which expresses “the attitude of the ADDRESSER towards the factual content of what is being communicated, i.e. whether it is being asserted, questioned, demanded, or whished for” (Finch, 2000:103; Locke, 2002:82-83; Chandler, 2007b:65). By examining the above modality verbs, the analysis aims to reveal the extent to which such verbs helped in expressing the speaker’s or writer’s authority (the EU), by articulating possibility and obligation about assessments of the Romanian enlargement as categorical truths (see Fairclough, 2001:105). The chapter will also look at the implications of authenticity claims, which are identified as claims to knowledge and which are presented as evident and are indicated as categorical truths through the use of modality forms (Fairclough, 2001:107).

6.2. Representing events

This section argues that the choice of process types in the Reports produced unequal power relations by controlling and constraining the contributions of participants in how events in the Romanian enlargement were described and represented.

The findings of the analysis of the Reports argue that one of the most consistent process types was the attribution type, which follows the format of SVC. Such a process type involves only one participant. For example “markets for land and capital are not functioning properly” (RR 1998:18) articulated the way the EU experienced the Romanian markets for land and capital, which were identified as not functioning properly. As discussed previously, the attribution type includes one agent (markets), in order to easily attribute the event or action to one particular agent. However, the producer of the Report has not included the causes to why markets are not functioning properly, leaving attributions of causality unclear. Furthermore, a noticeable aspect in this example is that through the application of the negation not (see
Fairclough, 2001:104), the EU is expressing a negative representation about markets. On the other hand, examples such as “Romania’s legislation is largely in line with” (RR 2001:51), which is another attribution type, identifies a positive representation, as Romania’s legislation is in line with assumingly what is required from a candidate country. Furthermore, as legislation is one of the main accession criteria (see rule of law), which needs to be satisfied in order to become a member state (European Commission, 2014a), this furthers the EU’s positive representation by pointing out that Romania’s legislation is “in line with” EU criteria, although the extent to which Romania’s legislation is “largely in line with” is not clarified. However we should not ignore the fact that “largely” points out a limitation, as Romania’s legislation is not completely in line with, but only “largely”.

Another attribution type, “Romania should … take measures that have a significant impact on corruption” (RR 2004:145), acknowledges one agent (Romania), which explicitly is made responsible for fighting corruption. The importance of such an action (fighting corruption) is made clear by suggesting the type of impact Romania’s measures would have upon it (significant impact). Most notable, as corruption was identified as a negative feature of the Romanian enlargement (see Chapter 4), the role of Romania’s measures in fighting corruption is attributed further importance and responsibility. One striking feature of the above example is also the impact of the verb “should”. As it will later be discussed in the chapter, “should” often implies relations of obligation, which affects how participants are positioning themselves as an authority in discourse.

Several interviewees also raised the issue regarding the EU’s and Romania’s contributions to the Reports, although their views differed. For instance, interviewee 7 indicated that he would have liked Romania to have had “a stronger implication or a view or something”, but this was
not possible (until Romania became a member state) as during the enlargement process, “Romania was more in a process of learning and adapting and willing to get in”. Interviewee 7 suggested that Romania lacked “a voice”, as well as the ambition to be heard, but pointed out that Romania did get a voice after becoming a member state. On a somehow different, yet similar vein, interviewee 3 suggested that although the Romanian voice was heard, this was largely facilitated through the questionnaires that the EU required of Romania as a candidate state in order to prepare the monitoring Reports. So, although Romania’s voice was heard, it seems to that its contributions were controlled by the EU. The controlled and constrained contributions of Romania were made visible by interviewee 3 when stating that “we invite the candidate country to provide a contribution” and “we compare, we assess the information, we extract what we think is important in terms of” [the monitoring reports]. Such statements question the extent to which the EU controlled and constrained Romania’s contributions to the Reports and to what extent was the Romanian voice actually heard.

In contrast, interviewees 6 and 9 suggested that both the EU and Romania contributed to the Reports during the enlargement process. Interviewee 6 explained that Romania had been capable to contribute by presenting their perspectives on the different accession chapters alongside the EU, arguing that a “continuous dialogue and exchange of information with the Romanian side” had taken place, whilst interviewee 9 maintained that Romania had had a negotiating voice with both the Commission and the individual member states. This was also implied by interviewee 8 in that Romania had “had the opportunity to ask and argue” through their negotiation teams. In particular, interviewee 9 suggested that Romania’s voice sometimes created “unhappiness in Brussels” due to their stronghold of their views of how the Romanian enlargement was represented. Interviewee 2 also indicated that Romania’s voice was not only heard, “but we needed their voice” as the implementation of the accession
criteria had to be done in collaboration with local authorities, whom the EU needed to listen to.

6.3. Obfuscating participants

Another interesting aspect is how the choice of participant types in the Reports produced unequal power relations by controlling and constraining the representations of participants.

The obfuscation of participants matters in the way power relations are produced, as such a choice may be ideologically motivated (Fairclough, 2001:103). For instance the obfuscation of participants in the Reports can be identified in examples such as “illegal trafficking of human beings is a problem in Romania” (RR 1999:16). In this example, the agent (illegal trafficking) is depicted as being a problem in Romania, while excluding information about for instance who and/or what is/are causing illegal trafficking. In fact, it may be for instance the demand for prostitution or cheap labour in the EU or the geographical position of Romania at the crossroads of a human trafficking path, which is causing “illegal trafficking of human beings” and the “problem in Romania”. However, the EU has chosen not to clarify causality, but this information is hidden and excluded. Furthermore, pointing out this particular problem (illegal trafficking of human beings) brings to the attention Romania’s failure of fulfilling one of the main accession criteria (see human rights), which needs to be satisfied in order to become a member state (European Commission, 2014a) and thus furthers the negative representation of the Romanian enlargement.

Another noticeable aspect of the obfuscation of participants throughout the Reports is the fact that the agent/s, who was/were running the Romanian enlargement, was/were largely unknown. Although the Reports seem to suggest that Romania and the EU were running the
enlargement process and occasionally references to individuals and specific departments were also attributed responsibility, largely the agent/s, who ran the Romanian enlargement is/are not identified. The absence of such participants leaves attributions of responsibility unclear. It should be noted that as the EU enlargement process is a complex process, which involves a significant high number of individuals and departments, as discussed in Chapter 4, it is largely likely that some participants are obfuscated in order to narrow down the size of the information included in the Reports (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009). This aspect was raised by interviewee 2, who stated that “the internal conditions of drafting and also because drafting documents in different languages” was a “very difficult exercise” impacted upon what and who was included in the Reports. However, this justification does not reduce the importance of understanding how the obfuscation of participants is a way through which unequal power relations can be produced, exercised and enacted by excluding information about who is responsible for the production of the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:36).

6.4. Producing contrasting relations and positions

The below section argues how the choice of declarative and imperative modes produces unequal power relations, by controlling and constraining relations and positions of participants.

The declarative mode can be identified by how the EU as the producer of the Reports is positioning itself as a giver of information and instructions, while Romania is positioned as the receiver of such information and instructions. For instance, throughout the Reports, the EU is giving information about the Romanian enlargement by assessing and reporting on for instance “Romania’s ability to assume the obligations of membership” (RR 1999:33) and is

---

82 Such as Romanian Prime Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu (CMR 2005:5) or Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne (RR 2004:6).
giving instructions, particularly in the *General evaluation* section (3.10. in RR 1999:33), by clarifying the necessary alignments that Romania needs to consider. In the same vein, as we do not hear Romania giving information or instructions, this implicitly indicates that Romania is a receiver of the EU’s information and instructions.

The imperative mode can be identified by how the EU as the producer of the Reports is positioning itself as asking something of the addressee, Romania, which is positioned as a compliant actor. For instance, by identifying shortcomings and lack of progress and highlighting the necessity of fulfilling the accession criteria can be regarded as ways in which the EU was asking Romania to do something. Examples can be statements such as “compliance with the EMU *acquis* is conditional on completion of the process of liberalisation of capital movements” (RR 1999:41) or “Romania needs to step up the pace of transposition and implementation in this area” (RR 1999:59). What we identify here is the fact that the EU was producing a range of utterances, which aimed to encourage Romania to fulfil different tasks, positioning the EU as asking Romania something, while Romania was the addressee, which needed to comply with these utterances. Although it is not clear how Romania is a compliant actor, it can be assumed that such a position is implicitly clarified in the way the EU was either praising or criticizing Romania’s progress or lack of progress in subsequent Reports. If progress was mentioned, this may imply that Romania had been a complaint actor, who listened to what the EU was asking Romania. In the same vein, as we do not hear Romania asking something of the EU, this implicitly indicates that Romania is a complaint actor. Though, based on the range of unsatisfactory assessments that the EU included in the Reports, this questions the extent to which Romania was actually a compliant actor.
It should be noted that the sections of each Report became vaster as the Romanian enlargement progressed. For example Chapter 3 in the 2001 Regular Report offers a much lengthier review than for instance the 1999 Report. This implies that the position of the EU as a giver of information and instructions, as well as being in the position of asking something changed in the sense that the EU offered more information and instructions and asked for more things as the Romanian enlargement progressed. However, the May 2006 Comprehensive Monitoring Report indicates to a significant change in the reporting style. For instance, the assessments are shorter and the language has changed in that for example each conclusion is introducing more positive representations of the Romanian enlargement (such as mentioning “significant progress” or “important progress”). Such a change in language may suggest that the EU’s position as a giver of information has remained more or less the same, but its position as a giver of instructions and of asking something of the addressee has changed. This change also influenced Romania’s position: Romania is still positioned as a receiver of information, but due to the less use of declarative and imperative modes, Romania’s position as a receiver of instructions and as a complaint actor has been reduced.

The different positions and relations in the Romanian enlargement were also raised by the interviewees, although they differed in their opinions. One set of interviewees maintained that the EU and Romania were equal partners. For instance interviewee 4 suggested that the relations between the two actors were of joint effort and collaboration, indicating that joining the EU was like “a family cooperation” and although there were standards to consider, the process of enlargement was not a teaching lesson, but a helpful guide by the EU. In the same vein, interviewee 6 mentioned “a relationship of genuine partners” between the EU and Romania, but neither interviewees 4 or 6 clarified in which way the relations were equal nor a genuine partnership. Interviewee 2 was explicitly against the argument that the interaction
between the EU and Romania was not an equal encounter and argued that “it was not a process between a teacher and a pupil”, adding a joking warning that “if you write this, I will be angry”. On the other hand, although interviewee 3 suggested that “I can fully understand and agree to the fact that sometimes if you read this document, you can have the feeling of being lectured”, interviewee 3 maintained that the aim behind the Reports was to “remain as factual as possible”, not produce an image of schooling Romania in what to do:

“We tried to be very cautious in that because we don’t want appear like lecturing the country because it is partnership and it is on a voluntary basis and equality so that is why the language of the Progress Report is very neutral, balanced, very boring, because it is very codified … So it is not in our interest to put publically lecture, it is in our interest to have a common understanding of where we stand, what we have achieved so far and what is the work behind us, before us, ahead of us and that is what is really the purpose of the Progress Report. This is a photo and we want to make sure that you and us, we share the same understanding of the challenges ahead in order to make sure that we can work jointly, the tools we have in order to best address this situation because our common aim is to have you. We are, we the Commission, we are working for you, but we are trying to serve your interests while being able to defend your interests to the member states without jeopardizing what is the EU about. So it is our pinpoint in order to avoid postponement clauses, infringement procedures, all that stuff that could happen badly and to ensure that the candidate country will be able to survive as a member state”.

In contrast, other interviewees acknowledged that the so called teacher-pupil relation was very much part of the Romanian enlargement. For instance interviewee 5 indicated that the relation between the EU and Romania “was much closer to that of a tutor to a student. It was very much “if the Commission said jump, Romania’s government would ask, how high?””. Similarly, interviewee 1 argued that the enlargement process is unilateral as the EU is the club candidates want to join and therefore during negotiations, the relationship is unequal, suggesting that the Romanian enlargement was a period of inequality. Furthermore, interviewee 7 maintained that Romania’s relation with the EU was of a teacher-tutor format, but justified such relations as a natural aspect of “a process of learning” and “a process of adjustment”, which other candidates also went through, as the below shows:
“When you become a student your ambition is to take the place of your teacher and to become at least at the same level of knowledge and behavior with him if not above and I think it is a normal process and it is a process not only Romania pass through”.

6.5. Producing relations of solidarity, exclusion and power

Another emerging argument, which will be discussed below, is that the choice and spelling of member states/Member States and candidate countries in the Reports produced unequal power relations by shaping relations of solidarity, exclusion and power (see Fairclough, 2001:59). This argument is related to the fact that one of the noticeable aspects in the Reports is the fact that EU member states are referred to as member states and the candidates, including Romania, as candidate countries. Another aspect is that the member states of the EU are spelt Member States in the Reports (capitalization), while the candidates follow the spelling of candidate countries, where lower cases have been used. Such aspects raises question of the extent to which these grammatical choices impacted upon power relations.

In the case of relations of solidarity and exclusion, by applying different terms to categorize participants, a feeling of solidarity between those, who share the same status, may be produced, while producing relations of exclusion to participants not belonging to the same categorization (see Fairclough, 2001:59 and 79). On the one hand, a candidate country such as Romania may share relations of solidarity with other candidate countries, while member states may share relations of solidarity with other member states. On the other hand, as candidate countries cannot be included in the member states category (until accession) and a member state cannot be part of the candidate countries categorization (once accession has taken place), this may produce relations of exclusion. However, this raises questions of the
extent to which such relations of solidarity and exclusion are maintained after accession and thus the implications of these relations upon power relations.

The production of in particular relations of solidarity may in fact be an act of simulated personal address towards anonymous interpreters of the Reports. Using nouns such as member states and candidate countries simulates personal address, as these establish potential addressees in interpreters. For instance, despite the fact that the interpreters’ identity is unknown to the producer of the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:106), by stating that “Romania and 14 Member States have already ratified it”83 (CMR 2006a:4) or that “candidate countries must take all necessary measures” (RR 2002:9), the nouns Member States and candidate countries become a direct address on an individual basis. In this way, the interpreters’ relations of solidarity to either candidate countries or Member States are produced.

In the case of relations of power, when referring to the member states of the EU, the Reports use the spelling Member States, where both nouns start with capital letters. On the other hand, when referring to the candidate countries such as Romania, the Reports are using lower cases as in candidate countries. As a rule of grammar, linguistic features that are deemed important are usually spelt with a first capital letter (capitalization). One pertinent example to this is the French spelling of tu and Vous, where both pronouns are used to state the single address of you. However, while tu is used to address subordinates, familiar people, less important people, etc., Vous addresses superiors, people who are respected, etc. Thus, the superiority attributed to Vous is highlighted by the use of a first capital letter, while tu is written with lower characters (Fairclough, 2001:59). In the same vein, it can be implied that the capitalization of Member States marks the superiority and powerful status of Member

83 The Accession Treaty.
States in contrast to candidate countries, producing relations of power (see Fairclough, 2001:59). The implication of this spelling is that producers and interpreters will attach certain attributes, such as distinctive, respectful, authoritative, powerful, etc., to the participants associated with Member States, while attributing opposing characteristics to candidate countries. In view of the above, this questions the extent to which the attributes attached to Romania as a candidate country will persevere once Romania becomes a Member State.

It should be noted that although the use of member states and candidate countries is consistently applied in the Regular Reports, this is not the case of the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. This is largely due to a change of status, as once Romania signed the Accession Treaty, its candidate country status changed to an acceding state status. The difference between candidate countries and acceding states is that the latter are regarded as in close proximity to accession, especially as they have (successfully) fulfilled the membership criteria and are thus entitled to more rights and freedom than candidate countries (see also European Commission, 2013b, 2013j, 2013m). This change was also mentioned by interviewee 2, who stated that:

“Acceding countries and candidate countries. There, there is difference … The difference is when the Treaty is signed there are no more negotiations on the condition of accession. No longer a candidate, there the wording means something. What the candidate country had to do is achieved”.

In other words, the above reflects the changes that Romania had achieved or as interviewee 8 indicates, the Treaty of Accession signature proved that the major changes required by the EU had taken place in Romania. However, the capitalization of Member States continued to be applied in the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. This questions therefore the extent to

84 Apart from a footnote in the CMR (2006b:4).
85 For instance commenting on proposals and holding “an active observer status in all the relevant bodies, in which they have the right to speak but not to vote” (European Commission, 2013k).
which the relations of power (as produced by capitalization) were maintained even though the status of Romania had changed.

The interviewees seemed to agree that the capitalization of member states does not have any importance. For instance, interviewees 1 and 4 claimed that the spelling of Member States is not relevant, as it does not articulate any aspects of “arrogance”, but the Reports were just “guidance” for Romania (interviewee 4). Similarly, interviewee 3 stated that there is no “hidden agenda” nor “rudeness or inferiority” implied in the spelling, but corrected herself by adding that “not that I am aware of”. Interviewee 2 mentioned that the capitalization was “a question of grammar, to my knowledge there was never reason for making a differentiation on capital letters for member states and not for candidate countries”. In contrast, interviewee 7 seemed to suggest that the capitalization was used in order to differentiate between participants, as the below demonstrates:

“To recognize that we are a union of sovereign member states and the basis of this Union is the member states, so the king of this construction is the member states so we recognize the member, so for the rest of the world we are even in the process of accession, they are start countries, so for the rest of the world they are different and we want to make a very clear difference between the membership from the Union and the rest of the world”.

One striking aspect is the fact that the interviewees seemed to justify the capitalization of Member States as what interviewee 5 called “normal EU usage”, implying that capitalization is part of a normal or standard spelling in EU documents. For instance, interviewee 7 stated that he had noticed the different spellings and “always wondered myself why we write Member States with capital” [letter], but justified it as “I think is just for the Commission technocrats … it is just written as usual”. Similarly, interviewee 1 mentioned that the different spelling is just a formalized act, but does not indicate “any discriminatory
signposts”. Both interviewees 2 and 7 indicated that there was no symbolism behind such a choice, but the spelling was just “accepted everywhere from the beginning” (interviewee 2). Finally, interviewee 5 justified the capitalized spelling of Member States as originating in the Treaty:

“That is because “Member States” is a term you find in the Treaty. Even the spelling with capital letters. Whereas you don’t find the term candidate country in the Treaty; you will find that any state - with a small letter s - may apply to become a Member State or something like that. But Member State is a sort of a consecrated legal term. It is the standard usage in all EU documents, the term ”Member State”.

What we identify in the justification of capitalization as “normal EU usage” or “standard usage” is the fact that although EU language is becoming standardized, such a process also embodies relations of dominance and subordination. First, standardization enables the dominance of EU language as the standard language (norm) against which the enlargement process is discussed. Second, as capitalization may become associated with powerful participants, institutions, etc. and emerge as the language of the powerful, while positioning candidate countries such as Romania in a subordinate position (see Fairclough, 2001:47-48), this strongly suggests to production of relations of subordination in contrast to the first point which suggests producing relations of dominance.

6.6. Producing authority

The argument discussed in this section identifies that the choice of modality verbs in the Reports produced unequal power relations, by expressing the Report assessments as categorical truths of possibility and obligation. The examination will focus on the verbs may, can, should and must, which are the most applied modality verbs in the Reports, as indicated in Table 8 and demonstrate how the EU constructed a position of authority for itself when
assessing the Romanian enlargement through the help of such modality verbs (see Fairclough, 2001:159).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Must</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. The number of modality verb instances in the Reports.

The findings argue that may and can expressed possibility in the EU’s assessments of the Romanian enlargement, as the following instances demonstrate: “legal measures for restructuring the agricultural sector may result in a more stable and transparent set of rules” (RR 2002:72) and “Romania can be considered as a functioning market economy” (RR 2003:44). The use of “may” and “can” expresses an evaluation that the EU makes about the possibility of legal measures or Romania as a functioning market economy. Such verbs place the EU in an authoritative position by making the EU’s claims over the truth of the impact of legal measures or Romania as a functioning market economy as a possibility evident (see Fairclough, 2001:151), especially when the Romanian voice is not heard in the Reports.

The findings maintain that “should” and “must” expressed obligation in the EU’s assessments of the Romanian enlargement, as the following instances demonstrate: “Romania should pay particular attention to the timely and effective implementation” (RR 2004:11) and “the Romanian authorities must subscribe to its recommendations” (RR 2002:16). The use of should and must expresses an evaluation that the EU makes when assessing implementation...
and recommendations. What is noticeable in the above two examples is the fact that should seems to produce a less authoritative position than must, which indicates a stronger urgency towards obligation. For example stating that “Romania should pay particular attention to the timely and effective implementation” implies that Romania is obliged to achieve something, but the tone is optional. On the other hand, stating that “the Romanian authorities must subscribe to its recommendations” perpetuates obligation through the use of must, but the tone is not optional, but obligatory. Similarly to “may” and “can”, the verbs should and may help placing the EU in an authoritative position by making the EU’s claim over the truth of Romania paying attention and Romanian authorities subscribing recommendations as an obligation evident (see Fairclough, 2001:151), especially when the Romanian voice is not heard in the Reports.

In particular the implications of should has been raised by O’Brennan, who indicates the importance of the modality verb should in EU enlargement discourse. For instance, O’Brennan highlights that while the earlier Strategy reports acknowledged that the fifth enlargement process “should” be concluded, the later Strategy reports had replaced the word “should” with “will”. O’Brennan maintains that such a change in the vocabulary indicates that the EU was determined to allow the candidates to become member states of the EU, something that was not clear when using “should” (2006:43 and 83; see also Joenniemi, 2012:26).

The authority of the EU is further solidified by observing in each Report that the EU claims to draw “on numerous sources of information” (see for example RR 2001:7) when assessing the Romanian enlargement. Such statements produce an authenticity claim (Fairclough, 2001:107), which aims to present the Report assessments as “the truth about the applicants’
The implications of the authenticity claim are several. First, it is not clarified what sources were used and what information belonged to what participant. Therefore as interpreters we do not know the extent to which participants exercised power in producing the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:42). Second, by positioning the Reports as a credible and accurate source of information and in particular by obfuscating the Romanian voice, locates the EU not only as a knowledgeable actor, but also as an authority, in contrast to Romania.

The authenticity claim can also be related to the interviewees’ trust in the “credibility” of the Reports (interviewee 1) and regarding the assessments of the Reports as “accurate”, as they were based on “a thorough documentation and evaluation especially by the European Commission” (interviewee 6). Similarly, interviewee 8 insisted that the EU “had a particularly accurate and detailed knowledge of Romania's position”. In contrast, interviewee 9 indicated that the EU asserted an authoritative power over Romania, by forcing the latter to mimic the EU. The interviewee stated that the negotiation relations between the EU and Romania were asymmetrical, but these were hidden by the fact that the negotiating teams were exposing the image of a win-win negotiation type. Furthermore, the interviewee also implied that there exited a mimicking tendency on behalf of Romania, much due to internal pressure.

It should be noted that the academic literature has implicitly raised the issue of authority when discussing that the interaction between the EU and the candidate countries in the fifth enlargement was based on the discourse that the EU was “a modernized, safe political and economic heaven” (Behr, 2007:254), while the candidates were “learners or adopters of European norms” (Kuus, 2004:473-474). Such an argument resonates with Buden, who
argues that the applicants were regarded as being “in diapers” (2010a:4) and as “a landscape of historical ruins that is inhabited only by children, immature people unable to organize their lives democratically without guidance” (2010a:5), in contrast to the EU. Buden’s argument was identified by interviewee 4, who indicated that the Romanian enlargement was a process, developing from immaturity to maturity. Interviewee 8 shared a similar view, acknowledging the EU’s position of authority by pointing out the Romanian “deepest scars” after the fall of Communism and the determination of the EU to make Romania’s accession possible. On the other hand, interviewee 6 saw the EU’s authority over Romania as “natural” in a process of negotiations.

In relation to the aspect of EU authority, a number of interviewees drew attention to aspects of colonialism and empire. For instance, interviewee 7 maintained that he had never considered “any similarities between this relationship and the old colonial system”, as the below demonstrates:

“Because I thought we are in a completely different philosophy and logic, so Romania was seeking membership to a club of developed nations and this club of developed nations, they were treated equally, irrespective of the size and of the level of development. I thought on the contrary”.

Similarly, interviewee 2 was against the idea of the EU being compared to an empire as “there is no emperor, and emperor gives the impression of a centralistic organization and even if the organization is working from Brussels, who is the European emperor … there is no centralistic power”. On the other hand, interviewee 3 seemed to detect elements of colonialism and empire for instance in the way the EU “is imposing rules”, but as she had been working for the EU’s negotiating team, the interviewee admitted that it was difficult for her to agree with such a view, though she could consider such an aspect. Similarly,
interviewee 5 also suggested to a colonial relationship during the Romanian enlargement, but stated that “to liken the EU to an empire once you have joined is something of an exaggeration”, as the below demonstrates:

“I think there is some element of truth in that as regard to the process of accession … And there were certainly elements of a colonial relationship, particularly between the Commission and Romania at least as a candidate country. I can’t talk about the others to the same extent, but I suspect you will find that the same in most of the new member states, at least during the period when they were negotiating accession. That underlines the point we discussed about the particular role of the Commission in the process … Maybe viceroy is not the right word, but in British India you had the British resident in the princely states, and it was perhaps a little like that … In a sense the EU is a little bit like the Holy Roman Empire”.

6.7. Establishing a postcolonial relationship

Considering the argument that each grammatical property discussed above may have been a place in which unequal power relations were produced, exercised and enacted, the below three sub-sections discuss how the findings help us understand the extent of the production of unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship and setting out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.

6.7.1. Subalternity

To start with, the significance of the above findings suggests that the choice of grammar reveals aspects of subalternity, muteness, instruments of subjugation and ventriloquized voice, which produced unequal power relations.

First, by identifying how modality verbs positioned the EU as an authority and exposed its assessments as categorical truths about possibility and obligation in the Romanian enlargement seems to suggest that the EU produced a position as the elite in contrast to
Romania as the subaltern. For instance, when the EU spoke for Romania with respect to what should be done, the use of should conveyed the EU’s authority over Romania, while Romania was positioned as a receiver, creating obligation for what Romania needed to do. Thus we identify that the EU had the authority to speak for Romania by creating values of obligation and probability, while Romania was rendered mute.

Second, the findings suggest that the choice of attribution processes can be identified as instruments of subjugation, which rendered Romania mute as the EU spoke on behalf of Romania. The choice of attribution process types implies that the EU had the control over causality and responsibility regarding representations of events in the Romanian enlargement, while Romania’s voice was not heard. Instead the Romanian enlargement was known, represented, and spoken for by the EU, which strongly indicates to a case of the Romanian voice being ventriloquized. Similarly, a number of interviewees seemed to suggest to an EU control of what and whose contributions were included in the Reports. Thus, by remaining mute and having one’s voice ventriloquized, Romania was positioned as a subaltern and was subjected to a marginalised position, which produced inequality in power relations between the subaltern (Romania) and the elite (the EU).

Third, although some interviewees indicated that both the EU and Romania contributed to the Reports, the findings question whether Romania was “understood with accuracy” and whether it had been listened to. Especially the obfuscation of participants draws attention to the way the EU controlled what and how participants were made visible and responsible in the Reports. Can it then be assumed that the muteness of Romania as a subaltern was a result of “a failure of interpretation and not a failure of articulation”? 
Fourth, a number of interviewees agreed that the Romanian voice had not been heard, but that the EU controlled what was said in the Reports. This suggests to an aspect of subalternity, which means that Romania was rendered mute by the EU. On the other hand, other interviewees suggested that Romania’s voice was heard. Such a contrasting view may relate to the aspect of mimicry and thus will be discussed later in the chapter. It should also be noted that as the findings indicated that as the Reports became lengthier and even shorter during the Romanian enlargement, the Romanian voice was still not included and heard, while the EU as the producer of the Reports spoke on behalf of and for Romania. This supports further the evidence that Romania was rendered mute (subalternity).

Fifth, it is against the above background that we question whether the subaltern (Romania) can be heard, listened to and have one’s experiences considered or whether it will always be spoken for. In contrast to Spivak, who concluded that the subaltern has “no history” and thus “cannot speak” (2006:32), but will remain mute, the above findings suggest that this does not have to be the case. As long as we can raise a critical consciousness of the ideological power hiding in and behind discourse and aim to change these instruments of subjugation, emancipation is possible. Furthermore, by including the interviewees’ perspectives on the production of unequal power relations, this will allow overlooked voices to be heard, listened to and have one’s experiences considered. In particular, the interviewees’ claim that the Romanian voice was heard also indicates that Romania did not remain totally mute.

6.7.2. Orientalist discourse

What can the findings tell us about the production of unequal power relations in relation to orientalism? The below discussion will in particular look at how the choice of vocabulary identifies aspects of orientalist discourse, which produced unequal power relations.
First, the findings suggest that different grammatical features produced an orientalist discourse, which consisted of particular modes of representing the Romanian enlargement. For instance, the use of process types and obfuscation of participants tended to create both negative and positive representations of the Romanian enlargement, which implied knowledge that the EU produced about the Romanian enlargement. Furthermore, this knowledge was made authentic through the use of modality verbs, which as discussed earlier, helped in sustaining the authority position of the EU and especially in making its claims authentic and in positioning its knowledge as categorical truths. This questions the extent to which ideological interests the EU had in making its claims authentic. It can be assumed that the EU aimed to held power in discourse in order to control and constrain what knowledge, relations and positions were produced in the Reports. In other words, the EU controlled how the Romanian enlargement was represented. In orientalist terms, the power being exercised here is the power to create knowledge. However, such an argument raises questions as to whether the knowledge about the Romanian enlargement was accurate or whether it was imaginative.

Second, one noticeable aspect in the findings is the role that different grammatical features played in producing binary representations. For instance, this was obvious in the case of the use of declarative and imperative modes, which produced contrasting relations and positions. Such elements were grounded in the discourse of producing the image of the EU as a giver of information/instructions and of asking something and of Romania as the receiver of information/instructions and as a compliant actor (see Said, 1993:44). By positioning the EU and Romania in contrasting positions, which also implicitly indicated that their relations were contrasting, anticipates that the two actors were opposing each other. As it will later be
discussed in Chapter 7, such contrasting positions and relations were shaped by what conventions were produced in the discourse types of the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:49).

Another example of binary representations produced through grammar is the choice and spelling of the nouns member states/Member States and candidate countries, as such elements categorize the different participants in opposing groups. Furthermore, the application of the simulation of personal address also consolidated the production of opposing groups. A striking aspect was also the capitalization of Member States, which as discussed above, provides support for the argument that such a spelling, in contrast to candidate countries, points to different attributes and produces opposing representations. In other words, these grammatical choices can be regarded as additional ways in which the EU produced binary representations between the EU and Romania and thus shaped alterity in the Romanian enlargement.

More importantly, the interviewees also addressed contrasting positions and relations as produced, enacted and exercised in the Reports. A number of the interviewees suggested that the relations and positions that were produced in the Romanian enlargement reminded of a tutor-pupil kind, while a range of interviewees insisted of an equal encounter. However, it should be mentioned that the interviewees categorically disregarded the capitalization of Member States as something of importance, justifying such a spelling down to “normal” EU language. The implication of such a justification is the standardization of the spelling, which may become the norm against which enlargements are discussed. However, this is exactly the point that CDA tries to make. It is exactly such a grammar that people find “normal” and do not question that produces unequal power relations by prompting binary representations and producing alterity.
6.7.3. Mimicry

In addition to the above presented findings, the below discussion argues that the significance of the findings on the research questions is that the choice of vocabulary identifies aspects of mimicry.

First, one particular aspect, which can be related to mimicry, is the change that took place in the choice of grammatical features in the Reports. The findings identified for instance that the May 2006 Comprehensive Monitoring Report introduced a different way of representing the Romanian enlargement, which included a larger number of positive representations in contrast to previous negative representations. Such a change became obvious in the use of less declarative and imperative modes, which indicate that the EU’s position as a giver of instructions and of asking something of Romania, as well as Romania’s position as a receiver of instructions and as a compliant actor had changed. Such an aspect can be related to the fact that as the Romanian enlargement progressed, Romania fulfilled the EU’s request of becoming a member state and thus became “entirely knowable and visible” by becoming similar to the EU. In the same vein, the findings demonstrate that once the status of Romania changed to an acceding state when the Treaty was signed, a change in the discourses of the Reports also took place. For instance, one noticeable aspect is the fact that the use of the term candidate countries was eliminated. It thus can be argued that mimicking the EU became a strategy of power of Romania by becoming similar to the EU, as Romania learned EU knowledge, which led to its accession.

Second, a number of interviewees argued that the Romanian voice was heard and even, as one interviewee in particular suggested, created “unhappiness in Brussels”. Such an aspect
can be related to the argument that by mimicking the EU, Romania could have been seen as a threat. In particular interviewee 7 raised the issue that in a progress of learning it was the ambition of Romania to “take the place” of the EU’s knowledge and behavior. This questions therefore the extent to which the EU felt the appropriation of Romania as a threat. Perhaps the EU’s choice of modality verbs, which produced the position of the EU as an authority, may be regarded as a way through which the EU maintained control as an authoritative participant due to the threat that the Romanian enlargement produced. The question is whether the EU experienced such a threat and if so, to what extent did the EU feel threatened by Romania.

Third, a number of interviewees mentioned that Romania was forced by the EU to mimic the Union, while other interviewees noted that Romania had a mimicking tendency. This kind of findings raise questions of the extent to which mimicry was a voluntary act on behalf of Romania to become similar to the EU or whether Romania was forced into mimicking the EU. This relates to findings, which suggest that at different occasions the EU may have encouraged Romania to mimic the EU. For instance, the choice of declarative and imperative modes can be identified as an act through which the Union encouraged mimicry, by either giving information or instructions or asking something of Romania in order to become similar to the EU. What is striking here is the fact that mimicry is not only voluntarily, but also encouraged by the dominant participant. As such, these findings may suggest a changing character in the nature of how mimicry works. The bottom line is that even though the EU may have forced or encouraged Romania to mimic the EU, such a strategy allowed Romania to gain power of knowledge in an unequal encounter and thus be able to change unequal power relations by becoming “equal” to the EU.
6.8. Conclusions

In particular, this chapter raised the question in which ways does the choice of grammar produce unequal power relations, revealing that the unequal encounter between the EU and Romania enabled the EU to hold power in and behind discourse by constraining the contributions of Romania and controlling what was said and done, what relations were entered and what positions participants occupied in discourses through grammar (see Fairclough, 2001:43). Such a linguistic strategy helped the EU to control and constrain the production of power relations, as the EU was in the position for example to speak on behalf of Romania (subalternity) and create knowledge about Romania (orientalist discourse). However it is vital to notice that, by imitating the EU and acquiring EU knowledge (mimicry), Romania gained power of knowledge and thus could challenge the unequal encounter.

Although the analysis above reveals the extent to which grammar produces unequal power relations, it does not tell us anything about what elements impacted upon such choices. This aspect is important as it draws attention to the significance of how interpreters are influenced by their MRs and producers’ choices, but also how the Reports are an indication of the producers’ MRs. By acknowledging these implications, CDA takes the assessment of discourse to a different level, by highlighting how the formal properties of the Reports are shaped by the discourse practices of interpretation and production. The next chapter will therefore engage with the production and interpretation practices in order to identify how these impacted upon the formal properties of the Reports during production and how the formal properties of the Reports may have affected interpretations.
This chapter argues that analyzing the discourse practices of the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, by applying the interpretation dimension, will demonstrate the extent to which the EU produced unequal power relations, as discourse practices are identified as processes through which ideologies and ideological power are reproduced.

The chapter follows a four-step structure. First, the chapter will briefly outline the interpretation dimension of the discourse practices, establishing what this particular CDA stage entails. Second, the chapter discusses how the interpretation dimension has been applied to the two discourse practices, the production process and the interpretation process, of the Reports. Third, this section includes the findings of the analysis of the discourse practices and the interview material. Fourth, in this section the emphasis will be focused on establishing a postcolonial relationship between the findings and the elements of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry. The chapter summarizes in which ways the application of the interpretation dimension can extract observations of interest to the postcolonial analysis and set out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.
7.1. Outline of the interpretation dimension

This section briefly summarizes what the interpretation dimension entails (as discussed in Chapter 3) and the importance of this dimension in analyzing the extent to which discourse practices can facilitate the production of unequal power relations in and behind discourse. The section will also discuss the correlation between the interpretation and description dimensions.

The interpretation dimension entails an analysis of two discourse practices, the production of text and interpretation of text, in order to reveal how such processes reproduce ideologies and ideological power, which impact upon power relations (Fairclough, 1989:26; 2001:21 and 118). The importance of these two practices is based on the argument that the way participants produce and interpret texts is based on their “knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social world they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions” etc., known as members’ resources (MR) (Fairclough, 2001:20-21 and 74).

In terms of the process of production, the MR of the producer will be employed when producing a text and thus will influence text production (2001:118). Therefore, in the production process, the formal properties of text are regarded as “traces of the productive process” (Fairclough, 1989:26, 2001:20), as traces may indicate what MR have influenced the text producer. However, it is when the producer’s MR are used in text production that ideologies can be reproduced and thus contribute to unequal power relations. In terms of the process of interpretation, the MR of the interpreter will influence how the interpreter will understand a text, but the text itself will also influence and shape the MR of the interpreter (see Fairclough, 2001:118; Titsche et al., 2003:150). Thus, in the interpretation process, the formal properties of text are regarded as “cues in the process of interpretation” (2001:20), as
cues prompt the interpreter to use certain MR and interpret a text in a certain way. In the same vein as the process of production, it is when the MR are used as interpretative procedures that ideologies can be reproduced and thus contribute to unequal power relations (2001:118). However, producers and interpreters are often not aware of how reproduction of ideologies occurs and how it may contribute to inequality in power relations (2001:2-3 and 118). Thus, by identifying the extent to which unequal power relations are produced in discourse practices may not only raise “a critical consciousness” of the impact of ideological power in and behind discourse, but may also allow change of and emancipation from such unequal relations.

The correlation between the description dimension and the interpretation dimension is based on the fact that the latter dimension facilitates the reproduction of ideologies, which are then projected upon language and thus impact upon how language is produced and interpreted. As mentioned earlier, ideologies are practices, which appear commonsensical and which people often draw upon, but without considering that the ideological power may in fact shape how people perceive reality, events, etc. and thus can impact on power relations. More importantly, ideological power is held in discourse by powerful participants, who control and constrain discourses and contributions of non-powerful participants through what is being said or done, what relations participants enter into and what positions participants occupy in discourse.

7.2. Applying the interpretation dimension

This section discusses how the interpretation dimension has been applied to the discourse practices of the Reports. The examination aims to reveal the correlation between discourse practices and unequal power relations by establishing that such practices reproduce
ideologies, which impact upon power relations. The interpretation dimension targets therefore to reveal how producers and interpreters produce and interpret discourses of the Reports based on a situational context and an intertextual context and how the choices made impact upon the production and interpretation of formal properties of language of the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:119). In other words, the interpretation dimension identifies how by regarding the Reports as a product of a process of production and as a resource in the process of interpretation enables an understanding of how unequal power relations are produced (Fairclough, 1989:26, 2001:21 and 118, 2010:132). Furthermore, the findings will be discussed in relation to postcolonial theory in order to provide empirical support in demonstrating the extent to which discourse practices are a place in which unequal power relations are produced, exercised and enacted through elements of subalternity, mimicry and orientalism. The interpretation dimension aims therefore to answer the question why the Romanian enlargement was represented, why it was represented in a particular way by the EU and what does this mean in connection to unequal power relations (see Merkl-Davies and Koller op.cit., p.181).

First, in order to apply the interpretation dimension, each Report has been analyzed by asking a set of three questions (see Table 9) in order to interpret how producers and interpreters made sense of the situational context (2001:122). The questions help identify in which way the producers determined the discourse type, which shaped the production of the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:122), but also how the interpreters of the Reports were influenced by the discourse types and acted upon these when interpreting. Second, each Report has been analyzed by looking at how producers and interpreters made sense of the intertextual context (intertextuality), which relates to the fact that producers and interpreters rely on assumptions, which impact on how the Reports are produced and interpreted (see Fairclough, 2001:121).
In order to explore the extent to which an examination of discourse practices can reveal the extent of the production of unequal power relations, this chapter builds upon three arguments, which are elaborated below.

First, the chapter argues that the production of the Reports based on the situational context was held by the EU, who was the powerful participant in the Romanian enlargement. The significance of this is that the EU was in the position to produce a certain discourse type, which influenced the conventions within which the Reports were produced and later interpreted. Such a position has implications upon power relations, as the EU was able to reproduce ideologies and employ MR (see Fairclough, 2001:118), which impact upon power relations by sustaining elements of subalternity orientalist discourses and mimicry. Moreover, as the producer’s dependency on the MR when producing a text is often not obvious to the producer, this suggests that the process of production may function ideologically (2001:118).

Second, the chapter argues that the interpretation of the Reports based on the situational context was formulated on the discourse types produced by the EU, as interpreters relied on what is in the Reports and in the formal properties of the Reports in order to interpret these. At the same time, the discourse type activated certain MR of the interpreter (see Fairclough, 2001:118). As such, especially when the MR of the producers are used in the interpretation of text, ideologies of the producers are reproduced (2001:199). Such a position has implications
upon power relations, as interpreters reproduce ideologies (see Fairclough, 2001:118), which impact upon power relations by sustaining elements of subalternity orientalist discourses and mimicry. Moreover, as the interpreter’s dependency on the MR is not obvious to the interpreter, this suggests that the process of interpretation may function ideologically (2001:118).

Third, the chapter argues that the producers and interpreters of the Reports were influenced by a background of intertextuality and what it is in the text, which shaped a specific intertextual context (2001:39). The production and interpretation of the intertextual context refers to how participants acted upon assumptions of where a text (the Reports) belonged to. Once these assumptions have been decided, the participants determine what can be taken for given, what is common knowledge by other participants, what can be excluded, etc. or what can be presupposed (Fairclough, 2001:121 and 127).

Furthermore, the chapter argues in particular that presuppositions played an important role in the production and interpretation of the Reports. Presuppositions can be sincere and manipulative, in the sense that the producer believes the readers sincerely share the same information, but manipulative that the information is hidden as to not include all aspects (2001:128). The importance of presuppositions lays in the fact that they are regarded as ideological assumptions (Hakam, 2009:38), as presuppositions are a resource in the production of texts and a cue in the interpretation of texts (Fairclough, 2001:121). Since presuppositions are taken-for-granted assumptions which are embedded in language, such presumptions function ideologically as the EU may try to “create a basis” for their Reports assessments (see Machin and Mayer, 2012:222). It should be noted that presuppositions are based on the assumption of intertextuality, which suggests that texts “exist in intertextual
relations with other texts” (Fairclough, 2001:129). Intertextuality refers to how the producer produces a text or the interpreter interprets a text with references to other texts and presupposes of the other participants what they know about a certain situation (Fairclough, 1995:134, 2001:127).

7.3. Producing discourse types

This section argues that the producer of the Reports, the EU, produced a certain discourse type, by making sense of the situational context. However, the chapter also argues that as the production practice was one-sided, the EU controlled and constrained contents, positions and relations of the Reports (Fairclough, 2001:39). The identification of discourse types is an important part of the production of the situational context, as once the discourse type is determined, the conventions of how to behave in such a discourse type have been established (2001:39).

7.3.1. What is going on?

This section argues that the EU as the producer of the Reports produced a certain activity type, included certain contents (topics) and a certain purpose of the activity type in order to describe what is going on in the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:123). However such a choice not only creates an overall picture of what is going on in the Romanian enlargement, but also impacts upon which discourse type is being determined and what conventions will be applied between the participants of the discourse.

To start with, the activity type of each Report is to assess “Romania’s preparations for membership” (CMR 2005:6). The contents included are constrained to assessments of the political and economic criteria and the implementation of the acquis chapters. The purpose of
the inclusion of such contents is to identify progress, gaps and future steps towards the successful accession of Romania (CMR 2005:6). The discourse type produced is therefore an EU assessment report of Romania. Such a discourse type introduces therefore certain “conventions, norms, codes of practice”, which are underlying the discourses of the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:75)

Although the above might sound arbitrary and perhaps commonsensical, an analysis of the production process says much more than what meets the eye. Two themes, which impact upon power relations, are identified. First as mentioned earlier, the Romanian enlargement was an “unequal encounter” (Fairclough, 2001:36) between the EU and Romania. This originates in the fact that the EU was the powerful participant in the Romanian enlargement and thus such a position enabled the EU sole power over the production of the Reports. In this way the EU determines the activity type, the contents and the purpose of the Reports, as well as controls and constrains the “contributions of non-powerful participants” (2001:38-39), which in this case is Romania. Such a practice has been discussed in Chapter 4, maintaining that the production of the enlargement documents was a one-way process, monopolised by a small group of Commission officials (Bellier, 2004:145) and that the EU had power to decide what was included and excluded in such reports (Pridham, 2007c:531). In particular Grabbe argues that the EU had the power to decide the information of the Regular Reports (2002:266).

As interviewee 9 argued, the production of the Reports “was scattered with manipulation by the EU and asymmetry in reporting”, as the EU had “ultimate power in assessing us”. Interviewee 9 highlighted that “the Reports were the property of the Commission and they decided what the final draft was going to include, although officially this was never
recognized”. Such a view emphasizes therefore the fact that the EU had sole power to decide what was going on in the Reports and thus was able to produce a certain discourse type, which implied certain conventions, which in turn embodied particular power relations (2001:49).

Furthermore, although officially, it is argued that each “Report draws on numerous sources of information” such as Romania, the Council, the Parliament, various international organizations, as well as NGOs (see for instance RR 2001:7), the Reports are not clear of what information has been provided and by whom. What we identify here is an obfuscation of agency, which is decided by the producer of the Reports. Interviewee 5 noted for instance that “ultimately the Reports were … done by the Coordination Unit in DG Enlargement”, but the Reports are still not clear about agency, causality and responsibility of what is going on the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:103).

Second, as the above implied a one-sided act of the EU in the production process (see Fairclough, 2001:41), this raises concerns about who is actually the producer of the Reports. The implication of the production of the Reports was raised in Chapter 4, which acknowledged the different entities involved and revealed that detecting the producer is not an easy task. Initially, the Reports may be identified as the product of the European Commission, as each Report is labelled “From the Commission on Romania’s progress towards accession” (RR 1998 to RR 2000) or it is indicated on the title page that the Report has been produced by the “Commission of the European Communities”86 (RR 2001 to RR 2006). But is the European Commission the sole power-holder in producing these Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:43)? As Chapter 4 shows, the Directorate- General Enlargement (DG

86 It should be noted that on the title page of the CMR 2005 only the name of “European Commission” appears.
ENLARG), which is one of the departments within the Commission, seems to be the central entity responsible for enlargement and thus the monitoring Reports (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009). Nevertheless, we did learn that within this DG, different officials and units are involved with the production of the Reports, in particular the Coordination Unit, which has an important role in revising the different Report drafts (Lass-Lennecke and Werner, 2009:279; see also Appendix 4). However, none of these producers are clearly identified (see Fairclough, 2001:42), although as Appendix 4 shows, there is an obvious presence of several entities with a clear division of labor in the production of the Reports. The absence of clarity of who the producer is has implications upon production, as we do not know whose MR and ideologies shaped the production of the Reports. It can perhaps be argued that the producer of the Reports is an “identifiable unknown agent”, which relates to the idea of the obfuscation of agency. What this means is that we can identify the institutional entity, which has produced the Reports (the EU or the Directorate- General Enlargement), but since different agents are embedded within this institutional entity, the ownership of the production of the Reports is dispersed amongst a variety of identifiable unknown agents (see Fairclough, 2001:133).

The obfuscation of the producer of the Reports was also raised by interviewee 3, who argued that although she had been part of the EU’s negotiating team, it was not possible to know all the involved actors in the production of the Reports:

“I do not know who for instance wrote section B or this paragraph in this report. I could assume, but I cannot tell for sure who the producer was. I can only say it was the EU”.

The interviewee also considered how such an obfuscation of the producer may have impacted upon the Reports:
“If anyone from the public would have asked who wrote this precise paragraph or sentence, we would not know. And it is important to know as the person who wrote that particular sentence may have had a view different from the person who read it. Now that you are asking it becomes interesting to know who wrote what and why … to know their background”.

What we see above is a reflection over the fact that producers rely on certain MR in order to produce the Reports. However, as mentioned before, participants, either producers or interpreters, are often not aware that such MR produce a certain discourse type, by for instance shaping what is going on in the Reports. Depending on what MR the situational context triggers with the producer, the discourses of the Reports will be shaped in a certain way. The above statement by interviewee 3 is in particular pivotal as it shows how the interviewee becomes aware of the fact that the producer of the Report is not only obfuscated, but that the producer may also have relied on certain background information to produce the Report. In this way, interviewee 3 is questioning the influence of the producer over the Report.

7.3.2. Who is involved?

This section argues that the EU, as the producer of the Reports, produced who was involved in the Reports by identifying the positions of participants, in order to give an understanding of what participants are involved in the Romanian enlargement (see Fairclough, 2001:123). Such a choice not only creates an overall picture of who is involved in the Romanian enlargement, but also impacts upon which discourse type is being determined and what conventions will be applied by the participants of the discourse. Although positions can be multi-dimensional in the production process (2001:123), this section argues that this is not the case in the production of the Reports due to the one-sided production practice of the Reports.
First, throughout the Romanian enlargement, the EU is largely producing the position of Romania as a negotiating candidate country and of the EU as the rapporteur of the progress, although as Chapter 4 indicated, the image of Romania as a laggard was a regular feature of the Reports. This can be related to interviewee 9, who maintained that in particular Romania had a “stricter negotiation pattern, which differed significantly from previous candidates”. The interviewee argued that the EU was “harsher” on the position that Romania had in negotiations due to “the level of dissatisfaction and non-progress”. Interviewee 1 supported such a view by adding that Romania was seen as a laggard and that “if it was not for less successful applicants, Romania would have still maintained its laggardness” (here interviewee 1 refers to the challenges encountered by the EU for instance with the applicants from the Western Balkans).

The power of the EU to decide who is involved in the Reports has implications upon production. For instance, as the production of the Reports is a one-sided act, the participants cannot easily alternate in their positions. It should be noted however that the EU as the powerful participant does have the power to produce different positions, but in the case of Romania this is not an option. We can contrast the one-sided aspect of the Reports to for instance face to face interactions, where participants may alternate in their positions. However in the case of the Reports, the production belongs to one producer. Also in comparison to a face-to-face interaction, the one-sided interaction is mostly produced “to address an ideal subject”, while in face-to-face interactions the production is formed to match the participants involved (2001:41). This can be related to the interview material. For instance, interviewee 6 argued that in accession negotiations Romania “was vocal and did put her interests across”. As a consequence, the EU was listening to Romania “by balancing tensions that occurred at the negotiation table and finding an answer to show Romania that
they were on our side”. On the other hand, interviewee 6 indicated that outside such negotiations, when perhaps Romania was absent from discussions, the EU produced an ideal subject:

“Even though the Romanian team did their best, the Commission had final and ultimate power in order to match their interests…. But you have to bear in mind that they did not treat us as unequal …”

Second, on the other hand, identifying the position of Romania as a negotiating participant can be seen as an “advantage” to Romania, as the EU to a large extent adopted the language of each Report to the situation of Romania and did not treat Romania as an unknown subject, as in the case of mass media, when the language is adopted to fit an ideal subject (see Fairclough, 2001:41). As such Romania is considered an entity with its own features and characteristics. Interviewee 4 for example argued that the EU “aimed to understand its peculiarities”. At a later stage in the interview, interviewee 4 also argued that any signs of discrimination or subordination of Romania “were eliminated”, an aspect which may suggest that Romania was not treated an unknown subject.

In contrast, interviewee 7 had a different view of the position of Romania in the enlargement, by claiming that:

“During the enlargement process I detected a tendency to portray Romania as a laggard who aims to demonstrate that it has come a long way from its Communist past. It is true that there was a level of desire to show the EU that Romania was making progress, but at the same time, the EU seemed to insist on maintaining the same laggard image of Romania, even after Romania became a member state. And we can clearly see that in the enlargement documents that have been produced, you mentioned the Regular Reports for example”.
In contrast to the above respondents, interviewee 2 raised the issue that as Romania had applied to become a member state of the EU, it was in the power of the EU to decide what representations the EU shaped, by arguing that “it is normal practice when you join a society that the leader decides what the applicant should do” to fulfill the entry requirements. The interviewee seems to suggest that both the EU and Romania were aware of the positions they both were to take, due to the conventions that are associated to an act of membership application.

However, the important aspect in this particular situation is the fact that as the EU was the powerful participant, who controlled the positions of the EU and Romania, this raises questions of implications upon power relations. What is important to consider is the fact that the producer of the Reports employed certain MR, which reproduced ideologies and which in turn impacted upon power relations. However, as we do not know who the producer of the Reports are (obfuscated as discussed previously), it is difficult to acknowledge what MRs have been employed. Nevertheless, by being aware of such an implication raises consciousness of the impact upon power relations.

7.3.3. In what relations?

This section argues that the EU, as the producer of the Reports, produced what relations were enacted between the EU and Romania during the enlargement process (see Fairclough, 2001:124). The importance of such a choice is that not only does it create an overall picture of the relations in the Romanian enlargement, but it also impacts upon which discourse type is being determined and what conventions will be applied.
The findings suggest that the EU produced a variety of relations in the Reports. For instance, the latter Reports witnessed of relations of solidarity, which were noticed through the EU’s representations of Romania as an inevitable member state. Such an aspect is exemplified by interviewees 1 and 5, who maintained that the relationship between the EU and Romania was characterized by “collaboration” and “friendship”. On the other hand in the earlier Reports, the EU produced relations of distance through the emphasis of Romania’s shortcomings. This can perhaps be related to interviewee 9 who argued that the EU “seemed to have a need of portraying Romania as different, even after Romania became a member state”. Later in the interview, the respondent made a comment that although he was familiar with the practices of the EU in an enlargement process, he could not identify “the reasons behind many of the EU’s decisions”.

Furthermore the production of relations was also visible in each Regular Report, which included one section in which the relations between the EU and Romania were discussed, something that was missing from the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. This is an interesting aspect of the production practice as it questions why this specific section was excluded from the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports. It can be argued that such a change occurred when the Treaty of Accession was signed in 2005 and Romania changed position from a candidate country to an acceding state. In this case, it can be suggested that due to changes in relations between the EU and Romania, the EU also produced a different kind of discourse in which such a section was not relevant.

7.4. Interpretation of the situational context

This section argues that based on the discourse type and conventions produced by the EU, interpreters of the Reports made sense of the situational context (see Fairclough, 2001:39).
However the interpreters were influenced by the discourse type and ideologies within the discourse type, which triggered certain MR and which in turn shaped a certain interpretation and impacted upon the interpreters’ MR (see Fairclough, 2001:39). The identification of the discourse type is an important part of the interpretation of the situational context, as once the discourse type is determined, the conventions of how to interpret a discourse type have been established (2001:39).

7.4.1. What is going on?

This section argues that when answering the question what is going on in the Reports, the interpreter makes an interpretation regarding the activity type, the contents (topics) and the purpose of the activity type, which helps interpreting the situational context and determines what discourse type to draw upon (Fairclough, 2001:123). The importance of such an aspect is the way through which the MR and the discourse type impact upon interpretation.

In terms of the activity type of the Reports, we can argue that the activity type identified by the interpreter is an evaluation of the Romanian enlargement by the EU. However, especially the Regular Reports and the first two Comprehensive Monitoring Reports also identify other activity types, such as describing the Romanian and the EU relations, analyzing and assessing the political and economic criteria and addressing the *acquis* capacity (see for instance RR 2003:4-5). Depending on who the interpreter is, the activity type which is identified can be an evaluation, a description or an address. Therefore depending on whom the interpreter is and the MR of the interpreters, the activity type may be interpreted differently. For instance, if the interpreter of the Reports is the Romanian negotiating team, the latter could have interpreted the Reports as the EU evaluating Romania unfairly. Interviewee 9 for instance argued that Romania was positioned in the Reports as an experiment for the future enlargements with
Turkey and Croatia and that Romanian officials were frustrated with the negative aspects that the EU detailed in the Reports about Romania. Furthermore, interviewee 10 maintained that the Reports did not seem to include the reality of what was going on, even though the interviewee maintained that the EU’s aim with producing the Reports was to successfully help Romania to become a member state. However what we see in the interviewees’ statements is the fact that as part of the Romanian negotiating team, the respondents interpreted the Reports in a negative way, which may be different from the interpretation of another participant.

What is important to remember is that interpretation depends on who the interpreter is and what MRs are being employed. For instance, someone who had worked alongside Romania during the enlargement process, such as an EU official, would have had a different interpretation of the Romanian enlargement as described in the Reports than someone, such as a non EU citizen, who was not involved in the Romanian enlargement to the same level. For instance interviewee 5, who had worked for the EU, but in Romania and very closely with the Romanian negotiation team, argued that:

“At the end of the process I obviously had more understanding. If you Google me somewhere you will find that I did once say in a press conference, “

This indicates that the position of the interpreter affects the interpretation of the Reports as it activates MR which are related to the knowledge, experiences, opinion, etc. that someone has about Romania. The interpretation may therefore be different for someone who does not have the same relation or knowledge about Romania.
What is however of great importance is the fact that the producer’s MRs and ideologies, which have been reproduced in the Reports will be imposed on the interpreters by activating certain MR and thus influencing the way interpreters interpret the discourses (see Fairclough, 2001:134). Such a practice functions ideologically, as participants are not aware of the elements of reproduction and ideological power that are sustained in the production of the situational context.

7.4.2. Who is involved?

This section argues that when answering the question who is involved in the Reports, the interpreter makes an interpretation regarding what positions the involved participants have, by relying on their MR (Fairclough, 2001:123).

As the main participants of the Reports are the EU and Romania, interpreters may create multi-dimensional positions of these two actors (Fairclough, 2001:123), depending on whom the audience is and what MR are activated. For instance, the European Council, which was consulting the Reports prior to each December Council and took decisions regarding the Romanian enlargement, often seemed to reproduce the same image as the producer of the Reports. As discussed in Chapter 4, this relates to the fact that the decisions taken by the Councils with regards to the Romanian enlargement, seemed to follow the recommendation produced by the Commission (see Pridham, 2007c:527). We can therefore argue that the European Council in its position as the interpreter of the Reports was influenced by the producer. Such an influence activated certain MR upon which the European Council formed an image of the Romanian enlargement and the progress of Romania. However, as Chapter 4 revealed, this was not always the case. For instance, the European Parliament was critical of the 1999 Report and disagreed with the assessments, arguing that the Commission had to re-
evaluate their evaluations of Romania’s fulfillment of the political criteria. This indicates that as an interpreter, the Parliament did not reproduce the same representation as the Commission, but was critical about both the producer (the Commission) and Romania. Although, it must be noted that such a critique was primarily raised by the Parliament’s rapporteur Nicholson and thus reveals that depending on whom the interpreter is and what MR are activated by the discourse, the outcome may be different.

Some of the interviewees drew attention to the fact that the way Romania’s position was discussed in the Reports had an impact on how it was to be understood by the public. For instance interviewee 10 commented that Romania was represented as a non-European country, an aspect also shared by interviewee 5. Although both respondents worked for different negotiation teams, their understanding of how Romania was positioned in the enlargement documents was similar. In particular interviewee 10 indicated that such an image “did us no good”, as interpreters of the Reports “would consider us as non-Europeans”. Furthermore, interviewee 5 supported such a view by adding that:

“the way Romania was portrayed in the Regular Reports was not in its benefit. It created a distance to Europe and for someone who did not know anything about Romania, such a perception can be damaging for Romania”

What is again pivotal in the interpretation practice of the situational context is the fact that the producer’s MRs and ideologies, which have been reproduced in the Reports will be imposed on the interpreters by activating certain MR and thus influencing the way interpreters interpret the discourses (see Fairclough, 2001:134). Such a practice functions ideologically, as participants are not aware of the elements of reproduction and ideological power that are sustained in the production of the situational context.
7.4.3. In what relations?

This section argues that based on how the EU produced what relations were enacted between the EU and Romania during the enlargement process (see Fairclough, 2001:124), this influenced the way interpreters interpreted relations in the Romanian enlargement.

To start with, depending on who the interpreters of the Reports are, they are likely to interpret the relations between the participants differently. First, one possible interpretation may be of a relationship of difference between the EU and Romania. Such an interpretation can be enacted in the language of the Reports through the use of the word “corruption”, which was repeated throughout the Reports. As discussed in the analysis of formal properties of language, such repetitions impact upon how interpreters understand the relations of Romania and the EU in the Romanian enlargement. For instance interpreters can formulate the image of Romania as a corrupted country, while of the EU as “policing” Romania and aiming to erase corruption before the country becomes member of the EU.

The interviewees agreed that the relations between the EU and Romania were shaped by how people understood the EU assessments and reports. For instance interviewee 8 claimed that through her work during the Romanian enlargement (as part of the EU negotiating team), she tried to expose “a good and progressive image of Romania”:

“for someone like me working for that long with Romania, I had a clear view of their prospective success and so I had the power to express such a view and let other EU departments and the general public of where Romania stood in relation to its accession”.
The striking aspect of the above comment is that the interviewee seemed to acknowledge that she had power in actually influencing how different audiences interpreted Romania. In her case, she seemed to project a positive image, though the interviewee does not reflect over whether her representations included ideologies, which in turn impacted upon the interpreters.

In contrast, interviewee 10, who had worked as part of the Romanian negotiation team (unlike interviewee 8), had a different interpretation of how the relations between the EU and Romania were described in the Reports and the impact of these. Interviewee 10 used words such as “shocked”, “frustrated” and “manipulative” in explaining how the EU was exposing the relations with Romania:

“First of all, we were shocked to understand that the EU viewed us as the Eastern Other and not as European. Our relation with Europe has always been strong, so it frustrated the negotiating team to accept … Such an image is manipulative. As these documents are historical documents, what will future generations think of us?”.

What we identify above is the extent to which interviewee 10 is questioning not only how the EU produced relations between Romania and the EU, but also raised fears of how such productions are to be interpreted by for instance the public (future generations). What is actually distinctive is the fact that although interviewee 10 shows concerns of the aspects of production and interpretation, it is doubtful that he is aware of the ideological power and reproduction of ideologies, which impact upon power relations.
A third example, interviewee 7, who had been part of the negotiating team of both Romania and later of the EU, maintained a different position on the relations depicted in the (Regular) Reports. Interviewee 7 claimed that:

“For me it was easy to understand the position of the EU in the Reports, once I had joined the EU team. However, prior to that, as part of the Romanian negotiating team, I felt the EU was creating distance between us and them. Once I joined the EU team, I understood that this was a matter of official wording and nothing personal … although I am not sure whether the public understands that, as the wording is so constrained by EU bureaucracy”.

In contrast to the other two interviewees, interviewee 7 seemed to have a different understanding of the relations enacted in the Reports. This is shaped by the MR of the interviewee who has different experiences, knowledge, etc., due to the involvement with both the Romanian and the EU negotiating teams.

### 7.5. Production and interpretation of the intertextual context

This section argues that producers and interpreters of the Reports produce and interpret the Reports according to an intertextual context. In order to set out such an argument, the section will examine the extent to which presuppositions played role in the production and interpretation of the Reports. As mentioned earlier, the importance of presuppositions lays in the fact that they are a resource in the production of texts and a cue in the interpretation of texts (2001:121). Their implication upon power relations is related to the fact that presuppositions are taken-for-granted assumptions, which are embedded in language (Machin and Mayer, 2012:222).

This section also argues that the Reports were produced and interpreted based on the assumption of intertextuality, which suggests that texts “exist in intertextual relations with
other texts” (2001:129). In other words, intertextuality refers to how the EU produced the Reports or the interpreter interpreted the Reports with references to other texts and presupposed other participants knew about the Romanian enlargement (Fairclough, 1995:134, 2001:127). The section also discusses how presuppositions can be sincere and manipulative, in the sense that the producer believes the readers sincerely share the same information, but manipulative that the information is hidden as to not include all aspects (2001:128).

7.5.1. Presuppositions

To start with, presuppositions are embedded in the production of each Report. For instance the first paragraph of each Regular Reports outlines the following:

“In Agenda 2000 the EU said it would report regularly to the European Council on progress made by each of the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe in preparations for membership and that it would submit its first report at the end of 1998. The European Council in Luxembourg decided that …” (RR 1998:4).

Such a paragraph includes a variety of presuppositions, such as Agenda 2000, report regularly, European Council, progress, candidate countries, Central and Eastern Europe, membership, first report and European Council in Luxembourg. These presuppositions are the EU’s interpretations of what they assume the audience might know about the enlargement process and does not need to explain in detail what each of the above terminology means. The EU has to assess the intertextual experience of the audience in order to determine what can be left unwritten, what can be included and what can be alluded to. In this case, the EU produces a text which is based on the assumption that the readers of the Reports will be familiar with the above presuppositions. The EU’s assessment of the audience is therefore limited as only someone with certain background knowledge will be able to understand the Reports (see Fairclough, 2001:123).
These presuppositions involve a dilemma. We do not know whether the EU produced such a paragraph, presupposing that the Romanian enlargement has attracted enough interest and therefore audiences share the same knowledge of the Romanian enlargement as the EU and do not need a more detailed explanation of what for instance Agenda 2000 is and who the candidate countries are. We can then assume that the presuppositions were sincere. However, even though the presuppositions may not be manipulative in this case, they can still be ideological, because by including certain words, for instance Central and Eastern Europe, such a vocabulary would activate certain MR with the interpreters which may create images of alterity and otherness. In other words, presuppositions can have a significant impact on interpreters.

The Comprehensive Monitoring Reports have a somehow different introductory paragraph, but which however also captures a number of presuppositions as the below example demonstrates:

“The accession negotiations with Romania were successfully concluded in December 2004. The Accession Treaty was signed in April 2005. Romania and 14 Member States have already ratified it. The Treaty envisages accession on 1 January 2007 unless the Council decides, upon a EU recommendation, to postpone it until 1 January 2008. Following the conclusion of the negotiations, the European Union decided that it would continue closely to monitor Romania's preparations and achievements and that, to this end, the EU would continue to submit annual reports on Romania's progress towards accession, together with recommendations, if appropriate. The EU presented its first such a report in October 2005. This report showed that Romania was already well advanced in preparing for accession. It also identified a number of areas where further efforts were needed to complete preparations. The EU decided to step up its monitoring activities and report again in spring 2006” (CMR 2006a:4).

In the above we also identify sincere presuppositions. The sincere presuppositions are for instance references to the different key dates that have taken place since December 2004.
Such facts can be presupposed to be known by the audience, but the EU does not know to what extent the audience is familiar with this information. Again, this may be based on the presupposition that the Romanian enlargement has attracted enough interest from the audience, who is familiar with for instance the Accession Treaty and the postponement clause. The ideological presuppositions come in references such as “continue closely to monitor Romania's preparations and achievements”. This implies a level of intertextuality as participants are presupposed to know the level of preparedness of Romania and its shortcomings.

On the other hand we can also identify a combination of sincere and manipulative presuppositions in the Reports. For instance, the 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report is a good example of how the EU used a number of presuppositions during a phase when Romania was officially recognized as becoming a member state of the EU in January 2007:

“Romania, in light of its geopolitical situation in Europe and with its 22 million inhabitants, plays the role of an interface between the European Union (EU) and the Balkans as well as Black Sea regions. After the fall of the Berlin wall and the emergence of a democratic regime, Romania very soon established in 1990 diplomatic relations with the EU. The same year, Romania signed a Trade and Co-operation Agreement with it. In 1993, a far-reaching Association Agreement called “Europe Agreement” which already recognised Romania's goal of becoming a member of the EU. This agreement, which created a free trade zone between Romania and the Member States, was already part of the strategy of the EU to prepare Romania for accession, which also included substantial financial and technical assistance” (CMR 2005:3).

The sincere presuppositions are for instance the aspect of Romania’s historical relationship with the EU and its post-communist transition. Such facts can be presupposed to be known by the participants, but the EU does not know to what extent the participants are familiar with this information. Again, this may be based on the presupposition that the fifth enlargement and the Romanian enlargement have attracted interest from the audience, who is familiar with
for instance the Europe Agreement and the free trade zone. The manipulative presuppositions are included in wording such as “the role of an interface and its geopolitical situation in Europe”. Such references can be regarded as manipulative in the sense that they presuppose background knowledge shared by the audience (see Fairclough, 2001:128). The ideological presuppositions can be identified in references such as “the strategy of the EU to prepare Romania for accession”. This implies a level of intertextuality as participants are presupposed to know the level of preparedness of Romania and its shortcomings. In particular presuppositions, which are made in the Reports, seem to indicate towards a level of intertextuality. For the producer, the EU, it is a matter of producing the Reports based on previous Reports and other documents, but which the EU presupposes other participants are also familiar with. In the case of the interpreters, the interpreter may interpret the Report with references to other texts and may presuppose of the other participants what they know about a certain situation (see Fairclough op.cit., 1995:134)

The findings suggest that producers and interpreters of the Reports produced and interpreted the Reports according to an intertextual context in which presuppositions played role. The importance of presuppositions lays in the fact that they are a resource in the production of texts and a cue in the interpretation of the Reports, but that presuppositions are also taken-for-granted assumptions, which are based on assumption of intertextuality (see Fairclough, 2001:129).

7.6. Establishing a postcolonial relationship

The below three sub-sections present a discussion of how the findings help us understand the extent of the production of unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship and setting out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports. The
main argument is that examining the two discourse practices can reveal the extent to which the production and interpretation of the Reports may be identified as places in which unequal power relations were produced, exercised and enacted.

7.6.1. Subalternity

This section argues that the discourse practices of production and interpretation of the Reports produced unequal power relations by allowing elements of subalternity.

First, the findings demonstrate that the EU had sole power over the production process of the Reports and thus had power to control and constrain Romania’s access to discourse, in particular as Romania was not part of the production process. Such a constraint to access to discourse implies that the EU had authority in producing discourse, while Romania was excluded (see Fairclough, 2001:53). In subalternity terms, this implies that the EU was the elite, which rendered Romania mute. Romania was being spoken for by the EU and its voice was not heard. However, this leads to questions of the extent to which what ideologies the EU could have included in the production practice and how these may have impacted upon power relations.

Second, in line with the main concern of subalternity, of whether the subaltern can be “retrieved and restored to history” (McLeod op.cit., p.221), whether the subaltern is able to be heard, to be listened to and to have one’s experiences considered or whether the subaltern will always be spoken for by colonial representational systems, looking at the production practice does not seem to allow Romania to be heard. In other words, it can be argued that the production practice does not allow Romania’s voice to be heard and thus Romania remains mute. Instead, Romania’s voice is ventriloquized as the EU is facilitating how Romania is
“known, represented, and spoken for” (Moore-Gilbert op.cit., p.452). Romania’s position as a subaltern in the Romanian enlargement is facilitated therefore by the production practice.

Third, due to the power of the EU as the main producer of the Reports, such a one-sided process affects the interpreter. In other words, the EU as the producer of a text exercises power over interpreters as the EU decides what should be “included and excluded, how events are presented, and … the subject positions of their audiences” (Fairclough, 2001:42). Elements of subalternity, which for instance recognizes the EU as the powerful participant (elite) and Romania as the non-powerful participant (the subaltern), are being reproduced not only through the production practice, but also through the interpretation practice.

7.6.2. Orientalist discourse

This section argues that the discourse practices of production and interpretation of the Reports produced unequal power relations by allowing elements of orientalism.

First, the implication of the production of the Reports is that the EU has power to produce a certain discursive register of particular perceptions and representation about the Romanian enlargement. In particular the EU has the sole power over the production of what is going on in the Reports, it controls and constrains the contents that will be included and can create certain knowledge about Romania, which will be later distributed to interpreters. This knowledge may for instance include negative and positive representations about Romania, as we identified in Chapter 5 through negative and positive vocabulary. However just like in the case of orientalist discourses, the discourses in the Reports may be manipulative and so can create imaginative truths about the Romanian enlargement. Thus the production practice
inscribed unequal power relations by enabling the EU to create knowledge about the Romanian enlargement, but this knowledge may create alterity.

Second, the implication of orientalist discourses upon the practice of interpretation is that this EU acquired knowledge influences the way interpreters understands the Romanian enlargement. This relates to the fact that the EU as the producer exercises power over interpreters as the producer decides what should be “included and excluded, how events are presented, and … the subject positions of their audiences” (Fairclough op.cit., p.42). What this means is that the discourses of the Reports activate certain MR with the interpreters and produce a certain image of Romania. As it has been revealed in previous chapters, the language of the Reports influenced for instance the decisions taken by the European Councils regarding the Romanian enlargement process. What this indicates is the fact that the EU (the Commission) produced knowledge about the Romanian enlargement based on interpretations of the Commission’s assessments. The implication upon the production of unequal power relations is related to the fact that the producer of the Reports reproduces ideologies and MR, which may influence the interpretations of the Reports. As for instance in the case of the European Councils, who were influenced by the same interpretations as the Commission’s when deciding the path of the Romanian enlargement, the assessments of the Commission may have created images of alterity about Romania as a candidate country, which influenced how the Romanian enlargement was controlled.

7.6.3. Mimicry

This section argues that the discourse practices of production and interpretation of the Reports produced unequal power relations by enabling elements of mimicry.
First, although the EU was the producer of the Reports, the production practice actually emancipated Romania to a certain extent by enabling Romania the power of knowledge. What this means is that while the EU produced the Reports in which for instance Romania’s shortcomings were assessed, this can also be seen as an encouragement for Romania to become similar to the EU and acquire the EU’s knowledge by overcoming the shortcomings. In this sense, the practice of production can be identified as a tool through which Romania became entirely knowable and visible. It was however not identifiable in the findings to what extent Romania challenged the EU by essentially mimicking it and furthermore, to what extent the EU felt threatened by Romania.

Second, as the EU adopted the language of each Report to the situation of Romania and did not treat Romania as an unknown subject, this again indicates that Romania was knowable and visible during the production practice. Furthermore, the way the EU produced positions of Romania as a laggard, but also as a future member state indicates that Romania was identified as almost the same, but not quite, which relates to the practice of double framing, discussed in a previous chapter.

Overall, what is intriguing about the elements of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry discussed above is that producers and interpreters are often not aware of how reproduction of ideologies occurs and how it may contribute to the three aspects, which in turn impact upon power relations (2001:2-3 and 118). However, by identifying the extent to which subalternity, orientalism and mimicry impacts upon unequal power relations through the two discourse practices may not only raise “a critical consciousness” of the impact of ideological power in and behind discourse, but may also allow change of and emancipation from such unequal relations.
7.7. Conclusions

This chapter has argued that the production of unequal power relations can be identified in instances of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, which operate in the discourse practices of the Reports. Although discourse practices may be automatic processes when producing and interpreting language, we cannot neglect the fact that they may also be ideological and thus produce unequal power relations. Furthermore, interpreters are exposed to the ideologies of the producers of the Reports and such influences activate different MR in the interpreters and shape the interpretation about what is going on in the Reports and what positions and relations are depicted. If the Reports activate the type of MR that the EU have produced, then we can conclude that the Reports had had ideological power by reproducing the EU’s ideologies. For instance, if the formal properties of the Reports activate a negative image of Romania linked to the inferiority of Eastern Europe, then we can say that such ideologies have been reproduced (see Fairclough, 2001:199).

The findings also suggest that the intertextual context plays an important role in the production and interpretation of the Reports, as presuppositions are a mechanism through which ideologies are being reproduced. This is especially produced when manipulative presuppositions are applied, as the producers (the EU) will consciously choose to hide certain information, which will impact upon how interpreters will interpret the discourses of the Reports. What is striking is the fact that neither the producers nor the interpreters are aware of the ideological functions of presuppositions upon power relations.

The above findings are significant because they question the extent to which discourse practices may affect the production and interpretation of the Reports. Although the analysis
above reveals how discourse practices produce unequal power relations, it does not tell us anything about what elements impacted upon such practices. In particular, this chapter has discussed reproduction of ideologies and how they impact upon power relations. However, as power relations are not static, but change, the next chapter will engage with the examination of the social conditions, sociocultural practices, that impact upon discourse practices, in order to identify the extent to which such conditions change unequal power relations and emancipate subordinated groups.
CHAPTER 8

ANALYSING THE SOCIOCULTURAL PRACTICES OF THE REPORTS

This chapter argues that analyzing the sociocultural practices of the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, by applying the explanation dimension, will demonstrate the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations, as sociocultural practices are identified as processes through which ideologies are reproduced, but also where ideologies can be changed through social struggles. To explore this argument, the chapter will first outline the explanation dimension of sociocultural practices. Second, the chapter discusses how the explanation dimension has been applied to the sociocultural practices of the Reports, followed by a third section, which includes the findings of the analysis of sociocultural practices. Fourth, the section introduces a discussion of how the findings help us understand the extent of the production of unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship to the elements of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry. Similarly to the previous dimensions, the chapter concludes in which ways the explanation dimension can be applied to extract observations of interest to the postcolonial analysis and set out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are functioning in the Reports.
8.1. Outline of the explanation dimension

Following the discussion in Chapter 3, this section summarizes what the explanation dimension involves and the significance of this dimension in analyzing how sociocultural practices enable the production of unequal power relations in and behind discourse, as well as facilitate change and emancipation. The section will also discuss the correlation between the explanation and interpretation dimensions.

The explanation dimension engages with the extent to which social structures (power relations) at the situational (the immediate social environment in which discourse occurs), institutional (such as court room, family, etc.) and societal (society as a whole) levels are reciprocally shaping and influencing discourse practices. The correlation between the explanation dimension and the interpretation dimension rests upon the fact that social structures impact upon MR, which in turn shape discourses, which in turn sustain or change MR and which in turn sustain or change social structures. Such an examination allows researchers to engage with how ideological power impacts upon discourses practices, taking into consideration how power relations are influencing and are being influenced (Fairclough, 2001:135, 2010:132-33; Fairclough et al., 2011:357).

While it is during the explanation dimension that ideologies are reproduced or discontinued (Fairclough, 2001:71), this reproduction or change occurs through social struggles. As discourse is identified as “the site of power struggles” and “the stake in power struggles” (2001:61), power struggles are won by controlling formal properties and constraining contents, relations and positions in discourse. In other words, participants are struggling for controlling and constraining discourse as by doing so, they can win the site of power struggles, i.e. by controlling discourse and by winning such a control, they have won the
discourse, which is the stake in power struggles. Thus, the participant, who has won control over discourse, is regarded as having “power in discourse and power behind discourse” (2001:36). Power in discourse refers to “controlling and constraining contributions of non-powerful participants” (2001:38-39), while power behind discourse is concerned with questions of “who has access to which discourses, and who has the power to impose and enforce constraints on access” to discourse (2001:52). Any participant will attempt to impose its ideologies on power relations in order to win or maintain power in and behind discourse at the situational, institutional and societal levels (2001:59 and 71).

It should be noted that the dominant bloc has to continually restate its power in social struggles with non-powerful participants (Fairclough, 2001:38-39), as the latter also engages to win power (2001:59) and thus power in and behind discourse can be lost in social struggles (2001:61). It is essential to mention that by having power in and behind discourse, the dominant bloc also has power to decide the discourse type (2001:39), which controls and constrains discourse (2001:25) and which influences the production and interpretation of text and what MR will be used in these practices (2001:124). A discourse type is defined as the type of discourse within which participants interact87.

8.2. Applying the explanation dimension

This section discusses how the explanation dimension has been applied to the sociocultural practices of the Reports. The examination aims to reveal the correlation between sociocultural practices and unequal power relations by establishing that such practices reproduce and change ideologies, which impact upon power relations. By doing so, the thesis aims to reveal whether the EU restated its power by enforcing ideologies in social struggles,

---

87 See footnote 43.
what forms these ideologies took and whether Romania engaged in social struggles and if so, at which levels could these social struggles be identified. In other words, the explanation dimension aims to answer the question why the Romanian enlargement was represented, why it was represented in a particular way by the EU and what does this mean in relation to unequal power relations (see Merkl-Davies and Koller, 2010:181). Such an examination allows researchers to engage with how ideological power impacts upon discourses practices, taking into consideration how power relations are influencing and are being influenced (Fairclough, 2001:135, 2010:132-33; Fairclough et al., 2011:357). Just as in the case of the description and interpretation dimensions, the findings of the analysis will be discussed in relation to postcolonial theory in order to indicate the extent to which sociocultural practices are a place in which unequal power relations were produced, exercised and enacted through elements of subalternity, mimicry and orientalism.

The explanation of the Reports will be applied as indicated in Figure 1, which shows that social structures (power relations) affect MR or producers and interpreters of the Reports and thus reproduce ideologies, which in turn shape discourses, which in turn sustain or change (social struggles) MR and which in turn sustain or change social structures (2001:135). In this interplay, ideologies can be reproduced or changed in social struggles (2001:31). The explanation dimension engages therefore with how discourses in the Reports are affected by and affects power relations at situational, institutional and societal levels (Fairclough, 2001:30). Thus, in contrast to the interpretation dimension, which is concerned with how MR reproduce ideologies, the explanation dimension is concerned with both reproduction and change of ideologies (2001:135).
It should be noted that the EU as the dominant bloc has to continually restate its power in social struggles with Romania as the non-powerful participant (Fairclough, 2001:38-39), as the latter also engages to win power (2001:59). As discussed previously, power in and behind discourse can be lost in social struggles (2001:61), but by retaining such power, the dominant bloc is able to decide the discourse type, which in turn controls and constrains discourse and which influences the production and interpretation of text and what MR will be used in these practices (2001:25, 39 and 124).

When applying the explanation dimension, researchers can ask three questions of a discourse in relations to the institutional, situational and societal levels (Fairclough, 2001:138). The three questions are indicated in Table 10.

- How is discourse positioned in relation to struggles at the situational, institutional and societal levels?
- Are these struggles overt or covert?
- Does it contribute to sustaining existing power relations, or transforming them?

*Table 10. What power relations at the situational, institutional and societal levels shape discourse? (Source: Fairclough, 2001:138).*
In order to explore the extent to which an examination of sociocultural practices can reveal the extent of the production of unequal power relations, this chapter builds upon one main argument, which maintains that power relations at the institutional, societal and situational levels supported an unequal encounter between the EU and Romania and which in turn impacted upon how the discourses of the Reports were produced and interpreted. The below findings claim that attempts to change social struggles did occur, in which the EU’s power was challenged by Romania, but that such social struggles were not won by the latter. As the EU won the social struggles, it therefore continued to impose its ideologies in and behind discourse at the situational, institutional and societal levels (see Fairclough, 2001:59).

8.3. Power relations at institutional level

This section argues that the analysis of power relations at the institutional level will demonstrate the extent to which power relations and power struggles shaped and were shaped by the discourses of the Reports.

The first aspect that should be asked about the discourses of the Reports is the kind of institutional level that the Reports’ discourses belong to. By identifying this discourse type, the explanation dimension will be able to identify what power relations, power struggles, MR and ideologies determined the language of the Reports, but also how language later shaped power relations, power struggles, MR and ideologies (see Fairclough, 2001:158).

This is a rather complex question as the Romanian enlargement relates to a variety of institutions. So far we have identified the EU and the Romanian government as agencies in the enlargement process, but other actors can also be recognized. For instance, within the EU, we have at one point argued that it was the Commission, who dealt with the enlargement
process, but more specifically, within the Commission, the DG ENLARG was the main actor running the enlargement process. Further, within the DG ENLARG, there was one unit of Commission officials set up as Romania country desk, which “monitored the development of all chapters … and was in direct contact with national actors” (Lass-Lannecke and Werner, 2009:277-278). From time to time we have seen how the European Councils influenced the enlargement process. In particular Chapter 4 revealed what one can identify as “the tip of the iceberg” (see Lewis, 2010:144) with regards to the many entities and layers involved at the institutional level. In addition to this, we can also add that there were other institutions, at both regional and national levels, involved with the enlargement, which also played a role in the Romanian enlargement. On the other hand, within the Romanian government, we have a range of ministries, departments and bureaus and within each one, a variety of smaller units, which were supporting the negotiation team and/or was part of this and thus was associated with the enlargement process. Moreover, lobby groups, resistance groups, oppositions groups, citizens, media, etc. were also part of this apparatus of actors. Although we can name other institutions within both the EU and the Romanian government, the above examples should demonstrate the complex dynamics that existed when it comes to the institutional level and deciding what institutional processes did the discourses of the Reports belong to (see Fairclough, 2001:158-159).

It can be argued that the discourses of the Reports belong primarily to the institutional level of the EU. Here is it necessary to recall that the Romanian enlargement discourses are primarily determined by the EU’s accession politics. Therefore we recognise a power struggle between the EU and Romania in who is controlling and constraining the discourses. As it was mentioned earlier, power struggles are identified as the ability to control and constrain contents, relations and positions within a discourse. Recalling the enlargement
phases in Chapter 4, it was acknowledged that Romania applied for membership to the EU, but that the EU was in the position to take decisions upon the Romanian membership application and the enlargement process. This suggests that not only was the EU the dominant bloc, but also that the EU determined the contents, relations and positions of the discourses produced. This strongly suggests that the EU’s MR had a determinative influence over the Reports discourses. This supports the argument that the power relations at this point in the Romanian enlargement were unequal, as the EU, as the dominant bloc, controlled and constrained discourses.

The next step is to identify what MR and ideologies did the EU use when determining discourses in the Reports. It should be argued that the Reports covered a great number of discourses, but one that was noticeable was the discourse of the second wave of the fifth enlargement. As already discussed, it was noted that the first wave differed greatly from the second wave and thus we cannot speak of a fifth enlargement discourse, but a second wave of the fifth enlargement discourse. Although the discourse aimed for the successful integration of Romania within the EU, the discourse also identifies a power struggle that ideologically determined the EU’s MR and activated certain MR. For instance, a central part of the Romanian enlargement was driven by the conditionality principle, as described in Chapter 4. Romania had to fulfil certain accession criteria in order to access the EU and it was according to these criteria that the EU was producing the Reports. Thus, the EU’s MR and ideologies were activated according to the accession politics and thus were shaping the discourses of the Reports. As it was noted in the Reports, the EU already had a precise image of what a successful member state should achieve. This suggests that the position of Romania was determined according to the EU’s view of the conditionality principle. Furthermore, relations between the EU and Romania were also decided according to how Romania
performed according to the conditionality principle. In this way the EU’s MR were activated, which in turn determined how discourses were produced. These have implications for power relations, as so far, the EU was the dominant bloc, while Romania was in a subaltern position.

Once the discourses were produced in the form of the Reports, these were published and distributed to the European Council, as well as made available to the general public (see Fairclough, 2001:160). At the European Council, decisions were taken regarding the Romanian enlargement progress. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the discourses of the Reports were influencing the decisions taken at the European Councils regarding the progress of the Romanian enlargement. It can be argued that the discourses activated certain MR in the officials working in the European Councils and thus had an impact upon the Romanian enlargement process. Such MR also impacted upon how social struggles and power relations were produced. In the case of the Romanian enlargement, the EU was in the position to maintain its dominant bloc position, while Romania continued to be subjugated to the subaltern position. In this way, unequal power relations were maintained.

On the other hand, we have the Romanian negotiation team, who sometimes showed concerns over decisions taken at the EU level, as indicated in Chapter 4. Here we can argue that Romania challenged the power struggle and attempted to win power over discourse by changing the discourse itself. For instance, the 1997 decision to leave Romania out of negotiations infuriated Romanian Prime Minister Ciorbea, who raised fears about discrimination and unequal treatment by the EU (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, op.cit. p.38). Here we identify a challenge to power struggle, but due to the less powerful position of Romania in the accession negotiations, changes were not sustained.
However, there were instances in the Romanian enlargement, when the discourses of the Reports changed and impacted upon power relations and power struggles. Two such instances have been mentioned in Chapter 4. The first instance is related to the 1999 Regular Report, which indicated a level of progress in Romania. Such a discourse satisfied the Helsinki European Council to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences and to begin negotiations with Romania. This meant that the discourse of the Report activated certain MR in the officials that worked at the European Council and which changed the way Romania was dealt with. The question is what triggered the EU to change its discourse about the Romanian enlargement. Was it a change in the practices of the Romanian enlargement or was it a change sustained by another factor? After all, it should be noted that Chapter 4 acknowledged that the Commission proposed opening accession negotiations with Romania as a solution towards the increasingly unstable situation due to the Kosovo conflict (Papadimitrious and Phinnemore, 2008:43) and the 1999 Report itself addressed how Romania joined the EU’s position on Kosovo and showed cohesion with both the EU’s and NATO’s actions and demands (RR 1999:58). Could this then have been a factor, which influenced the EU’s discourse regarding Romania?

The second instance is related to the 2004 Regular Report’ discourse, which indicated that Romania was ready for the next level in the enlargement process and implied the signing of the Treaty of Accession. The change in the discourse of the Report activated certain MR in the officials of the EU and changed the negotiations with Romania. It can be argued that once the discourse changed, different MR and ideologies were reproduced, which caused a change in the enlargement process. Again, the main question is what caused such change in the EU’s discourse production. One possible answer may be that the discourse or/and practices of
Romania changed, which in turn had an impact upon what MR were activated in the EU when assessing the enlargement.

However, the examination of the institutional level identifies an implication, which suggests that the discourses of the Reports did not change the power relations to a considerate level, but that the power relations continued to determine the discourses, by sustaining the same MR and ideologies. Despite the fact that we see a change in Romania’s accession politics, by becoming a candidate country and an acceding state, the September 2006 Report introduced continued monitoring activity of Romania post accession. Especially in the Comprehensive Monitoring Reports, the discourses introduced a vocabulary, which was unprecedented, such as benchmarking and safeguard clauses, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Such a wording not only activated certain MR, but also constrained contents, relations and positions. For instance, by establishing the need of continued monitoring of Romania, such a decision activated the knowledge (MR) that Romania had not joined the EU on equal terms, but that it was still a laggard. The relations between Romania and the other member states were therefore not equal.

It is also worth discussing whether the interplay between power relations and discourses had the same effect and determination on both the production and interpretation processes. This is another complex question. For instance, the discourses of the Reports are important in the interpretation process of for instance citizens. In the case of the referendum that takes place when an acceding state is joining the EU, the national vote of the citizens is important for such a phase. The citizens’ decisions are however based on how the Reports’ discourses shape the citizens’ MR about the Romanian enlargement. For instance, in the case of the Romanian ratification, a high number of officials in the Flemish and Dutch Parliaments voted
against ratification (Phinnemore, 2011:99). Although this was not seen as a threat to the ratification, we cannot neglect the fact that this may indicate that the discourses of the Reports impacted upon the officials’ image of Romania as a member state, shaping and activating their MR in a certain way and influencing their decisions.

According to CDA, the dominant bloc “constantly reasserts their power” in order to keep the power, while the less powerful agents are making a bid for power (Fairclough, 2001:57). This was identified in Chapter 4, when for instance the Romanian officials were infuriated with some of the decisions of the EU regarding the Romanian enlargement and how the EU maintained its power by either making demands or ensuring Romania of a later accession. The Reports can be regarded as an important element in this power struggle, as the discourses in the Reports maintained the power struggle at the institutional level. What this means is that the power struggle was enabled by the dominant position of the EU in the production process and who used the Reports to include ideologies of how Romania belonged to a certain category of applicants (laggard) and thus created knowledge about Romania. Such discourses imply that certain ideologies, which can be identified as common-sense assumptions about the Romanian enlargement, were actually functioning ideologically.

The findings reported above suggest that the Reports’ discourses were ideologically determined and ideologically determinative of power relations and power struggles. First, it was highlighted that due to the process of enlargement, the EU was the dominant bloc, which had control and constraint over the discourses of the Reports. This provides support for the suggestion that as the EU controlled what contents, relations and position were produced in the Reports, such a practice impacted upon power relations. Such findings help to explain the correlation between the institutional level, discourses and power relations. Second, it appears
that the institutional level supported a second wave discourse, which sustained the EU as the dominant bloc and Romania as the non-powerful participant. In this way, unequal power relations were produced.

For example when the EU engaged with Romania in for example negotiation meetings, these meetings created certain conventions for how these get-togethers would happen. The EU had the knowledge about how enlargement should take places, was seen as asking the right questions to establish Romania’s situation as an applicant, candidate and accession state, had experience from previous enlargements (even if these differ from the fifth enlargement) and had solutions and information of how enlargements could be processed, all of which Romania needed. Romania had no knowledge or had limited knowledge and experience of what enlargement entitled, what to question or negotiate about (especially perhaps during the early stages), what needed to be done and so on. This put the EU in a dominant position and Romania in a subaltern one, as EU enlargement was not Romania’s place of expertise. In this circumstance, language was the instrument through which ideologies about positions, relations, etc. were shaped. This relates to the argument that power can be “won, held and lost” through language and that language is “the site of power struggles” and “the stake in power struggles” (Fairclough, 2001:61).

8.4. Power relations at societal level

The analysis of the determinations and effects at the societal level will highlight how the social structures shaped and were shaped by the discourses of the Reports.

---

88 This discussion was based on Fairclough’s example of a doctor - patient appointment (2001:2).
The first aspect that should be asked about the discourses of the Reports is the kind of societal level that the discourses belong to. By identifying this discourse type, the explanation dimension will be able to identify what power relations, power struggles, MR and ideologies determined the language of the Reports, but also how language later shaped power relations, power struggles, MR and ideologies (see Fairclough, 2001:158). This is again a complex question to answer, as the Romanian enlargement relates to a variety of societal levels. For instance, we can identify a Western and Eastern society, Europe and Europe’s Other, two European societies that are aiming for integration, a capitalist society and a post-communist society, etc. Although we can illustrate other agencies, the above examples should demonstrate the complex dynamics that exists when it comes to the societal level and deciding what societal processes did the discourses of the Reports belong to (see Fairclough, 2001:158-159). However, in order to clarify in which ways discourses are ideologically determined of and ideologically determinative by power relations and power struggles at the societal level (see Fairclough, 2001:2), this section will look at the power relations and struggles determined by the image of the non-European Eastern Other (Romania) and the embodiment of Europe (the EU), which was raised in the Introduction chapter.

The implication of such a level is that the Romanian enlargement is no longer a matter of only EU enlargement and integration, but also a matter of integration of the Eastern European Other (Romania) into the European Self (the EU). To a certain extent this also implies that a former satellite state (Romania) transitions from post-communism into democracy, a functioning market economy and the implementation of the acquis, which are central features of the EU’s Copenhagen criteria.
What we can identify at the societal level is that power relations and power struggles have taken a different shape in comparison to the institutional level. Instead of enlargement politics, which is largely dealt with at the institutional level, the societal level is shaped by power relations and power struggles, which are determined by the “idea of Europe” discourse (see Pagden, 2004). Thus, the MR that will be activated in the process of production and the process of interpretation are related to the common-sense assumptions that the EU has about Romania as part of Europe. As mentioned in chapters 5-7, we could identify how the EU controlled and constrained contents, relations and positions based on such MR. For instance, it was identified that the EU applied a certain vocabulary, such as the words Eastern and European, as means to describe the Romanian enlargement (or some aspects of it). Such findings suggest that the MR, which determined what discourse was to be produced, were shaped by the power relations between Europe and the Other. These themes have implications for the investigation of power relations, as it provides support of how power relations that exist, activate certain MR, which will produce a certain discourse.

One noticeable aspect is the implications that the discourses produced in the Reports will have upon activating certain MR in the interpreters and so maintain or change power relations. As mentioned previously, in 2006, the study Footprint Romania identified that Romania was still regarded as an exotic presence in Europe (Euractiv, 2008) and that 68% regarded Romania as old-fashioned, as well as linked images of poverty, backwardness and corruption to it (Euractiv, 2006). At the same time, the discourses in the Reports accentuated that Romania would at one point become a member state and thus the discourses witnessed of indications of an imminent accession. It can be argued that the EU simulated solidarity with the non-European Eastern Other and the post-communist Romania through the latter discourse (see Fairclough, 2001:160). The interpreters were therefore interpreting such
discourses as Romania making progress towards accession, while the Romanian society was very much becoming a European society (see Euractiv, 2006). Nonetheless, by producing such a discourse, the EU brought in the idea of the non-European Eastern Other becoming European through enlargement. What we then identify here is how discourses at the societal level maintained a particular kind of discourse, in which a distinction was made between Europe and the Other.

Thus, at the societal level we identify a different power struggle between Romania as the non-European Eastern Other and the EU as the embodiment of Europe. The Reports’ discourses can be regarded as an important element in this power struggle, as the discourses sustained the same power relations. What this means is that the power struggle was enabled by the position as the dominant bloc of the EU in the production process and which used the Reports to include ideologies of how Romania belonged to a certain category of applicants and thus created knowledge about Romania (see Fairclough, 2001:73). As mentioned earlier, the power struggle was won by the EU at societal level by constraining contents, positions and relations in discourses. For instance, the use of distinctive words to describe the positions of the EU and Romania clearly identified how the EU controlled what positions each agency was to intake. In Chapter 6, it was revealed how the wording of member states and candidate countries had an impact on the contents, positions and relations that were being produced, but also how such a vocabulary may have impacted upon interpretation.

One notable question that emerges from this analysis at the societal level is whether there have been any changes of unequal power relations. The above indicates that this is not the case. For instance, the introduction of unprecedented criteria, such as benchmarking and safeguard clauses, indicates that the unequal power relations were sustained at the societal
level. In particular, this was noticed in the September 2006 Report, which introduced the idea of a continued monitoring activity of Romania post accession. In other words, the discourse sustained the same unequal power relations in that the EU was to continue its monitoring role, while Romania had to comply to a subaltern position.

The findings reported above suggest that the Reports’ discourses were ideologically determined and ideologically determinative of power relations and power struggles. It was established that at the societal level, the discourses of the Reports were produced based on for instance the idea of the non-European Eastern Other and the European Self. As the EU was the dominant bloc in the enlargement process, it also had control over what contents, relations and positions were produced. The important part however is that depending on the societal situation, the MR that the EU relied on were to influence and thus shape in which way they controlled the discourses. As previous chapters have shown, the Reports’ discourses witnessed of a variety of practices in which a distinction between the EU and Romania was based upon the idea of Europe versus the Other. This in turn would impact upon how interpreters were to understand the Romanian enlargement and thus activate specific MR.

8.5. Power relations at situational level

The analysis of the determinations and effects at the situational level will underline how the power relations and power struggles shaped and were shaped by the Reports’ discourse. This level is also related to the situational context discussed in Chapter 7 and thus is related to how producers and interpreters were influenced by a background of MR, intertextuality and what it is in the text, in particular the discourse type, as well as the contents, positions and relations of the discourse type (Fairclough, 2001:39).
The first aspect that should be asked about the discourses of the Reports is the kind of situational level that the discourses belong to. The situational level is largely related to time and space in the Romanian enlargement. As it was previously discussed in Chapter 7, during the production process, a certain discourse type was produced, according to which a discourse took a certain shape. This discourse type was related to the process of enlargement, in this case Romania and so the discourses produced were related to what the situation required of the Reports to include. As it was mentioned in Chapter 3, language was used to constrain relations, contents and positions in the Reports. When it comes to the process of production, the findings suggested that the EU was the dominant bloc and thus had power to control and constrain relations, contents and position to a higher degree than the non-influential participants such as Romania.

The situational level has a striking importance to the interpretation dimension, questioning how MR and ideologies will be interpreted. Although the Reports were produced as the EU’s assessment of the Romanian enlargement, such discourses were meant not only for the EU, but also for instance the general public. As it was mentioned earlier, the Reports can be found for instance in electronic format on the Internet or as hard copies in Brussels and thus can be accessed by largely anyone. This distribution of the Reports can be identified as an attempt to introduce the wider public to the EU’s assessments of the Romanian enlargement, but it does not mean that by doing so, the EU is not ideologically influencing how interpreters will interpret such assessments. In particular, by opening up towards larger audiences, the assessments were exposed to large masses and thus the EU’s examinations would impact upon how the wider public viewed Romania. What is of concern is the fact that we do not know whether the EU did this as a manipulative or a sincere act. As it was discussed in Chapter 7, a sincere act takes place when a producer believes that the interpreters of a
discourse sincerely share the same information, knowledge, understanding, etc. as the producer, while a manipulative act has the contrast effect, in that the producer deliberately hides information (see Faiclough, 2001:128).

8.6. Establishing a postcolonial relationship

This section argues that examining the sociocultural practices can reveal the extent to which such practices may be identified as places in which unequal power relations were produced, exercised and enacted. The focus here will therefore be on how sociocultural practices have given rise to aspects of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry at the institutional, situational and societal levels (see Locke, 2004:42). The below presents a discussion of how the findings help us understand the production of unequal power relations and sets out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry were operating in the Reports.

The analysis of the sociocultural practices argues that due to the unequal encounter between the EU and Romania, the EU held power in and behind discourse. It was therefore the MR and ideologies of the EU that were reproduced in the Reports. We can then argue that the power relations at institutional, situational and societal levels can be identified as representational systems, which rendered Romania mute. Especially as Romania was dependent on the EU’s approval regarding the membership criteria, its position as a subaltern did not change. This questions whether the muteness of the subaltern (Romania) can in fact be challenged, by finding ways of allowing the subaltern to speak, to be heard and to be listened to. One way of finding out whether Romania was able to speak may be identified by examining the sociocultural practices after Romania has become a member state. Although such an aspect is not part of the aim of this research, it is nonetheless interesting to compare whether Romania’s subalternity changed post-accession.
Due to the powerful position of the EU in the Romanian enlargement, the EU was also able to produce knowledge about the Romanian enlargement and about Romania as a candidate (orientalism). As the above argued, the EU’s assessments of the enlargement reproduced their MR and ideologies about Romania. Romania on the other hand did not have the power to create knowledge, although we have identified instances when Romanian officials reacted to unsatisfactory assessments of the EU. Such reactions imply two postcolonial elements. First, we identify that the EU was producing knowledge (oriental discourse), which created a certain image about Romania. Second, Romania disagreed with such a discourse by raising concerns and disapproval of the EU. This can be seen as a way through which Romania was making its voice heard. We can then assume that the power of the EU was challenged (social struggle). However, judging from the path of the Romanian enlargement, a change of discourse did not occur, most likely due to the powerful position of the EU in the actual enlargement process and the dependency of Romania for the approval of the EU. In this case we identify not only an unequal encounter, but also that social struggles did not enable change or emancipation.

Aspects of mimicry were not discernable in the findings of the explanation dimension. This may be due to the fact that as the EU maintained power in and behind discourse throughout the Romanian enlargement and thus power relations were not changed, the analysis could not identify instances in which Romania became knowable and visible. Nevertheless, this does not mean that mimicry did not occur. For instance, once Romania became an EU member state, the former became the same as the EU (mimicry). What is however interesting to examine is the extent to which the EU still maintained power in discourse after Romania’s accession or whether social struggles occurred, which led to change and emancipation. This
relates in particular to the EU decision that Romania was to be monitored post-accession and would therefore introduce useful insights about power relations in a post-accession phase. Although such questions are not related to the current thesis, it is nonetheless pivotal in understanding the production of unequal power relations post-accession from the perspective of mimicry. Such examinations can for instance engage with the extent to which Romania was “a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite” or whether the EU regarded Romania as “both resemble and menace at once” (Bhabha op.ci., p.86).

However, one particular element in the findings above suggests an aspect of mimicry. When discussing the societal level, it was argued that discourses supported a particular discourse, in which a distinction was made between Europe (the EU) and the Other (Romania), although Romania was regarded as a future EU member state. This can be related to the fact that Romania was becoming knowable and visible during enlargement and thus was challenging the power of the EU. However, by creating a certain representation of Romania (which in this case relates to oriental binary representations), the EU inscribed the image that Romania was “almost the same, but not quite”, which is an aspect of mimicry.

8.7. Conclusions

This chapter has argued that the production of unequal power relations can be identified in instances of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, which operated in the sociocultural practices of the Reports. In a wider perspective, the above findings are significant because they question the extent to which unequal power relations are affected at three different levels, institutional, societal and situational, as power relations at these levels supported an unequal encounter between the EU and Romania, which in turn impacted upon how the
discourses of the Reports were produced and interpreted, which in turn effect the formal properties of the Reports.

The analysis of the sociocultural practices demonstrated that due to the unequal encounter between the EU and Romania, the EU held power in and behind discourse. It was therefore the MR and ideologies of the EU that were reproduced in the Reports. The power relations at the institutional, situational and societal levels can be identified as representational systems, which rendered Romania mute. Due to the powerful position of the EU, the latter was also able to produce knowledge about the Romanian enlargement and about Romania as a candidate (orientalism). Aspects of mimicry were not apparent in the findings of the explanation dimension, although parts of the Reports’ discourses in which Romania was promised a future as EU member state can be identified as mimicry. On several occasions, the chapter also discussed how Romania challenged the EU (social struggles), but that such social struggles were won by the EU and thus did not result in a change of power relations, but the continued reproduction of the EU’s ideologies in and behind discourse at the situational, institutional and societal levels.
CONCLUSIONS

This thesis argues that the limited application of postcolonial perspectives in EU enlargement studies, and especially in studying power relations, has led to a failure to properly identify and examine the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. Current studies of the EU are largely based on mainstream positivist theories, which overlook the importance of a post-positivist, critical and interpretivist research framework in understanding enlargement and power relations. In contrast, by adopting postcolonialist perspectives, and applying them to the case of the Romanian enlargement, the thesis presents a critical discourse analysis of the EU enlargement monitoring reports and interviews with officials of the EU and Romanian negotiating teams in order to demonstrate the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations through instances of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry that have so far been identified and discussed by postcolonial scholars. This thesis aims therefore to address this gap and advance the postcolonial research on the EU and unequal power relations.

In order to proceed with the above argument, the thesis first reviewed the EU enlargement literature. The discussion argued that besides its strengths in engaging with different aspects of the EU, there is a dearth of postcolonial applications in the literature and in particular in examining how the EU produces unequal power relations, which are similar to the legacies of colonial and imperial unequal power relations. In contrast, the thesis argued that postcolonial scholars have established a solid body of literature based on different postcolonial perspectives. One of the most distinctive postcolonial scholarships is the EU focused postcolonial literature, which has proven to be a fruitful research avenue, by taking
postcolonialism to new levels in the study of the EU. Nevertheless, there still remains a
dearth of postcolonial applications in this particular literature, due to limited application of
postcolonial perspectives, overlooking the examination of the second wave of enlargement
and using a limited research method. The thesis argues that tackling these gaps is of particular
value for trying to come to terms with how the EU produces unequal power relations and
introducing a critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU as a
postcolonial space in which unequal power relations are produced. Overall, the thesis argued
that by building upon postcolonial literature, this current thesis will advance the application
of postcolonialism to the study of how the EU produces unequal power relations.

The thesis argued that the literature has been silent about the following research questions:

- To what extent can a postcolonial examination demonstrate how the EU produces
  unequal power relations in the enlargement context?
- How can we reveal such unequal power relations?
- In which way does a postcolonial examination contribute to our understanding of EU
  enlargement and the production of unequal power relations?

The thesis maintained that in order to address the research questions and move beyond the
gaps identified, engaging with postcolonial perspectives is pivotal in adequately
demonstrating the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. The thesis also
argued that the application of three postcolonial perspectives, subalternity, orientalism and
mimicry, will introduce a critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the
EU and in particular in adequately understanding how unequal power relations are produced.
Moreover, apart from orientalism, which has been steadily applied, subalternity and mimicry
have so far been obscured to a great extent from EU enlargement studies. Thus, the thesis
argued that examining the EU from the standpoints of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry will set out a preliminary discussion of how these perspectives might be applied to analyse the EU and unequal power relations.

The thesis also maintained that employing critical discourse analysis and the interviewing technique will aim to shed the maximum light on examining the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations. Content analysis was also employed to provide an additional element of data-collection and thus support the research findings. Furthermore, the thesis argued that the most relevant CDA model for the purpose of the research questions is Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA. The centrality of this model is sustained by bringing into perspective a research method, which engages with the production of unequal power relations “through focusing upon language”. More importantly, the three-dimensional CDA model contributes to the research questions through its engagement with the production of unequal production in and behind discourse at a micro, meso and micro level of analysis. The thesis indicated the extent to which each dimension (description, interpretation, explanation) of the three-dimensional CDA model has the potential to make a significant contribution to the understanding of the way unequal power relations are produced, by revealing what ideologies are hidden in the language produced by the EU and how do they impact upon unequal power relations. The three-dimensional model was applied to two sets of EU documents, the Regular Reports and the Comprehensive Monitoring Report. Furthermore, by making participants aware of how ideologies may work as instruments of inequality, change of unequal power relations and emancipation of subordinated participants may occur.

The thesis argued that examining the contextual background of the Romanian enlargement will not only provide a history of the enlargement progress and accession negotiations, but will also set out the extent to which different elements of the Romanian enlargement reveal
some of the key analytical points that will be made in the analysis of the Reports. The chapter identified an unequal encounter between the EU and Romania and which facilitated the production of unequal power relations in the Romanian enlargement.

**Establishing a postcolonial relationship**

The thesis argued that although formal properties (vocabulary and grammar), discourse practices and sociocultural practices may be automatic (see Fairclough, 2001:102), we cannot neglect the fact that these may also be ideological. Thus these elements can be identified as places in which unequal power relations are produced, exercised and enacted. The thesis therefore presented discussions of how the findings help us understand the extent of the production of unequal power relations by establishing a postcolonial relationship and setting out how subalternity, orientalism and mimicry are operating in the Reports.

The thesis argued that each of the above mentioned elements produced aspects of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry, which impacted upon unequal power relations. Such findings are significant because they demonstrate that examining the EU and unequal power relations through the perspective of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry enables scholars to conceptualize new postcolonial experiences in the EU. In particular since the existing literature has developed largely without references to subalternity and mimicry, these notions become a paramount way in understanding the EU’s production of unequal power relations in the present and in expanding the postcolonial research on the EU and unequal power relations. What is intriguing about the findings is that participants in discourse are (often) not aware of how the different elements of discourse can contribute to unequal power relations. However, by identifying the extent to which subalternity, orientalism and mimicry impact upon unequal power relations through formal properties, discourse practices and sociocultural
practices may not only raise “a critical consciousness” of the impact of ideological power in and behind discourse, but may also allow change of and emancipation from such unequal relations.

First, the thesis argued that subalternity is of enormous value in examining the EU and unequal power relations as it enabled us to engage with questions regarding the extent to which representational systems rendered marginalized groups mute and the ways in which instruments of subjugation impacted upon power relations within the enlargement context. Moreover, the application of subalternity also engaged with the extent to which the muteness of the subaltern can in fact be challenged, by finding ways of allowing the subaltern to speak, to be heard and to be listened to. Similarly, the application of subalternity enabled an understanding of the EU and in particular unequal power relations to be represented from the perspectives of marginalized groups. In particular, this bottom-up approach aims to enable the voices of these groups to be heard, which are missing in mainstream positivist analyses and which so far has been “represented” by “the colonial voice of the EU” (Polat op.cit., p.1269). Second, the application of subalternity not only introduced alternative representations and knowledge from the perspectives of marginalized groups, but also questioned the durability of truths created by the EU and challenges power relations inherent from EU practices and forms of representations and knowledge.

Second, orientalism was of paramount importance to EU studies from two different perspectives. First, it expanded the discursive and linguistic turn in enlargement studies and drew attention to an alternative way of understanding the EU. Second, orientalism established a platform in which discursive domination can be examined in the postcolonial present. By applying this to for instance enlargement documents, such an analysis expands the
examination of how language was used as a medium through which unequal power relations were produced. Moreover, the application of orientalism enabled alternative forms of knowledge and resistance to be seen and heard.

Third, engaging with mimicry was also instrumental when examining the EU and unequal power relations, as mimicry engaged with the EU on a different level than subalternity and orientalism. Mimicry advocated resistance to unequal power relations by acknowledging the mimicking of marginalized groups and how mimicry evoked both resemblance and threat to the EU, which indicated a flaw in the certainty of EU dominance in controlling the mimic man (Romania). The centrality of mimicry laid in the fact that its application revealed a state of ambivalence of Romania and which can be regarded as a form of power strategy against the EU. Moreover, the application of mimicry recognized a bottom-up approach and encouraged emancipation, by acknowledging how subordinated groups can be “knowable and visible”.

Overall the three postcolonial perspectives enabled new ways of theorizing and displaying a new critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand enlargement and set out a preliminary discussion of the extent to which postcolonialism might be applied to the case of the EU and unequal power relations. In particular these perspectives have helped in answering the three research questions.

**Contributions**

The thesis argued that the current research makes three important contributions.
First, the thesis contributes to the advancement of post-positivist application and postcolonial research on EU enlargement and power relations, by introducing a critical exploration and rethinking of the way we understand the EU as a postcolonial space in which unequal power relations are produced. The thesis argued that although the bulk of enlargement studies is vast, enlargement has largely been discussed from the perspectives of positivist mainstream theories. However, by providing a postcolonial springboard for the investigation of the EU and power relations, this research aimed to make an important theoretical contribution, which will consolidate the application of post-positivist perspectives and reduce the postcolonial void that exists in EU studies (Tlostanova op.cit., p.130).

Second, another contribution is related to EU focused postcolonial scholarship. Although this scholarship provides substantial research, the fifth enlargement and power relations have been largely discussed from the viewpoint of one specific postcolonial perspective, orientalism. Even though orientalism offers a solid rationale within which the EU and power relations can be understood, by including two additional postcolonial perspectives, subalternity and mimicry (and alongside orientalism) this thesis aimed to capture a broader postcolonial analysis, by expanding our understanding of the extent to which postcolonial perspectives can provide a framework within which the EU’s production of unequal power relations can be examined.

The third contribution is methodological. Building upon discourse analysis studies, this thesis argued that we can further expand EU research by applying the method of critical discourse analysis, which aims to “‘critique, expose, deconstruct, counter and … transcend’” unequal power relations (Sidaway op.cit., p.594). In particular, CDA not only examines the extent to which unequal power relations are produced in and behind discourse through the application
of a micro, meso and macro level of analysis, but it also aims to attain change and emancipation.

Limitations

The thesis argued that four limitations can be identified in the current research.

First, the three-dimensional CDA is a research method that largely depends on the involvement of the researcher in engaging with the examination of inequality in power relations. As mentioned previously, CDA is influenced by a range of aspects such as what the researcher “‘sees’ in a text, what one regards as worth describing, and what one chooses to emphasize” (Fairclough op.cit., p.22). For instance, when it comes to the interpretation dimension, the researcher also uses her own MR, ideologies, etc., which may influence the results through the research’s “capacity to herself engage in the discourse processes she is investigating” (Fairclough op.cit., p.138). Thus, the researcher is “inevitably influenced in the way they perceive” matters they research, the choice of research topics and the way researchers approach such topics. Therefore, it is important for a researcher to acknowledge her standpoint and identify how this could have been influenced by the researcher’s own MR and ideologies (Fairclough, 2001:4). However, as long as the researcher is aware of the implications of one’s MR, ideologies, etc. upon results, a certain level of objectivity is maintained, as the researcher is conscious of the conventions applied to research and is self-conscious of her involvement and the need “to explicate what she is doing” (2001:139).

Second, due to limited accessibility to some of the interviewees, I resorted to other forms of interview techniques, such as phone and email interviews. These forms of interviews have their strengths, but their shortcomings lay in the fact that such techniques offer an impersonal
method and provide short and not expansive replies. In contrast, the material recorded in face to face interviews was lengthier and more elaborated.

Third, in contrast to non-elite respondents, elite interviewees had a tendency to control the interview situation in a variety of ways, such as in deciding the flow of the interview through interruptions and controlling their responses. Furthermore, elite interviewees opted for anonymity, an aspect which was not requested by non-elite interviewees. Such circumstances questioned the extent to which the interview material include the accurate version of what happened or the experiences of the interviewees in the Romanian enlargement.

Fourth, although all interviewees were advised that their participation would enable insightful contributions to the academic literature through this current research, a significant low number of Romanian officials indicated that they wanted to be part of the research, in contrast to the EU officials. This raised questions regarding their motives for not responding to or declining the interview request.

**Future research**

The below includes a range of suggestions regarding future research.

First, the main suggestion is to further the applicability of postcolonial perspectives on enlargement and power relations, for instance by engaging with other postcolonial key themes such as ambivalence and hybridity (both Bhabha’s themes). This will not only expand the use of post-positivist perspectives in EU studies, but will also further our understanding of the EU as a postcolonial space in the present.
Second, another interesting prospective research project may be a postcolonial critique of perhaps a different round of enlargement, as this will engage with the question of whether the postcolonial discourse was the same in the Romanian enlargement as it was in for instance the Polish one. In particular, as Chiva and Phinnemore argue that the impact of the 2007 enlargement has brought evident changes to the reports of the next round of enlargement (2011b:14), it would therefore be of importance to reveal what aspects have changed in the recent rounds of negotiations. Such an application can be applied to the latest round of enlargement (Croatia) or future ones as in the case of the Western Balkans and Turkey.

Third, one of the themes that was discussed in the above thesis was the aspect of reproduction of ideologies. For a possible future research, especially one which I would be interested in, an examination of the extent to which unequal power relations are produced by the EU after post-accession would be of significant importance in order to engage further with the aspect of reproduction of ideologies and the impact upon power relations. Such an avenue of research was slightly suggested in Chapter 8, when it was questioned whether Romania was able to speak by analyzing the sociocultural practices after 2007 and whether changed and emancipation did take place and how.

Fourth and as a suggestion, the theoretical (and analytical) framework of the thesis can offer a useful avenue for research of the EU’s relationship with Greece and Ireland during the Eurozone crisis. Postcolonialism can be instrumental in identifying how EU discourses have created for instance a certain knowledge of the “other” (orientalism), dismissed the other’s voice (subalternity) or how the other has resisted the framing of orientalism and subalternity (mimicry). A number of scholars have engaged with postcolonialism when discussing the Eurozone crisis in relation to Greece and Ireland, although there is still room for further
research (Pitelis, 2012; Gibbons, 2013; Bhambra, 2016; Vossole, 2016). One insightful study, which addresses the rise of racism towards Greece and Ireland (as well as three more EU countries), is Jonas van Vossole’s examination of political and media discourses and how such discourses have produced a racist framing of Greece and Ireland. Vossole employs a postcolonialist framework in order to reveal how these discourses have re-employed (or what Vossole calls “a return of colonial dynamics in the Eurozone”) “colonial power relations through processes of economic dependence, conditional aid and cultural hegemony” (2016:1). Further postcolonial examination will therefore challenge mainstream understandings of Greece/Ireland-EU relations and raise awareness of “the situatedness of the EU and its current crises” from a post-positivist perspective (Manners and Whitman, 2016:3 and 14).

As a concluding remark, this thesis argues that by adopting postcolonialist perspectives, and applying them to the case of the Romanian enlargement, the thesis presents a critical discourse analysis of the EU enlargement monitoring reports and interviews with officials of the EU and Romanian negotiating teams, demonstrating the extent to which the EU produces unequal power relations through instances of subalternity, orientalism and mimicry. As such, the thesis has enabled an alternative (post-positivist) way of explaining and understanding how power relations are produced in enlargement.
Appendix 1.

List of the ten questions\(^{89}\), which we can ask about the formal properties of a text, as outlined in Norman Fairclough’s *Language and Power* (2001), pp. 92-93.

A. Vocabulary

1. What experiential values do words have? *
   - What classification schemes are drawn upon? *
   - Are there words which are ideologically contested? *
   - Is there rewording or overwording? *
   - What ideologically significant meaning relations (synonymy, hyponymy, antonymy) are there between words? *

2. What relational values do words have?
   - Are there euphemistic expressions?*
   - Are there markedly formal or informal words?

3. What expressive values do words have?

4. What metaphors are used?*

B. Grammar

5. What experiential values do grammatical features have?
   - What types of process and participant predominate?
   - Is agency unclear?
   - Are processes what they seem?
   - Are nominalizations used? *
   - Are sentences active or passive? *
   - Are sentences positive or negative?

6. What relational values do grammatical features have?
   - What modes (declarative, grammatical question, imperative) are used?
   - Are there important features of relational modality?
   - Are the pronouns of we and you used, and if so, how?

\(^{89}\) The questions identified by star (*) indicate that these were not applied to the Reports, as the questions were not relevant, were absent or could not be asked.
7. What expressive values do grammatical features have? Are there important features of expressive modality?

8. How are (simple) sentences linked together? *
   What logical connectors are used? *
   Are complex sentences characterized by coordination or subordination? *
   What means are used for referring inside and outside the text? *

C. Textual structures

9. What interactional conventions are used? *
   Are there ways in which one participant controls the turns of others? *

10. What large-scale structures does the text have? *
Appendix 4.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Entity responsible</th>
<th>Received by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spring of each year</td>
<td>Commissioner for Enlargement set the final deadline when the Reports had to be forwarded to the Council of Ministers.</td>
<td>DG ELARG</td>
<td>Co-ordination Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set exact deadlines for the Reports.</td>
<td>Co-ordination Unit</td>
<td>All relevant parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Report detailing achievements in previous year sent.</td>
<td>Candidate country[^90]</td>
<td>DG ENLARG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Report detailing achievements in previous year sent.</td>
<td>EU delegation of each candidate country</td>
<td>DG ENLARG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First draft based on both reports was prepared.</td>
<td>Country desk</td>
<td>Chapter desks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draft compared with every chapter desk within DG ENLARG, to ensure correctness and consistency in their policy area.</td>
<td>Chapter desks</td>
<td>Co-ordination Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Draft revised to ensure coherence in content and language.</td>
<td>Co-ordination Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Consultation of other sources to ensure a broad understanding of the candidate’s progress. On the political criteria: Council of Europe; non-governmental organizations (i.e. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, etc.), etc. On the economic criteria: International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, etc.</td>
<td>Commission officials</td>
<td>Co-ordination Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-September</td>
<td>Additional information could be sent.</td>
<td>Candidate country</td>
<td>DG ENLARG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early September</td>
<td>Harmonized information and draft to ensure consistency.</td>
<td>DG ENLARG</td>
<td>All DGs of the Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Inter-service consultations took place during which DGs made comments, which they returned within ten days. The DGs only received the individual chapters concerning their field.</td>
<td>All DGs of the Commission</td>
<td>Co-ordination Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Final reading and adjustment of draft.</td>
<td>Co-ordination Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of September</td>
<td>Final internal deadline of the Report.</td>
<td>Co-ordination Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First half of October</td>
<td>Short bilateral meeting with each candidate in order to present the central points of the Report. Afterwards, the Reports left the administrative level within the Commission and approached the political one.</td>
<td>DG ENLARG</td>
<td>Commission’s College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second half of October- first half of October</td>
<td>Inter-cabinet consultations and adoption of a final version of the Report.</td>
<td>Commission’s College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^90] This is the report of the country’s Chief Negotiator and his office (Grabbe, 2001:1018).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>November</th>
<th>Second half of November</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>Following year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decisions based on the Report to enter into practice.</td>
<td>All relevant parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Böröcz, J. (2006a), Coloniality and the EU: Speaking Through the Switch and the Broadband – Strategies of Inferiorization. When it is Not Okay to Inferiorize. Alexander von Humboldt Lecture, Nijmegen, 6 March.


Oxford University Press.


Education and Research. pp 95-102.


Harper Publishing.

Corbett, R., Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E. (2012) “The EU’s institutions”. In Bomberg, E., 
Oxford University Press. pp 47-73.

Cornis-Pope, M. (2012) Local and global frames in recent eastern European literatures: 
Postcommunism, postmodernism, and postcoloniality. *Journal of Postcolonial Writing*, 48 
(2) : 143–154.


Cramer, J. (2010) 'Do we really want to be like them?': Indexing Europeanness through 


Interviewee 1 (2013) *Personal communication.*

Interviewee 2 (2013) *Personal communication.*

Interviewee 3 (2013) *Personal communication.*

Interviewee 4 (2013) *Personal communication.*

Interviewee 5 (2013) *Personal communication.*

Interviewee 6 (2013) *Personal communication.*

Interviewee 7 (2014) *Personal communication.*

Interviewee 8 (2014) *Personal communication.*
Interviewee 9 (2014) **Personal communication.**

Interviewee 10 (2014) **Personal communication.**


