THE INITIATION AND SUSTAINABILITY OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN SMALL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ENGLAND AND THAILAND

by

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ABSTRACT

Collaboration provides a way of increasing the capacity of small local governments in providing services without reducing the quality of local democracy. The Thai government has been promoting cross-council collaboration with limited success while it has been widely implemented in England for decades. In the literature, little attention has been paid by scholars to the way in which the formation of collaboration and its implementation interacts. To generate new insights of academic and practical relevance, this study aims to generate insightful explanations about the role of collaborative entrepreneurs and collaborative managers in the initiation and institutional embedding of small council collaboration policy. It employs comparative empirical analysis of two pairs of cases in England and Thailand, set within an original theoretical framework built on the integration of policy-making models, the typology of collaboration on a continuum, and the notion of factors influencing sustainable collaboration. The thesis adds to the literature by distinguishing between and empirically demonstrating two roles – ‘collaborative entrepreneurs’, who initiate collaboration to solve immediate shared problems of resource scarcity and dependency facing small councils, and ‘collaborative managers’, who maintain sustainability of the collaboration and facilitate further integration across councils. It also reveals that the converse of resource/power dependency applies where the council with larger resources can become locked-in to disadvantageous relationships controlled by small councils with fewer resources. Furthermore this thesis shows that collaboration is more likely to occur where it does not challenge the vested interests of citizens and councillors. Building a coalition for change and developing collaborative culture are essential for enduring collaboration.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

There has been much interest in collaboration between local governments in Thailand, as well as the international context, for decades. Cross-council collaboration has evolved as an essential mechanism in producing public services for key reasons. A number of scholars state that organisations establish working across organisational boundaries in the pursuit of improved efficiency, i.e. to deal with resource scarcity (Aiken and Hage, 1968; Wiess, 1987; Oliver, 1990; O’Toole, 1997; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Krueatthep et al., 2010). In collaborative working arrangements critical resources for providing a particular service can be shared between partners and duplication of service delivery can be reduced. This offers possibilities for small councils to achieve cost-efficiency in the face of financial and resource constraints (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Hulst et al., 2009). Essentially, the joint provision of public services allow small local governments to achieve economies of scale in providing services to a larger territory and a bigger set of citizens (Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991; Ferris and Graddy, 1991; Lavery, 1999; Hulst et al., 2009; Blaire and Janousek, 2013) even if they are small, “without losing local control and local identity” (Warner, 2006, p. 222).

Some scholars argue that organisations seek to enter into collaboration to improve policy delivery. Over the past decades local governments have been facing the proliferation of wicked issues, problems that are neither solved effectively through traditional bureaucratic
management nor by a single organisation working independently (Clarke and Stewart, 1997; O’Toole, 1997; Audit Commission, 1998; McGuire, 2006). Collaboration takes place as an essential mode of working for dealing with such problems. It has the capacity to bring together necessary resources and the collective actions of stakeholders to provide improved services in such policy issues (Stewart, 1995; Clarke and Stewart, 1997; O’Toole, 1997; the Audit Commission, 1998; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Bogason and Musson, 2006; Krueathep et al., 2010).

Another impetus for collaboration is the need to improve coordination between service providers (the Audit Commission, 1998; Williams and Sullivan, 2007; Benton, 2013). Collaboration is a preferred way to decrease the duplication of local service providers in a particular service, which results from the fragmentation of public agencies and the overlapping jurisdictional functions between different tiers of local governments (the Audit Commission, 1998; Williams and Sullivan, 2007). In collaboration, the principle of provision is shifted from functionally-defined to outcome-defined services. This means relevant organisations in a particular policy area are integrated to jointly shape policy and pool critical resources to accomplish their common tasks, and efficiently provide better outcomes of services to citizens (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Williams and Sullivan, 2007).

Regarding gaps in the literature, there are a number of studies on collaboration in local governments in the Western world, particularly in Europe (see Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991; Warner, 2006; Hulst and Van Montfort, 2007; 2011; Hulst et al., 2009; Labianca, 2014). However, there is a lack of published research on cooperation between small local governments in the Thai context. Furthermore, scholars on the topic of inter-organisational collaboration tend to focus only on a particular aspect of collaboration. Many studies
explore why interagency working emerges (Lober, 1997; Baker, 2007; Gazley, 2008; Krueatethep et al., 2010). Some studies examine factors affecting successful collaboration (Huxham and Vangen, 2000; McGuire, 2002; 2006; Tomlinson, 2003; Sloper, 2004). Little attention has been paid to the relationship between the emergence of collaboration and its practice.

This study fills these gaps by investigating the collaboration journey of small, lower tier local councils in England and Thailand. It considers the way in which the policy formation and the practice of collaboration interact. It attempts to gain in-depth understanding on, and construct the concepts as to, the motivations and the forces for collaboration, as well as the vital roles of key actors in the process of collaboration policy formation. Furthermore, it investigates the types of cross-council collaboration that have been used, the reasons why the particular forms have been chosen to implement, as well as the necessary ingredients for sustainable collaborations. This is consistent with the argument that studying policymaking together with its practice is a vital part of understanding public policy, as follows:

“Woe betides the policymaker or adviser who makes or frames policy without regard to how its implementation will be managed” (Pollitt, 2008, p.6).

The cross-national comparative nature of this study stems from the situation where collaboration has been introduced as a potential mechanism for enhancing the capacity of small local governments with restricted resources in providing services for decades. Despite this there has been little progress in practicing inter-local governmental collaboration policy in Thailand. This policy area is also remarkably under-researched in Thailand.
In England collaboration has longstanding history as a policy mechanism to assist public organisations and local governments in sharing resources for improving public services (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Dickinson and Sullivan, 2014). Collaborative public service provisions have been proactively promoted by central governments since 1997. It has also continued to be a key policy instrument to assist small councils to improve efficiency and achieve better outcomes in delivering services in an era of financial constraint, i.e. government spending cuts since 2010, which have placed great pressures on both service providing and public management (Local Government Association, 2011; Heley and Moles, 2012; Rees et al., 2012). Consequently, there are a number of councils operating various forms of collaborative arrangement across the country (Williams and Sullivan, 2007; local Government Association, 2011). Hence, conducting a cross-national comparison between England and Thailand from case-based evidence can provide an account of the development of small council collaboration. This research-based knowledge may be transferred into policy and practice in both countries, particularly in Thailand, where the knowledge on this area is quite limited.

1.2 Collaboration between small councils in Thailand

In Thailand cross-council collaboration has been recommended as a key strategy for increasing the capacity of small local government as a result of two important reasons. Firstly, a number of functions and responsibilities have been devolved from central to local government, resulting from Local Government Reform since 1997 (Department of Local Administration, 2008). Local governments therefore face an increasing number of challenges in providing a wide range of services to meet the requirements of the people.
Secondly, there are a large number of small local governments, in terms of both area and population. In 2015 there are 5,335 Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAOs) and many of them have a population under 5,000 (Department of Local Administration, 2015). This results from an attempt by central government to promote the value of local self-government. However, these small units lack capacity and have too limited resources – money, equipment, and qualified staff – to provide some services in efficient ways (Krueathep, 2004; College of Local Government Development, 2007; Department of Local Administration, 2008).

To address these issues, local government collaboration has been introduced by policymakers at the national level to increase the capacity of local government to produce public services. Some academics have recommended a constitutional amalgamation approach, merging two or more local governments into one larger unit to deal with such challenges (Department of Local Administration, 2008). Despite this it is obvious that Thai policy-makers and practitioners in local government prefer a collaborative approach, particularly cross-council joint working as council amalgamation rarely happens in Thailand. It seems one of the plausible explanations for such a phenomenon is that they believe that collaboration will help increase efficiency in providing services, without reducing the quality of local democracy that small local governments can offer (Allan, 2003; Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011).

In practice, however, there has been little progress in implementing collaboration in Thailand for a number of reasons. Firstly, this policy area is remarkably under-researched in Thailand. There is a lack of literature providing an account of the rationale and benefits for, as well as possible limitations of, collaboration. This lack of literature extends to accounts suggesting factors prompting and inhibiting successful implementation of
collaborative arrangements, which would provide valuable notions for councils seeking to enter into cross-council collaboration. Secondly, although there are some local governments implementing this mechanism which can be set as a model for others, they have still been facing significant challenges in practice. For example, local governments still encounter legal restrictions to collaboration. It has been stated in relevant laws that local governments can cooperate with each other, but it is not stipulated that a new separate legal entity can be established (Department of Local Administration, 2008). Consequently, the number of collaborations among Thai small local governments is small. Also, collaborative endeavors are often informal, ad-hoc, and grounded greatly on close relationships between local leaders (ibid.).

The promulgation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007)\(^1\) could be seen as a positive development for promoting collaboration between local governments. In this constitution it has been stipulated in section 283 that inter-local government cooperation should be supported, and ‘a new service provider organisation’ can be established based on cooperation between local governments in order to deliver efficient local services to citizens (Department of Local Administration, 2008). Following from this collaboration has been launched as a primary agenda in Local Government Improvement Policy and has been promoted by key central government agencies related to local government administration. However, there are few local governments implementing a collaborative approach. Furthermore, although there have been some types of collaboration implemented such as collaborative budgeting, contract agreement, and service provision, local governments are still facing a number of challenges in operating joint working initiatives in more effective ways (Thailand Innovation Administration Consultancy Institute, 2004; Department of Local Administration, 2008).

\(^1\) On 22 May 2014, the constitution was repealed by the military junta, save some chapters concerning the senate and the king. Then it was completely repealed and replaced by an interim constitution on 22 July 2014.
Regarding the existing knowledge of this policy area, research on cross-council collaboration is quite limited in Thailand. Krueatheap et al. (2010) provides a foundation for an understanding of the determinants of network formation in Thai local governments. There have also been studies exploring the experience of other countries concerning collaboration between local governments. The College of Local Government Development (2006) has used documentary analysis to study the type and process of collaboration between small local governments in countries with a unitary system (i.e. Japan and France) and countries with a federal system (i.e. the United States of America and Germany). The College has then provided policy recommendations on implementing a collaborative approach in Thailand.

The study entitled ‘Collaborations among Local Governments: Type and Possibility’ by the College of Local Government Development (2007) is another important study which has used documentary analysis to gather information about the forms of local government cooperation that have been implemented in Japan, France, and the United States of America. Although these existing studies attempt to explore other countries’ experiences on collaboration, a comparative case study between Thailand and other countries has not been undertaken. Moreover, documentary analysis was the only research method employed.

1.3 Cross-council collaboration in England

England has a long history of implementing collaborative public service provision as a key strategy in co-ordinating resources for public purposes (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). Collaborative arrangements in public services and management proliferated in the 1990s
and 2000s under national governments of different political doctrines (Dickinson and Sullivan, 2014). Joined-up government, a partnership working between public agencies, had been a core New Labour doctrine to public service improvement from 1997 to 2010 (Newchurch, 1999; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004; Williams and Sullivan, 2007).

Indeed, the New Labour government proactively supported councils to employ collaborative approaches as a new way of delivering services, through partnerships with each other and with other public organisations, ‘on a joint project where there is a shared interest in positive outcomes’ (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p.1). Since the coalition government formed in 2010 collaboration between small local governments has continued to be an important mechanism to help councils increase efficiency, and achieve better performance in service provision in the face of financial retrenchment, following public sector cost-cutting started in 2010-2011 (Heley and Moles, 2012; Rees et al., 2012). Under the current coalition government the Local Government Act 2010 was promulgated to give new powers and flexibility to councils in order to urge them to form collaborative arrangements as the effective way of working in an era of austerity. This law introduced innovative forms of joint working to re-design service delivery and management. For example, shared services and sharing back office functions aimed to enable councils to protect frontline services whilst achieving efficiency savings (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010b, p.2).

Over the past decades a number of councils have been implementing various types of collaboration such as a shared chief executive, shared services, service delivery agreements, and collaborative budgeting, to achieve cost-efficiencies and to deliver improved services to meet the rising demands of citizens (Tomkinson, 2007; Local
Government Association, 2010; Deloitte, 2010; Raine and Watt, 2013). For example, the Local Government Association (2015) demonstrates that in 2015 there are 416 shared services arrangements implemented between local governments across England, generating £462 million of savings. Nowadays, local government collaboration is a widespread phenomenon throughout England and continues to be recognised as a crucial mechanism for small councils in providing public services under financial pressure (Dickinson and Sullivan, 2014).

As England has longer experience in implementing a collaborative approach, therefore, undertaking cross-national research between England and Thailand will provide new empirical evidence enabling the development of a conceptual model. Also, the findings of this study can benefit the promotion of collaborations between local governments in Thailand, where knowledge is limited.

1.4 Research questions

This study explores the process of inter-local government collaboration, not the outcomes of this policy. As Thailand has less experience in implementing a collaborative approach some forms of collaboration implemented in England might not have occurred in Thailand. Hence, this study would be unable to compare the outcomes of different types of collaboration practiced in the two countries.

This study aims to generate insightful explanations about the role of collaborative entrepreneurs and collaborative managers in the initiation and institutional embedding of small council collaboration policy from case-based, empirical evidence. The findings will be research-based knowledge which can be transferred into policy and practice. This can
help policymakers and practitioners in both countries, particularly in Thailand, to successfully develop and operate the collaborative arrangements for public purposes. To achieve the research objective three research questions need to be answered:

**Research question 1: How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated?**

The explanations provided by existing literature about the rationale for collaboration seem plausible and offer insights into the emergence of collaboration in public administration. Despite this they have limited power to explain the process by which the motivating factors for collaboration receive serious consideration by key people in and around local authorities, which results in cross-council collaboration policy formation. Furthermore, there is not enough knowledge to explain whether collaboration in small local governments arise primarily from endogenous or exogenous factors. How important political aspects, opposed to managerial aspects, are for the creation of joint working policy are also underexplored.

**Research question 2: What forms of collaboration have been used and why?**

Analysing the typology and function of small local government collaborative arrangements is useful for councillors and officers of small councils that seek to enter into collaboration. In this regard, the existing literature provides an account of some of the possible forms that have been used in the two countries. In Thailand some types of collaboration have been practiced—namely collaborative budgeting, contract agreement, and shared services (Department of Local Administration, Thailand, 2008). In England more varied types of cross-council working have been operated such as shared chief executive and
management team, and shared services (Tomkinson, 2007; Local Government Group, 2011; Local Government Association, 2010; 2011, 2012c). Nevertheless, little has been published on why particular forms are chosen and, or how, the form of collaboration may change over time.

**Research question 3: What factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaboration?**

To sustain a working relationship after it is formed, this study attempts to highlight the necessary ingredients for long-term and successful joint working to provide valuable lessons for small councils interested in pursuing cross-council collaboration. Existing literature provides the key components of collaborative capacity (Webb, 1991; Williams, 2002; Sloper, 2004; McGuire, 2006; Aulich et al., 2011), particularly literature relevant to collaboration in local governments (the Audit Commission, 1998; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Williams and Sullivan, 2007; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009; Warm, 2011). These notions suggest that successful collaboration requires **boundary-spanners**, individuals who have particular competency to play a number of different roles to facilitate, co-ordinate, and sustain interagency relationship. **Leadership**, a leader trusted by partners, has a central place in collaborative arrangement. Moreover, although the contributions of individuals to collaboration are valuable, it is insufficient for developing effective and long-lasting interagency working. **Collaborative culture**, which is a shared understanding and commitment of partners on key issues including the imperative, the benefit, and the value of collaboration, the common goals, and the roles and responsibilities of partners in collaborative working, is needed for sustainable collaboration. However, there has been little focus on exploring factors which are
important for sustainable collaboration in the context of collaboration between small local governments.

To address these questions and to achieve the objective, an exploratory cross-national research based on comparative case studies was used as a research strategy. The fieldwork and analysis in this study is divided into two stages (figure 1), resulting from the fact that England has much longer experience in collaborative approaches since this policy has been actively promoted by central government since 1997.

**Figure1: Research questions and methods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1: Two English cases</th>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Data collection</th>
<th>Data analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated? What forms of collaboration have been used and why? What factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaboration?</td>
<td>• Documentary sources • In-depth interviews • Non-participant observations</td>
<td>Longitudinal analysis within cases Thematic analysis between cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generate hypotheses for studying in Thai cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 2: Two Thai cases</th>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Data collection</th>
<th>Data analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Testing hypotheses which are the result of the two English cases analysis</td>
<td>• Documentary sources • In-depth interviews • Non-participant observations</td>
<td>Longitudinal analysis within Thai cases Thematic analysis between Thai cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the researcher

In the first stage the two English cases, demonstrating joined-up working between district councils, will be treated as an exploratory set of cases from which to generate hypotheses for testing in Thailand. The second stage concerns hypotheses testing. The two Thai
cases, demonstrating shared services between small councils, will be examined to test hypotheses generated from the English cases analysis.

To answer the research questions the data was collected through documentary sources relevant to the cases, twenty in-depth interviews – six in England and fourteen in Thailand – with local leaders and senior officers working within the cases, and non-participant observation of events related to the collaborative working of the cases. Within each country the qualitative data was analysed by a longitudinal, within case analysis of each case, followed by a thematic, cross-case analysis of the two cases. Then the findings of hypotheses testing in Thai cases was compared with the English cases to provide a comparative account of the two countries, in order to develop a model of the development of collaboration between small local governments.

1.5 The structure of the thesis

This thesis is divided into five sections. The first concerns research design and methodology. The second provides an account of the theory of collaboration. The third concerns empirical evidence of the two English cases. The fourth provides empirical evidence of the two Thai cases and the comparative analysis of the two countries. The fifth demonstrates reflections and key findings.

The first section is the research design and methodology as demonstrated in Chapter 2. It justifies the selection and the use of an exploratory cross-national comparative case studies approach and using a number of theoretical perspectives to understand the realities of local government collaborations in two different countries. These aim to generate theories/concepts from empirical, case-based evidence.
The second section consists of Chapter 3 – 4. These chapters explore theories and concepts which are useful for gaining a rich understanding of the development of collaboration. **Chapter 3** provides a literature review relating to the two research questions: how and why collaboration is initiated, what types of collaboration have been used, and why. The model of motivations for collaboration and the typology of interagency relationship on a continuum, which can be used to investigate the form of collaboration implemented in local government context, were created as a result. Furthermore, it discusses theoretical issues related to the empirical analysis of collaboration in real-life settings. Gathering the empirical evidence of the English cases, as well as the initial analysis, enabled the researcher to realise that it is important to study the development of collaboration policy as longitudinal case studies, because this policy contains a temporal dimension as it evolves over time. However, none of the existing models recognises this temporal dimension. To address this issue the researcher opted to use the policy-making models (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997; Takahashi and Smutny, 2002) since they have the explanatory power of why and how collaboration policy is formed at a specific time, as well as changed/progressed over time.

**Chapter 4** examines theories to address the final research question; what factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaborations. Consequently, the model of factors influencing sustainable collaboration was developed. As this study focuses on the initiation of collaboration policy and the practice of collaboration, it found that all the existing models need to be integrated for examining such phenomena. Accordingly, an integrated conceptual framework of the study was developed. It was built on the combination of the policy-making models (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997; Takahashi and Smutny, 2002), the typology of interagency relationship on the continuum (Houge, 1993; Bailey and Koney, 2000; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Mandell and Steelman, 2003), and the notion of factors influencing sustainable collaboration.
The third section consists of Chapter 5 – 6 which concerns the empirical evidence of the two English cases. **Chapter 5** provides a longitudinal analysis within the two English cases: collaboration between Adur District Council and Worthing Borough Council, and Babergh District Council and Mid-Suffolk District Council. It applies a chronological approach to empirical data to develop case background. It envisions a chronology of events as a storytelling of what has occurred in the cases by emphasising the temporal, contextual, sequential aspects of collaboration, as well as various concerns of participants of organisational change processes. This enables the researcher to shape an understanding of the development of interagency working relationships between two councils. It provides a good basis for primary data collection in the case study sites as well as thematic analysis between the two cases in the next chapter.

**Chapter 6** demonstrates the results of using thematic, cross-case, analysis coupled with the conceptual framework (see Chapter 4) to investigate the English cases regarding three key areas. These areas are the process by which councils form collaborative working policy; the types of collaboration that resulted; and factors influencing the operation of collaboration. Consequently, hypotheses for testing in Thai cases were generated.

The fourth section consists of Chapter 7 – 8 which concern the empirical evidence of the two Thai cases and the comparative analysis of the two countries. **Chapter 7** presents the findings of a longitudinal analysis within the two Thai cases. These are the inter-local government in Lampang province demonstrating a shared landfill and waste management service between four small local governments in the same tier, and inter-local government in Roi-Et province demonstrating joint disaster prevention and mitigation services between four lower tier local councils. It also discusses the policy overview and the current context of local government collaboration in Thailand. **Chapter 8** provides the results of
hypotheses testing. The integrated theoretical framework (see Chapter 4) combined with the thematic approach and cross-case analysis was used to analyse empirical data of the Thai cases to test hypotheses generated from the English cases analysis. The findings were demonstrated relating to the key research questions previously provided. Besides providing the analytical results of Thai cases in each section of hypothesis testing, this chapter also discusses the findings of the Thai cases compared with the English cases.

Chapter 9 is the final section. It provides the key findings from the study which have implications for policy and practice, and discusses the theoretical implications of the research. Furthermore, reflections of undertaking the research and recommendations for further research are provided.
CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This study employs exploratory cross-national comparative case studies using various theoretical perspectives to understand the realities of the development of small local government collaboration policy in two different countries. It attempts to generate concepts concerning cross-council collaboration from these cases. In the use of this approach the integrated conceptual framework the researcher develops is not a direct product of the literature review. Rather, it derives from the iterative process between the analysis of empirical evidence from the cases and refines an existing conceptual model.

This chapter provides an account of the way in which this approach informed the research process. It also discusses and demonstrates the way that the systematic procedures for conducting exploratory cases studies suggested by scholars (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1995; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009) have been used in this study to increase the overall quality of the research. Moreover, the realities of undertaking research within two different national contexts, English and Thai, will be provided.

This chapter is divided into seven sections. The first provides the rationale for the exploratory objective of this study. The second discusses the use of cross-national comparative case studies as a research design. The third demonstrates the research framework which envisages the whole picture of undertaking this study. The fourth concerns the sampling design by providing justification for selecting England and Thailand and discussing the use of a purposive sampling to select two cases from each.
The fifth discusses *data collection* where qualitative methods, *documentary research* and *semi-structured interviews*, were used for the in-depth investigation of the social phenomenon of collaboration. Working with a policy consultant in England, and having good networks in Thailand, provided opportunities to collect empirical data through *non-participant observation* in both countries. It also discusses the use of data triangulation, using multiple sources of evidence to address the same set of research questions (Patton, 2002), as an effective data collection approach for increasing the reliability of this comparative case study research.

The sixth concerns the *qualitative data analysis*. It describes the use of *within-case analysis* in each case as it allowed a detailed description, and key themes related to the key three research questions emerged. This analysis also enabled the researcher to realise that it is important to study the development of collaboration through *longitudinal case studies*, because collaboration policy contains a temporal dimension. Hence, it needed to utilise theories that have explanatory and exploratory power to investigate cross-council relationship that develops over time. Then a discussion of the use of *thematic analysis* across the cases will be provided. Finally, the chapter engages with the examination of the challenges regarding the quality of research including *validity*, *reliability*, and *generalisability*. Ethical issues will also be examined in this final section.

### 2.1 Research strategy: exploratory research

The ontological position of the researcher in this study is *constructionism*, an assumption that the nature of social entities should be considered as social constructions (Bryman, 2012). The development of small local government collaboration is subjective, and not an objective reality external to social actors. This ontological position precedes an
An interpretivist epistemological position of the researcher. Epistemological issues concern the suitable ways of acquiring knowledge of social subjective realities (Blaikie, 2000; Bryman, 2012). In an interpretivist approach towards this study, the knowledge of small local government collaboration can and should be acquired through the interaction between researcher and the social phenomena being investigated. Evidence about the development of small local government collaboration requires the researcher to grasp and interpret the ‘subjective meaning of social action’ (Bryman, 2012, p.30). To develop the explanation of the development of collaboration, it is the role of the researcher to gain access to and interpret the actions, the meanings, and the behaviours of the actors within their natural setting, and from their point of view.

Rather than focusing on inductive/qualitative and deductive/quantitative explanations this study is driven by research objectives, either exploratory or confirmatory research (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). This research project employs an exploratory research design as it is suitable to address the research questions.

“Exploratory studies typically attempt to develop theories about how and why a phenomenon operates as it does” (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005, p.278) from case-based, empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). Viewed this way, the overall objective of this study is an exploratory approach since it aims to generate insightful explanations about the role of collaborative entrepreneurs and collaborative managers in the initiation and institutional embedding of small council collaboration policy. It uses various theoretical perspectives to undertake a comparative investigation of such particular phenomena from four cases in two different countries, and conduct cross-national comparisons based on cases of small local government collaboration.
While a confirmatory research objective needs hypotheses, exploratory research does not need hypotheses or propositions (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005; Yin, 2009, p. 28). Rather, the research purposes, rationale, and initial questions need to be identified in an exploratory study. To achieve the research objective mentioned above three research questions need to be answered:

1. How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated?
2. What forms of collaboration have been used and why?
3. What factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaboration?

Focusing on a few variables or measuring statistical incidence may help answer the questions above. However, to gain richly detailed and intensive knowledge of this particular slippery and essentially contested social phenomenon, to address the research questions and the research objectives, comparative case studies and qualitative methods are the best methods employed in this project.

2.2 Research design: cross-national comparative case studies

A research design is the logical thinking about the holistic picture of undertaking research that helps researchers avoid “the situation in which the evidence does not address the initial research questions” (Yin, 2009, p.27). It is not just a work plan. Rather, it is a logical framework that links together the initial set of research questions to be addressed, the data to be collected, the appropriate method for data analysis to be used, and the conclusions to be drawn, which would help the researcher to achieve the desired outcome of a research (Yin, 2009; Bryman, 2012). To achieve the research objective and questions mentioned above, this study employs cross-national research based on case studies.
2.2.1 Cross-national research

According to Hantriats and Mangen (1996) comparative and cross-national research is a study that uses the same theoretical concepts to investigate specific issues or phenomena in two or more countries. This is undertaken with the intention of comparing the manifestations of the units of comparison in different socio-cultural settings, explaining them, and generalising from them. Cross-national research can provide fresh insights and a more in-depth understanding of particular issues that are of central interest in different countries (ibid, p.3). Furthermore, cross-national comparisons may reveal the practicable directions for formulating and implementing the relatively same policies in different countries (Hantriats and Mangen, 1996; Daniel, 2010).

This study applies cross-national research design to the local government context as it allows the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of specific phenomena, the occurrence of small local government cooperation policy and its actual practice, from case-based evidence in two different national contexts, England and Thailand. Within exploratory cross-national comparison the English cases will be treated as exploratory cases to address the initial key questions above. This derives from the fact that England has much longer experience in implementing collaborative approaches while Thailand has made little progress. The findings of the English cases analysis will then be used to generate hypotheses for studying the Thai cases.

Two English cases and two Thai cases demonstrating small council joint working are the units of comparison. Using the same conceptual framework to systematically analyse the collaborative journey of these cases by looking for commonalities and differences, and having awareness of cultural differences in the two countries, allows this study achieve
the objective namely developing a generalised concept of the development of collaboration policy between small local governments from case-based evidence.

However, the most fundamental methodological issue in cross-national comparisons is that of conceptual equivalence, that is, the question of whether the concepts under study have any equivalent meanings in the cultures and social units which are being examined (Przeworski and Teune, 1973; Warwick and Osherson, 1973). Przeworski and Teune (1973, p.120) point out that typically “concepts are expected to have different meaning in different countries”. The challenge is how to investigate the same phenomena in different societies.

This study faced the challenge of achieving functional, comparable equivalence of concepts and terms under study. Although the concept ‘collaboration’ could be regarded as applicable to all known nations and cultures, it can also be considered as a slippery and essentially contested concept as its meaning may change according to people’s point of view and experience. Regarding the concept ‘small local government’, although England and Thailand are unitary states with a two-tier local government system operating almost across the countries, the researcher had difficulty in defining small local government, which is closely connected to the problem of defining the unit of investigation of this study - the collaboration between small local governments. To overcome equivalence issues, some key solutions have been adopted.

Firstly, scholars in cross-national research (Hantriats and Mangen, 1996; Przeworski and Teune, 1973; Warwick and Osherson, 1973) suggest that to achieve equivalence in cross-national research, theoretical frameworks must be developed on clearly defined and comparable concepts. The conceptual framework of this study is built upon clearly defined and comparable conceptual definitions. To clarify, exact meaning of concepts and terms
under investigation have been operationalised so that they have cross-national validity and meaning, though not identical, in different cultures and countries, which then allow comparisons to be made. Secondly, pilot interviews were conducted with respondents in both countries to ensure that interviewees understood exactly what was being investigated. Finally, to deal with the difficulty in defining small local government, the selection criteria were developed that corresponded with the research objective and questions, as well as the comparative account of the English and Thai cases. Consequently, small local government was defined as the lower tier local governments where they are functionally similar between the two systems of local government. These refer to Borough Council and District Council in two-tier local government areas in England, which are similar to Thesaban (Municipality) or Tambon Administrative Organisation (TAO) in Thailand.

2.2.2 Case study research

In an attempt to select an appropriate research design the type of research questions under investigation provide an important clue (Campbell et al., 1982). According to Yin (2009, p.4), “the more that your questions seek to explain some present circumstance (e.g., “how” or “why” some social phenomenon works), the more that the case study method will be relevant”. Yin (2009, p.18) defined case study research as an empirical inquiry that deeply examines a contemporary social phenomenon within its real-life situations, particularly “when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.

The research objective, purposes, and questions of this study inform the use of comparative case studies and qualitative methods for key reasons. Firstly, the study
seeks to investigate the empirical aspect of local government collaboration, a complex contemporary phenomenon. In this respect Bryman (2012) states that comparison has the most utility when researchers seek to investigate a specific social reality in two different settings. It is a well-established design which enables the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of particular policy in different national contexts (Hakim, 2000). Secondly, collaboration policy cannot be distinguished from its real life context. In other words, to understand collaboration in an in-depth manner, a number of contextual conditions need to be encompassed. Case study is a suitable design since it allows the researcher to provide a richly detailed and precise account of the development of collaboration policy, while the holistic and meaningful characteristics of this complex social science topic can be still retained (Yin, 2009).

The following sections demonstrate the way in which this study follows systematic procedures for conducting cross-national comparative case studies throughout the research processes. It starts from gradually developing a theoretical framework, selecting cases, gathering and analysing empirical data, to generate findings of the study, in order to achieve the exploratory objective of the study.

### 2.3 The four stages of undertaking research

As the overall objective is exploratory, using multiple theories to understand issues and building theories from the cases, this study adopted the suggestion on the process of developing theory from case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989). It also adopted procedures for conducting comparative case studies (Stake, 1995; Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009) to help develop the systematic procedures within this design. This can be seen as a four-stage process (see Figure 2).
The first stage is conducting a literature review to gain insights into three topics related to collaboration within the three research questions being asked. Developing a theoretical framework of what is being studied is an early step in any research design. According to Yin (2009) theoretical frameworks are a useful means for defining appropriate methods of data collection and analysis. It will also help with the interpretation and organisation of the research findings (Bryman, 2012). In this study reviewing literature resulted in the construction of three initial conceptual models relating to the research questions, expected to be used as a framework to analyse the empirical data.

The second stage provides an exploratory study of the English cases. The fieldwork of this study was divided into two parts. The first investigates English cases as exploratory case studies from which to generate hypotheses for studying in Thailand. The second concerns examining Thai cases. Gathering and analysing the empirical data of English cases enables the researcher to revise existing conceptual models in order to create the framework that has power to explain the development of collaboration in real-life contexts.

At the third stage the hypotheses resulting from the English cases were tested in the Thai cases. Finally, a comparative analysis of English and Thai cases is conducted to draw generalisable conclusions of the study. The specific procedures and details within each stage will be discussed in the following sections.

Practicing this framework allowed the researcher to experience an iterative process between undertaking empirical data analysis and refining theoretical models, a striking feature of undertaking exploratory study. Undertaking a literature review led to the development of potential conceptual models initially expected to be used as an analytical framework for the study. However, whilst gathering and initially analysing the English cases, the researcher realised that collaboration policy at local level develops and
changes over time. Furthermore, the existing models developed from the literature review had limited power to explain such processes. In other words, to generate a rich understanding of this topic it needed to seek other theories that contain a temporal dimension. Therefore the study revised the existing models in order to develop a conceptual framework that has power to examine collaboration in its real-life settings, which progress over time. This enabled the researcher to realise that undertaking an exploratory study is not a linear process, but iterative and flexible.
Figure 2: Research framework for the comparative case study of local government collaborations in England and Thailand

Research questions:
1) How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated?
2) What forms of collaboration have been used and why?
3) What factors influence sustainable collaboration?

Stage 1: Conducting a literature review to understand the formation of collaboration and the practice of collaboration and developing a conceptual framework

Stage 2: Undertaking the English case studies
- Purposive sampling
- Data collection:
  - Documents
  - In-depth interviews
  - Non-participant observations
- Data analysis:
  - Longitudinal analysis (Within-case analysis)
  - Thematic analysis (Cross-case analysis)

Stage 3: Undertaking the Thai case studies
- Purposive sampling
- Data collection:
  - Documents
  - In-depth interviews
  - Non-participant observations
- Data analysis:
  - Longitudinal analysis (Within-case analysis)
  - Thematic analysis (Cross-case analysis)

Stage 4: Conducting a comparative analysis of English and Thai cases and drawing generalisable conclusions from the study

Generating hypotheses for studying in Thailand

An iterative process between undertaking the analysis and refining the theoretical model.

A few themes emerge:
- A detailed description of each case
- Chronology of the development of cross-council collaboration

Purposive sampling:
- Thai case 1
- Thai case 2
2.4 Sampling design

Within the exploratory approach purposive sampling, rather than random, is the most appropriate (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). In purposive sampling cases are chosen because they allow the research questions to be addressed (Yin, 2009). However, Yin (2009) mentioned that access to the cases and potential data is also an important aspect to consider when selecting cases. Researchers need to ensure that they can gain access to interview people, make observations, or review official documents (ibid.). Taking these issues into account this study employed purposive sampling, complemented by the use of the researcher’s network of contacts in England and Thailand to select cases in both countries. In this study a case refers to collaboration between small local governments. Multiple-case studies were employed as they yield a stronger base for theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009); “the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust” (Yin, 2009, p. 53). Essentially, they allow a more robust and generalisable theory/concept to be developed than a single-case study. This is because “the propositions are more deeply grounded in varied empirical evidence” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, p. 27). Due to the advantages of multiple-case studies this research decided to select two English cases and two Thai cases for the purpose of the study. This number of cases also resulted from resource considerations, time, money, and capacity of the researcher, in doing this research.

2.4.1 Justification for selecting England and Thailand

Thailand was selected to study as the researcher sought to generate insights into cross-council joint working to assist small local governments within the country to enhance
capacity in providing services. The number of small councils, lower tier local governments, has been rapidly increasing since the 1990s. In 2011 there were 2,082 Municipalities (Thesaban) and 5,693 Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAO), to promote the value of local self-government. However, these small units lack capacity in delivering services, because they have been challenged by limited financial resources and equipment, and unqualified staff (Krueathep, 2004; College of Local Government Development, 2007; Department of Local Administration, 2008). Joint working has been introduced by central government as an effective mechanism to deal with such issue for decades, but there has been little progress in using this approach. Existing studies in this area are scarce. Local governments tend to lack knowledge about how this policy can and should be formed, as well as implemented in effective ways. Therefore, it is important to study this issue in Thailand.

Moreover, Thailand was selected due to the accessibility to the cases. Before embarking on doctoral study the researcher worked as a researcher at the Office of Political Development Council, King Prajadhipok’s Institute in Thailand for two years and at the Thailand’s Reform Committee for a year. The main responsibility in both positions was undertaking research in the areas of local governance. This allowed the researcher to develop networks with officers of the College of Local Government Development, King Prajadhipok’s Institute, the leading academic centre for research on local governance studies, and the Department of Local Administration, the government body responsible for the administration and improvement of Thai local governments, as well as the leading academics in this field. Having these good connections enabled the researcher to use their knowledge and contacts with councils across the country to access to the cases.

There are three important reasons for selecting England. Firstly, England has a long history of implementing a collaborative approach in public service provision for more than
fifteen years, due to the previously mentioned focus on collaboration, which saw continuity between the Labour and Coalition governments (Newchurch, 1999; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004; Williams and Sullivan, 2007; Heley and Moles, 2012; Rees et al., 2012). As England has a much longer experience in implementing this policy studying the English experience may demonstrate the full range of positive and negative implications which can benefit the promotion of collaboration between local governments in Thailand, where there has been little progress.

Secondly, England was selected due to the accessibility of the cases. Being a PhD student at the Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV), University of Birmingham, England, enabled the researcher to use the knowledge and contacts of this institution to recruit and gain access to the cases and valuable data to answer research questions. This is because INLOGOV is the leading academic centre for research on local governance studies, which has good connections with councils across the country, and has valuable knowledge relating to local governance and public management.

Thirdly, the two countries had a comparatively similar political system. The politics of the United Kingdom is conducted under a unitary democracy, on the basis of a constitutional monarchy, whereby the Prime Minister of the UK is the head of government and the Monarch is the head of state. Before May 2014, Thailand had been under a constitutional monarchy, in which the Prime Minister acts as the head of government and the monarch is the head of state. Since the coup d'état in May 2014, Thailand has become a state under the rule of the military. However, this study was undertaken before the coup d'état.

Regarding the local government system it seems central governments have been playing a crucial role in setting the development direction and in the operating of local governments in both countries. Local governments have been able to do only the things
they are statutorily permitted to do – the principle of ultra vires. Both countries have two tier systems. Thailand has a two-tier local government system across the country. In addition, there are two special local self-government organisations in Thailand, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and Pattaya City. England also has a two tier system, where the county council is the upper-tier and the district or borough is the lower-tier authority operating in many areas. In England, similar to Thailand there are also areas of single tier local government – unitary and metropolitan councils – and in London a special two tier system of London Boroughs and the Greater London Assembly.

Finally, although there may be other suitable countries with experience in local government collaboration, such as France and Japan, literature published in English is scarce. Hence, those countries were not selected due to the language barrier.

2.4.2 The selection of cases: the use of purposive sampling

In qualitative case study research cases and participants need to be chosen for the purposive or theoretical, not statistical, reason so that the research objectives are achieved, and the research questions are addressed (Yin, 2009; Bryman, 2012). This sampling approach is called ‘generic purposive sampling’ by Bryman (2012, p.122)

Selection criteria

In using purposive sampling selection criteria need to be established specifically related to the kinds of cases needed to address the research objective and questions (Bryman, 2012). With respect to the research objective and questions mentioned above, as well as
the comparative account of the England and Thai cases, the three criteria were created to select cases in both countries:

1) *Functional similarity:* The cases need to be demonstrative of collaboration between the lower tier local governments where they are functionally similar between the two systems of local government. These refer to Borough Council and District Council in England, similar to Thesaban (Municipality) or Tambon Administrative Organisation (TAO) in Thailand.

2) *Enough data on collaboration:* The cases must have enough history of collaboration, and not be those in the early stages of collaboration, so that an in-depth understanding of the development of collaboration over a period of time can be gained.

3) *Accessibility:* Yin (2009) mentioned that sufficient access to the potential data is an important aspect that should be considered. Bryman (2012) also confirmed that the issue of gatekeeper, an important person who can allow or not allow the researcher to access the case data, must be given a high consideration. Hence, the cases need to be accessible. Access to the case and participants can be facilitated by key actors, intermediaries or gatekeepers of the case, so that the quality of qualitative data can be increased.

**Selecting English cases**

For English cases the recruitment was facilitated through INLOGOV’s contacts with possible cases that fit the criteria, resulting in a list of three candidates as follows:
1) Babergh District Council and Mid Suffolk District Council

2) Adur District Council and Worthing Borough Council

3) Christchurch Borough Council and East Dorset District Council

The candidate cases were checked by gathering relevant documents to decide if the cases meet the established criteria. Christchurch and East Dorset councils were not selected as gaining access to the case could not be achieved through the use of INLOGOV's contacts. However, there are a number of valuable document sources relating to the first two cases. Babergh and Mid-Suffolk was selected as one case because gaining access to the case and key informants could be achieved through the use of an intermediary, the director of INLOGOV, as she is a policy consultant for this case. Similarly, Adur and Worthing was selected as she has a good relationship with senior officers of the case, facilitating access to the case data. Both cases have enough data on collaboration, as Adur and Worthing started joint working in 2002 while Babergh and Mid-Suffolk started collaboration in 2008.

Selecting Thai cases

As an international student the researcher expected that selecting English cases would be difficult in terms of access to the cases and participants. However, it went well and smoothly. Instead the researcher experienced some difficulty in selecting the Thai cases. The cases in local government collaboration are scarce since there have been very few local governments implementing this approach. Furthermore, some of the possible candidates seem to no longer collaborate.
At the first stage case selection was facilitated through an intermediary. The researcher’s previous boss has been a member of a committee under the Department of Local Administration, and a member of a sub-committee under the Local Government Organisation Committee in Thailand for many years. By using an intermediary, as well as the Department of Local Administration’s knowledge and contacts, the following candidates were found:

1) A shared Waste Management Service between six small local governments in Lampang Province.

2) A Joint Infrastructure Service between eight local governments in Rayong Province.

3) A Joint Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Service between three small local governments in Kanchanaburi Province.

Cross-council collaboration in **Lampang Province** was selected as the first case as it is quite well-known regarding operating collaborative arrangement. Also, the intermediary has a good connection with the mayor of the leading council, providing a good opportunity for accessing the case and key informants. When visiting the site to interview participants the researcher consulted participants about other possible cases. It found that councils in Rayong no longer operate shared service. In Kanchanaburi some key officials involved in the early days of collaboration have left the councils, resulting in a halt in shared service. This meant the researcher had to find other possible cases that meet the criteria. The researcher consulted with an officer of the College of Local Government Development, King Prajadhipok’s Institute, who the researcher used to work with when working for Thailand’s Reform Committee, asking him if the College has knowledge and contact about possible cases. As a result cross-council collaboration in **Roi-Et Province**, demonstrating a joint Disaster Prevention and Mitigation service, was suggested as a feasible case that
meets the selection criteria. Some background documents about the case and the contact point to gain access were received from this intermediary. In conclusion cases in both countries were selected since they met the criteria as shown in table 1.

**Table 1: Four selected English and Thai cases, resulting from the use of the purposive sampling**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>English cases</th>
<th>Thai cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adur and Worthing Collaboration</td>
<td>Babergh and Mid-Suffolk Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional similarity</td>
<td>District and Borough councils²</td>
<td>District councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough data on collaboration</td>
<td>Started collaboration in 2002</td>
<td>Started collaboration in 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessibility</td>
<td>Access to the case was facilitated by INLOGOV</td>
<td>Access to the case was facilitated by INLOGOV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the researcher

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² District and borough councils have the same functions; but borough councils hold a royal charter
2.5 Data collection and realities of undertaking the research

Case study research is seen as one of the most powerful research designs because it allows various sources of evidence to be used to generate rich and completed accounts of particular social issues and processes (Hakim, 2002). According to Bryman (2012, p.68), case study can be either qualitative or quantitative research depending on its philosophical assumptions and its approach to the relationship between the study and theory. It can be a mix-methods research. However, qualitative approach is often favoured by the advocates of case study research as qualitative methods are useful for the in-depth investigation of social phenomenon (Silverman, 2000; Bryman, 2012). To gain a rich understanding of the development of collaboration the extensive data collection in this research needed to be drawn on multiple sources of evidence; documents, in-depth interviews, and non-participant observation. The use of multiple sources of evidence strengthened confidence in the findings and established construct validity of the study (Eisenhardt, 1989).

According to Buchanan and Dawson to gain valuable insights into organisational change processes, which is a multi-story process, it is the role of the researcher to provide the narratives of changes relating to sequenced and thematic accounts (2007). However, these narratives seem to be multiple and conflicting, resulting from their nature of conflicting interests, negotiations, and alignments (Bacharach and Lawler, 1998). Multi-story also results from the different experiences, viewpoints, and objectives of people within the change process (Buchanan and Dawson, 2007). For example, some interviewees may have partial involvement in collaboration which develops over time. In retelling stories of such phenomenon, therefore, the researcher as a story teller needs to take account of the multiple narratives provided by participants and written in documents.
They need not just report the loud and respectable voices, but reveal silenced and different views. This can be achieved through using systematic data collection, with multiple data sources, to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the change story (ibid.).

Taking these notions into account, the fieldwork of this study incorporated three qualitative data collection methods, using a triangulation of evidence to develop inferences. It firstly opted to use documentary research and in-depth interviews as the primary instruments. Non-participant observations were added as a data collection instrument when the opportunities to attend events relating to cross-council collaboration arose in both countries.

2.5.1 Documentary research

Documentary research was planned to be used as an instrument for the initial collection of data in both countries. For the English cases, gathering documents was followed by in-depth interviews. It also continued throughout the process of investigating the English cases. In contrast, this could not be done as planned in Thailand, resulting from the fact that published documents about the cases are scarce. Hence, the researcher changed the strategy by first visiting the cases’ sites and interviewing key informants to gain insight into the cases, and then asking them to provide unpublished documents.

The English cases

The documents relating to the English cases consist of the councils’ documents obtained by accessing the councils’ websites and visiting councils’ offices. These include meeting
minutes, working papers, business cases, progress reports, and councils’ newsletter related to their collaboration. Further documents were Government and external bodies’ documents including The Audit Commission’s reports, government’s discussion paper and policy statements relevant to the cases, and the reports of councils’ consultants. More valuable documents were newspaper articles from Local Government Chronicle (LGC) and BBC’s news and articles. The list of documents employed was sent to key informants of each case, and received no further suggestions. A total of seventy four documents – thirty nine documents of Adur and Worthing and thirty five documents of Babergh and Mid-Suffolk – were gathered and analysed (Appendix D).

Documentation served several objectives. They were gathered to gain valuable information about the development of collaboration in each case prior to field visits. They were initially analysed concerning the three research questions. Gathering documents enabled the researcher to realise that decision making by local governments on collaboration policy changes over time depending on different driving forces in each period. Hence, to gain valuable insights into this policy, this phenomenon needed to be examined through longitudinal case study instead of studying it at one point in time. This caused the researcher to seek useful theories that contain a temporal dimension for analysing the interagency working.

Furthermore, it allowed the construction of a chronology of events as a storytelling of what has occurred relating to the development of collaboration policy by emphasising the temporal and contextual aspects. They also provided various concerns of specific individuals in such a change process at particular time. According to Atkinson and Hammersley (1995), documents created by individuals with specific aims can be regarded as a useful source. These documentary sources were part of triangulation allowing
inferences on opinions and concerns of collaboration, reinforced by the perspectives of the interviewees and observation data.

Gathering and initially analysing the documents further allowed the researcher to identify key themes to be focused on (Stake, 1995). It helped identify the specific knowledge gaps and questions that needed to be answered in interviews, enabling the researcher to alter and add specific interviews into an interview topic guide. The researcher experienced the overlap between data collection and analysis when entering fieldwork, a key feature of exploratory research aiming to develop theories from case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to Eisenhardt (1989, p.533), “flexible and opportunistic data collection methods” should be employed for an exploratory research objective. Adding data collection methods and altering data collection instruments during research are legitimate since the researcher is attempting to understand each individual case as deeply as possible. This approach should not be seen as unsystematic. In the exploratory approach adjustment can be made to data collection methods and instruments when a new data collection opportunity arises, and new theoretical insights can be gained from such an alteration (Eisenhardt, 1989).

The Thai cases

Unlike the English cases published documents related to the Thai cases are scarce.³ While a number of valuable and official documents such as minutes of councils’ meeting, working papers, and internal reports relevant to the joint working between the councils can be easily gained by accessing the authorities’ websites in England, there was no such

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³ Documents were not confidential. There is just no process for providing them to the public. For instance, there are no meeting minutes relevant to the cases’ collaboration published on the councils’ websites.
information publicly available on councils’ websites in Thailand. The researcher created methods in response to this flexible but systematic data collection. Instead of starting on gathering documents, visits to cases’ sites were undertaken to interview key informants. Intensive understanding was gained from interviews, and a number of internal and official councils’ documents such as meeting’s minutes, regulations and memorandums of understanding, were obtained by asking interviewees to provide them. Further documents, specifically reports by external bodies, were received from intermediaries who helped the researcher access cases. The relevant documents for local government collaboration in Roi-Et were given by an officer of the College of Local Government Development, King’s Prajadhipok Institute as his department was auditing this case. For the Lampang case some study reports by the Department of Local Administration were given by an intermediary.

2.5.2 Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews were employed as the researcher has a fairly clear focus on what to investigate. This particular method is appropriate as it has a capacity to gather detailed and rich answers from the participants so that the particular issues can be addressed (Bryman, 2012) in a clear manner (Marshall and Rossman, 2006).

An interview topic guide: instrument development

In designing an interview topic guide (see Appendix A) the conceptual models were used to help formulate the list of specific topics and questions to address each research question. Within each question there are also memory prompts, developed from the theoretical framework. These prompts were used to make the respondents think more
about each topic, allowing the researcher to gain a more detailed response (Bryman, 2012). Consequently, the interview topic guide consists of five pages with four topics that link to the research questions and fourteen questions with prompts. The response of interviewees was recorded, as were the impressions that occurred to the researcher, what the researcher learned, and some comparisons among the interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989; Creswell, 2007).

Selection of participants

Purposive sampling was employed to select interviewees. Following Bryman, people within cases were selected due to their relevance to the research questions (2012). The research questions informed the creation of three selection criteria to select participants in both countries: being politicians and senior officers in the cases; having experienced collaborative working and either the process of the formation or implementation of inter-local government collaboration policy; and access can be facilitated via the intermediaries. Twenty participants – six in English cases and fourteen in Thai cases – were interviewed. The fewer interviewees in England resulted from the fact that English cases were treated as an exploratory study, and documents were the initial sources used.

Conducting interviews: procedures and its realities

Pilot interviews were conducted with two respondents, one was a native English speaker who studied in local governance and one was an academic in local governance in Thailand. The native English speaker ensured the questions were well formed, whilst the academic in Thailand ensured that the questions were relevant to the study. These were
done to test how well the interview topic guide could be used. The researcher then had confidence in the flows of interviewing and the utility of the interview topic guide.

For both the English and Thai cases almost all of the interviews were conducted face-to-face at the councils’ offices. There was just one telephone interview of an English participant. Yin (2009) argues that well-informed respondents can provide valuable information about the phenomena. Prior to the interview an information sheet and a consent form were provided to respondents by email in England and by post in Thailand to ensure that participants were fully informed about the objective and the questions of the study. They acknowledge that their participation is voluntary and their confidentiality is protected.

The interviews took between one hour and one and a half hours. The interview topic guide was used. Interviewees were asked about their experiences in and opinions on, the development of interagency working relationships. Starting with the general background of interviewees (how long have you been involved in the initiatives, what is your responsibility) and general background of the collaboration (when and how collaboration has happened), the researcher then moved to the rationale for cross-council collaboration. For the implementation of the collaboration the interviewees were asked to explain the way resources were shared and the governance structure of the collaborations. Regarding factors influencing sustainable collaboration, the interviewees were asked to define the factors found to be vital to operation in their cases and provide examples or stories about each factor. Respondents were asked to identify key challenges of working across boundaries. Lastly, respondents were provided a chance to indicate the key factors as to the formation and implementation of collaborations that were not mentioned by the researcher. Before finishing, they were asked if they could provide further documentation setting out the collaborative working and suggest other key informants for interview.
In undertaking semi-structured interviews the researcher experienced what Yin (2009) recognised; although there was a list of issues and questions, asking questions was likely to be flexible rather than rigid. It found that people working in local government, especially in high positions, seemed to be good at telling stories. In some interviews, as the story was already told by interviewees it appeared some questions were answered without asking. Although the researcher was pursuing a consistent line of inquiry in the topic guide, questions asked did not exactly follow it. It found that this strategy was effective as the interviewees seemed to be comfortable giving information and talking about their experience and opinions. However, their responses were still relevant to the specific topics and questions. The list of prompts was used to ask the questions when the researcher picked up on specific information provided by participants. Notes were taken in the interview topic guide for each interview. An audio recorder was used to record answers subject to permission of interviewees. All interviews were fully transcribed to prepare data for longitudinal, within-case analysis, and then thematic, cross-case analysis.

The researcher partly experienced a situation Bryman (2012) acknowledged; gaining access to the organisations does not always mean the researcher will have easy access to the people within organisations. While gaining access to interview key informants was easy in England, the researcher faced some difficulties in doing this in Thailand. The following sections will provide the realities of gaining access to participants in both countries.

**The English cases**
Arranging interviews in both English cases was done by sending emails to the key informants. An information sheet providing the objective and key information of the study, along with the researcher’s curriculum vitae, were sent to prospective participants to enable them to make an informed decision about whether or not they wish to be involved in this study. For the Babergh and Mid-Suffolk case emails were sent to prospective participants individually to arrange interview. The snowballing technique was used to a degree since the interviewees were asked to suggest other key informants for interview. For the Adur and Worthing case the Director of INLOGOV was an intermediary. She sent an email to the Chief executive officer to introduce the researcher and the PhD project. Then the researcher received an email from them stating that they gave permission to access the case and people. Interviews were arranged with the help of the chief executive’s secretary. Consequently, six participants, three in Adur and Worthing and three in Babergh and Mid-Suffolk, were interviewed (Appendix C).

The Thai cases

While an informal approach such as e-mail communication can be used to arrange interviews in England, a more formal approach was needed in Thailand. Although email and telephone communication could be used to arrange interviews with participants in Lampang, because the intermediary has a good relationship with the gatekeeper, the mayor of the leading council in the case, such informal communication was not useful for the other case. In Roi-Et, the researcher had established a contact with a senior officer of the leading local authority, who is directly responsible for the collaboration project, and can be seen as a key contact person of this project. However, this person was unable to help gain access to key informants. The researcher was told that an informal way seemed to be unacceptable for arranging interviews with politicians and senior officers of the five
partnering councils. Instead a formal letter is required. This reflects the hierarchical culture of Thai society in which Thai people are expected to have a higher level of respect for people in a high position within a society. An informal way is inappropriate to contact a person in a high position within an organisation, particularly a public or governmental organisation. A formal letter is needed and it has to follow the formal procedure of an organisation. What the researcher could do was send the letter and wait for a response, making a response uncertain. However, this formal way proved to be helpful as the researcher was given permission by all councils to interview key informants. Consequently, fourteen interviewees, six in Lampang and eight in Roi-Et, were interviewed (Appendix C).

2.5.3 Non-participant observations

Non-participant observation was not originally planned. However, with the help of the intermediaries in both countries the opportunities to attend the meetings and workshops emerged, allowing the researcher to add observational evidence for one Thai case and one English case.

Regarding the English case, working with the Director of INLOGOV, a policy consultant for Babergh and Mid-Suffolk, enabled the researcher to have a chance to observe the events relating to collaborative working between Babergh council and Mid-Suffolk council. On the 15th of May 2013, the researcher visited the case site to observe an informal executive meeting about managing the challenges of operating with a single workforce serving two councils. Then, on the 8th of July 2013 the consultant team led by the Director of INLOGOV held two training programmes on political management skills for the officers.
The researcher attended these sessions as a PhD researcher and observer, not a member of the consultant team.

For the Thai cases a chance to gain more empirical data from observation arose in the Lampang case. The intermediary has a good relationship with the Mayor of the lead council of the case, as he has been visiting the case site for years as an external/governmental auditor. On the 3rd of June, 2014, the mayor allowed the intermediary and the researcher to observe a meeting of the Joint Committee, set up to be the main decision-making mechanism on the joint working arrangement. In this meeting the mayors of 6 local governments jointly discussed and made decisions on joint waste management issues. As the observation was done prior to interviews it shed some light on the key informants to be interviewed, and was a useful source of potential questions to be asked. Observations allowed the researcher to observe the behaviour and language of politicians and officers concerning their joint working, partly identifying the collaborative entrepreneur and collaborative manager of the case.

During observations notes on the issues, languages, behaviours, and impressions that occurred relevant to the research questions were recorded. Field notes were created as soon as possible after visiting the cases’ sites to prepare data for analysis. After gathering data, to prepare data for analysis, a transcript of each interview was produced. Field notes from observations were created.

2.6 Data analysis

Following the procedures for an exploratory comparative case study data analysis of this study incorporated two parts. The first concerns a narrative, temporal within-case
analysis, to gain a rich familiarity with each case and to identify key themes for cross-case comparison. Each case was analysed and written up as a narrative description through a chronology of the development of cross-council relationship. The second concerns a thematic analysis across the cases to address the research questions.

2.6.1 Within-case analysis: longitudinal case studies

A detailed description of the case emerges through the data collection stage (Stake, 1995). In the English cases, documents revealed that there were situations where something has happened in the past, becoming a key determinant of feasibility of present choice of collaboration formation. For example, in the Adur and Worthing case a number of documents stated that their joint working began in 2007 as shared waste services commenced. However, having read through some of the councils’ key internal documents the researcher realised that collaboration formed in 2007 as a result of their successful joint working on a shared depot, started in 2002, and shared waste collection, started in 2004.

Evidently history and the temporal dimension have an influence on the development of collaboration policy. Therefore, one of the features of this study must be examining the cases through longitudinal case studies, instead of studying this policy at one point in time. This confirms the argument of Pollitt (2008) about the significance of time and the past in the study of policy and management. In his book ‘Time, Policy, Management: Governing with the Past’ Pollitt (2008) asserted that analysing the temporal dimension and the past is important. This is not only important for policy makers and public managers in developing and operating policy, but also researchers who study public policy, where
processes take a long time with a temporal sequence that is crucial to present choices and outcome.

Analysing documentary sources allowed the construction of the chronology, demonstrating the development of collaboration within each case, allowing the verification of specific claims through the following interviews and observations. The researcher experienced that the longitudinal analysis of each case was very time consuming and needed good data management. However, it was valuable as it helped to gain intensive knowledge about the cases, and helped to cope with the immense volume of data. A detailed description of each case revealed specific issues found to be important, as well as particular knowledge gaps that needed to be investigated via interviews and observations. This step is referred to as ‘preliminary theory generation’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.533). Also, interviews and observations were particularly successful as the researcher had learned jargon and had specific contextual background before entering the field.

2.6.2 Cross-case analysis: thematic analysis

“Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail. However, it also often goes further than this, and interprets various aspects of the research topic” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.6). Thematic analysis across the cases was conducted to address the research questions to gain rich details of collaboration policy formation and its practice.

The identification of themes and the coding process
This exploratory study opted to use a hybrid approach of inductive and deductive thematic analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006) to interpret qualitative data. Essentially, the identification of themes on how and why inter-local government collaboration has formed, the types implemented, and what factors are important for effective collaboration, results from the use of both theoretical framework (theory-driven deductive approach) and within-case analysis (data-driven inductive approach). This approach complemented the research questions in that the deductive approach allowed the emergence of tenets of the development of collaboration, while themes can also emerge directly from the empirical data by employing an inductive approach. 

**Nvivo** qualitative data analysis (QDA) computer software was used to help organise and analyse data systematically. The project was created and all data, interview transcripts, field notes from observations, and the documents, were entered into the Nvivo programme, preparing data for analysis.

The coding process employed a **theory-driven deductive approach**. Theoretical concepts and research questions were used to develop the pre-defined template of codes or codebook (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 2006) before commencing data analysis (see Figure 3 for the pre-defined codes linked to the three key research questions, and Table 2 for an example of a pre-defined template of codes for dealing with the first question). This template was then applied to the data. The data was organised into central themes, and then displayed in subthemes for subsequent interpretations. In addition to this deductive approach an **inductive approach** was used as data was read and re-read to allow something important related to the development of collaboration grounded in the data to emerge.
Figure 3: The pre-defined template of codes linked to research questions developed in Nvivo

**RQ1** How and why is collaboration initiated?

**RQ2** What forms have been used and why?

**RQ3** What factors influence sustainable collaboration?

Source: the researcher
Table 2: An example of a pre-defined template of codes developed based on research questions and theoretical framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question 1: How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theories: Policy-making models (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem stream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy stream</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political stream</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisational stream</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative entrepreneur</td>
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</table>

Source: the researcher
2.7 The challenges regarding the quality of case study research

The lack of rigour and limited generalisability seem to be common concerns over case study research. Using systematic and rigorous procedures can address such concerns and can increase the quality of research (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). The sections above demonstrated the way in which this study was undertaken by following procedures for exploratory case studies suggested by scholars (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1995; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). The following sections will discuss methodological challenges, and how those challenges have been overcome to achieve quality and credible research.

2.7.1 Validity

Construct Validity

One of the common criticisms of case study research is that a case study researcher often uses ‘subjective’ judgment, instead of developing an appropriate operational set of measures to collect data (Yin, 2009, p.41). This issue refers to one of the tests commonly employed to establish the quality of any given social research design; construct validity. Construct validity concerns establishing operational theoretical measures which match the specific concepts being studied (Yin, 2009). In other words, it is an indicator that the research has an ability to operationalise theoretical concepts within the particular investigational context (Cronbach, 1986). Yin (2009) suggested that in order to meet construct validity of case study research there are two steps to follow. Defining the social setting in terms of specific concepts that are supported by empirical studies is the primary
stage. Establishing operational measures, deriving from empirical research, and appropriately matching the concepts is the secondary stage.

To increase construct validity this study has reviewed the established literature relevant to the initial three questions, to develop an understanding of collaboration, and construct a conceptual framework before commencing data collection. The terms and concepts related to collaboration were operationalised for applying it to collaboration in local governments.

However, the gathering and initial analysis of documentary data of English cases revealed that cross-council collaboration policy in real-life settings contains a temporal dimension. None of the existing models has the power to analyse interagency working policy which progresses over time. To address this issue this study sought other theories that contain a temporal dimension. Consequently, policy-making models, such as Kingdon’s (1995) agenda setting model and Lober’s (1997) collaboration forming model, were employed.

The existing models, initially planned to be used as conceptual frameworks were refined and integrated to construct the integrated conceptual framework. This gives an account of the dynamic process of collaboration formation and implementation within local government organisations, useful for investigating the development of collaboration through temporal periods.

This study has gradually developed the integrated conceptual framework based on the concepts and theories found in existing literature (see Chapters 3-4). The framework was used throughout the research processes, from gathering data to analysing data to drawing findings and conclusions.
Yin (2009) also mentioned that the use of multiple sources of evidence can help increase construct validity of case study research. This study employed various sources of evidence namely documentary sources, in-depth interviews, and observation to draw inferences about the development of local government collaboration, and factors influencing effective collaboration. Construct validity was therefore achieved in this case study research.

**Interpretative validity**

Interpretative validity is important for an interpretative, qualitative researcher, and can be achieved when the opinions, perspectives, experiences, and behaviours of the respondents who participated in the research were reflected accurately (Maxwell, 1992). In this respect, Patton (2002) suggested that to strengthen the reliability and validity of qualitative research, the researcher must clearly illustrate the way in which claims and inferences are made. Particularly, validity is achieved when findings are made from the triangulation of various data sources and are supported by quotations of the raw data (Rice and Ezzy, 1999). The researcher took these into account in all research processes of the study. In the stage of data analysis data was selected as it was organised around the conceptual framework, it was not just selected due to its ability to confirm theory. Also, the themes and arguments of the researcher have been supported by excerpts from the reflections of participants and documentary data. This is to ensure that data was interpreted relating directly to the participants’ own thoughts and experiences.

**2.7.2 Reliability**

“The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in a study” (Yin, 2009, p. 45). In qualitative research reliability concerns whether procedures and operations of the case
study can be repeated, with the same findings and conclusions (Yin, 2009). Creswell (2007) suggests that reliability can be achieved by following systematic and rigorous procedures in qualitative case study research process. Hence, this study established systematic and rigorous procedures for conducting comparative case study research, and adopted the process of developing theory from case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1995; Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). For instance, appropriate sampling techniques were employed to carefully select cases and participants, demonstrating that bias in sampling was avoided (Hakim, 2000; Creswell, 2007). Records of all stages of the research were properly recorded and documented. These helped ensure that this study could claim reliability.

### 2.7.3 Generalisability

Generalisability or external validity refers to the extent that the findings of the research can be generalised to populations beyond the particular research context (Bryman, 2012). Providing a small basis for scientific generalisation is a standard concern for case studies (Hakim, 2000; Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009; Bryman, 2012). Advocates of case study research argue that generalising results to other cases or to populations, statistical generalisation, is not the purpose of case study design (Cresswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). A case does not represent a sample from a known population and is not selected for this reason. Also, participants in case study are not treated as representative of a whole population. Instead, case study research strives to generate intensive investigation and in-depth understanding of case(s) in order to expand and generalise theories. As such, it still has an ability to generalise the findings to theoretical propositions, if not to a wider universe (Yin, 2009). According to Yin (2009, pp.38-39), this perspective of generalisability is called ‘analytical generalisation’, which refers to the scheme of
generalisation where developed theoretical perspectives are employed as a framework for comparing the empirical findings of the case study. Replication can be claimed if multiple cases support the same theories.

To increase the quality of case study research this study made an effort to create an appropriate theoretical framework; a vital part of undertaking case studies. The well-developed theoretical framework then became a means in identifying the research design. It also becomes an immense aid for selecting appropriate research methods for data collection and analysis, and generalising the findings, which help increase the validity and reliability of case study research.

2.7.4 Ethical considerations

This study completed the ethical review and received approval by the University’s Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee before commencing the project. A valid ethical evaluation of this research exists. The information sheet and the consent form (see Appendix B), providing key information, namely the central purpose of the study, the uses of the research, the confidentiality of information, the anonymity of participants, the participation as voluntary, the right of participants to withdraw, appreciation for participation, and the time required for interview, were used in the study. These documents provided were sent by email in England and post in Thailand to gatekeepers and respondents prior to interviews, so that participants could ensure that their participation is voluntary and their confidentiality will be protected. During fieldwork, before commencing interviews, the consent form was signed by both the interviewees and the researcher.
To protect the confidentiality of the participants the interviewees were asked only about their experiences and opinions relevant to the research questions. The data of respondents was stored and analysed in a confidential way. The specific details of interviewees, that could make a participant identifiable, were not included in any written work. Interview records and observation data were stored and were used for the purpose of this study only (the Data Protection Act, 1998 cited in Bryman, 2012, p.137). It has been stated in the consent form that the respondents can request the interview notes and a summary of the overall results of interviews if they wish. After interviewing there was only one respondent who asked for a summary of a case. A draft version was sent to them and they did not ask the researcher to revise any information in there.

**Field ethics**

Protecting participants from harm is the duty of the researcher. Researchers must take all procedures to ensure that the physical, physiological, and social well-being of participants is not affected by participation in the research (Social Policy Association, 2009; Economic and Social Research Council, 2010). In this study the researcher interviewed senior officers in highly charged political environments, with job cuts in the English cases. This may have created a situation where it was stressful for them to express opinions about the challenges of the development of cross-council collaborations. According to Ethical Guidelines of Social Research Association (2003), questions being asked may cause distress or offence to participants.

To mitigate against prospective negative impacts on participants, such as physical harm and stress about their job security, key strategies were exercised in the field. The researcher did not encourage a sense of obligation to participate. Rather it was clearly
stated in an informed consent form and by verbal language that participation was voluntary and for academic purposes. To protect the interests of participants, the researcher gave them prior information about the consequences of participating (Social Research Association, 2003). Before the interview date the researcher presented prospective participants with all the key information about the study including the information sheet and an interview topic guide for them to make an informed decision about their participation (Bryman, 2012).

On the date of the interview, the researcher read through the information in the information sheet and an informed consent form to the interviewee. Informed consent was gained to ensure that the participants understood what was being asked of them, as well as to ensure awareness of any potential negative impacts and risks (Fisher and Anushko, 2008, Economic and Social Research Council, 2010).

During interviews, the respondents were not treated as objects of measurement. The researcher was aware of the feelings of the respondents by observing their emotions and non-verbal language, to make sure that they were willing to respond to the questions (Social Research Association, 2003). Their individual values and personal domains were protected as the researcher did not overburden participants by gathering “too much” information (Social Research Association, 2003, p. 27) or ask questions beyond the topic guide, which they had already acknowledged. While asking the questions they were told that they had the right to not answer the question, for example, the challenges of cross-council working, if they felt uncomfortable. As all these steps were taken by the researcher, the participation of respondents in this study was based on “enthusiastic co-operation” rather than “reluctant acquiescence” (Social Research Association, 2003, p. 29). As any prospect of harm to respondents was avoided, the interviews resembled
enjoyable conversations rather than a Q&A session.

**Conclusion**

This chapter provided justifications of employing an exploratory cross-national comparative case studies approach, using a number of theoretical perspectives to understand the realities of local government collaborations in two different countries, and aiming at generating theories from the cases. It discussed an account of the way in which this approach informed the whole research process and demonstrates the way in which the systematic procedures for conducting exploratory cases studies suggested by scholars were utilised (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1995; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009) in this study to increase the overall quality of the research. Moreover, the realities of undertaking the study concerning the two different national contexts were provided.
CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING THE FORMATION OF COLLABORATION:
PART 1 OF THE INTEGRATED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

Collaboration between organisations has been implemented as a key strategy of managing public programmes and providing public services more economically and more effectively for decades (O’Toole, 1997; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Williams and Sullivan, 2007). There are a number of theoretical approaches that can be used to explain the genesis of interagency relationship and its operation in real-life settings. Williams and Sullivan (2007, p. 24) argue that “there is no single theoretical framework that adequately explains inter-organisational relationships and no consolidated body of inter-organisational theory”. This is because joined-up working is informed by various disciplines; political, economic, sociological theories (Faulkner and de. Rond, 2000; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Williams and Sullivan, 2007), and public administration and management theories (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). Hence, to gain intensive knowledge of the development of interagency relationship, the literature review of this study is built on a number of theoretical approaches and cross-disciplinary models. This enables the researcher to construct an integrated conceptual framework for investigating the journey towards the collaboration of small local governments, to address the three key research questions being asked.

The literature review of this study is divided into two chapters. This chapter deals with the first of three research questions ‘How and why is collaboration between small local
governments initiated? which informs the first part of the integrated conceptual framework. The next chapter address the last two questions ‘what types of collaboration have been implemented and why?’ and ‘what factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaboration?’ enabling the researcher to develop the remaining parts of the conceptual framework.

This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first provides the systematic method in which the literature review was undertaken. The second discusses the nature of collaboration. The third discusses collaboration specific to local government. The fourth examines the theories and concepts which can be employed as analytical frameworks to investigate the emergence of local government collaboration policy. In this fourth section, it reviews the notion of motivations for collaboration. Such a notion might be helpful for investigating why councils seek to enter into joined-up workings. However, it has limited power to explain how and why those forces are realised by key actors in the policy-making process resulting in the collaboration policy. Significantly, it does not contain the temporal dimension necessary for understanding collaboration policy formation and development in the real-life settings.

To address these issues this chapter explores policy-making models, including Kingdon’s agenda setting model (1995) and Lober’s collaboration forming model (1997). It further explores the way in which Takahashi and Smutny (2002) have utilised the notion of Kingdon’s and Lober’s policy-making models to explore the formulation of interagency collaboration together with its implementation, and Cohen et al.’s garbage can model (1972). Consequently, this study opted to use the policy-making models combined with factors that create the potential for collaboration to construct the first part of the analytical framework. Policy-making models have the power to address the research question on how and why cross-council collaboration policy is formulated at a specific time and
developed over time. Essentially, this part of the framework suggests that collaboration policy is a result of interactions between key individuals, collaborative entrepreneurs, and key exogenous and endogenous factors - under each stream at any point in time, which can be changed from one time to another.

3.1 Reviewing existing knowledge on collaboration

For the scope of the review three criteria were developed for selecting the literature to be included. Firstly, this review interrogates the theoretical perspectives and the relevant empirical literature; existing knowledge within this area that contribute to an understanding of collaborative working. Secondly, this review examines international perspective literature. Much of this literature on local government collaboration originates from the United States of America, as many of the theoretical perspectives concerning collaboration grow from academics in the USA (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). However, it also attempts to specifically review literature relevant to England and Thailand, the cases of this research. Thirdly, it focuses particularly on the literature related to collaborative working between local governments, but not the relationship between council and other sectors.

Searching literature involves electronic searching of University of Birmingham databases. Key terms used include collaboration, joint working, partnership working, inter-organisational relations, inter-agency working, networking, intergovernmental management, cooperation, joined-up government, and inter-local cooperation. Moreover, the relevant literature was found from references in articles and books about the interagency collaboration topic. The various literature including theoretical and conceptual
books, peer-reviewed journal articles, empirical studies reported in articles and books, and reports undertaken by government bodies and various bodies are included.

3.2 The nature of collaboration

Interagency working has been implemented in the public sector for decades (McGuire, 2006). Regarding the benefits of collaboration, it is widely recognised that collaboration is a powerful mechanism of managing and governing public programmes and services, as it has capacity to solve complex societal problems that cannot be easily addressed by a single unit working independently (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Gajda, 2004; McGuire, 2006). Joined-up working can help improve coordination between service providers, improve policy delivery of cross-cutting and wicked issues, and improve efficiency of individual organisation facing resources constraints.

However, Gazley and Brudney (2007, p.392) pointed out that there are possible drawbacks of collaboration, including “mission drift, loss of institutional autonomy or public accountability, co-optation of actors, greater financial instability, greater difficulty in evaluating results, and the expenditure of considerable institutional time and resources in supporting collaborative activities”. Similarly, an empirical study on partnership working in mental health services (Glasby and Lester, 2004) demonstrates that a decrease in job morale and satisfaction of staff is a clear evidence of negative outcomes of collaborative working. This negative effect occurred as staff were confused over organisational identity, and concerned about changes in their professional roles.

As this study focuses on collaboration in local governments, therefore, it is important to note that local governments may prefer not to collaborate with others due to their nature
as legal and autonomous entities (Weiss, 1987). Indeed, the propensity for collaborative working between local governments is greatly decreased if collaborations result in organisational identity loss (Scherm herhorn and John, 1975).

Regarding its characteristics collaboration takes place in various settings. Collaboration can occur both in vertical and horizontal forms of interagency relationships (Alter and Hage, 1993; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). In the vertical form collaboration occurs through hierarchical levels of government, whereas public-private partnerships and collaboration between councils in the same tier can be seen as an example of horizontal collaboration. Moreover, collaboration can be a formal or informal institutional working relationship. For the former, collaborative arrangements sometimes take place in an official partnership, or have formal contractual obligations, which are usually seen as a lasting and formalised institutional collaboration (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Schneider et al., 2003). For an informal collaboration, loose institutional and occasional cooperation can occur when leaders of organisations voluntarily agree to work together to cope with a common problem, or to achieve a shared interest, where the relationship not based on any written agreement (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; McGuire, 2006).

3.3 Collaboration in local governments

Since the 1950s, local governments in developed countries have played a vital role in providing public services (Hulst et al., 2009). It resulted from the circumstance that national governments have decentralised the power and responsibilities to local governments. However, over the past decades, local councils in European countries have faced challenges in producing improved public services while keeping the costs low in the face of austerity (Hulst and Van Montfort, 2007; Hulst et al., 2009). To deal with such
pressure councils, particularly small councils, have entered into the joint provision of public services to achieve economies of scope and scale, to increase cost-efficiencies in delivering services, and to meet the rising demands of citizens (Bish and Ostrom, 1973; Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991; Hulst et al., 2009). In recent years municipal cooperation in European countries has been growing in various types of institutional arrangements, to achieve efficiency in delivering services, to achieve shared goals, to fulfil specific tasks (Labianca, 2014), and “to increase the capacity for solving policy problems that escape the boundaries of a single municipality” (Hulst and van Montfort, 2011, p. 122). Nowadays, inter-municipal cooperation regarding joint public service delivery is a widespread phenomenon throughout Europe and the Western world (Stoner, 1964; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Warner, 2006; Hulst et al., 2009; Hulst and Van Montfort, 2011; Labianca, 2014).

The United States of America also has a long history in local government collaboration in public services, resulting in a large literature on local government collaboration. Collaboration among local government has been a common form for producing public services in the United States for decades (Warner, 2006; Blaire and Janousek, 2013) and has steadily grown in importance in the public sector (Chen and Thurmaier, 2009; LeRoux and Carr, 2010). This is because it allows improvement of public services and efficiency to be gained. While collaboration in public services in the USA among local councils has become a widespread practice to addressing community challenges, for example, collaboration between regional and local governments is scarce (Benton, 2013). According to Warm (2011), interlocal, bilateral collaborative relationships among local governments to fix specific service issues has been common in US local governments since the 1980s, and are still the norm.
In the US context the terms collaboration and cooperation have been used interchangeably by scholars to refer to joint working between local governments in the delivery of public programmes and services. The consensus in this context is that it is an innovative alternative to the provision of services to address common issues or achieve respective goals (Chen and Thurmaier, 2009; Warm, 2011; Benton, 2013). Warner (2006) defines the term inter-municipal cooperation as the voluntary and common form of collaboration among local councils which aims to achieve efficiency in producing public services. Blaire and Janousek (2013) used both terms interchangeably in their longitudinal examination of cross-council relationships to refer to the phenomenon where one council voluntarily collaborated with one or more other councils, where various collaborative mechanisms can be used, which may be subject to change over time given changes in the internal and external forces for collaboration. From these definitions local government collaboration can be conceptualised as ‘working across institutional boundaries’ in a thorough way that significantly ‘reshapes the processes of decision making or service delivery’ (Warm, 2011, p. 61).

Since the 1950s various forms of cross-council collaboration have been implemented across Europe, ranging from single to multi-purpose collaboration and shared consultations to shared operations among small to large number of councils (Labianca, 2014). A study on institutional features of inter-municipal cooperation in eight European countries showed that inter-municipal cooperation, concerning the services provisions which have been implemented across Europe, can be categorised into four basic types: “quasi-regional governments, planning forums, service delivery organisations and service delivery agreements” (Hulst and van Montfort, 2011, p.121). In the US Benton (2013) demonstrates that although some collaborative endeavours can be short-term fixes to address particular service issues, they can be further expanded to a more complex relationship for delivering long-term outcomes to the community, due to forces affecting
local governments. Local government collaboration can be both informal and formal institutional relationships. Informal arrangements can be seen in cases of information exchange and ad hoc meetings to increase the provision of services, where the institutional relationship is not based on any written formal agreement. Formal arrangements with a written agreement range from sharing resources, such as money and equipment, to the joint delivery of services (Benton, 2013).

One potential *rationale for entering into collaboration* that induces small local governments to collaborate with each other is that collaboration allows them to obtain economies of scale. This allows them to provide services to a larger territory and a bigger set of citizens, and to maintain or even improve the level of services provided (Bish and Ostrom, 1973; Morgan and Hirlinger, 1991; Ferris and Graddy, 1991; Lavery, 1999; Hulst et al., 2009; Benton, 2013; Blaire and Janousek, 2013;), even if they are small, “without losing local control and local identity” (Warner, 2006, p. 222).

Warm (2011) argues that almost all US local governments have a formal collaboration with other local governments for the purpose of providing better outcomes for the community. Warner (2011, p. 62) pointed out that collaborative relationships nowadays are more complex, involve multiple sectors, and aim to achieve long-term benefits. This is because of four key forces affecting local governments; *financial* – less state funding in the face of greater service demands; *competitive* – councils must build their capacity as part of larger economic system; *practical* – the nature of wicked issues requiring multifaceted strategies; and *political* – local leaders are expected by citizens to exercise effective leadership (Warner, 2011). Along with the argument that fiscal constraint is an impetus for collaboration Benton (2013) has examined key literature recently published. He finds that local governments develop collaborative service provision with neighbouring councils as it offers opportunities to improve efficiency in delivering services. It also
improves the quality of services to meet the rising expectations of citizens, in a period of the fiscal stress caused by the great recession in the USA.

Literature relevant to local governmental collaboration in Thailand is scarce. However, the empirical study on the determinants of network formation in local governments in Thailand by Krueathep et al. (2010) lays a foundation for an understanding of this topic. It found that there are two significant forces that induce organisations to work together; task complexity and management capacity. For the former, the study found that when local governments encounter problems that cannot be addressed by single organisation working independently, such as wicked problems, they are more likely to form collaborative relationships. These relationships among organisations increase organisational capabilities to cope with such complex issues and tasks. Regarding management capacity the study found that local leaders who had successful experiences collaborating will have a positive attitude towards interagency working, resulting in the greater likelihood of establishing collaborations.

3.4 The formation of collaboration: How and why is collaboration initiated?

In an attempt to answer why organisations decide to establish joint working relationships with each other, this study firstly examines the existing knowledge about the impetus for interagency working. Although such a notion is useful to understand the reasons why councils have made a decision to form collaboration policy, it lacks capacity to explain the way in which collaboration policy is formulated at one point in time and changed over time. This study addressed this issue by combining the notion of motivations for
collaboration with the policy-making models (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997; Takahashi and Smuty, 2002) to construct the first section of the analytical framework.

3.4.1 The notion of motivations for collaboration

There are a number of significant existing theories and empirical studies of why collaborative working among local governments has occurred, and continues to grow in popularity as an accepted means for managing public programmes and services to achieve better outcomes. The rationale for interagency collaboration can be explained by a variety of disciplines (Faulkner and de Rond, 2000; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Gazley, 2008). Generally, there have been few attempts to provide a comprehensive explanation of drivers of collaboration (Oliver, 1990; Faulkner and de Rond, 2000).

To construct a potential analytical model for investigating the incentives of councils to form interagency relationships, this study examined and synthesised some of most relevant literature (Aiken and Hage, 1968; Wiess, 1987; Oliver, 1990; O’Toole, 1997; Clarke and Stewart, 1997; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; The Audit Commission, 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; McGuire, 2006; Bogason and Musson, 2006; Williams and Sullivan, 2007; Krueathep et al., 2010). It is argued that motivations for collaboration formation can be conceptualised into four factors (figure 4). These are individual managerial experiences (Williams and Sullivan, 2007; Krueathep et al., 2010), to improve policy delivery of cross-cutting and wicked issues (Clarke and Stewart, 1997; O’Toole, 1997; the Audit Commission, 1998; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Bogason and Musson, 2006; Krueathep et al., 2010), to improve coordination between service providers (Alter and Hage, 1993; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Williams and Sullivan, 2007; Krueathep et
al., 2010), and to improve efficiency in providing services (Aiken and Hage, 1968; Wiess, 1987; Oliver, 1990; O’Toole, 1997; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003).

Figure 4: The model of motivations for collaboration

![Figure 4: The model of motivations for collaboration](image)

Source: the researcher

3.4.1.1 Individual managerial experiences

Some empirical studies identified that interagency workings are constituted on the basis of management experiences of the leaders in joined-working (Williams and Sullivan, 2007; Krueathep et al., 2010). In the Thai context the empirical study on the determinants of network formation at the subnational level of government in Thailand (Krueathep et al., 2010) found that the individual factor is one of the most significant factors inducing organisations to work together. Essentially, the leaders, both political and managerial, who have positive experiences of collaboration will typically have a positive attitude towards interagency working, increasing the probability of collaboration formation (Krueathep et al., 2010). In the study of collaboration in the UK Williams and Sullivan (2007) have conducted a literature review on collaboration across all policy areas to examine the
factors that influence successful collaboration. They too suggested that the individual factor is one of the key drivers for collaboration. Public managers seek to use partnership working in planning and providing services, as they personally believe that working with partners is the best way to achieve a positive outcome of public policy (Williams and Sullivan, 2007).

3.4.1.2 To improve policy delivery

It has been stated in a number of studies that the need to address wicked issues and cross-cutting issues is one of the impetuses for collaboration (Clarke and Stewart, 1997; O'Toole, 1997; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; the Audit Commission, 1998 Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Bogason and Musson, 2006; Krueathep et al., 2010). Scholars and practitioners demonstrate that public organisations have been inevitably facing the proliferation of problems that cannot be solved effectively through traditional bureaucratic management (Clarke and Stewart, 1997; O'Toole, 1997; the Audit Commission, 1998; McGuire, 2006). This is due to this management having a very strong top-down, command and control approach of management and relationships (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). Indeed, these problems are often recognised as ‘wicked issues’ or problems that cannot be solved by separating them up into simple pieces and cannot be tackled or easily tackled by single organisations working independently (Rittel and Webber, 1973; O'Toole, 1997). This wicked problem can only be addressed by bringing together the necessary resources and the actions of stakeholders (Stewart, 1995).

The problems that require collective action from various actors at different levels of management, including international, national, local, and individual, to address them in order that that their long term vision, sustained improvement, and positive outcomes can be achieved are also known as ‘cross-cutting issues’ (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002).
Environmental sustainability, crime, health care, unemployment, waste disposal, infrastructure construction and maintenance, and disaster prevention are all examples of the cross-cutting issues.

The traditional bureaucratic model of organising seems unable to cope with these problems. Hence, organisations need to explore other appropriate ways of working. O'Toole (1997, p.46) asserts that ‘interagency coordinating committees’ is one of structural forms which can be established in response to such issues. McGuire (2006, p.36) confirmed that collaborative working can be used to deal with such wicked issues, because of its essential elements; including the “completely flat, self-organising network”, and “the presence of a lead organization, acting as system controller or facilitators”. To conclude, collaboration takes places as an effective mechanism to improve policy delivery and an essential mode of working for dealing with wicked problems. This is because it has the capacity to bring together stakeholders in a particular service and/or a particular issue to use existing resources more efficiently, by sharing or pooling necessary resources (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998) such as money, knowledge, potential staff, and technology, which allows them to achieve the delivery of improved public services to citizens (Clarke and Stewart, 1997; O'Toole, 1997; the Audit Commission, 1998; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Bogason and Musson, 2006; Krueathep et al., 2010).

3.4.1.3 To improve coordination between service providers

The need to decrease the duplication of local service providers resulting from the fragmentation of public bodies is one of the drivers of collaboration (the Audit Commission, 1998; Williams and Sullivan, 2007). Williams and Sullivan (2007) illustrate the issue of duplication and fragmentation of service providers as follows:
“In the UK, the need for co-ordination in government stem in part from the fragmentation of public services and the creation of multiple agencies with unclear and differing forms of accountability; … as a result of decentralisation and devolution which make problems of co-ordination and policy coherence between different tiers of governance highly problematic” (Williams and Sullivan, 2007, p.10).

In England the phenomenon of fragmentation of government agencies arises from the decentralisation and devolution of power and authority from the central government. The English public sector has realised that the effective implementation of public policy and the effective delivery of better services to citizens cannot be achieved by either centralised power or working alone. Moreover, a number of new organisations have been established to manage and provide efficient services to the people (the Audit Commission, 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). Inevitably this also resulted in the fragmentation of public service providers and organisational responsibilities in a particular policy area, leading to overlapping jurisdictional responsibilities between public organisations. This may lead to conflicts between the interdependent providers in shaping and delivering a particular service (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Williams and Sullivan, 2007). To deal with such issues collaborative arrangements across organisational boundaries have been proactively stimulated by national governments since 1997, in order to bring interdependent agencies together to achieve the best use of resources and best policy outcomes (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Williams and Sullivan, 2007).

Such phenomenon can also be seen in the Thai local government context where there is a two-tier local government system. Indeed, there are two tiers of local governments operating within the same area, and the jurisdictional responsibilities of these two tiers of local governments seem to overlap in some tasks, such as providing social welfare services and constructing infrastructure. Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO) is the upper tier which is responsible for providing local services at a provincial level – the
overall area of the provincial territory. However, within the provincial territory there are Municipalities and Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAOs), lower-tiers local governments that provide local services in their specific territory (Krueatthep, 2004). Hence, collaboration among several providers in a particular service is much needed.

Collaborative arrangements across organisations, for instance a shared waste collection service between upper tier and lower tier local governments operating in the same provincial territory, has been implemented as a preferred way to eliminate the issue of overlapping and duplication of functions (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Williams and Sullivan, 2007). By working together, the principle for public services is changed from ‘functionally-defined services’ to ‘outcome-defined issues’ (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 33), which is designed to integrate relevant agencies in a particular policy area to jointly shape policy and to pool or share needed resources for achieving their common tasks and goals of a particular policy area. This eventually delivers better benefits of public services to citizens, ensuring citizens’ tax is efficiently used and improved services are delivered to citizens (Alter and Hage, 1993; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003).

3.4.1.4 To improve efficiency

A number of scholars stated that the need to deal with resources scarcity is one of the key drivers for collaboration (Aiken and Hage, 1968; Wiess, 1987; Oliver, 1990; O’Toole, 1997; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). Interagency working in the public sector happens since it allows resources such as information, finance, expertise, technology, innovation, and other essential resources to be shared between partnering organisations, which help them efficiently and effectively provide public services (Kickert et al., 1997; McGuire, 2002; Williams and Sullivan, 2007;
By joined-up working essential resources for providing a particular service can be shared between partners (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). This enables local governments to address the issue of resources scarcity, to improve efficiency, and to achieve the better outcomes of public policies (Deloitte, 2010).

In the UK resource scarcity has been a key driver for collaboration in the public sector (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Deloitte, 2010). Due to the increase of budgetary and public resource constraints since the mid-1970s local authorities have been stimulated by central governments to develop various forms of collaborative arrangement, to provide greater value of services to citizens at lower costs (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Bovaird and Loffler, 2009). Accordingly, local authorities have sought to enter into collaboration as it offers opportunities to make better use of existing resources.

### 3.4.2 Exchange theory and resource dependency theory

The four factors promoting collaboration mentioned above all assume that a local authority has autonomy to decide whether or not to enter into collaboration, suggesting collaboration is voluntary. However, it is important to recognise that local authorities are not hermetically sealed organisations. They need flows of resources from their environment in order to survive. There are two theories that explain this phenomenon. The first, exchange theory, assumes that organisations have equal resource supplies. Resource dependency theory explores situations where resources are distributed unequally.

**Exchange theory**
Exchange theory, developed by Levine and White (1962), describes that collaboration will occur when service providers of a particular public service provision in a fragmented system voluntarily seek to form interagency relationships. This is done in order to address the scarcity of necessary resources, so that their shared goals as well as the positive outcomes of the system can be achieved. Levine and White (1962) demonstrated the phenomenon of a highly fragmented arrangement of health and social care service providers, which motivated agencies in the system to voluntarily work together. Service providers faced the issue of resource scarcity as "hospitals were reliant on primary care providers for referrals of service users. And these primary care bodies needed to refer on because they did not have resources to treat such individuals" (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p.37). The voluntary transfer of resources between hospital and primary care providers were established so that each agency can access the needed resources controlled by each other to accomplish their tasks.

Exchange theory assumes that collaboration will form when individual organisations realise two key aspects (Skelcher and Sullivan, 2008). First, they hold shared objectives and/or have mutual benefits in a particular system. Second, the necessary resources for the fulfilment of an individual organisations' task and the shared goals are controlled by other agencies in the system, where few agencies are able to access sufficient resources to complete their objectives. Resource scarcity therefore motivates individual organisations to voluntarily form exchange relations between the individual organisations that have equal resource supplies in the pursuit of the respective goals. Viewed this way, collaboration is presented by an optimistic view in that collaboration occurs because of a shared desire of partners to achieve positive outcomes and absolute gains for the whole system and/or mutual benefits rather than to gain sectional benefit (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). This enlightened shared-interest perspective of partners is a unique feature that underpins exchange theory. Skelcher and Sullivan (2008) asserted that since no one
agency dominates the distribution of resources, exchange theory can be perceived as a positive sum game of collaborative formation.

**Resource-dependency theory**

It has been asserted by a number of scholars that another important motivation for collaboration is resource dependency (Aiken and Hage, 1968; Wiess, 1987; O’Toole, 1997; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). Resource-dependency theory proposes that in a situation of resource scarcity, where resources are distributed unequally, organisations establish collaboration with others by attempting to control or influence each other’s activities, in order to access critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Individual gain is the top priority above all else (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002).

In contrast to the optimistic perspective of exchange theory, resource-dependency theory assumes that when an organisation is dependent on the external scarce resources for task fulfilment, each organisation may attempt to influence or control the domains and activities of others (Emerson, 1962; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). An organisation that controls more critical resources than others may use this power to maintain or enhance their position, by inducing dependent organisations to become a partner. On the other hand organisations lacking in-house resources and expertise may establish dependence on others in the network, in order to obtain critical scarce resources for fulfilling their individual task (Krueathep et al, 2010). Hence, Sullivan and Skelcher classified this theory into the pessimist view of collaboration because of its underlying assumption as follows:
“Resource dependencies create power differentials in the inter-organisational network. Consequently the motivation to interact is likely to be asymmetrical, with one or more organisations inducing or forcing others to interact” (Skelcher and Sullivan, 2008, p. 758)

Although the starting point for collaboration in exchange theory is similar to resource dependency theory, in that an individual organisation seeks to access the essential resources controlled by other organisations in order to fulfil its goal, their fundamental perspective is different. While exchange theory applies in “organisational systems that have a high normative regard for altruistic behaviour and a strong respect for others’ autonomy” (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p.38), resource dependency theory refers to the phenomenon that each organisation may challenge or influence other’s activities in order to secure its own position in the system (ibid.).

3.4.3 Discussion of the notion of motivations for collaboration

The study treated the two English cases as an exploratory set of cases from which to generate hypotheses for studying the Thai cases. Empirical data of the English cases were first gathered and analysed, to gain insight into the occurrence of cross-councils collaboration policy in real-life settings. This enabled the researcher to realise that the specific proposal for collaboration was elevated into the status of policy, in response to the specific set of endogenous and exogenous forces for collaborations at a particular time, and progressed in temporal sequence. In this regard, the notion of catalysts for collaboration might be useful for analysing the incentives and necessary conditions of why local authorities seek to collaborate with each other. For example, it may be argued that councils seek to enter into collaboration to address the resource scarcity and dependency. However, it lacks power to explain how and why those conditions receive serious consideration by key people in and around local authorities, which results in the creation
of cross-council collaboration policy at any point in time. Therefore, it is crucial to find other theories that do have a temporal dimension to be applied to the development of collaboration through longitudinal case studies. To solve this issue, this study opted to use the notion of *policy-making models* (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997; Takahashi and Smutny, 2002) since these models suggest that policy formation is a result of the interactions between key individuals and structural factors at any point in time, and can be changed from one time to another.

**3.4.4 The formation and the development of collaboration policy over time: Policy-Making Models**

**3.4.4.1 The agenda setting model**

Kingdon’s agenda setting model (1995) is an important contribution to understanding the formation of policy. He constructed his model to examine the process by which agendas (or policies) are formed in the areas of health and transportation within the US Federal Government, as he sought to answer “what makes people in and around government attend, at any given time, to some subjects and not to others?” (Kingdon, 1995, p.1)

There are some key terms used in Kingdon’s model that need to be clarified to prevent confusion when applying this model to empirical evidence. The term ‘policy proposals’ is used to refer to policy solutions that individuals are advocating and seeking to elevate to the status of policy, but might not have been established as policy (ibid., p. 143). A particular proposal that has been elevated to the status of government policy is called an ‘agenda’ (ibid., p.3). In the political science, public administration and general contexts,
the term ‘agendas’ of Kingdon are widely understood as ‘policy’, i.e. the intentions of politicians or a governmental department (Baker, 2007). However, Kingdon (1995) argues that ‘agendas’ constitute both the intentions of elected official or government, and the problems/subjects that are being discussed at any given time (ibid., p.3). Indeed, the model seeks to explain the way in which these agendas (or policies) are formed at any point in time and could be changed from one time to another. To apply this concept to the cases it is important to recognise that the term ‘agenda’ is the governmental policy, which is the result of a specific proposal that has been adopted.

**Three process streams and their coupling**

In the agenda setting model, Kingdon (1995) imported the garbage can model of Cohen et al. (1972) into the political context. The garbage can model suggests that in organisations which have three properties namely problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation, decisions are a result of the coupling of four relatively independent streams (garbage): problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities (Cohen et al., 1972). In Kingdon’s model, he proposed that the formation of agendas (or policies) is an outcome of the convergence of three streams flowing through the federal government: a problem stream, a policy stream, and a political stream. *The problem stream* refers to situations that become defined as problems since they rise to occupy the attention of key people in and around government, in the way that such issues need to be dealt with. *The policy stream* consists of various proposals or alternatives which have been developed by various groups in a policy community of specialists, such as bureaucrats and academics, in an attempt to solve the problems set out by the problem stream. *The political stream* is comprised of factors such as national mood, the results of election, a change of public opinions, a change of administration, and actions of the media. Kingdon (1995) accepted
the argument of Cohen et al. (1972) that these three process streams are developed and operated largely separately of one another. However, these “streams are not absolutely independent” which means that one stream might be affected by one another or connected to one another to some degree (Kingdon, 1995, p.88).

Occasionally ‘policy windows’ open, and stay open for only a short time (ibid., p. 166). The policy window is an opportunity for ‘policy entrepreneurs’ – individuals or groups in and around government who are advocating and are seeking to push their pet proposals to become government policy – to couple their proposals to problems. This rare opportunity occurs when the separate streams align together at specific times, which refers to the phenomenon that “a problem is recognised, a solution is developed and available in the policy community, a political change makes it the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are not severe” (Kingdon, 1995, p.165).

Typically, a policy window opens due to either changes in the political stream, such as a change of government and a shift of public opinions, or a problem is seriously recognised by governmental officials (ibid, p.168). As the window does not stay open long, in order to be able to couple their pet proposals to problems policy entrepreneurs must be prepared, be able to realise the convergence of the separate streams, and must be is the right place to take advantage of this opportunity. Therefore, Kingdon (1995) indicated that policy entrepreneurs who are more likely to successfully advance an agenda are the ones who hold a central position in policy networks. Furthermore, to be able to exploit such an opportunity to push their pet proposal to the status of policy, policy entrepreneurs must invest their resources such as skills, time, and money to act as an advocate to gain support amongst participants such as lobby groups and politicians for their proposals long before the policy window actually opens.
3.4.4.2 Discussion of Kingdon’s agenda setting model

Although Kingdon’s (1995) model provides valuable insight into how and why policies are formed at one point in time, and can be changed from one time to another, there have been some debates concerning the limitations of the model that should be considered. The model might have limited power for explaining the inter-local government collaboration in this study.

It has been asserted that this model closely ties to the US political context; problematic when the model is adapted to study the agenda setting within organisations located in a different political context (Exworthy and Powell, 2004; Baker, 2007). However, the notions of this model are still useful for this study since it explores local government collaboration located in a political system which appears to have the same environment – for example, stakeholders such as media, academics, bureaucrats, and politicians – as in the US.

Furthermore, since Kingdon’s model was developed to examine the policy formation at national level, it might have a limited power for explaining the policy formation at the organisational level, particularly at local council level. In this regard, Lober (1997) and Takahashi and Smutny (2002) have emphasised that organisational factors are important factors that must be given a high consideration in order to gain in-depth understanding of interagency relationship formation and development. However, there is no such organisational aspect in Kingdon’s model. Therefore, Lober (1997) refined Kingdon’s model and constructed a collaboration forming model by adding an organisational stream, so that it has a rigorous explanation for collaboration between organisations.
Additionally, Kingdon’s model lacks the capacity to explain the implementation of policy after it has been formed (Baker, 2007; Takahashi and Smutny, 2002). In this regard, Takahashi and Smutny (2002) have utilised the notion of process streams of policy creation (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997) to explore the creation of interagency working and the governance structure of (form of) joined-up working that resulted.

Finally, as Kingdon (1995) stated that proposals are developed by various groups in a specialist policy community in an attempt to solve the defined problem within the problem stream, it seems that those solutions are generated to address the defined problem. However, empirical evidence demonstrated that policy decision-making process in local governments is more clearly explained by the notion of the garbage can model (Cohen et al., 1972) in that proposals are generated by people in and around organisations whether or not they can address the defined problems. Indeed, the garbage can model argues that in real-life contexts the decision making process is an arena where “solutions looking for issues to which they might be an answer” (Cohen et al., 1972, p.2). Furthermore, those streams do not easily come together and perfectly align to create a policy window, but the factors under each stream, such as defined problems and pre-existing solutions, are dumped into an organisation to be selected for use in the decision making process. Essentially, collaborative windows are not a result of fortunate circumstances where the streams align with each other. Rather, they can be created by the actions of collaborative entrepreneurs who manipulate streams by pushing their pet solutions they wish to see implemented to become policy.

In conclusion, Kingdon’s model is still useful for this study as it concerns a dynamic process of policy formation within a political context. To deal with these limitations of the model, it can be complemented by the notion of garbage can model (Cohen et al., 1972), Lober’s (1997) collaboration forming model, and the way in which it was utilised by
Takahashi and Smutny (2002), to help create an analytical framework. This would have a rigorous explanation for collaboration formation and implementation between local governments through longitudinal case studies.

3.4.4.3 The collaboration forming model

Lober (1997) modified Kingdon’s (1995) agenda setting model and developed a ‘collaboration forming model’, suitable for explaining the process by which collaborative relationships are formulated at an organisational level. The model suggests, by readjusting Kingdon’s three process streams, that there are four relatively independent streams – problem, policy, organisational and social/ political/ economic – flowing through organisations. The policy stream refers to solutions. The problem stream refers to the problem facing an organisation. The Kingdon’s political stream was altered to be social/ political/ economic stream which refers to public opinions and public demands. Finally, an ‘organisational stream’ was added as the fourth stream to refer to such factors as the willingness of an organisation to include environmental conditions in decision making and the capacity of organisation to collaborate (Lober, 1997, p.8). This stream contributes understanding to the formation of interagency relationships between local authorities. This is because a local government is regarded as an organisation where organisational factors have a great influence on the possibilities of cross-council collaboration policy formation.

Once four streams converge it results in a ‘collaborative window’ opening, which provides an opportunity for ‘collaborative entrepreneurs’ (Lober, 1997, p.8), key individuals or groups, to couple solutions to problems, such as forming interagency collaborative relationships.
Many studies focus particularly on explaining why collaborative relationships between organisations initiate (Lober, 1997; Baker, 2007; Krueathep et al., 2010). However, Takahashi and Smutny (2002) employed Lober’s collaboration forming model to examine the formation of social service partnerships together with the governance structure initially developed. Essentially, Takahashi and Smutny (2002, p.165) have argued that “because collaborations form in response to particular collaborative windows, the initial governance structures developed will correspond to the conditions characterising the window”. This argument has an important implication for exploring the type of collaboration as it is suggested that the specific type of collaboration is developed to fit the specific features of collaborative windows and participants.

### 3.5 Part 1 of the integrated conceptual framework: understanding why and how collaboration between local governments happens

This study examines the occurrence of collaborative working between small councils together with its implementation. As the main focus is the initiation of collaboration policy this study opted to use the notions of process streams of policy creation (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997; Takahashi and Smutny; 2002). This is complemented by the concept of drivers of collaboration to create the first part of a conceptual framework for investigating the process by which cross-council working relationship emerges and develops over time (Figure 5). This part of the framework will be combined with the other two concepts: the typology of interagency relationship to explain the implementation of collaboration which closely corresponds to its formation, and the notions of factors influencing the sustainability of collaboration which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Figure 5: The first section of the integrated conceptual framework, applying policy-making models to analyse how and why cross-council collaboration happens

3.5.1 Operationalising the concepts under policy-making models

For the purpose of this study examining the formation of cross-council collaborations, this section operationalises the concepts used in the policy-making models as they apply to local government. This first part of the framework suggests that joined-up working policy is a result of the interactions between key actors, i.e. collaborative entrepreneurs, and key factors, exogenous and endogenous forces, under each stream at any point in time and can be changed from one time to another.

In order that collaboration might arise, there needs to be specific factors/key conditions under each process stream present to create potentials for collaboration. The conditions for collaboration can be categorised into two groups: necessary conditions and supporting
conditions. The necessary conditions are the factors under the key three of four process streams – problem, policy, and political. The supporting conditions are the driving forces under the organisational stream. This framework argues after Lober (1997) that changes in the problem, political, and organisational streams can help create or inhibit the potential for the opening of a collaborative window.

The framework also suggests that the formation of collaborative relationships requires the opening of ‘collaborative windows’ (Lober, 1997), i.e., the opportunities for forming collaboration, which is a result of the convergence of the four relatively independent streams. In order that the window can be opened, it requires the actions of collaborative entrepreneurs to play vital role in realising the presence of those driving forces for collaboration and adjusting all streams together to elevate their pet solution to become policy. All these concepts are operationalised as follows.

### 3.5.1.1 The necessary conditions for collaboration

The framework argues that collaboration might arise when key elements within three of four streams – problem, policy, and political – are present to create the conditions for collaboration.

**The problem stream** refers to the problems that come to raise the concerns of important people (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997) in and around local authorities. In this study, problems that capture the attention of political and managerial leaders of councils and professionals of relevant public bodies, and make councils decide to enter into joined-up working, could be resource scarcity or resource dependency as discussed in the model of driving forces for collaboration.
The policy stream refers to proposals for collaboration. This part of the conceptual framework argues that the decision making process on collaboration policy can be a linear process, that is to say solutions/proposals are generated by people inside councils as a direct response to the defined problem. In this regard collaboration policy is locally-driven. On the other hand proposals can be invented by interest groups, both inside and outside councils, whether or not they respond to the defined problem. The latter circumstance can be explained by Garbage can model (Cohen et al., 1972) which argues that decision making process within organisations in real-life settings is the phenomenon that solutions are developed separate from the defined problems and “solutions looking for issues to which they might be an answer” (ibid, p.2). Then problems and solutions are dumped together in the garbage can waiting to be selected. Viewed this way collaboration policy can be centrally driven; the proposal that has been evaluated to the status of policy is created by central government. This also leads to the argument of the next part of the conceptual framework that collaborative windows are not a result of fortunate circumstances where the streams align with each other. Rather, they can be created by the actions of collaborative entrepreneurs (Zahariadis, 1999; Baker, 2007).

The political stream is comprised of factors such as ‘the national mood’ (Kingdon, 1995, p.87), the results of election, a change of administration, and the changes in public opinion and public behaviour, which can be perceived as the common perceptions or demands of constituents in local areas. It follows Baker’s (2007) argument that this stream could refer to political beliefs and attitudes of different local political groups.
3.5.1.2 The supporting factors for collaboration

The organisational stream is consists of aspects such as the willingness of organisations to include environmental influence in organisational policy decision making, and to engage in inter-organisational working, as well as changes and trends in industry (Lober, 1997). This study also argues, following Baker (2007), that the organisational stream should be expanded by including specific organisational factors. These may have a significant impact on the creation of collaboration, such as the capacity of an organisation to collaborate and the attitudes and competency of both political and executive leaders.

3.5.1.3 The opening of collaborative window

The framework argues that for collaboration to emerge it requires the opening of a collaborative window, resulting from the convergence of the four relatively independent streams, as well as requiring the collaborative entrepreneurs to play a vital role in creating interagency working policy (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997; Takahashi and Smutny, 2002). To explain the opening of the collaborative window, the opportunity for collaborative entrepreneurs to couple proposal to problem, this framework adopted the notion of the garbage can model (Cohen et al., 1972) in that that those streams do not easily and perfectly align to create a collaborative window as a fortunate circumstance. Rather, a collaborative window is created by the action of collaborative entrepreneurs, i.e. local leaders and senior officers, who realise the existence of potential factors under each stream, then adjust and align them to elevate their pet collaboration proposal to the status of councils’ policy.
3.5.1.4 Collaborative entrepreneur

The collaborative entrepreneur is a critical catalyst for the initiation of cross-council collaboration. The framework follows Lober’s (1997, p.19) argument that “without this collaborative entrepreneur, it seems unlikely that the collaboration would have formed”. To elevate the pet proposal they wish to see implemented to the status of policy, they play these particular roles in the process of collaboration policy formation (Lober, 1997; Takahashi and Smutny, 2002):

- Realise the presence of conditions for collaboration;
- Invest their resources such as skills, money, and time to select appropriate partnering councils and bring them together to participate;
- Exercise their appropriate competencies – skill, knowledge, attributes – to initiate cross-council collaboration initiatives;
- Lobby potential partners and generate trust between partners to initiate a collaborative relationship before the collaborative window closes.

The framework also follows Kingdon’s (1995) argument that policy entrepreneurs, as he terms them, who are able to advance their proposals to become policy are the persons who have a central position in policy networks. Viewed this way, collaborative entrepreneurs might be local leaders or senior officers of councils.

However, because Kingdon does not consider questions of implementation, it is important to distinguish collaborative entrepreneurs from collaborative managers as this study is considering both the initiation and the implementation of collaboration. This framework argues that while the roles of collaborative entrepreneurs are initiating cross-council
collaboration policy, the roles of **collaborative managers** are sustaining collaboration. Essentially, they play different boundary spanning’s roles at the different stage of collaboration (see figure 6).

**Figure 6: The different roles of collaborative entrepreneur and collaborative managers in collaboration**

In order that collaboration can be initiated, it requires individuals to play **collaborative entrepreneurs’** roles to bring together putative partners and couple solutions to the problem to initiate interagency relationship (Lober, 1997; Takahashi and Smutny, 2002). However, in order to maintain cross-council collaboration after initiation, it requires individuals to play **collaborative managers’** roles to implement, facilitate, and sustain interagency relationships (Takahashi and Smutny, 2002). This framework argues that local authorities wishing to have sustainable collaboration require both roles.
There are particular competencies that enable collaborative entrepreneurs to play a vital role in initiating cross-council collaboration. Competent collaborative entrepreneurs have excellent communicating, networking, negotiating, and empathizing skills. In terms of attributes, the collaborative entrepreneur typically understand the big picture and the nature of common problems facing partners, as well as understand the different background and the limitation of each partner (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Williams, 2002; McGuire, 2006). These competencies enable them to persuade people from different organisations facing common issues or having shared concerns or objectives to work together and to create common understanding and sense of common goals between putative partners (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Williams, 2002).

Although the collaborative entrepreneurs may be successful in bringing together partnering councils in response to specific sets of factors charactering collaborative windows, they do not necessarily have competencies to facilitate and sustain collaboration after it has been formed as a policy. To maintain and drive forward cross-council working relationships collaborative managers play boundary spanning roles including facilitator, negotiator, and, sometimes, leader. There are particular skills and attributes that make up the competent collaborative managers. They have leadership, conflict resolution, negotiation, and communication skills. They understand the different background of partners such as the different organisational cultures and resources each organisation has. Due to having these competencies, collaborative managers are able to do activities which are essential to secure long-term commitment of partners as follows (Huxham, 1996; McGuire, 2002, 2006; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Williams, 2002):
- Assist partners to identify their roles and contributions to networks
- Assist partners to establish agreement on collaboration and governance structure of collaboration
- Assist partners to develop collaborative culture for interagency working
- Sustain commitment and participation of partners.

The importance of collaborative managers as a key catalyst for sustainable collaborations will be discussed in the model of factors affecting sustainable collaboration in the next chapter.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the definition and nature of collaboration. As this study explores the journey of collaboration between small councils, the term ‘collaboration’ is used to refer to any form of joined-up working between small local governments in the same tier. The chapter then examined theories and concepts that are relevant to the occurrence of collaboration, to construct an analytical framework for addressing the first of three research questions – how and why collaboration policy in small local governments happens. The notion of the impetus for collaboration is useful for investigating specific motivations of organisations when they seek to enter into interagency working. However, it lacks capacity to analyse the development of collaboration policy through longitudinal case studies.

To create the first part of a conceptual framework for analysing the rationale for entering into joined-up working, and the process by which cross-council collaboration policy is formulated and developed over time, this study opted to use the notions of process
streams of policy creation (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997; Takahashi and Smutny; 2002) complemented by the concept of drivers of collaboration. This part of the integrating conceptual framework argues that collaboration policy in small local councils is a result of the interactions between key individuals, collaborative entrepreneurs, and driving forces, exogenous and endogenous, under each stream at any point in time and can be changed from one time to another.

This study also seeks to explain the type of collaboration used as a result, and why such specific type has been selected, as well as what factors affect the operation of collaboration. Hence, the literature relevant to such issues will be examined and discussed in the next chapter, to construct the second part of the conceptual framework used to analyse the actual implementation of collaboration policy.
CHAPTER 4
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COLLABORATION:
PART 2 AND 3 OF THE INTEGRATED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated the way in which the first part of the integrated conceptual framework was constructed to analyse how and why collaboration is initiated. This chapter examines literature to address the last two of three research questions concerning the implementation of collaboration policy. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first discusses the lack of definition of the concept of ‘collaboration’ in the literature. The second provides a way of defining the concept of collaboration that is appropriate for this research. It explores and discusses theories relevant to the typology of collaboration to construct an analytical model to address the question ‘what types of collaboration have been implemented and why?’ Consequently, collaboration can be defined as six types of inter-agency relationship on a continuum. The third section addresses ‘what factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaboration?’ Finally the fourth section demonstrates the whole picture of the integrating framework which is built on the combination of the policy forming models (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997), the typology of interagency relationship (Houge, 1993; Bailey and Koney, 2000; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Mandell and Steelman, 2003), and the notions of factors influencing sustainable collaboration.
4.1 The lack of a uniform definition of collaboration

Despite the widespread use of the concept of collaboration in the literature, as exemplified in the previous chapter, the concept itself is often not defined, or when it is, is not in a uniform way. The issue is that there is no unified accepted meaning among scholars for the terms that are usually employed to define types of interagency working such as collaboration and partnership. This is one of the enduring research issues in the topic of cross-organisational relationships in public administration and public services (Williams and Sullivan, 2007).

On one hand the term ‘collaboration’ is often used to signify any type of joined-up working, meaning collaboration can be interpreted by practitioners in multiple ways (Huxham, 1996; Gajda, 2004). This makes it difficult for “those seeking to collaborate to put into practice or evaluate with certainty” (Gajda, 2004, p.66). On the other hand, “collaboration is known by many names” (Gajda, 2004, p.68). The terminology employed to define collaboration is substantial. Scholars and practitioners have used various terms to denote forms of inter-agency relationship, such as partnership, collaboration, co-operation, network, co-ordination, alliance, joint working, coalition, and joint venture (Huxham, 1996; Mandell and Steelman, 2003; Gajda, 2004; Williams and Sullivan, 2007). Such terms are usually employed interchangeably, but refer to different phenomenon to different people (Williams and Sullivan, 2007). For instance, Mandell and Steelman (2003) use the term ‘inter-organisational innovations’ to signify the diverse forms of inter-organisational arrangements that can be employed to bring public, private and non-profit organisations to work together on problems of shared concern. The term ‘partnership’ was used by the Labour Government during 1997-2010. It referred to the phenomenon that autonomous organisations agree to collaborate with each other by creating a new working process or
organisational structure, sharing relevant resources such as staff and information to achieve common goals (the Audit Commission, 1998; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004; Williams and Sullivan, 2007).

According to Mandell and Steelman (2003, p.199) “the inability to make clear, conceptual distinctions among these arrangements” appear to be an enduring problem for scholars studying the field of interagency relationship. Along with this argument Thomson et al. (2007, p. 23) have stated that since there is no consensus among academics on the definition of collaboration, it makes it difficult for researchers “to compare findings across studies and to know whether what is measured is really collaboration”. Moreover, it makes it difficult for practitioners to bring this concept into practice (Mandell and Steelman, 2003; Gajda, 2004; Williams and Sullivan, 2007). In this regard Williams and Sullivan (2007) have confirmed that there is evidence that the different interpretations of the concept and objective of collaboration are the key issue that many partnerships encounter in practice.

In an attempt to develop the operational definition of the term collaboration being used in this research, it was found that definitions provided by some key scholars helped in forming a clear idea about collaboration between local governments. Challis et al. (1988, p. 27) define collaboration as “a process of interaction in which two or more parties identify mutual interests and freely agree to work together towards a common goal”. Barrack (1998, p.8) conceives collaboration as “any joint activity by two or more agencies that is intended to increase public values by their working together rather than separately”. The focus on a shared concern and a common goal that bring organisations to cooperate is consistent with the meanings of interagency working provided in existing literature mentioned above, where organisations work together to address problems of shared concern (Mandell and Steelman, 2003) and to achieve shared goals (the Audit Commission, 1998; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004; Williams and Sullivan, 2007).
Along with these definitions, Agranoff and McGuire (2003, p. 4) explain collaborative management as “a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations”. From these definitions there are two key common themes which can be conceptualised as key features of collaboration. Primarily collaboration is any form of joint working between two or more organisations to achieve shared benefits and/or common goals. Secondly, organisations cooperate with each other since it enables them to accomplish individual tasks that cannot be accomplished by working independently. However, it is still perceived that collaboration is a slippery and essentially contested concept as it has been used to refer to any form of interagency relationship. Therefore, the following section will develop the operational definition of the term collaboration for applying to joint working between small local governments.

4.2 Types of collaboration

Analysing the typology and function of interagency relationship is useful for policy makers and practitioners that seek to enter into collaboration. This is because it would help them to adopt an appropriate response to specific conditions and problems they encounter, consistent with the aim of this study.

This study opted to use an organisational perspective to define and analyse the forms of collaboration as its notions are useful for analysing the types of collaboration that have been implemented and changed through time in the longitudinal cases studies. This is because literature in organisational perspectives suggests that there are various types of collaboration along a continuum, and a more integrated institutional relationship is usually preceded by a loose institutional relationship (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002).
Given that there is a lack of a uniform definition of the concept of collaboration any attempt to construct an analytical model that has explanatory power to analyse the specific forms of local government collaboration implemented in England and Thailand requires the examination of key literature relevant to the forms of interagency relationship. This research examines the existing studies built on an organisational perspective conceptualising collaboration as various types of interagency relationship on a continuum namely Hogue (1993), Bailey and Koney (2000), Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), and Mandell and Steelman (2003). As the models and concepts of typology of inter-organisational relationship provided by these scholars were synthesised (figure 7), it enabled the researcher to realise that various forms of collaboration can be conceptualised as six categories on the continuum, which helps inform the construction of the second part of the conceptual framework of this study.
Figure 7: The comparison of models of the types of collaboration (Source: the researcher)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/Source</th>
<th>Model Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sullivan and Skelcher (2002)</td>
<td>Forms of collaboration and rules of governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandell and Steelman (2003)</td>
<td>Interorganisational Innovations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Synthesised by the researcher| • Verbal agreement to share information and certain resources to support each other's activities  
  • Organisations maintain their own autonomy  
  • Loose relationship  
  • Limited agreement to share resources  
  • Ad hoc activities to address specific common issues  
  • Semi-formal relationships  
  • Maintain separate identities  
  • Align activities and share resources to accomplish compatible goals  
  • A letter of agreement formally define the commitment and relationships  
  • Formal agreement to pool resources to accomplish common specific goals  
  • Extensive and long-term commitment on relationships and resources sharing with formal written agreements  
  • Formal agreements to devolve some degree of autonomy to achieve common goals  
  • Larger proportion of resources are given from partners  
  • Long-term and formal relationships  
  • Gear to form a separate entity to carry out common tasks  
  • Merger of organisations into single unit |

### A continuum of interagency relationships

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1. Intermittent coordination</td>
<td>2. Temporary task force</td>
<td>3. Permanent and/or regular coordination</td>
<td>4. A coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Networking</td>
<td>2. Cooperation or Alliance</td>
<td>3. Coordination or Partnership</td>
<td>4. Coalition</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** the researcher
Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) developed the model of *forms of collaboration and rules of governance*. The model envisages forms of collaboration along the continuum, ranging from informal and lower-level interactions through to moderate and to more formalised and highly structured relationships which may finally lead to the merger of organisations into a single organisation. The terminologies of the organisational and public policy literatures have been used to define those various forms of interagency relationships, where each form is explained by rules of governance. ‘A network’ refers to an informal relationship, that is, a linkage between organisations which is typically grounded in person-to-person relationships, whereas the term ‘partnership’ refers to collaboration that requires joint decision-making. Partnership differs distinctively from a network in that it requires a long-term commitment from autonomous organisations to work together to achieve common goals by sharing decision making, responsibilities and resources, governed by a formal written agreement.

Chapman et al. (2010) applied Sullivan and Skelcher’s (2002) model to examine forms of governance of public organisation collaboration, specifically schools. The study found that the model was useful as the relationships fell into partnership, federation, and integration. However, those terms were problematic as the initiative defined themselves as federations. Therefore, they conceptualised the relationships along a continuum ranging from soft to hard federations.

Sullivan and Skelcher’s (2002) model is useful as a basic concept for exploring forms of collaboration in local governments, as it focuses on the collaboration in public services and provides the range of potential collaborative arrangements covering the lowest to highest level of relationships. However, their conception of each form is broad. Although the specific characteristics of each are defined, the meanings of each are insufficiently provided. For instance, partnership is explained as “various degrees of formalisation
which are less than complete integration” (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p.42). Therefore, to help develop a clear idea of each form, this model needs to be complemented by the following literature. This will then allow the model of typology of collaboration that has power to analyse the practice of collaboration in small local governments in the case studies to be developed.

Bailey and Koney (2000) have proposed Strategic Alliance Processes and Models, suggesting four levels of organisational integration on the continuum. The clarification of terms ‘cooperation’, ‘coordination’, ‘collaboration’, and ‘coadunation’ provided by Bailey and Koney (2000) is helpful for the researcher to better understand the exact sense of each form of relationship which could be applied to local government in this study. Also, it may help practitioners choose the appropriate form of collaboration in response to a given situation. Cooperation is the lowest-level of a relationship. When organisations cooperate with each other their autonomy still remains, meaning their independent decision-making authority is retained. In this form information and certain resources are shared to support each other’s programmes based on the informal agreements. Normally, there is no attempt to build an official administrative body, since the administrative leadership is informal. Usually the agency that has more power to get into targeted resources and information will be assigned the responsibility as a convening organisation, responsible for arranging regular meetings and coordinating other tasks among organisational members.

Through coordination independent organisations work in a partnership with partnering organisations in specific tasks. Their activities are aligned to better accomplish individual organisational goals. Typically a letter of agreement defining the commitment of member organisations will be signed by each member. This form of relationship can be governed through a formal or informal administration, but normally the alliance is governed by the documents which formally define the process of allocating resources. Since coordinative
arrangements are formed to accomplish specific tasks these arrangements are usually short-term.

In collaboration a common strategy for working together to achieve a shared goal is developed. A formal plan and procedure are made to provide a regular basis for joint working. There are formal written agreements, such as memoranda of understanding and contracts, which define the relationships among members. A larger proportion of resources are given from each member than through other less formal forms of working together. The structure of collaborative arrangement is more complex. Interactions among organisations are more frequent. Therefore, the scope of work and the system of governance are formally written in protocols. The duration of collaboration is usually long-term. Furthermore, it is often geared to forming a separate entity – ‘which may or may not be legally defined or separately incorporated’- to address their common issues and carry out their tasks (Bailey and Koney, 2000, p.101). This means participating organisations agree to devolve some of their autonomy to work together. For this reason, ‘specialised legal advice should be sought in establishing a collaborative alliance’ (ibid, p.102). Coadunation is the highest point of organisational integration where “member organizations unite within an integrated structure to the extent that one or all relinquish their autonomy in favor of a surviving organization” (ibid, p.7).

Rutledge (2011) applied Bailey and Koney’s (2000) Strategic Alliance to two cases that demonstrated inter-organizational collaboration. They argued that “when parties come to the table without a common framework for understanding collaboration, the void puts the collaborative endeavour at risk” (Rutledge, 2011, p.22). It demonstrated that the continuum was useful in helping members to understand the purposes of joint working by matching their purpose with the appropriate form on the continuum. This enabled members to understand their roles and the way in which to organise their work, which
helped alliances operate smoothly. Tsasis et al. (2013) developed a model of three forms of inter-organisational integration on a continuum built on Bailey and Koney’s model, to examine the interactions between agents in the context of the development of integrated care delivery. They found that interagency relationships characterised by a high degree of commitment and investment to achieve mutual goals – collaboration and co-ownership in their terms – are more likely to contribute to the self-organising capacity, which is vital to successful collaboration.

Along with Bailey and Koney’s model (2000), Mandell and Steelman (2003) have proposed a model called *Inter-organisational innovations*, providing the five types of inter-organisational arrangements on a continuum. The valuable knowledge of this model which can be adopted in understanding collaboration in local governments in practice is that “these five different types of interorganizational arrangements represent pure forms or theoretical archetypes” (ibid, p.204). This means in practice these arrangements can be overlapped or developed into another form over time, due to the change of participants, problems, and situations. In their model, types of inter-organisational relationship are classified by the functions that they serve. Five levels of inter-organisational arrangement range from occasional and limited cooperation to more formal, lasting, and interdependent collaborations. *Intermittent coordination* is the lowest level of relationship. This type happens when two or more agencies agree to work together to accomplish some purpose or mutual policies. Although members can cooperate on a wide range of activities, the levels of interaction between them are low, and the commitment to each other is held at arm’s length. Thus, there are small and low risks of resource sharing. Coordinating activities of various organisations to respond to disasters can be seen as an example of intermittent coordination.
The second type is **Temporary task force**; ad hoc activities among agencies established to operate on specific and limited objectives. When those objectives are accomplished, the task force will be disbanded. Information and expertise are the essential resources which are expected to be shared among organisations. Bringing the expertise to work together as a group, to address very specific issues which can range from environmental issues to social issues, leading to the discussion of potential solutions can be seen as an example of this arrangement. The third type is **Permanent and/or regular coordination**, which occurs when a number of organisations agree to engage in limited tasks to accomplish a specific goal through a formal arrangement. There are more formal requirements and extensive commitment to activities, interactions, and resource sharing including time, staff and facilities amongst others. Regional planning groups and any groups that comprise of a number of organisations which agree to coordinate to serve their mutual clients better can be examples of this arrangement.

**A coalition** is the fourth type concerning interdependent and strategic actions. A number of organisations commit to coordinate to deal with the specific issues which require long-term commitment and stable membership. Formal agreements are required to regulate the relationships. Essential amounts of resources are shared within the collaboration by the commitment of each member. Public-private partnership and memo of understandings between organisations to accomplish specific long-term objectives can be seen as examples of this type of inter-organisational arrangement.

The highest level of interagency relationship is **a network structure**. Although this type is developed on broad tasks and strategically interdependent activity, which may appear to be similar to a coalition, a very strong commitment from members to achieve goals are needed. Significant resources are extensively committed to share over a long period of time of collaboration. While coalitions will be disbanded when goals are achieved or
problems solved, network structures have an extended life because the issues they cope with are either long term or continually redefined. Activities of this type may include, but reach beyond, any other types of interagency working arrangements mentioned before. The various programmes of economic development and a number of efforts on community building are examples of this type.

In the study on the impact of participation in networks on the implementation of polices at local level, Krause (2012) utilised inter-organisational innovations by Mandell and Steelman (2003) to classify the case studies as networks. The model was effective as it suggested the types of collaboration that increase the strength of member commitment. Recently, in an attempt to develop a conceptual framework to help public managers examine inter-organisational management, McNamara (2012) utilised Mandell and Steelman's (2003) inter-organisational innovations to clarify the characteristics of each type of relationship - cooperation, coordination, and collaboration – on the continuum.

Another important model of typology of collaboration is *Community Linkages-Choice and Decisions* developed by Hogue (1993). The continuum of collaborative working have been published by the National Network for Collaboration, which is widely used as the Collaboration Framework for evaluating collaboration efforts in communities in a number of studies in the US (Cross et al., 2009). In this continuum, five levels of relationship - *networking, cooperation, coordination, coalition*, and *collaboration* - are slightly different in their purpose, structure of organisation and administration, and their process of communication and decision making. These linkages range from the simplest relationships to the most complex and lasting. In essence, networking is the lowest degree, where its purpose is communication among members. Collaboration is the
highest degree of joint working, where its purpose is to accomplish shared vision and build an independent entity to address common issues and carry out their activities.

Hogue’s model was employed by Borden and Perkins (2007) to investigate the roles and responsibilities of volunteers that can play various roles at different levels of community-based efforts. Cross et al. (2009) employed a mixed-method approach to evaluate the development of collaboration between public organisations and community agencies in a project-funded Initiative. In this study, Hogue’s community linkages matrix proved effective for evaluating the strength of inter-organisational relationships. It enabled participants and evaluators to understand the structural reasons for creating specific and appropriate forms of relationships, which is vital to effective collaboration. Recently, Woodland and Hutton (2012, p.379) modified Hogue’s model and developed an actionable framework “Levels of Organisational Integration Rubric” to evaluate levels of inter-organisational integration, a widely accepted mechanism for dealing with wicked social issues in the 21st century.

4.2.1 Discussion of the typology of collaboration

By analysing and synthesising those organisational approach models, this study found that there are key notions of organisational perspective that are useful for applying to the collaboration between local governments. Firstly, the types of collaboration fall across a continuum of low degree to high degree of organisational integration. Although scholars have used different labels to vary forms of interagency relationship in their individual work, they suggest that the types of collaboration can be conceptualised a continuum. At one end are the simplest and the most informal relationships which refer to loose institutional interactions and at the other formalised, highly structured, long-term relationships with needs highly commitment from partners to integrate key resources which eventually may
result in the amalgamation of partnering organisations into a single unit (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). **Secondly**, an organisational perspective argues that in real-life situations those forms of collaborative relationships can be overlapped or developed into another form over time due to a change of participants, problems and context (Mandell and Steelman, 2003).

**Thirdly**, many scholars have confirmed that more integrated and highly structured institutional collaborations between agencies are usually developed from lower-level institutional interagency relationships (Peterson, 1991; Himmelman, 1996; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). Indeed, an informal institutional collaborative working is a crucial fundamental element of a more formal institutional collaborative arrangement. In this regard Himmelman (1996) provides an optimistic argument by stating that collaboration, which is the optimal form of partnership working between agencies in his concept, cannot be achieved in all cases. However, once the objectives of working together are accomplished by using other forms of organisational interactions, it encourages stakeholders to strive to achieve collaboration. Moreover, it has been asserted in the study of the motivation to, and the challenges of, partnership working in British local authorities that the existing working relationships between partners appeared to be important to move from informal collaboration to further formal arrangements (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009).

Regarding the limitations of an organisational perspective, there are issues that need to be considered when adopting it to analyse the form of cross-council collaboration through longitudinal cases. None of the existing typologies provided above covers all six of those points. The models provided by Hogue (1993) and Mandell and Steelman (2003) cover only five points on the continuum, indeed, amalgamating organisations into one organisation is not included. In this regard, the model of Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) and
the work of Bailey and Koney (2000) are useful because they envisage different forms of
collaboration ranging from the simplest form to ultimately the most formalised relationship;
merged organisations into a single unit. However, Sullivan and Skelcher’s concept of
partnership is broad and may need to be sub-divided. To address this issue the
researcher integrated these models and developed a model of the six categories of
interagency relationship on a continuum, to be used as the second part of the conceptual
framework. This is because it has exploratory power to examine the governance
structures of (forms of) collaboration in local governments, which may have been
implemented in different ways in two different countries.

*The notions of typology of interagency relationship also* have limited power to explain
why the particular forms have been chosen to implement at any point in time. To address
this issue, this study opted to use the argument of Takahashi and Smutny (2002) to
complement the model of typology of collaboration. It is argued that “because
collaborations form in response to particular collaborative windows, the initial governance
structures developed will correspond to the conditions characterising the window” (ibid,
p.165)

**4.2.2 Part 2 of the integrated conceptual framework: understanding the types of collaboration used and why**

To analyse the forms of cross-council collaboration that have been used in the cases, this
second part of the framework – the typology of interagency relationship providing six
categories of collaboration on a continuum (figure 8) – was created. It was built on the
integration of the models and notions of the types of collaboration provided by the
scholars as previously discussed in section 4.2. Moreover, the model of a typology of
collaboration was complemented by the argument of Takahashi and Smutny (2002), as previously mentioned.

Figure 8: The typology of interagency relationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• A relationship not based on any written agreement to share information and certain resources</td>
<td>• Limited agreement to share resources</td>
<td>• A letter of agreement formally defines the commitment and relationships</td>
<td>• Formal written agreements defines intensive commitment and relationships</td>
<td>• Formal agreement to share key resources and devolve some degree of autonomy</td>
<td>• Merge organisations into a single unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aim to support each other’s activities</td>
<td>• Aim to accomplish the goal of individual organisations</td>
<td>• Shared resources and aligned activities</td>
<td>• Focuses on alignment of tasks</td>
<td>• Aim to achieve common goals</td>
<td>• One or all organisations relinquish their autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Each organisation maintains their autonomy</td>
<td>• Ad hoc activities to deal with a specific issue</td>
<td>• Aim to accomplish the purpose of individual organisation and common tasks/issues</td>
<td>• Pooled resources</td>
<td>• Larger proportion of resources are given from members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Loose relationship</td>
<td>• Semi-formal relationship</td>
<td>• Usually short-term relationship</td>
<td>• A medium-term to long-term commitment and stable membership</td>
<td>• Long-term and formal relationship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Short-term or long-term relationship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Geared to form a separate entity to carry out common tasks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This section is closely connected to the first section of the conceptual framework, as it suggests that the specific form of collaboration is chosen in response to a specific set of conditions under four process streams at a particular period. Essentially, the formation of collaboration policy and the type that results derive from the needs of councils to deal with specific conditions characterising collaborative windows. This model suggests that there are six institutional types of collaborative working ranging from the lowest level of institutional relationship (i.e. network) to the highest level of institutional relationship (i.e.

4 Created by the researcher by integrating models of the types of interagency relationship of Bailey and Koney (2000), Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), Mandell and Steelman (2003), and Houge (1993).
integration). Each type has specific key characteristics, which were operationalised to local governments for the purpose of this study as follows.

### 4.2.2.1 Network

Network is the lowest-level of cross-council relationship, often built on interpersonal relationships between leaders of organisations. Organisations seek to build networks to deal with scarcity of resources, such as information and technology (though typically not including money). A formal written agreement is not necessary. Rather, networks can be formed and operated by developing dialogue between staff at all levels of authorities, and making common understanding, verbal or informal agreements, that they merely need to share particular resources for supporting each organisation’s activities (Bailey and Koney, 2000; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). Organisations that form networks have no interest in influencing each other’s services operation and delivery (Bailey and Koney, 2000). Therefore, each organisation contributes resources, but still retains its own autonomy and independent decision making power. There is no change in organisational structure, or the operation and delivery of services within networking relationship. As this form of collaboration is a very loose integrated relationship, it results in little conflict between members.

### 4.2.2.2 Cooperation

Typically cooperation is formed as a result of the need to improve service delivery to citizens, for example to reduce the overlapping of public services’ delivery (Hogue, 1993). Its aim is to enable each organisational member to effectively achieve its individual goals. Regarding governance structure an informal agreement on sharing information and some
certain resources for supporting each organisation’s programmes and goals is made. In some cases, however, a formal agreement can be created to make a common understanding among partners on sharing resources and each partner’s role, in order to ensure that the specific task being cooperated is done by a partner (Hogue, 1993). A central unit which includes representative staff from each organisation may be formed to be a hub for members to formally communicate with each other and to jointly make decisions on issues such as who contributes what and who operates which activities. Hence, although each organisation retains its autonomy, some conflict can occur and a facilitative leader might be needed to operate cooperation more effectively.

4.2.2.3 Coordination

For coordination organisations work in partnership with each other in order to address a wicked issue or cross-cutting issue (Hogue, 1993) that can be addressed short term or needs to be addressed immediately. Its purpose is to deal with a specific common issue or achieve a common task by sharing resources and aligning activities. Coordination is governed by a letter of agreement that formally define the roles of members, the working process, and their commitment on sharing and implementing aligned tasks. Typically, a temporary task force is established to operate such specific purpose (Mandell and Steelman, 2003). Information and experts are the key resources that need to be shared as these resources allow the task force to accomplish the specific common task. Within task forces the decisions on potential solutions to their common issue, and the roles and activities that will be assigned for each organisation to operate, are made by group decision making. Therefore, this arrangement is more complex and leads to more conflicts than in networking and cooperation. Coordination is usually a short-term interagency relationship. When the common task is achieved, the task force will be abolished.
4.2.2.4 Coalition

In coalitions autonomous organisations work in partnership with compatible organisations around a particular service or a common task in order to effectively accomplish a shared goal (Bailey and Koney, 2000). A formal written agreement like a Memo of Understanding (MOU), written and signed by member organisations, is required to govern this interagency working. The formal agreement sets out a medium-term to long-term relationship and intensive commitment of partners to operate aligned activities and to pool more resources such as staff, facilities, and time (usually non-monetary) in order to achieve the specific common task or service. Essentially, aligning the tasks of autonomous members is vital. Also, all members formally participate in decision making.

4.2.2.5 Partnership

The aim of partnerships is to secure “the delivery of benefits that could not be delivered by a single organisation working alone” (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 6). In the local government context, better outcomes of public services are delivered to local communities by partnership working between a local authority and partners. The key feature of a partnership is that autonomous organisations commit to working together and making joint decisions to achieve individual objectives as well as shared goals (Hough, 1993). As such, a partnership is different to a network. While a network is formed and operated by an informal, short-term, relationship consisting of interagency working between organisations, a partnership is governed by more formal agreements. These instead set out longer-term relationships, necessary for the delivery of joint decision-making and shared resources.
Although this collaborative arrangement may seem to be similar to a coalition, it is differentiated from coalitions regarding its purpose and governance structure. The purpose of a partnership is to achieve a common goal or to address a common issue by organisations committing to highly connected working. The basic requirement of a partnership is a very strong commitment from partners to share or pool a larger proportion of key resources, especially money, than through other less formal institutional forms of collaborations, to achieve a shared goal or to address a common issue (Bailey and Koney, 2002, Warm, 2011). In many cases, it leads to a change in organisational structure (e.g. sharing a single chief executive and management team between two authorities), and the way of services operation and delivery of organisational members (e.g. joint services delivery between local authorities). While a coalition would be disbanded when a specific common task or a shared goal is achieved, a partnership is an enduring interagency working (Mandell and Steelman, 2003). This is because partnerships are designed for dealing with wicked issues/cross-cutting issues, that need to be addressed in a sustainable way (ex. social exclusion, environmental issues, unemployment), and for achieving a common goal (ex. long-term savings for each authority) that can be achieved in both the short and long term.

Moreover, it usually mobilises to form a separate unit, which may or may not be a legal entity, to carry out their common tasks (Bailey and Koney, 2000). Typically, when local authorities agree to work in partnership, they commit to devoting some degree of their autonomy and some of their essential resources for supporting shared goals (Raine and Watt, 2013). In such complex local collaborative arrangements, therefore, a formal, perhaps legal, agreement, such as memorandum of understanding and contracts that set out the shared goals, governance system, scope of work, and relationships among organisations is required. A formal plan and procedure that provide a basis for joint working need to be created and communicated among participating organisations. The
frequent and clear communication among members is vital. Significantly, “specialised legal advice should be sought in establishing a collaborative alliance” (Bailey and Koney, 2000, p.102).

4.2.2.6 Integration

Integration is the most complex, tightest and enduring interagency relationship. Integration in local authorities can be implemented into two ways. In the first local authorities are completely merged into a single authority (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002) where all authorities relinquish their autonomy. Typically, in such an approach, two small local authorities are combined to form a bigger authority in favour of economic value, to achieve economy of scale and significant savings. In the other way local authorities unite within an integrated structure ‘in favour of a surviving organisation’ (Bailey and Koney, 2000, p.7). In such an integrating approach, local authorities work very closely together to achieve a particular mutual goal. The integration of staffing structures and services between two councils, one workforce serving two sovereign councils and providing services to two areas, to achieve substantive and long-term savings in the circumstance of government spending cut, is an obvious example of such integrating approach.

In conclusion, this typology of interagency relationship has a power to address the research question as to the forms of collaboration implemented, as it provides the significant characteristics of, and governance structure of, each form for applying to local government collaboration. Moreover, as it is complemented by the arguments of Takahashi and Smutiny (2002), this model has power to explain that the specific form of collaboration is implemented in response to a particular set of forces under the four
process streams for collaboration at a particular time. The form of collaboration can change and develop over time as it fit a given circumstance.

4.3 Factors influencing the operation of collaboration

This study attempts to highlight the necessary ingredients for sustainable implementation of collaborative arrangements, to provide valuable lessons for councils interested in pursuing cross-council collaboration. The findings of this section of research may help local government managers understand how collaboration can be effectively applied in local government, by considering key elements crucial for sustainable collaboration. This section examines literature, both theoretical and empirical, relevant to factors prompting and inhibiting sustainable collaborations to construct the final part of the integrated conceptual framework of this study.

The concept of factors affecting the capacity to collaborate, provided by Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), seems to be useful as a fundamental concept to analyse data. This is because they argue that “the contribution of individuals to collaboration is insufficient if it is not facilitated by a wider commitment of agencies and groups to developing new ways of working and organising” (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 105). For individual factors they suggest that it requires a particular set of competency of individuals who work across boundaries to develop, facilitate, and sustain collaborative relationships. Another factor is leadership – individuals who are trusted by partners and have sufficient and particular capacity to motivate others to take collective action. Within organisational factors, they suggest that a new organisational culture supporting joint working, an adaptive and responsive culture, has to be developed. Moreover, inter-organisational trust is valuable to developing enduring collaborations.
Sullivan and Skelcher’s (2002) concept offers valuable insight into the sustainability of collaboration in that the actions of individuals are not enough to maintain interagency relationship. Rather new ways of working and organising facilitative of collaboration must be developed by a partnering organisation to complement the individual working across organisational boundaries. Although their concept covers significant sub-factors under both individual and organisational factors, it seems the meaning and concept of each sub-factor is broadly provided. For example, the competency and roles of individuals who work across boundary need to be sub-divided.

To address this, therefore, this study argues that their notions can be complemented by embracing the concepts of other studies focusing on factors affecting the success of collaborative public management (Webb, 1991; Williams, 2002; Sloper, 2004; McGuire, 2006; Klijn et al., 2010; Aulich et al., 2011; Kort and Klijn, 2013), in particular literature relevant to collaboration in local governments (the Audit Commission, 1998; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Williams and Sullivan, 2007; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009; Warm, 2011). This is helpful in gaining a richer understanding of each sub-factor to help investigate empirical evidence from local government collaboration cases. Moreover, examining the literature enabled the researcher to confirm the argument of Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) that there are two key components of collaborative capacity which are necessary for the sustainable collaboration: individual factors and organisational factors. This allowed an analytical framework to be constructed (Figure 9) which has exploratory power for the key components of collaborative capacity in local governments.

4.3.1 Part 3 of the integrated conceptual framework: understanding factors affecting sustainable collaboration
The analytical model argues that factors enabling collaborative operations to flourish can be categorised into two groups: individual factor and organisational factor (figure 9). For the purpose of the study – exploring the collaborative working journey of small local governments – the concept of each factor has been operationalised to apply to collaboration in local governments. In the use of thematic analysis in this study, then, this model will be used to construct a pre-defined template of codes to help explore key ingredients of effective collaboration, from the empirical evidence from the case studies.

**Figure 9 The conceptual model of factors influencing sustainable collaboration**

![Diagram showing individual and organisational factors influencing sustainable collaboration](image)

Source: developed by the researcher

### 4.3.1.1 Individual factors

#### Collaborative managers

Sustainable interagency working depends on individuals who work across agencies. Individuals who have specific competencies – the right skills and attributes - enable them to play a central role within an interagency working context. This boundary spanning role is the collaborative manager role (see chapter 3). They implement, facilitate, and sustain interagency working relationship after it has been formed. This model argues that without
collaborative managers, it seems unlikely that cross-council joint working would be sustainable. Collaborative managers can be individuals or groups who work across councils’ boundaries as a catalyst for the effective and long-lasting collaboration.

To help create a pre-defined template of codes to explore the roles of collaborative managers in the cases, this study adopted the notion of the competent boundary spanner provided by Williams (2002). It covers the important roles which are pivotal for effective and sustainable collaboration including building sustainable relationship; managing through influencing and negotiation; managing complexity and interdependencies; and managing roles, accountabilities and motivations.

Leadership

As collaboration means new ways of working across boundaries, it requires leaders, either political or managerial, to play collaborative leadership roles to inspire commitment and action, rather than command and influence (Warm, 2011). The commitment of leaders at the top of agencies is required for sustainable inter-local government collaboration (Warm, 2011). As collaborative arrangements refer to working across boundaries, which embrace various demands, values, and perspectives, leaders can rarely deploy traditional models of leadership that focus on the formal role of the leader who command and influence others to follow (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Williams and Sullivan, 2007; Warm, 2011). New forms of leadership are required.

This model also argues, based on Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), that having leaders trusted by partners and key stakeholders to play those roles is valuable for collaboration. This is because they can help motivate partners to take collective action and maintain
staff morale. Sustainable collaboration requires leaders with sufficient personal capacity to play a number of important roles, including to persuade and bring potential individuals and agencies together to remedy common and complex issues; convene and inspire commitment and action of partners; facilitate coordination among partners; solve conflict which may happen along the process of interagency working; and motivate and maintain the action and involvement of partners (Benson, 1975; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Williams and Sullivan, 2007).

4.3.1.2 Organisational factors

Focusing on specific skills, roles, and behaviours required by individuals is necessary for developing long-term cross-council joint working. However, it is insufficient if it is not supported by a wider commitment to support sustainable collaborations. This is because the organisational context, within which individuals operate, partly informs the capacity of individuals to act (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002).

Collaborative culture

Although the contributions of individuals to collaboration are valuable, it is insufficient for sustaining interagency working. Effective and sustainable collaboration requires new ways of working and organising. Partnering councils need to develop and promote collaborative cultures in their organisation, otherwise cross-council working can be less effective than it could be, or even disbanded. Collaborative culture, which is a shared understanding of and a commitment of members on the key issues including the imperative, the benefit and the value of collaboration; the common goals; and the roles and responsibilities of partners in collaborative working, is needed for effective collaboration (Sullivan and
Skelcher, 2002). Collaborative culture triggers the sense of ownership of collaborative endeavor among partners (Himmelman, 1996). Organisational culture facilitative of interagency working is adaptive and responsive (Newman, 1996). Organisations with these cultures tend to have strong strategic partnerships; effective mechanisms for linking with various agencies; and staffs at all levels that can work well across boundaries (Newman, 1996; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). To develop collaborative culture, the Department for Communities and Local Government (2009) suggests that helping each partnering organisation to have a clear understanding about the necessity of collaboration, the shared goal and the agreed ways to achieve it is required. This is because it helps maintain partner’s commitment and contributions to joint working.

**Inter-organisational trust**

Trust is a vital attribute of effective and sustainable collaboration (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Williams, 2002; McGuire, 2006; Williams and Sullivan, 2007). “Attitude of mistrust and suspicion are a primary barrier to co-operation between organizations and professional boundaries: collaborative behavior is hardly conceivable where trusting attitudes are absent” (Webb, 1991, p.237). Trust which pertains both to individuals helps in building the sense of common goals in the beginning stages of collaboration and maintaining the quality of interagency working over period (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). Therefore, lack of trust is one of the reasons why collaborations are less successful and even disbanded (Huxham and Vangen, 2000). Trust develops as partners have worked together over time. Indeed, it is built on the interaction between actors of partnering organisations. When trust is built it leads to the sense of ownership of the joint arrangements among partners which enhance the quality of interagency relationship. In the study on multi-organisational partnership in the UK, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998,
p.322) confirm that “the quality of relationships was linked to the level of trust between actors and the extent to which interaction was seen as leading to mutual benefit”. Similarly, it has been asserted by some scholars (Himmelman, 1996; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001) that although there are no official agreements, joint working can be occurred, sustained, and be deepened because of trust between partners. Furthermore, Skelcher et al. (1996) point out that trust is the vital element of informal institutional interagency relationships which underpin more formal institutional forms of collaborative working.

In the study on the impact of trust in achieving better performance in governance networks, and the complex interaction and decision making among various sectors, Klijn et al. (2010) found that trust increased the performance of networks, and that network management strategies matter for enhancing the level of trust. Kort and Klijn (2013) studied the relationship between democratic legitimacy, performance, and trust. The findings of this study resemble the earlier study by Klijn et al. (2010) as it showed that trust between the partners had a strong positive impact on the performance of governance networks.

Recently, Peter et al. (2015) studied the role of trust in integrated public health policy and the performance of networks. They found that the creation of trust helps improve the performance of the inter-sectoral policy networks in public health. However, they did not explore the role and specific characteristics of network managers and their leadership style, which they suggest would help in building trust between actors.

Regarding trust building, Cropper (1996) suggests that creating principled conduct, based on agreement of agencies, may help to build trust since the beliefs and values of various agencies can be shared. Such process can help build a shared understanding, as well as
promote a sense of belonging among partners. Moreover, it enables partners to understand the benefits of collaboration, and their roles and responsibilities in achieving shared goals (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). It has been confirmed by the empirical study in the motivation and challenges of the British local authority’s partnership working that trust which leads to effective partnership working derives from a clear perception among partners about the common goal and the agreed ways to achieve it (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009). On the other hand, Ferguson and Stoutland (1999) argue that trust is grounded in positive interactions between individuals in interagency working. The more interaction and better communication among partners lead to the greater trust (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004; McGuire, 2006).

To apply this model to local governmental collaboration, this framework argues that interagency relationship between councils can be formed, sustained, and progressed to a more formal, deeper collaboration, because of some degree of trust, grounded in interactions between individuals in interagency working.

4.4 The integrated conceptual framework of the study

The integrated conceptual framework of this study (figure 10) has been gradually and systematically developed for exploring the collaborative working journey of small local governments. It starts from examining literature relevant to the formation of collaboration policy, the key imperatives for collaboration and the process by which interagency working policy is created. It resulted in the construction of the first part of the analytical framework for addressing the first of three research questions – how and why collaboration between small local governments is initiated, which is built on the stream models of policy-making process (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997; Takahashi and Smutny,
complemented by the notion of driving forces for collaboration and the notion of garbage can model (Cohen et al., 1972). It argues that there needs to be key conditions under each process stream present to create the potential for collaboration. In order that joint working can become a policy of small local governments, it requires a particular boundary spanning role - **collaborative entrepreneurs**, i.e. local leaders and senior officers who play a central role in policy-making process, to realise the existence of those driving forces for collaboration and adjust and align them to elevate their pet proposal to the status of councils’ policy (see chapter 3).

Then, this chapter examined literature providing an account of the implementation of collaboration policy. Consequently, **the second part of the framework**, the typology of interagency relationship, was created by integrating the models of types of collaboration (Houge, 1993; Bailey and Koney, 2000; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Mandell and Steelman, 2003). This has been constructed to address the second research questions: what types of collaboration have been selected to implement and why. It argues that the particular form of collaboration is selected as a result of the need of councils to respond to the specific set of conditions under four process streams at a particular period. The creation of a deeper institutional relationship over time was influenced by their existing somewhat loose institutional relationship and their experiences working together.

**The final part of the framework** deals with the third question: what factors influence sustainable collaboration? This part argues that factors considered as capacity for collaboration can be conceptualised into two groups. The first are individual factors including collaborative managers and leadership. The second are organisational factors which refer to collaborative culture and trust.
Figure 10: The integrated conceptual framework for exploring the initiation of collaboration policy together with its implementation

Source: developed by the researcher
Conclusion

This chapter has examined literature that provides an account of the governance structures of interagency relationship, and the key factors supporting and inhibiting successful collaboration, which resulted in the construction of the second and third sections of the conceptual framework of this study. Integrating the notions of policymaking models, the first part of the framework discussed in the previous chapter, with the typology of interagency relationship on a continuum, and the model of factors influencing sustainable collaboration, enables the conceptual framework to have rigorous exploratory and explanatory power to analyse collaborative arrangements in small local governments. These are subject to development and adaptability over time given changes in endogenous and exogenous forces. Essentially, the integrated framework will be used within the thematic analysis of this study to help develop a pre-defined template of codes. These will be applied to empirical evidence from the cases to investigate the dynamic process by which small local authorities form collaborative relationships and investigate the type of collaboration that resulted as well as explore the key ingredients of the effective operation of cross-council collaboration.
CHAPTER 5
LOCAL GOVERNMENT COLLABORATION IN ENGLAND:
LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF TWO ENGLISH CASES

Introduction

This chapter applies a longitudinal analysis to investigate the development of collaboration policy within two English cases. These are Adur District and Worthing Borough councils, and Babergh District and Mid-Suffolk District councils, both with a shared management team and a single workforce providing shared services for residents in two areas. It draws on documentary sources to provide a descriptive narrative of each case, before primary data collection in the case study sites and to provide a basis for thematic analysis between the two cases in the next chapter. Within each case a chronology of cross-council collaboration was constructed to demonstrate the fact that the collaboration policy in small local governments develops and changes over time. Hence, the development of inter-local governmental collaboration was divided into phases based on particular periods where key decisions on joint working policy have been made.

5.1 Adur and Worthing Collaborative Working

5.1.1 The background to Adur district council and Worthing borough council
In England there are two local government systems operating throughout the country. While some parts of England have a one tier unitary authority local governmental unit, many parts operate under a two-tier system – having county and district, borough or city councils (Wilson and Game, 2006). In West Sussex local government runs under a two-tier system. West Sussex County Council is an upper tier local authority responsible for providing the majority of services including education, transport, strategic planning, waste management, social care, libraries, and fire and public safety, covering the whole of the county. Adur District Council and Worthing Borough Council are neighbouring District Councils (See Figure 11 for the map) – the lower tier local authorities under this county – which are responsible for services like housing, leisure, waste collection, council tax collections, and planning applications in their particular areas.

**Figure 11: Map showing location of Adur District Council and Worthing Borough Council**

These two are small councils, considering both their area and population relative to other lower tier district councils in the county (Reference table 3). Regarding the political dimension, at the time collaborative working was firstly introduced, when Adur and Worthing agreed on sharing vehicle depot services in 2002, Adur was under Conservative
control while Worthing was under Liberal Democrat control. Throughout the period where the two councils have been deepening their interagency working relationship, 2004-present, both have been under Conservative control (see Table 4).

Table 3: The residents and area of districts in West Sussex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Residents (persons)</th>
<th>Area (Hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adur</td>
<td>59,600</td>
<td>61,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worthing</td>
<td>97,600</td>
<td>104,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arun</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>149,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chichester</td>
<td>106,500</td>
<td>113,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crawley</td>
<td>99,700</td>
<td>106,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horsham</td>
<td>122,100</td>
<td>131,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Sussex</td>
<td>127,400</td>
<td>139,860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4: Election History of Adur and Worthing councils

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party in control</th>
<th>Adur</th>
<th>Worthing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>No overall control</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
<td>No overall control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>No overall control</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.2 The development of Adur and Worthing collaborative working

The development of collaboration between Adur and Worthing is divided into four interrelated phases, based on their key decisions on taking further step on joint working. The chronology of their collaboration during 2002 – 2007 and onwards is demonstrated in Figure 12.

**Figure 12: Chronology of Adur and Worthing collaboration, 2002 – 2007 onwards**

![Chronology of Adur and Worthing collaboration](image)

Source: the researcher

**Phase 1: Starting the Partnering Adur and Worthing Services (PAWS) project (2002)**

It was reported in the Annual Audit Letter of Adur District Council 2001/2002 that collaboration between Adur and Worthing started in the early 2000s, where the chief executives of both councils signed a joint statement outlining the approaches to their joint working. As part of this initiative, in 2002, the two councils created a mechanism called the Joint Chief Officers Management Team (JCOMT), where senior officers hold joint
management team meetings to support their joint working. At the same time, the Simultaneous Executive Meetings (SEM) – the joint executive meeting of members – was set up to be the main decision-making mechanism on the joint working arrangements, as the key element of its governance. Under this mechanism the political leadership of each council jointly discuss partnership issues in the same meeting room at the same time, and with a single agenda, but vote separately at the end of the meeting. This innovative decision-making mechanism benefits joint working since it enables decisions to be made quickly, especially in the circumstances where the two councils had different democratic arrangements (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006a; Tomkinson, 2007). Essentially, the decisions concerning partnership working can be made at this meeting without going back to each individual council to confirm.

The formal agreement on collaboration between Adur and Worthing was made at the first SEM on the 12th of September 2002 (Adur District Council, 2002). This phenomenon, where two councils make decisions at the same time in the same place, was recognised as the first of its kind in England (Local Government Chronicle, 2002). At this meeting councillors of the two councils agreed to start their partnership project. This was originally known as Partnering Adur and Worthing Services (PAWS). It was the first public-public partnership project in the country that received Pathfinder status by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister under the ‘Supporting strategic service delivery partnership in Local Government’ programme (Audit Commission, 2003b, p.43). The key drivers for this partnership were service improvement, capacity enhancement, cost savings, and keeping the council tax down, by investigating the potential areas for joint working between Adur and Worthing (Adur District Council, 2002; Local Government Chronicle, 2002; Audit Commission. 2003a, 2003b).
Under PAWS their partnership has developed in several stages. The first stage was the commencement of a shared vehicle depot services as a pilot scheme in 2002 (Adur District Council, 2002) meaning both councils shared a single depot, joint team, and facilities to operate vehicle workshops. The driving factor for the shared depot was to secure efficiency, economy, and effectiveness in the use of resources (Adur District Council, 2002; Local Government Chronicle, 2002).

Shortly after a joint depot was established, which enabled the councils to achieve better use of resources, reduce duplication of providing services, and gain cost savings (Audit Commission, 2003a), there was further discussion between the two councils focused on sharing all services. At this stage the two councils were investigating the potential to integrate most direct services provisions such as waste collection, planning, building control, and vehicle maintenance of both councils (Audit Commission, 2003a). Integrating refuse collection and recycling services was decided as a pilot project, as they had positive experience in working together on the existing shared depot. Consequently, in July 2003 the SEMs agreed on an action plan under PAWS for a move to a single directed service organisation for waste management services by 2007. Following this decision a shared depot operation at Commerce Way, Adur depot, was established for refuse collection, recycling vehicles and workforce. Both councils invested resources in the Adur depot for its joint operation, and let out the former Worthing depot to generate income for both councils.

**Phase 2: Embarking on shared waste services (2004)**

In October 2004 Adur and Worthing councils decided to consider shared refuse collection and recycling services, as both councils had realised that the potential benefits regarding
improved services and reduced costs could be achieved as a result (Joint Corporate Management Team, 2006a). After this collaborative endeavour was agreed on by both councils PAWS transformed into the Adur and Worthing Services (AWS) with the aim of establishing a unified workforce for providing a single refuse and recycling management service for both areas by 2007.

There were some driving factors for establishing the joint waste services. The two councils needed to achieve significant savings and efficiencies in providing services; necessary conditions for delivering services at that time, and forecasted to remain as key conditions of future local authorities (Joint Corporate Management Team, 2006a, 2006b; Latham and Everett, 2006). The financial savings which were achieved from the shared depot was fundamental to integrating their refuse and recycling services (The SEMs of Adur and Worthing, 2006a). Furthermore, there was the need to reduce waste and to increase recycling rates as the landfill taxes were forecasted to increase, and the government was planning to improve the recycling target for local councils. Although it was confirmed by public consultation that the two councils provided a good service for waste collection, the service provision still needed to be changed to achieve the best savings and meet targets for recycling and waste minimisation by government (The Simultaneous Executive Meeting, 2006a, p. 68).

Regarding its management, the SEM meeting on 16th March 2006 agreed to create a single structure for AWS, and agreed to transfer staff involved in shared waste services to a single authority, be it Adur or Worthing. By applying TUPE – the Transfer of Undertaking, Protection of Employment Regulations 2006 – they ensured that the terms and conditions of employment of all AWS employees would be the same. Regarding the operational aspect external consultations were undertaken as to the management and technical issues to ensure the effective joint working on sharing waste management
service. A formal union consultation with Unison, the trade union, took place to consult the human resources issue (The Joint Corporate Management Team, 2006b). Parallel with the external body consultation, public consultation was undertaken in May 2006, to ask householders to select their preferred option of service delivery, and express their views and concerns regarding this shared service. The councils took the results of consultations into account, and decided to move towards the single refuse and recycling management service.

Later, on the 12th of July 2006, the councils agreed to the policy to introduce the single service operation for refuse and recycling services. They also agreed to set up the Joint Committee responsible for the implementation of collaborative working in waste management services, including vehicle workshop, household waste collection, household recycling collection, trade waste collection, trade recycling collection, clinical waste, and street cleansing (The Simultaneous Executive Meeting, 2006a). Finally, at the SEM meeting on the 21st of September 2006, the members agreed on moving towards a single council employer for employees related to Adur and Worthing Services (AWS) to support the operation of the single service style for waste management. Therefore, 2004 to 2006 was the period of design and preparation for the joint waste services.

**Phase 3: Considering a full council merger (2005)**

It is important to note that while Adur and Worthing decided to integrate waste services, the two councils also voluntarily considered a full constitutional amalgamation, the merging of two authorities into a political single unit, since this mechanism was believed to be a potential alternative to gain considerable long-term savings. During 2004-2005 the Joint Chief Officers Management Team (JCOMT), the internal body established to support
the partnership working, conducted an exploratory study to gain insight into the benefits, disadvantages, and risks of merging the councils. Senior officers proposed the merger to the SEM between the Policy and Strategy Committee of Adur District Council and the Cabinet of Worthing Borough Council on 14th June 2005 for the councillors’ decision.

However, the SEM rejected this proposal and agreed to make recommendations to both councils that they do not undertake further works relating to a merger of councils. Instead, it recommended that investigating other solutions for further partnership working to improve services and achieve savings should continue. The reasons behind this decision provided in the meeting minute were “the payback period was too long and the risks high with uncertainties over time scale, putting any process towards a merger at risk”. Furthermore, “the use of the Council Tax was felt to be more useful being spent on services than on expenditure on a process. All opportunities for joint working should be encouraged and taken where there were clear advantages for better services for the electorates” (The Simultaneous Executive Meeting of Adur and Worthing, 2005b, p.3).

Accordingly, at the full council meeting on the 23rd June 2005, both Councils accepted the recommendations from the SEM and decided respectively not to proceed with merger. Rather, they agreed to proceed with their commitment to the AWS project and continue to investigate other alternatives to achieve services improvement and savings in the shorter term (Adur District Council, 2005; Tomkinson, 2007). The strong statements on the refusal of the amalgamation were provided by the two councils’ leaders. The Worthing leader states:

“I must emphasise that we are not looking at a merger. People have been telling us they want services to improve but without a hike in council tax. Joint working is an excellent way to achieve this. Doing the same work with less resource is the way that organisations
throughout the world use to improve efficiency” (Adur District Council and Worthing Borough Council (2006a) ‘Forward in Partnership’, 18th September, p.1).

An Adur leader also stated:

“Both councils have already disregarded the idea of merger because of the lead-in time and the costs involved. We are interested in saving money for the council tax payers not wasting it” (ibid, p.1).

In 2005, after the two councils decided not to amalgamate, the joint interim chief executive was established because of the vacancy of Wothing’s chief executive. It led to a question among staff of both councils that “is this merger by the back door?” and “Where is this all leading to?” (Lowrie, 2006a, p. 2). To minimise the concern of staff and key stakeholders, senior officers proposed that the councillors should develop a clear strategy for the collaboration between the two councils which led to the next step of their relationship.

Phase 4: Establishing a joint officer structure and shared services (2006 onwards)

Creating a single structure for Adur and Worthing Services (AWS)

The two councils had been jointly providing wastes services from the shared depot under the shared waste services project since 2004. As the councillors had already agreed to transfer staff involved in the AWS to a single authority since 2006, the works had been undertaken to address a number of administrative issues, particularly a single employer status. Finally, the SEM of the 27th of February 2007 approved the transfer of staff employed by Worthing to the employment by Adur beginning from the 1st of July 2007 (The Simultaneous Executive Meeting, 2007). After many years of the gestation of a joint
refuse and recycling, the shared waste management service for Adur and Worthing councils went live in September 2007.

**Integrating officer structures and comprehensive merging services**

At the SEM on the 12th of July 2006 the joint interim chief executive, Ian Lowrie, reported the necessary reasons for setting a clear and formal strategy for their partnership to the leading councillors of both councils. As it was clear that the small local governments would face more financial constraint, because of government funding cuts over the following years, joint working in a systematic way was recognised as a way to enable them to achieve significant required savings and efficiencies within tighter budgets.

To minimise uncertainty of key stakeholders about the direction of cross-council relationship and to respond to both current and future challenges, senior officers of both councils collectively agreed that a clear strategy and a formal agreement, on the aims and objectives of collaborative working, was an effective mechanism in managing organisational change (Lowrie, 2006a). This is because it would provide a clear and overall picture of what the councils were attempting to achieve and how to achieve it, whether the councillors would decide to continue with the existing partnership or increase their cross-council relationship. Hence, the joint interim chief executive proposed that the councillors commission an investigation of a formal partnership strategy, to give certainty to councillors and officers about clear reasons for developing partnership working and a whole picture. This included such key aspects as goals to achieve, a realistic framework in terms of the capacity to deliver the strategy and timetable for steering future partnership arrangement. Consequently, the leading councillors of both councils accepted that a clear
strategy was needed to steer their partnership and requested the joint interim chief executive to propose a draft Partnership Strategy for consideration.

In the SEM on the 21st of September 2006 the joint interim chief executive proposed four strategic choices. These were developed from extensive discussions among senior officers of both councils, ranging from uncoupling their existing joint working through to continuing with existing partnerships – jointly providing shared services in some areas – to creating greater integrated services for a consideration of councillors. The upcoming release of the 2006 Local Government White Paper and the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review were going to put pressure on all local governments in the UK, particularly Adur and Worthing as small local governments, to achieve substantial savings and efficiencies in the challenging financial climate (Lowrie, 2006b). Therefore, he underlined that this proposal should be built on the consideration of the greater savings and efficiency required in response.

Instead of a local government reorganisation, the unlikely way forward earlier announced by Government, it was clearly mentioned in the 2006 Local Government White Paper that the Government was encouraging councils to develop innovative ways of joint workings to provide the transformed services and to gain efficiency savings (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006b, Lowrie, 2006b). At this meeting, consequently, leading councillors made the decision to endorse the option ‘work towards a comprehensive merger of services’, larger integrated services and a possible merged officer structure, as a strategy to move forward. They agreed to commission consultants to develop a business case for this strategic approach (The Simultaneous Executive Meeting, 2006b, p.103).
Moreover, it was agreed that communication was essential for supporting this organisational change. Hence, the joint interim chief executive was given the duty to develop a communication strategy to keep public and staff informed. Political leaders of both councils were requested to attend the officers’ seminar to communicate with officers about councillors’ perspective on moving towards this collaborative endeavour. Also, a Joint Appointments Committee was to be established to deal with the employment and staffing issues relating to the possible joint officer structure. Eventually, the decisions of this SEM had been recommended to the full council meetings of both councils. Adur council and Worthing council took a decision on the 3rd and the 5th of October 2006 respectively to proceed with the proposal for developing comprehensive shared services with a single, shared officer structure (Lowrie, 2006c).

It is clear that there were many endogenous forces; the success of the joint depots, recycling and refuse collection services, and the need for a formal strategy for move forward on joint working. However, the occurrence of exogenous forces also had considerable influence on councillors’ decision to deepen their inter-organisational relationship; particularly the significant savings requirement of the 2006 Local Government White Paper, the efficiency demands of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review, and the Government’s agenda on encouraging partnership working as preferred way to improve services and efficiency. Particularly, these exogenous forces made councillors realise that although the two councils were already progressing well in jointly providing services in some areas, such joint working was not enough to allow them to gain substantial savings whilst maintaining good quality services. This shared desire amongst councillors for substantial savings, whilst protecting services, through a comprehensive collaborative working were reflected in several documents:
“Consideration of [service] mergers and joint working was necessary to deliver services in the future as remaining as a standalone authority was not an option...however, a strategy was required to move this forward” (The Simultaneous Executive Meeting of Adur and Worthing, 2006a, p.70).

“It is entirely sensible for the two councils to consider such a step... People have been telling us they want services to improve but without a hike in council tax. Joint working is an excellent way to achieve this. Doing the same work with less resources is the way that organisations throughout the world use to improve efficiency” (Adur District Council and Worthing Borough Council (2006a) ‘Forward in Partnership’, 18th September, p.1).

“Members felt that increased partnership working and the resulting savings represented the best way forward in order to minimize Council Tax increase without reducing services” (The Simultaneous Executive Meeting of Adur and Worthing, 2006b, p.103).

Since then the preparation of a High Level Business Case for the possible joint officer structure serving both councils had been done by the Partnership Management Board. Capita Advisory Service was commissioned by the two councils to evaluate and challenge the High Level Business Case. In this process, staff, councillors and external bodies were involved and their views were considered in the organisational change process. The staff consultation exercises were held to gain the views and comments of the staff in both councils. To clarify related issues and assess the progress, regular councillors’ meetings were set. External bodies such as Unison, the South East Centre for Excellence (SECE) and the Audit Commission, were asked to provide comments on the proposal (The Simultaneous Executive Meeting of Adur and Worthing, 2007).

In July 2007 the councillors agreed on the business case for a full integrating services and developing a single workforce to provide shared services for both areas (Adur District Council, 2007). It was stated in the report of Improvement and Efficiency South East (IESE formerly known as SECE), the consultancy organisation that was commissioned by Adur and Worthing, in October 2010 that this collaborative initiative was driven by the
need of the two councils to preserve essential frontline services and keep council tax low in the face of reduced central government funding. It was expected that savings would derive from establishing a single officer structure with a single chief executive to run shared services for both areas. Also, better services would be achieved at the same time (Adur District Council, 2007).

Eventually the single senior management structure with a shared chief executive was established on the 1st of April 2008 (Adur and Worthing, 2012). At the same time, a two-year services integration programme which embraced the business case for each service review had begun (IESE, 2010). The process of transferring staff to the single structure had been done on a phased basis throughout 2008-2010. Adur was the single employer for all staff. In 2009 the individual service reviews designed to examine the shared delivery of each council service commenced (IESE, 2010).

The current context of joint working (2013)

Adur and Worthing now have in place a joint management team, consisting of the single Chief Executive; two Strategic Directors; and seven Executive Heads of Service, and a single workforce to jointly serve both councils and to provide shared services to residents of both areas. However, three services, namely Adur Homes, Worthing Leisure and Worthing revenues and benefits, were excluded in the process of services integration, since these services are exclusive to their individual councils (IESE, 2010). This kind of collaborative working relationship allows each council to retain its own autonomy and identity, as well as its political leadership (IESE, 2009a; 2009b). In 2013 partnering with communities and empowering communicates to run services have been initiated by the
new shared chief executive, as a new strategy to deal with the continued squeeze on public sectors finances. This might demonstrate a change in their collaborative strategy.

5.2 Babergh and Mid Suffolk Collaborative Working

5.2.1 The background to Babergh district council and Mid Suffolk district council

In Suffolk local government operates under a two tier system. Suffolk County Council is an upper tier, and seven districts serve as lower tier local government. Babergh and Mid-Suffolk councils are neighbouring districts and lower tier local authorities, responsible for services like housing, leisure, waste collection, council tax collections, and planning applications in their particular area (See Figure 13 for the map). According to the Office for National Statistics 2011 Census’ population data (Office for National Statistics, 2013) Babergh and Mid Suffolk authorities have a small population size relative to other lower tier districts councils in Suffolk (Reference Table 5).
**Figure 13:** Map showing location of Babergh District Council and Mid-Suffolk District Council


**Table 5:** The residents and area of districts in Suffolk in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Residents (Persons)</th>
<th>Area (Hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Babergh</td>
<td>87,740</td>
<td>59,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Heath</td>
<td>59,748</td>
<td>37,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ipswich</td>
<td>133,384</td>
<td>3,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid Suffolk</td>
<td>96,731</td>
<td>87,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Edmundsbury</td>
<td>111,008</td>
<td>65,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffolk Coastal</td>
<td>124,298</td>
<td>89,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waveney</td>
<td>115,254</td>
<td>36,968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the political dimension, Babergh and Mid Suffolk are very distinctive from one another in their political make-up and culture, which might be seen as a key challenge in the creation and implementation of an intensive collaborative working. Mid-Suffolk has clear political leadership resulting from a long period of Conservative control since 2003. Although the council still operates with a committee system, their decision-making is quite straightforward. In contrast to Mid-Suffolk, Babergh has had no overall political control since its creation in 1974. As the council operates with the committee system, which includes the Political Leaders Group to discuss the key agendas, decision-making in this council somewhat long-drawn out (Local Government Association, 2012b).

Table 6: Election History of Babergh and Mid Suffolk councils

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party in control Babergh</th>
<th>Party in control Mid Suffolk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>No overall control</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>No overall control</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No overall control</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BBC, England council Election 2011,  

5.2.2 The development of Babergh and Mid Suffolk collaborative working

The development of collaboration between Babergh and Mid Suffolk is divided into four phases, based on the specific periods where the two councils made decisions on their cross-council working relationship. The chronology of their collaboration, during 2008 – 2013 and onwards, is demonstrated in Figure 14.
Phase 1: Working together under the Suffolk County Pathfinder initiative (2008)

Babergh and Mid Suffolk have recent experience of collaborative working. Before the two councils committed to preferred partner status in 2010 there had been a proposal for a unitary Suffolk, the creation of a new single tier authority from the amalgamation of the existing county and district councils, promoted by the Labour government in 2008. During an uncertain period it was not clear whether this agenda would be implemented or not. All local governments in all tiers across Suffolk had come to work together under the Suffolk County Pathfinder initiative in 2008 in response to the case that the proposal not being adopted. This collaboration initiative aimed to explore new ways of working among councils to achieve efficiencies in delivering services to residents across Suffolk in the climate of financial challenges. Under this initiative Babergh and Mid Suffolk had worked
jointly in waste management contract, and had worked with other authorities in a wide range of services such as Tourism, Leisure Management and Norfolk Property Services (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010b, p.11).

Shared services were developed as an instrument to achieve savings and to deliver better services across all tiers of local councils in Suffolk (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010a, p.5). Although services had been improved, savings had been gained, and capacity of local authorities had been strengthened in some degree by such collaboration, such an approach was not capable of generating significant savings relative to the financial pressures facing the two councils (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010b).

**Phase 2: Committing to preferred partner status and embarking on a programme of integration and potential merger (2010)**

In 2010 the unitary Suffolk agenda was shelved by the 2010 Coalition government. Accordingly, the two councils made the decision to identify each other as a ‘preferred partner’, ‘Babergh on the 28th of January 2010 and Mid Suffolk on the 25th of February 2010’ (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010b, p.3). In common with a number of local councils in England at that period, they opted to use ‘preferred partnering, the integration of services and management structures between local authorities’, which go beyond traditional collaborative working arrangements as the best way forward (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010b, p.11).

This interagency relationship was driven by some key factors. *As in the first case*, there was a shared desire to protect front-line services and deliver services to meet the needs
of people in a more cost-effective and sustainable way in the face of financial retrenchment (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010a; 2010b; 2011c; Mid Suffolk and Babergh District Councils; 2011; Mid Suffolk District Council, 2012). Indeed, both councils realised that they were facing a substantial financial challenge. Government funding cuts by 25% to 40% were likely to occur over the next few years and beyond, which would produce an impact on frontline services, in that some services would need to be decreased or withdrawn (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010a; Mid Suffolk and Babergh District Councils; 2011). Also, this financial pressure would affect residents, as charges for some services may have been needed to be increased or introduced. The two councils believed that this enormous financial issue could not be overcome by a single council working independently, but collaboration was needed (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010a). The rationale for investigating more intensive collaborative arrangements, that would enable them to survive in the context of austerity, was highlighted in the statement provided in the Proposed BDC/MSDC Merger – High Level Outline Business Case July 2010:

“The elected Members of Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils are facing that enormous challenge. Due to the current financial climate and the requirement of meeting the Government’s intention to reduce public expenditure by 25% over the next four year, we need to rethink the way we deliver our services. Both councils agree that in order to meet this challenge they must focus on the needs of their citizens and communities and radically restructure and transform the way they deliver services to those communities.

Doing nothing is not an option. Facing the challenges alone will leave both organisations more fragile, less resilient and lack the capacity to meet the needs of our communities” (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010a, p.3).

Experience in working together and with a number of local authorities across Suffolk enabled Babergh and Mid Suffolk councils to realise that embracing only a small number
of potential partners, ‘that face similar issues, whose communities are similar and where geography or size is not a barrier to integration’, was essential for successful partnerships (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010a. p.5; 2010b. p.11). Under this collaborative endeavour the two councils agreed to jointly seek new ways of working together to achieve shared objectives as follows:

- “Value for money for Council Tax payers should be the paramount objective in undertaking this review, and;
- Any programme of strategic integration should aim to achieve a jointly agreed balance between financial savings and future resilience in all aspect of service delivery” (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010b. p.3).

**Working together on a High Level Outline Business Case (July 2010)**

After the two councils had agreed on a shared objective of interagency working, in July 2010 a High Level Outline Business Case was developed, in order to prepare the intensive joint working arrangements between the two councils. This document outlined key information including the necessary to find new ways of working, three potential scenarios for working together, desired benefits and savings, opportunities and challenges, risk assessment and mitigation, and implementation plan/timetable. Specifically, it proposed three scenarios for the councils to consider; scenario 1: creating a single chief executive and shared management team to provide some integrated services where appropriate for the councils; scenario 2: establishing a single management team with a single officer structure to deliver full integrated services where possible for the councils; and scenario 3: merging the two councils into a single council (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010a).
This High Level Outline Business Case was presented by senior officers to both councils for consideration, ‘the Babergh Strategy Committee on the 29th of July and Mid Suffolk Executive Committee on the 2nd of August 2010 respectively’ (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010b, p.3). Consequently, **scenario 1**, creating a single Chief Executive and shared management team, was rejected at this stage since ‘the relatively limited savings did not justify either the up-front transitional costs or the potential disadvantages to both councils from this original Scenario 1’ (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010b. p.4). This left the proposals either integrating staff and services or full amalgamation to move forward.

A radical change to the way Babergh and Mid Suffolk have worked together, integration or full merger, was considered by the councillors as the best way to achieve significant savings and maintain key services for local people of both areas (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010b). Under **Scenario 2** a shared chief executive, a shared management team, and joint Heads of Services would be firstly appointed to run the programme of fully integrated service and management to prepare for a single officer structure providing fully shared services across two separate councils. It was assumed that a minimum savings of £962,000 a year could be achieved by integrating staff and service.

In the preparation for working towards **Scenario 3**, if this scenario was approved, staff and services would be integrated to transition to one council, rather than implementing the whole change at once. This was planned to be established in April 2012, almost two years from the date the business case was proposed (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010a, p.15). By integrating senior management structures the number of management positions and the senior management structure would be the same as in Scenario 2, but a Financial Director position would be removed. With one council instead
of two a minimum saving of £273,000 could be achieved from councillor’s arrangements and democratic processes. This substantial savings would be derived from a decrease in the number of councillors, a reduction in the number of committees, reductions in costs in supporting committee systems such as printing and postage costs, and a reduction in a number of officers to support a decreased number of committees. In total, a minimum savings of £1,540,000 a year could be achieved by a full merger (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010a).

**Working together on a Detailed Business Case (September 2010)**

After the proposal on simply sharing a chief executive had been rejected, the two councils worked together intensively to consider the other two available possible scenarios to move forward. This resulted in the creation of a Detailed Business Case for Staff and Service Integration and for the Creation of a New Council by senior staff, to provide key additional information as to financial details, the key assumptions of costs and savings for both Scenarios 2 and 3. Then senior officers proposed this document to the two councils for consideration and it was approved by both councils in August and September 2010. Later, the two councils agreed in principle, Babergh District Council on the 28th and Mid Suffolk District Council on the 30th of September 2010 respectively, on the plans to create a new single council by April 2013. This was viewed as the preferred way forward since this option would produce the greatest financial and organisational benefits, subject to local poll, which would be held in both areas in May 2011 (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010c). Moreover, in 2010 a Joint Member Board was established to be responsible for not only leading and supervising the integration process, but also evaluating the benefits of moving on the further step of amalgamating two councils into a new single council (Joint Member Board, 2011).
Phase 3: Sharing of a chief executive and preparing a full merger of councils (2011)

It has been stated in the external validation of the Detailed Business Case – March 2011 that the two councils had worked closely together to prepare the integration of staff and services with the joint management team, since they agreed in principle on the plan to amalgamate into a single legal entity in September 2010 (Jenkins and Rooney, 2011).

In March 2011 the Detailed Business Case was updated, especially regarding significant financial information. Moreover, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) had been commissioned by the two councils to develop an independent external validation of the Detailed Business Case – September 2010. This was later updated in March 2011 to validate the assumption of costs and savings of Scenario 2 (integration staffing and services) and Scenario 3 (creating a new single council) proposed in the Detailed Business Case. It also assessed the key risks related to the financial case in order that strong and effective arrangements can be achieved (Jenkins and Rooney, 2011, p.2).

The key documents, namely the Detailed Business Case for staff and service integration, and for the Creation of a new Council: Updated Financial Case – March 2011; The Business Case – Key Financial Information – March 2011; and the Business Case external validation Executive Summary – March 2011, were submitted to both councils with an outline of key information and recommendations by the Director of Finance (Babergh District Councils) and Chief Financial Officer (Mid Suffolk District Council) in March 2011. The first two documents confirmed that the key assumptions of the two scenarios for working together indicated in the Detailed Business Case – September
2010, remain valid, and the financial case for both integration and the establishment of single council were very strong. The external validation indicated that a full constitutional merger could produce more significant and rapid savings than those integrating staff and services while separate legal entities still remain (Jenkins and Rooney, 2011). These documents, and relevant key documents on the integration and the creation of a single council, were later made publicly available on the website of both councils to assist councillors, staff, citizens, and stakeholders to understand the transformation of collaborative working between the two councils.

**Local referendum for the full merger proposal**

At the period when the two councils were integrating staffing and services, and planning to amalgamate, a local referendum was chosen to ascertain residents’ support for the full merger proposal. To assist citizens to understand the key facts on the two councils’ plans to integrate staff and services, and possibly merge, the councils had created the information sheet *Facing the Future* in May 2011 prior to the local referendums. This document provided the key information about this initiative including what local poll is, the rationale for creating a single council, the financial situation and potential impact on council tax, and how joint workforce and shared services will work between the two councils. Moreover, there were a number of voting channels including internet, telephone, SMS or post provided for people to vote for or against the proposal. The determination of voting results whether the merger will go ahead was also stated in this document:

“If more than 50% of those voting in each council area vote ‘yes’ we will ask the Local Government Boundary Commission for England to carry out a review. If the Secretary of State then gives approval, one new single district council would be likely to be created from April 2013.
If more than 50% of those voting in each council area vote ‘no’ integration of staff and services under a single chief executive will continue but the two councils will remain as separate authorities. We would then have to find other options to raise income and reduce spending” (Mid Suffolk and Babergh District Councils, 2011, pp. 1-2).

The local referendums took place from the 9th of May to the 6th of June 2011 to examine the opinion of residents of both areas. While voting was in progress in both areas some elected members of Babergh council showed their concerns over a full merger, which then had an impact on public opinion towards this merger proposal. It was reported that local people had been urged by the Labour, Liberal Democrat, and Independent groups on Babergh council to resist amalgamation because of the issue of financial basis (Local Government Chronicle, 2011, ‘Babergh councillors try to halt districts’ merger’, May 18, p.1). It was argued in their joint statement provided to residents that amalgamation would lead the residents of Babergh to be responsible for some part of the debt of Mid Suffolk, even though this was previously denied by finance directors of the two councils.

The results of the local polls revealed that 59.9% of Mid Suffolk residents voted for amalgamation while only 39.1% of Babergh residents voted yes (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2011, ‘Babergh and Mid Suffolk residents vote differently on merger’, June 10). Consequently, the district merger proposal was rejected, but the two councils still proceeded with an integration of staffing structure and services under a shared chief executive, as it has been indicated in the Detailed Business Case - September 2010 previously agreed upon by the two councils in September 2010 (Local Government Chronicle, 2011c).

**Phase 4: Integrating staffing structures and services**
The integration of staff and services was decided upon since it ‘was essential to achieve savings, and increase resilience and capacity to deliver the outcomes that both councils were aiming to achieve’ (Local Government Chronicle, 2011c, p.3). Regarding the progress on staff and services integration, the first step of this arrangement can be seen from the appointment of a shared chief executive, Charlie Adan, in May 2011. Then, in June 2012, a shared management team for Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils was established (Mid Suffolk District Council, 2012), comprised of a single Chief Executive, three Strategic Directors, two Corporate Managers and six Heads of Service. This new management team is responsible for transforming the ways of working and providing services for better outcomes of residents in both areas. In 2011/2012, £230,000 savings across the two councils was achieved, resulting from the integration process (Local Government Association, 2012b, p. 4). Since 2012 the two councils have had a single integrated management team in place, headed by a single chief executive serving both councils. The two councils have been integrating all staff from both councils into a single workforce under the Integration and Transformation programme.

Conclusion

This chapter provided the findings of the two English cases’ analysis concerning the creation of collaboration policies and their operation. Analysing empirical data enabled the researcher to realise that the development of collaboration policy at local government level has three aspects. Firstly, the processes of interagency working development take a significant amount of time. Secondly, collaboration policy at local government level changes over time. Finally, there are situations where things that occurred in the past made a significant impact on the further steps of collaborative workings. Essentially, this study argues that a temporal dimension is necessary for studying collaboration policy.
This confirmed the argument of Pollitt (2008, p.16), in that every policy contains a temporal dimension. Therefore, it is important for policy makers and researchers to take time and the influences of the past into consideration within the analysis so that a greater depth understanding of policy can be gained, and proper solutions to such policy problems created. Furthermore, the within-case analysis revealed a few key issues and themes to be focused in order to address the key research questions, which will be the main focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 6
THE FORMATION AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
COLLABORATION –THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF THE TWO
ENGLISH CASES

Introduction

The previous chapter provided the background of the two English cases on cross-council collaboration. This chapter demonstrates the results of using a thematic analysis between the cases, coupled with the conceptual framework, to investigate the English cases regarding three key areas: the rationale and the process by which councils form collaborative working policy; the types of collaboration that resulted; and factors influencing the sustainable collaborations. The findings of the English cases analysis related to the research questions are then used to generate hypotheses for testing in the Thai cases, as demonstrated in table 7.
Table 7: The findings of the two English cases and hypotheses that resulted (Source: the researcher)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Adur and Worthing</th>
<th>Babergh and Mid Suffolk</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RQ1 How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated?</td>
<td>In the face of financial pressures facing both councils they decided to bring specific services and management together to reduce individual councils’ cost bases, where they have equality of resources.</td>
<td>In the face of government spending cuts the two councils decided to integrate services and management to achieve significant savings and increase resilience to deliver services, where they have equality of resources.</td>
<td>H₁ Scarcity of resources leads to a greater likelihood of inter-local governments collaboration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kingdon’s agenda setting model, 1995; Lober’s collaboration forming model, 1997).</td>
<td>▪ Partnering councils’ initiatives — Councils voluntarily cooperated with each other, and proposals on collaboration were generated by senior officers. ▪ National governments’ policies — Their initiation of collaboration in 2002 and its development over time had been supported by the Labour government’s policies.</td>
<td>▪ Partnering councils’ initiatives — Councils voluntarily cooperated with each other and proposals on collaboration were generated by senior officers. ▪ National governments’ policies — Pro-collaboration policy at national level had supported their collaborations since 2008, even if initiatives were different.</td>
<td>H₂ Collaboration policy develops locally rather than being imposed by national government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem stream (necessary condition)</td>
<td>Political support — the formation of collaboration was subject to the approval of both councils.</td>
<td>Public opinion — local referendum was a precondition for a full council amalgamation.</td>
<td>H₃ Collaboration is more likely to occur where it does not challenge local vested interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy stream (necessary condition)</td>
<td>Political support — collaboration must be endorsed by both councils.</td>
<td>Political support — collaboration must be endorsed by both councils.</td>
<td>H₄ The more the support of politicians on a collaboration proposal, the more likely collaboration will arise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stream (necessary condition)</td>
<td>This case was the first joint senior management in England. The radical idea could become policy as they had visionary political leaders who were leading alongside the chief executive.</td>
<td>Collaboration has been deepened over time as they have leaders, both politicians and officers, who believed that it will work and were very keen to make it a success.</td>
<td>H₅ Strong leadership, both political and managerial, is needed for forming deep cross-council collaboration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational stream (supporting condition)</td>
<td>Senior officers brought the two councils to work together in sharing depots. Then they developed formalised forms of cooperation over time to respond to new possibilities.</td>
<td>Senior officers realising the opportunity, developed joint working proposals, and gained support from politicians and the public to push their pet proposal to become policy.</td>
<td>H₆ Collaboration proposals will be elevated to the status of policy by the actions of senior officers rather than the politicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative entrepreneurs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research questions</td>
<td>RQ2 What forms of collaboration have been used and why?</td>
<td>Adur and Worthing</td>
<td>Babergh and Mid Suffolk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(The typologies of interagency relationship built on Houge (1993); Bailey and Koney (2000); Sullivan and Skelcher (2002); Mandell and Steelman (2003))</td>
<td>The more integrated institutional relationship was developed over time from their lower level institutional relationship. Sharing depots and waste services was the precursor to integrating the management team and then merging officer structures into a single workforce</td>
<td>The more integrated institutional relationship was developed over time from their lower level institutional relationship. Sharing waste services was preceded by integrating the management team and then by merging officer structures into a single workforce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                    | Collaborative managers | The senior officers played a vital role in:  
- ensuring that the two councils are still independent and are served equally by a single workforce  
- harmonising the two sets of councillors to work well together | The shared chief executive with the management team played a vital role in:  
- steering the two set of councillors to form one set of policy  
- equipping officers to work for the different cultural and democratic structures in place in each council | $H_8$ Collaboration is more likely to be sustainable when senior officers act as collaborative managers rather than the politicians. |
|                    | Collaborative culture | Councils developed organisational culture supportive of the sustainable collaborations  
- supported officers to work well in the new arrangements  
- recently developed strategy to involve communities in joint services | Councils developed organisational culture supportive of the sustainable collaborations  
- supported officers to work well in the new arrangements  
- recently developed strategy to involve communities in joint services | $H_9$ The more a collaborative culture is developed and promoted by each of the partners, the more sustainable collaboration will be achieved |
|                    | Building a coalition for change* (factor emerged from data) | Key stakeholders have been engaged in collaboration at the early stages and throughout the entire process of collaboration | Key stakeholders have been engaged in collaboration at the early stages and throughout the entire process of collaboration | $H_{10}$ When the key stakeholders have been engaged in collaboration process by partnering councils, it leads to a likelihood of sustainable collaboration. |
6.1 How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated? Applying the policy-making models

This section discusses the thematic analysis regarding the formation of collaboration policy. The policy-making models (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997; Takashi and Smutny, 2002) which is the first section of the integrated conceptual framework were used to create the pre-defined template of codes in Nvivo (see Figure 15), which was then applied to data, i.e. documents, interviews, and field notes from observations.

Figure 15: the pre-defined template of codes in Nvivo for analysing the process by which inter-local government collaboration emerges

Source: The researcher
The evidence from the English cases confirmed that the successful formation of collaboration policy required the convergence of the four streams. However, it found that the presence of factors within the three streams – problem, policy, and political – were considered as the necessary conditions for cross-council policy initiation, while a factor within the organisational stream was considered a supporting factor. Furthermore, these streams did not just easily and perfectly align together to create a collaborative window; the opportunity to couple solution to problem as a fortunate circumstance. Rather, it required collaborative entrepreneurs, managerial leaders in the English cases, to play a vital role in realising the presence of those factors, providing potential for forming collaboration, adjusting all streams, and bringing putative councils together to elevate their pet solution to become policy. All these findings will be clarified in the following analysis.

6.1.1 The necessary conditions that provide the potential for forming collaboration

6.1.1.1 Problem stream: scarcity of resources

The problem stream refers to the problems that raise concerns and capture the attention of important people in and around local authorities (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997). In both cases the financial pressures proved to be the driving impetus for collaboration. Data demonstrated that collaboration has been driven by the need of councils to achieve savings, secure front-line services, and provide excellent services in the face of retrenchment. In the Adur and Worthing case the two councils voluntarily initiated cross-council collaborations, starting from the Partnering Adur and Worthing Services (PAWS), which aimed at integrating all services; shared depots and shared waste services; and eventually a single workforce serving two separate councils. These arrangements were
driven by the need of both councils to achieve service improvement, capacity enhancement, cost savings and at the same time keep the council tax rate low (Adur District Council, 2002; Audit Commission, 2003a, 2003b). A senior officer illustrated the picture:

“The UK economy and public sector has been squeezed really hard. In terms of the local councils, the main driver is to provide good services and to keep the money flowing to provide those services. Bringing the management of the councils and bringing some significant services together means reducing the cost of management administration and still keeping the front-line services running, which helps in financial constraint situation” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

Another senior officer added:

“Because the financial position we’re in, almost everybody in the system accepted that it’s a good idea to come together. It would save money. The critical piece was driven by the financial requirement, which shared services and management reduce the cost of” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer A, November 2013).

Similarly, in the Babergh and Mid Suffolk case, the decision to define each other as a preferred partner in 2010 was driven by the need to gain savings in the periods of austerity. An officer argued:

“There was the recession… there was an awareness that the funding would be reduced dramatically from central government into local governments. So, they needed to save money” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid-Suffolk officer D, May 2013).

Another officer added: “what brought them together? the principle factor is resources and a biggest part of resources would be money. There is a lot of pressure to save more money in public sector” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid-Suffolk officer B, February
2014). “The two councils wanted to achieve financial savings and increase resilience to deliver services, which can be achieved by establishing joint working” another officer confirmed (telephone interview, Babergh and Mid-Suffolk officer C, March 2014). However, data also demonstrated that besides the sole gain of cost savings, councils voluntarily decided to pool resources in providing services to achieve a shared goal; to provide better services to residents in both partnering areas. An officer described:

“We didn’t want only to bring things together; we also wanted to… this’s the opportunity to process the reengineering of services, and doing so generated further savings. We developed something called a rapid improvement review. We’re also redesigning services. So we had done that” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer C, November 2013).

From these perspectives the two councils decided to initiate shared services and management, as it was believed it would enable them to archive efficiency in the face of financial pressures. Collaboration in the English cases is more appropriately explained by exchange theory, within an optimist perspective because of three aspects (Levine and White, 1962; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). Resource scarcity motivates individual councils to voluntarily initiate collaborative arrangements to reduce the individual organisations’ cost bases. In both cases collaboration occurs since partners share a level of altruism (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002), demonstrated by the shared desire to achieve mutual benefits; service improvements for the system as a whole. Interagency relationships were seen as bilateral and equal where the two councils have equal resource supplies and no one dominates the distribution of resources. The findings of this problem stream inform the following hypothesis:

\[ H_1 \text{ Scarcity of resources leads to a greater likelihood of inter-local government collaboration.} \]
6.1.1.2 Policy stream

The policy stream refers to the available solutions for addressing the problems (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997). In both cases although collaboration policies at local council level have been locally driven, inevitably, national governments’ policies promoting cross-council collaboration have considerable influence on the creation of more formal institutional collaborative arrangements over time.

Local government’s initiatives

In both cases collaborative arrangements, developed over time, have been invented and proposed by senior officers. To address significant financial challenges facing the councils (the problem stream), professionals inside councils generated collaboration proposals (the policy stream). Empirical evidence demonstrated the way in which the two councils took advantage of being able to control the process to identify additional forms of cooperation in line with their overall policy direction. The discretion councils have over their internal management structures and modes of service delivery enabled them to respond opportunistically to new possibilities. Also, cooperation relied heavily on voluntary actions by councils. Viewed this way, it is argued that collaboration initiatives have been locally driven.

In Babergh and Mid Suffolk such circumstances can be seen from the evidence, as managers of the councils collectively created the preferred partner proposal after having good experiences in a joint contract for waste service and the unitary disappearing. As an officer clarified:
“What drove them to come to preferred partner status was the unitary disappearing. They still wanted to achieve the same benefits as the unitary. So they needed to seek another model that brings them to achieve the benefits without having the unitary” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk, officer A, May 2013).

In Adur and Worthing this can be seen from the phenomenon where senior officers of the two councils had worked together under the Joint Chief Officers Management Team (JCOMT) to develop proposals and directions for their joint working since 2002. In 2005, Adur and Worthing initiated a joint interim chief executive as there was a vacancy of chief executive in Worthing. An officer described:

“After sharing depots, we were also thinking about the other things could happen. And there was a vacancy of chief executive in Worthing. So, the two sets of councillors and officers were meeting together. They said could your chief executive come in a couple of days on a part-time basis for us. So, there was a proper formal arrangement. And that kind of led to the thought… well, do we really need two chief executives” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

Senior officers collectively invented a ground-breaking proposal, a shared chief executive and management team and a single workforce serving two councils (solution) to deal with the climate of retrenchment, which had placed significant challenges on both management and frontline service provision (defined problem). In 2007 the two councils agreed on this policy proposed by senior officers. Such locally-driven radical initiative received recognition, as the first in England having single staffing structure working for two separate councils.

National government’s policies
The national agendas on cross-council collaboration had positive impacts on the opening of collaborative windows throughout the collaboration developments in both cases. In the early stages of their joint working development, in the early 2000s in the Adur and Worthing case and in the mid of 2000s in the Babergh and Mid-Suffolk case, their collaboration formations were partly supported by the partnership agenda of the Labour government. Since 1997 the partnership agenda had been established under the 'joined-up government' discourse; a key theme in Labour’s approach to improve public services and tackle complex cross-cutting issues (Newman, 2001, p.104). Indeed, the Labour government’s policies legitimised collaboration as the dominant policy response of local government when addressing problems, as a long term solution that enabled local councils to achieve long term benefits for both communities and councils. This was reinforced through the promotion of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), various funding streams related to partnership working, and the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) carried out by Audit Commission on local governments (Newchurch, 1999; Newman, 2001; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004; Williams and Sullivan, 2007). So, it is argued that the councils were in a collaborative mind-set even before they started to respond to the problem stream.

The 2002 PAWS project in Adur and Worthing was the first public-public partnership project in the country. It received Pathfinder support by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, under the programme ‘Supporting strategic service delivery partnership in Local Government’ (Audit Commission, 2003b, p.43). As partnerships in shared services were legitimised by the Labour government, it partly supported Adur and Worthing to agree on joint waste management services as a solution to financial pressure in 2004 (Joint Corporate Management Team, 2006a; Head of Corporate and Legal Service of Adur District Council and Assistant Director of Worthing Borough Council, 2006).
In the *Babergh and Mid-Suffolk* case the unitary Suffolk agenda promoted by the Labour government in 2008 helped support the creation of their somewhat tight collaborations. Arguably, this unitary agenda brought local authorities in all tiers across all of Suffolk to develop shared services strategy as a defensive strategy to avoid a unitary Suffolk solution. While there was uncertainty whether this agenda would be implemented or not, all councils in Suffolk had explored innovative ways of working which could allow them to achieve savings and improved services in the face of increasing demands on services and financial constraint. It is argued that the preferred partner solution, proposed by managers of both councils and made partly as a way to gain savings, was also a defensive strategy by the two district councils as they realised that if they cooperate, they will still be able to control what happens to their councils. Indeed, this policy on collaboration was an attempt to avoid central government imposing a unitary Suffolk solution as it was reported that:

“Suffolk’s districts are partnering on closer joint working arrangements in case moves to establish a single council for the whole county do not proceed” (Local Government Chronicle, 2010b, ‘Suffolk Districts Consider Partnering Up’, January 7, p.1).

Consequently, in early 2010 they therefore took a decision to commit to preferred partner status with each other. This was reported:

“Mr Good [Mid-Suffolk chief executive] says the proposed joint arrangements will leave the door open for a potential merger of the two councils if the proposed creation of a single unitary for Suffolk does not happen” (Local Government Chronicle, 2010b, ‘Suffolk Districts Consider Partnering Up’, January 7, p.1).

Moreover, as a period when the government was cutting public spending to address a legacy of immense public debt, the government was urging councils across the country to improve efficiencies. Under the Local Government Act 2010, the government gave new powers and flexibilities to councils, and introduced effective ways of working which
includes ‘sharing back office functions’ in order to enable councils to protect frontline services and achieve savings (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010b, p.2). As the Coalition still promoted collaboration, even if the initiatives were different, it is argued that pro-collaboration policy continuity at national government level had positive impact on the decision on integrating workforces and services in Babergh and Mid-Suffolk later in 2011.

In conclusion, it is argued that although pro-collaboration policy continuity at national government level had considerable impact on the development of collaboration policies in both cases over time, the policy of collaboration and sharing services and officials quickly became embedded as the modus operandi for the two councils. Therefore, there is a strong degree of policy continuity over the period of time. Indeed, this continuity arises in particular because the policy stream developed locally rather than being imposed by national government. Hence, hypothesis was generated as follows:

\[ H_2 \text{ Collaboration policy develops \textit{locally} rather than being imposed by national government.} \]

### 6.1.1.3 Political stream

Conceptually the political stream is comprised of such factors as the results of elections, the changes in public opinion (Kingdon, 1995) the political beliefs, and attitudes of different local political groups (Zahariadis, 1996; Baker, 2007). Empirically, this study found that there are three factors under the political stream that have a powerful effect on the initiation of collaboration policy; \textit{election results at national level, public opinion, and political support.}
This study found that the political stream has the most significant impact on the opening of collaborative windows throughout the development of interagency working in both cases. Essentially, there was a phenomenon where although other streams align well to create the potential for collaboration policy setting, the changes in the political stream inhibited the collaborative window for forming policy. This confirmed the argument of Kingdon (1995) that changes in the political stream can significantly create or inhibit the potential for the opening of a policy window.

**Election results at national level**

The change of national government had no impact on the formation of Adur and Worthing collaborative workings since their collaboration had developed during 2002 to 2007, a period of Labour government. However, the change of government from Labour to a Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition in particular had a positive impact on the opening of a window for Babergh and Mid-Suffolk to formulate the policy on integrating managements and potential merger in July 2010.

The results of the United Kingdom general election in May 2010 led to changes in the political control of British government. The Conservative Party won the largest number of seats, enabling the Conservatives to form the coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, resulting in the end of a 13 year Labour government. This change in British government caused the unitary Suffolk agenda, supported by the previous Labour government, to be ultimately shelved in June 2010.

The disagreement surrounding the unitary local government between the Coalition and its predecessor government can be clearly seen from the statement produced by the
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Conservative MP Eric Pickles, who called the proposals “wasteful and unnecessary restructuring plans” (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010a, p.1). It was clarified in his statement that since the government faced the inherited vast public deficit, it was clear that the first priority was to tackle the deficit and cut unnecessary spending. The unitary plans had to be halted since the cost of restructuring from a two-tier local government to a unitary authority for Suffolk was estimated at £40m (The Local Government Boundary Commission for England, 2009b). On the other hand, without restructuring councils the Coalition government suggested that councils could achieve genuine saving of £39.4m through collaborative working, between each other and with partners (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010a, p.1). In particular, efficiencies were seen to be achieved through sharing back office functions (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010b).

In May 2010, therefore, the Secretary of Stated called a halt to the unitary proposals. When it became clear that the unitary Suffolk was no longer viable, Babergh and Mid-Suffolk still needed to explore alternative innovative ways of working which could result in them responding to the significant Government funding cuts of 25% to 40%. Consequently, during July until September 2010, when all streams provided the potential for the opening of collaborative window, the two councils took a decision to establish the integration of workforces and services and potential merger. The powerful impact of this subtheme, the exogenous force for intensive collaboration formation, can be seen from the excerpts of interview and document data:

“I think it was with the unitary disappearing. They still wanted to achieve the same benefits as the unitary, so they needed to seek another model that brings them to achieve the benefit without having the unitary” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer A, May 2013).
“The failure to arrive at a form of unitary local government for Suffolk means that alternative models must be considered, and the success of both authorities’ partnership working suggests that a model based on strategic collaboration or merger would be the best way forward” (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010b, p. 11).

Public opinion

While public opinion was not a contextual factor surrounding collaboration formation in Adur and Worthing, the attitudes of local constituents towards a full council merger proposal influenced the failure to open the collaborative window for a full constitutional amalgamation in Babergh and Mid-Suffolk. It is important to note that Adur and Worthing also considered amalgamating their councils. In contrast to the Babergh and Mid-Suffolk case, Adur and Worthing decided not to proceed with the merger because it was obstructed by the organisational stream; essentially, the different tax bands of the two councils and the complexity of restructuring processes.

Before considering merger Babergh and Mid-Suffolk councils had committed to preferred partner status, and had started the programme for officers and services integration and potential merger since early 2010. In September 2010 the two councils agreed on an amalgamation approach as the preferred way to cope with the financial constraints facing them, subject to local referendum. It appeared that the other three streams created the opportunity for merging councils. There was the financial and budgetary pressure that councillors and officers paid serious attention to (problem stream). To deal with financial problem proposals were available, namely an integration of workforces and services and a full council amalgamation (policy stream). Also, both proposals were supported by the political leaders and senior officers of both cases (organisational stream). However, the results of local referendums which were held in both areas (political stream) demonstrated
that local constituents of Babergh rejected local government amalgamation (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2011, ‘Babergh and Mid Suffolk residents vote differently on merger’, June 10). This inhibited the opportunity for collaborative entrepreneurs to couple the constitutional merger proposal to the fiscal challenges. As a politician described:

“Local people have spoken and from these results those in Babergh are telling us not to go for merger. We are in very tough times financially, and the estimated additional savings from running one council rather than two, will now have to be found elsewhere” (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2011b, ‘Babergh and Mid Suffolk Residents Vote Differently on Merger’, June 10, p.1).

This finding confirmed the argument that “perceptions of the national mood affect governmental agendas, both by promoting items that fit with that mood and by inhibiting attention to items that do not” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 163). It demonstrated that public opinion was an obstacle to the merger proposal, and raised the integration of workforces and services proposal to prominent status. Empirical evidence also demonstrated that the refusal of local constituents on the merger partly resulted from the attitudes of political groups against this proposal. This will be clarified in the following subtheme.

**Political support**

Empirical data from both cases demonstrated that collaborations will be unlikely to occur without political buy-in. “First of all, there has got to be the political will amongst politicians to want to do it” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer B, February 2014). The obvious situation showing that a lack of political support can halt collaboration formation can be seen from the failure to form the councils’ merger policy in both cases. Political opposition to collaborations particularly occurs if such arrangements cause
organisational and/or political identity loss. In *Adur and Worthing*, a senior officer illustrated such phenomenon:

“Merger was considered in 2005 – 2006 before we decided to go to a shared chief executive and the joint management arrangement, but it was later rejected. One of the reasons was because the political constitution of the two councils might change. Some of the councils are uneasy to lose their identity. Because Worthing is a borough, it’s got the Borough Charter. There is a mayor. And the two councils were worried about just been folded up into one. We never got any idea about what we might call it [combined councils]. They were very concerned. I think deep down lots of members would be concerned about loss of identity” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

Similarly, in the *Babergh and Mid-Suffolk* case, the disagreement over the full constitutional merger proposal among political groups partly led to the failure to open the collaborative window. In September 2010, the merger proposal was agreed in principle to be endorsed as a preferred way forward by both councils, subject to local polls. While voting was in progress during the 9th of May to the 6th of June 2011 to examine the opinion of residents of both areas, there was no unanimous support among political groups for the merger proposal in Babergh District Council. The Babergh Labour, Liberal Democrat and Independent councillors had published a joint statement to urge residents to resist amalgamation because of the issue of financial basis. It was defined in their joint statement provided to residents that “merging would mean a higher council tax in Babergh and residents becoming responsible for part of Mid-Suffolk’s £12m debt, something denied by a paper issued to residents by both finance directors earlier this year” (Local Government Chronicle, 2011b, ‘Babergh Councillors Try to Halt Districts’ Merger, May, 18, p.1). Political opposition to amalgamation proposal was reflected in the councillors’ statements:

“Financially, we believe there are important differentials between the two authorities - many councillors believe that these are significant, they are potentially to Babergh's
disadvantage, and should not be discounted.” (Local Government Chronicle, 2011b, ‘Babergh Councillors Try to Halt Districts’ Merger, May 18, p.1).

“The council agreed to conduct an advisory poll, not a full merger. I always thought it was going too fast and no-one who has sat in meetings with me could have thought I was in favour of merger” (ibid).

From these statements it is perceived that some political groups in Babergh opposed merging with Mid-Suffolk because they thought amalgamation would bring about more financial and political cost and cause their political identity loss. This is consistent with the argument of Schermerhorn and John (1975 cited in Kruathep, 2008, p.161) that the likelihood of cooperation formation is particularly reduced if such collaboration causes organisational and/or political identity loss, or leads to more financial costs.

The disagreement of political groups in Babergh towards amalgamation might result from its political make-up. While Mid-Suffolk has been run by Conservatives and has had a very clear political leader since 2003, Babergh has had no overall control since its establishment in 1974 (Local Government Association, 2012b). Having no consensus among various political groups in Babergh finally led to the failure to open the collaborative window for merger.

Success in the creation of cross-council collaborations policy, however, was not evidently related to party politics. Rather, having similar aspirations between leaders and councillors of putative councils was vital for success. In the Babergh and Mid-Suffolk case, besides the issue of amalgamation, councillors of the two councils worked well in partnership even though they had different political affiliations. An officer stated “the important thing here is that they do that very well even if they are from different political parties” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer B, February 2014). “As they [councillors]
needed to make savings and become more effective, they found that both districts are too small to survive alone. So, intensive joint working was a good idea" another officer confirmed (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer A, May 2013). For the Adur and Worthing case, although they are both Conservative controlled councils, what brought them together to successfully develop joint working was not mainly because they were from the same political party. As a senior officer stated:

“It helps but it’s not the only thing. Because actually even within the Conservative philosophy, there are a number of differences. In Worthing, they are more supportive of a free market economy. In Adur, it’s much more social conservatism" (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer A, November 2013).

An officer added:

“Clearly, local government is about politics, but local government where we have a budget which is getting tighter and tighter and more challenging means the ability to be very political is much more limited, because of working in very tight resources. I wouldn’t say it becomes depoliticised. That isn’t the case. We still have active politics. But I think you can still have shared services with local authorities whose leading parties are different. It might become a bit more challenging, but we’ve not been in that place yet" (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer C, November 2013).

In conclusion, empirical evidence from both cases confirmed the argument that changes in the political stream can greatly promote or inhibited the opportunity for coupling some solutions to problems (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997). Collaboration policy was unlikely to be initiated without political and public support. Collaboration involves changes which usually encounters some resistance. Winning political buy-in and ensuring the ongoing support of councillors throughout the early stages were crucial for promoting collaboration initiatives to staff and public. Hypotheses were generated as follows:
H₃ Collaboration is more likely to occur where it does not challenge local vested interests.

H₄ The more the support of politicians on collaboration proposals, the more likely collaboration will arise.

6.1.2 The Supporting factors for collaboration: strong leadership

Success in developing collaboration policies depends on strong and able leadership from both political leaders and managerial leaders. As an officer mentioned “It is the issue about trust and leadership. You have to have leaders, politicians, and senior officers who believe that this will work” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer C, November 2013).

Strong political leadership is extremely important for bringing visibility to collaboration and providing evidence of a high commitment, when such interagency relationship is a radical idea. In Babergh and Mid Suffolk, when they committed to preferred partner status in 2010, “clearly there was the political will and imperative to make that work” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer B, February 2014). In Adur and Worthing, at the period they decided to share management and services, after implementing shared waste project, political bravery of political leaders was very important. It helped win support of key stakeholders inside and outside the councils. An officer described:

“The thing that really made it work was the political leadership, because although the leader of Worthing had changed, the leader of Adur was in place when we were coming about to see if this is the right way forward, to share a chief executive in that difficult situation and expanding that to the management team and then to services. We have the
political leaders and senior councillors supporting it, understanding it, and seeing the benefits”

“They were encouraged to come along to the conference to promote the partnership working to the manager and the staff. So, they were seen to be leading alongside the chief executive. If they hadn’t have been there the staff could question whether or not we were doing the right thing. But we have the key political leadership and they were very keen to make it success” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

Besides strong political leaders successful policy making requires **executive leadership** to play a vital role in driving forward a collaboration proposal to become policy. An officer highlighted:

“You need to be brave in doing that. There are costs in that process in terms of redundancy cost, or cost that you need to invest in new system or whatever. And there are changes of services. There are risks of why you are doing all of that work, which the quality of services might start reducing when you’re focusing on trying to bring everything together. It takes strong leadership, takes vision to be able to do that. And the role of senior officers is to try to build those business cases to see this is what could be achieved” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer C, November 2013).

Data also demonstrated that a good working relationship between local leaders and senior officers helped in initiating cross-council collaborations. An officer demonstrated:

“In a way, we’ve got a really good top team who were keen to make it work. If we hadn’t have had that, then that would be an obstacle. They work very well with the chief executive and senior officers” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

In conclusion, collaboration is likely to occur when there is a group of local leaders and managerial leaders who are brave, visionary, and can inspire commitment and action to joint working. Collaboration policies depend on both political and managerial leadership. The findings led to the following hypothesis:
Having strong leadership, both political and managerial leadership, was needed for forming deep cross-council collaboration.

6.1.3 The key actor in policy making process: Collaborative entrepreneur

This section argues, following Baker (2007), that a collaborative window is not a result of fortunate circumstances. Although factors previously mentioned emerged to provide the potential for collaboration, they did not just easily and perfectly come into alignment to create the opportunity for the collaborative entrepreneur to push collaboration to be adopted as policy. Rather, it required the actions of collaborative entrepreneurs to realise the presence of those necessary conditions within each stream, adjust them, and couple the proposal they wish to see implemented to the defined problem so that such proposal can become policy.

Councils in both cases can be considered as officer-led. Although the marriage between the two councils required the support of both political and managerial leaders, senior officers (both individuals and in collective form) were collaborative entrepreneurs. They developed cross-council collaboration initiatives. An officer of Adur and Worthing mentioned:

“I can’t remember who said why don’t we commission a piece of work to see whether we could actually introduce a shared management team? There was quite a lot of work done by senior officers. I think at the senior level, we’ve been very lucky because we have a team of officers that are very pro-partnership working” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).
Moreover, they brought together potential partners. An officer described his roles in this regard:

“We tried to work in partnership with other councils. And I think the main issue is to be able to see that there are real benefits in doing it. There was a scheme set up across West Sussex called ‘Better Together’ and I was asked to attend the meeting, initially to see whether services or activities could be provided across the county. From that experience, well, the collaboration between the districts like us was really good. But, when you started to try to dialogue with the upper tier, the county council, it started to become much more difficult. We sometimes found that it’s quite challenging bringing two councils’ services together, but when you then add on five or six more, those challenges multiply many times” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

Furthermore, they realised the opportunity to match proposal to financial pressure, and played important roles to elevate those proposals to the status of policies. An officer of Babergh and Mid Suffolk argued:

“It was with the Unitary proposal disappearing. They still needed to make savings and become more effective. So the two chief executives at that time found that both districts were too small to survive alone. So it was a good idea to become a preferred partner and jointly explore close workings to achieve the benefits of the Unitary” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer D, May 2013).

Having professionals inside councils acting as entrepreneurs is consistent with the argument that entrepreneurs, who are more likely to be able to advance their proposal to become policy, are the persons who have a central position in policy networks (Kingdon, 1995). The findings led to the hypothesis as follows:

H₆ Collaboration proposals will be elevated to the status of policy by the actions of senior officers rather than the politicians.
6.2 What forms of collaboration have been used and why?

Applying the typology of interagency relationship

The previous section examined how and why collaboration policy initiated. This section and the next section analyse the practice of collaboration. To investigate the types of collaboration that have been implemented, the typology of interagency relationship on the continuum built on an organisational perspective, the second part of the integrated conceptual framework of this study (see Chapter 4), was employed. In both cases the collaborative journey can be divided into two key phases (See Figure 16). The first phase is *partnership*, the mid-level relationship where the council voluntarily decided to jointly make decisions and share resources to achieve shared goals in long term. The second phase is *integration*, the highest level of relationship where councils merged staffing structures into one workforce.
In the first phase the relationship was started from sharing a particular service, the depot sharing in Adur and Worthing and integrating waste services in Babergh and Mid-Suffolk. Then, as trust was built, benefits of collaboration were demonstrated by the existing relationship, and solutions for collaborations were available, the two councils decided to deepen their relationship. They did this through establishing a shared chief executive and management and joint services in some areas where there were opportunities to do so. This is consistent with the argument that once partners realise the benefit of a relationship they will inevitably be driven to develop a more integrated relationship (Himmelman, 1996). An officer illustrated such a picture:
“I think the most important was the relationship which was built on waste service. And then there was an appetite to do more. So, we really found ourselves moving toward trying to bring things together. We could do joint management, because we could do the chief executive, and that became a shared chief of Adur and Worthing. At the same time, we had the pressure on the local government finance starting to build in terms of efficiency. So, that really created the environment whereby the rest of partnership working was possible” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

The forms implemented in this phase are conceptualised as a ‘partnership’; this refers to the typology of interagency relationship on the continuum, the second part of the integrated conceptual framework addressing what forms have been used and why (see section 4.2.2.5 of chapter 4), because of their key constituents. The two autonomous councils committed to work together and share resources on the shared strategy, which entailed a long-term commitment. The aim of joint working was to achieve shared goals. In Adur and Worthing the shared desire to achieve substantial savings and services improvements made them agree on PAWS in 2002. This required long-term commitment, as it aimed to establish a single workforce for shared waste services by 2007. Babergh and Mid-Suffolk in 2010 committed to preferred partner status and agreed on shared objectives, which were “financial savings and future resilience in all aspect of service delivery” (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010b. p.3). Since then they have worked closely together to examine sustainable solutions, integrating officer structures and a full constitutional amalgamation, which will offer long-term benefits for both councils, and provide value for money for Council Tax payers. Finally, the two councils worked together through joint decision making and production. In this regard evidence can be seen from Adur and Worthing where the Simultaneous Executive Meeting (SEM) was set up as a decision making mechanism for the joint working arrangements.

In the second phase the existence of cross-council relationship led to creating a single workforce providing integrated services for both areas, where the democratic sovereignty
of each council is retained. This is conceptualised as ‘integration’ - the highest level of interagency relationship; this refers to the typology of interagency relationship on the continuum, the second part of the integrated conceptual framework addressing what forms have been used and why (see section 4.2.2.6 of chapter 4).

Their highly integrated cross-council relationships were developed from less integrated collaboration, consistent with previous studies (the Audit Commission, 1998; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Peterson, 1991; Himmelman, 1996). An officer illustrated:

“At that time we're initially obviously looking at working together at the waste services and bringing those services together. That experience was a positive one. And that built trust and a relationship between the two councils. If you could do waste, you could move on to do other things. And it's the area where we were both very good. We had done a lot of work and consultations, and that was a success. And I think that was great because it really generated trust between the two authorities well, actually we can work together and we like working together. This joint project saved money. It’s been a very complicated project and actually if we can do this project probably most of the partnership projects would be easier” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer C, November 2013).

Regarding why particular form of collaboration was chosen, the empirical evidence demonstrated that a particular form of collaboration was chosen to implement as it fit specific endogenous and exogenous forces for collaboration at a specific period. This confirmed the argument of Takahashi and Smutny (2002, p.165) that “because collaborations form in response to particular collaborative windows, the initial governance structures developed will correspond to the conditions characterising the window”. Babergh and Mid-Suffolk case provides a strong demonstration of this. In 2010, the senior officers learnt the government planned on spending cuts of 25%. Then they proposed amalgamation and a single workforce to the councils. The two councils agreed on an
amalgamation proposal, subject to local referendums, but residents voted no. As the two councils still needed to achieve substantial savings and become effective in the climate of financial constraint, they decided to continue with an alternative intensive collaboration, shared services and management, since it allowed them to gain significant savings, maintain their front line services, and deliver efficient services to residents of both areas while keep councils tax low (Babergh and Mid Suffolk District Councils, 2010a; 2010b).

In conclusion, it is argued that the creation of a deeper relationship over time was influenced by an existing loose institutional working relationship, experience of working together, and driving forces at a particular time. The interaction between cross-council collaboration policy formation and the practice of collaboration is suitably explained by the notion of ‘emergent strategy’ of Mintzberg and Waters (1985), which argues that it is the practice of learning and doing collaboration that create strategy (policy). The councils did not make a major policy decision to collaborate over time; they made a decision on joint working policy as the first step, then commitment escalated. As a result of this the councils deepened their collaborative relationship and, de facto, there is a policy. The findings led to the hypothesis as follows:

\[ H_7 \text{ The creation of a more formal, deeper interagency relationship over time is relative to the longevity of the interagency relationship} \]

6.3 What factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaboration?

Applying the model of factors influencing sustainable collaboration

6.3.1 Individual factor: Collaborative managers
This study argues that to practice and maintain collaborative relationships, it requires individuals to play boundary spanning roles as collaborative manager’s roles rather than collaborative entrepreneur’s roles. While collaborative entrepreneurs are required to bring together partners and couple solutions to the problem in the stage of policy formation, collaborative managers are required to play a vital role in managing and sustaining collaboration after initiation as previously discussed in section 3.5.1.4 of chapter 3.

Data from both cases demonstrated that managerial leaders, a chief executive coupled with the team of senior officers, were collaborative managers able to play various roles, including new leadership roles, to facilitate the practice of cross-council working. The need for senior officers to be collaborative managers results from the fact that both cases demonstrated a single workforce covering two sovereign councils. Highly integrated collaboration particularly required managers able to work across council boundaries and work closely with councillors of both councils to cement relationships between two councils. This study suggests that in managing cross-council relationships collaborative managers exercised their specific skills, abilities, and personal traits. These allowed them to successfully undertake key activities supporting the operation of collaboration.

**Building sustainable relationships**

In Babergh and Mid Suffolk, as part of my observations on the 15\textsuperscript{th} of May 2013 of the informal managerial officers meeting and on the 8\textsuperscript{th} of July 2013 of the Political Management Skills workshops for officers, I noticed that the shared chief executive with management team played leadership roles in fostering effective collaborations. They made a strong effort to equip both councillors and officers to go through the transformation process by initiating a number of mechanisms such as training and
workshops. For example, training for managers was created to develop their ability to manage the political dimension. This is because they realised that with one workforce serving two councils the appropriate relationships between managers and councillors will be critical to this arrangement (observation, May 2013). This showed their visionary leadership, supportive of long-lasting collaboration. Moreover, the shared chief executive always attends all events to show their enthusiasm for successful collaboration, which helps in winning buy-in from councillors and managerial officers, gaining support from staff, and maintaining staff morale.

**Managing through influencing and negotiation**

Data from two cases is consistent with argument of Williams (2002) that collaboration concerns the management of difference, requiring boundary spanners to facilitate the process of building and sustaining effective collaborations. *Harmonising the two councils and the two sets of policy* was highlighted by interviewees as one of the key roles of collaborative managers, where collaboration in both cases involves a single workforce serving two sovereign councils. The necessary competencies, which frequently appeared in the conversation with senior officers, were *an acute understanding of differences, negotiation, influencing* and *steering*. When the two councils have different political-make up and culture in particular, it required managers to support the councillors to build relationships, put differences behind them, and work closely together to pursue mutual goals. A *Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer* explained:

“At the first place they were frustrated by the fact that both councils had different political make-up and culture. Mid Suffolk has straightforward decision making, Babergh has slow decision making and vice versa. We had harmonised them and supported them to accept the differences” (Telephone interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer C, March 2014).
Senior officers acting as collaborative managers developed mechanisms for helping people from different organisations and backgrounds get to know each other. They also ensured these people had an understanding of the overall picture and shared goals of partnerships. These included informal and formal meetings of the councillors of two councils, training, and workshops. An officer explained:

“We developed the governing body to steer the collaborative working called JMIB where the leading members and senior officers of both councils can work together and discuss together in this body. And there were several means that had been used to harmonise the two councils. There were seminars where each set of members had a chance to get to know each other. The relationship and trust between members was built on these means” (Telephone interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer C, March 2014).

Similarly, these ways of managing the differences and building sustainable relationships were implemented in Adur and Worthing, as an officer discussed:

“There was the circumstance that Worthing had already moved to the cabinet system but Adur still had a policy committee with the chair and senior members. So, we developed what we called ‘Simultaneous Executive Meeting’. So you have two executives’ functions of the councils meeting together in the same room, considering the same report, and hopefully making the same decision” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

Regarding harmonising the two sets of policy, interviews with senior officers revealed that they had been aware of the autonomy and legitimacy of each council. They acknowledged that although the staffing structures were integrated, the democratic sovereignty of each council remained. Each council still has to be responsible for residents in its territory which means “the policies of the different councils could be different” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer A, November 2013). To respond to this aspect, workshops were created and facilitated by directors to be a place where
councillors of both councils can work collaboratively together. An officer described this process:

“In the workshop, you get the members together to start working with them about how we are facing these challenges, this is the issue, how do we resolve it, what policy do we need, and you need them to work collaboratively…It’s not the decision making stage. This is the stage that you can collect information, listen quite a bit well about what members say, understand where they’re coming from, and try to get them to work together to solve issues” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer A, May 2013).

Also, in the workshops collaborative managers can **steer** councillors to form one set of policy for two areas in pursuance of shared goal, such as significant savings. An officer described the way in which senior officers exercised steering skills:

“Steering has always been a technique that officers would need… but more so now. You have to be more intervening. To steer effectively you need to understand what drive these people and where they want to go. So you steer them to where they want to go. And in a way to steer you have to slightly follow the lead of members, but then steer them to vote for this, or at least get them to explore it's actually being here is better than being over there. It’s to make sure that these two sets of members have a good relationship” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer A, May 2013).

Another officer explained how **negotiation** skills were exercised by senior officers in response to this issue:

“I think you have to work closely with them to understand why they wanted us to do the different thing and to see whether that is gonna be the efficient way of doing things. Because at the end of the day… the way our resources have been reducing, we have always had to make sure that we providing things much more effectively at the reduced cost generally. And that’s where the savings, the large savings from partnerships, have come into place. So, you have to work with them and inform them about the benefits and disbenefits of doing something in a particular way” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).
Acting *honestly* and *objectively* was another effective role for dealing with the policy difference if it occurred, consistent with the argument of Williams (2002, p. 117) that deals between various parties can be successfully realised by the action of expertise who plays ‘the honest broker role’. An officer defined:

“We need to talk to them about why they want to do that policy. Is it significant because of some geographical aspect? All the things I think, we are the people who look at the harmony. So, just be honest and talk to them honestly” (Telephone interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer F, March 2004).

**Managing complexity**

While harmonising two autonomous councils to work collaboratively well together was vital to sustainable collaboration, understating their differences, and ensuring they retain independence and are served equally by a single team, proved to be critical skills of collaborative managers. “They might think like...am I getting a fair share of officers?” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer B, May 2013). Data demonstrated that directors played a vital role in mitigating the councillors’ concerns of the loss of officer support and bias against any specific council. An officer illustrated:

“Yesterday I had a meeting in Needham Market, which is in Mid-Suffolk council, with two Babergh councillors who had to go there for meeting. They commented that ‘We never see you in Hadleigh’ (the Babergh council). But when I’m over there, politicians say ‘We never see you in Needham Market’. So, we have had to work very hard [he stressed] to convince and assure members that just because we are in one place doesn’t mean we are not working for the other council. So, you need to give them confidence that you are doing the work anywhere” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer B, February 2014).

These findings led to the following hypothesis:
Collaboration is more likely to be sustainable when senior officers act as collaborative managers rather than the politicians.

6.3.2 Organisational factors

6.3.2.1 Collaborative culture

Besides the contribution of individuals to collaboration, as previously discussed, data showed that sustainable collaboration requires partners to develop new ways of working. Empirical evidence confirmed the arguments of Newman (1996) and Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) that it requires partners to resource and support the development of a collaborative culture, such as responsive and adaptive councils, which will be facilitative of a long-lasting relationship. Collaborative culture was developed in the councils in two ways. A number of mechanisms, such as training and workshops, were used to support staff, particularly senior officers, to be able to work well across council boundaries. In both cases there have been managers who successfully played boundary spanners’ roles in facilitating and progressing interagency relationship as previously discussed. A strong focus on the community and decentralised service delivery was recently considered in both cases as they realised that failure to secure people’s understanding about joint working might to be a barrier for sustainable collaboration. An officer demonstrated:

“And sometimes you’ll find that some communities think the other one is bad and this will bring them down to that level. We have to say we’re trying to get them both to come up to the best – what’s the best for Babergh and the best for Mid-Suffolk; that’s what we want” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer B, February 2014).
Recently the leaders of both cases believed that becoming an adaptive council that focuses on empowering communities to coproduce the shared services helped sustain the collaborative relationship between the two councils. This is because it helps secure frontline services and allows the councils to achieve significant savings and service improvements in a period of financial pressure. A senior officer of Adur and Worthing described:

“We were bureaucratic and we can be offensive. We do some partnership work but not enough, particularly at this stage of the economy cycle where the UK has been in a recession cycle for about four years. The squeeze on public sectors means we have no choice but to help develop the capacity of the community to do things themselves, to run services” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer A, November 2013).

An officer of Babergh and Mid Suffolk case mentioned the same strategy:

“By collaborating together you are more efficient and you can have a smaller staff doing things for both councils. Now, we’ve got to start deciding that we are going to stop doing things we used to do, because we don’t have the same number of people anymore. But that doesn’t mean the collaboration and sharing things is not a good thing, it just means you need to encourage your communities, villages, towns to do more for themselves” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer E, February 2014).

The findings led to the following hypothesis:

\[ H_9 \] The more a collaborative culture is developed and promoted by each of the partners; the more sustainable collaboration will be achieved

**6.3.2.2 Building a coalition for change**
Building a coalition for change is a factor supporting sustainable collaboration which emerged from empirical evidence. Both cases demonstrated integrating two officer structures into single organisation, which made a completed transformation in the way of working. This form of collaboration greatly affected people both inside and around organisations. Hence, engaging with key stakeholders at the early stages and throughout the entire process of collaboration is essential for a long-lasting relationship. “You need to involve everybody at the start to make it work” an officer explained (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer C, November 2013).

Engaging with staff

Integrating staffing structures into one workforce to deliver shared services and to serve two separate councils involves a change process where current working operations may be changed and some staff may lose their jobs. This can decrease staff morale. An officer indicated:

“When it comes down to change, there’s a natural aversion to change by people. People who’ve been working in a particular way for a long time, they don’t like anything that’s going to change. I think there was a bit of fear of the unknown” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer C, November 2013).

Addressing staff’s concerns over change and winning their support for the transformation process was vital to the success of collaboration. “We spent a lot of time and energy in engaging with staff. Otherwise you will get bureaucracy pretending to do things but really not committed to them” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer A, November 2013). An officer added:
“You need to bring people with you and convince them that you’re doing the right thing. Because without the people to make it work... you can have the system and IT in place but if you can’t lead people, bring them with you because they wanted to, you’ll get the hard battle. You need to get people to want to be with you and keep going” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer E, February 2014).

In both cases the transition to shared services and management and integrated workforce did not happen quickly in short timescales, rather it was an incremental process which helped maintain staff morale. For example, in Adur and Worthing a full integration of services and a single workforce was agreed by the two councils in 2007. A two-year services integration programme, embracing the business case for each service review, was initiated. During 2007-2009 was a period that the process of transition to shared services and transferring staff to the joint structure had been done on a phased basis. Finally, in 2010 a single workforce went live.

One organisation serving two councils means also officers are responsible for the different organisational cultures and democratic structures in place in each council. To be able to work effectively in the new arrangement new skills are required. A number of mechanisms such as training, workshops, and one-on-one mentoring have been initiated by directors, the collaborative managers, to equip staff to effectively work across boundaries. It also helps managers who have to work closely with two sets of councillors to develop their ability to manage the political dimensions. These techniques were also employed to make staff understand the rationale for integration and how integration might affect them, which allowed directors to realise how staff feel about change. An officer illustrated the whole picture:

“We’ve done a lot of work with staff on what we called Culture and Behaviours. We put a lot of effort in trying to help people come through change. There were some people that just couldn’t see the benefits of the joint working. So they were quite resistant to the
change. I think probably one of the main challenges was managing the people and trying to encourage them to take part, to give them the support, to give them training if needed. And we spent a long time on trying to promote the benefits because some people couldn’t see further than the things in front of them” (personal interview Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

Moreover, involving operational leaders responsible for ongoing service delivery at an early stage in developing the business case was believed to be vital to long-lasting collaborations. An officer defined:

“A more operational board that was called ‘partnership support group’ was set. In this board we had all of the support areas – finance, technical services, legal, cooperate strategy with the thing like HR- plus some others like support officers. The details to run the partnership were done with this partnership support group” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

Another officer described:

“The head of services were asked really to look at how all of those things could be weaved into their business cases and deliver shared services” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer C, November 2013).

Engaging with councillors

Securing ongoing support of councillors was mentioned by interviewees as critical to long-lasting shared arrangements, where senior officers played a vital boundary spanner role. Councillors were kept onside in the early days of the practice of collaboration initiatives to maintain their support. This was done by establishing a partnership board comprising the leading councillors and senior officers of both councils. In this mechanism, “they were setting policy, and the direction of the partnership was going to work and then looking at how services are going to be brought together” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing
officer B, November 2013). Another mechanism employed to sustain support of councillors was the business case as it reminded them the reason to collaborate and the expected benefits of collaboration. An officer put in:

“Politically the members have to consider how this plays back in their district or borough. It’s important that they have the ability to sell that back to their locality. And the business case makes sense. It shows that it isn’t about losing control because we are still two separate councils that have joint services. We haven’t merged” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer C, November 2013).

In both cases the specific key challenge of a joint workforce covering two independent authorities was dealing with the councillors’ concern about the loss of staff support. An officer explained: “There were worries and concerns that if officers are in a particular place, they are not working for the other place” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer E, February 2014). Another officer confirmed:

“There have been one or two grumbles occasionally as members perceived that officers were working for one council more than the other council. There might be time like I’m working on the project for this council and the member of the other council tried to contact me and felt like I was not interested in his council” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

Hence, it is important for senior officers to make councillors understand that both councils are served equally. This was achieved by senior officers acting as collaborative managers as previously discussed in section 6.3.1. The findings led to the following hypothesis:

$$H_{11} \text{ When the key stakeholders have been engaged in collaboration process by partnering councils, it leads to a likelihood of sustainable collaboration.}$$
Conclusion

This chapter discussed the findings of employing thematic analysis to investigate the two English cases to deal with the initial three key research questions. The two English cases were treated as exploratory set of cases to develop in-depth understanding about how and why cross-council collaborations policy initiates and operate as it does. To achieve the research objectives of conducting a cross-national comparative investigation to generate insightful explanations of the formation of collaboration policy and its practice at local government level, the findings of the English cases analysis were used to generate hypotheses for testing in Thailand, which will be discussed in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 7

LOCAL GOVERNMENT COLLABORATION IN THAILAND:
LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS WITHIN THE TWO THAI CASES

Introduction

This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first provides the background of Thai local government. The second discusses the policy overview and the current situation of local government collaboration in Thailand. The third section is longitudinal analysis within the two Thai cases, inter-local government in Lampang with a shared landfill and waste management service between four small local governments, and inter-local government in Roi-Et with joint disaster prevention and mitigation services between four small local governments. The fourth concerns the discussion on key challenges regarding forming and practicing the collaboration policy in the Thai context. This within cases analysis enables the researcher to gain rich familiarity with each case prior to undertaking thematic analysis to test hypotheses generated from the English cases, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

7.1 The background of Thai local government

Thailand is a unitary state. In 1932 a democratic regime was introduced in the Constitutional Revolution. The country officially became a constitutional monarchy with a prime minister as the head of government. There is a full written constitution defining the governmental and administrative structure of the state. The state is governed by a parliamentary system, incorporating three-levels of administrative structure; central,
regional, and local. The central administration consists of a number of ministries serving as the executive branch. The regional administration is constituted by a number of arm length bodies of central ministries covering 76 provinces. However, these bodies are seen as branches of national government, which have neither absolute autonomy nor power over policy making (Krueathep et al, 2010). In contrast to those bodies, at the local level administration consists of local governmental units, defined in the constitution to be autonomous bodies.

Regarding local administration, after the 1932 Constitutional Revolution one form of local government, *Municipality* or *Thesaban*, was established and operated under the concept of local self-government in 35 urban areas across the country (Nagia et al, 2008). As the decentralisation and democratisation process has made gradual progress, various types of local governments were created and operated across the country. At the early stage of the decentralisation process, however, it seemed these bodies ‘did not play an important role in public service delivery compared with the central government and its branch offices’ since ‘all local governments accounted for less than 10 percent of total national expenditures’ (Nagia et al. 2008, p.2). Throughout the 1930s-1980s the Thai local governments were seen as a subordinate mechanism, created by the state in order to deliver some public services to citizens.

Essentially, the promulgation of both the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997) and the Determining Plans and Process of Decentralization Act B.E. 2542 (1999) were seen as significant local government reform in Thailand. There had been important positive developments since these laws came into effect (UNDP, Thailand and Department of Local Administration, 2009). As the autonomous status of local governments was guaranteed in the 1997 Constitution, the various Acts related to local government had been revised and enacted to block interventions in local government
management from central government (Nagia et al., 2008). Furthermore, the legal basis for devolved functions was provided; a large number of functions have been devolved from central to local government. It was also the first time that the directly elected mayors and local councillors approach was implemented in all types of local government in Thailand. Finally, the legal framework provided the specific functions of local governments in all types minimised overlapping of functions among different types of local governments.

Thailand employs a two-tier local government system which is made up of five types of local authority. There are three types of local governments - The Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO), Municipality (Thesaban), and Tambon Administrative Organisation (TAO), operated throughout 76 provinces. The Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO) (76 units) is the upper tier responsible for large-scale public services provision covering an entire province. The lower-tier local government comprises of Municipality (Thesaban) and Tambon Administrative Organisation (TAO). Municipality (2,082 units by the year 2011) has three forms in terms of different function as designed by law. Tambon Administrative Organisation (TAO) (5,693 units by the year 2011), the smallest unit closest to local people is the lower-tier which operates small-scale functions. While Municipalities are established in urban areas TAOs are founded in rural areas, to serve the value of grass-roots democracy and to promote the public’s participation (Rajchagool, 2001). In total there are 7,853 local government units in Thailand (Department of Local Administration, 2011).

It is important to note that there is a codified constitution providing local government with a statutory underpinning, setting out the rights and responsibilities of local governments and their relationship with central government, and defining the status of local government as an autonomous body. However, there have still been a number of laws and regulations
which are direct central government instruments in place to control local governments. Furthermore, there are a number of central governmental bodies which provide guidance, monitor, and inspect the operation of local governments. Under legislation and central government interventions, Thai local government appears to be appropriately described as a semi-autonomous unit, able to do only the things they are statutorily permitted to do.

7.2 Inter-local government collaboration: policy overview

While the functions of local authorities have been increasing as the central government has continually devolved powers and responsibilities to local governments since 1997, a number of Thai local governments are still facing great challenges in providing services. Policy problems spill over the boundaries of more than one jurisdiction, for example environment issues, which require horizontal coordination. Contiguous functions being allocated to different tiers of local government lead to the need for vertical coordination (UNDP, Thailand and Department of Local Administration, 2009, p.3). There are a large number of small local governments which have limited resources – money, equipment, and qualified staff – to provide services in efficient ways (Krueathep, 2004; Department of Local Administration, 2008). If they invest in some projects, such as constructing waste water disposal systems, they face the economies of scale issue (Department of Local Administration, 2008; UNDP, Thailand and Department of Local Administration, 2009).

In 2008 the Department of Local Administration developed the local government improvement policy. This is a strategy of improving local administration capacity to equip small councils to tackle the economies of scale issues, to deal with more complex responsibilities, and to efficiently deliver public services (Department of Local Administration, 2008). Following the launch of this strategy, studies commissioned by the
national government were undertaken that provided policy recommendations on possible ways for enhancing the efficiency of small local governments; such as contracting out, local government amalgamation, and cross-council collaboration (Department of Local Administration, 2008; UNDP and Department of Local Administration, 2009.).

In the study on Thailand’s decentralisation process conducted by United Nations Development Programme Thailand alongside the Department of Local Administration of Ministry of Interior (2009), increasing the effectiveness of carrying out local governments’ duties and reforming local government structure were raised as primary agenda. Two key possible methods were recommended. Firstly, the number of TAOs should be decreased by ‘merging them and then upgrade them to municipalities’ through local government amalgamation (UNDP, Thailand and Department of Local Administration, 2009, p. 6). Secondly, encouraging inter-local government cooperation would enable small councils to effectively provide services. However, both mechanisms were recommended as a medium-term strategy, expected to be implemented four to six years after the study was published. Academic knowledge and a feasibility study are still required to support the implementation of these strategies.

It is important to note that amalgamation, the merging two or more small councils into a larger unit (Local Government Association of Queensland, 2005), has never been used as a means to enhance the capacity of local governments in Thailand. In contrast there have been collaborative approaches by some local governments towards cooperating with each other to deliver services in the pursuit of economy and effectiveness (Department of Local Administration, 2008).
7.2.1 Current position of local government collaboration in Thailand

The idea of collaboration between local governments is not at all new. It was stipulated in the Municipality Act 1953 that a *syndicate* can be established as a legal entity, based on the cooperation between two or more municipalities, in order to address policy issues of shared concern. However, a syndicate can be established only between ‘municipalities’, not other types of local government. Furthermore, municipalities that have used a syndicate for collaborative working are scarce (College of Local Government Development, 2006).

Besides a syndicate cross-council collaboration has been implemented in both formal and informal ways. Nevertheless, most collaboration is informal, where coordination usually occurs among neighbouring local governments, and is grounded on a close relationship between local leaders where the relationship not based on any written agreement. Regarding formalised collaboration with a written agreement, the studies by the Thailand Innovation Administration Consultancy Institute (2004) and Department of Local Administration (2008) showed that some local governments have implemented formal collaboration by establishing partnerships based on a formal contract agreement for joint delivery of public services.

However, existing studies have demonstrated that there are significant obstacles that local governments have been encountering when implementing collaboration (Department of Provincial Administration, 2002; Thailand Innovation Administration Consultancy Institute, 2004; Department of Local Administration, 2008). Although the autonomous status of Thai local government has been guaranteed by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand
1997, in practice local government can do things only what they are statutorily permitted
to do. Although the Determining Plans and Process of Decentralization Act B.E. 2542
(1999) has encouraged all types of local government to cooperate with others without
establishing a legal entity in order to provide services, many local leaders still have no
confidence to create any highly integrated collaborations because of an absence of
specific laws permitting them to do. Furthermore, since there are only few studies which
provide recommendations for implementing this method, local governments may lack
knowledge about the feasible ways of practicing collaboration. These limitations result in
little progress in implementing formal collaboration.

The promulgation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007) further
provided an opportunity for local governments to form collaboration. It was stipulated in
section 283 of the constitution that inter-local government cooperation should be
supported and ‘a new service provider organisation’ can be established, based on
cooperation between local governments, in order to deliver efficient local services to
citizens (Department of Local Administration, 2008). To grasp this opportunity and to
address the issues mentioned before, the Department of Local Administration (2008) has
conducted two operational studies on local government collaboration during 2005-2012,
covering 6 local areas in order to provide possible models of collaboration. The first
project is an operational study of the way in which local governments in three areas have
cooperated among others in order to deliver three cross-cutting issues. These all require
inter-local government’s cooperation; waste disposal, infrastructure construction and
maintenance, and disaster prevention and mitigation. Nevertheless, from the finding of the
first study, establishing a new service provider organisation which is based on
collaboration between local governments to tackle common issues and to deliver services
of shared concerned is only one model which was recommended to be employed under
the current legal restrictions.
7.3 Longitudinal analysis within the two Thai cases

This section examines the collaborative journey of the two Thai cases of a shared waste management between local governments in Lampang province and shared disaster prevention and mitigations services between local governments in Roi-Et Province (see Figure 17 for the location of each case on the map of Thailand). Both cases demonstrate joint working within lower-tier local governments, specifically Municipalities and Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAO). Whilst the municipality is responsible for urban areas, and TAO responsible for rural areas, these two types of local governments perform similar functions as follows (Krueathep, 2004, pp. 272-273):

- Local and community planning and development.
- Promotion of local economic development, investment, employment, trade, and tourism.
- Local public services provision; including local roads, walkways, public transportation system and traffic light engineering, public markets, ports and docks, waste treatment, water drainage system, public utilities, parks and recreation, garbage collection, pet controls, slaughtering, public safety, natural resource and environmental provision, disaster control, sanitation and cremation services.
- Social welfare services provisions; including education, social welfare for children and for the elderly and disabilities, primary health care and medical services, housing and restoration, arts and cultures.
- Promotion of democratic values, civil rights, public participation, laws and order, and conflict resolution.

Each local government unit is formed of an executive body and a local council headed by the elected executive, who is referred to as the mayor, who is also the chief political head of local government (Krueathep et al, 2010).
Figure 17: Map of Thailand showing the location of the two Thai cases located in Lampang province and Roi-Et province

7.3.1 Inter-local government collaboration in Lampang

There are 104 local governmental units in Lampang (Department of Local Administration, 2014). Lampang Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO) is an upper-tier local government, responsible for large-scale public services provision covering an entire province. Also there are 103 lower-tier local governments comprised of 41 Municipalities, operating small-scale functions in urban areas, and 31 Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAOs,) providing small-scale services in rural areas. In 2006, four lower-tier local governments in Lampang province namely Koh-kha Sub-district Municipality, Sala TAO, Thapa TAO, and Koh-kha maeyao TAO\(^5\) committed to working together on a shared landfill and joint waste management service.

Figure 18: Map showing location of neighbouring councils sharing a landfill and waste management service in Lampang

Source: Collaborating Centre for Shared Waste Management Service in Lampang (2011)

\(^5\) The last three organisations have now been upgraded to Sub-district Municipalities.
Data demonstrated that their collaboration was divided into two phases, where the formal shared waste service proceeded from the initial loose institutional interaction. While resource scarcity and dependency issues play an important part to start the interagency relationship process, the presence of the national government’s shared services initiative and a strong mayor are the key factors leading to changes in their relationship.

**Figure 19: The chronology of inter-local government collaboration in Lampang, the 1990s onwards**

Source: the researcher

**Phase 1: A loose collaboration on shared landfill (1990s – 2006)**

In the Lampang case a shared landfill without a written agreement, which then progressed to waste services with a formal written agreement between the lower-tier councils, was driven by two problems: resource dependency and resource scarcity. Regarding **resource dependency** there has been one landfill in this geographical area controlled by Kho-kah municipality, which most councils have been dependent on for decades (see Figure 20). Historically this landfill belonged to a unitary local government that was responsible for the whole area. The 1990s local government reform resulted in the establishment of a large number of lower-tier local governments with their own territory.
and jurisdiction across the country. In the Lampang case in 1999 the Koh-kha municipality resulted from the previous unitary local government that used to have rights over the landfill. Hence, Koh-kha requested the central administration grant them rights over the management of the landfill. Since then this landfill had been managed by Koh-kha for many years, before the establishment of a number of neighbouring TAOs in this area. However, when the TAOs emerged as a result of the local government reform, it was discovered that the landfill had been located in Sala TAO’s territory, whilst Koh-kha still had rights over it because of having more capacity than others. As none of the new-born TAOs had their own landfill the mayor of each council individually asked the mayor of Koh-kah municipality’s permission for dumping waste into this landfill. A politician of a TAO illustrated such a picture:

“The key point was that we all have not had our own landfill, which also means we had limited capacities and resources in waste services. In the beginning we did not think about savings as a goal at all, but just the need to solve the limited capacities” (personal interview, Lampang politician A, June 2014).

**Figure 20: Resource dependency issue in Lampang case**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A unitary local government (Past)</th>
<th>A number of small local councils (Present)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landfill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sala TAO, the local authority where the landfill is located</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koh-kha Sub-district Municipality, the host organisation which has more capacity and resources in providing waste service and has rights in managing the landfill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the researcher
Besides the resource dependency, *lacking capacity and resources* in providing waste services was another driving force that drove each TAO to actively seek a relationship with Koh-kha municipality. Among the partners only Koh-kha municipality had the capacity and sufficient resources in waste services production (See table 8). Koh-kha municipality had two waste collection vehicles whereas Thapa had only one vehicle and the others had none. Especially, Koh-kha was only council that has an effective method of waste management, whereas the others lack knowledge of management in such a service (Department of Local Administration, 2008). All TAOs had a small and tight budget (see table 9) and constructing its own landfill would require a large amount of money for investment. To mitigate the diseconomies of scale, therefore, relying on the resources of Koh-Kha municipality was seen by each TAO as a pragmatic way to accomplish their task on waste services.

**Table 8: The capacity and resource of partners in waste management service prior to the shared waste management service**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local government</th>
<th>The amount of waste (ton per day)</th>
<th>Number of vehicle for waste collection</th>
<th>Waste management staff</th>
<th>Approach to waste collection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koh-Kha</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Managed by council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sala</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Managed by community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thapa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Managed by council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koh-kah maeyao</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Outsourcing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Local Administration (2008, p.23)
Table 9: The population, area, and revenue of lower tier local governments that work together in Lampang province in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Locally collected revenues (million baht)</th>
<th>Centrally collected taxes for local government (million baht)</th>
<th>Grants (million baht)</th>
<th>Total revenue (million baht)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koh-kha municipality</td>
<td>139.14</td>
<td>5,047</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>12.86</td>
<td>23.84</td>
<td>40.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sala TAO</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>5,520</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>20.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koh-kah maeyao TAO</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>3,603</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>13.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thapa TAO</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>6,062</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>9.36</td>
<td>11.13</td>
<td>21.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the Department of Local Administration, Thailand (2009)

http://www.dla.go.th/work/money/data/03/Summary_52.pdfA

All interview respondents confirmed that the genesis of collaboration and its development over time was driven by resource dependency and scarcity issues. A politician highlighted:

“The driving force behind joint working was the problem facing us. Our council had no landfill and lacked capabilities to manage the waste issues. We had an idea that we needed to work together, otherwise these problems would be unable to be fixed. Constructing a landfill by ourselves seemed to be impossible. Investment and maintenance costs would be high, which we cannot afford due to our limited fiscal resource” (personal interview, Lampang politician A, June 2014).

A senior officer added “If each TAO had a landfill and had sufficient budget in managing waste issues, they would not have a desire to cooperate” (personal interview, Lampang officer A, June 2014).
Empirically the relationship in this phase was a loose institutional relationship built on personal relationships between local leaders, conceptualised as a **Network**, a relationship not based on any formal written agreement where individual councils still maintain their autonomy (refers to the integrated conceptual framework of this study, section 4.2.2.1 of chapter 4). As a senior officer described “in an attempt to address resource constraints facing each council, we just informally shared the landfill without written agreement, but relied heavily on the interpersonal relationships between local leaders” (personal interview, Lampang officer B, June 2014). After Kho-kha municipality had allowed each TAO to use the shared landfill without written agreement for years, such a relationship then “resulted in an inappropriate use of a shared landfill, because all TAOs lacked proper knowledge to manage waste issues before sending it to the landfill (personal interview, Lampang politician A, June 2014).

**Phase 2: A formal shared landfill and waste services (2006 onwards)**

Evidently, Koh-Kah municipality could work independently and might not be interested in formally cooperating with others, as it has the rights in managing the landfill as well as greater capacity regarding waste management knowledge than neighbouring councils. All councils were individually given permission by Koh-Kah to dump waste into this landfill free of charge and without a written agreement. The waste from each council had been increasing year by year, however, because those small neighbouring councils lacked appropriate waste management knowledge and skills. This placed Koh-kha in great difficulty managing the limited space. Particularly, the spending on waste disposal had increased. To solve such problems the mayor of Koh-Kha exercised authoritative power
by persuading dependent TAOs to become partners in a highly integrated cooperation governed by a written agreement. A politician stated:

“Koh-kha is a big-brother to those new-born councils which still lack capacity. Also, the landfill is managed by Kho-kha. All these aspects made me think I must act as a leader to lead them to form a formal shared arrangement (personal interview, Lampang politician B, June 2014).

There were three significant factors supporting the initiation of a shared landfill and waste management in 2006; the national government’s shared services initiative, political buy-in, the public support.

The data showed that without the pre-existing national government's shared services proposal this case was unlikely to step from a shared landfill based on interpersonal relationship to a joint waste management with a written agreement. In 2005 the Department of Local Administration, the governmental body that responsible for the administration and improvement of Thai local governments, in collaboration with Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Thammasat University conducted the operational study on local government cooperation. It aimed at developing the manual of cooperation for encouraging local government to practice collaborative approach. As the manager of the landfill, the mayor of Koh-kha considered such a project as a chance to initiate a formal relationship with all dependent TAOs, as she believed that it would solve the resource dependency issue and problems related to sharing landfill with limited space in long-term. A politician described:

“The four neighbouring councils have been dumping waste into the same landfill without proper management to reduce waste prior to sending it to the landfill for many years. Those newborn councils had limited knowledge about how to reduce, reuse and recycle
waste… I heard about the government’s project and I thought it would be a starting point to get things done, to fix the problem of over waste on the limited space of landfill, in a sustainable way” (personal interview, Lampang politician B, June 2014).

Another important factor for forming shared waste management was **public support, a sub-factor of the political stream.** Respondents revealed that holding local forums to ascertain public support for joint waste services was a precondition for each council to become a partner. Data demonstrated that the important reason that made residents of TAOs vote for the shared waste service were that they had no landfill. Moreover, “the main reason for them was that the waste would not be dumped in their home” (personal interview, Lampang politician A, June 2014). A senior officer confirmed “No community wants a landfill to be located in their areas” (personal interview, Lampang officer C, June 2014). Although the resource constraint and dependency issues facing TAOs were interpreted in such way by local residents, their concern over it created the opportunity for the mayor of Koh-kha to couple a shared services proposal to such problems.

Furthermore, each authority must gain the **political support of** more than half of all the councillors of a council to become partner in the shared arrangement (Collaborating Centre for Shared Waste Management Service in Lampang, 2006). Gaining the support of the councillors in each council was not a key challenge, as councillors were already aware of the resource dependency and scarcity issues facing them, and they saw the joint service as a potential means to fix it. “There was no problem in gaining support from councillors, because our real key problem was that our council had no landfill and they were fully aware of this issue” (personal interview, Lampang politician A, June 2014).

The occurrence of those key factors aligned with the resource dependency and scarcity problems, allowing the Mayor of Koh-kha to act as **collaborative entrepreneur** (see
Chapter 3) by convincing neighbouring councils sharing the landfill to be partners, and applying to be a part of the project. On 28 December 2005 the mayor of Kho-kha exercised power by holding the meeting and inviting three councils depending on the landfill to consider this opportunity together (Koh-kha Municipality, 2005). As all TAOs need to use the landfill controlled by Kho-kha they agreed to participate in this project. Consequently, in June 2006 the new single separate entity was formed as a body where neighboring councils can jointly work on the shared landfill and waste management service. A senior officer described:

“We had dumped waste into the same landfill for so long without any written agreement on how to manage the joint use of landfill. Then, [the mayor of Koh-kha] saw the project as an opportunity to set a formal arrangement to address the problems of the shared limited space of landfill, facing us for a decade” (personal interview, Lampang officer B, June 2014).

A virtual organisation without legal identity was developed as the governance structure of the shared landfill and waste services. The relationship is governed by a written agreement, specifically a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), defining a 3-year relationship and the intensive commitment of partners to operate aligned activities and to pool resources - particularly money in joint waste management service. The joint executive committee for waste service was set up to be the main decision-making mechanism where representatives of each autonomous council made decisions together. A sub-committee was created to be responsible for day-to-day operations, constituted by the chief executive and the law officer of partnering councils, chaired by the chief executive of Koh-kha. The law officers are appointed to be committee members due to Thailand having no specific legal support for complicated shared services arrangements. “We need to have them to help us figure out many things that require legal advice. For example, at the beginning we were not sure that if we bought the equipment, then who
would control it. There were many challenges that required their help” (personal interview, Lampang officer A, June 2014). This situation is consistent with the argument that “specialised legal advice should be sought in establishing a collaborative alliance” (Bailey and Koney, 2000, p.102). Theoretically, such an arrangement is conceptualised as a Partnership, a highly integrated institutional collaboration designed to achieve shared goals and benefits in a sustainable way (refers to the integrated conceptual framework of this study, section 4.2.2.5 of chapter 4).

Regarding resource arrangements, this collaboration has been operating in two ways. In the first each council still retains responsibility for waste services in-house. Each council still employs staff and has rights over its money and equipment, as well as the use of these resources to provide waste services, such as collection and recycling for its own area. However, the partners jointly consider their budgets and assign some part of their resources, especially staff action and time, to deliver agreed respective objectives. For example, each council was asked by the joint committee to implement community-based waste management programmes in their areas by using their individual resources, helping decrease the amount of waste from the whole area. Indeed, the aligned activities in support of shared waste services are delivered using the resources of each partner.

At the same time, each council spend a portion of their waste budget to support the cross-council waste management. Each council directly pays that money to the single fund under the Collaborating Centre for Shared Waste Management Service, the virtual organisation for partnership managed by Koh-kha municipality, to accomplish the shared goal which is to sustainably reduce waste in the whole area. In the initial place all partnering TAOs paid an equal 100,000 Baht per year to the fund, while Koh-kha paid a greater 200,000 per year, because of having more resources than the others (Department of Local Administration, 2008). Now they are all pay equally. A number of programmes for
reducing waste have been implemented in all areas of partnering governments, leading to a decrease in the amount of waste going to the shared landfill. This successful practice attracted more neighbouring councils to become partners. Therefore, since 2013 there have been six councils working together on the joint waste management service for this area.

7.3.2 Inter-local government collaboration in Roi-Et

Roi-Et is a province in the northeast of Thailand with 203 local governmental units in total (Department of Local Administration, 2014). Roi-Et Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO) is the upper-tier local government. There are 73 municipalities delivering services in urban areas and 129 TAOs providing services for people in rural areas. In 2007 four neighbouring councils in Roi-Et, Roi-Et Municipality, Nua-muang TAO, Donglan TAO, and Robmuang TAO, voluntarily formed a highly integrated joint working on disaster prevention and mitigation service. Their collaborative journey is similar to Lampang case, in that the joint service with a written agreement was developed from their loose institutional relationship grounded on the interpersonal relationship between local leaders.

Figure 21: The chronology of inter-local government collaboration in Roi-Et, the 1990s onwards

Phase 1: Loose collaboration on disaster service

Networking

the 1990s
An assistance on providing disaster prevention and mitigation service was given from Roi-Et municipality to 3 neighbouring councils without formal agreement.

Phase 2: Formal collaboration on disaster service

Partnership

2007
4 councils commenced a joint disaster prevention and mitigation service, with a formal written agreement and procedures.

2011
Khonkean TAO was included in the shared service.

Source: the researcher
Phase 1: A loose collaboration on disaster prevention and mitigation service (1990s – 2007)

The genesis of a loose institutional cross-council relationship which progressed to joint service with a formal written in this case was driven by resource constraint and interdependency issues facing the TAOs to effectively deliver disaster prevention and mitigation service. As was mentioned in the section of the project background of the 2013 annual report of their shared service:

“The problem is many of us have still been facing the resource constraints. A number of small local governments have limited ability and resources namely staff, equipment, and suitable knowledge to deal with disaster” (Collaborating Centre for Shared Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Service in Roi-Et, 2013, p.3).
In this geographical area only Roi-Et municipality has full capacity to provide such a service, while all neighbouring councils lack qualified staff and equipment, and have a smaller budget compared with Roi-Et municipality (see Table 10). Due to the limited capacity and resources facing the TAOs, each individual TAO chose to establish a relationship with Roi-Et municipality so that they can receive assistance from such a powerful council. The relationship in this phase meant that when disaster occurred, for example, fire, in one of these neighbouring TAOs's territory, the mayor of the TAO asked the mayor of Roi-Et municipality to send staff and fire engines to help control the fire. Viewed this way, the interaction between Roi-ET and each TAO in this phase is conceptualised as a Network, an interagency relationship constituted on the personal relationship at the top level (refers to the integrated conceptual model of this study in chapter 4). A senior officer indicated:

“When fire occurred, we just called them [Roi-Et municipality], our small neighbouring TAOs always called them and asked for help. He [the mayor of Roi-Et] is like a big brother to us” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer C, July 2014).

Table 10: The population, area, and revenue of lower tier local governments that work together in Roi-Et province in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Source of revenue</th>
<th>Total revenue (million baht)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Locally collected revenues (million baht)</td>
<td>Centrally collected taxes for local government (million baht)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roi-Et municipality</td>
<td>11.63</td>
<td>34,637</td>
<td>40.25</td>
<td>61.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donglan TAO</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>8,076</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>10.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robmuang TAO</td>
<td>28.25</td>
<td>16,621</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>18.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nua-muang TAO</td>
<td>29.25</td>
<td>19,505</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>20.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the Department of Local Administration, Thailand (2009)
A politician described the *resource dependency* and the way in which the loose institutional relationship based on verbal agreement was operated:

“Roi-Et municipality has been operating for 60 years while these four TAOs have just emerged since the mid to end of the 1990s. Obviously, Roi-Et municipality has more experience, capacity, and resources - namely staff, money, and equipment - than those TAOs. Located in the centre among the neighbouring councils, Roi-Et has always been asked to help these councils control disaster when it occurred. We must go out to help even though we had been unsure who was going to be responsible for the expenditure from the operation outside our own territory” (personal interview, Roi-Et politician B, August 2014).

**Phase 2: A formal joint disaster prevention and mitigation service (2007 onwards)**

After each TAO had relied on this loose institutional relationship with Roi-Et municipality for almost a decade, a formal, long-term joint disaster service between Roi-Et and all TAOs was formed in 2007. In fact, Roi-Et municipality could maintain its own position and continue delivering a good quality of service without working in partnership with others, as it has a full capacity in disaster service production. However, the informal relationship with no written agreement caused problems for Roi-Et, as it had to deliver services outside its own territory without supporting laws. It had never been clear how, and how much, Roi-Et can charge the TAOs for the service operated. The presence of significant factors, namely the continuity of resource dependency and resource scarcity issues, the national government’s shared service initiative, political support, and strong political leader enabled the mayor of Roi-Et to act as collaborative entrepreneur in forming the shared service policy.
All respondents confirmed that the continuity of resource dependency and scarcity issues was one of the significant forces resulting in the decision to form the joint disaster service. A politician of a TAO defined:

“Each TAO has very limited financial resource. If we invested money in this service to operate alone, we would not have enough money for other services. But if we shared resources, led by Roi-Et municipality who has more money and skilled workers than us, the better service can be delivered within the financial constraints facing us” (personal interview, Roi-Et politician A, July 2014).

The presence of the pre-existing shared services proposal proposed by national government was another significant factor that led to a change in their relationship. In 2005 the mayor of Roi-Et applied to join the same government’s project as the Lampang case, realising the government’s project was an opportunity to persuade TAOs relying on Roi-Et municipality to become partners in a highly integrated partnership. Roi-Et’s application was rejected. However, the presence of this project gave the mayor of Roi-Et’s confidence in creating shared disaster service, since it was promoted by the government. A politician discussed:

“At least the Department of Local Administration acknowledged that we were going to do this, which indeed followed their model. So, it was not going to be problematic. To sum up, this joint working arose from two things: the problem we faced and government’s agenda” (personal interview, Roi-Et politician B, August 2014).

All respondents mentioned that the mayor of Roi-Et municipality was a strong political leader, another factor generating the high potential for forming the joint service. Although Roi-Et case was not selected to be involved in the study or gain direct support by the national government, he still had a keen interest in forming a highly integrated collaboration and acted as a collaborative entrepreneur. He wished to push this national
government’s available solution to be implemented, as it could respond to the resource scarcity and dependency in delivering disaster prevention and mitigation service facing them. Furthermore, such arrangements can provide improved disaster service to citizens long-term. “He did not give up because he saw it as a great opportunity to fix the long term issue” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer C, July 2014). It was described:

“I applied for the project but got rejected. Anyway I had seen the model implemented in Kanchanaburi supported by government and I was so sure it’s going to work for our case. So, I thought it’s time to move on no matter what happens. Actually, we [Roi-Et municipality] can work alone but we wanted to help them increase their capacity. Working together will improve disaster service for our whole area, so that people will receive a better service. That’s why we formed a joint service” (personal interview, Roi-Et politician B, August 2014).

A politician of a TAO confirmed “what brought us together was the mayor of Roi-Et, who partners trusted. His leadership was the key. In other areas the political leader’s concern might be to survive individually. They might think about their own territory, but the leader in our areas didn’t” (personal interview, Roi-Et politician A, July 2014).

Then, during 2005 – 2007, the group of political leaders and officers of the four councils had visited Kanchanaburi which had implemented a joint disaster prevention and mitigation service, supported by the Department of Local Administration. These visits were fairly regular, as they wanted to learn the way in which collaboration formed and was implemented. Then prior to becoming a partner in the joint disaster management service, each council must gain approval from the councillors.

Once there was the occurrence of the national’s government proposal on shared services, the resource dependency and scarcity issues, and the political support, the mayor of Roi-Et municipality, the strong political leader, grasped this opportunity to form a joint disaster
service. He played a collaborative entrepreneur’ role (refer to chapter 3) by convincing three neighbouring councils, which always asked for help, to become partners in a formal joint disaster service. As all dependent councils need to continually access key resources controlled by Roi-Et, they agreed on such an arrangement. Consequently, in 2007 a joint disaster prevention and mitigation service between the four neighbouring councils was established. As senior officer of a depending TAO explained:

“At that time, this council did not even have a fire engine. Many of TAOs did not have adequate firefighting equipment and lacked suitable skills and knowledge to effectively provide such a service, whereas Roi-Et municipality was a powerful council. This led us to think working alone was not an option anymore. We needed to deepen the relationship with others, especially with Roi-Et municipality, so that long-term benefits could be achieved” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer B, July 2014).

Regarding the governance structure of the joint service, a virtual organisation, without legal identity, where partners can work together was created. This form of collaboration has strong similarities to the Lampang case, and can also be conceptualised as a Partnership (refers to the integrated conceptual framework of this study in chapter 4). It is a highly integrated collaboration constituted by the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) setting out a 3-year relationship. Moreover, the MOU defines the commitment of partners to operate aligned activities and to pool resources, namely finance, staff, and equipment. It also defines the respective goal of collaboration as “enhancing the local governments’ capacity in providing disaster service so that the quality of life of people in this area will be increased and their security will be ensured” (Collaborating Centre for Shared Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Service in Roi-Et, 2013, p.3). The governance arrangement is set up by two bodies, the Fire joint executive committee and the working group. The Executive Joint Committee is an upper tier key decision-making mechanism responsible for setting policy and direction for joint working arrangements, consistent with the
argument that shared decision making is a basic requirement in collaboration (Houge, 1993). The councillors of the executive committee are the mayor, the chief executive, the political member’s representatives, and the resident representatives of each partnering council, chaired by the mayor of the leading council. The working group is responsible for the operational level. Its members are comprised of the chief of the fire section and the chief of the office of partnering councils.

The way they shared resources is also similar to the Lampang case, where two approaches have been operated. In the first approach each partner directly pays equal cash to the single fund under the Centre for Shared Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Service while Roi-Et municipality, as a leading council, pays more than others. Roi-Et municipality also acts as a host to manage the fund. The pooled money has been spent on achieving the common goal through purchasing equipment and training staff of all councils so that they have a same working standard.

Along with this approach each council retains responsibility for the disaster prevention and mitigation service in-house. They continue to employ their staff to deliver disaster services for their own area. The staff are, however, trained together and go out to respond to disasters on behalf of the Centre for Shared Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Service, when requested by partners. Additionally, each council still has to spend money on key equipment for delivering disaster service in its own territory. Essentially, in the joint meeting partners consider their budgets and align activities in support of a shared disaster management, delivered from the resources of each partner. For example, although all partners can use the shared resources, such as equipment and staff, “a council had been told by the committee to purchase a fire engine for using in its own area, instead of always waiting for help from the partners, which might be too late to control fire” (personal interview, Roi-Et mayor B, August 2014). In 2012, Khonkaen TAO applied to join the
shared service. Since then there have been five councils providing joint disaster service in this area.

7.4 Key challenges of the initiation of collaboration policy in Thai context

The empirical data demonstrated in the previous sections confirmed the argument that collaboration has been difficult to initiate since it involves politics, power, and people (McGuire, 2006). Specifically in the Thai context, there are some challenges to the establishment of collaboration that need to be considered. Firstly, the formation of collaboration policy in local government level and its practice relied greatly on strong political leadership. This resulted from the context whereby Thai local governments can do only what they are statutorily permitted to do. However, there have been no particular laws defining how a formal and highly integrated collaboration can be formed. It required strong political leaders, who are brave enough and confident that a deep institutional collaboration, for example shared services, can be achieved as long as it complies with the requirements of the relevant legislations, to act as collaborative entrepreneur to bring together putative partnering councils. Moreover, such political leaders who play collaborative entrepreneurs’ roles need to be highly trusted by potential partners. In this regard, the point to be considered is what would happen for areas which have no strong leadership. It seems unlikely that collaboration can emerge in these areas. Secondly, shared services in both cases were developed from the fact that there is a larger and powerful council that has full competency in providing a particular service, which seems to easily convince other small councils to work with. This is because the small councils, which lack capacity and resources, can have continued access to the resources controlled by the larger council. Essentially, it seems having a larger council that can lead
neighbouring smaller councils is one of the necessary factor for the initiation of collaboration in the Thai context.

7.5 The common characteristics of shared services arrangement in both cases

In both cases the collaborating centre for the joint service, a separate virtual unit, was formed as a mechanism for governing the partnership. Within such a virtual unit, the joint committee was established to be the key decision-making mechanism responsible for setting the strategy and direction. However, it is important to note that the joint committee, which represents the collaborative centre, can neither purchase or hold assets nor employ staff for delivering the shared service. Its characteristic in this respect is equivalent to the constitutional form of partnership ‘Joint Committee’ suggested by Sullivan and Skelcher (2002, p.143). Instead, the municipality where the collaborating centre was located acted as the host for the collaboration. The procurement of equipment for joint services is made by the host council. The host council also holds and manages the equipment on behalf of the centre and those partners. Furthermore, the officers relevant to the shared services in both cases were not actually integrated into the collaborating centre. They are still employed by each council. They are, however, trained together to have a same standard and deliver service together when requested by a partner. The host council was also assigned the responsibility to act as a convening organisation responsible for facilitating regular meetings and coordinating relevant tasks among partners (Bailey and Koney, 2000; McGuire, 2006). In this respect, as it was mentioned above that the collaborating centre is unable to employ staff, officers of this leading organisation were assigned a duty to run routine administration for the collaborating centre besides their normal job.
7.6 Key challenges of the practice of collaboration in Thai context

The empirical cases demonstrate that intensive collaboration has not been smoothly practiced without challenges, consistent with the argument that “once established, however, collaborations continue to present challenges” (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 7). Firstly, the two Thai cases demonstrated the presence of the mayor of the leading councils, who acted as collaborative managers to facilitate and maintain interagency relationships. However, their political position is temporary. The possible challenge is whether the collaboration will be effectively implemented when they leave the council.

Secondly, although councillors of all partnering councils were supportive of a shared service initiative, securing the ongoing support of councillors proved to be a key challenge. In Roi-Et the issue that emerged concerns the equal payment, where each partners must pay money equally and directly to the single fund to support shared objectives. Recently, there have been different views on this equal payment, as there are different levels of revenue among those TAOs. Furthermore, there has been an opinion currently expressed by some councils that the disaster prevention and mitigation service could, and should, be managed by a small council with limited resources working alone, rather than investing a large amount of money into the service integration arrangement. A senior officer pointed out:

“Our council now has started to think about the money that each TAO needs to pay equally into the joint service. The political members said our organisation is very small in terms of both area and revenue compared to others, but we must pay equally which is quite unfair. Some mentioned that the disaster, for example, fire, rarely happens in our area. And when it happened it was just a small case which we could control by working alone. So, why do we have to invest 200,000 Baht into the shared service every year? 100,000 Baht a year as in the first few year is okay, but 200,000 Baht is too much for a small government like us” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer E, August 2014).
However, the interviewee added that the council “still does not have the desire to withdraw from the joint working, but the negotiation on the proper amount of payment will be raised in the committee meeting”. This situation is consistent with the argument that the likelihood of collaboration formation is reduced if collaborations cause more financial costs than working alone (Shermerhorn and John, 1975 cited in Krueatehep, 2010, p.161). Such circumstances might be problematic for sustaining and developing their relationship, particularly challenging for the collaborative managers, as the key human resources forming the backbone of collaboration to sustain partnership. Besides this emerging challenge, the factors affecting the operation of inter-local government collaboration in the Thai context will be discussed in the next chapter.

**Conclusion**

Longitudinal analysis within cases revealed specific characteristics relevant to the genesis of collaboration policy and its practice of each case. It enabled the researcher to realise that there are a number of common features within the two Thai cases, characterising their initiation and practice of collaboration policy. *Firstly*, both cases demonstrated a shared service that was driven by the need of councils to address resources dependency and scarcity issues.

*Secondly*, their collaborative journey can be seen as having two phases. Loose relationship, a network built on interpersonal relationship of local leaders, initiated first. Then, it was developed into a more integrated relationship consisting of shared services with written agreements and long-term commitments. *At the first stage*, the relationship was constituted in the situation where a number of councils lacking in-house resources and knowledge to effectively provide a particular service. They realised that they needed
resources for fulfilling their individual goals, and these were in the hands of another organisation; municipalities in both cases. Hence, each council asked the powerful municipalities, who controlled the necessary resources, for permission to use such critical resources, without written and formal agreement. *From the perspective of those depending councils,* such a relationship allowed them to access the needed resources; allowing them to accomplish their individual tasks. *From the perspective of the powerful municipalities,* however, this kind of loose and informal institutional collaboration created problems. Without any contract and written agreement it appeared that municipalities found themselves locked-in to the small councils, because they perceived themselves to be supportive “big brothers” to those TAOs. The mayor of the powerful councils believed that it was their responsibility to help those little new-born brothers lacking capacity and expertise. All these issues forced councils to move to a more integrated collaboration, with high commitment of partners to contribute to shared goals.

*At the second stage of their journey,* therefore, the mayor of authoritative municipalities exercised their power by acting as collaborative entrepreneur. To push the pre-existing national government’s shared services proposal into becoming policy, they convinced those small dependent councils to become partners. A highly structured and formalised shared service was established. In both cases the highly integrated collaboration was unlikely to occur without the strong mayor of the authoritative municipality, who acted as collaborative entrepreneur to initiate collaboration policy, and played a collaborative manager role to facilitate and maintain the practice of partnership.
CHAPTER 8
THE THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF THAI CASES AND
THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ENGLISH AND THAI CASES

Introduction

The previous chapter provided the longitudinal analysis within the two Thai cases. This chapter analyses the results of hypotheses testing. In this study the researcher is using term ‘hypothesis’ to refer to the explanations of collaboration that have been identified from qualitative analysis – they are provisional explanations whose robustness and context specificity will be examined in the cross-national comparison.

To test hypotheses generated from the English cases the integrated conceptual framework (see Chapter 4), combined with the thematic cross-case analysis, was employed to analyse empirical evidence from the two Thai cases. The findings will be demonstrated relating to the three research questions. Besides providing the results and analysis of hypothesis testing, this study also discusses the findings of the Thai cases compared with the English cases. Consequently, a comparison of the formation and the practice of cross-council collaboration between the two countries is provided in Table 11.
Table 11: A comparison of local government collaboration between the English case and Thai cases (developed by the researcher)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>English cases</th>
<th>Thai cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RQ1 How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated?</strong></td>
<td><strong>Problem stream (necessary condition)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Resources scarcity</strong> – small local governments lacking capacity and resources to effectively provide service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kingdon’s agenda setting model, 1995; Lober’ collaboration forming model, 1997).</td>
<td><strong>Resource scarcity</strong> – financial constraints facing the two councils, where they have equal supplies and no one dominates the essential resources (non-hierarchical exchange of resources)</td>
<td><strong>Resources dependency</strong> – the necessary resource for fulfilment of each council’s tasks controlled by one powerful council (uneven relationship as one council controls key resources that others need)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy stream (necessary condition)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Collaboration initiatives have been locally driven, facilitated by the pro-collaboration policy continuity at national level</strong></td>
<td><strong>Collaboration initiatives were locally driven</strong>, enabled by national government’s shared service initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The incremental process</strong> in which there were gradual steps towards a collaborative solution</td>
<td>Councils have discretion over their policy creation. Due to the leaders’ fear of entering into a highly integrated collaboration because of an absence of law supporting it, the shared service in both cases would not have occurred without the national government’s shared service initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political stream (necessary condition)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Public opinion</strong> – collaboration is less likely to happen where it is opposed by citizens <strong>Political support</strong> – the formation of collaboration is subject to the approval of both councils</td>
<td><strong>Public opinion</strong> – people forum was a precondition for collaboration <strong>Political support</strong> – to be a partner each council needed to gain approval of its council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisational stream (supporting condition)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strong leadership, both political and executive,</strong> is critical to the success of forming collaboration policy</td>
<td><strong>Strong political leadership</strong> is the most important for forming formal inter-local authority collaboration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collaborative entrepreneurs</strong></td>
<td><strong>The managerial leaders</strong> and a group of senior officers acted as collaborative entrepreneurs, developing collaboration proposals and pushing them to become policies. (Officer-led authorities)**</td>
<td><strong>The political leader</strong> of the authoritative council that has more capacity and resources than others acted as a collaborative entrepreneur, elevating the government’s shared service initiative to become policy. (Member-led authorities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research questions</td>
<td>English cases</td>
<td>Thai cases</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **RQ2 What forms of collaboration have been used and why?** | - Both cases reached the highest level of relationship, i.e. *integration* – the merger of two workforces into a single organisation serving two sovereign councils and delivering services for the two areas  
- The creation of the more integrated and formalised collaboration was developed from their less integrated relationship | - Both cases reached the mid-level relationship on the continuum, i.e. partnership – a joint decision making and production for a particular service  
- The creation of the more integrated and formalised collaboration was developed from their loose institutional relationship grounded on interpersonal relationships between local leaders, i.e. network |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
<th>Integration</th>
</tr>
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</table>

**RQ3 What factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaboration?**  
(The model of factors influencing sustainable collaboration. See figure 9)

| The managerial leaders and a group of senior officers acted as collaborative managers, facilitating and sustaining collaboration | The political leader of the host council and a group of senior officers acted as collaborative managers, facilitating and maintaining collaboration. |

**Building a coalition for change** by engaging key stakeholders is essential for sustainable collaboration, particularly where collaboration is integrating two officer structures into single organisation which made a significant change in the way of working which affected people both inside and around organisations.

**Collaborative culture.** In the bilateral relationship, it requires both partnering organisations to promote and develop collaborative culture – an adaptive and responsive organisation – which will be supportive of the operation of new ways of working, roles, and relationships.

**Trust** at both individual and organisational levels is essential to operating and maintaining collaboration (emerging factor).
8.1 How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated?

This section presents the findings regarding reasons why local governments choose to enter into collaboration with one another, and the way in which cross-council collaboration can be formed in both countries. To test the hypotheses generated from the English cases the policy-making models (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997) were employed to analyse the Thai data. This study found that where collaboration might arise in both countries, there needed to be the necessary conditions present to create the potential for collaboration. These necessary conditions were sub-factors under the Problem, Policy, and Political streams. Moreover, organisational capacity, or the organisational stream, was a supporting factor for collaboration. However, this study argues that those factors do not perfectly converge together to create the collaborative window; the opportunity for the collaborative entrepreneurs to match the pet collaboration proposal to the defined problem. Rather, it requires the collaborative entrepreneurs to realise the presence of these streams, alter and align them so that collaboration proposal can be actually elevated to the status of policy. Essentially, the intersection of the four streams, which resulted in the opening of the collaborative window, is not a fortunate phenomenon. Rather it can be created by the actions of the collaborative entrepreneurs.

The empirical evidences highlighted a number of similar factors characterising the initiation of collaboration in both countries. However, collaboration in each country were also driven by striking internal influences resulting from the local and national context, consistent with the argument that “each collaboration is set in its own local context, and will be subject to particular influences as a result” (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 116).
**RQ1** How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated?

### The necessary conditions creating potential for collaboration

| Problem stream | $H_1$: **Scarcity of resources** leads to a greater likelihood of inter-local governmental collaboration. | **Accepted** |
| Policy stream | $H_2$: Collaboration policy develops **locally** rather than being imposed by national government. | **Accepted** |
| Political stream | $H_3$: Collaboration is more likely to occur where it does not challenge local vested interests. | **Accepted** |

$H_4$: The more the **support of politicians** on a collaborative proposal, the more likely collaboration will arise.

### The supporting factors for collaboration

| Organisational stream | $H_5$: **Strong leadership, both political and managerial**, is needed for forming deep cross-council collaboration. | **Rejected** |

### The actor in policy making process who realises the potential for collaboration

| Collaborative entrepreneur | $H_6$: Collaboration proposals will be elevated to the status of policy by the actions of **senior officers** rather than the politicians. | **Rejected** |

### 8.1.1 The necessary conditions creating the potential for collaboration

#### 8.1.1.1 Problem stream: resource scarcity and resource dependency
**Hypothesis:** Scarcity of resources leads to a greater likelihood of inter-local governmental collaboration.

This hypothesis is accepted as Thai case data demonstrated that lacking expertise and in-house resources, money, equipment, and knowledge, to effectively provide a particular service was the impetus for collaboration between Thai small local governments. It also confirmed the argument of previous studies that resource scarcity is one of the important motivations for inter-organisational collaboration (Aiken and Hage, 1968; Wiess, 1987; O’Toole, 1997; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Krueathep et al., 2010). In both countries the empirical evidence of the cases demonstrated that resource constraints were the common significant reason why small local governments decided to enter into collaboration with one another. However, the phenomenon of resource dependency was a striking feature of the Thai cases, that made the formation of collaboration policy in the Thai cases differ from the English cases. While collaboration in the English cases is a bilateral and equal relationship, where partners have equal supplies to share, collaboration in the Thai cases is an asymmetric relationship, as one partner has more resources than others and control key resources that others need.

**English cases: non-hierarchical exchange of resources**

At the beginning of the collaborative journey in both English cases the two councils voluntarily decided to share resources to achieve mutual goals, to achieve cost savings, services improvements, and capacity enhancement in the face of financial constraints, where they have equal supplies (see Chapter 6). This relationship is consistent with exchange theory, which argues that in a situation of resource scarcity where no one
body controls more resources than others, organisations form voluntary exchange relations to achieve positive outcomes for the whole service system (Levine and White, 1962; Cook, 1977; Skelcher and Sullivan, 2008). Then, the relationship developed over time as small councils in both cases must respond to significant government funding cuts. It might be expected that financial pressures would cause councils to protect their resources by self-interested, non-collaborative behaviour, or even to try and put other councils in a dependent position on them. However, this did not happen; early successes reinforced pro-collaboration policy, and political and public support. Hence, to achieve substantial savings councils decided to develop more integrated relationships, shared services and management, which then progressed to the integrated workforce serving two sovereign councils.

Thai cases: hierarchical share of resources

In contrast to the bilateral and equal relationship in the English cases the development of cross-council collaboration in the Thai cases reflected an unbalanced relationship between, the small TAO councils lacking resources and the larger municipality council, which has more resources. In both Thai cases there was a powerful council that had full capacity and controlled critical scarce resources that other small councils needed to fulfil their tasks; Koh-kah municipality that controls the only one landfill in Lampang, and Roi-Et municipality that has more capacity and resources in delivering disaster prevention and mitigation in Roi-Et. At the beginning of their collaboration each mayor of the small councils lacking key resources – finance, qualified staff, and equipment – created an interpersonal relationship with the mayor of the powerful council by asking for permission to use the needed scarce resources without any written agreement. This loose institutional relationship was driven by the self-interest of each individual small council to address resources constraint facing individual council. For instance, in Lampang each small
council asked the larger council for permission to dump waste into the landfill free of charge, because none of them had their own landfill. This relationship created problems for the larger council, as the spending on waste disposal had increased. It was because waste that had been increasing year by year; the small councils lacked competency in managing waste prior sending to the landfill. Similarly, in Roi-Et the Roi-Et municipality faced problems helping smaller councils deliver disaster services outside its territory, without legal support. Viewed this way the larger councils became locked-in to a disadvantageous relationship controlled by the small councils. This form of collaboration was facilitated by cultural norms in Thai society and the Thai local government system, in which the big brother council was expected to help smaller new-born councils.

The larger councils with full capacity and resources in both cases could decide to end the loose institutional relationship and work independently. However, the mayors of the larger chose to deepen relationship with those small councils. Data demonstrated that they exercised their power by convincing the smaller councils into a formalised collaborative partnership. On the one hand they needed to mitigate problems facing them caused by the relationship without written agreement. On the other hand, in both cases, the mayors of the larger council perceived themselves as a big brother who had responsibility to help those little new-born councils. Moreover, data demonstrated that shared service was perceived by the leaders of the larger councils as a productive mechanism for achieving the effective use of scarce resources, and providing better services for the wider community beyond their territories. Due to this mixture of both self-interest and altruism they acted as collaborative entrepreneurs to push the pre-existing government’s proposal on a shared service into becoming policy. This action of the authoritative councils led to step change in both cases, in which highly structured and formalised collaborations, shared landfill and waste services in Lampang and shared disaster prevention and mitigation services in Roi-ET, were established.
For those small councils, entering into the formalised collaboration required them to pay more money into the joint arrangement than the previous loose institutional relationship. However, they were willing to become partner as playing this cross-council collaboration game enabled them to address resource constraints by securing long-term access to key resources controlled by the larger council. As a politician mentioned:

“Each TAO has very limited financial resources. If we invested money in this service to operate alone, we would not have enough money for other services. But if we shared resources, led by Roi-Et municipality who has more money and skilled workers than us, better service can be delivered within the financial constraints facing us” (personal interview, Roi-Et politician A, July 2014).

In conclusion, this study argues that resource scarcity and dependency was a key factor influencing the decision of local governments to form collaboration in the first place, and to deepen their relationship over time in both countries. Collaborations were formed so that essential resources vital to their survival and growth could be secured. In the English cases to respond to financial pressures small councils voluntarily shared resources, where no one controls the distribution of resources consistent with the fundamental idea of exchange theory. In contrast, collaboration in the Thai cases is asymmetrical; there is one council controlling critical scarce resource that others are dependent on. In this regard, the motivation to collaborate is uneven. At the beginning of their journey small councils lacking resources and capacity chose to rely on the larger controlling council in pursuit of their survival, resulting in temporary networking without written formal agreement. Then, the factor contributing to the development of the ad hoc relationship to a formal institutional collaborative arrangement was the action of the mayor of the larger council, coupled with the presence of the national government’s shared services proposal. As the mayors of the larger councils perceived themselves as a big brother and found themselves locked-in by those small councils, they induced small councils dependent on
them to become partners in shared services. This was believed to fix problems caused by the previous loose institutional relationship, to achieve better use of scarce resources, and to generate improved services for people in the whole area.

8.1.1.2 Policy stream

\( H_2 \) Collaboration policy develops locally rather than being imposed by national government.

This hypothesis is accepted as the Thai data demonstrated that the initiation of collaboration policy in both case was driven by the need of councils to respond to the resource scarcity and dependency facing them. However, this study found that councils in both countries would not have been successfully formed inter-local government collaboration without national government’s policy enabling it.

*In the Thai cases* without the national government’s shared services initiative, both cases would not have established shared services. Thai local government is defined by constitution as an autonomous body which has discretion to make policy without central government approval. However, the integrated service was seen as radical approach with no law supporting it. This caused local leaders’ fear about establishing highly integrated collaborations since it might not be lawful. The presence of national government’s initiative eliminated local leaders’ fear by giving the form of collaboration legitimacy.

After facing resource dependency which could not be effectively addressed by ad hoc, loose institutional relationship for many years, the mayor of the larger council in both Thai cases perceived the pre-existing government’s shared services initiative as a potential
solution. They grasped this opportunity by acting as the collaborative entrepreneur to pick the government’s initiative they wished to see implemented becoming policy. The leading mayor of both cases applied to join the project where Lampang was accepted. Although Roi-Et was rejected, the occurrence of the government’s initiative mitigated the fear of the mayor of Roi-Et municipality about initiating shared disaster prevention and mitigation service. This is because it was believed that shared service was legitimised by government. It was mentioned:

“At least the Department of Local Administration had acknowledged that we were going to do this, which indeed following their model (personal interview, Roi-Et politician B, August 2014).”

The English cases demonstrated the incremental process in which there were gradual steps towards a collaborative solution. In response to significant financial challenges facing the councils, senior officers of the councils invented forms of collaboration and proposed them to councillors for making decision. As the councils have discretion over their internal management structures and modes of service delivery, it enabled them to develop additional and formalised forms of cooperation over time to respond opportunistically to new possibilities. Moreover, collaboration policies were created through voluntary cooperation between councils. Hence, it is argued that collaboration initiatives have been locally driven.

In conclusion, this study found that the policy-making model (Kingdon, 1995) effectively provided a way of explaining the formation of collaboration in both countries as it reveals that where collaboration between local governments might arise, it requires proposals on collaboration to be available (policy stream). This study pinpoints that where joint working between small councils can be formed, there needs to be collaboration proposals, either proposed by local or national governments, available. Furthermore, it defines that
although local governments have discretion over their policy initiation, inevitably the pro-
collaboration policy at national level is factor enabling the creation of collaboration policy
at local governmental level in both countries. Particularly, the Thai cases would not have
been able to step from the loose institutional relationship to the highly structured shared
services without the presence of the government’s shared services initiative.

8.1.1.3 Political stream – public opinion

$H_3$ Collaboration is more likely to occur where it does not challenge local vested
interests.

This hypothesis is accepted because the Thai cases demonstrated that collaboration was
successfully formed as local people realised the benefits of it. In both countries gaining
public support is a precondition for collaboration. Whereas Thai councils held local forums
on the shared services because citizens were expected to partly coproduce it, English
councils held local referendums on the council merger proposal to increase the legitimacy
of decision-making. This is because council amalgamation would have a significant impact
on the way that services were provided which would affect citizens’ benefit.

In the Thai cases holding local forums to ascertain the support of citizens was the
precondition for partnership in shared services. Councils in Lampang succeeded in
gaining public support for the joint waste service proposal, as it met the demands of local
people. A senior officer confirmed “No community wants a landfill to be located in their
areas” (personal interview, Lampang officer C, June 2014). In contrast, it is argued,
drawing upon Kingdon (1995), that people’s attitude against the collaboration proposal
can be the restraining force that discourages the genesis of collaboration. A politician described:

“There were many local governments that wanted to be our partner but they were unable to obtain local people’s support in the referendums, because the attitude of people is that waste segregation, recycling, and reuse make their life more difficult. If the proposal was rejected by residents, the council will not be selected to be a partner. Can you imagine if we accepted the council that cannot gain the support of communities? They will just bring waste into the shared landfill without the cooperation of their people to reduce waste. It wouldn’t benefit the partnership at all” (personal interview, Lampang politician B, June 2014).

From the perspectives mentioned above, it is argued that the Thai cases held referendums since they considered that efficient shared waste disposal and joint disaster planning required the involvement of citizens who coproduce the service. However, in the English cases, local referendums were held to increase the legitimacy of decision making processes when they were considering the transformation in their structure, a full council amalgamation. The obvious situation can be seen from the Babergh and Mid Suffolk case. To ensure that the policy could meet residents’ demand, both districts defined that “only if more than 50% of those voting in both district voted ‘yes’ would the merger proposals continue to the next stage” (Local Government Chronicle, 2011c, ‘Voter’s Split over Council Merger Proposals’, June 8, p.1). The results showed that voters in Babergh rejected the proposal because of concerns over the financial equation. Failure to secure public support ended the constitutional merger proposal.

In conclusion, this study argues that when collaboration proposals do not challenge peoples vested interested they provide a bright opportunity for collaborative entrepreneurs to push such a proposal into becoming policy. However, rejection by the people can inhibit the opening of a collaborative window. This phenomenon is consistent with the argument
that a shift of public opinions within the political stream can either promote or inhibit a policy window (Kingdon, 1995).

8.1.1.4 Political stream – political support

H₄ The more the support of politicians on a collaboration proposal, the more likely collaboration will arise.

This hypothesis is accepted since the Thai case data showed that without the endorsement of political members of the putative councils, shared services would not be formed. In both countries political buy-in proved to be crucial to the success of any forms of collaborations. This also confirmed the argument of Kingdon (1995) that a shift of factors in the political stream can significantly either create or inhibit the potential for opening a collaborative window. In the English cases forming inter-authority working at the beginning stage and tightening relationships over time were subject to the approval of the partnering councils. Similarly, in the Thai cases to move towards partnership in shared services each authority needed to gain the support of more than half of all the councillors of a council. “It requires more than just the desire of the mayor, the community must agree. It must be endorsed by the council because it is a legitimate body that can approve the money to be invested in the shared service” (personal interview, Lampang officer D, June 2014).

However, in both countries gaining and maintaining the support from councillors along the collaboration journey has been a key challenge. This is because the councillors have specific elected term of office. In the Thai cases a senior officer indicated:
“There was a problem for our interagency working at the moment when the new mayor of the council in which the landfill was located was elected. He wanted to get the right to manage the landfill back and manage it individually. His vision and policy were very contrasting to the previous mayor, who signed the MOU with us” (personal interview, Lampang officer D, June 2014).

In the English cases a managerial officer mentioned:

“First of all, there has got to be the political will among politicians to want to do it. Along the journey we have been supported politically. But there are some backbenchers who are still a little bit sceptical. You know not everybody thinks this is the right thing, but mostly they do” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer B, February 2014).

Babergh and Mid-Suffolk demonstrated the obvious evidence in this regard. As some political groups in Babergh were opposed to the full merger proposal, it contributed to the rejection of this proposal by Babergh residents. This failure to secure political support caused failure to open a collaborative window for forming amalgamation policy. In conclusion, this study found that the attitude of political members towards a collaboration proposal greatly influences the potential for the opening of a collaborative window in both countries.

8.1.2 The supporting factors for forming collaboration: strong leadership

The above section demonstrated that there needs to be key factors within problem, policy, and political streams present to create the conditions where collaboration might arise. However, this study found that collaboration in both countries would not be formed without strong leadership, regarded as an organisational capability supportive of policy formation in local government. This is consistent with the argument that factors within the
organisational stream have a significant impact upon the initiation of interagency working (Lober, 1997; Baker, 2007).

$$H_5$$ *Strong leadership, both political and executive, was needed for forming deep cross-council collaboration.*

This hypothesis is rejected as the Thai cases demonstrated that the strong mayor not chief executive is vital to forming a highly integrated collaboration. Whereas English councils required the presence of both strong political and executive leaders, Thai councils were unlikely to step from loose institutional relationship to the highly structured joint service without the **strong, competent mayor of the larger council** controlling key resources.

**In the English cases** success in creating highly integrated relationships, such as shared services and management and integrated workforce, depended on both strong *political* and *executive leadership*. This is because these forms of collaboration transformed the ways of working for all people within the local authority, both councillors and officers. Therefore it required both the managerial and political leaders of the two councils to play a vital role in securing the support of key stakeholders, officers, councillors, and residents, so that the policy could be successfully formed. Specifically, the data showed that the chief executive and senior officers were the key actors who played a vital role in driving forward the proposal for collaboration over time. The need for both strong local leaders and strong chief executive shows that professionals still have considerable influence on policy-making process.
In contrast to the English cases, forming a deep collaboration in the Thai cases greatly require the strong mayor not chief executive because of specific circumstances. There is an absence of law supporting formal, high integrated joint working, particularly shared service, between small local governments. Furthermore, there is an instrument of central control which creates the local leaders’ fear of entering into shared services. The State Audit Commission of Thailand, an independent constitutionally established body, has powers and duties to audit the spending by local governments and determine the actions as to disciplines in financial affairs to ensure that public spending complies with legislation (Office of Auditor General of Thailand, 2015). If councils spent money on activities beyond what is clearly defined by legislation, it might be regarded as abusive behaviour from the perspective of the State Audit Commission. Then local governments must return that spent money to the state. Due to these circumstances, initiating a radical joint arrangement particularly required a brave mayor who is competent to motivate others to take a risk together. Both Thai cases showed that the mayors of the larger councils were very enthusiastic about shared services and able to persuade leaders of small councils to cooperate. A senior officer illustrated:

“He [the mayor of Roi-Et municipality] was a leading mayor who invited the mayors and chief executive officers of three neighbouring councils to discuss the possible ways to form a joint service. Although this was without the government’s knowledge and support, he told us that we can make it happen by just following what Kanchanaburi does, then we can ensure we abide by the laws. So, we agreed on that” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer B, July 2014).

In conclusion, this study found that strong leadership was an important stimulus for forming collaboration in both countries. Strong leadership by both political and managerial leaders was needed in the English cases resulting from the fact that their types of collaboration would greatly affect the councillors and officers within authority. Rather, a
strong mayor of the lead council is a crucial factor in creating inter-local government cooperation in the Thai cases because the chief executive does not play an important role in forming collaboration policy. Indeed, the political leader has more influence on policy making than professionals in Thai local government. However, leadership of both groups of leaders were required to act as collaborative managers in maintaining and driving forward relationship which will be discussed in the following section.

8.1.3 Collaborative entrepreneurs and the opening of collaborative window

\( H_5 \) Collaborative proposals will be elevated to the status of policy by the senior officers who act as collaborative entrepreneurs rather than the politicians.

This hypothesis is rejected because the Thai cases demonstrated that the mayors of the larger councils in both Thai cases were collaborative entrepreneurs, rather than the professionals. In the English cases authorities were perceived to be officer-led. The senior officers (both individuals and in collective form) were the key actors who initiated cross-council collaboration initiatives and played important roles to push those proposals becoming policies over time (see Chapter 6). However, the Thai cases showed that due to an absence of specific laws supporting shared services, the shared services initiation required a brave and visionary political leader, who was highly trusted by partners to act as collaborative entrepreneur. Data demonstrated that the mayor of the leading council in both cases had specific competency, which allowed them to successfully play particular roles in opening the collaborative window as follows.

Realising the potential for collaboration
In both cases the mayor of the larger council had started acting as a collaborative entrepreneur as they considered the existence of the government’s shared services project as a solution to solve the issue of resource dependency. As they wished to see this pre-existing initiative implemented, the mayors first attempted to gather coalitions of support for this proposal from the putative partners. They exercised their organisational power by inviting dependent councils to an informal meeting to sell this radical idea. Once it was agreed they applied to join the project as previously discussed.

**Brought together potential partners**

To convince councils to cooperate a key skill was used which was to *persuade these councils through a narrative that conveyed the benefits to all parties of cooperating*. In Lampang rather than pointing at the lack of capacity in delivering waste service of small TAOs, the mayor of Kho-kha municipality raised the issue of limited space of the shared landfill to persuade dependent councils to cooperate in shared waste services. “She never mentioned about the lack of capacity and resources those TAOs encountered. Rather she persuaded them to focus on the common issues concerning the limited space of shared landfill” a senior officer pointed out (personal interview, Lampang officer A, June 2014). Moreover, the mayor showed great understanding about others’ situations, enabling them to win support for collaboration. As an officer stated:

“*She said if we could just share a small amount of money and work together in some waste management programmes to reduce waste, each council would not need to spend a large amount of money in constructing its own landfill, which seemed to always face strong opposition from local communities*” (personal interview, Lampang officer B, June 2014).

The politician illustrated such picture:
“I invited the mayors of councils that were using the shared landfill to the informal meeting and raised this issue. I told them that the model of shared service introduced by the national government might be used to fix this problem. In the joint service, we can help each other to learn how to manage waste issues to reduce waste, so that the landfill used can last longer. At least Koh-kha has already set example for others, so we can help them to improve waste service with their limited resources. And they bought this idea” (personal interview, Lampang politician B, June 2014).

Moreover, both cases showed local leaders of small councils decide to cooperate in shared services, without the support of law, because they trusted in the mayor of the larger council, who has a good reputation. This is consistent with the argument that potential partners make the decision to collaborate partly based upon information about the attributes and skills of key agents who work across organisational boundaries (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). It also confirms the perspective that some elements of trust between putative partners are essential to start a collaborative effort (Himmelman, 1996; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; McGuire, 2006). An officer of Lampang case shared their perspective:

“To her, public interest and people’ quality of life seems to be the first priority above all else. Her good attitude and high performance on waste management won other leaders’ hearts” (personal interview, Lampang officer C, June 2014).

In Roi-Et data confirmed the good reputation, and strong attributes and performance, of the mayor of Roi-Et equipped him to successfully motivate others to take risks to form an innovative arrangement without the government’s support. A senior officer described:

“What brought us together was the strong political leader. He [the mayor of Roi-Et municipality] is a good man with great vision, and this has already been widely accepted. He had a very clear goal of joint working and acted as an advocate for its formation. It made us have a high confidence in following what he introduced” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer F, August 2014).
Another senior officer added:

“I must admit that he [the mayor of Roi-Et municipality] is a visionary leader. He doesn't think about his own territory only, but how to improve the quality of local services, so that local people in any area can receive the same standard” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer B, July 2014).

Generating trust from putative partners

In both Thai cases the mayors of the powerful councils generated trust from potential partners. They displayed empathy by showing their understanding of the small budget each council had and offered to pay more than those small councils. This is consistent with the argument of Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) that the ability to empathise combined with their communication skills make them an effective negotiator. A politician mentioned:

“I understood how much they can contribute to the joint service project. If you asked too much money or had too many details like council A should pay less or more than council B, it would not convince the councillors of those councils. It was the beginning stage where bringing partners together is the most important. So, as the big brother I told them that we are happy to pay more than them, although we actually did not have to share, but we wanted them to enhance their capacity by working with us and with each other” (personal interview, Roi-Et politician B, August 2014).

Moreover, in Roi-Et case data showed that while there was no problem securing political support from the councillors of Roi-Et municipality, who introduced the initiative, winning political buy-in in those TAOs that relied on Roi-Et was not an easy process. Most interviewees mentioned that in the first place the shared service proposal was a contentious issue among politicians. A senior officer illustrated such circumstances:
“Once our mayor agreed on shared disaster service, then we needed to get the endorsement from the council because it was a condition defined in the MOU. But in our council there were so many members who opposed it. They said it was unnecessary because disasters rarely occur in our area, for example, a fire just happens once a year or not at all. It seemed unreasonable to invest a large amount of money for such shared service. Investing in road construction for our own area would be better idea” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer E, August 2014).

Data showed that this resistance was overcome by the collaborative entrepreneurs. Having complete confidence in the mayor of the leading council enabled the political leaders and senior officers of TAOs to confidently negotiate and persuade councillors in their council to agree on shared service. An officer described:

“At the beginning it seemed most councillors of our councils opposed the joint service proposal. They said it was unimportant. They didn’t want to pay that amount of money into shared service. The mayor of Roi-Et then told us, the chief executives and the mayors, that we might go to tell the councils that we’re just asking for a chance. It was a 3-year contract so if they think it wasn’t working or useless they can quit” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer B, July 2014).

In conclusion, this study showed policy-making model (Kingdon, 1995) is useful to help examine the key actors who play a vital role in forming collaboration, collaborative entrepreneurs. This study pinpoints that within local government context collaborative entrepreneurs who are more likely to be able to advance collaboration proposals to become policy are either the political leaders or senior officers. It further defines the particular required competency of collaborative entrepreneur in local government including realising the presence of potential for cooperation, constructing a narrative that conveyed the benefits of collaboration to persuade partners, and generating trust to cement partners. Moreover, this study found that the process through which they gain mutual support from local leaders of prospective councils led to the shift of the attitude of political members and local people, the political stream. This finding allows this study to argue that
the convergence of streams is subject to manipulation by entrepreneurs. Indeed, collaborative window can be created by the action of collaborative entrepreneurs.

8.2 What forms of collaboration have been implemented and why?

This study investigates the interaction between the policy formation of collaboration and its practice. This section and the next section discuss the way in which collaboration has been practiced after it was initiated as a local government’s policy.

Figure 24: The findings of applying hypotheses generated from the English cases to the Thai cases regarding the second research question (source: the researcher)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Findings</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RQ2 What forms of collaboration have been implemented and why?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>H7 The creation of a more formal, deeper interagency relationship over time is relative to the longevity of the interagency relationship</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Accepted</strong></td>
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This hypothesis is accepted as the Thai cases demonstrated that a highly structured and more formalised form of interaction was developed from their existing loose institutional relationships. The typology of interagency relationship built on the organisational perspective conceptualising collaboration as a spectrum (see chapter 4) has effectively provided a way of analysing the types of collaboration implemented. In both countries local government collaboration began as less structured relationships, which then led to the higher structured, more integrated interactions over time. This is consistent with the literature which shows that less formal collaboration was a precursor to a more formal relationship (Peterson, 1991; Himmelman, 1996; the Audit Commission, 1998; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009). It is also
important to note that the deepest relationship which has been implemented in Thai cases was the shared service; conceptualised as a mid-level relationship. However, the English cases reached the highest level of interagency relationship, the integration of two administrative structures into a single organisation serving two sovereign councils and delivering services for both areas (see Figure 25).

Figure 25: Types of cross-council collaboration on a continuum, implemented in English and Thai cases

This study pinpoints two significant arguments regarding what forms of collaboration have been implemented and why within the local government context in both countries. Firstly, the specific type of collaboration was implemented as it fits the particular forces of four streams characterising the collaborative window consistent with the argument of Takahashi and Smutny (2002). Secondly, more formal institutional forms of small local
government collaboration were preceded by loose institutional relationships. Indeed, the creation of deeper relationships over time was influenced by what happened in their previous relationships and their history of working together. This is consistent with the argument of Pollitt (2008, p.16) that every policy contains a temporal dimension and things that happened in the past are key determinants of present choices.

In the English cases the development of cross-council collaboration between Babergh and Mid Suffolk can be an explicit example of the influence of the temporal aspect on collaboration (see Figure 26). Supposing that the researcher studied their relationship at one point in time, when they formed a shared chief executive and management team in 2011, it would be unlikely to gain in-depth understanding of why they decided to integrate besides the financial necessity at that particular time. Indeed, the empirical evidence revealed that two key things occurred in the past, which were regarded as primary reasons for that decision. Firstly, positive experience in shared waste services since 2007 built their confidence to develop closer working. Secondly, in 2010 they agreed on merger but later decided not to proceed with it because the residents voted no in one area. As they still needed to gain significant savings and service resilience, they decided to integrate managerial structures.

Figure 26: The influence of the previous relationships on the development of collaboration between Babergh and Mid Suffolk councils over time

Source: the researcher
At the start of collaboration in the Thai cases small councils developed ad hoc relationships with the larger council in an attempt to respond immediately to the emerging problems of resource scarcity and dependency. This problem was a driving force for starting the collaboration process as each small council requested permission from the powerful council that controlled necessary resources to access critical resources for fulfilling their individual tasks. In Lampang, for example, “The key point was that none of us had our own landfill, which also meant we had limited capacities and resources in waste services” a politician offered (personal interview, Lampang politician A June 2014). In Roi-Et small TAOs had been always asking for help from Roi-Et municipality to control disasters when they occurred. “At that time, this council did not even have a fire engine” a senior officer stated (personal interview, Roi-Et officer B, July 2014). Another senior officer explained “When fire occurred, we just called them [Roi-Et municipality]; our small neighbouring TAOs always called them and asked for help” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer C, July 2014). Another senior officer added “we used to pay them money each time we asked them to come to control fire in our area” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer F, August 2014).

This relationship was conceptualised as a Network, the lowest level on the continuum. The cross-council relationship was loose and informal. Assistance was given from the larger council to those small councils without explicit formal agreement but grounded heavily in personal relationship between the local leaders. Each council still retain its own autonomy and its own independent decision making power, consistent with the idea that there is no change in organisational structure within a networking relationship (Bailey and Koney, 2000). A senior officer defined: “Frankly speaking, it’s all about personal relationships. The mayors of these councils are so close to each other. They just had a word, like can you help me and I’ll pay for that” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer D, July 2014). While the ad hoc cooperation helped small councils to address the resource
scarcity and dependency facing them, it created problems for the larger council. For instance, it was unclear how the larger council can charge small councils for fire mitigation.

As the mayor of the larger council in both cases needed to fix the problems caused by the loose relationship with no written agreement in the long term, and perceived themselves as a big brother, they started to act as collaborative entrepreneur to move to a formal arrangement. At this second phase, once the national government’s proposal on shared services emerged, the mayors of the leading councils acted as collaborative entrepreneur to push this proposal to become policy, and exercised their power by inducing those small councils to become partners in a formal arrangement. As a result, the existence of the loose relationships, coupled with the specific factors within the process streams and the actions of collaborative entrepreneurs discussed above, led to the formation of a closer, highly structured and formalised collaboration, that is, a shared service, which is conceptualised to as Partnership, in both cases.

8.3 What factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaboration?

This section tests the hypotheses concerning factors found to be important for long-lasting collaboration. This study found that all the influential factors around operation are not particular to any specific from of collaboration. Rather they must be considered when implementing any cross-council working so that its sustainable can be achieved.
RQ3 What factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaboration? Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual factor</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( H_8 ) Collaboration is more likely to be sustainable when senior officers act as collaborative managers rather than the politicians.</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational factor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( H_9 ) The more a collaborative culture is developed and promoted by each of the partners, the more sustainable collaboration will be achieved</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( H_{10} ) When the key stakeholders have been engaged in the collaboration process by partnering councils, it leads to a likelihood of sustainable collaboration.</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust at both the individual and organisational levels is essential to operating and maintaining collaboration</td>
<td>Factor emerging from Thai cases</td>
</tr>
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8.3.1 Collaborative managers

\( H_8 \) Collaboration is more likely to be sustainable when senior officers act as collaborative managers rather than the politicians.

As discussed in chapter 6 the English cases showed that a strong and competent chief executive, coupled with the management team, were the group who played a vital role in facilitating and maintaining cross-council collaboration. Politicians appeared to have less interest in, and impact on, the management of collaboration compared with senior officers. However, this hypothesis is rejected in the Thai cases where political leaders together with the group of managerial officers played significant roles in driving and
sustaining collaborative relationships. This difference did not mean English local governments have more managerial capacity in the officer cadre than in Thailand. Rather this study pinpoints that the political leaders in Thai local governments have more of a managerial role than in England. Besides playing collaborative entrepreneur roles as previously mentioned, the mayor of the larger council was required to cement and maintain the successfully initiated cross-council relationship. A politician of a small council illustrated:

“At present what is possible in the Thai context is there needs to be a big brother, the effective and powerful council, and then this council must bring the little brothers to work with, to help them learn from such a leading council the way in which service can be effectively provided. Joint working between TAOs hardly happens. They still don’t trust each other” (personal interview, Roi-Et politician A, July 2014).

Essentially Thai mayors must play more of a managerial role than usual to achieve effective and sustainable collaboration. Having the right personal traits and competencies enabled them to play collaborative managers roles throughout the practice of collaboration as follows:

**Building sustainable relationships**

Data demonstrated that helping key stakeholders develop *a sense of belonging* to the shared service initiative was the significant role of collaborative managers. This is because the mayors of the leading council believed that when stakeholders have a sense of ownership of the collaborative initiative, they would make an effort to sustain it. A politician of Koh-kha municipality stated:
“In my view the political position is temporary. We must make people both within and around partnering councils feel that this is their own project. Specifically for local residents, the reducing wastes activities must be integrated in their life. These will help maintain the collaboration; otherwise collaboration may collapse when they are without a strong mayor of the host council” (personal interview, Lampang politician B, June 2014).

**Setting an example for others** and using the right language in communication were their strategies to equip stakeholders to build a sense of ownership. In both cases the mayor of the host council set an example for staff and politicians of partnering councils by going out into the field to show their support and enthusiasm for joint services. A senior officer stated: “He [the mayor of Roi-Et municipality] always goes into the field himself to control fire or any disasters when this happened in a partner’s area. He showed us what we should contribute to the joint working” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer E, August 2014). A senior officer confirmed “the mayor and I have always been there in the partnering areas helping them to promote the activities and projects of reducing and recycling wastes to citizen” (personal interview, Lampang officer A, June 2014).

Moreover, the effective communication skills were used by the mayor of the host council. They exercised social power rather than authoritative power to cement partners and gain contribution from partners in the joint working. In Lampang the researcher observed the Joint Committee meeting on the 3rd June 2014, where the mayors and executives of all partnering councils collectively discussed issues related to the shared waste service. In this meeting I observed that the mayor of Koh-kha used the right language, helping them win the hearts of the leaders of partnering councils. This mayor is the mayor of the council controlling the essential resource that other neighbouring councils depending on. In their position they might call others in a formal way like Mr. and Mrs. or the position of that person. However, this mayor called everyone ‘older brother/sister’ in the Thai language, showing high respect for them. During my interview with this mayor, the
researcher also noticed this fact when the mayor referred to other political and managerial leaders by the term ‘brother/sister’, not their status. This stems from the fact that this mayor is younger than those people and is in such high position at a young age, but still paying respect to others. This is a respectful thing to do in Thailand which made people admire this mayor. An officer illustrated:

"With her status she is the most powerful leader among us, but she never exercised her strong power. When she wanted partners to implement any innovative waste management programmes to reduce waste in each area, she never commanded but politely asked for cooperation" (personal interview, Lampang officer B, June 2014).

The observation that the use of the right language to show respect to others helps the mayor successfully played collaborative managers roles may be internal to Thai culture. However, UK research also confirms that being able to ‘talk the right language’ is a key skill of boundary spanners, supportive of sustainable collaboration (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p.100). From their actions discussed above, this study argues that they exercised non-hierarchical leadership style rather than hierarchical/conventional style that involves direction of others (Williams, 2002; Williams and Sullivan, 2002). This enabled them to successfully maintain partner’s commitments in the shared service since it was initiated in mid-2000s.

Besides the actions of the mayors, data demonstrated that the group of managerial officers were key actors who sustained the shared service, by convincing the new mayor to continually support the partnership and run its operation. A politician stated:

“There is a team we called the sub-committee, where the chief executives and officers relevant to the shared service of partnering councils can discuss every issue together and set the plans for the joint executive committee to approve. This group of people is the real
coordinator, they are like glue that stick councils together and actually enable the implementation of collaboration” (personal interview, Roi-Et politician B, August 2014).

Another politician confirmed:

“I still have not seen the situation where a partner wanted to withdraw, because the change of the mayor. The management team always effectively convinced the new local leaders to keep doing this policy’ (personal interview, Roi-Et politician A, July 2014).

Managing roles, accountabilities and motivations

According to Williams (2002, p.120) an understanding of ‘who does what’ and motivating partners to be appropriately involved in joint working are required competencies of effective boundary spanners, vital for successful and enduring collaboration. The Thai cases confirmed this argument, where this role was done by the group of local leaders and senior officers working together in the joint committee. In Lampang they showed an understanding that partners may not make equivalent contributions to the joint waste service as long as each partner still made a strong effort. This motivated partners to continually make contributions to the partnership rather than withdraw from it. A politician described:

“In the monthly meeting each partner is encouraged to present the waste reduction programmes that are implemented in each area. We never judge who the best is. Some council might be less successful in reducing waste compared to others. But there is nothing wrong at all. We’re still encouraging each other to keep doing it. We thought at least they have tried, and such programmes have already started in their area” (personal interview, Lampang politician B, June 2014).
In Roi-Et motivating partners to contribute to partnership working, as well as encouraging them to increase their individual organisational capacity to benefit shared goals, were done by the team of senior officers. A politician described:

“There was a council that did not even have a fire engine although there are a number of department stores in its area. So in the committee system, the senior officers discussed this kind of issue. They considered together the contributions of different councils. If there was a gap they would try to fill it. Then, that council has been told by the committee to purchase a fire engine for use in its own area, instead of always waiting for help from the partners, who might be too late to control a fire” (personal interview, Roi-Et politician B, August 2014).

8.3.2 Collaborative culture

\( H_9 \) The more a collaborative culture is developed and promoted by each of partners; the more sustainable collaboration will be achieved

The English cases demonstrated the bilateral collaboration between the two councils required both organisations to develop a collaborative culture within the individual organisational domain, to promote the joint working relationship (See chapter 6). In contrast to this, the Thai cases presented collaboration between a numbers of councils, led by the powerful council. In this regard, besides the need for each partner to develop a collaborative culture, it required the host council to support and resource the creation of a collaborative culture, supportive of the operation of new ways of working, roles, and relationships (Alter and Hage, 1993; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). This hypothesis is accepted as the Thai cases confirmed this argument where the role of host council was mainly focused as the primary developer of the collaborative culture.
The concept of collaborative culture provided by Newman (1996) and Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) effectively provides a way of explaining the suitable organisational culture for collaboration in both countries. This study pinpoints that within the local government context partnering councils need to develop specific organisational features which are supportive of sustainable collaboration: a strong focus on public participation in service provision and staff at operational level were supported to effectively work in joint services.

Regarding a strong focus on the community and effective modes of involving service users, in both Thai cases the representatives of local residents were appointed to be the members of the joint committee for the shared services to participate in the design, delivery, and review of inter-local governments’ joint service. This is because effective and enduring shared services required the participation of citizens as they partly coproduce the services. For instance, shared waste management between councils would not have been achieve a goal in reducing waste prior sending to the shared landfill without citizen cooperation in reducing, reusing and recycling waste. A politician explained:

“We wanted the local people to realise that waste is the common issue. That's why we focus on public participation in this project. Also, when the community feels that this is their project and it was included in their lives, any new mayors could not stop it. If the new mayors wanted to halt it, local people would not allow this because this is their life and they saw the benefits of doing it” (personal interview, Lampang politician B, June 2014).

Similarly, promoting local people to participate in service delivery was developed by English councils as new ways of working which is supportive of sustainable collaboration. This is because rather than cutting spending in frontline services, for example, cutting staff, co-delivery of service by citizens can help councils protect front-line services and
allows the councils to achieve significant savings and service improvements in a period of austerity (see chapter 6).

In both countries staff were supported to be competent to work in collaborative arrangements. English councils employed a number of mechanisms such as training and workshops to support staff, particularly senior officers, to be able to work well across council boundaries. Similarly, in the Thai cases besides having local leaders and a management team that can work well together, data showed that staff at operational level were supported to effectively work in joint services. Some councils used to face the issue that staff were unable to understand the new responsibility and think beyond their organisational territory inhibiting the progress of collaboration. Equipping staff to be able to work in the new arrangement was done by the collaborative managers, the mayor of the host council and the group of senior officers. It was described in Lampang case:

“They felt like this work did not come directly from the mayor’s policy. So, I had to explain to them that we had the MOU with other councils, signed by our mayor. So, when the joint service committee agreed to do any activities or programmes, we must comply with it” (personal interview, Lampang officer C, June 2014).

Empirical data from Roi-Et showed the same circumstance:

“In the first place, they didn’t understand their role. They thought the work for joint service was beyond their job. So, I set an example to them. I always go out to control disasters that occurred in any partners’ area. Then, they seemed to realise that people in all five areas are under their responsibility. They started to think about the public interest, not only in our territory” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer F, August 2014).

In conclusion this study identifies that each of the partners must invest resources in building a new organisational culture which is supportive of long-lasting collaboration. The
key characteristics of the suitable culture are staff that can work in collaborative arrangements; strong focus on the community and strong strategic partnership with partners. However, where there is a lead council of collaboration among a number of councils, such a council must be a primary developer of collaborative culture.

8.3.3 Building a coalition for change

\( H_0 \) When the key stakeholders have been engaged in the collaboration process by partnering councils, it leads to a likelihood of sustainable collaboration.

This hypothesis is accepted since the Thai case data demonstrated that inclusion of key stakeholders both inside and around the organisation in collaboration, at the beginning stage and throughout its implementation, was essential to sustainable collaboration.

In the English cases managing with people inside councils, especially officers, and winning their support was vital in sustaining collaboration. This resulted from the fact that both cases demonstrated that an integration of two workforces into one organisation to provide shared services inevitably had high implications for staff. In such an arrangement support from politicians was required, but provided no guarantee of success. Rather officers were needed to be involved at an early stage, and encouraged throughout the entirety of the transformation process. This is because the integration of officer structures meant some staff may lose their jobs, and current working practices may change; potentially decreasing staff morale and causing resistance to change. To engage with senior officers the joint management team was established where senior managers of partnering councils can work together to set the strategy of collaboration at an early stage and support the partnership throughout its operation. For staff at the operational level a
number of mechanisms have been employed early, such as training and mentoring, by insiders and outsiders, to make staff understand the rationale for integration and how it might affect them. To address councillors’ concern over losing control over policy decision making a joint board comprising leading councilors from each council was established, where they can collectively make decisions. Workshops were used as places where councillors could work collaboratively to form policies.

In the Thai cases key stakeholders related to shared services were embraced early in the collaboration process. To engage with citizens local forums and referendums were held to ascertain public support and were a precondition for a council to become a partner. After the partnership was formed the representatives of residents were appointed to be the members of joint committee for shared services, together with workshops to develop resident’s knowledge and skills about waste reduction and management. This resulted from the perception of leaders that the joint waste management and disaster prevention and mitigation services would not run efficiently without the cooperation of service users.

Similar to the English cases getting people inside organisations on board was given a high consideration in the Thai cases. Appointing councillors from each council to be members of the joint service committees was the way both cases involved councillors in the initiative. However, there is a recently emerging challenge in Roi-Et, where some councils started to think that the equivalent payment to support the joint disaster management service is unfair.

Moreover, empirical evidence from both countries demonstrated that the effective practice of partnerships and its sustainability demanded partnership staff, consistent with the findings of the Audit Commission (1998). In the joint services of both Thai cases the centre of the shared service, the separate visual entity for joint working, are unable to
employ staff for its operation. Rather, the host council is responsible for the routine administration of this separate body. The officers of the host council were assigned the responsibility of acting as convening staff responsible for facilitating regular meetings, and coordinating other tasks among partnering councils alongside their normal job. Strong support and encouragement were given from leaders to those staff. Respondents mentioned that those leaders always go into the field to deliver collaborative actions, which “showed their ambition to achieve it, which helped increase the spirit and passion of the staff”, a senior officer pointed out (personal interview, Roi-Et officer D, July 2014).

In conclusion, this study argues that key stakeholders, councillors, staff, and citizens, be brought to involve in the collaboration from the early stage and throughout they process, so that sustainable collaboration can be achieved.

8.3.4 Trust

Trust emerged inductively from the Thai cases as the factor supporting sustainable collaboration. Due to the absence of a law supporting shared services the leaders of the small councils had to trust the mayor of the larger council; helping the partnership to form as previously discussed. Moreover, data showed that trust was built between people at the top level of partnering councils, as they have worked together over time in the joint committee. Furthermore, trust was built from their existing interpersonal relationship and the communication style, perceived as being a non-leadership style, of the mayor of the host council. A senior officer in Lampang case stated:

“The interpersonal relationships between the local leaders, both political and managerial leaders, informed the way of working in the joint committee which is more about coordination rather than command from the leading council. This style of working made
partners trust each other which facilitates collaborative behaviour. It would never happen if the command and hierarchical way was exercised” (personal interview, Lampang officer C, June 2014).

An officer in Roi-Et case illustrated a similar circumstance:

“There are so many challenges and obstacles to real-life implementation. There are different perspectives among us. For example, a council wanted to buy particular equipment for shared service but another council said that stuff was not necessary for its area. Sometimes there was a very serious discussion, perhaps fighting. This has always happened but we can get through it because we trust each other. We can honestly talk, think about each other’s needs, show empathy, negotiate and finally make a conclusion together” (personal interview, Roi-Et officer E, August 2014).

Due to the trust in each other they were able to sincerely and transparently discuss issues related to the shared services and collectively find the consensus; helping secure the partners’ commitment to common goals. This finding is consistent with the argument that trust between partners is vital; both to “begin a collaboration venture and to sustain and deepen the collaboration over time” (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p.50). Applying this emerging factor back to the English cases, it found that trust was a factor enabling the continuity of collaboration. Data showed that the positive past experience in working together built trust which enabled the two councils to progress their interagency working relationship over time. An officer pointed out:

“At that time we’re initially obviously looking at working together for the waste services and bringing those services together. That experience was a positive one. And that built trust and relationship between the two councils. If you could do waste, you could move on to do other things. And it’s the area where we were both very good. We had done a lot of work and consultations and that was successful. And I think that was great because it really generated trust between the two authorities; well actually we can work together and we like working together” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer C, November 2013).
Similar to Thai cases, data from English cases demonstrated that trust which was built among those who leading collaboration as they have been spent time to get to know each other and worked together under a number of mechanisms over time steered and sustained their collaborative working. A senior officer stated:

“The bit that I think is absolutely critical is making sure those who are leading it spend a lot of time getting to know each other and trust each other… make sure the two leaders and chief executive are incredibly close so nothing’s gonna derail the process” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer A, November 2013).

It was reinforced by another officer:

“We developed the governing body to steer the collaborative working called JMIB where the leading members and senior officers of both councils can work together and discuss together in this body. And there are several means that had been used to harmonise the two councils. There were seminars where each set of members had a chance to get to know each other. The relationship and trust between members was built on these means” (Telephone interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer F, March 2014).

Conclusion

This chapter analysed the Thai cases to test hypotheses generated from the English cases and comparatively discussed the findings. Regarding the formation of collaboration policy, the policy-making model (Kingdon, 1995, Lober, 1997) effectively provided a way of explaining the formation of collaboration between small local governments in both countries. This study found that for cross-council collaboration policy to be formed it required the opening of collaborative windows, resulting from the convergence of four relatively independent streams – problem, policy, political, and organisational. Within local government this study defines resource scarcity was the driving impetus for collaboration in both countries whereas resource dependency was a
driving force behind the shared services between councils in Thai cases (problem stream).

For the policy stream, Kingdon’s (1995) model has limited power to explain the influence of national government’s policy on collaboration in local government as the model focussed on the agenda setting at national level. This study pinpoints that collaborations in both countries have been locally driven as local governments have their discretion over the policy initiation. However, the pro-collaboration policy continuity at national governmental level is an enabling factor for the development of cross-council cooperation over time. For the political stream collaboration is more likely to occur where it does not challenge the vested interests of citizens and political members. Within the organisational stream a strong political leader of the leading council was required because of the absence of specific laws supporting the shared services between councils.

However, initiating collaboration in the English cases required strong leadership from both political and executive leaders because the shared chief executive and management team was a radical idea, requiring leaders who were keen to make it happen and committed to making it work. In order that collaboration proposals can be formed as organisational policy, it required the actions of collaborative entrepreneurs to adjust those four streams and match the solution they wish to see implemented to the defined problem. In English cases the entrepreneur roles were played by chief executive and senior officers whereas in the Thai cases it was played by the mayor of the larger council that controls more resources than neighbouring small councils.

Regarding the form of collaboration, the typology of interagency relationship on a continuum built on an organisational perspective is useful for investigate the type implemented and why. This study found that the deep collaboration, developed over time,
is relative to the longevity of the inter-organisational relationship. Moreover, the specific form of collaboration is used as it suitably responds to the particular forces for collaboration at a particular time. Finally, the model of factors influencing sustainable collaboration sufficiently provided a way of understating factors found to be supportive of long-lasting collaboration. This study pinpoints that within local government having leaders (both political and managerial leaders) acting as collaborative managers, building a coalition for change, and developing collaborative culture were essential for enduring collaboration in both countries.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION

Introduction

This study has investigated the journey of cross-council collaborations between small, lower tier local governments in both England and Thailand. Collaboration between local governments has been common between English local governments since the 1990s. A number of English councils have practiced collaboration in various forms throughout the country (Dickinson and Sullivan, 2014). This is because collaboration is recognised as a powerful mechanism for enhancing the capacity of small councils with limited resources in providing services without losing local control and political identity. In contrast to this there are few councils that have entered into collaboration in Thailand. In current literature there is a lack of published research on cooperation between small local governments in the Thai context.

In-depth understanding of public policy and policymaking is unlikely to be gained “by dividing it into neat stages or periods, with formulation separated off from implementation” (Pollitt, 2008, p. 6). However, little attention has been paid by scholars in this topic to the interaction between the initiation of collaboration and its practice.

This study has closed those gaps by examining the way in which the formation and the practice of collaboration policy interacts through longitudinal case studies. It attempted to help policymakers and practitioners in Thailand successfully develop and implement cross-council collaboration policy. Furthermore, the findings may offer some general
guidelines for the encouragement of cross-council collaborations on a wider scale. To achieve these objectives, this study sought to address three questions:

1. How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated?
2. What forms of collaboration have been implemented and why?
3. What factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaboration?

These have been answered by conducting exploratory cross-national comparative case studies. This study generated insightful explanations about the role of collaborative entrepreneurs and collaborative managers in the initiation and institutional embedding of small council collaboration policy. The experience in collaboration of the two English cases was firstly investigated from which to generate hypotheses to test in the two Thai cases. The integrated conceptual framework, built on the combination of the policy-making models (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997), the typology of interagency relationship on the continuum (Houge, 1993; Bailey and Koney, 2000; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; Mandell and Steelman, 2003), and the notion of factors influencing sustainable collaboration, was applied to empirical evidence, i.e. interviews, documents, and observational data, from case studies. A thematic analysis was employed to analyse qualitative data systematically.

This chapter provides the key findings from applying the integrated conceptual framework to the empirical evidence from the two countries, which will have implications for policy and practice. The next section discusses the key points emerging from the empirical cases. Then, the theoretical implications of the research, and its relation to the integrated framework, will be discussed. Moreover, reflections of undertaking the research will be provided. Finally, it offers recommendations for further research.
9.1 Key findings: implications for policy and practice

The following are the key findings highlighting the key lessons and significant factors behind the progression of small local government collaboration. These would have implications for policymaking and policy implementation, particularly in Thailand where knowledge about cross-council collaboration is scarce. It provides the necessary conditions for collaboration to arise which may help small local governments make better decisions about entering into collaborations and successfully develop joint working policies. Moreover, it discusses the key factors found to be important for sustainable collaboration which would help making their existing collaborations work successfully and long-lasting.

Research question 1: How and why is collaboration between small local governments initiated?

The policy-making models (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997) proved effective for explaining the formation of collaboration policy, created in response to the complexity of driving forces for collaborations at a particular time, and progressed in temporal sequence. It found that collaboration formation required the opening of a collaborative window, resulting from the convergence of four relatively independent streams – problem, policy, political, and organisational. However, this study argues, contrary to Kingdon (1995) and Lober (1997) that the streams did not easily and perfectly converge as a fortunate circumstance that created the opportunity for the collaborative entrepreneur to couple their pet proposal to the defined problem. Rather, it required the actions of collaborative entrepreneurs, either political or executive leaders, to realise the occurrence of factors
providing potential for collaboration within the four streams. They then were required to invest resources and exercise their skills to align the four streams together so that the proposal they wish to see implemented can be actually elevated to the status of councils’ policy. The followings are key points to be considered when local governments wish to successfully form collaborations.

**Resources scarcity and resources dependency – problem stream**

Collaboration can result from and in either an equal or uneven relationship. When councils voluntarily cooperate to achieve shared goals, and where they have equal resources to share, the relationship is a positive sum game. The cross-council collaboration in the English cases demonstrated this relationship, consistent with the basic idea of *exchange theory* (Levine and White, 1962; Cook, 1977; Skelcher and Sullivan, 2008). In contrast, this study pinpoints a new insight that cross-council collaboration can also be an asymmetrical relationship when there is a council controlling critical resources and/or having more resources that others need for fulfilling their tasks, demonstrated in the Thai cases. An important finding of this research is that the council controlling the key scarce resource, that other small councils need, and/or having more resources than others can become locked-in to a disadvantageous relationship controlled by the small councils, if the cooperation operates without a formal, written agreement to achieve the shared goal. To address this issue the leader of the council controlling key resources may need to induce or force the councils dependent on them to become partners in the highly integrated cross-council collaboration. This would also offer the better use of scarce resources and improved services for people in the whole area.
Collaboration is locally driven – policy stream

This study found that cross-council collaborations have been locally driven in both countries. Essentially, the discretion councils have over their internal management structures and modes of service delivery enabled them to initiate joint working to address problems to achieve long term benefits for communities and councils. Moreover, it allowed them to develop additional forms of cooperation over time to respond opportunistically to new possibilities. However, without the pro-collaboration policies at national governmental level, collaboration could not have been successfully locally driven.

The English cases particularly demonstrated the incremental process where there were gradual steps towards a collaborative solution, facilitated by the enabling condition from the national government. At the start of the process collaboration could be formed as it was legitimised by the Labour government’s policies. Then the additional forms of cooperation, developed over time, were supported by the pro-collaboration policy continuity at national level. It is important to note that the joint working initiatives were invented and proposed to the councils for consideration by the group of senior officers inside the councils (policy stream). This is because they realised them as an effective mechanism to address the government spending cuts (defined problem). Then, they played collaborative entrepreneur roles to push the proposal they wished to see implemented to become policy. This allows the process of policymaking in English cases to be realised as a rational process, where solutions are created and progressed over time by people inside organisation to address the defined problems.

Similarly, shared service in the Thai cases was driven by the resource dependency problem facing them and the actions of the strong mayor who was keen to make
collaboration occur. However, without the presence of the national government’s pre-existing shared service initiative, collaboration could not have been initiated. This resulted from an absence of a specific law legitimising collaboration between different types of small local governments, even though they are in the same tier. Therefore the mayor of the larger council controlling the scarce resources picked the national government’s pre-existing shared service initiative to become their pet solution (policy stream). This is because they realised it as an effective mechanism to sustainably address the resource dependency and scarcity facing small councils (problem stream). The circumstance whereby there was the government’s shared service project available and actively looking for actual cases to address is consistent with the idea of the garbage can model (Cohen et al., 1972). This study pinpoints that within local government, collaboration proposals can be generated by people either inside or outside the council, whether or not they can fix the defined problems. The important proposition is a cross-council collaboration proposal is likely to successfully become policy when it is legitimised by national government.

**Political buy-in and public support – political stream**

Cross-council collaboration initiated when it did not challenge the vested interest of political members and citizens. Gaining public support on collaboration proposal is a precondition for forming inter-authority working policy in both countries. Thai local governments want to ensure public support since they considered that the effective joint waste and disaster management services among councils needs community to partly coproduce. Without the willingness of local people to cooperate the initiative would not succeed. However, in the English cases local referendums on the amalgamation proposal were held to increase the legitimacy of the decision-making processes. People voted against the councils merging, ending the chance for the proposal to become policy in
Babergh and Mid-Suffolk; an obvious example on how public opinion makes a high impact on policy formation.

Moreover, without the endorsement of political members of the putative councils, collaborations would not be formed and progressed. In the English cases forming inter-authority working at the beginning stage and tightening relationships over time were subject to the approval of the partnering councils. Similarly, in the Thai cases to become a partner in shared services, each authority must gain support more than half of all the councillors of a council. However, winning political buy-in has been a key challenge which required collaborative entrepreneurs, political and managerial leaders, to play a vital role in this regard.

**Strong political and executive leaders – organisational stream**

The presence of strong and competent leadership, either political or managerial, who have a keen interest in cross-council working, was the most important stimulus for forming collaboration in both countries. In the English cases the need for both strong political leaders and a strong chief executive resulted from the fact that their form of collaboration involves organisational transformation; i.e. integration of management and services. It also represents the basic idea that the local authority is comprised of the political and the administrative structures, where collaboration means the local authority can really be conceptualised as two separate legal and political entities, but linked operations. In the Thai cases an absence of a specific law supporting the shared services created fears of councils to enter into it. Therefore, it required a strong mayor who is visionary, brave and trusted by putative partners to act as collaborative entrepreneurs to make potential partners have a confidence in joining the radical initiative.
Local leaders or managerial leaders as collaborative entrepreneurs

Without collaborative entrepreneurs, the strong and competent political leaders in Thailand and competent managerial leaders in England who aligned those four streams and brought putative partners together, collaboration would not occur. In order that collaboration proposals can be actually formed as councils’ policies, it required the collaborative entrepreneurs to exercise their appropriate competencies – skill, knowledge, attributes – to develop cross-council collaboration initiatives, lobby potential partners, and generate trust among them. In the Thai cases the good reputation regarding personal traits and performance of the mayors who acted as entrepreneurs equipped them to effectively convince potential partnering councils to take a risk to become partner in the shared services.

In both countries the process whereby the collaborative entrepreneur developed coalition support for shared service proposal began long before the collaborative window literally opens, consistent with what Kingdon (1995) observed. They invested their resources – using the right communication language and developing evidence-based proposal – to influence the way in which prospective partners understand the mutual problems, helping them gain support from politicians and citizens, a factor in political stream. Once they secured political and public support on their pet proposal, it enabled them to couple the proposal to the resource scarcity or dependency problems, which then became policy. This circumstance confirmed the argument that the convergence of streams is subject to manipulation by entrepreneurs (Zahariadis, 1999; Baker, 2007). Within local government context this study pinpoints that the opportunity for creating cross-council working policy can be created by the actions of collaborative entrepreneurs, political leaders or senior officers, rather than a result of fortunate circumstances.
Research question 2: What forms of collaboration have been implemented and why?

The typology of interagency relationship developed in chapter 4 proved effective in explaining the types of collaboration implemented at a particular period and developed over time. There are two key findings which contribute to knowledge of the actual implementation of collaboration policy at local government level. Firstly, there is no one suitable model of collaboration for all local governments and for all circumstances. Decisions on creating a particular form of collaboration were made by councils in response to the driving forces for joint working and enabling conditions at a specific time. This is consistent with the argument of Takahashi and Smutny (2002) that the governance structure of (form of) collaboration is developed, as it closely correspond with the conditions characterising the particular collaborative window.

Secondly, the deep and highly integrated relationship, which develops over time, is relative to the longevity of the inter-organisational relationship. The creation of a more integrated relationship over time was also influenced by the occurrences in their previous relationships and their history of working together. Moreover, a more integrated and structured collaboration was preceded by a loose institutional relationship. This finding is consistent with the argument of Pollitt (2008) that every policy contains a temporal dimension and things which have happened in the past are key determinants of present choices. However, his argument has not been applied to local government. Hence, this study pinpoints that for researcher studying collaboration policy within local government, it is necessary to take a temporal dimension and the past of the policy into the analysis. This is because it provides insight into the rational way in which the present choice of cross-council collaboration was developed by councils. Moreover, it is important for
policymakers and practitioners to take the longevity of their interagency relationship into consideration. This is so that a sensible collaboration solution/policy to the defined problem can be developed, and the existing relationships can be effectively operated in the long term.

**Research question 3: What factors promote and inhibit sustainable collaboration?**

This study attempts to highlight the necessary ingredients for long-lasting shared arrangements from empirical cases, for councils interested in pursuing cross-council collaboration. It found that there are three key factors - having leaders (both political and managerial leaders) acting as collaborative managers, building a coalition for change, and developing collaborative culture – enabling sustainable collaboration at local level in both countries. All these influential factors operation are not particular to a specific form of collaboration. Rather, they are factors must be considered when implementing cross-council working in any type.

**Political and managerial leaders acting as collaborative managers**

Having leaders, either political or executive or both, play the specific boundary spanner role of collaborative managers is a vital ingredient of successful and sustainable collaboration. This study found that the collaborative managers who efficiently played key roles in facilitating collaboration, building trust among partners, and maintaining partners’ commitment to shared goals were the same actors who succeeded in playing collaborative entrepreneurs roles in the stage of collaboration policy formation. Identifying the role of the collaborative managers is a particularly important finding conceptually as
this had seldom discussed in the literature (see for example, Williams, 2000; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). This study, furthermore, not only identified the roles of collaborative managers, but also pinpoints the required skills and competencies of effective collaborative managers identified from the case studies:

- Understanding each partner’s role and responsibility for the collaborative working and motivating them to make a contribution to it
- Using the right language in communication to win the heart of partners at the early stage and secure their long-term commitment

It is also an important practical finding that when collaboration means a shared management team or an integrated single workforce covering two sovereign councils it particularly required a competent senior officer team to act in a champion role in fostering and maintaining an interagency relationship. In this regard, the required skills and attributes of effective collaborative managers which help in winning buy-in from political members, gaining support from staff, maintaining staff morale, and helping people come through the change process are as follows:

- Having and showing enthusiasm for collaboration
- Showing an acute understating of different democratic structures, different organisational cultures, and any different contexts in place in each authority
- Harmonising the two councils and the two sets of policy in pursuance of shared goals through negotiation, influencing, steering, and acting honestly and objectively
- Assuring the two councils’ politicians and stakeholders that they are still independent and have been served equally by a single officer team
Building a coalition for change

Engaging with key stakeholders, both inside and outside organisations, at the early stages of collaboration and throughout its entire process proved to be essential for sustainable collaboration. This is because collaboration usually means new ways of working, affecting people both inside and around organisations. Without buy-in from key stakeholders, i.e. councillors, staff, and residents, collaborations are not going to work. “You need to involve everybody at the start to make it work” an officer pointed out (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer A, November 2013).

To involve political members in collaboration, a joint committee comprising leading councilors from each council, where they can share decision making, was used. Getting staff relevant to shared arrangements on board was a responsibility of collaborative managers, especially when collaboration means some staff may lose their jobs, and the current working practices may be transformed; decreasing the morale of staff and causing resistance to change. Therefore, strong support from leaders and the managerial level must be given to partnership staff to help them come through the change process. They must set themselves as an example to the staff and show their ambition to achieve collaboration which helps increase spirit and passion of the staff.

Public forums and local referendums were the effective mechanisms employed to engage local residents in the collaboration process in both countries. Holding local referendums to ascertain public support was a precondition for council to become partner as well as for moving their relationship forward. English councils hold local referendums to increase the legitimacy of decision-making process. Thai councils used these mechanisms to ascertain public support for shared services initiative. Moreover, once the shared service was
formed the representatives of communities were appointed to be the members of joint committee for joint working. This is because the effective joint service – either waste or disaster management – between councils required the communities to slightly coproduce.

**Developing collaborative culture**

Partnering councils developed and promoted collaborative culture in their organisation. Otherwise, collaborative workings can be less effective than it could be or even disbanded. This study confirmed the argument of Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) that partnering councils must develop the following key features in their organisation which are considered as collaborative culture that is supportive of collaboration.

- Staff at all levels that can work across boundaries and have a strong focus on public interest rather than their own area
- A strong focus on the community and effective modes of involving service users
- Strong strategic partnerships with partners

### 9.2 Emerging key points from empirical evidence

The above section discussed the findings from applying the integrated conceptual framework to data. This section demonstrated the key influential factors of the collaboration development which emerged from empirical cases namely the national culture and central-local government relationship. These factors need to be considered but were not expected in this study. Hence this study suggests that when undertaking a cross-national comparison of collaboration policy at local governmental level these factors must be included in the investigation to gain rich understanding of the phenomenon.
9.2.1 National culture

Empirical evidence from the four cases of cross-council collaboration in the two countries confirmed the argument that “each collaboration is set in its own local context, and will be subject to particular influences as a result” (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002, p. 116). However, this cross-national comparative study further argues that collaboration is shaped not only by local influences but also national effects, specifically, national culture. The study found that specific pattern of cross-council relationship implemented in each country reflected the cultural norms in its system. The English cases demonstrated the successful cross-council collaboration characterised by an equal relationship between small local governments in the same lower tier. However, cooperation between lower and upper tier is identified as problematic. In contrast to this, collaboration in Thai case was considered as an asymmetric relationship between a larger council and smaller councils in the same lower tier, facilitated by a strong hierarchical social system of Thai culture.

English cases: An equal relationship between small local councils

Both English cases demonstrated joint working between two small local governments in the same tier. An enabling condition for their collaboration formation and sustainable commitment was the similar characteristics of the two councils. Sharing local similarities appear to be a symbol that binds the two councils together, as it enabled key people in the councils to have a confidence in cooperation. Such a perception enabled them to attract one another and facilitated them to eventually collaborate with each other:
“The two districts’ characteristics are quite similar. They are different in terms of politics but quite similar in terms of geography, demographic, and the issues facing the communities. That made them confident that they can make it work” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer A, May 2013).

Indeed, they believed that collaboration can successfully work when the two councils sharing things in common work together rather than trying to negotiate with more councils, which is more complex. “Rather than trying to negotiate with seven other districts, if you have a one willing partner that seems to be more successful and build from that, it would be more attractive to councillors” an officer stated (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer E, February 2014). Another officer confirmed “we sometimes found that it’s quite challenging bringing two councils’ services together. But when you will then add on five or six more, those challenges increase many times over unless you’ve got that drive to make it a success” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

While the two districts in both cases have been working well together, partnering with an upper tier council, i.e. county, appeared to be a problematic. This is because the upper tier local government did not face the same significant challenges as the small, lower tier councils. Indeed, the lack of common issues and shared benefits inhibiting shared goals caused the challenge in a vertical relationship between them. An officer stated:

“Collaborating with the county is more challenge. Our relationship with Ipswich borough is difficult because they are very separate. They don’t talk to us as much as we would like them to. So it’s not all roses” (personal interview, Babergh and Mid Suffolk officer E, February 2014).

It was reinforced by another officer:

“We tried working in partnership with other councils. Well, the collaboration between the district council and the borough council like ours was really good. But when you started to
try to dialogue with the upper-tier, the county council, it started to become much more difficult” (personal interview, Adur and Worthing officer B, November 2013).

The circumstances whereby English upper-tier local governments seem unwilling to cooperate with lower-tier local governments differ greatly from the Thai local government system. Thai larger councils are willing to develop a vertical cooperation with the smaller councils because of the cultural norms; bigger councils were expected to help those smaller, new-born to increase the capacity in service provisions.

**Thai cases: An asymmetric relationship on a big brother – little brother basis**

An asymmetric relationship between the larger council and the smaller councils in the same lower tier local government was successful in the Thai cases as it was facilitated by hierarchical system in Thai culture. Empirically, both Thai cases demonstrated collaborations built on a big brother – little brother council basis. During interviews, the word ‘**a big brother**’ was used by the leader of the larger council, i.e. municipality, because they perceived themselves as a big brother as an entity who has the responsibility to assist the smaller councils in the same tier, i.e. Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAOs), to enhance capacity in service provision. Moreover, it was used by the mayors and senior officers of those TAOs to refer to the mayor of municipality and the municipality itself. This is because they perceived the municipality as a higher status than them due to having more resources and capacity.\(^6\)

\(^6\) As previously discussed in section 8.1.1 of Chapter 8
Essentially in this vertical cross-council relationship there was a bigger council (municipality) controlling larger resources than small neighbouring councils (TAOs). Although they are in the same lower tier local government, municipalities are usually perceived as a bigger council for two significant reasons. Being located in an urban area enabled municipalities to collect more taxes, resulting in more revenues compared to TAOs responsible for rural areas. As municipalities were established in the early 1930s, they are perceived to have more experience and capacity to effectively provide services than those new-born TAOs established in the late 1990s. As previously discussed, the mayors of powerful municipalities perceived themselves as having big brother status, with responsibilities to help those little brothers to enhance capabilities in services delivery.

For the TAOs, they frequently preferred partnering with the bigger councils, because it allowed them access to the critical resources controlled by the powerful municipalities for fulfilling their tasks. However, TAOs seem unwilling to cooperate with each other because they perceive that each of them has limited capacity and resources. The vertical relationship is shaped by a strong hierarchical system which has a central place in Thai culture; commonly implemented in particular ways. Respect should be given to those of higher status. At the same time, those with lower status have a right to ask for help from those with higher status. Also, it appears to be the responsibility of people with higher social status to assist those with lower status. All these aspects of a hierarchical system in Thai culture, which applied to both Thai cases, had a high impact on the development of cross-council collaboration as previously discussed in chapter 8. Therefore, having a powerful leading council that perceived itself as a big brother was a significant enabling factor for forming collaboration in Thailand. A horizontal, equal collaboration between TAOs themselves seems unlikely happen because they lack confidence in each other.
9.2.2 Central-local government relationships

The autonomy of local government over policy-making has been a central theme as to the argument about central-local government relationships. In essence, how much is local government able to create its own policies to tackle problems they face without the intervention of central government. England and Thailand are both unitary states where local governments could and should have a considerable degree of autonomy in policy formation and operation. However, it appeared that national governments can still control and supervise local governments by using a wide range of intervention techniques. Regarding cross-council collaboration policies in both countries, this study found that although collaborations were not driven at the behest of central government, various instruments of central interventions inevitably have an effect on cross-council collaboration policy formation and its development over time.

The audit body: monitoring and inspection

In both countries there is a public organisation established to scrutinise the operation and the expenditure of local governments to ensure that public money is used in accordance with the law, i.e. the Office of the Auditor General in Thailand and the Audit Commission in England. Although these bodies operate independently, they are widely perceived as an instrument of central government to control and direct local government. The common basis in both countries is that local governments can only do things that they are statutorily permitted to do. Having such an organisation acting as an instrument of central state might inhibit councils from creating innovative cross-council working policies.
In Thailand the operation of the audit body is often cited as a barrier of developing cooperation between local governments. There have been concerns that formalised, highly structured cross-council collaboration might contradict the relevant laws and have been recognised by the audit body as illegal. If the cross-council initiatives were judged by the Audit Commission as an abuse of power, councils must return money operated in the initiatives to the state. Thai councils are afraid to enter into collaboration because of such issues, resulting in the small number of inter-local government cooperation. In essence, the audit body was cited as a factor prohibiting collaboration initiation in Thailand. Due to concerns about the inspection from the audit body and legality, collaboration can be formed where it was supported by national government’s organisation. Moreover, it is unlikely to happen where there was a strong political leader who is brave enough and able to persuade putative councils to take a risk together.

In England, it is commonly perceived that the Audit Commission⁷ was regulating and inspecting rather than auditing and highlighting the inefficiency for improvement to help local governments achieve economy, efficiency and effectiveness. This is the key reason why the Commission was abolished. As a Local Government Minister stated:

“The decision to abolish the Audit Commission was because it was wasteful, ineffective and undemocratic. What should have been a voice for taxpayers became a creature of the central state. Instead of just auditing accounts: it was regulating, micromanaging, and inspecting, forcing councils to spend time ticking boxes and filling in forms rather than getting on with the business of local government” (GOV.UK, 2014, ‘Audit Commission Abolition of Course to Save Taxpayers Over £1 Billion’, March 10).

Besides a pessimist perspective provided above, this study found that the audit body also had a positive impact on the development of cross-council collaboration in England. Reviewing literature about English inter-local government collaboration enabled the

⁷ The Audit Commission in England was closed on 31th March 2015, 32 years after it was established.
researcher to realise that there are a number of publications and studies conducted by the Audit Commission which supported councils in building effective collaborations. Moreover, the reports on councils’ comprehensive performance assessment conducted by the Audit Commission provided a valuable advice for the cases where the councils can be used to make their partnerships work more effectively. Indeed, the operation of the Audit Commission was seen to be a more enabling factor in English cases than in Thai cases. Therefore, this study pinpoints that scholars looking at collaboration within local government need to consider national governmental bodies that have influence on the initiation of cross-council collaboration.

**National government’s agenda and government departments’ advice and guidance**

The central government’s collaboration agenda, and the government departments’ advice and guidance had an impact, in both direct and indirect ways, on collaboration policy-making at local government level in both counties. In English cases the genesis of joint working emerged during the early to mid of 2000s; facilitated by the partnership agenda of the Labour government which had been promoted to deal with the fiscal constraints and policies priorities of that period. Then collaboration developed over time, supported by pro-collaboration policy continuity at national level. The strongest evidence of this can be seen in the Adur and Worthing case. At the time they were looking at establishing a shared management team serving the two councils, they received advice from a central body which enabled the radical idea to become policy.

In an attempt to help small local governments in Thailand enhance capacity in service provision the Department of Local Administration, the government body responsible for
the administration and improvement of Thai local governments, conducted the operational study on shared services. It aimed to develop the manual for councils wish to enter into joint services. This initiative was an enabling factor for partnership in both Thai cases even though Roi-Et case was not accepted to join in the project. It influenced the decision of councils in Roi-Et case to enter into shared services. The local leaders had confidence that it would be legal as it was promoted by the governmental department. This demonstrated that central advice and guidance still have considerable power over the policy-making of local governments.

9.3 Theoretical implications

This study makes significant contributions to knowledge about collaboration policy at a local level. The study concentrates specifically on collaboration between local governments, rather than joint working between local government and other sectors. Collaboration is a slippery and essentially contested concept which might be difficult to define precisely. In this research the term ‘collaboration’ was used to refer to joint working arrangements between two or more local governments. The collaboration initiative can be any forms of interagency relationship on the continuum, ranging from informal, loose, ad-hoc institutional relationships to formal, highly structured, long-term institutional relationships (see Chapter 4). Since this study attempts to offer valuable lessons for councils interested in pursuing cross-council collaboration, it has investigated the rationale and the process by which in which cross-council collaboration initiate. Moreover, it has further examined the form of collaboration that resulted and the factors enabling long-lasting collaboration. The findings from empirical cases enable this thesis to provide theoretical implications as follows:
9.3.1 Reversing uneven relationships – resource dependant councils

The literature on resource/power dependency assumes that those with less resources are dependent on the organisation with more resources (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer and Salami, 1978; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). However, the empirical evidence from the Thai cases reveals that the converse also applies. Where the council with larger resources, who control necessary scarce resources that other councils need to fulfil their tasks, can become locked-in to the uneven and disadvantage relationship. This relationship is controlled by the councils with less resources. This unequal cross-council relationship is enabled by the lack of written, formal agreement to govern the relationship. Also, it is facilitated by cultural norms in the Thai society and the Thai local government system, in which the larger council with more resources was expected to help smaller new-born councils with have limited capacity and resources in providing services.

9.3.2 The roles of collaborative entrepreneurs in opening a collaborative window

The policy-making model (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997) is useful for investigating factors under the four process streams which enable or constraint collaboration policy formation. However, it was not applied to decision-making at local government level. Moreover, it has limited ability to describe the way in which the four different streams converge, resulting in the opening of the collaborative window, i.e. the opportunity for collaborative entrepreneur to couple their pet solution to the problem. In this regard, Kingdon’s (1995) agenda setting model suggests that the alignment of independent streams is the fortunate, occasional
circumstance resulting in the creation of policy windows. Empirically, this study rejected such an argument and argued that the convergence of streams leading to the opening of collaborative windows can be created by the actions of collaborative entrepreneurs. Indeed, this study argued that the four streams are interconnected and can be manipulated by the collaborative entrepreneurs. In other words, collaborative entrepreneurs have sufficient capacity to realise the existence of shared interests across council boundaries. Then they adjust the factors within each stream so that interdependent streams align to each other; creating the opportunity for elevating collaboration proposal they wish to see implemented to the status of policy.

Moreover, empirical evidence showed that in an absence of councils’ collaboration proposals collaborative entrepreneurs, political leaders, realised the presence of national government’s collaboration initiative, and picked it to become their pet proposal. Then they invest resources to push it to become policy. This circumstance reinforced the argument of this study that the collaborative window can be created by the actions of collaborative entrepreneur. Furthermore, the formation of a collaboration policy at local government level is suitably explained by the notion of garbage can model (Cohen et al., 1972) in that those streams do not easily and perfectly come into alignment to create a policy window. Rather the factors under each stream, such as defined problems and pre-existing solutions, are dumped into an organisation to be selected for use in the decision making process. Particularly, collaborative proposals can be independently generated by people either inside or outside organisations whether or not they can address the defined problem.
9.3.3 The collaborative manager sustainability role

One of the most important implications drawn from the case studies and the integrated conceptual framework is that small local authorities wishing to have sustainable collaboration require individuals or group of people to play both collaborative entrepreneurs and collaborative managers’ roles, which are subsets or boundary spanning roles. This study pinpoints that within local governments to initiate cross-council collaboration it requires local leaders or senior officers to play collaborative entrepreneurs’ roles to realise the presence of potential for collaboration, bring together appropriate councils, and couple a proposal to the problem. However, the existing literature on boundary spanning roles does not discuss the ‘collaborative managers’ roles as the key boundary spanning roles in sustaining collaboration between local governments after initiation. Hence, the contribution of this study is that to maintain cross-council collaboration and to drive forward the joint working, it requires individuals, political leaders and/or senior officers in this study, to play collaborative managers’ roles to facilitate and sustain cross-council working relationship.

9.3.4 The importance of the temporal dimension of collaboration policy

One of the important theoretical implications of this research is that cross-council collaboration policy at the local level has a temporal element. Therefore, to gain rich understanding of this phenomenon, the temporal element of the collaboration policy should be included into the investigation. Empirical evidence from cases demonstrated that cross-council collaboration policy has a temporal dimension in three key aspects. Firstly, collaboration policy evolves over a period of time. Secondly, decision on creating a
specific collaboration policy such as shared management and constitutional amalgamation is made by partnering councils in response to specific sets of factors under the problem, policy, political, and organisational streams at particular period. Thirdly, the decision to create deeper relationships over time was also influenced by occurrences that happened in their previous relationships and their history of working together, as discussed above. Scholars seeking to gain an in-depth understanding about why and how collaboration initiates and to gain deep insight into the practice of this policy at a local level need to undertake a longitudinal study rather than examine it at one point in time.

Before collecting empirical data the researcher did not realise the importance of the temporal element of collaboration policy. The conceptual models the researcher developed at the start of the research resulting from literature review had limited power to investigate the interaction between the formation of collaboration policy and its practice. For instance, the model of drivers of collaboration might be useful for investigating the motivations and necessary conditions concerning why councils need to collaborate with each other. However, it has limited power to explain how and why those conditions receive critical consideration by important people in and around local authorities, which then results in the formation of collaboration policy at any one point in time and progresses over time. The revised conceptual model drew on the policy-making models (Kingdon, 1995; Lober, 1997). These proved effective for understanding how cross-council collaboration policies are formed and developed over time. This is because the models suggest that policy formation is a result of the interactions between the actions of key individuals, i.e. entrepreneurs, and structural factors at any point in time and can be changed from one time to another.
9.4 Reflections of undertaking the study

The approach of informed consent was adopted in this study which meant participants involved in this research agreed to be involved in the research in the full knowledge of the objectives and the way the research will be presented. The researcher was completely open about the research in both ethical and practical ways. This allowed the researcher to avoid the false impression that the researcher can be some kind of spy for policy makers in governmental organisations. Although the researcher had worked for the Thai government before commencing doctoral study, the practitioner status of the researcher was insignificant, and it was an academic role that did not directly impact on policy making. Also, the researcher resigned from these positions before starting the study. During doctoral study the researcher held no status as a practitioner. Moreover, the researcher will be going back to Thailand to be a lecturer according to the condition of the Thai government scholarship, and will not be in a practitioner, managerial, or governmental official role. Hence, the researcher has no future practitioner status. The respondents in both Thailand and England were informed and acknowledged that the data will be used for the academic purpose of this study only. Therefore, when going into the field, the researcher was a doctoral student with no practitioner status. There was no requirement to disclose the previous roles from which the researcher had already resigned. So any false impression about the researcher as a practitioner, which may have made the respondent worried about harm deriving from their answers, their opinions, and their behaviour were avoided.

Data collection methods and undertaking fieldwork
Employing the three qualitative data collection methods - interviews, documentary study, and observations – was successful in gaining comprehensive understanding of the development of local government collaboration over time. Interagency collaboration means new ways of working which involves change process. According to Buchanan and Dawson (2007), the story of transformational process seems to have multiple aspects as it involves conflicting interests, negotiations, and alignments and depends upon the different experiences, viewpoints, and objectives of people in change process. Hence, the in-depth understand about the interaction between the initiation of cross-council collaboration policy and its practice was gained from a number of perspectives which also help enhance the validity of the study. The roles of collaborative entrepreneurs in collaboration policy formation and the actions of boundary-spanners in its operation in sufficient detail were gained by using systematic data collection and multiple data sources. However, there were some challenges concerning undertaking fieldwork in two different countries as follows:

**Documentary studies**

The researcher planned to use documents as initial data collection in both countries. For the English cases, gathering documents was done first and then followed by in-depth interviews. It was very useful since the researcher gained a rich understanding about the cases prior to interviewing key informants. It also helped identify the specific knowledge gaps and questions needed to be answered in interviews. Hence, the English cases drew largely upon documentary data. However, this could not be done as planned in Thailand, resulting from the fact that published documents relevant to the cases are scarce. To fix this issue the researcher changed the strategy by firstly visiting the cases’ sites and interviewing key informants to gain insight into the cases, then asking them to provide
documents that were not publicly available. Then data from multiple sources, documents, interviews, and observations, were used to form the inference in this study.

**Interviews**

Regarding conducting interviews *in the English cases*, the researcher got nervous initially resulting from the fact that the researcher is an international student. Gathering and analysing a number of documents relating to English local governments and their collaboration policy helped increase confidence before interviews. However, the researcher had not had a chance to get to know the behaviour of people who work within local governments in real-life contexts. With the help of the Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV), gaining access to participants in England was easier than expected, particularly in comparison to Thailand. The researcher’s supervisor introduced the researcher to the Director of INLOGOV who had a good relationship with a number of councils and also had knowledge of English local government collaborations, resulting from her previous roles in local governmental settings. Hence, after the researcher selected cases using purposive sampling, the director of INLOGOV introduced the researcher to the key informants of both cases; enabling access to the cases and participants.

Particularly, as the Director was a policy consultant and as the researcher was her team member for Babergh and Mid Suffolk case, opportunities to collect data by non-participant observation of the events related to the partnership occurred. At the first visit to the case with the Director to observe the executive meeting, the researcher was introduced to the chief executive and senior officers. They were informed that the researcher was going to select them as a case study for the thesis and going to interview people within the case.
With the use of documentary source and observational data, it helped partly defined who would be key informants. As such, when the researcher got to know key informants in person, the researcher asked each individual to be an interviewee.

Getting to know each other and analysing documents before interviews helped the in-depth interviews go very smoothly. Interviews were not like a Q&A session. Rather, it was more about real conversations and knowledge sharing in which both the researcher and respondents showed enthusiasm for discussion inter-local government collaboration in real-life settings. The researcher could feel how relaxed they were when answering the questions even though some questions were about the key challenges and problems they faced in cross-council working. Another strategy used to gain access to key informants and gain valuable data was making them aware of the contributions of the research to their practice. The researcher shared the summary of the case study with both cases, as they also showed interested and requested it.

Regarding the interviews in Thailand, having an intermediary with good connections with gatekeepers of the cases, who can assist the researcher to gain access, is the most important. Furthermore, while an informal approach, e-mail communication, can be used to arrange interviews in England formal ways of communication, i.e. formal letter, proved to be successful in gaining access to key informants in Thailand.

9.5 Recommendation for future research

This study defined collaboration as joint working relationship between two or more small councils which can be seen as a broad terminology since it sought to explore how far English local councils have implemented this approach comparing with less experienced
Thai councils. Future research may find it profitable to conduct case studies to examine the occurrence and operation of a specific type of cross-council collaboration such as shared services, shared management team, and integrated office structure as it would allow the comparison aspects to be demonstrated more precisely. This may be a fruitful area for future research. However, the challenge is if the research planned to undertake a cross-national comparative study, as it would need to ensure that such a specific type of collaboration has been already implemented in the countries expected to study. For example, shared chief executive and management team has never been operated in Thailand which means a comparative study would not be possible.

This study examined the collaborative journey of small councils, i.e. the initiation of cross-council relationship and its progress and operation over time, but not the output and outcome of collaboration policy. The case have been used were perceived to be successful by the people involved, rather than necessarily being successful according to an external measure. Therefore, important questions to answer are why some collaboration initiatives have proved successful in some cases, whereas others have failed or disbanded. Moreover, it would be necessary for future research to explore what type of outcome a particular form of collaboration produces.

Moreover, this study employed only qualitative data to provide an account of the formation of collaboration policy and its practice. Future research may find it profitable to conduct mixed methods research to investigate the initiation and the practice of cross-council collaboration, i.e. using quantitative data, for example, survey data, to complement qualitative evidence. For instance, local citizens might be surveyed about their views of collaboration, and how this intersects with local ideas about place and identity. It would lead to greater validity of research as the questions are answered from a number of
perspectives. Particularly it offers a better understanding of a research topic than either research approach alone.

**Conclusion**

This study employed a cross-national comparative case study methodology to provide an account of the way in which the initiation and the practice of cross-council collaboration interacts. Four cases in two different countries, England and Thailand, were examined. Using multiple evidences to develop inferences proved successful in explaining how and why cross-council collaboration is initiated, the types have been used and why, and the factors influencing sustainable collaboration. This study found that cross-council collaboration is initiated as it is believed by political leaders and senior officers of the small councils to be an effective mechanism to respond to scarcity of resources, particularly financial constraint, facing small councils. The shared management and the joint provision of services enables small councils to achieve efficiency, cost savings, and services improvement without losing local identity and local control. For this reason, collaboration between small local governments is likely to continue and grow in importance due to downward pressure on government spending in many countries. In particular, this study found that local governments who wish to collaborate need individuals to play both boundary-spanner roles. Individuals need to play a ‘collaborative entrepreneur’ role to initiate collaboration to solve immediate shared problems of resource scarcity and dependency facing small councils. After collaborative working is initiated, it requires individuals to play a ‘collaborative managers’ role to maintain sustainability of the collaboration and facilitate further integration across councils. The thesis also demonstrated that collaboration is more likely to happen when it does not challenge the
vested interests of citizens and councillors. Building a coalition for change and developing a collaborative culture is essential for enduring collaboration.
Appendix A
Interview topic guide

A topic guide for interviews on collaboration between local governments

- This topic guide is to be used in interviews for the UK and Thai cases.
- The purpose of the questions is to gain more understanding on the formation of collaborative working and the forms of interagency working as a result, as well as the factors that promote and inhibit collaborative working.
- Make clear we are interested in ‘collaboration between local authorities’, not collaborative working between local authorities and other sectors (e.g. private sector or community).
- The respondents would be local leaders, committee/board members or government officers (central or local government bodies) who have been involved in or knowledge of collaborative working.
- Interviewers should be explained that:
  1. Notes will be made of the interview/ the interview will be recorded by audio recorder.
  2. Your responses will be confidential. We will not name anyone in our study.
  3. Your answers will be analysed in an anonymous and all data will be stored securely.

Note: specific examples should be asked where ever possible and questions may not follow on the way outlined in this schedule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Question and memory prompt</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee background in relation to collaborative working</td>
<td>1. How long have you been involved in collaborative arrangements between the two councils?</td>
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<td>2. Which aspects of collaborative working you have been involved? (developing policy, implementing policy) Please describe your role in relation to collaborative working.</td>
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<td>Issue</td>
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<td>The formation of collaborative working <em>(formation)</em></td>
<td>3. What do you perceive as the objectives of collaborative working?</td>
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<td>4. What has been the most important driver that stimulates the two councils to create collaborative arrangements? <em>(ask for details)</em> <em>(to deal with complex issues, to access scarce resources, to reduce the duplication of services delivery, to meet the statutory requirement, because of individual interest of local leaders)</em></td>
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<td>5. What were the key factors that support or prohibit the collaborative working to form? <em>(political support/ public support/ willingness and capacity of organisations)</em></td>
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<td>Issue</td>
<td>Question and memory prompt</td>
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| Collaborative entrepreneur (formation)     | 6. Who were the key persons in forming collaborative working between the two councils? (could be individuals or groups)  
What they have done to form the partnership working?  
• Match solution to problem  
• Invest their resources  
• Bring together the potential and available partners |
<p>| Types of collaboration (implementation)    | 7. Could you explain the way your organisation has been collaborating with partners? (Can you give me some examples?/ask for details)                                                                                     |
|                                            | 8. Did you exchange or share organisation’s resources within collaborative working? What kinds of resources have been exchanged or shared? And in what way? (Resources: money, information, staff, etc.) |
| Effectiveness of collaborative working     | 9. What outcomes have the collaboration achieved? (ask for details and examples)                                                                                                                                            |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Question and memory prompt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Did you face any obstacles in the efforts to implement collaborative working? What was it? Which obstacle do you think to be the most significant?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>What do you perceive/regard as the important factors for <strong>effective collaboration</strong>? (Individual factors: Boundary-spanners; leadership, trust, informal relations; Organizational factors: culture; commitment and involvement; trust; working plans; political support; Environmental factors: support from central government)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filling in the gaps</td>
<td>12. Are there any other points about constraints on collaboration that you think I need to understand?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Are there any documents that set out the collaborative working that you can provide?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Is anyone else that you think I’m able to talk to about this topic?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B
Information sheet and consent form

The Participant Information Sheet
“Collaboration between Local Governments for Enhancing the Capacity on Public Services Provision in Thailand: Lessons from the UK Experiences”

We would like to invite you to participate in the research study which aims to explore the appropriate methods of local government collaboration for implementation in Thailand by studying the UK’s experiences. Collaboration has been introduced as a potential mechanism to increase the capacities of local government in providing efficient services in Thailand for decades. However, there has been little progress in implementing collaborative working and there are challenges that local governments face when using collaboration in Thailand. The UK has much long experience of implementing a collaborative approach. Hence, studying UK experiences of collaboration between local governments can benefit the implementation of this policy in Thailand.

The study is conducted by PhD student of Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV), University of Birmingham- Miss Pobsook Chamchong. To gain insight into this topic, we are seeking interviews with local government managers and politicians on the following issues:

1. Why has collaboration between local governments developed?
2. What forms of collaboration have been used?
3. What factors promote and inhibit collaboration between local governments?

Interviews will be a maximum of 1 hour. Taking part in this study is totally voluntary. Subject to your agreement, interviews will be audio recorded. Your responses will be confidential. Your answers will be analysed in an anonymous way and all data will be stored securely. No identifiable personal data will be published. The respondent can withdraw from the study, may request the return of any data they have provided, and request the researcher to destroy these data within 14 days from the date the consent form has been signed.

We would like to thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. If you have any questions about the study at any stage, please do not hesitate to contact me - Miss Pobsook Chamchong (PXC052@bham.ac.uk) or my supervisors – Chris Skelcher (c.k.skelcher@bham.ac.uk) and Catherine Needham (c.needham.1@bham.ac.uk)
The Consent Form

“Exploring Possible Models of Collaboration between Local Governments for Enhancing the Capacity on Public Services Provision in Thailand: Lessons from the UK’s Experiences”

We would greatly appreciate you taking the time to take part in this study. If you agree to participate, please Sign and Date this consent form which has been approved by the University’s Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee.

- I have read and understood the Information Sheet.
- I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study
- I understand that taking part in the study is voluntary.
- I understand that confidentiality will be ensured and my identity will be protected in the analysis and further reports.
- I understand that I can request the interview notes or a summary of case study from the researcher.
- I understand that I can withdraw from the study and may request the return of any data I have provided, and request the researcher to destroy these data by contacting the researcher: PXC052@bham.ac.uk within 14 days from the date I sign the consent form.

Signature of Participant: ________________________ Date: ______________

Signature of Researcher: ________________________ Date: ______________
Appendix C

The list of interviewees

The list of participants and the dates of interviews of the two English cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Interviewee (senior officer)</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adur and Worthing</td>
<td>Officer A</td>
<td>1st November 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer B</td>
<td>1st November 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer C</td>
<td>1st November 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babergh and Mid-Suffolk</td>
<td>Officer D</td>
<td>15th May 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer E</td>
<td>28th February 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer F</td>
<td>11th March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(*Telephone Interview)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The list of participants and the dates of interviews of the two Thai cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Interviewee (senior officer and politician)</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-local government</td>
<td>Politician A</td>
<td>3rd June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collaboration in Lampang</td>
<td>Officer A</td>
<td>3rd June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politician B</td>
<td>3rd June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer B</td>
<td>3rd June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer C</td>
<td>4th June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer D</td>
<td>4th June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-local government</td>
<td>Officer A</td>
<td>22nd July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collaboration in Roi Et</td>
<td>Officer B</td>
<td>31st July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politician A</td>
<td>31st July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer C</td>
<td>31st July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer D</td>
<td>31st July 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer E</td>
<td>1st August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officer F</td>
<td>1st August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politician B</td>
<td>1st August 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D

The list of documentary sources of the English cases

Case 1: Adur and Worthing

Internal councils’ documents


External bodies’ documents


**News**


31. Adur District Council and Worthing Borough Council (2006b) ‘Forward Thinking with Adur and Worthing’ *Adur District Council and Worthing Borough Council*


Case 2: Babergh and Mid Suffolk

Internal councils’ documents


External bodies’ documents


REFERENCES


Improvement and Efficiency South East (IESE) (2009b) Adur and Worthing: A Members’ Perspective Council Members in Adur and Worthing Joint Forces to Deliver Local Government First in Joint Partnership Working [online]. Available from:


The Simultaneous Executive Meeting of Adur and Worthing, (2006a) Minutes of the Simultaneous Executive Meeting between the Policy and Strategy Committee of Adur District Council and the Cabinet of Worthing Borough Council on 12 July


