The Russian migration regime and migrants' experiences: the case of non-Russian nationals from former Soviet republics

by

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A thesis submitted to
The University of Birmingham
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Centre for Russian and East European Studies
School of Government and Society
College of Social Science
The University of Birmingham
2009
Acknowledgements

This work would be impossible without the people who agreed to participate in my research. I am extremely grateful for their time and trust. I am also very grateful to the International Fellowship Program of the Ford Foundation which provided funding for my work on this thesis.

I want to thank my supervisors – Prof. Hilary Pilkington and Dr. Deema Kaneff for their patience, understanding, and critical guidance. It was a real pleasure to work with them.

Within CREES at the University of Birmingham I would like to thank Dr. Derek Averre for his work as a Director of Post graduate Research Programme. My thanks also go to Marea Arries, Tricia Carr and Veta Douglas for their technical assistance and eagerness to help. I want to thank Marta Slaska for her assistance with the library research.

My friends – Julie, Tanya and Gulya – were important sources of encouragement during my time in the UK. I am very happy that I have such friends in my life. I am also very grateful to Anaximandro Gomez for his care and support for the two last years of my work on the thesis.

My thanks go to Eve Richards and Vickie Hudson for their help with proofreading my thesis. I am also grateful to Julie for final proofreading of my thesis.

I am extremely grateful to my parents for their financial help which allowed me to finish this work. I also want to thank Timur Ismagilov who, by sorting out my problems in Novosibirsk, allowed me to focus on my studies in the UK. Special thanks also go to Ul’yana Maksyuta who helped me to understand myself.

Finally, I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my grandmother. I will always remember her unconditional love and support.
This thesis explores how the Russian migration regime is reflected in migrants’ experiences and identities. The conceptual framework developed in the thesis is informed by the theory of structuration. On the basis of this theory and the analysis of primary empirical data, the thesis seeks to refine the understanding of the concepts of ‘migration regime’, ‘social exclusion’ and ‘territorialisation’ of identity.

The empirical research conducted for the thesis focuses on the period 2002-2009 and on the experiences and identities of a particular group of migrants, namely, former Soviet citizens from former republics of the USSR, who are currently living in post-Soviet Russia without Russian citizenship. The thesis explores and analyses, on the one hand, the structures which constitute the Russian migration regime and, on the other, the stories told by interviewed migrants about their lives in Russia.

The thesis argues that the current migration regime of the Russian Federation represents ‘a differentiated system of othering’ and shows that this system is informed by two processes – nation-building and racialisation. It also argues that differentiations institutionalised in the Russian migration regime affect the social exclusion of migrants and through this the ‘territorialisation’ of their identities.
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Glossary and Abbreviations

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States
FMS – Federal Migration Service
ILO – International Labour Organization
IOM – International Organization for Migration
NGO – non-governmental organization
NIS – New Independent States
OVIR – Office of Visa and Registration
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Library of Congress transliteration system has been used throughout the text.
Introduction

In 1991 a new space of international migration appeared in the world. This space encompasses fifteen new independent states which emerged on the territory of the USSR, after its disintegration as a single geopolitical entity. At present, these states, which have a common history, cultural ties, social links between populations, and mutual economic interests, form one migration system (Robarts, 2008). The Russian Federation, as the net recipient in migration exchange with almost all former Soviet republics, is considered to be the centre of this system (Tishkov, Zaionchkovskaya et al., 2005). Most of the foreign citizens moving across Russian borders are the citizens of other New Independent States (NIS), and official statistics as well as a range of experts’ evaluations indicate that the migration-based population growth in post-Soviet Russia has occurred mainly as a result of its migration exchange with other former republics of the USSR (Goskomstat, 1999, pp. 323-333; Rosstat, 2005a, pp. 476-481, 517-519).

The aim of this study, which is a piece of sociological research, undertaken at the intersection of two multidisciplinary fields (Russian studies and Migration studies), is to explore how the Russian migration regime, constructed as a response to migration from the near abroad, is intertwined with the experiences of migrants as well as the construction of their identities. The study focuses on the period after 2002, a year of crucial changes to Russian legislation regulating issues linked with migration.

The idea of this study stems from my previous research. In 2000-2003, I conducted a project focused on the experiences of former Soviet citizens who came to Russia after the collapse of the USSR and managed to obtain ‘forced migrant’ status. This meant that they were entitled to support provided by the Russian authorities through numerous programmes developed with a view to integrating this category of migrant into Russian society. The aim of the research was to investigate how the gender order of the receiving society influenced the implementation of

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1 New Independent States (NIS) – the countries which emerged as a result of the collapse of the USSR.
2 The ‘near abroad’ is a term commonly used in Russia to refer to the other former Soviet republics.
3 In Russia, ‘forced migrant’ status can be granted only to Russian citizens. Others are entitled to refugee status.
these programmes and, through this, the experiences of the migrants whom they targeted.\textsuperscript{4} I studied this issue through a case study of Novosibirsk and Novosibirsk region. As it happened, this research coincided with the beginning of major transformations in the Russian migration regime. In 2002, the Territorial Branch of the Federal Migration Service was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and two federal laws – the Law ‘On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation’ and a new Law ‘On Citizenship’ – were issued.

Working in close collaboration with the Territorial Branch of the Federal Migration Service in the Novosibirsk region, I had the opportunity to observe how ongoing institutional transformations and changes in the Russian legislation were affecting migration regulation on the ground. At the beginning of my research I was impressed by the attitude shown by officials working in this branch of the Federal Migration Service towards their clients — migrants. Having the opportunity to talk with these officials and observe their interactions with migrants, my strong impression was that the majority of them were genuinely oriented towards helping and assisting the people approaching this Service. I remember how confused these officials were by the internal note which was sent out to all branches of the Federal Migration Service when it became a department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2002. This note stated that ‘The task of the Federal Migration Service is to fight against migrants’. Some officials literally could not believe their eyes, and initially thought that this must be some kind of typographical error. By the end of my research, many of those working in the Territorial Branch of the Federal Migration Service in Novosibirsk had left their jobs, because they did not share this new approach towards migrants and did not like the semi-military atmosphere which had come with the Service’s transfer to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The changes taking place in the structures of the Russian migration regime directly affected the experiences of people who came to Russia from former Soviet republics for permanent residency but did not manage to receive Russian citizenship before these transformations began. During the fieldwork which I conducted in the Novosibirsk region in autumn 2002, I had

\textsuperscript{4} This research was supported by the International Association for the Promotion of Co-operation with Scientists from the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union (fellowship reference N YSF 01/1-26).
opportunity to meet such people and to talk with them. The migrants’ stories which I had heard before were far from the narratives of the despair produced by these people who had come to Russia expecting to receive Russian citizenship within six months, but who instead found themselves trapped in a situation of ‘illegality’. After the passage of the new legislation, they even lost the right to be located on the territory of the Russian Federation. They did not know what they could do or where to turn for help in this situation. Their stories were stories of exclusion and of uncertain futures.

Since the focus and scope of my previous research project meant that I had been unable to address the situation of those migrants who were excluded by the 2002 changes in the Russian migration regime, I then decided to embark upon another project which would do so, with the aim of giving a voice to these people.

My previous research devoted to the experiences of forced migrants showed me that even seemingly powerless social actors are able to express creativity and agency and to carve out some space of control. At the same time, I realise that representing someone as an active actor can lead to the perception that he/she is responsible for his/her disadvantages and can thus effectively mean ‘blaming the victim’. With this in mind, I approached the design of the present research from the position that emphasising agency (viewing people as active and creative) has to go hand-in-hand with emphasising the significance of structure for people’s experiences. The theory of structuration was chosen as the theoretical framework for this research precisely because its accounts of the interconnectedness of agency and structure make the abovementioned position possible.

The present research encompasses two objectives: to conduct a comprehensive analysis of changes in the structures constituting the national migration regime of the Russian Federation and the present composition of this regime, on the one hand; and to collect and analyse migrants’ stories about their life in Russia, on the other. The analysis of the Russian migration regime is guided by the questions: What trends can be discerned in the transformations taking place? What limitations/opportunities are imposed on non-Russian nationals by the current migration regime? Questions posed by the study in relation to analysis of migrants’ stories are: What limitations/opportunities are experienced by migrants in the receiving society? How do migrants access resources allocated in the receiving society? What meanings are attached by migrants to
the limitations/opportunities that they encounter in the receiving society? Do the experiences of migrants affect their identities? If so, what is the nature of these effects?

The migrants who participated in this research differed in gender, age, ethnicity, country of origin, reasons for migration, and legal statuses on Russian territory\(^5\). Their selection for inclusion in the study was based on the following shared characteristics: all were once citizens of the USSR, had been permanent residents in another former Soviet republic before moving to Russia, and, at the moment of the interview, had been living without Russian citizenship in post-Soviet Russia for more than one year.\(^6\)

The results obtained through this research allows me to argue that the current Russian migration regime represents ‘a differentiated system of othering’, which institutionalises differences between people on the basis of citizenship and racial constructions. I also argue that this system, manifesting itself through differentiated access to rights and resources, is an important factor affecting the social exclusion of migrants in Russia and through this the ‘territorialisation’ of their identities.

**Existing Academic Frameworks**

Migration to post-Soviet Russia from other NIS countries has attracted the attention of social scientists who have explored the issues raised by this geographical movement within the frameworks of different disciplines and at different levels of analysis (Vitkovskaya, 1998). The composition, trends and geographical patterns of such migration have been explored throughout the post-Soviet period (Codagnone, 1998; Tishkov, Zaionchkovskaya et al., 2005; Heleniak, 2008). The published literature almost always includes a discussion of the reasons for migration. Some works contain estimations of the possible political, economic, cultural, and social

\(^5\) Migration between Russia and other former Soviet republics is subdivided into different migration flows by national and international legislation and discourses resulting in the identification of different ‘types’ of migrants, including, for example, forced migrants, labour migrants etc. This research considers this division to be a social construction, and a subject for analysis in itself, and looks at the migration to Russia from other former Soviet republics as one geographical movement.

\(^6\) Altogether 42 migrants were interviewed within this research (3 during the first stage of the fieldwork and 39 during its second stage). All of the interviewees lived in urban and semi-urban areas: 15 in Moscow, 7 in two small towns in the Moscow region and 20 in Novosibirsk (including 1 in the Novosibirsk region). See Chapter 2 for more information about fieldwork sites and respondents.
consequences of this movement, for both the sending and the receiving societies (Shlapentokh, Sendich et al., 1994; Heleniak, 2008; Korobkov, 2008). There are also studies that look at this migration in an historical context, exploring its roots and comparing it with migration in the Soviet and pre-revolutionary periods (Messina, 1994; Vishnevskii, 1998).

A significant number of studies by Russian social scientists on migration to Russia from former Soviet republics, and also by some of their colleagues from abroad, focus on the response to this movement from within Russian society. These studies include analyses of legislation regulating the international migration from abroad to Russian territory (Voronina, 1997; Yastrebova, 2004); the institutions responsible for implementing this legislation (Denisenko, Kharaeva et al., 2003); and discourses about migration and migrants constructed in different spheres of society, for example, in the mass media and politics (Mkrtchyan, 2003; Bacon, Renz et al., 2006). Alongside these works there are also some studies devoted to the exploration of migrants’ experiences in the receiving society (Filippova, 1994; Kosmarskaya, 1999; Kisileva and Damberg, 2001; Brednikova and Tkach, 2010) and a relatively small amount of research focused on the identities of migrants (Filippova, 1997; Gritsenko, 1999). The gap between macro- and micro-analysis often found in the literature about migration to Russia from other former Soviet republics has been addressed by Pilkington (1998) and Flynn (2004). Their studies combine different levels of analysis and explore the interconnections between institutions designed to ‘manage’ migration and migrants’ own identities and experiences in Russia.

An overview of the literature reveals that social scientists concur that migration to post-Soviet Russia from other former Soviet republics has changed significantly over time. If in the 1990s it was perceived as a geographical movement which mainly consisted of people changing their permanent place of residence as a result of fears for their safety or well-being in the countries of departure, in the 2000s it has been understood as a geographical movement which mainly consists of people coming to Russia for only a limited time in order to earn money (Mukomel', 2005; Heleniak, 2008). This change in perception can be traced through a significant increase in the proportion of studies about labour migration to Russia from other NIS countries within the total body of research about migration to Russia from this region. While in the 1990s the dominant theme of academic discussions was ‘forced’/ ‘return’ migration to Russia from the former Soviet republics, today it is the so-called ‘illegal’ labour migration from the region.
The evolution of the academic debate on migration is a product of the changing political, economic and social context, which, itself, has brought about a transformation in the Russian migration regime, as well as migrants’ experiences and identities. This study uses the theoretical approach employed in the works of Pilkington (1998) and Flynn (2004) to explore the interconnectedness between the migration regime existing in present-day Russia and the experiences/identities of migrants from other former Soviet republics. Beyond bringing these works up to date, however, this thesis develops the theoretical concept of the migration regime, employed by Pilkington (1998) and Flynn (2004), and interweaves it with other important sociological concepts, namely, social exclusion and identity ‘territorialisation’.

**Conceptual Framework**

This research is designed within the framework of the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1984) and its application to theoretical accounts and the empirical study of migration and migrants’ experience (Goss and Lindquist, 1995; Pilkington, 1998; Pilkington and Phizacklea, 1999; Westwood and Phizacklea, 2000; Morawska, 2001; Flynn, 2004). The research adopts key conceptual elements of the theory of structuration: the notion of ‘duality of structure’, which implies that social structures are both the medium and outcome of interactions between social actors; the notion that structures both constrain and enable agency; and the idea that social actors are knowledgeable – in other words, that they have ideas about the conditions and possible consequences of their actions.

These conceptual starting points have been used, in this thesis, to develop the notion of the migration regime as a combination of structures that are constructed and reproduced/transformed through interactions of knowledgeable social actors who, in their turn, are constrained and enabled by these structures. The theory of structuration highlights three kinds of structures which are exhibited by the social system and deeply intertwined with each other: structures of signification (meanings); legitimation (norms); and domination (resources). Following this, this study assumes that a migration regime consists of: discourses about migration and migrants created and reproduced by different actors in different spheres of society; the legislative
framework, which includes legislation regulating migration at international, national, regional, local, and institutional levels, as well as unwritten rules; and the composition of resources available to social actors involved in the construction and reproduction of this migration regime. Thus this study does not limit a migration regime to structures constructed by the authorities (Schwarz, 1999; Flynn, 2001). The thesis suggests, rather, that a migration regime can be understood as ‘a system of othering’, which institutionalises differences existing between people and through this contributes to the construction of migrants as ‘others’. A migration regime is ‘a differentiated system of othering’ since it also differentiates between constructed ‘others’. This system, manifesting itself through differentiated access to resources allocated in the receiving society, moreover, affects the social exclusion of migrants in this society.

The definition of social exclusion understood in this thesis through the lens of the theory of structuration refers to a process of negotiating access to resources and rights between social actors operating within a social structure that is both enabling and constraining. From this perspective, the social exclusion of migrants can be seen as a process of negotiation over their access to resources and rights, which takes place between them and the other social actors operating within the migration regime. This definition of social exclusion captures the agency of migrants in shaping this process and draws on a further element of the theory of structuration – the ‘dialectic of control’ – which explains the ability of less powerful actors to use resources and rules exhibited in the social system to reach desirable outcomes in their interaction with other social actors. The emphasis on the enabling capacity of the structures and agency of social actors does not mean that all social actors have equal power or ‘transformative capacity’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 258) to influence the outcomes of their negotiations. Such inequality in power stems first of all from the differentiated availability of resources that can be mobilised by social actors. The inability of one social actor (or group of actors) to reach a desired outcome occurs not because this social actor (or group of actors) is not active enough, but because other social actors are more powerful.

Another key concept in this study is the ‘territorialisation’ of identity which refers to people’s understanding of themselves in relation to place(s) as expressed in their reflections on the question ‘Where or what is the place(s) to which I belong?’ A range of studies have suggested that this understanding is rooted in feelings of (in)stability/(in)security associated with place(s)
(Amit-Talai, 1998; Flynn, 2004, 2007). While the stability and security felt by individuals contribute to the construction of an emotive link between them and place, feelings of instability and insecurity decrease attachment to the place(s) associated with such feelings. The present study argues that the social exclusion experienced by migrants in the receiving society affects their feeling of (in)stability/(in)security and, as a result, the whole process of identity ‘territorialisation’. This study also explores the temporal dimension of identity ‘territorialisation’, which has been outlined in the literature (Jansen, 1998; Flynn, 2004, 2007). In other words, it explores how a person’s interpretations of the past, perception of the present and visions of the future are interconnected in this process.

**Research Methodology and Methods**

The methodology of this study is informed by ontological positions expressed in the theory of structuration through the notions of the ‘duality of structure’ and the ‘knowledgeability of social actors’ (Giddens, 1984, pp. 374-375). Another ontological position underpinning the methodology of this study is one that recognises that the ideas of social actors about themselves and the social world around them affect their social practices. The epistemological positions which shape the methodology of this study include: an acceptance that the knowledgeability of social actors (the researcher included) is limited by their inability to grasp all the conditions and contexts within which they act (Giddens, 1984, p. 5); the recognition of the dialogical production of data; and an understanding of the active position of the researcher in the field.

The research design followed the principle of the double hermeneutic suggested by Giddens (1984, p. 374) and was shaped in such a way as to allow a dialogue between *a priori* suggested concepts and data gained through empirical study. In fact, the only concept that was relatively developed before fieldwork commenced was that of the migration regime. The emergence and development of other concepts in this thesis were prompted by the need to reflect on the empirical data received.

To facilitate the abovementioned dialogue between theory and empirical data, the central research question was formulated in a very broad manner, which, however, still reflects ontological positions on the interconnectedness of the structures of society and the social actors.
The question ‘how is the migration regime reflected in the experiences and identities of migrants?’ was addressed on two levels of analysis. On the one hand, this research scrutinised the legislation and discourses which constitute the migration regime under discussion, as well as transformations in a set of collective actors involved in the regulation of migration. On the other hand, it explored the understandings and experiences of migrants. Since acknowledging the limitations of social actors’ ideas about the social world does not mean negating the fact that social actors still know a great deal about this social world, this study pays significant attention to such actors’ own accounts.

The set of material used for this two-level analysis consists of some secondary data (official statistics, results of research on so-called ‘illegal’ migration, and results of opinion polls) and empirical data generated within this research project through the following methods: semi-structured interviews with migrants; expert interviews with representatives of NGOs; informal conversations with social actors operating in the field; and informal observations in the field. Empirical material used for analysis also included the legislation of the Russian Federation and publications in Russian newspapers.

The levels of analysis indicated above were interconnected. The analysis of structures constituting the migration regime provided information which was used for designing guides for interviews with migrants about their experiences and understandings. It also informed the analysis of data received from these interviews, as well as from informal observations and conversations which took place during the fieldwork. At the same time, the analysis of data obtained through observations and interviews/conversations with migrants which focused on the exploration of migrants’ experiences and understandings also informed and directed the analysis of the migration regime.

Epistemological positions which indicate that the information obtained during research is a product of contextualised interaction between a researcher and other participants of the research, and that a researcher entering the field inevitably becomes a social actor operating in it, require the researcher to be reflective about the research process and sensitive to ethical issues raised in the course of the research. This study outlines the importance of the positionalities of research participants including the researcher in the process of data production. It also discusses ethical issues linked with the dissemination of the research results.
Thesis Outline

Although in practice this research was characterised by the constant interaction between empirical data and theory, the structure of the thesis is that of a set of chapters organised according to deductive logic. In other words, the concepts employed in and developed through the research process are presented before the empirical chapters which illustrate their descriptive and analytical value. This structure has been chosen because it is convenient for tracing the connections between the key concepts of the research and presenting the research results in the form of a coherent story which tells how the contemporary Russian migration regime, as ‘a differentiated system of othering’, affects the social exclusion of non-Russian nationals from former Soviet republics living in Russia and, through this, the ‘territorialisation’ of their identities.

Chapter 1, through an overview of the academic literature, indicates the key debates in understandings of migration. It critically explores different approaches to answering the question of how agency and structure are related to each other in shaping migration and the experiences of migrants. This exploration is focused on the theory of structuration and its application in the field of migration studies, which shaped the theoretical framework of this thesis. The chapter proceeds with a discussion of the key concepts used in the thesis to analyse the empirical data collected during the research, namely: migration regime, othering, citizenship, racialisation, social exclusion, social networks and the ‘territorialisation’ of identity. The chapter also links these concepts together in a single explanatory scheme.

Chapter 2 discusses the methodology, methods and ethics of the research. It presents the ontological and epistemological positions which informed the methodology used in the study; takes a general overview of the research process in the field; and justifies the methods used by this study for generating empirical data. The chapter also explains how the methods for collecting empirical data were used, and how the data thereby obtained were analysed and utilised in the
text of the thesis. It also discusses some of the ethical issues which emerged in the course of the research.

Chapter 3 contextualises the stories told by interviewed migrants about their experiences in Russia. The chapter starts with an examination of the trends and composition of net migration to Russia due to population exchange with former Soviet republics. It proceeds by outlining a set of collective social actors directly involved in the construction and reproduction of the Russian migration regime. Exploring transformations which have occurred in this set of collective actors in the 2000s, it reveals the ongoing centralisation and securitisation of the Russian migration regime. The chapter continues with an exploration of the Russian migration regime. It draws on an analysis of the present-day Russian legislation and mass media discourses to show that this regime can be understood as ‘a differentiated system of othering’ constructed along two criteria – citizenship and racial constructions (meanings ascribed to the physical appearance of people).

Chapter 4 draws on the analysis of semi-structured interviews with migrants in order to explore how the two criteria of differentiation revealed through the analysis of the Russian migration regime, citizenship and racial constructions, are reflected in migrants’ experiences in Russia. The chapter shows how these dimensions are involved in the process of social exclusion, understood as a negotiation over access to resources, and stresses the significance of migrants’ personal social networks in shaping this process and its outcomes.

On the basis of an analysis of migrants’ stories recounted in the semi-structural interviews, Chapter 5 scrutinises how the social exclusion experienced by migrants in Russia at present affects the ‘territorialisation’ of their identities. The chapter also explores the temporal dimension within the ‘territorialisation’ of identity and shows that within this process interpretations of the present are interconnected with memories of the past and visions of the future.

Chapter 6 – the conclusion of the thesis – summarises and discusses the results of this research project and indicates possible avenues for its further development. Such avenues include investigations of the ways in which racialisation is reflected in the identities of migrants and in
the social practices of officials responsible for implementing the legislation regulating the admission and permission to remain in Russia. The conclusion also raises the issue of the silence among social scientists about the process of racialisation which is taking place in Russia. It argues that this process has to be recognised and studied in depth.
Chapter 1
The Theoretical Framework and Key Concepts

Introduction

This chapter has two aims: to present the theoretical framework used in the thesis and to
discuss the concepts employed in and developed through the analysis of the empirical material
collected during the research. The chapter is divided into three parts.

The first part of the chapter begins with some general remarks about migration as a
social phenomenon, outlining problems with its definition and classification as well as
making comments about the perception of our time as the ‘age of migration’ (Castles and
Miller, 2003). It proceeds with an overview of theoretical accounts of migration existing in
the academic literature and indicates points of disagreement among them. Then it turns to a
discussion of the theory of structuration and its application in the field of migration studies,
where it has been used in an attempt to solve the dilemma of relationships between ‘agency’
and ‘structure’ in shaping migration. The first part of the chapter ends by pointing out the
specificity of the research undertaken in the framework of this thesis.

The second part of the chapter discusses the concepts used for, and developed through,
the analysis of data generated during the research. Among these concepts are migration
regime, othering, citizenship, racialisation, social exclusion, social networks and the
‘territorialisation’ of identity.

Finally, the third part of the chapter introduces an explanatory scheme which links all of
the abovementioned concepts and shows the significance of differentiation, institutionalised
via the migration regime, for the experiences and identities of migrants.
1.1 In search of a theoretical framework

1.1.1 Migration as a social phenomenon: general remarks

Migration can be defined as movement from one place to another. Technically this definition would allow all people to be seen as migrants, since in fact everyone moves from place to place. However, the label ‘migration’ is not attached to every change of place undertaken by people, since migration involves not only a change of place but also changes in the social and cultural environment.¹

People on the move are subdivided into groups by migration regimes (international, national, regional and/or local)² constituting so-called ‘migration flows’. Migration flows can be perceived as social constructs. The division of migration into flows can occur on several different bases, such as: reasons for migration; distance and duration of migration; or characteristics of people participating in migration – their ethnicity, education, age, social status, etc.. The identification of migration flows which may initially appear only at the level of discourse (including academic discourse) can be strengthened by the creation of institutions and regulations focused on identified flows. The division of migration into flows and the consequent division of migrants into different types can be criticised for simplifying reality. It is also worth noting that migrants themselves do not necessarily share the perception that their geographical movement is part of this or that migration flow.³

Although migration became a subject for social science enquiry fairly recently,⁴ humans have been migrating since the beginning of their existence on Earth (Manning, 2004). Migration has affected cultures and societies throughout all human history. However, starting from the second half of the twentieth century, migration (due to political, economic, social and technological transformations) acquired new characteristics which have allowed social

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¹ As the Glossary on migration issued by the International Migration Organisation indicates, ‘no universally accepted definition of a migrant exists’ (Perruchoud, 2004, p. 40). Problems with defining the terms migrant and migration are also acknowledged in the academic literature (Papastergiadis, 2000, p.57; Rybakovskii, 2001, pp. 12-13).
² See the discussion of the concept of migration regime in the second part of this chapter (section 1.2.1).
³ That is why this thesis, which focuses on the experiences and identities of people who moved to Russia from the other countries that emerged following the collapse of the USSR, does not refer to these people as ‘immigrants’, and instead refers to them as ‘migrants’. As the research shows, although they crossed geopolitical borders, many do not recognise these new borders and do not think about themselves in terms of ‘immigration’/ ‘emigration’.
⁴ It is generally accepted that the study of migration began with the publication of Ravenstein’s Laws of Migration in 1885 (Ravenstein, 1976 [1885]).
scientists to speak about our time as an ‘age of migration’. Among these new characteristics of migration are its globalisation, acceleration, differentiation and politicisation (Castles and Miller 2003, pp. 7-9).

Besides these changes in the geographical movements of population, our time is also characterised by an increasing awareness of these movements and their effects, and this also contributes to the image of our time as an ‘age of migration’. The development of technologies provides not only opportunities for some people to make longer and quicker journeys, but also opportunities for others to be informed about these journeys, their circumstances and consequences, providing building material for discourses about migration and migrants. Actively participating in the production of discourses, studies about migration have also been making a significant contribution to an increasing awareness of the effects of this social phenomenon.5

1.1.2. Theorisation of migration: an overview

Since researchers who investigate migration are looking, first of all, for an understanding and explanation of this social phenomenon and its effects, the process of theorisation accompanies empirical studies. The outcomes of this process are numerous typologies of migration, theoretical concepts, theories and models explaining migration (or types of migration) at its different stages6 and its effects on people (first and foremost, on migrants themselves), societies, cultures, politics and economies at the places of departure and destination.

At present, there are several competing theories of migration, none of which fully explains contemporary migration (Arango, 2004). Some attempts have been made to deal with the plurality and incompleteness of these explanations by integrating existing theories in a single explanatory model or by creating new overarching theories (Massey, Arango et al., 1998). However, these attempts notwithstanding, the prevalent view among social scientists is

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5 It is important to recognise that social scientists not only increase awareness about social issues and phenomena, but also participate in shaping the attitudes of the general public and authorities about these issues and phenomena by presenting their views and the results of their research in the literature and mass media. Moreover, authorities at different levels of government (international, national and local) use social scientists as experts and refer to the results of their research when developing and/or justifying measures directed at the regulation of these issues and phenomena.

6 In the literature, there is no unity concerning the subdivision of migration into stages (see, for example, Demuth [2000] and Rybakovskii [2001]). The most frequently indicated stages are: departure, actual moving from place to place and adaptation to the new place.
that the creation of one grand theory is highly problematic due to the complexity of contemporary migration. As Castles (2007) puts it: ‘A theory that took account of all the complex forms and permutations of migration would be so abstract as to be without any useful explanatory content’ (p. 365). Instead of trying to explain migration in all its multifacetedness through creating a grand theory, they suggest that migration should be ‘unpacked’ through mid-range theories so that each aspect of this social phenomenon can be understood (Portes, 1997, p. 811). Several ways of ‘unpacking’ have been suggested. Some suggest that mid-range theories should provide an account of the different stages of migration (Demuth, 2000). Others argue for concentrated theory-building around different thematic issues stemming from migration and its consequences, for example, the origins of migration, the directionality of migration flows, transnational communities, second generations of migrants, households and gender in migration etc. (Portes, 1997; Portes and DeWind, 2007). It is still worth noting that such ‘unpacking’ will not result in any unified theoretical account of certain aspects of migration, since the same aspect can be theorised from the perspectives of different paradigms which contain different epistemological and ontological assumptions.

One of the problems that preoccupy social scientists trying to understand migration is the relationship between agency\(^7\) and structure\(^8\) in shaping this social phenomenon. The two opposite viewpoints on the issue are presented by push-pull models suggested by the neoclassical economic perspective (Todaro, 1969; Borjas, 1989) and segmented market theory (Piore, 1979) together with the so-called ‘structuralist approach’, which according to Goss and Linquist (1995) encompasses dependency theory, world systems theory and modes of production theory. While the first range of theories represents migration ‘as the aggregate result of individuals exercising rational choice’, the second range sees it ‘as the result of socio-spatial inequalities systematically reproduced within global and national economies’ (Goss and Linquist, 1995, p. 318). Attempts to find a middle way between these two points of

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\(^7\) The term ‘agency’ is a central but heavily disputed category in the social sciences. There is a significant body of theoretical work which seek to answer the question ‘what is agency?’ (for an overview, see Emirbayer and Mische [1998]). However, as Marshall (1998) has noted, ‘agency’ is often used in the academic literature simply as a synonym for the word ‘action’ (p. 10). In this thesis, the term ‘agency’ stands, first and foremost, for action(s) performed by social actors.

\(^8\) The term ‘structure’ is another central category for the social sciences. Despite its omnipresence in the academic literature devoted to the conceptualisation of society, this term remains one of ‘the most… elusive and undertheorized concepts in the social sciences’ (Sewell 1992, p. 1). This term is ‘loosely applied to any recurring pattern of social behaviour; or, more specifically, to the ordered interrelationships between the different elements of a social system or society’ (Marshall 1998, p. 648). The research project undertaken in the framework of this thesis employed the conceptualisation of social structure suggested by the theory of structuration (Giddens 1979, 1984). This conceptualisation is introduced below in section 1.1.3.1.
view have been proposed in the new economics of labour migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985),
the theory of cumulative causation (Massey, 1990) and the migration system perspective
(Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992), which employed the concepts of household and migration network
in an attempt to show the interplay between individual actions and social structures.

While a household is understood as ‘a group of persons sharing a home or living space,
who aggregate and share their incomes’ (Marshall, 1998, p. 283), a migration network is
defined as a set of interpersonal ties, which are developed from social networks and which
‘connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through
ties of kinship, friendship and shared community origin’ (Massey, Arango et al., 1998, p. 42).
Together household and migration networks can be seen as exemplifying micro-structures,
through which macro-structural conditions such as the political economy of the world market,
the migration policies of sending and receiving states etc. are channelled to the individual and
shape his/her actions (Castles and Miller, 2003, p. 27).

The concepts of household and migration network have been criticised, however. The
first concept, which is used in the new economics of labour migration to identify the unified
strategic actor of migration instead of the neoclassical rational individual, has been criticised
for its refusal to see power relations within the household and to recognise the existence of
individual motivations alongside the collective (Wolf, 1990; Phizacklea, 2004, p. 125). Critics
of the second concept point out that networks ‘are the subject of terminological confusion and
are treated as a causal category by virtue merely of their empirical existence without an
adequate theorization of their logical and structural characteristics’ (Goss and Lindquist,

In the continued search for answers to the dilemma of agency/structure relationships in
the area of migration studies, some researchers apply the theory of structuration (Goss and
Lindquist, 1995; Pilkington, 1998; Flynn, 2001; Morawska, 2001). This theory and its
applications for theoretical accounts and empirical studies of migration are discussed below.
1.1.3. The structuration perspective: discussion and applications

1.1.3.1 Structure/agency relationships: discussion of structuration

The theory of structuration is a theoretical project which aims to explain how society is constituted. As such, it covers a range of central issues of sociological debate, and it sets out to provide new answers to some of the most fundamental questions in sociology. For example, structuration theorists have sought to define such key sociological terms and categories as structure, agent, and agency, as well as describing their relationship to one another. Structuration theory also tackles such wide-ranging problems as the nature of the links between what happens here and now and broader social contexts; how social continuity, transformation and reproduction work; and how time and space are intertwined with these processes, as well as even broader questions concerning the nature of power. The wide scope of structuration theory is reflected in the critique of this theory, which is also highly diverse (Bryant and Jary, 1997). This section of the chapter is focused on the conceptualisation of structure/agency relationships suggested by this theory, as well as the related critiques which target this conceptualisation. The section also outlines what ramifications the theory of structuration has for the exploration of everyday life, discussing structuration theory’s approach to the everyday in light of the debate about structure/agency relationships.

Conceptualisation of structure/agency relationships constitutes the core of the theory of structuration and represents its distinctive feature. The theory seeks to solve the basic question of the relationship between structure and agency, and it does so partly by rejecting the notion of dualism (that is, the notion of structure and agency as two separate parts opposed to each other).9 In place of dualism, the theory suggests the concept of duality as a better way of understanding how agency and structure are related to one another. The use of duality is intended to highlight the fact that agency and structure (structural properties exhibited by a social system)10 are unable to exist separately from one another. They are treated as two sides of the same coin. It suggests that the ‘structural properties of social systems do not exist

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9 The notion of ‘dualism’ denotes the existence of two separate parts (categories, forces, essences, phenomena) opposed to each other within one domain (area, process). In the philosophy of mind, for example, the notion of ‘dualism’ is employed to highlight opposition between the mental and the physical, or mind and body. In theology, the notion of ‘dualism’ is invoked in theorising about Good and Evil, or God and the Devil, as opposing forces (Robinson, 2007).

10 The theory of structuration defines a social system as ‘the patterning of social relations across time-space, understood as reproduced practices’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 377).
outside of action but are chronically implicated in its production and reproduction’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 374). Structural properties, namely resources and rules, are used and reproduced through the recursive interactions between knowledgeable\textsuperscript{11} agents (social actors), in other words, through social practices. As such, structural properties can be perceived as both medium and outcome of social practices. An analogy used by Giddens to illustrate such interconnectedness between agency and structure, which he named ‘duality of structure,’ is a relation between language and speech. When we speak we draw on our knowledge of already existing language structures, but through speaking we also reproduce it (Giddens, 1984, p.24).

The amalgamation of agency and structure undertaken by the theory of structuration has been extensively criticised. It has been argued that the rejection of the notion of dualism between agency and structure is a mistake. Firstly, relations between social structure and agency cannot be organised in the same way as relations between language and speech since ‘rules and resources are not so coherently organized as grammar … and action is not really so tightly integrated with structural properties’ (Archer, 1990, pp. 77-78). Secondly, it has been argued that there are structures which exist externally to the interacting subjects and serve as constraints on their actions. For example, according to Layder (1997), power, defined ‘as a set of (prior) reproduced asymmetric social relations between groups based on the possession of, and restriction of access to, certain resources’ (p. 107), can be considered as such a structure. Thirdly, it seems that ‘actors often distance themselves from rules and resources, in order to question them, or in order to build theories about them, or – even more importantly – in order to devise strategies for either their maintenance or their transformation’ (Mouzelis, 1997, pp. 202-203).

Criticism of the notion of the ‘duality of structure’ can be answered through reference to Bernstein. He indicated that the perception of structure and agency in terms of dualism inevitably provokes the question ‘Which of them is more important?’ To avoid this opposition ‘a reconstruction of the concepts of structure and agency is required’ (Bernstein, 1997, p. 333). According to him Giddens suggests such a reconstruction, introducing the notion of the ‘duality of structure’, which shows that social structures and agency cannot exist without each other and are equally important.

\textsuperscript{11} Knowledgeability is ‘Everything which actors know (believe) about the circumstances of their action and that of others, drawn upon in the production and reproduction of that action, including tacit as well as discursively available knowledge’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 375). It is worth noting that although, according to the theory of structuration, social actors are knowledgeable, their ‘knowledgeability’ remains limited (Giddens 1984, 5).
The issue of structure/agency relationships has been addressed in the modified version of the structuration theory developed by Stones (2005), who draws a distinction between ‘ontology-in-general’ (which describes social reality at the abstract level) and ‘ontology-in-situ’ (‘ontology directed at the “ontic”, at particular social processes and events in particular times and places’) (p. 8). Stones considers the ontology presented in the works of Giddens as ‘ontology-in-general’, which sets out a frame of core principles through which a researcher should understand the social world. This ontology represents a certain worldview, according to which social structures should not be perceived as external for social actors or independent of actors’ agency. However, social actors, who live a non-abstract reality, that is, in social situations, tend to think about social structures as something external and not always under their control. In other words, social actors tend to perceive the relationships between structure and agency in terms of dualism, and this is where Stones’s concept of ‘ontology-in-situ’ comes in: it aims to identify the causes of this kind of perception.

In his attempt to explain this kind of perception, Stones incorporates the notion of ‘internal structures’ into his version of structuration theory. These ‘internal structures’ constitute a kind of cognitive frame through which a person interprets the world around him/her and his/her position in this world. Perception of this or that patterning of social relations as something external to and independent from the agency of the social actor is the result of looking at the social reality through the lenses shaped by a particular combination of ‘internal structures’.

‘Internal structures’ are further subdivided into ‘general-disposition structures’ and ‘conjuncturally specific internal structures’. ‘General-disposition structures’ represent the analogue of ‘habitus’.12 They are those schemas of interpretation which are developed through the process of socialisation. Taken-for-granted concepts of ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ internalised by a person in his/her early childhood and supported by his/her further experiences in society can be considered examples of such structures. ‘Conjuncturally specific internal structures’, in turn, are interpretive schemas informed by the knowledge which a social actor has due to his/her social positioning. For example, the director of a firm and the

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12 The term ‘habitus’ was introduced by Bourdieu and defined by him as ‘a system of lasting transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems’ (Bourdieu 1977, p. 83).
employees of a firm may have different perceptions of what factors limit and/or enable performance of this firm in the current economic climate.

It is worth noting that a person’s ‘internal structures’ can be transformed in the course of his/her life. For example, his/her migration to another country may cause questioning and consequent transformation of internalised concepts of ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’. As a result, he/she may stop perceiving some social patterns as external entities which he/she cannot influence or change.

Stones’s explanation of structure/agency relationships is partly based on ideas expressed by Mouzelis (1997), who indicates that both notions (duality and dualism) are important for understanding how social actors orient themselves to social structures. For example, duality of structure can be found in routine practices of social actors, while dualism is present when routine is broken and/or questioned for some reason.

Mouzelis (1997) argues that social actors have the ability to distance themselves from social structures in order to theorise about these structures and/or elaborate ways of using/changing them. This idea puts agency in a prerogative position with relation to structure. While it is the case that social structures influence the conduct of the social actor, at the same time, it is acknowledged that the social actor can withdraw from these structures at any time.

The question remains, however: to what extent can the social actor distance him/herself from social structures? Can he/she be ‘free’ from all social structures? On this question, this thesis shares the position expressed by Emirbayer and Mische (1998), who, while they are convinced that agency will never be completely determined by structure, still say that ‘there is no hypothetical moment at which agency actually gets “free” of structure’ (p. 1004). Even when a person is able to distance him/herself from some structures (for example, from particular norms regulating society), in theorising about these structures, he/she inevitably draws on other norms which he/she still takes for granted.

The theory of structuration highlights three kinds of structures exhibited by the social system. These are the structures of signification, legitimation and domination. Structures of signification (rules of signification) are represented by interpretative schemes (codes) and are linked with the communication of meanings in interactions between social actors. Structures of legitimation (rules of legitimation) are presented by norms and deal with the sanctioning of
conduct. Structures of domination are formed by resources (facilities)¹³ and serve as media for generating the power expressed by social actors in their interactions (Giddens, 1979, p. 82). Structures of signification, legitimation and domination are deeply interconnected with each other and can be separated from each other only analytically.

[S]ignification is fundamentally structured in and through language, language at the same time expresses aspects of domination; and the codes that are involved in signification have normative force… [L]egitimation necessarily involves signification as well as playing a major part in co-ordinating forms of domination (Giddens, 1979, pp. 106-107).

Structures of domination shaped though meanings and norms, in their turn, influence their reproduction and transformation (Giddens, 1979, p. 104). All these structures are involved in the interactions of social actors simultaneously.

According to the theory of structuration, structure is both constraining and enabling, so even a seemingly powerless individual is able to mobilise resources and exercise some power in his/her interactions with others (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). Power is understood as the ability to ‘act otherwise’, in other words, to be ‘able to intervene in the world, or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a specific process or state of affairs’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 14). The exercise of power does not presuppose any particular type of act; rather, it is embedded in every action of an individual. Neither is power a resource; rather, resources, constituting structures of domination, are media through which power as a transformative capacity is exercised (Giddens, 1984, p. 258). The mobilisation of resources by a social actor in his/her interaction with another social actor is influenced by other structural dimensions – the structures of signification and legitimation (Giddens, 1979, p. 92). This thesis will show how meanings and norms exhibited in the receiving society influence the access of migrants to the resources allocated in the society.

Although the theory of structuration recognises the significance of resources in shaping the outcomes of interactions between social actors, it does not contain any discussion about the inequality of the abilities and opportunities of social actors to mobilise resources. The statement proposed by this theory about the capability of even seemingly ‘powerless’

¹³ Giddens (1984) indicates two types of resources – allocative (material resources which ‘derive from human domination over nature’) and authoritative (non-material resources which ‘result from the domination of some actors over others’) (p. 374). This thesis does not make such a fine distinction and views the resources as goods (material and symbolic).
individuals to execute power (a statement which is one of the inspirations for this thesis) does not negate the requirement to answer the question about the differentiation of power, in other words, the differentiation of the transformative capacities that social actors can generate through resources available to them. As Mouzelis (1997) has pointed out, ‘Although Giddens’s more empirical work does not systematically neglect considerations pertaining to hierarchy and asymmetry, his structuration theory does’ (p. 213).

The definition of social structure given in the theory of structuration is criticised by those social scientists who tend to see structure only as a context within which social actors construct their interactions. Hay, who claims that he supports Giddens’s quest for rejecting dualism between structure and agency in favour of their duality, is among these social scientists. He considers that in defining structure as a medium of actions, Giddens has ‘resolved’ the dilemma of structure/agency ‘less by theoretical innovation than by definitional sleight of hand’ (Hay, 2002, p. 121). According to Hay, the strategic-relational approach developed by him and Jessop is better suited to convey the duality of structure and agency (Jessop, 1990; Jessop, 1996; Hay, 2002). Within this approach structure is conceptualised as a strategically selective context which favours some strategies of social actors over other strategies ‘as means to realise a given set of intentions or preferences’ (Hay, 2002, p. 129). However, the very discussion of structure as a context for social actors’ actions implies thinking in terms of dualism – this is the social actor and this is the context within which he/she is acting – which contradicts Hay’s stated intention to promote the duality perspective. It is also unclear from Hay’s text what is included in the notion of a ‘strategically selective context’ (Hay, 2002). The ontology suggested in the theory of structuration is far more coherent and elaborate, and thus, accepting the adjustments made by Mouzelis, this thesis employs Giddens’s theory as its theoretical framework. It is worth noting that Mouzelis’s suggestion (i.e. that the duality of structure expressed within routine interactions of social actors co-exists with a dualism of structure and agency expressed in the ability of social actors to engage in strategic conduct and monitoring) makes possible an understanding of social structure both in terms of means/outcome and in terms of the context of social actions (Mouzelis, 1997, pp. 210-212).

Outlining the interconnectedness of agency and social structures, the theory of structuration suggests that empirical sociological research should combine so-called

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14 For the implications of this approach in terms of migration research see Szczepaniková (2008).
‘institutional analysis’, in other words, analysis of how social structures influence each other, with ‘analysis of strategic conduct… concentrating upon how actors reflexively monitor what they do… how actors draw upon rules and resources in the constitution of interactions’ (Giddens 1984, p. 373). Thus research projects should incorporate elements of ethnography which allow people’s practical and discursive knowledge to be grasped by focusing on their everyday life and their understandings of the world (including the social world) around them. Such a focus is important since people’s regular and often taken-for-granted activities which constitute everyday life are at the centre of the production/reproduction and transformation of the social world (Giddens 1984, p. xxiii-xxv). While this thesis is not ethnographic, it does nevertheless take account of Giddens’ recommendations on this count. The qualitative methods of sociological inquiry employed here make it possible to explore the everyday life of the research subjects as well as their understandings of their experiences, themselves and the social world around them. The contribution made by this thesis to the study of everyday life in Russia lies not only in the collection of information about people in a unique situation within a certain period of time, but also in linking the immediate experiences of these people to the broader social order using the theory of structuration.\footnote{Whatever theoretical stance of understanding everyday life is shared by those who conduct their research in Russia, they enjoy an ideal opportunity to test their assumptions and concepts since this country and other former Soviet republics became available for such research rather recently (Caldwell, 2004, p. 14). As new terrains for the study of everyday life, post-Soviet societies provide researchers with a unique opportunity to explore how people’s everyday lives are affected by radical changes in the socio-economic and political order. The projects conducted in Russia, for example, include studies about: survival strategies of people in situations of economic and political instability (Humphrey, 1999; Burawoy, Krotov and Lytkina, 2000; Round, 2002); effects of the new economic order on relations in working collectives (Ashwin, 1998, 1999); construction and reproduction of ethnicity (Voronkov and Osval’d, 1998); transformation of gender relationships and identities (Mesherkina, 2000; Ashwin and Lytkina, 2004; Kay, 2006); changes in patterns of consumption (Gladarev and Tsinman, 2009); transformation of the everyday life of Russian youth (Yurchak, 1999; Omel’chenko, 2003), elderly people (Round, 2002; Cadwell, 2004) and other groups constituting Russian society, including newly emerged social groups (Humphrey 2002).}

The main sources for Giddens’ theorisation of everyday life were the theoretical accounts produced by Goffman (1959, 1961, 1963, 1972, 1974, 1981) and Garfinkel (1963), who studied the patterns of people’s interpersonal encounters. These micro-sociologists were later criticised for failing to link their insights about the everyday to the broader social order (Baert, 1998). Giddens (1979, 1984) overcomes this limitation by explaining how the routine practices and strategic actions of social actors are embedded in production/reproduction and transformation of social system as a whole.
There are also other theories which contain explanations of how everyday life is interconnected with the larger social order (Bourdieu, 1977; Vaneigem, 1983; Certeau, 1984; Heller, 1984; Lefebvre, 1984, 1991; Debord, 1987; Smith, 1987). However, all these theories, for all their diversity, differ in one crucial way from structuration theory in that they all use a dualistic perception of agency/structure relationships. They tell the story of how social structures shape the everyday and how social actors, through their everyday activities, conform to (consciously and/or unconsciously) or resist the order imposed on them. The theory of structuration, as we have seen, rejects this opposition between agency and structure. Instead, it suggests that social structures – resources and rules – not only influence everyday interactions between social actors, but also, at the same time, are reproduced and changed through these interactions.

Structuration theory does not share the negative attitude towards routine which characterises some of the works on this subject (Gardiner, 2000, pp. 24-42). This theory does not perceive the routinisation of actions as impoverishing actors’ everyday lives and reducing creativity and agency. Instead, it perceives everyday routine as pivotal for social system integration, and it seeks to explain, through reference to the psychological literature (Erikson 1963, 1967, 1968), why knowledgeable social actors who are capable of reflexive monitoring of their actions are personally motivated to develop and support routine in their everyday life.

It is worth noting that structuration theory has been criticised for drawing too peaceful a picture of the everyday, and for failing to pay attention to the asymmetry characterising social actors’ abilities to execute power in their interactions (Karner 2007, 36-37). This thesis takes this point into consideration, and consequently, it approaches the everyday life of its research subjects as a site which is by no means immune from conflict and inequality. In addition, referring back to the viewpoint of Mouzelis (1997) about the coexistence of dualism and duality in structure/agency relationships, this thesis assumes that although social actors are psychologically interested in preserving routine, they are also able to distance themselves from social structures and to conduct strategic actions, including those which may subvert the existing order.
1.1.3.2 Theory of structuration: applications in Russian and Migration Studies

This thesis is not the first attempt to apply structuration theory to the study of social phenomena and processes occurring in Russia. This being said, the related literature is still quite minimal.\(^{16}\) This theoretical approach has been applied mainly in the area of gender studies (Zdravomyslova and Temkina, 2007a, 2007b) and management (Romanov, 2000). The author of this thesis used structuration theory in her previous research devoted to the gender analysis of the programmes designed by the Russian government to assist forced migrants from former Soviet republics in their settlement in Russia (Kosygina, 2007b).

It is worth noting that the abovementioned projects have tended to use structuration theory uncritically. In the case of Russian scholars, this may partly reflect an intention to promote this theory as an alternative to or replacement for the Marxist-Leninist theoretical paradigms which dominated during the Soviet period (Kosygina, 2003). On the other hand, foreign researchers applying structuration theory to Russia have been more critical in their use of this theory. For example, they have problematised it, showing that social actors and social structures are not always located in a relation of duality (Pilkington, 1998; Flynn, 2001). This thesis also aims to take a critical approach towards structuration theory. The ways in which it problematises this theory are set out below, in the context of other works which have applied the theory of structuration in migration studies.

As Bryant and Jary (2001) have shown, theory can be used by academics in their work with different aims and in different ways. An overview of the literature in the area of migration studies suggests that works employing structuration theory can be divided into three groups.

The first group consists of works which point out the analytical value and potential use of structuration theory or its elements. For example, Phizacklea (1998), using material collected in the course of her research on the experiences of domestic workers in London, shows how ‘powerless’ migrants have been able to mobilise the resources available to them in order to change migration regulations in the UK. She refers here to the notion of ‘dialectic of control’ (see definition of this notion further below), which was introduced by the theory of

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\(^{16}\) A Russian translation of structuration theory was published only in 2003 (Giddens, 2003). Until that time, Russian researchers without sufficient knowledge of the English language could not apply this theory in their studies.
structuration. However, at least in the work cited here, she does not go further than simply indicating that structuration theory can be used for analysis of the case in question.

The second group consists of works which employ structuration theory or its elements in order to question previously existing ways of thinking about migration and issues linked with this social phenomenon. In some cases, these works have yielded conceptual innovations. For example, Richmond (1988) uses the notion of ‘enabling/constraining social structure’ introduced by the theory of structuration in order to question the widespread subdivision of migration into ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’. He points out that migration is initiated by social actors who are not only constrained, but also enabled by social structures. As a result, stretching between cases of extreme compulsion to migrate, on the one hand, and of unbounded opportunities to migrate, on the other, there is a whole continuum of situations in which migration is motivated and initiated. The existing forced/voluntary dichotomy, which shapes national and international migration policies, does not capture the peculiarities of these situations.

Another example of conceptual innovation arising out of the application of structuration theory in the area of migration studies is provided by Goss and Lindquist (1995). Being unsatisfied with explanations of international labour migration, which were developed from theoretical perspectives prioritising either structure or agency, they employed structuration theory in an attempt to re-conceptualise this social process. They conceptualise international labour migration as a result of actions which are constructed and reproduced by social actors informed by their knowledge of the ‘migration institution’. The concept of ‘migration institution’ is understood here as a combination of rules and resources which constrains and enables the agency of social actors involved in migration and/or organisation of migration (Goss and Lindquist 1995, p. 345).

Morawska (2001) presents another attempt to re-conceptualise international migration with the help of structuration theory. She considers her theoretical account as a further step towards the creation of an encompassing theory of international migration, as initiated by the study published under the title Worlds in Motion (Massey, Arango et al., 1998). She points out that although this earlier work acknowledged the need for the model explaining international migration to combine macro-factors (national and international migration policies, socio-economic and political situations in the receiving and sending societies, transformations in the social world caused by the late capitalist system etc.) with micro-
factors (understandings and actions of social actors), ultimately it failed to link these levels into one theoretically coherent account (Morawska, 2001, p. 49). Using the example of income-seeking migrants who arrived in Western Europe and the USA from post-Soviet Poland prior to Poland’s entry into the European Union, Morawska shows that migration can be understood as a social process shaped by interactions between social actors who draw on enabling and constraining social structures. This conceptualisation is reminiscent of the conceptualisation suggested by Goss and Lindquist (1995). However, the theoretical account suggested by Morawska (2001) contains several important new developments. First of all, she incorporates the state as a social actor participating in structuration of migration. She then points out that although interactions between social actors reproduce social structures, this reproduction is never ideal. Rules can be reinterpreted and resources can be redesigned through the experiences of migration and living in other societies.

Finally, the third group of works using structuration theory consists of the empirical studies focused on migrants’ experiences (Flynn, 2001, 2004; Morawska, 1985, 1996; Pilkington, 1998). By categorising these works as a separate group, the author of the thesis does not mean to suggest that they do not contain conceptual innovations or problematise and test structuration theory – in fact, they do both. In these works, however, conceptual innovations and problematisation of the theory are not the aims per se; rather, such innovation and problematisation arises in the course of the research process.

The prime aim of this third category of works is to explore migrants’ experiences. For example, Morawska (1985) is interested in the coping and adaptive strategies employed by peasants who migrated from East and Central Europe to Johnstown, Pennsylvania, USA in the period between 1890 and the beginning of World War II. In another work, she focuses on the experiences of Jews following the same migration path during the same period (Morawska, 1996). Empirical studies conducted by Pilkington (1998) and Flynn (2001, 2004) are focused on the experiences and identities of people who migrated to Russia from other former Soviet republics in the 1990s as a result of the collapse of the USSR.

None of the works from the third group has employed the whole conceptual apparatus provided by the theory of structuration. Instead they have selectively used some of the theory’s conceptual points as ‘sensitizing devices’ (Giddens, 1991b, p. 213) for formulating
research questions and interpreting findings. In the empirical studies in question, the conceptual points applied were the ‘duality of structure’; the notion that structures both constrain and enable ‘agency’; and the knowledgeability of social actors. Applied to the analysis and further theorisation of migrants’ experiences, these conceptual points allowed migrants’ experiences to be presented as an outcome of the interaction between structures and human agency. Structures such as discourses about migration/migrants and written/unwritten norms regulating migration are used and reproduced/transformed through the interactions of knowledgeable social actors. In their turn social actors experience constraining and enabling influences from these structures. The notion of the ‘dialectic of control’, which refers to mobilisation of resources and rules by less powerful actors in order to reach desirable outcomes in their interaction with more powerful agents, was another concept applied in the discussed studies. This notion orientated researchers in their exploration of how migrants were able to negotiate their interests with more powerful social actors.

The findings of the abovementioned empirical studies support the position expressed by Mouzelis (1997) who, as we have seen, argues for the co-existence of ‘duality’ and ‘dualism’ in structure/agency relationships. The studies illustrate the fact that, in their interactions with other social actors, migrants draw upon taken-for-granted schemas, which are reproduced/transformed through these interactions. At the same time, these studies also show that migrants may distance themselves from these structures and perceive them as something external. Some of the structures are perceived not only as external, but also as unchangeable and beyond the control of migrants. The studies under discussion also problematise the theory of structuration by outlining the issue of power and conflict. Their findings indicate that actors are unequal in their capacity to influence outcomes of interactions.

This thesis draws its inspiration primarily from this third group of works. It focuses on the interconnection between migrants and the enabling/constraining social structures emerging in the receiving society as a response to their migration. Taking into consideration the findings of the empirical studies outlined above, this thesis takes the problematisation of structuration theory a step further, by turning attention to and exploring the inequality experienced by migrants. Its empirical findings make it possible to identify two ongoing processes through which migrants are differentiated in Russia, namely: nation-building and

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It is worth noting that since borrowed conceptual points present certain ontological and epistemological positions, these empirical studies also have similar research designs. All of them combine ethnographic fieldwork with non-ethnographic research such as analysis of legislation and statistical data.
racialisation. The thesis explores how these differentiations influence the agency of migrants and their identities. Through application of the theory of structuration, this thesis also suggests possible ways of developing further such concepts as migration regime and social exclusion.\(^{18}\)

1.2. Key concepts used in the research

**1.2.1 Migration regime**

One of the central concepts employed in this study is that of the migration regime. Usually this concept refers to the set of organisations and measures created by the authorities at different levels to regulate migration (Schwarz, 1999). However, some researchers do not limit the content of this concept to these features alone. For example, they also incorporate in it discourses about migration and migrants, produced and reproduced by different social actors (Pilkington, 1998, pp. 23-34), and they do not see the institutional framework of the migration regime as a set of organisations consisting exclusively of bodies created by the authorities (Pilkington, 1998, pp. 74-86; Flynn, 2001, pp. 116-131).

In this thesis, the concept of the migration regime is interpreted through the lens of the theory of structuration and refers to the structures constructed in society in response to migration. This interpretation of the concept differs from those interpretations which consider a migration regime as a composition of structures created only by the authorities, including the set of organisations which regulate migration. Following the conceptual outline proposed by the theory of structuration, this interpretation indicates three structural dimensions in social systems: signification, legitimation and domination. From this perspective, the migration regime of the receiving society consists of: discourses about migration and migrants created and reproduced by different actors in different sites of this society; the legislative framework, which is partly presented by the legislation at different levels concerned with regulating migration (international, national, regional, local, institutional, etc), and partly by unwritten rules which do the same; and the composition of resources available to social actors involved in the construction and reproduction of this migration regime. Organisations, in their turn, are

\(^{18}\) These concepts are presented in the next part of this chapter, in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.5 respectively.
considered by this thesis as collective social actors which both through their interactions with each other and with individual social actors (including migrants), produce and reproduce the abovementioned structures. Figure 1.1 provides schematic representation of interconnectedness between structures constituting migration regime and interactions of social actors.

Figure 1.1 Interconnection between migration regime and interaction of social actors

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19 Due to graphical limitations, this figure does not show that social actors may be unequal in their capacity to transform social structures.
The definition of ‘migration regime’ used in this thesis is not synonymous with the concept of the ‘migration institution’ (Goss and Lindquist, 1995). While both concepts refer to rules and resources, the concept ‘migration institution’ presupposes that rules and resources are produced by social actors participating in the process of migration or regulation of migration irrespective of their spatial positioning. The concept ‘migration regime’, on the other hand, presupposes that rules and resources are produced by social actors operating within the borders of a particular geo-political unit. Migration regimes, for example, can be subdivided into international (regimes encompassing several countries), national, and regional regimes (Schwarz, 1999; Flynn, 2001, p.135).

According to the above-mentioned classification of migration regimes the focus of this thesis is on the national migration regime, specifically, the migration regime of the Russian Federation. Through an analysis of some sections of the legislative and discursive frameworks that constitute the Russian migration regime, this study suggests that this regime can be understood as ‘a differentiated system of othering’ which institutionalises differences among people. This system manifests itself primarily through a differentiated degree of access to resources allocated in the receiving society and as such affects the social exclusion of migrants in this society. The migration regime not only separates migrants from local members of the receiving society, but also identifies different sub-groups within a group of migrants arriving from one and the same region and treats them differently. The present study explores what criteria of differentiation are institutionalised in the Russian migration regime and how this differentiation affects the experiences and identities of the migrants.

1.2.2 Other and othering

The argument that a migration regime can be understood as ‘a differentiated system of othering’ requires clarification of the terms ‘othering’ and ‘other’/’Other’. 20

The term ‘other’ or ‘Other’ has its roots in Hegel’s inquiry into the epistemological and ontological qualities of the Self: ‘self-consciousness is real only in so far as it recognizes its

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20 Although, as this section shows, ‘other’ and ‘Other’ can be defined differently, in the social sciences the terms tend to be used interchangeably. In talking about the process of ‘othering’ this thesis uses the term ‘other(s)’ except where it cites quotations which use ‘Other(s)’.
This contention was taken up by Sartre who identified ‘the Other as the subject’ and ‘the Other as the object’. Looking at an individual, ‘the Other as the subject’ fixes the possibilities of this individual and transforms him/her into an ‘object-for-Others’. As a reaction to this, the individual also transforms ‘the Other as the subject’ into an ‘object-for-Others’. Sartre writes: ‘I recognize the Other as the subject through whom I get my object-ness…. I apprehend myself as the free object by which the Other gets his being-other’ (Sartre, 2003 [1957], p. 314).

Another development of Hegel’s philosophical insight about the significance of the other for self-consciousness was undertaken by the psychoanalyst Lacan, who introduced a distinction between ‘the Other’ and ‘the other’. ‘In Lacan’s theory, the other – with the lowercase ‘o’ – designates the other who resembles the self, which the child discovers when it looks in the mirror and becomes aware of itself as a separate being... The Other – with the capital ‘O’ – … [is] the great Other, in whose gaze the subject gains identity’ (Ashcroft, Griffiths et al., 1998, p. 170). The Other, in this theory, is identified with the figures of the Mother and the Father whose recognition an individual pursues throughout his/her life.

Sartre and Lacan were more preoccupied with understanding how the Self is affected by the Other (‘the Other as a subject’). In social science, this theme is developed, first of all, in social identity studies which can be traced back to the works of Cooley\(^{21}\) and Mead\(^{22}\) (Cooley, 1964 [1902]; Mead, 2000 [1934]). However, the construction of ‘the Other as the object’, or, in other words, the process of othering, also receives attention from social scientists, in particular, from those who engaged in cultural and post-colonial studies (Pratt, 1985; Spivak, 1985; Hall, 1997b). The process of othering presupposes that the individual (or group of individuals) constructs differences and reinforces observable differences between his/her (their) self and non-self – ‘other(s)’.\(^{23}\) This process is infused by power relations and can take a variety of forms since the line between ‘us’ and ‘other(s)’ can be drawn on the basis of different criteria (Hall, 1997b). For example, racialisation is a process whereby the ‘other’ is

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\(^{21}\) Cooley introduced the concept of the ‘looking-glass self’ which consists of three parts: an individual’s imagination of his/her image observed by an other; an individual’s imagination of the opinion that others might have about this image; the individual’s feelings that arise from all these imaginations (for example, shame) (Cooley, 1964 [1902], p.184).

\(^{22}\) Mead sees individuals as constructing their social practices with reference to the attitudes and expectations of a ‘generalised other’ – a community or social group to which he/she belongs (Mead, 2000 [1934]).

\(^{23}\) It is worth noting that the question of the construction of ‘other(s)’ had been tackled by scholars well before the term ‘othering’ was introduced by Spivak (1985). For example, Said (1978) explored how Europe constructed ‘the Orient’ as its other.
constructed through ascribing meanings to (culturally determined) observable and imagined physical features, while nation-building is a process whereby the ‘other’ is constructed through reference to people’s belonging and non-belonging to the nation. In this respect, ‘othering’ is an umbrella term which signifies a range of processes through which ‘other(s)’ is (are) constructed. Intertwining, these processes may result in a differentiated multitude of others. This thesis argues that the Russian migration regime reflects at least two processes through which the ‘other’ is constructed: the process of nation-building; and the process of racialisation. As such, this migration regime differentiates migrants on the basis of citizenship and racial constructions.

1.2.3 Citizenship, nation-state and differentiation of non-nationals

This thesis argues that citizenship is one of the criteria involved in construction of the Russian migration regime as ‘a differentiated system of othering’.

A review of the literature reveals that there is no unified understanding of citizenship (Turner, 1993; Isin and Wood, 1999; Bosniak, 2001). There are at least three interpretations of it: citizenship as a legal status defining members of the polity;24 citizenship as a set of social practices; and citizenship as a form of identity. Citizenship as a legal status, which defines members of a particular polity, refers to the scope of the rights and duties25 which these members have in relation to the polity. Citizenship as a set of social practices refers to the social competence of an individual, which allows him/her to participate in the polity – in other words, to achieve and use his/her rights and to negotiate and perform his/her duties (Turner, 1993). Citizenship as a form of identity is understood as the individual’s feeling that he/she is one of the people characterised by membership in a particular polity. While some commentators consider these interpretations as separate discourses about citizenship, others perceive them as definitions of different dimensions of citizenship (Bosniak, 2001, pp. 240-241). When speaking about citizenship, the present work refers to its first dimension – citizenship as a legal status which defines the members of a polity.

24 Polity may be defined as ‘a formal, organized, territorially based community with some degree of sovereign self-governance’ (Bosniak, 2001, p. 243).
25 Rights grant a person access to resources and indicate his/her entitlements. Duties indicate what a person must do.
It is assumed that those who have citizenship of one and the same polity have rights and duties of one and the same scope in relation to this polity and that, in this respect, citizens are equal to each other. Yet, as Klusmeyer (2001) points out, ‘the attribution of formal citizenship has always been as much an act of exclusion as of inclusion’ (p. 14). In identifying some people as citizens belonging to the polity, this process simultaneously identifies other people who do not belong to it. Such division is far from having only a symbolic meaning. It has practical outcomes for those who hold citizenship and those who do not. On the territory which belongs to the polity, those who do not belong to this polity may find themselves excluded from at least some of the rights and duties shared by its members.

At present the most widespread type of polity is the so-called ‘nation-state’, ‘a political unit that controls a bounded territory (the state) with a national community (the nation) that has the power to impose its political will within those boundaries’ (Castles and Davidson, 2000, p. 12). National citizenship, as a legal status possessed by people, comprises a particular set of rights and duties which they have in respect to a certain state. National citizenship indicates those people who are recognised by a given state as members of the nation which it governs and whose interests it supposedly serves.

Some commentators have expressed the view that ‘national citizenship is no longer an adequate concept upon which to base a perceptive narrative of membership’ (Soysal, 1994, p. 167). Instead, they have proposed denationalised forms of citizenship that are sometimes described as transnational, global or postnational. Such claims are premature, however. National citizenship is still far from losing its significance, since nation-states continue to be the main actors in allocating people’s rights and duties (Bosniak, 2001). Nowadays, despite the rhetoric of universal personhood and the promotion of human rights all over the world, in the territories of most national states, those who belong to them as citizens have more rights than those who do not. The Russian Federation is no exception here. Chapter 3 of this thesis

26 Although the term ‘nation-state’ is widespread in present-day political and academic discourses, some commentators question the existence of a polity which can be defined as a ‘nation-state’ (Ingram, 1996). The ambiguity stems from the problem with defining the term ‘nation’ (Snyder, 1990).

27 ‘Nation’ is one of those terms which are used a great deal but are very hard to define. ‘Some scholars consider the meaning of nation to be so complex a metaphysical fiction that they assume or explicitly state that it is not capable of scientific definition’ (Snyder, 1990, p. 230). At its most basic, a nation is a community of people; however, which people constitute this community is an issue for debate. One of the political science dictionaries defines a nation as ‘a body of people who possess the consciousness of common identity, giving them distinctiveness from other peoples… This consciousness will be based upon common historical experience (which may be partly based on myth) and other shared features such as geographical propinquity and a common culture including a literature and a language’ (Bealey, 1999).
presents the results of an analysis of Russian legislation, which shows discrepancies between the rights available to non-Russian citizens and the rights available to Russian citizens.

The literature shows that a nation-state constructs differences not only between its citizens and those who do not hold its citizenship, but also between different categories of foreign citizens (Tesfahuney, 1998; Van Selm, 2005). In this respect, a nation-state participates in the creation of different ‘others’ vis-à-vis its citizenry (Karner, 2007, pp.111-114). While some non-nationals can be treated almost as citizens of the country, others are limited in many ways in their opportunities to enter the country and rights to access resources allocated there. Differentiated treatment of non-nationals by the nation-state is justified in official discourses through references to possible benefits and/or threats to the ‘nation’.

An analysis of the Russian legislation conducted within this thesis indicates that foreign citizens on Russian territory are differentiated in terms of their access to rights and resources. The differentiation of non-Russian nationals is also reflected in the process of their naturalisation. It seems that some of them are perceived by the state as more desirable and/or worthy to be admitted as full members of the ‘Russian nation’ than others.

In the case of the Russian Federation and other recently emerged ‘nationalizing states’ (Brubaker, 1996) (in other words, states which have to deal with nation-building as a result of the redrawing of political boundaries), differentiated treatment of non-nationals reflects a complex process of constructing a collective ‘we’. Variations of this process taking place in the former Soviet republics are based not only on the understandings of the present and visions of the future, but also on the interpretations of the past existence of these countries within one geopolitical unity (Bremmer and Taras, 1993). The nation-building currently underway in the Russian Federation is complicated by the construction of so-called ‘nations’ undertaken within the USSR by the Soviet government (Brubaker, 1996; Suny, 1998; Martin, 2001). The struggle to understand who ‘we’ are as a nation can be observed in the Russian legislation and discourses produced by politicians and state officials (Laruelle, 2009). The general public is also trying to construct a sense of ‘us’, and in doing so, is constructing a multitude of ‘others’ (Gudkov, 2006 c). The specificity of this thesis is that it explores not only differentiations of non-Russian nationals which can be found in the Russian legislation, discourses and public attitudes, but also how these differentiations are experienced and understood by non-Russian nationals who once shared Soviet citizenship with present-day Russian citizens.
Although the perception of ‘other(s)’ as a potential threat to ‘us’ is not a new phenomenon (Karner, 2007), the negative discussions of non-nationals violating the borders of the nation-state and coming to live on its territory have intensified since the end of the Cold War and became especially paranoid after September 11, 2001 (Bigo, 2001; 2005). Such discussions tend to coincide with the introduction of restrictions regulating migration and migration issues (Tesfahuney, 1998; Bigo, 2005). In post-Soviet Russia, securitisation of migration could be detected from the mid-1990s, which also saw the beginning of the first Chechen War (1994-1996) (Robarts, 2008). The gradual transformation of the initially receptive migration regime of the Russian Federation into a more restrictive one has been described by Pilkington (1998) and Flynn (2001, 2004). The present thesis continues to trace this ongoing process, through analysis of the discursive representations of migration and migrants in the Russian mass media, as well as changes in the national legislation and institutions regulating migration.

The literature which discusses the securitisation of migration points out that not all non-nationals experience the same degree of suspicion and, by extension, the same degree of control (Negel, 2002). It is argued, for example, that securitisation of international migration in the contemporary world is intertwined with the process of racialisation (Tesfahuney, 1998). This proposition is supported by the present thesis, which also argues that the Russian migration regime is shaped as ‘a differentiated system of othering’ on the basis of racial constructions reproduced in the society through the process of racialisation.

1.2.4 Racialisation

How, then, do we define racialisation? At the beginning of the twentieth century, the term ‘racialisation’ denoted the process of ‘race-building’ based on so-called ‘race-feeling’ – the mysterious ability of people to feel an affinity to other people belonging to ‘their kind’, which was considered to have been implanted into mankind by Nature (Barot and Bird, 2001, pp. 602-606). After being out of use for some time, the term racialisation was later rethought and reintroduced into academic discourse by social scientists who questioned the appropriateness of such categories as race and race relations (Fanon and Farrington, 1969; Banton, 1977). Although this new interpretation of racialisation also refers to ‘the process by which groups of persons come to be classified as races’ (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998, p. 33),
nowadays racialisation is primarily conceptualised as a socio-cultural process of constructing the ‘other(s)’ by referring to people’s observable and imagined biological characteristics. This new concept of racialisation is accepted both by those who completely reject the category of race as useless and moreover harmful, and by those who still employ the notion of race, but emphasise that races are socially constructed groups of people, whose borders are changeable over time (Barot and Bird, 2001, pp. 608-609). Some social scientists even consider that this process of race construction is about defining the ‘other(s)’ not only through reference to people’s somatic features, but also through reference to people’s culture (Brah, 1996; Malik, 1996). This thesis, however, adopts the position adopted by Cohen, who argues that such broadening collapses racialisation with other processes of ‘othering’ (Cohen, 1994). Creating differences between people through references to culture can be described by other processes, for example, by the process of ethnicisation which results in the construction of so-called ‘ethnic groups’.

This thesis shares the position of those who understand racialisation as a representational process of ascribing meanings to the physical appearance of people, which informs interactions between social actors (Figure 1.2). Racialisation is a dialectical process. ‘Ascribing a real or alleged biological characteristic with meaning to define the “Other” necessarily entails defining the Self by the same criterion’ (Miles and Brown 2003, p. 101). Those who are defined as ‘other(s)’ are not passive recipients of external categorisation. They can resist it through the denial, negotiation and transformation of meanings (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998, pp. 113-121).

Murji and Solomos provide an overview discussion concerning the proliferation of the concept (Murji and Solomos, 2005).

This thesis adopts a broad definition of ‘ethnicity’ suggested by Van Maanen. According to him ethnicity as a category of social organisation refers to construction of membership based on a sense of common historical origins and shared culture (Van Maanen, 1996, pp. 260-261). An ethnic group can be defined as a self-conscious ‘collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of shared historical past and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood’ (Schermrihorn [1978, p. 12]) cited in Cornell and Hartmann, 1998, p. 19).
Racialisation as a concept is employed in theorising racism. For example, Miles and Brown (2003) define racism as a mode of racialisation, which ‘represents the world’s population as divided biologically and negative evaluations are made about some groups constructed by this division’ (p. 65). From this perspective, racism as a representational phenomenon is analytically distinguished from practices that serve to exclude. In other words, for Miles and Brown (2003), racism is not an action, but rather an ideology (p. 104). This analytical distinction, however, does not deny that exclusionary practices can go hand-in-hand with an ideology of exclusion. As illustrated in the literature, the differentiation of people according to their phenotype made on the level of representation can result in their being deprived of rights and resources allocated in the society in which they live and/or operate (Solomos, 2001).

Social scientists working in the multidisciplinary area of migration studies have actively employed the concepts of ‘racialisation’ and ‘racism’ in their analysis of migrants’ experiences and social structures constructed in the receiving societies in response to migration (Wimmer, 2000). However, as Rath (1993) and Miles (1993) have noted, understandings of these concepts can differ significantly from one migration scholar to another. As a result, their research projects describe different processes which produce disadvantages experienced by migrants in the receiving society. This thesis uses the ‘racialisation’ of migration to refer to the process of the differentiation of migrants on the basis of constructed meanings ascribed to their real and imagined somatic features.
1.2.5 Social exclusion

The argument that a migration regime is ‘a differentiated system of othering’ which affects the social exclusion of migrants in the society where they operate demands a close look at the concept of social exclusion. This concept is relatively new and highly debated in the social sciences. Although the use of the term ‘social exclusion’ can be traced as far back as to the 1960s and 1970s, when it was employed to discuss the situations of people who were not covered by the existing social security system in France, the credit for initiating its widespread use at present must go to European Union institutions which, in the second half of the 1980s, indicated the fight against social exclusion as an urgent task for member states in developing their social policies (Vleminckx and Berghman, 2001).

While some social scientists see the term social exclusion as simply a euphemism for poverty, others disagree, and argue that social exclusion as a concept offers a more advanced approach to analysing social disadvantages and has its own descriptive and analytical value (Gore, Figueiredo et al., 1995; Room, 1995). However, even those who support the use of this concept agree that a ‘clear definition of social exclusion remains elusive’ (Atkinson and Davoudi, 2000, p. 428).

‘The different meanings of social exclusion and the uses to which the term is put are embedded in conflicting social science paradigms and political ideologies’ (Silver, 1994, p. 536). Silver has identified three theoretical approaches which provide different interpretations of the term social exclusion. She calls them the ‘solidarity’, ‘specialization’ and ‘monopoly’ paradigms. The roots of these paradigms can be found in ‘French republican notions of solidarity, Anglo-American liberal individualism and the European social democratic notion of conflict based on hierarchical power relations’ respectively (Saraceno, 2001). According to the ‘solidarity’ paradigm, people are considered to be excluded when they experience a breakdown of the social bonds between them and other members of the society. From this point of view, social exclusion actually means social isolation. The other two paradigms understand social exclusion as a deprivation of rights and resources; however, their interpretations of the way in which this deprivation occurs are different. The ‘specialization’ paradigm understands social exclusion as an unfortunate outcome of the economic division of labour. Access to resources and the ability to use rights can be damaged if economic division is accompanied by the creation of barriers which handicap the free movement of people.
between spheres of specialisation, trapping them in a situation of economic disadvantage. According to the ‘monopoly’ paradigm, the deprivation of resources and rights is embedded in a social order characterised by power relations. This approach assumes that the structural positions within a society enable some groups to restrict the access of other members of that society to resources and rights.\(^{30}\)

One of the attempts to unite these understandings of social exclusion is presented by Saraceno (2001), who indicates that the concept of social exclusion

\[O\]n the one hand …points to the social conditions by which individuals and groups are included in or excluded from relevant resources and social rights; on the other hand it points to processes by which individuals and social groups belong to, or are detached from, relevant and meaningful social networks and share in the values and identifications within a given community (p. 4).

Hence, according to this interpretation, social exclusion as an analytical concept encompasses two dimensions: social actors’ being deprived of the rights and resources allocated in the society where these social actors live and/or operate; and social actors’ feeling of non-belonging to the society, community, to a meaningful network of people and so on. Although aware of the second dimension of social exclusion, this thesis, dealing with the experiences of migrants, remains focused on the first.

The literature discussing social exclusion has a tendency to speak about it as a dynamic process. Although this work shares this understanding of social exclusion, it also bears in mind that this process can lead to the situation of social exclusion. As Silver (1994) points out, ‘observers who insist that exclusion is only a dynamic process miss the structural outcome of the process’ (p. 545). The process of excluding people from rights and resources, when constantly repeated, may result in the creation and reinforcement of social boundaries between those who have access to this or that right/resource and those who have not. These boundaries may become highly impenetrable, so people can be trapped within them and actually find themselves in certain structural positions characterised by a certain inaccessibility to rights and resources.

The dilemma of agency/structure relationships is also presented in the debate about the concept of social exclusion. While some social scientists argue that the deprivation of

\(^{30}\) See Silver (1994) for a discussion of these paradigms.
resources and rights is imposed by social structures, others tend to see this deprivation as a relational process between social actors (Burchardt, Le Grand et al., 2002, p. 4). From the perspective of the theory of structuration, both structure and interactions between social actors matter in shaping this process and its outcomes. This theoretical approach makes it possible to interpret social exclusion as a process of negotiating access to resources and rights between social actors operating within enabling and constraining social structures, which are being transformed through their interactions. It is worth noting that the social actors who shape the process of exclusion and its outcomes are not only those who exclude, but also those who are excluded. The actions of the latter can intensify exclusion or resist it and can even promote inclusion into the society (Gore, Figueiredo et al., 1995, pp. 23-24; Johnston, 2001; Jordan, 2001, pp. 69-77). Thus the social exclusion of migrants in the receiving society can be understood as a process of negotiation between them and other social actors with respect to their access to resources and rights allocated in society. In the course of this negotiation they draw on the structures constituting migration regimes and at the same time reproduce/transform these structures (Figure 1.1).

There is still one more question to answer. Why should the process of negotiation about accesses to resources be called ‘social exclusion’, if there is a possibility that such negotiations might result in inclusion? Some may argue that this process could equally be presented as social inclusion. However, the process of negotiation about access to resources from the outset presupposes the existence of social actors who are deprived of resources and/or ways to access these resources. Until these social actors become equal with others in this matter, their negotiation concerning resource access is actually a process of being differentiated in terms of different degrees of exclusion. For example, foreign citizens who live in Russia are restricted in terms of rights and deprived of a range of resources by Russian legislation. Until they attain Russian citizenship, they and Russian citizens remain unequal in this matter. Although this research shows that in most cases, interviewed migrants managed to avoid a situation of complete exclusion, it is nevertheless impossible to say that they were fully included in the receiving society. Interviewees had to make more effort in order to reach resources allocated in Russia; certain access paths were unavailable to them, and they had to find other channels. There were also differences in the characteristics of the resources (including their quality) which the interviewees could attain.

31 Inclusion is defined as a situation where one social actor is not more limited in access to the resources and rights allocated in the society than other social actors who live and operate in the same society.
The stress on the enabling capacity of the structures and ability of social actors to transform them can lead to the assumption that those who find themselves locked in a situation of social exclusion must blame themselves for not being active enough to change social structures or creative enough in using the enabling potential of these structures to obtain resources and rights. However, it must be remembered that social actors can have unequal power to influence the outcomes of their negotiations, owing to their unequal positions in society (Flynn, 2001, p. 46). The inability of one social actor (or group of actors) to change social structures in his/her favour may occur not because a social actor is not active enough, but because other social actors are more powerful. Another point to consider is that the ‘non-creativity’ of social actors in using the enabling potential of social structures could stem from the limitations of their knowledgeability. Although all social actors are knowledgeable, the knowledge available to them depends on their position in the society (Giddens, 1984, p. 91).

Social exclusion is a multi-layered process; in other words, the negotiation of access to resources and rights occurs simultaneously within several domains of a society (Littlewood and Herkommer, 1999; Atkinson and Davoudi, 2000). The empirical data collected for this thesis suggest that migrants negotiate their access to resources and rights allocated in the receiving society simultaneously within two interconnected domains – the domain of state regulations and the domain of the economy.

Social exclusion in the domain of state regulations is mediated by rules imposed by the legislation and the implementation of these rules by officials. The rules not only indicate what rights and resources can or cannot be accessed by this or that category of people, but also prescribe certain ways of obtaining these rights and resources (where to apply, what documents to submit, to which organisation, how much to pay, when to expect a decision, how to appeal, etc.). These rules constitute the formal channels of ‘getting things done’ (Rose, 2000 [1999]).

Social exclusion in the domain of the economy is mediated through practices created and reproduced within society with respect to the process of earning money for buying required or desired resources and rights. People are considered to be socially excluded in this domain if they experience deprivation of opportunities to earn money and the ability to buy what they need or want.
The exclusion of migrants in one domain of the receiving society is interconnected with their exclusion in other domains. For example, the research undertaken in the framework of this thesis shows that migrants’ deprivation occurring in the economic domain is affected by legislation and its implementation by officials.\textsuperscript{32} At the same time, the exclusion experienced by migrants in the domain of state regulations can be reduced or increased by their participation in the economy.\textsuperscript{33} Another point which is worth noting is that an increase in a migrant’s deprivation in one domain increases his/her dependence on other domains.\textsuperscript{34} The results of this research are also in line with the literature which outlines the importance of social networks for social actors in negotiating access to resources and rights (Richardson and Mumford, 2002; Lazaridis and Koumandraki, 2007).

\subsection*{1.2.6 Social networks}

It is important to note that the broad definition of social networks as connections linking social actors does not refer exclusively to connections between individuals. The ties linking different kinds of collective actors (for example, collectivities and organisations) can also be understood as social networks (Castells, 1998, p. 470). To make the picture more complex, collective social actors themselves can be perceived as aggregates of formal and informal social networks. While formal networks connect positions within collective actors and operate according to written rules, informal networks are based on interpersonal relationships between people who take these positions and operate according to unwritten rules (Prigozhin, 1995). Even a much more narrow definition of social networks as connections linking individual social actors can be interpreted differently. On one hand, some social scientists use the phrase ‘social network’ to imply the image of a net without a particular centre (Berkowitz and Wellman [1988] cited in Gladyrev [2009]). From this perspective, the whole society can be presented as a social network. People are constantly encountering other people, and even if

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
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they do not develop any personal relationships with these others, they are still connected with them as part of a single net. On the other hand, other researchers use the term ‘social network’ to imply chains of connections between individuals based on individuals’ interpersonal relationships. These chains ‘are egocentric and are mapped as stretching out from a single individual’ (Glick Shiller, 2004, p. 455). Their members are people who ‘know each other and are bound together by kinship, friendship or propinquity’ (Rose, 2000 [1999], p. 149). These chains operate according to unwritten rules and form informal channels of ‘getting things done’ in society. This thesis employs this last interpretation of the term ‘social network’.

The results of research projects about migrants’ experiences in the host country of post-Soviet Russia have pointed to the importance of migrants’ interpersonal relationships for their survival in post-Soviet Russian society and long-term integration into this society (Brednikova and Pachenkov, 2002; Flynn, 2004; Brednikova and Tkach, 2010). These results are in line with the literature from migration studies more broadly (Boyd, 1989; Gurak and Caces, 1992). The specificity of this thesis is that it is focused on an exploration of how the absence of Russian citizenship affects the experiences of migrants in post-Soviet Russia. It shows how non-Russian nationals who are limited in their rights and access to resources by Russian legislation can use social networks to overcome these limitations. It also provides evidence that, at least in the context of Russian society, chains of interpersonal relationships are essential for non-nationals’ entry into the domain of state regulations and the domain of the economy. Finally, the thesis states that, even if migrants who lack Russian citizenship find themselves excluded from these two social domains, they are still capable of attaining the required resources allocated in the receiving society by mobilising their social networks and thereby avoiding a situation of complete social exclusion.

Although, in Russia, the experiences of non-Russian citizens differ from the experiences of Russian citizens in many ways – people without Russian citizenship are much more limited in their legal rights, for example – the significance of personal connections in solving problems is common to both of these groups. Both ethnographic studies of everyday life (Burawoy, 2001; Round, 2002; Salmi, 2003; Caldwell, 2004;) and works based on surveys

35 The migration studies literature outlines the significance of social networks not only for migrants’ experiences in the receiving society, but also for motivation for and organisation of migration (Palloni and Massey, 2001). The theme of social networks is also presented in the discussions about transnational (translocal) migrants and communities, in other words, migrants and communities which form and support multiple economic, political, cultural and social links both in the country (locality) of origin and country (locality) of destination (Glick Shiller, Bash et al., 1992).
(Rose, 2000 [1999]; Clarke 2002) have highlighted the fact that informal channels of ‘getting things done’ are in common use by people living in post-Soviet Russia.

In the 1990s, this popularity of social networks among the population of post-Soviet Russia was explained in terms of people’s need to operate in a situation characterised by rapid socio-economic and political transformations, shortages of money, and a ‘weak’ state. It was argued that in order to deal with the challenges of the new time, former Soviet citizens had to draw on modified social practices developed in the Soviet period (Burawoy and Verdery, 1999). It seems, however, that informal ways of ‘getting things done’ are still popular in the 2000s – a time characterised by serious efforts on the part of the central government to build up a so-called ‘vertical of power’ and, until recently, by an improvement of the Russian economy and well-being of the population (Ledeneva, 2006).

Such observations do not mean, however, that the usage of informal ways of ‘getting things done’ is some kind of unique or unchanging feature eternally engraved across the ‘mysterious Russian soul’. Ledeneva (2006) argues that the usage of informal practices is informed not only by existing cultural norms, but also by the state of formal regulations in the country. In an earlier work, Ledeneva (1998) also presented an excellent account of how formal regulations provoked the active use of social networks by citizens of the USSR. Other researchers argue that the state regulations existing in pre-revolutionary Russia were also shaped and implemented in such ways that people had to use informal ways to get things done (Hartley, 2000; Volkov, 2000).

Analysis of the data collected for this thesis revealed the existence of incoherencies in the Russian legislation and in its implementation. In 2004 and 2005, interviewed migrants stated that without social networks they would not be able either to secure and preserve their legal statuses in Russia or to participate in the Russian economy. The irony of the situation is that, in Russia, the presence of the state in the area of migration regulation is very strong nowadays. Apparently, not only a ‘weak’ state lacking the resources to regulate social processes, but also a ‘strong’ state which over-regulates social processes or regulates them inefficiently, can lead social actors to use informal ways of ‘getting things done’.

In conclusion, some additional remarks must be made about ‘social networks’ as a concept used in this study. Connections based on interpersonal relationships are considered by some social scientists as a core element of social capital – a form of capital which refers to the consequences of sociability for the people involved (Portes, 1998). A review of the literature,
however, reveals a lack of clarity in the relationships between social capital and social networks. While some social scientists equate social networks with social capital (Putnam, 2000), others consider social networks as a kind of prerequisite through which social capital emerges in the forms of trust, expectations, information and norms (Coleman, 1990). Social capital is also defined as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to a durable network’ (Bourdieu, 1986 [1983], p. 51). From this perspective, social networks are only the channels through which social capital circulates. Sharing the point of view that treats social networks as a prerequisite through which social capital emerges,36 this thesis outlines the use of social networks as a means for overcoming resource deprivation and the limitation of rights caused by differentiations institutionalised by the Russian migration regime, but it does not go to the next level of analysis – the exploration of social capital. A deeper exploration of this kind is a possible topic for a future research project.

1.2.7 The ‘territorialisation’ of identity

This thesis suggests that the social exclusion experienced by people in a given society affects the ‘territorialisation’ of their identities.

The identity of a person is his/her understanding of him/herself which is formed through interaction with other social actors. As Hall (1996) puts it, ‘there is no identity that is without the dialogic relationship to the Other’ (p. 345). It is recognised that such dialogues are ‘permeated by inequality and power relations’ (Jansen 1998, 107). It is also recognised that identity is not fixed; rather, it can be understood as a process of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ which never ends and is going on all the time (Jenkins, 1996).

The dialogical and continuous nature of identity is reflected in the conceptualisation suggested by Jenkins (1996). According to him, identity is an ongoing process of identification which represents the dialectic of two analytically (but only analytically) distinct dimensions: the internal and external – in other words, a person’s self-definition of who he/she is, on the one hand, and the definition of the person offered by others, on the other.

36 Initially ‘social capital’ was considered as an umbrella concept for ‘social network’. However, after some consideration, that position was rejected, since it implies a pragmatic view of sociability. To call something ‘capital’ means that this something is used to generate profit (Castells, 1998, pp. 471-472; Marshall, 1998, p. 52). From this perspective the social networks of individuals are, first and foremost, instrumental. In the words of Lin (2001), ‘individuals engage in interactions and networking in order to produce profits’ (p. 19). Such a perception is quite limited. It undervalues the fact that people communicate with each other for different reasons. Social connections have more importance for people than simply utilitarian value (Round, 2005, 2006).
This distinction between dimensions does not imply that one is more important than the other and that one happens before the other. They are equally important and happen simultaneously. The external definition of a person, though made by others, is part of a person’s own understanding of him/herself. At the same time, his/her understanding of him/herself is part of the external definition articulated by others. According to Jenkins, the process of identification is intertwined with the allocation of resources and the implementation of regulations in a society. ‘Identity is consequential in terms of allocation: how you are identified may influence what and how much, you get. Allocation is part of the process which generates identification: being deprived of, or given access to particular resources is likely to colour the sense of what it means to be an X or a Y’ (Jenkins, 1996, p. 169). From this perspective, the construction of identity is not simply the naming of a person. It is grounded in a person’s actual life and linked with the process of social exclusion experienced in different domains of society.

The ‘territorialisation’ of identity is a person’s understanding of himself/herself in relation to place(s)\(^{37}\) and as such is actually part of the identification process. The ‘territorialisation’ of identity is the process of reflection on the question, ‘Where is the place(s) to which I belong?’ Identity, however, is by no means spatially fixed. The link between a person and a territory does not exist \textit{per se}. It is constructed, reproduced, questioned, subverted and negotiated through a person’s interaction with other people, collectives, organisations, etc. The ‘territorialisation’ of identity is a dialogue penetrated by power relationships. In his/her stories an individual has the freedom to create links between him/herself and any place. However, the discourses and social practices of more powerful others can substantially subvert his/her variants of identity allocation (Jansen, 1998). As a result of this dialogue, people can even experience a deconstruction of belonging to a place(s), that is to say, their identities could be ‘de-territorialised’.

This thesis uses texts of semi-structured interviews with people who have migrated to Russia from other former Soviet republics after the collapse of the USSR and who live there without Russian citizenship. Through exploring these accounts, the intention is to develop the analytical model suggested by Flynn in her study devoted to the identities and experiences of former Soviet citizens who arrived in Russia from other former republics after the collapse of the USSR and managed to obtain not only Russian citizenship, but also the status of forced

\(^{37}\) Place is understood here as ‘space to which meaning has been ascribed’ (Carter, Donald et al., 1993, p. xii).
migrants (Flynn, 2001, 2004, 2007). Flynn’s model focuses on the process of ‘home/land’ disruption and ‘home/land’ re-construction, or, in other words, on identity ‘de-territorialisation’ and identity ‘re-territorialisation’. According to Flynn, these processes are rooted in the (in)stability/(in)security felt by individuals in ‘immediate physical and social relations’ (Flynn, 2004, pp. 62-66). The present study explores this nodal point of ‘territorialisation’ of identity. Through analysis of interviews, it traces how the exclusion experienced by migrants in the domains of state regulations and the economy, as well as the social connectedness they have achieved through networks, affect their feeling of (in)stability/(in)security and as a result the whole process of identity ‘territorialisation’.

![Figure 1.3 ‘Territorialisation’ of identity](image)

38 The glossary on migration issued by the International Organisation for Migration defines forced migration as ‘a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development project)’ (Perruchoud, 2004, p. 25). In the Russian Federation, this broad definition is reduced to the somewhat narrower classification of forced migration as migration caused by persecution, or by the threat of persecution ‘on the basis of race, nationality, religion, language and affiliation to a particular social group or political conviction’ (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 1995b). Russian citizens alone have the right to apply for forced migrant status, while non-Russian citizens can apply for the status of refugee.
This study also explores the temporal dimension of identity ‘territorialisation’, which has been outlined in the literature (Jansen, 1998; Flynn, 2004, 2007). It investigates how memories of the past, interpretations of the present and imagination about the future influence the construction of belonging to a place(s) and shows their interconnectedness, at least in the migrants’ reflections obtained in the framework of this research. Interviewees perceived their present through their memories of the past and expectations about the future. They interpreted their past through making sense of the present and images of the future. They constructed visions of the future on the basis of their understanding of the past and present. This interconnectedness is depicted graphically in Figure 1.3, which schematically presents the process of identity ‘territorialisation’ traced through an analysis of interviews with migrants.

1.3 Explanatory scheme

The thesis links the concepts discussed above in one explanatory scheme which aims to illuminate the significance of differentiations institutionalised in the migration regime for the experiences and identities of migrants. Although the text of the thesis is written in such a way that this scheme is introduced at the start and appears here as a guide according to which the research was conducted, in reality the scheme emerged in the course of the complex interaction between theory and empirical data collected during research.

Migrants coming to the receiving society encounter its migration regime, which through the lens of the theory of structuration can be conceptualised as a composition of structures constructed and reproduced in this society in response to migration. These structures comprise discourses about migrants and migration, the legislative framework, and the composition of resources available to social actors participating in the production and reproduction of the migration regime. The structures are used by knowledgeable social actors (including migrants) in their interactions and are reproduced/transformed through these interactions (Figure 1.1).

A migration regime can institutionalise differences among migrants and as such can be understood as ‘a differentiated system of othering’; in other words, it constructs different groups of migrants, and these groups are treated differently. For example, different meanings may be attached to different migrants and their geographical movement, different rules can be
employed for regulating migrants’ entry into and stay in the receiving society, and the scope of resources available to migrants in this society can differ. In Russia, as this thesis will show, the migration regime differentiates people according to racial constructions and citizenship.

Differentiation embedded in the structures composing the migration regime affects the experiences of migrants since they draw on these structures in their interactions with other social actors. Because of this differentiation, the capacities of migrants to influence the outcomes of their interactions with other social actors are also different. So, the social exclusion of migrants in the receiving society, as a process of negotiation between them and other social actors concerning access to resources, is also affected by the differentiation institutionalised in the migration regime.

The process of social exclusion can result in a situation of social exclusion, in other words, in a situation whereby people do not have opportunities to access the resources they need or want. However, since the process of social exclusion occurs in different domains of society there is also the possibility that the deprivation of resources experienced in one domain may be compensated by opportunities to access resources in another domain. Resources also can be attained though social networks – chains of connections between people based on interpersonal relations. Being knowledgeable social actors, migrants can see enabling opportunities embedded in structures and use these opportunities to avoid situations of social exclusion. This thesis shows how, by using existing structures of signification and legitimation and mobilising already available resources, migrants can gain access to resources they need or want.

The emphasis on the agency of migrants in their resource negotiations does not eliminate the fact that there is differentiation in power (transformative capacity) which they are able to exercise in their interactions with other social actors. Differentiation in meanings, norms and the range of resources available for mobilisation causes differentiation in the availability of opportunities for migrants to attain other resources. There is also a question about the quality of resources which can be reached by them (a full-time job in the formal economy is not the same as part-time employment in the informal economy).

Differentiation institutionalised in the migration regime affects migrants’ identities through its influence on their experiences. The ability of a person to access necessary and/or desired recourses in the present prompts him/her to feel secure and stable. These feelings, in turn, contribute to the ‘territorialisation’ of his/her identity at the place which is associated
with them. Conversely, a person’s deprivation of resources experienced at the present time can prompt him/her to feel a sense of insecurity and instability and, as a result, prevent him/her from perceiving the place associated with these feelings as a place where he/she belongs. Further, it must be taken into consideration that the construction of belonging to the place(s) is affected not only by the person’s perception of his/her present, but also by interpretations of his/her past and expectations about his/her future.

Conclusion

Through an overview of the theoretical accounts of migration existing in the academic literature, this chapter has indicated key debates concerning this social phenomenon. The main focus of the overview was the debate about relations between agency and structure in shaping migration and the experiences of migrants. This focus is grounded in the recognition that the conceptualisation of the relationships between agency and structure expresses the ontological and epistemological positions of researchers which inform the methodology used in their research. The chapter critically explored different approaches to answering the question of how agency and structure are related to each other, including answers suggested by the theory of structuration – to reject dualism in perceptions of agency and structure and, instead, perceive them in terms of duality.

This thesis employs the concept of the ‘duality of structure’ suggested by the theory of structuration, but at the same time agrees with critiques which point out that social actors are also able to withdraw from structures. It shares the ontological position expressed by Mouzelis (1997), who indicates that while the duality of structure is expressed in the routine interactions of social actors, dualism emerges when social actors distance themselves from structures in order to understand how to use and/or change them. In short, he does not reject the existence of the duality of structure, but argues that it ‘must be complemented with the notion of dualism’ (Mouzelis, 1997, p. 214).

Other conceptual points borrowed from the theory of structuration by this research include: the notion that structures both constrain and enable agency; the knowledgeability of social actors; and the ‘duality of control’. However, while admitting that even the seemingly powerless social actor is able to exercise power in his/her interactions with other social actors and is capable of influencing the outcome of these interactions, the thesis raises the question
of the unequal levels of generated power. Following other studies which have applied elements of the theory of structuration in exploring migration and migrants’ experiences, this study points out that this inequality stems from differentiation embedded in structures upon which social actors draw in their interactions. The specific contribution of this study in relation to other studies is that it explores this differentiation and its effects in more detail.

Following the overview of the theoretical accounts of migration, the theory of structuration and the conceptual points of this theory employed by this particular research, the chapter proceeded with a discussion of the key concepts used in the thesis to analyse the empirical data collected during the research and linked them in one explanatory scheme. The central element of this scheme is the concept of a migration regime, which refers to the structural elements created and reproduced in the society in response to migration. It is argued that a migration regime could be understood as ‘a differentiated system of othering’ which manifests itself through differentiated accessibility to resources and rights allocated in the receiving society and as a result affects the social exclusion of migrants in this society and, through this, their identities. Differentiation embedded in a migration regime could be constructed on the basis of various criteria. In the case of the Russian migration regime, these criteria are citizenship and racial constructions which are interlinked with two processes of othering – nation-building and racialisation.
Chapter 2
Methodology, Methods and Ethics of the Research

Introduction

In this chapter I discuss the methodology, methods and ethics of my research.\(^1\) The first part presents the methodology used in the research as well as the ontological and epistemological positions reflected in this methodology; the second part gives a general overview of the research process in the field, dividing this process into three stages. The third part of the chapter is devoted to explaining the rationale and describing the methods used as well as describing how the data are analysed and incorporated into the text of my thesis. In the fourth part of the chapter, I reflect on the methodological issues which arose in the course of my interaction with people in the field. This final section also includes a reflection on the ethical issues involved.

2.1 Ontology, epistemology and methodology of the research

Research methodology may be defined as the logic which guides the organisation and carrying out of a research project. It is informed by the ontological and epistemological positions of the researcher (Patton, 2002). The ontological position is expressed through answers to the question ‘What is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there that can be known about it?’, while the epistemological position emerges through answers to the question ‘What is the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?’. Finally, methodology constitutes answers to the question ‘How can the inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding out whatever he or she believes can be known?’ (Guba and Lincoln, 2004, pp. 21-22).

My ontological position is very close to that presented by Giddens (1984) in his theory of structuration. I share the point of view that society contains structures constructed and reproduced by social actors operating in society, who are, in their turn, affected by these

\(^1\) In contrast to other chapters, this chapter adopts a first person narrative, since it is devoted to the author’s personal reflections on the research process.
Social actors are knowledgeable in the sense that they have ideas about the social world, including the conditions of their actions and the possible consequences of their actions. These ideas affect social actors’ practices and, as a result, the structures of society. These ontological positions draw the attention of sociological researchers not only to the structures of society, but also to social actors and their understandings of the world around them.

I also agree with a number of the epistemological statements expressed in Giddens’ theory of structuration. As indicated above, in this theory Giddens states that social actors (which include the researcher and the researched) know a great deal about the social world within which they organise their every-day interactions. However, Giddens also identifies certain limits of this knowledge. For example, he indicates that the knowledgeability of social actors is limited by their inability to grasp all conditions and contexts within which they act. He also points out that this knowledgeability depends on social actors’ respective positions in a given society (Giddens, 1984, p. 341). In addition, he assumes that some ideas shared by social actors about the conditions and outcomes of their interactions may be false (Giddens, 1984, p. 340). In expressing ideas about the existence of social reality beyond social actors’ actual knowledge about it, as well as possible mistakes in social actors’ understandings of this reality, Gidden’s epistemological position looks similar to the critical realist position (Sayer, 2000).

The recognition that the knowledge of all social actors is limited and may be false gives rise to a range of difficult epistemological questions. What is the status of knowledge received by social researchers through his/her studies? Is this knowledge more able to grasp social reality than the knowledge which lay social actors have? In my opinion, if the researcher is attentive to the interpretations of lay social actors involved in the research and to the contexts in which these actors operate, he/she has the opportunity to grasp something which may go unnoticed or be taken for granted by them. That is why I paid significant attention to the

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2 This interconnectedness of social structure and social actors is expressed by Giddens (1984) in the notion of ‘duality of structure’ (p. 374).
3 This account is based on the notion of ‘knowledgeability’ (Giddens, 1984, pp. 281, 375).
4 Although commentators point out that Giddens, in his theory, avoids any clear and elaborate expression of his epistemological position (Bryant, 1997, Cohen, 1997), I think that some information about this can be gleaned in his writings about the application of his theory to empirical research (Giddens, 1984, pp. 281-354).
5 There is some confusion about the philosophical status of structuration theory. Some commentators consider Giddens to be a post-empiricist, although at the same time they recognise that the ontology elaborated in this theory correlates with that expressed by critical realists (Bryant, 1997; Cohen, 1997).
accounts of my respondents as well as to the contexts within which the respondents live and operate.

The concept of the double hermeneutic suggested by Giddens (1984, p. 374) provides a possible middle way between two opposite approaches to studying social reality. This enables the researcher to steer a course between, on the one hand, a concept-driven approach (whereby the lay actors’ interpretations are not taken into account), and on the other, a data-driven approach (whereby the researcher attempts to free his/her mind from a priori assumptions and concepts before embarking on the research process). This middle way is based on dialogue between empirically gained data and pre-existing theoretical concepts. For example, although my research is underpinned by concepts derived from the literature, my elaboration of these concepts in this thesis has been undertaken in constant negotiation with the data received through my empirical study, first and foremost, of interviews with the research participants.

Although personally sympathetic to most of the statements expressed in the philosophical position of critical realism, I would like to avoid labelling this thesis as critical realist. This is due to a number of reservations I have in relation to this approach, at least as interpreted by Sayer, specifically its underestimation of the impact on social reality of the researchers and their research activity (Sayer, 2000, pp. 33-35). I consider that it is important to recognise the active position of the researcher in the field. A researcher entering the field inevitably becomes a social actor operating within that field. He/she participates in the construction and reproduction of social practices and, through this, influences the situation in the field. In addition, the results of research can themselves transform social practices and thus social reality.

A further important aspect of my understanding of knowledge production relates to research participants. As noted above, although I share the view that all social actors are knowledgeable, I do not consider their accounts about the social to be an unproblematic source of data. In addition to acknowledging the limitations of social actors’ knowledge, I also recognise the fact that their accounts are produced through dialogues with the other. This means, among other things, that any speaker or writer takes his/her audience into consideration (Kvale, 1996, pp. 35-36). As a result, what is said or written for one audience may differ from what might be said or written for another audience; the audience exerts an influence on the ideas of the speaker/writer. Therefore, the information which I received
through communication with my respondents constitutes situated knowledge about the social. Production of this information is influenced by our interpretation of the entire interactive engagement.

My ontological and epistemological positions are reflected in the methodology of my research. Before commencing the empirical study, I identified the theoretical framework of the research as well as constructed, within this framework, the concept of the migration regime. At the same time, my research design was shaped with a view to enabling dialogue between *a priori* suggested concepts, on the one hand, and data gained through empirical study, on the other. For example, my central research question was formulated in a very broad manner, which nonetheless reflects my ontological belief in the interconnectedness of the structures of society and social actors. ‘How is the migration regime reflected in the experiences and identities of migrants (former Soviet citizens without Russian citizenship who came from former republics of the USSR to Russia and decided to stay there permanently)?’

In line with structuration theory, which holds that both institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct are important for understanding the constitution of society (Giddens 1984, 373), I approached my central research question from two angles. On the one hand, I analysed the structures which constitute the migration regime of the Russian Federation. On the other, I explored the understandings and experiences of migrants interacting with this regime. As a result, my study contains what might be termed ‘desk-based research’ (analysis of Russian legislation and mass media discourses) and a significant fieldwork component. The fieldwork component is focused on an investigation of the immediate experiences of knowledgeable social actors who have participated in the construction/reproduction of the Russian migration regime, as well as on their understandings of this regime and their experiences in Russia. In my fieldwork I used qualitative methods – semi-structured

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6 My research experience supports the statement that no clear line can be drawn between institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct (Giddens, 1984, p. 288). In my opinion, those critics of structuration theory who argue that this theory promoting ‘duality’ is not able to overcome ‘methodological dualism’ (Archer, 1990) are mistaken. The methodological bracketing – that is, the subdivision of research practices into the abovementioned types of analysis – suggested by this theory is simply an analytical division of research methods which emphasise different aspects of the social. What we deal with during our research projects, which combine institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct, is methodological duality. It is easy and convenient to write ‘first I did this, and next I did that; first I analysed this and next I analysed that’ – but the reality of the research process is much more complex. We cannot block out our questioning of everyday life from our knowledge (or questions) about structures (legislation, discourses etc), just as we cannot separate off our questioning of structures from our knowledge of everyday life.
interviews, expert interviews, informal conversations and observations, which allowed me to gain access to a variety of social actors’ experiences and interpretations.\(^7\)

The design of the research can be defined as a cross-sectional design with case study elements (Bryman, 2008, pp. 53-55). The cross-sectionality of the research was expressed in the intention to collect migrants’ stories as cases to be compared with one another. At the same time, the research is also a case study, given that the Russian migration regime on which I focus is only one of many migration regimes existing in the world.

Data obtained through the empirical research provided the opportunity to develop the concept of the migration regime as ‘a differentiated system of othering’. The empirical data also prompted the search for concepts which could reflect the data received. The concepts which I found relevant here include citizenship, racialisation, social exclusion, social networks and the ‘territorialisation’ of identity. Finally, dialogue between concepts and data prompted an additional visit to the field after the main part of the fieldwork had been completed.\(^8\)

The methodology used in this research follows my belief in the dialogical production of data, as well as my views on the active involvement of the researcher in the field and the ability of the research results to influence the practices of social actors. The methodology presupposes that I, as a researcher, reflect on the effects of my research activity and aim to make the processes of the research design, data collection and data analysis transparent for the reader.\(^9\)

2.2 Stages of fieldwork: location in space and time

The empirical focus on migrants’ experiences required extensive fieldwork and immersion in the environment in which respondents themselves lived. Altogether, there were three stages in my fieldwork.

The first stage which provided the idea for the general topic of my thesis took place, as noted in the thesis introduction, before I actually embarked upon PhD study. While working on another research project in Novosibirsk region in 2002 I encountered non-Russian

\(^7\) A description of how these methods were designed and used in this particular study can be found in section 2.3.
\(^8\) See section 2.2. for information concerning all stages of the fieldwork conducted during this research.
\(^9\) Section 2.4 provides space for my reflection on some methodological and ethical issues that emerged during my interaction with other social actors involved in the research.
nationals from former republics of the USSR who had arrived in Russia with the aim of permanent residency. These people were trapped in a situation of ‘illegality’ because of transformations which had ensued in the Russian migration regime subsequent to their arrival. Three semi-structured interviews conducted with these people not only inspired the topic of my subsequent thesis, but also provided data which helped to shape its research design.

The second stage of my fieldwork lasted from April to October 2004. During this time I spent four months in Moscow and two small towns in the Moscow region (to be referred to in my thesis as X and Y) and three months in Novosibirsk, a large city in Western Siberia with approximately one and a half million inhabitants. The initial choice of Moscow and Novosibirsk as settings for fieldwork was determined by the availability of contacts which could facilitate my access to potential interviewees. Using my contacts in Moscow, I was also able to locate respondents in X and Y.

The economic, social, and demographic situations of Moscow, Novosibirsk and cities in Moscow region (X and Y) were different (see Appendix G). This variation in contexts caused differences in migrants’ experiences. However, the aim of this research was focused on experiences shared by non-Russian nationals in Russia, irrespective of their place of residence. I was interested in the meanings which my respondents attached to the limitations imposed on them by the current Russian legislation, which was applied throughout the country. While in the 1990s, the implementation of national legislation differed from region to region (Flynn, 2004), in the 2000s, it became possible to speak about uniformity in the implementation of national legislation throughout the territory of the Russian Federation.10

Experiences of so-called ‘non-Russian’-looking people were also explored with a focus on commonalities. The aim of the analysis was to clarify whether migrants coming to Russia experienced differentiation according to their appearance, and if so, what meanings they attached to this differentiation. It is worth noting that all the interviewees who told me stories of being perceived as ‘non-Russian’-looking people lived in big cities (Moscow and Novosibirsk). I assume that experiences of being visually different in a small town or a village may differ greatly from the experiences of my respondents. Exploring how local contexts influence experiences of visually different migrants is a possible topic for future research projects.

10 Changes in implementation of national legislation were interconnected with the centralisation of migration regulation (see Chapter 3 for further details on this process).
During the second stage of my fieldwork I conducted semi-structured interviews with 39 migrants (22 in Moscow and the Moscow region, and 17 in Novosibirsk) and six interviews with experts (representatives of non-government organisations (henceforth NGOs) involved in the reproduction/ transformation of the Russian migration regime). In the field I had the opportunity not only to talk with social actors who were actively participating in the construction and reproduction of the Russian migration regime (migrants, members and leaders of NGOs, officials, academics, journalists, etc.), but also to observe their interactions with one another. My observations were supplemented by informal conversations which provided background information concerning what was going on in the field. Interviews with representatives of NGOs, observations and conversations helped me to verify and contextualise the data obtained through my semi-structured interviews with migrants. At this stage of my fieldwork I also continued my analysis of the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime which I had started in the course of preparing for the field, as well as beginning my analysis of representations of migration and migrants presented in the Russian mass media. I completed the latter analysis after returning from the field.

The third stage of my fieldwork took place in Moscow in the summer of 2005. At this stage I held follow-up meetings with some of the migrants whom I had interviewed in the previous stage. This round of interviews was aimed at developing the ideas and concepts generated through my analysis of the data obtained during the second stage of the fieldwork. I also wanted to trace any changes in the situation of my respondents which had occurred over the course of the year. Altogether four interviews with migrants were conducted. This stage of the fieldwork included formal meetings with representatives of NGOs, as well as informal conversations with them and migrants.

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11 I held interviews and had informal conversations with members and leaders of three Moscow-based NGOs — the Forum of Migrants’ Associations (http://www.migrant.ru/), the Civic Assistance Committee (http://www.refugee.ru/), and the Tajikistan Foundation (no web site). I also conducted interviews with the leader and other members of the Novosibirsk-based NGO ‘A Helping Hand’ (Ruka pomoshchi) (no web site).

12 Since changes in the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime continued to be made throughout the time of my research, I also carried on analysing the legislation throughout.
2.3 Methods of the research: design, data gathering and analysis

Within the qualitative sociological study undertaken in the framework of the project I used semi-structured interviews and expert interviews, as well as informal observations and conversations with social actors operating in the field who were involved in the construction and reproduction of the Russian migration regime. These methods were combined with other non-fieldwork methods (the analysis of legislation, the analysis of statistics and textual analysis of mass media). The logic of using these methods in my research is illustrated in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Logic of the use of methods in the research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research tasks</th>
<th>Methods</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of contexts</td>
<td><strong>Migration regime</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Legislative framework</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Discursive framework</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Collective social actors who participate in construction of Russian migration regime</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Exploration of migrants’ experiences in the receiving society</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Exploration of how migrants construct their identities in relation to place(s)</strong>&lt;br&gt;Analysis of official statistics and overview of results obtained through research on ‘illegal’ migration&lt;br&gt;Analysis of legislation&lt;br&gt;Textual analysis of mass media (Russian newspapers)&lt;br&gt;Overview of public opinion polls&lt;br&gt;Analysis of legislation&lt;br&gt;Expert interviews with representatives of NGOs&lt;br&gt;Semi-structured interviews with migrants&lt;br&gt;Informal conversations&lt;br&gt;Semi-structured interviews with migrants&lt;br&gt;Expert interviews with representatives of NGOs&lt;br&gt;Informal conversations&lt;br&gt;Informal observations&lt;br&gt;Semi-structured interviews with migrants&lt;br&gt;Informal conversations with migrants</td>
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As the table shows, I divided my research project into three tasks. First, I explored the contexts (including structures which constitute the Russian migration regime) within which non-Russian nationals from former Soviet republics organise their life in Russia. To this end I analysed Russian legislation and discourses presented in the Russian newspapers, as well as official statistics. Existing research findings on ‘illegal’ migrants and expert interviews also provided useful information for this task. Second, I explored the experiences of these migrants in Russia. Interviews and informal conversations with social actors operating in the field (including migrants, representatives of NGOs, the local population, etc.) as well as informal
observations, provided material for the accomplishment of the second task. Finally, I explored how these migrants construct their identities in relation to place(s). Interviews and informal conversations with migrants were the source of information for accomplishing this third task.

While my research can be subdivided into three distinct tasks, I did not carry these tasks separately, one by one. In practice, I worked on these tasks simultaneously, since the methods used in the research informed all three tasks. Thus, for example, my analysis of Russian legislation and mass media discourse, the main aim of which was to gain information about the structures of the migration regime, also influenced my perception of what was going on in the field (and in this sense influenced the results of my observations) and shaped the questionnaires for my interviews with social actors. Similarly, informal observations in the field informed my analysis of mass media and directed my analysis of the legislation, as did my interviews with social actors. Interviews and informal conversations with migrants influenced information gathering for all three tasks.

2.3.1 Semi-structured interviews

In my research, the semi-structured interview was the principal method for generating data. This method was used for gaining information for all three project tasks (see Table 2.1). Given its centrality to my research, it is worth providing a particularly detailed account of my usage of this method.

2.3.1.1 The choice of method and designing the interview guide

The literature on social science methods agrees that interviews allow the collection of data about experiences and understandings in cases where direct observations are impossible (Creswell, 2003, p.186; Bryman, 2008, p.466). In the case of my research, interviews provided a way of accessing not only the current, but also the past experiences and understandings of my respondents, which could not be observed directly. In addition, interviews, which involve respondents providing verbal interpretations of their experiences and the world around them, also offer insights into respondents’ discursive knowledge13 of the structures of the society in which they live and operate. Finally, as Bryman (2008) has

13 Discursive knowledge is ‘what actors are able to say, or give verbal expression to, concerning social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action’ (Giddens, 1984, p.374).
observed, interviewing as a method of data collection enables the researcher to cover a wider range of people and situations (p. 468).

I chose to employ semi-structured interviews in my research. This choice was based on my previous experience of using semi-structured interviews in earlier research projects (Kosygina, 2001, 2003). This experience had shown me that loosely structured interviews involving open-ended questions allow for more flexibility and spontaneity, as well as generating new topics for investigation which cannot be predicted or planned in advance, since they arise in the course of the interaction itself. Further, open-ended questions had the potential to prompt reflexive accounts by my respondents, of their experiences as migrants (Kvale, 1996, pp. 27-29). Finally, this type of interview is also useful because it simulates informal conversation, and is thus conducive to building a relationship of trust between interviewer and interviewee (something which is especially important when interviewing ‘illegal’ migrants, due to their vulnerable situation).

Semi-structured interviewing, as a method, presupposes that the researcher has an interview guide – a list of questions which are not strictly formulated and can be asked in any order, depending on the flow of the interview and the dynamics of interaction with the respondent. My interview guide was created along the lines of the scheme suggested by Manson (2002, pp.69-72). The research question was subdivided into ‘mini’-research questions, within which ideas of themes for discussion were developed. Each of the themes for discussion contained a range of more detailed questions. Afterwards, the questions, grouped thematically, were arranged in the interview guide. Any new themes and questions were added during my research in the field, since the interviews with my respondents revealed some themes which I had not predicted or anticipated.

2.3.1.2 Sampling and sample

Since nobody knows the precise number of migrants from former Soviet republics currently residing in Russia, there is no sampling frame to employ random or quota samples in studies focused on these people. In my research, I used the so-called ‘snowballing technique’ (Patton 2002, pp. 237-238). Interviewees were approached through my friends,

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14 The interview guide can be found in Appendix A.
15 See section 2.3.6 for further information about official statistics on migration.
acquaintances and relatives, as well as through members of NGOs. This way of approaching my potential respondents was chosen with the aim of gaining their trust.\textsuperscript{16}

Using the ‘snowballing technique’ made it difficult to tailor the sample. However, following my initial assumptions about possible differentiations institutionalised by the Russian migration regime, I tried to diversify the sample along two dimensions: legal statuses available to foreign citizens in Russia, on the one hand, and the ethnicity of respondents, on the other. I used recommendations suggested by Mason (2002, pp.133-137) in order to determine the size of the sample. Since I was interested to explore how the Russian migration regime is experienced and understood by non-Russian nationals at different stages of their legalisation and naturalisation in Russia, I expanded the sample until it included migrants with a wide range of legal statuses as well as migrants without any legal status. Another dimension of sample construction – ethnicity – was abandoned subsequently as I learned more about the process of racialisation encountered by my respondents in Russia and became aware that ethnicity per se was less important as a marker of difference. What emerged as more important in the experiences of my respondents were supra-ethnic categories based on physical appearance. Through my research I managed to collect interviews with people who indicated that their physical features were perceived in the receiving society as ‘non-Russian’ and people who were defined as ‘Russian’-looking. I considered ending the sampling once the two sets of interviews were large enough to enable useful comparative analysis.

During the first and second stages of the fieldwork I conducted semi-structured interviews with 42 migrants, all of whom lived in urban and semi-urban areas: 15 in Moscow, 4 in X., 3 in Y. and 20 in Novosibirsk (including 1 in the Novosibirsk region). My respondents were people who had migrated to Russia for a range of different reasons. Some of them had come to work and planned to return home as soon as they had earned enough money; some had come to study; some had been forced to change their place of residence after having their lives and livelihood threatened; and some could be defined as repatriates because, in their terms, they had returned to their ‘homeland’. Finally, some had migrated in order to join their families (their spouses, children, parents). Sometimes the above-listed reasons for migration were intertwined. While 19 respondents had legal status in Russia, 23 were so-called ‘illegal’ migrants. Twelve of my respondents were men and 30 were women. Twenty-six of the interviewees identified their ethnicity as Russian. The age of my

\textsuperscript{16} Some interviews were arranged without the involvement of intermediaries (the respondents were approached at an NGO venue).
respondents ranged from 20 to 78. They also differed in terms of their educational status and family situation. They had come to post-Soviet Russia from different former Soviet republics at different times.\footnote{More detailed information about the socio-demographic characteristics of my respondents, with information about the places of their origin and time of their arrival in Russia can be found in Appendix B.}

Although my respondents differed in age, gender and ethnicity, as well as in their legal status on the territory of the Russian Federation, there were two factors which they all shared: all of them were former Soviet citizens; and at the time of the interview they had all been living in Russia for more than one year. The only person who (at the second stage of my fieldwork in 2004) had been living in Russia for less than a year expressed a strong desire to live there permanently. In summer 2005, he was still in Russia and I conducted a second interview with him.

\textbf{2.3.1.3 The process of interviewing}

The interviews took place at different locations: the homes of respondents, their work places, and ‘neutral’ territories, such as cafés, parks, etc. Interviews differed in length of time, ranging from 20 minutes to three hours. Some of them were conducted in the presence of other people. Information about each of the interviews can be found in Appendix C.

Approaching my potential interviewees, I introduced myself (my name, affiliation, how I knew the gatekeeper through whom I approached them) and the nature and purpose of my research. I explained why I was interested in migrants’ stories about life in Russia, and how the data collected were going to be used. I explained the type of interview employed, outlining the roles of interviewer and interviewee. I pointed out that the interview was going to be recorded on tape, but that the names of interviewees would not be available to anybody but myself. I also pointed out that the tapes would be heard by me and the person who was going to transcribe them, and that if a potential interviewee objected to anyone else hearing the interview I would transcribe the tape myself. I then asked the potential respondent if he/she would be comfortable to give me an interview. After receiving the interviewee’s verbal consent, I began the process of interviewing. I did not ask my respondents to give written consent, because to do so may have seemed to contradict my promise of confidentiality. I
assumed that potential interviewees might be apprehensive about signing any documents since they might perceive this as compromising their anonymity.\footnote{See also Miller and Bell for their discussion of why written consent can be problematic in research projects focused on sensitive themes (Miller and Bell, 2002, pp. 64-66).}

According to the design, the actual interview with migrants started with an open question: ‘Please, tell me about your life in Russia after your arrival.’ This question was aimed at encouraging the respondent to tell the story of his/her life in the receiving society. The strategy of beginning with an open-ended question allowed me not only to cover the themes indicated in the guide, but also to discover new themes to follow up. After a respondent had finished telling his/her story, I asked him/her questions in order to gain additional information to develop the themes which had emerged through his/her story. I also asked questions to investigate themes indicated in the guide but which were not mentioned by the respondent. At the end of the interview, I asked the interviewee if he/she felt that he/she had said everything that he/she wanted to say and whether he/she had any questions to ask me. Sometimes this prompted my respondents to talk more about themselves and their situation in Russia. The dynamics of the interview as a whole generally proceeded from less to more sensitive themes. However, questions about the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents and questions about their countries of origins and time of arrival in Russia were placed at the very end of the interview. This served as a kind of marker that the interview as such had ended. Sometimes the interview was followed by an informal chat, which could last up to two hours. Before leaving my respondents I asked them about the possibility of contacting them again.

All of the interviews were recorded on a dictaphone, which I switched on only after gaining the permission of the respondent, whom I had assured of the confidentiality of the discussion. There were some cases when respondents asked me to stop recording in the course of the interview when they approached some sensitive themes. After finishing the interview and leaving the respondent(s), I recorded a description of the place and context of the interview and also my immediate thoughts on my interaction with him/her/them. These data were transcribed along with the text of the actual interviews. The interviews, whenever they are cited in the thesis, are identified by randomly assigned letters.
2.3.1.4 Analysis of migrants’ stories and their incorporation into the thesis

My analysis of the interviews was divided into two stages. During the first stage I worked with each interview separately. First of all, I coded the text. I looked through it and indicated the themes mentioned in it. Next, I made a separate file in which I noted down my thoughts and ideas about what I had read. During the second stage, I worked with all the interviews simultaneously, concentrating on the themes which had emerged in the first stage of analysis. I went back to my files of notes written for each of the interviews and used the ‘cut/paste technique’ to create thematic folders. For example, the ‘housing’ folder contains all my memos about finding and securing accommodation in Russia and the problems which my respondents faced during these processes. One and the same item in the notes could be included in several different folders if it related to more than one topics. As for the actual texts of the interviews: I put them through a qualitative data analysis software package – Atlas.ti – which allowed me to browse across all interviews according to theme. For example, typing the code ‘social-networks’ calls up a window showing the citations coded as ‘social-networks’ from all the interviews. Reading though the interviews with the help of Atlas.ti provided additional material for the development of thematic folders. Further analysis of the interviews focused on what was contained in these thematic folders with constant references to the actual texts of the interviews. Looking through the thematic folders allowed me to discern two major themes which can be traced though the majority of the folders: the social exclusion of migrants, on the one hand, and the ‘territorialisation’ of identity, on the other. These themes became the core for my thesis and are explored in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively.

2.3.2 Expert interviews

In the course of the research, I was able to interview leaders and members of NGOs dealing with migrants. Following definition suggested by Flick (2006, p.165), these interviews might be categorised as expert interviews. The aim of the interviews with NGO representatives was to gain information about the ongoing changes in the Russian migration regime from the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidency onwards. These interviews were
focused on the changing relations between NGOs and the state, as well as on the activities of the NGOs themselves.

I initially approached the leaders of two major Moscow NGOs, the Forum of Migrants’ Associations and the Civic Assistance Committee, by telephone. After I had introduced myself and my research, we arranged appointments in their office premises. I made contact with the leaders and members of other NGOs based in Moscow via the leader of the Forum of Migrants’ Associations. In Novosibirsk, I used a pre-existing research contact with the leader of a local NGO.

It should be pointed out that although NGO leaders (especially the leaders of the Forum of Migrants’ Associations and the Civic Assistance Committee) helped me a great deal by sharing printed information, and introducing me to the field and to my potential respondents, they were not keen to be interviewed themselves. This was at least partly because they are extremely busy people whose schedules made it very difficult for them to allocate time for an interview whose practical outcome was not immediately obvious (given that my PhD thesis was evidently not considered a tool through which the situation of migrants could be improved in the here-and-now). As a result, the leader of the Civic Assistance Committee, for example, elected to give her interview in the format of a press conference (that is, she collected several researchers together and answered their questions in a single interview session). The leader of the Forum of Migrants’ Associations, on the other hand, postponed her appointment for interview several times before finally arranging to be interviewed simultaneously by me and another researcher. Leaders of other NGOs did, however, find time for personal interviews with me.

The questionnaires for the expert interviews were prepared and handed to the experts in advance of each interview. For each interview I had to adjust the questionnaire, adding or omitting certain questions. The interviews were taped with the permission of the respondent. While leaders of the Forum of Migrants’ Associations and the Civic Assistance Committee felt comfortable being recorded, leaders and members of other NGOs occasionally asked me to switch off my dictaphone, and two of them did not wish to be recorded at all. Such precautions may have been a result of the unfriendly climate within which NGOs were operating at the time in Russia.¹⁹

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¹⁹ See Evans (2006) for the analysis of the situation with regard to civil society in Russia.
The material obtained from the expert interviews was used in the analysis of the institutional framework of the Russian migration regime. The results of this analysis are presented in Chapter 3. In addition, NGO leaders and members spoke about the issues and problems encountered by people arriving in Russia from former Soviet republics. Data received from these expert interviews informed the guide for the semi-structured interviews with migrants.

The initial design of this research project presupposed that I would also conduct expert interviews with officials from the Federal Migration Service with a view to learning their opinions about the changes in the Russian Federation’s migration regime. This intention was based on my past research experience. In the course of my previous project, which I started in 2000 (that is, prior to the Service’s incorporation into the Ministry of Internal Affairs), I worked closely with the Territorial Branch of the Federal Migration Service in the Novosibirsk region. At that time, the staff there were open to participation in a research project devoted to increasing the efficiency of their service. In the framework of that project, interviews with the officials from this branch of the Federal Migration Service allowed me to learn how migration regulations were implemented in practice; to receive evaluations of these regulations from the people who implemented them; to access statistical data generated by the Federal Migration Service; and to look at the migrants’ experiences in the receiving society from another perspective (that of the officials providing services for migrants). The personnel of this branch shared with me their points of view not only on their day-to-day activities as implementers of migration regulations, but also on the Russian Federation’s migration policy. Besides expert interviews, I was even allowed to conduct observations in the offices in order to study communication between officials and migrants firsthand.

By contrast, however, in 2004, during the fieldwork conducted for this research, I experienced significant difficulties in gaining access to officials from the Federal Migration Service. In Moscow and Moscow region, I contacted them by telephone or approached them at conferences, but they were reluctant to meet with me for interview. The usual reason cited was that they were very busy. Instead, they referred me to the official publications issued by the Federal Migration Service. Since I had no prior experience of communicating with officials working for the Federal Migration Service in Moscow and Moscow region, I cannot say whether this marked a change in their style of communicating with the research community. In the case of Novosibirsk, however, I did have the opportunity to trace the
transformations that had taken place. In 2004, I was not granted permission to meet with officers of the Federal Migration Service in Novosibirsk region. I was only permitted to hold a single official meeting with the deputy director of the Novosibirsk regional branch. In our interview, the deputy director’s conduct was quite obstructive: she repeatedly refused to answer my questions, on the grounds that the matter under discussion was beyond her competence. This observed shift in communicative patterns may be linked with the securitisation of migration that had occurred in the intervening period; it might also be linked with the atmosphere of secrecy endemic in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which had subsumed the Federal Migration Service.

2.3.3 Informal conversations and observations in the field

Informal conversations in the field were not planned or designed beforehand; they occurred spontaneously and were part of my every-day life. Such informal conversations with social actors involved in the construction of the Russian migration regime comprised a useful way of gathering data for my research and as such can be considered as a research method (Yadov, 1995, p.38).

Informal conversations occurred during the entire course of my fieldwork in a variety of different locations. I spoke with migrants, representatives of NGOs, officials, the local population, journalists and academics. These conversations often followed my interviews with respondents. In any event, they were not taped; instead, I recorded their content and contexts afterwards, from memory. The information received through informal conversations afforded me additional insight into the experiences of migrants in Russia and helped to shape the guide of the semi-structured interviews with migrants, as well as providing additional context for analysing the migrant interviews. Informal conversations also provided additional information for the analysis of the Russian migration regime.

Like the informal conversations, my observations were unplanned. They were made at different locations including NGO venues, branches of the Office of Visas and Registration (henceforth OVIR), gatherings of migrants, and conferences where I had the opportunity to meet academics, NGO activists and officials. My observations provided me with supplementary information about relations among social actors operating in the field and migrants’ experiences. These observations verified the information received through
interviews and conversations with migrants and provided topics for discussion with migrants during informal conversations and interviews.

Researchers have pointed out that living in the field gives a valuable opportunity to gain insider knowledge about the places, cultures and societies of their research subjects (Round, 2002; Popov, 2005). According to my experience, such knowledge comes to us first of all through informal conversations and observations, which are unavoidable since a researcher cannot formalise every communication and observation occurring during his/her prolonged presence in the field. I think that those of us who choose to use ethnography or at least some of its elements in research projects, are actually looking for non-formalised ways of gaining knowledge. However, at the same time, we should not forget that the people with whom we communicate informally or who are observed by us informally do not realise that their words and actions constitute data for our research. We have to be cautious in using data obtained through informal methods, especially when we study sensitive issues and/or work with vulnerable groups of the population. Personally, I could not allow myself to use data obtained informally in the text of this thesis (in the form of direct citations, for example). I used such data only to develop designs of formal methods (semi-structured interviews, expert interviews, analysis of legislation) and to verify data obtained through these formal methods.

2.3.4 Analysis of the legislation

The analysis of legislation was used in exploring the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime and outlining the set of collective social actors participating in the construction and reproduction of this regime. This analysis also informed the guide for my semi-structured interviews and influenced informal conversations and observations in the field, as well as affecting the analysis of data obtained through all these methods.

My analysis was focused on the national legislation regulating issues linked with migration and the integration of people from the former Soviet republics into Russian society. However, besides Federal Laws, Presidential Decrees and Government regulations, I also analysed bi-lateral agreements between Russia and the former Soviet republics. I accessed all these documents via the internet, using the database provided by ConsultantPlus – the service network operating in the Russian market of information and legal services.20

20 The database can be accessed at http://www.consultant.ru/.
I compared the legislation which existed before 2002 with that enacted afterwards. This year was chosen as the benchmark for comparison because this was the year in which two laws were issued that proved pivotal for the Russian migration regime. The first was the new Law № 62 ‘On Citizenship’,\(^{21}\) which completely changed the procedure for acquiring Russian citizenship for former Soviet citizens from NIS countries. The second law is Law № 115 ‘On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation’ which defined former Soviet citizens from these countries as foreign citizens and prescribed rules regulating their stay and residence in Russia.

In my study of the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime I was interested in changes to the rules regulating access to resources and rights in Russia. In my study of the collective social actors participating in the construction of the Russian migration regime I was interested in changes to the rules allocating official responsibility for implementation of the legislation. The results of my analysis are presented in Chapter 3.

2.3.5 Textual analysis of the representations of migrants and migration in Russian newspapers

Textual analysis of Russian newspapers was employed to explore the representations of migrants and migration from former Soviet republics in Russia, creating the discursive framework of the Russian migration regime.

I acknowledge that discourses about migration and migrants are generated by a range of institutions and take diverse forms. They can be found, for example, within political debates, every-day communication, and the mass media. Nevertheless, I have focused my analysis on discourses produced within the mass media, to be more specific, on discourses which were presented in Russian newspapers.

I chose to analyse the mass media, firstly, because of the social power which I see as being located in its capacity to reach a large number of people and, as a result, to contribute to the construction of social practices. I acknowledge that the influence of mass media discourses on their audience is a complex process which includes decoding ‘meaningful’ discourses by readers (viewers) and their negotiation of meanings with media texts and other social actors (Moores, 1993; Morley, 1996 [1983]). So, for example, the representation of a

\(^{21}\) Russian titles of the normative documents cited in the thesis are provided in Appendix D.
migrant as a ‘criminal’ in the mass media will not necessarily lead all people from the audience to attach such a meaning to all migrants. Still, mass media discourses can be seen as one of the sources which provide social actors with ‘material’ to construct their meanings and in turn to inform their social practices.

The second reason for focusing on the mass media is that it is a useful site for accessing a variety of representations which circulate in society about any particular person, event, social phenomenon, etc. Of course, what we see and read in the mass media constitutes only a limited proportion of the total representations which might be found in society. Mass media representations, even if they are presented as ‘voices’ from other sites of discourse production, are nonetheless products of the media (Fairclough, 1995). Still, the production of discourses within the mass media does not take place in a vacuum and representations about migrants and migration which are constructed within this site are based, at least partly, on representations which can be found beyond it.

In selecting the types of media for analysis, I have taken into consideration the place which this or that medium occupies in the mass media realm. I have used two criteria in making my selection: the number of people who use any given type of media, and the plurality of representations which can be found in it.

A survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (Fond Obshchestvennogo Mneniya [FOM]) in 2003 indicated a discrepancy in the consumption of different mass media in Russia. The most rarely used mass medium is the internet – 88% of respondents indicated that they did not use it at all. Twenty five percent and 15% of respondents did not listen to the radio and did not read newspapers respectively, while only 5% of respondents did not watch TV (Petrova, 2003a; Petrova, 2003b).

Although TV is the most popular mass medium in Russia, I have not chosen it for analysis, since it provides a limited range of the views of migrants and migration circulating in Russian society, because it is mainly controlled by the government and represents its attitudes (Touzovskaya, 2005; Oates, 2006). In contrast, the printed media, which are controlled by different social actors, contain a much wider variety of representations.

Four newspapers with around the same numbers of readers, but with varying political stances, and one tabloid-type newspaper with one of the largest circulations in Russia were selected for analysis. The characteristics of these newspapers are presented in Table 2.2. I analysed the issues published in the period of my fieldwork (from 1 April to 1 October 2004).
Altogether I looked through 704 issues of newspapers and found 163 articles (39 in Izvestiya, 13 in Kommersant’-Daily, 60 in Rossiiskaya gazeta, 27 in Trud, 24 in Moskovskii komsomolets) which discussed or mentioned issues linked with migration from the former Soviet republics to Russia and migrants from these republics who live in Russia.

Table 2.2 Information about the newspapers selected for analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readership (in thousands)*</th>
<th>Characteristics **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Izvestiya</strong></td>
<td>480.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former USSR government newspaper, founded in 1917. Now independent. Has a reputation for accuracy and high journalistic standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kommersant’-Daily</strong></td>
<td>287.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business newspaper. Until summer 2006 was supported by an oligarch (Berezovskii) who opposed the current Russian government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rossiiskaya gazeta</strong></td>
<td>334.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The newspaper of the Russian government, published since 1990.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trud</strong></td>
<td>348.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formerly the newspaper of the trade unions and still retains a strong orientation in this direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moskovskii komsomolets</strong></td>
<td>1483.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia’s largest circulation newspaper. Of all Russian papers the closest to a British tabloid in approach, content and appeal. Close to Luzhkov and the Moscow city government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Created on the basis of information presented by Gallup
http://www.tns-global.ru/rus/data/ratings/press/rumospb/_may__oktyabr__2004_g_/ezhednevnie_gazeti.wbp
and
both links were accessed on 09/12/2005

** Source: Berry (2004).

Analysis of the selected Russian newspapers was subdivided into two parts, focusing respectively on the representation of migration from former Soviet republics and of migrants from this region themselves. The results of my analysis can be found in Chapter 3.

2.3.6 Analysis of secondary data

In my research, I also analysed a range of secondary data including: public opinion polls conducted by a range of national and international agencies among the Russian population;
official statistics provided by the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (further Rosstat);\textsuperscript{22} and the findings of academic research about ‘illegal’ migration.

I analysed public opinion polls which contained information about the attitudes of the Russian population towards migration and migrants from former Soviet republics. This was a part of my exploration of the discursive framework of the Russian migration regime. The reason for this analysis was my acknowledgement that the representations which may be found in media discourses may be different from the images of migration and migrants held by its audience. The results of this analysis are presented in the third part of Chapter 3.

I do not consider official statistics about migration between Russia and the other former Soviet republics as an unproblematic source of data. Such statistics have been criticised for inconsistency caused by differences in the data collection methodologies employed by the state agencies, as well as inefficient data exchange among these agencies (Chudinovskikh, 2001). Moreover, the current methodologies used by the state agencies only calculate documented migrants (Denisenko, Kharaeva et al., 2003, pp. 33-36). In their turn, surveys of so-called ‘illegal’ migrants conducted by a range of national and international agencies cannot be considered a reliable source of statistics. The lack of reliable and precise information on the numbers of undocumented migrants makes it impossible to construct representative samples, and so the results obtained by these surveys are of only limited value, and cannot be generalised. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that a combined analysis of these two sources of data – surveys on ‘illegal’ migrants and official statistics – can draw an at least approximate picture of the situation regarding population exchange between Russia and other former Soviet republics, as well as providing background for the analysis of the Russian migration regime and for the stories told by migrants in this research. The results of this analysis are presented in the first part of Chapter 3.

\textbf{2.4 Research in and after the field: some issues for reflection}

I began with the assumption that a researcher, upon entering the localities where his/her research subjects live, becomes a social actor participating in the construction of the social world and thus participates in the production of data received during his/her fieldwork. This

\textsuperscript{22} ‘Goskomstat’ was the abbreviated term for the Federal State Statistics Service in the past.
makes it necessary to reflect on my interactions with other social actors in the field and, in this part of the chapter, I discuss some of the methodological issues which arose in the course of these interactions. In addition, I discuss the ethical issues connected with the presentation of the research results, which are linked with accepting an active position as a researcher in the field. The text is divided into three sections according to the sequence of the research process: gaining access to respondents; constructing relationships with respondents; and presenting the data received from them.

2.4.1 Access to respondents: the issues raised from interaction with the gatekeepers

The people through whom the researcher gains access to his/her respondents are often named as gatekeepers (Bryman, 2008, p. 407). Their importance for research is discussed extensively in the published academic literature (Miller and Bell, 2002; Sixsmith et al, 2003; Emmel et al, 2007). In this section of the methodological chapter I would like to present two issues which arose through my experience of interaction with these people. First of all, I outline the role played by my being a Russian citizen, but living and studying in the UK, in the construction of relationships between myself and the gatekeepers whom I met for the first time during fieldwork in 2004. After this I proceed to a discussion of the way in which gatekeepers can affect the relationships between researchers and respondents.

One of the first questions which I had to ask myself during my work on the research design was ‘How am I going to find my respondents?’ Given the specific topic of my research, answering this question was not so easy. Even though I knew places where I could find non-Russian nationals from the former Soviet republics (for example, building sites and markets), I could not simply go to such places and ask people to give me an interview without being introduced to them by some intermediary whom they knew and trusted. I anticipated that among these non-Russian nationals there would be a number of people who had not managed to secure their legal status and I assumed that these people, in their vulnerable situation of ‘illegality’ in a country from which they could be deported at any time, would not be eager to speak to a complete stranger. I was also not sure whether people would be willing to spend their time talking to a stranger for no other reason than helping with a piece of research. All these factors encouraged me to approach my potential respondents through mutual social connections.
Half of my respondents were approached through people whom I knew before my research began. These gatekeepers were my relatives, friends and colleagues. The other half, however, were approached via people with whom I had built up relationships during the course of my fieldwork itself. Among the second group of gatekeepers were people involved in NGOs dealing with issues of migration. I met them by contacting and visiting these NGOs. Besides these individuals, there were gatekeepers whom I met and with whom I had the opportunity to develop relationships simply because I lived in the field. For example, four of my respondents were approached via a contact made while studying; we had studied sociology together in the Moscow based Institute of Sociology in April 2004.

The literature points out that the interaction of the researcher with gatekeepers is affected by their social positionalities, in other words, by their positions in the society as individuals defined through a range of socially loaded attributes, such as gender, age, ethnicity, race, class, nationality, urban-rural background, etc. (Burgess, 1991; Sanghera and Thapar-Bjorket, 2008). In the case of this research, my own migration history – the fact that I had lived and studied in the UK – was one of the most influential aspects in shaping my relations with gatekeepers. I felt that my gatekeepers interpreted my migration history as an indicator that I had some knowledge that might be shared. This was manifested not only in the simple curiosity which they expressed about my life ‘in the West’ (‘zhizn’ na zapade’), but also in the interest which they showed in more practical matters. For example, since I had received a scholarship to study in the UK, some assumed I knew how to find funding and to write successful grant proposals. Different gatekeepers sought different types of information from me. While some of my gatekeepers who were involved in NGOs asked me to design research projects and write proposals for grants to support the activities of their organisations, others were interested in ways of organising the continuation of their education or the education of their children in the West. There were people who simply asked me for advice on how to change their life for the better because somehow they considered my movement to ‘the West’ as an indicator that I had been successful in improving my own situation.

In my experience, gatekeepers not only provide information which allows the researcher to get to know the field better and to find his/her subjects for research, but also influence the interactions between the researcher and the researched. I had the impression that one of the most important factors influencing my relationships with the migrants, was the way in which I

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23 The social positionalities of the researcher actually influence the whole research process starting from the shaping of the research question (England, 1994).
approached them for an interview (in other words, through which people and where I got in touch with them). Apparently they tended to associate me with these people and/or places. Interpretations by my respondents concerning who and what I was – a relative or a friend of a friend, a friend of a manager or teacher, a person involved in the activity of an NGO, etc. – played a crucial role in the construction of our relations from the outset.

The literature indicates that, upon entering the field, a researcher finds a complex net of relationships among the social actors (Goode, 2000; Alcalde, 2007). Being in the locality and interacting with social actors, the researcher inevitably becomes a part of this net. His/her position within it is a product of the negotiation between him/her and other social actors which involves the negotiation of the researcher’s identity. ‘Who is this person? How is he/she related to others? How is he/she related to us?’ Such questions about the researcher, albeit differently worded, and less explicit, are asked by subjects of the research.

While the association of a researcher with a person trusted by the potential respondents and with whom they have good and/or profitable relationships, can prompt people to do this person a favour by agreeing to participate in the study, the association of a researcher with a person who is mistrusted can prompt people to refuse to participate in the research. In fact, the latter is hardly a gatekeeper, but researchers can be taken in by such a person’s self-presentation and perceive him/her as a gatekeeper until the truth is revealed through meeting other social actors in the field. By this time, the initial misperception may already have caused harm to the research process. For example, at one point in my research I almost lost access to a group of respondents, because I unwittingly approached them through someone whom they did not trust. This person was a leader of one of the NGOs which constituted the Forum of Migrants’ Associations. I met her at the headquarters of this umbrella organisation. She gave me information about where I could find my potential respondents; non-Russian nationals who came to Russia from former Soviet republics before the changes to the migration regime and who had not yet managed to attain Russian citizenship. She presented herself as a person fighting for migrants’ rights and someone trusted by them. However, when I came to the place where these migrants lived and met them, I perceived a negative attitude as soon as I mentioned her name. Apparently, they considered her a person who did not really care about them and did not do anything for them. They believed she used them to make her own career in politics. Associating me with her, they refused to be interviewed. Only a stroke of good luck saved the situation. I approached my potential respondents during one of their meetings
where they were discussing their problems and trying to find solutions. Apart from the migrants, some local people trying to help them were also participating in the meeting. One of the locals expressed interest in another aspect of my identity – my migration history, which I had mentioned during my introduction. Through interaction with this local person I managed to renegotiate my identity – to decouple myself from the person who was mistrusted, showing that I had my own agenda. Later I was reintroduced by this local person to the group of respondents who had initially rejected me and this time they agreed to participate in my research.

2.4.2 Interviewer-interviewee relations: the case of migrants

Gaining access to respondents is an important task for a researcher, but the next and no less important task is to develop relationships which will allow him/her to access the information he/she seeks. As the experiences of other researchers show, like the relations between the researcher and gatekeepers, the relationships between the researcher and the respondents are affected by the social positionalities of the interacting parties (Reynolds, 2002; Ganga and Scott, 2007).

Wolf (1996) has pointed out that if the researcher is a newcomer to the field, then he/she has more opportunities to play with his/her positionalities during the construction of his/her self-presentation in the dialogue with people rooted in the field (p.11). Being away from his/her home setting, the researcher can alter and conceal different aspects of his/her positioning in the society (for example, marital status, professional and educational backgrounds, ethnicity, etc.) in order to access more information or for other reasons (Rollins, 1985; Thapar-Bjorkert and Henry, 2002). I was honest about my positionalities, but, with the aim of developing rapport with my respondents, I emphasised those aspects which I supposed could help me in communicating with my interviewees. One of these aspects was my migration history (the fact that I was resident in a country other than the country of my citizenship). I thought that this might bring me closer to the migrants with whom I would interact during my fieldwork. These expectations were partly fulfilled. Some of my respondents obviously related their stories about their lives in Russia to their imagination of my experience in the UK. They assumed that I would understand them because I was also a
migrant. Consider, for example, this statement by a 35 year-old woman from Belarus who had been living in Russia without Russian citizenship since 1992:

_Here, I feel like an outsider. Just like you living in the West. You have a lot of friends, with them you feel at home, but as soon as you enter an official setting, you are caught out by your accent – ‘What country are you from?’_

(B.)

Another factor which influenced my relations with interviewees was gender. A great number of texts are devoted to reflections on how gender shapes the researcher/respondent interaction (Finch, 1984; Gill and Maclean, 2002; Gurrey, 1985; Hunt, 1984; Scott, 1984; Warren, 1988). Usually, explanations of discrepancies between interviews with men and women tend to focus on the respondents. Hypotheses are made about how the interview is influenced by the respondent’s social experiences and by his/her perceptions of the interviewer. However, in my experience, the social experiences of the interviewer and his/her perceptions of the respondent also influence the interview and cause a certain disparity between each interview conducted.

The influence of gender on my interaction with migrants was especially noticeable when I conducted interviews with men from the former Soviet republics located in Central Asia (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). I realised that I was influenced by stereotypes concerning the ways in which these men thought about women and treated them. I imagined that they expected women to be modest and somehow I assumed that I might be perceived as immodest simply because I talked with them tête-à-tête without the presence of a male chaperone responsible for my protection (for example, my husband). Consequently, I felt uncomfortable and did not feel able to make our interviews as long and deep as I had done when interviewing other respondents. I also felt that it was impossible to ask them to introduce me to their male friends and relatives. I did, however, ask them to introduce me to their wives and sisters. None of them agreed to do so, but again, I did not feel entirely comfortable asking them why not. On the other hand, I did not experience difficulties in my interviews with other men, since here I imagined that we had a shared knowledge of the rules of the same gender order. I think that since I expected these men ‘to play according to the rules’, a knowledge of which we presumably shared, I felt more secure during our interviews.
My longest and deepest interviews were with my female respondents. During the interviews with women, I allowed myself to be an active listener (I expressed emotion and reacted to the story verbally, through body language, and so on) and encouraged them to talk. I felt that my female respondents ‘forgot’ that my prime identification was as a ‘researcher’ (professional) and began to treat me first of all as ‘female – young’. Some women began to construct a mother-daughter dialogue; others began to see me as a friend. Some of them looked for moral support from my side; others wanted my advice, etc. One of the more distinct characteristics of the transformation of the communication format was the shift in the form of address, from the more to the less formal form (from ‘В’ to ‘ты’ in Russian), which often took place during the course of my interaction with female respondents. Thus, I usually managed to reach a high level of rapport with my female respondents and as a result I could ask them more sensitive questions than I did the men. I also felt free to ask the women to introduce me to friends who might be potential respondents.

2.4.3 Presenting the research results and protecting the research participants

After receiving the data from the respondents, the next steps of the research, which often coincide or overlap with one another, are analysing the data and writing the text which presents the results of the fieldwork. While some would argue that respondents have some power to negotiate access to information and the process of data gathering with the researcher (Thapar-Bjorkert and Henry, 2002), respondents cannot control what the researcher does with the data after he/she has received it. The researcher, analysing data and writing the text, follows an agenda and presents his/her perspectives on the situation in the field. However, whatever the agenda, he/she must bear in mind that the dissemination of the research results has the potential to influence those who remain in the field, so he/she has to think how best to avoid causing harm to the participants of the research. The problem here is that although the researcher may have the aim of improving the life of his/her respondents, he/she does not know how the information presented in the text will be used by the readers.

Although the prime audience for my thesis is the academic community, there is the possibility that it could be read by other people. Moreover, I intend to publish some parts of my thesis eventually, and as a result my writings will inevitably become available to a wider audience. This may also include people I know from the field, since I would like to publish in
Russian, too. The acknowledgement that my writings could affect the situation in the field and
the life of my respondents puts a responsibility on me not to harm the people who participated
in my research. I adopted a number of strategies with a view to protecting my respondents.
Firstly, I identify interviewees only by using letter-codes. Secondly, the social-demographic
characteristics of the respondents and other information concerning the interviews, which can
be found in Appendices B and C, will not be published anywhere else. I have also concealed
the names of the small towns near Moscow where I conducted some of my interviews.
Nevertheless, I fear that the manner of sampling used in this research makes total anonymity
impossible. My respondents will recognise themselves, as will, possibly, people who know
them well (and who put them in touch with me). Sometimes, as my previous experience has
shown, people can be recognised even by their way of speaking. Taking this into
consideration I did not reveal in my text any information which my respondents viewed as
confidential. I do not report any personal secrets and use the information received from my
respondents only to discuss general topics, such as social exclusion and the ‘territorialisation’
of identity.

Conclusion

This chapter was devoted to methodology and the process of the realisation of my
research.

In the first part of the chapter, I presented and discussed my ontological and
demographic positions. I also traced how these positions were reflected in the methodology
used in my research. Methodological demands – transparency and reflexivity – which stem
from my ontological and epistemological positions provided the focus for the remaining
discussion on the actual research process.

The second part of the chapter presented the spatial and temporal dimensions of the
fieldwork which was conducted during my research and was divided into three stages.

In the third part of the chapter, following the methodological demand for transparency, I
revealed how and why I chose the methods employed in this research as well as the process of
their implementation and the analysis of data received with the aid of these methods.

Following the methodological demand for reflexivity, I have tried to be aware of my
role in the production of the data and results. The range of issues which arose from my
interactions and which were discussed in the final part of the chapter focused in particular on
the construction of my relationships with gatekeepers and respondents, and ethical concerns
linked with the dissemination of my research results.

This chapter outlines the complexity of the research process in social science, starting
from the revealing effects of the ontological and epistemological positions shared by the
researcher, and ending with the dissemination of research results. The special story told here
is also one of the inherent complexity of the research project realisation, especially during
fieldwork. I learned many lessons in the course of my research project. Perhaps the most
important of these lessons, from my point of view, is the need to accept the fact that I cannot
control and predict everything.
Chapter 3
Contextualising Migrants’ Experiences in Russia: Statistics, Organisations and the Migration Regime

Introduction

This chapter aims to contextualise the stories told by interviewed migrants about their experiences in the Russian Federation.

It starts with an analysis of net migration\(^1\) in order to draw an at least approximate picture of the trends and composition of migration growth observed in Russia as the result of its population exchange with other former republics of the USSR. The results of this analysis provide the necessary background information not only for analysing the interviews with migrants, but also for the analysis of the Russian migration regime.

The chapter proceeds with an examination of the collective social actors who participate in the construction and reproduction of the Russian migration regime, namely NGOs and organisations created by the Russian authorities. It traces the transformations that have taken place in their composition and focuses on changes that have occurred in the relationships between these two sets of organisations. Through this the chapter maps changes in the attitude of the Russian authorities to migration from former Soviet republics.

Finally, the chapter analyses the Russian migration regime as a composite of social structures created and reproduced in the receiving society in response to migration. This analysis seeks to verify the proposition that this regime represents ‘a differentiated system of othering’ and focuses on revealing the criteria of differentiation institutionalised in its discursive and legislative frameworks.

\(^1\) Net migration is the migration balance resulting from the difference between the number of migrants arriving in the country and the number of those departing from it.
3.1 Migration to Russia from other former republics of the USSR

Russia and the other former Soviet republics can be seen as participants in one of the world’s migration systems (Robarts, 2008). This migration system is relatively new; it emerged as a result of the collapse of the USSR. The countries which participate in it are connected by a common history, the cultural ties and the social links between the populations of the countries, and continued mutual economic interests. In addition to these factors, Russia and the former Soviet republics have in place a range of bilateral and multilateral agreements regulating the access of their citizens to social rights in the territories of other signatories. Moreover, citizens of the majority of NIS countries can enter Russia without a visa. All these factors stimulate migration to Russia from the former republics of the USSR.

This part of the chapter, based partly on an analysis of data provided by Rosstat and partly on research on ‘illegal’ migrants, draws a broad and approximate picture of migration growth in Russia due to population exchange with other countries. The analysis is focused on net migration to Russia due to exchanges with former Soviet republics. The aim of this analysis is to contextualise the data obtained through other methods employed by the research and to provide background information for the analysis of the Russian migration regime and migrants’ experiences in Russia.

3.1.1. Analysis of official statistics on net migration

Comparison of the data obtained through the last Soviet population census and the last population census of the Russian Federation reveals that between 1989 and 2004 Russia gained at least 5,769,000 people from its migration exchange with other countries. According to official statistics, the exchange between Russia and other NIS counties constitutes the main source of growth among the migrant population. Data on the citizenship of people arriving and leaving Russia over the period 2002-2004 indicate that the rise in net in-migration of foreign citizens to Russia consists mainly of citizens of former Soviet republics (Figure 3.1).

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2 This joint analysis is undertaken to overcome the limitation of the data from these two sources of information.
3 This figure is calculated via the ‘residual method’. A detailed explanation of the application of this method to estimating the net migration received by the Russian Federation due to population exchanges with other countries can be found in the work of Heleniak (2008, pp. 34-39).
Russia’s positive migration exchange did not appear with the collapse of the USSR. In the 1980s, total immigration to Russia from the other republics of the USSR already exceeded the total emigration from Russia to the rest of the region. Nevertheless, in post-Soviet Russia, the growth of the migrant population due to migration exchange with other former Soviet republics has increased significantly, and exceeded the Soviet-era net in-migration rate up until 2002 (Figure 3.2).

The increase in net migration charted above was mainly the result of a decrease in the number of departures from the Russian Federation. The number of arrivals to its territory increased only during the first three years after the collapse of the USSR; at this point it

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4 Modified version of this figure can be found in Kosygina (2007b).
started to decline. In 1995, immigration from the former Soviet republics was already lower than immigration from the region in the 1980s (Figure 3.3). The decrease in the number of arrivals to and departures from the country continued and resulted in a fall in net migration. After 2002, the rate of net migration due to population exchanges between Russia and the former Soviet republics dropped below the lowest level in the 1980s (Figure 3.2).

![Migration between Russia and former Soviet republics: numbers of arrivals and departures](image)

**Figure 3.3 Migration between Russia and former Soviet republics: numbers of arrivals and departures**

*Source: Created on the basis of: Goskomstat (1999, pp.330–333); Rosstat (2005a, pp. 517-519)*

Although information provided by Rosstat does not depict the real trend of the migration exchange between Russia and other former Soviet republics, since it is confined to those migrants who obtained registration or residency permits in Russia, this information does nevertheless allow assumptions to be made about developments in the migration policy of the Russian Federation. For example, the fact that the start of Vladimir Putin’s presidency coincided with a drop in net migration and a decrease in the number of arrivals from former Soviet republics prompts the hypothesis that the migration regime of the Russian Federation under the new president became more restrictive towards foreign citizens in general and former Soviet citizens without Russian citizenship in particular, thus preventing or deterring them from coming to Russia and/or securing their legal status there. This hypothesis will be verified later, in the second and third parts of this chapter, with further exploration of how this transformation influenced the experiences and identities of migrants in Chapters 4 and 5.

5 Modified version of this figure can be found in Kosygina (2007b).
The participation of former Soviet republics in population exchanges with Russia changed over the course of the post-Soviet period (Figure 3.4). After the collapse of the USSR, Russia experienced negative migration exchanges with Ukraine and Belarus, but it soon became the net recipient in population exchanges with all former Soviet republics. Moreover, according to official statistics, after 1994, migration exchange between Russia and Ukraine became one of the main sources of migration-related population growth in Russia. Although the total emigration from Russia to Belarus began to exceed the total immigration to it from this republic in 1998, Russia still remained the net recipient in population exchanges with other former Soviet republics.

According to the statistics, Kazakhstan has provided the biggest share of population growth due to migration in the Russian Federation since the Soviet era. Uzbekistan also had a significant share in this growth and Kyrgyzstan gradually increased its contribution to the migration growth of the population in Russia after 1998. Migration exchanges with other

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6 Modified version of this figure can be found in Kosygina (2007b).
former Soviet republics, the Baltic States in particular, had a less significant share in the net migration of the Russian Federation. The contributions made by each former republic of the USSR to the increase of Russia’s migrant population from 1992 until 2003 are presented in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5 Contributions of former Soviet republics to the increase in Russia’s migrant population 1992-2003 (%)

Source: Tishkov, Zaionchkovskaya et al. (2005, p. 11).

Although, according to official statistics, the increase in Russia’s migrant population has occurred mostly through migration exchanges with Kazakhstan (35.5 %), other former Soviet republics situated in Central Asia (approximately 30%), and the Caucasus (approximately 19%), most of those who migrated from these countries appear to be ethnic Russians. Data on the ethnic composition of net migration received by Russia due to population exchanges with other former Soviet republics between 1992 and 2003 show that Russians constituted 66.8% of this net migration (see Figure 3.6).
Official statistics about migration exchanges between Russia and other former Soviet republics indicate that the migration growth of all the so-called ‘ethnic groups’ in Russia has experienced a decline. It is worth noting that although the migration growth of Russians also experienced a decline, migrants whose ethnicity is defined as Russian continue to represent the majority of those receiving registration and residency permits. According to the statistical data for 1997-2004, migrants who belonged to the so-called ‘ethnic groups of the Russian Federation’ constituted more than 50% of the migration growth seen annually in Russia due to its population exchanges with other former Soviet republics. Migrants whose ethnicities were defined by the official statistics as ‘titular ethnicities of former Soviet republics’ constituted 24-33% of the migration growth discussed above (Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.6 Net migration to Russia, by ethnic groups 1992-2003 (%)


7 The term ‘titular ethnicity’ (‘titul’naia natsional’nost’ ) refers to ‘ethnic groups’, the names of which coincide with the names of the territories. For example, Belarusians as an ‘ethnic group’ represent the titular ethnicity for the territory named Belarus, or Tatars as an ‘ethnic group’ are the titular ethnicity for the territory named the Republic of Tatarstan, which is one of the regions in the Russian Federation. The term was actively used in the USSR, when the Soviet government made serious efforts to construct ‘ethnic groups’ and link them with certain territories (Tishkov, 1997). After the collapse of the USSR, the legacy of this term remains in former Soviet republics.
Finally, it should be noted that, in the 1990s, Russian official discourse represented the movement from former Soviet republics to Russia mainly as forced migration (Pilkington, 1998). However, in 2001, the number of forced migrants dropped significantly (Figure 3.8). It is worth noting that this drop coincided with changes in Russian legislation regulating migration (these changes will be discussed in the next part of this chapter). In 2004, at the time the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted, less than 10% of net migration was explained by ‘forced migration’.

**Figure 3.7 Net migration due to exchange of population between Russia and former Soviet republics: ethnicity of migrants**

*Source: Created on the basis of information from Rosstat (2005a, pp. 556 – 561).*
3.1.2. Overview of surveys on ‘illegal’ migration

The data provided by official statistics do not contain information about all the foreign citizens who are actually resident in the Russian Federation. They cover only those migrants who register and manage to secure their legal status in Russia. People who have lived in the country for a long time, but who entered illegally or did not manage to secure their legal status on its territory are not reflected in these statistics. Thus a fuller picture of migration to Russia from other former Soviet republics can be drawn if the analysis of official statistics is supplemented by an analysis of academic research on so-called ‘illegal’ migrants.

The glossary on migration issued by the International Organisation for Migration contains several terms to indicate a migrant ‘who, owing to illegal entry or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country… who infringes a country’s admission rules and … [is] not authorized to remain in the host country’. Such a migrant is called ‘clandestine/illegal/undocumented/irregular’ or a ‘migrant in an irregular situation’ (Perruchoud, 2004, p. 34). This variety of designations stems from discussion of the ethical issues around migration and attempts to grasp a variety of reasons leading migrants into a so-called ‘irregular situation’ (Koser, 2005, p. 5; Parker, 2005, pp. 8-9). In Russia, the term used by officials, academics, journalists and other social actors to define the above-mentioned category of migrants, is ‘illegal’ migrants.
How many ‘illegal’ migrants are there in Russia? The answers of experts to this question contain figures which vary significantly (Bacon, Renz et al., 2006, pp. 130-131). According to experts from the World Bank, the ‘estimated number of irregular migrants’ in Russia constitutes approximately 11% of the total number of migrants from abroad (Mansoor and Quillen, 2006, p. 45). The question about the number of former Soviet citizens from the former Soviet republics among the ‘illegal’ migrants also has no single answer. Experts indicate that migrants from this region may constitute between 80% and 90% of all ‘illegal’ migrants on the territory of the Russian Federation (Yastrebova, 2004; IOM, 2005).

A range of surveys have been conducted (both by the Moscow Research Program of the International Organisation for Migration, and by other organisations and individuals) with ‘illegal’ migrants in the regions of the Russian Federation (IOM, 2004; IOM, 2005; Tyuryukanova, 2006). However, since nobody knows how many ‘illegal’ migrants live in Russia or its regions, it is impossible to construct any representative sample for such surveys and, consequently, the results of these studies cannot be generalised or verified. Taking this into consideration, the results of the abovementioned surveys must be seen as little more than estimates.

Research projects conducted in Russia on ‘illegal’ migration and migrants can be understood as case studies focused on the situation in particular regions of the country. Comparison of their results shows that the proportion of migrants from any given country varies from region to region. The geographical factor is significant here. For example, regions which are geographically close to Kazakhstan have more arrivals from this country than from any other country. Similarly, those regions which are close to the Caucasus have a higher proportion of migrants from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (Poletaev, 2004, pp. 93-94). The ethnic composition of migrants included in the samples of the research projects also varies from region to region. It is worth noting that in any case people whose ethnicity is defined as Russian do not constitute the majority among ‘illegal’ migrants, as they do among ‘legal’ migrants. According to the results of research conducted in Moscow and Stavropol’skii krai in 2001-2002, the proportion of Russians among ‘illegal’ migrants was half that of so-called ‘Caucasians’ (Armenians, Azerbaijani, Georgians) (IOM, 2005). This is the reverse picture to that provided by official statistics about the proportion of different ethnic groups in the migration movement from former Soviet republics to Russia. The Moscow Research Program of the International Organisation for Migration argues that this discrepancy is caused
by the discriminatory implementation of Russian migration policy. On the basis of data obtained through the survey of migrants, this research agency argues that it is much harder for non-Russian migrants to secure their legal status in Russia than it is for Russian migrants (IOM, 2005).

Surveys conducted with ‘illegal’ migrants show that most of them want to be ‘legal’, but do not know how to secure legal status in Russia. This evidence subverts the opinion expressed by officials, who argue that migrants put themselves into a ‘situation of illegality’, because they do not wish to spend their time and money on securing their legal status in the country (Yastrebova, 2004, p. 36). More than a quarter of the ‘illegal’ migrants who were interviewed expressed a wish to stay in Russia as permanent residents. This finding from the surveys contradicts the view shared by officials that ‘illegal’ migrants come to Russia for only short stays (Poletaev, 2004; Tyuryukanova, 2004, p. 188; Yastrebova, 2004).

3.1.3. The broad picture and the hypothesis derived from the analysis

The precise characteristics of the net migration received by Russia due to population exchange with other former Soviet republics cannot be determined though the analysis of official statistics and survey data on ‘illegal’ migration. Questions about the exact numbers and socio-demographic characteristics of the people who migrated from this region to Russia remain unanswered. Nevertheless, an analysis of the available data draws at least an approximate picture of the migration inflow from these countries and through this provides a context for analysing material generated by other methods employed in the research.

Firstly, the analysis presented reveals the significance for Russian society of the migration exchanges between Russia and other former republics of the USSR. Both official statistics and research on ‘illegal’ migrants indicate that the vast majority of foreign citizens on the territory of the Russian Federation are people from the former Soviet republics. Migrants arrive in Russia from all NIS countries and, according to official statistics, Russia is a net recipient in population exchanges with all these countries, except Belarus.

Secondly, an analysis of official statistics and surveys of ‘illegal’ migrants draws attention to possible changes in the migration regime. Although official statistics have indicated a decrease in the number of arrivals in Russia from other former Soviet republics, as well as a decline in the net migration experienced by the Russian Federation due to population
exchanges with the countries of this region since 1994, the most significant drop in net migration and numbers of arrivals occurred in 2001. Taking into consideration the fact that official statistics reflect only those migrants who managed to receive and secure legal status, this drop could be interpreted as the result of the restrictive changes introduced to the Russian legislation regulating migration issues.

Finally, the analysis conducted allows a hypothesis to emerge about the differentiation of migrants’ experiences. This assumption is based on the inconsistency between the data provided by official statistics and the surveys of ‘illegal’ migrants regarding the ethnic composition of the migration inflow from former Soviet republics. While official statistics show that most of the migrants arriving in Russia from these countries are ethnic Russians, research on ‘illegal’ migrants indicates that Russians constitute a minority in this migration flow. Given that official statistics in Russia contain information only about the migrants with legal status, it can be assumed that people whose ethnicity is defined as Russian can secure their legal status on the territory of the Russian Federation more easily than non-Russians. This has also been suggested by researchers who conducted surveys among migrants (IOM, 2005).

3.2 Collective social actors reproducing the Russian migration regime

People who migrate to the Russian Federation are inevitably affected by the activities of collective social actors – organisations – involved in construction and reproduction of the migration regime, and in the formation and implementation of migration policy. Figure 3.9 maps these collective social actors as they exist today. This part of the chapter tracks transformations of state bodies participating in the formation and implementation of migration policy since the collapse of the USSR. It also includes an overview of the changes in the relationship between the state and civil society (represented by NGOs) with regard to the formulation and implementation of migration policy. It argues that all of these transformations reflect processes of securitisation and centralisation of the migration regime making it more restrictive towards migrants than it had been in the 1990s.

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8 Diagrammatic representations of these actors in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s can be found in the existing literature (Pilkington, 1998, p. 51; Flynn, 2004, p. 46).
Figure 3.9 Collective social actors constructing the Russian migration regime 2004 – 2008
3.2.1 State bodies

The state as a ‘set of institutions that has authority to make [and execute] the rules which govern society’ (Marshall, 1998, p. 635) plays an important role in shaping migration regimes through making and executing the formal rules which regulate the geographical movement of people over the territory occupied by the given society. As Pilkington (1998) points out, the Russian Federation did not inherit from the USSR any working mechanism to deal with the migration emerging in the post-Soviet space (p.89). The country had to build such mechanisms from scratch. The changes to the Russian state bodies dealing with issues concerning migration are outlined below. These changes reflect the shifting attitudes of the authorities towards migration and migrants’ experiences.

The Federal Migration Service is the key actor participating in the construction and reproduction of the Russian migration regime. It is the state body directly responsible for the implementation of migration policy and its history reflects the changes in this policy. Established in June 1992 in response to the flow of migrants from former Soviet republics, by 1996 this state agency had offices in all regions of the Russian Federation. Initially concentrated on the assisting forced migrants who arrived to Russia, the Federal Migration Service gradually expanded the spheres of its activity and began to participate in the control and management of international and inward labour migration. Moreover, this Service not only implemented migration policy in the country, but also actively participated in forming this policy; it developed all the migration programmes of the Russian Federation issued in the 1990s. At the end of 1990s, the head of the Federal Migration Service raised the issue of elevating the Service to ministry status with further expansion of its functions, such that it would become the sole body in the country responsible for the migration sphere. Such expansionist statements were interpreted by other social actors as flagging an intention to monopolise the migration sphere (Flynn, 2004, p. 47). The Federal Migration Service was severely criticised for such ambitions (Airapetova, 1999). It was also criticised for its problems with management, including its inability to overcome the dual subordination observed among its regional branches – to the central office of the Service, on the one hand, and the local authorities, on the other (Pilkington, 1998; Flynn, 2001).
In 2000, the Federal Migration Service was abolished, or rather was incorporated into the newly established Ministry of Federation Affairs, National and Migration Policy. So its status as the state body responsible for the regulation of migration diminished. However, the new ministry did not last long. In October 2001 it was abolished and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, one of the ‘power ministries’\(^9\) of the Russian Federation, took over its functions in the field of migration. This shift in the institutional framework centralised state regulation over migration (almost all state bodies directly involved in the implementation of migration policy were incorporated into the Ministry of Internal Affairs).

The further centralisation of the institutional framework of the Russian migration regime occurred as part of the administrative reform undertaken in 2004.\(^10\) As a result of this administrative reform, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with other ‘power ministries’, was subordinated directly to the President of the Russian Federation. The Federal Migration Service reappeared at this point as a quasi-independent body. It remained accountable to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ministry of Internal Affairs participated in the development of migration policy and legislation, while the Federal Migration Service was responsible for the implementation of both policy and legislation. It is worth noting that migration regulation is not the only sphere in Russia to have experienced centralisation during recent years. It is argued that changes in migration regulation have to be perceived within the wider context of policy making under the so-called ‘Putin regime’ (Bacon, Renz et al. 2006, p. 146).

Official discourse presented these shifts in the institutional framework of the Russian migration regime as representing ‘normalisation’ of migration regulation, in other words, as a move towards a more transparent and effective system of management in this sphere. However, a range of scholars have interpreted it as a sign of the further securitisation of migration as a social phenomenon (Flynn 2004; Bacon, Renz et al. 2006).

The securitisation of migration can be traced through the discourse produced by high-ranking officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which depicts migration as a threat to the receiving society (Bacon, Renz et al. 2006, p. 134). This perception can be observed through the idea, expressed by these officials, of introducing a structural unit within the

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\(^9\) In Russia, the term ‘power ministries’ refers to the military and strategic security ministries of the country.

\(^10\) As a result of this reform, state bodies, which constituted the executive branch of the state, were divided into three groups – Ministries, Federal Services, Federal Agencies – with different sets of functions. These groups were organised hierarchically (Ministries at the top and Federal Agencies at the bottom). Ministries participate in the development of state policies and provide legal regulation in their sphere; Federal Services control, supervise and implement state policies and legislation; and Federal Agencies provide state services.
Federal Migration Service, to carry out the tasks of operative control over migration and migrants. Without this unit, the Federal Migration Service was compared to a body with a ‘clever talking head’ but without ‘arms’ and ‘legs’ and thus (presumably) ultimately ineffective.\footnote{http://www.materik.ru/print.php?section=analitics&bulsectionid=5745 (accessed on 09/03/2007)}

The imperative to acquire ‘arms’ and ‘legs’ was also expressed in a number of institutional ‘experiments’. While the Federal Migration Service existed as a department within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, so-called ‘migration inspectorates’ were set up in five regions of the country. The main task of these inspectorates was defined as controlling the legal status of foreign citizens in Russia. Although these inspectorates were part of the Federal Migration Service, they were funded by the local authorities. After the administrative reform in 2004, the Federal Migration Service tried to acquire federal funding for ‘migration inspectorates’ in other regions, but this was unsuccessful. Eventually, ‘migration inspectorates’, having failed to acquire a stable source of funding, slowly disappeared from official discourse. Subsequently, however, the idea was revived. At the end of 2006, the idea of setting up operative units to implement direct control over migration appeared again in the speeches of high-ranking officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Migration Service. They started to talk about organising a special-purpose military-style migration police to fight ‘illegal’ migration.\footnote{http://www.a-vo.com/info/podrobno.php?t=1164029640&screenwidth (accessed on 09/03/2007)}

The tendency towards the securitisation of migration was observed in the 1990s, too. Pilkington (1998) indicated that the migration policy of post-Soviet Russia began to move from its initial liberal stance towards a tougher position very soon after the dissolution of the USSR. In 1994 the head of the Federal Migration Service stated that ‘uncontrollable migration is acquiring a threatening character, aggravating the epidemiological, criminal and social situation in major cities and causing harm to the security of the country’ (Informtsionno-analiticheskii Byulleten’ [1995, p. 78] cited in Pilkington [1998, p. 71]). However, upon closer consideration, it appears that, in the 1990s, such rhetoric was mainly used in relation to migration from the so-called ‘far-abroad’. Migration from former Soviet republics was presented in a much more positive manner by the majority of the social actors constructing the Russian migration regime at that time (Pilkington, 1999). The securitisation of migration from the ‘near-abroad’ was mainly undertaken by the internal security organs,
first and foremost by the Security Council. However, the discourse produced by these organs had strong competitors and was not as influential as in the time of Putin’s presidency. As for the evolution of the Federal Migration Service from a body protecting migrants into a body regulating and controlling migration flows (Pilkington, 1998; Flynn, 2001), here it is worth noting that throughout the 1990s the humanitarian component still constituted a significant part of the activity of this Service (Mukomel’, 2005, pp. 130-132). By contrast, this component is hardly visible in the activity of the present-day Federal Migration Service, which is subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and focused on the ‘fight’ with ‘illegal’ migration.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Migration Service perform their roles in migration regulation in collaboration with other state bodies of executive power, including Presidential advisory bodies such as the Presidential Commission on Citizenship and the abovementioned Security Council (Figure 3.9). The Federal Security Service is in charge of border control and covers some questions of control over foreign citizens in Russia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues entry documents for those who need them to come to Russia. The Intelligence Service also participates in the creation and implementation of migration policy in Russia. All these state bodies are directly subordinated to the President. The government ministries involved in regulating migration are the Ministry of Public Health and Social Development and the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade, both of which participate in setting quotas for labour migrants entering Russia.

Besides the state bodies which constitute the executive branch of power, there is another state agency which is directly involved in the formation of migration policy in the Russian Federation. This actor is the State Duma of the Russian Federation, the lower house of the Russian parliament. It is a key participant in the formation of the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime. Draft legislation can be turned into law only if the State Duma has approved it.

In the 1990s, this state body was a strong and independent player in the construction of Russian migration policy (Pilkington, 1998). It often disagreed with the President over his legislative initiatives and drafts of the legislation submitted by the executive branch of power were often changed as the result of parliamentary debates. However, this balance of power was transformed during Putin’s presidency through the construction of a pro-presidential majority in this state body (Remington, 2003). The existence of a pro-presidential majority in
the State Duma was crucial to the adoption of the new legislation which fundamentally changed the migration regime of the Russian Federation in 2002. Experts on the Russian political scene have pointed out that the present constitution of the State Duma allows the President to receive guaranteed support for his legislative initiatives and policy (Sakwa, 2004, pp. 119-122).

As the analysis has shown, the transformation within the set of state bodies under discussion reflect two interconnected processes – centralisation of migration regulation, on the one hand, and securitisation of migration, on the other. These processes could be observed as early as in the 1990s, however, in the 2000s, under the Presidency of Vladimir Putin, they significantly intensified. Such intensification is especially visible in the transformations of relations between collective actors representing the Russian state and collective actors representing Russian civil society.\(^\text{13}\)

### 3.2.2 Relations between NGOs and the state

A range of collective actors representing elements of civil society in Russia participate in the production and reproduction of the Russian migration regime. These actors are first of all NGOs, which deal with migration issues. They include international NGOs which have their headquarters outside Russia and NGOs created and located in Russia. Russian NGOs which deal with issues of migration may be subdivided into two groups. The first group incorporates organisations which operate at the federal level. The second group consists of organisations which operate locally (at the regional, city- or village-level). The local organisations, in turn, may be further subdivided into formal organisations and informal self-support groups. Research on the Russian migration regime has shown that NGOs operating at the federal level and the local level perform different functions. While the first group tends to concentrate their efforts on protecting the human rights of migrants and influencing the Russian migration regime through active interaction with the state bodies involved in the construction and implementation of Russian migration policy, the second group of NGOs has focused on socio-economic provision for migrants (Flynn, 2001, 2004, 2006). Since the focus of the analysis here is the national migration regime, this chapter takes an overview of the

\(^{13}\) ‘Civil society’ is a disputed concept (Marshall 1998, 74). The definition used in this thesis interprets ‘civil society’ as ‘an arena of activity that is distinguished from the private realm of the family, the self-interested behaviour of the economic sphere and the state’ (Henry and Sundstrom, 2006, p. 323).
NGOs operating at the federal level. At the time when this research was conducted, there were three such organisations: the Forum of Migrants’ Associations, the Civic Assistance Committee, and the ‘Memorial’ Human Rights Centre.

The ‘Memorial’ Human Rights Centre was established in 1991. In 1996, with the financial support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), it launched the ‘Migration Rights’ programme. The aim of this programme was to protect the rights of forced migrants in Russia through creating a national network of legal consultation services. Consultation services were attached to regional NGOs, which provide assistance to migrants. By the spring of 2005, the network had been extended to 45 regions of the Russian Federation. Although the ‘Migration Rights’ programme was initiated to help forced migrants, the network of legal consultancies provided assistance not only to forced migrants, but also to other migrants, including those who, due to the particularities of the Russian legislation, were unable to obtain official status on the territory of the Russian Federation. This programme also conducted seminars which provided an arena for academics, human rights activists, parliamentarians and state officials to discuss problems of migration regulation and legislation in Russia.

The Civic Assistance Committee was created in 1990 with the aim of providing assistance to forced migrants. It provides migrants with support services such as medical and economic help, social assistance (including educational programmes for children) and legal consultations. The head of this organisation is also the head of the ‘Migration Rights’ programme.

The Forum of Migrants’ Associations, established in 1996, unites 167 migrants’ associations located in 43 regions of the Russian Federation. The main tasks of this association are lobbying on behalf of migrants’ interests, protecting migrants’ rights, and influencing state bodies in order to create a welcoming migration regime and construct a positive image of migrants.

In the 1990s, these NGOs had a significant influence on the migration regime of the Russian Federation (Flynn 2004, p.109). Although they were critical of migration regulations in Russia, there was a good level of cooperation between them and the state bodies ‘in day-to-day policy-making and policy implementation’ (Pilkington 1998, p. 89). These organisations were engaged in collaborative projects with the Federal Migration Service for providing
assistance to migrants. They successfully lobbied in support of migrants’ interests in the State Duma. Their representatives participated in drafting legislation.

However, since 1999 their relationship with the state has been deteriorating and their influence on the Russian migration regime has been gradually decreasing. They were excluded from discussion and work on the key legislative acts which constitute the present migration regime: the new Law № 62 ‘On Citizenship’ and Law № 115 ‘On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation’. Their ability to influence migration legislation via the State Duma has now ceased due to changes that took place in the composition of this state body after the 2003 parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, dialogue and cooperation with the Federal Migration Service became almost impossible after the latter was subsumed into the Ministry of Internal Affairs in autumn 2001. Finally, the Government Commission on Migration Policy, which included representatives of NGOs as its members, was abolished in 2004.14

At the time of this research, the instruments of leverage actively used by NGOs with a view to influencing migration policy included: the Institute of Ombudsman of the Russian Federation (for lobbying for changes in legislation); the mass media (for creating alternative discourses about migration); the courts (for protecting the rights of migrants and creating precedents); and public gatherings such as congresses, conferences and seminars (for discussing migration policy with state officials and other interested parties). Although NGOs have continued to influence the Russian migration regime and migration policy through these institutions, their influence has declined significantly. This decline has meant a reduction in migrants’ opportunities to negotiate their interests with the receiving state.

The decrease in the NGOs’ ability to influence migration policy in Russia occurred within the context of the changing relationship between the Russian state and civil society which, in its turn, was informed by the securitisation and centralisation of state regulation. The beginning of the 2000s was marked by attempts on the part of the authorities to shape civil society as ‘a network of organizations that, while remaining technically outside the state, will be co-opted to assist the leadership of the political regime in pursuing the objectives that it has chosen for society’ (Evans, 2006, p.152). This vision of the relationships between the state and NGOs does not present them as equal partners who construct a dialogue with each

14 Although this Commission, according to interviews with NGO leaders, did not have any significant influence on the migration policy of the Russian Federation, it was still useful as a forum for discussion between the state and civil society about this policy.
other and through this attain a common goal. This is reflected clearly in the exclusion of the NGOs from the process of shaping the migration policy of the country. They were not expected to take any initiative in this sphere; where they did, for example, by criticising current legislation or the actions of authorities, they were ignored or even persecuted.15

In April 2006, the head of the Russian Federal Migration Service issued an order to create a Civil Council (Obshchestvennyi Sovet) attached to this service. The role of the Civil Council was defined as providing assistance to the Federal Migration Service in the form of suggestions for improving migration policy and developing small and medium businesses. The Civil Council consists of social scientists who are experts in migration studies, representatives of NGOs, and businessmen. One of the three NGOs discussed above, the Forum of Migrants’ Associations, has representation on this Council. In February 2007, the Civil Council held its first session, during which its members suggested creating analogous regional councils. In summer 2007, the head of the Federal Migration Service issued the order to create these councils. They started work in 2008.

At first glance, the creation of this network of Civil Councils attached to the Russian Federal Migration Service and its regional branches might be interpreted as a sign that the conditions for interaction between the state and civil society in the area of migration policy creation and implementation have improved. Yet this interaction does not represent communication between equal partners. On the contrary: the introduction of these councils is in fact perfectly suited to the above-described project of creating a ‘tame’ and controllable civil society. The councils have only an advisory function in relation to the state body, which can accept or reject their suggestions. Moreover, this state body has the power to abolish these councils, and thus to limit even further the channels available for the representatives of civil society to offer their suggestions.

15 In 2006, upon attempting to renew its registration with the authorities, the Forum of Migrants’ Associations came under threat of closure. Some commentators have argued that the problems it faced were linked to the Forum’s criticism of Russian migration policy and migration regulation (http://www.newsru.com/russia/28apr2006/npo.html accessed on 07/11/2009). In 2006-2007, the Civic Assistance Committee was subjected to a range of checks performed by the police, the office of the Public Prosecutor in Moscow, and the State Registration Chamber. As a result, the Civic Assistance Committee was issued with a warning by the office of the Public Prosecutor which claimed that this NGO had violated a range of laws including the Law ‘On Refugees’ (http://www.demos-center.ru/news/16568.html accessed on 07/11/2009). Memorial was also investigated by the Russian authorities during this period. For example, in 2007 it was required to provide all documents about the financial sources used to fund the book which it had published on the procedures for complaining to the European Court of Human Rights (http://www.newsru.com/russia/26feb2007/memorial_print.html accessed on 07/11/2009)
It is still unclear what influence the Civil Councils will have on migration policy, or how long these councils will continue to exist. At present, however, they do give representatives of civil society an opportunity to articulate the interests of migrants and thus for their voices to be heard by the state, which remains in control of shaping this policy.

3.2.3. Centralisation and securitization in 1990s and 2000s: continuity and differences

The Russian state bodies dealing with migration issues and their relations with representatives of civil society have been transformed so significantly under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, that it is tempting to draw a clear line between the 1990s and 2000s (Mukomel’, 2005, p. 133). However, as several commentators have rightly argued, the processes of centralisation and securitisation of migration which informed the transformations of the 2000s, could also be observed in the 1990s (Pilkington, 1998; Flynn, 2004). It is important to point out, nevertheless, that certain characteristics of these processes of centralisation and securitisation have undergone significant changes since Putin came to power.

In the 1990s, centralisation of migration regulation was mainly driven by the Federal Migration Service, which expressed a tendency to monopolise the migration sphere in the country. In the 2000s, however, this process moved entirely beyond the control of this Service since centralisation (not only of migration regulation, but of state regulation across the board) became a priority for the new President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. It would appear that, according to Putin’s interpretation, the Russian President should stand at the centre of all regulation in Russia.

While in the 1990s, securitisation of migration mainly targeted migration flows from the ‘far abroad’, in the 2000s, it also effectively included migration from former Soviet republics. Although some of the social actors constructing the Russian migration regime in the 1990s also produced a discourse of securitisation in relation to migration from the ‘near-abroad’, at that time this discourse was not as influential as it would later become in the 2000s. The intensity of the migration securitisation taking place in the 2000s is reflected in the discursive
framework of the Russian migration regime, whereby migration as such is considered to pose a threat to society.\textsuperscript{16}

Under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the processes of centralisation and securitisation have affected all spheres of Russian society. The most prominent outcome of these processes, in the 2000s, was the transformation of relations between the state and civil society in Russia. In the sphere of migration, this transformation resulted in a narrowing of NGOs’ opportunities to influence migration policy, and as such in a limiting of migrants’ ability to negotiate their interests with the Russian authorities.

All these differences within the processes of centralisation and securitisation taking place during the 1990s and 2000s have made the current Russian migration regime much more restrictive towards migrants from former Soviet republics than it had been before Putin’s presidency.

3.3 The Russian migration regime as ‘a differentiated system of othering’

This part of the chapter examines the migration regime constructed and reproduced in the Russian Federation in response to migration from other former Soviet republics. It will be argued that this regime can be understood as ‘a differentiated system of othering’ which draws a line between Russian citizens and non-Russian citizens, as well as between foreign citizens.

In this thesis, a migration regime is understood through the lens of the theory of structuration as a combination of three types of structures: signification, legitimation, and domination. Structures of signification are presented by discourses about migration and migrants; structures of legitimation by written and unwritten norms regulating migration; and structures of domination by the combination of resources available to social actors participating in the construction and reproduction of the migration regime. These structures, which constitute both media for and outcomes of interactions between social actors, are deeply interconnected and are used simultaneously and in combination in such interactions.

The structures constituting a migration regime influence the experiences of migrants, who draw upon these structures in their interactions with other social actors. This part of the

\textsuperscript{16}See section 3.3.2 for an analysis of the discursive framework of the Russian migration regime.
chapter clarifies what differentiations of migrants are institutionalised by the Russian migration regime. Although the analysis is focused on legislation (structures of legitimation) and discourses (structures of signification), it also seeks to illuminate how differentiation institutionalised in these parts of the migration regime affects the composition of the resources available to migrants (structures of domination).

### 3.3.1 Legislative framework of the migration regime

The legislative framework of the migration regime consists of both formal rules, embodied in laws and instructions, and informal rules, which are not recorded anywhere, but are reproduced through everyday interactions between social actors. This section scrutinises the set of formal rules which regulates the admission of foreign citizens from former Soviet republics onto the territory of the Russian Federation and mediates their access to the resources allocated in the receiving society. Analysis reveals that such rules create a system of differentiation, which constructs differences not only between Russian citizens and foreign citizens, but also between foreign citizens themselves. Since the collapse of the USSR this system has been changing. The transformation of the national legislation on migration which has occurred throughout the post-Soviet period can be seen as part of an underlying process of nation-building, which involves redrawing the lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The analysis shows that while in the 1990s the line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was drawn according to the criterion of possession or lack of Soviet citizenship, today, there is a complex system of differentiation based on belonging to the actual state.

#### 3.3.1.1 Regulating Admission and Residence

The set of written rules which regulates the entry of foreign citizens into the country and their right to stay there for a period of time is part of the so-called system of ‘external alien control’ (Brochman, 2002). These rules are derived from international agreements concluded by the receiving state and from its national legislation. They regulate the quantity and characteristics of non-nationals who are admitted to the territory of the state. In practice, they impose multidimensional differentiation on migration inflow, creating different categories of migrants and different regimes of admission for these categories.
The migration regime of the Russian Federation has been consistently more liberal towards former Soviet citizens from former Soviet republics than towards other foreign citizens. Russia has had non-visa regime agreements with most of the former Soviet republics since the collapse of the USSR.\(^\text{17}\) Former Soviet citizens have also received preferential treatment under the national legislation of the Russian Federation. However, the Russian Federation’s current admission regime with regard to former Soviet citizens from other former Soviet republics differs significantly from the regime of the 1990s. This is primarily a result of changes in the Russian national legislation in the intervening period.

In the 1990s, the Russian admission regime for foreign citizens was built around two national legislative acts: the 1981 Law № 5152 ‘On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in the USSR’ (Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta, 1981); and the 1991 Government regulation № 212 ‘On Approval of the Regulations of Stay of Foreign Citizens in the USSR’ (Sobranie postanovlenii, 1991). It is important to note that the norms of these acts were not applied to former Soviet citizens from the former Soviet republics. Migrants from the post-Soviet space were registered in the Russian Federation in the same way as Russian citizens.\(^\text{17}\) This practice was officially approved by a Government regulation issued in 1997 (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 1997). Moreover, citizens of former Soviet republics, who did not need a visa to enter the territory of the Russian Federation, could stay in the country as long as they wanted, as well as enjoying the right to move freely throughout the territory of Russia. This was facilitated by their possession of Soviet passports, which remained valid documents of identification in the territory of the Russian Federation until 2004.\(^\text{19}\)

\(\text{17}\) Up until 2000, the non-visa regime between Russia and the majority of NIS countries was mediated by a multilateral agreement signed in Bishkek in October 1992. In 2000, the Russian Federation withdrew from the Bishkek agreement, but immediately suggested to other former Soviet republics that they should sign a range of agreements which ensured a non-visa entry regime for their citizens. These agreements were multilateral agreements involving Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and Russian bilateral agreements with Moldova, Armenia, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. In June 2008, the President of the Russian Federation passed a decree which allows non-visa entry to non-citizens of Latvia and Estonia who were once citizens of the USSR (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2008b).

\(\text{18}\) Freedom of movement is guaranteed to Russian citizens by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Law № 5242-1 ‘On the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to the Freedom of Movement, and the Choice of Place of Stay and Residence within the Borders of the Russian Federation’ issued in 1993 (Vedomosti Sobraniya, 1993). However, according to the Government regulation issued in July 1995 (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 1995a), Russian citizens were required to register with the police within three days if they intended to live in a new place for more than ten days. At present these three days have been extended to 90 days (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2004).

\(\text{19}\) The fact that both Russian citizens and former Soviet citizens without Russian citizenship could use a Soviet passport for identification allowed this document to be perceived as a marker of belonging to a single symbolic community. However, after July 2004, the Soviet passport became a marker of differentiation between ‘us’ and
Substantial changes in national legislation were incorporated into the migration regime in 2002. Law № 115 ‘On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation’ (25 July 2002) introduced new rules for the admission of foreign citizens onto the territory of the Russian Federation (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2002b). This new law significantly reduced the differences between the admission regime for citizens of former Soviet republics and the admission regimes for other foreign citizens.

Currently, according to Russian legislation, foreign citizens from all countries (except Belarus and Ukraine) undergo the same process of registration on the territory of the Russian Federation and all of them can stay in Russia for only a limited time. Non-visa arrivees can stay in Russia for up to 90 days, while the stay of visa-holding arrivees is limited to the period of time indicated on their visa. If they wish to stay longer they have to apply for a temporary residence permit, which would then entitle them to reside in the Russian Federation for up to three years. After one year in possession of this permit they can apply for a so-called permanent residence permit lasting for up to five years. It should be noted that this way of extending one’s stay in the Russian Federation is further limited by quotas. Besides, a range of requirements regarding the health and wealth of migrants complicates the process of obtaining this permit. Finally, possession of a temporary or permanent residence permit does not automatically mean that the holder is guaranteed the right to stay in Russia for the full three- or five-year period. There are obligatory annual checks and if, in the course of such a check, a person fails to meet the requirements prescribed by the regulations, then he/she loses his/her legal status on the territory of the Russian Federation and has to leave the country within a few days.

‘them’, since it could now be used as a document of identification only by non-Russian citizens who were Soviet citizens in the past, who came to Russia from former Soviet republics, and who registered in Russia before 1 July 2002 or received a permanent residence permit or temporary residence permit before 1 November 2002. This regulation was due to end on 1 July 2009 (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2009).

Citizens of Belarus can stay in Russia without registration for up to 30 days after entering the country. Citizens of Ukraine can stay in Russia without registration for up to 90 days after entering the country.

According to Law № 115 ‘On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation’ the following categories of immigrants are exempt from the quotas: people who were born in the territory of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic and held citizenship of the USSR or who were born in the Russian Federation; people recognised as unable to work and who have a son or daughter with Russian citizenship who is recognised as able to work; people who have at least one parent with Russian citizenship, who is recognised as unable to work; spouses of Russian citizens living in the Russian Federation; and investors in the Russian economy. In 2006, amendments to the Law introduced a new category of immigrant exempted from the quota – participants in the state programme ‘On Assisting the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Residing Abroad’ (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2006a).

According to Law № 115, temporary and permanent residence permits can be withdrawn if a person does not earn enough money to support him/herself and his/her dependents and/or does not have accommodation in
One of the declared aims of the changes in the national legislation regulating issues linked with migration was the introduction of greater control over migration and migrants. However, rather than increasing such control and rationalising the system, these changes in fact created inconsistencies in the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime. Among other things, the new legislation effectively transformed initially ‘legal’ migrants into ‘illegal’ migrants – in other words, into people who were outside the system created by the state to control migration and migrants.

The transformation of ‘legal’ migrants into ‘illegal’ ones often occurred due to the inability of migrants to meet the requirements laid down by the normative acts regulating the process of their registration and stay (Yastrebova, 2004). Additional difficulties could be caused by officials whose interpretations of the national legislation sometimes prevented migrants from securing their legal status in the Russian Federation. Others were transformed into ‘illegal’ migrants after they over-stayed their legal limit.

The 2006 changes to Russian migration law seem to have been designed with a view to increasing the controllability of migrants and migration by eliminating the legislative inconsistencies which generated ‘illegal’ migrants. These changes resulted in a slight liberalisation of the admission regime, both in general terms and with regard to migrants from former Soviet republics in particular.

Law № 109 ‘On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation’ (July 2006) indicates two types of registration: registration at the place of Russia after staying there for three years. These permits can also be withdrawn if a person has become a drug addict or contracted a disease which has been officially designated as dangerous to society. In summer 2008, new amendments to this law were introduced, according to which a temporary permit can be withdrawn in the event that the quota is reduced, and both temporary and permanent permits can be withdrawn if their holders are recognised by the authorities as undesirable residents in Russian territory (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2008a). These amendments destabilised the situation of temporary permit and permanent permit holders in Russia even further. While previously non-Russian citizens who held these permits had some control over the preservation of their legal status in Russia, since they could take action to meet the requirements (for example, by avoiding illegal drugs and looking after their health), after the new amendments they effectively lost this control. Regardless of what action they take, they can be designated by the authorities as undesirable residents and as such deported from the country.

23 The information bulletin issued by the Forum of Migrants’ Associations regularly reported on cases of such ‘creativity’ shown by officials. See, for example, Raeva (2003).

24 This practice shows that people who entered the Russian Federation from former Soviet republics without a visa did not necessarily leave the country after the 90-day limit prescribed by Russian legislation. The law indicates that a 90-day stay can be extended for up to 180 days, but non-Russian nationals interviewed within this research project reported that they had experienced difficulties in extending their stay in Russia. Another difficulty for those foreign citizens who wanted to stay in the country longer than 180 days and had to apply for a temporary residence permit was presented by the introduction of quotas for this category of permit, as well as new requirements which migrants had to meet in order to qualify for this permit.
residence; and registration at the place of stay (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2006b). The Law gives a detailed description of the registration application process, as well as indicating the criteria for rejection. This detailed description outlined in the Law limits the scope for officials to introduce their own rules, and has rendered the process of registration more transparent. The process of registration has become easier as a result. For example, an application to register at the place of stay can now be sent through the post without visiting the police station in person.

New amendments simplified the acquisition of temporary residence permits. Before these amendments, immigrants who applied for a permit had to submit documents which verified their level of income simultaneously with their application. According to the new rules, proof of income is no longer required at the initial application stage. Instead, immigrants are obliged to submit documentary proof of income within one year of their arrival on the territory of the Russian Federation. The lag of one year provides an opportunity to find a job (or jobs) which can produce the level of income required for the acquisition of a temporary residence permit.

Initially, the changes in the Law № 115 ‘On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation’ which were introduced in 2006 also meant that non-visa arrivees were not included under the quota limiting temporary residence permits (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2006c). This change directly affected former Soviet citizens from NIS countries, since Russia has non-visa regime agreements with most of these republics. This change was shortlived, however: fears that migration from former Soviet republics would ‘overwhelm’ Russia soon led, in January 2007, to the re-establishment of quotas for temporary residence permits for migrants who do not need a visa to enter Russia (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2007b). Moreover, according to new rules introduced in January 2007, temporary residence permit holders can work in Russia only if they hold a work permit (which they did not require previously). It is worth noting that the amount of work permits is limited by quotas. The practice shows that the size of these quotas, which are defined annually by the Russian authorities, is not large enough to meet the demand on the part of migrants wishing to work (Human Rights Watch, 2009). This discrepancy pushes migrants into the informal labour market. Migrants who work informally are vulnerable to possible violations

25 This does not apply to participants of the state programme ‘On Assisting the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Residing Abroad’, or to citizens of Belarus.
of their working conditions by their employers. In addition, since informal employment of non-Russian nationals is a violation of the rules regulating their stay in Russia, foreign citizens who work informally can also be prosecuted by the Russian authorities and even deported from the country.

3.3.1.2 Access to rights

While laws regulating the entry of foreign citizens could be understood as tools which help a nation-state to control the admission of non-nationals to its territory, laws regulating foreign residents’ access to rights and resources could be interpreted as tools used by a nation-state to admit or reject arrivees as members of the society which it governs (Leitner, 1995). According to Marshall’s classification, which is used extensively in the contemporary literature on citizenship, rights can be subdivided into civil, political and social (Marshall [1950] 1992). Civil rights comprise freedom of speech, freedom of thought, the right to justice, etc. Political rights deal with political participation. Social rights mediate access to social goods such as the health service, education, pensions, social benefits, etc.

In the 1990s, according to the legislation of the Russian Federation, former Soviet citizens from the former Soviet republics had the right to receive *permanent registration at their place of residence* in Russia.\textsuperscript{26} The real scope for exercising this right differed from region to region, and the registration process was not always easy (Ganushkina, 1998; Osipov, 1998a, 1998b). However, in the event that a migrant was successful in completing such registration, they then received access to employment, social benefits and services provided through the system of social services, pensions, primary and secondary education on a par with Russian citizens registered in the same area. In fact, such registration was even more important than citizenship of the Russian Federation. A non-registered Russian citizen was in many respects more socially excluded than a registered non-Russian citizen from an NIS country. Many people lived in Russia without Russian citizenship and did not feel that they needed it, since they were registered at their place of residence.

In 2002, non-Russian nationals from former republics of the USSR lost their right to *permanent registration at place of residence*. Law № 115 ‘On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation’ (July 2002) linked the range of rights available to the type

\textsuperscript{26}See Appendix E for more detailed information about *permanent registration at place of residence.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holders of Temporary Residence permits</th>
<th>Russian Citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Not required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permission to live (for employees)</td>
<td>Not required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical limitations</td>
<td>Not required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to be elected and participate in elections (federal and regional level)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right to be elected and participate in elections (local level)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to social services</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension</td>
<td>Yes (since 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (primary and secondary)</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency</td>
<td>Subject to fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical services</td>
<td>Free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can invite others to Russia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other notes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Stay in Russia**
- Freedom of movement: They can live anywhere in Russia, including in regions where temporary residents are not allowed to live. They must register with the police within 3 days of their arrival.
- Right to be elected: They can vote in local and federal elections. They can also be elected to local and federal offices.
- Can invite others: They can invite temporary residents to stay in Russia.

**Persons on temporary stay in Russia**
- Holders of Temporary Residence permits: They must register with the police within 3 days of their arrival. They can work in Russia, but must register with the police within 3 days of their arrival.
- Others: They must register with the police within 3 days of their arrival.

**Visa requirements**
- Not required for most temporary residents. A visa is required for citizens of Ukraine, Moldova, and Tajikistan.
- Required (since 2007) for citizens of Georgia.

**Visa duration**
- 90 days for some foreign citizens.
- 3 years for others.

**Visa restrictions**
- Limited to 3 years for some foreign citizens.
- No visa restrictions for others.

**Temporary residents are eligible for free tertiary education in Russia.**
of stay in Russia (Table 3.1). Foreign citizens were henceforth divided into three categories, based on the nature of their stay in Russia: temporary stay; temporary residence; or permanent residence. The first group is represented by visa-holders (or non-visa holders staying in Russia for less than 90 days). The second and third groups comprise the holders of temporary and permanent residence permits respectively. Permanent residents have more rights on the territory of the Russian Federation than temporary ones. The latter, in turn, have more rights than those who do not hold a residence permit.27

The 2002 changes in the national legislation on migration increased the value of Russian citizenship as a tool for integration into the receiving society and as a marker of differentiation between ‘us’ – full members of the receiving society, and ‘them’ – who do not enjoy full membership of society. The legal statuses available to foreign citizens, including those from former Soviet republics, do not provide them with the range of rights available to Russian citizens (Table 3.1). Moreover, as mentioned above, their legal status and hence their rights can be withdrawn at any time, while Russian citizens cannot be deprived of their citizenship against their will. In this respect Russian citizenship means not only full rights in the Russian Federation, but also stability.

3.3.1.3 Acquisition of Russian citizenship

The changes described above coincided with the introduction of new rules for acquiring citizenship (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2002a). The 2002 Law № 62 ‘On Citizenship’ made the process of citizenship acquisition more complex than it had been previously (Table 3.2). Firstly, the law lengthened the process of acquiring Russian citizenship for all foreign citizens. The law introduced different stages of naturalisation. Under the new law, migrants had to have a permanent residence permit in order to apply for citizenship. This permit, in turn, could be issued only to those non-nationals who had lived on the territory of the Russian Federation with a temporary residence permit for one year. Secondly, the Law introduced new requirements with regard to income level and knowledge of the Russian language. Thirdly, it created differences between former Soviet citizens from NIS countries. Last but not least, the

27 Citizens of Belarus represent an exception to this rule, due to bilateral agreements concluded between Belarus and Russia as part of the work on building the union between these countries. The treaty of creating the Union State was signed on 8 December 1999 and ratified by Russia on 22 December 1999 and by Belarus on 26 January 2000.
law recognised citizens of these countries as a pool of potential applicants for Russian citizenship. The previous law had not mentioned this category of foreign citizens at all; instead, it referred to former Soviet citizens living on the territory of the former republics of the USSR (this, in practice, included former Soviet citizens who had later become citizens of these republics) (Vedomosti Sobraniya, 1992).

Citizenship of the Russian Federation could be interpreted as a marker of belonging to a community, which consists of individuals with a particular range of rights and duties in relation to the state. This citizenship indicates that a person is recognised by the state as a full member of the Russian ‘nation’. Differentiated access to citizenship reflects who is more welcome as a potential member of this community. Before 2002, former Soviet citizens from former Soviet republics received more privileges in acquiring Russian citizenship than other foreign citizens. This preference could be interpreted as part of ‘the securitization of the wider borders of the Russian “nation”’ (Flynn, 2004, p. 50). Former Soviet citizens from former Soviet republics were considered to be close to ‘us’ and could in fact become Russian citizens even without leaving these republics.

The introduction of the 2002 Law ‘On Citizenship’ undermined the value of Soviet citizenship when it came to acquiring citizenship of the Russian Federation. While the previous law allowed former Soviet citizens to receive Russian citizenship within six months, purely on the grounds that they were once citizens of the USSR, the new law does not consider possession of Soviet citizenship alone to be sufficient for privileged access to Russian citizenship. Soviet citizenship has significance only in conjunction with other circumstances, such as participation in the Great Patriotic war; birth, residence, and/or internal registration on the territory of the Russian Federation; or citizenship of an NIS country which had concluded an agreement with Russia involving reciprocal simplification of their respective naturalisation processes, etc. (Table 3.2).

Four years later, however, in 2006, the importance of Soviet citizenship was boosted once again with the introduction of the state programme ‘On Assisting the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Residing Abroad’. Under the terms of this programme, participants were entitled to preferential treatment in the process of naturalization, though in practice this was only the case from 2008 onwards (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2008c).
### Table 3.2 Acquisition of citizenship of the Russian Federation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence in Russia months</th>
<th>Law on citizenship (1991)</th>
<th>Law on citizenship (2002)</th>
<th>Stages of naturalisation months</th>
<th>Total time spent on acquiring citizenship</th>
<th>Knowledge of Russian language</th>
<th>Income level requirement</th>
<th>Renunciation of other citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td><em>(temporary regulations)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Former citizens of the USSR including refugees from the former Soviet republics</td>
<td>Former citizens who live on the territory of former Soviet republics and do not have citizenship of the country they live</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Those who arrived from former Soviet republics and registered in Russia before 01/07/2002 if they apply for citizenship before 01/01/2009 (introduced in 2006) <em>TEMPORARY REGULATION</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Those who arrived from former Soviet republics and received temporary residence permit if they apply for citizenship before 01/01/2009 (introduced in 2006) <em>TEMPORARY REGULATION</em></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participants of ‘On Assisting the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Residing Abroad’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>People who were born on the territory of the Russian Federation and live there at the moment of application</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Veterans of the Great Patriotic war, who live on the territory of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Citizens of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, who were born in Russia or lived there before 21/12/1991; or who have close relatives (parents, grandparents, children, grandchildren, brothers, sisters, spouse) who are Russian citizens and permanently reside in Russia*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Those who graduated from Russian colleges and universities after 01/07/2002</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Those who serve in the armed forces of the Russian Federation (3 years)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Disabled people and people without citizenship, who arrived in Russia from former Soviet republics and registered before 01/01/2002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>People who have parents or grandparents with Russian citizenship</td>
<td>People who have at least one parent with Russian citizenship residing in Russia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Disables parents of Russian citizens residing in the Russian Federation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Spouse of a Russian citizen</td>
<td>Spouses of Russian citizens (3 years of marriage)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>High achievers in science, technology and culture; people who have a profession or qualification which is of interest to the Russian Federation</td>
<td>High achievers in science, technology and culture; people who have a profession or qualification which is of interest to the Russian Federation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>People who have given great service to the Russian Federation</td>
<td>People who have given great service to the Russian Federation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Asylum</td>
<td>Those granted asylum</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-30</td>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-60</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 – Time of residence with temporary residence permit (could be up to 36 months); 2 – Time of residence with permanent residence permit (could be up to 60 months); 3 – Time of waiting for citizenship after application (period of consideration); Total time spent on acquiring citizenship = 1+2+ (respective periods of consideration for granting residence permits (up to 6 months each)) + 3

* Agreement between the Republic of Belarus, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation about facilitating the acquisition of citizenship via fast-track. In Russia, the agreement came into effect on 4/11/2000

Sources: [http://antropotok.archipelag.ru](http://antropotok.archipelag.ru); Law on citizenship 2002 (with amendments); Law on citizenship 1991
3.3.1.4 Admission of compatriots

The terms ‘compatriots’ and ‘compatriots from abroad’ were introduced into Russian legislation in 1999 by Law № 99 ‘On the State Policy of the Russian Federation with Respect to Compatriots Abroad’ (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 1999). The Russian legislation defines ‘compatriots’ as ‘persons, who were born in one and the same state, live or have lived in it, possess features of commonality in language, religion, cultural inheritance, traditions and customs, as well as descendants of the abovementioned persons’. In turn, the term ‘compatriots from abroad’ includes: citizens of the Russian Federation who permanently live abroad; citizens and non-citizens of former Soviet republics who were once citizens of the USSR and now live in the former Soviet republics; emigrants from Russia (the Russian Empire), the Russian Republic, the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic and the Russian Federation, who once held citizenship of these states, but then became citizens of a foreign state, obtained permanent leave to remain in the foreign state, or became stateless persons; and descendants of all the above-listed groups, except those descendants whose ethnicity is defined as titular for the foreign country. Despite various inconsistencies and the general lack of clarity of these definitions, it is possible to say that the introduction of the term ‘compatriot’ has created an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983). This imagined community unites actual Russian citizens with those foreign citizens whom the Russian state recognises as connected to itself.

The Russian Federation’s policy on so-called ‘compatriots’ is focused heavily on ‘compatriots from abroad’. Until recently it was directed towards supporting their symbolic affiliation with Russia and simultaneously towards their integration into societies of the foreign states where they live. The policy did not include measures to support those ‘compatriots from abroad’ who ‘returned’ to the Russian Federation and did not have Russian citizenship. This policy was therefore interpreted as a policy for ‘preventing “compatriots” from becoming “repatriates”’ (Pilkington, 1998, p. 56).

The policy on ‘compatriots from abroad’ was transformed in summer 2006, with the announcement of the state programme ‘On Assisting the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Residing Abroad’. The programme has been developed as one of the mechanisms aimed at overcoming Russia’s current demographic crisis. It creates a favourable regime of admission both into Russian territory and Russian society for people who are
defined by Russian legislation as ‘compatriots from abroad’. The current time-frame of the programme has been set as 2007–2012.

Participants in the programme must settle in one of a limited selection of regions of the Russian Federation, though they have the right to choose which one. Information on the scheme is distributed by representatives of the Federal Migration Service abroad, as well as by Russian embassies. Programme participants are exempted from the quota for temporary residence permits. The Russian government pays for travel and relocation expenses. It also waives all customs duties for participants in the programme, as well as reimbursing any expenses incurred in connection with the registration process. Participants receive a one-off grant for organising their life after arrival (obustroistvo) and a monthly allowance for up to six months for unwaged participants. Participants in the programme are the only category of temporary permit holders who do not need to have a work permit to work in Russia. They are also provided with a so-called ‘compensation package’ which includes access to state services and municipal education, social and medical institutions and employment services. Support with regard to accommodation and employment is provided by the regional administration but is financially supported from the federal budget.

An important minor point to note about this programme is the fact it does not necessarily entail privileged treatment for the descendants of all former Soviet citizens from former Soviet republics. If the ethnicity of such descendants is defined as titular for their country of residence, Russian law excludes them from the ‘imagined community’ of ‘compatriots from abroad’.

3.3.1.5 Changes in the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime: summary

Russian legislation regulating the entry of non-Russian citizens from former republics of the USSR, as well as their stay and residence, has undergone significant transformation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The initially receptive approach taken towards former Soviet citizens, which did not take their actual citizenship into account, subsequently developed into

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1 At present, there are twelve regions of the Russian Federation participating in the programme. They are listed on the programme’s official web page (http://www.fms.gov.ru/programs/list.php?ID=61&SECTION_ID=244).
2 A more detailed study of this programme implementation would clarify whether it differentiates between former Soviet citizens on any basis (first of all, at the stage of entry) or treats all of them equally.
a much more restrictive one, which paid attention to their citizenship. Currently, the legislation of the Russian Federation creates differences between Russian citizens and former Soviet citizens who do not now have Russian citizenship. The latter, in their turn, are also differentiated, and one of the criteria of their differentiation is their actual citizenship.

The differentiation between Russian citizens and non-Russian citizens is reflected in the scope of the rights available to them on Russian territory. Analysis of Russian legislation reveals that it provides a wider range of rights to Russian citizens than to non-Russian citizens. While, in the 1990s, former Soviet citizenship influenced the access to rights and resources in Russia through the opportunities to obtain permanent registration at the place of residence and the use of a Soviet passport as a document of identification, there is no indication that former Soviet citizenship plays any role in accessing rights and resources in Russia at present. Today the range of rights available in Russia to non-Russian citizens (including former citizens of the USSR) depends on specific agreements between the Russian Federation and the countries of their actual citizenship and the legal status granted to them according to Russian legislation.

The differentiation between non-Russian citizens from former Soviet republics can be traced through the rules which regulate the process of acquiring Russian citizenship. While the Law ‘On Citizenship’ which existed before 2002 treated all former Soviet citizens more or less equally, the new law imposes on them a complex differentiation, recognising some of them as more desirable than others as potential citizens of the Russian Federation.

The transformation of legislation which regulates the admission of foreign citizens to Russian territory and Russian society reflects the process of nation-building which is taking place in the Russian Federation. This process includes the identification of the community which constitutes one ‘nation’ and as such has a certain range of rights and obligations towards the state which is supposed to serve its interests. It seems that in the 1990s, in terms of the availability of rights, this community included not only people who held Russian citizenship but also all former Soviet citizens residing on Russian territory, regardless of their actual citizenship. Today, however, this comprises only actual Russian citizens. Former Soviet citizens without Russian citizenship are treated as ‘others’ who have to prove to the Russian state that they are worthy to be admitted to membership of the community called the Russian ‘nation’.
3.3.2 Discursive framework: the representation of migration and migrants

Discourses\(^3\) about migration and migrants constitute the discursive framework of the migration regime, which can be understood as the field of meanings which are constructed in a receiving society with respect to migration and migrants. In terms of the theory of structuration, meanings constitute structures of signification upon which social actors draw in their interactions. At the same time, meanings are produced and reproduced through these interactions. The production of meanings occurs through several interconnected processes, the most central of which is the process of representation. This process refers to the construction and exchange of meanings through language, in which ‘we use signs and symbols – whether they are sounds, written words, electronically produced images, musical notes, even objects – to stand for or to represent to other people our concepts, ideas and feelings’ (Hall, 1997a, p. 1). Meanings are produced through this process at different sites – art, politics, mass media etc. This thesis draws upon the analysis of representations of migration and migrants in several Russian newspapers which have nationwide distribution and which were published during the period of the fieldwork (from 1 April to 1 October 2004).\(^4\)

Social actors cannot be seen as passive recipients of the meanings produced through mass media discourses. They participate in the construction of meanings through their decoding of ‘meaningful’ discourses and by negotiating meanings with each other in everyday interactions (Moores, 1993; Morley, 1996 [1983]). It follows from this that meanings which are constructed in newspapers may differ from those which are shared by the public. Taking this into consideration, in this study the analysis of newspapers was supplemented by a review of the research on public opinion about migration and migrants conducted in Russia.

Analysis of the representations found in the selected Russian newspapers highlights the securitisation of migration as a social phenomenon. It also reveals that the negative/positive images of migrants presented in these newspapers are linked with the construction of migrants’ otherness/affinity in the receiving society. It shows that one of the criteria along

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\(^3\) Discourse is a contested concept. Howarth shows how its definitions and applications depend on the theoretical approach within which it is used (Howarth, 2000). This thesis employs the definition suggested by Hall (1997a), whereby discourses comprise different ways ‘of referring to or constructing knowledge about a particular topic of practice: a cluster (or formation) of ideas, images and practices, which provide ways of talking about, forms of knowledge and conduct associated with a particular topic, social activity or institutional site in society’ (p. 6).

\(^4\) The methodological rationale for this, as well as details of which newspapers were analysed, can be found in Chapter 2.
which the otherness of migrants is constructed is racial constructions reproduced in the society. The same criterion is revealed by the review of research on public opinion about migration and migrants. This kind of differentiation suggests that a process of racialisation is at work in Russia.

3.3.2.1 Representation of migration

In their coverage of migration between Russia and other NIS countries, Russian newspapers discuss Russia mostly as a destination and focus their attention on two main questions:

- What does migration from abroad bring to Russia and the Russian population?
- How is migration regulated in Russia? What can be done to improve this regulation?

If in 1994 Russian newspapers tended to present the movement of people from the former republics of the Soviet Union to Russia mainly as a ‘forced migration’ and to treat it as a reflection of Russia’s international stance (Pilkington, 1998), ten years later they were discussing it primarily as a process caused by economic factors. As such, discussion tended to focus on the social and economic ‘advantages’/‘disadvantages’ of such migration. Of the 163 articles dealing with migration which were found in the analysed newspapers published during the fieldwork, 70 articles contained references to labour migrants (‘foreign workers’, ‘gastarbeiters’), 19 to re-settlers, 6 to forced migrants, 4 to victims of sex trafficking and 3 to students.

Migration from former Soviet republics to Russia is mentioned within a range of different thematic contexts (Table 3.3). All of these contexts are in turn intertwined with a discourse about the rules imposed by the state to regulate migration and about the implementation of these rules (Figure 3.10). This discourse links the notion of ‘migration’ with the notion of ‘order’, understood as controllability. ‘Order’ has positive connotations as a necessary factor for preventing, avoiding and eliminating problems and threats. Controllable migration (‘legal’ migration), which follows the rules, is usually presented as a way of solving Russia’s problems, while uncontrollable migration (‘illegal’ migration) is mostly depicted as a threat to Russia’s economy, culture, security and geopolitical situation, as well as to the wealth and health of its population.
Figure 3.10  Representations of migration and migrants: intersection of the themes
Table 3.3  Representations of migration and migrants: themes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction of order – migration regulation</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminality</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation (imperfections/improvements)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian economy</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Ours</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration/Collaboration of NIS countries</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of human rights</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic crisis</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism (criticism of)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitics</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sense of threat communicated by the press coverage is intensified by the frequent use of images of ‘invasion’. It is considered that people from other former Soviet republics are attracted by Russia’s relatively high level of economic development and social stability. Whatever measures are undertaken to prevent them from coming to Russia and whatever difficulties await them there, it is suggested, they will still come. If they cannot stay in Russia legally, then they stay illegally.

*As soon as the three-month period of registration expires, they [foreign citizens] leave Russia and then re-enter. Those who consider this to be laborious can get an invitation through a firm.*

*(2004-09-29[MKO*-No.220]*)

It is assumed that even if migrants go back home, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, they will eventually return to Russia. For example, in an article, which described the case of some sex workers from former Soviet republics who were arrested in Moscow and were going to be deported from Russia, it was pointed out that:

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5 *MKO – Moskovskii komsomolets*
In the search for a job, some of them [sex workers] will come back [to Russia]. A stamp in the passport prohibiting entry to Russia for five years does not make any difference. The scenario is simple – the document [passport] ‘gets lost’ and after some time the new [passport] is received.

(2004-04-03[IZV*-No.060mm.])

The imagery of invasion is intensified by constant accentuation of the fact that nobody knows the real number of migrants from former Soviet republics in Russia and by speculative guessing about this number.

Nobody has exact information about the number of labour migrants in the country. Their number is estimated as 3.5–5 million people (of these, 1-2 million people are in Moscow and the Moscow region).

(2004-04-26[MKO-No.091])

The phenomenon of ‘illegal’ migration is presented as evidence of a lack or even a complete absence of order in migration regulation. ‘Imposing order on migration’, or ‘taking control’ of migration is considered to be a task for the state authorities and is associated with ‘check ups’, ‘disclosure’, ‘prevention’ and ‘punishment’, as well as with changes in legislation and the institutional framework. Newspapers present two views on the imperfections of migration regulation. The system of legislation and its implementation are presented either as incomplete and too ‘soft’ to stop ‘illegal’ migration, on the one hand; or as too tough, complex and unclear, on the other, such that migrants are unable to preserve/achieve legality. Consequently, two alternative ways of ‘introducing some order in migration’ are presented: the introduction of new restrictions and toughening of punishment for breaking the rules; or simplification, clarification and rationalisation of the rules and of the system as a whole.

The existence of ‘illegal’ migration is also presented as the result of a lack of order in the receiving society. ‘Illegal’ migration is often discussed in the context of corruption among officials and the unlawful behaviour of other Russian citizens, which prevents the proper

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IZV -Izvestiya
implementation of the existing rules and handicaps initiatives for the improvement of migration regulation.

As long as it is possible to buy registration …practically everywhere, often even from officials, all talk of toughening up control is absurd

(2004-09-11[IZV-No.168m.])

At the same time, ‘illegal’ migration is presented as a threat to the order of the receiving society. The uncontrollability of the former reduces the controllability of the latter.

On the territory of the Moscow region, there are more than 1.5 million guests, including foreign citizens. The majority of them violate the residency regime in the Russian Federation … This creates conditions for terrorists to get into the country, to hide weapons and explosives ...

(2004-09-22[MKO-No.214])

The ‘introduction of order in society’ is associated with the ‘introduction of order in migration’. This link is even more apparent when migration is discussed in the contexts of terrorism and criminality, the very manifestation of which is considered to be evidence of the lack of order in society. After the terrorist attack in Beslan in September 2004, there was a sudden increase in press publications referring to migration (Table 3.4). The dominant view of officials expressed in the publications was that control over migration must be intensified to ‘introduce order’ into society, in order to prevent a repetition of this kind of tragedy.

Table 3.4 Number of publications about migration and migrants (1 April – 1 October 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is worth noting that the changes to migration regulations suggested by some officials as a means of ‘introducing order’ to society as a response to terrorism and criminality, often target not only transnational migration, but also the migration of Russian citizens within the borders of the Russian Federation. Migration as a social phenomenon is positioned within the realm of state security. It is depicted as posing a threat to society if the state cannot control it. This position can be illustrated by the words of the chairman of the State Duma Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building, published in the newspaper Trud:

‘Long before perpetrating their crimes a lot of terrorists lived without registration on the territory of our country. To address this we plan to increase the punishment for people who refuse to register and at the same time we plan to make the process of registration easier and more transparent … Local authorities must have clear information about the migration of people … We have lost control over the migration of the population and sometimes do not know who lives where.’

(2004-09-25 [TRD’ - No. 182])

3.3.2.2 Representation of migrants

Discussion of migration is inevitably linked to the representation of migrants. On the one hand, images of migration are often constructed through reference to images of those who migrate, as in the case made, for example, in the article ‘Perforated Border’ (‘Prorvannaya granitsa’), where migration is presented as a phenomenon which causes problems for the receiving society (‘increased drugs trade’ and ‘deterioration of the epidemiological situation’), through the representation of migrants as ‘drug couriers’ and ‘homeless beggars’ with health problems:

After the very first train from Khudzhand to Saratov, according to the militia, ‘an increase in drugs trade and homeless people was recorded … [B]eggars from Tajikistan… “reside” with their little children … on the pavements of Saratov … There are hundreds of such people on the streets of Saratov. They do not have refugee status. The local authorities are concerned about their health. According to doctors, the

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7 TRD - Trud
epidemiological situation has deteriorated. We also know that people carrying drugs are coming under the guise of [ordinary] passengers. The transportation of weapons is also possible’.

(2004-06-25 [RG-No. 134])

On the other hand, speculation about migration contributes to the construction of the image of migrants. The links of the semantic chain ‘migration – migrants – problems (or the solution to problems) in the receiving society’ seem to be so interconnected with each other, that even if one of them is omitted in a particular text, the reader can reconstruct or reinsert it unconsciously. For example, in the interview with the General Prosecutor published in Rossiiskaya gazeta under the heading ‘Bribes Smell of Hexogen’ (‘Vzyatka pakhnet geksogenom’), nothing is said directly about migrants, but nonetheless an association is constructed between ‘foreigners’ who come to Russia and terrorists, since the ‘illegal migration of foreigners to Russia’ is cited as the ‘breeding ground for terrorism’:

The reasons for terrorism are complex ... The breeding ground for it is constituted by extremism, nationalism, the illegal migration of foreigners and a lot of other things.

(2004-09-16 [RG8-No. 202]).

While positive/negative images of migration from the former Soviet republics are correlated with notions of ‘legality’/‘illegality’, it would be problematic to speak about the existence of such a correlation in the case of attitudes towards migrants. Although articles referring to ‘illegal’ migrants constitute the majority of articles attaching negative predicates to migrants, 18% of articles about undocumented migrants contain positive images of them, and another 24% depict them as victims deserving pity.

Both documented and undocumented migrants are mentioned alongside predicates which associate them with strangers, or depict them as a burden on the receiving society, competitors with the local population in the labour market, a source of infection, criminals, potential terrorists, etc. At the same time, one can also come across descriptions of ‘illegal’ and ‘legal’ migrants as people who are ‘culturally close’ to the local population and as

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8 RG - Rossiiskaya gazeta.
industrious workers, who take on work which locals do not want to do or are incapable of doing.

The construction of sympathetic images of migrants proceeds by way of depicting them as victims. Undocumented migrants are presented as people who violate the laws of the receiving society (this is the main accusation against them), only because of imperfections in its system of migration regulation, which prevent them from achieving and preserving legal status. In the sympathetic press coverage, it is also argued that such migrants commit robberies and cheat only because of their hardships, not because they are people of bad character. Undocumented as well as documented migrants are often depicted as victims of unlawful behaviour on the part of Russian citizens (including officials), who exploit, blackmail, cheat, rob, beat and even kill them. An example of such representations comes from an interview with the head of one of the Moscow districts, which was published in Izvestiya.

− How can you explain the burglary of dachas?

− At present, there is a building boom in the Moscow region. In our district alone, 110-115,000 square metres are built annually... And who are the builders? They are not Muscovites or builders from our region, they are Moldovans, Ukrainians, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Armenians. Everyone tries to hire them for less; they do not create proper working conditions and, moreover, they constantly cheat them, they do not pay them a salary. What does a person – a so-called ‘illegal migrant’ (and how can he be legal, if nobody gives permission to private employers to hire foreigners? – that is how our legislation works) do in such circumstances? He robs.

(2004-04-22[RG No. 084])

The negative/positive attitudes towards migrants from former Soviet republics expressed in Russian newspapers are related to the construction of their otherness. Publications in Russian newspapers reveal the existence of ‘a differentiated system of othering’. All migrants are strangers for ‘us’ (locals), but it seems that ‘not all strangers are equally strange’ (Fitzpatrick in Stolcke, 1995, pp. 14-15), and some of them are considered to be so close to

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9 A dacha is a seasonal or year-round second home with a plot of land located outside urban limits. Generally, it is used by city-dwellers as a summer retreat and/or for growing food (in most cases for consumption within the household).
‘us’ that they can be seen as part of ‘us’. The bigger the distance constructed between ‘us’ and migrants, the more negatively they are depicted. The otherness of migrants to a receiving society is constructed along several intertwined dimensions. These dimensions include space, ethnicity and culture.

‘Others’, who may be variously referred to as ‘foreigners’, ‘non-residents’, ‘visitors’, ‘guests’, ‘resettlers’ etc., come from places located beyond the borders of ‘our’ space. People who come from one and the same place may be represented as ‘other(s)’ or as part of ‘us’, depending on what variant of border-drawing is chosen in the given article. Analysis of newspaper articles about migration from other NIS countries to Russia reveals three different ways of delineating borders between ‘our’ space and ‘other’ space. The first variant is to construct borders between ‘our’ city/region and other places:

On Tuesday, during an anti-terrorist meeting, mayor Luzhkov accused the Russian government of not allowing the Moscow government to make tougher rules on registration, ‘which would provide an opportunity to protect Moscow... from terrorists’

(2004-09-11[IZV-No.168m])

The second variant is to place borders between ‘our’ country and other countries; while the third variant presents all post-Soviet space as ‘ours’ and constructs a border between this space and the outside world.

After the collapse of the USSR, the majority of people who came to us were our compatriots ... New laws made them ‘foreigners’ as if they were refugees from distant countries. This was absolutely unfair and disgraceful and very offensive to people.

(2004-08-31[TRD-No. 163])

Not all people who come from ‘other’ places are presented as ‘other(s)’, just as not all people who come from places within ‘our’ space are called part of ‘us’. Russians from former Soviet republics (irrespective of the location of these countries within or beyond ‘our’ space) can be represented as people who have ‘returned’ to their fatherland and as such are considered to be part of ‘us’.
The village of ‘Mirnyi’ is a typical provincial corner of the Bryansk region. Almost five years ago, 300 resettlers from Georgia – descendants of peasants from the Voronezh and Tambov provinces, who moved to the mountains of the Caucasus around 250 years ago – settled here. They had lived in peace and friendship with their Georgian neighbours, but after the collapse of the Union the situation became worse ... When they could not stand it any longer, the descendants of the Russian peasants decided to return to their historical motherland.

(2004-07-30 ([TRD-No. 141])

Russian newspapers use references to migrants’ ethnicity to construct the image of ‘other(s)’ or part of ‘us’. Discussion of ‘returnees’, for example, refers exclusively to ethnic Russians. By referring to ‘compatriots’, they also indicate that there are Russians among them, while keeping silent about other ethnicities. Russians from former Soviet republics are never described as ‘foreigners’, ‘non-residents’, ‘visitors’, ‘guests’ or ‘guest workers’. They are discussed in the context of resettlement for permanent residence in Russia to solve its demographic crisis and are singled out as the most desirable resettlers:

Each year Russia loses one million people, because mortality exceeds fertility in the country. It is almost impossible to change this in the near future. Can Russia attract a substantial number of resettlers? Today the economies of NIS countries (Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus), which are rich in their Russian population, are not only stable, but also improving. Their living standards are very close to the living standard in Russia ...

In such circumstances, we cannot think about any substantial migration inflow from these countries.

(2004-07-07[RG-No. 143])

The construction of migrants’ ‘otherness’/‘affinity’ to the receiving society is also carried out through speculation about their cultural ‘otherness’/ ‘affinity’ to it. For example, one of the reasons why Russians are perceived as the most desirable migrants from other NIS countries is the belief that they are closer in culture to the receiving society than anybody else. Cultural differences are assumed to be grounds for a whole spectrum of problems starting
with misunderstanding and conflicts between migrants and locals at the interpersonal level and ending with threats to the state’s security and very existence:

*It is not easy to adjust to a new culture, to understand a person of another culture. It is necessary to teach children (and adults) to adhere to the ethical and moral norms that are customary in Russia. Since women in Muslim countries do not wear tight-fitting clothes… sometimes boys from the East can even perceive a teacher negatively if she is dressed like this [in tight-fitting clothes].*

(2004-09-01 [RG-No. 189])

To indicate that migrants are ‘others’, newspapers refer to their inability to speak Russian. ‘Others’ are also associated with Muslims, whose system of beliefs and way of life are presented as different to that of the local population. The fact that large sections of the Russian population are also Muslim is passed over in silence.

*The situation is aggravated by the formation of two migration flows to Russia. These are the migration flow of Muslims from former republics of the USSR – above all from Azerbaijan and Tajikistan – and the migration flow of Chinese people. If the establishment of closed national communities (Chinatowns) is permitted, the state will risk losing control over a significant part of the economic, social and political process in its own territory.*

(2004-07-07 [RG-No. 143])

The intersection of dimensions along which the ‘otherness’ of migrants is constructed in newspapers – space, ethnicity and culture – forms ‘a differentiated system of othering’. At the top of this system, there are Russians from former Soviet republics, who are considered to be culturally close to the Russian population. At the bottom of it, there are ethnically non-Russian migrants from the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. To make matters more complicated, this system appears to be racialised. Articles about migration from former Soviet republics discuss the stigmatisation and exclusion of non-Russians, whose ‘otherness’ is visible because of their appearance. In these articles, different ethnicities are often incorporated into such supra-ethnic categories as ‘Asians’ (aziaty) and ‘Caucasians’ (kavkaztsy).
According to the results of the research project ‘Hate Speech in the Russian Mass Media’, launched in 2001 by the ‘SOVA’ Information and Analysis Centre and based on an analysis of national and regional newspapers and national TV programmes, ‘Asians’ and ‘Caucasians’ are among the most likely targets for ‘hate speech’ supported in the Russian mass media. Researchers note that while extreme elements of ‘hate speech’ such as calls for violence and discrimination are usually condemned by journalists in their presentations, other elements of ‘hate speech’, such as the creation of negative images, statements about inferiority, criminality and a lack of morality are at the same time taken for granted (Verkhovskii, 2007).

Analysis of the newspapers conducted within this thesis indicates that supra-ethnic categories such as ‘Asians’ and ‘Caucasians’ are subsequently incorporated into categories such as ‘non-Russians’ (nerusskie) and ‘blacks’ (chernye). ‘Non-Russians’ and/or ‘blacks’ are perceived as the ultimate ‘others’ who pose a variety of threats to the receiving society:

‘Others’ are ‘Blacks’...43% of Russian citizens, including Muscovites, believe that the presence of ‘non-Russians’ is spoiling their life.

(2004-09-20[IZV-No.173p])

The greater the degree of otherness attached to migrants, the less trust is extended to them. The reproduction of negative stereotypes linking ‘non-Russian’-looking people with criminality, drug trafficking, epidemics, competition in the labour market and so on is indicated by a range of studies focused on the representations of migrants in Russian newspapers (Karpenko, 2004; Titov, 2004; Mkrchyan, 2003).

If we assume that images circulating in the mass media are symbolic resources to which migrants and other social actors can refer in creating, negotiating and legitimating their social practices, then the creation of difference among migrants at the level of newspaper discourses could affect the migrants’ experiences in the receiving society (Tesfahuney, 1998).
3.3.2.3 Perception of migration and migrants by the local population: Review of research on public opinion

Since representations in the mass media may differ from the images of migration and migrants held by their audience, this analysis of the discursive framework proceeds with a review of the findings of public opinion polls on popular perceptions and attitudes. This review revealed a correlation between the discourse presented in the selected Russian newspapers and public attitudes towards migration and migrants.

Research on public opinion conducted in Russia indicates the presence of xenophobia in society. According to a survey carried out by the Yurii Levada Analytical Centre in June and July 2005, 57% of respondents had a negative attitude towards migrants and only 27% felt positively about arrivees from other places. The ratio of attitudes was similar for both rural and urban areas (Gudkov, 2006d). According to the results of the surveys, statements suggesting that migrants made a profit out of the local population, increased the crime rate, forced locals out of their jobs, increased property prices and spread disease were chosen by the respondents far more often than statements which proclaimed a positive image of migrants (IOM, 2005; Gudkov, 2006a). The majority of the Russian population was opposed to migrants’ access to a range of resources allocated in the receiving society (Figure 3.11).

Figure 3.11 Percentage of respondents signalling a negative attitude to the questions ‘How do you feel about the fact that migrants will …’

Source: Created on the basis of information presented in Gudkov (2006b).
However, attitudes towards migrants are differentiated. The unwillingness to interact with migrants in different areas of life expressed by respondents in surveys reflects this differentiation (Leonova, 2005a; Gudkov, 2006c). The next figure illustrates this (Figure 3.12).

![Figure 3.12 Negative attitudes towards marriage and vicinity with migrants](image)

Source: Created on the basis of information presented in Gudkov (2006c).

Research carried out by the International Organisation of Migration in a range of Russian regions showed that while so-called ‘Slavs’ (*slavyane*) – Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians – were welcomed by 40% of the local population, ethnic groups combined in the survey under the name of ‘Caucasians’ (*kavkaztsy*) were welcomed by only 9% of locals. According to this survey, negative feelings towards ‘Caucasians’ and ‘Asians from NIS countries’ were expressed by 39% and 19% of respondents respectively, while negative feelings towards ‘Slavs’ were not mentioned at all (IOM 2005). Surveys conducted by the Yurii Levada Analytical Centre also provide information about the differentiation in attitudes of the local population towards migrants (Table 3.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of migrant</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People from the Caucasus</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from the former Central Asian Republics of the USSR</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No restrictions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult to answer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created on the basis of information presented in Levada-Centre (2007, p. 161).
‘Slavs’, ‘Caucasians’ and ‘Asians from NIS countries’ as well as ‘people from …’ and ‘migrants from…’ are racial categories. Such categories as ‘Slavs’, ‘Caucasians’ and ‘Asians’ combine people from different ethnic groups and refer to their physical appearance. As for the seemingly neutral labels ‘people from the Caucasus’ and ‘people from Central Asia’, they do not signify in Russia all those who have migrated from these geographical locations, but implicitly mean only those of them who are not identified as having ‘Russian’ ethnicity or ‘Slavic’ appearance. The presence of racial categories in the questions of the surveys reflects the racialisation of the migration issue in Russia. Migrants are divided into groups on the basis of their appearance and these groups are treated differently by the receiving society. The Russian population seems to be more aggressive and suspicious towards ‘non-Russian’-looking migrants than to ‘Russian’-looking migrants (Table 3.6).

Table 3.6 Levels of sympathy and antipathy between the Russian population and migrants (% of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What feelings do you personally have towards migrants from …</th>
<th>What feelings do migrants have towards Russians, if migrants come from …</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(rather) positive</td>
<td>(rather) negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created on the basis of information presented in Leonova (2005b).

Researchers point out that the Russian population perceives migration from former Soviet republics to Russia as migration inflow consisting mainly of non-Russians from the Caucasus and Central Asia (Badyshova 2006). The question of whether this image of migration has caused negative attitudes towards so-called ‘Caucasians’ and ‘Asians’ or, vice versa, whether the negative image of these ‘others’ has caused the negative perception of migration is beyond the scope of this research. It is worth noting, however, that this image of migration co-exists with negative attitudes towards migrants and migration. According to a number of surveys conducted by the Yurii Levada Analytical Centre from 2002 to 2007, more than 50% of respondents thought that the government should restrict the inflow of migrants (Figure 3.13).
3.3.3 Differentiations in the discursive and legislative frameworks of the Russian migration regime and migrants’ access to resources

The analysis of discursive and legislative frameworks reveals the Russian migration regime to be ‘a differentiated system of othering’. It differentiates between people along several criteria which are institutionalised in its structures.

Russian legislation defines the formal rules according to which foreign citizens access resources and rights allocated in the receiving society and differentiates migrants on the basis of their actual citizenship and former citizenship (citizenship of the USSR). The role of the latter is not so significant today as it was in the 1990s. Although former Soviet citizens, who are now citizens of the NIS countries, are still treated in a more favourable way than citizens of other countries under the Russian legislation regulating entry and stay in Russia, they are considered to be ‘others’ who need to prove that they are worth admitting to the community called the Russian ‘nation’. And until they become part of this community, they have access to a lesser scope of resources and rights allocated in Russia than Russian citizens.

Analysis of the representation of migrants and migration in Russian newspapers and an overview of the research on public opinion revealed that the discursive framework of the Russian migration regime differentiates migrants through the construction of their otherness/affinity to the receiving society. The greater the degree of otherness attached to
migrants, the less trust they are thought to deserve, and the more control and restrictions ought to be imposed on them. One of the criteria of differentiation institutionalised in the discursive framework is meanings ascribed to the physical appearance of migrants. People whose looks are considered to be ‘non-Russian’ are constructed as more ‘other’ to the Russian society, than people whose looks are interpreted as ‘Russian’. This racialised differentiation of migrants takes the form of racism as defined by Miles and Brown (2003). In other words, not only migrants are divided on the grounds of their appearance, but negative meanings adhere to those of them who are defined as ‘non-Russians’.

Although the analysis conducted by this research did not reveal connections between differentiation of migrants institutionalised in the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime, on the one hand, and in its discursive framework, on the other, these differentiations seem to work together in shaping migrants’ access to resources. While according to the legislative framework all non-Russian citizens are limited in the scope of their rights and resources in comparison with Russian citizens, analysis of the discursive framework suggests that the rights of some migrants may be more limited than others because of meanings ascribed to their physical appearance.

**Conclusion**

Analysis of net migration received by Russia as the result of its population exchange with other countries shows that the majority of those who came to Russia, and are now resident there, are people from other former Soviet republics, in other words, people who were once citizens of the USSR, many of whom do not hold Russian citizenship.

Coming to Russia, migrants encounter the collective actors formed by the authorities that have a particular influence on the migration regime and migration policy of the country and, through this, on the lives of migrants. Analysis of the transformations that occurred in the 2000s in the composition of these collective actors and in their relations with collective actors representing civil society reveals that migration from former Soviet republics has shifted into the realm of security and is now perceived as a potential threat for the receiving society. This kind of attitude to migration is reflected in the migration regime of the Russian Federation and may explain why the numbers of ‘legal’ migrants in Russia have decreased. Analysis
shows that the Russian migration regime has become much more restrictive than it was in the 1990s.

The current migration regime of the Russian Federation not only securitises the migration of non-Russian nationals; it also differentiates them from Russian citizens in terms of rights to access resources. This differentiation also affects former Soviet citizens without Russian citizenship, who were once treated in Russia more or less equally with Russian citizens. This change in attitude to former co-citizens may be interpreted as a reflection of the process of nation-building which involves drawing a line between members of the community called the Russian ‘nation’ and ‘others’ who do not belong to this community. However, not all foreign citizens in Russia are treated in the same way. Analysis of the discursive framework of the Russian migration regime revealed that so-called ‘non-Russian’-looking people or ‘blacks’ are constructed as more ‘other’ to Russian society than ‘Russian’-looking people. The greater the degree of otherness attached to migrants, the more negative meanings are associated with them and, as a result, the more restrictions expected to be imposed on them.

The intersection of differentiation on the basis of citizenship institutionalised in the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime and differentiation on the basis of meanings ascribed to physical appearance which are institutionalised in its discursive framework shape this regime as ‘a differentiated system of othering’. The next chapter will analyse interviews with migrants with a view to exploring how migrants’ experiences of accessing resources in Russia are shaped by the differentiations described above.
Chapter 4
Social Exclusion as a Process of Negotiation:
Migrants in the Receiving Society

Introduction

Using stories told by former Soviet citizens from NIS countries about their lives without Russian citizenship within post-Soviet Russia, this chapter reveals how differentiations institutionalised in the discursive and legislative frameworks of the Russian migration regime affected the social exclusion of interviewees.¹

The first part of the chapter explores how the absence of Russian citizenship influenced respondents’ access to resources and rights allocated in the receiving society. It shows that this access is negotiated by foreign citizens in several domains of society, and that deprivation experienced in one domain can be compensated by access to resources through other domain(s). The second part of the chapter examines how migrants’ access to resources in these domains was affected by racialisation – the process of constructing ‘other(s)’ through ascribing meanings to physical appearance – which they encountered in Russia.

Both parts of the chapter are focused on migrants’ agency expressed in the process of accessing resources and rights. They show how migrants have been able to overcome constraints and use opportunities embedded in the Russian migration regime. The chapter indicates the significance of social networks for migrants in terms of their access to resources/rights and explores in detail how these networks are used.

Whilst emphasising the creativity of migrants in using social structures and their ability to mobilise the available resources to attain other resources and rights, this chapter points nonetheless to migrants’ inequality in relation to Russian citizens. The chapter problematises the perception of everyday life as a site which is free from conflicts and asymmetry of power.

¹ This thesis defines social exclusion as a process of negotiating access to resources and rights between social actors operating within enabling and constraining social structures.
4.1 Russia: Social exclusion and non-Russian nationals from former Soviet republics

This part of the chapter draws on the stories told by the migrants interviewed for this research and explores the complexity of social exclusion experienced by foreign citizens in Russia.

In their interviews, non-Russian nationals revealed that they experienced limitations in accessing rights and resources in Russia. The stories about their lives in the receiving society suggest that social exclusion as a process of resource negotiation took place in two interconnected social domains simultaneously: the domain of state regulations, and the economic domain. This process was also mediated by migrants’ social networks, or, in other words, by their connections with other individuals based on interpersonal relationships. As a result of this complexity, most migrants managed to avoid the situation of complete social exclusion, where they would not be able to access any resources allocated in the receiving society.

Although the majority of interviewees described having some ability to access resources, they cannot be considered as fully included in the receiving society. This is because, firstly, some ways of accessing resources remained blocked for the respondents, necessitating the identification of other channels to obtain resources. Secondly, as foreign citizens, they had to make greater effort to acquire resources than Russian citizens. Thirdly, the resources accessible to them differed in kind and quality from those available to Russian citizens. It is worth noting, moreover, that those interviewed perceived Russian citizenship to be a condition for full inclusion in the receiving society.

4.1.1 Social exclusion in the domain of state regulations

4.1.1.1 The case of ‘legal’ migrants

The domain of state regulations consists of rules issued by the authorities. These rules are presented in the form of laws and administrative norms which regulate the interactions of social actors within the society. These rules might be understood as the formal channels of ‘getting things done’ that exist in a given society. They not only prescribe what a social actor can and/or must do, but also include the sanctions that apply for non-compliance.
Among the migrants who participated in this study, there were people with different legal statuses and people who had not managed to secure their legality in Russia. While the former were able to use formal channels of ‘getting things done’, the latter were totally excluded from such channels. This section discusses the experiences of interviewees who had secured a legal status.

The analysis of the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime undertaken in Chapter 3 shows that the range of different legal statuses which are available to foreign citizens fails to provide them with the same scope of rights and opportunities to access resources as Russian citizenship (see Table 3.1). This differentiation was reflected in the experiences of all the migrants interviewed who were in possession of legal status on the territory of the Russian Federation. These migrants could use formal channels to access resources and rights. However, without Russian citizenship, interviewees still experienced limitations and, from time to time, had to use other ways to obtain the necessary or desired resources. These techniques sometimes contravened the rules imposed by Russian legislation and, if uncovered, could provoke sanctions from the authorities, including deportation from the country. The complexity of negotiations concerning access to resources by ‘legal’ migrants is illustrated by an interview conducted with 24-year-old R. who came to Russia from Ukraine.

In Ukraine, R. lived in a town with a population of around 200,000. There he met his future wife, a Russian citizen, and in autumn 2002, after they had married, they moved to Russia. At the moment of interview R., who had been in the country almost two years at that point, was assembling the necessary documents to apply for a permanent residence permit. He was successful in securing his legal status in Russia. However, according to him, this success would not have been possible had he not had social networks to draw on. On arrival in Russia, he had to register somewhere and this was made possible by his wife’s parents. It was his mother-in-law who gathered the documents needed to apply for a temporary residence permit, since he was very busy at work. It was his wife who demonstrated the income required for obtaining his temporary and permanent residence permits, since he was employed in the informal sector of the economy and thus could not declare his earnings (even though they were in fact higher than his wife’s).

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2 Section 4.1.3.1 contains a more detailed discussion of the use of social networks for receiving and securing legal status.
It is worth noting that as a ‘legal’ migrant R. was entitled to work in the formal economic sector but had chosen to work informally, in violation of the rules which regulate the residence of foreign citizens in Russia. His choice here was partly a result of the employment restrictions governing temporary permit holders. People with this legal status must work in the region where they are registered. R., being unable to find the job he wanted in the city where he was registered, worked in Moscow. His job provided him with a good salary; this was essential given the fact that he and his wife had a child to support, and that, as a temporary permit holder, he did not have access to the welfare system in Russia. However, working informally meant R. could be prosecuted if his employment were revealed to the authorities.

In his interview, R. also recounted the other limitations he experienced in Russia. For example, he indicated that even if he were to be employed in the formal sector of the economy, he would not be able to take out a mortgage since Russian banks did not give loans to foreign citizens. R.’s plan was thus to obtain a permanent residence permit, which would give him the opportunity to work wherever he wanted in Russia and to start working legally at his work place, so that his family would be able to demonstrate enough income for a mortgage application by his wife. Thus, despite his ability to gain access to a range of resources, R. considered that, in order to achieve full social inclusion, he would need Russian citizenship. He perceived Russian citizenship to be a guarantee of stability for his life in Russia and expressed the intention to apply for this citizenship as soon as he was legally able to do so.  

The significance of Russian citizenship for inclusion into the receiving society was noted by all migrants interviewed, including citizens of Belarus, who have, according to Russian legislation, more rights than other foreigners on the territory of the Russian Federation since the inception of the Union of Russia and Belarus (see Table 3.1). A 28-year-old woman from this country, who had been living in Russia since 1999 and who had a successful career in the formal sector of the economy, expressed her feelings:

*To summarise, there is a feeling that Belarusian citizenship and Russian [citizenship] are not the same [for life in Russia]. On the one hand, Belarus, although it is not a part of Russia, forms a single Union [with Russia], so it is not as difficult here [for us] as for [people from] Moldova, Georgia and other former republics [of the USSR]. On the*

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3 The spouse of a Russian citizen has to have resided in Russia as a permanent residence permit holder for at least three years.
other hand, Belarus is not Russia, so it is not as easy [for us] as for Russian citizens. It is something in between. In many areas it is not so difficult [for us] as [for people from] other republics, but it is impossible to say that we are equal with Russian citizens.

It can be assumed that the amendments introduced into the Russian legislation in 2008 which make it possible for the authorities to deport any foreign citizen from Russia within the course of a few days in the event that their presence is deemed ‘undesirable’, made possession of Russian citizenship an absolute must in order to feel secure and included in Russian society.

4.1.1.2 The case of ‘illegal’ migrants

Most of the migrants interviewed for this research had not managed to secure legal status in Russia. As ‘illegal’ migrants, they were completely excluded from the domain of state regulations. They could not access rights and resources through the formal channels specified by Russian legislation. However, their participation in the economy through employment in the informal sector and their social networks were able to provide them with some of the resources allocated in the receiving society and even to facilitate their own legalisation. This happened in the case of 23-year-old A.

A. came to Russia from Uzbekistan. Since he migrated to a place where he had relatives, he was immediately included in their social networks. With the help of these social connections he found a job in the informal sector of the Russian economy. This incorporation into the economy provided A. with the chance to earn money to initiate and proceed with legalisation (a process requiring payment for documents and application fees), while his social networks enabled him to meet the other specified requirements – registration, demonstration of sufficient funds to support himself in Russia (he could not reveal his own earnings as he worked in the informal sector of the economy) and assistance with collection of documents etc.4

Not all ‘illegal’ migrants were able to tell such success stories. Although complete exclusion from the domain of state regulations can be compensated for, to some extent, by

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4 The role of social networks in the legalisation of migrants in Russia is explored in section 4.1.3.1
participation in the informal sector of the economy and the use of social networks, migrants living in this manner are still vulnerable. First of all, ‘illegal’ migrants can be caught and deported from the Russian Federation to the countries from which they came. Secondly, their ‘illegality’ prevents them from being employed in the formal economy. Working in the informal sector, they are not protected from possible mistreatment by employers. Thirdly, exclusion from the formal channels of ‘getting things done’ puts migrants in a situation whereby they are extremely dependent on their social networks. If something goes wrong with these connections, so-called ‘illegal’ migrants may find themselves in a difficult situation, as happened with T. and her family.

T. came to Moscow with her mother and grandmother in 1990. They had been driven out of their home in Azerbaijan by the ethnically-rooted conflict in Baku. Living without permanent registration (propiska) in Russia, they were not able to receive Russian citizenship after the collapse of the USSR, as they could not officially prove their permanent residency. Until 1996, they had had refugee status, but it was not extended subsequently. In their pursuit of the restoration of this status, they did not apply for Russian citizenship, despite the fact that they would have been entitled to do so according to Russian legislation. Each year a close friend of the family provided them with accommodation and temporarily registered them at his flat. In the 1990s, temporary registration and a Soviet passport gave T. the chance to work in the formal sector of the Russian economy. However, the changes to Russian legislation described in Chapter 3 brought an end to such possibilities. T. started work in the informal economy as a distributor of cosmetics. She built up a network of clients, but at the time of her interview this network was experiencing disruption:

At the moment, this work is not going well. That’s because I need to search for new clients and travel across the whole city. My old clients have either left or don’t want to buy these cosmetics. Sometimes, I travel all day long and get nothing.

(T.)

Some time before the interview, the close friend who had helped T’s family with accommodation and registration migrated abroad, leaving T. and her relatives with the problem of where to live:
In November and December, we stayed at Kursk railway station, at the Kursk railway station, because the Migration Service did not provide accommodation and our acquaintances had gone away from the city at the time. Now we’ve got somewhere to live for a few months [staying with acquaintances], but after that I don’t know what we’ll do.

(T.)

4.1.2 Social exclusion and the domain of the economy

The domain of the economy comprises social practices created and reproduced within society with respect to the processes of earning money and buying needed/desired goods and/or services. In this work, a situation of complete exclusion from the domain of the economy presupposes that a person does not earn money and is limited in buying the necessary/desired goods and/or services. Although among the foreign citizens interviewed for this research there were people who did not work, these interviewees frequently drew upon their social networks which provided them with money to acquire the resources they needed. In this respect, they could not be considered to be completely excluded from the domain of the economy. All of the respondents were involved in various ways in the process of negotiating access to resources through this domain.

Money is an important means through which foreign citizens can obtain resources in the receiving society. In Russia, non-Russian nationals are excluded from the welfare system, until they receive a permanent residence permit. This means that they have to pay for medical services, for example, which can be quite expensive. The processes of receiving and preserving legal statuses also require money. Moreover, judging by the interviews conducted for this research, those arriving in a place where they have no relatives to provide them with free accommodation are forced to spend a substantial amount on renting somewhere to live.

The non-Russian nationals interviewed for this research reported that they could actually buy any goods and/or services they needed, from food to the services of firms that help people collect documents for legalisation and naturalisation. However, the main resource available to

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5 See section 4.1.2.2. for a discussion of ways to access resources revealed by non-working interviewees.

6 Except for citizens of Belarus (see Table 3.1).
people in the economic domain is paid employment. It is this resource that provides the opportunity to earn money in order to access other resources in the society.

Opportunities for foreign citizens to sell their labour in exchange for money are restricted by Russian legislation. Non-Russian nationals cannot be employed in the formal labour market as easily as Russian citizens. With the exception of Belarusian citizens and those included in the state programme ‘On Assisting the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Residing Abroad’, foreign citizens are required to obtain a work permit in order to be able to work officially; the number of work permits issued is also subject to quotas. Their employability is also geographically restricted until they obtain a permanent residence permit. Employers have to undertake additional paperwork to employ foreign workers. Besides, according to Russian legislation, a range of jobs are only available to Russian citizens.

Interviews with non-Russian nationals revealed that despite all the restrictions imposed on foreign citizens by Russian legislation, they were still able to find employment in Russia. The majority of the migrants interviewed for this study were working. However, among the 33 working interviewees, only five were employed in the formal labour market. The remainder worked in Russia informally. This section discusses interviewees’ experiences in the formal and informal sectors of the Russian economy. The thesis then goes on to explore how non-working respondents accessed resources.

4.1.2.1 Working migrants

4.1.2.1.1 Participation in the formal economy

Interviewees who were employed in the formal sector of the economy felt more secure about their employment than those respondents who worked informally. Those who worked in the formal sector felt legally protected against potential mistreatment by their employers. They did not express fear that their employers might violate the conditions of their employment, and they felt free to negotiate with their employers about these conditions. Being employed officially also gives foreign citizens access to so-called ‘social packages’ provided by some firms. These ‘social packages’, at least in the case of foreign citizens interviewed for this research, include medical insurance and benefits for employees with children.
Despite the advantages of participation in the formal sector of the economy, foreign citizens (whatever their legal status) are more restricted in terms of their opportunities in the Russian labour market in comparison to Russian citizens. This discrepancy was mentioned even in interviews given by Belarusian citizens. An interesting stratification model was suggested by one of the respondents, a 32-year-old woman, who had come to Russia from Belarus to study for an MA degree at one of the educational institutes in Moscow. At the time of the interview she had already graduated and was working as an office manager for a Moscow firm:

*Recruiting agencies and employers [in Moscow] have the following pecking order: Muscovites come first, second are people from the Moscow region, in third place are Russian citizens – in other words, if you came from other parts of Russia… In fourth place are Belarusians, Ukrainians are fifth, and then come all the rest.*

(In.)

This perception of employment opportunities stems at least partially from the legal restrictions imposed on all foreign citizens; a range of jobs are unavailable even to citizens of Belarus and permanent residence holders (Sobranie zakonodatel’stva, 2002c). In. apparently encountered this obstacle in her search for a job in Russia:

*Despite having eighteen months of work experience [in the bank], I was rejected by every bank to which I applied, because of my citizenship. They did not take me although my work experience corresponded to the positions, the criteria, and the indicators… The head of the Human Resource Department told me, ‘You are ideally suited to the position, but with your citizenship we cannot give you a job either in the office, or even on reception’. Access to the bank was closed to me.*

(In.)

The interview with In. also indicated that employment opportunities for foreign citizens could be limited not only by law, but also by misinterpretations of the law. In. reported that she had found it hard to get a job because potential employers were often uninformed about the special status of Belarusians in Russia.
Out of, let’s say, 40 rejections, 35 were because of my citizenship, even though the law had already been passed saying that citizens of Belarus have equal employment rights in Russia.

(In.)

On one occasion In. also experienced direct discrimination by a potential employer who refused to take her simply because he was personally opposed to the employment of foreign citizens.

I was really shocked when I was interviewed for the firm ‘Quantum’. They were looking for a personal assistant to the deputy director. They were offering a good salary, 800 dollars. This was not bad. When he [the interviewer] saw my citizenship, he gave me such a lecture! He said: ‘Why are you coming here [to Moscow]? I think that you are flitting around, you don’t have family here or a home, you are renting flats, you are changing jobs’. He told me that his daughter and his friends’ daughters can’t find jobs here, and then we newcomers come along and expect something.

(In.)

4.1.2.1.2 Participation in the informal economy

The employment of a foreign citizen in the formal economy requires the observance of all the regulations imposed by Russian legislation. Those non-Russian nationals who for some reason cannot meet all the legal requirements usually end up seeking employment in the informal economy instead. Among the 42 migrants interviewed for this research only 19 respondents had legal status in Russia, and thus had the opportunity to work in the formal sector of the economy. Nonetheless, 14 of these ‘legal’ migrants worked in Russia informally.

The most common reason given by ‘legal’ migrants as a reason for remaining outside the formal economy was the additional formalities and fees imposed by Russian legislation on employers who hire a non-Russian national. D., a 34-year-old woman from Azerbaijan, educated in Moscow during the Soviet period, reported:

I went to the hospital. I am a nurse, a medical college graduate. They looked at my passport. At first they wanted to take me, but then the chief accountant rejected my application. She said, ‘You know, it is difficult to employ migrants [non-Russian
citizens] ... There’s a tax on this. And it means a heap of paperwork’. She said ‘I cannot be responsible for you and I don’t have the time to get these papers together. I don’t have time for you, there are a lot of people here’. I said, ‘But you wrote that you were looking for [new staff]’... I said this to her – it’s advertised everywhere that they were looking for [new people]. She answered, ‘Yes, we are, but I cannot take [you]’.

(D.)

Another reason for the exclusion of foreign citizens from the formal sector of the economy has already been illustrated by the case of R. (see section 4.1.1.1), who was unable to find a suitable position in the city where he was registered and so went to work in another city, thus violating official regulations.

Interviews conducted with student/visa holders revealed the existence of so-called ‘student jobs’ which were often offered by Russian firms without concluding contracts. These jobs are part-time, non-professional and low-paid, and might include, for example, working as a security guard or a hawker, washing cars, or waiting tables. However, these jobs provided opportunities to organise work around one's studies and, as such, were convenient for students, who did not consider them as permanent jobs, but as a temporary source of income.

While those with legal status could still try to find a job in the formal sector of the economy, people who had not managed to secure their legal status in Russia did not have any choice but to work informally. Interviews with these migrants revealed that employment in the informal sector of the economy had an ambivalent effect on the process of a foreign citizen’s exclusion from Russian society.

In the absence of access to the formal economy, informal employment provided income and the means to set oneself up in a new place of residence. On the other hand, people employed in the informal economy could not use the formal channels in order to ‘get things done’ since they had not signed any contract with their employer. Without a legally recognised contract, those who worked in the informal economy could not access health care or holiday pay and could not be protected by the Russian state if an employer violated their conditions of employment. Thus interviewees who worked informally reported that sometimes employers had not paid them for their work, or had paid much less than agreed beforehand. They also reported that they were made to work longer hours and/or that their workload per hour was increased without any concomitant increase in their wages. Employers
could dismiss them without notice and had no obligation towards them in the event of illness or even injury occurring at the workplace. Foreign citizens could not even turn to the authorities for help against their employer since non-Russian nationals have no right to work in the informal sector. If they were to reveal the circumstances of their employment they would be fined or even deported for breaking the law. F., a 39-year-old man from Tajikistan, who at the moment of the interview was informally employed in Moscow, expressed his understanding of this situation:

*People work, but are not paid. They cannot complain or say anything about this… if they complain, they are ‘illegal’ migrants and do not have any rights here… they will be deported.*

(F.)

Participation in the informal economy also had an ambiguous effect on the process of receiving and retaining legal status. On the one hand, participation in the informal economy provided money for people to initiate and carry out these processes. On the other hand, foreign citizens could not reveal their income to the authorities (see section 4.1.1.1 for the case of R.) even though, at the time of interview, the ability to show proof of sufficient funds was a requirement imposed on foreign citizens applying for Russian residence permits or citizenship.

### 4.1.2.2 Non-working migrants: ways to access resources in the receiving society

Although most of the migrants interviewed for this research worked, there were some who did not. This latter group included people who were unable to work because of their age and/or state of health, as well as students who did not need to work because they received financial support from their parents.

Not earning money could be partly compensated by incorporation into the domain of state regulations. Those elderly migrants who had managed to secure their legal status in Russia could take steps to acquire permanent residence permits and Russian citizenship. As a result, they could receive a pension and other social benefits in Russia. Holders of student visas received help with registration and accommodation from their universities. Some of
them also received scholarships. However, the main compensation for those migrants who did not work in Russia came not from their incorporation into the domain of state regulations, but from their social networks.

Seventy-eight-year-old O. came to Russia from Ukraine to live with her daughter’s family in a small town near Moscow. It took some time before her legal status was arranged and she could begin to receive her pension and social benefits in Russia. According to her, she could not have survived in Russia without the support of her daughter during this period of transition. This support continued to be essential for O. even after she began to receive her pension. The amount of the pension and social benefits provided by the Russian government appears to have been insufficient to allow her to live without the help of her daughter.

Twenty-year-old An. came to Russia from Kyrgyzstan to study at university. She chose to study in Novosibirsk where her relatives lived. An. did not need to rent accommodation, since her cousin had invited her to live in her flat. The money sent regularly by An.’s mother, who remained in Kyrgyzstan, was enough to cover An.’s expenses in Russia. An. tried to find a job in Russia in order to gain experience, but she did not succeed. However, she herself admitted that she had not tried very hard to find a job, since earning money was not crucial for her:

*I had no burning desire [to find a job]. In principle I could have put an advert in the newspaper, for example in ‘From Hand to Hand’, saying I was looking for a job and that I’m a student. But I had no real need to do so.*

*(An.)*

4.1.3 Social networks and exclusion of migrants from the receiving society

Although among the interviewed migrants there were those who were completely excluded from the domain of state regulations and/or did not earn money, there was nobody who did not have a social network in Russia. The importance of social connections based on interpersonal relationships in compensating for an increasing degree of deprivation (or even complete non-participation) in the domains of state regulations and the economy was noted above. The following section provides a more detailed discussion of the role of social networks in mediating non-Russian nationals’ access to resources in Russia.
4.1.3.1 The use of social networks for entering and securing participation in the domain of state regulations

The interviews undertaken for this research suggest that it is almost impossible for migrants to obtain legal status in the Russian Federation without recourse to informal channels in the form of support from their social networks.

Social networks were central to the process of collecting the required documents which have to be submitted when applying for a residence permit or Russian citizenship. Migrants indicated that the dilemma time for work vs. time for collecting documents was one of the main problems facing them during the legalisation process. The considerable number of documents required meant that it takes a significant amount of time to prepare the application, and the offices where applications are submitted are only open during regular working hours. Consequently, migrants reported that they had either to work less and thus earn less money, or ask their relatives and friends to help them prepare their application.

Besides problems with time, migrants experienced problems with the availability of the required documents. Applications for all legal statuses require a range of documents issued in the country of departure. Various circumstances can prevent migrants from returning home to collect the necessary paperwork. In this situation, the existence of social networks in the country of departure is vital. This is illustrated by the testimony of E., a 34-year-old woman who arrived in Russia from Uzbekistan in 1992 but who still did not have Russian citizenship in 2004:

What happened to us is that the stamp on my birth certificate which was issued 33 years ago, when I was born, had rubbed off because of the age of the document. It is not clearly visible. No notary will certify this stamp. They say ‘Go to Uzbekistan and make a copy of your birth certificate there’. How can I travel there on a Soviet passport? That is our problem now... I asked if they could send a letter of inquiry. They say that this letter of inquiry will wait at least three months for an answer... I do not have relatives in Uzbekistan to ask for help with this problem. I don’t have anybody. My husband cannot go, because he is the only one who is earning money. There are five people in our family – three children, him and me. He earns fifteen thousand roubles, which is very little to
live on in the North... We do not have the money to go to Uzbekistan even for a month to get my birth certificate.

(E.)

Secondly, social networks are employed in order to overcome pitfalls in the formal system. Migrants reported that the procedures for acquiring legal status in Russia were full of inconsistencies, which could be circumvented only through social connections. The following quotation from an interview with R. provides evidence of such use of social networks:

*I had to submit the results of three medical tests – HIV, sexually transmitted diseases and something else, I don’t remember now... When the results were ready, the doctors wrote a certificate stating ‘He is healthy’. The police said ‘No, we need a certificate for each test’. I went back to the hospital and asked for three certificates. I was told ‘No, we don’t provide them in that way’... This problem was solved only because we found some connection to the chief medical officer of this hospital... My mother-in-law was acquainted with him somehow... Until we spoke [with this chief medical officer] we did not get what we asked for.*

(R.)

Finally, social networks help migrants to meet the requirements imposed by Russian legislation on applicants for registration, residence permits, and citizenship. For example, applicants for all three forms of status have to submit official documents proving that they have enough money to support themselves and their families in Russia. All the migrants interviewed in this research were able to fulfil this requirement only with the help of their social networks.

4.1.3.2 Social networks and participation in the economy

Social networks were actively used by interviewees working in the formal and informal economy alike. However, while in the formal economy social networks were used by interviewees alongside the formal channels of ‘getting things done’, for those working in the informal economy, social networks were the only means whereby migrants could get things done.
According to the interviewees, social networks in the informal economy perform a number of roles. In addition to functioning as channels for information about jobs, goods, clients etc., and for reaching people who provide access to resources, they also act as a regulatory mechanism. Migrants use the networks to secure their conditions of employment and personal security. Two migrants from Tajikistan – a 39-year-old man and a 23-year-old woman – reported:

_Without acquaintances, when you don’t know anybody, it is very risky to work here ... If you find a job though acquaintances, it is more secure. It would be better to earn less money, but have some guarantee that you’ll receive it._

(F.)

_At the beginning I was afraid to dance for Russian people... There’s a difference between dancing at family events among your relatives and dancing in a restaurant in another country. Who knows what could happen? So I was scared. However, now that a lot of people know me, I’m not afraid, because if something happens, I have acquaintances, so somebody will be concerned about me._

(N.)

At the same time, employers looking for informal employees use their social connections to find reliable people. A 27-year-old migrant from Uzbekistan, who had his own team of builders in Novosibirsk, explained how and why employers approached him:

_I constantly work for this person... We met last winter ... My team built the roof for a restaurant and I met with his friend. We renovated his office and after that I met M.A. [the present employer]... He came and looked at our work. He liked it and asked us to do some work on his cottage... People who are interested [in our service] come along, they take a look at [our work] – the main thing is the quality and the speed of the work – and if they like it, they offer us work and recommend us to their friends._

(Z.)
4.1.3.3 Social networks: composition of social connections

Given the importance of social networks in preventing a situation of complete social exclusion from the receiving society, it was not surprising that most of the interviewees reported that their choice of their new place of residence had been influenced by the availability of an initial social network. They migrated to the places where they had relatives, friends or acquaintances. The literature also points to the existence of this tendency among migrants more generally (Boyd, 1989; Brettell, 2000, p. 107).

Where respondents moved to a place in which they did not have an existing social network, they relied on formal organisations (for example, educational institutions), which they expected would provide them with certain resources in the receiving society and give them the chance to create social networks. However, for most interviewees, the availability of support from the formal organisations was not enough and they considered it an advantage to have social networks. The words of H., a 21-year-old woman from Kazakhstan, who was studying at one of the universities in Novosibirsk, illustrated this point:

Why did I decide to come to Novosibirsk in particular and to Russia in general? I am from Kazakhstan ... In Novosibirsk I had an acquaintance who studied here and so the problem of housing could be solved by sharing accommodation with her. She was also studying at this university ... Novosibirsk is close to where my relatives live, so if anything goes wrong I can ask them for help ...

(H.)

The last sentence from the quotation above indicates that social networks at the site of departure were also considered important by migrants. They were used in the negotiation of access to resources and rights in the receiving society. The role which they played in the collection of documents for legalisation and naturalisation in Russia has already been mentioned. In addition, social networks could provide migrants with money, other resources and support, which could help them overcome problems and organise their lives in the receiving society.

However, according to the interviews, neither social connections at the site of departure nor connections initially available at the new place of residence were sufficient for
newcomers. After their arrival they intentionally or unintentionally expanded their social networks in the receiving society. Among the factors facilitating the creation of new connections were: the sharing of common space, for example, working together, studying at the same educational institution, or living in close proximity; and common interests. The last factor includes initially shared interests in, for example, the process of legalisation, and negotiated interests (such as interests shared between employer and employee or landlord and tenant).

4.1.4 Non-Russian nationals in Russia: discussion of the research results in the context of wider literature on social networking

This part of the chapter has explored how the absence of Russian citizenship affects the experiences of former Soviet citizens coming to Russia from other NIS countries. It has shown that the limitations imposed by the current Russian legislation can be overcome by these people through the complex process of negotiation which they carry out with other social actors operating in the receiving society in the domain of state regulations and the economy. It has indicated that social networks play a crucial role in this process. In the case of non-Russian citizens living in Russia, these networks mediate their entry to and participation in the domains of state regulations and the economy. Moreover, social networks can even compensate for non-participation in these domains. The data collected within this research indicate that social networks are not something which exist per se. Social actors have to invest their time and effort in constructing and maintaining meaningful social connections with others. In this respect migrants’ social networks can be perceived as indicators of migrants’ agency.

The results of this research telling about significance of social network for migrants in the receiving society are in line with results of other research projects conducted in Russia and other parts of the world (Gurak and Cases, 1992; Brednikova and Pachenkov, 2002; Flynn, 2004; Brednikova and Tkach, 2010). However, this thesis is far from perceiving social networking as an unequivocal panacea to social deprivation. As has been shown, reliance on social networks without opportunity to participate in the domain of state regulations and the economy can turn out to be insufficient to secure access to resources in the receiving society. Most of the success stories are told by those non-Russian nationals who managed to secure
their legal status in Russia and as such were able to combine formal and informal ways of ‘getting things done’.

Research based on surveys (Rose, 2000 [1999]; Clarke, 2002) and studies of everyday life (Burawoy, 2001; Round, 2002; Caldwell, 2004) outline the importance of social networks for people living in Russia. Some researchers even express hesitation as to whether reliance on formal channels alone is enough to ‘get things done’ in this country. That was certainly true in the 1990s when Russian citizens had to operate in a situation of dramatic economic, political, and social changes accompanied by the inability of the so-called ‘weak’ state to control implementation of the legislation. Informal practices were used across all society, ranging from people who were struggling simply to survive (Burawoy, Krotov, and Lytkina, 2000; Round, 2002), through to the new business and power elites who used these practices to accumulate more and more resources in their possession. In the 2000s, the economic growth which the Russian Federation experienced until recently, and the building of the so-called ‘vertical of power’, increased people’s opportunities to access resources by means other than social networks. However, the usage of informal channels of ‘getting things done’ is far from having been eliminated in this country (Ledeneva, 2006). The author of this thesis thinks that the Russian population’s inclination to use social networks to access resources cannot be explained by reference to the specificity of ‘Russian culture’ alone. After all, people in other societies also use social networks to ‘get things done’. Social networks are used for this purpose in situations when the existing formal channels cannot provide people with the required resources, or when the usage of these formal channels demands more efforts and resources than the usage of informal channels. For example, this research has shown that it is extremely problematic for non-Russian nationals who come to Russia without visas to secure their legality through formal channels without using social networks. The research has also shown that it is precisely limitations with regard to opportunities to access resources through formal channels that push both ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migrants to employ their social networks.

4.2 Social exclusion and racialisation in Russia: the case of former Soviet citizens

As indicated in the methodological chapter (p.64), this research initially assumed that the Russian migration regime differentiates migrants according to their ethnicity. Although
differentiation based on ethnicity was revealed through analysis of the discursive framework of the migration regime, analysis of the migrants’ interviews showed that another differentiation embedded in the discursive framework, namely differentiation based on racial constructions, was no less influential in shaping interviewees’ experiences in Russia.

The migrants interviewed for this research reported that the local people do not distinguish them according to their ethnicities. Instead they call them collectively ‘non-Russians’, ‘blacks’, ‘persons of Caucasian nationality’, ‘churki’, etc. A 27-year-old woman who came to Novosibirsk from Azerbaijan and a 29-year-old man who came to Moscow from Tajikistan share an understanding of the classification system which is reproduced in the receiving society:

*Here, there is no ‘You are an Azerbaijani, Uzbek or Armenian’. Here the word ‘non-Russian’ is used or they also say ‘churki’.*

(J.)

*Young people do not know what the Caucasus is, what Central Asia is. They do not draw a distinction. They see ‘non-Russian’ and it is obvious to them that someone is ‘black’ or a ‘person of Caucasian nationality’.*

(G.)

The respondents felt that the receiving society subdivides them into two groups. While ‘Russian’-looking people are assigned to one group, people who have features (skin colour, form of nose, eyes etc.) which are defined as ‘non-Russian’, find themselves categorised in another group. This externally imposed categorisation involves ascribing meanings to people’s real and imagined biological characteristics and as such can be conceptualised as racialisation.

As is evident from the interviews, racialisation in post-Soviet Russian society takes the form of racism as defined by Miles and Brown (2003). It appears that migrants who look ‘non-Russian’ experience negative appraisals, while those who look ‘Russian’ are perceived

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7 The division into ‘Russian’-looking people and ‘non-Russian’-looking people indicated by the respondents points to the fact that ‘skin colour’ is not the only marker involved in racialisation, although the literature discussing racialisation in post-Soviet Russian society tends to speak about this marker alone (see, for example, Roman [2002]).
more or less positively. Migrants talking about the experience of being perceived as ‘non-Russians’ recalled the negative stereotypes encountered in Russia. Among these stereotypes are those which represent ‘non-Russians’ as a threat to the security of Russian society. L., a 23-year-old woman living in Novosibirsk, but originally from Uzbekistan, recounted the suspicion she encountered in Russian shops, where she would be watched as if she were a thief. The interviewees in Moscow pointed out that every terrorist act prompted an intensification of police checks of ‘non-Russian’-looking people. In their interviews, ‘non-Russian’-looking migrants frequently mentioned that people tended to associate them with drug trafficking.

The negative stereotyping of ‘non-Russian’-looking people, as shown in Chapter 3, is produced and reproduced by the mass media. The differentiated attitude towards ‘Russian’-looking people and ‘non-Russian’-looking people revealed in the interviews conducted for this research project is also reflected in the results of public opinion polls. They show that the Russian population expresses a higher level of aggression and suspicion towards ‘non-Russian’-looking migrants than towards ‘Russian’-looking migrants.8

The following sections of the chapter explore how racialisation informs the interaction of migrants with other social actors operating in the receiving society. It also examines the effects which this interaction has on the social exclusion of migrants, as well as on their social networks.

4.2.1 Racialisation and social exclusion in the domain of state regulations

The interviews conducted with migrants show that the whole system in place in Russia to regulate migration makes it difficult for migrants to secure their legal status in the country. As Chapter 3 notes, the transformation of ‘legal’ migrants into ‘illegal’ ones often occurred as the result of the ‘creativity’ of officials, whose interpretations of the national legislation could prevent migrants from obtaining registration in the Russian Federation.9 Among the interviewees who had been pushed into the realm of ‘illegality’ were both ‘Russian’-looking migrants and ‘non-Russian’-looking migrants. However, the literature describes cases when

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8 See Chapter 3 for an overview of studies on public opinion.
9 As indicated in Chapter 3, before 2002, migrants from the former Soviet republics had to obtain registration, a so-called ‘propiska’ (temporary or permanent) in Russia in order to obtain rights and resources in the receiving society. Nowadays they do not need a ‘propiska’, but to secure legal status in Russia they must get another kind of registration on their migration card within three days of their arrival. This registration lasts for up to 90 days. Problems arise when the police refuse to allow the migrant to extend this registration.
‘non-Russian’-looking migrants were not able to secure their legal status in Russia because of the direct discrimination of officials (Roman, 2002; Amnesty International, 2003).10

‘Illegal’ migrants find themselves in a very vulnerable position. They are excluded from the formal channels of ‘getting things done’. Their rights are not protected by Russian legislation; in fact, they can be persecuted as offenders. If they lack the proper documents, both ‘non-Russian’-looking and ‘Russian’-looking people alike face trouble if they come into contact with the authorities. However, ‘non-Russian’-looking ‘illegal’ migrants are considerably more vulnerable than ‘Russian’-looking migrants in the same situation, because of the racial profiling exercising by Russian police during document checks on the street.

Russian legislation allows the police to stop people on the street in order to check their documents, namely their passports and registration. Through these routine checks the police can find those who are violating the migration regulations. Such people are fined or taken to the police station for further questioning and possibly deportation. Interviewed migrants, irrespective of their legal status in Russia, expressed apprehensions regarding encounters with Russian police officers not only because of the abovementioned reasons, but also because they expected unlawful behaviour from police officers. Migrants’ negative feelings and attitudes towards the Russian police corresponded with the feelings and attitudes expressed by Russian citizens more broadly. According to an opinion poll conducted in Russian cities (including Moscow and Novosibirsk) in 2004, 48% of city-dwellers thought that encounters with police officers could result in bribery, 40% of respondents thought that meeting with police officers could lead to ungrounded detention,11 and 24% expected physical violence (Obshchestvennyi Verdikt, 2004).

Such attitudes seem to be grounded in real experiences. According to the cited research, 44% of city-dwellers had been victims of extortion during encounters with Russian police officers, 47% of respondents reported that either they or their relatives/friends had been detained without reason, and 25% reported that either they or their relatives/friends had experienced violence in their dealings with the police (Obshchestvennyi Verdikt, 2004). Migrants interviewed for this thesis also told about their experiences of being subjected to

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10 Some of the migrants interviewed for this research thought that the rudeness which they had experienced in their dealings with officials working for the Federal Migration Service and problems with legalisation might be caused by racial prejudice held by these officials. However, since some of the ‘Russian’-looking respondents also reported similar experiences, it is impossible to state with certainty that racial discrimination exists in the Federal Migration Service.

11 According to Russian law a police officer can detain a person for 48 hours without laying charges (Jurix, 2006, p. 53).
unlawful behaviour on the part of Russian police officers. For example, R. – a Ukrainian citizen who holds a temporary residence permit in Russia – was robbed by police officers who stopped him for a document check on his way home from his place of work in Moscow. The respondents from Tajikistan complained that they were constantly stopped by Russian police officers who were intent on extorting money from them.

In 2004, more than 82% of city-dwellers in Russia thought that it was almost impossible to redress violations of justice by police (Obshchestvennyi Verdikt, 2004). Interviewed migrants – both ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ – were similarly convinced that nothing could be done in the case of unlawful behaviour on the part of police officers. While such an attitude is arguable in the case of legal migrants, it is reasonable in the case of ‘illegal’ migrants who cannot refer to the legal system of the Russian Federation without making themselves vulnerable to deportation as violators of the migration regulations.\footnote{Unprotected by Russian law and persecuted and harassed by the law enforcement agencies, ‘illegal’ migrants are also vulnerable to the unlawful behaviour of local people more broadly. Because of the negative stereotypes circulating in Russia about ‘non-Russian’-looking people, those ‘illegal’ migrants who do not have a so-called ‘Slavic’ appearance are even more vulnerable. Some of the migrants interviewed during this research revealed that they and/or their relatives had experienced acts of violence on the part of locals simply because they were identified as ‘non-Russians’. Other ‘non-Russian’ respondents expressed fears of becoming victims of violence in the future.}

From observations made during fieldwork, it seems that police officers tend to approach ‘non-Russian’-looking people more often than ‘Russian’-looking people. This racial profiling has also been noted by other researchers (Caldwell, 2003; Jurix, 2006; Ziemer, 2008). The migrants interviewed for the present research were aware of this, too. In their interviews they outlined the importance of physical appearance. For example, a 25-year-old woman from Belarus who defined herself as a Russian Jew claimed that she had never been approached for a document check and attributed this to her ‘Slavic’ appearance. At the same time, a young woman who had come from one of the Central Asian republics revealed how she altered her appearance in order to blend in with ‘Russian’-looking people. She acknowledged that this helped her to avoid encounters with the Russian police:

\emph{Before I used to dress in a more Oriental way and because of that the police often stopped me. Nowadays I dress in such a way that people do not notice that I am different. Who knows, maybe I got a tan in the solarium.} (N.)
It is often argued that a ‘non-Russian’ appearance makes migrants more visible in Russia, and thus more easily identifiable as migrants than ‘Russian’-looking migrants. However, there are many ‘non-Russian’-looking citizens in the Russian Federation (for example, Buryats, peoples from the North Caucasus, etc.) who are also often stopped and checked by the police (Gdaniec and Ovchinnikova, 2006; Ziemer, 2008). What makes ‘non-Russian’-looking migrants more vulnerable to document checks by the police, therefore, is a negative attitude towards ‘non-Russians’. ‘Non-Russian-ness’, it appears, is a mark of the ‘other’. The greater the degree of ‘otherness’ attached to a person, the more trouble is expected from him/her. The fact that ‘non-Russian’-looking people are stopped by the police more often than ‘Russian’-looking people means that those of them who lack legal status on Russian territory have a considerably greater chance of being fined, imprisoned and deported from the country as ‘illegal’ migrants than ‘Russian’-looking ‘illegal’ migrants. They are also more likely to be subjected to unlawful behaviour on the part of the police.

Some commentators argue that the racial profiling practiced by Russian police during document checks on the street is a result of the personal prejudices held by individual police officers, arising out of lack of education, professionalism etc.. If so, then the proportion of Russian police officers characterised by a lack of education and professionalism can be said to be very high. Research in the Moscow metro, for example, revealed that ‘non-Russian’-looking people are stopped by the police 21 times more than ‘Russian’-looking people (Jurix, 2006).

Alternatively, it can be argued that such profiling is a sign of institutional racism (Osipov, 2005). Institutional racism means the existence of recursively reproduced social practices of differentiating people according to their appearance with further unequal treatment of these people. Establishing definitively whether such institutional racism exists, however, requires rigorous ethnographic research focused on social practices produced and reproduced by the police officers and other officials in their everyday activity at their working places and especially during their interactions with their clients. Such studies could not be carried out in the framework of this thesis due to the atmosphere of secrecy endemic in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Experts have pointed out that unequal treatment of people based on appearance is also displayed by other officials, for example, by those who work in the office of the Public Prosecutor or in courts of justice (Zabryanskii, 2005).
4.2.2 Racialisation and social exclusion in the economy

It has been argued that the post-Soviet Russian economy is characterised by the emergence of ‘ethnic’ niches, in other words, economic activities dominated by individuals of a particular ethnicity (Snisarenko, 1999; Turukanova, 2006, pp. 92-93). This phenomenon is presented as a side effect of migration from abroad, especially from the former Soviet republics. The data collected during this study, however, support the work of researchers who argue that there are no ‘ethnic’ niches in Russia (Brednikova and Pachenkov, 2000; Voronkov, 2000). All the migrants interviewed for the present research project worked in multiethnic environments and did not use social networks based exclusively on shared ethnicity in their search for jobs. At the same time, some ‘non-Russian’-looking migrants provided evidence to suggest that their experiences in the Russian labour market were informed by the process of racialisation.

In Russia, in certain circumstances, a ‘non-Russian’ appearance can help in finding a job. Such was the case of a young woman from Tajikistan who started a new career as a belly dancer soon after her arrival in Novosibirsk. In Russia, where belly dancing is associated with the Orient (Vostok) and is identified as ‘oriental dance’ (‘vostochnye tantsy’), to look ‘oriental’ (‘po-vostochnomu’) is an advantage for performers. N., a 23-year-old woman from Tajikistan, who started her career without any previous experience, reported that she did not need any certificate, diploma or videotapes with recordings of her performance to get her first appointment as a dancer in an ‘oriental’ restaurant. According to her, she got this job simply because she looked ‘oriental’.

The otherness of ‘non-Russian’-looking people has become an object of consumption for the locals. The demand for the ‘oriental look’ which exists in the Russian entertainment and catering industries is reflected in interviews with other respondents. Both 29-year-old G. and 39-year-old F., migrants from Tajikistan, recounted in their interviews that they were employed as ‘oriental men’ to make shaurma (doner kebab). Not all the places which sell the ‘Orient’ have ‘oriental’-looking staff. However, competition in this market has prompted entrepreneurs to start paying attention to this. According to L., a 23-year-old woman from Uzbekistan, she was approached many times by the owners of ‘oriental’ restaurants and cafes who promised to hire her without proper papers and even offered their help in the process of legalisation. In her interview L. expressed her understanding of this situation:
...It is profitable for them [the owners of ‘oriental’ places]. The restaurant is ‘oriental’ and waitresses there are also ‘oriental’. Imagine, you enter a [restaurant] and [find] the ‘Orient’ in Siberia...

(L.)

Although migrants who are defined as ‘non-Russian’ thus have an opportunity to be incorporated into the economy of the receiving society through involvement in the production of goods and services, they are at the same time excluded from it through obstacles to their consumption. Sometimes they cannot buy what they want because the vendor of a given commodity or service does not want to sell it to ‘non-Russian’-looking people. The migrants interviewed reported, for instance, that a ‘non-Russian’ appearance significantly complicates the search for rented accommodation. Many landlords express their unwillingness to have ‘non-Russians’ from the former Soviet republics as tenants. In both Moscow and Novosibirsk, it is common to see advertisements for rented accommodation which clearly state that only Slavs need apply (photo 1). Every one of the ‘non-Russian’-looking respondents had a story to tell about an occasion when a potential landlord rejected him or her as a tenant merely on the basis of their otherness. The evidence provided by the interviewees is supported by the findings of other researchers about the experience of migrants in Russia (Pain, 2003; Mukomel’, 2005, pp. 234-243; Vendina, 2005).

4.2.3 Social networking: racialisation and ethnicity

4.2.3.1 Racialisation and social networking

The importance of migrants being included in social networks has been discussed above. Among the migrants interviewed for the present research, all of them made use of social networks. They used these networks to meet the requirements imposed by Russian legislation regulating the issues of migration and naturalisation, to find jobs and accommodation, and to
gain access to other resources. Moreover, social networks were used to secure not only the interviewees’ material wellbeing, but, as the research has shown, the psychological comfort of not being alone.

The data collected for the present research do not suggest that the social networking of interviewed migrants is racialised. The interviews suggest that in Russia the construction of differentiation among people, through ascribing meaning to their real and imagined phenotypic features, does not prevent ‘non-Russian’-looking people from becoming members of the social networks of ‘Russian’-looking people, and vice versa. Although the migrants interviewed recognised that stereotypes and prejudices about ‘non-Russians’ could complicate their initial contact with some locals in the receiving society, they also indicated that personal communication and getting to know each other better caused people to change their attitudes towards the ‘other’ and could result in close relationships (see also Caldwell, 2003). An illustration of how such ‘bridging of differences’ can occur was provided by a 53-year-old woman who identified herself as Armenian.

Am. came to Russia from Armenia in 2000. She held the status of refugee which she received in Armenia as a person who had to leave Baku (the capital of Azerbaijan) as the result of ethnically-rooted conflict in 1989. On her arrival in Russia she stayed with a relative in the Moscow region and after some time she managed to obtain a permanent residence permit. At the time of interview she was collecting documents to apply for Russian citizenship.

After receiving a permanent residence permit Am. found a job in Moscow, and needed to find rented accommodation. She reported that, when they first met, her present landlords had expressed prejudice against her and her Armenian friend (with whom she was looking for accommodation):

*Yes. I can say that they [the locals] are reluctant to let accommodation. Even my landlords, who are very nice and pleasant people... When we first met, we set a time [with the landlords and the estate agent] and met... I noticed the expression on my future landlady’s face... Despite the fact that I have white skin, my appearance is not Slavic. As for my friend, she is clearly Armenian – swarthy, dark-haired. I saw how the face of the landlady changed... I asked [the estate agent] ‘Olya, what is wrong with her?’ She answered ‘Pay no attention, please. I often see this in my trade and think that you should ignore it’. We went [to the flat], we liked it. It was a clean, light flat. It was*
fine and pleasant. We asked [the landlady] ‘So, what are we going to do now? We like [the flat]. When can you give us an answer?’ And she said ‘I will think about it. My husband does not like “kavkaztsy” [Caucasians]’. You know, it was all said so shamelessly and openly... I got very angry! I said to her ‘You do not need to like us’. Her husband does not like ‘kavkaztsy’! I said to her, that she does not need to like us. ‘You simply have to let the accommodation and we have to pay for it.’ (Am.)

Eventually, however, the landlady decided to offer the flat to Am. After Am. had been renting this flat for a while, the relationship between Am. and her landlords became friendlier. As Am. indicated in her interview, her landlords had had the opportunity to see that she was a reliable tenant and they appreciated this. She was also satisfied with them. She characterised them as decent and trustworthy people. Am. indicated that the most significant shift in their relationship occurred after they had had the opportunity to spend some time together. This opportunity emerged when her landlords decided to change the furniture in the rented flat. They had to do this themselves and so they spent a whole day there with Am. Talking and getting to know each other better helped Am. and her landlords to overcome the landlords’ initial prejudice. The relationship improved even further when the landlord (the husband who did not like ‘kavkaztsy’) offered to help Am. buy a computer. That suggestion impressed her very much. She gave him the money and he bought her a good computer, installed all the neccessary programmes and connected it to the internet. The following words used by Am. in her interview can be used to summarise Am.’s story about ‘bridging’ the initial hostility between her and her landlords.

_We have normal human relationships [now]. And it seems to me that the more often people communicate in this way [like my landlords and I], the more opportunities they have to understand that other people – each has his/her own peculiarities, nobody must think that he/she is better... I don’t know how to say it. We have to be more tolerant._ (Am.)

According to the results of public opinion polls, the majority of the Russian population does not want to have migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia as neighbours.
Nevertheless, it seems that in some cases, as soon as these migrants become their neighbours, opportunities arise for the locals to get to know them better, to rethink existing stereotypes and eventually to build good relationships with them. Since, as shown above, social networks are so important in accessing resources, the absence of racialisation in social networking could be interpreted as a factor which might to some extent alleviate the consequences of resource deprivation in the domain of state regulation and the economy for ‘non-Russian’-looking foreign citizens in Russia. Unfortunately, at least in the cases of the ‘non-Russian’-looking migrants interviewed for this research, their non-racialised social networks could not shield them from all the negative effects of racialisation in the receiving society. The interviewees reported that although they had many local friends, it was still possible for them to find themselves the subject of discrimination and violence provoked by their ‘non-Russian’ appearance. For example, L., a migrant from Uzbekistan, reported that her husband, who had studied in Russia for several years and had a wide non-racialised social network in the receiving society, had been beaten up more than once by Russian youths because he did not look ‘Russian’. L., herself, despite having many friends among Russians, did not feel safe on the streets or in her encounters with Russian officials.

4.2.3.2 Ethnicity and social networks

Although interviews did not provide evidence that the social networks of so-called ‘non-Russian’-looking people are racialised, they did enable some level of solidarity to be discerned among people who consider themselves to be members of the same ‘ethnic group’. On the basis of shared ethnicity, people create social networks which can help with problems in the receiving society, including those which are caused by racialisation. For example, as has been shown above, ‘non-Russian’-looking migrants without ‘legal’ status in Russia are at much greater risk of deportation than ‘Russian’-looking migrants. However, according to the respondents, in practice, officials find it difficult to deport ‘illegal’ migrants due to insufficient funds. As a result, instead of going back to their respective countries of origin, ‘illegal’ migrants detained by the police may spend an indeterminate length of time in Russian prisons. In the case of Tajiks living in Moscow at least, help in such situations is provided by an NGO which was created by influential representatives of the Tajik diaspora. This organisation tries to locate detained migrants’ relatives and friends. Sometimes these people
may live in Russia, but, as ‘illegal’ migrants themselves, cannot make contact with a relative or friend who has been detained by the police. If relatives cannot be found, the organisation raises funds to help the individual concerned. What follows is the story told by a 29-year-old man from Tajikistan, who managed to help his friend with the assistance of this ethnic-based NGO:

I had a friend. The friend disappeared. I went to work, but he was caught. He did not have a passport. I had warned him lots of times that he needed to sort out his registration. He did not listen to me, either because he had no money – I was ready to help him with this – anyhow, he got caught. I did not hear from him for three days... I went to the police, searched that police station... I found him, I found him in the police station... He was sentenced to deportation, but he did not have a passport. [With the help of the NGO] we got him a passport. Gavar [the manager of the NGO] sponsored all this... There were also other prisoners in the police station. They did not have relatives.... That is also a problem. People without relatives are insecure and it is very hard to find relatives. Sometimes those in prison have no idea where their relatives are. They’ve lost [touch with] each other ... Anyhow, we got passports for these people too, bought tickets and sent these people home.

(G.)

However, according to the migrants interviewed in the context of this research, shared ethnicity does not necessarily constitute grounds for mutual help with most problems. Rather, help comes from family members, friends and acquaintances. The social networks of the respondents stretch far beyond the borders constructed through ethnicisation. Migrants have friends and acquaintances among a variety of people assigned to different so-called ‘ethnic groups’.

This research also revealed cases when people preferred to avoid social networking based on shared ethnicity. For example, L. and N., two 23-year-old women who came to Russia from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan presumed that other Uzbeks and Tajiks (both women and men) would carry in their minds the social practices, norms and regulations of the gender
they had left behind, and would seek to impose these norms and restrictions on them in Russia. As a result, these two young women tried to avoid other compatriots and did not seek out the Uzbek or Tajik ‘community’. When Uzbeks and Tajiks approached L. and N., the girls tried to conceal their origin by pretending that they did not know the language. Instead of networks based on ethnicity, L. and N. constructed connections with people whom they did not identify as belonging to their ‘ethnic groups’. At the time of the interview both of them had extensive social networks of friends and acquaintances, which had helped them to organise their lives in the receiving society and feel at home in it.

4.2.4 Differentiation of people on the grounds of their appearance: locating the research results in the broader context of the Russian situation

The experiences of ‘non-Russian’-looking migrants in Russia are informed by the process of racialisation which is currently underway in contemporary Russian society. A ‘non-Russian’-appearance is not a sign that a person is a migrant from another country who must consequently be treated differently. There are many ethnic groups whose ‘homes’ are considered to be in Russia, but whose appearances are not considered to be ‘Russian’. These groups of ‘non-Russian’-looking citizens are also the targets of racial rhetoric and racial stereotypes. They experience racial profiling practised by police and racial attacks by other Russian citizens. Although human rights activists point to the existence of racism in Russia, this topic is not present in discourses produced by officials; nor is it a matter that receives much academic attention in Russia (Osipov, 2005). Experts point out that the current legal system existing in Russia does not allow a person to prove that he/she has been a victim of racial discrimination. Although Russian legislation does contain articles which stipulate penalties for such discrimination, there is no working mechanism in place to prove such cases of racial discrimination (Soboleva, 2005).

The lack of discussion about racial discrimination in Russia is a very interesting phenomenon in its own right. Although the problem of unequal treatment of people on the basis of their appearance is one that is recognised by academics and the authorities, it tends to

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14 The gender order is described by Connell (1987) as ‘an historically constructed pattern of power relations between men and women and definitions of femininity and masculinity’ (p. 99).

15 L. and N. talked a lot about the emancipation they experienced as the result of migration to a society with a more liberal gender order. The women’s reflections on this are presented in more detail in Appendix F.
be pitched as a problem of xenophobia (hostility to the other/stranger) or a problem of ethnic hostility (animosity between different ethnic or national groups \([\text{natsional’nosti}]\)). The category of ‘race’ is absent in this discussion.

An engagement with the debate on the existence of races in Russia is beyond the scope of this study. This study wishes simply to indicate the existence of a process of racialisation, through which people in Russia are differentiated into ‘Russian’-looking and ‘non-Russian’-looking people. These groups are social constructions and their borders are very fluid. Moreover, people who are assigned membership of these groups by others do not necessarily identify themselves as in the same way. The interviewees who reported experiences of being externally categorised as ‘non-Russian’-looking did not consider this categorisation as valid or relevant to their own identities. They defined themselves in terms of their ethnicity.

However, people’s self-identification is not fixed, and can change over time. Thus, for example, some of the respondents spoke about themselves not only as representatives of a particular ethnicity, but also as ‘Oriental men/women’. An interesting observation in this regard is provided by the research conducted in one of the regions of the North Caucasus (Ziemer, 2008). This research reveals that young people who consider themselves as belonging to different ethnicities of the North Caucasus are starting to identify with the supra-ethnic category of ‘Caucasians’ (\([kavkaztsy]\)), in response to the external identification imposed on them by Russian youth residing in this region. This represents an attempt to re-appropriate this category, by re-casting it in a positive sense (as opposed to the Russian usage of the term, which is pejorative). The category ‘Caucasians’ (\([kavkaztsy]\)) has become not only a category of self-definition, but also a factor of social mobilisation. This can be considered as a kind of reification of the fluid process of racialisation – in this case, the process of differentiation into ‘Caucasians’ (\([kavkaztsy]\)) and others.

Osipov (2005) points to the danger of importing the category of ‘race’ into discourses circulating in Russia. He correctly indicates that an understanding of ‘races’ as reified social groups has the potential to increase differentiation between people. The differentiation of people observed in the framework of this research should be understood as a process of social construction performed by social actors through their interactions. Such an understanding still allows us to talk about racism in Russia, since those who are defined as ‘non-Russian’-looking are subject to negative stereotyping. This research has shown that such stereotyping affects the experiences of interviewees in negative ways. It is worth noting that racialisation
does not necessarily lead to racism; if the category of the ‘other’ is defined in positive or neutral terms, then this will not necessarily cause deprivation of those defined as such. For example, interviewees who were defined as ‘non-Russian’-looking reported that they had in fact gained access to additional opportunities in the Russian labour market because of their appearance.

This research also showed that negative stereotyping presented in the mass media and public opinion can be overcome through personal communication between individuals. The distant ‘other’ can be imagined in negative terms, but as soon as you encounter this ‘other’ in real life there is opportunity to revise your attitude towards his/her otherness. This is part of the reason for the current flexibility of the categories of ‘Russian’-looking people and ‘non-Russian’-looking people.

Conclusion

The migrants interviewed for this research provided illustration of the fact that the process of their social exclusion was affected by the Russian migration regime, which differentiates people according to their citizenship and meanings ascribed to their physical appearance (racial constructions).

The interviewees’ social exclusion, in other words, their negotiation of access to resources, occurred simultaneously in two interconnected social domains – the domain of state regulations and the domain of the economy – and was mediated by their social networks. This complexity of negotiation allowed them to avoid a situation where they were unable to access any resources in the receiving society whatsoever.

The interviews demonstrated the creativity of migrants in using the enabling potential of social structures and their own ability to overcome constraints. The most important elements in resisting the deprivation of rights and resources were social networks. Social networks enable migrants to compensate for deprivation experienced in the domains of state regulations and the economy. The significance of social networks in overcoming limited access to resources indicates the role played by the agency of those who are excluded, when it comes to shaping the process of social exclusion and its outcomes. However, an exclusive reliance on social networks may be insufficient to overcome social deprivation.
The research revealed that foreign citizens who were defined through the process of racialisation as ‘non-Russian’-looking people were more vulnerable in Russia in comparison with ‘Russian’-looking migrants, because of racial profiling displayed by Russian police. At the same time, in the domain of the economy, racialisation influenced interviewees’ experiences in contradictory ways. On the one hand, representations of the ‘other’ as different and ‘exotic’ created additional opportunities for those ‘non-Russian’-looking people whose appearance was defined as ‘oriental’ to earn money through selling their ‘otherness’ to the local population. On the other hand, the negative meanings ascribed to this ‘otherness’ resulted in barriers to consumption for people defined as ‘non-Russian’-looking. It is worth noting that the research did not provide evidence that interviewees’ social networks were racialised. Taking into consideration the importance of social networking with regard to the negotiation of resources through the domains of state regulations and the economy, the absence of racialisation in social networking could be interpreted as a factor which may partially alleviate the consequences of deprivation in these domains for ‘non-Russian’-looking foreign citizens in Russia.

This chapter has provided numerous examples of migrants’ ability to access resources in the receiving society. It has shown that even seemingly powerless individuals are able to carve out a space of control through negotiation with other social actors. However, the chapter is far from telling a story of interviewees’ inclusion into the receiving society. Although the majority of interviewees were integrated into Russian society, they were not recognised by the state as full members of that society. Being non-Russian citizens, they were limited in rights and in opportunities to access resources, not to mention the fact that those not managing to secure their legal statuses in Russia lived under the constant threat of detention. In this situation, interviewees had to invent other ways of ‘getting things done’ to substitute for the formal channels which remained closed to them. These other ways did not necessarily lead them to resources of the same quality as the resources available through formal channels. For example, the majority of interviewees, even some of those with legal statuses, worked informally in Russia and hence lacked protection of their rights against possible and actual discrimination and exploitation. Work in the informal sector of the economy in the majority of cases did not provide interviewees with good salaries and thus limited their opportunities in accessing other resources. Since these migrants are not covered by the welfare system of the Russian Federation, their expenditure on essentials such as medical care has the potential to
impose a severe financial burden. Taking all these factors into consideration, it is not surprising that all of the migrants interviewed in 2004-2005 shared the view that in order to be fully included into the receiving society, they needed Russian citizenship.
Chapter 5
The ‘Territorialisation’ of Identity: Past, Present and Future

Introduction

Chapter 3 demonstrated that the migration regime of the Russian Federation can be understood as ‘a differentiated system of othering’ and that ‘non-Russian’ appearance and absence of Russian citizenship are among the markers of otherness upon which this system is constructed. Chapter 4 showed how differentiation embedded in the migration regime of the Russian Federation influences migrants’ experiences of social exclusion in the receiving society. Based on interviews with migrants, this chapter is focused on how the identities of interviewees are influenced by their experiences in Russia.

According to Jenkins, identification (the process of identity construction) is linked with the allocation of resources in a society. He suggests that a person’s understanding of him/herself is influenced by whether he/she has opportunities to access resources, or whether access to these resources is limited, and the ways in which he/she manages to access resources (Jenkins, 1996, p. 169). This chapter applies this proposition to the ‘territorialisation’ of identity understood as a component of identification. It argues that social exclusion experienced by a person in a given society affects the process of constructing a link between him/her and that place(s).¹

Identity construction is an ongoing process and involves not only reflections on the present situation, but also the interpretation of the past and imagining about the future (Giddens, 1991a). This chapter explores how visions of the past, present and future are interconnected in the case of identity ‘territorialisation’ by former Soviet citizens from NIS countries who live in Russia without Russian citizenship and as such experience inequality in

¹ To prompt the recounting of narratives of belonging to place(s), migrants were asked if they felt that Russia was their motherland (‘rodina’) and whether they felt that they were now at home (‘doma’). The use of the words ‘motherland’ and ‘home’ can be considered problematic, since people impute different meanings to them (Fog Olwig, 1998; Rapport and Dawson, 1998; Morley, 2000). However, it is still possible to say that these words refer to spaces which for some reason have become places to which people feel that they ‘belong’, what one might term ‘our place’. In introducing the terms ‘rodina’ and ‘doma’ during the interviews, this study also followed existing published research about the experiences of migrants in Russia, in which these terms have been shown to be authentic, i.e. they were introduced by migrants themselves as key terms for understanding their relationship to both place of origin and destination (see Flynn [2004]).
terms of rights and access to resources in comparison with their former co-citizens who have Russian citizenship.

The chapter is structured to reflect the ‘temporal’ dimension of the ‘territorialisation’ of identity. The first part is focused on the respondents’ interpretations of the past in their reflections about their relationship with place(s). The second part of the chapter addresses directly the main argument of the chapter: it examines how respondents’ perceptions of their current social exclusion shape the ‘territorialisation’ of their identities. The third part explores the respondents’ visions of their future and the influence of these visions on respondents’ understandings of where they belong.

5.1 ‘Territorialisation’ of identity and memories of the past

Every person has his/her own past which is comprised of a unique combination of experiences as well as the events and circumstances which shaped these experiences. Since some experiences, events and circumstances are shared by people it is also possible to speak about collective pasts. It is acknowledged that ‘[t]he past is an important resource upon which to draw in interpreting the here-and-now and in forecasting the future’ (Jenkins, 1998, p. 27). However, it is also important to remember that what we draw on in our expectations about the future and our interpretations/understandings of ourselves in the present are not our past per se, but our interpretations of different elements of this past. Interpretations made about one and the same element of the collective past may vary a great deal from person to person. These interpretations provide some kind of ‘lens’ through which we ‘look’ at and make sense of ourselves and world around us today.2

This part of the chapter explores interpretations of the past presented by the interviewed migrants in their reflections about themselves in relation to place. To be precise, it explores their interpretations of the fact that Russia and the countries they had left had for a long time constituted one country – the USSR – which disintegrated relatively recently into fifteen independent states. This focus was chosen because all the migrants reflecting about

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2 While recognising the significance of interpretations of the past for the ‘territorialisation’ of identity, it must be acknowledged that these interpretations are formed in the present. What a person recounts in his/her interview about his/her past is his/her interpretation of it in the light of present experiences.
themselves in relation to place touched on this point. They revealed three interpretations of the USSR, which were intertwined with five variants of ‘identity territorialisation’ (see Figure 5.1).

The first interpretation depicts the USSR as an integral whole – spatially, culturally, economically, socially and politically. In this interpretation, the USSR was not a coalition but a single entity. Thus the movement of people between republics was not perceived as a migration from one place to another. This is evident in the following statement made by a 53-year-old Armenian woman, who fled Azerbaijan for Armenia as a result of ethnic conflict in 1989 and later, in 2000, came to Russia:

I did not perceive Azerbaijan as my motherland, I perceived the Soviet Union [as the motherland] and it made no difference to me whether I lived or was born and raised in Uzbekistan, or in Sochi, or in Aleksandrov [a small town near Moscow]. I just saw it as ‘the USSR’.

(Am.)

This interpretation of the USSR as an integral whole is embedded in two variants of the identity ‘territorialisation’ traced through interviews with the migrants. These variants differ from each other in their perceptions of the collapse of the USSR. The thesis terms people who share these perceptions of the collapse as either ‘displaced’ persons or ‘deniers’.

‘Displaced’ persons perceived the disintegration of the USSR as a process whereby the place to which they belonged had disappeared, without it being replaced by any new place. In their interviews, these people could not indicate the place(s) to which they belong at present. Instead, they identified their place of belonging as something in the past, the USSR, a country which no longer exists. The woman quoted above expressed this in the following way:

I’m one of the people who currently find it difficult to determine what the motherland is for them... My motherland is the former USSR. It is and will be the USSR. Can you understand that? It’s simply impossible to say that my motherland is some other, new country...

(Am.)
Figure 5.1 Interpretations of the USSR in the different variants of identity 'territorialisation'
‘Deniers’ did not want to admit the collapse of the USSR and did not recognise the new geopolitical borders between former Soviet republics. These people continue to see the post-Soviet space as one integral whole and feel that they belong to it. A., a 23 year-old migrant from Uzbekistan, who identified himself as Russian, reported:

*When I was born, there was no such notion as the state of ‘Uzbekistan’. There was the republic ‘Uzbekistan’ which was a part of the Soviet Union and that was all... It’s difficult for me to say that Uzbekistan is not my motherland and Russia is my motherland. I consider all post-Soviet space as my motherland. That’s my position.*  

(A.)

While the first interpretation of the USSR depicts it as an entity which had no internal divisions – effectively viewing everywhere in the USSR as the same – the second interpretation presents a less homogenised picture of the country. According to this second interpretation, Russia was the definite centre of the USSR and the other Soviet republics were understood in relation to this centre; they were viewed as peripheries. This interpretation of the USSR as a unity, with Russia at the centre, was found in interviews with those migrants who presented Russia as their historical motherland. This image of Russia was constructed by them through claims that they and/or their ancestors were born on the territory of Russia (or on territory which once belonged to it) and that they shared the Russian culture and language.

The image of Russia as an historical motherland which appeared through the interviews was used in two variants of the ‘territorialisation’ of identity, which can be called ‘Russia-centred’ and ‘multi-centred’. The first variant was expressed by those interviewees who located their identities solely within Russia. The second variant was expressed by those who expressed a sense of multiple belonging. These two variants of the ‘territorialisation’ of identity are illustrated here by the words of two students who considered themselves to be ethnically Russian and who came to study in Russia from Kazakhstan, where their parents were still living. Both had lived in Russia for several years and had close relatives there. However, while the 21-year-old P. located her identity in Russia, the 18-year-old Y. did not express such certainty.
Russia is my historical motherland... Kazakhstan is just the place where I was born... I know that on paper it is my motherland, but, to tell the truth, I do not feel that it is my motherland. I don’t miss it... I know for sure that if I were to move abroad [from Russia] now I would feel very bad. I would miss Russia. I am in Russia now and I feel that it is my motherland... I consider this place to be my motherland, because I can hear my language here, here everything is written in my language, it is like our native culture here.

(P.)

[Russia] is like a historical motherland, Russia is like the motherland... If dual citizenship was available I would take it and would live both there and here... I don’t see Kazakhstan as my motherland... how should I put it... I like living in Kazakhstan more than here. My friends and relatives are there.

(Y.)

The third interpretation represents the USSR as a coalition of fifteen republics. This coalition was multi-centred; although the republics were organised as one geopolitical unit, each was still a spatial entity in its own right. Migrants who shared this perception of the past recognised the borders constructed after the collapse of the USSR. The perception of the past was presented in two variants of identity ‘territorialisation’. The first of these variants might be called ‘rootedness in the country of departure’. It was presented in the interview of 27-year-old J., who came from Azerbaijan and defined herself as Azerbaijani:

I will never call Russia my motherland... I have made my own mind up about this. Every person has only one motherland, doesn’t he?

(J.)

However, the majority of the interviewees, who shared the interpretation of the USSR as a geopolitical coalition, expressed a sense of ‘multi-centred’ belonging. These people tended to locate their identities both in the country of origin and in Russia. For example, another woman who came from Azerbaijan, and who defined herself as Azerbaijani, expressed her feelings in the following way:
I am constantly thinking about myself. Where I was born, let’s start with that, the soil is the same – black – and it is the same soil here. It seems to me that people here and there are also the same ... Maybe because my mother isn’t there anymore, I don’t miss that place. My husband and family are here, we live here, work [here], day after day. We have got used to it [this place]. I go on visits there, but when I’m there I miss it here. I don’t know why. I don’t know the answer myself ...

(D.)

This woman, and other interviewees who shared a perception of the USSR as a geopolitical coalition and constructed ‘multi-centred’ belonging in the present, neither presented themselves as ‘returnees’ nor saw Russia or the USSR as their motherland. However, nor was Russia perceived by them as a totally foreign place. Instead, it was interpreted as a country which shared a common history with their countries of origin and as the place where they were educated, carried out their army service, or had lived or worked for some time. Even if they had not visited Russia before, they assumed that they knew it, due to their experience of living in the USSR. The following quotation from an interview with a 39-year-old man from Tajikistan who identified himself as Tajik exemplifies this understanding of the Russian Federation:

... I came to Russia, because the Russian language and Russian culture are close to us... I was educated in the Soviet Union, in the Russian language and Russian culture, and [we have] very close relations with Russia. There is a large unit of Russian border guards in Tajikistan still.

(F.)

The appearance of a multiplicity of interpretations of one and the same fact – the existence of the USSR – in migrants’ interviews is not surprising, since ‘the stories people tell about their pasts have more to do with the continuing shoring up of self-understanding than with historical “truths”’ (Jansen 1998, p. 89). The next part of the chapter, which explores how the perception of present experiences affects migrants’ understanding of themselves in
relation to place, contains further examples of the interconnectedness between the present and the past.

5.2 ‘Territorialisation’ of identity and the perception of the present: understandings of social exclusion experienced in the receiving society

The process of identity construction, which includes the ‘territorialisation’ of identity, takes place in the present. A person’s present experiences and his/her understanding of them inevitably influence his/her understanding of him/herself and world around him/her. The thesis has already shown that the migrants interviewed for this research experienced deprivation of resources in the receiving society and had to find ways to access these resources. This part of the chapter will explore how these migrants understood their present situation in Russia and how their understandings affected the ‘territorialisation’ of their identities. The text below is divided into three sections. The first section considers the impact of migrants’ understandings of their social exclusion, in other words, their negotiations over rights and resources, in the domain of state regulations. The second section explores the impact of migrants’ understanding of their experiences in the economic domain. The third section discusses how the ‘territorialisation’ of identities expressed in migrants’ interviews is affected by migrants’ perceptions of their social connectedness.

5.2.1 ‘Territorialisation’ of identity and social exclusion in the domain of state regulation

As Gupta and Ferguson (1992) argue, ‘The area of immigration and immigration law is one practical area where the politics of space and the politics of otherness link up very directly’ (p. 17). The literature shows how the regulations imposed by the state in the field of migration can create differences between its own nationals and those who lack citizenship in the country (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002). The present research found a similar differentiation.

As was shown in the previous chapter, foreign citizens living in Russia experience limitations and deprivation of opportunities to access resources through the formal channels
of ‘getting things done’. However, as was also outlined, not all non-Russian nationals experience the same degree of limitation and deprivation. While those who managed to secure their legal status were able to use some of the formal channels, those without legal status were totally excluded from such channels. Hence, the experiences of migrants with legal status differ palpably from the experiences of migrants without it. For this reason, in seeking to understand how social exclusion in the domain of state regulations affects the ‘territorialisation’ of identity, migrants who have legal status are considered separately from the others in this section.

This section also separately investigates the case of those migrants who came to Russia from other former Soviet republics after the collapse of the USSR and lived there legally for some time but, despite this, failed to receive legal recognition after the changes in legislation which occurred during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. At the time when the research was conducted, these people were treated as ‘illegal’ migrants and were excluded from all formal channels through which they had been able to access resources and rights in the past. Although those caught out by the Putin legislative changes and ‘illegal’ migrants who came to Russia after these changes had similar experiences in the present, their past experiences were different. Thus their interpretations of the present deprivation of resources and limitations of rights could be different, too.

5.2.1.1 The case of ‘legal’ migrants

Chapter 3 shows that the legislative framework of the Russian migration regime creates differentiation between foreign citizens who manage to obtain and preserve their legal statuses in Russia (Table 3.1). What unites them is the fact that they have fewer rights than Russian citizens. This section investigates how the ‘legal’ migrants interviewed for the present research perceived this discrepancy and how their understanding of it affected the ‘territorialisation’ of their identity. The section is based on an analysis of the stories provided by citizens of Belarus who are entitled to more rights in Russia than any other foreign citizens.

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3 These changes in the legislation are discussed in Chapter 3.
4 That is why the previous chapter, which was focused on interviewees’ current experiences, did not consider these migrants as separate cases.
The research showed that interviewed migrants understood the constraints on their rights as a situation of inequality. In their reflections, the interviewees often referred to the past, when they and current citizens of the Russian Federation were citizens of one state, the USSR, and as such shared one and the same set of rights. The present discrepancy in access to resources through the formal channels was perceived by them as a sign that they had become ‘other(s)’ in Russia. Below are the words of a 35-year-old woman, who has been living in Russia without Russian citizenship since 1992:

*If I go to the state hospital, I go through a system, which requires payment. They’ll always rub your nose [in it] – ‘This person is a citizen of Belarus, so she has to pay’. You go down the corridor as if you are going to be executed. It’s very unpleasant. When you find yourself in the state system, which creates and reproduces this, you meet people for whom you are a social outcast. That is the most unpleasant thing, this split that has occurred in society and divided people into ‘us’ and ‘them’ [‘others’]... It is really unpleasant to be an ‘other’ and it’s this that you want to avoid – most of all you do not want to encounter that [feeling of ‘otherness’].*

(B.)

The limited opportunities to access resources may provoke feelings of insecurity and instability. For example, a young woman from Belarus, 32-year-old In., who by law, has the same employment rights as Russian citizens, shared her fears, arising from her experience of the Russian labour market during her previous search for a job:

*Because of the incompetence of those who work [in human resource departments] in these firms, the employment agencies, etc., I am really afraid of losing my present job. I can feel, imagine, these three (or four, or five) months of looking for a new job and being told over and over again, ‘We don’t have the right to employ you, we cannot take you on’, or experiencing prejudice – ‘You’re a foreigner’.*

(In.)

Feelings of insecurity and instability make it difficult for migrants to perceive the place where they live now as a place where they belong, a place to call home. In. compares her situation with that of Russian citizens.
I constantly feel these constraints placed on me. At the same time, I see the girls from Moscow who work at my workplace and who have parents here, have husbands and have propiska – they are at home. They feel secure here. They are not afraid of losing their jobs. They don’t have limited finances. Everything is different; everything is different [for them in comparison with me]. I feel that I am a guest here and they are at home.

(Inf.)

5.2.1.2 The case of ‘illegal’ migrants

In Russia, foreign citizens who have not managed to secure their legal status are not only excluded from the formal channels of ‘getting things done’, but are also subject to persecution as people who have violated the prescribed rules for entering and/or staying in the country. If the police catch them, they are liable to pay a fine. They could also be imprisoned and deported back to their country of origin. Since the police have the right to stop people on the streets to check their documents – a practice which is extensively called upon – migrants without legal status are under constant threat of being discovered and of incurring the consequences. Migrants, in their interviews, revealed that this threat makes them feel insecure. N., a young woman from Tajikistan, shared her feelings:

I was simply afraid of everything, I was afraid to go out. It seemed to me that there were police everywhere... I expected I would be stopped and deported [from Russia].

(N.)

The feeling of insecurity is also increased by the negative image of the police which circulates in society and is shared by the migrants (Gudkov, Dubinin et al., 2004). The ‘illegal’ migrants interviewed for this research expressed the fear that police officers might be violent towards them. The situation is made worse by the fact that there are no mechanisms in place for migrants who lack legal status to protect themselves from such violence. The vulnerability of ‘illegal’ migrants in their relations with the Russian police is well expressed by a young woman from Uzbekistan. She perceives Russian policemen as a threat, not only
because they can apprehend her as an ‘illegal’ migrant and deport her from the country, but also because she expects violence from them:

For example, they [the policemen] will say ‘Let’s go to the police station...’ I’ll be afraid... they can take you anywhere... People say, newspapers write that ... they [policemen] beat up and rape ...

(L.)

The insecurity felt by ‘illegal’ migrants, stemming from their fears of persecution, penalties and possible mistreatment by officials, contributes to their perception that the receiving society treats them as ‘other(s)’. Memories of the past make the present situation look even more unjust. A 29-year-old man who came to Russia from Tajikistan expressed his feelings:

I am an ‘illegal’ [migrant]. I feel this ... And this offends me. They, our former compatriots, treat us as if we were their enemies...

(G.)

Exclusion from the domain of state regulations can also result in feelings of economic instability. As noted above, foreigners without legal status cannot be employed in the formal sector of the Russian economy. They work in the informal economy, and are thus unprotected against possible maltreatment by employers.

The feelings of insecurity and economic instability consequent upon complete exclusion from the domain of state regulations would not be so strong if migrants still perceived their move to Russia as a change for the better. Some of the migrants interviewed did indicate that they had experienced worse living conditions in their country of origin, even if, in Russia, they were excluded from the formal channels of ‘getting things done’, persecuted by the law, and discriminated against by locals.⁵ As shown in the previous chapter, such deprivation could be partly compensated by social networks, which provided migrants with opportunities

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⁵ Appendix F, for example, discusses the case of two young women who migrated to Russia from former Soviet republics in Central Asia and who, despite all the difficulties they encountered in Russia, considered their situation in the receiving society to be an improvement in their lives.
to access resources in the receiving society and secured their situation in the informal economy.

Even so, there was one group of migrants without legal status who at the time of interview could not identify any positive trends in their lives and whose social networks could not compensate for their exclusion from the domain of state regulation, which had resulted from the transformation of the Russian migration regime during Putin’s presidency. This group consisted of non-Russian citizens who had migrated to Russia from former Soviet republics before 2002, the year when Law № 115 ‘On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation’ and the new citizenship law was issued. They had migrated with the intention of staying in Russia permanently. Before the introduction of the new rules regulating the entry and residence of foreign citizens, these people had had almost the same opportunities to access resources through the written regulations as Russian citizens. Changes in the legislation, however, resulted in their being deprived of these opportunities. The next section investigates how current experiences of social exclusion in the domain of state regulation affected the identity ‘territorialisation’ of this group.

5.2.1.3 The case of non-Russian citizens who arrived in Russia for permanent residency before 2002

As shown in Chapter 3, in the 1990s, access of migrants from former Soviet republics to resources in post-Soviet Russia was mediated by their permanent registration at the place of residence and facilitated by the use of a Soviet passport. As soon as a migrant had permanent registration in his/her Soviet passport, he/she had more or less the same opportunities as locals to access resources.6 According to the interviewees, even temporary registration included people in the formal channels of ‘getting things done’; for example, they could draw a pension and had the right to be employed in the formal economy. In their interviews, the migrants reported that during this period they had managed to organise their lives and achieve a sense of stability and security in Russia without acquiring Russian citizenship. As Q., a 53-year-old woman who had migrated to Russia from Kazakhstan in 1994 and was interviewed during the first stage of the fieldwork in 2001, reported:

6 However, inequality in the opportunities available to migrants and locals could arise from other factors. (Kosygina 2007a).

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We don’t need [Russian] citizenship at all. I have a Soviet passport... I use that and nobody bothers me. As far as I understand it – the most important thing is the propiska. Nobody needs more.

Transformations in the Russian legislation at the beginning of the 2000s had an extremely negative effect on the lives of former Soviet citizens who came to Russia for permanent residency before the changes, but who had not managed to acquire Russian citizenship. These people lost all opportunities to access resources and even their right to be in Russia for more than three months, unless they applied for, and received, residence permits. What aggravated matters was the fact that procedures for acquiring residence permits were not designed for their situation. Officials responsible for the implementation of migration regulations caused additional problems for migrants through their interpretation of the new regulations.

The inability to fulfil the requirements of the new regulations pushed people who once had full legal rights and access to resources into a situation of ‘illegality’. This was painful and they considered it an injustice committed against them by the state. One such person, a woman who had come with her family to Russia from Ukraine, shared her anger:

I am now outlawed. I am now an ‘illegal’ migrant. In other words, I am in the same situation as a gastarbeiter, as the Chinese brought to Russia in crates. I have the same status as they have. But I arrived in 2001, registered at my place of residence, lived and worked, brought benefits to the Russian state, paid taxes. I was no parasite. They [the

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7 See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the changes in the legislation.
8 For example, according to new regulations, in order to be able to receive a residence permit, an individual has to have a certain level of income. Application packs for residence permits, as well as for Russian citizenship, require official proof of income, which means a bank statement or a certificate from an employer stating the level of salary. People who came to Russia after the discussed changes in the migration regulations could take these requirements into account when planning their trip to Russia. They could think through ways to fulfil this requirement in advance. People who had lived in the Russian Federation before the legislative transformation were deprived of this opportunity. They had to find out how to deal with this requirement already being in Russia. Many of them were not able to provide bank statements with sufficient funds, since they simply did not earn enough money in Russia to make savings. Moreover, they could not provide official proof of their earnings in Russia, because the new rules pushed these people, who had previously for the most part worked in formal employment in Russia, into the realm of informal employment. According to the new regulations, their employers would be fined for infringing the law, since non-Russian nationals (except for citizens of Belarus) lost their right to work in Russia without a work permit.
authorities] made me a nobody. What kind of authorities are these? What kind of authorities are these? The authorities made me a nobody.

(Ta.)

Exclusion from the domain of state regulations followed by exclusion from the formal economy has resulted in feelings of insecurity and instability. Ba., who migrated to Russia in 1996, described her family’s current situation:

*I am not a [Russian] citizen. I have everything needed for citizenship, like Russian citizens, but we are not citizens of Russia. We have to receive permission to work, to enter the country – to do everything. We live without certificates. They may come to us tomorrow and kick us out of our house and we will go live at the railway station.*

(Ba.)

The new regulations did not treat these people as though they had been living in the Russian Federation for years, although they had. Their past in post-Soviet Russia was not recognised at all. It was suggested to them that they should forget about the past and start their life in Russia as though they had only just arrived. So it was no surprise that they resented such a situation. They felt that they had the right to be treated in a special way and to be granted Russian citizenship without the fulfilment of requirements prescribed by the new law on citizenship. Ba. continues:

*In November 2003 I went to OVIR. I was quickly taken out [to the corridor] – ‘Read what you need to do in order to apply for a residency permit’. I said ‘I do not need a residency permit’. They responded ‘Nobody will give you Russian citizenship unless you hold a residency permit’... Now, we are doing everything to prove that we have the right to receive Russian citizenship through the fast-track. I can’t imagine living another five years without anything, after living here for eight years already.*

(Ba.)

The desire to acquire Russian citizenship represents not only a wish to escape the instability and insecurity caused by exclusion from the domain of state regulations, but also a
longing to be recognised as those who belong in the place where they live now. A woman struggling to get citizenship for her elderly father, who had arrived from Turkmenistan, expressed her feelings:

*I asked them [officials] – ‘So if, for example, he dies, God forbid, will he be taken to be buried in Turkmeniya?’ ‘No, no, how can you can say this?’ How can I say it? How can I prove that he is my father? Or rather I will prove that he is my father, but how can I prove that he has the right to be buried here? He is not a citizen of Russia, so he cannot be buried on Russian soil. He does not have any rights, any obligations here.*

(S.)

Represented by NGOs and human rights activists, former Soviet citizens who came to Russia after the collapse of the USSR – and before these transformations in the Russian legislation – were extremely critical of the new migration regulations and the new law on citizenship. As a result, some amendments to the legislation have been introduced. Among them was a rule which provides the right for non-Russian nationals who had lived in post-Soviet Russia permanently before the introduction of the new law on citizenship to obtain Russian citizenship via a fast-track method. However, this change has not solved the problem for everyone. The point was that the officials responsible for naturalisation considered that only permanent registration could serve as proof of permanent residency in Russia. As it turned out, not all former Soviet citizens from former Soviet republics who had permanently lived in Russia had succeeded in acquiring this registration. Among the migrants interviewed, there were some people who did not have this registration. Some of them went to court to try to prove that they had been living in Russia as permanent residents. However, although they managed to prove their permanent residency by providing other evidence (for example, documents which showed that they had worked in Russia and had paid taxes for some years), they reported that officials still did not wish to recognise them as eligible for Russian citizenship. An example of this situation is provided by the case of Ba. and her family:

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9 The literature on migration has discussed the factors preventing migrants from receiving registration (*propiska*) at their place of residence in Russia (Filippova, 1998; Osipov, 1998a, 1998b; Pilkington, 1998)
We even proved through the court that we had been living here since 1996 without going anywhere. We proved that we live here de facto but nevertheless, they [officials] refuse to accept our applications for citizenship and instead have forced us to accept residence permits.

(Ba.)

People who found themselves in the situation described here perceived exclusion from the domain of state regulations and their difficulties in acquiring legal status and Russian citizenship as the state’s rejection of them. Although many of them located their identities in Russia or in the post-Soviet space of which Russia is a part and felt that they had the right to be in this country and to be admitted as citizens, the difficulties which they encountered in post-Soviet Russia after the introduction of the new regulations influenced their identity ‘territorialisation’. The words of a woman, who migrated from Ukraine to her place of birth in Russia, provide an illustration of how this influence works:

I feel at home here, but, if you are constantly kicked, this feeling will probably pass.

(M.)

5.2.2 ‘Territorialisation’ of identity and social exclusion in the domain of the economy

The previous chapter showed that although Russian legislation limits the opportunities for foreign citizens in the formal sector of the Russian economy, they are able to participate in it through employment in the informal sector. The opportunity to work and earn enough to satisfy their material needs was understood by migrants in terms of economic stability. M., a 54-year-old woman, who returned from Ukraine to her birthplace in Russia and who, at the time of the interview, was unofficially employed as a seamstress in a factory, expressed her feelings:

When I lived in Ukraine for six years, I did not get a salary and did not know where to get a piece of bread. Now I know that I am earning and I will get my salary on time. I know that I can send some money to my daughter and that I can buy something for
myself without borrowing from anyone. If I want, I can buy cheese. If I want, I can buy chocolate.

(M.)

In cases where social networks or state support were absent or were insufficient to satisfy an individual’s needs, the inability to earn could result in the feeling of economic instability. T., a 28-year-old half-Russian, half-Armenian woman, who had fled Azerbaijan as a result of ethnic conflict, could not be employed in the formal sector of the Russian economy because she had not managed to secure her legal status in Russia. At the same time, she experienced problems with employment in the informal sector of the Russian economy due to the disruption of her social networks:

My grandmother has had a stroke and has no medication ... If I’m lucky enough to earn some money somewhere, somehow, then I buy medicine for her. I have the children [her younger brothers] to feed and mother and so on. We are in a very difficult situation. I want to get a job. I’d do anything.

(T.)

While a sense of economic stability contributes to the construction of one’s sense of belonging in the place where one is, economic instability disrupts this link between identity and place. The following quotations from interviews with migrants can be used to illustrate this statement. Whereas 27-year-old Ar., who had come to Russia from Tajikistan some years earlier and had already managed to buy a flat, could construct a sense of belonging in Russia, T., who had experienced difficulties with employment in Russia, did not feel as though she belonged in Russia:

I don’t feel that Russia is a foreign country for me, especially taking into consideration that I work here, have good earnings and have already bought a flat.

(Ar.)

Maybe I should go to America... Or, I don’t know, even go back there [to Baku]. Back – but I don’t know about going back... My grandmother, for example, wants to go back to Baku. She wants to... My mother, for example, also is a Russian ... But I don’t know,
I’m half Russian, half Armenian, I don’t know how I would be there … I don’t know if my safety is guaranteed there.

(T.)

The migrants interviewed for this study interpreted their experiences in the Russian economy not only in terms of material welfare, but also in terms of self-fulfilment and self-appraisal. It seems that if a job provides a person with a feeling of self-actualisation, it also increases his/her emotional stability (psychological comfort) and, in this way, contributes to the location of his/her identity wherever such jobs are available. Twenty-four-year-old R., who came to Russia from Ukraine and had managed to build a successful career as a designer for one of Russia’s glossy magazines, revealed:

On the one hand my parental home is there [in Ukraine]. I grew up there. On the other hand, I have set myself up here [in Russia], and things are starting to go well here. I don’t know. I don’t feel that I am not at home here.

(R.)

The ability to participate in the Russian economy and positive interpretations of the economic situation in the Russian Federation enable migrants to see their future as rooted in Russia. Twenty-nine-year-old G. from Tajikistan responded as follows to the question about what he liked in Russia and what made him stay there:

Work, work ... if you try hard, if you want to make it, if you make an effort then whatever you want to do in life, you can do it in Russia. So I somehow see my future in Russia.

(G.)

5.2.3 ‘Territorialisation’ of identity and social networks

The previous chapter demonstrated the crucial role of social networks for migrants in the receiving society. Using these networks migrants were able to access resources allocated in the society, and to overcome limitations experienced in the domains of state regulations and the economy.
Without social connections, or with weak ones, a person’s feelings of insecurity and instability are intensified. The previous sections of this chapter have illustrated that if these feelings are associated with a particular place (for example, a country), they may cause the person to think that he/she does not belong in this place. Conversely, if a migrant has social connections with other people, in particular with locals, and if these connections are strong in terms of providing opportunities to access the resources allocated in the receiving society, he/she may avoid feelings of insecurity and instability – even if he/she continues to suffer complete exclusion from the domain of the state regulations and/or limitations in the domain of the economy. This contributes to the development of his/her attachment to the place where he/she lives at present.

Social networks are important not only as a means to access resources and enter the domains of state regulations and the economy; they are also crucial for the creation of close relationships with other people, which appear to be a very important factor in the emotional stability of migrants and, subsequently, for the construction of their sense of belonging in a place. The following quotation from an interview with N., a young woman from Tajikistan, shows that individuals tend to feel attachment to the place where they know people with whom they can share their emotions and who they feel care about them:

Yes, I feel that Russia is my country, maybe because I feel here [I get something back] from people, from my boyfriend and my friends. I feel that they need me and that is the most important thing for me. I think that a person, no matter where he is in the universe, has to feel that he is important to someone else, I think that this feeling is the most valuable thing for a person – simply to feel that you are needed by someone, that someone cares about you, someone remembers you.

(N.)

In turn, the absence of a circle of close relatives and/or close friends may lead to a feeling of not belonging to a place, as happened in the case of J., a 27-year-old woman from Azerbaijan:

They say that if you stay a while, you get used to it, but I don’t know, I don’t think I will ever get used to this place, I don’t feel I belong here ... I miss my relatives, we have
other values, you know what I mean? I need everyday communication with my relatives, with my mother and sisters... Psychologically I probably won’t be able to stand it here (J.)

5.2.4 ‘Territorialisation’ of identity and the perception of the present: concluding remarks

Overall, interviews with migrants supported conclusions made by Flynn in her study of identities and the experiences of those former Soviet citizens who came to Russia from other former Soviet republics and managed to obtain not only Russian citizenship, but also the status of forced migrants (Flynn, 2001, 2004, 2007). She suggests that the ‘territorialisation’ of identity is rooted in the (in) stability/(in) security felt by individuals in ‘immediate physical and social relations’ (Flynn, 2004, pp. 62-66). The contribution of the current thesis is in linking Flynn’s explanation of identity ‘territorialisation’ with a more general statement made by Jenkins about the importance of resource accessibility for identity construction. Through the analysis of migrants’ interviews it became evident that a person’s feelings of (in)stability/(in)security are provoked by his/her experiences of social exclusion, in other words, by his/her experiences of negotiating access to resources and rights.

Figure 5.2 shows how feelings of (in)stability/(in)security were reflected in the ‘territorialisation’ of identity expressed in migrants’ interviews conducted within the framework of this research. The stability and security felt by the interviewee in his/her present situation promoted his/her attachment to the place where he/she lived now. He/she tended to place his/her identity either solely in Russia or to construct multiple-belonging (to Russia and to the previous place of residence). In one case, the positive interpretation of present experiences also coincided with the interpretation suggested by a ‘denier’, who indicated his place of belonging as the whole post-Soviet space. Instability and insecurity felt by the respondents promoted a weakening of their connections with their present place of residence. These feelings about the current situation were reflected in accounts by ‘displaced’ people,

10 The only case where an individual had a rather stable and secure life in the present, but still felt herself displaced was presented by the story of Am, a 54-year-old Armenian women. She had a permanent residence permit in Russia and a high income, but as a person without any citizenship (she did not take up citizenship of Armenia where she had lived for more than ten years after she left Azerbaijan and before she came to Russia) she could not travel freely throughout the post-Soviet space and visit her relatives who lived in Ukraine. The traumatic experience of being unable to attend the funeral of her mother and of ’illegal’ travel experiences in order to visit her sick brother and then his funeral caused her dissatisfaction with the present arrangements.
people who located their identities in the countries of departure, and people with ‘multiple belonging’.

Figure 5.2 Perception of the present experiences and ‘territorialisation’ of identity

The previous paragraph and graphical presentation provided by the figure might prompt the reader to think that the migrants interviewed for this research were strictly divided into two groups – one expressing feelings of stability and security in their interviews and the other expressing feelings of instability and insecurity. In reality, the combination of these feelings was more complex. It is more accurate to say that the respondents expressed different degrees of (in)stability and (in)security. This complexity was partly a result of the complexity of the social exclusion experienced by them in Russia.11 As was shown in the previous chapter,

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11 The personal physiological characteristics of the respondents also contributed to their perception of the present experiences, however, analysis of this important factor is beyond the scope of this thesis.
although interviewees were deprived of resources and limited in terms of their rights, the majority managed to carve out a space of control where they felt relatively stable and secure.

A further remark must be made. As became clear from the analysis of the interviews, present experiences were understood by the migrants through reference to their past (Figure 5.2). Remembering the existence of the USSR, respondents perceived their present inequality with Russian citizens as unjust and felt that they had become an ‘other’ for Russia. They also referred to the existence of the USSR as sufficient justification of their right to be in Russia. Migrants’ references to the past were not limited by reflections on the existence and collapse of the USSR. Migrants could also think about their everyday lives at their previous places of residence. Comparison of these memories with the present situation increased or decreased interviewees’ rootedness in the new place of residence.

5.3 ‘Territorialisation’ of identity and images of the future

The importance of a person’s vision about his/her future in his/her identity construction is outlined in the literature on identity. According to Giddens (1991) ‘the reflexive construction of self-identity depends as much on preparing for the future as on interpreting the past’ (p. 85). The visions of the future which the individual imagines and uses in his/her understandings and representations of him/herself are based on his/her interpretations of the past and the present. ‘If one is to frame any conception of how one will live, one has to have some knowledge of how things have gone so far; plans and projects for the future, a conception of what to do next, cannot be formed in the void. It is not just that we think of ourselves as temporally extended; we think of ourselves as causally structured’ (Campbell, 1994, p. 63). The link between perception of the present and images of the future in a person’s understanding of him/herself in relation to place(s) has already been mentioned in the previous part of the chapter. This part comments on it further.

In constructing visions of the future, the migrants who participated in this research inevitably located these visions somewhere. Analysis of their interviews revealed that they tended to link their future with those place(s) with which they associated feelings of stability and security. These feelings, as shown earlier in this chapter, stem from the migrants’ perceptions of their current experiences in the receiving society.
The interviewees who perceived their present life in Russia as relatively stable and secure and/or saw opportunities to achieve the desired level of stability and security in Russia tended to imagine their future life in the same place. For example, 24-year-old R. from Ukraine, who had a successful career as a designer in Russia and who at the time of the interview was in the process of acquiring a permanent residence permit, expressed this as follows:

*I see my future here. Materially I think my position is not bad. I can support my family and even start thinking about [buying] a flat ... I have participated here in various exhibitions, competitions – I did some extra work. As a result of this, I have made some connections. I have become known a bit as a designer and so I think that I can achieve something here.*

(R.)

Conversely, if a person did not perceive his/her present situation in Russia as stable and secure, he/she might detach his/her visions of the future from the present place of residence, as did a young woman from Belarus, who had lived and worked in Russia for several years:

*Nothing attracts me to Russia. I think I could leave it very easily. Maybe because I have never been abroad I have rosy visions about everything there, about America, England, France ... Maybe it is partly my fault that I can’t settle here. On the other hand, I think that wherever you work, if you put all your effort and energy into your work, if you finish work at 9 or 10 p.m. and work at weekends, and you have some level of education, you have a right to expect a reasonable salary which will allow you to get a decent place to live, a decent chance of helping your relatives and those who are close, some opportunity to receive medical treatment, buy clothes etc. I think that these are basic things. If the country cannot provide these... I don’t dream of staying in Russia.*

(In.)

Feelings of stability and security experienced in the place of current residence prompted migrants to imagine this place not only as a place for their future, but also as a place for the future of their children. A vivid example of this was presented by a mother of two who came
to Russia with her family from Azerbaijan in 1998. This is how she reflected on her relationship with her present place of residence:

*It may be also because our children write ‘My city, beloved Novosibirsk’... I do not know ... The children have opened my eyes here ... They speak Russian, do everything just as everyone here does, they dance and sing [like the others here], etc. They don’t know their own language better [than they know Russian]. I think that it is better for them to be here, so it is better for us [parents], too.*

(D.)

It seems that feelings of security and stability experienced by a person at the place where he/she now lives encourage him/her to imagine his/her future in the same place. At the same time, visions of a positive future there make him/her feel connected with this place in the present. This dialogue between the perception of the present and expectations about the future is intertwined with interpretations of the past (Figure 5.3).

![Figure 5.3 Perceptions of the present and interpretations of the past in ‘placing’ the future](image)

12 The letters above the arrows are the initials of the respondents whose interviews provided examples of different variants of placing the future depicted by the figure.
If interviewees felt insecure/unstable in the present, but at the same time thought that their present life in Russia was still better than it was in the country of departure, then they tended to imagine their future as being in Russia (see the cases of L. and N. in Appendix F). If interviewees felt insecure/unstable in their present place of residence and remembered the previous place as being more stable/secure they could imagine returning to this place. However, only one interviewee, J. from Azerbaijan, expressed such a desire for her future. Other migrants who felt insecure/unstable in Russia nevertheless rejected the idea of returning to their countries of departure. They realised that the post-Soviet space had undergone rapid economic and political changes and that if they were to return, they would find a different social order at their previous place of residence. The reasons for the interviewees’ rejection of returning varied from the inability to earn enough money upon return to secure their material comfort, to fear for their lives being in danger. In some cases, people had already spent so many years in Russia that they felt they had lost connection with their previous place of residence. The impossibility of returning to the past combined with an insecure/unstable present resulted either in a deterritorialised future – in such cases respondents expressed the desire to escape somewhere without knowing where (see In.’s citation in this section) – or in a refusal to think about the future at all.

**Conclusion**

The interviews with migrants conducted within the framework of this research support the conclusions of other research that point to the crucial role played by feelings of (in)stability/(in)security in the ‘territorialisation’ of identity (Ami-Talai, 1998; Flynn, 2004, 2007). While stability and security contribute to the construction of individuals’ attachment to the place(s) where these feelings arise and through this ‘territorialise’ identity there, instability and insecurity experienced at that place(s) can make it hard for individuals to feel that they belong there. This chapter connected this insight into the ‘territorialisation’ of identity to the recognition of the significance of resource allocation for the construction of identity.
The research revealed that migrants from former Soviet republics living in Russia without Russian citizenship and, as such, experiencing deprivation of resources and limited access to rights perceive their current situation in terms of instability and insecurity, and interpret their present inequality in Russia as a sign that this country treats them as ‘other(s)’. The majority of the interviewees, however, did not feel exclusively (un)stable/(in)secure or stable/secure; rather, they revealed different degrees of (in)stability/(in)security. This could be a result of the complexity of the social exclusion they experienced in the receiving society (the complexity of their negotiation over resources). The previous chapter showed that despite all limitations and deprivations encountered by the interviewees in Russia, they were able to carve out some space of control and acquire the resources they needed. The data presented suggest that feelings of insecurity and instability, for example, could be reduced if migrants had the opportunity to participate in the Russian economy, if only informally. This opportunity is interpreted by the interviewees not only in terms of creating access to the resources located in the receiving society, but also in terms of their self-realisation and achieving a better life, if not now, then in the future. Their social networks also played a crucial role in diminishing their feelings of instability and insecurity, since these networks provide them not only with access to resources, but also with emotional support. The presence of people to whom individuals are close and can share their feelings encourages them to construct an emotional link with this place and to connect their future life with it.

In the narratives produced in the course of the interviews, migrants constructed their belonging to place(s) not only though their interpretation of the current experiences of social exclusion, but also through their memories of the past and visions of the future.

All interviewees reflecting on where they belonged referred to their interpretations of the fact that Russia and their countries of departure once constituted a single geopolitical entity, the USSR. The study indicated several interpretations of this fact which were involved in different variants of identity ‘territorialisation’. In the majority of cases the current deprivation of rights and resources experienced by the interviewees in post-Soviet Russia was perceived as unjust in the light of memories of the previous equality within the USSR. Reference to the USSR’s former existence was also very common in interviewees’ justifications of belonging in the place where they lived now.

Memories about the past, which influence the ‘territorialisation’ of identity in the present, concerned not only the existence of the USSR. Interviewees’ interpretations of their
lives in the countries of their departure and their comparison of these interpretations with their perceptions of their present in their new place of residence were also very important for the spatial allocation of their identities. If respondents thought about their lives in the countries of departure as being worse than in Russia, they tended to construct their attachment to the present place of the residence, despite any instability and insecurity they currently felt. If their memories of life in the countries of their departure were positive, this decreased interviewees’ attachment to the present place of residence.

In their reflections about belonging, the migrants interviewed for this research revealed that understandings of present experiences are linked with images of the future. While perceptions of the present as secure and stable prompted respondents to imagine their future in the place associated with these feelings, perception of the present as insecure and unstable discouraged them from doing so. At the same time, in imagining his/her future in a particular place, a person tends to feel a connection with this place at the present time. This dialogue between present and future was intertwined with interpretations of the past.

The complexity of the ‘territorialisation’ of identity which this chapter has set out to convey through words and graphical presentations is summarised by the scheme which can be found in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.3).
Chapter 6

Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to explore how the migration regime of the Russian Federation affected the experiences and identities of non-Russian nationals from former Soviet republics living in Russia. This question was addressed both through analysis of structures constituting the Russian migration regime and through giving voice to migrants. Such an approach allowed this thesis to explore not only what opportunities and constraints are contained in the abovementioned structures, but also to clarify how these opportunities and constraints are perceived by and reflected in the everyday life of those affected by the migration regime.

The analysis of the data suggested that the migration regime existing in contemporary Russia can be understood as ‘a differentiated system of othering’. This differentiated system of othering manifests itself through differentiated accessibility of the resources and rights allocated in the receiving society and as such affects the social exclusion of migrants and their identities. The thesis builds on previous research, which has also indicated that migrants from former Soviet republics were unequal in their capacity to influence the outcomes of their interactions with other social actors because of differentiations embedded in the migration regime (Pilkington, 1998; Flynn, 2004). The thesis supplements this body of work, however, with a detailed exploration of the differentiations institutionalised within the Russian migration regime and their effects. This final chapter summarises and discusses the conceptual developments and empirical findings of the thesis and suggests possible directions for further investigation.

6.1 Conceptual developments and empirical findings

In this thesis, the concept of the migration regime is interpreted as a combination of constraining/enabling structures of signification (discourses about migration and migrants);
legitimation (written and unwritten rules); and domination (resources allocated in the society) constructed in the receiving society in response to migration and used/reproduced/transformed by social actors (including migrants) in their interactions (Figure 1.1). This definition follows other interpretations of migration regimes derived from the application of the theory of structuration to the area of migration studies in its attention to both the enabling potential of social structures and the agency of social actors (Pilkington, 1998; Flynn, 2001, Flynn, 2004). However, the definition suggested by this thesis departs from the perception of the migration regime as no more than a combination of institutions and regulations created by the authorities to regulate migration. It highlights a greater range of social structures that affect migrants’ lives. It points, in particular, to the significance of unwritten norms regulating interactions of migrants with other social actors, and draws attention to the variety of discourses (not only political, but also academic, and media) which shape migrants’ experiences and identities.

The main conceptual contribution of the thesis is the development of the notion of the migration regime as ‘a differentiated system of othering’. Of course, the existing literature on migration includes studies of how laws and discourses construct migrants as ‘other’ for the receiving society (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002; King and Wood, 2001; Reisigl and Wordak, 2001). The originality of this research project, however, lies in its development of an understanding of the migration regime as ‘a differentiated system of othering’ not as purely theoretical, but as grounded in the experiences and perceptions of the interviewees.

The articulation of the sense of ‘othering’ among respondents in this study was particularly strong, it is suggested, for two reasons. Firstly, these migrants ‘remember’ their previous equality within the single geopolitical entity of the USSR and thus perceive their present inequality vis-à-vis Russian citizens as ‘unjust’. Secondly, the respondents encountered the receiving society at the point at which the migration regime was undergoing rapid change and differences between Russian citizens and citizens of other NIS countries were being institutionalised. These changes came from both above – the legislative changes of 2002 - and below – the reformulation of ethnic difference in media discourse and public opinion. This, it is suggested, has produced new forms of ‘othering’ not captured in previous published research on migration from former Soviet republics to Russia.
The empirical study undertaken within this thesis showed that the migration regime of the Russian Federation reflects two processes of constructing the ‘other’ — the process of nation-building and the process of racialisation.

The process of nation-building, which is a process whereby the ‘other’ is constructed through reference to people’s belonging and non-belonging to the nation, is reflected in the current national legislation of the Russian Federation which institutionalises differentiation between people on the basis of their actual citizenship. According to this legislation, those who are defined by the state as belonged to the Russian nation are entitled to a greater scope of rights and resources than those who are defined as non-Russian nationals. Such differentiation is rather recent. Before 2002 the line between “us” and “them” in terms to access to rights and resources was drawn according to the criterion of possession or lack of Soviet citizenship.

The process of racialisation, in other words, a representational process of ascribing meanings to the physical appearance of people, is reflected in the discursive framework of the Russian migration regime. Both analysis of the Russian newspapers and overview of public opinion polls’ results have revealed that migrants whose appearances are considered to be ‘non-Russian’ are constructed as more ‘other’ to Russian society, than people whose looks are interpreted as ‘Russian’. This racialised differentiation of migrants takes the form of racism as defined by Miles and Brown (2003). In other words, not only migrants are divided on the grounds of their appearance, but negative meanings also adhere to those of them who are defined as ‘non-Russians’.

An analysis of migrants’ interviews revealed that absence of Russian citizenship, on one hand, and meanings ascribed in the receiving society to observed and imagined physical features, on the other, influenced migrants’ social exclusion in Russia. Being non-Russian nationals, the interviewees experienced limitations in access to resources in two interconnected social domains: the domain of state regulations, and the domain of the economy. Those who were defined through the process of racialisation as ‘non-Russian’-looking people experienced additional difficulties in the domain of state regulations because of prejudices about ‘non-Russians’ shared by officials. In the domain of the economy, racialisation created certain financial opportunities involving selling ‘otherness’ to the local population, on one hand, while, on the other hand, negative meanings ascribed to this ‘otherness’ resulted in barriers to consumption.
Although the process of social exclusion could potentially result in a situation whereby migrants would not be able to access essential resources, the migrants interviewed were all capable of avoiding this situation and had carved out a space of control using social networks and the existing structures of the receiving society. Social networks were crucial, not only for overcoming and compensating for migrants’ deprivation of rights and resources, but also for entering the domains of state regulations and the economy.

The research also revealed that although social networking based on ethnicity was practised by some interviewed migrants in order to overcome the constraints imposed by the Russian migration regime, these migrants also had other kinds of social connections, which linked them to people who did not share their ethnicity. Moreover, some migrants preferred to avoid any inclusion in ‘ethnic’ networks.

It is worth noting that the social networks of interviewees were not ‘racialised’. The research showed that the reason for this was the ability of social actors to negotiate meanings presented in the discursive framework of the migration regime. While analysis of the Russian mass media and opinion polls reported about quite hostile attitudes towards ‘non-Russian’ looking people, the migrants’ stories contained examples of how initial negative meanings attached to their physical appearance ceased to exist in their everyday interaction with some people.

Using the example of migrants’ experiences, this study contributes to the literature on social networking in Russia by pointing out that the importance of social networks in this country is caused not so much by some mysterious inclination of people to do everything informally, but by the need to deal with the ineffective formal rules created by the authorities to regulate access to resources and rights in the society. According to the migrants interviewed, the existing formal regulations and the flawed implementation of these regulations simply placed them in a position whereby they could not even secure their legal status without turning to social connections.

Constructing, revitalising and maintaining social connections and employing them to overcome constraints, and by using opportunities contained in the structures of the Russian migration regime, migrants demonstrated their agency. At the same time, despite the many creative ways in which interviewees negotiated access to resources in the receiving society, they could not be considered as equal to Russian citizens. This is because some means of accessing resources, and some resources remained unavailable to them as non-Russian nationals. Furthermore, the kind and quality of the resources which interviewees could attain differed from those available to Russian citizens. In general, as a result of the constraints
imposed on foreign citizens by the migration regime, the migrants interviewed had to exert more effort to attain what they needed/wanted in the receiving society. The interviewees also understood that as non-Russian nationals they were unequal with Russian citizens in terms of their opportunities to influence Russian legislation and to resist possible mistreatment at the hands of officials implementing this legislation. All these inequalities were perceived by the respondents as an indication that in Russia they were treated as ‘others’, and, consequently, they considered Russian citizenship an important factor for inclusion in the receiving society.

The social exclusion experienced by the migrants interviewed contributed to their feelings of (in)stability and (in)security, which are crucial for the ‘territorialisation’ of identity (Amit-Talai, 1998; Flynn, 2004; Flynn, 2007). While the stability and security contributed to respondents’ attachment to the place(s) where they had these feelings and, through this, ‘territorialised’ their identities, conversely, instability and insecurity could make it hard for them to feel that they belonged to this place. It is worth noting, however, that the migrants interviewed for this research could not be divided neatly into two distinct groups: those who felt only stability and security and those who felt only instability and insecurity. Rather, respondents reported varying degrees and combinations of feelings of (in)stability and (in)security. This may possibly be a result of the complexity of the social exclusion which they experienced in Russia. As the interviews showed, despite all the limitations in access to resources and rights, respondents were able to attain necessary resources and to exercise some degree of control over their life in the receiving society.

The interviews with migrants revealed that belonging to place(s) was constructed not only through interpretations of their present but also through interpretations of their past and visions about their future. These temporal dimensions of identity ‘territorialisation’ were interconnected in migrants’ stories. While perceptions of the present as secure and stable prompted respondents to imagine their future in the place associated with these feelings, perception of the present as insecure and unstable discouraged them from doing this. At the same time, in imagining his/her future in a particular place, individuals tended to feel a connection with this place in the present. This dialogue between present and future, in its turn, was intertwined with interpretations of the past. For example, if interviewees interpreted their lives in the previous place of residence as being worse than the present, they tended to associate their future with the current place of residence and felt attached to the place even if it was characterised by feelings of instability and/or insecurity. However, interpretations of both past and present as instable and insecure were also presented in interviews of those who
were unable to indicate their present place(s) of belonging or locate their visions of the future – this thesis named such persons ‘displaced’ people. It is worth noting that the territorialisation of identities was affected not only by interpretations of an individual past – the everyday lives of individuals in the previous place of residence – but also by interpretations of a collective past, in the form of the USSR. Three variants of interpretations of the USSR were revealed through analysis of migrants’ interviews: the USSR as an integral whole; the USSR as geopolitical entity with Russia as its centre; and the USSR as a multi-centred coalition of fifteen republics.

The complex interconnectedness between interpretations of individual and collective pasts, perceptions of the present and visions of the future resulted in a plurality of identity ‘territorialisation’ found in the migrants’ interviews. In addition to the abovementioned ‘displaced’ people, there were also interviewees who perceived the entire post-Soviet space as their place of belonging (in this thesis they were termed ‘deniers’); who perceived Russia as their place of belonging; who felt that they belonged both to Russia and to their country of departure; and who felt that they belonged to their country of departure.

6.2 Limitations of the research

The migration regime of the Russian Federation is just one of many national migration regimes existing world-wide. This research thus presents a single case study, and its empirical results should not be generalised to other cases automatically. It is possible that other migration regimes institutionalise other criteria of differentiation than those revealed through this analysis of the Russian migration regime. It is also possible that there are migration regimes which do not contribute to the construction of migrants as ‘others’. However, the conceptual framework suggested by this study could usefully be employed and verified in research projects focused on other migration regimes and the experiences/identities of migrants who operate within them.

The second limitation of the research is chronological. The thesis focused on the period from 2002 to mid-2009. Of course, all empirical research is necessarily limited in the time-frame which it can cover, but in the case of post-Soviet Russia, research can become outdated especially rapidly. As this thesis has shown, the post-Soviet Russian migration regime is currently in a state of flux. It seems highly likely that this period of volatility will continue, at
least in the near future, and that this will mean still more changes in the legislative and institutional structures for the management of migration, and hence in the parameters for the differentiation of migrants.

6.3 Possibilities for further research projects

The possibilities for future research arise from the limitations of the presently existing research. Thus, for example, further research projects might include the verification of the conceptual developments suggested by this thesis against other empirical data. Such research might take the form of comparative studies examining other migration regimes and other migration populations. Alternatively, it might involve exploring the future evolution of the Russian migration regime.

This thesis did not exhaust all the potential for exploring the connections between the migration regime and social exclusion. Possible avenues for further research on this theme might include, for example, the study of how unwritten norms (rules), which are part of the legislative framework of the migration regime, influence the experiences and identities of migrants; how these rules influence the implementation of written rules regulating migration; and how the effects of the migration regime differ in the case of migrants living in urban and rural areas. However, the most obvious avenue for further research is the exploration of how racialisation influences migrants’ identities and how it affects relations between migrants and collective actors formed by the authorities.

Although the interviews conducted with migrants for this thesis did not provide enough evidence to argue that racialisation, as revealed through an analysis of the discursive framework of the migration regime, informed the ‘territorialisation’ of the interviewees’ identities, they did contain remarks from which it could be inferred that this ‘racialisation’ affected interviewees’ identification, or in other words, their understandings of themselves. The differentiation of migrants into ‘non-Russian’-looking people and ‘Russian’-looking people that the respondents encountered in Russia, was reflected in some interviews in the construction of two supra-ethnic categories: ‘Slavs’ and ‘Oriental men/women’. The exploration of these self-identifications among the interviewed migrants would be a potentially rich topic for further research.
In this thesis, information about the effects of racialisation on interactions between migrants and officials was obtained through interviews with migrants. This might usefully be compared with ethnographic research focused on the social practices of officials responsible for implementing the legislation regulating the admission and conditions of stay of foreign citizens. It would be particularly interesting to focus on their interactions with migrants. Although research of this kind has been carried out in Russia in the past (Kiseleva and Damberg, 2001; Kosygina, 2003), it would have been extremely problematic to conduct such investigation within the framework of this thesis, because of the highly securitised and militarised migration regime at the time the fieldwork was conducted.

It would be beneficial to further explore forms of ‘racialisation’ and its effects on the experiences and identities of people living in Russia more generally. Although the existence of racism in Russia is recognised among human rights activists working in Russia (Lukashevskii and Lokshina, 2002), social scientists studying Russia have not devoted sufficient attention specifically to the process by which the racialised ‘other’ is created. I would argue that this discrepancy may be a result of limitations embedded in the terms ‘xenophobia’ and ‘ethnic hostility’ (‘etnicheskaya nepriyazn’), which are the predominant terms used by researchers in their descriptions and analyses of the discrimination encountered by ‘non-Russian’-looking people in Russia (Vitkovskaya and Malashenko, 1999). The usage of these terms conceals the underlying racialisation processes at work. The term ‘xenophobia’, defined as enmity towards strangers or outsiders, is too broad a term to capture the process of racialisation, which warrants separate attention as a specific subset of the range of processes involved in the construction of strangers and outsiders. The term ‘ethnic hostility’, for its part, draws on the idea of ethnicity, which despite all the academic debates surrounding it, tends to refer to cultural differentiations among people (language, religion, rituals, cuisine etc.). Thus ‘ethnic hostility’ assumes that those who consider themselves to be people of one ethnicity are hostile to some other self-identified groups of people, who differ from them culturally. The application of this term to the situation of migrants in present-day Russia does not allow analysis to focus on the implications of ‘supra-ethnic’ categories, constructed and reproduced through discourses circulating in the country, such as ‘Slavs’ (‘slavyane’), ‘Caucasians’ (‘kavkaztsy’, ‘litsa kavkazskoy natsional’nosti’) and ‘Asians’ (‘aziaty’). These terms, at least in their fundamental senses, do not refer to the cultural characteristics of people and each includes individuals who consider themselves members of different ‘ethnic groups’. They
refer primarily to the meanings ascribed to physical appearance and as such are signs of the process of racialisation. It is interesting that although these categories can be found in the literature discussing xenophobia and ethnic hostility in Russia, they tend to be used merely as illustrations of existing enmity towards strangers/outsiders and certain ethnicities, rather than being analysed in depth.

The process of racialisation occurring in Russia today is informed by the post-Soviet context. There can be no doubt that social, political and cultural interactions between the former republics of the USSR, including Russia, are deeply affected by their previous existence within this geopolitical entity. Although the USSR differed from traditional empires in numerous and important ways (Brubaker, 1996; Martin, 2001; Suny, 1998), the self-evident importance of the Soviet past has led some scholars to suggest that this context can be studied from the perspective of post-colonialism which may bring new insights (Hann, Humphrey et al., 2002). Considering post-Soviet migration within a comparative post-colonial framework is thus another potential avenue for future research; indeed the very different nature of the Soviet imperial/colonial relationship might help refine our understanding of post-colonialism. Whether or not this particular comparative framework proves fruitful, understanding how the post-Soviet present is informed by the Soviet past is one of the challenges facing contemporary scholars in the field. Indeed, the question of how it has come to pass that a society which experienced over seven decades of anti-racist ideology should now be experiencing racialisation is one of the great puzzles that remain to be solved.
# Appendix A

## Guide for interview with migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The sequences of action</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>Introduction of the research and researcher, explanation of the interview process, and ethnic concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initiation of interview</strong></td>
<td>Please tell your story about your life in Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Questions linked with information received in this interview</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Questions about themes which were not mentioned in this interview. That might include questions about:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process of legalization</td>
<td>Please, tell what did you do to secure your legal status in Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience with finding and managing accommodation</td>
<td>Please, tell your story of finding accommodation in Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience in Russian labor market</td>
<td>Please, tell your story about finding job in Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of access to other resources allocated in Russian society such as:</td>
<td>Please tell your story about access to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Health service</em></td>
<td><em>Health service in Russia</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Pension</em></td>
<td><em>Pension</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Education (including education for children)</em></td>
<td><em>Education</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Child care</em></td>
<td><em>Child care</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of construction of relationships with locals</td>
<td>Please, tell about your relationships with people here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The question: is there any other topics you would like to raise in this interview</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-demographical data</strong></td>
<td>Age, gender, marital status and information about family, level of education, where and when come from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion of interview</strong></td>
<td>Asking permission to contact respondent again</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B

**Social and demographic characteristics of the respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Ethnicity (defined by respondent)</th>
<th>Family status</th>
<th>Level of education</th>
<th>Year of arrival to Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>53 Russian</td>
<td>Single, two grown up children, lives with relatives</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>43 Russian</td>
<td>Single, two children, lives with them</td>
<td>Technical secondary</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ne</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>43 data missing</td>
<td>Single, one grown child, lives with son’s family</td>
<td>Technical secondary</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23 Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>28 Half Russian/half Armenian</td>
<td>Single, lives with mother, grandmother and two siblings, who are younger than her</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>data missing</td>
<td>Single, lives with two children, father and mother</td>
<td>Technical secondary</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>36 Russian</td>
<td>Married, lives with husband and two children</td>
<td>Technical secondary</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>34 Russian</td>
<td>Married, lives with husband and two children</td>
<td>Technical secondary</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>28 Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>32 Belarusian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>24 Ukrainian</td>
<td>Married to Russian citizen, lives with wife and her daughter</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>53 Armenian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>25 Russian Jew</td>
<td>Married, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ar</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>27 Tajik</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>10th class</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>35 Russian</td>
<td>Married, one child, lives alone</td>
<td>10th class + university (unfinished)</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>29 Tajik</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives with other relatives</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ku</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>54 Karakalpak</td>
<td>Single, lives with grown up child</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>39 Tajik</td>
<td>Married, no children, lives with wife</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>54 Russian</td>
<td>Single, one grown up daughter, lives alone</td>
<td>Technical secondary</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>Single, two grown up daughters, lives alone</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, lives with grown up child</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Married, one child</td>
<td>Medical secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, lives with the family of her daughter</td>
<td>data missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mo</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single (widow), lives with her grown up children</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Married, lives with her husband</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>Married, no children, lives with husband</td>
<td>Medical secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Azerbaijani</td>
<td>Married, no children, lives with husband</td>
<td>Pedagogical college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives with partner</td>
<td>10th class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ga</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives with partner</td>
<td>Study at University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zo</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives with relatives</td>
<td>Study at college</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, one child, lives with partner</td>
<td>Technical secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pa</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>Study at University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>Study at University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>Study at University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>Study at University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>Married, lives alone</td>
<td>Technical secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ro</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives with future husband</td>
<td>Study at University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pe</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>Study at University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Belarusian</td>
<td>Single, no children, lives alone</td>
<td>University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Azerbaijani</td>
<td>Married, two children, lives with husband</td>
<td>Medical secondary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C

Situation of interview (description)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Approach to respondent</th>
<th>How gatekeeper is related to my respondent</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Place of interview</th>
<th>Presence of another</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Through NGO leader</td>
<td>she helps her</td>
<td>12/07/2001</td>
<td>11.00 - 14.00</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, bench in the park</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Through NGO leader</td>
<td>she helps her</td>
<td>12/08/2001</td>
<td>9.30 - 11.00</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, cafe</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ne</td>
<td>Through my respondent from previous research</td>
<td>sister</td>
<td>12/08/2002</td>
<td>18.00 - 18.50</td>
<td>Novosibirsk region</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Through my friend</td>
<td>sister</td>
<td>08/05/2004</td>
<td>18.00 – 20.00</td>
<td>Moscow region, forest</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Nobody introduced me to her. She was approached during her visit to NGO.</td>
<td></td>
<td>17/05/2004</td>
<td>12.15 – 13.00</td>
<td>Moscow, bench near NGO door</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Through person whom I met in NGO and to whom I was introduced by the leader of NGO</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>18/05/2004</td>
<td>13.45 – 14.30</td>
<td>Moscow region, home of respondent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba</td>
<td>Through person whom I met in NGO and to whom I was introduced by the leader of NGO</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>18/05/2004</td>
<td>15.00-16.45</td>
<td>Moscow region, home of respondent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Through person whom I met in NGO and to whom I was introduced by the leader of NGO</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>18/05/2004</td>
<td>15.00-16.45</td>
<td>Moscow region, home of respondent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Through my acquaintance whom I met at SPSS course</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>24/05/2004</td>
<td>20.30 - 21.15</td>
<td>Moscow, home of respondent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In</td>
<td>Through my acquaintance whom I met at SPSS course</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>25/05/2004</td>
<td>18.45 – 20.30</td>
<td>Moscow, cafe</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>Through my acquaintance whom I met at SPSS course</td>
<td>fried of his colleague</td>
<td>31/05/2004</td>
<td>17.50 – 19.10</td>
<td>Moscow, park near his work place</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Am</td>
<td>Through person whom I met in café and who I helped</td>
<td>sister in law</td>
<td>17/06/2004</td>
<td>19.20 – 21.20</td>
<td>Moscow, café</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo</td>
<td>Through my acquaintance whom I met at SPSS course</td>
<td>colleague</td>
<td>19/06/2004</td>
<td>15.40 – 17.00</td>
<td>Moscow, café</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ar</td>
<td>Through NGO leader</td>
<td>she helped him</td>
<td>25/06/2004</td>
<td>17.40 – 18.30</td>
<td>Moscow, café</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Through my relative</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>26/06/2004</td>
<td>15.50 – 17.00</td>
<td>Moscow, café</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Through NGO leader</td>
<td>he works in NGO</td>
<td>27/07/2004</td>
<td>11.25 – 12.45</td>
<td>Moscow, café</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ku</td>
<td>Nobody introduced me to her. She was approached during her visit to NGO.</td>
<td></td>
<td>27/07/2004</td>
<td>16.00 – 16.30</td>
<td>Moscow, bench in park near NGO</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Through NGO leader</td>
<td>she helped him</td>
<td>04/07/2004</td>
<td>15.10 – 15.55</td>
<td>Moscow, café</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Initial contact through NGO leader, who provided information where to find respondent. Access to interview through local person.</td>
<td>NGO leader is distrusted by respondent. The local person actively helped her</td>
<td>07/07/2004</td>
<td>14.15 – 15.15</td>
<td>Moscow region, bench in the park near town hall</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be</td>
<td>Initial contact through NGO leader, who provided information where to find respondent. Access to interview through local person.</td>
<td>NGO leader is distrusted by respondent. The local person actively helped him</td>
<td>07/07/2004</td>
<td>18.45 – 19.10</td>
<td>Moscow region, at the work place of respondent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fa</td>
<td>Through respondent Be.</td>
<td>she knows Be, who helped her</td>
<td>07/07/2004</td>
<td>19.15 – 20.30</td>
<td>Moscow region, at Be’s work place</td>
<td>Be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Initial Contact Method</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Contact Result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta</td>
<td>Initial contact through NGO leader, who provided information where to find respondent. Access to interview through local person.</td>
<td>NGO leader is distrusted by respondent. The local person actively helped her</td>
<td>07/07/2004</td>
<td>12.00 - 14.00</td>
<td>At the meeting of NGO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>Through respondent Be</td>
<td>she knows Be, who helped her</td>
<td>08/07/2004</td>
<td>10.00 - 11.00</td>
<td>Moscow region, at home of respondent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mo</td>
<td>Initial contact through NGO leader, who provided information where to find respondent. Access to interview through local person.</td>
<td>NGO leader is distrusted by respondent. The local person actively helped her</td>
<td>08/07/2004</td>
<td>12.00 – 12.45</td>
<td>Moscow region, bench in the park</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le</td>
<td>Initial contact through NGO leader. Access to interview through local person.</td>
<td>NGO leader is distrusted by respondent. The local person actively helped her</td>
<td>09/07/2004</td>
<td>13.50 – 14.40</td>
<td>Moscow, bench at train station</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Through my friend manager</td>
<td>August, 2004</td>
<td>17.30 – 18.30</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, park near work place</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Through my friend manager</td>
<td>August, 2004</td>
<td>12.30 – 13.00</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, at her work place (café)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>She was approached in Buddhist centre for meditation, where I went with my friend to meditate</td>
<td>August, 2004</td>
<td>18.30 – 19.30</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, cafe</td>
<td>Her friend</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ga</td>
<td>Through my colleague teacher</td>
<td>09/09/2004</td>
<td>19.30-20.00</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, bench near University</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zo</td>
<td>Through my friend friend of his aunt</td>
<td>12/09/2004</td>
<td>21.15 – 21.55</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, home at respondent</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Through my former classmate acquaintance</td>
<td>14/09/2004</td>
<td>16.50 – 17.50</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, park</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>How Acquainted</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pa</td>
<td>Through my friend</td>
<td>acquaintance</td>
<td>15/09/2004</td>
<td>19.55-20.45</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, cafe</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>She was approached during her visit to the International department in the University, where I worked</td>
<td></td>
<td>17/09/2004</td>
<td>11.00 – 11.45</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, office in University</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te</td>
<td>She is my former student</td>
<td></td>
<td>18/09/2004</td>
<td>10.35-11.00</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, office in University</td>
<td>colleague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An</td>
<td>He is my former student</td>
<td></td>
<td>18/09/2004</td>
<td>11.30 – 11.50</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, office in University</td>
<td>colleague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Through my former student</td>
<td>manager of the firm where my respondent is involved in a project</td>
<td>September 2004</td>
<td>13.30 – 14.10</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, at his work place (it was his home as well)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ro</td>
<td>Through my colleague</td>
<td>teacher</td>
<td>20/09/2004</td>
<td>9.30-10.45</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, her office in University</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pe</td>
<td>Through a student of the University, where I worked</td>
<td>sister</td>
<td>20/09/2004</td>
<td>15.05 – 15.45</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, New York Pizza</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Through my friend</td>
<td>teacher</td>
<td>22/09/2004</td>
<td>19.30 – 19.45</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, café in University</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Through my friend</td>
<td>teacher</td>
<td>22/09/2004</td>
<td>20.00 – 20.40</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, classroom in University</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da</td>
<td>Through my friend</td>
<td>teacher</td>
<td>23/09/2004</td>
<td>12.30-13.15</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, cafe</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Through my friend</td>
<td>friend</td>
<td>24/09/2004</td>
<td>19.20 – 20.00</td>
<td>Novosibirsk, home of friend of my friend, who knows my respondent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D

Russian legislation: translation of the titles used in the text of the thesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English Translation</th>
<th>Russian Original</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Laws</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Citizenship</td>
<td>О гражданстве</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the State Policy of the Russian Federation with Respect to Compatriots Abroad*</td>
<td>О государственной политике Российской Федерации в отношении соотечественников за рубежом</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation</td>
<td>О миграционном учёте иностранных граждан и лиц без гражданства в Российской Федерации</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Legal Position of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation</td>
<td>О правовом положении иностранных граждан в Российской Федерации</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to the Freedom of Movement, and the Choice of Place of Stay and Residence within the Borders of the Russian Federation*</td>
<td>О праве граждан Российской Федерации на свободу передвижения, выбор места пребывания и места жительства в пределах Российской Федерации</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in the USSR*</td>
<td>О правовом положении иностранных граждан в СССР</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government regulation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Approval of the Regulations of Stay of Foreign Citizens in the USSR</td>
<td>Об утверждении правил пребывания иностранных граждан в СССР</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State programme</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘On Assisting the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Residing Abroad’*</td>
<td>по оказанию содействия добровольному переселению в Российскую Федерацию соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Translation of all titles except those marked * has been taken from the database located at the site http://www.egarant.ru/
Appendix E

Permanent registration at place of residence in the Russian Federation

Permanent registration at place of residence was introduced by Law № 5242-1 ‘On the Right of Citizens of the Russian Federation to the Freedom of Movement, and the Choice of Place of Stay and Residence within the Borders of the Russian Federation ’ in 1993 (Vedomosti, 1993). This registration replaced the propiska (internal registration) employed in the USSR to control the geographical mobility of the population. Citizens of the USSR were not free to change their place of residence. To do so they needed to ask permission from the state by applying for a propiska at the prospective place of residence. Those Soviet citizens who were not registered at the place where they lived experienced social and political exclusion, since, according to legislation, they could exercise their rights (not only social, but also political) only at the place of their internal registration. Access to employment, too, was mediated by propiska. A person had to be registered in the area where her/his workplace was located. People who were not registered at their place of residence were subject to prosecution.

The 1993 Law states that citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to change their place of residence or sojourn without asking permission from the authorities. They are obliged to register at the new place, but the authorities are also obliged to provide them with this registration. Although according to this law the absence of permanent registration at place of residence does not constitute grounds to prevent Russian citizens from accessing their rights, the legacy of propiska continues to exist in popular consciousness and in the practices of social institutions (Filippova, 1998; Tishkov, 1998).
Appendix F

‘Women of the East’ in Russia: Liberation

23-year-old L. and N. had been living in Novosibirsk for several years. L. hailed from Uzbekistan and identified herself during the interviews as Uzbek. N. was originally from the Pamir region in Tajikistan, but did not speak about herself as Tajik; instead, she used the category of ‘eastern/oriental woman’ (‘vostochnaya zhenshchina’). Neither of the women had Russian citizenship. Moreover they were ‘illegal’ migrants, as they had not managed to obtain official registration at their place of residence. Both of them worked in the informal economy. Their employers hired them unofficially without a contract and consequently, as employees, L. and N. were not protected from possible mistreatment. L. had finished medical college in Uzbekistan, but in Russia she could not find a job in the area for which she had been trained. She was working as a waitress in a café which served fast food. N., who had completed only ten years of schooling, was working as a dance tutor in a number of fitness centres and also as a dancer in restaurants and at events of different kinds such as birthday parties and other celebrations.

L. came to Russia with her husband, a Tajik who had been born and grew up in Uzbekistan, but had studied for a medical degree in Novosibirsk and had already obtained Russian citizenship. She met him in Uzbekistan, where he had an internship as a doctor in a hospital. L. had just returned to her hometown after graduating from medical college and worked in the same ward as her future husband. They met during a dramatic period in L.’s life. Her parents were going to give her away in marriage to a man whom she had never met. L. was very pessimistic about the arranged marriage and had been happy to avoid it by marrying a person whom she at least knew. After the wedding, the couple left Uzbekistan, since L.’s husband had to continue his

1 This self-naming of N. is quite interesting as ‘eastern/oriental woman’ is a supra-ethnic category. In some other interviews with ‘non-Russian’-looking migrants, the category ‘east/oriental people (woman/man)’ was also used. In the interviews, this category had positive connotations. The emergence of such supra-ethnic categories can be interpreted as a response by ‘non-Russian’-looking people to external categorisation encountered in the receiving society.

2 Although L. was married to a Russian citizen, at the time of the interview she did not have the temporary or permanent permit required by the Russian legislation in order to be considered a legal resident of the country. When she was asked by the interviewer why she did not get a temporary or permanent permit she answered that Russian officials did not recognise marriage certificates issued in Uzbekistan.
studies in Russia. At the time of L’s interview, her husband, a newly qualified doctor, was working as an intern in one of the hospitals in Novosibirsk. Because of her husband’s social embeddedness and legal status in Novosibirsk, L. joined a social network which provided her with the basis for a new life in Russia. This initial network was not based on ‘ethnicity’. It consisted of her husband’s colleagues.

N., in contrast, came to Russia alone. She did not say in her interview why she had left her place of birth at the age of 17 and moved to a place where she knew nobody. She never visited or contacted her family after she arrived in Russia. N.’s account of her life in Russia showed the importance of social networks for survival. She went through some extremely hard periods in Novosibirsk because of her initial lack of contacts. However, despite all these difficulties, she never approached other Tajiks in the same town to get help.

L. and N. experienced significant constraints in the receiving society as ‘illegal’ migrants and as people classified as ‘non-Russian’. In their interviews, they pointed to the prejudices of the local population against ‘non-Russian’-looking people. They also spoke about the discrimination they had experienced in Russia because of their ‘non-Russian’ appearance. Both L. and N. had experienced unpleasant encounters with the Russian police. They were aware of their vulnerability and expressed a fear of violence. Nevertheless, they stated that they liked being in Russia because it gave them a freedom which they had not experienced in their countries of origin.

This feeling of freedom arose from the differences between the gender orders inherent in the societies which they had left, and the gender order in Russia. According to L. and N., the gender orders which exist in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are restrictive towards women, especially towards younger women.

While N. in her interview depicted a relatively patriarchal model of the family, in which women are oppressed by men, L.’s description of the lives of young married women in Uzbekistan revealed a much more complicated picture of the hierarchy. In this pyramid of power the daughter-in-law, who has to live with her husband’s parents, is at the bottom and the parents of her husband are at the top. A woman must obey her husband and both, in turn, must obey his parents. She has to ask permission for everything, and all of her husband’s decisions have to be approved by his parents. According to L. the husband cannot even give presents to his wife.
without first asking permission from his mother. The husband’s mother is a powerful figure. She rules the household, her children and the wives of her sons. This rule by older women appears to be very restrictive for the young women in a household. As L. put it in her interview:

To get married means to send yourself to prison … It is a cage, it can be a golden cage, but it is still a cage … You cannot even visit neighbours without permission … I cannot explain it. To understand me you need to experience this atmosphere where everyone is waiting for the word of the mother-in-law …

(L.)

Both L. and N. outlined a society where parents tend to marry off their daughters when they are very young. According to L. and N., family life does not allow young women to invest time and effort in further education. Young women may be forbidden to take up employment. Their prime responsibilities are giving birth to children and working as housewives.

If I had married there, I would have had to sit at home and give birth. That is all. My tasks are to give birth and look after the house… no studies, no employment.

(L.)

The Russian gender order has its own regulations which produce unequal treatment of women and men in the society (Ashwin, 2000; Kay, 2000). Researchers who study gender issues in Russia indicate, for example, gender inequality in the economic sphere (Jyrkinen-Pakkasvirta, 1996; Kozina and Zhidkova, 2006) and in politics (Temkina, 1996). However, the Russian gender order seems to be much more liberal than the gender orders which L. and N. left behind. Taking into consideration their accounts of the restrictions imposed on women in the societies where they lived before, it was no surprise that they perceived Russia as a country where women had freedom.
I feel free here ... I like being here ... A person who has lived in the atmosphere in which I lived before will understand me ... Nobody tells me what to do, whom to speak to ... I am learning by my own mistakes. I like that. I am independent now. I like being independent ...

(L.)

As the interviews with L. and N. showed, liberation from the internalised gender regulations inherent to the society which they had left did not happen overnight. For example, in her interview, L. expressed her happiness at having the freedom to make her own decisions and to communicate with people without first seeking permission, but as she herself said, she had to live in Russia for some time before she could get used to this freedom and stop asking her husband if she could do this or that. Indeed, it was her husband who encouraged her to enjoy more independence, since he was uncomfortable with the possible negative reactions of his Russian friends and neighbours towards the patriarchal pattern of relationships between wife and husband displayed in his former society.

The support of those close to them was apparently very important for enabling both women to rethink the internalised regulations of the gender orders left behind. N. described being very scared at the beginning of her teaching career. It was so unusual for her to tell people what to do and how to do it. She said that she was even afraid to look her students in the eye or to correct them. However, with time she became more relaxed and confident in class. She was encouraged by the progress of her students and by the respect which they showed towards her. Some of them became her friends and supported her a good deal. Through her teaching and communication with students she began to feel that her skills and knowledge were important for others and this made her, in her own words, ‘feel that I am fulfilled in all senses’.

Interviews with L. and N. showed why, despite the problems caused by racialisation, women from societies with more restrictive gender orders than the Russian one prefer the receiving society to those left behind. Having experienced liberation from the restrictions imposed on them in their countries of origin, they link their future with Russia. They expect that the gender order of Russian society will provide them with opportunities to fulfil their dreams of personal development and achievement. Even though their aspirations to continue their studies and to start a reasonable career in Russia would be unrealised unless they managed to, at the very
least, legalise their situation on Russian territory, they feel that they have more chance to live a fulfilled life in Russia than in the countries of their citizenship.

There is hope that some day I will study and will make a career ... that I will be able to achieve something, to do something for myself, not for somebody else or on somebody’s orders ... 

(L.)
Appendix G

Description of research localities

The empirical data for this research were collected in Moscow, Moscow region (cities X and Y),\(^1\) and Novosibirsk. The figures below indicate the geographical positioning of the research localities (Figures G.1 and G.2). This appendix provides a description of these localities including their economic, social, and demographic characteristics. The description reflects the situation as it stood in 2004 – the year when the main part of the fieldwork for this research was conducted.

First of all, it is worth noting that the administrative positions of Moscow, Novosibirsk and cities in the Moscow region differ from each other. Moscow is the capital of the Russian Federation and as such houses the administration of the President, the Federal Government and the State Duma of the Russian Federation. This city is recognised as a separate region and as such it is a federal subject of the Russian Federation. Novosibirsk in its turn is a centre of the Siberian federal district (\textit{okrug})\(^2\) and as such it houses the Plenipotentiary Representative

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\(^1\) Since cities X and Y are too small to be named without jeopardising the anonymity of the interviewees, this appendix contains a description of Moscow region as a whole, making references to X and Y where appropriate.

\(^2\) In 2000, the regions of the Russian Federation were grouped into seven federal districts (\textit{okrug}). These districts are not the constituent units of the country. They are administrative units. The Siberian federal district consists of twelve federal subjects and covers 5 114 800 km\(^2\).
of the Russian President who oversees the work of federal agencies in the regions (federal subjects) constituting this district and serves as liaison between federal subjects and the federal government. In addition, Novosibirsk is a centre of the Novosibirsk region and houses the governor and other regional authorities. Cities X and Y, located in Moscow region, are centres of the raiony which constitute this region. According to the administrative hierarchy existing in the country, these two cities are less powerful politically than Novosibirsk, which in its turn, is less powerful than Moscow.

![Map of Moscow and Moscow region](http://www.russianamericanchamber.com/en/business/moscow/region.htm)

**Figure G.2 Moscow and Moscow region**  

The economic situations of Moscow, Moscow region and Novosibirsk differ from each other, too. In 2004, the market value of all finished goods and services produced within Moscow per person was three times higher than the same indicator for Moscow region and Novosibirsk region (Rosstat, 2006, pp. 351-352). In 2004, Moscow had 1 221 514 enterprises and organisations, while Novosibirsk had only 117 275 and the whole Moscow region – 195 025 (Rosstat, 2006, p. 386; Novosibirskstat, 2006, p. 6).

Moscow’s economic prosperity is further reflected in the opportunities provided by the Moscow labour market. Those who work in Moscow earn more than in the majority of other regions. In 2004, the average Moscow monthly salary was 10 634 rubles, while in Novosibirsk it was 7 501 rubles and in Moscow region – 7 399 rubles (Rosstat, 2008a, p. 159; 3So-called ‘resource extracting regions’ (such as the Far North) provide an opportunity to earn roughly the same as in Moscow.

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3 So-called ‘resource extracting regions’ (such as the Far North) provide an opportunity to earn roughly the same as in Moscow.
In 2004, Moscow had the lowest rates of unemployment of all the federal subjects of the Russian Federation, while Novosibirsk was roughly in the middle of the rating list (Rosstat, 2006, p. 115). As for Moscow region, its rate of unemployment is traditionally low since many people who reside in this region work in the capital (Zaionchkonskaya and Mkrtchyan, 2009, pp. 30-31).

Moscow is one of the few places in the Russian Federation where the population has been increasing throughout the entire post-Soviet period (Rosstat, 2008a, pp. 56-57). Given that the mortality rate has exceeded the birth rate throughout this period, this increase of Moscow’s population must be the result of migration exchange (Rosstat, 2008a, pp. 82-83). The rate of migration growth observed in Moscow is one of the highest in the country. According to official statistics, in 2004, the Moscow population amounted to 10 407 000 inhabitants, a figure which, by 2007, had grown to 10 470 000 (Rosstat, 2008a, p. 56). The unofficial population is considerably higher. This migration growth can mostly be attributed to migration exchange between Moscow and other regions of the country. For example, in 2004, this city officially gained 48 073 people via migration exchange with other regions of the Russian Federation, and only 3 599 people via migration exchange with other countries (Rosstat, 2005a, p. 488). While losing population due to migration to the so-called ‘far-abroad’, Moscow gained population from former Soviet republics. In 2004, migration growth occurring in Moscow as the result of migration exchange with NIS countries amounted to 3 998 people (Rosstat, 2005a, pp. 532-533). Approximately 44% of this migration growth was the result of migration exchange with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus; 22% – with former Soviet republics located in Central Asia, 21% – with NIS countries in the Caucasus, 11% – with Kazakhstan, and only 2% with the Baltic States (Rosstat, 2005a, 2005, pp. 532-533). According to experts, the construction and retail sectors remain the main spheres providing work for migrants in Moscow (Tyuryukanova 2009; Tyuryukanova 2004).

Moscow region, which surrounds Moscow (Figure G.2), contains 80 cities and towns, which are relatively small. It can be argued that the growth and development of these cities are handicapped by their proximity to Moscow. The capital of the country draws people away from the surrounding region (Zaionchkonskaya and Mkrtchyan, 2009, p. 29). None of these cities and towns has more than 200 000 inhabitants and only sixteen have populations in excess of 100 000 people (Rosstat, 2008b, p. 54). X belongs to the latter group of cities, while

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4The ‘far abroad’ is a term commonly used in Russia to refer to those foreign countries which are not former republics of the USSR.
Y is one of 64 cities which have less than 100 000 inhabitants. In Moscow region as in Moscow, the mortality rate exceeds the birth rate. In the 1990s, this region was losing its population. However, in the 2000s, it began to gain population due to migration exchange. In fact, since 2003 the rate of migration growth in Moscow region has been exceeding that of Moscow (Rosstat, 2008a, p. 92). This may be a result of high prices on the real estate market which prevent people from renting and buying accommodation in Moscow. In 2004, according to official statistics, 6 630 000 people lived in Moscow region (Regiony, 2008, p. 56). Migration growth in this region is mainly produced through migration exchange with other regions of the Russian Federation. In 2004, the region gained 48 103 people as a result of such exchange. At the same time, its migration exchange with foreign countries provided only 8 767 new inhabitants (Rosstat, 2005a, p. 488). In the migration exchange with foreign countries the region lost population to the ‘far abroad’, but gained population via exchange with former Soviet republics. In 2004, approximately 32% of this migration growth was the result of the exchange of population with Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, 11% — with the NIS countries situated in the Caucasus, 33,4% — with former Soviet republics located in Central Asia, and 21,5% — with Kazakhstan (Rosstat, 2005a, pp. 532-533). Unfortunately, there are no data available on migrants’ employment in this region.

Novosibirsk is Russia’s third largest city in terms of population (after Moscow and St. Petersburg). In Novosibirsk, the mortality rate exceeds the birth rate. Novosibirsk and Novosibirsk region are also losing population in migration exchange with other regions of the Russian Federation. Until 2002, however, the decrease of the population had been partly compensated by the inflow of migrants from former Soviet republics seeking permanent residence in Russia after the collapse of the USSR (Novosibirskstat, 2003, p. 8). Because of its geographical proximity to the former Soviet republics located in Central Asia, Novosibirsk region was one of the Russian regions which received the greatest inflow of repatriates obtaining forced migrant status (Rosstat, 2008a, pp. 96-97). Due to changes in national legislation introduced in 2002 this flow decreased significantly5. As a result, according to official statistics, Novosibirsk started to lose its population in migration exchange

5 In Russia, forced migrant status can be claimed only by Russian citizens and only within one year of their arrival to the Russian Federation. Before 2002 the usual practice was as follows: former Soviet citizens arrived in Russia, applied for citizenship, received it within six months, and then applied for forced migrant status. The introduction of the 2002 Law ‘On Citizenship’ blocked former Soviet citizens from receiving Russian citizenship within six months. Nowadays, in the majority of cases, they can receive citizenship only after one year of residency in Russia (Table 3.2). This effectively renders them ineligible for forced migrant status.
In 2006, however, statistics showed that Novosibirsk was once again beginning to gain population via migration exchange (Novosibirskstat, 2008, p. 9). This change in official data could be a result of the liberalisation of the migration regulation which occurred in Russia and allowed migrants to obtain and preserve their legal statuses more easily than before (see Chapter 3). These recent changes in migration growth were not, however, substantial enough to compensate for the ongoing decrease in the city’s population. In 2004, the population of Novosibirsk stood at 1,405,569 people, a figure which had shrunk by 2007 to 1,390,513 (Novosibirskstat, 2008, p. 6).

According to information provided by the Federal Migration Service, 77,600 international migrants came to Novosibirsk region between January and August 2004. Analysis of their migration cards indicates that 86.1% of these migrants came from former Soviet republics (Kazakhstan – 26%, Tajikistan – 23%, Uzbekistan – 18%, Kyrgyzstan – 6%, Armenia – 8%, Azerbaijan – 4.5%; Ukraine – 0.6%). Around 26% of foreign citizens were registered in Novosibirsk. This figure was twice higher than in any other city of the region. It was also estimated that during this period 16,600 migrants lost their legal statuses due to overstay.

During the seven-month period under discussion, only 2,497 foreign citizens received permission to work in Novosibirsk. Experts from the Federal Migration Service estimated that 30% of the foreign citizens working in Novosibirsk region in 2003 and 2004 were working there illegally. Data provided by the Federal Migration Service on migrants’ participation in the economy of Novosibirsk and Novosibirsk region covered only those migrants who had managed to receive work permits and were working in Russia legally. According to this data the majority of migrants worked at construction sites and in the retail sector. Twenty-one per cent of migrants who managed to receive work permits and were working in Russia legally during 2003 and 2004 were citizens of former Soviet republics.
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1 These items can be found in the European Resource Centre at the University of Birmingham