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This thesis examines the intellectual history of male friendship through its articulation in non-Shakespearean early modern drama; and considers how dramatic texts engage with the classical ideals of male friendship. Cicero’s *De amicitia* provided the theoretical model for perfect friendship for the early modern period; and this thesis argues for the further relevance of early modern translations of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, and in particular, Seneca’s *De beneficiis*, both of which open up meanings of different formulations and practices of friendship. This thesis, then, analyses how dramatists contributed to the discourse of male friendship through representations that expanded the bounds of amity beyond the paradigmatic ‘one soul in two bodies’, into different conceptions of friendship both ideal and otherwise. Through a consideration of selected dramatic works in their early modern cultural contexts, this thesis adds to our understanding of how amicable relations between men were arranged, performed, read and understood in the early modern period.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my brother, James B. Walters, Jr.
Acknowledgements

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Conventions and Abbreviations

**Dates:** The year is assumed to begin on 1 January.

**Dating of Plays:** From the *Annals of English Drama 975-1700*, rev. edition (1964), unless otherwise noted. When no date of composition is available the range is given.

**References:** Follow the Modern Humanities Research Association style.

**Spelling and Punctuation:** Original spelling and punctuation have been retained except for i/j and u/v, which have been distinguished and ‘y’ which has been substituted with ‘th’.

The abbreviations used for translations are given immediately after the first entry in the reference for each chapter. The following abbreviations are used in the references:

- **Court**  The Court Of Chivalry 1634-1640
- **DNB**  *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*
- **IEP**  *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*
- **OED**  *The Oxford English Dictionary*
- **SEP**  *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*
Introduction

In John Harington’s 1562 translation of Marcus Tullius Cicero’s *De amicitia* he reiterates Cicero’s understanding of the integral nature of friendship to a man’s life saying, ‘neither water, nor fier ne aire, as they say, do we more places use then this frendship’.

Harington’s ‘preface to the reader’ suggests that he, too, recognised the necessity of friendship at the time that he translated it. He writes that in Cicero’s text he ‘sawe’ the ‘civyle use of friendship’. And he was not alone. At a time when rank and status not only mattered, but helped to forge male bonds that drove personal and professional success, the development and preservation of amicable relations was more than a worthy endeavour, it was, in fact, crucial. Friendship’s attainment could, like success in other intimate relationships, namely marriage and parenthood, confer honour and reputation. Early modern humanist thinkers not only recognised this, but also understood that private friendship had public resonance. As such, just as didactic manuals were printed to advise men on raising their children and to guide them in conducting their other domestic responsibilities admirably, a proliferation of literature was made available to assist men in the successful cultivation and maintenance of one of the more instrumental relationships necessary for his success: male friendship.

Humanist writers looked to guide the ethical practice of friendship beginning in grammar school through appeals to classical wisdom, particularly Cicero’s work. The hope was that each young man might realise what Harington claimed that he found in *De amicitia*, ‘a glasse to dycerne my freends in, and a civile rule to leade my life by’.

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2 *Booke of Freendship*, Harington, sig. A3'.

3 *Booke of Freendship*, Harington, sig. A3'.
The influence of Cicero’s *De amicitia* on the discourse of early modern friendship cannot be denied. The work was available in Latin and five vernacular translation editions between 1481 and 1577. Its ideas were widely disseminated. Lorna Hutson observes the pervasive presence of Cicero’s principles in ‘all genres of literature’ in the sixteenth-century. But she is right to wonder to what extent the prevalence of the work’s principles in the discourse can be ‘read’ as correlating to a ‘belief’ by men that their friendships should comply to the Ciceronean model, especially given the work’s own explicit appeals to friendship’s usefulness. Thomas Newton’s translation of *De amicitia* claims that ‘love is confirmed by benefits received’, as well as goodwill and acquaintance. And although this idea is somewhat muted to the overall call for virtue in friendship in Cicero’s text, it is there nonetheless. Further, Harington’s own application of the term ‘use’ in his preface, still carried with it at the time an instrumental meaning: ‘the act of employing a thing for any (especially a profitable) purpose’. The association between benefit, friendship and goodwill however, received full expression in Seneca’s *De beneficiis*. This too, was available in translation in the period, and its ideas also had extra-textual life. Even so, the contributions to the discourse of friendship by *De beneficiis*, and Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, which expands friendship beyond the Ciceronean ideal’s exclusivity, have been largely subordinated by the critical attention given to Cicero’s work, even though Aristotle and Seneca had important things to say about friendship.

While contemporary literary critics do credit Aristotle for his contributions to ideas on friendship in the period, it is to a lesser extent than Cicero. In part, this may be because

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5 Hutson points up that the text ‘never pretends to sever friendship from instrumentality’, p. 62.
7 ‘The Newton translation reads ‘frendshyp cannot be where vertue is not’, sig. B1’.
8 ‘Use’ *Oxford English Dictionary*, def. 1a. (in use around the time of Harington’s translation in 1440, 1558).
Aristotle acknowledges as friendships those amicable relations that do not reflect the ideal of ‘one soul in two bodies’. The same may be said for Seneca’s work, which is mainly mistakenly regarded only as a treatise on the politics of exchange. Both works however, have similar ethical grounding as De amicitia. It is just that their emphases, focus and intents differ. The Ethics is an inquiry into eudaimonia, and De beneficiis outlines the ethical practice of giving and receiving, positing friendship as a social act. Coppélia Kahn recognised the general importance of De beneficiis, describing it as ‘the most influential treatise of the Renaissance on gift-giving per se’. But it is also useful to acknowledge the work’s contribution to ideas on the conventions of friendship.

In his 1986 article ‘Timon of Athens and the Three Graces: Shakespeare's Senecan Study’ John Wallace observed that Seneca’s De beneficiis had been ‘much neglected by recent scholarship’. He remarked that at the time the work’s ‘influence over sixteenth-and seventeenth-century English thought’ had ‘yet to be fully explored’. Even though Wallace’s study focused on exchange and benefit in Shakespeare’s work rather than a consideration of amity, he sheds important light on the ideas discussed in Seneca’s text and demonstrates how a reading of the work can help foster further understanding of representations of ‘friendly affection’ and generosity. Despite Wallace’s submission that there was work to be done, there has yet to be a focused study on the representation of friendship in early modern drama that considers the import of ideas on the conventions of giving and receiving from Seneca’s work. Historian David Wootton called De beneficiis

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9 Coppélia Kahn “‘Magic of Bounty”: Timon of Athens, Jacobean Patronage, and Maternal Power’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 38.1 (Spring, 987), pp. 34-57, (p. 49). It is also interesting that De beneficiis has not received as much attention or consideration as Marcel Mauss’ The Gift, a work that David Wootton rightly notes ‘whose subject matter is identical with that of Seneca, though strangely, Seneca is never mentioned’, in David Wootton ‘Francis Bacon: Your Flexible Friend’ in The World of the Favourite ed. by JH Elliott and WB Brockliss (London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp.184-204, (p. 186).


12 Wallace, p. 352.
to critical attention in his important 1999 study, ‘Francis Bacon: Your Flexible Friend’.
Here he recognised Seneca’s work as one of three classical texts that were ‘prolonged
mediations on friendship’. Nevertheless, despite the fact that early modern translations
of the work invoke friendship and the work posits benefit and giving as the beginning of
friendship, De beneficiis remains largely overlooked for what it may add to an
understanding of the conventions of early modern friendship.

While this is curious, in that two of the work’s translators had (albeit different) ties to
the London commercial theatre community, it is not surprising, in light of Arthur
Golding’s description of the work in the dedicatory epistle as the ‘why, how, when, too
what ende, and on whom’ of benefitting, as well as ‘what reward is too bee looked for in
the doing of it, and what frute it yeeldeth again’. The description seems antithetical to the
virtuous friendship model promoted in Cicero’s De amicitia. G.W. Peterman has remarked
that modern readers may find that Seneca’s ideas ‘smack of bribery’. But as Peterman
cautions, one must be mindful of ‘the cultural chasms between twentieth and first century
social conventions’; a chasm that was not all that wide between first century Rome and
eye modern England, as they shared a similar understanding of the integral relationship
between friendship and benefit. This is an understanding that Harington himself highlights
in his translation of Cicero’s work when he considers friendship’s ‘use’. In his work on
Saint Paul’s descriptions of his relationship with Philippians, Peterman relates that Paul
uses ‘terms common in commercial transactions’ and observes that ‘the transactional

13 David Wootton, ‘Francis Bacon: Your Flexible Friend’ in The World of the Favourite ed. by JH Elliott
and WB Brockliss (London and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp.184-204, (p. 186). The other
two he named were Cicero’s De amicitia and Plutarch’s ‘How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend’.
14 Lucius Annaeus Seneca, The Woorke of the Excellent Philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca Concerning
Benefyting That Is Too Say the Dooing, Receyving, and Requyting of Good Turnes trans. by Arthur Golding
(London : By [John Kingston for] John Day, 1578), sig.*2r. (The pagination begins A1 with the text itself),
sig. 2r; is the way the page is paginated. Hereafter the reference will read De beneficiis, Golding.
15 G.W. Peterman, Paul’s Gift from Philippi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), fn. 53 p. 68.
16 Peterman, fn. 53 p. 68.
17 Book of Freendship, Harington, sig. A3r.
The character of Greco-Roman social reciprocity is very much like buying and selling. As such, we might not be surprised by the forthright assertions of the benefits of giving and receiving that inform *De beneficiis*, a work written at a similar time, between ACE 56 and 62. We should certainly not dismiss the work’s importance because it appears on the surface to suggest the building of strictly instrumental relationships devoid of affection; for *De beneficiis* is much more than a first century version of *How to Win Friends and Influence People*; its philosophical underpinning is strongly rooted in Seneca’s ideas on friendship, including the generally held classical view that equality is requisite for true friendship.

There have been many scholars who have made important contributions to the work on friendship in the early modern period. Several historians who have furthered an understanding of certain aspects of early modern amity include Alan Bray, Mervyn James, Alexandra Shepard, Blair Worden and David Wootton. This current study benefits from their insights. The most recent contribution is ‘Friendship and Sociability’ by Keith Thomas in *The Ends of Life* (2009). Thomas’ work points up the continued interest that the subject of early modern friendship engenders. The seminal work on male friendship in drama is Laurens Mills’ 1937 study *One Soul in Bodies Twain*. Mills surveyed over eighty plays that consider friendship as a theme. The work devotes a chapter to a review of classical ideas and catalogues dramatists’ engagement with friendship themes, tracing the evolution of the topoi of friendship in its various permutations through Shakespeare and Stuart drama. It provides a useful thematic and friendship plot survey, but given the scope...

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18 Peterman, p. 64.
19 Peterman, p. 52. Date held for the Philippians (ACE 60-62), fn. 6 p. 52.
20 *How to Win Friends and Influence People* is a much reprinted 1936 best-seller by Dale Carnegie on how to establish friendly relations with others in order to achieve your goals; ‘The greatest friendship we can intend to any man is to make him equal with ourselves’ in Seneca, *De beneficiis* trans. by Thomas Lodge, rpt. of 1612 edn. by Israel Gollancz (London: J.M. Dent, 1899), pp. 49-50.
of the project there are limited in-depth readings. There was an almost fifty year gap between Mills’ study and further substantive consideration of male friendship in early modern drama. This extended gap was filled in part by work that subordinated classical thinking to post-Foucauldian sexuality, through a significant focus on male homoerotics.\footnote{See for instance the work by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Love, Sex, Intimacy and Friendship Between Men, 1550-1800 ed. by Katherine O’Donnell and Michael O’Rourke (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Queering the Renaissance ed. by Jonathan Goldberg (Durham : Duke University Press, 1994) and Alan Sinfield, *Shakespeare, Authority, Sexuality: Unfinished Business in Cultural Materialism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).}

The call for papers for 17 September 2009 London Renaissance Seminar on ‘Amity in Early Modern Literature and Culture’ highlighted the need to redress this imbalance and pointed up the research possibilities available in the study of male friendship in the early modern period:

In recent years, discussions about early modern human relationships have been dominated by the topic of sexuality and eroticism, with the result that non-erotic relationships have been reductively misunderstood within this theoretical approach. This has meant that the complexity, diversity and importance of non-erotic relationships have not been given due scholarly attention.\footnote{Call for papers ‘Amity in Early Modern Literature and Culture’ at the University of Portsmouth, via email June 2009 from Bronwen Price and Paraic Finnerty at <http://earlymodern-lit.blogspot.com/2009>.
}

Four recent studies have refocused attention on classical and humanist-inspired ideas on male friendship and considered them, to differing extents, in relation to representation in early modern drama. Lorna Hutson’s work in *The Usurer’s Daughter: Male Friendship and Fictions of Women in Sixteenth Century England* (1994) considers how the ‘economies’ of the humanist ideology of male friendship influenced the representation of women, and offers a new reading of *The Comedy of Errors* and *The Taming of the Shrew*
in this context. Lisa Jardine examines companionate marriage and male friendship and considers how familiar letters were constructed as acts of friendship in Reading Shakespeare Historically (1996). Laurie Shannon considers friendship discourses and the politics of likeness and explores mignonnerie as friendship in Sovereign Amity: Figures of Friendship in Shakespearean Contexts (2002). Tom MacFaul’s Male Friendship in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries (2007) explores the ‘fictions of connection’ informed by humanist ideas on friendship that stressed ‘equality and permanence’ and deprived the self. Overall, however, the works of Shakespeare continue to receive the most significant scholarly attention.

This thesis has two main objectives. The first is to consider how an understanding of the ideas on friendship and giving in De beneficiis and the more inclusive formulations of friendship outlined in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics can help to open up meanings of friendship in early modern drama and contribute to a broader definition of, and depiction of friendship beyond the Ciceronian model of ‘a most perfect agreement of willes, desires & opinions’. This work will analyse how Aristotle’s ideas on conceptions and formulations of philia from the Ethics and Seneca’s ideas on the conventions of giving, receiving and benefit from De beneficiis figure in dramatic representation and early modern practice of friendship. This will be done by analysing what the works have to say about these aspects of friendship and exploring the extent to which these ideas became a

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24 Hutson, pp. 52-90, 188-223. Only pertinent highlights of this text and the works of other scholars are referred to here.
28 The Booke of Friendshipe, Newton, sig. A7; see also sigs. B1r-B1." The word ‘meanings’ seems most apt here in that it accounts for understanding across the spectrum of friendship’s possibilities. The term is coined by Alexandra Shepard in her book Meanings of Manhood in Early Modern England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
part of the discourse of friendship in the period. This will involve a consideration of the influence of Aristotelian and Senecan thought beginning in the thirteenth century. The second aim of this thesis is to analyse the innovative ways in which dramatic works that have been heretofore less-attended to, that is, those that lie outside the Shakespearean canon, engaged with classical ideas on friendship from Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and to a much lesser extent, Epicurus, Plutarch and Lucian. The hope is that this work will provide further understanding of how amicable relations between men were arranged, performed, read and understood in the early modern period. The idea is not to map classical or contemporary texts to specific works of drama, as this would be problematic and speculative at best. Rather, the purpose is to consider the resonance of ideas on friendship represented on the academic, commercial, and private stages in order to more fully understand the range of views that were a part of the discourse of friendship.

The argument for drama’s relevance as a contributory voice in the discourse of male friendship follows Michael Hattaway’s suggestion that dramatic texts may be viewed as evidence ‘in history’ through which we might gain further insights into a time, offering ‘a record, highly mediated, of the period’s perceptions of itself, sometimes of an event or series of events—even if this is only a performance or a series of performances’. When attempting to gain an understanding of male friendship in the period, drama may be considered as important to ‘read’, as the other evidence considered in this thesis. This approach acknowledges the limitations of trying to read drama as evidence of a shared cultural view, however, it recognises the value of dramatic representation in helping to uncover some of the ways that classical ideas on friendship were affirmed, challenged, interrogated, and understood.

The scope of this study is purposely limited. It examines eleven plays by nine dramatists in order to undertake an in-depth analysis. The plays chosen for inclusion have been heretofore less well-represented in the critical literature. They have received little, if any, attention for contributing to an understanding of male friendship. They include *Titus et Gesippus* by John Foxe (1544), *The Excellent Comedie of Two the Moste Faithfulllest Freendes, Damon and Pithias* by Richard Edwards (1565), *Endymion* by John Lyly (1588), the anonymous *Arden of Faversham* (1591) and *Timon* (1602-3), *A Woman Killed with Kindness* (1603) and *The Rape of Lucrece* by Thomas Heywood (1608), the anonymous *The Faithful Friends* (1614), *The English Traveller* by Thomas Heywood (c. 1624), *The Tragedy of Orestes* by Thomas Goffe (1633) and *The Lady’s Trial* by John Ford (1638). These plays will be considered through extended case studies that analyse their interrogation of a particular conception or formulation of friendship. Although in no way quantitative, this examination hopes to contribute to the growing body of scholarship that considers representation of friendship in drama beyond the Shakespearean canon, as some of Tom MacFaul’s most recent work has done. This study acknowledges a debt to the work of Lorna Hutson, whose point about reading ‘belief’ in the Ciceronean model is at the heart of this inquiry, and to David Wootton, whose attention to ideas in *De beneficiis* also informs this work.

For this endeavour all evidence provides insights. As such, early modern contextual examples of friendship will also be considered thematically to help understand the cultural resonance of formulations and enactments of friendship beyond the Ciceronean model. This is not to insist that art necessarily imitates life, but to help add further dimension to

our understanding of the cultural influences that may have helped to shape the way that ideas on friendship entered the discourse. Just as the pulpits served as a source for the mediation and dissemination of ideas, so too did the theatre. The potential of that reach was broad, if Andrew Gurr’s observation is correct that ‘on average’ there were ‘as many as a million visits to the playhouse a year.’ With this in mind, examining how dramatists mediated ideas and participated in the dialogue of friendship can help to further our understanding of the discourse of early modern friendship.

Situating the study in its early modern historical context can assist in evaluating how classical ideas were mediated through translation and redaction, as well as through contemporary practice; practice that may also have pointed up problems with ‘translating’ theory into action. This requires a broad approach which will consider historical, philosophical, and religious evidence. As a study of ideas, contemporary voices in the discourse of friendship are considered including works by Francis Bacon, William Baldwin, Richard Braithwaite, William Cecil (Lord Burghley), Erasmus and Michel de Montaigne. Other evidence will include early modern vernacular translations of classical texts, collections of adages, commemorative inscriptions, Court of Chivalry proceedings, early modern essays, extant letters, humanist didactic literature, obsequies, printed sermons, and works by early church theologians. Because context is important, sixteenth and seventeenth-century editions of classical texts are used. Later editions are employed as points of comparison or for purposes of explication only. The value of this approach will become visible beginning in Chapter 1 when the early modern construct of male friendship

is explored through consideration, in part, of contemporary translations for their distinctly contextual feel and understanding.\textsuperscript{32}

The emphasis is on male friendship, as gentlemen were the target audience for friendship advice. This is not meant to dismiss the significance of female friendship or the importance of the scholarship of Barbara Harris, Valerie Traub, and Merry Wiesner, whose works have contributed greatly to our understanding of its consequence. Further, because of the attention paid by critics to the homoerotics of male friendship, such representations are excluded from this study. As such, although Chapter 5 briefly considers Plato’s \textit{Phaedrus}, the \textit{Lysis} is not examined. As Charles H. Kahn observes, the \textit{Lysis} ‘is staged as a conversation on friendship set within the frame of an erotic courtship’, \textsuperscript{33} as such, it is not within the scope of this thesis, especially in light of the fact that erotic love and friendship, according to David Konstan, ‘were understood normally to be incompatible relationships’ in classical Greece because the former eliminates the symmetry required of friendship.\textsuperscript{34}

Because this study considers the historical context the term ‘early modern’ has been employed. The question over the exact bounds of the early modern period remains unresolved. As Keith Thomas most recently observed, ‘early modern times are variously said to have started at different dates between 1300 and 1560 and to have ended at sundry points between 1660 and 1800’.\textsuperscript{35} For these purposes, the examination of drama begins with John Foxe’s \textit{Titus et Gesippus} (1544) and ends with John Ford’s \textit{The Lady’s Trial} (1638). Primary source evidence expands this view beginning with John Tiptoft, the Earl

\textsuperscript{32} Lorna Hutson provides a cogent explanation of the value of this approach in \textit{The Usurer’s Daughter}, ix.


of Worcester’s translation of *De amicitia* in 1481 and ending with the results of Katharine W. Swett’s study of the friendship circle of Sir Richard Wynn of Gwydir, Caemarfonshire (1634-1674) in "The Account between Us": Honor, Reciprocity and Companionship in Male Friendship in the Later Seventeenth Century’.  

The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 explores the early modern construct of friendship through a review of the vernacular translations of Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca and traces the influence of Aristotle and particularly, Seneca, from the early church through the early modern period. Chapter 2 considers how academic dramatists writing about perfect friendship pairs represented the classical ideal. Chapter 3 traces the dissolution and use of the ideal through dramatic construction of a friend whose *raison d’être* is the practice of asymmetrical friendship. Chapter 4 evaluates benefit and performance in friendships of utility. Chapter 5 reviews how marriage challenges the dynamics of male friendship and considers how the shared parlance and similar codification of friendship and marriage obscured relational boundaries.

In Thomas Lodge’s unpublished pamphlet *Honest Excuses, A Reply to Stephen Gosson’s Schoole of Abuse in Defence of Poetry, Musick, and Stage Plays* Lodge acknowledges a link between the theatre and classical thought. He deems Seneca ‘the father of philosophers’ and invokes an idea of Aristotle’s remarking that it was ‘first pronounced by no smal birde even Aristotle himself’. Lodge, the dramatist who would go on to translate the complete works of Seneca in 1614, demonstrates an appreciation and

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37 Lodge’s biographer, Edward Andrews Tenney relates that the publication of *Honest Excuses*, attempted in 1579, was ‘forbidden’ by the licensors. Lodge indicates that some ‘private unperfect’ copies did get printed. See Edward Andrews Tenney, *Thomas Lodge* (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1935), pp. 78-79.

understanding of Aristotle’s *Poetics* and its grounding in ethical thought, commenting, ‘But (of truth) I must confess with Aristotle (it), that men are greatly delighted with imitation, and that it were good to bring those things on stage, that were altogether tending to vertue’. To what extent did Lodge’s fellow dramatists comply with this call to represent virtue when they engaged with the Ciceronean model of the ideal and figured male friendship on the early modern stage?

Chapter 1

Constructing Early Modern Friendship

In the preface to the reader in the 1574 verse adaptation of Boccaccio’s *Titus and Gesippus*, Edward Jeninges metrically recounts the difficulty with which writers approached the task of defining friendship, and the wealth of classical wisdom from which they had to draw:

I am not able of freindshyp to showe
A true definycyon in every thinge,
Though all a whole yere my wyt I bestowe
In such like sentences still wrytinge,
With manie auncient Hystoryes searchynge
Whearin I shulde fynde such stoore to indyte
That in a large booke I scarce coulde them write.¹

Despite some of the similar ideas that philosophers shared about friendship, Jeninges’ commentary relates the difficulty in defining friendship in the context of such a vast array of thought on the subject. And Jeninges’ work is but one example of the multitude of musings on the topic. Contemporary tracts and translations of classical and Christian treatises on friendship published during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England demonstrate a resurgence in consideration of the notion of friendship.² But entries for ‘friendship’ and ‘friend’ in the *Oxford English Dictionary* indicate that even before William Caxton published *Fables of Aesop* in 1484, the terms were well-established in the lexicon. Between 1000 and 1535 friendship had a varied range of designations, including:

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¹ *The Notable Hystory of Two Faithfull Lovers Named Alfagus anb [sic] Archelaus (Whearein is declared the true fygure of amytie and freyndshy.)* trans. by Edwarde Jeninges (London: Thomas Colwell, 1574), sig A3’.
a condition, an alliance, a sentiment, a close personal relationship, something performed
(as an ‘act’, a ‘favour’ or ‘friendly aid’), as well as a being, simply, a friend.3

Early modern men did not have the benefit of the *Oxford English Dictionary* however,
to help them understand friendship, or to explain the actions and obligations necessary to
earn the title of ‘friend’. What they did have were their experiences and an abundance of
voices from past and present contributing to a burgeoning discourse that was at times
disparate, at others, collective. These voices not only contributed to an understanding of
what early modern friendship was supposed to be, but also codified methods to cultivate
and maintain it. The views on friendship at the time formed what can best be described as
a continuum, with the shining ideal of perfect friendship at one end and its dystopic
extreme, false friendship’s betrayal, at the other. In between these two views emerged a
more politic definition of the term, with friendship a designation for relationships of ‘credit
and patronage’, as well as a reflection of the realities of court life, especially in the late
Elizabethan and early Jacobean periods, and particularly the factious 1590s where
friendship became linked to self-interest and benefit.4 This more pragmatic connotation
encouraged unequal amicable relations where friendship rested on one’s ‘ability and
disposition to help another by his influence in high quarters’.5

The term ‘friend’ had multiple contemporary uses. It was used as a greeting, and
employed to engender a certain feeling of concord. These uses are exemplified in William
Heminge’s ‘Prologue’ to *The Jewes Tragedy* (1628-1630) where he addresses his audience
as ‘friends’, and ‘judicious’ ones at that.6 The term could also designate ‘a lover or

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3 ‘Friendship’ in *The Oxford English Dictionary*, def.1a-c to 3; ‘friends’, 1c.
5 *OED*, def. 5c.
paramour of either sex’, a definition that could prove problematic to friendship and marriage, as will be examined in Chapter 5. The contributing voices in the discourse that addressed this range of connotations came from a variety of secular and Christian sources including: early modern translations of classical philosophy, the Bible, popular print narratives, epigrams and anthologies. Ideas about friendship were circulated in grammar schools, universities and Inns of Court. They were disseminated from the bench at the High Court of Chivalry and from Reformation pulpits. They were symbolically represented in funerals and commemorative monuments and in dramatic works on the early modern English stage. The boundaries between the disciplines that spoke of friendship were frequently blurred, owing much to reliance on a shared classical tradition. This idea is realised in Thomas Crewe’s translation of Gabriel Meurier’s *The Nosegay of Morall Philosophie* (1580). Here he considers Christian responsibility, as well as man’s *eudaimonia*, through references to Aristotle, Cicero, Plato and Plutarch pondering, ‘wherein consisteth the accomplishing of mans felicity?’ and concluding, ‘in getting of friends, and doying [sic] good to others’. In his assertion of the compatibility of amity with *caritas* Crewe acknowledges what Augustine, other church fathers, and Christian humanists recognised long before him when it came to friendship: that there was much to learn from the wisdom of the ancients, and incorporating their views would not necessarily compromise Christian ideology.

This chapter begins the study of the intellectual history of male friendship and its articulation in early modern English drama through an examination of how classical ideas entered and contributed to the discourse, and by a consideration of available vernacular

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translations and contemporary mediations in popular works. It reviews the shared mining of, and negotiation with ideas of friendship from Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca by the early Church, humanists, translators and contemporary writers. The core classical ideas on friendship that entered the discourse from early modern translations and redactive mediations will be highlighted, and later chapters will draw on this context in dramatic representation. Further, this chapter will call attention to the particular influence of Senecan moral philosophy, suggesting the usefulness of reading *De beneficiis* as a text on the conventions of friendship and demonstrating its value to the study.

Section I of this chapter briefly examines some general issues related to the translation of classical texts. Section II examines the influential early modern vernacular translations and translators of key texts by Aristotle and Cicero, and underscores how some of the ideas were shaped. Section III traces the influence and appreciation of Senecan moral philosophy and Stoic thought from the early Church through the seventeenth-century. It also begins a discussion of the Stoic virtue of constancy, which will continue throughout subsequent chapters in relation to different representations of friendship on the early modern stage. Section IV makes the case for the usefulness of reading Seneca’s *De beneficiis* as a work on friendship, considering its ideas and early modern translations. Section V looks at contemporary mediations and redactions of classical ideas on friendship in contemporary humanist works, philosophical compilations and miscellanies. The final section considers the importance of friendship not only as a private, but also as a public good, and how that recognition became an important part of the discourse, fuelling the overall concern and rigorous inquiry into its achievement and maintenance.

The authors and texts considered here are not exhaustive, but are chosen for their prominence at the time and for their usefulness to the overall consideration of dramatic
representation in subsequent chapters, where some additional works will also be invoked to highlight particular points. The overall aim of this chapter is to arrive at a picture of how friendship was ‘constructed’ through the use of classical friendship theory, so as to provide a framework within which to interrogate early modern dramatic treatment of its distinctive, prominent features.

I. Issues of Vernacular Translation of Classical Texts

Before reviewing the key, available vernacular translations of moral philosophy related to friendship, a brief discussion of issues affecting how classical ideas were translated and came into the discourse is warranted. Extant works reveal problems related to authority, comprehensiveness and overall quality. The work of Elizabeth Eisenstein, Charles Nauert and Knud Sorenson speaks generally to these issues. Nauert notes the availability of many classical texts by 1500 in Italy through hand copying of translations into Latin, but points out the resultant steady ‘corruption’ of classical manuscripts through unintended replication of errors.8 He credits printing with not only establishing a ‘standardised frame of reference’ but also with helping to ‘stabilize’ texts, ‘even if the text used for the printer’s copy was far from perfect’.9

To be sure, vernacular translations were often several times removed from their French, Latin or Greek counterparts. The extent to which this was the case could depend on the translator and the cultural demands exerted, for example censorship, and the overall context in which they were writing. Elizabeth Eisenstein’s work underscores this idea. She points out that the ‘written or printed’ Renaissance book was ‘a culturally hybrid

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9 Nauert, p. 53.
product’. For instance, she relates that Erasmus ‘was celebrated for redoing St. Jerome’ (emphasis mine), at a time when ‘a humanist who was engaged in copying one of Livy’s books’ was ‘in a sense’ actually ‘engaged in “writing” one of Livy’s books’. Knud Sorenson takes a similar view, explaining that translators working from Latin to English were innovators, ‘transferring new senses from the Latin contexts’. He notes that ‘most Elizabethan translations, and all the best of them, are stylistically as much Elizabethan as they are classical’. According to Sorensen, ‘Most sixteenth and seventeenth-century translators were not scholars’, although he excludes Arthur Golding, who translated Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Seneca’s De beneficiis, and Philemon Holland, translator of Plutarch’s Moralia, from this grouping.

While it is possible to see how translators may intentionally shape a text, the work of Sorenson and Nauert also highlights the potential for unintentional new renderings. Translators with less solid knowledge of the French, Latin or Greek from which the work was derived may have produced less authoritative translations. For example, it would be important to consider how John Harington’s hasty education in French while in the Tower might have affected his translation of De amicitia (1550) from French. Harington makes clear that his translation needed and received emendation. In his dedicatory epistle to the Duchess of Suffolk, he says that the work was reviewed by the ‘knowen wel lerned to be

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11 Eisenstein, pp. 188-189, 191.
13 Sorenson, p. 21.
14 Sorenson, pp. 31-32.
corrected’ and when ‘perfected’ emerged with ‘a newe spirite and life’. It is plausible that Harington’s editor may have been the learned humanist Sir Thomas Smith, writer of De republica Anglorum (1565), who was well versed in Latin and Greek, became the Ambassador to France in 1562 and was imprisoned in the Tower at the same time as Harington. Whomever it was, Harington’s preface suggests that the text was considerably altered, but does not accept full responsibility for the need to change the ‘sence’ of his translation, attributing it in part to the fact that the French translation that he worked from ‘was somewhat darkened.’ Whether this means that his ‘lerned’ editor also engaged with the French, or merely tidied up the style of his translation is unknown, but what emerges is a text perhaps yet another hand removed from its original. Although Harington was well aware of some of the problems with his translation, Sorenson notes that translators were ‘frequently unconscious’ of straying from ‘current usage’. But even a small misinterpretation of just one word can significantly affect meaning. This is notable in Thomas Lodge’s translation of Seneca’s De beneficiis where he translates ‘sincere’ for ‘sincerus’, the latter of which, according to Sorenson, ‘must be taken to mean “morally corrupted,”’ thus conveying a completely different sense. One can see how such a distinction might be of great significance in terms of understanding ideas, especially in relation to moral ethics and friendship.

Even so, the extent to which it is possible to attribute changes to individuals is problematic, unless one traces a work’s copying and printing history up to and including the translation under question. For instance, Harington does not mention the name of the

16 The Booke of Frendeship, Harington, sigs. A3v-A4r.
17 The biography of Smith is from Ian Archer in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. The suggestion that Smith could have provided editorial advice is my own.
18 The Booke of Frendeship, Harington, sig. A4r.
19 Sorenson, p. 17.
20 Sorenson, p. 17.
‘learned’ man who revised his translation; therefore it is impossible to ascribe particular readings to either. For the purposes of this thesis, however, assigning intent is not the focus. The emphasis rests on the ideas themselves, and on the form in which they entered the robust discourse of friendship.

II. Early Modern Translations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Cicero’s De Amicitia

This section examines some of the issues at play in relation to the translation of the work of Aristotle and Cicero on friendship, the Nicomachean Ethics and De amicitia respectively. It considers how circumstances of their production and textual emphases and omissions may have shaped the way in which classical ideas on friendship were disseminated and understood. Although Aristotle’s work pre-dated Cicero, De amicitia will be examined first, as its vernacular printing predates that of Aristotle’s Ethics.

The Roman statesman and orator, Marcus Tullis Cicero (106-43 BCE) wrote his Laelius De amicitia c. BCE 44 as a testament to his lifelong friendship with Atticus.21 The work is described as being influenced by earlier works on friendship from the Greek school, namely, Plato's Lysis, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Xenophon's Memorabilia.22 It is considered one of the most influential contributors to the discourse of early modern friendship because of the central place it occupied in the humanist school curricula where it served as a repository for moral wisdom, as well as what Laurie

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Shannon notes was ‘a gateway text in Latin learning’.\(^{23}\) Shannon underscores the text’s dual use for moral and grammatical instruction.\(^{24}\) T. W. Baldwin’s work has demonstrated the text’s centrality to the Elizabethan grammar school system.\(^{25}\) School records as early as 1560 show that Cicero’s views on friendship were imparted through this work to young men in their formative years from Rivington to Tidewell in Derbyshire.\(^{26}\)

*De amicitia* remained an important source of ideas on friendship throughout the Elizabethan and pre-Civil War Stuart period. The work has received considerable attention for its contributions to an early modern understanding of amity, and with good reason, as it marks an early beginning of a rigorous intellectual inquiry into friendship which continued in the early sixteenth-century through works by Erasmus, Thomas More and Thomas Elyot. There were several key classical texts made available in vernacular translations during the early modern period, but Cicero’s *De amicitia* is generally heralded as the key friendship text. As such, it is invoked with relative frequency when readings of dramatic works on friendship are considered, for as Lorna Hutson relates, its principles pervade all types of sixteenth-century literature.\(^{27}\)

The 1574 verse by Edward Jeninges that opened this chapter whimsically suggests that one book could not contain all of the possibilities for friendship. Nearly one hundred years earlier, this proved no obstacle to humanist John Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester, who recognised Cicero’s *De amicitia* as just that one text and made a translation that became


\[^{24}\text{Shannon, pp. 26-27.}\]

\[^{25}\text{T.W. Baldwin, }\text{William Shakspere’s Small Latine and Lesse Greek, 2 vols (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1944), I, p. 433.}\]

\[^{26}\text{T.W. Baldwin, I, pp. 345, 347 for Bishop Pilkington’s Rivington, and pp. 430-433 for Tidewell.}\]

available in 1481 (reprinted 1530). This translation, which receives a thorough examination by Laurie Shannon in *Sovereign Amity*, was followed in 1550 by John Harington’s *The Booke of Freendeship of Marcus Tullie Cicero*. This text, and a later translation by Thomas Newton, will serve as the focus of this review.

Harington (1517-1582) was a courtier under Henry VIII and entered the service of Sir Thomas Seymour. While the latter relationship was instrumental in his rise to a parliamentary seat, it was also what led to his first imprisonment in the Tower. This is where he learned French and made his translation from the French version available to him, as previously discussed. Jason Scott-Warren notes at this early date ‘Harington stands out as a vigorous champion of the vernacular.’ And indeed he was. Harington indicates in his preface that in his ‘enterprise’ he ‘used the playne and common speache’ in the hope of making Cicero’s thought accessible to ‘the unlatined’ (or perhaps those who could not speak French, as he himself had access to a French translation). Further, he says that the work was meant to ‘bee enterpreted rather by freends, as a treatise of frendship, then by lerned clerkes in an argument of translation’. Through his work, Cicero’s ideas on friendship now had the potential for an even wider audience.

Harington’s interest in friendship perhaps took on a new significance after the ‘great and sundrie miseries’ that befell him, through which he found ‘some holow hertes, and a few feithfull freendes’. Without Harington’s translation before it was emended by his unnamed editor(s), and without information about the French translation from which he was working, it is impossible to know to what extent the text was informed by his or his

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28 The work had a 1562 edition with the same publisher, Thomas Berthelette, and this will be used in this study.
29 Biography of Harington all from Jason Scott-Warren, in *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
30 *The Booke of Freendeship*, Harington, sig. A3*. Harington does not entitle this a dedicatory epistle. The later pages refer to it as ‘the preface to the reader’ even though it appeals directly to the Duchess of Suffolk on A2*. Here it will be referred to as ‘preface’.

editor’s personal experiences, religious beliefs or rather, those of the French translator. This would be interesting to understand, for the translation reads less like a recounting of a philosophical dialogue about friendship between Gaius Laelius and his sons-in-law Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius Scaevola, and more like a Christian didactic work. It is a syncretised work of religious theology and classical philosophy of the kind one would not expect, or find, in later twentieth-century translations, such as the Loeb editions (1923-2001). But Harington’s preface evidences a conflation of the two, declaring:

for an assured freende is the medicine of life: suche a one shall thei obtayne, that reverently honoure the lorde; He that honoureth the lorde dooeth stablishe and make sure this friendship forever as another hym selfe shall his frende bee to hym.33

Here the friend retains the classical designation of ‘another self’ but it is made clear that that ‘self’ should be a Christian. To assume this perspective in a classical translation was not unusual. Robert Miola relates that ‘some prefatory material, notes, and commentary aggressively managed reading, directly and indirectly conforming classical texts to Christian revelation’.34 But equally important is the way in which Harington’s preface underscores the ease with which Christian morality was able to accommodate certain classical ethics, and how translators would reconcile the latter to do so.

Harington’s translation defines ‘amitee’ in the following terms:

33 The Booke of Frendeship, Harington, sig. A6v.
no thinge els but a perfecte a greemente with good wyll and true love in al kind of
good thinges and godlie. And I knowe not whether any better thyng hath bene
given of GOD unto men, wysedom excepted, then this same frendship.\textsuperscript{35}

Here the gift of friendship bestowed on man by the pagan gods becomes the providence of
the Christian God. The love in friendship is defined within a moral framework as unity in
things ‘good’ and Godly. The next vernacular translation fifteen years later, by Thomas
Newton (1577) defines friendship twice. In the first instance there is no attribution of
friendship to a supreme being. Here, Laelius’ definition of the ‘whole summe of
Frendshippe’ is represented as consisting of ‘a most perfect agreement of willes, desires, &
opinions’.\textsuperscript{36} The later Loeb edition (2001), working from nine manuscripts from the ninth
to the twelfth-centuries, reads similarly to Newton’s, asserting that ‘the whole essence of
friendship’ lies in ‘the most complete agreement in policy, in pursuits and in opinions’.\textsuperscript{37}
But Newton refines this definition later in the work, reiterating Harington’s view: ‘For
friendshippe is nothinge elles but a perfecte agreemente with goodwil and hearty love in al
matters, both divine and humaine’.\textsuperscript{38} Newton’s work also posits friendship as a gift from
God, similar to Harington’s. Both translations assert a view of perfect friendship that
makes requisite the sharing of not merely ‘one soul in two bodies’ as classical friendship
suggests, but rather, a Christian soul ‘in two bodies’.\textsuperscript{39} As Newton was a Church of
England clergyman, this may not be a surprising addition to his translation. But as an
editor and translator of note, with at least twenty books and translations including several
of Cicero’s and the only English translation of Seneca’s dramatic works in print at the

\textsuperscript{35} The Booke of Frendeshipe, Harington, sigs. B6’ - B7’.

\textsuperscript{36} Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Booke of Frendeshipes in Fouure Seuerall Treatises of M. Tullius Cicero

\textsuperscript{37} Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Amicitia in Cicero, De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione, trans. by

\textsuperscript{38} The Booke of Frendeshipe, Newton, sigs. B1’- B1’.

\textsuperscript{39} The Booke of Frendeshipe, Newton, B1’- B1’.
time, it is interesting to further consider to what extent his religious beliefs informed his translation of *De amicitia*.  

His Christian consciousness is indeed felt in other instances in the work. In the section delineating lesser types of friendship, Newton retains Cicero’s subordination of these to perfect friendship, but characterises them in unmistakably dark tones. Rather than the less disapproving designations of ‘ordinary and commonplace’ (or similar permutations) found in early and late twentieth-century translations (Loeb 1927-2001), he chooses the more censorious ‘vulgare or meane’, firmly dislocating the other types of friendship from the ideal. He further promotes the negative sense of friendships of utility, by affirming that: ‘Frendship prowles not after profit’, rather than the twentieth-century, less contemptuous, ‘It is not the case, therefore that friendship attends upon advantage’.  

Newton’s translation evokes an image of useful friendship as a medieval vice character, similar to Voltore, Corbaccio and Corvino in Ben Jonson’s *Volpone*, men who are in search of pure profit, not affection in friendship.

Another example of this in the work helps to show not only how a translation can be subtly inscribed by one’s own morality, but also perhaps one’s cultural context. In a section which discusses ‘howe farre Love ought to stretche in Freendshippe’, Newton labels Gaius Blossius’ reply, that he would do what his friend Tiberius requested even if it meant burning the city, as a ‘villanous saying’, and deems his actions in wrongdoing ‘trayerous attemptes’, while the earlier pre-Elizabethan Harington translation does not qualify the attempt adjectivally at all, and deems Gaius’ reply that he would do what his

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40 Gordon Braden, ‘Thomas Newton’ in *DNB*.
41 In fact, Cicero does not recognise these other relationships as friendship.
43 *The Booke of Freendeshipe*, Newton sig. C7; Cicero, *De Amicitia*, Loeb, xiv. 50, p. 163.
friend asked as merely a ‘shamefull’ ‘sayinge’.\textsuperscript{44} But Harington in 1562 is writing before: the imprisonment (1569) and execution of Mary (1587), the papal Bull excommunicating Elizabeth (1570), and threats from plots by the Nevilles and Percys (1569) and Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk, the latter culminating in his execution in 1574.\textsuperscript{45} While the background of Harington’s writing was the Lady Jane Grey controversy, his work might not register the same intensity regarding sedition as Newton’s, as his was exempt from the acute pressure of Catholic threats against the Queen. Such threats were contemporary to Newton, as were concerns over representation of such ideas. Newton’s translation was made at the same time that professional theatre was gaining its footing in London and concerns about its potential to incite ‘disorder’ were growing.\textsuperscript{46} Further, while a scholarly exercise in translation of a classical text may have been considered less problematic (or potentially subversive), Janet Clare’s work on censorship reminds us that the beginning of state control of the presses was under the early Tudors.\textsuperscript{47} This context may have provided a frame of reference for Newton’s adjectival choices that intensify the sense of high treason. It may also help explain why the work is emphatic that friendship has it limits and that the public good outweighs perceived duties of fidelity in friendship.

It is easy to see how a work on friendship which encourages its promotion and lauds its benefits on a public and personal level might have its use in Newton’s England. In the text its necessity is palpably felt in the imagining of a world devoid of friendship: ‘Now if you take out of the world the knot of friendship, certes, neyther shall any house be able to stand

\textsuperscript{44} The Booke of Frendeshipe, Newton, sighs B9*-C2'; The Booke of Frendeshipe, Harington, sighs D2”.

\textsuperscript{45} For a discussion of the Catholic threats see Newton Key and Robert Bucholz, Sources and Debates in English History, 1485-1714 (Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), p. 77.

\textsuperscript{46} Although Janet Clare explains that it was during Elizabeth’s later years that ‘bureaucratic regulation of the stage’ took place. See Janet Clare, Art Made Tongue-tied by Authority: Elizabethan and Jacobean Dramatic Censorship (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{47} Clare, p. 16.
ne City to endure, no, nor yet any tillage to continue’. With this in mind, the work outlines the specific characteristics of ‘true and perfect’ friendship. Friendship is between good men. It promotes and is grounded in virtue. A friend offers counsel and comfort. Similar to Pylades, whose willingness to die for Orestes ‘affirmed’ his friendship; a true friend remains steadfast in fortune and adversity. And there is again the iteration of the idea dating back to Pythagoras of all-encompassing closeness in faithful friendship where the friend becomes a ‘pattern’ of one’s ‘owne selfe’.53

Despite the forwarding of the benefits of true friendship, however, there is the caveat that it is rare, as are the type of men who would prove to be such friends; as Newton’s translation notes ‘there is greate scarcity’ of ‘sure, steadfast and constante’ men. There is a significant emphasis here on faithfulness in terms of Stoic constancy, with the steadfast friend likened to ‘a God [sic]’. One and one-half quires are dedicated to this idea, noticeably in a section offering advice about the selection of friends (like the above), with ‘constant, & stable’ ‘stabenes & constancie’ and ‘stable’ reiterated. If the friend is a pattern of one’s self and a true friend is constant, it follows that one must cultivate such virtue in oneself if he is to have a friend. Thus the reciprocal nature of friendship is implicitly enforced. But there is another insistence here, and that is that ‘a sure Frend is tryed in Adversitye’, not only in the figurative sense, but quite literally, ‘as men use to assaye their horses’, as it is ‘a harde matter’ to ‘judge’ a friend’s constancy ‘without

48 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. B3r.
49 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. A8r.
50 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. B1v, B5v, C2v, C4v, C5v.
51 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. C4v, D2r.
52 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. B3v, C8r, D4v.
53 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. B3r.
54 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. B1v, D3v-D4v.
55 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. D4v.
56 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. D3v, D4v-D5v.
This idea becomes a significant part of the discourse, especially as it relates to constancy. It emerges with frequency in compilations and literary works. There is also a warning about flattery, which is denounced in the work, but the caveats in no way detract from the sense that friendship is a noble and worthy endeavour. Overall, the work remains true to its Roman roots as a celebration of the friendship that Laelius shared with his deceased friend, Scipio. The healing power of friendship recollected is palpably felt in the penultimate part of the Newton translation.

The final words ‘exhorting’ men to value virtue and friendship above all else, provide a gentle reminder of their inextricable link, despite the divisive political world of the Roman Republic where friendships of utility flourished, De amicitia was composed, and Cicero was eventually betrayed by a false friend. It was a world not unlike Tudor and Stuart England when the work was translated and made available to a new audience. Perhaps the hope was that the work would foster a ‘commonly shared belief’ in the value of friendship so that they would shape their useful friendships with these duties in mind, as Horst Hutter notes that the Romans had done before them.

The Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BCE) contributed to the early modern discourse on friendship primarily through translations of his Nicomachean Ethics. The first complete translation of his Ethics into Latin was in 1260 by Robert Grosseteste. The work received much attention in the thirteenth century through commentary by Albert Magus in

57 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. D3’ D4’.
59 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs.E6’-E8’.
60 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sig. F4’.
61 For a discussion of friendships of utility during the time of Cicero and its relation to the writing of De amicitia see Hutter, p. 133-135.
62 Hutter, p. 136.
1250, and his student Thomas Aquinas in 1266.\textsuperscript{63} The earliest vernacular edition in England was John Wilkinson’s 1547 translation. Its source is the thirteenth century Italian translation of Brunetto Latini. Christiana Fordyce explains that Latini was a rhetorician of note, who was inspired by Aristotle and Cicero and sought to educate the growing mercantile class in the rhetoric of \textit{utilitas}: ‘an art that could preserve good name, assure gain, make alliances and fortify individual will into common want’.\textsuperscript{64} Fordyce holds that Latini’s translations were informed by ‘this idea of \textit{utile}’\textsuperscript{65} It is important to note at this point that Latini’s work was itself a translation of an Arabic abridged version by Hermannus Alemannus.\textsuperscript{66} Therefore, Wilkinson’s translation into English came to his early modern readers third hand, its thought compressed and possibly influenced by Latini’s concern for \textit{utilitas}. While this helps to demonstrate the importance of using contemporary editions to understand the shape that ideas on friendship took as they entered the discourse, it also raises the question, given Latini’s views, how might he have engaged with Aristotle’s inquiry into friendship that ascribes a lesser status to useful amity? Without an examination of that translation this question remains unanswered, but the Wilkinson translation highlights the problem with working from abridged versions in general.

There is little known about John Wilkinson. In the preface to his translation he refers to himself as the ‘humble and obediente servaunte’ of Edward earl of Derby (1509--


\textsuperscript{65} Fordyce, p. 109.

The sections on friendship in the work, generally books 8 and 9, comprising fifty-five pages in modern editions, is reduced to six and one-half quires in the Wilkinson. The abridgement and redaction is significant insofar as it reveals the ideas that were emphasised in relation to friendship. And as will be considered, because of the complex nature of the *Ethics* this can open the text to misinterpretation in places. The inquiry into friendship in the work begins by establishing an association between friendship and virtue, but with a notable addition which figures it in Christian terms. Friendship is not a gift from God, as is posited in Newton’s Cicero, but it is something God himself embodies: ‘Amitye is one of the vertues of almightie God’. This elevates amity to something nearly unachievable, outside the realm of possibility for earthly men. Further, it affords it a status suggestive of one of the cardinal virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance.

The view taken here, in essence, is that ‘God is friendship’. This is a perspective assumed in the work of twelfth-century Cistercian abbot Aelred of Rievaulx in his Christian humanist work, *Spiritual Friendship* (c. 1147). As discussed at the outset of this chapter, classical ethics had long been recognised, and used, to inform Christian moral thought, and Aelred’s and Wilkinson’s texts speak to this idea.

The Wilkinson text transformed the classical model of friendship that other contemporary works offered for emulation from that of Damon and Pythias or Orestes and Pylades, to that of God and man. It does so, in part, through the inclusion of a chapter that

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68 *Ethiques*, Wilkinson, sig H3'.

has no correlative in the 1998 Oxford edition: ‘The love that a man hath with God’. 70 In this section the work argues that the love of God, not the friend, or the self (which is central to the ethic of amity according to Aristotle) ought to be above all others. It reads: ‘the love of God oughte to bee preferred before the love of father. For the benefits that a man receiveth of God: be more greate and noble’. 71 This idea challenges the paradigm of perfect classical friendship understood in the period through other classical texts and the aforementioned perfect friendship pairs by implicitly holding up the nobility of God’s sacrifice as the model from which friendship is to be judged. This of course would be a view that readers might be familiar with through biblical teaching, but incorporating it in a translation of a work by a pre-Christian philosopher is striking. 72 Importantly, this Christian framework for understanding friendship stresses the benefit received from God as the motivating factor for preferring his friendship above all others. This contradicts Aristotle’s view of perfection in friendship, where the friend is an ‘other self’, as it establishes a superior-inferior relationship; for man is not on equal footing with God (even if he is made in God’s image), as the story of Adam and Eve confirms. Further, this model engenders a sense that indebtedness and reward are the basis for friendship, in sharp contrast to principles of ideal friendship. 73 The suggestion in Wilkinson is not that love and virtue compels this philia, but rather, that it is driven by the need for man to reciprocate God’s beneficence. While Aristotelian philosophy recognises the role of reciprocity in perfect friendship, the additional chapter in Wilkinson registers a more useful, obligatory sense of the ideal generally absent from modern translations.

71 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sigs. H7v-H8v; See also Ross, Ackrill and Urrmson, pp. 211-214.
72 Even so, biblical teaching held up David and Jonathan as examples of perfect friendship.
73 For instance, Smith Pangle, pp. 38, 153, 169.
The emphasis in Wilkinson’s translation forwards a hierarchy that ensures that earthly friendships are not esteemed above the phiła between God and man. The degree of ‘amite’ differs depending on the nature of one’s relationship, and is specifically outlined: ‘The amite of kyndred, frendes, neighbours and straungers, is more and lesse accordyng to the diversitie of causes by that whiche one beareth good will unto another’.74 The problem here of course is that employing the term ‘amity’ to define relationships with even strangers dilutes perfect friendship’s lofty ideal of ‘one soul in two bodies’, something which is important to Aristotle’s conception of perfect friendship (despite the practical acknowledgement and discussion of friendships of utility and delectation).75 The inclusive ‘amity’ and Christian sensibility that permeates the discussion renders friendship less akin to classical amicitia and rather, nearly indistinguishable from caritas.76 And while it nevertheless remains a virtuous exercise, the sense of classical friendship is muted in an overall implicit call for brotherly love based on Christ’s charge to the disciples that he reminds, ‘you have I called frendes’ in John 15, telling them: ‘that ye love together, as I have loved you’.77 But this conception of friendship as caritas and the extension of the definition of friendship to include everyone removes discernment and choice, and effects quality, three essential aspects of classical friendship theory asserted in De amicitia and in Aristotle’s Ethics. Further, it contradicts the ideas recounted in later translations of Aristotle that ‘one cannot be a friend to many people’ and that true friendship is one with origins in familiarity and ‘the good’.78 But herein lies a problem, as Wilkinson also includes the classical idea of the exclusivity of friendship, thereby muddying the waters,  

74 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. H8r.  
76 David Konstan explains that the noun philia is ‘commonly rendered as friendship’ but that it actually has a more inclusive definition including love (from the verb philēin) and solidarity in Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 9.  
77 The Bible in Englishe (London: Richarde Harrison, 1562), G4r. There are no verse numbers given in this work.  
78 In Nicomachean Ethics, Ross, Ackrill, Urmson, pp. 193, 196, 201.
saying ‘There can be but one verteous frend. As a man can have but one lover that he loveth intirely.’ This exclusivity is where the Wilkinson translation departs from its view of friendship as caritas.

Amity in the Wilkinson translation is weighted heavily in terms of responsibility to others, and is demonstrated through acts that are seen as a way to preserve friendship. In this way, the work not only outlines the duties of friendship, but emphasises, the duty for friendship, as compelled by Christian dogma. That said, Aristotle’s inquiry into friendship does consider goodwill and different types of friendship between unequals, outlining ‘proportional affection’ and the Wilkinson translation follows similarly:

The greater man to geve unto the lessee winnyng, & the lesse ought to geve unto the greater honor and reverence. And this ought to bee accordyng to the deservyng of them both: In these waies is conserved frendeship.

One can see how the idea of ‘gevyng and receivyng naturally from hand to hande’ and the notion that this safeguards friendship might be troublesome to an understanding of friendship, even if it is explained that it is ‘a good thyng it is to do good to other [sic] without any hope of gaynes’. But Aristotle does see the bestowal of benefits as ‘an active exercise of friendship’. Conversely however, if ‘love is the pryce of vertue and thankes of benefites received’ then philia is neither an end nor good in itself, which is part of ‘the deeper strain of friendship’, but rather, the means, what one must offer to achieve virtue and the reward of friendship. This is contradicted later in the work by the

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79 *Ethiques*, Wilkinson, sig J8r.
80 For a discussion of this idea see Smith Pangle, pp. 57-64.
82 *Ethiques*, Wilkinson, sigs. J1'-J2'.
83 Smith Pangle, p. 142.
insistence that a friend should be loved ‘for the very love of vertue’,\textsuperscript{85} for here virtue is an end in itself. If the Wilkinson translation was meant as an instructive work for readers or students, which the subtitle suggests it was—\textit{The Ethiques of Aristotle, that is to saye, preceptes of good behauoute [sic] and perfighte honestie} \textsuperscript{86}—then it is possible to see how there could be some confusion in practical application of some of the ideas discussed thus far. As a dialectical inquiry into \textit{eudaimonia},\textsuperscript{87} which was the objective of Aristotle’s work, this proves less problematic.

The significance of Aristotle’s \textit{Ethics} (and ethics) to moral thought in the early modern period is pointed up by the translators’ note to the 1611 \textit{King James Bible}. Amidst mentions of Erasmus and Saints Ambrose, Augustine and Jerome, the unnamed translator asserts, ‘The Judgement of Aristotle is worthy and well knowen’, although he goes on to lament its popularity as a subject for translation:

\begin{quote}
How many booke\textup{s} of profane learning have bene gone over againe and againe, by the same translators, by others? Of one and the same booke of Aristotles Ethikes, there are extant not so few as sixe or seven severall translations.\textsuperscript{88}
\end{quote}

One of those who went ‘over’ the \textit{Ethics} was Thomas Aquinas, his exegesis on the work is said to have had ‘the widest ranging and lasting influence’.

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Ethiques}, Wilkinson, sig. J7\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Ethiques}, Wilkinson, title page.
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{The Holy Bible} by his Majesties Speciall Co[m]mandement, n. trans. (London: Robert Barker, 1611), sig. A6\textsuperscript{v}.
complementary natures of classical and Christian ethics. The issue of the classical ‘Supreme Being’ proved no problem to Christian mediation, as Jill Kraye’s work on Renaissance ethics finds that pagan gods ‘were often transformed’ into the Christian God. Wilkinson’s translation of the Ethics offers an example of this accommodation, as well as an instance of a continued syncretic approach to friendship ethics beyond Aquinas. Importantly, however, it is presented in the guise of a translation of Aristotle.

The apparent consonance between Christian theology and classical morality helps to shed light on the Christian perspective taken in Wilkinson’s work. It may also, along with the abridgement of the original, help to explain the translation’s oversimplification of the idea of self-love’s relationship to friendship, a concept that continues to give rise to scholarly debate. Wilkinson’s translation asserts, ‘There bee men that love themself to much, and that is called a filthy love’ and declares that a ‘manne ought to love his friend, for in loving him he loveth himself’. While twentieth-century scholars disagree over whether Aristotle is suggesting ‘friendship is based on self-love’ or whether he is merely considering ‘whether it makes sense to speak of love for oneself in the way it obviously makes sense to speak of loving another,’ for Wilkinson this poses no problem. He identifies two key precepts to be derived from Aristotle’s complex inquiry into ‘the nature of the end or ends at which man ought to aim’: You should not love yourself too much, and you should show love to your friends, both of which subordinates self by putting

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95 This is how David Ross describes Aristotle’s efforts in ‘Introduction’ in Nicomachean Ethics, Ross, Ackrill, Urmson, vi.
others first. This truncated version of a rather complicated idea corresponds nicely to the Christian imperative to love one’s neighbour as oneself, so long as your love of self was ‘proper’, which in Augustinian terms meant the love was ‘morally neutral’ as opposed to the ‘reprehensible’ kind ‘which produced selfish behaviour’. It is interesting that a discussion of the significance of self-love is virtually eliminated from the Wilkinson translation, especially in light of the fact that Aristotle closely associates ‘the higher form of self-love’ with virtue, as Lorraine Smith Pangle explains, ‘obeying and gratifying one’s true self means doing what one should, choosing virtue’. Curiously, however, the view on self-love in Wilkinson, assigning it egocentric status in relation to friendship, prefigures Kierkegaard who also condemns self-love and finds love and friendship exacerbating it because love for the ‘other I’ is really just love for oneself. Wilkinson leans in this direction especially in his focus on caritas, what Kierkegaard sees as superior because it is love of ‘the first-thou’, one’s neighbour, rather than the ‘other I’, oneself.

But Wilkinson’s text does not abandon the idea of friendship altogether, (as Kierkegaard’s will do). Rather, it reflects on the capacity of friendship to provide ‘helpe and counsail’, support in ‘adversitee and prosperitee’, and guidance along the path towards virtue ‘so that menne maie become the better one by another’. What emerges overall is the sense of friendship’s benefit and obligations. Wilkinson’s translation serves less as a

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96 For friendship’s basis on self-love see Nicomachean Ethics, Ross, Ackrill, Urmson, where a section is devoted to self-love and friendship: ‘Internal Nature of Friendship: Friendship is based on self-love’ 1165b - 1167a 13, pp. 227-230; David Konstan avers it is a discussion of the question and argues that there is ‘only a hint’ that friendship somehow comes from self-love’, Konstan, p. 77.


98 Smith Pangle, p. 171.


100 Kierkegaard’s views from ‘You Shall Love Your Neighbour’, Pakaluk anthology, p. 244.

theoretical model of friendship, or celebration of ‘one soul in two bodies’, which early modern readers might find in works such as Michel de Montaigne’s ‘De l’amité,’ and more of a framework for establishing harmony in society through self-denial and helping each other to achieve success, especially through declarations such as: ‘it is a natural thyng to man to live citezenly, and a necessary thyng to manne to accomplishe his busines of necessitee by his neighbores and frendes, which cannot bee doen by hymself’.102

The benefits of a more inclusive idea of amity, posited as concord, are prominent and explicitly outlined in Willkinson’s *Ethiques*, as well as in Newton’s *De amicitia*. Harington indicates that he was prompted to make his translation of *De amicitia* by reading it in French in the Tower and being struck by the ‘civyle use’ of friendship, which made him think the work was ‘mete for moe’.103 Making the ‘fruits’104 of friendship manifest through the work of Aristotle and Cicero might help to convince readers that its cultivation and practice was a worthy endeavour, especially if they could be convinced of Aristotle’s lofty claims of its public usefulness in an uncertain world: ‘frendshippe destroyeth al strife, and euery discorde that may be’, and ‘yf every man wer frendly to other, Justice shuld not nede’.105

III. The Influence of Senecan Moral Philosophy and Stoic Thought

Lucius Annaeus Seneca (c. 4 BCE-65 CE) was a Cordoban-born, Roman statesman, philosopher, and dramatist. He was well-known in the sixteenth-century for his corpus of revenge tragedy from which dramatists drew inspiration, but also for his Stoic moral

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103 ‘Preface’ in *The Booke of Freendship*, Harington, sig. A3v. I take the meaning here as good for the community or society, as the usage of ‘civil’ pertaining to an individual is not recorded until 1788, see *OED Online* ‘civil’ def. 5a.
104 Francis Bacon refers to the benefits of friendship as ‘fruits’ and outlines them practically in Francis Bacon, ‘Of Frendship’ in *Essayes or Counsels Civill and Morall* (London: John Haviland for Hanna Barret, 1625), fol. 161.
philosophy which helped to prompt the English Neo-Stoic movement. Janet Clare has pointed up the ‘wave of academic and aristocratic Senecanism’ that flourished in ‘the mid sixteenth-century’. Servais-Theodore Pinckaers relates that even though Thomas Aquinas, working in the thirteenth century, considered Aristotle ‘the philosopher’ and drew on his work, Aquinas also ‘exploits’ Cicero and Seneca to shape his ‘project of constructing a morality of virtues’.

A fourteenth-century manuscript miscellany also helps to support the idea of the influence of Seneca’s moral ethics. This compilation further attests to the comfortable coexistence of pagan and Christian thought, but most notably to Seneca’s centrality to it. The volume, said to have been compiled for Roger of Waltham, a clerk to the Bishop of Durham, contains devotional texts by Church fathers, scientific writings by Aristotle, and moral and liberal arts treatises which draw largely from Seneca (pp. 99-274). This volume, indeed, is not unusual for its inclusion of Seneca; Alcuin Blamires asserts that ‘Seneca’s ethics were endlessly cannibalised in medieval compilations’.

The manuscript is described as ‘well used’, with ‘margins annotated by a number of hands’, but it is the two pictures by the Master of Taymouth Hours that are most striking. In the first, Seneca is portrayed as sharing his wisdom with an eager ‘disciple’ (fig. 1). In the second, Plato, Seneca and Aristotle are ‘presented’ as Beryl Smalley suggests, ‘according to the medieval iconography of the Blessed Trinity (i.e. the Father, 

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107 Pinckaers, p. 20.
108 Julie Gardham, ‘Manuscript Compilation: Devotional & Philosophical Writings’ Online at The University of Glasgow Library Special Collections <http://special.lib.gla.ac.uk/exhibns/month/june2008.html> [accessed 25 June 2009]; Manuscript: London: c. 1325-1335 Sp Coll MS Hunter 231 (U.3.4). Photos reprinted with the kind permission of The University of Glasgow Library Special Collections; They are described as paginated on vellum and not foliated.
110 Beryl Smalley description in Julie Gardham, ‘Manuscript Compilation’.
the Son and the Holy Spirit)’ (fig. 2).\textsuperscript{111} Seneca’s centrality here may be a reflection of what has been the subject of later scholarly debate: his influence on St. Paul’s thought. Marcia L. Colish explains that Jerome indirectly helped to promulgate the now widely discounted ‘myth’ that Seneca corresponded with St. Paul and that this may have contributed to Seneca’s esteem in the late medieval period.\textsuperscript{112} It is clear that there was a keen appreciation of Seneca’s moral ethics by the Church fathers and later theologians. The oldest manuscript of \textit{De beneficiis} dates to the eighth-century and his \textit{Epistulae morales} had not only what Colish notes was ‘the richest manuscript tradition’ but also, the ‘most extensive influence’.\textsuperscript{113} According to Colish, Seneca’s popularity in the middle ages was greater than in the late classical period.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{111} Beryl Smalley description in Julie Gardham, ‘Manuscript Compilation’.
\textsuperscript{112} Marcia L. Colish, \textit{The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages: Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought Through the Sixth Century}, vol 2 of The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (Leiden: BRILL, 1985), p. 91; See also Arnaldo Momigliano, \textit{On Pagans, Jews, and Christians} (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), p. 204; Terence Paige notes the distinct dissimilarities between Paul and Seneca’s thought, but asks, ‘why does he [Paul] so frequently use language that appears Stoic?’
\textsuperscript{113}Terrence Paige, ‘Stoicism, ἐλευθερία and Community at Corinth’ in \textit{Christianity at Corinth: The Quest for the Pauline Church} ed. by Edward Adams and David G. Horell (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2004), pp. 207-218 (p. 209).
\textsuperscript{114}Colish, pp. 17-18.
1 Seneca reading to a disciple. c. 1325-1335 (London) Sp Coll MS Hunter 231 (U.3.4). Reprinted with the kind permission of The University of Glasgow Library Special Collections.
2 Plato, Seneca and Aristotle. c. 1325-1335 (London) Sp Coll MS Hunter 231 (U.3.4). Reprinted with the kind permission of The University of Glasgow Library Special Collections.
Smalley’s thoughts on the iconography of the drawings are interesting, even if Aristotle, Seneca and Plato were not thought of as competitors for the hearts and minds of the Church. At the very least, the anachronistic clothing of the philosophers in garb similar to that of the early Church theologians depicted as beneficently offering their wisdom imparts a sense of importance and reverence. These depictions support the idea that despite the Stoic belief in suicide and determinism, wholly unacceptable to Christian dogma, the Church still found Stoicism, and particularly Seneca’s moral ethics, appealing and valuable. The work of Cicero and Seneca did much for the understanding of Stoicism in the middle ages. Sarah Hutton reminds us that the Stoics were considered ‘admirable for the parallels with Christian ideals which they appeared to exhibit’. Other fourteenth-century proponents of Senecan morality included Petrarch, Gower and Chaucer, the latter dubbed ‘Seneca in morals’ by Eustace Deschamps in a ballade (c. 1384-1390).

Petrarch’s *De remediis utiusque fortunate* (1366), his most popular work, was itself an imitation of a work erroneously ascribed to Seneca, which not only highlighted Seneca’s appeal ‘as a lay moralist for Christian consumption’, but also ‘did much to recommend Stoicism as a repository of moral sententiae’.

While the harsher Stoic prescriptions may have found a willing audience amongst medieval moralists and theologians, Stoicism might not have been so keenly felt in the latter part of the sixteenth-century if not for the Northern European religious and civil wars that Jill Kraye sees as fundamental to the Neo-Stoics gaining footing. It was a time when ‘the Stoics appeared no longer quite so extreme; indeed it seemed that the only way


116 Hutton, p. 53.

117 See Petrarch *De remedied utiuisque fortunae* (1366) and John Gower’s reference to Seneca in his *Mirour de l’homme*.; for Chaucer reference see Alcuin Blamires, p. 9.

118 Hutton, p. 54.

to control the inflamed passions which were ravaging society was to eradicate them completely, just as the Stoics had recommended.\textsuperscript{120} This contributes to the sense of the public benefit of moral philosophy, as discussed in Section II in relation to early modern translations of Aristotle and Cicero’s work on friendship.

J.H.M. Salmon’s work explores the interest in Stoic ethics in England through an examination of Neo-Stoicism derived from Seneca and Tacitus in the work of Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius.\textsuperscript{121} Although Lipsius published an edition of Seneca’s works in 1605, his \textit{De Constantia} (1584) is credited with reinvigorating interest in Seneca’s ideas, through ‘a new interpretation of Seneca’.\textsuperscript{122} \textit{De Constantia} was a work that encouraged ‘fortitude and private prudence’ and provided a system of ‘practical ethics that adapted Stoic assumptions to an undogmatic Christianity’.\textsuperscript{123} Jan Papy suggests that Lipsius’ work was the ‘manifesto’ of a man who believed that Seneca’s thought could serve as ‘a consolation and a solution to the public calamities which he and his contemporaries were enduring’.\textsuperscript{124} Lipsius’ friendships with Sir Philip Sidney and Phillipe Duplessis-Mornay were instrumental in the transmission of Neo-Stoic ideas, which ‘flourished in Catholic as well as Protestant circles’, as Salmon relates that either directly, ‘through their own writings’ or indirectly, through ‘those of their clients’, some of the men with ties to the ‘Senecan and Tacitean cults’ included: Francis Bacon, Charles Blount (Baron Mountjoy), William Cornwallis, Michel de Montaigne, John Florio, Fulke Greville, Bishop Joseph Hall (chaplain to Prince Henry, and dubbed the ‘English Seneca’), Henry Savile, Robert

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[124] Papy, ‘Lipsius’, \textit{SEP}.
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Sidney, and the dramatists Ben Jonson and Thomas Lodge, the latter also a translator of Seneca’s *De beneficiis*.125

Through the work of early humanists the Stoic canon was ‘enriched’ and ‘established’ and contributed to an understanding of Roman, and to a lesser extent of Greek Stoicism.126 Stoic virtues included temperance, justice and humility which were also embraced and promoted by the (early and later) Church.127 One virtue that had great resonance in Elizabethan and Jacobean England was fortitude, and what Aquinas saw as an important ‘attribute’ of it, constancy.128 While this is not a new idea, as Aristotle had also considered fortitude, as Blair Worden relates, ‘constancy is a Stoic virtue.’129 Yet, while Aristotelian ethics may have been an important part of the humanist education initiative, as William Prior notes, the difference between the Ancient Greek and Stoic approach to virtue rests on the Stoic emphasis on endurance.130 Endurance, demonstrated through

125 Salmon, ‘Stoicism and Roman Example’, pp. 205, 207, 208, 219, 222. This is not to say it didn’t have its detractors, namely James I. Erasmus ‘admired and edited Seneca’ and was one humanist who was a ‘powerful advocate’ of Stoicism despite the fact that he ‘mocks the Stoics’ in *Praise of Folly*’ see Hutton, p. 54. Francis Bacon also evidences an understanding of Stoicism in his work, even though Salmon characterises him as ‘no blind admirer of ancient Stoicism’ in Salmon, ‘Stoicism and Roman Example’, pp. 212, 223; Salmon, ‘Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England’, pp. 176-178 (p. 183).
126 Hutton, p. 53.
127 The virtues were also similarly considered in Greek ethics, as Houser notes the Platonic influence on St. Ambrose’s cardinal virtues in R.E. Houser, ‘The Virtue of Courage’ in *The Ethics of Aquinas* ed. by Stephen J. Pope (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 304-320 (pp. 304-305). The Stoic influence on early Church virtues has been documented. See Boyle who relates that William Peraldus’ (a ‘senior colleague’ of Aquinas) own *Summa* quotes classical philosophers including Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca in order ‘to define and document, among other things, the theological cardinal virtues’ in Leonard E Boyle, ‘The Setting of the *Summa Theologiae* St. Thomas--Revisited’ in *The Ethics of Aquinas* ed. by Stephen J. Pope (Georgetown University Press, 2002), pp. 1-16 (pp. 9-11).
129 Blair Worden, ‘Favourites on the English Stage’ in *The World of the Favourite* ed. by J.H. Elliot and L. W. B. Brockliss (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 159-183 (p. 162); see also Prior, p. 218; Houser, p. 305. Worden also has mentioned constancy in his work on ‘fortune’ and the favourite, but in a different context, arguing ‘favourites have no constant selves’, in ‘Favourites on the English Stage’ p. 162.
130 Prior, p. 218.
constancy in adversity, becomes very important in the consideration of friendship at this time, and consequently, in this thesis.131

A greater awareness of Stoicism was gained in the early modern period through the availability of the work of Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca and Montaigne.132 A consideration of the idea of constancy resonated in a variety of discursive forms, including Lipsius’ work, as previously discussed. Arthur Golding’s translation of M. Jacques Hurault’s ‘Passions of the Mind’ (1595) is also concerned with this idea, emphasising its importance by defining it in relation to its ‘contrarie’: ‘Inconstancie or unstedfastnesse, whereunto he opposeth Constancie, or Stedfastnesse’.133 Shakespeare’s Roman plays also demonstrate an understanding of constancy as a Stoic virtue, as Geoffrey Miles and Coppélia Kahn’s work underscores.134 Thomas Lodge’s late sixteenth-century writing demonstrates a preoccupation with this idea.135 It was something Elizabeth I found of interest in Seneca and expressed in a translation she made of his Moral Epistle CVII that she sent in a letter to her godson, John Harington, in 1567. She writes, ‘This onlye lyeth in our power; to frame a stowte mynde and worthie a good bodie, by which we maye strongly withstand mishapps’.136

The fact that misfortune would befall one was expected, but Stoicism helped to frame one’s mind to steadfastness. The help of a ‘constant’ friend in times of adversity could help make this possible. As such it is not surprising that this idea became important to the

131 ‘Bearing with and accepting hardship’ as Stoic, not Socratic virtues, in Prior, p. 218.
132 Hutton, pp. 53-54.
135 See for instance Lodge’s consideration of constancy in An Alarum Against Usurers (1584), Catharos (1591), The Famous, True and Historicall Life of Robert Second Duke of Normandy (1591), Euphues Shadow (1592), Euphues Golden Legacie (1592), A Fig for Momus (1595), The Divel Conjured (1596) and A Margarite of America (1596).
construction of male friendship. It already figured heavily in early modern gender relations, with inconstancy part of the construction of femininity. The relationship between constancy and friendship is explicated in Seneca’s *De providentia*. The work sets out to answer why, if there is a God or gods, bad things happen to good people. The idea of fortitude and strength in adversity are forwarded in Edw. Sherburne’s translation which posits man’s relationship with God as amity, similar to Wilkinson’s translation of Aristotle’s *Ethiques*, using perfect friendship rhetoric of similitude and concord:

Twixt God and Good men there’s a friendship layd  
Still Firme, by virtu’s Mediation made.  
Did I say Friendship? An inforcive Tye  
Or likenesse rather, and a Sympathie.  

Here ‘firmness’ qualifies the friendship in Stoic terms, linking it to virtue. The relationship is one that can be depended on, with God not only characterised as a faithful friend, but also as a beneficent father figure who ‘doth good Men, (like a severe Father,) Afflictions learne to beare’. But adversity does not only aid in building the requisite fortitude; equally, according to Seneca, it is an important measure of it. Friendly relations can be a means not only to build, but also to test this virtue. In *De providentia* God (or the gods) ask, how else may constancy be determined?

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139 Edw. Sherburne, ‘Epistle’, *De providentia*, sig. A4’. The title page cites author as E.S., Esq. The epistle bears the signature ‘Edw. Sherburne’. In the epistle the pages are by signature. The text is paginated beginning with 1.
140 Seneca, *De providentia*, p. 4.
141 Seneca, *De providentia*, p. 5.
Whence shall I
Know with how constant, and compos’d a state
Thou canst brook slanders, and the Peoples Hate,
If in the Generall Plaudit thou grow old? 142

It is easy to see how this idea would resonate with Christian thought and the ascetic monastic life of fourth-century Church fathers, as the Old and New Testaments upheld the importance of this virtue in the stories of Noah, Moses, David and Goliath, and especially in the crucifixion and sacrifice of Christ. There was a similar insistence on the idea of fortitude, sacrifice and virtue in the classical paradigm of perfect friendship. The integral role of constancy as the touchstone for perfect, true friendship is strongly felt throughout the early modern discourse on friendship. Chapter 2 will begin to interrogate the dramatic treatment of this idea, recognisable in oft-repeated, various permutations of Cicero’s instruction that ‘we must in freendshype make tryall’. 143

IV. Seneca’s De beneficiis and Friendship: Ideas and Translations

Seneca’s De beneficiis has been described and considered critically to some extent as a text on gift-giving and exchange. 144 Arthur Golding’s dedicatory epistle to his 1578 edition reflects this idea: the ‘why, how, when, too [sic] what ende, and on whom’ of benefitting, as well as ‘what reward is too bee looked for in the doing [sic] of it, and what

142 Seneca, De providentia, p. 18.
144 Coppélia Kahn ‘“Magic of Bounty”: Timon of Athens, Jacobean Patronage, and Maternal Power’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 38.1 (Spring, 1987), pp. 34-57, (p. 49). It is interesting that De beneficiis has not received as much attention or consideration as Marcel Mauss’ The Gift, a work that David Wootton rightly notes ‘whose subject matter is identical with that of Seneca, though strangely, Seneca is never mentioned’, in David Wootton ‘Francis Bacon: Your Flexible Friend’ in The World of the Favourite ed. by JH Elliott and WB Brockliss (Yale and New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp.184-204, (p. 186).
frute it yeeldeth again’. 145  But as David Wooton has noted, Seneca’s text is also important for its treatment of friendship.146  This is not only because the word friendship is invoked twenty-four times in Lodge’s translation and twelve in Golding’s, but mainly because of the direct link that Seneca draws between benefit and friendship, characterising the act of accepting benefits as ‘receyving of freendshipe’.147  It is not a theoretical exposition that details in full Seneca’s philosophy of friendship.  This was, it is believed, advanced in his lost treatise De Amicitia, of which only fragments remain.148  But the work of Senecan scholars such as Anna Lydia Motto point up that in De beneficiis and the Epistulae Morales there is much to learn about Seneca’s views on friendship.149  What De beneficiis provides is a discussion on the ‘social conventions’ of friendship, where friendship is posited as a social act, grounded in ethics and goodwill, but predicated on giving and receiving.150

In many ways, the ideas on giving and friendship forwarded in De beneficiis are quite similar to those proposed by Aristotle and Cicero in their works on friendship. Aristotle’s discussion of benefits suggests ‘it is a great pleasure when a man hath dooen service to his frendes’ and speaks to the idea of ‘gevyng and receivyng naturally from hand to hande’, while Cicero asserts that ‘love is confirmed by benefites received by Goodwyll approved, and by acquaintaunce adjoyned’.151  This link between goodwill and benefit is at the heart of Seneca’s work, as giving engenders ‘friendly goodwill’.  As Peterman explains, this is

146 Wootton considers De beneficiis to be one of three classical works that are ‘prolonged mediations on friendship’ in Wootton, p. 186.
147 De beneficiis, Golding, sig. F4v.
148 Anna Lydia Motto, Further Essays on Seneca by Anna Lydia Motto (Frankfurt:  Peter Lang, 2001), p. 7.
149 See Motto, pp. 7-16.
150 See W. Peterman, Paul’s Gift from Philippi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 52, 70.
151 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. J1'; The Booke of Freendshipe , Newton, sig. B6'.
all that is expected when bestowing a benefit.\textsuperscript{152} Giving and receiving are seen here as an integral part of the performance of friendship, an idea that became an important part of the early modern understanding of friendship, as William Cecil, Lord Burghley’s letter of advice to his son suggests:

Be sure thou alwaies keepe some great man to thy friend, but trouble him not for trifles, complement him often. present him with many, yet small gifts and of little charge, And if thou hast cause to bestow any great gratuity, then let it be some such as may bee daily in sight, for otherwise thou shalt live like a hop without a pole, live in obscurity, and be made a footeball for every insulting companion to spurne at.\textsuperscript{153}

But Seneca speaks to this idea in relation to virtue, relating it to the idea of equality in friendship, which is essential to a classical understanding of friendship, known as ‘like for like’.\textsuperscript{154} The value in the requital of a benefit rests in the virtuous mind of the giver, not in the material good:

he hath doone verie much: hee hath rendered good \textit{with} a good will, yea & like for like also, whiche is the propertie of frendship. Ageine the payment of a Benefite is one way, and the payment of a det is another way. You muste not looke that I should shewe my payment too the eye: the thing is doone betweene mynd and mynd.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{152} See Peterman, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{De beneficiis}, Golding, sig G3’. 

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Even though, as David Wootton notes, ‘friendship is inseparable, in the early modern period, from alliance, clientage and favouritism’\(^{156}\) (as Burghley’s letter suggests), Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca’s work speak to ideal relations despite the fact that their treatises were invoked as didactic texts in a world where friendships of utility were commonplace. To be sure, Arthur Golding saw the practical use of the text for harmonious relations at the Elizabethan Court where friendships of utility flourished. He declares his impetus for the translation as follows:

> I have therefore thought this woorke not unmeete too bee put intoo our Moothertung, that the mo myght take benefyte by it; nor yet unexpedient too comme in Courtyers handes, who shalbe so muche the greater Ornament too themselves, and too the place whereof they take their name, as their Courtesies and Benefytes bee mo and greater towards others.\(^{157}\)

This suggestion by Golding of how personal application of key Senecan principles by courtiers could affect the Court reflects Seneca’s idea of the public value of beneficence in terms of concord and harmonious relations. As Paul Veyne notes, Seneca maintains that ‘beneficence is fundamental to society, creating the social bond’.\(^{158}\) He sees gratitude and beneficence as helping to create friendship: ‘So is the Law of benefites a most holy law, wherout of sprinketh frendship’.\(^{159}\) Anna Lydia Motto explains that for Seneca, the ‘crucial value of friendship’ rests on the principle that ‘each friend not only perfects himself but also finds the opportunity to assist the other’.\(^{160}\) What is central to this however is that ‘love and generosity’ drives the relationship rather than expectation of

\(^{156}\) Wootton, p. 188.

\(^{157}\) De beneficiis, Golding, sig. *ii*.


\(^{159}\) De beneficiis, Golding, sig. E4*.

\(^{160}\) Motto, p. 11.
reciprocation and reward.  

This is not an endorsement of friendship as a useful commodity, or a recognition of utilitarian friendship, for Seneca’s ideas are very much in line with Cicero’s, in terms of upholding an ‘ethos of disinterested friendship’, for Seneca is avowedly against utilitarian friendship. As a Stoic, he would adhere to the belief that friendship should be conducted in a ‘completely unexploitative way’. As Motto explains, true Senecan friendship ‘relies on love and generosity without mediating a return for services rendered’. In this he shares a common understanding with Aristotle and Cicero that in true friendship ‘two soules are coupled together.’ However, while Aristotle views friendship as a good, Seneca suggests that friendship is not a good in itself, but rather, that its practice and demonstration can help to foster virtue in oneself. This is why the Stoic ‘wise-man’ is deemed ‘self-sufficient’, because although he enjoys and desires friendship, it is in the ‘being’ a friend, not ‘having’ a friend that matters.

In general, Seneca’s writings may not always subscribe to a strict Stoic philosophy, but they are strongly grounded in the Stoic belief that ‘only virtue is good’. It is from this principle that De beneficiis is figured, as Seneca takes the view from the outset that ‘amongst so many and mighty vices there is no one more frequent than that of Ingratitude’. Like Christian humanists, Seneca saw the benefit of philosophical study to

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161 Motto, pp.10-11.
162 ‘Disinterested’ friendship in Kahn, ““Magic of Bounty””, p. 48; Motto, p. 10.
164 Motto, p. 10. Motto relates that there are extant fragments of a work by Seneca entitled De amicitia and references F. Haase ed. L. Annaei Senecae Opera Quae Supersunt (Leipzig 1897), 3.435-36, but I have been unable to locate scholarship on the work.
166 Seneca suggests that ‘the wise-man although he be content with himselfe, will not withstanding have a friend, if to no other end but to exercise his amitie’ in Epistles, Lodge, Epistle IX, p. 175.
168 De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 2; Golding terms it ‘unthankfulness’ in De beneficiis, Golding, sig. A1’.

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public life, and one of his works, ‘On Mercy’ is considered ‘one of the earliest examples’ of *speculum principis*, or ‘mirror-for-princes’ literature.\(^{169}\)

Erasmus published an edition of Seneca’s work in 1515 (Froden) and a revised edition in 1529 (Basel).\(^{170}\) The earliest vernacular translation of Seneca’s *De beneficiis* is by Nicholas Haward (1569). It consists of only the first three books of the work. The title betrays the work’s *raison d’être*: *The Line of Liberalitie Dulie Directinge the Wel Bestowing of benefites and Reprehending the Comonly Used Vice of Ingratitue*. It follows Wilkinson’s *Ethiques* in carrying out a similar religious reshaping. In particular, Haward’s translation Christianises the pagan gods in Book 2 Chapter 29, where later translations by Arthur Golding (1578) and Thomas Lodge (1614) do not. Haward’s mediation of Seneca on benefits and love also serves, similarly to the *Ethiques*, as a call for beneficent relations between men in keeping with the second of the ‘greatest’ of the Commandments, to ‘love thy neighbour’.\(^{171}\) Haward relates that God has made man in his image and has demonstrated the greatest love. The implicit suggestion is that this relational model, which has been described as ‘the amitie betwixt Christ and his Church’,\(^{172}\) should be followed by men:

> yea God hath above al other thinges delt most beneficiallie with thée as with his owne dere derling. For verely truth it is that God who is immortall both hath done, 

\(^{169}\) Vogt, Katja, *SEP.*  
\(^{170}\) There is correspondence surviving that links Erasmus’ former pupil, Robert Aldridge, with helping with research on manuscripts housed at Kings and Peterhouse Colleges, Cambridge. The letter is dated ‘Basel 25 Dec 1525’. *See The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 1535 to 1657* trans. By Robert Dalzell (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974; 1994), p. 397. The numbers in the title of the book refer to the correspondence numbers rather than dates.  
\(^{171}\) ‘Thou shalt love thy neyghboure, as thy self. There is none other commandement greater then these’. The line preceding this relates the first and other, namely, the love of God. From the Gospel of Mark Chapter 113 in *The Byble in Englyshe* (London: Thomas Petyt and Robert Redman for Tho. Bethelet, 1540), fol. xxii.  
\(^{172}\) For the relationship between God and man described as ‘amitie’ see Robert Abbot, *A Wedding Sermon Preached at Bentley in Darby-shire vpon Michaelmasse Day 1607* (London : By N. O[kes] for Roger Jackson, 1608), fol. 61, sig. E2'.
and stil doth love us & that tenderly, for certein token now herof, he hath made us lyke himself ye most evident argument of his parfect love. At whose handes we have received so great benefits besides, that impossible it is to have any gretter.\textsuperscript{173}

Golding’s and Lodge’s translations read similarly, but retain the ‘gods’. Golding’s declares:

The Gods immortall have loved us and doo love us most deerly: and (which is the greatest honour that could bee given) they have placed us next unto themselves. Greate thinges have wee received, and greater we could not take.\textsuperscript{174}

Lodge’s reads:

The immortal gods have and doe love us entirely, and (which is the greatest honour that could be given) they have placed us next unto themselves. Great things have we received, neither were we capable of greater.\textsuperscript{175}

Although there is a slight alteration between Golding and Lodge, in that Golding suggests there is no greater gift than what the gods have bestowed, and Lodge suggests deferentially that men are not capable of such beneficence, both excerpts are devoid of contemporary religious parlance. Even so, the sense remains the same, as all three mediations provide an ideal model of beneficence and amity based on man’s relationship with a Supreme Being through which men can judge and mould their own behaviour.

The absence of a Christian perspective does not hold throughout either the Golding or the Lodge translation however, as there are references to the bounty of God, his divine providence and even a clear attempt to reconcile Seneca’s Fortune and Fate with the

\textsuperscript{173} Lucius Annaeus Seneca, \textit{The Line of Liberalitie Dulie Directinge the Wel Bestowing of Benefites and Reprehending the Comonly Used Vice of Ingratitude} translated by Nicholas Haward, (London : Thomas Marshe, 1569), pp. 80-81.

\textsuperscript{174} \textit{De beneficiis}, Golding, sig. G1’.

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{De beneficiis}, Lodge, p. 71.
Christian God. In Book 4 Chapter 8 Lodge states: ‘Call him then as thou pleasest, either Nature or Fate, or Fortune it makes no matter, because they all are the names of the selfsame God, who diversely useth his divine providence’. 176 While this at first glance is an instance akin to that which was seen in translations of Aristotle and Cicero (and Haward’s Seneca above), it should be noted that later twentieth-century translations contain a similar mix of references to ‘some god’, ‘gods’ and ‘God’. 177 And, as Sorenson notes, Lodge ‘does not conceal the fact that he takes up the attitude of a Christian’ in his translation. 178 This is made clear at the outset in the preface to the reader, where Lodge implores: ‘Would God Christians would endeavour to practise his [Seneca’s] good precepts, to reform their own in seeing his errors; and perceiving so great light of learning from a pagan’s pen, aim at the true light of devotion and piety, which becometh Christians’. 179

Lodge is described as both a Christian humanist and Catholic, and Golding, according to Sorenson, was a Puritan, and spent much of his translating life on Protestant texts, including Calvin’s sermons (1574). 180 While Sorenson describes Golding’s translation of De beneficiis as ‘thorough, meticulous’, he suggests that while Lodge’s demonstrates ‘a good working knowledge of Latin’, it also ‘reveals such an abyss of ignorance that one can hardly believe that he had really been through the extensive grammar-school curriculum of the time’. 181 But what is evident from a comparison of the two translations is the poetic

176 This is from Lodge, but it is similar in Golding, De beneficiis, Lodge, p.135.
178 Sorenson, p. 37.
179 De beneficiis, Lodge, vi.
181 Sorenson, p. 44, 27.
license that Lodge takes in terms of ‘embellishment’ and ‘ornamentation’,\textsuperscript{182} perhaps not unexpected given the extent of his other dramatic and literary pursuits.

Both Golding and Lodge had ties to the dramatic community, although Lodge’s were more extensive. Golding’s translation of Ovid’s \textit{Metamorphoses} (1567) and Lodge’s \textit{Rosalynde} (1590) were both sources for Shakespeare’s work. But Lodge had other links with the dramatic community through associations with Ralph Crane, Thomas Dekker and Phillip Henslowe, and through his collaboration with Robert Greene on \textit{A Looking Glass for London}, which was acted under the auspices of Lord Strange’s Men in 1592.\textsuperscript{183} Lodge’s writing and translation work demonstrate an interest in the topos of friendship, and his links to Oxford, Lincoln’s Inn and the theatre, makes it plausible that some of the ideas that he was familiar with may have circulated through his dramatic circle.\textsuperscript{184} So even though T. W. Baldwin’s work was unable to place a copy of \textit{De beneficiis} in the hands of the English grammar schools’ future dramatists, perhaps the one that Lodge is said to have placed in the hands of Dekker helped to disseminate some of Seneca’s thoughts on friendship. Section V will consider additional indirect methods of transmission of classical ideas on friendship, and examine how Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca’s ideas were disseminated in isolation from their works.

\section*{V. Early Modern Mediations and Transmission of Philosophical Ideas on Friendship}

In the 1595 \textit{Politicke, Moral, and Martial Discourses}, written by M. Jaques Hurault and translated by Arthur Golding, a suggestion to the reader speaks to the issue of the abbreviated form that ideas on friendship sometimes took in contemporary mediations and

\textsuperscript{182} Sorenson, pp. 138, 141.
\textsuperscript{183} Tenney, pp. 42, 189.
\textsuperscript{184} In his 1935 biography of Lodge, Edward Andrews Tenney claims that Lodge gave a copy of his translation of Seneca to Thomas Dekker, although I have been unable to find evidence to confirm this elsewhere. See Tenney, p. 189.
redactions. It reads: ‘He that is desirous to see more, let him read *Aristotles* [sic] Morals, *Lucians Toxaris*, and *Ciceros Laelius*.’\textsuperscript{185} Readers and students in grammar schools may not have had the original *Lysis* of Plato, but they may have learned of its reasoning from Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations* or another contemporary work. Just as students may not have read Lucian’s *Toxaris* because perhaps their Latin was ‘small’ at the time, they may have come to its thought on friendship through works like Erasmus’s *Moriae Encomium* and Thomas More’s *Utopia*, which demonstrate Lucianic influence, or through representations in school books by Erasmus and other humanists.\textsuperscript{186} At St. Paul’s for instance, as T. W. Baldwin notes, the curriculum was built on Erasmus’ ideas, which were also represented in student texts.\textsuperscript{187}

One of Erasmus’ more popular works, *Adagia*, was a collection of classical wisdom (including multiple entries on friendship) taken from authors including Aristotle, Cicero, Plato, Plutarch, Pythagoras and Seneca.\textsuperscript{188} Consequently, students would have access to their ideas even if their complete works were not employed as school texts. The work was first published in 1500 with 818 proverbs. It went through twenty-seven editions by 1536, growing in size until the final edition, which contained 4251 proverbs.\textsuperscript{189} In 1508 the subject of friendship begins the work, invoking the classical proverb from Pythagoras, Aristotle and Plato ‘*amicorum communia omnia* / Between friends all is common’.\textsuperscript{190} In

\textsuperscript{188} Desiderius Erasmus, *Proverbes or Adagies* (with newe addicions gathered out of the *Chiliades* of Erasmus) ed. by Richard Taverner (London: Richard Bankes, 1539), passim.

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his accompanying discussion of the proverb Erasmus remarks that ‘nothing was ever said by a pagan philosopher which comes closer to the mind of Christ’, as he, too, follows translators in an attempt to relate this classical idea of friendship to a sense of community and ‘brotherly love’.  

This extension of *amicitia* and *philia* towards *caritas* is an important one, as seen in translations previously discussed, and had its roots in the early church. It relates to Seneca’s idea of beneficence and was something that Erasmus was familiar with. Invoking an idea from *De beneficiis* in his *Adagia* Erasmus suggests: ‘He who gives quickly gives twice’, explaining that ‘the lesson in this maxim is that we should not be dilatory or reluctant in helping our friends when they need it, but should do what we can for them on our own initiative without waiting to be asked’. These two examples suggest the extra-textual life philosophical ideas on friendship had, despite the observation by Baldwin that ‘Seneca in any extended form seldom appears in the grammar schools of the sixteenth-century’. The form may have been abbreviated, but the ideas on friendship from *De beneficiis* and *Epistuale Morales* were available and disseminated through others’ work beginning much earlier than that.

The early Tudor works of Robert Whittington (1480–1553?) speak further to this issue. Whittington, a contemporary of William Lily, was a prosperous and favoured schoolmaster under Henry VIII ‘famous for his elementary Latin school books’. He translated from Latin into English Erasmus’s *De civilitate morum puerilium* (1532), Cicero’s *De officiis*, (1534), *Paradoxa*, (c.1534) and *De senectute*, (c.1535), as well as such works attributed to Seneca, including *The Forme and Rule of Honest Lyvynge* (1546),

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194 Nicholas Orme, ‘Robert Whittington’, *DNB*. 
The Mirrour or Glasse of Maners (1547), and De remediis fortuitorum (1547). Forme and Mirrour were later identified as the work of Saint Martin of Braga, a sixth-century theologian whose work evidences an understanding and use of Seneca’s work.

With Whittington’s position and influence on learning at the time, whether the work was correctly ascribed or not, we might expect that Whittington may have imparted his ‘knowledge’ of Aristotle and Seneca to his students in lessons or school texts, especially given the regard he pays Aristotle and Seneca in the prologue to The Mirrour or Glasse of Maners:

Therefore for as muche as Aristotle is as a cheyf prince amonge these that be spoken of, natwithstandynge I can finde no man nother of our latyne men: nor yet of ye Grecions, whome to the reason of these vertuous practise & actions, which we require [require] of an honest man I maye compare to Seneca.

Proverbial collections served as a popular source for disseminating classical ideas on friendship. William Baldwin-Thomas Palfreyman’s Treatise of Morall Philosophie was considered ‘an Elizabethan best-seller’, with twenty-three editions published beginning in 1547. Its popularity is put into perspective by Robert Hood Bowers who explains that its closest competitors for the most editions printed at the time were the editions of the Bible, at 283, and Arthur Dent’s The Plaine Mans Pathway to Heaven (1601) at 16. The Treatise includes an introduction to philosophy, short biographies, pithy precepts, and

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195 ‘Robert Whittington’, DNB.
197 Robert Whittington, The Mirrour or Glasse of Manners (London: John Morris, 1547). There are no page numbers or signatures until B1 so the pages have been assigned beginning with the title page, as the text begins on the verso side of this page Mirrour, sigs. A4°-A5°.
199 Bowers, v.
some expanded paragraphs of proverbial wisdom from over fifty-two thinkers from Pythagoras to Ambrose. The work provides vernacular accessibility to ideas on friendship through its chapter ‘Of Friends, Friendship and Amitie,’ which relates the key tenents of perfect friendship represented in Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca. This chapter further highlights some of the ways in which different compilers ascribed ideas, which may in part be explained by the process through which the text was written. This is detailed by the work’s 1557 reviser, Thomas Palfreyman, in his preface ‘To the Reader’: ‘I called to remembrance the like worthy and notable sentences and good counsailes that I had often read in divers and sundry other works. And to the intent of placing them together, I might the better keepe them in memory’. Even with a gift of exceptional memory, one can see the potential for errors here unless Palfreyman had access to several volumes of treatises.

Entries on amity repeat the commonplace tenets of perfect friendship, emphasising ideas such as the requisite qualities of constancy, equality and succour. Also reiterated is a permutation of the ideal that sees the friend as another self: making ‘one hart and minde, from many hartes and bodies’. But just as the didactic use of translations was evidenced in prefaces to the reader, the admonitory tone of the Treatise suggests a similar intent, as amongst its celebratory maxims on friendship are cautions that serve to educate the reader by corollary. Men are warned against ‘lightly’ taking friends and against the short endurance of new friendships. Similar to Cicero’s suggestion to try one’s friends in De amicitia, men are encouraged to ‘prove’ friends, and to be ‘slow to fall into

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200 Thomas Palfreyman, Preface ‘To the Reader’ in A Treatise of Morall Philosophie, p.5.
201 Baldwin and Palfreyman, p. 175.
202 Baldwin and Palfreyman, p. 175.
203 This is an approach used to educate on virtue, and is voiced in relation to the Stoic idea of constancy, as will be seen later in the chapter.
204 Baldwin-Palfreyman, p. 178.
friendship’, with the exhortation to judge men first, choosing only those for friendship who are virtuous and follow truth’.  

Another work that excerpts classical thought on friendship is Nicholas Ling’s *Politeuphia* (1579). Claiming to provide ‘Illiads of prayse for vertue’ and ‘good counsailes against vice’, the work is a collection of un-attributed precepts with a section ‘Of friendship’ that, like Baldwin and Palfreyman’s *Treatise*, repeats much the same proverbial wisdom on ideal classical friendship. It includes the following quotation, which reflects Seneca’s *De beneficiis* and demonstrates the ways in which extracted ideas, out of context and without explanation, had the potential to be misunderstood as they entered the discourse: ‘Maintain thy friends with benefits, to make them more friendly’. The abbreviation of this idea figures friendship as a more reward-driven relationship. Ling appears to be drawing from Seneca’s *De beneficiis* here. Golding’s translation had been available for nearly twenty years by the time *Politeuphia* was compiled. But Ling’s mediation of the idea not only strays from the ideal, but also renders it less noble and fairly reductive. In Golding, the idea is represented as follows: ‘Benefiting is a felowlike thing: it purchaseth favour: it maketh men beholden’. To be sure this appears very much in line with the profitable, obligatory friendship that Ling’s mediation suggests, but this is explicated further in Golding, which may make this idea akin to a Stoic paradox, but nevertheless attempts to correct any potential for misunderstanding:

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207 Ling, *Politeuphia*, sig. K1°
208 *De Beneficiis*, Golding, sig. T1°.
That is a benefite, whiche a man giveth not for his owne sake, but for the parties sake to whom hee giveth it. But hee that dooth himself a good turne, dooth it for his owne sake: Ergo it is no benefite.  

The explication of the idea abbreviated in Ling makes evident the idea of giving for the sake of the other, rather than in order to obligate reciprocation. Benefits do have their rewards according to Seneca, but that is not why they should be given. Ling does not make this important distinction and figures benefits as part of instrumental friendships of patronage and utility, where the continual flow of benefits or liberality is needed to ensure friendliness, much like Burghley’s advice to his son. Further, Ling’s maxim does not heed the importance of selfless giving, and likewise, does not capture the essence of beneficent giving’s relationship to its demonstration of virtue that is forwarded in De beneficiis: ‘it is the propertie of a noble and vertuous minde, not too respect the profit of welldooing, but the welldooing itself’.  

Interestingly, Lodge’s 1614 translation of this idea, although maintaining a similar sense through words like ‘commerce’ and ‘interchange’ evokes the more business-like, transactional parlance that may make it seem like a less beneficent type of exchange:

For in what other thing are we secure but in this, that we are helped by mutual offices, and interchangeable friendships? by this one and only commerce of benefits our life is not only assured, but better defended.  

The tenor of the Lodge translation is very much in line with the idea of beneficence in the earlier, anonymous play Timon (1602-3) that will be examined in Chapter 4. Lodge’s
translation and the play reflect the sense of the transactional nature of Greco-Roman social reciprocity in the first century.\textsuperscript{212} The sense may derive also from Lodge’s (and the anonymous dramatist’s) acquaintance with the practice of law, or the post 1590s Court political milieu that gentleman experienced, given Lodge’s membership in Lincoln’s Inn beginning in 1578, and the play’s provenance at the Inns.

Even Lodge’s slightly nuanced translation points up the difficulty in interpreting the idea of benefit and friendship given the contemporary socio-political context. In Seneca’s view, exchanges create ‘bonds of friendship’;\textsuperscript{213} as the friend attains the equality requisite of perfect classical friendship. For as Seneca asserts, ‘The greatest friendship we can intend any man, is to make him equal with ourselves and suffer him in every sort and jointly to enjoy our goods and fortunes’.\textsuperscript{214} This understanding renders impossible asymmetrical friendships driven by need and reward. The benefit is not meant to extract either favour or reciprocity, but rather, as Stephan Joubert relates, ‘the bestowal of benefits leads to a \textit{fides}-relationship’,\textsuperscript{215} an idea that Mervyn James considers in relation to honour and good lordship, as will be explored in Chapter 4. Taken out of context and re-presented in a curt maxim, however, Seneca’s idea about benefits may be easily misunderstood as a more practical, less virtuous \textit{quid pro quo} relationship.

Although Ling’s work differs from the more scholarly and explanatory \textit{Adagia}, both served as a repository for moral wisdom, even though Sasha Roberts states that commonplace books like Ling’s have often been ‘dismissed’ by critics for their

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{212} See Peterman, pp. 52, 64.
\item \textsuperscript{213} Stephan Joubert, \textit{Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, Strategy and Theological Reflection in Paul’s Collection} (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), fn. 102, p. 50; On equality, see \textit{De beneficiis}, Lodge, p. 49-50.\textsuperscript{214} \textit{De beneficiis}, Lodge, p. 49-50.
\item \textsuperscript{215} Joubert, fn. 102, p. 50.
\end{itemize}
‘misleading compilations of bowdlerised verse’. Even so, the work of Ann Moss and Mary Thomas Crane illustrates the importance of the Renaissance commonplace book to education and the transmission of ideas. This learning by way of extract was a significant part of the humanist-inspired active reading process for grammar school students as well, who were encouraged to keep their own commonplace books. But as Sasha Roberts’ work further underscores, the compiler’s imprint on extracts for popular consumption cannot be denied. She relates how England’s Parnassus (1600) by Robert Allot (printed by Ling) creates ‘new contexts and meanings’ for Shakespeare’s Venus and Adonis. This idea of subjective ‘imprint’ affecting the shape and form of ideas can also be extended to include readers themselves. The final arbitrators of written ideas, they kept their own commonplace books under tidy headings such as ‘Fortitudo’, ‘Harmonia’, ‘Ingratitudo’, for compartmentalisation of insights that delineated virtue from vice, as suggested by Erasmus in De Copia. It is evident how these categories might easily accommodate classical, and especially Stoic thought on friendship. With this, and Erasmus’ Adagia and Ling’s Politeuphuia in mind, it is possible to see the wide variability of shape and form that ‘meaning’ might take in relation to an original idea on friendship. Through Ling’s redaction of Senecan thought a more worldly and limited sense of Seneca’s idea of giving and friendship enters the discourse.

Sententiae Pueriles by Leonard Culmann saw at least twelve editions from 1612-1697 and acknowledges the continued popularity of such works as an educational tool late into

219 Roberts, p. 93.
220 See Hackel, pp. 132-133.
221 Hackel, p. 183.
the seventeenth-century. The work provides short sentences and phrases for beginning Latin students ‘to get both matter and phrase, most speedily and surely, without inconvenience’. The ‘matter’ of the first entry very concisely reminds the reader of his friendly responsibility: ‘Help thy friends’. Friendship as a topic dominates the first seven entries (with three in total), and reflects key classical ideas: the duty to assist, the need to ‘try’ and suggestion to ‘use thy friend’. The book takes a somewhat admonishing tone, emphasising through repetition certain key ideas that permeate the discourse, namely, the elusive nature of true friendship, the need to ‘try’ or ‘prove’ one’s friends in adversity and the problem with inconstancy in friendship (and women): ‘Inconstancy doth disdaine friendes’. The work demonstrates a familiarity with ideas from De beneficiis related to ingratitude, an idea that Seneca and Elyot link closely to friendship. Culmann asserts, ‘Ingratitude [is] the head of all vices’, while Lodge’s translation of De beneficiis asserts, that there is no one vice ‘more frequent than that of ingratitude’.

There were many other texts that contributed to the discourse of friendship, either registering an understanding of classical ideas, or providing contextual musings, including the work of Francis Bacon, Michel de Montaigne, and Thomas Elyot, to name but a few. The limitations of this study prevent a full treatment, but they will figure at intervals in the remaining chapters of this thesis.

223 Culmann, p. 1. This also continues in later editions, such as the 1658 edition, which reads ‘Be helpful to thy friends’ in Leonard Culmann, Sentences for children, trans. by Charles Hoole (London: Printed for the Company of Stationers, 1658), sig. A1'. The earlier editions do not list the name of a translator, perhaps because they were not emending Culmann’s original work.
224 Culmann, p. 1.
225 Culmann, pp. 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 18, 21, 22, 24; ‘Women are inconstant’, p. 6.
226 Culmann, p. 14; De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 2.
VI. The Public Benefit and Use of Friendship

Humanists who encouraged vernacular translations of classical works on friendship recognised the potential usefulness of friendship as a public good. After 1534 and the end of papal supremacy, the temptations of vice and rewards of Christian piety and virtue, for so long mainly imprinted by Roman Catholicism, were now additionally informed by translations and contemporary didactic works that appealed not only to Christian, but also to classical authority. By grounding theological doctrine in classical precedent the ideas gained added currency. In his *Epistulae Morales*, Seneca advises Lucilius Junior of the primary benefit of philosophy: ‘Philosophie promiseth this first of all, common sense, humanitie, and entercourse and societie’. And the repercussive effects of friendship and concord on society were clearly understood. A sermon preached by Robert Cushman in 1620 at Plymouth, New England, and then printed for publication in London in 1621, serves as one example of the contemporary resonance of this idea and of its wide dissemination. Cushman’s sermon highlights the idea of one’s usefulness to others. Meant to stand as a pointed example of the consequences of ignoring one’s responsibilities as a Christian friend, it recounts the events of the winter of 1620, which claimed the lives of half of the Pilgrims. The intent of the publication is made manifest in the dedicatory epistle and title page, which quotes Romans 12.10: ‘Be affectioned to love one another with brotherly love’. This is followed, in bold in the centre of the page, by the declaration: ‘WHEREIN IS SHEWED the danger of self-love, and the sweetnesse of true Friendship’.

229 Cushman, sig. A4f.
230 Cushman, sig. A4f.
The utilitarian nature of friendship is underscored in Cushman’s sermon, though viewed through the Christian idea of ‘one body in Christ’. But most significantly, it emphasises a sense of the positive societal, rather than divine implications of equality and responsibility in friendship, as the burden for citizens’ welfare is shifted off of the church and common-weale—relieving burgeoning pressure—and onto the friend: ‘We are bound each to other, so that his wants must be my wants, his sorrowes my sorrowes, his sicknes my sicknes, and his welfare my welfare, for I am as he is’.  

The dedicatory epistle, written three days after the sermon was delivered, develops this idea further:

if any shall marvell at the publishing of this Treatise in England, seeing thereis no want of good bookes, but rather want of men to use good bookes, let them know, that the especiall end Is, that we ma y keepe those motives in memory for our selves, &those that shall come after, to be a remedie against self-love the bane of all societies.

Represented here is a much later iteration of the Christian perspective taken on the threat posed by self-love as seen in Wilkinson’s translation of Aristotle.

In closing the sermon, Cushman makes very clear the socio-political benefits of Christian amity, as well as the consequences of its absence, which he suggests was experienced at Plymouth:

And such a sweet sympathie were excellent, comfortable, yea heavenly, and is the onely maker and conserver of Churches and common-wealthes, and where this is wanting, ruine comes on quickly as it did here.

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231 Cushman, sig. C3r.
232 Cushman, sig. A4r.
233 Cushman, sig. C3r.
Cushman’s sermon serves a didactic purpose across the Atlantic in England. While it is a vivid illustration that reveals the destruction possible in a world without friendship, it also posits friendship’s potential as a positive force for stability of the Church and Commonwealth.

The importance of this idea was not unique to Jacobean England, as a concern over stability and the belief in ‘ordering’ relations to aid that end was reflected in the Queen’s royal entry celebrations in London in 1559. With the bloody Tudor past still looming over the coronation of Elizabeth, the recognition of the benefit of concord during the pre-coronation festivities was emphasised. There was a pageant on unity that took place at the upper end of Gracechurch Street during which a child, in part, read aloud ‘coniunctæ manus fortes tollunt onus / Regno pro minibus æneis ciuium concordia’:

‘Joined hands are stronger to carry the burden / The concord of the citizens is like a bronze rampart for the kingdom’. Concord is tied to Aristotle’s view of friendship in Wilkinson’s _Ethiques_. Friendship is ‘knitte of love and concord’ and the importance of a ‘concord of willes’ in friendship is promoted. The pageant’s appeal to concord calls to mind the idea of friendship and unity as serving as a defence against the vicissitudes of fortune as expressed in Golding’s translation of _De beneficiis_. It reads:

For in what other thing have wee so mu che saferie, as in helping one another with mutuall freendlynes? Through this onely one intercourse of good turnes,

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235 _The Queen’s Majesties Passage through the citie of London to Westminster the daye before her coronacion_ (London: Richard Tottel, 1559) in _The Queen’s Majesty’s Passage_ ed. by Germaine Warkentin (Toronto: Centre for Reformation Studies, 2004), p. 81, 127 (Appendix III for translation).

our life is both better furnished, & better fenced agaist sodein assaultes. Put everyman too himself alone, and what are wee? 237

The public benefit of amicable relations between citizens is underscored in the pageant and the Senecan quote, as the protective nature of unity is asserted. This would be an important message to promulgate at the start of Elizabeth’s reign. Although there were no vernacular translations of De beneficiis available at the time, the facility with Latin that the pageant writers and the Queen possessed, as well as the latter’s familiarity with Senecan thought, make it possible that the ideas from the work may have influenced the festivities’ composition. The resonance of the ideas on the social conventions of giving and receiving and gratitude can be felt. According to Germaine Warkentin, a key aspect of the pageants around London on this occasion was an insistence on demonstrations of reciprocity through largesse and the ritual of exchange, which were symbolic displays of the bonds the new monarch forged with the populace. 238 This relationship is figured as an amicable bond, similar to that which was forwarded in the Ethiques between subjects and monarch, based on beneficence and obligation in line with the amity between God and man. It is an idea that resonates in an address Elizabeth gives later in her reign when she tells her Parliament’ I have Reigned with your Loves’ adding that she views ‘love and thanks’ ‘unvaluable’. 239 In this instance David Harris Sacks rightly notes that the Queen was asserting a ‘mutual love’ with her subjects ‘akin to the Greek ideal of philia, friendship’, to ensure ‘stability and order in the realm’. 240 Although the reciprocity here is reminiscent of a patron-client relationship where the obligations of fidelity and service are sacrosanct, as

237 De beneficiis, Golding, sig. D3r.
238 Germaine Warkentin, ‘Introduction’ in The Queen’s Majesty’s Passage, pp. 15-74 (pp. 54-55).
240 Sacks, pp. 283-284.
Sacks suggests, reciprocity, as envisaged by the Queen, went beyond material interest and ‘created a moral community whose watchword was “love”’. 241

The public benefit of friendship may have taken on an even more important dimension during 1570-1640, a period that Martin Ingram has identified as one of significant ‘geographic mobility’ and associated conspicuous ‘social differentiation and economic inequalities’ on local and countrywide levels.242 Such changes in community could only serve to weaken ties amongst neighbours and heighten tensions. Keith Thomas argues that ‘harmony was prized, whereas lawsuits which set neighbour against neighbour were (following I Corinthians 6:7) widely deplored as un-Christian breaches of charity’.243 Nevertheless, as Ingram’s work attests, this period found church courts, secular tribunals, manorial and borough courts, courts of assize and county quarter sessions busy with ‘resolution of conflict within the society’.244 Defamation cases that busied the High Court of Chivalry (or Earl Marshal’s Court) between 1 March 1633/4 and 4 December 1640 also support this idea.

The language used in interrogatories and submissions by parties after adjudication by the Court speaks to the belief that there was a keen awareness of how discordant relations on a personal level could affect conformity with the law, but also supports an understanding of the importance placed on friendship in the maintenance of order. In the case of Turberville Morgan of Dover, Kent, gentleman v George Rookes of Horton, Kent, gentleman (Feb 1639-ct 1640) the potential for fidelity in friendship to give rise to an unfair trial was broached, as plaintiff interrogatories questioned whether a man would

241 Sacks, pp. 283-284.
244 Ingram, p. 27.
perjure himself to save a friend: ‘Would Morgan’s witnesses Robert Tokeley, Samuel Dove, Hugh Lewis and James Watkins, depose untruthfully for reward or friendship?’ Friendship also played a part in the defence interrogatories in the case, as the depth of the friendship tie was questioned. The defence asked if ‘there was such a league of friendship and correspondence between them’, and suggested that there indeed was, to the extent that Rookes subordinated kinship ties to friendship at the behest of Morgan. The interrogatory further reads: ‘and did not Morgan inveigle and drawe Thomas Rookes to oppose his father in suites of lawe...’ This case questions the willingness of friends to betray other obligations, both familial and legal, in the name of friendship, and suggests that the fidelity with which some men adhered to their responsibilities in friendship could be at the expense of the other relationships.

The occasion of the action between Richard Porter of Launcells, Cornwall, gentleman v Thomas Rookes, gentleman (1620) is unknown, but the Court’s words also evidence concern for the repercussive public effects of private quarrels, and especially how Courts felt compelled to aid in the renewal of friendship ties:

Your petitioners, brought before your lordship twelve months since upon a difference that happened between them were some few daies in durance by your lordship’s command, and upon their discharge were bound to appeare before your lordship upon notice, and to keepe the peace towards all his Majestie’s subjects, and especially towards one another, which bonds have remained with your lordship ever since.

246 Morgane v Rookes, Defence interrogatories, No. 7, 14/3kk, Cust and Hopper, eds. The ellipses are as found in the interrogatory.
247 Porter v Rookes, EM327, Petition, Court of Chivalry, Cust and Hopper, eds.
The final petition that Porter and Rookes were to sign affirmed not only that they had resolved their differences but that they would re-establish amicable bonds. The petition reads:

Now forasmuch as your petitioners do hereby protest, upon their words as they are gentlemen, that all differences between them are fully reconciled to justice, friendship renewed between them, their humble suite is that your lordship would be pleased that the bonds may be cancelled, and your petitioners fully discharged from any further attendance in this business.\textsuperscript{248}

Being reconciled to justice was not enough. Successful resolution not only rested on determination of guilt or innocence, but also on the re-establishment of friendship.

The defamation suit that Phillip Grigg, gentleman, brought against John Corditt and John Ellison in January 1638 adds weight to this idea. In the end, both Corditt and Ellison signed separate submissions which iterated similar repentant apologies, but also included an acknowledgement of the effort that would be made to re-establish friendship and goodwill. Corditt’s reads:

I doe hereby professe my hartie sorrowe for the same and doe intreate Mr Grigg to pardon and remitt this my fault. And for the future I doe promise to carrie myselfe with that respect towards him as shalbe fitt for me to give to a gent. of soe good rancke and callinge and will indeavou r to regaine his favour and friendship.\textsuperscript{249}

While it is possible that neither Corditt, Ellison, Porter nor Rookes actually intended to work towards the restoration of amicable bonds despite their signed oaths, what is clear is

\textsuperscript{248}Porter v Rookes, EM327, Petition, Court of Chivalry, Cust and Hopper, eds.
\textsuperscript{249}Grigg v Corditt and Ellison, Submission, 13 January 1637/8 by John Corditt, Court of Chivalry, Cust and Hopper, eds.
that the Court put much emphasis on this aspect, and saw personal friendships as integral to the maintenance of a harmonious society.

This chapter has highlighted the unique shape and form that some key classical ideas took as they entered the early modern discourse of friendship, and indicated how they became a significant part of the cultural consciousness. It has also highlighted the influence of Stoicism on early modern thought and the usefulness of considering Seneca’s *De beneficiis* in relation to friendship. Through an examination of the syncretisation of classical and Christian morality that was used to frame ‘laws’ of friendship, an important issue concerning application emerged. The problem of course is that codification, despite its infusion with Christian responsibilities to others, did not account for the wide variety of early modern meanings of friendship, especially what Aristotle would call ‘lesser’ friendships, but rather, offered for individual application rules governing the ideal. This is an idea that will be considered throughout this thesis, in conjunction with an examination of the treatment of some key issues raised here. These include benefit, giving, and ingratitude. They extend also to confusion between *philia* and *caritas*, to notions of obligation and symmetry in friendship, and to problems arising from diluted and expanded definitions of friendship that invite competition for affection as friendship models are used to describe relations to wives. The next chapter begins a consideration of the contributions made by drama to the early modern discourse of friendship through an examination of plays that depict idealised pairs of friends.

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250 For the codification of friendship see Robert Stretter, ‘Cicero on Stage: *Damon and Pithias* and the Fate of Classical Friendship in English Renaissance Drama’ in *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, 47.4 Winter (2005), 345-365 (pp. 346-348).
Chapter 2
The Academic Ideal

The classical ideal was continually held up for emulation in order to encourage the cultivation and maintenance of friendship. This example faced contemporary challenges from views that suggested its illusory nature. Commenting on the ‘iniquitie’ of his ‘time’ in 1589, Walter Dorke asserts that ‘a man may as soone see a black Swan, as finde out a faithfull friend’. 1 Dorke’s observation strikes a similar note to Richard Brathwaite’s later view in The English Gentleman (1630) when he reflects on a similar diminishing integrity within contemporary society declaring, ‘perfection of friendship, is but a speculation’, adding, ‘it is rare to see a faithfull Damon or a Pythias; a Pylades or Orestes; a Bitias or a Pandarus; a Nisus or Euryalus’. 2

Despite the forty-one years that separated their comments, Braithwaite and Dorke register a similar concern for one of the most revered, and emphasised qualities of perfect classical friendship as discussed in Chapter 1, namely, constancy. But Braithwaite and Dorke’s comments also speak obliquely to one of constancy’s adjuncts: sacrifice. In using the phrase ‘finde out’ rather than ‘find’ or ‘see’, Dorke emphasises not the inability to locate an appropriate partner for friendship, but rather, the importance of ‘discovering’ the friend through ‘trial’, as Cicero suggests. Similarly, Brathwaite’s reflections suggest much the same; however, he does so in a way that became common in the early modern period in didactic works, literature, and translations of classical friendship treatises, through appeals to a reader’s understanding of the symbolism evoked by the names of idealised friendship

1 Walter Dorke, A Tipe or Figure of Friendship. (London: Thomas Orwin and Henry Kirkham, 1589), sig. A3v.
2 Braithwaite here is expanding on the view Francis Bacon articulated in his 1612 essay ‘Of Friendship’ when he said, ‘Perfection of friendship is but a speculation.’ In Francis Bacon, ‘Of Friendship’ in The Essays of Sir Francis Bacon (London: John Beale, 1612), pp. 80-84 (p. 83); Richard Brathwaite, The English Gentleman (London: John Haviland, 1630), sigs. li2-li4.
pairs. The pairs included Damon and Pythias and Orestes and Pylades. Their names were synonymous with constancy and sacrifice, and their importance rested on what they represented, rather than in the complete narratives of their friendship. This is perhaps why exposition of their stories of friendship infrequently accompanied their names. This trend is reflected in Edmund Spenser’s *The Faerie Queene*:

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Such were great Hercules, and Hyllus deare;
Trew Jonathan, and David trustie tryde;
Stout Theses, and Pirithous his feare;
Pylades and Orestes by his syde;
Myld Titus and Gesippus without pryde;
Damon and Pythias whom death could not seuer:
All these and all that ever had bene tyde,
In bands of friendship there did live for ever.3
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Along with classical pairs, Spenser includes the biblical image of perfection in friendship, David and Jonathan, as well as a more recent figuring from Boccaccio’s *Decameron*, Titus and Gesippus. All, along with Achilles and Patroclus, were frequently invoked for didactic purposes and became paradigmatic for perfect friendship, as they embodied the virtuous Aristotelian and Ciceronean constant ideal.

Robert Stretter suggests that in terms of classical ideal friendship, ‘Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca, and others were the holy scriptures and men such as Orestes and Pylades were the saints’.4 And just as the wisdom from those ‘scriptures’ found their way into commonplace books in pithy precepts that evoked specific distinctive qualities of

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friendship, a mere mention of the names of the ‘saints’, namely, Orestes and Pylades, Damon and Pythias, or others, was enough to summon a vision of the embodiment of sacrifice and faithfulness requisite of true classical friendship, as Thomas Elyot defined it: ‘a blessed connexion of sundry wylls, makynge of two persons one, in having and suffrying: And therefore a friend is properly named of Philosophers, the other I’.5

This chapter considers the dramatic retellings of narratives of perfect friendship by three early modern academic dramatists, all of whom received a classical Oxford education, namely Titus et Gesippus (1544) by John Foxe, The Excellent Comedie of two the moste faithfullest Freendes, Damon and Pithias (1565) by Richard Edwards, and The Tragedy of Orestes (1633) by Thomas Goffe. Although Edwards and Goffe’s plays are in the vernacular, Foxe’s is in Latin, which makes its choice perhaps seem out of place. But its translation into the native tongue of Cicero’s De amicitia may suggest Foxe’s attempt at aligning his play more closely with the classical friendship tradition, even though its narrative is derived from Boccaccio. While all works in this chapter will be considered for their engagement with ideas of perfect classical friendship, this makes Foxe’s work an interesting addition, especially as Foxe dramatises a more contemporary, popular fiction from Boccaccio, of purportedly perfect friends to whom writers traditionally assigned idealised and equal status with classical friendship pairs.6 Further, Foxe’s play is noteworthy not only because it receives little or no attention, (despite what John Hazel Smith recognises as its worth as an early ‘epitome of English Renaissance comedy’, and Laurens Mills’ suggestion that it contributes to the original story ‘which helped popularise the theme’),7 but also for its consideration of the competing affective claims on friendship

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6 Namely, Elyot, Governour, Spenser, Faerie Queene.
that later dramatists such as Thomas Heywood would explore in works such as *A Woman Killed with Kindness* (1603) and *The English Traveller* (c. 1627?) (which will be considered in Chapter 5 of this thesis).

This chapter begins with a brief review of the key contextual emphases of ideal friendship and a consideration of the cultural currency of friendship pairs. The second part of the chapter is divided into three separate case studies which interrogate the plays’ engagement with the ideal, in light of their titular appeal as representative of perfect friendship. The examination will ask how, and to what extent academic dramatists who invoked paradigmatic pairs for didactic purposes tested and reshaped the classical ideal and registered the cultural preoccupation with constancy and sacrifice in friendship. It will consider forces exerting pressure on friendship such as adversity, the good of the state, obligation to family, and gratitude, deploying classical ideas from Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca.

I. Writing the Ideal

When representing perfect friendship in didactic and literary works, great weight was given to the grand gestures friends made, or were willing to make, for each other’s benefit, most usually including the ultimate sacrifice: risking or offering to trade one’s life for the other. This emphasis in the early modern conception of perfect friendship rested securely on the biblical directive of John 15, and prefigured in the biblical idealisation of David and Jonathan’s friendship: ‘Greater love hath no man, than this:that [sic] a man bestow his life

Laurens Mills suggests the play’s interest ‘lies almost wholly in the fact that it adds to the original story’, in Laurens J. Mills, *One Soul in Bodies Twain: Friendship in Tudor Literature and Stuart Drama* (Bloomington: Principia, 1937), p. 327. Mills and Smith have given the play the most attention. Smith in his 1973 edition and Mills notably, in his 1937 work affording it a brief entry.
for his frendes’. The competing classical analogue of this idea was available in Nicholas Grimalde’s 1556 translation of Cicero’s *De officiis*, where Damon and Pythias are described as ‘so affectioned, one toward an other’ that although one was sentenced to die, ‘the other becamne bounde body for body’, so that ‘he wolde himself dye for him’. In a similar way, in *The Boke Named the Governour*, Thomas Elyot’s retelling of the friendship of Orestes and Pylades only includes the action which demonstrates constancy in friendship in the face of death: Pylades claiming to be Orestes so as to spare his friend’s life. And although in the same work he allots twenty-six pages to a detailed, more contemporary narrative of Titus and Gesippus, again, prominence is given to the self-sacrifice of the pair. While this narrative includes an added dimension of selflessness, namely, relinquishing one’s betrothed for a friend, it also asserts the requisite magnanimous and reputation-enhancing act of offering to trade one’s life for one’s friend.

To be sure, there were perhaps not all that many instances in reality where friends would be put to such harsh a test as giving one’s life for another, yet, to the early modern reader or playgoer these pairs summed up the length to which one *should* be expected to go, if called upon, defining that all-important value of constancy in friendship. Biblical, classical, literary and historical examples abounded, with *amicitia perfecta* a prevalent motif. The Bible in 1Samuel 18 (‘the first booke of the kinges’) recounted the bond between David and Jonathan. The friendship of Nisus and Euryalus and their honourable deaths at the hands of the Rutulians was recounted in Book IX of Virgil’s *Aeneid*, translated into the vernacular in 1562. The friendship of Theseus and Perithous was retold

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and referred to in multiple works including: Castiglione’s *The Courtier* (1561), Arthur Golding’s translation of ‘The Eighth Book’ of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* (1567), George Tuberville’s translation of Ovid’s ‘The Fourth Epistle: Phaedra to Hippolytus’ (1567), and Thomas North’s *Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romanes* (1579). It is not surprising that by 1614 the pair would appear (though not in their historical depiction) as characters in a play about friendship by Shakespeare, *The Two Noble Kinsmen*.

The discourse of friendship was preoccupied by an emphasis on constancy and self-sacrifice. This provided the necessary counterpoint to contemporary laments over disappointments in friendship, especially the complaint that friends abandoned each other in adversity. But ideal rhetoric and theoretical models of paradigmatic pairs did not necessarily translate into personal conduct. As Lucian’s dialogue on friendship, *Toxaris*, suggests, the awe-inspiring models of perfect friendship that garnered much attention did not necessarily help to create the impetus for action among men:

> But when you should come to use it [friendship], you fall from your words, and taking wing, I know not how, shift your selves from the practice. And when you see such rare friendships presented on the stage in a Tragedy, you applaud, and clap hands; and when you see them mutually engaged in one anothers dangers, many of you shed teares: yet you your selves attempt nothing praise worthy for your friend.¹²

Lucian recognises that men can appreciate the benefits of constancy and self-sacrifice in friendship, yet fail to enact their friendships according to ideal principles. Appreciation does not necessarily equate with emulation. And this is the problem with any ideal.

Nevertheless, early modern playwrights drew from the dramatic capital that idealised pairs

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¹² Jasper Mayne, *Part of Lucian Made English From the Originalle* (London: Printed by H. Hall for R. Davis, 1638), sig. X3⁺

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provided for comedy and tragedy, just as Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles did long before them. Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare made good use of the ideal’s cultural currency. François de Belleforest may have provided the ‘basic story of a Prince of Denmark’ from a Scandinavian folktale by Saxo Grammaticus, but Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* bears some striking similarities to Euripides’ *Orestes*, even though the perfect friends who Shakespeare invokes in the play are not Orestes and Pylades, but Damon and Pythias. Shakespeare need only have Hamlet address Horatio as ‘O Damon dear’ (3.2.269), to conjure the notion of the closeness of the pair. But in a word, the reference to ‘Damon’ serves as more than mere compliment. The word takes on a serious connotation, that would not be missed by an early modern audience, for if Horatio is Damon, then it implicitly renders Hamlet as Pythias, the man condemned, and suggests that Horatio will be called upon to save him, just as Damon did Pythias. But Hamlet’s eventual death contravene the protective power promised by the ideal, as Horatio cannot save his friend. Thus Shakespeare adds another layer to the reality of true friendship: that disappointment need not only come from infidelity, but from the limitations of friendship’s potential in the face of external forces outside of its reach.

But invocation of ideal pairs also served as a tool for manipulation and subject of mockery. Damon and Pythias serve a comic turn in Ben Jonson’s *Bartholomew Faire* (1614). The pair are puppets, quite literally and figuratively, who are caught up in the immorality of Littlewit’s play world, their friendship’s ‘trial’ reduced to doggerel verse:

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‘Twixt Damon and Pythias here, friendship’s true trial / Though hourly they quarrel thus and roar each with other’(5.4.261-262). Dramatists also found that references to ideal friendship pairs served a strategic purpose to manipulate impression and feign sentiment. In Christopher Marlowe’s Tamburlaine, Part 1 (1587) invocation of Orestes and Pylades is meant to engender a sense of Tamburlaine’s loyalty beyond utility to Theridamus. Tamburlaine suggests that he will be as constant a friend to Theridamus as he is to his other, present friends: ‘And by the love of Pyllades and Orestes, / Whose statues we adore in Scythia, / Thy selfe and them shall never part from me (in 1.2.242-244). Appeals to Orestes and Pylades are a rhetorical device meant to convince Theridamus of fidelity; here it functions akin to swearing an oath of allegiance to friendship. Whether the archetypical pairs were referred to for purposes of rewarding or courting friendship, deriding the ideal or to underscore the need for constancy in friendship through recounting their grand and life-saving gestures of self-sacrifice, ideal friendship pairs were frequently invoked as examples of the power and triumph of true friendship. In the academic drama of Richard Edwards, John Foxe and Thomas Goffe, titles appeal to perfect friendship and evoke a sense of expectation of a celebration of its value. How do they in fact speak to this anticipation of the ideal?

II. John Foxe’s Titus et Gesippus

Historian John Foxe wrote Titus et Gesippus in 1544, just before he left his post at Oxford and wrote his popular Actes and Monuments. The play was meant to serve as a gift and a writing sample to demonstrate his competency for a teaching post to a Dr. Hensey of

Exeter and a Mr. Hedley.17 This is all that is known about the intended recipients and the occasion of the play. The play, a romantic comedy, was written in Latin, and was based on Continental narratives of the friendship of Titus and Gesippus available as early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Boccaccio (the *Decameron*) and Filippo Beroaldo, respectively.18 After Foxe’s play, the story of Titus and Gesippus continued to be treated as material for comedy in two later versions: Ralph Radcliffe’s *The Most Firme Friendship of Titus and Gisippus* (c.1546-1556), and *Titus and Gisippus* (1577), whose anonymous dramatist apparently thought it unnecessary to reinforce the emphasis on constancy adjectivally in the title.19 Both plays are lost.20

John Hazel Smith suggests that Foxe’s manuscript is ‘a very early draft’, although he suggests that the play may still have been performed, as was the custom with academic exercises, because of its closing address to the audience.21 Smith relates that the popularity of the tale itself rested in its mix of romance and morality and notes that the play is only ‘one step removed from the well-spring of all the sixteenth century versions of the Titus-Gesippus story,’ although my examination will suggest that that step and the changes it entails from its source narrative affect the representation of friendship significantly.22 Although the story of the pair, in its various retellings, generally appeals to the classical friendship tradition of Damon and Pythias and Orestes and Pylades, the tale seems a product of medieval romance more than of the classical friendship tradition.

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19 *Annals*, pp. 28-29, 46-47.
20 *Annals*, pp. 28-29, 46-47.
21 Hazel Smith, p. 8.
22 See Hazel Smith, p. 9.
Nevertheless, this did not stop the friendship of Titus and Gesippus from being held up as
on par with ideal classical models, as the quotations from *The Faerie Queene* bears out.

Foxe draws from Thomas Elyot’s extended narrative of Titus and Gesippus in *The Boke
Named the Governour*, which had at least seven printings from 1531 to 1580, as well as
from Boccaccio’s ‘Tenth Day, Eighth Story’.23 The latter source was retold in William
Walter’s rime royal translation *The Hystory of Tytus & Gesyppus* as early as 1525, but
prior to this in Italian, German and French translations of the *Decameron*.24 And Smith’s
detailing of the correspondence between the versions by Boccaccio, Elyot and Foxe is
useful for these purposes, as it helps to further an understanding of Foxe’s own choices in
terms of the representation of friendship. Even so, curiously, in all three, there are two
relatively overlooked, troubling aspects of the tale of ideal friends when it comes to the
representation of *amicitia perfecta*. The flaws rest in the contravention of virtue and
equality, two requisite tenets of perfect, classical friendship.

Classical thought on virtue in friendship contend that friends should further ethical
behaviour in each other, rather than uphold the other’s vice. Cicero tells his son in *De
officiis*: ‘a good man, for his frendes sake, nother will do against ye commonweale nother
against his othe, & promes’.25 Plutarch voices a similar concern, arguing that one friend
should not undertake for another anything that is ‘againste the common welth, or else
against his othe or fidelitee. For the offence is not excusable, to say, thou dyddest it for thy

24 Florio’s translation of the *Decameron* was not available in English until 1620. Hazel Smith contends the
Walter translation is a translation of Beroaldo rather than Boccaccio. The title page from the EEBO text is
missing and cannot be found in the British Library catalogue. In the EEBO text the publication details on the
final page do not credit either author, however, the EEBO citation credits Boccaccio as author. I have treated
the work as a translation of Boccaccio, as William Walter was known for translating the author, again in
1532: *Guystarde & Sygysmonde*. Even though Beroaldo, an Italian humanist, was known for translations of
Cicero, Plato and Pythagoras. Tales from the *Decameron* were available in ‘numerous printings’ in Italian.
Nicholas Grimalde (London: Richard Tottel, 1556), sig. P4v.
frendes sake’.26 Aristotle, for his part, claims that friends ‘become the better one by another’.27 But in all three configurations of the Titus and Gesippus story, Gesippus’ relinquishing of Sempronia to Titus involves deceit and the breaking of an oath to marry her. An early modern reader accustomed to espousals and betrothals as verba de futuro contracts would understand that the breaking of such a contract would be considered a serious matter.28 This seriousness is registered in Boccaccio and Foxe. In Boccaccio, Gesippus’ kinsmen find ‘he deserved for his false trayne / In depe pryson to suffre punysshement’, whilst similarly in Foxe, Chremes refers to the subterfuge as ‘wickedness’ and deems his slave, Syrus, ‘a criminal’ for not informing him of it sooner. (2.7).29 In neither source is the friend assisting the other in terms of virtue; and further, by deceiving betrothed, parents, and kin, one could argue that they are furthering vice, as their friendship becomes what Cicero distinguished as ‘conspiracie’ and ‘not amitie’.30

Deception equally plays a role in other tales of perfect friends who claim to be the other in order to spare their friend’s life. These actions, however, are only employed in a life and death situation when one of the pair is about to be unjustly killed; they are not frivolously undertaken merely to please a friend and ease his lovesickness, as is the case in one instance in Titus et Gesippus. In this way the narrative of Titus and Gesippus tests the ideal, and renders virtue negotiable. Plutarch notes that the only exception wherein

29 Giovanni Boccaccio, Hystory of Tytus & Gesyppus trans. by Wylyam Walter (n. pub: 1525), sig. B2’ (Here Sempronia is known as Sophrone); John Foxe, Titus et Gesippus in Two Latin Comedies By John Foxe the Martyrologist: Titus et Gesippus; Christus Triumphans ed. and trans. by John Hazel Smith (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 51-197. There are no line numbers for the English text, only for the Latin. Citations are by act and scene division. All future entries will refer to this edition.
30 Cicero, Bokes of Duties to Marcus His Sonne, sig. P5v.
breaking one’s oath is acceptable is when a friend ‘standeth in jeopardy, either of his lyfe or of his good renoume’. Jonathan is willing to betray his father, family and wealth, to save the life of David. Pylades claims to be Orestes to save his friend from an unjust death sentence. Likewise, Pythias remains as the bond for Damon who is to be put to death by the tyrant Dionysus. Near the end of Boccaccio, Elyot and Foxe, Titus claims he is guilty of a crime to spare the innocent Gesippus. His action, like those of Jonathan and Pylades, is justifiable under Plutarch’s imperative, as they meet the necessary criteria: impending jeopardy of death. When measured against this standard, the trick in switching Titus for Gesippus in the early part of the play, thus deceiving the bride, family and kinsmen falls far short. Gesippus’ avowed justification for his action: (‘Anyone who professes to be a friend in good times should prove that he is one in difficult times as well’) (1.9), is misguided, and points up a common misunderstanding of the classical laws of friendship, and a common concern of early modern authorities. This idea was examined in Chapter 1 in relation to Cicero’s discussion in De amicitia of ‘howe farre Love ought to stretche in Freendshippe’.

Titus et Gesippus is a comedy, and this casts the deception of Sempronia and her family, through the use of the bed-trick, in a more playful light, diminishing its dishonourable quality to some extent. The bed-trick was not unusual to ‘set up’ or resolve a problem, as Marliss C. Desens relates. As such, it serves a useful purpose in this instance. But Desens also argues that it was ‘more than an arbitrary plot device’. In the versions by Boccaccio and Elyot she sees it being used ‘to assert the superiority of male

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32 This second-century representation is seen in Lucian’s Amores, ‘The History of Orestes and Pylades’.
35 Desens, p. 16
friendship over the relationship of husband and wife’. And this holds for Foxe’s play as well, as female agency is muted and denied, even though Foxe tries to reduce this effect through Sempronia’s encouraging reaction, which is a departure from Boccaccio, who depicts the wife as upset, and from Elyot, who does not address her view on the switch at all. In Foxe’s version Sempronia contends that she actually is ‘more favourably disposed’ towards Titus (3.8).

One further way in which Foxe revises his source narrative is in the treatment of Chremes, Gesippus’ father. Foxe’s play is the only version where Gesippus’ deceit occurs while Chremes is still alive. This is significant, because the use of the bed-trick while Chremes is alive suggests that all other relationships must be subordinated to friendship, even that of fathers and sons. While ideal friendship frequently was portrayed as superior to the love of women, family and kin, as in The Faerie Queene and in the Morgan and Rooke Court of Chivalry Case adduced in Chapter 1, here it is anything but celebratory because it creates a fissure in two families over something trivial, a friend’s purported lovesickness. Through this Foxe questions the very nature of obligation in friendship, as Gesippus understands that fidelity in friendship requires not only deception but dishonour, even when it involves indulging a friend in something as frivolous as his heterosexual desire. Here obligation to friendship assumes greater importance, above all other duties: to one’s word, family and kin. By introducing a woman, Foxe’s generic experiment highlights the extent to which blinding male friendship can lead men astray, an experiment that was replicated and reworked in later drama and prose.

Desens argues that the bed-trick in Elyot’s narrative of Titus and Gesippus stands out as a ‘radical’ departure from the ‘well-ordered society’ that is so much a part of the

36 Desens, p. 25.
37 Detailed plot correspondences in Hazel Smith, p. 15.
38 See for instance John Lyly’s Euphues (1578) and John Fletcher’s Monsieur Thomas (c. 1610-1616).
Governour, and as a ‘social disruption’ caused by the subversion of the father’s right to choose his daughter’s husband. But it is also a serious digression from the ideal friendship that Foxe asserts through the play’s titular appeals to perfect friends. The duplicity of the friends subverts the impact of the climactic ending, which echoes the sacrifice classical pairs such as Damon and Pythias were willing to make. Further, it highlights the dissociation between the idealised discourse of classical friendship evoked through appeals to similitude, constancy and sacrifice and the action of the play. In doing so, it mirrors the problematic nature of rhetorical assertions of perfect friendship when viewed in relation to its subsequent performance. While Titus and Gesippus are given equal stature with such exemplars as Damon and Pythias, their friendship fails to meet the criteria for inclusion. In Boccaccio, Elyot and Foxe it falls short of the requisite virtue, as the friends do not promote each other’s moral goodness. And in Foxe, the subversion throughout most of the play prior to the ending debases the ideal, as obligation in friendship becomes a destructive force, shattering long term familial ties and binding oaths, actually leading friends away from the path of virtue. ‘Bring this off if you can manage it somehow’ (1.9), says Gesippus, after learning of Phormio’s plan to substitute Titus for him. The deceptive action renders Titus and Gesippus (with Phormio joining them in an unholy triumvirate in Foxe) Ciceronean conspirators, as they unite to betray several innocent people because of lovesickness.

Foxe attempts to ameliorate this sense and promote the selflessness of Gesippus’ act through less than convincing appeals to the acute nature of Titus’ suffering. As Robert Burton would later explain in the Anatomy of Melancholy, love’s melancholy was not

39 Desens, p. 25.
without its symptoms of ‘body or minde’. And the lovesickness exhibited by Titus does reflect a similar symptomatology to that which Burton describes: ‘palenessse, leanenessse, drinessse’. Even so, despite Burton’s observation that the disorder ‘is so irresistable [sic] and violent a passion’, and ‘controverted by some, whether Love-Melancholy may bee cured’, he concedes that it is not life-threatening: ‘if it bee taken in time it may be helped, & by many good remedies amended’. Both Boccaccio and Elyot highlight the point that Titus’ love sickness is an ‘extremyte’ which warrants desperate measures, thus lessening to some extent the moral responsibility to be honest and keep one’s oath and guide a friend to right action. In Elyot, Titus’ somatic presentation is underscored, ‘the wanne and pale colore’ and ‘chekes meygre and leane’. In Boccaccio, Gesippus sees his act in giving up Sempronia as actually life-saving. But in Foxe, significantly, it is Phormio’s exploitation of Gesippus’ expected constancy in friendship which leads to this understanding. In an attempt to manipulate Gesippus into demonstrating loyalty and relinquishing Sempronia to his master, Phormio likens Titus’ lovesickness to ‘a disease’ which is ‘incurable’, employing emotive adjectives and verbs like ‘torturing’, ‘wretched’ and ‘resurrect’ to convey a sense of desperation (1.9). Given Phormio’s intent, his testimony about Titus appears not only exaggerated, but also less trustworthy, especially in light of his recognition that Gesippus obeys the laws of friendship:

My first snare must be set for Gesippus. He’s always been a great friend of my master, as friendly as anyone—he hasn’t loved his own life more. If he learned

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43 Elyot, Governour, sig. Q7v.
44 Boccaccio, sigs.A4v, A5v, A5v.
that my master is dying and that he could easily help him at the trifling cost of one
girl, he wouldn’t let him die, I’m sure of that (1.5).

Phormio underscores that friendship is a useful commodity, and acknowledges that
sacrifice and constancy in friendship requires the friend to believe his act is life-saving, in
keeping with stories of idealised pairs. Without this imperative, Phormio does not see
Gesippus relinquishing Sempronia.

Titus’ hyperbolic lover’s lament ‘I want to die [emphasis mine]’ uttered in 1.1, does
nothing to contribute to the sense of impending death, but rather suggests his demise is a
choice rather than a physiological certainty. It contributes to the overall sense of the
manipulability of friendship, as Titus, rather than going directly to Gesippus to ask for help, employs the aid of the cunning Phormio. Phormio, as John Hazel Smith notes, is
among the most important of Foxe’s additions to his sources, injecting Terentian comedy
into the world of generic romance. His addition is critical to the understanding of how friendship is adduced in the play, for Phormio’s plotting underscores how outsiders may view the malleability of others’ exclusive friendships and how despite rhetorical appeals to perfection, external forces are able to intrude and influence. His action as intermediary between friends calls to mind Pandarus. Except here, Phormio brokers a deal between the friends which allows Titus to remain one step removed from the deception of Gesippus.

Even so, Phormio’s presence and culpability in the scheming does not negate the fact that it is Titus, the purported friend of Gesippus, who sets in motion the exploitation of friendship. Titus tells Phormio: ‘Kill me with your sword and deliver me from my miseries’ (1.1). And after a quick retort from Phormio, Titus qualifies his statement with ‘or’, as if to suggest he really has something else in mind: ‘Or, if you can devise

45 Hazel Smith, p. 19.
something else, some other remedy—[emphasis mine]’(1.1). This supports the notion that Titus’ request to die was nothing more than empty dramatic hyperbole aimed at achieving his own ends. This is a significant departure from Elyot, for in Elyot when Titus requests punishment it is because he has betrayed friendship, not as in Foxe, because he is unable to marry Sempronia. And despite John Hazel Smith’s contention that Titus does not know what Phormio is doing on his behalf, as ‘the help he specifies is for Phormio to kill him or arrange a postponement of Gesippus’s wedding so that Titus can leave town’, Titus’ hasty comeback, ‘Or’, suggests that if he doesn’t have anything himself in mind, he is clearly open to suggestions from the cunning Phormio.46 These actions are important, as they set in motion the debasing of constancy and sacrifice in friendship.

Despite the fact that Gesippus appears persuaded by Phormio’s diagnosis, telling him, ‘If he [Titus] is so smitten with love that he must die without her, I am not such a scoundrel, Phormio, that I would ever allow his safety to be locked up in a prison of my joys’ (1.9), the play does not register a sense that Titus’ death is imminent (in part because this is a comedy). Hence, Gesippus cannot be excused for having been tricked by Phormio, especially as his evaluation of the situation is coloured by his need to perform the grand gesture in friendship to prove his constancy. He has ample opportunity to see Titus and judge his condition for himself. Titus is not bedridden when he encounters him, and Gesippus does not comment on his friend’s physical debility brought on by lovesickness. In fact, evidence to the contrary is present, not only in the rapidity of Titus’ recovery in time to consummate the marriage, but also in the exuberance he demonstrates. Nevertheless, Gesippus is blinded by obligation in friendship and the opportunity that the situation presents to demonstrate loyalty. He declares to Phormio: ‘Anyone who professes

46 Hazel Smith, p. 21.
to be a friend in good times should prove that he is one in difficult times as well’ (1.9).

But this ‘difficult’ time is not akin to that which engendered the sacrificial response from Pylades or Damon, and is a naïve interpretation of the commonplace ‘A true friend is best perceived when a doubtfull matter is tryed’.47

In all three versions of the narrative there are implicit attempts to justify the deception, heightening its ethical quality. Elyot makes the loftiest argument for the morality inherent in the deception and sacrifice, as Gesippus claims that it was God’s will that Sempronia should marry Titus. In this way, Gesippus is beyond reproach, acting as an agent of God: ‘Am I of that vertue, that I maye resist against celestiall influence, preordinate by providence divine?’ he asks, adding, ‘she was by him from the beginning prepared to be your Lady & wife’.48 But in Foxe, the appeal is to the idea of similitude in friendship. In a soliloquy Gesippus suggests that it makes no difference whether he or Titus marries Sempronia, embracing a ‘one soul in two bodies’ view of their friendship:

Really it’s nothing more than if she had married me, for Titus and I have an absolutely joint account. Thus I long for his good fortune and promote that entirely. If anything were good for him, I take it to be good for me, as if he were Gesippus and I Titus. For I take it as my [emphasis mine] rule for those who wish to be friends and not just be called friends, that each should bear each other’s mind, not his own, and each should live in the other’s body not less than in his own (2.1).

The key here is that it is Gesippus’ rule and not Titus’ and this is unique to Foxe’s representation. There is little consideration given to Gesippus’ mind by Titus. Gesippus, reflecting on his father’s reaction after the deception which allows Titus to marry

48 Elyot, Governour, sigs. Q5v, Q6v.
Sempronia, reflects: ‘When he learns of it, oh, what remedy I will find for his rage?’ (2.5).

If Titus and Gesippus were truly of ‘one harte and minde’ then Titus surely would consider
the cost of his friend’s sacrifice in terms of either Sempronia or Chremes, or both. In Elyot he not only does that, but also, declines the offer of Sempronia. Elyot writes, he ‘refused the benefite that hee offred, saying: that it were better, that a hundred suche unkynde wretches as he was should persyhe, than so noble a man, as was Gisippus, should susteyne reproche or domage’. Likewise, in Boccaccio, Gesippus’s demonstration of friendship, ‘made [Titus] hym have shame of his grete usurpinge’ and as such, he also is unwilling to accept Gesippus’s sacrifice in relinquishing Sempronia:

Gesyppus thy grete liberalyte
Is openly to me now manyfest
Whiche on my parte sholde be shewed to the
But I shall not obey to thy request
To take thy wyfe the dede were unhonest

However, not only does Foxe’s Titus disregard the sacrifice and the effect it will have on Gesippus, but also, he never attempts, even half-heartedly, to protest Gesippus’ beneficence. In fact, rather than a grateful lamentation for the grief he has caused his friend, Titus sings of his gratitude when he learns that Gesippus has relinquished Sempronia to him:

TITUS [singing] Oh happy day of shining joy,
Owed of a fortune-favored boy
A thousand thanks, a thousand gems,
A thousand white-stoned diadems!

51 Boccaccio, sig. A5v.
Away all sorrows, far away,
Farewell to cares this glorious day.
Io triumph, with delight I find
Restored my blissful peace of mind.

Oh life-renewing day, I cast
Aside my robe of woes at last
And joy to live eternity
At peace with all divinity (2.2).

John Hazel Smith suggests that this is one of the details that Foxe includes ‘that make Titus appear insensitive’, but it goes further than that.\(^{52}\) Even though Titus does not know that Gesippus is watching, the reaction is not one of a true friend, for ‘where true friends are knit in love, there sorrowes are shared equally’.\(^{53}\) After the song celebrating the consummation, Titus adds, ‘What man beneath the sun has ever lived to whom a greater triumph can be given than mine today? [emphasis mine]’(2.2). Even in the sixteenth century, the word ‘triumph’ suggested ‘victory, conquest, or the glory of this’,\(^{54}\) so this is a curious choice of words, which cannot be accounted for by a translation discrepancy, as in the original Latin, Titus proclaims: “O dies festus” quin canimus triumphum, Phormio’ (2.2.1).\(^{55}\) One might ask, over whom exactly has he triumphed? His friend, Gesippus? Although Titus acknowledges his debt to Gesippus, Titus is clearly celebrating, singing a song of rejoicing and in no way is suggesting that he views this victory as pyrrhic; his friend loses, as he wins. This is contrary to the classical view of the friend as the ‘other self’, as well as the representation in Boccaccio and Elyot, where Titus bemoans his friend’s loss rather than rejoices at his own gain.

\(^{52}\) Hazel Smith, p. 21.
\(^{53}\) Ling, Politeuphia, p. 63.
\(^{55}\) Line numbers given for Latin only, p. 100.
Foxe’s placing of Titus’ song of self-interest immediately after Gesippus’ soliloquy that asserts a ‘one soul in two bodies’ view of their friendship not only ‘adversely affects’ an audience’s view of Titus, as Hazel Smith suggests, but further underscores the asymmetrical nature of this friendship. This is an interesting idea in its own right in a play whose title suggests perfect friendship, but which is composed by Foxe to engender *ex gratia* help in securing a teaching post from Dr. Hensey of Exeter and Mr. Hedley.\(^56\) In this way, the friendship of Titus and Gesippus does not speak to similitude in the way that Cicero meant when he characterised friendship as ‘a most perfect agreement of wills, desires, & opinions’, but rather does so in terms of appearance only, looking as much alike as (nearly) twins.\(^57\) This is not exclusive to Foxe. Laurie Shannon has argued that ‘the scope of *summa consensio*’ pushes ‘beyond its classical definition’ in other Renaissance texts, including Elyot’s *Governour*.\(^58\) In Foxe it is used to accommodate the problem of the plot and the bed-trick. Here, similitude is employed in a similar manner that Shannon found in Elyot’s treatment of Orestes and Pylades and Titus and Gesippus, where ‘likeness has been literalised as a wonder-generating physical fact’.\(^59\) The emphasis is not on ‘one soul’, but rather a similarity in the friends’ taste in women and their physical features.

Foxe’s play also registers an understanding of the link between beneficence and gratitude in friendship, as seen in Seneca’s *De beneficiis*, and in its early modern figuring in Elyot’s *Governour*. In Chapter XIII of *The Governour* Elyot associates friendship with ingratitude:

\(^56\) Hazel Smith, p. 21. In a letter to Hedley, the play is referred to as ‘a little comic gift’. There are no further details of a patronage request. In Smith, p. 7.

\(^57\) *The Booke of Freendeshipe* Newton, sig. A7v; See Hazel Smith, ‘Correspondences’ in ‘Introduction’, p. 15.


\(^59\) Shannon, p. 43.
This I truste shal suffise, for the expressynge of that incomparable treasure, called amytie: in the declaration wherof I have aboden the longer, to the intente to perswade the reders, to enserche therfore vigilantly, and beinge so happy to fynde it, according to the sayde description, to embrace and honour it, abhorrynge above all thynges ingrattydude, whiche pestylence hath longe tyme raygned amongst us, augmented by detraction, a corrupte and lothly syckenesse, wherof I wyll trayte in the laste parte of this warke, that men of good nature espienge it, nede not (if they list) be therwith deceyved.60

Amity is a ‘treasure’, but ingratitude devalues it. And Gesippus is represented in line with this view, denouncing Titus’ ingratitude. His sense of obligation to Titus is driven by his own need to avoid the appearance of ingratitude in friendship. After Phormio tells him of Titus’ lovesickness, Gesippus replies, ‘non sum tam ingratus, Phormio, Vt vnquam illius patiar salute in meis claudier voluptabius. Habeat’ (1.9.42-44).61 His avowed unwillingness to allow Titus to suffer because of his joy is strongly grounded in his appreciation for their friendship and the obligation that this requires, an obligation that Gesippus sees Titus as lacking when he does not recognise his friend. Elyot speaks to this point in the narrative and asserts that Gesippus’ despair is the result of Titus’ ungratefulness in friendship:

But moste of all accusynge the ingratitude of Titus, for whom he sufferd all that mysery: the remembraunce wherof was so intollerable, that he determined no lenger [sic] to lyve in that anguyshe and dolour.62

60 Elyot, Governour, sigs. U3v-U4r.
61 Smith translates this as ‘I am not such a scoundrel, Phormio, that I would ever allow his safety to be locked up in a prison of my joys’ (1.9 p. 95). However, the sense of ‘ingratus’ here is more in keeping with this idea of ‘unthankful’, which is the way I translate it here. See ‘Ingratus’ in Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 94; Although the text reads ‘unquam’, umquam is the sense ‘at any time’, that fits the understanding here.
62 Elyot, Governour, sig.,T2r.
In Foxe, Gesippus’ willingness to admit guilt for a crime he did not commit responds to a similar despondency. He identifies the cause of his situation, telling Fulvius, ‘I was gracious to an ungrateful man’ (4.3) and responds to Fulvius’ question if he had a ‘friend here?’ with ‘I thought I did’ (4.3). Titus’ ingratitude has rendered him no longer a friend in Gesippus’ eyes. Gesippus may have been the epitome of the Senecan disinterested giver when he relinquished Sempronia, but his understanding of the obligatory nature of his beneficence is that it requires future reciprocation. Foxe strikes a similar note to Seneca, also reiterated in Elyot:

The most damnable vice, and moste against justice, in myn opinion, is Ingratitude, commonly called unkindnesse. All be it, it is in divers formes, and of sondry importaunce, as it is discrybed by Seneca in this fourme. He is unkynde whiche denyeth to haue receyved any benefite, that in dede he hath receyved, He is unkynde, that dissimuleth, he is unkynde, that recompenseth not: But he is moste unkynde, that forgetteth.  

While Titus has previously recognised the importance of gratitude, he has done so only with the empty and exaggerated rhetoric necessary to ensure that he appear grateful to his friend. He deems Gesippus’ act of relinquishing Sempronia ‘beneficio maximo’ (2.2.25), to be a very great benefit, and lauds him for his generosity, saying ‘Oh what I owe you for these favors if not to deliver myself utterly into your hands as a perpetual slave to your every command’ (2.2). Despite the hyperbole, the indication is that he understands that reciprocation is required. But in the time that has passed since his return to Athens, Gesippus believes that Titus has forgotten his beneficence, and, importantly, their

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63 Elyot, Governour, sig T6v.
64 Ullrich Langer remarking on Boccaccio’s narrative suggests that the friendship of Titus and Gesippus is demonstrated by beneficia in Perfect friendship: Studies in Literature and Moral Philosophy from Boccaccio to Corneille (Geneva: Droz, 1994), p. 46.
friendship. Moreover, he has not reciprocated the benefit received. But his lament in 3.9 after Titus does not recognise him alters the sense one gets of his giving in the first instance, as the once disinterested giver, Gesippus suggests that *quid pro quo* is an expected part of friendship. He strikes a similar note to Braithwaite and Dorke, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in a soliloquy that inveighs against the ‘times’ and the disloyalty of friends. Gesippus says:

> Is this the way you repay your friends for favors, Titus, to refer to them as meddlers when you’re ashamed to acknowledge them? Oh the customs, oh the times, what is this perfidy of men? And didn’t I foresee that it would be so? When men are in need themselves, nothing is more sweet-natured than they; later, when they are puffed up by fortune, they know no one. Oh ingratitude! Is there no trustworthiness in human behaviour? (3.9)

Gesippus implicitly registers an understanding of the failure of the performance of friendship to engender a similar affective feeling, but moreover, he questions the type of friendship he shared with Titus in the first place. What this soliloquy suggests is that the friendship was ‘temporarie’ in Senecan terms, because for Titus it was a friendship of utility.65 As opposed to the ideal, it is rather, what Seneca calls ‘the other’, which is not friendship, but rather, ‘traffique’, an exchange of goods, ‘which onely regardest profit, and that makest account of that which may yeelde thee commoditie’.66 But Gesippus’ need for demonstrated recompense and his denunciation of his friendship only adds weight to the critique of non-idealised friendship. The ideal expressed by Epicurus eschews suspicion over intent or motivation for friendship: ‘‘Distrust is wholly inconsistent with Friendship’

66 ‘Traffic’ def. 2a, *OED.*
he says.\footnote{Epicurus, \textit{Epicurus’s Morals} trans. by Walter Charleton (London: Printed by W. Wilson for Henry Herringman, 1656), IV, p. 180, sig. Aa2 v.}{67} And this is upheld in perfect friendship narratives like Damon and Pythias, as Pythias has complete faith that Damon will return to accept his punishment, rather than leave him to suffer on his account. Pythias makes excuses for his friend’s late return in the face of Dionysius’ goading that his friend has abandoned him, whereas in Foxe’s play, Gesippus’ soliloquy is accusatory and questions Titus’ motivations and friendship.

According to Elyot, those ‘in whom frenshyp is most frequente,’ also ‘therto be most aptely disposed’ and are ‘specially they, whiche be wyse, and of nature inclyned to Beneficence, Liberalitie, and Constance’.\footnote{Elyot, \textit{Governour}, sig R6v.}{68} Foxe’s Gesippus is not so ‘aptly disposed’ even though he exhibits beneficence, liberality and to a certain extent, constancy (albeit not wisdom) because he condemns his friend and disavows their friendship for a lack of gratitude and reciprocation. But just as Foxe suggests ingratitude’s ability to destroy friendship, he allows Titus a sudden conversion into the friend Gesippus thought he was at the beginning. Titus is given his dramatic Pylades’ moment in 5.2, and in his reciprocation for Gesippus’ earlier beneficence, Titus upholds the Senecan idea that the return of a benefit is better late than never: ‘he that rendereth not one good turne for an other, offendeth more than he that dooth it not speedily’.\footnote{Lucius Annaeus Seneca, \textit{The Woorke of the Excellent Philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca Concerning Benefityng That Is Too Say the Dooning, Receyvynge, and Reqyting of Good Turnes} trans. by Arthur Golding (London: By [John Kingston for] John Day, 1578), sig. *2r. (The pagination begins A1 with the text itself), sig. A2v, * is the way the page is paginated. Hereafter: \textit{De beneficcis}, Golding.}{69} The scene is an Aristotelian anagnoristic happy ending, where recognition quite literally and figuratively occurs. Titus finally ‘recognises’ his friend visually, moving from ‘ignorance to knowledge’ and ‘producing friendship’.\footnote{Components of anagnorisis in Terence Cave, \textit{Recognitions: A Study in Poetic} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990; rpt from 1988 Clarendon edn.), p. 33. See also pp. 48, 53 for recognition in comedy.}{70} This punctuates the play with a nod to the personal and public benefits and healing powers of perfect friendship, for in Damon and Pythias fashion, Titus
and Gesippus’ final heroic acts of friendship prompts Martius, ‘the Roman cut-throat’, to confess and change his ways. ‘Because of the great friendship of these two I am so moved to pity’ (5.5), he declares. In the end Foxe’s play registers a similar understanding as perfect friendship narratives, that it is in the self-sacrificial act that true friends are revealed. Despite the play’s frequent departure from the Aristotelian, Ciceronean and Senecan tenets of perfect friendship, the ending reasserts the period’s preoccupation with the grand life-saving gesture through a scene depicting the touchstone of classical friendship: the test of constancy in adversity.

III. Richard Edwards’ *Damon and Pythias*

The date that the Oxford educated Richard Edwards wrote *The Excellent Comedie of two the moste faithfullest Freendes, Damon and Pithias* is unknown.71 The play was written for the Children of the Chapel. Recent scholarship dates its most likely first performance at Whitehall at Christmas 1564-1565 by the Children of the Chapel, with subsequent performances possibly at Lincoln’s Inn in 1565 and at Oxford during a royal visit in 1568.72 Edwards held the post of Master of the Chapel from 1561-1566. The play was first published in 1571. It is the only extant example of Edwards’ dramatic treatment of friendship; his *Palamon and Arcyte*, a reworking of Chaucer’s ‘The Knight’s Tale’ performed in 1566 for a royal visit to Oxford, is lost. Harbage and Schoenbaum list the play as the first of two whose titles appeal to the idealised pair. The second, *Damon and

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99
*Pithias* (1600), now lost, was written by Henry Chettle and was performed under the auspices of the Admiral’s Men.73

Edwards’ *Damon and Pithias* closely adheres to Ciceronean convention in its representation of the classical ideal. The pedagogy that pervades the work is reminiscent of the humanist grammar school curriculum and the teaching methods employed for imitation and retention, which would not have been lost on its young performers. With classical sententiae on friendship from Cicero, infused with Aristotelian wisdom, as mediated by Erasmus’ *Adagia*, the work might easily be dismissed as a pedagogical exercise in *De educatione puerorum*.74 In his essay, ‘Cicero on Stage: *Damon and Pithias* and the Fate of Classical Friendship in English Renaissance Drama’, Robert Stretter characterises the play as follows:

> In *Damon and Pithias*, Edwards creates a world that functions according to the proverbs of the friendship tradition. Characters and situations exist to test and ultimately to validate the adages that Edwards gleans primarily from Cicero’s *De amicitia* and *De officiis*.75

Edwards’ dramatisation also negotiates with some of those ideas, however, and this will become important later in this section when the ending of the play is discussed. Stretter’s description of the play is correct to a certain extent in that the play is peppered with classical proverbial wisdom in Latin, but we should be careful not to dismiss it as simply an attempt to ‘dramatize an ethical treatise’,76 or view it as an exercise merely to counsel the Queen against flatters. There is more to the play than the validation of Ciceronean

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73 Annals, pp. 76-77.
74 For a discussion of Edwards’ use of proverbs and Erasmus’ *Adagia*, see Stretter, p. 353. *De educatione puerorum* is a work on ‘the education or bringing up of children’ from Plutarch translated by Thomas Elyot (London: Thomas Berthelet, 1532?).
75 Stretter, p. 352.
76 Quote from Stretter, p. 358.
ideals of friendship by Damon and Pythias. The play speaks to issues in the translation of classical works that humanist writers on friendship had no control over: interpretation and application by individual readers. Some might follow a work’s governing principles to the letter, while others might invoke some aspects of it selectively to suit their own purposes. Through the use of proverbs in the mouths of true and false friends, Edwards suggests that sententiae are only words requiring the correct mind and virtue to put them into practice if they are to be considered truly ideal, as Aristotle and Seneca had claimed.

In *Titus and Gesippus*, Foxe touches on the idea that close, private friendship can destroy familial bonds, as well as have positive societal implications, including the reformation of criminal behaviour. Edwards follows suit, in effect, creating a dramatic example of precisely the problem Cushman’s sermon outlining the death at the Plymouth colony raises (as discussed in Chapter 1). Edwards’ play interrogates the importance of private friendship’s public resonance through a series of oppositions: true friends and false friends, self-love and love of others, self-indulgence and self-sacrifice, and tyranny and justice, arriving finally at the root of the problem at Dionysius’ Court, namely, that enmity rather than friendship prevails.

Edwards juxtaposes the world of Aristippus, Carisophus and Dionysius with that of Damon and Pythias and figures friendship as two extremes: either instrumental or perfect. Aristippus, Carisophus, Damon and Pythias are all well-versed in perfect friendship’s tenets, but despite Carisophus’ ability to recount its laws and to ask rhetorically, ‘Is there no perfect friendship but where is virtue and honesty? (1.14.46), he is unable to apply its principles because he lacks virtue. He and Aristippus serve as examples of the problem of application when it comes to those whom Aristotle thought incapable of perfect friendship, namely, less than ‘good men’. They are men in whose hands the laws of friendship can be
distorted and manipulated, as they embody the self-indulgence and self-centeredness that are anathema to the ideal.

Edwards explores this issue of goodness against the backdrop of Court politics where Dionysius rules with a beneficent iron glove, bestowing liberally on dissembling courtiers and fawning flatterers. The philosopher turned courtier, Aristippus, says he has enjoyed the King’s favour in material terms and suggests that he has learned from classical precedent (and has advised Dionysius) that ‘the King’s praise stands chiefly in bountifulness’ (1.9.10, 12). \[77\] But the type of bounty at Dionysius’ Court is devoid of the morality suggested by Seneca, who argues that, ‘bounty must be accompanied with love and charitie’, \[78\] for the King’s beneficence rests not on affection, but rather on the expectation of obligation, reciprocity and reward. Aristippus counsels Dionysius on the usefulness of beneficence, in much the same way that Seneca counselled the young Nero, suggesting that it is the way to engender favour and loyalty. \[79\] This relational model of friendship between beneficent monarch and loyal subject is similar to the symbolic display of *philia* scripted for the festivities surrounding Elizabeth’s coronation and her speech to Parliament (see Chapter 1). The difference lies in the fact that despite the reciprocation and obligation that were engendered in the pageants and the speech, *philia* and *caritas* were proposed. The model at Dionysius’ Court however, is solely instrumental, and devoid of requisite feeling.

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78 This is a note by Lodge in the margin in Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *De beneficiis* trans. by Thomas Lodge, rpt. of 1612 edn. by Israel Gollancz (London: J.M. Dent, 1899), p. 44. From this point forward the reference will be *De beneficiis*, Lodge.

79 In *De Clementia* Seneca reminds Nero that beneficence and justice are necessary qualities of a prince or king in C. J. Rowe, Malcolm Schofield, Simon Harrison, Melissa S. Lane, *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 410.
The value of friendship is espoused in philosophical tracts, but at the Court its worth lies in material reward. Aristippus, the philosopher, best understands the inability to enact principles of moral ethics at the Court in the absence of virtue, and turns to ‘Courtly philosophy’ (1.19). He and Carisophus are caricatures of fawning flatterers, the embodiment of the men Seneca speaks against, who are not friends of kings, but rather are numbered as such only because they flatter, rather than counseling honestly and wisely. Seneca tells us that he ‘knowest not the value of friendship’, for he ‘understandest not, that thou shalt give him very much to whom thou givest a friend’ because a friend will offer good counsel.80

But equally, the monarch must also come to understand the value of friendship, as Edwards attempts to point out in his play’s oblique counsel to Elizabeth (despite his protestation in the prologue that ‘we talk of Dionysius’ court, we mean no court but that’) (40). As such, he represents Dionysius’ Court as exemplar of what can happen in the absence of amicable relations, when a ruler is surrounded only by men like Aristippus and Carisophus who foster fear and distrust, feeding the more ‘brutish’ side of the monarch’s nature. Edward’s treatment of this idea is demonstrative of Plutarch’s admonition:

Now one of the meanes to beware of this flatterie, is to know and remember alwaies, that our soule consisteth of two parts, whereof the one is addicted to the truth, loving honestie and reason; the other more brutish, of the owne nature unreasonable, given to untruth and withall passionate. A true friend assisteth evermore the better part, in giving counsell and comfort, even as an expert and skilfull Physition, who hath an eie that aimeth alwaies at the maintenance and encrease of health: but the flatterer doth apply himselfe, and settleth to that part which is voide of reason and full of passions: this he scratcheth, this he tickleth

80De beneficiis, Lodge, pp. 262-263.
continually, this he stroketh and handleth in such sort, by devising some vicious and dishonest pleasures, that he withdraweth and turneth it away quite from the rule and guidance of reason.  

Dionysius is ‘voide of reason and full of passions’, so much so that he is mistrustful and believes that ‘fear and terror defends kings only’ (1.10.219). The unfounded accusation that Damon is a spy feeds his suspicion and as such, only Damon’s death will quell that feeling: ‘Till he be gone whom I suspect, how shall I live quietly / Whose memory with chilling horror fills my breast day and night violently?’ (1.10.220-221). This reaction seems out of proportion to the threat Damon actually poses, but Dionysius’s brutish side has been nurtured by Carisophus, and, without a trusty friend to appeal to his better nature, he seems destined to tyrannical rule. So much so, that he cannot comprehend Eubulus’ talk of ‘merciful justice’ (1.10. 214). Duty-bound to offer wise counsel, (perhaps as Edwards sees himself), Eubulus points out the folly and injustice inherent in seeking Damon’s death, telling Dionysius: ‘He only viewed your city, and will you for that make him away?’(1.10.158), but to no avail, the king is not moved.

Juxtaposed with a world where friendship is ‘spoke’ but not ‘meant’ (1.1.124), where self-indulgence, self-love and tyranny reign supreme and the public fallout from the absence of amity between King and subject is keenly felt, is the private world of true and selfless friendship demonstrated by Damon and Pythias. There is no pecuniary exchange necessary here, as bounty is limited to self-sacrifice, for there are no material goods that can aid the condemned Damon. Pythias’ understanding of giving calls to mind the story that Seneca recounts of Aeschines (a friend of Socrates), who although poor, wanted to give a worthy gift to Socrates but found the only thing he could give was friendship: ‘I will

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81 Plutarch, *The Philosophie Commonlie Called, the Morals* trans. by Philemon Holland (London: Arnold Hatfield, 1603), sigs. 12r-12v.
give mine own, myself, and the best of me’. Similarly, Pythias has nothing to offer Damon but constancy in friendship, quite literally, his own self, his life for his friend.

In opposition to this selfless friendship of the ‘good’, is the friendship of utility of Aristippus and his rival courtier Carisophus, predicated, as Aristippus suggests, on the benefit that he anticipates it will bring: ‘I have done very wisely to join in friendship with him, lest perhaps I / coming in his way might be nipped’ (1.1.119-121). Neither Aristippus nor Carisophus is seeking to benefit the other in the Senecan spirit of friendship. They typify the man described in De beneficiis, who ‘desireth nothing else, but that him self [sic] may be discharged, desireth by any means to accomplish the same, which is an argument of a most evil will’. Such a will is obscured here however, by Carisophus’ rhetoric, as his words invoke a sense of the Senecan precept that each friend will ‘apply himself to his friend’s commodity’. He says to Aristippus, ‘Since we are now so friendly joined, it seems to me / That one of us help each other in every degree’ (1.1.86-87). Here the image of perfect friendship’s virtue and mutual aid is suggested, but exploited. In contrast with the main plot, here it is represented as self-serving; the sentiment evoked lacks the honourable spirit of giving requisite to Senecan philosophy. The beneficial act of forwarding each other at Court would not be wrong in itself, because Seneca accepts that benefit may profit the giver and receiver alike, but here the benefit is tainted because it is sought, premeditated and requested. Seneca’s definition of what a benefit is rests firmly on one’s intent:

a frendly good deede, giving gladnesse au[sic] taking pleasure in giving, foreward and redie of it owne occord, too doo the thing that it dooeth. And

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82 De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 17.
83 De beneficiis, Lodge, pp. 264-265.
84 De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 265.
therfore it is not material what is doon, or what is given, but with what mind’.

The minds of Aristippus and Carisophus distort this view, as well as run counter to the spirit of true classical friendship, as both see and seek only a utilitarian end in an amicable union. Aristippus recognises that Carisophus’ motivation for friendship was utility, telling him: ‘My friendship though soughtest for thine own commodity / As worldly men do, by profit measuring amity’ (1.14. 37-38).

And the mind is the crux of the issue, as the beneficence of the King and the friendship of Aristippus and Carisophus are driven by selfish intent, at odds with the friendship of Damon and Pythias, who do not seek commodity in friendship, but rather represent a friend’s selfless, disinterested giving. With this in mind, the final recognition, which moves Dionysius to friendship through a hasty metamorphosis similar to that seen in Titus et Gesippus, is less miraculous than has been suggested, especially in terms of classical friendship. The catalyst for Dionysius’ volte-face, which has been credited to his admiration for the friendship that Damon and Pythias share, stems from his attributing value to the noble acts of the pair, suggesting that his ‘mind’ has not been converted to unselfish virtue equal with Damon and Pythias. When Dionysius says ‘there is no guard [compared to] a faithful friend’ (1.15.222), he recognises the potential usefulness of a friendship where the friend is willing to die for the other. To Dionysius, friendship is still predicated on reward, the value of the benefit given, not the love of the friend. His self-interested vantage point is further evidenced in his expectation of reciprocity after granting

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85 *De beneficiis*, Golding, Book 1, Chap 6, sig. B1v.
86 Stretter sees it as ‘a final miracle enabled by the divine workings of amicitia’, p. 258.
87 The footnote reads ‘compared with’, the word in the text is ‘unto’.
Damon clemency. Although the request asserts honourable intent, it nevertheless rests on utility. He says:

Damon, have thou life, from death I pardon thee,
for which good turn, I crave this honour do me lend,
O friendly heart, let me link with you to you—make me the third friend’ (1.15.226-228).

The fact that Dionysius’ request is for reciprocation, no matter how honourable the pardon, reinforces the sense of the profit to be gained from friendship that pervades the subplot and is punctuated by the final song. The song serves as an epilogue, and posits the preceding play as a ‘mirror for princes’.88 The emphasis on the private and public usefulness of friendship is articulated in the lines before the song: ‘The strongest guard that kings can have / Are constant friends their state to save’.

True friends for their true prince, refuse not their death,
The Lord grant her such friends, most noble Queen Elizabeth.
Long may she govern in honour and wealth,
Void of all sickness, in most perfect health,
Which health to prolong, as true friends require.
God grant she may have her own heart’s desire,
Which friends will defend with most steadfast faith,
The Lord grant her such friends, most noble Queen Elizabeth
(‘Last Song’ 7-14).

Here friendship is a gift from God, as seen in Harington’s translation of Cicero.89 But perhaps more importantly, the final song supports Stretter’s contention that ‘Edwards is

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88 As such, it is part of a tradition which included Gorboduc (1561). For the latter, see Andrew Hadfield, The English Renaissance 1500-1620 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p. 162. The dating of Gorboduc is the date of the first performance and is taken from Hadfield, p. 162.
intent on demonstrating that friendship rhetoric must always be coupled with action’.  

For the action suggested and emphasised echoes the kind by which paradigmatic pairs have gained their reputations, namely, the grand sacrificial gesture. Assimilating the relation of monarch and subject to the model of friendship has its benefits, as it obliges the latter to be willing to die for their prince. This, Dionysius’ improbable change of heart notwithstanding, serves to reinforce the sense of the possibility of a better world enabled through friendship, as its reparative and harmonising power is highlighted. Edwards demonstrates how private friendship can aid monarchs and public stability, as the court of Dionysius becomes a just and very different place after Damon and Pythias accept the king into their friendship. Friendship has triumphed over tyranny, supporting Aristotle’s contention that ‘if every man were friendly to other, Justice shuld not nede: for whi? frendshippe destroyeth al strife, and every discord that may be’.  

That is not to say that an audience would not be left with the sense of the possibilities for reward inherent in the pursuit of the elusive *amicitia perfecta* on a personal level, for that was undoubtedly part of the intent, given the play was written with its educable young performers in mind. But the emphasis is on the far reaching effects personal friendships can have on society.

In order to achieve this sense of public utility, however, Edwards is willing to negotiate with classical precedent on the cultivation of friendship. In doing so he takes up the issue of gratitude and its link to friendship, as Foxe did in *Titus et Gesippus*. Edwards would be aware of the commonplace admonition about ‘friends taken lightly’ and the suggestion that men rush into friendships at their peril, as Plutarch suggests in ‘The Maner to choose and cherishe a freende’. According to Plutarch:

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90 Stretter, p. 359.
and in the getting of other thynges, men use great care and diligence, but in choosyng of freendes they be veraie negelijent, nor they have not as it were markes and tokens, by the which they maie deine those that ar fete to be received into freendeship.⁹²

One might expect that Edwards’ didactic intent might compel him to enforce this idea for the benefit of the Chapel boys who would act his play. Yet, faithful to Elyot’s humanistic telling of the tale, Edwards’ ending diverges from the Pythagorean account of the tale retold by Iamblichus in the fourth century in On the Pythagorean Way of Life. In the historic account, Damon and Pythias ‘refuse’ to admit Dionysius into their friendship.⁹³ In Edwards, Damon and Pythias do not even proceed slowly in entering upon a ‘friendship’ with Dionysius, in contravention of Cicero, from whom he draws his classical understanding. Montaigne, quoting Cicero, argues that confirmation of friendship comes with time and discretion:

\textit{Omnino amicitiae corroboratis iam confirmatis ingenij & aetatibus indicandae sunt.} Clearly friendships are to be indge[sic] by wits, and ages already strengthened and confirmed. As for the rest, those we ordinarily call friendes and amities, are but acquaintances and familiarities, tied together by some occasion or commodities, by meanes whereof our mindes are entertained’.⁹⁴

But Dionysius’ declaration that ‘before this day, I never knew what perfect friendship meant’ (1.15.219), does not reflect this understanding. Further, as previously considered, his call ‘to be counted a perfect friend’ (1.15.244), rests on his understanding that to be

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numbered as such he is entitled to certain benefits of the kind he witnessed in Damon and Pythias’ willingness to die for each other.

The swift acceptance of Dionysius into friendship by Pythias is an interesting turn by Edwards, especially as Pythias has embraced the tenets of amicitia perfecta to the classical letter throughout the play in his relations with Damon. But his impulsive and naive response to Dionysius’ request seems out of place, as even though Dionysius promises to ‘honour’ friendship and makes claims of virtue eschewing ‘tyranny, flattery and oppression’ (1.15.241, 243), it flies in the face of the judgment, measure and discernment required of perfection in friendship. But Pythias’ response is motivated by gratitude, of the kind Seneca links to friendship, as discussed in Foxe’s play. He replies to Dionysius:

For this your deed, most noble King, the gods advance your name,  
And since to friendship’s lore you list your princely heart to frame,  
With joyful heart, O King, most welcome now to me,  
With you will I knit the perfect knot of amity’ (1.15.245-248).

Thus he indicates that it is the ‘deed’ that prompts friendship. Pythias is appreciative that Dionysius has spared his and Damon’s lives, and this gratitude is expressed through consent to Dionysius’ wish. For Pythias, the King’s beneficence engenders friendship in true Senecan fashion. This idea has precedence in De beneficiis, as Seneca says ‘so is the Law of benefites a most holy law, wherout of sprinketh frendship’.  

But significantly, in his preceding sentence, Seneca speaks to the issue of discernment in relation to choosing one’s friends and bestowing benefits, declaring, ‘& freendship warneth mee too admit no unworthie persone’, suggesting that discernment still matters. But there is much public

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95De beneficiis , Golding, sig. E4v.  
96De beneficiis , Golding, sig. E4v.
benefit for the state riding on the extension of friendship to Dionysius; in such a case rules governing private friendship, namely, the requirement for discernment, are subordinated in contravention of the ideal.

IV. Thomas Goffe’s *The Tragedy of Orestes*

Nearly forty-five years after Edward’s play took to an academic stage at Oxford, Thomas Goffe’s *The Tragedy of Orestes* played on the Christ Church, Oxford stage. The play was written and performed between 1613 and 1618 whilst Goffe was an Oxford student, before he received his Bachelor of Divinity degree and became a Church of England Clergyman. The work was published posthumously (1633), as were with his other two plays *The Raging Turk* and *The Courageous Turk.*

Although *The Tragedy of Orestes* could be considered ‘amateurish’ in parts as Norbert F. O’Donnell notes, he also suggests, because of its affinity to commercial revenge tragedy, that it ‘is one academic play which might have succeeded as well on the stage of the Globe as in a college hall’. And perhaps it might have, for it draws from a rich classical Greek theatrical tradition, including Seneca’s *Agamemnon*, as well as the early modern revenge tragedy genre, thought to be established through Thomas Kyd’s *The Spanish Tragedy* (1587). In *Orestes* Goffe explores the avenger’s concomitant harbouring of revenge and *philia*. In his endeavour, Goffe centralises the importance of male friendship and questions the reputation for perfect amity that Orestes and Pylades

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97 Norbert O’Donnell, ‘Shakespeare, Marston and the University: The Sources of Thomas Goffe’s *Orestes*’, *Studies in Philology*, 50.3 (July 1953), pp. 476-484 (p. 476); Eleri Larkum, ‘Thomas Goffe’ *DNB*.
98 Larkum, *DNB*.
100 For influence of *Agamemnon* see O’Donnell, pp. 478-479; For Kyd and revenge tragedy see Janet Clare, *Revenge Tragedies of the Renaissance* (Tavistock: Northcote, 2006), p.3; dating from Clare, ‘Biographical and Historical Outline’, x.
enjoyed in the period through an engagement with the idea of the limits of obligation and unity in friendship.

In ‘The Prologue’ to the play, which stage directions indicate was ‘spoken by the Author himselfe’, Goffe asserts that his intent was to ‘revive a tale, / Which once in Athens great Eurypedes / In better phrase at such a meeting told’. But Goffe’s play does not hold to any one source, ancient or contemporary, especially the author cited in the prologue, and the play suggested by its title, namely, Euripides’ *Orestes*. Euripides’ *Electra* takes up the murder of Clytemnestra and her lover Aegystheus, but it is committed by Orestes and his sister Electra. *Iphigenia at Tauris* is the play in which Pylades’ friendship is important, but it takes place after the murders. Similarly, Aeschylus’s trilogy the *Orestesia* recounts comparable events, but again, in the play where the killings occur, the *Choephori*, Pylades only reminds his friend to honour the gods in avenging the deaths; Orestes and Electra are complicit in the murders. Goffe’s rendering conflates several of these accounts, in support of his prologue’s contention that he has constructed a ‘new edifice’ ‘from an old foundation’. But the wattle and daub strengthening Goffe’s ‘new edifice’ came from more contemporary underpinnings, namely, John Marston’s *Antonio’s Revenge* (1600) and William Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* (1600). Goffe’s creation involves the murder of Agamemnon, the killings of Clytemnestra and Aegystheus, and an ending that does not exonerate the avengers, as in Euripides, where Apollo sets everything right, Pylades marries Electra and Orestes marries Helen’s daughter Hermione. If Goffe did use Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* as a source, as Norbert F. O’Donnell suggested in his work on

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103 See O’Donnell for a good discussion of Goffe’s use of Marston and Shakespeare, pp. 481-484.
104 See Euripides, *Orestes*, pp. 48-95 passim.
the play in the fifties, then the depiction of Horatio, the Pylades counterpart, would have served as another example of the supportive, but non-conspiratorial role the friend plays, as seen in the *Choephori*. Goffe however, chooses an alternate representation of the friend.

He spends the first four acts establishing the loyal friendship of Pylades. Employing the parlance of true, classical friendship Orestes tells his friend:

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Come now my dearest friend, my other self,
My empty soule is now fild to the top,
Brimfull with gladnesse and it must runne o’r
Into my deare friends heart (1.3).
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But true to the tenets of perfect friendship, when gladness turns to misery, the friend’s heart must share the burden. This burden is heavy in tragedy. Even though Orestes sets a solitary course as he declares his intent to flee the court and find out who has killed his father, Pylades asserts his understanding of fidelity in adversity and union in friendship. When Orestes relates his plan, saying ‘I will flie’ and I’ll put a new shape on, / And live alone (2.3), Pylades counters his friend’s use of the pronoun ‘I’ with words that assert union:

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Nay, not alone Orestes, whilst I live,
Shouldst make thy bed upon the rigid Alps,
Or frozen on the Caucasus, wrapt in sheets of snow,
I’d freeze unto thy side; (2.3)
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105 O’Donnell, pp. 476, 481.
106 Thomas Goffe, *The Tragedy of Orestes* (Printed by I. B. for Richard Meighen, 1633). All subsequent references are from this edition. There are no line numbers.
Goffe continues this emphasis throughout Act 3 by use of first person pronouns ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’: ‘our pillow’s a dead skull’, ‘our comfort’, ‘we have a grave’ (3.6). Goffe’s university audience would recognise that Pylades’ actions adhere closely to those prescribed for the ideal friend in three main areas: comfort, counsel, and the all-important constancy. Nevertheless, even though these tenets are judged through action, and enactment is precisely what Goffe gives his audience through Pylades, he emphasises its importance through Orestes’ later reflections on it. This is significant because in dramatic representations of friendship the parlance of perfect amity is often asserted, but the application is frequently absent. Orestes acknowledges his friend’s ‘kinde counsell’ and tells him:

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\begin{align*}
thou has plaid musique to my dolefull soule; \\
And when my heart was tympaniz’d with grief \\
Thou lauedst out some into thy heart from mine, \\
And kept it so from hurting (4.2).
\end{align*}
\]

Pylades’ friendship is like a comforting melody to soothe Orestes’ stretched and swollen heart which has been overcome by grief. His unswerving devotion and fidelity is a model of constancy in friendship. When Tyndarus banishes the friends alone, saying ‘no one shall company the other’, the punishment is palpably felt. It is not the lack of food, but the absence of the friend that is depicted as most severe. Without Pylades consoling presence, the ‘tormenting furies’ overtake Orestes (5.6).

Tom MacFaul describes some of the roles that Horatio assumes in \textit{Hamlet} as including those of a Baconian ‘deputy’, and a ‘sounding board’.\textsuperscript{107} Significantly, however, Hamlet is sole avenger, even if his friend’s presence is of consequence to the plot. John Kerrigan has

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noted that 'the prince excludes his audience, and, in the process, wins a depth and secrecy unlike anything found in Greek drama'.

Goffe’s play reverses this distancing effect through the centralisation of Pylades role beyond his sources. Through the close friendship of Orestes and Pylades revenge becomes a shared experience; its psychology laid bare for the audience through the interplay of the friends and the representation of their amity as perfect. Pylades’ constant friendship ensures that Orestes will not be a Hamlet-like figure negotiating the exigencies of revenge alone. He is the vehicle through which revenge is assured; his verification of the vision of Agamemnon’s ghost provides the necessary catalyst to stay Orestes’ momentary hesitation because of the young child’s words of love. Orestes tells the young child, ‘Would thou wert not my mothers, I could weepe / But see, O see now my relenting heart’ (4.7). However, the ghost’s appearance at this crucial moment abruptly terminates any capitulation, especially because Orestes receives confirmation from Pylades of the reliability of the apparition. With Pylades affirmative response to Orestes’ query, ‘didst thou see't, friend?’ (4.7) the possibly dismissed vision of the ghost of his wounded father transforms into a vivid reality and revenge follows on its heels. Pylades’ constant presence prevents Orestes from lapsing into moments of uncertainty and inaction.

The play’s moral ambiguity is realised through Pylades, whose acts waver slightly from his friend’s desired course, at times suggesting a vaguely disparate moral code. He tries to stay Orestes’ unbridled revenge when the killers of Agamemnon were unknown (3.2), counsels against matricide (3.4), and brings the child to Orestes in what appears a bid for pity, enjoining his friend, ‘I Faith Orestes prethee spare the child, / It hath no fault, but ’tis too like the mother’ (4.7). Even so, Goffe slowly transforms Pylades into a co-conspirator

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through Orestes’ appeals to obligation in friendship. After Orestes stabs the child, there is no stage direction indicating that Pylades is trying to save him, but Orestes’ reproof suggests that Pylades has intervened in some way: ‘Hold Pylades, be stedfast, for by heaven / Hee wounds mee, that perswades me not to wound’ (4.7). Orestes directly appeals to fidelity in friendship to achieve cooperation. He debases this ethic of constancy by using it as a tool for revenge. This friendship cannot accommodate justice and mercy, as Orestes proves when he calls for the ultimate test of friendship saying, ‘Be pittilesse now Pylades, be my friend’ (4.8). Pylades is called to demonstrate unwavering love by aiding his friend in a merciless act of killing an innocent child. In this way he perverts the integrity of perfect friendship, because as Aristotle argues, ‘only the good is lovable’. Lorraine Smith Pangle explains Aristotle’s view in such situations when a friend’s virtue ‘has begun to slip’ suggesting that ‘there is little hope here of re-establishing equality and intimacy between the friends’. But Goffe does not explore this tension. Instead, he maintains the equality of the pair through Pylades’ affirmative answer to the call of constancy through abetting the immoral act. The friends remain equal, but no longer in the shared ‘good’. Paradoxically, the requisite test of friendship’s constancy that would normally inspire awe, as seen in Damon and Pythias, is debased. This moment serves as a counterpoint to Aristotle’s idea that ‘yf every man wer frendly to other, Justice shuld not need’.

When Orestes appeals to friendship’s duty in what he sees as a moment of equivocation, Goffe comes closest to his source in Euripides, not in character or action, but in his treatment of friendship. David Konstan argues that in Euripides’ Orestes

111 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. H3’.
‘unhesitating support is treated as the essential criterion of friendship’. But the ordained act of just revenge by Apollo distances Euripides’ play from Goffe’s. In this way the type of support that Goffe’s play insists upon through bloodthirsty acts might reverse any sympathy and appreciation for fidelity in friendship that the pair might have engendered from their audience. Janet Clare reminds us of the added effect that ‘conditions of performance’ have on the ‘emotional register’ of a play. In this instance, if Christ Church’s large hall’s seating arrangement was similar to that represented in an extant drawing for a visit by James 1 in 1605, the smaller stage’s immediate proximity to the audience and tightly compressed seating might have had the effect of closing the distance between the audience and the action. As Janet Clare has noted, onstage vengeance acted in a more intimate space does not necessarily arouse audience indignation as it might in the public theatre. Writing on Antonio’s Revenge Clare suggests that ‘the overwrought imagery, moreover, is an indication that we are not to take altogether seriously the histrionics of the play about to be performed’. This seems to hold for Goffe’s play as well, as he replicates exaggerated vengeful acts from his sources and allots all of Act 4 Scene 8 to revenge. Nevertheless, the child’s spurting blood, his cries of ‘save me, save me’ (4.8) and the cups of blood presented to his parents, Aegystheus and Clytemnestra that

112 Konstan, p. 59.
113 Clare, p. 58.
114 The size of the hall is described in the extant design as ‘115 foote long & 40 borade’. If the seating and stage ratios remain the same for later plays such as Goffe’s, the drawing suggests the stage was approximately 1/3 the size of the Hall in John Orrell, ‘The Theatre at Christ Church, Oxford, 1605’ in Shakespeare Survey, Volume 35 Paperback Set ed. by Stanley Wells (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 129-140 (p. 129); comparing this, for instance with the Fortune theatre, which measured 80 feet square on the outside and 55 inside in Andrew Gurr, The Shakespearean Stage 1574-1642, 3rd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 138.
115 Clare, p. 59.
116 Clare, p. 59.
indeed follow the prescribed pattern of vengeful ‘excess’ may still serve to reverse any empathy felt for the avenger and his accomplice here.\textsuperscript{117}

The problem that the play posits in relation to the ideal friend comes through Pylades’ unquestioning loyalty in the face of immoral acts. Classical friendship requires that a friend foster virtue in the other, as this chapter has outlined, but neither Orestes nor Pylades abides by this responsibility in friendship. Even though Pylades does not wield the knife that kills Mysander and the child, because he does not attempt to dissuade Orestes from the murder of innocents through an appeal to virtue, he is just as culpable as his friend. In the end, he too, is condemned by Tyndarus, who outlines his crime as follows: ‘You \textit{Pylades} wich [sic] did so smoothly cloake, / The damnde [sic] profession hee did undertake’ (5.1). However, Pylades has done more than that. It is Pylades plan to hide at Court in the disguise, offering the idea as ‘The best plot I can thinke is this’ (4.2). His additional remark is what turns him from friend to confederate, as he tells Orestes: ‘You may in time so minister to the King / Physiques occasion fit revenge may bring’ (4.2), knowing that the ministration will be murder. Avenging the death of Agamemnon, as ordained by Apollo, contributed a sense of retributive justice to Euripides’ play that would be understood by its Ancient Greek audience. But Goffe removes the god, and employs a Senecan ghost, and following Shakespeare, posits revenge as an act of obedience to the father. The classically educated Oxford audience familiar with the source might appreciate the ancient precedent for matricide even without Apollo’s order, and thus sympathise with Orestes and Pylades in these killings. Nonetheless, this scene is pivotal in establishing Pylades as not only a willing participant, but as an orchestrator.

\textsuperscript{117} For a discussion of this aspect of Senecan revenge, see Clare, p. 39.
This is a turning point in the play in terms of friendly responsibility and virtue, as for the first time we see a shift in Pylades’ call for restraint with the suggestion that revenge is indeed part of the plan. The murder of Mysander by Orestes, which follows the plan’s enactment, much like Hamlet’s killing of Polonius, adds another dimension to the play’s moral sensibility. But this is complicated further by the ideal friend’s complicity. Mysander is a parasite and eavesdropper, similar to Polonius, and his death at the hands of Orestes carries the same immoral taint. Because Pylades does not intervene to stop Mysander’s killing and employs a lie to suggest that the killing was in self-defence, he aligns him with his friend. In doing so he remains loyal to friendship, but betrays virtue. But the unity of the friends is central to this scene. As he kills Mysander, Orestes says ‘on thee our medicine first shall worke’ (emphasis mine) (4.3). When the pair are confronted and asked who is responsible for the act, the declaration by each asserting their guilt does not seem heroic, or on a par with that of Damon and Pythias’ similar assertions at Dionysius’ Court. Rather, it engenders a sense of a configuration of friendship similar to that which Laurie Shannon sees as a ‘rebel compact’ in 2 Henry IV, where friendship ‘circumvents the law’ and privileges ‘private interests’. An audience might see this as a defining moment in the pairs’ friendship, as it turns conspiratorial.

The aforementioned instances are two moments in the play when Pylades undergoes a test of constancy in friendship. In contravention of the principles of classical friendship, the killing of the child and Mysander are aberrant, dishonourable tests that engage with the Ciceronian question of ‘howe farre Love ought to stretche in Frendshippe’. Pylades’ blind fidelity and misunderstanding of the limits of true friendship calls to mind the example of Gaius Blossius in De amicitia. Blossius is represented as a man who was

118 Shannon, p. 172.
119 The Booke of Freendeshipe, Newton, sigs. B9’- C2’.
willing to burn a city, if his friend requested it.\textsuperscript{120} Up to this point in the play Goffe has registered a sense that sharing one’s friend’s burdens is implicit in the philosophical call for reciprocity and equality in friendship. But through these tests that require ignoble behaviour he challenges Cicero’s idea that constancy and self-sacrifice has its limits. Cicero suggests:

\begin{quote}
And first, a man must doe asmuche [sic] for his frend as he is possibly able: & next, asmuch as yt party whom he loveth & would further, is able to discharge. For a man cannot bring al his frends (though he be never in such high authoritie himselfe) to honorable advauncemente.\textsuperscript{121}
\end{quote}

There is no ‘honourable advancement’ here, but rather, the beginning of a trajectory that ensures that the two practices which define the play—friendship and revenge—collide, as the test of killing the child pushes the boundaries of both. As Janet Clare explains, a key aspect of Senecan revenge tragedy is ‘overreaching in retaliation, surpassing the original crime’.\textsuperscript{122} And it is this recognition by Orestes that drives the penultimate, most horrifying test of constancy depicted graphically onstage. ‘But who revengeth, must all meane exceed’ Orestes says (4.8). Because Pylades brings Orestes’ young half-brother to meet his grisly, protracted death, thus making him complicit in fratricide, his status as confederate in immorality is confirmed.

Orestes’ insistence on blind obedience in friendship arises from his own experience with its obligatory ties. In exploring this idea in the play Goffe engages with Aristotle’s extended view of friendship from the \textit{Ethics}: friendships between husbands and wives and

\begin{flushend}
\textsuperscript{120}The Booke of Frendeshipe, Newton, sigs. B9v-C2\textsuperscript{r}.
\textsuperscript{121} The Booke of Frendeshipe, Newton, sigs. D7\textsuperscript{v}, D8\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{122} Clare, p. 39. \end{flushend}
fathers and sons. Goffe’s use of these relational models for friendship helps an audience to understand the motivation behind Orestes’ unyielding belief in duty and obedience. This is made poignant in Orestes reflection that his father was ‘murdred of his friends’ (3.4), and in his lament, ‘Did ever foule, disastrous, friendlike hand / Cast up so huge a heape of well-bred mischief [?]’(4.2). Orestes suggests that Clytemnestra and Aegystheus have breached the laws of friendship in their murder of Agamemnon. In Euripides’ Orestes the protagonist registers a similar concern for duty apparent in his appeal to Menaleus to act ‘as philoi should for philoi’; however, in Goffe’s play the emphasis rests on the friendship of father and son.

In the Ethics Aristotle outlines ‘corresponding forms of friendship’ and establishes hierarchies amongst them. The friendship, albeit unequal, between fathers and sons is highlighted. Wilkinson’s Ethiques explicates this formulation in terms reminiscent of the ideal: ‘The father loveth the soone as hymself’. But the soone loveth the father as a thyng made of him. The sense of attachment and unity here is underscored. To Aristotle, ‘the friendship of the father’ surpasses the friendship between monarch and subject in the ‘greatness of the benefits conferred’ by the father. Wilkinson reflects this understanding in his translation figuring the father as God. Either way, a similar debt of obligation is asserted. What Aristotle proposes using the model of fathers and sons, is that ‘the father oughte to be honoured with the honoure dewe unto him’, for ‘when children render to parents what they ought to render to those who brought them into the world’ and vice versa, ‘the friendship of such persons will be abiding and excellent’. In Euripides Orestes, following Apollo’s orders and honouring his will is central to the friends’ distress,
but in the end is rewarded. However, what Goffe suggests in the two competing
‘friendships’ in his play—that of father and son, and son and friend—is that fidelity to the
dead father obliges disobedience to laws of his friendship with Pylades. Further, it brings
with it the requirement that Pylades, as ‘other self,’ proves obedient to Orestes’ father-son
relationship as well, through continued loyalty despite the immorality of the acts required
to meet his friend’s filial responsibility. Just as Aristotle applies a hierarchy to different
formulations of amity, so too, does Goffe. The play makes clear the need for homosocial
ties that bind and loyalty that persists beyond the grave, and understands that this extends
to fathers and friends. Orestes may claim he has ‘too rare gifts’ in his father and his
friend’ (1.3), it is just that obedience to Agamemnon’s memory transcends obedience to
virtue in his friendship with Pylades.

The father-son friendship adds another dimension to the understanding of revenge in
the play. Obedience to the father and honouring his memory requires punishing
Aegystheus and Clytemnestra. The ghost of Agamemnon condemns Orestes for his
‘yeeldig soule’ saying ‘O can a child smile blanke the memory, / Of all these horrid
wounds’ (4.7). But Agamemnon does not call for retributive justice that would be morally
justifiable, the kind that Apollo and Athena acknowledged as laudable in Aeschylus’
Oresteia. Rather, he calls for bloodthirsty vengeance by reminding Orestes of Atreus’
‘venegetful soule’ (4.7). Goffe’s audience would easily be able to bring to mind this
reference to Agamemnon’s father who, in his own fit of revenge, killed the sons of his
brother, Thyestes, and fed them to him. The vicious model that Agamemnon’s ghost
demands that Orestes follows steps beyond the proportionate ‘eye for an eye’. The ghost’s
appeal to the priority of filial rather than fraternal duty is manifest when he decries
Orestes’ pity of his young half-brother and declares, ‘By all the rites of Father, I conjure
thee’ (4.7). The hierarchy of familial friendship is reinforced: to father first, not to his young brother. While the use of ‘conjure’ in this petition may reflect the ghost’s invocation of supernatural authority, or the sacred nature of the father son bond, interestingly, a use for ‘conjure’ also included something less honourable: ‘to be sworn together in a confederacy or conspiracy’.128 This latter connotation also ironically fits, and sheds light on the demand of allegiance that Orestes makes of his friend when he commands: ‘Be pittilesse now Pylades, be my friend’ (4.8).

Orestes’ ‘justice’ may appear to exceed proportion in its cruel, protracted enactment, but it is not only rooted in the familial tradition of revenge that he is reminded of by the ghost. After Orestes discovers his father’s lifeless body he declares of the unknown murder: ‘If ever he have children let them be, / Murdered before his face, that he may know, / How nature binds a father and a sonne (1.6). Seen from this perspective, the act of killing his young half-brother underscores the importance of the father-son bond, if carried out in front of the boy’s father Aegystheus. The philia that he owes and must demonstrate to his deceased father is also reaffirmed. This becomes part of the justice for his father’s murder. In this way the revenge exacted on the child may not be viewed solely as a crime of passion or excess, but a calculated part of what Orestes views as just revenge. Pylades’ compliance with the act is in part because of his own understanding of the importance of the father-son bond, which was inculcated in him by his own father, Strophius. This is underscored by his dying father’s bequest which reinforces a sense of the centrality of male friendship in all its formulations: ‘I commend / Unto my son the heart of a true friend, / That’s all the will I leave, and let him know / Friendship should ever be, but most in woe’ (5.2).

128 ‘Conjure’ (v), def. 1b.,II.3, II, OED.
Steadfast to the end, Pylades validates this legacy, as he searches for his exiled friend. Alone, separated from Orestes, Pylades declares, ‘Thus seeking others, I have lost my selfe’ (5.5). While Goffe may have intended this to reflect Pylades’ persistent fidelity demonstrated through his prolonged pursuit of his friend, the words echo the loss of self that perfect friendship requires, and this play in particular traces, a self made unwillingly complicit and dishonourable. Goffe’s play supports Tom MacFaul’s conclusion that ‘the plays and characters which centralize friendship are the ones that lead to the most attenuated selves’. The sense that Pylades’ self is ‘diminished’, subordinated to his friend’s needs and obligations holds through to the end, as he searches and find his ‘other self’, Orestes. Upon, finding him he says: ‘O art thou deare friend, for thee I sought’ (5.5). Orestes and Pylades perish on each others’ rapiers in a joint suicide, but not before Orestes avows the extraordinary nature of their friendship and tells Pylades that they are ‘leaving all ages to deplore our death: / That friendships abstract perish with our breath’ (5.7). This act and Tyndarus’ words reaffirm the constancy and unity in friendship that pervades the play:

No force so great, no so disaster wrong
As can unknit the bands which holdeth strong,
United hearts: who since they thus are dead,
One roome, one tombe shall hold them buried (5.8).

In the end, Orestes sacrifices himself, his friend, his half-brother, and his mother, for the sake of the father-son bond. The hierarchical nature of this Aristotelian conception of friendship trumps all others. Even though the play registers an understanding that the obligation to virtue in friendship is subordinated to the father-son bond, Goffe is

129 See MacFaul, pp. 1-2, 196-197.
130 MacFaul, p. 196; MacFaul speaks of the ‘diminished and alienated self’ that results from ideal friendship in comedy and tragedy in MacFaul, pp. 1-2.
unyielding in his advance of ideal friendship’s constancy and unity, quite literally in the end through the comparison of Orestes and Pylades to the constellation Gemini, and their deaths ‘embracing each other’ (stage direction 5.7). Their ending poignantly calls to mind the view of perfection in friendship that Thomas Elyot expressed as ‘a blessed conexion of sundry wylles, makyng of two persons one, in having and suffryng’. Even so, the representation of what has been asserted to be perfect friendship is not ideal because of the immoral acts of killing Mysander and the child. As Aristotle claimed:

Perfite Amite is in them that be good, and that be like in vertue, and beare good wil one to another, because they be like in their vertues. And this frendship is a way that conteyneth al goodnes, and amongst themthere [sic] is no delectacion nor evil.

Despite the pair’s historic renown made familiar in the early modern period through accounts by Cicero, Elyot, and Lucian, Goffe’s ‘friends’ cannot claim a similar status as their namesakes whose excellence in constancy and virtue in skirmishes with the Scythians promoted a Scythian law to ensure that children would visit the temple where an engraving was hung to honour the pair ‘so that it is easier for them to forget the name of their father, then be ignorant of the deeds of Orestes and Pylades’. Ironically, this suggests an enculturation of the importance of ideal friendship above the filial bond, in opposition to Goffe’s play which asserts the sanctity of philia between fathers and sons.

The ending of The Tragedy of Orestes endorses the eternal nature of friendship, as Cicero did in De amicitia through the recollection of Laelius and Scipio’s friendship. Even death is unable to sever the amicable bond. In this, the play joins the others reviewed in

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131 Elyot, Governour, sig. P8v.
133 Jasper Mayne, Lucian, sigs. X2v X3v.
this chapter in its final avowal of constancy as requisite of ideal friendship. It was the
defining feature that made friendship pairs paradigmatic. The representation of ‘ideal’
friends by Edwards, Foxe and Goffe interrogate the earthly bounds of friendship and the
weighty tensions pressing on it through obligations to self, family, and state that
necessitate, in comedy and tragedy, that friends diverge from strict adherence to classical
imperatives governing friendship, even, Damon and Pythias. Robert Stretter notes that
‘the visual and physical elements of theater inevitably exacerbate the gap between
idealizing theory and the imperfect world of human action’.\textsuperscript{134} Even so, it did not follow
that dramatists only saw the potential to lampoon the pursuit of perfection in friendship or
the attempted application of its principles. This chapter looked at dramatic representations
of the theoretical ideal. The next chapter considers work that explored, perhaps in greater
dramatic fashion and complexity than Edwards, Foxe and Goffe, the exercise, and qualities
of ideal friendship. It examines how dramatists problematised and reconsidered what was
ideal through issues of asymmetry and the use of the ‘friend’ as a character whose \textit{raison
d’etre} was the practice of friendship.

\bibitem{Stretter} Stretter, p. 360. Stretter argues that ‘the general shift in early English drama towards a parodic approach
to ideal friendship can thus be seen as the natural consequence of the difficulty of enacting ethical
abstractions in anything like literal fashion’ in Stretter, p. 360.
Seneca suggested that the Stoic sage was able to live without friendship. In this he disagreed considerably with Cicero who saw friendship as the foundation of personal and public life. But Seneca favoured self-sufficiency and saw a great difference between needing a friend and having one. The difference rests in \textit{being} one:

\begin{quote}
the wise-man although he be content with himselfe, will notwithstanding have a friend, if to no other end but to exercise his amitie, will not endure that so great a vertue should remaine without use.
\end{quote}

In Senecan terms, having a friend allows one to practice friendship as a virtue, and requires a mind aligned with a more disproportionate and disinterested view of friendship, one where the focus is on giving and not receiving. According to Seneca a friend should ‘not’ be sought

\begin{quote}
to have some one to assist him when he is sicke, relieve and ransom being in need and captivitie,’ but rather, ‘to the end to have one for whom I may die, whom I may accompanie in banishment, and for whose life and preservation I may expose my selfe to danger and deathe.
\end{quote}

In this view, friendship becomes a way for one to better oneself, morally speaking, through altruistic acts towards the friend, as opposed to each friend seeking to better the other as

\begin{enumerate}
\item Cicero asserts, ‘But if you should take oute of the worlde the knot of frendshyp, neyther can there any house, neyther any citie be able to continew, no not the tillage of the lande can endure’ in Marcus Tullius Cicero, \textit{The Book of Freendship of Marcus Tullie Cicero} trans. by John Harington (London: Thomas Berthelette, 1562), sigs. B8-C1.
\item \textit{Epistles}, Lodge, IX, p. 175.
\item \textit{Epistles}, Lodge, IX, p. 175.
\end{enumerate}
Aristotle suggests. While the end, increased virtue, is similar, this distinction is significant, as the sense of unity and the friend as the ‘other self’, becomes muted to asymmetry.  

As examined in the preceding chapter, narratives of ideal friends rested on a reciprocal willingness to embrace self-sacrifice; but dramatic interpretations posited this more forcefully against public pressures imposed on private friendship such as conformity to the law, stability of the commonwealth, family ties and justice. The designated role of friend as a caretaker to the other however, was challenged, albeit it was still stressed, very much in line with advice literature and sermons such as Cushman’s at Plymouth. It supported a continued emphasis on one’s responsibility as friend. This perspective and the possibilities it engendered prompted writers like Thomas Breme to translate works that outlined in detail ‘the true duetie of one friend to another’ which he fervently wished ‘may be unfainedly practiced, and fol.lowed [sic] by those that seeke to preferre vertuous, honest, and lawfull amitie’. Breme’s ‘practice’ suggests the application of theory, whilst Seneca’s ‘exercise’ imparts a sense that the endeavour of the friend is required ‘to acquire or maintain proficiency’, so that he may advance in virtue. Even though Breme suggests a joint undertaking and Seneca a unilateral enterprise, the potential for asymmetry arises in the former as well, as opportunities to prove one’s friendship in adversity requires a change in the equal circumstances of the friend, rendering one friend ‘in need’ awaiting the other ‘in deed’.

7 Thomas Breme, ‘Preface to the gentle reader’ in The Mirrour of Friendship trans. by Thomas Breme (London: Abel Jeffes, 1584), sig. A4’ (the original Italian source has not been identified, but EEBO entry reads ‘collected out of sundry tongues by I.B. [i.e. T.B.? i.e. Thomas Breme?]’).
8 ‘Practice’, def. 2a, The Oxford English Dictionary.
Titus et Gesippus depicted a more contemporary figuring of perfect friendship. Although it drew from similar classical precedent, the challenge to the idea of ‘one soul in two bodies’ begins to be felt, as self-interest exposed concerns of ingratitude and asymmetry. Even so, depictions of the ideal in Titus et Gesippus and The Tragedy of Orestes still rested on the responsibility of one friend to support, succour and make sacrifices for the other, prior to the instance of mutual magnanimity. And importantly, the action of each play provided reciprocal opportunity for magnanimous selflessness on behalf of the friend. Hence, symmetry was eventually maintained or re-established. In this way, academic dramatisations followed perfect friendship narratives in creating opportunities in the action where each friend would demonstrate beneficent selflessness and overall, reciprocity was stressed.

Commercial dramatists, however, began to explore the idea of perfect friendship in strictly asymmetrical terms. They constructed, what will be referred to as an ‘ideal friend’. Evolving from Titus and Gesippus, this figure is a step removed from the classical ideal and tests the model of perfection on characters who are written as men, rather than archetypes. This ideal friend was figured in terms of his friend’s needs. He was at times ardently Senecan in his exercise of friendship, and at other times a useful Baconian deputy. His ‘practice’ of friendship was integral to the plot. His stage ‘life’ was thinly drawn and revolved mainly around advancing his friend.

This conception of the ideal broke the circle of reciprocity that was so much a part of perfect friendship narratives and academic drama discussed in Chapter 2, for the plots only depicted the adversity of one, and the ‘trial’ of the other. In this way, the malleability of the classical ideal was tested. Thus, commercial dramatists challenged and probed friendship’s proportion and requital. And they were not alone. Contemporary works by
Francis Bacon and Michel de Montaigne considered questions of friendship that pushed at the outer bounds of the ideal, albeit disparately. In doing so, their essays expanded the scope of the ideal in both directions: towards utility and dissolution on one end, and exclusive unity on the other.

Even though the ideal friend may be viewed similarly to other conventional characters that have been described as helpful in counteracting the ‘limited narrative possibilities’ of drama, their construction relies on the serious obligations of friendship. This sets them apart from the two stock friendship characters noted by Stephen Orgel: the ‘witty friend’ and the ‘malicious friend’. But the ideal friend is not memorable for his humour or plotting, and is more than a mere confidant or secondary character ‘whose main function is to provide a leading character with a friend to whom he or she can entrust confidences’. Not unlike parasites, clever slaves, braggart soldiers, shrews and even the ‘ideal courtier,’ types who ‘come pre-packaged with set personalities and motivations’, the ideal friend reliably personifies certain expected qualities and behaviours in line with the discourse of perfect friendship from classical and contemporary sources. He is written as constant, despite the nonreciprocal nature of the relationship with the object of his friendship, and his raison d’etre is simply to be the perfect friend in asymmetrically Senecan and Baconian terms.

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12 Pinciss lists these as some of the stock characters, pp. 3, 6.
13 Cicero understands friendship in its reciprocal form through ‘another self’ symbolism.
There may have been only ten instances in early modern drama where a character was named simply ‘Friend’ in the dramatis personae, dialogue or stage directions, but there were others where the construction of the friend was essential to the plot and action and where the friend served as an important counterpoint to other relationships, providing dramatists with the means to interrogate the idea of constancy. Although he was given no stage identity other than that of friend, he was distinctive for the way his depiction registered the evolution of the theoretical ideal in practice.

As Stephen Orgel relates, characters ‘are not people, they are elements of a linguistic structure, lines in a drama, and more basically, words on a page’. With reference to the perfect friend, the words and the actions he conveys echoes the parlance of a synthesis of the classical and contemporary ideal. He reflects an understanding of certain friendship conventions, while at the same time his use signals an appreciation of the problems that can arise when one friend serves as the benefactor, and the other as the recipient of friendship. This chapter examines four ideal friends: Eumenides in John Lyly’s *Endymion* (1588); Franklin in the anonymous *Arden of Faversham* (1591); Aramanus in *The Faithful Friends* (anon; 1614); and Aurelio in John Ford’s *The Lady’s Trial* (1638). Their use as a touchstone for constancy and as a focus for the consideration of other relationships will be examined, as each amiable bond is set against a backdrop of betrayal and feigned friendship in one sense or another, and examined in light of fidelity in heterosexual relationships.

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15 Orgel, p. 8.
The plays cross genres and are sampled to include comedy, tragicomedy and domestic tragedy. They span the period from Elizabethan to Caroline drama. Thus, though indicative rather than exhaustive, they serve to demonstrate the evolution of the role of the ideal friend across time and genre. Sections one and two provide a review of alternate views of the ideal through the work of Francis Bacon and Michel de Montaigne. Section I considers the development of Francis Bacon’s view of friendship throughout his adult life. Section II provides a discussion of Michel de Montaigne’s understanding of ideal friendship outlined in his essay, ‘Of Friendship’. Sections III-VII will consider each play individually for the ways in which they engage and test the ideal.

1. Francis Bacon on Friendship

Francis Bacon, Viscount St Alban (1561-1626), was a politician who held various posts throughout his active, forty-five years of public service. He was a senior barrister at Gray’s Inn, clerk of the Star Chamber, attorney-general and solicitor-general. He was also a philosopher in his own right.17 Over the course of his life he wrote on many subjects, but the focus of this section will be his writing on friendship in his Essays of 1597, 1612 and 1625. Although Bacon gained a solid grounding in classical thought through his early education at home and during his years at Trinity College, Cambridge, and was well-acquainted with the work of Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca, the evolution of Bacon’s philosophy of friendship reflects the exigencies of political life. As David Wootton has shown, this influenced the formulation of friendship that Bacon expressed in his Essays, as

did three significant friendships Bacon shared, with Robert Devereux, the second Earl of Essex; George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham; and Toby Matthew.  

Wootton characterises Bacon’s friendship with Matthew as ‘ideal’, but this type of ideal friendship was far from that which Damon and Pythias were said to enjoy, in that its hallmark was asymmetry. The politics of Elizabethan and Jacobean court life transformed the mutual interdependency of the classical ideal to variable dependency, as one friend is in a position to help the other at any given time and vice versa. Although this negates the classical idea of similitude in terms of equal standing, it still provides for the ‘trial’ of friendship which reveals fidelity and ‘character’. And this became an important part of how Bacon viewed friendship, as evidenced in his essays.

Bacon’s early career demonstrates his lack of success as recipient of what he terms ‘the last fruit of friendship’ namely, ‘aid’. Essex’s attempts to intercede on his behalf for the solicitor-general post in 1595 were fruitless. But equally, Bacon’s efforts to counsel Essex in his affairs with the Queen were unsuccessful. It was at this point in his career that he wrote his first essay relating to friendship. The timing corresponds to a period of strong factional politics at court, and as such, it comes as no surprise that ‘Of Followers and Friends’ pays little attention to friendship. It speaks to followers mainly, and issues of ‘use’ and ‘favour’ and registers a much different sentiment, not only from his later essays on friendship, but also from classical views. The word friend is referred to only once, when Bacon claims that ‘to take advise of friends is ever honourable’. As Wootton rightly notes, ‘Bacon is adapting the ideal of friendship to reflect the realities of court life’

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19 Wootton, p. 188.
20 Francis Bacon, The Essayes of Counsels, Civill and Morall (London: John Havilland for Hanna Barret, 1625), sigs. V3r-Y2r (sigs.Y1r-Y1v).
and is ‘rejecting Cicero’s and Montaigne’s ideal of the friend as the mirror of one’s true self’. And this is clear from the essay’s abandonment of the classical idea of similitude of circumstance and especially the failure to distinguish a follower from a friend, both manifest in Bacon’s closing declaration: ‘There is Little friendship in the World, and Least of all betweene Equals, which was wont to be magnified. That that is, is between Superiour and Inferiour, whose Fortunes may Comprehend, the One the Other’.

Bacon’s 1612 essay ‘Of Friendship’, is the first one to consider friendship in an extended way. The work opens with the declaration that ‘there is no greater desert or wilderness then to bee without true friends’, yet the rest of the work does not hold out the hope for true friendship as a possibility. It moves a step closer to the Ciceronean classical ideal than its predecessor, as it rejects the pursuit of friendship for the sake of utility, albeit unconvincingly. For even though the work delineates true from instrumental friendship, it also registers a sense of the interrelatedness of the two in that friendship brings with it the promise of rewards to its participants. On one hand, Bacon asserts the exclusivity and affection of true friendship, claiming that ‘it is friendship, when a man can say to himselfe, I love this man without respect of utility. I am openhearted to him, I single him from the generality of those’. On the other hand, he points out the usefulness of the friend in strengthening one’s courage to withstand the vicissitudes of fortune: ‘Therefore whosoever wanteth fortitude, let him worshippe Friendship. For the yoke of Friendship maketh the yoke of fortune more light’. The idea stressed is that the constancy of the friend during times of adversity helps make the burden lighter. This point may adhere to

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22 Wootton, p. 195.
23 ‘Of Followers and Friends’ in Essayes (1597), sig. B5v.
classical precedent and even invoke a Stoic sense, but Bacon posits it from the view of a passive recipient of friendship’s benefit, whereas Seneca sees it from the vantage point of a benefactor who exercises friendship rather than awaits a friend to supply what he lacks, namely fortitude. In this way Bacon does not divorce himself fully from the idea of utility. He does, however, support the belief that true friendship is rare, but not in the extraordinary sense that Montaigne envisages it, as will be discussed subsequently. Bacon assumes a more sceptical position about perfect friendship’s existence beyond the theoretical, stating (just as Braithwaite later articulates verbatim), that ‘perfection of friendship is but a speculation’. Written fifteen years after the end of his friendship with Essex, a dissolution ensured by the Queen’s insistence that Bacon demonstrate his fidelity to her by prosecuting his one-time friend, this pessimistic view is understandable. It underscores the requirement to sacrifice private friendship for the sake of one’s success, and the stability of the commonwealth.

Bacon’s final essay ‘Of Friendship’ comes in 1625, a year before his death, in the wake of his own misfortune of scandal and disgrace. It also, significantly, comes at the end of his public life and after his prosecutorial work in the trial of King James’ favourite, Robert Carr, Earl of Somerset in 1616. Somerset (and his wife, Frances Howard) stood accused of the poisoning death of Somerset’s one-time friend, Sir Thomas Overbury. In his ‘The Charge against Somerset for the poisoning of Overbury’ (1616), Bacon suggests that it was an untoward effect of close friendship that contributed to the murder, namely Overbury’s dissatisfaction that he was ‘to be dispossessed’ of Somerset’s attention once Somerset decided to marry Frances Howard. Bacon says:

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as it is a principle in nature, that the best things are in their corruption the worst, and the sweetest wine makes the sharpest vinegar, so fell it out with them, that this excess (as I may term it) of friendship ended in mortal hatred on my Lord Somerset’s part.  

Bacon suggests that sometimes friendship can be too much of a good thing, when one party invests too deeply in its exclusivity and continuance, again highlighting the idea of the realistic potential for asymmetrical amity.

Just as the marriage and subsequent murder signalled an end to Somerset’s friendship with Overbury, Somerset’s trial and conviction similarly led to the dissolution of another he enjoyed, most notably, with the King. Bacon’s 1625 essay is dedicated to James’ next royal favourite, Buckingham, whose court friendship with Bacon proved disappointing. The essay, however, was written at the urging of, and as Wooten suggests, for, Toby Matthew, ‘a true friend’. Even so, the sentiment voiced bears more of an understanding of the instrumental nature of friendship, rather than affection, as Bacon again assumes the view of the recipient rather than giver, outlining friendship’s ‘fruits’. He may follow classical precedent in upholding the responsibility of the friend to succour and provide counsel, but he debases the idea of the friend as ‘another self’. His ideal ‘other self’ does not evoke a sense of completion and union, but rather, an opportunity for self-advancement. His ideal friend acts as agent to assist his partner in friendship. Bacon says:

Here, the best way, to represent to life the manifold use of Friendship is to cast and see, how many Things there are, which a Man cannot doe Himselfe; and then it will appear that it was a Sparing Speech of the Ancients, to say, That a frend is another Himselfe: For that a Frend is farre more then Himselfe. [...] 

29 Wootton, p. 200.
30 Bacon, The Essayes (1625), sigs. V3r-Y2 (sigs. X2′, X3′, X4′, X4v, V3v, V4r, Y1′).
So that a Man hath, as it were, two Lives in his desires. A Man hath a Body, and that Body is confined to a Place; but where Friendship is, all Offices of Life are as it were granted to Him and his Deputy. For he may exercise them by his Frend.  

Bacon’s idea of ‘exercising’ friendship contrasts sharply with Seneca’s. The former is self-directed, while the latter, although promoting one’s virtue, is other-directed. Despite his purportedly close private friendship with Matthew, Bacon does not separate friendship from public life in this essay. The prism through which he understands and defines friendship is inextricably linked to success in the public arena. Here, success relies on the friend’s exercise of friendship, something Bacon put much stock in, but was frustrated by throughout his life. At the end of his life, his ideal friend is still a necessity, but not for the soul, but rather, for the performance of the duties of public life. In the theatre of the court, the friend as supporting actor is indispensible, for as Bacon suggests: ‘where a Man cannot fitly play his owne Part: If he have not a Frend, he may quit the Stage’.  

II. Michel de Montaigne and Ideal Friendship

Michel de Montaigne was a sixteenth century French courtier, a Mayor of Bordeaux, and a philosopher. Similar to Francis Bacon, he had an active political life conducted under difficult conditions. As John O’Neill explains, it was ‘when the conflict between state and religion, interwoven with deadly quarrels, the massacre of Saint Barthélemy, and individual assassinations, could cost a man his life and property for just a word or thought

31 Bacon, The Essayes (1625), sig. Y1’.
32 Bacon, The Essayes (1625), sig. Y1’.
out of season.’ Just as Bacon had in 1572, Montaigne writes about a variety of subjects in a collection of essays first published in two volumes in 1580. He expands the work and publishes it as a complete, three volume edition in 1588. John Florio’s 1603 translation made the work available to English readers. Some critics view this translation of the *Essays* as a source for Shakespeare’s work.

According to Ann Hartle, Montaigne’s work represents a new ‘philosophical form,’ far removed from medieval theology, and the ancient philosophical tradition. Unlike John Foxe’s Latinizing of his work to give it a more classical feel and demonstrate erudition, Montaigne writes his *Essays* in French rather than the Latin in which he was fluent. It has been proposed, because of the affinity of the title from the French verb ‘essayer’ that the work constitutes ‘an attempt’, but Hartle puts a finer point on this explaining that Montaigne’s ‘form articulates “that which is”’. This suggests that in the work Montaigne assumes a personal vantage point from which he describes life as he sees it. And indeed, he does. While translations of classical theories and didactic works outlining the duties and obligations of the friend hold up historical and literary pairs as exemplar, Montaigne’s work provides a personal illustration of friendship that engages with and even challenges certain classical ideas of perfect amity. Unlike Bacon, however, the contemporary, non-fictionalised frame of reference that Montaigne provides emphasises private friendship.

Montaigne’s work is a celebration of his friendship with Etienne de la Boëtie. He characterises this as an ‘unspotted friendship’, one ‘so entire and inviolably maintained

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36 Hartle, pp. 1, 63-64.
37 Hartle, p. 64.
38 Hartle, p. 64.
betweene us, that truely a man shall not commonly heare of the like; and amongst our moderne men no signe of any such is seene'. 39 Although this is very similar in substance to the classical proclamations made about the amity shared by ideal friends, Montaigne is very clear to distance his friendship with Boëtie from those heralded by ‘the ancients’, whose expanded definitions of friendship (as discussed in Chapter 1) he viewed as far from ideal:

For generally, all those amities which are forged and nourished by voluptuousnesse or profit, publike or private neede, are thereby so much the lesse faire and generous, and so much the lesse true amities, in that they intermeddle other causes, scope, and fruit with friendship, then it selfe alone: Nor doe those foure auncient kinde of friendships; Naturall, sociall, hospitable, and venerian,40 either particularly or conjointly beseeme the same.41

What Montaigne suggests is that if the definition of friendship is more inclusive, and the term is applied widely, as seen in early modern translations reviewed in Chapter 1, it debases perfect friendship’s exceptional and noble nature. According to Montaigne, ‘those we ordinarily call friendes and amities, are but acquaintances and familiarities, tied together by some occasion or commodities, by meanes whereof our mindes are entertained’.42 In this he aligns himself with Seneca who suggests the devaluation of the term through application to the ‘great troopes’ who ‘knock at thy dores’, but who are not really true friends. 43 As Montaigne saw it, the name ‘friendship’ should be reserved and

40 ‘Venerian’, ‘influenced by’, or ‘inclined to wantonness’, def. 1.a.b. from OED.
41 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 90.
42 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 92.
revered, with, for example, the relationship between children and parents ‘termed respect’ rather than amity.44

For Montaigne, perfect friendship was that which he shared with Boëtie, and not similar to that of so-called paradigmatic pairs like Achilles and Patroclus, whose representation by Aeschylus Montaigne contends was not ideal, because it was not based on the recognition of ‘internall beauty’.45 He contends that his friendship, by comparison, was compelled by an attachment that defies explanation:

In the amitie I speake of, they entermixe and confound themselves one in the other, with so Uniuersall a commixture, that they weare out, and can no more finde the seame that hath conjoyned them together. If a man urge me to tell wherefore I loved him, I feele it cannot be expressed, but by answering; Because it was he, because it was my selfe.46

As the product of a humanist education, Montaigne was well-versed in Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca. Here, that familiarity is felt as he employs the parlance of perfect classical amity to characterise his friendship with the deceased Boëtie, a contemporary assertion of the friend as ‘another self’. But unlike the friendship pair Titus and Gesippus, whose similitude was represented only in terms of physical appearance, Montaigne asserts that he and Boëtie, enjoyed a unity of heart and mind:

Our mindes have jumped so unitedly together, they have with so fervent an aflection considered of each other, and with like affection so discovered and sounded, even to the very bottome of ech others heart and entrails, that I

44 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 90.
45 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 92.
46 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 92.
did not onely know his, as well as mine owne, but I would (verily) rather have trusted him concerning any matter of mine, than my selfe.  

Montaigne explores the anecdote from *De amicitia* of Caius Blossius’ friendship with Tiberius Gracchus with this sense of unity in mind, providing greater clarity than the Newton translation of Cicero did, which had emphasised the treacherous nature of blind allegiance to the friend.  

Demonstrating an awareness of early modern objections to Cicero’s inclusion of this example of friendship, Montaigne suggests:

but yet those, who accuse this [Blossius’] answer as seditious, understand not well this mysterie: and doe not presuppose in what termes he stood, and that he held Gracchus his will in his sleeve, both by power and knowledge. They were rather friends than Citizens, rather friends than enemies of their countrey, or friends of ambition and trouble. Having absolutely committed themselves one to another, they perfecty held the reines of one anothers inclination: and let this yoke be guided by vertue and conduct of reason. [...] If their affections miscarried, according to my meaning, they were neither friendes one to other, nor friends to themselves.

Montaigne’s view that ‘a singular and principall friendship dissolveth all other duties, & freeth all other obligations’, registers a keen awareness of what Cicero meant, although early modern translator Newton had not explicated this in an attempt to downplay an instance of seditious behaviour. This introduces an important difference from the emphasis on public usefulness, self-sacrifice and inclusive amity proposed in the early modern discourse of friendship in translations, didactic works, sermons, and the literary

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50 Montaigne, *Essays*, Florio, p. 94.
and dramatic depictions of ideal friends. According to Montaigne, to be a friend means that one has friendship at the forefront of one’s mind and actions, such that personal ambition or grievances against the state or others could not divert one’s attention away from friendship; therefore concern over leading one’s friend astray becomes a moot point. In a much later discussion of the negotiation of ‘uncertainties’ of friendship and its propensity for good as well as evil, Alan Bray suggests that ‘the ethics of friendship operated persuasively only in a larger frame of reference that lay outside the good of the individuals for whom the friendship was made [emphasis Bray]’. But Montaigne’s essay shifts the focus off of the instrumental ‘fruits’ and public benefit of friendship that was so much a part of the discourse, and reclaims the private nature of friendship, placing it within a narrow and more exclusive ‘frame of reference’: that of the friends alone.

Montaigne’s essay is particularly interesting because it shows how the classical idea of friendship’s grounding in virtue and its link to reputation can be established in practice. He asserts this through his description of how he and Boëtie were drawn into their friendship without regard for gain: ‘wee sought one another, before we had seene one another, and by the reports we heard one of another’. The essay itself serves as a testament to Boëtie and underscores the responsibility that Montaigne as friend undertook to ensure that similar to paradigmatic pairs Boëtie’s posthumous reputation for virtue and friendship was recognised. Indeed, this is an instance demonstrating Senecan gratitude and benefit in friendship. Montaigne does so by declaring that in both his friend was unsurpassed: ‘for even as he did excell me by an infinite distance in all other sufficiencies and vertues, so did he in all offices and duties of friendship’. But this statement, if not posthumous panegyric, underscores the unrealistic call for similitude in the theoretical

52 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, pp. 90, 93.
53 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 96.
ideal, as Montaigne acknowledges the differences that exist between himself and his friend in terms of virtue, and practice of friendship. And it is this idea of one friend surpassing the other in friendship’s practice that is part of the concern of the rest of this chapter, which examines the way dramatists figure and employ their perfect friends.

III. Endymion

*Endymion* was entered on the Stationers’ Register on 4 October 1591. Its date of composition is unknown. It was performed by Paul’s Boys in front of the Queen at Court during Candlemas in 1588. The earliest text of the play exists in the first published edition of 1591. The play’s dramatist was John Lyly, one of the ‘university wits’, who was educated at Magdalene College, Oxford. The play is a comedy, a retelling of a ‘classical legend’ of a narrative recounted in Ovid, Lucian and Apollonius of Rhodes, as well as references in Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*, Aristotle’s *Ethics*, and Montaigne’s *Essays*.58

Lyly’s humanist education at Oxford would have made him familiar not only with classical myths, but also, with Latin and Greek scholarship on friendship. One of the characters in *Endymion* is even a Greek court philosopher, named Pythagoras. The character’s classical namesake was one of the earliest philosophers of friendship (c. 570 -

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55 Andrew Hadfield places the play’s composition date as 1586/7 in Hadfield, p. 84.
56 Bevington, p. 8.
490 BCE) and although his writings are lost, he has been credited through the work of Iamblichus, and later, Erasmus, with describing the friend as ‘another self’. Endymion was not Lyly’s first literary consideration of the topos of friendship. His earlier prose narrative Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit (1578), took up the theme with resounding success. Leah Scragg notes, it was ‘the literary sensation of the age’, having thirty editions published between 1578 and 1630. Euphues bears some striking resemblances to the tale of Titus and Gesippus, although Lyly explores and problematises, more than celebrates, perfect friendship, just as he does in Endymion.

Endymion has received much attention for its potential reading as a political allegory representative of favour and factionalism at Elizabeth’s court, and its signalling of Lyly’s return to favour. But the work is also interesting for the way it once again engages with what David Bevington proposes was one of several ‘familiar Renaissance debating topics’, namely ‘love versus friendship’. Lyly does so, as he had in Euphues, through an exploration of the idea of the constancy of friends in light of heterosexual attraction to women. In Endymion, however, the emphasis is not on the friendship of the pair, but rather, the practice of friendship by Eumenides. Eumenides is neither depicted as Endymion’s ‘other self’, nor developed as a character in his own right, but rather, important in the play in his role as ‘well-wisher’ to Endymion, and through his actions as friend that drive the plot and its resolution.

59 ‘Amicitia aequalitas. Amicus alter ipse’ ‘Friendship (sayth pytthagors) is equalitie, & al one mynde or wyll’, in Desiderius Erasmus, Proverbes or Adagies (London: Richard Bankes, 1539), sig. G5v.
61 Bevington, pp. 9, 27; Hadfield, p. 84.
62 Bevington, pp. 11-12.
63 Bevington notes that the name comes from the Greek for ‘eumenes’, and relates the name’s resonance in Aristotle’s definition of a friend, ‘one who wishes well for another’, pp. 13, 75, fn. 2; This is a more appropriate connotation here than the name’s link to madness or the Furies (Roman), or Erinyes (unresting, jealous, avenger) see p.98 in J.E. Zimmerman, The Dictionary of Classical Mythology (New York: Bantam, 1971).
Although the play opens with Endymion’s lament for Cynthia, the exchange between Eumenides and Endymion provides the first glimpse into Lyly’s development of the quality of their friendship, one based on asymmetry, and on Eumenides’ belief in Endymion’s goodness. Throughout the first ninety-two lines, Eumenides is written as a true Ciceronean counsellor, dissuading his friend from his silly infatuation for Cynthia (whether she is in fact the moon or the Queen). ‘Cease off, Endymion’, he says, ‘to feed so much upon fancies’ (1.1.28).64 He persists in his admonitions: ‘Stay there, Endymion. Thou that committest idolatry wilt straight blaspheme if thou be suffered’ (1.1.77-78). Endymion lashes out at him, remarking disparagingly, ‘Vain Eumenides, whose thoughts never grow higher than the crown of thy head!’ (1.1.81-82). Eumenides excuses his outburst, deeming it atypical. He claims Endymion must be ‘bewitched’ suggesting, ‘otherwise in a man of such rare virtues there could not harbour a mind of such extreme madness’ (1.1.88-91). Here the quality of the friendship based on goodness is advanced by Lyly. And despite the frivolous nature of the disagreement between the friends, there is an earnest assertion of friendly duty to advise honestly, akin to that which Cicero argues is paramount to perfect friendship:

Therefore it is not a freendes parte, to be suche unto him, as hee is to himselfe: but hee ought rather to study and devise which way hee maye recomforte the appalled mynde of his freende, and put him in good hope of a better amendement.65

This scene ends with Eumenides playing his ‘part’ of faithful friend, as he relates before leaving the stage, ‘I will follow him, lest in this fancy of the moon he deprive

64 John Lyly, *Endymion* ed. by David Bevington (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). All future references to this play will be taken from this edition.
65 *The Booke of Freendeshipe*, Newton, sig. D2'.
himself of the sight of the sun’ (1.1.90-92). His final words confirm that friendly responsibility requires that he ensure the light of reason shines perpetually on his friend. This ending note of constancy is underscored by contrast, as Lyly sets Eumenides’ loyalty against the jealously of the jilted Tellus, who decides to exact revenge on Endymion by casting him into a state where ‘he shall neither live nor die’ (1.2.42). The place she envisions is where the affection of a friend and the love of a woman cannot be experienced, a place without intimate relationships. Ironically, despite her aim, Tellus is unable to deprive Endymion of Eumenides’ friendship which thrives notwithstanding Endymion’s state. Both Tellus and Eumenides have been disregarded by Endymion, yet only Eumenides’ love endures.

Lyly’s choice of the word ‘friend’ which Tellus uses to describe Endymion, serves to highlight this further, as it points up the problem in the arbitrary use of the term and its extension to other relationships which might not be guided by like affection and virtue. Here, Tellus’ friendship with Endymion stands in stark contrast to Eumenides’. She declares, ‘She that is so oppressed with love that she is neither able with beauty nor wit to obtain her friend will rather use unlawful means than try untolerable pains’ (1.2.86-89). When compared with the selfless devotion of Eumenides, the fleeting and corrupt nature of Tellus’ self-centred ‘friendship’ is underscored, and constancy’s link to friendship’s foundation in virtue is promoted. This sense continues into Act 3, as Eumenides pleads with Cynthia to restore the sleeping ‘honourable’ Endymion. Eumenides asserts his connection to his friend, saying, ‘but such is my unspotted faith to Endymion that whatsoever seemeth a needle to prick his finger is a dagger to wound my heart’ (3.1.21-
The ‘unspotted faith’ calls to mind the ‘unspotted friendship’ Montaigne avowed with Boëtie, one where the friends’ pain is doubly felt by the other. When the wise Geron tells Eumenides that ‘affection is grounded on virtue, and virtue is never peevish’ (3.4.64-65), he is not referring to the *philia* between male friends, but rather heterosexual love, further insisting on friendship’s superiority to the love of a woman. In this exchange the audience learns of Eumenides’ affection for Semele, although a relationship is never developed. The love interest serves a functional purpose only insofar as it allows Lyly to establish a basis for the necessary test of true friendship, as required of all narratives of ideal friends (as seen in Chapter 2). The test reiterates the commonplace understanding that ‘trial shall prove trust’ that Lyly invokes in *Euphues*. This scene in essence explores this maxim, as well as another on friendship that would become commonplace through inclusion in Nicholas Ling’s 1598 edition of *Politeuphuia, Wits Common wealth*: ‘The love of men to women is a thing common, and of course; the friendship of man to man infinite, and immortal’ (3.4.121-123). Here Eumenides repeats the phrase but despite the ease with which it seems to trip off his tongue, Lyly problematises practicing what proverbial wisdom teaches, for Eumenides needs to ask his father for advice on its veracity. What follows is a lengthy speech by Geron reinforcing the constancy and primacy of male friendship through an iteration of the classically-inspired benefits of friendship over love. Even so, the wavering by Eumenides signals the clash between the disinterest required of perfect friendship and the self-interest of the friend.

Much like Gesippus in Foxe’s play, here Eumenides is forced to choose between love and friendship. In a moment of soul-searching, he reflects aloud on the nobility of the choice between the two, paradoxically, a choice that his friend Endymion had not been willing to make when he disregarded Eumenides’ advice and friendship to seek Cynthia’s love. In his instance of testing Eumenides ponders, ‘shall the enticing beauty of a most disdainful lady be of more force than the rare fidelity of a tried friend?’ (3.4.119-121). The understanding here is that Endymion has proven to be a loyal friend in the past, despite the play’s depiction of his turn from Eumenides’ friendship in Act 1. Lyly’s representation of the choice carries with it an articulation of a gender construct that figures women as attractive on the outside, but lacking in virtuous qualities on the inside. Female inconstancy here is posited to elevate friendship above physical love, just as it was in *Euphues*. This idea of friendship’s superiority is reinforced in 5.1 when Endymion awakes and Eumenides, the constant friend, reproves Floscula, saying, ‘do not that wrong to the settled friendship of a man as to compare it with the light affection of a woman’ (5.1.163-165).

Eumenides’ choice between love and friendship may, from an audience’s standpoint, seem obvious. It is something later plays, such as Thomas Heywood’s *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, (as will be reviewed in the next chapter) will grapple with. But in *Endymion* Eumenides’ decision, although seemingly straightforward, still rings nobly and sacrificially. Despite the play’s light-hearted look at love and friendship, and its comedic appeal, the gravity of the moment of sacrifice promotes a provisional sombre mood, as it did in the comedies reviewed in Chapter 2, namely, *Damon and Pythias* and *Titus et Gesippus*. Through the moment of required sacrifice, Lyly aligns Eumenides with the paradigmatic ideal friend. Eumenides’ response to the choice is reminiscent of that which
Foxe writes for Gesippus in his play when placed in the similar position of choosing between love and friendship:

Anyone who professes to be a friend in good times should prove that he is one in difficult times as well. Though I certainly can’t deny that I love her too, I don’t love her so much that I would not readily put my friend ahead of everything.’ (1.9)  

But Lyly prolongs Eumenides’ decision, as he ponders whether to ask for his love of Semele to be requited, or for his friend to be restored from sleep. Although Lyly figures a similar hesitation in his earlier narrative *Euphues*, where the protagonist finally chooses to value self above friend concluding, ‘where love beareth sway, friendship can have no show’, in *Endymion* the wavering is short-lived (sixteen lines), and the view that ‘Love knoweth neither friendship nor kindred’ (3.4.116) is abandoned as Eumenides opts to aid his friend. Lyly’s representation in *Endymion* contrasts with Gesippus’ immediate relinquishing of Sempronia in Foxe’s play. Nevertheless, although Eumenides’ first thought is for himself, his struggle with his conscience creates dramatic tension, as the audience awaits the decision whether he will choose love or friendship. It also serves to reveal a crack in the armour of friendship, as momentary self-interest rears its head. Lyly does not dwell here, however, as in Eumenides’ self-reproof the obligations of true friendship triumph, commingled with a strong pull of public duty to the Queen: ‘Hast thou forgotten both friendship and duty, care of Endymion and the commandments of Cynthia?’ (3.4.111-113). An understanding of the hierarchical nature of obligations of friendly fidelity are made manifest here. Importantly so, perhaps, given the performance of the

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play before Elizabeth and Lyly’s own desire to be seen as her ‘friend’ after what Bevington notes was ‘four years of non-performance of his plays at court’. 71

Even so, Lyly follows a similar course to Foxe in terms of the expectation of reciprocation in friendship. Similar to Foxe’s Gesippus, who denounces his friendship to Titus after Titus does not recognise him, Eumenides, when Endymion cannot identify him, says ‘Ah my sweet Endymion, seest thou not Eumenides, thy faithful friend, thy faithful Eumenides, who for thy sake hath been careless of his own content?’ (5.1.37-40). Eumenides recounts his previous selfless act in the expectation of reciprocation, namely recognition, just as Gesippus does in Foxe’s play. Eumenides will not receive satisfaction beyond this, as the plot does not allow for the sacrificial act by Endymion to even the score, as it did in Titus et Gesippus. This contributes further to the play’s overall understanding of friendship as one-sided in nature, as Endymion is the recipient of friendship, and Eumenides is the benefactor.

While this is anathema to the classical ideal that stresses proportion, it was a view that friendship literature fostered through inscription of expectations of behaviour that implicitly emphasised friendship’s benefits. Perhaps realistically recognising the reduced opportunities a man might be afforded to risk his life for a friend, ‘trials’ of friendship rested on classical duties in friendship that were undertaken, but not solicited, just as Lyly’s depiction of Eumenides does. The marginalia in one page of Thomas Breme’s 1584 The Mirrour of Friendship reads ‘Note how to know a perfect friend’, with the adjacent text outlining the conduct expected:

Hee then of good right ought to be called a friend, and esteemed as true

71 Bevington, p. 9.
and perfect, that dothe willingly offer, departhe, and give to his friend 
those things that he lacketh, before he asketh his ayde: and that speedily 
commeth to succour & helpe his friend, being in peril, without calling, or 
sending for, and therefore there is not, nor can not, be in this world better 
friendship then this that I have spoken of, which is that commeth with a free 
heart of himselfe to ayde his friend in necessitie, and to succour him when 
he is in griefe or sorrow.72

Here the ideal friend conforms to classical prescriptives of succour and aide, without 
expectation of reciprocation. But Breme makes a significant movement away from 
Cicero’s idea that friendship should not be sought to fill a weakness or help one secure 
what they ‘lack’.73 Importantly, Breme’s emphasis is on the requirement that the friend is 
self-motivated in acts of friendship. This is a value Lyly explores through Eumenides, 
Endymion’s ‘well-wisher’, who is pressured only by his own fidelity to friendship to 
practice what he preaches.

IV. Arden of Faversham

Arden of Faversham (1591) was entered on the Stationers’ Register on 3 April 1592; 
however the play’s auspices, dramatist(s) and date of first performance are unknown.74 
The earliest text is the quarto playbook printed in 1592.75 The play draws from 
contemporary documents which detail the account of a real ‘domestic tragedy’, the 1551 
murder of Thomas Arden in Faversham, Kent, by his wife, her lover, and their 
accomplices. Yet, there is one notable addition, Franklin, a friend for Arden. Unlike in

72 Breme, sig. B3’.
73 See Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Amicitia in Cicero, De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione, trans. by 
(pp. 103-211), p. 141.
74 Tom Lockwood, ‘Introduction’ Arden of Faversham ed. by Martin White, New Mermaids (London: A & 
C Black, 2007), vii-xxx (vii, xiii, xxv, xxvi). All history and publication information on the play is from here.
75 Lockwood, xxv-xxvi.
*Endymion*, the friend does not drive the plot, but serves three main functions as a counterpoint to the infidelity and associations of utility orchestrated by ‘the bourgeoise Clytemnestra’, as an intermediary akin to the Baconian ‘deputy’, and as a foil to the would-be murderers aiding the ‘dramatic predicament’ that Tom Lockwood points out arises from a play where the audience already knows the protagonist will die.

The anonymous dramatist’s choice of the name ‘Franklin’ is interesting, given its early modern usage to denote a landowner below the rank of a gentleman, and the play’s concern, through the characterisation of the greedy Arden, with the acquisition of lands. But perhaps just as compelling is the affinity that this Franklin shares with Chaucer’s Franklin in the *Canterbury Tales* who also is chronicler of a tale of infidelity and marriage. Arden’s Franklin, however, is also cast as friend. And despite his sideline distance from the main action, he still enjoys sufficient proximity to objectively comment on events, and provide insights into character, much like a witty servant, or more significantly, Lear’s fool. To be sure, as Tom Lockwood has pointed out, as a character, Franklin’s ‘purpose’ is ‘purely functional’. He is indeed similar to a choric voice. At first glance, it appears he serves as not much more than an alternative to a soliloquy, a way for the anonymous dramatist(s) to reveal Arden’s feelings and inner turmoil to the audience. In this way, and because he is fairly one-dimensional, it would be easy to discount him as merely a useful device. But his significance lies in his function as friend and what his depiction contributes to the love and friendship debate, as a true friend’s constancy is posited against the marital infidelity of Alice and the false friendship of Mosby.

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77 Lockwood, x-xi.
78 The term was in use in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. See ‘Franklin’ in *OED* def. 2.
79 Lockwood, xxviii.
Franklin’s care of, and for his friend casts into deeper relief the malevolence Alice seeks to exact on her husband. The juxtaposition between the fidelity of the friend and the betrayal by the wife, turns the motif of the ‘domestic triangle—wife, husband, husband’s friend’—considered by dramatists such as John Ford, upside down. In Arden the destabilising force is not the loyal friend, but the wife and her lover, who is lightly termed ‘friend’. As loyal friend, Franklin provides the substance to the underlying theme of friendship’s trustworthiness and superiority to other relationships, which resonates quietly in the background throughout the play. This begins with Franklin’s opening lines that signal an understanding of duty in friendship, which necessitates an attempt to alleviate Arden’s melancholy. Franklin tells him, ‘Arden cheer up thy spirits and droop no more’, and later ‘comfort thyself, sweet friend’ (1.1.1, 20), after presenting him with news that Arden has secured the deeds of ‘all the lands of the Abbey of Faversham’ (1.1.5-6). Arden reveals his suspicions about his wife and Mosby in a moment that underscores what Francis Bacon termed ‘The principall Fruit of Friendship’, namely ‘the ease and discharge of the Fulnesse and Swellings of the Heart, which Passions of all kinds doe cause and induce’. The comfort of the friend is acknowledged, as Arden tells Franklin, ‘Ah, but for thee, how odious were this life’ (1.1.10).

While Chaucer’s Franklin protests: ‘I lernyd never rethorik in certain / Thynge that I spake muste be bare and pleyn,’ Arden’s Franklin embodies this idea. His language is devoid of the perfect friendship rhetoric of ‘one soul in two bodies’ and his honest and plain speech becomes a contrast to the dissembling avowals of affection and friendship.

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81 This and all subsequent references are from this edition: Anonymous, Arden of Faversham ed. by Martin White, New Mermaids (London: A & C Black, 2007).
82 Bacon, ‘Of Friendship’ (1632), sigs.V3”–V4”.
from Alice and Mosby. This is not to say that Franklin is written without emotional attachment to Arden, for it is palpable when he tells his friend, ‘Yet let your comfort be that others bear / Your woes, twice doubled all, with patience’ (1.4.25-26). In fact, the text suggests that there is some ambiguity in the intensity of feeling Franklin harbours for Arden. Franklin proposes to Arden: ‘lie with me at London all this term,’ (1.1.52) as part of a plan to help ‘ease’ Arden’s grief and ‘save’ Alice’s ‘chastity’ (1.1.45). But this in itself seems an odd solution, which would give Alice and Mosby further opportunity for dalliance. Further, as Arden is saying goodbye to Alice, Franklin interrupts their farewell disapprovingly, saying to Arden, ‘Come, leave this dallying, and let us away’ (1.1.396). Tom Lockwood has rightly suggested that Franklin’s response to Arden’s complaint that he ‘cannot rest’ at his house because it is ‘irksome’ (1.4.27), is open for interpretation. When Franklin suggests, ‘then stay with me in London; go not home’ (1.4.28), he is indeed dissuading Arden from reconciliation.84 That said, care need be taken to promote a reading of this beyond male friendship, especially given Alan Bray’s work outlining the distinction between the intimacy of male friendship and male homosexuality and the ‘facts’ of ‘physical closeness’ which was part of the way ‘friendship worked’ in Renaissance England.85 Further, these instances when considered in relation to Franklin’s suggestions on ways that Arden can salvage his marriage, lend weight to an affective male friendship reading. When Alice wishes to accompany the friends to Lord Cheiney’s Franklin recommends, ‘Why I pray you, sir, let her go along with us’ (1.10.20). Later he advises Arden not to accentuate the pleasant details of their visit with Cheiney, ‘For that will make her think herself more wronged / In that we did not carry her along; / For sure she grieved that she was left behind’ (1.13.69-71).

84 For a discussion of this instance see Lockwood, xxix.
Franklin is further removed from his Chaucerian namesake who denies Greek or Latin learning and says, ‘I slept never in the mount of pernaso / Ne lernrd marcus Tullius Cithero’, for Arden’s anonymous dramatist figures his Franklin in some ways reminiscent of the Ciceronean friend who is charged to ‘bee glad in deede, freelye to geeve our freende good counsell’, but also, ‘to warne one another, not onely plainly, but (if occasion so serve) sharlye’. Franklin’s admonitions are at times severe and serve to interject reason into the emotion that ensnarls Arden. After Alice’s explanation that she and Mosby were arm and arm only for ‘sport’ (1.13.90). Franklin responds first interrupting her attempt to explain away their behaviour saying, ‘Marry, God defend me from such a jest!’ (1.13.98). Franklin may not lay claim verbally to the status of Arden’s ‘other self’ but he serves as such acting as the Jungian ego, the voice of truth and common sense that seeks to ground Arden in reality. Similarly, although he is not depicted as Arden’s soul mate in the classical sense, he is the ideal friend Thomas Breme described, one that gives to his friend ‘those things that he lacketh’.

What Arden lacks is the ability to see things clearly; this includes himself and others. Through the dramatist’s construction of the friend, the familiar topos of self-delusion and perception can be explored, as it was in Lear through the wise fool. Arden has seen tangible evidence of Alice and Mosby’s betrayal through love letters and the ring that he gave Alice on Mosby’s finger, yet Arden is easily mislead by denials of inappropriate behaviour. When Arden tells Alice that he heard her call out for Mosby in her sleep, she attempts to downplay it, but Franklin interrupts and affirms Arden’s reading of the event.

87 The Booke of Freendeshiipe, Newton, sig. C4’.
89 Breme, sig. B3’.
(1.1.78). After Arden apologises for his angry outburst and accusation and reclaims Mosby as a ‘friend’, Franklin warns, ‘Why, Master Arden, know you what you do? / Will you follow him that hath dishonoured you? (1.13.135-136). In keeping with his role throughout the play, in the epilogue, it is Franklin who is tasked with the final words outlining ‘the truth of Arden’s death’ (1) that proves him still an honest counsellor: ‘Arden lay murdered in that plot of ground / Which he by force and violence held from Reede’ (10-11). Through the absence of posthumous panegyric to Arden, and ensuring the murderers are brought to justice, Franklin proves he is not only constant with regard to friendship, but also, to truth.

Despite the absence of Franklin in the real-life tragedy of Arden, the play suggests that it is in part Arden’s failure to give weight to Franklin’s friendly counsel and truth-telling that is his downfall. This corresponding responsibility of the friend to heed friendly counsel was highlighted in Thomas Newton’s translation of Cicero: ‘Let the Authoritie of Frendes (geving sound counsel) beare great sway and force in Frendship’ ‘and let suche aucthoritie so geeven be throughly [sic] obeyed.’ This idea had significant contemporary resonance during the later 1590s, regarding Francis Bacon’s advice to his friend Essex, advice that went largely ignored and contributed to Essex’s downfall and death. In Arden however, the problem of the degree of influence that Arden affords Franklin’s counsel is complicated by his desire to please his wife and save his marriage. There is a noticeable pull between friendship and marriage here, but marriage prevails. Ruled by desire and affection for Alice, the callous businessman who has aggressively procured lands from his neighbours (1.13.13) is easily deceived by his unfaithful wife, Alice, and false-friend, Mosby.

90 The Booke of Frendeshipe, Newton, sig. C4v.
Throughout the play Franklin is constant in more ways than one: steadfast, as well as ever attendant, the latter somewhat problematically so. When Arden remarks at the play’s onset, ‘Franklin, thy love prolongs my weary life’ (1.1.9) this might be read as Arden’s acknowledgment of the comfort brought by Franklin’s friendship in his time of distress. Additionally, however, the play bears a literal interpretation of the words, as Arden escapes his fate at every turn in Franklin’s presence. This is how as a character he assists the dramatist to ‘generate the tension and suspense’ that Tom Lockwood identifies as necessary to engender audience attention in a play that draws from actual, known events.91 His friendship with Arden provides something for the main character to ‘do’, as well as supplies the opportunity to stage (and foil) the would-be attempts on Arden’s life by delaying the inevitable.92 Franklin is something of a Sancho Panza in terms of the help and grounding in reality he provides during Arden’s travels and travails. Arden is never without Franklin in a scene until the dinner party, when the murder takes place. And here Franklin is conspicuously absent; more so because Michael creates the expectation in the audience that Arden is to bring him, along with Mosby and the others, to dinner (1.14.36). When Arden arrives with Mosby alone and remarks, ‘he and I are friends’ (1.1.176), the idea of the danger in misunderstanding how true friendship presents itself is heightened. In this scene of hospitality when expectations of affectionate and convivial behaviour are raised and engendered, the safety of the domestic space is shattered by Arden’s inability, and perhaps unwillingness, to recognise feigned friendship. In the absence of the constant friend, Franklin, Arden loses his life. Ironically, despite his travels and attempts on his life in the public space, Arden’s life is lost in what should be the safety and sanctity of his own home. The dramatist turns ‘the codes of civility’ that Viviana Comensoli suggests are

91 Lockwood, xi.
92 For a thoughtful discussion of the use of delay and failed murder attempts see Lockwood, xi-xii.
inscribed on the text upside down, as the false friend, Mosby, reveals himself, striking the first of the fatal blows. Immune to Franklin’s admonitions, Arden, quite literally, has to be hit over the head with an iron before he is able to determine that Mosby is a false friend (1.14.232).

Franklin’s constancy however, is not to be taken at face value as an unquestionable good. The play indistinctly wonders if it can be too much of a good thing. As previously discussed, a similar idea was raised by Bacon regarding the Carr and Overbury friendship. In *Arden*, while the dangers of false friends and unfaithful wives stand in stark contrast to Franklin’s steadfast friendship, the anonymous dramatist subtly underscores a potential drawback to a friend’s fervent practice of friendship, namely the inability of the friend to recognise that friendship has its limits. This idea of boundaries and friendship’s ‘excess’ will be examined in detail in relation to *The Lady’s Trial*, in Section 6, but it is worth mentioning here. Franklin is embroiled in all of Arden’s intimate concerns, even in what one would normally expect to be private conversations between husband and wife. The first conversation in which Arden suspects Alice of infidelity takes place in the morning, with Franklin already present. He has already been conversing with Arden, whilst Alice was still asleep (1.1.1-56). While Arden reminisces aloud to Alice about their intimate encounters in happier days, specifically alluding to their sexual passion, Franklin is still onstage (1.1.57-63). When Arden tells Alice ‘thou hast killed my heart,’ disclosing that he heard her call out for Mosby in her sleep, it is Franklin who interrupts Alice’s denial, adding, ‘Mistress Alice, I heard you name him once or twice’ (1.1.78). Franklin’s presence during private moments and his actions as mediator, answering for Arden, may reflect the idea of the friend as the Baconian deputy, but it also raises questions about

access and prerogative in friendship, and how far ideal friendship requires the
relinquishing of one’s privacy. Although this is not developed, but rather subtly suggested
in Arden, it becomes a more explicit, central concern in The Lady’s Trial. In Arden,
Franklin may be the epitome of what Seneca advised men to find: ‘a trusty friend, to whom
we may freely & sincerely powre out our secrets’94 but his construction as a character
whose raison d’etre is the practice of friendship bordering intrusiveness, adds a further
dimension to asymmetry in friendship with regard to feeling as well as practice.

V. The Faithful Friends

The Faithful Friends was entered in the Stationers’ Register on 29 June 1660 along with
several other plays attributed to Francis Beaumont and John Fletcher by Humphrey
Mosley.95 Based on Walter Greg’s work on the manuscript, G.M. Pinciss argues that this
attribution ‘carries no weight whatever’, and places the play in three hands belonging to
the 1620s.96 The play is listed as a comedy.97 Its auspices are unknown.98 The play was
not published until 1812; its manuscript remains in the Dyce Collection at the Victoria and
Albert Museum.99

The dating of the play during the last years of the Jacobean era is significant in terms
of its consideration of the idea of royal ‘prerogative’ in friendship during a time when
King James’ friendship with Buckingham was under scrutiny. Curtis Perry sees the play as
engaging with the wrangling over Buckingham’s favour and specifically, his 1619

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94 Seneca qtd in Robert Burton, in The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. by Thomas C. Faulkner, Nicolas K.
Subsec. 1, p. 105, lines 31-32.
95 Introduction to The Faithful Friends prepared by G.M. Pinciss and G.R. Proudfoot for The Malone Society
96 Pinciss, xv; Schoenbaum and Harbage date the plays limits as 1613- c. 1621 in Annals, p. 104.
97 Pinciss, v.
98 Annals, p. 105.
99 Pinciss, v.
advancement to admiral in the navy. Indeed, the play mirrors this situation in part, through the promotion of young Tullius to Roman general by the King. As Perry’s work does a fine job of examining the idea of the King’s ‘prerogative pleasures,’ this section’s focus is on the representation of Aramanus, written as an ideal friend to Tullius. Of all of the depictions of the ideal friend considered in this chapter, Aramanus’ practice of friendship engages most with the classical ideal, and equally, Montaigne’s view. His character serves as the touchstone for perfect friendship against which other friendships and relationships in the play can be measured. It is his friendship for, however, rather than friendship with, Tullius that the dramatist underscores, thus highlighting its asymmetrical nature and testing the idea of application of friendship theory through individual interpretation and exercise.

G.M. Pinciss suggests that the play demonstrates ‘some knowledge of a schoolboy’s classics’. This idea is borne out not only in the play’s Roman setting and the use of Marcus Tullius as a name for one of the friends, but also in the play’s engagement with classical ideas of perfect friendship and specifically, through the construction of the ideal friend, Aramanus. He is given no other function or ‘life’ in the play other than that of an ideal friend in the best classical sense. Defined in the dramatis personae in the manuscript as merely ‘Friend to young Tullius’, he is unlike Tullius’ other friend, Marius, who is deemed a brother, a lover as well as a friend. After the initial test and resolution of friendship where Aramanus proves steadfast, he is no longer part of the play or the main plot’s resolution, when Tullius and Philadelphia are reunited and Marius and Laelia

101 perry, p.5.
102 pinciss, xv.
matched. Amidst a constellation of less than perfect friendships, Aramanus’ practice of friendship stands out and highlights the lesser nature of friendships of utility between Rufinus and the King, and delectation\textsuperscript{104} among Snipsnap, Blacksnout and Calveskin. It also stands in sharp contrast to that of his friend, Tullius, who lays claim to perfect friendship’s laws and reaps its fruits, but does not attend as carefully to its practice.

Montaigne’s description of his impetus for friendship with Boëtie resonates in the play, as the anonymous dramatist(s) underscores that Aramanus’ ‘yoke’ of friendship, is similarly ‘guided by vertue and conduct of reason’.\textsuperscript{105} Tullius’ virtue is held up at intervals to counteract the accusations of his elevation by favour, but also, importantly, because this is a precondition for perfect friendship. It is one that the dramatist underscores through several characters commenting on Tullius’ virtue. As such, the basis for Aramanus’ affection and practice is established in line with classical precedent. Tullius is deemed ‘truly Vertuous’ (fol. 4b 151).\textsuperscript{106} But the dramatist (s) problematises the idea of discerning virtue, especially later in the play, as jealousy and distrust, coupled with revenge become apparent in the purportedly virtuous Tullius, leading him to turn against his friend. The play equally holds up Aramanus’ integrity, but in this regard the practice fits the verbal assertion of his virtue. Tullius refers to Aramanus as ‘thou best of men, a true and faithful friend’, saying ‘I know thy love, and valor / both exceed comparision’ (fol. 11a 720-722). Even though Tullius declares that Marius’ company in combat is ‘a second life to mee’ (fol. 6b 318), the play bears out a literal interpretation of this rather than a theoretical one of ‘another self’; for it is Aramanus whom he entrusts with caring for his prize possession, wife Philadelphia, while he is away.

\textsuperscript{104} These are considered pleasurable friendships in Aristotle, \textit{The Ethiques of Aristotle} trans. by John Wilkinson (London: Richard Grafton, 1547), sig. J7\textsuperscript{r}. Hereafter: \textit{Ethiques}, Wilkinson.

\textsuperscript{105} Montaigne, \textit{Essays}, Florio, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{106} All references to the play are attributed by folio and line numbers.
The first glimpse of the asymmetrical nature of the friendship however, is evident when Tullius fails to understand that his lack of expectation that Aramanus would accompany him to battle is an affront to friendship. To a perfect friend such as Aramanus, even the thought that he would be willing to remain behind would cast doubt on his steadfastness in friendship. This scene exposes the disjunction possible in idealised friendship as individual perspective precludes consummate unity of ‘one soul in two bodies’. Tullius and Aramanus view, understand, and most importantly, apply, the rules of friendship differently, even though they both are familiar with, and invoke the parlance of perfect friendship. The dramatist problematises the application of the ideal and tests its viability through Aramanus’ sole exercise as giver. Through Aramanus he underscores the potential for disappointment in friendship, when one’s practice and belief in the reciprocal obligation of the ideal is unmatched by the friend. Aramanus’ objection to being left behind arises from his understanding that the perfect friend is willing and expected to sacrifice his life if need be for his friend. Tullius on the other hand, does not recognise this obligation or others that friendship imposes, only its rewards. Tullius’ terse ‘farewell [my] dearest freinde’ upon his departure, and Aramanus’ heartfelt response point up their different understandings (fol. 11a 713). Affronted that he would be thought to consider abandoning his friend who is marching into danger, Aramanus says, appealing to the laws of constancy in friendship:

> you wrong me friend [sic] to thinke my love so faint
to leave you now, no thoe your way were through
hels pitchy Cave, without a Sibells clue Ide fol.lowe ye Sands shall be numbred first, the heavens stand still, earth fly her Center, before death or (fol. 11a 715-719)

107 All brackets in quoted text in this section are those of its editors.
Here Aramanus’ assertion that he would follow his friend to Hell is exaggerated, but generally, so is the classical claim of the existence of ideal friendship. The goal is to convince Tullius of his constancy, and the paradigmatic perfect friendship appeal is the recognised way to do so. Tullius interrupts Aramanus’ ‘death or’ mid sentence, reassuring him: ‘forbeare thou best of men, a true and faithfull friend / urge not what cannot bee, / I know thy love, and valor / both exceed comparision, yet now thou must not goe’ (fol. 11a 720-722). Tullius suggests that Aramanus has not only rhetorically convinced him of his constancy, but has proven it previously.

Tullius’ wariness about his enemies seizing the opportunity to dishonour him while he is away is his priority. Aramanus is to assume the role of ‘domestic governor’ in his stead and battle with those who might try to assault Philadelphia’s honour. Tullius instructs him: ‘be thou her comfort, and believe me friend / the least of these, more, mutch more I esteeme / then if they manly brest should stand a shield [sic] / twixt mee and thousand perills’ (fol. 11b 732-735). Replaceability is a hallmark of perfect friendship narratives. A willingness to take the friend’s place in the face of threat was an important part of what made Damon and Pythias, Orestes and Pylades and Titus and Gesippus perfect pairs. Here Aramanus’ friendship is to undergo its own ultimate test, as Tullius appoints him to stand in his stead as guardian of Philadelphia’s chastity. This may seem like a tricky proposition (and is a situation other dramatists examine), but it is one that allows Tullius to acknowledge his faith in the amicable bond and Aramanus’ virtue. In a more literal sense, it may be viewed as aligned with the idea of the friend as ‘another self’. Montaigne registered a similar understanding of confidence in the perfect friend, when he

said of Boëtie: ‘I would (verily) rather have trusted him concerning any matter of mine, than my selfe’. ¹⁰⁹

In his care of Philadelphia, Aramanus’ practice of ideal friendship rests on protecting Tullius’ honour, albeit at home. Ironically, the situation constructed for him to demonstrate his constancy may have at first appeared less sacrificial than that of a willingness to die for Tullius in battle, as Patroclus did Achilles. However, in protecting Tullius’ honour, Aramanus jeopardises himself, as he disregards the King’s wishes. The King has promoted Tullius to general, not out of favour or friendship, but rather, as it is suggested early in the play, to ensure that he gains unfettered access to Philadelphia, the object of his desire. The key to access rests with Aramanus, whom the King tries to enlist through Rufinus to act as pandar. When Aramanus tells Philadelphia, ‘I come to sue for Love’ expounding, ‘such Love as Tullius shall enjoy / when he lyes panting in these Ivory Armes’ (fol. 16a 1141, 1144-1145), an audience would reasonably assume that Aramanus has failed the test of friendship, just as Philadelphia does. A forty-four line exchange between wife and friend takes place, heightening the dramatic tension (reminiscent of Wendoll and Anne’s in Heywood’s *A Woman Killed with Kindness*), as Philadelphia reproves Aramanus by appealing to inconstancy in friendship. She says:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{can you imagain I would trust my truth} \\
\text{or virgin honor, or the unspotted white} \\
\text{which Tullius neare unclaspt yet with a man} \\
\text{that proves so faithless to so good a friend (fol. 16 b 1173-1176).}
\end{align*}
\]

When Aramanus reveals that he is suing for the King and not himself, his obligation as friend and subject are tested, as is Philadelphia’s as wife and subject. ‘Tis for the King’

declares Aramanus, adding, ‘whose awfull dread Comaund / must be obeyd before our owne desires’ (fol. 17a 1189-1190). When Aramanus discloses to Philadelphia that ‘what I spake / was only to confirme my sacred thoughts / of thy religious virtue’(fol. 17a 1206-1209), he acknowledges that from the outset he has privileged private friendship over that of the King’s. In this Aramanus is written as an ideal friend as Montaigne envisioned him, one who privileges private friendship, recognising that ‘a singular and principall friendship dissolveth all other duties, & freeth all other obligations’. 110

Curiously, his obligation as friend of Tullius extends to Philadelphia even when Tullius is present. The dramatist expands the scope of ideal friend beyond what was evidenced in Arden, as here the friend becomes a different sort of mediator between husband and wife, as not only keeper of the wife’s chastity, but also her chief source of consolation. It is a role familiar to the ideal friend, but here Tullius charges Aramanus with his wife’s emotional care. Perhaps in another nod to the interchangeable nature of ideal friends, the role normally reserved for Tullius as comforter of his wife, he passes to Aramanus. This responsibility establishes a sense of the close bond between Aramanus and Philadelphia, which may raise audience’s suspicions in the scene where Aramanus tempts Philadelphia, but it may also be read as the use of the friend and the expectation of the extension of friendship to the wife after marriage. When Plutarch speaks of ‘brotherly love’ in his Moralia he suggests that this is requisite between brethren:

but better it would be farre, if thy love and kind affections be extended as far as to their wives fathers and daughters husbands, by carrying a

110 Montaigne, Essays, Florio, p. 94.
This idea is borne out in the play, as Philadelphia becomes the shared interest and concern of the husband and the friend, drawing them closer, as the translation of her name—‘brotherly love’—suggests. In this instance, Tullius tasks Aramanus to intervene on his behalf alerting Philadelphia to his impending departure. Tullius enjoins him, ‘Worthy friend, / take off the [greife] edge of Philadelphas [sic] greefe / for this short separation, be you the first / that shall acquaint her with my great Comannd / it will abate some of the bitternes’ (fol. 5a, 215-219). Aramanus’ reliability and usefulness as comforter is made manifest here, as is the sense of his indispensability to the marriage. The dramatist suggests a broadened scope to the ideal friend’s practice of friendship which is not viewed as interference, but rather, welcomed and expected. It is involvement on which Philadelphia has come to rely:

My Lords best friend, best welcome
oh Aramanus, free my sad fears from this
same killing sound, that flys from vulgar mouthes
words dipt in Gall have pearct my quickest sence
must Tulius leave mee (fol. 9 b, 563-567).

Despite Aramanus’ diligent practice of friendship, Tullius’ trust in him is short-lived, as Tullius’ jealousy and cuckold anxiety become the pretext for his willingness to believe accusations against Aramanus. Blinded by self-interest and the belief that ‘where shee falls, my fame is perished, / [...] all my name / lost and undone to all eternitie’ (fol. 35b 2724-2727), Tullius subordinates friendship to reputation. The sense of the asymmetrical

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nature and understanding of this friendship is heightened as Tullius denounces Aramanus as a false friend, without explanation, deeming him a ‘villin’ (fol. 26 b 1976). His censure is severe and includes the worst possible condemnation for an ideal friend: a negative comparison of their friendship with that of Orestes and Pylades. When Tullius says ‘the Storie of Orestes, was a fable’ (fol. 26 b 1977), he implies that his Pylades, Aramanus, has proved inconstant. Even though his doubt of Aramanus ‘is wholly inconsistent with Friendship’ according to classical precedent,\(^{112}\) his soliloquy invokes the parlance of perfect friendship—co-joined souls, similitude, and sympathy—underscoring his familiarity with the duties and applicable rhetoric, if not with the practice.\(^ {113}\) Tullius says:

\begin{quote}
but Aramanus to see, the Antipathy twixt love and friendship as if it were ingrafted in the soule in which there is more pleasure then desire in will and in affection, like twoe harts close up both in a mould that if one dye the poisonous infection kills the other I would I could forget thee for mee thinks Im’e neare lone when I remember thee such sympathie conditions manners speech studies, pleasures, inclinations bearing contynuall one thought and motion for such are perfect friends. (fol. 30a, 2282 -2294)
\end{quote}

The irony of course is that Aramanus has proved ever constant, the epitome of perfection in friendship. His own soliloquy preceding Tullius’ outlines his unceasing attempt to find


his friend and avenge what he believes is his friend’s death. Further, the adjoining soliloquies highlight the striking difference between friendship’s theory and practice. Unlike Tullius’, Aramanus’ actions have been consistent with his rhetorical assertions of friendship. His soliloquy supports his earlier affirmation of his willingness to move Heaven and Hell for his friend:

> Thrice has my horse overthrown mee, the last tyme
> feel starke dead under mee ominous signes,
> the scortching beames too, weakens and makes faint
> my brused limbs that I of force must rest, if rest dares
> steale into the dwelling place of greefe and care (30 a 2255-2259).

In the end, Tullius cannot kill Aramanus, and accepts his friend’s version of the truth. His apology however, is understated and falls short: ‘pardon mee / thus will I begg it from thee, jealousie and frantic rage [...] put mee past my selfe’ (fol. 31b 2405-2409). It sharply contrasts with his seventy-eight line intermittent, vitriolic denunciation of Aramanus and their friendship that preceded it, demonstrating that in the end the gulf between their understandings of friendship remains. Shortly thereafter, Aramanus is no longer of functional use to the play, nor necessary for the final seven hundred and eighteen line resolution. In the final scene, there is a question as to whether he is on stage, as the stage direction reads: ‘Enter Philadelphia, Marius, Lelia etc’ (fol. 42a). If not, he is noticeably absent, for when the King refers to having ‘tryed you all’ in the end, it is the friend, Aramanus, and the wife, Philadelphia who have earned his title of ‘worthy’ (fol. 42a 3182). Thus the play ends with a nod to the successful undertaking of the duties of friendship and marriage. It reinforces the play’s preoccupation with constancy through
two characters that were written to embody this ideal, the perfect friend and wife,
suggesting that the title may not have anything to do with Tullius.

VI. The Lady’s Trial

The Lady’s Trial was licensed on 3 May 1638 and was staged the same year at the Cockpit
theatre under the auspices of Beeston’s Boys.114 Its first and only early edition was printed
in 1639.115 The play has been classified as both a comedy and tragicomedy.116 It was the
final play written by John Ford, who was educated at Exeter College, Oxford, and was a
member of the Middle Temple.117 It is a play that is frequently disregarded in favour of
Ford’s other works, namely, ‘Tis a Pity She’s a Whore, The Broken Heart and Love’s
Sacrifice. It is generally not included in modern editions or compilations of Ford’s
plays.118 According to Michael Neill, The Lady’s Trial is one of Ford’s later plays which
evidences ‘a falling-off in dramatic power’.119 Relating that it represents Ford’s ‘last
reworking of the Othello story’, Neill analogises the play’s Aurelio to Iago, but deems him
a ‘benign-Iago-figure’.120 Despite this interesting comparison, Aurelio has not been
subject to critical scrutiny. This section undertakes that work and highlights Ford’s unique

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114 Annals, pp. 136-137; See also, Michael Neill, ‘Introduction’ in John Ford: Critical Re-Visions ed. by
Stage 1574-1642 3rd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.238; The managers of
Beeston’s Boys (1637-1641) included Christopher Beeston, William Beeston and William Davenant, see
Annals, p. 297.
and Schoenbaum, p. 137;
116 Michael Neill and John S. Keltie classify it as a tragicomedy. See Neill, ‘John Ford’ in DNB and Keltie,
(Edinburgh: Nisnmo, 1875), pp. 460-461 (p. 460); Harbage and Schoenbaum classify it as a tragedy in
Annals, p. 137.
117 Neill, DNB.
118 Modern editions are dated 1811, 1831, 1851 and an un-published PhD thesis in 1989 by Katsuhiko
Nogami. John S. Keltie includes it in his Works of British Dramatists. This is one of the more recent
published ‘editions’, dated 1875, although it is part of a larger, selected work; Dorothy Farr takes this idea up
noting that the play is also ‘little known’ in John Ford and the Caroline Theatre (London and Basingstoke:
119 ‘Ford’, DNB.
120 ‘Ford’, DNB.
figuring and testing of the ideal friend who has evolved since Lyly’s Eumenides into a more complex and contextually resonant, self-interested friend, whose ardent asymmetrical practice of friendship is problematic.

Fords plays were written ‘almost exclusively’ for the private theatres, where well-educated gentleman fully acquainted with classical ideas of friendship, were attendant. His work reflects the influence of his connection with the Neo-Stoic movement from which he was familiar and embraced in his early prose works *The Golden Meane* (1613) and *A Line of Life* (1620); it was a movement which demonstrated an appreciation of those parts of Stoic ethics compatible with Christianity, namely constancy and virtue, that was also evident in the work of Montaigne. These two Stoic ideals inform *The Lady’s Trial*, a play that as its title suggests, tests a wife’s fidelity, but also, calls into question, the friend’s; but in a way dissimilar to *The Faithful Friends* and perfect friendship narratives. Rather, it tests the limits of close male friendships as mirrored in life.

Ford’s ties with the Inns and his patrons at Court provided individual experiences with friendship and led to connections with (as opposed to intimate involvement in), failed, high-profile ones, including those of the Earl of Essex and Francis Bacon, and Thomas Overbury and Robert Carr, Earl of Somerset, favourite of James 1. Ford had ‘sympathetic links’ with the Essex circle, according to Neill, and was associated with Overbury as a fellow member of the Middle Temple. He contributed to Overbury’s poetry and chronicled the ‘Overbury affair’ in a lost work entitled *Sir Thomas Overbury’s Ghost*. Both Essex and Overbury’s friendships failed, and to differing degrees, can be said to have been an aggravating factor in their deaths. For Essex it was the failure to attend to Bacon’s

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121 See chapter 1 of this thesis; see also, ‘Neo-stoicism’ (4 May 2005) by John Sellars, Wolfson College, Oxford University in *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ed. by James Fieser at the University of Tennessee at Martin.

122 ‘Ford’, *DNB*.

123 ‘Ford’, *DNB*. 
advice to curb his ‘vaulting ambition’; for Overbury, as Bacon claimed, it was his ‘excess’ of friendship for Somerset, which ‘ended in mortal hatred’. John Ford’s understanding of the events surrounding both incidents, and the proceedings of subsequent trials all prosecuted by Bacon, may have influenced his figuring of friendship in The Lady’s Trial at the end of his career. There are certainly striking comparisons that can be drawn from the Overbury case—through Bacon’s account—and Ford’s depiction of the ideal friend, Aurelio, in The Lady’s Trial. This will be examined in the latter part of this discussion.

In his examination of love and friendship in The Ladies Trial and Love’s Sacrifice Brian Opie observes that in the plays Ford is working out how both relationships can endure in a world ‘incapable of sustaining’ them. Certainly the earlier, contemporary examples may have contributed to Ford’s view and would perhaps still resonate amongst the gentlemen in attendance within the intimate space of the Cockpit. But while Othello, from which Ford draws, reflects Bacon’s idea that ‘there is little friendship in the world’, The Ladies Trial imagines a different world, where unmatched degrees of attachment and individual understanding of the obligations in friendship contributes to an altogether different type of asymmetrical practice, one in which there can be too much of a good thing.

Disproportionate intensity of feeling in male friendship is not an infrequent consideration in drama, as Alan Sinfield’s work on The Merchant of Venice and Twelfth Night has shown. In this chapter its seeds were evident in Arden of Faversham in a similar way that it presents itself in The Lady’s Trial, as the practice of the ideal friend presses against the friend’s marriage. But Aurelio is even more ardent and intrusive in his

125 Opie, p. 235.
practice than Franklin. Rather than Neill’s good-natured Iago characterisation (if that’s not a contradiction in terms), it might be more appropriate to view Aurelio as a rule-obsessed, over-zealous friend, for his intelligence does not derive from purposeful inventive deception, but misconstruction of a compromising situation because he prioritises friendship compulsively. He approaches his friendship with Auria like a martinet; not only in the precision with which he attempts to apply its classical edicts, but in the way he views its reciprocal responsibilities. His first words upon his entrance in Act 1 support this idea. He responds to Auria’s enthusiastic greeting of ‘See, see! / Yet in another I am rich, a friend, / A perfect one, Aurelio’ with the objection: ‘No stranger to your bosom, sir, ere now, / You might have sorted me in your resolves, / Companion of your fortunes’ (1.1).

Aurelio’s reproof stems from Auria’s unwillingness to seek his counsel and tell his friend of his plans to head to the wars to recover his dwindling fortunes. Aurelio views Auria’s concealment as an affront to friendship and does not accept Auria’s explanation claiming, ‘twas not friendly spoken’ (1.1). But it becomes clear from the outset that Auria has failed to seek Aurelio’s advice because it has been historically antithetical to Auria’s exercising autonomy in personal affairs, namely, his choice of a wife.

The strict interpretation of the ideal friendship principle requiring ‘al one mynde or wyll’, suggests a type of unity that appears to subordinate the self. But as Laurie Shannon has shown in her consideration of Ciceronean and Stoic thought, friendship’s

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127 Reporting of information gathered to Auria, rather than intellectual capacity.
128 John Ford, *The Ladies Trial* in *The Works of British Dramatists* ed. by John S. Keltie (Edinburgh: Nimmo, 1875), pp.461-482. All future references are from this edition. There are no line numbers, only act and scene divisions corresponding with the first edition.
129 Erasmus credits Pythagoras as the originator of this idea in Desiderius Erasmus, *Proverbes or Adagies* (London: Richard Bankes, 1539), sig. G5; ‘Tom MacFaul has noticed something similar arguing that “friendship which relies too much on the concept of equality ultimately makes people less themselves” in Male Friendship in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 196.
unity does not equate with a loss of personal sovereignty.\textsuperscript{130} She explains that ‘friendship’s first figure is the self’, a self that is ‘autonomous and integral’.\textsuperscript{131} This idea helps to elucidate the friendship of Auria and Aurelio. Written as merely an ideal friend, Aurelio is given no ‘self’, whereas Auria is given not only a life and a self, but also, a wife. This is why the friends differ in their approach to friendship, as Auria seeks to maintain personal autonomy, whilst Aurelio embodies the literal belief in the common mind and will of the ideal. He is not content to merely offer advice on an \textit{ad hoc} basis for he has a personal investment in Auria as his ‘other self’. He heeds classical friendship’s call to counsel as a continual directive to action, rather than an assistive measure arising by situation or request. When Auria seeks to explain his rationale for leaving his wife to repair his financial state, saying ‘Hear me further’, Aurelio interrupts him disapprovingly saying:

\begin{quote}
Auria, take heed the covert of a folly \\
Willing to range, be not, without excuse, \\
Discover’d in the coinage of untruths; \\
I use no harder language. Thou art near \\
Already on a shipwreck, in forsaking \\
The holy land of friendship [and forbearing] \\
To talk your wants— Fie! (1.1)\textsuperscript{132}
\end{quote}

Aurelio adds to the charges against Auria’s practice of friendship by suggesting that because Auria has failed to alert him to his decreasing coffers, he has prevented Aurelio from demonstrating his constancy in adversity. In perfect friendship, this imperative is

\textsuperscript{131} Shannon, p. 30.  
\textsuperscript{132} In the penultimate line of the Keltie edition reads ‘[and forbearing]’. In the 1639 edition it reads ‘forsaking’ in John Ford, \textit{The Ladies Triall} (London : Printed by E[dward] G[ riffin] for Henry Shephard, 1639) sig. B3'.
sacrosanct, and Aurelio escalates its importance more so than Aramanus in *The Faithful Friends*, by suggesting that Auria’s breach is akin to breaking a holy law. The invocation of the ‘holy land’ elevates the status of friendship by locating it in a hallowed realm. But the ‘holy land’ was also the place where betrayal and denial of friends occurred and this allusion may also be an implied suggestion of the proximity this contravention comes to disloyalty in Aurelio’s eyes. Equally, there is a hint here that Aurelio views Auria as ungrateful for his friendly help.

The problem is that Aurelio does not trust Auria’s judgement, as suggested by his claim:

He who prescribes no law,
No limits of condition to the objects
Of his affection, but will merely wed
A face, because ‘tis round, or limn'd by nature
In purest red and white; or at the best,
For that his mistresse owes an excellence
Of qualities, knows when and how to speak,
Where to keep silence, with fit reasons why,
Whose virtues are her only dower else
In either kind, ought of himself to master
Such fortunes as add fuel to their loves;
For otherwise---but herein I am idle,
Have fool’d to little purpose (1.1)

Aurelio sees Auria’s marital choice as moved by passion, not reason, and as such, he is concerned by what he believes is his friend’s inability to see things clearly. As such, he appoints himself as guardian and protector of Auria’s reputation with an almost religious fervour. Like Aramanus in *The Faithful Friends*, Aurelio stands in the husband’s stead, but his inability to recognise both physical and emotional boundaries between friendship
and marriage renders his actions intrusive, and is mirrored in his unwarranted entry into Spinella’s bedchamber where he misconstrues events. Ironically, his own affection for Auria actually clouds his vision, for it is his perception of the bedchamber incident as infidelity that leads to the trial of the innocent Spinella. In this instance it is Auria, the friend whom Aurelio believes to be guided by passion, who remains steadfast and rational. When Aurelio calls for revenge, in an un-Othello-like response Auria declares, ‘Revenge! for what? uncharitable friend / On whom? lets speak a little, pray with reason’ (3.3). Left to care for Spinella Aurelio takes this as his chance to prove his friendship—something Auria has previously denied him in the refusal of counsel—and this is what drives his zealous undertaking and clouds his perception of events.

This also informs his lack of remorse that borders on recalcitrance. In two instances where self-scrutiny and self-transformation are possible, Aurelio instead defends his actions against Auria’s reproof that his ‘rash indiscretion was the bellows / Which blew the coal (now kindled to a flame)’ (3.3). Aurelio’s unapologetic and unwavering responses signal an unwillingness to be viewed as causing distress, as this is contrary to the role of the friend. But an audience is left to wonder if Aurelio protests too much. Perhaps, however, even though his actions may have done more harm than good, if understood in the context of his keen sense of duty as a friend that the play establishes in Act 1, they appear motivated less by Iago-like jealousy, and more by his raison d’être as merely ‘a friend to Auria’. Ford gives him no other life but that of a friend who tests the limits of friendship, and in the end, continues to assert resolute constancy in friendship, by

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declaring unapologetically that he would do the same again: ‘hear and believe it, / What I have done, was well done and well meant; / Twenty times over, were it new to do, / I’d do’t and do’t, and boast the pains religious’ (3.3). Similar to Gesippus in Foxe’s play, Aurelio prefers death to dissolution of friendship, telling Auria ‘Yet since you shake me off, I slightly value / Other severity’ (3.3).

In effect, the ideal friend that Ford presents in Aurelio is strikingly similar in some ways to Francis Bacon’s characterisation of Overbury, whose ‘excess’ of friendship for Somerset led to his downfall. In his account of the Somerset prosecution for poisoning Overbury, Francis Bacon describes Overbury’s friendship for Somerset:

Sir Thomas Overbury for a long time was known to have had great interest and great friendship with my Lord of Somerset, both in his meaner fortunes and after; insomuch as he was a kind of oracle of direction unto him.135

Overbury, too, opposed his friend’s marital choice, deeming Frances Howard ‘an unworthy woman’, but perhaps for less altruistic reasons.136 Bacon relates that ‘when Overbury saw that he was like to be dispossessed of my Lord here [Somerset], whom he had possessed so long, [...] he began not only to dissuade, but to deter him from that love and marriage’.137 Ford parallels this idea in The Lady’s Trial. Spinella accuses Aurelio with misconstruing the incident in the bedchamber out of a desire to regain his place in Auria’s affection:

While you, belike,
Are furnish’d with some news for entertainment,
Which must become your friendship, to be knit
More fast betwixt your souls, by my removal,
Both from his heart and memory! (2.4)

136 Bacon, ‘Charge’, p. 319.
137 Bacon, ‘Charge’, p. 319.
She recognises Aurelio’s strict attendance to friendship’s precedents and understands this ‘must’ compel him to report back to Auria. Despite the play’s outcome in which the marriage bond remains strong and friendship maintained, Ford’s play, like the Somerset prosecution, signals the danger of friendship’s ‘excess’. In Ford, it arises from a friend who practices friendship with rule-directed intensity, taking the ‘zeale’ that Cicero claims is ‘bredde in freendes’ too far.\textsuperscript{138}

This chapter explored the various pressures placed on classical principles of friendship when put into practice in works that figured a further developed, ideal friend as an integral part of the action. The plays all point up the usefulness of the friend to plot, theme, and overall understanding. At the same time, the works emphasised problems leading to asymmetrical practice including individual interpretation of friendship’s obligations, unequal affection, and differing degrees of investment in friendship. The next chapter moves a step further away from the ideal in its consideration of friendships of utility, where asymmetry of interest and reward drive its practice, further complicating friendship’s affective dimension.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{The Booke of Frendeshipe}, Newton, sig. B3'.
Chapter 4

‘Measuring Amity’:
Benefit, Fidelity and Performance in Friendships of Utility

The grief was palpable on 4 December 1572 at the Lancashire funeral of Edward Stanley, Earl of Derby, as attendants ‘with weeping hearts’ were ‘kneelinge on their knees’ while the earl was laid to rest. This unmistakable graveside anguish recorded in the funeral account was not that of Stanley’s family, however, but rather, that of his yeomen, gentlemen ushers, comptroller Henry Stanley of Cross Hall; treasurer, Sir Richard Shireburn; and steward, William Massey, who symbolically ‘brake their white staves and roddes’of office ‘over their heads and threw the slivers of the same into the grave’. For these men, the future was uncertain, as the relationship they had with Stanley came to an end with his death. As the work of Alan Bray, Paul Hammond, Stephen Orgel, Eve Sedgwick and Curtis Perry suggest, reading homosocial relations during this period can be problematic. This scene at Stanley’s funeral is no exception. Were the men merely followers, similar to men Francis Bacon described in ‘Of Followers and Friends’, or were

3 Derby’s generosity to his ‘men’ is well-documented, as some of his retainers benefited financially through leases of lands, whilst other men rose in the ranks of public office—e.g. Sir Piers Legh—during the earl’s tenure. Whilst many would continue in the family’s service, how Stanley’s heir would measure up to the Earl’s ‘godly disposition’ was an unknown and undoubtedly a source of anxiety. See Wendy Walters-DiTraglia, ‘Death’, pp. 108-109.
they friends? Were the tears the men shed those of grief, as their bond with Stanley ‘went beyond the more contractual implications of faithfulness’ that Mervyn James notes at times occurred in lord-affinity relations,⁵ or were they demonstrative of more than a hint of apprehension over their future livelihoods? As James suggests, there was a close link that existed between ‘friendship, trust and fidelity’ in relationships of a lord and his followers, where faithful service was rewarded with ‘friendship’.⁶ But this type of friendship is unique in that it appears to move even farther from the ideal, as it is based on inequality, figured in terms of necessity and reward and not compelled by virtue or love. Despite this distance from the ideal, Aristotle recognises this as one ‘Of the kindes of Amitee’.⁷ Albeit distinct from the ‘good’, it is of the sort that he describes as ‘profytable’, and ‘loved’ for ‘gaines’.⁸ He does not however, endorse its practice. Although he delineates it as a lesser form of friendship, he sees it as friendship nonetheless. Even so, he outlines its drawbacks as similar to another lesser form of friendship, ‘delectation’, in that it ‘indureth so long as indureth the delectation and the perfite’.⁹ As James O. Grunebaum observes, Aristotle’s conceptions of friendship are differentiated only by the bases for them: virtue, utility or pleasure.¹⁰ He does not consider the idea of affection in relation to these formulations.¹¹ He does, however, draw an important similarity between the three. Grunebaum explains that in Aristotle’s ideal and ‘less than ideal’ formulations ‘mutual assistance through reciprocal goodwill' is seen as ‘essential’.¹² In this way, all three formulations forward benefit.

⁸ Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig.H4r.
¹¹ Grunebaum, p. 38.
¹² Grunebaum, pp. 31-32.
Cicero does not recognise this as friendship, for it lacks the foundation in affection and virtue. He claims ‘friendship prowles not after profit’. Similarly, Seneca views true friendship as ‘based on natural instinct and beneficence’ rather than ‘expediency or utility’, and sees the latter as motivated by ‘self-interest’. And self-interest is the key. In the previous chapter, the examination of constructions of ideal friends who dramatists figured as men rather than archetypes with ‘one soul’ exposed the illusion of similitude in friendship, as individual men understood, viewed, practiced and prioritised friendship differently. Some clung to the vestiges of the classical ideal and imposed their application on their friends assiduously. They were sometimes disappointed and frustrated as their friends recognised friendship’s benefits but did not match its obligations equally. The gap between self-interested friendship and disinterested friendship led to asymmetrical practice. In friendships for profit, which from this point on will be referred to as friendships of utility (based on later translations of Aristotle), variable asymmetrical practice was understood by both parties and was its hallmark. It was a type of friendship that Francis Bacon lamented, when he closed ‘Of Followers and Friends’ with the words: ‘there is little friendship in the world’, adding, ‘That that is, is betweene superior and inferiour, whose fortunes may comprehend, the one the other’.

Practice of this type of friendship was not measured through application of classical ideals of counsel and succour, or magnanimous sacrifice. It was based on the exchange of specific benefits that varied according to its individual participants. Generally speaking, these were of a more demonstrable nature, yet not necessarily material. So while the men

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at Stanley’s funeral in no way equalled him in rank, status or economic standing and as such could not reciprocate his beneficence materially, they could demonstrate gratitude in other, more symbolic ways that would promote his reputation: in the loyal diligence with which they undertook their offices, and in memoriam. In this way, the private province of friendship became somewhat muted to its public link with affinity, honour and reputation. Practice became more akin to performance, sometimes on a grand scale, like the Stanley funeral. The problem of course, is that some of these bonds may have engendered private affection, as well as loyalty amongst its participants. Lorna Hutson explains that in the sixteenth century friendship underwent a ‘transformation’ from ‘a code of “faithfulness” to ‘that of an instrumental and affective relationship which might be generated, even between strangers, through emotionally persuasive communication, or the exchange of persuasive texts’.16 Determining the genuine degree of the affective bond generated through such performances, and indeed, discerning if a reciprocal one existed at all could be a difficult task, especially given the abandonment of the classical idea that like virtue was a prerequisite of friendship.

While the previous chapter recounted dramatic depictions of the ‘fruits of friendship’ realised by some friends who nobly, and even religiously, ‘practised’ it, this chapter examines the sweet rewards of amity that also engendered the establishment of friendships of utility. Here the focus will be the rhetoric, scripting and performance of utilitarian friendship in obsequies, Court of Chivalry proceedings, and the Inns of Court and public stages. This exploration moves from history to drama and back to history, with philosophical principles invoked when necessary, beginning with a consideration of the inherited manorial system, its sixteenth century transformation altering the way bonds

between lords and their affinity were structured in the period. In order to accurately
historicise the work, a discussion of early modern gentry concerns of status, reputation and
hospitality is included. Seneca’s *De beneficiis* is employed as a comparative text when
valuable, as are references to Cicero’s *De amicitia* and *De officiis*. This provides the
context for a re-consideration of the anonymous *Timon* (1602-3) and Thomas Heywood’s
*A Woman Killed with Kindness* (1603) and will form the basis of an examination of the
significance of their textual ‘meanings’ on the nature, philosophy and performance of
utilitarian friendship in gentry culture. The chapter concludes with a look at the rhetoric
employed in epistolary performances of friendship through two of Erasmus’ letters
included in the 1514 combined volume of *De Copia* and *Parabolae* and two of Francis
Bacon’s letters to his friend, Toby Matthew.

The choice of an in-depth interrogation of utilitarian friendship in these two plays stems
from ‘a confluence of feeling’ and understanding that emerges from their review within
this particular historical context, which has not been previously considered in this way. *A
Woman Killed with Kindness* and *Timon* may seem peculiar bedfellows at first glance, as
they are of different genres and were written for different audiences. But their
commonalities are significant, as they are written at a similar time, by dramatists familiar
with the classics, with plots structured around aristocratic and gentry culture wherein

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17 Douglas Kries argues convincingly that *De Officiis* should be read less as a personal letter by Cicero to his
son, Marcus, and more a didactic for the ‘aspiring young statesmen’ in Douglas Kries, ‘On the Intention of
Cicero’s *De Officiis*,’ *The Review of Politics*, 65.4 (Autumn, 2003), 375-393 (p. 379).
18 For *Timon*, later scholarship by Bulman (1974) and agreement by Jowett (2004) sets the dating ‘soon after
Shakespeare, ed. by John Jowett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 1-153 (p. 20). In the
introduction to the Malone Society edition of *Timon*, eds. Bulman, Nosworthy and Proudfoot (1978) set the
limits as 1602-3. This will be the date range settled on here. For *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, earliest
printed text, Q1 1607 in Brian Scobie, ‘Introduction’, *A Woman Killed with Kindness* by Thomas Heywood,
ed. by Brian Scobie (London: A&C Black, 1985; rpt. 2003), vi-xxxvi, (xxviii) and Alfred Harbage *Annals
19 For a description of ‘Who were the gentry?’ see Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes *The Gentry in England
friendships of utility were endemic. More specifically, despite Timon’s Athenian setting, both plays evidence concerns similar to those that Brian Scobie notes of the subplot of A Woman Killed with Kindness, namely, ‘chivalrous values of reputation, gentility and aristocratic pride’, which are ‘medieval in character and social in preoccupation’. And these ideas have a direct relation to an understanding of utilitarian friendships within both plays. Further, through the plays’ respective public and private spaces, of bustling Athens, and isolated country manor in the north, the dramatists paint a shared picture of a persistent loneliness amongst this social group, which drives their elusive pursuit for meaningful and unwavering affective bonds. In doing so, the dramatists problematise the ability to attain and sustain unequal friendships. The genre categories notwithstanding, at the heart of one dramatist’s satire and another’s domestic tragedy is a portrayal of two men who seemingly have it all, but lose much, in their misdirected bids for true friendship.

Both plays have been derided critically, A Woman Killed with Kindness for its subplot and conclusion, most notably by William Hazlitt and TS Eliot, and Timon for its puerile nature when viewed in light of the later tragedy by Shakespeare and Middleton, Timon of Athens. This chapter offers a new reading of both plays, which hopes to overturn those views, examining the plays as a study of utilitarian friendship in gentry culture, based upon the usefulness of its partakers to each other, where position and liberality offer rewards to the recipient and giver alike. Brian Scobie’s useful commentary on Heywood’s subplot and gentle values is a beginning, but this chapter will argue that ‘aristocratic pride’ is

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present in the subplot as well as the main Frankford-Anne-Wendoll plot, presenting itself in ideas and expressions of beneficence and liberality and bound up with reputation, expectation and reward in a similar way that these ideas form the main concern of Timon.

In Natalie Zemon Davis’s study of ‘gift economies’ in sixteenth century France, she relates how hospitable acts of liberality by ‘high-ranking’ householders ‘not only confirmed local ties, but established reputation and rank’. Marcel Mauss’ later study, outlined in The Gift (1923-4) asserts a similar cultural understanding amongst North-West American Indian societies, concluding that ‘in some potlatch systems’ it was believed that ‘the rich man who shows his wealth by spending recklessly is the man who wins prestige’. Zemon Davis and Mauss’ findings posit heightened reputation as a form of remuneration, and along with an in-depth consideration of the conventions of social exchange of friendship in De beneficiis, this idea will be explored in terms of Timon and A Woman Killed with Kindness.

The anonymous Timon is particularly suitable for this discussion because its dramatist, as John Jowett notes, ‘turns around the structural emphasis of Lucian’s dialogue, dealing in considerable length with Timon’s life in Athens’. In doing so the focus is turned to relationships with greater insights provided into friendship’s links with seeking and receiving honour and prestige. Hence, this Timon not only offers an opportunity for contemplation because of its differing representation and critical dismissal, but also because it offers more potential to interrogate ideas of the economies of aristocratic utilitarian friendships, namely, expectation, liberality, reciprocity, reputation and reward. A similar resonance is found in A Woman Killed with Kindness. First however, a survey

of the different discourses—historical, philosophical and legal—where these ideas were explored and the cultural spaces where they were performed will be undertaken to establish the context that will inform the readings.

I. Affinity, Beneficence, Honour and Reputation

Early references to friendship convey a sense of its utilitarian designation and understanding well before the early modern period. To ‘friend’ was used as a verb, meaning ‘to act as friend’ which was described as ‘to assist, to help’.25 In 1400, one connotation for friend was ‘anything helpful’.26 Entries for this understanding of friendship beginning in 120527 places this designation in the midst of the medieval period, where the feudalistic structure was based on a useful system of exchange and reward between lords and their tenants. As Mervyn James notes, the Tudor period however, heralded a change in contractual relations between lords and their followers, which led to a shift in these relationships, as ‘royal authority’ was exercised in tenancy agreements, ‘feudal ties declined’, and ‘the more informal relationship of friendship was all that remained’.28 But the key in James’ analysis is the word ‘informal’. Whilst this may suggest a more casual, familiar type of friendship, which may or may not have included affective bonds, understanding the nature of such friendships is problematic because the relationships still rested firmly on utility, whether it was recognised or deemed as such.

The absence of equality and paramount importance of shared usefulness in such relations

25 ‘Friend’ (v), def. 3 in The Oxford English Dictionary.
26 ‘Friend’ (n), def. 5d in OED.
27 ‘Friend’, def. 5a : ‘One who wishes (another, a cause, etc.) well; a sympathiser, favourer, helper, patron or supporter; a supporter of an institution or the like, contributing help, money, etc.’ (1205 earliest reference) Entry 5c ‘friend in or at court: one who has ability and disposition to help another by his influence in high quarters (1400 earliest reference) in OED.
28 James, pp. 330-331.
are the hallmarks of utilitarian friendship; a bond, as Aristippus advises Carisophus in

*Damon and Pythias* wherein commodity ‘measures’ amity.\(^{29}\)

This understanding of friendship was also an important part of the Elizabethan political culture, structured around what David Harris Sacks terms ‘the countervailing of benefits’ based on Senecan principles of ‘giving and receiving benefits’, which fuelled the patronage system.\(^{30}\) Seneca disavowed friendships for profit, but he recognised that beneficence could engender friendship. In *De beneficiis* he suggests that the giving of a benefit is ‘wherout of sprinketh friendship’, and describes the act of accepting a benefit as ‘receyuing of freendsheipe’.\(^{31}\) The idea of benefit and friendship seems incongruous, but Seneca approaches the idea from a classical perspective which makes the two compatible. Reaffirming the classical call for affection and virtue in friendship, Seneca sees ‘genuine friendship’ as dependent on ‘love and generosity’.\(^{32}\) In this way, benefiting one’s friend is important because it fulfils the requirement that ‘each friend not only perfects himself but also finds the opportunity to assist the other’.\(^{33}\) Much like rules governing friendship, Seneca sets out rules to guide this practice of friendship, because he recognised that relationships frequently disintegrate because men lack an understanding of the principles of giving and receiving benefits. The main problem, according to Seneca, arises from what he views as the most ‘frequent’ vice: ingratitude.\(^{34}\) As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 ingratitude was a frequent complaint in the asymmetrical practice of friendship. This was

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29 Richard Edwards, *Damon and Pythias* (1.14.57-58). Cicero also acknowledges ‘commodities’ in friendship in *The Booke of Freendeshipe*, Newton, sig. B2r. But the rewards emphasised are not material, and mainly the love of the friend, although the word chosen evokes another sense.


32 Motto, p. 10.

33 Motto, p. 11.

a consideration of dramatists in their figuring of characters such as Gesippus, Eumenides and Aurelio. Thomas Elyot, recounting the Titus and Gesippus narrative highlights the potential for the literal dissolution of friendship because of ungratefulness: ‘the ingratitude of Titus, for whom he suffred all that mystery: the remembraunce wherof was so intollerable, that he determined no lenger to lyve in that anguyshe and dolour’. In *De beneficiis* Seneca addresses this problem in order to help men forge and sustain societal bonds of friendship. He outlines in detail the responsibilities of giver and recipient alike, which include using ‘judgement and discretion’ in choosing a recipient, giving without turning it into a ‘debt’, and receiving with ‘thankfulness’.

G. W. Peterson aptly notes that *De beneficiis* provides ‘a definition of what binds human society together’ and the aim is to help men to keep those ties strong. Even so, one can see how friendship that develops and must be sustained by exchange moves further away from the ideal. Additionally, it is apparent how this model could be misconstrued, and misapplied, and approached for gain and profit, rather than an affective bond, rendering friendship the useful commodity that Cicero and Seneca denounced.

On the other hand, Seneca saw how an understanding of the rules of social exchange might be helpful in governing such amicable relations. And there were some formulations of early modern friendship that mirrored Seneca’s understanding that benefits can establish and sustain such ties. Mervyn James talks about friendship relations between lords and their affinity which offered benefit to both parties, with ‘a lord’s friendship’ revealed ‘in the special trust, goodwill and favour extended to a dependant’ which in return obliged ‘a

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36 *De beneficiis*, Lodge, pp. 4-11.
response of fidelity and gratitude’. This reciprocal friendship relationship between the
gentry and their retinue was part of the ‘lineage culture’ James’ work demonstrates was
present in the north (the setting of Heywood’s play) during the sixteenth century, under
families such as the Percies and Nevilles, dramatis personae of Shakespeare’s history
plays. This social bond established between the aristocracy and their retainers, followers
and dependants promoted order through a ‘common allegiance to the great family which
dispensed the benefits of “good lordship” in return for proffered fidelity and obedience’. James cites the use of the term ‘friends’ by the fourth Duke of Norfolk and the earl of
Northumberland to refer to politic relations with dependable followers, and suggests the
likelihood that ‘friendship was increasingly emphasized in the relationship between lord
and affinity’ during the Tudor reign. There is no doubt that fidelity engendered from
these types of reciprocal friendships could be useful, especially during times of unrest and
uprising. A similar understanding was integral to the pageant associated with Elizabeth’s
royal entry discussed in Chapter 1. Here an inclusive definition of friendship between
monarch and subjects was proffered, with the resulting unity portrayed symbolically as a
'rampart for the kingdom'. Even though there is neither a ‘one soul in two bodies’ unity,
nor necessarily an affective connection asserted in this understanding of friendship, there
still remains a reflection of the anticipation of constancy proposed in discussions of the
classical ideal: that ever important help in adversity.

Not only was it thought that these friendships could protect, but also, they were
believed to help promote virtue, much like their classical forerunners. This was significant,

38 James, p. 330; fn 92 p. 330.
39 James, p. 274.
40 James, p. 271.
41 James, p.331, p. 331 fn. 95.
42 The Quenes Majesties Passage through the citie of London to Westminster the daye before her coronacion
(London: Richard Tottel, 1559) in The Queen’s Majesty’s Passage ed. by Germaine Warkentin (Toronto:
Centre for Reformation Studies, 2004), pp. 81, 127 (Appendix III for translation).
in that the obligation of beneficence and the performance of virtuous acts was an integral part of the ‘honour culture’ and ‘chivalric ethos’ amidst the ranks of the aristocracy in the Elizabethan and Stuart periods. Mervyn James notes that a lord’s entry into the ‘community of honour’ required ‘virtuous deeds’, which were aimed at demonstrating ‘the innate quality of his honourable blood’. According to Malcom Smuts, ‘rival claims of education and merit’ by Elizabethan humanists, challenged lineage as ‘a plurality of the published literature stressed the superiority of virtue to birth in conferring honour’. One such work, The Accedens of Armory (1562) by Gerard Legh, highlights this understanding, asserting ‘Noblenes of vertue’is gained ‘by exercise of good workes, with whom they are familiar’. Familiars typically referred to members of ‘one’s family or household’ or those with whom one was ‘extremely friendly’ or otherwise ‘intimately associated’. This definition would extend to those with whom one shared kinship ties, as well as friends. In this way, it would correlate with Seneca’s idea about friendship as providing an opportunity to ‘perfect’ oneself, as well as one’s friend. This idea had greater contemporary resonance however, as more weight was given to the proactive undertaking of deeds that demonstrate virtue. As Legh contends, ‘So much is noblenes of vertue, more precious then noblenes of lignage [sic].’ So while the Cushman sermon cited in Chapter I suggested the public usefulness of acting as a friend to one’s neighbour, there were many individual benefits to be gained from munificence. Public shows of Christian friendship

43 These terms discussed in James, pp. 308-413.
44 James, p. 332. This aspect of lineage conferring honour but ‘supplemented by virtue ‘was represented in the Boke of St. Albans (1486-1610 several printings between this period) and a translation of Lull’s The Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry (1483-5). See James, p. 310.
47 ‘Familiar’, def. 1a, 2 in ’OED.
48 Lydia Ann Motto defines this as ‘the crucial value of friendship’ as per Seneca in Motto, Essays, p. 11.
49 Legh, fol 22’v. This work was brought to my attention in Mervyn James’work. He quotes the second citation himself on p. 332.
could also contribute to the accretion of godly, moral virtue and public reputation, again, tied in with the chivalric concept of honour.\(^{50}\)

This idea of concern for one’s honour and reputation, and the latter’s potential as a transactional commodity is important for our purposes and resonates in posthumous tributes to other gentry at the time. In epitaphs and funeral sermons, men like Thomas Dutton, Esquire of Cheshire, were remembered for their liberality towards their ‘poore friends and neighbours’.\(^{51}\) The inscription on John Warburton’s brass plaque commemorating this Cheshire gentleman’s life remembers Warburton as a ‘friend to the poor’.\(^{52}\) The one hundred poor at Stanley’s funeral attests to his beneficence, which if Stowe’s accounts are correct was substantial, on a daily basis over 35 years.\(^{53}\) While today we would deem someone who was generous a humanitarian, we might not necessarily refer to them as a friend, but in early modern England this was indeed one of the many ‘faces’ of friendship. It corresponds to the inclusive amity discussed as *caritas* in Chapter 1 in relation to Wilkinson's translation of Aristotle’s *Ethics*.\(^{54}\) For men of gentle birth like Dutton, Stanley and Warburton, such acts of friendship could serve a beneficial purpose even after their deaths, in terms of enhancing their social memory and their families’ social identity. This is why the acts were referenced in funeral sermons and

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50 See James, p. 327-330.
52 This section of the brass reads: ‘IN RELIGIONE CONSTANS/ AMATOR LITERARV & AMICVS PAVPERV’ John Warburton (d. 1575), brass plaque in the Warburton Chapel (c. 15th c. chantry chapel), St. Mary and All Saints, Great Budworth, Cheshire. This from Wendy Walters-DiTraglia, ‘Death’, Part pp.35-54, (p. 52).
53 Stowe contends that the earl, as well as feeding ‘especially aged persons, twice a day 60. and beside all comers, thrice a weeke’, also supplied ‘another, 2700. with meate, drink money and money worth’ on ‘Good fryday’ for thirty-five years. In John Stowe, *The Annales or Generall Chronicle of England* (London: Thomas Adams, 1615), p. 673 lines 58 ‘-59’, 3 ‘-6’. Thomas William King suggests that Stowe was incorrect about the holiday, and that it was actually Christmas in ‘Edward Earl of Derby 1572’ in *Lancashire Funeral Certificates* ed. by Thomas William King with additions by FR Raines (Printed for the Chetham Society: 1869), pp. 11-12.
54 *Ethiques*, Wilkinson, sigs.H7*-H8*. 

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on funerary monuments and why the poor were included in the heraldic funerary ritual.\textsuperscript{55} The benefit was also felt publicly, especially as benefactors such as Stanley met some of the food needs of the poorer citizens. Not only would this benefit the commonwealth fiscally, but given the potential for unrest during times of dearth, Stanley’s acts may have helped to foster that all important stability.

II. Demonstrations of Fidelity

Even though friendships of utility did not require life-saving sacrificial acts to display constancy, there were other essential demonstrations of fidelity that were expected and mutually understood. Again, given the unequal bases for these friendships and the frequent disparity in rank and status of its participants, non-pecuniary demonstrations served a useful purpose. The prose elegy, ‘The Dead Man’s Right’ (1593), written for Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester (1588 d.) is illustrative of the connection made between honour and virtuous acts, but also serves as another example of an act of posthumous fidelity by a friend or follower.\textsuperscript{56} Speaking in defence of Dudley’s reputation, the writer, known only as RS, asks rhetorically (and defiantly), ‘Did he purchase his honours otherwise than by his vertues, [...]?’\textsuperscript{57} Here the friend deflects the aspersions cast on his dead friend’s reputation.

Whilst obedience and fidelity historically included military defence of land, Smuts notes, by the end of the sixteenth century English noblemen had ceased their journeying about with ‘cavalcades of armed retainers’.\textsuperscript{58} Fidelity now could be judged by one’s willingness to defend the reputation of one’s lord. Maintaining an honourable reputation.

\textsuperscript{56} R.S. is unknown but is posited to be Richard Stapleton (friend of the dramatist George Chapman). R.S. of the Inner Temple, \textit{The Phoenix Nest} (London: John Jackson, 1593), sig. A3\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{57} R.S., \textit{Phoenix}, sig. A3\textsuperscript{v}.
\textsuperscript{58} Smuts, p. 8.
was essential. The preponderance of defamation cases brought before the High Court of Chivalry through 1633/34 in an attempt to curtail duelling speaks to this persisting concern. The May 1640- January 1641 case of Thomas Badd of Camsoyell, Fareham, Hampshire, esquire against Robert Rigges of Fareham, Hampshire, gentleman, illustrates the understanding of friendship between lord and follower and how public demonstrations of fidelity may be viewed in these relationships. Badd’s action stems from his claim that at the Red Lion Inn on 27 January 1639/40 Rigges said:

Thou art a base fellow and the sonne of a Cobler and no gentleman. And knowing that your petitioner hath particular relation to a right honourable Earl of this Kingdome, Knight of the Garter and one of the Privy Councell to his Majestie, he told your petitioner in a geering and scornfull manner, I know your great friend and names the said Earle, saying he was a poore beggarly lord and cared not a jot for what he could do for your petitioner.

Badd views the affronts to his gentle status as impugning his reputation, but also considers the insults made publicly against his ‘great friend’ Edward Sackville, Baron Buckhurst, 4th Earl of Dorset. He considers them damaging enough to report them to the earl. Rigges denies the allegations and suggests that Badd has reported the ‘pretended words’ because Rigges has ‘indicted Badd for contemptuous words against the king at the Hampshire assizes in June 1640’. Either way, Badd understands that his reporting, whether true or false, will help to stand him in good stead with the earl, who subsequently files a petition against Rigges. The friendship of the earl and Badd is not described in detail, but it is

clear that Badd is one of his ‘men’. The libel account of Thomas Badd’s reply to Rigges suggests the utility of his friendship with the earl: ‘Thomas Badd answering that he never yet had any cause worth the troubling of the Lord of Dorset, but if he had it was likely he would repayre to his lordship, and make use of him’. Badd demonstrates an understanding that his friendship with the earl can be useful, but also that he has obligations to reciprocate when presented with an opportunity. This incident provided just such an opportunity; an occasion to demonstrate fidelity through concern for a friend’s reputation, similar to that which R.S. seized in his print defence of Dudley, and Stanley’s men took at his graveside. A consideration of this historical context and the associated ideas of beneficence, performance, reputation, and reciprocity will inform the alternate readings of Timon and A Woman Killed with Kindness that follow.

III. Timon: Audience, Performance, Narrative

There is little written about Timon. Its dramatist is unknown. J. C. Bulman and J. M. Nosworthy have identified two scribes’ hands in the manuscript, which is housed in the Victoria and Albert Museum. Because of the play’s Shakespearean and Jonsonian ‘echoes’ the play has been dated c. 1602-1603. Bulman and Nosworthy argue for the ‘virtual certainty’ that the play ‘was written for a performance at one of the Inns of Court’, possibly the Inner Temple.

The importance of dramatic performance to aristocratic culture has been studied by Ann Jennalie Cook and Susan Westfall, as well as Andrew Gurr, who notes the frequency of

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64 Bulman and Nosworthy, xiii-xiv.
afternoon visits to London playhouses by Inns of Court students. As dramatic venues, Cook describes the Inns of Court as ‘entrenched areas of theatrical activity’. Comedies that satirise persons, politics or societal concerns are as old as treatises on friendship, as the comedies of Aristophanes and Pherecrates, *The Birds*, and *The Savages* bear out. Inns of Courts students seemed to follow this theatrical tradition in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, ‘ridiculing their superiors’ and ‘satririzing legal forms, procedures and personages’ in holiday revels. A. Wigfall Green’s research on drama on the Inns of Court stages finds there was a broad interest: in the classical, tragic, didactic and comedic. *Gorbuduc* (1561/2) graced the Inner Temple stage in 1561/2, *Jocasta* and *The Comedy of Errors* played at Gray’s Inn in 1566 and 1594 respectively, and *Twelfth Night* was on stage at the Middle Temple in 1601/2. It is easy to understand how Timon’s anonymous dramatist saw, in what Greg suggests was at first a literary manuscript, its potential, when he perhaps unknowingly followed in Aristophanes’ footsteps, who, long before, ‘ridiculed [Timon] in comedy’. The choice of the story of Timon is in keeping with the interests of the Inns’ audiences, and its satirical treatment makes it easy to see how it could suit a holiday revel. Not only might it satisfy a taste for the classical or

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67 Cook, p. 307.


69 For discussion on genre and plays, and Inner Temple records, see Green, pp. 142-157. Tragedies do account for a significant proportion of the plays listed in the Inner Temple records (pp. 153-155) and Green argues that ‘the romantic element of *Gorbuduc*’ was ‘definitely subordinated to political didacticism’, p. 144.

70 For dating of performances see Harbage, *Annals*, Green (Records, pp. 153-155) and Bulman et al, xiv. For *Twelfth Night* and *Comedy* the records of Inner Temple in Green are employed.

71 Greg in Bulman and Nosworthy, viii. The revisions, JC Bulman and JM Nosworthy argue, ‘appear to be more theatrical than literary in nature’, x.

72 Armstrong notes Aristophanes treatment of the Timon character in A. Macc. Armstrong, ‘Timon of Athens a Legendary Figure?’, *Greece & Rome*, Second Series, 34.1 (April., 1987), 7-11 (p. 11). Further, he relates that there was a comedy written by Antiphanes in the fourth century called Timon (p. 8) and that he ‘is first mentioned’ in Aristophanes *The Birds* and Phrynicus *The Recluse* (8), the latter, like Timon, also a ‘character play’, p. 8.
didactic, its young educated audience capable of seeing the Aristotelian, Ciceronean and
Senecan resonances and contraventions, but it may also have garnered appreciation from
the young would-be courtiers for the lampooning of the politics of friendships of utility.
Given the importance of instrumental\textsuperscript{73} friendships to the futures of these gentlemen, it is
not surprising that amity was a theme of other Inns’ productions. \textit{Gesta Grayorum}, the
1594/5 Christmas revels at Gray’s Inn, included a masque with the Goddess of Amity and
Orestes and Pylades. The Inner Temple hosted the (now lost) play \textit{Lady Amity} c. 1604.\textsuperscript{74}
Ancient works by Aristophanes, Comicus, Lucian, Neanthes, Plato, Plutarch and Strabo
all reference the figure of Timon, the misanthrope,\textsuperscript{75} but it was the early modern
translations of Lucian and Plutarch that contributed to the period’s understanding of the
story, and served as a source for both \textit{Timon} and the later, \textit{Timon of Athens} by Thomas
Middleton and William Shakespeare.\textsuperscript{76} Shakespeare and Middleton’s tragic treatment of
the narrative may retain some of the Lucianic satire,\textsuperscript{77} but the anonymous dramatist’s
comedic handling of the tale frequently pushes it to the point of caricature. Even so, this
work, which is thought to be a source for Shakespeare’s play,\textsuperscript{78} maintains an underlying
admonitory sense, despite Timon’s epilogue wherein his ‘heart grows milde & laies aside
its hate’ (fol. 24a, 2622). This ending was perhaps more suited to its holiday revel occasion
and its young gentlemen audience at the Inn, who would find that the reality of court life
would preclude their eschewing mankind in favour of forging useful friendships at court.

\textsuperscript{73} The term ‘instrumental’ to describe such friendships is from Hutson, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{74} Recorded in Harbage, \textit{Annals}, p. 88.
\textsuperscript{75} See Armstrong pp.7-11.
\textsuperscript{76} See Jowett, pp.18-19; Francis Hickes of Christ Church Oxford was one such translator of the work from
Greek to English; Interestingly, even Thomas Heywood recounts ‘the argument of the dialogue’ of Timon in
\textit{Pleasant Dialogues and Dramma’s, selected out of Lucian, Erasmus, Textor, Ovid, d&c.} (London: Printed by
R. [fulton] for R. H[earne],1637); Scholarship supports this work as the source for the anonymous comedy,
as well as Shakespeare and Middleton’s work, see Jowett, pp.18-19 and Bulman and Nosworthy, xiv.
\textsuperscript{77} Jowett, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{78} See Jowett, p. 20; See also Bulman and Nosworthy, xvi.
IV. Beneficence and Friendship in Timon

Recent scholarship on Middleton and Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens does not consider the work in relation to Seneca’s De beneficiis.79 However, Tom MacFaul’s suggestion that Shakespeare’s Timon ‘expresses friendship through giving’ correlates to what is at the heart of Seneca’s work, ‘that beneficence wisely given establishes friendships’.80 This is an important point which is explored in the anonymous Timon and can be further understood when considered in conjunction with Seneca’s ideas on friendship and giving in De beneficiis.

Exchange and reciprocal giving is not at odds with the practice of classical friendship. Even Cicero in De amicitia recognises, as Peterman notes, that ‘the giving and receiving of favours is a part of friendship.’81 That said, as Cicero sees it, this giving should not be held to reckoning:

Me thinketh trewe freendeship is a richer and a bountifuller thyng, and doeth not take so narrowe heade to geve no more than it maie receive. Neither is there suche feare to bee taken in freendeship, that we lease not a good tourne, or let it fal in the mire, or that we heape not up more benefites than just measure. 82

Cicero does not expound on how these relations should be ordered, as his perfect friendship, grounded in the virtue of its participants, would undoubtedly ensure honourable behaviour along these lines. Seneca however, despite his agreement that perfect friendship could be realised (albeit by Stoic sages), also believed, as Anna Lydia Motto claims, ‘that

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80 MacFaul, p. 145; Peterman, p.66.
81 Peterman, p. 63.
friendship is essential in order to put into practice one’s knowledge, beneficence, charity, 
humanitas. As such, he outlines the importance of giving and receiving in friendship in practical terms, so that amicable bonds can be maintained for the benefit of society and one’s virtue. As noted in Chapter 1, Arthur Golding and Thomas Lodge recognised the usefulness of De beneficiis in terms of the astute advice it provided to sustain the many formulations of friendship that men enjoyed in early modern England. One of those formulations, discussed in the beginning of this chapter was that between a lord and his men. This is the model that Timon’s dramatist explores.

The unequal relationship is established based on Timon’s wealth and others’ need. Timon sees himself as a friend to those who are less economically advantaged. When his faithful servant, Laches, returns home with sacks of golden talents and asks if he should put them away for safe-keeping, Timon replies munificently, ‘Lett poore men somewhat take of my greate plenty / I would not have them grieve, that they went / empty from Timons threashould, and I will not see / my pensive freinds to pyne with penurie’(1.1.13-16). The ‘poor men’ become ‘friends’ in the final alliterative reference through their partaking of his benefit. In doing so, Timon acknowledges his understanding that in giving he is bestowing friendship. Additionally, the dramatist suggests that Timon is practicing his virtue through friendship in true Senecan fashion. This beneficent friendship reflects the inclusive amity described by Aristotle as ‘the love that ought to bee amongst menne’, whereby ‘the greater man ought to geve unto the lesse winnyng, & the lesse ought to geve unto the greater honor and reverence’. The friendship Aristotle proposes is not based on reciprocal affection, but rather, on the valuable reward realised by its participants

83 Motto, p. 10.
according to their needs; reward that needs to continue on each side for the bond to remain intact.

 Affection however, could be engendered through the friendly act. As discussed earlier, Seneca claims in *De beneficiis* it is from the benefit ‘wherout of sprinketh friendship’, as the friendly act engenders a feeling of goodwill, an amicable bond. In accepting the benefit, the recipient is ‘receyuing of freendshipe’. Returning to the display of friendship at the Stanley funeral that opened this chapter, this idea gets full expression. Here beneficence prompted a show of that affection. If the tears of mourning witnessed at the graveside were any indication, Stanley engendered the love of his subordinate ‘friends’. He had a reputation for beneficence that was earned through his generous acts. And this is precisely the amicable bond that Timon believes he has established with his ‘friends’ through his giving. The problem is that Timon is not a Senecan disinterested giver. He does not approach his giving according to Senecan philosophy which is strongly grounded in the values of perfect friendship:

> And since the greatest friendship we can intend to any man, is to make him equall with our selves, and suffer him in everie sort and joynly to enjoy our goods and fortunes; so ought we equally to advise him to the good and honour of us both. I will give unto him in his necessitie, yet in such manner and measure, that I will shunne mine owne miserie: If I see him in danger of life, I will succour him;  

As this suggests, giving in friendship does not necessarily refer to material possessions: ‘this man giveth succours; that ornament; these other consolations’; all are

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85 *De beneficiis*, Golding, sig. E4v.
86 *De beneficiis*, Golding, sig F4v.
87 *De beneficiis*, Lodge, pp. 49-50.
capable of engendering a feeling of goodwill which creates an amicable bond. What the
play registers however, is the sense that giving must be realised solely in outward shows or
performance in material terms. It also places an emphasis on reciprocal reward. This is
seen in Timon’s continual pursuit of furthered reputation for giving. It distinguishes this
Timon from the Timon in Middleton and Shakespeare’s work whom Tom MacFaul finds
‘does not want to be repaid’, and rejects ‘any attempts to reciprocate friendship’. Nevertheless, repayment is central to an understanding of giving and friendship, even in
Seneca. The key is that the benefactor gives without the expectation of reciprocation.
However, he should receive it, along with gratitude from the recipient. This is disinterested
giving at its best and is a hallmark of virtue and sagacity.

The representation of Timon’s giving differentiates him as a self-interested giver. His
preoccupation with the honour he might realise from beneficent acts supports this idea.
Although his interest reflects the early modern aristocratic concern of reputation that
affected Stanley, and would not be lost on the gentleman audience at the Inns of Court,
here it is treated sardonically, his concern exaggerated. Timon understands the link
between virtue and giving, denouncing the rich man who may ‘sitt at home and hugg
himselfe / rubbing his greedy right hand wth. his gould’(1.1.44-45). He is depicted as
understanding that virtue is a conveyer of honour, and liberality a virtue. Twenty-four
lines after a philanthropic declaration to share his riches with the poor, however, he revels
in the honour and reverence his giving engenders:

\[
\text{It is to me a Tryumph and a glorye}
\]
\[
\text{that people fynger poynt at me and saye}
\]
\[
\text{this, this is he, that his lardge wealth and store}
\]

88 De beneficiis, Lodge p. 92.
89 MacFaul, p. 144.
Recognition for one’s beneficence is not in itself problematic. According to Seneca, ‘fame’ is indeed the ‘second frute’ of giving. But there is a difference between this as a consequence and this as an incentive, as Seneca makes clear: ‘For his intent was not too have anie thing in recompence: for then had it not bin a benefite but a bargeine’. It is this distinction that renders the friendship in giving as one of utility, for in true friendship a friend seeks to benefit the other without considering recompense, whereas a bargain is a ‘transaction’ akin to ‘an agreement between two parties settling how much each gives and takes, or what each performs and receives’. So when Timon tells Laches, ‘lett the people knowe / How bountifull the hands of Timon are’ (1.1.48-49), his giving appears more of a Senecan bargain than a benefit. And the dramatist pushes this idea even further, punctuating the scene with a vociferous declaration by Timon reaffirming his preoccupation with his reputation:

The noyse ascend’s to heav’n; Timon’s greate name
In the Gods eares resounds, to his great fame
This I hear willinglie and t’is farre sweeter
then sound of harpe, or any pleasant meetre
I magnified by the peoples crye
shall mount in glorye to the heavens high. (1.1.52-57)

The virtue that Timon recognised as arising from giving is conspicuously absent from this soliloquy. In his appeal to glory he reveals that it is not virtue, but rather the pursuit of fame that drives his giving. Fame is the reward that Timon seeks and receives and it may

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90 Seneca, *De beneficiis*, trans. by Golding, sig G2v.
92 ‘Bargain’, def. 2a, *OED.*
even be more important to him than his riches. This pronouncement of his preoccupation with reputation takes on even greater significance through its hyperbolic push to the celestial sphere, as Timon sees his acts as worthy of recognition by the gods. The dramatist’s mockery of beneficent giving notwithstanding, an audience is still left with an understanding of how easily acts of beneficence can become blemished by hubris. They may have been already have been familiar with Cicero’s thoughts on misapplied liberality:

A man may see some also doo much, not by nature so liberall, as led with a certein glorie, yt they may seeme bountieful: which thinges may be thought to come rather of a bragge than of a free hert. Such a falsse fainig is a nearer neibour to vanitie, than either to liberalitie, or to honestie. 93

This distinction between true beneficence and vainglorious liberality is highlighted here by Cicero. He is clear that this giving is not driven by innate virtue, but rather, a desire for glory. This idea resonates in Timon’s repeated calls for public affirmation of his liberality. His giving is tainted with a self-interest that contravenes the virtue of beneficence. When Timon pays Eutrapelus’ debt to the usurer, Abysuss, commanding ‘Carry my name unto the Judges’ (1.2 85.), his comment contributes further to this sense and suggests that Timon’s reputation is a transactional commodity.

There is a particularly striking instance of self-glorification in Act 1 Scene 5. Here, the dramatist mocks a superior’s bestowing of offices upon an inferior and unworthy recipient, an act that had cultural resonance. In a literal and preposterous application of Seneca’s idea to make a man ‘equal with our selves’, 94 Timon, like a beneficent God, elevates Hemogenes, a fiddler, to equal rank and status. He tells him, ‘What dost thou with this

93 Cicero, Marcus Tullius, De officiis trans.by Nicholas Grimalde (London : Richard Tottel, 1556),sigs. 18v-19r.
94 De beneficiis, Lodge, pp. 49-50.
The idea of course is absurd, and would undoubtedly engender appreciable laughter from the audience. And although the dramatist mocks the idea that a wealthy aristocrat would make a man of lower rank and status his actual equal, he suggests the rewards possible from well-chosen friendships through Hemogenes, a man who ‘this daye rose with his Arse upwards / to daye a fiddler and at night a Noble’ (1.5.498-499). Despite the humour, however, later, when Hemogenes refuses to aid Timon, the lord who ‘raised him’, the dramatist evokes a sober sense that parity in friendship through material goods does not equate with like affection. Making a friend one’s equal does not create a union of souls as the rhetoric asserts. Further, rank and status does not ensure virtuous friendship, for despite Hemogenes’ rich garments and elevated position, in Timon’s penury he does not reciprocate Timon’s beneficence. Although he tells Laches ‘Thy masters harde misfortune I lament’ (fol. 15a, 1563), when Timon asks for housing, saying ‘Suffer mee not to perish with the colde’ (fol. 17a, 1840), Hemogenes rebukes him saying ‘Bee [...] gone, bee gone, thou art troublesome I say’ (fol. 17a, 1849).

Timon appeals to the constancy requisite of perfect friendship in his time of need, as if the bonds he has engendered with his followers were other than useful. He selectively applies the rules of giving and friendship, conflating them with perfect amity. The dramatist echoes this idea as well as the disjunction between philosophical theory and practice most resoundingly in the subplot where the philosophers are mocked as ‘fooleosphers’(fol. 24a, 2609). Stilpo and Speusippus are thinkers who descant illogically with innumerable pat sententiae and references to Aristotle as a ‘blockhead’ (fol. 22a, 2378). In one instance Stilpo breaks from his nonsensical metaphysical musings

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95 Hemogenes is also represented in the text as Hermogenes.
to tell Hemogenes that his ‘phrases’ are worth more than Hemogenes is offering to pay for them (fol. 17a, 1828-1830). In a rare moment of rational thought, Stilpo raises the question that the play, and perhaps the educated audience, asks of philosophy: ‘Dost thinke Philosphy is soe little worth?’ (fol. 17a, 1830). The answer that the play offers is a resounding yes, especially regarding individual understanding of theory and practice. In this instance the dramatist strikes at the heart of philosophy’s use: for erudition or application? Is the ‘possession’ of theory enough?

Timon possesses an understanding of some of the ideological principles underpinning friendship, especially those that provide him with benefit, yet he does not recognise the need to apply them anything less than selectively. Further, he is educated in the parlance of true friendship and appeals to its principles of constancy, similitude and trial, but he fails to understand how its philosophy translates into virtuous action devoid of self-interest. Similarly, despite Hemogenes’ protest of ‘love’ of the philosophers’ ‘witty disputations’, when Stilpo tells him that ‘a man may love two manner of waies, effectively or causally’, this insightful reflection receives no response or contemplation, but rather gives way to a question Hemogenes indicates has ‘long troubled’ him: ‘Whether there be a man in the moone?’ (fol. 17a, 1803, 1807-1808). Hemogenes becomes the embodiment of man’s inability to separate the wheat from the chafe in terms of prioritising the use of philosophical ideas; Timon epitomises the worthlessness of philosophical learning without exercise of its precepts. The dramatist suggests that knowing is not enough.

The irony of course, is that the fooleosophers actually spout some pearls of wisdom amidst their nonsensical musings. Even though Stilpo’s comment that ‘a man may love two manner of waies, effectively or causally’ (17a, 1803) is lost on Hemogenes, it is central to the play. It reflects Aristotle’s distinction between perfect amity and that which
he describes as ‘proftyable’, and ‘loved’ for ‘gaines’, by delineating friendship along ‘effective’ and ‘casual’ lines. This opposition sets friendship compelled by benefit, against the more noble type of friendship that occurs by chance, without thought of gain. The latter is reminiscent of Montaigne’s claim to the cause of his friendship with Boëtie: ‘If a man urge me to tell wherefore I loved him, I feele it cannot be expressed, but by answering; Because it was he, because it was my selfe’. This distinction may be lost on the play’s protagonist, but the dramatist ensures that amidst the frivolity of the plot and subplots it remains evident. In this way he mitigates audience identification with Timon as a sympathetic figure who has been duped by false friends.

The inclusive use of the term ‘friend’ that Montaigne decried as diluting the ideal is pointed up here, as Timon refers to both himself and his followers as ‘friends’. Timon refers to himself as a ‘needy friend’ and says ‘I am compelled by necessity to prove my friends’ (fol 15b, 1610-1611 1632). Unlike the affective bonds Stanley’s giving engendered, Timon’s giving has not, because he has not bestowed with the right mind. The benefactor should ‘keep no account or memory of their good deeds’ according to Seneca, but as previously discussed, the continual call for honour and esteem suggests Timon is keeping a mental register of his acts. The key here is the way that each participant views the relationship. Timon pays Eutrapelus’ debt in excess of what is required, saying, ‘yea, take ffyue, while I have gould I will not see my ffreinds to stand in neede’(fol. 2a, 121-122). He believes that his beneficence has created an amicable bond.

96 Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig.H4r.
97 The manuscript reads ‘causally’. The OED cites this play as an origin of the use of ‘effectively’ (Def 2a), (1600), but in doing so refers to ‘causally’ as ‘casually’. Casually, (def. 1b, 2) rather than ‘causally’ makes sense here if ‘effectively’ is meant. However, even though there is no entry in the OED for ‘affectively’ before 1631, there is one for ‘affective’ (1443), which might make plausible another reading, in that ‘causal’ also was in use (1570): ‘affectively and causally’.
99 De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 12.
Eutrapelus is relieved and naturally thankful. He calls Timon a ‘Heroicke Spiritt!’ (fol. 2a, 123). But the dramatist suggests that a hero is altogether different from a friend. In his response, all that Eutrapelus acknowledges is his appreciation, not his friendship. And this is significant because it is at the core of the play’s understanding of benefitting and friendship: that not everyone understands a benefit as conferring affective friendship. It’s not that Timon sees his generosity as buying friends, but rather, as engendering a reciprocal friendly feeling. In this way, he views Eutrapelus and each of the men he benefits as friends. In *De beneficiis* Seneca does put some responsibility on the recipient, saying that the ‘reception of benefit implies the existence or establishment of a friendship’; however, the giver must be prudent.  

V. Ingratitude, Discretion and Friendship in *Timon*

While friendship ‘can be established’ through acts of beneficence, it does not necessarily mean that it is received as friendship, because according to Seneca, what matters is the virtue of those on whom one bestows benefits. In the play’s source, ‘Timon or, The Misanthrope’, Lucian explores this idea, negotiating the tension between the protagonist’s munificence and foolishness and its relation to friendship. Timon’s culpability is suggested by Mercury’s speech:

> Some say his bountie undid him, and his kindnesse, and commiseration towards all that craved of him; but, in plaine termes, it was his folly, simplicitie & indiscretion in making choice of his friends, not knowing that hee bestowed his liberalitie upon crowes and wolves’.

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100 Peterman, p. 54.
101 Peterman, p. 54.
Mercury may be surveying the views about Timon’s responsibility, but he does not conclude that Timon is ‘a man more sinned against’. In *Timon of Athens* Shakespeare and Middleton allow their audience the latitude to judge whether the protagonist is the victim of his own foolish generosity or of unscrupulous, flattering, fortune-seeking friends. But Lucian’s account is quite clear and corresponds to the perspective on liberality prefigured in *De beneficiis* that places the blame for the failure of beneficent giving to maintain amicable bonds squarely on the benefactor. It begins with the benefactor’s imprudence and is compounded by incorrect behaviour by the recipient. At the heart of the issue is ingratitude. According to Seneca, ‘*mens indiscretion in giving & receiving benefits maketh ingratitude so frequent*’. This discretion requires, according to Seneca, that one chooses men ‘who are worthy to partake’ of one’s benefits. As he sees it, the nature of the man affects the way he receives the benefit, as well as the accompanying friendship. And this idea is tested in the play through Timon’s rash liberality, and the clamour of his newfound ‘friends’ in his times of bounty. The trusty Laches alerts Timon to his potential new friend, Demogenes, and wonders why Timon ‘suffers’ the fiddler in his house, telling him ‘there’s not a veryer knave in all the towne’ (fol. 5a, 457-458). So when Timon appeals to Senecan laws of giving and receiving and declares Demogenes, and the others ‘ingrateful’, he may be correct, but he has chosen them as recipients without deeming them ‘worthy’ (fol.17a, 1798). As such, according to Senecan principles, he can expect ingratitude. The case of Stanley, the earl of Derby, helps to illustrate this

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104 John Jowett notes there is no early modern performance history on the play, although it is listed in the First Folio with the plays said to be performed by the King’s Men. See Jowett ‘Introduction’, *Timon of Athens*, p. 8. Harbage and Schoenbaum list it as ‘unacted?’ in *Annals*, p. 94-95.
106 Seneca, *De beneficiis*, Lodge, pp. 2,-3.
understanding in practice. Although his munificence was characterised as ‘remarkable’, the account of his giving qualifies this idea, indicating that it was reserved for selected persons: to ‘such as showed themselves grateful to him’. The final act of their requisite gratitude was performed through attendance at the funeral where all would view the outpouring of support for Stanley, furthering his social memory, and the reputation of the Stanley name. In the play, Timon expects similar gratitude and fidelity, yet, he does not understand the Senecan precept, as Stanley did, that ‘we sow not our seeds in a fruitless and barren ground’. 

Without worthy recipients, the friendships that Timon engenders are of pure utility and devoid of affection. This is in some ways similar to the ‘category error’ MacFaul notes is at work in Timon of Athens, as Timon confuses ‘the economic with the affective’. But in the anonymous Timon it is more akin to confusion over what constitutes true friendship and precisely what type of friendship he believes that his giving is proffering. To his friends, the friendship is of pure utility, driven by reward and reciprocation. When Eutrapelus acknowledges Timon’s generosity, telling him ‘I will thee adore and sacrifice to thee in ffranckinsence’ (fol. 2a, 123-124), he is not acknowledging friendship, but rather, debt. Eutrapelus’ response to Timon suggests his view of the relationship as very much akin to that which he enjoyed with the usurer, Abysuss, predicated on pecuniary assistance in time of trouble. When Eutrapelus says ‘I will’, the use of the future tense is an indicator that he expects that this debt too, will one day be due.

Timon cultivates a similar relationship with Demeas. He willingly pays Demeas’ debt, 

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107 King, Lancashire Funeral Certificates, p.11.
108 It is said that ‘he never forced any service at his tenant’s hands’, and that ‘no gentleman ever waited in his service without allowance, as well wages as otherwise, for horse and man’. This was not the end of the reward that men like Stanley get for his beneficence: virtue is forwarded. This was not the end of Stanley’s social acts of amity, as in his will he made bequeaths to the poor, and provided for all of the servants, those graveside mourners, ‘to have every of them a year’s wages’ in King, Lancashire Funeral Certificates, p.11.
109 Seneca, De beneficiis, Lodge, p. 2.
110 MacFaul, p. 145.
but after Demeas’ voiced gratitude, Timon says: ‘I putte my talents to strange usury / To
gaine mee friends, that they may follow mee’(2.4.859-860).\footnote{By comparison, usuary and friendship are anathema to Antonio in Shakespeare’s *The Merchant of Venice*: ‘or when did friendship take / A breed for bareen metal of his friend? (1.3.131-132).}
A lord with followers would signify wealth and help reinforce status and reputation, so this may speak once again to the desire to foster reputation. Additionally, however, it may speak to a similar confusion between the ‘economic and affective’ that MacFaul observed in Middleton and Shakespeare’s Timon.\footnote{MacFaul, p. 145.} The use of the term usury speaks against friendship, as ‘usury’ presupposes ‘advantage’, furthering inequality. If anything, it conjures a sense of a more instrumental than affective bond. It acknowledges a desire for an ‘excessive’ return on Timon’s money, as he expects to receive more than he originally loans. Further, this Shylock-like quality of exploitation has no place in affective friendship and begs a comparison between Timon and Abysuss, deemed ‘thou Damned Usurer’ (fol 2a, 105).
Here he becomes Demeas’ usurer, not his friend. And like a relationship with a usurer that begins with appreciation and help, and ends when the debt is called, Timon's friendships last only as long as Aristotle suggests that such friendships would. They indureth so long as indureth the delectation and the perfite’.\footnote{‘Profit’ from *Ethiques*, Wilkinson, sigs. H4\*-H4\*.}

The relationship between friendship and credit had contemporary resonance. As Alexandra Shepard has noted, father-son advice literature that proffered guidance on successful relations between men cautioned sons to maintain ‘economic independence from other men’, particularly friends. Walter Raleigh counselled his son in choosing friends, and emphasised discretion. In particular, he suggests that his son avoid those who might require pecuniary assistance. It’s better to receive than give, according to Raleigh’s advice:

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for by them thou shalt bee judged what thou art; let them therefore be wise and vertuous, and none of those that follow thee for gaine, but make election rather of thy Betters then thy Inferiors, shunning alwayes such as are poore & needie.  

In Chapter 1 we saw Burghley’s advice to his son on the choice of friends. Burghley also spoke directly to helping one’s friend in financial need, advising:

Beware of suertiship for thy best friend, for he that payeth an other mans debts, seekes his owne decay, but if thou canst not otherwise choose rather then to lend that money from thy selfe upon good bonds, (though thou borrow it) So maist thou pleasure thy friend and happily secure thy selfe.  

Burghley’s advice walks that fine line between wanting to ‘pleasure’ the friend and protect oneself. Burghley’s advice takes this a step further in an additional precept and acknowledges an age-old problem related to mixing friendship and credit, namely the dissolution of the friendship. He distinguishes the fine line between amity and enmity and suggests how such transactions in friendship can push bonds towards the latter:

Trust no man with thy credit or estate, for it is a meere folly for a man to enthrall himselfe to his friend further then if just cause be offered, he should not dare to become otherwise thy enemie.  

Timon’s dramatist engages a similar audience as Burghley and Raleigh, with like ideas, but admonishes perhaps more appetisingly, but not less effectively, through satire. Timon is

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the epitome of indiscretion in friendship and giving. He represents men whose ‘trust’ is ill-conceived, and who are consequently disappointed by friendship.

VI. Beneficence, Friendship and Reputation in A Woman Killed with Kindness

There is little information available about the first performance of Thomas Heywood’s A Woman Killed with Kindness. Harbage and Schoenbaum write that a payment for the play was made to Heywood between 12 February and 6 March 1603. The play was under the auspices of the Earl of Worcester’s Men with whom Heywood was affiliated beginning ‘around 1600’. Andrew Gurr places it at the Rose playhouse, one of the theatres the company was associated with. It came at the early stages of Heywood’s playwriting career, which has been traced to as early as October 1596, through a payment (loan) to the Admiral’s Men for one of his works. The earliest recorded text of the play is the 1607 Quarto edition, identified by Martin Wiggins as deriving from Heywood’s ‘foul papers’. The play is a domestic tragedy, set in a northern country home where gentry hospitality, giving and receiving all play a part in the development and maintenance of amicable bonds.

In Sir Henry Wooton’s view, ‘Every Mans proper Mansion House and Home ’ was not his castle, but ‘the Theater of his Hospitality’ and Master Frankford’s hasty offer to the down on his luck, Gentleman Wendoll of a ’man’, a ‘gelding’, his ‘table’ and his

117 Annals, p. 86.
118 See Scobie, vii and Annals, p. 87.
120 Scobie, vi.
'purse’ (1.4.70) 123 portrays Frankford as performing his part as beneficent host and giver. Adding to this sense is Wendoll’s admission in soliloquy that he is ‘a man by whom in no kind [Frankford] could gain’ (1.6.36). He acknowledges requisite gratitude for Frankford’s beneficence and suggests that he has intention of reciprocating at some point:

Master Frankford, I have oft been bound to you
By many favours; this exceeds them all
That I shall never merit your least favour.
But when your last remembrance I forget,
Heaven at my soul exact that weighty debt. (4.72-76)

Wendoll’s response to such generosity is in line with Senecan principles of reciprocation and the rules of civil courtesy expounded on by conduct writers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, well-known to gentry culture. But also, while there is a sense that an obligatory bond has been established, the language of ‘debt’ and ‘favour’ do not support a belief that Wendoll views this bond as an affective one. Rather, Heywood crafts his reply employing the rhetoric of deference similar to that which is taught in such works like The Courte of Civill Courtesie (1577), whose subtitle reveals its intent:

fitly furnished with a pleasant porte of stately phrases and pithie precepts, assembled in the behalfe of all younge gentlemen and others that are desirous to frame their behaviour according to their estates at all times and in all companies, therby to purchase worthy prayse of their inferiours and estimation and credite amonge theyr betters. 124

124 S.R, The Courte of Civill Courtesie (London: by Richard Jones, 1577). EEBO identifies the author as S.R. Gent, with ‘Samuel Rowlands?’ listed as a potential ‘other author’. Anna Bryson in From Courtesy to
Interestingly, here again financial terms are employed—purchase and credit—to suggest the transactional quality of esteem and praise in the period. This parlance is not peculiar to the period. G. W. Peterman’s work underscores its presence in first-century Greco-Roman social relations. Heywood represents Wendoll as just such a young gentleman of inferior means, who might attend to such didactic literature, one looking to 'purchase' such ‘credite’ and estimation, here, from Frankford. The purchase that he wishes to make is future favour. The frame of the deferential behaviour is scripted to maximise advantage and benefit. The courteous reply to Frankford’s generosity is similar in sentiment and tone to the advice given in *The Courte* on how to respond to ‘a noble person pleasantly, that is of acquaintance which must bee also pleasantly answered’:

My Lorde I have had to good experience of your former curtesies, bothe towards mee and other my freeindes, as I had need with my service to goe aboute to recompence some parte of that, beeore I come in debt for any more: But the lesse wee can requite, the more wee muste stande bounde.

The idea is to reverence the giver through voiced gratitude and acknowledge obligation, very much in line with *De beneficiis*. Interestingly, as Anna Bryson notes, ‘in the Elizabethan *Courte of Civill Courtesie* the older courtesy-defining categories of “lord”, “servant”, and “guest” have been replaced by “better”, “equal”, “stranger” and “friend”’. Bryson further relates that the altered categories reflect ‘changing conditions’ which ‘made their perception and expression a more urgent matter of concern in the

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125 Peterman, p. 64.
conduct of social life’ during the period. This supports an understanding of the expanded definition of friendship during the period. Further, the application of the designation ‘friend’ in relationships formerly marked by service and hospitable acts widens the scope for misunderstanding in these relationships. One can see the potential for misconstruing one’s duties as well as the affective dimension of the bond. Heywood explores this idea through Frankford and Wendoll. Their relationship traverses all but one of the latter categories Bryson outlines. Wendoll is a virtual stranger invited into the home, but soon becomes a cherished friend. His response to Frankford is similar to the one from The Courte, which is intended for a ‘better’, not a friend. The response is not familiar in any way, as he addresses Frankford as ‘Master Frankford’ (4.72). And although a gentleman of equal in rank, Wendoll is not on par with Frankford in terms of status. This idea will become important later when we consider to what extent the dramatist depicts Frankford as mistaking true friendship for useful amity.

Wendoll’s appreciation, articulated in line with the Courte’s finely crafted rhetoric, serves to reinforce Frankford’s status, rank and superiority. And this is part of Frankford’s reward. Nevertheless, he looks for something else. He tells Wendoll, ‘I know you / Virtuous, and therefore grateful’ (1.4.77-78). Again, as noted in Timon and recounted in relation to Stanley, gratitude was a persistent concern of the benefactor. This idea is reiterated throughout the period in drama, literature, and historic accounts, and its understanding is expressed clearly in Chapter 33 of De Beneficiis where Seneca offers the view from the recipient’s vantage point:

128 Bryson, p. 138.
He hath bestowed a good turne upon mee, and I have accepted it even as he would have wished. Now hath he the thing that he sought, yea & the only thing that he sought: for I am thankful. Herafter remaineth the use of mee, and some commoditie too redound [sic] too him by my thankfullnesse’. 130

The idea that gratefulness is essential to such friendships is made manifest here. Additionally, the recipient understands not only that the ‘good turn’ is acknowledged, but also, that the act has created a bond of obligation for the future. This understanding is evidenced in Wendoll’s response to Frankford, wherein he acknowledges his ‘weighty debt’ to his benefactor (4.76).

Frankford’s beneficence towards Wendoll, a man ‘of small means’ and ‘pressed by want’ (1.4.31-32) may serve as a useful plot device by Heywood to engender audience sympathy for Frankford when he is betrayed by Wendoll and Anne, but his liberality, much like Timon’s, is not disinterested. An understanding of the effect of attending to the conventions of early modern hospitality may help to open this reading further. According to Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes, in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries ‘the image of generosity and openness was sustained wherever the family concerned was in quest of social influence’. 131 Although this was most realisable between families of equal rank and status where ‘reciprocal exchanges of honour could occur and loyalties be affirmed’. 132

Heywood’s Frankford attempts its achievement through a caritas-like giving through friendship with Wendoll. In his soliloquy in Act 4, Frankford asserts a similar concern for his reputation, rank and status that was evident in Timon. He says:

I am a gentleman, and by my birth

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130 De beneficiis, Golding, sig. G2v.
132 Heal and Holmes, p. 283.
Companion with a king. A king’s no more, 
I am possessed of many fair revenues, 
Sufficient to maintain a gentleman. (1.4.3-6)

At first this may appear an interesting, perhaps excessive, addition by Heywood. He has already established Frankford’s social position in the play’s opening scene when Sir Charles comments on his noble descent, and his new wife’s pedigree is established: born of nobility and sister to a knight (1.1.69). This reiteration of rank and status could be an oversight by Heywood, given Q1 (1607) in use here is generally accepted as being from authorial foul papers, not a theatrical prompt book, and contains some ‘minor errors’. But just as plausibly it may be employed as a way for Heywood to emphasise and reflect upon Frankford’s preoccupation with his rank and status, the latter of which has been compromised as Frankford is ‘no longer a member of the court elite’. Perhaps Heywood had in mind the Court experiences of men like Sir John Harington and Sir Thomas Wyatt, their careers, as Heal and Holmes note, ‘catapulting between success at Court and banishment and disgrace in the country’. This would help to explain the intimation in the soliloquy that Frankford has in some way fallen out of favour, which speaks to an overall understanding of the nature of friendships of utility in the play.

Further, it supports the argument that reputation, not disinterested friendship, is a driving force behind Frankford’s demonstrated beneficence.

Beneficent, reputation-enhancing (or saving) acts which further the social identity of gentry are an important concern of the play. They are figured as self-denying and ill-considered, and even satirised in the subplot, just as they are in Timon. Sir Charles’

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133 Both Wiggins and Scobie note the variances between the extant Q1 and Q3 (1617); Wiggins terms them ‘a range of minor errors’ in ‘Introduction’, xxxviii.
135 Heal and Holmes, p. 277.
troubles begin because he views an insult made about his hawk as an affront to his reputation as a gentleman. While a hawk was indeed a recreational staple for the English country gentleman, Sir Charles’ escalation of a petty comment by Sir Francis that his hawk was ‘a rifler’ (1.3.27) into an argument that ends with a huntsman and falconer dead serves to highlight the absurdity of the aristocratic concern for reputation here, a consideration examined in relation to the Court of Chivalry cases earlier in the chapter. Further, Sir Charles may enter in Scene 14 ‘gentlemanlike’, but his actions aimed to maintain his honour and reputation belie the stage direction. Charles refers to himself as akin to ‘a barbarous outlaw or an uncivil kern’ because he asks Susan to sacrifice her virginal honour to Sir Francis to repay the debt Charles believes he owes to him (1.14.5). His concern for his reputation and honour are paramount and take precedence over his sister’s virtue. Charles acknowledges his private behaviour is boorish, and significantly, not on par with his rank, but he is more preoccupied with how he is viewed publicly, as Heywood makes clear in Charles’ plea to Susan: ‘Wouldst thou see me live / A bankrupt beggar in the world’s disgrace / And die indebted to my enemies? / Wouldst thou behold me stand like a huge beam / In the world’s eye, a byword and a scorn?’(14.11-15). Charles is willing to sacrifice the brother-sister relationship in order to maintain instrumental homosocial bonds. Further, he is driven by the need to retain his reputation for gratefulness to Sir Francis for his kindness in freeing him from prison, even though Sir Francis is not a friend. The problem is that the beneficial act has, in Senecan terms, engendered a certain amicable bond, and through its acceptance, Charles understands that he must reciprocate.

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136 Stage direction beginning of Scene 14.
137 ‘Kern’ def. 2. OED: ‘a rustic, peasant, boor; contemptuously vagabond’.
Heywood satirises the extent to which a man of such rank is willing to go, as he did with the hawk, but here the cost is in human terms. Sir Charles, in contemplating how to reciprocate, asserts the need to ‘requisite that grace’:

> But he, nor father, nor ally, nor friend,  
> More than a stranger, both remote in blood  
> And in his heart opposed my enemy  
> That this high bounty should proceed from him!  
> O there I lose myself. What should I say?  
> What think? what do, his bounty to repay? (1.10. 113-118)

Charles is bewildered by the gesture, especially given that he and Sir Francis did not share any kinship or amicable bonds previously. Although Sir Francis’ act appears to have engendered goodwill from Sir Charles, Susan indicates that his giving was self-interested. She tells her brother:

> You wonder, I am sure, whence this strange kindness  
> Proceeds in Acton. I will tell you brother;  
> He dotes on men and oft hath sent me gifts,  
> Letters and tokens. I refused them all. (1.10.119-122)

Charles is not moved, and does not reflect on Francis’ worthiness as giver or recipient. Attending only to the conventions of social reciprocity, he is determined to outdo his benefactor by giving all that he has to give: Susan. He understands that this is the only way to ensure the maintenance of the amicable bond, demonstrate gratefulness, and stand him in good stead for future favour. He says: ‘I have enough; though poor, my heart is set / In one rich gift to pay back all my debt’ (1.10. 123-124). Sacrifice in this hasty, self-serving friendship is not of the self, but the next best thing, a transferable commodity, his sister.
Returning to the main plot, some of Frankford’s beneficent acts are less sacrificial, but remain of questionable necessity. They reflect a similar need, however, to further or maintain his reputation for kindness and generosity. When Sir Francis suggests that Frankford’s absence from his guests at the wedding would cause them ‘to doubt their welcome’, adding, ‘and charge you with unkindness’, Frankford says he will ‘prevent it’, leaving his kinsmen and putting off his nuptial night, in order to forestall a negative view of himself in the eyes of his friends (1.1.77-78). In another instance, when Nicholas approaches Frankford to tell him of Wendoll’s affair with Anne, Frankford immediately and automatically assumes that his man is coming to him for money and offers him half a crown before Nicholas even speaks. Later, when the youth comes to bring the letter useful to his plan to secure evidence of their adultery, Frankford instructs Nicholas to ‘Have him into the cellar: let him taste / A cup of our March beer. Go, make him drink’(1.11.48-49). The directive to ‘make’ him drink is significant, as it suggests that an offer is not enough. The recipient must be forced to partake of the goodwill extended if necessary, in order that Frankford’s reputation for generous hospitality be furthered. This recipient is not a kinsman, but rather, a ‘stripling’ messenger, yet he is afforded the hospitality and social friendship reserved for members of his social circle (1.11.46). Martin Wiggins suggests that the aforementioned is one of those acts of ‘generosity’ which are ‘only the material expression of his positive feelings towards its recipient’. There is, perhaps, something more to it. For the country gentleman during the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods hospitality remained one of the important ‘expressions of status’. With this in mind, like Timon’s offering of five talents, when four are sufficient to pay Eutrapelus’ debt, Frankford’s acts, especially extending such hospitality to Wendoll and even a mere

139 Bryson, p. 140.
delivery boy, are not only excessive, going beyond the necessary limits of generosity required for the situation, but also, may be viewed as a by-product of conspicuous consumption, which serves to once again demonstrate superiority and reinforce reputation.

Ironically, the most self-denying act of liberality portrayed in the play is Frankford’s welcoming of Wendoll into his home. Frankford has a wife and kinsmen of even higher rank and status, but his need for a friend on whom he can practice his beneficence leads him to make gross misjudgements. Frankford asserts his happiness in Scene 4, outlining his many blessings of wealth and a loving wife. He ends this review saying: ‘If man on earth may truly happy be, / Of these at once possessed, sure I am he’ (1.4.13-14). But there is uncertainty here, for eleven lines later, he is evaluating Wendoll’s attributes for companionship, and hastily deems him suitable saying, ‘I have preferred him to a second place / In my opinion and my best regard’ (1.4.33-34). As Martin Wiggins suggests, this position of ‘second’ is in relation to Anne, who is first.\textsuperscript{140} Despite Frankford’s verbal ordering of his affections where Anne is given primacy, the relationship with his wife is not sufficiently fulfilling to preclude him from seeking to develop a close male friendship with Wendoll. As Jennifer Panek suggests, ‘once married, he [Frankford] proceeds to seek out someone to fill the place that his wife ought to hold’.\textsuperscript{141} The friendship he cultivates through reckless beneficence, leads him to jeopardise his relationship with his wife. Frankford may afford Anne first place in theory, but in practice the sense that the play evokes is that a man’s aspiration for reputation and realisation of male amicable bonds transcends marital bonds.

Frankford protests too much when he indicates that he has it all. Removed from his position at Court, he sees in Wendoll a way to recoup his reputation and an opportunity to

\textsuperscript{140} Wiggins, ‘Notes’, fn. 4, p. 308.
re-establish male homosocial bonds, which may prove instrumental at some point. This idea calls to mind the friendship of Francis Bacon and Toby Matthew insofar as its epistolary performance provided Bacon with comfort and attachment to affairs of state during his exile from James’ court. The problem with this formulation of friendship, especially as Heywood figures it, is that a friend becomes a necessity. This idea may be explained through consideration of Seneca’s Epistle IX where friendship is posited as divorced from the idea of self-completion. Seneca argues that ‘the soveraigne good seeketh not externall instruments, it is wholly accomplished in it selfe’. The fully-realised self does not need friendship. One does not seek friendship to provide what one lacks, but brings a whole self to friendship. This idea is evidenced in Cicero, as Laurie Shannon has shown in her work on ‘soveraigne amitie’. Shannon relates that the friend is ‘emphatically independent’ and that this quality frees friendships from a basis of ‘weakness or need’. In the absence of this, Seneca sees the emergence of utility in friendship, as an unfulfilled self looks for fulfilment in the friend. He says: ‘It beginneth to bee subject unto fortune, if it have neede to seeke any part of it selfe out of it selfe’.

This accords with the representation of Frankford. To Frankford, Wendoll becomes, ‘as necessary as his digestion’ (1.6.41). Wendoll may declare himself ‘a man by whom in no kind he could gain’, but to Frankford, his friendship is a necessity (1.6.36). Although he cannot provide pecuniary reward, Wendoll can provide companionship and allow for demonstrations of the virtues of benevolence, hospitality and liberality, which have the potential to convey esteem. Because of his need to reaffirm his standing amongst his

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144 Shannon, pp. 30-31.
145 Epistles, Epistle IX, Lodge, p. 176.
kinsmen, Frankford must be seen to be hospitable and generous, and at great expense. Leaving Wendoll alone in his house, commanding that he ‘keep his table, use his servants, / And be a present Frankford in his absence’ is one way of demonstrating beneficence (1.6.76-77). It is also surprising and ill-considered, especially given the alert raised about Anne’s attractiveness to men in the opening scene of the play (1.1.24). It speaks to the lengths that Frankford is willing to go, and sacrifices he is willing to make, to maintain appearances of wealth and status, reflecting a similar early modern concern. Early in the play Anne is described as ‘Beauty and Perfection’s eldest daughter’ and metaphorically likened to ‘a gold chain’ to ‘adorn’ Frankford’s neck (1.24, 65). To this her husband responds, ‘But that I know your virtues and chaste thoughts, / I should be jealous of your praise, Sir Charles’ (1.26-27). With the understanding of his wife’s allure and his proclaimed valuation of her as highest ‘of all the sweet felicities on earth’ (1.4.10), his decision to leave her in the care of Wendoll while away strikes a similar note as Charles’ willingness to sacrifice his sister, Susan. In this aristocratic, homosocial world, a purportedly beloved woman’s virtue is as much a marketable commodity as reputation and demonstrations of friendship. Ironically, despite Frankford’s ostensible kindness, surprisingly, it is only Sir Francis who is unwilling to trade on a woman's virtue in the end.

After Frankford’s betrayal by Anne and Wendoll, Heywood does not implicate Frankford in any way for his folly in welcoming Wendoll so freely into his home in the first place. Even though early modern constructs of masculinity did make the husband responsible for his wife’s chastity, and as such, here, Frankford would be somewhat culpable, Heywood directly avoids any explicit suggestion of responsibility through self-recrimination by Frankford. Rather, Frankford continues to be depicted as having been exceedingly generous. He asks Anne, ‘Wast thou not supplied / With every pleasure,
fashion, and new toy, / Nay, even beyond my calling? (1.13.106-108). Frankford is portrayed as very much the victim here, but also again, Heywood ensures that reputation continues to be an issue. Frankford responds to Anne’s self-abasement saying ‘Now I protest, I think ’tis I am tainted’ (1.13.85). He speaks of the shame of adultery as ‘my shame’ (1.13.10) and later he talks of ‘the blemish of my house’ (1.13.117) (emphases mine). In this scene through Frankford Heywood reflects early modern aristocratic anxiety about inheritance, particularly relating to children and land-owning families and property, both, again, linked to Frankford’s reputation. Frankford argues Anne’s adultery ‘Hath stained their [the children’s] names with stripe of bastardy’ (1.13.124). Here, as Martin Wiggins suggests, Frankford is not suggesting that the children are not his, but more importantly, ‘that their legitimacy will forever be doubted’.

But Frankford’s temperance, fostered by the maid that stays his hand, provides an opportunity for his reputation to be re-claimed. The scene encourages a Christ-like comparison, as Frankford refuses to kill the adulterous pair with his rapier, but grants them Christian mercy: ‘I would not damn two precious souls/ Bought with my Savior’s blood, and send them laden / With all their scarlet sins upon their backs / Unto a fearful judgement’ (1.13.43-46). In fact, as Frankford becomes their adjudicator on earth, his status is heightened in terms of the moral dichotomy established with the fallen Eve and betraying Judas Iscariot on one hand, and the mercifully kind husband/ friend on the other. In his recrimination of the pair, Frankford asserts his superiority through assuming the position of judge, and also implicitly suggests that the crime that they are guilty of is ingratitude.

Beneficence and gratitude are integral to the play’s understanding of friendship. When Wendoll contemplates adultery with Anne, his soliloquy acknowledges that friendship has been engendered through beneficence and that certain expectations of behaviour are required. He says: ‘and to wound his name / That holds thy name so dear, or rend his heart / To whom thy heart was joined and knit together’ (1.6.47-49). But his self-remonstrations are most telling: ‘And shall I wrong this man? Base man, ingrate!’ (1.6.43). Ingratitude in friendship here takes precedence in his consideration rather than the overall immorality of the adulterous act. As the inferior friend, all that Wendoll has been able to offer Frankford is furthered reputation for beneficence, and gratitude. Here he acknowledges that his act of adultery will undo both, as it will dishonour Frankford publically, and reveal him as ungrateful. When Frankford learns of Wendoll’s infidelity, he refers to him as ‘that Judas that hath borne my purse!’ (1.8.100). The reference to Judas would be enough to evoke a sense of the epitome of betrayal in friendship, but here the qualification—‘that hath borne my purse’—additionally charges Wendoll with violation of the rules governing benefitting and friendship. Wendoll has received a benefit and he has repaid it with ingratitude, infidelity and by making his friend a cuckold.

Heywood prolongs the dispensation of justice to Anne, while he affords little attention to Wendoll’s punishment. Even so, Frankford’s last words to Wendoll, and Wendoll’s understanding of what they mean, suggests that his sentence is indeed severe and perhaps will be protracted. Franklin repudiates Wendoll for violating the conventions of friendship and giving, telling him: ‘When thou record'st my many courtesies/ And shalt compare them with thy treacherous heart, / Lay them together, weigh them equally, / ’twill be revenge enough. Go, to thy friend / A Judas; pray, pray lest I live to see / Thee Judas-like, hanged on an elder tree’ (1.13.71-76). The use of the term ‘courtesies’ again, calls to mind
the polite giving and receiving that are a part of the social act of friendship. And Frankford declares that the many benefits that he has bestowed on Wendoll have been reciprocated improperly, with infidelity. Frankford’s understanding of friendship follows Seneca’s idea that the amicable bond is created through the goodwill that giving engenders in the recipient. He believes that his giving has bestowed friendship and his expectation was that Wendoll accepted friendship along with the benefit. The attributive ‘thy friend’ he uses to rebuke Wendoll signals the symbolic return of Wendoll’s friendship by Frankford, a breaking of the amicable bond. Further, the reference to the Judas-tree may imply that Frankford thinks Wendoll ought to follow in his namesake’s suicidal footsteps, or, just as plausibly, may suggest that Wendoll has quite figuratively hung himself, in terms of future prospects for beneficent friendship. This punishment for ungratefulness Wendoll acknowledges may haunt him for quite some time when he says:

And I must now go and wander like Cain
In foreign countries and remoted climes,
where the report of my ingratitude
cannot be heard. […]
when I have recovered, and by travel
gotten those perfect tongues, and that these rumours
may in their height abate, I will return;
and I divine, however now dejected,
my worth and parts by some great man praised,
at my return I may in court be raised. (1.16.124-134)

The problem of course with Wendoll’s plan is that such friendships require gratitude and reciprocation from the inferior participant. This is something that Wendoll has failed to demonstrate other than verbally. What this soliloquy registers is an understanding of the
consequences of such behaviour and highlights that non-reciprocation and ingratitude in friendship places a young gentleman’s success in jeopardy. It is a similar concern that Raleigh speaks to in his advice to his son when he suggests:

> for if thou givest twenty guifts,[sic] and refuse to doe the like but once, all that thou hast done will bee lost, and such men will become thy mortall Enemies.  

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VII. The Symbiotics of Friendship in *Timon* and *A Woman Killed with Kindness*

In *Timon* and *A Woman Killed with Kindness* the protagonists are superiors who bestow benefits that they believe create amicable bonds with men of inferior means. The problem posited in both plays is the expectation of what this type of friendship obliges. Timon and Frankford look for the benefit of constancy promised by *amicitia perfecta* when the bonds they forge are not intimate and affective, but rather, social and useful. They desire the rewards of friendships built on virtue, and ‘the very love it self’,

148 but they have not established their friendships on these grounds. In both plays the search may be for the ideal, the contemporary model of perfection gleaned from *De amicitia*, but the disillusioned realisation is with the reality of friendships of utility.

Both dramatists point up the rewards gained equally in these friendships, despite the protagonists’ denunciation of their friends for receiving and not giving. It would be easy to deem Frankford and Timon’s ‘friends’ parasites, a conventional character employed in other dramatic works of the time. However, because the emphasis in both plays is on reciprocal rewards obtained, and the dramatists depict obligation and expectation on both sides, the symbiotics of these relationships more closely resemble mutualism, as there is

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benefit to be had on both sides. The theoretical model of mutualism asserts that it is the ‘relative magnitude of costs and benefits that determines the outcome of the interaction’.\textsuperscript{149} And in the plays, in the end, the magnitude of the cost is too high a price on both sides, with all parties abandoning the interaction when their interests are compromised, whether it is their fortune, their friendship, or their wife. This renders the representations more akin to the co-operative model than parasitism.\textsuperscript{150} In this way Timon and even Frankford, albeit to a lesser extent, may be viewed not as victims of disloyal friends or parasites, but rather exemplar of reputation-preoccupied, wealthy aristocrats who have not proffered virtuous friendship, but expect its rewards. Audiences who were apt to judge them may have been familiar with Cicero’s view of such men. He claimed, ‘men yt flow in wealthe are not to be hearde, if at any time they dispute of frendship, wherof they have neither by Practise, neyther[sic] by knowledge, anye understandinge’.\textsuperscript{151} Timon and Frankford ‘dispute of friendship’, yet their practice is selective and arbitrary. As such, the bitter denunciation of their friends rings hollow.

**VIII. Epistolary Performance of Friendship**

*Timon* and *A Woman Killed with Kindness* question the extent to which affective bonds exist, are recognisable, and understood in less than ‘ideal’ friendships. This is a matter that the weeping men at Stanley’s grave bring to bear, and which may be better understood through an examination of the performance of friendship in early modern letters. Lisa Jardine’s work on epistolary instruction and the use of Erasmus’s *De Copia* towards this


\textsuperscript{150} For the differentiation between mutualism and parasitism see Stadler, et al, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{151} *Booke of Freendeshippe*, Newton, sig. C7’.
end, finds that it ‘develops a technology of affect to “fabricate intimacy”’. The notion that closeness or familiarity can, should or even need be manufactured is significant, as it begs the question, how reliable are demonstrations of friendship? The idea that a ‘rhetoric of affection’ was something to be taught displaces the sense of an intrinsic emotive dimension one expects of friendship. Further, it speaks to the difficulty that arises in trying to discern true feeling from constructs of friendship and social interaction based on Erasmian models that Magnusson suggests ‘perform horizontal relations of reciprocal friendship’. There have been alternative readings of Erasmian practices, which underscore the different ways epistolary performance may be understood. Magnusson notes the fine line between flattery and politeness, while anthropologists Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson see what Magnusson calls Erasmus’ ‘prolific inventories for ingratiation’, as the ‘building blocks of friendship and intimacy’.

As we saw in the consideration of De beneficiis, acts had the ability to engender a goodwill that led to friendship. This idea receives full expression in a letter that Erasmus includes in a volume of his works that Lisa Jardine characterises as ‘a textual gift, an amicitia or friendship transaction’. The letter is demonstrative of the ‘building blocks’ to which Brown and Levinson refer. It reflects on the benefit that Erasmus has received from Matthias Schürer, a Strasbourg printer who printed some of his work and is an illustration of the Senecan idea that the beneficent act and its reception may be viewed as giving and receiving of friendship. Erasmus writes:

154 Magnusson, p. 68; the views of Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson are discussed in Magnusson, pp. 69.
And so, were I not deeply attached to Matthias. I should rightly be accused of having iron and adamant where my heart should be, such was his initiative in offering by acts of kindness to become my friend. Nor will I act so as to fall short in spirit at least and in readiness, although it was he who began it.156

The word ‘act’ is invoked twice and speaks to the idea of performance of friendship even when it comes to proffering feeling or ‘spirit’.157 Schürer extended friendship through the ‘act of kindness’ that he performed in publishing Erasmus’ work. The ‘acts of kindness’, as Jardine observes, ‘were no less acts of friendship for the fact that Schürer’s relationship is a professional one’.158 In this way Erasmus lends credence to an understanding of friendship that was enacted outside the bounds of the Ciceronian model and structured similarly to Senecan conventions on giving and receiving.

Erasmus’ letter reveals the way that giving can establish amicable bonds. It also acknowledges that Erasmus has accepted Schürer’s friendship and is ‘ready’ to requite it in Senecan fashion. The epistolary act and its public presentation in the volume demonstrate the requisite gratitude that Seneca outlined as necessary for the continuance of amicable bonds. Most importantly perhaps, like the demonstration at the Stanley funeral, it is done publically; for the letter is not addressed to Schürer but Jakob Wimpfeling, the ‘spokesman’ for Strasbourg’s sodalitas literaria’ with whom Erasmus was associated.159 Erasmus certainly had a familiarity with Seneca’s ideas. After moving from Strasbourg he established a work place in Basle where he completed his edition of Seneca.160

156 Letter reprinted in Jardine, p. 86.
157 The understanding of ‘spirit’ here is ‘the active or essential principle or power of some emotion, frame of mind’ def. 7a (Wyclif, 1382) , OED.
158 Jardine, p. 86.
159 Jardine, p. 85.
160 Jardine, p. 86.
Erasmus’ letter registers a sense that affection accompanies the instrumentality of his friendship with Schürer. Nevertheless, he employs a similar epistolary ‘staging’ for a prefatory letter in the Parabolae to a Pieter Gilles of Antwerp, whom Jardine deems Erasmus’ ‘close friend’. At the beginning of the letter he delineates true, intimate friendship from the ‘commonplace’, asserting that which he shares with Gilles is the latter. Erasmus aims to distinguish his friendship with Gilles by claiming that ‘commonplace’ friends are ‘attached to material things; and if ever they have to face separation, they favour a frequent exchange of rings, knives, caps, and other tokens of the kind, for fear that their affection may cool when intercourse is interrupted’. Lorna Hutson’s review of the letter outlines Erasmus’ attempt to ‘elevate’ his gift of the book from other tokens of ‘commonplace’ friendship; however, importantly, Hutson demonstrates that the exchange of gifts in commonplace friendship as well as the kind that Erasmus asserts with Gilles, are both representative of the ‘exchange’ of ‘good faith and honour’ through the ‘pledge’ that the object represents. In this way the two formulations of friendship may be viewed as less distinct than Erasmus contends. This is an important idea that speaks to the question that Hutson’s work in The Usurer’s Daughter raised and that helped to inform this thesis: to what extent can friendship really be separated from utility in the period? Erasmus’ letter lends support to the idea that despite claims to the contrary, maybe it cannot.

It might also be useful to consider Hutson’s point beyond the bounds of the gift-exchange economy explored in Marcel Mauss’ The Gift and examine Erasmus’ letter in relation to Seneca’s ideas of benefit and friendship. Erasmus raises the point about the materiality of the gift as a designator of the quality of friendship and suggests the necessity

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163 Hutson, pp. 4-5.
164 Hutson, p. 62.
of the token to call to mind the friend. A most extreme example of this of course is found in rings bequeathed to friends in wills. This was not uncommon among the wealthy, as Keith Thomas explains that the wealthy ‘preserved symbolic reminders of their intimate relationships’ in the form of ‘miniatures, posies, rings and locks of hair’.\textsuperscript{165} But such gifts did not necessarily debase friendship, or preclude an affective dimension, as giving and receiving could be a part of its expression as \textit{De beneficiis} demonstrates. Further, as discussed earlier in the chapter, benefit in friendship was not limited to material exchange. Benefit could, at different times throughout friendship’s course, include ‘succours’, ‘ornament’, as well as ‘other consolations’.\textsuperscript{166} Equally, it is plausible that a token could be read as a form of ‘consolation’ during periods of absence, as Lisa Jardine’s work on letters suggests, rather than demonstrative of a less affective or effective, form of friendship.\textsuperscript{167}

Erasmus invokes the similitude of \textit{amicitia perfect} asserting that his friendship with Gilles ‘rests wholly in a meeting of minds and the enjoyment of studies in common’, but paradoxically closes with the extension of a token himself, his \textit{Parabolae}, saying, ‘and so I send a present –no common present, for you are no common friend, but many jewels in one small book’.\textsuperscript{168} As Jardine notes, ‘written texts are the ideal tokens for such enduring [intellectual] friendships’.\textsuperscript{169} They are nevertheless, exemplar of giving and benefit in friendship, just as \textit{De beneficiis} outlines. It is just that in Erasmus’ letter he asserts that it is given to a friend with whom he claims a more intimate than instrumental bond, even though as Natalie Zemon Davis points out, Gilles ‘helped Erasmus sell his books’.\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{165} Keith Thomas, \textit{The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 188.
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{De beneficiis}, Lodge, p. 92
\textsuperscript{167} Jardine, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{168} Letter, Jardine, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{169} Jardine, p. 87.
Erasmus’ letters take us back to Chapter 2 and the consideration of benefit that was seen as anathema to ideal friendship. The epistolary performance and crafting of affective rhetoric is similar to the appeal to paradigmatic friendship pairs, as they attempt to engender a similar effect. In both instances, as in the case of friendships of utility, the difficulty in discerning the true depth of the affective bond is problematic for friendships’ participants. To close the chapter, two letters which passed between friends Francis Bacon and Toby Matthew are examined to demonstrate this idea. Bacon and Matthew, a man sixteen years his junior, enjoyed a long-term friendship. Lisa Jardine and Alan Stewart note that Francis and his brother, Nicholas Bacon were men who ‘constructed their lives around intricate networks of friendship and service’, but observe that Francis’ relationship with Matthew went beyond the ‘tired bids for patronage’.\textsuperscript{171} Even so, the two letters written to Matthew by Bacon in 1621(2) and 1623\textsuperscript{172} respectively, highlight the complicated nature of delineating affection and instrumentality in friendship. In the first, an affective bond of amity is asserted, as Bacon suggests that Matthew is the inspiration for the revision of his essay ‘Of Friendship’ (1625):

Good Mr. Matthew,
It is not for nothing that I have deferred my essay De Amicitia, whereby it hath expected the proof of your great friendship [sic] towards me. Whosoever the event be (wherein I depend upon God, who ordaineth the effect, the instrument, all) yet your incessant thinking of me, without loss of a moment of time, or a hint of

occasion, or a circumstance of endeavour, or a stroke of a pulse, in demonstration of love and affection to me doth infinitely tie me to you.\textsuperscript{173}

There is a reflection of the Senecan principle of giving as engendering sustained friendship here, for implicit is the understanding that Matthew’s friendship is ‘great’ because of his many demonstrations of affection. Bacon acknowledges that these acts have forged an abiding ‘tie’. But unlike Erasmus’ letter to Schüier, there is little assertion of reciprocal feeling, as Bacon’s letter, to a man who is purportedly a close friend, is remarkably reserved in emotion, especially given the tenor of Matthew’s attentions referenced by Bacon. The letter’s voice does not conjure a feeling of a friendship based on mutual affection, despite a hint of a palpable bond between the two men. Even so, it is as if Bacon almost basks in the adoration displayed by Matthew, in a similar way that Timon and Frankford savoured the attention of their inferior friends.

There is the requisite implied gratitude in the letter, but given the asymmetrical affection it asserts it becomes problematic to read this letter as demonstrative of the existence of (or depth of) an affective bond between Bacon and Matthew. Given Bacon and Matthew’s education they were both familiar with pedagogical models of familiar letters. Bacon’s correspondence illustrates his use of the form to secure suits. While Bacon signs the letter to Matthew ‘Your most affectionate and assured friend’, this closing, or a similar permutation of ‘your assured friend’, was one of several stock phrases, used to close a letter. In Nicholas Breton’s \textit{Conceyted Letters: the perfections or arte of episteling} (1618, 1632, 1638) it is used in the response to a sample letter ‘from a Knight to a Nobleman, for the entertaining of a Secretary’, in appreciation for a new employee.\textsuperscript{174} The letter does not suggest that the two men exchanging letters are friends, but merely that

\textsuperscript{173} Spedding, p. 430.
\textsuperscript{174} Nicholas Breton, \textit{Conceyted Letters:} (London: Printed by B. Alsop for Samuel Rand, 1618), sig. C3'.
the knight has heard of the death of the lord’s secretary and proffers a suit for the post on behalf of a kinsman, which the lord accepts. Yet, the closing of this letter is similar to that employed by Bacon to Matthew. Further, closings which recall *amicitia perfecta*’s ‘one soul in two bodies’, such as, ‘Yours as mine owne’ and its response, ‘Yours, or not mine owne’ are found both in a ‘Letter To A Friend to Borrowe Money’ (and the friend’s response) and ‘A Letter to a Friend, on the otherside [sic] of the Sea’(and response); the latter asks for nothing more than some news of the friend’s welfare and goings on, the former, for five pounds.\(^{175}\) Here, there is indeed a ‘confusing’ of ‘the economic and affective’.\(^{176}\) Overall then, how is a man to discern the type of friendship that he has transacted?

Bacon’s revision of ‘Of Friendship’ is thought to be a tribute to the affective friendship he enjoyed with Matthew and written, as the letter suggests, at his friend’s request. It takes a less cynical view of friendship, with reduced emphasis on a friend’s usefulness, but it does not abandon the idea of utility altogether. As discussed in Chapter 3, in this essay Bacon explains how a friend may open doors to opportunity, by acting as one’s deputy. He also asserts how useful a friend can be in terms of one’s reputation:

> A man can scarce allege his owne Merits with modesty much less extoll them: A man cannot sometimes brooke to Supplicate or Beg: [...] But all these Things, are Graceful in a Friends Mouth, which are blushing in a Mans Owne.\(^{177}\)

Although Jardine and Stewart claim that Matthew in no way wielded the type of power that Essex and Villiers enjoyed at certain times at Court, Matthew also was useful to

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\(^{175}\) Breton, *Letters*, sigs. A4\(^{-}\)-A4\(^{+}\), C4\(^{-}\)-D2\(^{+}\). Original, non-standardised capitalisation of titles retained.

\(^{176}\) This idea, and coining of phrase, discussed earlier in relation to *Timon of Athens* by Tom MacFaul, p.145.

\(^{177}\) Francis Bacon, ‘Of Friendship’ in *The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall of Francis Bacon, Viscount St. Alban* (London: John Haviland, 1632), sig. Y2\(^{-}\).
Bacon, and vice versa. They relate that Matthew delivered important correspondence for Bacon early and late in his career and that Bacon vacated his St Albans seat in Parliament for Matthew and instead sat for Ipswich. As David Wootton contends, Matthew was well-connected at court. This is clear from a letter that Bacon writes to Matthew three years before Bacon dies in 1626. It is similar to many of the letters that Bacon wrote to others throughout his career wherein he requested assistance in suits. He writes in part to Matthew:

so as with great confidence I commend myself to you, hoping that you will do what in you lieth to prepare the Prince and Duke to think of me upon their return. And if you have any relation to the Infata, I doubt not but it shall be also to my use.

Although this letter’s tone differs significantly from the first’s more intimate one, this does not necessarily speak against what David Wootton contends was Bacon’s finding ‘true friendship’ in Matthew. This is especially understandable with Aristotle’s belief that all formulations of friendship can exhibit ‘mutual assistance and goodwill’. Wootton’s observation on Bacon’s friendships of utility illustrates this coexistence:

throughout his career he had sought to adapt the language and sentiments of friendship to the demands of court life, where friendship was inseparable from flattery, patronage and favouritism. At court there was no love without utility, and perfection of friendship was ‘but a speculation’.

178 Jardine and Stewart, Bacon, p. 483.
179 Jardine and Stewart, Bacon, pp. 520, 276.
182 Wootton, p. 201.
183 Wootton, p. 201.
A comparison of the dates of both letters that Bacon writes to Matthew with the dates of Matthew’s second exile, from 1619-1622, supports Wootton’s assessment. If Spedding’s dating of both letters to Matthew is correct, then the first one discussed, signed ‘your assured friend’, came whilst Matthew was in exile.\textsuperscript{184} It makes no requests of a man who is no position to be of assistance. The second, dated between 17 June- July 1623 comes after Matthew’s return to Court and the King’s favour. It acknowledges Matthew’s diplomatic role, which began that spring (and led to his knighthood that October) in helping with the negotiations for the marriage to the Infanta.\textsuperscript{185} Thus, even in the twilight of his life and career, Bacon saw the use of a friend with whom it is believed he shared a close affective bond.

The letters of Bacon and Erasmus, the Stanley tribute and James’ description of relationships between gentry and their followers all highlight the difficulty that not only researchers face in trying to ‘read’ amicable bonds between men when political and social realities necessitated a conflation of ideal and useful friendship, but more importantly perhaps, the problems that early modern men faced trying to discern the same, as the rhetoric and performance of true and useful friendship sometimes crossed paths. At a time when, as Jason Scott-Warren observes, ‘on the ladder of status, everyone was at once patron and client, dispensing favours to those beneath them and begging favours from those higher up’\textsuperscript{186} what Heywood and the anonymous dramatist of \textit{Timon} capture in their representations in a sometimes satirical, sometimes sober way, are the multi-dimensional ways such relationships can be read and misunderstood.

\textsuperscript{184} The date of Matthew’s second exile from 1619-22 from A. J. Loomie, ‘Sir Toby Matthew’, \textit{The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography}.
\textsuperscript{185} Loomie, ‘Matthew’, \textit{DNB}.
This chapter examined the treatment of another formulation of unequal friendship that drew from the theoretical ideal. The following chapter takes this idea further, examining the problems created by the shared parlance of ideal friendship and marriage through Heywood’s representation of the status of the friend after marriage in *The Rape of Lucrece* and *The English Traveller*. 
Chapter 5

A ‘Woe’ to Male Friendship?¹

On the 6 August 1628 Thomas Heywood’s *The Rape of Lucrece* was performed at the Cockpit Theatre by Queen Henrietta’s Men.² Less than a year later, in 1629, nearly twenty-five years after its first performance, William Shakespeare’s *Othello* took the stage at the Blackfriars Theatre. Both plays were revivals: *Lucrece* from the Red Bull c. 1608 and *Othello* from its performances at Whitehall in front of King James 1 on 1 November 1604, at Oxford and the Globe in 1610, and again at court for Princess Elizabeth's marriage in 1612/13.³ The plays had been written close to a time when drama evidenced a ‘preoccupation with marriage’, often posited in relation to its co-existence with friendship.⁴ Shakespeare’s treatment of this combined theme in *Othello* and *The Winter’s Tale* (1610) suggests that the two relationships are incompatible. As Allan Bloom notes, in *The Winter’s Tale* he calls into question the viability of male friendship after marriage, finally endorsing ‘a definite primacy to marriage over friendship’.⁵ *Othello* (1603/4) may be viewed somewhat similarly, for despite much of the play’s action suggesting otherwise, ultimately the friendship that challenged marriage is denounced, and marital union is only symbolically re-established in death.

¹ This idea from the characterisation of women as ‘a woe onto [sic] man’ from Chapter 1 of Joseph Swetnam, *The Araignment of Lewd, Idle, Froward, Inconstant Women* (London: Printed by George Purslowe for Thomas Archer, 1615).
⁴ Kathleen E. McLuskie notes there was a ‘preoccupation with marriage in the plays of the turn of the century’ in *Dekker and Heywood: Professional Dramatists* (London: St. Martins, 1994), p. 95. Additionally, Heywood’s *A Woman Killed with Kindness* was written at this time (1607).
Lucrece and Othello were first performed during the early days of King James’ friendship with Robert Carr, Earl of Somerset. Their revivals coincided with the ‘early marital discord’ at the Caroline court between Charles 1 and Queen Henrietta Maria, and the halcyon days of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, the royal friend and favourite at both Charles and James’ courts. Villiers was in the audience at the Cockpit on the 6 August during the performance of Lucrece. The theatre visit was in the wake of the Remonstrance drafted by Parliament that denounced the King’s friend, laying at his feet the commonwealth’s troubles. Villiers attendance at the play is not necessarily remarkable, as it was one of his royal duties. He had escorted the Ambassador of Savoy to the Globe for a performance of Fletcher and Shakespeare’s Henry VIII (1611) earlier in the month, a play revived for only one performance at the behest of Villiers (who is reported to have left after Buckingham’s death). What is interesting to consider is not the later theatre visit’s temporal proximity to Villiers’ murder or the circumstances surrounding the revival of Henry VIII, but the plays’ shared interest in the historical treatment of the primacy of homosocial bonding figured in relation to fidelity and marriage, something of great relevance to Buckingham’s career and life at court.

In Othello and the Winter’s Tale Shakespeare examines friendship and marriage through jealousy. Tom MacFaul suggests that this plot line may be viewed as a genre,

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6 For James’ relationship with Queen Anne and Buckingham see David M. Bergeron, King James & Letters of Homoerotic Desire (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1999), pp. 98-107. For Charles’ relationship with Queen Henrietta Maria and friendship with Buckingham, see Michelle Anne White, Henrietta Maria and the English Civil Wars (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), pp. 12-13.
7 The culminating section reads: ‘the principall cause of which evils and dangers, we conceve to be the excessive power of the Duke of Buckingham, and the abuse of that power’ in A Remonstrance Presented to His Majesty by the Parliament in June Anno Dom. 1628 (London : 1643), sig. A4v.
8 The visit to the Globe is recounted in Appendix I, Gurr, Playgoing, p. 209.
given its ‘sufficiently common’ use; a use that provides the basis for dramatists to consider
‘the nature of ideal friendship’, which is ‘ultimately shown to be a hollow rhetorical
construct’. Even so, in *The Rape of Lucrece* and *The English Traveller*, Thomas
Heywood steps beyond this generic formulation as he envisions the possibilities for the co-
existence of marriage and friendship. In the previous chapter we saw how Heywood
highlighted the instrumentality of male bonds after marriage in *A Woman Killed with
Kindness*. He did so through his depictions of Frankford and Sir Charles, men who afford
primacy to male bonds at high costs to wives and sisters. In *Lucrece* and *The English
Traveller* Heywood explores this further. He advances beyond Shakespeare’s treatment
and resolution of the theme in *Othello* and *The Winters’ Tale* and his insistence on
jealousy and betrayal at the expense of developing the friendship of Othello and Cassio or
Leontes and Polixenes. This makes Heywood’s dramatic contributions to the discourse of
friendship and marriage in these two plays not only noteworthy, but a fitting close to this
study.

Heywood and Shakespeare’s treatment of friendship and marriage in the
aforementioned plays raise some interesting questions, but they strongly beg one question
above all: if both friendship and marriage are necessary for social stability and success,
and marriage equates with fully realised manhood, how do men negotiate the bounds and
bonds of friendship and division of loyalties of husbands after marriage? Shakespeare’s
*Othello* and *The Winter’s Tale* reveal the competing pull of the two and the problems that
arise when primacy is given to one over the other. This chapter will consider how Thomas
Heywood treats these two socially constructed, idealised relationships by exploring the

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10 Tom MacFaul, *Male Friendship in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries* (Cambridge: Cambridge

11 For marriage as part of the achievement of manhood see Alexandra Shepard, *Meanings of Manhood in
correlation between the religious language that prescribed marriage and the classical humanist parlance of male friendship made familiar in this study. The first part of the chapter considers the cultural and theatrical contexts which may have played a part in the renewed interest in friendship and marriage. The second part discusses the codification of friendship and marriage through shared language in classical, religious and contemporary works to highlight the inherent conflict established through shared discourse. The third section will explore how Heywood addresses this conflict and the ideal in *The Rape of Lucrece* and *The English Traveller*.

I. Cultural and Theatrical Contexts

*Lucrece* and *Othello* were only two of the plays performed during the twelve year period 1627-1639 that examined friendship and marriage. Several, like *Lucrece*, were part of the repertory for the Cockpit under Christopher Beeston and included: Heywood’s *The English Traveller* (c. 1627?), John Ford’s *Love’s Sacrifice* (1631?) and *The Lady’s Trial* (1638), and James Shirley’s *Love’s Cruelty* (part of the 1631 and 1639 repertories of Queen Henrietta’s Men and Beeston’s Boys respectively). Each of the plays re-work the friendship and marriage theme in their own unique ways, despite the obvious resonance, to a lesser or greater extent, of *Othello*. This perhaps argues less for the dramatists’ personal interest in the subject matter, and more for an astute Beeston, who was a savvy theatre and company manager. But also, it may in part relate to the literary connectedness of the dramatists.

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Critics have noted with some regularity the shared affinities between Ford, Heywood, Shakespeare and Shirley in their use of the love and friendship theme.\(^{14}\) Martin Butler identifies Shirley’s *Love’s Cruelty* as having similarities with Ford’s *Love’s Sacrifice*.\(^{15}\) Further, A.T. Moore and Martin Butler have underscored the debt owed to *Othello* in *Love’s Sacrifice*, through either ‘allusions’ or ‘borrowings’.\(^ {16}\) Heywood was a closer contemporary of Shakespeare than either Ford or Shirley, but his works were not merely written in Shakespeare’s shadow. David Farley Hills locates *A Woman Killed with Kindness* at the Rose in ‘late February or early March 1603’, nearly a year before *Othello*’s first public performance when the theatres re-opened after plague closure in March 1604, and suggests that *Othello* was ‘a Globe reply to Heywood’s apparently highly successful domestic tragedy’.\(^ {17}\) Paulina Kewes notes another response by Shakespeare to Heywood, arguing that the change of the title of Shakespeare’s narrative poem *Lucrece* (1594) to *The Rape of Lucrece* when published in 1616 (Q6), ‘was surely prompted by the publisher’s desire to capitalize on the popularity of Heywood’s stage version which by then had gone through three editions, in 1608, 1609, and 1641’.\(^ {18}\) Both of these examples point up the nature of dramatic production (and perhaps commerce), and suggest that dramatists’ works could be in dialogue with one another. It also lends credence to the view that there was robust dramatic life and creativity that prefigured, as well as followed, Shakespeare,


\(^{15}\) Butler, p. 208.


\(^{18}\) Paulina Kewes, ‘Roman History and Early Stuart Drama: Thomas Heywood’s *The Rape of Lucrece*, *ELR* 32 (2002), 239-67, (p.247).
especially evident in the way the friendship and marriage theme was refigured and reinvigorated by Heywood.

This notable attention given to friendship and marriage in drama came as a married King followed a Virgin Queen on the throne and correlates to what Gina Hausknecht finds were ‘a proliferation of books on marriage’.19 Two of the texts that took up the subject of marriage, with particular focus on wives, were written by Thomas Heywood: *Gynaikeion* (1624) and *A Curtaine Lecture* (1637). Although Hausknecht accounts for the rise in output in part by noting an increase in the publication of books in general, she also suggests that perhaps it was linked to ‘renewed public interest in discourse about marriage’ that accompanied the new King.20 There was also a continued print interest in friendship at the time, with works that considered the integral nature of friendship to life, like Robert Burton’s *Anatomy of Melancholy*, which had five, pre-Civil war editions. This interest may be in part explained by the publicity surrounding relations in the royal household between James 1, Queen Anne and Buckingham. The persistent interest in stage favourites may have a similar explanation. Work by Curtis Perry and Blair Worden link the interest in dramatic representation of favourites to the period of Elizabethan and Stuart concern over their prerogative.21 Even so, it is important to acknowledge, as Worden suggests, that the drama may not necessarily reflect ‘the operation of power’ itself, but rather, ‘public perceptions of it’; perceptions that Worden notes ‘crossed the gulf between literature and life’.22 The correspondence of themes germane to Buckingham’s life at court reflected

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20 Hausknecht, p. 83.
21 Perry notes that that ‘upwards of fifty extant plays from 1587-1642’ have royal favouritism as their central concern, p. 3; Worden, pp. 159-160.
22 Worden, p. 160.
II. Shared Discourse and the Codification of Friendship and Marriage

Chapter 1 of this study examined the appropriation of classical philosophy by the Church fathers and early modern humanists to order amicable relations between men. The subsequent chapters considered the dramatic potential of problematising the strict codification of friendship figured through idealised rhetoric. But classical friendship rhetoric proved useful in shaping early modern marriage as well. And when dramatists like Heywood added a wife to the equation, the responsibilities of stage husbands were compounded, mirroring early modern expectations of masculinity, as men attempted to negotiate two intimate relations which were codified similarly. At issue was the social imperative to be both friend and husband, and the competing benefits offered by each. This section will explore some of the points of intersection in order to highlight the contexts within which Heywood would understand both.

Patriarchal early modern society necessitated that gentlemen establish and nurture close friendship ties. Lord Burghley’s advice to his son, Robert Cecil, discussed in Chapter 1, makes clear the implications for inattention to one’s useful friend, namely, insignificance. He warns: ‘for otherwise in this ambitious age thou mayest remain like a hop without a pole, live in obscurity, and be made a football for every insulting companion to spurn at’.23 Equally, however, because marriage was seen as a stabilising factor in society, men were encouraged to marry, as constructs of ‘normative, or patriarchal

manhood’ favoured married men.24 As Alexandra Shepard notes, ‘conduct writers identified three principal gateways to patriarchal privilege: age, marital status, and more obliquely, social status’.25 And herein the tension between friendship and marriage begins to be felt, as instrumental friendships, much like ‘good’ marriages, also helped to confer the honour and prestige necessary to achieve one’s social status in relation to rank, as Burghley’s advice suggests. Cultivating male friendships then, could not, and did not, end when a man said ‘I do’.

While the institutionalisation of marriage and Christian exegesis communicated in sermons and advice literature supported the primacy of marriage, the marital relationship was cast in classical friendship terms. Rhetorically, (and otherwise) this set marriage in competition with male friendship. Lisa Jardine’s work on companionate marriage underscores the sources of conflict between the two, noting that the reformed Church’s ‘marriage-model (mutual consent; free choice; partnership) made it readily comparable with intimate male friendship’.26 While the Christian perspective on the primacy of marriage left no doubt for any man taking part in the marriage ceremony (Form of Solemnization of Matrimony from The Book of Common Prayer 1559), the reiteration and reinforcement of that message read from pulpits on occasions throughout the church year in An Homily of the State of Matrimony (1562) provides just one clue as to the competing aims of friendship and marriage. The second sentence reads: ‘It is instituted of God, to the intent that man and woman should live lawfully in a perpetual friendship’.27 The use of the word ‘friendship’ to characterise marriage is interesting, especially as Constance M.

24 Shepard, pp. 9, 87.
25 Shepard, p. 9.
27 ‘An Homily of the State of Matrimony’ (1562) in Homilies Appointed to be Read in Churches in the Time of Queen Elizabeth (London: Printed for the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1851), pp. 534-549, (p. 534)
Furey suggests that ‘early modern Europeans assumed that it was men, not women who were best equipped for friendship and other communal relations’ (and to whom friendship literature was addressed). It is understandable however, given that the comparative example was made by men (namely, the Church fathers and theologians), for men. As men were charged with ensuring the success of the marital relationship, a model that mirrored a relationship with which they were already familiar could be useful.

This figuring of marriage as amity can be traced to Thomas Aquinas, who was among other medieval theologians who figured marriage as ‘love or friendship between spouses’. Aquinas posits marriage as a ‘friendship of equality’, invoking the notion of the mutuality held as the basis for male friendship: sharing all things in common. This is an idea which is Pythagorean in origin, articulated in Plato’s *Phaedrus* and reiterated throughout the early modern period. Citing a Christianised derivation of ‘one soul in two bodies’ from Genesis—‘they shall become one flesshe’—Aquinas asserts that ‘the love of man and woman is counted strongest of all’. This in itself is not unusual, as at the time he was writing Aquinas was responsible for a ‘new modus vivendi between faith and philosophy’. Yet, this idea of husbands and wives as ‘one flesh’, reiterated in the marriage service from St. Paul’s letter to the Ephesians (5: 31) is bound up in gender inequalities. If the husband is privileged over the wife, and she is merely part of his body

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where he is the head, there can be no equality as Aquinas suggests. The idea of men joined by a soul in perfect friendship however, links the very essence of the self, and despite its more quixotic view, in theory suggests a more equitable and noble union. When King James asserted in *Basilikon Doron* (1603) that a wife should be treated as 'the halfe of your selfe', he came rhetorically closer to classical friendship’s view of the friend as ‘another self’ from the *Nicomachean Ethics*: that ‘frendes have one life and one bloud’. This may in part reflect his simultaneous experience with close male friendship and marriage. But it is clear that despite religious precedent maintaining marriage’s primacy, shared symbolic imagery and language and constructs of femininity and masculinity set friendship and marriage in conflict.

This was heightened further through the shared benefits offered by male friendship and marriage, making friends and wives potentially equal competitors for affection and fidelity. As previously mentioned, the friend could help further reputation and confer honour. In a similar way, however, so too could a chaste and obedient wife with established kinship ties and influence. King Kames reinforces the latter in his advice to his son in *Basilikon Doron*, noting marriage’s ability to confer ‘friendship by alliance’. This idea made early modern marital choice a vital concern (more so among elite families), and as important perhaps, as Burghley’s suggested selection of a well-placed friend.

And just as the friend was called to promote virtue through moral correction and guidance, so, too, was the wife. Gina Hausknecht’s work on early Stuart advice literature underscores this idea, relating that Alexander Niccholes reference to a man without a wife as ‘a man unbuilt’ in his *Discourse of Marriage and Wiving* (1615) suggests an inability to

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34 *Basilikon Doron*, p. 61.
reach moral potential without one, rendering a man ‘not fully a man.’ One can already begin to see the friction here between friendship and marriage literature as overlapping duties to promote virtue are apportioned between friend and wife. While Niccholes’ work and William Whatley’s *A Bride-Bush* (1617) supported the Aristotelian claim that virtue was not in man by nature by asserting the need for an earthly moral guide, the suggestion that the wife might fulfil this role set the position of the friend and wife at added variance. Whatley urged wives ‘to draw’ their husbands ‘out of sin’, and as a co-partner gave them equal responsibility to ‘mitigate’ any ‘distemperatures’, thereby charging wives to promote virtue in a similar way as Aristotle did the friend, when he claimed ‘menne maie become the better one by another’. Marriage itself was seen to further this end, through sanctioned sexual intimacy for those who lacked the ‘gift of continency’, as the second ‘cause’ of matrimony was its use as ‘a remedy against sin, and to avoid fornication’. The third ‘cause’ of matrimony outlined in ‘The Form of Solemnization of Matrimony’ was ‘mutual society, help and comfort’. This also challenged the responsibility afforded the ideal friend to provide succour. In actuality, the key differences between classically-ordered male friendship and early modern marriage rested on marriage’s first ‘cause’: procreation; its ability to provide lineal continuity through children, and its sanctification of sexual intimacy. That said, evidence suggests that some men did conduct intimate sexual relationships with other men, despite the fact that such relations were considered

36 Hausknecht, p. 82.
39 In *BCP*, p. 291.
political, sexual and religious crimes, and they did so, as Alan Bray notes, ‘within social contexts which an Elizabethan would have called friendship’.  

Marriage’s primacy over friendship was supported by liturgical practice and didactic marriage manuals (like the aforementioned). Even so, the views of writers such as Edmund Tilney, who claimed that ‘no friendship, or amitie is, or ought to be more déere, and surer, than the love of man and wife’ met with challenges from alternative voices in print.41 One influential dissenting view was from Saint Augustine. His major works, *Citie of God* and *Confessions* were available in English translation in 1610 and 1631 respectively, but his thought was invoked in other contemporary works. Thomas Heywood demonstrates his familiarity with Augustinian thought in *Gynaikeion, Nine Bookes of Various History Concerninge Women* (1624), a work which is a synthesis of Christian theology and classical philosophy drawing from ideas of other Church fathers as well as Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch and Pythagoras.42 Augustine takes a less cooperative view of marital union than Aquinas, assigning Eve's main role as procreation, not as companionship for Adam.43 In *De Genesi ad litteram* his perspective on friendship in marriage is somewhat obliquely defined, as Carolinne White’s translation suggests: ‘how much better would two male friends live together, alike for company and conversation, than a man and a woman’.  

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40 Alan Bray, ‘Homosexuality and the Signs of Male Friendship in Elizabethan England’, *History Workshop* 29 (Spring, 1990), pp. 1-19, (pp. 2, 5, 14).
42 Augustine is invoked throughout. For all others see Thomas Heywood, *Gynaikeion* (London: Adam Islip, 1624), passim and pp. 271, 426, 618-619, especially.
44 From *De Genesi ad litteram*, IX, v, 9 as quoted in Carolinne White, *Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 10 and as ‘Quanto enim congruentius ad conuiuendum et colloquendum duo amici pariter quam uir et mulier habitarent’ as quoted in Bonner, p. 22. According to Bonner, the idea is that a male companion would be more ‘useful’. For consonance in thinking on friendship with Cicero, see also White, p. 50.
and practice of classical amity outlined by Aristotle and Cicero, and perhaps Augustine’s own experience with male friendship. Interestingly however, Aristotle posits marriage as *philia*. John Watt’s translation of Augustine’s *Confessions* offers a perspective on the theologian’s view of male friendship that may inform his view about friendship and marriage. In a recollection of the loss of a dear friend, the unity of ideal friendship is invoked:

> for I still thought my soule and his soule, to have bee but one soule in two bodies and therefore was my life a very horror to me, because I would not live by halves. And even therefore perchance was I afraid to dye, lest he should whooly die, whom so passionately I had loved.

The friendship is described as intimate and intense; the mourning of the friend is reminiscent of the same in *De amicitia*. Although Augustinian thought acknowledges that the wife might serve as companion, the *Citie of God* supports a similar view as the *Confessions*, proposing that the ‘affection of sure friends’ and ‘unfained faith’, not marriage, are the only ‘comfort’ man has ‘in this vale of immortal miseries’. With both texts in mind, Augustine’s view appears to elevate the male homosocial bond above the marriage relationship, perhaps not surprisingly given that marriage was not an option for him. Even so, Augustine accepts the necessity of the marital union for peopling God’s

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45 For Romans marriage was ‘designed for the production of legitimate children’, see Susan Treggiari, *Roman Marriage: iusti coniugis from the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), p. 8; See also the first book of Cicero’s *De officiis*, ‘On Marriage’ (London: Printed by H. Lownes, for Thomas Man, 1616), pp. 115-117. This work claims in its title that it was translated ‘chiefly for the good of schools’, and emphasises the procreative end, as does Aristotle’s *The First Book, Politiques or Discourses of Government* (London: Adam Islip, 1598), p. 8.


kingdom, something Aquinas’ view challenged. Augustine’s view makes plain the conflicting tendencies within religious discourse on marriage that may have contributed to the mixed messages being conveyed. This is something that is evidenced later in Erasmus’ *Matrimonii encomium* (1536), a work that encourages a friend to marry. In the work Erasmus emphasises the superiority of the marital relationship over ‘other’ friendships because of its reliability and enduring quality: ‘in other frendshyps, howe greate symulation is ther? howe greate falsyte? Yea they, whome we judge over best frendes, lyke as the swalous flee’. Likewise, marriage to friendship, there is the ‘one soul in two bodies’ suggestion: ‘it is an especyall sweetnes to have one with whom ye may communycate the secrete affectyons of your mynde, with whom ye may speake even as it were with your owne selfe’. Interestingly Erasmus’ well-known *Adages* begins with an entry related to male friendship and equality, with line five deeming the friend as ‘another self’.

Two final contemporary examples contribute to an understanding of the blurred theoretical boundaries between friendship and marriage in the period and the contradictory messages that became a part of the discourse of both. A succinct entry in *Politeuphuiua* (1597) pointedly challenges the idea of marriage’s precedence over male friendship, noting that: ‘The love of men to women is a thing common, and of course, but the friendship of man to man, infinite and immortal’. In the same edition, is a conflicting entry which suggests that friendship ought to take marriage as its model, claiming that ‘friendship ought to resemble the love betweene man and wife; that is, of two bodies to be made one

52 Desiderius Erasmus, *Adages* ed. by Margaret Mann Phillips, Roger Aubrey, et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p.31 (Ii2, line 5).
Whether or not the author understood that the origin of this sentiment was in classical friendship rhetoric, the significance of an early modern colloquial work adopting a marital framework to systematise friendship demonstrates not only misunderstanding in attribution, but more importantly, the way in which friendship and marriage were seen not only to imitate, but also, perhaps, to potentially replace each other. Robert Burton’s *Anatomy of Melancholy* is another case in point. The work was popular, with at least twelve printings from 1597-1641. It casts friendship as a hallowed union akin to marriage: ‘Friendship is an holy name and a sacred communion of friends. As the Sunne is in the firmament, so is friendship in the world, a most divine and heavenly band’. While friendship lacks the religious sanction of marriage, Burton’s work affords it like status, the words calling to mind ‘the holy estate of matrimony’ proffered in the Elizabethan marriage ceremony. This idea becomes important to the discussion of friendship in *The English Traveller* that will be examined in Section III.

This discussion has illustrated the shared parlance and the different prioritisation afforded friendship and marriage in works available in the period. The focus on the collective descriptions of the two relationships that men were expected to cultivate and sustain highlights friendship’s usefulness as a preparation to marriage; and perhaps this was understood by writers who viewed them similarly. Katharine W. Swett’s study of the friendship circle of Sir Richard Wynn of Gwydir Caernarfonshire speaks to this idea. She argues that successful pre-marital male friendships could actually benefit future marital relations: ‘friendship encouraged certain skills and habits conducive to loving marriages

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54 *Politeuphia*, sig. K1’.  
56 *BCP*, p. 297.
as well, such as fluent communication, comfort in expressing affection and articulating emotional needs, thoughtfulness, and the capacity for loyalty.\(^{57}\) Her study found that ‘the points of intersection between marriage and companionate friendship indicate that they could be mutually sustaining’.\(^{58}\) In principle, this makes sense, but in practice, given the blurred distinctions between the two this could be problematic. This section has explored the possible bases for the tension between idealised friendship and marriage through the shared discourse of the classical friendship and early modern marriage models. The concluding section will take an extended look at how Thomas Heywood treats this conflict of co-existent, but mutually exclusive affective relationships.

### III. Gynaikeion and Figuring the Co-existence of Friendship and Marriage

in *The English Traveller* and *The Rape of Lucrece*

Christian writers on marriage may have been surprised by Thomas Heywood’s didactic foray into print extolling the virtues of chaste and constant wives in *Gynaikeion* (1624)\(^{59}\) and *A Curtaine Lecture* (1637); however, the dramatist had already revealed the compatibility of moral instruction and the dramatist’s pen in his *Apology for Actors* (1612) and demonstrated its force in *A Woman Killed with Kindness* (1603) and *The Rape of Lucrece* (1608). These plays, as well as *The English Traveller* (c. 1624) reflect Heywood’s central concern in his prose works *Gynaikeion* and *A Curtaine Lecture* (1637): how to be an ideal wife. He may have viewed himself as following in the footsteps of the ‘wise men of Greece’ who ‘could by their industry, finde out no neerer or directer course

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\(^{57}\) The study was post-civil war, 1654-1674, in Katharine W. Swett, “The Account between Us”: Honor, Reciprocity and Companionship in Male Friendship in the Later Seventeenth Century’ *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies*, 3.1 (Spring 1999), 1-30, (p. 25).

\(^{58}\) Swett, p.29.

to plant humanity and manners in the hearts of the multitude then to instruct them by
moralized mysteries, what vices to avoyd, what vertues to embrace; what enormtyes to
abandon’, but in doing so, his work also forges a classical and early modern connection
similar to that which is at the heart of this study.60 Classical examples of wifely chastity
and virtue heralded in his Gynaikeion inform his work, as Heywood undoubtedly saw the
parallels between the patriarchal Greek and Roman societies where a woman’s chastity
concerned men, and where the imperative to marry rested on ‘the production of legitimate
children’.61 Equally, there was a corresponding association between friendship and
marriage as ‘friendship went hand in hand with kinship, and marriage might place the seal
on a friendship’.62 In A Curtaine Lecture Heywood acknowledges the procreative
function of marriage to people God’s kingdom in a similar way that classically Greek
marriage was envisaged as an end to people the democracy.63 Heywood engages with the
aforementioned classical ideas on marriage in the Gynaikeion through his championing of
historically chaste and self-less wives. Additionally, he contributes to the written sense of
the early modern rhetorical debate between friendship and marriage by outlining a view of
marriage that resembles friendship, even in terms of choice:

The sacred institution of marriage, was not onely for procreation, but that man
should make choice of a woman, and a woman to make election of a husband,

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61 On procreation as the basis for marriage see Susan Treggiari, Roman Marriage, p. 8; Bruce W. Winter
relates Augustus’ ‘desire to restrain through legal means the conduct of the new Roman wives and secure
their commitment to chastity in marriage’ and the outlining of specific clothing in the lex Iulia meant to
63 For the ends of Ancient Greek marriage see Wilson, p. 450.
as companions and comforters one of another as well in adversitie as prosperitie. 64

Here Heywood takes up the idea of mutual help as the cause of marriage from the *Book of Common Prayer*. This figuring of the wife as a friend continues in the work through examples of wives whose constancy and actions challenge those prescribed for the ideal friend. Heywood employs the parlance of perfect friendship’s ultimate test of fidelity to argue that the virtuous wife rivals a Damon or Pythias:

An admirable and rare president in man, and a husband; which I can easily instance in woman, and a wife: for as there is nothing more divelish and deadly than a malitious and ill disposed woman, so there is on the contrarie, nothing more wholesome and comfortable to man than one provident, gentle, and well addicted; for as she that is good and honest, will upon just necessitie lay downe her life for her husbands health and safetie, so the other will as willingly prostitute hers for his distruction and ruin. 65

In *Lucrece* this idea of safeguarding the husband is explored beyond the threat against life and in relation to honour and reputation. In *Gynaikeion* the historical model Heywood holds up for emulation is Seneca’s wife, Pompeia Paulina. To Heywood Pompeia was the model of wifely constancy, as she tried to follow Seneca to his death by suicide but was stopped by Nero. 66 In the above citation, Heywood ‘easily’ affords virtuous wives a similar status to estimable husbands. And on the whole, the attention paid to marriage in the work prioritises it over male friendship. This is seen in the section entitled ‘The Moderne History of an Adultresse’ which is an earlier, narrative version of *The English

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64 Heywood, *Gynaikeion*, p. 180
65 Heywood, *Gynaikeion*, p. 120.
Traveller that Heywood describes as modelling a ‘moderne Historie lately happening’.\(^{67}\) Unlike the play, friendship is relegated to the background.\(^{68}\) This may speak to Heywood’s understanding of the dramatic interest to be engendered by the representation of friendship.

Heywood’s prose works can be read as a defence of marriage and the virtuous wife. In The English Traveller and The Rape of Lucrece Heywood diverges from his apologist stance, as well as from Shakespeare’s final preferring of marriage to friendship in Othello and The Winter’s Tale, and subordinates marriage to male friendship. He does so through action, characterisation and dialogue that emphasise the importance of homosocial male bonding, prioritise the friend and accentuate weaknesses in the early modern marriage models; in doing so, Heywood highlights the shared benefits, and language of friendship and marriage. Consequently, he leaves his audience and reader with the idea that male friendship is privileged above marriage. Perhaps more importantly, however is the sense that emerges of the ease with which the wife may be replaced by the friend.

Exposing the flaws in the early modern marriage models is one way in which Heywood promotes the superiority of male friendship in both plays. The English Traveller and The Rape of Lucrece can be viewed as representing the companionate marriage and the ‘loving’ marriage models, respectively. In The English Traveller the Wincott marriage is characterised as ‘a match’ (1.1.59). Wincott’s wife’s description of her marriage lends credence to the companionate, useful understanding of the word, as she tells Young Geraldine she ‘never wished nor sought’ her union with Wincott, but added ‘Now done, I not repent it’ (2.1.231-232). Wincott’s wife does not imply that she was coerced, but rather, perhaps, encouraged. Significantly, however, she does not describe her feelings as

\(^{67}\) Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 193.
\(^{68}\) Heywood, Gynaikeion, pp. 192-193.
love. And this is central here as Heywood gives no indication that the match was based on
love on either side.

From the husband’s perspective we are given no evidence of his affection for his wife
until the end of the play when she dies and Wincott indicates he is so ‘wretched in her
loss’ as ‘she was so good a creature’ (5.1.212, 214). This sentiment pales in comparison to
the effusive affection that Wincott displays and voices for Young Geraldine beginning in
Act 1 scene 1, when he enthusiastically declares his friendship for the young man to his
wife, saying, ‘O this gentleman I love, nay almost dote on’ (1.1.177-178), soon after
embracing Young Geraldine. In staging this keenness for Young Geraldine through words
as well as a physical demonstration of affection and positing it in opposition to the lack of
intimacy voiced as ‘small doings at home’ (1.1.40) between the older Wincott and his
younger wife, Heywood emphasises the importance of the young friend. The overall
sense is that in the absence of physical intimacy and true love in the marriage an affective
void is created which must be filled. In the play it is filled by an intimate adulterous
liaison with Dalavill for Wincott’s wife and a close male friendship with Young Geraldine
for Wincott. In order to submit the ideal friend to the test of constancy, however,
Heywood problematises this configuration even further, through the close and free access
that Young Geraldine is allowed with Wincott’s wife, who equally recognises his many
attributes.

Interestingly, the main appraisal of the Wincott marriage comes not from those closest
to it, namely, the Wincotts, but rather, from Young Geraldine. This is a curious turn by
Heywood in that Young Geraldine’s description of the marriage as an ideal union is not
borne out by the action or plot, and is contradictory to the wife’s characterisation. This
unreliable complication can be seen as more of a plot device to engender sympathy for
Wincott and Young Geraldine after the wife’s adultery, as it heightens the intensity of disappointment and empathy from the audience when a fall is from a pedestal. But further, this also serves to highlight Young Geraldine’s character, adding weight to the superiority of friendship, as Young Geraldine is figured as a very suitable, loyal friend, for his understanding of relationships is through the prism of their ideal constructions.

Young Geraldine’s portrayal as constant friend and his idealised understanding of marriage places him in sharp contrast to the fallen spouse who reflects poorly on the ideal of the wife as faithful friend. When Young Geraldine says to Wincott’s wife, ‘so mutual is your true conjugal love’ (2.1.225), the irony is not yet palpable to the audience, as she has yet to prove unfaithful. The phrase however, is similar to one that Heywood invokes in Gynaikeion in reference to women he deems noble for their devotion, chastity and constancy towards their husbands.69 He enquires rhetorically, ‘In what greater virtue can either sex expresse themselves, than in true coniujall love?’70 The Latin derivative 'coniugium' is associated with coniungere, 'to join together', and evokes a similar sense as the Elizabethan marriage service dictum: ‘those whom God has joined together, let no man put asunder’.71 The mutual conjugality asserted does not suggest a ‘match’ for dowry, procreation or kinship ties, as the Wincott marriage does, but something altogether nobler. This marriage ‘match’ reflects a similar unity called for in ideal male friendship: the formation of a whole, ‘something which exactly corresponds to or complements another’ more pointedly, ‘something forming one of a matching pair’.72 Young Geraldine’s reference to the Wincott marriage in this way may be at odds with the wife’s view and

69 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 119.
70 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 119.
71 In Tregiarri, p. 6. Here Tregiarri also notes that ‘the ancients were uncertain whether it derived from the verb coniungere, to join, or from iugum, a yoke’; ‘Those whom God has joined together, let no man put asunder’ in ‘The Form of Solemnization of Matrimony’ in BCP, p. 293
72 ‘Match’, def. 5 (usage from 1474), OED.
overall depiction in the play, but it engenders a dramatic sense of that shared symbolic imagery of amicable and marital unions: ‘one soul in two bodies’. And this is the model brought forth for Wincott’s wife by the idealistic Young Geraldine, just as Heywood made it available for his women readers in *Gynaikeion*; the problem of course with all theoretical ideals—as the play bears out (and this thesis has illustrated)— is in the ability and willingness to apply it.

Young Geraldine’s idyllic view of the Wincott marriage is naive at best. It could be argued that it reflects the unmarried man’s experience with the model of perfect friendship and an attempt to understand the marital relationship through a reliance on a comparable ideal. An audience would be aware of the early modern theoretical frameworks within which friendship and marriage were figured correspondingly. This perspective is made manifest in Young Geraldine’s description of Wincott’s attachment to him in marital terms. He indicates that Wincott ‘is so wedded to my company’ (1.1.70). Additionally, Young Geraldine ascribes similar obligations to friendship and marriage and expects that Wincott’s wife will do the same, most notably with respect to fidelity. Young Geraldine will not cuckold his friend, Wincott, even though he loves his wife and is given ample access and opportunity. He indicates that he will await Wincott’s death, an occasion he does not wish imminent, to marry his widow. This is how Heywood establishes the requisite ‘test’ that all ideal friends must undergo, a test Young Geraldine is portrayed to pass nobly. This is a stage moment not represented in the narrative in *Gynaikeion*. In the tragicomedy Young Geraldine says ‘my soul doth wish / A Nestor’s age, so much he merits from me’ (2.1.253-254), but in *Gynaikeion* the wife wishes her husband a long life. On the stage the dramatic force of the constant friend acting in selfless idealised fashion would be felt, calling to mind the Gesippus-like quality of Young Geraldine and

reaffirming the trustworthiness of male friendship. The interrogation of the Wincott marriage and the choice to heighten the steadfastness of Young Geraldine and diminish the virtue of the wife emphasises the dissonance between the companionate marital ideal and the reality, while at the same time it proffers a reliable alternative in male friendship.

In the play this alternative is pursued with vigour by Wincott, who exhibits a near obsessive interest in keeping Young Geraldine close. By suggesting that his wife’s sister, Pru would be a good marriage match for Young Geraldine, Wincott is not asserting a diminution in his affection for his friend, but rather, an expectation that the marital union would assure continuance of their friendship. Through wives male homosocial bonds were established and maintained. Close friendships were not necessarily threatened by marriage, as men understood the social, economic and procreative necessity for marital unions; James I even ‘urged Buckingham to marry’.74

Wincott’s desire to retain Young Geraldine’s friendship and company comes at the expense of the young man’s relationship with his father. This selfish fascination with Young Geraldine is not, philosophically speaking, similar to the Greek philia or friendship that Plato recounts in the Phaedrus wherein the friend does not seek to deny his friend the company of others.75 Rather, it is more in line with the actions of a lover.76 Kathy Eden’s work on Plato notes that it is lovers, not friends, who ‘seek to deprive their beloveds in an effort to ensure their inferiority and continued dependence’.77 The play does not support a homoerotic reading, but it is difficult to reconcile Wincott’s enthusiastic attentiveness to Young Geraldine and dismiss his efforts to keep his young friend close, especially as both

76 Eden, p. 71.
77 Eden, p. 70.
actions are undertaken at the expense of his marriage. Alan Bray’s work on male friendship in Elizabethan England notes the difficulty in reading ‘signs’ of affection, relating that kisses and embraces, as well as the use of the word ‘love’ were ‘accustomed conventions of Elizabethan friendship’, as well as part of more homosexual relationships between men. 78 With this in mind, an audience might read Wincott’s actions and attentions as nothing more than fervent friendship. Yet, because of the deliberate attention Heywood affords the Young Geraldine in Wincott’s affection, the friend emerges from the play as more important to Wincott than his wife. In De educatione puerorum (1532) Thomas Elyot explained ‘howe we ought to favour our frends, to love womenne with measure’. 79 Thomas Heywood’s depiction of Wincott’s relationships with Young Geraldine and his wife registers a similar sense.

Old Geraldine comments on his son’s constant presence in Wincott’s home, telling Wincott: ‘You have took him from me quite, and have, I think, / Adopted him into your family, / He stays with me so seldom’ (3.1.7-9). It was not unusual that a friend might act as an ‘other father’ to a son of a friend. Thomas Lupset’s dedication to the son of a friend in An Exhortation to Yonge Men (1535) bears this out. 80 But there is no sense that Young Geraldine is in need of moral guidance or that Wincott imparts any. Even so, Old Geraldine’s suggestion that his son has become part of Wincott’s family is significant, because early in the play, it could be thought that Young Geraldine serves as the son that Wincott never had. Later however, this idea is invalidated with Wincott’s admission that Young Geraldine is his ‘chief friend’ (5.1.251). Heywood does not repeat this idea in

78 Bray, p. 7.
Gynaikeion where lineal ‘anxiety,’ not amity, is invoked as the basis for the relationship between the older and younger man. The husband has ‘no issue’ by the wife and the young man is chosen by the husband as an heir, not a friend.

The child-parent relationship had been discussed in relation to friendship by Aristotle, albeit not as a model of the ideal. As Roger Crisp’s reading of the Nicomachean Ethics suggests, the child, quite literally, can also be seen as ‘another self’. But even a suggestion of a filial friendship in the play underscores further the ambiguousness of relational boundaries, a parallel to which is evident in the terms of endearment James I used for Buckingham: ‘son, friend, sweetheart, wife, child’. This idea is fully realised in Wincott’s penultimate avowal to Young Geraldine:

This meeting that was made
Only to take of you a parting leave
Shall now be made a marriage of our love
Which none save only death shall separate (5.1.251-254)

Wincott’s description of friendship is evocative of the marriage vow: ‘till death us depart’. This depiction is a reminder of the fluidity of the shared language across relational boundaries in the period, while the overall representation of the relationship between Wincott and Young Geraldine in the play, especially in this moment after the wife’s death, heightens the sense of male friendship’s enduring inviolability.

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81 This ‘anxiety’ is discussed by Lisa Jardine in ‘Companionate Marriage Versus Male Friendship: Anxiety for the Linea Family in Jacobean Drama’ in Reading Shakespeare Historically, pp. 114-131.
82 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 193.
85 Bergeron, Royal Family, Royal Lovers, p. 165.
86 Note ‘depart’ rather than the later ‘do part’ in BCP, p. 292.
But what type of friendship exactly? Heywood’s construction of the ideal friend in Young Geraldine is not based solely on the Ciceronean model of perfection. Notably, Young Geraldine demonstrates Stoic resolve in terms of Wincott’s wife, restraining his emotions and passions and demonstrating the constancy requisite of perfect friendship. Even so, the basis of Wincott’s friendship with the young man is reminiscent in part of Heywood’s treatment of Frankford’s desire for Wendoll’s companionship. Young Geraldine fills a void. It may have grown from the young man’s ‘infancy’, but in Wincott’s later years, he finds in Geraldine an opportunity to relive a youth that he himself has not experienced. This is something that only a homosocial relationship could offer. After Young Geraldine regales Wincott and his wife with the stories of his travel, Wincott responds:

And what more pleasure to an old man’s ear,  
That never drew save his own country’s air,  
Than hear such things related? I do exceed him  
In years, I must confess, yet he much older  
Than I in his experience. (1.1.122-126)

This idea is bound in gender inequalities as Wincott’s wife, despite her youth, would be unable to provide such tales of adventure to pique her husband’s curiosity, let alone his attention. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, she has been unable to provide Wincott with an heir. As this was undoubtedly part of the bargain of the Wincott’s May-December match, Wincott’s wife becomes a less attractive companion than Young Geraldine who is able to fill the void. As we saw in Chapter 3, according to Cicero, friendship should not be established on the basis of need, as this ‘assigns’ friendship to ‘a
lowly pedigree' and an origin far from noble'. Heywood’s construction adheres to the
more contemporary view espoused by Thomas Breme, as the ideal friend is posited as one
who, in part, will ‘give to his friend those things that he lacketh’. Heywood’s ideal
friend in The English Traveller is still on unequal footing with his friend in terms of status,
just as he was in A Woman Killed with Kindness, but here he is figured as a loyal, constant
companion, who becomes part son, part surrogate wife.

Heywood may be reworking some of the material from A Woman Killed with Kindness
here, but his choices in The English Traveller reinforce the sense of potential for loyalty in
male friendship. Young Geraldine’s friendship with Dalavill is mainly to be assumed. It is
neither interrogated, nor described (at all). Especially absent is the parlance of perfect
friendship that Heywood used to characterise and highlight Frankford’s friendship for
Wendoll in A Woman Killed with Kindness. The treatment of the Dalavill-Young
Geraldine friendship also differs from Gynaikeion, where the similar narrative deems the
Dalavill doppelganger the young man’s ‘neerest and most familiar friend’. Instead
Heywood underscores Wincott’s friendship with Young Geraldine, and mutes Dalavill’s
scenes of machination, limiting them to brief instances in 3.1, 3.3, and 4.1. The idea of the
diminished importance of the Young Geraldine-Dalavill friendship is supported through
the lack of attention it is given in the confrontation scene after the adultery is revealed.
This takes place between only Young Geraldine and Wincott’s wife. Heywood diminishes
the effect of betrayal in friendship through a simple one line condemnation of Dalavill
from Young Geraldine that avoids any mention of friendship. After Wincott’s wife

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87 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Amicitia in Cicero, De Senectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione, trans. by
pp. 103-211 (p. 141).
B3’.
89 Heywood, Gynaikeion, p. 194; Heywood does not give the characters in the narrative names.
swoons, Young Geraldine says to Dalavill: ‘Go take her up whom thou hast oft thrown down, Villain’ (5.1.176). Dalavill has not been condemned as a false friend or Judas here, but rather, as a tempter of Wincott’s wife. Heywood’s focus in this scene is on the wife’s transgression. He affords fifty-two lines to Young Geraldine’s confrontation with, and reprimand of her. The focus in *A Woman Killed with Kindness* is also mainly on the wife after the betrayal, but there are several instances where Wendoll’s disloyalty is highlighted. The loss felt at the end of *A Woman Killed with Kindness* with the death of Anne and the loss of male friendship is absent in *The English Traveller*, despite the demise of Wincott’s wife and Dalavill’s departure. Over twenty years after he wrote *A Woman Killed with Kindness* Heywood gave his betraying friend a different biblical referent transforming him from a Judas to a devil, but the diminished import given to Dalavill’s Iago-like behaviour, and an ending that effortlessly replaces the wife with the friend, reaffirms strong male amicable bonds and holds out hope for the restorative power of loyal friendship.

The marriage model that Heywood presents in *The Rape of Lucrece* is optimistic and holds out the greatest hope for marriage’s primacy, as it appears to be based on mutual affection. Yet, at the same time, Heywood demonstrates that it, too, is bound by the conventions and strictures of the patriarchal society within which it exists and functions. Historically, Ancient Rome may have been geographically and temporally distant from early modern England, but as Heywood understood, the situation between men and women was strikingly similar, as the pull of public duty and the rewards to be received in terms of honour reinforced the primacy of homosocial relations. The military friendships depicted in *Lucrece* on which the success of the Republic rested were similar to the ‘mutual bonds of friendship and patronage’ that Richard Alston observes were responsible for the success
of Ancient Rome in the first three centuries. This type of friendship, albeit martial, would resonate clearly with men in the audience, including Buckingham, who would draw distinct parallels with those ties that bind and the ones necessary for success at Court.

The addition of the wife to this world, countering the sharp pull of public duty, was something that Shakespeare considers at the outset of *Othello*, when the Moor leaves his new bride for a mission to Cyprus. In contrast, *Lucrece’s* early representation of the marital relationship of Collatine and Lucrece subverts this idea, as the husband and wife relationship is depicted as close, with homosocial business subordinated to the marriage. Sextus tells Brutus that Collatine will not be venturing to the oracle with his male companions because he ‘is troubled with the common disease of all new-married men; he’s sick of the wife’ (1.3, p. 132). Just as he does in *The English Traveller*, where Dalavill and Young Geraldine provide commentary on the Wincott marriage, Heywood does here with Sextus. It is the first suggestion of the friend’s continued closeness to Collatine, despite the marriage, as he has intimate knowledge of a private nature. This onstage reflection is symptomatic of early modern domestic matters where the line between public and private was easily breached. Here it signals the beginning of Sextus’ encroaching proximity to the marriage, seen in his light-hearted additional comment, ‘Lucrece will not let him go’ (1.3, p. 342).

But also, this scene contributes to the sense that the husband and wife relationship is prioritised at this point, as Collatine is depicted as eschewing male adventure in favour of spending time with his wife. In the moment of homosocial bonding, where Aruns, Brutus and Sextus plan the journey to the oracle and Sextus comments on Collatine’s marriage,

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91 Thomas Heywood, *The Rape of Lucrece in The Best Plays of the Old Dramatists: Thomas Heywood* ed. by A. Wilson Verity, pp. 327-427. All future references are from this edition. There are no line numbers, so page numbers are included.
Collatine is absent. Heywood contributes to this sense later in Act 2, when the Clown relates the recent news of camp, city and country to Collatine before first relaying a message from Lucrece that Collatine is urgently needed at home. Collatine reproves him, saying ‘And couldst thou not have told me? Lucrece stay, / And I stand trifling here! Follow, Away!’ (2.1, p. 350). But the tension between the call of homosocial business at court capable of conveying honour, and his duties as husband can be felt when Collatine complains that the camaraderie of friends ‘makes me lose my hours / At home with Lucrece, and abandon court’ (2.1, p. 348). Here, the divided loyalties of an active civic life that necessitates long periods of absence from home and one’s wife are tangibly felt, and parallel the plight of early modern gentry and noble men. While this differs from the chosen absence from the marital bed by Wincott, distance is distance and whether it is emotional or physical its effect can be the same: disintegration of the husband and wife relationship, and leaving a void to be filled by male friendship. Whether the male friend is chosen for affection and pleasant diversion as in *A Woman Killed with Kindness* and *The English Traveller*, or for loftier calls of honour and glory, as suggested in *Lucrece*, both are choices nonetheless, and Heywood relates the potential consequences of each.

In *Lucrece* that choice is signalled later than in *The English Traveller*, specifically in Act 3. The marriage’s end will not be caused directly by neglect and lack of strong affective ties between husband and wife, as is suggested in *The English Traveller*; its disintegration begins with the choice of Collatine to grant the friend continued access to his domestic affairs and space. This is a common topos used by Heywood to test male friendship and wifely chastity. He employs it in *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, *The English Traveller* and again here. In *Lucrece* it sets in motion the prioritising of friendship over marriage, escalating to the point that the friend is welcomed into the home while
Collatine is away, just as he is in *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, thus allowing the rape of Lucrece. Heywood begins this trajectory towards marital disintegration through Collatine’s participation in the wager with his friends about their wives. This action brings the friends into the private, domestic space. In Act 3, scene 4, Lucrece entreats her husband to remain at home: ‘I hope my Collatine will not so leave his Lucrece’ (3.4, p. 380), she says, asking shortly thereafter, ‘Will my husband repose this night with me?’ (3.4, p. 381). But her pleas are rejected.

This scene underscores that Collatine is no longer ‘sick of the wife’ (1.3, p. 342), but rather, ‘swayed’ by the call of duty and friends (3.4, p. 381). Lucrece’s first plea is directed towards her husband’s friends. This may be a reflection of her understanding of the friends’ importance, but also may be explained in terms of the Plutarchan expectation that a wife was ‘to have no peculiar friends by herself, but to use her husbands [sic] friends and take them as her owne’. By directing her first comment to the friends she is acknowledging their superiority as men in general, but also, as friends who have influence over her husband. But the second request is directed to Collatine, who does not answer, but rather, allows his friend, Sextus, who will betray him, to speak for him, granting him temporary charge of the wife. Sextus responds unequivocally, ‘He must: we have but idled from the camp, to try a merry wager about their wives’ (3.4, p. 380). From the comments about the marriage in Act 2, to the middle of Act 3, Sextus has moved closer to the marriage and the wife. Collatine’s abdication of household governance is not too dissimilar to the way in which Heywood writes Frankford as relinquishing domestic authority to Wendoll in his absence in *A Woman Killed with Kindness*, and granting Dalavill and Young Geraldine unbounded, open hospitality in *The English Traveller*, in

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that they all provide access and opportunity for betrayal.93 However, in *Lucrece*, by allowing Sextus to answer for him, Collatine relinquishes autonomy as well. If we consider this in terms of perfect friendship, which requires abandoning self-interest for communal good—‘one soul in two bodies’—Heywood aligns Collatine with his friends rather than his wife. In doing so Heywood retains the sense evoked in his other plays previously discussed, that male friendship requires demonstrations of beneficence and trust, even if it is at the expense of the wife. To be sure, his allegiance to friendship is imperative for the future stability of Rome. This is one of the larger concerns of the play as well as its historical analogue and Heywood reaffirms this sense. As a commander (and future consul), he would recognise that ‘ties of obligation, friendship and loyalty would bind members of a unit together and would further bind those men to their commanding officer.’94 This strong pull of homosocial bonds is seen in the unmarried Brutus, who will eventually lead the charge against the Tarquins. In Brutus Heywood realises a man with a clear sense of where his priorities and loyalties would lie should he have a wife. His response to Sextus’ quip underscores this idea: 'Had I both [wit and a wife], yet should you prevail with me above either' (1.3, p. 343).

Male friendship is further prioritised in the play through a contrast of two marital relationships that accommodate male friendship differently. Male friendship figures significantly in Collatine and Lucrece’s marriage as discussed above; however, the marriage of Tarquin and Tullia allows for no outside influence by friends. In fact, it displaces all other ties that bind, including parental, as Servius is slain so that Tarquin may ascend to power. Through Tarquin and Tullia’s marriage Heywood figures a close

93 Here I develop a suggestion made by Catherine Richardson who explains that ‘Arden’s role as domestic governor is called into question’ in *Arden of Faversham* in *Domestic Life and Domestic Tragedy in early modern England* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2006), p.114.
94 Alston, p. 160.
attachment to the wife as a sign of male weakness, and a recipe for tyranny. Brutus articulates this understanding when he suggests that Tarquin is either ‘a foole or a madman’ because he allows himself to be ‘over-ruld by a curst wife in private’ (1.2, p. 335). Tarquin’s loyalties have shifted from friends and kinsmen to his wife, now that he is King. Lucretius complains of Tarquin’s rejection of friendly counsel alleging:

he despises

The intent of all our speeches, our advices,
And counsel, thinking his own judgment only
To be approved in matters military,
And in affairs domestic; we are but mutes,
And fellows of no parts, viols unstrung,
Our notes too harsh to strike in princes’ ears. (2.1, p. 345).

The musical metaphor underscores the dissonant note that friendly counsel now strikes, as there is no longer a part for male friends on Tarquin and Tullia’s stage. The male members of Tarquin’s ensemble have been replaced by the singular Queen consort, who has become chief counsellor and confidant. Tarquin’s involvement in the usurpation and murder of his father-in-law (with his wife) has isolated him from his men, as has his ascension to the throne. Through this marriage, which calls to mind the Macbeth union, Heywood similarly problematises a close and exclusive marital attachment to the wife. It is through this prism it is understood that Collatine’s ascension to consul at the end of the play will necessitate a shift in priorities towards friendship.

Heywood affords considerable attention to this marriage, in which is manifested a sense of idealised marital union, albeit an unholy conspiratorial communion of thought and aspiration. This unity is evident in the couple’s verbal exchange, where Tullia’s words are

a seamless continuation of Tarquin’s, with each employing the words ‘we’ and ‘our’: ‘we have sought to win’, ‘we are secure’, ‘our greatest strength’ (2.3, p. 355). In Goffe’s Orestes a similar sense was conveyed of Ciceronean unanimity in male friendship: ‘a most perfect agreement of wills, desires, & opinions’.

Through the couple, Heywood offers a contrast to the marriage of Lucrece and Collatine. The marital closeness of the Tarquins is driven by a wife overstepping gender constructs and disrupting homosocial connections by usurping the role of friends and favourites as counsellor in affairs of state. In essence, Tullia has become like the self-serving male friends we saw in Chapter 2 at Dionysius’ Court in Damon and Pythias. The tyranny this wreaks on the state heightens the imperative for noble friendship as opposed to marriage, calling to mind the Aristotelian idea that even ‘mighty riche princes’ require friendship, even more so than other men perhaps, because their fall is more ‘perilous’.

Through this glaring example of the threat posed by a move towards the wife and away from the homosocial ties that honourably counsel and bind, Collatine’s dissociation from Lucrece appears compulsory for the success of the Republic and maintenance of the patriarchal order, for despite being an affective marriage, the relationship cannot viably replace male friendship when it comes to the public space. As per Aristotle, friendship and justice go hand in hand.

While Tullia is depicted as perhaps as ‘unsexed’ as Lady Macbeth through her plotting of her father’s demise, and goading, ‘I am no wife of Tarquin’s if not King’ (1.1, p. 332), Heywood’s adherence to early modern stereotypes of femininity in his portrayal of Lucrece (and Wincott’s wife) is an additional way in which he contributes to a sense of the inability of friendship and marriage to co-exist. He outlines the way to choose a wife in


98 ‘yf every man wer frendly to other, Justice shuld not nede: for whi? frendshippe destroyeth al strife, and every discorde that may be’ in Ethiques, Wilkinson, sig. H3r.
Curtaine Lecture (1637) in a similar way that Plutarch advises men to choose a friend. He suggests a man should assess ‘the fancies of her mind; and take her not for her outward person, but her inward perfection. For if thou makest election of beauty, it fadeth; if of riches, they soone waste; if of fame, it oft proves false; if of vertue, that only continues’. 99 Nevertheless, in The English Traveller and Lucrece Heywood depicts the wives in line with early modern gender stereotypes of women, emphasising both wives’ beauty, as well as their virtue. Wincott’s wife is described as ‘a lady, / For beauty and for virtue unparalledled, / Nor can you name that thing to grace a woman / She has not in a full perfection (1.1.54-57). Equally, he upholds Lucrece’s historic renown: ‘her beauty hath relation to her virtue, and her virtue correspondent to her beauty, and in both she is matchless’ (3.4, p. 379). The problem here of course is that the two men who take note of, and comment on, their friends’ wives’ attributes, are Dalavill and Sextus, the eventual betayers.

In Sextus’ answer to Lucrece’s entreaty that her husband remain at home, he uses the word ‘idle’ to describe the friends’ venturing into the domestic space to test the wives. Thus, he associates the domestic space with triviality, and diminishes its importance, suggesting it is a place ‘serving no purpose, useless’. 100 This reduces the men’s venturing into it as nothing but a lark, and a worthless endeavour. Sextus very clearly differentiates between the male and female spaces of activity and supports the idea of the superior value placed on the male dominated public space of homosocial activity and bonding. Heywood explores this idea further in his Gynaikeion, the title of which refers to a Greek woman’s space in the home, where she would carry out her duties. Cynthia Patterson relates that


100 ‘Idle’ in The Oxford English Dictionary Def. 3 a. (1597).
although some historians have considered this space as a form of seclusion, this was not the case, while Robert Garland notes the *gynaikeion* was designed because ‘Greek husbands regarded it as a matter of honour that their wives not be exposed to the public gaze even when at home’. 101 This is an interesting idea, especially given the central concern of wifely chastity in *The English Traveller* and *Lucrece*. But interestingly in both plays, the husbands themselves open the private space to the ‘gaze’ of purported and untried ‘friends’, putting their wives in jeopardy, as the women become the trial to prove friendship. The *gynaikeion* that Heywood constructs for his stage wives stands in contradistinction to Lucretius’ view that ‘home breeds safety’ (2.12, p. 343), as their domestic spaces are misused to threaten virtue and honour. Because friendship is prioritised, friends are afforded access and increased proximity to the private space of the marriage and the wife; husbands are depicted as ignorant of the Plutarchan warning about the possibilities for betrayal by the friend: ‘that thou committ nothyng to hym / but that thou woldest committe to an enmie’. 102

In *Lucrece*, while the rape is the final and ultimate violation of the sanctity of the marriage, the penultimate instance of intrusion by the friend is already emblematic of the way the boundaries between friendship and marriage have been traversed in the play, through the delivery of the ring by Sextus. This marks the first occasion when Collatine provides unsupervised access into the domestic space. This ingress of the friend into the private domain of husband and wife in the husband’s absence is particularly symbolic because of the implication of the ‘private token’ (3.5, p. 382) the friend is to convey: a ring. The ring is not in Heywood’s source or in Shakespeare’s poem (1594), but is of significance in the c. 1571 Titian painting, depicting the rape, entitled ‘Tarquin and

Lucretia’. Catherine Belsey notes the ring’s ‘critical placement’ on the canvas, ‘one-third of the way down vertically’. But also, significantly, Lucrece is holding up her ringed hand near the heart of her husband’s friend. Heywood treats the ring as similarly central to his scene. Akin to Desdemona’s handkerchief in its link to the wife’s chastity, its main significance, however, lies in its relation to its meaning as a token given during the marriage ceremony. Generally, writers in the early modern period saw the wedding ring as ‘a token of love and commitment’, as David Cressy notes: for Richard Hooker it was ‘an especial pledge of faith and fidelity’, for Henry Swinburne, a mark of ‘perfect unity and indissoluble conjunction’. The conveyance of the ring by the husband’s friend here as a token of remembrance of their recent union and reaffirmation of their vows creates a fissure in the inviolability of that union, as the transfer to the wife is not directly from the husband, but mediated by the friend (in a perverse twist of the role of a best-man). Ironically, rather than representative of faith and fidelity, it becomes linked with disloyalty, as it foreshadows the dissolution of friendship, and the end of the marriage. Interestingly, rings in the early modern period also served a symbolic purpose when it came to friendship, given as a token of remembrance to male friends after one’s death.

As this scene demonstrates, Heywood does not strictly adhere to his source material. By reading his choices against his sources we can see how he gives prominence to friendship. As Paulina Kewes points out, *The Rape of Lucrece* is alone among late Elizabethan and


Tiziano Vecellio (Titian) 1568-71 Rape of Lucretia (Tarquin and Lucretia). The painting is in The Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge.


Cressy notes that ‘godly critics’ in Tudor and Stuart England disapproved of the use of the ring, but that James I viewed the ring as fundamental in *Birth, Marriage and Death*, pp. 344-345.

early Jacobean Roman plays in its blatant renunciation of historical authenticity’. In another significant deviation, Heywood re-writes the ending, diverging from the representation in Shakespeare’s narrative poem, and as Kewes observes, ‘drastically compresses’ the rape. Certainly plays and poems work differently, and what might be expressed in the written word may be more problematic to represent on stage, but this compression serves an important function in Heywood’s overall treatment of friendship’s superiority, as his condensing of the betrayal by the false friend not only downplays its significance, but also, allows the focus to be shifted to the depiction of its converse: steadfast friendship. He follows a similar course in The English Traveller, as previously discussed. In both plays this assigns a greater significance to the altruistic and honourable deeds of the loyal friend, namely, the self-sacrificial revenge, after the rape headed by Brutus, and the self-denial of Young Geraldine, rather than reinforce the deeds of the false ones. While an audience is left with an understanding that friends can indeed be Machiavels, moreover, Heywood impresses upon them that in the face of trials friends can be steadfast and ‘performe the part of a faithfull friend’. This is a significant point of departure from Shakespeare’s emphasis in A Winter’s Tale and especially Othello, where the ending suggests the outlook for loyal friendship is bleak. In this way Heywood’s contribution to the discourse of marriage and friendship is notably different.

Despite the deaths of Wincott’s wife and Lucrece in The English Traveller and Lucrece, in the end, male homosocial bonds are strengthened and re-established. In both plays, the wives are, albeit in differing ways, integral to this resolution. As Janet Clare notes, Lucrece, in her final moments of life, ‘is instrumental in inciting Junius Brutus, her father

108 Kewes, p. 250.
109 Kewes, p. 247.
and her husband to rise against and depose Tarquin. Without her incitement there would be no rebellion and no challenge to tyranny’. Additionally, there would be no test of Brutus’ loyalty to Collatine. Lucrece’s recounting of the rape leads to a moment of sworn brotherhood and the reaffirmation of unity between the men, as they pledge their allegiance on Brutus’ sword and vow fidelity to unite in ‘just revenge’: ‘As you are Romans, and esteem your fame / More than your lives/ [...] / Revive your native valours, be yourselves, / And join with Brutus/ [...]/ swear!’ (5.1, p. 407). Heywood furthers this sense with another dramatic choice that differs from his source. He does not merely banish the Tarquins; rather, they are killed, allowing Brutus to die avenging the rape of Lucrece by killing Sextus. This is a significant alteration from the source and from Shakespeare’s poem, because rather than punctuate the play with the selfless act of the wife, who is willing to sacrifice herself for the sake of her husband’s honour and reputation, the play ends by emphasising Brutus’ self-sacrificing act in avenging her death, which serves to recover Collatine’s reputation, as the rape is understood as wronging him. While this might have been a way for Heywood to capitalise on audience interest in onstage revenge, it alters the way friendship is depicted. Lucrece’s death carries great weight and significance in Shakespeare’s poem, but here, the addition of the parallel act of sacrifice by Brutus almost serves to trump Lucrece’s, as it reinforces the friend’s noble deed in laying down his life for duty, justice, and friendship. This idea of the differing significance apportioned to each sacrifice is further borne out in the attention given to each in the text. After Lucrece’s death, Brutus maintains she will be honoured: ‘Lucrece, thy death we’ll mourn in glittering arms / And plumèd casques. Some bear that reverend load / Unto the forum’ (5.2, p. 408). Nevertheless, there is no accompanying lament by Collatine and no references to the nobility of her act after this point. In Gynaikeion, Heywood emphasises

the willingness of wives, including Lucrece, who are willing to sacrifice their lives for their husbands, particularly Alceste, who does so when no friend or kinsmen would.\textsuperscript{112} In the play, however, Lucrece’s sacrifice and the part it plays in helping to establish the Republic is somewhat overshadowed by the final, notable death, Brutus’, which resonates nobly, and with heroic significance in the moment, and for posterity. Horatius declares:

\begin{quote}
O noble Brutus, this thy fame
To after ages shall survive; thy body
Shall have a fair and gorgeous sepulchre,
for whom the matrons shall in funeral black
Mourn twelve sad moons –thou that first governed Rome,
And swayed the people by a consul’s name. (5.6, p. 423).
\end{quote}

Horatius’ words reinforce the importance of Brutus’ sacrificial act and the necessity of strong, homosocial ties.

In\textit{ Lucrece} friendship is undeveloped on a close personal level and left to be mainly assumed from an understanding of the historical source. The friendship between Brutus, Horatius, Valerius and Collatine prior to the rape is portrayed as somewhat frivolous, in the ‘merry wager’ (3.4, p. 380) that takes them from the serious business of the camp. The friendships that are solidified by Lucrece’s death get their fullest expression in this instance, as they become almost chivalric in nature and akin to ‘sworn brotherhood’, the type of friendship that Laurens Mills notes was ‘frequently’ depicted in medieval literature and ‘distinct from classical friendship’.\textsuperscript{113} The group friendship is somewhat reminiscent of Orestes and Pylades’ unity in seeking retribution and justice for Agamemnon’s murder, as this and the rebellion to overthrow the Tarquins unite the men in a common purpose;

\textsuperscript{112} Heywood, \textit{Gynaikeion}, pp. 120, 126, 159-160.
\textsuperscript{113} Laurens Mills, \textit{One Soul in Bodies Twain: Friendship in Tudor Literature and Stuart Drama} (Bloomington: Principia, 1937), p. 376.
however, Heywood offers no suggestion that the friendships meet any of the requisites of perfect friendship. It is only Brutus’ constancy and sacrifice in the end that calls to mind the ideal.

Further, the plot itself rests on the betrayal of Collatine by the friend, Sextus, as such this was not true friendship, despite its contradictory characterisation by Lucrece in Act 4. In fact, this is the first instance where their friendship and its basis is articulated in the play. Lucrece remarks to Sextus, ‘Oft, and many times, / I have heard my husband speak of Sextus’ valour, / Extol your worth, praise your perfection, / Ay, dote upon your valour, and your friendship’ (4.1, p. 386). Moreover, she deems Sextus as ‘one that loves my lord’ (4.3, p. 391). Of course if Sextus was loved as a friend, this may have served to heighten the betrayal in the audience’s eyes. But Heywood suggests, as he had previously in his depiction of Frankford and Wendoll, the asymmetry possible in male friendship in terms of one’s understanding the nature and depth of the bond. In Lucrece, Sextus’ assessment of the friendship does not necessarily bear out Lucrece’s estimation, as he refers to Collatine only as his ‘wronged kinsmen’ (4.3, p. 390).

This friendship depicted by Heywood that leaves undeveloped the depth of the ties between Collatine and Brutus, and Collatine and Sextus, reflects the political friendship that Aristotle underscores in the Ethics as ‘concord’. Generally, these appear to be more civic and useful friendships centred around a bond of loyalty to the state and democratic principles rather than intimate bonds. As Lorraine Smith Pangle explains, ‘concord relates primarily to matters of weighty consequence, to justice and the freedom and security of whole cities and nations’.  

Although it is an instrumental friendship, and not indicative of the unity of perfect friendship, Smith Pangle explains that it still is reliant on virtue to a certain extent. The overturning of injustice through the military friendships of Collatine and his men and their ousting of the Tarquins promotes the good, as Aristotle defines it. According to Smith Pangle such political friendships were ‘another reason why Aristotle has been reluctant to deny that utilitarian friendship is real friendship’. This ‘concord’ as friendship was the type of friendship advanced in Elizabeth’s Royal Entry pageants, and the address to her Parliament discussed in Chapter 1. It is also asserted in King James’ edict overturning Elizabeth’s policy against Spain, namely, the ‘surprising and taking of the said Kings [sic] subjects and goods’. James declares, ‘we stood, as still wee doe, in good amitie and friendship with all the Princes of Christendome, and therefore are carefully to provide, as much as in us lyeth, that none of them or their Subjects should by any hostile action be endamaged.’ To be sure, these instances, like the depiction in *Lucrece* are not indicative of the Ciceronean ideal of ‘one soul in two bodies’ or for that matter, Aristotle and Seneca’s ideas of perfect friendship, but they are recognised as a more inclusive amity: civic friendship, focused on the good.

Interestingly, Heywood uses his wives in *Lucrece* and *The English Traveller* to comment on their husband’s feelings for the friend. Lucrece’s evaluation employs a similar word that Heywood uses to describe Wincott’s affection for Young Geraldine: ‘dote’ (1.1.179). Collatine and Wincott are said to ‘dote’ on Sextus and Young Geraldine, respectively. And it is something the wives understand completely, either articulating that sense, as Lucrece does, or commenting on it, as does Wincott’s wife. This use is also

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116 Smith Pangle, pp. 157-158.
117 Smith Pangle, p. 158.
119 James I, ‘By the King’, page 1 of 2.
striking, in that it adds to that sense of the blurred line and shared language of friendship and love, as its range of connotations during this time suggests ranging from ‘infatuatedly fond of’ to the point that one confers ‘excessive love or fondness on or upon’, to the state of being ‘foolishly in love’. While these usages can be traced to 1477, in 1591 it is invoked by Shakespeare, notably, in another play that considers friendship and love, namely, *Two Gentleman of Verona*; however, it is coined in relation to the female object of affection: ‘You doate on her, that cares not for your love’ (4.4.87). In Heywood, both of the recipients are the male friends.

Nevertheless, when Wincott refers to Young Geraldine as a man ‘I love, nay almost dote on’ (1.1.179), he is not describing ideal friendship. His relationship with Young Geraldine is based on inequality, as Young Geraldine is markedly similar to his wife, ‘not above two years different’ in age (1.1.87, 89), as they were actually ‘playfellows’ of youth. Wincott may appreciate Young Geraldine’s virtue in the end, and especially his passing the test of loyalty, but this is not what Heywood depicts has drawn Wincott to Young Geraldine. The ideal friend must, as Heywood suggests in *A Woman Killed with Kindness* as well, not counsel, but prove entertaining: a ‘good companion’(1.4.30). In *The English Traveller* the ideal is something less noble, and aligns the friendship with Aristotle’s description of friendships of delectation. In *Lucrece* the perfect friend must hold similar Roman democratic values and virtues, and be willing to forsake other relationships for the good of the state. Most importantly, Heywood’s ideal must be tested, at the expense of the wife, in all of his formulations of friendship: civic, chivalric, and pleasurable, and prove constant in a self-sacrificial way.

In *The English Traveller* and *The Rape of Lucrece* Heywood figures Wincott and Collatine’s *eudaimonia* in the same way as, according to Shepard, contemporary conduct

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120 ‘Dote’ def. 3, *OED.*
literature considered the ‘place’ of men, ‘almost exclusively in terms of their relationships with other men’.\textsuperscript{121} So when Buckingham, a man whose ‘place’ was determined by intimate, male friendship, visited the Globe to see \textit{Lucrece} in August 1628, he might have done so with an eye on the political resonances of the play: namely, the ‘unfavorable [sic] comparisons between the Stuarts and the Tarquins’ in the 1620s (and 1630s), or the representation of what Kewes calls ‘the politically sensitive theme: the King’s rejection of counsel’.\textsuperscript{122} Nevertheless, he could not fail to recognise from personal experience how prioritising male friendship would compromise the nature and viability of marriage.

Lisa Jardine argues that Jacobean drama ‘makes the woman bear the burden of an irresolvable conflict between competing social modes in early modern life’.\textsuperscript{123} And in both plays the conflicting ‘modes’ are friendship and marriage. Heywood underscores this conflict, asserting the primacy of male friendship by positing wives bound by gender constraints of the early modern and Roman patriarchies that render them incapable of achieving the equitable, amicable relations in marriage that Aquinas, the early modern Church and conduct writers idealised; relations that the husband could realise in male friendship, which although were not perfect, were preferable. And similar to those thinkers who idealised marriage along amicable lines, Heywood makes his stage wives unwitting challengers to male friendship, who in the end must sacrifice themselves and their marriages for the necessity of male business and male bonding.

\textsuperscript{121} Shepard, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{122} Kewes, pp. 260, 262.
\textsuperscript{123} Jardine, p. 131.
Conclusion

In early modern England, where favour and fortune could rise and fall at whim, where threats were feared from the familiar and the foreign alike, and where men were reminded that women were inconstant, true and steadfast friendship offered a bastion of hope amidst any incoming storm. Its early modern construction seemed to have this very much in mind. Its guiding principles were buttressed with appeals to ancient authority, infused with Christian morality, and peddled as a salve for man and commonwealth through translations of classical treatises and pithy precepts aimed at changing minds and behaviour through an attempt at codifying friendship in a way that would compel adherence. This became especially important in post-Reformation society when, as Douglas Bush suggests, Protestantism in essence ‘made every man his own priest’. This may help to explain in part why Christian morality informed classical ideologies of friendship in translations: to provide the compelling force to alter behaviour that classical appeals to virtue for its own sake lacked.

Friendship’s rewards were innumerable and were emphasised in the discourse; the obligations of friendship were equally prominent, daunting and demanding. A friend could indeed be a companion, but also an ethical guide for one’s moral compass, and this idea, and the recognition of private friendship’s reverberant possibilities—both negative and positive—by humanists undoubtedly drove what Lorna Hutson calls the ‘reading

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1 See for instance Leonard Culmann’s *Sententiae Pueriles* (London: Printed by H. L[ownes] for Thomas Man, 1612). Its subtitle ‘translated grammatically leading the learner, as by the hand, to construe right, parse, and make the same Latine; also to get both matter and phrase, most speedily and surely, without inconvenience’ indicates its intent as a school text. On page 11 are the precepts ‘Good friends are rare’ and ‘Nothing is more pretious then a faithfull friend’. On page 7 is found: ‘Inconstancy doth disdaine friendes’, and on page 6: ‘women are inconstant’.

programme’ that ‘transformed the education of Englishmen’. Friendship, like religion, was not merely a ‘private matter’. With friendship’s cultural significance so impressive, and its performance the measure of its attainment and character, it is no surprise that Richard Edwards, John Ford, John Foxe, Thomas Goffe, Thomas Heywood, John Lyly and three anonymous playwrights saw rich potential in representing its attempt, realisation and failure. They seized upon the opportunity these instances provided to invoke fear, pity, sympathy and even laughter in their audiences. They did so by juxtaposing true and useful friendship, by questioning the extent of friendship’s obligations and exploring its disappointments, by depicting its excesses, limitations and potential for asymmetry in affection and practice, and by considering its effects on society through fictive worlds and courts.

When Tullius in The Faithful Friends (1614) remarks ‘the Storie of Orestes, was a fable’ (fol. 26b 1976) and Laches in Timon (1602-3) acerbically deems the inconstant Eutrapelus ‘another Pylades’ (fo. 23a 2530) their dramatists register a similar sentiment seen in Walter Dorke’s earlier lament (1589) that ‘a man may as soone see a black Swan, as finde out a faithfull friend’: disillusionment with the ideal. It was not that the dramatists, Dorke, or even later, Braitwaithe, who also bemoaned the inability to find a latter day Orestes or Pylades, truly believed that Cicero’s model for friendship could be reproduced over fifteen hundred years later in early modern England; they were merely reflecting that the theoretical ideal held up for emulation was unachievable in practice. Undoubtedly, the humanist and didactic writers, translators and compilers who flooded the

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5 Walter Dorke A Tipe or Figure of Friendship. (London: Thomas Orwin and Henry Kirkham, 1589), sig. A3”.

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discourse of friendship with Ciceronean precepts and made *De amicitia* a staple of the grammar school curriculum recognised this themselves. They understood that providing a theoretical framework for perfect friendship would not guarantee a populace made up of friends such as Laelius and Scipio, just as they realised that inculcating students in Ciceronean rhetoric would not assure that the commonwealth would have innumerable orators on par with Cicero. Nevertheless, they saw the merit in providing gentlemen a model for friendship that detailed its guiding principles. They harboured the same hope for better relations that Cicero had when he wrote *De amicitia* under similar conditions, when useful friendships were integral to a man’s success and stability of the state. As such, men like Erasmus made key tenets of ideal friendship commonplace, and men like Thomas Elyot recounted stories of perfect friends in their treatises on education and politics.

But a friend could no more be expected to be a Pylades, than a wife could be expected to be an Esther, even though didactic literature asserted these possibilities. Yet, conduct writers saw value in teaching through parables, for historical models of ideal pairs provided an opportunity to bring the theory of friendship to life. The problem of course, is that an ideal is just that. It may represent the ‘highest conception’ of something, but also it is ‘a hypothetical construct’, ‘existing only in idea’ and ‘confined to thought or imagination’. So even though Cicero’s work attempted to express the ‘idea’ of friendship in words, his rhetoric of unity, equality and constancy, though oft-quoted in the early modern period, frequently proved difficult to put into practice.

The eleven plays examined in this thesis engaged with this dilemma and the resultant differing expectations and misunderstandings that affected friendships. They explored the imagined classical ideal, envisaged it in action and tested its viability through negotiation.

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6 ‘Ideal’ in *OED*, defs. 2a, 1b, 4a.
with ideas on friendship by Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca. They traced the way that the ideal friend as ‘another self’ was vulnerable to public pressures and self-interest and registered an understanding of the friend’s fundamental importance to a man’s life and success. He was made integral to dramatic plots, and at times advanced his friend like a devoted ‘deputy’, yet given no stage ‘life’ of his own, ironically mirroring the loss of self that the Ciceronean ideal made requisite in a world where friends were not ‘disinterested’ selves, but rather, self-interested men.  

In drama the ideal friend also became an ‘inferior’ capable of promoting honour and reputation rendering friendship akin to caritas. ‘He’ could also be a wife. Both instances registered a further dissolution of the Ciceronean ideal of exclusivity through recognition of the many formulations of philia outlined in Aristotle’s Ethics. In this way dramatists reflected the cultural understanding that lords could be friends with their ‘men’, their kin, their wives, and also could be friends to the poor. That is, Timon could share his wealth with men of equal and lesser rank, and Frankford could help the down-on-his-luck gentleman, Wendoll. But the friend was also sought as a companion, by country gentlemen, by kings, and in some cases by husbands after marriage. Friendship was depicted as capable of righting injustice and helping to create a republic.

Edwards, Ford, Foxe, Goffe, Heywood, Lyly, and the three anonymous dramatists may have reworked plots, and imagined friendship through artificially created situations, but their representations of friendship did not vacillate at either end of the extremes: their friends were not always perfect, and they were not always Iago-like. Their portrayals offered an alternative to the standardisation advanced by the Ciceronean model, as friendship was figured as unique rather than uniform, as individual characters, their

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experiences, their understanding, and their situations helped to define what was ideal. Even so, their work evidenced a similar insistence on the period’s abiding preoccupation with three aspects of amicable relations: benefit, constancy, and gratitude. Through comedy, satire and tragedy the plays engaged with Seneca’s ideas about the conventions of friendship and giving outlined in *De beneficiis*, specifically benefit and gratitude, even if they did not register a sense of the similar ethical underpinning of Seneca’s philosophy of friendship. The dramatists highlighted the benefits that men were to look for and realise in friendship and pointed up that constancy, gratitude, and reward were essential to maintain amicable bonds. Edwards, Foxe and Goffe did so even in their consideration of paradigmatic friendship pairs, perhaps recognising as Arthur Golding and Thomas Lodge had when they thought *De beneficiis* useful for translation, that men could not be Stoic sages or disinterested friends, but giving and receiving could be the beginning and end of friendship.

The aim of this thesis was to add further dimension and scope to an understanding of early modern friendship by considering the contributions made to the discourse by dramatic representation on the academic, commercial and private stages. Through an examination of works in their cultural context and an exploration of early modern examples of private and public practices of friendship, certain resonances could be felt. The overall hope was to illustrate how a consideration of Aristotle’s *Ethics* and Seneca’s *De beneficiis* might open up meanings of friendship in early modern drama and practice, just as an understanding of Cicero’s *De amicitia* has provided insights, for their authors had much in common. Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca saw the benefit of friendship, and viewed it as a ‘good’, even if Seneca believed that the truly wise man was self-sufficient. All of their works on friendship were equally grounded in a strong moral ethic. But in *De
amicitia Cicero does not acknowledge a friendship that is not perfect, and as such its inflexibility is revealed in practice. *De beneficiis* and *The Nicomachean Ethics* outline a more realistic sense of how amicable relations are conducted. We may think of it this way, Cicero’s *De amicitia* details what ideal friendship should look like, and more to the point, what it shouldn’t; Aristotle’s *Ethics* describes the many faces of amity in all its inclusive conceptions and formulations; and Seneca’s *De beneficiis* contributes in a more practical way, providing advice on the behaviors necessary to cultivate and maintain amicable bonds. It is in this way that dramatists engaged with the ideas on friendship from all three philosophers. With this in mind, the results of this study suggest that there is still more to be learned by exploring classical ideas beyond *De amicitia* when reading dramatic works for what they have to say about friendship. This warrants a more inclusive and thorough investigation of the influence of the ideas on friendship by Aristotle, and particularly by Seneca, on the conception and practice of amicable relations in the period. Despite the limited scope of this current study, it is clear that the contributions to the discourse made by Edwards, Ford, Foxe, Goffe, Heywood, Lyly, and the three anonymous dramatists were significant, as their representations suggested more gradations of experience than the extremes of ideal and disloyal friendship that translations and redactions emphasised. Their representations of friendship’s enactment and practice, specifically through an engagement with the ideas on giving and receiving in friendship from *De beneficiis*, suggests that the ideas from the work had greater resonance than has heretofore been considered.

The question raised by Lorna Hutson’s work about the extent to which we can ‘read’ the omnipresence of the Ciceronian model correlating to a belief by men that their
friendships should comply remains important. Contemporary writers such as Richard Braithwaite certainly lamented the ideal’s elusive nature, and dramatists satirised it. The work in this thesis, despite its limited scope, demonstrates that there are indeed other ways in which to read early modern enactments and stage depictions of friendship, as they were variable in their conformity with the exclusive Ciceronean ideal. Whether these instances can be viewed as a measure of ‘belief’ may remain unresolved. It certainly appears that the ideas and principles of benefiting, giving and receiving from De beneficiis were a part of the discourse and practice, as were the more inclusive formulations of amity posited by Aristotle. Even so, early modern men and dramatists did register a familiarity with the Ciceronean model and the positive implications of asserting adherence to its principles despite practice that represented, embraced and underscored utility.

As a Stoic, Seneca believed that a man could live happily without friendship. Even so, he acknowledged its significance to a man’s life. In a letter to his friend, Lucilus, he reflects:

he marrieth a wife: he is contented with himself, he bringeth up children, hee is content in himselfe; and yet would he not live, if he should live without mankinde. No profit but a naturall instinct inciteth him to entertain friendship: for as in other things we have a certaine inbred sweetnesse, so have we of friendship.9

The dramatists whose work was a part of this study understood men’s inherent disposition for male friendship and articulated the same through depictions of men who, much like

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8 Hutson, p.62.
their early modern counterparts, may have seemingly had it all, yet still saw the benefit in pursuing bonds of amity, even if they might prove less than ideal.
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