Developing a Framework for Researching
Ethnicity and Multiculturalism in New Zealand

by

John Lowe

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Department of Sociology
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines a variety of theoretical issues relating to ethnicity, multiculturalism and racism in New Zealand. It is argued that whilst the country’s history has been replete with anti-Asiatic racisms, it is necessary to transcend the timeless notion of racism as colour discrimination and to instead, situate past and present anti-Asiatic racisms within the nation’s temporally specific positions in modernity. Through an orientation to time and diachrony, the research considers if a liberal policy of multiculturalism is conducive for contemporary New Zealand society. In view of academic debates suggesting that a ‘practical’ version of multiculturalism exists alongside the country’s constitutional biculturalism, it is argued that the de facto version of multiculturalism exhibits the characteristics of commercial and conservative multiculturalisms which fail to address the problem of racism. A liberal form of multiculturalism, it is maintained, will not produce the best outcome for New Zealand because it is insensitive to indigenous rights and will remain mutually exclusive from biculturalism. This research then concludes with a discussion on the likely future of cosmopolitanism in New Zealand, both as a theory and how it might possibly work in practice without immolating the hegemony of biculturalism.

Keywords:

New Zealand, New Zealanders, Asia, Asians, Pakeha, Maori, immigration, Treaty of Waitangi, race, racism, ethnicity, biculturalism, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism.
In memory of

Jens Richardson BAgribSc (Hons)

died tragically in a hit-and-run accident on 06 August 2009

A doctoral scholar in plant science I knew since 2003, I was privileged to discuss certain issues with Jens about multiculturalism and biculturalism when I was in New Zealand during the months of April and May 2009. Though the issues Jens raised are not discussed in this thesis, this research was close to his heart and his efforts to make the world more harmonious, dynamic and unified. I have been blessed by his insights, encouragement and optimism – despite my own pessimism – in cosmopolitanism and my search for a solution to the bicultural-multicultural dilemma. Magnanimous and well ahead of his time, Jens had still so much more to give.
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GLOSSARY

Aotearoa: The official indigenous name of New Zealand in the Maori language. It translates as Land of the Long White Cloud.

Crown: This word is often used in place of the government of New Zealand. In relation to the Maori and indigenous politics, this term is a signifier of colonisation and represents a ‘partnership’ formed between two peoples. Statutorily\(^1\), the Crown refers to Her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand; and includes all Ministers of the Crown and all departments; but excludes

i. An Office or Parliament; or

ii. A Crown entity; or


‘Host Society’: In the context of this thesis, the ‘host society’ refers to the ascendant Maori and Pakeha sectors of New Zealand’s citizenry. Whilst this term is antiquated from a British perspective and conceptually consonant with assimilation, its widespread use in New Zealand by scholars and policy makers to refer to the non-immigrant sectors of the population renders its usage in this thesis appropriate.

Maori: Officially recognised as the indigenous peoples of New Zealand, the Maori are descendents of the first group of people from Polynesia who were first to settle in

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the country prior to British colonisation. The Maori language is publicly recognised as one of New Zealand’s two official languages, alongside English.

**Pakeha:** The Maori word referring to Anglo-Celtic and other European New Zealanders. It is functionally equivalent to ‘New Zealand European’. The concept of ‘Pakeha’, according to Wevers (2006: 7), was a collective name given to European settlers by the indigenous people and has a meaning only in relation to the Maori. Though the term is frequently used to denote non-Maori New Zealanders, it excludes Asians and non-Europeans.

**Tangata Whenua:** A literal translation of *tangata whenua* into English is ‘people of the land’. This term is used to affirm the indigenous status of the Maori in New Zealand society.

**The Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti O Waitangi):** Signed in 1840 between the British and chiefs of forty Maori tribes, the Treaty is New Zealand’s founding document and first document permitting immigration into the British colony. The Treaty remains an integral source of the country’s *unwritten* constitution. The texts of the Treaty in English, Maori (and translation of the Maori version into English) are located in Appendix 1.
Introduction

[Social] science is an activity of human beings acting and interacting, thus a social activity. Its knowledge, its statements, its techniques have been created by human beings and developed, nurtured, and shared among groups of human beings. As a social activity, science is clearly a product of history and of processes which occurred in time and in place and involved human actors. These actors had lives not only in science, but in the wider societies of which they were members.

Everett Mendelsohn (1977: 3-4)

The background to this study: the initial vantage point

This study is in several ways, an embodiment of my research journey. The antecedents of my academic interest in New Zealand’s social sphere can be traced to my sojourns in the country as a teenage secondary school student who arrived in the city of Christchurch during the mid 1990s. As an overseas student brought up by middle-class parents in Singapore who decided that an education abroad would be in my best interest, I left home with a sense of excitement. In reality, I looked forward to leaving because I lacked a real sense of belonging and loyalty to the country. I never felt at home as a citizen of the nation-state founded as a British colony in 1819 which gained independence in 1965. This was because my personal biography and ancestry was entangled in the crucible legacies of the Great British Empire. My paternal great-grandparents were descendants of inter-marriages amongst locals and settlers from the Netherlands, Portugal and Britain. Known colloquially as the ‘Eurasians’, we are an ethnic minority that comprise less than five per cent of the country’s population. Due to the super-ordinate status and positions that Europeans enjoyed in the region during
the country’s colonial days, many of our counterparts from other ethnic groups maintained a distance from us and were forthright in proclaiming our ethnic and socio-cultural distinctiveness: we were usually either Catholic or Protestant Christians, spoke English as a first language, had some European and Asian ancestry, and never proficient in the other official languages spoken.

Questions of personal identity, belonging and citizenship have therefore been of perennial significance to me as a teenager. The opportunity to study in New Zealand was initially perceived as an opportunity to escape the dilemmas and feelings of being treated like an ‘outsider’ in the country in which I was domiciled. Upon my arrival in New Zealand, I realised that the problems I sought an escape from were to be intensified in due course. For a start, it was to the surprise and relief of my homestay family and to the teachers at the private Christian school that I spoke English and understood the Bible. It became apparent that my Anglophone family name and visibility as an ethnic minority attracted a variety of questions I really did not enjoy answering. Because I was from a country in South East Asia, I was labelled an ‘Asian’ and began to realise that this was due to my looks and physical appearance. Because ‘looks’ have been subject to various processes of racialisation in colonial regimes of power (Brah, 1996: 3), I was imputed with stereotypical traits of Asian international students that were not consonant with my personal sense of self that would also be rejected by other Asians as well. A growing awareness of the false essentialism inherent in the notion of ‘Asian’ emerged when I was asked on several occasions, to my surprise and bemusement, the absurd question if I spoke ‘Asian’. Vernacular meanings of ‘Asian’ in New Zealand parlance, as maintained in the first part of
Chapter Four, imbricate racial connotations and perpetuate stereotypical notions of culture that exaggerate differences between Asian minorities and mainstream New Zealand society.

Although I considered myself Asian only in so far as I was born in a country in South East Asia, no one could understand the pride I had in being of mixed Asian and European lineage or the possibility of being both. My status as an Asian overseas student during the late 1990s converged with the country’s wariness expressed to its immigrants and students from Asia who were deemed an economic necessity and asset, but in several ways, an affront to the integrity of New Zealand culture. In particular, the Asian transformation of urban spaces in the country’s main cities spawned outrage amongst disgruntled members of the ‘host society’ who claimed that their cities were being ‘taken over’ (see Ip and Murphy 2005). At this point in time during the late 1990s, the relative weakness of the New Zealand dollar attracted overseas students who could not afford an education in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The country was however certainly unprepared for an ephemeral increase in international students, mostly Asians and Chinese, in secondary schools and colleges, English language schools, universities and polytechnics. Nevertheless, international students were essential for the country’s economy. As the fifth chapter argues, New Zealand has not really accepted, but rather, acquiesced, to the presence of Asian immigrants and embraced ‘multiculturalism’ with equanimity on the basis of their pecuniary contributions to the economy. The concept of ‘multiculturalism’ as it is loosely used in New Zealand is examined in Chapter Five.
At university, the reality of having to cope with feelings of insecurity and rejection amidst claims that campuses were ‘invaded’ by Asian students was a reality faced by many international students. To make matters worse, isolated instances of assaults and overt expressions of racial abuse on Asian students in Christchurch and other cities tarnished the country’s reputation as a destination of international study. Graffiti on campus and student union newspapers reporting anti-Asian sentiments expressed to overseas students were particularly disturbing. Domestic students were particularly censorious at Asian students who did not mix with New Zealand students, went around ‘driving flash cars’, ‘worked too hard’ and ‘spoke loudly in their languages’. As an undergraduate student of social science, I became preoccupied with residual questions relating to racism and ethnicity that were only tangentially addressed in modules about New Zealand history and public policy. Nevertheless, I developed an awareness of the country’s colonial past but always wanted to find out why certain groups had always been considered unfit for citizenship in New Zealand and what constituted racism. As a result of much thought about these intriguing questions, the third chapter is a socio-historical analysis explaining how historical and contemporary anti-Asiatic racisms resonate with the country’s temporally-specific position(s) in modernity.

Throughout my time in New Zealand, my proficiency in the English language rendered the task of interacting with Pakeha New Zealanders easier. At university, my positive experiences corresponded with Ward and Masgoret’s (2004: 56) findings that international students with a stronger command of the language develop better relationships with New Zealanders and enjoy more satisfying student experiences. A
lot more can be said about an immigrant’s or foreign student’s mastery of the English language as a form of linguistic capital as according to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 142), “linguistic relations are always relations of symbolic power”. Thus, even though most Asian international students and other non-Anglophone people in New Zealand would be fairly fluent in English, irregular elements in speech and accent can be understood as a lack of ‘linguistic capital’ and consequential loss of opportunities. According to a longitudinal study of Asian settlers in New Zealand by Anne Henderson (2003: 156), “employers and agencies reacted negatively to Chinese accents, particularly in telephone calls but also in face-to-face situations”. This confirms the assertion of Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 142) that dominated peoples like refugees and immigrants have their linguistic capital “more or less devalued, be it in school, at work, or in social encounters with the dominant”.

Although I might have possessed a greater degree of linguistic capital and did not lack friendships with New Zealanders, I could not help but feel bewildered whenever my friends who were New Zealanders would engage in harsh and callous conversations about Asian international students, their accents and different ways of doing things. Even though I considered such conversations indecorous and racist, I wondered if they spoke about such culturally insensitive matters in my presence without moral qualms because they considered me ‘one of them’, or if they were referring to me. To make matters worse, being an ‘Asian’ social science and humanities student in New Zealand was a deviation to the stereotype. With the majority of Asian international students in New Zealand embarking on the more ‘practical’ or vocational degree programmes in commerce and management,
engineering and science that require lower standards of rhetorical diction and prose in
the English language, my academic success in the humanities and social sciences
attracted some unwanted attention and antagonisms. In the second year, after being
congratulated with an academic prize for achieving the highest combined average in
my cohort, I was dismayed with a change in attitudes and felt guilty for ‘stealing’ the
award as a non-New Zealander. On a separate occasion, an informal discussion about
the social science degree programme with a middle-aged Pakeha female student was
countenanced with the crude riposte of “if you don’t like it here I really think that you
should leave!” Apart from these isolated, unpleasant experiences, my friendships with
a handful of New Zealanders remain amiable and enduring.

During this first phase of what was to become my research ‘journey’, my
vicarious experiences as an overseas student at high school and university in New
Zealand provided impetus for me to contemplate studying elsewhere. I was therefore
unaware that my student experiences in New Zealand would eventually provide the
epistemological standpoint and initial crude picture of the phenomenon to be
investigated, and type of research questions that would form the basis for this study.

In September 2004, I departed New Zealand for the University of Birmingham
in England to pursue analytic philosophy. Although I found the new environment
daunting, the transition to life in Britain was smooth and relatively easy because I felt
safer and less conscious of my high-visibility as a non-European person with racism
being less overt in contrast to New Zealand. There was also a better sense of
belonging, due in part to my ancestry, but also because I was pleasantly surprised to
find that British students were considerably more accepting of international students
from outside the European Union. For a start, it was a relief not to be asked the annoying questions of “do you speak English?”, “where are you from?” and “how long have you been learning English?” or “where did you learn English?” that I had grown accustomed to answering in New Zealand. Reflecting upon my experience as a student in both Britain and New Zealand, I made the decision to consolidate my philosophical interests and fuse them with my interests in New Zealand studies. For this reason, I left the Department of Philosophy and registered for a research degree in the Department of Sociology. Thus, the second phase of this study’s research ‘journey’ necessarily involved a reflexive re-appraisal of my positive and negative personal experiences in New Zealand as well as the infusion of appropriate theoretical and empirical frameworks inspired by certain traditions in the philosophy of science and social theory. I then acknowledge that my research interests were shaped by my sensitivity to certain issues as a result of the social locations I occupied in New Zealand. These issues which relate to my autobiographical elements are addressed in Chapter Two.

During the earlier stages of this research, the design of an appropriate theoretical framework for situating this twenty-first century New Zealand study was directed by an appreciation of Immanuel Kant’s famous dictum that ‘Philosophy of science without history of science is empty’\(^1\). Although this is not a study about the philosophy of science *per se*, Kant’s dictum remains pertinent in so far as the social sciences need to be grounded in theoretically-led empirical research programmes that are appropriate for our present condition – our *time* in history. Upon reading the

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\(^1\) Paraphrased by Imre Lakatos (1983: 102)
literature available on multiculturalism, and race and ethnicity in New Zealand from various disciplines including sociology, I became aware of the absence of a temporal and spatial dimension. Though informative and still relevant in many ways, the notion of racism as discrimination on the basis of colour difference is timeless. Thus, the task of understanding how historical and present racisms differ is rendered more difficult. The notion of time is surely of importance, as according to Bergmann (1992: 85), sociology is concerned with the relationship between temporal perspectives and social roles, social classes, cultural, social types and so on. Accordingly, the first chapter finds the existing literature on race and ethnicity in New Zealand imbalanced due to a preponderance of accounts that over-emphasise the synchronic rather than diachronic or temporal features of past and present racisms. It was therefore necessary to address this imbalance before commencing the search for an appropriate civic idea that would suit contemporary New Zealand. To this end, the fifth and sixth chapters are devoted to a theoretical discussion of the merits and viability of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism as political philosophies to adjudicate between the competing demands of cultural diversity.

Taking for granted that time and space are inseparable where the one necessarily presupposes the other, this social scientific inquiry would be slanted if it did not recognise the pre-eminence of space. In twenty-first century New Zealand, debates about the suitability of immigrant groups are premised on the fact that people from faraway lands are currently occupying a common spatial and temporal dimension. Whilst spatial-temporal dimensions are taken for granted as ‘givens’ in social research, the salient importance of this fact is aptly summarised by Nigel Thrift (2006: 143):
The spaces in which humans can be together have progressively increased in scale as new forms of materials, which are also new forms of spacing, have allowed new kinds of social relations to exist. Human reach is greater and becoming continuous at scales that were formerly the subject of stuttering or, at best, periodic contact.

Historically, in settler societies like New Zealand, social relations between the indigenous and all other ethnic groups have always been dependent on the exigencies of each group’s demands on land, space, and scarce natural resources. In this context, the temporal and spatial can be described as constituting a continuum. The search for an appropriate political philosophy that can effectively manage the contemporary demands of the country’s Maori, Pakeha and other minority ethnic groups does not only encompass the temporal; it will also simultaneously (re)construct the spatial identities of groups within the New Zealand population in so far as racism is intertwined in the struggle for space and natural resources. In this modern era of increased migrations and border crossings, Brah (1996: 208) maintains that diaspora spaces are created wherein “multiple subject positions are juxtaposed, contested, proclaimed, or disavowed; where the permitted and prohibited perpetually interrogate”.

With regard to New Zealand’s main cities which have been transformed by the arrivals of Asian and other non-European immigrants and students, section 5.23 of the fifth chapter discusses the confluence of New Zealand’s commercial multiculture with race and ethnicity.

Transforming New Zealand’s public sphere through sociology

Whilst the main intentions of this study were to provide a temporal and spatial perspective on contemporary racisms in New Zealand, as well as provide a response to
the dilemmas surrounding multiculturalism’s perceived incompatibility with the country’s constitutional policy of biculturalism, it sufficed that this research project should attempt to *enrich* public debates at a time when discussions about overt racisms, intolerance and discrimination have been acknowledged as problems that need to be publicly addressed. According to the New Zealand Human Rights Commission’s 2008 (NZHRC 2008) report on race-relations released on 21 February 2009, safety for ethnic minority groups is an important public issue the country needs to work towards this year (2009). The report found that Asians have been identified as the most widely targeted and racially discriminated group and victims of racially motivated crime (2008: 11). Racially motivated crimes in New Zealand are however not restricted to Asians or non-White people. In April 2008, racially motivated attacks involving victims who were Europeans garnered the media’s attention when an Irish tourist was assaulted in Westport, alongside an instance of eight Danish and English tourists attacked in central Christchurch. In the latter incident, six were taken to hospital with two suffering from knife wounds (*The Press*, 19 Jan 2009). In both these instances, the victims were attacked only because ‘they spoke in funny accents’ (*The Press*, 14 April 2008; 23 April 2008). In the aftermath of a man arrested and convicted in March 2009 for murdering Korean student Jae-Hyeon Kim earlier in 2003, Human Rights Commissioner Joris De Bres emphatically stressed the need for ‘racism support’ for international students. In his address to the International Education Association Conference in December 2008 he said:

> You (education providers) have a particular responsibility to ensure the safety of your students, to make them aware of the risks and to provide them with easily accessible processes to report instances of racial harassment.  

(*The Press*, 5 Dec 2008)
Although an online facility now exists for international students in Christchurch to report racial harassment, this will do very little to address racism as a pressing problem in the public sphere that is not restricted to overseas students. It is indeed time for New Zealand’s sociological canon to play a more active role in addressing the public issue of racism in the country.

My awareness of the need for social inquiry to ‘address’ public problems was inspired by Michael Burawoy’s (2005: 4) call for sociologists to reinvigorate the discipline by engaging “multiple publics in multiple ways”. During his Presidential address to the American Sociological Association in 2004, Burawoy contended that the ‘public sociology’ which characterised American sociology before World War II was displaced by a professionalism in the wake of declining budgets, intensified competition for students and corporate-market solutions in the university. For Burawoy, the professional, market-based solution fails to deliver and, paradoxically, “inspires the demand and, simultaneously, creates the obstacles to public sociology” (Ibid: 7). Indeed, the self-fulfilling and negative effects of the widespread ‘academic capitalism’ that encourages universities to function as corporate businesses, according to Herminio Martins (2004: 28), are evident when ‘product-lines’ (in the form of university departments, subjects and even faculties) are discontinued or ‘restructured’ in accordance to market demands.

With respect to sociology, then, the discipline risks degenerating into a science of propaganda should interpenetrations between the market’s demands and research methodologies result in expert knowledge that will undermine the conditions required
for dialogue in liberal, Western democracies. In other words, it is highly likely that egregious value-laden solutions to socio-political problems will jostle for acceptance in the public sphere. Because credible expert opinions to complement any political position can be easily obtained under the existing conditions of ‘academic capitalism’, sociologists may feel pressurised to align the agendas of their research projects together with the ethos of funding agencies; or to even go so far as to disguise their real interests to render their research proposals more appealing to government bodies. Though writing over three-decades ago, these contemporary problems that beset Western sociology were foreshadowed by Alvin Gouldner’s evocative claims about the changing character of the University. In his own words:

The university’s central problem is its failure as a community in which rational discourse about social worlds is possible. This is partly because rational discourse as such ceased to be its dominant value and was superseded by a quest for knowledge products and information products that could be sold or promised for funding, prestige and power – rewards bestowed by the state and the larger society that is most bent upon subverting discourse about itself.

(Gouldner, 1973: 79)

For Gouldner, the uneasy relationship between market values and the production of social knowledge ought to be addressed through a ‘reflexive sociology’ that establishes theoretical communities which are protected from the “impediments to rational discourse still growing within the university as much as from those in the larger society” (Ibid: 79). It is not difficult to discern the cause of Gouldner’s concerns. Because sociology engages with issues that have reverberations in public policy, its highly specialised knowledge claims are usually accepted on trust by publics for whom such knowledge has implications. Although democratic entry into debates about
public policy issues by ‘the public’ is impossible, Stephen Turner (2001: 124), maintains that democratic action can still rule over such activities through a “capitulation to ‘rule by experts’ or democratic rule which is ‘populist’ – that is to say, that valorizes the wisdom of the people even when ‘the people’ are ignorant and operate on the basis of fear and rumour”.

For this reason, Gouldner’s argument that theoretical collectivities need to reach beyond the university whilst maintaining a foothold in the university appears to be the best way of ensuring that social scientific expertise will not compromise the conditions required for dialogue in liberal democracies. The question however as to whether Gouldner’s claims are realistic in contemporary conditions remains moot.

These issues affecting contemporary Western sociology are of immediate concern to New Zealand’s sociological canon. Despite the paucity of writings about how sociology is maintained as an academic discipline in the country’s eight universities, it has been acknowledged that there is much disquiet and unease in the wake of dwindling student numbers, declining research funds and outputs. In her essay on the shifting practices in New Zealand sociology, Ruth McManus (2006: 281-2) found that the sociology departments in three of the country’s eight universities had already abolished compulsory social theory modules for undergraduate sociology students due to competition for students from other departments, and complaints from previous students that learning social theory was too difficult. Following Pierre Bourdieu’s (1988: 74) assertion inspired by Kant that “theory without empirical research is empty and empirical research without theory is blind”, it would be unfortunate if this move were to result in New Zealand sociology becoming
characterised by a preponderance of *degenerating* empirical research programmes that are market-led as opposed to *progressive*, theoretically led programmes. By drawing upon the work of Lakatos (1978) in his *Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*, it is possible to appraise social science in terms of research programmes that are either degenerating or progressive. To Lakatos, progressive frameworks are distinguished by verifying instances of *excess* empirical content which corroborate the programme’s ‘hardcore’ theories. Although Lakatos was highly critical of the social sciences which he claimed were degenerating when he wrote in the 1960s, his philosophy of science reminds us that sociological research can be vulnerable to stasis and degeneracy should empirical research result in knowledge claims that are no longer novel or innovative. For our purposes, a progressive social research programme could be construed as one that exhibits increased explanatory scope. This could mean endeavouring to produce knowledge that will make life better for the general public.

This study is not about the sociology of New Zealand’s sociological community, neither does it claim to have successfully contributed a model for public sociology. It was however inspired by C. Wright Mills’ call for sociologists to connect the state’s public issues with the private troubles of its citizens. Though Mills’ seminal text *The Sociological Imagination* is now half a century old, the conditions that gave rise to its inception are still applicable to our current social conditions; in particular, the reasons why the society of his time responded with anxiety and fear due to their lack of social understanding (1959: 4-5):

>The very shaping of history now ouptaces the ability of men to orient themselves in accordance with cherished values. And which values? Even when they do not panic, men often sense that older ways of feeling and thinking have collapsed and that newer beginnings are ambiguous to the point
of moral stasis. Is it any wonder that ordinary men feel they cannot cope with the larger worlds with which they are so suddenly confronted? That they cannot understand the meanings of their epoch for their own lives? That – in defence of selfhood – they become morally insensible, trying to remain altogether private men? Is it any wonder that they come to be possessed by a sense of the trap?

The ideas of C. Wright Mills have already been taken up by Burawoy in his recent call for a move towards public sociology. In New Zealand sociology, the arguments of Burawoy are given greater resonance in light of the following observation made by Charles Crothers (2008: 11):

New Zealand Sociology has not been noted for its public involvement...Indeed, whereas a couple of decades ago there was some concern and debate about sociological interventions this seems to have faded since. Sociologists are regularly called on as commentators on media issues, but remain peripheral in influencing public views.

In view of Crothers’ comments and C. Wright Mills’ account of society’s failure to cope with the larger social worlds with which they were confronted half a century ago, I want to suggest that the same would be true in New Zealand and other Western countries in the extant conditions of late-modernity. Certain sectors of New Zealand’s citizenry were certainly unprepared and ill-equipped to develop a rational response to the dramatic economic deregulatory policies of the late 1980s that provided impetus for a colour-blind immigration policy. Thus, the perennial problem of overt racisms could be, to some degree, a symptom of the fact that there are groups of people who ‘cannot cope’ with the realities of these other ‘social worlds’ existing with them in the same spatial-temporal dimension. Sociology should therefore help the public to be better informed about what is going on in the world, and equip them with emancipative knowledge to make rational decisions. Public contributions of such
knowledge are needed in contemporary New Zealand society. Whilst the intention to produce such knowledge might be utopian and remain beyond the remit of this study, it is hoped that this work can, at the very least, provide a platform for future public contributions of knowledge that will benefit members of New Zealand society.

With this aim in mind, the second part of the fourth chapter was designed to connect, using empirical data, the private troubles of ethnic minorities experiencing racism in the public sphere by identifying the similarities they shared with the majority of New Zealand society. Here, it became apparent, to some degree, that the respondents (from both the mainstream society and minority ethnic groups) expressed similar anxieties about the future of multi-ethnic New Zealand that arose out of their common membership in the country. Finally, to provide a solution to the public and academic dilemmas as to whether New Zealand should replace its constitutional policy of biculturalism with a form of multiculturalism that would not immolate the latter, or if biculturalism should be replaced with multiculturalism, I decided to develop a response to this issue by considering how cosmopolitanism would work as an incumbent political philosophy, and examine if it could possibly overcome the strictures of multiculturalism and produce a better outcome for all New Zealanders. To this end, the sixth chapter presents cosmopolitanism as a more fitting civic idea by virtue of the fact that transnationalism is a civic, cultural and spatial dimension of New Zealand citizenship. The findings of this chapter depart from my original intentions of devising a version of multiculturalism that would be amenable and congenial to the country’s constitutional biculturalism that is currently reticent on the status of non-European and non-Maori New Zealanders in the country. Nevertheless, I began to
incline towards the view that multiculturalism and biculturalism were mutually exclusive because of their different historical and theoretical origins; the former deriving from British imperialism and the latter, being a relative newcomer, essentially a post World War Two development that emerged out of decolonisation and immigration. It then sufficed that the attempt to reconcile biculturalism with a form of multiculturalism would prove futile when the one would threaten to cancel out the other. Moreover, in the wake of claims that multiculturalism is responsible for eroding social cohesion in Western democracies (see Phillips 2007: 13), it sufficed that multiculturalism could eventually be unsuitable for the purposes of representing the needs of a population that is most likely to develop a greater sense of imperviousness to national boundaries in the near future. I therefore decided to examine the prospects of cosmopolitanism as a solution to the tension found in multiculturalism’s uneasy relationship with biculturalism that would successfully represent the demands of a culturally diverse New Zealand society in the twenty-first century.

Summary of research objectives and significance

The research objectives of this study can be broadly summarised as mainly theoretical. The first objective of this thesis is concerned with developing a theoretical framework for discussing issues related to racism, ethnic identity and multiculturalism in New Zealand that is orientated to time, historicity and temporality. The theoretical limitations in the literature are multifaceted. The concept and category of ‘racism’ is highly contested in the social sciences and there is little agreement over its definition and the practices that are circumscribed in racism. As Ferguson (2003: vi-vii)
maintained in his critique of the historical literature on anti-Chinese racisms: “The New Zealand work is found to be notably underdeveloped. Among the deficiencies are its largely narrative and unreflective character. Little use is made of a substantial body of theoretical work which has been developed abroad and which could offer valuable tools for analysing the White New Zealand policy”. One particular theoretical issue that has not been adequately addressed in the New Zealand literature is the fact that discussions do not go beyond the discussion of racism as discrimination on the basis of skin colour or cultural traits that are deemed inferior. Though the timeless emphasis of racism as discrimination on the basis of differences in skin colour and culture will always remain meaningful and pertinent as a logical class and variable, it is hoped that a diachronic perspective to existing accounts of racism in New Zealand can be obtained by situating colour racisms within the nation’s historically specific positions in modernity and late-modernity. In turn, it is hoped that the orientation to time and temporality will pave the way for future empirical research in racial and ethnic studies that eminently considers and identifies temporally specific contagions or ingredients of racism (in the past and present) in terms that are beyond colour or cultural differences. Additionally, a focus on diachrony has the potential to enrich the quality of our existing synchronic understandings of racism. Diachronic analyses of racisms, for example, may help future researchers to identify the resilient structural conditions responsible for the institutionalisation of racism in the educational, employment and economic domains.

As such, the selected research method of the qualitative interview is appropriate for providing a diachronic perspective on the fragmentary nature of ethnic
identities in New Zealand and the confluence of racism with other factors, including the notion of risk promulgated by Ulrich Beck (1992). Qualitative research, nevertheless, does not proceed without tensions or contradictions. Writing of cultural studies where qualitative research is taken as a given, Nelson et al (1992: 4) suggest that:

Qualitative research embraces two tensions at the same time. On the one hand, it is drawn to a broad, interpretive, postexperimental, postmodern, feminist and critical sensibility. On the other hand, it is drawn to more narrowly defined positivist, postpositivist, humanistic and naturalistic conceptions of human experience and its analysis. Further, these tensions can be combined in the same project, bringing both postmodern and naturalistic, or both critical and humanistic perspectives to bear.

In light of this, the research methodology encourages the researcher’s reflexive\(^2\) interaction with qualitative data through the hermeneutic circle discussed in Section 2.3 of Chapter Two. Methodologically and theoretically then, and taking into consideration the points made by Nelson et al (1992: 4), the second objective of this thesis attempts to combine the postmodern and naturalistic tensions found in qualitative research first, by establishing how the unofficial policy of multiculturalism in New Zealand exists, and second, by discussing why cosmopolitanism might potentially succeed in addressing multiculturalism’s tensions and incompatibility with biculturalism. The intention to specify and define, using both qualitative research and theory, the existing policy of multiculturalism as commercial and conservative multiculturalism can be argued to be on the one hand, representative of a naturalistic and positivistic endeavour. On the other hand, in allowing provision for a form of

\(^2\) See Guba and Lincoln (2005) who recommend that the tensions in qualitative research be addressed through action-reflection methodology.
cosmopolitanism (with the possibility for multiple versions of cosmopolitanism to evolve) that accommodates the transnational lifestyles of New Zealanders which broadly encapsulate forms of belonging that are not confined to territorial boundaries, and, the treatment of individuals on the basis of morally equal citizens of the world, a postmodern perspective as such attempts to balance the earlier tension.

Whilst this research is about New Zealand, a small country in the South Pacific, it is internationally relevant to scholars of racial and ethnic studies, post-colonialism, globalisation and international relations. Despite the small size of New Zealand and its remote location, it is a country with global economic interests “[whose] geographical position provides a genuine test case for the widely accepted proposition that globalization has diminished ‘the tyranny of distance’” (Patman and Rudd, 2005: 17).

Thus, in relation to Britain, Western Europe and other settler societies, it is hoped that this work will allow researchers to acquire insights into the predictable wider socio-economic transformations and, in particular, the complex ethnic dislocations that are intertwined with colonialism, immigration, economic deregulation, indigenous rights and global integration. Moreover, this study’s attention to the saliency of the Treaty of Waitangi and its foreseeable applicability to cosmopolitanism (and multiculturalism) will be of interest to academic debates encompassing post-colonialism, indigenous rights and conflicts in settler societies such as Canada, Australia and the USA. Finally, through this study that has been undertaken in England, scholarly inquiries in Britain may help the British citizenry to better understand the complexities of their colonial past and repercussions of British imperialism by looking beyond the British Isles, and through the perspective of one of its former colonies.
A note on the use of language

This thesis is written in the English language. It has however, been written in British English – not New Zealand English – despite the fact that there are numerous references throughout to distinctively New Zealand terms and expressions (such as the notion of biculturalism and various Maori words). While most New Zealanders (and international readers who are familiar with New Zealand studies) would understand the distinctive meanings of these New Zealand words and phrases, it is acknowledged that readers from the United Kingdom and elsewhere without a background in New Zealand studies will need an introduction to these terms. To facilitate a quick and easy explanation, a glossary has been provided. As this thesis is written in an English university, the usage of language is formal and necessarily academic. The vocabulary of the research informants’ spoken language is, in contrast, more casual, informal and frequently idiomatic. For example, while ‘New Zealander’ is formally used to describe people from New Zealand, those interviewed were more likely to refer to themselves and other ‘New Zealanders’ colloquially as ‘Kiwis’. This is explained below, together with several other latent ambiguities in nomenclature that are likely to occur in this study.

New Zealanders, Kiwis, Australasians, Asians, Orientals and Antipodeans

A variety of terms are used by New Zealanders, scholars of New Zealand Studies and others to represent the country, and the different groups of people that live in New Zealand. There are therefore potentially ambiguous acronyms and concepts
with vast fields of meanings that, if not clarified, could cause much confusion. Most notably, the concept of ‘Asian’ in this thesis is used strictly in accordance to New Zealand English with a connotation that departs from its common usage in Britain. Contrary to protocol in Britain, ‘Asia’ and ‘Asians’ in New Zealand refer to the nations and peoples of East and South East Asia. Although South Asians from the Indian sub-continent of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives are seldom referred to as ‘Asians’ by New Zealanders as is the case here in the United Kingdom, the category of ‘Asian’ in New Zealand could eventually evolve to include South Asians. Conversely, East and South East Asians are usually labelled as ‘Orientals’ in Britain but very rarely referred to as such in New Zealand.

Whilst New Zealanders (together with their Australian counterparts) living in other countries are frequently referred to as ‘Antipodeans’, this term is rarely used in the New Zealand context. In her research on New Zealanders who first arrived in the United Kingdom for their working holiday or overseas experiences, Judith Wilson (2007: 36) reported that several of her informants were ignorant of this term and had to ask other people what it meant. The term ‘Australasian’ is however commonly used by New Zealanders in New Zealand. Due to the country’s geographical location in the Southern Hemisphere, and its closest neighbour being Australia, the two countries are frequently referred to as ‘Australasia’ on a collective basis whilst Australians and New Zealanders are often referred to (by others and by themselves) as ‘Australasians’. Whilst the notion of ‘downunder’ would correctly include South Africa, together with both Australia and New Zealand that are geographically located in the southern hemisphere, it is normally evocative of Australia, not New Zealand.
As mentioned earlier, people from New Zealand are commonly called ‘Kiwis’ and refer informally to other New Zealanders as such. In colloquial language, the ‘Kiwis’ of New Zealand are functionally equivalent to the ‘Aussies’ of Australia and ‘Saffas’ of South Africa. According to historian Keith Sinclair (1986: 189), New Zealanders started calling themselves and identified as ‘Kiwis’ during the later stages of World War One. The name is taken directly from the flightless bird, native to New Zealand that remains in danger of extinction. The image of the Kiwi is frequently used as an icon on New Zealand-made products, souvenirs and other types of New Zealand paraphernalia.

**New Zealand and Aotearoa**

On a final note, I have chosen to use, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, *New Zealand*, the country’s official English name instead of *Aotearoa*, its indigenous name. As Maori is an official language in New Zealand, it is not uncommon to find both terms used alongside each other in public discourse and academic publications. As this thesis is written in a British university, the use of both (viz. Aotearoa New Zealand or Aotearoa/New Zealand) would be cumbersome, redundant, and unnecessary.
Chapter One

The View from Within:
The Settlement of New Zealand Society

It is necessary to examine race, ethnicity and multiculturalism in New Zealand both empirically and theoretically at a time when debates on indigenous rights, immigration and emigration are intense and vociferous. The background, and context, to fully understanding these debates, however, needs to begin in New Zealand, the social world that is the focus of this study. The first part of this chapter will provide a socio-historical narrative and discussion of settlement in New Zealand, prior to, and after British colonisation in 1840. This serves as a prelude to understanding how race and ethnicity have shaped the nuanced national imaginations of its peoples and the country’s cultural development from the time of its founding to the present day. The second half of this chapter will then proceed to examine how the New Zealand literature accounts for the country’s past and present racisms, and the perennial question on whether the country’s bicultural framework is appropriate for managing the requirements of a multicultural population. Based on an analysis of the existing literature, it draws together the crucial strands of academic and policy debates in this field. It will finally identify the important theoretical and conceptual omissions in the literature that this study is dedicated to addressing.

This chapter relies mainly on New Zealand-based published sources that are derived from a range of disciplines that include, but are not limited to Asian Studies, Anthropology, New Zealand studies, history and sociology. Whilst the literature is
vast and diverse, the various sources under scrutiny here are necessarily partial and
selective; chosen for their significant influence in establishing a particular conceptual
trend or trajectory in the extant literature that is problematic. It should be stated that
this chapter does not intend to fulfil the purposes of an annotated bibliography or
provide a comprehensive review of all the literature that is available.

1.1 The making of New Zealand society

New Zealand was the last settler-society of the British Empire colonised during
the mid-nineteenth century. It was designed to provide a future for its burgeoning
population, and to also supply the British population with agricultural produce. As
Figure 1-1 illustrates, the two islands comprising New Zealand are literally ‘half-a-
world-away’ from Europe and very remote from the rest of the world’s major
landmasses. The minimum flying time to Australia, its closest neighbour, is around
three and a half hours; the same amount of time one can travel to Moscow from
London or from Frankfurt to Tel Aviv in Israel.

Figure 1-1: New Zealand’s remote geographical location
Due to the remoteness of New Zealand, Europeans who arrived in the eighteenth century onwards were intrigued by the origins of the country’s first occupants – the Maori. It is important to emphasise that whilst the Maori are formally recognised as the country’s indigenous peoples, they are, in reality, descendants of the country’s very first group of immigrants who claimed the country for themselves when it was uninhabited. New Zealand’s constitutional framework recognises the indigeneity of Maori because they were occupants of the land prior to British annexation in 1840. Scholarly anthropological and historical sources provide documented evidence that the two idyllic islands comprising present day New Zealand were first discovered and populated by peoples from the Polynesian outliers of Melanesia and Micronesia. There is no archaeological or anthropological evidence of human occupation in New Zealand before the thirteenth century AD (King, 2003: 18). Maori settlement was clearly preceded by voyaging mariners from Eastern Polynesia who sailed away from the tropical warmth of their islands in the Central Pacific Ocean to the temperate waters of New Zealand in search of new places to live. Archaeological evidence suggests that around eight hundred years ago, seafarers in canoes had already developed ancient navigational systems to make return voyages to New Zealand from Polynesia. In a very intriguing experiment, Ben Finney and his students sailed to the North Island of New Zealand in 1985 from Rarotonga in a reconstructed nineteen-metre replica of the Hokule’a, an ancient Polynesian canoe. Built some ten years earlier in the University of Hawai’i, Finney’s intention was solely aimed at making a non-instrumentally navigated voyage to New Zealand from Rarotonga and back. In his own words, Finney
(1994: 66) summaries the outcomes of his experimental voyage which lasted only sixteen and a half days:

To reach Aotearoa, one has to want to sail there (or at least in that direction), and we propose that the voyages of both Hokule’a and Hawaiki-Nui demonstrate how the strategy of using summer easterlies to sail southwest could have been used by earlier voyagers to reach Aotearoa from Eastern Polynesia...It is not far-fetched to assume that ancient Polynesian mariners knew enough about changing wind patterns to be able to wait for the right season to attempt an ocean crossing which otherwise would have been difficult because of generally contrary winds. Ethnographic and archaeological evidence indicates that they were well-acquainted with the alternation of westerlies and easterlies in the tropical Pacific, and used these to sail, with favourable winds, from island to island both to the east and to the west.

The first New Zealanders and founders of the existing indigenous Maori population were therefore Polynesian in ancestry. After about a hundred and fifty years of colonising the lands, King (2003: 71) maintains that the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were transitional years that allowed for the settlers to adapt their Polynesian practices to their new living environment, culminating in the creation of a distinctively New Zealand Maori culture. Their new culture began with a gradual transformation and adaptation of their Polynesian lifestyle practices to the cooler climate and new environment. Examples include the discovery of carving spears for hunting using materials found only in New Zealand that differed from Polynesian ones, and new ways of storing and preserving food.

The Pre-European spread of Polynesians across the two islands can therefore be broadly characterised as the very first stage of New Zealand’s settlement history. Over the centuries, as medieval Europe was marked by the crusades and religious wars, Maori multiplied and distributed themselves across the north and south islands without
any contact with the rest of the world. They divided the land amongst themselves on the basis of tribes with members of each tribe tracing their ancestry to the occupants of the original canoes that arrived in New Zealand (Sinclair, 1980: 20). As the age of European expansion had already commenced by the late eighteenth century, Maori could no longer hide their pristine lands from imperial foreigners who were primed to unsettle their tranquil lifestyles and bring about permanent changes to their detriment. On 6 February 1840, Governor William Hobson, a representative of Queen Victoria, successfully annexed the two islands to Great Britain at a gathering in Waikato Heads. The Treaty of Waitangi was to presage a bitter struggle of rivalry and battle for political power between the natives and the British Crown.

1.11 The Treaty of Waitangi

The signing of the Treaty between Hobson and a total of forty consenting Maori tribal chiefs marked a watershed in New Zealand’s history for two reasons. First, it heralded the beginning of the second stage of immigrant settlement into New Zealand from Britain (and Europe), and second, the Treaty remains fraught with ambiguity, controversy and multiple interpretations even today. These issues which converge with non-European immigration are critically examined in the rest of this thesis. As an integral source of the country’s *unwritten* constitution, the Treaty¹ remains central in perennial debates about race, ethnicity and national identity. In short, though frequently “reviled, revered and disputed as a regrettable necessity, the

¹ A copy of the Treaty in both Maori and English, alongside an English translation of the Maori version is found in Appendix 1 (Appendices 1A, 1B and 1C).
centrality of the treaty to contemporary constitutional discourses is rarely disputed” (Maaka and Fleras, 2005: 104). If it is reviled, it is due largely to the retrospective nature of existing Treaty claims that Maori have made against the Crown. The view that the present generation should not be responsible for the consequences of the British Crown’s historical omissions and injustices committed against the ancestors of present day Maori is currently persuasive in certain political circles and the centre-right.

One does not have to look too far to discover the root causes of the contemporary turbulent relations that exist between Maori and Pakeha. In short, Hobson had drawn up the Treaty without any draft documents prepared by lawyers or the Colonial Office in London. Further details of the historical and legal omissions of Hobson are recorded by King (2003: 157-8):

… [H]e had to cobble together his own Treaty, with the help of his secretary, James Freeman, and British Resident James Busby, neither of whom was a lawyer. That done, Hobson recognised that a Treaty in English alone could scarcely be understood, agreed to or even debated by Maori, so he had the missionary Henry Williams and his son Edward hastily translate the English version into Maori. All this occurred over four days, with the Maori version being prepared overnight on 4th February.

This lack of preparation and consultation is a major reason why relations between Maori and all other non-indigenous New Zealanders have always been tense. There are, accordingly, various contemporary Maori and non-Maori hermeneutic constructions of the Treaty’s true meanings that have emerged in more recent decades with competing political intentions. Consisting of three very brief articles, the
English\textsuperscript{2} version of the Treaty text stipulated that the chiefs would cede their \textit{sovereignty} to the Queen in return for a guarantee that Maori would enjoy possession of whatever lands, fisheries, forests and other property they possessed individually or collectively that they wished to retain. Maori subsequently promised that the Queen would enjoy the exclusive rights of purchasing land from them. In return, the forty chiefs and all Maori were granted the rights and privileges of British subjects.

In terms of conceptual equivalence however, the Maori\textsuperscript{3} version of the Treaty signed by the chiefs failed to correspond to the English version. Part of this problem stems from the fact that it was difficult to convey the true, unequivocal meanings of specific political concepts and legal structures to a culture that lacked familiarity with these foreign terms of references – in particular, that of ‘sovereignty’ (King, 2003: 159). ‘Sovereignty’, for example, in the English language was erroneously translated as ‘kawanatanga’ in Maori which the chiefs had interpreted as ‘governorship’. \textit{Mana} would have been the equivalent term for ‘sovereignty’ in Maori. On these grounds, Maori activists promoting the case for indigenous self-determination have traditionally argued that the chiefs were mislead into believing that they would retain political sovereignty, and the right to govern their own affairs. In other words, Maori believed that the Treaty would only allow the British Crown the rights of governing their two islands in a non-political sense. This impression has always been reinforced by the Maori wording of article two assuring them ‘\textit{te tino rangatiratanga o ratou wean kainga me o ratou taonga katoa}’ which translates\textsuperscript{4} into English as the ‘unqualified

\textsuperscript{2}Please see Appendix 1C  
\textsuperscript{3} Please see Appendix 1A  
\textsuperscript{4} Please see Appendix 1B
exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures’. In this respect, article two of the Treaty in Maori pledged to Maori chiefs more than what the Crown had committed themselves to in the English version which reads as, ‘the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates, Forests, Fisheries and other properties’. The repercussions of this lack of agreement are evident in the form of polemical debates concerning the demands that Maori be restored as the lawful owners of the foreshore and seabed surrounding the two islands. The conceptual scope of ‘tino rangatiratanga’ is frequently invoked in this decade’s contemporary context of indigenous politics and activism. This term, according to Maaka and Fleras (2005: 102), is expansive but remains “implicity transformational in challenging the absolute authority of the Crown by restoring Maori as constitutional partners in jointly exercising sovereignty over New Zealand”.

Whilst the Treaty of 1840 mandated by Hobson was to have no standing in international law during that time (Sinclair, 1980: 71-2), it did however succeed in establishing the basis for a bicultural framework which would allow for Maori and Pakeha settlers from Britain (and later Europe) to live together. It was only in the more recent past that the Treaty of Waitangi has been recognised by the United Nations as a treaty formed between two sovereign nations (Mutu, 2009: 265). Thus, the Treaty is still regarded as an authoritative source of the country’s constitution and is New Zealand’s first official immigration document that permitted European settlement in the country.

1.12 The European settlement of New Zealand
In the years following the Treaty, the colonial settlement of New Zealand was intended to be that of a ‘Better’ and ‘Greater’ Britain of the South Pacific. At the same time, settlement was facilitated by government funded passages for British emigrants to de-populate the overcrowded British Isles. Utopian and highly selective by definition, the immigration policy was discriminatory in not just nationality and ethnicity, but religion as well. An early handbook for intending migrants written by George Butler Earp (1853: 242) stipulated that:

…none but persons of good character, as well as members of the Church of England, shall form part of the population, at least in its first stage; so that the settlement may begin its existence in a healthy moral atmosphere.

In highly exaggerated promotional literature aimed at attracting desirable British settlers, New Zealand was presented as an ideal pastoral paradise and haven settler-society for the morally upright and superior Aryan. The direct denigration of its competitors was also a common feature: South Africa was labelled as “too hot and Dutch”, Canada “too cold and French”, the United States of America “too hot and cold” with too much “democracy and slavery” with Australia being just too problematic as a settlement for convicts (Belich, 1996: 285).

Even though the majority of settlers were British, substantial numbers of immigrants arrived from continental Europe in the 1870s under the Vogel Public Work and Immigration Scheme. At this time, Premier Julius Vogel launched a large-scale development programme requiring immigrant labour to construct roads, railways, bridges and telegraph lines, and to also extend European settlement through the purchase of more land from the Maori (King, 2003: 229). Under the partially-assisted passages provided by the Vogel scheme, thousands of Germans and Scandinavians
were recruited to work in New Zealand (Sinclair, 1980: 156). The scheme also allowed for small numbers of French, Italian and Polish immigrants to settle in the country (Jupp, 1999: 35). Whilst the British colonisers clearly preferred British immigrants over Northern and Western Europeans, the latter were considered ‘acceptable enough’ to assimilate into a White New Zealand national identity and culture. On the other hand, Irish Catholics, Eastern and Southern Europeans were deemed less desirable than the former group but nevertheless regarded more highly than the Asiatics (Chinese), Indians or Lebanese (Brooking and Rabel, 1995: 23).

The years after the Second World War continued to see the country peopled by Britons in the majority. Around 100,000 arrived with assistance packages offered by the New Zealand government between 1948 and 1976, with a subsequent 150,000 independent arrivals (Belich, 2001: 538). Between 1944 and 1964, a small number of Eastern Europeans arrived from Poland (1,730) and Hungary (1,117) as displaced orphans and refugees (Trapeznik, 1995: 80). The largest inflow of non-British settlers between 1945 and 1975 were from the Netherlands. Highly desired and deemed assimilable because of their superior Aryan and Germanic ancestry, the Dutch were an economically successful and desirable immigrant group (Belich, 2001: 538). However, matters were complicated for Dutchmen with Indonesian wives and children seeking entry into New Zealand. This group of intending settlers faced considerable difficulties. In 1952, the New Zealand immigration authorities announced that these cases would be considered individually on the basis of merit and percentage of colour (Schouten, 1992: 68-9, cit Belich, 2001: 538). Though such practices would be considered discriminatory and unacceptable by our present social norms, the
traditional preference for British immigrants over Western and all other European nationalities was institutionalised through New Zealand’s highly restrictive immigration policy.

This colour-based immigration policy was to shape the fabric of New Zealand society until 1986. The assimilation capabilities and merits of other European countries were compiled by Lochore (1951) in a book entitled *From Europe to New Zealand: An Account of our Continental European Settlers*. It is worth noting that the essentialist reasoning and use of stereotypes by Lochore would engender much criticism and be highly unlikely to be considered worthy of publication by our existing standards of peer-review. In essence, the author concluded that:

All Europeans are assimilable. We naturally prefer northerners because experience has shown that they find their place more easily in our community. But given fifty years’ breathing space and a will to the task, we can also impress thousands of southerners, if need be.

The 1920 Immigration Restriction Amendment Act was designed to maintain a ‘White New Zealand’ national identity. This legislation only permitted British and Irish subjects the right to enter New Zealand freely without a permit. All other non-White colonial subjects of the British Empire were excluded and required permits to be granted at the discretion of the Minister for Immigration. While such was the official preference of the pioneering settlers for European immigrants, there were still very small numbers of non-European settlers accepted due to labour shortages.

### 1.13 The non-European settlement of New Zealand
The advent of Chinese gold miners from 1860-70 characterised the third stage of the colony’s settlement. This group of non-Europeans were neither colonists nor long-term settlers. They were sojourning itinerant workers whose main motive was to earn a living overseas and to return to their families in China prior to their deaths. Initially, the Chinese were invited over by the Dunedin Chamber of Commerce to work in the district’s abandoned gold mines that were soon exhausted. However, Sino-phobia increased as the Chinese started drifting into the market places of Wellington and Dunedin as market gardeners and fruit vendors. According to Fong (1959: 17), the prevalence of anti-Chinese hostility can be attributed to three factors in the ascending order of: i) economic competition, ii) suspected immorality and iii) the widely-held view that coloured races were inferior, degrading and a menace to European settlers. Though the Chinese comprised less than one per cent of New Zealand’s population in 1880, they were subject to a series of highly discriminatory legislation designed to safeguard the destiny and purity of the mainstream White New Zealanders. The Chinese were the only group of people denied the rights to be naturalised as New Zealand citizens until 1952. (The temporal and theoretical specificities of these racisms are discussed in the third chapter).

Like the Chinese who were loathed because of the perceived threat of economic competition and immorality associated with their poverty and non-adherence to Christianity, the Indians were another group who were subject to institutional racism. However, due to India’s prominence in the British Empire, Queen Victoria’s proclamation of 1858 pledged equal rights to Indians throughout the British Empire (Bandyopadhyay, 2005: 127). The Indians were therefore immune from the
draconian discriminatory measures imposed on the Chinese. Whilst the Indians as British subjects enjoyed a lower-rank in the social hierarchy stratified by the colonial rule of difference, the Chinese were clearly outsiders without rights as British subjects. The majority of Indian settlers originated from the state of Gujarat in Western India with significant numbers arriving via Fiji, where they were previously indentured labourers (Belich, 2001: 227). ‘Push’ factors providing impetus for the emigration of Indians from the Punjab and Gujarat can be summarised along the lines of land shortages, taxation demands and rural indebtedness precipitated by British imperialism and market relations in India (Leckie, 1995: 137). Prior to 1945, Indians remained numerically small. In 1916, the New Zealand census recorded a total of only 181 Indians and 671 in 1926; mainly hawkers and unskilled manual workers working in road construction and bush clearing, the Indians entered the fruit and vegetable trade around the start of the First World War (Bandyopadhyay, 2005: 126). It, however, was not until the 1960s when the Indians, both New Zealand born and immigrant, acquired the necessary skills to enter the professions and thereby improve their socio-economic mobility (Leckie, 1995: 146). The stereotype of the ‘Indian dairy owner’ is still pervasive and reinforced by the 1991 census revealing that 23.5 per cent of Indo-New Zealanders are self-employed in the retail trade (Bandyopadhyay, 2005: 127).

Apart from the small numbers of Indians and Chinese settlers allowed into New Zealand, provisions were made for Polynesians from the neighbouring Pacific Islands to meet the demands for unskilled labour after the Second World War. Their numbers remained very small at 8,000 in 1956 with Samoans being in the majority (Belich, 2001: 533). Together with the Samoans, Polynesians from the Cook Islands,
Tonga, Niue, Tuvalu and Tokelau made up six per cent of New Zealand’s population in 1996. In 2001, fifty-eight per cent of the country’s Pacific Islanders were born in New Zealand (Macpherson, 2004: 135). This increase has resulted in Pacific Islanders enjoying greater economic and social mobility with the younger generation not being required to assimilate to the expectations of mainstream Pakeha New Zealand in the manner their parents and grandparents were expected to do so in the past (Macpherson, 2004: 153). As an ethnic group, Pacific Islanders are well-represented in New Zealand society’s sporting, political and professional spheres.

1.14 A new era: from colour to skills and capital

The hitherto historical narrative emphasises how, through a narcissistic preference for European settlers, New Zealand’s projected self-defined national identity and culture have always been homogenous and hostile to people of non-Aryan ancestry. By the end of World War Two, New Zealand was one of the most homogenous of European settler societies with British New Zealanders comprising 93.57 per cent of the population and Maori at 5.8 per cent (Brooking and Rabel, 1995: 36). It was not until 1986 when the preference for immigrants from European ‘traditional source countries’ was abolished and replaced with a merit based, colour-blind policy, paving the way for the country’s fourth phase of immigrant settlement. In 1986, a review of the country’s immigration policy was undertaken by Kerry Burke, then Minister of Immigration. Known as the Burke Review of 1986, it recommended that immigrants should be selected primarily on the basis of merit. The Burke Review maintained that the old notion of assimilation was no longer the intended and desirable
outcome of immigration (Burke, 1986: 10). Rather, the skills, qualifications, investment capital and conduct of a prospective settler would determine if one would be an asset to New Zealand society (Burke, 1986: 10). This long-awaited shift in attitude had finally re-aligned New Zealand’s policy with the colour-blind immigration policies found in other Western democracies. By the mid 1970s, Australia, Canada and the United States of America had already jettisoned their overtly exclusive Aryan preferences.

The departure from ‘traditional source countries’ was precipitated by a demand for skilled migration from Asia. In the global context, Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community in 1973 resulted in an urgent need for New Zealand to find new markets to direct its agricultural produce as well as build economic linkages to the wealthy economies of the Asian-Pacific rim. Thus, skilled and talented immigrants with investment capital were needed to help stimulate the New Zealand economy. Middle-class Asians, mostly from Korea, and members of the Chinese diaspora from Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong took the opportunity to live in New Zealand (Ip, 1996). An influx of Asian settlers was about to change the ethnic composition of New Zealand society as a fait accompli. Between 1991 and 1994, Asians accounted for 54.2 per cent of the 69,090 approved permanent residency applications (Brooking and Rabel, 1995: 46). The visibility and presence of Asian migrants in urban areas was negatively perceived by the ‘host society’ as imperilling the integrity of their localised New Zealand culture. Mainstream New Zealanders – including Maori and the assimilated Chinese and Indians – were clearly unprepared for these unprecedented changes. The media and public began to complain that there
was an ‘Asian Inv-Asian’ due to the impact of Asian immigration on property prices, places in schools and competition for jobs (Ip and Murphy, 2005). Despite the removal of preferences for British settlers, recent changes in the government’s immigration policy requiring immigrants to possess an offer of employment before being granted a work or residence permit has seen the United Kingdom return to becoming the most important source country, followed by South Africa, Canada and Australia. Intending migrants from Britain and Europe do not face ethnic penalties in the job market and find it easier than Asians to obtain employment offers from New Zealand employers (see Zodgekar 2005). Due to reasons of cultural and linguistic similarity, New Zealanders have confirmed their traditional preferences in polls which reveal that there are ‘too many’ Asian immigrants and ‘not enough’ from Britain, Canada, Australia and the United States of America (see Ip and Murphy, 2005). At present, New Zealanders from Asia are the fastest growing minority ethnic group but the most vulnerable to harassment, racial discrimination and social exclusion.

1.15 Multicultural or bicultural?

Whilst the Burke Review of 1986 was a watershed year in opening up New Zealand’s borders to people from all over the world, it did not establish an official multicultural policy of immigration that already existed in Canada, Australia, the United States of America and most Western European democracies. This is because New Zealand is a bicultural country and is constitutionally defined as such in the Treaty of Waitangi. Pakeha New Zealanders who are descendants of British and other European settlers are therefore enfranchised as partners of the Treaty. The prospects of
an official policy of multiculturalism have always posed a serious challenge to the
hegemony of biculturalism, and to the relative privileged status that biculturalism
confers upon Maori as *tangata whenua*.

In an empirical and descriptive sense, present-day New Zealand society is truly
multicultural. Many proponents of multiculturalism have argued that biculturalism
ignores the “polyethnic diversity of cultures that increasingly constitute New Zealand”
(Smits, 2006: 30). As a riposte to these claims, some Maori academics, most notably
Walker (1995), have alleged that the colour-blind immigration policy of 1986 was a
covert attempt to suppress the political struggles of Maori by swamping them with
outsiders not obliged to them under the Treaty. As the Burke Review was undertaken
without consulting the Maori, legal claims contesting the rights of non-European
immigrants in New Zealand have been derisive and exacerbated the overt racisms and
antagonisms towards the more recent Asian and other non-European settlers. New
Zealand therefore requires a civic solution to resolve the lingering problem of racism
and the dilemmas surrounding its bicultural national identity and multicultural realities
that threaten to de-stabilise relations between Maori and Pakeha.

**Interlude**

The first half of this chapter provided a socio-historical narrative of settlement
in New Zealand prior to and after British colonisation in 1840. Prior to 1986, Britons
were the most sought after settlers whenever there was a need to increase the New
Zealand population. However, there were also smaller numbers of other Europeans as
a result of the government’s assisted schemes introduced in the 1870s and years after
1945. Despite highly restrictive immigration policies favouring Western and Northern Europeans, small numbers of post World War Two refugees from Eastern and Southern Europe were allowed into New Zealand. These arrivals were not perceived as de-stabilising New Zealand’s national identity and image of itself as a European country uncorrupted by the inferior, coloured races of the world. Britain’s declining reliance on New Zealand’s agricultural exports was to foreshadow an end to the traditional ‘White New Zealand’ immigration policy. After the United Kingdom became a member of the European Economic Community on 1 January 1973, New Zealand producers were struggling to compete with European suppliers protected by tariffs and subsidies. Thus, towards the mid-1980s, New Zealand could not afford to retain its preference for settlers from only European-source countries. As New Zealanders reluctantly opened its borders to middle-class East Asians with whom the population had little contact, they were not informed about the necessity for immigration and therefore not prepared to accept these new cultural realities.

To date, New Zealand sits at an important cross-road. In so far as economic-relations with Asia are concerned, stable export markets will be required to maintain the high standard of living desired by its citizenry. Notwithstanding, racism – most particularly towards Asians and other non-European ethnic minority groups – is a public problem that has been exacerbated, to some extent, by the ambiguity of their status under the Treaty of Waitangi. Whilst the Treaty recognises non-British Europeans as official partners (because Maori had consented with the British Crown on this matter), it is not clear where non-European groups fit into the Treaty. A proposed solution to this dilemma is one of this study’s research objectives, in
conjunction with the need to understand the specificity of the racisms that have been organic to New Zealand.

In terms of structure then, the second-half of this chapter is devoted to an examination first of how the New Zealand literature accounts for the country’s past and present racisms, and second, the ambiguity surrounding the perennial question on how bicultural New Zealand should manage the demands of its multicultural population. The first conceptual trend identified in the historical and interdisciplinary examples to follow concerns the pervasiveness of narrowly defined notions of racism which superficially attribute the unfavourable treatment of groups to cultural difference or skin-colour. The second conceptual problem identified is the highly ambiguous biculturalism versus multiculturalism dilemma that has culminated in an academic and policy impasse. In recent years, scholars have represented New Zealand society in terms of its bicultural constitutional framework that, at the same time, acknowledges a vague, unofficial version of multiculturalism that is believed to co-exist alongside biculturalism (see Clarke 2006; Kolig 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2007). Furthermore, some commentators have made considerable attempts to address this dilemma by suggesting that biculturalism and multiculturalism in New Zealand should be treated as non-mutually exclusive and non-competing ideologies (see Ip 2008, Ward and Lin 2005).

It is important to state clearly at the outset the definitions of the terms which are under scrutiny in this chapter. The concepts of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are distinctive and cannot be used interchangeably. Existing categories of ‘race’, according to Miles (1989: 71) perpetuate false beliefs that people can be divided according to their innate
genetic essences on the basis of phenotype. From the perspective of Miles, a prominent Marxist theorist, racism is derived from capitalist structures that reinforce powers of racial dominance and oppression (1993: 8). Despite overwhelming scientific refutations of any biological basis for ‘race’, the concept continues to survive without its original root meaning. ‘Ethnicity’, on the other hand is a more subjective term that members of a certain group use to identify their shared characteristics, these typically include culture, language and nationhood (Jenkins, 1994). In essence, racial identities usually originate in assignment by others whilst ethnic identities are self-ascribed (Cornell and Hartman, 1988: 35). Notwithstanding the absence of a genetic basis for different human ‘races’, the category of ‘race’ currently continues to wield huge power in late-modern societies. For this reason, it is necessary to interrogate and problematise how the notion of ‘race’ is deployed in the New Zealand literature. Although these concepts and corresponding definitions are Western in origin, their explanatory functions within the scope of this study would be appropriate and adequate for New Zealand society. It remains an undisputed historical fact, amongst historians, that the pioneering settlers have always been held responsible for marginalising the indigenous population through the imposition of their copious cultural and legal imperialism during the mid-nineteenth century (see Gibbons 2002; Belich 1996, 2001; King 2003).

1.2 Literature on the history of New Zealand

New Zealand historians were among the first to attempt an analytical understanding of race through an examination of the ontological basis for race, and the
subsequent components of statutory discrimination and institutional racism. The works of four historians deserve an in-depth discussion here: Ferguson (2003), O’Connor (1968), Belich (1997) and Sorrenson (1979). Quite important individually, they exemplify the trajectory of how historians have conceptualised ‘race’, racism and ethnicity in New Zealand’s past, thus affecting how the topic has been sequentially construed across different academic disciplines. These are some of the very few texts that demonstrate an unequivocal understanding of ‘race’ as an analytical concept. Through a careless and nebulous usage of ‘race’, many non-historical commentators uncritically and carelessly presuppose the ontological status of ‘race’ and subsequently blur the distinction between ‘race’ and ethnicity.

Historian P.S. O’Connor’s (1968) *Keeping New Zealand White 1908-1920* is a seminal paper that brought the study of anti-Chinese racisms in New Zealand to the fore. An historical narrative, O’Connor states that his paper was written in response to widespread protests against Asiatic immigration during the 1920s that in his own words, “produced little echo among historians” (O’Connor, 1968: 41). In sum, O’Connor argued that the source of the population’s anti-Chinese attitudes were the combined result of *racial prejudice* and fears that competition from Chinese would threaten the economic interests of White New Zealanders and returning soldiers. Although the author does not define the notion of ‘racial prejudice’, the paper attributes anti-Chinese racisms to colour discrimination. Despite this deficiency, O’Connor’s article provides a revealing insight into this era’s prevailing attitudes towards Sino-phobia:

One result of the refusal of historians to be interested in these racial attitudes has been that New Zealand has escaped in its own eyes a good deal of the
opprobrium incurred by Australia for a [White] policy similar in many respects...as it is certainly more comfortable to believe that the national character is freer from racial prejudice than is that of the benighted Australians (1968: 65).

Philip Ferguson’s (2003) Doctoral thesis entitled *The Making of White New Zealand Policy: Nationalism, Citizenship and the exclusion of the Chinese from 1880-1920* makes an important contribution to an under-researched aspect of New Zealand’s history. Ferguson critiqued the racist ‘White New Zealand Policy’ using a theoretical approach exemplified by the work of Robert Miles, as indicated above, an influential Marxist Sociologist of racism. Ferguson mentioned that Miles’ explanatory framework was useful in challenging widely-held views that the Chinese were excluded on the basis of their culture and ‘different’ physical appearances. However, Ferguson concluded that it “proved less fruitful to the particular subject matter and research”; he needed to revamp his theoretical approach to include international literature on nationalism and citizenship (2003: ix). He concluded that the Chinese were the most vilified and discriminated ethnic group because they failed to satisfy certain *par excellence* ideals “of citizenry and nation that were seen as desirable by nationalist ideology” (Ibid: 257). As the first in-depth study of New Zealand’s anti-Chinese legislation, the seminal value of Ferguson’s work is reflected in the effective use of previously untapped international literature on ‘race’ and racism in his critique of the White New Zealand Policy.

The backcloth of a *capitalist nation state* defines Ferguson’s thesis in opposition to undisputed assertions that the New Zealand Chinese were overtly discriminated against because of their cultural and physical ‘differences’. But more
importantly, Ferguson’s reference to literature on the extant ideologies of nationalism and citizenship exemplifies a concern with the discursive representation of ideologies that reinforce racial differences, going beyond reductive notions of racism as simply colour discrimination. As an historical thesis, Ferguson’s writings provide insight on the historical specificity of the racism towards the Chinese from 1880 to 1920. His work could shed light on ongoing contemporary debates concerning Asian immigration which for Ferguson, are:

…part of a history of dispute over questions of race and immigration which can be traced back to the early 1850s in this country, when Chinese migrant labour was first considered as a means to overcome the shortage of workers here. (2003: vi)

In *Maori Origins and Migrations: The Genesis of Some Pakeha Myths and Legends*, Miles Sorrenson (1979) identifies false Pakeha constructions of Maori as being of Aryan origin. This ‘Aryan Maori’ myth emerged from ‘newly invigorated’ anthropological evidence suggesting that Maori had an historical connection with the superior races that colonised Europe. According to Sorrenson (1979: 18), this consensus remained in vogue during the twentieth century, even after 1970. Moreover, Belich (1997: 18) noted that the 1974 revised edition of an immensely popular history book for children by A.H. Reed entitled *Story of New Zealand* informed its young readers that Maori descended from “a people called Aryans, as well as our own Anglo-Saxon race”. The Europeans’ construction of the Maori ‘them’ was therefore that of ‘almost like us’. This racial anthropology, according to Ryan (2005: 105), assumed an even wider significance in the midst of mounting restrictive immigration policies against the Chinese. Ryan argues that Sir Apirana Ngata, a prominent Maori politician
during the early twentieth century, had augmented the status of Maori by identifying their common genetic bonds with Pakeha (Ryan, 2005: 110). The European constructs of racial superiority which Sorrenson proves false should not be treated as mere falsehoods to be debunked, but as “important historical determinants and refractors” (Belich, 1997: 9). These historical determinants are important in a sociological study and have the potential to disclose the attitudes and ideologies of those who promulgated and legitimised these myths.

James Belich’s *Myth, Race and Identity in New Zealand* drew upon Sorrenson’s pioneering 1979 work and examined “the interactions of myth and history, race, tribe, and nation, of Europe and the Pacific, and of Us and Them” (Ibid: 9). To the first settlers, the European colonisation of New Zealand was legitimated as a family re-union, as James Belich notes:

> It populated a runeless and ruinless land with a respectably lengthy, romantic and distinguishing, yet European-like, history. It overcame the Maori as an obstacle to the recolonial demand for racial homogeneity...At least, in the abstract, the idea of Maori Aryanism levered up Maori status in some European eyes (1997: 17).

During the infamous New Zealand Land Wars\(^5\) of the 1860s, Maori bravely resisted the dispossession of their land and many were killed. Aryanism was then reinforced with Pakeha interpretations of Maori resistance as chivalrous and European-like. To make matters worse, Pakeha perceived the wars as “minor squabbles, after which the combatants kissed and made up” (Belich, 1997: 16). Belich’s concise paper argues that the Pakeha collective identity, from around 1880 to the 1920s, was transformed

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\(^5\) The New Zealand Land Wars took place when British troops confiscated 1,660,618 acres of land from Maori tribes in the Waikato, Taranaki, Tauranga and Bay of Plenty.
through a repertoire of race-related axioms, including the all important ‘myth of better racial stock’ created through propaganda falsely portraying the new colony as a paradise destined to be brought into fruition by the cream of the British population. This myth subsequently shaped a collective identity created by the rhetoric of racial purity, racial improvement and racial destiny (1997: 13-14). Belich mentions a subtle form of colour-blind racism which may be of further interest. He notes that New Zealand was advertised as “uniquely well-placed to deliver progress without the price, paradise without the serpent, and Britain without the Irish” (1997: 13). This better ‘Britain of the South’ boasted a climate that created racial reinforcements including “a powerful ruralism, which insured against racial degeneracy” (1997: 14). Belich’s aim was to show that Aryanism was used as a point of leverage, to renew the value of Maori for Pakeha. This work does not examine how these racial constructs condemned the Asiatics as degenerating and inferior. Belich makes clear that the racial myths were produced by scientific theories ‘above’ in conjunction with attitudes from ‘below’.

Bickleen Fong’s (1959) *The Chinese in New Zealand: A Study in Assimilation* provides an insider’s perspective to how the Chinese were required to assimilate into the mainstream culture by giving up rights to their language and traditions. Fong examined factors affecting the Chinese community’s assimilation into the nation’s wider monoculture. She accounted for racism in terms of the economic, political and social structures that perpetuate racism and examples of statutes that excluded Chinese

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6 Based on Fong’s (1955) University of Otago MA in Education thesis, it is the first book published on the Chinese New Zealand community and their history. She was the first Chinese woman in New Zealand to be conferred a Master’s degree. Interestingly, the monograph was published in Hong Kong, not New Zealand.
from political discourse. She cited how Pakeha New Zealanders perceived the Chinese as a threat to their economic security, standards of living and morality. As she states, “some still hold [the] view” that Asiatics are inferior and dangerous to whites (1959: 17). The first publication on the New Zealand Chinese, Fong’s excellent work is the locus classicus. She concludes that mainstream New Zealand never facilitated the assimilation of the Chinese due to fears that the ‘Yellow Peril’ would swoop down.

Angela Ballara’s Proud to be White?: A Survey of Pakeha Prejudice in New Zealand is an historical attempt to explain Eurocentric racial prejudice in New Zealand. Written in 1986, it repeats the standard territory of describing and narrating in a highly accessible form. Only one eight-paged chapter entitled Selective Immigration surveyed how the desire for physical and cultural homogeneity discriminated against the Chinese. Most chapters argue that ethnocentric and racist attitudes towards Maori were legion. She concluded that “it [was] falsely pessimistic to assume that a multi-cultural Utopia [would be] near” (1986: 169). Ballara’s concluding remarks shortly preceded the 1987 Immigration Act which saw New Zealand adopt a colour-blind, non-discriminatory approach to immigration. Her omission of the connection between Eurocentrism and national identity is notable. It is however the failure to deploy or interrogate ‘whiteness’ as an analytical category that disappoints, given the title of the book. Moreover, a juxtaposition of Ballara’s publication with Fong’s reveals two extant histories, one from the traditional white-New Zealander’s historical vantage point, and the other from a Chinese internal ‘Other’.
Manying Ip’s *Chinese New Zealanders: old settlers and new immigrants* provides a comprehensive overview of the Chinese in Stuart Greif’s (1995) *Immigration and National Identity in New Zealand: One People, Two People, Many Peoples?* The book was a direct outcome of the political and social debates concerning Asian immigration and New Zealand identity. Written eight years after New Zealand’s introduction of a non-discriminatory approach to immigration, Ip concluded that mainstream New Zealand’s wariness towards new Asian immigrants “is but a manifestation of their own fundamental unease about their identity” (1995: 199). Earlier in the chapter however, she briefly mentioned the historically important anti-Chinese legislation:

> The root of the problem lies in the cultural and physical distinctiveness of the Chinese. The late nineteenth century was a time when New Zealand was slowly acquiring a national identity, a time when the myth of white racial superiority was unquestioned (1995: 174).

Here, Ip clearly assumes that the Chinese were discriminated against because of their physical and cultural differences. This reductive conceptualisation of racism as colour and / or cultural discrimination obviates the more pertinent question as to why the cultural and physical distinctiveness of the Chinese were an issue.

For social scientists, these historical works generate a variety of interesting questions: What *forms* of racism emerged during different historical periods? What structural processes reinforced racial *archetypes* and *anti-types* that marginalised the Asiatics? Do derivatives of these anti-types survive today? How have the tensions and ambiguities within and between racisms been accepted and resisted? These questions are not unique to New Zealand but represent the overarching research
agenda pertaining to racism and ethnicity internationally. In the next chapter, the first and second research objectives elaborated, viz: i) to develop a framework for conceptualising race and ethnicity in New Zealand, and ii) how racisms resonate with the nation state’s historically specific position in modernity are carried out. The purpose is to find a response these questions in a manner that provides for empirical and theoretical comparability. The subsequent section of this chapter demonstrates how contemporary inter-disciplinary work on race and ethnicity in New Zealand needs to go beyond the representation and theorisation of racism as colour discrimination.

1.3 Wider disciplines

In the absence of any visible boundary between academic and non-academic texts, most authoritative publications on race and ethnicity in New Zealand are inter-disciplinary and clearly intended for a very wide readership. This is best explained by the relatively small market and low demand for academic books in New Zealand. Following the 1987 Immigration Act, some noteworthy edited collections arose in response to a growing interest in the pertinence of racism, ethnicity and immigration. The most recent influential collections that encapsulate the relevance of racism and immigration across different disciplines include Spoonley, Macpherson and Pearson (1996) and (2004). These publications record the map of research into ethnic relations and migration issues and are available to readers in a highly readable and accessible format.
In the two edited collections of Spoonley et al, a few contributors attempt to situate existing inter-ethnic tensions within wider political and economic constraints. Palat (1996) for instance, discusses the declining significance of European economies and the resulting inflow of immigration from East Asia, especially China, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong. Palat successfully maps out the evolving nature of capitalism and why Asian migrants are blamed for failing to jumpstart the economy from the ‘doldrums to which it sunk’ (1996: 52). In *Tangata Tangata: The Changing Ethnic Contours of New Zealand*, Bartley (2004) contributes a longitudinal study of Asian adolescent migrants. This chapter discusses the ambivalent aspects of their willingness to settle in New Zealand in the long term. Here, Bartley questions the dominant assumption that migrants will simply settle down in New Zealand and argues that transnational opportunities will pose a problem to policy makers. The chapter succeeds in illuminating the extent in which long-term Asian migrants still find it difficult to be accepted and treated as authentic New Zealanders.

Partick Ongley (2004) provides an overview of the historical and structural background of the factors influencing ethnic inequality in the labour market. A very informative chapter that successfully deploys quantitative statistics to highlight variations between different ethnic groups in New Zealand, the conclusion stresses the importance of understanding “ethnic inequality and ethnic relations” in terms of the historical economic processes mapped out (2004: 218). There is however a slight degree of repetition from Ongley (1996) when he argues that:

Racism and ethnicity do, however, constitute significant disadvantages and barriers to socioeconomic mobility amongst both migrants and succeeding generations. The generation of racism is closely linked to migration through a process of racialisation. By this process, the supposed racial distinctiveness of
migrants is invested with negative perceptions based on their economic status and beliefs that they are responsible for social ‘problems’, provide unwanted competition for jobs and other scarce economic resources and represent a threat to the majority culture (1996: 14).

By “racial distinctiveness”, Ongley appears to construe ‘race’ as physiognomic features. Left unsaid are the dimensions of one’s ethnicity that are barriers to socioeconomic mobility. Ongley does not disavow this missing connection between immigration and racism:

There is not enough space and indeed insufficient existing research to adequately analyse the complex relationship between migration to New Zealand and those political and ideological relations that are commonly understood as ethnic or race relations (1996: 33).

Aside from these gaps, the use of quantitative charts and tables provides informative descriptions pertaining to the concentration of Asian immigrants “in a narrow range of occupations and industries” (1996: 15). Interestingly, Ongley used the concept of ‘race’ in the 1996 chapter whilst ‘ethnicity’ was used in the more recent 2004 chapter. As interchanging each instance of ‘ethnicity’ with ‘race’ would yield no major contradictions, the underlying assumptions as to what constitutes racism appear to be taken for granted. As notions of otherness identified through cultural differences, race and religion reside in the socio-economic and political spheres, it would have been better if attempts were made to identify how these various strands of racism overlap.

In Recalling Aotearoa: Indigenous Politics and Ethnic Relations in New Zealand, Fleras and Spoonley (1999) examine how biculturalism, Asian immigration and Maori self-determination have transformed New Zealand’s cultural and national identity. The book is devoted to the over-arching theme of Maori-Pakeha relations and
Treaty issues with only one chapter aimed at debunking widely-held myths concerning immigration in general. The authors fail to provide answers to the rhetorical questions they pose concerning Asian immigration, diversity and national identity. The alibi cited is the

unfortunate, but inevitable…lack of consensus on immigration regarding the ‘what, why, where, how many, and what kind of’ questions that precipitate heated debate, given the recency and potency of immigration as a social phenomenon in New Zealand (1999: 189).

The descriptive nature of this book renders it accessible to a wide non-academic audience; this arrives at the expense of omitting an analysis and situation of racism and bicultural conflicts within an appropriate explanatory framework. The authors also take for granted the reader’s conceptual understanding of ‘race’, racism and ethnicity.

The harassment and racial discrimination leveled against Asians is often the subject of much interest in the media. An ethnography of Koreans in the city of Christchurch funded by the Families Commission and undertaken by Morris, Vokes and Chang (2007). It was published in SITES: A Journal of Social Anthropology and Cultural Studies, documenting the experiences of thirty-six South Korean migrant families. Whilst the majority of families interviewed arrived in New Zealand with excitement and hopes of being able to participate and contribute to the wider society, most of their aspirations have never materialised. The report concluded that many experienced various forms of racial discrimination, ranging from assault, verbal abuse and to having bottles, eggs and stones thrown at them in public. In most instances, the informants do not report the incidents and have to seek the moral support of members from their own communities, and in particular, the Korean churches they attend. In
summary, their conclusions illuminate the unwillingness of the country to accept Koreans on the basis of their colour and cultural differences. In their own words (Morris, Vokes and Chang, 2007: 27):

> What our research shows is that from a migrant perspective, the creation of a ‘mini-Korean society’ in Christchurch is an outcome of not a lack of desire to integrate, but of various processes of social exclusion. Thus, the onus of change lies not with the migrants themselves, but with the wider society within which they are trying to find a home.

In the absence of informative literature on the experiences of Koreans in New Zealand, this essay should be lauded as a seminal piece of work. Notwithstanding the significant quantity of qualitative data, the article does not situate the empirical findings within a discernible theoretical framework. Thus, the findings reinforce the timeless view that Koreans and Asians are the victims of harassment, racism and abuse because of their colour and cultural differences.

Whilst some of the edited collections are appropriate undergraduate texts and accessible to non-academic readerships, most of these reviewed works struggle to successfully situate the racial and ethnic processes within a theoretical framework or much wider socio-economic context. This is most probably due to a failure to go beyond the simple premise that racism is based on colour. Furthermore, without any clear identification of the issues that should be included in future research agendas, it is difficult to identify what precisely it is that the authors are advocating. This telling omission could attract criticism that the authors’ primary intentions were to provide introductory and informative texts, instead of extending our existing boundaries of knowledge on this aspect of New Zealand sociality. However, due to the publishing
constraints in a small market for academic books in New Zealand, the authors cannot be held entirely responsible for this omission.

1.4 The importance of temporalism

With a few exceptions, the majority of the hitherto historical and contemporary interdisciplinary works reviewed embodied the notion of racism as the unfavourable treatment of ethnic minorities on the grounds of colour or cultural difference. By an appeal to the timelessness of this notion and its relative atemporal bias, the temporal dimensions of the social-cultural processes intertwined with racial phenomena are de-emphasised and rendered more difficult for the theorist to discern. Whilst this study does not entirely reject these accounts which emphasise this synchronic feature of racial phenomena – that is, the features which persist over or across time boundaries, it places a greater emphasis on the diachronic – the formulation, transition and transformation of social institutions and conceptual structures at a particular time. In other words, it is the differences rather than the similarities between past and present racisms that are more important, as Gilroy notes (1991: 38):

“Race” has to be socially and politically constructed and elaborate ideological work is done to secure and maintain the different forms of ‘racialization’ which have characterised capitalised development. Recognising this makes it all the more important to compare and evaluate the different historical situations in which “race” has become politically pertinent.

In contributing to the existing literature, this thesis encourages a much broader conceptualisation of racism advocated by Balibar (1991: 17-18) which encapsulates the various pathologies which underlie racial discrimination. The aim, in essence, is to go beyond the timelessness of racism as colour and facilitate socio-historical
understanding of how issues of race and ethnicity resonate with the nation-state’s historically specific position in modernity. In Chapter Three of this study, Balibar’s definition will be explicated before the conceptual structure of race and ethnicity in New Zealand is historicised. The following section will proceed to evaluate the literature on the biculturalism-multiculturalism question in New Zealand.

1.5 The literature on biculturalism and multiculturalism

Despite the uniqueness of New Zealand’s bicultural character enshrined in its constitution, defining a partnership between the ascendant Anglo-Celtic majority and the indigenous Maori, the ambiguous position of non-European New Zealanders within this bicultural framework remains unclear. According to Ip (2003: 246), some Maori politicians refused to recognise non-Maori under the Treaty and contended that Asians had fewer rights than Maori and Pakeha. The convergence of indigenous rights with immigration raises the very sensitive question on whether biculturalism is mutually exclusive from multiculturalism, or whether biculturalism can co-exist with multiculturalism. Beyond doubt, the task of defusing this dilemma is to some extent legal and hermeneutic in nature. Thus, scholars who have attempted to contribute knowledge on this debate have not gone beyond the basic premise that New Zealand has become multicultural after the more recent influx of migrants from non-European countries (see Ward and Masgoret 2008, Thakur 1995, Kolig 2005) and that an unofficial, ill-defined version of ‘multiculturalism’ has been adopted (Kolig 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Clarke 2006). The question then as to whether or not biculturalism and multiculturalism are mutually exclusive is a difficult one to answer.
From the standpoint of social psychology, Ward and Lin (2005: 169) argue that these two ideologies are compatible and not mutually exclusive. It is however the distribution of resources and advantages accorded to Maori at the expense of other New Zealanders that defines biculturalism in opposition to multiculturalism. It has also been noted that before New Zealand can contemplate multiculturalism, it must first adopt a bicultural model of state development to resolve treaty grievances with the indigenous people (Mein Smith, 2005: 241).

Some of these issues have been recognised in a chapter entitled ‘Multicultural Identity in a Bicultural Context’ written by Katherine Smits (2006) in a highly influential text edited by Raymond Miller entitled *New Zealand Government and Politics*. The short essay succeeds in mapping out the difficulties of governing a multicultural population under the existing bicultural framework. Smits examines the arguments suggesting why a policy of multiculturalism would and would not be compatible with the state’s biculturalism. To resolve this problem, she recommends using the term ‘binationalism’ instead of biculturalism which would see Maori assert their status as a separate people from all other ethnic groups. ‘Binationalism’, according to Smits, “is agnostic on the composition and identity of non-Maori society, and thus is potentially more compatible with multiculturalism” (2006: 32). Lasting no more than eight pages, there is clearly not sufficient space devoted to explaining how ‘binationalism’ can be distinguished as mutually exclusive from biculturalism. Moreover, the notion of ‘binationalism’ is highly problematic because it is evocative of two separate geographical (national) spaces for two different groups of people. Originally coined as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the notion of
binationalism clearly postulates the ontological existence of two distinct geographical boundaries within the nation-state of Israel.

In an essay entitled ‘Ethnicity and education: Biculturalism in New Zealand’ that was published in *Multicultural States: Rethinking Difference and Ethnicity*, edited by David Bennett, Anne Maxwell (1998) provides a narrative of educational policy in New Zealand. Here, she explains how Maori political activism, in the form of land marches and protests, was successful in bringing about constitutional changes in the area of land rights and education. The implications of a bicultural educational framework, according to Maxwell (1998: 197) resulted in higher-year school students being required to “read literary texts and myth-based histories belonging to Maori, alongside the canonical texts belonging to the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture”. One effect of the bicultural model of history writing that Maxwell highlights has been the problematic representation of Maori elements along a homogenised pan-tribal identity as opposed to tribal identities. Whilst Maxwell’s account of the problems and criticisms in the bicultural model of education is useful and informative, the more difficult questions surrounding the dilemmas of multiculturalism and biculturalism are not addressed.

In the absence of any consensus as to what exactly constitutes ‘multiculturalism’ in New Zealand – and which variant of multiculturalisms used in the international literature the New Zealand model is contiguous with – the term is nebulously used as a buzz word. The notion of ‘biculturalism’ is equally ambiguous and vague. Thus, the biculturalism versus multiculturalism debate in New Zealand has clearly culminated in a conceptual impasse. My evaluation of this conceptual trend
was based on three conceptual assumptions, namely: First, the hegemony of biculturalism in New Zealand’s constitution renders multiculturalism mutually exclusive from the former. Second, this dilemma cannot be defused without first developing a unique version of multiculturalism that will, in relative terms, be compatible with biculturalism. Third, this laborious conceptual task may not be the best solution given the criticisms which multiculturalism has been vulnerable. These issues will be discussed in chapter five. Upon these three conceptual assumptions, the more attractive alternative of cosmopolitanism will be provided as a response to the bicultural-multicultural dilemma. It will be argued that cosmopolitanism can transcend the strictures of multiculturalism and remain compatible with New Zealand’s constitutional biculturalism.

1.6 New Directions: cosmopolitanism and social theory

In the international literature, cosmopolitanism is a competing political philosophy and global ethic that purports to be a more attractive alternative to multiculturalism. In the West, the latter is usually conceptualised as a variety of socio-political strategies for dealing with differences in society by preserving the integrity of minority cultural practices and identities (see Modood 2007; Phillips 2007; Hall 1998). In contrast to multiculturalism, proponents of cosmopolitanism contend that the very notion of traditional cultural identities that multiculturalism seeks to defend have lost currency in the contemporary world (Phillips, 2007: 68). This is the chief premise undergirding the various versions of cosmopolitanism in the extant literature. In the influential work of Jeremy Waldron (2000: 231), for example, allegiances to a
particular culture or country make little sense when most cultural communities are, by
definition, already cosmopolitan:

[M]any cultures in the world have already something of a cosmopolitan aspect.
A person who grows up in Manhattan, for example, cannot but be aware of a
diversity of cultures, a diversity of human practices and experiences, indeed a
diversity of languages clamouring for his attention.

Amidst criticisms that cosmopolitanism fails to recognise the importance of the
various cultural attachments that people have difficulties choosing between, some
theorists have sought to provide a greater emphasis on culture. Kwame Anthony
Appiah’s notion of the ‘cosmopolitan patriot’ entertains the possibility of everyone
becoming a rooted cosmopolitan attached to one’s cultural particularities and allowed
to “take pleasure from the presence of other, different places that are home to other,
different people” (1997: 618). In these two readings, cosmopolitanism is presented as
a more authentic and late-modern alternative to multiculturalism’s emphasis on
tradition, culture and community.

In European social theory, the more recent writings on cosmopolitanism are
marked by an engagement with establishing a sound reason for jettisoning
multiculturalism in favour of cosmopolitanism. Most influentially, Ulrich Beck has
linked his rejection of multiculturalism with the need to transcend the strictures of
methodological nationalism, viz. ‘the national pre-definitions of social reality’ that are
the subject of sociological inquiry (Martins, 1974: 276). In essence, Beck argues that
in this era of globalisation, the declining significance of territorial boundaries renders
the notion of the national-state an anachronism. Multiculturalism, he asserts, (2006: 66)
is constrained by the national outlook which fails to confront the reality of transnational phenomena and obviates the search for transnational solutions:

Briefly, multiculturalism rapturously celebrates the social accommodation of diversity, but it lacks a sense of cosmopolitan realism. It accepts the distinction between the national and the international, and consequently it is blind to the contingencies and ambivalences of ways of dealing with difference that go beyond assimilation and integration.

Beck advocates a move away from the normative conceptual strictures of the nation-state towards a cosmopolitan perspective that can successfully engage with transnational phenomena. By rejecting multiculturalism, Beck is also rejecting the nation-state as a theoretical concept that is representative of the social world.

Beck’s call for the social sciences to adopt a cosmopolitan epistemology can potentially offer new directions for researching issues relating to race, ethnicity and difference in New Zealand society. As a new cosmopolitan epistemology has the potential to transform the sociological canon, the timing is appropriate for this study to consider the prospects of cosmopolitanism as a political philosophy for New Zealand in the twenty-first century. This has been, in essence, the impetus for this study’s attempt to examine the viability and prospects of cosmopolitanism as an alternative to multiculturalism that can co-exist with biculturalism in twenty-first century New Zealand.

**Conclusion**

This chapter provided a short introduction to settlement in New Zealand before and after British colonisation in 1840. The country’s preference for British and other European settlers was pivotal in determining the country’s projected and self-defined
national identity as an ethnically homogenous ‘Britain of the South’ prior to 1986. Due to the country’s bicultural national identity in virtue of the Treaty of Waitangi, the shift from traditional European source countries for immigrants to Asia was precipitated by economic factors. It has been over two decades since Asians have been allowed to migrate into the country. Thus, the governance of a multicultural population under a bicultural framework was identified as an issue that needs to be addressed in the public sphere and examined in this thesis.

Against this backdrop, a review of the literature on past and present New Zealand racisms failed to go beyond the explanations of racism as discrimination on the basis of colour differences. It was argued in section 1.3 that this emphasis on the synchronic, timeless features of racism obscured from view the diachronic features of racism, that is: the differences between past and present racisms. Finally, writings about the ambiguity surrounding the country’s Janus-faced bicultural and multicultural realities do not provide a convincing solution to this public problem and conceptual dilemma. On the basis of these two theoretical omissions in the literature, the subsequent chapter formulates a set of research objectives that the rest of this thesis is devoted to achieving.
Chapter Two

Research Design

This chapter is devoted to an examination of the epistemological and methodological framework for this study, and the semi-structured interview method. In terms of structure, the research questions will be spelt out first, relative to the New Zealand literature. Subsequently, the epistemological and methodological approaches deployed to address these questions will be presented. This surely, is of importance, as Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 19) assert, every researcher has “an interpretive paradigm’ encapsulating his or her ‘epistemological, ontological and methodological premises’. Whilst arguing that the semi-structured interview is the most appropriate research method, a discussion of research ethics, reflexivity and the limitations of the empirical data is included. To ensure that this study’s theoretical framework is appropriate for New Zealand society, it is instructive to examine some of the theoretical and empirical issues arising from the use of Anglo-American and European theories of modernity. Finally, this chapter will also highlight the role of the qualitative data and theory in relation to the explanatory and exploratory research goals that are dominant in a research project of this sort.

2.1 Research objectives

In the last chapter, two conceptually problematic trends in the New Zealand based literature were identified. The first was the pervasive embodiment of racism as
the unfavourable treatment of ethnic minorities on the basis of colour or cultural difference. Whilst it remains true that racism, with few exceptions, is essentially about colour, there is a need to go beyond written accounts that over-emphasise this timeless, synchronic characteristic of racism over time. While there is still much information to be found in such accounts, what is missing in the literature are diachronic perspectives that take into consideration the transition and transformation of social institutions and conceptual structures at particular time-frames. To address this omission, the first two research objectives have been formulated to encapsulate the historical and contemporary patterns of continuity and change in racisms organic to New Zealand.

**Objective One:** To develop a clear framework for conceptualising and historicising issues relating to ‘race’, racism, ethnicity, and identity in New Zealand.

  i) How do these concepts exist?
  ii) How can we acquire knowledge of these phenomena?

**Objective Two:** To identify how social debates that converge with race, racism, ethnicity, biculturalism and multiculturalism resonate with the nation state’s historical position(s) in modernity and late-modernity.

  i) What are the specificities of historical and contemporary racisms in New Zealand?
  ii) In what ways are they similar and / or different?
  iii) How do similarities or differences resonate with the nation state’s position in modernity?

In relation to the second problem identified in the literature, namely: the egregiously defined ‘unofficial’ versions of multiculturalism that New Zealand
scholars have made references to in recent years, what is conspicuously missing is a convincing response to the more fundamental question as to why multiculturalism and biculturalism, ought to be treated as compatible (or conflicting) positions. Accordingly, the following two research objectives aim to break this conceptual impasse:

**Objective Three:** To situate the ascendant Pakeha, indigenous Maori and other ethnic minorities within the nation state’s existing position in late-modernity.

i) What were the national and global factors that precipitated the emergence of contemporary multicultural and multi-ethnic New Zealand society?

ii) What is the ‘unofficial version’ of multiculturalism that has been adopted in New Zealand?

iii) Is this compatible with biculturalism?

**Objective Four:** To discuss the case for cosmopolitanism as a more appropriate civic idea than multiculturalism that, in relative terms, can better accommodate biculturalism in New Zealand in the twenty-first century.

i) Why is multiculturalism not compatible with New Zealand’s constitutional biculturalism?

ii) How is cosmopolitanism different to multiculturalism?

iii) Why is cosmopolitanism a more attractive alternative for New Zealand?

iv) How can cosmopolitanism manage the demands of a culturally diverse population without impinging upon indigenous rights to self-determination?

v) What are the limitations of cosmopolitanism in New Zealand and how would a policy of cosmopolitanism co-exist with biculturalism?

As a direct response to the first research objective, the following section aims to establish a sound ontological and epistemological frame to anchor the rest of this study.
This is a necessary point of departure to facilitate a more compendious methodological discussion of the issues related to the empirical data collection.

2.2 Ontology

In researching ‘race’ and racism, Bulmer and Solomos (2004: 3) argue that it is particularly difficult to agree on the exact nature of the phenomenon under scrutiny. To address this issue, we need to continue interrogating these terms and pose some questions concerning the reality of these concepts, the independent variables and purported root causes of the phenomena central to this study. According to conventions of analytic philosophy, ‘ontology’ refers to the nature of what exists and how it exists. As social scientists, our ontological assumptions about the social world underpin the structure and scope of our explanations (see Marsh and Furlong, 2002). An ontological position adopted shapes how knowledge is produced and must be recognised if a researcher is to be reflexive. Thus, it is necessary to first establish the assumptions about the nature of the social realities that are examined in this study. The ontological assumptions of a researcher, according to Grix (2002: 177), must be identified before one can discuss what can be known about the social reality that is thought to exist. It is important, therefore, to commence by being clear about the ontological foundations of this thesis.

The fundamental concept of ‘race’ is neither conclusive nor unequivocal. Despite the overwhelming scientific evidence refuting notions of ‘race’, counter-claims attesting to its existence and analytical usage continue to be advocated by sociologists who univocally conclude that the concept should be retained in so far as
people continue to deploy ‘race’ as a socially imagined and reified category. This contradiction is aptly described by Brett St Louis (2005: 30) as “a descriptive and analytical impasse that obviates incontrovertible racial meaning and understanding”. There is indeed no requirement for an unequivocal understanding should we permit the concomitant avowal and nullification of the concept’s existence, whether biological or social. ‘Race’, according to Stuart Hall (1998: 209), is a fashionable buzzword that is so discursively entangled that it is used ‘under erasure’. We have no other alternatives but to continue interrogating this problematic concept.

Sociological representations of ‘race’, according to Robert Miles (1989: 71), categorise people through a social and ideological construction of reality: “races are socially imagined realities rather than biological realities”. In his own terms, Miles is rather vague and does not elaborate on what these socially imagined realities are, apart from stating that these categories are responsible for perpetuating beliefs that people can be divided according to biological and cultural essences (Ibid: 72). In other words, the crux of the problem confronting us is that phenotypical characteristics have been ideologically used as markers of non-existent genetic differences between various human groups. In short, social scientists who argue that ‘race’ is constructed and devoid of any veritable scientific ontology would be agreeable to the four broad considerations as follows.

**Step 1.** The growth of knowledge over the last century in genetics has confirmed that inter-human cultural and phenotypical differences cannot be attributed to the notion of genetic and biological differences. In simple terms, the bulk of genetic variations which exist are:
overwhelmingly inter-individual and within-population, and not between “races” or populations. By the nature of its known distribution, then, genetic variation cannot explain why many behaviours are shared within groups, but not between groups. That is, genetic variation does not explain why human groups dramatically differ from each other in thought and behaviour (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992: 25).

Step 2. This line of reasoning can also be buttressed by an even older anti-essentialist argument. The empiricist philosopher John Locke argued in his 1689 Essay Concerning Human Understanding that it is erroneous to categorise objects by their ‘natural kinds’ through colour, shape, size or texture. In his own words:

We in vain pretend to range things into sorts and dispose them into certain classes, under names by their real essences, that are so far from our discovery or comprehension (Locke, 1689, Essay III, VI, 9).

Locke believed that we do not possess the faculties of knowledge and linguistic capability to articulate and classify physical objects in terms of their real imperceptible essences because “…languages, in all countries, have been established long before [the] sciences” (Locke, 1689, Essay III, VI, 25).

Step 3. On the basis of these two steps, we can logically deduce that the “constant” in question (genetic differences or ‘race’) cannot explain the “variable” (phenotypical and cultural differences). We are therefore left with the conclusion that ‘racial differences’ have no innate genetic or biological taxonomy. Clearly, ‘race’ is now a concept surviving outside its genetic ontology which once made it highly intelligible.

Step 4. There is consensus that step 3 is conclusive. It follows logically by an inference to the best possible explanation that previous and contemporary meanings of
'race' have always been created through the social world which is external to individuals.

These four steps encapsulate the processes responsible for transforming the status of ‘race’ as a scientific term to a social construct. Thus, for the purposes of this study, the ontology of the concepts under scrutiny – ‘race’ and ethnicity – are assumed to be socially constructed. This social constructionist ontology contends that social identities are relative to the perspectives of observers and social actors (Searle, 1995: 9). In other words, the notions of meaning and reality are to be understood from the perspective of social actors, where ethnic identities and other relationships are defined and enacted and rationalised from the way respondents subjectively view themselves as belonging to a particular ethnic group in New Zealand society. This ontological stance, according to Guba and Lincoln (1994: 111), treats social phenomena as ‘multiple, apprehendable, and conflicting’ and, as the products of human intellect, are subject to change as social actors become increasingly sophisticated and informal. An appropriate epistemology for this social constructionist ontology is the interpretive or hermeneutic approach that aims to understand how actors subjectively make sense of social phenomena.

2.3 Epistemology

Having established the ontological assumptions embodied in this study, this section focuses on questions of epistemology, or the knowledge-production process. Epistemology in social science, according to Crotty (1998: 8), is concerned with the criteria for establishing legitimate and adequate knowledge. As this study examines an
under-researched topic in New Zealand sociology, it is necessary to develop a theoretically led epistemology that is progressive and of increased explanatory merit. The constructionist ontology delineated earlier assumes that quantitative law-like explanations about social phenomena are of limited value in a highly unpredictable post-modern social world. In these ‘new times’ characterised by globalisation, economic de-regulation and the pluralisation of institutional practices, highly sophisticated and contradictory forms of social exclusions have paved the way for the resurgence of new ethnicities, racisms and new kinds of fundamentalisms (see Hall 1992a; Hall 1996; Beck 2006). Thus, this view assumes that knowledge about the social world should not consist in absolute, axiomatic truths but knowledge that will help a society formulate new strategies to address its existing issues. The philosopher-sociologist Paul Diesing (1991: 364) encapsulates this point very incisively:

Social science produces a multiple, contradictory truth for our time – that is, a set of diversified perspectives and diagnoses of our changing, tangled, and contradictory society. These truths live in the practices and understandings of a research community, not in particular laws, and when that community peters out, its truth passes into history with the society it tried to understand.

From Diesing’s perspective, we can infer that a social science’s raison d’être is to produce knowledge that is capable of, at least, assuaging society from the effects of inequalities. The strength of Diesing’s vision of social science lies in the implicit heuristic approach that imposes a sense of reflexivity on the researcher. George Herbert Mead (1962: 134) described reflexivity as the process of reflecting upon and questioning our assumptions about the research process. Thus, reflexivity entails self-confrontation, not merely self-reflection. In our attempts to re-define strategies to recalcitrant social problems, we need to question our research habits and modes of
thinking and prejudices. These factors must then be considered part of the research process as they are essentially products of previous inquiries and should also be scrutinised. This heuristic approach adopts a vision of social science as a process of inquiry, or search for knowledge. To Diesing (1991: 75), social research essentially consists of the accumulated results of previous problem solving available for addressing new social problems and inequalities.

The knowledge gathering process of this study has to begin by drawing upon the existing empirical and theoretical knowledge (secondary data) on ethnicity and ‘race’ in New Zealand society. During this course of exegetical research, all existing knowledge claims in the literature are treated as interpretations of phenomena that are subsequently being (re)interpreted by the researcher as an observer. This interpretive process is what Marsh and Furlong (2002: 19) describe as the ‘double hermeneutic’:

…the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer (a second hermeneutic level).

The ‘double hermeneutic’ also underpins the semi-structured interviewing technique employed in this study. During the course of interviews, an ongoing dialectic must be established between the researcher and the interviewees’ interpretations of the phenomena. Thus, it is necessary to incorporate a sense of reflexivity into this dialectical process during the qualitative researching process and analysis of data.

The hermeneutic theory of Hans Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) introduces a vital concept of ‘play’ that encourages reflexivity and self-awareness of the researcher’s assumptions and subjective beliefs. This sense of self-awareness is especially important whenever we attempt to interpret an interviewee’s subjective
understanding of social phenomena. To Gadamer, knowledge or meaning is only established when ‘play’ occurs between an interpreter and the interpreted through an ongoing dialectic (Fay, 1996: 146). In brief, interpretation begins with a vague, incomplete or mistaken hypothesis (or expectation) about the meanings concealed. Next, ‘play’ is established in the dialectic as we test our interpretations against what we are trying to comprehend. Finally, our foreknowledge is revised when we integrate our existing frames of knowledge with new knowledge acquired through trial and error. As expectations about the unknown are formed using what we already ‘know’, re-interpretations and a further re-integration of new knowledge into our foreknowledge takes place. This back and forth process is widely known as the hermeneutic circle (see fig 2.1). This process ensures that a researcher will reflexively confront his/her earlier assumptions.

During this circuitry process, a break in the circle occurs when there is a failure to integrate new knowledge into our existing foreknowledge. This hermeneutic
perspective is reflexive because it enables us to understand and participate in the lives of others; and by extension would also help us understand our own lives (Diesing 1991: 308). This, in essence, helps us move towards producing knowledge that is emancipative as we learn heuristically from our shortcomings and build upon our strengths and existing knowledge.

2.4 Methodology and method

This study’s constructionist conceptualisation of ethnicity, ‘race’ and national identity requires a qualitative methodology to understand how these notions are negotiated and inter-related. Thus, the qualitative semi-structured interview suits this overall aim most ideally. The strength of this method, according to Miller and Glassner (2004: 137), is the opportunity it provides for us to collect and rigorously examine narrative accounts of social reality. Unlike the structured interview, the semi-structured interview provides for more opportunities to ask questions in a sequence deemed most appropriate to the research context. The semi-structured interview also allows the researcher to probe respondents beyond the accounts provided through a process of clarification and elaboration (May, 1993: 93). This selected qualitative method needs to be fore-grounded on certain principles to ensure that the collection and analysis of the primary data is maintained at a stringent and high standard. Methodology, according to Martin Bulmer (1984: 4), denotes the systematic and logical study of the general principles guiding primary sociological investigation. The task here is to reflexively examine the methodological strategy used to address the research objectives of this study. To ensure that this study’s methodology is reflexive,
each interview will be situated within the frame of Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle discussed earlier. The researcher’s interpretation of each interviewee’s account can be interrogated through the process of re-integrating new knowledge of the interviewee’s social location and historical context into his / her existing knowledge. This will allow the author to understand how each social actor’s subjective understandings of the world is uniquely shaped by a range of categories including (but not limited to) religion, gender, class, occupation, sexuality and education.

2.41 Primary data collection: key informants; rationale and limitations

A total of thirty-one in-depth interviews that lasted between thirty to sixty minutes on average were conducted in New Zealand during the months of July and August 2007. Upon my arrival in the country, pilot interviews were informally conducted with New Zealanders of various ethnic groups selected from the Lincoln University campus in Christchurch. A series of semi-structured interview questions were prepared to gradually introduce the topic of this research project to the participants. During this initial phase of collecting empirical data, it became apparent that more questions were required to probe respondents on issues pertaining to their views on the future of biculturalism and multiculturalism in New Zealand. Although a refined set of semi-structured questions was eventually produced and broadly adhered to, further questions were posed on an ad hoc basis in order to follow-up and clarify responses. Thus, as cues were taken from the interviewees, I engaged in deeper conversations with respondents about their experiences and issues that concerned them.
most as individuals. This procedure privileges the social constructionist’s view that it is essentially one’s *subjective* experiences that reveal the racialised and gendered social domains a person occupies. By extension, the social spheres inhabited by the respondent would then help shape how s/he constructs meaning in social phenomena.

The selection of respondents was premised on a condition that they were either New Zealand permanent residents or citizens. International students without permanent residency status were excluded. To facilitate a fair and compendious macro-level analysis, it was necessary to include mainstream Anglo-Celtic New Zealanders as well as migrants from Europe, Asia and Africa. I also sought to anchor this study within a group of participants comprising various nationalities, age groups and professions for a more representative sample that would also permit, where applicable, a juxtaposition of the commonalities of responses from European and Asian migrants. For this reason, a snowball technique was used to select interviewees. During the pilot phase of the semi-structured interview with people I knew of various ages, educational backgrounds and genders, chain referrals were made which subsequently resulted in an increased number of successful referrals that included a highly exceptional and very complicated case of an eighty-seven year old Malaysian-Indian woman being granted residency on compassionate grounds at the age of eighty-five. Throughout the snow-balling process, respondents were asked to first contact and obtain consent from the prospective interviewees on the researcher’s behalf. If consent was successfully obtained, the prospective respondents’ names and contact details were given to the researcher. Only three prospective participants declined to be interviewed. The snow-ball technique, according to Davidson and Tolich (1999: 111),
is appropriate for qualitative studies when it is particularly “difficult to contact people in any other way”. Nevertheless, the most significant problem with this research method is found in the fact that referring participants could be biased towards recommending those who shared their views. This problem was addressed through an explicit request to referring participants that they only recommend interviewees of a different country of origin or ethnic group. This measure proved very productive in most instances, where, for instance, a British-English migrant couple referred me to a Malaysian-Indian migrant woman who teaches on polytechnic courses aimed at helping migrants settle into New Zealand society more effectively.

In order to prevent the over-concentration of interviewees situated in a particular urban or rural New Zealand location, I began the snow-balling process with staff and students in Lincoln University, and the rural townships of Kurow and Duntroon in North Otago. This made it possible for this study to take into consideration the uniqueness of responses from interviewees living in both rural and urban locations.

Prior to departing for Christchurch in the south island, plans were made to carry out interviews in Wellington and Auckland. Unfortunately, this did not go to plan due to financial constraints and the lack of personal contacts in the North Island. In view of this, the researcher was already aware that the sample of interviews recorded in the South Island could be criticised as being biased and not an accurate representation of the citizenry’s attitudes towards ethnicity and racism. In response to this potential methodological criticism, I should state that prior to my arrival in Christchurch, Lincoln University had very graciously granted me the privilege of
‘visiting student’ status. I was subsequently asked to introduce my research topic to staff and graduate students at two seminars I delivered on campus. Through this process of networking, I was fortunate to have interviewed people who grew up in various New Zealand cities. I was also referred to a New Zealand born Chinese male student from Auckland and another permanent resident student from Malaysia who lived in Wellington with her family before going to university. Around five migrant interviewees had also relocated to Christchurch from Auckland, Dunedin and Greymouth for employment opportunities. Thus, with a varied mixture of migrant and New Zealand born respondents who lived in more than one geographical location, a common axis for the construction of ethnic identity and racism can be found within each individual’s understanding of their own experiences in New Zealand society, regardless of locality.

2.42 Research ethics

Qualitative researchers, according to Stake (2005: 49), are “guests in the private spaces of the world. Their manners must be good and their code of ethic strict”. Accordingly, ethical considerations relating to research methods were carried out in accordance with the University of Birmingham’s Code of Conduct for Research. This code “prescribes standards of work performance and ethical conduct expected of all persons engaged in research [in the University of Birmingham]”, the guiding principles stipulated are as follows:

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Research involves, inter-alia, the pursuit of truth in furtherance of the advancement of knowledge.

a. Research workers should, in all respects of their research: i. demonstrate integrity and professionalism, ii. Observe fairness and equity, iii. avoid, or declare, conflicts of interest, iv. Ensure the safety of those associated with the research, v. observe all legal and ethical requirements laid down by the University or other bodies properly laying down such requirements.

b. Research methods and results should, subject to appropriate confidentiality in relation to personal or commercially protected information, be open to scrutiny and debate.

Additionally², researchers are also ‘asked to give consideration’ to issues related to research and research methodology concerning societal effects or impacts’: ‘implications or risks…for the University of Birmingham’; ‘implications arising from the research or enterprise methodologies or techniques involved’; and the maintenance of effective and efficient records’

The collection of empirical data was carried out in accordance with the ethical framework stipulated here that encompasses the standards upheld by the British Sociological Association (BSA), the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Social Research Association (SRA). A brief information sheet introducing this research topic was given to each respondent prior to the interview. Respondents were also asked to sign a consent form declaring their understanding that their participation was entirely voluntary. A clause granting participants the option for withdrawal at any stage was also included on the form. With the permission of each respondent, interviews were tape recorded. All participants gladly obliged with none insisting otherwise. Most respondents had no qualms speaking with the tape recorder on, the exceptional few who felt uneasy at the beginning eventually felt more comfortable as

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we progressed through the interview. Full anonymity to all respondents was assured with special care taken to present responses in a way that would not result in the interviewees becoming identifiable.

2.43 Reflexivity: standpoint epistemology and autobiography

As a ‘biographically situated researcher’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 24), the researcher’s subjectivity and autobiographical elements need to be acknowledged. My personal experiences of racism in New Zealand as an ethnic minority would have shaped my subject position as a researcher can created a greater sensitivity to the area of racial and ethnic studies as opposed to gender and sexuality. To the informants that I interviewed who experienced racism, my research topic could have been interpreted as an indirect attempt to express solidarity in our common experiences of discrimination. Thus, my experiences of racism and previous social location in New Zealand had inevitably affected my way of thinking about this subject. To the respondents who were ethnic minorities, I would be deemed a ‘known observer’, (Lofland, 1971: 95), who already gained access to the social settings that they occupied. In the physical spaces of schools, university campuses, shopping centres and other public places in New Zealand, I had observed and was also subject to frequent instances of racism. At university and school for example, I noted earlier how intimidated and traumatised international students would be when they were abused or had things hurled at them. Less intimidating instances included seeing Asian students at school getting confronted by local students and castigated for sticking to their own groups and not speaking ‘Kiwi’ English. I also walked into Asian restaurants,
takeaways and provision shops where I over-heard conversations about the difficulties that immigrants faced in finding employment, adapting to a new culture and country. To a certain extent, I was also ‘one of them’ and we experienced racism together. For example, in 2003, I was at a BP fuel station in Christchurch queuing up to pay for petrol when the kiosk attendant became angry because the Asian woman in front of me forgot to remove the pump from her fuel tank. After her transaction was over, he made slurs to his colleague that she had ‘spoilt’ his day before he served me very rudely. For many such observations of racism expressed towards Asians I had witnessed in New Zealand, there would be corresponding instances of equivalent intolerant treatment reported by my informants.

My own observations and similar experiences I shared with some of my informants provided “a point of reference, a life and ground to stand on” (Clandinin and Connelly, 1998: 155). The issue here then is not whether my perspective on society is a correct, ‘value-neutral’ or objective one. Rather, it is simply that the locations I occupied in New Zealand provide a particular angle of vision and therefore can be said to characterise a social science that recognises ethnic or racial difference as a valuable resource. According to standpoint epistemologist Sandra Harding (1991: 150), it is instructive to begin research “from the lives of the systematically oppressed, exploited, and dominated, those who have fewer interests in ignorance about how the social order actually works”. I therefore decided to use the subject position I shared with my research participants who were ethnic minorities as the ‘common denominator’ for serious reflection. In other words, I attempted to exercise my sociological imagination by examining if my ‘private troubles’ were also part of a
much larger social reality that needed to be connected with much wider ‘public’, social issues. This is of critical importance to C. Wright Mills (1959: 8) who argued that:

Troubles occur within the character of the individual and within the range of his immediate relations with others; they have to do with his self and those limited areas of social life of which he is directly and personally aware. Accordingly, the statement and the resolution of troubles properly lie within the individual as a biographical entity and within the scope of his immediate milieu-the social setting that is directly open to his personal experience and to some extent his willful activity. A trouble is a private matter: values cherished by an individual are felt by him to be threatened.

By bringing my shared biographical experiences to the centre of my research, it was also possible to identify the ‘private troubles’ my informants did not share with me that needed to be connected with the country’s wider ‘public issues’. To address the potential problems of moral outrage we feel about racist phenomena, Vera and Feagin (2004: 76) suggest that a researcher’s emotions ought to be reflexively acknowledged. Although this is important, it is instructive to reflect upon the fact that research undertaken with punitive intentions could have damaging effects on a society concerned, including those who have been at the receiving end of racial discrimination.

2.44 Towards a theoretical framework

At the earliest stages of this thesis, it was my initial preference to contribute only theoretical knowledge. Thus, I was preoccupied with the idea of contributing a theoretical framework that would maintain empirical (and theoretical) continuity and comparability across time and space. To achieve this goal, I found it more innovative to de-emphasise the timelessness of racism as colour (or cultural) discrimination and
instead encourage a more diachronic and temporal explanation by focusing on how racism resonates with the nation state’s historically specific position in late-modernity. Thus, in order to fulfill the second and third research objectives, it was necessary to draw upon various theories of modernity that originated in Europe and America. As the author is from an English university analysing this aspect of New Zealand sociality through the lenses of European and Anglo-American writings, this study’s delineation of modernity in New Zealand society must not be disproportionately Eurocentric.

Whilst modernity in New Zealand was constituted by social practices and traditions which were established by Europeans during the colonisation process, representing the reality of life in New Zealand at specific timeframes within the framework of a nation-state is particularly problematic when there is much debate in European social theory as to whether it is now time to transcend the strictures of the nation-state. The globalisation and uncertainty of the present era has presaged an end to the traditional categories used to direct research in Western countries (Holmwood, 2007: 85). These categories include class, gender, race and ethnicity which now embody ‘global’ and ‘local’ dimensions of reality as transnational realities no longer respect the territorial boundaries of nation-states. In other words, the ‘nation-state’ can no longer be considered the ‘organising principle of modernity’ (Chernilo, 2006: 6). The highly influential writings of Ulrich Beck argue that in the post-national era of the ‘Second Age of Modernity’, it is necessary for the social sciences to adopt the new paradigm of methodological cosmopolitanism. In essence, this is a new framework designed to i) modify the grammar of the social sciences, ii) recalibrate well-
established research topics and iii) theorise them from a fresh cosmopolitan perspective (Beck, 2006: 33).

For the purposes of this study, New Zealand can be accurately referred to as an independent nation-state which exhibits – on the periphery – the characteristics of any advanced Western democracy existing in the ‘Second Age of Modernity’. These characteristics broadly include globalization, the crisis of the welfare state, economic deregulation and incoherent social practices resulting in fragmentary social identities (see Wagner 1994; Beck 1992; Hall 1996). Nevertheless, as New Zealand was once a colonial settler society with its identity embedded in Britain, representing issues of race and ethnicity within the framework of a European ‘nation-state’ could be considered erroneous. It is not entirely clear if New Zealand was a sovereign ‘nation-state’ prior to 1947 when the Statute of Westminster was ratified. Likewise, as European societies are currently in a post-national phase of the European Union, where territorial boundaries between member states are of diminishing significance, another dilemma arises when one could argue that New Zealand has not yet entered a post-national era. When confronted with these two dilemmas, the use of European theories of modernity as a guide to delineating similar configurations in New Zealand could be considered problematic and inappropriate.

To defuse the first dilemma, it is worth noting that in academic writings referring to New Zealand as a sovereign nation, it is generally assumed that the contemporary ‘New Zealand nation-state’ is the end-product of a distinctively complex and providential continuity of time. The absence of a more inquiring edge in questioning if New Zealand was a ‘nation state’ before it was settled as a British
colony in 1840 encourages an atemporal view of the country that – by an appeal to the
immanence of the nation state’s continuity through time and space – is relatively
difficult to criticise: for lack of historical specificity. New Zealand historians are also
seldom unanimous in establishing the year in which the colony became a nation-state
(see Ladley and Chisholm 2008).

An unintended consequence is that historically significant individuals, events
and institutions are either conflated or treated as interchangeable: the actions of the
Prime Minister, the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 or the colonial
government of New Zealand are treated as a part of the processes of the nation state’s
providential development. Despite these problems, New Zealand can, for the purposes
of this study, be treated as an independent nation-state prior to 1947 by invoking the
legal doctrine of *ius gentium*. According to Waldron (2005: 133), this doctrine is
frequently used as a synonym for international law and ought to be conceived as “a
body of law purporting to represent what various domestic legal systems share in the
way of common answers to common problems”. From this perspective, the Treaty of
Waitangi signed between Maori and the Crown would be construed as an agreement
made between two sovereigns encountering one another in a universe governed by no
state or superstate (Pocock, 2001: 79). This view, as mentioned earlier in Chapter One,
is not disputed and 1840 has often been taken as the starting point, by which New
Zealand has been represented as an independent nation-state, as Benedict Kingsbury
(2002: 118) states, from the perspective of legal theory:

In New Zealand, the argument is made that Maori were sovereign prior to
1840, that this collective sovereignty was recognised not only by Busby as
British Resident, but by the British government and was never lawfully
surrendered, and that it should now be revived and made operational.
Moreover, in so far as the pioneering settlers considered New Zealand to be a ‘Better’ and ‘Greater Britain of the South’, New Zealand was already an “imagined community” that can be sharply distinguished from Britain. According to Anderson (1991), a nation is concretised through social ideals it is free to collectively create as an ‘imagined community’.

In response to the second question as to whether or not New Zealand is currently in a post-national era, it could also be argued that the country has already entered a post-national era that, in relative terms, can be discerned by its close relationship and trans-Tasman linkages with Australia that date back to the 1960’s. This enduring connection, according to Bedford, Ho and Lidgard (2002: 40), has been central to New Zealand’s economic and social security with one tenth of New Zealand’s population residing in Australia. As New Zealanders have also been leaving the country to find work overseas for many years, global networks are ‘not such a new thing’ (Henare 2002). Whilst New Zealand’s transnational networks between Australia may not be as extensive as those shared by member states of the European Union, its close relationship with Australia would, for the purposes of this study, be sufficient evidence that it can be represented as existing in a post-national, cosmopolitan era unique to both Australia and New Zealand.

The efficacy of this study’s intention to maintain empirical continuity and comparability, in essence, depends largely on the transparency and accessibility of the past. The task of situating past injustices within different configurations of modernity would depend on the researcher’s interpretation of historical events. Given the
tentative nature of the social world and difficulties involved in assessing the past, it is easy to judge past events by the standards of the present. Wagner (2001: 80) describes this as *presentist empiricism*, it is a condition that:

> [rejects] the temporal character of the social world and confines its ambition to the only temporal state that is accessible – the present – turning an epistemological dilemma into a methodological virtue by means of self-restraint.

In this study, the problem of *presentism* could be a potential problem when a utopian state of ethnic-relations is projected into the past; resulting in the pioneering settlers being indicted for committing injustices that they may not have been able to avoid. It could be argued that past actors cannot be charged for being racist when the doctrine of racial superiority carried scientific authority during the mid-nineteenth century. Post-modernists would deem it more appropriate to render each historical period and its associated evils as a hermetically sealed envelope. This, in essence, involves summoning the historical and cultural uniqueness of past injustices within their unique self-justifying episodes. The expansiveness and *relativity* of time and morality might effectively neutralise the repugnant actions of people who are distant from us in time and space. This approach is problematic because it cannot resolve the problem with the future and present: it is difficult to appraise *present* issues without the backcloth of an ideal utopian state of ethnic-relations that the country *ought* to aspire towards. As this study is a sociological study which needs to draw upon historical writings, the best solutions to the potential problem of presentist empiricism are the principles of reflexivity and recognition of the limits of sociological (and historical) analysis. Through the process of reflexivity and the hermeneutic circle discussed earlier, I
recognise that my (re)construction of historically specific events are the product of my own subjective understandings not beyond critical reflection or reconsideration.

2.45 The interplay between methodology, methods and published source materials

Granted that a theoretical framework is required to critically situate and analyse the various topics encapsulating multiculturalism, race and ethnicity in the New Zealand literature, this study adopts an interdisciplinary approach by drawing upon a variety of internationally relevant published source materials beyond sociology that includes anthropology, political science, political philosophy, Asian Studies and public policy. As New Zealand’s state elites have done little to clarify the ambiguous political and legal rights of Asian and non-Europeans under the Treaty of Waitangi, it was necessary to include (in the fifth and sixth chapters) the works of legal theorists of public law in New Zealand. Responses to the research objectives of this thesis can therefore be obtained in a stringent and dialectical manner wherein a reflexive methodological strategy will alert the researcher to analyse the empirical data using the most appropriate theories. The relationship between the ‘researcher’ and the ‘researched’ is therefore a dialectical one wherein, the researcher must revise his initial theoretical assumptions concerning the selection of theories that should be used to analyse an informant’s response. It is therefore instructive for the next section to examine more critically the relationship between the empirical data and the theoretical.
2.5 The role of the theoretical and the empirical

The goals of research, according to Neuman (1997) can be differentiated in terms of the exploratory, descriptive or explanatory as follows:

Table 2.5: The goals of research (Neuman 1997: 20-1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPLORATORY</th>
<th>DESCRIPTIVE</th>
<th>EXPLANATORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Become familiar with the basic facts, people, and concerns involved</td>
<td>Provide an accurate profile of a group</td>
<td>Determine the accuracy of a principle or theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a well-grounded mental picture of what is occurring</td>
<td>Describe a process, mechanism, or relationship</td>
<td>Find out which competing explanation is better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generate many ideas and develop tentative theories and conjectures</td>
<td>Give a verbal or numerical picture (eg. Percentages)</td>
<td>Advance knowledge about an underlying process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine the feasibility of doing additional research</td>
<td>Find information to stimulate new explanations</td>
<td>Link different issues or topics under a common general statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formulate questions and refine issues for more systematic inquiry</td>
<td>Present basic background information or a context</td>
<td>Build or elaborate a theory so it becomes more complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop techniques and a sense of direction for future research</td>
<td>Create a set of categories or classify types</td>
<td>Extend a theory or principle into new areas or issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clarify a sequence, set of stages, or steps</td>
<td>Provide evidence to support or refute an explanation or prediction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Document information that contradicts prior beliefs about a subject</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

To identify how the theoretical and empirical are related in the rest of this study, it is necessary to identify how the four research objectives spelt out in section 2.1 of this chapter approximate within the framework of Neuman’s (1997) ‘three goals of research’. Whilst the collective research aims of this research project may be multiple, one or two of these would be dominant in each chapter.
In the case of the first objective which was to develop a research framework for conceptualising and historicising race in New Zealand and carried out in sections 2.2., 2.3 and 2.4, the goal is clearly exploratory where as a researcher, I am required to constantly alert myself to the need for testing and revising my assumptions and beliefs about the social phenomena that are being investigated in this study. The second objective which is carried out in Chapter Three is mainly explanatory, and to a lesser extent exploratory. In the absence of empirical data, modernity was used as an overarching theory to develop a diachronic perspective on these historical racisms.

As well as being explanatory, the third and fourth research objectives carried out in Chapters Four, Five and Six are both exploratory and explanatory. In Chapter Five for example, the endeavour to shed-light on the vaguely defined *de facto* multiculturalism that exists in New Zealand is primarily explanatory and less exploratory on the basis that I have attempted to advance knowledge by using existing theories of commercial and conservative multiculturalisms to provide a more elaborate and complete account, viz. that the unofficial, *de facto* multiculturalism adopted in New Zealand’s public sphere oscillates between being commercial and conservative multiculturalisms. Subsequently, the goal of Chapter Six is more explanatory than exploratory. The argument that cosmopolitanism is a more appropriate political philosophy for contemporary New Zealand involves arguing in favour of a competing theory that is used to situate various issues and topics.

As the empirical data is used only in Chapters Four and Five wherein qualitative data is explained through the use of theory, an iterative process is deployed whereby “theory, conceptualization, and empirical activity are interwoven in a
contextual operation such that theory guides research while research guides theory” (Denzin, 2009: 56). Thus, in these chapters where the goal is primarily explanatory, theoretical concepts like ‘race’, ‘multicultural’ etc. found in the literature are first interrogated. Second, instances of these concepts featuring in the empirical data collected from respondents will play an important role in the abstraction of a series of propositions that, if coherent with a particular theory, will be formulated, “in order to see which of diverse formal theories are applicable for furthering additional substantive formulations” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 34), and to avoid forcing the data to fit a particular theory.

Assuming that truth in social scientific theories is approximate and admits of relative degrees, an individual datum that does not cohere with any formal theory is not intended to falsify or verify theories in a manner that is analogous to scientific experiments. Rather, individual datum sets as such might be helpful in devising new ways of re-theorising empirical issues. As empirical events may sometimes be unrelated to the content of a theory, Denzin (1970: 82) suggests that concepts and propositions from a theory should be used to identify the location of empirical events, and to then theorise or explain them accordingly. The intention however is not to produce an ‘objective’ view of the world, but to extend the principles of certain theories to obtain a more informative perspective on certain social issues. While theories are generally the products of different traditions, Fielding and Fielding (1986: 33) point out that when theory is combined with qualitative data, one obtains a ‘fuller’ picture with added range and depth, but not necessarily a more ‘objective’ one. Thus, it is at the explanatory stages of this study (Chapters Four, Five and Six), where the
theoretical perspectives of risk, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are ‘extended’ to the issues of diversity and difference in New Zealand.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented a set of four research objectives for this study, relative to the extant literature reviewed in Chapter One. Through a critical engagement with the research objectives, the ontological, epistemological, methodological and ethical issues relating to the research process have been highlighted for the reader. The selected research method is the semi-structured interview. In conclusion, it would be worth emphasising that there were autobiographical elements that shaped the author’s interest in the theoretical and empirical dimensions of this research. The theories of cosmopolitanism in the second half of this thesis, for instance, are an expression of the author’s philosophical background and emerged after it was deemed applicable, as a substantive theory, for understanding New Zealand society. The hermeneutic circle articulated earlier has been adopted as a compendious way to facilitate reflexivity on the part of the researcher, and to hopefully enhance the criticality and quality of the qualitative data presented in this work, and subject to analysis in Chapters Four and Five.
This chapter performs the correlative task of situating historical racisms in New Zealand within the nation-state’s historically specific position in modernity. The aim is to address the bias towards the *synchronic*, timeless feature of racism as colour or cultural discrimination which features in the New Zealand literature. This is an issue because a discernible relationship between social theory and empirical studies of racism with regard to time is conspicuously absent in the international literature as well. In one of the earliest and most neglected essay on time and social theory, Herminio Martins (1974) criticised the successors of structural-functionalist social theories – including ethnomethodology, social phenomenology and behaviouralism – for failing to ‘take time seriously’. His criticisms were made in light of the prevailing view that a sociological theory could be considered valid only if it maintained historicity and temporalism (Martins, 1974: 246). Martins observed that the demise of structural-functionalism in sociology failed to produce an increase in theories which underscored the specificity of time to the formulation, transition and transformation of social concepts and structures. It is worth noting that this omission persisted despite critics arguing *ad nauseam* that structuralist theories of social action (largely

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1 This chapter is a revised and extended version of a refereed article entitled ‘Late-Modernity and the Theorisation of Race in New Zealand,’ *British Review of New Zealand Studies*, 2008, Vol. 17: 11-36.
Parsonian) were deficient due to the timeless explanations of social systems they embodied.

Whilst the study of time (and space) in social theory is a highly abstract and complicated topic in the philosophy of social science and social theory, the important point is not that the preponderance of synchrony and absence of diachronic perspectives will fail to advance our theoretical and empirical knowledge on racism in New Zealand. But rather, for the present purposes of this study, the more fundamental issue rests on the need to contribute an analytical template that maintains empirical and theoretical comparability across time. It is the differences rather than the similarities between past and present racisms that are more important, as Gilroy maintains (1991: 38):

“Race” has to be socially and politically constructed and elaborate ideological work is done to secure and maintain the different forms of ‘racialization’ which have characterised capitalised development. Recognising this makes it all the more important to compare and evaluate the different historical situations in which “race” has become politically pertinent.

In other words, it is necessary to ensure that temporal theoretical representations of racism and ethnic inequality maintain a sense of continuity with the empirical dimensions of change in social structure and human behaviour. The emphasis on diachrony here will help facilitate compendious socio-historical comparisons of structural and behavioral changes at a particular point in time, at both the empirical and theoretical levels. Additionally, it is hoped that a diachronic analysis may help extend the empirical and theoretical scope of our existing synchronic understandings of racism. In the contemporary context of New Zealand, past conflicts between Maori and their colonisers are often understood through selective, usually presentist,
reconstructions of history (see Oliver 2001; Ballara 2001). There is therefore a need for historians and social scientists to determine which collective memories and amnesia bear important implications for the nation’s trajectory of ethnic relations. This can only be achieved through a temporal, rather than a timeless perspective.

3.1 The theoretical framework

As this chapter is concerned with how historical racisms resonate with the processes and transformation of social structures at various epochs, temporality and historicity is maintained through the notion of modernity. However, to ensure that the temporal aspects of racism can be understood and represented accurately across time and space, it will be necessary to also adopt a more inclusive conceptualisation of racism that goes beyond the simple notion of colour or cultural discrimination. The version advocated by Balibar attempts to encapsulate the various pathologies associated with racism that resonate with the values and codes of modernity:

Racism is inscribed through practices (forms of violence, contempt, intolerance, humiliation, and exploitation), in discourses and representations which are so many intellectual elaborations of the phantom of prophylaxis or segregation (the need to purify the social body, to preserve ‘one’s own’ or ‘our’ identity from all forms of mixing, interbreeding or invasion) and which are articulated stigmata of otherness (name, skin colour, religious practices).

(Balibar, 1991: 17-18; Emphasis Added)

Here, Balibar’s more inclusive definition considers cultural or religious discrimination justified as prophylactic attempts to circumvent risks associated with fears of the unknown are discourses responsible for the perpetuation of racism. These pathologies overlap with the rationale of the Enlightenment project and its inner logic which promises equality, progress and freedom through human reason. Whilst modernity and
racism are not interchangeable terms, the historical specificities of racism can be understood from a register of modernity.

The notion of modernity is highly abstract and nebulous as the “categories of tradition and modernity have been used in a great many confused ways, [culminating in] a conceptual source surely of the present impasse in the field” (Martins, 1974: 260). Accordingly, as Kahn (2001: 130) asserts, modernity can never be understood as a “pure state of social or cultural being [and] neither is it separable from the modern imaginaries that make it possible”. Despite these difficulties with the term, the discourse of modernity can be discerned and analysed as the intellectual rationale for the demarcation of racial divisions in historical New Zealand. Although the origins and characteristics of a collective New Zealand identity have been explored in various ways around the nation state’s British substratum, the role which racial ideology might have played has not received the attention and depth of analysis it deserves. James Belich notes, of New Zealand history in general, that

> We should not necessarily castigate people in the past for holding racialist views, but we should try to understand the effects of those views on history. In fact, racial ideology has played a major and underestimated role in New Zealand history, not only through its power to exclude, but also through its power to include


It is a surprising fact that the overarching intellectual discourse of modernity and its relationship with racial ideology has never been explored by historians and sociologists alike in depth. Miles Fairburn (2004) argues that New Zealand historians have increased the number of causal factors in their endeavours to explain the anti-Asiatic racisms of 1860 to 1950. Notwithstanding, they fail to demonstrate the relative
importance and cogency of the factors they invoke as causes. In consequence, Fairburn argues, our historical knowledge about the causes of Sino-phobia is not progressing\(^2\). In light of this impasse, it is time to examine this missing stratum of old anti-Asiatic sentiments. An explication of the fundamental tenets of the discourse of modernity will be performed, as a prelude to exploring how they permeated the practices and institutions of New Zealand society; with a focus on their function as mechanisms of racial discrimination. At this level, it is acknowledged that this task is viewed at best as \textit{hermeneutic}, not prescriptive. Out of the resulting historical understanding, the temporal institutional and structural characteristics deemed functionally necessary for erecting boundaries between the ‘Others’ can be adduced for appraising the present.

Whilst modernity and racism are conceptually distinct and stand in direct opposition to each other, the relationship between modernity’s sensibilities of equality and racism’s exclusionary practices is a very complex and abstract one. Nevertheless, the two aberrational concepts can be situated within the inner logic and ambiguity in the project of modernity. It is possible to invoke a premise that racism and modernity are inseparable, as Wieviorka (1994: 174) argues, because the latter arose from Europe during the Enlightenment and developed through industrialisation and colonisation. This ambiguity between egalitarianism and racial subordination was validated by the construction of non-European ‘Others’ as inferior and uncivilized; which according to Stuart Hall, was pivotal in enshrining national values on Enlightenment ideals and more importantly, the main discourse of modernity itself:

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\(^2\) Fairburn argues that the best possible explanation rests in the Chinese having a far more powerful orientation to their home country and culture than other migrant groups (2004: 81).
Without the [‘Others’], the West would not have been able to recognise and represent itself as the summit of human history. The figures of ‘the other’, banished to the edge of the conceptual and constructed as the absolute opposite, the negation, of everything which the West stood for, reappeared at the very centre of the discourse of civilisation, refinement, modernity and development in the West. The ‘Other’ was the ‘dark’ side – forgotten, repressed and denied; the [antithesis] of Enlightenement and modernity.

(1992a: 313-4)

These constructions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ were reified by Enlightenment attempts to distinguish between groups that were fit and unfit for progress and civilisation. It is essentially the modernist distinction between un/reason, according to Wagner (1994: 40), that remains the underlying reason why modern societies have always erected divisive frontiers around the ‘Others’ identified as a threat to the future of the society. Although Wagner (1994) does not make references to the demarcation of boundaries on the basis of ethnicity or race, contemporary racisms function as a means of excluding social groups considered a menace to well-established norms. From a brief socio-historical vantage point, it is necessary to perform a short explication on the core tenets of ‘modernity’ as a prelude to exploring how these ideals permeated social practices and institutions across New Zealand’s history; with a focus on their function as mechanisms of racial exclusion.

According to Habermas (1987: 2), ‘modernisation’ was only introduced in 1950 when Max Weber dissociated the concept of modernity from its European roots and incorporated it into his spatial-temporal model of societal development. But nevertheless, the eighteenth-century can be described as the green youth of modernity, as the nineteenth was its prime. The discourse of modernity can be aptly described as an application of the philosophical principles which emerged from the European
Enlightenment. To begin with, prominent *philosophes* of the eighteenth century, viz. Voltaire, Kant, Hume and Hegel wrote philosophical treatises about morality, human nature and society with centrality given to the rational, scientific study of human nature as an autonomous agent. These works were written specifically for the educated general public in a highly accessible form, in contrast to their more academic lucubrations. Immanuel Kant (1793: 34) defined ‘Enlightenment’ (*Aufklärung*) as:

‘The exit by man from his own self-imposed minority’, when he begins to rely on his own understanding and rejects the guidance of others.

(cit. Scarre, 1996: 50)

This intellectual revolution of the eighteenth century provided impetus for a major socio-political transformation across Europe. The concomitance of these two transformations ushered in the ‘modern society’ (Wagner 2001: 1). In contrast to the *convoluted* religious values and speculative theories of humanity pervasive in the ‘traditional society’, rationalism was well-suited to establish a new society based on the universal precepts of autonomy and non-religious morality. The elegance of human reason and scientific inquiry was its *parsimony* and simplicity.

As apotheoses of liberalism and egalitarianism, the crusaders of modernity expressed a sanguine belief in the perfectibility of society through rational means. This resulted in a preoccupation with the collective interest and simultaneous intolerance of individual liberties. In the words of Wagner (1994: 15), the fundamental tension and ambiguity of modernity “resides in the double imaginary signification of modernity as individual autonomy and its substantive *collective other*”. On the one hand, the master discourse of modernity affirms universal autonomy, yet on the other, its valorisation of
collective ends represses individual liberty. Where racial exclusions are concerned, this tension is manifested when ‘alien cultures and lifestyles’ are considered antithetical to the progressive and modern ways of the mainstream. This tension in the relationship between modernity and exclusion can be used as a common theoretical axis to examine the diachronic and synchronic features of racial phenomena in the extant New Zealand literature, ensuring continuity and comparability. A diachronic perspective can be obtained by identifying the different historical circumstances of racism in conjunction with the nation state’s position in modernity. At this juncture, it is necessary to add a rider that although the modernisation of New Zealand would have been hegemonised by prevailing British ideals, the configuration of modernity in New Zealand’s history should not be assumed to have undergone similar processes in Western Europe. The overriding ideals would be similar in so far as the colonising crusaders were inspired to establish a New Britain of the South.

3.2 Boundary-setting for ‘Better’ and ‘Greater’ Britain

Drawing upon a wide-range of published narratives of racisms in New Zealand, the rest of this chapter contextualises historical anti-Asiatic racisms within their different legislative, cultural and political circumstances, including their relative position to anti-Maori racisms. This chapter will therefore represent historical relations between the Europeans, Asiatics (Chinese) and Maori. Due to the lack of space, it will not be possible to focus on the other smaller groups such as the Africans, Indians, Eastern Europeans and Pacific Islanders. Many of the published sources used have been written by New Zealand academics from the disciplines of Asian Studies,
sociology and history. Beginning with the ‘White New Zealand Policy’ of 1880-1920, the historical anti-Asiatic sentiments of this epoch are situated within the specificities of their historical contexts.

New Zealand’s history is replete with racist legislation that oppressed, for example, the Maori, Asiatics and Indians. The historian Paul Gibbons (2002: 309) confirms that the colonisers of New Zealand considered themselves the world’s finest civilisations who “regarded as both acceptable and inevitable the subjection of non-European peoples by the imperial agents of European states”. Thus, the broad pattern of modernity in New Zealand would, like in Europe, be constituted by a conjunction of social configurations across different historical epochs, including the rise of the secular state and capitalism, the formation of class and division of labour (see Hall 1992a).

By beginning an analysis of New Zealand history in the 1880s, it is apparent that the colonial government sought to establish a better Britain of the South to accommodate the burgeoning population of Great Britain. The most intriguing feature of this epoch is the sense in which the colonists defined their new country as a progressive British paradise. To the enlightened colonisers, the idyllic islands of New Zealand and absence of social ills from Old Britain provided them with the perfect opportunity to establish the “Ideal Modern Society” they desired. The ‘Better Britain’ motif, according to Belich (1996: 302), “ranked paradise over progress; Arcadia over Utopia; and quality over quantity”. Thus, if New Zealand was to be a better Britain, the crusaders’ imperatives could materialise with only the most utopian measures, including racial homogeneity at the expense of excluding alien ‘races’. It soon became
axiomatic that pristine New Zealand was destined to be populated by the “genteel, respectable and decent English, Scots and Protestant Irish; moneyed, or else young, healthy and rural” (Ibid: 313). By the 1890s, the settlers’ fervour and imperialism fuelled hostility and increasingly hardened attitudes towards the Asiatics. At such a crucial time when social cohesion and forming a collective identity were important, Australia and New Zealand chose to distance themselves from their Asian neighbours (Mein Smith, 2005: 117).

To the British settlers, the Chinese were perceived as the greatest threat to the future of their latent paradise:

The small numbers of Chinese who arrived in New Zealand were hard-working and law-abiding, yet New Zealanders persuaded themselves that Chinese people were debauched and drug-ridden, inclined to the worst vices and perversions, a threat to white womanhood and the purity of the Anglo-Saxon race.

(Gibbons 2002: 310)

The end result, as the colonisers and settlers feared, was the decline of morality, Christianity, economic standards and civilisation. It was eventually not what the Chinese did, but fears of what they might do that eventually became the yardstick of racism (Fong, 1959: 16). In a similar vein, the Indians were also recipients of relatively hostile discriminatory treatment and stereotyped the ‘Hindoo Peril’ due to their non-Christian traditions (Ip and Murphy, 2005: 134). However, as mentioned earlier, India’s significance in the British Empire did immunise her subjects from the draconian legislative restrictions imposed on the Chinese. Despite the fervour of the anti-Chinese societies and White New Zealand League, their utopia of a ‘100% White New Zealand’ could never come to fruition. The reason is mundane and simple: Great
Britain and China were signatories to the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin and 1860 Convention of Peking (see Murphy 2002). These treaties accorded subjects of both countries reciprocal rights of travel and protection. Due to the obligations of the Imperial government and to the frequent consternation of her Antipodean colonies, total exclusion remained impossible. The 1920 petition of the Returned Services Association to repatriate all Asiatics from New Zealand was rejected on similar grounds. Yet, there were occasions when the Colonial Office compromised and allowed New Zealand to legislate varying degrees of restriction against Asiatics (see Murphy 2002; 2003). The most notorious measure that peremptorily singled out the Chinese for discriminatory treatment was the £10 poll tax of 1881. It was subsequently increased to £100 in 1896 and abolished in 1944. That the Chinese were the only ethnic group to be finger-printed epitomises the extreme lengths taken to protect the European settlers from their perceived immorality, heathenism and degeneracy.

Given that the Chinese remained in such insignificantly small numbers and were not permitted to settle permanently, it is surprising that they were subject to a voluminous amount of discriminatory policies which prevailed for well over a hundred years. While it is important that such poignant facts be remembered, the discriminatory legislation needs to be situated within the overarching discourse of modernity. The hitherto historical narrative has attempted to illuminate the peculiar sense in which the crusading colonisers’ ambitions were tied to modernity’s goal of excluding those who posed a threat to the future of the societal order to which they aspired. With very few condoling settlers inveighing against these denigrating measures, modernity’s universalism of reason eventually prevailed.
This particular construction of ‘race’ and draconian anti-Asiatic measures were integral to the configuration of a progressive egalitarian society that accepted only those groups deemed fit for membership. The discriminatory legislation culminating in the ‘White New Zealand Policy’ excluded Asians from basic civil liberties such as suffrage and citizenship which were accorded to all other people in the country. Whilst New Zealand prided itself for being the first country in the world to bestow women with suffrage in 1893, the Chinese were considered unworthy to participate in modernity. Domestic benefits were only available to Asians in 1938, while suffrage was granted after 1951. For the purposes of a socio-historical study, these collective forms of racial discrimination were designed to specifically i) identify ‘Otherness’, ii) impose order on the perceived threat of ‘Otherness’ and iii) project and, at the same time, eradicate any residual ambivalence and fears.

The advent of the Second World War created a change in mainstream New Zealand’s attitudes towards their oriental ‘Others’. When Winston Churchill declared war on Germany in September 1939, New Zealand made a fully-fledged commitment to augment Britain’s wartime efforts. Subsequently, by the time Singapore which the British considered ‘impregnable’ fell to the Japanese in February 1942, the Dominion realised that its security in the South Pacific was under threat. Ever since Japan and China were at war in 1937, the patriotic overseas Chinese in New Zealand donated generously to the cause of their motherland. Between 1937 and 1944, they donated a total of £174,149. This was no mean feat considering the fact that the New Zealand Chinese were comparatively poor (Ip, 1995: 180). But in terms of ethnic-relations, China’s war efforts proved a turning point as mainstream New Zealanders began to
view the Chinese in a different light (Ip and Murphy, 2005: 83). The vulgar stereotype of the much loathed “yellow scourge” was rapidly transformed to that of our “brave allies” (see Wong 2003; Murphy 2002). The ascendant group’s easing attitudes were however by no means universal.

At a more prosaic level, things began to improve for the Chinese when the government momentarily relaxed the discriminatory restrictions and granted two-year refugee permits to the families of Chinese men working in New Zealand. Yet however, the boundaries remained clearly demarcated. This was undoubtedly the most charitable and tolerant policy towards Chinese women and children in the Dominion’s history. Nevertheless, it was meticulously designed to exclude the Chinese from being included in New Zealand society. A £200 good behaviour bond was required; refugee Chinese women were forewarned that they would be repatriated at the end of their two-year stay, together with any New Zealand born children. An additional £500 bond was levied to ensure compliance to this condition. In spite of these restrictions, many Chinese men took this opportunity to be reunited with their wives and children. A total of 249 wives and 244 children were reunited in New Zealand through this refugee permit scheme (Fong, 1959: 32). By the end of the war in 1945, prospects of life on return to post-war China were extremely bleak amidst civil strife, lawlessness and starvation. Under the leadership of Rev. (Dr) George McNeur, the Presbyterian Church of Dunedin intervened and diligently petitioned for the Chinese to remain in New Zealand on humanitarian grounds. It was eventually this outstanding humanitarian and Christian spirit of McNeur that determined the fate of the Chinese. Finally, in 1947, the Fraser administration acquiesced. Permanent residence permits
were granted to refugee women and their New Zealand born children. The permitted entry of Chinese women made it possible for the Chinese community to create the nucleus of a post-war ethnic group comprised of nuclear families rather than that of itinerant male workers (Ip, 1995: 182).

This humanitarian spirit of the post-war Labour government evinced a gradual erosion of the highly divisive racial boundaries enforced earlier. However, this is not to suggest that racism was no longer rife or that the Chinese were no longer under strict surveillance. By the end of World War II, New Zealand remained one of the most ethnically homogeneous settler societies (Brooking and Rabel, 1995: 36). The Dominion’s immigration policy continued to be racially biased and parallel to the par excellence Better and Greater Britain motifs. In fact, New Zealand’s national identity was to be determined by the economic and social certainties of the next three decades.

In the wider economic context, the Dominion’s strong economic dependence on ‘mother Britain’ provided no reason to deviate from its well-established ethnocentric immigration policy. A more fitting description of this strong ethnic preference for British and non-British Europeans (viz. Norway, Holland, Denmark and Sweden) would be the ‘whiter than white’ policy (Ibid: 39). Indeed, New Zealand’s tenacious cleavage to its chosen European-British identity proved to be a stumbling block to the Chinese community’s assimilation and integration.

During the years of prosperity and peace after the war, the future prospects of Chinese New Zealanders were improved with racism being less overt. After forty-three years of rootlessness in New Zealand, the Chinese were finally allowed to apply for naturalisation in 1951. The government’s overriding criteria restricted the right of
citizenship to applicants who could satisfy the Minister of Internal Affairs that they were of the most assimilable types with a lifestyle closer to the ‘New Zealand way of life than to the Chinese’ (Ip, 1995: 183). In general they had to be of good character, proficient in English and renounce their Chinese citizenship if successful (see Fong 1959). The screening process was assiduously stringent. Only one person qualified in 1952 and a total of about 23 out of around 400 applications were approved by January 1955 (Fong, 1959: 38).

While most European New Zealanders did not mind having a fellow Chinese colleague at work, they were less keen to have Chinese as neighbours, close friends or spouses (Ip, 1995: 186). To many, the tolerance of the ascendant group and associated opportunities were construed as privileges – not unalienable human rights – that could be withdrawn at anytime (K. Wong, 2003: 129). Kirsten Wong wrote about a family member’s move into a new state house in Levin in 1950 that garnered a dramatic negative response which was eventually reported in the *New Zealand Truth* (Ibid). This pervasive parochial ideology that only a white person or Maori could enjoy the rights and privileges of being a New Zealander was literally sacrosanct.

The government’s assimilation policy was also repressive in obliterating the more egalitarian rights of the Chinese to their heritage. For example, in 1949, the government denied first generation New Zealand born Chinese the right to their mother tongue. In perceiving the Chinese language as a negative force that would keep them within “their enclaves and hinder their ultimate assimilation”, work permits to Chinese language teachers were peremptorily abolished (Internal Affairs file Memo 116/7, cit. Ip, 1995: 185). Notwithstanding the loss of their native tongue, younger
Chinese New Zealanders began to avail themselves to opportunities in higher education and meritocracy. Despite their newly found success in the 1960s, the Chinese behaved very cautiously in public and maintained a very low profile as self-effacing, successful, hardworking and law abiding citizens. In general, these virtues were maintained in the form of an ‘unspoken contract’ to eschew jeopardising the goodwill and tolerance of the mainstream (see Yee 2003; K. Wong 2005). By the 1980s, the Chinese earned the well-deserved ‘Model Minority’ epithet; at 19000 and 0.6 per cent of the population, the ethnic Chinese community was largely middle-class, well-educated, unobtrusive and politically silent (Ip, 1995: 186).

In contrast to the racisms of the pre-war years, it could be argued that the post-1945 racisms illuminate a striking shift in the way mainstream New Zealanders found it increasingly difficult to enforce the draconian boundaries of the past. The Chinese community’s alliance with the Dominion’s war efforts certainly deemed such boundaries unjustifiable and untenable as the ‘otherness’ of the Chinese was transformed; in such a way that the perceived danger was positively reduced. The observable legislative processes which buttress this fact include the repeal of the poll tax in 1944, the right to residence in 1947, the restoration of welfare benefits and the ultimate right to naturalisation in 1951. Within the wider discourse of modernity, these liberties to participate in the emerging modern society punctuate a gradual erosion of the boundaries enforced during the forty year period of the ‘White New Zealand Policy’. Nevertheless, the setting of boundaries and availability of liberties was still privileged by the government over and above what Wagner (1994: 68) describes as
“the liberal assertion of the autonomy [of the Chinese] to create and recreate themselves and their social contexts”\footnote{Wagner (1994) notes that this is what typically characterises the social configuration of ‘organised modernity’ whereby the availability of liberties is privileged by the state.}.

This fact is evident in the government’s straitlaced assimilation policy that took the form of a quasi \textit{modus vivendi} entered into by two dissenting peoples; but incorporated into this were the vices of intolerance and parochialism. Chinese who made the assimilation adopted a subordinate position whereby it was especially clear that they were permitted to partake in the project of modernity but only on the condition that they divested themselves of their ‘otherness’. The liberties accorded to them still subjected them to the dominance of instrumental rationalities that eventually denied them the congenial and intrinsically meaningful aspects of Chinese culture, and, at the very most, allowed them to enjoy their liberties within the boundaries of their marginalised spaces. As mentioned earlier, the government’s assimilation policy did little – actually nothing at all – to recognise and educate the ascendant group about the positive attributes of Chinese culture; quite unlike the United Kingdom’s admirable – but far from perfect – post-war multicultural initiatives. Bickleen Fong observed that:

Assimilation is a two-way process, yet for the New Zealand Chinese it has been mainly a one-way process – that of the Chinese assimilating New Zealand culture – because the Chinese in New Zealand are not capable of offering something of their own culture in return (1959: 129).

From a macro-sociological vantage point then, it logically entails that the post-war legislative mechanisms of racial exclusion were specific to the state’s peremptory attempts to \textit{divest the Chinese of their ‘otherness’} before they were permitted to
integrate and assimilate. It was also their alleged lack of ‘New Zealand-ness’ that was identified as the threat of a hypothetical danger. In the post-war atmosphere less blighted by overt racial abuse, the temporality of this epoch’s anti-Asiatic racisms can be generalised as being less draconian in contrast to the racisms of the pre-war years. By virtue of the Chinese community’s alliance with the Dominion’s war efforts, the restrictions of the pre-war years were deemed far too draconian and unjustifiable. As a result, the Chinese were granted the right to apply for naturalisation in 1952. The right to citizenship and post-war assimilation policy urging Chinese to be “as much like white New Zealanders as possible” (Wong, 2003: 128), is evidence of a slight erosion of earlier boundaries between reified notions of civilisation and un-civilisation. Although the post-war years saw more liberties accorded to the Chinese, albeit very cautiously and begrudgingly, the lives of Chinese were ameliorated within the boundaries of their own communities.

During this period, it is necessary to highlight that other ethnic groups such as the Dalmatians, Indians, Lebanese and Polish were also subject to certain policies of discriminatory that were relatively less draconian in contrast to those which were used to restrict the Chinese (Brooking and Rabel, 1995: 28). As Asiatics remained the most vilified group, a socio-historical comparison of pre and post-war anti-Asiatic racisms reveals an inherent hypothetical doomsday scenario of the Asiatics destroying the utopia of Better and Greater Britain. This ‘doomsday scenario’ can be traced to the inner logic of modernity itself: the mainstream’s desire for a self-fulfilled future justified the exclusion of the ‘Others’, whose ways were considered degenerate and retarded in a progressive society. This particular construction of the Chinese ‘Others’
was integral in the establishment of a utopian settler society. At this juncture, it is necessary to move on to an examination of how, relative to the incompatibility of Chinese in New Zealand society, the indigenous Maori were considered more worthy citizens than the Chinese, despite measures imposed on them to adopt the ways of their European colonisers.

To their European colonial masters, Maori were considered innately inferior. Believing that their civilised ways were culturally and technologically superior to Maori tradition, they sought to subjugate the indigenous peoples and establish an ‘ideal modern society’ by transforming their traditional lands and resources as they deemed fit. The bases of Maori inferiority were due largely to their lack of a written language, codified legal system, central government and mechanical technology (Ballara, 1986: 5). Their spiritual beliefs and metaphysical attachments to their ancestral lands were considered pagan and anathemised by Christian missionaries who were at the forefront of imperialism and colonisation. Although Maori were considered backward and in need of modernisation, this sense of inferiority needs to be situated within the register of capitalism and industrialisation that in the same vein, is an integral hallmark of European modernity: the crusaders’ overriding intentions to create an outpost for the burgeoning population of Britain resonate strongly with the historically specific necessity to create a colonial economy by subjugating indigenous peoples and dispossessing them of their unused lands. This is evident in two ways: first, the displacement of Maori from their ancestral lands is dictated by the capitalist ideal emphasising state control to maintain economic fluctuation through technological advances. Second, the capitalist agenda justified the movement of labour
and immigrants from Britain to ensure the progress of capitalism which was considered beneficial to Maori in the long term.

By situating the historical injustices committed against Maori within the ambiguous position of New Zealand during the early phases of modernity, it could be argued that, from a macro-sociological perspective, when analysed within the register of capitalism, these temporally specific anti-Maori racisms exemplify an attempt to attain the distinctive modernist establishment of a colonial settler society and capitalist economy. Unlike the temporally specific racisms designed to impose order and remove the perceived threat of the Asiatics, Maori were generally considered much more worthy subjects of modernity. Assertive and risk-taking in their cultural personality, Head (2001: 99) argues that Maori sought to improve their fringe status by pursuing modernisation, even before the Treaty of Waitangi was signed with the British in 1840. There is consensus amongst historians that in contrast to the degenerate Chinese, the indigenous Maori were considered virile, masculine, progressive, adaptable to European ways, and worthy for citizenship in a modern democracy (see Ryan 2005; Belich 2001). To buttress this fact, the perceived superiority of Maori, relative to Asiatics and Africans, was not without a scientific basis. Late nineteenth-century New Zealand scholars, according to Ryan (2005: 110), had developed persuasive anthropological evidence suggesting that Maori shared an historical connection with the superior Aryan race. This explains why Maori were in a much better position to embrace modernity and why, in the prevailing climate of racism towards the Chinese, Indians and non-British Europeans, Maori were subject to relatively less stigmatisation in contrast to these racialised groups. In short, whilst the
Chinese could be excluded as non-subjects of the British Empire, “the Maori clearly belonged in New Zealand as natives” (Murphy, 2009: 57). Having situated these historical racisms within an overarching register of modernity, the subsequent section examines the more contemporary racisms in the context of New Zealand in late-modernity.

### 3.3 The turning point: 1984 -

To gain a temporal perspective on the more contemporary expressions of racism, it is necessary to examine how they resonate with the global, late-modern conditions that portended an end to the country’s high-dependence economy and self-represented bicultural national identity. Most ostensibly, the year 1984 which witnessed the Fourth Labour Government’s rise to power created a watershed in New Zealand’s economic and ethnic sphere. A series of economic deregulatory policies paved the way for a permanent alteration to the make up of New Zealand society. The policies introduced from the mid-1980’s onwards were, for the first time in New Zealand’s history, an affirmation of the government’s realisation that the nation would have to compete for export markets in a highly competitive global world. Prior to 1984, the United Kingdom’s entry into the European Common Market in 1973 resulted in a drastic decline of New Zealand exports “from gradual and relative to rapid and absolute” (Belich, 2001: 397). For the sake of brevity, it is worth recapitulating that between 1973 when the United Kingdom entered the European Common Market and 1984, New Zealand experienced her most tumultuous economic downturns. As New Zealand’s preferential access to the British agricultural market was severed along with
her ‘apron strings’ to ‘Mother Britain’, New Zealand was reduced to one of today’s lowest ranking members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Palat, 1996: 48). The colour-blind Immigration Act of 1987 was therefore an important milestone in realigning immigration issues in the direction of the Fourth Labour Government’s deregulatory policies. As trade with Britain diminished, New Zealand sought access to the larger markets of her South-East Asian neighbours. Thus, in an attempt to forge closer relations with Asia, New Zealand had to jettison her controversial preferences for immigrants from ‘traditional source countries’ (namely Britain, Scandinavia, Western and Southern Europe, North America, Canada and Australia). The raison d’être for the new ‘colour-blind’ immigration policy was purely economic and designed to foster international linkages with the governments of Asian countries. Furthermore, immigrants with the desired skills were sought to expand New Zealand’s sluggish labour and export markets. This was the prescribed antidote to the exodus of New Zealand’s young and talented to Australia’s more robust economy (Ip, 1995: 187). From 1975 to 1989, emigration exceeded immigration with a net migration deficit of over 250,000 New Zealanders (Parr, 2000: 307). The largest groups of immigrants were East Asian. From 1991-1994, 54.2 per cent of new immigrants were from Asia, the majority of whom were of Chinese ethnicity (Brooking and Rabel, 1995: 46).

Most mainstream New Zealanders – as well as Maori and the assimilated Chinese community – were not mentally prepared for an unprecedented influx of non-European immigrants that would, fait accompli, alter the nation’s complexion. Although the year 1987 heralded a new era of non-discriminatory immigration in New
Zealand’s history, it also revived a fresh wave of anti-Asiatic racisms across the nation. Amidst fears that the country was being ‘taken over’ or ‘invaded’ by Asians, many were deft to criticise the government’s colour-blind immigration policy as the ‘Asian Inv-Asian’. Large sections of the local population remained wedded to the anti-Asiatic sentiments of the previous century by treating Asians as undesirable intruders (Vasil and Yoon, 1996: 43). Even to date, Asian immigrants continue to be accused of not integrating and not contributing to the New Zealand economy. Their ascribed stereotypical predilections to speak loudly in their native languages, drive erratically, and buy expensive cars and houses have often been enumerated as aberrations to the sacrosanct localised ways of working class New Zealanders. Many Asians continue to be considered inassimilable, brash, too wealthy and unworthy to be real New Zealanders.

It is interesting to note that this sense of disjuncture and antipathy was also expressed by the acculturated New Zealand Chinese community in a state of shock. As a self-effacing and low profile community, they worked hard to gain the acceptance of the mainstream and earned for themselves the well-deserved ‘model-minority’ epithet. They were naturally traumatised to suddenly find themselves mistaken as new immigrants told to ‘go home!’ Understandably enough, many second and third generation Chinese New Zealanders were resentful of their newer counterparts for this backlash of anti-Asian sentiments (see Ip 1996; Ip 2008; K. Wong 2003; Ip and Murphy 2005). Unlike their humble and poor ancestors who arrived as sojourners, the newcomers were affluent, well-educated and highly-skilled. Thus, the ‘old settlers’ shared little cultural values with the newcomers they
pejoratively referred to as FOBs (‘fresh off the boats’). The well-established Chinese community gradually adopted a more charitable and broadminded perspective when they finally realised that they were witnessing the similar sorts of racisms their forefathers encountered a century earlier. By the late 1990’s, an increasingly diverse and multi-ethnic society provided inroads for the ‘old settlers’ to assert a bolder claim to their place in New Zealand society, and to also condemn the overt anti-Asian sentiments and racisms.

This sudden change in immigration policy and shift towards economic deregulation needs to be identified as an epochal transition to a new era of modernity referred to by Beck (2000) as the ‘second age of modernity’ or – more commonly by other theorists – as post / late-modernity. The suggested collapse of early modernity and transition to late-modernity can be broadly distinguished, through the register of capitalism, from the pluralisation of institutional practices, crisis of the welfare state, globalisation and economic deregulation. This is manifested through what Wagner (1994: 128) describes as “a change in the locus of agency and a change in the mode of control over social practices” rather than the “state’s loss of agency and control”. Although the economic and cultural spheres are not mutually exclusive, the amorphous nature of late-modernity is most ostensibly discerned through the fragmentation of social and cultural identities caused by sophisticated and contradictory forms of social exclusion. Overarching and concomitant to these two registers of late-modernity is the ongoing contestation of the West’s claim to its monopoly of modernity, exemplified primarily through economic globalisation, and the indifference to national boundaries (Beck 2000).
Consequently, it is instructive to identify the new forms of racial exclusion which resonate with New Zealand’s current position in late-modernity. Globalisation’s erosion of traditional certainties in understanding collective national and ethnic identities has, in Stuart Hall’s terms, resulted in the *strengthening of local identities* – the defensive reaction of dominant ethnic groups threatened by the presence of new immigrants (1992b: 308). Quite unlike Britain, such defensiveness has produced aggressive alliances in New Zealand formed by Maori and Pakeha against the perceived threat of Asian immigrants; as Manying Ip notes:

> The message, however, is similar in spirit to those given by the “liberal whites” of the 1900s who claimed to be protecting Maori against the “alien Orientals”. The spirit is one of “us” against “them”. The only difference is that previously it was the Pakeha taking the lead, whereas in recent times the lead has been taken by the Maori, with the Pakeha in tow.

*(Ip, 2003: 244)*

This anti-Asian alliance led by Maori could be ephemeral but it clearly emerges from their fresh endeavours to *i)* cope with globalisation’s erosion of old boundaries between the ‘Others’ and *ii)* secure their future pursuit of modernity by re-establishing control over social and institutional practices. This inter-ethnic alliance can be interpreted as a response to globalism’s erasure of the past epoch’s more concrete demarcations between modernity and its enemies. Amidst fears of this ‘Asian Invasion’ eroding the privileged status of both Maori and Pakeha, Maori have forged a common national identity with the ascendant group circumscribed in their common national and linguistic origins.

Whilst some Maori feel challenged by those who are unfamiliar with their hard-won recognition of rights under the Treaty, Manying Ip’s (2009: 160) latest research maintains that most of the Chinese and Asian community in New Zealand
have been sensitive to Maori criticisms and therefore recognise the Maori as “an important ‘host’ ethnic group” and “showed guarded support for the Treaty of Waitangi”. Nevertheless, the government’s reticence over the ambiguous status and legitimacy of Asians is emblematic of the two host parties failing to resolve their longstanding differences. The implicit suggestion is that Asians (including the long-standing Chinese and Indian communities) must ‘wait their turn’ to negotiate and justify their presence and status in New Zealand society (Ward and Lin, 2005: 169). In no where was this sense of ambivalence exemplified more controversially than it was in the reaction of Maori to the government’s apology to the Chinese community. In February 2002, the government made an unexpected formal apology for the historical poll-tax that singled out the Chinese for discriminatory treatment. Whilst this apology was appreciated and accepted by the Chinese community, the apology garnered a litany of controversy and dissent. Many mainstream New Zealanders were censorious of the apology and considered the government’s actions overly-apologetic and politically correct. The most vociferous of objections were expressed by the Office of Treaty Settlements and the Ministry of Maori Development (Te Puni Kokiri):

The relationship between Maori and the Crown is unique. The treaty settlements process concerns actions by the Crown that were in direct breach of explicit promises the Crown had made in the Treaty of Waitangi to the indigenous people of New Zealand. Therefore, the extension of Crown apologies to other ethnic groups should reflect the unique relationship by assuming a different form to Treaty settlement apologies


The government’s apology, though humane, business-like and most probably political in nature, fails to accommodate – let alone address – the more pertinent social issues;
namely, the mood of ambivalence circulating around New Zealand’s national identity implicated by questions about the status of Asian immigrants as illuminated in Maori disapproval of the government’s apology. As the apology was construed as a case where “multicultural considerations outweighed bicultural ones” (Chang, 2009: 205), the stance of Te Puni Kokiri and other Maori dissenters is an example of the types of conflicts that the present framework of biculturalism cannot address satisfactorily. Thus, a legal vacuum exists where many questions about the legitimacy and rights of non-Europeans in New Zealand society are left unanswered.

Controversial questions about the legal rights of non-European immigrants have also been academically challenged by Ranginui Walker, former Chair of Maori Studies at Auckland University. In an edited chapter that garnered much rebuke and controversy, Walker (1995) challenged the legality of the government’s immigration policy by claiming that New Zealand’s founding document, the Treaty of Waitangi only permits immigration from Europe, Australia and the United Kingdom into New Zealand. Walker belaboured the government for not heeding the advice of the Human Rights Commission, which was to consult Maori for approval to any variation of these rules to include Asians (Ibid: 285). For this reason, he vehemently opposes Asian immigration and launched a scathing attack on the integrity of Asian countries, Asian cultures and its peoples. He argued that the government’s waiver of visitor / tourist visas to citizens of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore has:

> opened New Zealand to criminals from overseas and to unethical practices by visitors wanting permanent residency. Headlines proclaiming New Zealand to be a ‘target of big racket in passports’, ‘Marriage scams and welfare fraud linked’…indicated the government’s naïveté in opening up the country to the rest of the world at a time when the nations of Europe are trying to insulate their borders against outsiders (Ibid: 300).
The variety of threats, risks and anxieties expressed are associated with the ‘doomsday scenario’ that pristine New Zealand will be engulfed by unscrupulous Asians who will denude the nation of its abundant resources. Aside from these fallacies, the *raison d’être* of Walker’s article was to censure the government for suppressing “the counter-hegemonic struggle of the Maori by swamping them with outsiders not obliged to them by the treaty” (1995: 292). This is a highly controversial constitutional issue although Maori protagonists have yet to discharge their onus of proof convincingly by spelling out the thresholds of exclusion. Beyond doubt, the task of defusing this dilemma is legal and hermeneutic in nature; it certainly goes beyond advocating a more charitable interpretation that validates the rights of New Zealanders from all ethnic backgrounds.

Although statutory frontiers of racial discrimination may no longer exist, the *locus* of exclusion remains in the New Zealand economy. The *mode* of control for more sophisticated forms of racism must then be traced to the inextricable global context. Increasingly, the notion of globalisation has gained prominence as a contentious social and political term. In macro-sociological terms, globalisation can be understood as the:

> Processes, procedures and technologies – economic, cultural and political – underpinning the current ‘time-space’ compression which *produces a sense of immediacy and simultaneity* about the world.

(Brah, Hickman and Mac an Ghaill, 1999: 3)
Here, the social phenomenon of globalisation is of less importance, but rather, the anxieties embedded in the breakdown of established social arrangements and globalisation of capital markets which generate expressions of racism that are derisive.

To situate these contemporary racisms within the conditions of New Zealand in late-modernity, it is worth re-examining the economic mandate for New Zealand to jettison its Aryan biased immigration policy. Roger Douglas, the fourth Labour government’s reforming finance minister, decided that the best way for New Zealand to achieve economic efficiency was to transform its economy from “one of the world’s most regulated economies into one of the freest” (Brooking, 2004: 153). Besides Asian immigration, New Zealanders also bemoan the late 1980s for the burgeoning national debt and sale of state-owned assets, including Air New Zealand, Post Bank, Telecom, the railways and several large pine forests. All these drastic changes, according to Brooking (2004: 155), brought little short-term economic gains as unemployment soared to record levels while the national debt reached an unprecedented high of NZ$42 billion by 1987. Indeed, the government’s sale of state assets privileged monetary stability over working class employment. This illustrates a transfer in the locus of agential capital and the mode of control in the nation’s economy. Within a short period of time, the sale of state-assets to foreign countries resulted in an end to the traditional economic certainties found in the government’s agential capital and alliance with trade unions. Concomitant to these global economic changes of the past two decades is the troubling question of whether the nation state’s “sovereignty [is] under siege” (see Patman and Rudd 2005; Bedford 2005). A dominant discourse of globalisation suggests that national autonomy in policy-making
is restrained by international issues such as terrorism, immigration, cross-border environmental problems and other sanctions undemocratically enforced by international bodies like the World Trade Organisation (Baragwanath, 2003: 200). At present, it is plausible to suggest that New Zealand’s diminishing autonomy to insulate itself from these global problems will result in risk adverse New Zealanders justifying the need to exclude migrants from cultures and religious backgrounds deemed incompatible.

In populist discourse, the public’s insecurity in this atmosphere of uncertainty is soothed when Asians and other undesirable groups, like Muslims for instance, become multi-purpose scapegoats for all their woes; from the sale of state assets to the alleged ‘destruction’ of New Zealand’s beautiful but fragile environment. The 1990s have seen the environment become a source of social risk and commitment to international regulations aimed at minimising these risks (see Welsh 1999, Beck 1992). In New Zealand, things are different with most anxieties aimed at insulating rather than minimising the country’s beautiful landscapes from these external threats. Conjecturally but conceivably, this could become an extremely pertinent and sensitive issue in New Zealand given international pressure on the nation to jettison its nuclear-free legislation, deemed by the centre / far right to be a stumbling block to trade and diplomatic relations with the USA. In the midst of economic uncertainty and mounting cold-war tensions, the populace’s anti-nuclear sentiment was a contributing factor to the snap election that ushered in the reforming fourth Labour government of 1984 (Mein Smith, 2005: 216). The anti-nuclear stance, though still very popular, illuminates the extent in which the nation can only insulate itself from international
pressure at the expense of diplomatic and trade relations. On the one hand, the
government acknowledges the need to diversify export markets, yet on the other hand,
they are proud of New Zealand’s nuclear-free status and must insulate the country’s
unspoilt beauty from the environmental problems other countries have to resolve.

Traditionally, idyllic New Zealand was enshrined as being fit for only those
who represented the values, culture and Protestant work ethic of the colonising
crusaders. For that reason, the Chinese were to be excluded at all costs. Today, in the
absence of the overtly racist legislation of the past century, mainstream New
Zealanders seem afraid of Asians degrading their paradise. A well-travelled New
Zealander expressed this view in the *New Zealand Herald*:

> I enjoyed your Long March series [on Chinese migrants to New Zealand]. I
spent 2004 and last year in China and can relate to the dislocation of
migrating to New Zealand. Two points:

1. Even though Chinese may express problems with the crowds and bad
quality of life associated with China, they are totally unready for a
situation where they are a minority (in New Zealand or another Western
country).

2. The absence of an oppressive officialdom can mean to some migrants that
they have an exploitable opportunity. They do not seem to appreciate that
many things happen in a Western liberal democracy by tacit acceptance
by most that there are norms. The dodgy driving licences or English
language certificates are symptoms of this.

(Reader Responds, p. A11, 19 Apr 2006)

Here, the writer predicates his argument on the incommensurable cultural and lifestyle
differences that render the Chinese unfit to join Enlightened New Zealanders in their
pursuit of modernity, including the privileges of democracy. Here, there is the implicit
appeal to the timeless ‘doomsday scenario’ of New Zealand ending up in a totalitarian,
polluted state; the first step to this domino effect is ascribed to Asian immigration.
This pervasive hypothetical fear is untenable and disingenuous for a mundane reason: the ‘doomsday scenario’ could materialise, at any rate, in the absence of immigration. Such political expressions of racisms that claim to be non-racist need to be traced to the inextricable global context. It is therefore essential to recognise the significance of anxieties associated with the perceived loss of the nation state’s autonomy and sovereignty, and the ways in which issues of race will be implicated in other social domains like the environment and global economy. Section 4.2 in the next chapter examines these issues, and the emerging environmental dimension of the ‘doomsday scenario’ associated with the ‘Asian Invasion’ that is likely to precipitate new expressions of racisms because the environment is of great significance to Asians, Maori and Pakeha.

3.4 Revisiting the synchronic and diachronic

The hitherto analysis has sought to provide a diachronic perspective to existing accounts of anti-Asian racisms in the New Zealand literature by using the tension in the relationship between modernity and exclusion as a theoretical axis to situate past and present racisms within their temporally specific political, social and economic circumstances. Whilst theoretical questions about the symbiotic connection between modernity and exclusion are inevitably very abstract to which definitive answers may never suffice, more can be said about the relationship between the synchronic and diachronic features of racism. In particular, it would be useful to see how a diachronic analysis can enrich our existing understandings of the synchronic features of racism.
when differences in colour, ethnic origin and culture are construed as the ‘functional necessities’ for racism (in Parsonian terms).

For instance, when elucidated against the temporal specificities of changing immigration policies and a politico-economic imperative to diversify immigrant sources, the recent role of the Maori in developing contemporary views of the Asian ‘threat’ illuminates a synchronic principle about the subordinate status of immigrants in modern societies that is unchangeable, irrespective of time and space. The timelessness of this principle in encapsulated by Joel Kahn (2001: 24) as follows:

[I]t...is a contest or often a conflict between self-appointed moderns on the one hand and on the other a diversity of peoples and groups formed within processes of modernisation, seeking also to be recognised as moderns and striving against their histories of exclusion from the prizes offered by modernity itself.

This best explains why, from a synchronic perspective, the insecurities of Pakeha and Maori concerning the major economic and social changes of the past two decades have underpinned fears of the consequences of increased immigration from Asia that are intertwined with racism. In this regard, Maori have no qualms in asserting their rights as ‘self-appointed moderns’ together with their Pakeha counterparts in an attempt to protect their political interests. Thus, immigrants who continue to seek a place in modernity will not be immune from conflicts and contestations with the ‘host society’ who are the ‘self-appointed moderns’ in so far as these newcomers possess the ‘functional necessities’ for racism. Notwithstanding, even though the uncertainties associated with globalisation are, to a certain extent, synchronically similar to those prevalent throughout many periods of the country’s history, new types of racist
expression are likely to be complicated by the ongoing fragmentation of once monolithic societal groups within New Zealand society as the next chapter suggests.

Conclusion

In contrast to the past, the present conditions of late-modernity and pluralisation of social practices have produced more elusive avenues and expressions of racism that may render the task of social scientists more challenging. For this reason, the broader notion of racism advanced by Balibar (1991) discussed earlier was deemed more appropriate for identifying temporally-specific racisms of late-modernity manifested by prophylactic attempts to circumvent fears and risks of the unknown. Thus, while the statutory mechanisms of racial exclusion during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries should be considered instrumentally rational expedients used to safeguard the future of a progressive settler society, these historical racisms can be temporally distinguished by institutional and social practices in an era that were a lot more manageable, predictable and coherent. Within the economic realm for instance, New Zealand’s privileged access to British agricultural markets before 1973 obviated the need for economic and diplomatic ties with Asia. Conversely, today’s anti-Asian racisms must be understood as being partly caused by the confusion and anxiety of a population forced to move out of a highly-regulated economy and self-defined bicultural society. The colour-blind immigration policy of 1987 and associated rise of anti-Asian racisms must also be understood as a direct consequence of the inextricable global transformations that New Zealand could not escape from, despite her geographical isolation from the rest of the world.
The specificities of racisms in late-modernity generate a variety of very important issues which need to be addressed. As New Zealand now sits at an important crossroad, in so far as economic relations with Asia are concerned, stable agricultural export markets are required to maintain the standard of living New Zealanders desire. Thus, although xenophobic sectors of New Zealand’s populace may look upon Asian immigration with scorn, it is difficult to dispute the importance of New Zealand’s engagement and interdependence with Asian economies (MacDonald, 2005: 175). The country therefore cannot afford to neglect its relationship with Asia and her peoples. As Asians are now the largest ethnic group, it is necessary for the citizenry to come to terms with the most obvious ‘foreign’ cultural reality in its social sphere to ensure that co-existence is possible. Moreover, the convergence of Treaty issues with immigration, for instance, raises the very sensitive question on whether New Zealand ought to move from biculturalism to multiculturalism, or if multiculturalism is appropriate for New Zealand in the Twenty-first century. In the next chapter, some of the themes developed above, in relation to New Zealand’s present position in late-modernity, are examined more specifically using empirical data, in the context of an era which is increasingly risk adverse and inter-connected.
This diachronic study is not only concerned with understanding contemporary racisms in the earlier context of advanced capitalism in late-modernity. In the last chapter, a temporal perspective on contemporary anti-Asian racisms was obtained by examining New Zealand’s move out of a highly-regulated economy and self-represented bicultural society. This, in essence, involved theorising racism and its temporal relationship with advanced capitalism as a key dimension of the modern society. As late-modernity in New Zealand was primarily discussed from the dimension of capitalism, the discussion of contemporary racisms and their resonance with extant debates on cultural and ethnic identities was tangential. No study on social divisions would be complete without a discussion on the issue of identity because self-identities are used to exclude and name groups which are deemed undesirable. The issue of personal and collective identities has always been an integral and intriguing aspect of modernity. In early modernity, Bauman (1996: 18) states that the ‘problem of identity’ was addressed by keeping it solid and stable whereas postmodern solutions seek to avoid fixation and emphasise options. To illustrate, the empiricist philosopher John Locke argued that one’s personal identity consists in ‘the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards…so far [as it]

\[^1\]This first half of this chapter draws upon empirical data and arguments from a refereed essay entitled ‘‘Asian’ in New Zealand Parlance: A False Essentialism’, accepted for publication in the New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 11, (2) forthcoming in December 2009.
reaches the identity of that person’ (Locke, 1689, *Essay II*, xxvii, 9). In this particular treatise, Locke was concerned with providing a naturalistic explanation of how we acquire knowledge about our human existence. But more importantly however, he contributed a timeless account of identity as sovereign, static and unified that exemplified the hallmarks of the Enlightenment. Whilst the hegemony of Locke’s explanation has not yet been superseded, the socio-economic and cultural transformations which inaugurated the advent of our late-modern era have, *fait accompli*, de-stabilised our material and social conditions for existence, and therefore render synchronic accounts of identity inadequate (see Hall 1992b). Thus, to obtain a balanced diachronic perspective, it would be instructive to interrogate, both theoretically and empirically, the conceptual content of key concepts used to demarcate social divisions in New Zealand.

In the literature on cultural and ethnic identities in New Zealand, there is much interest on the salience of mixed identities, for example, oral history projects on Maori-Chinese ethnicities (see Ip 2008; Lee 2007) and the experiences of the ‘1.5’ or ‘one-and-a-half-generation’ Asian migrant adolescents who migrated to New Zealand with their parents as teenagers (see Bartley 2004). Whilst these works have provided interesting qualitative insights on ambivalent identity choices, there is an urgent need to develop theoretical perspectives that transcend the strictures of traditional fixities like culture and ethnicity which cannot go beyond superficial representations of ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is argued that these concepts are inevitably failing to capture the complexities of life in late-modern New Zealand. In the broadest and narrowest senses, issues ranging from the contestation of resources in the public sphere to the
increasingly mobile population seceding for career opportunities overseas are producing an unsettling effect on traditional understandings of social divisions based on class, ethnicity and gender, due largely to the consequences of living in highly uncertain and fragmentary late-modern times (see Beck 1992, 2000).

This chapter then explores, using empirical data, the proposition that cultural and ethnic categories of identity are beginning to implode in late-modern New Zealand, due to acute manifestations of cultural changes and the ubiquity of shared risks, ranging from the blurring of distinctions between the internal and external. In terms of structure, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first is concerned with problematising, with qualitative data, the concept of ‘Asian’ in New Zealand parlance. As Asians are now the largest-growing and most diverse ethnic group in New Zealand, this is necessary to better understand the interrelationship between existing issues of race, ethnicity and the changing socio-economic, political and cultural conditions affecting New Zealand. A cross-national perspective on the similarities and differences with ‘Asian’ in New Zealand and ‘Black’ in Britain is also included, for comparative purposes. It is argued that the problems with ‘Black’ in British academic and political discourse are, to varying extents, contiguous to ‘Asian’ in New Zealand parlance. The second part aims to interpolate into the overarching racism-modernity framework, the centrality of risk as a key dimension of late-modernity and its convergence with race, culture and ethnicity. The aim of the second part, then, is to provide a New Zealand perspective on these dominant parochial currents found in the Anglo-American literature. It is hoped that this will render the study of contemporary issues relating to race and ethnicity more compendious and accessible.
4.1 ‘Asian’ in New Zealand Parlance: A False Essentialism

In the New Zealand literature, what remains unexplored is how and why meanings embedded in the concept of ‘Asian’ in New Zealand parlance often shift from descriptions of people usually distinguished by their straight black hair and yellow skins, in the case of East Asians, or brown skins if South Asians are referred to as Asians, to that of a hierarchically organised category in various social contexts. In view of the paucity of detailed insights into the ascribed meanings of ‘Asian’ in New Zealand parlance, Bennett (1998: 14) argued that the monolithic notion of ‘Asian’ to most New Zealanders was a pejorative one. In a more recent quantitative survey of attitudes towards immigrants by Ward and Masgoret (2008: 235), it was established that the attitudes of mainstream New Zealanders towards immigrants and immigration policy are, on the whole very positive with more than eighty per cent endorsing a multicultural population and agreeing that “it is important to accept a wide variety of cultures in New Zealand and a strong preference for migrant interaction”. Thus, the mainstream’s attitudes towards Asians today would, in relative terms, probably be more positive than that of Bennett’s observation a decade ago.

The Asia-New Zealand Foundation’s Perceptions of Asia survey reported that most New Zealanders admired the “hard-working and industrious” character-traits exemplified by Asians with a further seventy-five per cent affirming the importance of Asia in New Zealand’s future (Robertson and Newton 2007). Interestingly, it was also reported that those interviewed expressed more warmth towards Asians from Thailand, Singapore and India in contrast to those from China. In this regard, Ward’s and Masgoret’s findings are broadly contiguous to, and also corroborate Robertson’s and
Newton’s report. The former reported that New Zealanders continue to desire Anglophone migrants from Australia, Britain and South Africa over those from India and China, due to cultural and linguistic similarities. What is illuminating on the one hand, is the tension between an avowed acceptance of cultural variety and, on the other hand, a preference for similar cultural backgrounds. It would be productive for researchers to hold onto this tension. Doing so would allow for socio-historical continuities and discontinuities to surface when researching issues relating to national identity and cultural belonging in the near-distant future.

Despite these positive and encouraging statistical reports, a qualitative reading would find that ‘Asian’ in New Zealand remains *par excellence*, the name of a ‘race’ that is functionally equivalent to its anachronistic appellation of classifying individuals into a racial taxonomy. In the more recent current affairs reportage, political speeches, academic writings and so on, a false essentialism is found to be pervasive. This false essentialism, namely: that Asian people share a common set of social, economic, linguistic and cultural characteristics – except for how they are identified and excluded by the mainstream – is problematic because it obscures the various class, cultural, religious and ethnic identities that Asians of various nationalities embody. The upshot of this is the *reification* of simplified and over-emphasised similarities which will suffice if one were to look hard enough. Once these characteristics are used to stereotype and define Asians, the term solidifies extant differences in Asian cultures.

Where public policy debates are concerned, the homogenisation of ‘Asian’ inadvertently restricts the focus of racism to skin colour or culture. This occurs when racism is simplistically understood as discrimination on the grounds of colour
difference. Thus, if this synchronic feature of racism is over-emphasised, it would be more difficult for one to discern the more temporal dimensions of the social-cultural processes inter-twined with racism at a historically specific timeframe. While there is well-documented evidence of direct and overt discrimination against Asians, most putatively in the context of employment (see Henderson 2003; Ongley 2004), it would be more innovative for researchers to de-emphasise the timelessness of racism as colour (or cultural) discrimination between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. Superficial accounts of employers reacting negatively to Asian accents and names overlook the extant economic, cultural, class, religious and gender differences that are likely to disadvantage certain groups of Asian immigrants. The superficial emphasis on colour-discrimination also obviates pertinent class, culture and gender analyses which have the potential to identify the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of Asian New Zealanders located in the existing hierarchy. In turn, a more holistic account that mapped-out the convergence of ‘Asian-ness’ with class, gender and culture would help policy analysts to understand how these other factors disadvantage and provide a basis of discrimination towards different groups of Asian New Zealanders.

If these criticisms are correct, unwelcoming locals and populists often disparage Asian communities with the implicit premise that their ‘Asian culture’ renders them different from the majority white-skinned, European New Zealanders. What is at stake here is a more disturbing issue than that of crude stereotypes: when host societies castigate newcomers for failing to adhere to their localised norms treated as universal rules, cultural difference is often loaded with moral significance, as Anne Phillips (2007: 64) argues:
...in many cases, the individual from the minority or non-Western culture disappears as a moral agent, so that being different comes to be viewed as a reflection of a morally distasteful culture, rather than anything to do with individual judgment and choice.

Phillips’ claim is illustrative of the processes precipitating typical complaints that Asians are extremely rich, buy mansions, drive flash cars, drive dangerously, wear expensive watches etc. This equation of immorality with a particular culture has been invoked by the media and politicians to conveniently denigrate Asian immigrants. Bearing testimony to this is the infamous Pat Booth article of 1993 entitled *The Asian Inv-Asian* (pp. 8-9) that callously posed the question:

“What lies behind the image of crowds of Asian children coming out of the best schools, the buy-up of expensive homes, slow erratic drivers in big new Mercedes and migration figures suggesting that Auckland is becoming the Taipei [sic]/Hong Kong/Seoul of the South Pacific?”

Here, the journalist equates the purchase of expensive homes and cars as something immoral because it is an aberration to the unspoken *status quo*. Exceptional individuals or ‘tall poppies’ from the ‘host society’ who transgress local rules of conduct by ‘flaunting’ their wealth in a similar vein will most likely be castigated as greedy, materialistic or arrogant. When Asian individuals offend, it is their ‘Asian culture’ that takes the blame. In 1994, much tension and anti-Asian sentiments were aroused when Mannu Paul, founder of a new Maori political party opposed to immigration publicly equated Asian culture with greed when he said that “Asian people come in and their culture is to take everything” (Schuer, 1994: 3, cit. Ip 2003: 246). Despite the warnings by the Race Relations Conciliator that his utterances
pandered to prejudice and endangered racial harmony, the politician refused to apologise (Ip, 2003: 246).

More recently, the popular media was also addressing the question of whether Asians have a culture that is ‘immoral’. An article in the December 2006 issue of *North and South* sensationalistically entitled “Asian angst: is it time to send some back?” garnered a great deal of controversy. On the first page of the article set against the background of a ‘sea’ of Asian people were the words of Deborah Coddington, the author:

> Welcome to New Zealand, the new home of Asian drug runners, illegal suburban brothels, health cheats, student pushers, business crooks and paua smugglers.

(Coddington, 2006: 39)

Coddington cited high-profile cases of murders, extortions and kidnaps committed by mostly *Chinese* immigrants and students to bolster her argument that *Asians* are a potential menace and threat to New Zealand. Coddington’s homogenisation of Asian differences along nationality and ethnicity employ the term ‘Asian’ as an ascribed ‘race’ through a process of negative politicisation. Despite the press council upholding complaints that the article’s use of language was emotionally loaded and its content highly hostile and unbalanced, neither *North and South* nor Deborah Coddington would apologise (see Eleven and Bennetts, 11/6/2007). The latter went so far as to label the decision of the press as ‘pathetic’. In these three instances, the association of ‘Asian culture’ with the immoral contributes to greater ethnic divisions when the host society is encouraged to view Asians and their cultures in a systematically distorted way. This homogenisation of Asian differences along nationality, language and
ethnicity also shows us how ‘Asian’ functions as a racial identity that is ascribed rather than self-determined. It is argued that this imposition of a racial identity generates some unsettling psychological effects on Asian New Zealanders which are quite difficult to identify.

The following section uses qualitative data to examine evidence of this issue as a prelude to a discussion of the need to take prophylactic measures against undesirable mental health problems. There is however an important rider that needs to be spelt out first. In response to the occasional instances of informants making reference to terms like ‘non-Caucasian’, ‘kiwi’, ‘white’ or ‘European’, the researcher does acknowledge that the respondents’ use of these terms are essentialist and equally problematic as ‘Asian’. For the purposes of clarity, it should be stated that ‘Asian’ had to be analysed in the context of ‘whiteness’ as the naturalised (historically constructed) norm by which all other groups are differentiated. In a seminal article on the construction of ‘whiteness’ as an invisible racial category in New Zealand society, Dyson (1996: 55) postulated a similar notion of ‘indigenised whiteness’ positioned alongside essentialised versions of ‘Maoriness’. In effect then, the responses in this section can reveal, to varying extents, how the informants view themselves as culturally distinct from the ascendant, invisible ‘white’ group.

4.11 Unsettled Asian identities

In the course of carrying out qualitative research, it sufficed that most respondents experienced being placed in the spot-light of stereotypical gazes that objectified and exoticised their Asian-ness. Most ostensibly, they found themselves in
assigned roles of patronising expectations they considered repugnant and pejorative.

The following young Malaysian woman narrates how she only became an ‘Asian’ after migrating to Wellington with her family in 1994 as a teenager. She arrived completely unprepared to accept this essentialised racial label that homogenised her unique personal and ethnic identity that resonates with Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1991: 71) criticism of legal pan-ethnic group categories that are over-simplified because they include “multiple possible subgroups” that are disregarded:

> I think it’s really really crap, because they always say ooh, ‘bloody Asians’, but hello, I’m an Asian but I didn’t do that…like you know what I mean. You get clumped in one basket. It’s like saying that everyone who looks White is European when things are more complicated than that.

> …I wanted to integrate with kiwis but it was quite difficult so I thought I’ll join the Christian group in school but I don’t know whether it was just me being a Malaysian…but it was very hard to form friendships and I had a couple of instances of younger students making fun of me…like I remember going up the stairs and these two kiwi boys making mock Chinese accents…you know the way Chinese speak English so I turned around and just said “can’t you speak English?”… I can’t stand it when people come up to me and say “whheerrree aaarrrrreeee yyyooouuu frrrooommm” thinking that I cannot speak English.

This respondent’s account of ‘becoming an Asian’ corresponds to Iris Marion Young’s (1990: 59) contention that culturally dominated peoples become members of groups constructed by the dominant when they are ‘stamped with an essence’ which they are expected to internalise, “at least to the extent that they are forced to react to the behaviour of others influenced by those images”.

In a similar vein, a third-generation New Zealand born Chinese man in his mid-twenties shared his unique experiences at school:

> It’s more the stereotypes you get like FOB ‘fresh-of the boat’ where you get those stereotypically ‘Asian’ things like speaking loudly among themselves in their language and bad driving…sometimes I just laugh about stereotypes and
that sort of stuff. I went to high school and had a game, there was about a
third of the class that was Chinese or Asian and we used to play this game
called ‘Asian Invasion’...you know on our hallway we had the Asians and
fresh-off the boats on one side and kiwis on the other side and we Asians
would race to the front to win the invasion.

I found this account evocative because of the respondent’s sense of humour. But more
tellingly, it reflects the ambivalence a New Zealand born Asian identifying with New
Zealand values would exemplify when affirming a subordinate racial identity. In this
case, the reproduction of the ‘Asian Invasion’ stereotype is acted out in a sensational
way that is both liveable and containable for the mainstream. Acting upon this abasing
role reinforces an exotic sense of difference, which encourages the subject to ‘know
his place’ in society because he is not a White New Zealander.

More revealingly, the following narrative illustrates how attempts to
circumvent and defy racialised expectations usually result in further attempts to
subordinate Asian subjects within their stereotypical roles. A Malaysian female
professional in possession of a Master of Arts degree from a New Zealand university
narrated her experiences at work with great insight:

Sometimes I feel uncertain about my own identity and it’s really hard for me
to claim my own ethnicity in New Zealand. When there’s a function at my
work place and I choose to wear a costume that typifies my ethnicity, even
though I don’t relate so closely to my ethnicity, it’s just one of the ways that I
do or can still kind of relate to it but when I do wear it, for one, my kiwi
colleagues well most of them will always say oh that’s a beautiful dress blah
blah blah, but there’re definitely some who would say oh you should wear
that everyday and I wonder why. I really enjoy wearing other clothes so why
should I be stuck in this? I feel it exoticises me and that’s why I wouldn’t
wear it on a normal day

…the strange thing is I have a German colleague who belongs to the Hare
Krishna sect here in Christchurch. She’d go early in the morning sometimes to
do an offering to the gods and that involved cooking something and offering it
and having breakfast there. She’d bring some of that to work in a sari that’s
very very badly dressed it’s always terrible. Anyhow, she’s allowed to eat her
curries and whatever with her fingers in the staffroom, smelly food really, wearing a sari and everyone is respecting of her, doesn’t ask her anything but if I have a sandwich with curry in it, everyone goes, “oh what’s that smell?”…It’s really strange, if you’re White and choose to go to a strange religion or an Asian thing, they’re really accepting. Hinduism and Buddhism are terribly fashionable these days and White people want to know a lot about those philosophies and yet people [Asians] who come with those philosophies and have them in their background and live according to them are not acceptable because oh they haven’t learnt how to live…it’s a tremendous paradox. A terrible paradox!

In refusing to wear her traditional costume, this respondent clearly did not wish to be exoticised as an Asian. The stifling effects of covert racism are echoed in her self-avowed inability to ‘claim her own ethnicity’ whenever her colleagues want her to live-out their perceived images of herself as an ‘Asian’ she finds abasing. Here, the process of exoticisation restricted this respondent from negotiating her personal life beyond the ‘Othered’ version of self ascribed to her. In contrast to the acceptability of her White German colleague’s preference for Indian food and dressing, she is positioned somewhat voyeuristically and sadistically so that her ‘Asianness’ can be objectified as an aestheticised aberration to whiteness as the unspoken norm. This respondent’s experiences resonate with what Bhattacharyya (2000: 481) describes as a black person’s refusal to the demand that they be ‘typical’ and taken as “an example of their racial group...and a means of analysing the whole”.

In these three narratives, I should add a rider that those individuals responsible for assigning these pejorative identities on their Asian counterparts are unlikely to be conscious of their actions and are not criticised here. Nevertheless, it is evident that the negative connotations of ‘Asian’ position Asian New Zealanders with false versions of their identities they find pejorative and reject. This is a way in which
‘Asian’ can often be used as a hierarchical racial category to dominate and dehumanise. The root of this problem is well-encapsulated by an ‘Asian’ respondent who has lived in New Zealand for thirty-one years:

…I think Kiwis don’t really know who Asians are for a start but they label Asians those who look, I suppose those who have non-Caucasian features shall we say and who have a particular skin colour perhaps, and they can’t tell the difference between Malaysian, Singaporean, Japanese, Chinese, Koreans and so on, they can’t so they just label them all Asians…I feel ambivalent as to whether or not I’m Asian. Sometimes people say things about Asians in my presence, some negative things and I’m sort of thinking, are you including me in that or are you including me as one of you so you can say what you’re saying, so I think New Zealanders have an interesting concept of the Asians.

As mainstream New Zealanders do not really know who Asians are and do not distinguish between Asians, an Asian identity is only adopted when one comes to realise that s/he is an ‘Asian’ on the basis of a shared oppression. This often occurs, according to Iris Marion Young (1990: 46), when groups are constructed by outsiders without those identified having any prior consciousness of themselves as a group. Clearly then, Thais, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Malaysians and Filipinos etc only ‘discover’ that they are ‘Asians’ when they arrive in New Zealand and begin to identify with those from other Asian countries on the basis of how the mainstream treats them; despite the extant language and cultural differences. Thus, ‘Asian’ in New Zealand parlance exists as an essentialised racial category created for immigrants as opposed to a self-assigned ethnic identity.

In any social context, the imposition of stereotyped ‘Asian’ identities renders it psychologically uncomfortable and difficult for any Asian New Zealander to be certain of their unique ethnic identities and history. It also makes their lives and identities fragmented and incoherent, both socially and psychologically. There is in
effect, a *split* between one’s self-determined ethnicity and the racialised version of self ascribed to the subject. In metaphorical terms, this split between the actual and ascribed identity of any racialised individual exemplifies a *transruption* or unsettling effect on the person’s original identity. This pathology is exemplified, on the one hand, by a stereotypical version of ‘self’ one is *expected* to live up to that is considered abasing and inaccurate; and on the other, by being *humiliated* or *dismayed* at expectations to live out a false racial identity.

Asians and non-White immigrants in New Zealand would be more likely to suffer from mental health problems due to constant problems of racial abuse, marginalisation and discrimination in the labour market, as O’Hare (2004: 19) stated in the *New Zealand Listener*:

> Marginalisation has been shown to be associated with the poorest mental health, and migrants and refugees with poor English have been among the most marginalised here for decades.

There is insufficient space to discuss problems of mental illness affecting Asian New Zealanders in greater depth but it is still plausible to suggest that anyone adapting to a new culture and new life in a new country would be more vulnerable to a variety of mental health problems. Language problems, unemployment, separation, and traumatic experiences after migration are, according to Ho (2004 *et passim*), factors associated with minor mental disorders like depression and anxiety. Thus, matters would also be exacerbated for Asians if they are imbued with a sense of worthlessness and uncertainty through expectations to demonstrate the negative and inferior qualities embedded in the concept ‘Asian’. The more congenial aspects of a person’s self-
determined personal and ethnic identities are inhibited and devalued by the mainstream; the upshot of this is an unsettled and fragmented sense of self-worth.

In the absence of a stable psychological edifice for Asians to confidently express and affirm the more congenial dimensions of their original cultures in New Zealand, it is not difficult to understand why they are often accused of not contributing and participating actively in New Zealand society. As Asians are now the largest and fastest growing minority group, they need to be accepted and treated with respect. The continued failure to harness their untapped skills is likely to presage greater socio-economic and mental health problems in the long term. Thus, the question we are now confronted with is what will happen if Asians and other minority groups continue to be marginalised and segregated. The fears expressed by this New Zealand university educated Asian respondent illuminate the likelihood of marginalisation precipitating mental illnesses and various types of fundamentalisms emerging:

I do fear that if New Zealanders continue to stay separate and only relate to other cultures on a very superficial level without actually accepting how they really do things and only accepting them if they do things correctly like how they want them to do it then I think you’re going to have very segregated communities. And Kiwis always say “oh the Chinese only like to stick within their own community and I’m thinking “do you not see why that is?” you know. They don’t see it as a two-way thing; it’s always blamed on the other people. And sooner or later, you’re going to have very alienated and disenfranchised people who just don’t relate and young people who are struggling to find their identity not able to live as a separate person because they identify so much with being a kiwi kid and yet are not accepted as a kiwi kid at school or whatever and then they’re going to do things like pull out their guns and shoot all their classmates which is awful! Just absolutely awful and then that points the finger again to the ethnic minority person who was mad you know mentally unhealthy etc and the society doesn’t accept any responsibility for that at all. They don’t see that their kids not accepting and teasing the Asian kids and not including them is what’s causing all this.
Here, this interviewee’s judicious insights explain why isolation within one’s own ethnic group is inevitable whenever attempts to integrate and participate are met with disapproval and disdain. Furthermore, Asians will be prone to identifying their ‘Asian’ cultures and original ways of life as aberrational and inferior to local New Zealand norms. According to Greenslade (1992: 213), this ‘internalised opposition’ is pervasive in Irish colonial subjects desiring acceptance and approval from their British colonisers:

The native’s consciousness and need for identity need to find their validation in the Other, while at the same time being tinged by an historical sense of inferiority resulting from the need to do so. The native has to recognize his or her inferiority in order to achieve self-validation but, at the same time, a secure identity eludes him or her because total identification with the Other is impossible; the colonized can never become the colonist, at best s/he can only replace him or her.

We need to recognise that such feelings of inadequacy are likely to be found in immigrants, indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in every country. Factors inducing the self-isolation of Asians could eventually boil down to despair and a loss of one’s sense of being with language problems playing a less significant role. The main antidote for potential cases of mental illness affecting Asians and other ethnic minorities in New Zealand does not lie entirely in them divesting themselves of their perceived inferiority or in their ‘hosts’ tolerating their differences. If the latter could levitate towards affirming the similarities they share with the former in their human experience, both groups can eventually exploit rather than tolerate their differences. This would provide the ideal conditions for a more harmonious future that would challenge the exoticisation of other cultures.
The deliberate act of rejecting the Chinese and Indians of the last century as normal citizens should not be repeated again. The more recent failures to welcome Asians have, according to Spoonley and Fleras (1999: 152), “robbed New Zealanders of any experience of dealing with diversity as normal or beneficial, except in the most superficial manner”. As New Zealand is geographically closer to Asia, the population’s antipathy and aversion to Asians is, at any rate, unsustainable for its future. The underlying assumption that Asians are profoundly different because of their practices, values and beliefs is rooted in pervasive assumptions about culture that are central to social scientific inquiry. One such assumption is the reductionist view that people are puppets of their culture and are therefore driven to behave in a certain way because they are Asian, Muslim or European. The use of culture as an all-purpose explanation for differences in human behaviour, according to Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 41), is problematic because it is easier to confirm and verify cultural differences but much harder to falsify. It is therefore instructive to jettison stereotypical notions of culture that conceal the similarities which immigrant cultures share with their host societies. The actions and behaviour of Asian minorities need to be understood as personal, individual choices rather than cultural dictates. This involves rejecting assumptions about particular behavioural patterns as being definitive of a culture (see Phillips 2007). Once individuals from ethnic minority groups are treated as autonomous agents and not representative of a reified Asian or European culture, differences on the surface like skin colour will no longer be used as stereotypes and predictors of behavioural patterns. This would obviate the
The hitherto issues which have been raised about the monolithic concept of ‘Asian’ are indeed problematic in New Zealand parlance but not necessarily unique. Thus, it would be worth looking at the secondary literature for a comparable country like Britain to obtain a cross-national perspective. In Britain, for example, the nomenclatural protocol for the usage of this term is different. Almost without exception, ‘Asians’ refer exclusively to South Asians originally from the Indian sub-continent of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives. Whilst as aforementioned in the introduction, immigrants from South East Asia are the vast majority of those most commonly referred to as ‘Asian’ in New Zealand, people of East Asian phenotype are usually referred to as ‘Orientals’ in Britain. The antecedents of these differences in nomenclature can be attributed to the two countries’ respective histories of colonialism, migration and settlement. In the case of New Zealand, the global and economic processes which provided impetus for the colour-blind immigration policy introduced in 1986 were discussed in the preceding chapter. The decision to accept immigrants from non-traditional European source countries was an inevitable affirmation of the fact that closer economic relationships with East Asia were needed for New Zealand to survive in a highly competitive global market. Thus, the majority of Asians that New Zealanders come into contact with are those of East Asian phenotype. In the case of Britain, it was the decline of the British Empire that
inaugurated the arrival of its colonised ‘coloured’ peoples. At the end of the Second World War, Commonwealth citizens from British colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and South Asia were recruited to meet the demands of Britain’s post-war economy. In the context of a negative response to the arrival of these ‘coloured’ peoples during the 1950’s, British race-relations acts (most specifically, the 1965, 1968 and 1976 Acts) were passed to tackle racial discrimination (see Solomos 2003). The establishment of these policies to address racism, according to Solomos (2003: 83), amounted to the government’s recognition that the majority of Black and South Asian immigrants from the New Commonwealth countries and Pakistan (NCWP) were ‘here to stay’. Notwithstanding these efforts, racisms directed towards the smaller groups of minorities such as the Irish, Chinese, Jews and gypsies were not addressed. During the 1980’s however, the category of ‘NCWP’ was replaced by the new monolithic term of ‘black’ and its extension to represent other minority groups like the Chinese, Irish and Jews. As a result, Britain’s new race-relations paradigm was, in essence, a black-white dualism that represented racism as deriving from the fixed hierarchical positions of ‘black’ as subordinate/oppressed and ‘white’ as dominant/super-ordinate (Mac an Ghaill, 1999: 12).

This shift in representation was informed by theories and concepts from the USA, and most significantly, the Civil Rights and American Black Power Movement’s anti-racist strategies. Nonetheless, this American conceptual apparatus was never adapted to the nuances of Britain’s ethnic fabric. In its original guise, ‘black’ had successfully represented the solidarity of black Americans as a homogeneous group who were descendants of African slaves. In Britain, problems
with ‘black’ were concentrated around the evocation of sub-Saharan roots and the failure to encapsulate the interests of groups like the Irish, Chinese, Jews, Arabs and gypsies who do not identify themselves as ‘black’. This conceptual problem with ‘black’ was however not only the consequence of drawing upon inappropriate theories and concepts from the USA. The adoption of the American concepts and terms for theorising British race-relations obviated attempts to understand the local historical and structural context and how it was shaped by Britain’s colonial legacy and imperial experience. Other problematic notions which were inappropriately deployed included those of ‘race riots’, ‘segregation’, ‘ghettoes’ and so on, that according to Small and Solomos (2006: 251), proliferated unwarranted, over-exaggerated panics amongst politicians and the anxious indigenous white population.

In contrast to the British perspective, it could be argued that ‘Asian’ in New Zealand parlance is a concept that can be understood on its own terms as it was never borrowed from another country, but still comparable to ‘black’ in Britain. In the context of an explicitly bicultural environment that does not permit the transposition of an American or British conceptual apparatus, it is apparent that Maori have clearly disavowed any expressions of solidarity with all other ethnic groups. Thus, ‘Asian’ in New Zealand is comparable to ‘black’ in Britain in so far as the label represents the ascribed identities and solidarity of East and South Asians, on the basis of their ethnic origins and how they have been designated by the mainstream. It is not the intention of this comparative discussion to concentrate on the failings of the pervasive black-white dualism in Britain. Instead, the intention is to highlight how race and ethnicity has been conceptualised in Britain through the black-white dualism and lessons which
New Zealand could learn from its deficiencies and successes as well. A misleading caricature of the black-white paradigm’s failings would emerge if the legacies of its anti-racist strategies are not mentioned.

4.13 Political ‘blackness’ in Britain

Central to most academic and political debates on racial disadvantage and ethnicity in Britain is the equation of Britishness with whiteness and the assumption that the only legitimate British people are white. This is also the fundamental contradiction at the heart of criticisms that political anti-racist mobilisations were counter-productive and ineffectual. Proponents of anti-racism were guilty of affirming the racist belief that discrete ethnic categories and cultural differences were the key features of racial difference (Gilroy, 1992: 50). In short, the hegemony of political blackness was discredited due to criticisms of cultural essentialism and reductionism that could not deal with shifting forms of racism which were discursively produced. In educational debates about the ‘underachievement’ of black students, for example, Rattansi (1992: 17) explains that the government’s cause for concern was based on research findings claiming that the allegedly ‘ignorant, uneducated parents’ of African-Caribbean students who did not help their children academically at home needed to be better informed. Further arguments that the preponderance of single-mothers and absence of male role-models in African-Caribbean families were a cause of academic underachievement embodied pejorative and essentialist readings of ‘culture’ that critics of anti-racism denounced as ‘racist’. Whatever the strengths or flaws of anti-racism, the black-white dualism was criticised for oversimplifying the
key issues through its failure to “grasp the specificities of emerging inter-ethnic social relationships and their engagements with a different racial semantics” (Mac an Ghaill, 2002: 116).

The strictures of the black-white dualism were not limited to its concentration on ‘non-white’ groups as the recipients of racism. Due to the timeless notion of racism as colour prejudice embodied in the black-white binary, discussions on racisms against white groups like the Irish, Jews and gypsies have been largely under-represented in contemporary academic debates (see Silverman and Yuval-Davis 1999). The Irish in Britain have been denied rights to ‘authentic’ ethnic minority status and their experiences of anti-Irish racial discrimination downplayed (Mac an Ghaill 1999; 2000), notwithstanding well-documented records of the Irish being subject to harsh and disorientating experiences in the face of British prejudice during the late nineteenth (Swift 1992); alongside continuing racialisation in the twentieth century (Hickman and Walter 1997). As inferior ‘colonial others’ in Britain, Irish immigrants who arrived in Britain after the war were stereotyped as dirty, stupid, drunk, lazy and violent (Mac an Ghaill, 2000: 138). In the 1990’s, the pervasiveness of the black-white representation of race and racism continued to obviate relevant research into the ethnic penalties that the Irish face in Britain. To address this imbalance, Hickman and Walter (1997) investigated anti-Irish racisms in London, Birmingham and Manchester. The study reported around 79 per cent of respondents encountering name-calling at work, having their accents ridiculed and negative stereotyping. The collective erasure and disavowal of anti-Irish racisms has been a direct result of the failure to adapt the American black-
white dualism to the nuances of the British nation-state, and the historical specificities of its imperial legacies.

In virtue of these inherent problems of cultural and colour essentialism, calls to transcend the colour paradigm and move towards an analysis of the inter-relationship between racism and other social domains continue to dominate theoretical debates on racial disadvantage and ethnic diversity in Britain. During the late 1980’s and 1990’s, the preponderance of arguments in favour of jettisoning the black-white dualism provided impetus for a new emphasis on mapping out racial divisions in the religious, sexualised and gendered spheres. The prominent work of Tariq Modood, for example, was influential in defeating the hegemony of political blackness. As a British Muslim, Modood contended that ‘black’ was an inappropriate category to represent people of South Asian origins due to the prominence it gave to people of African and Caribbean origins. In short, the label was not conducive to Asian ethnic pride, obscured the needs of British Asians, and was incapable of recognising the emergence of hybrid identities (see Modood 1994, 2000, 2003). The upshot of these problems are similar to the erasure of anti-Irish, Catholic racisms in so far as the pervasiveness of political blackness would have bypassed calls for legitimate anti-racist mobilisations and lobbying led by Muslims themselves.

4.14 The historical and logical versions of the black-white dualism

In the literature on race and ethnicity in Britain, it has been frequently stated ad nauseam that the widespread and reiterated reasons of essentialism mentioned earlier provide the best reasons to jettison the black-white dualism. However, it is argued that
these reasons to transcend the colour paradigm have been over-stated and oversimplified at the same time. It is plausible to suggest that the current framings of problems in the forms of cultural essentialism and reductionism overshadow the benefits of its accurate representations of racial disadvantage in Britain during the first modernity. Critics of political blackness could miss the fact that, despite the failures to adapt the black-white dualism to the uniqueness of the British nation-state’s historical legacies, they have yet to analytically distinguish between the logical and historical forms of the black-white dualism. By rejecting it on the grounds that the dualism is an inaccurate conceptual apparatus for representing ethnic minorities like British Muslims, the Irish and the Chinese, theorists like Modood do not question the extent to which it successfully advanced their interests. Mac an Ghaill (1999: 61) notes that these criticisms often embody, to varying extents, a historical amnesia concerning the historically specific legislative and political circumstances of racial exclusion. Elsewhere, in his work on the Irish in Britain, Mac an Ghaill argued that the racial dualism of black and white had served to highlight, through a socio-historical approach, the causes and effects of racism and anti-racist mobilisations across particular periods and geographical spaces (see Mac an Ghaill 2002). On these grounds, Mac an Ghaill is concentrating on the fact that the black-white dualism, notwithstanding its origins in the Negritude movement across the Atlantic, can still be used to provide knowledge on the collective forms of historical racisms. Thus, Mac an Ghaill’s call for theorists to simultaneously transcend the dualism whilst holding onto its historical legacies operates specifically at the level of the colour paradigm’s failings that arise from its inadequacies in conceptualising the historical development.
of Britain’s colonial experiences. It would therefore be appropriate to identify his position as the *historical version* of the black and white dualism.

On the other hand, the much reiterated criticisms of the black-white dualism’s conceptual essentialism and reductionism concentrate more specifically at the level of the *disciplinary development* of ‘black’ and ‘white’ as analytical sociological concepts. Theorists like Modood and Rattansi have maintained that the failure of ‘black’ to resonate with British Muslims and other ethnic groups renders the label ineffectual, both politically and academically. Such arguments have always been predicated on a problem with conceptual definitions and logical presuppositions. Thus, it would be more appropriate to distinguish this from the earlier historical position as the *logical version* of the black and white dualism. After making this analytical distinction between the logical and historical versions, it becomes apparent that calls for the transcendence of the dualism have been *reinforced* by the historical position. As critics generally do not differentiate between these two versions of the black-white dualism, the fixation on its conceptual strictures hinders rather than makes it easier for British sociology to move beyond the black-white dualism. The failure to distinguish between its historical and logical versions obviates the need for accurate historiographies of past racisms and their spatialisations. In this regard, there is a need to avoid declaring prematurely that the black-white dualism is no longer appropriate for understanding the present. It is crucial then, to remember that whilst the historical argument is as contentious as the logical, it remains true that the black-white binary can no longer be regarded as a complete and accurate representation of racial division in Britain. Nevertheless, it would also be worth exploring, at both the logical and historical
planes, the relative extent in which the colour paradigm succeeds or fails in advancing our knowledge on past and present racisms. In the present climate of heightening emphasis on fragmentary identities, the black-white paradigm may still be useful for providing insight on how survivals (or derivatives of survivals) of old racisms are ‘renegotiated’ into the second modernity and thereby enable temporal continuity to be maintained.

4.15 Lessons for New Zealand

Like ‘black’ in Britain, ‘Asian’ in New Zealand parlance is primarily used to represent racial division on the basis of colour. Nevertheless, in so far as issues of Asian immigration and ethnic differences have always attracted academic and political attention, it may be beneficial to hold onto this monolithic label. Persisting problems of overt racial abuse, and xenophobia continue to be reflected in the sensational media coverage of Asians in New Zealand. More worryingly, in the context of the highly hostile and xenophobic media discourses like the ones proliferated through the media by Coddington (2006) and Booth (1993), the public’s fears and misperceptions of Asians are most likely to be affirmed rather than challenged. Thus, it remains the case that, on the basis of their highly visible differences, Asians will be more likely to face ethnic employment penalties, relative to immigrants from Anglophone countries, and remain vulnerable to racial taunts and abuse in public. On these grounds, the retention of ‘Asian’ as it currently exists will help provide insight on how anti-Asiatic racisms resonate with New Zealand’s entry into the second modernity from 1986 till now, and beyond.
As the Fourth Labour government’s mandate to adopt a colour-blind immigration policy for the first time in 1984 was entirely economic, certain historical parallels can be drawn with Britain’s post-war demands for labour from Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere. Like New Zealand in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the British population was not prepared for an influx of coloured aliens. For this reason, riots and attacks on black and Asian people by whites during the 1950’s and 1960’s in Britain have been typically explained by the arrival of a large number of coloured immigrants from the Commonwealth (see Solomos 2003; Small and Solomos 2006). In the case of New Zealand, the politicisation of Asian immigration during the late 1980’s and late 1990’s has also been commonly attributed to the population’s disjuncture towards the uncontrolled ‘Asian Inv-Asian’ that underscored the infamous Pat Booth article of 1993, mentioned earlier. In contrast to more recent years, it could be argued that the present day anti-Asian sentiments have started shifting towards an emphasis on the perceived stereotypical immoral and surreptitious character traits of Asian settlers. The large number of immigrants is therefore not an adequate explanation anymore. For the purposes of tracing the temporal specificities of racial division in New Zealand just illustrated, the monolithic notion of ‘Asian’ can be used to delineate the forms and contents of these manifestations, for the purposes of historical and cross-national comparisons. As anti-racist mobilisations by Asians in New Zealand are generally low-key and have not gone beyond rallies against racism and the boycotting of magazines such as *North and South*, it would still be necessary to transcend the logical strictures of ‘Asian’ as a pan-ethnic label in order to identify the ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ amongst existing Asian New Zealanders. This can be
achieved by examining the interplay of ‘Asian-ness’ with the gendered, economic and sexualised domains (through qualitative means). The subsequent section aims to broaden the epistemological framework for researching race and ethnicity in New Zealand by examining the convergence of race with the notion of risk, as a key dimension of the second modernity.

4.2 Beyond Colour Dualisms and Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society Thesis

In contemporary New Zealand, risk pervades the daily lives of New Zealanders from all ethnic and social backgrounds. Over the course of the late twentieth century to date, there has been a growing body of knowledge on the concept of risk and its significance in western countries. The debate on risk is a unique event, perhaps even a turning point, for theorising modernity and its futures. For the first time in social theory, there have been widespread discussions on the dangers and threats associated with the rise of post-industrialism and how people have altered the ways in which they pursue their lives. The extant literature within the social sciences concentrates on how people in Europe, Britain and Australia define and manage risk in their daily lives. In this climate of a heightening awareness and interest in the concept of risk, it would be instructive to ensure that there is research on this concept by examining, both empirically and theoretically, the pervasiveness of risk and its interplay with race, cultural and ethnic identity in New Zealand.

As a prelude to identifying the relevant dimensions of risk in New Zealand relevant to this study that are relevant for research, it is necessary to briefly examine the tenets of the risk society thesis originating in Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society: Towards
a New Modernity (Beck 1992). In sum, Beck contends that we need to go beyond simplified understandings of the recent social transformations in western societies commonly defined as ‘post-Fordism’, ‘post modernity’ or ‘late modernity’. The macro-structural changes characterising the transition of western societies to this late-modern era have been evident in the pluralisation of institutional practices, including the crisis of the welfare state, globalisation and economic deregulation. Manufactured risks in our late-modern societies, according to Beck, are inevitable due to mass industrialisation, modernisation and techno-scientific development. In existing debates on the viability of recombinant genetic engineering for instance, a great deal of anxiety and controversy has arisen because there are many empirical questions about the outcomes of proposed experiments we cannot find answers to. We are fully aware that should our research endeavours backfire, the worst ‘doomsday scenario’ foreseeable would result in reverberations affecting the entire human race, not just a few individuals or communities. The anxieties and risks generated by these rapid modernising transformations are a defining feature of what Beck calls the modern ‘world risk society’:

The driving force in the class society can be summarized by the phrase: I am hungry! The movement set in motion by the risk society, on the other hand, is expressed in the statement: I am afraid! The commonality of anxiety takes the place of the commonality of need. The type of the risk society marks in this sense a social epoch in which solidarity from anxiety arises and becomes a political force (Beck, 1992: 49).

The diffusion of manufactured risks – and changing nature of risks – has resulted in socio-cultural practices becoming increasingly fragmented and susceptible to change through our prophylactic attempts to circumvent risks in our daily lives. The
predilection we have to question the outcomes of modernisation and willingness to alter our socio-cultural practices to deflect risks is, in Beck’s view, evidence that the world risk society is self-reflexive and self-critical as well. The upshot of this is ‘a surge in the individuation’ of Western countries and declining significance of traditional fixities around class, gender and other social identity formations (Beck, 1992: 87). Essential to this ‘tragic individualisation’ is a growing awareness that governments and social institutions responsible for controlling uncertainties are inefficient and counter-productive (Beck, 2006a: 308). In our prevailing conditions of existence, individuals have to be responsible for the consequences of whatever decisions they make. Thus, individualisation is an involuntary process that impinges upon the lifestyles and biographies of all peoples as the labour market becomes “the axis of living in the industrial age” (Beck, 1992: 139). Individualised activities, it needs to be stressed, are required, and embedded in social institutions and affect contemporary conditions of employment (McGuigan, 2006: 220).

In the last chapter, it was briefly mentioned that in New Zealand, there is much anxiety as to how long the nation can continue to insulate rather than minimise the country’s beautiful environment from the cross-border environmental problems with which other Western countries are faced. As yet, fears of immigration and their manifestations in New Zealand have not been properly considered from the perspective of Beck’s world risk society that is intrinsically Eurocentric. It is therefore necessary to insert a number of riders. First, Beck’s work is not intended for the purposes of comparing the types of anxieties and risks in New Zealand with those in European societies. Second, it is not suggested in anyway that the structures of
environmental concerns and risks that Ulrich Beck identifies in Europe and New Zealand are similar. Instead, this section adopts an exploratory position that focuses on the ways that the risk society thesis can be used to sharpen our understandings of anxiety and fears related to immigration, race and ethnicity. As modernist categories like gender, class and ethnicity have been elided by Beck’s reliance on ‘meta’ concepts and lack of empirical data (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003: 77), it is hoped that this section can address this imbalance.

4.21 A framework of race, ethnicity and risk in New Zealand

In New Zealand, the risks of environmental degradation and terrorism are two features of globalisation that have their antecedents in non-European immigration. In debates on Asian immigrants, as mentioned in the earlier chapter, controversy often arises because non-European immigrants are considered ill-suited for life in Western democracies. To make matters worse, the media’s over-stated representations of the perceived dangers and risks that Asians pose to the New Zealand environment and social order add fuel for controversy. Within this lacuna of risk, it is evident that Asians and non-European groups are cast as those who are deemed most risky by populist politicians and some sections of the media. Ranginui Walker controversially maintained that it would only be a matter of time for the environmental conditions in Asia to be replicated in New Zealand (Walker, 1995: 297). The negative consequences of Asian immigration on the beautiful New Zealand environment, as he argued, would “impinge on both Maori and Pakeha” (Ibid: 299). Here, Walker expressed the anxiety of a ‘doomsday scenario’ caused by immigration when New Zealand would culminate
in a totalitarian, polluted state denuded of its abundant resources. The arguments and principles of risks and uncertainty invoked by Walker, like those promulgated by populist journalists, Deborah Coddington (2006) and Pat Booth (1993) are not lightly dismissed by an anxious population. This is because ecology has, in New Zealand and other settler societies, provided indigenous political movements with “new possibilities” that emphasise the importance of conserving the natural environment (see Bhattacharyya, Gabriel and Small, 2002: 150). Thus, it is not surprising to see that the economic benefits of non-European immigrants and inevitability of immigration for the nation’s survival is likely to recede in importance when ecological risks come to the fore.

This exemplifies what Beck (2006a: 35) identifies as a blurring of the division between the rational and the hysterical. Against the backdrop of imminent terror threats and incalculable ecological catastrophes foreseeable in Europe and America, the conservative principle has its logical appeal in New Zealand. Thus, research will be required in the near future to identify the new and expanding varieties of environmental risks and other public insecurities that will presage new structures of racial and ethnic divisions in New Zealand. The crucial questions that researchers need to pose concern public perceptions in the popular media’s reportage of the foreseeable consequences that ‘unsustainable cultures’ will have on the country, despite the government assurances that immigration is important. Qualitative data on such issues of trust would provide essential knowledge on the population’s trust in politicians and the media.
At first glance, it might be thought that the hitherto configuration of ‘the environment at risk’ from immigration is quite straightforward, at least in principle. The empirical facts – and probabilities of risk – that can be uncovered about attitudes towards the riskiness of immigrants may not involve particularly difficult normative or conceptual problems. Unfortunately, it could be argued that such inquiries will fail to go beyond uninformative conclusions that the mainstream’s fears are ‘irrational’. Thus, there may be much empirical, but very little theoretical sense in investigating the risk perceptions towards immigrants. This is essentially a conceptual problem compounded by the difficulties in maintaining a clear analytical distinction between the riskiness of minority cultures and the riskiness of global environmental and economic risks; it is difficult to discuss environmental problems without talking about a burgeoning national population that is the result of immigration. Making a clear distinction is difficult when, “population scares are articulated on the assumption that the lifestyle and survival of western peoples are under attack from less deserving and burgeoning populations of the poor world” (Bhattacharyya, Gabriel and Small, 2002: 144). This best explains why British and other European immigrants remain preferred in New Zealand.

As the threats of global risks are incalculable and uninsurable with no sectors of the population being immune to their consequences, it would be more propitious to challenge divisions premised on prophylactic attempts to deflect global risks by examining the ways in which minorities and immigrants also express the anxieties and fears of the majority, and how this affects their identities and biographies. The blurring of identities and subjectivities caused by shared risks, according to Tulloch and
Lupton (2003: 20), is seldom recognised in research on atomised risk adverse individuals. In view of this omission, the following section examines qualitative data suggesting that the ubiquity of shared risks has certain implications for traditional fixities of identities in New Zealand.

### 4.22 The ubiquity of shared risks: implications for the future

The questions posed to interviewees about the future challenges of multi-ethnic New Zealand yielded responses which encapsulated a few dominant categories of risk that converged with identity. These included environmental, financial and crime risks which were deemed important to the security and well-being of both immigrants and the majority who expressed a desire to continue pursuing their insouciant lives in New Zealand. Most ostensibly, a sense of fear and dread was also accompanied by an acknowledgement of a need for the government to contain the loss of control through conservative measures. An Irish-born woman in her late-sixties who migrated to New Zealand during the 1970’s from Birmingham, England earnestly hoped that British problems of ethnic segregation would not appear in New Zealand:

There’s also other things, simple things like what to do with the rubbish, put it in the right containers, don’t leave it in the garden to collect and you get the problems in England with rat problems because people are just not putting the rubbish in the right places and not cleaning up their gardens. This, I know upsets a lot of the Western people here, people don’t mind them living next door just as long as they look after the gardens and keep it nice and clean. They get upset because if you have people around you that are not doing that, the value of your house will go down. There’re a lot of these worries going through people’s minds.

I hope they will have a sense to integrate more and it’s happened in England where there’re places you can’t walk down if you’re white. That’s dreadful, it’s like they want areas just to themselves, there’s no hope for the future like that. To avoid a radical situation, there’re things happening in England that
are frightening. I for one can go back to when I completed my training, I was a nurse in a factory, for the first time, a certain group of men got jobs there and the English boys argued with them. I discovered they were carrying knives, this was 1962 or 61, and I had to take the knives off them to keep them in the surgery and let them collect them on the way out. The talk was that we got to carry knives because these men from other countries are carrying knives and I was horrified and that was a long time ago. A situation was developing between as they say ‘them’ and ‘us’ and it’s just got worse and worse. I’m not excusing the English boys, the ‘teddy boys’ the whatever they call themselves now. I know myself from my sisters that because of the drugs, whole communities are becoming awful. What has happened in the UK at the moment, in certain cities and places, because of drugs, the abuse the wives and children have to put up with is terrible. Drugs unfortunately are a cause of many problems in the world…when people come through immigration, there’s got to be a way of finding out their past behaviour in their own country. It would take an enormous amount of research and study to have just the simple man and woman on the street say, you’re an immigrant, I’m an immigrant in this country but let’s try and make sure that we’re all here to enjoy what we’ve got in this beautiful country and try to prevent the drugs coming in, and any person with radical ideas to come in. How that can happen I don’t know.

This pessimistic scenario of the future and desire to contain the varieties of foreseeable risks taken by the government to allow immigration exemplifies a blurring of the boundary between rationality and hysteria as illuminated earlier by Beck (2006a: 335). In a similar vein, this sense of ambivalence was also displayed by an Indian man who migrated to New Zealand in 1997 who added that his greatest fears for the future were that of ethnic strife.

More and more people who study here are now staying and starting to work here. That would’ve added to a certain amount of hostility unlike the older years when people would just return home. The government’s policy to allow people residence visas does not seem to take into consideration the consequences of their policies. People are not clearly explained as to why immigration is needed and they just don’t want Asians here. Every year they’re taking in 750 refugees from mostly Middle-Eastern countries so the future of New Zealand looks quite bleak to me actually. There’ll probably be domination by one or two ethnic groups and there will be different sorts of strife between these groups and the degree of tolerance that is seen now will be worsened.
Similarly, a twenty-two year old white male student from Zimbabwe predicted a bleak future for multi-ethnic New Zealand.

It’s going to be interesting because tolerance is going to be pushed a lot more and there’re going to be differences which will result in prejudices and fascism. Cultures are different, we’ve got to accept it and people aren’t going to altogether be happy being tolerant of some cultures which they frankly think are clearly wrong. So it’s going to lead to fascism and we need more talk and public debate and we need to bring it out in the open.

Despite this interviewee’s invisibility as a white person, he informed me that he did not like talking about his past and how he was forced to leave Zimbabwe, the place he called home. He was also worried about experiencing discrimination in the labour market because he is not a ‘straight-blue kiwi’.

The shared risk of foreign nationals not integrating into New Zealand culture was also externalised in the responses by a male Pakeha New Zealander in his mid-twenties who is a doctoral student. It was worth highlighting that this respondent was adamant in asserting his right to a job in New Zealand and “inherently despised and wouldn’t want any foreign national around who would take it away from him”. In maintaining that as a New Zealander, he should have “first dips and they should only pick up the drags” he confessed that his views were tantamount to “racism in a bucket”. Interestingly, he affirmed a preference for New Zealand becoming multicultural with some reservations:

I am excited about it and love the idea of New Zealand becoming more and more multicultural, I have a couple of fears however. The first would be the gain of multicultural-ness but loss of integration where we gain a divided community whereby you have an Italian or Chinese sector. But, in saying that, I don’t disagree with that. I know that if I were overseas, I would choose to stay with Kiwis so that’s fine. I fear in the short-term, New Zealand’s racism in my opinion, comes from us being a small nation in the first place is because we don’t know yet how to deal with that I think at least, until my generation is
in power or maybe a couple of generations after will we start to see a fair representation of those other nationalities in New Zealand.

Despite his residual ambivalences with multicultural diversity, this interviewee’s anxieties were also shared by respondents who were not native Pakeha or Maori New Zealanders. On a more optimistic note, this Chinese woman in her thirties also expressed an understanding of the rationale for these fears and anxieties carried by the ‘host society’:

We quite understand why the local people sometimes, you know, do the bad things to the foreigners and outsiders but sometimes you know it really hurts so that’s the problem even though I can understand. People like us who decided to stay here, we really want the local people to treat us equally as friends and we want to know them better. Most people are quite nice and sometimes it’s not their problem, we have our own problems as well, because of our language, we are different and we’re shy to talk to them. Kiwis also want to protect themselves and their environment; they think a lot of people like us who emigrate here take everything for granted like the fresh air and the sweet water. If they don’t protect the environment, we will all suffer so we can understand that and we share their concerns, we don’t want to see this country become polluted and crowded.

The reflexive awareness inherent in this respondent’s account illuminates the extent to which the environmental and socio-economic risks perceived as important to the mainstream’s security and well-being are ironically not only risks to herself as a minority, but effectively make it more difficult for her to integrate into the wider community despite her personal willingness to do so.

It is clear from these interviews that the shared understandings and perceptions of risks amongst the different respondents discussed here are not the results of common personality traits but arise from their common membership in New Zealand society, regardless of their ethnic origin. Through a shared sense of risk and distrust of the government’s promises of security, it is difficult for people, regardless of ethnicity,
to ascertain whether the foreseeable environmental and perceived risks of immigration are rational or hysterical. The prospects of well-adjusted minority groups forming an alliance with the majority would have an impact in conceptualising the structure of ethnic division. In the future, Beck maintains that it will be difficult to “prevent a diabolical power game with the hysteria of not-knowing” (2006a: 336) despite assurances of security and rationality from politicians and other scientific institutions that are now losing currency. The upshot of this blurring of the division between the rational and the hysterical would then result in a further erosion of boundaries between traditional fixities like ethnic groups and the distinction between the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.

In an attempt to protect themselves from the risk of New Zealand’s educational standards from being diluted by non-native English speaking Asians, a well-documented example of an inter-ethnic solidarity between the Pakeha and assimilated New Zealand born Chinese who were unsympathetic to the needs of their new counterparts is worthy of mention. It exemplifies what Yee (2003: 219) describes as “a group topping the racial hierarchy forming an alliance with the second-placed racial group in order to ‘gang up’ on other minorities”. In 1995, the Epsom Normal Primary School in Auckland introduced a highly controversial ‘no English, no entry’ policy to exclude Asian immigrants. Whilst supporters of the new Asian arrivals such as Manying Ip of the University of Auckland maintained that this measure was discriminatory and breached human rights law, the ‘old settlers’ from the New Zealand Chinese Association and Wellington Chinese Society immediately released press statements dissociating themselves from Ip in an attempt to defend the school’s
discriminatory policy (Pang, 2003: 251). This example illuminates how common sources of anxiety could create new forms of solidarity and new structures of ethnic division in the near-distant future.

The risk society thesis has proven useful for the purposes of identifying the creation of shared risks and anxieties in New Zealand associated with immigration, crime, and, to a limited extend, the feared impact of immigration on the environment. Nevertheless, its applicability is limited because an in-depth study on the division of labour and work biographies would be required to assess Beck’s notion of individualisation which is an integral dimension of the risk society thesis. It would therefore be presumptuous to conclude that individualisation undermines the significance of group identities in New Zealand. Different but fruitful areas of potential research could include identifying the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the various ethnic groups by examining the risks which are more specific to the gender, sexual or class domains that certain sections occupy. Conjecturally, but conceivably, it could be suggested that there are sections within a minority group that are more immune to certain types of risks due to their class, gender or occupational backgrounds.

**Conclusion**

This chapter maintained as its socio-historical context the two decades between 1987 and the present which have witnessed an increasing number of debates on the pertinence of race, immigration policy and ethnic identity in New Zealand society. As Asians are now the largest and most visible minority group, it was argued in the first section that the concept ‘Asian’ needs to be problematised and interrogated since it is
always used to demarcate differences between the Asian communities and the ‘host
society’. Using qualitative data, it was argued that the pervasiveness of this pan-ethnic
category homogeneously conflates the complex histories and identities of Asian New
Zealanders along distorted lines of culture, language and ethnicity. It was also
illustrated that this problem creates another more psychologically unsettling problem;
which was the proliferation of a ‘split’ between one’s self-determined identity and the
ascribed hegemonic ‘Asian’ label. In view of these problems associated with colour
reductionism and essentialism, a comparison was made with ‘black’ in Britain to
obtain a cross-national perspective on the analytical value of the ethnic identifier
‘Asian’ in New Zealand. It was argued, after distinguishing between the logical and
historical versions of British black-white dualism that it would be more propitious to
hold onto the ‘Asian’ as it currently exists in the near future for the purposes of
maintaining knowledge on how anti-Asiatic racisms resonate with New Zealand’s
entry into the second modernity from 1986 till now, and beyond. The second part of
this chapter sought to broaden the epistemological framework for researching race and
ethnicity in New Zealand by examining the convergence of race and ethnicity with the
notion of risk, as a key dimension of the second modernity by deploying Beck’s risk
society thesis to map out the relationship between risk and ethnic identity. Using
empirical data, it was suggested that the boundaries between traditional fixities of
ethnic or cultural differences are beginning to erode as the ubiquity of risks are
beginning to affect the lives of people in New Zealand, irrespective of their ethnic
origins or identities. The shared anxieties and risks, it was argued, could potentially
blur the divisions between the hysterical and rational and the internal and external, resulting in the emergence of more complex structures of societal division in future.
Chapter Five

The Multicultural Dilemma

The terms ‘multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’ litter government documentation and official policy, though little or no attempt is made precisely to define the nature or limits of this multiculturalism. The term is used in general public discourse in a broadly positive manner, sometimes contested, but more often juxtaposed, with ‘biculturalism’, as meaning the tolerance and acceptance of a certain form and degree of cultural difference. The ‘difference’ is clearly perceived as a deviation from the majority, Anglo-Celtic cultural norm, though it is never explicitly defined as such. The ambiguity, and lack of reflexive understanding, of the term ‘multiculturalism’ in New Zealand has served to make it particularly superficial, and prey to some of the problematic features of this policy and related ideology found in overseas settings.

(Clarke, 2006: 77)

Whereas the previous two chapters deployed a theoretical framework to historicise ethnic and racial division in New Zealand by examining the nation state’s position in modernity, this chapter aims to develop a contemporary understanding of how cultural diversity is governed in the country. In New Zealand, people from the less familiar countries of Asia are now the fastest growing and most visible minority ethnic groups. The population of Asians living in the country is expected to rise from 346,000 in 2003 to 604,000 or thirteen per cent of the population by 2021 (King, 2003: 506). With the reality of having to co-exist with Asians, the world’s most populous people group in New Zealand, questions of cultural difference and multicultural politics inevitably come to the fore and must be addressed. Although the arrivals of Asian and other non-European immigrants is often considered a culturally-enriching experience presenting
new economic and cultural opportunities, it has been perceived by the media and popular culture, as an imperiling risk and legitimate cause for suspicion. The challenge of finding ethical solutions to cultural differences and problems experienced by immigrants is very difficult – at both conceptual and policy levels. This task has not yet been fulfilled. Most attempts to do so have been exacerbated by a climate of ambiguity and controversy surrounding the nation-state’s constitutional biculturalism that is considered by state elites and academics to be incompatible with multiculturalism. Even though biculturalism in New Zealand’s political and academic discourse remains under-theorised and fuzzy, it is necessary to insert a rider that the discussion of biculturalism in this chapter will be limited, both notionally and empirically, to the country’s power-sharing arrangement between Maori and the Crown (Pakeha) that is institutionalised. Due to the multiple ways of interpreting bicultural discourse and the controversy that enshrouds debates surrounding biculturalism, including the claim that biculturalism amounts to nothing more than “reinserting indigenous culture into the monocultural norm” (Wevers, 2006: 8), the next chapter will examine the concept of biculturalism in greater detail before arguing that the already existing application of biculturalism precludes the simultaneous application of multiculturalism.

During the late 1980s, the notion of ‘multiculturalism’ and the multicultural realities of New Zealand became an important public issue. In the more recent years, debates about multiculturalism have become controversial in scholarly and political debates. This is due at least in part to claims made by Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi demanding that they be recognised as the legal owners of the country’s foreshore and seabed. Dominating the literature on the nation’s immigration and ethnic
relations are generally descriptive narratives of the population’s attitudes to ‘multiculturalism’, which superficially define the term as the diversity of non-Anglophone cultures resident in New Zealand (see Ward and Masgoret 2008; Kolig 2006a, 2006b; Ip 2008; Murphy 2008). This failure to distinguish between the ‘multicultural’ as the adjectival (Hall 1998) from the ideologies that denote the ism of ‘multiculturalism’ is relatively common. According to Tiryakian (2003: 22-23), the two should be treated as analytically distinct categories that bear “empirically complementary consequences for the public and private spheres”. The academic study of multiculturalism in New Zealand has now reached a clear impasse arising from the strong tendency of scholars to deploy ‘multiculturalism’ as a buzz word that has not been subject to any rigorous analytical appraisal. This practice has led to an increase in a variety of superficial accounts that do not advance our understandings on how multiculturalism is configured in New Zealand. As a result, it is difficult to find a convincing answer to the contrasting claims that multiculturalism is / is not compatible with biculturalism. In the absence of systematic academic accounts that problematise the concept of ‘multiculturalism’ in New Zealand, this chapter aims to contribute to the clarification of the country’s ‘practical’ and unofficial policy multiculturalism, and identify its limits. The aim is to initiate discussions beyond the confines of the ‘practical multiculturalism’ that give the existing New Zealand based literature a particularly distinctive blandness and vacuity. This is urgently required because the failure to interrogate current guises of the concept have deflected attention away from understanding the more fundamental issue that scholars and state makers need to answer if they are to argue that multiculturalism is or is not mutually exclusive from
biculturalism; namely: Why would a liberal form of multiculturalism – imagining that biculturalism did not exist – be appropriate for twenty-first century New Zealand society? If there is a preponderance of foreseeable disutility in multiculturalism because it is not suited for New Zealand in late-modernity, as it shall be argued, there is little sense in making any attempts to reconcile biculturalism with multiculturalism.

In terms of structure, this chapter first delineates the difficulties in conceptualising the notion of multiculturalism in New Zealand. It then argues that the ‘practical’ and ‘ill-defined’ version of multiculturalism frequently referred to is Janus-like and oscillates precariously between its celebratory commercial and conservative guises that are never distinguished by scholars in the New Zealand literature. This is partly because the relationship between multiculturalism and the prevailing social-demographic changes accompanying change in New Zealand has not been accurately historicised. The chapter then proceeds to argue that while these two versions of multiculturalism are amenable to the exigencies of New Zealand’s constitutional biculturalism, they are repressive ideologies that stand in urgent need of critical reassessment. Whilst it may be possible to defuse the conceptual dilemma by developing a more nuanced version of multiculturalism that does not immolate biculturalism, this is a very difficult conceptual task and not necessary because multiculturalism is not the only available civic idea for governing multicultural New Zealand society in the twenty-first century. The study’s search and consideration of an alternative incumbent policy to multiculturalism that is congenial to biculturalism is presented in the next chapter.
5.1 The fuzziness of ‘multiculturalism’ in New Zealand

It is usually implied that the task of identifying the parameters of this ‘ill-defined’ or ‘practical’ multiculturalism is a very complicated one because any attempt to do so will raise a variety of unanswerable and controversial questions. This conceptual problem appears relatively insurmountable because the country’s existing policy of biculturalism is enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi, an authoritative and integral source of its unwritten constitution. Essential to existing interpretations of this Treaty is an affirmation of an official partnership between the indigenous Maori and the Crown (Pakeha). It is taken as axiomatic that there is no provision for the recognition of any other treaty partners (and immigrants) except for the latter – the ascendant homogenous Anglo-Celtic group, encapsulating both ‘old’ and ‘new’ settlers. Consequently, the task of spelling out how non-Maori and non-European groups are enfranchised under the existing framework of biculturalism is very difficult. Although the latter groups are relatively powerless in setting an agenda to redefine the conceptual vocabulary of biculturalism to represent their interests, the increase in Asian immigrants and rhetoric of ‘multiculturalism’ from the 1980s onwards has posed a challenge to the hegemony of biculturalism. As a power-sharing agreement between Maori and Pakeha, biculturalism emerged around the late 1970s and early 1980s after Maori engaged in political mobilisations to ameliorate their marginal status. Essentially based on both a politics of identity and politics of recognition, their struggles for self-determination came to fruition when they were finally granted rights to seek formal compensation for the injustices committed against their ancestors retrospectively from 1840. Today, the Waitangi Tribunal is still hearing claims lodged by descendants of Maori who were
dispossessed of their lands. Existing legislation also endows Maori with special rights and privileges, on the basis of their indigenous status, designed to address the highly visible socio-economic inequalities they face. Examples of these legal and institutional provisions for indigenous peoples are discussed in Section 6.23 in the next chapter. Maori politicians and academics have therefore asserted their political resources to protect their hard-won political rights from being eroded by the rhetoric of multiculturalism, and by the presence of Asian immigrants in particular.

The convergence of indigenous rights with non-European immigration raises the very sensitive and controversial question on whether biculturalism should continue guiding social policy in a multicultural society. If New Zealand were to affirm the country’s cultural diversity and introduce an official Multicultural Act, as Canada did in 1988, such a move would be considered unconstitutional and illegal by many Maori politicians on both the left and right. In so far as biculturalism is concerned with social justice and the redistribution of state resources (Larner and Spoonley, 1995: 52), multiculturalism and biculturalism are, by definition, both incompatible and mutually exclusive (Thakur 1995). Nevertheless, given the pressures of an increasingly culturally diverse population, the government has eschewed immolating biculturalism by establishing an unofficial, tokenistic form of multiculturalism. In fostering what Kolig (2006a: 221) dubs the realities of ‘practical multiculturalism’, the New Zealand government affirms being in favour of cultural and religious plurality, as is the case in other liberal Western democracies, without enforcing cultural assimilation or
homogenisation. Integration\(^1\) is nevertheless tacitly expected (Kolig, 2006b: 52). Whilst these commitments and promises are not part of the state’s official commitment to ‘multiculturalism’, they are derived from the international human rights legislation that New Zealand is signatory to and ratified in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1970 and New Zealand Human Rights Act of 1993. These statutes guarantee equality in New Zealand society and outlaw discrimination on the basis of gender, sexuality, race or creed. Writing from the perspective of jurisprudence and public law, the legal theorist Benedict Kingsbury (2002: 104) maintains that the inevitable problem of reconciling the minimum standards found in these two statues with other policies and principles based on non-Maori group identities remain unaddressed in legislation and government policy\(^2\). Whilst a legal vacuum exists here, the development of a solution to this problem is proposed in the next chapter.

Configured thus, the de facto multiculturalism may be admirable given that the ascendant Maori and Pakeha population had considerably little time to confront the harsh realities of its culturally heterogeneous population. Nevertheless, the blandness and opacity inherent in this unofficial ‘practical multiculturalism’ makes it very difficult for one to conceptualise and represent its realities and limits accurately in terms of the ideologies in which it has been inscribed in. In the international literature, ‘multiculturalism’ is a highly contested term. Despite attempts to define ‘multiculturalism’ positively and definitively, the logic of this core concept remains

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\(^2\) An elaboration of the latent ambiguity found in New Zealand’s public law is beyond the scope of this study. A detailed attempt to dissect and analyse these competing conceptual structures is found in B. Kingsbury (2002) “Competing Conceptual Approaches to Indigenous Group Issues in New Zealand Law”, University of Toronto Law Journal, 52 (1): 101-134.
highly problematic (McLennan, 2001: 390). And this is rightly so. Whilst the conceptual content of ‘multiculturalism’ remains multifaceted and difficult to disentangle, it could be argued that the concept itself must avoid definitive specification. Any attempts to do so would, by definition, be deemed an ‘un-multicultural’ thing to do and, in effect, misrepresent the term as a timeless, monolithic doctrine. ‘Multiculturalism’ then, according to Hall (1998: 210), does not connote a single political strategy or achieved state of affairs but a variety of incomplete strategies and processes used to accommodate and preserve the integrity of minority cultures. The realities of ‘multiculturalism’ are therefore subject to a variety of different interpretations at both the levels of mundane everyday thinking and academic writings.

Despite the many varieties of multiculturalism available in the literature, contemporary discussions of multiculturalism usually embody the tacit and often explicit assumption that, as a civic idea, it calls for the recognition of, respect for, and defense of cultural diversity in a country’s public sphere. Much of the uncertainty and controversy surrounding the propriety of multiculturalism and the tolerance it entails arises because it necessarily involves making connections between the ‘private troubles’ of minority ethnic groups and the wider issues of the public sphere. In the West, debates on multiculturalism are contentious because it entails a public commitment to tolerate and accept the cultural practices of minority communities which the ascendant group(s) may not necessarily approve of, as Tiryakian (2003: 29-30) states:

In effect, it is when structural changes in the institutional arrangements of the public sphere and the relation of the public sphere to the private/communal sphere are called for that the reactions against [multiculturalism] are most vehement.
Here, Tiryakian implicitly represents multiculturalism as a nation-state’s commitment to the ‘private problems’ of culturally distinctive minorities in the public sphere. Following Tiryakian and the call of C. Wright Mills’ public calls for sociologists to connect the ‘private troubles’ of individuals to ‘public issues’ mentioned earlier in the introduction, this chapter aims to identify the characteristics of the ‘practical’ multiculturalism in New Zealand against the backdrop of an interaction that takes place between the public and private spheres. This would also allow for a nuanced analysis that can compendiously situate public opinions on multiculturalism within a theoretical framework. According to Verkuyten (2004: 54), public opinions on multiculturalism and cultural diversity are largely unexamined and ignored in the international literature. As multicultural societies comprise of people who must live with cultural difference and diversity, knowledge of the everyday meanings and ways of thinking about multiculturalism can help guide policies that will improve inter-ethnic relations (Ibid). It would therefore be instructive to include in this chapter, where appropriate, qualitative material that encapsulates how multiculturalism and the multicultural in New Zealand are imagined and conceptualised at the more informal level of everyday thinking.

Within the sociological canon, the postulation of the public and private as two separate domains is frequently contested at a much deeper level. Despite affirming the need to maintain this distinction, Rex and Singh (2003: 8) acknowledge that this distinction is usually disputed by liberal opponents of multiculturalism, usually feminists, who in the name of human rights, contend that there are certain public values that must apply in the private cultural domains of certain minority ethnic groups. Whilst some sophisticated criticisms of multiculturalism render such a distinction inappropriate,
adopting this distinction will be necessary to achieve the first aim of this chapter which is to delineate and identify the limited trajectories of New Zealand’s *de facto* or ‘practical’ multiculturalism. Once this task is completed, the arguments against multiculturalism which dispute this division will be examined. Also, to address the perennial need of understanding the ill-defined ‘practical’ multiculturalism in New Zealand in greater empirical and theoretical detail, the plural vocabulary of multiculturalisms as recommended by Hesse (1998) and Hall (1998) will be adopted. Thus, it is hoped that by identifying how successfully multiculturalism in New Zealand connects the private spheres of minority ethnic groups with the ‘public issues’ of the state’s social structures, a more nuanced and informative contribution will succeed in initiating debates beyond the confines of the vague *de facto* multiculturalism that frequently appears in the literature.

In what follows, the proposition advanced is that the poorly documented ‘ill-defined’ or ‘unofficial’ version of multiculturalism referred to in the New Zealand literature can be better understood as a superficial form of multiculturalism that oscillates precariously between a *celebratory* commercial multiculturalism and, on the other, a conservative multiculturalism operating as a bastion of ethnocentrism and assimilationism. In both these guises, multiculturalism celebrates difference in the public sphere perfunctorily without making any difference. This is because the two multiculturalisms only allow for the ‘private troubles’ of minority ethnic groups to be addressed as ‘public issues’ in so far as this would yield economic benefits for the ascendant groups. Thus, commercial and conservative multiculturalisms repress the more substantive ‘private troubles’ of ethnic minority groups from being connected to
the ‘public issues’ of New Zealand’s social structures. It is on this basis that it subordinates the presence of non-European and non-Maori minorities to the sufferance of the ascendant Maori and Pakeha ‘hosts’ who are yet to be reconciled together. Based on this reading, New Zealand scholars such as Thakur (1995) who claim that the poorly defined ‘practical’ or de facto multiculturalism is not mutually exclusive from biculturalism are not wrong. This is because it does not allow substantial ‘private troubles’ facing minorities to impinge upon the country’s self-defined bicultural public sphere. These multiculturalisms therefore fail to combat racism and justify the repression of non-Europeans without promoting the cause of social justice. The conditions of their emergence and their present configurations will now be spelt out.

5.2 Multiculturalism as commercial multiculturalism

Instead of difference being seen as different and competing interests, the plan has been to defuse the threat of diversity among the population by presenting this diversity as a life-enhancing thing for everyone. People come to be regarded as embodiments of their ‘ethnic’ culture, a constant display and entertainment for others. This is the latent possibility of diverse populations: in the multicultural city everyone becomes a perpetual tourist and everyday life becomes a constant, spectacle-filled holiday. This happy consequence is readily available if only we can all come to re-evaluate our perceptions and recognise the uncomfortable antagonisms of racism as the feel-good diversity of multiculturalism. The good life is here, and we have been living it all along, if only we could see it.

(Bhattacharyya, 1998: 259)

The antecedents of commercial multiculturalism in New Zealand and sudden optimism in cultural diversity as a ‘life-enhancing thing’, following Bhattacharyya, can be located in the 1986 immigration policy review undertaken by Kerry Burke, the
Minister of Immigration responsible for its implementation. According to this report, the explicitly avowed *raison d’être* for the immigration reforms was to:

...enrich the multicultural fabric of New Zealand society through the selection of new settlers principally on the strength of their personal contribution to the future wellbeing of New Zealand.

(Burke, 1986: 10)

As mentioned in the introduction and Chapter Three, the conditions linked to globalisation that precipitated the diversification of New Zealand’s immigration policy and emergence of a multicultural society date back to the 1970s through Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community that resulted in a declining commitment to New Zealand. As the basic premise underpinning the development of the country’s society and economy during the mid 1980s necessitated a “more outward-looking policy” (Bedford, 2005: 135), it would have been increasingly inappropriate and difficult for New Zealand as a Western democracy to continue discriminating on the basis of race or country of origin. As these were the most turbulent times, the New Zealand government had little choice but to revise foreign policy, as Palat (1996: 46) notes:

The roots of the eventual removal of the more discriminatory provisions of the immigration regulations against Asians in 1987 can be traced to the gradual undermining of the privileged position New Zealand had occupied under the political and economic arrangements of the British Empire and the integration of the world market under the auspices of the U.S.A...One consequence of this policy was the British entry into the European Common Market in 1973 and the gradual phaseout of the preferential conditions of access to British markets that New Zealand producers had hitherto enjoyed.

Immigrants were therefore sought to help build economic and diplomatic bridges with Asia, attract foreign investment into the country, create jobs for New Zealanders, and
help sustain the nation’s prosperity and economic growth. In addition to accepting immigrants from Asia, international students were also recruited to attend the country’s universities, state-schools and private language schools. However, it was not until the year 2000 when New Zealand made a much stronger attempt to export its educational system as ‘world class’ and to compete with Britain, Australia, Canada and the USA for international students. The majority of international students in New Zealand are Asian, with eighty-two per cent coming from East and South East Asian countries (Benson, 2006: 97). The influx of immigrant families and full-fee paying students from Asia transformed the outward complexion of New Zealand’s main cities in a very short period of time. Outbursts of anti-Asian sentiments exemplifying a mixture of fear, xenophobia, prejudice and cultural ignorance were emblematic of an anxious population forced to move out of a highly-regulated economy and self-represented bicultural society. The predilection of many Asians to purchase conspicuously large houses and luxury cars made them victims of jealously, hate and racism. Whilst the majority of unemployed Asian immigrants did not depend on the welfare state for benefits, their egregious levels of wealth and prosperity, relative to the vicissitudes of declining living standards that many New Zealanders were experiencing, garnered stereotypes of Asians as greedy, brash and materialistic. Their preferences for expensive cars and houses when seen in public are often deemed an aberration to the country’s protestant work ethic that is to be tolerated rather than accepted. Their contributions to the economic growth of local businesses were seldom acknowledged with beneficiaries of the Asian immigration boom within the non-immigrant population including new and used car dealers, real-estate agents and English language school teachers and proprietors.
Whilst Asian immigrants and students alike have been invited to live and study in return for their economic contributions, the general public and government have, to date, demonstrated very little sincerity at understanding and developing relationships with Asian countries and Asians in New Zealand. This is evident in the way that New Zealanders generally do not make the effort to distinguish between Asian permanent residents and international students whenever these two groups attract media attention (see Bennett, 1998; Ip and Murphy, 2005). Allegations that Asians fail to contribute enough to the economy and have not created jobs for New Zealanders bear testimony to this fact:

‘Where is our Silicon Valley?’ asks [Professor] Ranginui Walker [on national television], well-known critic of Asian immigrants. Even if they do establish businesses, ‘they usually employ their own people’. Meanwhile, their children leech on New Zealand taxpayers’ money, and become duxes of the best schools in the most exclusive suburbs.

(Ip and Murphy, 2005: 110)

Few ever questioned why Asian immigration could not create a ‘Silicon Valley’ for New Zealand, instead many viewers accepted Walker’s sweeping allegations as fair and rational (Ip, 2003: 245). In blaming Asian business immigrants and investors for not generating revenue and jobs, critics seemed oblivious to the hallmarks of capitalist restructuring that provided impetus for many New Zealand-based corporations to relocate their operations to lower-wage countries (see Palat 1996; Baragwanath 2003). These unfavourable economic conditions have created structures of ethnic and racial division responsible for relegating Asians to menial, low-capital businesses like takeaways, souvenir shops and other businesses that service Asian communities. The
accusations frequently levelled against Asians also illuminate the extent in which the citizenry and state elites construe them as economic assets rather than humans.

The incorporation of Asian immigrants and international students into the nation’s economic discourse reflects its racially exclusive narcissism and tacit acquiescence to multiculturalism as an undesirable, but ineluctable choice. It has become all too clear that large sections of the mainstream Anglo-Saxon and indigenous population consider Asian immigrants and international students unfit for life in New Zealand but have no moral qualms in treating these groups as sources of national revenue. Asians remain ‘wanted’ and ‘needed’ to ‘build bridges’ with Asia (Ip and Pang, 2005: 186). This connection between the government’s mandate to attract Asian immigrants and conspicuous failures to address the overt racial animosity has been astutely described by the late historian, Michael King (2003: 504), as the most uncertain and ambiguous configuration evident in New Zealand:

Nowhere was the uncertainty about future configurations more clearly demonstrated than in the country’s ambiguous relations with Asia. As trade with Britain necessarily diminished, New Zealand had sought to direct more of its products and produce towards the largest markets in the region, in the populous countries of South-east [sic] Asia. Prime Minister Jim Bolger even began to talk of New Zealand finding at least part of its identity from its proximity to Asia…And increased immigration to New Zealand from Asian countries in the 1990s – from Taiwan, Hong Kong, China and Korea – activated anti-Asian prejudice which had been so strong 100 years earlier, particularly in Auckland, which received the most of those new immigrants.

King’s references to the interconnection between racism and capital accumulation may be implicit but the overt racisms evident today are reverberations of the government’s economic strategy built around the flawed logic of a celebratory commercial multiculturalism. According to Stuart Hall (1998: 210), commercial multiculturalism
assumes that once a diversity of cultures is recognised in the marketplace, cultural differences will be dissolved through private consumption, without necessitating a redistribution of power and resources. The repertoires of this pervasive ideology are embodied in three different ways that will be examined in greater depth, namely: i) a repositioning of Asia in New Zealand’s economic discourse and manipulation of a hybridised ‘Asian-Pacific’ national identity, ii) an acquiescence to, rather than acceptance of ‘other’ cultures and, iii) the perfunctory celebration of cultural diversity as a financial asset rather than an embarrassment to national identity.

5.21 Riding the ‘Asian-Pacific’

In July 2006, the geo-political boundaries between the country’s Asian ‘others’ were blurred and momentarily erased when Winston Peters, leader of the anti-Asian New Zealand First Party and ironically Minister of Foreign Affairs (until September 2008), made astonishing headlines at the ASEAN East Asia Summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur, viz.: Maoris came from China: NZ FM –

Mr Peters in the past has been a strong critic of Asian immigration to New Zealand, a stance opponents said deemed the New Zealand First leader unfit to represent his country in the region. But in an address to an Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Mr Peters informed ‘gobsmacked’ ministers that DNA evidence suggested indigenous New Zealanders originated in China.

(Melbourne Herald Sun, 28/07/06)

This was one of the very few occasions when New Zealand’s foremost opponent of Asian immigration had garnered positive attention from the media. Undoubtedly aimed at convincing his neighboring ASEAN leaders that he was not racist, this proclamation blurs the traditional binary between the ‘West and the Rest’ and conceals New
Zealand’s traditional distrust of Asia by acknowledging the importance of interdependence on trade with Asia. That this adoption of an Asian identity was devised as a means to obtain economic gains is obvious. Prior to the economic deregulations of 1986 and foreign policy reformations, New Zealand’s construction of its Asian neighbours as degenerate, imperiling and inferior had the effect of insulating itself within the spatial-temporal zone circumscribed by its identity as an occidental Anglo-Saxon country in the Southern Hemisphere. By erecting divisive frontiers around itself from Asia during the 1950s, the country had effectively distanced the ‘Other’ forms of life from its self-defined space-time dimension. This disavowal of synchrony with non-modern, traditional cultures characteristic of by-gone eras produces a global result that anthropologist Johannes Fabian (2002: 31) calls:

The denial of coevalness. By that I mean a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse.

During the 1950’s and 1960’s, this denial of coevalness was affirmed in the government’s strict assimilation policy requiring Chinese New Zealanders to adopt the Anglo-Saxon ways of the ascendant group. By identifying the Chinese language and culture as handicaps to their integration, the assimilation policy can be considered in certain ways permission granted to the Chinese to co-exist in the spatial-temporal dimension occupied by the mainstream with certain conditions attached.

The outcomes of distancing the foreign cultures and ways of its Asian neighbours in a spatial-temporal dimension far from its own have been achieved at a cost to the present generation. Part of this cost may be judged in terms of the population’s cleavage to false and anachronistic conceptions of its Asian neighbours.
through lack of exposure. The overt expressions of fear, anxiety and xenophobia associated with New Zealand’s trade relations with Asia are symptomatic of a population struggling to confront the harsh realities of having to co-exist with Asia and Asians inter-subjectively in the ‘here and now’. This is illustrative of what Adam (1995: 146) calls a “loss of the other” (as illustrated in Winston Peters’ declaration) that creates a sense of temporality emphasising a “global we among the people”. The government’s deregulatory immigration and economic policies of the 1980s were designed to harness Asia’s phenomenal economic growth by entering Asia and, by opening its borders to Asia. This two-way process necessarily involved New Zealand entering the spatial-temporal dimension defined by its Asian neighbours through the embodiment of a new ‘Asian-Pacific’ trans-border identity. To simply conclude however that a ‘loss of the other’ (Adam 1995) has emerged due to the unclear boundaries between New Zealand and her Asian neighbours lacks coherence and explanatory scope. It would be more appropriate to examine the repositioning of Asia in New Zealand’s economic discourse and subsequent entry into the Asian-Pacific within a broader framework of economic orientalism.

New Zealand’s embodiment of a complex Asian-Pacific trans-border identity has the potential to – despite its geographical location in the southern hemisphere and proximity to South East Asia – destabilise the traditional distinction between the ‘West and the Rest’ without necessarily neutralising the extant differences. Whilst opportunities for the West to distance itself from the ‘Others’ are diminishing in an increasingly inter-connected world, globalisation has produced complicated discursive forms of ‘otherness’ that accentuate socio-cultural differences. The pioneering work of
Ngai-Ling Sum (2000) maps out a series of new orientalisms which have emerged through global trade between the USA and newly-industrialised countries in the Asian-Pacific. Due to the extant discrepancies and absence of a comparative dimension between the USA and New Zealand, it is necessary to insert a rider that only Sum’s explanations and definitions pertaining to the time and space of ‘unequal internal others’ are relevant for the purposes of contextualising New Zealand’s entry into the Asian-Pacific, and Asia’s entry into the country.

To demarcate boundaries between inferior ‘others’ who are located close to a hegemon’s space and time, Sum postulates the notion of unequal ‘internal others’. Unequal ‘internal others’, “may be seen (or see themselves) as inferior and/or as located within the (eastern) hegemon’s self-defined time/space” (Sum 2000: 107). To illustrate this orientalism, Sum provides the example of Japan and other East Asian newly industrialised countries being constructed as a threat to the USA’s liberal trade policies:

...It rests on economic narratives centred around ‘fair/unfair’ trade policy/practices unilaterally defined by the USA to serve the interests of the ‘American self’ against the ‘Japanese other’. It provides a discursive framework and sanctions for the USA to condemn countries which are supposedly departing from ‘liberal’ standards; and it legitimates the American self-image as ‘liberal-protectionist’.

(Ibid: 112)

New Zealand’s entry into the spatial-temporal dimension of her unequal Asian ‘internal others’ has produced a similar type of orientalism – albeit more prevalent at the level of the local population – that is reminiscent of the last century’s ‘yellow peril’. However, this time round, the allegations are that free-trade agreements and economic liaisons with Asian countries are ‘unfair’ and potentially benefit Asian economies disproportionately, obliterate the protection of jobs in New Zealand, and disadvantage
the remaining manufacturing industries struggling to survive. With most New Zealanders proudly adopting localism rather than globalism as the prevailing and dominant norm (Parr 2000), local constructions of Asia as inferior and imperiling to New Zealand’s local economy are fairly common. Despite the adoption of a hybridised ‘Asian-Pacific’ trans-border identity and entry into the economic spatial-temporal dimension of her Asian neighbours, antagonisms at the local-popular level reinforce a sense of superiority and illuminate the precarious manner in which Asian countries and Asians are constructed as New Zealand’s unequal ‘internal others’ urgently needed but unwanted in the inter-subjectively shared economic spatial-temporal dimension of the ‘here and now’. In the face of populist allegations that the country’s entry into the ‘Asian-Pacific’ had resulted in the inevitable loss of jobs and industries, commercial multiculturalism has certainly gained inroads as the most convenient way to disarm dissent, induce an amnesia of unequal relations that have always existed with Asia, and mask the resurgent cultural differences emanating from Asia’s entry into New Zealand. The next section examines empirical data suggesting that this is the case.

5.22 Commercial multiculturalism: a celebratory pastiche

The exceptional openness of the state’s economy from the 1980s onwards stands in contrast to the well-known insular nature of New Zealand society. Although state elites acknowledge the significance of Asia in the making of New Zealand’s economic future, the population exhibits highly ostensible characteristics of a parochial and

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3 Most notably, the sudden closure of New Zealand’s local car assembly plants in 1998 eliminated thousands of jobs. As import tariffs on vehicles and other goods from Japan were dramatically removed as part of trade negotiations with Asia, many were understandably resentful of the Asian economies ‘stealing jobs’ by undercutting New Zealand’s local manufacturing industries with lower wages.
insular society. Parochialism in some regions and most notably Canterbury, according to Baragwanath (2003: 281), is an important expression of identity that is most explicitly expressed in the form of proud ‘one-eyed’ stereotyping used to distinguish between New Zealanders from various regions. At the regional level of Christchurch, in Canterbury, the South Island’s largest city for example, the ubiquity of the ‘JAFA’\textsuperscript{4} stereotype (Ibid) is used to exclude and belittle anyone from Auckland, the largest city in New Zealand, home to about one-third of the national population. It is therefore not surprising that the idea of government assistance to preserve the traditions and cultures of ethnic minorities is considered anathema for many. As Asians are deemed the most inscrutable and inassimilable migrant group (Ip and Murphy, 2005), the mainstream population acquiesces to the presence of Asian immigrants, tourists and international students with equanimity on the basis of their pecuniary contributions to the economy.

This climate of acquiescence rather than genuine acceptance has been reinforced by the mantra that immigration is necessary for the economy. The obvious lack of sincerity makes it blatantly clear that Asian students and skilled migrants are reduced to the level of commodities and treated as outsiders. In her research on Asian international students for example, Benson (2006: 103) found that state-owned Radio New Zealand represented this group as a market rather than a legitimate social group that “inserts them into the category of ‘other’ to mainstream Pakeha society”. Whenever the debate on Asian immigration comes to the fore, the rhetorical gestures that state elites frequently have to make to the economy in order to placate an anxious population illuminate the extent that commercial multiculturalism in New Zealand is an artifice

\textsuperscript{4} ‘Just another f***ing Aucklander’. 

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imposed by state elites to conceal the more authentic realities of intolerance, racism and xenophobia.

Over the past two decades, as Asian immigrants and international students have interacted with and gradually transformed the urban spaces that they occupy, landscapes of commercial multiculturalism most commonly in the form of residential suburbs, Asian owned restaurants, takeaways and other businesses designed to service the Asian community are, following Brah (1996: 209), known as diaspora spaces where “boundaries of inclusion, exclusion, of belonging and otherness, of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are contested”. In New Zealand cities, these spaces are not only occupied and traversed by Asians and other non-Europeans but by the mainstream population as well. The contestation of boundaries in these urban, multicultural spaces are underpinned by highly uneven power struggles based on the exigencies of maintaining in urban spaces the super-ordinate position of the country’s identity as an Anglo-Saxon democracy manifested by a disavowal of Asia’s entry into its space-time zone. This exigency of preserving the country’s whiteness as the norm is mediated by the Eurocentric imperialism inherent in commercial multiculturalism that denies immigrants the right to express themselves in the public spaces they occupy.

5.23 The confluence of commercial multiculture with space and race

Recognitions of the rights of indigenous and native peoples and migrant communities sit squarely within the fourfold tensions of critical urbanism, functional city building, communitarian valorization and stigma, and the problem of liberalism. It does not always sit easy. The case in favour of migration for the benefits of the economy of the city play against reactionary debates on the threats of migration to the constructions of solidarity. They speak also to more complex debates about which cultural rights of migrant
communities should be recognised and which suppressed by the governance structures of the well-run city.

(Keith, 2005: 257)

In this passage, Keith refers to the contestation of space in British metropolitan cities, and in particular the connection to those in power who are motivated to appropriate spaces for the purposes of reinforcing or challenging hegemonic identities. In this context, it is important to recognise Edward Said’s (1993) claim that no person is exempt from the struggle and contestation for space. This struggle is an interesting and complex one because different and contested groups that share built and public areas – national spaces – imbibe these spaces with competing symbolic and cultural meanings, and even sovereignty. In the New Zealand urban centres of Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, the presence of Asians as the most visible minority ethnic group and the expressions of their ethnic identities within the spaces they occupy are countenanced with racism from the ‘host society’. In what Les Back (1996: 7) describes as the ‘metropolitan paradox’ in most European cities, urban spaces that are celebrated as sites of cultural diversity produce “complex and exhilarating forms of transcultural production” yet generate the most acute forms of racism. Accordingly, Back’s notion of the ‘metropolitan paradox’ accurately encapsulates the problem of commercial multiculturalism in New Zealand. In the Auckland metropolis that is home to a third of the country’s population and the majority of immigrants, the racism that frequently accompanies the transformation of suburban spaces into sites of commercial multiculture is certainly a response to the de-stabilisation of the hegemonic ‘white spaces’ that are symbolic of modernity. ‘White places’, according to Bonnett (2005:
111), become visible only when they are juxtaposed with ‘non-white places’ that are deemed invasive. Thus, a sense of solidarity can be forged within the national imaginaries of an anxious citizenry that does not wish to see the built environment transformed by people from parts of the world who are deemed inferior.

In the course of research, this Pakeha female respondent in her late-forties from Christchurch was most forthright in articulating a sense of anxiety at the fact that ‘white-spaces’ were being subsumed by the aesthetics of commercial multiculture. She expressed a desire to maintain in public spaces the hegemony of New Zealand’s occidental ‘white space’:

...well, I’m not sure on everything about immigration. Some of it is good but some of it is a wee bit threatening in some ways as well...we’re getting more ideas, sharing from other cultures, learning how other cultures live and what they do in their country. But I guess in some ways, they’re taking over because their ways, like if you look at them building temples and mosques, it’s foreign to us and people that are Christians are starting to worry where we’re going to be heading...when you go to shops, like the Hornby Mall and there’re lots of Asian markety stalls in the middle of the mall selling all sorts of Asian stuff with Asian signboards, I don’t like that myself but I think myself because it’s kinda like you think where are all of ‘us’ as well, there’re more of ‘them’ than ‘us’ New Zealanders if you know what I mean. I don’t know how it makes you feel really but yeah, it’s like everyday is an extra change, and I don’t know how to put it...

The implicit modernist distinction she makes between the West and the Rest identifies the construction of mosques and Buddhist temples on New Zealand soil as a threat to national identity and security. Her disjuncture towards the presence of Asian-owned stalls in shopping malls can be interpreted as a contestation of their rights to sell their wares in New Zealand shopping malls with signboards in foreign languages. This interviewee’s responses encapsulate the difficulties she encounters in accepting the entry of Asia into New Zealand’s public spatial-temporal zones that many other
working class New Zealanders are likely to exemplify in their ordinary, everyday ways of thinking and talking about the multicultural. More interestingly however, it is apparent that some of the aesthetical features of commercial multiculture are not always desirable or regarded as congenial to New Zealand culture. Sign boards for shops in Asian languages, for example, can be considered intrusive to the status quo because “linguistic differences are the ’retranslation’ of social differences” (Jenkins, 2002: 154). Thus, as the aesthetics of commercial multiculture converge with the spatial, overt expressions of racism in public areas do not seem to be avoidable. Commercial multiculturalism can therefore create new geographies of racism in the long term.

The difficulties that many would face in accepting Asia’s entry into New Zealand’s space-time can be explained by modernity’s relationship with whiteness that, according to Bonnett (2002: 351), assumes three basic positions:

…[F]irst, as a corporealization – hence, naturalization – of value (or more broadly power); second, as an axial term in the organization of ethnic difference (i.e. the white ideal defines other positions in the field of ethnicity and race); third, as an obfuscation of the newness of modern power relations: whiteness, like other racial terms, is communicated as a premodern distinction, as something simply carried forward from the distant past. In this way it can render the racialized aspects of modernity as forms of common sense.

These three points of modernity’s confluence with whiteness explains why whiteness is fixed and naturalized as a hegemonic norm in the national imaginaries of the New Zealand citizenry. Thus, whilst there is generally a climate of reservation and acquiescence to the cultural industries which are a direct outcome of Asia’s entry into New Zealand’s urban spaces, the appropriation of Asian immigrants, international students, takeaways and restaurants as key motifs of New Zealand’s social and multicultural diversity to be celebrated as assets is commercial multiculturalism’s
strategy to maintain peace and equanimity. The availability and affordability of ethnic foods is definitely something that many consider to be an ‘exciting’ feature of multicultural and multiethnic New Zealand. This tokenistic way of acknowledging the Asian presence in New Zealand is, like the Chinese presence in Britain, “recurrently reduced to the willing provision of everyday staples, and thus celebrated with orientalist condescension as an example of a dormant and pacified contribution to a [un]successful multicultural society” (Parker, 1998: 73). State elites would not deny that Asian international students and immigrants make small-scale contributions to the local economy and also provide some New Zealanders with employment. Nevertheless, their contributions are never acknowledged by the populace. Instead, they remain treated like intruders. A respondent who was an English languages teacher candidly confessed this:

The Asians have come in and there’s been a housing boom, the Asians have come in and there’s been a supermarket boom, the Asians have come in and there’s an English teaching boom, an education boom you know, it’s keeping a lot of Kiwis in jobs. There’s been definitely a second-hand car dealer boom, but none of that has been acknowledged, they just prefer the Asians to go away, yes I just want them to think of the interdependence here and stop treating them like cash cows and accept their presence here.

It is no coincidence that commercial multiculturalism allows for the diversity of culturally inferior groups to exist in the market and confines of their private cultural spheres, while it does little to foster equality of opportunity and condition. Thus, it is manipulative and exhibits a cavalier unconcern at bridging the fissure that separates minority ethnic communities from the political-cultural spheres in the public spaces that few are allowed to occupy.

The stigmatisation of Asian immigrants and the ethnic penalties they face in the employment sector, relative to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, remain highly visible
because commercial multiculturalism is an ineffectual civic idea that does not succeed in connecting the more important ‘private troubles’ of minorities with the ‘public issues’ of New Zealand’s social sphere. Thus, commercial multiculturalism promotes a tacit acquiescence to cultural diversity and evades a need for authentic dialogue between immigrants and the host society. The valorisation of the ethnic foods and income that non-European immigrants bring into New Zealand and concomitant repudiation of their presence and rights to occupy a modern lifestyle is a distinguishing feature of commercial multiculturalism in its existing celebratory configuration. The ostensible failure to address the root problem of racism and prejudice is the most deficient feature of commercial multiculturalism that renders it untenable:

Just because a version of multiculturalism has become commercial does not mean that it is working in any readily apparent way. Rather multiculturalism enters mainstream logics in ways that might not touch racism at all.

(Bhattachryya, 1998: 264)

The discrepancies between the officially avowed immigration policy and revivifications of anti-Asian racisms reminiscent of the last century’s ‘Yellow Peril’ coupled with the apparent failure of state elites to combat racism will be a significant challenge for New Zealand in the near future. A female Pakeha student in her twenties who is sympathetic towards the problems faced by Asians expressed her concern of this problem:

I think it’s a good thing but I do think that for a lot of people in the country today, it’s a completely new environment in a new country and that as New Zealanders we should be giving them adequate time to adapt; it’s about assistance and their immigration process and settling into the New Zealand lifestyle…I do think that racism in New Zealand is a problem and must be eradicated, it always has been in New Zealand history dating back to the immigrants that came here as gold-miners. I guess sometimes it seems like we invite people in but New Zealand society is not accepting of them when they actually get here…I think that a portion of the reason is that the policy makers are a lot more forward thinking than the rest of our you know populace, those
that make the decisions see the advantage of bringing in immigrants but the body of New Zealand is still too bigoted to understand that that’s best so they treat them like rubbish as if it’s the right thing to do.

As commercial multiculturalism fails to address the problem of racism, it is necessarily a shallow and manipulative form of instrumental rationality that best explains, if not justifies, why it is morally acceptable to divest foreigners of their humanity by treating them as means to financial ends. Whilst this superficial form of multiculturalism celebrates difference in a tokenistic manner without making a difference, it is evidently an unsettling feature of New Zealand society. The discrepancy of overt racisms casts serious doubts about the capacity of state elites to establish the elusive dream of *E Pluribus Unum*\(^5\) – the coalescence of unity with diversity – through this configuration of commercial multiculturalism that cannot address the highly visible ethnic inequalities in the public.

In its existing configuration, the hitherto delineated version of commercial multiculturalism welcomes cultural diversity and will allow for selected ‘private troubles’ of non-European immigrants to penetrate the public sphere in virtue of economic opportunities that will logically entail for the ascendant groups. However, because of its tokenistic celebration of the aesthetic and pecuniary features of the multicultural, it has clearly failed to engage dialogically with the socio-political demands of cultural plurality in the public sphere. For this reason, it inevitably suffers from the proclivity of collapsing into a conservative multiculturalism that singles out Asians and other non-Europeans for inferior and manipulative treatment. At the more

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\(^5\) Latin for “Out of many, One”.
abstract conceptual level, this oscillation towards an imperial and conservative outlook is evidence of what can be known as a ‘transruption’. This neologism was originally coined by Hesse (1998: 17) to describe “the interrogative phenomena that, although related to what is represented as marginal or incidental or insignificant, that is identifiable discrepancies, nevertheless refuse to be repressed”. In the context of this chapter, transruption can be used to refer to the discrepant racisms and valid socio-political claims emanating from a multiethnic polity that cannot be repressed on a permanent basis. It is, in other words, the impetus for commercial multiculturalism’s pastiche to be excoriated and its inherent parochialism to be revealed.

5.3 Multiculturalism as conservative multiculturalism

The notion of conservative multiculturalism, as its name suggests, is an oxymoron by definition. Regardless of whether or not it is a validation and preservation of the multicultural, conservative multiculturalism is inherently a form of neo-colonialism that does not differ from mono-culturalism and ethnocentrism (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1997). In its existing guise in New Zealand, conservative multiculturalism conceals the country’s obsession with localism and whiteness by paying lip service to the diversity of non-Europeans who are deemed inassimilable. The characteristics of conservative multiculturalism, according to McLaren (1994: 49), are its disavowal of whiteness as a form of ethnicity that is subsequently used to judge all other ethnicities, and the requirement that non-European minorities must first accept the patriarchal norms of the “host” society before being allowed to assimilate into the dominant culture. Accordingly in New Zealand, many in the majority Anglo-Saxon
group would be quick to detach themselves from racist ideologies but nevertheless insist that minorities must divest themselves of their alien cultures, embody New Zealand cultural and national values that include speaking only English in public and supporting the national sporting teams before they can be treated as New Zealanders. The nation’s obsession with rugby as its ‘national sport’, for instance, reinforces the hegemony of white (and Maori) masculinity and supremacy (see Ryan, 2005; Pringle, 2004). It is also evidence of what Kincheloe and Steinberg (1997: 3) identify as conservative multiculturalism’s shift towards the colonialist tradition of white male supremacy towards the end of the twentieth century.

In the New Zealand context, the domains of masculinity and rugby are public cultural domains and emblems of its national identity that will include only very few from non-European and non-Maori backgrounds deemed fit enough to assimilate. The evidence of sexism and fascism that was expressed to me by a senior lecturer (originally from England) currently teaching in a New Zealand university is worthy of mention:

There’s still in my opinion, a considerable level of intolerance of migrants that’s very disturbing and it was shown best to me some years ago when I was lecturing on equal employment opportunities and the rude language and racial abuse in the subject evaluations at the end of that course was positively embarrassing to me. They weren’t liberal at all, a bunch of fascists! Someone actually went so far and suggested women might have a…., we’re talking about women not talking about migrants, there was obviously a very conservative element that you don’t see most of the time but it’s there. It’s reminding me of something else, a film, a Sir Roger Donaldson film, I think it’s called Straw Dog, about an imagined insurrection in New Zealand in the early 1980’s. I think it would’ve come out before the 1981 rugby tour but basically the level of intolerance shown matched Mr. Muldoon as Prime Minister of those days who was very intolerant. To me, it’s awfully close to reality. It was quite uncomfortable actually that these things could happen in Paradise…the level of intolerance, not specifically to immigrants but generally to people who are different and being a trade-unionist and radical is to be different…
In such a climate of extreme intolerance to any form of difference, even a draconian policy that enforced the assimilation of non-European immigrants would fail to achieve its intended result. Many of those willing to assimilate and adopt New Zealand’s core values and principles will, like many from the Chinese community during the 1950s and 1960s who were castigated for not assimilating but not allowed to assimilate (Belich, 2001: 229), continue being singled-out for discriminatory and manipulative treatment. Asians and other non-Europeans may be included in the country’s civic form of national identity by being allowed New Zealand citizenship and a passport. Nevertheless, they would find it much harder to gain acceptance and entry into the more restricted sporting and cultural domains of New Zealand society that are public ideological spaces wherein discourses of racial exclusion embedded on white masculinity operate.

Whilst commercial and conservative multiculturalisms exist in a somewhat contradictory and precarious manner in the public sphere because they are only interested in connecting the selected ‘private troubles’ of minorities to ‘public issues’ that will provide economic gains, the relationship between these two multiculturalisms is an uneasy, but necessary one. In other words, they are not independent competing doctrines; the former presupposes and requires the latter. Conservative multiculturalism is the *sine qua non* of commercial multiculturalism. In a global, inter-connected world, conservative multiculturalism is an expedient instrument to preserve the super-ordinate position of the country’s whiteness and Anglo-Saxon identity by harnessing the financial resources of non-European immigrants whilst assigning to them an inferior status. Conversely, commercial multiculturalism requires a parochial citizenry to exhibit a relative degree of occidental narcissism before it can gain currency as a way of
celebrating the diversity of the subservient minorities that it is dependent on financially. These two multiculturalisms are responsible for delaying the extension of equality of opportunity and recognition of non-European minorities. This is not surprising given that conservative multiculturalism denies “as culture – as embodying and reflecting worthy value(s) – any expression that fails to fit its mold” (Goldberg, 1994: 5). In their existing configurations, conservative and commercial multiculturalism continue relegating non-European immigrants to a forgotten spatial-temporal dimension and should be rejected because they do not advance the cause of social justice but provide the discursive and ideological spaces for multiculturalism to operate as a bastion of ethnocentrism and biculturalism itself. The following confrontation which occurred between the Maori and Chinese illuminate the extent in which these two multiculturalisms subordinate the socio-political claims of unwanted Asian immigrants in the public sphere to the vagaries of the electorate, and sufferance of the Pakeha and Maori citizenry who have not resolved their longstanding quarrels:

For those immigrants who did leave, the sense of vulnerability and not belonging was even stronger than that of the more established Chinese settlers. This was evident in the saga of the Chinese Christian church’s interaction with the Maori (New Zealand Herald, 7 April 1995, 11). In April 1995, the church signed a deal with the Ministry of Education to buy the former Tamaki Girls’ College for their congregation and paid a NZ$165,000 deposit. Maori protesters occupied the site and barricaded the grounds claiming the government had no right to sell it because some iwi [local tribe] were using the empty building. The government stood firm, saying that the iwi were squatters and should vacate the building for the new buyers. The Chinese church backed out, even taking the risk of losing its deposit. Public opinion tended to see the Chinese concession as a logical and inevitable outcome. The Chinese Christians remained low profile and refused to talk to the press of their plight in being caught up in a confrontation between the government and the local Maori.

(Ip, 2003: 247)
Here, it is quite clear to see that conservative and commercial multiculturalisms do not allow for the more pressing economic ‘private troubles’ of a minority group to be addressed in the public sphere when doing so could defeat the hegemony of biculturalism. Even if inevitable compromises were to be made by both the immigrant and non-immigrant sectors of the population, it would be very difficult to see how a more liberal and wide-ranging form of multiculturalism can adjudicate such complicated claims between Maori and non-European groups. Clearly, the former can conveniently invoke the premise that they are not obliged to recognise ‘uninvited ethnic groups’ as legitimate partners of the Treaty.

5.4 The future of commercial and conservative multiculturalisms

The hitherto delineated varieties of multiculturalisms in New Zealand, though very bland, superficial and tokenistic, are both functionally amenable to the exigencies of biculturalism. While they are both repressive and clearly ineffectual instrumentally-rational ideologies that fail to promote equality of opportunity and social justice, they still allow for the challenges of a multicultural and bicultural country to be addressed tangentially through the economy with little political or cultural integration. This mode of governance illustrates that cultural diversity can be celebrated and the status-quo preserved if the selected ‘private troubles’ of minority ethnic groups are allowed to penetrate the public sphere on the condition that profitable outcomes for the ascendant citizenry will eventuate. Although these commercial and conservative multiculturalisms are congenial to the exigencies of biculturalism, these two civic ideas, it is maintained,
are untenable and should no longer be used to govern bicultural and multicultural New Zealand society in the near future.

Two-decades have now passed since New Zealand has revised its foreign policy to accept non-European immigrants. On the periphery, commercial and conservative multiculturalisms appear to ‘work’ by maintaining a climate of equanimity – despite the lingering problem of racism – only because the settlement of Asian immigrants has not been accompanied by an intense competition for state-sponsored public resources in the form of welfare and housing benefits. Granted that only highly-skilled immigrants with substantial investment funds are accepted, New Zealand’s Asian immigrants, who unlike their counterparts from traditional Anglo-Saxon countries that succeed in attaining employment and incomes commensurable to the ascendant citizenry (Zodgekar, 2005: 148), do not turn to the welfare state as a result of the ethnic employment penalties they continue to face. Due to their financial resources and transnational business linkages with their countries of origin, they remain more resilient to the financial, non-cultural effects of racial discrimination. The failure then to address the more substantial effects of racism and continued exclusion from the political-cultural spheres could, in the longer term, create new types of ‘private troubles’ amongst ethnic minority groups that will reverberate in the public sphere and require tremendous human and financial resources to redress.

Some of the ‘private troubles’ of Asian immigrants manifested in the form of criminal acts like extortion, kidnapping and murders committed within Asian families and among international students have, in recent years, been manipulated by the media to portray Asians as evil people of utmost otherness that are a major threat to the moral
order of New Zealand. The deployment of this repertoire of racial traits and images by journalist Deborah Coddington (2006), in her controversial *Asian Angst* article in *North and South*, may have succeeded in convincing many that Asian immigrants alone are to blame for turning their ‘private troubles’ into undesirable public troubles that tax-payers must now address. Ironically, at the start of her article, she implicitly affirmed the importance of commercial multiculturalism for the economy before proceeding to incriminate Asian students and residents for bringing their crimes and diseases to New Zealand (Ibid: 40):

The massive influx of Asian investment in our commerce and education has indeed been bounteous. In 2002 alone, 72000 Asian students contributed $258 million. Our current annual income from export education is a staggering $2 billion, and that’s not counting the millions brought in to the country by 60,000 business migrants.

The fact that neither Coddington nor her supporters would pose the ultimate question of *how* skilled and allegedly wealthy immigrants could be capable of committing such crimes within their own groups best explains why commercial multiculturalism is destined for failure. The crimes and other problems that Coddington imputes to those particular Asians in her article are, in several ways, the corollaries of commercial multiculturalism’s sustained ‘successes’. They are the upshot of allowing the economy to manage cultural diversity, but hardly recognised as such. While this study does not in any way exonerate or apologise for the actions of those committing murders and other crimes, a corporatist-commercial multiculturalism that does not recognise the non-economically viable ‘private troubles’ of minority ethnic groups in the public sphere may eventually generate further instances of such problems as a result of its ‘success’. Most ostensibly, the lack of attention paid to their identification with the ascendant
Maori and Pakeha sectors of the population, and disregard for their psychological needs of belonging and acceptance is likely to produce other types of undesirable repercussions in the public sphere. A citizenry that treats its minority ethnic groups like commodities will not understand that human fragility can lead one to commit vicious acts when a person’s psychological needs are suppressed. Commercial and conservative multiculturalisms, though congenial to biculturalism, both stand in urgent need of reassessment and critical reflection because they show a cavalier disregard to the general well-being of immigrants.

It then appears appropriate and timely to configure a more appropriate form of multiculturalism for New Zealand that will allow for the more substantive ‘private troubles’ of minorities to interpenetrate ‘public issues’ without immolating biculturalism. The task of spelling out how the thresholds of such a policy will not repudiate the hegemony of biculturalism is indeed utopian. Nevertheless, this laborious task would certainly be futile and unnecessary if multiculturalism is an untenable and fundamentally flawed doctrine. It would therefore be instructive to examine why a critical configuration of multiculturalism that respected the cultural and linguistic capital of minority groups and their differences would be (in)appropriate for New Zealand in the twenty-first century. In view of a preponderance of hostile criticisms against multiculturalism in Europe which have gained purchase in the twenty-first century and the interest that New Zealand scholars have expressed in this doctrine, the final section will first examine arguments against multiculturalism that are established in terms of foreseeable outcomes (rather than the conceptual problems with multiculturalism that will be examined in the next chapter) before concluding that it is
not a civic idea worth aspiring towards in the twenty-first century – regardless of whether or not it is amenable to biculturalism. The preponderance of foreseeable disutility with multiculturalism, as it will be argued, obviates any further need for scholars to continue the futile task of reconciling multiculturalism with biculturalism.

5.5 Is multiculturalism the best solution for New Zealand?

To reiterate, this chapter maintained as its starting point that multiculturalism should be represented in terms of the penetrations that take place between the state’s public issues and private domains of minority ethnic groups. Although this distinction is ubiquitous in the sociological and politico-philosophical canons, it has been destabilised in more recent decades by arguments invoked in the name of human rights that criticise multiculturalism for privileging cultural and ethnic identities over other identities. In other words, multiculturalism is ineffectual because it suppresses the inequalities that exist within certain ethnic groups. In particular, feminists like Susan Moller Okin (1998; 1999) have argued that liberal multiculturalists legitimate patriarchal cultural practices that are oppressive to women and children. They do not find it appropriate to temper one’s responses to certain cultural customs – in the form of forced marriages, honour killings and genital mutilation – that if practiced by the ascendant group would be unconditionally condemned as acts of sheer viciousness and barbarism (see Dustin and Phillips 2008).

By rejecting the principles of cultural and moral relativism that are engendered in multiculturalism, this critique from a liberal, human rights perspective demands that it is a country’s public values which must first penetrate the private cultural practices of
minority ethnic groups before these can be accepted in the public sphere. While the critiques of feminists and other opponents dispute the distinction between the public and private domains, they imbricate a plethora of other arguments censorious of multiculturalism that require this distinction. Most putatively, the public recognition of cultural differences, as it is often pointed out, projects an essentialist view of group and cultural identities that are often taken to be definitive of the individuals within these groups and cultures (Phillips 2007, Modood 2007). Moreover, internationally, multiculturalist policies are often criticised for fostering self-segregation and minority ethnic groups ‘living parallel lives’ within the confines of their own communities in the aftermath of September 11 in the USA and the London bombings of 2005. For all these reasons, multiculturalism has been criticised for undermining national solidarity and subverting the highly elusive dream of *E Pluribus Unum*.

Whilst commentators frequently contend that Western countries are retreating from multiculturalism, Kymlicka (2007: 52) suggests that this retreat is not universal because there are “a lot of uneven advances and retreats in relation to immigrant multiculturalism, both within and across countries”. Whilst an investigation of the attitudes of New Zealanders towards multiculturalism is not the main focus of this chapter, it is difficult to determine if a liberal policy of multiculturalism would be conducive to the citizenry’s existing attitudes towards their national identity. According to Murphy’s (2008) discourse analysis on New Zealand’s reaction to the French and Australian riots that occurred in October 2005, the policies of multiculturalism and pluralism adopted in these two countries were judged by New Zealanders to be a failure. Interestingly, Murphy found that whilst many New Zealanders believed that France had
failed, New Zealand had succeeded by not implementing multiculturalism (2008: 105).
The findings suggest that there is an uncertain, and perhaps unlikely future for multiculturalism in New Zealand when taking into consideration Murphy’s (2008: 94-5) critique of the citizenry’s attitudes to multiculturalism in France and Australia. In his own words:

The discourse, however, also revealed both a misunderstanding of the situation that led to the French riots, and a tendency to view the world through New Zealand-centric preoccupations, and impose these views on others. While this tendency is not unique to New Zealand, the desire to preach and tell others how to behave is a reflection of New Zealand’s national identity as a model society in the international arena.

As it is methodologically difficult to generalise the findings of Murphy’s discourse analysis, it might be the case that with time and further research, larger sectors of the New Zealand population may be convinced that the benefits of multiculturalism will outweigh the risks and disutility. The prospects of multiculturalism for New Zealand and elsewhere are nevertheless bleak. According to Kymlicka (2007: 58), citizens in Western countries are neither convinced of the benefits of multiculturalism nor are they convinced of the state’s capacity to manage the moral hazards surrounding the problems of border control, welfare state abuse and dilemmas surrounding cultural practices that may be deemed immoral by the ‘host society’.

In view of these criticisms and heightening pessimism in multiculturalism, there are some theorists who have nonetheless sought to defend and reform the civic idea by refocusing its priorities. Stephen May (1999), for instance, argues that multiculturalism’s strictures of essentialism and culturalist preoccupations must be transcended through a critical multiculturalism that acknowledges the role of unequal
power relations and material structures of inequalities. He provides a theoretical framework for the educational curriculum to implement critical multiculturalism by first calling for the cultural and linguistic capital of minority ethnic groups to be recognised in the public sphere. Second, these differences need to be situated in the overarching field of power relations in order for the processes that underpin a school’s preference for certain cultural values to be unmasked (May, 1999: 32). Once these two imperatives have been achieved, May argues that the problem of cultural essentialism can be addressed by adopting a more dynamic conception of culture that “incorporates the ongoing fluidity and constant change that attends its articulation in the modern world” (Ibid: 33). To this end, May’s attempt to identify the material and structural bases of racism certainly appears practical and workable beyond the confines of a country’s educational curriculum. While any attempt to reform multiculturalism would most certainly be motivated by laudable intentions, the project of a genuinely critical multiculturalism, as the Chicago School of Cultural Studies (1994: 135-6) maintains, “cannot be brought about by good will or by theory, but requires institutions, genres, and media that do not yet exist”. Thus, while critical multiculturalism appears to be articulated as an attractive theoretical framework, it is utopian because it clearly fails to establish a coherent relationship with the empirical.

The foregrounding of critical multiculturalism is also problematic on two grounds. First, the requirement that the cultural capital of minority ethnic groups must be recognised in the public sphere is predicated upon the stereotypical notion that the lifestyles of minority ethnic groups are discrete and fundamentally different to those of the ascendant citizenry. This is likely to result in the exoticisation of ethnic minorities
as puppets of their cultures. Second, it is a logical contradiction to propose that the dynamic and ongoing fluidity of cultures must be recognised. The culture of a minority ethnic group in any Western country would have already, in several ways, been subject to a continuous process of interactions with the ascendant group(s) as well as other cultures. A culture is after all a product of historical processes of interaction between other cultures, each of which is already ‘hybrid’ by definition (Ohnuki-Tierney, 2006: 16). As it fails to provide a dimension for an ascendant population to identify the cultural similarities rather than differences they share with minority ethnic groups, critical multiculturalism appears to be configured in opposition to its purpose of countering the problems of essentialism and is therefore not worth aspiring towards. Thus, regardless of whether or not biculturalism was constitutional in New Zealand, implementing a policy of multiculturalism (or critical multiculturalism) would be vulnerable to criticisms of cultural essentialism and the allegation that the country’s national solidarity will be undermined. There is in effect, no type of multiculturalism that can successfully address the highly visible ethnic inequalities, xenophobia, and the deep-seated reluctance to accept non-Europeans as New Zealanders.

By the same token, two inferences to the suitability of multiculturalism for New Zealand can be drawn from the hitherto critique of critical multiculturalism and criticisms against multiculturalism justified in terms of the foreseeable consequences of its implementation rather than its conceptual and logical strictures. First, taking into consideration the fact that biculturalism is embedded in New Zealand’s constitution as a power-sharing agreement between two distinct groups of people, coupled with the other fact that state elites in the West are well-poised to jettison multiculturalism due to its
fragmentary logic and failure to attain the dream of *E Pluribus Unum*, the introduction of an official policy of multiculturalism would most certainly be vulnerable to similar, or even more severe criticisms. There will undoubtedly be questions raised about the legality of such a move. Second, the preponderance of the foreseeable disutility with multiculturalism certainly outweighs the benefits accrued through the public recognition of cultural differences. While some New Zealand scholars seem interested in maintaining that the country’s official bicultural constitution is compatible with multiculturalism, (or using biculturalism as a future framework for multiculturalism) the task of configuring a version of multiculturalism that will not impinge upon the exigencies of biculturalism may not be realistic, any further attempts to do so would certainly be futile and not only unnecessary. *Prima facie*, these two inferences seem to imply an uncertain future for New Zealand because we are confronted with a conceptual and constitutional impasse that is pervasive at both the levels of academic and more mundane level of everyday thinking about the multicultural.

In their everyday ways of thinking about multiculturalism, the following two respondents exemplified an awareness and knowledge of the controversy that any official policy of multiculturalism would generate. In both instances, the respondents were generally positive and supported the need for the government to address the Crown’s historical grievances with Maori before other cultures can be accepted. This informant’s incisive and candid response is indeed optimistic:

> Well, I think biculturalism and the movement towards getting the Maori a decent place in New Zealand society, an equal place, was and is, very very important, it is a good thing, it’s a very good thing. For a while back then, I actually struggled with it. I kept saying “hey bicultural, but what about all those other cultures, what about multiculturalism, we’re all here too?” But I think they are right in that, in one sense, the Maori culture ha[s] to be established
alongside the Pakeha culture first before the other cultures can be integrated. I
believe that, but from there, I don’t believe that biculturalism has to stay
dominant. I think once the Pakeha have accepted the Maori culture as valid and
contributing and I think the Pakeha have kind of given a bit of lip service and
superficially said, okay, just as long as it doesn’t involve you know us, going
beyond our comfort zones, like learning a lot of Maori, as long as it doesn’t
become a compulsory subject at school then that’s okay. They’ll say all right,
we can use it for official ceremonies, we’ll have a haka and powhiri and
whatever but, and yes, okay, let’s give Maori some scholarships so they can
also get jobs but the time has come and it’s also long, long due to go beyond all
this lip service.

Contrary to crude generalisations and complaints that Asian migrants are ignorant about
the Treaty and do not acknowledge the tangata-whenua status of Maori (see Ip 2003; Ip
2008), this respondent positively affirms the need for Pakeha to reconcile themselves
with Maori first, in order to facilitate the integration of other cultures. This vision of
biculturalism as a non-mutually exclusive ideology from multiculturalism resonates
with the position espoused by New Zealand scholars like Ward and Lin (2006: 169) and
 Ip (2008: 18) who argue that biculturalism should be positively used as a framework for
multiculturalism to be realised in the near future.

Similarly, this informant who has forged close relations with Maori over four
decades does not see biculturalism as mutually exclusive from multiculturalism.
However, his views differ quite subtly from the earlier respondent:

I’ve been here long enough to understand the Maori and I’ve had contact with
Maori right throughout, from the time I was a student. So, the view I’m giving
you is that this creation of multiculturalism and biculturalism, we openly raised
to Maori...I’ve been to maraes and spoken at other Maori association meetings,
the answer we get from them is, we must settle biculturalism first before we can
have multiculturalism come in. That’s the answer we get. I accept their view in
the sense that biculturalism is already here and multiculturalism is coming in.
But our people think that we shouldn’t wait for biculturalism to be established
before multiculturalism. That’s our point of view and we do express this to the
Maori okay, so we get on very well…our view is that multiculturalism and
biculturalism can go hand in hand…we’re not saying you go first and then we
come last, we’re saying we should go together…Maori are good friends of us
and we can only tell them what we think, they know what we think and it’s okay to disagree.

The evidence of this informant’s amicable dialogue and disagreements with Maori is indeed encouraging. Whilst his views would be highly contentious to some, the suggestion that multiculturalism can be simultaneously accommodated alongside biculturalism through dialogue between Maori and Asians is worthy of mention although there is little purpose in hoping for this scenario to materialise.

These two responses embody a false dilemma that has been responsible for hindering the search for a more comprehensive and holistic solution beyond the two options of biculturalism and multiculturalism. Clearly, multiculturalism has been mistakenly perceived, in New Zealand’s academic circles and in the more ordinary levels of everyday thinking, to be the only, albeit highly controversial solution for managing a culturally diverse population in twenty-first century New Zealand society. For this reason, coupled with the fact that the acceptance of multiculturalism in the West has resulted in some undesirable consequences, in the form of self-segregation and cultural essentialism, multiculturalism may not necessarily be the best solution when the much older alternative of cosmopolitanism has not yet been examined by New Zealand scholars.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that there is an urgent need to initiate discussions beyond the vacuity of the *de facto*, ‘practical’ or ‘ill-defined’ version of multiculturalism that dominate the literature on ethnicity, race and multiculturalism in
New Zealand. In an attempt to contribute a conceptual clarification to the ambiguity and blandness characterising the concept of multiculturalism in New Zealand, this chapter maintained as its starting point, the sociological representation of multiculturalism as a series of inter-penetrations between the public sphere and the private cultural problems of minority ethnic groups. It then proceeded to argue that New Zealand’s existing form of multiculturalism is limited to the celebratory traits of a commercial multiculturalism that presupposes and requires an inherent conservative multiculturalism. These two multiculturalisms are the two sides of one single coin that are amenable to the exigencies of New Zealand’s constitutional biculturalism because they prevent the private troubles of minority ethnic groups that pose a challenge to the hegemony of biculturalism and whiteness to penetrate the public sphere. While the country’s constitutional biculturalism renders it difficult for an official form of multiculturalism that goes beyond the limits of commercial and conservative multiculturalisms to materialise, it was maintained that New Zealand scholars should lay aside the insurmountable task of reconciling biculturalism with multiculturalism given that the latter has been prone to a plethora of hostile criticisms from both the left and right in recent years. In the next chapter, further problems with the logical and conceptual strictures of multiculturalism and biculturalism vis-à-vis the unique configuration of New Zealand in late-modernity will first be elucidated to justify the case for cosmopolitanism as an alternative to multiculturalism that will not immolate the country’s constitutional biculturalism.
Chapter Six
The Cornerstone for Governance in Contemporary New Zealand

The debate in New Zealand is about biculturalism, not multiculturalism: the two are mutually exclusive. The Maori are the oldest immigrants to New Zealand, and Pakeha the second oldest. Groups which are neither Maori nor European are frozen out of the debate on the identity and future of the country and disenfranchised with respect to the politics of multiculturalism. They are rendered impotent in setting the agenda of the debate or defining its conceptual vocabulary.

(Thakur, 1995: 272)

In Chapter Five, I maintained that the poorly defined de facto version of multiculturalism that exists in New Zealand can be broadly represented and understood as encompassing conservative and commercial multiculturalisms. It was also suggested that a liberal form of multiculturalism – comparable to those adopted in Western democracies like France, Britain and Germany – would be untenable for two reasons, discussed in terms of negative foreseeable consequences. The first reason cited was that an official proclamation of multiculturalism would be vulnerable to the similar, or more severe types of criticisms the civic idea has engendered in the West, viz. that multiculturalism perfunctorily celebrates difference exotically, proliferates ethnic segregation, and accentuates cultural differences. The second reason briefly invoked the uniqueness of New Zealand’s existing bicultural constitution and reality that, according to King (2003: 520),

remains a given, about which all New Zealanders need to be informed, and through which they will have to continue to negotiate – as national
governments, as local governments, as community organizations and as individuals”.

In light of biculturalism’s enshrined position in New Zealand, any attempts to establish a state-sponsored project of multiculturalism have always been treated with suspicion and controversy due to the fact that it is legally grounded in the Treaty of Waitangi, the country’s founding document that remains an authoritative source of its constitution. An official proclamation of multiculturalism would therefore risk running into serious legal problems through the charge that it is unconstitutional and will inevitably immolate the hegemony of biculturalism.

This chapter continues with the previous chapter’s search for an appropriate solution to cultural diversity in New Zealand that will be at harmony with biculturalism, and also avoid the tensions and controversies found in multiculturalism’s uneasy relationship with biculturalism. To continue with the position maintained in the previous chapter that multiculturalism is not the best civic idea for the nation to aspire towards, this chapter first posits that biculturalism is largely incompatible with multiculturalism. This position that I maintain in this chapter can be known as the argument from ‘mutual exclusivity’. In short I explain why, from a jurisprudential perspective, the existing application of the former precludes an application of the latter; there is therefore little point in attempting to reconcile biculturalism with any form of multiculturalism.

Second, to support this position, it will be argued that multiculturalism is not only difficult to reconcile with biculturalism, it is not congenial to the existing social configuration of New Zealand in late-modernity. In short, it would be more accurate to
represent the country as ‘cosmopolitan’ rather than ‘multicultural’. The preponderance of evidence suggesting this is the case includes the phenomenon of an increasing number of young New Zealanders who choose to live and work abroad during their overseas experiences or, ‘OEs’. The term ‘OE’ in New Zealand, is a young adult’s rite of passage and cultural institution that ranks with “leaving school, getting a degree, the first job or getting married” (Bell, 2002: 144). Even though the OE has spawned scholarly attention that typically outlines the mobility of New Zealanders and their perspectives on home from overseas and geographical movements, no attempts have been made to examine how the political philosophy and global ethic of cosmopolitanism could be strategically used to manage the dilemmas surrounding citizenship and national identity affecting Pakeha, Maori and all other immigrant groups in New Zealand, and ultimately, the bi-multicultural dilemma.

As the governance of today’s multicultural societies necessarily involves the search for answers to questions related to unity and diversity “that have no parallel in history” (Parekh, 2000: 34), the political and moral philosophy of cosmopolitanism is argued to be more relevant to the cosmopolitan norms embedded in New Zealand’s social sphere. It will therefore be considered as a more fitting alternative and candidate to multiculturalism that can co-exist alongside the country’s bicultural constitution on a continuum, rather than across a dividing line.

6.1 Biculturalism: central issues

In the previous chapter, my discussions of multiculturalism were performed against the backcloth of biculturalism as broadly referring to a power-sharing
agreement formed between Maori and Pakeha. More descriptive than definitive and also subject to dispute, this generic meaning provides a basic understanding of what biculturalism is. Despite its familiarity and widespread usage in the New Zealand literature, the concept of biculturalism is seldom defined by scholars who use the term for their own purposes and intents. There are, accordingly, various academic and political renderings of the concept which are designed to represent the current distribution of political power in New Zealand. Nevertheless, biculturalism is one major issue “in which Maori views do not differ significantly” (Vasil, 1990: 104). In the early 1980s, biculturalism emerged as a model of governance that constituted an acknowledgement on the part of the Pakeha dominated government that the marginal status of the indigenous communities needed to be addressed publicly. For the Maori, the rights to have their entitlements under the Treaty investigated were achieved only through great effort after a decade of unceasing political lobbying. Maori were therefore ready to confront Pakeha with their grievances and compensation for the past wrongs their ancestors suffered, and to also be recognised as indigenous peoples. Writing about what the Maori wanted back in 1990, Raj Vasil made the following observations:

In their quest for their place in the sun, the Treaty of Waitangi and the notion of special aboriginal rights have assumed an overwhelming saliency. The Treaty has caught the fancy of almost all Maori as a Magna Carta, a fountainhead of their rights and status, while the notion of aboriginal rights has yet to touch and influence the rank and file of the community.

(Vasil, 1990: 113)

In short, as a broad model of governance and citizenship, biculturalism can be described as a response to the unprecedented levels of Maori political activism during the 1970s and 1980s. It was also an indication that the government was committed to addressing
the socio-economic disadvantages faced by the Maori, and to consider their legal requests for self-autonomy to manage their own indigenous affairs.

As a political framework and constitutional blueprint for guiding ethnic-relations between Maori and Pakeha, biculturalism’s main *raison d’être* is to facilitate the process of reconciliation between the two peoples. Despite the Pakeha dominated government’s public affirmation of biculturalism and their commitment to establish justice, Maaka and Fleras (2005: 98) point out that an ostensible paradox and contradiction is inherent in biculturalism:

This political paradox is also a constitutional problem: to one side is a Maori determination to expand their self-determining autonomy (rangatiratanga); to the other side is a Crown inclination to preserve its authority (kawanatanga) by blocking any competing claims to shared sovereignty. Maori struggles to preserve rangatiratanga from the clutches of Crown governance are counterpoised with equally determined Crown movements to protect kawanatanga from the transformational politics of rangatiratanga. Efforts to find a sustainable compromise between each of these constitutional principles – that of partnership, protection, and participation versus that of governance, surrender, and control – have proven both elusive and infuriating.

In light of this tension, and the ever-changing trajectories of Maori-Pakeha relations, it might be worth stating that the indigenous claim for greater self-autonomy is the most sensitive and controversial aspect of Maori-Crown relations in New Zealand today. The fact that Maori are still in the process of pursuing restitution of their political power (*rangatiratanga* or, to a lesser extent, self-governance) does not, in itself preclude the fact that biculturalism remains a power-sharing model of governance and partnership formed between the indigenous peoples and the Crown (see Ip 2009, Pearson 2009). Nevertheless, because the distribution of power remains subject to negotiations between the two partners, changes to the existing arrangement in the future are foreseeable.
Many factors could determine changes to the existing distribution of power – the economic leverage of the Maori on the New Zealand economy; increasing marriages between the Maori with Pakeha and other minority ethnic groups; and of course, global political and economic factors. As a word of caution however, it should be noted that there are at least two factors which complicate the ambiguity found in biculturalism. First, because biculturalism constituted a manifest attempt by the government to publicly address the concerns of the indigenous, it inevitably projects an essentialist representation of Maori that does not take into account differences in gender, sexuality, class and generation. Biculturalism, according to O’Sullivan (2007: 21-2), has been premised on the erroneous assumptions that Maori (and Pakeha) comprise single homogenous entities. This inaccurate monolithic representation of Maori-ness, according to Poata-Smith (2004: 76), is problematic:

The notion that all Maori share an innate essence that overrides their contradictory places in the relations of production has dangerous implications for political practice because it means that the struggle for tino rangatiratanga is based on the fiction of a classless Maori society. By concealing the differential access to economic and political power that exists within and across contemporary Maori society, cultural nationalism has failed dramatically as a strategy for working-class Maori in their struggle against neo-liberalism and a settlement process that has resulted in the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of tribal capitalists and Maori businesses in the private sector.

Whilst biculturalism is potentially ineffectual as a constitutional framework when it fails to recognise the significance of iwi (tribe or clan) and hapu (subtribe) in Maori culture, the problem of essentialism gives rise to another source of legal and academic ambiguity – one to which not enough philosophical and jurisprudential attention has been given.
Biculturalism may have succeeded so far in creating a national imagination that includes the indigenous Maori as being integral to New Zealand society and culture. However, because non-European minority ethnic groups like the Asians, South Americans, Indians, etc were not mentioned in the Treaty, a literal interpretation of the Treaty would mean that such people groups are not represented within biculturalism’s framework of ‘Two peoples, one nation’. This is the most difficult socio-legal problem that state makers have to address before non-Europeans and non-Maoris can be begin to feel included and recognised in New Zealand society. From a socio-legal perspective, the existing constitutional blueprint of biculturalism was created in the context of intra-societal relations – i.e., relations between government institutions and individuals that represent the partnership between the Maori and Pakeha in the Treaty of Waitangi. Because these are the only groups mentioned in the Treaty, biculturalism appears to be a form of what John Locke postulated as the ‘social contract’ that is underscored by the notion of reciprocity (Locke 1980 [1689]). Reciprocity is certainly evident whereby Maori protagonists claim that the Maori chiefs who signed the Treaty accepted the authority of the British in exchange for protection and other privileges (see O’Sullivan 2007). However, because the Treaty made no provision for immigrants from Asia to settle in New Zealand, there is clearly no ‘social contract’ (and therefore no reciprocity) between Maori and Asians that is discernible in biculturalism. There may however have been a ‘social contract’ established between the majority Pakeha population (but not with the Maori) and all non-European groups from 1986 onwards in the form of the optimism that Asians immigrants with capital would boost the economy. This rendering
implies that biculturalism can be interpreted as being exclusionary to non-Maori and non-European sectors of the population.

It should also be emphasised that when the New Zealand government decided to abandon its preference for immigrants from selected European source countries and opened their country to Asians, they failed to consult with Maori or to explain why immigrants from Asia would be necessary for their collective *raison d’état*. On the basis of this omission, Maori academic Ranginui Walker (1995) questioned the legality of Asian immigration and accused the government of suppressing their indigenous struggles. To make matters worse for Asians and non-European immigrants, O’Sullivan (2007: 19) mentions that although the multicultural rhetoric adopted in the mandate for Asian immigration was attractive to non-Maori New Zealanders because it denied the importance of indigeneity, “its protagonists did not argue for positions of genuine regard for the cultures of non-Anglo/Celtic immigrants”. Consequently, this has been one of the most troubling issues for New Zealanders of Asian and other non-European origins. Because the rights of non-Europeans are not spelt out in the framework of biculturalism, it is entirely up to the goodwill of Maori and Pakeha politicians to adopt a broad minded approach by recognising Asians under the Treaty.

Whilst it might be deemed reasonable to label as racist anyone who questions the rights of non-Europeans, biculturalism’s reticence on the rights of this group of people are an undermining factor in their struggles against racism and discrimination. Biculturalism therefore remains open to the charge that it can be viewed as a form of racism when, as an ideology and model of governance, it operates in an institutional and ideological manner that excludes certain groups of people. Racism is, in essence,
inscribed through exclusionary practices (Balibar, 1991: 17). In a somewhat comparable political movement with biculturalism, the United Nations controversially passed a resolution\(^1\) in 1975 that Zionism\(^2\) was a form of racism. Although this resolution was later revoked in 1991, the hierarchical boundary of exclusion that separates non-European and non-Maori New Zealanders from Maori and Pakeha is comparable to the boundaries of exclusion drawn between the Jewish and non-Jewish citizens of Israel. I do not suggest that biculturalism should be considered a form of racism; branding a state strategy that seeks to ameliorate the status of its indigenous population as racist would be unfitting. Moreover, the terminology of racism is a little too generic in providing any help at solving the problem when there may be various forms of racism and processes of exclusion not necessarily inscribed in colour. Thus, labelling bicultural New Zealand society as a racist Western democracy would not clarify the more important issues at stake.

That New Zealand faces an acute problem in reconciling two peoples, as well as reconciling Maori and Pakeha with non-European and non-Maori minority groups is obvious. While there is no easy solution, it remains clear that i) the existing model of biculturalism has not been entirely successful at addressing indigenous issues and ii) the reticence on the status of non-Maori and non-European New Zealanders constitutes as a legal vacuum, wherein the power to unceremoniously exclude any minority group not mentioned in the Treaty reigns free. In a Western democracy, no person from an ethnic minority should ever be found in a legal vacuum bereft of protection from the state.

\(^1\) Resolution number 3379.
The combined thrust of these two issues is that there is a much needed cornerstone for governing contemporary bicultural and multicultural New Zealand society. What New Zealand needs is a state-sponsored civic idea that protects the rights of non-European and non-Maori peoples without immolating biculturalism. Whilst the civic idea of multiculturalism, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was considered an attractive alternative, such a move would pose a threat to biculturalism and to the emotional and indigenous sensitivities of the Maori. There may be scholars (see, for example, Ip 2008; Ward and Lin 2005) who suggest that biculturalism is compatible with multiculturalism. I, however, disagree and maintain in the following section that the current application of the former precludes the applicability of the latter.

6.2 The argument from mutual exclusivity: multiculturalism should not co-exist with constitutional biculturalism

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that New Zealand’s failure to consult with the Maori over their intentions to accept Asian immigrants constituted a commitment to an outcome not in contradiction with their obligations towards the Maori, the question then arises which of the two obligations is the government obliged to fulfil. Interestingly, because New Zealand is a Western democracy that is a signatory to international human rights legislation, including the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination3 (ICERD), they are still obliged to protect the human rights of every minority ethnic group – even if the Maori are in disagreement with their Treaty partners. Both commitments (to Maori and to all other

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3 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 Dec. 1965, resolution number 2106A
minority ethnic groups after 1986) that the Crown (Pakeha) entered into should be considered valid. New Zealand ought to therefore comply with both of these commitments.

Notwithstanding, a contradiction between her first and more important obligation to Maori (biculturalism) would occur should an official policy of multiculturalism be adopted. That her commitments to the indigenous are of most importance would be the view reinforced by the Treaty. Thus, the fact of ‘multi’ in multiculturalism will be hostile to the emotional and indigenous sensitivities of Maori because it will effectively reduce their status to just one group amongst the many in the diversity; in so far as multiculturalism posits that the needs of all minority ethnic groups should be recognised equally in the public sphere. Any prior commitments that New Zealand made to preserve their indigenous status through biculturalism would therefore result in being treated on a par (or even abrogated) with the demands of all other cultures through an official policy of multiculturalism. The upshot of this would be polemical diatribe that would exacerbate the already existing tensions and polarity between Maori and the rest of New Zealand society. Analytically, the argument that a concurrent establishment of multiculturalism and biculturalism would require the two civic ideas to exist as separate entities across a dividing line that are liable to be in conflict with one another – and eventually yield a contradiction in terms – may be substantiated on the following, inter-related grounds.
6.21 Theoretical substantiation

Biculturalism is a state-sponsored policy that publicly recognises the importance of issues affecting its indigenous population. It was developed to manage the socio-economic, health, and other disadvantages that this group faces. It therefore focuses on addressing the ill-effects of the consequences of the British colonisation of New Zealand, viz. the dispossession and confiscation of Maori lands. Multiculturalism, by contrast, emerged as a response to the growing numbers of non-White immigrants into Europe and other predominantly white countries (Modood, 2007: 2). The connection between the development of biculturalism during the 1970s and the transition from a self-defined bicultural national identity formed between the Crown and Maori to the adoption of a merit-based, colour blind immigration policy during the 1980s is evident in Britain’s dwindling demands for New Zealand produce, and need to build ‘bridges’ to sustain the country’s rapidly de-regulated economy. Arguably, the two civic ideas, signifying British imperialism and the marginalisation of native peoples, and the more recent advent of non-European immigrants, govern not only different, but mutually exclusive social situations that have, at times, proven to be in direct competition with each other as illustrated in the confrontation between Maori and a Chinese community, cited in section 5.3 of Chapter five.

6.22 Historical substantiation

Biculturalism and multiculturalism have distinct historical processes and origins; the former dons the mantle of re-distributive justice, and is consonant with British imperialism and the West’s representation of itself in relation to the indigenous peoples
they perceived as inferior. The latter, on the other hand, being a relative newcomer, is essentially a post World War Two development in Europe. In the case of Britain, it emerged only after de-colonisation and the settlement of colonial peoples who were recruited to meet the labour shortages of the post-war economy (see Solomos 2003). It is currently inspired by the conditions of late-modernity and the global movement of capital and peoples. These distinct historical roots are pertinent as they indicate the *raison d’être* of each civic idea and their respective scopes of applicability.

Biculturalism has been ingrained in the country’s constitution and will be fully cognizant of colonial expansion and the Lockean social contract that exists between the British and the indigenous peoples through the Treaty. It regards the indigenous-ness of the Maori as a *principle* of governance and re-distributive social justice on the basis of *historical* wrongs committed against the indigenous peoples. Multiculturalism, by contrast, is informed by the present cultural differences of non-Celtic/Anglophone immigrants who have to adapt to life in a new country. As these two political philosophies have emerged through different historical processes, they have different intents that could easily be in conflict with one another – in the event of a concurrent application in the public sphere.

### 6.23 Legal and institutional substantiation

The separate public spheres of biculturalism’s and multiculturalism’s existence are further evidenced by the different institutions responsible for ensuring compliance with the government’s legal obligations to Maori. The Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975 to investigate indigenous claims against the Crown. Although it was
intended that alleged breaches of the Treaty would be heard from 1975, its powers were made retrospective to 1840 in 1985 (Oliver, 2001: 9). Biculturalism also finds expression in institutionalised special measures designed specifically to address the disadvantages that Maori face in education, employment and health (see Callister 2007). Quotas, for example, are set in place for Maori students in competitive medicine and law degree courses that do not require an applicant to meet the standard minimum entry requirements to which applicants from other ethnic groups and nationalities are subject. The Resource Management Act of 1991 also obligates local government councils to consult with Maori whenever there are plans to alter existing allocations and uses of land, air, coastal and water-related state resources. The Maori tribes who hold ‘mana whenua’ (authority) over the specific land areas approve proposals if their spiritual and indigenous values are not impinged upon (King, 2003: 447). Biculturalism clearly emphasises a series of duties that the Crown is required to fulfil towards the Maori who are the recipients of a certain privileged treatment. It is therefore formulated as a series of indigenous rights for Maori that are incommensurable to the cultural needs of minority ethnic groups. Due to multiculturalism’s emphasis on the acceptance of different cultural norms in the public sphere, the concurrent application of multiculturalism and biculturalism would inevitably raise difficult questions on whether this can only be achieved at the expense of certain dimensions of biculturalism being partially revoked, or even abrogated. In so far as the Treaty of Waitangi remains a source of the country’s unwritten constitution, biculturalism should, from a jurisprudential perspective, be considered non-revocable and non-derogable.
**Interlude**

The hitherto discussed ‘Mutual Exclusivity’ argument proposes that it would be potentially very difficult to concurrently establish an official policy of multiculturalism alongside biculturalism that will not pose negative consequences for the latter. As the two civic ideas would have to co-exist as two separate entities across a dividing line, the task of reconciling the two together would be very difficult and literally impossible. This argument was buttressed by drawing a distinction between colonisation and decolonisation. Further supporting this modernist distinction are Maori academics such as the late Irihapeti Ramsden (2002), who contended that New Zealand exists in a state of neo-colonialism in so far as its indigenous peoples are struggling for recognition and the rights to self-autonomy. Because biculturalism was clearly designed to remedy the negative outcomes of colonisation that are still evident in New Zealand, it remains applicable for this era. The premise that biculturalism was designed to cover a different historical configuration is underscored in contemporary suggestions that multiculturalism ought to supplant biculturalism because the latter is inadequate in the present era when there are growing numbers of non-Maori and non-European minority ethnic groups. It is on this basis that some New Zealand scholars and commentators have assumed that the nation’s social sphere is adjectivally ‘multicultural’ rather than bicultural, and that multiculturalism is a civic idea worth aspiring towards (see Smits 2006; Ip 2008; Kolig 2006a; 2006b). Yet, a state-sponsored policy of multiculturalism has not yet been adopted because the current application of biculturalism is pervasive and very well-substantiated on historical, institutional and legal grounds.
As I have hitherto maintained that biculturalism is largely mutually exclusive from multiculturalism and that they are both difficult to reconcile together, I proceed to present an alternative civic idea to multiculturalism. Due to the emergence of cosmopolitan norms in New Zealand, the country can be aptly represented and conceptualised as ‘cosmopolitan’, rather than ‘multicultural’. Thus, in contrast to multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism succeeds as a more suitable political philosophy that renders itself more conducive for New Zealand in the twenty-first century. It also remains at harmony with biculturalism and supports the rights of the indigenous. Unlike multiculturalism that would have to exist as a separate entity from biculturalism across a dividing line, I maintain that cosmopolitanism can co-exist with biculturalism on a continuum because the two are not mutually exclusive.

6.3 More cosmopolitan than multicultural?

As ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘multicultural’ are two closely related adjectives frequently used to describe the characteristics of a population or urban surroundings in non-academic contexts, it is necessary to delineate and explicate, the analytically distinct usage of ‘cosmopolitan’ and how it is academically predicated in political philosophy and sociology. The underlying logic of an academically distinctive usage of ‘cosmopolitan’ might suggest that it is distinct from the ‘multicultural’ and cannot be used interchangeably although there may be overlaps in meaning. Thus, it would be instructive, following Beck (2006a), to disaggregate the concept by regarding the egregious everyday ways in which cosmopolitan is used to predicate the superficial
descriptive intermingling of people from various countries as *banal* expressions of the cosmopolitan.

As a historical category, ‘cosmopolitan’, according to Pollock et al (2000: 577), “should be considered entirely open, and not pregiven or foreclosed by the definition of any particular society or discourse”. With a variety of differing analytical and adjectival usages of the concept, ‘the cosmopolitan’ can be distinguished from the ‘multicultural’ in so far as it is predicated on the universal. Multiculturalism, in contrast, emphasises a sense of particularism and communitarianism. In other words, multiculturalism allows for each ethnic minority to adopt a mode of political representation appropriate to its group and cultural requirements (Modood, 2007: 120). In the context of political philosophy and jurisprudence, Jeremy Waldron (1995: 110) provides a broad operational definition of the cosmopolitan self which is appropriate and relevant for the purposes of this New Zealand study:

The cosmopolitan, as we have seen, is not in the business of disputing that people are formed by attachments and involvements, by culture and community. She acknowledges it, but acknowledges it – as it were – *too much* for the communitarian’s comfort. For she shows how each person has or can have a variety, a multiplicity of different and perhaps disparate communal allegiances. Such integrity as the cosmopolitan individual has therefore requires *management*. Cultural structures cannot provide that management for her because too many of them are implicated in her identity, and they are too differently shaped.

Following this line of reasoning, the communitarian-based approach of multiculturalism would render certain communal allegiances to be incompatible and at odds with others. A person of minority status who chooses to be naturalised in a different country might be considered disloyal by members of his / her ethnic group. Thus, the cosmopolitan New Zealander with communal allegiances to a variety of countries will be faced with
the rather difficult task of comparing them and determining which ones are to be jettisoned. The self capable of ‘managing’ such a predicament with integrity, according to Waldron (1995: 111), would have to be an “ethereal sort of entity, without any content or commitments of its own”.

The cosmopolitan alternative allows for one to avoid this undesirable problem altogether and manage the multiplicity of communal allegiances by first and foremost, asking an individual to consider himself/herself a world citizen. When asked where he came from, Diogenes the Greek Cynic famously declared that he was a citizen of the world (Hicks 1990, cit. Nussbaum, 1997: 5). By this, Nussbaum maintains that Diogenes chose to define himself, in terms of universal aspirations and commitments rather than his local origins and group memberships which were central to ordinary Greeks in ancient times (1997: 5). Thus, in contrast to the ‘multicultural’ which emphasises one’s loyalties to language, religion and other forms of group membership within the nation state’s territorial boundaries, a cosmopolitan society consists of various ethnic groups that relate in plural and loyal ways to different nation-states as a result of its citizens combining multiple loyalties and identities. Such a society can be broadly identified by social processes that are indifferent to the boundaries of the nation-state, discernible through people desiring to work, marry, research and study internationally (Beck, 2000: 80). Being a New Zealander in cosmopolitan New Zealand today could mean that one speaks German as a native language, eats German food, attended university in Canada, and worked in Northern Ireland or France for a few years before returning to New Zealand permanently. More importantly, however, being a cosmopolitan New Zealander involves maintaining the socio-cultural commitments to
people and elements of culture adopted from New Zealand, Germany, Northern Ireland, France and Canada. These freely chosen commitments and attachments to various localities and peoples will shape and direct cosmopolitan New Zealanders’ lives in a unique way, allowing them to find meaning and happiness in life and thereby enrich the lives of others around the world. Writing of London’s cosmopolitanism that attracts the majority of New Zealanders who choose to live and work there on their ‘Overseas Experiences’, Crawford (2008: 88) maintains that whilst those departing seek mobility and professional development, there is consensus amongst researchers that New Zealanders’ attitudes to this form of cosmopolitanism enhances their personal development and also contributes to the country’s national development.

A political philosophy that recognises the significance of these commitments that increasing sectors of the population will develop – without denying their personal importance to the individual – would succeed as an alternative to multiculturalism for New Zealanders living in the twenty-first century. It is after all no longer one’s ‘culture’ and other traditions that need to be preserved through multiculturalism. As a result of global experiences and networks that are forged by transnational New Zealanders who live and work around the world, the moral significance and importance of one’s culture – Pakeha, Maori, Dutch, Japanese, Korean, German etc – will eventually diminish as they lose currency in the late-modern era. In the longer-term, the various cultures that comprise the nation’s ethnic mosaic within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state will not be capable of preserving their uniqueness and differences from other cultures. What is originally a ‘foreign’ cultural artefact could become the dominant symbol that could represent the self of all New Zealanders in the near-future. Emiko Ohnuki-
Tierney (2006: 15) provides an anthropological explanation to illustrate how a ‘culture’ becomes the cumulative result of historical processes between the global and local:

…the local was never a solid structure/culture selectively absorbing cultural elements through reinterpretation, only to reproduce itself. Rather, the global/local interaction is a mutually constituent process in which the local, through the actions of historical agents, acts upon the outside forces, which becomes transformed, while the local, in turn, undergoes changes because of the global. In this process of interpenetration, there is no privileged domain in culture.

The suggestion here is that New Zealanders, through their commitments and engagements with forms of life from across the world, begin to incorporate into Pakeha or Maori culture distinctively ‘foreign practices’. The example of the kiwifruit assumed to be synonymous with New Zealand illuminates this point. Originally known as the Chinese gooseberry, New Zealand growers had renamed it ‘kiwifruit’ in the 1950s in order to secure a niche market. As a big contributor to the New Zealand agricultural exports, it was Isabel Fraser, the principal of Wanginui Girls’ College who brought seedlings back from China (Belich, 2001: 450). Though this imported fruit does not function as an official emblem of the New Zealand way of life, it is still of symbolic and economic value to the nation and self. From an anthropological point of view, Ohnuki-Tierney (1999: 245) maintains that foods are unique metaphors and symbols of the individual and social group that also represent a nation’s land and history, and in other words, an integral aspect of their lifestyle.

6.31 The NZOE (overseas experience) : a cosmopolitan norm

At the time of writing (October 2008), it is no coincidence to read in the New Zealand Herald that the Prime Minister’s actions provide evidence of the fact that the
nation has been influenced by a cosmopolitan outlook that exemplifies what Seyla Benhabib (2007) calls the emergence of cosmopolitan norms. It is reported that Helen Clark played an important diplomatic role in ensuring that the British government’s immigration reform plans would not have negative consequences on the privileged rights of New Zealand citizens to live and work in the United Kingdom. Following her intervention, the British government has reversed their initial plans to i) abolish the ancestry visa permitting New Zealanders to work in the United Kingdom for four years prior to being eligible for indefinite leave to remain and ii) reducing the visa-free period from six months to three months. Through dialogue between both countries, the British government has recently launched a ‘Youth Mobility Scheme’, allowing for New Zealanders aged between eighteen and thirty to apply for two-year working holiday visas (Eriksen, 29/10/2008). Thus, the New Zealand ‘overseas experience’ (OE) which is the traditional rite of passage for many young New Zealanders to adulthood retains its special salience and significance in New Zealand culture. According to Bell (2002: 145), the OE is “an almost obligatory rite of cultural consumerism” where examples of middle class young Pakeha New Zealanders not taking OEs are unusual and “almost require justification”. New Zealand citizenship has therefore been incorporated with an imminent transnational dimension that paves the way for New Zealanders to live and work in not only neighbouring Australia, but in the United Kingdom and Europe as well. With 24.4 percent of the New Zealand born population working overseas, the country is second behind Ireland amongst OECD countries for its high percentage of graduates who choose to work abroad (Bennetts 2006).
The decision to articulate the OE and Prime Minister’s diplomatic efforts in this chapter were motivated, in part, by an observation that the OE phenomena needs to be theorised and situated vis-à-vis the current perspectives relating to *cosmopolitanism* found in social science and philosophy. In essence, the OE is an ‘unintended and lived cosmopolitanism’ that, according to Beck and Sznaider (2006: 7), is of increasing significance because these cosmopolitanisms will create global public spheres. The Prime Minister’s intervention and significance of the OE to New Zealanders are evidence of the fact that a *cosmopolitan* New Zealand society that ought not to exist, is nevertheless already in existence. With perennial debates in New Zealand frequently drawing attention to the problem of a ‘talent drain’ and dependence on immigration due to the country’s young and elite seceding for more attractive opportunities overseas, both the Prime Minister’s intervention and the OE suffer from the aporia of linking an individual’s liberty to travel around the world, as a national birthright, to a notion of the collective good for the country’s future. This is premised on an implicit acknowledgment of the fact that not all New Zealanders will return home. This aporia is certainly evident in the Prime Minister’s own admission as follows:

*The opportunity to build their skills is highly valued and of wider benefit to New Zealand when our young people return home, bringing their skills and experience with them.*

(Eriksen, 29/10/2008)

It is crucial to unravel a much deeper level of ambivalence that is reflected in this admission. By maintaining a cosmopolitan dimension in New Zealand citizenship, the Prime Minister is fully aware that her actions amount to an encouragement of the ‘brain drain’ and confession that the nation is not economically competitive enough to retain
its talented citizens. Such a problem however, would also be pervasive in other Western
countries as well. In today’s modern nation-states, the networks, skills and
competencies developed through its ex-citizens and immigrants are necessary to
enhance a country’s own standing in an increasingly competitive global world
(Benhabib, 2007: 24). While the government can only speculate on the number of
transnational New Zealanders that will eventually return home, Henare (2002: 17)
writes about a prevailing climate of insularity that discourages many New Zealanders
desiring to return and contribute, who experience similar difficulties that new migrants
face when entering the job market:

It is my suggestion that the introspective attitudes promoted by influential
cultural commentators in recent years have had a profound and in some ways
negative impact on the way New Zealanders see themselves. The notions that
we are a ‘Pacific nation’, and that *pakeha* are indigenous to New Zealand are
primarily aspirational and encourage some to think of those who stay away too
long as outsiders, ‘expatriates’ guilty of ‘behaviour unbecoming a New
Zealander’.

New Zealanders working abroad who return to visit friends and family during the
holiday season will most likely be caricatured by their less privileged counterparts as
the elite who are treated like outsiders to be shunned.

The problems of rejection which expatriate New Zealanders face upon their
return home are not surprising. This is because the cosmopolitan subject, according to
Featherstone (2002: 1), is a figure to be reviled due to its consonance with the ‘revolt of
the elites’ and concomitant failure of these middle and upper classes to maintain a sense
of responsibility to their excluded and ‘left-behind’ counterparts. The latter, who render
the elite ‘outsiders’ to be deplored for their ‘unbecoming’ transnational lifestyles are,
following the German theorist Ulrich Beck (2000: 92), “inhabitants of the first, nation-
state, age of modernity” who insist on cleaving onto patriotic identity as the only legitimate one. Given that we are now living in the second, post-national (cosmopolitan), age of modernity, Beck claims that the specific categories that shape a person’s life and integration into a global society are no longer subservient to the nation-state (see Beck 1992, 2000, 2006, 2006a).

Because images and caricatures of New Zealand’s young transnational citizens as frequent flyers becoming independent of their local communities are a reality that Zygmunt Bauman (2001) dubs the ‘secession of the successful’, it is necessary to recognise that in the longer term, future generations of the population will develop a sense of imperviousness to national boundaries and not need to root themselves in the ‘nation-state’ to consider themselves New Zealanders. Today’s influential New Zealand born citizens with talents of international standing who currently live overseas include soprano Dame Kiri Te Kanawa, Professor Malcom Grant, Provost of University College London and Professor Jeremy Waldron an influential legal-political philosopher based in the United States of America who espouses the doctrine of cosmopolitanism. Thus, citizenship in twenty-first century New Zealand society has already been permeated by cosmopolitanism that, following Ulrich Beck (2006a: 93), can be discerned most notably through the indicators he provides, viz. a highly mobile and transnational population. Moreover, with over twenty per cent of the Maori and Pakeha population living in Australia, Britain and other parts of the world, the secession of these New Zealanders is further evidence that exterritoriality is already an important characteristic of New Zealand citizenship. The exterritorial world that elite members of the world’s population occupy, according to Bauman (2001: 54), are not defined by ‘permanent
addresses’ except for their email ones and mobile telephone numbers; they are therefore guaranteed the ‘community-free’ zone which they so desire. Contemporary cosmopolitan New Zealanders with knowledge that can transcend local boundaries are clearly prepared to leave a workplace and country in favour of a more attractive opportunity emerging elsewhere. This exemplifies what Ossewaarde (2007: 372) identifies as a cosmopolitan person’s *emancipation* from neighbourhood roots, workplace and even national groupings.

During the mid 1990’s, populist politicians politicised the high unemployment rates of the country’s skilled Asian immigrants who would leave their families in New Zealand and travel back and forth to their country of origin for periodic employment. Despite their youth, qualifications and credentials, only twenty and a half percent of Asians who arrived since 1986 were employed in 1996 (Ip, 2000: 9). Unemployed immigrants did not turn to the welfare state for help, and were never criticised for a dependence on financial assistance. With the threat of impending unemployment and high rates of business failures, Asian breadwinners who adopted the transnational lifestyles of their elite Pakeha and Maori counterparts were stereotyped as greedy airborne ‘astronauts’ guilty of leaving their ‘parachute’ spouses and children behind to exploit the goodwill of the host country. From the perspective of the new settlers, the ‘astronauting’ strategy is not an option chosen lightly; it is the undesirable alternative to unemployment and dependency on the state for handouts (Ho 2003). When juxtaposed together, it is clear that although New Zealand’s migrant and ascendant Pakeha populations enjoy a similar degree of mobility and are equipped to transcend the territorial strictures of the nation-state to achieve better career opportunities and higher
standards of living, the forms of their transnational practices emerge out of different socio-cultural conditions, embody different motives and should not be conflated together. Nevertheless, as both groups are engaging in long-distance, work-related travels that require individuals to be situated in global networks, it becomes apparent that those making *ad hominem* criticisms of transnational Asians who resort to overseas employment render them unfit to occupy the elite modern positions their Maori and Pakeha counterparts are entitled to enjoy. Suggestions that Asian and other immigrants who engage in transnational activities demonstrate disloyalty to New Zealand not only employ double-standards, they nostalgically disguise the country’s post-national, cosmopolitan realities which are not unique to New Zealand, but already characteristic of citizenship in Northern European countries (see Gustafson 2009 for the example of Sweden) and member states of the European Union (see Pichler 2009).

The adoption of a cosmopolitan outlook and realism essential for survival in the twenty-first century, according to Beck (2006: 14), results in the diminishing validity of traditional dichotomies between the internal and external, us and them, and the national and international. With these hallmarks of a cosmopolitan nation existing in late-modernity defining the country’s national identity, its successful and mobile population resident overseas will eventually rely less on the nation-state and its community for their services, sense of identity and belonging. Future generations of cosmopolitan New Zealanders – regardless of ethnic background – will be conditioned to adopt, as the norm, lifestyles that celebrate what Bauman (2001: 56) calls an ‘irrelevance of place’. A country like New Zealand in late-modernity that has already been defined by cosmopolitanism differs from a ‘multicultural’ one when its population is transnational,
mobile and does not depend on its community for a sense of ontological security. A cosmopolitan citizen is flexible because s/he would find cultural differences superfluous and attribute little importance to ethnic culture (Ossewaarde, 2007: 374). As a political philosophy which seeks to protect the integrity of culture and traditions from internal and external change, multiculturalism is not merely ineffectual, but in direct opposition to the lifestyles of a transnational population that embodies multiple, and egregious levels of allegiances to different countries and places. Thus, the ontology of the social world that multiculturalism postulates is not coherent with the configuration of contemporary New Zealand. In his nuanced and implicit diagnosis of the problems with ‘multicultural’ societies and multiculturalism, Waldron (1995: 99) maintains that we are dealing with “conceptions of man and society which, if not actually inconsistent, certainly are opposed in some important sense”. In other words, multiculturalism is only appropriate for a society that finds its sense of self and identity in the wider communities of the nation-state. The aerial view of a multicultural society that Waldron renders ‘inauthentic’, according to Phillips’ (2007: 68) interpretation is one where its various communities sit side by side on a flat plane and touch only at the edges without engagement. Western countries in late-modernity are no longer configured as traditional and collective as such, but as risk adverse, individualistic and transnational (see Beck 1992, 2000, 2006a).

To recapitulate, the previous chapter maintained as its point of departure that the emergence of multiculturalism as a liberal civic idea during the 1970’s to-date can be appraised in terms of C. Wright Mills’ (1959) calls for sociologists to connect the ‘private troubles’ of individuals to ‘public issues’. It is therefore clear that
multiculturalism is a not a tenable civic idea for New Zealand when it can no longer ‘connect’ the private troubles of its considerably large transnational population with the nation-state’s public issues. Multiculturalism remains trapped in the ‘epistemology of the national outlook’ (Beck, 2006: 62) that is blind to the “contingencies and ambivalences of ways of dealing with difference that go beyond assimilation and integration” in a post-national era. In New Zealand, the ‘private troubles’ which members of its transnational Pakeha, Maori and minority citizens are likely to encounter will most likely be centred around dilemmas about identity, and the adjudication of loyalty to various extraterritorial attachments that multiculturalism cannot engage with. Multiculturalism would therefore have been more appropriate for earlier social configurations that were less individualistic and not conducive for the contemporary New Zealand condition. Cosmopolitanism is therefore a worthy alternative cornerstone for governing the nation that should be considered.

The hitherto theoretical contention that New Zealand society in late-modernity is more of a ‘cosmopolitan’ rather than ‘multicultural’ country could certainly be accused of being elitist and bourgeois due to its appeal to the middle and upper classes. The transnational habits of young, elite New Zealanders are clearly beyond the reach of the older generation and less skilled or educated sectors of the population. Ossewaarde (2007: 372) forthrightly states that outside of their neighbourhoods and local workplaces, the less privileged sectors of the population “know nothing”. Though such a statement might be considered pejorative to some, it does capture some degree of truth. Despite the fact that cosmopolitanism projects an elite perspective of the world, there are few academic theories that can escape this charge (Calhoun, 2002: 91). Due to their
lack of knowledge, the opportunities available to cosmopolitan New Zealanders that transcend local and national boundaries are not available to the less educated and less mobile. This trend however is likely to change in New Zealand. The vast majorities of university-educated New Zealanders embarking on their OE’s are not part of the elite or privileged groups but are instead, from the middle classes (Conradson and Latham, 2005: 230):

What is notable about these migrants is their ‘middling-ness’. Although they are well-educated, many have jobs that are relatively insecure and short-term, and rarely do they earn enough to place them in the upper stratum of British society. They certainly do not fit with any sensible definition of eliteness.

The OE in New Zealand would, in general terms, therefore be more consonant with the notion of transience and mobility due to its pervasiveness as a cultural norm. Cosmopolitanism is also viable for the less-mobile sectors of the population who do not travel or work overseas. The frequent flows of tourists, international students and immigrants into the country provide them with opportunities to understand other cultures and thereby pluralise their local attachments. Accordingly, cosmopolitanism is not an elitist civic idea for New Zealand. Though ancient, it is far more relevant and better-equipped than multiculturalism to accommodate the ‘private troubles’ of all its citizens. Regardless of whether or not they are mobile transnationals or physically rooted to the territorial boundaries of the nation-state, cosmopolitanism has the potential as a political philosophy that can accommodate the exigencies of all sectors of the New Zealand population. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an examination of the tenets of cosmopolitanism, as a prelude to a discussion of how this political philosophy would work in practice and resolve the bicultural-multicultural dilemma.
6.32 An ancient civic idea for contemporary New Zealand

Cosmopolitanism is a political philosophy and global ethic that, like multiculturalism, is conceptually difficult to define positively. According to Pollock et al (2000: 577), there is yet to be conceptual certainty established about cosmopolitanism, and, figuring out why this is so, and what cosmopolitanism is raises very difficult issues. In this section, cosmopolitanism is discussed in the context of the discipline of political philosophy and its historical roots in Greek philosophy; its core tenets that are considered applicable for this study will therefore be selectively identified. This serves as a prelude to the delineation of a more streamlined form of cosmopolitanism that can hopefully be realised in New Zealand. An expanded and generic discussion of the concept would therefore be necessary because cosmopolitanism is frequently deployed as a style of argument (rather than a political philosophy) that has attracted ardent supporters.

In recent times, its pervasiveness can be discerned in the way it is viewed by its enthusiasts as a down-to-earth and liberating cornerstone for governance that conjoins an organic attitude to one’s relationships and obligations to others as a citizen of the world. It is, in other words, the modern-day rationale for a universal ethic circumscribed on human rights that transcends the territorial strictures of nation-states. When national governments intervene in the affairs of countries afflicted by wars and natural disasters on humanitarian or peace-keeping grounds, they endeavour to implement the goals of cosmopolitanism. As a normative political philosophy, cosmopolitanism’s raison d’être is to extend social justice to individuals on a global scale. In short, it stands for “justice without borders” (Tan 2004). Within such a framework, military interventions that
Breach international law are frequently justified in response to genocides or despotic rules in other countries. Examples of international law transgressed in the name of human rights have been fairly common in the past two decades; the decision by NATO to bomb Kosovo in 1999 and Anglo-American led invasion of Iraq in 2003 embody purported attempts to extend justice and human rights to the persecuted citizens of these disparate countries. In the case of the latter, a prophylactic appeal to preserve the human rights of non-Iraqi citizens was also deemed an important end that buttressed the necessity for invasion. According to Ulrich Beck (2000: 83), the transition towards a cosmopolitan world order is evident through a reversal of the principle that international law precedes human rights that previously characterised the (nation-state) first age of modernity. This reversal is the direct result of a break down of the distinctions between ‘war’, ‘peace’, ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ policies that governed the previous order. In these respects, cosmopolitanism is already institutionalised through institutions and other legal frameworks (such as the Declaration of Human Rights of 1948) that have already transformed the nation-state system in the ‘here and now’ (Held, 2002a: 68 and Held, 2002b: 23).

Whilst it is certainly apparent that we have been ushered into a cosmopolitan world order where human rights now trump international law, it is important to state that the philosophical underpinnings of this world-order are not new but can be traced back to the writings of the ancient Greek polis. Although resistant to any simple definition, cosmopolitanism is not beyond characterisation in general terms. The numerous theories on cosmopolitanism which have developed over the centuries are linked by a common ideal and ethical structural core of ‘the world community’ that
comes directly from the Stoic philosophers of ancient Greece in the third century BC. The Stoics, in essence, were first to maintain that an individual’s moral allegiance is to the community of humanity in general, regardless of nationality (Berges, 2005: 6). The appeal of world citizenship, to the ethical and virtuous cast of mind, has been perennial. From a retrospective perspective, it could be argued that in every age of civilisation blighted by bloodshed and war, a conscious adherence to this core tenet of cosmopolitanism could certainly have obviated the need for people to kill enemies whom they were incapable of hating. In her quest to establish this cosmopolitan consciousness inspired by the Stoics, Martha Nussbaum (1996: 9) advocates a wholesale educational reform in the North American curriculum that regards culture and nationality as ‘morally irrelevant’:

In educational terms, this means that students in the United States, for example, may continue to regard themselves as defined partly by their particular loves – their families, their religious, ethnic or racial communities, or even their country. But they must also, and centrally, learn to recognize humanity wherever they encounter it, undeterred by traits that are strange to them, and be eager to understand humanity in all its strange guises. They must learn enough about the different to recognize common aims, aspirations, and values, and enough about these common ends to see how variously they are instantiated in the many cultures and their histories.

This ancient Stoic ideal, though utopian, offers hope for perpetual peace in a world that has been characterised by inter-ethnic conflicts throughout its history. It is also a virtuous way of life for people who traverse multiple jurisdictions of allegiances and commitments.

To this end, cosmopolitanism – as a normative global ethic – embodies as a fundamental aspect of its ethos the moral scruple postulating that an individual must be treated as an end regardless of where s/he is located in the world; and never as a means
to an end. Where the issue of war is concerned, patriotism can no longer be represented as a sacrifice of the self for a greater cause. This however does not imply that the Stoics prohibited any forms of legitimate loyalty or patriotism to any particular city-states, as Hill (2000: 70) explains:

Despite their injunctions regarding obedience to the laws of both republicae, and service to the interests of all, including intimates, the Stoics do pledge their loyalty to an ultimate authority: the cosmospolis...Before we can be a good citizen of the city-state, we must first be a good citizen of the cosmospolis.

For all intents and purposes, being an exemplary citizen of the cosmospolis is about de-legitimising one’s local attachments and exclusive membership bonds that are hostile to strangers who are different or foreign. The upshot of adopting a cosmopolitan ethos, according to Metha (2000: 623), will most likely result in the pluralisation of one’s local attachments and enhancement of solidarities with groups that exemplify ‘transnational modes of belonging’. In this regard, cosmopolitanism appears to be a tenable political philosophy for the technical reason that one need not sacrifice his or her local attachments and group affiliations to be a moral world citizen. It extolls as a virtue, the just treatment of strangers and aliens who are to be detached from their nationalities, religion, culture and educational background – as if born ex nihilo – as morally equal individuals to be accorded the equal worth that they are due. Here, it is worth highlighting that cosmopolitanism’s universalist-egalitarian treatment of an individual’s moral worth and autonomy differs from the group-differentiated public policies that are definitive of multiculturalism. In the words of David Held (2002b: 25):

This broad position runs counter to the common view that the world comprises fundamentally contested conceptions of the moral of the individual and the nature of autonomy.
Multiculturalism’s public recognition of cultural differences, in essence, validates the widely-held view that the moral worth and autonomy of an individual will vary, and are contingent on one’s culture. Thus, cosmopolitanism’s egalitarian individualism circumvents the moral and cultural relativism associated with multiculturalism’s recognition and toleration of cultural practices embedded in patriarchal norms deemed oppressive to women and children (see Phillips 2007).

Though its offer of world citizenship and guarantee of equal moral worth is indeed attractive, cosmopolitanism is not without its criticisms and pitfalls. One of the most common and potentially damaging criticisms made of cosmopolitanism is that it cannot accommodate the exigencies of nationalism and patriotism required for a locality or nation-state to sustain a common-sense of belonging and solidarity amongst its people. In short, the cosmopolitan ideal which ranks the unlimited inclusion of humanity over one’s neighbours, country folk and other local affiliations will not result in the successful inclusion of strangers but rather, in a loss of the localities required for global lives to be sustained (Ossewaarde, 2007: 383). It could also be said that the welfare of humanity will not be best promoted by people who disregard their special ties to their neighbours and local communities. Cosmopolitanism’s goals of a world state and world citizenship are apparently hostile to patriotism and nationalism that bind one to a particular country. For example, cosmopolitanism’s calls for political sovereignty to be centralised globally as opposed to nationally as required in the case of nationalism are by definition, mutually exclusive (Tan, 2004: 94). Simply put, cosmopolitanism would be unviable for New Zealanders living overseas if they are
morally required to sever patriotic affinities to their homeland. Vice-versa, cosmopolitanism could also be accused of denying to New Zealanders their rights to national self-determination if they do not engage in transnational activities. If this is indeed true, cosmopolitanism is an ineffectual political philosophy that cannot resolve the conceptual conundrum of New Zealand’s bicultural constitution and its tension with multiculturalism.

But a claim of this sort would be too hasty. The criticism that cosmopolitanism makes excessively heavy demands on the individual’s attachments and right to national self-determination is an overly rigorous view which rests upon the assumption that cosmopolitanism must penetrate institutions at a national-level. This however is not true. In the case of New Zealanders who are not well-travelled, they need only cultivate the view that an individual’s nationality, place of birth and cultural background are morally arbitrary. In drawing a sharp distinction between institutional cosmopolitanism and moral cosmopolitanism, Kok-Chor Tan (2004: 94) maintains that, unlike the former that calls for the establishment of a world state, the latter does not impose necessary institutional demands:

…moral cosmopolitanism is not concerned directly with the question of how global institutions are to be ordered, but with the justificatory basis of these institutions. And nothing in this interpretation of cosmopolitanism necessitates the idea of a world state. On the contrary, a moral cosmopolitan can as well defend national self-determination if she believes that the ideal of equal and impartial concern for individuals is best realised by respecting their claims to national sovereignty. So there is no necessary conflict between moral cosmopolitanism and the idea of national self-determination.

As the cosmopolitan goal of accepting New Zealanders from minority ethnic groups need not be realised through a world state or world government but can be extended
through the local community, cosmopolitanism is not at odds with the patriotic ideals of national self-determination that New Zealanders who do not travel will most likely embody. This broad-mindedness towards an individual’s attachments was exercised by the Stoics who were fully cognizant of the remote possibility of a world-state materialising during their time. But, like us, the Stoics advocated moral cosmopolitanism by “exerting their influence over policy, writing on statecraft and denouncing ‘bad’ governments” (Hill, 2000: 74-5).

Thus, when ratified as a moral outlook, cosmopolitanism is not inherently incompatible with an individual’s special ties to the nation-state and other local memberships. Cosmopolitan philosophers who succeed in achieving a sense of disinterestedness in their home countries are certainly rare. This view has attained currency in more recent years as cosmopolitan philosophers have taken great pains to recognise the importance of one’s ties to kith and kin and other patriotic attachments. In a nuanced attempt to soften the line, Kwame Anthony Appiah (1997: 618) maintains that cosmopolitans can also be patriots rooted to their homelands and cultural particularities whilst they take pleasure in the homes of people from other cultural backgrounds. He succinctly provides the framework for the cosmopolitan patriot by arguing that the celebration of cultural variety within as well as _across_ states is what defines cosmopolitanism and distinguishes it from multiculturalism:

> It is because humans live best on a smaller scale that we should defend not just the state but the county, the town, the street, the business, the craft, the profession, the family _as_ communities, as circles among the many circles narrower than the human horizon that are appropriate spheres of moral concern. We should, in short, as cosmopolitans, defend the rights of others to live in democratic states, with rich possibilities of association within and across their borders; states of which they can be patriotic citizens. And, as cosmopolitans, we claim that right for ourselves.
Here, Appiah can be interpreted as maintaining that a cosmopolitan patriot’s commitment to local institutions that support the conditions required for a common life is a moral obligation. Thus, an important lesson from Appiah that is relevant for the many New Zealanders living and working overseas can be delineated as follows: by not severing their patriotic ties to their homeland, they can adopt a virtuous stance as cosmopolitan citizens of New Zealand and the world. The vast majorities of New Zealanders abroad would certainly qualify as ‘cosmopolitan patriots’. In her study on New Zealanders working in London, Janine Wiles (2008: 133-4) found that all her participants identified strongly as New Zealanders and expressed a strong attachment to New Zealand as home by linking home to family and personal relations. Thus, New Zealanders who live and work overseas during their OEs can maintain their loyalty to New Zealand alongside their other attachments overseas and aptly fit Gustafson’s (2009) description of Swedish international travellers as ‘more cosmopolitan [but] no less local’.

Against this background, cosmopolitanism appears to be a suitable moral outlook for New Zealanders to be instilled with, and subsequently adopted as the cornerstone for governing New Zealand in the twenty-first century that avoids the pitfalls of multiculturalism. It would now be instructive to proceed with a discussion of the more substantive issues on how cosmopolitanism offers the best prospects for resolving the conceptual conundrums of biculturalism’s tension with multiculturalism without immolating the hegemony of biculturalism. In short, their solution is not found in cosmopolitanism’s disavowal of the moral significance of culture in a person’s life,
but rather, in the principle of humanity in the person – regardless of culture. The following section utilises literature predominantly derived from the legal and philosophical disciplines to explain why, biculturalism, at least as it stands today, can be said to be conceptually equivalent to cosmopolitanism and co-exist harmoniously. Although the legal literature has been interpreted with considerable care, it will be necessary to insert the caveat that the following attempt to resolve the bi-multicultural dilemma may be limited in scope to a theorist of public law or philosopher of jurisprudence due to the researcher’s lack of an academic background in law.

6.33 Cosmopolitanism and the future of biculturalism

In New Zealand’s socio-legal academic spheres, there is much theoretical and legal ambiguity in the concept of ‘biculturalism’ and other concepts related to indigenous rights. Benedict Kingsbury (2002: 101), a theorist of New Zealand public law maintains that the lack of agreement even on core concepts is “inevitable where smaller groups are seeking a radical change in the majority’s thinking and fundamental interests clash”. The consequence of this clash is an image of a nation, as pointed out through the commercial and conservative multiculturalisms mentioned in the earlier chapter that provides little autonomy to its minority ethnic groups who are allowed to exist on the periphery. Their existence is nevertheless a necessity for the sake of the centre – for good and for bad – as a real economic periphery for the centre. This might amplify, more than at times justified, the image of a majority population so caught up with reconciling itself with its first nation’s people, that the issues affecting its other minority groups take second priority. The government and majority population can
hardly be held responsible for this omission when doing so could undermine all their hitherto diplomatic efforts at reconciliation with the Maori. Most ostensibly, if multiculturalism were to be concurrently applied with biculturalism as it has been argued earlier, this would be achieved at the expense of marginalising biculturalism. This however may not have to be the case if we were to look to cosmopolitanism as an alternative to multiculturalism.

Whereas an official framework of multiculturalism (that existed alongside biculturalism) would promote respect for all minority ethnic groups, the cosmopolitan alternative opposes such policies which are premised on group differences and culture. This is because cosmopolitanism, generically speaking, as we have seen, is inherently against multiculturalism’s elevation of cultural membership above the universality of the law, and other global considerations. Yet, it could be argued, once we identify the fact that biculturalism – when conceptualised as a power-sharing agreement between Maori and Pakeha – can remain congenial with the universal standards of justice and morality that cosmopolitanism upholds. Accordingly, it would be instructive for the rest of this chapter to restrict the meaning of biculturalism to state-led policies designed to ensure that Maori are recipients of distributive justice on the basis of their ‘indigeneity’ and injustices committed by disturbing their established social order. Examples of restorative justice include handing over to them the management and ownership of mountains which are an integral part of their spiritual and genealogical worldviews. According to Ruru (2004: 114), mountains are sacred, contain a life-force, and are considered the literal ‘ancestors’ of modern-day Maori.
The question then, as to what exactly is ‘indigeneity’ and why it plays an important role in privileging the Maori over other immigrant groups and the Pakeha majority needs to be addressed before the claim that cosmopolitanism is compatible with biculturalism can be given any credence. According to Jeremy Waldron (2003: 55) who now writes *qua* a legal theorist rather than a political philosopher, the importance of indigeneity in New Zealand public law is predicated on the claim that Maori are the first inhabitants of the land at the time of European colonisation. Thus, the provisions for indigenous rights are justified on the two competing legal principles of indigeneity known as the Principles of First Occupancy and Prior Occupancy. In the case of the former, moral recognition is given to the fact that Maori were first to possess New Zealand without disturbing any occupants who arrived first; the latter is a more conservative principle which goes further to command that the established arrangements of Maori as the first occupants should not have been disturbed by the British colonisers (Ibid: 55). While both principles apply in New Zealand law today, legal debates allow for one to argue that the Principle of First occupancy necessarily implies the Principle of Prior Occupancy. A satisfactory response to this debate is beyond the remit of this study. Though the former appears to be the more promising basis for legal redress, Waldron argues that it is susceptible to becoming an “entirely presentist and forward-looking perspective that aficionados of indigeneity reject” (2003: 77). Thus, it would be instructive to take the Principle of Prior Occupancy as the philosophical basis of moral justice and hence, biculturalism itself.

Granted that the Principle of Prior Occupancy is the legal basis of restorative justice which recognises that a disruption to the established cultural and institutional
practices of Maori has resulted in their social disadvantage, the country’s existing policies of biculturalism would be consonant with what Tan (2004: 168) posits as the virtue of distributing justice in a context of injustice through “a division of labour along citizenship lines”. In other words, biculturalism can be adopted by non-indigenous New Zealanders as a collective means of addressing the existing inequalities and injustices experienced by Maori on the basis of social justice rather than culture. While many might say that the present generation of Pakeha New Zealanders should not be held responsible for the wrongs of their ancestors which are confined to the past and that biculturalism and special rights for Maori are inappropriate in a ‘multicultural’ country, such a claim is irresponsible. Jeremy Waldron maintains that though the historical violations sanctioned against the ancestors of indigenous groups may be relegated to the past, the consequences of these historical actions persist into the present. Waldron (2002: 146-7) provides the following apposite example to illustrate:

Suppose that someone stole my car yesterday. That is an unjust act that took place at a certain place and at a certain time: at 9:30a.m. on 14 September, my car was stolen from the parking lot. Clearly, anyone committed to the prevention of injustice should have tried to stop the theft from taking place. But once the car has been driven nefariously out of the parking lot, the matter does not end there. For now there is a continuing injustice: I lack possession of an automobile to which I am entitled, and the thief possesses an automobile to which he is not entitled. Taking the car away from the thief and returning it to me, the rightful owner, is not a way of compensating me for an injustice that took place in the past, or adjusting the present to fit some counterfactual hypothesis; it is simply a way of remitting an injustice that is ongoing into the present.

To this end, the special policies under the rubric of biculturalism designed to compensate Maori for the ongoing injustices they suffer in the form of social disadvantage are threatened by multiculturalism and competition for resources from
immigrant groups (see Walker 1995). Because multiculturalism necessarily entails recognising each ethnic group’s cultural requirements in the public sphere, Maori are most likely to continue to feel threatened by the state’s recognition of all other cultures, exacerbating the social inequalities they face and diluting the significance of their indigenous status. Cosmopolitanism however can escape this charge.

As outlined earlier, cosmopolitanism, as a generic global ethic, posits that the individual – irrespective of cultural or group membership – is of equal moral value and must be rendered justice. Thus, in so far as it is designed to achieve distributive justice for Maori and all other citizens on the basis of an individual’s universal moral worth and not group or cultural membership, biculturalism is congenial with cosmopolitanism’s goals of extending world citizenship and justice without borders. To this end, cosmopolitanism is not mutually exclusive from biculturalism and can therefore be said to co-exist on a continuum (in the similar vein as time and space existing on a continuum). It also circumvents the inherent tension of biculturalism’s uneasy relationship with multiculturalism, and the charge that the latter will immolate the hegemony of the former. Should cosmopolitanism replace multiculturalism as the more fitting civic idea for New Zealand in the twenty-first century, it is hoped that derisive debates that threaten to disenfranchise non-European immigrants can eventually come to an end. As cosmopolitan patriots of New Zealand, Pakeha, and all other immigrant groups must recognise their obligations in ensuring that Maori are rendered justice through bicultural policies designed to address the penalties they face in employment, education and the wider society at large. Conversely, Maori and Pakeha should, following Martha Nussbaum (1996), reciprocate by treating minorities as
morally equal individuals to be accorded the justice they are due, regardless of their cultural and national backgrounds.

6.4 The continuum of biculturalism and cosmopolitanism

The above analysis suggests that, broadly speaking, the political philosophy of cosmopolitanism can succeed in defusing the conceptual dilemmas that surround the mutual exclusivity of a concurrent application of biculturalism and multiculturalism in New Zealand. Nevertheless, further explication on how cosmopolitanism can harmoniously co-exist with biculturalism in practice is required. As analytical certainty in cosmopolitanism is a goal that is yet to be fulfilled, it remains the case that, according to Pollock et al (2000: 577), the elusive task of establishing cosmopolitanism as a practice awaits realisation. Thus, specific questions on how cosmopolitanism’s relationship with biculturalism will evolve in the near future cannot be predicted and exceed the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, in what follows, I wish to propose that biculturalism and cosmopolitanism can be conceptualised as co-existing on a continuum (rather than across a dividing line) whereby the state’s commitment to addressing the needs of non-European minority ethnic groups and the indigenous Maori is an integral aspect of, rather than an exception to, the normal course of life in New Zealand’s public and political spheres. My approach does not deny that there may be certain instances of conflicting interests and legal-ethical dilemmas that cosmopolitanism may not be adequately equipped to handle. Thus, inter-ethnic conflicts and disputes over the rights of non-Maori New Zealanders to access the foreshore or seabed entail significant challenges. The application of cosmopolitanism in practice, as an ethic, assumes certain
conditions of mutual hospitality, respect and trust in a self-governing framework. Inadequacy, however, is not tantamount to inapplicability. Indeed, the application of cosmopolitanism’s universal values in situations of conflict and wars need not be suspended, even in the most atypical of situations.

Let us assume for a start that cosmopolitanism – for the purposes of this study – can be theoretically streamlined to encapsulate two broad overlapping approaches that are identified by Nira Yuval-Davis (2005: 167), namely (i) “as a form of belonging which is detached and fluid, avoiding any fixed notions of boundaries” and (ii) a second approach “based on local attachments that conceptualise the national as expanding into the international and transnational”. The second approach is generally emphasised in discussions about the universal rights of human beings to be treated with justice and right to hospitality as citizens of the world, regardless of cultural background. Accordingly, by allowing for the possibility of multiple versions of cosmopolitanism based on these two general premises to evolve over time, the special challenges of conflicting indigenous requirements should not lead to a disavowal of the object and purpose of cosmopolitanism as a political philosophy that strives to establish social justice. Instead, it should lead to the development of creative solutions, respective, as much as possible, of biculturalism and developed in response to the collective raison d’état of the country. Cosmopolitanism can effectively be construed as providing a normative stance on general matters in contrast to biculturalism’s emphasis on the specific. By invoking the jurisprudential principle of lex specialis⁴, which stipulates that an existing public statute governing a specific matter is not to be abrogated by a newer

legislation that encompasses a more wide-ranging and general remit, the shortcomings
of biculturalism and its reticence on the rights of non-Europeans and non-Maori could
and should be compensated by cosmopolitanism in so far as this does not immolate the
former. Because a comprehensive survey of the implications of this assertion is beyond
the scope of this thesis, it would be appropriate to conclude with a few observations
demonstrating the theoretical and practical importance of this salient point. Generically
speaking, it can be deduced that the confluence of biculturalism and cosmopolitanism
encompasses four modalities: (a) situations where the requirements of Maori and non-
European minority ethnic groups are in direct conflict in the public sphere; (b) a
situation that is either unregulated or sparsely regulated by either biculturalism or
cosmopolitanism; (c) a situation where biculturalism / the Maori interpretation of the
Treaty influences the interpretation of cosmopolitanism; and (d) a situation where
cosmopolitanism influences the interpretation of biculturalism / the Treaty. The
remainder of this section is devoted to an elaboration on each of these modalities.

6.41 Four modalities encompassing the interplay of cosmopolitanism
and biculturalism

(A) In cases of a direct conflict in the requirements between Maori and non-
European minority ethnic groups, biculturalism ought normally to prevail, unless an
explicit contrary intent of Maori is evident or made clear at a later stage. The
application of biculturalism alone would suffice that, as the indigenous peoples, they are
entitled to have their rights under the Treaty considered. Situations wherein their rights
under the Treaty should be in conflict with the legal entitlements of other New
Zealanders under the existing human rights law are likely to be extremely rare. A situation of conflict would only suffice should the demands of the Maori go beyond their existing entitlements under the Treaty. In such extreme situations, both cosmopolitanism and biculturalism could apply concurrently and be harmonised to provide for the indigenous to engage in dialogue.

(B) In the event of cases that are either unregulated or sparsely regulated by biculturalism, cosmopolitanism ought to apply and vice versa. Should biculturalism be considered to be reticent about the rights, for example, on the status of non-European groups in the Treaty, the reticence should be constructed as a legal vacuum and not as a negative exclusionary arrangement. This approach would therefore emphasise the complementary nature of the two civic ideas. For instance, cosmopolitanism – and international human rights law – would regulate generically about the obligations of non-Maori to ensure that the indigenous are accorded the distributive justice they are due. Biculturalism however can fill this gap and provide extensive insight into this matter; the public recognition of their indigenous needs and policies of positive discrimination (see Callister 2007) are available for Maori and various minority groups. At the same time, whilst some of these provisions do not apply to individuals from non-indigenous backgrounds, cosmopolitanism could provide a roughly equivalent form of protection, for example, in the form of advocacy and anti-racism.

It is the same need to reduce conflicts and legal vacuums between cosmopolitanism and biculturalism that warrants the cross-influence of interpretations between the two civic ideas, as discussed in (C) and (D) as follows:
(C) Cases wherein biculturalism influences the interpretation of cosmopolitanism could potentially be common, given the historical, institutional and legal substantiation of the former. Thus, for instance, changes in the distribution of power between the Crown and Maori could affect how the presence of non-European groups is appraised. In light of the great degree of interpretative latitude in establishing the meaning of the Treaty, it could be a possibility that the entitlements of certain non-Europeans groups to justice are considered an obstacle to indigenous claims for the restitution of their political power. Should any such situation arise, key concepts such as ‘distributive justice’, ‘political power’ and other terms mentioned in the Treaty ought to be construed in a manner that is compatible with biculturalism, so that acceptable practices under cosmopolitanism would be deemed lawful. This however might be unnecessary. The legal principle of *lex specialis* mentioned earlier would be sufficient to ensure that indigenous rights under biculturalism and the Treaty are not to be derogated or abrogated by cosmopolitanism.

(D) Situations where cosmopolitanism is likely to influence the interpretation of biculturalism’s norms provide the last modality, and, I argue, the importance of which increases in direct proportion to the degree in which the former is considered exclusionary to non-Maori and non-Europeans citizens. Should this occur, the comprehensive provisions for equality and justice in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to which New Zealand is a signatory, and ratified in the New Zealand Bill of Rights and Human Rights Act should be used to determine the scope of the prohibition against discrimination in biculturalism.
Conclusion

This chapter began by introducing the background to biculturalism and its roots in the Treaty of Waitangi. I then argued that, due to the historical, legal and institutional substantiation of biculturalism, a concurrent application of multiculturalism alongside biculturalism would not be harmonious. I then suggested that cosmopolitanism, and not multiculturalism would be a worthy incumbent alternative civic idea that can be concurrently applied with biculturalism. First, it was asserted that the country’s social sphere was more ‘cosmopolitan’ than ‘multicultural’. With exterritoriality being the norm for most working and middle class Pakeha New Zealanders, rather than the exception, the importance of cultural and group identities would eventually diminish. Thus, multiculturalism and the importance it ascribes to culture and tradition is ill-suited for a population that develops a sense of imperviousness to the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. In other words, multiculturalism cannot connect the ‘private troubles’ (in the form of dilemmas surrounding the ‘management’ of loyalties and ties that lie outside of New Zealand) of such a population to its ‘public issues’. Cosmopolitanism, it was argued, succeeds not only because it is more congenial to the transnational lifestyles of New Zealanders, it has greater potential to overcome the conceptual tension found in biculturalism’s uneasy relationship multiculturalism.
Concluding Chapter

Overview of the research

This thesis has embodied a predominantly exploratory and explanatory approach to debates that encompass racism, ethnic identity, biculturalism and multiculturalism in contemporary New Zealand. In this final chapter, the research goals elaborated in Chapter Two are revisited in respect of the underlying theoretical and methodological foundations of social scientific research. The chapter, and thesis, will then conclude with suggestions for a number of future research topics in relation to the themes and various perspectives that have been examined in this study.

On the basis of an introduction to the socio-historical context of debates relating to racism, ethnicity and multiculturalism in New Zealand, and a review of the literature around these topics in Chapter One, this research project first began by establishing that most academic representations of racism and ethnicity lacked explanatory depth and needed to transcend the timeless notion of racism as discrimination or exclusion on the basis of colour or cultural differences. Subsequently, it was also argued that egregiously defined versions of the ‘unofficial’ multiculturalism adopted in New Zealand’s public sphere culminated in a conceptual impasse and obscured from view the more important question of whether a state-sponsored project of multiculturalism would be compatible with the country’s existing constitutional policy of biculturalism that privileges the rights of the indigenous Maori over the non-indigenous sectors of the population.
Accordingly, the task of providing a diachronic perspective on past and present anti-Asiatic racisms (see objective two presented in section 2.1 of Chapter Two) was performed in Chapters Three and Four, by situating historical and contemporary racisms within the nation’s historically specific position(s) in modernity. To adequately answer the question of how issues relating to race and ethnicity resonate with modernity and are temporally specific, it is necessary to understand the goal of this research aim and how it ‘fits’ in a theoretical perspective. This can be understood in terms of the descriptive, exploratory and explanatory goals of research that Neuman (1997) differentiates (see Table 2.51 in Chapter Two). In the case of exploratory and explanatory research, familiarity must first be established with basic facts about New Zealand’s settlement policies and society before tentative theories and conjectures can be developed. It is therefore only during the explanatory stages that theories can be extended to deepen our understandings of the debates that encompass immigration policy, racism and indigenous rights. Thus, the research goal of Chapter Three was predominantly explanatory and less exploratory. Continuity across past and present racisms was established by adopting Balibar’s (1991) more inclusive definition of racism prior to reviewing and applying existing theories of modernity to locate the socio-historical specificities of racisms organic to New Zealand. In essence, it was argued that, in contrast to the racisms of the nineteenth century, contemporary racisms are specific to the confusion and anxiety of a population forced to co-exist with foreign cultures as a result of the country’s highly-regulated economy being transformed to one of the world’s most de-regulated economies.
Continuing with the theme of temporal continuity, Chapter Four was also largely explanatory in nature. The socio-historical context of this chapter was the two decades between 1987 and the present which have witnessed an increasing number of debates on the pertinence of race, identity, immigration policy and multiculturalism. The chapter presented, in part, an attempt to highlight the fact that minority ethnic and other group identities in the late-modern era do not lend themselves to easy categorisation. Using the concept of ‘Asian’ as an example, it was argued, using qualitative data, that the pervasiveness of this pan-racial category homogeneously conflates the complex identities and histories of Asian New Zealanders along distorted lines of culture, language and ethnicity. Here, the main theory used in the explanatory stages was the risk society thesis of Beck (1992). When used to guide the interpretation of empirical data, it was suggested that boundaries between traditional fixities of ethnic or cultural differences are beginning to recede. Though only parts of Beck’s risk society thesis are relevant to racism and identity, the applicability of European-based theories on risk to a New Zealand study, is by definition limited in scope. Thus, it is not possible to go beyond the tentative conclusion that: the ubiquity of risks affects the lives of people irrespective of their ethnic origins or identities; these shared risks can potentially complicate structures of social divisions going beyond race and class.

The research goals of Chapters Three and Four were pre-dominantly explanatory. In explaining how the temporal characteristics of racism, identities and the categorisation of minority ethnic groups depend on the wider context of New Zealand’s geographical, historical, economic and social environments, the literature on
modernity, risk and New Zealand society from a variety of disciplines were used, alongside empirical data in Chapter Four, to provide for explanatory depth in the area of racism and ethnicity in New Zealand. The search for a type of multiculturalism or political philosophy that could address the needs of New Zealand’s culturally diverse population without impinging upon indigenous rights was more complicated than expected. This was for two reasons.

First, there were academic writings in the New Zealand literature arguing that multiculturalism would be appropriate for the country’s multicultural fabric. There were then assertions that multiculturalism was either compatible (see Ip 2008) or incompatible (see Thakur 1995) with the country’s existing official policy of biculturalism that is enshrined in the constitution. These written accounts lack substantiated theoretical or empirical arguments as to why multiculturalism was in/compatible with biculturalism and indigenous rights – let alone which type of multiculturalism was advocated. Second, the accounts suggesting that a vague, de facto version of multiculturalism (see, for example, Kolig 2006a and 2006b) has already been in existence alongside biculturalism failed to provide a more adequate theoretical and detailed empirical account of what this was. Thus, before I could argue why a particular type of multiculturalism would be suitable for managing diversity and difference in New Zealand, it was necessary to provide more empirical and theoretical details to the unofficial version of multiculturalism.

The research goal of the fifth chapter was therefore both exploratory and explanatory in nature. Prior to explanation, the process of exploration began with multiple lines of theoretical inquiry using the secondary literature on multiculturalism.
to offer different perspectives on what the literature referred to as ‘practical multiculturalism’. This was an essentially iterative and reflexive process where the theoretical was used to guide an interpretation of the empirical whilst empirical data was also used to identify any latent ambiguities or anomalies in theory that could be addressed. An example includes the use of empirical data to broaden the scope of theoretical writings about commercial multiculturalism to include a more specific examination of the spatial in Section 5.23 in Chapter Five. The conclusion that the *de facto* version of multiculturalism in New Zealand could be correctly understood and represented as encompassing both commercial and conservative multiculturalisms was formed *deductively* by using existing theories to guide the interpretation of qualitative data, and vice-versa. The theories on commercial multiculturalism in the international literature provided explanatory depth but needed to be adapted to the nuances of New Zealand’s immigration policies, its trade-relations with other countries and self-defined bicultural character.

Subsequently, the research aims of Chapter Six were also exploratory and explanatory. The point of departure in this chapter was that biculturalism and multiculturalism were by definition, mutually exclusive on the basis of the historical, theoretical and legal grounds I elaborated. Subsequently, multiculturalism was no longer deemed the most appropriate civic idea for contemporary New Zealand. Thus, the process of searching for an incumbent alternative political philosophy meant that it was necessary to generate a few conjectures about the configuration of New Zealand society by examining the prospects of cosmopolitanism as the more fitting alternative to multiculturalism. On the basis of an assertion that the country was more
cosmopolitan than multicultural, I proceeded to explain why cosmopolitanism was better-suited to the nuances of New Zealand. Moreover, cosmopolitanism was argued to be congenial to the exigencies of biculturalism where it was possible to conceptualise and represent the relationship between biculturalism and the proposed solution of cosmopolitanism as co-existing on a continuum rather than on a dividing line. A series of four modalities that encompassed the interplay of cosmopolitanism were also presented to address the foreseeable jurisprudential and policy questions that include how competing claims ought to be adjudicated should biculturalism influence the interpretation of cosmopolitanism and vice-versa.

Review of research significance

The goals of this research project were to provide a conceptual approach to theorising racism, ethnicity and multiculturalism in contemporary New Zealand society. In order to do this, I explored a variety of theories on modernity, social theory, space-time and political philosophy. The search for theoretical solutions was guided in part by C.Wright Mills’ (1959: 236) call for sociologists to connect their ‘private troubles’ with the state’s wider ‘public issues’ by bringing their biographical experiences to the centre of their research endeavours. No other research on the sociology of race and ethnicity in New Zealand has sought to develop a research framework that maintains theoretical (and empirical) continuity relative to the temporal (and to a lesser extent, the spatial). It is hoped that through this research, future theoretically-led research into racial and ethnic studies in New Zealand and around the world will, following Herminio Martins (1974: 246), take ‘becoming,
process and diachrony as both ontologically and methodologically privileged”, by developing research methodologies that aspire towards this outcome. Furthermore, to date, there has been no attempt made to defuse the conceptual dilemmas surrounding the uneasy relationship between a state-sponsored project of multiculturalism and New Zealand’s hegemonic policy of biculturalism by considering the prospects of cosmopolitanism as a worthy alternative and how it might possibly work in practice.

Finally, although this research is about New Zealand, it, as mentioned earlier in the introduction, provides a test case and comparative perspective of the ethnic dislocations and socio-economic transformations that are likely to be precipitated by post-colonialism, indigenous rights, economic deregulation and immigration in other settler societies. Granted that “New Zealand has been actively involved in drafting the UN’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” and is aware of its international contributions in this field (Patman and Rudd, 2005: 11), this study’s examination of the confluence between the Treaty of Waitangi and cosmopolitanism offers perspectives that state elites of other settler societies can use to improve their relations with indigenous peoples. The comparative differences that exist between New Zealand and their own countries must however be taken into account first.

**Limitations of the research**

Granted that the theoretical and conceptual issues surrounding race, racism, ethnic identity and multiculturalism are rarely addressed in the New Zealand literature, the conceptual and empirical approaches employed in the preceding chapters are not presented as without need of revision or reconsideration in the near future. This
applies, in particular, to the likely future of cosmopolitanism, as a theory, concept, political philosophy, and state-sponsored policy. It is hoped that this thesis can stimulate further debates and research by opening up a new area of social scientific inquiry within New Zealand studies, New Zealand sociology and New Zealand political science. Nevertheless, in the absence of any hitherto attempts which have examined the possibilities of cosmopolitanism as a more fitting alternative that circumvents the tensions found in multiculturalism’s incompatibility with biculturalism, a variety of jurisprudential and other legal questions beyond the scope of the social sciences are reasonably foreseeable. Thus, the analyses and findings of this thesis should not be considered conclusive, but rather, be viewed as part of a work in progress that will be required to adapt itself to any changes in New Zealand society, government policy, as well as global forces.

A further limitation concerns the contested nature of cosmopolitanism as a concept and political philosophy that is theoretically and also empirically vague. As Pollock et al (2000 et passim) suggest, this is a very common and worthy criticism of the concept. In particular, when justified as a more fitting alternative to multiculturalism on the basis that cosmopolitanism is already in existence and that the term can generically ‘capture’ some of the citizenry’s way of thinking through transnational lifestyles and world citizenship, it is difficult to empirically research evidence of New Zealanders’ attitudes towards cosmopolitanism when it is a concept of which many would be unconscious. As a concept that is generically abstract, it is not realistic to expect respondents to recognise or verbalise their understandings of cosmopolitanism. This limitation in itself will not impair future conceptualisations of
cosmopolitanism as an alternative to multiculturalism that can avoid the latter’s conceptual tensions with biculturalism which are examined in Chapter Five and Six. Neither will it diminish cosmopolitanism’s potential to compensate for biculturalism’s reticence on the rights of non-Maori and non-European New Zealanders. It is hoped that this study can establish the foundations for research programmes that will identify the national structures and ideologies which render, and do not render, cosmopolitanism conducive for New Zealand society. Extensive empirical research and consultation with government authorities would be required before state elites can formally consider introducing cosmopolitanism as an official state-sponsored civic idea.

Moving forward: ‘Where will New Zealand go from here?’

Whilst the analyses and assertions made in this thesis are not beyond critical reflection, reconsideration or even substantial revision in future, it is hoped that the research findings of this in-depth research study have contributed an analytical framework for future research into race and ethnicity in New Zealand wherein broader theoretical and empirical insights might evolve. As debates about multiculturalism, indigenous rights and the presence of non-Europeans continue to persist and attract the attention of state elites and scholars, this work’s discussions of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are anticipated to pave the way for refreshing new research perspectives in New Zealand sociology and New Zealand studies. The process of qualitative research generated a considerable amount of interest from the informants with a considerable number feeling optimistic that the future looked promising. I was
often asked what I thought the future of multi-ethnic New Zealand would hold – as to whether the societal structure of the country would be a more cohesive and harmonious one, or if it would be more deeply segregated along ethnic lines. Whilst it is impossible to predict what will happen in the near-distant future, it would be interesting to surmise the state of affairs that is most ideal should successive government administrations continue to publicly address the disadvantages that Maori face.

In Chapter Six, it was maintained that the existing distribution of power between Maori and the government could change – ranging from a greater economic leverage the former might have on the economy, increasing marriages between European, Maori and other ethnic groups, and other global political and economic factors. Thus, should a greater cultural connection and appreciation increase towards the Maori, it is likely that the problem of overt racisms might dissipate over time. For now, however, the Treaty settlements process is not yet completed and remains fraught with controversy. It is therefore recommended that future research projects attempt to address any (or all) of the following areas:

1. **The impact of non-European immigration on Maori**

   It has been over two-decades ever since the New Zealand government did not consult the Maori about their intentions to accept immigrants from Asia. It might therefore be worthwhile investigating the merits and disadvantages of the new colour-blind policy of immigration on indigenous peoples through both quantitative and qualitative means.
2. **The convergence of race and ethnicity with risk**

As mentioned in the fourth chapter, it would be important to establish the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ amongst the minority ethnic groups in New Zealand by examining the risks which are more specific to the gender, sexual or class domains that certain ethnic groups occupy. Thus, it would be appropriate to also research the risk perceptions the mainstream hold towards the various immigrant groups present in the country.

3. **Empirical research on cosmopolitanism in New Zealand**

While there is a substantial amount of theoretical literature on cosmopolitanism as a political philosophy, there is very little written\(^1\) on how cosmopolitanism would work in practice as a public policy. Thus, empirical insights into how the citizenry and state-elites would conceive of this would be beneficial.

4. **New Zealand in the global context**

There are also broader research agendas that can provide empirical and theoretical perspectives to issues relating to indigenous rights, racism and diversity in New Zealand. Thus, comparative studies with other settler societies like Israel, Canada, Australia, France and South Africa could help identify the lessons New Zealand can learn from other countries, and vice-versa. Debates in Israel, for example, about the merits of the prospective ‘two-state’ versus the ‘binational’ systems of governance as a solution to the more complicated Israeli-Palestinian conflicts would certainly be

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\(^1\) With the exception of Nussbaum (1996) who proposes a change to the educational curriculum.
beneficial to research strategies that might encourage reconciliation between the indigenous peoples of New Zealand and all other sectors of the population.

5. **The geographies of race in New Zealand**

While there is little research into ethnic residential segregation in the major cities of Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, longitudinal studies would be helpful and desirable in identifying new geographies of race which have been created by the effects of commercial multiculturalism.

6. **The relationship between the diachronic and synchronic features of racism**

Theoretical research that examines how the diachronic and synchronic features of racism are related may pave the way for cutting-edge synchronic analyses of racism. For example, it could explain why European peoples are sometimes the victims of racism when the ‘functional necessities’ of racism such as colour, phenotypical, linguistic and cultural differences are absent. Additionally, the resilient structures responsible for perpetuating institutionalised racism in education and employment may be identified through diachronic analyses.
APPENDICES
Appendix 1A: Te Tiriti O Waitangi

The original treaty text was signed in Waitangi on 6 February 1840. It is reproduced as it was written. The original copy is held by the National Archives in Wellington.

TE TIRITI O WAITANGI

Ko Wikitoria to Kuini o Ingarani i tana mahara atawai ki nga Rangatira me nga Hapu o Nu Tirani i tana hiahia hoki kia tohungia ki a ratou o ratou rangatiratanga me to ratou wenua, a kia mau toms hoki to Rongo ki a ratou me to Atanoho hoki kua wakaaro is he mea tika kia tukua mai tetahi Rangatira - hei kai wakarite ki nga Tangata maori o Nu Tirani - kia wakaaetia a nga Rangatira maori to Kawanatanga o to Kuini ki nga wahikatoa o to wenua nei me nga motu - na to mea hoki he tokomaha ke nga tangata o tons Iwi Kua noho ki tenei wenua, a e haere mai nei.

Na ko to Kuini a hiahia ana kia wakaritea to Kawanatanga kia kaua ai nga kino e puts mai ki to tangata maori ki to Pakeha a noho tore kore ana.

Na kua pai to Kuini kia tukua a hau a Wiremu Hopihona he Kapitana i to Roiara Nawi hei Kawana mo nga wahi katoa o Nu Tirani a tukua aianeai amua atu ki to Kuini, e mea atu ana is ki nga Rangatira o to wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani me era Rangatira atu enei tore ka korerotia nei.

Ko to tuatahi

Ko nga Rangatira o to wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hold ki hai i uri ki taua wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki to Kuini o Ingarani ake toms atu - to Kawanatanga katoa o o ratou wenua.

Ko to tuarua

Ko to Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangatira ki nga hapu - ki nga tangata katoa o Nu Tirani to tino rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o ratou taonga katoa. Otiia ko nga Rangatira o to wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa atu ka tuku ki to Kuini to hokonga o era wahi wenua a pai ai to tangata nona to wenua - ki to ritenga o to utu a wakaritea ai a ratou ko to kai hoko a meatia nei a to Kuini hei kai hoko mona.

Ko to tuatoru

Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo to wakaaetanga ki to Kawanatanga o to Kuini Ka tiakina a to Kuini o Ingarani nga tangata maori katoa o Nu Tirani ka tukua ki a ratou nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea ki nga tangata o Ingarani.

[signed] W. Hobson Consul & Lieutenant Governor

Na ko matou ko nga Rangatira o to Wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani ka huihui nei ki Waitangi ko matou hoki ko nga Rangatira o Nu Tirani ka kite nei i to ritenga o enei kupu. Ka tangohia ka wakaaetia katoatia a matou, koia ka tohungia ai o matou ingoa o matou tohu.

Ka meatia tenei ki Waitangi i to ono o nga ra o Pepueri i to tau kotahi mano a ware rau a wa to kau o to tatou Arika.

Ko nga Rangatira o to Wakaminenga
Appendix 1B: The English Translation of the Maori Treaty Text

This recent literal translation of the Maori text of the articles of the Treaty was performed by Professor Ian Kawharu, it was published in the Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy, Wellington, 1988, pages 87-88. A comparison of this text with the English text of the ‘official’ version will illuminate the crucial differences in meaning, especially in the first and second articles.

THE TREATY OF WAITANGI

Victoria, The Queen of England, in her concern to protect the chiefs and subtribes of New Zealand and in her desire to preserve their chieftainship and their lands to them and to maintain peace and good order considers it just to appoint an administrator one who will negotiate with the people of New Zealand to the end that their chiefs will agree to the Queen’s Government being established over all parts of this land and (adjoining) islands and also because there are many of her subjects already living on this land and others yet to come.

So the Queen desires to establish a government so that no evil will come to Maori and European living in a state of lawlessness.

So the Queen has appointed me, William Hobson a captain in the Royal Navy to be Governor for all parts of New Zealand (both those) shortly to be received by the Queen and (those) to be received hereafter and presents to the chiefs of the Confederation chiefs of the subtribes of New Zealand and other chiefs these laws set out here.

The First

The Chiefs of the Confederation and all the chiefs who have not joined that Confederation give absolutely to the Queen of England for ever the complete government over their land.

The Second

The Queen of England agrees to protect the Chiefs, the subtribes and all the people of New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures. But on the other hand the Chiefs of the Confederation and all the Chiefs will sell land to the Queen at a price agreed to by the person owning it and by the person buying it (the latter being) appointed by the Queen as her purchase agent.

The Third

For this agreed arrangement therefore concerning the Government of the Queen, the Queen of England will protect all the ordinary people of New Zealand and will give them the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England.

(signed) William Hobson
Consul and Lieutenant – Governor

So we, the Chiefs of the Confederation and the subtribes of New Zealand meeing here at Waitangi having seen the shape of these words which we accept and agree to record our names and mark thus. Was done at Waitangi on the sixth day of February in the year of our Lord 1840.

The Chiefs of the Confederation
Appendix 1C: The Treaty of Waitangi – English text

Here is the English treaty text. This text became the ‘official’ version.

THE TREATY OF WAITANGI

Her Majesty Victoria Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland regarding with Her Royal Favor the Native Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and anxious to protect their just Rights and Property and to secure to them the enjoyment of Peace and Good Order has deemed it necessary in consequence of the great number of Her Majesty's Subjects who have already settled in New Zealand and the rapid extension of Emigration both from Europe and Australia which is still in progress to constitute and appoint a functionary properly authorized to treat with the Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition of Her Majesty's sovereign authority over the whole or any part of those islands - Her Majesty therefore being desirous to establish a settled form of Civil Government with a view to avert the evil consequences which must result from the absence of the necessary Laws and Institutions alike to the native population and to Her subjects has been graciously pleased to empower and to authorise me William Hobson a Captain in Her Majesty's Royal Navy Consul and Lieutenant Governor of such -parts of New Zealand as may be or hereafter shall be ceded to Her Majesty to invite the confederated and independent Chiefs of New Zealand to concur in the following Articles and Conditions.

[This is] the first

The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation of Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole sovereigns thereof.

[This is] the second

Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession; but the Chiefs of the United Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat with them in that behalf.

[This is] the third

In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects.

[Signed] W. Hobson
Lieutenant Governor

Now therefore We the Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand being assembled in Congress at Victoria in Waitangi and We the Separate and Independent Chiefs of New Zealand claiming authority over the Tribes and Territories which are specified after our respective names, having been made fully to understand the Provisions of the foregoing Treaty, accept and enter into the same in the full spirit and meaning thereof in witness of which we have attached our signatures or marks at the places and the dates respectively specified.

Done at Waitangi this Sixth day of February in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty.

The Chiefs of the Confederation
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