A TALE OF TWO MOVEMENTS: SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILISATION IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA

by

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A thesis submitted to
The University of Birmingham
For the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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September 2014
Abstract

The thesis employs the political process approach within social movement theory (SMT) to examine in a comparative fashion two distinctly different opposition movements in southern Russia. One is the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai and the other is the ethno-national Balkar movement in Kabardino-Balkaria. The political process approach focuses on the role and interaction of political opportunities, mobilising structures, and social movement framing for both movements, and seeks to explore their role in social movement mobilisation dynamics in Russia’s non-democratic context.

The combination of the analysis of the three variables of political opportunities, mobilising structures, and social movement framing allows for fresh perspectives on both SMT and post-Soviet area studies. The thesis is particularly concerned with networks. It argues that in non-democratic contexts, the role of networks is more important than in democratic contexts.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Lucy and Viggen.

For their support, encouragement, and love.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEBN</td>
<td>Council of Elders of the Balkar Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPRF</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWNC</td>
<td>Environmental Watch on the North Caucasus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEA</td>
<td>Protest Event Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>POS</td>
<td>Political Opportunity Structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAT</td>
<td>Rational Action Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
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<td>ROC</td>
<td>Russian Orthodox Church</td>
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<td>RMT</td>
<td>Resource Mobilisation Theory</td>
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<td>SMT</td>
<td>Social Movement Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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Ethnic Map of the Caucasus (O’Loughlin et al., 2007)
INTRODUCTION

This thesis seeks to explain two interrelated phenomena. First, do social movement dynamics operate the same way in non-democratic contexts as in democratic contexts? Second, can the same methods developed in Western liberal democracies for studying social movements be applied to non-democratic settings? This research focuses on southern Russia for a number of reasons. Putin’s tenure as president and premier from 1999 to the present has resulted in reassertion of government control on domestic mass media, the crackdown on dissenting elite, and repression of political opposition and independent civil society, essentially turning Russia into a non-democratic state. These changes create an environment for social movements characterised by higher degrees of state coercion, more scarce opportunities for social movements to engage in open communication with constituencies, and weak formal organisations. Another reason is that the social movements have remained heavily understudied in the West. This research therefore contributes to filling the gap in the existing scholarship on this issue. It focuses on the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai and the ethno-national Balkar movement (hereafter referred to as ‘Balkar movement’) in Kabardino-Balkaria for the period between 2000 to the present. This choice was determined both by their similarities in pursuing claims related to land use, their differences in the direction and nature of their claims, and their operation in two different types of subjects of the Russian Federation — one majority ethnic Russian territory and one North Caucasian ethnic republic. Given the ethno-federal composition of the Russian Federation, there are significant differences in the nature and dynamics of social movements across the country.

The thesis will employ the political process model within social movement theory (SMT). This approach is best suited for such a study for its ability to address questions about movement mobilisation by examining the role of structural factors (political opportunities), movement attributes (networks as mobilising structures), and cultural factors (framing).
Research Questions and Objectives

This inquiry will serve to elucidate the following:

- How and why the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai experienced mobilisation;
- How and why the Balkar ethno-national movement in Kabardino-Balkaria did not experience mobilisation but, rather, went through abeyance;
- What the findings tell us about the nature of the Russian polity and society.

In order to answer the research questions, this analysis proposes a comparison of two social movements in two locations in southern Russia: the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai and the Balkar movement in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. I argue that these movements’ mobilisation or demobilisation, distinguished by the frequency of public demonstrations, are caused by the interaction of three factors: 1) the political structures in the political environment, in other words the presence of a divided elite, increased or decreased state repression, media access, and allies; 2) the movements’ mobilising structures or their organisational networks; and 3) the interpretive and discursive processes occurring within each movement — their cultural framing processes. The combination of these factors, together known as the political process model, is an important approach in exploring the role of structural, network, and ideational dynamics in the activity of social movements in Russia. As such, it attributes a new role to Russian social movements as being not only subjects of structural constraints but also active transmitters of grievance and agents of reality construction surrounding the issues at their heart. Furthermore, the study provides qualitative indicators of under-researched post-Soviet Russian civil society in the context of stable non-democratic regimes.

The study of the first factor involves the characteristics that define the political structures and opportunities in Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria. This will be an examination of the main factors of the political environment — the opening or closing of the
structural polity. According to the theory, the presence of a divided elite, increased or decreased state repression, media access, and allies all lead to an opening of political opportunities during which social movements are more likely to mobilise.

The second factor relates to the movements’ mobilising structures. This will be an examination of the mechanisms that facilitate collective action — the networks that provide a space for actors to assemble and that promote interaction and the exchange of ideas. Mobilising structures, in particular micromobilisation and macrocoordination structures, facilitate communication and increase coordination across networks of individuals, ultimately facilitating mobilisation. In particular, this study will compare the network robustness of the Krasnodar environmental and Kabardino-Balkaria Balkar movements by examining the way they structure social interaction.

The third factor concerns the movements’ framing processes — their discursive and interpretive constructions of reality. They are important for mobilisation because they help tie individual identities to collective ones, facilitating feelings of solidarity, and they also identify the issues relevant to each movement’s agenda. This will be an examination of each movement’s collective action frames which operate on the individual level, articulating grievances, identifying the issues relevant to the movement, and attributing blame and master frames which function at a more general level, resonating with a wider audience. Convincing and resonant frames are expected to spur protest activity.

The analysis of those factors seeks to contribute to both the conceptualisation of social movements in a stable, non-democratic context and to the better understanding of the Russian polity and society.

The thesis’s research questions and objectives define its structure, divided into five chapters that, apart from the Introduction and Conclusion, mirror elements of the analytical approach set out in the theoretical framework. It is structured as follows:
• Chapter 1 discusses the literature surrounding the researched topic.

• Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework and methodology used in this research.

• Chapter 3 provides an empirical account of the impact of political opportunities on the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai and the Balkar movements in Kabardino-Balkaria.

• Chapter 4 provides an empirical account of the impact of mobilising structures on the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai and the Balkar movements in Kabardino-Balkaria.

• Chapter 5 provides an empirical account of the impact of framing on the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai and the Balkar movements in Kabardino-Balkaria.

• The conclusion summarises the findings and assesses their impact on our understanding of the mobilisation dynamics of the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai and the Balkar movements in Kabardino-Balkaria.

Need for Research

With the contested Duma elections in December 2011 and the prospect of another six years of Putin, Moscow and indeed the whole of Russia saw an unprecedented number of people join the anti-Kremlin opposition movement. Some accounts had 100,000 people out on the streets for a single protest. In the meantime, smaller, local-level civic groups have been emerging across Russian regions to push forward a range of claims, surrounding issues from housing issues and benefits to animal rights.

In the increasingly authoritarian political environment under Putin and his regime, any movement’s activity, especially of an oppositional nature, has been hampered by the close monitoring of the authorities. This was particularly the case in southern Russia, which
includes the North Caucasus — a prime example for investigating how the political environment in Russia’s regions influences the field for social movements that operate there.

The North Caucasus, being well known as the most volatile region in the Russian Federation, has been the setting for violent conflicts including ethnic, religious, and separatist struggles. Chechnya alone, where the most destructive conflicts took place, continues to be a source of diffusion for much of the instability in the localities outside it. The region is associated with human rights abuses, corruption, and a lack of economic development. The legacies of Russia’s regime change in the early 1990s as well as the effects of institutions and political actors’ choices in the post-Soviet period are widely seen to be some of the root causes of the situation. Krasnodar Krai has been relatively free of the spillover from these conflicts but is distinguished by a very pro-Kremlin regional government, which stifles opposition and promotes nationalistic-illiberal ideologies.

With the collapse of the Soviet system, people in the North Caucasus and southern Russia grouped together chiefly along ethnic lines in order to launch common grievances in the public sphere. Frequently these alliances became politicised and developed into social movements in their own right. In the past 20 years, several of these ethnic movements have since failed while new ethnic movements have emerged. Whereas human rights, ecological, and other civic movements have been gaining salience recently, in the interests of competition power figures and groups have restructured society such that ethnicity is still one of the most important aspects of society in the Caucasus. However, the increasing centrality of civic aspects to life cannot be denied.

The importance of the study of social movements in southern Russia becomes apparent when considering that the region maintains its crucial international and geopolitical significance, even more than a decade into the new millennium. The region is Russia’s boundary with the South Caucasus, it borders the Black and Caspian Seas, and it has an abundance of valuable natural resources including oil and gas. It is also fertile ground to study
social movements in a non-democratic environment. As social movements maintain the potential to influence state-society relations, understanding more about what allows them to mobilise under these conditions can lead to a greater knowledge about their predictability and impetus for action.

Social movements influence social dialogue allowing citizens to take part in civic life in an otherwise vertically structured political system. Social movements represent ideas in motion and can serve as a litmus test for the direction in which society in southern Russia is going. The ideologies and values they espouse and the messages they offer guide the participants’ actions, help define their orientation, and find support among the population. They justify political change, although whether that change is broadly supported in society or not remains to be investigated.

**Limitations of the Study**

This study is based on fieldwork findings limited to 2012 (interviews and participant observation), other information obtained from the movements’ cases, and the Internet. It presents an initial inquiry on the Krasnodar Krai environmental movement and the Kabardino-Balkaria Balkar movement through the prism of SMT. This research is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of the movements but focuses on its mobilisation processes and dynamics and raises questions for further research.
1 EXISTING APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN POLITY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

This chapter will examine the two main areas of literature central to this research’s topic: the political context and culture of southern Russia and social movement theory (SMT). The review will pay special attention to problems related to empirical research and theorising in these areas of scholarship.

The first section begins with a discussion of empirical area studies on the Russian Federation, including issues related to their methodological quality and logical rigor, and then moves to Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria. This will orient the reader towards the larger political context in which these social movements operate and will help identify the literature’s gaps. The second part comprises a review of the literature surrounding SMTs whose explanatory utility is better suited to explain mobilisation in Russia than the empirical studies done before. These theories are arranged historically so that concepts are introduced in the chronological order in which they appeared in the literature. This has been done in order to trace the evolution of social movement theory and show how newer theories built upon older ones and attempted to remedy the concepts’ application to non-democratic contexts. The review will then proceed to analyse the key concepts of SMT, which are utilised in this study.

1.1 Relevant Literature on the Area

In order to avoid universalised understandings of social movement mobilisation across contexts, it is necessary to understand how context affects movement dynamics. Context for social movements is most often understood to be the external environment within which the
movements operate with all its historically developed formal institutional structures and informal configurations of power relations. For the purposes of clarity, I delineate these contexts by political geography: Krasnodar Krai and the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria.

This section will explore the institutional landscape and state-society relations in Russia as a non-democratic state (see page 3), and more specifically in Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria. This investigation is necessary in order to understand the constellation of institutions and relations in the environment that provide the backdrop for social movements. Internal intervening variables of mobilisation not directly related to the external environment, for example, the movements’ attributions, as well as activists’ interpretations of grievances are still mediated by context. Indeed, as Miller (2000, p.24) argues, social movement mobilisation ‘operates in place-specific contexts, draws on place-based and place-structures identities, and employs spatial strategies’. Thus the context needs to be elaborated in order to apply specific analytical tools (to be discussed in Chapter 2) to the empirical analysis of the two cases under investigation.

1.2 The Institutional Landscape in Russia

Following political theory, the nature of the political arena plays a key role in the protest cycle — or a sustained period of mobilisation — of movements. This political environment comprises the stable structural aspects of the political system, conceived here as the Russian state’s formal (institutional) ordering of power, which is important for specifying which channels are formally open to contenders and which are not (Williams, 2010).

The character of modern Russia’s political institutions has led scholars to characterise its regime type as “managed pluralism” (Balzer, 2003), “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way, 2002), and “managed democracy” (Beer, 2009; White, 2006). However, the term “hybrid regime” (Hale, 2010; Shevtsova, 2011) has received the broadest application. In qualifying Russia’s regime type — whatever term chosen — the literature points to unfair
and fraudulent elections, the difficulty of holding a popular referendum (Volkov, 2004), subordinated and biased courts, the mechanism of personal rule (Bacon and Wyman, 2006), the weak separation of powers (Bacon and Wyman, 2006; Hough, 1998, p.691), and the regime’s contradictory tendencies (Shevtsova, 2011, p.67) as indicators of the system’s non-democratic nature.

Despite the guarantee of separation of powers in the 1993 Russian Constitution, in practice the system of checks and balances in Russia is actually weak and underdeveloped. Scholars see the lack of fully fledged parliamentary institutions and the balance of power as emerging from the conditions under which the 1993 Constitution was made. Boris Yeltsin (President, 1991-1999) drew up rules that heavily favoured the executive branch. The power concentrated in the executive branch has meant an absence of real and competitive political parties as well as a high emphasis on personality in the presidency. In addition, Russia’s electoral system is based on non-competitive events with the official results of polls determined in advance, regardless of voters’ preferences (Gel’man et al., 2008; Reuter and Remington, 2009). The political system is dominated by the United Russia party (founded in 2001), and is comprised of people loyal to Vladimir Putin (President, 2000-2008, Prime Minister 2008-2012, President 2012-present) (Ordeshook and Shevtsova 1995, p.113; Petrov and Slider, 2003, p.222). The high threshold of 7 percent for party entry into parliament further skews the already flawed proportional representation electoral system, allowing United Russia to easily dominate it. Putin has solidified the power vertical throughout the country through appointments of regional leaders and the Federation Council and by building a stronger system of subordination of the regions to the centre (Hahn, 2005, p.166; Shevtsova, 2005, p.91).

In this manner, the institutionalised political system is insulated from the appearance of new players in the political arena. These institutional factors are important to understand how contentious groups are constrained. Despite the formally democratic nature of Russia’s
constitution, the de facto control of the state over the system of checks and balances and the electoral system, as well as the creation of a vertical of power serve to make action “from-below” difficult, and alienates people from the political process (Bacon and Wyman, 2006, p.79). All of this has led to a situation where many Russians have become increasingly disenchanted by regional and local politics (Slider, 2005, p.184). In light of this, it is interesting to study how independent social movements have emerged in such an atmosphere. To do so, it is necessary to also analyse the configurations of state-society relations in order to better understand the spaces for social groups to interact and engage with the state in contentious action.

1.3 State-Society Relations in Russia

Until recently, state-centred thinking dominated efforts to understand social and political contexts, resulting in a top-down approach. It is now accepted that citizens also impact the state’s structure by making claims on it in a bottom-up civil society approach. Together, this relationship forms the dialectical part of political opportunities — the relationship between the state and society. For Russia, it is the space in which Russian social movements operate.

Post-Soviet Russian civil society has not proved to be a particularly strong mediator in state-society relations. Both passivity within Russian society and the state’s monopoly over the public sphere have been attributed to the Soviet legacy. McFaul and Treyger (2004) point out that ‘no political system has ever been more hostile to civil society than the totalitarian communist regime erected by Stalin’ (p.142). Furthermore, obstacles to grassroots activities and protests have become increasingly stronger under Putin. The Kremlin appears to set out to control civil society rather than engage it, fostering pro-Kremlin groups while marginalising

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1 The notion of “civil society” here is understood as avoiding both prescriptive universalism and western exceptionalism; it is “the space of uncoerced human association and … the set of relational frameworks – formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology – to fill this space” (Michael Walzer 1991).
or even disposing of those considered to be oppositional (McFaul and Treyger, 2004). As a result, there has been increasing difficulty for independent social movements to operate freely.

State coercion is a part of social movement actors’ everyday lives. Putin’s regime relies heavily on bureaucracy as well as the military and security services (Shevtsova, 2011, p.67) for political and social objectives. Sociologist Anton Oleinik (2008) characterises Russian society as a system of imposed power based on coercion and co-optation of groups that show loyalty. Social movement activists are pre-emptively detained and arrested, and arbitrary and sometimes ad hoc legislation is passed to constrain their activities. This coercion reaches down through the centralised power vertical to the regions. The fait accompli that the heads of the seven federal districts (okrugs) hailed largely from the power ministries — the Federal Security Service, military, and police – has been emphasised by scholars as a way for Putin to exert leverage to impose more centralisation in the regions (Hahn, 2005, p.156-7; Petrov and Slider, 2003, p.212; Taylor, 2011, p.13). The system of federal districts is seen as a source for manipulation by regional and local law enforcement (Taylor, 2011, p.142) as well as a method implemented by the authorities to manage and tame social movements in the regions.

The two studies that cover social movements in Russia, Sperling’s Organising Women (1999) and Clément’s New Social Movements in Russia (2008), echo this repressive environment. These two studies, which are generally descriptive in character, see the existence of movements primarily as indicators of civil society’s strength. While the challenges faced by social movements and civil society in Russia are widely discussed, there is much less concern about how they influence social movement dynamics. As such, analysis of the intermediary steps between social movements’ conditions and outcomes has been largely absent from their work, limiting their utility. Laura Henry’s (2007) paper goes further than mere descriptions of the system analysing forms that activism in Russia takes as well the Russian context’s impact on movement dynamics. However, her unduly strong emphasis on
the importance of movement leaders is a clear drawback of the work. She states that leaders
determine the form and strength of movements. This creates an elite-bias and erases the
contribution of rank-and-file movement participants. She also emphasises social movement
organisations, misguidedly calling them mobilising structures rather than the contrary, and
completely overlooks the role of networks.

In conclusion, the nature of the political and social context that social movements in
Russia are faced with has received some scholarly treatment, helpful to the extent that they
provide some useful descriptive comments with some limited application of systematic
frameworks. They however leave some key questions unanswered. What, for example, are the
most important variables in the political environment that affect social movements in a
context like Russia’s? How do social and cultural factors contribute to a protest cycle’s life in
Russia? These and other more specific questions will be addressed below.

1.4 Southern Russia: Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria

Turning to the specific regions under study, we find certain variances in the political
environment. Miller (2000, p.6) explains: ‘National-level states, for instance, may indeed be
distinct systems, but they are also internally differentiated with substantial variations among
local and regional-level state units that can substantially affect social movement mobilisation’. Most scholars agree that the relationship between Russia’s federal centre and its 83\(^2\) regions
has not been definitively settled (Bacon and Wyman, 2006, p.40). The differences in their
relative wealth, degree of autonomy, and location have made a uniform application of
regional policies difficult (Bacon and Wyman, 2006, p.40). In this way, the political
opportunities of the regions operate within one space — the Russian Federation — but are
subject to differences in the regional institutional structures and regional state-society
relations that can impact contentious groups operating within them differently.

\(^2\) Russia has 85 regions if including Sevastopol or Crimea.
Both Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria are located in Russia’s “conservative” south. Krasnodar Krai is sometimes placed within the North Caucasus region (e.g. Arutjunov 2002; Popov and Kuznetsov, 2008) or else set in Russia’s “south”. Kabardino-Balkaria on the other hand is firmly established as a North Caucasus republic. This has certain implications for the literature. Literature on southern Russia is dominated by the North Caucasus region which has been oriented toward three areas of inquiry: 1) violence and war (e.g., Holland and O’Loughlin, 2010; Khoperskaya, 1998; Gammer, 2006; King, 2008; Schaefer, 2010; Ware and Kisriev, 2009; Sakwa, 2011), 2) ethnicity and nationalism (Khoperskaya, 1998, p.45; Markedonov, 2010, 2011; Kuchins, Malarkey, and Markedonov, 2011), and more recently 3) Islam (e.g. Sagamoso, 2007, 2012; Bobrovnikov and Yarlykapov, 1999; Yarlykapov, 2006). Consequently, literature on Kabardino-Balkaria and Krasnodar Krai reflects this. Studies giving attention to the factors that characterise the political scene in each of the two regions do exist, but they are few. By taking into account the popularity in post-Soviet studies of the role of elites in Russian regions (Hughes and John, 2001), it is possible to collate information on the institutional “rules of the game”. With the small number of works on civil society in the regions, an idea of state-society relations there can be formed as well.

1.4.1 Krasnodar Krai

Krasnodar Krai’s institutional political regime is dominated by an administrative-political elite known to both Russian and non-Russian researchers to be conservative and reactionary (e.g. Morozova and Miroshnichenko, 2009, p.65; Popov and Kuznetsov, 2008, p.231; Webb, 1994, p.237) as well as hostile and intolerant to the opposition and independent civil society. These elites, whose resources far surpass those of oppositional parties, social

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3 In January 2010, the Kremlin announced the creation of the North Caucasus Federal District, which excludes the Republic of Adygea. Through this action, Moscow separated the North Caucasus republics from the Southern Federal District, which includes Krasnodar Krai. This was ostensibly to allow more focused attention to problems in the North Caucasus, a step towards increasing its financial independence, but also perhaps to isolate the region, helping distance Sochi from it for the Olympics (Kuchins, Malarkey, and Markedonov, 2011).
movements, and nongovernmental media in influence, are made up of the head of the region (the governor), the regional organs of state power, and legislative deputies (Patseva, 2006). Patseva (2006) argues that the region’s institutional structure, characterised by a weak normative-legal separation between powers with a highly centralised power (the governor), presupposes informal consensus of the branches of power under the governor’s patronage. Civil society, social movements, and “outsider” parties all play a subordinate role.

Large federal injections of funding to Krasnodar Krai for the realisation of the Sochi 2014 Olympics project strengthened the structure of political hierarchies in the region (Nikovskaia and Iakimets 2010, p.94) and enriched local elites, including Governor Alexander Tkachev (Shahnazarian, 2011, p.3). Corruption and exploitation in Krasnodar Krai are considered regular phenomena and are well known.  

Shahnazarian (2011) argues that the continued support of Tkachev by the Kremlin despite these problems indicates a neo-feudal power structure (votchina) (see also Blank, 2011). The regime is characterised by a “winner take all” system, evidenced by the lack of oppositional factions in the regional government (Patseva, 2006). The various formulations presented by all the authors previously mentioned all highlight the presence of an archaic structure of power that melds power and property. This structure mediates governance in the region, which is characterised by the dominance of the administrative elite over the social, political, and electoral arena. This elite dominance of decision-making in addition to a low level of civil participation in politics is definitive of a non-democratic, in this case local, regime.

Scholars note that the influx of ethnic minorities into the region has consequently marked it with greater social tensions (Webb, 1994, p.231). Popov and Kuznetsov (2008) identify a certain “securitisation” of ethnicity in the region on the part of the authorities. This is the positioning of ethnic relations within the realm of state security rather than leaving them

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4 Krasnodar has been ranked as one of Russia’s least democratic regions, putting it 66th out of 89 (Petrov and Slider, 2003). Furthermore, the 2002 Regional Corruption index ranked it as one of the most corrupt.
as social or political issues. It is perhaps for this reason that so many scholarly works on Krasnodar Krai concentrate on the impact of ethnicity and xenophobia on the region (e.g. Derluguian, 2000; Koriakin, 2006; Pilkington, Omel’chenko, and Garifzianova, 2010; Popov and Kuznetsov, 2008).

This “securitisation” of what is usually relegated to social spheres of life has had an effect on the relationship between the state and society regarding the coercive capacity, or the strength of the state’s institutional capacity for repression, which is characterised by arbitrary checks of citizens by the authorities. The existence of formal registration in the region⁵ is seen as a justification for arbitrary repressive measures on the part of law enforcement agencies (Popov and Kuznetsov, 2008, p.233) against people in all segments of the population.

It is within this environment that the Cossack movement achieved ascendancy in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Cossacks made ethnic nationalism and state and church loyalty their official ideology and in time became institutionalised, receiving funds from the state budget for their activities. This can be seen within the context of the differential treatment of the Russian authorities to contention — those seen as ideological allies are eventually co-opted and controlled rather than directly opposed and curbed. Groups of Cossacks were given the authority to conduct checks and raids (Derluguian and Cipko, 1997), essentially turning them into a paramilitary organisation with Governor Tkachev at the head of this system (Omel’chenko and Goncharova, 2008). These social control measures, ostensibly meant to manage migration in Krasnodar Krai, have in practice been directed towards those deemed a threat to the established order, including ethnic Russian opposition members and anyone considered a political opponent force. As Governor Tkachev said: ‘This land belongs to the Cossacks and everybody should be aware of this. Here we play according to our own rules’ (Markedonov, 2004).

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⁵ Registration has been a way for the Krasnodar Krai authorities to control migration by requiring that citizens register at their place of residence. This replaced the Soviet propiska (residence permit), which was deemed illegal in 1993 as it violated the constitutional freedom of movement. However, executive authorities in the regions still maintain the registration practice, using their own interpretations of it, or passing ad hoc legislation to regulate it.
Although Morozova and Miroshnichenko (2009, p.61) see civil society as well developed in Krasnodar Krai, they argue that civil society actors are dissatisfied with the constraints they face. Morozova and Miroshnichenko also distinguished a large gap between the assessments about the public sphere given by respondents from the state and municipal authorities on the one hand and from civil society actors on the other. This is indicative of a large gap between state and society in Krasnodar Krai. Thus, a conflictual relationship might be generated between citizens and the state — with the marginalisation of civil society, those considered legitimate political partners become limited and are excluded from ‘normal’ institutional politics more widely.

These works on Krasnodar Krai, although elaborating much about the institutional dynamics and power relations in the region, do not engage in any meaningful discussion about the dynamics that drive contentious politics in any generalisable way. Despite some brief acknowledgements regarding the rise of Cossack activities that rarely go beyond their emergence and are based in social-psychological interpretations, they do not discuss the dynamics of their mobilisation nor do they use systematic theoretical frameworks to study the movement over time. They fail to give attention to the individual and group motivations for taking part in collective action just as they disregard movement-level factors facilitating action. The environmental movement in Krasnodar is also practically left unmentioned in the literature. By leaving these themes unexplored, the literature fails to help us understand the impact that the structural environment, group dynamics — including interpersonal relationships and cultural factors — and especially interpretive processes have on their protest cycles. This presents an obstacle for understanding movement mobilisation in the Russian context and leaves a large gap in the literature to which Russian cases could contribute to knowledge of movement dynamics in non-democratic contexts.
1.4.2 Kabardino-Balkaria

Unlike with Krasnodar Krai, literature on Kabardino-Balkaria suffers from an extreme lack of material on the general political landscape of the republic. Most works on the republic are for a popular readership, and although there is a slowly growing body of Russian literature on institutional or state power in Kabardino-Balkaria, as Thabisimova (2001) admits, a main drawback of these works is their ideologisation of the national-state construction process and the non-objective nature of their analyses. She also admits that despite the growth in literature, the subject of the republic’s political structures had still not become a subject of comprehensive study. In 2013, this did not change.

Sagramoso, in her broad overview of the North Caucasus in *Violence and Conflict in the Russian North Caucasus* (2007), describes an autocratic environment in Kabardino-Balkaria, with President Valery Kokov at the helm of the republic from 1991 until his resignation in 2005 due to health problems (2007, p.687). Kokov disbanded the old parliament in 1993 and established a new one composed mainly of old nomenklatura members, subduing and curbing opposition groups (2007, p.688). Complying with Putin’s recentralisation efforts and dealing heavy-handedly with Islamic extremism, Kokov earned a hands-off approach from Moscow, but as Yemelianova (2005, p.75) notes, his policies were also accompanied by a rise of corruption, economic degradation, and increased state surveillance and coercion, the stifling of opposition, and the curbing of free press. He created a Kabardian ethnocratic regime comprised of powerful clans under the guidance of his family. Yemelianova argues that the dominance of the Kabardian clans has been defended through indirect policies promoting Kabardian nationalism in various spheres of life. This fact has contributed to piqued feelings of grievance among the minority Balkar people living in the republic.

Kokov’s successor, Arsen Kanokov (President 2005-2013), though appointed on the basis of his supposed competence and integrity, has been associated with more arbitrary
policies. Nedea (2012, p.255) for example emphasises unrest, volatility, and the “lack of authority” in the republic since his presidency. Orazaeva’s work (2004) characterises relations among institutional powers in Kabardino-Balkaria as vertical in nature, with the notion of a singular administration “from top to bottom” involving the executive branch with Kanokov at the helm obligating local self-government to certain norms. This power vertical, as with most, if not all, Russian regions, goes all the way to the top, imbuing regional life with elements of Kremlin-approved policies. At the same time, institutional weakness pervades the republic and is seen as a reason that the state “imposes” itself on local self-government (Orazaeva, 2004) and consequently onto civil society and social movements, limiting their autonomy and constraining independent civic activity.

Current president Yuri Kokov (2013-present) took over after Kanokov reportedly voluntarily stepped down. It is still early in Kokov’s term to be able to characterise his presidency in any definitive way. However, his background as a career Ministry of Interior officer reveals Putin’s desire to prioritise security in the region, perhaps in anticipation for the Sochi Olympics in February 2014. It is also indicative of a victory of the “Kokov clan” over Kanokov, who was seen as a rival.

The ethnic factor is hugely popular in scholarly works on the politics of Kabardino-Balkaria. Indeed, the republic was formed from the merging of the ethnically distinct Kabardian and Balkar districts (okrugs) (Akkieva, 2008, p.261). Although the literature on the republic and the region is slowly turning away from ethnic issues towards religious as religious violence emerges across the region (Babich and Yarlykapov, 2003), ethnic organisations are still important to the institutional structure of the republic. Yemelianova (2005) states that ethnosocial and administrative control through the political unification of the ethnically distinct Kabardian and Balkar peoples is significant for the republic’s present condition. In line with this, Misrokov (2011) argues that it is necessary to take into account
the ethnic factor and historical traditions when working out current institutional issues, especially regarding municipal borders in a multi-ethnic republic.

In this way, the Kabardian ethno-nationalist movement in Kabardino-Balkaria has received some scholarly attention (e.g. Arutiunov, 2002; Cornell, 2001, p.456). The movement, comprised of several groups, the most significant of which is Adyge Khase⁶, was as Yemelianova (2005, p.57) notes dedicated to reviving the culture of the Circassians, or to creating a Greater Circassia, depending on the informant. However, as Yemelianova (2005) points out, by 1992 the movement was in abeyance with the more radical nationalists marginalised, and the more moderate activists co-opted into political and economic institutions. The movement has found itself at odds with the republican regime, whose policies have not been ideologically compatible with the organisation. More radical Adyge Khase activists have, for example, been coopted by the Kanokov regime despite the fact that ethnic Kabardians dominate the republican government. However, the movement still emerges as more opposed to the Russian federal government and its policies, which are collectively seen to hurt the Circassian nation and its interests. Its members in Kabardino-Balkaria appear to try to influence policies not so much within the republic as they do nationally and internationally. Furthermore, many of their members have friendly relationships with members of the Balkar movement. In this way, their significance for the Balkar movement is low.

The Balkar movement also emerged during perestroika with public claims to restoration of autonomy over the Balkar districts of El’brusskii and Cherekskii, emptied during the nation’s deportation to Central Asia in 1944, as well as aiming for an official apology for the deportations. Yemelianova (2005) argues that a key element of the movement’s success in the 1990s was its effective appeals to ethnic feelings of the wider Balkar community, although its leadership failed to take advantage of its opportunities. The

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⁶ For more detailed information about the Circassian movement and Adyge Khase, please see annex 2.
movement was further weakened by the government’s crackdown on various groups of the movement and the co-optation of certain key leaders (e.g. Sufyan Beppaev), which resulted in the movement’s depolitisation. (See below for more information about the Balkar movement.)

Markedonov (2012) notes that new political realities in the 2000s reenergised the Balkar movement. He argues that land shortage issues coupled with the existence of the concept of “ethnic property” or collective ownership of land increased in salience with the introduction of land reforms that effectively put land historically controlled by Balkars (Chegemoskii, El’brusskii, Cherekskii, and Khulamo-Bezengievskii) under control of Kabardian-controlled municipalities. This pushed issues of land distribution to the forefront, reigniting the old grievances of the Balkar movement. This change, coupled with several high-profile murders of Balkar elites interpreted by the Balkars as retaliation for opposition to land reforms, served as the impulse to start the protest cycle of the Balkar movement in the mid-2000s.

The religious insurgence in Kabardino-Balkaria is also an important aspect of the institutional landscape and societal power relations. It only began to be seriously discussed in the literature in 2005 (e.g. Yemelianova, 2005), about the time the phenomenon began to emerge. Unemployment in Kabardino-Balkaria is very high and is seen by many to be a reason for youth joining violent Islamist groups (Sagramoso, 2007, p.693). This phenomenon has provided some justification for the Russian authorities to place a strong power ministry presence across the North Caucasus; the region has the highest density of law enforcement in all of Russia and even Europe (Zubarevich, 2004, p.114). Repressive measures by these power ministry authorities are also seen as a source of anger and frustration among both men and women, thereby facilitating their enlistment with the underground Islamic movements as well (Sagramoso, 2007, p.704), leading to a cycle of increased repression. The use of torture,

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7 The constitution of the Russian Federation includes a special clause for most of the North Caucasus republics, including Kabardino-Balkaria, (Part 1, Article 9) enshrining and protecting land use as a “source of life” for the people that live on it (Misrokov 2011).
kidnapping, and disappearances, though best documented in Chechnya, are also known to happen in many republics of the region, including in Kabardino-Balkaria. This situation has created a tendency for the authorities in Kabardino-Balkaria to resort to associating any political opposition with “terrorism” in order to discredit it, thus subjecting civil society to a high degree of pressure.

As with the literature on Krasnodar Krai, the literature on Kabardino-Balkaria does not adequately address the causal factors for contentious politics. Literature on the Kabardian and Balkar ethno-national movements emphasises grievance as a mobilising force, but in doing so they leave demobilisation unexplained. The literature also leaves unexplored activists’ own perceptions about their struggles as well as the impact their structures of social networks might have.

Existing research suggests instrumental and ideological paths to collective action, but do not address the varying impact of the structural environment, individual agency, or other factors internal to movements. The result is a lack of creative production of new analyses on the dynamics of contentious action in both regions. Area studies so far leave many questions unanswered. In particular, they fail to capture the role the structural environment has on mobilisation, they disregard individual and group agency, and they leave interpretive and cultural considerations unanswered.

The extant literature can still contribute to understanding the context in which social movements in Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria operate. However, it is clear that new empirical research is necessary to augment this knowledge. Furthermore, this literature needs to be integrated with a theoretical model that can help account for the disadvantages and lacunae previously discussed. Thus, this work aims to contribute a systematic, theory-oriented comparative empirical analysis that can resolve and bridge this gap by creating a new framework that incorporates knowledge of the geographic context with theoretical knowledge.
that accounts for structure, culture, and networks. Social movement theory is arguably best suited for this. The following section explains the reasons.

1.5 Social Movement Theory and its Core Concepts

Social movement literature provides us with a number of useful theories and heuristic tools to explain the mobilisation patterns of social contention phenomena that the area literature has not furnished. Since social movement literature accommodates a broad variety of factors systematically, as it provides the necessary conceptual tools for understanding contention in various contexts and is adaptable to various political systems, I suggest that it is the best framework to use in order to understand contention in Russia. The following section traces the development of the literature and its drawbacks, finally highlighting the most useful concepts and approaches necessary for this study.

1.5.1 Collective Behaviour Model

Emerging from the field of sociology, modern social movement theory began in North America with a broad critique of the collective behaviour model (Gamson, 1990; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977). In the 1960s, the collective behaviour model was the dominant stream most notably associated with Turner and Killian (1957) and Smelser (1962), who saw collective action as extra-institutional, irrational, and emergent from individual social conditions. Smelser’s (1962) work especially exemplifies an attempt to define a field and organise concepts about collective behaviour that were previously unlinked in any framework. The book challenged previous notions of social life as overly organised by focusing on change and conflict as inherent aspects of it. Social life was revealed as dynamic and existed together with external mechanisms of instability. The concept revealed new ways of understanding collective action, unpacked its fundamental components, and carried the foundations that would be developed in later collective action theories. Smelser’s (1962) concept of “structural
conduciveness”, for example, would later be advanced to become political opportunities (see below). However, the model’s focus on individual grievances and psychological factors began to be seen as insufficient in explaining the organised and strategic student and civil rights movements (McAdam, 1999).

The idea of mobilisation being irrational was discarded when these and other ‘new’ social movements with instrumental political goals emerged in the late 1960s. It was not enough to view collective behaviour as extraordinary and driven by emotions. It was time for a new paradigm that captured the rational nature of collective action.

1.5.2 Resource Mobilisation Theory

The resource mobilisation theory was advanced by McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) work. This theory understood collective action as an organised phenomenon in which rational actors take part. The development opened up new ways of theorising social movement studies. It changed the previously dominant questions from the grievances and orientations that characterised social movement studied in the 1970s to how movements were able to mobilise. Individual actor psychologies were minimised to focus on prerequisites for mobilisation, underlining the importance of rational actors’ strategic choice of tactics. Shared beliefs alone could not make mobilisation happen, and collective action began to be seen not as a given, but something that is carefully organised. The theory has shown that although grievances appear everywhere, movement contention does not. In doing so, it went beyond the previous, more simplistic explanations for mobilisation and elaborated intermediary variables between

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8 Some scholars use the term “new social movement” applying it to all movements instead of treating it as a subtype. New social movements are generally accepted to encompass women’s and environmental issues, while peace movements are seen to be "new" on account of their generally post-materialist values, not based strictly on economic interest. Neither approach is satisfactory. Social movements are mobilised groups that make political demands that challenge the status quo, whether in the polity or society, and do not involve political parties. This definition does not restrict by the content or programme of the movement, nor does it by outcome. Indeed, criticism has been raised about the distinction between old and new social movements (e.g. Brand, 1990; Kriesi et al., 1995; Tarrow, 1991).
grievance and action and accounted for the strategic resources for action (Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1999; Tilly, 1978; McCarthy and Zald, 1987). These authors in particular shifted the focus to the causal role of resources in the mobilisation of the African American movement in the United States in the 1960s. Resources such as finances, labour, time, and social networks were seen as necessary in order to make action possible. In this way, the theory puts emphasis on social movement organisations as formal decision-making entities that allocate tasks and resources (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

Although resource mobilisation theory was advanced to account for the drawbacks in collective behaviour theories, the overly rational conceptualisation of actors caused the theory to be seen as too economic and entrepreneurial (Jenkins, 1983). Social movement organisations began to resemble companies in competition with one another in an institutional context, with incentives being central to mobilisation. Furthermore, the focus on American cases (e.g. Gamson, 1999; McCarthy and Zald, 1977) created a limited applicability globally.

1.5.3 Political Process Theory

The political process theory (PPT) emerged as a corrective to the drawbacks of resource mobilisation, in particular in its excessive focus on the role of resources and its failure to sufficiently account for the wider political factors that impact resources and grievances (McAdam, 1983). The theory emerged from McAdam’s (1983) analysis of American civil rights struggles and focused on the interaction between internal movement characteristics and the broader political context. Scholars Sidney Tarrow and David Meyer also contributed to the development of this theory, and together with McAdam, promoted the influential idea that mobilisation is not an irrational event, but something caused by broader causal mechanisms.

Three parts were eventually recognised as the “key” common ingredients of PPT causing mobilisation and demobilisation (Gamson and Meyer, 1996; Goodwin and Jasper,
2004; McAdam, 1996; Meyer and Minkoff, 2004; Polletta and Jasper, 2001). These three “nested” components of the model are:

- Political opportunities
- Mobilising structures
- Framing

1.5.4 Political Opportunities

Political opportunities, sometimes referred to as a “political opportunities structure”, has evolved since it was conceived in the 1970s to become the dominant social movement theory (Bevington and Dixon, 2005, p.185), and the idea of political opportunities is central to PPT. Political opportunities, as the most important determinant of collective action, give movement actors signs to act or refrain from action (Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1996). Political opportunities theory focuses on the specific structural environment external to movements and how that structure impacts mobilisation capacity (Meyer, 2004, p.126). In particular, changes to this political opportunity structure are seen to either facilitate or inhibit movement activity (McAdam, 1999, p.40-41), and the theory’s main approach is to identify and map out those structures. Political opportunity theory was introduced by Eisinger (1973), who emphasised the “openness” of government as a variable in explaining why some American cities experienced race and poverty riots. Indeed, the theory positions the state as the central actor, and the state emerges as the main target of mobilisation (Tilly, 1975). In short, the political structure is seen to be unfixed and changes over time as the polity undergoes shifts, sometimes “opening” up, leading to increased access for challengers.

Empirical research has identified multiple variables of political opportunities, such as election instability (Piven and Cloward, 1979), elite conflicts, presence of elite allies, and state repression (Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; McAdam et al., 1996). The use of such diverse variables has attracted some criticism (e.g., Gamson and Meyer, 1996, p.285; Goodwin and
Jasper, 1999, p.85). However, despite differences in terminology, political opportunities scholars have reached a level of general consensus by more or less continuously referring to the same dimensions (McAdam et al., 1996, p.26). Scholarly discussions of political opportunities really centre on two general ideas. First, the measure of openness of the political system indicates the scope of political opportunity. Second, opportunities are defined in terms of the system’s fluctuation.

Studies of social movements’ mobilisation in the collapsing USSR and post-Soviet space have demonstrated the use of political opportunities’ usefulness in non-democratic contexts, and they have emphasised largely the same dimensions as the political opportunities theorists such as the state’s openness (Oberschall, 1996; Williams, 2010; Zdravomyslova, 1996), elite structures (Oberschall, 1996), and repression (Wilkening, 2005). More recent studies on contemporary opportunities tend to capture community-based mobilisation (e.g. Amenta et al., 1992, p.313) and the role of media (e.g. Osa and Corduneanu-Huci, 2003). However, a comprehensive study of political opportunities should encompass informal structures as well.

Political opportunities structure theory has several drawbacks. Since it considers factors external to a movement, structure tends to become more important in understanding mobilisation than actors’ agency. This leaves peoples’ motivations unaccounted for. The other drawback is the fact that the theory has been developed in liberal democracies — something that poses certain challenges for researchers of non-democratic countries. Liberal democracies have formal channels for expressing competing interests as well as legal guarantees for civil rights. ‘By contrast’, says Schock (1999, p.361), ‘non-democratic regimes are highly centralised with the legislatures, judiciaries, and bureaucracies typically wielding no real power independent from the executive’. Political competition is repressed. Increased access to challengers as occurring in democratic states would erode the non-democratic state’s power and authority.
Though repression is a hallmark of non-democratic regimes, its influence on mobilisation is contradictory. Much of the literature suggests that a decline in repression leads to mobilisation. However, some empirical work has shown the opposite to be true (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001; Tilly, 1978). Osa (2003, p.13) clarifies the problem to a great degree, contending that the determining factor is not the overall level of repression, but rather the change in repression that acts as a trigger for protest.

What constitutes political opportunities for a post-Soviet Russia characterised by political repression? What are the fundamental parts of political opportunities for such a setting? In his study of political opportunities in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia, Williams (2010) argues that both formal and informal rules must make up the opportunity structure and names three basic parts that comprise it: constitutional rules and rights (formal rules), elite control (informal rules), and the state’s capacity for repression (informal rules). The problem with this conceptualisation is two-fold. Firstly, it takes informal and formal rules as separate when, for example, the relationship of elites and challengers can be defined both by formal rules as well as informal practices (Kriesi et al., 1992). Secondly, it ignores an array of relevant factors that open up political opportunities for challengers, such as media access, and allies. This research will address these drawbacks.

To summarise, scholars analysing social movement mobilisation employ the theory of political opportunity for its utility for explaining collective action as a result of opening or closing political opportunities. As such, it has a strong explanatory utility in explaining the timing of movement mobilisation.

1.5.5 Mobilising Structures

Political opportunities are important for mobilisation. But equally important is the manner in which movements use their vehicles of contention in response to these opportunities. These are called mobilising structures (McAdam, et al., 1996). According to
McAdam (1996, p.35), mobilising structures are the organisational dynamics of collective action. Although favourable conditions in the political opportunity structure increase the likelihood that grievances will translate into mobilisation, whether or not mobilisation occurs is relative to these “instruments of contention”, or the resources that allow movements to initiate and engage in collective action. These are the ‘collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize’ (McAdam, 2004). Such instruments of resources are usually understood to be networks, but McCarthy (1996) takes a broader stand and includes collective action repertoires as well as framing to the definition. In other words, these structures are the organisational resources and assets that are available to movements and facilitate or constrain mobilisation.

Empirical studies of mobilising structures have shown them to be sites for disseminating ideas, coordinating action, and drawing in participants. McAdam (1982) identified informal and subcultural networks as playing a major role for the framing of injustices by African American churches. Whether formal or informal, social networks facilitate movement mobilisation (McAdam, 1983).

Social networks are the informal ties by which motivation for collective action is built. In other words, by providing a basis for feelings of solidarity, social networks have a positive affect on mobilisation (Osa and Corduneanu-Huci, 2003; Fireman and Gamson, 1979). There is no guarantee that solidarity will result in mobilisation, but there is a consensus within the literature that through social relations, networks reinforce participants’ identities around values and norms related to areas of contention. Networks also provide contacts that can serve as distributors of resources such as money and information (Osa 2003, p.15). Furthermore, expanding networks provide decreased illicit associations, allowing actors to increasingly share risk of contention with each other (Osa 2003, p.15).

The importance of mobilising structures for the study of mobilisation of movements in non-democracies cannot be easily overstated. In non-democracies, movements cannot as
easily make open coalitions with organisations or establish structured channels of interaction with political elites. Thus, the flexible networks through which mobilisation occurs in non-democracies may serve as a necessary strategy for movements in non-democratic contexts where centralised organisations are easy targets of repression (Schock, 2005, p.29).

Zaira Jagudina’s (2009) study on gendered social movements in contemporary Russia, although reversing the causal train (i.e. gender processes affect political opportunities and mobilising structures), still provides some important elaborations of the nature and function of mobilising structures in the post-Soviet Russian context. She posited that existing informal social networks, clubs, and formal organisations might provide incentives for people to mobilise in protest groups (Jagudina, 2009, p.276). In her study, she notes the importance of face-to-face interactions and rituals that result in solidarity building within a movement as well as the shared group culture (Jagudina, 2009, p.281) and the sentiment that transforms into enthusiasm — things that ultimately facilitate mobilisation.

In summary, mobilising structures provide understanding about the influence of network structures and repertoires on mobilisation. Mobilising structures also cause framing processes and strategies to emerge (Gotham 1999, p.336).

1.5.6 Framing

Framing reinforces the previously discussed components of political opportunities and mobilising structures with consideration for culture, narratives, and shared experiences. The theory of framing constitutes the reassessed importance of symbolic resources in the study of social movements (Snow and Benford, 1992). The concept of framing originates from Goffman’s (1974, p. 21) sociological explorations of the ‘schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large’. In other words, frames are the interpretive devices used to understand and acknowledge experiences and the world.
The framing process is interconnected with collective identity. Alberto Melucci has been a prominent voice in highlighting the importance of identification in framing. Founded in his research on Italy, Melucci sees identity and meaning construction in movements as contingent on and negotiated through collective action. For him, meaning and identities are constructed through contention. Collective identity construction in part depends on framing processes that identify general themes necessitating collective action and tie individual identities to collective identities (Benford and Snow, 2000). Social movements are, at their core, groups of individuals with a collective identity (Melucci, 1985; Kriesi et al., 1995), and individuals who join a movement are expected to share to some degree a set of attitudes and responsibilities regarding the movement’s goals. Frames facilitate that process. Dorceta Taylor (2000, p. 513), in analysing environmental justice movements, posited that through ‘claiming the collective identity, movement supporters redefine their individual identities around a new, salient, and valued identity’.

Snow and Benford introduced an influential mode of framing analysis — frame alignment. In order for movement mobilisation to be successful, movements’ frames have to line up and connect with the real-life events and experiences of adherents and the general public so that they are more compelling (Benford and Snow, 2000). In this process, movement actors construct their interpretations of reality so that they are credible as well as salient and resonate both with participants and the broader cultural context (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.81). According to Taylor (2000, p.512), ‘This is accomplished by expanding the personal identities of a constituency or group to include the collective identity of larger segments of society’. In other words, the frame is harmonised with the larger belief system, made relevant to the realities of the participants, thereby increasing mobilisation potential. In this way, framing is not only an interpretive process, but also something motivational. Frames are meant to influence cognition and perception but also, ultimately, action.

Osa (2003) makes an important distinction between master frames and collective
action frames — they each operate on different levels. Master frames (macro-coordination) connect organisations in a cycle of protest, and collective action frames (micro-mobilisation) operate on the individual level through articulation of grievances, which are inherently linked to motivation. Johnston and Noakes (2005, p.10) state: “When numerous movements share aspects of their collective action frames, researchers ask whether there is a master frame”. This analytical separation is necessary in order to locate movement mobilisation during a protest cycle. Snow and Benford (1992) argue that innovative master frames are tied to the appearance of a new protest cycle. Master frames “provide the interpretive medium through which collective actors associated with different movements within a cycle assign blame for the problem they are attempting to ameliorate” (Snow and Benford, 1992, p.139). In other words, master frames go beyond the movement itself to speak to a larger set of groups and identities in kick-starting action. “Master frames are to … collective action frames as paradigms are to finely tuned theories” (Snow and Benford, 1992, p.138). They are more general and resonate with a wider audience, establishing meaning within a protest cycle.

Snow and Benford also elaborated a typology of framing known as core framing tasks, in which three “action-oriented” framing tasks were seen to produce meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers (Snow and Benford, 1988, p.198). These concepts are 1) diagnostic framing (identifying the problem, attributing blame and responsibility), 2) prognostic framing (elaborating a solution to the problem), and 3) motivational framing (offering a rationale and incentives for collective action) (Snow and Benford, 1988, p.199). This sheds light on individually held conceptions of action and helps understand how these ideas might come to be shared more collectively on the macro-level (master frames).

1.6 Political Process in Non-democratic Contexts

Although initially developed to explain social movements in Western liberal contexts, the likeness of contention dynamics across contexts was becoming evident and in turn, the

The theory’s application to so many different cases attests to its flexibility and analytical promise across contexts. Far from being finalised, the model continues to be refined. It has however not changed drastically, even in its application to more and more contexts.

The political process model has been applied to post-communist contexts as well — to Eastern Europe (Oberschall, 1996; Osa, 1997) and Russia (Zdravomyslova, 1996). Oberschall’s study is useful for its elaboration of political opportunity variables within the late-1980s Eastern European political structure. However, the work does not tell us much about how mobilisation occurs, concentrating instead on “success” of the movements. The overemphasis on the transitional and democratising context also limits its application to more stable political settings. Also problematic is its emphasis on the “moral conviction” of actors (Oberschall, 1996, p.102) in realising movement success, as it is difficult to imagine a social movement that does not claim moral justification, and it is unclear how such a right would be measured. Zdravomyslova’s (1996) study avoided the pitfalls of overemphasis on the democratising context and made two notable contributions to the literature. Firstly, her work
contributed to the argument that there is a cultural dimension to political opportunities and frames, as did Gamson and Meyer (1996) and Polletta (1997). Secondly, Zdravomyslova suggests that variables impact mobilisation through their interaction, arguing that during the period of perestroika, when the Soviet Union had weakened, the master frames generated by pro-democracy activists actually served to expand their political opportunities. Osa’s (1997) study is also exceptionally useful in contributing to understanding how opposition emerges and develops in non-democratic contexts through protest cycles. Though her work puts an overemphasis on mobilising structures, it still stands out for its advancement of a more comprehensive set of variables, accounting for their interaction as Zdravomyslova (1996) did. Osa (1997) links institutional political actors and movements and provides a much more convincing argument of why protest should appear beyond the small circles of dissidents in Solidarity-era Poland. In this manner, the work is inspiring in its application potential to the non-democratic context of southern Russia, where political opportunities and framing processes are also constrained and networks as spaces for interaction away from state coercion are vital to mobilisation.

Social movement literature is typically focused on the “lucky” parts of the world — liberal Western democracies — full of positive cases of interest to traditional political science disciplines. Along with this is the lack of bridging social movement literature with Russian area literature to expand social movement theory. Although the fields of political science and sociology have generated numerous analyses of civil society in post-Soviet Russia, they have done so in relative isolation from developments in social movement theory. Thus, a bridging of social movement theory and studies on Russian social movements would serve as an example of more intense dialogue between various literatures to tease out the dynamics and structural differences in understudied contexts, just as McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) have called for. For this research in particular, area studies should help elaborate the context that forms the backdrop to political opportunities.
1.6.1 Key Definitions and Concepts of Political Process

Before moving on to a suitable synthesis of the theories associated with the field of study, it would be prudent to define what a social movement is. For leading social movement scholars, a social movement is a set of ideas and beliefs that display certain preferences for change in society (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). A social movement is also a network of relationships without formal organisational bindings that engage conflictual opponents (Diani, 1992). Tarrow (1998, p.2) developed the definition in a more comprehensive way, defining them as ‘sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents’.

According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), social movements emerge in response to a social or political problem. This is a definition that I share. Social movements’ activities are directed at changing aspects of the political and social structure. However, the difference between social movements and other forms of political contention, such as coups d’état or strikes, is that social movements involve sustained interaction between challengers and power holders through a process that enables collective identity construction and use of ideology. Social movements engage in contention while expressing ‘values, grievances, and identities that spill over the boundaries of conventional politics’ (Meyer, 2006, p.541). In brief, the argument that I make is that social movements are a set of collective actions though which participants reshape shared identities guided by a common understanding of grievance and strategies to change the status quo.

Furthermore, a distinction between social movements and social movement organisations (SMOs) should be made. Most scholars agree that SMOs are ‘formal, bureaucratic, centralized structures’ (Buechler, 1993, p.223) and are part of broader movements. In other words, a movement can be represented by various formal social
movement organisations (McCarthy and Zald, 2009, p.21) that attempt to further that movement’s goals. The literature on SMOs has typically focused on internal structures characterised by formalisation, professionalisation, and integration. By comparison, this thesis is instead concerned with the impact of social movements,\(^9\) which will enable capturing a broader variety of features of mobilisation and demobilisation exhibited by the environmental movement in Krasnodar and the Balkar movement in Kabardino-Balkaria.

### 1.6.2 Defining Mobilisation

The consensus among social movement scholars is that mobilisation depends on three general factors: political opportunity, organisational or mobilising networks, and interpretive or cultural factors (McAdam et al., 1996). Morrison (1987, p.3) in his book *Black Political Mobilization* defined mobilisation as ‘the collective activation and application of community or group resources toward the acquisition of social and political goods’. In other words, it is the interaction of actors in activating and persuading others to perform desired actions.

Mobilisation is the process that links the potential for protest with opportunities for protest. The study of mobilisation concerns the identification of the phenomena associated with its emergence. The initial concept of mobilisation as a focus of study comes from Karl Deutsch (1961, p.494), who in the early 1960s defined it as ‘the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour’. However, this definition assumes mobilisation to be a teleological social condition of development. Later, Anthony Oberschall (1973, p.102) overcame that by defining mobilisation as ‘the process of forming crowds, groups, associations, and organization for the pursuit of collective goals’. By specifying the search for collective goals, this definition captures motivations for action triggered by resource inequality — conditions that cannot be underrated in the study of social

\(^9\) Though this is the situation, this work will not ignore the social movement organisations that have played a role in the development of my two cases.
movements. It is for this reason that the use of the term ‘mobilisation’ by Oberschall is better than Deutsch’s. Still, it does not use the term in a way that really explains the meaning of mobilisation. It rather describes “collective action” more generally.\textsuperscript{10}

The best definition of mobilisation is provided by Charles Tilly (1978, p.78), who posits that it is the process by which groups pursue collective interests and using group resources \textit{through} collective action. This thesis follows this definition. The question of motivation for collective action in both the cases of the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai and the Balkar movement in Kabardino-Balkaria fit the definition as described by Tilly. Though their goals are different, both movements seek to broaden collective access to justice, power, and resources through employing some level of organisation and networks. As such they are embedded in the larger field of mobilisation processes that tie collective goals with collective action.

However, mobilisation is also important for the fact that it constructs a protest cycle, important in its own right as it relates to the broader political context. Cycles of protest allow taking into account cyclical features of movement mobilisation, periods of increased conflict, and the creation of new meanings of action.

1.6.3 \textbf{Protest Cycle}

Questions about the reasons for fluctuation between contention periods and dormancy have motivated scholars for a long time. In the study of protest cycles, Sidney Tarrow wrote, ‘What needs to be explained is not why people periodically petition, strike, demonstrate, riot, loot, and burn, but rather why so many of them do so at particular times in their history…’ (Tarrow 1989, p.13). Tarrow’s study of Italian politics, where he identified a ‘cycle of protest’, crucially included the decline of social movements as well. He did this by including

\textsuperscript{10} The terms “collective action” and “mobilisation” are practically indistinguishable but should in this thesis be regarded as conceptually distinct phenomena. Collective action is the general term to describe episodes of action by groups of individuals, while mobilisation is the \textit{process} of action under analysis here.
institutionalized politics in his analysis as well as social protest, and in doing so, he described the “trajectory” of social movements, and found empirical evidence for the curvilinear nature of protest that Peter Eisinger (1973) and Charles Tilly (1978) had studied before. As government openness “reduced” the cost of collective action, and ensuing violence after people took to the streets “raised” the cost of collective action, protests were constrained and decreased.

Tarrow (1989, p.147-50) distinguishes two protest cycle phases: mobilisation and demobilisation. Mobilisation occurs when political opportunities appear and forms of contention expand and diffuse across the network. Demobilisation occurs when a movement is radicalised, becomes exhausted, or is overly involved in institutionalised politics, such as political parties. He theorised that new forms of contention are created and diffused within a protest cycle, and they either take hold or fade away. Meyer and Staggenbord (1996) and Zwerman, Steinhoff, and della Porta (2000), contributed empirical evidence supporting Tarrow’s conceptual cycles. Tilly and Tarrow (2007, p.97-98) later theorised in more detail that most mobilisation processes eventually reverse themselves based on the initial conditions of mobilisation, and they specified certain mechanisms and processes that lead to demobilisation: competition among sources of support, actor defection, actor disillusionment, state repression, and some degree of institutionalism. All of these factors combine to different degrees in various episodes to produce demobilisation.

Of particular relevance to this research is work by Maryjane Osa (2003) because she theorises mobilisation using the political process approach for a non-democratic context. She admits that little is known about protest cycles in non-democratic contexts, in part because repression makes it difficult to gather data, and also because repression often ends protest before it gains momentum and diffuses. Osa theorises that in a non-democratic environment, participants must cooperate and come together for any movement to consolidate.

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11 For a fuller elaboration of political opportunities, see Chapter 3.
Demobilisation will also vary from democratic contexts because the option of institutionalisation is not available in more repressive regimes, which leaves exhaustion and repression to instigate demobilisation. Furthermore, movements’ inability to mobilise is also understudied. This research will be yet another contribution to the study of protest cycles in a non-democratic context, represented by a study on the Krasnodar environmental movement and the Balkar movement in Kabardino-Balkaria.

Social movement research in the past has been characterised by scholars’ tendencies to root their research exclusively in one of its schools of thought, usually in isolation from others. The theory, having also largely been developed in Western and democratic settings, with fixed notions of democracy, direct action, and civil society — conceptions that do not always correspond to the empirical realities of the post-Soviet space and non-democracies more generally — must therefore be better adapted and ‘nativised’ to both take into account more factors that affect mobilization dynamics as well as suit real-world conditions in non-democratic contexts.
2 A NEW APPROACH TO STUDYING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

2.1 Theorising Social Movement Mobilisation

The following chapter introduces the social movement mobilisation theory that sets the conceptual background for a comparison of the mobilisation and demobilisation or abeyance patterns of the environmental movement in Krasnodar and the Balkar movement’s failure to mobilise in Kabardino-Balkaria. The chapter outlines a political process theoretical framework that can be applied to Russia and can serve as a useful analytical tool for the study of the mobilisation patterns of the two cases.

2.2 A Synthesised Model: Political Process Theory in a Non-democratic Setting

The development of a synthesised model will draw on McAdam’s, Tarrow’s, and Tilly’s combination of the factors involved in the political process theory (see below). As Meyer (2002, p.3) points out, ‘if substantial progress in the study of social movements is really to occur, it will come from a community of scholars that triangulates’. Established by Tarrow’s *Power in Movement* (1994) as well as McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald’s *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements* (1996), knowledge from various disciplines have been incorporated into a more integrated political process model. The three central concepts to mobilisation, 1) political opportunities, 2) mobilising structures, and 3) framing, encompass knowledge from rational and cultural perspectives, and many empirical studies have been useful for studying movement mobilisation (e.g. Diani 1996; Kitschelt 1986; Klandermans, 1997). More significant is that these constituent parts capture the interrelationships between challengers and the state.
In particular, the thesis will use Osa’s (2003) approach to the analysis of the causal patterns of interaction of the political process variables as they operate in southern Russia. It will, however, expand it further to include both the interpersonal quality of networks as well as an update to include the role of new information and communications technologies (ICTs).

The thesis will emphasise a need to understand networks as spaces that accommodate a multitude of processes and that locate networks within the discourses of individual subjects by focussing on people, mutual knowledge, and social ties (e.g. Buechler, 1990; Snow et al., 1986; Taylor and Whittier, 1992). This need is relevant because interpersonal networks, communication, and negotiation are central to contention (Carroll and Ratner, 1996). The thesis will perceive networks as free spaces where counter hegemonic identities are created (Polletta and Jasper, 2001) and where framing can be articulated to show the role of activists’ positions in these networks. It will argue that social networks which ensure face-to-face or online relationships between individuals who know each other and are bound together by kinship or friendship can facilitate social movement mobilisation (e.g. Coleman, 1988; della Porta, 1988; Diani and McAdam, 2003; Diani, 2005; Fireman and Gamson, 1979; Mueller, 1994; Snow et al., 1980; Jasper and Poulsen, 1995; Oberschall, 1973; Osa, 2003; Tilly, 1978; Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson, 1980). This approach allows accounting for the impact of pre-existing identity structures while also acknowledging their formation through contention and framing. In this way, it is expected that the role of networks as a unique set of ties where people are recruited, agendas made, and action taken will be different for the Balkars who arrive at collective action already sharing ethnic identity, while the environmental activists come from different backgrounds.

Another important characteristic of networks is their ability to minimise the barriers to movement activism (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987), in particular in their ability to offer decreased illicit association. This is especially important in Russia where most social movement activity can be seen to be anti-systemic and where open recruitment is not an
option. Furthermore, socialisation and reinforced emotional attachment within a group can raise the cost of personal demobilisation. In the highly coercive environment of Kabardino-Balkaria, this may play an important role. These factors indicate the need to depart from the focus on formal organisational networks towards an accommodation of networks as decentralised and informal, made of likeminded individuals that plan actions and maintain protest cycles (Friedman and McAdam, 1992). They should be seen as social settings relatively free from state control (McAdam, 1986; Gould, 1991).

This thesis’s theoretical innovation also relates to its development of Osa’s conceptualisation of media and information transmission, which is more than 10 years old and is applied to an age during which ICTs did not exist. The political process model as prescribed by Osa is in need of an update, and it is within this framework that this dissertation addresses existing questions about the impact of ICTs on contemporary movements in Russia.

The recent revolutions in the Middle East have brought scholarly attention to the role of the Internet and other technology for social movement mobilisation (Mejias, 2011). Studies by Gamson and Wolfsfield (1993) as well as Walgrave and Manssens (2000) both argued for the potential for social movements to expand an issue and increase legitimacy by getting their messages into the mainstream media. However, in Russia where mainstream media is strictly controlled by the state, the spread of mobile phones, blogs, and personal and organisational websites are becoming an increasingly important alternative space for individuals to circumvent media constraints and disseminate information. These technologies provide social movements with lowered cost of communication and quick information distribution that ultimately facilitate mobilisation (Diani, 2000; Leizerov, 2000; Elin, 2003). These attributes especially empower people in non-democratic contexts because they create a safer basis for collective action. This assumption is backed by empirical evidence, for example, from the Philippines (Diani, 2000; Leizerov, 2000; Elin, 2003; Castells et al., 2006; Bagalawis, 2001), Malaysia (Sani and Zengeni, 2010), and Ukraine (Goldstein, 2007).
This thesis’s analysis of the media’s role will also be informed by Marco Diani’s work (2000) which sees technology as impacting social movements by facilitating the spread of information and increasing the accuracy of messaging. The Internet gives a speed to activities never before seen and spreads uncensored messages (della Porta and Mosca, 2005), crucial for non-democratic contexts. However, works most important for this research were authored by Bennett (2003; 2004; et al., 2008) and Castells (2004) which provide an assessment of the importance of hyperlinked communication networks that facilitate finding of points of entry into political action and that facilitate growth patterns of social movement networks.

These works identify two strands of opinion regarding the role of the Internet in social movement mobilisation. On the one hand, the Internet facilitates offline contention, creating new opportunities for standard street protests, and on the other hand, it creates new ways of contention. Thus, in some works, the Internet is seen as expanding and complementing the social movement repertoire of collective action (McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly, 1984) and, in others, as offering communication systems resistant to state control, reducing the state’s capacity for repression (Osa 1997; Scott and Street, 2000; Kidd, 2003) eventually becoming a new variable of political opportunities. This thesis regards both as equally important. The research thus draws special inspiration from Garrett’s (2006) study, which conceptually bridges these understandings through seeing ICTs as providing political opportunities that are affected by and in turn affect repertoires by creating new chances to innovate contention practices. Using that conceptual bridging as well as Osa’s (1997) positioning of political opportunities within a cycle of protest, we can identify the nexus where ICTs impact both opportunities and mobilising structures within a cycle of protest.

A synthesised theoretical model of political process could enable identifying how political opportunities, characterised by shifts in the political structure of Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria, enable and hinder collective action of the environmental and Balkar movements by opening and closing opportunity for contention. The mutual impact of framing
and mobilising structures on mobilisation emerges in this context (see Figure 1). Since framing is a process of cultural and ideational interpretations that determines how symbols become visible for the public and resonate with them (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi, 2004), they need a space for interaction — a space from which networks emerge. In other words, the same structural constraints work both against collective action as well as frames and reveal the relationship between networks and framing. Both need “space” for interaction. Zaira Jagudina’s (2009, p.276) research on Russia echoes this sentiment, further highlighting that the framing process influences and is influenced by the mobilising structures of social networking, ties of friendship, and solidarity. Jagudina goes on to connect that dynamic with political opportunities, noting that the forms and availability of mobilising structures are contingent upon historical and political conditions (i.e. political opportunities). The empirical work of my study will show the mutual impact of framing and organisational networks that Jagudina and Osa touch upon, and in particular which frames are successful in mobilising constituents.

Figure 1: Interaction of variables in political process theory

In short, mobilisation is the result of the structure of political opportunities at a
particular time, the framing processes that a movement engages in, and its mobilising structures (Giugni and Berclaz, 2003). The mobilisation phase of a cycle is also, as mentioned earlier, characterised by the emergence of new forms of contention (Tarrow, 1989). As Osa (2003) states, whether an initial protest surge can turn into a sustained contention cycle depends on interaction of the four over time. Demobilisation then may or may not occur, but if it does, it is characterised by radicalisation, exhaustion, or institutionalisation.

The political process model has been criticised by some scholars (e.g. Armstrong, 2002; Gamson, 1990; Goodwin, Jasper, and Khattra, 1999) for its assumption of dominance in the political field by one source of power. To illustrate that particular drawback, Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) contrasted the approach with a multi-institutional one, demonstrating how it was better suited to explain variance in outcome. However, like much of the theory, this criticism is also based in a democratic setting, where there are many more nodes of power in the polity besides the state need to be accounted for.

2.3 Research Design

The structure of the thesis’s methodology is defined by the theoretical framework outlined in the previous section. Thus, the methodological approach to each theoretical component of the political process theory — the dependent variables (political opportunities, mobilising structures, and frames) — shall be addressed in separate chapters, i.e. Chapter 3: Political Opportunities; Chapter 4: Mobilising Structures; and Chapter 5: Frames. Throughout these chapters, the independent variable of mobilisation, or more specifically a protest cycle, will be addressed, followed by a conclusion.

This thesis will largely use qualitative methods because detailed and nuanced information about the role of the dependent variables — political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing — is sought. The data presented for these variables will be acquired from both primary and secondary sources. Primary source material consists of interviews with
movement actors (to be discussed towards the end of this chapter), and secondary sources include essential books, periodicals, newspapers, and Internet news portals. Thus, through qualitative analysis of particular social movement contexts, I can produce a multidimensional account of the political arena that teases out the relationship between opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing to be described in the next sections. This allows for a more detailed and contextualised comparison of the two regions under study. This research will be supplemented by quantitative data, in particular through protest event data and repression data to provide commensurability across movements. Furthermore, such data can trace protest cycles through accommodating mobilisation’s rise and decline. This avoids sampling on the dependent variable by focusing only on positive cases where movements succeed (Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn, 2004, p.221).

For political opportunities, because structural information about the polity is sought, an analysis that takes into account qualitative differences of the Russian political system must be utilised. I will be using textual analysis in order to draw out the configurations of political opportunities with which the movement cases are confronted. In this way, I approach the problem with a phenomenological (qualitative) analysis in order to assess the impact of the dependent variables on social movement mobilisation.

For studying mobilising structures, and in particular networks, a qualitative approach is best in order to glean the importance and role of the mechanisms of social structures and integration. This is crucial for analysing the cultural significance of networks in non-democracies. Qualitative analysis is best suited for the task of accessing information about movement participants’ social ties and structures of meaning in social phenomena (Bryman, 2000). Social interactions play a role in connecting members to a protest and help inform them about issues relating to the movement as well as to protest activities, helping overcome obstacles to collective action. Since such individual and subjective meanings are being investigated in order to assess movement networks and repertoires, micro-level data is needed.
Thus, data will be used from semi-structured interviews regarding respondents’ socialization within movement-related issues, ties to other movement members, as well as participant observation. Interviews are especially well suited to convey participant interpretive meaning. With interview data I will show how individuals interact with their movements. Participant observation will augment the data regarding the socialization of the movement networks as well as the repertoires displayed. The data will be analysed using textual analysis in order to understand the interplay of individual lives with social structures and ideological systems.

Finally, for framing, a qualitative approach is best suited to analysing both interview data as well as the textual material of the movements, which provides a useful way to analyse participants’ own understandings of events. Analysis of these frames involves a qualitative strategy of enquiry in order to access information about participants’ shared understandings of their movement’s goals, strategies, and scapegoats. This involves two types of data sources. Firstly, interview data will be accessed in order to attain individual-level collective action frames. Second, movement documents and material, both in print and online, will be accessed in order to uncover the movement-level master frames. Both the material and interview data will be analysed using textual analysis, as ‘textual data come contextually embedded and are often gathered in ways that offer insights into their interpretation that are lost in survey techniques’ (Johnston, 2002, p.63). In doing so, I can measure the collective action frames’ abilities to effectively communicate identity and meaning and whether these understandings can get boosted to a larger political milieu in master frames.

2.3.1 Political Opportunities

The chapter on political opportunities seeks to answer the question: What impact do political opportunities have on the mobilisation propensity of the Krasnodar environmental movement and the Kabardino-Balkaria Balkar movement? To do so, it will analyse the data related to the two regions and will follow Tarrow’s and Osa’s approach. In particular, I follow
Tarrow’s (1996, p.80) advice to delineate political opportunities to a ‘more testable and widely accepted form’ using the literature as a starting point. I also draw from Osa (2003) in naming four important kinds of political opportunities in non-democratic contexts: (un)divided elite, change in repression, media access/openness, and influential allies.

As outlined above, a qualitative strategy of enquiry will be utilised because it provides more textured accounts.

a. (Un)divided elite: As Mazzei (2009, p.10) stated, the analysis of (un)divided elite points to the provision of challengers with new allies: as elites splinter, they may look outside for support and the situation may lead to opportunities for outsiders to enter the political arena. Javeline (2003, p.26), on the other hand, suggests that the presence of divided elites can confound the attribution of blame (see Chapter 3) making mobilisation more difficult. It thus remains to be seen if divided elite have any effect on the Balkar movement’s ability to mobilise. Though there has been no division among elites in Krasnodar Krai in the timeframe of this study, consideration of the divided elite variable might be useful in investigating how and why mobilisation occurred in the absence of divided elites. The expectation is that the interaction between the variables gives unforeseen results.

b. Change in repression: Following Osa’s (2003) lead, the analysis of change in repression will consider any change in the regime’s overall toleration of opposition, both through formal ways, such as elections, and informal ways, such as protests. The environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai experienced a marked rise in pressure from the local authorities in 2010-2011, from increased arrests and threats of arrest, beatings, criminal charges, as well as ad hoc changes in local legislature that constrained their activity. By contrast, the Balkar movement did not experience a change in repression, but was rather subject to a stable repressive environment. A comparison of this variable across the two cases will provide
valuable insight regarding the effect of repression on mobilisation, in particular how repression might actually instigate mobilisation, as some recent studies have shown.

c. Media access/openness: In dealing with media access/openness, I will consider all types of media, but keep in mind that in a non-democratic context, this will more likely indicate the presence or absence of alternative sources of information. Here I will challenge Osa’s (2003) approach, who posits that for socialist Poland, media access and information flows increased where there was 1) sustained relaxation of state censorship, 2) foreign journalists who publicised opposition activities that were rebroadcast into the country, and 3) an active underground press that disseminated uncensored material. I argue that for contemporary Russia, this model, at least as broken down by Osa, has limited applicability, with the exception of the first point. The presence of the Internet trumps the role that any underground press may have played. The Internet in Russia is largely free and is central for social movement information dissemination and mobilisation. For Russia media openness will by and large be played out through the Internet.

d. Influential allies: While analysing influential allies, I will deal with actors external to the social movement that contribute material and symbolic resources to the movement. This will involve organisations, political parties, celebrities, and scientists, as stated by Stearns and Almeida (1998). Groups inside the government or state actors that are sympathetic to the movement can boost movement demands to the inside of the polity. An ally “on the inside” aids challengers in terms of pressuring for movement goals (Almeida, 2006, p.62). In voicing movement demands within the halls of power, such allies can be seen to lessen the cost of collective action and serve as a motivating factor to mobilise. The environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai has a number of influential allies among the
opposition as well as across the network of environmental activists in other regions. Through this facet, this research can try to establish how the presence of country-wide allies outside the realm of the state impacts mobilisation. The Balkar movement’s lack of allies will also be analysed to discover how that impacted their lack of mobilisation.

The goal of this analysis is to formally test the hypothesis that opening political opportunities facilitate the start of a protest cycle. Thus the use of qualitative measures described above will empirically place the two regions under study within a typology of political opportunity configurations. This will allow me to accurately measure the association between political opportunities and the dependent variable — the protest cycle.

2.3.2 Mobilising Structures

I will use Garrett’s (2006) and McCarthy’s (1996) definitions of mobilising structure as the established networks and strategies that bind participants in contentious action together. These authors identify two functions of mobilizing structures: 1) the informal networks that serve as a mode of organisation in pursuing collective action and 2) the movements’ tactical repertoires. Next, I seek to identify the role these structures play in mobilizing adherents of the Krasnodar environmental movement and the Balkar movement. I will identify and analyse the ties of the two movements’ participants to each other and the outside as well as the type of repertoires they use. This will allow me to compare the networks’ varying structures across the two cases and their repertoires and thus enable an analysis of the role of mobilising structures in protest cycles. More specifically, how mobilising structures account for facilitating the mobilisation process and how they can support sustained mobilisation, which can eventually construct a protest cycle, will be explored.
2.3.3 Framing

For the framing component, I use Johnston’s (2009) definition of framing as the cognitive structures of meaning held both at the individual and movement level, in particular through collective action frames and master frames. This will provide insight into concepts of ideology and discourse regarding both individual level and movement-level articulations of grievance.

The goal of this analysis is to not only report individual and movement-level conceptions of the movements, but to seek patterns in these accounts and to discuss what deeper impact they may have. This is important for understanding the course of social movements because whether movements mobilise or not depends in part on the frames’ discursive abilities to effectively communicate identities and meaning to adherents and whether the framed ideologies can get “boosted” to the larger movement field. The research will establish the role of frames in establishing networks as well as their ability to bridge ideological gaps and connect people. This is an important element in understanding the role of frames in the protest cycle. This thesis, taking from Swart’s (1995) work, sees the presence of resonant frames that speak to a diversity of social groups as associated with the beginning of a protest cycle.

2.3.4 Protest Cycle

The protest cycle is the product of a sustained mobilisation process, seen in this research as shaped by the dependent variables of political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing. In order to determine the timeframe of the protest cycles of the two movements under investigation, it is necessary to include some quantitative data. I will use graphs for protest events\(^\text{12}\), which provide data about the timing and location of events (McAdam, 1982; Olzak, 1992). The cataloguing and data set construction is broadly known as protest event

\(^{12}\text{See Chapter 3.}\)
analysis (PEA). Tilly (2008) considers PEA as a useful method to determine fluctuations of collective action across time. The method is concerned with compiling quantitative data and involves analysing newspapers, media, or other public accounts of protest. This facilitates the understanding of the process of mobilization.

This procedure is carried out chronologically before the qualitative procedures so that the findings can inform and shape my interpretations of the qualitative data. The method is useful in its ability to complement and augment other data sources to account for problems in relying on single accounts. A drawback of this method is the fact that small protest events — a significant part of the collective action repertoire of the social movements covered in this study — are underreported. Similarly, unobtrusive forms of protest, common in non-democratic contexts, are difficult to measure through standard protest event data. Despite this fact, it still provides a representative picture of protest events that can be analysed on their own.

Furthermore, mainstream Russian publications, often subjected to state censorship, fail to report on protest events in general, leading to a real shortage of sources upon which to rely. However, there is an Internet news portal (Kavkazskii Uzel), which reports on these events from a regional perspective.\(^{13}\) This news outlet will serve as the data source for this analysis. Kavkazskii Uzel is a useful source as it has been regularly reporting on small-scale events regionally across the North Caucasus for over a decade, when most other outlets only cover the biggest stories. The outlet was established by Memorial, a civil rights association that monitors human rights in Russia. Due to Memorial’s orientation in promoting Russian civil society, Kavkazskii Uzel has a decidedly oppositional stance and highlights civil society activity to a much greater extent than any other news outlet in Russia. I do not consider this to be problematic in terms of source bias for this research because I am only concerned with

\(^{13}\) Russian media analysis company Medialogia placed Kavkazskii Uzel as one of the most cited resources of the Russian Internet (Medialogia, 2011).
reported protest events and not any assessment of their value or meaning. This outlet still provides the most comprehensive information on indicators of protest mobilisation.

### 2.4 Comparative analysis of the two cases

In this study, two social movements are analysed in the context of southern Russian social movements. The starting point for selecting these cases for a comparative analysis was the awareness of both ethnic and environmental movements as two of post-Soviet Russia’s most common types of social movements. The two movements under study are also similar in their political contexts — both Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria were part of the Southern Federal District until 2010, which keeps some of the contextual variables constant, and both are oriented in opposition to the regional authorities. Both have dispositions that are both social and political, while their specific claims are regionally oriented, often legal and related to elite capture and use of land. This allows for a basis for a comparison of the two movements’ political opportunities in particular, or the factors that define their political environments.

The movements are different enough: they span two types of Russian political subjects — one administrative territory (Krasnodar Krai) and one ethno-national republic (Kabardino-Balkaria), both with different political and social contexts. For example, the Krasnodar environmental movement is faced with a united elite making it more difficult for them to mount a challenge, while the Balkar movement deals with a divided elite; the Krasnodar movement has experienced a marked change in repression while the Balkar movement has been under constant repression. The Krasnodar environmental movement utilises social media, while the Balkar movement does not, and the Krasnodar environmental movement has allies while the Balkar movement does not. The environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai and the Balkar movement in Kabardino-Balkaria will be analysed in a three-dimensional comparative perspective, highlighting these differences. This research will cast the two
movements’ broad similarities as a backdrop, while the differences in terms of member profiles, networks, and resources and tactics applied by these movements will be delineated.

A two-case comparative study may not have the authority to allow for generalisable conclusions, but it provides important insights into the functions of the Russian polity and non-democratic contexts more generally. Such an approach underlines the fact that while the movements may face conditions, which may at first seem very different, their success and failure depends on the extent to which they can combine the variables. This adds understanding of findings across certain types of cases.

2.4.1 The Krasnodar Environmental Movement

The first movement case under study is the environmental movement of Krasnodar Krai. The movement has roots in an anti-nuclear commune in Krasnodar Krai to which certain members belonged in the late 1980s. After the fall of the Soviet Union, this network of activists remained, but did not become active again until the early 2000s when the current movement emerged in response to the growing number of private business and state projects deemed harmful to the environment. The movement became more active in 2007 when Sochi was announced as the host city for the 2014 Winter Olympics. This activity increased during a campaign in 2009 to save the Utrish natural reserve, and from 2010 confrontation with the authorities intensified, starting the sustained protest cycle in 2010-2012.¹⁴ The movement’s members are active on the Internet, and their liberal and progressive disposition helps them maintain ties with oppositional groups across the Russian Federation. A commonly stated goal is rule of law, which is seen to effectively guard against the kind of environmental violations that currently occur. The movement has seen a great degree of cooperation with like-minded movements and organisations, including most notably the Yabloko political party

¹⁴ For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 3.
(White, 2006) and the anti-Putin democratic movement that mobilised in Moscow and other Russian cities in 2011-2012.\textsuperscript{15}

2.4.2 The Kabardino-Balkaria Balkar Movement

The Balkar movement emerged in the 1990s, as many of the ethnic revivals in the North Caucasus did after the collapse of the Soviet Union, uniting along ethnic lines in order to assert ‘claims for greater rights, privileges, and constitutional recognition’ (Treisman, 1997, p.212). The early 1990s can be considered the peak of the movement’s activity, with frequent protests. However, after Putin took over as President in the 2000s, the movement’s activities began to wane. Unlike most of the ethnic movements that faded away, the Balkar movement continued to exist and even experienced a revival in 2005, when movement members established the main organisation of the Balkar movement, the Council of Elders of the Balkar Nation (CEBN). This was done in response to the adoption of two amendments to the republic’s constitution: No. 12-RZ and 13-RZ, “On the Status and Borders of Municipal Formations”, which essentially dissolved the electoral bodies of the local self-government of the two largest Balkar settlements, Belaya Rechka and Khasanya, joining them to Nalchik (Federal Union of European Nationalities 2012). This directly conflicted with Federal Law 131-FZ “On General Principles for the Local Municipalities in the Russian Federation” from 2003, which guarantees that territorial subjects will be classified as “in-between” settlements. The Kabardino-Balkarian government also transferred the bulk of Balkar territories into the “inter-settlement” category, essentially taking control over them. Although the movement’s demands were never met, its mobilisation has since subsided. Since that time, the movement has taken on a very anti-republican disposition and has directed most if not all its grievances towards it, while Moscow is seen rather ambivalently. The movement places as its stated

\textsuperscript{15} For more detailed information regarding the movement’s claims and disposition, see Chapter 4.
goals full rehabilitation after exile, the resolution of unfair land laws, and the reversal of other measures that are seen to marginalise them as an ethnic group.\textsuperscript{16}

This research will then utilise Osa’s (2003) work on Solidarity in Poland, which is better suited for non-democracies. In it, she develops a more comprehensive theoretical model that synthesises the dominant theoretical perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing approaches in the political process model, all while elucidating the theoretical contrasts in democratic and non-democratic contexts. I will also explain why the political process model — the best-suited model for a study of the southern Russian context — needs to be slightly adapted and extended. I discuss the literatures surrounding the areas of these adaptations to the political process theory: networks, contentious practices, and technology. The operationalisation of the various concepts involved, in particular how they apply to the southern Russian context, will also be discussed. This will be done in an attempt to explain why the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai experienced a mobilisation wave in 2010-2012, while the Balkar movement in Kabardino-Balkaria has not for the timeframe of this study.

2.5 Methodology

2.5.1 Semi-structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews will be central for understanding the movements’ mobilisation by providing greater depth of information on their protest cycles. As interactions that are to some degree controlled, they are fairly consistent from respondent to respondent, allowing for comparison across personal accounts. At the same time, they are flexible enough to allow for asking supplementary questions and clarification, and they allow the respondent more room in which to discuss their experiences. Interviews also offer the opportunity to

\textsuperscript{16} For more detailed information regarding the movement’s claims and disposition, see Chapter 4.
begin to overcome what Benford (1997) describes as the “elite bias”, providing another source of information beside movement-generated material so often elite-produced.

As Blee and Taylor (2002) suggest, for semi-structured interviews of this type of research, sampling should be directed more by theoretical concerns than for randomness and should strive for two main things: 1) completeness, because the topics of enquiry should be satisfied by responses by various people so that the same questions are posed to respondents and 2) similarity and dissimilarity, so that we can see how interpretations of various people vary on similar positions.

The most important aspect of this method, however, was the attaining of knowledge on the experiences and perceptions from the perspective of movement actors. Semi-structured interviews allow movement participants to tell their side of the story and provide a level of detail on their points of view that cannot be found in secondary sources. In particular, interviews shed light on what the activists themselves consider to be the main problems against which they are fighting, what methods they implement, what the movement’s main obstacles are, and what is necessary to overcome them. This method gives them an opportunity to tell why they joined the movement and why they believe in the movement’s mission. Direct access to respondents’ experiences are not being accessed here, rather the representations of their experiences are sourced (Widerberg, 1996). The interviewees’ interpretation of their realities take place in the context of their own social conditions, and the choice of themes they refer to shows us something about the experiences of people in social movements in Russia. Also, because most secondary sources about the events the respondents described are either outdated or unavailable, this research data offers a unique insight into the movements’ participants and explores new themes and nuances that arise during the interviews. Furthermore, the language used by informants is important for gaining insight into their perceptions and values, essential for analysing framing processes, for example.

A limitation to interviews is that they are difficult, if not impossible, to repeat.
Because of the flexibility involved in the process, none of the conversations could have been repeated exactly. Similarly, the freedom offered by the format means that a respondent may answer a question in a different way depending on a number of factors, ranging from their mood that day or their relationship to me, the researcher. However, it is precisely the free character of the semi-structured interview that allows the opportunity to generate such rich data not available in any secondary sources.

Fourteen semi-structured interviews were carried out in order to obtain perceptions and interpretations of movement actors about their respective movements and protest activities. The majority of the interviews were carried out with the core activists of the two movements. I conducted interviews with eight respondents from the environmental movement and three respondents from the Balkar movement and supplemented them with participant observation. These respondents were contacted through previously established contacts in the universities of both locations. Once contact was made with one movement activist, it was not difficult to be introduced to others in the network. In addition to the activists, I interviewed people knowledgeable about the political and social contexts in the two locations, which expanded the respondent group. Of these experts, one interview was conducted in Krasnodar Krai and two in Kabardino-Balkaria. Reliability and representativeness was attempted as much as possible by also speaking to as many other activists as possible in order to get an idea of the range of individuals as participants as well as their varied positions within the movement.

2.5.2 Ethical Considerations

Informed consent, anonymity, and confidentiality were safeguarded in this research. When I met my informants, I discussed with them the purpose of my study and I informed them that participation was voluntary and the data would be kept confidential and anonymous. I also made sure the respondents knew they had the power to stop the interview at any time. I
removed information that might lead to the identification of the respondents in my recorded interviews and I have used codes when referring to them in the thesis.

2.5.3 Fieldwork procedures

Fieldwork was conducted during four and a half months in the cities of Krasnodar (14 February-30 April 2012) and Nalchik (13 May-30 June 2012). This research was conducted in accordance to the ethical guidelines as given by the British Sociological Association.

Access to the movement actors was gained through two gatekeepers and snowball sampling. Interviews were arranged by phone, although I sometimes had already met these individuals. I called contacts ahead of time and introduced my research and myself. Some of the contacts did not answer the telephone, but everyone I managed to reach was willing to meet with me. Interviews were fairly easy to obtain and were usually arranged within one or two days of the initial phone call. Only one respondent suggested an interview via Skype, for convenience.

Interviews were usually arranged to take place in peoples’ personal offices. Four interviews were given in local cafes. I tried to ensure adequate privacy for interview settings, so that respondents would feel more open to speaking. The fact that many of the interviews took place in offices, however, meant that they would get interrupted from time to time by periodic visitors and phone calls during my interviews, although when this occurred, the respondents always made an effort to give me priority. Interviews lasted from 30 minutes to four hours. Most lasted around 50 minutes. Interview times were dictated by the usually busy schedules of the respondents.

I began each interview asking the respondent to speak about themselves and how they became involved in their respective movement. This question allowed me to firstly get a picture of the range and depth of experience of the respondent in the movement and secondly, to develop rapport with the respondents. All the respondents were asked the same questions,
but in different order. This flexible method was adopted in order to allow for a more natural and informal flow of the interview. The level of detail that the respondents were able to give varied, and each answered as they could.

Document analysis was also employed. Some documents and data about the movements are available on the Internet, although much less so for the Balkar movement. Thus, the Spasti Utrish (Save Utrish) flyer was used for the environmental movement and the V Nal’chike zaiavili ob ignorirovanii chinovnikami zemel’nogo voprosa (In Nal’chik, the land question was ignored) handout was used for the Balkar movement. Such movement material helps gain insight into how the movement frames itself, its goals, and its activities. Furthermore, news outlet Kavkazskii Uzel provided data regarding movement activities and repression.

It is worth noting that the fieldwork in both locations was conducted in tense, and sometimes even dangerous conditions. Because harassment and repression of the environmental activists of Krasnodar Krai had increased over the course of my work with them, it was difficult to meet, speak, or discuss issues with them openly. Almost all of the respondents’ telephones were tapped. Furthermore, the authorities, sometimes in unmarked cars and plainclothes, had been following them, sometimes when I was present. This created a strained environment and it made collecting data more difficult.

It was much more difficult to penetrate and operate in Kabardino-Balkaria. It is a very closed society characterised by violence, political pressure, and lack of rule of law. Counter-terrorist operations occasionally resulted in the lock down of whole neighbourhoods both in the capital, Nalchik, and other towns. Public transportation vehicles were routinely stopped to check documents of passengers. I would not have been able to conduct my research there without an Armenian passport, a “Caucasian” appearance, and fluency in Russian that all allowed me to move around relatively unnoticed. Yet travelling in Russia with this “Caucasian appearance” and Armenian passport posed other problems. Russian police
detained me twice while travelling between regions and both times threatened me with deportation. The actual detentions did not disrupt my research but the feeling of unease and vulnerability made it more stressful to move about in public spaces.

Thus, a typical attribute of the study of social movements has been the proclivity of scholars to stay within one singular theoretical framework. A central development of a more dynamic theoretical framework for studying social movement mobilisation has been the political process theory, as developed by Doug McAdam as well as colleagues Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly. The political process theoretical framework accommodates insights from structural and cultural approaches as well as incorporates the influence of networks on mobilisation.

However, as noted above, there has been a lack of attention on local patterns within a national context in the political process framework. In this way, the application of the political process framework to two cities in Russia’s south would offer needed insight to localised dynamics of contention and advance the paradigm. Furthermore, through application of the political process theory on Russia, this work will be advancing the theory as it applies in a non-democratic setting.

The thesis seeks to rectify this imbalance and to develop a framework that offers a “complete model of insurgency” (McAdam, 2010) rather than capturing a moment of that process by looking into protest cycles as a central element of social movement dynamics. In analysing Krasnodar’s environmental movement and Kabardino-Balkaria’s Balkar movement, it will demonstrate the utility of political process theory for the analysis of cycles or ongoing processes of mobilisation. In doing so, it will offer important correctives to the existing scholarship on the researched subject.
3 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MOVEMENT CASES

This chapter examines the main aspects of the political opportunities referred to in Chapter 2: (un)divided elite, state repression, media access/openness, and influential allies. Each of these elements of political opportunities will be investigated for Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria. Combined, these factors define the nature of their prevailing political environments. Their analysis therefore will compare structures of political opportunities in two regions and will help to understand the dynamic of mobilisation in both localities. The patterns of protest actions of the two movement cases can be seen in the figures below.

![Figure 3: Number of protest events of the Krasnodar Krai environmental movement (Kavkazskii Uzel 2000-2013)](image)

For a thorough discussion of political opportunities, one must also look at the broader Russian context within which these movements develop. Thus, an analysis of each of these elements, with the exception of influential allies that are specific to each movement, will be considered for Russia.
As the graphs show, the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai experienced a clear mobilisation cycle beginning in 2010 and peaking in 2011-2012, after which activity sharply drops off. The Balkar movement in contrast does not exhibit a mobilisation cycle, but rather displays small spikes in protest activity in 2006, 2008, and 2010. A combined look at the political opportunities for each movement in this chapter, as well as the mobilising structures and framing in Chapters 4 and 5, respectfully, will allow an examination into how these components of the political process impact mobilisation.

3.1 Undivided Elite in Russia

Theoretically, a divided elite structure provides a clear opportunity for movements to mobilise. Divided elites are more inclined to merge their interests with those of challengers in order to expand their base of support, providing an easier way for challengers into the polity. Furthermore, divided elites can create an unstable polity with shifting alliances that can more easily be exploited by challengers.

Russian political elites have become increasingly united since Putin came to power in 2000. Putin has managed to radically reshape the configuration of power in the Russian
political system, transforming the presidency into the core seat of authority, around which a new, more unified political arrangement was constructed. Under Putin, influential elites outside Putin’s administration, such as governors, oligarchs, and those in the media, were brought into the fold through co-optation and erosion of their power — they were sidelined and even imprisoned.

Formal mechanisms of policy making are dominated by the United Russia political faction, which helped Putin’s centralisation efforts by influencing legislative and electoral arenas at the national level and the regions, facilitating Putin’s legislative agenda and promoting voting cohesion among lawmakers and smooth adoption of laws. Debate was shifted from taking place in the legislature to behind closed doors (Isaacs and Whitmore, 2013, p.7). United Russia, though lacking the resource distribution and policy-setting powers that exist in authoritarian parties in other countries18 (Isaacs and Whitmore, 2013, p.1-2), has been a powerful tool in the hands of the Kremlin, expanding to cover every region, disenfranchising any opposition (Slider, 2010, p.257), and co-opting independent forces and potential challengers to the regime. As its name suggests, United Russia helped gloss over differences in following a singular national interest (Slider, 2010, p.257). The party is essentially part of a long-term strategy to reassert Putin’s dominance (White, 2012, p.217) and has ensured the elites’ support for the regime in the regions through patron-client networks, with regional officials controlling resources through their administrative power locally. It is a system in which stability and loyalty take precedence over discussion and reflection. In such an environment, peoples’ wellbeing is contingent on relationships with patrons because alternative channels for pursuing their interests through political participation are limited.

In the Russian political system, formal institutions accommodate only elite members, and it is in the interests of these elites to have their relations mediated by these same institutions. This has had the effect of inhibiting challenges from below by concentrating

18 The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico is an example of a truly authoritarian party (Reuter and Remington, 2009).
power at the top. This system, rather than being uniformly applied across the country, is replicated through the regions as individual power structures that retain many of the same traits as the centre. In such a top-down, undivided political sphere with cohesive elites, there are few power cleavages to take advantage of for an insurgent group.

This replication of the power vertical is upheld in Krasnodar Krai extremely well. The Krasnodar elite’s strong power consensus is facilitated by Krasnodar Governor Tkachev’s unrivalled political and economic power, his endorsement to rule by Moscow, and the prevailing regional political discourse that puts the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church front and centre, legitimising Tkachev’s rule and stifling dissent. In contrast, Kabardino-Balkaria’s political sphere represents a production of a very different political system from Moscow, in addition to being a fractured political arena. Its predominantly Muslim population has limited its integration into any Russian national idea, and its clan-based society has lent it to factional competition. Moscow tries to maintain control by attempting to manipulate these elites, but the consequent cleavages in power impede the establishment of a cohesive political space.

Based on the data, the political opportunity variables for the two cases can be seen in the table below and will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. It should be noted that the variables of divided-undivided elite, open-closed media, and presence-absence of influential allies should be regarded as continua of variation rather than directly opposing each other. The repression variable, while also on a continua (repressive-facilitating), is rather significant in change, which is believed to create a change in political opportunities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Krasnodar Krai</th>
<th>Kabardino-Balkaria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>Very united</td>
<td>Somewhat divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>No real change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Somewhat open</td>
<td>Very closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential Allies</td>
<td>Allies present</td>
<td>Allies absent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Table 1: Political opportunities for the environmental and Balkar movements*
3.1.1 Undivided Elite in Krasnodar Krai

The elites in Krasnodar Krai are united. Power arrangements in the region operate as part of the centralised, vertically integrated executive power that leads up to the Kremlin. It is to this vertical that the regional elite promise loyalty in exchange for consent to personal wealth. All influential opposition to the Kremlin and Kremlin-approved regional policies in Krasnodar Krai has been purged since 2000.

In Krasnodar Krai, what used to be a viable opposition in the 1990s and early 2000s has been reduced to “an absolute minimum” (Serova, 2007). Members of the once all-powerful (at least until 2000) Krasnodar branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) have been in large part co-opted by the Kremlin’s United Russia Party, and those Communist elite that did not leave the party were pressured to relinquish their posts. For example, highly popular Communist governor of Krasnodar Krai Nikolai Kondratenko (1997-2001) who unexpectedly did not run for a second term was rewarded for this concession with a smaller power position (Turovskii, 2011, p.9).

Alexander Tkachev, governor of the region since 2000, has since become one of the strongest governors in the Russian Federation under Putin and Medvedev by virtue of his loyalty to Putin as well as the economic and political importance of his region19 (Turovskii, 2011, p.14). The Kremlin’s tolerance for Tkachev’s power is requisite on his ability to both secure local population votes in favour of the Kremlin and to repress dissent. As Vladimir Shlapentokh states, no other Russian regime has consciously made a governor into a quasi-feudal baron as Putin has done with Tkachev (Shlapentokh, 2012). Federal funds are injected into the region,20 which does little for local economies. This money rather helps fortify existing power relationships and facilitates the dominance of the circles surrounding Krasnodar’s regional administration. This is exacerbated by elite capture of profitable

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19 The Sochi 2014 Olympics were held in Krasnodar Krai and were considered largely “Putin’s” games, showcasing both his authority and Russia’s resurgence.

20 Chechnya receives the most federal subsidies, and as a federal district the North Caucasus Federal District receives the most subsidies (Vestnik Kavkaza, 2010).
industries and agriculture in this most economically developed of the southern regions, feeding corruption and criminality (Shahnazarian, 2011, p.3). Tkachev’s informal patronage networks reach down into the local political arenas allowing those connected to his clique to use government ties and resources in order to exercise influence locally. This influence has given them significant advantages during political campaigns. In 2007, 100 percent of Krasnodar Krai’s municipal leaders were members of the United Russia party (Novaya Gazeta, 2007). In the same year, a rogue lawmaker who voted against reconfirming Tkachev’s second appointment described the political environment in the following way: ‘The others gave in. Lawmakers, including members of the Communist faction, were invited to private meetings and given to understand that if they voted against Tkachev, they would be in trouble’. (Novaya Gazeta, 2007). Dissenting elites were thus dismissed, detained, and pressured, and any allure to challenge from the inside dwindled (Novaya Gazeta, 2007). In this way, the shifting political alignments that open up windows of opportunity to mobilise, as described by Tarrow (1995) and Goldstone (2004), are not available in Krasnodar.

Tkachev has also been powerful enough to keep strong businessmen in the territory under his control and balance their interests. Tkachev’s strategy to monopolise political control has been facilitated by his use of state assets to buy off potential enemies and establish clientelistic relations with businessmen (Shahnazarian, 2011, p.3). The conflicts that had previously existed among landowning elite under Kondratenko were completely resolved under Tkachev (Golosov, 2010). Tkachev used the administrative bureaucracy in this process to put pressure on farms and businesses that he and his allies had been taking over. Only after the Kushchevskaia incident, where a whole family was killed by murderers connected to Tkachev’s business circles, was there increased attention focussed on political-business practices in Krasnodar Krai. Tkachev’s position was however never under threat, even despite politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s pleas to then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Medvedev to fire him, evidencing his importance to the Kremlin. This was further proven by
Tkachev’s mishandling of the Krymsk floods in which 171 people died (Gazeta.ru, 2012), and again, not losing his position.

A final fact about the Krasnodar elite is its relation to the conservative-patriotic regional discourse in the region, which presents Krasnodar Krai as a sort of Russian heartland, the domain of the Kuban Cossacks (see appendix), who are, as one local told me, ‘even more Russian than Russian’. Popular and political narratives present Cossacks as the lords of the region, emphasise foreign (usually migrant) threats, and reinforce chauvinistic attitudes towards non-Russians, and the supremacy of Russian political leaders and the Russian Orthodox Church, to whom faithfulness must be maintained. This creates an environment in which any dissent is framed as a threat to the very fabric of Krasnodar Krai, and by extension Russian society. About the Kuban Cossack emphasis on traditional ideas, families, the Church, and morality, and how they are utilised by the authorities, respondent IK 200212 notes:

‘This is something that the Russian political authorities are exploiting. Putin was saying things about that, then Medvedev, then the mayor of Moscow, and the same thing was happening with the Krai leadership. And [the Cossacks] would hold gatherings regularly, for the “strengthening of the soul”, or maybe there’s a gay-pride parade somewhere and of course, they would make counter statements that “this is bad”. There is this tendency.’

The elite in the region felt they owed their prosperity to the stability and environment that Tkachev, with his Kremlin blessing, provided. In Krasnodar, popular attitudes towards the central Russian leadership shifted from perceiving it as the source of the regions’ problems in the 1990s to seeing it as securing future prosperity in the 2000s. On the eve of the presidential elections of 2008, Governor Tkachev said about Medvedev: ‘We need such a president… that is close to the Kuban in mind and heart’ (Bashmakov, 2012, p.3). Such a statement would have been unheard of in the 1990s, but because the Krasnodar regional leadership has become dependent on the strengthening federal power to support and legitimise it, the ties between it and the Kremlin become even stronger.

21 “The Kuban” is often used to refer to Krasnodar Krai.
In conclusion, Krasnodar’s elite is extremely undivided. As a result, opposition to Governor Tkachev and his monopoly on power is practically non-existent, and there is less opportunity to challenge it. However, even if the elite were divided in the region, because of the non-democratic character of the political system as well as the vertical of power, the elite would need to be divided at the top (the Kremlin) for any perception of opportunity for change at the bottom to be present. Indeed, the Russian political system makes it highly improbable that an opposition or dissenting regional politician coexist with federal rulers in Russia (Turovskii, 2011, p.2).

Furthermore, while the presence of other political opportunity factors allowed the movement to begin to mobilise in 2010, the presence of the undivided elite contributed to a sustained higher cost of action which, along with other factors to be discussed, helped bring about the waning of the mobilisation cycle towards the end of 2012.

3.1.2 Divided Elite in Kabardino-Balkaria

The elite in Kabardino-Balkaria is fractious. Although Kabardino-Balkaria created democratic regional institutions and held direct elections for regional leaders, it is clear that this nominally democratic institutional arrangement has been manipulated by incumbent elites (Grebennikov, 2013, p.4). As with other regions, the appointment of republic heads allowed for an informal contract between the Kremlin and regional elites that could facilitate the integration of United Russia there, allowing Kremlin power to dominate in the localities (Reuter and Remington, 2009). Kabardino-Balkaria’s ruling elites are, as elsewhere in Russia, charged with achieving administrative manageability and strengthening the vertical axis of power (Chirikova and Lapina, 2000, p.32). However, this highly centralised, top-down organisation of the power vertical only contributes to the consolidation of local, clan-based patronage networks in a republic where elite competition for economic resources has been very strong since the early 2000s and is the cause of much of the republic’s instability.
In Kabardino-Balkaria, in the absence of direct elections, two areas of political competition exist: the public one, where politicians appeal to constituencies and the Kremlin, and a hidden one, ‘...where elites compete over access to state resources influencing the head of the republic directly who is the supreme arbiter in conflict between local interest groups’ (Matveeva, 2013, p.141). In this hidden arena in Kabardino-Balkaria, a system of patronage exists that is vertically organised and virtually stamps out horizontal alliances. The most influential players in Kabardino-Balkaria are from these top echelons and they themselves ensure political support for players already in power.

Since the Kremlin cannot easily navigate the diverse local ethnic and clan power arrangements in Kabardino-Balkaria,22 Moscow has displayed a more officious tendency with the elites there than in Krasnodar Krai. The momentary replacement of President Valerii Kokov with Arsen Kanokov in 2005, and then the unexpected replacement of President Kanokov halfway through his second term with Yuri Kokov in 2013, shows the readiness of the Kremlin in trying to contain and manage clan elites in Kabardino-Balkaria, even acting to directly diminish their power.23 Although in doing so, the Kremlin only aggravates tensions and produces new conflicts (Grebennikov, 2013, p.159). Thus, despite the fact that Moscow might formally be involved in local politics, in reality politics in Kabardino-Balkaria are local.

The politics of ethnicity adds an additional element to the vertical axis of power in Kabardino-Balkaria. Clan ties, prevalent due to the importance of family and kinship relations in the republic, have been used for ethnic and clan-based elites to draw power through

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22 This fact holds true for most of the North Caucasus region where the Kremlin is decreasingly in control of local power conflicts. Alexander Khloponin, the presidential envoy in charge of the North Caucasus Federal District, for example, received more administrative powers than any other envoy, presumably to try to control local elites in the North Caucasus.

23 A notable example of the Kremlin’s interfering with local elites is when Russian law enforcement closed alcohol-producing factories that belonged to republic elites, dealing a blow to their economic power. Also, on 7 June 2012, while I was present in the field, 100 Russian investigators and special forces targeted and arrested four high profile figures closely connected to President Kanokov: the head of the republican governor’s administration Vladimir Zhamborov, his brother Ruslan Zhamborov, the head of the postal service in the republic, Khabdulsalam Ligidov, the minister of state property and land resources in the republic, and businesswoman Madina Khatsukova.
processes of post-Soviet privatisation of political power and property (Markedonov, 2010, p.4; Grebennikov, 2013, p.159). They are also a significant means for recruiting and mobilising support for various initiatives. These clans constitute a few well-connected families for whom their ethnic identity is only really significant when the clan comes into conflict over political and economic resources with members of another ethnic group (Alekseev, 2013, p.304). Still, the preferential treatment and collusion between government and private actors is based on these informal networks (Alekseev, 2013, p.287). The institutionalisation of ethnic power sharing in formal and informal institutions makes collusion among the authorities and business elites go along mutually, reinforcing ethnic lines (Alekseev, 2013, p.304). This benefits ethnic Kabardians to a much higher degree.

In a system in which Kabardians have fundamental control over republican institutions, the “tandem” institutional mechanisms of conflict avoidance in the republic and distribution of power and resources particularly among the titular nations — Kabardians and Balkars — do not work and have resulted in simmering ethnic tensions. This system has also marginalised ethnic Russians and Cossacks in the republic, but because they both have no clan systems, their ability to make claims for more power is compromised.

However, not all Kabardians are favoured when it comes to political decisions, rather only those with connections to prominent Kabardian elites, particularly those connected to Kanokov’s “clan”. These Kabardian elites have, for example, undermined Kabardian nationalist groups, including Adyge Khase in the past through instruments of neutralisation, such as bribery and co-optation (Gunya, 2004, p.15). Such tactics against nationalist movements should be seen first and foremost as a method to thwart any threat against the power elite. For example, in the 1990s, during calls to unite Balkaria with the Karachai region of the Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessia, violence was averted when then-President Valerii Kokov, a Kabardian, promoted the leader of the Balkar National Congress, Sufian Beppaev.

24 This clan consists of three extended Nalchik-based families: the Kanokovs, the Zhamborovs, and the Tlekhugovs (Katsoev, 2012; Pyl’nova and Shkrylev, 2008)
to a senior government position to help with distribution of compensation to families of Balkars deported by Stalin. Thus, a power-sharing agreement came into force whereby the President would be a Kabardian and the Prime Minister a Balkar (Besleney, 2002). However, rather than actually address Balkar grievances, Beppaev and those close to him were co-opted and neutralised, a tactic these authorities have continued to use.

3.1.3 (Un)divided Elite of Both Regions in Comparison

This section reviewed the conditions of the elite in Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria to determine how they affected the mobilisation for the two movements. It is clear that the united elite on the federal level makes it more difficult for challenger movements in the regions to mobilise, as quashing local dissent is a requisite for receiving power from the centre to govern, and thus regional elites will be less likely to accommodate challengers.

The Krasnodar elite, dominated by Governor Tkachev, after carrying out Kremlin-endorsed regional state capture and aligning their legitimacy to the foundation of the Russian political power as a whole, have produced an almost unassailable unity. Political inroads to such an arrangement of elites are extremely unlikely. Yet in Kabardino-Balkaria, elite structures shaped by the interaction of social integration (clans) with formal state institutions are quite fractious. In this way, the elite-arrangement element of political opportunities for Krasnodar Krai is much more closed compared with Kabardino-Balkaria.

However, in the face such strong elite unity, the Krasnodar environmental movement still mobilised in 2010-2012. It is worth considering the possibility that unified elites even contributed to mobilisation simply by closing off any potential channels for claim making through formal institutions, funnelling the movement’s claim-making to the public sphere. However, because this is the case for most non-democracies, it is more likely a combination of other political opportunities (discussed later in this section) and other mediating factors.
(such as mobilising structures and framing discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively) that
opened the way for mobilisation to occur.

It is important to note that while social movement scholars dictate that divided elites
create competition at higher levels and increase elites’ willingness to tolerate political
challengers (Tarrow, 1994), this has not happened for the Balkars because the divided elite
and movement actors have failed to link up with one another. The marginalised and
vulnerable nature of the movement as well as the co-optation of Balkar elites outside the
movement in the past has made any cooperation with the activists appear useless. Furthermore,
as a disenfranchised group, the Balkar movement has not been able to mobilise the necessary
organisational resources from its networks (see Chapter 4) in order to mount a challenge as a
reaction to the divided elite. The ‘distance from political elites makes it difficult for them to
identify the splits and alliances that signal new prospects for successful insurgency’ (Polletta,
1999, p.10). Another reason is what Tarrow (1998) calls “negative opportunities” created by
divided elites. In other words, elites in Kabardino-Balkaria lack the power to make
concessions to challengers because they are divided. This contributed to the movement’s
inability to mobilise in a long-term, sustained campaign. In this way, the Balkar movement
can be shown to be acting not only due to objective opportunity structures, but on the basis of
correlating factors.

3.2 Repression in Russia

Repression has most often been viewed by scholars as a cost imposed on movement
actors; it is seen as something that decreases mobilisation. However, Davenport, Mueller, and
Johnston (2004) show that the impact of repression on mobilisation has produced less
consistent results. This necessitates taking into account the main events of a cycle of protest to
identify its effect. As stated in Chapters 1 and 2, this work looks to changes in repression,
both increasing and decreasing, as helping to enable protest. Thus any changes in repression in relation to any increase in protest activity will be sought.

Russia experienced a period of limited democratic progress in the 1990s that was then succeeded by a backsliding in the 2000s — the Putin era (Ryabov, 2008, p.2). The flawed nature of the parliamentary elections in December 2003 and the presidential elections in 2004, the continued consolidation of state control over the media, and the order to curb opposition parties contributed to this assessment (Freedom House, 2004).

Since then, there has been a steady decline in democracy and human rights observance in Russia. It can be argued that Putin’s regime is not totally repressive, but rather ‘only moderately repressive’ (Krastsev, 2011, p.8), as ordinary citizens who do not challenge the regime seem to be able to live their lives without experiencing state coercion. This however cannot be the only marker for democracy. As Johnson and Saarinen (2013) point out, the Russian regime allows elections, but it is essentially impossible that the opposition wins. There is freedom of speech, but not when it involves holding government accountable. While the Kremlin nurtures some elements of civil society, it quashes others (Johnson and Saarinen 2013, p.546), and it does so by employing aggressive and even illegal tactics to suppress potential sources of dissent, rather than engaging in more compromising strategies. Furthermore, these repressive steps have become more frequent since 2000 (Puddington, 2011).

Given the vertical structure of power in Russia, policies and strategies generated at the federal centre tend to be reproduced in the regions. It would thus be expected that, with a degree of independence within regional political systems, growing repression in Russia would be repeated in the regions, both through formal ways such as elections and informal ways, such as protest policing.

The severity of state repression must be taken into account as it illustrates state response to challengers (Earl, 2003, p.46). In the following table, the degree of state
repression is operationalised as one of four categories of repressive action by the state: Mild, Moderate, Heavy, and Extreme. It should be noted that the repression event is being considered and not, for instance, the number of people affected, or any ensuing consequences down the line.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Severity of Repression</th>
<th>Type of Repression Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mild Repression</td>
<td>Denial of request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formal Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Repression</td>
<td>Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Censoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harsher work conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disruption/halting of protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Repression</td>
<td>Arrest or detention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Repression</td>
<td>Violence/attack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Repression typology adapted from Chang and Vitale (2013)*

### 3.2.1 Repression Dynamics in Krasnodar Krai

It has been established that collective action incites a response from the state in relationship to the “threat” that protest activities represent to state actors (Earl, Soule, and McCarthy, 2003). Because the environmental movement is engaged predominantly in uncovering and publicising abuses of state power in Krasnodar Krai concerning the environment, and since it holds authorities directly accountable to the rule of law, it is oriented in opposition to the regional government and perceived as a threat by the authorities.

Using newspaper data from *Kavkazskii Uzel* (1 January 2001–1 July 2013), it is possible to map the acts of repression against the environmental movement of Krasnodar Krai. This data is represented in Figure 5. Based on this data, it is possible to see that the number of

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25 These only take into account “hard-pressure” acts, i.e. state-led pressure, not “soft-pressure” or the use of stigma or framing of challengers in a negative light.
protest events rose slightly in 2002, which was during the “Save Taman”\textsuperscript{26} campaign and was met with some limited repression. However, the 2007 announcement of Sochi as the location for the 2014 Winter Olympics and the consequent commencement of construction activities for it prompted the subsequent rise in protest activities for the next few years. The accompanying growing confrontation between the movement and the authorities grew during this time, and in 2010-2012 a sharp increase in repression is evidenced.

During this time period, levels of “heavy” repression rose 22 percent, a significant increase. Other levels of repression also rose during this time, but to a lesser degree. “Mild” levels of repression rose 1 percent, “moderate” levels of repression rose 3 percent, and “extreme” levels of repression rose by 2 percent. The first year of the environmental movement’s existence was also 2012, during which all levels of repression rose. Thus the period starting in 2011 and ending at the close of 2012 clearly stands out as the time change in repression.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{repression_graph.png}
\caption{Distribution of reported repression events on environmental movement by year (Based on Kavkazskii Uzel, 2001-2013)\textsuperscript{27}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{26} This was the environmental movement’s campaign to protect the Taman peninsula, located between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, from industrial development.

\textsuperscript{27} For the graphs on repression, lines seemed better suited to represent the more gradual repression trends.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Severity of Repression</th>
<th>Type of Repression Event</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage of Overall Repression</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mild Repression</td>
<td>Denial of request</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formal Statement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Repression</td>
<td>Censoring</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harsher work conditions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disruption/halting of protest</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Repression</td>
<td>Arrest or detention</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal sanctions</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme Repression</td>
<td>Violence/attack</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3: Type of repression event and percentages for environmental movement (Based on Kavkazskii Uzel, 2001-2013)*

The repressive measures visualised in Figure 5 are carried out by a variety of actors. “Mild” repression, consisting of formal request denials, official statements, and fines, are carried out by courts, high-ranking officials, and law enforcement agents. Acts of “moderate” repression were performed by the local authorities and police. These include for example an artificially orchestrated protest organised by members of the Kremlin-aligned Social Justice party outside the offices where the environmental activists worked and the exclusion of an environmental activist from a local mayoral candidate list.

“Heavy” methods, consisting of arrests and detentions, are primarily carried out by law enforcement agents such as police. Law enforcement charged activists with insubordination and other administrative violations throughout the time period of 2001-2012. The number of these charges increased sharply in 2011-2012. During detentions police
sometimes confiscated personal items of activists, in particular recording devices such as cameras that were sometimes not returned. Some detentions resulted from the fact that police did not always know the law themselves, but were just generally wary of any protest activity. One environmental activist was detained at a protest just for carrying a green and black flag, which the arresting police officer thought was “Chechen” (Mikhal’chenko, 2010). In 2011-2012, more serious charges such as “extremism” or “violation of the border regime” began to be invoked. There was also a rise in the number of provocations by proxies during 2011-2012. For example, on several occasions, groups of youth would surround solo-picketers and taunt them, but even if the picketer ignored them, it was still enough to be surrounded by others to be accused of holding an unsanctioned mass protest or causing public disorder (Kravchenko and Vlasova, 2011).

It is interesting to note that the data shows that proxies carry out “extreme” methods of repression, not law enforcement. Of the five physical attacks reported by Kavkazskii Uzel, two were carried out by construction workers at the sites where activists were either observing or trying to stop construction, one attack was carried out by private security guards at Governor Tkachev’s dacha, and unidentified people committed the other two attacks.

Surveillance was also used on the movement participants. It should be noted that my fieldwork was conducted at the time of the highest repression. During the fieldwork, I experienced difficulty speaking to activists over mobile phones because of telephone tapping. Sometimes the telephone connection would simply cut out in the middle of a conversation. On another occasion I observed activists being surveilled by unidentified men on foot from a short distance. On yet another occasion, a Tuapse city administration car pursued the vehicle I was sharing with three other activists for some time, after the car we were originally riding in was purposefully blocked from leaving a car park by another administration car. In early 2012, respondent SG 180413’s home, after being surveilled for some time, was broken into, with

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28 Proxies are those that are not actual law-enforcement representatives or the authorities. For these movement cases, these were local people that have been hired by them.
nothing taken but the respondent’s and his wife’s wedding rings — an attempt in the respondent’s opinion to make the act resemble a burglary. In July 2012, respondent AM110413 found a wiretap in her home, which she blogged about. Another activist reported to me a phone call he received from the Centre for Combating Extremism inquiring about “the American girl”, presumably referring to me. On two occasions, activists were detained well away from any protest activity, suggesting more surveillance. Activist MU and respondent SG 180413 were detained together while buying food in a store during a day of inspections at a limestone quarry. Activist AM was detained and charged with police insubordination a full month after the peaceful protest during which the disobedience allegedly took place. This individual was at his office when police came in and took him away, literally from his desk. Respondent LS 130413 detailed how the police visited his home:

‘They came; they asked to sign a statement promising not to go to the protest. It is complete nonsense. I heard the knock in the morning, and I understood right away who it was. I went to the door and looked out and there were a couple guys standing there. I did not open the door. They were in civilian clothes, and they started knocking on the neighbours’ doors and then it was all clear to me. They started asking the neighbours questions, and she [the neighbour] signed something, and told them I am a good guy. And basically they had nothing on me.’

Respondent YN 080413 spoke about intimidation at his workplace after participating in protests:

‘I worked at an oil plant, and just for my participation in this process, they threatened me. And not just me. They understand. They are smart people. They know that it is useless to threaten me. I am a young guy. If I am fired, I will go somewhere else. But they threatened my relatives.’

In the case of the environmental movement, sustained crackdowns on the activists at the onset of the protest cycle and throughout it clearly helped the movement galvanise and mobilise. This happened for several reasons. Firstly, group identification is strengthened through conflict. As Hirsch (1990) argues, on the individual level, repression actually

29 Also known as “Centre E”, it is formally charged with fighting “extremism and terrorism”. It is part of the Ministry of Interior directorates of all the regions. ‘Because their targets are unclear, and the officers lack the imagination to change their methods, they arrest more or less anyone who is politically active’ (Tumanov, 2012).
increases the commitment that movement participants feel toward their cause. Secondly, the
number of protest acts increased because activists began including protests against the
persecution of their colleagues in addition to protesting on environmental issues in their
campaigns. However, when abeyance mechanisms begin, repression can also be a catalyst in
disengagement. The sustained campaign of repression against the environmental activists also
quickened the end of the protest cycle towards the end of 2012. Increased detentions of solo
picketers combined with more propensity for initiating criminal trials and convictions for
protesting and renewed criminal charges against activist leaders were clear deterrents for the
activists who were enduring a two-year protest cycle.

3.2.2 Repression Dynamics in Kabardino-Balkaria

As Chang and Vitale (2013, p.20) have found, authorities react to the nature of social
movements as embodied by the goals and targets that members identify. Since the Balkar
movement is engaged predominantly in speaking out against land reforms that benefit the
powerful Kabardians in the republic’s state institutions, and because they publicly call on
these authorities to observe the rule of law and the Constitution of the Russian Federation,
they are, like the environmental movement, oriented in opposition to the regional government
and perceived as a threat by the authorities.

In Kabardino-Balkaria, Kavkazskii Uzel data on repression of the contemporary
Balkar movement is available only from 2005, which is the year it became revived in its
current form. The movement had been spurred on by the introduction of land laws in late
2004 that affected their ethnic group, and a year before the Council of Elders of the Balkar
Nation (CEBN) was established. The years 2005-2006 were relatively absent of repression.

30 In the 1990s, the movement consisted of much of the same individuals as it does today, but its goals
were different; the movement prior to 2000 was focussed on more radical goals of uniting with the
Karachais in neighbouring Karachaev-Cherkessia. The focus of this work is the movement since
2000.
The year 2007 marked the beginning of some repressive measures of the Balkar movement (Sova, 2010). It began with the authorities’ reaction to an analytical report written by a Balkar activist called ‘The Position of the Balkar Nation in the Republic of Kabardino-
Balkaria: Sources of Problems and Ways to Resolve Them’ (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2007), which laid blame for the Balkars’ suffering at the feet of the republican authorities. This began a year of formal warnings and fines over the content of the manifesto and the prohibition of a planned demonstration. Then, the government increased pressure when the prosecutor’s office halted the activities of the CEBN, the main organisation around which the movement is concentrated. The Kabardino-Balkaria High Court then ruled to ban, citing the alleged propensity of Balkar movement leaders to make “extremist” and “inflammatory” remarks. These remarks were drawn from two sources. The first was the analytical report mentioned above, the content of which, according to the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor, included ‘signs of extremism in the form of propaganda of exclusivity or inferiority of citizens on the basis of their ethnic background’ (Sova, 2007), an allegation human rights centre Sova disputes. The second was a statement made by CEBN member Oius Gurtuev to the Prosecutor of the Russian Federation in which he declared President Kanokov to be guilty of ‘carrying out acts that create the danger of death for people, or that can advance other socially dangerous consequences… [and that] provoke the aggravation of socio-political tensions, lead to social outbursts, and undermine the basis of internal and external politics of our state’. As a result of the statement, the Kabardino-Balkaria prosecutor launched a slander case against the activist. Thus it was these two events that led to the banning of the Council of Elders.

The ban was overturned in the High Court of the Russian Federation, but the Kabardino-Balkarian high court failed to implement the decision. The organisation continued its activities. One respondent (IS 020613) described this:

‘Twice the high court of Kabardino-Balkaria took the decision to forbid our activities. We appealed this decision to the higher court of the Russian Federation... The first time, the high court of the Russian Federation annulled the decision of the Kabardino-Balkaria court and advised the court to review the case. Two years have passed and they have done nothing. On purpose. And then they impede our work. The second time the Russian Federation high court ruled in favour of the organisation was 27 July 2010. And the Council [of Elders of the Balkar Nation] is included in a list of extremist organisations that was published in a newspaper. Even after the decision of the Russian Federation high court.’
After the ban of the Council of Elders there was a small rise in movement activity in 2008. Protests against land reforms occurred (Nalchik in June, and Kendelen in September). Balkar activists took their appeal of the ban to the Russian Federation High Court, getting the ruling overturned in March. They also made an appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.

If 2007 was the year of “mild” and “moderate” repressive measures, then 2008 and 2009 were clearly the years of “extreme” and “heavy” types of repression for the Balkar movement, during which a simultaneous drop in “mild” and “moderate” repressive acts is observed. Here, it is clear that these actors are challenging a regime that has the capacity and propensity for violent repression. In 2008, there was an assassination attempt on a movement activist during which a gun was discharged, two separate attacks on an activist with blunt instruments occurred, and another activist was beaten up. Also in 2008, Gurtuev was given a very heavy fine (50,000 RUB) for slander against President Kanokov. In 2009, a movement participant’s car was set on fire and the offices of the CEBN were firebombed. None of the perpetrators of the violent attacks were identified, nor were any suspects found. The constant threat of violent policing of protests has been a reason people have been afraid to come out into the streets. Regarding the common practice of the regional authorities to bring criminal elements to support law enforcement agents in restraining protests and peoples’ fear, respondent RB300513 said:

‘Of course many were afraid! They bring bandits into the police. The police together with bandits drove out our protest. With criminals!’

As with the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai, surveillance was also practiced on the Balkar activists. In 2008, on the day that activist Dalkhat Baidaev was beaten at the entrance to his building, he told someone in a phone conversation that he was planning

31 These can be any local criminals who are paid on an ad hoc basis to follow the authorities’ orders. I observed this tactic in Krasnodar Krai as well when a person recognised and identified by activists as a local drug addict gave false testimony against a movement leader during a trial.
to go home at 14:00, which is exactly when the unidentified attackers were waiting for him, suggesting telephone surveillance. After my meetings and interviews with respondents at the offices of the CEBN, I was always escorted outside by a movement member because they, as they told me, were always in fear of “more attacks”. During my interview with respondent OB 030613, I relayed an incident regarding a prior conversation I had in Nalchik during which a third party walked in and asked the person speaking to me not to use names for fear of retribution, and the respondent replied:

‘Of course! It can happen with anyone. We all understand that our phones are being listened to, it’s all understood.’

Through these incidents, it becomes clear that the political elites in Kabardino-Balkaria are protected by more elaborate and extensively repressive institutions than in Krasnodar Krai. Furthermore, given the presence of political violence that has been used in the republic against other perceived opponents, such as alleged Islamic insurgents, the authorities are more likely to believe that violence is an acceptable and effective response to perceived threats. In Kabardino-Balkaria, repression is a constant part of life, though to some degree specifically directed to groups outside the mainstream of political life that are deemed to pose a threat to the ruling elite. Therefore, it is difficult to say the movement experienced any major change in repression, as coercion is rather constant.

The year 2010 marked another attempt to ban the CEBN for extremism, which, as in 2008, caused an increase in protest activity. However, other than this ban there were virtually no other repressive acts save for a warning by the prosecutor’s office against holding an unsanctioned protest. In conclusion, it was the acts of banning the CEBN that precipitated the spikes in protest activity in 2008 and 2010, while the indiscriminate, violent acts of repression did not affect the number of protest acts, suggesting the movement only responds to that kind of suppression. It is also significant that in 2010, two out of four of the protest activities occurred outside the republic. Two hunger strikes were carried out, one by Balkars who had
travelled to Moscow and another by Balkars who went to neighbouring Stavropol Krai in the small town of Essentuki to undergo their own. It seems that the ban and violence pushed protest outside the borders of the republic and the authorities’ reach it was directed towards, instead of stopping it. Furthermore, the CEBN de facto continued to exist and function but with less protest activity, possibly due to their propensity to use institutional channels of protest (i.e. the Russian Federation High Court and their appeal to the European Court of Human Rights). Simultaneously, repression dropped off, reflected in respondent OB 030613’s statement:

‘We began to express our wishes at protests. And we’ve been doing this since 2005, ever since they instigated those land laws. We now understand that there is no point in these protests. They don’t pay attention to us.’

3.2.3 Krasnodar Environmental Movement’s Jump in Repression and Kabardino-Balkaria Balkar Movement’s Constant Repression

The previous two sections reviewed the state of repression in Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria on the movements under study to determine how they affected their protest cycles. It is clear that the repressive capacity of the Russian state is present on the federal level, and this transposes itself on the regional level.

In the Krasnodar environmental movement’s case, the rise in repression that the environmental movement experienced in 2011-2012 was a direct reaction to their increasing protest activities beginning in 2010. Here, the increased repression created a self-perpetuating dynamic that encouraged more demonstration as the protest cycle carried on, as the authorities’ rise in repressive acts consequently raised the number of protests that were a reaction to the crackdowns on activists. The numbers of protests were already rising, and thus the persecution of actors spurred on more demonstrations. In this way, this research points to the positive influence of repression on mobilisation, at least in this case of the Krasnodar environmental movement, in the short-medium term. However, the high number of repressive
acts sustained for over two years began to take their toll on mobilisation. Some of the more active individuals were targeted repeatedly, minor infractions began to invite more serious punishments, and many activists expressed worry about not being able to protest at all. With the increased number of arrests and crackdowns, the cost of mobilisation was raised and the protest cycle finally ended at the end of 2012.

In Kabardino-Balkaria, some repression began soon after the movement’s revitalisation in 2005, but its numbers (like the protest acts they sought to curb) were much less than in Krasnodar. The act of banning the CEBN spurred the spikes in protest activity in 2008 and 2010 but failed to produce a sustained protest cycle. Repression can be said to have facilitated mobilisation for the Krasnodar environmental movement, but when sustained, it actually brought about its end. For the Balkar movement in Kabardino-Balkaria, it was the type of repression that had some limited effect on protest activity — namely the attempts to ban the CEBN. Although this caused a spike in protest activities both times, a sustained protest cycle did not materialise either time for two reasons. First, although the bans can be considered as a rise in repression, with the backdrop of violent attacks on members instead of a clear change in repression and the authorities’ deployment of a counterframe that characterised the Balkar movement as extremist (see Chapter 5), the situation is rather one of constant coercion and threat. Second, the fact that the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation ruled the Kabardino-Balkaria court’s CEBN ban unconstitutional also served to discourage protest, as activists felt to some degree vindicated and continued to organise activities despite the republican court’s failure in recognising the higher court’s decision. Furthermore, the ratio of extreme and violent acts of repression was much higher in Kabardino-Balkaria, reflecting the more authoritarian environment. Although repression played a role in the Krasnodar environmental movement’s sustained protest and abeyance, in Kabardino-Balkaria, it may have suppressed the movement altogether, preventing full-scale mobilisation given its high cost in the republic.
3.3 Media Openness in Russia

In stable, non-democratic regimes, media is largely state controlled but the presence of alternative media can provide an opportunity to bypass mainstream media and disseminate information. For any social movement, the ability to convey its message to both members and the broader public is an important factor for mobilisation (Brinson, 2006, p.543). This section explores the impact the presence or absence of an open media has on the movement cases’ mobilisation cycles.

According to Freedom House’s 2012 report, media freedom in Russia remained “extremely poor”, with the Kremlin relying on both “crude” and “sophisticated” methods of media control. Media diversity has declined since Putin’s presidency in 2000 as private companies loyal to the regime and regional authorities bought out more outlets, while other print and broadcast outlets continued to rely on regional and municipal authorities and state funds — a trend exacerbated by the economic crisis of 2008 (Reporters Without Borders, 2009; Freedom House, 2012). State-controlled television has been the main source of news for the majority of Russians (Freedom House, 2012), and this remains true in the regions. This has not changed in 2013. Social movements in Russia and especially its regions are thus at a great disadvantage because ‘integral to any attempt made by social movements to gain access to the polity, to put issues that concern the movement on the public agenda, or to work for social change is the ability of the movement to communicate’ (Brinson, 2006, p.543).

However, at the same time, modern information and communications technology has been an emerging facet of modern activism and politics globally (McCaughey and Ayers, 2003). Internet media is an informal mechanism of interaction and a venue for discussion of common issues. For a non-democratic country like Russia where the Internet is still fairly
free and traditional forms of media are not, it is logical that the Internet would assume a more prominent role as a communication tool for social movement activists.

A look at the specific features of the Russian-language Internet reveals the threat it poses to traditional forms of broadcast media. Internet use in Russia has steadily increased since 2000. By 2008, 20 percent of the Russian population used the Internet regularly, a near seven-fold increase since 2000 (Fossato and Lloyd, 2008). According to the Russian Public Opinion Foundation, since 2009, numbers of monthly, weekly, and daily Internet users had also steadily risen (FOM, 2011). The problem is that, despite its expansion, Internet penetration in Russia as a whole sits at approximately 47 percent (RIA Rating, 2013), while in the United States for example that number is nearly 80 percent. So, rather than exaggerate Russian Internet user numbers, this work regards the Internet as a political opportunity for social movements with an increasing role.

There are three main types of Internet resources comprising the media that give the two movements under study coverage. Firstly, there are the independent Russian online news outlets that cover these movements (Kavkazskii Uzel, Novaia Gazeta, Ekho Moskvy’s individual blogs, etc.). Of these, Kavkazskii Uzel carries the most content about the regions of Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria as its focus includes the North Caucasus and southern Russia. Novaia Gazeta and Ekho Moskvy are both Moscow-based and tend to focus on Moscow-related content, but occasionally cover the movements in this study. Secondly, Russian and international human rights organisations periodically cover these movements (e.g. Sova, Greenpeace, etc.). These organisations can help boost the movements’ legitimacy to some extent by bringing more visibility to their issues, but given the difficulties they have

32 In Russia, even the Internet is not completely free. Kremlin supporters have obtained several online newspapers and are reputed to be promoting a pro-Kremlin network of bloggers and hackers who produce pro-Kremlin content or hack independent sites (Freedom House, 2012). Furthermore, individuals who have publicised anti-Kremlin content online have faced government reprisal (Freedom House, 2012).

33 There is a regional branch of Novaia Gazeta in Krasnodar, Novaia Gazeta Kubani, which is not funded by its “headquarters” and struggles with lack of finances and near-constant court hearings.
been facing in basic operations themselves, they have a very limited impact. Thirdly, social media, having become an alternative forum for political debate in Russia, has also become an important channel for activists. By social media, this work refers to interactive Internet and mobile communication technologies with user-generated content (Lonkila, 2012, p.3). Such social media outlets include Facebook, its Russian twin VKontakte, YouTube, Twitter, and the Russian-language part of LiveJournal (Zhivoi Zhurnal or ZheZhe as it is usually called). These are the main outlets for public debate and tools for political mobilisation in Russia.

As a result of these alternative forms of media, the movements have an opportunity to create political capital outside traditional broadcast media through building up more varied engagement mechanisms and credibility by informing the public of their message. In this way, since 2000, it can be posited that traditional media has become increasingly closed, making Internet resources increasingly the only remaining channel for disseminating information about movement issues in Russia.

3.3.1 Media Openness in Krasnodar Krai

Traditional forms of media in Krasnodar are quite closed to political outsiders. Krasnodar authorities have transformed an official “media register” into a mechanism of controlling privately owned newspapers. ‘Those that register enjoy major financial advantages but they have to publish content provided by the authorities and submit to close control of their accounts’ (Reporters Without Borders, 2009). Given that the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games had been drawing nearer, the urgency for controlling coverage in Krasnodar Krai made control there stronger since 2007, when Sochi was selected as the host city.

Independent news outlets and international organisations have provided an information medium for the environmental movement. The independent Kavkazskii Uzel news outlet however has been covering the Krasnodar environmental movement since 2001, and the reporting has remained steady since then. As a consequence it is the most
comprehensive source of information independent of the movement. Given the increased crackdowns of environmental activists in 2011-2012, coverage in other independent online news outlets appeared as well.\(^{34}\) At the same time, similar coverage was virtually absent from state-controlled media. For this reason, the media specification of “somewhat open” for the environmental movement is due to its being comprised almost solely of alternative and social media rather than mainstream media, which is usually closed to challengers in non-democracies.

Information about the movement on Russian and international human rights websites began in 2008 with the movement’s ‘Save Taman!’ campaign, where the first references to the movement appeared on the sites of Crude Accountability and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), although they were very few. Such coverage remained at a very low level, with occasional mentions until 2012, when coverage expanded. Organisations such as Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace, European Parliament, Oxfam, and Eurasia.org began covering the movement at that time. Such coverage can be regarded as helping validate the movement’s claims but remain limited given that their content is often inaccessible for the movement’s audience, being in English.

Social media has been very popular among activists of the environmental movement and has played a much greater role for the movement than the previously mentioned outlets. Given Krasnodar’s relatively high Internet penetration for Russia (at 41.2 percent), the Internet is a viable alternative for movement-based information dispersion. Most if not all activists have had and continue to keep individual VKontakte, Facebook, Twitter, and LiveJournal accounts from which they launch discussions, rally support, and comment on current events relevant to their activism, thereby increasing their visibility and creating online networks. Zhivoi Zhurnal has been a significant resource for Krasnodar environmental activists who link their own blogs to those of other activists and to a wider audience in

\(^{34}\) Besides some coverage in the local Novaia Gazeta Kubani, there was some limited coverage in the Russia-wide Novaia Gazeta as well as on Ekho Moskvy.
general. With its networked structure, the *Zhivoi Zhurnal* user is immediately a member of a community that includes a large part of the Russian political intelligentsia, all in one integrated platform. The site has been notably used by those movement participants who carry out community inspections of sites where there are suspected environmental violations. These activists take photos and video of such evidence, and together with descriptive text, create an accessible, easy-to-follow account of the given violation. It has been an important platform through which other activists have come to learn about specific issues and the state of the natural environment in the region in general. On other occasions, activists have used *Zhivoi Zhurnal* to publicise protests and pickets, also with photos and text narration, including the occasions when those protests and pickets have been disrupted or halted by law enforcement agencies — activity that can potentially constrain repressive capacity of the authorities (Wisler and Giugni, 1999).

Twitter’s role has also been important in diffusing live information for the environmental activists who have made use of its short textual format. This format can be transmitted via SMS from mobile phones, used most notably to announce crackdowns by law enforcement, detentions, and the locations of detained activists. Twitter’s use for communicating information about detentions has been instrumental in alerting activists to the location of detained colleagues so that they could converge to help put pressure on the authorities carrying out the detentions.

Furthermore, the organisation around which the environmental movement in Krasnodar is organised — the Environmental Watch on the North Caucasus (EWNC) — has its own website that includes news, press releases, publications, video, photos, and a newsletter which followers can sign up to receive via e-mail. Respondent AS 180413 said:

‘There’s the Internet. We have the [electronic] newsletter, and anyone who wants it, gets it’.

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35 This has given activists the opportunity to integrate YouTube into the *Zhivoi Zhurnal* platform, allowing for a multimedia experience.
Thus we can see that, despite the restrictions of traditional forms of media, the limited impact of independent Russian online news outlets, and Russian and international human rights organisation coverage, the very open social media domain actively utilised by activists results in a fairly open media for the Krasnodar environmental movement.

The movement’s communication processes, both internally and externally, have thus been facilitated, with a direct effect on social movement mobilisation (Brinson, 2006, p.543). In this way, the Krasnodar environmental movement has, instead of ‘working within the system’ and acquiescing to the constraints of existing mass media, has simply circumvented it (Brinson, 2006, p.344). This ability to control their own message and disseminate it on their own terms to the broader public has been a valuable advantage for the movement in counteracting the authorities’ monopoly on public debate and decreasing the power inequalities present in this non-democratic context.

With such an important information-disseminating resource, many new individuals have been exposed to the movement’s messages and several joined after finding out about activities on the Internet. This fact also relates to the movements’ mobilising structures, as they will attend to the factor of social networks discussed in Chapter 4, the structure of which this open media shapes. Respondent AS 180413 described how she became interested in the movement after meeting an activist while on holiday at the Utrish nature preserve:

‘And when we returned to Krasnodar, I went on the Internet myself and found the initiative to save Utrish, and when there was a protest, I went to it’.

Thus, the Internet provided a way to share information about protest activities. To my questions about how people came to find out about and support protests, the Internet was revealed as the main tool. Respondent SG 180413 said:

‘When we have public protests, it’s also a PR campaign to somehow get the story across to people. Under Putin, we lost the mass media. So people only find out about things through the Internet. And thanks to the Internet we have some support’.
3.3.2 Media Openness in Kabardino-Balkaria

The Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria has some of the most constricted press freedoms in the whole Russian Federation. With restrictions on freedom of speech that are at odds with federal legislation, and a gag-rule stipulation stating that ‘the circulation of information incompatible with the morals, ethics, and national traditions of the territory of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria is considered legally punishable’ (Obydenkova, 2007, p.228), there is little room for freedom of speech. The Kabardino-Balkarian authorities have strengthened censorship of the internal mass media (Gunya, 2004), which has in practice amounted more to controlling information surrounding the activities of the authorities, especially information regarding corruption, as well as for controlling information regarding the fight against the Islamic insurgency (Aloeva, 2008). Noteworthy is the 5 December 2012 murder of Kabardino-Balkaria TV news presenter Kazbek Gekkiev, who covered social issues for the regional branch of the VGTRK. The murder, to date unsolved, highlights the compromised right to freedom of expression and the right of journalists in the republic to carry out their work without fearing for their lives.

Thus official and traditional broadcast media in Kabardino-Balkaria is strictly limited to official discourse. Traditional print and broadcast coverage of the Balkar movement is either non-existent or shows the movement in an extremely negative light. Unsympathetic media coverage of social movement activities often undermines movements (Gitlin, 1980; Smith et al., 2001).

Few Russia-wide independent publications give attention to Balkar protests or issues when they can report on more popular stories about militant Islam in the republic. Of the independent Russian newspapers, Kavkazskii Uzel has covered the Balkar movement most consistently, and consequently it is the most comprehensive resource for independent information about the movement. Novaia Gazeta occasionally covered the movement’s
activities from 2008, which is the same year that Russian human rights group Sova and Radio Free Europe began posting information about the movement on their sites. There was another small spike in coverage by these sources in 2010 which has since lulled. The timing of these increases in coverage can be linked to attempts by the republican authorities to ban the CEBN. But in general, coverage about the movement, whether from rights organisations or independent news outlets, is scarce. Furthermore, within the republic, there are virtually no independent press outlets that cover the movement’s activities.

The Balkar movement has been printing its own newspaper *Vestnik Balkarskogo Naroda* (Herald of the Balkar Nation) since 2008 until at least 2012, the distribution scope of which is unknown and there is no information about it online. The newspaper is published in the Balkar language and consequently, its audience is limited to that ethnic group. Furthermore, there is another newspaper, *Sobesednik*, that respondent RB 300513 discussed, which I have not seen or been able to find any reference to online.

The movement has virtually no social media presence at all. Although activists have made video recordings of protests and detentions, none have been put up on the Internet or distributed for public view.\(^{36}\) Asked about how information is given out to interested participants, respondent RB 300513 stated:

‘That we do ourselves by telephone. We don’t announce anything publicly — no press, no nothing’.

It is clear that individual activists in the movement have not sought to use the Internet or social media as a platform to further their interests or to publicise their cause. This of course is partly related to the low Internet penetration in Kabardino-Balkaria (at 22.1 percent), much lower than Russia’s national average (RIA Rating, 2013). Furthermore, the cost of Internet service is much higher in the region than in other parts of the country. In 2009 Nal’chik was one of the most expensive cities in the country for Internet service (Sidorenko, 

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\(^{36}\) I was given compact discs with various media on them as well as paper copies of the *Vestnik Balkarskogo Naroda* when I asked for material.
Thus poor infrastructure and poverty has essentially made the Internet inaccessible for the movement actors and their audience. The combined restriction on traditional media and low Internet penetration in the republic has made for an environment where media as a whole is considered extremely closed to the Balkar movement.

Social movements’ ability to communicate their message on the Internet facilitates mobilisation efforts simply by expanding the number of people who receive them, but they also nurture collective identity and expand network capacity through recruitment (Diani, 2000; Kreimer, 2001). For the Balkars, the lack of an alternative media in the face of unsympathetic elite media organisations has implied an acceptance of their contemporary media landscape. With no open forum for participants to communicate and without the opportunity to frame their issues in the broader media arena, they cannot extend their discursive spaces to broader publics. The movement could be reaching city-dwelling Balkars in the republic not already personally connected to the movement members, Balkars living in other parts of Russia, especially in Moscow, as well as more Russian and international human rights groups. However, it is clear that the Balkar movement is simply self-limiting in not utilising the scope of means of communication available to them. The Balkars for example do occasionally post copies of verbose legal appeals and decisions online. In other words they do not actually use Internet platforms for discussion or interaction, but rather for uploading documents pertaining to whatever legal dispute is happening. Referring to this, respondent OB 030613 said:

‘The authorities don’t pay attention to us. Now we’re writing about it on the Internet. Maybe someone will notice what is going on. Maybe we can get the ear of Russia’s higher-up politicians. Because we cannot reach them’.

It should be noted that the placing of legal documents online is hardly making use of the varied ways that ICTs and the Internet in particular can be used to put forward a movement’s message. Although even this limited use is a start, it is not sufficient to carry the movement through periods of demobilisation. This has meant that the movement cannot carry out a sustained, long-term protest campaign to bring forth their claims and grievances. The
movement cannot count media framing as part of their tactical repertoire to explicitly offer an alternative view to that of opponents to the broader public. Rather, as visible from the repression and mobilisation graphs, the movement can only react to short-term menaces and situations.

3.3.3 Comparison of Somewhat Open Media in Krasnodar Krai and Extremely Closed Media in Kabardino-Balkaria

This section reviews the media conditions in Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria in order to ascertain how they affected the mobilisation cycles for the two movements. The constrained mainstream and state media freedoms in Russia have been replicated throughout the regions making it more difficult for any movement in Russia — federal or regional — to disseminate its message. The use of ICTs can be an alternative channel, but its penetration is extremely varied in the country with more Internet use in large cities and regions with greater economic prosperity.

Internet penetration is much higher in Krasnodar Krai than in Kabardino-Balkaria, and it is clear that the environmental activists’ ample use of social media sites, e-mail, and newsletters facilitated its mobilisation cycle of 2010-2012. It is apparent only through interview data that some of the newcomers to the movement learned about it online and used the Internet to find out about other activities. In contrast, the Balkar movement has not used ICTs for disseminating information about it. Of course, due to the low Internet penetration in the republic and the rural nature of much of the group’s constituent base, it is unclear what the Internet’s potential for movement mobilisation could have been locally had the movement used it. Media restrictions are an important intervening variable affecting mobilisation prospects (Lyall, 2006, p.408), and it is worth noting that the Internet is not totally closed to the movement. The office of the Council of Elders has computers and Internet connection, and with it, the movement could be reaching a much wider audience with its own tailored
message. The Balkars instead chose to disseminate information for its members and supporters through personal networks and by telephone, and it does not make information about it public and accessible through any other means. With a heavily censored and state-controlled press in the republic, Balkars do not have an alternative medium to build informational autonomy. Furthermore, it marginalises the movement more. ‘In such a context, members… face more difficulties in articulating and expressing their interests, opinions and social perspectives’ (Porto, 2012, p.46).

The closed media factor of political opportunities also shaped the other variables of the political process framework for the Balkar activists. In particular, it confined the information flow to the movement’s narrow social networks (see Chapter 4) — narrow especially because of the lack of ICTs and the absence of the space that the Internet provides. Information moves slowly through its network and with a limited reach. This has in turn impacted frames to make them also limited and has made it more difficult for the movement to mobilise broader constituencies as well as resist the counterframe of extremism (see Chapter 5) that the republican authorities initiated against it. It is as Schock suggests — that dimensions of political opportunities interact in different ways, leading researchers to approach mobilisation as coming from multiple conjunctural causation (Ragin, 1987; Schock, 1996).

### 3.4 Influential Allies

Following McAdam’s political process model, we find that mobilisation is likely to increase when a movement has influential allies, as those allies can maximise access to state institutions as well as increase the legitimacy and bargaining position of a movement. Movements are often too vulnerable to engage in overt oppositional activities without influential allies (Schock, 1999).
While the Krasnodar environmental movement’s struggle has drawn in outside activists, supporters, and advocates, the mobilising potential of this support is somewhat undermined by the oppositional position of the allies themselves who consequently have limited political resources and influence among the authorities. However, in a non-democratic setting, allies are not usually found within the state domain (Schock, 1999). Nonetheless, these non-state allies have helped the movement develop by expanding its network connected to the mobilisation structures to be discussed in Chapter 4 and lend it a more optimistic outlook, help legitimise its struggle, and give it increased visibility.

The Balkars, both as a community and a movement, do not have any single, consistent ally or any influential or authoritative voices speaking out on their behalf. There has been none of the supportive expressions that the environmental movement has received in terms of its struggle, and recurring persecution and unchallenged extremist frames used by the authorities on them have represented a crisis in their political advocacy, isolating them from any groups that might otherwise support it.

3.4.1 Influential Allies of the Krasnodar Krai Environmental Movement

Given the environmental movement’s oppositional stance vis-à-vis governor Tkachev, and considering the power relations in the region (described in the section on elite divisions earlier in the chapter), the conclusion is that it is highly improbable for the environmental movement to find influential allies within the regional government. As respondent AM 110413 stated:

‘To expect any help from the government is useless. Of course if we had that it would help enormously. If only there was even one small hope of cooperating with them. No. We are enemies for them’.

Nonetheless, the Krasnodar environmental movement has had allies outside the regional government. In non-democracies, individual politicians, political parties, and
associations are usually under state control (Schock, 1999), and therefore allies are more likely to come from outside the realm of the state. This was true for the environmental movement. The movement has enjoyed support from the oppositional social liberal Yabloko party, the votes for whom are often too few to make the 7 percent barrier for State Duma representation and which ‘barely registers in opinion polls’ (White, 2012, p. 211). Nevertheless the party has some moderate popularity among the educated, cosmopolitan class of the big cities. Yabloko’s goals of fighting corruption and protecting the environment overlap with those of the environmental movement. Yabloko’s support for the environmental movement in Krasnodar has ranged from material, by offering its offices, computers, and Internet to the activists, to official by helping the movement publicise its campaigns and events on its website and receiving personal support from Yabloko leader, Sergei Mitrokhin (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2011a). Yabloko’s participation in ecological campaigns began in 2010, when party members took part in public hearings against oil drilling in the Black Sea alongside members of the Ecological Watch on the North Caucasus (EWNC) (Tesheva and Rudomakha, 2011), the organisation around which the Krasnodar environmental movement organises. Yabloko supported the environmental movement’s campaign to save the Utrish wildlife preserve (Yabloko, 2011a), which the Krasnodar branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) also supported. Yabloko supported the environmental movement’s campaign to protect the Taman peninsula located between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (Yabloko, 2011b), and it also supported the movement’s campaign against the Evrokhim corporation’s plans to drill oil in the Black Sea. The party publicly stated support for the EWNC and its members when slanderous material about them was published (Yabloko, 2011c).

37 One of the party’s three is the ‘Green Faction’.
Respondent AM 110413 contrasted Yabloko to what she called “pseudo” environmental movements:

‘… in speaking to people, I realised that Yabloko offers its support for the environment. There is a fraction in Yabloko called Green Russia (Zelenaya Rossiya) that is real…’.

Respondent DS 160413 said on the movement’s work with parties:

‘…it’s difficult to get people involved for the environment. It is one of the reasons [why] we collect allies more quickly. We expand our activities… with our shift to a political party. We understand that it is a way to resolve environmental issues as well. All our activities come to working with the authorities’.

Respondent YN 080413 said:

‘It often became simpler for us to act when we began to act jointly with Yabloko. That is an important part. Yabloko has a so-called fraction called Green Russia (Zelenaya Rossiya) which we joined. And with the help of Green Russia and more concretely Yabloko, we inform Yabloko about what is happening. And they, using their resources, whatever kind, even information resources, tell everyone else.”

The environmental movement has also found allies in environmental activists in other parts of Russia. Activists from a Moscow-based organisation called Ekooborona (Eco-defence) helped organise protests in Moscow in support of Krasnodar environmental activists. (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2011a). Furthermore, Evgeniia Chirikova, who has in recent years become the popular face of Russian civic protest after leading a movement to save a forest outside Moscow, has supported the Krasnodar environmental movement. Chirikova travelled to Krasnodar Krai from Moscow at least twice and personally took part in two acts of protest in the territory — one in Tuapse on 30 October 2011 and another in Krasnodar on 14 May 2012. On both occasions she was detained. She wrote about these events and the plight of the environmental activists in Krasnodar on her popular Zhivoi Zhurnal (Chirikova, 2012a, 2012b).

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38 The respondent was referring to volunteer clean ups of parks and the coast that in her view ‘tried to paint it as some big environmental initiative’.
The face of the anti-Putin opposition, popular anti-corruption blogger, Aleksei Navalny, has also supported individual members of the environmental movement in Krasnodar, helping draw attention to its struggles, of which corruption is a large component. Navalny, a lawyer by profession who ran for Moscow mayor and lost in September 2013, has used his highly popular blog and Twitter account (which as of September 2013 has over 400,000 followers) to engage with and discuss the movement’s obstacles in Krasnodar (Navalny, 2012a). He also developed and released what was supposed to be a cutting-edge crowd-sourcing project called the “Good Machine of Truth” with an app, using Krasnodar Krai and environmental activist Suren Gazaryan as an example (Navalny, 2012b), but it never expanded as was intended (Judah, 2012). Navalny’s support however still boosted the environmental movement’s profile significantly, helping direct popular frustration of people with the government to targets now identified by him through such coordination. Navalny’s support also underlined the important overlaps between the environmental movement and the anti-Putin movement across Russia. Krasnodar environmental activists would occasionally travel to Moscow to attend anti-Kremlin rallies, while anti-Putin activists from other Russian regions would visit the Krasnodar activists, highlighting the link between the mobilisation of the greater Russian anti-governmental movement in 2011-2012 with the Krasnodar movement’s mobilisation at essentially the same time.

The Krasnodar environmental movement also had international organisations as allies. In March 2012, Greenpeace launched a petition in support of Krasnodar environmental activists who were facing criminal charges and collected more than 20,000 signatures (Greenpeace, 2012).

Thus, although it can be said that the environmental movement has few to no allies in the regional government, it has other allies outside of it who, though mainly Russian opposition and “outsider” political groups, facilitated expanded support for the movement using the resources that they possess (Gamson, 1990). However, it was the Russian
opposition actors that had the most profound impact on the environmental movement through linking up their own struggle for democracy and rule of law with that of the environmental movement. As concessions to reform-minded challengers outside the power vertical is highly unlikely, oppositional allies across Russia had a huge impact on the movement in terms of increased publicity and contributing heightened feelings of positivity. This factor is all the more significant because these common struggles were linked up at a time when the Moscow opposition was experiencing mass mobilisation from 2011 to 2012 (see Chapter 4). It was a time of increased exchanges and visits among each other, facilitated by the common social networks that will be discussed in Chapter 4.

3.4.2 Influential Allies of the Kabardino-Balkaria Balkar Movement

Given the Balkar movement’s opposition to the republican government and in particular its members’ direct calls to dismiss President Arsen Kanokov (Zabolotskikh, 2011), and considering the fact that power relations in the republic (described in the section on divided elite in Kabardino-Balkaria) are characterised by clientelism that rewards loyalty to the ruling circles and disenfranchises and excludes outsiders, it is highly improbable that the Balkar movement will have any influential allies within the government. The membership of certain ethnic Balkars within the government should be seen as the result of a process of co-optation rather than actually fulfilling a quota for Balkars for real representation, as the Balkars in government do not have political independence. In fact, any expression of sympathies towards the movement would be seen as a threat. Respondent RB 300513 stated:

‘If he [the Balkar in government] starts to help, he won’t be working there anymore. Why? Because Balkars do not choose them. We want to vote in our own people ourselves’.

39 I witnessed these “exchanges” — at times, individual environmental activists would travel to Moscow to attend rallies there. Other times, activists from Siberia and central Russia came to Krasnodar to attend rallies and “camps” there, in order to exchange knowledge and experience amongst one another.
Former President Arsen Kanokov for example only met with Balkar representatives a full three years after taking office (Fuller and Taukenova, 2008), demonstrating their high degree of marginalisation.

Osa (2000, p.5) states: ‘Because the political systems of authoritarian regimes are closed, challengers may seek influential allies by turning to transnational movements or foreign governments’. It is for similar reasons that the Balkar circles oriented themselves towards Istanbul and Pan-Turkism in the early 1990s. This rhetoric has since been softened, as being seen as influenced by “foreign” elements in contemporary Russia is a code word for treason and an easy pretext for suppression. The Balkar ethnic group remains a member of the Assembly of Turkic Peoples, an international organisation with limited influence, engaged mainly in cultural exchanges between countries with Turkic-speaking populations. However, even some of these links have been exploited by ethnic Kabardians. Respondent RB 300513 details:

‘I want to add that there is a Turkic institute in Kazakhstan… For 15 years, our Ministry of Education was getting an invitation from there to send 20 Balkars there to study for free. We only found out that this was happening in 2007. They never showed us this invitation! And instead they sent four Kabardians there… There is a Turkish referendum in Turkey to invite Balkars to Baku. They send Kabardians there: the chairman of a radio station and the editor of Kabardino-Balkarskaia Pravda. Kabardians go there. Do you understand me?’

The Balkar movement has ethnic brethren in the Karachais in Karachaevo-Cherkessia that could have been potential allies. However, because of Kabardian fears of a potential secession of Balkaria to create a separate Karachevo-Balkar republic (Ashinov and Fuller, 2009), as unfounded as those fears might currently be, Karachais appear to be reluctant to make any supportive overtures to the Balkar movement for fear of sowing unrest in their own republic, which they share with the Cherkess.
The Balkar movement has some very limited, nominal support in other repressed nations exiled during World War II (e.g. Ingush, Chechen, Crimean Tatar). However, this support is limited only to memorials and days of remembrance, official statements about the shared trauma experienced by these people during the Stalinist repressions, and discussions about ongoing issues of “rehabilitation” through conferences where these topics are discussed. The more contentious aspect of the Balkar movement’s agenda, in other words actually holding the republican government to account for its contemporary social and economic problems — partly a consequence of this exile — is never commented on by these other groups, perhaps not to politicise the remembrance or be seen as meddling in Kabardino-Balkaria’s affairs. These days of remembrance and official statements remain instead a safe and unthreatening way to provide some mutually reinforcing legitimisation of their historic grievances.

The Yabloko Party, more specifically its Kabardino-Balkaria branch, supported the court case initiated by Balkar activists for compensation of moral harm caused during the course of exile in 1944 (Maratova, 2012). However, rather than regarding the party as an ally, it should instead be seen as “instrumentalised” by the Balkar ethnic group (Crisis Group, 2013, p.10), with its members consisting mainly of Balkar movement activists. It is for this reason that the party’s programme in the republic is organised around social and economic issues. They include developing mountain villages and handling appeals of those whose property was destroyed during the Stalin repressions — precisely the issues of the Balkar movement. Such an alliance might inspire and encourage movement members, especially through times of abeyance. However, the potential of the party to influence politics in the republic and the region as a whole is limited. As Yabloko party member Victor Kogan-Yasny, advisor to Grigorii Yavlinsky, stated: ‘As to the North Caucasus: first, the region is complicated; it is hard to navigate in such diversity; secondly, it is dangerous; thirdly, its population is rather

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40 There are for example days of remembrance for the Balkars in Ingushetia (see Mikhal’chenko, 2011)
small. So when the party’s resources are scarce and political circumstances constraining, the cost and benefit factor favours other regions’ (Crisis Group, 2013).

Thus, the Balkar movement has no significant allies either inside or outside the republican government, and though Yabloko is an ally to an extent, its limited capacity in the republic hardly renders it “influential”. Thus, it could be said that the Balkar movement has no influential allies that could strengthen their legitimacy or bargaining power. Instead, the lack of allies makes the movement more vulnerable, limits its networks and resources, and makes it less likely to carry out any long-term protest campaign. Respondent IS 020613 said:

‘We don’t get anything from anyone, no one helps us. People give what they can for our newspaper that we publish once a month — we do it ourselves. The CEBN does not have any financing. Even our offices. This is my personal office. I pay for the communal services and so on, even though we, as a civic organisation should be getting that [for free]… There is no material help at all. They scare our Balkar businessmen — if they try to help us, then right away there will problems with their business. And these are the conditions unfortunately that we live in’.

3.4.3 Presence of Influential Allies for the Krasnodar Environmental Movement and Lack of Influential Allies for the Kabardino-Balkaria Balkar Movement

This section reviewed the presence and absence of influential allies in order to determine whether they affected their protest cycles. In comparison, the environmental movement had more influential allies than the Balkar movement.

Influential allies played a role in the activities of the Krasnodar environmental movement by providing support, publicity, and in the case of Yabloko, an entry point into institutionalised politics. For the environmental movement, the presence of influential allies was of great benefit. Sergei Mitrokhin of the liberal Yabloko party, Evgenia Chirikova of the Moscow Khimki forest environmental movement, and Alexei Navalny, the anti-corruption blogger and opposition leader, all provided organisational expertise and resources, moral support, and publicity to the movement. As Schock (1999) points out, such allies “lower the power discrepancies between challengers and the state” (Schock 1999:361). On its own, the
movement would have been too weak and vulnerable to undertake action (Schock 1999). These allies provided their own organisations and networks that were harnessed by the environmental activists to move their claims forward. Interaction and alliances with anti-Putin movement activists gave the environmental movement hope that it had chance for success. This is especially so given that the anti-Kremlin/anti-Putin movement in its pro-democratic and pro-rule of law activities, if successful, would have changed the political scene so dramatically in favour of the environmental movement, that it was in a way, a shared battle. Furthermore, the movement’s change in strategy occurred around 2010 to move claims forward through more politically contentious challenges. Negotiation with the authorities was seen as something better done through Yabloko as a political party, and this served to open the door for the activists to more channels of contention, in particular contention that the party engaged in on the national level, helping reorient the movement’s sense of direction towards national politics.

The case for Kabardino-Balkaria is different – although the disunited elite could have provided a facilitated way into the polity, without any influential allies, this dimension of political opportunities is weakened for the Balkars. Ethnic Balkars in the republican government structures who might have helped push their claims forward have been coopted by the authorities and are hence regarded as sell-outs, seen as causing more harm to collective Balkar interests than good. Ethnic Cossacks in Kabardino-Balkaria who could have represented an allying force given the fact that their problem set as a marginalised ethnic group is similar to the Balkars’, do not. This is due to two main reasons: Firstly, Cossacks lack a clan system, which in Kabardino-Balkaria as elsewhere in the North Caucasus, is a major channel of mobilisation, and are thus weak as a political force in the republic; second, there is a tendency for Cossacks to leave the republic to ethnically Russian territories, for example nearby Stavropol Krai, as a reaction to their marginalisation instead of staying to take up activism. These factors diminish the Balkar movement’s bargaining power as there is
no one who could act to amplify their claims or offer support that politicians and leaders like Sergei Mitrokhin, Aleksei Navalny and Evgenia Chirikova⁴¹ or their respective networks and organisations have done for the Krasnodar environmental movement. This keeps the cost of action for Balkar activists high. The lack of influential allies has left the Balkar movement constrained in its ability to coordinate and carry out a long-term, sustainable campaign to advocate its interests. Instead it remains vulnerable, and is seemingly able only to react to attempts to shut down its main organisation. Furthermore, given the lack of media exposure, both alternative and otherwise, the lack of influential allies has isolated the movement.

⁴¹ Leader of the Moscow-based environmental movement to save the Khimki Forest.
4 MOBILISING STRUCTURES

If the broader set of political opportunities discussed in the previous chapter determines the prospects for mobilisation, then their effect is mediated by the types of mobilising structures. This chapter provides an analysis of the mobilising structures of the environmental movement in Krasnodar Krai and the Balkar movement in Kabardino-Balkaria. I will identify the possibilities and constraints involved in their networks of contention as well as evaluate their social relations’ capacity for innovation in repertoires of action.

Mobilising structures are ‘sites for transmitting movement ideas, coordinating activities, and … drawing participants into the movement’ (Kuumba, 2001, p.75). They make mobilisation possible by consolidating people in the field through a structure of interaction that mediates between participants and movement goals (Kriesi, 1995; Rucht, 1995). They provide a foundation for organising by fostering and sustaining social-structural spaces for sharing information, building solidarity, and nurturing shared identities. Mobilising structures include 1) informal social networks that emerge as a mode of organisation for participants to pursue their objectives in contentious action and 2) the movement’s repertoires (Garrett, 2006; McCarthy, 1996).

Networks consist of interactions and personal relationships, and the greater their facilitative capacity to help actors overcome challenges in organising and sustaining protest, the more conducive they are for action. Networks in mobilising structures consist of three elements: flow of information, flow of influence, and joint action (Oliver and Myers, 2003). These elements in turn help shape how innovative repertoires are.

“Repertoires” in this work refer specifically to the concept of “repertoires of contention” — the set of protest tools that are available to a movement in a given context. Repertoires are adapted ‘…to the immediate circumstances and to the reactions of antagonists,

42 Social movement theory holds that mobilising structures also include organisations. However, my findings show that networks are much more significant, especially in a nondemocratic environment.
authorities, allies, observers, objects of their action and other people somehow involved in the struggle’ (Tilly, 1995, p.27). The innovations they produce increase the ways the general public can engage with movement issues. Repertoire flexibility, or the ability to innovate, is associated with more success in mobilisation (McAdam, 1983), and the diffusion of these innovations through the social movement’s network boosts the start of the movement’s protest cycle (McAdam, 1994, p.236). An analysis of the movements’ mobilising structures will allow insight into the way the two movement cases organise for collective action as well as how suited they are to sustaining mobilisation.

4.1 Networks and Mobilisation

In mobilising structures, networks become facilitators of movement information transmission and interaction, or in other words, diffusion. Diffusion, at its core, is the contact of individuals and groups and the communication among them that transmits a message, idea, or understanding. Diani (2003) emphasises the importance of network structures in mediating diffusion. In particular, the centralisation, or the formality of the network structure, and its segmentation is seen to shape how participants communicate. As part of that understanding, Diani (2003) identifies four main types of network structures: clique, polyccephalous, star, and segmented. Based on this typology, the environmental movement can be said to have a star-shaped network structure with a core group of activists that maintain both strong and weak ties with the rest of the network (see section 4.1.1.). The Balkar movement, with its small, tight social structure, can be said to have a clique network structure (see section 4.1.2.) — a structure of people with exclusively strong ties that ‘interact with each other more regularly and intensely than others in the same setting’ (Salkind, 2008). This has implications for the movements’ mobilisation chances because the type of network structure impacts the 1) flow of information, which both affects and is shaped by the 2) flow

43 These transmitted things are often referred to as “objects”.
of influence, both of which together impact 3) joint action. All three network elements connect back to mobilisation (Della Porta and Diani, 2003).

![Figure 7: Interaction of network elements in mobilising structures](image)

4.1.1 The Open, Loose, and ICT-Enhanced Krasnodar Environmental Movement

Network Structure

Flow of Information

Flows of information that involve one communication source that is directed towards a large number of people simultaneously, such as media, are called broadcast-type information flows (Myers and Oliver, 2003). In the 21st century, these broadcast sources should also include Internet Communication Technologies (ICTs). The environmental movement’s network, through its use of the Internet, is characterised by this broadcast-style structure. ICTs further represent a crucial way for the movement to bypass censorship and relay relevant information not covered by Russian mass media.

Perhaps the most important aspect of an ICT-enhanced flow of information is the reduced cost of organising (Bimber, 1998; Bonchek, 1997). The expanded access to relevant
movement information that ICTs provide increases the number of people that can be recruited. An example of this process is the respondents cited in Chapter 3 who joined environmental protests in Krasnodar after learning about them online. ICTs provide spaces that cheaply facilitate information sharing and participation (Jenkins, 2006). This decreases obstacles to mobilisation. The environmental movement actors used ICTs to speedily inform the public about relevant protest information such as arrests and meeting points. For example, in late spring 2012 on Twitter, activists posted tweets with hashtag #ShataiZabor (transliteration: rock/shake the fence) to collectively post updates on the criminal case and protest activities surrounding two activists that were happening at the time. Multiple users could update each other in real time using the same hashtag, facilitating low-cost organising. This demonstrates a shift away from more centralised structures of discussion and allowed the movement to widely disseminate information about the topic, giving a large number of people ‘who otherwise have no connection at all’ (Myers and Oliver, 2003, p.184) the opportunity to be united in their reaction to the news. Thus the environmental movement’s network is given the coherence it has even though many members do not know each other personally. In this way, the movement displays the abundance of weak ties which, together with strong ties exemplified by the closer relationships between certain activists, leads to stronger group-centred and pluralistic interaction (Bimber, 1998, p.156).

Concrete examples of the way ICTs have enhanced the facilitative capacity of information flows in the environmental movement’s network are the LiveJournals of certain environmental activists. These media have supplemented the information flow, providing a forum for nurturing interactivity for supporters and observers. For example, respondent SG 180413’s LiveJournal includes detailed information about elite dachas built illegally in nature

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44 These activists were accused of property damage in 2012 after a protest act meant to bring attention to a fence built illegally on a forest preserve surrounding Krasnodar Governor Tkachev’s elite mansion. Part of the fence was removed by the activists in order to survey and record damage on the other side, which included the felling of endangered species of pine trees and illegal construction. The activists were later convicted for damaging the fence, although during the trial the existence of the fence was denied by the authorities.
preserves in Krasnodar Krai, replete with maps, coordinates, and descriptions of construction activities. Through this popular web presence, the wider Russian population came to learn about what the movement was protesting against. These people in turn could share these stories and discuss them with their own networks. The spread of such technology across the movement has enabled what Poster (1995) calls ‘a system of multiple producers, distributors and consumers [that] use decentralized and newly accessible media technologies in everyday practises’ (Poster, 1995, p.5).

It is worth noting that ICTs have not replaced real, face-to-face interpersonal relations in the environmental movement. Rather they have complemented them with a new type of political and social commons, hence the sustainment of strong ties even as weak ties grow. None of the respondents spoke about the Internet or online interaction as the only means of communication or ties with the rest of the network. Those that were drawn to the movement through social networking often later developed close personal ties “in real life” to other activists. Respondent AM 110413, originally from the harbour town of Tuapse, describes the process from beginning to write on a Tuapse online forum about local environmental problems to getting involved in the larger movement in Krasnodar. This respondent was spurred to write when her aunt in Tuapse developed breathing difficulties and red patches on her skin after a controversial waste terminal was built in her city. She explained:

‘I started my own blog. I’m on Twitter, Facebook, and I began to talk about this issue. As a result, I found out about the Environmental Watch on the North Caucasus (EWNC) and that they help people in these situations together with Yabloko and with their publications and everything. And I got to know them. People also at the same time were reading my material and invited me to fight with my writings — with words, so to speak’.

In this way, ICTs helped integrate the environmental movement’s online and offline political contention in “glocalised” logic. Important decision- and relationship-building in the movement still remained predominant in face-to-face interaction, supplemented simply with electronic communications. Another activist interviewed in Caucasus Knot stated:
‘I came to Krasnodar Krai from St. Petersburg on 3 January, leaving my job. I read an article on the Internet at night, and I came in my own car to Utrish, and since then, I have been living at the picket’ (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2009a).

Thus, my empirical evidence supports theorising that ICTs can increase face-to-face interaction (see Kavanaugh et al., 2005). This lends importance to the idea that “online” action should not be seen as completely different from “real-world” action.

As ICTs can ‘accelerate and geographically extend the diffusion of social movement information and protest’ (Garrett, 2006, p.207), they can also magnify movement issues, accelerating the cycle of protest (Bimber, 1998). From my observation, the capacity for choice in online information consumption can be individualised to a great degree, with the ability to sign up for news digests and newsletters from the organisations and groups representing issues relevant to them. These issues can become extremely amplified as they fill their e-mail inbox. Thus, my findings are in line with Bennett’s (2008) conclusion that ICTs ‘allow activists to manage the information attendant to multiple issues, memberships, and identifications and to link rapidly to larger, personal-level action networks’ (2008, p.284). As ICTs allow the activists direct coordination and communication among themselves and other groups without the need for hierarchical consent, individuals’ capacity for participation is tremendously enhanced.45 Related endeavours can directly link up, ‘articulating around common objectives without compromising their autonomy or specificity’ (Juris, 2000, p.347).

For example, the threat of the construction of a natural gas power plant in a small community south of Sochi, over 250km from the city of Krasnodar, resulted in a spontaneous, local campaign (Genin, 2013; Antonova, 2012) that eventually linked up with the environmental movement actors. This would not have happened without the flexible patterns of communication, increased self-led networking, and the facilitation of horizontal tie building across diverse groups that ICTs allow.

45 The Internet should be seen as a tool for people already predisposed, so to speak, to activism. The Internet should not be seen as a mass-recruiter. Rather it is a tool that facilitates organising within activist networks as well as facilitating those networks’ growth.
Flow of influence

The environmental movement’s open flow of information discussed previously is reinforced by a broader structure of interaction that is loose, diffuse, and with a fairly flattened hierarchy (Giddens, 1997, p.269). This arrangement has created a broad space in which a diverse group of individuals converges around a few core issues while preserving their autonomy. As a loose network, the environmental movement makes its decisions both at the central and nodal level. Though the centre has more influence, as a whole social relations characterised by an ICT-infused network are ‘decentralised, diverse, heterogeneous, fluid, open, informal, and in many ways, self-governing’ (Carty, 2010, p.159), which accommodates varying individual and group initiatives to a large extent.

The environmental movement has a core organisation with formal membership — the Environmental Watch of the North Caucasus (EWNC) — around which much of the movement’s activities centre. The organisation is based in the city of Krasnodar. Membership for the organisation is two-tiered: “allies” can join freely while “board members” must go through an indeterminate period of time as an “ally” before becoming a board member. I was told this structure was adopted to prevent infiltration by government agents into decision-making levels, something that had apparently happened in the past. Within the board, structures for coordinating action are minimal. Respondent AF 090413 described membership in this way:

‘Membership is open. If a person wants to, they join the organisation… Donations are voluntary. We don’t have membership fees. If a person wants to donate… it is a totally horizontal structure’.

The EWNC does not purport to be the sole representative of the movement, and not all environmental movement activists are members of the organisation. Rather the broader movement tends towards loose and adaptable coordination that closely interacts with formal EWNC members. The advantage of this loose structure is that it can integrate individuals’ numerous and diverse ideas and initiatives. This has resulted in an attitude of self-
management, with participants — both EWNC members and non-members — often coming up with their own ideas for action and executing them, without the need for consent.

This loose structure has made it easier for the movement to mobilise in part because it has been difficult for the authorities to attack and dismantle through repression. For example, as the movement does not only consist of the EWNC, which as a formal organisation can be more easily dissolved, the larger movement can live on through the diffuse structure of interaction between activists. An example of this concept in practise on the micro level is that when groups of activists were being targeted by the authorities during protests, especially in 2012, there were always other individuals to take up where they left off, sometimes literally picking up a placard of a solo picketer who had been detained and standing in their place. This structure of loose and interchangeable positions makes the movement’s persistence possible through periods of abeyance, and it helps it survive in environments where it would more likely fail if it were reliant upon a hierarchical and rigid structure.

Another feature of the influence flow of the environmental movement is its wheel, or a star structure, sometimes known as a “core-periphery” arrangement (Diani, 2003). The centre of the network consists of core activists, including EWNC members, and the spokes connect them to activists on the periphery. In this arrangement, core activists become ‘relayers and exchangers, generating concrete practices involving the reception, interpretation, and relaying of information out to the diverse nodes within and among alternative movement networks’ (Juris, 2004, p.351). Influence goes in both directions — it can also be directed from the nodes to the core. Due to the greater geographical spread of movement actors with this structure, nodes of individual activists can detect small-scale plans that impact the environment from their locations and relay them back to the centre. For example, respondent YN 080413 learned of the impending destruction of a children’s park in a residential area of Krasnodar in order to make way for a gubernatorial residence in May 2012, an issue that was eventually taken up by the EWNC. This would have been much more difficult for the
movement to bring to light so quickly had that activist not been living in the particular
eighbourhood that was to be affected. Thus, violations can be reported back to the movement
core at the centre of the “wheel” that can then relay out to the larger network about what has
happened and possibly coordinate action.

Another benefit of this structure of influence is that it gives the movement increased
access to the space outside its network where resources and ideas are found. In this structure,
the higher number of activists on the periphery places them in a position to receive these
resources and ideas and draw them into the movement. The presence of these peripheral
positions is consistent with the fact that many movement actors were members of other
organisations. This has implications for mobilisation because membership in more than one
organisation is seen to increase involvement of people in collective action overall (McAdam
and Paulsen, 1993, p.2). Individual environmental activists having membership in the liberal
Yabloko Party, the opposition Solidarity Party, or animal rights and election transparency
groups had more involvement in contention overall.

Not all environmental activists were participants in these other groups, leading to
some degree of one-sided interaction — they choose whom to participate with. However,
directed action was still increased because these linkages and bridges among the networks
became a diffuse, all-channel space for sharing resources, information, and discussion. It is
interesting to note that these alternative streams of contention never emerged as competing
with environmental activism. They did not siphon away activists to other targets and protest
issues, rather they seemed to increase activism in general. Those other individuals, who
themselves were embedded in their respective networks, became a bridge between respective
networks. Thus, weak ties connect not only trivial acquaintances but also bridge groups of
people who represent closer ties with one another (Granovetter, 1983, p.202), thereby rapidly
increasing the number of people in the network (Friedkin, 1982). More complex networks
tend to result in more protest action. The environmental movement’s more diffuse sense of belonging allowed for this complexity, facilitating sustained contention.

In this way, movement activists while remaining in close ties with people in their individual circles in Krasnodar Krai connected with local groups. The horizontal structure of action made it easier to link up to other groups outside the region, highlighting the benefit of allies (Chapter 3).

This influence, characterised by a high flow of information, has been a tool for mobilising structures by increasing communication and coordination among a diverse group of movement participants, including cross-network coordination. The increased capacity for participation associated with this structure facilitated mobilisation.

**Joint Action**

Joint action is seen as a process that occurs through network ties; it is the construction of collective action as mediated by the flows of information and influence. For mobilising structures to accommodate a cycle of protest, a certain level of communication and coordination is necessary (Schock, 2005). Based on the protest event data, we can see that there was a clear protest wave or cycle in 2010-2012.
This trend is the distinction between individual protest acts and concerted “joint action”, or in other words, a protest cycle. The idea is that joint action is a kind of extreme flow of influence (Oliver and Myers, 2003, p.4). Although this research looks into the interacting impact that political opportunities and framing also have on mobilisation, the cycle as a rhythm is considered. More specifically, in order for actors to manage more than just a protest spike, and to organise over a sustained period, the flow of both information and influence conducive to organisation must diffuse through the network.

In sum, my analysis shows that the open and free flows of information (broadcast flow) promoted by ICTs and the horizontal flows of influence in a star-structured network within the environmental movement reinforce its ability to construct joint action quickly and cheaply. This ability for coordination strengthens prospects for sustained mobilisation. This evidence supports the theory that a network structure that accommodates the movement’s different individuals and groups without undermining their autonomy is often the most effective structure for mobilisation (Tarrow 2003, p.136).
4.1.2 The Closed and Hierarchical Structure of the Balkar Movement Network

Flow of Information

In the Balkar movement, messages and information are carried by chains of personal and direct contacts. This type of information flow is called node-to-node (or a who-to-whom network matrix). Node-to-node communication implies close social relations that are stronger than more anonymous ICT- or mass media-based connections. This type of communicating supplies the added advantage of high trust between individuals that know each other personally, which proves especially important in a repressive environment such as that in Kabardino-Balkaria described in the previous chapter. Node-to-node communication is also a way to bypass media censorship, but unlike ICTs, the information dissemination is limited to personal contacts. These contacts directly provide and share facts about actions and protests to each other and allow one other to know about information not carried in the media. When asked about how information gets out to supporters about a protest, respondent RB 300513 said:

‘We did that ourselves by telephone. We don’t announce anything publicly — no press, no nothing. You know how police can obstruct your way to a protest — the traffic police did that. They tried to block us. They came and drove us away’.

A node-to-node structure of communication, in contrast to a broadcast flow, implies more control over the direction of the message. This limits access to information about internal debates and discussions to personal contacts already embedded in the movement.

Dependence on direct information keeps the transfer of messages about the movement limited to a smaller network, and the lowered cost of action associated with the speed of the Internet and its facilitative quality tying diverse people together is not present. Direct communication among individuals is further slowed by the hierarchical consent involved in the more rigid social structures of the Kabardino-Balkaria context. Thus the combination of lack of ICT use in the Balkar movement together with the hierarchies has also inhibited the
information flows necessary for self-led networking and self-led interaction. Because of this, sustained coordination around concrete campaigns has proved difficult for the Balkars.

Flow of Influence

The flow of information in the Balkar movement contributes to a structure of influence and hierarchies that is narrow and closed. The space where Balkar movement activists converge is confined, and the network is more tightly knit than in the environmental movement. Decisions are made at the core level, based presumably on consensus, which has the effect of constraining individual initiatives by requiring consensual support. As a result, there is less diversity and divergence of opinions acted upon as a collective. Of course, differences in opinion exist on the individual level. One respondent told me he was for the separation of Balkaria from Kabardino-Balkaria, while another said he was strictly for ‘the observance of Russian laws’, which at its core contradicts the first respondent’s views. Indeed, as the Balkar movement seems less capable of accommodating divergent views and interests, its actions empirically gravitate towards uniformity in content and goals. Self-led initiatives are decreased. The public departure of several key activists from the movement in 2009 after differences in opinion about tactics became insurmountable, which implies a lack of ability to integrate individual action resulting in a static and rigid core structure of political representation. In this scenario, struggles over different political projects can more easily lead to exit rather than pluralist accommodation, as was evidenced by the withdrawal of the activists in 2009.

The organisation around which the movement orients itself is the Council of Elders of the Balkar Nation (CEBN), based in the capital, Nalchik. Unlike the EWNC, the CEBN seems to present itself as the primary if not sole arbiter and institution representing the opposition and the political interests of the Balkar people in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. Membership is informal but extremely restricted, evidenced by the selection of members on
the basis of personal vetting and reputation. In this context, female members are an extreme minority and, as the organisation’s name implies, there are no young members. In Kabardino-Balkaria, social norms where male elders dominate and community accord is given importance prevail. Respondent IS 020613, a former lawyer, said about his recruitment:

‘They invited me there, and I didn’t even think I would; I had retired. And they came to me and said, “You are a respected person, people know you”, etc. They said we have to save the nation. And I couldn’t say no. Because with us, if the elders ask, then you have to do it. So I agreed’.

The CEBN coordinates nearly all of the movement’s activities. Non-member supporters and some-time participants play practically no role in decision-making, and there is no evidence of them taking up their own initiatives, with the exception of the 2010 hunger strike, to be explained later in this chapter. When disputes and public discussions occur around Balkar issues in Balkar areas outside Nalchik, members of the CEBN have been known to travel to support and help mediate, as they present themselves as representing a wider ethnic community of individuals not necessarily active in the movement.

Since the CEBN is so central to the movement, and because of the relatively low activity and independence of nodes outside it, the organization is more easily attacked and repressed and is more susceptible to co-optation. For example, the banning of the CEBN in 2007 and again in 2010 by the authorities represented an immense threat to the movement as a whole, in a way that banning the EWNC would never be for the environmental movement. A more networked structure with less hierarchy would mitigate this structural vulnerability.

The tight-knit characteristic of the network is enhanced by its closed influence flow, giving it its clique-like structure (Diani, 2003). Key nodes are positioned in relation to one another, involving less interaction with the outside and more interaction within the network. This situation results in a more inward looking, isolated structure, but with extremely dense ties to one another. Establishing and maintaining such close ties requires more time and energy, and as a result, processes of influence within the network are constrained to a smaller
number of individuals. What emerges is a more narrow community with stronger affinities. With the exception of the more recent association of some members with the Yabloko Party, multiple memberships in other organisations for this network are low to non-existent, a fact reinforced by the lower level of civil society in the republic as a whole. The benefit of this structure of close ties provides more trust and safety. However, this comes with the cost of curtailed ties to the outside, lessened permeability of the network, and limited exposure to outside information and ideas. Still, strong ties can help make individual members feel safer together, especially in a coercive environment. In a similar vein, Granovetter (1983) cites a work on employment (Ericksen and Yancey, 1977, p.23), pointing out that ‘Strong networks seem to be linked both to economic insecurity and a lack of social services’. It makes sense that repression and a coercive environment would draw people closer for protection. However this serves to underline the high cost of action for the movement exemplified by the lack of political opportunities.

The network’s isolation has become a disadvantage for the Balkar movement that has closed off its actors from innovations existing outside its network. Granovetter (1983, p.202) remarks: ‘it follows, then, that individuals with few weak ties will be deprived of information from distant parts of the social system and will be confined to the provincial news and views of their close friends’. It has also increased the homogeneity and redundancy of information and put them in a position deprived of the ability to share ideas more widely (Carpenter et al., 1998, p.419). The capacity for joint action is consequently lowered.

Furthermore, Balkar activists and their supporters do not only maintain a connection with each other through the dominant CEBN, but also through participation in various social and cultural activities in the wider Balkar community, in particular through commemorative events for the Balkar deportation in 1944. In doing this, they create a specific cultural milieu that supplies them with an oppositional political orientation, even in the absence of protest. This is because the historical issue of the Balkar nation’s exile and the movement’s politically
contentious issue of land use around which the Balkar movement is organised are linked. Since the issue of remembrance of exile is a symbolic event that presents a subtle challenge to authorities, it emerges as a competing channel to air Balkar grievances, lowering actual collective political contention.

**Joint Action**

The construction of joint action for the Balkar movement resembles protest spikes or rhythms, rather than a sustained wave or cycle.

![Protest event data for the Balkar movement](https://example.com/figure11.png)

*Figure 11: Protest event data for the Balkar movement, based on data from Kavkazskii Uzel, 2005-2013. Graph by Karena Avedissian.*

The flows of information and influence underline the lack of capacity to coordinate enough joint action around a shared agenda to create a protest cycle. The authorities’ passing of the land reforms in 2005 and their attempts to ban the CEBN in late 2007 and 2010 resulted in small spikes in activity as a reaction, but these spikes failed to initiate a sustained cycle of protest. As flows of information and influence are both slow and limited to personal contacts, the cost of organising remains high and diffusion of ideas and resources is limited. The benefits that could have been extracted from the network’s more intimate flow of influence,
much suited to the repressive social and political context of Kabardino-Balkaria, have been diminished by that high cost of organising.

4.1.3 A Comparative Analysis of the Network Structures

The comparison of the networks of the environmental and Balkar movements reveals that open information flows and diffuse flows of influence facilitate joint action, which then can form a protest cycle. The reasons for this are the ICT-influenced broadcast flow which made information widely available to the environmental movement’s audience. It increased and encouraged individual participation, and promoted the flourishing of diverse ideas providing the network with the necessary space to coalesce. In contrast, the Balkar movement’s constrained information flows limited individual participation and weakened the benefits that the safety of a closed social network gives.

The environmental movement’s broadcast-style information flows — free, open, and accessible — significantly lowered the organisational costs associated with mobilising by reducing the burden of action carried by any one individual. A much wider audience was reached and information about coordination of action could also be disseminated quickly. The actors in the environmental movement were able to expand their influence beyond themselves and make more alliances. This type of information flow reduces costs and leads to an upsurge in participation (Leizerov, 2000). Communication enabled by their horizontal social structures and patterns of influence formed the hearts of their campaigns. Starting from the campaign to save the natural preserve of Utrish in 2008-2009, these activists gradually started to ensure wider communication through blogging more extensively about their activities on the Internet and communicating their actions to a wider circle of people. The Balkar movement’s person-to-person information flow, although entailing the advantage of heightened trust between actors, did not provide any lowered cost of organising because of the slow pace of relay and
limited scope of information dissemination. Campaigns remained constrained and to some extent exclusive with the way protests were publicised, keeping the cost of action high.

The environmental movement’s influence flow with its loose, star-shaped structure gives considerable autonomy and agency to individual actors. The network is broad and includes a diverse group of people with varying strength of ties to one another. Weaker ties are less demanding on the individual and can broaden the network, but diverse network affiliations reinforce each other.

The diffuse and weak ties, permeable periphery that allowed in information and resources, and the presence of multiple memberships enabled the bridging with other groups, or “network intersections”. The open space for interaction helped establish mobilising identities among activists in allied groups discussed in the previous section on political opportunities. Through articulating common themes in their activisms, common oppositional dispositions were reinforced. This reveals the importance of culture in the network: elements of norms and values were established and influenced one another. Spau (2013, p.184) states: ‘Social networks are the place in which the symbolic production is developed and where social relations are connected to mobilisation’. The activists imagined the power of change constructed through the extensive network of alternative institutions of camps, online forums, and visits. These become new channels of communication among different groups where common goals can be extended. This space is where more inclusive framing and ideologies were formulated (see Chapter 5).

Yet the Balkar movement’s influence flows, dominated by an organisation with low to non-existent independent activity in nodes outside it, is characterised by a “clique” structure and has a much less diverse membership. Strang and Soule (1998, p.273) note that: ‘The argument is that strongly related partners share many ties to third parties and so have little new to report to each other, while the social circles of weakly ties actors overlap less’. Inward-looking tendencies result in less opportunity to draw in ideas and resources from the
outside and to some degree the inability to accommodate internal differences of opinion regarding contention. Furthermore, the participation of Balkar activists and supporters in non-contentious and politically “Balkar” events leads to alternative engagement that takes away from contentious demands.

The identified difference in the flow of information and influence between the two movements produces different types of joint action. The diverse groups of individuals in the environmental movement connected by ICTs enable activists to better coordinate their activities. This increases the intensity and scope of action and allows for the development of broader solidarities that can tackle movement issues on a more expanded front. This arrangement is more difficult to attack with repression because where one group or individual is suppressed another can emerge, as there is no single head to the hydra — something that happened during the movement’s protest cycle in 2010-2012. In contrast, the dismantling of the CEBN could neutralise the entire movement.

The Balkar movement maintains a structure where leaders have control over discretion and disposal of resources. The strong personal ties of the movement actors buttressed by kinship ties are more enduring and less ephemeral when compared to technology-enabled social movements. Kinship networks of course provide recruitment opportunities as sort of ready pools of adherents. These pre-existing bonds and community institutions ‘nurture traditions of opposition to dominant ideologies’ (Polletta, 1999, p.8). The problem lies in the limited reach of that recruitment as well as the undiminished cost of organising for the Balkars. A result of limited information flows and narrow influence structures can lead to what Polletta contrasts to full mobilisation — “unobtrusive resistance”. This contradicts the supposition that in higher-risk polities such as Kabardino-Balkaria, togetherness will facilitate mobilisation by raising the cost of demobilisation or by offering decreased illicit association (see Chapter 2). Rather the situation has been more what Granovetter (1983, p.202) explains as efficient recruitment among the immediate clique, but lacking the momentum to spread
beyond it. Strong personal bonds simply limit the number of ties there can be, and this has been an obstacle to Balkars in reaching beyond their normal boundaries. This point is in line with the converse “weakness of strong ties” postulate (e.g. Flache and Macy, 1997). It provides evidence that ‘strong ties may have an active role in weakening the spreading of information by constraining the dynamical process in clumps of strongly connected social groups’ (Karsai et al., 2014).

In this way, the thesis’s findings show that the Balkar movement’s strongly integrated network with its close communication, solidarity, and commonality of interests did not facilitate mobilisation, as Polletta (1999, p.11) posits they do. Though she accepts that ‘the concentration of ties in indigenous institutions may make it difficult to mobilise beyond the bounds of the locality’ (Polletta, 1999, p.11), she attributes that difficulty to the fact that those groups cannot identify the political structural shifts very well because of their isolation. Although this specific fact may be true for the Balkar movement, the Balkars’ establishment and subsequent ethnicisation of the Yabloko Party suggests some degree of ability to recognise the political opportunity that was opened up by the Moscow anti-Putin opposition, hence their trying to align themselves with the party in an attempt to push forward their claims through an organisation with established expertise and resources. From the results of this study, however, it seems more likely that the Balkar movement’s closed media, lack of allies, and limited recruitment ultimately constrained the network and its unoriginal repertoires. Exclusive framing confined their ability to take advantage of any political opportunities and speak to wider audiences.

In a repressive environment like Kabardino-Balkaria, without the help of ICTs to spread information, the energy and commitment necessary for mobilisation would need to be supplemented by stronger, more diverse networks. If Balkars were to seek to mobilise broader swathes of the population in terms of both numbers and diversity of participants, without an equivalent growth of ties and networks, they would have to rely on mass communication,
which would lower the cost of interaction. But neither is present in this case. In contrast, the Krasnodar environmental activists can better go it alone as individuals, especially as its core group engages with ICTs and communication.

4.2 Repertoires

The social patterns consolidated by the networks discussed in the previous section are also evidenced through the culturally available set of tactics that characterise the form that protest takes. The network-reinforced norms and practices help fashion these “repertoires of collective action”. Repertoires are ‘how opposition is performed’ (Eyerman, 2006, p.193) or ‘claim-making routines’ (Tilly, 2006, p.46). Repertoires are seen as learned cultural artefacts; they make sense in their particular milieu, both by the challengers and the challenged (Tarrow, 1997).

Repertoires generally change very slowly in the long term (Tarrow, 2011, p.31). They evolve through interaction both internally among movement actors and between movement actors and the challenged (Oliver and Myers, 2003, p.1). McAdam (1983) identified shifts in repertoire as marking the beginning of protest cycles because the heightened interaction and struggle that characterise a protest cycle is seen to lead to new forms of contention which in turn spark more creative changes in routines. Tarrow (1995) calls this the ‘moment of madness’, when at the start of a protest cycle repertoire innovation happens rapidly.

Innovations in tactics however are more likely to occur within a shorter time span. Tactical innovations happen ‘within limits set by the repertoire already established for their place, time, and pair’ (Tilly, 2006, p.46). In this way, movement actors produce new tactics not by creating a totally new form of contention, but by improvising on an existing repertoire. They add ‘elements of play and carnival or ferocity and menace to [the repertoire’s] basic form’ (Tarrow, 2011, p.102). Movement actors ‘do not have to reinvent the wheel at each place and in each conflict. Rather they often find inspiration in the ideas and tactics espoused
and practised by other activists’ (McAdam and Rucht, 1993, p.58). Tactical innovation includes bringing in a de-contextualised tactic (Tilly, 2001); in other words, taking a tactic from another context with its certain resonances, environment, and significance and contextualising it in their own milieu. The presence of tactical innovation is a marker of a “flexible” repertoire. A flexible repertoire allows for the adoption of different tactics that are observed elsewhere and deemed to be effective. Flexible repertoires are important for mobilisation because within them, tactics can be diffused, adopted, and eventually become totally new repertoires (Tarrow, 1998, p.102). This theoretically creates the opportunity for protest waves simply because of the inspiration and motivation that new forms of contention bring (Tilly, 1978; Soule and Tarrow, 1991).

The Krasnodar Krai environmental movement demonstrates some tactical innovation, with more diversity in tactics than the Balkar movement, but it must be noted that both movements’ repertoires are limited when compared with the range of options theoretically and empirically available to them. What can be compared however is the extent to which each movement’s repertoire allows for tactical change (Tilly, 1979, p.126-155) based on the diversity of tactics present. It could be said the environmental movement displays some tactical flexibility, while the Balkar movement displays almost no tactical flexibility. Tactical flexibility signifies the greater capability of the repertoire for innovation. This difference will provide insight into how repertoires have impacted the likelihood of mobilisation and whether they reflect the network structures.

4.2.1 The Flexible Repertoire of the Krasnodar Environmental Movement

The literature on repertoires suggests that innovation and increasingly radical and disruptive acts cluster at the beginning of a cycle of protest (Kriesi et al., 1995). However, the environmental movement’s repertoires did not really change during their cycle of protest.

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46 By “radical and disruptive”, the literature usually refers to occupations, strikes, violence, and website hacking.
in 2010-2012. The forms that their collective action took — protests, pickets, petitions, public inspections and walks, legal action, and hunger strikes — were all practised before the start of their cycle of protest in 2010 and therefore cannot be considered new or innovative. What the environmentalists do display is tactical flexibility, coinciding with Tilly’s (1978) expectations that collective action is more likely to follow ways that are already familiar to people, rather than reinventing the wheel.

An example of this is the use of highly individualised, decorative signs during protest acts in addition to simple text signs. These use mixed media. The first photographic evidence of the environmental movement’s signs is from 2009, where some handmade signs using only text were used, but the signs used in the lead up to and during the 2010-2012 protest cycle were much more individualised. The Krasnodar environmental movement since late 2010 has made ample use of signs that utilise original visual representations through pictures, symbols, and sometimes household items to convey a message. That the movement’s signs are handmade and individualised underlines the DIY character of the movement, with some even made spontaneously during protests (see pictures below).

Tilly (1978) dismisses the possibility that placards and signs can be considered visual art, but his “repertoires of collective action” logic implies the presence of degrees of improvisation. Protest aesthetics such as signs work to form connections between people and can be called ‘artistic tools of resistance’ (Seifert, 2013, p.8).

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47 The signs pictured here were almost certainly made prior to, and in preparation for the protest.

Picture 2: Environmental activist in Krasnodar, 23 October 2010 [Sign reads: Save Utrish!] (Source: Dorokhina, 2010).

By holding and wearing protest signs activists transform the public space by building a visual impression of resistance during collective action. In the hands of protesters, they become communicative media. Compared with the Balkar protest signs (see the following section), they display a great degree of creativity, improvisation, and individuality. The increased personalisation of the signs through 2010-2012 can be considered a diffused tactical innovation of the standard street protest. These individualised signs are a reflection of both the artistic resources available to the movement (e.g. art supplies, someone with the ability to draw/paint) as well as an impression of the movement’s individualistic structure that does not involve a centralised and controlled process of sign-making.

Dramaturgical elements displaying and using emotion and humour have also been used as a tactical innovation of the environmental movement’s standard street protests. At a protest in Krasnodar in December 2011, a symbolic funeral was held for the state-protected Utrish natural preserve, located on the coast in the Anapa region of Krasnodar Krai, which was in danger of development at the time. A coffin with “Utrish” written on it was carried through the demonstration, accompanied by flower bearers, before police broke up the protest and detained the activists.

*Picture 4: The “Utrish coffin” in Krasnodar, 12 December 2010 (KPRF, 2010).*
At this same demonstration an activist also dressed in a raccoon costume to symbolise the fauna affected by environmental threats in Krasnodar Krai. Together with the feigned funeral, these elements of dramaturgy allow protesters to communicate with a broad audience using emotion. Humour at protests can enliven and confront serious topics with accessibility (Branagan, 2007, p.480). The significance of such emotional resonance in political messages is in their communicative strength. Ahmed (2004) noted: ‘Thus, just as “negative” emotions such as hate and disgust can reconfigure social and bodily space, so too can the use of humour’. These emotions can transcend activist boundaries and create common ground with audiences (Branagan, 2007, p.470).

This performativity can also serve to bolster emotional experiences for activists. These acts are seen to mitigate protest fatigue by bringing inspiration and sustainability through a ‘chaotic and joyful transgression of boundaries’ (Wettergren, 2009, p.12). Activists can more intensely feel and express their protest than they would through instrumental mobilisations, such as the more formal street march with placards (Eyerman, 2005; Wettergren, 2009).

*Picture 5: Activist dressed as raccoon during protest in Krasnodar, 12 December 2010 (Source: KPRF 2010).*
These experimental forms of collective action can help transform places from being dominated by organised politics and marches to places of merriment and alternatives (Brown and Pickerill, 2009, p.26). Humour in particular ‘establishes common ground and creates liminal atmospheres conducive to conversion’ (Branagan, 2007, p.11). It is highly inclusive, drawing in crowds and potential adherents, thereby grabbing media attention. It ‘communicates widely and exposes covert processes, shifting public opinion subtly but surely’ (Branagan, 2007, p.11). The dramaturgical tactical adaption however did not have the chance to diffuse in the environmental movement. Firstly, the necessity of a greater number of people to contribute to creating the accessories for such performances makes it harder to organise. Secondly, increased repression by the authorities on protests led activists to consequently exhibit a greater proclivity for solo pickets that were both easier to organise and less likely to be suppressed. This shift back to more simple protests is an example of the adaptability necessary for innovation. It demonstrates a level of repertoire flexibility that helped carry forward the protest cycle’s momentum through the increased repression described in Chapter 3. Furthermore, this repertoire adaptation was facilitated in great part by the network structure of the movement discussed in the previous section. New tactics must be communicated (flow of information) and should be available to members (flow of influence) in order to be adopted and put into use (joint action).

The environmental movement has also displayed tactical innovation through the inclusion of cultural protest in its repertoire. Examples are photo exhibits, concerts, and academic conferences, such as an event in October 2011 that included all three (Dorokhina, 2011). The first musical concert, organised by the movement in January of 2010, can be considered an innovation associated with the lead up to the cycle of protest of 2010-2012. However, the art exhibits and conferences as a tactic did not diffuse. The inclusion of cultural performances of protest provide the movement with an additional toolkit that serves to inculcate popular interest in the movement, giving audiences more opportunities to engage
and react to the message. This practise reveals not just the varied contacts of movement members with art, music, or academic milieus but their flexibility in trying to complement their protest activities with them.

For example, three environmental activists who happened to be musicians formed a local rock band together and used their lyrical content to highlight environmental issues. One of these musicians, Respondent LS 130413, described his intention to use his band’s performance as an opportunity to bring environmental issues to a wider audience:

‘We are planning the summer KSP [Klub samodeiatel’noi pesni, an annual concert for singer-songwriters]. People go to the forest with their guitars, and we’re going to have our own “eco-stage”’.

A significant tactical innovation of a repertoire that did in fact diffuse and become regular practise was the transformation of inspections of public land through walks and picnics into a political act of protest. Activist walks through forestland existed before the cycle of protest in 2010-2012 and were initially carried out by movement members who often had advanced science degrees. They intended to get into infrequently accessed forest areas to gather information on the state of the ecology and to assess the advancement of environmental
violations. However, the nature of these walks became increasingly political as the confrontation between the movement and the authorities escalated leading up to and through the protest cycle. With the increase of land capture and construction in protected land from 2009, these walks and inspections became more adversarial as the activists’ paths would more often be blocked by elite mansions belonging to high-ranking authorities and inevitably led to a rise of disputes between the activists and private security guards working at these residences. As part of this tactical innovation activists began publicising these walks, enticing more activists, and sometimes invited the public to join. This tactic was oriented to publicly challenge the legality of these various construction projects and bring attention to the issue of freedom of movement through state-protected natural preserves that by law should be accessible to the public as well as the environmental damage that they cause. These acts include a picnic held outside Governor Tkachev’s elite mansion in Dzhubga (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2011b), a walk down the beach near Gelendzhik to Patriarch Kirill’s mansion (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2011c), and an inspection of the beach and surroundings of President Putin’s mansion (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2012b).49

Tarrow (1993, p.286) posits that the use of such acts of collective action are not just instrumental means to achieve benefits, rather they represent the rights that protesters demand. These walks, inspections, and picnics were not just a way to draw attention to the region’s ecological environment. By walking along the coast and along paths through natural preserves, they were practising some of the movement’s goals — to keep these spaces open and accessible to the public, free of elite capture. Furthermore, as crackdowns on more traditional protests and pickets were increasing, it was likely that the activists were pushed into this form of action. Though the walks were not immune from crackdown, they were at least not overt

48 These are mansions along the coast of Krasnodar Krai widely known to belong to President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev, Patriarch Kirill, and Krasnodar Governor Alexander Tkachev.

49 I accompanied activists on one of these inspections of Putin’s mansion. The experience consisted of attempts to get as close to the construction as possible, while evading private security guards. Photo evidence was collected of the surroundings to document illegal activities such as felling, as the area was considered a protected zone.
political claim-making in an urban space, the way traditional protests are. This is a testament to the authorities’ ability to coerce challengers.

Thus, the embellishments of traditional forms of collective action that the environmental movement displays, such as protests, hunger strikes, and pickets, demonstrate diverse tactical variations which signal flexibility in repertoire. This is in part facilitated by the use of ICTs by the movement, which is known to expand the social movement repertoire of collective action (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001). ICTs have helped share resources and information, promote discourse, and create the space for considering new forms of political action. They even developed electronic petitions that the environmental movement utilised as an innovation of the traditional petition. The movement’s repertoire flexibility is also a result of the network’s structure of strong and weak ties which allows more individual initiatives. Thus, the network has more capacity to inspire a more diverse set of actions by individuals than the Balkar network’s capacity, discussed in the next section. The environmental movement’s network structure’s permeable boundaries also lead to more diverse interactions with other individuals.

There has been no real rise of repertoire innovation throughout the environmental movement’s existence, even through the cycle of protest in 2010-2012, although the presence of cultural and dramaturgical tactical innovations indicate the tactical flexibility of the movement’s repertoire. However, until these new tactics are adopted and the method is widely diffused, it is not considered an innovation in repertoire. What these tactical innovations do signal is an ability of the movement to adapt to changing structural conditions such as increasing repression as well as signal the capacity of the movement to innovate. Thus the empirical data point to a greater variance of repertoire and some tactical innovation for the environmental movement, demonstrating its capacity to be flexible.
4.2.2 The Rigid Repertoire of the Balkar Movement

As the Balkar movement’s number of protest events is small, and as the movement has not experienced a protest wave, tactical innovation and consequently repertoire innovation was expected to be limited. The forms of collective action that the Balkar movement take consist of legal action, pickets, protests, and hunger strikes, and they have existed throughout the existence of the movement. Thus the forms of protest remain uniform and repetitive, resulting in a rigid repertoire.

Legal action as a form of contention is significant for the movement because it is the most popular form of action that the Balkar movement takes. That legal recourse constitutes such a large part of the movement’s repertoire is not surprising, given the structural constraints of repression and security problems in the republic that discourage direct public action. Furthermore, given that the addressee of the majority of these legal actions is the High Court of the Russian Federation, they demonstrate the movement’s looking to the Kremlin as a potential ally against the Kabardian-dominated republican structures.

The Balkar movement’s public protests are also interesting to analyse in order to find what the visual content can tell us about the repertoire. In particular, the highly uniform textual signs used at Balkar protests, absent of individual or artistic elements, stand out in contrast to the environmental movement’s protest signs. These signs use principles that reflect their makers’ disposition and intentions. In particular, using undifferentiated blocks of text, they deemphasise the performative nature of the protest. While the text imparts messages of resistance and challenge, it does so utilising utilitarian legal and moral rhetoric. Much of the signage seen in the picture below refers to the Russian Federation and its laws, while others refer to principles of self-rule and equality for ethnic groups. One sign for example demands the enactment of Article 131 of the constitution which gives Balkars control over their historic land. Another makes reference to the Balkar elders holding a hunger strike (explained later in this section), stating simply: ‘Balkar Elders are living on a bench for 140 days!’
Picture 7: Balkar movement protest in Moscow, 12 December 2010 (same signs seen used in KBR) (Golos Balkarii, 2010).

Picture 8: Balkar protest in Nalchik, 17 October 2010 (Stavropol’skaia Pravda, 2010)

Picture 9: Balkar protest (ikd.ru, 2011)
Thus, the visual content of the Balkar protest represents a peaceful means of action meant to indicate their identity and reaffirm the movement’s beliefs. With the lack of ICTs that can introduce more varied visual expressions of oppositional messages, the visual forms of protest for the Balkars will also be narrow and limited.

An exception to the Balkar movement’s uniform repertoire is one highly confrontational protest event — a spontaneous and illicit road blockade that occurred on 15 September 2008 (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2008a). Rather than considering this an example of tactical innovation, it should be seen as a one-time event that was a reaction to a set of events as they unfolded. It occurred on the road at the entrance to the Balkar village of Kendelen, when Kabardians on horseback re-enacting the Battle of Kanzhal\(^{50}\) were blocked by village inhabitants, for whom the re-enactment felt like a threatening, if only symbolic, play for power.

*Picture 10: The blockade at Kendelen, 15 September 2008 (Ajanskafkas, 2008).*

\(^{50}\) Kabarda’s victory at Kanzhal in 1708 against Crimean Tatars reduced the Crimean Khanate’s influence in the region, and it is commemorated annually among Kabardian activists.
The conflict emerged from Balkar grievances against these Kabardians in particular, who were considered by the Balkars to be using historical pretext to lay claim to yet more Balkar land.\(^{51}\) The event is significant because the protest was addressed directly to the Kabardians on horseback rather than to the republic authorities or the federal centre in Moscow. Members of CEBN were there, and the protest had much more of a face-to-face dynamic with the potential to turn violent. No other such confrontational act of protest occurred with the Balkar movement. This is a ‘tactical question’ of instrumental calculations that faces every social movement (Jasper, 1997). Forms of action that could lead to violence are costly because of the inherent risk. It is therefore unlikely that this tactic would diffuse.

Perhaps the only tactic that can be considered an innovation demonstrated by the Balkar movement was the 2010 hunger strike, which was carried out to bring attention to the Balkars’ eroding land rights. It should be noted that the hunger strikers were comprised of the Balkar members who walked out of the CEBN in 2009 (discussed in Chapter 3). To carry out this strike, these activists travelled from Kabardino-Balkaria to Moscow. Firstly, the length of the hunger strike is noteworthy, as it lasted for at least four months. Second, the location of the protest is significant. Without the benefit of ICTs to bring their message to a larger audience, Balkar movement members at once brought their cause to a very public and visible arena — they camped out on a bench in Red Square (Kavkazskii Uzel, 2010a). That Moscow became the physical location of this protest is politically very significant. Sewell (2001) states: ‘Some scholars emphasize that spaces are not only contexts but also objects of contentious politics’. In this case the target of the protest — the Kremlin — was decisive in the selection of a protest location.

\(^{51}\) One of my Balkar activist contacts mentioned the event’s supposed inclusion of a “traditional” sword plunging into the ground as a symbolic way of claiming that land, adding: ‘You’re also a minority, you should understand this’.
What was also innovative about this hunger strike was the choice to wear traditional clothing — the light-coloured felt hats for summer and the woollen burka in winter. In Russian areas, let alone the capital, such clothing is extremely out of place. It was a carefully chosen display and performance of identity and meaning that provided a context for the political challenge that they presented. Local identity always becomes salient vis-à-vis the broader context, and with this statement these actors made ethnicity emerge in relation to the federal political structures.
As Tilly (1978) found with black protest in the United States, some forms of collective action are not only instrumental means of making political claims. In this way, this hunger strike represented the physical expression of the right to “be” Balkar, with all its attendant attributes, including the rights that they were protesting for.

The cultural innovation of the traditional hunger-strike tactic has not been adopted. It cannot be considered to represent a change in repertoire after having been carried out in Moscow only once. This is understandable given that any sustained contention outside the republic, especially Moscow, is a difficult and demanding undertaking, especially for a four-month long hunger strike. Furthermore, repeating such an act in Kabardino-Balkaria would not have the same effect given that the cultural attributes on display as clothing would not have the same resonance as Kabardians can lay claim. It however represents an important innovation within a repertoire that is otherwise extremely uniform and rigid.

4.2.3 A Comparative Analysis of Repertoires

Tactical innovation is dependent on the improvisation and innovation of participants, and is something demonstrably stronger in the environmental movement. When ‘familiar performances receive strong preference but some unfamiliar performances also occur in the form of innovations, we are dealing with a flexible repertoire’ (Tilly, 2010, p.51). Given the display of tactical innovations that were more effective at creatively adapting to new challenges, we can consider the environmental movement’s repertoire to be more flexible, but not innovative. It also revealed activists’ ability to ‘creatively dislocate and relocate an item for their context’ (Wood, 2004, p.74) in tactically innovating. Their repertoire was visible in the use of humour, dramaturgy, as well as cultural protest, which brought inspiration to constituents and helped mitigate protest fatigue for the activists. Furthermore, the

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52 Some of the protesters’ health deteriorated as a result of malnutrition and cold and they had to abandon the protest.
individuality expressed on the handmade signs at traditional protests gave the impression that joining a protest was not predicated on going through some centralised or hierarchical organisational system for authorisation or permission — anyone could join. This connects back to mobilising structures more generally, as the movement’s network structure is characterised by an open-access attitude towards the circulation of information and allows for creativity and experimentation exemplified in the use of personalised DIY signs, dramaturgy, and culture in protest. This tactical flexibility emerges from the space that the environmental movement’s network accommodates for divergent ideas and individual initiatives. It allows for innovation at the margins of existing repertoires (Tilly, 1995, p.28), making ‘creative modifications or extensions of familiar routines’ (McAdam et al., 2001, p.49). Though most innovations did not diffuse for the movement, their appearance through the protest cycle likely contributed to the momentum of the protest cycle of 2010-2012 simply by engaging with more activists. ICTs greatly facilitated information and influence flows in the movement’s network, not just for supporting traditional offline collective action, but for online action as well.53 ICTs also allowed for the establishment of a sparse ‘mesolevel’ network of individuals which further provides the means for new forms of action and enables more decentralised decision making (Davis and Zald, 2005, p.346). This has a positive correlation with mobilisation. As Chadwick (2007, p.284) notes, the Internet creates ‘an environment where rapid institutional adaptation and experimentation is almost routine’. This more flexible organising for the environmental movement indicates the ability of its actors to take novel ideas from beyond the movement’s boundaries and diffuse them throughout the network’s flexible communications that are tied through loose but coherent ties and embrace a wide variety of identities and ideas — something that helped shape the movement’s inclusive framing (see Chapter 5).

53 Online protest was also created through a “digitalised” repertoire of collective action (Van Laer and Van Aelst, 2010, p.3), though this was limited to online petitions.
In contrast, the Balkar movement’s repertoire is rigid. For the Balkars, ‘nothing but very familiar performances ever appear despite changing circumstances’ (Tilly, 2010, p.51). The Balkars’ isolated and closed network and consequent limited interaction with outsiders and the outside, where new ideas and objects are generally located, means that effectively, there is an obstacle to idea and resource exchange. However, even if new ideas and divergent strategies permeated the movement, it is unclear to what degree the tightknit and hierarchical structure of the Balkar network and its slow information transmission would be conducive to the diffusion of these objects. The lack of ICTs, the node-to-node information sharing, and hierarchical social structures keep interaction in the Balkar movement on a “micro-level”, keeping the speed and scope of any idea diffusion limited. For the Balkar movement, the one tactical innovation of the Balkar hunger strike in Moscow, which displayed very novel and deliberate cultural expressions, was an exception, possibly due to disagreements these individuals had had after quitting the rigid and hierarchical CEBN in 2009. This cultural innovation of a familiar repertoire did not diffuse for the reasons of cost discussed earlier. Furthermore, at home in Kabardino-Balkaria, more performative and overt political contention is more likely to be suppressed by the authorities simply because it is more attention grabbing. This connects back to the political opportunities discussed in Chapter 3, with the hunger strikes moving not only to Moscow but to Essentuki in Stavropol Krai. The Balkar movement’s limited repertoire of contention also characterises its low level of institutionalisation of relations with the authorities. More interaction with challengers could help breed protest by contributing to an intensification of conflict (Garrett, 2006, p.9), which in turn can spark new innovation.

Thus, because a more flexible repertoire can allow for the adoption and re-contextualisation of tactics that are found inspiring or effective, they can diffuse and lead to waves of protest. By being novel, they can spark interest, inspire, and overcome protest fatigue, and as such are more conducive for mobilisation. The environmental movement
combined and recombined cultural codes and circulated ideas and strategies freely. It is here that the environmental movement’s mobilisation structures become more facilitative to mobilisation. As Aunio (2012, p.110) said, ‘Creativity is central to mobilisation’. The Balkar movement’s network structures impede the adoption of new tactics through a limited and slow person-to-person information flow through a hierarchical social structure that encourages uniformity—reflected in the limited repertoire.

My findings point to the salience of the interaction of the structural environment’s role with culture. Political opportunities (see Chapter 3) constrain movement actors, while they, within their “free spaces” of mobilising structures, interact and share ideas and strategies in order to respond to that environment. For the Balkar movement, that environment, characterised by coercive state structures, violence, and lack of media, in turn constrict the social spaces in which activists can exist. Their network structures are narrow, and ties of high trust prevail as a safe haven from the state and their repertoires are consequently more limited. In contrast, the environmental movement’s allies and alternative media flows (mainly ICTs) create a safer and more open space with more diversity, allowing for freer and more individualised interaction among activists—also reflected in the more flexible repertoire. This research will next explore both movements’ framing processes in an effort to analyse actors’ interpretations of these structures.
5 FRAMES

Where political opportunities (Chapter 3) provide an assessment of the structural environment, and mobilising structures (Chapter 4) explain the collective vehicles for mobilisation, social movement frames account for movement participants’ understandings of the world, providing the ideational component of the political process theoretical framework. This section investigates collective action frames — the “action-oriented” cognitive structures that provide a representation of the world (Snow and Benford, 1988, p.198), which help give events the meaning necessary for collective action (Benford and Snow, 2000, p.614).

Collective action frames operate at the individual (micro) level, emerging as individual elaborations of collectively shared grievances and perceptions about direct collective action, thereby tying individual and collective identities (Benford and Snow, 2000). In helping construct collective awareness of the movement’s vision, they make mobilisation possible (Melucci, 1996). Collective action frames are comprised of three functions, together known as core framing tasks (Snow and Benford, 1988). These are 1) diagnostic framing (defines the problem and directs blame), 2) prognostic framing (proposes solutions to the problem and provides strategies on how to go about it), and 3) motivational framing (provides the logic for action and the rationale for motive — essentially agency framing), and together they are intended to move movement actors from understanding to action.

Collective action frames impact mobilisation in ways that depend on their variable features. Firstly, the more credible and salient the frame is in its particular context, the greater the chance it will help facilitate mobilisation. Second, the larger the range of problems a frame identifies (inclusivity), the more different groups will be implicated in it. This raises the chances for mobilisation as more individuals and groups are likely to get involved in the collective action meant to remedy that problem. This aspect however is seen to only have power insasmuch as those problems are coherently linked to one another (Benford and Snow, 2000). Third, the more a frame is adaptable, or the better it can be augmented and conformed
to include more problems without losing its meaning (flexibility), the stronger it is. In this way, the more flexible and inclusive the frame is, and the broader it is in scope and influence, the more resonant it will be and the more likely it is to become a master frame. Master frames emerge when collective action frames are so broad in scope that they act as a kind of “master algorithm” that shapes the activities of other movements and groups in the field (Benford and Snow, 2000, p.618-619), making mobilisation even more likely.

Master frames operate on the collective (macro) level emerging as the result of movement-level articulations of grievance. They are the understandings, ideology, and discourse shared not just within one movement, but across the social movement field54 (Benford and Snow, 2000). While collective action frames use terminology related to the specific movement problem at hand, master frames use less restrictive rhetoric (Snow and Benford, 1992, p.138). As with collective action frames, the more flexible and inclusive master frames are, the greater their resonance and the chances for mobilisation there are (Noonan, 1995; Benford and Snow, 2000, p.619). In this way master frames have a discursive dimension that focuses on the selection and shaping of ideas in the broader arena, rather than the processes of communication that are meant for eliciting action within a movement (van den Brink et al., 2005, p.100). Master frames are made resonant through a mechanism called “master frame alignment”. This entails a dynamic process by which social movement actors strategically shape the frame during a protest cycle in order to make it resonate more strongly within the movement’s social and historical context (Swart, 1995, p.465). The process, as Swart (1995) explains, links ‘the activities, goals, and ideology of a movement organization to those within the broader cultural and political context’ (Swart, 1995, p.466).

As this is a qualitative study, I rely on activists’ own formulations as well as on material produced by the movements for framing data, which I then interpret. Of course, the

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54 The “social movement field” in this work is considered the configuration of social movements with which the focus social movement might build ties. Adapted from Curtis and Zurcher’s work on social movement organisations (1973, p.53).
decision about what is included and what is not is subjective to a degree, as indicated in the methodology section (Chapter 2). However, as the participants are engaging in the ‘hierarchical cognitive structures that pattern the definition of a situation for individual social action’ (Johnston, 1995, p.237), they are essentially engaging in political signification. It is thus important to look to the participants’ vocabulary, the selection of factual data, and the parallels they draw in order to know what to extricate from the data to come to conclusions about the movements’ framing. Thus, the goal of this chapter is to draw these elements out from both the material produced by the movements as well as from interview data and participant observation of the discourses used by the two movement cases.

Drawing on the literature that shows the ways in which framing is involved in mobilisation efforts, this chapter will identify and assess how the two movement’s diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational functions of social movement framing, and how the movements master frames and cultural or contextual factors, influence their chances for mobilisation. This will allow connecting back to the previous two chapters, as these contextual and cultural factors are connected to the political opportunities and mobilising structures which as will be explained later in this chapter have a direct impact on the movements’ framing.

5.1.1 Krasnodar Krai Environmental Movement’s Collective Action Frames and Master Frames

The Diagnostic Frames of ‘Environmental Destruction’, ‘Bad Governance’, and ‘Political Apathy’

The central issue that the environmental activists cited as problematic was, predictably, damage to the environment in Krasnodar Krai. Chemical plants, illegal elite residences, and construction related to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi have been described as the leading factors responsible for destroying the Krai’s natural environment. I call this the
‘environmental destruction frame’. The frame encapsulates environmental activists’ worries about the environment and its conservation. The respondents’ comments below exemplify this.

AM 110413:

‘In 2009 they built the [Tuapse waste] terminal… And in two to three weeks, dead dolphins started washing up on the beach between Tuapse and Sochi. Dead dolphins, dead birds. There are photographs of all this, documents. I have them on my Zhzh [Live Journal]. And some of these dolphins were without skin. So it is not like they washed themselves up on shore. Their skin was peeling off as in chemical burns. And it makes sense because the current flows south towards Sochi. A couple of people died too. It was a horrible thing’.

AS 180413:

‘Of course Anapa has a host of problems. Not in Utrish itself, but next to it, they are cutting trees. In Anapa they are sourcing sand that is changing the whole ecosystem there, and it is unclear what will happen to the Black Sea region in the long run’.

YN 080413:

‘For example, construction for the Olympics has turned out to be very destructive for the environment in the Sochi region. Because there, they violated all kinds of norms. They often simply dump the rubbish from construction into rivers that go through many villages and end up in the Black Sea… In this way, they have destroyed several rivers. There is one river I definitely know has been destroyed. These were rivers with fish. And they are simply destroyed’.

A subtheme emerged from within this frame: the problem of the authorities blocking off access to public land, often accompanied by illegal felling and construction of elite mansions. This concern links the environmental damage frame to the “bad governance frame”, to be discussed next. Such violations are tied to the movement’s repertoire mentioned in the last chapter of nature walks as a way to bring attention to the problem. Concern voiced about this problem is not only about the environmental damage that these fences result in, but also for the authorities’ land usurpation that it involves.
LS 130413 said:

‘In Zmeinoe ushchel’e they are building some villas, and it is not possible to access it anymore, people are not allowed in. They say, “we have leased this land” and that is it. Utrish has been closed to the public though they have not started building anything. The environmental activists have won several court cases in that regard. But still, access is closed. They have made it into a sort of preserve or something. To tell you the truth, there is nowhere to go anymore’.

The environmental damage frame is strong for two reasons. Firstly, it is broad in interpretive scope and inclusive — the frame’s claims of environmental damage are not limited to the interests of a small group of activists. Environmental damage affects everyone in Krasnodar Krai. Secondly, the frame is resonant in particular for its high empirical credibility. Many residents of Krasnodar Krai traditionally take their holiday along the coast of the Black Sea and are confronted first hand both with the damage to the environment there as well as the issue of an increasing number of no-access areas that the environmental movement grapples with. The frame’s claims can be verified by the public, and the appeal of this frame is made broader in this way. However, while the frame’s interpretive scope is broad and resonant, it is not clear if this frame has the potential to mobilise on its own. Rather the combination of other frames and the movement’s more overarching master frame had the mobilising effect that started the movement’s protest cycle in 2010.

The movement’s second frame is what I call the “bad governance frame”. In particular, it is the problematisation of ineffective state institutions and procedures concerning the environment. This frame focuses on the political system as a whole, tying the environmental aspect with the political: the erosion of state power in Russia is seen as responsible for environmental problems. For example, respondents cited the authorities’ changing of laws in order to circumvent construction restrictions or simply ignoring the laws.

55 An area on the Black Sea coast popular for camping and recreation.
56 Many Russians cannot afford to go abroad for holiday and instead stay within Russia. In 2011, official statistics show 13 million tourists take their holiday in Krasnodar Krai (Zhivaia Kuban’, 2011).
SG 180413:

‘The legislature is getting weaker, with every year, almost with every month. There are changes all the time in laws’.

AM 110413:

‘When I first started this struggle, I did not know everything depended on the laws. Because it turns out that there are laws that protect the environment! Laws that forbid what they are doing to the environment. But they go around those laws, and people close their eyes to it. Because someone somewhere doesn’t want the law to work. The law is there. It just does not work’.

AM 110413:

‘No one supports environmental protection, those organs that should do not. They say all the time, no! There are no problems here’.

YN 080413:

‘The court is very biased. They will say, “Everything is fine! You shouldn’t have started this”. And that is it. That is why ecological issues are often locked in political issues. Because without political influence, it is very difficult to resolve issues’.

The bad governance frame is resonant, firstly because it has some degree of empirical verifiability, which has been provided through the efforts of individual movement actors to put official documentation online. Photocopies of legal decisions and maps with coordinates of forest preserves (on which felling and construction is illegal) with photographs have been provided to the public on activists’ social media pages (see Chapters 3 and 4). The frame is inclusive and flexible because it addresses core problems of Russian political rule that ordinary Russians live with (e.g. corruption and rule of law), and it allows for extensive interpretation in terms of what those problems in governance mean. This flexibility and inclusivity increase its chances of becoming a master frame (Benford and Snow, 2000). This process was done through frame alignment, by making bad governance with its attendant properties of corruption and ineffective state institutions a primary concern, thereby allowing
the environmental movement to capture many of the same concerns that mobilised the anti-
Putin opposition. The frame was broad enough to act as an umbrella for all the problems
stemming from bad governance — in other words, not only environmental. Thus, the frame
contributed to a broader master frame of opposition (see below) which itself directly
motivated mobilisation.

An unexpected third collective action frame emerged from the environmental
movement’s interview data, something I call the “political apathy frame”. In this frame,
movement actors problematize the public’s indifference and inaction concerning
environmental and political problems.

AS 180413:

‘People don’t think. They live in the moment, right now. And that’s it. But what
happens later… And this is not only about people who are building mansions. But
ordinary people, too, who could participate and support the movement. People think
about feeling comfortable right now, and “why should I do something when some
people are cutting down some forest somewhere, what’s the difference?”’

AM 110413:

‘Those that are easily fooled by TV programmes and such… Bless them, they are
good people, they are just easily fooled. There are always going to be like that. But
what can you do? They do not want to see further, but some of them are starting to
see’.

LS 130413:

‘Yes, yes, many people do not consider themselves citizens. I think many do not even
understand that they are citizens of Russia and have a responsibility for the country
that they live in, they do not understand this. They give all their responsibilities away
to the authorities and the authorities use that to put them under their boot’.

YN 080413:

‘People cannot see the long term. People want to have fun, people don’t want to think
about what will happen later’.

This frame is significant because it expresses vocabularies about collective identity
and reveals a process of movement actors actively distinguishing themselves from the general
public — a process called boundary-framing (Hunt et al., 1994). In constructing this frame, activists present an alternative version of reality, in other words active involvement as a prudent way to resolve social and political problems that affect everyone (Raymond et al., 2013, p.10). This frame ultimately facilitated mobilisation by providing a normative-identity framework that supported group cohesion, which was useful in the master frame alignment (see below).

Environmental activists attribute the problems identified in these previously discussed frames to two main, but overlapping areas. The first is Putin and his regime, in turn responsible for keeping the Krasnodar Krai authorities in power. Officials at both levels are seen to abuse administrative resources and contribute to a breakdown in state institutions. The second target of blame is corruption, which is seen mainly in the collusion of the authorities and business. These two points overlap, as corruption is seen to originate from within the regime and be perpetuated by it. About Putin and the regime, a respondent said:

SG 180413:

‘With Putin’s arrival, all environmental protection broke down. It does not work… Back then, the system for environmental protection was different. Then new laws were adopted, like the Forest Code. The laws of environmental inspection have been practically nullified.

‘And we can’t do anything about it because United Russia is in power and these changes are supported by them.’

About corruption, from which the regime and its people benefit, respondents referred to how business and the authorities had found “common interests”.

AM 110413:

‘Because of money and the partnerships between businessmen and the government, our environment is being destroyed. The borders of the preserves are being redrawn, and that’s how they want it’.
DS 120413:

‘It’s business interests that are closely tied in every case with the authorities… They find excellent mutual-understanding with business’.

Concerning the Olympics venue construction, YN 080413 said:

‘This is a corrupt project. The whole thing is tied to business, businessmen. Even the railway authority violated norms. It is very simple. If you want to cut down trees, you have to go through several instances and establish the fact that you will be cutting down such and such number of trees. But they cut down trees without any sort of permission. These are endangered trees. And it is forbidden to cut them down at all; you can’t touch them. But they did it quietly’.

The movement’s attribution of blame resonates because the problems are coherently linked of the congruency of the identified culprits with the movement’s beliefs, claims, and actions in terms of environmental damage, corruption, and a breakdown in governance being attributed to Putin’s regime and its regional agents. Framing of blame also facilitated mobilisation by contributing to the movement’s oppositional orientation, which was bolstered by the political apathy frame that positioned identities as “activist”. This stance corroborated the movement’s claims and its critiques of the political system in a broader, more appealing way. In other words, the diagnostic frame identified key problems that had a “good fit” with the prognostic and mobilising frames (see below) that were to show how to address these problems and mobilise action. This coherence made them strong.

**The Prognostic Frame of ‘Protest’**

Corresponding to diagnostic framing is prognostic framing: in order to sell the idea of overcoming the diagnosed problems, it is necessary for a movement to describe the steps for amelioration, to frame in people’s minds how to go about it. The clearer the prognostic frame is articulated and the better it corresponds to a diagnostic frame, the more likely mobilisation will be because the problem and the means of redress are clearly linked.
In the environmental movement’s case, interview data and participant observation point to consensus about what I call a “protest frame”. In other words, the frame imagines resolution to the aforementioned problems as happening through protest, through collective action. This demonstrates the contentiousness of the movement and reflects the participants’ oppositional identities as challengers. The frame exhibits the environmental activists’ awareness that state institutions are ineffective and corrupt, and that change needs to occur and can be brought about through contention. Some respondents made comments about the respective challenges faced.

DS 120413:

‘In 2008, it became apparent that the only possibility of resolving any environmental issues is social activism, and as banal as it sounds, social resonance is necessary for promoting environmental issues. So with that I started working with the EWNC in organising protests… It was naïve to place our hope on appeals to the state organs insofar as the administration of the President violated environmental law… That is why it was apparent from the beginning that it is necessary to increase social action in order to somehow get things moving. That includes going out to the site and blocking the work of completely illegal construction’.

SG 180413 contrasts pre-2010 times in which state bodies were regarded more positively than in the present which is seen as dysfunctional:

‘Back then, things worked better. Back then one could write to the prosecutor’s office, and they would act. They would call the police even… Back then those mechanisms worked, and we used them… Things are more complicated now. Court cases could be won. Everything was all right. Of course back then it seemed to us things were bad. But now we understand that things were a lot better than now [laughs]’.

SG 180413’s follow-up statement outlines that the only way to change something is to change the “system” itself:

‘The realisation that it is possible to change something only by changing the system itself came maybe two years ago [i.e. 2010]’.

The commitment to activism on the part of the movement actors is driven by a belief that activism can open up political opportunities. For example, DS 120413 said:
‘These are the main effective methods for protecting the environment. To publicise as much as possible and to get as many people as possible involved in the issue — get their attention. And constant pressure on the authorities — not just appeals, but actual pressure. These are the main ways of solving any environmental problems. Those methods that are standard in the civilised world [referring to institutionalised politics in liberal democracies] in Russia do not work unfortunately. That will happen in the future’.

In this way, this prognostic frame relates directly to the sources of injustice as well as the entity to be blamed, as elaborated in the diagnostic frame. On one level, the call is to save the environment, and on the other, it is to achieve a more just, transparent, and participatory political process. By focusing on the second, the first will be resolved. Thus, the frame contains a great deal of congruence with the diagnostic frames and is in that sense strong. However, in terms of providing the steps for amelioration, it is interesting to note that no specific strategies past more collective action were elaborated.

**Effective Motivational Framing**

Motivational framing serves as the call for action based on the aforementioned diagnostic and prognostic frames. A good source of data for motivational framing is movement-generated material because it is data created by activists intended for constituencies. I have taken a movement flyer for examination from the 2011 environmental movement’s campaign “Spasti Utrish!” [Save Utrish!] (see Annex 1), which offers a representative look into the vocabularies of motive that the movement used when it was beginning its protest cycle.

In the text, the natural environment of Krasnodar Krai is presented as significant, special, and unique. Through using the words “rare” and “endangered” the audience is given a compelling reason to act. This is supported by statements from respondents, for example from DS120413:

‘There is amazing nature here, there are preserves, the coast, resorts. Basically a large resort. The only one in Russia is Krasnodar Krai’.
These “vocabularies of motive” (Benford, 1993, p.196) amplify the urgency to act to save the environment. Attention is also drawn to the “illegal” nature of the “sly” authorities’ actions that are putting the preserve in danger, giving a sense of propriety and meaning to participation because the authorities are not “good”. Supporting this is respondent DS120413:

‘The significance of the environment for [the authorities] is nullified. They are not ready to take it into account. What is that connected to? A low culture… Yes, so one can speak about a low level of culture, morals, values, etc.’.

In other words, mere dissatisfaction with environmental issues and governance is not enough to bring people out into the streets. Strong commitment to action has to be created, and this was done here by subjecting the situation to moral and ethical rhetoric that connects constituents to concepts of justice. This evokes a sense of duty or responsibility to act that motivates people to take to the streets. Such language also can elicit emotion, in this case anger, which makes for collective action participation (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2010, p.2; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). It was these frames about politics that transformed individual grievances into shared ones that helped lead to mobilisation.

Furthermore, the call for action is directed to ‘Residents of Krasnodar Krai and all of Russia; civic, political, and religious organisations’, evidencing a concerted effort to address a broad swathe of social groups in the region and Russia overall. In this way, the motivational frame makes use of “vocabularies of motive” and emotion which incite mobilisation by helping overcome issues of fear in the absence of expectation that peoples’ individual actions can help ameliorate the problem.

**The Master Frame of Opposition**

Master frames are the result of a frame extension made from collective action frames to a broader arena, a process explained in the previous section. As master frames are usually not expressed by individual movement members, the frames must be ascertained from the broader movement discourse. The environmental movement subscribes to a master frame that
directs activists to engage with the wider issues of anti-Putin, anti-government opposition. I call this the “opposition frame”. This frame articulates grievances towards Putin and his power at the federal level as well as power at the regional level embodied in Governor Tkachev and the Krai administration. This master frame emerges from a discourse of “oppositional knowledge” — the presentation of alternative accounts that give a different perspective from the power elite (Coy and Woehrle, 1996, p.309).

This oppositional knowledge posits that redress in Russia’s non-democratic context for the systematically debased rights by the power elites can only come about through in systemic change. The Krasnodar environmental movement’s opposition frame is heavily influenced by and adapted from concepts of opposition constructed by the actions and rhetoric of the 2010-2012 Moscow and more broadly Russian opposition movements. The environmental movement began shifting its framing focus at around this time, going from regarding the Krai administration as a bothersome power entity with which it had to do business through official channels from time to time, to observing it as part of an unjust, corrupt, and self-serving systemic power structure with Putin at the helm which had to be challenged. This is evidenced by the interview data cited above.

With this opposition frame, the environmental activists have been able to expand the focus of the movement from more narrow concerns of environmental damage from pre-2010 in the Krai to engage and enlist others in their milieu who share values and goals that are consonant with the objective of systemic change in Russia. This is a clear example of frame alignment in that the environmental movement came to incorporate some of the key views, interests, and sentiments of the all-Russian anti-government movement. This oppositional master frame validated the environmental movement’s struggle regionally, especially as their activities began turning more and more towards rights protection during the increased repressions of the protest cycle. This frame gave an awareness of unjust power as “structural… systemic, and susceptible to transformation” (Carroll and Ratner, 1996, p.610),
in other words, that it could be successfully opposed. Through this frame, the environmental movement actors, like the Moscow activists, had begun to see themselves as exploited and subjugated under a system in which the powerful were not accountable. These experiences were commensurable across the Russian opposition field. The frame not only engages the movement’s base of environmentally minded people, but also resonated with Krai constituents with an anti-Putin disposition, who were inspired by the mass turn out in Moscow and St Petersburg. Furthermore, because of the then approaching Sochi Olympics the environmental movement’s activities in the Krai were steadily increasing in salience around the country, allowing influence to go in both directions for the first time. Thus the environmental movement emerged as the only significant oppositionally disposed movement in the region because of their flexibility and inclusivity.

Thus, my empirical observations are in line with the theory that protest cycles tend to happen contemporaneously among movements in the same “industry” (Mc Carthy and Zald, 1977; Swart, 1995, p.468). Social movement activity across the field tends to rise and fall at the same time, influenced by a few basic themes that shape their aims (Turner, 1994, p.79). In this way, the success of the oppositional framing strategy among other groups in the Russian Federation during the opposition movement opened up political opportunities for mobilising. During one period (2010-2012), the currency of the idea of systemic change was heightened, and attention among divergent groups focused to resolve the same problem (Snow and Benford, 2000). Swart (1995, p.467) states: ‘As increasing levels of inter- and intramovement activity occur along the lines of these political opportunities, historical watersheds of collective action occur, which in turn constitute a cycle of protest’. By taking advantage of political opportunities in this way, the oppositional frame pushed the environmental movement to mobilisation.

Of course this also may serve to alienate those who may have thought that nothing short of radical acts would be sufficient for the movement.
This oppositional master frame, inclusive, flexible, and broad in scope, could only be constructed in the presence of the movement’s open network (as discussed in Chapter 4) that acted as a conduit for ideas from the outside. The frame borrowed oppositional ideas from the outside, yet it also developed new codes of meaning by re-contextualising them for itself. In this way the environmental movement created a new discourse and placed a new set of ideology before its audience, that of a challenge to the Krasnodar authorities in the framework of a generally Russian opposition movement. The frame was the result of strategic refashioning based on changes in the prevailing cultural climate that rendered the frame salient, resonant, and a powerful motivator for action. In this way, the environmental movement’s ability to mobilise was linked to their adoption of an oppositional frame and their adaption of it for the regional level. Through this process, they were able to build an idea big enough to attract a larger constituency and eventually win ideological battles.

5.1.2 Kabardino-Balkaria Balkar Movement Collective Action Frames and Master Frames

The Diagnostic Frames of ‘Incomplete Rehabilitation’, ‘Marginalisation’

The central grievances that the Balkar movement organised around were dissatisfaction about rehabilitation after their return from their 1944 deportation in 1957 as well as the eroding influence of Balkars as an ethnic group in Kabardino-Balkaria. I call these the “incomplete rehabilitation frame” and the “marginalisation frame”. Although the concept of incomplete rehabilitation is in many ways an aspect of marginalisation, the respondents separate them conceptually: the problem of rehabilitation is seen by movement members almost exclusively through the prism of legal injustice, while marginalisation refers to trends of the Balkars’ loss of power and resources more generally.

The incomplete rehabilitation frame points to the unfulfilled reparations meant to remedy the injustice of the 1944 deportation, as set out in the federal law of April 1991 “On
the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples”. This law endorses the return of Balkars to their home villages and provides for a set of other rehabilitative measures. In particular, it provides for territorial, political, social, and cultural rehabilitation (Akkieva, 2002, p.313) The frame focuses on the failure of republican institutions to implement this law. For example, of those Balkars returning from exile, many were settled in Kabardian villages instead of their home villages, many of which still remain uninhabited today. Respondents’ statements reflect these claims of incomplete reparations. Respondent RB 300513 said:

‘They let us return [from exile], but they did not allow us to revive our villages… They haven't renovated 76 villages. Their territory has been emptied.’

IS 020613:

‘They adopted a decision on the rehabilitation of repressed peoples. But this decision remained on paper. In reality that document does nothing and that law does nothing. Until now we have not been rehabilitated territorially, politically...’.

RB 300513:

‘The same with lands with the law on rehabilitation in 1991. Balkars were given, at least on paper... we have the documents showing how much money and material was earmarked, technical equipment, medicine that they did not give the Balkars!’

These claims reflect historical evidence that the law on repressed peoples across the Russian Federation was left without a clear definition of how it was to be implemented and that initiatives to carry it out were not completed (Arbatov et al., 1997, p.45). However, inadequacies of legal definitions are not the focus of the frame; the focus is rather the laws’ incomplete execution.

The frame is rigid, focusing only on rehabilitation’s legal issues, while ignoring wider problems of the judicial system. It therefore allows little room for elaboration or expansion because the entire issue is measured by legal negligence in one area. The frame is also narrow in scope, focusing exclusively on the right of Balkars who want to move back to their old villages and thus has limited influence with a wider constituency and is not likely to become a
master frame. The frame is credible to the extent that it is possible to say it is common knowledge that Balkars were not fully rehabilitated. However, given the limited scope and rigidity of the frame, it is not likely to contribute to a master frame and facilitate mobilisation.

The marginalisation frame however depicts the Balkar nation as unable to achieve equitable reintegration into political, economic, and social life after exile. This includes problems in Balkar parity in status, representation in curriculums, and assimilation. The frame includes the claim that upon return from exile, the Balkar people found themselves as second-class citizens in a de facto “Kabarda” rather than equal members in a shared Kabardian and Balkar republic. There are two subthemes to this frame. The first is what the Balkar movement members regard as a concerted effort by Kabardian historians to distort history. This is done for example by erasing Balkar names from history books and presenting Balkars as not indigenous to the territory all in order to diminish the role Balkars have played in the republic historically and to delegitimise the Balkars’ influence in the republican structures. My interviews with Balkar respondents often turned to rhetoric that argued the historically “legitimate” right of Balkars to the region, even when I tried to turn the conversation to other topics. Respondent IS 020613 said:

‘History is subverted. They try to make up tales about things that did not happen in real life... I will also give you an example of a schoolbook that was published during Kanokov's presidency, ‘The History of Kabarda and Balkaria’. It writes that when 450 years ago Kabarda joined [the Russian Empire], the vassal nations dependent on Kabarda were Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, Balkars, Karachais. I ask a question. My dear scholars, if you were really scholars, you would not write this rubbish. ‘And they do not teach Balkar in our schools. Before at university, we had a department that every year 25,000 people were selected... teachers were trained to teach the Balkar language and literature. Now they have closed that department. When there is no language there is assimilation, whether you want that or not. And they do everything so that we assimilate and dissolve among other peoples’.

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59 This figure is very likely significantly inflated.
RB 300513:

‘How can they say “today's historians”, how can they say that we are newcomers? How can a small nation impose its language on other nations? Its institutions... And scholars see everything is about the Cherkess [referring to the Kabardians]. Even on the legislative level, on the constitutional level. We are all Cherkess as Russians called us, so it remained. Even Cossacks took it as Chekmen — that is our word. The bullets, the costume, all the names are ours.

‘They started to change the place names. There were no Kabardian names before. Their villages were named after Balkar monuments. And during the Soviet times... their villages were named after the surnames of princes. Why? Because they [Kabardians] were nomadic.\(^60\) They did not have a permanent place’.

The second subtheme of the marginalisation frame is the construction of meaning around the Balkars’ loss of power and resources in the republic. This includes claims of being taken advantage of or being passed over for social and political goods. Issues of territory and local self-determination loom large in these claims.

IS 020613:

‘All the useful things that have been dug up: molybdenum, gold, silver, etc., are all in the territory of Balkaria. Furthermore all the mineral springs are also on the territory of Balkaria. It is all ours. Imagine, if we were independent, we would be like Switzerland. And so they want to take all those resources, all our wealth for themselves.

‘If the laws were observed, land would belong to the rural population. Not to the state, or anyone else, but to the rural population. Let us say for example that I am the chairman of a village council. If the laws work, I would be in charge of the land. Without my permission or the permission of the village council, deputies, and myself, no one has the right to take away the land. They do not observe this law on purpose’.

RB 300513:

‘All the houses of culture, schools were in Kabardian villages. Gas was connected to Kabardian villages and somehow there was not enough for the Balkar villages. Same with electricity. They didn’t build clubs [in Balkar villages], they did not build anything. In those years, they robbed Balkaria. They robbed the poorest’.

\(^{60}\) A common trope among nationalists in both the North and South Caucasus is the delegitimisation of ethnic groups by calling them “nomadic” in order to portray them as newcomers to the area. In this way, this respondent counters the history frame in trying to portray the Kabardians as such.
The marginalisation frame is flexible as it includes within it many different ideas about weakening Balkar influence, from historical and cultural, to political spheres. It is on the other hand limited to the Balkar ethnic group and so this narrow scope of interest undermines the frame’s inclusivity. Still, its flexibility gives it a greater likelihood of turning into a master frame.

The blame in the rehabilitation and marginalisation frames is attributed squarely to the Kabardian leadership of Kabardino-Balkaria which is seen as the source of oppression. For example, one respondent told me that the laws in Kabardino-Balkaria were not observed “on purpose”. Upon my question of who was not observing the laws, IS 020613 responded simply: ‘The leadership of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, [President] Kanokov’.

RB 300513:

‘Balkars never got that parity and the Kabardians usurped power. And on this basis things continued in this way until today’.

It is notable that the blame, unlike for the environmental movement, was put onto the regional authorities. As negatively as the movement actors felt about the Kabardian leadership, their feelings about the Federal Centre were in contrast quite ambivalent. The republican authorities are blamed for not carrying out the federal law on rehabilitation; in other words, the laws do not work not because of an inadequacy with the federal authorities or institutions, but because the Kabardino-Balkaria authorities do not obey them. Respondent RB 300513 continued:

‘Then Balkars returned here and the Kabardians refused to rehabilitate. And Russian laws were adopted at the same time on 9 January [1957] for Balkars’ rehabilitation

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61 For Balkar movement actors, the terms “authorities” and “Kabardians” are interchangeable. Historically Kabardians have been the dominating group, and this fact has been further reinforced by Russians’ preference in dealing with Kabardians in the region. Exemplifying this trend is Ivan IV’s marriage to Kabardian princess Goshenai in the 16th century.  
62 Former President Arsen Kanokov is Kabardian, and indeed, all the leaders through the Soviet period in Kabardino-Balkaria have been Kabardian. Ethnic quotas allowed for other positions to be allocated to Balkars, but they were always of lesser significance.
and reestablishment of their national autonomy. Kabarda only began to understand this after three months. Can you see how disobedient they are? They do not listen to the central authorities; they drag their feet, etc.’.

Moscow is regarded by Balkar activists as an omnipotent force that can protect against the Kabardians when it has the will. In must be noted that Balkar activists generally consider federal authorities to be ineffective, but the legitimacy and authority of the Russian political system is not under question. The blame rather goes to “disobedient” regional leaders who do not play by these rules. However, frustration with the central authorities among individual activists has grown over time, especially as many of the movement’s appeals have been ignored. RB 300513 said:

‘And our authorities — Putin, Medvedev — they are all boors. Nothing else. I haven’t got patience for them anymore. So we have this mountain of complaints that we write, and nothing. It’s like knocking on wood — it’s useless... it’s corruption!’

However, at the movement level, this frustration is not expressed. The blame attribution does not go to the central authorities, even though their protests and appeals are directed toward them. I argue that the marginalisation frame in particular, with the republican government as the instigator of the stated grievances seen as actively engaging in the marginalisation of the Balkars, contributed to a master frame of injustice (see below).

**Prognostic Frame of ‘Appeal to Federal Authorities’**

The prognostic frames for the Balkar movement do not clearly designate a plan of action, and at times display contradictory assertions. Although the movement’s main goal is complete rehabilitation, which would bring with it attendant rights and privileges that can mitigate the Balkars’ loss of power and parity, no strategy for carrying it out has been elaborated. Furthermore, although the diagnostic frames described previously identify the

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63 This statement refers to the adoption of the law “On the Reorganisation of the Kabardian ASSR into the Kabardino-Balkaria ASSR” adopted on 9 January 1957 (Sabanchiev, 2007).
regional authorities as the problem, Balkar activists articulate the wish to take their grievances against them to the federal level (courts), despite the fact that federal laws have been depicted by respondents as ineffective. For example, respondent OB 030613 said: ‘The federal level is the only level that we have any hope of doing anything with’.

At the same time, it is also freely acknowledged that the federal-level institutions might not be sympathetic or responsive. In this next quote by respondent IS 020613, goal attainment has even been described to be appealing to international institutions, failing a satisfactory response from the federal level.

‘Now we have only one way left. That is to apply for self-determination. An appeal to the President and State Duma. Either they will accept it, and we can be content with that, or they reject it and we go to the European Court of Human Rights. We are not going to be shy anymore about potentially shaming Russia. We are going to appeal to the world, to the global community. The police are controlling the country. Why should we try to keep its image when it is not trying itself? When they insolently take away everyone’s rights? We are demanding that they observe the laws. We are not demanding that they adopt new laws. There is a constitution, there is an agreement on unification.64 There is the law on rehabilitation... Everything is there already! They all only need to be observed. We’re not demanding anything new. We are asking that the constitution be brought into alignment with this law about unification. We are standing on this document in which it is written and signed, even if we didn’t sign it voluntarily. It’s a good document, it should be carried out’.

RB 300513:

‘These laws, the constitutional court, all of that... I thought, if it’s a constitutional court, then it will work. That constitutional court is crap. And nothing else. They don’t carry out their rulings’.

In this way, the diagnostic frames do not have a good fit with the prognostic frames in that the culprits of their problems, the Kabardians in the republican government, are not really being addressed. There is also some outright contradiction within the movement’s prognostic frame. For example, respondent OB 030613 states that civic action is not a viable solution.

64 By “unification”, the respondent is referring to the reorganisation of the Kabardian ASSR into the Kabardino-Balkarian SSR which eventually became the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria.
‘We began to express our wishes at protests. And we have been doing this since 2005, ever since they instated those land laws. We now understand that there is no point in these protests. They don’t pay attention to us’.

Later in the interview, the same respondent, when elaborating on what was necessary in order to reinstate Balkars’ rights, answered simply: ‘civil society’.

In this way, the prognostic frame is unspecific and therefore weak. It is difficult to imagine that such unclear solutions would have any capacity to motivate. When a proposed solution is vague, or does not provide clear steps for amelioration, it will be less effective in motivating action (Benford, 2005, p.41).

**Ineffective Motivational Frame**

Of the movement material I examined, the only part that had been compiled for an external audience was a print out that activists gave me. The piece is a collection of quotes sourced from an article in *Kavkazskii Uzel* that movement actors had put together as a printed, stapled document. Though not technically a flyer as with the motivational frame data for the environmental movement, the data is still comparable because it offers a representative look into vocabularies of motive and discourse meant for a wider audience.

The motivational frame constructs the nation’s problems as a matter of justice in land ownership and control. In this source, the issue of the proposed “tour cluster” in the North

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65 The rest of the material that I was given consisted of newspapers and compact discs containing video footage of community gatherings and protests.

66 As part of the Russian government’s strategy for developing the North Caucasus Federal District, a “tour cluster” has been created which would be operated by North Caucasus Resorts (NCR), an open joint-stock company. The stated aim of this project is to benefit the local population socially and economically. The problem is that the plans entail developing Elbrus, which is an already existing and well-organised resort operated by the local community of ethnic Balkars, and connecting it to Bezengi, a Balkar village in a cattle-breeding gorge. The Elbrus municipality is made of five Balkar settlements already embroiled in disputes over federal law 131 “On General Principles of Local Self-Government”, which cedes their control to Kabardian-controlled Nalchik. Nalchik authorities back the resorts in the hopes that it will cede control from local communities to them.
Caucasus is high on the agenda. The tour cluster topic came up several times during my interviews, but to no significant extent.

The rhetoric of the text frames marginalisation and injustice as a continuation of the “genocide” of the Balkars, initiated in 1944, today manifesting itself as economic violence. Legal injustice is portrayed as putting Balkars into a state of “slavery”, who are as a result destined to a “slow death”. Such rhetorical devices serve as vocabularies of motive meant to invoke a sense of criticality and urgency in order to create that sense of emotion and anger that can be extremely effective in motivating constituencies to action.

Furthermore, the events are portrayed as having caused pain to the Balkar nation; the “national honour and dignity” important to “mountaineers” has been insulted. In doing this, the rhetoric also draws on a moral framework that casts integrity as an expression of nation. This can be a powerful tool that creates a sense of propriety and agency, as it makes every individual Balkar a potential vindicator of this Balkar collective honour and connects it to ideas more common in the region as a whole.

However, the strengths of the motivational frame are compromised by the lack of coherent links between the stated problems. For example, the tour cluster is condemned for excluding Balkars’ interests, while “private individuals” (i.e. companies, businessmen) are set to benefit from the resources there. The problem is that the stated rationale for action invokes “rehabilitation”, an altogether different issue. It becomes clear that the term “rehabilitation” is often conjured up by activists to symbolise all the injustices that the ethnic group has borne from the deportation in 1944 onwards. However, without articulating the links between these related topics, the conceptual clarity of the motivational frame becomes muddled. Furthermore, in speaking about wanting rehabilitation, activists contend that there will not be resolution until the government of Kabardino-Balkaria brings its republican laws in line with federal laws. Of particular note in this piece are federal laws 131 ("On the General Principles of Organising Organs of Local Self-Government") and 101 ("On Turnover of Lands of
Agricultural Purpose”), both of which would keep the control of Balkar lands with the Balkars. However, neither of these laws directly connect to the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples Act of 1991. In this way, although land and rule of law are common themes among these concepts flexible enough to be expanded on and reinterpreted, “rehabilitation” still emerges as the focus. An example is the statement in this text by a movement actor: ‘If rehabilitation is achieved, then there will be no problems left’.

In the text, the Council of Elders of the Balkar Nation (CEBN) is depicted as the legitimate authority representing Balkars’ interests; it is asserted that the people “demanded” that the CEBN resolve the tour cluster problem. This projects an image of consensus on the part of the Balkar nation about the legitimacy and representativeness of this organisation. In reality, however, it also may pose a problem for those Balkars who might hesitate to associate with it after its public condemnation by the authorities or for those who might be closer to the figures that publicly broke away from the organisation in 2009 (described in more detail in Chapter 1). Thus this claim limits the interpretive scope and influence of the frame to a particular organisation and compromises its resonance.

Lastly, the motivational frame lacks an explicit call to action. There is no indication that that the cause being fought for is either obtainable or worthy of action. The frame lacks a rational of motive suggesting that people’s actions can affect the outcomes desired (Gamson, 1995). The problem has been framed, but there is no call to action that suggests a modicum of expected success. In this way, the motivational frame is weak and not likely to incite mobilisation.

**Master Frame of Injustice**

The Balkar movement constructed a “master frame of injustice” that forms the basis of its prevailing discourse (Oliver and Johnston, 2000, p.4). Master frames, as mentioned before, are usually associated with protest cycles, and though the Balkar movement has not
experienced a cycle of protest, this injustice frame persists through periods of inactivity as a “structure of abeyance” (Mooney and Hunt, 1996; Swidler, 1995), tying together the meaning of the movement through periods of inactivity and providing a ready framework to be reinterpreted later.

The frame articulates the present position of the Balkar people — economically, socially, and politically — as fundamentally unjust. It constructs a “cognitive map” through which Balkars develop and shape moral awareness in their interaction with others (Steinberg, 1998, p.857). This master frame takes the conditions of marginalisation and rehabilitation collective action frames and using more broad rhetoric, boosts them to signify a larger struggle.

Injustice frames diverge from “dominant” realities (Gamson, 1992). As structural inequalities are often taken for granted as normal, activists must engage in “meaning work” in order to transform the status quo into something that must be challenged through a “mode of interpretation” (Benford and Snow, 2000, p.615). For example, decreased political representation of the Balkar people was often cited to me in interviews. I was told that out of 72 deputies in the republic, 13 are Balkar, 14 are Russian, and the rest are Kabardians. Because of this, Balkars are not able to pass any laws. This frame however transforms these numbers into an unacceptable fact that serves as a basis for action.

This injustice frame is constructed around a conceptualisation of rights borrowed in large part through the actions and rhetoric of previous ethnic movements in the North Caucasus, reflecting its emergence and links within a larger cultural field. Similar discourses about historical grievances and exile have been used across national groups, for example Chechens and Cossacks, affected by Second World War-era exile and Soviet-era persecution. These groups had also lost their economic resources in Soviet and post-Soviet times and had been the target of official and unofficial discrimination. However, while the Balkars’ struggle

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67 The movement had its cycle of protest in the 1990s, but for the timeframe of this study, although activity exists, it is generally decreasing.

68 I cannot find official data to corroborate the numbers. However in 2001 only nine Balkars were in Parliament (Skakov, 2001).
was comparable to that of these groups, its articulation was also very localist, identity-based, and with a single-movement political praxis.

Although this localist and identity-based characteristic reinforces collective identity among the movement members that is important for mobilisation, politics structured around defending identities ‘forces people’s experiences into categories that are too narrow and also make it difficult for us to speak to one another across the boundaries of these identities, let alone create the coalitions needed to build a movement for progressive change’ (Epstein, 1992, p.344). The frame is thus weak due to this limitation — it may be flexible, being able to accommodate historical, social, and political claims, but it is too exclusive to resonate across the field. The Balkars’ injustice frame was never about emphasising wider problems to which broader and more diverse constituencies could relate as well. For example, the broken mechanisms of conflict resolution or the absence of free elections could be included within it. The Balkar movement never pushed beyond its conventional boundaries and continued to use an analytical perspective that centred on themselves rather than on the systemic and interconnected character of the injustices that affected their society more widely. The frame is characterised by a lack of an inter-group solidarity component, even while some very low-level cooperation and interaction with other groups did occur, because there was no common language from which other activists could take and communicate and find common ground. For example, some efforts to coordinate action with Russians (Cossacks), who were also being marginalised in Kabardino-Balkaria, were being made. However, cross-movement organising was constrained because the frame does not elevate the movement’s politics beyond its single-issue and local-context emphasis.

In many ways, this is a product of the narrow mobilising structures of the Balkar movement discussed in Chapter 4. Without free cross-movement networking, it cannot adapt better master framing. According to Carroll and Ratner (1996, p.620): ‘The localism implicit in identity politics, while conducive to the pragmatic pursuit of immediate objectives in some
contexts, can obscure this realisation by fixating on narrow agendas and can truncate the transformative framing processes that nurture counterhegemony’. Thus the frame is not inclusive and does not resonate beyond the movement.

Of note is the fact that, unlike with the Krasnodar environmental movement, the Balkar movement’s master frame was challenged by the republican authorities. This was done using a counterframe that involved attacks on Balkars’ collective character, in this case to portray Balkar activists as ethnic extremists. In this counterframing process, the republican authorities, together with the help of what the activists consider “sellout” Balkars, tried to discredit the Balkar movement. In the meantime, mass media, under the control of the authorities, helped form a public image of Balkar villages as centres of Wahhabism and strongholds of international terrorism. The power structures, made up of more than 90 percent Kabardians, systematically carry out military operations, raids, clean-up operations, and illegal searches in Balkar towns and villages using the declaration in the country of the fight against international terrorism as a convenient excuse for this extra control.

The movement members were aware of this counterframe. RB 300513 said:

‘Look here, the attacks on Nalchik69 — Kabardians did that. They were all Kabardian. They write that on the same days as the attacks, there were attacks from the direction of the Balkar village of Belaya Rechka. There were no Balkars involved. The president and other people near him stated that these people were supposedly Balkars. The prosecutor gives an interview to a local newspaper that the Balkars did it. I took them to court for that, and the newspaper was forced to print that they were not all Balkar. Can you imagine what is happening? Two weeks later they write that 25 Balkars were wanted as assistants to the attackers. Can you imagine what they are doing? They are starting to harass religious Balkars. Every day they arrested by police, beaten, and then released. They have begun to hide from the police’.

OB 030613:

‘Because they have nothing to get us with, they formally declare us an extremist organisation and demand that we be forbidden to function. And the prosecutor, like a hat on the head of the republic, also calls us an extremist organisation. We stand up for

69 The respondent is referring to the October 2005 attack on Nalchik by a large group of Islamic insurgents.
our rights in the High Court of Russia, and the high court says, “You are not an extremist organisation, you are fine”. And they annul the decision of the republican level, but nothing helps. When we try to put forth candidates, they refuse to register us, saying we are an extremist organisation’.

It is important to consider the counterframe in terms of whether it further limited the inclusivity and resonance of the master frame. Fear of openly supporting a group publicly denounced by the authorities, whether or not these claims are true, has a demobilising effect. In this way, the emergence of this competing frame is more notable for the vulnerabilities of the Balkars that it suggests.

The potential of the Balkar’s injustice master frame was further disrupted and undermined because of historical and cultural events that conspired against it. Political Islam has grown in salience in all of the whole North Caucasus over the past ten years, such that it has become a major outlet for oppositional identities and a challenge to an unjust, opaque state. In this way, political Islam represents a “frame contest” (Benford, 1993). The call to Salafism cuts across ethnic divisions, with both ethnic Balkars and Kabardians heading the rebel movement in the republic over the last few years (Jamestown Foundation, 2013). Political Islam is also a challenge to the authorities, an attempt at justice and a master frame on its own. It presents a competing discourse to the Balkars’ insistence on redressing “ethnic” injustices. The Balkar movement’s frames of injustice and its refrains about self-determination never addressed other groups’ grievances and thus were never able to align with other groups’ interests and frames, but Islam is and can allow for expansion into more broad and diverse constituencies.

Balkar movement members are generally above 40 years old and tend to be very secular and with a Soviet identity. At the same time, they are aware of the competing Islamic frame and worry about Balkar youth becoming frustrated with their elders’ lack of progress and turning towards Islam as a result. There is genuine concern on the part of the Balkar activists that Balkar youth will become more extreme in pushing forward their claims,
because the elders were not diligent or fervent enough. Movement members imply that if the authorities do not do something to resolve the Balkar ethnic group’s situation, then they risk the youth becoming radicalised. RB 300513 said:

‘That is why we are saying… do it now, so that there will not be armed conflict. We will go and then we will try to calm down our youth, that we will solve this. But there is the danger that this will turn into a revolution. We are calming them down. We are telling them to hold on. They trust us for now. They trust me.

‘…And maybe this is a mistake. We did not want to politicise them. But now they have started to politicise on their own. We did not want to burden them with all this. We thought we were doing the right thing. We thought, we are lawyers, we are…

‘They have even started to harass us because we are not calling for more decisive action, that we are sell outs. They have started to blame us. And not only the youth, certain citizens, too. They also see this lawlessness. They think we show them, print things, we print the government’s responses. Nevertheless they say, “Maybe we should try other methods.”’

While the Balkar activists’ concerns about the possible ascendancy of Islam as an alternative ideological framework are unequivocal, the possibility of the emergence of liberal-democratic frame is outright excluded. Individual Balkar attitudes towards the Moscow opposition for example were neutral to negative. To the question about whether the Moscow opposition protests gave Balkar activists any hope, respondent OB 030613 said:

‘Quite the opposite, I think things will get worse!’

K.A.: ‘Do you mean the government’s response?’

‘Yes, of course.’

K.A.: ‘And what of the fact that an unprecedented number of people came out to voice their opinions?’

‘So what! Whatever! [laughs] People came out at the beginning of the Communist Party, against them, and they were shot. And nothing changed… everyone has their place. This is not America or France where people can influence policy. This is a completely different country, a different mentality’.
5.1.3 Comparative Analysis of Frames

The Krasnodar Krai environmental movement displays a discursive construction of environmental violations and political issues related to the environment in much broader and more inclusive terms than the Balkar movement did in framing their rehabilitation, marginalisation, and injustice claims. The environmental movement’s bad governance frame and its attribution of blame to Putin’s regime allowed for the creation of an opposition master frame that aligned it with other groups in its particular social movement industry, which helped it mobilise. The Balkar movement’s rehabilitation frame — too narrow for any resonance or expansion — did not further any mobilisation efforts, and the somewhat flexible injustice master frame was still too narrow and exclusive for it to have any wider mobilising effect. Russians (Cossacks) in Kabardino-Balkaria, for example, would link with the Balkar cause because their experience is excluded by the exclusive formulation of the injustice master frame. Though both groups’ collective experiences are commensurable, their aims are ultimately different.

It is also interesting to note that for the Balkars, territorial claims linked to the land laws explained earlier did not constitute a diagnostic frame, though I had expected them to. The issue is specific enough and is fully capable of being formed into a diagnostic frame, rather elements of it were incorporated into the more general master frame of injustice. The topic was presented as just another general grievance. This is surprising, given that territorial issues can be considered in the same category as the problem of rehabilitation — both are legal issues that, unresolved, hold back rights and privileges from the Balkars. For some reason, however, respondents did not frame territorial issues separately. Indeed it seemed sometimes that respondents were less interested in speaking about them than about rehabilitation. The concept was not well developed.

As we look to master frames in order to assess their causal relationship with mobilisation, what emerges is the difference between the environmental movement’s master
frame that resonated with wide constituencies because it was culturally compatible with diverse groups across the field and the Balkars’ master frame, which was localist and narrow. The environmental movement borrowed ideas from the anti-Putin movement across Russia and aligned its frame with that of the opposition. It was in this way a powerful motivator for action. The frame was articulated, with ‘relevance to the issues at hand, adequacy, applicability, appropriateness, and resonance’ (Schmidt, 2008, p.311), and it was able to link its own ideology and strategy to those within the broader context (Smart, 1995).

The network dynamics present in the environmental movement combined with the political opportunities of media and allies were significant factors, allowing the alignment process to occur. Collective consciousness-raising processes among the environmental movement and its allied groups had already begun through communication and interaction facilitated by the open political opportunities and mobilising structures described in Chapters 3 and 4. As Taylor and Whittier (1992, p.515) state, it was ‘an ongoing process in which groups reevaluate themselves, their subjective experiences, their opportunities and their shared interests’. Thus, protest emerged as a culturally compatible and valuable outcome. Furthermore, with the mobilisation of the anti-Putin movement in Moscow against the allegedly fraudulent parliamentary elections in December 2011, moods were radicalised among growing segments of Russian society. The image of the regime’s supremacy was shaken, and peoples’ attention was drawn to the negative aspects of the regime through exposure and caricatures of the regime’s drawbacks. This made it easier for the environmental movement to connect to the anti-regime dispositions within it and harness them in order to make them relevant outside the movement. The interpretive sources of master frames provide a foundation for constructing meaning around collective action, and in the context of the growing anti-Putin movement, this was opposition and regime change. This explains how the environmental movement members developed a shared perception about a certain problem that spanned movement boundaries through frame alignment.
The Balkar movement’s master frame also links back to its narrow and exclusive mobilising structures (see Chapter 4), which in large part shaped the frame. This was itself a result of the limited political opportunities and coercive environment explained in Chapter 3. Part of the reason for the extremely ethnically delineated frame is that in the North Caucasus ‘ethnicity remains a dominant category, and defines the level of acceptable claims. Such perspectives link territory with identity, which matters when it comes to land competition’ (Matveeva, 2013, p.136). Thus it is possible that the reason for the ill-developed aspects of the frame was that ethnicity has been the predominating political division for the Balkars and, indeed, historically for institutionalised politics in the republic where ethnic identity and structural factors have been mutually reinforcing. For Vermeersch (2001, p.8), ‘ethnic identity is set against a broader structural picture with identity as a basis for mobilisation in search of access to political power, material resources and the control over representation’. In Kabardino-Balkaria and the North Caucasus more generally, the structural environment is expected to accommodate special channels for ethnic representation and rights, even if these channels do not function or are disregarded by those in power. In this way, the institutionalised ethnic identity that emerged in the Soviet period is still shaping the Balkar activists’ shared meanings.

Furthermore, the isolated and confined Balkar movement network in turn affected the movement’s framing in a way that can be explained by cognitive flexibility. For example, in contrast, the environmental movement’s prevalence of weak ties leads to ‘complex role sets and the need for cognitive flexibility’ (Granovetter, 1983, p.204-5). This refers to the elaborated code (versus restricted code) of speech necessary when communicating with a more diverse set of people, especially necessary when using a broadcast type of communication (see Chapter 4). Because the Balkar movement network has been so insular, there has been no need for an elaborated code, as communication has been limited to a
homogenous set of actors. This in turned shaped how they constructed their frames (see below).

One of the characteristic elements of a master frame is its new or transformed nature meant to inspire and justify action (Tarrow, 1989, p.48). The Balkar’s master frame of injustice, influenced from the field of other marginalised ethnic groups from the 1990s, is thus not new and does not construct a different or more nuanced view of the problem. Also pitted against this already narrow frame was the authorities’ counterframe of Balkars as extremists and the frame contest of Islam.

It could be argued that the lack of resonance of the Balkar movement’s injustice master frame was a significant factor in the movement’s inability to maintain a sustained protest cycle. This is also a consequence of the frame being ill-defined. Similar and linkable problem sets such as rehabilitation and diminished local self-government rights within the frame as explained earlier in Chapter 5 were not coherently connected, and neither was the frame expanded to incorporate any wider grievances in the field. Theoretically, injustice frames on the whole can be both flexible and inclusive and can resonate further beyond the confines of the movement, as many empirical works show (e.g. Johnston and Almeida, 2006; Gulewitsch, 2011). However, the Balkar activists tied the injustice frame to a relatively narrow set of issues, and the effect is that it does not catch on. For example, the frame construction not only does not integrate wider societal issues, but it also disregards the Balkar youth. It is difficult to imagine how strongly advocating for “rehabilitation” can mobilise younger generations of Balkars when it is highly unlikely that they will fight for the right to repopulate their ancestors’ remote villages in the mountains. It also does not take into account issues that are more salient for Balkar youth, for example population flight because of wider societal and political issues of corruption and lack of opportunity. It is essentially an old frame that has not changed.
While there might be a predominance of ethno-social categories over resources in the republic (See Chapter 1), this research suggests that this is changing. Ethnicity seems to be waning as an ideology for social and political control, simply because it cannot mobilise the constituencies it used to and is therefore no longer the precept the authorities adhered to previously. Ethnically based communities are prevalent in the region, but at the same time, the frames that have wider appeal are not the ones that are based exclusively on ethnicity and clans, like Islam.

Notable is that both movements diagnose legal failures as a problem but attribute the issue to different causes. For the Krasnodar environmental movement, detrimental laws and the authorities who enact them are blamed for allowing much of the environmental problems to occur. On the other hand, for the Balkar movement in Kabardino-Balkaria, the laws are regarded as favourable — they just aren’t being implemented. Thus in a sense, the diagnostic frame is to some extent the same; — what changes is the prognosis. Different patterns of activity emerge from this, having an effect on the master frame. Specifically, the environmental movement’s protest is more geared towards systemic change, while the Balkar movement directs its protest towards advocating for laws, keeping within the framework of official power structures.

The choice of target is contingent also on ‘pre-existing repertoires, networks of organizations and the processes that underlie diffusion… the economic and political context of different regions influence the existence and activity of political organisations, their issues, campaigns and of course their choices of tactic and target’ (Wood, 2003, p.9). The environmental movement was increasingly transposing its orientation to contentious, confrontational politics, while the Balkar movement remained engaged in less disruptive strategies. The two movements identify the authorities, whether on the regional level, federal level, or both in the case of the Krasnodar Krai environmental movement, as the source of their problems. The difference is that the environmental movement engages with and takes on
oppositional identities in its contention. Balkars on the other hand are extremely reluctant to be seen as oppositionist. For example, OB 030613 said:

‘What is the point of using the word oppositionist if we are demanding that federal laws be enacted? Who are we in opposition to? We oppose those that don’t care about federal laws. In reality, those that are “oppositionists” are those that stand in opposition to the federal authorities.’

Furthermore the Balkar activists had to deal with an additional obstacle to their framing — the authorities’ deployment of a counterframe of extremism. What is interesting about this counterframe is that it does not invoke or engage in any argument against the initial Balkar injustice frame. Rather, in the contest for public opinion, the frame completely ignores Balkars’ claims and attempts to delegitimise Balkar activist voices through depicting them as treasonous and a danger to Kabardino-Balkarian society. This has a strong implication that links back to political opportunities, as such criminalisation of the movement has an effect on policing. Demonising a movement as extremist makes repression understandable, if not required. This was in effect a pre-emptive legitimisation of violence and repression.

Furthermore, the counterframe presents a problem for the Balkar movement, because with its lack of open media, the movement cannot effectively communicate a rebuttal or rejection of the frame, or otherwise engage in public contestation.

The Balkar movement has been further faced with the competing frame of political Islam which, with the growing importance of religion in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, has made space for its rise as a competing ideology. Unlike the localist and ethnically limited Balkar injustice master frame, a political Islam master frame has a much wider frame of reference. If adopted, one becomes automatically associated with a resource-rich supranational network. In this way, Islam can offer agency on both individual and collective levels in its orientation towards a shared collective identity. From that shared identity, a new more Islamic community of Balkar activists could possibly arise — one that could be more plugged into the global Islamic community. If the Balkar movement wants to challenge the
established distribution of power and resources as well as the control of the regional political apparatus by entrenched elites, it would be difficult to imagine how it could succeed without mobilising political support more widely. It is possible that the Balkars’ current injustice frame becomes so impractical that to promote their own interests Balkar constituencies will begin to ascribe to this macro-level ideological frame for elaborating claims through a pan-Russian or global Islamic focus.

The competing political Islam frame also has implications for the political opportunities available to the movement. As the authorities and the Balkar movement compete for the same support base, the counterframe that portrays the Balkar movement as extremists and sowers of ethnic strife limits the opportunity structures for the movement. Furthermore, because political Islam is a competing frame, it becomes easier for the counterframe creators (the authorities) to decry the Balkars as having a more extreme, Islamic agenda. From this emerges anti-terrorist legislation and more obstacles for others to buy into the Balkar concept if that would mean they would also potentially be associated with Islamist extremists.
CONCLUSION – UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN A NON-DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM

In examining the cases of the Krasnodar Krai environmental movement and the Kabardino-Balkaria Balkar ethno-national movement through the prism of social movement theory (SMT), this research aimed to answer questions about opposition dynamics in post-Soviet Russia and in non-democratic contexts more generally. The lack of systematic theoretically grounded comparative studies on collective action dynamics in Russia make it prudent for this research to draw from the dominant Western theoretical frameworks, with minor adaptations made for the Russian setting. This is done while following the lead of works that have applied social movement theory to other non-democratic contexts. Based on the lacuna in the existing literature, this study investigated how the political process theoretical model could be extended for better understanding of how social movements mobilise in Russia. It was particularly concerned with networks, which enabled it to move beyond the boundaries of traditional SMT.

A theoretical innovation of this thesis is the adaptation of existing SMT that has been developed and refined in western democratic contexts, to make it a useful analytical tool for application to a non-democratic context. The movement-oriented perspective adopted for the analysis of the two chosen movements also allowed a more agency-focused means of enquiry that captured the relationship between the political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing for collective action.

A comparison of the two movements in this study revealed that this approach, from a theoretical perspective, provided the tools for analysing the movements and producing findings that use the same set of variables to explain two different outcomes. The movements were subject to similar overarching state constraints and political-contextual factors, and their differences stem both from external factors. These factors for instance could have been nuances in the political opportunities across the regional context in which the movements
exist as well as internal factors, such as the movements’ network structures for information
diffusion and their interpretive framing. It found that movements benefit greatly from
interaction between activist networks. This is a good case for acknowledging movement
boundaries as being blurred and delineated. These are important elements that impact
mobilisation that often cannot be drawn out of broader studies. The thesis’s findings are
presented in the table below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Opportunities</th>
<th>Mobilising Structures</th>
<th>Framing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Krasnodar environmental movement** | • The repression that increased in 2011 spurred on mobilisation initially, but ultimately weakened the movement and hastened its demobilisation in 2012;  
• Undivided regional elite did not hinder the movement’s mobilisation;  
• The presence of media in the form of ICTs helped the movement communicate its message, coordinate activity, and facilitated its bridging with other groups;  
• Allies helped overcome the power balance between it and the authorities; they helped the movement link up with other activist networks such as the anti-Putin network as well as political parties, such as Yabloko. | • The movement’s loose network structure with diffuse ties allowed a diverse group of people to be connected in a coherent way;  
• Its broadcast flow of information reduced the cost of organising;  
• Activists on the periphery were in the position to receive information and resources from outside, and facilitated bridging and interaction with other movement networks;  
• Repertoires demonstrated some tactical innovation which was likely to help facilitate mobilisation. | • The environmental movement constructed an inclusive and flexible oppositional master frame that was able to implicate more actors and accommodate more claims, allowing for increased momentum and sustained action;  
• The oppositional frame was more culturally salient during Moscow protests. |
| **Kabardino-Balkaria Balkar movement** | • There was no significant change in repression; rather the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria is characterised by constant state coercion and violence which raises the cost of action;  
• The open opportunity of the divided regional elite was not enough for the movement to mobilise;  
• The lack of media meant the movement was unable to communicate its own message and shape the discourse; it reduced recruitment opportunities, and kept the cost of action high;  
• The lack of influential allies kept the movement marginalised and isolated. | • The strong, tight-knit network that was good in a coercive environment was not conducive to the free exchange of ideas or recruitment;  
• Node-to-node interaction kept the information flow slow and limited;  
• Structure kept movement isolated from information, resources, and innovation from outside;  
• Repertoires demonstrated limited innovation and were not likely to help facilitate mobilisation. | • The Balkar movement’s injustice master frame, despite being flexible and able to accommodate varying interpretations of what injustice entailed, was ultimately too localist and exclusive to resonate beyond its narrow circles;  
• The injustice frame was articulated through old ethnic formulations and no longer culturally salient. |
As this table shows, the interaction of different structural, network, and framing variables accounts for differences in mobilisation outcome. For the Krasnodar environmental movement, the open media (ICTs) boosted the benefit of the presence of influential allies by facilitating open communication with the networks associated with those allies. The open communication provided by the media and the allied networks in turn contributed to a network structure that was broad, in contact with more diverse ideas and people, and able to accommodate people in strategic positions on the periphery who could transverse the boundaries of the movement. Finally, the combination of the presence of media, influential allies, and an open diffuse network allowed for framing that was inclusive, resonant, and attended to the identities of the people within the movement and those in the wider field. This master frame alignment allowed for ideological linking and coordination among more heterogenous groups which encouraged more communication and bridging. In this way, the combination of these variables’ effect boosted each other and resulted in a point of lowered power difference between challengers and the state, which led to its protest cycle of 2010-2012.

For the Balkar movement, the lack of media and absence of influential allies put the movement in an isolated position from the start, making it unable to communicate its message or enjoy support and exposure from sympathetic entities. This isolation, as well as the more repressive environment, contributed to a network that was tight-knit, closed-off, and not suited for diversity or accessing resources and information from outside. The “strength of weak ties” concept is also helpful in the discussion of the Balkar movement and how its network of exclusively strong ties contributed to its isolation and marginalisation. As Granovetter posits, actors with few weak ties are “unlikely to mobilise effectively for collective action within their communities” (Granovetter, 1983, p.224). The absence of media, influential allies, and the presence of a closed network contributed to frame construction that was also localist and narrow, discouraging support and closing it off to collaboration with
other groups. The way the variables combined for the Balkar movement increased its power marginalisation, leaving the movement weak in relation to the state and unable to mobilise. It was thus unable to take advantage of the divided regional elite.

It therefore could be argued that in a national political setting, local mobilisation is not always a given, rather it is set off by differential problems that warrant closer examination. This is particularly relevant to the ongoing debate in SMT literature about how to account for variation in activism. It provides new insights into how people respond to political opportunities and what people are doing in social movements, what their structure of social interaction is, and how their behaviour helps facilitate collective action.

Through applying the variables recognised as the key ingredients for movement mobilisation and demobilisation (political opportunities, mobilising structures, and framing) to Russia, while keeping in mind the specific and political features of Russia and its regions, the thesis shows that movement dynamics within Russia can be understood through the application of general social movement concepts. This shows also that Russia does not exist in a parallel universe where a different set of theoretical concepts is needed to understand it, but it does call for a deep knowledge about its political and social context in order to apply the variables in a meaningful way.

This thesis’s other contribution to area studies and to understanding Russia more specifically lies in its elaboration of the relationship between the Russian state and its citizens. This exposes the underlying nature of the Russian political system, which is based on using the power concentration of regional elites connected to the Kremlin (the power vertical), as a patronage system that rewards loyalty by reinforcing their local authority, and sanctioning repression, creating a power imbalance between the state and its citizens. In so doing, this regional manifestation of the power vertical maintains cohesion among local elites through its access to power, allowing them to raise the cost of dissent by facilitating the isolation of movements, limiting their access to potential allies and resources, and undermining their process of consolidation. Within this context, movements can only achieve a
protest cycle by broadening their networks outside halls of power, thereby beginning to equalize the power imbalance.

With the current configuration of Russian political structures, the only way movements can achieve a protest cycle is to broaden their networks outside halls of power. Ties with other movements stimulate the mobilisation process by integrating activists from other groups and hybridising ideologies appealing to broader constituencies. This promotes a movement interdependency view, with social movements understood in terms of relationships to other movements that can exchange information, know-how, and leave a legacy (Rojas and Heaney, 2008, p.4; Isaac and Christiansen, 2002, p.726).

The environmental movement’s 2010 change in orientation from being more exclusively environmentally concerned to pursuing more oppositionally shaped issues meant that it has had a greater chance to develop and incorporate more actors through such hybridisation of identities allowing them to span movements. It is thus useful to see the movement not only as a local phenomenon but as part of a “network society” (Castells, 1996) of people who share oppositional values and ideologies, even while geographically separated. This social structure confronted the environmental activists with new and more varied ideologies and ideas simply because they had access to a broader pool of people and resources outside the network (Polletta, 1999, p.20). This also offered activists more positions from which political opportunities could be detected. In this case, this was exemplified by the national “crisis” of the anti-Putin mobilisation becoming a political opportunity for the environmental movement in Krasnodar. The Krasnodar environmental movement would also not have been able to mobilise were it not able to generate information for consumption and to some extent dictate the conversation about it by taking advantage of the presence of alternative and social media, fast and wide information diffusion. As Castells (2002, p.370) said, ‘knowledge generation and information processing are the sources of value and power in the Information Age… both depend on innovation, and on the capacity to diffuse innovation
in networks that induce synergy by sharing this information and knowledge’. This idea refers
to what Castells calls the “space of flows”. The Internet, social media, and other ICTs such as
mobile phones offered the environmental activists new possibilities. They updated old
methods with modernity and globalisation as well as developed new understandings of
“opposition” to match their own socio-political contexts. All this made its engagement with
the broader Russian political culture possible, allowed it to tap into liberal and democratic
ideologies, especially in 2011-2012 when such ideas gained in strength, and permitted the
movement to become one of the leading opposition groups in Krasnodar.

On the other side, the Balkar movement exhibits signs of decline. The movement can
only revitalise itself and grow by deriving increased potential through more widely appealing
ideologies. The movement is faced with either transforming its community of activists into
something more integrationist in order to become part of a broader community, or dying out.
Kabardino-Balkaria’s isolated position from Russian politics as a republic in the North
Caucasus where ethnicity and clans still influence politics makes it especially difficult to
utilise ICTs and to restructure their informational relationships to diffuse information more
openly, transparently, and widely.

What is the significance of these results for non-democracies more generally? In using a
comparative study with an in-depth ethnographic research to understand the dynamics of Russia,
robust findings have been produced based on a variety of different sources. This is a strong
endorsement of the method used and suggests the high feasibility of its application elsewhere. As there
are clear similarities in variables among nondemocratic regimes, such as lack of access to media and
repression, the replication of this approach in other nondemocratic countries would be particularly
fruitful and would in fact bring about much-needed refinement of the approach.

Regional political systems are characterised by the same overarching state-level
political factors but with different configurations at work, and the findings of this study add to
the understanding of these understudied dynamics in non-democratic settings as a whole. In
particular, this research confirms that networks are of increased significance in a setting
where spaces free of the state are constrained. Furthermore, mobilising structures in non-democracies are best looked at as structures that link core activists with peripheral supporters and various movement organisations as well as provide links to outside networks which allow coordination, coherence, and movements to persist through abeyance. In non-democracies, these informal networks gain significance because activists must create autonomous networks as an alternative to state institutions, given the high risk of working through formal organisations that can be targeted. The Krasnodar environmental movement shows that ‘in non-democratic contexts, the forging of oppositional networks is vital to successfully challenging the state and developing civil society and democratic relations’ (Schock, 2005, p.29). This research suggests that free spaces for flow of information are needed in order to construct resonant frames. They need space in which to coalesce in order to challenge the dominant ideologies and overcome fear of repression successfully. In a strongly state-controlled and censored media landscape, alternative information sharing and distribution becomes a powerful tool in facilitating the construction of collective identities, which in turn increases strength. Similar to what Shock found with the Philippines, for Russia ‘the opening of information flows… lower[s] power discrepancies between challengers and the state in facilitating challenging movements’ (Schock, 1999, p.370).

In this way, a key claim of this research is the importance of the role of networks in nondemocratic systems. Firstly, the research’s emphasis on networks, rather than SMOs, acknowledges the diminished relevance of formal organisations in non-democracies, due to the risk and high visibility of their operation in a more repressive environment. Rather, the emphasis is on loose, informal networks, which operate ‘under the radar’. Secondly, the significance of the role of these networks’ emerges from the combination of the variables that helps a movement attain social and political connectedness, consequently overcoming isolation and reducing the state’s capacity for isolation and repression. Lastly, the inclusion of
social networks and ICTs in this research’s analysis is a novelty in SMT in general, and
certainly has not been tested to any significant extent in the post-Soviet context.

Overall, this research contributes to filling the gaps both in social movement studies in
non-democracies as well as in Russian area studies and opens up new avenues for enquiry.

**Further Research**

While this thesis identifies and analyses the various structural and cultural factors that
shape mobilisation in southern Russia, it simultaneously raises other issues that might lead to
further research. The focus of this study has been on mobilisation. While the regional
comparative approach could be deemed representative of other subnational subjects of the
Russian Federation, one must approach any generalisation across Russian regions carefully.
In this sense, the consideration of research and methodological constraints is crucial in
assuming any representativeness from the insights of this work.

The limitations of this research bears considering new avenues of exploration. Further
research should attempt to “validate” the emerging collective action arrangements in different
regional contexts in Russia which remain underresearched and undertheorised. Although the
“unlikelihood” for collective action in Russia cannot be denied, where it does occur, in
particular in community-based action surrounding various initiatives across Russia such as in
Astrakhan, Izhevsk, and other localities (Kleman et al., 2010), it is often ignored as a result of
the Western-centric foundations of inquiry which tend to overlook micro-level contention.
Only with further research in different regions and sectors of Russia will we have a better
understanding of Russian social movement dynamics as a whole.

Furthermore, social movements’ ability to affect wider discourses is a potentially
fruitful direction for future research. In particular, it would be interesting to explore how the
anti-Putin opposition movement, which although ultimately “unsuccessful” in its stated
claims of putting an end to Putin’s regime, challenged prevailing discourses about power and
politics in Russia and how it influenced both peoples’ perception of the regime as well as of collective action as a means to air grievances.

Another possible direction for future research could be exploring the links between the emergence and continuation of political Islam in the North Caucasus and other Muslim regions of Russia and its interaction with the various institutions that shape the power structures that they contend with. Although carrying out such research would be extremely difficult, it would nevertheless be very fruitful for the North Caucasus as the region faces perennial insecurity being caught in the fight between these groups and the power structures.

Lastly, given the increasing Internet restrictions in Russia, how will social movements fare in the future? Since the 2014 Sochi Olympics, the annexation of Crimea, and heightened tensions with the West, Russia has been changing course, clamping down even more on opposition. Alexei Navalny’s influential and popular blog for example has been blocked as a result of his being put under house arrest. In this way, Russia is moving increasingly towards a more repressive authoritarian state. Given the increasingly closed political system in Russia as of 2013, it remains to be seen how social movements might link up with the wider support necessary in order to mobilise.

Annex 1a
СПАСТИ УТРИШ!

Утриш — уникальная природная территория на Черноморском побережье рядом с Анапой. Сегодня над ней нависла смертельная угроза! Управление делами президента РФ хочет построить там элитную дачу, которую называет физкультурно-оздоровительным комплексом.

В уничтожении Утриша принимает участие и администрация Краснодарского края. Чиновники хотят проложить через Утриш автотрассу и застроить его берег. Погибнет можхассийная и фисташковые деревья, занесенные в Красную книгу. Будет разрушен естественный ландшафт и места обитания редких и краснокнижных животных. В итоге Россия и весь мир навсегда потеряют уникальную территорию.

В 2008 году для подъезда к президентской даче стали строить автотрассу. Ее называли лесоохранственной «противопожарной дорогой». Зимой 2008-2009 гг. защитникам природы удалось остановить строительство, буквально стоясь на пути техники. Тогда строительство велось на территории заказника «Большой Утриш» и было полностью незаконным.

Чтобы уклонить беспредел, власти пошли на хитрость: решением Правительства РФ в Утрише создан заповедник. Но самые ценные территории, где собираются строить элитные дачи, в заповедник не включены. Посмотрите на рисунок.

Теперь власти Краснодарского края хотят убрать одно из последних правовых препятствий для уничтожения природы — ликвидировать заказник «Большой Утриш». В подтверждение этого 19 января 2012 г. на сайте государственных закупок появилась информация о проведении конкурса на подготовку материалов для ликвидации государственного заказника "Большой Утриш" и изменении границ и площади заказника "Абраусский". Жители Краснодарского края и всей России, общественные, политические и религиозные организации! Объединяйтесь! Спасем Утриш!

Экологическая Вахта по Северному http://ewnc.org/utrish
Движение «Спасем Утриш» http://www.save-utrish.ru/
В Нальчике заявили об игнорировании чиновниками «земельного вопроса»

Участники митинга в Нальчике, посвященного 68-й годовщине депортации балкарского народа, заявили об игнорировании их требований чиновниками Кабардино-Балкарии. Главой проблемой балкаров остается нерешенный земельный вопрос, считают участники мероприятия.

Гериева: люди обеспокоены строительством туркластера

Чиновники игнорируют положения сразу нескольких федеральных законов, таким образом нарушая права балкаров, считает участница митинга, эксперт Общероссийского движения «За права человека», ответственный секретарь Совета старейшин балкарского народа (ССБН) Тамара Гериеева.

«Основная наша проблема — это земля. Республиканские власти не выполняют целый ряд федеральных законов — это ставит балкарский народ в положение работ, обреченных, в конечном итоге, на медленное вымирание», - заявила Гериеева.

По ее словам, речь идет о невыполнении республиканскими властями федерального закона № 131 «Об общих принципах организации местного самоуправления в Российской Федерации», ФЗ № 101 «Об обороте земель сельскохозяйственного назначения», ФЗ № 435 «О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в части совершенствования оборота земель сельскохозяйственного назначения».

«Участники митинга потребовали от ССБН направить свои усилия на скорейшее решение проблемного вопроса. В большой степени их к такому решению подвигло и решение о создании туркластера на балкарских территориях. Люди воинственно настроены против этого кластера», - утверждает Тамара Гериеева.

В конце января этого года представители трех сел Черкесского района КБР – Верхняя Балкария, Бешентги и Карса-Суу – создали рабочую группу из 12 человек для
Annex 2

Other major social and ethno-national movements and NGOs in Krasnodar Krai and Kabardino-Balkaria

1. Krasnodar Krai

1.1. Cossack movement and groupings

Cossacks\(^{70}\) were settled in the North Caucasus in the 1800s by Imperial Russia with the intention of “neutralising” the Muslim population (Matsaberidze 2007) and to help support Russian colonial forays into the region. The establishment of Cossack settlements in the region was deemed necessary as the Russian imperial elite in the borderlands regarded the failure of indigenous North Caucasians to convert to Christianity and conform was seen as evidence of their “savagery” (Jersild 2000). The Bolshevik regime however saw Cossacks as a threat and “stripped [them] of their special military roles and social privileges” (Skinner 1994:1018). During the Soviet period Cossacks were further persecuted, and forced through repressions “which broke up or destroyed whole Cossack communities” (Skinner 1994:1018). In this way, Cossacks were essentially done away with as a social category during the Soviet period.

With the onset of glasnost’, descendants of these original Cossacks “began to shake the dust off their grandfathers’ uniforms and to proselytize for a renewed kazachestvo, or Cossackdom, with its historic role of ‘defending the Fatherland’” (Skinner 1994:1017). After 1990, the already growing interest in Cossack culture in Krasnodar became politicised with the outbreak of ethnic collective mobilisation brought on by the social and political uncertainty surrounding the break-up of the Soviet Union. During this time, “the urge to formulate a defensive discourse of Russian identity grew particularly strong in the borderland and multi-ethnic region of Krasnodar” (Derluguian and Cipko 1997:1489), and led to the

\(^{70}\) There are several groups of Cossacks, for example the Don Cossacks in Rostovskaia Oblast’, and the Terek Cossacks, who occupy settlements in Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, and Chechnya (Galeotti 1995). The largest and most politically active group however are the Kuban Cossacks of Krasnodar Krai.
creation of the so-called “neo-Cossack” project in the region (Derluguian and Cipko 1997). The movement mobilised in the 1990s along nationalistic lines, and participated in paramilitary action in Moldova and Abkhazia. However, since the 2000s, “the movement and its appeal seems to have faded, both in terms of influence and reverence” (Toje 2006:1058), due to their co-optation by the state.

The contemporary Kuban’ Cossacks’ narrative idealises Cossack folk heritage, and deploys a conservative and nationalistic condemnation of globalism and cosmopolitanism as a reaction to perceived social instability and moral decline. Kuban’ Cossacks’ self-proclaimed role has been to revitalise its way of life and preserve the moral fabric of Russia. As they link their claims to the region through the idea of Krasnodar as “indigenous” Cossack territory (Boeck 2007:650), their position as guardians and protectors of the Russian state in the region emerges. Furthermore the overlap of their conservative ideologies with the Kremlin’s which itself “in many ways resembled a twenty-first century version of the Tsarist patrimonial state” (Stent 2008:1092) becomes apparent. As such, the movement was a willing partner in its co-optation by the state. This co-optation was welcomed also because it entailed establishing a permanent Cossack presence within the state bureaucracy and receiving steady funds from the federal budget. Krasnodar Krai gives Cossacks financial backing and the regional government even “has a department for Cossack affairs” (Arnold 2014:9).

This co-optation however has had implications for the way the group has functioned. After co-optation, the Cossacks essentially ceased to be a movement with autonomy, and became a state institution. People who are not of Cossack background join the ranks, simply because it is seen as a job that provides some level of authority. This authority is often arbitrary, and Cossack paramilitary street patrols often have more power to act than policemen, and are constrained by fewer rules. Krasndoor Governor Tkachev has publicly spoken about his frustration with the way police try to stop “unwanted guests” into the Krai, because “there are limits – democracy and heightened care for human rights, civil society”
(Chaykovskaya 2012). It is in this way that the state has deployed Cossacks for extra-legal policing purposes. Thus despite being best known for playing a role in the authorities’ securitisation of ethnicity in the Krai (Popov and Kuznetsov 2008) and in suppressing visible minorities, Cossacks are also a tool for constraining and policing civil society and state opposition in the region, exemplified in their whipping of Pussy Riot members during the Sochi 2014 Olympics (BBC 2014), their expulsion of the Cossack who defended Pussy Riot (Okolov 2014), or physically attacking anti-Putin protesters at a Cossack rally (Kavkaz Uzel 2012). This makes it difficult for non-state actors opposed to the regime to operate in the region.

1.1.1. Anti-Putin movement and groupings

The anti-Putin movement in Krasnodar Krai has been comprised of a loose conglomerate of different groups and different people, just as it has been across the Russian Federation. The movement’s activities in the region began in mid-2010 with the Strategy 31 pickets (YouTube 2010), which occur on the 31st of every month that has 31 days, to protest the deterioration of rights of public assembly in Russia. In 2012, a regional March of Millions on 6 May was held in Krasnodar, and local activists also protested the detention of the 6 May protestors on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. When the Moscow-based Occupy Abay project appeared, which was inspired by the global Occupy movement but oriented around anti-Putin sentiment, it created a regional spinoff in Krasnodar called Occupy Kuban’. The associated hashtag #оккупайкубань (Occupy Kuban’) enjoyed some popularity as activists set up an Occupy Kuban’ camp which was supported by other Russian activists, evidenced in particular by the arrival and participation of fourteen activists from Moscow. Six local activists and members of the Yabloko Party (see below) were detained at this camp, some twice. Furthermore, there have been various groups and forums on social media that served as a platform to organise around different issues associated with the opposition. For example, local
activists created a group on Vkontakte called “Kuban’! Otkroi glaza!” (Kuban’! Open your eyes!), which featured and continues to feature news about Russian political prisoners, Pussy Riot, as well as anti-war (Ukraine) news and messages. Furthermore, local activists became involved the regional branch of Golos, the organisation that had been organising initiatives for citizen monitoring of elections in Russia since 2000, and which was revitalised in 2013 after Putin’s re-inauguration. Although Golos’ activities were suspended in 2013 for failing to register for the foreign agent law, activists previously involved in it continue to do independent trainings for election monitoring.

Art collectives of Krasnodar can also count themselves as part of the anti-Putin movement – in particular, the contemporary art group “ZIP”, as well as the organisers for the “Prokhodite Mimo” gallery. The group positions political art often in public spaces, and holds street exhibits featuring political art, which have been shut down by Cossacks.

*Street art by ZIP collective. Photo by Karena Avedissian, March 2012*

The Yabloko Party has had a very important role in Krasnodar Krai as one of the most active and well-known branches of the party, known for heavily publicised investigations of
illegal construction in forest preserves, and active participation in local elections and monitoring (Gazeta.ru 2013). The party facilitated the regional activities of many sub-groups in the anti-Putin and pro-democracy movement, including offering its offices to be used by the environmental activists. However, recently, the party has been severely weakened. The party’s regional leadership exited after its Federal Bureau headed by party leader Sergei Mitrokhin expelled Krasnodar member Leonid Zaprudin on 23 November 2013 for donating 5,000 roubles to Aleksei Navalny’s Moscow mayoral campaign. Andrei Rudomakha, head of both the Krasnodar regional Yabloko division as well as the Environmental Watch of the North Caucasus (EWNC) quit Yabloko in protest of Zaprudin’s dismissal, after which other Krasnodar members decided to leave. As if to finish the process, in February 2014, another large group of members left Yabloko, many of them environmental activists. The regional party has since then been practically dissolved.

As a whole, however, the anti-Putin and oppositional network has weakened considerably since the end of 2012, due mainly to repressive measures by the regional authorities. At this time however, they still become active for high-profile cases such as for environmental activist Evgeny Vitishko and civic activist and academic Mikhail Savva, both of whom recently faced criminal charges.

2. Kabardino-Balkaria

2.1. Circassian\textsuperscript{71} ethno-national movement and groupings

The Circassian national movement comprises a variety of groups and organisations, the best-known and largest organisation of which is Adyge Khase. Also known as the International Circassian Association, Adyge Khase is the flagship organisation of the

[Accessed 4 May 2014]
Circassian and Abkhaz-Abazin people. Their stated goals include the return of all ethnic Circassians to their homeland, the recognition of the Circassian Genocide by Russia (which has incidentally been recognised by regional parliaments of Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria), and the reintegration of Circassian lands (Zhemukhov 2013). The organisation has an active branch in Krasnodar Krai as well, and its role there has, as with Kabardino-Balkaria, become more active in recent times in both opposing the Sochi Olympics in February 2014. The Olympic Games in particular have been a source of contention for the Circassians as “Sochi is considered by the Circassians as the last capital of independent Circassia. Its port was the place from which the Circassians were deported to the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Krasnaya Polyana (Kbaada in Circassian), the area that will be the centre of the 2014 Olympic Games, was the place, where, on May 21, 1864, a parade of Russian troops celebrated the end of the war against the Circassians” (Zhemukhov 2013).

The movement’s role in Kabardino-Balkaria has also been reinvigorated in advocating for the return of ethnic Circassians fleeing the conflict in Syria to the North Caucasus, especially as the overwhelming majority of repatriates have been settled in Nalchik. However, despite Circassian efforts in Nalchik, Cherkessk in the neighbouring Republic of Karachevo-Cherkessia, and Maikop in the Republic of Adygea, the Russian Duma has refused calls to recognise Syrian Circassians as compatriots, leaving them without Russian state assistance in repatriation. This has caused consternation among Circassian activists of various political orientations, and has created a feeling among them that Russia is doing everything it can to curb such immigration (Dzutsev 2013b). Dzutsev states, “apart from stopping the flow of Circassian refugees from Syria, the Russian government also took a more hostile stance towards those refugees that made it into the country. For example, the Circassian civil organisation Peryt (translation: “moving forward”) was fined for helping a group of 19 Syrian Circassians obtain Russian business visas” (Dzutsev 2013b). The author also posits this as a growing point of contention between Circassians and Moscow. In this way, though the
Circassians might have always been seen as unsympathetic to Moscow, they have more recently represented a more oppositional-oriented group, and as some might argue, even a potential ally of Georgia in the region.

2.2. Human Rights groups

There is a very small set of people working in human rights organisations Kabardino-Balkaria. The local branch of the human rights organisation Memorial had been providing crucial legal representation to families in which young men have been illegally detained and tortured, or killed in the republic. However, the presence of Memorial in the republic is under question as the office had two lawyers in 2012, one of whom left the organisation shortly afterward after receiving death threats. Furthermore, it was announced in April 2014 that Memorial is being closed down in Russia as part of the crackdown on NGOs under the “foreign agent” law. It thus remains to be seen how this gap can be filled. The other active organisation in the republic is the Kabardino-Balkaria branch of the all-Russia civic organisation Za Prava Cheloveka (For Human Rights). This organisation is also small, with around three permanent members of staff. This group also deals with legal cases in defending and giving counsel to families whose members have been detained, abducted, or killed. However, their activities are also geared towards building civil society, employing educational initiatives with conferences, seminars and report writing. This group also works for the protection of rights of Circassian repatriates coming from the Middle East, as well as protecting linguistic rights of Balkars and Kabardians. This group is also under constant pressure from the authorities, their phones are tapped and staff is followed.

The role of these groups in the republic is to provide a crucial watchdog presence that watches and records the activities of the authorities and law enforcement, providing some constraint on the authorities’ impunity. This situation contrasts for example with neighbouring Karachaevo-Cherkessia, where no such organisations operate, and where the
power structures regularly take suspects from the region in order to force confessions without the presence of lawyers or watchdog groups. It is worth noting that as a sign of burgeoning civil society in the republic with the potential of creating a more open and just society, it is still in its very early development stages and has thus far had a limited effect.

2.3. Islamist movement and groupings

Political Islam as a movement in Kabardino-Balkaria has been growing since the 2000s. Until 2005, the Northwest Caucasus had been regarded as somewhat unaffected by the Islamic insurgency that was emerging in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan. This was due to what Souleimanov states was in Kabardino-Balkaria a “sizeable” Russian population, Europeanisation during Soviet rule, as well as the fact that “local societies largely lack the attributes contributing the swift mobilization in the Northeast Caucasus: the prevalence of highly traditional societies including tribalism, blood feuds, and a strong role for Islam in the public and private spheres” (Souleimanov 2011).

These assessments necessitated re-evaluation after 13 October 2005, when over 200 militants attacked buildings of the security apparatus of the Kabardino-Balkarian capital, which resulted in two days of street battles and dozens of deaths. In a taped speech, Shamil Basaev of the Caucasus Emirate claimed the attack to be by the Kabardino-Balkarian component of the “North Caucasian Front”, headed by its leader Anzor Astemirov.

This attack are a part of the rise of political Islam in the whole region, which is seen as being caused more by Putin’s recentralisation policies during his first term (2000-2004) rather than the conflict in Chechnya (Markedonov 2010). State suppression facilitated by centralisation has caused the movement to move to other, less policed areas, and to

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72 Anzor Astemirov (Amir Sayfullah) of the Kabardino-Balkarian Jamaat is an example of the phenomenon of younger imams in the North Caucasus who have been educated in the Middle East and have been taking the place of the older, Soviet-educated religious leaders. With his participation, the Islamic Centre of Kabardino-Balkaria was established (ICKB), becoming the most formidable opposition of the Kremlin-dominated official spiritual board.
decentralise over the last two decades, creating various nodes of activity that are in close communication with each other (Malashenko and Yarlykapov 2009). It was from these adaptations in the mid-2000s that the Kabardino-Balkarian jamaat became the most organised and most well-known in the North Caucasus, able to mount the attack in October 2005, while other networks of jamaats (Islamic communities) in other republics continued to flourish (Malashenko and Yarlykapov, 2009). However, numbers of the jamaat of Muslims have been seen to grow as persecution from the authorities, especially towards ordinary, non-terrorist practicing Muslims, increases.

Malashenko and Yarlykapov (2009) state that there is no charismatic leader for Russian Muslims that would cover the entire Muslim community. However, the potential for the growth of political Islam still persists. According to Markedonov (2010) radical Islam offers a universal ideology that can transcend the factionalism and clan fighting in the region. Furthermore, the persecution that young and especially male Muslims endure in the North Caucasus can potentially produce more militancy.
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