FLORENCE, BYZANTIUM AND THE OTTOMANS (1439-1481). POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

by

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation studies the diplomatic and political communication between Florence, the Byzantine and the Ottoman empires in the fifteenth century (1439-1481). The first chapter is introductory to the thesis and reconstructs the contacts between Florence and Byzantium. The second chapter and the third chapter examine the privileges granted by John VIII to Florence; the chapters present the contents and contextualise the privileges within the humanist environment. The fourth chapter studies the Florentine-Byzantine contacts after the Council (1439-1453), focusing on why Florence abandoned Byzantium. The fifth chapter analyses the beginning of Florentine-Ottoman relations and reconstructs the commercial privileges given by the sultan to Florence. The sixth and seventh chapters investigate Florence’s diplomacy during the Ottoman-Venetian war (1463-1479) and Otranto (1480-1481) until Mehmet II’s death.

The thesis is accompanied by three appendices including a number of unpublished documents, a prosopography of the Florentines involved in the Levant, and selected Byzantine charters used for the analysis in chapter two. I aim to demonstrate that the relations between the eastern and the western part of the Mediterranean in the fifteenth century were determined by political and economic considerations rather than faith. These considerations guided Florence’s diplomacy to achieve commercial superiority in Constantinople.
To my wife and my family
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASF = Archivio di stato Firenze

ASV = Archivio di stato Venezia

ASMi = Archivio di stato Milano

BNC = Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Firenze

DBI = Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani

EI = Enciclopedia Italiana

MGH = Monumenta Germaniae Historiae

OHBS = Oxford Handbook of Byzantine Studies

ODB = Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium

PLP = Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palaiologenzeit
Introduction

This PhD dissertation is a study of the political and economic relations between Florence and the Levant in the fifteenth century. Politics and economics are, in my opinion, among the best observation angles for a study of Florence and its connections to the Levant. Undoubtedly, these two elements interact with each other as political choices can be influenced by the economic background and vice versa. This is because Florence was an economic power rather than a military power in the fifteenth century.\footnote{For the general history of Florence see Davidsohn 1977.} Throughout the fifteenth century, Florence never displayed an impressive military power but always relied on the efficiency of its diplomacy and economy due to its impressive networks formed by the bankers, emissaries and merchants around Europe.\footnote{On the networks see Goldthwaite 2009:37-38.} These networks had connected the Florentine city with both the Western and the Eastern parts of the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, depending on its trade and political networks, Florence had worked out its policies on the basis of events in the Levant and Italy.

My main goal is to explore and unravel the way in which Florence became the most privileged city during the reign of Mehmet II in Constantinople, the reasons why Florence wanted to improve its power in Constantinople, the ways adopted by the Florentine Signoria to expand its commercial and political influences in
Constantinople, and the agreements Florence made with other political powers. Furthermore, this PhD dissertation underlines the connections between events in the Levant and in Italy. Did the Italian wars in the fifteenth century have some connection with the fall of Constantinople or the rule of Mehmet II? Were the policies of the Florentine Signoria influenced by Levantine as well as Italian events? Was it realistic to define the Mediterranean area in the fifteenth century as a place where the borders became more narrow? The answers to these questions are another important goal of this work. Especially, since this dissertation is the first true attempt to give a unitary history of Florence and the Levant.

Moreover, this PhD dissertation fills an important research gap in the historiography. This gap lies in the lack of extensive works on Florence and its relations with the Levant.3 Although the city of Cosimo the Elder and Lorenzo the Magnificent has been extensively studied as the centre and birthplace of the Renaissance, little has been said about Florentine relations with the Levant. Indeed, the studies on East-West European relations have focused on the most famous Italian state-cities such as Venice and Genoa. Florence has scarcely been considered because the Florentine city never established such a long commercial tradition as the other aforementioned cities. The late acquisition of a seaport in 1419 had also affected the commercial power of the Florentine city and its chances of expansion.

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The methodology used in this study will be mainly historical and focused on the political and economic interactions among Florence and other political powers, such as Milan, Rome, Naples, Venice, the Byzantine and the Ottoman empire. This appears the best way to reconstruct the complex mechanisms which had regulated the Florentine policies with regard to Italy and the Levant. The amount of sources concerning this period, both published and unpublished, is considerable. I will particularly take into account the governmental sources in the form of ambassador/spy reports, private letters from prominent citizens, as well as the instructions given to the ambassadors before their missions. These sources are of the utmost importance because they can further explain the motivations of the policies enacted by the Florence Commune. This thesis is clearly historical in nature because without historical contextualisation all these aforementioned sources would be useless. This work will also use diplomatic methodology in the chapter on the privileges granted by John VIII to Florence in 1439. In this specific case, this thesis discusses Bruni’s numerous treatises and past privileges granted by both Byzantine and Western emperors to other institutions, in order to have a better historical contextualisation of the Florentine privileges. A brief introduction of the fifteenth-century political and economic backgrounds of Europe is therefore needed. Each chapter will further integrate the following introduction with more narrative details about the general historical backgrounds.

4 Mainly the sections of Missive II Cancelleria, Legazioni e Commissarie, Dieci di Balia, Responsive Copiari etc.
The Byzantine empire in the last century of its history was only a shadow of its glorious past.\footnote{For the late Byzantine period see Djuric 1995, Nicol 2002.} The once powerful Eastern Roman empire was now reduced to the city of Constantinople, the despotate of Morea and some pieces of land on the Black Sea such as Mesembria. In Constantinople, the real rulers were Genoa and Venice. The Byzantine emperors were so heavily in debt to these two Italian city-states that they were unable to enact any kind of policy adverse to Genoa and Venice’s interests. Meanwhile, the Ottomans had progressively acquired the former lands of the Byzantine empire and became the foremost threat to Constantinople. Pressured on two fronts, the Byzantine emperors could do nothing but attempt to delay the end. However, the Ottomans instead started their period of glory. The Ottoman empire conquered all of Anatolia and surrounded Constantinople after the conquest of Adrianople (1361), Bulgaria (1369) and Thessalonica (1430).\footnote{For the Ottoman empire I prevalently based my work on İnalcık 1973, 1997.} Finally, Mehmet II (r. 1444-1446 & 1451-1481) accelerated the end for Byzantium (1453) due to his determination to make Constantinople capital of the Ottoman empire.

In Italy, political instability caused numerous conflicts which influenced the whole peninsula through the fifteenth century. The perennial wars between Florence and Milan came to end with the death of Filippo Maria Visconti (1447). In the kingdom of Naples, the Angevin power disappeared due to the arrival and the conquest of Alphonse V (1442) which consequently brought together the kingdom of
Sicily, Naples and Aragon. This unification led to the forming of a new superpower which had a deep impact on the Italian and Levantine political background. In Milan, the dynasty of the Visconti ended with the death of the aforementioned Filippo (1447). After the war of succession in Milan, Francesco I Sforza, the renowned condottiere, achieved the conquest of the duchy in 1450 and established a new ducal dynasty. From the beginning of the century the popes aimed to impose Roman authority over the Byzantine emperors. After the fall of Constantinople, all the popes tried to organise a crusade against the Ottomans but were unsuccessful due to the political divisions among the Italian states. Venice was still one of the most powerful states in Italy, although its predominance was starting to show its limits for the first time. The Serenissima failed in several important goals during the fifteenth century such as preventing Francesco Sforza from conquering Milan, avoiding the fall of Constantinople and keeping its commercial predominance in Constantinople. By the end of the century, the Venetian city-state had lost most of its past greatness and was no longer the uncontested power in the Mediterranean Sea. Also, Genoa lost most of its dominions in the Levant. The fall of Constantinople led to the end of the independence of Galata. In 1475, the Ottoman conquest of Caffa left Chios the only possession of Genoa. Other Aegean islands, including Lesbos, were already lost to the Ottomans in 1462. Moreover, in Italy Genoa also lost most of its power due to

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7 For the kingdom of Naples and, in general the Aragonese, see Ryder 1990, Caselli 2010.
8 On the Pope attempts of crusade see in general Setton 1978.
9 As introduction on Venice see Romanin 1853-1861. On the relation between Venice and the Ottoman empire see Preto 2013, Venice’s commercial power in Constantinople see Inalcik 1998. On Venice and Byzantium see Nicol 1988.
the aggressiveness of the Milanese dukes (Visconti and Sforza) and Alphonse V’s attempts to cripple the city.

Meanwhile, Florence witnessed many changes in this century. The Albizzi, an ennobled and powerful family and dominant in the Signoria, lost the political war against Cosimo the Elder and was exiled in 1434. The Medici’s rise in 1434 brought a shift to the Florentine diplomatic position; from this point onward their primary aim was to preserve the political balance among the Italian powers.\(^\text{10}\) Medici Florence would never start an offensive war, but rather confront the incoming or present threats with its diplomacy and alliances. The major change in the diplomatic alliance for Florence was the shift from Venice to Milan after Sforza’s acquisition of the duchy of Milan. In fact, Francesco I Sforza’s conquest of Milan was a personal success for Cosimo the Elder as he personally financed the \textit{condottiere}. Sforza’s victory brought to a close the long-time enmity between Florence and Milan and marked the beginning of one of the most solid alliances for the Florentine Signoria. In the Levant, Florence did not achieve such a considerable amount of success. Was this failure due to the late acquisition of a seaport or was it the result of political circumstances in Constantinople? The Florentines attempted to gain commercial privileges from the emperors but only in 1439 did Florence finally obtain the long-desired commercial privileges from John VIII.\(^\text{11}\) The political and commercial consequences of these privileges are part of this PhD dissertation. Moreover, it is

\(^{10}\) For the Medici rise to power See Rubinstein 1999, Kent 1978.  
clearly important to compare the Florentine privileges of the Byzantine period with the Florentine status after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453.

Scholars’ discussions of East-West relations in the fifteenth century are quite diverse. However, scholars have focused mainly on Venice, Genoa, Naples and the Byzantine and Ottoman empires. Florence has rarely been studied, and when it has, it has only been mentioned in passing. In fact, researchers so far have only investigated the cities of Venice, Genoa and Pisa, while no monograph has yet been written about the history of the relationships between the Florentines and the Byzantine and the Ottoman empires.

In fact, it appears that modern historians took for granted Florence’s political and economic conditions in the Levant from a few old articles. For example, Berza dated the creation of the Florentine loggia in Constantinople to 1439. The author simply thought that Florence enacted the Florentine privileges in 1439 without undertaking any further investigation. In fact, nearly all historians have accepted Berza’s assumption. This is also the case with Florence’s privileges granted by the Byzantine empire. After the publication of these privileges by Müller (1970) and Lampros (1972), the Florentine privileges were strangely forgotten. These privileges

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13 Berza 1945.

14 Necipoğlu 2009, İnalcık 1997, Antoniadis-Bibicou 1963 but the list is long and impossible to fit the footnote. Enough is to say that none ever argued against the presence of the Florentine loggia.
were only briefly cited in some works but still lack a proper diplomatic and historical analysis.\textsuperscript{15}

In general, Florence is regarded as a walk-on actor and mostly mentioned in passing without specific details. For example, Thiriet states ‘\textit{Jalousée par tous les États italiens, par Florence notamment, la République de Saint Marc voyait s’évanouir son commerce du Levant},’ or ‘\textit{...le trafic vénitien retrouvé rapidement sa vigueur...malgré la concurrence des Florentins...}’; Balard mentions no contacts between Florence and the Byzantine empire ‘\textit{... mais au XV siècle celle de Florence, qui, ayant conquis sa rivale en 1406 et pris possession de Porto Pisano, entend renouer avec les relations anciennes et privilégiées des Pisans avec l’Égypte...Plus attirés par les territoires de Romanie et de Turquie, les Florentins ne réussissent pas à organiser une ligne régulière...}’.\textsuperscript{16}

New studies on Florence and the Levant have emerged only recently. Unfortunately, these works do not present new interpretations but are simply brief synopses from older published articles.\textsuperscript{17} As a result, they do not add any particularly new interpretation to the relations between Florence and the Levant. For the Florentine relations with the Ottoman empire, İnalcık and his several works are the perfect starting point. İnalcık’s works are indeed a valuable modern source for the economic factors affecting the commercial relationship between the Florentines and the

\textsuperscript{15} Dölger and Karayannopoulos 1968, Ferjančič 1967.
\textsuperscript{16} Thiriet 1959, Balard 2006.
\textsuperscript{17} Fleet 2011, Tanzini 2009.
The author gives evidence for the Florentine commercial activities during the reign of Bayezid II (and a bit for that of Mehmet II) in Pera and Bursa. However, İnalcik’s interpretation is mainly from the Ottoman point of view and lacks discussion of the connection between Florentine economic expansion in the Levant and Italian political status.

Some other scholarly works present the relationship between Florence and the Ottoman empire, such as Franz Babinger’s articles. Babinger’s works outline the political ties between the Italian cities and Mehmet II. From Babinger’s publications, the diplomatic line of Florence appears to be of the most importance. Finally, Babinger raises issues which are also considered as a part of this dissertation.

For example, the German scholar presents Lorenzo de’ Medici as decisively leaning in favour of the Sublime Porte. This assumption is based on the policies enacted by the Ottoman empire, which seemed to favour Florence to the detriment of Venice and Genoa. The debate among the scholars on whether Florence was the Renaissance “bad guy” did not end with Babinger.

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20 Specifically in the article “Lorenzo de’ Medici e la Corte Ottomana” (1963).
Babinger and Pastor argue that Florence probably did make an agreement with Mehmet II against Venice.\textsuperscript{21} Only Black states that Florence was a power ready to back the crusade initiative.\textsuperscript{22} Despite the fact that Black’s work is more on the figure of Benedetto Accolti (1415-1464), humanist and chancellor of Florence (1458-1464), large parts of his book deal with the Signoria’s attitude towards the crusade.

Florence’s active role in the Ottoman’s attack to Otranto seems to be evident for the majority of historians. Hankins, Tanzini, Panareo and other scholars stated that Florence was actively involved in Mehmet II’s attack against Otranto (1480).\textsuperscript{23} The predominant evidence for this theory is the medal made by Bertoldo di Giovanni and gifted to the sultan by Lorenzo de’ Medici. Only Babinger shows some doubts and rejects the medal as evidence of Florentine complicity.\textsuperscript{24} Chapter seven in this dissertation will re-examine this question to solve the historical enigma.

THE SOURCES

The sources for this PhD dissertation belong essentially to three different categories: governmental sources, private correspondence and chronicles. A preliminary observation on the sources is necessary. The governmental sources are part of the complicated legislative mechanism which regulated the political life of the Italian city-states. Therefore, it would be a mistake to assume the governmental

\textsuperscript{22} Black 1985.
\textsuperscript{23} Hankins 1995, Tanzini 2010, Panareo 1931.
\textsuperscript{24} Babinger 1963.
sources as a monolithic block of information. The Italian city-states of the period ran
a bureaucratic machine which tended to preserve most of the documentary evidence.
Before introducing the sources it might be worthwhile to say few words to introduce
this monumental institution. The chancery was the hearth and main core of
Florence’s political life.25 The entire political life relied on the chancery which had
the specific duty to redact and copy all the decisions made by the Signoria and the
other minor offices. At the head of this gigantic institution was the chancellor of
Florence. Normally, this office was given to a personality of paramount gravity, who
was a leading figure of Italian humanism, such as Coluccio Salutati, Leonardo Bruni,
Carlo Marsuppini, Poggio Bracciolini and Benedetto Accolti. This office did not
have any specific political power, but was of a certain magnitude in terms of its
political influence. For example, Salutati’s influence was crucial for the arrival of
Chrysoloras in Florence and Leonardo Bruni had a central role during the ecumenical
Council. Therefore, the governmental sources are obviously of paramount relevance
for this dissertation. At the same time, this relevance requires a very careful
approach. This is the main reason why I divide the sources used in this dissertation
into five different groups: letters sent and received by the government, instructions
given to ambassadors, reports from ambassadors and discussions among the most
prominent citizens on important issues and provisions enacted by the Commune. The
letters “sent and received” are the main pillar of this research, since these letters gave

25 On the Florentine chancery see the monumental work of Marzi 1910 1-2.
general information about the political life concerning the Florentine Commune.\textsuperscript{26} The Signoria normally sent and received several letters per day.\textsuperscript{27} This documentary evidence is important because it represents the official position of the Florentine Signoria. Consequently, the letters do not contain descriptions of individual opinions, or general details which were supposed to stay secret.

Accordingly, the letters are the perfect starting point for a broader investigation. For example, a letter could refer to an attack or an agreement on specific dates and subjects. The letters “sent and received” can confirm the authenticity of an event, with an accurate date. Thanks to these sources, the investigation can proceed on more specific government source, such as the ambassadors’ reports. These sources give general information for events or rumours about personalities and political powers. The ambassadors’ reports are optimal sources for revealing the level of awareness of the Florentine Commune about general events, the Florentine reputation in other courts and in general the information at the disposal of the Signoria. These documents are scattered in all the sections of the Florentine Archive. They can be found in \textit{Dieci di Balia, Responsive} or even \textit{Signori, Dieci di Balia, Otto di Pratica, Missive}, or even in \textit{Miscellanea Medicea}.

One of the most relevant sources used in this dissertation are the instructions to the ambassadors. They are normally very detailed and contain the guidelines given to

\textsuperscript{26} In the Florentine state archive the archival name is \textit{Signori, Missive II Cancelleria}.

\textsuperscript{27} The Signoria was formed by the Standard-bearer of Justice and the Prior of Arts the highest of the Commune. For the general introduction on the political structure under the Medici see Rubinstein 1996.
the ambassadors before the departure. Since the “permanent ambassador” was not yet established, Florence had to elect and send ambassadors for every necessity. Therefore, the eventual sending of an ambassador was evidence itself of the gravity of the event. The typical instruction would contain the target of the mission and the event connected, and also the suggestion of tactics to be used as well as the reasons behind it. All these pieces of information are of paramount importance because they state the unofficial reasons behind the choice of the Florentine Signoria. For example, the suggested tactics are normally an important hint of the real necessities of the Florentine Commune. Florentine ambassadors are often asked to postpone the subsidies of the crusade or never to make official promises. In other instructions the Signoria forbids the ambassador to promise anything publicly and orders him to negotiate only in secret.

Another type of government source used in the thesis is the discussions among the most prominent citizens generally defined in the work of scholars as pratiche.\(^{28}\) The pratiche were the restricted meetings in which the most prominent citizens, even if at the moment not holding an office, discussed events of high importance, proposed possible solutions and finally voted among the suggestions. Normally the Signoria summoned these meetings with the purpose of requesting the viewpoints of the most prominent citizens in Florence. The pratiche were not official but the proposals were first voted here before being passed to the normal legislative process.

\(^{28}\) From now on whenever the dissertation will refer to the “discussion among the most prominent citizens” I will use the term pratiche as well which is the short term taken by the Archival collocation namely Consulte e Pratiche.
The only notary allowed to be present in these meetings was the chancellor of Florence and he was in charge of the notarial transcription of the sessions. The fact that only the chancellor was allowed to stay only improves the significance of this source.

The matters discussed in the *pratiche* could range from the subsidies to the pope for the crusade, to the diplomatic line towards Venice, Naples and the Ottomans, and to problems of administration and finance within the Florentine Commune. This source is particularly important because it alone gives a very specific insight on the political thinking and discussions of the individuals among the Florentine Signoria.

Last of the list are the provisions. The provisions were the final act of the legislative process of the Florentine Signoria. While the *pratiche* or the official legislative channels discusses eventual proposals, the provisions state without any doubt the policies enacted by the Florentine Signoria and provide the text of the policy. Moreover, the provisions also contain the official reason behind the policy enactment.\(^{29}\)

Of the non-governmental sources, the Medici private correspondence has a special importance for this dissertation.\(^{30}\) Although the Medici were not the monarchs in Florence, there was no doubt about the Medici’s influence upon the decisions of the Florentine Signoria. Therefore, the private letters of the Medici give

\(^{29}\) In the archive these documentary evidences correspond to the *Provisioni*.

\(^{30}\) The Medici private archive called *Mediceo Avanti il Principato* is exclusively online at the following link http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/rMap/index.html.
us the only opportunities to know about the real thinking of the unofficial rulers of Florence. The Medici chose not to appear in the public acts in order to present the Florentine republican institution as unaltered and to avoid the risk of angering the most prominent Florentine families such as Pitti, Acciaiuoli, Soderini, Giugni and Guicciardini.\textsuperscript{31}

The last types of source used in this dissertation are chronicles. The chronicles are historical accounts of events presented in narrative form. They complement in a useful way this dissertation since they provide information not contained in the governmental sources. Of a particular importance is Dei’s opera “La cronica dall’anno 1400 all’anno 1500”.\textsuperscript{32} Benedetto Dei (1418-1492) is without any doubt one of the most original personalities in the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{33} He describes himself as an adventurer, spy and able man; Dei’s travels included Italy, France, North Africa, Greece and Turkey. In the cronica often he appears as the intermediary and agent (not so secret apparently) between the Medici and Mehmet II. Besides, he also accuses himself of spying on the Venetians on behalf of the Ottomans.

The cronica practically has been used by every scholar who studied the political events in the Levant in the fifteenth century. Moreover, the chronicle gives precious insight, which sometimes derails into gossip, into the events in the background of the Ottoman-Venetian war. It is essential because it is the only Florentine source which

\textsuperscript{31} The number of families in Florence can reach quite a high amount for example I did not cite the Machiavelli or the Morelli.

\textsuperscript{32} Dei 1985.

\textsuperscript{33} On Benedetto Dei see DBI s.v. Dei, Benedetto. Pisani 1923 and Orvieto 1969.
comments on Florence’s espionage on the Ottomans. Furthermore, it provides interesting information about the Florentine community in Constantinople and Florence’s relationship with Mehmet II.

Another fundamental chronicle is the Venetian Malipiero’s “Annali Veneti dall’anno 1457 al 1500”. Similar to Dei’s, Malipiero’s chronicle refers to the background of the Ottoman-Venetian war (1463-1479). Malipiero was a naval captain of the Serenissima and part of one of the most important families in Venice. He gives precious details on the modality of the Florentine espionage activity and provides the Venetian point of view.

Usually, the risk in using information from the chronicles is due to the obvious bias of the author. Therefore, it becomes essential to integrate altogether the chronicles, the government sources and the private correspondence. In this way, the correct interpretation of the historical background can follow.

The main collection of sources on Florentine-Levantine relations, Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll’Oriente cristiano e coi Turchi fino all’anno MDXXXI, published by Müller in 1870, was followed by a few similar publications. After Müller, some sources were published in Babinger’s articles but the same scholar stated that ‘probably the State archive of Florence does not have more documents on the relationship between Florence and the Levant. All the documents have been published by Müller and only a lucky case could bring to light new

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34 Malipiero 1845.
35 The only important source about Malipiero is his work of the Annali see Malipiero 1845.
materials.\textsuperscript{36} Apparently, I was lucky since much of the documentary evidence was there. The results were so astonishing that I was forced to circumscribe my investigation to the Florentine State Archive. Unfortunately, there was simply not enough time to investigate more archives or even to have the chance to consult the precious manuscripts preserved in the Medicea or the Laurenziana. Most of the sources found are listed and partly transcribed as an appendix of this dissertation.

These unpublished sources are particularly crucial for this dissertation. The lack of a strong military forced the Florentine Commune to seek different ways to expand its commercial and political weight in the Levant. Therefore, Florence had to rely prevalently on its diplomacy and political/commercial networks. These diplomatic, political and commercial links are very complicated in their nature just as Italian politics in the fifteenth century. Therefore, to investigate the nature, ways and manners used by Florence in its expansion without more documentary materials is practically impossible. The importance of this work is in its new interpretations thanks to the emergence of new primary sources.

A humanist channel, in addition to travelling merchants and ambassadors, connected Florence to Byzantium.\textsuperscript{37} This channel developed almost in parallel with the expansion of Florence’s commercial companies. It was the combination of humanists and commercial workers that created the prerequisites for the arrival of

\textsuperscript{36}All Babinger’s works excluding \textit{Mehmet the conqueror and his time} generally present unpublished sources even if in a limited quantity. Babinger 1963:359 fn. 161.

\textsuperscript{37}See as a general introduction Burckhardt 1955, Baron 1957. More specific for this thesis see Hankins 2003.
Byzantine embassies in Florence at the end of the fourteenth century. Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406) was doubtless the pioneer of the cultural connection between Florence and Byzantium. Being one of the brightest minds and forerunners of the Renaissance, Salutati was the Chancellor of Florence from 1374 to 1406.\textsuperscript{38} The epistolary exchanges between the Florentine humanist and Byzantine personalities such as Manuel Chrysoloras and Demetrios Kydones revealed the humanist link between Florence and Constantinople.\textsuperscript{39} If Manuel Chrysoloras arrived in Florence in 1397 it was due to these connections between Salutati and Chrysoloras.\textsuperscript{40} Clearly, the appointment to the Greek professorship of Manuel Chrysoloras from 1397 to 1400 was not merely a cultural occasion. For the first time in Florentine history, a direct connection between Constantinople and Florence was established. Besides, this contact seemed to be even more important as Chrysoloras was not only a brilliant scholar but also an important envoy of the Byzantine emperor as well as close advisor of Manuel II. Obviously, apart from teaching, Chrysoloras’ mission was to make the Western powers aware of Byzantium’s tragic condition. Without surprise, during the period of Manuel’s teaching in Florence, the first Byzantine

\textsuperscript{38} On Salutati see Ullman 1963.
\textsuperscript{39} For Chrysoloras and Kydones see in general ODB s.v. \textit{Chrysoloras Manuel} and Cammelli 1941. For Kydones see ODB s.v. \textit{Kydones Demetrios} and Loenertz 1971. See also in general Barker 2009. For Salutati’s epistolary see the unmatched work of Novati 1891-1911.
\textsuperscript{40} As the same Salutati explicitly admitted when he wrote to Chrysoloras that he managed to appoint the Byzantine erudite as professor of Greek in the Florentine university. Novati 1896: nn. 17; 18; XVIII.
embassy arrived in the city in 1397 led by Hilario Doria, another important oikeios of the emperor.41

The humanist channel was essential to the Ecumenical council as well. Leonardo Bruni (1370-1444), chancellor of Florence (1427-1444) at the time of the Council, delivered a very important oration to the Byzantine delegation.42 This oration, the Περί τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίνων, was one of the first instances in which a Latin scholar wrote and probably recited in Greek. The oration is a political work aimed to reveal to the Byzantine audience the political structure of the Florentine Commune.

This dissertation does not aim to provide a literary and philological context of the humanist cultural exchanges of the period. Obviously, these contacts contributed to the Renaissance, pushed Cosimo the Elder to found the so-called Platonic Academy which boosted the recovery of Greek classicism.43 However, the humanist channel was also a way used by Florence to establish a direct contact with Byzantium.

In conclusion, before the outset of this thesis, it is important to remark that Florence was different than Venice and Genoa in its relations with the Byzantine East. It did not directly benefit from 1204 (Venice) or from the Byzantine recovery

41 For the epithet oikeios see Verpeaux 1965.
43 Hankins proved convincingly that rather than being an academy in the modern world sense it was most probably a group of scholars of different composition. For the entire argument see Hankins 1991.
of Constantinople (Genoa). It was a landlocked city and its economy was based on banking and cloth production. Consequently, the path followed by the Florentine Signoria was less straightforward than other political powers at that time, since it was the result of a sophisticated labyrinth of stratagems, political choices and alliances, together with an extensive diplomatic/commercial network which made Florence always informed about the happenings around Europe.
CHAPTER I

FLORENCE AND THE LEVANT BEFORE THE COUNCIL OF FERRARA-
FLORENCE (1204-1439)

The Ecumenical Council in 1439 is only the final step of several approaches made by Florence to establish diplomatic contacts with Byzantium. This chapter provides the necessary historical background to reveal the relations between Florence and Byzantium before the Ecumenical Council. The chapter is divided into three interrelated sections in order to provide the best understanding of this multifaceted relationship.

The first section of the chapter introduces the problem of a seaport for Florence and sheds light on the political choices made by the Florentine Commune. From the twelfth to the beginning of the fifteenth centuries, these choices were focused on the acquisition of a seaport to serve the city of Florence. The second segment of the chapter proceeds to examine Florence’s efforts which in the end produce the first direct contact with Byzantium in 1397, the year of Hilario Doria’s embassy to Florence on behalf of the Byzantines. This discussion especially focuses on the Florentine commercial companies and their expansion in the Levant, the
Acciaiuoli’s venture in Greece and the humanist channel. All of these subjects had a role in creating a link between Florence and Constantinople.

The third part of the chapter starts with Doria’s embassy (1397) and ends with the Ecumenical Council (1439). Here I will analyse the diplomatic approaches made to obtain commercial privileges from the Byzantine empire by the Florentine Signoria after the first contact in 1397. The chapter covers two emperors, Manuel II and John VIII, and ends just before the beginning of the Ecumenical Council in 1439.

The landlocked position of Florence was surely the most difficult obstacle for Florence’s expansion in the Levant. The Florentine commercial companies, as well as private individuals, substituted the Florentine Signoria in Levantine expansion. It was thanks to private initiatives that Florence began to claim footholds in the Levant. Only the general bankruptcy of the commercial companies in 1345 and the later acquisition of Porto Pisano in 1421 allowed the Signoria to take over the Florentine private citizens and to establish a Communal diplomatic line towards the Levant.

The temporal span – from the twelfth century to 1439 – is quite long, but it is essential for the comprehension of the historical background. The thirteenth century witnessed a number of political changes.\(^{44}\) The most important is the Fourth Crusade and the consequent collapse of the Byzantine empire into three separate political

\(^{44}\) On the Italian background between tenth to fourteenth centuries see Abulafia 1997, and Abulafia 1993.
powers (Nicaea, Trebizond and Epirus). The conquest of Constantinople by the crusader army on 12 April 1204 is indeed a turning point in the history of medieval Europe as this event opened the Byzantine Levant to the Western powers. Venice and the papacy obtained the greatest benefit from this conquest. While the *Serenissima* increased its commercial power by creating new permanent colonies in the Latin empire, the Holy See extended its ecclesiastical influence with the formation of new dioceses. This new political and economic situation created opportunities for minor powers, such as Florence.

Italy witnessed many political changes which eventually favoured Florence. At the battle of Benevento in 1266, the Angevins, led by Charles I of Anjou, defeated the troops under the Sicilian king, Manfred Hohenstaufen, the illegitimate son of Frederick II. The victory at Benevento allowed Charles I to become King of Sicily and to establish the Angevin dynasty. The Kingdom of Sicily would later split between the Angevin and the Aragonese after the Sicilian Vespers (1282), when the Aragonese, with the complicity of Michael VIII, conquered Sicily. The Angevin dynasty would rule Naples until the conquest of Alphonse V of Aragon in 1442. In the rest of Italy, the struggle between Guelf and Ghibellines remained fierce. In Florence, the Guelf faction achieved a permanent victory over the Ghibellines at the battle of Montaperti in 1267. From that moment Florence would remain Guelf.

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45 On the fourth crusade see Angold 2003. On the three new Byzantine political powers created after the fourth crusade see for Nicaea see Angold 1975. For Trebizond see Karpov 1986 and for Epirus Nicol 1957.

46 The Guelf and Ghibellines fight was, to put it in very simple words, the war between the imperial and the papal supporters for the Italian predominance. See Raveggi 2006.

23
Guelf predominance opened the city of Florence to alliance with the pope and Naples.

This alliance with the pope and with Naples allowed Florence to improve its connections in the Levant. The pope used Florence’s commercial companies for the collection of tithes from the newly formed dioceses of the East. Commercial companies such as Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli, therefore took on an important role in the Levant as they were able to settle in areas previously closed to them, including the former territories of the Byzantine empire.

In addition, the Angevin dynasty would establish a special connection with individual Florentines, mostly in the role of bankers and economic operators.\(^{47}\) It was thanks to this relationship that Niccolò Acciaiuoli, prominent member of the Acciaiuoli company, had the opportunity to become a feudal lord in Achaia. Later, Neri Acciaiuoli, a relative of Niccolò, would conquer the duchy of Athens from the Catalans (1385-1388).\(^{48}\) The resulting Florentine dynasty in Athens would last for almost a century, until Mehmet II decided to have the last ruler, Francesco II Acciaiuoli, assassinated in 1460.

The success achieved to this point by Florentine individuals and commercial companies was not shared by the Florentine Signoria. Venice, by this time, had already consolidated a tradition of state-galleys and territorial colonies in the Levant.

\(^{47}\) On Florence’s establishment in Naples see Abulafia 1981: 378-384. For the presence of Florentine merchants see Abulafia 1993:7.53-7.57.

Florence was not even able to deploy a fleet. The chief reason for this was the geographical position of Florence. Unlike Genoa, Venice and Pisa, Florence was an inland city and therefore lacked of a natural seaport. This geographical problem greatly influenced Florentine policies in the period which were mainly focused on the acquisition of a seaport. The nearest solution was Pisa and its seaport, that is, Porto Pisano. The wars between Florence and Pisa were numerous in these centuries and only ended when Florence annexed Pisa in 1409. Nevertheless, Florence had to wait until 1421 when it was finally able to hold a seaport of its own, due to French interference at Porto Pisano.

**A logistical problem: Florence and the seaport.**

*Map number 1: cities of Northern Tuscany*

![Map of Tuscany: red arrow points to Porto Pisano (Pisa), green arrow to Talamone (Siena).](image)

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49 Location of Porto Pisano in map number one red arrow. Florence underwent also internal problems such as the revolt of the Ciompi (wool carders) in 1378. See Franceschi 1993.
Florence’s main obstacle concerning the maritime commerce was doubtless the lack of a seaport. While Genoa and Venice were geographically inclined to the sea, the city of Florence was landlocked. This geographical disadvantage influenced Florence’s policies in both the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Therefore, Florence had to depend on other Italian seaports such as Pisa, Genoa and Siena for the transport of its wares. The first solution found by the Florentine Commune was diplomatic. On 4 July 1171, Florence signed an agreement with Pisa which allowed the Florentines to trade its wares through Porto Pisano.50

While Pisa benefited from the mercantile traffic in the seaport, Florence benefited by finally being able to transport their wares. Consequently, Florence was also able to improve its economy through the transport of wares to international markets. This treaty included an offensive and defensive alliance for the duration of forty years.51 The treaty also provided that Florentine citizens in Pisa would pay the same taxes as Pisa's citizens, and established two fondaci for Florentine merchants on the river Arno.52

However, in the thirteenth century the Florentine commercial volume was not as significant as the other three Italian maritime cities of Genoa, Venice and Pisa. In this century, Florence’s commercial presence was mainly formed by individual

50 Goldthwaite 2009:26. The accurate position of Porto Pisano is in the map at the beginning of the chapter with the red arrow.
51 Davidsohn 1977: 1.497.
52 The fondaci were buildings in which the merchants stayed or stored their wares. For the treaties see Davidsohn 1977: 1.768-1.769 and Arias 1901:18-20.
merchants, most of them associated by *accomandita* with other merchants (not surprisingly, most of them were Genoese or Venetians citizens). Florence did not have proper commercial companies or a structured governmental organisation for the Levant such as those of Pisa, Genoa or Venice.

Florence’s economic growth frightened Pisa to the point that the latter nullified the treaty with Florence in 1220. Moreover, Pisa’s government confiscated the Florentine wares. These actions were a consequence of the on-going hostilities between the Western empire and the papacy which had a severe impact on the Italian struggle between Guelf and Ghibelline. The reciprocal affiliation of either Pisa or Florence to one of the two factions was not relevant for the purposes of these wars. What really mattered was Pisa’s concern over Florence’s growing power. Not surprisingly, Pisa decided to nullify the treaty in 1220 when both Florence and Pisa were Ghibellines. The economic interest was almost certainly the first reason for the new tensions between Pisa and Florence rather than their faction affiliation. Pisa’s defeat in this new war forced the signing of a new treaty with Florence in 1256. This treaty was later renewed in 1270. The real need for Florence to have a seaport was the primary reason for all the wars fought against Pisa as Florence needed the access to a seaport for the transport of its wares such as wool.

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53 The *accomandita* was a kind of commercial activity in which the merchant received money from investors for a limited travel or expedition.
54 Arias 1901:49.
55 Arias 1901:98.
The duration of the treaty signed in 1270 must have ended at the beginning of the 1280’s. Otherwise there would not have been a valid reason for Florence to sign a treaty on 7 February 1281 with the municipality of Genoa.57

This episode comes from the Annali di Caffaro, an annalistic source, which is one of the most important historical documents for medieval Genoa. The name of these annals comes from the author – Caffaro di Rustico da Caschifellone.58 Afterwards, the Genoese Commune institutionalised these annals and more scribes took over Caffaro’s work.

The commercial exclusion of the Florentine merchants from the Levantine routes is clearly a result of the will of the Genoese to preserve their monopoly in the Levant. Although in the later treaty between Florence and Genoa of 30 December 1298 the limitation on travel to Romania did not appear explicitly, this does not prove that Genoa deleted the aforementioned clause, since the Annali di Caffaro explicitly affirmed that there were Florentine merchants who operated in the Levant. For example, the Byzantine ambassador who in 1262 brought to Genoa the news of Michael VIII’s conquest of Constantinople belonged to the natione Florentinorum.59

57 Ferretto 1903:345-346. Michele dei Salvatici da Valenza, podestà, Oberto Spinola e Oberto Doria, capitani, ... stipulano con Geri Cardinale e con Giovanni de Vulpe, ambasciatori e procuratori del Comune di Firenze un trattato di navigazione e commercio, durevole 5 anni. Si promettono vicendevole aiuto, e i Fiorentini dichiarano di non andare nelle parti di Romania, stante la convenzione coll’imperatore dei Greci.
58 For more reference about Caffaro see s.v. Caffaro da Rustico da Caschifellone in DBI 16 (1973).
59 Imperiale 1926:45 unfortunately the name of the scribe is unknown. Die quinta madii de Romania applicuit quedam navis Ansaldi Aurie, in qua detullit quendam nuncium dicti imperatori natione Florentinum; et in qua nave nova venerunt quod dictus imperator civitatem Constantinopolitanam a Venetis et latinis abstulerat et ipsam suo imperio adiacerat, et quod idem imperator palacium latum et
Further documentary evidence from notarial acts confirms the Florentine presence in the Levant at the time of the Genoese-Florentine treaty. Donato de’ Donati appears in ten notarial deeds drawn up in Pera from July 1281 to October of the same year. Yet, Pera, in territorial terms, was a Genoese colony. Therefore, the exclusion from Romania did not ban the Florentine merchants in the Levant.\(^\text{60}\) It was mandatory for Florentine merchants to trade through the Genoese loggia. It makes sense as the Florentine merchants would pay the taxes on their wares when approaching the Genoese loggia. Otherwise, it is impossible to explain the presence of Donato de’ Donati in Pera at the time of the treaty if there was a ban on the Florentine wares.\(^\text{61}\)

This Florentine-Genoese treaty of 1298 did not last long. The appearance of the emperor Henry VII (1310-1312) in Italy brought Genoa into the imperial alliance. At the time of the emperor’s arrival, Florence was a member of the Guelf faction due to the battle of Montaperti (1260) and the defeat of Farinata degli Uberti, the Florentine leader of the Ghibelline faction. Before the arrival of the emperor there was no necessity for Genoa, a member of the Ghibelline faction, to block the Florentine transport of wares. One ought to consider that the transport of Florentine wares was probably good business for Genoa. However, the imperial alliance likely forced Genoa to nullify their treaty and

\[^{amplum ad formam castri quod Veneti in dicta civitate obtinebant, Ianuensibus qui sibi aderant pro comuni Ianue donavit.}\]

\(^\text{60}\) See the previous treaty for the travel limitation to Romania. See fn. 55.

\(^\text{61}\) Ferretto 1903: nn. 797, 805, 812, 822, 827, 835, 843, 844, 870.
consequently put Florence again into the situation of needing a seaport. Florence sent an embassy to Siena in 1311, led by Francesco di Balducci Pegolotti, to negotiate access to the Talamone seaport. Talamone is located near Grosseto in Tuscany, and at that time was part of Sienese territory. This negotiation likely led to a treaty between the two cities. The use of Talamone presented both positive and negative factors for Florence. The Sienese seaport was unhealthy and suffered silt. Nevertheless, Talamone also represented an advantage for Florence, since not transporting Florentine wares was an economic loss for Pisa, Florence’s direct rival. The economic condition was so critical for Pisa that after Florence renewed its treaty with Siena again in 1362, Pisa had little choice but to declare war against Florence. However, after two years Florence harshly defeated Pisa at the battle of Cascina in 1364. After the war, the Florentines again obtained access to Porto Pisano under the same conditions of the past treaties. Furthermore, the other terms inflicted on Pisa by Florence in the peace treaty were so harsh that Pisa ceased to represent a threat to the Florentine mercantile and territorial expansion in future years.\footnote{Zorzi 2004:11-13.}

Florence was unable to annex Pisa because a new, strong enemy emerged in Italy: the Visconti of Milan. After the Pisan-Florentine war, the Visconti seized the cities of Pisa, Siena and Perugia from 1399 to 1400. Indeed, the fall of Pisa and Siena were a hard blow for the Florentine municipality as the Florentine Commune was again without a seaport. Only the duke of Milan’s
death saved Florence from complete defeat. A Florentine counter-offensive was aided by an alliance with the papacy concluded on 28 March 1404. Reinforced by this new agreement, after two years the Florentines and the papacy were able to drive out the Milanese from Bologna, Perugia and Siena. Finally, Florence and Pisa signed a truce at the end of July 1404. The truce again allowed Florence access to Porto Pisano. Finally, Florence purchased the city of Pisa from Gabriel Maria Visconti on 9 October 1406 for the sum of 200,000 florins. However, just before the final agreement with Florence, Gabriel Maria Visconti granted Porto Pisano to France. Indeed, the French aim was to limit Florentine expansion as in that period Genoa was a vassal of France. In order to secure the port, the king of France sent Boucicaut, marshal of the kingdom of France, to Porto Pisano. Boucicaut’s presence again limited Florentine ambitions with regard to the seaport. For that reason Florence had to sign another treaty in 1413 with Genoa in order to access Porto Pisano. This treaty forced Florence to pay 10,000 florins and grant the towns of Portovenere, Lerici and Sarzanello to Genoa. These three towns were strategically important as they were on the border between Liguria and Tuscany. Only in 1421, thanks to the desperate condition of Genoa which was at the time under siege by the Visconti, was Florence able to successfully purchase Porto Pisano and Livorno for an overall sum of 100,000 florins. 63

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In conclusion, the long history of the Florentine attempts to acquire access to a seaport is clear evidence of the Florence’s interest in expanding its commercial organisation. Thanks to the conquest of Porto Pisano, Florence was finally able set up a maritime commercial policy and to begin its commercial adventure.

The first approaches: the cases of the Alberti, the Bardi and the Peruzzi and the rise of the Acciaiuoli to the dukedom of Athens.

As stated in the introduction, Florence’s presence into the Levant had improved sensibly because of three events: the conquest of Constantinople by the crusader army on 12 April 1204, the Florentine alliance with the papacy after the Guelf triumph in Florence in 1260 (battle of Montaperti) and Charles of Anjou’s acquisition of the Sicilian crown after the victory at Benevento in 1267.

These three elements together marked the beginning of the new alliance between the pope, Florence and the kingdom of Naples. The good relations with the popes allowed some Florentine banks such as the Bardi, the Peruzzi and the Acciaiuoli, to obtain the office of tithe collectors for the newly formed Eastern dioceses.\(^{64}\) The acquisition made by Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli was due to the logistical problems of the pope who had difficulties in the effective collecting of the tithes in the Eastern dioceses. Therefore, from the first half of the fourteenth century,

the pope began using the Florentine branches to collect the tithes, thus helping the Florentine banks to expand into the Eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea.

The success of the Florentine banks was due to the proper organisation which protected tithes from any danger, such as the Mediterranean piracy or highway robbers. The reliability of this system was absolute. The branch collected the tithes and then would send a communication to the Roman branch. The latter would deliver the money to the Apostolic Chamber. This was for, both pope and Florence, extremely convenient. While the pope avoided losing money to corruption or piracy, at the same time the Florentine merchants obtained currency to invest in several activities such as trading and lending. The commercial companies based their entire organisation on the capital association and on a strong familiar presence: at the edge of the companies there were always members of the family who controlled the bank while the other workers were normally external employers in a subordinate position.  

The large amount of money used by the banks in investments came mainly from public and private deposits. In fact, the banks encouraged people to deposit money with the guarantee of an annual interest return of around six and seven per cent. Therefore, the people involved ranged from the high classes to the common citizens. In addition, another point of strength of the commercial companies lay in the organisation of the branches as the investments spread from Florence to all

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65 On the structure of the commercial companies see Sapori 1972 and in general the works of F. Melis.
Europe (London, Barcelona, and Constantinople). The branches were partially autonomous and operated in the same way as the mother-branch in Florence. The reason of the term “partially” is due to the structure of the companies. The mother-branch retained a sort of superior control, especially in the case of heavy losses or problems. In this situation, the mother-branch could have reacted by sending a trusted man in order to reorder the branch. Indeed, the banks not only collected tithes in the Levant, but also had several other businesses such as changing, lending, and trading. This way of operating resembles that of a regional power, as the banks even possessed autonomous diplomatic channels. The commercial companies of Florence conducted independent negotiations with other political powers on different matters such as taxes and safe conduct.

The Fourth Crusade played an important role for Florentine interests as the pope supported Florence’s expansion in the Levant. Without surprise, the first mentions of Florentines in Pera and Caffa begin to appear from the beginning of the thirteenth century. Florentine merchants were present not only in Pera and Caffa, but also in the kingdom of Cyprus. Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, a Florentine merchant, successfully negotiated some commercial privileges from the king of Cyprus in 1335. Soon after, the king of Cyprus extended these privileges to every Florentine citizen. Pegolotti was an important employee of the Bardi’s bank. This

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66 See fn. 63.
67 See Balard-Laiou-Otten Froux 1987: 109-110 n. 2, 111-112 n. 6; 118 n. 12; 121 n.19; 121 n. 20; 123 n. 23;125 n. 6; 124 n. 24; 129-130 n. 34; 132 n. 38; 136 n. 44; 177-180 n. 9 (Constantinople). Verlinden 1977:926-927. (Caffa) Balbi-Raiteri 1973 :46-49 n. 19; 63-66 n. 28; 71-75 n. 33 (Caffa). Sapori 1952:2.273; 2.288 (Constantinople) and Balard 1984:233 (Cyprus). See also the appendix for a detailed picture.
Florentine merchant also wrote an important source related to Florentine commerce – "La pratica della mercatura". The same Bardi commercial company was present in Little Armenia as Pegolotti reports: ‘The commercial company of the Bardi is free, as they do not have to pay anything in the kingdom of Armenia neither entering nor getting out’.

The privilege granted by the king of Cilician Armenia in 1335 showed the typical modality of Florentine expansionism supported by the papacy as in that period the Armenian king was supported by the Church of Rome. In this political context the pope requested that the Bardi bank buy 10,000 florins worth of grain for the king of Armenia, after a famine had stricken the kingdom. This event should be taken as the perfect example of the Florentine commercial policies mainly tied to the papacy. Finally, on 18 June 1317 the pope granted to the Bardi and the Peruzzi the right of collecting the tithes in all Romania.

Therefore, Bardi and Peruzzi were present in all of the most important ecclesiastical dioceses in the Levant. The same Acciaiuoli had several branches in Clarenza, Rhodes and in general in the Levant. Specifically, the Acciaiuoli’s interests lie in Greece and Rhodes, rather than Cyprus or Constantinople.

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68 Pegolotti 1936.
69 Pegolotti 1936:60 La compagnia de’ Bardi è franca, che non pagano niente per tutto lo reame d’Erminia né entrando né uscendo. For the Cilician Armenia and other bibliographical references see De Nersessian 1969.
70 Borsari 1958:488-499.
The Florentine commercial companies had a lot of interests connected to the Knights Hospitaller. These interests lay in the recent conquest of Rhodes by the Knights Hospitaller in 1310 under the Grandmaster Fulkes de Villaret.\textsuperscript{71} Florentine activity there ranged from logistical supply to lending and changing. For example, since 1312 the Bardi had been trading swords and Florentine \textit{panni}. The \textit{panno} was a general piece of cloth of variable length and kind. There were several kinds of \textit{panni} made of cotton or wool and later silk such as Florentine \textit{panni}, Milanese \textit{panni} etc.\textsuperscript{72} The Florentines were also conducting other activities, such as buying buildings and terrains and exporting various items such as spices, soap, sugar and other products of Rhodes. Moreover, Florentine banks transferred currencies from the West to Rhodes and operated lending activities. By 1320 the Knights Hospitaller owed to the Florentines the huge sum of 500,000 florins, more than the double the pope’s annual income.

The English bankruptcy of 1343, which led to the bankruptcy of the Florentine banks, created a great deal of turmoil for the investors in the Florentine banks. In fact, as news of the bankruptcy spread, the investors immediately tried to recover the money from the banks, thus accelerating the bankruptcy of the Florentine banks. The same Pope Clement IV, even if he was formally still an ally of the Florentine municipality, abandoned the Florentine banks. Moreover, the pope tried to recover ecclesiastical money through papal tribunals, while the Florentine government

\textsuperscript{71} Luttrell 1975:285.
\textsuperscript{72} For the production of Florentine \textit{panni} and in general the \textit{panni} see Hoshino 1980; Hoshino 2001 De Roover 1999, Tognetti 2002.
protected the merchants and the families involved in the great bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{73} This event led to a shift in the Florentine policy towards commerce and the trade. Florence had to revise its economic policies and made trade expansion even more protected in order to maintain the support of the economic growth in the city. As a matter of fact, the banks’ failure did not coincide with a decrease in local manufacturing activities which, instead, continued to grow. Therefore, another intermediary had to be sought as the banks ceased to support the local growth by trading and selling the wares produced by the manufactories. The banks acted on behalf of the Florentine Signoria like foreign governments.\textsuperscript{74} However, after the bankruptcy, a new mediator emerged for the Florentine interests, that is, the Florentine Commune itself. From at this specific time the Signoria began to act in favour of the Florentine companies, while in the past the companies carried out negotiations on their own behalf. For example, the municipality of Florence offered its condolences to Peter I of Lusignan, King of Cyprus, after his father’s death in 1360, and underlined the good relationship existing between the Florentine merchants and the kingdom of Cyprus. Moreover, the Florentine municipality recommended to Peter I Luca Alberti, an employee of the new bank of the Alberti Nuovi, as well as Arriguccio Pegolotti.\textsuperscript{75} Clearly, the Signoria assumed prerogatives that in the past belonged to the Florentine commercial companies.

\textsuperscript{73} See the request of Clement IV as he tried to push the municipality of Florence by forcing the Bardi to return the money they owed to Goccio, cardinal of Saint Prisca. Müller 1879:113. Of course, the municipality denied their request, as they did everyone else.

\textsuperscript{74} See the previous paragraph.

\textsuperscript{75} See Müller 1879:120-128.
I can therefore conclude that the bankruptcy of 1343 did not greatly modify the Florentine presence in the Levant, but caused a change in the Florentine commercial system. This symbolised the failure of a commercial system, not the failure of Florentine trade. The same families who had run the bankrupted banks were part of the Signoria and they did not stop to obtain prestigious offices within the Florentine Signoria. Clearly, these families had a lot of interests in protecting the family businesses through the power of the government rather than weaker commercial companies.\textsuperscript{76} The commercial rights given to all the Florentines without exception benefited the city as a whole.\textsuperscript{77} Moreover, as far as the commercial negotiations are concerned, surely the Signoria had more strength, authority and credibility than the single companies.

Although the Bardi, Acciaiuoli and Peruzzi banks had disappeared, the same cannot be said for the merchants’ activities. The Hospitaller Order continued recruiting and privileging many Florentines within the Order because they still provided useful services. For example, Niccolò di Catellino Aldobrandi, previously an employee of the Peruzzi, became a citizen of Rhodes and an agent of the Order. Aldobrandi traded in retail items such as grain, timber, oil and textiles. Niccolò da Prato transferred money from Cyprus to Rhodes for the Knights. In March 1348, Bartolomeo degli Albizzi bought grain and collected money for the Order. Niccolò di Lapo Bellincioni, previously an employee of the Bardi, afterwards became citizen of

\textsuperscript{76} Where the publicum is the Florentine Signoria.
\textsuperscript{77} Therefore benefiting at the same time the new companies created after that date as they would have the opportunity to expand their markets due to the increased output.
Rhodes, from whence he led a merchant ship to Constantinople in order to buy spices and other goods.\textsuperscript{78} The Florentines were also present in the Byzantine capital itself. The account book of the Alberti bank stated that Miniato Filippi e Ridolfo Cambi were both employees of the Alberti branch in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{79} The Florentine expansion was mostly commercial without any kind of territorial expansion.

**A different expansion: the case of Niccolò and Neri Acciaiuoli in Greece.**

The relationship between the Florentine municipality, the pope and the Kingdom of Naples was providential for the Acciaiuoli family. This relationship offered to Niccolò Acciaiuoli the possibility of becoming a powerful feudal lord in Latin Achaia. The Florentines, as I have mentioned, were usually employed as commercial agents and lenders. The Angevin conquest of the kingdom of Naples witnessed a growing presence of Florentine banks and merchants, in particular the Acciaiuoli. The lenders’ activities were much in demand for the primary necessity of fresh cash which in general every ruler needed in order to sustain their expensive wars. At the same time, the commercial banks were usually lending to the sovereigns at zero per cent interest as the lenders would have gained in material grants (lands, titles). The expedition of Charles I against the Hohenstaufen was actually financed by a notable number of Florentine banks which in exchange received commercial

\textsuperscript{78} For a general picture about the Florentine presence in Rhodes see Luttrell 1999. All the examples in the text are from Borsari 1958:477-507.

\textsuperscript{79} Sapori 1952:37-38.
rights. For example, the company of Ghino Frescobaldi received a safe conduct to trade in the Angevin territories in exchange for several loans.\(^80\) Sometimes, the crown could appoint to prestigious offices the same lenders either for their commercial abilities or in order to repay previous debts. Niccolò Acciaiuoli was one of the most successful cases in which a banker rose to a top political position of Angevin power, first as Great Seneschal (1348) and afterwards as one of the most important fief-holders in Latin Achaia. Niccolò was an important citizen of Florence, son of Acciaiuolo Acciaiuoli who was in Naples as administrator of the local Acciaiuoli branch.\(^81\) He was to become one of the most important lenders of the Angevin crown.\(^82\)

The politics of the Mediterranean Sea changed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries with the emergence of new protagonists such as the Aragonese and the Catalans. The Aragonese, thanks to their alliance with Michael VIII Palaiologos, successfully drove out the Angevins from Sicily in 1282 in the so-called Sicilian Vespers. Furthermore, the pope consecrated the Aragonese as the rightful ruler of Trinacria in Sicily. The other groups, the Catalans, were former mercenaries of the Byzantine empire connected to the Aragonese Crown. They established a new dynasty in Athens after they defeated and killed the duke of Athens, Gualtier of Brienne. Angevin power in Morea was consolidated in 1267 with the death of

\(^80\) Abulafia 1987:6.379. See also Terlizzi 1950 n.4 and for Florentine privileges later in 1265 and in 1266 see nn. 5, 8-15 etc.
\(^81\) DBI s.v. *Acciaiuoli Niccolò*.
\(^82\) On Niccolò Acciaiuoli see Tocco 2001, Léonard 1956.
William II Villehardouin. William II, prince of Achaia, had previously made an agreement with Charles I of Anjou. By this agreement the Principality of Achaia was to go to Charles I Anjou after William II’s death. The new Catalan threat forced the Angevins to strike back in order to preserve their economic interests in Latin Achaia. Indeed, such military expeditions would normally have required huge sums of money. The Acciaiuoli bank offered the necessary money in loan for the first expedition against Achaia and the Catalans which was conducted by Giovanni di Gravina. As a form of compensation, the Acciaiuoli bank received some fiefdoms in Elis, Lichina, and Mandria. These feudal fiefs represented the beginning of the Acciaiuoli’s expansion in the Latin Achaia. Their main difference with other Florentine commercial companies lay in the fact that the Bardi and the Peruzzi, for example, exclusively maintained a commercial profile. Instead, Niccolò Acciaiuoli pursued familiar and territorial aims. This point is illustrated further by an example in 1334, when Niccolò, acting as a private citizen, purchased the territories of Elis, Lichina and Mandria from the Acciaiuoli bank, which they had received previously from the Angevins. Furthermore, in 1335 Catherina of Valois-Courtenay appointed Niccolò Acciaiuoli to the prestigious office of Royal Seneschal in return for his past lending the amount of 5.000 gold ounces. To this appointment followed three other important concessions all in Morea: the first in 3 June 1336, which granted to

83 He agreed to become vassal of Charles I with the treaty of Viterbo (1267) and since he died without heir the fiefdoms passed directly to Charles I of Anjou.
84 He was son of Charles II of Anjou and of Maria Arpad of Hungary. Giovanni was count of Gravina and Alba. He conducted an expedition into Achaia in order to keep those territories under the Angevin authority.
85 Documents in Buchon 1843:2.31-2.32.
Niccolò a fief formed by nine villages that in the past belonged to Perin de Courcelles and Pietro Joussard; the second was on 18 November 1337, which comprised other fiefdoms formed by thirteen villages in Elis previously belonging to Lisa du Quartier and several concessions in Cephalonia; finally the third on 13 July 1338 was another fiefdom formed by five villages.\footnote{The first concession is in Buchon 1843:2.51-2.65, the second concession is in Id.:2.71-2.98; the third concession is in Id.: 2.103-2.106.} The reason for these concessions was additional loans made by Acciaiuoli to the Angevins between the years 1333-1342 for an overall sum of 40,000 gold ounces. The grants of several loans was surely part of Niccolò’s plan to obtain feudal rents on behalf of the bank, as after having relieved these lands from the bank he put them directly under his control.\footnote{See Tanfani 1863, Léonard 1956 and Tocco 2001.}

There is an invaluable source detailing the entirety of the Acciaiuoli’s possessions in Achaia, that is, the inventory compiled by Aldobrando Baroncelli in 1354.\footnote{Longnon and Topping 1969:67-115.} This inventory listed several lands in Latin Achaia: in Christiana (Krestena), Cremisi (Ano Kremmydi and Kato Kremmydi), Machona (Macona in Messenia, not far from Kremmydi), Caraveniza, Clegi (Gliczi), Grisi (eastern extremity of Messenia), Cosuma (Cosmina or Chosmina), Arcangeli, Lacus, Arminico, Kalamata, Drusii, Bulcano, Petoni. Finally, in 1358, Queen Joanna I of Naples and Princess of
Achaia granted to Niccolò Acciaiuoli the barony of Corinth for the merits shown during the military expedition in Sicily from 1356-1357.\textsuperscript{89}

After Niccolò’s death, his son Angelo Acciaiuoli inherited the lands and appointed his cousin Donato di Jacopo Acciaiuoli as administrator of the barony of Corinth. However, Donato di Jacopo Acciaiuoli had several debts with another cousin Neri Acciaiuoli. Therefore, Angelo paid his debts to Neri with the barony of Corinth.

Around Neri’s acquisition of Corinth there emerged two different branches of the Acciaiuoli family in Greece. The first branch would be the Acciaiuoli patrimony administered by Aldobrando Baroncelli and controlled the fiefs in Elis and Messenia. The second branch would be Neri Acciaiuoli’s autonomous rule of the barony of Corinth.\textsuperscript{90} The crucial year of Neri’s expansion towards the Catalan duchy of Athens was 1373. In this year Philip II of Taranto died. He had held several titles, among them the title of emperor of Constantinople and prince of Achaia. After Philip II’s death without an heir, a dispute took place over his inheritance between Jacques des Baux (?- 1383), the grandson of Philip II, and Joanna I (1326-1382), the queen of Naples. The latter was the daughter of Charles, duke of Calabria (1298 –1328), who was the son of Robert I of Naples (1276-1343). She became queen in 1343 and with the Neapolitan crown she also received the claims in Morea. On the other hand, Jacques des Baux had dynastic legitimacy due to being the son of Margherita of

\textsuperscript{89} See Longnon and Topping 1969; for the original documents Buchon 1843:2.143-153.

\textsuperscript{90} On Neri Acciaiuoli see DBI, s.v. Neri Acciaiuoli. See also Buchon 1843:1.126-1.159; Miller 1921:127-138,154-169,254-263.
Taranto and Francois des Baux, duke of Andria and Montescaglioso, and was the sole descendant of Philip II of Taranto. Besides the title of prince of Achaia, des Baux also possessed a claim on the title of emperor of Constantinople.

The barons of Morea supported and recognised Joanna, the queen of Naples, on 25 November 1373. The reason for the dispute over the inheritance concerned the claims on the Latin Principality of Achaia, as both contenders had valid claims. The struggle between Joanna I and des Baux was brief as Charles III of Durazzo (1345-1386) invaded the kingdom of Naples and took Joanna I prisoner. Afterwards, Charles III became the new king of Naples in 1382 and claimed the Angevin titles in Greece and replaced Joanna I in her fight against Des Baux.⁹¹

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⁹¹ The below genealogical table is taken from [http://www.uni-mannheim.de/mateo/camenaref/cmh/vol13.html](http://www.uni-mannheim.de/mateo/camenaref/cmh/vol13.html).
This struggle helped Neri to expand the territories of the duchy of Athens. In fact, in 1374 Neri Acciaiuoli had already occupied the city of Megara when Florence entered the war against the Catalans. The accurate date for the fall of Thebes and Levadia into the hands of Neri is still debatable. It is certain that both cities were part of Neri’s possession at the time of Neri’s death as his will in 1395 confirmed both Thebes and Levadia to Antonio I Acciaiuoli.92

Since 1378, the Hospitaller had been hiring several companies of mercenaries after the disaster of Vonitza, in which the Order was defeated by the Albanians of Gjin Spata.93 One of these companies was that of Juan de Urtubia. From the documentary evidence it seems that Neri Acciaiuoli hired de Urtubia for the conquest of Thebes, Levadia and Athens.94 Neri Acciaiuoli, together with Urtubia’s army, in 1385 occupied Athens, except for the acropolis, which submitted three years later. Neri I emerges with the ducal title in one privilege granted to the Greek branch of the Medici in 1387.95 However, this source is not very reliable. Finally, at the end of the fourteenth century, Ladislaus, king of Naples, confirmed definitively Neri’s title of duke.96

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95 This source is not so reliable and should be investigated carefully. It is in Buchon 1843:2.220-2.223. One ought to understand that this documentary evidence is a copy, dated on 1567, which had been made in Florence by Francesco Zanetti Vivigano, M. Franco and M. Polo di Medici. They had brought it from Naples with the aim of claiming their being relatives to the grand duke Cosimo de’ Medici.
96 Buchon 1843:2.223-2.228.
The investiture of Neri as duke of Athens represented a turning point for the Acciaiuoli’s history in Greece. While Navarreses mercenary companies at the order of Jacques des Baux conquered the fiefs of the Angevin concessions to Niccolò Acciaiuoli, the cadet branch led by Neri in Athens continued autonomously. In fact, from the end of the fourteenth century, even if contacts between Florence and the duke of Athens persisted, the political and social choices of the Acciaiuoli followed the real-politik just as other regional powers in Greece. This new dimension for the Acciaiuoli of Athens started with the matrimonial policy which aimed to build a web of alliances like any territorial lord. Neri Acciaiuoli married Agnese Saraceni, daughter of Saraceno Saraceni, who was an important and influential merchant in Negroponte, whose ties connected Neri to Venice. Of Neri’s daughters, one, Francesca Acciaiuoli, married Charles I Tocco, son of Leonardo I and Maddalena Buondelmonti (daughter of Niccolò Acciaiuoli’s sister and Manente dei Buondelmonti) and the other, Bartolomea, married Theodore I Palaiologos, despot of Morea.97 The Tocco were Sicilian family, Palatine counts of the Western empire, and at that time rulers of the isles of Cephalonia, Leuca, Santa Maura, and the cities of Arta and Ioannina. Neri also had a male son, Antonio, not from Agnese Saraceni, but Maria Rendi, who was the daughter of Demetrio Rendi, the notary of Athens.

97 Nicol 1993:303.
Antonio Acciaiuoli later married Maria Melissene, the daughter of an important Greek archon.\textsuperscript{98}

Several observations are needed to explain the eventual diplomatic aims pursued by Nerio Acciaiuoli. The Acciaiuoli’s natural allies were the despotate of Morea (thanks to the marriage between Bartolomea and Theodore I) and the Toccos (as Charles I was son of a Buondelmonti and he himself had married an Acciaiuoli). The second consideration is that the enemies of the Acciaiuoli were the Navarreses, presently vicars of Morea on behalf of Jacques des Baux, and the Turks. The relationship with Venice depended on single episodes. In fact, Venice had always considered Athens politically important due to its strategic position. This Venetian attitude is clearly visible in the Venetian attempt to seize the city upon Neri’s death. Antonio Acciaiuoli was able to regain Athens only after he defeated the Venetians in 1402. Neri Acciaiuoli even became a relative of the Byzantine imperial family, thus indirectly connecting Florence with Byzantium. In fact, even if Neri ruled autonomously, he was still a Florentine citizen and had connections in Florence. This point can be illustrated by a detailed analysis of Neri’s capture by the Navarreses company obedient to Venice.

Neri’s captivity immediately became a matter of international politics as it involved many of the major governments of the period, including the papacy. There are several sources which detail the events following Neri’s capture. First of all, the

instructions to Donato Acciaiuoli, Neri’s brother, given to the Florentine ambassador in Venice, which specified that Neri was a Florentine citizen and above all Venetian.\footnote{All the following sources are in Buchon 1843:2.238-2.254.}

Even about this matter they did not pay attention. They have offended the prestige of their municipality [Venice] and ours by offending Nerio and his status as he is [Venetian] and our citizen and [offended also] our city,... and he is its son and servant...

The mentioned Nerio and his daughters and heir, for their singular grace have the citizenship and singular privilege in Venice and outside Venice and the same his brother Donato Acciaiuoli \footnote{Ibidem Eziandio di questo chaso non anno riguardato, ma offeso la riverenza del loro chomune e del nostro, offendendo messer Nerio e ’l suo istato, il quale è loro e nostro cittadino, e insieme cholla nostra città a lui eguale patria e d’esso filgiuolo e servidore,... Il detto messer Nerio e le sue filglie erede, per loro singhulare grazia, anno della loro cittadinanza singhulare brevilegio in Vinezia e fuori di Vinezia, e ’l simile Donato Acciaiuoli suo fratello.}

In addition, this event involved Genoa.\footnote{Ibidem In prima, sarete a gienova, e parlate con messer Ludovicho e Choni Stroza, ambasciatori del comune; e chon essi ordinate che messer lo Dugie vi faccia porre in su la ghalaria che va in Romania...che di nuovo mandai due più savi huomini di Firenze ambasciatori di chomune a Vinezia chon ogni modo a preghare l’aiuto... e questa potenzia, dalle parti di qua, non chono sco più utile che Gienovesi. E che sopra di ciò o volato sentire l’animo del Dugie e de’ Gienovesi; li quali trovauo molto bene disposti al servigio in fare aiuto a messer Nerio e alla donna e al suo istato perché sento che la duchessa della Luchata fu fatta accomandata dalla singnoria di Gienova chon cierti mezzi e chondizioni e, anno preso la sua difesa...}

This document is one of the most interesting because it clearly shows the internationalisation of Neri’s capture. The municipality of Florence, allied with the papacy, pressed the doge of Venice in order to facilitate Neri’s release. Meanwhile, Maddalena Buondelmonti, the Duchess of Leuca and Cephalonia, appealed for Neri’s release. Maddalena Buondelmonti had ties in Genoa after the Genoese municipality granted citizenship to Charles I Tocco the Genoese.\footnote{Charles I Tocco was Maddalena Buondelmonti’s son. See Zćeveić 2005:61-75.} What emerged is the pervasive influence that the Acciaiuoli-Buondelmonti family
had in Italian cities other than Florence. The same instruction of Donato to the aforementioned ambassadors stated:

> When you will be in Corinth with Agnese, Nerio’s wife, you will greet her on behalf of me and of the cardinal as our sister ... you will say that I sent to Venice Lionardo Frescobaldi as an ambassador of the municipality and that the cardinal sent another one on behalf of the pope. Those will be together with the bishop of Argo.  

The cardinal cited in this document is Angelo Acciaiuoli, son of Jacopo di Donato and Bartolomea Ricasoli, brother of Donato. Angelo Acciaiuoli was bishop of Florence in 1383, and became cardinal on 26 June 1385. Therefore, there was a communication channel between Angelo Acciaiuoli and Theodore I of Morea, Despot of Morea, evident in the letter sent by the despot to Angelo Acciaiuoli.  

Another episode which helps to understand the pervasive influence of the Acciaiuoli network is that of Esaù of the Buondelmonti family. He was the son of Manente Buondelmonti and Lapa Acciaiuoli. Therefore, Esaù was the brother of Maddalena Buondelmonti, at the time duchess of Leuca and Cephalonia. After the death of Thomas II Preljubović, the despot of Ioannina, in 1384, Esau married the widow Maria Angela Doukaina Palaiologina (1350-1394) in 1385, and obtained sovereignty over Ioannina. After Maria Doukaina’s death in 1394, Esau married Irene, daughter of John Buo Spata (?-1399) in 1396 and added to the dominion the

\[103\] Buchon 1843: 2.238-2.254 Quando sarete a Choranto chon Madonna Angnesa, donna di messer Nerio, salutarete ella per parte del cardinale e mia, chome nostra sorella ... Direte le chome a vinegia mandai Lionardo Frescobaldi ambasciadorre per lo chomune, e ’l cardinale vi mandò uno per la pappa, i quali vi si trvarono insieme col vescovo d’Argho.

\[104\] Angelo Acciaiuoli was therefore a brother of Neri Acciaiuoli. The letter is in Miklosich- Müller, 1865:5.250-5.251.

\[105\] For Esaù’s life see Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, s.v. Buondelmonti Esàù, 15, 201-203. Moreover See Piranesi 1917, Della Berardenga 1963.

\[106\] Maria Angela Palaiologina was the daughter of Simeon of Uroš († 1370) and Thomas Orsini († 1394).
city of Arta. Spata was Albanian and the despot of Arta and Angelokastron from 1374.\textsuperscript{107}

Esaù’s death in 1403 allowed Charles I Tocco to take over all Buondelmonti’s territories as he was Esaù’s nephew.\textsuperscript{108} This territorial acquisition strengthened the Acciaiuoli’s network in the Epirote-Greek area as the duke of Cephalonia married Francesca Acciaiuoli, the daughter of Neri and Agnese Saraceni.

Therefore, I assert that the Acciaiuoli’s sphere of influence, stretching from Genoa to the Morea and able to touch even the Palaiologoi, was extensive. This territorial area in the Epirote-Greek territories was the first bridge, in a certain sense, between Florence and the Byzantine empire.\textsuperscript{109}

**Florence’s expansion in the Levant in the fifteenth century before the Council of Ferrara-Florence**

The Florentine commercial expansion in the Levant, which became consistent after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, was a long process which began before Florence’s annexation of Pisa. In fact, the economic development had already started with the commercial companies in the fourteenth century. However, there were no institutional contacts between the Florentine

\textsuperscript{107} For a description of Spata and also the tales of Esaù and the Tocco see in general Schirò 1975.
\textsuperscript{108} Charles I Tocco was the son of Maddalena Buondelmonti.
\textsuperscript{109} On the Epirus and on Esaù Buondelmonti see Nicol 1957: 157-179 and Schirò 1975 for Buondelmonti’s adventures. Also on Epirus see Stiernon 1959:90-126.
Commune and the Byzantine empire. This relationship only began at the end of the fourteenth century, during the reign of Manuel II. The first document which reported institutional contacts was the official embassy conducted by the Byzantines to Florence in 1397. Previously, if contacts between Florence and Byzantium had occurred, they must have been only indirect, as there is a lack of any sources with regard to Florence and Byzantium. The letter from Coluccio Salutati, at the time chancellor of Florence, to Pope Boniface IX on 5 October 1397 states the arrival in Florence of Hilario Doria.\footnote{Langkabel 1981:339-340.}

Hilario Doria, a high-born Genoese, was an important personality in the Byzantine court who had married Zampia Palaiologina, illegitimate daughter of Manuel II. He was also gambros of Manuel II and was often used as ambassador on behalf of the Byzantine empire.\footnote{On the genos see Ganchou 2008:71-94. See PLP s.v. Hilario Doria.} In the Byzantine imperial court he held the title of mesazon, one of the highest in the imperial administration.\footnote{On the mesazon see Verpaux 1966:270-296.} At the time of Doria’s embassy to Florence on 25 September 1396, Byzantium was in a dire state due to the blockade of Constantinople enacted by Bayezid I, the Ottoman sultan, from 1389-1402. As a matter of fact in 1387, just ten years before Doria’s embassy, the Byzantine empire had lost Thessalonica to the Turks. Moreover, just one year before Doria’s embassy, a crusade that was supposed to free Constantinople was completely crushed in Nicopolis.
After the dramatic end of the Nicopolis Crusade, the Byzantine empire was in a dreadful state. It stands to a reason that the Byzantine ambassadors went to Rome to ask for subsidies and help in lifting the blockade from Constantinople. Salutati’s letter confirmed Doria’s passage to Florence. The document is a recommendation made by the Florentine municipality in Doria’s favour.\textsuperscript{113} The possible reasons why Doria decided to stop in Florence are various. Florence at the time was a rich city in Italy, and it is probable that Manuel II knew this, due to the indirect contacts in the past, such as Neri’s matrimonial policy with the despotate of Morea and the presence of Florentine banks in the Levant from the second half of the thirteenth century. Another example is the same marriage between Antonio I Acciaiuoli, Neri’s heir, and Maria Melissene.\textsuperscript{114} Nevertheless, the humanistic channel was the main source of Manuel II’s information on Florence. As I stated in the introduction, Coluccio Salutati had a direct relationship with Salutati, Manuel Chrysoloras and Demetrios Kydones in the last years of the fourteenth century (1397-1400),\textsuperscript{115} In a letter dated 8 March 1396, Salutati announced to Chrysoloras that he managed to appoint Chrysoloras as professor of Greek in the Florentine University.\textsuperscript{116} Manuel Chrysoloras arrived in Florence on 2 February 1397.\textsuperscript{117} Moreover, the time gap between the arrival of Chrysoloras and Doria was not

\textsuperscript{114} Daughter of Leo Melissene and Helena Chalcocondylis.
\textsuperscript{115} Novati 1896: nn. 17; 18; XVIII.
\textsuperscript{116} Novati 1896:119-125.
\textsuperscript{117} Thomson 1966:76. On Chrysoloras in Florence see Weiss 1977:227-254.
that wide, since the Commune wrote to the pope the recommendation letter in Doria’s favour on 5 October 1397.\textsuperscript{118} The proximity of the two arrivals cannot be a coincidence, considering the importance of both Chrysoloras and Doria in Manuel II’s court.\textsuperscript{119} What is most likely is that by the end of the fourteenth century Florence came to be known in the Byzantine court due to a number of the indirect contacts (the commercial companies and the Acciaiuoli dynasty in Athens) and direct contacts (the humanist channel).

The main purpose of Doria’s embassy was to request subsidies and help against the Turks who at the moment were blockading Constantinople. Florence determined to deny Doria’s request.\textsuperscript{120} Their refusal was probably due to several reasons. Florence, already by 19 May 1397, had asked for commercial privileges from Byzantium as stated in the \textit{pratiche}.\textsuperscript{121} There is no doubt that the Byzantine emperor rejected Florence’s request since there is no trace of eventual privileges received by Florence at the time of Doria’s embassy. Another important reason was probably the on-going war between Florence and Milan which was at that moment going badly for the Florentine Commune. Doria’s embassy still remains significant since it was the first direct contact between Florence and Byzantium. It was only the first of more embassies in the time to come.

\textsuperscript{118} The sources do not state whether the two came together, so this hypothesis is impossible to prove.
\textsuperscript{119} Both were \textit{oikoeis}, and as mentioned above, Doria was \textit{gambros}, having married Manuel II’s daughter. On the \textit{oikoeis} see Verpaux 1965:89-99.
\textsuperscript{120} Langkabel 1981:339-340.
\textsuperscript{121} Novati 1896:125 \textit{Referantur gratie imperatori Constantinopolintano et sciatur ab illis de Mercantia an bonum sit quod Florentini habeant consules et si bonum est petatur, aliter non}. 

The three year presence (1397-1400) of Chrysoloras probably eased the arrival in Florence in 1401 of Demetrius Palaiologos (Goudelis), the emperor’s cousin. He was surely *mesazon* by 1416. Since Hilario Doria was also a *mesazon*, this embassy was the second to have a *mesazon* as its main ambassador. Demetrius’ embassy was once again requesting financial and military aid. As later became the custom, Florence refused to help Constantinople. In regards to the military aid, Florence stated that it was the pope’s duty to grant the necessary indulgence. As far as the subsidies are concerned, Florence postponed the answer.

The embassy of Demetrios Palaiologos Goudelis probably returned to Florence the same year from Rome. The pope granted the indulgence required by Florence and granted the right to preach for the Crusade. Of course, the Signoria did not intend to give money to Byzantium.

18 October 1401 10 indiction

Angelo de Baroncelli said
We should apologise to the ambassador of the Byzantine emperor for the state of our current expenses, but the preaching for the crusade shall be allowed.
Donato Albizzi <de Acciaiuolis>, said
On the matter of the Greek ambassador the same.

122 Andriopoulou 2010:148 on Goudelis *mesazon* see also Verpaux 1955:288.

123 There were also present John Chrysoloras (who met Manuel Chrysoloras in Florence in 1400), Demetrius Gadelli (who I identify as Demetrio Goudelis Palaiologos) and Nicolas Notaras as the Florentine municipality asked Bettino Bartoli to present to them greetings on behalf of Florence.

124 Müller 1879:1.148.

125 Conti-Ninci 1991:261-264. *Die xviiiij octobris x indictione, mcccc primo Angelus de Baroncellis <pro Gonfaloneris> dixit:...Oratori imperatoris Constantinopolitani fiat excusatio propter expensas occurrentes, sed predicatio Crucis permitatur...Donatus Albizi <de Acciaiuolis>, pro Duodecim dixit:... Super facto oratoris Greci, idem.* It is impossible that this source is related to the first embassy of Demetrius Goudelis Palaiologos. For, it makes no sense that at first the chancery answered negatively by letter to the emperor and afterwards the government discussed again which answer they were to give to the emperor’s ambassador.
Florence again refused financial aid to Byzantium, but allowed the preaching of the crusade against the Ottomans. Again, the reasons for the Florentine refusal vary. First of all, Florence was at that time waging a war against the Visconti. Secondly, the Florentine commercial investments in the Levant were probably not so consistent as to justify any economic aid to the Byzantine court. Therefore, Florence thought it was unnecessary to help Byzantium. Florence was not alone in this decision. Most European powers, with the exception of Genoa and Venice, refused to help the Byzantine emperor.

From 1403 to 1420 there was a lack of diplomatic contact between the two governments. The purchase of Porto Pisano in 1421 must have changed the attitude in Florence. For after this acquisition, the Florentine government sent instruction to Bettino Bartoli to ask for privileges from Manuel II. Bettino Bartoli was a Florentine citizen who lived and traded in Constantinople. By 1421 Florence had already taken Pisa (1409) and of course Porto Pisano (1421). There is no doubt that the Florentine Commune did not waste time and started immediately to discuss the eventuality of expansion in the Levant. Clearly, the main aim was Constantinople since the market was the perfect place to sell the manufactured woollen clothes and later silk clothes.126 The cloth manufactured in Florence had a potentially good market in

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126 For the passage from woollen to silk see Tognetti 2002:36-39.
Constantinople as the Venetian Doge Mocenigo stated before dying in 1423. Clearly the Venetians were not doing this commercial transport on behalf of Florence for free. Therefore, it makes sense that Florence, after the acquisition of Porto Pisano, wanted to establish a commercial transport of its own.

...And from the moment that our Lordship had rightly succeeded to the privileges and immunities of the Pisans which they had... he (the emperor) should deign to confirm and concede to us, to our citizens and merchants who do commerce in the place where he rules, or to those who are going to do commerce, the church, the loggia, the privileges, the immunities, the benefits and dignities that once belonged to the Pisans.

From the document emerges that the Florentine government wanted to present the city of Florence as the rightful heir of Pisa’s commercial rights in Romania. However, before making any interpretation, I think it is mandatory to date the letter so to contextualise this document in a proper historical background. Surely, the conquest of Porto Pisano happened before Florence sent this instruction. Since, the conquest of Porto Pisano finally allowed Florence to begin its Levantine expansion. Moreover, the letter mentioned Hilario Doria who was dead by 1423. Therefore the chronology of this letter could be limited from 1421 to 1423.

127 Romanin 1855:4.94. Voi sapete che I fiorentini danno ogni anno panni sedicimila li quali consumiamo nella Barberia, nell'Egitto, nella Morea et nel'Istria et ogni mese. Other evidences about Florentine clothes are in Iorga 1899:1.100. See also Heyd 1967:2.351. 128 Müller 1879:149-150. Et perché la Signoria nostra è iustamente succeduta ne’ privilegii et immunità de’ Pisani et che cost’ avevano... che si degni di confermare et concedere a noi et a’ nostri cittadini et mercatanti che trafficassono ne’ luoghi sottoposti alla sua dignità, o che in quelli arrivassono, la chiesa, loggia, privilegii, immunità, beneficii et dignità che per adietro avevano i Pisani.
We send you this letter, about this subject and as recommendation to you to the emperor, Nicolas Notaras, Demetrius Gadelli, Hilario Doria and John Chrysoloras.\textsuperscript{129}

However, in another document emerges the possible date of this letter. The Florentine Commune sent a recommendation letter to Pope Martin V on 13 June 1421 in favour of Johannes Platinterius, Manuel II’s ambassador.\textsuperscript{130}

This evidence shows that the Florentines mediated between the Byzantine emperor and the pope. As the aforementioned letter states, Florence requested the emperor’s friendship in order to receive benefits from the Byzantine empire. These \textit{beneficiis} might refer to eventual concessions of commercial privileges to Florence. Therefore, Florence might have sent the instruction to Bettino Bartoli in a period between the purchase of Porto Pisano in 1421 and 1422. The only problem concerned the identity of Bettino Bartoli. Fortunately, the Florentine Signoria’s instruction gave a partial answer:

‘From information received by our Lordship from many of our citizens and for the report of Luca di Domenico, we have heard about your good fame and that virtuously you have been conducting your activities’.\textsuperscript{131}

\footnotetext[129]{\textit{Müller} 1879:149-150 \textit{ti mandiamo con questa lettera sopra questa materia et di credenzia in te alla Supereminentia dello imperatore et a messer Nicola notara et a messer demetrio Gadelli, a messer Ilario Dora et a messer Giovanni Crissolora.}}

\footnotetext[130]{\textit{Müller} 1879:151.}

\footnotetext[131]{\textit{Müller} 1879:154. \textit{Per relationi fatte alla Signoria nostra da molti nostri cittadini et per rapporti di Luca di Domenico abbiamo sentito della tua buona fama, et quanto virtuosamente t’eserciti et governi, et nel conspecto di ciascuno per le tue virtù et laudabili portamenti se’ accepto.} The identity of Luca di Domenico is quite impossible to determine without a surname. Yet, There is in the online catasto (1427) (http://www.stg.brown.edu/projects/catasto/) a certain Luca di Domenico without family name and taxable for 660 ducats, quite a considerable sum. Whether he is the same Luca di Domenico it is difficult to say.
The merchant Bettino Bartoli lived in Constantinople in the period of the letter and most probably enjoyed good fame and some ties to the Constantinopolitan court. The account book of Giacomo Badoer confirms that Bartoli was a merchant as the Florentine emerged with the role of sanser, that is, a commercial broker. In Badoer’s account book emerges also the presence of Zaneto di Bettino Bartoli, most likely the son of Bettino. Zaneto’s presence reinforced the idea of long-term local activity of the Bartoli’s family as it seems to imply that Bettino Bartoli had been living in Constantinople for more than thirty years. However, at that time there were neither formal privileges granted by the Byzantine empire for Florence, nor were there any formal answers from Constantinople to Bettino’s embassy.

The main reason for this lies, once more, in Manuel II’s fear of conceding further tax-exemption to another Latin power. The Venetian influence over the Byzantine court should not be underestimated. Constantinople, especially in the last two centuries, was a “victim of the commercial rivalries” of the Italian powers, especially between Venice and Genoa. Moreover, already by the time of Manuel II, the Byzantines owed to Venice a sum of 17,163 hyperpyra. It stands to reason that Venice was probably not willing to allow another Latin power to expand its commercial power into the Constantinopolitan market, especially if that power was Florence since the Venetians earned a great deal from carrying Florentine wares.

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132 Badoer 1960: pp. 6, n. 19; 7, 94; 17; 19, 102; pp. 19, 135, 251; 34, 95; 76, 78; 505, 520.
133 Badoer 1960:582, 562.
134 Nicol 1992:264-283 the definition of Constantinople as a “victim” comes from Nicol in a chapter dealing with the rivalries between Genoa and Venice over the Byzantine capital which more than once led to naval fights within the very borders of the city.
especially panni, to Constantinople.\textsuperscript{136} Therefore, the Florentine Commune had to change plans and search for other ports of call in the Levant. Luckily for the Signoria, the ties which Florence had with the Acciaiuoli family in Athens and with Tocco’s despotate in Epirus were beneficial.

The Duke Charles I Tocco was the son of Maddalena de’Buondelmonti and Leonardo I Tocco. Maddalena was part of a noble Florentine family, the Buondelmonti, which was strictly bonded to the Acciaiuoli. Furthermore, Charles I Tocco married Francesca, the daughter of Neri Acciaiuoli. This marriage consequently strengthened the ties between the Toccos and the duke of Athens and indirectly also the Florentine Signoria due to the Acciaiuoli connection. The reason for Florence’s interest in Tocco’s dominion probably rests in Tocco’s Morea possessions. Charles I Tocco had taken advantage of the war between the despot of Morea and the Prince of Achaia and purchased from the adventurer Oliverio Franco the city of Clarenza in 1421. Afterwards, all Elis soon fell under Tocco’s rule.\textsuperscript{137} The Florentine Signoria sent an ambassador to both Charles Tocco and Antonio Acciaiuoli just after the duke of Cephalonia had conquered the whole of Elis. The instructions given by the Florentine government to Tommaso di Francesco Alderotti, the Florentine ambassador, confirmed Florence’s interest in the Levant as Alderotti was to negotiate privileges in favour of Florentine merchants. The informativa of the

\textsuperscript{136} On Mocenigo’s speech see fn. 121.
\textsuperscript{137} Zakythinos 1975: 197-201; On the Tocco See Schirò 1975.
ambassador also confirmed that this embassy was not the first contact between the duchy of Athens and Florence. The text below stated:

You will say that we had their letters and we listened to what Rinaldo Mezola reported on his behalf. And give thanks to him on behalf of our Lordship ...and that we accept him as a friend and a good citizen of this city just as his ancestors had been.\textsuperscript{138}

Rinaldo Mezola had visited Florence in the past, as the letter states. Rinaldo Mezola appears in a further source which at least allows us to have some more information about Mezola. He was likely an adviser to Antonio Acciaiuoli since he also appeared as a legal counsellor on the occasion of an arranged marriage between Nerozzo Pitti and Laudamina in 1422 with the name of Rinaldo di Bernardo da Mezola, as the chronicler Buonaccorso Pitti stated.\textsuperscript{139} Since Rinaldo Mezola appeared in Florence on the same year as the instructions given to Alderotti, it makes sense to hypothesize that the Florentine Signoria negotiated with Neri’s advisor in Florence. Unlike in the past, Florence could now state the readiness of its state-galleys.

\textsuperscript{138} Müller 1879:152-153. Gli dirai come avemmo le sue lettere, et udimmo quanto ci rapportò Rinaldo Mezola per sua parte, al quale si rispose. Et ringraziato per parte della nostra Signoria...et che noi l’acceptiamo come d’amico et buono cittadino di questa città, come sono sempre stati i suoi antenati. \textsuperscript{139} Pitti 1720:130. Adi XXV di Giugno l’anno MCCCCXXII Nerozo mio nipote ando’ Atene in Grecia, pevr trovarsi col Signore Antonio degli’Acciaiuoli per conchiudere il matrimonio giurato e compromesso in Firenze tra’l detto Nerozo e Laudomina figiuola che fu di Franco di Messer Donato Acciaiuoli. Funne roghato Ser Domenico di Arigho di Ser Piero Mucini. Rinaldo di Bernardo da Mezola fu procuratore della parte della donna. La dota proimessa è f. dumilia d’oro. There is also mention of Mezola’s visit to Florence; however this one year later in 1423. Pitti 1720: 135. There is another document in which appears the name of Rinaldo Mezola. Nevertheless, that document is dated 1481. Unless Mezola lived for over 80 years, this date leads me to doubt that the individual named was the same Rinaldo. The document describes him as a resident of Nauplion. He might have been the son of the other Rinaldo. The document is in Minio 2008:147 and states: ‘by this I inform you that today at the eleventh hour, Sier Rinaldo Mezola arrived here, a citizen of Nauplion, having come from Panagia under the jurisdiction of the territory of Thebes, from where he left on the twentieth in the greatest haste.

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And you will say to him that our municipality has decided to sail with heavy galleys to Alexandria and Syria and also to Romania, and if we had not done so in the past this was because we did not have a ready mercantile fleet just as now.\textsuperscript{140}

The term \textit{marina spedita} refers to the galleys built after the conquest of Porto Pisano. This guaranteed the duke of Athens a future amount of the Florentine trade. Moreover, the mission of Tommaso di Francesco Alderotti included a stop in Cephalonia.\textsuperscript{141}

Florence had commercial interest in the Morea for some time. Alderotti’s mission, contrary to that of Bartoli, seems to have had a positive ending, for Antonio Acciaiuoli conceded commercial privilege to Florence on 7 August 1422. This privilege set the \textit{kommerkion} at two per cent and abolished all the other minor taxes, such as the tax for docking.\textsuperscript{142} There are no official documents surviving from the duchy of Cephalonia. Fortunately, a letter addressed to Charles I Tocco from the Florentine Signoria in 21 December 1424 provides evidence for the possible outcome of the embassy.\textsuperscript{143}

The Florentines expressed gratitude to the duke for both the \textit{quibus quidem beneficiis} and the good reception which Tocco provided to the merchants and the captains of the Florentine galleys. These benefits along with the “good reception” might refer to either a lower \textit{kommerkion} or a reduction of the minor taxes. However,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{140} Müller 1879: 152-153. \textit{Et dirai, come la nostra Comunità à deliberato di navicare con galee grosse nelle parti d’Alexandria et di Soria, et ancora nelle parti di Romania; et se per lo passato non s’è fatto, è stato per non avere avuto la marina spedita come al presente.}
\item \textsuperscript{141} Müller 1879:152-153. \textit{Ancora anderai al duca di Cianfolonia (ezianndo in prima se ti attaglia) colla medesima ambasciata... ma ingegnati d’avere da loro eziando per scriptura, se bisogna, più obbligo che puoi. Et di quanto farai ci avisa per tua lettera, se v’è passaggi.}
\item \textsuperscript{142} Müller 1879:153.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Müller 1879:154.
\end{itemize}
whether the Florentines obtained the privileges from either Alderotti’s embassy or due to Neri Acciaiuoli’s connection to the city is not clear.\footnote{Neri’s voyage cited in the letter had the purpose of ratifying the treaty already concluded by the Alderotti.}

Despite these limited successes, Florence appeared to have an interest in expansion in the Levant. Unfortunately for Florence, Charles I Tocco’s presence in the Peloponnese did not endure. The Tocco family lost the war against the despot of Morea in 1426. After the war the Toccos gave up their territories in the Peloponnese to the despotate of Morea. In addition, Charles I Tocco was forced to give Maddalena, his niece by his brother Leonardo II, in marriage to Constantine Palaiologos, Despot of Morea.\footnote{Maddalena later changed her name in Theodora.} However, the good relationship between the Toccos and Florence seemed to remain unaltered. Proof for this comes from another letter, dated on 31 July 1429, in which the Florentines confirmed the ancient friendship with Charles I Tocco.\footnote{Müller 1879:154.}

The interest in maintaining good relationship with the Tocco family derived from the fact that, in those years, the first Florentine galleys had begun to sail to the Levant. One of the first sources to discuss Florentine expansion in the Levant was an official complaint sent by the Signoria on 8 April 1430 to the maona of Chios.\footnote{The maona possessed political and economic power over Chios. On Genoese Chios the bibliography is huge. See in general Balard 1978 and Epstein 1996. Specifically on Chios see Balletto 2005, Balletto 2005 (2) and Basso 2007. Some primary sources on Chios can be found in Rovere 1979.} The reason of the complaint was that, in Chios, the Genoese had forced the Florentines to pay taxes on unsold wares. Since there
are no sources which mention Florentine state-galleys sent to the Levant, it is most likely that the ships were not Florentine. This complaint refers to a previous treaty signed between the two cities which may lead one to think that the ships were Genoese carrying Florentine wares. Moreover, the Florentine municipality sent an unofficial request for information to Giovanni de’ Pazzi, Florentine merchant in the island:

We have heard that Florentine wares unloaded in Chios have to pay taxes even for those which are not sold. Write to the governor or to their municipality in order that they will take the proper actions.

Another problem for Florentine expansion which becomes apparent from the above passage was Florence’s dependence on ports of call. Florence did not have the same logistic power possessed by Venice or Genoa which already had several ports of call in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Florentine Signoria, therefore, had to negotiate passage for Florentine galleys through the colonies of the other Italian cities.

However, the main goal for the Florentine Signoria in the Levant remained Constantinople, which traditionally had one of the largest international markets in the eastern Mediterranean. Florence once again began to negotiate with Byzantium, after the previous interruption during the reign of Manuel II. The opportunity for new negotiations emerged after Manuel’s

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148 Müller 1879:155-156.
149 Id. sentiamo che le mercatantie de’ Fiorentini che si scarcano a Scio sono constrecte a pagare le gabelle, così quelle che non si vendono come quelle che si vendono. Scrivianne al Podestà et alla Communità di costì che vi vogliono provedere.
abdication in favour of his son, John VIII Palaiologos in 1425. The Florentines most probably believed that a new emperor represented new prospects. The decree of the Sea Consuls, the legislative office of the Commune appointed to the maritime policies, on 23 May 1429 states that Florence sent a galley to Romania with a special mission:

To bring to Constantinople, free of charges, six individuals chosen from among the ambassadors and the young people by the Consuls... [of Sea] ... and to take them back to Porto Pisano.\textsuperscript{150}

Florence may have sent this embassy to officially congratulate the new emperor on his ascension to the throne, but it also had the purpose of opening new negotiations with regard to commercial privileges. This interpretation is confirmed by the letter which the Florentine municipality sent to Constantinople on 8 June 1430.\textsuperscript{151} The letter attests to the presence of Byzantine ambassadors in Florence and the Byzantine willingness to negotiate for eventual privileges. John VIII Palaiologos probably thought it was a good idea to involve as many Latin powers in Constantinople as possible. This policy is made evident from the emperor’s favourable disposition to negotiating an agreement about the dues and the taxes of the Constantinopolitan market. John VIII’s attitude towards the West was quite different from Manuel II’s policy. John VIII’s policy strongly favoured the Latin West. In fact, the eventual organisation of the Council was in the emperor’s opinion the necessary step to persuade the pope in organising the crusade. Furthermore, John

\textsuperscript{150} Müller 1879: 283-284. \textit{Portare in Constantinopoli, sanza alcuno nolo, sei tra ambasciatori et giovani che si disputeranno pei detti Consoli, con ogni loro arnesi et cose et ridurgli in Porto Pisano.}

\textsuperscript{151} Müller 1879: 156.
VIII surely knew of the prosperity and the richness of Florence thanks to the previous connection already present since Manuel II. Unsurprisingly, John VIII asked for the Florentine help.152 Unfortunately the names of the ambassadors are not specified in the aforementioned letter. Nevertheless, I would suggest that they were the same ambassadors who, in this period, were in Italy at the papal court. For this period saw the first negotiations between Florence, the papacy, the Council of Basle and the Byzantine empire in order to organise a council to discuss church union. John Dissipatos and Manuel Tarchaneiotes Boullotes were in Bologna on June 20 1437 to meet with Florentine ambassadors to organise the proposed council.153 There is some information on Manuel Boullotes in Manuel II’s letters. He was probably a friend of John Chortasmenos, a Byzantine erudite and monk, as he appears in a panegyric written in the period from 1390 to 1425 by the same Chortasmenos and addressed to Manuel II.154 John Dissipatos was a son-in-law of Demetrios Goudelis Palaiologos and was often employed by John VIII as an ambassador in the lead up to the council.155

Unfortunately, the results of these new negotiations were once again disappointing. No privileges or concessions were granted to Florence in this period. It is possible that either Venice or Genoa intervened with John VIII on the matter. A

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153 Andriopoulou 2010:294. See also Ceconi 1869 document number XCVI, Müller 1879: 165-166.
154 Dennis 1960:22-223, Leonte 2012 Although Dennis thought this Boullotes to be much too young to be the same Manuel of the Council.
Florentine letter dated 22 November 1436 attests to the lack of privileges for Florence.

We plead your sublime Excellency to grant a full safe conduct for all men and wares and bestow the same immunity in favour of the Florentines merchants who will sail (to Constantinople) and for their wares…such as your sublime Excellency usually granted in other cases.¹⁵⁶

Two years before this letter, Cosimo de’ Medici had assumed power in Florence from the Albizzi who were then exiled from the city. With this letter, the Medici confirmed Florence’s interest in the Levant despite the change of regime. Furthermore, Cosimo de’ Medici was even more explicit in his goals, as he asked the same rights that the other Italian cities had received from the Byzantine emperors. Therefore, despite the change of regime in Florence, the main aim of the Signoria with regard to the Levant did not change. The letter from the Signoria to the Byzantine emperor in 1436 clearly shows that access to Constantinople continued to be crucial for Florence’s commercial interests.

Conclusion

The three paragraphs, although very different in content, are deeply connected. The reason for the late appearance of Florence as a maritime power in the Eastern Mediterranean was mainly geographic. As a landlocked city, Florence did not have the same advantages as other cities, such as Venice and Genoa, to develop its own commercial system. Therefore, Florence fought against Pisa in numerous wars from the end of the twelfth century to the fifteenth century. After the conquest of Pisa in 1409, Florence had to wait until 1421 to finally buy from Genoa the long desired Porto Pisano. Before this, Florence mainly relied on private initiatives such as the commercial companies and the Acciaiuoli family. After the fall of Constantinople to the crusaders in 1204, the alliances with Naples and the papacy further aided Florentine expansion in the Levant. Thanks to the alliance with the papacy, the commercial companies were able to expand their powers into areas, such as Greece, which were previously closed to them. Moreover, the Angevin advent in the Neapolitan kingdom represented an opportunity for many Florentine individuals, such as, Niccolò Acciaiuoli, who quickly rose through the ranks of Angevin power and became a powerful lord in Achaia. Thanks to Niccolò’s personal achievement, his successor Neri Acciaiuoli, from the barony of Corinth, conquered the Catalan duchy of Athens and finally received the ducal investiture from the king of Naples in 1392. The last way in which Florence expanded its influence in the Levant was the humanist channel. Thanks to the humanist network of Coluccio Salutati, Florence was able to enjoy the presence of Manuel
Chrysoloras in 1397. That same year, the embassy of Doria appeared in the city as well. Whether or not this was a coincidence, Florence was no longer the unknown Italian power as it was in the twelfth century. Since the first appearance of Doria’s embassy, Florence tried to obtain commercial privileges from the Byzantine empire. Clearly, the lack of a seaport affected every possible answer from the Byzantine emperors. Without a seaport, Florence could not guarantee annual shipping of wares which would justify the eventual grant of commercial privileges from the emperor.

The lack of any mention of Demetrios’ embassy in 1402 to 1421, the year of the conquest of Porto Pisano, might not be a coincidence. From the moment of the acquisition of the seaport, Florence immediately appointed Bettino Bartoli, a Florentine citizen in Constantinople, to ask for commercial privileges from Manuel II. However, the emperor refused the Florentine’s request. This was probably because of the consolidated presence of Genoa and Venice in the Constantinopolitan market. The two Italian city states would have never allowed another competitor in the city of Constantinople. Besides, Genoa and Venice used to be the commercial brokers of Florentine cloths. Clearly, the two Italian cities had their reasons for preventing Florence from directly selling its wares in Constantinople.

The ascension to the Byzantine throne of John VIII changed this political situation. The new emperor was determined to increase Latin
involvement, and thus sent an embassy to Florence to discuss the eventual granting of commercial privileges around 1430. Again, the discussions failed. The reason for this is unclear, but it was probably again due to the interferences of Genoa and Venice. The appearance of the new Medici power in Florence in 1434 did not change the political and commercial goals of the Florentine Signoria. The letter sent from Florence to Constantinople in 1436 was even more explicit than previous negotiations in its request for the same privileges enjoyed by the other Italian cities.

What Florence did not accomplish through its diplomacy in embassies, letters and humanist exchanges, it finally achieved thanks to the Ecumenical Council. The presence of John VIII, and the consequent possibility to negotiate directly with him, helped Florence to receive commercial privileges in 1439. In Florence, Venice and Genoa were not able to pressure John VIII into refusing to grant the privileges to Florence.

In conclusion, I maintain that Florence’s commercial and political expansion in the Levant was not an initiative of a specific government or individual. It was the natural development of a city which boasted one of the most important cloth trades in Italy.\textsuperscript{157} It stands to a reason that Florence wanted to become the sole exporter of its own wares rather than pay Genoa and Venice for their commercial brokering. Finally, this ambition was made a

\textsuperscript{157} On the general development of Florence’s oversea markets, Levant excluded, see Ruddock 1951 for England, and more in general see the introduction in Goldthwaite 2009:23-34.
reality by the acquisition of Porto Pisano. However, the lack of sea experience and the late emergence in a market which was completely overwhelmed by Genoa and Venice again stalled the ambitions of the Florentine Signoria, at least until the Ecumenical Council of Ferrara-Florence.
CHAPTER II

THE FORGED PRIVILEGES OF JOHN VIII TO FLORENCE

Introduction

On this day, 16th of August Wednesday at the 21st hour, the illustrious John Palaiologos, emperor of the Romans and of the Greeks, the August, had departed from Florence to return to Constantinople. He was going along … the Magistrates … and the Lords…and (the emperor) he (John VIII) greeted each Priors and the Standard-bearer of Justice. He (John VIII) appointed them Palatine counts …with the right to use the emperor’s coat of arms, to legitimate (children) … He also abolished half of the tax and duties for all the Florentines in Constantinople…similarly he (John VIII) granted to this people (the Florentines) one house (loggia) which once belonged to the Pisan in Constantinople … and also the Florentines had the privilege to have their own consul. 158

In January 1439, John VIII Palaiologos (1425-1448), together with the Patriarch of Constantinople, Joseph II (1416-1439), moved to Florence to attend the Ecumenical Council.159 Florence’s role was essential for a positive ending of the Council. The

158 Gutwirth 2001:290 Addi’ 16 dagosto il mercoledì’ insulle 21. Hora si partì’ di Firenze lo Illustrissimo Ioanni Peleologo Inperadore de’ Romani, e de’ Greci Aghusto, si partì’ di Firenze per ritornare a Ghestantinopoli….achonpagiato..e’ Magistrati..e’ Signori..e quivi el detto Inperadore gli visito’, e ciaschuno degli altri di detti Signori, el Ghonfaloniere della giust. Lascio’, e fecie chonte di Palazzo...
union achieved by the Ecumenical Council was the necessary price for the emperor to pay in exchange for a future crusade against the Ottomans.\footnote{There are letters between Florence and the pope with regard to the imperial schedule. For the letters see Müller 1879:159-172. Florence held the Council not only to raise their prestige but also to gain the occasion to negotiate directly with the Byzantine emperor by having the latter in the city. As a matter of fact, holding the Council would give to the Florentine government the opportunity to negotiate with the John VIII free from any negative enforcing enacted by Genoa or Venice. The same Pope Eugene IV had been guest of Florence from 1434 (therefore from the return of the Medici in the city) to 1438 (beginning of the Ecumenical Council in Ferrara).}

The pope was the main opponent to any past crusade expeditions in support of Constantinople as long as the emperors remained schismatic. In fact, the pope requested as mandatory condition that Byzantium acknowledge papal authority and accept the religious union with the Roman Church. At the same time, John VIII’s policy was clearly different from that of his father, Manuel II. John VIII and his father were in disagreement on account of Mustafa and his struggle against Murad II. As is well known, Manuel II accepted his son’s decision to support Mustafa though expressing his disagreement. As far as the Ecclesiastical Union is concerned, John VIII, unlike his father, considered the Union the sole way to save Constantinople from the Ottoman threat. Therefore, John VIII tended strongly towards the Latins instead of the Ottomans, despite the theological hostility between the Western and Eastern world.\footnote{For John VIII’s policies see particularly Djuric 1995. On Manuel II see Barker 1969.} The emperor was surely aware of the risk in pursuing the Churches’ Union as a factor of political instability. Already the past Union (Lyon 1274) brought conflicts within the Byzantine empire. Therefore, John VIII willingly risked internal turmoil for the religious Union just to obtain papal support for the crusade. The same impressive number of Byzantine delegates at the Council
remarked on the importance the event held for the emperor. In fact, never in Byzantine history had such an impressive delegation ever gone to Italy. This is the main reason why it was to be a very different event from the Council of Lyon in 1274 or the personal conversion of John V in 1369. Also, John VIII brought with him personalities who were publicly against the Union such as Mark Eugenikos or Georgios Scholarios. The emperor left the city of Florence on 16 August 1439. Moreover, John VIII granted two different chrysoboulloi logoi and nine prostagmata to the highest offices in the Florentine Commune.

This chapter analyses all the privileges granted by the emperor to Florence in 1439. The analysis will cover the contents, the diplomatic composition, and the political and economic background behind the privileges. The investigated documents are two chrysoboulloi logoi and two prostagmata, all written in Palaiologan minuscule. Specifically, each one is addressed to the Standard-bearer of Justice and the Priors of Arts on behalf of Florence. Each chrysobull has the golden bull attached at the middle end of the page.

One chrysobull granted to Florence commercial privileges, such as the right to have a loggia, a consul and a church in Constantinople. For the purposes of the chapter analysis, this chrysobull will be identified as the commercial chrysobull from now on. The other chrysobull granted to the Florentine Signoria the right to appoint

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162 Such as Mark Eugenikos, the Patriarch, the emperor of Constantinople and several others.
164 From this moment instead of Standard-Bearer etc., I will use the term Signoria.
imperial notaries and to legitimate extra-marital children. This chrysobull will be identified as the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters.

The chrysobull is the most important imperial grant of privilege. The name comes from the Greek χρυσός (gold) and βούλλα (seal). This is because of the traditional golden bull normally attached at the end of the document. The chrysobull had specific and strictly adhered to diplomatic features, such as a rhetorical preamble (prooimion), three logos written in red ink and the κράτος formula. The rhetorical preamble normally contains ideological elements connected to the imperial figure.¹⁶⁵ These elements are part of the imperial ideology of the Byzantine empire and stressed the emperor’s quality as being the supreme good for the mankind. The logos are authentication elements present only in the chrysoboulloi logos. The emperor himself signed the logos after the chancery finished drawing up the document. Finally, the κράτος was a specific formula of the chrysobull which contains the ‘emperor’s autograph subscription written below’.¹⁶⁶

Scholars have divided the chrysobulls granted through the course of Byzantine history into two kinds: the chrysoboullos logos and the chrysoboulion sigillion. Only these charters have the important golden seal attached from the lower margin of the document. The chrysobull logos is the more important of the two. To use the words of Müller, the logos was ‘a dignified expression of imperial majesty, in

¹⁶⁵ See Angelov 2007:29-51.
¹⁶⁶ OHBS 2008:133.
accordance with the ideology of the Byzantine ruler and the representational needs of that ideology.  

The prostagma is an imperial ordinance whose purpose changed several times in history. At the beginning it was originally called prostaxis (eleventh to thirteenth century) only to become later prostagma (thirteenth to fifteenth century). The name is a clear indication of the original purpose of the prostagma, which is the joining of the term pros (to) and tagma (the army). In the later period, the prostagma was used to grant honorific titles, minor privileges, appointing individuals to administrative position, etc. This charter does not have the golden seal, the three logos written in red ink or the κράτος formula. It was after all a minor kind of grant, thus it does not have the same authentication elements as the chrysobull logos. The prostagmata were given to each member of the Florentine Signoria and appointed the recipient of the title of Palatine Count with the right to elect imperial notaries and legitimise illegal children.

Scholars have often neglected the study of these privileges as they have simply acknowledged the contents of the privileges and never raised any doubt about the effect achieved by Florence’s implementation of John VIII’s privileges such as the loggia, the consul.

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167 OHBS 2008:130.
168 See ODB, s.v. prostagma.
169 OHBS 2008:132-133.
170 Necipoğlu 2009, İnalçık 1997, Antoniadis-Bibicou 1963. As stated in the introduction, the list is very long.
As far as the diplomatic analysis of the Florentine privileges is concerned, scholars have never specifically studied the privileges but always mentioned them in passing to compare other documents of the same typology. Probably the most extensive investigation belongs to Božidar Ferjančić who engaged in a deeper discussion of the diplomatic composition.\(^{171}\) However, this analysis is quite incomplete as the author failed to notice important elements within the grants. Besides, Ferjančić did not take into consideration the actual contents of the privileges which, in my opinion, are essential for a correct analysis of these privileges. This chapter includes an in-depth analysis of all the privileges which connects the content with their diplomatic composition.

It is important at the outset to discuss the historical background of the privileges. Moreover, a brief history of the privileges granted by Byzantium to the Italian cities may be useful since Florence was the last Italian city to receive commercial privileges from Byzantine emperors. I did not take into account the Byzantine privileges given to Venice because of its particular history with the Byzantine empire. The complexity of the relation between Venice and Constantinople consequently made the privileges clearly different from the privileges given to other foreign powers.\(^{172}\) Another question is if the Florentine privileges are a transfer of the previous Pisan privileges granted by the Byzantine emperors. The Florentines in the past had often tried to disguise themselves as Pisan citizens in

\(^{171}\) Ferjančić 1967, Dölger-Karayannopulos 1968 just mentioned in passing.

\(^{172}\) On Venice and Byzantium see Nicol 1988.
order to pay fewer taxes on their wares.\(^{173}\) Besides, one of the first attempts made in 1422 by Florence after the acquisition of Pisa and Porto Pisano was to present itself to the Byzantine emperor as the natural heir of the Pisan privileges due to right of conquest.\(^{174}\) Moreover, the emperor effectively granted the buildings Pisa had been using in Constantinople. Probably for this reason past scholarship interpreted the commercial chrysobull as a transfer from the previous Pisan privileges to Florence.\(^{175}\) This chapter will present a comparison of Pisa’s privileges with the commercial grants given to Florence in order to establish the nature of the commercial chrysobull.

**The commercial chrysobull**

The document is formed by three *folia* glued together while the *ductus* is in Greek Palaiologan minuscule. The imperial signature is in red ink. The text states: ‘John in Christ God faithful emperor and autocrat of the Romans the Palaiologos and always August’.\(^{176}\) The word *logos* is written three times in red ink in accordance with the Byzantine diplomatic tradition. There is no *intitulatio* or *inscriptio* as the document

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\(^{173}\) Pegolotti 1936:84. Another reference on this matter is in Villani 1990, book 7 chapter 53: *eziandio i Fiorentini si spacciavano in Tunisi per Pisani*.

\(^{174}\) After the conquest of Porto Pisano there is Bartoli’s mission in Constantinople. The Signoria ordered Bettino Bartoli to present Florence as Pisa’s successor to the privileges for conquest right. See chapter I of this PhD dissertation.

\(^{175}\) Müller 1879, Miklosich-Müller 1860-1890, Lampros 1924. Texts are also in Appendix I.

\(^{176}\) Müller 1879:174-175.
starts immediately with the *prooimion*. The latter presents typical aspect of the Byzantine conception of power such as to be generous, to show a sense of humanity and to behave showing generosity.\(^{177}\)

After the *prooimion*, the document leads to the proper *narratio*, in which the Florentines present the requests. The requests are for a consul, a general safe conduct, several immunities, tax exemptions and concrete grants such as the *loggia*, the church and the possibility to buy or build houses for their citizens. Furthermore, the document states that the Florentines specifically requested these grants. The emperor honours Florence through these imperial concessions.\(^{178}\)

The *narratio* shows the reasons behind the grants, that is, the honours and the loyalty which John VIII received from the Florentines due to the Florentine involvement as host of the Ecumenical Council.\(^{179}\) As far as the *dispositio* is concerned, the document grants to the Florentines the use of the church of St. Peter Apostle and the *loggia*, located in Galata, which once belonged to Pisa. The Florentines are required to expose in the *loggia* the Communal coat of arms next to that of the emperor’s eagle.\(^{180}\) They may elect one consul in Constantinople. The consul has legal and legislative powers over the other Florentines, just as the other Italian consuls living in Constantinople. The consul may have also a stronghold in

\(^{177}\) Id.:174-175.

\(^{178}\) Id.:175.

\(^{179}\) Id.:175.

\(^{180}\) Id.:175.
which to reside and to imprison convicted Florentines.\textsuperscript{181} Another concession given to the Florentines is the right to buy or build in Constantinople at most three houses for Florentine use.\textsuperscript{182} Finally, the emperor granted a safe conduct to all the merchants and citizens to do business in Constantinople. The document specifies that it is not usual to lower the \textit{kommerkion} due to consequent damages caused to the imperial economy.\textsuperscript{183}

The \textit{sanctio} specifies that all the privileges become invalid if Florence and Byzantium go to war with one another.\textsuperscript{184} I also want to stress that the privileges granted to Florence concern only Constantinople, not the remaining Byzantine territories, such as Morea or Mesembria. In fact, the document clarifies that the safe conduct allows the Florentines to travel only to and from the Byzantine capital.\textsuperscript{185} Furthermore, some years after these concessions, the Florentine Commune presumably received from the despot of Morea an argyrobull in 1451 which theoretically gave some privileges within the despotate of Morea to Florence.\textsuperscript{186} I wrote “theoretically” because the original copy is lacking and we have only Lascaris’ offer. This document, written in Greek, is an offer of an argyrobull presented by Athanasius Lascaris to Florence in 1451. Therefore, I think it plausible that the Florentines did not enjoy any commercial privilege within the despotate of Morea (at

\textsuperscript{181} Id.:175-176.  
\textsuperscript{182} Id.:176.  
\textsuperscript{183} Id.:176.  
\textsuperscript{184} Id.:176.  
\textsuperscript{185} Id.:176.  
\textsuperscript{186} The document has been published by Müller 1879:177-178. I should add that Müller dated the document to 1439. However, the correct date is 1451. For the date see Zakythinos 1975:2.276-2.278. In addition, Athanasius Lascaris was travelling in Italy in 1451. See PLP n.14522, 145. Unfortunately, it seems that there is no original \textit{argyrobulla} in the Florentine State Archive, but only Lascaris’ offer.
least not before 1451). Moreover, Florence could not have sailed to the Black Sea since the chrysobull mentions only Constantinople. This exclusion is important since Florence would have remained officially excluded from the rich markets of Tana, Caffa and Trebizond. Accordingly, the Florentine state-galleys officially approached the Black Sea only after the fall of Constantinople.187

The κράτος formula is indeed interesting. Dölger affirmed that one of the points for understanding whether a document is original or a forgery is the presence of the word κράτος as the first word in the last sentence. However, in this the κράτος emerged as the last word of the last sentence.188

The reason for the absence of any commitments for Florence in the chrysobull is probably due to the weakness of the Byzantine empire at the time. The emperor had no coercive power to force Florence into stricter duties in exchange for the privileges.189 Therefore, contrary to other Italian privileges, Florence remained free from any binding agreements.

Another brief observation on the golden bull remains. In the front, there is the imperial figure standing and holding the crossed sceptre. On the left, part of the inscription states:

IW(ANNHS)

187 Mallet first edited the galleys list. Mallet 1967:153-176; and then Sapori recovered it. Sapori 1972: 104-109. The list presents an empty space from 1447 to 1454.
189 As it appears common in every chrysobull, the sanctio relates to the support of the empire whenever an enemy arises against it. As an example … si inimici vestri insurrexerint in quibus nostri sunt e necesse fuerit, ut adiuvent homines vestros, terras vestra.
EN

Χ(ΡΙΣΤ)Ω

ΑΓΓΟΚ

ΡΑΓ

ΩΡ

While on the right:

ΠΑΛ

ΑΙ

Ο

ΛΟΓ

ΟΣ

On the reverse side, there is the blessing Christ standing on a *suppedion*. On the left side the inscription states:

Ι(ΕΣΥ)Σ

On the right side:
Finally, one must consider whether the Florentine commercial chrysobull was a transfer of Pisa’s previous privileges. The contents disprove this hypothesis.

What was the extent of the privileges granted to Pisa from Constantinople? Pisa received commercial privileges from the empire on four occasions. The first grant received was from Alexios I Komnenos (1111), from John II Komnenos (1136), Manuel I Komnenos (1170), and last Isaac II Angelos (1192). The emperor Isaac II granted the latter after a period of turmoil, the so-called Latin massacre (1182). Isaac II gave to Pisa significant improvements to the previous privilege concerning the *kommerkion*. The emperor extended the *kommerkion* of a four per cent rate, previously limited to imported foreign goods, to all the transactions without any limit of sort. However, exported goods remained liable to the full *kommerkion* which was a ten per cent rate. As far as the trade locations are concerned, the privilege allowed Pisa to access ‘*tam in magna Urbe, quam in ceteris terris nostrae piae tranquillitatis*’ which excluded any past restrictive interpretation.

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190 About the Genoese’s Latin versions see Imperiale 1936–1942:2.112. In addition, there are two different versions, different in wording but similar in the content. For the Greek, see Miklosich-Müller 1860-1890: 3.25-3.37 (issued by Isaac II Angelos containing both Manuel and Alexius’s privileges) For Pisa’s version see Müller, 1879:1.43-1.45; 1.52-1.54 (for both Latin-Greek editions). See also Zepos 1962:5.457-5.467 and Lilie 1984. For secondary literature the list is long especially for Genoa. Again it is important to have in mind Balard’s huge work Balard 1978.

191 Since the past chrysobulls were restricted to Constantinople and the Aegean Islands. On the matter see Jacoby 1994:349-368.
The grants to Florence were quite different with regard to the *kommerkion*. John VIII, in the commercial privilege given to Florence, reduced the *kommerkion* to two per cent, which was a net gain for Constantinople compared to the privilege given to Pisa. Furthermore, the Florentines enjoyed this tax exemption not only with regard to imported or domestic goods, but also for exported wares which, as I mentioned, was at ten per cent for Pisa. Moreover, Florentine trade was limited to Constantinople, while Pisa’s merchants were free to trade in the empire at large.\(^{192}\) The Florentine chrysobull mentioned only the city of Constantinople without adding any other place such as Morea or the Black Sea domain like Mesembria. Though not explicitly stated, the Florentines could not officially do business outside Constantinople.\(^{193}\) In conclusion, the Florentine commercial chrysobull do not at all resemble Pisa’s privileges. Due to pragmatic reasons, the emperor granted to Florence the same buildings used in the past by Pisa since the latter was now subject to Florence’s power.\(^{194}\)

**The problems in the diplomatic composition of the commercial chrysobull**

\(^{192}\) For Pisa’s privileges see fn. 184.

\(^{193}\) A possible explanation lies in John’s VIII will to concentrate the foreign merchants in Constantinople as he hoped to force the involved cities to contribute to Constantinople’s defence in the event of an Ottoman attack. However, there are no specific sources that can support this theory.

\(^{194}\) On the Pisan colony in Constantinople see Matschke 2002:476; for topographical references see Janin 1964.
There are some unclear points in the commercial chrysobull which need further clarifications. The commercial chrysobull has certain unusual features that set this grant apart from other chrysobulls given by the Byzantine emperors to foreign powers, first in the chrysobull *logos*. In this period the Byzantine emperors almost never issued chrysobull *logos* for commercial privileges. All previous commercial privileges granted by Byzantine emperors in the period after the Fourth Crusade were not chrysobull *logos* but the so-called chrysobull *sigillion*. The chrysobull *sigillion* is a minor form of the chrysobull *logos* also defined as ‘small charter of privileges’.\(^{195}\)

The *sigillion* does not have the *prooimion*. The commercial privileges given by Andronikos II Palaiologos in 1290 to the Catalan merchants is a chrysobull *sigillion*, just as the other privilege granted to the Catalan merchants by Andronikos II in 1320.\(^{196}\) The privilege given by John V Palaiologos to the Provençal merchants (without date) is also a chrysobull *sigillion*.\(^{197}\) On the contrary, the privilege given by Constantine XI Palaiologos to Ragusa’s merchants in 1451 is a chrysobull *logos*, but does not include the *prooimion* just as the normal chrysobull *sigillion*.\(^{198}\) The only commercial privilege which is a chrysobull *logos* and that includes the *prooimion* is Florence’s commercial privilege in 1439.\(^{199}\) Clearly this uniqueness is strange by

\(^{196}\) Both the privileges are in Miklosich-Müller 1865: 3.97-3.98.
\(^{197}\) Miklosich-Müller 1865:3.120.
\(^{198}\) On the privilege given to Ragusa/Dubrovnik see Miklosich-Müller 1865:3.228, Zepos 1962:5.603-5.605. From now on this PhD dissertation will mention Ragusa/Dubrovnik as Ragusa for reasons of simplicity.
\(^{199}\) On the history of Ragusa and its role in the Mediterranean see Krekić 1972, Id. 1986. For the negotiations between Ragusa and Constantine XI see Krekić1986.
itself but is not the only element which marks a difference with previous chrysobulls given by Byzantine emperors to foreign powers.

The commercial chrysobull presents a long and unusual repetition which is an odd element for a chrysobull logos. In fact, the dispositio seems to repeat twice, as the repetition includes juridical formulas along with the concessions. Therefore, one must inquire about the authenticity of the source through the comparison of this commercial chrysobull to similar documents. The investigation of past chrysobulls, and especially those given to the Italian cities, confirms the absence of any kind of repetition such as the one present in the Florentine privileges.

Some new answers emerge after the investigation of the three other documents. The three documents are the chrysoboullos logos given by John VIII to Gemistus Pletho in 1426, the chrysoboullos logos given by Constantine XI to Ragusa in 1451, and the chrysoboullos logos given by Manuel II in 1405 to the church of Monemvasia. All these documents present similar repetitions. The verb διορίζεται introduces as usual the formula which precedes the dispositio. Then, in the dispositio, there are the grants conceded by the emperor. However, after the dispositio there is not the eschatocol, which is the final part of the document, for another pseudo-dispositio appears and is introduced by verbs such as νέμω, ἔχω and κατέχω. After these verbs there is exact repetition, word for word, of the same

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200 See Appendix I/A. The chrysobull to Pletho is in Lampros 1926:330.
201 For κατέχω see the chrysobull to Pletho. For ἔχω see the first privilege to the Florentine Commune. For νέμω see the privilege to Ragusa and both νέμω and κατέχω in the second privilege to Florence.
contents present in the *dispositio*. The repetition, or second *disposition*, starts for all the three chrysobulls with a specific formula:

... through the power and strength of the present chrysoboullos logos of my Majesty.\(^{202}\)

The first appearance of the formula is in Michael VIII Palaiologos’ chrysobull granted to the monastery of Makrinitissa in 1272.\(^{203}\) This document is, however, slightly different in its wording. The same formula appears again only in 1317 in another chrysobull granted by Andronikos to the inhabitants of Monemvasia.\(^{204}\) The formula appears also in a Latin notarial copy of an imperial privilege which was produced probably in a period from 1328 to 1341 by the recipient of the privilege, that is, the Provençal merchants. The formula states:

\[
\text{Huius etenim rei gratia robore et virtute praesentis privilegii Imperii nostri}^{205}
\]

However, in these documents, after the formula, the repetition is not to the letter. It is a sort of summary of the single grants articulated in the *dispositio*. Manuel II’s chrysobull provides the first example of repetition word for word after the

\[\text{Ἠχω applies also for the chrysobull of Manuel II see } \text{Tῇ ἱσχύι καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβούλλου λόγου τῆς βασιλείας μου ἐξει}. \text{ All documents are in Appendix I/A.}\]

\[\text{202 Tῇ ἱσχύι γοῦ καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβούλλου λόγου τῆς βασιλείας μου...}\]

\[\text{203 Michael VIII’s chrysobull however does not present a repetition word for word, but it is more like a summary of the concessions present in the dispositio. Moreover, the formula is similar but not the same τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβούλλου λόγου τῆς βασιλείας μου. Also, present with a similar formulation in the chrysobull given by Andronicus in 1284 to the inhabitants of Monemvasia. Zepos 1962:5.513-5.515.}\]

\[\text{204 Zepos 1962:5.538-5.541.}\]

\[\text{205 Zepos 1962:5.586-5.588. There another Greek privilege granted by John V Palaiologos in Greek in Ligenthal 1857:3.712-3.713.}\]
This variation from the past diplomatic composition might indicate a different standard in the use of the imperial chancery in Manuel II’s reign, due the absence of any similar construction in the past. Therefore, it might be that from the end of the thirteenth century a new chancery typology emerged which evolved further to new forms during the late fourteenth century.

This new chancery standard still does not explain the odd diplomatic construction of the commercial chryσobull. Evidently, the presence of the prooimion is rather odd since it is absent from chrysobulls granted to foreign powers such as Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Ragusa etc. While the repetition might not be a notarial mistake but a change of the imperial chancery, still the repetitions are notably longer than they should be.

Other chrysobulls given at different times which have these repetitions never include any juridical formulas within these repetitions, but only the material concessions of the dispositio. However, the Florentine privileges are different, as the text not only repeats material concessions but also juridical formulas. The absence of any scholars’ works and the scarcity of sources about this issue complicate this analysis. Despite the common presence of this repetition in other imperial

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206 I have found the earliest attestation of this kind of chancery typology in a chrysobull of Manuel II in 1394. See Zepos 1962:1.696-1.698. We must note that the repetition is not always word for word, but it can also repeat using different words. See Zepos 1962: 1.702-1.704. The privilege given by to the Catalan merchants in 1290 has the formula ἥ ἱσχύι γοὰν καὶ δύναμις…, but lacks of the repetition in the same words. Another privilege given by Andronicus II (1320) still to the Catalan merchants does not have the formula, probably because the latter is only a confirmation of the privileges already given in 1290.
207 Dölger 1968:125.
documents, the fact cannot be ignored that the Florentine commercial chrysobull appears to be written in a superficial and careless form.

Moreover, Florence had no legal Latin copy of the imperial privileges, in contrast to Pisa and Genoa which had proper notarial copies of their privileges. Iorga argued about the presence of a copy in Latin of the commercial privileges which might be the one published in Pagnini. This copy is not authenticated by any Byzantine officer, so it is likely that this text was made for the convenience of the Florentine Commune since the notarial subscription was an essential authentication feature in the Latin chancery. What is intriguing is that this Latin copy includes the same unusual structure of the commercial chrysobull and appears to be a complete translation of the Greek privilege.

Why the Commune did not produce a Latin authenticated copy during the Council is a mystery. Every power normally had the possession of a notarial copy in the recipient language to be assured as much as possible in case of any controversy, as it was a sort of legal assurance especially with regards to business events. Unfortunately, only further archival research may shed illuminating light on this controversy.

208 The logothetes tou dromou usually certified the Latin copy, as it appears in Isaac II’s privilege to Pisa where it is written that Demetrius Tornikes, sebastos and logothetes tou dromou, approved and certified the document. For the last Latin chrysobull given to Genoa in 1352 see Zepos 1962:5.595-599.
210 Iorga 1899: 3.365.
211 See all the privileges given by Constantinople to the Italian cities. Only Florence lacks of the notarial copy. See chapter II fn. 186.
The last reason which creates some doubts about the originality of the commercial chrysobull is that Florence never enacted the commercial privilege. Florence, even after 1439, seems not to have had a consul, a loggia etc. The first ever mention of a Florentine consul in Constantinople is on 3 May 1461 in a letter sent from Benedetto Dei to Carlo Martelli which mentioned the presence of Mainardo Ubaldini as Florentine consul.\textsuperscript{212} Obviously, for the latter period the city was already the capital of the Ottoman empire. Even the statutes of the foreign Florentine colony seem to confirm this hypothesis as the first drafting is in 1480.\textsuperscript{213} Moreover, we do not have any letters sent from the Signoria to Florentine consuls and vice-versa for both John VIII and Constantine XI’s reigns. Finally, there is no documentary evidence of the eventual appointment of any Florentine to the consular rank in Constantinople. The only partial evidence is a document which concerns the right to sell alum in Tuscany to certain Florentine merchants. However, the document specifies that the act happened in \textit{logia dominorum Catalanorum} and not \textit{Florentinorum}.\textsuperscript{214} The only mention of a possible Florentine presence is in the notarial signature. However, the signature only affirms that:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Petrus Samoyragensis, publicum imperiali auctoritate notarius et curie consulatus dominorum Catalanorum et Florentenorum in regia urbe Constantinopolis cancellarius}\textsuperscript{215}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{212} The letter is in Orvieto 1969:228-230. Chapter VI and VII will have more information about Mainardo as it will deal with the first period of the Florentine colony in Constantinople.

\textsuperscript{213} Masi 1941 contains the statute done in 1488, yet this is a reference to a previous statute in 1480.

\textsuperscript{214} Müller 1879:172.

\textsuperscript{215} Müller 1879:169-172.
Therefore, the document does not mention any effective presence of a Florentine *loggia* but rather seems to imply that the Florentines administrated official businesses in Constantinople in the Catalan *loggia*.\(^{216}\) Yet, due to the lack of sources on this matter, it is not clear whether there was an agreement between the Florentine Signoria and the Catalans. Finally, this transaction happened in 1437 which is two years before the Council and the grants of the privileges. For this chronological reason this document cannot be used as a proof of the existence of a Florentine *loggia* in Constantinople under the Byzantine empire.

Unfortunately, I was not able to find more convincing evidence which could prove the commercial chrysobull to be a forgery. Clearly I was surprised to have an imperial chrysobull of such low quality and unique in structure and not even enacted by the Florentine Signoria, despite the long-time efforts spent by Florence (since 1397) to obtain commercial grants from the emperors.

The only hypothesis so far plausible is to suggest a possible inexperienced copyist or notary. Of course, this particular mistake is difficult to attribute to a Byzantine expert copyist. Especially, since this document is a *chrysoboullos logos* that is by any means the most important charter of the Byzantine chancery. At the same time, however, the hypothesis that the copyist was a Florentine notary who badly copied or even created from the scratch this commercial privilege is at the

\(^{216}\) The Catalans had a *loggia* since 1290; see the privilege given to the Catalan merchants in Miklosich-Müller 1879: 3.97-3.98.
moment impossible for me to demonstrate. Therefore, for now, I am not able to provide an answer to this enigma without speculation.

**The chrysobull dealing with domestic matters**

Along with the commercial *chrysoboulos logos*, John VIII granted another *chrysoboulos logos* which gave to Florence the right to create and elect imperial notaries. The document contains three *folia* glued together. The *ductus* is in Palaiologan minuscule and at the bottom there is attached the customary golden bull. As in the previous chrysobull, there are the imperial signature and the three mentions of the *logos*, both in red ink. There are no other authentication marks in the text, just as the previous commercial chrysobull. This chrysobull granted to the Florentine Commune the right to create public notaries. While there are certainly other examples of chrysobulls given by emperors to cities within the Byzantine empire, the contents of these documents does not at all resemble those of the Florentine privileges. In fact, these privileges often relate to juridical property, tax exemptions or property alienation to or from the imperial territory or the city.\(^{217}\) The Florentine privilege, on the contrary, differs completely from all other chrysobulls and appears in a certain sense unique in the composition.\(^{218}\)

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\(^{217}\) See for a general description of the chrysobull given to imperial cities Kyritses 1999:229-243.  
\(^{218}\) For the document see Müller 1879:172-174; Lampros, 1972: 335-338.
There are several other differences connected to the diplomatic composition of the document. The presence of the *intitulatio* is clearly something unique for this document when it is considered from the point of view of the late Byzantine diplomatic tradition.

† Ὅσιόνος ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστός βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωμαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος καὶ ἀεὶ αὐγουστος 219

Moreover, the *prooimion* is different from the commercial chrysobull. Of course, the rhetorical introduction presents typical ideas of the Byzantine conception of power. However, the main issue which emerges from the ideological preamble is the necessity to give noble concessions in order to promote those (people) who had deserved such great honour. This would later assume importance in the political contextualisation of this chrysobull.

The *narratio* follows more or less the same pattern of the previous chrysobull. The document then carries on with the *dispositio*, that is, the list of all the concessions granted by the emperor to the Florentine Commune. This *dispositio* includes some unique grants both of pragmatic and ideological nature. As mentioned above, John VIII granted to the Signoria the right to create and elect public notaries with imperial authority. 220 Moreover, the document clearly states the elected notaries

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219 Müller 1879:172.
220 Müller 1879:173.
must give an oath of fidelity to the Byzantine empire.\textsuperscript{221} The public notaries can write letters, contracts, acts and agreements. These notarial deeds follow the laws of the city in which the imperial notaries would live and work. Moreover, all the acts that the notaries produce enjoyed the imperial authority (βασιλικός ἐξουσία).\textsuperscript{222}

Besides, the emperor granted the same βασιλικός ἐξουσία for making legal illegitimate children to the Signoria, with the exclusion of the illegitimate children of the nobility.\textsuperscript{223} Finally, the future governments which would later be elected kept these grants.

Since the document presents some unusual features, I will analyse in greater detail its diplomatic and palaeographic composition. The first problem is to identify the typology of this document. This chrysoboullos logos differs in key respects with those granted in the past by the Byzantine emperors. The presence of the intitulatio at the beginning of the text is an unusual element, as these kinds of documents from the thirteenth century onward usually start with the narratio.\textsuperscript{224} Moreover, just as in the first chrysobull, even in this grant the κράτος formula does not follow the usual tradition of being the first word of the last sentence. Here the κράτος is the second...

\textsuperscript{221} ἀφ’ ἐν καὶ λήγονται ὅρκον σωματικὸν καὶ Ἱσόχρον, ὡσπερ πανταχοῦ πιστοὺς εἶναι τῇ βασιλείᾳ [μου]. The μου is actually an insertion made by Müller. Logically without this insertion the oath of fidelity became to the empire (in general) and not my power/the emperor. I think in this case that the most correct definition would be empire for the documents mentions notaries. The notaries normally are faithful in respect to the laws so the Byzantine empire.

\textsuperscript{222} Müller 1879:173.

\textsuperscript{223} Idem.

\textsuperscript{224} See the other privilege to the Florentines, or the one to the Ragusa Commune. Moreover, the same Genoese and Pisan privileges do not have the intitulatio and the ideological prooimion. See also Dölger-Karayannopolos 1968:120-125.
word in the last sentence. Finally, the golden bull is smaller compared to the bull in the commercial chrysobull.

Since the contents closely resemble Western charters, I will present a comparison of this document to some imperial diplomas normally granted by Western emperors. A preliminary comparison seems to show some contamination derived from Latin diplomatic practice in both the domestic chrysobull and the prostagmata. The first element is the presence of the intitulatio which started to disappear in the Byzantine chancery from the thirteenth century.\(^{225}\) Besides, this is the first time that a Byzantine emperor gave to a foreign power the right to elect public notaries with imperiale auctoritate and to make legal illegitimate children.\(^{226}\) Venice, Genoa and Pisa never received any similar concessions. The several irregularities present in the document make me doubt the chrysobull authenticity and think it may be the result of a forgery.

In fact, a comparison between the commercial document and the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters shows further differences between the two documents. In this particular case, the prostagmata acquire a special importance, for the chrysobull and the prostagmata have features in common, while the commercial chrysobull seems a different document. The chrysobull dealing with domestic

\(^{225}\) Dölger-Karayannopulos 1968:120-125. See also Guillou 1991. The imperial diploma given by the emperor Sigismund to the Italian Giovanni Francesco Capodilista can be found in Notarile, 3343, f. 60-62v. Sigismondus divina favente clementia Romanorum Imperator semper Augustus... Or Albertus etc. see Koller 1955:38-40.

\(^{226}\) Western notaries with imperial authority had this title: notarius publicus imperialis auctoritate.
matters, contrary to the commercial chrysobull, have the *intitulatio*, the golden bull is relatively smaller, and in the eschatocol there are three crosses rather than one.

Moreover, the analysis on the text brought up several other issues which seem to confirm that the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters is definitively a forgery. Even the *logoi* are slightly different. In fact, the *logoi* of the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters seem more an imitation rather than being the work of the same hand.

**First difference**

**Logos in the documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commercial chrysobull</th>
<th>Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Logos</td>
<td>First Logos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Logos</td>
<td>Second Logos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Logos</td>
<td>Third Logos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have already mentioned the different eschatocol of the commercial chrysobull with only one cross and the other document with three crosses.

**Second difference**

**Crosses**
Between the commercial chrysobull and the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters there are other differences especially in the *ductus*. The first difference is in the *καὶ* between *αἰτησεσσα* and *τη* which is only in the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters and the *prostagma* but not in the commercial chrysobull. The latter, instead has *τε* which is not present in the other documents.

**Third difference**

Moreover, while in the commercial chrysobull appears *καὶ τὴν τοὺτον εὐνοιῶν* on the other hand the chrysobull and the *prostagma* has *καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων εὐνοιῶν*. Some other very important issues are due to the imperial signature: the commercial chrysobull has one “point” between *αν* and *το* and one between *βα* and *σι* while the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters has one point between *λευσ* and *καί* and one between *το* and *κόσ*.

**Fourth difference**
The fifth difference concerns the construction of the word *leus* in the emperor’s signature. The domestic chrysobull appears again to be an imitation.

Another important difference is in the final part of the imperial signature. The two crosses at the end are clearly different. The chrysobull dealing with domestic matters has two points, while the commercial chrysobull does not have any. Moreover, there is an extreme difference between the shapes of the two crosses. The line which connects the *logos* to the cross seems written by a different hand. In addition, the *lambda* and the first *alpha* in *Παλαιο* seem different.
Sixth difference

Commercial chrysobull

Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters

Another crucial difference is in the *indictio* of the two documents. The commercial chrysobull has the *indictio* written in numerals, while the other chrysobull has the *indictio* in letters.

Seventh difference

Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters

Commercial chrysobull

I do not think these particular differences are the result of notarial sloppiness, for the faults are too many and too drastic. The ending of the imperial signature
seems the result of notarial ignorance rather than sloppiness. I think, therefore, that there are two different hands which signed the chrysobulls as the imperial signature in the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters is completely different and likely to be an attempted imitation. The chrysobull dealing with domestic matter is the result of a forgery rather than of a new particular kind of document given by the Byzantine chancery. I will present more proofs especially after the introduction of the prostagnata.

The two complete signatures

Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters

Commercial chrysobull
The prostagmata as forgeries

As I have already mentioned, John VIII supposedly granted, together with the two chrysobulls, one *prostagma* for each of the highest offices in the Florentine government: the Standard-bearer of Justice and the eight Priors of Arts. There are three sources related to the *prostagma*. One *prostagma* was granted to Michele Fedini Brancacci and transcribed by Giovanni Lami. The second was granted to Giacomo de' Morelli. There is also the Italian vernacular translation in a manuscript. This translation is only partial and concerns the *prostagma* granted to Domenico di Tano Petrucci.

As far as the classification of the *prostagma* is concerned, Dölger and Karayannopulos (1968) argued that the documents are *kodikelloi* rather than *prostagma*, while Božidar Ferjančič (1967) believed them to be *prostagma*. Moreover, while Dölger believed the latter to be the original document granted by John VIII, Ferjančič supported the idea that this document was a copy from the original. It is plausible that Dölger’s idea is not completely correct as the

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227 For a total of 9 *prostagma*.
228 Morelli’s can be found in the Bibliothèque Nationale Paris, Cod. Gr. Suppl. 821, Fedini’s *prostagma* is a hand-made copy by Giovanni Lami in the eighteenth century. Preserved in the *Estense*, Cod. Campori 1075. The vulgar translation of Petrucci’s *prostagma* is in Florence, BNCF, Conventi sopressi, C4 895 fol. 141r-142r. The other families who received the privilege are the following: Alessandri, Cocchi Donati, Marignolli, Marsili, Petrucci, and Carducci. See [http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/ceramellipapiani/servlet/action?navigate=Log] s.v. Alessandri, Cocchi Donati, Marignolli, Marsili, Petrucci, Carducci; See S. Ammirato, *Istorie Fiorentine*, Firenze 1826, VII, p. 280.
229 See Dölger 1976 n. 3489.
The menologem rarely gives honorific titles and, in general, few of these particular documents survive to today. In addition, one must analyse whether Morelli’s document preserved by the Bibliothèque Nationale of France is an original or a copy. Ferjančič maintained that the menologem seemed completely different from other documents. There is, therefore, the possibility that the copyist had the original at his disposal and tried to imitate the John VIII’s menologem.

Brancacci’s prostagma is a hand-copy made by Giovanni Lami. Lami’s copy, contrary to Morelli’s document, strangely includes the day of the drawing up, 6 August. The difference is more likely the result of an interpolation, suppression or simply a mistake depending on which of the two documents is wrong. Besides, if Lami’s copy is correct the date proposed by the Priorista (and Cambi) is a mistake since the latter put the grants of the privileges on 16 August 1439. As discussed above, Ferjančič believed Morelli’s document to be a copy while Giovanni Lami claimed to have copied the prostagma from the original document. Ferjančič also stated that from the middle of the fourteenth century the day in the menologem began to appear in the prostagmata following Manuel II’s decree in 1394 which imposed the addition of the day in the indictio for all the notarial acts, prostagmata included. Morelli’s copy makes no mention of the day but only the month of the drawing-up. The two prostagmata are also different in content: while the Parisian


231 Ferjančič 1967:276, for the decree see Ferjančič 1967:275, the transcription is in Miklosich-Müller 1862:3.214.
document (Morelli’s *prostagma*) finishes with the proper *indictio* 

\[\text{Μην} \]

\[\text{ᵻ} \]

\[\text{Ἀὐγοῦστον \ iv̄d̄kτīd̄v̄νος} \ β' \] written in red, Lami’s copy of Brancacci’s *prostagma* finished with an odd *ἐκτη* Αὐγοῦστον ἵνδικτιῶνος δευτέρας. The differences are noteworthy. The first difference is the two crosses circumscribing the month; the second difference is the mention of the day in Brancacci’s document; the third difference is the *indictio* spelled out and not in the traditional Greek numerical system.

Seemingly, Lami made a mistake when he transcribed the document from the original, since I cannot explain the lack of the two crosses in the menologem and the *indictio* spelled out instead of the Greek numerical system.\(^{232}\) In fact, all the *prostagmata* so far examined have the menologem always in the midst of crosses and the *indictio* in Greek numerical system. Therefore, I believe that Lami wrongly transcribed the word Μην for ἐκτη.\(^{233}\) Moreover, another proof comes from the literary sources quoted at the beginning of this chapter: the so-called *Priorista* and the *Istorie Fiorentine*. The author of the chronicle is Giovanni Cambi.\(^{234}\) However, Cambi used Pagolo Matteo di Pietriboni’s *Priorista* for the period from 1404 to 1459. Giovanni Cambi was a very influential politician in the second half of the Quattrocento (three times Prior of Arts, once also Standard-bearer of Justice). The successful career of Cambi might be proof of the good connection between this


\(^{233}\) See at the end of this chapter several examples of original *menologemma* which could have confused the Italian scholar.

Florentine and the Medici’s family, since the Medici had a great influence over the election of the Florentine officials in the Signoria. Cambi’s and Pagolo chronicles alleged that the emperor granted the privileges on the same day he departed from the Florentine Commune on 16 August 1439.\textsuperscript{235} Therefore, Lami’s transcription of the \textit{indictio} must be wrong.

Another feature which raises other problems is the presence of the \textit{intitulatio}. According to Dölger and Karayannopulos, the \textit{prostagma} protocol should only have the symbolic \textit{invocatio} and never has an \textit{intitulatio}.\textsuperscript{236} Dölger considered this document as a \textit{kodikellos}, but the presence of the \textit{intitulatio} is also rare in the \textit{kodikellos}. The presence of the \textit{intitulatio} in the \textit{prostagma} cannot be due to a change in the diplomatic composition of the imperial documents. Therefore, I think that it is necessary to investigate in further detail the \textit{prostagma}. The lack of the \textit{intitulatio} in the commercial chrysobull leads me to believe that there was a specific agenda for the addition of the \textit{intitulatio} to both chrysobulls dealing with domestic matters and \textit{prostagma}.

Another interesting element is that the \textit{prooimion} of the \textit{prostagma} is word for word, identical to the domestic chrysobull. The commercial chrysobull \textit{prooimion} is slightly different. A \textit{prooimion} is also rare in a \textit{prostagma}. The content of the \textit{prooimion} in late Byzantine privileges (chrysobulls in form) stresses the necessity for the emperor to promote those who possessed certain kinds of stereotypical

\textsuperscript{235} See the passage at the beginning of the chapter.
\textsuperscript{236} Of course, the \textit{invocatio} is present.
qualities.\textsuperscript{237} The document in the narratio presents the reason why these private citizens deserved this honour and afterwards listed the qualities connected to the perfect behaviour such as having a noble soul and a good moral standard. The dispositio lists all the grants that the Florentines received from the emperor. First, the grant includes the receiver among the imperial oikeoi and grants to the receiver the privilege to use the imperial insignia in the recipient banner. Moreover, John VIII conceded to the receivers the title of Palatine count together with the faculty of creating notaries and making legal illegitimate children. Similar to the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters, the prostagma recipient could make legal the illegitimate children excluding those of the nobles such as barons and counts. Furthermore, in Brancacci’s document there is the presence of the Palaiologan/imperial insignia on the bottom left of the page which so far seemed rather unusual. What is really interesting is the overall diplomatic structure of the documents. As a matter of fact, these prostagma do not follow the standards of other prostagma given by John VIII or Manuel II.\textsuperscript{238} Let us look at the eschatocol:

\begin{quote}
"Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων δῆλον καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸν εἰρημένον εὐγενὴ ἄνδρα Τάκοβον Τσάννο Παύλου Ντεμορέλης, τὸ παρὸν τῆς βασιλείας μου πρόσταγμα, ἀπολογηθὲν κατὰ μὴν Λέγομεν τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης δευτέρας ἵδρυμον ἵδρυμον τοῦ ἑξακοσιοστοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοῦ ἑβδομοoS supplemented by the special estigmatic sign of John VIII.

\textsuperscript{237} Angelov 2007:145-155.

\textsuperscript{238} See for example John VIII’s prostagma in the Actes de Kutlumus in Archives de l’Athos. Lemerle 1988:2.157-2.158; 2.401-2.402. Or the one in Actes de Lavra in Archive de l’Athos. Lemerle 1979: 3.186-3.187. It is notable that even before the two emperors none of the prostagma had this particular eschatocol.
The first element that immediately raises questions is the double mention of both month and *indictio* as seen in the sentence “κατὰ μὴν Ἀὔγουστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης δευτέρας ἱνδικτιώνος” and by the presence of the menologem. These elements are highly unusual. After an analysis of all the *prostagma*ta given by the Palaiologan emperors, I can exclude any further presence of both menologem and *indictio* with the month of emission and therefore conclude that only the Florentine *prostagma*ta have these peculiarities.

The second unusual part is the presence of the *κράτος* formula in the *prostagma*ta as normally the *κράτος* is only in the chrysobull *logos*. The same *κράτος* formula has another strange element. This formula is usually the last word of the chrysobull, appearing immediately before the imperial signature. However, in the *prostagma*ta the *κράτος* is in a different position. In fact, there is another formula after the *κράτος* formula and before the menologem which states:

*ἐπιτεθείσης καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας συνήθους καὶ βασιλικῆς βούλης*

Although the formula is not strange, since there are several past documents which mention the customary bull attached, the position in which it appears in the document is unusual. Normally this formula is *after* the menologem but never between the *κράτος* formula and the menologem. Furthermore, the position and

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239 The sentence is: ἐν ὧν καὶ τὸ ἡμετέρων εὐσεβές καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος.
significance of this formula in this document reminds one of the standard formula used in the Western chancery as an authentication feature. The Western diplomas always mention the golden bull with formulas such as “presentium sub nostre imperialis maiestatis sigillo”, or “presentium...”, “sub pendent”. The formulas in the Latin documents always have the same position just as in this Greek prostagmata, that is, before the date of the document emission.

Morelli’s prostagma in the Parisian manuscript presents another curious element. There is the presence of the de’ Morelli’s “arma” (coat of arms) at the bottom left of the document. This element is again similar to the diplomatic standards of the Western chanceries. Sometimes, when a Latin auctoritas granted a privilege which modified the recipients “arma”, the shape of the new arma is pictured in the document. However, despite the fact that these clues indicate cross-cultural influence, it still remains to interpret the strange presence of the double

240 See again for example Koller 1955:76-77 presentium sub nostris regalis sigilli appensione testimonio litterarum. Furthermore see the diploma given by Frederik III to Pietro de Bonomo, secretary of the former, in 1492: Praesentium sub nostrae imperialis Majestatis Sigilli appensione testimonio litterarum, or Charles IV in 1376 to John and Bartholomeus de Guarzonibus: presentium sub Imperialis nostre Majestatis sigillo testimonio litterarum... or another Frederik’s III diploma to Archangel de Balduinis of Trent sub nostril imperialis maiestatis sigilli appensione testimonio litterarum. These examples also show the continued presence of the formula in the Western chancery.

241 Koller 1955 “donamus leonem azurum erectum in campo aureo et....que ponitur cum cimerio hic depicto”, Frederik III to Arcangel de Balduinis of Trent: vobisique in signum...nobilitatis arma, sive armorum insignia vestra, utpote scutum rubrum, et eius medio capra integra azuri coloris extensis, et causa ad currendum disposita...et progenitores vestry ut veri sacri Romani Imperii nobiles gestare, et deferre consuevitistis, melioramus, et colla caprarum tam in scuto, quam supra galea pellibus de varo prout haec in medio praesentium pictoris artificio clarius cernitur figurate decoramus. Frederik III to Bonomo: auctoritiae nostra Caesarea Arma illa et Insignia quae vos...deferre consueveritis, vide licet Scutum rubri coloris cuius medium per obliquum a dextero superiori...et praefatae Imperial potestatis Nostrae plenitudine exornandaque duximus, confirmamus, adaugemus, exornantisque presentium Litterarum tenore adeo ut arma, et insignia ipsa predicta adiecta in memoriam virtutis, et meritorum vestrorum Corvo praedicto super capite aurea Corona, quemadomodum in medio praesentium pictori arte clarius cernuntur figurata.
mention of both month and *indictio* and the presence of the *κράτος* formula. The question can be answered on comparison of the Florentine *prostagma* to the Florentine commercial chrysobull and other *prostagma* of the same period. The eschatocol of the *prostagma* is fully identical to the eschatocol of the Florentine chrysobulls. One possible hypothesis is that the Greek copyist or the notary in charge just copied most probably from the chrysobull dealing with the domestic grants. However, this hypothesis means that the notary was such an amateur that he did not realise the colossal mistake. This explanation seems rather superficial since hardly a Greek notary or copyist from the Byzantine chancery could possibly make such a huge mistake, not even once but at least twice. Besides, it cannot be a mistake since the two copies of the *prostagma* to come down to us have the same repetition.

These mistakes seem more likely to be the result of ignorance rather than distraction, and only a Latin notary would ignore the difference in the diplomatic construction of a Byzantine chrysobull and a *prostagma*.

There is another difference between the standard *prostagma* and the *prostagma* granted to Florence. Ferjančić, in the aforementioned article, pointed out that already from 1394, following a decree of Manuel II, the *prostagma* had to include not only the month and the *indictio*, but also the day and year of emission. The Florentine *prostagma* included the year but not the day. Therefore the

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242 See Appendix I/B.
inclusion of the year is not due to the Latin notary awareness’ of Manuel II’s decree but rather to the fact that the notary literally copied word for word the eschatocol of the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. Therefore, if the notary copied the eschatocol, it is highly probably that the presence of both intitulatio and prooimion is due to the notary not realising that he was actually writing twice both month and the *indictio*. Therefore, the notary was not Greek, and surely was doing something not really “legal”.

There is a strong chance, therefore, that the *prostagmata*, as well as the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters, are all forgeries. Later I will present further evidence to this end. Ferjančić’s argues that Morelli’s document is not an original due to the imperial menologem. In fact, the latter is slightly different from the *menologem* normally made by John VIII, and Ferjančić argued that this might have been the work of someone who had tried to imitate John VIII’s original signature. Nevertheless, Ferjančić did not notice the strange repetition of both the month and the *indictio*. Therefore, if Ferjančić proved that the imperial *menologem* is not of John VIII’s hand and there is other clear evidence, such as the copied eschatocol, the hypothesis of the *prostagmata* being forgeries is verified.

One ought to explain the presence in this forgery of the sentence “ἐπιτεθείσης καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας συνήθους καὶ βασιλικῆς βούλης”. There is no doubt that it was a useless risk to add further elements evidently alien to the Byzantine chancery tradition if the *prostagmata* were not authentic. However, this is a forgery made for
the Western world and not for the Byzantine world. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that the Florentine chancery prepared the *prostagma* using chancery standards fit for a possible Western audience. Moreover, Florence had no worries about the possible discovery of a forged document by potential enemies. Few in the period would have had enough knowledge of forgeries made in Greek to disprove the authenticity of the *prostagma*. For the knowledge of the Byzantine chancery standard was probably known by only a few highly educated humanists who had in the past visited Constantinople or had been part of the imperial court. Even the knowledge of Greek was rare and only understood by a few humanists, most of whom lived in Florence.243

The comparison between some Western Imperial chancery diplomas, a despotate privilege following Latin diplomatic standards and the Florentine privileges

I will present a comparison between some of the Western diplomas and the Florentine privileges. This comparison will give some more accurate insight into the

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nature of the forgeries. The comparison does not include the commercial chrysobull, which as I have mentioned in the previous chapter is presumably not a forgery.

For the purpose of this specific comparison, I will use some Western ennobling privileges from the end of the fourteenth century to the end of the fifteenth century. The reason of this long span of time is due to the similar standards of the different German chanceries. The privileges I chose for the comparison are Sigimund’s diploma to Capodilista, one 1438 charter given by Albert II to Leonard Bishop of Passau which granted the right to create imperial notaries, and three charters given by the emperor Frederick III to several individuals. Following this methodology, it appears that there is a deep connection in the diplomatic formulas between the Florentine privileges and Western diplomas.

The first elements to analyse are the similar formulas present in both the Florentine privileges and the Western diplomas. Thanks to this more accurate comparison with the Western grants, close translations emerge from Latin to Greek in both the Florentine prostatgama and the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. For example, the same formula for creating public notaries is the result of a direct translation from the Latin formula. Moreover, the Western emperor forbade

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244 The one from Albert II is in Koller 1955:38-40; Frederik’s III to Bonomo is in Codice Diplomatico Istriano Vol. 4, the former to Archangel de Balduinis is in Compendium Diplomaticum I, Capodilla’s diploma in Martellozzo Forin 1999:79-119.

245 See the formula Possit insuper facere et creare notarios publicos seu tabelliones in the diploma to Capodilista; Frederick’s III diploma to Francesco Gonzaga in 1479 possit et valeat facere et creare notaries publicos seu tabelliones.; Frederick’s III diploma to Francesco Bonomo in 1492 possitis et valeat per totum Romanum Imperium facere et creare Notarios publicos seu Tabelliones; Frederick III’s diploma to Archangel de Balduinis of Trent in 1476 possis, et valeas...et valeant per totum sacrum Romanum imperium facere, et creare notaries publicos, seu tabelliones. Not surprisingly the
making legal *illustrium virorum principum comitum et baronum filis*, the same formula appeared in Greek in the *prostagma* and the chrysobull *logos* dealing with domestic matters.\(^{246}\) Therefore, the *prostagma* and the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters used the same Latin notarial formulas translated literally. Furthermore, there are other similarities in the diplomatic composition which further confirm the resemblance between John VIII’s privileges to Florence with the Western privileges. The *intitulatio* is present in every diploma produced by the Western chancery, while it did not exist in the Byzantine *prostagma* or chrysobulls; however, the Florentine privileges, commercial chrysobull excluded, had all the *intitulatio* just as in the Western charters.\(^{247}\) Besides, there was another unusual diplomatic element which was the *prooimion*, as I have mentioned in the

latter seem to be is the same Latin rendering from *...προχειρίζεσθαι καὶ συνιστᾶν νοταρίους ἢ τ’ οὖν ταφοσλαρίων...* See also the obligatory oath to give to the empire *...pro ipso sacro Imperio debite fidelitatis corporale prius recipiatis iuramentum in hunc modum...in Capodilista; et pro ipso Romano Imperio debitum fidelitatis recipiatis et quilibet vestrum recipiat corporale, et proprium iuramentum in hunc modum in Archangeł’s diploma; et pro ipso Romano Imperio debitum fidelitatis recipiatis corporale, et proprium iuramentum in hunc modum in Francesco’s Bonomo diploma; et pro ipso Romano Imperio debitum fidelitatis ac quivis vestrum recipiat corporale et proprium iuramentum in hunc modum in Francesco Gonzaga diploma. In the Florentine privilege it appears as *ἀφ’ ὄν καὶ λήφονται ὅρκον σωματικῷ καὶ ὄψιςίην, ὡστε πιστοὺς εἶναι τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου* which has the same value as the Latin formulas.

\(^{246}\) (Albrecht II to Leonhard) *illustrium tamen principum comitum et baronum filis dumtaxat exceptis* and Martellozzo Forin 1999:79-119 (Sigismund to Capodilista) *illustrium virorum principum comitum et baronum filis dumtaxat exceptis*, (Frederick III to Bonomo) *illustrium tamen Principum, Comitum, Baronumque filiis dumtaxat exceptis*, (Frederick III Archangel de Balduinis) *illustrium tamen principum, comitum, baronum, et nobilium filiiis dumtaxat exceptis*; (Frederick to Francisicus Gonzaga) *illustrium tamen Ducum, Marchonum, Baronum, magnorum nobilium natis dumtaxat exceptis*. The reason for this prohibition can be probably found in the Western tradition. Same as this document the Western emperor never allowed a Palatine count to make legal children of the noble. This likely comes from the necessity of the sovereign to maintain the control and to be the only one allowed to make legal the children of any noble.

\(^{247}\) (Sigismund to Capodilista) *Sigismundus divina favente clementia Romanorum imperator semper augustus* (Albrecht II to Leonhard) *Albertus etc.*; (Charles IV to John and Bartholomeus de Giazarobius) *Carolus Quartus, divina favente clementia Romanorum Imperator semper Augustus*; (Frederick III to Bonomo); *Fridericus divina favente clementia Romanorum Imperator semper Augustus...*; (Frederick to Archangel de Balduinis) *Fridericus divina favente clementia Romanorum imperator semper augustus*. 111
previous paragraph. Again, the presence of the *prooimion* was not at all unusual in the Western diplomas, especially in the privileges concerning the honorific title of Palatine count, but in the Byzantine *prostagmata* the preamble is exceedingly rare.\textsuperscript{248}

For the purpose of comparison, I will now introduce another kind of unusual charter. Vitalien Laurent published an interesting article in which he analysed a privilege given by a Greek chancery to a Latin individual. The document is the argyrobull given in 1419 by Theodore II Palaiologos, Despot of Morea, to the Tuscan Mastino de’ Cattanei. Mastino was from Foligno, in Tuscany, and the argyrobull is a reward for his merit in the arrangement of the marriage between Theodore II and Cleope Malatesta, the daughter of Malatesta IV, lord of Fano and Pesaro.\textsuperscript{249} This argyrobull had tremendous importance as the document granted to the recipient and his heirs the title of count; it gives to the recipient the right to use ‘…*insignia nostra aquile auree bicipitis coronate in campo rubeo que licet nulli

unquam alteri concesserimus… The document adds more elements for the present investigation. One element is the concession of the golden double-headed eagle. Apparently, this kind of grant was used even before John VIII’s prostagmata to Florence. Another element is the diplomatic composition of the document as the privilege entirely uses the Western chancery standards. Moreover, the language is in Latin and not Greek. Furthermore, there is the presence of both intitulatio and inscriptio. Finally, the same menologem follows the Western chancery tradition and is not from the creation of the world but the Nativity of Christ. Without any doubt, this charter is one of the most interesting experiments of a Byzantine chancery emitting a Latin type of document.

These features in the argyrobull of 1419 do not deny the forged nature of the Florentine prostagmata and the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. Actually, the despotate document confirms my hypothesis about the forgery. The Florentine

Laurent 1963:218-219. About the count title te et descendentes tuos decoramus et ipsius comitatus nostri dignitatem vobis omnimode concedimus for the “stemma”… et erogamus speciali dono gratie insignia nostra aquile auree bicipitis coronate in campo rubeo que licet nulli unquam alteri concesserimus.


Apart from the imperial signature at the end of the document which follows the Byzantine rule that is to be in red ink and in Greek.

Laurent 1963:218-219 Theodorus in Xpo Deo fidelis despotus Paleologus porphirogenitus et cetera.


Laurent 1963:218-219 Datum in civitate nostra Misitralis anno a Nativitate Domini Nostri Yhu Xpi millesimo quadringentesimo decimo nono indicione duodecima et die decimanona junij cum sigillo nostro argentio circumaurato pendent cum cordula sdirca rubra et proprie manus nostre in grecis litteris rubies subscription iuxta morem nostrum despotatem.
prostigmata seem more the result of a mixture between a Latin and a Byzantine chancery usage, which is coupled with the presence of gross mistakes on a diplomatic level, and sometimes even general confusion.256 These diplomatic mistakes are not present in the privilege to Mastino de’ Cattanei. Moreover, there are other incongruences. In the argyrobull the picture of the banner is not present, while in the Florentine prostagma to Giovanni de’ Morelli it is visible in the bottom left of the document. Moreover, the argyrobull describes the banner in detail, while the prostigmata mentions only the ‘σημείῳ τῆς βασιλείας μου’.257 From the argyrobull, it is clear that the Byzantine chancery had experience in drawing up Latin diplomas probably connected to the growing presence of Latin oikeioi in the Palaiologan court. However, the Florentine privileges do not uniformly follow either of the two standards but are a mixed product. I find it hard to believe that the Byzantine chancery could make these mistakes since Latin and Greek notaries who were in Florence during the Ecumenical Council could have noticed the presence of these mistakes.

In conclusion, I think that the mixed diplomatic composition of the Florentine privileges is another proof of the document’s forged nature. The privilege given by the despot of Morea to Mastino de’ Cattanei does not present any kind of mistakes, but only unusual features. Actually, Mastino’s argyrobull consequently makes the Florentine prostigmata not so unusual for the contemporary audience. Therefore, no

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256 See for example the presence of the double mention of both indictio and the month.
257 The entire sentence is in Müller 1879:156.
one could have contested the creation of such ennobling privileges to the Florentine Signoria.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has set out to analyse and investigate the diplomatic structure as well as the contents of the privileges given by John VIII to Florence in 1439. Despite the long scholarly tradition of accepting these privileges as genuine, this chapter provided enough evidence to demonstrate the exact opposite. As far as the commercial chrysobull is concerned, this document is probably original despite several incongruences present in the text. The *dispositio* repeats itself like a pseudo-*dispositio* which includes even the juridical formulas of the *dispositio*. It is true that previous Byzantine documents had the repetition, but this feature was limited and a sort of summary. The Florentine commercial privilege is the only one that has such a long and wordy repetition including formulas not expected in that section. This anomaly assumes a paramount importance since the document in the analysis was a chrysobull *logos* which was the most important document enacted by the Byzantine chancery in its history. Furthermore, Florence does not seem to have enacted the commercial privilege, which is even more unusual. Since 1397, Florence had tried to obtain from the Byzantine emperors commercial privileges for its merchants, but never managed to succeed. Even with the advent of Medici power (1434) in Florence, this aim remained as stated in the letter sent from Florence to Byzantium in
Yet, there is no evidence for the existence of a loggia, a consul or any kind of general activity that could confirm the possible activity of the Florentine loggia. Finally, the commercial chrysobull is in itself a unique document, since it is the only commercial privilege which has the rhetorical preamble. Unfortunately, I do not think these are enough reasons to identify this privilege as a forgery. For example, Florence could have simply decided not to enact the loggia for the simple reason that the kommerkion (four per cent) was not competitive enough against Venice and Genoa. Clearly, further researches in the archives are required to give an explanation to this enigma.

If the commercial chrysobull is genuine then it was a good achievement for Florence. In fact, this commercial chrysobull recognised the disappearance of Pisa in favour of Florence with the grant of the lodge and the church belonged in the past to Pisa. However, contrary to what has been interpreted in the past, the Byzantine emperor did not transfer any of the past privileges belonging to Pisa but simply recognised the conquest made by Florence. The document mentioned only the buildings in Constantinople which passed from Pisa to Florence and said nothing more of the past privileges enjoyed by Pisa.

The negotiations about the privileges probably took place between the proclamation of the Union on 6 July 1439 and the grants of the all the privileges on 16 August 1439, which is a gap of nearly one month. Apart from John VIII’s visit

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258 Müller 1879:162-163.
from 22-23 to the 26-27 of July to Prato and Pistoia, there is no further information revealing what the emperor did in that time.\textsuperscript{259} There is the possibility that during this month, the emperor, with the imperial entourage, met with Cosimo and the Florentine elite to discuss the possibility of the commercial chrysobull. The lack of information from Syroupolos about this period of time could induce us to think that was exactly the period of the negotiations. For Syroupolos, this was likely a matter of no interest due to the absence in his work of any mention to the privileges.

Entirely different is the issue concerning the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters and the \textit{prostagma}. These documents, brought up in the above paragraphs, are forgeries. The chrysobull dealing with domestic matters presents too many oddities compared to previous chrysobull \textit{logos} granted by Byzantine emperors. Even considering the presence of similar Latin privileges enacted by the Byzantine chancery, this document presents a completely anomalous structure in which Latin and Greek elements combined without really having a specific reason or order. Clearly, the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters tried to follow the standards of the Latin chancery. The presence of the \textit{intitulatio}, or the use of letters instead of numerals for the \textit{indictio}, is only the last elements of this long list of odd elements. Even the existence of Latin type privileges issued by the despotate of Morea in favour of Mastino Cattanei does not save the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. As a matter of fact, the despotate privilege, although written in Greek, follows perfectly the standards of the Latin chancery and is not the result of mixed

\textsuperscript{259} For the travel in Prato and Pistoia see Braccini 2006:383-397.
notarial traditions as in the case of the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. After a calligraphy comparison, it appears that the hand which wrote the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters is not the same. Accordingly, the same imperial signature is completely different in the shape of the letters. Therefore, there is little doubt that the chrysobull dealing with domestic matter is the result of a forgery.

Just as the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters, the prostagmata are the result of a forgery. In this case, the evidence is even more convincing. Contrary to the past prostagmata given by Byzantine emperors, the Florentine prostagmata contains elements which evidently do not belong to this kind of document. First of all, there is the presence of the intitulatio that, just as in the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters, is never present in the Byzantine prostagma. Secondly, there is the presence of the κράτος formula which in the Byzantine chancery is a distinctive element of the chrysobull logos alone. Nonetheless, the most striking element is the completely unusual eschatocol of the prostagmata. In fact, there is the double mention of both month and indictio in the same document. This clear mistake is probably the result of a notary copying from another document which I presume was the domestic chrysobull dealing with domestic matters. This hypothesis would also confirm the odd presence of the κράτος formula since the notary simply copied it altogether with month and indictio. Therefore, I have no doubt that the notary was not Greek. Otherwise, he would have noticed the tremendous mistake in the moment of the writing. Only a Latin notary, due to ignorance of the Byzantine chancery
standards, could have possibly made such an error without having the minimum of awareness.

Doubtless, the Council of Ferrara-Florence provided the Medici and Florence with a valuable occasion to reinforce the Medici’s power in the Florentine Signoria, especially in the Italian political context. The dreadful condition of the Byzantine empire in the fifteenth century aided the Florentine ambition. The fact that John VIII was ready to accept the primacy of Rome shows the desperation of the Byzantine delegation. This desperation paradoxically made the ennobling privileges granted to Florence (the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters and prostagmata), a reality, even if the documents themselves were forgeries.
CHAPTER III

LEONARDO BRUNI, COSIMO THE ELDER AND THE PRIVILEGES

Introduction

This chapter aims to show the connection between the forgeries analysed in chapter two, the Medici needs for political legitimacy, the political and economic contextualisation of the privileges and the role of Florence’s humanists in the Council. Therefore, this chapter consists of three parts.

The first part discusses the presence of a vernacular translation of one of the prostagma, specifically the privilege given to Domenico di Tano Petrucci, a humble coltriciaio.260 In 1439, at the time of John VIII’s grants to Florence, Domenico was

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260 *Coltriciaio* is the tanner.
serving as part of the Signoria. The prostagma is lost, but part of it surfaces in the Priorista. The translation was made by Matteo Pietroboni, who was part of the papal embassy during the Ecumenical Council and held offices in the papal court since at least 1432.

The second part contextualises the forgeries within the political and ideological background. Why did the Medici need such forgeries? The Medici had several reasons to produce these forgeries. Their purpose concerned both the internal control over the Florentine Signoria and also the on-going struggle of Cosimo against the duke of Milan and the Albizzi. Even during the Council, the Milanese opposition to the Ecumenical Council proved to be a threat as Niccoló Piccinino, Visconti’s condottiere, conquered Bologna (1438), Imola (1438) and Forli (1440).

The last part of this chapter focuses on Bruni and the Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίων. Florence at the time of the Ecumenical Council had a vast group of humanists able to read and write in Greek and some of whom had received an excellent Greek education in the past from Manuel Chrysoloras. Of these intellectual elites, Leonardo Bruni was of particular importance, as the former was also chancellor of Florence during the Council. Bruni undoubtedly possessed a

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261 The list of the Signoria composition for the time of the grants is in Gutwirth 2001:288.
263 The use of the condottiere was useful because the ruler could have refused any official association with him. This would have avoided a real declaration of war because everything was officially due to Piccinino’s initiative. In addition, this is exactly what Filippo Maria did with the Piccinino, as the latter was officially acting alone without any allegiance with Milan. Some information on Niccoló Piccinino are in EI 1936 s.v. Piccinino Niccoló which also includes some bibliography. On Piccinino see also Bignami 1934.
considerable knowledge of Greek. The Florentine humanist was already a well-known character before the Council. Bruni’s works on Greek literature included, among the others, the translation from Greek of Aristotle’s *Politics* and a Greek treatise written by him in occasion of John VIII’s arrival at the Council and addressed to the Byzantine delegation.²⁶⁵ Bruni’s first work, the letter from Aristeas, was probably published around 1403. Still in the same year, Bruni translated St. Basil address to young man on the right use of Greek literature. It was also the time of controversy over pagan literature. Bruni’s opera on St. Basil was probably an answer to the critics, often coming from ecclesiastical ranks, critical to the recovery of ancient Greek literature. Bruni produced a translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* around 1416 and of the spurious *Oeconomica* around 1420-1421. Bruni became chancellor of Florence in 1427, but apparently this new prestigious office did not halt the literary production of the Florentine humanist. In 1437, he completed the translation of Aristotle’s *Politics* at the request of the duke of Gloucester. In 1441, Bruni composed a history of the Gothic War of the sixth century.²⁶⁶ His *Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίων* composed in Greek was delivered as an oration to the Byzantine delegation in Florence on the occasion of the Ecumenical Council. Was this oration together with the forgeries part of the political needs of the Medici?

²⁶⁵ The *Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίων* of which I will give a proper analysis later in this chapter as, in my opinion, it is crucial to understand the reasons for these forgeries.
The case of the vernacular translation

I would like now to discuss the existence of a rough Florentine translation in *volgare* of the *prostagma* given to Domenico di Tano Petrucci.\textsuperscript{267} The translation is in a manuscript in the *Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale* in Florence.\textsuperscript{268} The author of this translation was Matteo di Pagolo Pietroboni. Stuart McManus theorised the possibility that there had once been an official Latin copy, for in the scholar’s opinion Matteo di Pagolo Pietroboni was a man of medium-low culture, therefore unable to translate from the Greek.\textsuperscript{269} This hypothesis seems to be the result of a superficial analysis. Pietroboni, even if he was uneducated in the Greek language, could have easily found someone in fifteenth-century Florence to translate the document for him. Secondly, the Priorista reduced this translation and stated ‘… *with more grants and privileges which, to my “memory”, did not come, and so I cannot report the thing …*’.\textsuperscript{270} This statement seems to imply an oral transmission: someone had verbally described the contents of the *prostagma* to Pietroboni. However, this hypothesis is not reliable since the vernacular *prostagma* is a translation, word for word.

\textsuperscript{267} *Volgare* is vernacular.
\textsuperscript{268} Florence, BNCF, Conventi soppressi, C4 895 fol. 142r. There are so far two transcriptions of the text: one with clear mistakes in McManus 2009 and another one in Gutwirth 2001:290-293.
\textsuperscript{269} He theorised the possibility of an official Latin copy based on his suspicion that the scribe was not educated enough to translate directly from the Greek. See McManus 2009.
\textsuperscript{270} Gutwirth 2001:293 "*con più altre autorità e privilegi che alla mia memoria no mi sono venute a noticia, et però // non ne posso fare una notitia*".
word, from the Greek version. The presence of a translation makes it difficult to imagine an oral transmission. Another hypothesis is that Pietroboni had the chance to see a partial translation. For the Priorista does not contain the full translation and stops at “e brevilegio ridugli e ristituigli e liberagli d’ogni machula”, which is the half point of the disposizio. Nevertheless, what is intriguing is that Pietroboni saw only a partial translation. This fact would imply that the work at the time was still in progress. Since Domenico di Tano Petrucci was a tanner would make sense if he asked for a translation directly from Greek to the vernacular. Interestingly enough, Domenico’s privilege is the only translated prostagma to survive. Still, the only solution is that Pietroboni had access to a translation, probably already in the vernacular, and not complete since the main reason why Pietroboni stopped his translation was due to ‘his memory’. The date of this translation should not be so difficult to uncover, for the chronicle’s author, Matteo di Pagolo Pietroboni, died around 1443-45. The translation can be set in the chronological period between from August 1439 and 1443-45. In conclusion, I do not think is possible to affirm that a Latin translation of Domenico’s privilege really existed as Matteo di Pagolo Pietroboni probably relied on a vernacular translation. Theoretically, I should now determine the eventual reasons of the incomplete translation and if there was a

\(^{271}\) The Greek version did not survive.  
\(^{272}\) Gutwirth 2001:293 che alla mia memoria no mi sono venute a noticia.  
\(^{273}\) Gutwirth 2001:17.  
\(^{274}\) The emperor left Florence on 16 August 1439.
correlation with the forged *prostigmata*. Unfortunately, the lack of primary sources, at this point, strongly limits any interpretation leaving only space for speculation.²⁷⁵

McManus brought up other issues, such as the lack of practical use of these privileges within the city of Florence. The scholar argued that the new Palatine counts did not use the privileges for fear of possible reactions from some of the Florentine oligarchs. Due to the Republican tradition in the Commune, the recipients of the privileges might not want to attract any unwanted resentment. This assumption is particularly weak for one simple reason, since the *prostigmata* had been actually. The Florentines who received this privilege did in fact modify the family banner by adding the Palaiologan eagle. If these Florentines feared possible reactions from the other Communal oligarchs they would have never publicly used the imperial *insignia*. The only possible fear was with regard to Cosimo the Elder. The Florentine statesman surely was always careful whenever there was an attempt to challenge Medici authority in Florence. However, as the picture below shows, Cosimo the Elder apparently did not forbid these Florentine families from using the new *insignia*. This favourable opinion of Cosimo the Elder was not, in my opinion, fortuitous.

²⁷⁵ It might be, if the documents are forgeries, that Pietroboni actually found or saw a sketch in preparation of the real forgery. By the end of the council Pope Eugenius IV was a strong ally of Florence, so the Medici had nothing to fear from him. However, it is simply impossible to prove due to the lack of any basic sources.
Fedini’s banner before and after the Council²⁷⁶

Carducci’s banner before and after the Council²⁷⁷

²⁷⁶ The picture is taken from the online version of the Ceramelli-Papiani. http://www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/ceramellipapiani2/index.php?page=Famiglia&id=3081. The link also reports that there were other cases of this image but do not specify or give the image.
The fact that Cosimo the Elder apparently did not object to this modification of the Florentine families’ banner introduces a new and important issue. Specifically, it is crucial to determine who was behind the forging of these *prostigmata* because they must have been officially commissioned. The only person who had enough power to commission such important forgeries was Cosimo the Elder. Without any doubt, he was certainly aware or even behind the forging of these *prostigmata*. McManus’ main inaccuracy was to interpret these privileges as addressing specific individuals only. For even if it is true that these privileges were given to single personalities such as Michele Pancrazio Fedini, Giacomo De’ Morelli or Domenico di Tano Petrucci, the recipients were chosen only because they were elected to the Signoria in July 1439. In fact, the same privilege specifies that the recipients are the Priors of Arts and the Standard-Bearer of Justice of the Florentine Signoria in 1439. The temporal duration of these offices was only two months and the recipients were in charge between July and August 1439, which is exactly the time of the supposed grants. Besides, Cosimo the Elder had enough power to control the elections in Florence. Therefore, he was probably behind the Signoria composition in July-August 1439.

The non-inheritance of the Palatine count title further confirmed the privileges as given to the Signoria as whole. Most probably, Cosimo the Elder’s real goal was to legitimise through the Signoria the entire Florentine Commune and indirectly the unofficial rule of the Medici over Florence. The lack of inheritance
excluded any possible creation of dynastic families and therefore the privileges applied only to the recipient. Therefore, I interpreted these *prostagmata* not as a grant for the single person but as an acknowledgment in favour of the Florentine Commune. These privileges actually improved the legitimacy of Florence and the Signoria in the Italian political scene. In conclusion, I believe that one should interpret these *prostagmata* as a prestigious acknowledgment for the Florentine Signoria and not for the single recipient.

**The political and ideological contextualisation of the privileges**

This paragraph contextualises the forgeries within the political and economic setting of the Italian peninsula in the fifteenth century. The historical context will provide answers to certain questions, such as why Florence (Cosimo the Elder?) commissioned these forgeries. As far as the Italian political situation is concerned, Florence from the fourteenth to the first half of the fifteenth centuries was engaged in a struggle against the duchy of Milan in both the political and military spheres. Cosimo the Elder played a clever political and diplomatic game as the Medici enjoyed remarkable success in mediating the support of both the *Serenissima* and the pope. Instead, the Milanese tried to obstruct the Florentine Commune from moving the Council to Florence. At that time, therefore, there was an alliance between Venice, Florence and the pope against Milan and its allies such as the Western
emperor and the Council of Basle. Unfortunately for the Byzantines this was one of the main reasons why most of the European powers deserted the Council sessions. Moreover, the ideological challenge was also crucial for the Florentine Commune. For the German emperors recognised Milan as a duchy since the end of the fourteenth century (1395), and Sigismund, King of the Romans, confirmed this title to Filippo Maria Visconti in 1426. Also, the duke of Ferrara would receive legitimisation by the Emperor Frederick III from 1452. Yet, the Este hold the title of Marquise since the thirteenth century. Therefore, Florence failed to have a similar ideological acknowledgment.

Another important element of the historical background is the Medici family. Medici power in Florence was relatively new since it dated back to only 1434. The previous dominant family, the Albizzi, was much more ennobled than the Medici since they were Palatine counts appointed by the Western emperors. The Medici lacked any ennobling status since they were merchants. Even if Cosimo the Elder exiled the Albizzi with the balìa in 1434, Rinaldo degli Albizzi and his familiars still represented an active threat to Florence. In fact, Rinaldo allied himself with the Duke of Milan, Filippo Maria Visconti, and still hoped to regain his power in

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279 First investiture received in 1395. See De Mesquita 1941:174; Filippo Visconti’s investiture see Black 2009:77.
280 On the first duke of Ferrara, Borso I Este, see Pardi 1906 and Lazzari 1945.
281 Apart when Florence was ruled by duke of Athens Gualtieri of Brienne. See DBI s.v. Brienne, Gualtieri di.
282 Specific office of the Commune was created only for a limited time in order to deal with an imminent threat. It was often used as a political instrument to exile political opponents. See Rubinstein 1997.
Florence.\textsuperscript{283} The Albizzi therefore were still a threat for Cosimo’s rule over Florence. This struggle between the Albizzi and the Medici was also ideological. Rinaldo degli Albizzi had the title of Palatine count, just as was granted to his father Maso by the Western emperors. Maso received the title from the Rupert III, king of the Romans, on the occasion of the latter’s descent into Italy in 1402, and Sigismund successively confirmed the title in 1422. In addition, Rinaldo’s son, Ormanno, received the honour of joining the imperial familiars just after Albizzi’s exile in 1435.\textsuperscript{284}

Moreover, Cosimo the Elder’s rule in the city was not explicitly authoritative, but more the consequence of personal ties established with part of the oligarchy. A large part of Cosimo’s power in Florence derived from the influence he held on electoral procedures. Cosimo had control of the \textit{accoppiatori}, which was the office in charge of determining the validity of every candidate for public offices. In the end, the \textit{accoppiatori} had the power to decide the names to be extracted for the Communal offices.\textsuperscript{285} Clearly, whoever had control of this office was the godfather of every election. In contrast to other important cities of the period, Cosimo the Elder had weak ideological claims connected to Florence’s rule. Cosimo de’ Medici’s \textit{potestas} had to be more akin to that of a \textit{primus inter pares}, than to absolutism due to

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\textsuperscript{283} This threat would cease only in 1440 after the Florentine’s victory at the battle of Anghiari against Niccolò Piccinino. See Rubinstein 1997, Bayley 1961:266-268.
\textsuperscript{284} For Maso see Böhmer 1967:354; for Rinaldo see Böhmer 1967:11.358. Furthermore, Maso’s son Giovanni, Palatine count as well, married Francesca Scolari, Matteo Scholari’s daughter. This Matteo Scolari was Filippo Scolari’s brother, a well-known man in the Hungarian court of Sigismund. Moreover, the emperor appointed Filippo Scolari \textit{comes} in the Hungarian kingdom, giving the latter several privileges regarding mines and making him an imperial familiar.
\textsuperscript{285} The Florentine electoral system was supposed to be random. The names of the potential candidates were to be put in balls which later would have been extracted. See Rubinstein 1997:30-52.
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the Florentine republican tradition. The Medici potestas had its pillars on the alliances with the most prominent Florentine families. These relationships were far from being stable and serene all the time.286

Further evidence of the Commune’s need for imperial acknowledgment emerges from the works of Leonardo Bruni, chancellor of Florence, famous intellectual and also a pioneer of the Greek translations.287 This chapter is not going to reopen discussions about the so-called civic humanism. However, Bruni’s writings could give some interesting insights into the political legitimacy which also involves the forgeries. I will investigate therefore Bruni’s writings not in a literary perspective, but rather use a historical and political interpretation. In particular, all the treatises written by the humanist present a clear evolution in his political thinking connected to the evolution of the Florentine Commune and the ideological/military struggle between Milan and Florence.288 In fact, both the political powers, when not battling in the field, fought each other by rhetorical panegyrics in order to improve their political status to the detriment of the other. The first important treatise written by Bruni is the Laudatio Florentinae Urbis, composed around 1403-1404, but not published until 1430.289 The original purpose of this work was to celebrate Florence’s victory over the Duke of Milan, Giangaleazzo Visconti, in 1402. However, in the Laudatio, Bruni depicted the Florentine government in front of the

287 On Bruni’s translation works. See Moulakis 1986:143.
288 On the ideological struggle against Filippo Maria Visconti’s Milan there are many works. See Baron 1966: 357-409 part five (City-State Liberty versus Unifying Tyranny. Particularly on Bruni’s role see the following chapter always in Baron 1966:412-430.
289 On the dating problem see Baron 1967:21-37.
Italian and foreign audience as a society in which the power equality between the citizens led Florentine society to harmony.\textsuperscript{290} The second document is a letter sent by Leonardo Bruni to Sigismund, king of the Romans, in 1413, which presents an interesting ideological statement. In this letter, Bruni demonstrates the legitimacy of the Commune by appealing to popular government.\textsuperscript{291}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Nostre igitur rei publice gubernatio popularis est, que tertia speties gubernandi legiptima fuit a nobis superius nominata}
\end{quote}

Bruni is using Aristotle’s \textit{Politics} to defend the political claims of the Florentine government. The popular government was, in fact, the third in Aristotle’s categories. Leonardo Bruni wrote another interesting and relevant treatise: the \textit{Oratio in funere Iohannis Strozze}. In this work, Bruni again stressed the popular basis of the Florentine government. In the same span of time, Bruni also published the \textit{Historiae Florentini populi} (1428) which uses themes and panegyric rhetorical style from previous works. What is important is to underline that from the time of the \textit{Historiae} Milan had begun a counterattack. Bartolomeo Capra, at that time serving as the governor of Genoa on behalf of the Duchy of Milan, wrote a letter to Filippo Maria Visconti in which clues emerges about the rhetorical struggle between Florence and Milan. Bartolomeo strongly advised the duke of Milan to hire Antonio Beccadelli

\textsuperscript{290} Griffith-Gordons-Hankins 1987:116-121.
also known as the Panormita as court poet. This should have been done in opposition to both the Historiae and the Oratio, as the same Bartolomeo stated:

The Florentines have recently caused their deeds to be published in six books… and to the degree they extol their own deeds, to that degree are they trying to obscure our own deeds… Leonard of Arezzo has just written a funeral oration… those who have read it know how much it lowers the estimation of our prince and our fatherland…

This exchange of rhetorical pamphlets began around 1435. In addition, Pier Candido Decembrio faced Bruni and the Laudatio. The Milanese humanist presented Milan as ideologically superior to Florence by depicting the Visconti rulers’ actions as motivated by honour. In fact, Decembrio showed the duchy of Milan as a timocracy and Florence as an oligarchy. The main difference in this case is the use of past auctoritas: to oppose Bruni’s Aristotle, Decembrio employed Plato in which oligarchy is a constitutionally inferior system. One of the most interesting elements is, however, the refutation of Florence’s ennobling origin which Bruni previously connected to the Roman Republic and Sulla. Decembrio pointed out that Sulla, whom Bruni considered the founder of Florence, was the “wickedest of tyrants”. In this ideological and military challenge the forgeries created by the Florentine Commune and the Signoria started to acquire a paramount importance.

A good starting point for the contextualisation of the privileges is the prooimia of the forged documents. The prooimion of the domestic chrysobull and the

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292 Hankins 2000:159.
294 One year after the rise of the Medici and the exile of the Albizzi.
295 And not surprisingly at the same time the Laudatio was republished.
297 Hankins 2000:149-150.
prostigmata are word for word identical. Evidently, the prooimia contain ideological elements which are crucial for identifying the need of Florence to gain these privileges. The prooimia of the “domestic” chrysobull and of the prostigmata mainly explain the idea of improving someone from a popular condition as expressed by δωρεαῖς προβιβάζοντας εὑπρεπέσιν, that is, to promote the social status through gifts. The prooimion of the commercial chrysobull is slightly different from that of the domestic chrysobull and the prostigmata since it does not have the expression δωρεαῖς προβιβάζοντας εὑπρεπέσιν. Furthermore, this sentence is not seen in any other Byzantine prooimia observed so far. I do not think that this absence is a coincidence. Actually, one ought to recall the possibility that these “gifts” (δωρεαῖς) mentioned in the text are in connection to the ideological sphere. These “gifts” actually improved the social status of the Florentine Signoria.

At this point I will present “the gifts” and show the improvements made to the political and ideological status of the Florentine Signoria. The Florentine city and government received the privilege of electing public imperial notaries. This privilege, that is, the ius faciendi notarios, belonged to the imperial and papal prerogatives. Besides, the chrysobull dealing with domestic matters to Florence would not have been the first case of such kind of grants. Frederick II Hohenstaufen had granted a diploma to Genoa in 1220 in which appeared the following formula ‘donamus et concedimus liberam potestatem consulibus vel potestati Janue faciendi notarios’. Therefore, Western emperors at least since the thirteenth century had

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298 Puncuh 1996. Frederick II’s diploma is in fn. 286.
transferred this particular *jus* to another public authority. Besides, the emperors also granted this imperial prerogative to individual personalities and gave titles including the above mentioned privileges such as the title of Palatine count.\(^{299}\) This privilege represents the ideological independence of the public and private Communal acts.

The bestowal of the title of Palatine count to the Signoria in 1439 fits this historical contextualisation. The title of Palatine counts with the right to create public notaries was a traditional privilege of the Western emperors. It was normally given to other foreign powers, cities or single personalities and people close to the emperor.\(^{300}\) The title of Palatine count or *Comes Palatti Laternanensis* implied a proximity to the emperor. In the medieval era, the Western emperors normally granted this title to people close to the imperial seat, such as chancellors and *doctores legum*. Only the bishop of Rome and the emperor could grant this honorific title.\(^{301}\)

Lastly, the Florentines who received the Palatine count title also received the honour of becoming *oikeioi* of the Byzantine emperor.

Several questions need to be answered after this analysis. Probably the most important is ascertaining the reason for Cosimo’s absence in any of the documents, especially since Cosimo must have been the commissioner of these forgeries. It is likely that the reason why Cosimo was not mentioned in any of the privileges lies in

\(^{299}\) See for example Leonard Von Passau, a bishop, who had received from Albert II the right to create public notaries without being a Palatine count. The same Frederick III gave the same right to Bishop Petrus of Wiener-Neustadt in 1477 see FRA: 113:116.

\(^{300}\) For example, these cities were free from the political control of any noble within the empire. The emperor formally ruled them. In fact, the cities are merely required to pay taxes directly to the emperor, while they were in the end politically independent. They could form leagues, made war and peace, and some of them even had the privilege to elect imperial notaries.

\(^{301}\) A brief digression on the Palatine counts can be found in Grendler 2002:183-184.
his attitude against publicly exhibiting his own power. Cosimo had never received any title above orator.³⁰² Doubtless, this lack of public exhibition does not discount the fact that Cosimo’s position as the person holding the power in Florence was well known.³⁰³ The amount of private correspondence between Cosimo and all the powers confirm his own influence. Cosimo’s prudent policy was necessary due to the strength of the other Florentine families in Florence. These families, even those allied with Cosimo, would have never tolerated any Medici attempt to establish an absolutist regime.³⁰⁴ For example, Piero de’ Medici, Cosimo’s son, managed to attribute to Cosimo the title of pater patriae on 20 August 1464. This title was probably more to legitimate Piero’s rule than to attribute an honour to Cosimo, since the latter was dead by then. The precariousness of the Medici regime appears clearly in the several plots that developed against Medici rule. Piero de’ Medici suffered a plot brought about by the Pitti, Acciaiuoli and Soderini in 1468. Furthermore, the congiura de’Pazzi seriously put the Medici regime at risk in Florence as the brother of Lorenzo the Magnificent was killed by the plotters.³⁰⁵ Without surprise, after Lorenzo the Magnificent’s death in 1492, the Florentine Commune exiled Piero di Lorenzo de’ Medici (1494), Lorenzo’s heir. All these events confirmed a persistent opposition even within Florence, despite the Medici influence on the electoral

³⁰² This title was normally given to ambassadors. See Mattingly 1988:26.
³⁰³ Only by looking at the impressive collection of ASF, MAP one can understand the importance given by the foreigner rulers to the Medici’s opinion on the matters.
³⁰⁴ Acciaiuoli, Soderini, Pitti, Giugni, Pucci etc…
³⁰⁵ On the congiura see Martines 2003 and Simonetta 2003:261-284.
procedures. Only with Alessandro de’ Medici would the family obtain the title of duke, and afterwards, with Cosimo I, the title of Grand Duke of Tuscany from the pope in the sixteenth century. Therefore, Cosimo the Elder probably did not want to appear in these privileges due to the risk of rousing discontent among his allies. The fact that Cosimo was elected Standard-bearer of Justice just in time for John VIII’s arrival in 1439 confirms that it was Cosimo’s decision not to appear in the forgeries.

Another question which might arise is about possible disputes over the forgeries from hostile powers. For example, the duke of Milan had every interest in reducing the legitimacy of the Florentine Commune. Paradoxically, the Byzantine empire’s dreadful condition was an advantage for Florence. Since John VIII was in need of help to defend Constantinople, the Byzantine emperor would have offered anything in return for any kind of aid. The same impressive delegation that had arrived in Italy for the Council showed the determined will of the emperor to reach an agreement on the Union with the pope. The Byzantine emperor had nothing to offer apart from relics and titles. Besides, John VIII, after the proclaimed Union in 1439, was titled emperor also in the catholic *oikoumene* with all the prerogatives due

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to the imperial status, among them the faculty of granting ennobling titles and other
privileges. \textsuperscript{309} Besides, the Byzantine chanceries had already granted Latin types of
privileges, such as the diploma issued by the despotate of Morea chancery, in Latin,
and granted to the Tuscan Mastino de’ Cattanei in 1419. Further evidence
demonstrates the Byzantine practice of giving Western type titles. The emperor sent
a Byzantine embassy to the duke of Milan in 1438, one year before the privileges to
Florence. \textsuperscript{310} The mission was to offer to Filippo Maria Visconti the title of \textit{vicarius
imperii}. Of course, the title of \textit{vicarius imperii} does not refer to Byzantine but to
Western titles. The Western emperor often used the title of \textit{vicariatus imperii} to
provide privileges, and consequently legitimacy, to ruling authorities who had the
power in territories which were formally part of the German empire. \textsuperscript{311} This title is a
legitimising act in the recipient’s favour and is also a formal investiture “\textit{cum
beneficiis}”. In exchange, the Western emperor received money or a useful ally. For
example, the emperor normally privileged the rulers of the Della Scala in Verona.

\textit{Sigismundus divina favente...confirmamus innovamus et approbamus eisdem
vicariatum prefatarum civitatum...} \textsuperscript{312}

Whether the duke of Milan accepted the Byzantines’ offer is unknown. Filippo
Maria Visconti at the time was still hostile to the pope and the Council of Ferrara-

\textsuperscript{309} See for example the Union Bull \textit{Laetentur Coeli} in which John VIII appears as \textit{Iohanne
Palaeologo romaeorum imperatore illustri et locatenentibus venerabilium fratrurum
patriarcharum}...The entire text is in Gill 1959:412-415.
\textsuperscript{310} Ullmann 1975.
\textsuperscript{311} See for example the diploma published by Heinrich Koller about Verona and Vicenza. Privileges
\textsuperscript{312} See Albrecht II confirm of Sigismund’s privilege to Frignano and Paolo della Scala in Verona and
Florence, especially because he was supporting the Council of Basle. In fact, the report clearly states that the Greek delegation was not to give this title to the duke immediately. Filippo Maria Visconti should have ceased first the hostilities against the pope and the Council. In fact, the Byzantines would have given the title to the duke of Milan only in the event that a Union was concluded, as the document clearly states.\textsuperscript{313}

This Byzantine embassy took place after the death of the Western emperor Sigismund and Albert II had not yet renewed the ducal title given by Sigismund to Filippo Maria Visconti. Despite this favourable political condition, the duke of Milan did not accept the proposal as he continued to support the Council of Basle in opposition to Pope Eugenius IV. Furthermore, Filippo Maria Visconti was allied with the exiled Albizzi and clearly had no interest in giving a truce to the Medici. To sum up, there was nothing unusual in John VIII granting privileges to Florence, at least in the eyes of a Western audience, since there was already a precedent of Byzantines giving Latin type privileges. For sure, the biggest success for the Medici was to have the emperor as a prestigious guest in the city of Florence, for the latter’s attendance justified the existence of these documents.

In conclusion, seeking an ennobling legitimacy was a crucial point of the political struggle between Milan and Florence, just as was the use of constitutional categories such as timocracy, oligarchy, tyranny and republic to praise or to diminish

\textsuperscript{313} Ullmann 1975:352 \textit{exhortando ducem quatinus operam dare ut ycumenicum concilium in loco ad quem romanus pontifex commodo venire posset, in ytalia presertim, celebraretur ibique de reperacione et reintragracione divis orbis monarchie laboraretur ea qua reintegrate facillime ecclesiastica monarchia posset reunire.}
each other’s cities. The importance of receiving privileges from an imperial auctoritas was even greater due to the political and ideological struggle between Milan and Florence, still on-going at the time of the Council. Therefore, I think it is of capital importance to remark on the expression δωρεαίς προβιβάζοντας εὔπρεπέσιν that it does not represent a standard of common prooimion, but provides evidence of the ideological reason for these specific ennobling privileges. Accordingly, the forgeries were an important part of a wider plan that, in the end, allowed Cosimo to maintain a prominent and legitimate position against potential enemies, such as Milan and the Albizzi. Florence used the Byzantine emperor’s presence to further the Commune’s political goals, while Milan and the Visconti tended to lean on the Western emperors. The duke of Milan was also in conflict with the pope, since Nicola Piccinino conquered some papal cities such as Bologna and Perugia and, not surprisingly, was supporting the Council of Basle together with the Western emperor. One last element that, in my opinion, further improved the importance of these privileges is the lack of any imperial counterpart at the time. The lack of any imperial counterpart surely enhanced the value of the privileges given by the Byzantine emperor, as John VIII at the time was the sole emperor of the oikoumene.

Leonardo Bruni and the Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίων

For the purposes of my analysis, it is particularly important to closely analyse another work written by Leonardo Bruni in 1439, that is, the Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν
Bruni’s involvement in the Council organisation is well known, as he even delivered two other orations to John VIII, now unfortunately lost. This work, written in Greek, is a very short introduction of Florence’s political structure. It was addressed to the Byzantines, if not to the same emperor, during the Ecumenical Council.

Since you wish to know about the constitution of our city, of what sort it is, and how it is constructed, I shall try to describe it as clearly as I can. The Florentine constitution is not completely aristocratic or democratic but a kind of mixture of the two.

Bruni’s treatise is a significant change in the humanist’s political thinking. For the first time Bruni denies the popular basis of the Florentine government. The author of the ‘Περὶ’ explicitly states that the Florentine constitution is neither completely aristocratic nor popular.

Thus, avoiding the extremes, the city looks to the mean, or rather to the best and the wealthy but not over-powerful.

This statement is completely contrary to Bruni’s previous works, such as the *Laudatio Florentine Urbs*, but especially the *Oratio in funere Iohannis Strozze* and the *Epistula ad magnum principem imperatorem* in which he – more than once –

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314 See especially the critical analysis of the treatise in Moulakis 1986:141-190.
affirmed and defended the popular basis of the Florentine Government.\textsuperscript{318} In the 
\textit{Oratio}, Bruni clearly identifies the basis of Florentine government:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Forma reipublice gubernande utimur ad libertatem paritatemque c\'ivium maxime omnium directa: que quia equalissima in omnibus est, popularis nuncupatur.} \textsuperscript{319}
\end{quote}

Likewise in the \textit{Epistula}:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Nostre igitur rei publice gubernatio popularis est, que tertia speties gubernandi legitima fuit a nobis superius nominata. Est eius fundamentum in paritate c\'ivium et equalitate, ut de gratribus supra similitudinem indeximus.} \textsuperscript{320}
\end{quote}

McManus pointed out that Bruni addressed the \textit{Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίνων} to the Byzantines who were attending the Council.\textsuperscript{321} Certainly, the absence of any Latin translation before 1484 restricted the audience of the text to Greek speakers. Moreover, McManus also argued that since the text was in Greek the best way to contextualise the treatise was “within the nexus of Florentine relations with the Greeks” and not for the “Florentine consumption”. In the scholar’s conclusion, Bruni’s idea was to present the city in an ‘ideological perspective nearer to Byzantine sensibilities’.\textsuperscript{322} This last hypothesis seems to me to be a very superficial explanation which does not take into account several elements such as the rise of the Medici to power in 1434, the close past connection between Bruni and the

\textsuperscript{319} Viti 1996:717. 
\textsuperscript{320} Hankins 2003:27. 
\textsuperscript{321} McManus 2009:9. 
\textsuperscript{322} McManus 2009:9-10.
Albizzi’s faction, and the privileges forged in the Commune in 1439. Before giving further explanations, I will focus on other scholars’ works. Griffith-Hankins-Thompson pointed out another possible reason why Bruni changed the political conception of the Florentine government.\textsuperscript{323} In this treatise, Bruni referred to Aristotle’s \textit{Politics}, which the Italian humanist had already translated from Greek in 1437. The scholars’ conclusions brought together the differences in this new treatise with Bruni’s embracing Aristotelian philosophy after abandoning Platonic beliefs.\textsuperscript{324} In addition, Griffith, Hankins and Thompson enhanced a particular passage which is very important for this analysis. This passage seems to recall Aristotle’s \textit{Politics} but with a very important difference:

With the passage of time…it seemed that political power should no longer be in the multitude, but in the hands of the aristocrats and the wealthy, because they contributed so much to the community.\textsuperscript{325}

While Aristotle’s passage stated:

Accordingly, those who contribute more to such a society are accorded more authority in the city than those who may be their equals or superiors by birth, but their inferiors in civic virtue, and more authority than those who are their superiors in wealth, but their inferiors in virtue.\textsuperscript{326}

Griffith, Hankins and Thompson explained the difference between Bruni and Aristotle as a result of Bruni’s disillusionment or realism. The Florentine humanist

\textsuperscript{324} To which Bruni adhered in the past and there are some connections with the \textit{Laudatio} or the \textit{Oratio in funere}.
\textsuperscript{325} Translation in Griffith-Hankins-Thompson 1987:116.
\textsuperscript{326} \textit{Idem}. 
did not want to admit the discrimination of the civic virtues in favour of the claims of birth or wealth. For Baron this change was due to the progressive abandonment of the civic army in favour of the use of mercenaries which consequently grow the power of the wealthy. Besides, Baron also thought that Quattrocento humanists appreciated wealth as ‘the foundation of civic action, and even as a condition for the exercise of certain kind of virtues’. On this matter, Nauert thought that this change had its root on the necessity of the ruling class to present themselves as the governing aristocracy of the Roman republic.327 The debate has clearly huge proportions, yet I believe that the Περὶ must be contextualised strictly for the period it was composed and delivered, that is, the Ecumenical Council and John VII Palaiologos’ presence in Florence (1439). In my opinion it is difficult to think that this was due to Bruni’s disillusionment or realism, as the treatise would consequently assume a polemical shape in clear opposition to the Medici regime. Neither McManus’ thesis, in which Bruni attempted to present the city nearer to the Byzantine sensibilities, nor Bruni’s disillusionment thesis proposed by Griffith-Hankins-Thompson, appears convincing enough in this particular political context. The solution depends on who had commissioned this work and for what reason. Neither McManus nor Moulakis identify a possible commissioner of Bruni’s Περὶ which in absence of any evidence must be considered due to Bruni’s personal

327 This passage is taken by Seigel 1966:5 who quoted Baron 1938. On this matter see also Nauert 1995:66 who pointed out that ‘the republic “civic humanism” of Bruni had been the ideological position of this group, for it justified the sharing of political power by a fairly large privileged group who thought of themselves as a proper ruling class comparable to the governing aristocracy of the ancient Roman republic. Yet, Nauert failed to notice the passage from the popular government type of the Laudatio to the more oligarchic system stated in the Περὶ.
initiative. Yet, in my opinion, the commissioner of the work was the same Cosimo the Elder.\textsuperscript{328}

Clearly, after his rise to power in 1434, it would have been dangerous for anyone to compose a text without Cosimo the Elder’s consent, especially if it opposed his regime.\textsuperscript{329} Therefore, Bruni’s treatise must have been approved by Cosimo the Elder. Moreover, since Bruni presented this work to the Byzantines and the topic was an introduction to Florentine government when the Signoria was under the Medici influence. The absolute importance of the Council for the Medici and the precarious political status in Florence seemed to confirm that nothing could have been done without the silent approval or encouragement of the Medici.\textsuperscript{330}

The Council was not only a matter of prestige but also theatre of political and economic interests of a certain entity. Even Bruni’s position was probably far from being solid, as in the past the humanist had praised individuals connected to the Albizzi faction.\textsuperscript{331} While the Albizzi needed to maintain an apparent popular origin due to their ennobled condition in order to avoid an eventual popular coup, which would explain Bruni’s previous popular conception of the government, Cosimo the Elder’s low-born origin meant he had the opposite problem. In addition, Cosimo the Elder was surely aware of Bruni’s previous political involvement and a rhetorical

\textsuperscript{328} To be more specific they seem not to care if there was even one.
\textsuperscript{329} Another famous humanist, Francesco Filelfo, a close friend of the Albizzi, had to flee in 1434. During Cosimo de’ Medici imprisonment in 1433, Francesco Filelfo had directly asked Rinaldo degli Albizzi for the death penalty for Cosimo the Elder. Therefore, while Bruni’s low profile during the Medici rises to power saved him from exile, Filelfo had to pay the extreme political price with his exile to Siena.
\textsuperscript{330} See fn. 296.
\textsuperscript{331} Bruni’s son Donato married Alessandra Castellani, the latter part of an oligarchic family connected to the Albizzi. See Field 1998:1133.
attack composed by Bruni, especially during the Council, would have carried serious consequences for the Florentine humanist. Bruni even appeared involved in an alleged plot against the Medici in 1437 when he helped Arezzo to get rid of Florentine sovereignty.\footnote{See Field 1998:1109-1150. For the letter, dated 11 January 1437, which mentioned Bruni’s involvement in the plot, see Field in the appendix. The original letter is in ASMi, Archivio Ducale, f. 14 n. 2. Arezzo was also Bruni’s birthplace from the nickname “L’Aretino”.} This event happened just two years before the Council moved to Florence. Cosimo likely ignored Bruni’s involvement in the rebellion of Arezzo, or if he had suspected him, the humanist must have persuaded the Medici to forgive him.\footnote{Or simply was “unofficially” pardoned by Cosimo de’ Medici.} Bruni’s position was therefore precarious if compared to other loyal humanists and first-time followers of the Medici humanist circle.\footnote{Humanists such as Carlo Marsuppini, Poggio Bracciolini, Niccolò Niccoli and others.} Besides, Bruni managed to keep the chancellorship even after the Albizzi’s exile in 1434. Cosimo probably considered Bruni’s reputation as a highly renowned man of culture and knowledge and the low profile displayed by the humanist during the struggle between the two parties most likely saved Bruni from being exiled. It is impossible to know if there were pacts between Cosimo and Bruni due to the lack of primary sources. Surely Bruni did not the share the same fate of Francesco Filelfo who asked for Cosimo the death penalty when he was imprisoned by Rinaldo degli Albizzi in 1433, thus compromising definitively his power after Cosimo’s return.\footnote{On Filelfo’s request for the death punishment see Davies 1988:85. On Filelfo’s career in Florence see Zippel 1979, on Filelfo in Milan see Adam 1979 and Robin 1991.} What is most likely is that Cosimo the Elder was certainly aware of Bruni’s intention of writing this treatise.
Even if McManus was correct when he stated that the Περὶ was not for a Florentine audience, Cosimo could have easily obtained a translation from another loyal humanist for the simple reason that this oration was written in Greek.\footnote{For the personalities and in general the humanist presence in the council see Gill 1964, Id. 1967, and Herrin McManus 2013:35-56.}

Clearly, the Περὶ was useful for the Medici, as Bruni stated to the emperor that power was “in the hands of the aristocrats and the wealthy, because they contributed so much to the community.” Bruni, with this sentence, points out to the emperor who had the real power in Florence, without compromising the republican tradition of the Florentine Commune. The treatise might have been part of Cosimo’s plan to confront the Albizzi’s claims in an ideological sphere. In the end, I think that Bruni was clearly stating to the emperor that Cosimo the Elder was the real ruler of Florence. Therefore, these diplomatic moves could be part of the ideological struggle for power in Florence between Cosimo and the Albizzi. On account of these thoughts, I think it is correct to interpret the Περὶ as part of the Medici’s agenda to bolster their claim to legitimacy over the Signoria. The connection between Bruni’s Περὶ together with all the forgeries seems only a small part of Medici’s political plan with regard to Florence. This is why McManus’ theory on the Περὶ as a Bruni attempt to depict a society nearer to the Byzantine sensibilities is not so convincing. The statement “\textit{those who contributed so much for the community}” is probably referring to the payment made by the Medici through their bank for all the expenses of the Florentine
Council. Scholars might object that Bruni never explicitly mentioned Cosimo the Elder in the treatise. The reason for Cosimo’s absence was again the usual prudential policy with regard to Florence’s internal politics.

In conclusion, this treatise surely fit together again with Cosimo the Elder’s plans to raise his prominence in the Florentine Signoria. For the first time this treatise acknowledged the fact that the Florentine municipality was no longer a popular government as in Bruni’s previous works, but rather suggested in a subtle way to John VIII, who held the real power in Florence, that is, the Medici.

Conclusions

This chapter aimed to reveal the connection between the humanist background, the forgeries and especially the role of Cosimo the Elder. The Florentine statesman cannot be excluded from the discussion since he must have been the main decision-maker behind the forgeries and Bruni’s oration to the emperor. At the same time, Pagolo Pietriboni’s strange vernacular translation adds only more evidence to the reality of the forgeries. Had the Priorista (Matteo di Pagolo Pietroboni) seen only part of a rough sketch of the prostagmata? Unfortunately, it is difficult to demonstrate what Pietroboni actually saw. Yet, this incomplete translation is yet another odd element which adds credibility to the hypothesis of the forgeries.

337 See the receipts given by the Apostolic Chamber to the Medici’s Bank in Iorga 1899:3.11, 3.12, 3.14, 3.15 etc.
338 Discussion on Bruni’s previous works are at the beginning of this chapter.
The forged privileges certainly had a specific political and ideological context. Cosimo the Elder was in need of imperial legitimacy for his new unofficial reign in Florence. Of course, it was difficult for Cosimo to be granted legitimacy when he was trying to keep a low institutional profile. This stratagem probably indicated that Cosimo the Elder was trying to legitimise the Florentine Signoria as a whole. Since he was the one behind the electoral procedures and the shadow ruler of Florence, this legitimacy included him as well. The necessity to seek this imperial acknowledgment is due to the struggle with the exiled Albizzi and Milan. The Albizzi aimed to regain the power lost in Florence and had the support of the duke of Milan. The Florentine forgeries effectively countered the ennobled status of the Albizzi, since the privileges came from an imperial auctoritas. Therefore, the presence of John VIII in Florence was thus perfect for Medici ambitions, since the Byzantine chancery already gave or offered in the past Latin type privileges.339

Leonardo Bruni corroborated the needs of the Medici regime with the Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίων. Without surprise, from the time of the Oratio in funere Iohannis Strozze (1427-1428) the Albizzi were the major party in Florence and, as mentioned above, they had no reason to seek any other form of legitimacy due to their ennobled status. On the contrary, the Albizzi had more reasons to stress the popular state of the Florentine Commune because they probably did not want to appear as tyrants.

339 Some examples of Latin type privileges are the chrysobull to Mastino de’ Cattanei and the Byzantine offer of the vicariatus imperii to the duke of Milan.
In this ideological context, the fact that Bruni addressed the Περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῶν Φλωρεντίων to the Byzantine delegation is further proof of the Medici’s political purposes. Bruni was in the impossible position of publishing such a delicate treatise without Cosimo the Elder’s full awareness or approval. As stated in this chapter, the Περὶ probably was intended for Cosimo the Elder as the true holder of power in Florence, that is, ‘those that contributed so much for the community’. This sentence is particularly true with regard to the Council, since the Medici family lent all the funding necessary for Pope Eugenius IV to bring about the monumental event. Without the crucial support of the Medici bank, the Council would have never happened.

In conclusion, the humanist background surely aided the fulfilment of Cosimo’s plans. One cannot be sure about Bruni’s level of involvement in the production of the forgeries because of the lack of primary sources. The only links between Bruni and the forgeries are represented in the Περὶ, and his being chancellor of Florence at the time and Greek educated. As stated in the introduction of this thesis, the chancellor of Florence did not have political power, but was the only notary admitted during the pratiche. If the forgeries have been discussed anywhere it was in the pratiche. However, this hypothesis is near to speculation, since the pratiche of that year are missing, and therefore cannot be developed further without another mandatory research into the Florentine archives.
CHAPTER IV

FLORENCE AND BYZANTIUM AFTER THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL (1439-1453)

Introduction

This chapter discusses the political and economic policies of Florence towards the Levant after the Ecumenical Council. Moreover, a special consideration will be given to events in Italy as there is no way to present an historical interpretation without understanding the complicated and deep interconnection between Italian politics and the events in the Levant in the fifteenth century. In particular, Florence was a weaker power compared to the kingdom of Naples and Venice. Florence had to deal with several obstacles presented by its more powerful opponents, such as Venice, Genoa and Naples. The Florentine seaport was in the Tyrrhenian Sea, which meant that Florentine galleys were required to cross Neapolitan, Papal and Venetian waters in order to reach Constantinople. Furthermore the endemic wars in Italy, especially those between Genoa and Naples, caused more problems and endangered the waters around Porto Pisano. Therefore, I will interpret in this chapter the political
and economic decisions made by the Florentine Commune connected to the Italian and Levantine events in the fifteenth century.

The aim of this chapter is also to explore the relations between Florence and Byzantium in the Levant in the period 1439-1453, that is, the period between the Ecumenical Council and the fall of Constantinople. I will question whether the privileges granted by John VIII effectively improved Florentine commerce in the Levant. Moreover, I will examine whether the Commune introduced proper policies for its Levantine galley organisation.

The first two parts introduce the consequences of Alphonse V’s conquest of Naples (1442). Florence lost its traditional bond with the Angevin dynasty and was even attacked by Alphonse V. The chapter focuses on the pragmatic consequences of the war on Florence’s policies. The appearance of Alphonse V, the king of Aragon and Sicily, (1435-1442) shaped future events in Italy and also influenced Levantine history starting with the conquest of the kingdom of Naples from the Angevin house. The kingdom of Naples was one of the most important trading places for the Florentine merchants and bankers who traded there since the thirteenth century.

The third part focuses on the new political balance in Italy after Francesco Sforza’s conquest of Milan in 1450. The alliance between Florence (Medici) and Milan (Sforza) was the beginning of a new political background in Italy. With Milan supporting them, the Florentines finally were able to find a powerful military ally to replace the lost alliance with the Angevins in Naples.
The fourth part discusses the consequences of the fall of Constantinople for Italy, which would lead the Italian city-states to sign the peace of Lodi (1454). This peace finally terminated all the wars in Italy and opened new opportunities for Florence to develop its own maritime practices further. This section of the chapter makes frequent connections between Italy and the Levant and will show the interconnections that existed between these two parts of the Mediterranean world.

The final sections of the chapter are strictly concerned with the relations between Florence and Byzantium (1439-1453). They introduce the embassies sent to Florence and explain the reason for Florence’s refusal to every request for help sent by the Byzantine emperors.

This chapter will also introduce the Ottomans. After the fall of Constantinople on 29 May 1453, the Ottomans would become instrumental to the political choices of the Italian powers. Fear of the Ottomans, although already present before the fall of Constantinople, became a political factor for internal Italian politics. In addition, the “Turkish menace” became an ideological element in the decision over whether to negotiate or declare war, or to organise a new crusade to the East. The main powers in Italy concerned over the Turkish advance were Venice and Genoa. Florence did not possess a colonial empire in the Levant, which made Florence less concerned with the Ottoman presence.

Due to the complicated events that once again reshaped the political geography in Italy, it is necessary to give a brief introduction to the new major protagonists, in particular Alphonse V (1396-1458) and Francesco Sforza (1401-1466). The island of Sicily had ceased to be part of the Angevin possessions since 1282 due the Sicilian Vespers, which brought the crown of Trinacria (Sicily) under Aragonese influence. Alphonse V, who inherited this prosperous empire deeply rooted in the Mediterranean, decided to turn his attention over the kingdom of Naples.

The last queen of the Anjou-Durazzo dynasty Joanna II (1373-1435) died in 1435 without an heir. At that time two individuals claimed the kingdom of Naples. René of

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Anjou, whom Joanna II had acknowledged as her heir, and Alphonse V of Aragon, who had been the formerly designated heir. Alphonse V claimed the kingdom of Naples and invaded the south of Italy. However, the Aragonese suffered a major defeat near Ponza in 1435 at the hands of the Genoese fleet, an ally of the Angevins, who destroyed the royal fleet and captured Alphonse V. As a prisoner of Genoa, the king of Aragon was brought to Milan and the court of the duke, Filippo Maria Visconti. The duke of Milan, instead of giving the coup de grace, stipulated an alliance with Aragon and released Alphonse V.342

The benefits of the alliance with the Aragonese for Milan are clear. With Alphonse V king of Naples, Florence would have been surrounded from north to south. Moreover, Alphonse V possessed an experienced army and a powerful fleet, which would be helpful for Milan. Fortunately for Florence, this new alliance provoked the anger of Genoa. Genoa was a long time competitor of the Catalans, especially in the Tyrrhenian Sea. The anti-Milanese party in Genoa successfully rebelled against the duke and exiled the philo-Milanese party from the city. In addition, Pope Eugenius IV was not enthusiastic about the Aragonese presence in Italy. The pope backed the Angevin claimant, René of Anjou, and issued a bull which confirmed the rights of the Angevins over the kingdom of Naples.343 Florence, despite its formal neutrality, secretly backed the Angevins/René of Anjou together with Genoa. The Florentines were worried about an eventual dynasty change in the

Neapolitan kingdom, since Alphonse V was in alliance with the duke Filippo Maria Visconti, who was an enemy of the Signoria. Moreover, the Florentine Signoria was concerned about its trade networks which were particularly solid in the Angevin kingdom of Naples. All Florence’s efforts were in vain as Alphonse V entered Naples in 1442 to celebrate his new acquisition. René of Anjou fled the kingdom for the safety of Florence. From there he was conducted to Porto Pisano and on to France. Florence did not help René of Anjou only for past bonds of friendship. Most likely, Florence wanted to preserve its friendship with the Angevin house because it could still be used a threat against Alphonse V due to the claim of René of Anjou. This aim becomes evident during the (second) Naples-Florentine war (1442-1447) when Florence called René of Anjou to Italy.

Francesco Sforza was the son of the renowned Muzio Attendolo Sforza (1369-1424). Muzio had been a famous condottiere who, in the past, had contributed to Florence’s conquest of Pisa in 1409. His son, Francesco Sforza, after the father’s death (1424), obtained territories in Benevento and offered his service to the queen of Naples, Joanna II in 1424. At this time the Aragonese were already attacking the Neapolitan kingdom. Naples itself already was under the control of the Aragonese. Francesco Sforza managed to free Naples on 24 April 1424 and on 2 June of the same year he defeated the troops of Braccio da Montone, an Aragonese condottiere, in the battle of L’Aquila.\textsuperscript{344} After these two battles, Sforza abandoned Queen Joanna

\textsuperscript{344} Santoro 1968:15. On the struggle between Braccio, Sforza and the battle of Aquila see Setton 1978:40 fn. 2 and particularly Valentini 1929: 223-279.
II for the duke of Milan Filippo Maria Visconti. The *condotta* of Sforza in favour of Milan, despite highs and lows, was to continue at least until 1431. In that year, the duke of Milan offered to Francesco Sforza his only child, Bianca Maria Visconti, in marriage. The marriage between Sforza and Bianca Maria Visconti took place later, in 1442. Sforza’s marriage with Bianca Maria Visconti was a noteworthy occasion for the Italian *condottiere* that gave him a minor claim to the duchy of Milan.345

Filippo Maria Visconti died in 1447, leaving no heir besides his daughter Bianca Maria Visconti. However, Visconti’s last will granted the Milanese duchy to Alphonse V who had conquered the kingdom of Naples by this time (1442). In this period of political uncertainty, the Milanese aristocracy proclaimed the *Repubblica Ambrosiana* in Milan and hired the *condottiere* Francesco Sforza to fight against the new threat from Venice. In fact, the *Serenissima* saw in Visconti’s death and the lack of a clear successor the occasion to weaken or even conquer the Milanese duchy.

In 1448, Sforza defeated the Venetians at Caravaggio, but afterwards the *Serenissima* made a deal with Sforza which resulted in Sforza changing sides. However, the Venetians would soon regret this decision, as Sforza’s party within Milan managed to take over the city and opened the doors to the *condottiere*. Sforza entered Milan in 1450 and became duke of the city. Venice did not accept Sforza’s *volte face* and carried on the war against Milan. The acquisition of Milan made by a strong and charismatic character like Sforza completely ruined the Venetian plan.

Venice therefore signed an alliance with the *Repubblica Ambrosiana*. However, due to the pro-Sforza uprising in Milan under the command of Gaspare Vimercati, Sforza’s party leader, the alliance between Venice and the *Repubblica Ambrosiana* was destined to fail. Furthermore, the uprising resulted in the murder of the Venetian ambassador who was in the city to coordinate strategy against the *condottiere*.\(^{346}\)

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**The triumph of Alphonse V and Florence’s fears**


\(^{347}\) [Map Link](http://pages.uoregon.edu/mapplace/EU/EU19-%20Italy/Maps/EU19_152.jpg)
Alphonse V entered Naples in 1442. The stratagem used by Alphonse V to conquer Naples is notable as it was the same tactic Belisarius had used to conquer Naples in 536, that is, to pass through the city sewers. What is even more interesting is that by 1442 Leonardo Bruni had already published his Gothic War (1441) in which Belisarius’ tactic is present. Whether Alphonse V took his inspiration from Bruni’s work is impossible to show, but if this were the case it would be rather ironic since in 1447 Alphonse V attacked Florence. Yet, it is important to focus the attention on Alphonse V’s celebration.

Alphonse V organised a great celebration for his victory against the Angevins. This celebration is described by Angelo de Tummulillis (1396/1480/1485) in his chronicle Notabilita temporum. The chronicler witnessed Alphonse’s celebration and described with some detail the role of the Florentine community in the event. In this grandiose ceremony emerged the worries of Florence’s merchants, who were afraid they might lose their traditional privileges to the new dynasty in Naples. Moreover, the Florentines were afraid of an eventual war of Alphonse V against the city of Florence. For the role played by the Florentine merchants during the celebration is quite evident. Florentine merchants appeared second in importance to Catalan merchants in Naples. The reason for Florence’s decision to celebrate Alphonse V’s victory in such magnitude is evident from de Tummulillis’

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348 On this fascinating theory see Hankins 2010:29 and Ryder 1990:244-245.
350 Corvisieri 1890:44-52 contains the entire text of the celebration made by the Florentines in honour of Alphonse V.
chronicle. Florence feared that the new ruler might soon move against Florence. Besides, its traditional bond of friendship with the Angevins, Florence had in Naples many interests and needed to preserve its past privileges. Without surprise, the Florentine community in Naples celebrated with much emphasis, second only to that of the Catalans, and offered clear signs of peace to Alphonse V. For example, Tummulillis’ chronicle states that the Florentine merchant community wished Alphonse V to preserve the protection of God and the freedom of the Florentine Commune. Moreover, the same text repeated the particular concept such as “Alphonse, king of Peace, may Christ exalt you with prosperity and look to the beautiful in Florence in freedom”. 351

Evidently, Florence’s diplomacy was intended to show friendship to Alphonse V. Fortunately for Florence, Alphonse V had other problems to deal with at that time. He needed to obtain legitimacy as king of Naples from the pope. The pope continued to support the Angevin dynasty and was concerned with the new situation in the kingdom of Naples. Alphonse V offered help to Pope Eugenius IV against Francesco Sforza, who was at the same time fighting in the Marca Anconetana, a territory considered to be part of St. Peter’s patrimony. Alphonse V offered his assistance to the pope in exchange for the pope’s blessing and legitimacy as king of Naples. 352 This help and the mediation of Cardinal Borja (the later Calixtus III) and Ludovico Trevisan, the Patriarch of Aquileia, Pope Eugenius IV

351 Corvisieri 1890:44-52 E questo vole Dio perché li pyace. Alfonso re de pace, Christo te exalte con properitate E guarde il bello Fyorenza in libertate.
legitimated Alphonse V as king of Naples on 6 July 1443.\footnote{Caselli 2010:23-24 and Marinescu 1994:82.} One year later, Eugenius IV also confirmed the rights of Alphonse V’s illegitimate son, Ferrante I, in the kingdom. Consequently, Alphonse V was now free to turn his attention to the Italian political situation. Two events in 1447 accelerated the Aragonese plan for Italy – the death of both Pope Eugenius IV (23 February) and the duke of Milan, Filippo Maria Visconti (13 August).

**The Florentine-Aragonese war 1447-1449**

Newly elected Pope Nicholas V granted to the king of Naples free passage for his troops travelling through the *Patrimonium Sancti Petri*. Clearly, Florence had begun to watch this measure with alarm, as it was the closest power bordering papal territory. Freedom of passage through St. Peter’s Patrimony meant that Alphonse V could assault Florence without transporting troops by sea.

The Florentine Signoria was certainly justified in manifesting fear of Alphonse V during the celebration of the conquest of Naples. Matteo Palmieri reports that on 9 August 1447, without any apparent reason, Alphonse V sent an army from Tivoli to occupy Cennina, a small town on the Florentine border. After the attack failed, the Signoria sent Giannozzo Manetti as its ambassador to negotiate with Alphonse V. Giannozzo Manetti was a very prominent humanist: the decision to give to him the role of ambassador depicts the gravity of the situation. All these
events took place before the death of the duke of Milan. Filippo Maria Visconti’s death left Alphonse V with no allies, but with a precarious claim on the Milanese duchy. Still, the road to Milan was made difficult by Venice and Florence. Therefore, Alphonse V asked the Florentine Signoria to stop supporting Venice. Moreover, the king of Naples also requested that Florence leave the alliance with Venice, to ally with him and to pay several indemnities.\footnote{Giovanozzo Pitti e Bernardo d’Antonio de’ Medici reached Alphonse V on 18 October 1447. For Palmieri de temporibus Scaramella 1906-1915:1.155. See also Palmieri Annales in Scaramella 1906-1915:1.154-1.155.} The king of Naples sanctioned such harsh conditions for peace that Florence was forced to refuse them and to continue the war.

After Filippo Maria Visconti’s death, Alphonse V invaded and conquered Castiglione della Pescaia, a town near Piombino.\footnote{It is interesting that Bartolomeo Facio, in his \textit{Rerum gestarum Alfonsi regis libri X}, depicted the king of Aragon as doubtful over which road to choose to approach Milan. There were two possibilities, through Todi or Florence. This doubt appears to be an invention due to the simple fact that it does not make any sense for the king to approach Milan and claim his title by choosing what would have surely been the most long and difficult road, that is, to make war against the Florentine Commune. Facio 2004:419-421. See Soldani 2007:25 and Ryder 1990:276-283.} The Aragonese troops reached the city by passing through papal territories, thus validating Florence’s alarm. However, given the distance between Naples and Castiglione, Alphonse V found his supply lines becoming dangerously long. His only solution was to arrange logistic support through the fleet, since the Florentine fleet was no match for the Aragonese galleys. However, what Alphonse V really lacked was a reliable seaport close to Tuscany for his logistic operations. Porto Pisano was too difficult to attack, due to its fortifications and the presence of both the Genoese and Florentine fleet. Alphonse V decided to move towards Piombino, a small but strategic seaport in Tuscany.\footnote{For general literature on Piombino see Abulafia 2011:3-14; Abulafia 2010:145-160.}
the conquest of Piombino, Alphonse V could gain an important seaport for his logistic operations and stop using the long passage through St. Peter’s Patrimony.\textsuperscript{357} Thus, Alphonse V attempted to gain an agreement with Siena, which had a certain influence on Piombino’s lord, Rinaldo degli Orsini. The Orsini were officially in \textit{accomandatizia} with the Sienese Signoria.\textsuperscript{358} Siena attempted to find an agreement between Piombino and Naples but failed. Consequently, the lord of Piombino turned to Florence for help.

At the same time, Florence was not caught by surprise with Alphonse V’s attack. Palmieri reports that Florence started to hire \textit{condottieri} and added new taxes before the war had even started.\textsuperscript{359} On 15 July 1448, a Florentine fleet full of supplies engaged battle with the Aragonese fleet. Alphonse V defeated Florence and even captured two of the Florentine galleys.\textsuperscript{360} The success of Alphonse V was only temporary. Sigismondo Malatesta, formerly \textit{condottiere} for Alphonse V, and now hired by Florence, defeated the Aragonese forces. Alphonse V had to lift the siege and call back his troops from Piombino. This battle ended the first of the war between Alphonse V and the Signoria of Florence, but the result did not settle the political tension between the two powers. Alphonse V’s defeat at Piombino was only a temporary halt to the military war but did not stop the clash between Florence and

\textsuperscript{357} Soldani 2007:25 showed the difficulties in using such passage.
\textsuperscript{358} \textit{Accomanda} is a certain type of clientele system in which a minor lord receives protection in exchange of some accommodations. It is not similar to the feudal system. On Piombino and its \textit{accomanda} see Abulafia 2011:3-14.
\textsuperscript{359} Scaramella 1906-1915:1.155.
\textsuperscript{360} Scaramella 1906-1915:1.157. The Florentine fleet was formed by four heavy galleys and eight \textit{fuste}. \textit{E Fiorentini armarono 4 galee grosse e alter fuste in tutto 8 e missono in Piombino fanti 300 con detta armata...a di' 15.}
Naples. The fight continued on another front. Alphonse V, since he was unable to subdue the Florentine Commune through weapons, decided to start an economic war.

In the medieval period, normally wars were not followed with policies against the commerce against the enemy of the moment.\textsuperscript{361} As Del Treppo pointed out all rulers were cautious in giving the right of rappresaglia (retaliation on wares) or even in expelling the merchants of the antagonist power. Indeed, expulsions of merchants or embargoes were extremely rare since these decisions caused collateral economic damage, even to the perpetrator. The main problem was the difficulty in replacing the businesses and all the money generated by the expelled merchants. This problem was especially valid in the case of Florence and the kingdom of Naples, due to the considerable presence of the Florentine merchants in the kingdom since the thirteenth century. Without doubt, a decision of such gravity confirmed the will of the Neapolitan king to bring Florence to its knees.

The king of Naples in 1447 decided to issue a prammatica, which formally expelled Florentine citizens from the kingdoms of Naples and Aragon.\textsuperscript{362} At the same time he recalled all the Catalan merchants in Pisa and Florence and ordered all his subjects living in Rome to stop any business with Florentine banks. On 20 February 1447, the Florentine Signoria received news of the capture of some

\textsuperscript{361} See Del Treppo 1972:322-323.
\textsuperscript{362} On Alphonse V and the prammatica see Soldani 2007:17 and Del Treppo 1972:323. The original document is in ACA, Cancelleria, reg. 2894 cc. 145r-146v.
Florentine merchants who were on-board the galley of the Catalan Villatort. Another ruling on 19 January 1448 prohibited Aragonese subjects from wearing any cloth made of *panni fiorentini*, which was the traditional cloth manufactured in Florence. This provision of Alphonse V was aimed precisely at severely affecting the revenues of the oligarchs in Florence, since the *panni lana* production was one of the backbone of the Florentine economy. Moreover, the Aragonese fleet patrolled the sea near Porto Pisano in a *de facto* blockade of Florence itself.

**New alliances**

The importance of Sforza’s rise in the duchy of Milan (1450) rests in the emergence of a new political balance in the Italian peninsula. The old alliances crumbled to make space for new ones. Florence abandoned its alliance with Venice after Francesco Sforza’s acquisition of the duchy of Milan. This was a shift of paramount importance considering that from the end of the fourteenth century Florence and Milan had been in an almost constant state of war against each other. With Florence’s decision to sustain Sforza in his war against the *Serenissima* for Milan, a war against Venice was unavoidable. Florence decided to call the French against Alphonse V so as to avoid any merging of forces between Venice and Naples. The calling of the French always appears to represent a delicate matter. In

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363 The names of the Florentines were Bardo Altoviti, Zanobi di Giovanni Jacopi, Antonio Fagni e Forese Salviati. The matter was even more dramatic since these merchants were on a diplomatic mission, delivering letters from the viceroy of Sicily to Alphonse V through which the former was asking to maintain the validity of the Florentine safe conducts. See Soldani 2007:18. ASF, Signori, Missive II Cancelleria, 37 cc. 70 20 February 1447.
this case, René of Anjou, who was still a legal claimant of the kingdom of Naples, was the perfect ally to add more power to the Florentine-Milanese coalition.\textsuperscript{364} The Florentine Signoria first had to persuade Francesco Sforza of the necessity to summon René of Anjou.\textsuperscript{365} The new duke of Milan was fearful of the claims held by the house of Orleans, due to the marriage between Valentina Visconti (1368-1408), daughter of Giangaleazzo Visconti (1351-1402) with Louis I, duke of Orleans (1372-1407).\textsuperscript{366} Moreover, Sforza remained a “usurper” since neither the emperor nor the pope had acknowledged his new position in Milan. Florence sent Angelo Acciaiuoli to Milan with the task of persuading Sforza to accept the French call, in which task he was successful.\textsuperscript{367}

At the same time, Sforza’s rule over Milan and his alliance with Florence pushed Venice to seek a league with Alphonse V.\textsuperscript{368} The Venetians also sent an ambassador to Florence to ask, once and for all, to dismantle their league with Sforza. This Venetian embassy was one of the most important turning points in

\textsuperscript{364} For the call of the French see Ilardi 1959:129-166.  
\textsuperscript{365} On René in Italy see Setton 1976:156.  
\textsuperscript{366} For a more detailed discussion on the claims see Robinson 1888:34-62.  
\textsuperscript{367} Charles VII of France was not an Angevin, but he had married Marie of the Angevin house, who was the eldest daughter of Louis II Angevin, king of Naples from 1389 to 1399. See the document in which the Acciaiuoli wrote “lo so che la S.V. non vorebbe potential di franciosi in Italia: ma io cognosco, selle cose non sono mutate da tre mesi in qua, che la S.V. ha solo uno remedio a fare questo, el quale e che la S.V. et noi facciamo accordo col Re di Francia et volsi che la S.V. che la S.V. intenda quali sono le ragioni perché il Re predicto pensi dentrare in Italia. Luna sie il fatto di gienova che dice essere sua di ragione. La seconda sie il fatto del Reame di Napoli per lo re Rinato. La terza sie per lo Duca dorldiensi. Il Re di Francia consentiva che voi vi facessi S. De gienova non e quatro mesi, lodava laquisto haveva fatto la S.V. Riprendeva il Duca dorldiensi del titulo di Melano. Soon after, René of Anjou realised that there was no chance for him to regain the Neapolitan kingdom and that he was fooled by the Italian allies. This document and other documents on the relations between Florence and the kingdom of France in the period can be found in Buser 1879:347-562.  
\textsuperscript{368} Predelli 1955:55.
Florence’s diplomacy in the mid-fifteenth century, and their answer determined the emergence of a new balance of power in Italy. Florence replied that Venice had no right to order a faithful ally like Florence to abandon Francesco Sforza. Moreover, the Signoria added that there was no will to break the lega with Venice since they continued to consider the Serenissima a friend. Simply speaking, the Florentines forced Venice to break their alliance. This new diplomatic realignment dragged Florence into a new war. Just as in the past, Venice and Naples attacked Florence and Milan. Furthermore, in 1451 Venice and Naples decided to expel all Florentine merchants in their territories. The Florentine position was even more tangled for the two major Italian naval powers closed any possibility for Florence to organise any state-galley expeditions.\footnote{Mallett’s list confirms that for the period 1447-1455 no galleys were dispatched by the Florentine Commune.}

It emerges from the letters between Sforza and the Medici that in 1453, Florence began to suffer from the war. Sforza desperately asked for money from Cosimo the Elder in order to keep up the war against the Venetians. The Milanese ambassador, Nicodemo Tranchedini, had the impression that Cosimo the Elder was not convinced about Sforza’s real power. Everything soon changed in Italy due to news from the Levant. On 29 May 1453 Mehmet II conquered Constantinople and put an end to the long history of the Byzantine empire.
From the fall of Constantinople to the peace of Lodi: the beginning of a new era
(1453-1454)

The fall of Constantinople is one of the most important turning points of European
history. The event sent a shock wave of reactions across Western Europe and the
"Turkish menace" entered lastingly the mind-set of Italians. A vast literature on the
subject, also known as crusading literature, grew exponentially and the fear of a
Turkish invasion of Italy became a topos.370

The political reactions of Florence to the fall of Constantinople are revealing.
The news came immediately to Chios and Crete and finally arrived in Italy, mostly
provoking consternation and incredulity.371 The Florentine political reaction to the
fall is interesting, since private and public reactions were practically the opposite of
one another. The earliest source on Florence and the fall of Constantinople is the
letter sent to the Florentine Signoria by Niccolò Soderini in Genoa. The letter,
written on 8 July 1453, officially announces to the Florentine Signoria the conquest
of Constantinople by the Ottomans. Beyond the natural grief provoked in Genoa by
the news, the letter also mentioned the capture of a Genoese ship which was full of
Florentine wares.

371 Some sources indicate the fact that at first the Latins did not believe that Constantinople had
been captured by the Ottomans, or even that the city had been retaken by the Latins. See in general Pertusi
1976/2.
That you have several ways to harm the Aragonese king and revenge them from this offence … and that you will be happy doing so for all the wares that were loaded, property of the Florentines

The Florentine Signoria wrote a very interesting letter to Soderini on 17 July 1453 in which the official reaction of the Florentine government can be seen:

We cannot express to you how greatly we were overcome with despair at the sad tidings of the loss of Constantinople; all Christian princes … should make peace with one another, and all other Christians should dress themselves in the mourning to demonstrate their anguish; and they should be so utterly ashamed that they are impelled to recover the lost places. But if they do not, as they will not, all Christendom will be injured and shamed forever.

The Florentine letter seemed in line with all Western reactions. Besides the formal and sympathetic manifestation of grief, Florence’s diplomatic stance was to stress Christian unity and to desire universal peace. Robert Black suggested that this letter proved Florence’s genuine feelings towards the crusade, contrary to what had been suggested in the past by scholars such as Pastor and Babinger. However, I strongly believe that the feelings of peace and unity mentioned in the letter were only due to the Florentine attempt to adhere to a general peace in Italy. Specifically, the Florentine government pressed for a general peace for reasons that, of course, did not include the organisation of the crusade, but rather concerned Florentine trade.

There are several reasons Florence needed the peace. Florence suffered from the expulsion of its merchants from Naples and the Serenissima’s territories.

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374 But the reaction witnessed by Tranchedini, the Milanese ambassador in Florence, would show another complete face of the situation. See fn. 371 of this PhD dissertation.
Moreover, the Venetian/Neapolitan commercial aggression cut off the Florentine Signoria from all the sea routes and forced the former to reallocate all their galleys for warfare.\textsuperscript{375} The reasons for Florence’s will for peace were pragmatic and not ideological. Of course, Florence could not have expressed happiness at the fall of Constantinople to an Islamic power, which makes me doubt the “genuine anguish” used by Black to describe Florence’s reaction to the fall of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{376} The strongest objection to Black’s interpretation comes from another source, a personal communication between Francesco Sforza and the duke’s ambassador in Florence. The document is a very interesting letter from the Milanese ambassador to Florence, Nicodemo Tranchedini. The letter, dated on 7 July 1453, is a comment by Tranchedini on what happened in Florence after the news of the fall of Constantinople. The letter shows feelings that do not exactly match with the Florentine Signoria’s official reaction.

I (Tranchedini) also wish that it may go ill with the Venetians, but not in a manner to the detriment to the Christian faith. I doubt not that your feeling is the same. Would to God that Pope Nicholas had built less and had believed me! How often have I told him that, besides its other innumerable advantages, the pacification of Italy would greatly tend to the honour of His Holiness!\textsuperscript{377}

Cosimo the Elder (or someone important in the court) apparently expressed satisfaction at the fall of Constantinople which provoked the shock of the Milanese

\textsuperscript{375} Again it is worthwhile to stress the fact that there were no Florentine galleys travelling between 1449 and 1454, the year of the Lodi peace. Mallett 1967 and later Soldani 2007 agreed on the relocation theory of the Florentine galleys to warfare.

\textsuperscript{376} Black 1985:242. He even stated that was a “genuine anguish” the fall of Constantinople for Florence.

\textsuperscript{377} Pastor 1891:284.
ambassador. Black, in his book about Benedetto Accolti and the Florentine Renaissance, overlooked the importance of this letter. In his work, the letter is simply mentioned in a footnote and Black simply states that “some Florentines were said to have rejoiced over losses suffered by their enemies in Constantinople”.378 This source must be taken more seriously for two reasons. The first is that Tranchedini was not referring to people, but most likely to the Florentine Signoria. ‘I also wish that...’ seems to point out that the Milanese ambassador was talking about the Florentine sovereign in a matter regarding the common enemies. I cannot be sure if the people “satisfied” were the Medici since the lack of a direct accusation. However, Tranchedini, and every Milanese ambassador in Florence, were the connection point between the Medici and the Sforza due to their alliance.379 It was a duty of the Milanese ambassador to deliver any news from Florence to the Milanese duke. The second reason concerns the political alliance between Florence and Milan. This alliance was quite solid, which makes it difficult to believe that the Milanese ambassador wanted to smear Florence.

Finally, the third reason is that Tranchedini, in his letter, is openly referring to the end of the Byzantine empire since he mentioned “the detriment to the Christian faith”. This “detriment of the Christian faith” cannot simply refer to the losses of the Venetians, as Black stated, but surely refers to the fall of Constantinople itself, since

378 Black 1985:242. Here is the quote of the text ‘when in early July 1453 the Florentines first learned that Constantinople had fallen to the Turks, they were at war with Venice and some Florentines were said to have rejoiced over losses suffered by their enemies in Constantinople’.

379 See fn. 371.
the latter was still the second city in order of importance in the Christian world. Therefore, it must be stressed again that the gravity of the words used by the Milanese ambassador, which implied that someone within the Florentine Signoria was not so displeased with the fall of the second patriarchal city into the hands of an Islamic power. Accordingly, the Signoria had every pragmatic reason to be satisfied with the fall of Constantinople since it effectively caused economic damage to Venice. Of course, this satisfaction was well hidden when the city wrote to Soderini, and afterwards to Pope Nicholas V.

To sum up, *realpolitik* made Florence less willing to support any crusading plan. The Venetian reaction and the policies adopted by the Senate after the fall of Constantinople confirms further that the conquest of Constantinople represented a new opportunity for the Florentine establishment. Venice and Genoa were heavily involved in the Levant and were afraid for their outposts there. After the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, large territories of the *Serenissima* and Genoa in the Levant became Ottoman targets due to their proximity to Constantinople. Rather than seeking peace in Italy, Venice opened the negotiations with Mehmet II to secure peace and the reopening of the Levantine commerce. Accordingly, the Venetian Senate considered Francesco Sforza to be a more imminent threat than Mehmet II. This decision to make peace with Mehmet II in 1454 was due to mercantile interests, the pressure from the Milanese in Italy and the Ottomans’ threat against the Venetian colonies in the Levant. These reasons pushed the Senate to negotiate peace with the
Ottomans and to refuse the papal plan for a crusade. A letter from the Senate sent to the archbishop of Ragusa states:

We also consider that our cities and places in Greece and in our other parts have been living in peace, as we said, for two hundred years and therefore they are neither fortified nor ready for the danger now evidently present.\[380\]

Venice had already sent an ambassador to the Ottomans before the fall of Constantinople. After Mehmet II’s conquest, the Venetian Senate ordered Bartolomeo Marcello to rescue the Venetian prisoners in Constantinople and to negotiate peace with the sultan, although the latter remained a secret of state.\[381\]

The Venetian Senate was not the only power to fear the Ottoman threat in the Levant. Pope Nicholas V ordered the arming of five galleys in Venice at the Curia’s expense and sent the Genoese Angelo Ambrosini to the Levantine Sea with three galleys. Ambrosini’s expedition finished as soon as the Genoese found the waters completely occupied by the Ottoman fleet and barely managed to escape.\[382\] Just as in Florence, the Venetian attitude to the crusade differed from their official statements. Despite Filelfo’s affirmation that the Venetian Doge made an impressive speech by declaring that the *Serenissima* would avenge Constantinople, the reality gleaned from the Senate correspondence to the Venetian ambassadors in Rome present the


\[381\] In a letter to the pope, the Venetians simply limit themselves to saying that they have armed some galleys to protect Negroponte. Setton 1978:2.140; See Thiriet 1961: 3.184-3.186-7. Reg. nn. 2917, 2927.

\[382\] Pastor 1891:275 and Della Tuccia 1872:240.
opposite picture. On 12 October 1453 the Venetian Senate sent clear instructions to Orsato Giustiniani and Cristoforo Mauro, ambassadors from the Serenissima to Rome. Venice wished to keep the on-going negotiations between the Serenissima and the Ottoman sultan completely secret. What the Venetians really wanted was to keep safe their territories in the Levant and not to embark on a difficult and especially expensive crusade.

The duke of Milan was seemingly less affected by the Byzantine defeat, for Milan had no stakes in the Levant, unless one considers their interest on behalf of Genoa. Yet, at the time of the fall of Constantinople, Genoa was still an independent Commune. Only afterwards, Francesco Sforza would manage to acquire the city in his dominion. It is possible that the fall of Constantinople represented good news for the Sforza. The duke of Milan was at that time completely entrenched in heavy fighting against the Venetians in the Bresciano. The kingdom of Naples was also involved in the Levant due to the increasing influence of the Aragonese fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, Alphonse V chose, like Venice, to focus on the Italian war and Naples sent no forces to the Levant.

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383 Pastor 1891:279. Filelfo’s account is in Zinkeisen 1854:2.19.
384 Pastor 1904:36-37.
386 On the final stages of the war between Milan and Venice see Mallett 1984. Tranchedini would not approve, but the fall of Constantinople was still something that “went ill to the Venetians”. On Tranchedini see fn. 371.
387 Ryder 1990:261-266. Rather Alphonse V’s policies were directed at creating, with the use of force, a space for royal wares by using Catalan positions in the Mediterranean. Caselli 2010:70. In a certain way, the Ottoman advance into Eastern Europe gave the king of Naples the opportunity to increase his
Meanwhile, Pope Nicholas V, who was concerned by the fall of the Byzantine capital, decided to send ambassadors to all Italian powers to arrange for a peace.\(^{388}\) The pope thought to use the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople as the unifying cause among the Italian powers. The pope’s final goal was, of course, a crusade against the Turks. For this purpose, the pope issued a bull calling for a crusade against the Ottomans and requested contributions from all the Christian powers, threatening excommunication in case of refusal. However, Pope Nicholas V failed in his peace-making initiative. It was rather the personal initiative of Fra Simonetto da Camerino, an Augustinian monk, who finally produced the peace agreement. Yet, one must stress that the Venetian Senate gave to the monk the official mission, proving the clear aim of the Venetians to find a general peace after the fall of Constantinople.\(^{389}\) The pope’s aim at the peace of Lodi (9 April 1454) was the crusade against the Turk, but by that time Venice and Genoa were at peace with Mehmet II. Furthermore, Genoa and Venice did not want to take further actions which could damage their commercial interests in the Levant.\(^{390}\)

\(^{388}\) Iorga 1902: 314, see also Pastor 1871:274-275.

\(^{389}\) On the mission of Fra Simonetto see Pope Pius II who reported the successful initiative by the monk, whom Pius II defined as “a man of unimpeachable integrity” See Piccolomini 2013:268.

\(^{390}\) On the relations between Venice and the Ottomans see Preto 1975; Beck-Manoussacas-Pertusi 1977; on Genoa and the Ottomans see Balletto-Pistarino 1995, Fleet 1999.
Byzantium and Florence (1439-1453)

This section discusses the diplomatic connections between Florence and Byzantium between the end of the Council in 1439 and the fall of Constantinople on 29 May 1453. This paragraph will explain why Florence abandoned Constantinople after the end of the Ecumenical Council. My argument here is the importance of analysing events in the Levant and in Italy together and not separately.

After the Ecumenical Council, the Byzantine emperor expected substantial assistance from Western powers, especially for the doctrinal price paid by the emperor in the form of the Union. The emperor John VIII decided to send to the pope an embassy around 1441-1442 to request the promised crusade. For these reason, John VIII sent to Florence the Franciscan monk Iacopus de Primaditiis, since the papal Curia was there at the time.391 The pope and the curia were in Florence due to rebellion in Rome, connected to the Council of Basle, which forced Pope Eugenius IV out from Rome in 1434. Jacob (Iacopus) arrived in Florence in 1442 with letters from John VIII. The letters contained requests for help and military support. However, the Florentine answer was a polite refusal.392 This kind of refusal

391 Iacopus was also the General Vicar for the Franciscans in the Levant.
392 BNC, Panciat. 148, 190v- 191r. **Veniens ad nos religious vir Frater Iacobus numptius et orator litteras attulit supereminentie vestre plenas benevolentie et caritatis erga civitatem nostrum...De angustiis vero atque difficultatibus, que civitatem constantinopolim presentialiter urgent, tanquam**
was going to become a rhetorical theme, especially for the later Byzantine embassies to Florence.\footnote{Djuric 1995:27.}

Another embassy led by Theodoros Charistinos arrived in Florence in 1443/1444. Charistinos travelled from Venice to Siena to Florence where his mission was to ask for support, specifically in the form of contributions and military resources.\footnote{The passing from Florence of Charistinos is known because the Commune issued a safe conduct for the Greek ambassador. See Djuric 1995:227.} Again, the Greek ambassador’s request was met with refusal masked in kind words and reflecting Florence’s disinterest in the fate of Constantinople. The reason behind these refusals is possibly related to the Florence’s reluctance in helping a Byzantium that was heavily influenced by Venice and Genoa. Moreover, the war in Italy deeply affected the political and commercial policies of the Signoria. A further reason that cannot be excluded is the non-competitive privileges given by John VIII to Florence at the end of the Ecumenical Council in 1439. Despite Cosimo the Elder’s direct request in 1436 to the Byzantine emperor for the same commercial privileges as the other Italian cities (Genoa and Venice), John VIII decided to lower the \textit{kommerkion} only to two per cent in 1439.\footnote{The letter is mentioned in chapter 1 since it relates to an event before the Ecumenical Council. See fn. 139.} Florence, therefore, was not competitive in Constantinople, especially compared to Genoa and Venice. As a result, after 1439, Florence became unconcerned with the fate of the Byzantine

\textit{very et devote filii vestry totis affectibus condolemus}.... That the letter is for Florence and not the pope is clear as it mentioned \textit{civitates nostra} which in that case is Florence. It would not have made any sense to refer to Rome or the papal curia as a city.
empire. At the same time, the Byzantine empire began to press the Florentine Signoria to join the struggle against the Ottomans.

The Byzantines expected the full cooperation of the Latin powers for the organisation of the crusade. After the pope achieved the Union with John VIII, he opened negotiations with Western Christian powers for the so-called crusade of Varna. There are no documents implying or even suggesting that Florence sent any kind of help (military or monetary) to support the crusade expedition. The only Florentine activity which can be connected to the crusade of Varna is banking. A receipt from the Apostolic Chamber states that Cardinal Ludovico Scarampi sent to Cosimo the Elder the sum of 2,000 florins. This money was to help Cardinal Cesarini in Hungary in the organisation of the crusade.396 This activity does not prove any Medici involvement in the crusade of Varna. On the contrary, the source seems to confirm the involvement of the Medici bank (Cosme de Medicis et sociis) in what was a profitable business.

Therefore, Florence sent no help to Byzantium and refused all Byzantine requests on this matter. As for the crusade, the Levantine Genoese decided to help Murad II, the Ottoman sultan, to cross the straits.397 If Genoa, a city still with noteworthy interests in Constantinople, decided to avoid the crusade in fear of

396 Hofmann 1929-1931:2.196. The Medici bank was often involved in this kind of transaction. For example, it was the Medici bank who anticipated the money spent by the Greeks for the council organisation. Or again, they anticipated the money for Bishop Thomas’s journey to the Copts. Hofmann 1929-1931:2.109. Therefore, it is impossible to say that the Medici, as a part of the Florentine Signoria, contributed to the Varna crusade for crusading fervour or as a result of a will to help Constantinople.

397 Imber 1988:5, 30,128.
empowering the Venetians, it is not a surprise that Florence would do the same. The crusade’s defeat in Varna (1444) scared the despotate of Morea as well. In 1446, the Commune sent to Demetrios Palaiologos, Despot of Morea, a letter which is an answer to what must have been the request of a past embassy from the despotate of Morea. The letter is without any specific requests. The Commune simply thanked the despot for his kind words without making any promises.

The despot’s initiative did not stop with the embassy in 1446. Another embassy arrived in Florence in 1451 with the offer of commercial privileges in the despotate. The despot’s ambassador, Athanasios Lascaris, is supposed to have given an argyrobull to Florence when he was travelling to Naples to meet Alphonse V of Aragon with the aim of discussing matters with regard to a new crusade.\textsuperscript{398} The main difference between the privileges given in 1439 and the despotate offer in 1451 is the fact that Florence never asked for privileges from the despot of Morea. This lack might means that Florence had no commercial interests in Morea. Perhaps, Florence was satisfied with its commercial ties with Athens, or did not see any potential in the Morea’s market. By any means, the grant of the argyrobull must be contextualised as the Byzantine despot’s initiative to involve Florence in the struggle against the Turks with material grants. However, none of these initiatives seemed to have success since Florence never agreed to provide help or subsidies.

\textsuperscript{398} No source shows the existence of a commercial privilege given by the Despotate of Morea apart the offer presented by Lascaris to the Signoria.
The last of the embassies from Byzantium arrived in Florence in 1451. Of this embassy there is an annotation written by an anonymous Florentine chronicler. In addition to the usual requests for help, Florence discovered that the Venetians had pressed the emperor to expel the Florentine merchants from Constantinople:

1451: Bernardo di Uguccione Lippi became Standard-bearer of Justice. In the same time the ambassadors sent by Constantine Palaiologos, emperor of Constantinople, arrived in Florence ... Here, they asked for help to the (Florentine) Signoria against the Turks. They (the ambassadors) said that the emperor, their Lord, had been requested from the Venetians to expel from his empire the Florentine merchants. Yet, he (Constantine) did not accept these requests since he knew about the courtesies used by the (Florentine) republic in favour of John VIII, his brother, when he was in Florence at the time of Eugenius IV and the Churches’ Union. The ambassadors also referred that the Venetians made the same request to Ragusa. The emperor gave to them (the Venetians) the same answer.399

Here, the ambassador is probably Andronikos Bryennos Leontaris, who is reported to have been in Italy in this period of time.400 Andronikos’ mission was to get help and subsidies. The Byzantine ambassador came to Florence after visiting Venice, which was the natural starting point for every Byzantine mission to Italy.

The war between Florence and Venice in Italy apparently had side effects in the Levant, as well. Venice was pushing the Byzantine emperor to expel all Florentine merchants from Constantinople. However, Constantine XI (1449-1453) refused to heed the Venetian’s advice and even told the Florentine Signoria about the Venetian request. Constantine XI was most likely trying to approach Florence in an attempt to reduce the Venetian influence in Constantinople. This was not the first

399 ASF, Manoscritti 117, 18v-19r. 1451. In Appendix II n. 2. On this request made by Venice see also Machiavelli 1847:288.
such attempt. Constantine XI had previously attempted to put some new taxes on Venetian wares, provoking the anger of the Venetian Senate and the consequent withdrawal of his provision. Once more, the Byzantines hoped that by involving other Western powers they would receive more help from the West. In a way, this idea was not wrong since the main reason for Florence’s disinterest in Byzantium’s fate was evidently Venice’s influence over Constantinople. Therefore, this embassy may have been part of a bigger plan by Constantine XI to attempt to open Constantinople to more Western powers and consequently to give pragmatic reasons to them for defending the city. However, Florence was well aware of the Venetian grip on Constantinople and therefore refused to help Constantine XI. Besides, there are no documents which confirm any kind of help sent from Florence to Byzantium. Nobody can deny that the Byzantine delegation created a huge impression on the Florentines. Clear evidences about the Byzantine cultural impact on Florence emerge from the artistic composition of the period. One example is the medal coined by Pisanello which represents the emperor John VIII; another evidence is the almost certain presence of John VIII in Gozzoli’s *Cavalcata dei Magi*. However, one thing is cultural impact, another thing is to pursue policies which are mainly determined by political and economic reasons. Florence and its elite might have been well impressed by the cultural and exotic presence of the Byzantine delegation. Yet, the policies and decision enacted by the Florentine Signoria did not match the
Byzantine’s expectations. In conclusion, the cultural sphere did not affect the coherence of Florence’s diplomacy.\textsuperscript{401}

\textbf{Why Florence abandoned Byzantium.}

The Florentines did next to nothing to prevent the fall of Byzantium. Every time a Byzantine ambassador visited Florence, the Signoria gave only gracious words, and never offered material help such as subsidies or military support. Moreover, after the Ecumenical Council, Florence never sent any letters or embassies to Constantinople. Despite the commercial privileges offered to Florence by John VIII, it seems that the Signoria did not have any reasons to defend the city. One of the main reasons is the extreme pragmatism of Florence’s diplomacy. Before the Ecumenical Council, it was clear that Florence wanted these privileges as the Signoria had presented similar requests since 1397. The moment in which John VIII finally fulfilled the Florentine ambitions also marked the end of Florence’s need for the Byzantine emperors. The Signoria was perfectly aware that what it had received in 1439 from John VIII was the maximum which it could have ever obtained.

\textsuperscript{401} On Benozzo Gozzoli and the ride of the Magi see Santi 1983. In general on Humanism and Art in Florence see Chastel 1959. In particular see the article about Roberto Martelli’s involvement in Crum 1996:403-417. On Martelli’s family see Litta 1902 and Martines 1959. On Pisanello see Weiss 1966. There is also an interesting PhD thesis which focuses on Pisanello’s medal see Jones 2011:73-99.
Another reason for Florence’s disinterest in Byzantium’s fate was commercial. The commercial privileges granted by John VIII set the \textit{kommerkion} at two per cent, which was not enough to compete with the commercial power of the Venetians and Genoese. Besides, there was no chance that the emperor could improve Florence’s privileges to the same level enjoyed by Venice or Genoa. Venice was interested in keeping Constantinople as its own commercial territory and Genoa wanted to preserve its superiority in Pera. Finally, the Venetian or Genoese intermediation of Florence’s wares produced considerable revenue for the two cities. It makes sense that both Venice and Genoa wanted to keep this commercial intermediation and the only way to do so was to keep Florence out of the Constantinopolitan market.

One of the manifest reasons for Florence’s political shift towards Milan was its other aim at reducing the preponderant Venetian supremacy in Italy. Yet, this political alignment had consequences also in the Levant. For it marked the definitive end of Byzantium’s hopes to expect help from Florence. When the war with Venice broke out in 1450/51, the small residual chances of possible Florentine help fell below zero, since Florence would have never helped its major enemy.

Another reason lay with the anticipated end of the Byzantine empire. Greek migrants and refugees were entering Italy already in the 1440s. Florence was aware that Constantinople’s days were numbered and that the city could not be defended in the event of a serious Ottoman attack. Clearly not equal in number to Venice, there was also a small community in Constantinople of Florentine merchants that most
likely had a communication channel with the Signoria.\textsuperscript{402} One of these merchants was almost surely Jacopo Tedaldi, who fought during the Ottoman siege in 1453.\textsuperscript{403} This Florentine merchant apparently was resourceful, since he found salvation on a Venetian galley and later arrived in Crete. Here, despite the war between Venice and Florence, he was freed by the Venetian authorities due to his contribution during the siege. In the Ottoman period, Tedaldi would become an intimate of the sultan. Due to Tedaldi’s prominent role in Constantinople, it is not difficult to imagine that he might have had good ties also in the Byzantine court so that he could have kept the Florentine Signoria up to date with useful information. Other merchants who might have provided information to Florence are Bettino and Zaneto Bartoli. The first was the one whom the Signoria appointed for the embassy to Manuel II in 1421. The second was Bettino’s son, Zaneto, who most likely kept a communication channel with the Signoria as well. Presumably, Florence was aware of the desperate conditions of Constantinople and simply decided to await more favourable conditions to improve its commercial power. The Commune evidently wanted to avoid any delay of Byzantium’s end for it was against its own interests. The probable relief shown by someone within the Florentine Signoria towards the fall of Constantinople further confirms this hypothesis.

Another issue that contributed to Florence’s reluctance is the Italian political situation. The Neapolitan conquest by Alphonse V caused Florence to lose its solid

\textsuperscript{402} See in general Badoer 1965. Most likely, the businesses between Venetians and Florentines ended due to the Italian war and the afterwards expulsion of all the Florentine merchants from Venice.

\textsuperscript{403} Tedaldi’s account is in Pertusi 1976:1.186.
alliance with the Angevins and marked the beginning of a period of wars. There were more consequences following two wars fought by Florence. The first war against Milan-Naples (1443-1447), the second against Naples-Venice (1450-1455) with the difficult defence of Piombino (1448), required all of Florence’s resources. The Medici banks, for example, sustained Sforza in his war against Venice, and paid Sigismondo Malatesta’s compensation for defending Piombino.404

The relationship with the despotate of Morea presents a similar situation. Just as with Byzantium, Florence never sent any embassy to the despot of Morea. Moreover, the Commune never answered positively to any requests from the despot. Florence received an ambassador from the despotate of Morea after the fall of Constantinople in the person of Iohannes Zamblaco, who arrived in Florence on 18 June 1455. The despot of Morea, Thomas Palaiologos, sent Iohannes to Florence to ask for help and support for the last Palaiologan domain. Again, in this case Florence kindly refused the ambassador’s requests. The only difference from the past was that at the time of the despot’s embassy Florence already had a diplomatic channel open with Mehmet II, as a letter in 1455 clearly shows.405 For the time being, Florence had no intention of breaking its diplomatic engagement with the sultan in what was a promising beginning for its commercial power in Constantinople.

Other elements that had an impact on Florence’s refusals were the lack of an effective league between Latin states against the Ottomans. In fact, this league could not have been formed because of the Italian wars and the bluffs played by Alphonse

404 The condottiere who defeated Alphonse V at Piombino, as above mentioned in this same chapter.
405 Müller 1879:182.
V, who had no interest in leading the crusade.\footnote{See Navarro Sorní 2003:73-74.} Seemingly, all these elements affected a situation already compromised for the other reasons. It was obvious that without any external help the fall of Constantinople was only a matter of time.

It is likely that the Commune considered Constantinople, at least after the Council, as a fulfilled political and economic goal. Florence’s policies regarding the Levant were not dictated by ideological issues such as the common enemy represented by the Turks or the fate of fellow Christians like the Byzantines, but simply pragmatic reasons. Byzantium was no longer part of Florentine plans because the city could not have gained anything more.

**Florence and commerce with the Levant 1439-1453**

Due to the conflict between Florence and the Aragonese from 1449 to 1454, Florence could not expand further into the Levantine market.\footnote{1454 is not surprisingly also the year in which the peace of Lodi was signed.} The Florentine fleet was clearly inferior to the Neapolitan and Venetian’s naval power. Not surprisingly, Florence did not dispatch any galleys from 1447 to 1455.\footnote{Mallett’s list is in Mallett 1967:153-176.} Between the end of the Council and the fall of Constantinople only a single galley went to *Romania*.\footnote{Romania is the territories formerly part of the Byzantine empire.} Giovanni Tosinghi’s galley, however, was not the most fortunate, since it sank
around 1444 in Romania and a certain Neri di Cambi died in these circumstances. The wars against Venice and Naples temporarily stopped Florence’s ambitions for its own state-galley system to the Levant. Florence had to find, again, a way to transport its wares. The solution was Genoa. The letter sent by Diotisalvi Neroni on 28 January 1452 to the Commune perfectly depicts the combined policies enacted by both Milan and Florence. Genoa was surely more than happy to transport Florence’s wares since the percentage paid was around one percent of the wares value.

The Venetian expulsion of all Florentine merchants in 1451 was the main reason for this change. Venice wanted to bring Florence’s economy to its knees through a trade embargo, just as Alphonse V was doing at just the same time. The reason of this harsh decision was most likely the aim to disrupt the cash flow from Florence to Francesco Sforza, and to hit Florence at its hearth, that is, the manufacturing and selling of cloths. Florence, to avoid the collapse of its trade, found in Genoa the perfect commercial broker for its cloth. In this way, Florence managed to keep its trade routes and to avoid the collapse of its economy.

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410 Ammirato 1615:71-74.
411 Iorga 1899: 3.461. From ASF, Dieci di Balia, Carteggio Responsive, reg. 21 lv...di praticare circa a divertere, le mercatantie non venghano per via di Vinegia, ma che la Lombardi et la Toscana si fornisca per lo mezzo et da Gienova et da Pisa... pagassono di comerchi cinque per cento, et che i Gienovosi s’obrigassono mandare ogni hanno tante navi in Levante quante si giudicasse necessario.
412 Dieci di Balia Carteggio responsive fol. 102 Iorga 1899: 3.462 Genoa 19 february 1452 ...li gabelotti de Zenoa, li qualli debeno ancora tenire le gabelle per dui anni sono convenzionati cum Fiorentine che de le robe le quale mandano in Levante pagano modo infrascripto cioè de pani de seta certum qui lo quale vene a rasone circa uno per cento, o manco, et de li pani de lana pagano soldi XXXV de Zenoa per peza, Iorga 1899:463 See also Ibid. reg 22 fol 27 and Idem. fol. 24.
413 On the expulsion of the Florentine merchants and its consequences see Mueller 1992:29-60. See also Del Treppo 1972:329-337.
Florence returned to practically the same status it held before the conquest of Porto Pisano, since the naval blockade formed by Naples and Venice was impossible for the Signoria to break. Therefore, the Commune relied once again on the personal initiatives of Florentine individuals such as Bernardo Salviati. In 1442 Bernardo Salviati, a Florentine merchant with strong connections to the Levant, obtained from the Knights Hospitaller a bulla which gave him the right to extract alum in specific territories of the Order.\textsuperscript{414} The reason for Florentine interest in the Knights Hospitaller and the alum was twofold. The Aegean islands and the Levant in general were utterly dominated by Venice and Genoa. The alum commerce was mainly in Genoese hands thanks to its monopoly over the mines in Phocaea.\textsuperscript{415} Florence had every interests in reducing the city dependence from the Genoese alum.\textsuperscript{416} The Florentine cloth manufactories completely relied on the alum import since this component was an important dye fixer. This necessity for this component was already clear in 1436 when the first contract was set up by several Florentine merchants, in which they obtained a share in the alum market from the Genoese in Phocaea.\textsuperscript{417} The contract between Salviati and the Knights Hospitaller further proves Florence’s goal in bypassing the Genoese intermediation. Bernardo Salviati had solid connections with the Knights Hospitaller, including his own familiars. Anastasio

\textsuperscript{414} Bernardo Marci domini Foresii Salviati et sociis de Florentia et cetera…
\textsuperscript{416} Especially the Florentini panni lana that were renowned piece of clothes which Genoa and Venice in the past usually trade to the Levant as Chapter I as shown.
\textsuperscript{417} Müller 1869:169-172. The letter also mentions Martello Martelli, member of the Martelli family, connected closely to the Medici. Specifically, he obtained to be the only seller of alum in Tuscany.
Salviati, for example, was a knight of the Order.\textsuperscript{418} Generally, the prominent role of Bernardo in the Levant is notable and known among the Medici. For in 1452 when he received from the Medici 5,000 florins to be invested in Rhodes.\textsuperscript{419} There was, therefore, a personal interest on the part of Cosimo the Elder to support Bernardo Salviati and the Levant, which attests to the Medici’s personal interest in the Levant.

Unfortunately, the sources are very scarce when it comes to the only Florentine “stronghold” in the Levant, that is, the duchy of Athens. The only letter present in the Medici archive merely relates information about horses and nothing really important emerges about the political relationship.\textsuperscript{420} Of course, there was a relationship between Florence and Athens, especially considering the connection between the Florentine Acciaiuoli and the Athenian branch of the family. However, if these contacts existed, they must have been mainly social, or in any case not political. The reason for the absence of official contacts is because Florence had already received privileges from Antonio Acciaiuoli so there was nothing else to request from the dukes.

The fall of Athens to the Ottomans must have provoked some kind of reactions in Florence, yet the sources are silent on the matter. None of the governmental sources mention any official reaction of the Florentine Signoria to the end of the Acciaiuoli’s domination in Athens. The reason of this lack might due to

\textsuperscript{418} On Anastasio Salviati see the recommendation letter sent by the Commune to the pope and mentioning the Salviati as “in desire to fight the Turks” for the Knights Hospitaller in Müller 1879:180-181.
\textsuperscript{419} ASF, Mercanzie, 10831 26v.
\textsuperscript{420} The letter is in MAP, f.11 n. 494.
the necessity of the Florentine Signoria to maintain good relations with Mehmet II since it is of these years the first travels of the Florentine galleys to Constantinople. Most likely, the fall of Athens affected more the families who were personally involved in the duchy, above all, the Acciaiuoli. Unsurprisingly, the Acciaiuoli would later become among of the most important sponsors for the crusade in open opposition to the Medici’s reluctance.

On a side note, one must mention that there were other Florentine families in Athens, such as a branch of the Pitti, who lived in the duchy territories. The Pitti were one of the most important families in this period and were at the time second only to the Medici. The first mention of a Pitti presence in Athens is in 1424 after the marriage in Athens between Nereo di Luigi Pitti and Laudomia daughter of Franco Acciaiuoli. In the aftermath of the Ottoman seizure of Athens in 1458, the Pitti of Athens were left with almost nothing and had to request help from Florence. Despite these connections between Florence and some Florentine families in the Levant, almost nothing emerges from the archives. Therefore, I have to conclude that, even if personal communications existed between Athens and Florence, a political communication between the two cities was not present. The reason of this

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421 Mallett 1967:162.
422 See fn. 375.
423 On the marriage see Pitti 1720:130. About Franco Acciaiuoli, there is no clear information on him besides being the son of Donato Acciaiuoli, cousin of Neri Acciaiuoli I of Athens.
424 Miller 1921:160-161. The letter states that the Turkish took Athens in 1458 and that the Pitti’s family who had a castle in Sikamino was left without almost anything and petitioned help to Florence. Originally, the castle of Sikamino was given to Franco Acciaiuoli, Donato Acciaiuoli’s son, by Antonio Acciaiuoli the second duke of Athens. See Geanakoplos 1975:270.
absence lies again on the pragmatism of Florence’s diplomacy which “abandoned” Athens and the Acciaiuoli to their Ottoman fate.

It might also be noted that the fall of the duchy of Athens provided the opportunity for the Florentine Signoria to strengthen its ties with Mehmed II without need for reference to the intermediation of local interests and dynastic enclaves in the Aegean whose gradual elimination was Mehmet II’s firm intention after 1453. It was the Florentine Signoria who was the main beneficiaries of the demise of the Acciaiuoli in Athens.

Conclusion

Florence had difficult times in the years after the Ecumenical Council (1439-1453), especially when it came to further developing its commercial and political influence in the Levant. The reasons were, of course, the wars in Italy, the Venetian and Genoese predominance in Constantinople, and the embargoes enacted by Venice and Genoa. Without surprise, Florence could not even send galleys from 1447-1454, which strongly limited any kind of diplomatic initiatives directed to improve the commercial or political influence in the Levant. Despite this severe limitations, Florence still tried to use alternative channels, such as the initiative of personal individuals like Bernardo Salviati, to at least maintain some commercial links, such as in Rhodes. A further solution found by Florence in order to avoid the economic collapse was again to use a commercial broker, in this case Genoa.
As far as Constantinople is concerned, Florentine privileges represented the end of any Florentine interests in the city’s fate. Florence’s endangered situation due to the wars in Italy, the Venetian predominance in Constantinople, the hopeless condition of Constantinople, are all logical reasons for Florence’s continued refusal to Byzantium’s requests for aid. Constantine XI did not have anything else to offer to Florence other than a sterile and long outdated idea of crusading against a common enemy of the faith, which was not of interest for the Medici. As far as the Venetian influence is concerned, Byzantium was aware of the heavy grip held by Venice. Constantine XI, in particular, tried to lessen this chain through the grants of new privileges to Ragusa (1451), his refusal to expel Florentine merchants (1451), and new taxes on Venetian wares (1450). Yet, everything was made in vain. In the end, it came without surprise that the only powers which provided minimum support during Mehmet II’s siege in 1453 were Venice and Genoa.

Florence’s diplomacy displayed a pragmatic coherence in its policies. After John VIII’s privileges in 1439, Florence reached the maximum benefit it could obtain from Constantinople. With a Byzantine empire so heavily in debt to Venice, there was no possibility to crush the choking bond between the Serenissima and Constantinople. Therefore Florence looked for other places to improve its mercantile activities. Constantinople, the Aegean islands, and especially the Black Sea were beyond its reach due the massive and much stronger presence of either Venice or Genoa. Therefore, the Commune used its traditional connections with the

\[425\] For Constantine XI’s attempt to put new taxes on the Venetian wares see Nicol 1992:48.
Hospitaller. These connections went back in a period even earlier to Niccolò Acciaiuoli’s time. Rhodes was an important port of call for Florentine galleys and a place of residence for many Florentines, some of them even part of the Order’s army.\footnote{See Luttrell 1999:8.317-8.326 and Chapter I of this PhD dissertation.} The same island was also a discreet market place being in the middle between Cyprus, Alexandria and Asia Minor. The attempts made by the Florentine Signoria evidently recalled the period when Florence was without a seaport and had to rely mainly on private citizen initiatives, such as Bernardo Salviati.

However, the geopolitical map of the Mediterranean was due to change after a dramatic set of events. Constantinople, virtually powerless in front of the Ottoman threat, was under pressure from Pope Nicholas V, for the latter wanted the Union to be enacted in Constantinople. The fate of the city, divided again by the struggle of the Unionist against the Anti-Unionist, appeared already sealed. In Italy, another war erupted between major powers. The war put Milan and Florence against Naples and Venice. The time was perfect for Mehmet II as he was surely aware of the extreme weakness of the Latin-Greek coalition and therefore put Constantinople under siege in 1453. To the Byzantine desperate requests of help, Venice and Genoa responded feebly while Alphonse V used the money collected from the tithes, for his Italian wars.\footnote{Alphonse V promised to send Bernat de Villamarí and a fleet to Constantinople, but the only tangible help we know of is only a single galley carrying grain to the besieged. See Caselli 2010:37-62. Also Cfr. Marinescu 1994:225, Id.:227-232 and Navarro Sorni 2003:73-74.} Constantinople fell on 29 May 1453. For Genoa and Venice the conquest of Constantinople represented troublesome news. Yet, in Florence, despite the sadness expressed by the formal letters, an indignant report sent to Milan by the Milanese
ambassador Tranchedini showed instead the probable satisfaction of the Florentine Signoria. Despite the different faith between Florence and the Ottomans, the prominent oligarchs of the Commune were aware that the fall of Constantinople weakened their major rival, Venice, both in the Levant and in Italy.

To sum up, the period from 1439 to 1453 was one of the lowest for Florence in terms of commercial and political opportunities in the Levant. The wars in Italy seemed to undermine the efficiency of all Florentine trade and put in serious risk even those few ties that the Signoria had in the Levant.
CHAPTER V

FLORENCE AND THE OTTOMANS (1455-1464)

To the Illustrious and undefeated prince and most excellent lord. Our citizens who have been in your magnanimous court and lands reported that all the Florentines freely can travel and are treated with kindness and favourably by your exalted Majesty and your officers as well. For these actions our people are happily grateful … you would concede to all the Florentines … free safe conduct and full security to all the places of your powerful domination, both by land and sea, and with their ships, galleys and boats, with all the wares, their things and items … and freely without receiving any offence or harassment or damage in any way… Dated in Florence on 3 December 1455. 428

Introduction

The rise of a new power in the city, far more powerful than the weakling Byzantine empire, marked a new beginning for the political and economic balance within Constantinople.429 At the time of the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans, the city was almost completely depopulated and most foreign merchants had fled. However, the desperate condition of Constantinople constituted a good opportunity for the new masters to reshape the city on a large scale. As a result, Mehmet II immediately

428 Full text is in Müller 1879:182.
429 On Florence and Ottomans relations see Pagnini 1765, Berza 1944, Origone 1988, Babinger 1951, Id. 1963, Id. 1978, see also Camerani 1939, Vedovato 1939, Tanzini 2010 and Fleet 2011, İnalcik 1997, Id. 1998. All these works present general aspects of Florentine-Ottoman relation without being too much specific about.
repopulated the city and revitalised its crippled economy. Moreover, the Ottoman sultan also aimed to limit the influence of both Venice and Genoa.

The initial policies enacted by the Ottoman sultan clearly showed that he still understood the necessities of having a vital merchant community in the city, without the supremacy of the Venetian and Genoese merchants. Venice and Genoa committed political mistakes during the siege of Constantinople. Venice chose to defend the city of Constantinople and broke the truce which it had recently signed with the Ottomans in 1451. Consequently, in the fallout from the conquest of Constantinople, the sultan had justified reasons to threaten the Venetian community harshly and even beheaded the Venetian bailo. On the other hand, the Genoese colony of Pera negotiated with Mehmet II an official position of neutrality before the siege. However, some letters sent from Lomellino, the Genoese podestà of Pera, to Genoa state that an unofficial force from Pera had participated in the defence of Constantinople. Besides, the letter from Lomellino confirms that he brought mercenaries to Constantinople from Chios and Genoa to defend the city. The Ottomans found few Genoese corpses from Pera in the city, and this episode gave justification for Mehmet II to tear down Pera’s walls. It is true that Giovanni

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431 Runciman 1965:150 Philippides 2011:246-247. For the fall of Constantinople see the latest and outstanding work of Philippides 2011. Another important work is the two volumes of primary sources of Pertusi 1976.
432 A letter sent from Lomellino the Genoese podestà of Pera indicate that an unofficial Genoese force was present see Inalcik 1998:282. The letter is published in Pertusi 1976:1.39-1.51.
Giustiniani Longo, a Genoese citizen, was present in Constantinople during the siege, but he was most probably a *condottiere*.\(^{434}\)

Meanwhile, in Rome, the situation was even more complicated after the death of Pope Nicholas V. All the popes who followed (Calixtus III, Pius II, Paul II and Sixtus IV) strived to unite the Christian princes under a single Christian banner. However, political fragmentation within Italy brought about the failure of each attempt. The era of Italian predominance over Constantinople was over.

Mehmet II had no doubt that Constantinople should be the capital of the Ottoman empire. Invitations were sent by the sultan to all the political powers present in this city before its fall. The sultan promised that the merchants could return to the city without any risk of retaliation, and even guaranteed the return of most of the merchants’ belongings. Of course, new agreements were to be made between the old mercantile powers and the new ruler of Constantinople. Accordingly, the new treaties with the Ottoman empire for Venice and Genoa raised the *kommerkion* up to two per cent, a clear increase from the free charges enjoyed by the two cities during the Byzantine empire.\(^{435}\)

Within this completely new political and economic context, Florence finally had the space to expand its commercial power into the Constantinopolitan market. This chapter therefore presents the overtures made by Florence to the sultan on the

\(^{434}\) Strictly speaking, a single mercenary, and therefore Genoa could not have been accused. On Giustiniani see Philippides 2011:376-387.

basis of mostly unpublished primary sources. Did Florence or the sultan begin official negotiations? The specific year and date of the Florentine initial presence in Constantinople are as yet unknown. This chapter will give a specific date to the event. An anonymous 1456 letter, probably sent from a merchant in Constantinople to Giovanni de’ Medici, Cosimo the Elder’s eldest son, and potential successor to the Medici regime, sheds a great deal of light on the situation.\textsuperscript{436} This unpublished letter mentions the possibility for Florence to obtain substantial concessions from the sultan, thanks to the favours of his personal physician, most likely Jacopus of Gaeta (?-1481) in Ottoman sources as Ya’kub Pasha. Jacopus of Gaeta was a Jew who had studied medicine in Italy and later arrived in Edirne during the reign of Murad II.\textsuperscript{437} Ya’kub Pasha then became Mehmet II’s personal physician and received from the sultan complete exemptions from taxes.\textsuperscript{438}

Furthermore, by 1455 Florence had already written an official letter to the sultan to show the gratitude and good treatment received by the sultan. Accordingly, in the period even before 1455, there were already Florentines in Constantinople, although without any official capitula.

\textsuperscript{436} Giovanni di Cosimo de’ Medici died in 1463, therefore making Piero di Cosimo de’ Medici the new “heir”. The letter is in ASF MAP f. 137 n. 76.
\textsuperscript{437} Lewis 1952:550.
\textsuperscript{438} Lewis 1952:550-551 for a detailed article on the life of Ya’kub Pasha see Babinger 1951(2).
From the peace of Lodi to the arrival of Florentine galleys in the Levant (1454-
1458)

After widespread wars throughout the Italian peninsula, the various powers of Italy
were nearly completely exhausted. On more than one occasion Florence had refused
to subsidise Sforza in his war against Venice due to lack of funds. This period was
not one of the most serene for the Serenissima either. Venice had witnessed the loss
of Constantinople and the slaughter of part of the Venetian oligarchy in the city.
Moreover, the war against Sforza and Milan heavily affected the Venetian economy.
Similarly, Genoa was at risk due to the naval war against Naples, and the city was a
sad spectator due to the end of Pera’s independence. Alphonse V of Naples had
several financial problems with the Neapolitan barons due to the numerous wars he
had waged in the period. Pope Calixtus III, after the death of Nicholas V, inherited
the burden of the “crusade”. In fact, the most important initiative of every new pope,
at least until Mehmet II’s death in 1481, was to retake Constantinople and stop the
Ottomans from expanding into Europe. Florence finally had a chance, thanks to the
peace of Lodi, to organise the Levantine communal galleys that had to cease their
operations due to the wars. Thanks to League of Lodi, the internal situation in Italy
was at last in a precarious peace, since also Alphonse V had been reluctantly forced
to join the Lodi league one year later (1455). The king of Naples was uncertain about the league because he wanted to continue the war against Genoa. Since it was more important for Florence and Milan to make this deal with Alphonse V, Genoa was left out of the league of Lodi. The league of Lodi was a defensive alliance binding together the most important Italian city-states, including Florence, Milan, Venice and the kingdom of Naples. In reality, the pragmatic purpose of the league of Lodi was to avoid more wars breaking out in the later years.

Therefore, Florence finally had the opportunity to ask to the pope and Alphonse V for the required safe conduct of its galleys. Safe conduct from the pope (as it was necessary to trade with the heathens) and from Naples was mandatory, since the Florentine galleys had to cross papal and Neapolitan waters to travel into the Levant.

At the same time, in 1455 (just 2 years after the fall of Constantinople and right after the peace of Lodi) Florence requested the required securities from Mehmet II in favour of Florentine state-galleys.

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440 Florence already by 14 October 1455 had sent ambassadors to Rome. Their mission was to obtain the safe conduct from the pope. See Appendix II n. 6. Florence did not ask Genoa since it had good relations with the city, from the expulsion of Visconti’s Milan in 1435. This event aligned Genoa together with Florence and the later Sforza’s Milan. See Machiavelli 1847 chapter 5 book 2 p. 212.
The problem of the safe conduct

Despite the goodwill of the sultan, Alphonse V again blocked Florence’s plans. From 1456-57, the Signoria sent two embassies to the pope and Alphonse V for the required safe conduct. These embassies were the first occasion in which Florentine sources mention very clearly the intention to dispatch the communal galleys to the Levant rather than to other places, such as the common routes to the West. While the pope did not present any difficulties, Alphonse V refused the Florentine request. Alphonse V gave no “official” safe conduct to Florence as a result of the so-called “Gambacorta” matter.  

The Gambacorta were a renowned family in Pisa, often appointed to the city’s highest offices. However, around 1455, the Gambacorta were stripped of all wealth and exiled from Florentine territories. Afterwards, they asked for help from Alphonse V. The latter promptly offered the Gambacorta a place in Naples. Not surprisingly, the Gambacorta merely presented a good pretext for the Neapolitan king to stop Florence from expanding into the Levant. As mentioned, Alphonse V aimed to expand his own influence in the Levant. For example, Alphonse V’s help to

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441 The so-called “galere ponentine”.  
442 In this sense, it is important that the Florentines immediately specified that they were not going to sell any kind of weapons, but cloth for economic welfare of the Florentine Commune.  
443 See ASF Responsive e Copiari I 15v-16r 10 febbraio 1455. In Appendix II n. 9 See also ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 41 107-108 17 Augusti 1457. In Appendix II n. 49: in re tuit oratores nostrum intleximus ob quas rationes et causas Maestas Vestrae salvoconductus nobis concessum poteri remeturi ad partes orientale perfectur non expediri perseverit... ASF, Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 41 173-175 letter to the duke of Milan. In Appendix II n. 54. noi abbiamo avviso di quanto gli ambasciatori della vostra illustissima Signoria hanno parlato della maestà del Re di Raona in favore che la sua Maestà ci conceda salvocondotto per le nostre galee di Levante.  
444 Machiavelli speaks about the Gambacorta and his role as lord of Val di Bagno. See Machiavelli 1847:294-295.
Skanderbeg, the leader of the Albanian resistance against the Ottomans, aimed to enhance Aragonese influence in Albania. Other examples are the three famous expeditions of Bernat of Villamarí in the Levant and the conquest of Kastellorizo in 1461. Indeed, Alphonse V was particularly wary of giving any kind of guarantee, such as the safe conduct, to another potential rival in the Levant. Safe conduct was a very important instrument, as it meant protection against corsairs. For Florence the safe conduct was crucial since they lacked any military sea-power.

At first, Florence decided to ignore the refusal of safe conduct and, not surprisingly, suffered from Aragonese-sanctioned piracy from 1455. Moreover, the lack of safe conduct was used to legitimise Alphonse V’s action against Florentine ships in Neapolitan waters that is, part of the Tyrrhenian Sea, as a violation of territory. Furthermore, the Florentine seaport was not in good condition due to the continuous war between Genoa and Naples. Alphonse V asked for the exclusion of Genoa from the treaty of Lodi since his likely aim was the

445 Since 1451 Alphonse V’s diplomacy turned decisively to Albania and its main leader Skanderbeg. Among the diplomatic negotiations between the two parties it is noteworthy the offer of fealty promised by Skanderbeg to Alphonse V and the Aragonese attempt to monopolise the selling of salt to the Albanians to the detriment of Venice. See Caselli 2010:80-86, also Marinescu 1994:163-176, Del Treppo 1972:226-230.

446 Kastellorizo is an island just south of Antalya, modern Turkey.

447 See ASF Signori Missive Cancelleria 40 280-281. In Appendix II n. 16. ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40 290-291. In Appendix II n. 17 the source mentions the capture of Bernardo of Ugucciano’s boat which was carrying grain. ASF, Signori Missive Cancelleria 40 417. In Appendix II n. 25 the source which mentions that Bernardo Salviati’s boat and conducted by Giannozzo Salviati, was captured and robbed around Cyprus. On the prince of Taranto, Giovanni dal Balzo Orsini, see Squitieri 1939:138-185 and Carducci - Kiesewetter – Vallone 2005.
predominance in the Tyrrhenian Sea. Thus, the Genoese-Aragonese war had heavy consequences for Florence as Porto Pisano became a theatre of naval clashes between Genoa and Naples and thus seriously undermined the efficiency of Florentine seamanship. Therefore, despite of the peace of Lodi, a stable political situation was still far from becoming reality.

Another reason for tension between Aragon and Florence was that Florence owed a certain sum to Giovanni Antonio da Foscia, an Aragonese advisor and subject. The first papal sentence on the matter of Giovanni da Foscia was unfavourable to the Commune. Unsatisfied, the Florentine ambassadors Giuliano Antonio di Piero Ridolfi asked for mediation with Alphonse V on behalf of the Signoria. However, Alphonse V ordered Florence to pay to Foscia a certain amount of money in return for safe conduct limited to the western part of the Mediterranean Sea and without permission to carry Genoese wares, as they were at war against Alphonse V. Undoubtedly, Florence used all the cards at its disposal to obtain this safe conduct. Florence requested the mediation of the duke Francesco

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448 About Alphonse V’s aim to have the control in the Tyrrhenian Sea see Del Treppo 1972:327. The author observed that Alphonse V’s war against Florence was also a struggle for the control of the Tyrrhenian Sea routes and the defence of the Catalan interests.
449 For the attack made by Genoese pirates in Porto Pisano against the Catalans see ASF Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40 267, in Appendix II, n. 14; for the war between Genoa and Alphonse V and its consequence to Porto Pisano see ASF, Signori Responsive Copiari I 21-22, in Appendix II n. 15. See also ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40 280-281, in Appendix II n. 16.
450 ASF, Responsive e Copiari I 39v-41v, 2 September 1456. In Appendix II n. 26. The document mentions Foscia as Johannis Antonii de Foxa consiliari et civis nostrî dilecti (where nostrî is Alphonse V).
451 The papal sentence emerges from Alphonse V’s letter to Florence in ASF, Signori Responsive Copiari 47r-48v, in Appendix II n. 32.
452 ASF, Signori, Signori Otto di Pratica Dieci di Balia Legazioni e Commissarie Missive, 77, in Appendix II n. 128.
453 ASF, Responsive e Copiari I 44v-45r, in Appendix II n. 29.
Sforza of Milan and proposed to make a joint embassy (Florence and Milan) to improve the chances of persuading Alphonse V to grant to Florence the safe conduct. Florence also contacted the duke of Calabria to act as a mediator. However, Alphonse V was only using these as pretexts in order to refuse safe conduct to Florence and maintain Aragonese predominance in the Levant. This safe conduct would have never been granted were it not for the death of the king of Naples on 27 June 1458. Alphonse V’s death resulted in the pre-planned split of the crown of Naples from Aragon, and removed one of the biggest obstacles for Florence to gain a commercial foothold in the Levant. Ferrante I, Alphonse V’s illegitimate son, became king of Naples following his father’s death. Meanwhile, the kingdom of Aragon, along with the crown of Sicily, passed to Alphonse V’s brother, John II.

The first travel of Florentine state galleys to the Levant

Not surprisingly, after Alphonse V’s death Florence decided to immediately dispatch two galleys to the Levant in 1458. Meanwhile, Florence sent a letter to Mehmet II on 1 September 1458, their second since 1455. Florence announced to the sultan that the Commune had sent two galleys to the Levant, specifically to

454 ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 41 173-175, in Appendix II n.54. The use of the term “di nuovo”, which in English means “again”, leads me to think that this was not the first time Florence had asked Milan to help the former in procuring safe conduct from the Aragonese.
455 The duke of Calabria was the future Ferrante I, illegitimate son of Alphonse V. ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 41 173-174, in Appendix II n. 52.
456 Sicily was an important port of call, especially for the Levantine trade. It was mandatory for the Florentine galleys a stop there, also to load/unload wares. See Mallett 1967:67 who mentions the presence of two ports of call in Sicily for the Florentine galleys: Palermo and Messina.
Constantinople. The particular importance of this letter emerges from the fact that Florence not only wrote to the sultan, but also to the other powers whose territories were on the Levantine route of the Florentine state-galleys, such as the prince of Taranto, the new king of Naples, Ferrante I, and the new king of Sicily and Aragon, John II. Moreover, the Florentine Commune asked the pope for the customary permission to engage in commerce with the infidels, which was necessary in order to avoid any kind of ecclesiastical censorship. Here, the importance is that this letter proves that this Florentine request was the first proper attempt of the city to organise its galleys for the Levantine route. It would not makes sense to ask permission to trade with the heathens if that was not the first official travel.

Despite Alphonse V’s death, the Florentine galleys had to rely on luck to travel through the Tyrrhenian Sea. In fact, some Neapolitan galleys from Gaeta, a seaport in the kingdom of Naples, tried to assault the galleys. Only the wind saved the Florentine galleys from capture. It is not clear whether Ferrante I himself ordered

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457 ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 42 92. ...galeas duas ad loca vestro imperio subdita et persertim bizantium mittere instituimus mercibus plenas quas earum magni navium a nobis propositi etiam in perversitis vestris discrabere et res alias emere commissione ... si ita eis per suo et rei per nostre commodo videbitur et quam eiusmodi hominibus naves ducertibus mercature gratia...

458 The prince of Taranto’s galleys were more than a simple threat for the Florentine galleys. In some cases Taranto’s galleys were responsible even for proper robberies to the detriment of Florence. See ASF, Legazioni Commissarie 14 58-65,77-81; ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40 238; ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 41 91.

459 Signori, Legazioni e Commissarie 15 13-14, in Appendix II n. 61.

460 ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 91 to the prince of Taranto, in Appendix II n. 59. The letter to Ferrante is in ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 92, in Appendix II n. 60. This letter is similar to the other one sent to the prince of Taranto. Both had the same date, 5 September 1458. As for the king of Sicily he was John II in Aragon, and the letter is in Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 42 112-113, in Appendix II n. 62.

the attack or if it was the result of the personal initiative of his galleys commander, Bernat of Villamarí.462

The political circumstances suggest that Ferrante I may have had something to do with the attack. Probably, the Neapolitan king wanted to show Florence that although he was the illegitimate son of Alphonse V, he was not going to accept challenges to his authority such the travel of Florentine state-galleys in the Neapolitan sea without safe conduct.463 In the end, the Florentine state-galleys managed to arrive safely in Constantinople through the Neapolitan waters without suffering any other troubles. For the lack of any complaint sent by the Signoria, makes likely that the Florentine galleys safely managed their journey up to Constantinople.

These galleys were probably not going to Constantinople merely for the purposes of trade. Instead, this voyage was probably an attempt by Florence to negotiate commercial privileges with Mehmet II in person. This interpretation is based on the first letter the Commune sent to Mehmet II just after the fall of

462 The letters and the commissions from Florence do not clarify who was responsible. For example: a letter sent from Florence to Benedetto Giugni, Florentine consul in Naples, ordered him to present a complaint to Ferrante I, hoping that this action happened without the king’s knowledge. ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 42 118-119, in Appendix II n. 64. The ambassadors’ instruction, dated on 14 October 1458, are in ASF, Legazioni Commissarie 15 19-20, in Appendix II n. 65. However, a commission given to Pietro di Bartolomeo Bardi to the same Bernat of Villamari states: bisogno non offesa o molestia alcuna ma subsidio et aiuto speravano et siano certi che alla Maesta del Re questa cosa da lui saputa giovissimo nuova gli sia molesta per l’amore et la benivolentia che e riposta. One must also recall that Florence was aware that its ships did not enjoy safe conduct see Bardi’s commission is in ASF Legazioni Commissarie 15 23-25, in Appendix II n. 66.

463 That is to say that Florence did not ask for any safe conduct from Ferrante I since the first requests are from 1456. See Appendix II n. 60.
Constantinople. In particular, a part of the text indicate this reason for sending these galleys to Mehmet II.\textsuperscript{464}

This part seems to indicate that Mehmet II approached the Florentine community in Constantinople first. Only after this letter did Florence write to Naples and Taranto for safe conduct. Therefore, the real reason for this voyage was to negotiate with the sultan for commercial privileges. It was risky to send letters directly to Mehmet II, as in that period letters were often intercepted by other powers. Surely, this moment of time was not ideal for Florence to be caught in negotiations with the Ottoman sultan while Pope Calixtus III was trying to organise the crusade.\textsuperscript{465}

A further proof of Florence’s plan with regard to the Levant is the text of the provision enacted by the Commune with regard to Levantine galleys. First of all, this provision states that, at first, Florence planned to send only one galley, but due to this provision this number increased to two. Secondly, the provision also mentions the necessities of sending an expensive gift to Mehmet II.\textsuperscript{466}

There is another letter which states, without doubt, the purpose of the galleys’ journey. The letter was written by an anonymous sender on 9 December 1456 and addressed to Giovanni de’ Medici, Cosimo’s son. In terms of chronology this letter is

\textsuperscript{464} Müller 1879:182.
\textsuperscript{465} See fn. 423 and 435.
\textsuperscript{466} Müller 1879:293.
exactly just before the new provision about the Levantine galleys and the gift to the sultan.

The Signoria should make a decision on this matter (the election of a Florentine consul in Constantinople) and (to choose) me or someone else ... For it would be useful the presence of a consul which would give prestige to our Signoria and help to our merchants, and I am sure...that the Turkish Lord...will grant us everything....thanks to mine close friendship with his physician, from whom I can obtain everything ... and we have even more friends, so I am sure that we will obtain everything from him (the sultan).  

This letter is a petition made by an anonymous to Giovanni de’ Medici, eldest son of Cosimo the Elder. The author asked clearly to Giovanni de’ Medici to petition the Signoria that he would be the perfect consul for Constantinople thanks to his personal networks with the personal physician. Even if the sender is anonymous, this letter provides us with other important facts. First, there was, already in that period, a considerable Florentine community in Constantinople. The Florentine community in Constantinople was probably not as large as those of Venice and Genoa, but big enough to attract the sultan’s interest. The galleys’ journey was undoubtedly connected to the anonymous letter, since the Commune dispatched the two galleys after the letter was sent. It might have been the case that the anonymous letter had some consequences for the decisions of the Florentine Signoria, because early on the Commune

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467 ASF, MAP f. 137 n. 76 ...che quando per la detta Signoria si deliberasse tal chosa o per me o per altri che fusse in questo luogo stare assai per giovare e avendo a me chare chome se in ... in ogni modo fa di me sicuro ci sia un chonsolo sia perhonore della nostra Signoria e hutile de merchatanti, e sono certo che a qualunchore dal signiore Turcho per la nostra communita si recherie alchune chose la fare abbiano voglia inpero intende in ogni modo de far buone quante cera si che ci concedera tutto per utile del suo paese isto isandosi che io ... una intrinsicha amizzie chol suo medicho. Il quale puo de lui quello che gli piace e chosi anchora ciabiamo degli altri amici siche son certo dallui avremo tutto.
decided to send only one galley, but afterwards that number increased to two. Moreover, there is another unpublished letter dated on September 1458, which further confirmed that the Commune sent two galleys, full of wares, to Constantinople.\footnote{ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancellaria, 42 c.92 Müller curiously skipped this letter, or probably failed to notice it in his publication: serenissime rex...galeas duas ad loca vestro imperio subdita et persertim bizantium mittere instituimus mercibus plenas quas earum magni navium a nobis propositi etiam in pervenitis vestris ... et libere res suis vendere et pretium ex eis...res per illis alias possint consequi seco ... quos rectores navium esse voluimus omni favore auxilio et benivolentia persequatur prestant eos ab iniuriis tutos ac secures ut quam famam de virtutibus vestris accipimus...}

The first “capitula” or ahd-nāme: a reconstruction and an interpretation.

I believe that it is crucial to understand precisely when Florence obtained the commercial privileges from Mehmet II since all the important written evidence (including the privileges themselves) has been lost.\footnote{Camerani 1939 and Vedovato 1939 tried to find what happened to the lost copy, without success. Most probably, it was lost somewhere in Pera in the monastery of the Padri Zoccolanti see Camerani 1939.} Certainly, there must have been a written agreement between the sultan and Florence, otherwise the Signoria could not have traded or establish a convoy within the Ottoman empire. Furthermore, this written agreement must be identified as a proper ahd-nāme, that is, the official capitula given by the Ottoman sultans to other foreign powers. Previous scholarship has been unable to provide a satisfactory answer in terms of chronology for this
agreement. Fortunately, I have found enough unpublished materials from the Florentine state archive to determine with some exactitude when the sultan signed these “capitula”.

Indirect sources concerning the capitula allow for the establishment of chronological boundaries. The terminus post quem might be connected to the departure of the Levantine galleys in 1458, as it is evident that before this date, there were no privileges granted to Florence by the Ottoman sultan. This theory is further confirmed by the anonymous letter in 1456, which is the first proof of on-going negotiations between Florence and the sultan. The terminus ante quem can be dated in 1462-1463, since on 28 June 1463 the Signoria sent a letter to its consul in Constantinople Mainardo degli Ubaldini:

And to send to his (Mehmet II) lands our galleys, not only in this year but forever... as it was sanctioned in the signed capitula…

At the time of this letter Florence had already received commercial privileges from the sultan. Moreover, there is another letter sent directly to Cosimo the Elder by Carlo Martelli on 3 May 1463. This letter does not explicitly state the commercial privileges or capitula like the Signoria’s letter to the consul of Constantinople in

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470 Camerani 1939:83-101 set the privileges from 1455 to 1460, İnalcık 1977:87 even set the privileges in 1469.
471 ASF, Signori Otto di pratica Dieci di balia Legazioni Commissarie Missive 77, in Appendix II n. 128.
472 ASF, MAP, f. 16 n. 87.
1463, but mentions the presence of “our consul”. The presence of a Florentine consul alone must be an evident proof of the agreement between Florence and the Ottomans. Of course, Florence could have a consul in Constantinople only after the capitula granted by Mehmet II. Therefore, the sultan must have granted these privileges before the date of these two letters (1463). The final proof is again indirect but, in my opinion, is the definitive proof needed to find a more specific date of the commercial privileges given to Florence. The evidence in this case is the text of a provision enacted by the Commune on 24 July 1460, just three years before Martelli’s letter. This provision introduced important modifications to the Levantine commercial organisation. Moreover, this document introduced the Levantine routes for the first time, which had up to that point been absent or rare in the Florentine documents. Therefore, before this provision the Levantine state-galleys lacked a proper organisation. Moreover, the provision established the necessity to organise a permanent trade for the Levant. There must be a reason for Florence to decide, at this specific moment, to set up the ports of call for the Levantine routes. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that this provision was enacted between the return of the first group of Florentine state-galleys from Constantinople and the first attestation of the capitula in 1463. Therefore, I have identified the period of time in which Mehmet II signed the capitula in favour of the Florentine Signoria with the

473 Lo nostro consolo scrive achotesta magnifica Signoria et a la magnificenzia vestra et chonforto che il manda di qua. Moreover, a letter from Benedetto Dei published in Orvieto 1969:228-232 mentions the presence of the Florentine consul in Constantinople. The letter is dated to December 1462.
first journey of the Florentine galleys in 1458.\(^{475}\) This provision represents convincing proof because the emission date was after Florence’s request to the pope for permission to trade with the Ottomans, which mentioned that no weapons or iron could be carried in the galleys. In conclusion, I believe that it is reasonable to chronologically contextualise the grant of the “commercial privilege” to Florence between 1458/1459.

What is essential now is to reconstruct, as much as possible, the content of the capitula, that is, the specific concessions. Since there is no written evidence, the reconstruction will be based on any possible indirect primary sources relevant to the specific concessions of the privileges. First of all, Mehmet II obviously gave the authorisation to have a Florentine consul in Constantinople, who also happened to be the first ever Florentine consul in Constantinople.\(^{476}\) Secondly, the rate of the kommerkion regarding Florence’s imports and exports was definitely superior to that of major competitors, that is, Venice and Genoa. One helpful source collection is the Actes de Mehmed II et de Bayezid II du Manuscrits Fonds Turc Ancien 39, published by Beldiceanu in 1960. In these acts, Genoa and Venice were present, while Florence does not appear. It is probable that at the time of the acts, Genoa and Venice still had a higher volume of business in the Levant, so there was no need to specify the presence of Florence in the document redaction. However, Genoa and

\(^{475}\) Specifically in this group were the galleys captained by Francesco di Paolo Vettori. Mallett 1967:163.

\(^{476}\) The first mention of Mainardo Ubaldini as a consul is in the letter from Carlo Martelli to Florence in May 3 1461. Mainardo degli Ubaldini will stay in charge until his death in 1470 see Müller 1879:215 letter dated 1471 26 October in Florentine style.
Venice did not enjoy free exemptions as they did in the Byzantine period. Unfortunately, the documents on the Constantinopolitan customs lack an accurate date.

Only one document gives an insight about the commercial tax regulations in Constantinople during the regime of Mehmet II. Beldiceanu dated the document to a period after the conquest of Constantinople. Therefore, this source must be approached carefully and taken with all the limits imposed due to such an ambiguous date. I assume that the document date should not be earlier than 1463/64 because Venice, in this particular document, is not present, unlike in other trading documents in the Ottoman empire. In fact, Venice’s absence from this specific document confirms that that Serenissima and the Ottoman sultanate were at war at the time. However, this regulation only mentioned generic etoffes franques which paid a kommerkion at four per cent without any specification with regard to the eventual seller.

In addition, Beldiceanu published another document regarding the commercial brokering on cloth and textiles between Constantinople and Galata, but still without an emission date. This document concerns the regulation of the brokerage tax on

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477 Depending on which wares and city and period of time, this varied between three to five percent. Beldiceanu 1960:126-130.
478 Probably lost or buried, at the very least Beldiceanu did not provide such information.
479 Beldiceanu 1960:116. “Apres le 29 mai 1453”. The reason given by the scholar was that the document mentioned Constantinople. Thus it is a very generic attribution.
480 And the peace between Venice and the Ottomans was only signed in 1454.
481 It is important to remember that, for example, Genoa in that period was transporting Florentine cloth to the Levant because of the general Italian wars that make impossible for Florence to send any commercial galleys.
cloth and textiles and specifically mentions the Florentine *panni*.\(^{482}\) Beldiceanu dated the document to a period after 1461, which seems perfectly in line with the hypothetical date (1458-1459) of the grants to Florence.\(^ {483}\)

If a merchant not Muslim sells [his wares] through the intermediation of a *dellal*, the seller and the buyer, same if the latter is Muslim, must pay the tax (dellaliq). If [the merchant] sells without the intermediation of a dellal, he will pay [the tax] for himself and the buyer. And one is to receive [the following brokerage tax]: 2 aspers from the seller and 2 aspers from the buyer for piece of cloth…from Florence or another piece which is similar…

The document specifies that the brokerage tax on Florentine *panni* was surely one of the lowest which definitely represents an advantage for Florentine exports in the Constantinopolitan market.\(^ {484}\) The document does not mention the nationality of the merchant, but only the origin of fabrication. Besides, this document only concerns the payment of the *dellaliq*, or brokerage tax.\(^ {485}\) None of the documents published by Beldiceanu mention the *kommerkion*, or the percentage of tax that Florentine merchants had to pay on imports and exports. An immediate thought would be that Florentine merchants were asked for the normal *kommerkion* imposed on all the “Franks” transporting wares to Constantinople, that is, between three and five per cent. However, another source tells us a different story. The letter sent by the

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\(^{482}\) This was one of the main exports of the Florentine establishment. See in general Hoshino 1980; Hoshino 2001 De Roover 1999, Tognetti 2002.

\(^{483}\) The document is without date but Beldiceanu put it in 1461 as “le document mentionne au 5 le bezzazistan de Constantinople”. Beldiceanu 1960:126.

\(^{484}\) For example, cloths of Mallorca and Catalonia kind, were at 5 aspres while those of England and Bergamo were at 3 aspres.

\(^{485}\) Fleet 1999:106.
Signoria in 1462 to the Florentine consul in Constantinople, Mainardo degli Ubaldini states:

…that if he could remove the kommerkion…from our galleys just as they were removed in Constantinople…\(^{486}\)

This unpublished letter is surely an important discovery in terms of the political and economic relations between Florence and the Levant. The letter evidently specifies that the Florentine kommerkion was zero, just as the free exemptions enjoyed by Venice and Genoa under the Byzantine empire. The term “levare” is particularly strong and clearly marks the complete removal of any custom tax. Furthermore, the letter confirms that for the first time Florence had a commercial advantage over Venice and Genoa since the two Italian cities had to pay the kommerkion at two percent.\(^{487}\)

This advantage with the relatively low dellaliq payment for the Florentine panni, confirms Florence’s commercial superiority in the exports of Florentine panni to Constantinople.\(^{488}\) Another question still unanswered is whether Constantinople was the only Ottoman market at the disposal of the Florentine Commune, or if Florentine galleys could approach other places within the Ottoman empire. Of course, only the original capitula could have this information. In this particular case,

\(^{486}\) ASF, Signori Otto di Pratica Dieci di Balia Legazioni Commissarie Missive 77, in Appendix II n. 128.


\(^{488}\) The dellaliq is the brokerage tax. See Beldiceanu 1960:126.
the aforementioned letter sent from Florence to the consul Mainardo degli Ubaldini in 1463 is very useful.

The letter reads:

… with respect to our capitula, it is necessary to obtain permission to send our galleys to other places, seaports and especially in Phocaea besides Constantinople, ….

The letter states, without any doubt, that the original capitula restricted the Florentine galleys route to Constantinople, since it is a clear request made by the Signoria to the Florentine consul in Constantinople to petition the sultan for new trading places to be made available to the Florentine state-galleys. One of the real Florentine goals was the alum, which was essential dye-fixer for the Florentine panni manufactories. The letter mentions, for example, Phocaea, one of the most important places for the alum extraction. Nevertheless, Mehmet II wanted to continue the trade in Constantinople in order to maintain the control over the foreign merchants while re-establishing the former Byzantine capital to its previous greatness through the revitalisation of Constantinopolitan trade. Yet, this restriction was valid only for the Florentine state-galleys. The individual merchants were not affected by the prohibition to trade in other territories within the Ottoman empire. The letter mentions only “our galleys” which is a clear reference to the state-galleys. If that

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489 ASF, Signori Otto di Pratica Dieci di Balia Legazioni Commissarie Missive 77. In Appendix II n. 128.
490 Strathern 2007:136. Tolfa mines were discovered around 1462, but the Medici would have taken possession only in 1464.
491 This theory is shared by every single scholar. I recommend in general İnalcık 1973.
492 le galee nostre, our galleys.
was not true, it would be impossible to explain for example, the presence in Bursa of Florentine merchants already witnessed by the Burgundian traveller Bertrand de la Broquière in 1432. Finally, around 1476 Mehmet II must have granted new consulates to Florence since in this year we have a letter which states the presence of a Florentine consul also in Adrianople.

After the locations for trade presented in the Ottoman capitula, I will try to reveal the single legal concession within the privileges granted to Florence. Normally, every privilege granted by one authority to another always included legal aspects, which regulated the status of the foreign community in the territory, such as cases of judicial controversy or a merchants’ death in foreign territory. I will base my analysis on indirect references to reconstruct this aspect of the privileges since the lack of any written official document. At first the Florentine consul had no jurisdiction over the Florentine community in Galata. This lack of authority is proven by the several problems arising between Florentine inhabitants and the consul. Therefore, on 22 March 1474, the Signoria petitioned the sultan to grant to the Florentine consul the power of prosecuting whoever jeopardised public order in the community.

Most glorious emperor, we beg you that (you will grant) full power to our consul so that he will correct the mistakes of our people in order to make them live correctly

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493 De La Broquière 1892:137.
494 ASF, MAP, f. 33 n. 542. The Florentine consul name was Agnolo Buondelmonti who was dead by the time of this letter for the plague.
495 Müller 1879:219.
While to the Florentine consul the Signoria wrote:

...we (the Florentine Signoria) have written to the Great Turk, begging him that he would give faculty and power to you in order to punish those who act against the law and that you may exercise your office to preserve the city’s dignity and that you will manage to force our citizens at the moment under your jurisdiction in living orderly so that they (the Florentine merchants in Constantinople) would not be cause of shame to our nation. 496

The consul lacked of any kind of judiciary power over the Florentine community in Constantinople before 1474. Some of the Florentines in Constantinople took advantage of this weakness and created some problems. The consul had to rely on Ottoman officials and Mehmet II to govern the Florentine settlement due to the lack of any coercive power. The reason of this consular weakness might be due to the sultan’s will to maintain full control and to leave the foreign merchants with only the necessary market privileges.

There were other problems for Florentine merchants. For example, there was always the risk of a Florentine merchant dying in Constantinople. What would have happened to his personal properties was not clear. In the absence of any specific regulation, the local authorities could have taken the belongings of the deceased. Of course, in the case of a merchant’s death, the value of the belongings might have been considerable. The Signoria sent another letter to the consul on 5 December 1467 and ordered him to petition the sultan to protect the goods of dead merchants.

496 Müller 1879:219.
Accordingly, before 1467 there was no legal guarantee on the property of the deceased and everything depended on the will of the local authorities. We must still discuss the material grants of the privilege, such as whether Florence had the right to have a *loggia* or a church for the Florentine community in Constantinople. Again some primary documents present some interesting details. The consul did possess a proper house already by 1461, which was eventually seized by a senior member of the Ottoman court. Benedetto Dei’s letter, written in 1461 to Carlo Martelli, describes this episode. Carlo Martelli was part of the Martelli household, close to the Medici, and at that time a resident of Rhodes.

…the house of our “natio” had been taken and this house belonged to the consul…that Istasinna (the name in the text) wanted it. And now he (the consul) is staying in the church …

This letter is also precious because it testifies to the existence of a church given to Florence as a worship place in Constantinople. So, I can confirm that the potential *capitula* given to Florence by Mehmet II included several privileges (limits of travel, church, consular house etc.), which past scholarship was not able to describe.

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497 Müller 1879:206-207.
499 The letter does not state explicitly if it was the same church given to the Florentine community, that is, the one of St. Peter and Paul.
To sum up, Florence definitely received the *ahd-nāme* from Mehmet II, despite the fact that there is no trace on the documentary resources. This privilege must have been issued no earlier than 1458, but no later than 1460. The *capitula* were indeed favourable to Florence. Despite the travelling limitation to Constantinople, the Florentines paid no *kommerkion* on their wares, while Genoa and Venice had to pay a sum between two to five per cent depending on the wares. This economic and political privilege empowered Florence for the first time in history, making it the most competitive power in the Levantine market. The *capitula* made Florence superior even to Genoa and Venice. Florence had the right to have a house (*a loggia*) and a church (Dei’s letter to Martelli), although at first the situation was a bit unstable.\textsuperscript{500} Since all juridical powers were in the hands of the sultan and the ministers, in the beginning the Florentine consul was unable to properly control the Florentine merchants in the colony. Turmoils in the Florentine settlements and struggles between merchants and the consul were quite normal, especially if the consul did not have enough coercive power over the merchants.\textsuperscript{501}

**Florence, Calixtus III and the Ottomans (1455-1458)**

Generally, scholars have conceived of Florence as opportunistic in the great mosaic of relations between the Italian states and the Ottoman empire. This analysis appears

\textsuperscript{500} The episode of the requisition of Mainardo’s house by the Ottoman official see fn. 492.

\textsuperscript{501} See the cases of Naples and the same Constantinople in the letters sent by the Signoria to the Florentine consul in the city fn. 671.
an oversimplification. Florence was still a Christian power, and because of that they
could not decisively side with the Ottoman empire. Such a position would risk the
accusation of friendship with the Ottomans, which in itself was a perfect *casus belli*
for a potential hostile power to justify an attack against Florence. This was even
more dangerous for Florence, since the Commune lacked a proper army and relied on
the duke of Milan for its military defence. Instead, the kings of France were virtually
untouchable, and therefore could have improved their relations with the Ottomans
without fear of any reprisal.

Therefore, it was necessary for Florence’s diplomacy to show a maximum of
neutrality. This plan became part of the “balance-of-power policy” pursued since the
peace of Lodi in 1454. This diplomatic position was intended to prevent any Italian
power becoming too powerful in Italy, and at the same time maintain Florence’s
advantage in the Levant.

It was not an easy mission since every pope in the second half of the fifteenth
century was determined to organise the crusade to combat the growing Ottoman
power in Europe. The Ottoman empire, therefore, had a certain influence on the
Italian diplomatic relations of this century. This part of the chapter aims to present
those relations between Florence and the Ottoman empire connected to the popes’
initiatives to call for a crusade. After Pope Nicholas V’s death, the Conclave elected
in 1455 the Spaniard Alonso Borja, former secretary of Alphonse V, as pope. His
elevation caused concern in most Italian states due to Borja’s relationship with
Alphonse V. Nevertheless, these fears disappeared when the new pope swore an oath to free Constantinople from the Turks.\textsuperscript{502} In 1456, the new pope sent letters to the entire Latin world and urged them to create a fleet for the crusade against the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{503} The pope also sent a letter to Florence in 1456 to remind the Commune of the subsidies which the Florentine Signoria had promised to his predecessor. Yet, for the time of Pius II’s letter Florence had already established a relationship with sultan Mehmet II.\textsuperscript{504} Thus, the papal initiative came at a very delicate moment for Florence as the Commune had no intention of interrupting the negotiations with Mehmet II and joining the papal crusade. Florence’s diplomacy tried, therefore, to please the pope in other ways that did not imply contributions to the crusade.

One of the solutions found by Cosimo the Elder to please the pope was to take care of the problem for the papal see represented by Giacomo Piccinino. Giacomo Piccinino was the son of the most famous Niccolò Piccinino. In this period, Giacomo Piccinino was trying to create a state with his army in the papal territory (likewise emulating the famous Sforza) and was diplomatically fluctuating between Florence and, for him later tragically, Naples.\textsuperscript{505} Indeed, he represented an element of extreme

\textsuperscript{503} Sciambra-Valenti 1968 contains all the “brevi” which were sent. The papal plan was to create a fleet under the command of a Pontifical Legatus. The fact that the pope’s fleet was a diversion is made known in the letter sent to the emperor (Sciambra-Valentini1968:76) in which the pope pressured the emperor to help the Hungarian king, while the fleet is keeping the Turks busy. In fact as it appears from the letter to the king of France (idem), the Turks had crossed the Danube and were engaging in combat in Hungary.
\textsuperscript{504} The letter from the pope is in Sciambra-Valentini 1968:74. As for Florence’s negotiations with Mehmet II, it is worth remembering the first letter sent by the Florentine Signoria in 1455 to Mehmet II and the anonymous letter sent from Constantinople in 1456.
\textsuperscript{505} For the relation between Piccinino and Ferrante I see Ferente 2005. For Piccinino in Siena and in general see Banchi 1879:44-58, 225-245.
instability and danger for the Papal See. Florence paid a *condotta* to Piccinino to prevent the *condottiere* from creating troubles near the Sienese territory. One of the reasons for Florence to “corrupt” Piccinino could have been to avoid any contribution for the crusade by doing this favour to the pope. However, this Florentine initiative with regard to Piccinino was not enough for Pope Calixtus III, who reminded Florence that the crusade was an expensive matter and he expected a contribution from the Medici in the future. The Florentine diplomatic method in this case was only a temporary solution to delay contributions to the crusade. The eventual contribution of Florence to the crusade would present a problem in negotiations with the sultan. The sultan’s fame for dealing harshly with the Italian powers was surely known in Florence. Reports of the treatment reserved for Venice and Genoa after the fall of Constantinople were widespread, and it makes sense that Florence did not want to meet the same fate. Fortunately for the Medici, Florence was not the only power that was not willing to contribute to the crusade. Venice and Naples responded coldly to Pope Calixtus III’s request. Venice, after the fall of Constantinople, was determined to keep the truce they had signed with the Ottoman sultan and to rebuild its Levantine trade. This attitude appears in the letters sent to Bartolomeo Marcello. Bartolomeo Marcello was travelling to Constantinople at the time of the siege in order to meet with the sultan. After the fall of the city he did not

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506 For example, in a letter sent in 1455 from Bartolomeo Visconti, bishop of Novara, to Francesco Sforza, we found that “he (the pope) complained that Piccinino’s issue for him (the pope) had already taken in debt more than 70,000 ducats that would have been better spent against the Turks. Letter is in Pastor 1891:2.45.

stop and carried on his journey. The Venetian Senate was satisfied on this choice and remarked on the necessity of signing a truce with the sultan. A truce was effectively signed in 1454 and followed the concession by Mehmet II of the *ahd-name* to Venice so that Venice could resume its trade to Constantinople. Just as Venice, Alphonse V of Aragon was more interested in defeating the Genoese rather than wasting his fleet in the Levant and joining the crusade. Alphonse V’s attitude towards Genoa is confirmed by the Genoese complaints to the pope about the continuous harassments made by Bernat de Villamarí, the Catalan commander.

Accordingly, to the detriment of Pope Calixtus III’s hopes for the crusade, Florence shared the indifference of most Italian powers. The Florentine expedients used in order to avoid the crusade started to become common. Florence was ready to contribute to the crusade, but only after all the Christian powers had done the same. Florence apologised but due to the current wars it was unable to provide the necessary contribution.

In no way did Florence want to show that they were openly against the crusade, but at the same time the Florentine Signoria did not want to be the first contributor and sponsor for the expedition. Florence still needed to maintain good relations with the pope both for their Levantine trade and for Florence’s business in Rome. Only

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509 See Sciambra-Valentini 1968:106. After Alphonse V’s death, the pope appeared to be pleased by the news, and even sent a soldier to pillage the Neapolitan ambassador’s quarter. Pastor 1891:2.560-2.562.
510 See for example ASF, Consulte e Pratiche 56 5v-6r or ASF, Legazioni e Commissarie 15 25-27.
the pope could grant to the Signoria the required “freedom” to trade with the Ottoman sultan.\textsuperscript{511} Moreover, Florentine galleys needed the necessary safe conduct from the pope for their galleys travelling to the Levant.\textsuperscript{512} Florence’s banking interests in Rome, including those of the Medici, the Pazzi and others were also at stake. The Medici held the apostolic depository, which was an important source of political influence and revenue in Rome.

These are all elements which explain the delicate diplomatic position of Florence in between the Ottoman empire and the pope. Robert Black describes Florence’s attitude toward the proposed crusade in his book “Benedetto Accolti and the Florentine Renaissance”, in which he argues that until 1456, Florence was favourable to the crusade project, but the Commune changed its position when the possibility of more favourable conditions presented itself in the Constantinopolitan markets. However, this is impossible since the negotiations between Florence and the Ottomans had already begun in 1455. My theory is that Florence was not favourable to the crusade project but was trying to gain time to conclude the negotiations with Mehmet II. This theory of mine is further proven by the anonymous letter in 1456. Moreover, the instruction given by the Signoria in 1456 to Antonio di Ridolfi, future ambassador in Rome, specifically states:

\begin{quote}
You will pray again to our Holiness that he would concede to us a safe conduct for our boats and merchants, which are going to go to the Levant and to Constantinople and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{511} Permission to trade with political powers of different religion.  
\textsuperscript{512} Because the Florentine galleys departed from Porto Pisano, it was necessary for them to cross through papal waters.
This instruction is the real reason for Florence’s initial willingness to support Pope Calixtus III’s crusade plan. Florence’s interest in the crusade was merely political. The Florentine Commune did not want to irritate the pope because it needed safe conduct for the Florentine galleys, which the Commune already had planned to dispatch to the Levant. Black makes a further argument. He states that, contrary to other states (such as France), Florence allowed the papal preachers to exhort and collect the tenth of the tithe in Florence (1456-1457) for the crusade. For Black, this was convincing evidence of Florence’s will to contribute to the Pope Calixtus III’s crusade. Just as I stated above, Florence was in negotiations with Mehmet II exactly when the papal preachers were in Florence. Therefore, Florence’s supposed will to contribute to the crusade can only be interpreted as the Commune’s attempt to maintain serene relations with the pope. For by the time of Florence’s alleged cooperation with the pope, the Signoria was still waiting for the permission of commerce and the safe conduct from the pope. An ambiguous or hostile attitude from Florence toward the papal initiative might have led to the refusal of Florentine requests. Black’s theory seems to be incorrect because it implies that Florence decided to leave the crusade only at the last moment. Black even states that Florence “openly voiced support for papal crusading effort” which really seems a very strong

513 ASF, Legazioni e Commissarie 14, 89-101, in Appendix II nn. 42-43. While the oratoribus Summo Pontefici received another commission one year later on 28 September 1457 to ask the pope about permission to sell wares to the Ottoman sultan. Supplicherai ancora alla Santità sua che si degni di concedere salvacondotto a nostre fuste et mercanti che anderranno in Levante et a Costantinopolì et a loro viaggi in forma piena e non dubiti la Santità sua che nostre fuste non hanno a aspotarte arma e come che diano subsidio da conmbattere a Turchi che prima vorremo morire.
and inaccurate sentence with regard to the period.\footnote{Black 1985:246.} In fact, Florence was already in negotiation with the sultan in 1455, seemingly even from an earlier period. For the first letter in 1455 states that contacts had been already made in Constantinople.

Florence had its own political influence over the papacy which it employed in case of controversies between the Commune and the Holy See. The popes needed access to the Florentine banks. The Medici bank especially helped the popes for two reasons. First because it was still a profitable business and second because the popes would be in debt with the Medici and therefore exposed to Florence’s political influence. Without surprise, the pope granted to Florence both the safe conduct and permission to sell wares to the Ottoman sultanate.\footnote{Otherwise the famous first journey of the two galleys to Constantinople would have never have happened. See Chapter V paragraph 5.3 about the two galleys and the first journey to the Levant in 1457.} Babinger and Pastor argue that Florence played both sides against each other with the crusade and their Levantine interests.\footnote{Especially in the period of Lorenzo the Magnificent. See Babinger both Babinger 1951 and Babinger 1973.} However, I think it is impossible to speak about “sides” in the case of Florence. Florence’s diplomacy was elaborately coherent towards its determined goals. The Levantine goal was, for Florence, one of the oldest goals, going back even before the Medici took power in 1434.\footnote{First request was made in the pratiche on 19 May 1397. See fn. 115.} This goal did not change after Cosimo the Elder seized power in Florence. The Medici managed to organise the Ecumenical Council and had even demanded from John VIII the same privileges held by the
other Italian cities.\textsuperscript{518} Besides, Florence was not the only power trying to avoid crusade obligations. The kingdom of France and Ragusa refused the collection of the tenth and the king of Portugal, despite all the promises of personal participation in the crusade, never showed up.\textsuperscript{519} The main reason for Ragusa’s refusal is due to political elements. Just as Florence, Ragusa wanted to maintain friendly relations with the Ottomans. Moreover, the geographical position of Ragusa was dangerously close to the Ottoman empire and a false move could have resulted in an Ottoman attack against the city. In all probability, the general reluctance of the Christian powers to answer Pope Calixtus III’s initiative facilitated their attempts to temporise the papal request whilst negotiating with Mehmet II.

The organisation of the crusade was temporarily halted when Pope Calixtus III died in 1458. This halt did not last long. The new pope, Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini, would become even more influential and even more determined than Calixtus III to bring about the crusade.

Florence, the popes and the Ottomans (1458-1463)

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the period between 1458 and 1464 was the most important time in the history of Florence's engagement with the Levant. This period was a promising one for Florence since the city had begun official trade with

\textsuperscript{518} See chapter I Florence’s request in 1436 to John VIII fn. 150.
\textsuperscript{519} See Black 1985:246. As for the single sources: on France see Pastor 1891:695,699; on Ragusa/Dubrovnik Pastor 1891:739; on Portugal Pastor 1891:700. See in general also Picotti 1996.
Constantinople, thanks to the privileges received around 1458-1460. However, the pontificate of Pius II threatened Florence’s commercial success with a new vigorous resumption of the crusade. Pius II decided to call a congress in Mantua in 1459 and pressed all the Latin powers to attend, including Florence.

Needless to say, this event raised serious problems within the Florentine Commune, especially when three galleys were preparing to depart to Constantinople in 1459.\(^\text{520}\) Florence, at this precarious time in history, was entirely unwilling to compromise the Signoria’s new favourable position in Constantinople with a crusade. Surely, the city’s diplomatic posture had nothing to do with its religious fervour, but rather was the mixture of commercial and political interests, such as the banking business in Rome and the need to have good relations with the pope. Thus, when news of the convocation at Mantua reached Florence, the Signoria decided to delay the departure of its ambassadors in order to gain some time for the three galleys in the Levant. However, in 1459, Pope Pius II, immediately following his election to the Holy See, had already published his papal Bull, “Vocavit Nos Pius”, ordering all the Christian powers to meet in Mantua to discuss the crusade against the Turks.\(^\text{521}\) Florence adapted by instructing its ambassadors sent to Rome to present

\(^{520}\) One of the first big expeditions to be sent to Constantinople after the first expedition sent in 1458.

\(^{521}\) Pastor 1894:24; Setton 1962. Pope Pius II also considered Udine as a location for the meeting, but Venice, which controlled the city at that time, refused for fear of a possible Turkish retaliation. See Piccolomini 1984:1.297. On the council of Mantua and Pius II’s activity see Setton 1978:3.208-215 and footnotes. On Pius II and the crusade see Housley 2004:39-52.
congratulations for the pope’s election, but to avoid any kind of promises, especially regarding any help against the Turks.⁵²²

The position of the Signoria in the *pratiche* shows a vivid debate among its oligarchs. Florence was willing to risk neither its positive papal relations nor the trade with the Ottomans. These *pratiche* show some division among individual Florentine oligarchs. One position in the *pratiche* argued that the crusade was in the interests of Florence while the other one pointed out that only Venice could have obtained profits from the eventual crusade. A peculiar position was that of Giovannozzo Pitti, who argued that Florence should have done something for its “good Christian name”. The “good Christian name” was the best way to avoid any possible accusation of being on good terms with Mehmet II. This accusation would have put not only the Florentine commercial and political interest in Rome at risk, but also threatened the territorial integrity of the Commune. In fact, any kind of accusation of favouring the Ottoman empire could have given legitimacy to any hostile act against the Commune, which is worth reminding, was militarily inferior when compared to the other major powers in Italy such as Venice or Naples. Unlike France, Florence was not strong enough to stand openly against the crusade without risking military retaliation from other powers. In the end, what the Signoria told the ambassadors once again concerned the pragmatic policy of preserving the political balance of power in Italy. The ambassadors had to explain to Pope Pius II that

⁵²² ASF, *Legazioni e Commissarie* 15, 25-27, in Appendix II n. 67. The official explanation was that Florence was still recovering from the past wars.
Florence had already given permission to collect the crusade tenth. But they had also to underline the fact that Florence was not in a good situation to provide more material help to the crusade.

Pope Pius II, probably aware of Florence’s manoeuvring, decided to stop in Florence on his way to Mantua and urge the Signoria to join the crusade. Florence spent 13,500 florins hosting Pius II and treated him respectfully, but refused to make any official promise. When Pius II finally reached Mantua, the pope was completely disillusioned by the lack of participants.\textsuperscript{523} Indeed Venice, not Florence, was the last power to send ambassadors to the congress. Venice had signed a truce with the Turks in 1455 and tried every effort to maintain its commercial position in Constantinople. Like Florence, Venice had no intention to come out publicly against Mehmet II, particularly after what happened to the Venetian Bailo and merchants in the aftermath of the fall of Constantinople. When the congress in Mantua finally began, the pope asked for contributions from every political power. Florence initially refused, but after a private meeting with Pius II, the Signoria agreed to some very vague promises.\textsuperscript{524} There is a need to understand whether Florence wanted to boycott Pius II’s initiative or simply maintained a coherent diplomacy in preserving the Signoria’s political and commercial interests.

In general, scholars hold two opposing theories about Florence’s attitude towards the crusade: Babinger and Pastor have argued that Florence tried to boycott

\textsuperscript{523} Piccolomini 1984:1.427. 
\textsuperscript{524} Piccolomini 1984:1.587.
the crusade; while Black has tried to show Florence’s positive, if secret, attitude toward the expedition.\footnote{525 Babinger 1978:233 “Florence played a double-game of intrigue against the pope’s plans”.
} I certainly cannot read Cosimo’s mind, nor that of any other Quattrocento protagonists. However, I do not think that either of the above theories is correct. Evidently, Florence had vital interests in the Levant, and commercial advancement in Constantinople was surely an important part of the Signoria’s policies. Yet Rome and the papacy were also central for Florence’s politics, as well as for the Florentine economy, due to the banking presence and the lucrative business which Florence had in the papal court. Moreover, if Florence had been so bold as to compromise the papacy’s policies on the crusade, as Pastor and Babinger suggested, then Pope Pius II would have never granted the monopoly of the newly discovered alum mines in Tolfa to the Medici in 1464. The Tolfa mines were to become a good opportunity for the pope to ban all importation of “Turkish” alum. Florence was evidently completely unwilling to give up its commercial progress in the Levantine market, but at the same time the Signoria understood the opportunities present in Rome at the papal court. Besides, the accusation of friendship with the Ottomans could have exposed Florence to possible retaliation from neighbouring powers.

The consequences of the congress of Mantua seem to confirm that Florence was determined not to displease either the pope or the Ottoman sultan. During the congress of Mantua, Florence asked for a secret meeting in which it effectively
agreed to Pius II’s requests on the tithes. Evidently Florence did not want to appear openly in favour of the crusade but at the same time wanted to keep the pope satisfied. This political attitude explains the secret meeting with the pope. There were also other problems during the congress. At the time of the congress, Florence had dispatched state-galleys to the Levant. The question is whether the Florentine establishment, in the end, agreed to fulfil the secret promise made to the pope in Mantua. The answer is that Florence did not give the subsidy promised at Mantua to the pope. When Pope Pius II returned from Mantua he even stopped in Florence and reprimanded the city for not having fulfilled what the Florentine ambassadors had promised in secret during the congress. Still the pope decided not to force the Signoria, but adopted a diplomatic approach. The pope had received from the Florentine ambassadors in Mantua promises of three tithes: a tenth on the clerks, a twentieth on the Jews and a thirtieth on the laity. When in Florence, Pius II asked the Signoria how it was going to carry out this promise. Florence apologised and presented several difficulties related to the task, such as bureaucratic impediments, in order not to be the first crusader power to displease the pope, and asked for a postponement. The pope thought that the postponement did not include the church tithe. As a result, after a few days, Pius II asked for the church tithe, thus embarrassing the Florentine establishment.

Florence agreed to give subsides to the pope in order to gain time. Soon it became clear that the pope had serious problems in collecting the requested tithes.

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almost everywhere, including Venice. Venice’s reluctance was a serious problem for Pius II. In fact, any crusade without Venetian participation was unthinkable, especially considering the magnitude of Venetian fleet which could have amounted to 180 galleys during the fifteenth century. Florence used the reluctance of the other states to gain more time. Despite Florentine opposition, the pope did not intend to let loose his grip on Florence. Pope Pius II turned to the Milanese ambassador and sent a clear, even if somewhat indirect message, to the Florentine Commune: if Florence would not pay the promised subsidies, the pope was ready to censure the city. The summoned Communal pratica in 1460 finally surrendered and allowed the pope to collect the tenth on the clergy. Finally, by 1461, Florence had delivered its contribution to Rome.

In Black’s opinion, the decision of the pratiche represented ‘another turning point in Florentine diplomacy with regard to crusade’. However, I still cannot see how this contribution can be regarded as evidence of Florence’s willingness to become an enemy of the sultan and a crusade sponsor. Again, my interpretation is that Florence never placed itself decisively in both sides. Florence followed its own political agenda. In fact, this choice was in keeping with Florence’s aims and not to close to itself off to profitable opportunities within and outside Italy.

528 For this number of galley see Pezzolo 2013:260.
529 The usual “Florence is ready to back up the crusade but only after all the Christian princes are ready to do the same”.
530 Black 1985:253-254. The author reports the document from the Florentine State Archive which is ASF, Consulte e Pratiche 56, 59r-62v.
This interpretation can be seen immediately after Florence’s contribution in 1461 and the political evolution in the Levant with the Venetian-Ottoman war (1463-1479). In 1463, the relations between the Ottoman sultanate and Venice had already begun to deteriorate. Needless to say, in 1463, Venice was most interested in the resumption of the crusading initiative, while Florence clearly had some concerns. Besides, Florence faced three problems in that period. The first was that, at the start of the Ottoman-Venetian war (1463-1479), the Florentine Commune had already sent galleys to Constantinople. The second problem was that in 1463 the Florentine community in Constantinople and in the Ottoman empire had begun to be considerable in its amount. Therefore, angering Mehmet II would have put the entire Florentine community at risk and the lucrative businesses established by the Florentine merchants there, as well. The third problem was due to the political decision of the duke of Milan. In fact, the political position of Florence at this time was more complicated since its most important ally, Francesco I Sforza, had decided to help the pope and the Venetians.

The Milanese ambassadors, Otto Carretto and Ugo Niccolini, sent a letter in 1463 of recommendations to the duke of Milan. This letter is very important because it gives hints about the political situation within Florence as well.533 Florence, in the Milanese ambassadors’ opinion, shared with the king of France the same idea about crusade subsidies.534 The Milanese diplomatic line in the letter was an attempt to try

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533 Black 1985:254; the letter is in Pastor 1904:189-190.
534 Pastor 1904:190.
to get the Florentines involved in the crusade. It also shows an awareness of the perplexity of the Commune. The Milanese ambassadors tried to negotiate with the duke of Burgundy and reached an agreement that all the conquests of the crusading army would be under the name of Christ – meaning the pope- but not Venice. However, the Milanese ambassadors did not believe Venice would have ever accepted such a proposal, and therefore this diplomatic line would risk alienating any possible support for the crusade.\textsuperscript{535} Florence, in the words of the Milanese ambassadors, ‘seems completely alien to this endeavour’.\textsuperscript{536} The reason for the Florentine alienation was Florence’s commercial expansion in Constantinople. Florentine contributions to the pope would help Venice in recovering its former power in the Levant. However, the position of Pope Pius II was clear: in Mantua every power agreed to subsidise the crusade with the tenth (clergy), the twentieth (Jews) and the thirtieth (laity) of the tithes and even requested that the Florentine ambassador negotiate with the king of France and other foreign powers.\textsuperscript{537} Florence expressed its official position in a letter sent to the pope on 1 October 1463.\textsuperscript{538}

The Florentine position was particularly articulated and presented with the intent of persuading the pope to abandon his crusading plan. The first objection to the crusade states that attacking the Turks would push the other Islamic powers to join the war together with the Ottoman empire, since they feared becoming the

\textsuperscript{535} Idem.
\textsuperscript{536} Idem \textit{Par in tutto aliena da questa impresa}.
\textsuperscript{537} Still in the letter of the Milanese ambassadors to the duke of Milan, the main reason for this duty was to bind Florence in a way to contribute to the crusade not only by subsidising but on a diplomatic level as well.
\textsuperscript{538} Pastor 1904:195-199.
crusade’s next target after the eventual defeat of the most powerful Islamic power. The second point concerns the great expenses for the crusade. If the crusade should fail, all the tithes collected would be lost as well. This would bring disgrace and infamy to the Christian world. The third point stresses the past Italian wars that greatly compromised the prosperity of the Florentine Commune. Finally, Florence warned the pope of the risk carried by the extreme expenses for the crusade. Florence expected few Christian powers to undertake the crusade, therefore he warned the pope of the risk in spending moneys for a crusade destined to fail at the first occasion. Florence stated that it was inconceivable that the crusade would begin with the participation of only the duke of Burgundy and the Italian city-states and no other major Christian powers. It is plausible that Florence, with this argument, was trying to align itself with France and England in the crusade matter without standing openly against the crusade. The commercial justification also made up a part of the letter. The document states that the sea trade was now the only business for Florence. Moreover, Florence informs Pope Pius II that the city had already sent the galleys to Constantinople. Finally, the Florentine community in the Ottoman empire would be at the mercy of the sultan if the latter would discover Florence’s involvement. This letter presents several interesting insights into Florence’s diplomatic line with the Holy See on the crusade. Obviously Florence did not intend to contribute or even consider participating in a crusade which would only be helpful to Venetian power in
the Levant. Therefore, I disagree with Black’s statement that Florence ‘was prepared to back Pius II’s crusade by the end of September 1463’. 539

In March 1463, an ambassador from Venice urged Florence not to send their galleys to the Levant. The “official” Venetian reason was that the Turks could have taken the two Florentine galleys and used them against the Venetians. This embassy is interesting as it testifies that Florence was regularly dispatching galleys to Constantinople and that Venice was not exactly pleased about that. Another proof of Florence’s organisation is in a diplomatic instruction from 19 March 1463 to Piero Acciaiuoli in Rome. The instruction sent to the Acciaiuoli mentioned that it was now a habitual custom to send galleys to Constantinople every year. 540 The Venetian threat was a problem for Florence as the same Signoria told the consul, Mainardo degli Ubaldini, in Constantinople on 28 June 1463:

We (the Signoria) are moved mainly for the honour and the welfare of this city (Florence) and for the care of all our merchants and their properties, we order that you, … should go as fast as possible to the sultan, and on our behalf you will tell him not be surprised if we have delayed the dispatch of our galleys … since the seas are full of a great number of armies. We suspect they might assault our ships, but our intention is firm and so in the future we will send them not only this year but forever. 541

Venice, however, was not going to quietly accept that Florence would trade with the sultan while the Serenissima was at war against the Ottoman empire. Febo Capella, ambassador of the Serenissima, had already visited Florence to dictate a halt

540 ASF, Legazioni e Commissarie 15, 162-163, in Appendix II n. 124.
541 Signori Otto di Pratica Dieci di balia Legazioni Commissarie Missive 77, in Appendix II n. 128.
to any travel to the Levant. Of course Florence did not accept the Venetian request. Therefore, Florence was aware that the danger to its trade with the Levant did not come only from the impending crusade, but also from the Venetian war galleys. The Florentine commune sent instructions to its ambassador in Rome on 15 October 1463. The instructions evidently stated that Florence was concerned about Venice’s potential initiatives against the Florentine galleys. This was true since Venice also sent an ambassador to Milan which made the Signoria scared since the instructions to his ambassador in Rome state that ‘if we (Florence) will send the galleys in any way and in any place the Venetian captain would take and spoil them as enemy vessels’.

Florence, instead of beginning a dispute with Venice, decided to directly ask for the protection of Florentine state-galleys from the pope. The importance of this diplomatic approach was not only to find protection for the Florentine state-galleys, but at the same time to avoid, as much as possible, any involvement with the crusade. Florence wanted to preserve the security of its state-galleys, but at the same time knew that, in exchange, the pope would require the contribution to the crusade as the new letter to the Florentine ambassador in Rome states:

Once we wrote to you...to say to the Holy Father that here in Florence we have reassured the Venetian ambassador that our galleys would not cross the strait

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542 ASV, Senato Registri Secreti 186v-187r. Sed si forsitan ipsi domini dicent tibi qui omnio mittere instituerint Constantinopolim seu instrictum triremes predictas: eo casu commemorabis et reitarbis pericula et inconvenientia interdicia: declarando etiam magnifici suis ox hemus capitaneum nostrum generalem maris cum classe nostra versus partes illas cum amplissima libertate qui que cum et ipse intelligat pericula qui per accessurus prefata galearum continget posset te quod admodum certum facis eius non esse permissurus galeas ipsas constantinopolis seu instrictum perficisci.

543 Pastor 1904:213-216.
(Bosphorus), and in case you have not yet spoken with his Holiness, do not do it. Instead, you should only say to the pope that we had instructed our captain (captain of the galleys) “in the right and proper way”… we received a letter from Dietisalvi (Neroni, the Florentine ambassador in Milan) which stated that the duke of Milan wants to give us support on this matter. Moreover he (Dietisalvi) had suggested that if we attend this impressa (the galleys travel) we need to receive assurances from the pope. We want you to find an understanding with the Milanese ambassador… do not say that you have any kind of authorisation to negotiate for the crusade.544

What is evident from this letter is that Florence did not intend to contribute to the crusade and asked the Florentine ambassador in Rome to find a compromise and an understanding with the Milanese ambassadors. This understanding between Florence and Milan was finally found as a letter written by the two Milanese ambassadors, Otto Carretto and Augustino de Rubeis on 19 October 1463 confirmed. Florence was ready to promise, in secret (again), that after four or five months, after the safe return of the state-galleys to Florence, the Signoria would contribute to the crusade. The official excuse for the request of a four-five months delay was that Florence needed time to withdraw men and wares from Constantinople as the text states:

As for what your Excellence (the duke of Milan) wrote to the Florentines, that they will pay their debts but they would need five months of time, or four at least in order to call back the wares and the men (from Constantinople)...and that your Holiness should press the Venetian ambassador in order that the latter writes to Venice the opportune things for the safety of the Florentine galleys.545

544 Pastor 1904:216.
Pope Pius II, not without reason, had serious doubt about the Florentines, as he himself states:

We (the pope) believe that the Florentines do not have the will, and look for justifications and they are going to promise, just as they did in Mantua, in which they used the same trick of promising in secret and to use the duke of Milan as their guarantee…

The crusade bull, published on 22 October 1463, put more pressure on Florence, since it followed the agreement made in Venice between the Serenissima and the king of Hungary on 17 October 1463.\textsuperscript{546} On 24 October 1463, Florence ordered its ambassador in Rome to say to the pope that Florence was ready to do everything necessary if only Pope Pius II would protect the Florentine state-galleys.\textsuperscript{547} Apparently Pius II’s doubts grew when the Signoria sent another letter to its ambassador in Rome on 5 November 1463, restating what they had already told him on 24 October 1463. The main reason for this reminder was a letter received by the Signoria from Venice. The letter related that the Serenissima was to allow its galley captain in the Levant ‘to do and make everything he judged was to the detriment of the Turk…and that surely they (the Venetians) believed that if the Turks would take our galleys, he (the sultan) could have hurt them (the Venetians).\textsuperscript{548}

Florence, therefore, asked the ambassador to again give assurances of Florence’s contribution to the crusade only when the Pope received from Venice a

\textsuperscript{546} Pastor 1894:330-340.  
\textsuperscript{547} Pastor 1904:227-228.  
\textsuperscript{548} Pastor 1904:233-235.
letter guaranteeing the safety of Florentine state-galleys.\footnote{Pastor 1904:233-235.} Finally, the efforts of the two combined embassies of Florence-Milan to the pope satisfied the Florentine hopes. Dietisalvi Neroni, Florentine ambassador in Rome, states on 8 December 1463 that he reached agreement with Pius II. The agreement protected Florentine state-galleys, and in exchange Florence would give the tenth, twentieth and thirtieth of the tithes.\footnote{ASF, Consulate e Pratiche 56 15v, in Appendix II n. 132.} Clearly, this agreement was a major victory for Florence, since the city offered to the pope what it had already promised at the famous congress of Mantua in 1459. This success was the result of the effort of the duke of Milan who pressed the pope to accept Florence’s requests. In Black’s opinion, ‘the Florentines may have felt better disposed to cooperate with the crusade now that the most dangerous part of the voyage had been completed by their galleys’.\footnote{Black 1985:257.} Instead, the Florentines were afraid of the return of their galleys from Constantinople. The next paragraph will show that this statement is a bit simplistic.

### The deaths of Cosimo and Pius II (1464)

In 1464, Cosimo the Elder and Pope Pius II died, which suspended the entire project of the crusade. Thus, it is important to give attention to the events of this year, as Florence’s diplomatic line with regard to the crusade became even more
sophisticated due to political pressure from the pope and the military threat from Venice. I think it is difficult to affirm that the halt to the crusade was due to Cosimo the Elder’s death. Cosimo the Elder had no intention to contribute to the crusade, and Florence tried to avoid the crusade as much as possible without provoking a definitive break with the Holy See.

The pope wrote a letter to Florence on 29 January 1464, reminding the city what it had promised and had never fulfilled. Apparently, Florence had not even collected the tithes they had promised to the pope at the congress of Mantua and had vowed again to Pope Pius II for the protection of Florentine galleys in 1463. Afterwards, the pope continued to remind Florence of the promises made to him by Florence even after the Florentine state-galleys had returned safely from Constantinople. From another letter sent on 4 April 1464 by the Milanese ambassador, Otto Carretto, to the duke of Milan, it emerges that Pope Pius II had no clue about what Florence was willing to do for the crusade and even proposed to Florence to keep the tithes in exchange of an armed support.

Still, Pius II wrote another letter on April 23 1464, from Petriolo, to the duke of Milan to ask him to press the Florentines to carry out their promises to the

552 Black 1985:259. Black states that it was Cosimo’s death that put an end to the crusade, since Florence, from that moment, suspended its contributions.
553 It is important to remark on the fact that the “Holy See” used here means the relations between Florence and the popes in general, and not this specific pope.
554 ASF, Responsive Copiari I 118v-119r. in Appendix II n. 131.
crusade. The pope was probably a bit upset since it recalls in his Commentarii that Florence had been making these promises for some time. Moreover, this letter confirms that the pope still did not have any clue about the Florentine attitude towards the crusade. Lastly, the fact that the pope wrote this letter to Milan and not Florence rise up more suspects about the “willingness” of Florence to fulfill their promises.

Due to Florence’s evident difficulties fulfilling its promises, the pope asked to Stefano de Nardinis the Archbishop of Milan, to write to the duke of Milan. In this letter the pope stressed the lack of troops sent by Florence. Pope Pius II sent this letter on 11 August 1464, that is, just eight days before the death of the pope. This letter is crucial to understanding if Florence gave the tithes (tenth, twentieth, and thirtieth) promised at Mantua. The letter states that the ‘Florentines did not intend to make this expense if not for the tenth, the twentieth and the thirtieth of the tithes, and but due to the plague (moria) and Cosimo’s death, this (the tithes) would not have taken place’. Therefore, eight days before the death of Pius II, Florence had still not fulfilled the promise continuously repeated since the congress of Mantua. It is true that Black has discovered an important unpublished document, which states that

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556 BPAA, Pergamene 9397. Petriolo is a town in the Italian region of the Marche which is near Ancona.
558 Pastor 1904:324.
559 Pastor 1904:324.
papal preachers started a money collection on 26 May 1464, but apparently the money collected was only a very minor part of what Florence had promised.560

Cosimo the Elder’s death might have given the final blow to the crusade, and this fact cannot be denied. Yet, Cosimo the Elder tried by all means to avoid any possible Florentine contribution until his last days, and with some success. Eight days before the pope’s death, the only “promise” Florence actually seems to have fulfilled was to send three galleys that at the time were being repaired in Porto Pisano, as stated in a provision of the Florentine Commune on 16 April 1464.561 Therefore, it was not the death of Cosimo the Elder that put an end to the crusade, but the Florentine Signoria’s use of his death as an excuse, in the same way as Cosimo had done until his last breath.

Conclusions

With the death of Pope Pius II on 19 August 1464, the planned crusade came to an end. At the same time, the Florentines somehow managed not to be involved in either


561 ASF, Provvigioni Protocolli 11r Informati magnifici et potenti domini priores libertatis et vexillifer iustitie populi florentini quod de mense decembri provisum preteriti domini qui tunc presidebant in officio sunt requisiti cum magna instantia pro parte summi ponteficis per eius proprium oratorem ad haris donationem tunc transmissum quod ipsi donatione placet venirede ipsi summo pontifici tre galeas...grossas et dues subtiles que tunc reparant fieri pisis de novo per officio consulum maris et ipsi domni quilibet dicta requisitio facta fuit habito prius super hoc consilio multorum sapientum civium ipsum ex consilium penitus seuquentes intellecto a dicto oratore quod ipse hec suprasede per aliqus opus neuiebat et pp responsium ad posita sibi fieri absque numia mora postulabat cum ...et rei qualitas non pateretus congregati ...consilia oportuna habito super hoc prius consilio multorum sapientium...quod dicta donatio facta per dictus dominos dicto summo pontifice de dictis tribus galeis de quibus et per isuper narratur intelligatur esse et sit vigore pritus provisionis approbata totaliter et confirmata e valesse et vale et observe debuisse....See also Mallett 1967: 35 and Black 1985:258.
the crusade or the Venetian-Ottoman war. A conclusion will be drawn as to the interpretation of the acts committed by Florence with regard to the crusade. There are two opposing views among historians on this subject: Babinger and Pastor from one side and Black from the other. Babinger and Pastor both declared that Florence had tried to sabotage the crusade as a result of the city’s economic situation in Constantinople, while Black opposes this theory by arguing that Florence effectively contributed with the three galleys sent to the Pope. In my opinion, both of these two interpretations are simultaneously correct and simplistic.

Florence tried to avoid any form of help to popes Calixtus III and Pius II in their crusade plans. The minimum effort made by the Commune was to send three galleys that, at the moment, were under repair in Porto Pisano. It is unfortunate that there are no other sources describing the state of these three galleys, but my impression is that these ships were not of the best condition. The reason for sending these ships was probably to give Pius II something less expensive than the tithes collection or even to pay for the military support.

Evidently, Florence’s foreign policy stance had been consistent since the congress of Mantua, which was to keep and preserve the interests of the Signoria. They succeeded in the negotiations with the sultan and improved the position of the Florentine merchants in Constantinople. Moreover, the Florentines maintained the role of bankers and obtained privileges from the pope in Rome. The Medici bank was still the official papal bank, together with other Florentine banks, such as the
Pazzi. In Constantinople, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Florence obtained the eagerly desired capitula, and made their merchants even more competitive with no kommerkion on their wares. In this period, Florentine galleys began to travel to Constantinople on an annual basis, although Florence remained a poor naval power. This lack of military power made the city a hostage to corsairs and potential “enemies”, such as the king of Naples or Venice. Florence’s diplomacy also emerged victorious in dealing with both the pope’s requests for support to the crusade and the fate of the Florentine galleys at risk of Venetian attacks. The promises to the pope were enough to prevent Venice from attacking Florentine galleys, and in the end Florence even managed not to fulfil all its promises.

What Florence wanted to do was to maintain the balance, both with Rome and Constantinople, and to avoid any risk of irritating either the pope or the sultan. Interestingly, Florence did not clearly manifest its refusal (as the kingdom of France did) towards the crusade, but indeed sent ambassadors to Mantua, an improvement over other powers who did not send any representatives. The Florentine ambassadors had the duty of making as few promises as possible in order to avoid obliging the Florentine Signoria in any way, and at the same time without risking the anger of the sultan so that the Florentine colony in Constantinople was not compromised. Florence was clearly aware that Pope Pius II’s crusade was a favour to Venice. This political fact was even confirmed by Pius II, who replied to what must have been a horrified Florentine ambassador, that it was better being conquered by the Venetians,
rather than the Ottomans. Cosimo the Elder could not have simply refused the papal request because of Florence’s many interests in Rome, such as the apostolic depository or the alum in Tolfa which were in Medici hands.

Florence, therefore, elaborated a temporising policy. The first basic rule was to order the Florentine ambassador in Rome not to promise anything publicly on behalf of the Florentine Signoria. The only promise the Florentine ambassadors made was in secret after the end of the congress in Mantua. This was to be the only case in which Florence explicitly promised to contribute to the crusade. From that moment, Florence began to subtly use the duke of Milan as a guarantee of their promises. This policy helped Florence not to be tied with the pope directly, and was used by Florence’s diplomacy until the death of Pius II. The third method was to delay any promises by using problems which did not sound petty. For example, the journey of the galleys to Constantinople was the perfect picture. Two were the main defences used by Florence’s diplomacy in order to avoid any contribution on this occasion, that is, the Venetian threat or the possible anger of the sultan. Florence most likely reminded the pope that it was impossible for the Commune to contribute if the three galleys were going to be attacked by Venice, since this attack would produce economic damage. The possible reprisal of the sultan was used when Florence asked for four/five months more in order to evacuate the Florentine colony in

562 Piccolomini 1984:2.413 \textit{Fatemur Venetos, more hominum, plurecupere quam habecant atque Italie dominatum quaerere \ldots Victoria polici adversus Turchos Veneti, Illyridis ac Graeciae possessors effecti, \textit{Italiam subigere conabuntur}, nonimus inficias, \textit{simodo Barbarorum metu vacant} et non externis bellis distineantur. \textit{Esto subigat Italiam Venetus, quod factu difficilimum est; quid ais? Venetis an Turchis pareremavis?} It is a pity that we will never know the look on the face of the Florentine ambassador when Pius II delivered this speech. 248
Constantinople. The letter sent to Mainardo degli Ubaldini on 28 June 1463 clearly states that there was no intention at all of evacuating the colony of Constantinople, and also demonstrates Florence’s will to improve its commercial transports to Constantinople.\textsuperscript{563} The reason why I do not agree with Babinger and Pastor, who accused Florence of trying to boycott the crusade, is in line with what I have written so far. Florence simply wanted to preserve its commercial power in Constantinople and to avoid as much as possible all the complications that could have harmed the Florentine colony in the city. This does not mean that Florence wanted to boycott the crusade, rather it simply wanted no part of it. Not only was the crusade considered a favour to Venice, but there was a great deal of concern over the fate of the Florentine merchants in Constantinople, and Florence’s privilege received from the sultan in 1458/1459 as shown in the \textit{pratiche} of the Florentine Signoria.

\textsuperscript{563} ASF, Signori Otto di pratica Dieci di balia Legazioni Commissarie Missive 77. In Appendix II n. 129. See fn. 499.
CHAPTER VI

Florence between Italy and the Levant: the Venetian-Ottoman war (1463-1478) and the Pazzi plot (1478).

Introduction

In this sixth chapter I will present the events and the diplomatic evolution of Florentine-Ottoman relations from Cosimo the Elder’s death until the Pazzi plot (1478).

The first issue I will address in this chapter is Florence’s involvement in the Venetian-Ottoman war (1464-1479). The role of Florence during this long war is still unclear. The question is whether Florence played an active part in supplying the Ottoman war effort or even spying on their behalf. It may also simply be the case that Florence took advantage of the war for their economic and political interest. Most of the sources used for this chapter are currently unpublished and the result of my personal investigation in the Florentine Archive. I will particularly use the pratiche, which are the discussions among the most prominent citizens in Florence about the most important matters such as the relations with the pope, Venice and the Ottomans. Thanks also to this particular source, I will present the Florentine attitude towards the Italian and Levantine events. This investigation will reveal the eventual
emergence of any connections between events in the two sides of the Mediterranean Sea.

The second issue addressed in this chapter is the emergence of Ottoman power in Italian politics. As a matter of fact, the events in the Levant and the rapid expansion by the Ottoman sultan caused intense reactions, especially in Italy. The truce signed at Lodi in 1454 was instrumental in keeping the peace in Italy, especially for Florence. The Florentine Commune was aware of the potential threat still represented by Venice and the kingdom of Naples. Florence’s diplomacy was aware of the risk of having a potentially hostile kingdom of Naples, especially given its proximity to Florentine borders and the military power at the disposal of Ferrante I.

The political background in the fifteenth-century Mediterranean Sea was a mosaic of potentially explosive elements. The peace treaty signed in 1455 between the sultan and Venice two years after the conquest of Constantinople was a temporary armistice that was not to endure for long. Venice was still a strong power, in terms of commercial volume in the Levant, despite the fall of Constantinople in 1453. However, the rise of the Ottoman empire greatly affected Venice’s predominance. Venice and Genoa were no longer the only uncontested powers. Moreover, they were no longer enjoying the strong status and commercial monopoly they held in the Byzantine period. The Ottoman empire, led by Mehmet II, did not

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564 The trade from Venice soon resumes as part of the peace treaty, and at the time surely there were no other powers able to compete with the Venice’s consolidated maritime commerce. On Venice and Ottomans relations see İnalçik 1977:88, Preto 1975 and Beck-Manoussacas-Pertusi 1977. On Genoa see Basso 2008, Pistorino 1995 and Fleet 1999.
intend to coexist with such a powerful neighbours, which represented a potential threat with a capacity for damaging the Ottoman empire thanks to their powerful fleet. In fact, Venice was more worried about losing its control in the colonies, such as in Greece and in the Levant, and the economic interests in the Constantinopolitan market due to the loss of its monopoly.

The Venetians’ problems were not only connected to the fall of Constantinople. In the first chapters of this thesis, I stressed that Florentine merchants, due to the unfavourable *kommerkion* in Constantinople, often used Venetian galleys (and later Genoese) to transport their wares. The same Venetian doge, Tommaso Mocenigo, remarked how great the revenue was for the *Serenissima* in transporting Florentine wares to Constantinople.\(^{565}\) Of course, the loss of the Florentine wares represented an economic loss for Venice, which created uncertainty in an already troublesome period for the *Serenissima*. Finally, Mehmet II likely decided that his power was enough to further weaken his strongest opponent. The sultan needed the truce in 1455 to gain time and consolidate his hold over Constantinople. In fact, Constantinople, at the time, counted entire neighbourhoods as completely empty or scarcely populated.\(^{566}\) Mehmet II understood that the Venetians would be content with the resumption of the trade to Constantinople.

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\(^{565}\) Romanin 1855:4.94.
\(^{566}\) See İnalcık 1998:269-376.
Florence, Venice, the Turks and the Venetian-Ottoman war (1463-1479)

In 1463 Mehmet II was strong enough to launch a full scale offensive against the Venetian foothold in Romania. The war started from the refusal of Venice to give back a slave, who converted to the Christian religion, to the Ottomans. It is clear that this was only Mehmet II’s pretext to declare war against Venice. On 6 September 1463, the Ottoman governor of Morea, Isa Beg, successfully captured the important city of Argos from the Venetians. Unsurprisingly, Venice’s approach towards the crusade proposed by the papacy changed after this attack. After its reluctant approach at Mantua, the Serenissima began to press Pope Pius II. A first, an agreement was made between Venice, the duke of Burgundy and the kingdom of Hungary. Venice and Hungary were interested in an alliance against the Ottomans, especially since Mehmet II had invaded and conquered Bosnia in 1463, and consequently exposed Hungarian territories to the Ottoman threat.

Venice’s diplomacy was aimed at involving Florence in the crusade. On 18 January 1463, Doge Cristoforo Mauro sent a long letter to Florence inviting the Commune to take part in the upcoming crusade. The letter again presents some common rhetorical themes, such as the idea that Christian powers should stand together against the common enemy of the faith. In addition, this letter contains invitations to contribute financially to the crusade and to obey the pope’s requests. Furthermore, Pius II, sent a letter to Florence on 1 October 1463, inquiring about the

567 On the war between Venice and the Ottomans see İnalcık 1989:311-353 and Babinger 1953.
568 Müller 1879:199.
will of the Florentine Commune to send galleys to Constantinople, and secondly, to invite Florence to contribute to the Venetian war effort.\textsuperscript{569} The pope asked Florence not to send commercial galleys to Constantinople in order to avoid a scandal.\textsuperscript{570} As I have shown in the previous chapter, these Florentine galleys travelled to Constantinople and returned safely to Porto Pisano. Moreover, Florence no longer had problems over its contribution to the crusade because Pius II died just one year later.

Cosimo the Elder’s death left Piero di Cosimo de’ Medici, Cosimo’s son, heir of the Florentine Commune. There were several political consequences to Cosimo’s death. As mentioned numerous times in the previous chapter, Medici rule in Florence was the result of a series of alliances with various members of the Florentine aristocracy. Cosimo the Elder ensured that these families had their share of Signoria offices. Therefore, Florence was not an absolutist state, but something more akin to the Augustan period of the \textit{principatus}. As such, Piero de Medici’s succession was contested and even led to an assassination attempt. The families behind this plot were among the most famous in Florence, such as the Acciaiuoli, the Pitti and the Soderini. However, not every single family member joined the plot against the Medici. There are cases of brothers taking opposite sides – one for the Medici and

\textsuperscript{569} ASF, Responsive Copiari I 118 rv, in Appendix II n. 130.
\textsuperscript{570} ASF, Responsive Copiari I 118 rv, in Appendix II n. 130. The end of the previous chapter showed how the galleys were able to travel safely to Constantinople. However, the difficulties tied to the galley’s journey represent very well the first problems Florence would have in sending wares to Constantinople during the Ottoman-Venetian war.
one for the plotters. In the Soderini family for example Niccolò supported the Medici and Tommaso was part of the plot against Piero de’ Medici.\textsuperscript{571}

This political turmoil had an impact on Florence’s internal and external policies, especially as it confirmed the Medici weaknesses in their rule of Florence. I particularly refer once more to the ennobling privileges granted to Florence by John VIII, which appear not to have been enough to stop the challenge to the Medici authority.\textsuperscript{572} Furthermore, in Rome the political affairs were no better. After Pope Pius II’s death the Conclave elected Paulus II as pope. The new pope was a Venetian of the noble family of Barbo. Florence soon realised that their hope that the idea of crusading would fade away would not come to pass. The new pope wrote in 1465 to request that Florence arm and dispatch the three galleys that Florence had repaired in Porto Pisano during the time of Pope Pius II.\textsuperscript{573} The Commune effectively carried out Pius II’s request as stated by the 1464 provision directed to the Florentine Sea consuls.\textsuperscript{574} The request made by Paul II makes me doubt that Florence in the end sent these galleys to Pius II, despite the promises made by the Signoria to the latter.

\textsuperscript{571} See especially for the Soderini’s brothers Clark 1991.
\textsuperscript{572} The forged privileges have been discussed in chapter II.
\textsuperscript{573} ASF, Responsive Copiari, 127v, in Appendix II n. 133.
\textsuperscript{574} ASF, Provisio, Protocolli 11 r 16. informati magnifici et potenti domini piores libertatis et vexillifer iustitie populi florentini quod de mense decembri provisum preterit domini qui tunc presidebat in officio sunt requisti cum magna instantia pro parte summi pontificis per eius proprium oratorem ad haris donationem tunc transmissum quod ipsi donatione placet venire de ipsi summo pontifici tre galeas...grossas et dues subtiles que tunc reparant fieri pisis de novo per officio consulum maris et ipsi domni quilibet dicta requisitio facta fuit habitio prius super hoc consilio multorum sapientium civium ipsum ex consilium penitus sequentes intellecto a dicto oratore quod ipse hec suprasede per aliquis opus neuiebat et pp responsium ad posita sibi fieri absque numia mora postulabat cum ...et rei qualitas non patereus congregati ...consilia oportuna habitio super hoc prius consilio multorum sapientium ...quod dicta donatio facta per dictos dominos dicto summo pontefice de dictis tribus galeis de quibus et per insuper narratur intelligatur esse et sit vigore pritus provisionis approbata totaliter et confirmata e valesse et vale et observare debuisse.
Moreover, lack of sources seems to suggest that Florence did not even send these three galleys to Paul II.

Pope Paul II carried on other initiatives. He decided to summon all Italian powers to discuss their contributions to the crusade and asked for still more in another letter sent to Florence. Florence replied to this letter on 7 June 1465, promising a contribution of 16,000 ducats. However, the Florentine Commune also reminded the pope of some of the difficulties the city was enduring. For example, Florence was afraid of a possible outbreak of bubonic plague.

The papal request was discussed in the pratiche. Francesco Neroni stated the necessity of dealing carefully with the request in order to keep the pope satisfied. The ambassador in Rome, Aloisio Guicciardini, was ordered to be wary and not to take any action without a specific order from the Commune. In a successive meeting, Mannio Temperano suggested that the issue should be discussed in the assemblies so that every important citizen could understand the situation. Mannio Temperano’s suggestion was only a pretext since in this meeting a fracture among the oligarchs in the pratiche on the issue of the crusade emerged.

In the past, members of the Acciaiuoli family, such as Angelo, did not hide his unhappiness due to Cosimo the Elder’s prudential diplomatic line with regard to the crusade. One of Acciaiuoli’s reasons might have been the destruction of

575 ASF, Responsive Copiari I 128-129 rv, in Appendix II n. 134.
576 ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancelleria,14-16, in Appendix II n. 137.
577 ASF, Signori, Missive I Cancelleria,14-16, in Appendix II n. 137.
578 ASF, Consulste e Pratiche 56 4r-5v, in Appendix II n. 135.
579 Idem, 5v-6r.
Acciaiuoli domination in Athens which had probably an impact on the Acciaiuoli family in Florence. The lack of sources about eventual connections between the Greek and the Italian branch of the Acciaiuoli’s family, does not exclude the existence of a communication channel between the Italian and the Greek branches of the Acciaiuoli’s family. Therefore, the Medici’s disinterest concerning the Greek branch of the Acciaiuoli might have impressed negatively the Florentine Acciaiuoli.

The Ottoman sultan, despite the preference given to Florence in Constantinople, did not have the same policy toward the Athenian/Florentine family of the Acciaiuoli. Francesco II, the last member and duke of the Acciaiuoli, was forced to abandon Athens for Thebes in 1458. Two years later, Mehmet II “suspected” a plot to reinstate the duke in Athens and ordered Zaganos Pasha, general and vizier of the sultan, to murder the last Florentine duke.580 Despite the lack of sources indicating any Florentine reaction whatsoever to events in Athens, one gets the impression that the Acciaiuoli were not quite “happy” with Mehmet II’s decision. Moreover, in the preceding years, Angelo Acciaiuoli had shown that he was less than enthusiastic about Cosimo’s plan to avoid the crusade, and in this case there might be a connection with the Acciaiuoli house in Athens.

The Acciaiuoli hostility emerged clearly in the pratiche on 27 May 1465. This pratica discussed the papal request for contributions and Angelo Acciaiuoli

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580 Miller 1921:159-160. Apparently the last duke of Athens offered himself to Sforza as condottiere. See Miller 1921:159 and even send an ambassador to Naples Miller 1921:160. Therefore, Mehmet II might have been not so mistaken to suspect a plot.
used strong words in its favour.\textsuperscript{581} Not only did Angelo Acciaiuoli suggest that Florence should pay the subsidies to the pope, he went on to urge an alliance with Venice and the kingdom of Hungary. The Acciaiuoli’s proposal was evidently unacceptable for the Medici, since it would put Florence decisively on the crusading side and risk a war against the Ottomans. The likely consequence of this war would have been the loss of all privileges enjoyed by Florentines in Constantinople and probably even the opportunity to have these privileges again in the future.

Needless to say, this course of action would have been catastrophic for Florentine businesses flourishing in Constantinople. Angelo Acciaiuoli most likely thought that the death of Cosimo the Elder opened new opportunities and that Piero de’ Medici’s power was far from being absolute. Carlo Pandolfini, someone close to the Medici position, suggested instead the usual Florentine tactic, that is, to contribute only when the other Italian powers would have done the same.\textsuperscript{582} In the end, the meeting decided to delegate the decision to the Consiglio dei Cento.\textsuperscript{583} This decision should not come as a surprise, as clear divergences emerged within the core of the Medici’s power for the first time. The Consiglio dei Cento was an ancient public office which had powers of control and supervision over the finances, but was later suppressed. However, in 1458 Cosimo the Elder decided to reform this ancient institution, and furthermore gave it more powers than in the past, especially in the ratification of legislative acts. The Consiglio dei Cento was of course Cosimo’s

\textsuperscript{581} ASF, Consulte e Pratiche 56, 6r-9v, in Appendix II n. 136.  
\textsuperscript{582} Idem.  
\textsuperscript{583} Idem.
stratagem to reinforce Medici power in Florence. The *Consiglio dei Cento* was also in charge of the Monte supervision, the main economic institute of the Commune, and even had the power to elect important offices.\textsuperscript{584} The elected offices included Florentine galleys roles, such as the conductor.

This decision to bring the matter to the *Consiglio dei Cento* was a victory for the Medici faction. The Medici were predominant in the *Consiglio dei Cento*, and therefore were able to suppress all the legislative acts that they did not like. The Medici proposal to bring the matter to the *Consiglio dei Cento* passed, since further letters from the pope confirm that Florence did not give the subsidies and again used dilatory tactics. The final confirmations come from another *pratica* on 16 October 1465. The reason for this meeting was a report by Jacopo Guicciardini, Florentine ambassador, who had left Naples for Rome to meet with the pope. He discovered that the pope had forbidden both Venice and Hungary from making peace with the Ottoman sultan. Moreover, the ambassador informed Florence that the pope was aware of the difficulties of Venice and Hungary, and therefore made clear that Rome was expecting subsidies from all Christian powers. This papal expectation confirms that the Commune delayed their crusade contributions.\textsuperscript{585} Giannozzo Pitti affirmed that the war between the Turks and Venice was very useful for Florence. Moreover, Pitti proposed to write to the pope that Florence was ready to back up the crusade.

\textsuperscript{584} Fubini 1987:150. Fubini describes the birth of the *Consiglio dei Cento* as a real and true organism of the regime.

\textsuperscript{585} ASF, Consulte e Pratiche 57 48r 49v, in Appendix II n. 146.
This proposal was likely a deception to avoid any peace negotiations between Venice and the sultan, which the Serenissima had begun to consider. Angelo Acciaiuoli suggested that if a peace was to be settled, it should not come about as a result of a lack of subsidies, especially from Florence.\textsuperscript{586} The latter opinion confirms once again the Acciaiuoli criticism of Medici policies and the presence of a disagreement within the Florentine elite as to its foreign policy. I believe it is clear that Florence was indeed aware of the good opportunities coming out of the Venetian-Ottoman war, but at the same time knew it needed to be cautious with the pope. Despite the Venetian-Ottoman war, Florentine galleys were still using the Levantine routes.\textsuperscript{587}

On 26 January 1465 three galleys safely returned to Porto Pisano from Constantinople, and with large cargoes. The commerce between the sultan and Florence was still active despite the threat made by the Venetian ambassador in 1463. It appears that Florence did not even evacuate the Florentine community in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{588} As shown in the previous chapter, Florence relied on its connections in Milan and with the pope in order to rebuff Venice’s unfavourable actions. In addition, Florence managed to achieve a diplomatic consensus with the Neapolitan kingdom. The relations between Florence and Naples, despite the initial quarrel with Ferrante I and the attack on the Florentine state galleys, began to

\textsuperscript{586} Idem. Angelo Acciaiolus. Postea scribendum videri hoc curandum ne si pax fiat cum turco dicatur pax facta esse qui non voluerint christiani et nostra civitas auxilium conferre.

\textsuperscript{587} See Mallett’s list in Mallett 1967:166-174.

\textsuperscript{588} ASF, Consoli del Mare 7, 65v-66v. It is interesting to note the presence of Genoese merchants on this cargo list.
improve. Florence established a bond with Ferrante I by once again taking advantage of its careful diplomatic policy. At the beginning of Ferrante I’s rule in Naples, erupted the first conflict between him and a vast faction of his barons. The cause was the lack of legitimacy for Ferrante I and the strong centralism imposed by Alphonse V. The barons decided to call to their aid Jean of Anjou. Venice did not assist Ferrante in this conflict. The alliance between Venice and Naples signed before the peace of Lodi, which was aimed at forcing Florence to capitulate, had apparently come to an end.

The reasons for the rupture between Naples and Venice lay in their competition over the Balkans. Both powers were interested in expanding their sphere of influence into the Balkans by using Skanderbeg’s resistance against the Ottoman Turks. Florence took advantage of this struggle between Venice and Naples. When the Neapolitan barons decided to revolt, Florence and Milan offered support to Ferrante I. The duke of Milan, Francesco Sforza, actively contributed in the war against the Neapolitan barons, and the Milanese duke even suggested to Ferrante I to attack Genoa in order to prevent an eventual use of the seaport for the Angevins, if called on by the rebels. The Milanese suggestion was not wrong since the offensive lead by Jean of Anjou, son of Rene I, took place with the support of Genoa. The Angevin initiative, however, met with failure. An important help came from the

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589 The Neapolitan attacks on the galleys in 1457 as shown in the previous chapter.
591 Caselli 2010:105.
Albanian leader, Skanderbeg, who first sent some men in Apulia and later joined the war himself.  

The revolt was crushed thanks to Ferrante I’s victory over the rebels near Troia’s plains, a locality in Apulia, on 18 August 1462. Afterwards, Giovanni Antonio del Balzo Orsini, prince of Taranto and leader of the rebels, died in November 1463. Florence was thus able to form a league with Milan and Naples in 1467. This league was a great success for the Medici since the kingdom of Naples was a key player, both for the balance of power in Italy, and Florence’s interests in the Levant. For example, since the formation of the league, Florentine galleys no longer experienced particular problems from Ferrante I’s corsairs or his admiral Bernat de Villamarí. Moreover, Florence was even able to give a condotta to Bernat de’ Villamarí and rely on the admiral for defensive and escort purposes as a stipendiato of the Florentine Signoria. Meanwhile, the Constantinopolitan business was so active that in May 1466 another two galleys were sent to the Levant and returned on 12 September.

Another objective fulfilled by Florence’s diplomacy, was the successful isolation of Venice in Italy. The reason why Florence wanted to isolate Venice was due to events in 1466. After Cosimo’s death, some of the most important families in Florence began to openly criticize Medici rule over the Commune, especially the

594 ASF, Legazioni e Commissarie 15 141. In Appendix II n. 117. The condotta states that Florence had hired and paid Villamari as condottiere.
Medici’s influence over the *accoppiatori*, the core of Medici power in Florence. The crucial moment for the plotters was the election of Tommaso Soderini as Standard-bearer of Justice. He was supposed to carry on reforms that would demolish Medici power, but failed completely in his attempt.\(^\text{596}\) As a consequence, the plotters decided to organise a coup in 1468, which failed as well. The internal Florentine struggle eventually led to the Pitti-Soderini-Neroni plot. The attempted coup, which also included the plan to kill Piero de’ Medici, was prevented and most of the rebels were exiled. Unsurprisingly, the exiled plotters went to Venice to ask for military support. Venice did not turn down their ambitions. Indeed, Venice entrusted its most renowned Venetian *condottiere*, Bernardo Colleoni, with a war against Florence.\(^\text{597}\) Venice’s goal, as stated by the same Venetian Senate, was the removal of Piero de’ Medici, and most likely the entire Medici family, from Florence.\(^\text{598}\)

Clearly, the league established in 1467 with Naples put Florence in a safer position and prevented further Venetian attempts to undermine Medici power in Florence. At the same time, the Florentine Signoria instructed its ambassador in Rome, Guicciardini, to reassure the pope of Florence’s goodwill towards the crusade. The significance of this specific order might have been a Florentine plan to force Venice to carry on the war against the Ottomans. In fact, Venice had used this to

\(^{596}\) For the *accoppiatori* office see page 119. On Soderini’s attempt see Clark 1991 and Najemy 2006:278-306.


\(^{598}\) ASV, Reg. Senato Secreti 19 80r MCCLXVII die XVIII Aprilis *Presentis ducis quem certi reddimur in re ista artificiose procedere: attento maxime quo iudicio nostro nuncuam passurus sit: quod petrus cosme a statu quem tenet removeatur. Et nos existimemus stante in florentia ipso petro alias res maximas in se habere difficultatis nihilominus idem illustrius capitem disponere potest circa hoc accessum suum sicut sibi videtur et placet quoniam de omni deliberatione sua contenti restabimus.*
justify to the pope its decision to open negotiations with the sultan, stating that the Serenissima was the only Italian power waging war against the Ottomans. Florence, therefore, willingly showed an interest in making contributions to Venice because, in this way, Venice was forced to continue the war against the Ottoman. Florence’s diplomacy, therefore, provided the pope with a necessary weapon to press Venice in carrying on with the war. At the same time, the league between Naples, Florence and Milan granted to Florence the necessary security in Italy to pursue its Levantine goals. In fact, Florentine galleys sailed almost regularly throughout the 1460s.

The Venetian threat to block Florence’s state-galleys proved ineffective, at least for the moment. Moreover, Venice’s war against the Turks in these years had settled into a stalemate. In the beginning, the war seemed to go favourably for Venice. The Serenissima and the king of Hungary managed to recover lands from the Ottomans both in the Morea and in Bosnia. However, the sultan’s reaction was immediate. Mehmet II quickly recovered the lost territories and, with Zaganos Pasha and Turhanoglu Omer Bey, went on the counter-offensive. Venice’s diplomacy was evidentially aware that if Venice was alone with the king of Hungary, then defeat was unavoidable. At this point contacts were being made between Naples and Venice, despite the former’s alliance with Florence and Milan. Most likely, Ferrante

599 ASF, Consulte e Pratiche 59, 1r. in Appendix II n. 165.
600 On the Ottoman-Venetian war see in general Babinger 1953, Setton 1969 and İnalcık 1989.
I viewed Ottoman expansion in the Balkans, ever closer to his kingdom, with a measure of concern.601

However, new events would again alter the political balance in Italy and lead to a rapprochement between Naples and Venice. The first was the siege and fall of Negroponte in 1470. Negroponte was strategically important for the Serenissima’s actions in the Levant. From there a Venetian fleet could directly threaten Constantinople. Mehmet II’s victory was immediately known in Italy and put the diplomatic balance maintained by the Florentine Signoria at risk. In 1470, Pope Paul II sent a letter to the Florentine Commune arguing that the fall of Negroponte signalled that it was time for all Christian powers to unite in a universal league against the Ottoman power.602 Yet another event would mark the shifting alliance of Naples from Florence to Venice. Only one year earlier, in 1469, the important Albanian leader Skanderbeg died. The death of Skanderbeg partly settled the Balkan struggles between Venice and Naples. Yet, the definitive push to a joint combination Naples and Venice came from the Ottoman occupation of most of Albania just after Skanderbeg’s death.603

If the news of the fall of Negroponte was probably welcomed in Florence, the fall of Albania was not. In fact, with the fall of Albania, the Ottoman Turks now

601 See the letter sent by Ferrante I to Florence which explicitly talks about the pro vicinitate periculi after Mehmet II’s conquest of Albania. Letter is in ASF, Responsive e Copiari II 23rv, in Appendix II n. 179.
602 ASF, Responsive Copiari II 22v-23, in Appendix II n. 178.
603 On the events in Albania after Skanderbeg’s death see Caselli 2010:171-172.
possessed, for the first time, a strategic location from which to directly threaten not only Venice but also the same kingdom of Naples, in particular Apulia.

The “Ottoman threat” for Ferrante I of Naples

Ferrante I was clearly concerned about the fall of Albania to the Ottomans. The Ottoman shadow was so close to Ferrante I’s kingdom that he wrote on 8 August 1470 a letter to the Florentine Commune in which he clearly urges the Signoria to unite with the efforts against the Ottoman threat. In this letter to Florence, Ferrante I states that “the closeness of the danger”, along with Mehmet II’s possession of the

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604 I would like to thank Alberto Imbrosciano for this map.
Aegean and Ionian islands, could lead to closure of the Adriatic Sea and an invasion of Italy. Of course, the Neapolitan king was more concerned about the possible invasion of the kingdom of Naples rather than Italy in general as the letter sent to the Florentine Signoria remarked the “pro vicinitate periculi” after the Ottoman conquest of Albania. At the time of the Neapolitan letter to Florence, the Venetian colony of Negroponte had already fallen. Soon, Florence discovered that the Ottoman sultan sometimes was not a good indirect ally. Here, the words ‘indirect ally’ is meant to define a specific situation in which Florence was simply taking advantage of the situation presented by the war between the Ottomans and Venice, but without any formal agreement between the Florentine Signoria and the Ottoman sultan. The fall of Albania and Negroponte pushed Naples and Venice to form an alliance which was dangerous news for the Florentine Signoria. In 1471 Venice and Naples, later to be joined by the duke of Burgundy, officially joined in a league against the Turks. In the agreement was also present the Grandmaster of Rhodes ad Turci offensionem.

The Venetian ambassador in Naples, Zaccaria Barbaro, sent a letter to Venice on 1 November 1471, which confirms the proclamation of the league between Naples and Burgundy. Here, the Florentine envoy is described as uneasy at the news of the signed league. Florence had strong reasons to be worried about this

605 ASF, Responsive e Copiari II 23rv, in Appendix II n. 179.
606 ASF, Responsive e Copiari II 23rv, in Appendix II n. 179.
607 Original source is in ASV, Senato Secreta Reg. 24 f. 119rv, league confirmed in Id. f. 176v—177rv.
609 Corazzol 1994:29-31 l’ambassador fiorentino non dimostro havere molto piacere per quanto dimostrava per i gesti suoi.
rapprochement between Naples and Venice. Naples and Venice represented a new axis of power that could become a danger to the Florentine trade routes in the Levant. An interesting example is provided by another report sent by Zaccaria Barbaro from Naples to Venice.⁶¹⁰ The Venetian ambassador states that, while he was meeting with the king of Naples, he reminded Ferrante I of his terrible mistake with regard to Florentine cloth. He explicitly stated that:

> Your Lordship had done things that at the beginning seemed useful to your Lordship but in the end they produced damages, since the Florentine cloths were after the ban diverted to Constantinople and this diversion in the end resulted in economic damage to your Lordship.⁶¹¹

Zaccaria Barbaro seems to indicate that the trade of panni Fiorentini between Florence and Constantinople was flourishing, to the detriment of the Neapolitan economy. It might be that Barbaro was only trying to put pressure on Ferrante I about Florentine trade in the Levant.

The addition of the kingdom of Naples to the crusade alliance was a victory for Pope Paul II, since the latter could use Neapolitan participation to pressure other Italian states, such as Florence and Milan. Unsurprisingly, the pope sent another letter with apocalyptic tones on 23 August, describing the threat represented by the

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⁶¹⁰ On Zaccaria Barbaro see DBI 1964 s.v. Barbaro Zaccaria.
⁶¹¹ Corazzol 1994:321 che vostra Signoria havea fatto alcuna volta dele cosse che al principio havea parso utile a la Signoria vostra et poi li erano resultate in damno et axime quella d’I panni da Fiorenza che dapoi el devedo erano andadi a Constantinopoli et fatto a vostra Signoria damno assai...It is not clear in which period this happened. It may be from the beginning of Ferrante I’s rule over Naples (1458) until the league was signed with Florence (1467), or from the end of the league with Florence (1470) to the year of Florence’s contributions to Naples (1472).
Moreover, Ferrante I sent a letter to Florence on 17 October 1470, which gives some hints about the diplomatic background in Italy and enhances the dangers represented from the Ottoman’s advance. This time it was the king of Naples who stressed the danger represented by the Ottoman threat for all of Italy and the entire Christian religion. However, the real purpose of this letter was to ask Florence for an intermediation with the new duke of Milan, Galeazzo Maria Sforza, who came to power after Francesco Sforza had died in 1466. The Neapolitan king was afraid of pursuing the expedition against the Turks without being certain of the neutrality of the Milanese duke, which is why he wanted to renew the league of Lodi. Most likely, Ferrante I wanted to win the favour of Florence because he needed the Medici to persuade Galeazzo Maria Sforza to join the league. Thus he probably restrained Venice from attacking Florentine galleys, as the same Zaccaria Barbaro states to Venice in a letter sent on 8 November 1471, in which he reports that the king of Naples ‘caresses the Florentines only because not all of them are of the opinion of the duke of Milan’.

Sforza’s opinion about the crusade at that time, just as his opinion about renewing the league of Lodi, was not favourable. He wanted the league to be renewed without including any additional clauses from the previous treaty signed in 1454. Sforza repeated this request at least two more times in the letter, and added a particularly enlightening sentence, which reads, “and if the pope or Venetians will

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612 Paul II’s letter is in ASF, Responsive e Copiari II, 25rv.
613 Ferrante I’s letter is in ASF, Responsive e Copiari II, 26v-27v, in Appendix II n. 183.
614 Corazzol 1994:36 Sua Maesta’ accarezza i fiorentini solo perché tutti non siano dela opinion del ducha di Milano.
not accept this” the duke would not have changed his mind and would have preserved the original content of the treaty.\textsuperscript{615} The reason why this sentence is enlightening is because it identifies the fears of the duke of Milan. One of the reasons why Milan did not want to renew the league was Galeazzo Maria’s personal aims, especially in regards to Piedmont, such as Vercelli, Asti and other locations.\textsuperscript{616}

Another element which may have contributed to Milanese uncertainty was the willingness expressed by the duke of Burgundy to contribute to the Crusade. The axis formed by Naples, Venice and Burgundy caused Milan to move closer towards the king of France, to whom Galeazzo Maria Sforza had been a \textit{condottiere}. In fact, Ferrante I feared the Angevins’ ambitions towards Italy. The duke of Milan, if encouraged to do so by circumstances, could have called the Angevins into Italy without hesitation. The French could have used the Genoese seaport since at the time the duke of Milan controlled it and Milan had cordial relations with the Angevins.\textsuperscript{617}

Not surprisingly, there was the same Venice behind the papal initiative for the league.\textsuperscript{618} However, unlike Florence, the duke of Milan was in the position to oppose a refusal in case of other papal requests for the crusade. The ties between Milan and the French were even stronger than they had been in the past, and especially after 1464, the year of the conquest of Genoa by the Milanese. Not surprisingly, Florence supported the Milanese attack against Genoa with supplies sent by sea.\textsuperscript{619} The same

\textsuperscript{615} ASF, Responsive Copiari II 28v29r, in Appendix II n. 184.
\textsuperscript{616} Fubini 1977:1.485-1.490.
\textsuperscript{617} See Caselli 2010:111.
\textsuperscript{618} Nebbia 1939:128-129.
\textsuperscript{619} ASF, Provvisioni Protocolli 66r 5 June 1464 ind. 12.
Louis XI king of France granted Genoa as a fiefdom to Milan after the duke’s request. Ferrante I was surely aware, therefore, of the double menaces which threatened the Neapolitan kingdom, and thus valued the safety of the double alliance with Venice and Burgundy. However, Florence did not enjoy the same protection such as Milan. Therefore, the Florentine Commune pressured Milan to allow the collections of tithes in its territory as the Florentines did not want to upset Naples, Ferrante I or the pope.

In fact, at the beginning of the 1470s, Florence seemed to change its position on the crusade. In 1470, Florence wrote a very favourable letter to the Neapolitan king, in which the Signoria defined the Turks as a “lethal plague”. Why did Florence appear so willing to support a renewal of the Italic league and to do so much against the Ottoman threat? The reason lies in Florence’s continued aim to maintain the political balance in Italy. New events once again threatened this balance. In 1466, as stated above, Piero de’ Medici thwarted the Acciaiuoli-Pitti-Soderini plot and the Venetian attempt to remove him from power. This local war was far from becoming a real threat, especially since Florence enjoyed the protection

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620 See Walsh 2005:32.
621 The new alliance of Naples, Venice and Burgundy was a horrid event for Florence. On this alliance see Fubini 1977:1.485-1.490.
622 Nebbia 1939:130. The letter is in ASF, Signori, Missive II Cancellaria, 49c Sentiamo quanto timore suscitino in tutta Italia e specialmente nel vostro Stato, a causa della vicinanza i progressi dei Turchi. E’ necessario opporsi prima che questa peste letale si diffonda ancor più. Il miglior modo per ottenere ciò è , secondo noi, l’unificazione dell’Italia in una lega, perché, così’ uniti diventiamo più potenti. Perciò abbiamo esortato il Papa affinché voglia benedire la lega e por rimedio alle cose d’Italia. Ci pare che ciò non sia difficile perché tanto noi quanto il duca di Milano, abbiamo mandato ambasciatori a Roma con piena facoltà di concludere la lega a difesa della Cristianità. Li specialmente non trascureremo nulla per soccorrere la religione ... tanto più ora che abbiamo sentito che tu corri grave pericolo. Nessuno, senza grande disonore, potrà astenersi dalla lega od ostacolarla.
of Milan. In the same years, further problems arose in Romagna due to the struggle between the Malatesta, the local ruling family and the pope.

To summarise these events, Sigismund Malatesta, lord of Rimini, had an agreement with the pope. This agreement stated that after Sigismund’s death the pope would assume possession of Rimini and other small cities in Romagna. Sigismund Pandolfo Malatesta (1417–1468) died in 1468, and subsequently Pope Paul II claimed Rimini and the other cities for the Patrimony of St. Peter. Roberto Malatesta (1441–1482), condottiere and one of Sigismund’s sons, first offered his services occupying the cities on behalf of the pope. However, after recovering the cities, Roberto Malatesta declared himself the new sovereign.\(^{623}\)

The risk of creating a conflict in Romagna was too great a danger for the Medici. The Signoria had always tried to keep the popes out of the affairs of Romagna due to the risk of larger papal territories near to Florence’s borders. As Florence’s diplomatic priority was to preserve the balance of power, the only solution was to resume the negotiations for the league. The best occasion to do so was in the aftermath of the Ottoman conquest of Negroponte in 1470, because this situation put new pressures on Venice and the pope. The fact that Florence was among the proposers of this league played in favour of the Florentine-papal relations. One ought to understand that Florence, still, had many interests in Rome, such as the alum concession in Tolfa, the apostolic depository and, in general, a good influence

\(^{623}\) On Romagna’s conflicts see Jones 1974: 245-248.
due to the banks. This diplomatic tactic could also explain the positive answer given to the Venetian ambassador who came to Florence on 12 October 1470. The ambassador, Antonio Priuli, described to the Florentine Signoria the fall of Negroponte, and again stressed the common threat represented by the Turks to the Christian world. The official answer of the Florentine Commune was supportive and stated the necessity of facing this issue and promised without any doubt to send emissaries to Rome. The Florentine Signoria also officially discussed the Turkish threat in the pratiche on 28 February 1471. The pratiche had to discuss the request for help against the Turks received from the king of Naples. Giovanni Canigiani argued that relations between Florence and Naples must not be endangered due to the business of Florentine merchants in the Levant. Luigi Guicciardini shared Canigiani’s proposal of giving 20,000 florins to Ferrante I, but specifically asked to remind the Neapolitan king that the Florentine Commune had sustained a number of expenses in the previous years due to Colleoni’s attack.

From the same pratiche also emerges the Florentine fear of what Mehmet II might do in response to such an act. Several voices inside the council raised worries about the safety of the Florentine merchants who operated in Constantinople. The fears of an Ottoman reaction were so great that Jacopo Pazzi even proposed calling Florentine merchants back from Constantinople. This discussion was carried out in

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624 On the Medici and the alum see De Roover 1963:152-164 and Zippel 1907. On the Medici’s power thanks to their bank see Goldthwaite 1987:3-31.
625 ASF, Signori risposte verbali di oratori 2 38rv, in Appendix II n. 182.
626 ASF, Consulte e Pratiche 60 121rv, in Appendix II n. 187.
627 Consulte e Pratiche 60 121rv, in Appendix II n. 187.
several other meetings and in the end, on 20 April 1471, Florence decided to give to the Neapolitan king the promised subsidies. Tommaso Soderini remarked that it was important for Florence to keep its good relations with the kingdom of Naples by means of these contributions. From a Neapolitan source we learn that Florence even gifted six galleys to the Neapolitan king in 1472 in the first three months of this year. This powerful contribution from Florence, rather than attributing to the Commune characteristics of crusading fervour, has to be seen as a result of the importance held by Naples in Florence’s diplomacy.

Again, the Ottoman Turks became instrumental for determining the aims of the Florentine Commune, especially in regard to its diplomatic goals. The contribution, in this case, was an instrument used by Florence to achieve the peace in Italy, seen as ever more necessary due to the axis of Venice-Naples; the papal aims in Romagna and the Florentine exiles armed by Venice and led by Colleoni.

This interpretation excludes any possibilities of speaking of philo-Ottomanism or philo-papalism, as these two categories cannot and should not be applied to the Florentine policies of the period. Florence decided to contribute willingly to the Neapolitan military expenses, even if this went against the Ottomans. One ought to recall that Florence was still actively trading with the sultan, therefore

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628 ASF, Consule e Pratiche 60 124v-125r, in Appendix II n. 190.
629 Schiappoli 1972:29. The source is in RASN, Ced. Di Tesor., LIV (1470) f. 44 t. -245 payment of ten ducats to Pietro Bosch for going and coming back from Pisa, leading the six galleys that the Florentine Commune has gifted to the king of Naples for the months of January, February, March, April and May.
one must exclude any crusading interpretation, but rather underline again both the importance of Naples and Constantinople for the Florentine Signoria.

However, the renovation of Lodi’s league, beyond helping to pacify Italy and reassure Florence amidst diplomatic tensions, did not stop papal appeals for the crusade. On 17 December 1471, the pope sent a new letter to Florence, questioning the city about the crusade. The pope expected Florence to provide 25 galleys, a considerable fleet if one considers the capacity of the Florentine sea-power.630 The papal request was considerable. This letter came not from Pope Paul II who had died in 1471 but from the new pope, Sixtus IV. With Sixtus IV, Florence’s goal to maintain the political balance in Italy started to crumble and at the same time, the Medici were hard pressed to survive the challenges posed by the pope’s family, Riario-Della Rovere and the armies of the kingdom of Naples.

Sixtus IV, Florence and the Levant in the period of Lorenzo the Magnificent until the Pazzi plot (1471-1478)

The election of Sixtus IV, previously known as Francesco Riario-della Rovere, took place on 9 August 1471. Despite the previous pope’s death, the crusade project did not stop. On the contrary, the new pope vigorously followed his predecessor’s plan. The letter delivered on 17 December 1471, sent by Sixtus IV to Florence, was quite straightforward in what it requested. Contrary to the past demands made by Paul II,

630 ASF, Responsive Copiari II 40vr, in Appendix II n. 194.
this time the new pope asked not only for contributions, but for military support in the form of 25 war galleys.

Piero de’ Medici did not survive much longer after the Acciaiuoli-Soderini-Pitti coup against him in 1466, dying only three years later in 1469 from the gout he had been suffering from all his life. Lorenzo de’ Medici, Piero’s son and later known as the Magnificent, took command in Florence.

In the 1470s, the simplest solution to find allies against the Ottomans was for Venice to establish a league with Naples and Burgundy. This league should have provided, in the Venetian hopes, additional naval power, through Naples, and the necessary land power, through the duke of Burgundy, to fight the Ottomans. The Serenissima was not only waging war against the Ottomans in the Levant. In Italy, Venice’s diplomacy was again focused on impeding non-Venetian trade, especially that of Florence, Ancona and Genoa with Constantinople. Zaccaria Barbaro reported to Venice that “the duke (of Milan) and the Florentines work with the Turk, their galleys go to Constantinople and in general everyone does whatever they want”. The relationship between Florence and Naples, despite the contribution of 20,000 florins and the six galleys given in the same year, did not protect Florentine interests. Several events brought about this result. Surely, the fall of Albania to the Turks and the concerns expressed by Ferrante I must be considered. The Ottoman conquests, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, put the kingdom of Naples dangerously exposed to a possible Ottoman attack.

631 Corazzol 1994:380 el ducha et fiorentini lavoreriano cum el turcho, le galeace sue vano a Constantinopoli et ognuno faceva quello I volevano.
In the past, Ferrante I might have welcomed Venetian defeats because the Serenissima was still a matter of concern in Italy due to the vast power it held. The second reason was the mistrust between the duke of Milan and the king of Naples, since Galeazzo Maria Sforza was connected to France and Florence was an ally of Milan. Besides, Galeazzo Maria Sforza had married Bona of Savoy, who was the sister-in-law of Louis XI, king of France. 632 Third, Florence, after the subsidy of 20,000 florins and the six galleys sent around 1471-1472, believed that Ferrante I would be satisfied. However, Venice and the king of Naples agreed in 1472 that Florentine trade with the Ottomans was indeed damaging their war effort, and therefore decided to block it. In fact, the king of Naples supported Venice’s proposal to combine his ambassador with the Venetian emissary in a united embassy in order to push the pope in forbidding any Florentine or Genoese commercial expedition to Constantinople. Since Genoa was part of the Milanese dominion, the joint Venice-Naples embassy can be interpreted as a hostile act against the Milanese-Florentine coalition. 633 The tactic adopted by Venice and Naples showed how important Constantinople was for the Florentine market. For Naples had even banned Florentine cloth in the kingdom. However, as we have seen from Zaccaria Barbaro’s report, this Neapolitan policy met with complete failure. 634 The shift towards the Levantine market damaged the Neapolitan economy, as the Venetian ambassador

632 Dover 2005:81-82.
633 Corazzol 1994:380 Mi rispose io diceva la verita…scrivere a suoi oratore in Corte presso nostro Signore facesse ogni instantia le galeazze dei fiorentini ne’ nave de’ Zenovesi vadino a Costantinopoli.
634 For the ban see Corazzol 1994:321. See also n. 43.
states in the aforementioned letter to the king Ferrante I. Naples and Venice therefore decided to strike directly at the source of Florentine wealth.\footnote{The aforementioned letter is in Corazzol 1994:380.}

The Neapolitan tactic is once again confirmed in another letter written around 4 or 5 October 1472. Barbaro received a confirmation from Ferrante I that the Neapolitan king had written to Anello, ambassador of Naples in Rome, who together with the Venetian emissary was ready to ask to the pope the interruption of all commercial expeditions to the Levant. This measure was especially addressed against the Florentine and Genoese ships.\footnote{Corazzol 1994:380 \textit{Sua Maesta’ ha scritto a Messer Anello in Roma che insieme al Veneziano debbano bloccare ogni nave e galeazza che vada sullo stretto.}} However, by the end of 1472, Venice had realised that the alliance with Naples was not useful for its goals. Naples and Burgundy did not really support the Venetian war. In fact, from 1472 Venice began to approach Florence.

The reason for this diplomatic initiative was probably the mutual interest to keep the peace in Italy. Florence and Venice were not interested in on-going wars in Italy. Florence, for the usual reasons connected to commerce, while Venice, because it was already in an exhausting war against the Ottomans. Moreover, the duke of Milan was more interested in keeping the duke of Burgundy out of Italy and expanding Milanese influence to the Savoy, especially Asti and Vercelli in Piedmont. This Milanese necessity is also one of the reasons why Milan did not want the universal league, as the treaty would have stopped its plan.\footnote{Fubini 1977:1.485-1.490.} Naples, despite the alliance signed with Burgundy and Venice, apparently did not contribute enough to
the war against the Ottoman. The Venetian ambassador in Naples reported to Venice that Ferrante I had recalled from the Levant the Neapolitan admiral. Venice’s interest in the league with Florence can be summarised in two important points: the first was that by maintaining the peace in Italy the Serenissima could have focused on the war against the Turks. The second reason was that within the league it was easier to obtain contributions for the war against the Ottoman empire.

The league between Florence, Venice and a reluctant Milan was officially signed on 2 November 1474. The alliance with Venice was made necessary for Florence by the papal siege of Città del Castello. The city itself was not an important town, but it was in a very important geographical position on the border between the Holy See and the Florentine Signoria. The pope ordered the siege in opposition to Niccoló Vitelli. The Medici were supporters of the Vitelli. Their wish to help in the siege led Lorenzo to seek stronger allies to replace Naples. On this occasion, for the first time in their relationship, the duke of Milan refused to help the Florentines.

Lorenzo de’ Medici feared that Milan was no longer reliable. Moreover, the departure of Naples from the league in the early 1470s pushed the Medici to find another ally. Venice was the perfect option to counterbalance the loss of Naples, as Venice was the only power in Italy with the military strength to contest the kingdom of Naples. Finally, with Venice as an ally, the Florentine state-galleys would no longer have to worry about Venetian attacks.

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638 Corazzol 1994:379-401 (and others see the table of names since the list is long).
However, the alliance between Florence and Venice concerned Sforza. Galeazzo Maria Sforza tried to persuade Lorenzo that this alliance with Venice was going to be a problem for the Medici in the future. The duke at this point used the usual Florentine tactic and tried to use the war against the Turks as a way to pressure the pope into once again promoting the Italic league, and therefore avoid an alliance between Florence and Venice. However, the Milanese plan faltered in the face of Florentine opposition. The duke of Milan had no choice but to enter the league, even demanding to be part of it. Clearly, a Florence-Venice alliance would entirely isolate the duke of Milan in northern Italy. Sforza even threatened the Medici with the possibility of a Milanese deal with the king of Naples. The Medici understood that Milan would have no need of the Medici if Sforza was to ally with Ferrante I, and at the same time Rome and Naples were sending alarming signals. The pope, aware of the disagreement between Milan and Florence over Venice, was trying to conciliate Milan and Naples. The danger of a possible understanding between Milan and Naples gave the final push to the Florentine Signoria in its alliance with Venice. Consequently, the duke of Milan was forced to agree in this alliance, failure to do so would have risked isolating the duke in Italy. Sforza even threatened Lorenzo to allow Milan into the alliance.

The league between Florence, Milan and Venice, which became official in 1474, represented a failure of the papal attempt to break the axis of Milan and

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640 Fubini 1977:1.487.
641 Fubini 1997:488.
642 Fubini 1997:488.
Florence. Soon, Lorenzo de’ Medici faced several situations which brought serious risks to Medici power. Four were the key events: the competition over the possession of the city of Imola against the pope, the resistance made by Lorenzo de’ Medici to the appointment in 1475 by the pope of Francesco Salviati Riario as archbishop of Pisa, the assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza in 1476 and the famous Pazzi plot in 1478.

In 1474, Pope Sixtus IV decided to appoint Francesco Salviati-Riario, a blood relative of his, to the archbishopric of Pisa. Lorenzo de’ Medici was against this appointment and refused to accept the pope’s choice. This unwanted appointment by the pope indicates that the political influence of the Medici in Rome was starting to fade. Since the acquisition of Pisa by the Florentines in 1409, the control of the archbishopric was a matter of capital importance for the Signoria. Unsurprisingly, the predecessor of Riario-Salviati was Filippo de’ Medici, of the cadet branch of the Medici. Moreover, Filippo de’ Medici was not the only case since Cosimo de’ Medici had always tried to influence the election of favourable bishops in the cities subjected to the Florentine Signoria’s rule. However, Francesco Riario-Salviati was a declared enemy of the Medici house, and he was to become one of the main conspirators in the Pazzi Plot. This papal attack was only the beginning in a series of attacks directed not against Florence, but specifically the Medici. This can be seen in July 1474, in the same year, when Sixtus IV decided to

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644 Another case is Donato de’ Medici elected as bishop of Pistoia in 1436. See Eubel 1898: 2.216. For Filippo de’ Medici see Eubel 1898:2.94.
replace the Medici bank from the Depositary General with the Genoese Meliaduce Cigala.\textsuperscript{645} Furthermore, the next year, in 1476, Sixtus IV granted to the banks of the Pazzi family, now second in Florence only to the Medici, the alum monopolies in Tolfa and the Crusade Depository. Therefore, Roman businesses, although still in Florentine hands, were lost to the Medici.\textsuperscript{646}

It is quite surprising that the Medici did not foresee the incoming Pazzi plot or the potential danger posed by a hostile papacy. The Medici, for the first time since Cosimo the Elder took power in 1434, witnessed the collapse of the relationship with the pope. Even with Pius II, Florence had managed to maintain normal relations, otherwise the pope would have never granted the alum mines of Tolfa to Cosimo de’ Medici.

Despite the prudent policies enacted by both Cosimo and Piero, who had always made it their policy to appease the popes, Lorenzo de’ Medici had to face the aggressiveness of Sixtus IV. A perfect example is the city of Imola. Pope Sixtus IV had always tried to expand in Romagna, considering it the domain of the Patrimony of St. Peter. Romagna was divided between small, local signori, and an ideal aim of a territorial expansion.\textsuperscript{647} The city of Imola was under the control of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, but in a very important strategic position very close to Florence. The papal acquisition of the city represented a nearby threat to Florence in the form of papal

\textsuperscript{646} For the Tolfa’s alum see De Roover 1963:164.
\textsuperscript{647} The more emblematic case in Romagna would have been the renowned Cesare Borgia, who became the duke of Romagna thanks to Alexander VI, pope and father of the former. Signori means lords.
power, or more specifically the Riario-Della Rovere. One must remember that Francesco Salviati was also related to the Riario. Potentially, Florence would have a Riario in Rome, another one in Pisa and one in Imola (Sixtus IV, Francesco Riario-Salviati and Girolamo Riario respectively). Therefore, rather than a fight between the pope and Florence, the ensuing war was between the Medici and the Riario-Della Rovere. The marriage in 1473 between Caterina Sforza, illegitimate daughter of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, and Girolamo Riario, nephew of the pope, opened the doors to Imola. The Pazzi, moreover, lent the necessary money for the purchase of Imola from the duke of Milan to the pope, despite the fact that Lorenzo de’ Medici refused a loan to the pope and gave similar recommendations to all Florentine banks.\textsuperscript{648} The relationship between Sixtus IV and the Florentine Commune, and specifically the Medici family, was therefore officially broken. The subsequent plot, which took the name of the Pazzi conspiracy, was probably the natural conclusion of a struggle between the Riario and the Pazzi against the Medici.

Before the Pazzi plot, another event shook the foundation of Florentine power in Italy, that is, the 1476 assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, the duke of Milan, by Lampugnani, Visconti and Olgiati.\textsuperscript{649} While it is not clear if there was a connection between the Riario and Sforza’s death, it is certain that the death of the duke of Milan represented another hit to Florence’s power. Despite the imperfect relations at the time between the Medici and the Sforza, Florence still relied heavily on its Milanese ally for its military defence, and Milan was still a part of the 1474 league

\textsuperscript{648} Pastor 1899:293.
\textsuperscript{649} On the assassination of Sforza see Ilardi 1972:72-103.
with Venice and Florence. Another reason for the Medici to worry was the fact that Sforza’s heir, Gian Galeazzo Sforza, was a minor, only seven years old. Lorenzo de’ Medici most likely witnessed these events with concern. Following Sforza’s assassination, the pope asked the regent Duchess of Milan Bona of Savoy to remove the 400 soldiers in Imola that Galeazzo Sforza was using to maintain control of the city against Girolamo Riario. After a papal embassy had arrived in Florence, Lorenzo de’ Medici seemed to accept the papal request for Imola. Most likely, Lorenzo had to accept that the Pazzi were gaining an influential position in Rome, and since the takeover of Imola was already complete, there was no need to create further problems with the Riario-Della Rovere. In later years, the pope would try again to impose contributions on the Italian states of 16,000 ducats, to be sent to the Hungarian king. Florence, along with Bona Sforza, duchess of Milan and acting regent, decided to decline the requested subsidies, enumerating the present difficulties after the assassination of the duke of Milan. The Florentine Signoria gave the same answer to the Venetian ambassador Piero Molin on 8 July 1477. After the king of Hungary made peace with Mehmet II in the beginning of 1477, Venice began to suffer heavily in their war with the Ottomans. Therefore, the original contributions planned since September 1476 ended, as had often happened, in complete failure. It stands to a reason that Florence considered the subsidies as an

650 See the request to Milan after Piero’s coup. Moreover, Milan played a part also in the successive war between Florence and the exiled led by the condottiere Colleoni.
651 Fubini 1977:2.258.
652 Fubini 1977:2.331.
unnecessary favour to Venice. Despite the *lega particolare* enacted in 1474 between Florence, Milan and Venice, Lorenzo de’ Medici and Milan did not want to give more money to Venice. Perhaps Florence since it had already obtained the league with Venice thought it was unnecessary to provide Venice with more money.

The Pazzi coup occurred in Florence on 26 April 1478. Lorenzo de’ Medici and Giuliano de’ Medici were attacked by Bernardo Bandini Baroncelli and Jacopo de’ Pazzi while they were attending mass in the Florentine cathedral. Giuliano fell under the assault, but Lorenzo managed to escape the church and reach his home. Meanwhile, Francesco Salviati-Riario, the archbishop of Pisa, directly attacked the palace of the Signoria but was repulsed, captured and hanged by Medici loyalists. The same cardinal Raffaele Riario was eventually captured and imprisoned in Florence.

The plot completely failed as Florence refused to rise against Medici power and even fought back against the attempted coup.\(^{654}\) That same day, Lorenzo de’ Medici wrote a letter to Bona Sforza, asking for urgent military help in order to secure the Medici position in Florence. The Milanese answer was positive, but Lorenzo de’ Medici did not know that the coup had already failed. With the arrest of Raffaele Riario and the execution of Jacopo, Renato de’ Pazzi and Francesco Salviati, the crisis passed. The consequences of this coup would be the collapse of relations between the papacy and Florence into a state of war. Pope Sixtus IV

\[^{654}\text{Accounts of the happenings are in Landucci 1985:17-20, Rinuccini 1840:127-128, Poliziano 1769. For the secondary literature see Martines 2003 and about Federico of Montefeltro’s involvement see Simonetta 2003:261-284.}\]
excommunicated Lorenzo de’ Medici and placed Florence under papal interdiction. Finally, the kingdom of Naples, instigated by Sixtus IV, invaded Florentine territory just after the ecclesiastical provisions were launched against Florence and the Medici. The war ended in 1479 after Lorenzo’s personal travel and negotiations conducted with Ferrante I. However, the negotiations did not prevent the presence of the duke of Calabria’s troops in Tuscany which still represented a sensible threat for the Medici.\footnote{On Lorenzo’s travel and negotiations to Naples see De Angelis 1992:385-422.}

**Conclusion**

In the case of the Ottoman-Venetian war, scholars have generally considered Lorenzo de’ Medici an ally of the Ottomans and directly involved with the sultan. In my opinion, this interpretation is distorted. Past scholars have naturally interpreted the events from the Florentine perspective. As we will see in the following chapter, this methodology is not the most correct since the Ottoman empire had the leading role in relations with Florence. From the Ottoman point of view the analysis of the events becomes quite different.

Florence was clearly a power in between two superpowers such as Venice and the Ottomans. The surprising element here is how Florence despite the complete lack of any military power managed to obtain from the Ottoman-Venetian war benefits from both Venice and the Ottoman empire. In the first part of the war
obviously Florence tended to the neutrality with respect to Venice thus the league with Naples and Milan in 1464. When the alliance with Naples started to crumble around 1470s, Florence reversed its alliance with Venice and signed the league with the Serenissima and Milan in 1474. This diplomatic acumen allowed Florence to keep its trade with the Ottomans despite the fact that the Signoria actually contributed to the crusade in order to favour its political aims in Italy.

The last obstacle Florence faced during the Ottoman-Venetian war was the pope. In this case, thanks to the Medici, the Florentine Commune possessed influential instruments, such as the banks and the control of the apostolic depository. The same Venetian ambassador in Naples, Zaccaria Barbaro, stated, already by 1471, that Florence was paying all the debts of the pope and the cardinals.656 This influence must have been of a certain magnitude. As a result, Pope Paul II at first refused communion for Florentine merchants in Constantinople, but was later forced to withdraw this provision, which shown the influence held by the Medici in Rome thanks to their banks.657

Even if Florence was militarily not powerful, the Medici could rely on an extensive network of information and the political influence thanks to their banks. The network helped Florence and the Medici in choosing the best policies. The only moment this network did not work efficiently was the Pazzi plot. The Medici did not see this event coming and Lorenzo de’ Medici did pay the price. Not only did he

656 Corazzol 1994:50.
657 Goldthwaite 1987:3-31. See, also, the statement of the Venetian ambassador Barbaro who acknowledged the Medici influence thanks to their banks in Corazzol 1994:50.
almost lose control of Florence itself, but he did lose his brother Giuliano. The failure of the Pazzi plot definitively reinforced Lorenzo’s power and the Medici regime in Florence.

In conclusion, I think that the Florentine attitude during the Ottoman-Venetian war was mainly oriented to maintaining both the status quo in Italy and the good relations with the sultan. Florence, as we will see, did collect intelligence for the sultan, but also gave subsidies to be used against the Ottomans. These behaviours are not contradictory with each other, but rather are coherent within the Florentine political agenda. Just as Florence, similar is the case of Ragusa. However, there is a certain degree of difference. Ragusa was a city obliged by the position to maintain good relations with both the West and the Ottoman empire, while Florence enjoyed relative security from the Ottoman empire by being located in the central part of Italy.\footnote{On Ragusa and its role of intermediation between East-West Mediterranean see Krekić 1972, Id. 1986.}
CHAPTER VII

Florence and the Ottomans (1468-1481)

Introduction

Florence managed to obtain a great deal from Mehmet II in Constantinople in the beginning of the 1460s following the ahd-nāme presumably granted by the sultan to the Commune in 1458-60. Mehmet II appears to have preferred Florence among the Western powers because it posed no real danger using a low military power and the near absence of a war fleet. In this way, Florence became a privileged partner of the Ottoman sultan, but was in no position to influence Ottoman policies. Mehmet II might have considered several other elements which made him to choose Florence rather than, for example, Ancona. Ancona’s political power in Italy was lesser compared to Florence. Unlike Ancona, Florence thanks to its banks was able to have an influencing power and an extensive network especially with regard the papacy. This political weight might have been considered by the sultan since Mehmet II was always looking for ways to have information as much as possible up-to-date. I am not persuaded that an eventual cultural admiration had its part. Surely, Mehmet II had always attempted to bring to Constantinople individuals of renowned cultural fame. Gentile Bellini is one of the most famous cases. However, intensive cultural
relations with Venice, for example, failed in preventing the Ottoman from attacking the Venetian empire in the Levant. Again, political and economic reasons were more determinant than cultural elements. What is certain is that from 1458 to 1469 the Florentine galleys in the Levant became an annual sight.\textsuperscript{659} Especially when compared to the Byzantine period, it is clear that Florence enjoyed a major improvement in trade conditions in the Levant.

This section will focus on the relationship between Florence and the Ottomans from the death of Piero de’ Medici in 1468 until 1478. The analysis of the diplomatic contacts between Florence and the Ottoman empire will be presented from the Ottoman point of view. In a correct diplomatic analysis, I think that the most accurate approach is to use the perspective of the leading power in the relationship. Moreover, I will also highlight the difficulties for Florence in maintaining good diplomatic relations with both the pope and the Ottomans. Finally, I will contest Babinger’s definition of philo-Ottomanism attributed to Florence’s diplomacy.

I will stress the idea that it is impossible to define the Florentine-Ottoman relation as balanced due to the much more powerful state of the Ottoman empire. Florence’s diplomacy was mainly reactive in its relation with the Ottoman empire.

\textsuperscript{659} Mallett 1967:169-176. 1461 two great galleys, 1462 three great galleys, 1463 three great galleys about to sail for Levant, 1466 two great galleys sailed for Levant 1467, the Ferrandina sailed for Constantinople, 1468 two great galleys sailed for Levant 1469, two great galleys prepared to sail for Levant, 1471 Ferrandina sailed for Levant, 1472 two great galleys about to sail for Constantinople and so on until 1478 which is just before the Pazzi Plot.
Moreover, I will take into consideration the considerably different power held by Florence and the Ottoman empire.

Unfortunately, the direct correspondence between the Commune and the sultan in this period (1464-1481) is quite rare and usually refers to episodes of low importance or petition made to the sultan in favour of single individuals or the Florentine community. The chronological gap between the letters is also significant. Some letters are even separated by three years, despite the “optimal relations” between Florence and the Ottomans. The pratiche are once again a crucial source to understand the significance for Florence of the Ottoman understanding. Thanks to these discussions among the most prominent citizen of the Florentine Signoria we are aware of details, previously unknown, which shed an interesting light on the real state of this relationship between Florence and the Ottomans. Another valuable source for this analysis is the chronicle of Benedetto Dei since it is the main evidence of the sultan’s interactions with the Florentine community in Constantinople.

The last issue tackled here is the conquest of Otranto by the Ottomans. Scholars have sometimes doubted the good will of the Florentine Commune and even accused the Florentine Signoria of active collaboration with Mehmet II. To undertake this, I will examine the medal made by Bertoldo di Giovanni (1480-1481) and some unpublished sources describing this critical event for the diplomatic history in the fifteenth century. This chapter will end with the death of Mehmet II when the Ottomans were weakened due to the civil war between Bayezid II and Djem Sultan.
Florence and the Ottomans: an unequal relationship (1468-1478)

I shall begin by introducing the official correspondence between the Florentine Commune and Constantinople. One of the first letters, after the grants of the privileges in 1464, simply petitioned the sultan to help the Florentine Signoria to get back the wares stolen by the Catalan pirate Suordinave. Despite the crusade decreed by Pope Pius II, the argument of this letter has nothing to do with the impending war. The letter contains nothing further of interesting detail, but confirms the presence of Catalan corsairs, which were quite common in the Mediterranean.

The second letter comes three years later in 1467. The Signoria wrote to the sultan and petitioned him to provide protection for the Florentine merchants and safeguard the belongings of those who had died in Constantinople. The Signoria sent a similar letter to the Florentine consul in Pera, Mainardo Ubaldini, urging him to obtain the protection of the sultan over the properties of dead Florentine merchants. One of the most interesting elements of this letter is the use of the term “natio” by the Florentine Signoria when referring to the Florentine merchants in Constantinople. The term “natio” made this document the first letter in which the Florentine Signoria finally acknowledged the Florentine community in

660 Müller 1879:201.
661 ASF, Responsive Copiari I 103v-104v. In Appendix II n. 105. In this letter received from René of Anjou on 5 November 1461 it emerges that Florence also suffered from the attacks of the Provencal corsairs, as well.
662 Müller 1879:206-207.
Constantinople as institutional. The organisation of the colony in Pera had most likely reached a noteworthy number of elements.

The next letter to Mehmet II was two years later, in 1469. The letter is rather formal in its contents. The Signoria thanked Mehmet II for the favours he had granted to the Florentine community. This document refers to the possible extension of the capitula. It is plausible that Mehmet II agreed to protect the wares of the dead Florentine merchants in Constantinople in compliance with the previous request.

At the time of this letter, Venice and the Ottoman empire had been at war for more than five years. Venice, moreover, was already threatening to block the trade route to Constantinople, specifically in the Aegean Sea. This Venetian policy particularly affected the Florentine, Genoese and Anconitan galleys.\textsuperscript{663} This period was relatively difficult for the Signoria, as Florence’s sea capabilities were nothing in respect to the long maritime expertise and tradition possessed by the Venetians.\textsuperscript{664} The terminology of “\textit{benivolentia}” can mean literally anything from being a simple protection to a favour, indicating a rather preferential position or even material grants. Therefore, this letter might also contain an indirect suggestion about a

\textsuperscript{663} The Anconitan galleys used to trade Florentine wares. For the Venetian attacks see Thiriet 1971: n. 2189 21 September 1463. The \textit{Serenissima} ordered Alvise Loredan to block any Florentine galleys in the Aegean Sea. See also ASV, Reg. Senato Secreti 19 83r MCCLXVII die XVIII Aprilis \textit{Preterea se tu trovasi nave alchuna de Anchoritani o ver altra nationi la qual volesse entrar nel streto di Galipoli volemo che quella aver quello intromittere et retignire tu debbi et farli tuo tute marchadantie arme munitioni et robe fossino in quelle facendole descargar in qualche terra over luogo nostro et facendo far particular et distinto inventario de tute cosse haverà stato descargar azo che sempre se possi veder el conto de quelle...idi proxime passadi del devedar de le nave non possano intrar nel streto de Galipoli.

\textsuperscript{664} An example of Venetian attacks. ASF, Missive I Cancelleria 45 342-343 … \textit{in italiam ex thracia due naves revehebantur que etsi anconitanorum essent nostrorum tamen mercatores plurimas ac pretiosas merces verehebant has igitur a nonnullis vestre classis biremibus captas et postque in modoni portum adducvte sunt omnibus rebus spoliatas.
possible military support given by the sultan to the Florentine galleys dispatched to Constantinople.

In fact, Mehmet II expected at least an annual expedition from Florence, as evidenced by the letter sent from the consul of Pera to Florence, in which the sultan enquired with the consul about the galleys that Florence was supposed to send.\textsuperscript{665} The contents of the Florentine letters to the sultan seem to be more about ordinary administration rather than political matters. As such, the letters seemed to lack any elements regarding possible Florentine espionage in favour of the sultan. There are some exceptions, such as the letter sent in 1472 to Mehmet II regarding Lorenzo Davanzati. Despite the formal writing in the letter, there are some noteworthy details. The first detail is that Davanzati, at the time of the letter, was travelling to Constantinople with two galleys.\textsuperscript{666} The second detail is that Florence seemed to apologise for not having sent galleys in recent years due to the plague which affected Constantinople since 1466-1467.\textsuperscript{667} This plague had to be a serious event for the Florentine community in Constantinople since several Florentine merchants died in the outbreak.\textsuperscript{668} Yet, the fact that it was necessary to justify the lack of galleys to the sultan seems more a consequence of the blockade enacted by the Venetians on the Aegean Sea. The reason why the Signoria never mentioned the Venetian blockade to the Florentine galleys to the sultan is doubtless of political nature. Florence most

\textsuperscript{665} ASF, Signori Otto di Pratica Dieci di Balia Legazioni Commissarie Missive 77, in Appendix II n. 128.
\textsuperscript{666} Müller 1879:217.
\textsuperscript{667} Varlik 2008:32.
\textsuperscript{668} Dei 1985:100-103, 153.
likely feared that Mehmet II would choose another more reliable commercial partner. The consequences of losing this trade arrangement would mean Florence would be cut off from all commercial improvements made in the Ottoman empire.

There are two additional letters that give notable information and provide some suggestion on both the organisation of the Florentine colony in Constantinople and the content of the capitula granted by the sultan. The Florentine Commune sent these letters in 1474, to the consul Mainardo degli Ubaldini and to the sultan. The Florentine Commune petitioned Mehmet II to grant their consul the legal jurisdiction, along with enough coercive power, to restore and maintain order in the Florentine Community. The other letter, sent to Mainardo, contains elements that concerned the Florentine community in Constantinople. The tone used is quite explicit in acknowledging the problems in the Florentine colony. The Florentine Commune reprimanded Mainardo degli Ubaldini, as he was unable to maintain the control of some Florentines in Constantinople.669

The Ottomans and Florence might have used other means of communication. In Babinger’s article on relations between Italy and Mehmet II, Florence appears to rely more on merchants or particular agents of the Medici house rather than official messengers.670 The aforementioned Benedetto Dei was one of these possible agents. Another possible Medici agent is the practically unknown Pagolo da’ Colle, who appears in a few Medici documents. These special missions were mostly connected

670 Babinger 1963. The author describes the relations between the Medici house and Pagolo da’ Colle and the latter’s mission carried out on behalf of the Medici.
to the Ottomans. For example, on the occasion of Bayezid II’s ambassador, Ibrahim’s visit in 1484, Pagolo was the person whom Lorenzo de’ Medici appointed to escort the ambassador to Savoy due to Pagolo’s knowledge of the Ottoman world. Unfortunately, the purpose of these special missions is not revealed by any official sources, and no specific details can be found in the private Medici archive. The reason for this absence of information might be due to the customary use of giving oral instruction for the most important missions. By doing so, Florence could avoid the dangerous risk of interceptions of documents by potential enemies and maintain an excellent diplomatic profile with regard to the other Italian powers, and especially the pope.

However, the Medici were not using often these special agents but only on selected occasions. Pagolo was not a spy in a strict sense but rather a trusted Medici agent for special missions. Babinger’s “Lorenzo de’ Medici e la Corte Ottomana” does say something about Pagolo da’ Colle. Unfortunately, the lack of sources about the Medici agents precludes any broader investigation. The only certainty is that Pagolo da’ Colle was a merchant directly connected to the Medici with particular expertise in the Levant. Every time the Medici needed a mediator they always relied on Pagolo da’ Colle.

671 Idem.
672 Idem.
673 Babinger 1963:335-347.
674 Babinger 1963:331. The same Pagolo da’ Colle describes himself as Pagolo da Colle, mercatante di Lorenzo de Medici, usato (nell’impero Ottomano) da 14 anni...
I will not here repeat word for word the article of Babinger, which seems to me particularly accurate and impossible to develop further due to the lack of primary sources. However, one consideration is important. The Medici always sent Pagolo da’ Colle for specific missions, such as the delivery of Bandini Baroncelli from the sultan, or when he travelled together with Bayezid II’s ambassador, Ibrahim, to Savoy when the problem of Djem sultan, Bayezid II’s rebel brother, was at stake.\footnote{For general literature on Djem see Vatin 2001, id. 1997, Balletto Pitarino 1995 (2).} Therefore, between the official correspondence and the private actions of citizens such as Benedetto Dei and Pagolo da’ Colle, the general idea which emerges is that Florence kept the contacts with Mehmet II to the bare minimum. Only in the case of events of a paramount importance the Medici used these special agents.

In conclusion, when Florence wrote to the sultan or to the consul, the Signoria consistently avoided political content. Besides, Florence always steered clear of any mention of the trade problems caused by Venice. These exclusions are probably due to two reasons. First, the Medici used unofficial communication channels between the sultan and Florence through agents such as Pagolo da’ Colle and this explains the lack of a consistent official correspondence. Second, Florence did not want to expose eventual weaknesses to the sultan for the fear that Mehmet II would replace the Signoria with another commercial partner.

The letters between the Signoria and the consul Mainardo expound on the organisation of the Florentine colony in Constantinople, which seems similar to the
organisation of other Florentine colonies, such as the one in Naples.\textsuperscript{676} The Florentine Signoria seemed unable to impose any centralisation and only maintained, with some efforts, the right to appoint the consul in the city. As a result, the Florentine consul dealt with a number of complications regarding the local merchants. This struggle between the central power and the local Florentine merchants was not exclusively in Constantinople. For example, in Naples there had been a quarrel between the Signoria and the local merchants’ colony due to the presence of two consuls in 1462: one elected in Florence and the other in Naples. Always in Naples, once the local community elected a Florentine exile which caused the Signoria to intervene.\textsuperscript{677} This weakness was possibly a result of the lack of resources and commercial experience of the Florentine Signoria. Therefore, it makes sense that Florence petitioned the sultan to grant more power to the Florentine consul.

In conclusion, the official letters sent to the sultan by the Florentine Signoria reveal only a part of the relations between Florence and the Ottomans. Florence did enjoy a privileged situation in Constantinople, but the lack of a centralised organisation and of notable sea power prevented Florence from maximising this advantage. The sultan seemed to satisfy the Florentine requests for reasons that went beyond the commercial volume transported to Constantinople by the Florentine merchants. Florence, despite these privileges, never matched the volume of Venetian

\textsuperscript{676} About internal disorders in the Florentine colony in Constantinople see pp. 197-198.

\textsuperscript{677} ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 44 89-90, in Appendix II n. 115. ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria 44 90, in Appendix II n. 116.
trade in Constantinople during the Byzantine empire, both in terms of organisation and in quantity of the wares.

The *Cronica* of Benedetto Dei, or the correspondence between the Medici and Pagolo da’ Colle, among other sources, provide a better understanding of the political relations between Florence and the Ottomans.\(^{678}\) I will begin by introducing the character of Benedetto Dei. He was a Florentine merchant (1418-1492) and a Medici agent.\(^{679}\) He wrote a chronicle named *La cronica dall’anno 1400 all’anno 1500*, a chronological annal which contains some digressions. To define Benedetto Dei only as a curious adventurer is to undermine the volcanic Florentine he was. By following the tales of the chronicle someone may have the impression that Benedetto Dei, rather than a normal spy, was probably a Renaissance James Bond. However, Dei is far from accurate in his writings as his chronology describes events out of order. For example, he dated the fall of Trebizond in 1455 rather than 1461.\(^{680}\) Therefore, I focused my attention on the general image that Dei presents about the relationship between Florence and the Ottomans, especially with regard to possible Florentine spying on the Venetians for the sultan during the period of his war against Venice. In 1461, Dei moved to Constantinople to be employed by Girolamo Michiel, a Venetian who was one of the main contractors of alum production in the Ottoman empire. Dei’s employment in Michiel’s business happened in the same period when the Medici had obtained the contract from the pope for the alum from Tolfa. The

\(^{678}\) On Pagolo da’ Colle there is an unfortunate absence of primary sources.

\(^{679}\) On Dei see Pisani 1923, Orvieto 1969. On Dei and his relationship with the Medici and the Ottomans see Babinger 1963.

coincidence of time between the two events is remarkable; however it is impossible to understand whether this was a coincidence or a specific order from the Medici. Certainly, if this was not a coincidence it could explain why Dei spied on Girolamo Michiel and not, for example, other Venetian merchants in Constantinople. Moreover there is still something unclear. For example: why Michiel, a Venetian, should have employed a Florentine considering the political condition in Italy?\textsuperscript{681}

Other interesting elements appear. Benedetto Dei seemed to confirm the existence of the Ottoman privileges in the same period I hypothesised, that is, in 1458-1459, although he set the exact date in 1461, which cannot be true because in the same period Florence had already dispatched other galleys to the Levant.\textsuperscript{682} Furthermore, Dei accused himself and Florence of actively spying on the Venetians on behalf of the Sultan.\textsuperscript{683} The Serenissima never explicitly accused Florence of being in league with Mehmet II, but rather targeted Ancona.\textsuperscript{684} The more interesting

\textsuperscript{681} On Dei and Michiel, see Babinger 1978:183.
\textsuperscript{682} Babinger 1963:312 Il gran Signore nel 1461 fece grazie e privilege ai Fiorentini in pregiudizio de’ Veneziani e nelle guerre del 1462 al 1466 intercettarono fino le lettere de’ Veneziani e le portarono al Gran Signore e diedero ad esso consigli.
\textsuperscript{683} Pisani 1963:15 E notate bene ciascuno che Firenze dall’anno 1460 all’anno 1472 a senpre tenuto e tiene pratiche e intelligene col gran turcho e co’ Maumett Bascia, chapitano de’ chapitani e senpre sono fiorentini colloro in canpo.
\textsuperscript{684} Here the accusation was about selling weapons to the Turks. Even if the blame went to Ancona, one must remember that Florence used to transport wares through the Anconitan galleys. ASV, Senato Secreti 271-273 Die XIII Februarii 1467 … impedire et providere quo introitus utilitates et emolumenta que percipit a christianis sutrahabantur sibi quam nulli dabitum est nations christianas ita navigare cum mercatoribus omnis fortis munitionibus armis et aliis rebus per viam chii et aliter constantinopolim sicut nulli bellum … cum hoste ipso. ASV, Reg. Senato Secreti 20 67 MCCCCLXVII die xxx Marci Sicut omnium notum esse post hac implicit simus in hoc ardenti bello cum turco tamen anconitani nunquam cessant cum naviores et aliis navigis suis continue navigare instructum et constantinopolim et nunc inter alias expediri student unam navium suam baturum vii et non solum agunt mercatura cum Turcis in grave damnum nostrum verum etiam deferent arma. On Ancona see in general Leonhard 1992. On the city’s commercial network with the Levant see Ashtor 1978, Id. 1986 and Id. 1997(2). An interesting account of the Anconitan consul in Constantinople during the siege in 1453 is in Pertusi 1980.
letter was the one sent from Venice to Florence in which the Serenissima accused again the Anconitans of selling weapons to the Turks. Venice informed the city of Florence that it was ready to arm four galleys for “taking care of the problem”. Why Venice informed Florence with such threatening words? In the end Florence was not Ancona. Most likely, Venice knew that Florentine merchants used to transport wares on the Anconitan galleys. Another reason might have been that Venice made clear to Florence that the Serenissima would have fiercely opposed any attempt to sell weapons to the Ottomans. To this Venetian letter, Florence apparently replied without giving much weight to the Venetian threats. Yet, all the Venetian accusations specifically against Florence came from chronicles or private reports, but never from public documents. Malipiero, in the Annali Veneti dall’anno 1457 al 1500, gives an interesting account of Florence’s espionage activity. The Venetian states that the Florentine consul received information pertaining to Venice from Florentine merchants who had arrived from Italy in Constantinople. Afterwards, the consul usually transmitted the information received to the sultan.

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685 ASF, Responsive Copiari I, Ab Venetis 167v-168r. In Appendix II n. 165. The Florentine Signoria’s answer is in ASF, Missive I Cancelleria 45 343-344, in Appendix II n. 166. 686 See the Venetian statement on Florence made by Zaccaria Barbaro in Naples in Corazzol 1994:380 el ducha et fiorentini lavoreriano cum el turcho, le galeace sue vano a Constantinopoli et ognuno faceva quello I volevano. 687 Malipiero 1845:41. E se intende che Fiorentini e Genovesi ne son in bona parte causa, perchè ‘l Consolo de Fiorentini, avanti che giungesse Zuane Capello, affermava al Bassa’ che la Signoria no manderia Ambassadore per la pase, e l’esshortava a metterse a ordene; e da poi fatta la domanda del salvo conduto, ghe ha ditto piu’ volte, che la Terra è in stretta, perché l’ Papa, la Comunita’ de Fiorenza e altri Signori d’ Italia ne muove guerra, e che la Signoria manda a trattar de pace, perchè la è in besogno e in pericolo tal che ‘l Bassa’ è fatto piu’ anemoso. Ghe è anche alcuni che va de qua a Constantinopoli su e giu’, che informa el Consolo de Fiorentini delle cose della terra; e lui fa saver el tutto al Bassa’, e ghe dise anche de piu’ per tuor la reputazion a la Signoria.

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What is interesting is that Dei described an activity based on letters intercepted while Malipiero referred instead to reports given by the Florentine merchants who travelled between Italy and the Levant. It is clear that the two elements are not exactly the same. Dei provides other details and even mentions some of the Florentines who acted as probable intermediaries between the Florentine community in Constantinople and the Ottoman sultan. These people were Jacopo Tedaldi, Mainardo degli Ubaldini (the consul), Niccolò Ardinghelli and Carlo Martelli.\textsuperscript{688} I have already covered Tedaldi and Mainardo, the Florentine consul in Constantinople, in the previous chapters.\textsuperscript{689} About Niccolò Ardinghelli we do not possess consistent information. He was a merchant who had some trouble with the Medici since he was exiled. In 1466 he received the pardon and finally was allowed to return to Florence.\textsuperscript{690} Carlo Martelli was probably a merchant with long experience in the Levant. He emerges in the letter sent to him by Dei in 1462 and he sent a letter to Cosimo the Elder in 1463 about the galleys.\textsuperscript{691} The fact that Martelli was in direct communication with Cosimo the Elder cannot but imply that he was person of a certain importance.

Yet Florence, despite all the sources examined so far, seemed not to be directly involved. Of course, the Florentine Signoria was informed about the events that had occurred in Constantinople and in the Levant, but there is no definitive proof of

\textsuperscript{688} Tedaldi was the same Florentine merchant who defended Constantinople from the Ottomans and escaped aboard a Venetian galley.

\textsuperscript{689} About Tedaldi see fn. 397.

\textsuperscript{690} On Ardinghelli see Walter 2005:67-72. Ardinghelli also emerges in some private letters of Alessandra Strozzi. See Gregory 1997:133-134 (See also the prosopography in Appendix III).

\textsuperscript{691} Dei’s letter is in Orvieto 1969: 228-230 and Martelli’s letter to Cosimo the Elder is in ASF, MAP, f. 16 n. 87.
espionage by the Signoria. In my interpretation, it was only a matter between Mehmet II and the Florentine community in Constantinople. Mehmet II presumably approached and pressured the Florentine consul without addressing the Signoria. The sultan did not have any reason to inform Florence since he had all the coercive power needed to force the cooperation of the Florentine community. First of all, Mehmet II could have harmed the Florentine community in loco which was extremely vulnerable to any kind of physical threat; or simply Mehmet II could have withdrawn the commercial concessions made to the Florentines. The latter option would have been, if enacted, an immense catastrophe for the Florentine merchants in Constantinople.

Dei’s description of the meeting between the aforementioned Florentine merchants and Mehmet II was probably only one of many episodes. The sultan met with the most important members of the Florentine community to learn about the reports received by them from the Florentine merchants. Dei’s description of this meeting with Mehmet II seems to match Malipiero’s information about Mainardo’s cooperation with the sultan. The fact that a Venetian and a Florentine source agree with each other improves the reliability of the information. The merchants were the first element involved in the espionage. The information given by Dei about Venice’s letters, which were intercepted by Florentine merchants (and also Dei) and later delivered though him to the sultan, confirm evidently what has been argued before. In the end, I think that the Florentine community in Constantinople spied for Mehmet II. Yet, this activity happened and continued because the Florentines in
Constantinople did not have a choice. In addition, this activity was part of a specific request of Mehmet II only to the Florentine community in Constantinople. The government in Florence must have been aware of this, but most likely was not involved in order to avoid political consequences. In this way, Florence would not have been taken as responsible for the actions done by the Florentine merchants in Constantinople. Most likely, the espionage activity was directed by the Florentine consul in Constantinople and not by the Florentine Signoria, as the Venetian Malipiero confirmed in his *Annali*.\footnote{\textsuperscript{692}} This espionage is only a small picture of the conditions in which the Florentine colony lived in Constantinople. Dei’s chronicle is useful in revealing more details about these conditions. Dei describes the celebrations of the Florentine colony over the successful conquest of Mytilene and Bosnia by the sultan in 1462 and 1463 respectively. On this occasion, the Florentine celebrated Mehmet II in the Florentine galleys which, at the moment, were in Constantinople. Dei used this episode to exhibit the importance and respect enjoyed by the Florentine community in Constantinople. The Florentine author did not spare words to describe the sultan’s love towards the Florentine community compared to the fear of the Venetian and Genoese’s merchants in Pera.\footnote{\textsuperscript{693}}

It is necessary to clarify the historical context in which these events took place. The Ottoman empire at the time of the first Venetian-Ottoman war was a powerful

\footnote{\textsuperscript{692} See fn. 681.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{693} Dei’s account on the celebration after the conquest of Mytilene is in Dei 1985:161. The words of Dei on the love and the fear are the following: *laonde I gienovesi e I viniziani, li qual'erono in Pera e per la Romania, n'ebbono ischoppio e tremore, visto che'l turcho portava tanto amore e tanta benivolenza e tanto chredito a la nazione fiorentina.* On Bosnia’s account see always Dei 1985:163.}
and expanding power, stretching from Asia to the Balkans. The armies of the sultan were the most technologically advanced ones thanks to the artillery weapons. Moreover, the humanist literature of the time depicts a picture quite fearful of the sultan, owing to a recognition of the military power at his disposal. Unlike the Ottomans, Florence did not possess a proper military capacity on either land or sea. Their commerce, although rising, was not yet comparable to the Venetian trade in the Byzantine period.\textsuperscript{694} Florence suffered from Venetian predominance in the sea.\textsuperscript{695} The Medici banks were the jewel of the city, granting to the Medici the possibility of moving capital and generating revenue. In addition, the banks could be used as a network of agents or diplomats, not for the Signoria, but for the Medici themselves. Besides that, Florence was quite a minor power compared to Venice, France, Naples or the Ottoman empire. Babinger, Pastor and most scholars commonly relate Florence as “using” or “influencing” the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{696} All scholars’ works, except İnalcık, interpreted Florence as the main actor in its relationship with the Ottoman empire. Therefore, Florence often appeared as “suggesting” or “influencing”, while in my opinion is wrong due to the uneven relation between Florence and the sultan. However, I agree more with the position of İnalcık, who assessed the Ottoman point of view in his works. This perspective seems to me the most accurate since the Ottoman empire was a superpower in this period, especially in comparison to Florence.

\textsuperscript{694} On the Venetian trading with the Ottomans see Preto 1975, İnalcık 1977 and Luzzato 1995.
\textsuperscript{695} See for example fn. 658 on the Venetian capture of one ship belonging to Ancona and carrying Florentine wares.
\textsuperscript{696} Babinger 1978:503.
It is absurd that a power like Florence could have used or even influenced Ottoman policies while the opposite is far more probable. Besides, Mehmet II had never been in position to depend on an Italian city and the Ottomans had all the coercive power necessary to enforce their superiority in Constantinople. For example, Mehmet II could have simply expelled the Florentines and privileged another community, such as Ancona. Also, Mehmet II was interested in using the Florentine colony for his objectives, since the sultan in this period was waging a war against a dangerous opponent, such as Venice. The sultan was not going to ignore the chance to have fresh reports from a closer source to Venice such as Florence. In particular, Mehmet II keenly observed the espionage activity and financed spies all over Europe.

For these reasons Dei’s entire attempt to depict the Florentine community in Constantinople as honoured to have the sultan as a guest paints only one side of the picture. In fact, Dei’s description tries to hide the fact that the Florentine community in Constantinople was powerless in the face of Mehmet II. It was not the Florentine community that was to be honoured by the sultan, but they who honoured Mehmet II, mostly because there was no alternative. Mehmet II attended celebrations and honours organised by a Christian power (Florence) to celebrate the victories of an

697 Information about the Anconitans in Constantinople during the Ottoman empire is very scarce. However, they were probably selling weapons to the Turks (see fn. 678). Moreover, Ancona, like Florence, was a city which did not represent at all a threat due to their military and territorial insignificance. On Ancona’s literature see fn. 678.
698 Bülent 2004:45-46.
Islamic ruler against other Christian powers. In fact, during the celebrations for the conquest of Mytilene the sultan went to the boat of Giuliano Ridolfi and was honoured by him and the crew. For the celebration after the conquest of Bosnia the sultan this time went into the house of Carlo Martelli, a prominent Florentine banker. Again, it was the sultan to be honoured by the Florentines and not the opposite. In view of that, these celebrations appear not have been spontaneous, but more an “unwilling tribute” to the power of the sultan.

The Florentine community in Constantinople offered this tribute because it wanted to keep its privileges and good relations with the Sublime Porta. In case of refusal, Florence would lose all its privileges and most likely suffer a heavy retaliation from the sultan. These events resembled the unequal condition of a vassal in front of his lord, such as the humiliation suffered by Manuel II when, as a vassal, he had to congratulate Bayezid I for his victory in Nicopolis. Another episode which confirms this interpretation is the execution of 456 Venetians in the presence of the Florentines, including the consul, at the moment in Pera. This episode enhances more the real balance of power between the sultan and Florence where the latter is reduced as simple and forced spectator of Mehmet II’s glory.

Additionally, Constantinople was Florence’s first market for wool and later silk cloth. Florence needed this market especially from the moment that Naples was not

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700 Discussion on the celebrations are in Babinger 1963:311, İnalcık 1997:231. Scholars use these happenings as evidences of the good relationship between Florence and Mehmet II.
701 This episode is in Dei 1985:162. The same Dei, despite his cynicism, commented that he had never seen something so cruel.
any more a reliable trade partner.\textsuperscript{702} The fact that Florence managed to ignore the Neapolitan ban on Florentine cloth and replace Naples with Constantinople is a sure evidence of the power at the disposal of the Ottoman sultan in respect to Florence. This is yet additional proof of why the celebrations reported by Dei must be contextualised as triumphal festivities for the sultan in which the Florentines, willingly or not, were only part of the background. The same Dei in the chronicle seems to admit that Florence had to honour the Ottoman sultan. For Benedetto writes that the sultan “asked and ordered” this celebrations to the Florentine community.\textsuperscript{703} Nobody celebrate willingly if it had not been ordered. Therefore, one ought to assume that the Florentine are not the “honoured ones” which Dei had attributed to the Florentine community for this event.

Mehmet II was doing a favour for Florence by waging war against Venice, because Venice was still a potential threat to the balance of power in Italy. Yet, no source suggests a military agreement between the Ottomans and Florence. For example, the conquest of Albania in 1469, rather than being a favour to Florence, was a troublesome event, since it was among the causes of Naples’ rapprochement to Venice. Furthermore, the same Venetian-Ottoman war also brought trouble for


\textsuperscript{703} Dei 1985:161 e mando’ al chonsole de’ Fiorentini a dire e a chomandare che tutti i fiorentini faciessino fuohi e festa, chome suoi amici e benvolenti. Another example, even more striking, is in Dei 1985:163 on the celebration after the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia e mandando al chonsole de’ Fiorentini a dire che chomandassi a tutti e suoi merchatanti che faciessino festa, e parassino le chase e le strade loro d’arazi e di seta, e che voleva venire a fiare tafaraggio e chollezione chon detta nazione.
Florence since the Venetian galleys did not intend to leave Florence free to trade with the sultan.

I think it is also unjustified to believe that Mehmet II told Florence any of his plans with regard to the war against Venice. First, because there are no sources and Florence did not seem aware of anything aside from reports from its merchants. Secondly, there was no reason why Mehmet II should have revealed the Ottoman plans to a minor power like Florence. The Florentine sources on their community in Constantinople confirm that the relations between Mehmet II and Florence were neither even nor smooth. The aforementioned fears, which emerge from the Florentine pratiche, are clear symptoms of the inferiority of Florence and the precariousness of its relationship with the sultan. Clearly, Florence was exposed to the sultan’s decisions and orders.

If that would not have been the case, one would have difficulties explaining why the Florentines would have risked their Italian neighbours, especially the pope, by siding so extremely and openly with the sultan. There were still negotiations and pressure from the pope for contributions in favour of Venice or Hungary. What is more, if Florence was so openly friendly with the sultan, it made no sense to send six galleys and 20,000 florins to Ferrante I in 1472, and then later to join a league in 1474 with Venice, which was still at war against the Ottoman empire.

Although rare, there are a couple of letters about Constantinople, but mostly in relations with the Florentine galleys. ASF, Mediceo Avanti il Principato, f. 35 n. 370, f. 35 n. 357; ASF, Mediceo Avanti il Principato, f. 35 n. 370, f. 35 n. 357.

About the moneys and galleys sent to Ferrante I see p. 230.
The Medici did not use permanent spies in the Ottoman empire, and the little information they received from the Levant came as reports mainly from trusted merchants, or sometimes from the Florentine consul of Pera. Therefore, the probability that some kind of deal or pact existed between Constantinople and Florence is quite low. Clearly, the Medici wanted to be informed about what was happening in the Levant, thus the existence of the reports sent to Florence by Medici agents. However, these reports were first of all directed to Lorenzo or Piero de’ Medici, not the Signoria, which means they were unofficial. Moreover, the contents mostly related to big events such as the fall of Caffa in 1475. Most likely, the Medici had their own agents operating under their direct orders. These agents were not official representatives of the Florentine Signoria in Constantinople, but rather individuals at the Medici’s service such as Pagolo da’ Colle.

To conclude, Florence could not have obtained commercial privileges by applying political pressure on the Ottoman empire. It stands to a reason that the grants were a specific decision of the Ottoman sultan. Therefore, the whole chronicle of Benedetto Dei must be interpreted under the perspective of a minor power dealing with a superpower. The aforementioned espionage activity may have been part of a specific “request” of the Ottoman sultan, just as in the case of the celebrations in Mehmet II’s honour after the conquest of Bosnia and Mytilene. The “trusted Florentine advisors” were probably only the “trusted informers” of the sultan. The meeting described by Dei was only due to Mehmet II’s will to have first-hand

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706 See fn. 680-681.
707 ASF, Mediceo Avanti il Principato, f. 35 n. 370, f. 35 n. 357.
information from an Italian power quite expert on Venetian issues such as Florence. Dei aimed to defend the marginality of Florence by transforming the city into the most important friend of the sultan. This theory makes even more sense when one analyses the chronicle as a whole, for the writer clearly wanted to celebrate Florence and the Medici at the same time, besides, of course, promoting his valuable support to the Medici’s cause. Besides, of course, celebrating himself. Unfortunately, it is not clear to whom this chronicle was addressed. What likely happened is a clever sultan granting commercial privileges to an insignificant military power, and consequently binding that city to the sultan’s goodwill.

The Signoria never connected itself with the espionage activity of the Florentine consul in Constantinople. All the actions and the reports came from the Florentine consul and the merchants in Constantinople. Whether that was the will of the Florentine Signoria is not known. Most likely, Mehmet II never addressed the Signoria on this matter since he had no reason to do so. It is possible that the sultan directly approached the Florentine consul, at the time Mainardo degli Ubaldini, and “kindly” requested Florentine services in the matter. Just as the celebrations in honour of the sultan, I find it hard to believe that Mainardo could have said no to Mehmet II.

Yet, Florence was able to take advantage of the political events even in this situation of manifest inferiority. This ability was also due to Florence’s balanced diplomacy which therefore explained why Florence never sided decisively with any power. The main interest for the city was to be able to prosper in Constantinople.
without getting too much involved in the conflict between the Ottoman empire and
Venice, and to benefit from both political powers whenever there was the possibility.
For example, the league formed in 1474 including Venice, Florence and Milan
enabled the Florentines to have a strong ally in order to counter papal ambitions in
Tuscany and Romagna. This alliance was also possible due to the strong pressure
Mehmet II put on Venice, which pushed the *Serenissima* to look for a treaty in Italy.
Venice feared Neapolitan expansionism both in Italy and in the Balkans, and the
impossibility of sustaining two fronts – one in Italy, and the other in the Levant. The
Neapolitan attempt to expand its influence in Cyprus probably represented the last
straw that broke the camel’s back.\footnote{On Ferrante I’s attempt to seize the control of Cyprus through the marriage between Alphonse, Ferrante I’s natural son and Carlotta, the daughter of Caterina Corner Queen of Cyprus see Caselli 2010:113, Corazzol 1994:600-603, Galasso 1992:672-673 and Schiappoli 1972:110-112.}

Also in the case of the Pazzi plot, the good connections of Florence with the
sultan worked in their favour. One of the conspirators, Bernardo Bandini Baroncelli,
fled to Constantinople. Bernardo’s hopes to be safe soon faded as someone in the
Florentine colony must have recognised him and warned Mehmet II. The sultan
immediately ordered Bandini to be imprisoned, while a merchant, Bernardo Peruzzi
wrote to Florence about the capture. The assassin was afterwards delivered to the
Florentine ambassador, Andrea di Bernardo de’ Medici, sent to what was probably
the only official mission of the Florentine Commune to Mehmet II. The sultan's
willingness to hand over Bandini Baroncelli to the Medici cannot prove a direct
involvement of the Florentine Signoria with Mehmet II. In fact, it only proves that
Mehmet II had no reasons in keeping Bandini Baroncelli as instrument of political pressure against Florence and the Medici. On a marginal note, it is interesting that the Florentine Commune was not informed by the Florentine consul in Constantinople about Baroncelli’s capture but by one of the Florentine merchants who was there.\footnote{Müller 1879:225-228.}

There is no doubt that Florence was able to seize the best opportunity at the perfect time. I do not think this is only a random case. The Medici, thanks to their banks, had at their disposal an excellent diplomatic network all around Europe which allowed Florence to always be well informed about events. Therefore, Florence was able to enact policies more convenient for the moment with the ultimate goal dictated by Florence’s political agenda. This was the goal of Florentine policy since Cosimo took control of the Signoria in 1434. Florence after it lost the war against Lucca under the Albizzi, would never start another war.\footnote{In general see Florence’s history Davidsohn 1977 and for the period under the Medici house see Rubinstein 1996, Brucker 1994.} The advantages of these policies are clear. Florence had the opportunity to increase Levantine commerce at the disadvantage of the Venetians and enjoy the benevolence of the sultan.

Otranto, Naples, the Ottomans and the role of the Medici: guilty or not guilty?

I have decided to reserve a special paragraph to discuss the political events around the Ottoman invasion of Otranto in 1480, carried out by the governor of Bosnia
Sanjak, Gedik Ahmet Pasha. The decision to focus on this event is due to the complicated debate over the role played by the Medici, and especially by Lorenzo the Magnificent. The question is whether Lorenzo de’ Medici had an active role in the invasion or if the Medici did not have a direct part on the Otranto attack. Some scholars have suggested that the Florentine Signoria had a direct involvement in the attack on Otranto.\textsuperscript{711} This hypothesis rests on the events following the Pazzi Plot. The Florentine Signoria sentenced Cardinal Salviati-Riario, one of the plot leaders, to death by hanging. As a consequence, Pope Sixtus IV placed Florence under interdict and excommunicated the Medici. The plot, which the pope was aware of, indeed failed. Afterwards, the invasion of the king of Naples, Ferrante I, supported by the pope, ended with the Florentine loss of some territories. Lorenzo de’ Medici had to travel personally to Naples, in order to negotiate peace with Ferrante I. The terms of the peace gave to the king of Naples, and to the pope, the option of returning territories occupied during the war.\textsuperscript{712} This peace was unfavourable for Florence, further demonstrating Florentine difficulties in military matters. Scholars hypothesise a connection between these events and an alleged active role of the Medici behind the invasion of Otranto in 1480.\textsuperscript{713}

\textsuperscript{711} Hankins 1995, Pastor 1894, Panareo 1931, Raby 1987, Jacobs 1927 see bibliography. Only Babinger rejected the theory on Florence actively involved in the invasion.
\textsuperscript{712} See Fubini 1977.
\textsuperscript{713} Jacobs 1927, most recently Hankins 1995 (2003) and Devi. The latter scholar acknowledged that accusations of Florence’s involvement with the Ottomans came from the later Neapolitan historiography see Hankins 1995: fn. 36. Although is true that Lorenzo de’ Medici was perfectly aware of the classical meaning of the term Magnae Grecia. Still, contrary evidence to be shown later are, in my opinion, stronger than this assumption.
The reason behind this Medici active role is that the conquest of Otranto put the king of Naples in desperate need of subsidies. Clearly, the invasion of Otranto was a great success for the Ottomans largely because at that moment all the majority of the Neapolitan army was still in Tuscany. The Medici offered large quantity of subsidies in exchange of the Florentine territories lost to Naples during the previous war. Moreover, scholars believed that the medal made by Bertoldo di Giovanni around 1480-1481 and presented as a gift to Mehmet II was the definitive proof of an agreement between Florence and Constantinople.\textsuperscript{714} The medal presents an inscription in which Mehmet II is called \textit{IMPERATOR ASIAE AC TRAPESVNZIS MAGNEQVE GRECIE}. The term \textit{Magna Graecia} has been interpreted as a clear reference to the South of Italy, and an invitation by Lorenzo de’ Medici to the Ottoman sultan to invade the kingdom of Naples. Babinger rejects this hypothesis and I tend to agree with the German scholar. The Florentine gains are to be connected once more with Florence’s ability to benefit from events, even if it did not have the power to influence them.

There are some unpublished Florentine sources which shed light on the Medici role in the Otranto attack. Several letters sent by the Florentine ambassador in Rome, Filippo Pandolfi, seem to point to the fact that the invasion was not a surprise. What is certain is that Venice was well aware of the Ottomans plans. The role of Venice has been examined and has determined that the sultan asked for Venetian neutrality before the invasion. The Venetian Senate agreed to allow the Turkish fleet to pass.

\textsuperscript{714} See fn. 705.
through the straits and attack Otranto.\textsuperscript{715} On 13 May 1479, the ambassador Pandolfi wrote to Florence:

One letter came yesterday night from Benedetto Salutati and told us that he received information from Otranto from a ship which came from Constantinople. The Turks both by sea and by land seem to organise themselves in order to put Ragusa under siege. This news alarmed the king (of Naples) for these war preparations were suspicious... XIII May 1479.\textsuperscript{716}

This letter confirms that Mehmet II had already begun to plan the attack. Whether it was for the actual attack to Otranto or the contemporary attack against Rhodes is not certain. What is certain is the fact that, in Constantinople, preparation for an attack was on-going, and the Italian powers were not completely unaware. The subsequent letter, written by Pandolfi to Florence just fourteen days later, gives more information.

Last night came here a letter from the governor of Fano which stated that in Fano and Ancona two Turkish boats had done severe damages. In these places, people are afraid and they had written to our lord (the pope) hoping that he (the pope) will do something about it, otherwise they would have to do whatever they can. This new letter scared the papal court and it is our impression that this event will accelerate the peace negotiations. XXVII Maii 1479.\textsuperscript{717}

Already by 1479 the Turkish army had begun to test the Italian defence by hitting the seaports of Fano and Ancona. Fano and Ancona are in the so called Marca Anconetana, while Otranto is in Puglia. The distance between Ancona and Otranto is 350 kilometres. The main goal of the Ottoman army was to test Italy’s defensive capacity and eventually mislead the Italian powers about their real targets. With the

\textsuperscript{715} Raby 1987:182 and Bombaci 1954:159-203 who spoke about Venice’s “benevolent neutrality”.
\textsuperscript{716} ASF, Signori Dieci di Balia Missive Legazioni 10, 42v, in Appendix II n. 196.
\textsuperscript{717} ASF, Signori Dieci di Balia Missive Legazioni 10, 49v, in Appendix II n. 294.
attack on Fano and Ancona, the Ottomans showed an ability to hit the Italian coast regardless of distance. Another possible conclusion from the letter is about Florence’s diplomacy. The tension created by this Turkish attack was, in the ambassador’s words, “good for the peace”. In fact, in Rome negotiations were taking place for the conclusion of the war between Florence, Naples and Pope Sixtus IV. Again, this does not prove anything about the alleged involvement of Florence in the attack, but rather confirms the versatility of Florence’s diplomacy, which was ready to use any development for its own benefit, regardless if it was an Ottoman attack against a Christian city. Another letter seems to confirm the fact that the pope was afraid of an Ottoman attack against Italy. However, when the pope asked for contributions from Venice, the Serenissima refused to oblige him. One must note that Venice had just made peace with Mehmet II, and were therefore not willing to risk another war, especially to defend Naples. Milan and Florence, after some consultations, decided to stay with the Venetians in a way confirming the league created in 1474.\footnote{ASF, Signori Dieci di Balia Missive Legazioni 10, 52v, in Appendix II n. 236.} The Florentine Signoria was therefore aware of the movement of troops made by the sultan, just as were all Italian powers.

Another reason why some scholars believe Florence was actively involved with the sultan’s plans is the medal of Bertoldo di Giovanni, made around 1480-1481 and given to the sultan as a gift from Lorenzo de’ Medici.
The front the figure shows an image of the sultan with the inscription MAVMET ASIE AC TRAPESVNZIS MAGNEQUE GRETIE IMPERAT. On the reverse there is the figure of the sultan triumphantly standing in a chariot and carrying three women as prisoners. The three women represented symbolically Asia, Trebizond and “Greece”. The medal was officially granted to the sultan as a gift for the delivery of the assassin, Bernardo Bandini Baroncelli. Scholars have debated about the significance of the words MAGNEQUE GRETIE. Some assumed that this inscription was the definitive proof of the Medici’s active involvement in the Otranto invasion, while Babinger rejects this idea and argues that the inscription referred to...
Babinger’s main point was that Magna Graecia in the Quattrocento defined Greece, and not the South of Italy. Apart from one rare case in the poem *Grecia Grande*, attributed to Michele Racchele, there are no other cases of the phrase Magna Graecia referring to the south of Italy. I believe it is correct to contextualise the medal as a gift for Mehmet II, for the delivery of Bandini-Baroncelli.

Let us consider the theory of the secret plot as true for a moment. The production of a medal like Bertoldo’s could not have been a secret action. The commission, the production, and even the moment in which the medal was gifted, involved a considerable number of people. Whenever an action is undertaken secretly, reason dictates the involvement of as few people as possible. This is why the Signoria or the Medici usually assigned Pagolo da’ Colle for special missions to the Levant. The same production of a medal supposes the existence of a workshop with assistants doing parallel works, while the artist was taking care of the main concept. Not only the delivery, but the decision to make that medal would require the involvement of a certain number of people who would be aware of the true significance of the medal. Therefore, if the medal is to be considered an invitation by the Signoria for Mehmet to invade Otranto, one would expect to find Florentine sources attesting to the fact. Instead, we find only a later Neapolitan source making

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719 Babinger 1963.
720 Nevì (date not present): 35. The author of this master’s dissertation uses this attribution to reinforce Hankins and others’ theory about the Medici’s involvement with the sultan. It seems to me that one case cannot confirm a grave theory like the one which depicts the Medici actively cooperating with the sultan during the Otranto’s invasion.
the claim.\textsuperscript{721} Even Ferrante I asked Florence for help in the aftermath of the invasion. If the king had even a minimal suspicion about Florence, he surely would not have asked Florence for help. Unsurprisingly, Ferrante I did not ask for help from Venice. Most likely, the king of Naples was aware that the \textit{Serenissima}, besides having knowledge of the Ottoman attack on Otranto, did not take any actions to prevent the Turkish army from disembarking at Otranto. Venice always patrolled the Adriatic, so Ferrante knew that Venice must have allowed the Ottoman army to cross the sea.

Last but not least, other doubts arise regarding the possibility of Florentine involvement. The medal, according to the studies on the object, was made around 1480-1481, and probably given to Mehmet II during the Ottoman embassy that went to Florence in 1480, asking for artists and wood carvers.\textsuperscript{722} The Turkish fleet attacked Otranto on 28 July 1480. The estimates of the size of the Turkish force range from 10,000 to 18,000 men and there is no doubt that the Ottoman army was of paramount quantity.\textsuperscript{723} Such large armies and fleets could not have been recruited in a few months. Yet, the best hypothesis, which denies completely any form of Florentine involvement, is that already on May 1479 the Ottomans were testing the Italian coastal defences with the aforementioned attacks at Fano and Ancona. The news of these attacks were known in Rome and, consequently, must have been known in the whole Italy. Only in that moment did Florence learn that the Ottomans were targeting the Italian powers. The sources clearly show that the Florentines had

\textsuperscript{721} Laggetto and the \textit{Historia della guerra di Otranto del 1480}. See Laggetto 1940.
\textsuperscript{722} Especially Raby, Jacobs and Babinger, while Dei describes the Ottoman embassy in 1480 Dei 1985:176.
\textsuperscript{723} See Panareo 1931:168-181.
no idea of the possible target of an Ottoman attack. Therefore, I believe that Mehmet II already had planned the attack on Otranto, considering it as a parallel to the Ottoman attack to Rhodes. In fact, to organise such complicated attacks at the time would have required a considerable amount of time, just only for recruiting or organising the necessary logistical support.

I cannot say whether one attack was a diversion for the other, but it is quite unrealistic to point to the Medici as an active and involved partner in the Ottoman attack against Otranto. What is plausible, however, is that once again Florence’s diplomacy was ready to gain whatever was possible from the fallout of the attack. At the moment Otranto fell into the hands of the Ottomans due to the “surprise” attack, Ferrante I immediately requested help and subsidies from Rome and from Florence. The dots between “surprise” are not random since it is difficult to think that Ferrante was caught completely off-guard. The previous signals (attacks on Fano and Ancona) and the threatening proximity of the Ottoman empire after the conquest of Albania were all known in Naples. Most likely, Ferrante I did not want to call back the troops from Tuscany at the command of the duke of Calabria, Alphonse, who, at the time, was trying to put under his influence the Commune of Siena. With regard to Florence, the letters from the Florentine ambassador in Rome seem to confirm a general unawareness in Florence about the Ottoman plans. Surely, the Florentine Signoria could have suspected something, but nothing points out to an agreement between Lorenzo de’ Medici and the Ottomans.

724 On the duke of Calabria’s attempt to control or influence the Sienese Signoria after the attack against Florence in the Pazzi’s plot, see Shaw 2000:42.
After the Ottoman conquest of Otranto, the Neapolitan ambassador sent letters to Florence on 4 July 1481 asking for the subsidies. The pratiche are quite straightforward in indicating what Florence requested in exchange. Domenico de Bartolo affirmed that Florence could have given the money, but required that the king of Naples return the territories lost in the recent war.\textsuperscript{725} The king of Naples, probably without much of an alternative, had to accept the Florentine conditions. One year later, a Florentine embassy carried out by Antonio de’ Medici was sent on 5 July 1481.\textsuperscript{726} The Signoria ordered the Florentine ambassador to go to Naples and thereafter to Barletta (city in Puglia) where the Neapolitan king was at that time. The ambassador was to express the Commune’s gratitude to the king for the restitution of the lands and satisfaction at the death of Mehmet II. Furthermore, Antonio recommended a league and friendship between Naples and Florence, especially against the Venetians. Once again the Italian political situation had changed, and once more the kingdom of Naples had become instrumental for Florentine policies. The main reason for this was, once again, the balance of power. With the attack against Otranto, Naples was deeply hurt. Instead, the true winner was indeed the Serenissima which managed to weaken a direct rival in the struggle for the Italian supremacy. Not surprisingly, just after these events, Venice was going to intervene aggressively against Naples in the war of Ferrara (1482-1482). Again, alliances

\textsuperscript{725} ASF, Signori Minutari 11 163v, in Appendix II n. 267.
\textsuperscript{726} ASF, Signori Minutari 11 289r-291v, in Appendix II n. 268.
changed in Italy. This time Venice joined the pope against Naples and Ferrara, the latter backed by Florence.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this chapter was to identify the state of relations between Florence and the Ottoman empire from 1464 to 1481. I believe that most of the diplomatic activities enacted by the Florentine Signoria with regard to the Ottoman empire were reactive rather than proactive. Florence needed the sultan to support its commerce in Constantinople, but the sultan did not need Florence. The Florentine interests in Constantinople were vital for the Signoria, especially for the Florentine *panni*. Therefore, Florence depended entirely on Mehmet II’s goodwill because the sultan could have revoked Florentine trading privileges at will.

Benedetto Dei, in his chronicle, clearly wanted to glorify Florence. The secret information provided by Florence to the sultan, the advice given by members of the Florentine colony in Constantinople, and especially the celebrations made in honour of the sultan, are all clear evidence of the inferior position of Florence in their relationship with the sultan. The sultan understood, from the beginning of his rule in Constantinople, that privileging Florence over Venice or Genoa bought him a dependable ally to use any time it was necessary. The celebrations made in honour of the sultan were, in my opinion, only one of the clearest examples. Dei declared that the sultan honoured the Florentine Commune by attending the celebrations and being
entertained in the Florentine galleys. However, I think that the only reason for the sultan to go to the celebration was to enhance his triumphant image as an Islamic ruler celebrated by Christians. It is implausible that the sultan wanted to honour the Florentines. The sultan would have removed the privileges in the event of Florence’s refusal to cooperate.

As far as the Otranto invasion and the role of Florence are concerned, there is no proof of direct Medici participation in the matter, while the role of Venice as the power who granted “benevolent neutrality” to the Ottomans has been proven. Florence did not take part in the invasion. The sultan probably did not even inform Florence of his plans, as Pandolfi, Florentine ambassador in Rome, appears to confirm. Besides, Mehmet II had no logical reason to inform the Medici, for there was nothing Lorenzo de’ Medici could have done in favour of the sultan. Moreover, Florence was still recovering after the Neapolitan invasion. Mehmet II had no interest in spreading this information as there was always the risk his plans might be discovered. The entire Ottoman operation in Otranto was a success because, at the time of attack, the sultan was also attacking Rhodes. The Neapolitan fleet was at that moment in Rhodes helping its defenders and therefore unable to defend the waters around Italy. Thanks in large part to Venetian neutrality, Gedik Pasha managed to cross from Valona to Otranto and conquered the city.

727 The neutrality given by Venice to the Ottoman fleet was essential for crossing the straits and attacking Otranto. See Bombaci 1954:159-203.
Another debate revolves around the medal made by Bertoldo di Giovanni, interpreted as an invitation from Lorenzo de’ Medici to invade the south of Italy. This theory is not convincing. The Italian powers were aware that the sultan was plotting something against Italy after the attacks in Fano and Ancona. Some other evidence emerges from Sforza’s archive. Yet somehow the Otranto invasion was a successful surprise attack. There was no point in presenting a medal during an Ottoman embassy to Florence in 1480 as an invitation to attack the South of Italy, as the entire operation had to rely on surprise. The Medici would have never risked of being closely associated with the Ottomans. Evidently, it was impossible to hide the Turkish embassy and the gift of the medal with so many people involved. Therefore, the medal must be interpreted as a Medici gift to the sultan for the delivery of Bandini Baroncelli. The three women in the chariot effectively represented Asia, Trebizond and Greece. It is true that the medal was celebrating the conquests of the Ottoman sultan, but not his future conquests. Of course, I will not deny the fact that the Medici received advantages from Mehmet II after his conquest of Otranto. Lorenzo de’ Medici gained the opportunity to reclaim territories lost to Naples after the war as an exchange for subsidies to Ferrante I. However, this event must be understood in the context of Florence’s diplomatic tradition, which took advantage of new developments. Finally, the medal and the attack on Otranto are nearly in the same period of time. Mehmet II’s decision to take Otranto required some time, and if Florence invited the sultan then the city was most surely aware of the Ottoman plans.

728 See Corungiu 2006.
So, why should Lorenzo de’ Medici have risked his position by inviting Mehmet II to do something that was already in motion? Again, this does not make any sense.

Evidently, Florence’s diplomacy operated as in the past by taking the most advantage of events arising without being directly responsible for them. The same attitude can be seen when Florence offered its contribution for the crusade to Venice and even forced Milan to do the same. Finally, the primary source accusing the Medici of collaborating with the sultan is from Naples. It stands to reason that the Neapolitan historians of the time had an interest in accusing Florence because they needed to safeguard the character of Ferrante I, as well as a need to justify the tension between Florence and Naples. The conquest of Otranto by the Ottomans and the consequent offer of contributions from Lorenzo the Magnificent to Ferrante I is yet another proof of Florentine pragmatic policy based solely on Florence’s political and economic goals.

In the following year, Mehmet II died, and so did Ottoman interest in holding Otranto. Ferrante I conquered the city from the Turks in 1481 and gave back the territories he had captured from Florence. The Ottoman empire faced a civil war between Bayezid II and Djem sultan, both sons of Mehmet II. What truly mattered is that the Medici managed both to preserve the status quo in Italy, and at the same time to protect their commercial interest in Constantinople. Clearly, Florence had a certain degree of success in its own political agenda that was neither philo-papal nor philo-ottoman, but purely Florentine.

729 Laggetto 1940.
Conclusions

This PhD dissertation aimed to answer several questions ignored or superficially discussed in past scholarship. The first question concerns the relations between Florence and late Byzantium. Scholars have traditionally focused too much on the Ecumenical Council of 1439 rather than the political and especially commercial goals behind this meeting. One of the central aspects of the relations between Florence and Byzantium are the privileges granted by John VIII. These privileges have previously lacked a critical analysis and historical contextualisation. Scholars have simply accepted them as a fact and never questioned their authenticity. Moreover, past scholars have failed to investigate whether Florence made concrete use of the commercial chrysobull. For example, scholars have not considered whether Florence ever created a loggia in Constantinople.

This dissertation has reversed the common perception in scholarship that Florence possessed a loggia after John VIII granted the commercial chrysobull to the city. It has made clear the complete lack of sources which identify the presence of a Florentine loggia in Constantinople during the Byzantine period. Therefore, Florence never enacted the commercial privileges given by the emperor. The reasons for this were of political and economic in nature. Specifically, Florence was unable
to overcome the predominance of Venice and Genoa in Constantinople, and therefore continued to use their intermediation, which was more profitable.

Another central issue was the nature of Florence’s diplomacy. This is important since Florence was a minor power compared to Venice, Naples and the Holy See. Therefore, the city had to rely heavily on diplomacy to preserve its interests and develop further commercial and political goals, making the investigation of its diplomacy crucial for the understanding of Florence’s relations with the Levant and the other Italian powers. This dissertation argued that Florence’s diplomacy maintained a remarkably flexible coherence based on pragmatism. This coherence can be seen in many episodes of Florence’s history. For example, Florence had hoped to receive commercial privileges since the end of the fourteenth century. The Medici’s rise to power in 1434 did not change this goal, as shown from the letter sent in 1436 by the Signoria to John VIII. After Florence received the privileges in 1439, the city no longer had need of the Byzantine emperors. Therefore, Florence always refused to satisfy the requests sent by John VIII and Constantine XI and did not participate in the Varna crusade. This Florentine disinterest does not represent, in my opinion, a change of diplomacy towards Byzantium, but rather shows the coherence of the Signoria’s diplomacy.

This dissertation investigated further the pragmatism at the base of Florence’s diplomatic coherence. Matters of faith were relatively unimportant for Florence. The

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730 See fn. 150.
discussions in the *pratiche* and the letter to the ambassadors confirm this statement, since the basis of every decision taken by Florence followed political or economic reasons. The same pragmatism can be observed in the instructions given to the ambassadors, especially with regard to papal initiatives on the crusade. Most often, the Signoria sent ambassadors with little authority to negotiate the organisation for the crusade or any other papal initiative. In this way the Florentine ambassador could have postponed every answer to the pope since they had to consult the Florentine Signoria. Of course, this choice was a Florentine expedient in order to gain time. It was crucial to delay every action in order to reason on the best policy and perhaps await more favourable developments. Moreover, the ambassadors were prohibited from promising anything which would bind the Signoria to the pope, especially in the case of crusade contributions. The only two exceptions were in cases of secret promises, like those at Mantua (1459), or in the case of the use of the duke of Milan as a guarantor for Florence, as happened at the beginning of the Venetian war against the Ottoman empire (1463). This pragmatic diplomacy was one of the reasons why Florence was deaf to the Byzantine requests. There was simply nothing to gain from helping the Byzantine emperors who were completely under Genoese and Venetian influence. This was not because Florence had no commercial interests in Constantinople.
On the contrary, the Constantinopolitan market was very important for Florence’s woollen and silk cloth production. Normally, Florence had in Naples one of the most important markets for its cloth production, but this trade stream diminished after Alphonse V took possession of the Neapolitan kingdom. Alphonse V and Ferrante I were not reliable commercial partners due to their political and commercial aggressiveness. Alphonse V twice enacted a trade embargo against Florence, while Ferrante I banned the Florentine *panni*. However, thanks to its commercial repositioning in Constantinople, Florence was finally able to divert its cloth trade to a stable and more profitable market, as the same Venetian ambassador in Naples, Zaccaria Barbaro, stated to Ferrante I.

Florence’s pragmatism manifested itself in the ways the Signoria conducted its foreign policy. The primary Florentine goal was to maintain the balance of power in Italy, and thus defend Florence’s independence and peace. The rise of Francesco Sforza as duke of Milan and the conquest of Naples by Alphonse V caused new alliances between Florence and Milan against Naples and Venice. Consequently, Florence was not going to help Byzantium, since the Florentine Commune had no reason to give support to an important Venetian marketplace. The reason for the Florentine shift from Venice to Milan lay not only in Italian politics but also in the Levant. Florence could not remain an ally of Venice since the latter was the main obstacle to Florence’s commercial expansion in Constantinople. Therefore,

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731 Tognetti 2002:36-39. If the woollen cloth production started to decrease, Florence had a recovery thanks to the silk cloth production; see in general Tognetti 2002.
Constantinople was just another “battleground” where the conflicts and shifting alliances among Renaissance powers were played out. The shocked reaction of the Milanese ambassador as he witnessed the satisfaction expressed by someone in the Signoria to the news of the fall of Constantinople is the final proof of Florence’s pragmatism. Florence and the Medici were aware that the fall of Constantinople represented a huge loss for Venice’s power and the end of Venice’s monopoly in the city.

Florence’s diplomatic shrewdness can be observed in the forgeries made by Florence. This dissertation has been the first modern work arguing that most of the surviving documents issued by the Byzantine emperor John VIII on behalf of Florence and the Florentines are forgeries. These forgeries themselves show the pragmatic, almost Machiavellian thinking of the Medici, who took advantage of the unprecedented presence of the Byzantine emperor and his huge delegation, to promote Florence’s narrowly Italian goals. The Medici needed these forgeries to reinforce their legitimacy at a moment in which their power was menaced by several enemies, such as the duke of Milan or the former ruling family in Florence, the Albizzi. Finally, another proof of Florence’s diplomatic pragmatism is in the understanding between Florence and the Ottoman power after 1453. This pact clearly shows that the Florentine city did not consider the religion of the partner to be an obstacle to trade and diplomacy. It is true that Venice and Genoa had also made commercial agreements with the sultan, but the case of Florence is different. Florence was chosen by the sultan for different reasons, above all the fact that the
city did not at all represent a threat to Mehmet II. The Florentine-Ottoman relationship was unequal from the beginning and depended entirely on the sultan’s goodwill towards the city. The willingness of Florence to accept an alliance with a more proactive and unequal partner, such as the Ottomans, shows again their very pragmatic approach.

This dissertation has also argued for a different understanding of the interrelation among Venice, Florence, the popes and the Ottomans. Florence has either been interpreted as philo-ottoman or philo-papal. I think that both the aforementioned interpretations are unsuitable in describing the specificity of Florence’s diplomacy. Florence had its own political agenda that followed mainly political and economic reasons. As such, Florence had to maintain good relations with all the major political powers of the time, such as Venice, Naples, the popes and the Ottoman empire. Accordingly, Florence could not have been rigid in its diplomatic line, such as always being contrary to the crusade or always in competition with either Naples or Venice.

This flexibility did not undermine Florence’s coherence since the city always pursued its political and economic interests, such as attempting to maintain the balance of power in Italy and at the same time improving its commercial presence in the Levant. Surely, the Florentine position in between Islamic and Christian powers made it harder for Florence to pursue its goals. For example, I do not think that Florence was so eager to provide intelligence to the Ottomans, but clearly had no
choice. Florence feared an eventual reaction by the sultan against the Florentine community in Constantinople as the pratiche clearly had stated. At the same time the Florentine and Ottoman relationship was not always a positive one for Florence. For example, following the Ottoman conquest of Albania in 1469, Ferrante I, afraid of the Ottoman advance, abandoned the alliance with Florence and Milan for Venice.\footnote{See in this PhD fn. 600.}

For Florence, having a friendly Neapolitan kingdom was crucial. For instance, a friendly Naples guaranteed the travel of the Florentine galleys to the Levant. The Ottoman attack against Albania, and the death of Skanderbeg, pushed the Neapolitan king toward the main enemy of the Florentine Signoria, Venice. Therefore, it makes sense that Florence granted six galleys and 20,000 florins to Ferrante I in 1472, as the Signoria probably wanted to restore the friendship with Naples and separate Ferrante I from Venice. Florence presented the gift even thought it was perfectly aware that this was an action against the Ottomans, and therefore carried fearful consequences if discovered.

Yet, Naples was not the only power with which Florence wanted to keep on friendly terms. Florence also tried to maintain a friendly relation with the Holy See. The popes had an important role since the time of the great Florentine commercial companies Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli. The first Florentine Levantine expansion took place thanks to the good relations with Rome, as the pope granted to the Florentine companies the collection of tithes in the Levantine dioceses since the fourteenth century. Florence had several economic interests in Rome, above all, the
apostolic depository which was in Medici hands since 1427.\textsuperscript{733} Moreover, the favour of the popes was necessary for carrying out trade with the Levant. Only the pope could grant the special permission needed to trade with the heathens. The pope could have undermined Florence’s interests in the Levant. For example, Pope Paul II denied Holy Communion to the Florentine merchants in Constantinople, even if that measure did not last.\textsuperscript{734} The reason why this papal provision was ineffective is again due to the Medici’s political acumen. Cosimo the Elder and, later, Lorenzo de’ Medici, often paid the papal debts and sustained expenses of the Roman curia. This monetary influence of Florence in Rome was so invasive that even the Venetian ambassador, Zaccaria Barbaro admitted that “I heard … that Lorenzo de’ Medici’s bank does everything in the court and has from the pope and the cardinal every favour and more reputation…”\textsuperscript{735}

Florence had a similar attitude toward the crusade – flexible but coherent. All the popes from the second half of the Quattrocento tried to organise a crusade which aimed to at least to bring to a halt the Ottomans’ aggressive expansion. Florence consistently employed temporising tactics to avoid paying contributions to papal requests for aid to the crusade. Scholars have hypothesised that Florence attempted to boycott the crusade in which Venice was the only power that might profit from it. However, the discussions in the pratiche give evidence of the fear the Commune

\textsuperscript{733} De Roover 1963:210.
\textsuperscript{734} ASF, Legazioni e Commissarie 16 55-62.
\textsuperscript{735} Corazzol 1994:50. Sento...el bancho de Lorenco d’i Medici fare gni cossa in corte et havere dal papa et cardinali ogni favore et piu reputation l’havesse mai.
held for the Florentine community in Constantinople if the sultan would find out about a Florentine contribution to the crusade. Besides, Florence effectively gave crusade contributions when it suited the Commune’s political goals. For example, Florence once offered contributions to prevent Venice making peace with the sultan, thus negating Venice’s argument that peace was necessary because the Venetians were the only power actively fighting Mehmet II. In 1474, however, Florence offered a contribution to Venice in exchange for joining the league in that same year.

Relations with Venice followed the aforementioned scheme. It is clear that, after 1453, hostility between the two powers could not have been avoided as a result of the will of Florence to increase its power in Constantinople. The Medici’s will was not to see Venice destroyed, but only contained especially in Italy. Venice, just as Naples, was crucial for the balance of power in Italy. Nothing stopped Florence from joining a league in 1474 with Venice in the period of the Ottoman-Venetian war. In this period of time, Ferrante I of Naples seemed to acquire too much power and began to erode Florence’s influence in Rome, especially after Pope Sixtus IV’s election. Besides, the league between Florence and Venice prevented the Florentine state-galleys from being attacked in their voyages to the Levant.

To sum up, Florence’s diplomacy was flexible but coherent in its pragmatism. Florence sometimes gave crusade contributions, even if they did so in secret and at the same time passed information to the sultan through the Florentine consul in Constantinople. Florence’s diplomatic tactic was to maintain the balance in
Italy in order to facilitate its commercial activities, including those in the Levant. Florence’s diplomatic view was global, and it took into account political and commercial matters that included the entire Mediterranean. For example, the league with Venice in 1474, or Florence’s league with Naples in 1464, were not only made from an Italian political perspective, but had consequences in the Levant as well, such as stopping Venetian or Neapolitan attacks against the Florentine state-galleys.

It is no surprise that, at this moment, the balance of power began to crumble. Florence was faced with one of the gravest dangers in Medici history. The election of Pope Sixtus IV, the alliance made with the king of Naples, and the assassination of Galeazzo Maria Sforza (1476) destroyed the Italian balance of power. Sixtus IV and Florence entered into a conflict over the pope’s policy in Romagna, which ran counter to Florentine policy. The Pazzi plot in 1478 was the last event of a conflict which escalated quickly. Fortunately for the Medici, Lorenzo survived and managed to overcome his enemies only to receive interdict and excommunication. Naples, incited by Sixtus IV, entered the war and managed to conquer some territories. It was mainly thanks to Lorenzo de’ Medici’s visit to Naples that peace was signed between Florence and Naples. Similarly, this peace saved Medici rule in Florence.

The subsequent conquest of Otranto made by the Ottomans clearly played in favour of Florentine interests. However, there is no evidence of Florentine involvement in the Ottoman decision to attack Otranto. First of all, I doubt that the sultan would have ever been influenced by a city, such as Florence, which was
militarily insignificant. Most probably, Mehmet II had this plan in mind after the truce with Venice in 1478, since the sultan always avoided fighting on different fronts at the same time. The unpublished reports sent from Rome by Pandolfini seem to confirm the Florentine Signoria’s ignorance of the impending Ottoman attack. What was certain was that Florence, as usual, reacted to this event with great diplomatic acumen. The Medici negotiated with Ferrante I and promised a contribution in exchange for the territories lost in the war against Naples (1478-1479). Once again, Florence benefited from the attack of Mehmet II, and afterwards obtained other benefits by helping Ferrante I to conquer back Otranto from the Ottomans.

This PhD dissertation on the Levant has shown the importance and great potential based on material from the Italian state archives. It reversed the common perception of Florence as a power that was relatively uninvolved or disinterested in the Levant, since Florence’s interests in the region are traceable from the fourteenth century. This work has also demonstrated that Florence had no inhibitions when dealing or negotiating with powers of different faith, as long as the outcome could strengthen Florentine interests. Matters of faith, so important in the Middle Ages, surrendered to the logic of the general welfare of the state and the wealth of its commercial elite. Florence’s diplomacy was coherent in its actions towards the Byzantine empire. If Florence did not help Byzantium, it was simply due to pragmatic reasons. Florence cooperated with the sultan simply out of fear of an eventual angry reaction from Mehmet II, and to protect its interests in
Constantinople. At the same time, to protect its independence and the balance of power in Italy, Florence made a deal with Venice and Naples and contributed to both for the crusade when these contributions went in favour of Florence’s political agenda.

To conclude, the history of the relationship between Florence and the Levant represents the successful attempt of a minor power to compete against much stronger neighbours like Venice or Naples. Florence, despite its military weaknesses, managed to achieve a privileged status in Constantinople with the favourable ahd-nāme granted to it by the sultan in 1458-1460. Moreover, Florence also managed to defend these privileges from the threats of the popes, the Venetians, and Naples. Diplomacy was the key to Florentine success, allowing Florence to maintain the balance of power in Italy and to preserve its commercial interests in the Levant.
APPENDIXES

Tabula Siglorum


Leg. Comm. = ASF, Signori, Legazioni e Commissarie (communications between the Signoria and the ambassadors).


MAP = ASF, Mediceo Avanti il Principato.


Prot. = *Protocolli del carteggio della Signoria*.


**LEGEND**

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APPENDIX I

Byzantine Documents used in chapter 2-3 for the forgeries
APPENDIX I/A

THE UNUSUAL LONG REPETITION IN THE
FLORENTINE CHRYSOBULLS AND THEIR
COMPARISON WITH OTHER CHRYSOBULLS OF
THE PERIOD

John VIII’s commercial chrysobull to Florence

Müller, 122, pp. 174-177; Lampros, pp. 338-344

† Τὸ ταῖς εὐνοίαις καὶ ταῖς χρηστότητι πάντας, εἰ ὁ ὁ τέ ἔστι, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μὴ κατ’ ἄνδρα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ πόλεις δεξιοῦσθαι τε καὶ προσάγεσθαι, βασιλικὸς ἀπαιτεῖται νόμος τοὺς εἰς τοῦτο σχήματος ὑπὸ θεοῦ καθεστῶτας. Κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἀνάγκη προσχεῖσθαι τοῖς βασιλεῖσι, οἶνον τινὰ μίαν ψυχὴν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, μᾶλλον δ’ εἴπεῖν, καθάπερ τινὰς ἐπιτρόπους τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένει, θεοῦ καὶ τῆς ὀφράτου καὶ ύψηλῆς ἐκείνου προνοίας ὑπηρέτας καὶ μάρτυρας, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης γνώμης αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτον τῶν νόμον σάζειν ἀκίνητω, οὕς ἄν ἔχοι ἐναρχέστερον ἐκφήναι σημεῖον τοῦ κατανεύειν ἔτοίμῳ τοῖς αἴτουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ προθύμους εἶναι περὶ τὰς εὐσκήμονας δοξαζᾶς οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὅλων τοσοῦτον τὸν βασιλέα χοσμεῖ, ὡσον τὸ πρὸς πάντας εὐμενὲς καὶ φιλόδωρον, οὐ μόνον γὰρ διὰ τούτων θεὸν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν μιμοῦμενος φαίνεται, πάσι προσημίως ὑπανοίγω τὰ ὁτα καὶ δαιμόλης ἐπαρκῶν τοῖς τῶν δεομένων αἰτήσει, τῇ τε παρὰ αὐτοῦ βασιλείᾳ λαμπηδόνι τοῖς εὐεργετουμένοις καταφαυλήσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τούτων εὐνοιαν ἐαυτῷ εἰσποιεῖται καὶ ὡσὶ διὰ τῶν χορηγουμένων ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ δοξαζῶν τοῖς ἄλλοις
συγκαταβαίνει καὶ ὁμιλεῖ, τοσοῦτο μάλιστα δι’ αὐτῶν τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ἑξαίρει ἀξίωμα, ἐπὶ τὸ ἐξοχότατον καθισμὸν, πηγήν τε καὶ προτανεῖον κοινὸν ἀποδεικνύον τῶν χαρισμάτων, πάσης τε ἀρχῆς ἐπιγείου ἀκρόφειαν.

Διὰ δὴ ταῦτα, ἐπεὶ οἱ ἐπιφανεῖς ἀρχόντες τῆς μεγαλοπρεποῦς πόλεως Φλωρεντίας, ὁ σημαιοφόρος δηλαδὴ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ οἱ πρώτοι τῶν τεχνῶν ὄνοματι καὶ δικαίως πάσης τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ δήμου τῆς εἰρήνης πόλεως Φλωρεντίας ἐδείχθησαν τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἵνα δορέα ἡμετέρα βασιλικὴ τιμήσωμεν αὐτοὺς καὶ παράσχωμεν αὐτοῖς ἐλευθερίας καὶ ἀτελείας τινὰς ἐν τῇ θεοφοροῦσῃ, θεοδοξόστῳ βασιλίδι πόλει ἡμῶν, τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει, εἰς τιμὴν, περίθαλψιν, ἀσφάλειάν τε καὶ ὑποδοχήν τῶν πραγματευτῶν αὐτῶν, τῶν τε πολιτῶν καὶ ὑπηρέτων αὐτῶν, ἡδὲ ἡ βασιλεία μου καθόλου μὲν διὰ τὰ προειρημένα, ἱδίως δὲ διὰ τῇ ἁρετῇ αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ τοῦ τρόπου φιλάληθης, (τοὺς χάρ τοιούτους ἡ βασιλεία μου ἀποδέχεται καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου περιθάλπει ἐφέτευτα), καὶ δὴ ἡ ἐνεδείξαντο περὶ τὴν βασιλείαν μου πίστιν, ἀγάπην καὶ εὐνοιαν καιρότερον μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ εξ ὠτού σωματικῶς ἐπεδήμεσεν ἐπὶ τὴν τὴν περιφανή πόλιν αὐτῶν, τὴν Φλωρεντίαν, διὰ τὴν συγκράτησιν καὶ προβῆσιν τῆς ιερᾶς καὶ ἁγίας τῆς δὲ συνόδου καὶ οἰκουμενικῆς, (πολλὴν γὰρ περὶ ἡμῶς καὶ ποιὸ τὰ ἡμέτερα πάντα ἐνεδείξαντο θεραπείαν, ἀγάπην, σπουδὴν, τιμὴν τε καὶ εὐνοιαν), εὐμενῶς ὑπεδέξατο τούτους καὶ ταῖς αἰτήσεσιν αὐτῶν ἐπένευσεν ἑλαρῶς.

Καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ προειρημένοι περιφανεῖς ἁρχόντες, ο οἱ σημαιοφόρος τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι τῶν τεχνῶν ὄνοματι καὶ δικαίως πάσης τῆς μεγαλοπρεποῦς κοινότητος καὶ τοῦ δήμου τῆς Φλωρεντίας ἐξήτησαν, ινα εὐφρενισθήσωμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τῶν ναὸν τοῦ μακαρίου Πέτρου τοῦ ἀποστόλου τὸν οντα ἐν τῇ προειρημένῃ θεοφοιλάκτῳ βασιλίδι πόλει ἡμῶν, τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει, δὲ τὴν ποτα τῶν Πισσαίων καὶ χρονίζει αὐτῷ κυρίως καὶ δεσποτικῶς ἔχοντες ἄδειαν ἀνάνεον αὐτῶν καὶ ἀνακτίζεις κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν βουλής, σωζόμενο μὲντο καὶ φυλαττομένου τοῦ πρώτου αὐτοῦ σχήματος, ἦταν ἢ ἔχουσι τὴν λόγον τὴν γενομένην ποτα τῶν εἰρήμενῶν Πισσαίων, ἐν ἢ ὁφείλουσιν ἀνιστῶν φλάμουλον τῆς εἰρημένης κοινότητος καὶ ἔχουσι καὶ χούνσουλον, ὃν ἀν ἐκλέγεται καὶ πέμπτη ἢτα αὐτοῖς ἢ εἰρημένη πειραφῆς κοινότης ἔχουντα ἄδειαν κρίνειν καὶ ἀποφαίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸν τύπον τῶν ἄλλων
κουνσούλων τών ἐν τῇ εἰρημένη πόλει τῆς βασιλείας μου τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει καὶ τιθέναι εἰς φιλακήν ἰδίαν, [ὅν ἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν θέλωσι παραδείσειν], ἦν αὐτοὶ οἰκοδομήσουσι σύνεγγυς τῆς λόντες αὐτῶν ὡς ἢ ἕνα ποτὲ συμβὴ ἀποθανεῖν τὸν τοιούτων κούνσουλον, ἐξοσιν ἐπὶ ἀδείας οἱ εἰρημένοι πραγματευταὶ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀποκαθιστᾶν ἕνα ἐκ μέσου αὐτῶν, ἡς ἂν μαζώσα ἡ προειρημένη περιφράνης κοινότης αὐτῶν ποιησθῇ ἐτέρων.

'Ετεί ἐδέησαν τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἵνα δωρήσητε αὐτοῖς καὶ εὐφυτήσῃ ἀτέλειάν τινα καὶ ἐλευθερίαν τοῦ συνήθους καὶ γενομεμμένου κομμορχίου· ἔτεὶ ἵνα ἤχωσιν ἄδειαν καὶ ἤξυσιάν ἀγοράσαι οἰκήματα ἥ ἀνοικοδομήσαι ἀναλώσιμαν ἰδίοις ἐν τῇ προειρημένῃ θεοδοξάστω καὶ θεοφρουρήτῳ πόλει τῆς βασιλείας μου, τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει, ὑπὲρ ἀναπαύσεως καὶ ὑποδοχῆς τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ πραγματευτῶν αὐτῶν, τῶν ἐκείσε κατὰ καιροὺς εὐσήμενοι, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις, ἵνα ἤχωσι ἄλιθον κονδούκτον πλῆθος καὶ διηνεκές οἱ ἐκεῖ ἐλευσόμενοι πραγματευταὶ καὶ πολίται αὐτῶν ἀπὸ παντὸς συμπτώματος καρπικοῦ, πλῆν μάχης καθολικῆς ἢ βλάβης τινὸς, ἐὰν ποτὲ συμβῇ γενέσθαι μεταξὺ ἧμῶν καὶ τῆς εἰρημένης κοινότητος.

Ἡ βασιλεία μου εἰμενὸς ταῦτα πάντα προσδεξαμένη καὶ ἐπινεύσασα, τὸν παρόντα χρυσόβουλον λόγον αὐτοῖς ἐπιχορηγεῖ καὶ ἐπιβραβεῖ, δι’ οὗ εὐδοκεῖ, προστάσσει, θεσπίζει καὶ διορίζεται, ἵνα ἡ προειρημένη περιφράνης κοινότης τῆς Φλωρεντίας ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐξῆς ἔχῃ ἄδειαν διὰ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ ὑπηρετῶν αὐτῆς ἐν τῇ θεοφρουρήτῳ πόλει τῆς βασιλείας μου, τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει, ἐσομένων χρήσαται καὶ νέμεσθαι τὸν ἴδιον ναὸν τοῦ μακαρίου Πέτρου τοῦ ἀποστόλου, ὅς ἦν ποτὲ τῶν Πισσαίων, χυρίως καὶ δεσποτικῶς, ἤχωντες ἄδειαν ἀνανεοῦν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀνακτίζειν κατὰ τήν αὐτῶν βούλήσην, σωζομένου μέντοι καὶ φυλαττομένου τοῦ πρώτου αὐτοῦ σχήματος· ἔτεὶ ἵνα ἤχωσι τὴν λόξαν τὴν γενομένην ποτὲ τῶν εἰρημένων Πισσαίων, ἐν ἧ ὅφειλον ἀνιστᾶν φλάμουλα δύο, πρῶτον μὲν τῆς βασιλείας μου, εἰτα τῆς εἰρημένης περιφράνους κοινόντιος καὶ ἤχωσι καὶ κοῦνσολων, ὅν ἂν ἐκλέγηται καὶ πέμπῃ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἡ εἰρημένη περιφράνης κοινότης ὅντα αὐτόχθων Φλωρεντίνων καὶ ἤχοντα ἄδειαν κρίνειν καὶ ἀποφαίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸν τύπον τῶν ὀλλῶν κουνσούλων τῶν ἐν τῇ εἰρημένῃ πόλει τῆς βασιλείας μου,
Κωνσταντινουπόλει, και τιθέναι εἰς φυλακήν ἰδίαν, ὄν ἀν ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν θέλωσι παιδεύειν, ἤντινα φυλακῆν αὐτοὶ οἰκοδομήσουσι σύνεγγυς τής εἰρημένης λόγνας αὐτῶν καὶ ἐὰν ποτὲ συμβῇ ἀποθανεῖν τὸν τοιούτων κοινόσυνον, ἔχουσιν ἐπὶ ἁδείας οἱ εἰρημένοι πραγματευται ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀποκαθιστᾶν ἄν ἐκ μέσου αὐτῶν, ἦς ἢ μαθοῦσα ἡ προειρημένη περιφανῆς κοινότητας αὐτῶν ποιησθαι ἔτερον. ἔτι ἢν ἀπὸ τοῦ συνήθους καὶ νεονικεμένου μεγάλου καὶ καθολικοῦ κοιμητηρίου ἔχουσιν εὐθεγεσίαν καὶ δωρεᾶν δῶ εἰς τὰ ἑκατόν, καίτοι γε δυσχερείας οὐ μιχρᾶς ἐνοσῆς τῷ πράγματι διὰ τὴν γυνομένην ἐντεθὲν μείωσιν ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις εἰσδήμασιν οὐ γὰρ εἰσῆ οἱ τοιαῦτα ἁδίας παραχωρεῖσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὕν ἢν κάτω τοῦ ὡς κάτω τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ προειρημένη μεγαλοπρεπῆς τῆς Φλωρεντίας κοινότητας εἰδής, πόσον ἡ βασιλεία μου ταῖς αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸ ἐγχεροῦν ἱκανοποιηθῇ ἕτετε, πάσαν ἄλλην παροῦσα δυσχερείαν καὶ ταύτην τὴν δωρεὰν ποιῆται ἀσμένως αὐτῆ, ὡς προειρηται.

"Ετι ἢν ἔχουσιν ἀδειαν καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἀγοράσαι οἰκήματα τρίω ἢ ἀναλώμασιν ἵδιος ἀνοιχοδομησίαν εν τῇ προειρημένῃ θεοφοινική καὶ θεοδοξίαστῳ πόλις τῆς βασιλείας μου, τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει, ὑπὲρ ἀναπώεις καὶ ὑποδοχής τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ πραγματευτῶν αὐτῶν τῶν ἐκεῖσθε κατὰ καῳρῶς εὐρισκομένων. Ταύτην μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀδειαν τοῦ ἀγορᾶσα ἢ ἀνοιχοδομησά τα εἰρημένα τρία οἰκήματα δωρεῖται ἡ βασιλεία μου, ως προειρηται, τῇ εἰρημένῃ μεγαλοπρεπῇ κοινότητι τῆς Φλωρεντίας κατὰ τὸ παρὸν καίπερ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ποιησμένῃ καὶ ποιοῦσα δυσχέρειαν, ἢν μὴ ἐξή ξένως οἰοισδίποτε ἀγοράζειν ἢ ἀνοιχοδομεῖν οἰκήματα ἐν τῇ προειρημένῃ πόλις τῆς βασιλείας μου, τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει, οὐκ ἀποκλείει δὲ εἰς τὸ μέλλον κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν μὴ δοῦναι ἀδειαν καὶ πλείω τούτων ἀγοράσαι ἢ ἀνοιχοδομήσαι, καθάπερ τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου δόξει ἀναγκαῖον ἁμα καὶ προσήκον. ἔτι ἢν ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἔχουσι σαλβὸν κοινοῦκτον πλῆρος καὶ δικηνεκε οἱ ἐκεῖ ἐλευθόριοι πραγματευται καὶ πολίτα αὐτῶν ἀπὸ παντὸς συμπότωμας καϊρικού πλὴν μάχης καθολικής ἢ βιλῆς τινὸς, ἐὰν ποτὲ καὶ καθάρος γενέσθαι μεταξὺ ἡμῶν καὶ τῆς εἰρημένες κοινότητος. ταύτα πάντα δωρεῖται ἡ βασιλεία μου τῇ προειρημένῃ περιφρανεὶ τῆς Φλωρεντίας κοινότητι καὶ προσδιορίζεται, ἢν τότε ὅσιν ἐνεργά καὶ ἔχουσι χώραν, ὅταν ἡ προσοψηθείσα.
περιφράνεις τής Φλωρέντιας κοινότητας ποιήσει τε και πληρώση, ὅσα ἀνωτέρω διασαφάται καὶ περιέχεται, οἷον ὅταν ἀνεγείρεσθη λόγτζαν καὶ καταστήσαντες κούνσολον στειλοῦσιν ἐκεί κατὰ τὸν διευθυνόμενον ἀνωτέρω τύπον καὶ τρόπον, καὶ τόλα πάντα πληρωθῶσιν, ὅσα ἐν ταῖς προειρημέναις αἰτήσει τε καὶ δωρεάς περιέχεται. τῇ γονὶ ἵσχυι καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβούλλου λόγον τῆς βασιλείας μου καθέξει καὶ νεμηθήσεται ἡ προειρημένη περιφράσεις κοινότητας τῆς Φλωρέντιας πάσας τὰς προειρημένας εὐφροσύνας τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἤγουν ἴνα ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξος ἔχει ἄδειαν διὰ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ὑπηρέτων αὐτῆς τῶν ἐν τῇ θεοφρονήτητι πόλει τῆς βασιλείας μου, τῇ Κωνσταντινούπολει, ἐσομένων χρῆσθαι καὶ νέμεσθαι τὸν ἰερὸν ναὸν τοῦ μακαρίου Πέτρου τοῦ ἀποστόλου, ὡς ἡ ποτὲ τῶν Πισσαίων, κυρίως καὶ δεσποτικῶς, ἐχοντες ἄδειαν ἀναισθῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀνακτίζειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν βούλησιν, σωζομένων μέντοι καὶ φυλαττομένων τοῦ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ σχήματος. ἦτα ἵνα ἔχωσεν τὴν λόγτζαν τὴν γενομένην ποτὲ τῶν εἰρημένων Πισσαίων, κυρίως καὶ δεσποτικῶς ἐν ἡ ὀρθόλουσιν ἀναστῶν φλάμιολα δῶν, πρῶτον μὲν τῆς βασιλείας μου, εἰτα τῆς εἰρημένης περιφράσεις κοινότητος καὶ ἔχωσε καὶ κοῦνσολον, ὅν ἂν ἐκλέγωσαι καὶ πέμπη ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἡ εἰρημένη περιφράσεις κοινότητος ὅντα αὐτόλοξην Φλωρέντιν καὶ ἔχοντα ἄδειαν χρίνεσαι καὶ ἀποφαίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸν τύπον τῶν ἄλλων κοῦνσολῶν τῶν ἐν τῇ εἰρημένῃ πόλει τῆς βασιλείας μου, τῇ Κωνσταντινούπολει, καὶ τιθέναι εἰς φυλαχὴν ἱδίαν, ὅν ἂν ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους αὐτῶν θέλωσε πανδεδείγματι, ἠκτίνα φυλαχὴν αὐτοῦ ὀικοδομήσουσι σύνεγγυς τῆς εἰρημένης λόγτζας αὐτῶν. καὶ ἔναν ποτὲ συμβὴ ἀποδάνειν τὸν τοιοῦτον κοῦνσολον, ἔχοσιν ἄδειαν οἱ εἰρημένοι πραγματευταὶ ἐκλέγονται καὶ ἀποκαθιστῶν ἑνα ἐκ μέσου αὐτῶν, ἴοι ἂν μαθοῦσα ἡ προειρημένη περιφράσεις κοινότητος αὐτῶν ποιήσεται ἐτερον. ἦτα ἴνα ἀπὸ τοῦ συνήθους καὶ νυνισμένου μεγάλου καὶ καθολικοῦ κομμουνικοῦ ἔχοσιν εὐρήχοσιν καὶ δωρεῶν δῶν εἰς τὰ ἑκατον, καίτων γας δουλερείας οὐ μικρὰς ἐνοῦσις τῷ πράγματι διὰ τὴν γνωμομένην ἐντεύθεν μεῖωσιν ἐν τοῖς βασιλικοῖς εἰσοδήμοις· οὔ γὰρ εἰσέθη τὰ συμβάντα ἡδίως παραχωρεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅν ἴνα κάν τοῦτο ὡς κἀν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ προειρημένη μεγαλοπρεπῆς τῆς Φλωρέντιας κοινότητος εἰδῆ, τόσον ἡ
βασιλεία μου ταῖς αἰτήσειν αὐτῆς κατά γε τὸ ἐγχερόν ικανοποιῆσαι ζητεῖ, πάσαν ἅλλην παροφόσα· δυσχέρειαν καὶ ταύτην τὴν ὁφείλει αἰσχρόνος αὐτῇ ὡς προείρησα. ἔτι ἵνα ἔχωσιν ἄδειαν καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἀγοράσας οἰκήματα τρία ἢ ἀναλώμασιν ἀνοικοδομήσας ἰδίοις ἐν τῇ προειρήμενη θεοφροσύνῃ καὶ θεοδοξίᾳ πόλει τῆς βασιλείας μου, τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει, ὑπὲρ ἀναπάυσεως καὶ ὑποδοχῆς τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ πραγματευτῶν αὐτῶν τῶν ἐκείσε κατὰ καιροὺς εὐρισκομένων. ταύτην μὲν οὖν τήν ἄδειαν τοῦ ἀγοράσας ἢ ἀνοικοδομήσας τὰ εἰρημένα τρία οἰκήματα δωρεῖται ἡ βασιλεία μου, ὡς προείρησα, τῇ εἰρημένῃ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ κοινότητι τῆς Φλωρεντίας κατὰ τὸ παρόν, καίπερ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ποιησαμένη καὶ ποιοῦσα δυσχέρειαν, ἵνα μὴ ἔξα ποίοις οἰκισθῆτοσε ἄγοράζειν ἢ ἀνοικοδομεῖν οἰκήματα ἐν τῇ προειρήμενῃ πόλει τῆς βασιλείας μου, τῇ Κωνσταντινουπόλει, οὐχ ἀποκλεῖει δὲ εἰς τὸ μέλλον κατὰ τὴν χρείαν μὴ δοῦναι ἄδειαν καὶ πλείον τοῦτω ἀγοράσαι ἢ ἀνοικοδομήσαι, καθάπερ δόξει τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου ἀναγκαῖον ἢμα καὶ προσήκον. ἔτι ἵνα ἐπὶ πάσι τούτοις ἔχωσι σῶβαν κοινότητι τίμων καὶ δηνεκές οἱ ἐκεί ἐλευσόμενοι πραγματεύονται καὶ πολίται αὐτῶν ὑπὸ παντὸς συμπτώματος καιρικοῦ, πλὴν μάχης καθολικῆς ἢ βλάβης τινὸς, ἐὰν ποτε συμβῆ γενέσθαι μεταξὶ ἡμῶν καὶ τῆς εἰρημένης κοινότητος. ταῦτα πάντα δωρεῖται ἡ βασιλεία μου τῇ προειρήμενῃ περιφρανεῖ τῆς Φλωρεντίας κοινότητι καὶ προσδοκίζεται, ἵνα τότε ὅσα ἐνεργά καὶ ἔχωσι χώραν, ὅταν ἡ προφηθείσα περιφράνη τῆς Φλωρεντίας κοινότης ποιήση τε καὶ πληρώσῃ, ὅσα ἄνωτέρω διασαφεῖται καὶ περιέχεται, ὅταν ἡ ἀναγείρωσι λόγον καὶ καταστήσαντες κοινοσυνολον στείλωσιν ἐκεῖ κατὰ τὸν διευκρινιθέντα ἄνωτέρω τῶν καὶ τρόπον καὶ τάλα πάντα πληρωθῶσιν, ὅσα ἐν ταῖς προειρήμεναις αἰτήσεσι τε καὶ δωρεάς περιέχεται, καὶ εἰς τὴν περί τούτων δήλωσι καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τοὺς περιφρανεῖς καὶ προειρήμενους ἄρχοντας, τὸν τε σημαιοφόρον τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοὺς πρώτους τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ διὶ αὐτῶν πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν μεγαλοπρεπή πόλιν καὶ κοινότητα τῆς Φλωρεντίας καὶ ὁ παρὸν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ μήνα Ἀὔγουστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης β'
John VIII’s chrysobull dealing with domestic matters to Florence

Müller 172-174, 121; Lampros pp. 335-338
τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ δωρεὰν προβιβάζοντας εὐπρεπεῖσθαι ὅσον γὰρ διὰ τῶν χορηγομένων ὑπὸ αὐτῶν δωρεῶν τοῖς ἄλλοις συγκαταβαίνοντες ὀμιλοῦσιν, τοσσύνῳ μᾶλλον τὸ τῆς βασιλείας ἀξίωμα μεγαλύνοντας, πηγὴν καὶ κοινὸν προτανείον ἐκδεικνύοντες αὐτὴν καὶ πάσης ἐπιγείας ἀρχῆς ἀκροφειαν.

Διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἀποβλέψασα ἡ βασιλεία μου πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφάνη τῆς μεγαλοπρεποῦς πόλεως Φλωρεντίας κοινότητα καὶ ἦν κέκτησι τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ γενναία μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ ὅσον δόξης ἀντιποιοοῦνται καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἐν πάσιν ὀρθῶτητος, καὶ βουλομένη ταύτην ὅσον ἔνεστιν ἔξαρα τε καὶ τιμήσει καὶ βασιλικάς κατακοσμησιά δωρεάς καὶ διὰ τὰ προειρημένα μὲν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ δὴ ἦν περὶ ἡμᾶς ἁμα καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα ἐνεδείξαντο σπουδὴν, θεραπείαν, πίστιν, καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τῆς βασιλείας μου ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς μεγαλοπρεπὴ πόλιν αὐτῶν ἐπιδημία διὰ τῆς συγκρότησιν καὶ προβιβασμὸν τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ ὄγιας οἰκουμενικῆς συνόδου, ἡδὲ ἐπιχορηγεῖ αὐτῶς τὸν παρόντα χρυσόβουλλον λόγον αὐτῆς, δὲ οὗ καὶ διορίζεται, δωρέται τε καὶ ἐπιβραβεύει, ὢν ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ εἰς τὸ εξῆς διαπαντός καὶ διηνεκῶς ὁ ἐπιφανῆς χορὸς τῶν ἐννέα τῆς πρώτης καὶ κοινωνίας παρ' αὐτοὶς τάξεως, τουτέστιν ὁ σημασιοφόρος τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ οἱ σὺν αὐτῷ λοιποὶ ὑκτὸ, οἱ πρώτοι τῶν τεχνῶν, οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ εἰς τὸ εξῆς ἐσόμενοι, συνημμένως τε καὶ ὁμοῦ, παρ' ὅσον ἄν χρόνον ἐν τῇ προφηθείσῃ διαμεῖνεσιν ἀρχῆς καὶ ἄξια καὶ οὐ περαιτέρω ἔχοισιν ἄθειον πλήρη καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἐντελῆ τοῦ ποιεῖν, προχειρίζεσθαι καὶ συνιστᾶν νοταρίους ἢ τον ταβουλιαρίους ἰκανοὺς ὄντας ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ εἰδότας γράμματα οὕς ὁμοῦ τὴ πάντας καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἔκαστον αὐτῶν προσδέξονται καὶ προβιβάσουσι τῇ εἰρήμενῃ τῆς νοταρίκης ἢ τον ταβουλιαρίκης λειτουργία κατακοσμήσαντες, ἐξητακότες πρὸ τοῦ τοῦ διὸ αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδειον ἀκριβῶς καὶ κρίναντες ἰκανοὺς τῶν τοιούτων ὑποδοχεῖς τε καὶ λειτουργοῦς, ἀρ' ὅν καὶ λήφονται, ὄρκον σωματικὸν καὶ ὑπόσχεσιν, ὡστε παντοχόῳ πιστοῖς εἰναι τῇ βασιλείᾳ [μου] καὶ τὴν εἰρήμενην τῆς νοταρίκῆς ἢ τον ταβουλιαρίκης λειτουργίαν ἐν πάσι τοῖς συμβολαίοις καὶ συναλλάγμασι τοῖς ὑπὸ αὐτῶν γεννησμένοις πίστεῖς ἐνεργεῖν καὶ ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀνευ δόλου, σκευωφιαὶ ἡ ἀπάτης μετίεναι, καθαρὸς τε καὶ εἰλικρινὸς διοικεῖν.
Τούτοις οι ειρημένοι ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες, ὁ τε σημαιοφόρος τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι τῶν τεχνῶν ἐνθίσσουσι καὶ ἐγχειρίσουσιν ἄδειαν πληρεστάτην καὶ ἔξουσίαν ἐντελὴ τοῦ ποιεῖν γράμματα, συμβόλαια συντιθέναι παντοῖα καὶ συγγραφᾶς, συναλλάγματα τε καὶ διαθήκας καὶ ἀπλῶς πάντα τὰ τῇ εἰρημένῃ ὑπηρεσίᾳ κατὰ νόμους ἀνήκοντα καὶ κατὰ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἔθημα, ἐν αἷς συναναστραφήσονται, ποιεῖν, ὑπαγορεύειν, γράφειν, πληροῦν, συντιθέναι τε καὶ ἐκτιθέναι καὶ βασιλικῆ διαβεβαιοῦν καὶ ἐμπεδοῦν ἔξουσία. ἔτη ἡ βασιλεία μου δοθεῖται τοῖς προφητεῖσιν ἐπιφανεῖσιν ἀνδράσι, τῷ τε σημαιοφόρῳ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῖς πρῶτοι τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς εἰς τὸ μέλλον κατὰ καιροὺς ἐσομένους, χρησιεῖ τε καὶ ἐπιβραβεύει, ἵνα τῇ αὐτῇ βασιλικῇ ἔξουσίᾳ ἔχοντες ἄδειαν τοὺς νόθους καὶ εἰς ἁθεμίτον προελθὸντος μίξεως, κοινῆς καὶ διηρημένης, ἱζόντων καὶ θανόντων τῶν γονέων αὐτῶν, νομίμως καὶ γνήσιος ποιεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ τῶν γνησίων καὶ νομίμων δίκαια καὶ προνόμια ἀποκαθιστᾶν καὶ ἐπανάγειν, πάσαν αὐτοῖς ἀπαλείφοντες τὴν ἀπὸ γεννήσεως κηλίδα καὶ ἐπανάγοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς πάντα τὰ ἐκ διαδοχῆς δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἐς ἀδιαθέτου, εἰς τε πάσας τὰς τιμὰς καὶ ἁξίας, αἰς δοῦναι ἅν χρῆσθαι καὶ ἄν ἀπολαύσειν οἱ γνήσιοι καὶ ἀπὸ νομίμων προελθόντες γάμων καὶ θεμιτῶν ὑπεξαίρουμεν δὲ καὶ νοεῖσθαι οὐ θέλομεν ἐν τούτοις τὰ τῶν αὐθεντῶν νόθα τὰ μὴ νομίμως καὶ γνήσιος ἐς αὐτῶν προελθόντα, ὦσαύτως καὶ τὰ νόθα τῶν μπαρόνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιωματικῶν ἄνδρῶν.

“Ετι διορίζεται ἡ βασιλεία μου, ἵνα ὅσους ἂν καὶ ὁίους, ὡς προείρηται, νόθους ὄντας καὶ ἁθεμίτως προσαχθέντας ἐπὶ τὴν βιον τῇ διὰ τῶν παρόντων χρησηθείση ἔξουσία, οἱ προρθέντες ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες νομίμως καταστήσωσι καὶ γνησίους ὄστω νοθᾶνται καὶ ὁσι νομίμως τε καὶ γνησίους τῆς τοιαύτης ἀπολαύσεις γνησιότητος, ὅτε μιθὲν τρόπον ἀπὸ τούτων ἐγγίνεσθαι πρόχρημα τοῖς τῶν γνησίων καὶ κυρίως νομίμωι δικαίους, μήτε παραβλάπτεσθαι τὰς τούτων ἐλευθερίας ἐν τῇ κληρονομίᾳ καὶ διαδοχαῖς καὶ ἐν ἀπάσαις τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν κληρονομιῶν καὶ διαδοχῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐπιβάλλων διανομαῖς τῇ γούν ἵσχυ καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβουλλοῦ λόγου τῆς βασιλείας μου ἔξουσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐξής διαπαντὸς καὶ διηνεκῶς ὁ προειρημένος ἐπιφανεῖς χορὸς τῶν ἐννέα τῆς πρώτης καὶ χορυφαίας παρ’ αὐτοῖς τάξεως, τούτοτιν ὁ σημαιοφόρος τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ
οί σον αὐτῶι λοιποὶ ὄχις, οἱ πρῶτοι δηλαδὴ τῶι τεχνῶν, οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξης ἐσόμενι, συνημμένως τέ καὶ ὁμοῖοι, παρ’ ὅσον αὐχρόν ἐν τῇ προφορθείσῃ διαμείνοντι ἀρχῇ καὶ ἄξια καὶ οὐ περαιτέρῳ, πλήρη ἄδειαν καὶ ἐντελῆ ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ποιεῖν, προχειρίζεσθαι καὶ συνιστάν νοταρίως ἕτ’ οṁν ταβούλλαρίους ἰκανοῦς ὄντας ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ εἰδότας γράμματα, ὦσ ὁμοῖο τε πάντας καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἔκαστον αὐτῶν προσδέξοντας καὶ προβιβάσουσι τῇ εἰρημένη τῆς νοταρίχης ἕτερου τόν ταβούλλαρίχης λειτουργία κατακοσμήσαντες, ἐξητακότες πρότερον τὸν βίον αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ἁριβὸς καὶ χρίναντες ἰκανοὺς τῶν τοιούτων ὑποδοξεῖς τε καὶ λειτουργοῦς, ἀφ’ ὅν καὶ λήφονται ὀρχον σωματικῶς καὶ ὑπόσχοντο, ὡστε πανταχοὶ πιστῶς εἶναι τῇ βασιλείᾳ [μου] καὶ τὴν εἰσημένην τῆς νοταρίχης ἐτερού τόν ταβούλλαρίχης λειτουργίαν ἐν πάσι τοῖς συμβολαίοις καὶ συναλλάγμασιν τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν γενησωμένους πιστῶς ἐνεργεῖν καὶ ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀνευ δόλου καὶ σκευωφόρας ἢ ἀπάτης μετίναι, καθαρῶς τε καὶ εἰλικρινῶς διασκείν. τούτοις οἱ εἰσημένοι ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες, ὦ τε σημαινόροφος τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ οἱ πρῶτοι τῶν τεχνῶν ἐνθήσουν καὶ ἐγχειρήσουσι ἄδειαν πληρεστάτην καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἐντελῆ τοῦ ποιεῖν γράμματα, συμβόλαια συντιθέναι παντοῖα καὶ συγγραφᾶς, συναλλάγματα, τε καὶ διαθήκας καὶ ἀπλῶς πάντα τα τῇ εἰρημένη ὑπηρεσίᾳ κατὰ νόμους ἀνήκοντα καὶ κατὰ τὰ τῶν πόλεων ἔθιμα, ἐν αἷς συναναστραφήσονται, ποιεῖν, ὑπαγορεύειν, γράφειν, πληροῦν, συντιθέναι τε καὶ ἐκπείνονται καὶ βασιλικὴ διαβεβαιώνει καὶ ἐμπεδοῦν ἐξουσία, ετι η βασιλεία μου ὀφειλότα τοῖς προφορθεῖσιν ἐπιφανέσιν ἀνδράσι, τοῦ τε σημαίνοροφος τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῖς πρῶτοις τῶν τεχνῶν, τοῖς εἰς τὸ μέλλον κατὰ χαίρονς ἐσομένους, χορηγεῖ τε καὶ ἐπιβραβεῦει, ἵνα τῇ αὐτῇ βασιλικῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ἔχωσιν ἄδειαν τοὺς νόδους καὶ εἶς ἀδεμίτου προελθόντας μίζους κοινῆ καὶ διηρήμηνος, ξόντων ἦ καὶ θανόντων τῶν γονέων αὐτῶν, νομίμους καὶ γνησίους ποιεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ τῶν γνησίων δίκαια καὶ προνόμια ἀποκαθισταν καὶ ἐπανάγειν, πᾶσαν αὐτοῖς ἀπαλείφουσι τῇ ἀπὸ γεννήσεως κηλίδα καὶ ἐπανάγουσιν αὐτοὺς εἰς πάντα τὰ ἐκ διαδοχῆς δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀδιαδέτου, εἰς τε πᾶσας τὰς τιμὰς καὶ ἀξίας, αἷς δύναντ’ ἂν χρήσθαι.
καὶ ὅν ἀπολαύονειν οἱ γνήσιοι καὶ ἀπὸ νομίμων προελθόντες γάμων καὶ
θημιτῶν, ὑπεξαίρομεν δὲ καὶ νοεῖσθαι οὐ δέλομεν ἐν τούτοις τὰ τῶν
αὐθεντῶν νόθα τὰ μὴ νομίμως καὶ γνησίως ἐξ αὐτῶν προελθόντα,
ὅσαιτος καὶ τὰ νόθα τῶν ὑμιπαρόνων καὶ κομητῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἄξιωματικῶν ἀνδρῶν. ἔτι διορίζεται ἡ βασιλεία μου, ἵνα ὁσοῦς ἂν καὶ
όνως, ὡς προείρηται, νόθους ὄντας καὶ ἀθεμίτες προαχθέντας ἐπὶ τῶν
βίων τῇ διὰ τῶν παρόντων χορηγηθείση ἐξουσία οἱ προφητήδεντες
ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες νομίμως καταστήσωσι καὶ γνησίως, οὕτω νοῦνται
καὶ ὡς νόμιμοι τε καὶ γνήσιοι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀπολαύσεως
γνησίοτητος, ὡστε μηδένα τρόπον ἀπὸ τούτων ἐγγίγνεσθαι πρόχερι
τοὺς τῶν γνησίων καὶ χυρίως νομίμων δικαίως, μήτε παραβλάπτεσθαι
τὰς τούτων ἐλευθερίας ἐν τε κληρονομίας καὶ διαδοχαῖς καὶ ἐν
ἄπασις ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν κληρονομιῶν καὶ διαδοχῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐπιβάλλον
dιανομαῖς.

Εἰς οὖν τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τοὺς
προφητήδεντας ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρας, τὸν τε ἐσόμενον κατὰ διαδοχὴν τῆς
dικαιοσύνης σημαίοφορόν καὶ τοὺς πρώτους τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ὁ παρὸν
χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς αὐτοῖς κατὰ μὴν
ἀγούστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης δευτέρας ἱνδικτιῶν τοῦ ἐξαικοίμιστοῦ
ἐννακοσιστοῦ τεσσαρακοστοῦ ἔβδομον ἐτούς, ἐν οἷ μέτερον εὐσεβεῖς
καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο χρότος.

Τιμάννης ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστῶς βασιλείας καὶ αὐτοχράτωρ Ἄρωμαίνων ὁ
Παλαιολόγος.

John VIII’s chrysobull to Plethon

Lampros 331-333
Ὅ οἰκεῖος τῆς βασιλείας μου κύρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς ἐνεφάνισεν εἰς αὐτὴν ἀργυρόβουλον τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου τοῦ Πορφυρογεννήτου κύρ Θεοδώρου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου, διαλαμβάνον ἦν ἐξή το ρηπὶ τὸ Καστρίον χωρίον τῆς Βρύσιν μετὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ νομῆς καὶ περιοχῆς, καὶ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πᾶσαν ἀποφέρηται καὶ ἀποκερδαίην πρόσοδον, τὴν τε ύπὲρ τοῦ κεφαλατικίου δηλονότι καὶ τὰς δύο μείζας τὰ τε ἐν αὐτῷ ἐξαλειμματικὰ στασία καὶ πὰν ἄλλο δημοσιακὸν δίκαιον, ἀνευ μὲντοι τὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἑξαμιλίου ἀποταχθέντων ἢ ἀποταχθησομένων κεφαλαίων, ἐχον ἄδειαν αὔξειν καὶ βελτιοῦν αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸν ἐνόντα τρόπον ὁμοίως καὶ ὀσὺς ἄν προσφέρηται ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ οἱ διάδοχοι αὐτοῦ ἐξόνως καὶ τοῦ δημοσίου ἀνεπιγνώστους, καὶ προσκαθήσωσιν ἐκείσεν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ χωρίῳ, ἵνα ἔχοσι καὶ αὐτούς κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. Μετὰ δὲ τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ καθέξη καὶ καθαρισθεῖται τὸ αὐτὸ χωρίον μετὰ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ γενησομένης ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ αὐξήσεως εἰς τὸν γνησίων παῖδων καὶ κληρονόμων αὐτοῦ, ὁ πρωτιμότερος, καὶ τοῦτο γίνεται κατὰ διαδοχήν εἰς τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀνὴκουσαν δουλείαν. [Ὤ μοίως] ἐνεφάνισά καὶ ἐτερον ἀργυρόβουλον τοῦ εἰρημένου περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, διαλαμβάνον, ὡς ἂν κρατῇ καὶ κεφαλατικεύῃ ὁ εἰρημένος κύρ Γεώργιος τὸ κάστρον καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου μετὰ πάσης τῆς αὐτοῦ νομῆς καὶ συνηθείας καὶ περιοχῆς, λαμβάνον κατ’ ἐτος ἐντὸς τοῦ προσοδίου αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τοῦ κεφαλατικίου τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας, τὰς τε μείζας καὶ ἐν τῷ ὄλλῳ ὁφείλουν οἱ ἔποικοι τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας βασιλικὸν δίκαιον χωρίς μόνης τῆς τοῦ φλωριατικοῦ δόσεως· μετὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ τελευτήν ἵνα κρατῶσι καὶ κεφαλατικεύωσι τὸ τοιούτον τὴν αὐτοῦ τελευτήν ἵνα κρατῶσι καὶ κεφαλατικεύωσι τοῦ τοιούτουν κάστρου καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου καὶ οἱ γνήσιοι νομῆς αὐτοῦ παρ’ ὅλην αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωὴν κατὰ τὸν ἀναγεγραμμένον τρόπον, ὁφείλουν ἄποδιδοντας αὐτοῦ τὴν τοῦ τεθνεώτος μερίδα παρ’ ὅλην τὴν τοῦ τεθνεώτος μερίδα παρ’ ὅλην αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωήν. Ταῦτα δὲ οὖν τὰ ἀργυρὸβουλα ἐμφάνισας τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου ὁ εἰρημένος κύρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς παρεκάλεσεν, ἵνα χρυσόβουλλον εἰς πλείονα τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀσφάλειαν. Η βασιλεία μου οὖν εὐμενῶς τὴν αὐτοῦ παράκλησιν προσδέχαμεν, τὸν παρόντα χρυσόβουλλον λόγον ἐπιχορηγεῖ καὶ ἐπιβραβεύει αὐτῷ, δι’ οὖν εὐδοκεῖ,
θεσπίζει πρός ταύτα καὶ διορίζεται, ἵνα τὰ εἰρημένα ἄργυροβουλλα τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου ἔχωσι τὸ κύρος, τὸ στέργον καὶ τὸ βέβαιον, καὶ κατέχῃ ὁ εἰρημένος οἰκείος τῆς βασιλείας μου κύρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς τὸ περὶ τὸ Καστρίου χωρίον τὴν Βρύσιν μετὰ πάντων τῶν εἰσοδημάτων αὐτοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἑξαμιλίου δόσεως, ὡς προείρηται, ἔχων ἀδειαν αὔξειν καὶ βελτιστὸν αὐτὸ καὶ παραπέμπειν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γνησίους παῖδας ἐπὶ τῷ παραπέμπεσθαι καὶ παρ’ ἐκείνων τὸν ἱσον καὶ ὁμοίων τρόπον πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀδιάκοπον εἰς τὸν ἐξῆς ἀπαντα χρόνον, ὁφειλόντων τῶν ἀεὶ κατεχόντων αὐτὸ ἀποδιδόναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνήκουσαν δουλείαν. Ὁμοίως ἵνα ἔχῃ ὁ εἰρημένος κύρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς τὸ κάστρον καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου, λαμβάνων ἐντὸς τοῦ προσοδίου αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τοῦ κεφαλατικοῦ τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας καὶ τὰς μείζας καὶ ἐτθὸς τῆς τοῦ φλωριατικοῦ δόσεως. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τελευτὴν ἵνα κρατῶσι καὶ κεφαλατικεύωσι τὸ τοιοῦτον κάστρον καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου καὶ οἱ γνήσιοι υἱοὶ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν καὶ ἰσχυροί τῶν εἰρημένων ἄργυροβουλλων τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου, τοῦ πορφυρογεννήτου.

Τῇ γούνι καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβουλλοῦ λόγου τῆς βασιλείας μου καθέξη

ὁ εἰρημένος κύρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς τὸ περὶ τὸ Καστρίου χωρίον τὴν Βρύσιν μετὰ πάντων τῶν εἰσοδημάτων αὐτοῦ, ἄνευ τῆς ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἑξαμιλίου δόσεως, ὡς προείρηται· ἔχων ἀδειαν αὔξειν καὶ βελτιστὸν αὐτὸ καὶ παραπέμπειν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γνησίους παῖδας ἐπὶ τῷ παραπέμπεσθαι καὶ παρ’ ἐκείνων τὸν ἱσον καὶ ὁμοίων τρόπον πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ αὐτῶν κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀδιάκοπον εἰς τὸν ἐξῆς ἀπαντα χρόνον, ὁφειλόντων τῶν ἀεὶ κατεχόντων αὐτὸ ἀποδιδόναι ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀνήκουσαν δουλείαν. Ἐτι ἵνα ἔχῃ ὁ εἰρημένος κύρ Γεώργιος ὁ Γεμιστὸς τὸ κάστρον καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου, λαμβάνων ἐντὸς τοῦ προσοδίου αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τοῦ
κεφαλατικού τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας καὶ τὰς μείζως καὶ εἴ τι άλλο ὁφείλουσιν οἱ ἔποικοι τῆς αὐτῆς χώρας βασιλικῶν δίκαιως· χωρὶς μόνης τῆς τοῦ φλωριατικοῦ δόσεως. Μετά δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ τελευτήν κρατήσωσι καὶ κεφαλατικεύσωσι τὸ τοιοῦτον κάστρον καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου καὶ οἱ γνήσιοι δύο υἱοὶ αὐτῶν παρ’ ὅλην αὐτῶν τὴν ζωὴν κατὰ τὸν ἀναγεγραμμένον τρόπον, ὁφείλοντες ἀποδιδόναι ύπὲρ αὐτῶν τὴν ἀνήκουσαν δουλείαν. Καὶ ὅταν τελευτήσῃ ὁ ίδιος αὐτῶν, ἵνα ὁ ἔκτας κατέχῃ καὶ τὴν τοῦ τεθνεῶτος μερίδα παρ’ ὅλην αὐτῶν τὴν ζωὴν κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ δύναμιν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀργυροβούλλων τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου τοῦ πορφυρογεννήτου. Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τοῖς δήλωσιν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο καὶ ὁ παρών χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ φλωριατικοῦ δόσεως. Μετά δὲ τὴν αὐτοῦ τελευτήν κρατήσωσι καὶ κεφαλατικεύσωσι τὸ τοιοῦτον κάστρον καὶ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Φαναρίου καὶ οἱ γνήσιοι δύο υἱοὶ αὐτῶν παρ’ ὅλην αὐτῶν τὴν ζωὴν κατὰ τὸν ἀναγεγραμμένον τρόπον, ὁφείλοντες ἀποδιδόναι ύπὲρ αὐτῶν τὴν ἀνήκουσαν δουλείαν. Καὶ ὅταν τελευτήσῃ ὁ ίδιος αὐτῶν, ἵνα ὁ ζῶν κατέχῃ καὶ τὴν τοῦ τεθνεῶτος μερίδα παρ’ ὅλην αὐτῶν τὴν ζωὴν κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ δύναμιν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀργυροβούλλων τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου τοῦ πορφυρογεννήτου. Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τοῖς δήλωσιν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο καὶ ὁ παρών χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ μῆνα Ὀκτώβριον τῆς νῦν ἑβδόμης ἰνδικτιῶνος τοῦ ἑξακισχιλιοστοῦ ἐννακοσιοστοῦ τριακοστοῦ ἑβδόμου ἔτους, ἐν ὧν καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβὲς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος.

† Ἡσίανης ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ρωμαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος.

Constantine XI’s chrysobull to Ragusa

Zepos 5.603-5.605; Miklosich-Müller 1865:3.228

† Ἐπεὶ τὸ εὐγενὲς καὶ περιφανὲς κομούνιον τοῦ Ῥαγουσίου ἐπεδείξατο εὔνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν εἰς τοὺς ἡμετέρους ἄρχοντας καὶ ἀνθρώπους κατὰ τοὺς παρελθόντας καιροὺς, τοὺς ἀπὸ τὸν μερὸν αὐτῶν διερχομένους, δεχόμενον αὐτοὺς μετὰ ἀγάπης καὶ τιμῆς
καὶ διαθέσεως καλῆς, καὶ διά ταῦτα κινηθείσα καὶ η βασιλεία μου ὁρίσεν, ἵνα, ἐὰν ἐλθοεσι καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰς τὴν ἡμιτεράν πόλιν ἐπὶ τῷ χρῆσθαι ταῖς πραγματείαις αὐτῶν, εὐφρενητῆσωμέν τινα εὐφρεσίαν εἰς τὰ κομμέρκια αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῦτο ἀκουσθέν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀπέστειλεν ἀποκρισιάριον τὸν εὐγένει ἄνδρα κῦρ Βόλτζιον τὸν Μπαλπάλιον ντέταιρον καὶ ἐλθὼν εξήγησεν, ἵνα δώσομεν αὐτῷ τόπον ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνοικοδομῆσαι λόςταν καὶ ἔχωσι καὶ κόνσουλον ἐν αὐτῇ, ἄλοι δὲ καὶ ἔκκλησίαν, ἵνα θέλωσι καὶ ἐμμένος καὶ εῖς αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα, οὐσι βούλλονται, καὶ ἔχωσιν ἄρ’ ἡμῶν περιθάλπησι καὶ περιπατήσει καὶ συγκατάβασεν εἰς τὰ κομμέρκια αὐτῶν, ἡ βασιλεία μου, καὶ δι’ ἥν πρότερον εἶχεν ἀγάπην εἰς τὸ εὐγενές καὶ περιφανὲς (κομούνιον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ ἀξίωσιν τὴν μετὰ τοῦ ἀποκρισιαρίου αὐτοῦ τὸν παρόντα χρυσόβουλλον λόγον ἐπιχορηγεῖ καὶ ἐπαρβαβεύει αὐτῷ, δι’ ἥν εἰδοκεῖ, προστάσει, θεσπιζεῖ καὶ διορίζεται, ὅτι εἰς τὸν τόπον, ἄλοιν μέλλομεν δοῶμεν αὐτῷ, ἀνοικοδομῆσαι, ὅτι εἰς τὸν τόπον, ὅτινα μέλλομεν δοῶμεν αὐτῷ, ἀνοικοδομῆσαι λόςταν, ἐν ἡ κόνσουλον ἴδιον ἔξει ἐν αὐτῇ, ὅτε κρίνειν τοὺς ἐαυτοῦ πάντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ ἐὰν ἐγκλητεύσῃ Ῥωμαίος Ῥαγουζαίῳ χρεωστοῦντι, ὀφείλει ἀπέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν φόρον τοῦ ἐγκλητευομένου Ῥαγουζαίου, δηλονότι εἰς τὸν Κόνσουλον αὐτοῦ· οὐσιοίς καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν Ῥαγουζαίος ὀφείλει ἐνάγων τῷ χρεωστοῦντι Ῥομαίοις ἀπείναι εἰς τὸν φόρον αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ῥομαίου. Ἐτι δὲ ἀνοικοδομήσας καὶ ἔκκλησίαν, ἐὰν θέλῃ. Καὶ διδῶσι καὶ πάντες οἱ πραγματευταὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων κομμερκίων δύο εἰς τὰ ἐκατόν, ἐμβάλειντες καὶ ἐκβάλειν τοὺς Ῥαγουζαίους πάντα τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἐλευθέρως ἀνευτικοῦς εἰς τὰ ἐκατόν, εἴτε ἐπὶ ἀγορᾷ ἐχοῦσι τὴν τοιαύτην δουλείαν τοῦ κομμερκίου, εἴτε ἐπὶ τῶν πιστῶν, ὡς ἐκκαθίζειν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν πάντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους· καὶ αὐτῶν ἐγκλητεύσῃ Ῥωμαίος Ῥαγουζαίῳ χρεωστοῦντι, ὀφείλει ἀπέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν φόρον τοῦ ἐγκλητευομένου Ῥαγουζαίου, δηλονότι εἰς τὸν Κόνσουλον αὐτοῦ· οὐσιοίς καὶ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν Ῥαγουζαίος ὀφείλει ἐνάγων τῷ χρεωστοῦντι Ῥομαίοις ἀπείναι εἰς τὸν φόρον αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ῥομαίου. Ἐτι δὲ ἀνοικοδομήσας καὶ ἔκκλησίαν, ἐὰν θέλῃ.
αὐτὸν ἰκανόσαι τῷ χρεωστουμένῳ Ῥωμαίῳ, ἣνικα μηνυθῇ τὸ περὶ τούτου πρὸς αὐτὸ διὰ γραφῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀρχόντων, πρὸς οὓς ἁν τὰ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνει ἁνήκειν, ἢ μὴ ἰκανώσας ἐμβάλλῃται εἰς φυλακήν, ἢς οὐ ἀποτίσῃ τὸ οἰκείον. χρέος· καὶ τούτῳ ἐνέχεται τὸ κομούνιον ποιεῖται, φανεροῦσης τῆς τοιαύτης γραφῆς τῶν ἡ ἐτέρων ἀρχόντων καὶ καθαιροῦσης τὸ χρέος ἀληθῶς ἢ καὶ διὰ προσώπου ἐνάγοντος περὶ τούτου εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἢ καὶ διὰ προσώπου ἐνάγοντος περὶ τούτου εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον αὐτῶν τῶν Ῥαγουζίων.

Τῇ ἰσχύι γοῦν καὶ δύναμίν τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβούλλου λόγου τῆς βασιλείας μου νεμηθήσεται
tὸ εἰρημένον εὐγενὲς καὶ περιφανὲς κομούνιον τοῦ Ῥαγουζίου τοῦ ἀνοικοδομῆσαι
λόγων, εἰς ἄντικα ἱδιον κόνσουλον ἔξει, ὃς γνώσει, διὰ καὶ τόπου τόπου (ἐκαυτοῦ πάντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους). Έτι δὲ ἀνοικομῆσαι καὶ ἐκκλησίαν, ἠνθέλη.
Καὶ διδῶσι καὶ πάντες οἱ πραγματευται αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱδιῶν κομμερκίων δῶς εἰς τὰ ἐκατόν, ἐμβάλλοντες πάντες οἱ Ῥαγουζίαι πάντα εἰς τὰ ἐκατόν ἐλευθέροι ἄνευ τῶν ἱδιῶν κομμερκίων καὶ ἐκτίθενται μένοιν περὶ τῶν εἰσερχομένων αὐτῶν πραγματειῶν, ὅταν ἔρχονται, δῶς εἰς τὰ ἐκατόν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεώνειται εἰς ἐμβολὴν καὶ ἐκβολὴν, καὶ πλέον μὴ ἀπαιτεῖσθον τοῖς ἑαυτῶν κομμερκίοις λαμβάνειν ὃς ἠφημεν, ὁφειλοντες καὶ οἱ κατὰ καιροῦς ἠμέτρητοι κομμερκιάριοι λαμβάνειν τὰ δύο εἰς τὰ ἐκατόν, εἴτε ἐπὶ ἄγορα ἔχωσιν τὴν τοιαύτην δουλείαν τοῦ κομμερκίου, εἴτε ἐπὶ τὸ πιστὸν, ὅπως ἔρχονται μετὰ τῶν ἱδιῶν πραγματειῶν.
Καὶ κατοικοῦσι καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ὅσοι ἐξ αὐτῶν βούλονται. Ὁμοίως τοῦ ἐξει καὶ τὰ
λοιπά, ὡς ἀνωτέρω πλατύτερον διαλαμβάνεται. Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτου δήλωσιν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ παρὰν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολογείζεται καὶ ἡμέτρης ἤμετέρος τοῦ ἐκατόν πρὸς τῶν πραγματειῶν τοῦ κομμερκίου, εἴτε ἐπὶ τῷ πιστῷ, ὃς ἔρχονται μετὰ τῶν ἱδιῶν πραγματειῶν.
Κωνσταντῖνος ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωμαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος

Manuel II’s Chrysobull to Monemvasia

Lampros 122-123
Ἡ βασιλεία μου ἀποδεχομένη καὶ ἔχουσα θέλημα, ἵνα ἡ ἁγιωτάτη μητρόπολις Μονεμβασίας κατέχῃ τὴν χώραν τοῦ Ἐλικοβουνοῦ ὀλοτελῶς καὶ ὅλοκλήρως εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν τοὺς κατὰ καιρὸν ταύτης ἀρχιερατικῶς προστατεύοντας λειτουργίας δύο καθ’ ἐκάστην ἐβδομάδα, ἐν ταῖς τῆς Τετράδος καὶ τοῦ Σαββάτου ἡμέραις, ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἐκείσε ταφέντων παιδῶν τῆς βασιλείας μου, ὡς καὶ ὁ νῦν ἱερώτατος μητροπολίτης Μονεμβασίας ὑπέρτιμος καὶ ἐξαρχὸς πάσης Πελοποννήσου κύριος Ἀκάκιος ἔταξε κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν τοῦ ἐπι τούτῳ προβάντος ἄργυροβουλλοῦ του περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου, τοῦ πορφυρογεννήτου κυροῦ Θεοδώρου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου, ἐπιχορηγεῖ αὐτὴ ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐπιβραβεύει τὸν παρόντα χρυσοβουλλὸν λόγον αὐτῆς, δι’ ὅν εὐδοκεῖ, προστάσει, θεσπίζει καὶ διορίζεται, ἵνα τοῦ εἰρημένου ἄργυροβουλλοῦ τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου τοῦ Πορφυρογεννήτου, ἔχει τὸ στέργον, τὸ κύρος καὶ βέβαιον, καὶ κατέχη ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐξῆς ἡ ἁγιωτάτη μητρόπολις Μονεμβασίας τὴν εἰρημένην χώραν τοῦ Ἐλικοβουνοῦ μετὰ τοῦ ἐν αὐτὴ πύργον καὶ πάσης τῆς περιοχῆς αὐτῆς ἀναφαιρέτως καὶ ἀναποσπάστως κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν καὶ ἵσχυν καὶ δύναμιν τοῦ εἰρημένου ἄργυροβουλλοῦ καὶ καθὼς εὐλόγως δικαιοῦται ἐπ” αὐτῷ, μὴ εὑρίσκουσα χάριν τούτῳ τὴν τυχοῦσα ἐπήρειαν, ὁρειλόντων τῶν κατὰ καιροὺς ἀρχιερατικῶς προϊσταμένων τῆς τοιαύτης μητροπόλεως ἐκτελεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐκάστην ἐβδομάδα δι’ ὅλον τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐν ταῖς τῆς Τετράδος καὶ τοῦ Σαββάτου ἡμέραις λειτουργίας δύο διηνεκῶς καὶ ἰσχυρῶς ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἐκείσε ταφέντων παιδῶν τῆς βασιλείας μου, καθὼς καὶ ὁ νῦν ἱερώτατος μητροπολίτης τῆς αὐτῆς ἁγιωτάτης μητρόπολις Μονεμβασίας καταχάρισσε καθὼς καὶ ἐξαρχὸς πάσης Πελοποννήσου κύριος Ἀκάκιος ἔταξε τοῦτο ἀπαύστως ποιεῖν.

Τῇ γοῦν ἱσχύι καὶ δυνάμει τοῦ παρόντος χρυσοβουλλοῦ λόγου τῆς βασιλείας μου ἔξει ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐξῆς τὸ εἰρημένον ἄργυροβουλλόν τοῦ περιποθήτου αὐταδέλφου τῆς βασιλείας μου, πανευτυχεστάτου δεσπότου τοῦ πορφυρογεννήτου κυροῦ Θεοδώρου τοῦ Παλαιολόγου τοῦ στέργον, τὸ κύρος καὶ βέβαιον, καὶ καθὼς καὶ ὁ νῦν ἱερώτατος μητροπολίτης τῆς αὐτῆς ἁγιωτάτης μητρόπολις Μονεμβασίας τὴν εἰρημένην χώραν τοῦ Ἐλικοβουνοῦ μετὰ τοῦ ἐν αὐτὴ πύργον καὶ πάσης τῆς περιοχῆς αὐτῆς ἀναφαιρέτως.
καὶ ἀναποσπάστως κατὰ τὴν περίληψιν καὶ ἱσχύν καὶ δύναμιν τοῦ εἰρημένου ἄργυροβουλίου καὶ καθὼς εὐλόγως δικαιοῦται ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, μὴ εὐρίσκουσα χάριν τούτου τὴν τυχόνταν ἐπήρειαν, ὀφειλόντων τῶν κατὰ καιροὺς ἀρχιερατικῶς προϊσταμένων τῆς τοιαύτης μητροπόλεως ἐκτελεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν καθ’ ἐκάστην ἐβδομάδα δι’ ὅλου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐν ταῖς τῆς Τετράδος καὶ τοῦ Σαββάτου ἡμέραις λειτουργίας δύο δυνατῶς καὶ ἀνελλίπως ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἐκείσε ταφέντων παιδῶν τῆς βασιλείας μου, καθὼς καὶ ὁ νῦν ιερώτατος μητροπολίτης τῆς αὐτής ἐκκλησίας, ὑπέρτιμος καὶ ἐξαρχικός Πελοποννήσου κύριος Ἀκάκιος ἔταξε τούτο ἀπαύστως ποιεῖν. Τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἐγένετο καὶ ὁ παρὼν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ μήνα Σεπτέμβριον τῆς ἐνισταμένης τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτης ἰδικτιῶνος τοῦ ἐξακισχίλιοστου ἐννακοσιοστοῦ τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτου ἑτερ ς, ἐν ὧ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβεῖς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημάνατο κράτος.

Μανουὴλ ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστὸς βασιλεὺς καὶ αὐτοκράτορ
Ῥωμαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος
APPENDIX I/B
THE UNUSUAL MENOLOGEM IN THE FLORENTINE
PROSTAGMATA AND THEIR COMPARISON WITH
SIMILAR DOCUMENTS OF THE PERIOD.

Joannes VIII’s Commercial chrysobull to Florence
Müller 174-177; Lampros. 338-344

Εἰς οὖν τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἄσφαλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τούς προρρηθέντας ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρας, τὸν τε ἐστώμον κατὰ διαδοχὴν τῆς δικαιοσύνης σημαιοφόρον καὶ τοὺς πρώτους τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ὁ παρὼν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς αὐτοῖς κατὰ μήνα Αὔγουστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης δευτέρας ἑυκριτικοῦ τοῦ ἐξακεραυλοστοῦ ἑννακοσιοστοῦ τετασαρακοστοῦ ἐβδόμου ἐτοὺς, ἐν ὦ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβεῖς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος. ✦

✦ Ιοάννης ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστῶς βασιλέας καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωμαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος. ✦

Joannes VIII’s Chrysobull dealing with domestic matters to Florence
Müller 172-174, 121; Lampros 335-338

Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἄσφαλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τοὺς περιφανεῖς καὶ προειρημένους ἀρχοντας, τὸν τε σημαιοφόρον τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοὺς πρώτους τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν πρὸς πάσαν τὴν μεγαλοπρεπὴ πόλιν καὶ κοινότητα τῆς Φλωρεντίας καὶ ὁ παρὼν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ μήνα Αὔγουστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης β’ ἑυκριτικοῦ τοῦ ἐξακεραυλοστοῦ ἑννακοσιοστοῦ τετασαρακοστοῦ ἐβδόμου ἐτοὺς, ἐν ὦ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβεῖς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος. ✦

✦ Ιοάννης ἐν Χριστῷ τῷ θεῷ πιστῶς βασιλέας καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ Ῥωμαίων ὁ Παλαιολόγος. ✦

Joannes VIII’s Prostagma to Giacomo de’ Morelli
Lampros 345-352

Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἄσφαλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸν εἰρημένον εὐγενῆ ἄνδρα Ἰάκωβον Ἰωάννου Παύλου Νετομέρέζης, τὸ παρὼν τῆς βασιλείας μου πρόσταγμα, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ μήνα Αὔγουστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης δευτέρας ἑυκριτικοῦ τοῦ ἐξακεραυλοστοῦ ἑννακοσιοστοῦ τετασαρακοστοῦ ἐβδόμου ἐτοὺς, ἐν ὦ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβεῖς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσημήνατο κράτος. ἀπειθείας καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας συνήθους καὶ βασιλικῆς βουλῆς.
John VIII’s prostagma to Michele Fedini

Lampros 345-352

Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἄσφαλειαν ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸν εἰρημένον εὐγενὴ ἄνδρα Βρακάντιον Μιχαήλ. Φειδίνης τὸ παρὸν τῆς βασιλείας μου πρόσταγμα, ἀπολυθέν κατὰ μήνα Αὔγουστον τῆς νῦν τρεχούσης δευτέρας ἰδικτίων τοῦ ἐξαικεσχλιστοῦ ἐννιακοσιοστοῦ τεσσάρακοστοῦ ἐβδόμου ἑτέρου, ἐν ὧ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβεῖς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσήμηνο κράτος, ἐπιτεθείσης καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας συνήθους καὶ βασιλικῆς βούλλης

John VIII’s Chrysobull to Plethon

Lampros 331-333

Καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ τούτων δήλωσιν καὶ ἄσφαλειαν ἐγένετο καὶ ὁ παρὸν χρυσόβουλλος λόγος τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἀπολυθεὶς κατὰ μήνα Οκτώβριον τῆς νῦν ἐβδόμης ἰδικτίων τοῦ ἐξαικεσχλιστοῦ ἐννιακοσιοστοῦ τριακοστοῦ ἐβδόμου ἑτέρου, ἐν ὧ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον εὐσεβεῖς καὶ θεοπρόβλητον ὑπεσήμηνο κράτος.

John VIII’s prostagma to Lavra monastery


Εἰς γάρ ἄσφαλειαν αὐτῆς ἐγένετο καὶ τὸ παρὸν πρόσταγμα τῆς βασιλείας μου, ἐν ἑτερωμενῳ γενυκτεροτεταρτῳ

ΜΗ(ΝΙ) ΟΚΤΩΒΡΙΟΥ (ΙΝΑΙΚΤΙΩΝΟΣ) Θ´

John VIII’s prostagma to Lavra monastery


Τοῦτον γάρ χάριν ἐγένετο αὐτ(οῖς) (καὶ) τὸ παρ(όν) τῆς βασιλείας μου πρόσταγμα, ἀπολυθ(έν) τῇ τετάρτῃ

ΜΗ(ΝΙ) ΔΕΚΕΜΒΡΙΟΥ (ΙΝΑΙΚΤΙΩΝΟΣ) Ζ´
Manuel II’s prostagma to Lavra monastery


Τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἐγένετο καὶ τὸ παρὸν τῆς βασιλεί(ας) μου πρόσταγμα ἐν ἐτεὶ ἐξακισχλιοστῶ ἐνακοσιοστῶ τρισκαδεκάτῳ, ἀπολοθ(ὲν) τῇ κε’ (30)

ΜΗΝΙ ΜΑΙΩ (ΙΝΑΙΚΤΙΩΝΟΣ) ΙΙ’

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Manuel II’s prostagma to Iviron monastery


Ποίησον δὲ κ(α)ὶ σὺ ἔτερον γράμμα τῇ τοιαύτῃ μονῇ εἰς δήλωσιν τῆς τοιαύτης ὑποθέσει(ας), ὅπως παρηκολούθησα(εν) ὅτ’ ἄρχῃς μέχρι(τ) τέλους, ἀπελύθη τῇ (πρῴ)θ.

ΜΗΝ( timespec) ΙΟΥΝ(ΙΩ) (ΙΝΑΙΚΤΙΠΕΝΟΣ) ΙΑ’

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Manuel II’s prostagma to Dyonisos monastery


Τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἐγένετο καὶ τὸ παρὸν πρόσταγμα τῆς βασιλεί(ας) μου ἐν ἐτεὶ ἐξακισχλιοστῶ ἐνακοσιοστῶ τριτῶ ἀπολοθ(ὲν) τῇ κ’

Μ(Η)Ν( timespec) ΔΕΚ(EMB)ΡΙΟΥ (ΙΝΑΙΚΤΙΩΝΟΣ) Η’
Appendix II

Unpublished primary sources from 1450 to 1481

Symbols only used in this appendix.

*Omissis* = impossible to read/damaged

*Italics* = texts in *Italics* are summaries of longer texts

*Ind.* = Indictio/Indiction.

Brief description of the sources used

ASF, Signori Missive I Cancelleria

Letters sent from the Florentine Signoria to foreign powers. The documents are all preserved in microfilms and ordered in progressive numbers. Therefore, no *recto* or *verso* is necessary.

ASF, Legazioni e Comissarie

The instructions sent by the Signoria to the ambassadors and the reports written by them to Florence.

ASF, Responsive Copiari I/II

The letters received by the Florentine Signoria from foreign powers or private individuals. The division between I and II is strictly chronological.

ASF, Consulte e Pratiche
The discussions among the most prominent citizens of the Florentine Signoria on matters of paramount importance such as the relations with the Ottomans, the pope, the policies to enact with regard to internal and external events.

**ASF, Signori, Dieci di balia, Otto di pratica, Missive**

Miscellanea of documents which include letters sent, received, reports of ambassadors etc.

**ASF, Manoscritti 117**

This manuscript was written by an anonymous Priorista and describes events year per year.

**ASF, Mercanzia**

Documents about commerce such as *accomandita*, dispute etc.

**ASF, Signori, Risposte verbali di oratori**

These registers contain the responses given by the Florentine Signoria to embassies coming from foreign powers.

**ASF, Signori, Minutari**

First draft of a letter than later was copied into the official register of “Signori Missive I or II Cancelleria”.

**ASF, Provvisioni**

These registers contain the provisions of the Florentine Commune in the moment they have been officially approved by all the assemblies and become operative.
1450

1

Legazioni e Commissarie 13

8-10

Commissione a Giannozzo di Bernardo Manetti

Ad Aragona

Giannozzo Manetti needs to preserve the peace with the king of Aragon and to obtain the return of the wares stolen from Florentine merchants who are Giannozzo Attavanti, Giovanni Bandini Baroncelli.

1451

2

Manoscritti 117

18v-19r

1451: Prese in quell’anno il Gonf. Bernardo di Uguccione Lippi. Ed in quel tempo passarono in Firenze ambasciatori di Costantino Paleologo Imperatore di Costantinopoli e quelli andavano a Roma e fecero reverenza alla Signoria in quel che potesse aiutare l’Imperio Costantinopolitano contro la potenza dei Turchi e riferirono come l’Imperatore suo Signore era stato richiesto da Veneziani a licenziare le … nel imperio suo, i mercatanti Fiorentini ma che egli capendo le cortesie usate dalla Repubblica all’Imperatore Giovanni suo fratello quando si trovò in Firenze al tempo di Eugenio IV e l’Unione delle Chiese non gli l’ha voluto in alcun modo acconsentire. I medesimi sentii che i Veneziani avevano fatto in Ragugia e che avevano avuto la medesima risposta.

3

Legazioni e Commissarie 13

34-36

Giannozzo Manetti

Aragona

Maii 1450
Noi abbiamo avuto notizia come addi del presente mese fu deliberata licenza a tutti i Fiorentini come debbino levare ogni loro cosa di ciascuno loro terra. Giacomo Manetti should impede the above from happening.

4

Legazioni e Commissarie 13
36
Giannozzo Manetti
Iunii s. a. (1451?)
Ti abbiamo raccomandato la causa deli mercatanti e così omissis che nuove è avviso della remata di Levante della maestà del Re omissis.

5

Legazioni e Commissarie 13
39-43
Giannozzo Manetti
Aragona
Iunii 1451
Safe conduct valid for two years to all Florentine merchants termine non di meno e così dal giorno della notificazione.

1454

6

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40
160
A Leandro omissis

Florence sends a courier who carries letters for the pope. The letters contain the Signoria’s request for the safe conduct in full form to Bernardo di Masi and Dietisalvi Neroni who currently are travelling to Rome. Poi a Napoli che
desideriamo che questo fate che rechi velocemente qua quindi si rapido ad ottenere il
salvacondotto e quando ce l’hai spediscilo con tutta fretta per la via che ti diranno
Bernardo de Medici e Dietisalvi di Nerone. Gli ambasciatori Veneziani arrivano piú
presto che speravamo. Sicche sollecitare il salivacondotto. Hora bisogna con
prestezza sabbia et pertanto sollecitelo e mandalo come diciamo.

Florentia Octobri 1454 die 14.

7

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40

183-184

Ai Veneti

*The Venetian galleys captured some boats in their route to Chios. In these ships there are wares which belong to Florentine merchants. The Florentine Commune decided to send Giovanni de Pillis to recover the stolen wares.*

Firenze

21 Novembrii 1454.

1455

8

Manoscritti 117

24v

Prese il Gonf. Bernadetto de Medici ed il Papa mandò a Firenze magnifico Giovanni
da Napoli e con Principi Cristiani acciochè pigliassero l’armi contro il Turco.

9

Responsive e Copiari 1

15v-16r

10 Februarii 1455

Florentine datation: 10 Februarii 1454

Re d’Aragona
Gherardi Gambacorta Battista Arnolfi Jacopi de omisssis Ormanni de Albizzi erga nos omisssis statum gravem et amplissima extisimte cupimus eas omnes in tanto et tam … (the above names are all Florentines exiled who are currently living in the Aragonese court).

10

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40
234-235
Provvisoribus gabellarum civitatis Pisarum
Per i capitoli della pace bisogna levare le gabelle alle navi Catalane abbiamo inteso che il re di Aragona farà lo stesso nel suo reame. omisssis
Aprile 1455

11

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40
237
Re d’Aragona
The letter relates to the sign of the peace (Lodi’s peace).
10 aprile 1455

12

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40
257
Ianua
Retulerunt nobis gabelle salis que eum quedam novis omisssis sole ad earum requisitionem veniret in Portus Pisanum de mandato dominis actianis nostre dicta navis Ianua deducta est cum nulla iusta at honesta causa sive ea retinere debiant omisssis licentiam omisssis dicte navis ut in Portum Pisanum per ut omisssis cum dicto sale venire possint ut nostrorum in ea mercatarum satisfactio omisssis.
13 Maii s.a. (1455)

13

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40
259
Ianua
The pope sent some galleys to Porto Pisano for an expedition against the Turks. Florence communicated to Genoa that "velit vestri onem honestum virorum illi imparturi".

16 Maii (1455) s. a.

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40

Florence communicated to Genoa that "velit vestri onem honestum virorum illi imparturi".

16 Maii (1455) s. a.

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40

16 Maii (1455) s. a.

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40

16 Maii (1455) s. a.
Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40
290-291
Re d’Aragona

Bernardo di Ugucciano owned a boat which was assaulted near Corefice (Corfu). The boat carried a cargo of wheat.

21 Iulii 1455

18

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40
311-12
Ianua

Luca de Caponibus et sociorum mercatorum ad civium nostrorum dum partente ad portum nostrorum dum gerentur eris hic fuisse et esse **omissis** qua re non possumus non mirari et visti nobis nec simile **omissis** et preterea comperitum quo omnibus que navigia vestra que navi quod applicant portui nostro vigore humane et fama com gratia recipiuntur nec leduntur nec retuntur a nobis quisquam aliquis **omissis** et causa sit facendi sub re **omissis** vidicentur **omissis** ut respicientes ab officio **omissis** caritatis vestra pervidere ac mandere velint ut barcas **omissis** mercatum nostrorum et quem illus vehementer libere ac celeriter expeditisse quo nec suum ad portum nostrum facere possint et suscipient mercatores nostrum fructum habemus populus nostro frumento uti possit **omissis**.

Octobri 1455.

19

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40
312
Genoa

Antonius Januense **omissis** et civitate vestri **omissis** Simonis dal Campo Pisani civis et Synon in Portu Pisanus venturum expectebat ut costitutum erant pertinens per Januam eam divertur **omissis**.

Sine data.

20

Responsive Copiari I
23-24

1455 Octobri 10
Callisto III

*The Turks are a problem and Florence must contribute to the solution... The pope elected Fra Giovanni of Naples as nuntium to Florence.*

1456

21

Manoscritti 117

25r

Prese il Gonfalone Daniele Canigiani e in quel tempo venne una d’una lettera scritta al Pontefice dal Cardinale di S. Angelo, suo legato in Ungheria sulla vittoria avuta dagli Ungari contro Maometto Imperatore de’ Turchi.

22

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40

358

Arcivescovo Ragusa

*The letter mentions a possible business concerning wheat. The pope gave is agreement.*

15 Februarii 1456

Florentine datation: 15 Februarii 1455.

23

Consulte e Pratiche 54

1v-3v

Marcii 1456

Inteso le lettere da Roma e da Napoli prima si dice intero alla richiesta che fa la maestà del re del fatto di Batista (Cerchi) che la si abbi prima notizia commetta questo caso a 6 della Mercatantia che vogliano la Signoria contenta che si dice un favore di quelli del Vigna et anchora il caso del ommissis Come quelli di Biliotto et che per loro s’intenda quello che ne vole ragione et che ommissis et di loro pareri et giudizio fanno rapporto alla Signoria. Come dissi ambasciatori che appresso la maestà del re dell aver dato favore allo accordo del ommissis nostro ambasciatore da Napoli il quale è bene informato del danno che fu fatto nel tempo della pace a nostri mercatanti si scriva che ci parli alla maestà del re et che ci possi consegnare quello che la sua maestà permise ad altri mercatanti ommissis.
Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40

397-399

Provvisori gabellarum

I nostri mercatanti dovevano godere di un beneficio per la rimozione di certe gabelle del re di Aragona se noi avremmo rimosso la gabbella di 4 per lira ai mercanti Catalani. La maestà del re afferma non solamente avere cavate le gabelle poste per i suoi regni ma ancora ha provveduto et così dice che la gabbella di denari 4 per lira si riscuote insino che a nostri mercatanti che già furono danneggiati da sue navi sia interamente satisfatto come per dette lettere scripte a Pozzuoli omissis passato chiaramente omissis e considerando ancora che le lettere che dicta gabbella non si riscuotessi fu falsa e fine che ne recavi delle omissis non fussino aggravati di dette gabelle e restante la cagiona debba cessare l’effetto omissis et che nostri mercatanti danneggiati siano restituiti nel primo stato omissis che dicta gabbella si riscuota havendo ad notizia che si riscuota nei luoghi della maestà del re et per loro cose che fussono condotte nella nostra iurisdictione e non per que che si trovano omissis.

21 Maii 1456

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40

417

Principi Tarentino

Giannozzo Salviati was captured and robbed by the Prince of Taranto’s men nearby Cyprus. The boat was owned by Bernardo Salviati. The letter also mentioned that Bernardo Salviati had certain business in Rhodes but does not mention which ones.

16 Iulii 1456

Responsive e Copiari 1

39v-41v

A rege Aragonum

2 Septembrii1456

Cum littere vestre adventum ambasciatori super satisfaciendo debito magnifici atque dilecti filii nostri Johannis Antonii de Foxa consiliari et deignum civis nostri dilecti per vestram excelsam communityte nostra destinandi significarent hoc equitate quadam extulumus et expectavamus donec vidivimus eam aliter subscripsisse litteras quas vestras ab asperibus discrepessa ita ut cum istius debiti satisfactio
quemadmodum experimento comprobamus in longum protrahatur nullius quadam versus ordo ad eadem satisfactionem probeatur compulsi quidem non mediocritatem affidavis eiusdem Johannes Antonii querimoniiis efficere non possumus quin eidem Johanni Antonio rectam itaque equitatem in se continentem petenti sui huiusmodi debiti satisfactio vestre denegari possit presentiam cum nobis ipsis consideramus illum sub fide vestri salvoconductus omisissis Quo id capitula inter nos set vestram huiusmodi comitatem in omisissis habito respectu captum fuisse atque depredatum sed omisiss is qui semper in rebus istis vestras procedere consuevimus habentes omisissis respectum ad conservandii amicitia nostra que ad iustitie rigorem scribendum quam ut omisissis fortissime percepimus possit atque deberet ad executionem et satisfactionem istius debiti per nos procedi volumus equitate quadem iterato nobis rescribere ut morem vos conosceturus. Rogantes requirentes et exhortantes omisissis ut omni opere finem querimoniiis istis imponat eo modo quo prefatus Johannis Antonio dedisto suo debito a nobis habeat satisfactionem. Alioquin vos reddimus certiores procedemus et procedi faciemus super huiusmodi satisfactione eas remedii debiti set giuridici et in similibus introductis fatis quidem moleste facente si eo modo fieri habeat et defide vestre et etiam illustri duce Mediolani publice disputari quem novimus egredissee fidem atque promissionem suam eidem Johanni Antonio pollicitam fuisse per omisissis sita rerum zelatum et custoditum et ne negotium huiusmodi ulterioribus dilationibus involveretur etiam viginti quinque duas suo silentio et novitate aliqua pretexterebimus ut infra huia satisfactioni provvideatis. Quibus elapses nihil aliud quandam ereditionem per nos modo predicto omisissis in re iste speretis.

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 40

446

Venetis

A Florentine ship while it was travelling toward Chios was captured by Venetians galleys. The Signoria asked the Venetians to return the wares.

30 Octobrii 1456

1457

Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41

13

Fratri Puccio

Sed hec paucu noluimus siluisse quondam mercatores illi nostri domini ex tunc facti sunt mercatanti Et rerum quando securitatem super illis illis imposuerunt. Et si potuissent suspiceri quandam “Aragona and Genova” dissidie tunc essent, numquam
se in villa securitate implicuissent. Summa nos est _omissis_ dictatum in quibus securitas interposita est et de quia indictio nostre deberrent confermari. Committimus igitur e vestra rem et negotia mercatorum nostrorum erogamus et creavimus plurimam ut ipse fervor velut eorum quod indemnitati perspicere

7 Ianuarii 1457

Florentine datation: 7 Ianuarii 1456

29

**Responsive e Copiari 1**

44v-45r

A Rege Aragone

18 Ianuarii 1457

Florentine calendar: 18 Ianuarii 1456

On the matter of Giovanni Antonio da Fossa (alias Fuscia) Giuliano de Ridolfis orator vester ad nos venit publica auctoritate et facultate cognitionem e decisionem cause et queralum eiusdem Ioannes Antonii in nostro nomibus commitens _omissis_ decervimus declaramur et sententiamus eandem vestram communitatem debitrice esse eidem Ioanni Antonii in ducatis milletrecentis et ambo mille trecentis vide lice pro conductione et exactione. Reliquis vero pro centum quinquaginta ducatis otto equi set alius rebus quo plurimi eidem Ioanni Antonii tempore captionis abbatio quam quidem pecuniarum summam integram et absque diminutione vestrem comunitatem _omissis_ mensem februaro proximo venturo solvere et satisfecere teneatur.

30

**Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41**

32-35

Duci e officiali di Balia Ianua

Quod ut regno triremes in porto nostro _omissis_ trireme ille quidem molestissime fuere impedirunt eunim _omissis_ ponitum _omissis_ spoliaverunt navigia, que onusta mercaturus ut pertebant _omissis_ nostro _omissis_ Que cum ita sint, pro comperto debente quidem sic occupantibus portum nostrorum necque favores nec sбудsidie auto opportunitate illes accondissevimus presertim quando fiere illa intelligeremus quietem et statum.

12 Marcii 1457

Florentine calendar: 12 Marcii 1456

31
A certain Giustino Barbarossa stopped a boat owned by Filippo di Rainiero and Pietro de Nerettis full of wheat which were supposed to come to Porto Pisano. Florence asked for the restitution of the wheat.

24 Marcii 1457

Florentine calendar: 24 Marcii 1456.

The pope had ordered that Florence needs to return the possessions which belongs to Gambacorta e Antonio de Pisaurus consiliaris nostri.

Florence insisted on the wares robbed from Salviati. Paolo Orsini, captain of the Prince of Taranto's galleys is the responsible of the robbery.

Marcii s.d. 1457

Perfecture omissis sint nuper triremes civitatis ac mercatoribus nostros ad partes Orientales omissis ad insulas Sicilie et ommissis Nam ipsa nos et mea ut presente perspicit et humanitate sua tuetur tenenti ut qui cum suis essent triremibus illis vehescentur tum homines tum mercatorem et res manere secentibus tenantur Maiestatem vestram rogatam e omissis per ob secretum facimus ut triremibus ipsis et hominibus ac mercatores et bonis omnibus que in illis veherentur pubblica fides et
salvocondueto in forma liberi et ampla conceditur. Quod singularis hec gratie omissis.

1 Aprilii 1457

Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41

41-45

Regi Aragona

Nonnulli e mercatoribus subjectis maiestas vestra qui suis negotiantur omissis quibus requirimus et renovamus illud vectigalia 100 per libra quod imposueramus mercatores que ad nos de regno afferentur per satisfactione mercatorum nostre omissis bona et res a navi omissis vestre fuerant discipet et expudentes igitur hisus ipsis debita semper cum omissis ac devotione omissis dictam quod vectigalia ipsum omissis a nobis impositus fuisse nisi maiestas vestram eis consensum habuissemus omissis quem non putavamus subjectos illos maiestatis vestri longe fore refragantur omissis perfectum eum notum si illis etiam omissis vestre celsitutine annuisse idem per vectigalia certa die id cause omissis de integro poneretur et exigeretur post omissis et impetravens a dignis tale maiestate spectabile Bernardo de Medicis oratore quia stimamus in hac quidem tamquam in re iuste et in principi iustissime ac cessa erit dedimus operam omissis quantitas pecunia que omissis intentiamus maiestatis vestri omissis causis et omissis quod effretur spoliatis insuper aliqui et e damno illo per ipsis quare supplicemus humiliter maiestatem vestram. Si quod semel et integra de sua begnignitate ac iustitia adresse ut ferme et ad effecturum per dicti peniteret iubere nam sic ad modo in alia parte per mercatores reficiuntur ad modum per vidimus maiestatem vestram que iustitia semper coluit nec mirare effectu complere et mercatores nostres omissis.

10 Aprilii 1457

Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41

Giovanni Filippo da Fusta

The Signoria wrote that the corsair Antonio de Montealto should not attack the Florentines. However, an attack apparently occurred on 21 of this month. The corsair entered in Pisa and assaulted a boat while the latter was unloading wines and clothes. This attack damaged Florence and the Signoria asked to stop these attacks.

25 Aprilii 1457
Domino Bosnie et Serbie

*We have received your ambassador* postulata sunt de vectigalibus tollendus per nonnullus mercator et illu conducentis *omissis* illustriorsum princips non plene potuissentiam nam nium libenter fecissent quando more gerere vestre *omissis* sed constitutiones rei aliquo pacto permittunt ut ab ordinationem sua vectigalia illa queant demovere.

28 Aprilii 1457

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*Albertazzi di Neri del Bene and “partners” were robbed. Moreover, their ships were captured by Pietro Pendere from Brindisi. Florence asks for a monetary compensation.*

2 Maii 1457

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*The Signoria reported that due to the decision of Cosimo the Elder, Florence had sent Gerardo de Pillis, counsellor of Bartolomeo son of Paolo, for certain negotiations. Florence recommends this Bartolomeo to the sovereigns of Ragusa.*

14 Maii 1457

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*Alphonse V complained about the tax on the wares.* Pacis ductum ius tolli fecerunt providam quo pro capitula pace servare facere antidictis subdictis nostros et salvoconductus omnes per vos eos concessos. Et si ob id lesi sunt in pristinum statum
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41

Venetis

Andrea Nicola de Alleis is the owner of a ship which was returning from the Levant on November. The ship was intercepted and captured towards Lesina in Sclavonia by your [Venetian] galleys which were coming from Candia. They captured wares whom belong to Pietro and Giacomo de’ Pazzi. Ut autem cives recuperent et vendent et constituerem huic negocii Filippo in Ghiandam exhibituram. Florence asked back the wares.

21 Maii 1457.

Legazioni e commissarie 14

Diplomatic instruction given to Antonio di Bartolomeo Masi. He has to go to Bernardo da Villa (Bernat Villamari) supreme commander of Alphonse V’s galleys. The ambassador has to ask for a safe conduct. Moreover, Antonio has to demand compensation for the damages produced by the Aragonese to the Florentine galleys which were bringing wheat and food.

Maii 1457

Commissione ad Antonio di Lorenzo Ridolfi ambasciatore presso il Santo Padre e alla maestà del re d’Aragona

Supplicherai ancora alla Santità sua che si debba di concedere salvacondotto a nostre fusti et mercanti che anderranno in Levante et a Costantinopoli et a loro viaggi in forma piena e non dubiti la Santità sua che nostre fusti non hanno a aspotare arma e come che diano subsidio da combattere a Turchi che prima vorremo morire.
Maii 1457.

44

Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41
82-83

Regi Aragone

Florence requested from the Aragonese king [Alphonse V] to provide for the damages made by the Aragonese Galleys to the Leghorn seaport. Furthermore, the Signoria asks for the safe conduct since “ancora non se ne avuto risposta”. The letter also contains another complaint for the wares lost by Salviati in Cyprus.

Maii 1457.

45

Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41
83-84

Regi Aragone

Pro triremibus nostris intere advente facentibus petivimus fidem publicam nam quia illa esse orbita *omissis* sed ut cum viderunt ceteri homines teneamus vestram salvaconducti regio liberum ad securis *omissis* cum igitur triremes ille nostre sint in duo quo destinata sunt perfectura oramus maiestatem vestram ut salvaconductum concedere dignetus pro triremibus et personis *omissis*.

14 Iulii 1457.

46

Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41
102-103

Duci Janue

*Corsairs who were disguised as fishermen arrived in Porto Pisano. Adduxerunt enim ex faucibus armi and took wares of the Catalans. Florence asks compensation from Genoa.*

13 Iulii 1457.

47

Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41
105
Regi Aragonum

Safe-conduct granted for the Western part of the Mediterranean Sea. Florence promised that its merchants will not carry wares which belong to Alphonse V’s enemies.

27 Iulii 1457.

48

Responsive Copiari 1

59v-60v

Aragona

This response from Alphonse V confirms the agreement of the letter written on 27 July 1457.

1457 26 Iulii.

49

Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41

107-108

Regi Aragonoum

In reditu oratores nostrum intelleximus ob quas rationes et causas maiestas vester salvaconductus nobis concessum poteri remeturi ad partes Orientale prefectur non expediri perseverit. Et plure et retulint que nos ante eius reditum latebant cum maiestas vester nobis concessit fidem publicam per trirerem et bonis que in ea veherentur ex captione dumtaxat omissis et illa non veheret non inimicarum per maiestam vestram. Et cum vestrar dictam triremi non veheremus ut Janue per se deventur gentis. Sperabamus ut de gratia maiestà vestre ille exceptione tolleretur aut saltem decoravetur qui nam essent inimici maiestatem vestram ut nos cum illis negotia non haberemus et multo pacto suaderi nobis poteras ut gratia ille primum et cessâ revocaretur. Utinam maiestas vester oratori ea litteris dum erat penes nuntiasset que retulit vian quedam rationabiliter fuisset ea omissis. Nec existenent observamus vestre serenitas et maximis de ceto ne dum per presentem turbationem aut offensionem aliquem fieri velimus. Supplicamus igitur serenitate veste ut salvaconductum ipsum in forma plena concedere dignetur per eunde et redeunde. Mittemus oratorem nostrum quo ita conferentur et componentur omissis.

17 Augusti 1457.

50

Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41
Duci Janue

*The ship owned by Filippo di Nicola di Pisa, who is a Florentine merchant, was intercepted and captured by Scervonucci, a Genoese corsair.*

20 Augusti 1457.

**Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41**

Calisto III

*Giacomo Guicciardini was sailing with one trireme ut Cypro Rhodium frumentibus veheret. Accipit tandem iter Jacobus tum vestre Sanctitatis tum patriarchi tunc civitate gratie non Rhodi frumenti penuria laburabatum *omissis* the boat was captured *omissis* spem et fidem publicam vestre. Guicciardini had a cargo valued to 350 ducats.*

26 Augusti 1457.

**1458**

Angelo Acciaiuoli

S’è scritto il novembre passato che pregassi il duca di Calabria affinchè il re d’Aragona ci concedesse il salvacondotto per le nostre galere di Levante. Facesti buona operatione. Inpero che abbiamo aviso da Napoli che la maestà del re era felice di concederlo et rimettere nelle fare del duca il fatto del Gambacorta. Ringrazierete la sua grazia di questo che ha fatto sino a qua e pregherete sempre sua grazia di mettere e suoi ambasciatori che insieme col nostro Nicola Giugni il quale mandano a Napoli facino tutto per avere il predetto salvacondotto et che s’aconci questo fatto del Gambacorta sicchè questa cosa abbia conclusione. In modo che noi possino navigare et fare le nostre mercantie et bisogni. Giugni prende la via di Sigismondo e a lui diviene che aviseremo delle risposte sia sul salvacondotto che sul Gambacorta. Scriviamo a Pigello Portinari inoltre.

16 Ianuarii 1458.

Florentine calendar: 16 Ianuarii 1457.
Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41

174

Pigello Solchi de Portinari

Se Agnolo non è partito presentagli la detta lettera. Ma se è partito per tornare a Firenze tu terrai le due lettere e presenterai al duca quelle solamente per il duca, solleciterai che abbiamo risposte d’ogni celerità possibile.

21 Ianuarii 1458.

Florentine calendar: 21 Ianuarii 1457.

Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 41

173-175

Duci Mediolani

Noi abbiamo avviso di quanto gli ambasciatori della vostra illustissima Signoria hanno parlato colla maestà del re di Raona in favore che la sua maestà ci conceda salvocondotto per le nostre galee di Levante il quale parlare è proceduto per lo scrivere della vostra illustissima Signoria della quale sommamente ringraziamo la vostra Signoria et abbiamo sincero aviso della risposta facta per la maestà del re della quale siamo certissimi che essa Signoria illustissima de prefati suoi ambasciatori è pienamente informata. Et per ragione che noi desideriamo che omisssis ogni standolo e confermi la benevolenza et che noi possiamo fare la nostre mercatantie col navigare et col trafficare però omisssis preghiamo la vostra illustissima Signoria che di nuovo commetta a suoi ambasciatori che insieme col nostro facciano ogni oratione et dicano favore che noi abbiamo predetto salvocondotto et che faccianci questo facto del Gambacorta omisssis attendiamo risposta con prestanza per poter dare notitia a Nicola Giugni il quale vi mandiamo al presente et per lo salvocondotto si ancora per dare favore omisssis si ancora che concordia nasca in tra la maestà del re et il magnifico signor Sigismondo.

21 Ianuarii 1458.

Florentine calendar: 21 Ianuarii 1457.

Signori, Dieci di balia, Otto di pratica Missive 4

25rv

Priors libertatis omisssis a Antonio de Lorenzo Ridolfi in Roma

88
Abbiamo letue de giorni 10 (e) 21 del presente et per quella intendiamo quanto è 
occorsor et seguito costi. comendiamo della diligentia tua intener bene avisa et 
Signoria et che cosi perseveri ti confortiamo in quanto scrivi delaverti solecitato el 
Sancto Padre cerca l’impresa del Turcho et di quanto rispondessi giudichiamo te non 
avere potuto meglior rispondere et eperche come tu sai nella tua commissione si 
dice che avendo noi delle maggiori potenze innanzi non dobbiamo essere e primi a 
rispondere et per tanto quella seguirai in tutto intenderi collo ambasciatore dello 
illustrissimo duca di milano et ingegnandoti ritrovare a che camino vanno gli altri e 
di tutto darai aviso che siamo certi che omissis tutto governerai come ai fatto insino a 
qui.

23 Februarii 1458.

Florentine calendar: 23 Februarii 1457.

Signoria Missive I Cancelleria 42

24-25

Domino Bernardo di Villamarina, Capitano classis regie Aragone

Siamo nuovamente informati da consoli del mare di Pisa come la maestà vestra dice 
esse essere parata a fare rilasciare certi nostri uomini di Livorno che padroni di certe 
vostre galee già presi per le quale già altra volta omissis in caso che voi siate chiaro 
essersi dato sufficiente sodamento intorno ai fatti della fusta di Nicola et che a voi sia 
noto è che alla maestà vostra possa a ragione domandare per li sopradetti vostri 
padroni et per omissis abbiamo dato ordine e operato in modo che il sodamento è 
fatto in modo piú e fermo del quale apparisca per meno del pubblico omissis.

7 Maii 1458.

Consulte e pratiche 55

22v-23r

Die 26 Junii 1458 in saletta de sero

Auditis patronis illis qui preterito anno duas galeas conduxerunt qui omissis sunt se 
magno in periculo fortunarum suarum esse ex eo quia propter impedita que 
accidente et suspicionem de rege Aragonum iussi sit navigationem inter mittere cum 
maximo eorum danno et incommodo et omissis postulabant ut aliquis modis ad 
liberetur per quem navigatio tuo fieri posset delecti sunt incliti cives ut superiore 
ipsa consultarent qui paucis exceptis omnes consenserunt que cives pauci et egregi
deputarentur qui re diligenter examinata quod eis videretur in eiusmodi negotio statuerent omnes quidem assumantes que quia ex navigatione ipsa non solum omissis et honor augetur civitati sed etiam utilitas maxima mercatoribus et artificibus melius sua negotio obeuntibus ex quorum operibus magnam civitatem pecunia cumulati solet cum qua semper civitatis libertas defensata est omnes illi modi caerentur precipue cum ipso rege Aragonum quibus mediis navigatio ipsa secura futura esset.

58

Consulte e pratiche 55

49v-50r

1458 6 Luglio in saletta de seco

rapporto facto per gli incliti citadini soprascripti de navigare

Che inteso di quanta utilità universalmente a tutta la città et contentamento di tutto il popolo che si navighi et maximamente commodo et sicuro che ne segue oltre a lutilile honore et reputatione della città et però raportarono che questo anno ne tempi usitati et debiti le galee che sono date per Fiandra in ogni maniera si mandino co patti e capitoli che sono stati tolte et etiandio che per Levante si mandi due galee in conserva come era stato ordinato perché sintende la morte del re et etiandio per galere della cruciata il mare essere cresciuto in pericoli di persone di male a fare et per potere mandare dette galee è necessario che consoli del mare abbinno auctorità potersi concordare co condottieri della galera per Levante a utile di comune et che per lavenire si mandi ogni anno in Levante due galee a tempi usitati le quali etiandio che per la galea di Barberia vada a tempi co patti et conduttori omissis.

59

Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42

91

Principe Tarantini

Nuper triremes duas omissis nostri civis versus Orientis partes navigarent non alium ob causis nisi ut mercibus vehendis omissis et per eiusmodi exercitum civitas vestre locu plector fieret omissis rogamus atque observamus ut si qua erunt quibus illi per navigium tutela per itinerens comoda vel per iiis rebus quos adventuri sint illi indigere
videantur vestra est nostro respectu omni benivolentia et favore perseveratur recepturi.

5 Septembrii 1458.

60

Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42

92

Regi Ferdinando

Florence requests to King Ferrante I of Naples the security in the seaports and possession of his kingdom in favour of the Florentine galleys.

5 Septembrii 1458

61

Legazioni Commissarie 15

13-14

Oratoribus ad Summus Pontefice

Abbiamo deliberato di nuovo con nostri collegi dovete anche dire al Santo Padre che gli piaccia volere dare buona licentia che le galee nostre le quali sono mosse per noi in Costantinopoli e nelle parti del Levante tra gli infedeli et in Barbaria vi possino lecitamente andare et vendere e comperare mercatantie come è usanza da fare.

28 Septembrii 1458.

62

Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42

112-113

Regi Sicilia

Florence sends a letter recommending the Florentine galleys which are going to travel towards his possessions.

12 Octobrii 1458.

63

Legazioni Commissarie 15

15-19

Commissione ad Angelo Acciaiuoli e Luigi Guicciardini a Napoli
14 Ottobre 1458

Et perché di nuovo omissis abbiamo quelle galee le quali armate di Gaeta et sono al servigio della maestà del re avere assalito le nostre galere di Levante con gravissimo pericolo di quelle le quali apena scampare poterono dicete alla maestà del re che intorno a questa materia voglia in modo provvedere per tutte quelle che necessarie faranno, che le nostre galee che sono partite sicure tornar possino e quello che aveano andare non siano in alcun modo molestate perché le galere predette cioè che possino liberamente tornare et così andare et perché stando le galere di quella armata per esse al porto nostro di Livorno danno grave sospetto a chi a quello con latro legno venire volesse. Lo pregherete gli piaccia dare opera che quella armata sia assai più discosta da porto nostro et in luogo che sospetto generare non possa et reccomenderete pregandolo che tenga modo che al porto nostro ciascuna sicuramente possa navigare.

Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42

118-119

Benedicto de Giugni consuli Florentini Neapoli et Filippo de Strozzis

Nuovamente abbiamo inteso non sanza grande admiratione come le galere le quali omissis di Gaeta assaltare le nostre galee che andavano in Levane con le mercatantie de nostri cittadini et furono in pericolo di non essere presa se l’aiuto di dio non si fosse intervenuto. Il perché molto dubitiamo che l’altre nostre galere le quali partire debbono et ancora quali quelle che tenevamo non sicure siano molestate . Il perché vi comandiamo che uno di voi sentiate alla maestà del re e a lui intendete le intentioni sua intorno a questa materia dolendovi della cosa gravissimamente e speriamo labbiano fatto a sua insaputa e fare nel modo che le nostre galere e fuste non siano molestate. Fatelo con grande diligenza perché il pericolo è gravissimo.

Octobri 1458.

Legazioni Commissarie 15

19-20

Oratoribus Rome

Angelo Acciaiuoli e Luigi Guicciardini rimangano a Roma i quali abbiamo eletto ambasciatori al nuovo re di Sicilia. Andrete a Napoli per andare con quell’ambsciata poi tornerete a Roma e quivi se possiate quando l’altre ambasciate si faranno et maximamente quelle de Vinitiani a quivi ingegnerete a fare. Insuper nuovamente omissis in caso al quale a noi pare gravidamente dovere essere stimato in però che siano avvisati che quelle galee le quali uscirono armata da Gaeta et sono al soldo del re di Sicilia assaltarono le galee nostre di Levante con grave pericolo di quelle et se non fusse la subita fortuna del vento l’arebbono prese et dubitassi questo
non fusse azione di messer Bernardo di Villamarina capitano di quell’armata. Il perché scrivano al consolo de Fiorentini et a Filippo degli Strozzi i quali appresso la maestà del re si omissis che di questo caso facciano cerimonia con lui per Agnolo voglia a questa materia rimediare e così a voi e a Pagolo et Luigi diciamo in commissione, dobbiate fare come in omissis ella più la gravitate si contiene e parci considerato il pericolo che voi prestamente faciate le visitazioni debite et poi di subite di così vi portiate acciochè colla maestà del re essere possiate et queste lettere la quale va a sidetto console et Filippo.

14 Octobri 1458.

66

Legazioni Commissarie 15

23-25

Cenni a Pietro di Bartolomeo Bardi presso Bernardo di Villamarina

17 ottobre 1458

Gli dirai come abbiamo avuto notizia nei giorni passati come le sue galere uscite da Gaeta hanno rotto il corso alle galere nostre le quali cariche di mercatantie andavano verso Levante e aveano assaltato e forse preso le nostre se non ci fosse stato il vento di fortuna la quale cosa noi è data non poca admiratione considerando noi avere colla maestà del re singolare amicizia omissis il quale umanissime parole noi regni suoi de cose nostre volere ricevere et conservare come le sue omissis et non solamente le nostre galere volere essere sicure ma che sento quanto si può favorire et honorare et qui a noi navi o galere mancassino volerci delle sue concedere per gli usi et bisogni di questa repubblica. Il perché essendo queste galere le quali le nostre assalire vollano insieme con tutta l’armata vestra omissis et obbedientia del prefato re di Sicilia ci meravigliamo come simili cose ebbino voluto tentare delle quali omissis fusse sito bisogno non offesa o molestia alcuna ma subsidio et aiuto speravano et siano certi che alla maestà del re questa cosa da lui saputa giovissimo nuova gli sia molesta per l’amore et la benivolentia che è riposta. Intendendo maximamente in quanto pericolo le galere siano state e quanto danno per avvenire abbiamo a tenere considerando che essendo già questa cosa nelle galee nostre che ancora in altri viaggi omissis a muovere pochi di vorranno che robe mercatantie vogliano caricare et similmente in quelle che sono andata et pochi siano che ella tornata messe alcuna cosa mettere si fa danno le quali cose non solamente risultano a danno grandissimo ma in vergogna ancora di noi e della città nostra. Ricordando alla sua maestà come il re di Raona et Valenza fece per le omissis mandera un bando la copia de quale è presso di noi abbianno nel quale specialmente e Fiorentini tutti et loro mercatantie e robe sono pienamente sicure omissis per rispetto di questo dobbiamo in tutta die lui e sue galere essere sicuri. Et poco lo pregherai che la giustizia et fede la quale nel re di Sicilia abbiamo per quella benivolentia omissis voglia per l’avvenire et omissis dimostrare a tutti quello che credono cioè lui essere a noi amicissimo etc. e che alle galere nostre ogni favore et subsidio darebbe et non violenza alcuna omissis et che voglia per maggiore sicurtà concederci sicurtà e salvacondotto per omissis galere che sono ite et per quelle anderemo ovunque. Per tutte le mercanzie e cose che
mese sono e faranno non perché ne abbiamo bisogno di lui lo bisogno ma per dare più reputazione alle galere predette. Et se in questo lui rispondesse volere salvacondotto concedere per le robe nostre e d’altri salvo che per quelle de Genovesi si omisiss risultasse pericolo et danno. In però che come si sentisse questo ciascuno altro dubitare omisiss tenendo che come robe di Genovesi non si omisiss ritenuto perché in simili casi et sospetto facilmente omisiss si che voglia suo conto di dare questa sicurtà a noi e non a Genovesi etc. in caso che così fare non volessi finalmente ritiri il salvacondotto per le robe nostre ed di tutte le galere excepti e Genovesi dicendo a llui questo salvocondotto non si demandare per alcuno sospetto che di lui sabbia ne perché essendo la pena di questo fatto per via del salvacondotto ogni sospetto da ciascuno omisiss et nessuno si guardera in decte galie arrivare come si guarderebbe el salvacondotto non leggendo.

67

Legazioni Commissarie 15
25-27
Angelo Acciaiouli e Ludovico Guicciardini
Oratoribus Rome
Andrete in questi luoghi in cui potrete trovare la maestà del re di Sicilia. Non afferirrete alcun subsidio o aiuto intorno alle armate de Turchi. Essenco ancora per le passate guerre afflitti.
27 Octobri 1458.

68

Legazioni Commissarie 15
27
Angelo Acciaouli e Ludovico Guicciardini
Roma
Nuova impresa de Turchi. Ricevere subsidio per su curia delle potenze Italiche specialmente dalla nostra. Quello che intorno a fatti del Turcho per voi facesse a seguitare unde perché veduta da voi quella rimarrete a pieno della nostra intentione informati
4 Novembrii 1458.

69

Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42
154-155
Ducatis nobilis civitatis Messane

Florence recommends the Florentine galleys que ab Orientis partes vehebantur onustas mercibus et per eiusdem frequentis apud Sicilie regias presides prestantissimos viros.

9 Decembrii 1458.

Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42

156-158

Duci Calabrie

Perditus naviculem quedem mercibus nostre, capitani illem bonifeceant Corefice insule oppidum adduxit. The Florentine Signoria asks for the ship and wares captured by the duke of Calabria.

18 Decembrii 1458.

Legazioni Commissarie 15

31-34

Angelo Acciaiuoli e Ludovico Guicciardini

Roma

Et quanto a quello l’impresa dei Turchi risondesse altra volta essere si imposta le decime qui ne terreni omissis e quelle pagata ne ancora da le altre potentie di Italia eccetto il duca di Milano alcuna quantità di denari se pagata e d’altra parte ommissis ci pare ragionevole essere ferma con gli altri omissis che da nuovo subsidio si dimandi ne questo si dice perché a noi questa imposta non piace e che non vogliamo al Santo Padre prestare in quella ogni possibile favore. In però che sempre come sapete siano stati fedeli omissis per le guerre passate abbiamo gravissime spese sostenute non dimeno offrendo che quando le altre potentie in questa impresa faranno tanto per la rata nostra etc.

27 Decembrii 1458.
Prese in quell’anno il Gonfalone Niccolò degli Alessandri nel medesimo tempo passò di Livorno il Duca Giovanni con un armata di 20 galere, dove fu ricevuto da ministri della Repubblica con onori grandissimi.

Bernardo Romano from Valencia had been captured by Giovanni from Venice. The wax belonged to the Florentine merchants and the Florentine Signoria asks Venice to return the wax.

16 Februarii 1459.
Florentine calendar: 16 Februarii 1458.

Leonardo (Leandro) degli Alessandri e Otto Nicolini per le galera del duca di Calabria che deve arrivare nel nostro porto

25 februarii 1459

Andrete a Pisa e aspetterete il passaggio di detta armata. Che avendo noi per le nostre galere et fustes e mercatanti salvocondotto dalla sua Signoria ommissis che non scriviamo esse necessario per la amicizia nostra meriti di nuovo e sia come impegno et in testimònio et tutte le ommissis di nostra ob sicurtà ci fará gratissimo lo concedere in piú piena forma et per piú tempo che potrà raccomandarai alla sua Signoria tutte le nostre fustes ommissis che passano neli luoghi della sua Signoria.
Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42

197

Ragusa

Per quiemus e modi solet non plus pelagii *omissis* septimum *omissis* Didicimus quoque vestre *omissis* ut pro mercibus eductis in modo advenire posset expecti quantum cives nostrum in eorum inebilis aut oppidus solvere cogerentur. Cum que sicut accepientes nuper Martinus Clavendis apud vos degens per Jacopo *omissis* cives vestre instituere pecunias *omissis* alio mitte instituisset eum *omissis* pendatur vectigalia solvere equum *omissis*

5 Marci 1458.

76

Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42

218-19

Raguseis

_The Florentine Signoria recommends Giannozzo Biliotti, who is a Florentine merchant coming to Ragusa with some wares._

77

Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42

226-227

Regi Aragonum

Cum priore anno triremes nostre cives mercibus plenes ad Orientem missimus Sicilie portus tenuisset ex ea insula bodies per *omissis* prede spe illeciti quam infutem fare esperabantus eas a docti *omissis* capere illas ac diripere conati sunt. Que ut eas regrebant celeriter *omissis* versi interamultis navalibus socius amissa etiam una in humanissime cum civibus e gentis nostris que captas aliques, litteres anno volunt nec sane referri potest que pie que egregiis *omissis* messene cives *omissis* sint volumus ut publicas sique aliqui ad vestras triremes nostros molestatentur que vestras in regni venture sint.

78

Consulta e pratiche 55

117v

8 Maii 1459

Maximus duper navigandi ordinem multo rum opinionem esse talem quia magnam auctoritatem et utilitatem civitati et mercatoribus efferet ob causas eam amplium a
civibus et consilium super eiusmodi re petituturi sit semper cives *omissis* dominus exhortatos esse et navigationationem et *omissis* augerent *omissis* vereri se ne si alius ordo non copiat finem. Ut navigationem non possit consequiri si mercatores cemerent ob in ordinationem navigandi sucis reperire aut in periculo esse omni re se ad hoc exercitio extraherent cum detrimento civitatis quo esse iustum formam et regulam ex qua tandem omnes intelligent cum minimo periculo navigationum futurem esse et ut ad particularia proposita deveniat duper se intellegire quamenmodum Bartholomeus de Lauri in primus statuendum esse ut presenti necessitati et cum pecuniiis si curratur et ob navibus qui iter facient providendum esse et quemenmodum ipse ex eius verbis intelligit pecunias petitus illis non suppeditatures tertio loco etiam providendum esse ut naves que ad huc reverse non sint tucto et que celeriter redire possint et quem hec difficultatem hanc videri sibi sexantocto capiendos esse qui dissensionibus aliquum nostre instituent presentibus civibus arendam et in Pisis esse civiam industrie intendum esse ut aliunde si fieri potest que ex Marsupiis civis pecunie *omissis* quamenmodum fieri posse a omnia duperetur si diligent ex quercatisse ita *omissis* futurum esse ut omnia prudenter et cum solet civium omnium provideretur.

Giannozzo Pitti. Utilitas navigationem fieri.

**79**

**Consulte e pratiche 55**

22v-23r

26 Iunii 1459 in saletta

Florentine calendar: 26 Iunii 1458

Auditis patronis illis qui preterito anno duas galeas conducerant qui quedi sint se magno periculo fortunarum sua esse ex eo quia perpetua impediunta que accideant et suspicione de re Aragonum iussi super navigationem intermittere cum magno eorum danno et incomodo et omnio postulabant ut aliquis modis adhibetur per quem navigatio tucto fieri possit delecti sint nostri cives ut super re ipsa consultarent qui paucis exceptis cives conserserunt quod times pauci et egregi deputaretur qui re diligentorum examinata quod eis videretur in eiusmodi negotio statuerent cives quidem assumentes quod quia ex navigatione ipsa non solum *omissis* et habere augetur civitatis etiam utilitas maxime mercantantis et artificibus melius sua negotia obeuntibus ex quorum operibus magnum civitate pecunia cumulare solet. Cum qua semper civitatis libertatis defensata est cives illi modi caperentur precipue cum ipso rege Aragonum quibus modiis navigatio ipsa segura futura erit. *Follows the signatures* C. Pandolfo, G. Machiavelli, A. Acciaiuoli, Luigi Guicciardini, Loisio de Ridolfi, Angelo Della Stufa, Jacopo de Pazzi.

**80**

**Consulte e pratiche 55**

134-137v
Die 7 Iulii 1459

Que plurimi mercatores ex nobiliaribus totius civitatis venerunt ad damnos graviter quidem querentes qui Petrum Ramandi de manuali cum quidem trireme quae dicte esse Bernardi de Castiglioncello agressus est lembos quasdam ad catalanos nomine pertinente set illos tandem eam capisse una preda omnia retinuit esse viro rem hanc per eximi et vero civitati et mercatoribus periculosem quam Florentine naves diviniter faciunt semper portus Aragonum regis tenere compelluntur sive Occidentis tradiciant sive in Orientis partes quas naves si ob damnum a Florentinis receptem Catalani ceperunt calamitas in gens multis sequerentur esse omissis vehementer aubitendum re ita quinque accedunt quantum illos omni offensi vel aliud cogitabant nisi que ad mode inuriam acceptam omissis feruntur convocasse igitur domnines illos cives ut abes consilium caperent quam omissis super hac re proveuderatur eum omissis.

81

Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42

261-262

Magno Magistri Rodi

Antonio Frescobaldi omissis suscepitis religionem ut una cum adus que bona fidem adversos barbaros hostes tueteretur per qua saepe deceritamus non cuique nullum periculum aut latore recusans tale denique omissis per gloriosem militiam expetere omissis.

30 Iunii 1459.

82

Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42

Domino Bernardo da Villamarina

287

Antonio di Simone Ambrogio son of Bernardo and Stefano di Ambrogio has been robbed by a catalan ship.

27 Iulii 1459.

83

Consulte e pratiche 55

49v

21 Iulii 1459

Rapporto fatto per gli nostri cittadini sopra i fatti del navigare.
omissis si mandi due galee di conserva come era stato ordinato perché s’intende per la morte del re et etiandio per galere della crociata il mare essere cresciuto in pericoli di persone di male affare et per potere mandare delle galere è necessario che i consoli del mare abbiano auctorità potersi concordare co conduttori delle gare per Levante a utile del comune et che per l’avenir si mandi ogni anno in Levante due galere omissis le quali e consoli del mare che pe i tempi saranno abbinno a dare allo incanto con capitoli e patti usitati et che la condotta sia fatta per certo tempo per una galere per detto viaggio di Levante omissis.

84

Signorie Missive I Cancelleria 42
302-303
Principi Tarentino

Bernardo Salviati que ab hunc triremio elapso an paulus quadens vicesimus per omissis nostre due quarumdam triremium que omissis ut cum barbari hostes prenerentur ut omissis per ipse Cyprum insulem facere omissis quaudam iniquo merces plurime Bernardi et socio rum eius vehebatur quem hostili omissis a vestris omissis Illi diripiunt omissis rogamus et observemus ut huus qui per Bernardo omissis benigne feci omissis et omni favere atque omissis intelligent commendatitiam nostram apud vos non omissis eum incoluma qua mercatoribus accendunt vestri haud dubie nostre omissis.

9 Augusti s.a.

85

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 42
346-347
Ianuensisibus

Adversum ac re medium quaerere que infamiam graviam nostre reipublice omissis quibus ut parve erat commoti per omissis predones aliqui in portu nostri versati sint que nave Liburno rese ac praedas actas vendere consueta erunt.

26 Maii 1459.

86

Consulte e Pratiche 56
1v

6 Novembrii 1459
Esse preterae duper cives creatos officiales quinque Pisarum verbis quibus quemadmodum ipsi affirmant pecunie desiunt plurime per hedificandi navibus certis quod esse agendis que ad navigandi usum necessarie sunt.

1460

Manoscritti 117

Gonfaloniere Francesco Orlandi. Il Papa vedendolo essere ancora la guerra *omissis* il re Ferdinando e il duca Giovanni e il non poter fare quella impresa contro i Turchi si risolse di ritornare a Roma. Giunse a Firenze il 25 di Gennaio e si fermò due giorni.


**88**

Missive I Cancelleria 43

1-2

Ragusa

*The Florentine Signoria reccomends Giacomo and Pietro Pazzi.*

15 Februarii 1460.

Florentine calendar: 15 Februarii 1459.

**89**

Missive I Cancelleria 43

6-7

Ragusa

*General mentions of Francesco and Carlo Cambi and the juridical quarrel they have with Nicola di Francesco da Cortola in Ragusa.*

14 Februarii 1459.
Legazioni Commissarie 15
80-81
A Guglielmo Oricellario oratore presso Piombino

Pregherai così sua Signoria a dare tutti i favori e aiuti che a lui sono possibili a le nostre galere et che mandi qualche legno suo a significare al capitano et padroni come di dette galere la venuta di questa armata et che riceva le dette galere nel porto suo sine che cessi ogni pericolo et suspetto et tu hai commissione di significare a prefati capitan et padroni questa cosa in que modo ti parva migliore et generalmente di potere fare et dire intorno a questa materia tutto quello che stimerai essere utile alla nostra città et non parrebbe et così vogliano che tu ti ingegni subitamente avisare decti capitan et padroni prefati delle notre galere et di fare in modo se sia possibile che loro ritorno colle galere a Palermo e Sicilia perché in questo modo ci pare dovrebbero essere più salve et più sicure

7 Iunii 1460.

Missive I Cancelleria 43
84
Piombino

Poiché noi speriamo le galie nostre di Levante dovere in su pochi giorni venire nel porto nostro di Pisa e di nuovo abbiamo inteso come l’armata dell’illustre duca di Calabria et de Genovesi è arrivata nel prefato porto et non sappiamo quanto tempo quivi abbino a sopraggiunse benceh noi ci rendiamo certi che da quello le galee nostre non ci verrebbono detrimento alcuno per la amicita la quale col prefato duca e co Genovesi abbiamo non di meno per torre ogni cagione di inconveniente et di pericolo che potesse intervenire pieglieranno sicurtà grande dalle città vostra la quale abbiamo sempre trovata in ogni caso amica et benivole singularmente della repubblica nostra pregandovi Sua Signoria massimamente quella gli sia di piacere dare alle prefate nostre galere ogni favore et comodità che gli sia possibile massimamente di mandare qualche vostro legno subitamente con quella celerità che sia possibile et che si rechi e de in simile caso a significare a quelli delle nostre galee come l’armata sopradetta si trova nel porto nostro et quando saranno arrivate a Piombino a tenerle colle galee insieme nel porto vostro in luogo sicuro et a buona guardia insino che l’armata sia partita et così facendosi per le spettabile Signoria vestra come sanza dubbio alcuno speriamo ci riputeremo a quella singularmente obbligati che mai simile beneficio dimenticheremo anzi terremo quelle insieme cogli altri vestri a perpetuo nella memoria a mente nostra.

3 Iunii 1460.

Missive I Cancelleria 43
A Filippo de Tornabuoni capitano galearum Orientalium

Perché nuovamente è venuto in Porto Pisano l’armata del duca di Calabria et de Genovesi et crediamo che quella nel porto predicto al quanto di sopra stia per levare via ogni materia distandolo abbiamo scripto al magnifico signore di Piombino et provveduto colla Signoria sua che quando sarete a Piombino arrivati vi ritengha nel porto suo a buona garanzia insino che avrete notitita l’armata predicta essere partita. Et però ti commendiamo che tu riduca le galere nel dicto porto di Piombino in luogo sicuro tenendo bene in punto et in ordine come si richiede et di quindi non ti partire insino che sentirai certamente l’armata sopra detta essere partita et non dubitiamo avrete ogni favore et comodità gli sia possibile.

3 Iunii 1460

Legazioni Commissarie 15

A Guglielmo Oricellario oratore presso Piombino

Abbiamo ricevuto la lettera del presente mese per la quale intendiamo la diligenza et industria tua nel mandare ad effetto quanto per noi ti fu commesso della qualcosa ti siamo essere commendati et confortanti a seguire con omissis cominciato et non lasciare indietro cosa alcuna la quale tu intenda essere utile e necessario per la ragione per la quale si fa manifesti et quanto tu vedi avere fatto tanto quanto vedi essere di bisogno intorno a quella ti diano licenza che tu possa ritornare.

10 Giugno 1460

Missive I Cancelleria 43

106-107

Papa

The letter mentions Bernardo Castiglione navali milite Fiorentino che con la sua flotta combatte i barbari nemici di Romana Chiesa. Florence asks the Pope to pay the condotta.

30 Iunii 1460

Provvisioni Registri 5

151
31 Marci 1460

Florentine calendar: 31 Marci 1459

Ut opera navigandi quia cum provisionem est quod singulis omnis mittantur octo galeis grosse cum quatuor capitaneis ad quatuor viaggia principalia et similiter inceptus est pro videre de bono assignamento per dicto opere navigandi plurime quod nam edite sunt provisiones ad idem opus utilissime *omissis*.

96

**Provisioni Registri 5**

166

8 Iulii 1460

Primo: provisionem *omissis* in consilio de cento per finali conclusione provisio fare quando presentis quinque gubernatores Pisarum possint se vulere de incanti galea cum que de presenti anno prefecture sunt addit partis Orienti set Occidenti set incantare ille barbere ad presens di cotanti viri *omissis* ad hoc vis galee rectores que reparatone indigent possent reparari hic et fieri de novis prout in previsione super id edicto latino continetur. Et considerantes quod id minime fieri potest absque damno comuni set incomodo conducturam galearum predictorum prout per eos assertur. Et cognosce res ad eundam emertim facili set absque ullius damno vel incomodo pernecturi modum proveniri posse habita primo super victus omnibus et consilio dicta die octavo mense Julii *omissis* ab incarnatione 1460 indictione octava infrascriptos dominos priorers et vexillifer in su facente ne omnio congregatos in palatio populi Florentini deliberate.

96

**Missive I Cancelleria 43**

137

Duci Calabrie

Cum erint classes dictes triremes vestras in eo portu offendissent mercibus plenas ad Orientis iter percutas atque instructas ne dum eas. *omissis*

4 Septembrii 1460.

97

**Miscellanea 1/18**

Anno 1460 114r/117r

8 Ottobri in consiglio de’ cento patroni galeras *omissis* conducentis pro partibus orientis teneantur et obbligati essenti *omissis* reditu afferre et consegnare provideri
capitano armo rum unum tappettum pro omnibus galeis quas pro dicto viatico concessus aut um pro qual iter ipso rum volentes potentes domini omisssis dubium omisssis ac simile sue lege renovare provideri et declari qui tam pro “suis” galeis’ viatica orienti qui prio omisssis et consignari provisor predicti ut supra dicti debeat ut omisssis de omnibus galeis predictis clare et aperte quod conductores seu patronum galeis pro partibus Romania seu cruentis tam omisssis teneantur et obbligati sunt infra unum mensem e due reditus sui in portum pisanum omisssis dari et consignari provisorsi unum tappetum pro quali ber galea omisssis quod tappetum sit valori set existimationi florenorum decem auri ad minus omisssis

1461

98

Legazioni Commissarie 15

A Pietro de Pazzi

Per la via di Pisa abbiamo omisssis attendono a ogni ora quelle abbi seguito et ristretto de loro che non pensiamo credere dexto aviso non giungha et per cagione che questo caso e dall’importanza che tu conosci ti comandiamo che sanza nostra licentia tu non debba partire da decta armata et opererai tutto che ti fu commesso con ogni sollecitudine e per sicurtà e salute delle nostre galere e di tutte quelle che ogni di occurre omisssis et potendo dare aviso omisssis.

11 Ianuarii 1461

Florentine calendar: 11 Ianuarii 1460

99

Provvigione Registri 5

237

21 Gennaio 1461 ind. 9

Florentine calendar: 21 Gennaio 1460

omisssis quanto sia l’utilità che risulta e in factori e in reputazione e quest’anno puote dal navichare delle vostre galee gli effecti lo dimostrano si chiaro che pure che ogniuno conforta che per una cosa non si possa fare la più utile che quello mantenere omisssis Et perché a fare questo si cognosce due cose intralaltre sono a recte necessarie che l’una è dare tanta comodità quanto honesta omisssis dare si possono tempo per tempo a conductori et padroni delle nostre galee sicché per tali comodità riesca loro ogni di più l’aviso omisssis De omisssis l’altra è dare modo ora eziandio e mercatanti per modo che possino e voglino charicare le robe loro su dette galee,
pertanto sperando che alcuna parte et allalatra si darebbe gran comodità se provedesse alle cose in che si dice che e conductori et padroni di tutte le galee che anderanno per provisione al viaggio di Fiandra et Inghilterra sia loro libertà *omissis* et si da il permesso di fare scala a Palermo *omissis* quelle di Barberia pagano la metà (pagano per la metà del detto secondo viaggio la metà di quello che dovesse pagare) *omissis* che i mercatanti possino avere certezza di quelle che abbino a pagare di noli et eziandio *omissis* capitani della parte guelfa deliberino sul “pregio dei noli” su qualunque cosa si scarischi su dette galee per qualunque viaggio e anche scaricare.

*The Sea Consul must ensure the presence of enough wood in Porto Pisano to build a galley.*

100

**Missive I Cancelleria 43**

229-230

Bernardo da Villamarina

*Florence complains about the capture of men and boats made by Fiscetto who is at Bernardo’s orders. Florence is confident that Bernardo will fix this problem.***

9 Februarii 1461

Florentine calendar: 9 Februarii 1460

101

**Missive I Cancelleria 43**

285

Nazioni Florentina Neapoli

*Florence is surprised by the election of Francesco di Mariotto Baldovinetti who is a Florentine exiled to the office of Florentine consul in Naples.*

18 Iunii 1461.

102

**Provvigione Registri 5**

166-167

15 Luglio 1461

Che i capitani di parte guelfa *omissis* deliberare e dichiarare il pregio denoli di qualunche mercatantia robe et cose che si caricassino sulle galere Fiorentine di per qualunche viaggio dallora innazi l’incantare et similmente circa l’avere levare et
caricare le mercatantie et cose degli altri mercantanti con questo che non potessino rescere alcun nolo che fusse stato ordinato omissis.

103

Missive I Cancelleria 43

338-339

Regi Renato

Cum ab hinc anno elapso cives nostri cum duabus triremibus officium peterent ut ibi ex more negotiarentur et pro petimo appulisent naves da carnicus quidam vestre ut perdurat miles vestra ferens insignia hostiliter illas aggressus non prius de scitia qui vestri novo novium impares pecunica omissis redimerent posset quo verrectione factus nostros civi navibus in omissis Bizantium versis cursum idenoeum tempos ac locum eos invaderet tandem nostris padroni egressi portum ob huius sint armi quod vidisse presenti spem omissis cum duabus trirembis inectibus plenus omissis amice virus atque armis institutem et re dum se illas accipere posse sed vicibus impareri arbitraretur ex hosti confesteri amicus factus dissimulans nil ab eo temendum esse multa que vestrum illi cepisse ne quid hostile in nos omissis noliretur qui licet suspicum essent omissis fidem utpote imperbi pro darsi continuo agere soluti cum quia verso Sicilia diceret censet que ipsis nefas esse amicissimi regis prefactum aggredi qui ab iniuria temperaret begnige omissis dimisso quel ille arbitrerunt qui ubi cestiant triremes alterum inctibus vacuem relictis alis ad cives omissis itere si cepisse natus facili hanc expugnari posse letat que dari sibi occasionem cives opprimende omissis illi videre e maribus perdant abstulisses omissis faciunt omissis ac adortus navibus suis omissis dedit nostri aut de nova perterrit cernentes nullam in arcus ne illos in meritum contumelia dammo que afficeret qui omissis.

21 Octobri 1461.

104

Missive I Cancelleria 43

340-341

Ragusa

Florence asks Ragusa to pay back the debt own by the Florentine merchant Ginori who sold some clothes.

24 Octobri 1461.

105
A Renato Sicilie Rege

Magnifici viri amici nostri carissimi. nuper litteras vestras accepimus quibus Scarinam sub nostris insignis ac de mandato nostros vestris triremes non mediocrì damno affecisse intelleximus omissis quod ex his centum et 30 navales socios ex illis triremibus acceppisse et in usum convertisset sinam omissis eisi summa opere fuit ingrata nobis quodam subditos nostros amicissimos contumelia danno inuiaria ac convitio affecerit tamen vehementer et multo plures quod agimur audire sub titulo consensus quisque voluntatis nostre Scarincium ipsum ea omnia adversus homines inos egisse. Non minus vos latere debet nos sedulo vestrám rem publicam in Summum pretiorum et tanquam amicam huissé nec ab lege veteris amicitie nostre impresemintarum abhorrere constituimus uno et continue mantenere et gratissimam here decretimus. quod si ad vestre rei publice utilitatem honorem et statum aliquid addere possimus libenter agemus ut cognosciatis nos amicitiam vestram continue maxime fecisse quorum heo viri magnifici ut intelligatis Scarincium ipsum sub preceptionis nostre lega ea que contra amicissimos nostros fecit minime operasse. et enim quando a nobis ipse discessit et iter versus regnum nostrum accipit ei expresse ommissis ut vos et vestrates inter alios amicos nostros plurimi facere et tanquam amicam nostra istam vestrám rem publicam favoribus quibus possa prosequeretur. quo sit ut admirationi non mediocrì officiamus Scarincium ipsum de nostro mandato ea egisse que adversos triremes nostra fecit asservare quam voluntas nostra seclus sit. reliquium est ut amicitiam vestrám nobis maxime gratam huissé ac semper fore intelligatis. scribimus ad eum ut dictos vestres subdito amicissimos nostros optime trahere neque deinceps apud contra eos aliquam inuiiam seu dannorum facere presimat. coeterum quam apud nos fuit dabimus operas ut qui primum vestri homines una cum rebus suis omnibus restituat. valete ut optaris datum in civitate nostra a questo die 5 Novembri 1461.

Responsive copiari 1

103v-104v

Missive I Cancelleria 43

349-350

Capitano galere Orientalium

E siccome sentiamo in questi mari dal canto di qua tra Napoli e Genova al presente piú galee e navi di malo affare et corsali et in fra gli altri Scarinci con circa 16 galee il quale insino a qua a danneggiato e nostri mercatanti et cosi sono certissimi farebbe in caso potesse e in piú nuovamente intendiamo a mole lavico a coteste galee che sapete ne fa e per pertinente nell’andare vostro e però noi intendiamo fare ogni cosa per honore e per utile in salvezza di quello et mandiamo questo et ancora noi di qua facciamo il peroramento che di fatto vi si dice. Sicche stimiamo questo fante vi
troverà a Modone e gli abbiamo detto stia quivi insino alla giunta vostra et perché et consigliamo et comandiamo che costi a Modone leviate quelli compagnoni potete per galee sopracello. Accioche per ogni caso siate meglio in ordine a potervi defendere la spesa de quali faremo mettere per avaria. Et quando di costi partito per fare il puleggio abbiate locho di non entrare ne a Spartiviento ne a Monte Ascagnolo et quelli lugoli sogliessi essere stanze di corsali a venga per rispetto del golfo di et di rivolte ve ne sia in caleta a Messina e di quivi non vi partite insino non sono due galere grossa della nostre le quali abbiamo ordinato di fare armamenti molto bene et forte di buoni uomini et facciamo conto partiranno di Porto Pisano innanzi Natale il più lungo et omiissis addirittura a Messina senza tochare in altri luoghi dove nella giunta loco intende nche nel paese fussano fusst di mali affarte a presente a potervi offendere vi si faranne incaute insino anno dove accioche de compagnia neph ssiate venire più sicuramente si che se dette galee de nuovo mandiamo fusso parte da messina per venirvi incontro vavessino trovate necessiamo e così vogliamo laspettiata a Messina insino a loro ritorno et in caso nel paese non fussero fusst di mali affari le dette due galere che de nuovo mandiamo vi aspetteremo a Messina per non perdervi pe cammino che stamani faremo prima de voi et di poi insieme et le 4 le galee de buona compagnia vi rechiare adiritura in Porto Pisano senza tochare altre luogho eccioche de voi sabbia meno lingua si può et ancora perché non gittate il ferro in alcuno porto dove potesse essere giusti che sapete il pericolo grande portano le galere come sono fusst alle quali la maxima de larneta non corrano niuno dessere offese dellaltri legni ma soprattutto bisogna abbiate grande avertenza alentrare in Porto Pisano ventriate in tempo che secondo omiissis possiate offendere et non oessere offesi et ancora sapendo che de Calabria vi potesse dare lingua de vostra venuta vogliano la facciate et per uno per pro aquello sendo avvisati prima de vostra tornata possiamo a Livorno fare quei procedimenti si intendesseremo essere validi per la vostra salvezza et benché noi siamo certissimi non bisogni niente di omiissis vi ricordiamo e vogliamo che voi vegnate con tutti quei procedimenti e avertete chiaro vi conducanno a salvamento.

18 Novembrui 1461.

107

Missive I Cancelleria 43

351

Mainardo Ubaldini consoli Florentini civitas Pere

Questa Signoria a per più vie intesto quanto tu porti bene a honore et utile de nostro mercatanti che somamente ti comendiamo. Et benché questo sia il debito tuo niante di mancho ti avisiamo che anoi et a tutta la nostra città è gratissimo et niun bene fu mai immiratato per salvezza delle nostre galee che così al presente si trovano abbiamo fatti alcuni provedimenti et alcune notitia a Modone accioché nel loro passare di tutto siano avvisati et crediamo che alla venuta di questa di così saranno partite niente di mancho abundare in cautela ti mandiamo in questa una lettera al capitano delle galee al quale diamo aviso quello abbiano a fare et come sabbia a governare. Sicche non sendo partito da li et essendo partito appresso dite fai con ufficio.
18 Novembre 1461.

Missive I Cancelleria 43
350-351

Pippo Cerchi, habitante alla Vallona

Questo fante che recha lettera di mercatanti che anno andare in Pera vogliamo che la vanno così vada insino a Modone con latre lettere le quali gli abbiamo dato et però vogliamo che alla giunta sua tu toglia le dette lettere vanno in Pera et mentirale pel fante che della ommissis et detto ommissis con presenza spatierá che ne vada a Modone di modo di tutti quei favori che ti saranno possibile che la siconduca a salvamento et questo fa con effetto.

18 Novembrii 1461.

Missive I Cancelleria 43
350

Martino Dossi (rigatterio a Modone)

Noi ti mandiamo questo fante con una lettera diretta al nostro apitano delle galere di Ghostantinopoli la quale dimportanza è come necessita dicto capitano l’abbia et però abbiamo detto fante stia così insino alla passata di dexte nostre galee et te confortiamo et comandianti che tu metta ogni sollecitudine et diligenza che nel passare di dexte galere dexto capitano abbia dexte lettere. Facendone notitia come a te parrá ommissis ad lui solo et altri luoghi circostanti accioché se dette galere vi capitassono su loro fatto nostra di dexte nostre lettere: accioché non manchi nulla ne cambi che passino così abbiamo fatto con ufficio.

s.d.

Missive I Cancelleria 43
369-370

Regi Ferdinando

Cum instiore ommissis pro clarissimo cives nostro Luca Pitti cum certis mercis conversgere petens vellonem insidia in tempstans coachis ad insulam ommissis pene desertium navem appulit. Cui casu quodam triremis perfectus que ad consalvium de rege Siciliam pertinet ob huius factis hostilem in modium nostri hominis navem ommissis
Cum erant continuo navigare mercatores Orientis apertas quas infidelis tenent per
distrahendis mercibus sicut multi ex Italia consueverint atque liceat permettibis
barbaris tutum ad illos aditum neque illius opere efferent adversus aliquid quo soiunt
accedant ut livorem honestium sibi \textit{omissis}. Florence requests to Ferrante I to
mediate with the king of Aragon and Sicily.

31 Decembrii 1461.

\textbf{1462}

\textbf{111}

\textbf{Legazioni e commissarie 15}

162

Piero Acciaiuoli Roma deliberata 1462 s.m s.d.

È stato di nuovo alla presentia nostra un mandatario della Signoria di Vinegia decto
Febo Capella il quale narrando con molte parole la potenza del Turco e che le galee
nostre si debbano partire d Augusti o di Settembre et aggiugnere a Ghostantinopoli al
tempo che il Turcho ará fatto colla sua armata tanto quanto a in proposito per
questo sia possibile che colle galere nostre gli posa offendere in alcun modo et che
essendo la ctità nostra mantentuasi di continuo per lo esercito de mercatanti il quale
in Italia é grandemente mancato et essendo per la qualità de tempi chiusi mercatanti
nostri quasi tutti gli altri luoghi nei quali \textit{omissis}.

\textbf{112}

\textbf{Missive I Cancelleria 43}

383

\textbf{Nationi Florentinorum (Napoli)}

Noi habbiamo con consiglio di nostri prudentissimi cittadini deliberato per buoni
rispetti e honesti del chonsolo della natione vestra in cotesto regno sia per l’avenire
diputato da nostri spectabili et honorevoli capitani di parte gelfa. \textit{omissis} é loro
informati di nostra intentione almeno al presente electo per vostro console lo
spectabile cittadino Zanobi Lottieri la cui elecctione vi significhiamo a voi tutti e per
honorato e in qualunque cosa trattato come consolo della nostra natione et così
vogliamo et comandiamo che con ufficio faccette senza qualunque scusa o cagione
che collegare si potesse. Et perché intendiamo che di nuovo avete creato un altro
console a lui comandiamo che rinunci al detto magistrato vedute le presente e a voi
che lo consigniate e così fare in caso che volontariamente non concorresse et che in
alcun modo non lo trattiate per lavenire per vestro console et se altrimenti per voi si facesse ne pigliamo dispiacere grande negli animi nostri.

6 Februarii 1462.
Florentine calendar: 6 Februarii 1461.

113

Missive I Cancelleria 44
15
Re di Aragona

Florence officially requests to the king of Aragon for the return of the Florentine wares which had been taken by his men. There is the interesting mention that “mercatores nostri per consuetudine sua super navi cuiusdam Genuensis merces poni”.

114

Proviggioni Protocolli
381-382
13/14/15 Februarii ind. 10

Per ricordo fatto per parte de Capitani della parte Guelfa della città di Firenze si dice come può essere noto a ciascuno così altra volta deliberato e ordinato che si dovesse mandare ogni anno tre galere pel viaggio di Romania e tre per quello di Ponente per più sicurtà delle galee per rispetto de corsali che vi sono in questi mari. Et che per questo tale ordine per parti di decti capitanì sono stati incantati già due volte cioè di Settembre e di Gennaio per più passati tre galee per Romania per questo anno però non davenire et non si sono potute allogare e niuno va fatto una superproferta di dare alcuna cosa al comune ma ogniuno chiederebbe et tanto che farebbe troppa spersa al comune et intendendesi che seguitando questo modo ogni anno si farebbono mai richieste et multiplicarebbero la spesa al comune per modo che in breve tempo il navichare sarebbe abandonata in tutto per la città nostra. La qual cosa quando adivenisse il nostro comune ne perderebbe assai di riptuatione et molto ne mancherebbe delle sue intrate, le nostre mercatantie et le Arti farebbono assai meno che non fanno et universamente tuto il nostro popolo ne riceverebbe grandissimo disagio et danno! Et che essi capitanì considerando questi tanti et tali inconvenienti et desiderando a quegli obiviare anno avuto ne di passati più volte sopra questo buone nuove de nostri savi cittadini più esperti nell’opera del navicare. Et con loro insieme avendo esaminato bene e così sopradetti propriamente s’accordano et consigliano et confortano che si tenga ogni modo et via per la quale situenda potersi meglio mantenere il navicare come cosa che tutti afferiscano essere utilissima sopra tutte lalre alla nostra città et a tutto il nostro popolo. Et finalmente concluso di dare le 3 galee per ciascuno detti viaggi ordinato insino a qui omissis che allora pare che si debba provvedere nel modo infrascripto cioè che per questo anno per più davenire
si possa et debba mandare tre galee grosse in Romania et tre in Ponente come è ordinato et che alle schale per l’andare et tornare et co capitoli conductioni et modi parti e effecti nel mandare delle due ordinate omissis di detti viaggi quelle che appartiene a lui salve nondimeno le cose in decisione.

Che delle tre galee l’una per ciascuno di detti viaggi si debba armare pe consoli del mare di Pisa che pe tempi saranno a chiesto et spesa del Comune di Firenze. Et così armati consegnarle a conduttori di quella a tempi debiti et sotto le pene ordinate per le dent. Et che sulla detta galea che così si armerà per a chosto del comune il Capitano di dette tre galee sanza altro perdurare o rassegna per quella tal galea andare il capitano però che la persona al capitano supplisce et così supplire possa in quella del luogo del padrone della rassegna. Et le altre due galee per ciascuno di detti viaggi si debbino armare pe conduttori di quelle et pongano il capitano come è stato ordinato per le tre galee e fare tutte le altre spese che et come è ordinato per le due. Potendo et dovendo sulle dette tre galee charicherà parimente dando a ciascuna la rada dogni mercantantia et robe come parrá al capitano et padroni di quelle che sia piú utile per conservatione di esse galee et delle robe che su quelle si charicheranno.

Item che in compensatione della spesa che si farà pel comune di Firenze in armare detta una galea delle tre per ciascuna di detti viaggi considerando dell’altra parte il vantaggio ne pigliano i conduttori per landata di tre galee per la sicurità desse galee et per la comodità et utilità che hanno di levare piú robe che omissis piú noli et della aptitutdine che harano a potersi spanare piú omissis senza haver a soprastera in Inghilterra per tutti questi rispetti il septo che piglierà o dovarà pigliare pe noli delle dette tre galee per ciascun di detti viaggi sia et appartenga al comune di Firenze. Et poiche si possa et debbi a tempo debito a consoli del mare di Pisa per l’opera del navigare et gli altri cinque septi di detti noli appartengasi a conduttori di quelle. Et che lo scrivano che sarà diputato a riceverle detti noli sia tenuto et debba pagare al capitano alla schiuse quella che rata che tornava allora al comune di tutti in noli che dovesse recare per le galee di Ponente. Et per le galee di Romania paga debba al capitano in Pera la decta rata de noli et noli che si pagano poi per intorno sia tenuto et debba detto scrivano pagarli poi a consoli del mare di Pisa tenendone diligente chonto per modo che nel comune di Firenze non ne sia difraudato. Et che il detto Capitano tutto quello che così vorra alle sue navi di detti noli possa e alui sia lecito convertire et pagare nel soldo et spese di decta galea così armata pel comune di Firenze tenendo di tutto buon chonto. Et avertendoli alcuna cosa sia tenuto et debba tutto quello che così gli avanzasse rimette a consoli del mare di Pisa alla sua tornata non delle galee et di tutto rendere a detti consoli buona ragione.

Item che capitani della parte che pe’ tempi saranno sieno tenuti et debbino infra dieci di dopo le finale conclusione di questa aver incantato le tre galere di Romania facendo detti incanti secondo gli ordini et infra il detto tempo debbino aver concedute non a chi meno ne che ne desse ma a chi piú profferre dare al comune. Et di poi immediatamente siano tenute et debbino incantare passati detti dieci di siano tenuti et debbino incantare le 3 galee per Ponente et quelle concedere nel medesimo modo facendo luno et laltro di detti incanti ne tempi et luoghi per gli altri incanti di galee ordinanti et fatti sotto le medesime pene. Et co capitoli conditioni modi parti et effetti et salvi et bisogni sopradetti. Intendendosi detti capitani di parte liberi et assoluti da ogni et qualunque spesa nella quale fussino o dicessi loro essere incorsi
per non lavere incantato a tempi ordinati le dette tre galere che per questo anno mandare si debbono alle parti di Ponente maxime considerato che tutto hanno fatto con buon consiglio di piú nostri cittadini perché sintende che quando non si fa profferta sugli inchanti delle galee ne segue vergogna al comune et gran manchamento al nostro navichare. Item che quello che di sopra nella presente provisione s’intende havere et habbia luogo solamente pe detti due viaggi et per questo anno presenti rimando per primo davenire. Rimanendo salve et ferme tutte le latre cose cosí pe’ detti due viaggi ommissis come per già altra ordinate.

15 Februarii 1462.

Florentine calendar: 15 Februarii 1462.

115

Missive I Cancelleria 44

89-90

Nazione Florentinorum in Neapoli

*Zanobi Lottieri is the consul chosen by Florence. Therefore the consul chosen by the Florentine community in Naples is not legitimated.*

25 Septembrii 1462

116

Missive I Cancelleria 44

90

Consoli natione Florentinorum Neapoli

*The letter concerns some problems between the local Florentine community and the designated Florentine consul.*

25 Septembrii 1462.

117

Legazioni e Commissarie 15

141

20 Octobri 1462

*Florence orders to Francesco di Nerone to finalise the agreement with the Neapolitan admiral Bernat Villamarí. The agreement concerns the protection of the Florentine galleys. Specifically, the text states:*

1) *To defend the Florentine galleys*

2) *Full safe conduct for the Florentine in the galleys.*
3) The seaport of Porto Pisano must not be theatre of fights between the Neapolitans and their enemies.
4) The admiral must stay XXX miles away from Porto Pisano.
5) Eventual supplies will come from the Florentine seaport; no negotiations will take place.
6) The admiral must dispatch for the protection of the Florentine galleys at least 5 galleys.
7) The admiral must be ready for every request made by the Florentine Signoria.

Legazione e Commissarie 15

A Luigi di Buonaccorso Pitti a Genova

153

The Florentine Signoria instructs Luigi di Buonaccorso Pitti at the moment in Genoa to negotiate a safe conduct for the Florentines. In the case of a Genoese’ refusal, the Florentine Signoria will continue to seize the Genoese goods in Porto Pisano.

24 Novembre 1462.

Missive I Cancelleria 44

114-115

Duci Genua

Per Bernardo Crappellum omisssis navi capta missa sunt origine cive nostrarum. The letter mentions two corsairs. One of them is Bernardo Barchenus (qui nobis molestum es). Florence promises retaliation against the Genoese wares in Porto Pisano.

17 Decembrii 1462

Missive I Cancelleria 44

128

Bernardo da Villamarina
Perché di qua a pochi giorni debba partire da Porto Pisano una galea delle nostre per il viaggio di Barbaria padroneggiata per lo spectabile nostro cittadino Piero di omissis Vespucci preghiamo e confortiamo la Signoria vostra che essendo richiesta da lui fare compagnia a decta galera e prestagli favore oportuno servo al tenore che capitoli con essa fatti accompagnare decta galee e rimasugli quel subsidio che bisognasse.

25 Ianuarii 1463
Florentine calendar: 25 Ianuarii 1462

120

Missive I Cancelleria 44

144

Duci e Consolibus Antiani Genoa

Florence asks to the Genoese to give back the boat which was captured by the Genoese. Moreover, Florence also wants a monetary compensation.

5 Marcii 1463.
Florentine calendar: 5 Marcii 1462.

121

Missive I Cancelleria 44

155-156

Bernardo da Villamarina

Abbiamo notitia per lettere de nostri consoli del mare de la città di Pisa come presso al porto nostro sono venute piú galee condotte da huomini di malo affare et ancora presso a Piombino ne sono alcuni altro di simili et quelli et scriviamo essere nostro dovere darne notitia alla Signoria vestra accioché improvvisamente et perché la galea nostra la quale andata in Barberia debba in pocho tempo tornare dubitamente ancora che da queste genti omissis la magnificenza vostra gli piaccia dare lingua a quelli della galea nostra la quale debba porre scale in pocho tempo a Gaeta delle galere che sono tenute a Piombino e al porto nostro e da poi prestare a quelle dicto subsidio e favore tale quale stimate essere bisogno per salvamento di quella che non dubitiamo mediante la virtú vostra ella ritornare salva come desideriamo e delle opere vestre vi rimarremo sempre obbligati e ci rimarrà singulare piacere.

16 Aprili 1463
Florentine calendar: 16 Aprili 1462

122

Missive I Cancelleria 44
A boat owned by Pietro and Gugliemo Pacti was captured. Florence asks to Genoa the return of the boat.

16 Aprilii 1463
Florentine calendar: 16 Aprilii 1462

Missive I Cancelleria 44

Domino Bernardo da Villamarina

Benché a noi sarebbe stato gratissimo che secondo e capitolì facti colla magnificenza vostra quella fusse venuta in questi mari al tempo debito e per la absentia vostra si siano seguiti assai detrimenti et danni et però quelli ci sia alquanto molesta non di meno avuto rispetto alla virtú vestra et fede verso questa republica che le galee vestra abbiano quella di nuovo ricondotta in quella medesima piú presto che gli sia possibile venire colle sue galee in questi mari vicini sperando che la venuta vostra abbia a essere senza dubbio alcuno salvamento delle galee che presto debbano tornare et ancora stimiamo che alla magnificenza vestra ne seguirà havere e bene però gli piaccia mostrare possibile perché conosce il pericolo nostro et il danno che ciascuno abbiamo se non venisse ne ad altro effettò che per sicurtà delle nostre galee e delle robe de nostri mercanti et similmente del nostro porto la conduremo et non dubitiamo malanimo che a noi ne seguirete quel fructo il quale sommamente desideriamo et a quello grandissimo honore et singolare benivolentia et perpetua di questa Repubblica.

29 Aprile 1463
Florentine calendar: 29 Aprile 1462

Legazioni e Commissarie 15

A Piero Acciaiuoli
An ambassador sent from Venice mentioned that the Turk had at his disposal at least 36 galleys. Moreover, the Venetian ambassador stated that the Ottomans would have taken the 2 Florentine galleys going to the Levant. Venice demands that Florence abandon the travel to the Levant. Florence refuses since its galleys are due to depart in August or September and to arrive in Constantinople around June or August. Florence also mentions that most of the markets are closed to Florence (because of
the war) and that the Turks always respected the safe conduct. Therefore Florence asks its ambassador in Rome to persuade the pope not to support the Venetians’ demands.

19 Marcii 1463.
Florentine calendar: 19 Marcii 1462.

125

Legazioni e Commissarie 15
164

Piero Acciaiuoli
The Florentine Signoria advises Piero Acciaiuoli to avoid any more request of tithes from the pope.

26 Marcii 1463.
Florentine calendar: 26 Marcii 1462.

126

Legazioni e Commissarie 15
177

Francesco di Neroni presso il Villamarina
You can give to the admiral the biscotto for July and even August. The admiral can go to Pisa to take more biscotto, if needed, since it is not needed by the Levantine galleys.

s.d.

127

Missive I Cancelleria 44
145

Regi Renato
Giovanni Villaggio captured a Catalan boat which had a cargo of wheat owned by Florentine merchants. Florence asks back the wheat.

12 Maii 1463.
Florentine calendar: 12 Maii 1462.

128
Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive

consoli Florentinorum Mainardo de Ubaldinis in Constantinopoli

Noi mossi principalmente per honore et bene di questa città e di tutti e nostri mercatanti et per salvamento delle cose loro che costi sono vogliamo in ogni modo et così ti imponiamo che veduta la presente con quella celerità ti sia possibile tu vadi alla presentia del signore Turcho et per nostra parte gli dirai che la sublimità sua non pigli admiratione se noi abbiamo alquanto differito del viaggio delle galee nostre le quali siamo usati mandare ogni anno a Ghostantinepoli et se quelle più tardi quivi si condurranno però che essendo ne mari de qua grandissime armate abbiamo avuto sospetto chelviaggio delelevante non cifusse da quelle impedito ma che la nostra intensione è ferma et così sempre sarà perlavenire dicontinuare il decto viaggio et mandare nelle terre sue le nostre galee non solamente in questo anno ma in perpetuo piacendo così alla sua illustrissima ancora con maggiore numero di galee et molto maggiore quantità di mercantantie come avremo la commodità et il modo di così potervi fare et sperando che i capitoli fatti colla maestà sua sempre interamente ci saranno osservati et riceveremo da quella ogni favore intorno alla pesentia de nostri mercatanti sicome insino al presente cuesto con somma fede osservato et fatto et che noi similmente non obstante questa lunghia novità o molestia che allui si facessi da qualunche altra nazione sempre la fede allui data come ne capitoli sicomtime indubitamente observeremo et quando alla maestà sua paresse avendo rispetto a capitoli nostri che al presente occorrono che noi dirigessimo le galee nostre ad altro luogo che a Ghostantinepoli ne terreni et porti suoi ecio e alle foglie o ad altro luogo che piú sicuro o commodo fuisse dirai noi essere aparichieti seguire in tutto la sua intensione et rispondendo lui parergli che si vada ad altro luogo et nominando quello agiugnerai gli piaccia fare levare et commerci a decto luogo alle nostre galee come furono levati a Ghostantinepoli et come arai avuto risposta da quello subitamente sanza indugio alcuno per tue lettere di tutto ci aviserai et così ancora el capitano et padroni delle galere nostre le quali per aventura fanno per cammino.

28 Junii 1463

129

Legazioni e commissarie 15

182-183

A Ottone oratore ad Ponteficem 1463 Augusti 24

Voi andrete con quella diligentia che siete usato nelle altre vestre legationi e trovandovi finalmente a Roma nella presentia del Sommo Ponteficie fatte prima le debite salutationi et offerte direte che noi essendo richiesta per lettere et ambasciatori della Santità sua mandare a quella nostro ambasciatore perché lo illustissimo signor duca di Borgogna doveva mandare a Roma in questo tempo suoi oratori come avrà significato per lettere per conferire et conchiudere intorno alla difesa et salute della Christiana religione contro a nimmici di quella. Richiese la sua Santità che convocasse gli oratori de laltre potenti per omisssis di Italia accioché insieme co quelli questa
materia grave et degna nuovamente si considerasse et trattasse noi desiderosi fare qualunche cosa grata et accepta alla Sancticà sua subitamente aver fatto proposito _omissis_ al suo desiderio degno di persona comune atione. in però che nessuna cosa può essere piú a quella conveniente di maggior merito et gloria piú grata _omissis_.

130

**Responsive Copiari I**

118 rv

ab Pio II Summo Pontifice

Rettulit nobis orator Venetus qui apud nos agit esse intentionis nostre mittere nonnullas triremes Constantinopolim et quam Veneti aperte bellum gerunt contra Turchum Christiani nominis hostem timent plurimum detrimenti inde affere posse. primum quia hostes qui Italorum vires formidant existimant omnes concordes esse in gerendo bello poterint ex eo coniectari non concordiam intra Italos ser magnum vigere discordiam quin alii in aperto sint bello cum Turcis alii cum his commerciunt quasi amicorum palam habeant. videbunt falsa predicari Italo imitis viribus defensioni Christiane religionis intendere. sue crescent animi hostium amicorum diminuunt et qui coacti Turchis serviant cupientes ad Christianos redire tepescens. timent a quia Turchis ubi oportunitatem habit triremium Florentinarum eas contra Christianorum classes cum suis parare poterit. nec confidendum est eius fidei: qui fidem non novit. supplicavit igitur nobis devotiones vestra hortaremur ne triremes illas mitteretis neque ex huiusmodi scandalum subsequi possit afferens deum Venetorum ad nos missum hanc ob eam oratorem suum. nos hac intelligentes accersuimus oratorem vestrum qui omnia communicamus qui excusationes quasdam in medium afferat que ab verisimile non abhorret tam non videt ex his satisfactum Venetis verum scandalum se qui non parum si mittantur. Per ea hortamur _omissis_ ut omnibus posthabitatis consulatis Christiane religionis et in mittendis triremibus superfedeatis ne ex huiusmudi missione cum magna Christiani popouli tacitura et non sive honoris nostri diminutere aliquid sinistri eveniat. Data Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatori die 28 Septembrii 1463 Pontificato nostri anno sesto.

131

**Responsive e Copiari I**

118v-119r

a Pio II Pontefice Maximo

Latere nos non debet quanta dilieci fili Ragusini cives postque iniquitatis spectator ex Christiane religionis impugnator Maumethus Turchorum rex Europas invasit damna et incomoda pertulerint et quod hoc anno post captum Bosne regnum et misere sed
cum dolore referimus in predam calamitorum distractum fuerent in timore constitutis ne ipsius voracitate absorberentur et ut ipsio feritatem et insolentiam evitarent ac in fide Orthodoxa constater persistent incredibilita ex Persarum onera passi sunt et non modo ea que ipsi pro eorum tuitione iam diu hinc timentes eventum preparaverant sed quod nos et subminiscravimus et dedimus penitus consumpserint. fecimus nos eis omne subsidius et pro debito a honore nostro ac applice fedis semper pro posse facturi fuimus neque ipsos inique deferemus sed ut peculiare et devotos filios totis viribus protegemus nunc vero cum decreverint dilectum filium Matheum archidiaconum et oratorum ipsorum pretium ostensorem ad vos mittere quod etiam auxilium implorare nostri offici esse duximus devotionibus nostris comendare eas hortantes ut denotorum et fidelium Sancte Matris Ecclesie munere fungantur ex quo certa praeter eterne retributionis premium laudem et commodationem maximam comperababum et nobis magnopere complacebitis. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatori die 1 Octobri 1463

132

Consulte e Pratiche 56

15v

Rapporto facto per dietisalvi di nerone de dietisalvi oratore allo illustrissimo signore duca di milano il quale ritorna in firenze questo di octo di dicembre 1463 circa alla pratica della dieta facta a Roma contea del Turcho che fu la parte principale della mia commissione chome di per di per mie lettere ho advisato se ridotto la cosa che unitamente a queollo illustrissimo signore et la nostra comunità sono stati in unione et duno medesimo parere et cosi insieme sono stati a Roma tractati chioe di dovere contorcere alle x x et xxxx al pagamento quando unitamente si faccia per gli altri et le altre potentie Italiane et altro impedimento non fusse dato alle nostre galere di Levante et per ragioni che tale impresa debbe da ciaschuno essere commendata et favoreggiata et troppo caricho sarebbe a chi facesse il contrario cosi ad presso a Iddio chome agli huomini el mondo però pare a quello illustrissimo et dicta che è si debba fare dimostrazione di volere prestare ogni favore et di poi seguirne secondo che i tempi ne mostreranno et dare i favori quando s’intendendo dovere fare fructo. omisiss

1465

133

Responsive Copiari I
Dilectis filis salutis et apostolicam benedictionem. requisiti fuimus superioribus diebus ab oratoribus vestris ut triremem quam olim vestra civitas imperceptam in Portu Pisano. Fere Pio predecessori nostro in usum hoc expeditionis et classis in Turcos armande concesserat nobis reddere vellemus quinuidem expeditio ipsa prosecutionem non habuit. superveniente dicti Pii obitur a vos ipsa trireme apprime indigere videamini. nos autem in civibus que cum Deo possimus comodis vestri cupimus benignos nos exhibere et petitionibus vestris ammirire. scire nos volumus in persuadenda instruendaque et armanda navilla a dicto nostro predecessore qui ut nostris corpus illius dumtaxat at imperfectum accepit magis sumptus factus fuisse quorum computa dilectio filio Thome Soderino militi oratori vestro apud nos ostendi fecimus omissis sit pro caritate qua nostre rei publicam affiamur contenti famus triremem ipsum cum corredis suis nobis consignari faceret volumus ait qui si pro hoc sancto opere fidei defendendo voluerimus ea uti nos requirentibus nobis eam consestim exhibeatis sperantes qui ita nostre ipsa fidei vos geretis ita fervor noster in causa Dei non imminutus sed magis quod autos se videat. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die omissis 1465.

Responsive Copiari I

Superioribus diebus ut comperetum habetis advertentes nos fuissetis impiissimi Turchorum regis communis hostis ex calamitatis Christianorum convocavimus omnes potentatus Italie et presertim Florentinos. cumque horum omnium oratores apud nos convenissent habuto communi consilio cum veneralibus fratribus nostris Sancte Romane ecclesie cardinalibus una cum his oratoribus ac negotio diligentissime agitato denique devetum est ut iam multo oportuno presidia Christianis his qui in faucibus vigentis hostis constitunt omnio mitterentur et maligna illa crudelis que fera e finibus europa traderetur itaque obtulerunt quisque presidium inter alios orator vestri duo milia ducatorum singulo mense in huiusmodi semper opus vestro nomine solvere obtulerit que omnibus parva res hec quid visa est ac longe minore quod florentissima vestra res publica prestare procul dubio debuisse. cum vestro casum in Christo filii nostri Mathie regis Hungarie illustris et propugnatoris ac defensoris acerrimi Christianorum nunc ad nos missi oratores exposuerint ipsum Turchum validiorem in dictis surgere atque trattari adversus Christianos omni genere crudelitatis ut nisi presto occurat valde formidandum fit omnibus nobis eo potissimum quam Hungari per se ad resistendum non sufficiunt ac omissis unde subsidia efflagitat. id a nostro considerationem adeos hndam esse
duximus verem ne si negligant turbulentissimus ille exercitus atque urget omneque
unius armi summam iam contribuatis et mittatis in Hungarorum subventionem neque
usque dum voluat armus differatis quam nunc egestas minet neque hiemem
expectetis in qua milites ociosi sunt neque cunctandum putetis ut cum post hac
accurrere voluitis sero id agatis. aiunt ne bis dediti quo cito dedit item omnia oportune
bona sint non enim satis erint quod neglectum fuit dolere si quidem nullo studio
corrigi poterit quod sero fie. Si vestro totius sine difficultatem obiiceretis quod
minime credimus oramus ut saltem dimidiam partem nunc detis vos in qui Dei gratia
divites et semper prompti pre omnibus aliis esse soletis ut boni cristiani in prestanda
huiusmodi subsidia cum feceritis ut spes nostra est profecto retributo bonarum
omnia operum deus acceptam habet hanc oblatorem neque in quo erit immemor
ad rependendas vobis amplissimas vites. ipse enim largus est retributor insuper et nos
quibus Christiane salutis omnis cura commissa est et qui totis viribus huic sancto
operi incumbimus hanc ipsam opportunam largitionem pro magno beneficio
deputabimus. placerit vobis immediate his litteris responsium dare. datum Rome
apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatori die 16 maii 1465 pont. nostri anno primo.

135

Consulte e pratiche 56

4r-5v

Die 24 Maii 1465

Laurentius Nicolinus vexillifer ab infrascriptis civibus petiit in his rebus consilia.
quid agendum sit de navibus mercatoris applicant ne barzalone quod orator regis
Aragonie ne fieret rogaverat. quid respondendum esse summo Pontifici qui xxiii
florenorum in animum promissorum sub conditionibus emolumenti cruciata
recipiendi imprimis petat saltem xii nulla habita conditio nis intentione omissis
Postremo quid mandandum sit dominus aloisio orator apud Sumnum Pontificem
iusso a Neapoli Romam proficisci illique expectare quid sibi in mandatis detur.

Franciscus Neronis Ad litteras summi Pontificis quibus preter conventum
impressa pecunie xxiii florenorum referendum sibi videre ad maiorem civium
numerum ut et materius et cautius agitare possit renderi ut quantum fieri possit non
offendatur animus Pontificis et utilitati publice consulatur omissis Quod intelligatur
interea dominus Aloisius orator Rome debeat illic supersedere nec ne et sedem meas
deliberationem mandata adentur.

136

Consulte e Pratiche 56

6r-9v

Die 27 Maii 1465
Laurentius Nicolinus vexillifer iustitie proposuit litteris summi Pontificis quia nihil adhuc deliberatus sit tandem quid sit respondendum. Presertim cum dominus Antoni de Ridolfis qui expectabatur adsit et qui poterit omni de re ut gesta cum summo fit Pontifice exponere omissis Dicunt omissis velle id quod haec nus cum Venetis fecerunt cum Florentinis pro antiqua benivolentia conservanda atque augenda contrahere et mercari et res eorum populo necessarias ex nostro portu et civitate pise urbi sue subministrare.

D. Antoninus de Ridolfis rem omnem exposuit ut cum summo egerat Pontifice sed secundum eius mandata obligasse Florentinum populum cum ceteri quoque oratores Italie idem unusquisque pro mandato suo facerent ut contribueret ipse quoque in hoc inceptum in Turchis Christianorum hostes uno anno tantum xxiii florenorum idest singulo quoque mense florenorum duomilia receptis in compensationem decimis vigesimis et trigesimis et predicationibus et indulgentiis et quicquid aliquid afferrre eolumenti posset. in calce autem fere reditus ipsius Summum Pontificem ab eo quiesisse existimaret ne Florentinos quod voluto anno promissum fuerat inprocessum et egestas impendea soluturos et cum id fieri posse orator denegasse rationesque attulisset tantum scribere se et id petere velle respondit. Atque ita fecit ego vero abii et hoc tandem ad nos Dei gratia incolumis proveni. Vos quid agendum deliberandumque fit melius considerabitis.

D. Mannius Temperanus: laudavit dominus Antonium de Ridolfis qui in legatione sua omnibus mandatus suis diligentissime satisfecerit. deinde omissis si deliberaretur ut pecunie omissis postulata Pontificis solvantur ut contra ab eo petatur ut ea que in compensationem per eius sa promissa sint de quibus in eius litteris nulla fit mentio omissis nobis. Ceterum rem ut magni ponderis mature deliberandas esse omissis

D. Carolus de Pandolfinis omissis: ad postulata Pape sibi visi necessarium futurum si ceteri potentatis Italie contribuerit quod satis policiti Florentinum quo populum idem facere et pp promissa legati nostri et ut infamia apud ceteros Italie populos evitetur qua notaretur Florentinus populos si concurrentibus ad solutionem promissorum in hoc Sanctum opus et communem Christianorum ausam ceteris nos soli immunes et expertes otiosi esse specatores conspiceremur.

D. Angelus Acciarolus omissis: ad postulata pape multis rationibus aseveravit assentiendum esse summo Pontifici id (non) debitum esse omnium Christianorum ut hostibus religionis nostre et pecunia et omnibus viribus repugnetur id esse e dignatii populo Florentini. se a multifacere pro in subventionem Hungarorum mittende sint pecunie ut id fieret promptis animis ut promptitudinem Hungari anima divertentes de animis et benivolentia nostra certitudinem haberent neque Venetos proponerent quorum amicitiam ut audio ungaris complectuntur. et cum formidanda sit potentia per se Venetorum additis viribus benivolentia ungarorum magna fiet accessio. et quam a populo deernendum est si pecunie solvende sint notarum rem fieri populo oportere non solum deligendos esse de sapientioribus qui rem agitent et mature sapientierque consulat ut qui an dixerunt consulerint.
Johannocci de Pittis: summi Pontifici obtemperandum esse si qua fieri possit. presertim uum un ea re sidetur compensatio lucrum magis qui damnum inesse videatur.

D. Antonio de Ridolfi: *omissis* de postulatis vero summi Pontificis multis relatis de his que Rome intelleixerat tandem conlusit deligendos esse nonnullus cives qui rem tractent et mature consulant. et in eam inclinavit verbis omnibus suis sententiam ut summo Pontifici quantum fieri possit gratificetur testimonium faciens de optimo animo et voluntate ipsius erga Florentini populum quam conservandam et augendam esse multis de causis et optimis rationibus conservavit.

D. Otho Nicolinus: postulata pape eiusmodi esse ut melius tractentur cum paucioribus civibus presertim cum his quo ob impedimentum nequiverunt adesse *omissis*

D. Angelus Stufa: quamquam existemet inceptum contra Turchos non habiturum esse nunc alium successum qui haetenus habuerit nihilominus rem mature discutiendum

Die XXX Maii 9 r Laurentius Nicolinus *omissis* petiti quid videatur respondendum Pape qui petiti *omissis*

Otho de Nicolinus dixit: ex consensum eorum omnium qui ad eas res tractandas fuerant delecti et ex sententia eorum qui ob impedimentum nequeunt adesse summo Pontifici in eius postulatis omnino esse obtemperandum. ceterum considerandum ut id qui minimo populi incommodo fiat. Et id fieri posse si quinque viri per consilium centum deligantur qui auctoritas ex potestas detur mutuo accipiendarum pecuniarum quibus voluntati summi Pontificis satisfiat.

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**Missive I Cancellaria 45**

14-16

Paulo Pape II

Superioribus diebus Sanctissime ac beatissime pater cum interlexissemus tuis litteris que esse tua voluntas ut impressentia a nobis in ungurarum auxiliuorum dimidium saltem solvere eius quod voluto anno et perfecto ex per commissione nostra deebatur statim oratorii nostro quem a Neapoli pridem venire ad serenissima tuam iussusseramus in mandatus dedimus ut de eo negocio ita tecum agendi quemadmodum alterus apostolicis litteris per oratores ungaros nobis reddieis haetenus ut videmus non est actum. quia ut existimamus legatus nostros istus nondum pervenerit cum ungari abierunt. alterius igitur litteris beatissime pater vis ut eadem xvi ducatorum idest dimidium totius quod pollicitis toto anno sumus in cruciate sanctissimun opus certis quibusdam modis ac donationibus quibus solvere promisimus posthabitatis tamen ob
instantem necessitatem ob pericula nisi succurratur ungaris sapientissime a te
elegantissimeque narrata ipresentia solvantur eorum oratoribus. movent nos cum
verissime rationes que divine sane scribimetur a te tum vel multo magis auctorias tua
beatissime pater se oborintur plurime et maxime difficultates que rem nobis adeo
reddunt difficilem ut omnino videre non que armis quomodo possit et voluntati tue et
nosto desiderio quod semper voluntatem sequitur Pontificis fieri satis. multa nos
incommoda circumsederunt. annone caritas in qua et benignitatem tuam sepius
excepti sumus. et sensit nostre populus et pro singulare beneficio et plane divino
dono in animis reposuit. pestis timore que omnem civitatem suspectam et inernem et
ociosam temuit. atque alias multo maiores difficulties perspessa est nostra civitas
que pro divina tua sapientia cognoveris necesse est. qua pp minime vere omissis
supplicare Sanctitate tue ut hanc excusationem nostram ita ut verissima est
clementissimis auribus excipias. ac nos pro devotissimis Romane ecclesie filii pro
deditissimis tibi pro his qui semper ad morem summo Pontifici gerendum
obsequendumque sint promptissimi nisi contra inogeat necessitas cui reductari
hominus non posse aint in gremio teneas tue beatissimo vii Iunii mcccclxv.

138

Missive I Cancelleria 45
24-25

Paulo Pape II

Accepiimus litteras tuas Sanctissime ac beatissime pater quibus humanissime ac
clementissime cohortaris ut xvi ducatorum quemadmodum aliis quoque apostolicis
litteris cohortati simus ipresentia persolvamino. hulla causa est beatissime pater
neque esse potest cive non observit? Sanctitate tue non debeamus ac in primis
cupiamitis. id si tibi erit persuasum cetera facilima relinquentur nobis. in presentia
autem ob maximas occupatiantes nostra pape illustissimos hospitos qui recipiendi
sunt a nobis et propter dies sestos Sancti Iohannis que omnem civitatet et occupatam
et negociosam habent nihil certi respondere possussum. paucos post dies cum erit
nobis copia nostorum civium de verum sententia solum consuetudinem nostre
civitatis aliquid tertius respondebimus hoc semper humiliime supplicantes beatissime
pater ut quemadmodum re vera est semperque fuit Florentinis populis ita
obsequentissimum deditissimusque et beatitudinis tue et ipsi fedi in qua ex divina
graotia tua os meritissime collcate existimare digneris nos que et populum omnem
nostro clementissime beatissime tue etiam atque ad comendare. te die bene valere
et foelicem esse cupimus. xxii iunii mcccclxv.

139

Missive I Cancelleria 45
25-27

Paulo Pape II
Nihil est Sanctissime ac beatissime pater quod magis cupiamus que voluntati et preceptis tuis facere satis. quod ad cause sunt ut litteris apostolicis nuper nobis redditis paulum differemus. conantibus enim nobis responsium atque omnia per omennis servantibus plurime oboriunt nunc difficultates de quibus aliis et litteris scripsimur ad serenitatem tuam que et conatu faciunt veritas ac desideria nostra intercipient. sed illud est in primis que persuasit sibi pro re certa populus cum primum de xxiii ducatorum millibus mentio facta est in expeditionem Sanctissimam contra immanissimos Turchos ex obligatione et converitus fuis contribuendum fuisse cum ceteri quoque Italie populi et principes ad auxilia huiusmodi convenere...
futura putaremus volentissimis animis esse facturos. sed que in presentia patris tuis litteris ut iacobus zamzo carcer liberetur per legis nostras fieri non potest invictis creditoribus quibus ipsa sua sponte se obligavit et integre satisfacturum solemnibus stipulationibus promisit dabimus tamen operam ut rem tibi gratam faciamus ut omnia que fieri possunt in sua commoditatem per creditores ipsos ea fiant tua causa cui parati sumus in omnibus que penterentur et que fieri possent gratificare. v augusti mcccclxv.

142

Consoli del Mare 7 Giornali 65v-66v

Ricordo della vagia delle 3 galere di Levante tornarono addì’ ommissis 1465 Capitano Bernardo Corsi Padrone Piero di Francesco Corsi, Francesco di Giovanni Benci e Niccolo’ d’Ugolino Martelli la quale fu gittata 9 Luglio 1466 per Bernardo Cambi e Bongiovanni Gianfigliazzi e Piero di Neretti eletti da Chonsoli del Mare di Firenze a detto di 9 fecerì raporto che ne e appresso e spese fatte per detti schali.

Paghati a Rodi per ancoraggio ..di quel porto 12
Pagati a un porto ancoraggio 3
Pagati Livorno ancoraggio 3
Salvocondotto ai maonesi 12
Per uno fante mandato da Rodi a Pera 27
Presenti fatti al maestro di Rodi e altri presenti fatti al podesta’ e a maonesi 20
Messina ancoraggio 7
Messina e 3 piloti 9
Ancoraggio Napoli 31, 6 B
omissis Gaeta 6 anchoraggio etc. 13 B 15
Pagati per vantaggio facessero a uno fante mandato a Firenze 9
3 piloti 60
Pagati per elezione del capitano Bernardo Corsi donati a Firenze secondo la legge 30
Donati ai consoli del Mare di Pisa 25
Totale: 274, B 146

Appresso faremo nota delle robe venute sulle dette ghalee qui al diripetto della loro firma fatta per detti compartitori
Aghostino di Toti 1195
Antonio di Rabatta e Bernardo Chambi e compari di Pisa 462.10.
Sdracella per mattei? 100
Rosso Cerretani che dimora a Pisa 1324.15
Lucha Capponi che dimora a Pisa 431.10
Giovanni di Filippo Villa con compari di Pisa 379
Francesco Berti? 2021
Bartolomeo e Nicola Benci co compari a Pisa 3040
Piero Doviso di Bernardo 42
Ugholino e Antonio Martelli co compari di Pisa 1345
Giovanni da Piacenza Schrabanello 192
Giovanni e Pietro Salviati di Pisa 237.10
Niccolo’ di Ugolino Martelli 6229
Giovannni Giustiniano di Ambrogio 240
Monaldo e Luigi Grimaldi 475
Filippo e Federigo Centurioni di Genova 60
Giorgio de Marmi 75
Jaco di Francesco e Manfredi suo fratello 75
Gabriello da Privanta 77.10
Battista e Bartolomeo Castiglione da Genova 172.10
Simone di Negroni’ da Genova 1433
Giorgio Guisse? Di Genova 165
Marchio? Maurchio? Mauro Buondina 146
Chalvano Adorno 9
Bernardo de Mich de Genova 250
Marchello Chappa da Genova 100
Paolo Grimaldi da Genova 91
Francesco Maruffo di Genova 475
Giuliano Maruffo da Genova 312
Baldassarre Adorno da Genova 390
Gherardo di Vivaldi 48
Ghirigoro Larchiaro 450
Pungiballa Paliuvi? 200
Attaviano Adorno 84

*Omissis* 50
Raffaello delle Torri 31.10
Giovanni Battista di Grimaldi da Genova 25
Benedetto di Valdia 18
Somma 23436.7 Ci. Ro largho.

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*Consulte e pratiche* 57

32v-33v

Die XVII Augusti mccclxv

Vexillifer ad infrascriptos senatores loquens consilium petivit *omissis* ad extremum utrum quod consules artis lane petiiit utile sit vectigalia lanarum reduci ad antiquum modum presertum ob nonnullas lanas que ea spe in portum nostrum duxerunt iter. et de navigacione etiamque futura est.

D. Mannus Temperari: ad ultimam partem prius respondit et de re navigatoria dixit sibi videri quod fieri in re tali consuevit ut id referatur ad consules maris et mercatores. De lanis sibi videri quod de re navigatoria.

D. Carolus: de lanis videri sibi quo fit in populus pasci possit providendum et prorogandam legem de vectigalibus mitioribus in annum alterum.
D. Jannotius: in omnibus que per eos qui ante dixerunt assensus est de re navigatoria solum quaedam verba fecit et ea quidem omnia lege navigandi constituta esse.

D. Loysius Guicciardinus: de lanis id quod superiores. Rem navigatoriam existimare se gubernari oportere ut leges et consuetudines navigandi constituit.

Sacchetti Canisianus Stupha Pucci idem quod dominis Loysiis.

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Legazioni e Commissarie 16

35-36

die xxii Augusti mcccclxv

Bernardus Bartholi de Corsis: electus sint secundum ordinamenta legatus ad magnum Sultanum ad regem Cipri et magnum Magistrum Rhodi cum litteris credentis et commissione per dominos et collegia deliberandis sine aliqua communis expensa

die ommissis Augusti

magnifici domini collegis deliberaverunt mandata ipsius ea que infra scribentur et litteras credenti ommissis esse. mandata huiusmodi fuere

Se arrivassi in luogo dove fusse la persona del Soldano padre et benefactore nostro singularissimo presenterati dinanzi a sua excellentissima maestà parendo a padroni et mercatanti di dexte galee. et prima salutatolo come è di consuetudine racchomanderai noi et tutto il nostro popolo alla sua sublimità dimostrando con efficaci parole quanto sia grande la fede et la devotione del nostro popolo inverso la sua celsitudine. Et ultimamente dirai che habbiamo mandato nel suo amplissimo regno le nostre galee perché così habbiamo stimato far cosa grata alla sua humanissima maestà perché sempre mai ha veduto et laltri che vi sono navichate et qualunque nostro cittadino et mercatante con letissimo et humanissimo volto et facto sempre a tutti nostri benefici et gratie assai piú che non è futo chieste a sua humanissima et gloriosissima maestà, et con quelle parole et modi che crederai gli sieno acceptissime pregherai di gratia che sia contento che e merchtatanti nostri paghino e commerchi con piú commodita di loro che si può e di quelle robe solamente et merchatantie che resteranno nel porto del suo amplissimo regno. et parendo a merchatanti di fare alchuno presente ad avaria lo fa in nome di questa Signoria con quelle parole che atte e alloro parranno convenienti.

Quando anchora dove fussi la persona della maestà del re di Cypri parendo a mercatanti come di sopra si dire ti presenterai anchora dinanzi a sua maestà et salutatolo et racchomandatoci et la città e merchatanti lo pregherai come di sopra per utile e commodita delle galee et merchatantie desse.
A Rhodi anchora visiterai el gran maestro reverendíssimo in Christo padre et benefactore nostro et salutatolo et racchomandato il popolo nostro e mercatanti et chiesto quelle medesime gratie che di sopra. racchomanderai a sua revertendíssima Signoria Bernardo di Marco Salviati e compagni nostro dilectíssimo cittadino et mercatante che si degni di volerli far fare dovere di ducati 771 7/8 debbe havere della ragione della sua nomea per rigore di sententia havuta qui da sei della merchatantia come piú pienamente di questa materia sarai informato da esso Bernardo o suo procuratore. et così delle altre faccende che aspettassino a detto Bernardo.

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Missive I Cancelleria 45

62

Regi Cipri

Propter eam que semper fuit humanissime maiestatis tue in nos et populum et mercatores nostros ad mirabilis quedam et prope divina beneficentia tua nihil omnino est quod petere at non audeamus et speremus consequi. cur enim non esse hoc animo debeamus que infinita pene documenta manifestíssima nobis dederis. cariorem nulli patri filium esse quenquem posse que sit tibi Florentinus populus ex quo etiam habemus et agimus tibi immortales gratias et quondam assuefeciisti nos tuis beneficiis non dubitamus continuo aliquem a te petere ut ea in dies cumulatiora faciamus. nos autem tibi continuo magis obnoxio in nos meritis reddamus. navigant igitur nostri cives mercatorem gratia per amplissima loca gloriosissimi regni tui. certo scimus eassidem qua semper incredibili humanitate tua eos te esse benficiis affecturum et omni mansuetudine et clementia prosequuturum sed id precipe a te petimus et oramus ut ea tantum mercionima Florentine. huic navigationis vectigalibus obnoxia sint in portibus tua iurisdictionis quocumque appulerint que in his ipsis locis vendita et tu adita reliquentur. que ex his exportabuntur ut sint ab omni onere navigatorio et ab omni portorio immuniont erit ea magnificentia vel benigitas tue maiestatis mercatoribus nostros magno emolumento et commoditati nobis autem ita gratum fiat ut gratuos fieri nihil possit nec quod nos per maiori benificio accipere in presentia a tua maiestate valeamus. nos filios tuos et populum nostrum devotissimum ac deditissimum tibi magno opere commendamus. diu et salute vale xxiii Augusti mcccclxv.

146

Consulte e pratiche 57

48r-49v

Die XVI Octobris mcccclxv
Iacobus Guicciardinis rediens a legatione Neapolitana Romam venit et apud Summum Pontificem cum fuisset non nihil habuit ab eo in mandatis. Itaque insu suo assingere in senatu omnia recitavit. Se fuisset ad Pontificem maximum et post consuetas commendationes captata prius attente legati sic accepit Pontificem tertiorem esse factum et quidem inscio rege ungarie regem ipsum etiamsi vehementer erat contra immanissimos Turchos. eritatus tamen restunctum esse omnem arorem legatis Venetis dissuaderibus net ad pacem shortantibus. et quamvis scripsurit ad regem et ad Venetos pontifex et pacem cum hoste nois Christiani prohibuerit. tamen vereri Summum Pontificem ne coacti necessitatibus que soli tantum bellum non possessint sustinere pacem feriant. itaque hortari ut communi consensu omnes potentatus in publicam Christianorum causam auxilia conferant. et tandem hortatum finisse Pontificem ut id refere ad senatum Florentinum et expectare super ea re responsium. ad sese respondisse legatus dixit urbeem Florentie numquam fuisset in postremis in quacumque laude presertim Christiana. et idem se putare nunc quo eam facturum. et id relatum et cunctatum pro mandato suo ut responderetur post reversionem suam. His dictus in consultationem venit senatus.

Bernardus de Giugnis: videri sibi inquit ex re nostra esse bellum Turchorum que maxime prorogari ut et Veneti et summus pontifex hoc intricati bello de novis rebus non excogiterit. Se censerent denit ad Pontificem littere ut hortetur sua Sanctitas eique supplicetur ut velut aggregi hoc sanctus opus belli contra Turcos et velit suscipere onus connocandorum populorum ut coi consensu bellum geratur.

Carolus Pandolfinus: rem tractari veterem et dui consiliis agitatem non tamen provisam id se habere animi hoc pacto non posse dictus perdurare quoniam ob potentiam Turchi Veneti non poterum dum repugnare. videri sibi Summum Pontificem agere ex officio suo et pastorali. Populum nostrum Florentinum semper promptum fuisset ad hoc inceptum ut etiam pius pontifex testis ubi est esse potest. Itaque scribendum ad Pontificem ut D. Bernardus quo dixit et ostendendum nos futuros semper paratos cum ceteri quoque potenatatus convenire volent.

Angelo Acciaiolus: quia audisse se inquit sepe numero de ea re agi semperque eodem animo conclusum subveniendum esse pro virili non esse opus ut que acta sunt impresentia rerident id tantum curare ut deinceps itares tractetur ut nihil scribatur qui levitatis maculam rei p possit incutere. Prius intelligendam esse rem mature. Postea scribendum videri hoc curandum ne si pax fiat cum Turco dicatur pax facta esse qui non voluerint Christiani et nostra civitas auxilium conferre.

Joannocitus de Pictis: bellum Venetorum cum Turcis utilem nobis dixit et putare verum ee Venetos esse hortatos ungares ad pacem et si denegabunt ungar Veneti ipsi pacem feriet. Et Pontificem ita qua est affectus patrie et sue civitati que ritare honestam causam Venetus huius paci si deneget auxilium. Censere itaque se scribendum esse ad Pontificem ostendam volontatem et naturam Florentini populi qui per se non posse tantam rem sustinere sed esse ita animatos sit cum alii simul aggregi omnia velint

Loisius Guicciardinis: necessitate aginmur inquit ad scribendum summo ponteficie ex renuntiatione legati nostri in eam fere sententiam quam coeteri.
Otho Nicolinus: commendavit Iacobum legatum de renuntiatione sua et responsio ad Summum Pontificem. Mercatoribus esse favendum nam de ea quoque re renuntiavit _omissis_ Iacobus. Rescribendum summo Pontifici ut _omissis_ qui ante dixerunt et si quo frequentiorem senatum agi res oportet ut quorum agatur et certi aliiquid responderatur.

Bartholomeus: laudavit et ipse legatum ob responsium ad Pontefice prudentia gravitateque plenissimum. In reliquis rebus idem quod coeteri censuit ut scribatur ad pontificem ut favent mercatoribus nam in eorum favore contineri non mediocrem rei per utilitatem et cense se ut intellectis his ad qua pertinet id prestetur id auxillii quod petierint.

Francis de Sachettis: mercatoribus omnem auxilium prestandum in re Turchi placere sibi sententiam D. Angeli de Acciarolis. Prius rem intelligendam eodem modo sententiis concordibus deinde id scribendum qui fit ratum postea futurum. Et frequentiorem senatum de eadem re censuit.

Joahnnes Canisianus: de mercatoribus dixit mercatanti laudibus extollens et utilem esse in civitatem affirmand et omnia censuit in eorum auxilium facienda que honest petent. deinde bellum protrahi Turchi cum Venetis utile videri et caute agendum nequid persentiscant. Respondendum censuit litteris ad Pontificem et frequentiorem senatum primo censuit.

Mariottus Benvenuti: de mercatoribus idem censuit cum ceteri que in suo ordine sedebant quod censuerunt qui an dixerat. Rem quoque Turchi putavit tractandam esse litteris.

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**Missive I Cancelleria 45**

72-73

Summo Pontifice Paulo II

Narravit nobis Roma reversis Sanctissime ac Beatissime Pater Jacobus Guicciardinis quem nos a Neapoli venire ad Sanctitate tua enim _omissis_ quantum moleste ferres qui Veneti auxilio defertur coeteros Christianitatem de pace cum immanissimo Turcho nomine Christiani hoste cogitare atque ad eandem ungarie regem amicahae ardentissimo spict insurgentem choortari ad eo ut iam refrigenerascere incipiat atque ipse quaque de pace cogitare. nos beatissime pater atque omnis Florentinus populus hanc Pontificalem molestiam non minore molestia accepimus. adeo ut nihil in presentis tanto opere desidereeet a nobis qui his esse viribus ut tanto oneri sufficere queas. ostenderemus enim et dilucidum faceremus nos coeteris omnibus circis hanc sanctissimam atque adeo necessarium anteposuisse sempre atque impresentia anteponere. sed tante rei minime suffocturos nos esse putamus. et si enim numquam nos animi deficiunt tamen veremur ut nunc res nostre sunt ne
suppetat facultas. quanquam pro excellentissimo quodam beneficio datum a summo et omnipotenti Deo putaremus si quid tale quod beatus tue curam an tollere ponitus aut levare saltem posset valeremus. id tamen polliceris audaciter possumus nos pro facultatibus nostris nullo in quam loco esse defuturos quin hi sumus veri apostolice sedis et devotissimi et obsequentissimi filii qui semper fuimus et qui esse cupimus presertim te Pontifice Maximo clementissimo et cuius in nos et civitatem nostram infinita pene exactare diminuissime humanitatis et benignitatis Pontifice non observa documenta. xviii octobris mccclxv.

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Missive I Cancelleria 45

76-77

Mercatoribus Florentinis Neapoli negotiantibus

Per nostra lettera habbiamo inteso degli ordini ac privilegi i nostri consueti costi nel provvedere davere il consule. il perché non volendo noi contra fare ad alcuno honore publico o alcuna utilita nostra vogliamo che come dite essere consuetudine nostra costi perseverare et eleggiate consule senza salario perché la ragione che dite del salario come dite ci pare pericolosa. et alla maestà del re scriviamo ringratianodo della clementia della sua maestà che di questo medesimo ne scrive et raccomandando noi et la natione alla maestà sua nella electione o diputazione farete del consule vi ricordiamo eleggier e tal persona che chi volesse calumniarvi meritatamente non possa havuti il rispetto allo honore principalmente della città e della natione et utilita et conservatione de mercantanti et cittadini et huomini Fiorentini che sotto suo governo haranno a esse. die xxv octobris mcccclxv.

1466

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Consulte e pratiche 58

80r-82r

Die iii Januarii 1465 (1466)

omissis.

Dietisalvi Neroni: et vicinarum nationum turbationes cum quibus mercatura exnereri non utilita potest itaque existimam sit vale augeret res domi et facere navigationi pp multa et moxa emolumenta qui his est. Et canalis omissis et securitatem portus nostri et dignitatem populi probavit.
Thomasus de Soderinis: et re navigatoria ad postremum berna sint et ea nullo pacto defenda est pp auctoritatem et utilitatem populi.

Loisius Guicciardinis: et navigationi facende est non si neglecta honorem attulis nostri rem publicam curata multo ad facere magis.

Francescus Beninus: de navigatione nostra dixit eam omnio ample ostendam esse pp utilitatem et nomen recuperandam.

150

Consulte e pratiche 58

83r-84r

Die IIII Januarii 1465 (1466)

Congregatis super rebus ommissis de duabus aut tribus navibus mittendis

Mannus Temperanus: navigatio autem quo secunbdio loco tractanda veniebat non in comode fortasse per consules mari ut consuevit ommissis ut ipsis totam hanc rem navigationem per trahant qui his ommissis et mercaturibus qui eius rei notitia habent.

Carolus Pandolfinus: rei navigatione ommissis et tractandam omnem hanc rem sui per consules sint per mercatores et recte.

Angelo Acciariolus: et differre tam qua mittati legatus na pro mercatoribus alisa persona causa requiris si alia de causa mitteret. Si enim pp nos ommissis qui apud Pontificem tractarent utilius videri non adesse legati ut sit nobis maris ommissis improvisi aut in rem Turchi aha qui occurent posset traherem itaque pro mercaturi tanti legationem censuit.

omissis.

Generally, everybody agreed on the res navigatoria. Times and modalities are, however, not known.

151

Missive I Cancelleria 45

130-131

Januensibus

Mirati sumus et nos magnifici domni fratres et amici nostri carissimi Bernardum Salvium non dedisse operam ut esset domni qui rem suam et causas ex illustrissimi ducis mandato cum Gabriele Recane procurare posset. Sue re causant affert ut
videtur nobis que admissi debeat. quoniam is cui rem mandarent precipiter necessaria quedam impedimenta proficiscii non potuerit. sed polliceretur nobis ita facturum non dubitamus brevi curaturum ut ad sit chii eius procuratore. et si antea id non siet saltem non deere quin navibus nostris mercatoriiis illuc profecturis legitimum procuratorem chium mittati. velimus ut gabrielem ipsum ad exoectandum cohortemini neque molesta sit hic tantula mora quoniam futurum est ut tandem omnis causa et iure et quiete componatur. die xiii Martii mcclxv (i).

Florentine calendar: die xiii Martii mcclxv.

152

Missive I Cancelleria 45

131

Mahoensibus Chii

Habbiamo la vostra lettera. ringratianovdi della humanita facta alle nostre galeaze benché non è nuova cosa la benivolentia vostra grandissima colla città nostra. Bernardo Salviati adimona per necessaria cagione che haveva mandato costi per la causa ha con Gabriello Rectane non essere potuto venire. ma che non presteza vi fare suo legittimo procuratore almeno colle nostre galeazze che questo anno debbono venire. paris iustiniano el quale modestissimamente nelle cose ragionevole et honeste ne raccomandate non dubitate che gli faria facta ragione et giustizia et nelle cose giuste ci sarà raccomandatissimo. ex Florentia die xiii Martii mcclx (sesto).

Florentine calendar: die xiii Martii mcclx quinto

153

Signori, Risposte verbali di oratori 2

14 rv
die xxvi Martii mcclxvi

Aepiscopus Legionensis legatus summi Pontificis de more ad auditorii ostium exceptis esse a magistratu ex ductus in sedilia cum omnes consedissent. dixit Summm Pontificem commotum fuisse et dolore affectum pp obitum francisci sfortie ducis Mediolani illustissimi. qui tamen et si ecclesiam ali quando vexaverit tamen tot tantasque fuisse eius virtutes tot facta egregia ut merito facturam fecisse nos maximam existimandum fuit. fuisse Summm Pontifice bene affectum eius virtutibus et mirifice eum dilexisse. habereque in animo certum eandem que dilectione filios et heredes prosequi. atque ob eam causam mitti se oratorem Mediolanum habereque in mandatis ut inter transeundum inter summi pontefici Florentinis domnis aperiat eam esse ut Italia pax et societas retineat. pertinere id ad
Summum Pontificem tum qui pater et custos est totius Christiani gregio tum que princeps est societatis Italicorum potenti et quid multo maioris existimandum esse maximus in vigilare oportet ne aliqque discordie Italic animos faciant immanissimis teucris et quid anetae ob concordiam Italic attentare non sint ausi orta discordia invadant. Sacre Summum pontefici Florentinum populum pacis esse studiosissimum. tam pro officio pastori et parris shortari et monere ut nihil pretermittant quid ad eam conservandam facere videatur omnia factura esse Summum Pontificem sponte sua propter eam causam. tamen cupere eum si quid preterea Florentini intelligent quod habeat in se utilitatem et conservationem pacis considenter admoneant nullo consilia negligentur nihil preteri iter ut pax tranquillitaque Italia conservet in ea preserverat societate Italicorum populos que divi nicolai quinti Pontificato imita est et ad hoc usque tempus summa cum utilitate et salute Christiani nominis conservata.

Respondit Bartholomeus lentius vexillifer iustitie nihil intelligere potuisse populum Florentinum gratius qui eam rotum mentem pontificio maximi ut nulla insecat inimicia Mediolansibus principibus quam ad Italici pacem retinendam nihil videatur esse accommodatius. procurasse populum Florentinum pro sua vie ut id fieret preterea siquid opus erit prompissime omnia esse facturos orare Summum Pontifex pro sua sapientia et probitate ut sanctissimo pacis proposito perseveret. nihil facere tum possesse quod aut parere posset maiorem utilitatem Christiani nominis aut quo possit summus pontifex maioram sibi gloriam comparare.

154

Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 45

141

Calzarando de Requesens capitano classis regis Ferdinandi

Da Livorno habbiamo una humanissima lettera vostra et benche non cie nuovo lamente della maestà del re inverso di noi nitededimo habiamo molto caro et accetto le promesse vostre. et havendo alcuno bisogno di voi o delle galee vostre arditamente ne richiederemo et viseremo la benignita della majestà del vostro re et padre nostro. le cose nostre siamo certi riguarderete et honorerete per humanita vostra perché riguardando et honorando quelle riguarderete et honorate le cose proprie della majestà del re. se possiamo fare cosa che sia grata a voi volenterio lo faremo se naremo notitia. die ultimo martii mcccclxvi.

155

Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 45

142

Capitaneo classis regis Neapolis ad Ianuas
A questi di havemo vostre humanissime lettere di Porto Pisano et a quello respondemo. crediamo larete havute. et perché intendiate noi fare conto delle nostre proferte cominceremo a richiedervi con quella sicurtà ci date per la vostra lettera. a questi di sono stati presi uomini nostri presso al porto baratto da uno corsale genovese prendibene da levanto et facto ricattare come nimici. il che molto cie doluto et crediamo ancora a noi perlamicittà habbiamo colla maestà del re ancora a despiacere perché chi offende noi et gli uomini nostri perla streetissima amicitia nostra offende ancora voi. saravvi agevole col grande senno vostro et riputatione dimostrare a costui il suo errore et quanto noi siamo cari figiluoli della maestà del nostro re padre vestro. quando con vostra comodità lo potrete fare haremo caro intendere qualche cosa. et se noi possiamo fare cosa vi piaccia lo faremo volentieri die ut supra (primo) Aprilis mcccclxvi.

156

Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 45

142-143

Domino Plumbini

Habbiamo notitia che una fusta di male affare conducta da uno prendibene da levanto huomo Genovese è capitata costi et ha preso nostri uomini et factogli riscattare che molto cie dispiaciuto et crediamo ancora a voi dovrà dispiacere quando lontenderete. però venediamo notitia e confortiamovi a fare quello per noi et honore nostro et utile degli huomini subditi nostri che richiede lantica et buona amicitia nostra. non vi manca prudentia ne buona vo lontà inverso di nuoi. la quale siamo certi che havete come habbiamo noi et havemo sempre inverso la vs. die vero Aprilis (1 Aprilii 1466).

157

Signori, Missive I Cancelleria 45

146

Ianuensibus

Rem per molestam nobis intelleximus magnifici domini fratres et amici nostri carissimi et que non minus gravis esse debeat nobis propter amicitiam et coniunctionem nostram cantalusium hominem januensem apud amatunta navem quandam mercimoniiis onustam Florentinorum mercatorum nullo iure neque ulla quidem iustitie omissis intercepisse. itaque magno affecti detrimento nostri mercatores magistratum nostrum circumstissant opear atque auxilium implorant ut non permittamus sine aliqua causa prede esse vestris hominibus quibus cum non pax solum est sed eadem eo coniunctissima amicitia iit addi nihil possit. velimus igitur ut aliquid remedii circumpiciatis. nos de prudentia vestra et de potestate tamen nobis
Legazioni e Commissarie 15

55-62
die xxxi Mai 1466

Matteus Palmerius a consilio centum legatus creatus est ad Summum Pontificem pro uno mese prorogando per domino et collegia quotiens utile iudicabitur cum octo equis et uno cancellario cum mandatis et litteris credentie per dominos ipsos et collegia deliberandis et cum salario consueto.

mandata Mathei de Palmeriiis oratio ad Summum Pontifices deliberata die vi Junii mcccclxvi per dominos et collegia

omissis

preterea quod non te fugit ob habita cum Turcis commercia multi mercatores cives nostri eucharistie communione prohibiti fuerunt. exortus enim rumor quidam ea inhibita fuisse per dies omnibus sancte sacerdotes et pastores deterruit ut omnes qui aliquo modo orientali navigationi ob mercaturas facerit prohiberent. ceterum que ea inhibitio fuerit aut quando quat quomodo fuerit inhibitum numquam notu fuit neque nobis neque quisque ex his qui mercaturam Orientis exerciti erint. itaque supplicabissimommo Pontifici clementissimo indulgentissimo ut mercatoribus nostris siquid imprudenter est erratum condonet commercionemque restituat preservam si nihil unquam quod antiquis canonibus ventitum sit importatus constet. lucrui tantum et negotiationum gratia exercita mercatura quoniam ea maxime alatur Florentina civitas et plebes egestasque opificium sustentetur. si autem videbitur aut impetrandi occasio aliqua prestabitur tibi dabis operam ut inficitmeum quo negotiari liceat. sed quoniam de responsio Pontificis subveremunt ne petenti tibi deneget et atque et videas oportet ut misi spe certa impetrandi nihil aggrediare. quod a tibi facile erit pro prudentia tua et tempus et sermones interea aliqua affermit que etsi vir sapiens non pretermissit tamen quomodo fieri possint que occasio est facilius re ipsa percipiuntur quin aliquibus mandatis tradit possint.

Legazioni e Commissarie 15

67-68

(This is related to the above mission carried by Palmieri in Rome)
Postremas litteras tuas accepimus datas Rome vii quintilio die ex his cognoscimus Christiane communionis mandatam fuisse, quod ad mercatorum attinet causa quam vehementer est cordi nobis velimus ut quantum potes omni studio et diligentia tua acceleres ut ex licet aliquid. in sapientia et iustitia Pontificis magna spes est presenti cum palam profiteat ex iure se cum mercatoribus velle agere delegaveruitque causam quatuor ex sapientissimis et iustissimis cardinalibus et rei publice nostre ob eorum insignem humanitatem optime affertis. sedulo itaque cum his ages ut de iure renuntiet Pontifici super delegata mercatorum nostrorum causa. seorsum et reverendissimo patri nostro cardinali Sancti angeli et atque et causam istas commendabis. is enim non solum quia urbi nostre semper facit ut mirifica in populum nostrum extent eius beneficia sed qua eccellensis est probutatis et amicis peritissimus vehemti favere nobis opem implorantibus suam debebit.

160

Responsive Copiari I

145rv

Federico Ferdinandi secundogenito Neapoli

omissis Impii magni teuci res quas in Albaniam egerit agitque ad presens eiusque et maritimos et terrestres apparatus dicere non curamus cum eas paternam maiestas D.V. significasse et in dies significare que a nobis aut aliis sibi scribiunt certo sciamus. dicimus tamen illos esse formidabiles atque Christiane religione et toti Italie periculum non parum minantes qui nisi aqstu providentum illisque obivetur res Christianas haud tutas iademus. valeat D.V. datum in arce civitatis Raenti die 2 mensis Julii 1466.

161

Signori Missive I Cancelleria 45

197

regi Ferdinando

Continuo gloriossisime rex pater urbis nostres accumulas benefitia tua quesint iam pene innumerabilia in populum et civitatem nostram. mercatores enim nostri qui negotiantur in tuo amplissimo regno continuo scribunt nobis ita tractari abs te ut ne humanius neque amicabilius in patria sua versari posse confirment. nihil peti atque quin concedatur. liberimam omnino atque utilem satis mercaturam esse. non conservari solum antiqua privilegia nostre nationis a divus regibus progenitoribus tui benignissime concessa. sed in dies magis ac magis ornatiora fieri. nihil habemus quo satis pro meritis tuis referre tibi gratiam possuimus. facimus tamen et omnis populus
ardentissime id approbat quod possimus omissis colimus scilicet et observamus te regem gloriosissimum ac beneficentissimum patrem urbis et populi nostri totis animo complestemur omissis die xx Augusti mcccclxvi.

162

Legazioni e Commissarie 15

76-82

Pro legatus ad Pontefice et regem Ferdinandus

Nota et informatione a voi spectabili cittadini nostri messer Antonio di messere Loreno Ridolfi et Giovanni d Antonio Canigiani et deliberata adi XXX di septembrem mccccxvi.

omissis

il perchè non abbiamo dubitato come per lettera scrivemo et per sua lettera fu confirmato la sua clementissima beatitudine havere havuto molestia de nostri pericoli. i quali siamo certi la fama et le lettere gi aranno portati grandi come certamente sono stati. Peroche per malignita et perversita dalquantit cittadini nostri ambitiosi et crudeli la nostra libertà è sita presso alla sua ruina et distenderete qui nel narrare alcuna delle particularita più necessaria. dicendo che è già molto che comincio fra noi queste discordie che hora hanno facto questo movimento. essi havendosi messo nellanimo volere più liberamente imperare et empire le sue meno che honeste et civili voglie hanno continuamento atteso con ogni industria seminare zizianie fra e viri principali cittadini buoni et giusti uomini fautori della giustizia et dogni bene et optimamente meriti della nostra republica. et havevamo tanto potuto con loro diaboliche astutie che havano condottola città nostra negli affanni diche la sua beatitudine et tutta Italia ha notitia. et che dio per la sua sommabonta et nostra non per merito alcuno nostro se non forse in qualche parte per la nostra fede perpetua et constantissima et continua et fervente devotione in verso la sua sacrosancta chiesa et pontificale omissis è sita grata nel divino conspecto con piccolissimo standolo et somma compassione in verso e capi dello errare perché a molti altri complici et coadherenti al tutto è stato perdonato et spenda al tutto ogni discordia a summa pace et tranquillita ridotta la città el populo nostro et levate via el mal sono che conduceva el campo della città nostra a sterilita omissis per la qualcosa noi siamo molto allegri del successo nostro si perché la nostra libertà molto ce piú cara che alcuna altra et che la cita nostra a si perché nella conservatione dessa si vedono rimediati et omissis una esopradecti gravissimi et abominevoli pericoli. fra quelli e questo che ancora tucta la fede Christiana nondebilita et davasi ardire et forza allo immanissimo Turcho et universale hoste della fede di Christo e della chiesa di pietro il qua essendo tanto feroce et tanto insultando per le victorie havute et ricordandolo secondo si stima solo lamita et pace d Italia havendo quella havuto alteratione sintende facilmente quello che seguirà che noi di tanti benefici ne rendiamo infinitissimamente grate adio et alla optima volunta di sua beatitudine et sanctissime opere sue per la conservatione dessa pace universale. la quale senza dubio ha dato grandissimo favore a questi nostri pericoli i quali havendo avuto altro
fine manifestamente harebbono impedito la laudatissima et necessaria impresa sua in
defensione della fede sancta della quale parlo comesso noi el reverendissimo padre
cardinale di Sancto Angelo. alla quale ancora trovando ne di de nostri tumulti in
questa città perché colla auctorìt et desso Pontefice et della sua virtú ne porse
grande aiuto molto ci sentiamo obbligati omissa

Et perché la città nostra piglia più grande utilita et ha necessita del navigare in
Levante et ha dimonstrato sua beatitudine qualche volta noi gli essere grata riferite in
questo come in ogni altra cosa landustria et prudentia nostra et se insulfacto
giudicherete che supplicando della lice
ntia a sua santitià senedovesse havere gratia
ne supplicherete quando altrimenti giudichassi et dubitassi che esso non lo denegassi

ci pare molto piú utile non tentare di tale materia cosa alcuna.

163

Legazioni e Comissarie 15

100-102

Domino Antonio Ridolfo et Johanni Canisiano oratoris ponteficialibus

omissis facto mentione dalla sanctita del sommo Pontefice della rinnovatione della
lega Italica spetialmanete perché la sua Santità già molto tempo et in piú a diversi
modi se ingegnata a rinnovarla omissis per tanto larghissimi offerte alla sua Santità
che saremo promptissimi aogni pensiero che farà la sua beatitudine per la
conservatione della pace omissis ricordandone in questa parte della impresa contra
limmanissimo Turco alla quale molto è necessaria lunita d Italia et come capo e
principe et conservatore et autore della lega sidegni procurare alleffecto sopradetto
come sempre ha fatto omissis.

164

Signori, Risposte verbali di oratori 2

17rv

die xv Octobris mcccclxvi

Orfeus Ricavis a ducibus Mediolani missis inter cetera materia data admonuit
magistratum advenisse tempus commodissimum Italico federi renovando
existimasse antem legatos nostros tam ad Summum Pontificem que ad Venetos
nondum cum venisset ex urbe fuisse profectos eaque de causa multum acceleravisse
iter videri enim dixit maxime essere ex utilitate utriusque status ut ad cetera mandata
eorum hoc quoque adderet ut aperte tandem Venetorum animi patescerent qui multis
ex causis suscepsissimì esse debent. et in primis propter novos exiles qui apud eos
convenerunt quod si fedus denegarent aut perplexitare et tergiversatìone consueta
uterentur nos rebus nostris circumspeceremus sanciremus que aliiu foedus et cum
Ferdinando rege Neapolitano et cum ducibus ipsis Mediolanensibus citaremusque
Summum Pontificem qui tum pp ea que vulgo disseminavit de proposito consilioque suo tum propter pontificale mimus pari favere turbatoribus autem eius adversus esse debet ut ipse princeps et caput foederis esse vellet. periculum enim esse ita terversantibus Venetis et se ad bellum occulte preparantibus nos interea otiosi simus expectemus que donec ipsi in apertam pugnam eruptam et mermes et mertis ut certa difficilimum bellum sit futuros magno cum discrimine communum fortunarum e bello eversivos.

Responsium est placere id consilium ceterum necessariam esse ex consuetudine civitatis senatus consultationem.

165

Consulte e pratiche 59

1r

Die xviii Octobris mccccclvi

Retulerunt ut scriberetur ad Paulum II in hunc modum habita prius super hac re consultatione (Carolus Pandolfinus, Angelus Acciariolus, Ioannoctius Pictis)

Inteso quanto Jacopo Guicciardini ha riferito per parte della Santità di n. s. con mostrare che la beatitudine sua porti gravissimamente quello che egli intende del pensiero de Viñitiani di fare pace col Turcho. la quale la Santità sua con ogni opera et forza è disposta reprimere per lo honore et conservazione della fede di Christo et della sedia apostolica. allegando che i Viñitiani sono mossi al cercare questa pace cognosendo essere soli in questa guerra. hora il raporto della pratica di nostri cittadini et considerando quanto questa tale deliberazion de venitiani sarebbe contro alla opinione della nostra città et etiam quanto porterebbe allo honore della nostra re publica quando noi mostrassimo per la nostra risposta non non stimare questo caso et essere negligenti et nelle risposte et nelle opere. vogliamo che scriva alla sua Santità alla nostra città non meno che alla sua Santità essere grave ogni affanno che noi intendiamo essere in quella et degli antri grandissimamente non sentir le forze nostre pegli affanni successi come è noto alla sua beatitudine tali quali noi vorremo. Perché dimostreremo et alla Santità sua et a tutti e Christiani anteporre questo caso adogni altra nostra cura et riputeremoci dadio havere singolarissima gratia essere quelli che lo potessimo fare. et benché noi non cognosciamo quali sieno leconditioni vestre nientedimeno noi vogliamo che la beatitudine sua sia certa che noi siamo quegli veri figlioli della sedia apostolica et della Santità sua che sempre siamo stati e così vogliamo che la sua Santità riputa et sia certa che noi saremo in futuro.
Ferdinando regi Neapolitano et ducibus Mediolanensibus mutatis mutandis

Nihil unquam longius fuit nobis rex gloriosissime pater nostre urbis quam videre hunc opratissimum diem quo novos isto foedere quod Rome oratores tui nostrisque et illustriissimum principum Mediolanensis inierunt quo vel stabilita est Italie pax quod nos magnopere expectimus vel certe id effectum ut summo eam periculo eius qui adversare dicta omisissi immoriant res veniant. sunt enim iam eo loco communes fortune ut videtur nobis ut nisi quis gratus volet esse esse temerarius contra quetudinem tranquillitatemque Italie qua fuimus multos iam annos asuram existimamus neminem. approbavit foedus noster populos summo studio summaque concordia ut publicis scriptis nostris que erunt cum his litteris poteris cognoscere esse. rogam omnipotentem Deum qui ac pacis ac bonis omnium causa atque auctor est ut sit hec societas atque hec sanctissima foederis coniunctio et diuturna et perpetua vale die xxii Januarii mcccclxvii.

Florentine calendar: xxii Januarii mccccclxvi.

Nominatis in foedere

Foedus quod Rome nostri oratores cum rege Neapolitano et Mediolani ducibus inierunt pacis conservande gratia ac communes status et fortunas confirmandi inter coeteris conductiones hanc qui haberi in primis ut amici et soci nominationibus omisissi qui percussimus foedus si ut amici ipsis ac sociis nostris videatur veniant in societatem. itaque nos vetustam benivolentiam nostram semperque inviolatam animis nostris recensentes inter amicos et socios Florentini nominis in primis palam habuimus interservimusque publicis scriptus ut fieri oportuit ex foederis conductionibus existimamus autem rem nobis gratam fecisse ut nos certe ex amicitia et benivolentia vestra maximum fructum incaditatis accipimus. si id placuit ut placere existimamus nobis velimus itaque primum ita placuisse ad nos rescribatis. est enim in conditionibus terminus prescriptus misis unius posteaque has nostras litteras acceperitis. quo respondere debeatis.

die xxx Januarii mcccclxvii.
Florentine calendar: die xxx Januarii mcclxvi.

165

Responsive Copiari I

167v-168r

Ab Venetis

Christophorus Mauro Dei gratia dux Venetiarum etc. magnificus et excellentis dominis prioribus libertatis et vexillifer iustitie populi Florentini fratribus et amicis nostris carissimi. salute et sincere dilectionis affectum. acceperimus litteras vestras datas duodecimo instantis super negotio navium Anconitanorum ex Constantinopoli in Italian navigantium que ad prefecto navium nostrarum armatarum et intercepte sint. et quecumque dicitis et memoratis de mutua antiquaque benivolentia nostra nera sint. Numque enim fuit quin nos et cives omnes vestros singulari prosecuti simus benivolentia. quantum ad naves Anconitanorum a verum in eis caricatam pertinet perspicuum est nos cum immannisimo Turco quadriemnio iam exacto bellum gravissimum et periculosissimum gessisse et gerere. quod ut impensis laboribis coeterisque malis inomedmis que belli materia fecim afferrer solei meminisse dici potest ita comuni periculo et comodis sique ex bello ipso ob nostras propugnationem suscipiunt commune omnium Christiani et dici potest et est. facti autem certiores cum navibus Anconitani et alibus etiam spreto Dei timore omni posthabita pietate et religione arma plures et omnifariam generis munitiones quibus hostes cavent ad eos deferri cum Anconitanis sceleris huismodi et literris et secretaris nostris plerimque expostulanimus petimus que abstinerent mittere instrictum naves eorum ne tante culpe ne tantiquer mali auctores apud Deum et homines haberentur et apud nos potissimum in quorum stragem et perniciem arma et munitiones connertebant. non negaverunt Anconitani rem hanc abominabilem et detestabilem esse et illis auctores acerrima dignos animadversione politique sint naves eorum in strictum amplius non missuros. Quod si qui inobedientes et contumaces eorum cives invita comunitate contrafere auerent nos quorum intenerat et qui poteram provdevemus ob quam rem non cessantibus navibus ipsique a navigatione consueta et sceleralis comertiis coacti fuimus ingenti impensa armare quatuor naves quorum prefecto comimus ut anconitanorum naves instrictum navigantes et vemeantes retinere. quod commune prefectum ipsum fecisse nobis esse nuntiatum iussimus naves ipsas simul cum hominius et rebus in illis existentibus huc conduci. ubi cum faciunt melius res intelligentur. datum in nostro ducali palatio die XXIII mensis Septembris prima 1467

166

Missive I Cancelleria 45

343-344

Venetis
Ex responso vestro sumus in sententia nostra confirmati qua semper fuimus etiam
cum ad vos super ea re dedimus litteras antiqua benivolentia et convictione nostra
dignas hanc scilicet navium Anconitarum interceptionem minime propter
Florentinos cives et mercatores excitisse quos semper amice tractavistis ut vos
amicissime scribies. fuit et nobis et mercatoribus et civibus nostris huiusmodi
omissis vestrum admodum gratum et antique benivolentie coniuncti omnie que
nostre memoria tetigit animos letitiaque affecit duas in Italia tales respublica cetera
marique vicinas his esse inter se animis oportet quale vos esse in cives et mercatores
nostros asseveratis. maximo detrimento est mercatoribus nostris pecunia et
mercimonia Florentinorum trahei istec et minime liberum esse sibi uti rebus fuis pro
opportunitatibus et utilitatis mercatoris tane siquid est ea res vobis allacura
comodi ferent equioure animo et nos feremus. sed cum exunt adducte captive naves
eri vestrae iusticie atque humanitatis et cives et civium nostros res libera facere et
auferre monem occasionem omnibus vos non alio esse animo in nos qui esse debeatis
pro vetere nostra benivolentia aut velle scribatis a persuasium esse omnibus velitis.
valete ex palatio nostro die xxviii Septembris mcccclxvii

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Signori, Risposte verbali di oratori 2

20rv
die xiii Decembris mcccclxvii

Bartholomeu Recanatus legatus Ferdinandi regis Neapolitani principio sue orationis
 amore et caritatem regiam in hac urbem et populum aplissimis verbis significavit.
deind missum esse hortatorem ut quando tot tantisque subterfugii pacem adversarii
dediment ea preparamenta sint belli ut vel mutent hostes animos et consecendum
pacem vel certe cum victoria geratur bellum ea autem non videri difficilia si enim
paululum quis addatur virum ad preteritos conatus facile fore ut quibus improvisi
restitumus preparati magis superemus et censere regem multum facere vel ad
victoriam vel ad pacem si marione apparet bellum omisit autem in animo parare
classem navium longaram omisit ita ad suadere Florentinis sociis armare in
presentia classes quodfortasse sit difficilior per dare operam ut fabricio aliquarum
navium auctoritatem afferre rebus federis et terrorem hostibus quem possint
vehementer augere ianuenses qui ob copiam navium fabricaturum spetiem subito
facere possint maritimi belli que preparanta conferre potuerit ad maturandam pacem
omisit sit nihilominus adversarii obstinatos afferrent animos cetera faciliorem
victoriam efficient necesse est. admonuiss preterea terra que instruendum esse bellum
et duces et militis in fide reinendos que mulc plurita ac meliores sit nobis que
advarsarii si singulos virtute expenderim omisit Se preterea mandata huisset ad
Summm Pontificem quibus pro suscepto labore ob pacem agere gratias et quantam
plus valere ambitio adversarios signifficaret regem habere in aio existimare se idem
sentire socios quelle tales futuros belli apparatus in quod ante hac facile sue paret
componere difficilior redda si expectet donec in aperte bellum descendat. preterea
hortatum fuisse senenses ut mirent societatem que pp pacem facta dicta ab hic nullium certum responsium retulisse.
Bertholdus Corsinus vexillifer cum gratias regi egisset qui non solum sapienti per adeo amice non communem procurare responsione difficili donec ad signori et collegis dixisset senatum retullisset ex eorum auctoritate respondesse.

1468
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Missive I Cancelleria 45

episcopo quinque ecclesiarchum

Qui audivimus legatos Venetorum acusare urbem nostram et incessere nos maledictis apud gloriosissimum istuum regem vestrum scribimus ad etiam maiestatem litteras quibus nos pro viribus purgamus et ostendimus omnia falsa esse que a Venetis obicrentur nobis quemadmodum litteria ipsis nostris videre poteris. scimus autem apud eum ipsum regem valere te plurimum auctoritate et prudentia tua amare autem nos et civitatem nostram et habere odio iniquietatem et superbiae propriam summam virtutem et probitatem tuam. itaque etsi certo scimus non fuisse opus his litteris nostris ad te ut cause nostre faveres tamen nolimus deesse officio nostro. rogamus igitur te in primis ut causam iustam et piem tuleris apud regem testimoniumque reddas animis nostris religiose et piis affirmes quequod et verissimum est nos et omnem civitatem Florentinam observare eius maiestatem et habuisse semper maiestatem regum Hungarorum summo in honore. in presentia autem tantum affectos esse eius clementissime maiestati ut pro beneficentissimo patre et benefactore nostro perpetuo colamus. tibi quoque et virtutibus tuis affecti adeo sumus ut offerri nobis aliquam occasionem cupiamus qua animum tibi et voluntatem nostram ostendere possimus. vale ex palatio nostro die XIIII Januarii mcccclxvii.
Florentine calendar: die XIIII Januarii mcccclxvii.

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Missive I Cancelleria 45

371-372

_The Florentine Signoria sends a letter to the Venetians and thanks their decision to return the wares previously stolen from the Florentines omissis._

die xiii Februarii mcccclxviii.

Florentine calendar: die xiii Februarii mcccclxvii.
Dilecti fili salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. plane perspect devotio vestra quanto pere ex initio Pontificatus nostri omni studio ac diligentia conati sumus ne pax Italia turbaret pertubata non molestiam ingentem ait cepreminis. itaque longe maiori conatu qescrivimus ut pax ipsa reingraretur atque fermaret. pastorale enim officium meum sic monuit et necessitas communis salutis Christianorum et conservande cum presertii palam fit rabidissimum illum cane immanissimum duce Turcorum qui nihil magis ardere videt qui excidium Christiane rei per biennio proximo bis albaniam cum validissimo exercitu personaliter petisse regionem Italie propinquam ac pene in conspectum appositan. proiectantes igitur apertum periculum quod Italie immisere videbat si potentatus Italie discordes forent. cogitantes et composita pace servissimam illum bestiam reprimendam oportuna remedia adhiberi posse ac non immemores quantum ad nos pertineat eam cumsuscipiper pacem hanc in qua maxime consultum credimus statui per uniuscuiusque potentatus Italie ut bene quietus et servare esse possit aduitore Deo confideamus et solemniter publicavimus quemadmodum et legere et nosse vestra devotio poterit. quamobrem cum videatus quanti res ipsa fit cumque et bonitate polleatis hortamur devotiones vestris et per viscera misericordie Dei nostri rogamus atque vobis ut catholicis virus iniungimus ut eam pacem quietas excellens et commune bonum allatura est ratam gramin acceptasque feratis et apletani sicii certi confidamus vos esse factivos. et enim si secus quod absit fieri contingat veremini ne omnipotens deus irascurat et renitentes vindicta horribili et formida afficere velit multaque abominanda mala subsequenti et in universale detrimentum Christianorum. quod summopere precavendum et evitandum est. pace autem ut speramus permanus non solum Italia libertatum ab hoc pestilentissimo periculo verum etiam exinde comparari poterii validissima expeditio in retundendum ac prorsis delendum hunc truculentum inimicum ad gloriam magni Dei et amplitudinem Christiani nominis. que res cecumque catholicos hominibus proviribus expectanda est et consuenda ut pro vestra prudentia illegitis. datum Rome apud Sanctum maarcum die II Februarii 1468 Pontificato nostro anno 4.
mentem rapine, incendia, disreptiones, supra sacrilegia omne nefas que bellum consequuntur penitet cunctarum discordias et detestamur humanos errores et si nos ut tu pro tua summa sapientia noviste semper fuimus pacis cupidi ac ne minimam quidem aliquam causam dedimus aliqui turbande miscendeque Italie que iam tota bellorum incendio conflagratura fuit nisi tu divino auxilio fretus furori armori occurrisses ex restituitis mediorem mentem Italicis populace. ergo per te paule summe pontifex conservata Italia est que procul dubio dico quodam fato suo intestinis armis et quasi furiis quibusdam se ipsam domesticis viribus superatura fuit sunt profecto per omnem vitam tuam multa facta a te que ut pene divina sunt ita in admiratione sunt omnium humanorum. sed hoc quod postremo fecisti qui servasti Italiam a calamitate bellorum et miserie servitutis tale est ut inter omnia bene facta tua clarius elueat. nunc reliquum rest quieta Italia et rediens concordia nam antea omnis huismodi conatus fustrus erat publicum et communem causam Christianam procures ut continuo procurare te audimus ut intelligat immantissimus hostis Turchum multum interesse cum pacata an cum perturbata Italia res si futura sit. favebis deus virtutem et deus noster ceeptis tuis et victoriam in manu tua dona te deus et principe et auctoritas Christiano nomine redas tandem in coelum unde missus fui est ad sanandas plagas nostras beatissumus et omnium ommissis felicissimus. nos et populum omnem nostrium beatissimi tue plurimum commendamus. vale die xxviii Aprilis 1468.

Responsive Copiari I

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ab Summo Pontefice Paulo Secundo

Dilecti filii salute etc. erat quidem omnis hec Italia ut ad nos scribitis se ipsam intestinis odiis et armoris furiis brevi superatura et que semper virtute ac robore prestare ceteris nationibus consuevit in miserabilem conditionem collapsura. Previdebamus autem hec omnia et vehementer angebamur cum presertum omne potentatus Italie utrinque acies complectissent ex nihil magis pro hoc dolor appetere qui excidium fuit viderentur. praeterea inpiissimus rex Turchorum qui Christiani nominis potentissimus hostis est in die validiorum exercitum comparat et ad occupandam Italiam sestinat exstingent exstinget oportuna habere viam explendis consiliis suis scelentissimis. Itaque ad omni potentia Deum nostrum prem misericordias et Deum totus consolationis cives iures licet improbito in terris gerimus confugiebamus esse duximus. ac deum summa ope laboravimus ut etiam omnes pene insonnes noctes peregerimus ad frangendas Italitas nostras et animos in mutua gratiam conciliando tedebat enimamimam nostram tantorum an oculos malorum. miserabimus certe Florentissime urbi vestre que huic sancto solio devotissima esse sole. ubi adolescentiam stans consolatione ex benivolentia omnium bonorum civium egimus de deum cardinalatus honorem suscepsimus cui proferto et nos non minus in omni cursu etatis nostre qui si nobis secundum qui carenem patria sit accettissimi semper fuimus que quo pare non armis gaudeat ommissis in eam labem et bellorum rabiem
tracta esset non sine periculo impedentis cladis sue. gratias igitur domino Deo nostro agimus qui et nobis affinit et illumina vit horum omnium corda ad reireciendas tribulationes et ad commune consolatione suscipiendam vos non plurimum in domino collandamus et benedicitus qui et diligenter hanc pacem omnia studio querere unde bami ni et eam ipsa quam letis animis ac omni genere exulsionis amplexi estis eo maxime quia ut speramus et confidimus erga misericordissimum ipsum Deum nostrum tante eius in vos largitionis non ingrat saevis. ceterum placet ea excitatio quam in calce litterarum nobis contra immanissimum Turchorum ducem facere indemini proficisci enim illum scimus ex optimis vestris ad eam rem animis quippe qui semper ad euiusmodi Sanctum opus obeundum ut boni catholici opem ferre pro viribus paratissimi iusti estis. sed ut de nobis loquamur ex citatione aut cohor tatione nequa qui indigemus quandoquidem ab initio Pontificatus nostri nihil magis ardemus qui et gregem comissum et rem publica Christiana a crudelissima illa bestia liberare nec solum hostem illum perditissimum reprimere nec etiam profugare ha ctenus enim ducenta milia florenorum in huiusmodi Christianorum subsidia erogavimus quorum centum et decem milia carissimo in Christo filius noster rex Hungarie illustris accepit. reliquis plerique ali qui a Turchis opprim tis rem publica Christiana a crudelissima illa bestia liberare nec solum hostem illum perditissimum reprimere nec etiam profugare ha ctenus enim ducenta milia florenorum in huiusmodi Christianorum subsidia erogavimus quorum centum et decem milia carissimo in Christo filius noster rex Hungarie illustris accepit. reliquis plerique ali qui a Turchis opprimerentur. non calcaribius igitur equis nostum profugare ha ctenus enim ducenta milia florenorum in huiusmodi Christianorum subsidia erogavimus quorum centum et decem milia carissimo in Christo filius noster rex Hungarie illustris accepit. reliquis plerique ali qui a Turchis opprimerentur. non calcaribius igitur equis noster omi ssis cur reret egebat neque in posterum egebit dum vos et ceteri potentatus Italie contribuatis quod facturos nonne dubitam. non enim eam tantam molem humeris nostris sufficiens substiner. quo quidem parum est evidens que ingratitudinis testimonium pace hanc recepsse pacem inter nos habere ac feroxissimum ipsum Christiano nominis inimicus non radicitus exstinguere ad gloria omnipotentis Dei et propagationem sanctae fidei. datum Rome apud Sanctum marcum sub anulo piscatoris die xvi Mai 1468.

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Consulte e pratiche 60

25rv

Die xviii Maii mcccclxviii

Super navigationibis

Mannus equitem: egressis tempestas bellorum et defatigatis civibus porrigendam opem et subsidia pacis submnistranda navigationes et in primis si quid mutari oportet dada operam ut inviter presertim dicti navigatione occidentali idem censuit de actis navigationibus

Carolous Pandulfinus eques: laudavit navigationem tamque et utile et honestam censuit et experi omis sas a omis sas tempo exprobavit. itaque censuit reasimendam navigationem et siquid propterea providendi sit id statuendum. adomnuit tamen ita navigandum ut exeo non possit niu modi alique ad rem publicam pervenire. si tempora navigatione servent id periculis posse omis sas vitari omis sas.

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Consulte e pratiche 60

26v-27r

Super navigando die 16 Iulii 1468

Mannus equitem: mirari rem tam valem tum neglii ut sepius in consilium est nihil unquam deliberare qua pp censuit eam rem diligenter providendam ut aliqua tandem via ad navigandum aperiat. id comodi fieri posse si mercatores qui eram artimu collet habeant consulori et ex eorum sententia stabat

Iohannotius Pictus eques: varia habent in se rationes huismodi consultationem et in utramque partiter disputavit. concludens mercatori disfactionem et celeritatem eiusdam sententie dixit esse (idem Carlo Pandolfini Johanne Canisiani Antonio Ridolfini)

Golinus Marcellus: comoditatem ostendi duorum navium qui pisis sint quibus navigare in presentia potest sint omni expensa dum valitatem ostend et conclusit prima sententia cum his qui in suo ordine adebant

Leonardo Manellus: misi tardi sumus laudavit navigationem Constantinopolitanam. atque eum celeriter apparandam et pp futuros annorum navigationem intelligendi quo mo magis utilitate navigari possit

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Consulte e pratiche 60

27r-28r

die 18 (1468)

Super navigando

Mannius Temperanus eques: Constantinopolitanam navigationem ita correpta est ac per eosdem et tamque acclarandam et omisiss usque nullam causam obstacolari dicta navigari possit. interra dum illic perventum sit relinqui spatium ad cogitandis sit ne tuta navigatio ulterior. et per tempore id deliberandum de secunda navigatione Constantinopolitanam considerandum quod utili sit rei publice.

Aloisio Guicciardini: in presentia Constantinopolitanam censuit. et eam delibeationem acclarandam atque per prefactis navigationibus urgendis qui id duxarunt ut preparent navigationem. atque in Constantinopolim verendum aliquid non omisiss a quo sunt fides publice sed a Venetis siquid in ea potest se exoffendere at ab eis in pace nihil timendi videri. quantum ad occidentalem navigationem et si non vidias consultati presentis temporis tamen venire in omisiss eam quidem fuisse multos omisiss
Bernardo Bonieremimus iureconsulti: leg. omissis id cantum monuit navigationem Constantinopolim nullam dicte viri habere prohiberent per bellum cum Turchis nostri ab religionem sed ab ambitionem et inperium altrui

Antonius Marcellus: referendam omnem disputationem et moras et per presentis intelligendum ab exeratoribus qui condurerunt que na fiat eorum obligationes et qui de facere velint. si non sunt obligati eam navigationem solita anchone se autem pollicereri se conduti nostro ubi nemo conducere ea per tucto augusti ab tirum. et ultra Chium non navigandi.

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Missive I Cancelleria 45

412-414

Paulo II Pontifice Maximo

Perpetua ista tua constans que in nos urbemque nostram clementissima benignissimaque volunctas Sanctissimis ac beatissime pater qua omissis id luce omnes claruis cognivimus non alio esse te animo erga nos ac si patria ista esset tua ut et litteris et nuntiis sepe significasti nobis et nos re ipsa semper omnibus in rebus experti sumus et quotidie experimur facit ut nihil omnino iam quidem dari ab ista nobis sancta fede nec fine Deo possit confidentissimse enim petam lovisti autem pro tua sapientia nulla re magis que mercatura omissis civitatem nostram ea enim ab eius omissis primis fere incunabulis novam urbem et angustis positam locis aluit deinde per omnia tempora maxima conservavit ornavit auxit. multe id res declarant et in primis honores qui ei arti semper impensi sunt a nobis neque injuria ut puta qui magnno sepe et ornamento et adiumento fuerit nostre civitati sepentumus enim paceque ac bello ac domi et foris nostri mercatores de publica et libertate nostra benemeriti obnoxum fuis industrie populum reddiderunt. idem quo facile secure potes per tua ingenti cognitione rerum nostras atque omnium in alienis quoque uribus a mercatura nostra factum et date amici preclare commoditates et non numquam cum urgerent magne necessitates liberalissimse subventum nullu mercatorio commodo. sed benivolentie meritis impellentibus sed ea nunc multas variasque inopportunitates incommoditates que per omissis est a devoctionibus a seditione a bello verum cum iam parta pax per te ac stabilita sit quod et tibi pro tua bennificentissima divinaque natura gratum esse remint restituere ei arti vires cogitamus ut tandem pacis huius quam tu et nobis imninet se Italie tanquam precipuum aliquod divinem que donum tradisti commoda populis que nost manifestias sentiat maiores que in dies gratias tibi auctori pacis honorum que ipsius habeat. id autem maxime futurum est si quod als bonis de causis quasque tu minime ignoras internissum est Constantinopolim mercatorias naves nostras ad verbi curemus non ut aliquam commodatatem subministremus hostibus communibus sed ut nos datis mercimonii et accepta pecunia factique ditiores mercatoria opera. cum tu meritissimum nominis Christiani caput nos ad id muneri vocaveris ad quod
vocaturum una cum cetero robore Italico predixisti potentiores audentio res que venire possumus. non est autem currendum necquid inconcessimi ad hostes deportet a nostris gerunt enim nostri mercatores ab omni huiusmodi luchro alienissimos animos et nos summam adhibebimus diligentia ut nihil omnino super hac re pollicentibus procurantibus que id nobis sollicitus esse summus pontifex quique debeat. non sine causa *omissis* leges navigationes et comertia cum his hominibus qui Christiano non robbunt non prohibuerunt sed quo modo navigandum et commerciandum esset statuierunt nos ex legibus illis hanc Constantinopolitanam navigationaem restituere nostris civibus cupimus tamen in suo Sanctissimo Pontifice sapientissimo iustissimo nobis autem et populo nostro beneficiosissimo ut faciamus non finte consilium. cum enim ad religionem id pertinere aliquo modo videatur ad Christi vicarium religionis principem deferendum fuit ut eo conscio et probante ac benedictionibus divinis ea navigationem prosequerite magis prospera magis que lucrosa sit. quoque propter te summis quibusque precis oramus Sanctissime ac beatissime pater ut supplicantibus nunc nobis cupientibus ut bona pacis ista navigatione nostro populus magis sentiat quodque bellum abstulit a te auctore pace esse restutum votis nostris annuas et Constantinopolitane huic navigationi benedicis. nihil profecta feceris quod fecisse te inquam penitendum sit neque novam aut inusitatam in Italia rem dederis sunt enim preterea alie quoque urbes ac nobilissimi religiosissimi que populi qui *omissis* cum infedelibus comertiis ornant atque augent suas civitates. geruntque cum eis bellum et clades inferunt iis ipsis quas huiusmodi navigatio mihi comparaverunt divitis quibus nos neque divino castu neque devotione in istam sacrosanctam sedem neque religionis aliqua observantia si vineri nos verbis ceteris quis putet iis profecto nolumus esset inferiores. vale die vii Septembris mcccclxviii

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**Missive I Cancelleria 45**

414

Filippo Martello Rome

Con questa stare una lettera al Sancto Padre perché pensando noi di rifare il viaggio in Levante non ce parso farlo che prima non se ne dia notitia alla sua Sanctita e richieggiasi della sua beneditione come vedrai per essa lettera di che ti mandiamo la copia, vogliamo che alla venuta desssa subito vadi presentarla et attendere condiligentia la risposta e perché il tempo del partire delle ghalee per quel viaggio è venuto. vogliamo che metta ogni sollecitudine et ogni industria adoperando gli amici tuoi che sappiamo che ne hai che ne habbiamo prestissima risposta et tale risposta che sia il bisogno et desiderio nostro et lutile et lohonore della città. et mandianti uno de nostri cavallari con comandamento che aspecti et ritorni collla resposta. dati die vii Septembris mcccclxviii.
Responsive copiari II

22v-23r

ab Paulo II Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. comperatum habet devotio ut putamus progressum immanissimi regis Turcorum qui potentissimo exercitu mari ac terra nigrum in extremis nihil alid molitantur anhelat quo omni genere crudelitatis ipsum christianum nomen exstingue cum alias fimitas Christianis fidelii nationes debellare tum maxime hanc Italia ceterarum provinciarum nobilissima expugnare prosterne. hec tamen horrenda lues et internitio non unius potentatis esset sed primo omne Italie potentatrum subinde omnium Christianorum et principium. Angit nos super qui credibile sit res ipsa et cogitantibus diu nobis nihil accommodatus ad resistendum tanto malo imminenti ac instanti visum est quod qui robur omnis Italie qui primum opponat tum deinceps subsequatur et ceteri potentatus fidelium. Id vero circa et oportunis et melius fieri non potest qui (sed) omnes consentiant. cum autem sciamus a omnis veros ad hanc sanctam rem comperandam conficiendam quae ut pote vere catholicos promptissimo verisimiliter fore. placuit in primis ad devotionem vestram scribere prout et ad reliquas Italas potentias scribere statuimus et in dominio eandem devotionem hortamur ac per viscera misericordie Dei nostri rogamus ut mittati ad nos oratores vestros viros probos timentes Deum et conservande rei publice Christiane studis statum lectis presentibus litteres cum ampio mandato tractandi et concluendii universalem Italie unionem. nam sicut eidem Turchorum principi non bona consensio Italorum prestat audaciam ac spiritus magnos advetandi ita consternabit omnis eius animus intellecta Italorum potentia uno consensu coniuncta et ad oportunas provisiones facienda ex inde Italis facultas proveniet. non est cunctandum dilecti filii quoniam ob hostis ipse qui nihil magis sicure videtur quo internitionem et sanguinem totius Christianitatis iam in fauci nostri es ac in dies viribus corroboratur ut quo omissis que vis mora occasionem excidi nostri communis e prebeat. celeris autem opposita providentissima virtus Italorum illum retundere et profligare facillime possit ad laudeam et gloriam omnipotentis Dei scelestissimi quod huius diaconis mahomet excitum sempiternum. datum Rome apud Sanctum marcum sub anulo piscatori die IV Augusti 1470 anno Pontificato nostro 6.

Responsive copiari II

23rv
ab Ferdinando rege Neapoli

Rex Sicilie etc. magnifici et excellentissimi domini amici nostri carissimi. certiores tade facti sumus litteris illustriissimi Venetorum dominatus quaram exemplum dedimus legato dominationis v qui apud nos agit urbe nigrum pontis vi expugnatam et in perfidissimi hostis nostre fidei potestatem venisse ipsum hostem urbe diripisse et omne genus crudelitatis exercuisse in Christianos ac si nihil preclarius ducat quo Christiano sanguine sagini meret animus noster et non parvo dolore afficitur vel pro Venetorum factura vel pro vicinitate periculi vel pro communi causa totius Italiae e Christianitate nobile ommissis emporium europe amisimus. data est magna facultas Turcharum imperatori insulas ionii et egei occupandi claudendi ora adriatici maris invadendi Italiani et ut est imperandi avidus maiora audendi. deterrere nos debent exempla tot verbum tot gentuum tot populorum tot ditionum ipsum post cladem Constantinopolitanam subegot. iminentem illum nam ceruit Italicidemus et prope sentimus hinc maria classibus infestat illinc terra claustris Italie proprios factus ostia pulsat. undique minaret premit infestat. cavemus et ille veluti per scaligardum omnibus servile vigum imponere gestum erigant itaque D.V. eorum animi altum consilium neque huius periculi expertem esse sibit persuadeat. hostis enim potentissimus est qui hinc maria classibus sternit. terras exercitibus complet et nihil eius viribus posse resistere animum induxit et iam finxit animo totius Christianitas. alioquin actum de nobis esse existimare possimus. si dum vicinorum periculum negligimus quo ad nos porro venita operimur. datum in castello novo Neapoli VIII Augusti 1470.

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Responsive copiari II

25rv

a Paulo II Pontefice Maximo.

Dilecti filii et apostolicam benedictionem. placet littere vestre quas vii instantis mensis circa uniendam Italiadem et rogandam eius virtutem contra draconem Turcharum tyrannum commune hostem nominis Christi ad nos deditis. nam et unionem huismodi vehementer appetisse profitemini ac multo magis nunc appetere et oratores non solum i vi promptu habere sed et hortatoriis sociis vestros litteris et ad ipsum per agendum executasse. utrumque admodum collaudamus verum ut vos sentire videhimi ambo socii prompti ac parati erunt ut autem prosiciums serenissimos ipse regis Ferdinandis antecedet vos studio cum statum oratores in eam rem lectis litteris nostris designaverit viros graves et timentes Dei et secundum ommissis nostrum cum facultate pro sequendi atque concludendi quantum censebimus ad rem pertinere. opusque de ex regin et vere catholicum et omni laude dignissimum. at insignis ille dux sepe numero contestatus est ad communem salvem semper affuturum. ex quo fit ut non dubitemus persertim accedente exhortationee vestra et urgenti evidentissima necessitate eum facturum omnia que res tanta postulat. vellemus maxime intelligere per vos uti rex effecit oratores designatos iam in via esse et advolere non qui reliquos
prestolent. sed qui prevenisse videri possint. preventio inedii exhortabitur et sed ex
quidem impellet eos exortabit. tempus admonet tempus instat tempus urget. non
autem eget prestolatione. Turchon enim hostis labes omnium Christianum exultans
memoria ex revore nostro nigropontum urbem clara fidelium trucidatis oribus a
decernio super Christianis et delevit et solo quavit. et iam ante portas Italie potentior
in horas ex immanios adest. de Rhodo enim creta corcyra ceterisque orientalibus
insulis per eum occupandis vel forte iam occupatis quod abioit certa sententia est
erasurus pulcherrima et clarissima Christianum exultans memoria.

Turcho enim hostis labes omnium Christianum exultans memoria ex revore nostro nigropontum urbem clara fidelium trucidatis oribus a
decernio super Christianis et delevit et solo quavit. et iam ante portas Italie potentior
in horas ex immanios adest. de Rhodo enim creta corcyra ceterisque orientalibus
insulis per eum occupandis vel forte iam occupatis quod abioit certa sententia est
erasurus pulcherrima et clarissima

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Signori Risposte verbali di oratori 2

37v

Die xxv Augusti 1470

A rege Neapolitano Aniellus Archamonus legatus ad magistratum venit visitationis
gratiam cum enim Venetias profiscisceret ex mandato regio non potuit non visere
magistratum ex legationis sue aperire causas. profiscisci igitur sequitur Venetia ideo dixit ut
res ad ducandum in Turcho bello hortaret vereri enim regem ne amissa euboea insula
succumbant. regem hortari ad Florentinos ut ad eam rem applicant aium et aliquid
remedii dispicient nec cum Venetis simul tota Italia et omnis Christiana republica
depeat hortari id regem cum ob comune causam tum ob suam sorsum qui primus
ob vicinitate veniat in periculo. Respondit Iohannes Ridolfi vexillifer populum
Florentinum tum rege causa que non aliter ac Florentinam libertatem salutem esse
vult tum Christiane rei daturum operam ut nullo loro desit.

182

Signori Risposte verbali di oratori 2

38rv

die xiii Octobris 1470

Antonius Priolus Venetus legatus venit in urbem die xii acceptus est in ede suorum ut
magistratus instituerat. postridie eius diei venit ad magistratum comitatus a nonnullis
cuibus quos eum deducere magistratus ad se iussisset excepti eum ad cancellum
auditorii. et cum consedissent post lectas legationis litteras. legatus humanissimis
verbis atque honestissimis appellationibus salutavis magistratum et senatum atque
omnia ex vere amicitie officio que essent Venetos communia in Florentinis asservit.
deinde euboee insule amissionem deploravit et periculum ide est toti Italie et toti
Christiano nominii magni impendere significavit per inde magratum ex senatum ad
auxilium ferendum vehementer est rohotatus. quandoquidem et consilio et viribus
plurimum in Italia valeremus.
Respondit Ristoris vexillifer et quidem per breviter gratam esse salutacione Venetos
et rerum Venetorum oblatione quod autem ad Turcham victoriam pertineret per
molestum fuisse illud nuntium cum primum auditum est atque existimasse
communem eam calamitatem fore nisi sunarraret. itaque missos esse Roma legatos ut
agant de ea defensione apud Summum Pontifice omisso Christianis legatis qui
voquant ipso summo Pontefice venuerint. populum Florentinum neque amicitie
Venetos neque Christianes cause dufuturum. missus deinde est et cives qui
deduxerant reduxerunt domum et munera publica stati subserita sunt.

183

Responsive Copiari II

A rege Ferdinando 26v27v

Rex Sicilie etc. magnifice et excellentissimi domini amici nostri carissimi. in magna
fluctuatione animi nostri qua agitamur ob excitiale hanc pestem commune que
periculum alluvionis Turchum que contra Italian precipitem se ferre vide maxime
spei nobis fuit societatis vestre integerrime istuis que sapientissimi sanctus
recordatio. qua spem confermarunt auscerunt que littere vestre et Marini legati nostri
quas nuper acceperimus quibus satis super que nobis perspertum pro una actionum
experientia pro excellenti vis ad omnia per sapiam incredibils vos cognoscce
impendentia mala cervibus nostris omisso Christianes communi periculo succurrat. tum illus
fuit volupatati maxime qui intelleximus nostra causa qui viciniore periculo sumus et
in faucibus fere esse videmus non nos pace commoveri publico que decreto
ordinum vestrum firmatum Italie rodei nobisque suppletas ferendas magna est
amicorum eorum que in omni fortuna constantium in gravi et ancipiti periculo spes et
recreatio. nihil est in secundis et in adversis rebus vel ad voluptates perfruendas vel
ad tolleranda pro adversitatem aduersitatem datum in societate humana commodius. fatemur
nos tant feccccse tantique fare turcarum contra Italie motus ut nihil contungere posse
extrimumus quod eque nos comoverre queat vel per labre et periculo Christiane
religionis vel pro Italie communi bono et dignitati vel prorsus pro re atque causa.
onque imminere possent cetera pericula eo non unica habere remedia nec adeo
atrociis videntur expectationis hec vero lues adeo dicta est adeo nefaria ut remedia
habere moveamus nisi soactis viribus Italie pro adversari potestia ambitione furore et
rei constitutene commoditate cui iam assequi posse videtur quod libet vel ideo magis
timemus qui non solum pro imperio belligerandum sit sed pro coingretibus liberais
patria penatibus vita sanguine libertate dignitate religioneque quod est in primis.
verso fidelis nostra societas in periculis semper nobis addidit aios et ad omnia
pericula magna constantia nos solatur et ut magni fecimus istius preclarams rei
publica integerrimam fidem que labre crimineque semper caruit que res nos ad ipsium
societate allexit ita omisssis potissima spem in arduo hoc negocio in vestra societate
et amicitia collocavimus. et factum iri putamus Deo auspice et istius sapientissimi
senatus consilio ex gravitate quod Italia sedus percuti teggionis dignitas Italie salus regnorum que et urbium libertas tuta erit a tam atroci spectaculo. illud etiam in primis speramus qui illustreissime excellentissimi Mediolani dux qui hoc periculum non satis intelligere videtur ac multi facere vestris hortationibus veritate periculi patefacta cum sociis coibit. et publice privateque et utilitati Italie ex sociorum consentiet. quod non difficile putamus cum sapientissimi fit et magna vi ingenii clareat fidei non religiosis amicitiaque fit observantissimus. hoc idem nos sedulo curavimus et curaminis. in urbe iam stringit federis universalis conlusio ad quod percutiendi omnium animi aspirant et per bonitate atque sapientia prope divina beatissimi pauli II Pontefice maxime parvum difficilatii videt in esse quo minus statim confletur. erit ut sapientor commemoratis postea facilior sedatis pacatischque animis ex seminario amoris amicitie federis que communi perculi provisio. hoc magnopere et premitus et rogamus ut in sententia stetio sanctissima duci Mediolani persuade nitamini que in commune re sunt. legato vestros qui Rome agunt moneatisque cum ceteris celerrime rem transfigant. non in hoc gravissimo negotio celeritatem plurimum utilitatis afferre iudicamus. agere autem vobis gratias pro tanto erga nos studio tanto amore tanta benivolentia haud necessarium putamus quoniam istud integerrime sobrietas officium non verba sed vicissitudine postulat. Datum in castello novo Neapoli die XVII mensio Octobris 1470

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Responsive Copiari II

28v29r

a Galeazzo Maria duce Mediolani

Excellentes et potentes domini tam qua pres nostri. nui credemo che le S.V. habbiano assai potuto comprendere per lo passato quanto lo animo et pensiero nostro sia desposto alla pace et tranquillità de Italia et de vicinare bene con ognuno. et questo haverlo demonstrato per multi effecti et argumenti et maxime nel facto de questa reunione. et redintegratione della liga cum la maeistà del S.re ferrando et quella sua comunita alla quale siamo venuti realmente ex con ogni sincerità et così alla executione et observatione de quella per il terzo capitolo nui tardassimo al tempo debito mandare nostri ambassadori insieme cum quelli de quella excellentissima republica primo alla maeistà del re ad honorarla et congratularsi cum essi de tale reunione et deinde ad Roma alla Santità del papa ad supplicarli et honestamente rechiedere che la sidignassi benedire la dicta liga nostra et redintegration et deinde venire alle altre particularità contenute in essa et intravalarli cum capitolii et conditioni honeste et così piacendoli di rinnovare la liga universale contracta nel anno 1455 fra le potentie de Italia offerire ad sua sta per se et per la illustreissima Signoria de venegia lo intrare degno et honorevole volendola renovare pure et simpliciter come la sta nihil addito vel diminuito et per quelli proprii chi legittimamente furono compresi in dicta liga salvisa capitulis de questa reunione nostra come nel terzo capitolo se contene et circa tutte queste cose havimo dato pieni et largissimi mandati et instructione ad essi nostri ambassatori et scripto et replicato più e più volte de intervenire cum li altri ambasciatori regii e de quella excelsa comunita alla
executione et conclusione de quanto specta ad noli dal canto nostro non li mancano in cosa alcuna che habbiamo potuto cognoscere perché ne seguisse tale effecto. et essendo agitata bon pezo questa materia devanti al papa pare che piutosto habbi assentito de volere insieme con Venetiani attendere alla renovazione de questa liga universale del 1455 che ad benedire et intrare in questa et nui per adaptare ad ogni cosa gli siamo ancora condiscesi perché non havessero alcuna hopnesta ragione de partirsi dalla conclusione et a questo siamo rimasti et a questo siamo rimasti et dio contenti che detta liga del LV se renovasse pure et simpliciter comere dicto per tutti quelli che legitime furono compresi in quella riservando la nostra particolare come secontene nel dicto II capitolo. studiandoce et sforzando de andare ad ogni verso per servare dicta versione et quanto in essa se contiene. Nondostante tutte queste cosa quando havemo creduto venire ad qualche effecto et conclusione di questa materia el pare che ogni di la cosa sia tracta in piú lunghezza et per alcuni lisii misso scrupolo et difficultate et cercato nove casone cum dare chavuto ad nostri collegati et in spetialita ad noi dicendo che per nui manca venire ad queste conclusione imputando li mancamenti loro ad altri et spargendo voce fra populi per favorire il fatto loro et seminando qualche zizanio per mettere discordia fra miei collegati il perché per satisfare ad noi medesimi et per defensione dello honore nostroe della verità havemo voluto communicare queste cose alle serenissime vestre. le quali sono prudentissime et intendono li portamenti et andamenti de questi tali meglio che nui amoche possino justificare la causa insieme cum noi et chiarire ad ognuno la verità et quello che è infacto et le bone mente et disposizione de vestre serenissime et nostra in questa materia perché nui come è decto non vedemo haverli mancato ne intendemo mancharli in cosa alcuna perché la pace et riposo de Italia habbi loro la quale nostra intentione è de venire alla liga del LV nihil addito vel diminuto stando ferma la nostra particolare et quando el papa et venitiani insieme o quale sia loro non acceptino questo haveveno satisfacto odio et al mondo et haveveno servato quello siamo obligati per la liga nostra particolare la quale deliberamo de servare et non fare cosa che habbia cum veruna persona et spetialmente con la maestà del re et vestre exceli signori essere disputabile anzi volemo sia chiara e sanza disputa. Data Vigevani XXV Novembris 1470.

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Responsive Copiari II

29v-30v

ab Ferdinando rege

Rex Sicilie etc. magnifice et excelsi domini amici nostri karissimi. quotiens isti sapientissimi senatus litteras accipimus mirifice animus noster reveat quidem est in epistula qua nuper ad nos dedistis in tanto vero pondere quod vel explicari elegantius vel perstringi acutis vel prudentis gravius que delibari potuisset suavissium illud est nobis in primis qui sententia vestra minime a nostri animi sententia dissentat ii solem animis ii sed studis ad una rem per agendam contendimus optamus omnes expectumus magno studio ex quirimus que omnis Italia uno federe coeat illud novet
foedus quod Nicolao V Maximo curante istum est. omnes cognoscimus urgentissimas rationesque nos vel invito ad id feriendum robustari debent communem esse causa intelligent omnes vident pericula sentiat vicina discrimina quid parere possit foedus atque concordia beneficii qui magnum exitum afferre discordia qui nesciat est nemo. movent nos exempla tot subactarum urbium tot populum tot gentium que servire vigum turpissime patiuntur.magnas esse Italos vires tot floride populis tot pibus beate tot armis clare tot bonis artibus ex disciplinis inbute tot principibus tot ducibus tot excellentibus rebus publicis exornare intelligent omnes habemus annales et exempla maxima quibus a satiss sperare liceret Italianum aptissima esse non ad tuendam solit dignitate propria sed ad illa qui maxime augendam. et tamen in re luce ipsa clares in tot ambages unde tanta animorum dissensio quamobrem nodum in seirpo querimus. fatumur gravia tot imperiorum tot urbium tot populum negotia semper solere non parum habere difficultatis cum ita natura comparatum sit ut optimis admixta sint pexima. sed in tanto rerum discrimine ubi de salute libertate de fide imprimis agit sine ulla difficulties conciliandi sunt animi. timemimus ne subiratus Dei nobis sit. dederata que populi suum in reprobum sensum cum videntes serentes que precipites labimur. ad ipsum tamen Deum onnipotentem plenumque misericordiam confugendum est nec desperandum. imo ab eo nobis spes esse debet a quo huismodi gloria facinora prodeunt que miro ordine dispensat. rectenamque facimus opere nos sorri iam diu uni rei studemus illi operam impedimus. satiss et ommiss exploratuet que pro publica utilitatem per epistolam et oratores egerimus. deus cui nihil ocultum est nobis sociis testis est non stetisse per nos quibus pluribus iam mensibus fedus ipsum percussum fuerit totaque Italia coverit. in communem ut forbitis hostem ommiss animos omnes excitaremus et summeremus arma hactenus ut cernitis dilata res est non nostra non sociorum culpa qui nihil alid in nova federe querimus nisi ut salvum illesumque esset foedus nostrum quod tam graviter tam sancte percussum est. neque aliter fieri possit cum ita legibus foederis cautum fit neque illud improbari a quo piam potest quando quidem primum potest quando ad conservationem dignitatem nostras istum sit fine alterius iniuria et cum succidatur discriminans materia pacemque ac publicam quietem passi reddenter. verum per recentiores nostrum oratorum litteras intellecimus foederis universalis conclusione bene habere sperare iam salvo nostro transactum viri. nam Veneti cum oratoribus nostris ex sociorum de conditionibus conivenerunt ut scilicet novando fediem nihil addatur minuatem vel sed novetur salvo nostro salvoque illesum federe quod cum Pontefice istum est. non est dubitandum ipsum Summum Pontifex accessum. nam quo pacto salva conscientia salvo honore dissentiret. si vero preter sper et expectationem nostram cederet diutius que differret denius operam ut hactenus fecimus ne nostra ex parte intelligatur que quis honctus que conditionibus nos tergiversari cum aperis que Venetis novandum esse foedus ipsum currem. satis apud Dei tribunal satis Deo reddemur innocentes puta animi conscientia cum rebus honestis non fuerimus reluctati. in omni autem rerum eventum hoc nos mirum in modi solat que ab hoc magnificentissimo populo excelsa que republica videmus nostram amicitiam magni fieri offerique nobis rem vestra publicam. quod enim esse iucundis potest in omni fortuna amico et socio cui idem sit velle idem que volle. non possumus brevi epistula perstringere quaanta letitia persis fuerimus litteris ipsis vestris et iis que Marinus Thomacellus cumulatibus per epistolam egit de ipsis dominatus erga nos benivolentia. Effict hec spes et expectatio locuplex ut omnium
periculum quot contingere possent recordati e sit nobis molto minus molesta. fratris tanta amicitia tantoque federe. non sunt dissimilia erga vos studia nostra. quod enim est quod huic rei publice non dicaverimus quod est quod de nobis non possit sibi polliceri et sperare. id est sepe novo obtulerimus vimam tamen iterum iterumque repetere. nos scilicet regno filiis nobis que ipsis non percipitos ut nostro pedriculo vos ubi facto opus fit a periculo liberemus. datum apud Tripergula die xxi mensis Decembris 1470.

1471

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Responsive Copiari II

31vr

ab Galeazzo duci Mediolani

Excellentes potentes domini tamquam pres. per lo cavallaro de la S.V. questa sera havimo ricevuto una sua lettera deli nove del presente. la quale secondo il costume nostro havemo molto bene lecta et intesa. et per rispondere a la substanzia di quella dicemo che non fu mai che non fussimo dispositissimi et inclinatissimi a tutte quelle cose che havemo congnosciuto credere in honore et beneficio della fede Christiana et poi ancora deli nostri collegati et de la loro canto sforzatone semper de mantegnire la fede nostra come se possuto vedere. et de presenti intendendo noi la instanza che fa fare la maiestà del re de sapere lanimo de nui collegati in questo subsidio che lo adomanda per defendersi dal Turco havemo fatto dire alla prefata Signoria vestre el pensero nostro per Sagramoro nostro ambassatore quale cognoscemo per questa loro lettera esserl piaciuto et certamente oltre la affinita et mutua benivolentia et coniunctione quale è tra la prefata maiestà et noi ne siamo ancora mossi ad fare tale ricordo per confermarsi con lo pensiero de la signorie vestre al quale semper in ogni cosa possibile deliberamo de ad servire come a quello che vedemo essere causato da ogni bono fondamento havemo adiuncha per omisssis de quanto ve havimo facto dire per esso Sagramoro posto una decima al clero del dominio nostro quale ascende alla summa de XX milia ducati et così si dava principio ad fodere li denari et poi se consignavamo a quello deputera la prefata maiestà. et questa rinnovatione de liga universale fusse stata simpliciter secundo il terzo capitolo della nostra liga particolare lanimo novo staria piú riposato che non sta. ma essendo stata facta tale quale è a noi non parve de potere ne anche volimo fare altro che quanto è detto salvo quando tutti li altri principi Christiani gli converrano che allora pro ratu faremo semper el debito nostro et così semper faremo il debito per confermatione delli comuni stati secondo siamo obbligati per capitoli della nostra lega particolare. ed da qui inanzi non deliberiamo fare piú spesa in queste cose del Turco per veruna persona se non como è dicto. datum Vigevani XIII Februarii 1471.
Florentine calendar: die xxviii Februarii 1470

Super auxilio regi contra Turchum

Tommaso Soderinus eques: respondendum legatio regi et subvenio dum regi de tuctis viginti millibus et persuadendum regis ut faveat apud Summum Pontificem per decimus ecclesiastis

Johannes Canisiani eques: idem et precipue videndum nequid fiat qui inutile fit reipublice et saluti mercatorum nostrorum consulis in hac proprie una ut danti pecunie regi quibus ipse perlilito uti possit et deputandos omissis dixit et quodmodo et quante pare solui in parari pecunie debeant consultamus

Loysius Guicciardinis: miseram olimonem civitatis deploravit qui superioribus anni tot clades passa sit et recitavit omissis et seditionis plure clades ex bellum quam cum coleoni gesti est obsidioni ariminensi afflicta esse rem publicam nunc autem parari bellum quod future sit diu omissis et dubiam esse constitutionem dixit et qui omissis que pericula magni potendas. et tamen ob regis in re omissis meriti censuit et ipse xx millia ducatus porrigenda regi in auxilium ut superioris rege sententie facimur

Antonio Ridolfi eques: omni ipso multi verbis et multis argumentationibus superiorem sententiam et tam cavendum ne qui palam fit nec novere id possit mercatoribus ob id presertim quod nuper acedit de regis hominibus et mercatoribus qui in turci ditione erant

Boniovanne Ianfiliactus eques: quod agitetur Christiana que res censuit et ipse idem quid superiores sententiam monere tam se ut meminerit magistratus et que rem hanc examinaturi fuit tribus huius anni paratque ante oculos mercatores salute qui Constantinopoli negotiantur

Iacobus Pactius eques: numquam putasse ut absque tributo ecclesiastico veniretur ad subvenendum robus Christianis et deci satus est qui lente predatur in eo tributo qui nisi fiat cum pro Christianis pugnandum est numquam sperandum esse in posterum futurum esset. et in subvenendum ut sed cauta subveniendum ut alias in consilio marrano omissis est nequid fiat quidem mercatoribus noveat qui Constantinopoli negotiant et confere se ut regi persuades ut an et cives et mercimonia qui in ditione turci sunt redeunti potestate nostram qui quicque deliberatos quod inutili fit rei publice et mercatoribus

Dominus Marcellus iureconsultus: probavit et ipse primas sententias et liberaliter regi subveniendum et id caute faciendum ut relique sententia fuerunt.
Bernardo Bonieronimus iureconsultus: idem et eius sententia secutus est romulus honofrius qui vixta foederis.

Andreas Crescius: cum iis qui in suo ordine Soderini idem.

Nicolaus Berardus: duas esse causas dixit cur auxilum regi porrigere debeamus primus quod infedeli sit qui offendit secum dolore esse ingerit regno merita in urbem nostram et multes rationibus probavit suvenendum esse regi sed ob ingentur tributa curandum ut ecclesiasticis tributo fiant xx milli ducatorum ad imitationem maximo ducis Mediolani qui omissis dictissimuns sit pollicitus tamen est xx millia ducatorum ex ecclesiasto tributo et quodam ex his qui simul seretur senturi dixit in tomasio soderinus equites cum additione Jacobi Picti.

Johanni Stufa: non esse sperandum et incurrendum in iis presertim qui gravissimi sunt.

omissis

Leonardus Mannellus: iis qui eran in sacello idem cum additionem iacobi pauli hoc est ut ecclesiasticolo tributo omissis regi si fieri possit.

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Consulte e pratiche 60

122r

die ii Martii 1471

Florentine calendar: die II Martii 1470

super re eadem consilium petitum a Gino Caponio vexillifere iustitie.

Tomasus Soderinus eques: fuit eiusdem sententies qua fiant in superiore consultatione ut interest per oratorem videndum ut impereret tributi ecclesiastici a Summum Pontifice

Iohannes Canisianus eques: post multa verba et multas argumentationes fuit in superiores sententia et deputandos cives adixit qui unde pecunie habende sint et quomodo et quando solui debemur diligenter examinaretur

omissis.

Nicolaus Berardus: respondendum esse regi dixit per oratore atque illi persuandedum ut nolit nostro maximo periculo contra qui opus sit expereri nos fortune ob nostris mercatores et mercimoniam expollicendum regi cum eris opus ommissis xx millia ducatorum ser omnes ommissis vires et tanem qui omnes alios sententie fuit in ponere
subveniret incoveniens putare esse si solus ipse dissentiret. quoque in preservavit superiores sententias.

die xxviii Martii 1471

admissus in senatu est Bartholomeus Recanatis regis legatis qui gravis egit regis nomine vel id quod *omissis* sibi pollicet suas ob expeditionem in Turcos et petit ut super pecuniis aliquid dedennat et ita legatis dimissus et super his consilium petitioni.

Tommasus Soderinus: gravis habendas regis que ita humanitatem *omissis* et nihilominus permissi *omissis* memoris et aliquid decernendum ut impleant quod facilius fiat paucorum civium consultationem censuit.

*omissis*

Angelus Stufa eques: ampie die causa quia res afferre in litteris difficulitatis animo in pecuniis et modii inducendum ut tardius solvant nequid in deliberandis pecuniis quod *omissis* est finiret apparia possit quod regis molestie fit

Iacobus Pactius: mittandum ligati ad regi qui de premissimus et aliis rebus nostra respondiant cautius enim agendum in ea re ne is qui in grecia negotiant nostra mercatores periculis obiicant

Mariottus Benvenutis: mittendum ex ipse legatum censuit ne mercatores qui Constantinopoli negotiant in periculo sint atque et ob qui nuper accidit de plumbino *omissis* et probavit prima sententia

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Consulte e pratiche 60

124rv

Die VI Aprilii 1471

Recitatio ab legato qui Rome est litteris quod respondendum sit super promissis regi Ferdinando factis deferendo auxilio per defensione Christiani religionis super prostulatis Roberti Sanseverinis.

Tommasus Soderinus eques: in litteras id esse potuissimun ut relligiosa bona possint venire in tributi quidem et si dubius sit vestra Pontifice dadatur tanto urgente necessitant tanto magis instam dum quinto denegare magis atque materia bona describende et aliquid principii dandum ut aliquid tam de transfigatur. in premissis perseverandum et quanto res ipse comoditatem offerunt tempori ampie domini eam dixit servit ampiendam ut quo aliquam persolui possit iam nunc dispiaciatur *omissis*.

190
Consulte e pratiche 60
124v-125 r

Die xx Aprilis 1471

super promissis regi factis de auxilio secondo florini summa viginti miliam quomodo perficenda sint

Tommasus Soderinus eques: promissa servanda esse et regis benivolentiam multi facienda curandum que ut aliquandum per plura verba nostra aliquid rei intelligat. itaque tam curam demandata esse viribus paucis qui quo id fieri possit disquirant quo minori incomodo pubblico possit omissis

omissis

Ugolinus Martellus: idem et curandum dixit ne qui sint quod pericolosum fit mercatoribus qui Constantinopoli negotiantur atque id esse dixit

191

Consulte e pratiche 60
128r-129r

Super parandis pecuniis ut promissis stari possit xx millium Florentinorum regi Neapolitano et expensis solvendi que facta fit in adventum Mediolanensis ducis.

Iohannes Pictis eques: suasit parationem pecuniam et promissa regi solvenda in sumptus omissis super navigando que multa dixit et quo plurimas utilitates publicas in eo esse demonstrator omissis

Tommaso Soderinus: eques super paratione pecunias idem, super navigatio autem subveniendum dixit consulibus mari ut penitus non extinguat navigatoria que in honori rei publice fit et intelligendos cives dixit omissis

Loysius Guicciardinis: eques merita certavit omissis regis in rem pubblica omissis que promissis perseverandum ut vestre regi referamus et que omnia pecuniis indigeant censere se ut tributo ecclesie omissis fieri possit. dissuasi omnem extraordinaria parandam cum pecuniam ea tandem deputatos cives dixit qui et quid oportunum sit examinatus et cum omissis pecunie possint pervenit. ab navigando nullo desistendum parte censuit quod honestissima res sit rei pubblice et eodem quo super risus est modo super hac re deliberandum

omissis

Jacobus Pactius eques: omissis et que triremis est Pisis qui navigare possit committendum consulibus maris ut qui corissime hanc rei expediant
Responsive Balia 25

257rv

Thomasus Soderini eques orator

Questa illustrissima Signoria per fare cosa grata a voi scrive al proveditor dell’armata sua che allavuta della lettera mandi una galea a Ragusa che qui aspecti lo imbasciadore che deve essere di ritorno da Costantinopoli et che giunto che sia lo levi et conducchilo per quello modo che iudicheremo essere piú sicuro dove de ommissis.

Venetis die XXI Septembris 1471

Responsive Copiari II

38v-39r

A Ferdinando rege

Magnifici et excellentissimi viri amici nostri carissimi. cum de Christiana republica ommissis periculis inquibus versatur solicitaremur ac magis magisque sollicitemur vidies semper sepe numero et per litteras et per oratorem nostrum exhortati fuimus illustrium ducem Burgundie ut maiorum suorum vestigiis incedes nobiscum pro tuenda Christiani republica adversus grassantes consentire Turco vellet. quibus auditis dux ipse ut est summa pietate et singulari in Deum cultu preditus incitatus et maiorum suorum exemplis nobiscum foedus percussit quod nuper ut moris est per urbes atque oppida regni nostri a preconibus pronuntiari missimus, quam rem ut par est d.v. per litteras nostras significare decrevimus quin et foederis ipsius exemplum atque copiam mittere ut que foedere continentur plane omnia intelligant. et quam pro iure amicitias atque coniunctionis nostre inter eos qui nobiscum foedere coniuncti essent rempublicam vestram noncupavimus d.v. summa opere rogamus ut noncupationem ac nominationem hanc nostram ratam acceptamque habere velint idque ut de more est per suas et litteras nobis declarare ut possimus ducem ipsum certo ac stato tempore de voluntate ac comprobatione vestra certiorem facere. quod ut dominationis vestre faciant vehementer et atque et hortamur. datum in Castellonovo Neapolis die X Novembris MCCCLXXI.

Responsive Copiari II

40vr

A Sixto IIII Pontifice Maximo
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. considerantes quot et quanta mala nefandissimus ille canis Turcorum princeps Christianis hactenis intulerit et quotidiani inferre non desinat statuimos post que adhunc summi platus apicem meritis licet insufficientibus sumus evecti omnibus quibus possumus modis republice Christiane usque adeo laboranti sucurrere. in presentiarum nobis in Deo est dilecti filii hoc primo vere Deo dante triremes usque ad numerum vigintiquinque ad huiusmodi opus paratas habere. habemus iam quinque ex nostris in portu anchonetano que nisi promptu erunt. reliquas aut non habemus. neque tam brevi tempore est conficiendi comoditatem habere possumus. Promissum est eas aliunde procurare. A vobisque tanquam ab iis quos bonos catholicos esse facimus quinque que nunc vobis forte supersunt et validas tamen petere per vos ad semestre commodandas nobis et nostris sanctibus inservendas atque armandas. exstimamus enim nos id libenter facturos esse. Qua praesente hortamur vos et ex mentis nostrre affectu rogamus ut has quinque triremes nobis pro ipso semenstre commodare velitis. Etenim ipsi videtis periculum imminentissimum. expectamus autem a vobis celerem et votivam responsionem. Ut sciamus si triremes habituri et quando pro eis missuri fumus. datum Rome die XVII Decembris MCCCCCLXXI.

1472

195

Responsive Copiari II

42rv

A Sixto quarto Pontefice Maximo

Intelleximus esse proposita apud vos exortatis quibusdam premia interfactoribus vestrorum rebellium quod inhumanum est a Christiana caritate alienum videtis optamus et pro nostra in vos paterna dilectione consulimus et hoc tamen ut ab huiusmodi re penitis desistatis vel saltum quod negare certe non debetis decenartis non intelligi de rellibus illi qui in alma urbe Roma et eius districtu aut alibi: ubi Romanum Pontifice interesse contigerit moram trahunt. Datum Rome die XI Aprilis 1472.

196

Responsive Copiari II

42v-43r

Ab rege Ferdinando
Affectit nos incredibili voluptate pecunia quam nobis ad expeditionem maritima nuper misistis que rei et si ut commoda rebus nostris per oportuna per se iocunda nobis est longe tamen esto et iocundissimum dictum nos vestrorum perspicere. Intelligereque populum vestrum non modo non ommissis nobis sed quod amicorum est proprium et pecunia qui belli necessis est et triremibus quibus navale bellum geritur nos innare. et enim ex vidi ubi aut quod modo apertius declararis amoris societatisque vis potest que madiuvandris expeditionibus atque iis possimun expeditionibus quibus pericula iniuriesque propulsantur et ao eo pretium hoste qui fit qui potentissimus. Vos autem non solum pecunia ac triremibus nos vivatis? magno cum populo vestri atque omnium ordinum consensu sed in maxime gravi periculo atque adversus hostem superbissimum. Qui qq Christianum nomen eque odi atque infectatur eiusque inpotentia omnium Christianorum capitis immine, tam Italie et nobis preserti qui vicinores sumus bellique calamitatis magis expositi omnis ire omnis que periculos vis ac rabies proprius minatur atque expressimo vehementius nos petit. quo circa vestri nobis auxilium eest gratius quo periculo propriore sumus et quod aperta iam adversis turcam arma movimus qq voluntaria non tamen minus incessaria ut finibus nostris tutandis si et defensitande Christiane republica. pro hac igitur subsidiaria ac pecunia presidiarisque triremibus ac profato armoris ni nos vestri testimonio agimus nobis summas et singulare gratias. Vosque hortamur ut communem fidei orthodoxe causam suscipientes ea agatis de nobis populusque Florentino ut Christianissimo sperare iure debent. Et quam nostri armorum atque institutum est receptorem beneficionem ubique memores ac gratos esse velle sic habeote regem Ferdinandum ita quids recenti hoc vestre beneficio devinctum esse ut nulla una incidares possit que eius valeat abolere memoria. et quon acceptos meritos gratia pacis non minus quam bell muneribus referri potes cuiusquid pacis quod cum bona dicti sit venia non minus studios nos esse quam quos vis aut opulos principes esse et nunc facemur et olim rebus ipsis declaramus. pro nostro studio tum pro Florentina libertatis incolumitate omnia facturos nihil aut consilio aut opera unquam pretermiss furos demum opere facultates copiasque nostras omnes expositione ut pacem omnium ut civilem tranquillitatem omnem undique Italia obtineat ut regnum hoc nostrum ut urbes oppiola atque agri vestrum non aliqui qui regni nostrorum suae suscepturum pacis acisque muneribus tucto de tranquillit frui valeant quod nostrum propositum vestrimque studium ut eventus sequatur et loquemur aut voibtum liberaliter et emine ex eludimus quod hostis loco habituri simus armisque nostris insecuri quisquis fuerit modo aliquis fuerit qui vel pacem Italiam turgere vel Florentinam vexare libertatem debeat. quam nostram mentes vobis testatam esse cupimus ut sciatis quantum et olim ab experto et nunc ex professo de nobis nostraque opera sperare possitis ac debeat. Die 28 Aprilii 1472.

197

Responsive Copiari II

44v

A Sixto quarto Pontefice Maximo
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. intelleleximus sub ortas esse volaterris dissensiones non leves quod nobis plurimum est molestum quippe enim ut iam manifestis signis intelligere potuistis omnes curas et cogiationes nostras riparandis Christianis et precipue Italis qui ad reprimendum et barbaricum impetum aptissimi esse videtur collocaverimus. quid quid alicui dissensionis exortur molestiam nobis affert et voluntati conficiende cordie adversature. quare per vestera misericordie Dei nostri et hortamur et monemus mono devotionem vestras ut ad sedandas penitusa tollendas dissensiones huismodi animum et secundium connertatis et in ipsis principis Oriente ignem opprimatus ne ex parva scintilla quod absit et deus misericordis pietate sua avertat maius excitendum et quietem Italie inter-turbet. vos ut intelligatis quam audi simus vestri et illos tranquillitatis studium auctoritatem opes et quicquid denique in nobis est ad hoc pollicemur et prestare parati sumus et ita quotiens iudentis necesse esse requiratis in nullo enim decerimus ob conservationem vestra. die ultima Aprilis 1472.

Responsive Copiari II

50v-51r

Ab Sixto Papa quarto

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. in direptione nobilis insule euboee e qua imatissimus Turchorum tyrannus superioribus annis Christianos eiecit commodum est hostes perfidos navigiis plurimis Christianorum que in eorum mari deprehenderenat visos et nostris nos potissimum expugnasse armis. quod non minus ignominio sum quam pernicioso fuit. iactura suscepta cautiores nos redderi dicit ut diligentius caveant quod semel damno et dedecori extit. hac nos rationale dicti admonente officio pastorali ad nos et alios catholicos principes qui locus maritimus oris et scribendum diximus ut quando quidem hostis sub dolus mari incumbe ad bellum parat in Italiam sibi transitum sciat omnis occasio potiendi navium Christianorum sibi principiatur ne rursis nostris nos armis impugnet. idem autem facile cavebitur si navigatio Christianos ad terras Turchorum hec tempore conquiescat si nostri in eis locis non negociabuntur ubi possit in Turchorum potestate venire. quare per morte et passionem domini nostri Iesu Christi per resurrectionis et eternae spem per pietatem tua vos obtestamur diletissimi filii ut omnibus vestre dictionissuio magnis et formi dabilibus poenis vihietis ne hoc tempore ad loca Turchorum audeant navigare ut eos in officio contineatis nec eo ire permittatis ubi sibi ipus et Christiane reipublice damnu afferant. hoc vos libenter facturos vestra nobis sapientia pollicetur sane a Deo premium et ab hac Sancta sede viderem omnem rationem et gratiam consequeris. datum Rome die 9 Decembris 1472.
1474

199

Responsive Copiari II

69v

Ab Sixto III Pontefice Maximo

Quanto per semper desideravimus ut generalis liga inter Italie potentatus instauraretur cum omnis alii tum precipue devotio vestra per optime novit. nihil enim rebus Christiani utilius et salubrius inquam existimavimus intercapturus est hoc sanctissimum opus quibusdam impedimentio que pretor spem. et expertationem nostram ariderunt adeo ut necessario res hic quisque protacta sit. nunc vero rebus ad tranquillitatem redatis visum est nobis provinciam. eam prosequi quam pro officio nostro pastorali susceperamus ad quam quidem rem cum plures cause honeste et necessarie omnes debeat adhortariet impellet illa est precipua que comunem Christiani nominis hostem cervitibus nostris imminentem habemus. si quidem allatum est cum vere novo validissima classe et ingenti exercitu Italian versus totis viribus esse erupturn cuius furori misi per Italos potentatus unamiter resistatur et crudelissima alius opprimantur consilia actum esse de summam rei publice Christiane. quare hortamur devotione vestram et publici boni studiosissima est ut oratorem cum mandato in plena forma detraneo et concludendo huius omnio federe qui primum mittere veletis quidem alii etiam significamus ut Deo auctore inceptum opus omissis perficere possamus. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die xxx Septembris 1474.

200

Responsive Copiari II

69rv

Ab Sixto III Pontefice Maximo

Quemadmodum magno adiumento rebus Italie et totius Christianitatis hactenus fuit et infuturum longe maiori esse potest motus insignis uxon cassan contra perfidum nostre religionis hostem Turchum ita nulli dubius esse orbitanti quin eo cessante in aperto et maximo periculo Italia ipsa et Christiani relinquantur. cum ob causam ne dum expediens saluti Italiae et Christianitatis sed omnino necessarium esse censemus qui ipse uxoncassan in ea opinione et proposito belli contra Turchorum gerendi retineat in quo ad presens est. quoniam nulla fortassis turci oprimendi occasio talis esse omissis offeret quisque hec ipsa est sollicitat enim nos principis ille per oratorem suos in terrestr exclamting Turchum Christiani invadant. polliceque si id fiat se rursum potentissimo exercitu iterum descensire omissis nec
inter missirem bellum nisi cum intentione ipsius turci. his orator uxon cassam instat pro responso cum redire cupiat ad principem suom non contentus verbis sed certus de eo quodam Christianis sit faciendum. nos pro debito nostro et salute domini gregis ac quia vetendum est nesi Christiani hanc rem negligant. ipse uxon cassam aliquod fedis cum Turcho ineat quod non essent absque discrimine et detrimento maximo Christianitatis. prompti simul ad faciendum quantum vires nostre valent possemus que utinam soli hoc pondus sustinere quanta neminem gravitatem veres facultates nostre non sufficiunt propterea necesse est ut devotione vestrarn et ceteros Italie potentatus hortam itaque nos filii dilectissimi quibus et privata et publica de ea hunc res concordi esse debte ut oratores hic nostros cum pleno mandato mittatis ad concurrendum simul cum ceteris potentatibus et conferendum impense expeditionis terrestris hoc anno contra Turchum suscipiende sine medio carissimi in Christo filii nostri matthie regis ungarie illustribus sive alio modo pro ut melius videbutur. et hoc cito fiat ut sciamus predicto oratori et principi suo certum responsum dare. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatori die ultima Septembris mcccclxxiiii.

1475

201

Responsive Copiari II

83r

Ab Sixto Papa quarto

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem . super iustis et causis pro forma necessitate fidei catholice et propter apparatus maximos quos terra ac mari immanissimus Turchis inperniciem Christianitatis presertim hoc anno sicut plurimos testimonio accepimus molitur. cum nostre et ecclesie facultates nullo modo sufficerent. unam integram decimam omnium fructum redditum ac proventum esse descasticos imposuimus pro omisis nostris litteris de super confectis continentum hortamur itaque comunitatem vestra atque reuirimus ut collectoribus decimas huiusmodi per loca dominii reipublice vestra deputatis oportunos ac necessarios favore impendere velitis in huic Dei et fidei cause que maxima celeritate indiget vestris et aliorum catholicorum adiuti presidiis sicurere valeamus. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatori die xx Aprilis 1475.

202

Responsive Copiari II

93v

Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictione. nuperrime ad nos venit orator magni et potentis principis assanbech qui plura de illis apparatu optimo et omni invadedendi comunes inimocs nostros Turchos nobis retulit utpote qui dies ac ommissis de salute Christiane reipublice solliciti sumus oratorem quidem ipsum libenter vidimus et beneigne audivimus qui cum ad nos accedere statuerit noluimus eum absque litteris nostris venire hortantes vos velitis hominem hunc pro consuetudine vestra grato omnio recipere et audire commendatumque habere ac principem ipsum per has nostras adhortam et excitare ut in tam utili opere in dies magis perseveret. datum Rome apostolicam sede Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die xxvi Aprilis 1475 Pontificato nostro anno iii.

203

Consulte e Pratiche 60

Die xxvi Aprilis 1475

Verum sit aliquid ordinandum benivolentie factis qui ex exemplo Mediolanensis ducis Venetis novis sociis cum appareat maxima laboraturos esse Turcho hoste insidies magis premente

Johannotius de Pittis eques: pertineri ad veros amicos amicorum re et communes existimari eporteri hanc societatem novam confirmandam esse omnibus modis neque id commodius posse fieri ommissis indifatigatis in periculis ferre auxilium atque id quidem et libenter et celeriter faciendum ut acciepitis beneficium sit et pulchrius in qua enim expectandum esse donec Veneti auxilium petavit cum sit impromptum qui tum auxili indigeant presertim pecuniam

Johannes Canisianus eques: sensit cum prima summa duabis additus cautionibus in caute agatur ne in periculum adducant mercatori Florentini qui in greciam negotiantur tum ut pecunie inde parentur inde minus incommodi ad rempublicam perveniat

Antonius Ridolfis eques: nihil dissentivis a superioribus sententiis admnuit id tantum ut de quantitate prudentie deliberatur in su per quidem secundum vires non dispare ad amicitie officio atque eam consultationem ommissis apariore

Bongiannos Gianfiliatius: idem et suasvi celeritatem

Petrus Minerbeitis, Johannes Florenus: idem

Charolus Nicoli de Medicis: cum hiis qui in suo ordinis sedeant primas sententias probare

Leonardus Bartholinis: idem
Ab Sixto III Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. novissime litteris dilecti filii nobili viri Petri Mocenico ducis Venetiarum accepmus immanissimum illum Turchum Christiani nostris hostem acerrimum classem validam que instructissimam retinere quam sicut signis que aliquorum relatione habetur per mare maius versus partes moldavie pro injuriis ulciscendis omitted clads ibridem suscepte connertere intendit. ex ademptatio nos merito et omitted ad commiserationem calamitatis Christiane quod ad hec ipso pericula consideranda primum igitur quod ad nostrum pastorale officium attinet suplices Deum oravimus quod per alias personas Deo acceptas preces effundi fecimus ut ipse qui preponeris est pro sui novis omitted decertantibus assistat ad omnis catholicos regume et principum ac fidelium populos uniate ut hic truculentissimus hosti Christianorum unibus repellatur devotioni non omitted significet malum duximus et copiam litteram memorati ducis presentibus introduci scimus ut plare intelligati quando indiscriminite non solum moldavie partes verum et omnium Christianos verseritur velitis praetere operare se sucurrere. nos non desiderantes quod ad tamtam belli mole susciendam nostre et ecclesie facultatis nullo modo sufficent concurrentibus auxiliis Christianos presidia exhibere. iuxta vires nostros pollicemur neque aliquo pacto una cum alii huic Dei et fidei cause deereimus, cogitare et ante oculos nostros ponere velitis quidem si dilectus filii nobiliis viri stephani voivoda qui nuper victoria potitus stragem et iacturam maxima Turchis intulit ab eis bello laecissitus Christianos auxiliis se de sciturum senserit et locho cesserit quod deus avertat quantus periculi ungari et germanos populi devotissimi et reliquam Christianitas sub incesserit. quare eandem devotionem vestram pervisera hunc Dei nostri et omitted ipsius Dei et Christiani nomine sententia hortamus in domino ac deprecamur ut visa virestr aliqualam solvenencion facere velitis prout vester conscientie visum fuerit in quo Deo iam primis gratissimum obsequiurum prestavitis et ad gloriam ac laudam rei publice vestre cedit. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die prima Iulii mcccxxv Pontificatus nostri anno quarto.
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. pridum urgente necessitate reipublice Christiane decimam super clero per universas Italiam imposuimus sicut omissis applicus de super et factis et istuc missis iam plene videre potuistis. sed quoniam ii quibus hec quia demandata est nobis scripsersunt id a nobis non fuisse permissum donec aliud deliberantis et propterea nihil aliud de mente vestra deinde referispersit sumus profecto admirati quippe qui persuase simus nobis vos ad id ante alios futuros promptiores. desideramus itaque omnium quam aperte intelligit ut sciamus an decima ipsa in domnio vestro exergenda vel non exorge exortamur et pictamus que litteras vestras. sumus enim ut testari omnes possunt de Christiana fide vehementer solliciti parati pro viribus nihil pretermotere. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die viii Julii mcccclxxv nostri Pontificato quarto.

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Missive I Cancelleria 47
41
Domino Aloysio Guicciardino (in Venice)

Estatto da noi Rinieri da Ricasoli narra che havendo lui insummo gruppo di Stefano di Maiolica da Branditio balle tre di panno di firenze et botte tre doli mandava alla valona a Francescho del Nero. una galea di cotesta illustriissima Signoria cioe la galea dellisola della Braza chiamata lagalera Bracciona prese decto grippo al suasino et levò detti panni et olio et posele a Corfú. per la quale cosa vogliamo siate a costesta illustriissima Signoria et suppliciate in nome nostro che scrivino al balio di Corfú et al padrone di dicta galea che decti panni e olio sieno restituiti al nostro cittadino et mercatante altre ad che faranno cosa degna della loro giustitia et nostra coniunctione ne faranno a noi etiamdio piacere singulare. vale die X Augusti 1475.

207

Responsive Copiarii II

89v-90r

Ab Sixto iii Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. audita tamdem caphensis civitatis direptione que immanissimo hosti preda facta est pro ex copiis litteras dilecti filii nobilis viri Petri Mocenico ducis Venetiarum et (...)prepositi hic in chios videre poteriti qui ampleis dicimus aut suadeamus non satis habemus nisi ut ignaviam nom accusemus qua sit ut cotidie magis Christianam religionem periclitari ante oculos conamus et periculum in dies magis admoneri cum hec omnia futura multo ante prospexerimus et legatis et nuntii et classe iam biennio emissa et facultatibus nostris in omne proficisci genus expositis hortati omnes fuerimus ad ponendas similitates ad concordiam pro republica Christiana susciapiendam ad resistendum hinc crudelissimae pesti ad conservandam religionem pateritis vocibus non semel sed plures
mutaverimus exemplo provocaverimus et nihil conferimus neque et omictamus quod saluti rei publice Christiana conducere possit et tamen in tanto periculo in tam manifesta calamitate nemo insus est ad salutem sese erigere qua se dimino quodam omissis omnibus mentis lumen ereptum sit ut non violeant iminentem omissis cernicibus tempestatem. sed quodam puis et misericordies et iniquitate nostras non respicet neque deferet speram in se non cessabimus verum pro officio nostro pastorali ea omnia temptare quod salutis sum ut omnes intelligant per nos non defuisse quin omnia adhiberimus remedia que presenti temporum conditioni pro facultate nostra adhibueri potuerunt. et quoniam iam eo progressu est immanissimi hostis rabies ut amplius cunctandum non sit statuimus ut omnes Christiani principes oratores suos ad nos mittans ad ea tractandum et consulendum quod hic tam necessarie provionis et communi cause expedere cognoverint quod si fiet ut speramus non dubitamus quin breva omnia bene successura sint et catholicae rationem tanta ignominia liberemus. si vero quod absit ex audite non erunt patris voces in tanto periculo. Deum testamur et homines quem omissis cunnus quem ex nunc imploramus non stetisse pernos quin Christiano sanguini opitularemur et eris rerum in suppremo malicio illum futurum esse qui in causa erit recordande hoc sanctissime expeditionis. cum non cognoverimus devotionem vestram reliogisissimam semper extitisse et omnia prompto anno fecisse que spectant adeo altationem Christianis religionis. hortamus nos omissis modum et per passionem salvatoris vestrem rogamus et omissis vestra auctoritate mandamus ut oratores vestrum cum pleno mandato bene instructum de his hominibus que petinens ad hoc opus sanctum Dei et ad consolendum et oportunas provisiones faciendum mittere velitis qui hic sit ad kalendis novembris proxime futuras simul cum aliis ad quoes et scribimus ut quid agendum sit consultare possumus quoniam et eas ipsa morum non patiatur et vos urgentissime necessitate non defitur vos pro catholico vestro vero non dubitatumus omissis cum agatur de stati defortunis et vita unusciusque quod si tales essent ecclesie facultates ut soli hoc onus sub omissis possumus faceremus libertissime nec quemquam alium ad hoc expectaremus. verum cum soli tanto provincie sufficer non pussumus nuper cum iam supsa vires fecerimus necesse est ut ceteros quo concurrant presidios. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die 11 Septembris mcccclxxv Pontificato nostro anno quinto.

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Missive I Cancelleria 47

47

Carolo Baroncelli consuli

Intendiamo essere morto costa Francesco di Giovanni Ugolini nostro cidadino diche viene al presente costi Antonio suo fratello per recuperatione digni cosa setruova del suo mandato da Jacopo Villani et Benefecto Salviati creditori di dicto Francesco vogliamo insieme col dicto Antonio conogni diligentia procuri che ogni cosa del suo sinnivenga et faccile de porre apresso a Bartholomeo Pecori o apresso di Philippo Pasquini le quali cose uno dedecti tengha a petizione desopra decti suoi creditori et in ogni cosa ne exeguisca la volontà di Jacopo Ugolini et Benedecto Salviati farai ogni
cosa con tale diligentia che meritamente ti possiamo commendare. vale die xi Septembris 1475.

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Missive I Cancelleria 47

47

Raguseis

Venit cum his ad vos literis baldus altovita nobilis civis noster quem mittit Joannes Benitus creditor Marini mercatoris Ragusei quemadmodum ex baldo ipso coram intellegit in totissima est iustitia vestra et nostra amicitia pregamus valete apud vos utrumque neque opus est modo quod scribi plenunque solet in litteris commendatutis ut aliquid demore conceditis benito nostro iustitia facis est. valete die xvi Septembris 1475.

210

Responsive Copiari II

91rv

Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. et si nuperrime ad vos scripserimus ut ad kalendas Novembris oratorum vestrum hic habitetis cum pleno mandato ad consultandum ea quot opus essent ad expeditionem adversus hostem Christiani nominis. in quia alia et intelleximus imminentia pericula que eam mora non patiuntur hortamus vos plurimum et applicat iterum auctoritate mandamus ut que ceptis presentibus oratorem ipsum vestrum aut plenum mandatum omisissis vestro hic mittere velitis quoniam et aliis hoc idem scribimus neque id tempus velitis expectare nam eo res iam deducta est ut misi celeriter provvideatur dubitamus non cum velimus postea providere possimus. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die xvii Septembris mcccclxxv Pontificato nostro anno quinto.

211

Missive I Cancelleria 47

50

Raguseis

Venit ad vos cum his litteris nostris Constantius Landuccius procurator et gestor negociorum Cipriani insigni nobilis civis nostri et benemeriti de republica et statu
nostro ut pecunias quasdam Hieronymi insignii filii sui recuperet quas Antonio Martori mercator vestro in Bursia crediderat atque ex quibus id serici quod istuc ad vertum esse intellleximus coemit. rogamus ergo nos in huius civis nostri iustitiae faveatis videtur enim imprimis satisfactum esse debere ei ut pecunias contribuís ad seriam coemendum. sed vos melius res intelligetis qui nos scriberemus et Constantius ipse coram omnia explicabit clarius. feceritis nobis rem ad modum gratam si eum nostra causa experitis benigne dedertisque operam ut que celerrime expeditus redire ad nos possit. valete die xix Septembris 1475.

212

Responsive Copiari II

91v-92r

Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo

The king of Hungary wrote to the pope that omissis sit accelerandum in provisionibus adversus impiissimum hostem faciendis omissis. Florence must send ambassadors to Rome

Septembris mcccclxxv pont. nostri anno 5

1476

213

Responsive Copiari II

96v

Ab Sixto III Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem . quid ad oratorem nostrum super rebus reipublice Christiane necessariis mandatum miseritis plurimum nos laudavimus in domino fecitis quod catholicos viros decet et quod omnes de nostra pietate sperabat. superest ut in religionis ad rei expeditionem necessaris nonnulla intermittatus sed ad tale iam provisione deveniater. qualiter tempora exigunt et omissis vestra pietas pollicetur. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die iii Februarii mcccclxxvi Pontificato nostro anno quinto.

214

Missive I Cancelleria 47

68

Francisco Dino
Altra volta scrivemo a messer Luigi operassi apresso acotesta illustissima Signoria la restituzione di certe balle di panni et botti dolio mandava Rinieri da Ricasoli alla valona a Francesco del Nero che furono tolte da una galea dicotesta illustissima Signoria come piú appieno sarai informato da ipso Rinieri delle quali robe nesono restituite parte et parte ne resta a restituire. voliamo sia acotesta illustissima Signoria et operi Rinieri de Ricasoli cictadino et mercatante nostro sia interamente restituito come si conviene alla nostra amicitia e confederatione nostra. vale die xxiii Februarri 1476.

Florentine calendar: die xxiii Februarri 1475

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Missive I Cancelleria 47

73

Joannetto de Villamarina

Viene in coteste parti el nobile cittadino nostro Pierfrancesco Tosinghi padrone di una delle nostre galee. potrebbe per qualche cosa havere bisogno della opera vostra o del vostro favore apresso la maestà del re. preghiamo strenissimamente di quelle cose che vi richiedeva lo favoregiate per nostro amore che ve ne resteremo obligatissimi. se mai accadera dimostremo cofacti havere ricevuto dalla v.m il favore. vale die xxviii Martii 1476.

216

Responsive Copiari II

97r

Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. promptitudinem cum nostri in oblatione secundi subsicii vehementer apud omnes commendavimus fecistis eam id quod de catholicis et religiosis viris expectabamus. verum eum hec ipsa expeditio cui incumbimus magnis videatur indigere subsidis aliquid oblationibus factis addendum putavimus et a nobis ommissis que scribus nostris s.d.r. pater et cardinalibus incipientes taxam omnibus auximus nobis et ipsis cardinalibus de triginta millibus ad quadraginto, carissimo in Christo filio nostro Ferdinando Sicilie regi illustri de triginta ad triginta quinque ne parva pro re alciui opportunitati deesse cogamur. speramus omnes quidem additamentum hoc libentissime et promptissime sucepturos nec defuturos imparvo. qui in magno tam alacros se ostendunt. dilectum quoque filium nobilem virum galeatium mariam
ducem Mediolani ad triginta milita taxavimus et credimus eum in hoc acquieturum. ad quod et vos eum velitis hortari iure confederationis. certos que qui adhuc no obtulerint taxavimus et ut cum aliis concurrunt paterna vigilanti qua insistemus aducemusque in sententiam Deo duce et eorum nobis pieta pollicetur. quia quare vos filii dilectissimi hortamur et rogamus in domino ut taxam adductione huiusmodi libenter suscipere velitis. vестросоре oratoris quod et aliis scribus faculatem dare illam ratificandi acceptandique absolute et absque sola conditione nequid abstet quominus celeretur tam sancto pioque operi detur mitum. preterea filii dilectissimi videntos nobis pp. tam magnum additione pro aliorum exemplo et publlica utilitate suscepam necesse fore ut impersis multus presertum gentum armorum paremis et quibusdam alis destituamur presidiis. equissimum videtur ut et nos et reliqui ad quod scribus. velitis permittere et nobis fidem dare quod eritis nobis auxilio et protectioni siquis quod in no credimus non lacessitus a nobis nostra et dicte ecclesie loca bello invadere aut quovis modo perturbare caperet aut seducere auderet ne viribus nostris pro salute publica spoliati incommodum et detrimentum subeamus. quod vos supra sapientia singulari et ceteri recte sententius optime possint considerite. datum apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die viii Mai mcccclxxvi Pontificato nostro anno quinto.

217

Responsive Copiari II

98r

Ab Sixto III Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii apostolicam benedictionem. pro defensione rei publice Christiane que ut nulli observum est in maximo versatur pericule assidue cogitantes totis his mensibus cum nostris et aliorum Italie potentatum oratoribus egimus ut ei certum ei decerneter subsidum in que et per totum triennium proxime futurum iuxta taxam quas iusta impositionem, nostram quilibet acceptaverat et iam nos ulto pro parte nostra polliciti oramus liberaliter sumus. carissimo in Christo filius nostri Ferdinandus Sicilie rex illustri dilectisque filii nobiles viri Venetiarum et ferrarie duces plenam absque exceptione mandatum ad oratores suos miserunt. rem tam piam ac tam necessarih aplactentes expectabatur mandatum rei publice nostre a qua non minus que a quo piam alio P.P. innatam pretatem animum que ad publica commoda semper promptum speratur ab omnibus. misistis illud quidem nuper sed non eiusmodi quod rei de qua agitur satus faciat. nam ommissis ceteras difficultatis solum pro una vice dumtaxat loquit et cum ea conditione si mario pars Italie populum contribuat non potevimus ob id non mirari atque dolere. mirari qui preter omnium expectatione et precipe dumtaxat deputate vestra opinionem acciditi dolere quia merentur ne id coram pertubit eam et cum pene conactam subuertat. non cernitur in hoc mandato ea liberalitas et promptitudo quam hortemis polliceti estis et que nos decet. immo ut libere loquamur subterfugium quoddam hoc videri posset. quia ut contribuat maior pars populum Italie hoc nec querendum ommissis nec exigi debet cum impossible fit quare dilectissimi filii facint. mittat a mandatu liberum non de imo anno sed de triennio non ut maior pars populum Italie concurrat quod impossibile esset sed sit

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absque illa(ulla) conditione presertim cum ita tractatum fit. ut contractum cum his et non cum maior parte populos ut optime nostri fieri debeat. satis ommissis pretati vestro et nostre omniumque expectationi. consulte honori nostro et comuni utilitati velitis taxaque quindecim millium ducatorum in quacumque summa libere exhibere que alii additiones acceptarunt et nos in prima taxa remansitis hoc pro pastorali monemus offero hoc saltor nos ter qui vos et alius pretios sanguine scernit suo postulat hoc necessitasque exigat quare paterna nos hortamur et rogamus in domino caritate ut mandatum ipsam in ea forma quam dicimus et in qua alii prenominati miserunt quam primum mittere velitis ut in cepta pro seque et feliciter domino auctore terminare possimus. quo eius feceritis speramus et dilectum filium nobilem virum galeatium mariano ducem Mediolani pro tuis religione et putatu m in rem publicam Christianam ex ommissis vestro piame hanc et necessariam ommissis non defertum datur fulgime. sub anulo piscatori die xxvii Augusti mccclxxvi Pontificato nostro anno sexto.

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Responsive Copiari II

98v

Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem audit dilecto filio Antonio de Tornabuonis sindico vestro contributionem subsidii anni presentis offere ricequesque cur pro reliquis duobus annis nunc obligationem non facitis afferente contenti sumus obligationem pro uno anno accipere et ita acceperimus sperantes seu potuis confidentes quod tamquam optimi Christiani et studiosissimi utilitatis publice quotiens necessitas postulabit in comuni causa non deeritis. datum fulginei sub anulo piscatori die xxiii Septembris mccclxxvi pont. nostri anno sexto.

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Missive I Cancelleria 47

102

Joahanni Villemarine

Lamore che vi portiamo cia pigliare confidenza in richiedervi: havete nelle mani Giovanbattista di Pasquale Genovese al presente ma antiquamente Fiorentino et e parenti suoi qui sono dibuona conditione in modo che havendo richiesti di questa littera volentieri compiaciuti per chiariv che per nostro amore gli doniate la libertà farettecene piacere assai et accedendo vi ricorderemo del piacere che farete. vale die xv Novembris 1476

220

Missive I Cancelleria 47
Fratri Antonio Ursino Magno Magistro Rodi

Mortuis sunt superiore tempore in navi cui operat Manfredus Papponius Pisanus civis Mariceris Vermillus et Dominicus Tovalias cives nostri. in res mercimonia. Florence asks to the Grand Master of Rhodes the wares of these Florentine merchants.
die primo (s.d.) mcccclxvii

Responsive Copiari II

Ab Ioanne de Villamarina

Excelsi et potentes domini post commendatione. quamvis diebus hiis non longe decursis vestris responsium dedeim litteris. Tum cum magnifici Pisanorum consuli hominem potestate munitum ideo per me mittere potuerunt. replicandos iterum respondebo et primo breve siffate littere imo summo opere oblectarunt. Tum quia an meum avventum in eo quod petebam vestre intevertebant dominationes et ad affatos consules maris scripserant ut casum benigni in portu vestro susceperint. sed que cumeque est opus esset ut amico subministrarentur. tum etiam quo vestre dominationes me ob id super amasse noviquid immixtumam pollizeone constituit. itaque viris dominationibus iteris innumerables refero gratias dominus Joannes consul ut vestre dominationes noverunt cum omisiss hic contulisse illico ad me venit umquam nomine potum et qucumque opus esse mih optulit petitque homines et res vestras nec non et Genoenses per me a securi debere cui responsium dedi infinitas gratias retulit res que vestras ut mea pro ut diu expedite mihi menti. curare et custodire ac ab alis iuxte posse curari et custodire me obtuli Genoenses non cum serenisissimo per egi innimicantur asservari negavi. nihil aliud inter me et ipsum allocutam neque omisiss expetita demum ut potuerunt me vestro magnificum orlandum davela potestaque sussultum ad eos nisi ut quid petebant audiret quo reverso quicquid perit audiri et nihil aliud dixerent netque potuerunt nisi id quod in omisiss me et ad affatum consulent supra alloqutum fuit petendo de verbis illis scripturas et fiere debent cumeque benignes homines et res vestres aservare que tutissime sunt in honestum et obsurdì mihi videri quam ob antiquam amicitiam benivolentiam que et comodo per eadem dominus mihi noviter illatas has vestras res ut supervis dixi medium commendatas sed in maximam habebo veneratione. ego enim sic maturus sum quod cum amicorum damna sentio dolore conciter vestris siquis particularis persona in domni ve alioque neretur que vereri non licet et omisiss securn velit omisiss quod non poset illi vel illis libenter concedam. Genoenses non assecureare tum que dicto meo serenisissimo domino regi inimicant tum itaque eius omisiss et subditi in hoc potu et in viaque opprimuntur pariter et omisiss neque iustum neque honestium facere iudet maxime illos tuto facere in locis illis in quibus me et alios regias subditos sicasus acciderit vestre dominationes difendasse neque tuto reddere non poterant.
cum me ad alios affatos defensare non possent nisi in tu per alzatam aut prope turra et in flumine. si in vestris locis vestris dominationibus placebit dummodo que Genoenses ipse ibidem dictos regios subditos stemos faciant eos libenti anno observabo aliter sine mei honoris omisissi id facere non possum quod vestre dominatione non velleit non vereror Petrum Luchensens quem vestre petunt dominationes liberari quibus me comendo ex portu Pisano vestro prope turras xvi Novembris indicione 6.

1477

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Responsive Copiari II

108 rv

Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. quod ad oratorem vestrum super rebus rei publice Christiane necessariis mandatum miseritis pluriumum vos laudamus in domino fecistis quod catholicos viros decet et quod omnes de vestra pietate sperabant. superest ut in reliquis ad rei expeditionem necessariis mora nulla intermittantur. sed iam ad tale provisionem deverniatur qualem tempora exigunt et spectata unam pietas pollicet. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die iii Februarii mcccclxxvii Pontificatus nostri anno quinto.

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Responsive Copiari II

110 rv

Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. considerantes quanto in periculo sit res Christiana et quotidie magis in partibus prefectum ungarie Turchorum sevitia exerescat. designavimus nuper ad partis illas apostolice sedis legatum dilectum filium nostro omisissi sancte procedis per omisissi cardinalem novariensis ut et illos paci principum quod huic communi cause conducit studeat et consulat qui prope die iter accipiet. sed ut melius res geri et fidei preforte subveniri possit ordinamus ut mediatem subsidii presentis anni quod singulos Italie potentatum tangit secum deserat. aliter enim insanis et irrita quod amno esset illius profertio devotionem igitur vestram quod semper pro vestra putare et religione ad hoc pactum opus promptissimos cognovimus. per presenter hortamur pro studio ut medietatem dicti subsidii vos tangentis quod est quindecimillium ducatorum ad nos que primum mitter velitis. scribimus odem et ceteris potentatibus et nos iam nostrum paravimus. ita enim filii dilectissimi cum Dei omnipotentis cuius quoque causa agitur auxilia labanti
Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 77

53v-54r

Die viii Julii mcccclxxvii

Florentine calendar: die viii Julii mcccclxxvi

responsium oratori Veneto quod consulit

Aloysiuys Guicciardinis
Angelus Stufa
Antonius Ridolfus equites
Bongiovannes Gianfiliatum
Bernardus Bonhieronymus Iurisconsultus et
Laurentius Medices

Richiedeva che non obstante la richiesta altra volta facta alla Santità del Papa et datone alui notitia per non parere di concorrere al presente alla contributione contro al Turcho per essere mutate le conditioni di Italia et che per pericolo che nuovamente si veghono per la invasioni del Turcho in diversi luoghi si dovessi conscendere alla domanda della Santità del Papa et a quella parte della contributione che si domanda fu consigliato si rispondesse in questa forma.

Magnifico imbasciadore molto ci dispiace quello che intendiamo da voi de pericoli ogni di magiori per gli apparati et successi del Turcho et perché ogni fortuna della illustissima Signoria di Vinegia reputiamo come per la nostra amicitia et confederatione et perché è connessa a questa causa vostra colla causa commune della religione Christiana pella quale noi sappiamo questo si conviene a noi et a ogni fedele Christiano ma considerando le presenti seditione d’Italia et nostre ci pare da pensare alle cose piú presso et stare proveduto aogni caso che arreca la fortuna maximamente perché inventa la città nostra come voi sapete pelle seditioni de tempi non è in quello essere che sanza sconcio grande si potessi fare et nondimeno come altra volta dicemo quando el resto di Italia concorresse sappiamo il luogho nostro et faremo il nostro debito et insieme cogli altri concorreremo secondo le forze nostre et satisfaremo al debito della amicitia et della religione Christiana.

1478
Addi 27 scrissi alla vostra Signoria di poi ieri lo oratore Viniziano ebbe lettere da Vinegia dalla sua illustrissima Signoria che lavisa come lavevono fatto la pace col Turcho et che subito tale cosa notificasse al papa et poi a cardinali et conferito con noi tali aviso et parendogli che tutti insieme andassimo al Papa examinato prima che parole sovesse avisare in sua compagnia ci presentammo a piedi del Pontefice. Loratore Viniziano espose quanto aveva incomissione et mostrò che la cagion che a questo aveva indotto la sua illustrissima Signoria era per salute delle cose loro et di loro colligati et constretti da omisssis et non per propria volunta. Il Pontefice rispose noi non possiamo laudare tali cosa ne la possiamo credere perché non possono fidarsi della fede dello inimico di Christo pure sia quello che si vuole noi siamo certi che quello illustissimo domino et non marirà mai la sua vera devotioni verso la religione Christiana et che sua intenzione era posare questa novità d Italia accioché per tutti e Christiani si possi fare e provedimenti convenienti et che fra pochi giorni lo vidremo questa notitia do pro mio debito alle vostra Signoria alle quali mi raccomando.

Magnifico orator iersera avemo lettere da Vinegia de di xxì per le quali siamo avisati la pace infra il Turcho et quella Signoria essere conclusa per mezzo di quello secretario che mandarono al Turcho adì xxv del passato in Constantinopoli con grande consenso cosi del Turcho con degli altri che gli sono datorno parci una grande novella et di qualità che fu molto migliore tanto le conditioni nostre habbiate voluto dare questo aviso per bene dallo imbasciadore Viniziano ne doverai essere informato prima. xxiiiì Februarii.
Per diverse vie si scrive che il re Ferrando fa preparatione alla guerra, raduna denari per ogni via vende castella a qualunque persona che intende a danari solda gente e fa alcuna cosa necessaria alla guerra informa che dimostra essere volto piuttosto alla guerra che alla pace. Intendendo alcuno particolare ne daro notizia alla vostra Signoria

*omissis*

Rome die 5 Martii 1478

**228**

Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di Filippo Pandolfi a Roma

8rv

Al continuo si sente di più luoghi il re Ferrando fare molti provvedimenti a fatto fare molte artiglierie et carta con spingarde per mandare a Talamone et di Viterbo a mandato 300 muli che portino vettovaglia in quello di Siena. A Genova a mandato per soldati navi et fa fare ogni demonstrazione dessere volto alla guerra come le signorie vestre peraltro mi debbono meglio intendere.

die Martii 1478

**229**

Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di Filippo Pandolfi a Roma

Da dieci

8rv

Per lettere del passato da Vinegia (XXVI) abbiamo inteso con grandissimo piacere che quella illustissima Signoria aveva deliberato in poregari et così significano al nostro imbasciadore di marci per capo delle gente che quella Signoria manda in favore nostro (the letter carry on with a list of several condottieri names).

XVI Martii

**230**

Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di Filippo Pandolfi a Roma

9rv

Ieri ebbe lettere il Papa della maestà del re Ferrando scritte a mano che lamostri per tutta la corte promette fare mirabilia et a sui spese et per mare et per terra et usa ogni atto in tenere fermo il papa a questa impresa et costoro che dipendono eda lui in ogni cosa sono vili e gagliardi secondo lettere et offerte che ne fa il re.
11 Martii 1478

231

Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di Filippo Pandolfi a Roma

10rv

Di nuovo non cie cosa alcuna salvo ieri passarono per qui circa 70 muli charichi di panni et drappi et alchuni danari vanno in quello di Siena per dare la prestante alle genti darme della maestá del re dimostrano volersi a buonora preparsi alla guerra. la venuta del conte carlo et deifebo in Toscana benché dia che pensieri a costor non la possono credere o vero così fingono ma ogni volta che solo le persone loro saranno così et indicato per li amici omissis xiii Martii 1478.

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Responsive Copiari II

135v-136r

Ab Sixto Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. novissime venerunt littere a carissimo in Christo filio nostro Mathia Hungarie rege illustri ad oratores apud nos suos quibus ille significat cogi se necessario ad ineundis cum Turchorum principe tregua pluresque in eamdem rem rationes adducit interqua illa precipua est que tot laboribus fatigatus tot expensis exhaustus amplius tantam solus sustineri non potest. id quidem non sine dolore audivimus ne si fieret cogitare unusquisque potest que tum danni atque detrimenti Christianas rebus eventint. turcus enim ipse cum potentiam Hungarorum admodum pertimeseat quasi insecuritatem ob huiusmodi treguas adductus redderetur profecto ardentior atque animosior incommune Christianorum perniciem et ruinam. accedit quoque Christianas nationes Hungarum ipsias adiacentes et vicine videntes tantam fidei nostrae pugile sibi deesse consternarentus animo et afflicius malis quem Turchi ipsi continue inferuit tanquam derelicti succumberet quo fit ut non ab re verendum sit ne et ipsi tandem conditione cum Turchis obligetur et vel treguas vel pacem ineant. sicque perfidissimus ille hostis indices magis animos affamens ad penetrandum tamquam intima Christianorum inquam eorum exitum debaccandum eo liberiores aditum littere quo minores sibi vires obstare plures autem inamicitas vinculos animadverteret. nos ex pastorali officio regem ipsum litteris nostris paterni atque ex cordis affecti fumus exhortati ne ad huissusmodi treguas vel pacem descendat. nihilominus quia comunis res agitur in vigilandum nobis est repenteque succurendum presertum cum videamus inimicum a propinquare quotidie et fortiorem freri qui omissis ut omnes iam aperte nocuit nihil aliud quam Christianos sanguinem omissis nihil que aliud machinatur quam in extremam eorum desolationem. quam obrem non est diutius immorandum
periculum prope est et ante oculos positum ita ut evitare misi celeri et efficaci remedio non possit. quis enim dilecti filii Rempublicam Christianam in tanta necessitate sicut omnes vident constitutam minare et tutare non debeat patiemur ne ut per ignavia nostram(vestram?) prevaleat adversus nos inimicus. velitis meminisse vos esse Christianos revolvite animo quid et que tum omnipotenti Deo sancteque religione debeatis. ferenda quidem sunt ab omnibus subsidia ut minis potentissimi hostis contundantur si nobis consuluisse si Deo satisfecisse si Orthodoxam fidem servasse volumus prout velle debemus quare devotionem vestra quarto studio possumur hortamur et pervisera misericordie Ihesus Christi obtestamur ut animu disponatis adferendum subsidium illudque cum affectum pretestis. pridem prestemus scribemus et ceteris. nos autem qui et notes et dies ea semper cogitamus quibus nefandissima hoc lues tolle possit opem nostram advinatibus ceteris addemus prompteque prestabimus solut scitis omnia non possumus et conatus dum taxat nostri in tanto negotio sine alio auxilio exigeri sunt. quemadmodum unusquisque pro sapientia sua potest considerare. datum a Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die xxvi Aprilis mcclxxviii Pontificatus nostri anno septimo.

1479

232

Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive lettere di Filippo Pandolfi a Roma

42v

Da Napoli ci fu iersera lettera di Benedetto Salutati et contano come li era aviso da Otranto che avevano per una nave venuta da Costantinopoli come il Turcho et per mare et per terra metteva a ordine venire allo assedio di Raugi. la quale cosa alla maestà del re dava sospetto come è ragionevole perché omissis a vise ragione di poterlo credere.

xiii Maii 1479

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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di Filippo Pandolfi a Roma

49r
Et però questa sententia si darà secondo il parere della maestà del re ferrando da che in ogni cosa dipendono, il quale benché per quanto si dica dimostri per lettere essere gagliardo nientedimeno intendo che in segreto desidera la pace ne è volto alla guerra perché conosce lui avuta a fare in maggiore parte la spesa e senza speranza dalcuno acquisto. et ha anch'ora qualche sospetto della armata di viniziani la quale si avesse fatto dimostrazione di offenderlo si iudica per tutti et per cosa certa si tiene che arresi la ommissis et ad votum.

Rome die XXVI Maii 1479

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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di Filippo Pandolfi a Roma

49v

Iersera ci fu lettera dal governatore di Fano et conta come nel porto di Fano e d Ancona è arrivato 2 fuste di Turchi et anno fatto altissimi danni in modo che quegli luoghi sono tutti inpauriti et quegli da nuovo scrivono a nostro signore che farà qualche provedimento aliter che saranno constrettì proveddervì loro per quello modo che meglio potranno questa nuova a data a tutta questa corte spavento et iudicas che alla conclusione della pace tali cosa abbi grandemente a giovare.

xxvii Maii 1479

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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di Filippo Pandolfi a Roma

50r

La Santità ommissis facendo lungo sermone et cominciando a riferire ommissis avevano più volte pregato e supplicato a sua ommissis per mezzodi sua imbasciadori ommissis che volesse mettere Italia in pace solo afine che meglio et più facilmente si potesse fare qualche buona provisione contro al Turcho. il quale già si poteva dire che era in Italia et ultimo loro ricordo come noi nella prima expositione avevamo anch'ora a questo fine chiesto la pace et conoscendo essere suo debito obbigare per tutte le a lui possibile al nemico della fede di Christo: era contento a questo fine defendere alla pace sanza havere molta consideratione et rispetti che in altro tempo meritamente avrebbe avuti.

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Signori otto di pratica dieci di balia legazioni commissarie missive 10 lettere di Filippo Pandolfi a Roma
Alargandosi molto in quello che segui ad 29 diche per l'ultima detti notizia et come il Viniziano aveva ricusato non volere concorrere a provvedimenti che contro al Turcho facessimo a fare et che il Milanese et io benché con parole non chiare piú concluudemero et diremo confirmarci col Viniziano. Et tandem concludi che poi che il fine per lo quale principalmente la sua Santità si muoveva a fare la pace non può conseguire se omisssis agli uomini che per lui non resta omisssis.

237

Dieci di Balia Responsive balie 25

170rv

Magnifici domini mei post commendationem. ultima mia fu adì questo et di poi non ho altro da voi ne di qua è accaduto cosa da darne notitia se non che ieri questa illustissima Signoria mi fece notificare come uno frate certosino stato priore alla certosa di Napoli era venuto qui priore in questo loro monasterio et di omisssis priore era stato dinanzi alla loro illustriissima Signoria et presentatogli omisssis lettere della credenza della maestà del re per la quali pregava instantanee questa illustriissima Signoria che se degnassi presto plenis sua fede a questo in suo nome per el predecto priore gli fussi exposto le quali lettere lecte comincio el pore ad exponere a questa illustriissima quanto la maestà del re era desiderosa omisssis dimostrando con efficace et verisimili ragioni con dimostrazioni et ricordare la buona amicizia et observanza la lega fu fra quella illustriissima Signoria et la maestà del re Alfonso sogiungendo molti benefici factogli con placentia di questa illustriissima per la maestà del re Alfonso et sua nelle loro onorentie et bisogni maxime contro al Turcho et in tempi che niuna altra potentia se voluta scuprir a far contro di lui. scuso et i casi de Cypri justificandoli et dimostrande edifecti non essa proceduti da sua maestà. similmodo scuso la andata del figliuolo al Soldano dicendo quella et cioè che lui omisssis esser stato contro al suo volere et tutte le predicte cose et pose il priore predeto in parole et ragioni efferisce et verisimili ragioni perché questa illustriissima prestasse piena fede a questo per lui sera detto questa illustriissima Signoria gli rispose bene consulere et differi secondo la usanza sua. la riposta in altro tempo si sa sel predecto priore vorra dire altro et questa illustriissima Signoria ha detto darà notitia di questo in questa vi succederá. sono circa vii giorni che ne di Lombardia ne dicosti omisssis nova veruna diche per questa Signoria et per noi se ne piglia grande amiratione omisssis

Venetiis die vi Septembri mcccclxxix

Tommaso Soderini

238
Die vii Septembris mcccclxxix

Responsio facta fratri Sebastiano priori Sancti Martini nuntio spectabilissimi domini regis Ferdinandi per illustriissimum dominum Venetorum.

Che noi havemo lecto la lettera della maestà del re et audito quanto la paternità sua ne ha referito per nome de questa Signoria pp. che in verità tutto ne è stato gratissimo non perché la cagione voglia che della mente di sua celsissima così nelle cose di Cypri come in tutte le altre se crede altrimenti ma perché piú per molti casi intervenuti non mancha chi verisimilmente ne possi havere facto diverso iudicio et presertim per i presenti movimenti et turbationi delle cose di Italia la concio delle quali havemo desiderato et desidereremo come è ben noto alla prefacta maestà oltre a tutti gli altri respecti et cause a fine omnibus de reintegrazione et firmamento di buona sincera et perpetua amicitia fra noi la quale oltre che la sua honesta per se et laudabile cosa è stata in hora favorevole et utile alle cose deluno et delelatre. in queste poche omiscesemocerti che sua omisces habbi inteso il nostro iudicio et existimatione della mente della prefacta maestà fundacta in ragione et in che intendi del desiderio nostro che tolto via ogni rancore et ogni dispiacere delle cose di Italia noi che i compagni nostri viviamo colla omisces in che quello amore in quella carita et sincerita che longamente havemo viso et è degna cosa che fra iservitori nostri et sua posterita se conservi et però non saremo piú longhi essendo sua omisces prudentissima et intendendo per la forma di queste parole in che convenendo li animi di tutte le parti in cotale buona disposizione come in verità semo dal canto nostro et lui ne aferma et noi vedemo sia la maiestà regia dal canto suo facile et pronto sera el potere venire a quelli termini di tutte cosa che meritano essere da tutti desiderata.

1480

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Dieci di Balia Responsive balie 25

omisces 406r

Magnifici domini mei omisces ho scripto alle s.v. per non dare spesa dimandare sintende et adì xxvii del passato a hore una di noche ricevette con delle s.v dedixxiii per la quale midanno notitia quello era seguito insino allora disarzana et come per detta ragione le s.v haveano mandato a Siena s. Allexandro Braccini allo illustrissimo s. ducha di calavria et la risposta havea ricevuto et etiamdio fui advisato come insino a quel tempo di lorenzo le sv. non haveano altro: la mattina seguente che hebbi ricevuta la vostra lettera fui costi allillustriissima Signoria prima la ringratiai per parte
delle s.v degli piaceri et comodità haveano dato a Antonio de Medici nella sua andata in Ghostantinopoli et etiamdio nel suo ritorno mostrando quanto tutto era stato grato alle s.v che mi rispesero che quello haveano fatto per Antonio de Medici Io haveano fatto volentieri et di buona voglia et che cosi sarebbono sempre disposti in qualunche cose potessino fare che credessero fosse grata alla vostra m. s. Venetis die iii Januarii mccccxviii

Aloysius Guicciardinis

240

Responsive Copiari II

153v-154r

Ab Sixto Papa IIII

Dilecti filii salutem et pace in domino sempiterna. ex litteris Rhodianorum cognovimus civitatem et insulam Rhodi a Turcis obsideri remque in periculo esse itaque ad subveniendum illis licet hactenus non desuerimus oportunam nunc classem cum auxilio Christianorum principum et potentatum parandam statuimus ex quo spes datur ne dum Rhodianos liberatum sed Turcos ipsos profigatam eri et cum causa heac communis fit debet ab omnibus consoveri. igitur ad presentem expeditionem taxatio unius civiusque facta est secundum quam contribuere debeat pro ut in cedula his acclusa continetur et nos primum taxam nostram iam persoluimus. taxa autem vestra octo milium ducatorum est. quare hortamur devotione vestram velitis ad hoc pro zelo fidei vos propios exhibere pecuniamque huiusmodi quanto cuius hic mittere ut quo celerius eri subsidium tanto opportunus huic rei consulatur. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die nona Julii mcccclxxx Pontificatus anno nono.

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Responsive Copiari II

154v-155v

Ab Sixto Papa IIII

Dilecti fiili salutem et apostolicam benedictionem cum oratorem vestrum una cum alis in concistorio evocassissemus horatoremque uniusqueque ad securandum omni diligentia et celeritate eam contributione qua eorum potenentibus omiressis per res Christiana in maiori periculo constituta esse non posset. adeo ut ne minima que de mora pati posse videretur et nos iam in presidium Rhodianum pro prius necessitate libenter contulissemus responsum est nobis ab oratoribusipsis suspitione apud nos in illos esse ne bellum in Italia oriretur proptererea cupere se de hoc fieri per nos certiores ut qua pro communi salute facienda essent liberioribus animus facere possent. nos quidem ut ipsis diximus non omiressis sumus qui Italicam pacem perturbare in animo
habeamus qua toto Pontificatus nostri tempore omnis studio omni cura et vigilantia conservare semper sum conati presentum in his temporibus quibus ea ingruit periculi magnitudo ut nihil alius magis cogemus quam quomodo unitis interse potentatum Italorum animis immanissime Turcorum potentia resistatur. itaque non est quod a nobis aut ab eis spatiali quadam devotione ad defendendum nos et apostolicam sanctam sede nuper se obligarunt et promiserunt et nos e converso Italie quid timeri debet firmiter tenenter que vos quoque una cum confederatus vestri erga Italice pacis securitatem et conservationem id facietis pro ut facere tenemini. quare hortamur vos perviscera misericordia Dei nostri ut comunis periculi admonitori ea considerare velit que ad pubblicam salutem pertineant. habemus hostem ante oculos iam maximis apulie numerosa classe infestatur videtur si Ragusio aut Rhodio potiatur quod Deus pro iuret sua averta nihil reliquum fit nobis ad salutem. in hoc omne cura collocande sunt omissis quibuscumque aliis simulatibus in hanc solam expeditionem amitendum est. audiatis paterna vecse comune periculum consideretis quanta opus sit celeritate metiarni. quod ad devotionem vestrum attinet ole contribuzione ne differatis idem alius scribimus. nam si intempero necessaria non praestans auxilia quicquid postmodum fiet prout facere omnino necesserit servum eri et irritum. nos primi que potuius fecimus parati et facere que facultas nostra prestare poterit. soli non possuimus erimus apud omnes excusati si vitam manifesta calamitate paterna noces audite non erunt. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die xxvii Julii mcccclxxxx Pontificatus anno nono.

242

Responsive Copiari II

156rv

A Sixto Pontefice quarto

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. ex litteris carissimi filii nostri Ferdinandi Siciliae regis illustris et eorum qui maritima littera apulia accolunt facti simus certiores perfissimos Turcos venisse nuper cum numeroso classe ad ea loca iocoque civitatem obsidere et omnia ibi flama ferroque devastare ita ut nisi celeri occuratur remudio dubitandum sit ne incetera loca Italiae penetrent. nam ea civitate expungnata difficillimum esses resistere quin ulterios pro arbitrio labi possent. quamobrem considerata vicina et imminentalamitate non est aliqua ex parte cunctandum sed celerrime ne ulterius serpat subveniendum. vos ergo dilecti filii per misericordiam Dei nostri obtestamur ut taxam illam qua superioribus diebus taxati fuistis hic sine mora mittatis. nos taxam nostrarum in promptur limenes videtis periculum ante oculos communem rei est consulendum. urget manifesta necessitas. nulla eum acceleratio ante ipos esse potest quin imo verendum est ne subsidium sit tardum. datum Rome apud Sancti petri sub anulo piscatoris die quinta Augusti mcccclxxx pont. nostri anno nono.

243

Responsive Copiari II
A Ferdinando rege Sicilie

Rex Sicilie et magnifici et ecellentissimi domini amici nostri carissimi. facile credimus civitate stat vehementissime commota fuisse audio nuntio de adventu Turcorum in Apulia ob que Hydruntine urbis obsidione quemadmodum nuper ad nos scripsistis, iam per littere enim cognitus et perspectus est nobis non levibus argumentis vester in nos animus praeterea ea esse amicitia et confederatio qua iungimur ut quecumque sive prospera sue adversa nostrum communia esse debant et presertum ea que impendet a comuni omnium Christianorum hoste pervicacissimo atque potentissimo. qui obrem primus agimus nobis gratias ingente per communi commodo perturbari fueritis. deinde per tam necessario tempore auxilium octomilium ducatorum auri nobis sed ministraveritis quod orator vester nobis exsolvit. non sumus nescii rem nobis esse cum hoste potentissimo ex a quanto valde tumendum sit verum aderit nobis omnipotens deus que ut scribitis non est verosimile deserturum populum suum. aderit etiam autoritate et praesidiis suis summi pontifex qui audito eo insperato nuntio nihil pratermisit quod ad pastoralis offici curam pertinuerit. nec deevunt confederatorum nostrorum subsidia qui existimat agi de eorum domino et salutem. ita Deo populum suum bene omissis et nobis reliaque bene providentibus et curantibus speramus breve futurum ut que animum nostrum et totius Italiae nunc sollicitum tenet non infelicem exitum sunt habitura. vellem ea in nobis essent que litteris ipsis vestris scribitis et qua adducti amore quo nos complectimi vera esse existimare verum si quid usus et discipline militaris in superioribus belli consecut sumus dum regnum nostrum tuebamur adversus fidei nostre cultores nobi tanto in merito in regno patrio adversantes contra immanissimam gente fidei nostre inimicissimam et qua nobilissimam regni nostri parte igne ferro directionibus que vastavit libenti et forti animo exercebimus et ut per alios exerceretur et communis hostis a cervicibus nostris repellat omni cura studio et vigilantia etiam cum nostro et filiorum nostrorum periculo procurabimus. cetera ex Marino orato nostro carius intelligetis. datum in castello novo Neapolim xviii Augusti mcccclxxx

Responsive Copiari II

157v

A Sixto Pontenfice IIII

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem evocavimus omnes Christianorum principum oratores ut ad kalendas novembres proxime futuras apud nos sint cum plenis et sufficientibus mandatis ad consulendum et contribuendum in tam manifesta rei publicae Christianae calamitate ea qua pro communi salute oportuna videbuntur. quare hortamur quoque devotione vestram ut pro vestro in defensione catholicae religionis studio considerata periculi magnitudine quod moram non patitur
velitis statuto tempore oratores vestros una cum alis hic littere vel sufficientia mandata ad eos qui nomine vestro huic sit transmittere a vero tandem communibus periculi implementibus aliquid dignum Christiano nominis fieri possit. et ut ad hoc sanctissimum opus carissimi in Christo filii nostri lodovici francorum regi animum et optimam dispositionem intellegatis mittimus ad vos his inclusum litteram tam eis qui legati nostri que ad constituenda in gallis pacem transmisimus exemplum ut voluntas vestra ad publicam salutem bene constituta ex hoc etiam ad re ipsam complectendum alacrius insurget et accendatur. datum Rome adpud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die xxii Septembris mcccclxxx Pontificatus nostri anno decimo.

245

Responsive Copiari II

158r

A Sixto Pontenfice IIII

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. conqueruntur apud nos per litteras suas Januenses se a vobis arni laccessuri viamque iustitia offerunt pp commune Italie periculum siquid habeatis securitatis. e contra orator apud nos vester asserit causa defensionis vos arma sumpsisse cum subditi vestri a Januensis hostiliter perturbarent. nos autem considerantes hanc armorem inter nos dimicationem non esse huic temporis necque presentis periculi hortamur nos paterna charitate et sub penis et censuris in bulla securitatis Italicae quam ad instantiam vestra et sociorum vestrorum edidimus contentis apostolica auctoritate vobis mandamus ut ab offensione statum discedatis viamque iustitia amplectamini quae nobis non denegabitur precipe cujus tempus ut dixeramus ea offerant. alioquin scito nos postulante comuni Italie necessitate adversus eam partem que causam dederit perturbationis et parere mandatis nostri noluerit ad executionem penarum et omissis predictarum statum esse processuros et omne alioque potentatus iuxta bulle ipsius tenore adversus ea invocatus. hoc idem et alteri parti scribimus. datum Roma sub anulo piscatoris die xxvii Septembris mcccclxxx Pontificatus nostri anno decimo.

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Responsive Copiari II

158r-159r

A Bona et Johanne Galeazmaria Sfortia vicecomitibus ducibus Mediolani

Excellenter et potente domini tanquam fratres nostri. inter magnum dolorem vestrum summanque expectationem quorum alterum recordatio amissorum oppidorum alteram vos spes recipiendorum auget consilium amicum sante et minime intempesturi inire videmus si quod flagitat rex Ferdinandus et summus pontifex persuadere nitietur anobis aequo anime audieritis. que in loco res Italica sit constituta
cernitis ut quae intestines discordiis et vexationibus magnis ubique iacturis laboravit
nunc ingenti omnium periculo et barbaris tentatur qui classicum in Calabria
cecinerunt. et quoque privatus dolor vos erit adeo ut non nisi receptis oppidis quieturis
videamini quoniam tanta res ad meliorem quantum unquam antea spem redit
brevique per regis voluntate quae proximo bello amisistis omnia in vestra potestatem
sunt reditura nolite quiescens nimirum magno periculo festinare. sed quod sponte in
omissis vestram relapsurum est temporis commodum expectate. misistis nuper
aliaquod turmas equitum cum haud magna peditem in lunensem agrum ut que
in vestros provinciales quotidie a fregosis qui sergianam urbem vestram praeter
induciares fidem occupaverant inferebant iniurie eas proulsaretus. mittendarum
copiarum iusta fuit causa sed quia urgentes suspectiones suscepta sunt quasi studia
vestra ad arma spectent omnibus curis vos si hic tempore bellum in
liguria evitaret neque pati velitis ut inimici vestri si qui sunt iactarfe
possint ex Florentinis scintillam ingentis incendii defluxisse. idem amicus et sociis
res oppisa qua occupata sunt in eturia restituere festinat necque diutius expectatio
vestra ut putamus distinebitur. sergianam per proditionem ad fregosios pervenit regia
fide eam recepturi estis. sed quod ratio temporum non patitur omne bellum premendum
evitare nitamini. iam si ea urbs armis recipienda esset longa maior moliri oportere
que per hyemem atque hoc toti Italia suspectissimum tempus parari et confici
possunt. in omni vestra fortuna nullos magis qui nos fideles socii estis habituri. nihil
que eque movet ut hortemur vos ad pacata consilia que sponte semper secuti estis qui
ne commisceri confundique Italia sustineamus si intestini tumultus concitatet
cum a fronte collato cum turci pede siquidem in oppugnationem aut
obsidione sergiana id totum pro commune utilitate hoc tempore deponatis. non enim
dubitamus fore ut quam violatis induciis urbem amisistis eam tota adiuvarbe Italia
sine magno negocio brevi ex regis sententia recuperetis.
Mediolani vi Octobris 1480.

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signori, responsive filza 8

300

Rex Siciliae a viro Petro Lutoci domino oratori Florentino amico nostro carissimo

Magnifici vir amici nostre carissime hogi simo venuti in fogia havendo prima patuto
non poco incommodo per lo malo cammino che havemo havuto. et domani perché
refera lo illustissimo duca di Calabria nostro primogenito conferiremo con lui del
modo per la expugnatione de Otranto e di omne cosa adico pertinenti. e di quello che
in futuro deliberavemovi donerimo particulare notitia. dichosi come è conveniente lo possiate notificare alla vestra Signoria. data fogie die xxviii Novembris mcccclxxx

1481

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Responsive Copiari II

160r-161r

ab Ianuensibus

Magnifici et excelsi domini fratres et amici carissimi. si omne tempore decuit Italiam esse quietam ac concordem et considerare quantum mali ei sepe attulit discordia qua illam coegit aliquin externis ac barbaris nationibus servire cum ipsa toti orbi olim imperasset hoc tempore non minus oportet eam interse mutua benivolentia mutuis que officis convenire ubi imminent novus hostis potentissimus infidelis nequaque negligendus. quod consilium sici per quanto in nobis est libenter amplectimur maiore possum animo id et amicis ut hoc idem faciunt persuadere ubi nec difficile consilium arbitramur si ad commune utilitatem qua ad privatos affectus auspicere volumus magis. audimus in civitate vestra Pisarum manere magnifico dominum prosperum adurnum qui moliri contra nos et statum nostrum non desinit existimas oportunitatem et vicinitatem loci ide melius facere posse qui si longius habitaret. preterea jeronimum de monte negro duas triremium et unius biremis ductorem qui iam non modo armis sed subditis nostris haud modica damna intulit pro quo iudicatus a nobis et publicatus hostis et rebellis nunc querere ut apud excelsa rempublicam vestram et in portibus ac locis estris recipiatur. quod et si non credamus magnifici vestri sibi concessuras quae probe intelligunt que ommissis ab omni amicitia ac pacis officie foret praeoccupare vestrum diximus animum que forstam eum te hostem nostrum ne scrivisse dicere potuisse et rogare amicitiam vestra ut neque ipsum magnifici d. prosperum qui publicus et ipse hostis noster est manere apud se patiantur nec ipsum jeronimum apud se nullo pacto recipiere. quod et si ommissis servandeque amicitia et paci nostre convenire plurimum si sic fecerint possit consulent etiam suorum securitati. cum jeronimus ipse non eos more inducta quibus litteri habere apud que piam fidem possit et qui prie sua adversatur ceteris parere posse credatur quod habebimus singulam complacencia qui et huis me et maio pro republica vestra officia prestare quando cunque oporteat non negabimus qua ob causam hunc ommissis nostrum mittimus cum his litteris nostri ut quid mag. v. in his statuerint intelligamur parati in omnes rem magnificis vestris gratam. data Janue die vi Martii mcccclxxxprimo.

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Responsive Copiari II

161rv
A Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem audiverunt omnes ferme oratores principum et potentatum Italie et in primis orator etiam vester apud nos agentes quam religiosissime Christianissimus rex francorum per dilectos filios oratores suos ad nos novissime destinatos se suaque obtulerit in favore fidei et nominis Christiani contra comune hoste et ligam et cum quibuscumque per maiestate suam oblata. dignis est ipse rex magna profeo commendatione qui publicum et scimus hoc opus tam ardenter amplectant et quia orator hic vester non est sufficiensi mandato omissis ad ipsum ligam ineundam et alia que in re hac tractanda erunt hortamus devotione vestram ut illud qui primum in plenissima et efficacissima forma destinare velitis quo hoc oratores prefati regis ostiandum et aperient conditiones in eo contentas. igitur offici vestri pp pericula imminetia sine aliqua cunctatione dictum mandatum transmierre quo possumus omni studio et contatu nostro incumbere ad ea quae sunt tutelae nominis Christiani queadmodum super omnia cupimus et vehementer desideramus. datum Romae apud s. Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die xxiii Martii mcccclxxxi Pontificatus nostri anno decimo.

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Responsive Copiari II

161r-162v

Ab Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem a omnia advertentes Christianorum principum discordias truculentos hosti ad commune presentiam in dies magis apercire. nolentes que pro pastorali officio nostro his tot incomodis et periculis obviare ne in deterius serpant postque eo iam deducte sunt res nostre ut minime cunctandum fit cum perfidissimum et vigilantissimum hostis apparatum maxima adversus Italianum et Rhodum indefesso studio ut ex pluribus locis compertum omiessis inter omnes Christianos principes et potentatus inducias indiximus. ad defense catholicae fidei paterna caritate omnes hortati sumus. venientes aut mittentes at tam piam et necessariam expeditionem sub nostra et per littera sedis protectione suscepiam eis bella ut impedimenta quomodolibet inferentes sub spiritualis et temporali gladii pena ut abstineant comovimus prout in litteris nostris de super confectis quas et in vestris et in reliquorum omnium principum et potentatum Christianorum regnii provinciiis et dominis publicare mandavimus latius continet. volentes igitur litteras ipsas plenum sortire effectum et debite omnino executione demandari devotionem vestra in domino hortamus et per religionem qua profitemini per passionem salvatoris nostri quam ut nos ab eterna morte redimeret subire dignatus est per tot fideles populus qui in teterrimam ducti servitutem presidium vestrum implorant per miseram stragem que tot preclarios civitatus tot nationibus imminet nisi quam primum surcuratum per gloriam et splendore Christiani nominis quod a spurcissimis hostibus in totum conculcatur nisi nos omiessis ipsos excitaverimus vos obtestamur et apostolica auctoritate vobis
mandamus ut litteras ipsas tenorem et contientiam in omnibus et per omnia servertis cum effectu ad impleatis sicuti pro catholico animo vestro facturos nos confidimus ne in extremo indicio apud tribunal Dei sitis effusi Christiani sanguinis qui e manibus vestri requirer. alio quin contra inobedientes et contumaces ita ur gente comuni periculo et necessitate ad executionem contentorum in litteris ipsis procedemus. datum Rome apostolicum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die x Aprilis mcccclxxxprimo Pontificatus nostri anno decimo.

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Signori Minutari 11

241v

Maii die II 1481

Da Roma da messer Guidantonio di 28 Maii omissis.

Laviso de Turchi 12 morti 40 presi a Otranto.

252

Signori Minutari 11

320v-321v

Ego Bartholomeo Scala Cancellerie.

Petro de Nasis die 13 Maii 1481

omissis habiamo preso piacere della preparatione dello assedio di Otranto del quale hai mandato particular notitia in che siamo sicuri come in ogni altra sua operatione la excellentissima prudentia della maiestà del re et siamo in grandissima speranza che presto la sua maiestà habbi col favore di Idio a liberare Italia da pericoli nequali era venuta et così preghiamo la clementia divina che habbi a seguitare questo così necessario et così desiderato effecto. Omissis.

253

Responsive Copiari II

163v-164r

A Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. optamus et vehementi quidem desiderio ut omnes in Italia tollantur controversiae et novitatum suspitiones ne
communi hosti ad publicam pernitie via magis aperiat et inextinguibili incendio tota conflagret Italia et perconsequens omnis Christiana religio. quare hortamur vos paterno affectum ut differentias omnes sique cum Januensibus et Senensibus vobis sunt velitis quo ad vos attinet de medio tollere et agere potuis via iuris quod et laudabilius et salutarius eri. nam et hoc idem ipsis scribimus ut autem partium quieti facilius consulat hortamur vos ut cautiones tale prestetis ad invicem ut de offensione et perturbatione unusquisque esse possit. quidem et vobis et toti Italie salutare admodum erit. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die xv Maii mcccclxxxprimo.

254

Responsive Copiari II

A Venetis 164r

Joannes Mocenigo Dei gratia dux Venetiarum etc. magnificus et excelsus dominis prioribus libertatis et vexillifero iustitie populi Florentini fratribus et amicis nostris carissimi salutem et sincere dilectionis affectum. hac hora ex Constantinopoli facti sumus certiores magnum turcum naturali morbo interisse et quam tantae rei nuntium dignum existimavimus cognitione potentatum Christianorum et eorum preseptum quos vetei prosequimur benivolentia sicut est vestra res publlica. tabellarium istum ad nos expediendum curavimus et istas scribendas breves litteras. sed tam huismodi re magnum vobis allatura certo scimus gaudium et laetitiam pro vestra religione et pietate desiderioque et studio publice salutis cui potentissimis ille quodam hostis imminebat. date in nostro ducali palatio die xxviii Maii hora xii indictione xiiii mcccclxxxprimo

255

Responsive Copiari II

165rv

A Sixto Pape IIII Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. postea que immanissimi Turcorum tyranni nuntiatus est interitus sicut ex incluso litterarum ex cognoscere poteritis videtur nobis deus ad salutem viam aperuisse qui non meritis nostris sed ineffabile eius clementia atrocissimum hostem populo suo crudeler omisit ulterior in Christianum sanguine debacchari passus non est ex alto nobis lumen omnes ad liberandum nos perpetuo eo discrimine quod superioribus annis rempublicam Christianam tantis cladibus affectis, si nobis ipsis deese noluerimus in tanta rei beneficendam occasione divinitus ob lata. quod obrum cum preteritis malis edocti id omni conatu procurare debeamus ut huiusmodi periculis liberati in summa viam tranquillicitatem et non solum catholicae religionis libertatem eum dignitatem reineamus sed etiam amissa recuperemus hortamur vos toto mentis affectu et per viscera misericordie Dei nostri obtestamur et rogamus ut si unquam ad hanc sanctam
expeditionem bene constituti fuistis nunc maioribus animis velitis insurgere vires
vestras in medium conferre non deserere tantam oportunitatem qua si neglecta fuerit
quod absit longe infeliciorem eventum rei Christiane parere posset quo ante peperit
si expectemus donec confirmato regno et rebus compositis filii patris immanitate
resumant. et quod ille atrociter incaesperat crudelius hi prosequantur. nos classem
nostram in promptu habemus apud Ianuam triremes triginta et naves quattuor egregie
instructe brevi in tyberinis hostis erunt. apud anchona et alias armamus quae omnes
invoice cum regia classe congiunget. exemplum hoc secuti afferte et vos prompto
animo subsidium vestrum aquo longe maior nunc quo ante fructus sperari potest
quinquidem minorem habituri sumus resistantiam si gloriosa provinciam in tempore
prosecuti fuerimus et oblata caelitus fortuna uti voluerimus. non solum cum perpetua
nobis et universe reipublicae Christiane salute et quiete comparabimus et sine timore
de manu inimicorum nostrorum liberati Deo servire paterimus in sanctitate et iustitia
coram ipso omnibus diebus nostrus sed et infelices illas fidelium populi populus animas
qua tetra oppresse servitute presidium nostrum assidue implorant et provincias et
reliqua Christiani nominis amissa imperia cum dignitate et gloria Deo ipso
concede recuperabimus. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris
die iiii Junii mcccclxxxi Pontificatus nostri anno decimo.

256

Responsive Copiari II

165v-166v

A Ferdinando rege Sicilie

Rex Sicilie etc. magnifici et excellentissimi domini amici nostri carissimi cum nobis
invisceribus hereat ardentissimum desiderium recipiencae urbis Hydrantine quam
Turci firmissimo presidio occupant oportet nos perquirere omnes pecuniarum vias
quibus tam salutare tamque pium et nobis et republicae Christiane tam necessarium
opus perficiatur. itaque preter alia multa quae cum subditis nostris transegumiis
coacti nuper fuimus pecuniam mutuo accipere a non nullis ex concivibus vestris qui
in regno nostro necoiant. interquos magnifici iulianus et antonius exodi preclare
eorum erga nos voluntatis testimonium exhibere volentes mutuarunt nobis grandem
pecuniarum summam cuis restituende cum nulla nobis commodior facultas offeratur
illaque eis gratios esse possit quam si ea pecunia que est ducatorum dece (ceto) milia
largorum in ista vestra civitate eis persolvatur. freti mutua nostra benivolentia
rogamus vos et observamus ut quanto hoctamen necessario tempore nobis opitular
 decrevisitis velitis pro nobis sponsione facere eidem Iuliano et Antonio qua cauti
efficientar ex primis pecunies que illustissimo duci Calabriae primogenito nostro
debentur ommissis sui stipendi eisdem spondis abseque aliqua retentione dedicta
summa satisfiet. sicque realiter et cum effectum ubi tempus advenerit eandem
pecuniae summam per solvi curabitus ad quod accedit ipsi illustissimi ducis
primogeniti nostri consensus et voluntas sicuti exipsis litteris cognosci. hoc a
vobis tanto studio petimus ut maiore non possemus pro quo habebimus vobis gratias
urgentes eadem si casus tulerit cumulutissime relaturi queadmodum omnia diffusius
intelligetis ex verbis Marini oratoris nostri cuius verbis eque ac nobis ut fidem adhibeatis vos rogamus. datum Baroli vii Iunii mcccclxxvprimo.

Responsive Copiari II

167rv

A duce Calabriae

Illustrissimi et excelsi domini amici nostri carissimi. la maiestà del signore re nostro patre ha scripto del bisogno grandissimo, in lo quale de presente si truova per le spese delle guerre passate et per quelle che continuamente fa per la recuperatione de Otranto ha facto et de continuo necessariamente fa el possibile suo per havere denari per presto ultimare questa impresa necessaria non solamente ad essa et alli soi subditi ma a tutta Italia et alla Christianita. et non havendo la maiestà sua in tanto bisogno lasciato derecercare alcuno deli amici soi ha ancora ricercato li magnifici juliano et Antonio Gondi de questa città antiqui amici et devoi soi li quali liberalissimamente la hanno servita de xviii milia largi et sono remasti contenti acceptarli sopra li primi denari che a nui seramo devuti da quessa excelsa republica per causa della nostra provisione come piú amplamente è contenuto in littere che de questo haveremo le V.S. da essa maiestà alla quale nui ne rimettemo. el perché nulla cosa desideramo piú che de gratificare in omnibus allo signore re secundo simo tenuti et tanto piú in questa cosa quanto che lana et importantia sua et lo commune periculo lo ricerca nui anchora ne havemo voluto preghare le S.V. et così quanto piú possimo le preghiamo che conformandose colle lettere della maiestà sua vogliano fare promessa a deci gondi sopra la provisione nostra decti deceocto milia ducati largi. et quando sarà lo tempo pagarceli con effecto et senza alcuna retentione secondo scrive lo signore re perché nui non solamente ne remaneremo contenti et satisfacti ma ne haverimo obligatione grandemente alle S.V. et stimarimo haverli havuti duplicati da quelle et così da mo per allora promettimo havere rato et firmo in dicto pagamento non altramenti che si dicta somma se pagasse in mano nostra. tanto estimamo che lo signore re in questa sua extrema necessita che è nostra anchora sia aiutato dalle S.V. alli piaceri delle quali continuamente ne offerumo. data in regiis foelicibus castris que hidruntini viii Junii mcccclxxvprimo.

Signori Minutari 11

247v

1481 Giugno

Una de 25 Maii colle copie da Ragugia della morte del Turcho contiene laviso della morte del Turcho et che il disposto di ommissis et omissis andavano a recuperare lo
stato. Et il nostro dare favore et ricordo illustrissimo per questa morte 
daversi *omissis* alle cose nostre per rispetto de Vinitiani etc.

259

**Signori Minutari 11**

249r

Junius
da milano Tommaso Ridolfi del primo

la morte del Turco et che la sarà facta festa *omissis*.

**Signori Minutari 11**

260

249v

1481 Junius

Notitia della morte del Turco e della festa ha facto il papa et doni.
Notitia della speranza della victoria d Otranto.

261

**Signori Minutari 11**

250v

1481 Junius

Notitia da Barletta da primo di Luglio de ii adì 10 colle copie et contiene

El dispoto de Arta et el figiliul de Scandarbeh che per ora mostrano delle imprese del recuperare il loro per la expugnatione d Otranto.

*omissis*

Rinferiscante della morte del Turcho da Raugia recando la copia.
Nuove d Otranto et Ungheri vengono in favore del re.

262

**Signori Minutari 11**

253r

Die xiii Junii 1481
domino Thomaso di milano
avviso de progressi d Otranto et delle cose del Turcho della morte et del seguito di poi a Costantinopoli.

263

Signori Minutari 11

253v

1481 Juniis die 4

Aviso della morte del basciá d Otrantro alla Valona.

omissis

One of the postscriptum states

el rispecto a vinuto per questa morte del Turcho. saspecti da parte del re

entro la sera da Filippo di Piero leggere una lettera di Marcii tratta alla excellentissima de ommissis el ricordava stare parati per loccasione che Vinitiani hanno per la morte del Turcho e ricordava il pensare al bisogno comune et proveano fare dal canto della nostra lega el duca di Urbino et ricordano la richiesta et illustrissima Girolamo.

264

Signori Minutari 11

254v

Junius

Notitia da Thomaso Ridolfi de 13 a 16 contiene quei signore conferma quello che ha decto alla parte de subsidii del re et conforta a expedire questi impresa de Otranto.

265

Signori Minutari 11

341rv

Petro de Nasis die xiii Junii 1481

Habiamo due tue da Barletta de II et de III e circa li advisi non accade sono commendiamo la tua diligentia. allaparte dei subsidii che con tanta instanta richiede la maiestà del re e fa richiedere anchora pel meco messer Marino ci è molesto non potere come et ottimamente il nostro desiderio di fare venire così promptamenti come et il bisogno della sua maiestà concordante colla volontà et studio nostro et
sempre farà cosa grata alla sua maestà in ogni cosa in questa molto piú che conosciamo laventa del bisogno che la sua maestà dimostra. ma questa deliberatione qui col popolo facendi molto difficile per li insoportabilī spese habiamo avanti et habiamo per lordinare a extraordinario per le cose di Lunigiana dove non ancora seguito la sicurtà regia contro Genovesi et noi secondo le obbligationi si fecero alla restitutione delle terre delle quali noi non ci è fatto avere la ratificatione se non per la quale che para omíssis la speranza anchora et universale in ciascuno che cotesta impresa di Otranto si omíssis questo a ultimate atteso la morte del Turcho et la turbatione di quello stato (la morte del bascia a valona) la mala conditio ne de Turchi in Otranto et successi omíssis per la sapientia regia et virtū della excellenza del duca di Calabria de da assai disfavore perché si crede non habbino abisognare altri aiuti.

266

Signori Minutari 11

259r

Thomaso de Ridolfis

Breve risposta accade alle tue de 20 et 23. sarai grati li advisi messer Marino di nuovo ha richiesto de subsidi come costi ha facto el omíssis siano confermati nella risposta da cotesto excellentissimo principe et ci è stato in quelli effecti che altra volta il che non labisogna altrimenti replichare. Sopra questo parata habiamo risposto amore al re da Filippo. In quanto al domandare significandone il parere della excellentissima sua della nostra opinione. havete ancora facto intendere la risposta facta a quel che la maestà del re riceveva del parere della excellentissima sua che sa da fare dopo Otranti expugnatione. et habbiamo approbata tal risposta perché cotanto è il vero che la sua maestà et per la sua prudentia et per essere in sifacto et per ogni cagione ne può meglio consigliare. noi da tal cosa excepto che da dicto messer Filippo non habbiamo havuto insino a qui alcuna notitia. havevamo scripto questa et lavemo la tua de xxvii per lora non accade altra risposta.

Sine die et mense 1481

267

Signori Minutari 11

163v

Die 4 Julii

Recitatis litteris et relationis qui venibant in consilio nomine in quid omíssis legato regio petenti subsidia pecuniorum pro Hydruntino expugnando

XII diei verba sunt
Dominicus de Bartholis: danda debito subsidia si tamem prius rex restitutione facit locorum in bello amissorum scribendum eius obligationis et omissis dare per subsidiis et pro stipendio ducis Calabrie et cum consensu princeps Mediolanensis equites et magistratus verba facis Loysius Guiciardinus eques: confirmaverint superatam sententiam et meminit sumptum moderatione

qui student post magistratus atque regibus verba facit Petrus Verarchis: idem addidit quid ad quo

recitatis de m. mandatis Antonii de Medicis ad regis et responsio litterarum Thomasii de Ridolfi omissis

subsidia secundum primas s.mas 47 (in favour) 1

omissis

mandata et littere 77 (in favour) 1.

268

Minutari 11

289r-291v

Commissione de nostri magnifici et excellentissimi signori a voi Antonio di Bernardo de Medici deliberata adì v di Luglio mcclxxx

andrai a Napoli e di poi a Barletta dove sarà la maiestà del re e chiesta et impetrata la audientia e facte le consueti observantie et cerimonie delle quali ti informerai apunto presenterai la lettera della credenza che harai con questa et quella lecta alla sua maiestà cominerai il tuo parlare salutando nel principio pro parte nostra et di tucto il nostro popolo observantissimo della serenissima maiestà la sua serenità et raccomandando a quella con breve parole come a padre et benefactore singulare la città tucta e tutto il nostro popolo. dirai di poi essere mandato da noi per essere apresso alla maiestà del re essendo suto di bisogno dare licentia a Piero di Lutozzo per alcune sue necessarie occupationi di qua perché noi giudichiamo molto necessario per conservazione della comune dignità della nostra confederatione essere sempre apresso alla maiestà omissis che per noi intenda e suoi sapientissimi discorsi et gravissimi consigli per potersi unire con quelli e con quelli governarsi ad comune salute et comune bene. Pregando la maiestà sua si voglii degnare secondo le occorentie conferire atecho come li parrà. aciocche tu ci possi dare advice delle cose che li occorreranno et noi secondo quelle meglio deliberare. non permettendo il nostro instituto con rispondente a quello che habiamo inteso et la intentione et desiderio della maiestà del re signore il quale è anchora conveniente alla natura della vera amicitia et della vera confederatione donde non debba essere cosa alcuna similata o coperta. ma debba ciascuno porre in mezzo liberamente et amorevolmente quello che occorre donde piú facilmente si possi trarrre quella migliore deliberatione che è nella materia della quale si tracti. noi anchora accadendo faremo così et non dimeno sempre ci accorderemo alla sententia regia et delli altri nostri confederati i
quali per ciò tucti come da capo et patre habiamo ad havere dependentia et seguitare il consiglio auctorità et sapientia della maiestà. Congratulerai colla maiestà della morte del Turcho e della turbatione de suoi et communi inimicis del nome Christiano, confortando maiestà perché Idio certamente in suo favore in defensione della commune causa. il quale sanza dubio prestamente li concederà una gloriosissima victoria et donerà una palma duna immortale et perpetua laude con grandissimo contentamento nostro et universale obligatione di tucti e principi et popoli Christiani per lo comune interesse della nostra religione et del proprio pericolo di ciascuno che instava se la maiestà collo aiuto divino et colla sua multa virtú non havessi resistito alli suoi potentissimi impeti. et interrupo et suoi audacissimi et confidentissimi propositi et incepti. ringratierai della opera sua prestante indefatigatamente per restituzione di quelle terre che per suo iudicio uno suo beneficío ne sono insino aqui restituite. diche tucta la città et tutto il popolo nostro non solamente resta lieto et satisfacto ma obligato di obligationi infinita et perpetua et conformemente et prudentemente ricorderai quando fusse il tempo ad che sua maiestà si degni di pensare questa città e questo popolo tutto aspecta non con minore desiderio la perfectione di questo beneficio. la restituzione del tucto il che sarebbe intermanente il posare li animi di ciaschuno ne havere a pensare mai ad altro che adire et referire gratie alla maiestà di tanto excellent et incomparabile beneficio. Agiugnendo in questa parte che havendo inteso quello non è occorso alla serena maiestà perché Vinitiani non habbino a prendere animo di operare in preiudicio della nostra lega questa opportunità della morte del Turcho la quale come sua maiestà disse pare che habbino piú tempo desiderata lodiamo fermamente il suo parere et la sua sapientia perché veramente et così nella unione degli animi nostri et nello amore nostro cifà noi confederati non solamente in fatto ma in demonstratione consiste interamente et il rimedio di questo pericolo et dogni altro che a communi stati et alla quiete de essi potessi mai in alcuno modo sopratras et che per questa cagione a noi occorrea ricordare alla maiestà sua come di sopra hai detto el iudicio della restituzione del resto delle terre nostre, perché nissuna cosa può piú efficacemente dimostrare lunità nostra. questo è il principale fondamento che farai credere quello che desidera chi è malcontento della unione et fermezza della nostra coniunctione et lega et al presente è tolta via ladissoluta che altra volta ritardo il iudicio della maiestà sua perché intendiamo per vera via che quelli che a Siena governano intesa già quale sia la intentione della serena maiestà non solo sarebbono contenti che il iudicio del resto della restituzione seguissi ma lo desiderano come anchora colla ossissis di messer Marino habiamo il tucto liberamente et amorevolmente conferito diche a sua maiestà dovrrà anchora inanzi alla tua giunta haver dato adviso. da questa intera restituzione nascerebbono oltre asopradetti infiniti comodi. fra quali sarebbe in primis che noi ci leveremo da sospetti et da spesa la quale necessariamente et in Lunigiana et altrove si fa et potremo con mancho difficoltà fare il debito et il desiderio nostro circa i subsbdi chiesti per lo presente bisogno della maiestà sua secondo il desiderio anchora et volontà nostra et in ogni cosa non solamente in questa conforme et corrispondente al desiderio et volontà della maiestà sua et il popolo nostro che al presente tutto è sospeso co hanimi in questa totale restituzione et per insino allefecto si rende ogni deliberatione molto difficile come altrevolte habiamo detto. restandone hora satisfacto et vedutosi tornato per beneficio et gratia di sua maiestà nella possessione delle sue cose verrebbe meno difficile in ogni deliberatione et noi potremo rispondere colli fatti a quello che
desideriamo et porgere convenienti subsidii alla sua mta in quei suoi bisogni et quelli in effetto sono bisogni anchora nostri suoi figliouli et confederati li quali siamo per havere sempre cola maiestà sua comune ogni fortuna come la ragione vuole et natura della nostra afeczione et observantia verso di sua maiestà et come vogliono leconditioni de tempi et delle cose presenti et molto piú et lo nostro firmassimo et constantissimo proposito et deliberazione dessere sempre iuniti et legati cola maiestà sua allegami donore vero et vera observantia indissolubili et perpetui.

_omissis_

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Responsive Copiari II

168v-169r

A Sixto III Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. ex litteris carissimi in Christo filii nostri Ferdinandi Sicilie regis illustris et legati classis nostre quare ex his inclusa mittimus intelligenet esse a nostris Hydruntum et Italianum duro barbarorum bello quod omnes hac tenet anxios tenuit Dei beneficio tandem liberatam quod qua scelux et salutare sit omnibus Christianis unusquisque potest facile iudicare ad hec cum apud vallonam et in epyro omnia nostris prospere succedere nucetur ut feliciatra te non possint quas dubitat Deum nobis ex alto lumen ondere que tandem Christianam religionem in pristinam dignitate restituamus amissam recuperemus bello hostes ita persequamur ut perpetrum hac cura hac molestia liberi esse possimus. quare si hanc ad hoc Sanctissimi _omissis_ bene constituisti fustis nunc omni conatu insurgite. nam ad reliquis omnes idem scribimus. ecce tempus salutis tempus glorie tempus victoriae quod si negligetur nullum tale unquam recuperare poterimus. parvis negocio bellum nunc confisi potest qui non sine maximo dispendio maximis calamitatis nostris quod deus avertat postea conficiet si cunctabundi expectare voluerimus donec efferus hostis se colligat vires recuperet et adversus nos manuatur. nos et libenter hactenus fecimus supra quam vires nostro ferre potuerunt et facturi et sumus que poterimus. nam et nunc viginti caravellas et navium una oneraria ex decimis nostris in Portugallia instructas ad reliquam classe nostram missimus. sed soli non possumus non dubitamus si vestra et aliorum praeidia in commune salutem una nobiscum conservare quis perpetuae saluti et tranquillitati Christiane religionis cum immortali omnium gloria Deo auctore consultatur. data Bracian sub anulo piscatori die xviii Septembris mcccclxxxprimo Pontificatus nostri anno undecimo.

270

Responsive Copiari II

169r

A Sixto III Pontefice Maximo
Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. pro parte Senensium fuit nobis expositum que vos attentatis non nulla praesertum in ipsis constringebantur que merito suspitionem prebere possunt. quare desiderantes inter vos et Senenses ipsos bonam vicinitatem servari et omnem turbationem scandalisique materiam tolli maxime ad universale totius Italie quietem pro qua tam laboravimus devotionem vestrarum hortamur in domino ut in hoc tale modium ad omnis velitis que ne dum turbatio aliqua oriatur sed omnis prorsus suspicio adunatur ne et contravenire videamini bullae nostre super gente Italica ut scitis edite. quod et nostra et caeterorum commendatio ne dignum erit. datum Viterbii sub anulo piscatori die xiii Octobris mcccclxxxi Pontificatus nostri anno undecimo.

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Responsive Copiari II

169r-170r

A Ianuensibus

Magnifici ac potentes domini amici carissimi, nuntiati nobis esse quasdam biremes et alia navigiola armata a vobis exisse ad depredationem nostrorum iamque aliquid egisse in hunc efficiem que res nobis fuit plurimum admirationi et eo magis quo fama esse magnifici vestri hoc facere qui Paulus Baptistae de Campofregoso cum suis triremibus aliquid damni vestris dicitur intulisse. nam etsi armamento illarum triremium numquam consenserumus nec eo tempore neque et apud nos armata fuerint quo rebus nostris in manifesto periculo laborantibus providere iis et alios que tunc fiebant malis possemus nec in presentiarum facere alius in nostra esset potestate. iudicavimus et publicavimus eum hoste et rebellem nostrum prohibuimus que ne in provincia nostra receptum habeat aut aliquid precipiat alimenti quid apud omnes sufficere potest ut pro omnis credant displicuisse nobis et displicere que ipse agit nec omittamus alia excogitare remedia quantumque a nobis fieri poterit pro quo omnis nullam causa vel limam habeat ad heac in nostro agendi sic que rogamus et hortamus vestri dominatum ut revocare suos velit ab hac nobitate et providere siquid rapuerunt integre restituat. fatemur enim nos pro nova et consilio libenter in pace cum omnibus vivere et siquid aliquo controversie accidit legibus et amicabile iudicio controversias dirimi prius quam armis disceptare si tantum compellimur tuemur res nostram quo melius possimus nec refugimus quod devitare non possimus ubi Dei gratia neque arma nobis desunt neque alia ad propulsandam vim necessaria excogitare et omnis decet quid honestum sit et quam periculosam solent esse discriminum initia que postea extingui facile nequeunt. Rogamus magnifice vestri ut quae omnis sua sit ad haec nobis respondeat per hunc tabellarium nostrum que ob hanc causam mittimus ad vos parati in omnem rem magnifici vestri gratas. data Ianue die xviii Octobris mcccclxxxprimo

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Responsive Copiari II
A Sixto IIII Pontefice Maximo

Dilecti filii salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. exigit rei magnitudo de qua agit ut unumqueque catholicum principem et rempublica hortari monere et requiri ad commune gloria et salute eo ferventis debeamus quo maiore in dies ab immortalis Deo offerri videmus occasione non solum amissa recuperandi sed etiam Christiani nomen uterius propagandi si nobis ipsis in tanta opportunitate desesse noluerumus. scrupimus ad vos et a hos Christianos principes et potentatus sepe numero ut ad hanc gloriosa adversus impios Turcos expeditionem communibus presidiis insurgeretur nihil omitteretur quod tante prestitae occasio de esse maxima subscuto Turcorum tyranni interitum discordiaque filiorum magnis utrumque favoribus de imperio invicem contendentum. recuperata etiam post modum a nostri Hydruntoque oportunitas eo maiore nunc et oblata est qui ex Oriente quotidie perfertur plures civitates et provincias ad Christianum nomen descire multas ad deficiendum paratas esse nihilique aliud expectare qui subsidia catholicorum quibus medianteibus pristina libertate possint audentius recuperare. preterea dissensione et concertationes illas suorum ipsorum ita nutriti hinc inde magnis contentionem fornitibus et alternis viribus augeri ut haud facile sedari posse videantur. quibus rebus fit ut aperte admoneamur non negligere tantam occasionem ne secordia et ignavia nostra eo res Christiana deducatur ut cum velimus providere postea non possimus et amittamus quietem et gloriam quam nobis et universae catholicae regionis ex hoc fuimus comparatur. vos igitur iterni hortamur iterum obtestamur et rogamus ut iam omnibus ad hoc praecelarissimum opus alacribus animis insurges presidium ad prosequendum hanc pulcherrimam expeditionem ad quam Deus ex alto nos incitat statum conferatuis exhibeatis Christianae caritati quidem est vestrorum partium ne imputari vobis possit fuisse vos interea communi causa his ipsis temporibus in quibus omnia prospere successura speratn. nos et pro parte nostra defuturi non sumus ut felix heac expeditionem consequantur ne casus fecerimus proximus annis notissimum vobis et omnibus esse debeat. sed qua tante provinciae solis officem non possimus necesse est ut vestra et reliquorum subsidia nobiscum concurrant. super hanc autem a vobis responsum quam primam expectamus. datum Rome apud Sanctum Petrum sub anulo piscatoris die ultima Octobris mcccclxxx primo Pontificati nostri anno decimo.

**Responsive Copiari II**

173 rv

Ab Iauensiibus

Magnifici et potentes domini amici nostri carissimi. disputati vinculam appellatis litteras nostras et ridiculum dicitis esse rationesque adduximus ut donatio vestra credere posset molestum nobis fuisse siquid in vestros egerit Paulus Baptista de Campofregoso cuius contrarium si simulatis non recte non amice facitis omittamus a
modo verba quibus non multis fidem adhiberet et stabit ipsa verita in sua sede ut vos dicitis nam ea est veritas quam boni et sapientes viri putari esse veritate. si non ad partes nostrarum litterarum respondisse vostra magnifica non indignum fuisset ut quicumque de virtutibusque partis honestate apertius posset iudicari. facere qui Pauli Baptista restituat siquidem a vestris abstulit non est in nostra potestate. in vestra est ut que vestris rapuerunt nostris restituat quia id consensum ac iussu vestro factum nemo est non aperte intelligat. si crescent discrimina non erit culpa nostra qui initia extingui summo curavimus studio. sed erit in nobis se per annis ad res honestas et tranquillas sed hoc ide vestra dominos hoc facere voluerit. iuste agere et modeste loqui et didimus. data Ianue die iv Decembris 1481
APPENDIX III

Prosopographic table

Alphabetical list of Florentines involved in the Levant in the XIII\textsuperscript{th} -XV\textsuperscript{th} centuries
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAMES</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>CONTENTS AND EVENTUAL PLACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Francesco degli Albizzi</td>
<td>16 September, 1437</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 445, 488</td>
<td>Francesco has to give a sum of 243 hyp. e 27 car. for half of the wares bought for him. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco degli Albizzi</td>
<td>10 September, 1438</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 475, 488</td>
<td>Francesco has to give 450 hyp. for wares to Tommaso Spinola. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco degli Albizzi</td>
<td>30 March, 1439</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 485, 488</td>
<td>Francesco has to give 150 hyp. to Bartolomeo Spagnolo for a promise he had made to Badoer. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco degli Albizzi</td>
<td>13 September, 1438</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 488, 489</td>
<td>Francesco has to receive from Badoer 527 hyp. equal to the half of the wares bought and loaded into the ship of Zorzi from Scarpanto on behalf of Badoer for the travel to Rhodes and Beirut. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco degli Albizzi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Francesco has to receive from Badoer 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source/Note</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco degli Albizzi</td>
<td>13 September, 1438</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 488, 491</td>
<td>hyp. and 27 car. for the wool loaded into the ship of Zorzi from Scarpanto. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco di Piero Alderotti</td>
<td>18 May, 1439</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 489, 658</td>
<td>Francesco has sold the wares in Rhodes and Beirut for overall revenue of 1149 hyp. and 3 car. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea di Niccolò Aleis</td>
<td>5 September 1477</td>
<td>Müller, p. 222-223 n. 184</td>
<td>Mentioned as prisoner in Caffa for the time of the letter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Altoviti</td>
<td>Several dates (1466)</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 176</td>
<td>Owner of two great galleys prepared for Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Altoviti</td>
<td>27 December 1468</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 171</td>
<td>Conductor and owner of two great galleys sailed for the Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niccolo Ardinghelli</td>
<td>7 February 1465</td>
<td>Gregory, p. 133-134</td>
<td>Niccolo Ardinghelli is mentioned as aspettava Niccolo<code> di Levante che si diceva aveva sue mercatanzie. Vedrassi che ora ch</code>egli è: tornato quello farà.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niccolo Ardinghelli</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatelan Amidei</td>
<td>8 February, 1436</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 7, 94</td>
<td>Bartoli wrote on behalf of Chatelan Amidei for a sum that Chatelan has to give to Drapieri’s bank. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatelan Amidei</td>
<td>19 September, 1436</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 6, 19</td>
<td>Bettino Bartoli (see in appendix) does commercial brokering on behalf of Chatelan Amidei for a sum of 9 perp. e 311. car. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manente Amidei</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piero Attavanti</td>
<td>March 1474</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 174</td>
<td>owner of one great galley sailed for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlo Baroncelli</td>
<td>September 1461</td>
<td>MAP, f. 88 n. 126</td>
<td>Letter sent to Piero and Giovanni di Cosimo de Medici regarding wool lot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlo Baroncelli</td>
<td>3 September 1472</td>
<td>Müller, pp. 216-217</td>
<td>The Florentine Commune appoints Baroncelli new consul in Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlo Baroncelli</td>
<td>17 July 1476</td>
<td>MAP, f. 33 n. 542</td>
<td>Mentioned as passing through Adrianople in the letter sent from Braccio de Medici to Lorenzo de’ Medici (see s.v. Braccio de Medici in this appendix).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentile Bardi</td>
<td>4 March 1474</td>
<td>Müller, p. 218 n. 176</td>
<td>The Commune interceded in favour of Giovanni Peruzzi and Gentile Bardi for some credit owned by them. Rhodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentile Bardi</td>
<td>7 March 1474</td>
<td>Müller, p. 220 n. 179</td>
<td>Recommendation to the Grandmaster of Rhodes. Rhodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 August 1474</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source/Note</td>
<td>Details</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentile Bardi</td>
<td>25 March 1478</td>
<td>Müller, p. 224 n. 187</td>
<td>Florence asks the Grandmaster of Rhodes to satisfy the credit owned by Bardi from the deceased Manfredo Papponi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ianucius Bartholi (de Florencia)</td>
<td>31 October 1300</td>
<td>Polonio, pp. 85-86 n. 73</td>
<td>Pisanus Vicecomes instructs Ianucius to recover a credit from an accomandita. Ianucius works for the Peruzzi company. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ianucius Bartholi (de Florencia)</td>
<td>31 October 1300</td>
<td>Polonio, pp. 86-87 n. 75</td>
<td>Called as a witness. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ianucius Bartholi (de Florencia)</td>
<td>31 October 1300</td>
<td>Polonio, pp. 87-88 n. 76</td>
<td>Ianucius complained against the consul of Venice, Nicola Zugno, for the forced unloading operated by the local government of 17386 wheat measure. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zichinus Bartholi</td>
<td>17 March 1299</td>
<td>Balard, III pp. 135-136 n. 111</td>
<td>Zichinus gives receipts to Negro de Sturla for wares given to him by Rizardellus de Clarencia. He works for the Peruzzi company and has a house in Famagusta. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bettino Bartoli</td>
<td>1421/1422</td>
<td>Müller, 149-150; n. 101</td>
<td>Bettino is sent to Constantinople as ambassador on behalf of the Florentine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 February, 1436</td>
<td>Bartoli wrote on behalf of Chatelan Amidei for a sum that he has to give to Drapieri’s bank. Constantinople.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 September, 1436</td>
<td>Mediation for Chatelan Amidei of a sum of 9 perp. e 311. car. Constantinople.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 September, 1436</td>
<td>Med. Constantinople.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 September, 1436</td>
<td>Med. Constantinople.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 November, 1436</td>
<td>Med. Constantinople.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December, 1436</td>
<td>Med. Constantinople.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 December, 1436</td>
<td>Med. Constantinople.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 March, 1437</td>
<td>Med. Constantinople.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 March, 1437</td>
<td>Remuneration for his mediating activities 18 car. through Drapieri’s bank. Constantinople.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 October, 1437</td>
<td>Med. Constantinople.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branca Bartolini</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaneto di Bettino</td>
<td>1437</td>
<td>Badoer, p. 582</td>
<td>Account and compensation for his intermediation. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartoli</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartoli</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marco di Lionardo</td>
<td>9 May 1467</td>
<td>Müller, p. 205 n. 158</td>
<td>The Florentine Signoria recommends Marco Bartolini to the Grandmaster of Rhodes. Rhodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolini</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girolamo Bellacci</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pandolfo Bellacci</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Benci</td>
<td>July 1471</td>
<td>Mallett p. 173</td>
<td>Owner of the Ferrandina which sailed to the Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joannes Benitius</td>
<td>16 September 1475</td>
<td>ASF, Sign. Missive 47 47</td>
<td>He emerges in a letter sent by the Signoria to Ragusa/Dubrovnik. Joannes is creditor from some Ragusans. At the moment of the letter he is going to Ragusa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Berrardi</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piero (di Bartolini) Berti</td>
<td>21/22 September 1461</td>
<td>Mercanzie, 10831 50r</td>
<td>Piero receives 400 florins to trade for 4 years from Benedetto di Bernardo Ugucione.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piero Berti</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldassarre (di Gualtieri) Biliotti</td>
<td>20 June 1461</td>
<td>Melis, p. 262</td>
<td>Copy of an account of 10 panne received by Biliotti from the Florentine galleys captained by Filippo Tornabuoni. Pera, Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldassarre (di Gualtieri) Biliotti</td>
<td>20 August 1461</td>
<td>Mercanzie, 10831 49r</td>
<td>Baldassarre di Gualtieri Biliotti receives from Lorenzo di Ilarione di Lippaccio Bardi 3000 florins to trade in the Levant, Romania and Turkey for 3 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giannozzo Biliotti</td>
<td>s.d. (1458)</td>
<td>ASF, Sign. Missive 42 218-219</td>
<td>The Florentine Signoria recommends Biliotto to Ragusa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso Biliotti</td>
<td>18/19 April 1466/7</td>
<td>Mercanzie, 10831 11v</td>
<td>He receives 580 florins from Giovanni di Taddeo (Corvetti) to commerce in the Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lipus Bonacurssis</td>
<td>31 October 1300</td>
<td>Polonio, pp. 87-88 n. 76</td>
<td>Lipus complains to the consul of Venice, Nicola Zugno, for the forced unloading operated by the local government of 17386 wheat measure. He works for the Bardi. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agnolo</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>mentioned in Dei’s list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Note</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buondelmonti Agnolo</td>
<td>17 July 1476</td>
<td>MAP, f. 33 n. 542</td>
<td>In the letter of Braccio de’ Medici (see s.v. Braccio de’ Medici) is mentioned as being elected consul in Adrianople. However, Braccio also advised Lorenzo of Agnolo’s death due to the plague (16 of June 1476).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buondelmonti Jacopo</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caetani Urbano</td>
<td>October 1463</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 167</td>
<td>Owner of three great galleys about to sail for the Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambi Carlo</td>
<td>14 February 1460</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 43 6-7</td>
<td>Mentioned for a business quarrel in Ragusa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambi Francesco</td>
<td>14 February 1460</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 43 6-7</td>
<td>Mentioned for a business quarrel in Ragusa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camurano Domenico</td>
<td>9 May 1464</td>
<td>Müller p. 201 n. 151</td>
<td>His boat full of Florentine wares and departed from Ancona was robbed by Suordinave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capponi Angiolino</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capponi Francesco</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnesecchi Zanobi</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castiglione Bernardo</td>
<td>30 June 1460</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 43 106-107</td>
<td>In one letter from the Florentine Signoria emerges as a privateer who currently is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Document/Citation</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pippo Cerchi</td>
<td>18 November 1461</td>
<td>Sign. Missive</td>
<td>Fighting the Turks and probably hired by the Pope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43 350-351</td>
<td>He is mentioned as living in Valona (Albania).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Cerretani</td>
<td>17 July, 1437</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 59, 96, 163</td>
<td>Cerretani receives 170 hyp. as a loan from Nicola Sardino, of the Badoer’s bank. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Cerretani</td>
<td>22 October 1438</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 181, 462</td>
<td>Cerretani brings back 7 gold yarn pipe, unsold in Adrianople, given by Pipo di Giacomo (Filippo) Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matteo C(i)erretani</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raffaello Charfidoni</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lione Chastellani</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salveltro Cieffini</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobus Contini</td>
<td>28 July 1463</td>
<td>MAP, f. 11 n. 539</td>
<td>Letter sent from Pera to Cosimo di Giovanni de’Medici.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo di Tommaso Corbinelli</td>
<td>1458</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 163</td>
<td>owner of two galleys sailed for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo (di Tommaso?) Corbinelli</td>
<td>Feb/March 1460</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 164</td>
<td>owner of two galleys sailed for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piero di Francesco Corsellini</td>
<td>July/August 1460</td>
<td>Mallett, pp. 164-165</td>
<td>owner of two great galleys about to sail for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo di Bartoli Corsi</td>
<td>22 August 1465</td>
<td>Leg. Comm., 16 35-36</td>
<td>Elected ambassador for the <em>magnum Sultanum, regem cipri et magnum magistrum Rhodi</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alessandro di Galeotto</td>
<td>21 November, 1438</td>
<td>Badoer pp. 59, 108</td>
<td>Alessandro di Galeotto has to give a sum to Nicola Sardino of the bank for some purchase on behalf of Demetrios Notaras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raffaello di Giovanni Corsidoni</td>
<td>6 August 1458</td>
<td>Mercanzie 10831 40v</td>
<td>Raffaello is mentioned as having business in Romania and Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagolo di Ser Giovanni da Colle</td>
<td>12 January 1481</td>
<td>Müller, p. 232 n. 194</td>
<td>Mentioned as having certain unspecified “duties” given by the Signoria. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adamo di Ser Piero</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>mentioned in Dei’s list, Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo da Monti Gonzi</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Individual</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambrogio son of Rustico da Firenze</td>
<td>3 September 1350</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou p. 125; n. 26</td>
<td>Canotus Rosso, called Malipetro, gives a dowry to Nicolote of 300 hyp. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo da Firenze</td>
<td>10 July 1350</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou pp. 109-110; n. 2</td>
<td>Commercial brokering Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo da Firenze</td>
<td>23 August 1350</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou p. 124; n. 24</td>
<td>Samuele gifts a sum to his son Sansone. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dato da Firenze</td>
<td>5 April 1274</td>
<td>Ferretto, 1 p.348, n.870</td>
<td>Dato da Firenze receives a loan of 11 l. Genoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dato da Firenze</td>
<td>11 April 1274</td>
<td>Ferretto, 1 p.350, n. 877</td>
<td>Dato da Firenze and Oberto d'Alba receive some sums. Genoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dato da Firenze</td>
<td>17 March 1274</td>
<td>Ferretto, 1 p. 342 n. 853</td>
<td>Dato together with Albertino son of Bonifazio Baldo d'Alba receive in comm. 19 l., 19 s., and 4 d. from Guglielmo from Codorno. Genoa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>2 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Andreolo Pachagnelo of S. Cassiano in Venice a young female tartar of 15 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>4 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Nicola Moro Venetian cit. a female tartar of 28 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>4 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells a young female tartar called Jamanzach. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>14 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Giovanni Trevisano a a slave. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>14 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Giovanni Trevisando, med. on behalf of Marzo Salvador, Cocha of 11 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>14 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells 3 females: one circassian, one from Catai, and a Jew. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>17 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Nicola of Valaresso med. on behalf of Elisabeth, Maffeo Contarini’s widow, one female tartar of 11 years old called Charachtes. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>17 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Nicola Contarini 3 female tartars: Aycholu, 20 years old, Charaches 13, Bollaza 10. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>18 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to a Venetian med. on behalf of a Lucca's cit. one female tartar Cochutamis 11 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>18 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells 3 females: a circassian, a Russian and one Tartar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Page References</td>
<td>Details</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>20 September, 1369</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Dandolo one female tartar of 15 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>21 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Andreolo de Bernardo one female tartar Chara of 16 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>21 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Andreolo de Bernardo one female tartar called Cholu. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>22 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Giovanni Trevisan one baptised slave called Antonio 11 anni. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>4 May, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells two females: one circassian and one Mongol. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>4 July, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Pietro Trevisan med. on behalf of Francesco Bragadin one female tartar of 16 years old called Saravish. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>13-14 July, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Rolando di Verona, Venetian cit., med. on behalf of Francesco Volpelli cit. of Lucca, one female tartar Ersapti 16 years old;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>4 August, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>one boy 10 years old, one Mongol female 8 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>8 August, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells several females one of 18 years old, one of 8, one of 12, one of 14, two of 16. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>11 August, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells two females: one circassian and one Mongol. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>7 September, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells two female circassians. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>8 September, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Nicola Superanzio, med., one female tartar of 14 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>25 September, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Antonio Venier, med. on behalf of Zaneto Lando one female Tartar of 14 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>25 September, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Nicola of Vallaresso med. on behalf of Andreolo Donato on female tartar of 9 years old called Chtothlucheb. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>25 September, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Nicola Contarini one female tartar of 18 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>26 September, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Sell to Andrea Gradenigo one female tartar called Benedict. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>4 May, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells one female circassian and one female Mongol of 13 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>14 July, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells one Mongol girl of 8 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>8 August, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells one Mongol boy of 8 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>14 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Bertuzio Zuirano, cit. of Venice, one girl from the catai. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>14 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Bertuzio Zuirano one girl of 12 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>4 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Nicola Delfino cit. of Venice, med. on behalf of Giovanni Bembo, one female circassian of 8 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>14 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Nicola Delfino med. on behalf of Caterina Sanudo one girl of 13 years old called Cecilia. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>18 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to Pietro Anselmini cit. of Lucca, resident in Venice, one female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Document</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>8 August, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells to a Venetian merchant resident in La Tana, Zarchassa of 13 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>11 August, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells two circassian girls of 12 e 14 years old. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico da Firenze</td>
<td>18 September, 1359</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Domenico sells one Russian girl called Rhosia. La Tana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninozzo Francesco da Firenze</td>
<td>9 November 1381</td>
<td>Balbi-Raiteri, p. 211-212 n. 11</td>
<td>Formed a society with Simone de Solrio da Varezzo. Licostomo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninozzo Francesco da Firenze</td>
<td>12 November 1381</td>
<td>Balbi-Raiteri, pp. 213-216. n. 12</td>
<td>Witness for his society partner will. Licostomo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninozzo Francesco da Firenze</td>
<td>19 December 1383</td>
<td>Balbi-Raiteri, pp. 217-218 n. 14</td>
<td>Ninozzo gives a certain sum to Alberto de Albara. The latter promise to put in Pera 156 hyp. Or in Licostomo 16 silver asp. For every hyp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo di Bindo da Firenze</td>
<td>15 February 1344</td>
<td>Balbi-Raiteri, pp. 46-49 n. 19</td>
<td>Will of Desseus son of Michele Dessi de Iayra. Caffa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo di Bindo da Firenze</td>
<td>13 March 1344</td>
<td>Balbi-Raiteri, pp. 63-66 n. 28</td>
<td>Lucia, daughter of Paolo da Firenze, declares to have received the dowry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo di Bindo da Firenze</td>
<td>23 March 1344</td>
<td>Balbi-Raiteri, pp. 71-75 n. 33</td>
<td>Paolo declares to have received from Bartolomeo Xandri Pandulfi da Firenze a certain sum of Caffa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Davanzati</td>
<td>July 1472</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 173</td>
<td>Two great galleys about to sail for Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Davanzati</td>
<td>5 November 1472</td>
<td>Müller, p. 217 n. 173</td>
<td>The Florentine Commune recommends Davanzati to Mehmet II. It is probably connected to the two great galleys coming to Constantinople (see Davanzati July 1472).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea de Banchis</td>
<td>March 1465</td>
<td>Prot. Leg. Comm. 15 c. 152</td>
<td>Is mentioned the inheritance of Andrea de Banchis. Not sure if referring only to wares or the eventual death of the merchant there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bochinus (de Bards)</td>
<td>11 September 1301</td>
<td>Pavoni, pp. 123-124 n. 94</td>
<td>Mentioned as living together (or guesting) with Nartinus and Iacobinus de Milano witnesses in an act. Also part of the Bardi company. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bochinus de Claro de Florencia</td>
<td>20 October 1296</td>
<td>Balard III, pp. 13-14 n. 10</td>
<td>Received a receipt on behalf of Nardo Centummille of Bardi society in Florence for a sum of 1.000 Saracen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bancus di Iacobi de Florencia</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>Polonio. pp. 117-118 n. 102</td>
<td>Witness, defined as <em>habitant</em> in Famagusta. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunetto de Florencia</td>
<td>21 February 1301</td>
<td>Polonio, pp. 279-280 n. 238</td>
<td>Brunetto receives 415 white bysant in <em>accomandita</em> to trade in Laiazzzo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Furcetus de Florencia</td>
<td>17 January 1307</td>
<td>Balard I, p. 90 n. 16</td>
<td>Received a receipt on behalf of the Peruzzi company for a payment of 7,000 white bysant for the selling of grain. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Forcetii (Furcetus) de Florencia</td>
<td>28 March 1307</td>
<td>Balard I, pp. 176-177 n. 107</td>
<td>Called as a witness. Works for the Peruzzi. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francisco Forcetii (Furcetus) de Florencia</td>
<td>28 March 1307</td>
<td>Balard I, pp. 177-178 n. 108</td>
<td>Called as a witness. Works for the Peruzzi. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guirardo Lapo de</td>
<td>13 March 1307</td>
<td>Balard I, pp. 166-</td>
<td>Called as witness. Famagusta. Works for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ianucius Bartholi de Florencia</td>
<td>31 October 1300</td>
<td></td>
<td>date name, page numbers, refers to the Peruzzi company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polonio, pp. 85-86 n. 73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pisanus Vicecomes appoints counsellor Ianucius to recover a credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from an accomandita. Ianucius</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>works for the Peruzzi company. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ianucius Bartholi de Florencia</td>
<td>31 October 1300</td>
<td>Polonio,</td>
<td>Called as a witness. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polonio, pp. 86-87 n. 75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ianucius condemn to the consul of Venice, Nicola Zugno, the forced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>unloading operated by the local government of 17386 wheat measure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>date name, page numbers, commemorates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iohannis de Florencia</td>
<td>27 February 1381</td>
<td>Basso,</td>
<td>The house of the deceased Iohannis is mentioned in the act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polonio, pp. 107-109 n. 50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The current occupier is the uxor. Chios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perso de Gualcelli de Florencia</td>
<td>6 February 1307</td>
<td>Balard I,</td>
<td>Called as a witness. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polonio, pp. 116-117 n. 44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perso de Gualcelli de Florencia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richus Manfredi de Florencia</td>
<td>4 March 1301</td>
<td>Polonio,</td>
<td>Richus receives a receipt. The Florentine works for the Peruzzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polonio, pp. 311-312 n. 262</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>company. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugezonus de Rubeo de Florencia</td>
<td>14 March 1297</td>
<td>Balard III, pp. 48-49 n. 36</td>
<td>Receives a sum in white bysant and will give back 59 golden ounces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>within 15 days of Benvenuto de Pestorio’s ship arrival. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugezonus de Rubeo de Florencia</td>
<td>14 March 1297</td>
<td>Balard III, pp. 48-49</td>
<td>Receives a sum in white bysant and will give back 59 golden ounces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>within 15 days of Benvenuto de Pestorio’s ship arrival. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Florencia</td>
<td></td>
<td>n. 36</td>
<td>back 59 golden ounces within 15 days of Benvenuto de Pestorio’s ship arrival. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobotius Gigni de Florentia</td>
<td>7 August 1350</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou pp. 121, n. 19</td>
<td>Francesco son of Corsini pay to his daughter of 300 hyp. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobotius Gigni de Florentia</td>
<td>20 August 1350</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou p. 123 n. 23</td>
<td>Canotus Melisino gifts his daughter Teodora of 100 hyp. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobotius Gigni de Florentia</td>
<td>s.d.</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou pp. 111-112 n. 6</td>
<td>Proxy for recovering credits from Romania through Franciscus de Vielmo. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodisio Petri de Florentia</td>
<td>19 March 1381</td>
<td>Basso, pp. 123-125 n. 61</td>
<td>Called as a witness. Chios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietro de</td>
<td>1310</td>
<td>Balard II, p. 353-</td>
<td>Gives a certain sum to Giacomo de Valenza in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Page/Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamberteschis</td>
<td>354 n. 61</td>
<td>exchange of 1100 Genoese lira within 3 months. Works for the Peruzzi. Famagusta.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodolfino de Micheli</td>
<td>6 April 1274</td>
<td>Ferretto 1, pp. 348-349 n. 871</td>
<td>Rodolfino gives in comm. to Manfredo Pallastrello from Piacenza 100 l., 6 s and 2 den. Genoa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacopo de Ricci</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simone di Brandaia</td>
<td>27 June, 1360</td>
<td>Verlinden, pp. 926-927</td>
<td>Simone buys from Giovanni cit. of Venice one young male Alan of 18 years old. La Tana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustico di Firenze</td>
<td>3 September 1350</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou p. 125 n. 26</td>
<td>See Ambrogio son of Rustico. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeni di Francesco</td>
<td>17 November, 1438</td>
<td>Badoer, p. 556</td>
<td>Zeni changes a credit letter of 76 duc. and 18 gros. to hyp. in favour of Badoer. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeni di Francesco</td>
<td>19 November, 1438</td>
<td>Badoer, p. 569</td>
<td>Zeni receives a commission for the change. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeni di Francesco</td>
<td>29 December, 1438</td>
<td>Badoer, p. 568</td>
<td>Zeni changes a credit letter worth 70 duc. in bysant. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeni di Francesco</td>
<td>“”</td>
<td>Badoer, p. 561</td>
<td>Zeni receives a commission for the change. One for cº.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandro di Pandolfo</td>
<td>27 February 1325</td>
<td>LIAB, Otten-Froux pp. 177-180</td>
<td>Sandro loans a <em>cocca</em>. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandro di Pandolfo</td>
<td>23 March 1344</td>
<td>Balbi-Raiteri, pp. 71-75 n. 33</td>
<td>Paolo di Bindo declares to have received from Bartolomeo Xandri Pandulfi of Florence a sum. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benedetto Dei</td>
<td>7 November 1467</td>
<td>Orvieto, pp. 250-251 n. 10</td>
<td>In a letter sent to Lorenzo de’ Medici Dei informed the Magnificent that several Anconitan ships which carried Florentine wares had been stopped by the Venetians towards Modon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerardino Delben</td>
<td>17 September 1350</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou pp. 129-130 n.34</td>
<td>Gerardino has to recover silver from Janachius de Crescencia. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berto Delbubbola</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Gherarini Deliochorno</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balduccio del Cappone</td>
<td>28 March 1274</td>
<td>Ferretto, 1 p. 347, n. 868</td>
<td>Balduccio gives gold a.v. 5 l. to Casalino de Domuculta in comm. Genoa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agostino del Nero</td>
<td>Feb/March 1460</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 164</td>
<td>owner of two galleys sailed for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco del Nero</td>
<td>10 August 1465</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 47 41</td>
<td>Living in Valona. Was supposed to receive the wares sent by Rinieri Ricasoli (see Ricasoli...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Page Number</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo di Simone del Nero</td>
<td>Various dates generally 1466</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 169</td>
<td>Captain of the state galleys to the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27 December 1468</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 171</td>
<td>Captain of two great galleys sailed for the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo di Bernardo di Simone del Nero</td>
<td>26 October 1471</td>
<td>Müller, p. 215 n. 170</td>
<td>The Florentine Commune appoints Bernardo new consul in Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovenco di Lorenzo della Stufa</td>
<td>September 1461</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 165</td>
<td>owner of two great galleys sailed for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lionardo Diguntino</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martino Dossi</td>
<td>s.d. (1461)</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 43 350</td>
<td>In the letter, Martino emerges as living in Modon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donato (dei) Donati</td>
<td>19 August 1281</td>
<td>Ferretto, 2 p. 412, n. 834</td>
<td>Donato gives to Dagnano 50 hyp. in comm. In Pera, in the Genoese loggia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donato (dei) Donati</td>
<td>16 July 1281</td>
<td>Ferretto, 2 p. 403; n. 812</td>
<td>Donato gives to Simone de Clavica Lombards panni a.v.86. l. In Pera, in the Genoese loggia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donato (dei) Donati</td>
<td>26 August 1281</td>
<td>Ferretto, 2 pp. 415-416, n. 842</td>
<td>Donato loans a galley together with other people from the consul G. Squarzafico. In Pera, in the Genoese loggia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donato (dei) Donati</td>
<td>2 October 1281</td>
<td>Ferretto, 2 p. 428 n. 870</td>
<td>Donato elects as his attorneys Aldobrandino and his brother Bonsignorino. In Pera, in the Genoese loggia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donato (dei) Donati</td>
<td>6 October 1281</td>
<td>Ferretto, 2 p. 428 n. 870</td>
<td>Donato is elected attorney In Pera, in the Genoese loggia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dono Doni</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Adrianople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico Fagiuoli</td>
<td>Various date generally 1466</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 169 Miscellaneous, 11/18</td>
<td>Owner of the two galleys returning from the Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domenico Fagiuoli</td>
<td>27 December 1468</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 171</td>
<td>Conductor of two great galleys sailed for the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Comment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matteo Federighi</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niccholaio Formigoni</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea Donati Fortis</td>
<td>3 December 1300</td>
<td>Polonio, p. 158 n. 142</td>
<td>Andrea on behalf of the Mozzi company received 1.450 golden florins from Boninus Grassus. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea (Donati) Fortis</td>
<td>15 April 1301</td>
<td>Polonio, p. 407 n. 343</td>
<td>Andrea grants a receipt to Perrocius Grassus for 70,000 white bysants. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deo Frescobaldi</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batista Frescobaldi</td>
<td>2 March 1478</td>
<td>MAP, f. 37 n. 106</td>
<td>Batista, as Florentine consul in Constantinople, sent a letter to Lorenzo di Piero de’ Medici which concerns Bernardo Bandini Baroncelli. Pera (Constantinople).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piero Ghaddi</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maso Giallo che non Volterra</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giuliano Ginori</td>
<td>August 1462</td>
<td>Roover, p. 274</td>
<td>Ginori travels together with the shipment owned by Niccolo (see Niccolo Dietifeci August 1462). Giuliano is supposed to start an apprenticeship under Niccolo in Pera.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niccolo Guasconi</td>
<td>July 1472</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 173</td>
<td>Two great galleys about to sail for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niccolo Guasconi</td>
<td>1473</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 174</td>
<td>Owner of two great galleys prepared for Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niccolo (di Zenobio) Guasconi</td>
<td>1478</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 176</td>
<td>Owner of two great galleys prepared for Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giacomo Guicciardini</td>
<td>26 August 1457</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 41 113</td>
<td>A galley used by Giacomo Guicciardini and transporting wheat from Rhodes to Cyprus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacopo di Piero Guiccardini</td>
<td>1457</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 163</td>
<td>Captain (or owner?) of one galley sailed to the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pietro Guidetti</td>
<td>25 March 1478</td>
<td>Müller, p. 224 n. 187</td>
<td>Guidetti emerges as living at the moment in Rhodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Ispini</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benitus Latinus</td>
<td>17 March 1301</td>
<td>Polonio, pp. 337-338 n. 281</td>
<td>Called as witness. Profession: speciarius. Famagusta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berthozius Latinus</td>
<td>17 March 1301</td>
<td>Polonio, pp. 337-338 n. 281</td>
<td>Owner of the house in which the act was draw. Speciarii probably father of Benitus and Thomasinus (see a.v. in this appendix). Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federicus Latinus</td>
<td>28 September 1300</td>
<td>Polonio, pp. 17-18 n. 15</td>
<td>Giovanni David from Acres, Pisan, appointed Federicus counsellor to recover what he is due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Machiavelli</td>
<td>13 October 1473</td>
<td>Müller, p. 218 n. 175</td>
<td>The Florentine Signoria recommends someone sent by Machiavelli to recover his wares in Valona due to the death of his <em>accomandatario</em>. Valona.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paolo di Giovanni Machiavelli</td>
<td>5 August 1471</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 173</td>
<td>Two Medici galleys sailed for Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giuliano Manetti from Florence</td>
<td>3 September 1350</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou p. 125 n. 26</td>
<td>Receipt of payment. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giuliano Manetti from Florence</td>
<td>16 September 1350</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou p. 129-120 n. 34</td>
<td>Proxy. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giuliano Manetti from Florence</td>
<td>17 September 1350</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou p. 124, n. 24</td>
<td>Proxy Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giuliano Manetti from Florence</td>
<td>22 September 1350</td>
<td>LIAB, Laiou p. 132, n. 38</td>
<td>Francesco Corbo sell one tartar girl to Giuliano. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richus Manfredi de Florencia</td>
<td>4 March 1301</td>
<td>Polonio, pp. 311-312 n. 262</td>
<td>Richus receives a receipt. Richus works for the Peruzzi company. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richus Manfredi</td>
<td>7 August 1301</td>
<td>Pavoni, pp. 45-47 n 36</td>
<td>Called as witness. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richus Manfredi</td>
<td>10 September 1301</td>
<td>Pavoni, pp. 127-128 n. 97</td>
<td>Called as witness. Works for the Peruzzi company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Mannelli</td>
<td>6 August 1437</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 156 Badoer, pp. 203, 248</td>
<td>Owner of a great galley sailed to Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruperto Mannelli</td>
<td>23 March 1464</td>
<td>Gregory, p. 109</td>
<td>In a <em>postscriptum</em> Alessandra Strozzi mentions the return of Ruperto Mannelli from the Levant. Unfortunately he did not bring any sugar for her. (Taken from the letter).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Marsuppini</td>
<td>[February 1466]</td>
<td>Müller, p. 204 n. 155</td>
<td>Giovanni is both citizen of Florence and Ancona. Florence asks to the Florentine consul in Constantinople that Giovanni should not pay double taxes on his wares. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio di Niccolo Martelli</td>
<td>October 1463</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 167</td>
<td>Conductor of three great galleys about to sail for the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo di Niccolo Martelli</td>
<td>September 1461</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 165</td>
<td>Conductor of two great galleys sailed for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo di Niccolo Martelli</td>
<td>October 1463</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 167</td>
<td>Conductor of three great galleys about to sail for the Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo (di Niccolo) Martelli</td>
<td>September 1461</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 165</td>
<td>owner of two great galleys sailed for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlo Martelli</td>
<td>3 May 1462</td>
<td>MAP f. 16 n. 87</td>
<td>Letter sent from Pera to Cosimo de’ Medici. Contains both political and commercial information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni di Niccolo Martelli</td>
<td>October 1463</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 167</td>
<td>Owner of three great galleys about to sail for the Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manetto Martelli</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manetto Martelli</td>
<td>s.d.</td>
<td>Orvieto, p. 239</td>
<td>Owner of a ship to the Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martello Martelli</td>
<td>19 October 1454</td>
<td>Müller, pp. 180-181 n. 129</td>
<td>Mentioned as being a Knight of Rhodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martello Martelli</td>
<td>1456</td>
<td>Roccagliata, p.54 n.20</td>
<td>Francesco di Lucca appointed Martello Martelli, patron of also one galley, counsellor on behalf of the Church of St. George in Mytilene. Mytilene.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piero Mattei</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariotto Mazuoli</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braccio de’ Medici</td>
<td>17 July 1476</td>
<td>MAP, f. 33 n. 542</td>
<td>Letter sent to Lorenzo di Piero de’ Medici. Adrianople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosimo di Leonardo Molletti</td>
<td>April 1465</td>
<td>Roover, p. 275</td>
<td>Banchi instructs Cosimo to recover as much as possible moneys and clothes from Dietifeci in Pera.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosimo (di Lionardo) Molletti</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albertazzi (de’) Neri</td>
<td>2 May 1457</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 41 68-69</td>
<td>Owner of a ship captured from Peter near Brindisi. He emerges from a letter sent to the prince of Taranto from Florence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommaso Neri</td>
<td>3 March 1466</td>
<td>Müller, pp. 204-205 n. 156</td>
<td>The Florentine Signoria recommends Tommaso to the Grandmaster of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Note</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angelo Dietisalvi Neroni</td>
<td>July/August 1460</td>
<td>Mallet pp. 164-165</td>
<td>Owner of two great galleys about to sail for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angelo di Nerone Dietisalvi Neroni</td>
<td>1458</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 163</td>
<td>Owner of two galleys sailed for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angelo di Nerone Dietisalvi Neroni</td>
<td>July/August 1460</td>
<td>Mallett, pp. 164-165</td>
<td>Conductor of two great galleys about to sail for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piero Ottavanti</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo Panteleono</td>
<td>22 October 1300</td>
<td>Polonio, p. 67 n. 58</td>
<td>Bernardo gives 420 white bysant to Giovanni de Paternanis in exchange of 8 and half of Venetian grossi. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernabo Patteri</td>
<td>Probably 1468</td>
<td>Müller, p. 207 n. 161</td>
<td>The Florentine Commune appoints Bernabo consul in Chios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo Peruzzi</td>
<td>18 June-11 July 1479</td>
<td>Müller, pp. 225-228 n. 189</td>
<td>Bernardo contacted Florence to inform the Signoria that Bernardo Bandini Baroccelli was in Constantinople. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Peruzzi</td>
<td>4 March 1474</td>
<td>Müller, p. 218 n. 176</td>
<td>The Florentine Signoria interceded in favour of Giovanni Peruzzi and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentile Bardi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for some credit owned by them. Rhodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Peruzzi</td>
<td>20 August 1474</td>
<td>Müller, p. 220 n.179</td>
<td>The Florentine Signoria recommends Giovanni to the Grandmaster of Rhodes. Rhodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 March 1474</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Peruzzi</td>
<td>2 December 1476</td>
<td>Müller, p. 222 n.183</td>
<td>The Florentine Signoria recommends Giovanni for business made by the Peruzzi on behalf of Francesco Sassetti. Rhodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Peruzzi</td>
<td>25 March 1478</td>
<td>Müller, p. 224 n.187</td>
<td>Florence asks the Grandmaster of Rhodes to satisfy the credit owned by Peruzzi from the deceased Manfredo Papponi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodisio Petri (de Florentia)</td>
<td>19 March 1381</td>
<td>Basso, pp. 123-125 n. 61</td>
<td>Called as a witness. Chios.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attaviano Petrucci</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luca di Buonaccorso Pitti</td>
<td>August 1459</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 163</td>
<td>Conductor of two great galleys sailed for Constantinople and the Black Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luigi (Luca?) di Buonaccorso Pitti</td>
<td>October 1463</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 167</td>
<td>Captain of three great galleys about to sail for the Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piero di Niccolo di Piero Popoleschi</td>
<td>August 1459</td>
<td>Roover, p. 271</td>
<td>Banchi entrusts 54 woollen cloths to Piero. Piero has to sell the clothes in Constantinople and Turkey and to purchase silk from the Caspian Sea. He also receives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date/Details</td>
<td>Source/Note</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio di Giovanni Quaratesi</td>
<td>25 August 1481</td>
<td>Müller, p. 233 n. 196</td>
<td>200 ducats. <em>(accomandita)</em> The Florentine Signoria petitions the Grandmaster of Rhodes to allow Quaratesi the seizure of Pazzi’s wealth in Rhodes. Rhodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benencasa quondam Alberti</td>
<td>10 September 1301</td>
<td>Pavoni, pp. 127-128 n. 97</td>
<td>Called as witness. Works for the Peruzzi company. Famagusta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simone Raynerius</td>
<td>s.d.</td>
<td>Balard I, pp. 187-188 n. 117</td>
<td>Simone gives a sum to Giacomo and Manfredo Turcha. The latter will give back as a change 1320 white bysant when their boat will return. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rinieri Ricasoli</td>
<td>10 August 1475</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 47 41</td>
<td>Owner of the ship that was sent to Valona and was captured by the Venetian galleys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo di Antonio Ridolfi</td>
<td>1334-1335</td>
<td>Saporii, p. 733</td>
<td>Bartolomeo purchases grain from Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea Rondinegli</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacopo di Niccolo Sacchetti</td>
<td>July/August 1460</td>
<td>Mallett, pp. 164-165</td>
<td>Captain of two great galleys about to sail for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonio Salteregli</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anastasio Salviati</td>
<td>19 October 1454</td>
<td>Müller, pp. 180-181 n. 129</td>
<td>Mentioned as being a Knight of Rhodes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anastasio Salviati</td>
<td>14 January 1462</td>
<td>Müller, p. 197 n. 146</td>
<td>Recommendation made by the Florentine Commune to the King</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo Salviati</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1442</td>
<td>Wright, pp. 175-191</td>
<td>Alum contract in Rhodes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 May 1452</td>
<td>Mercanzie, 10831 26v</td>
<td>Salviati received from Giovanni di Cosimo e Giovanni di Bicci 5.000 florins to commerce in Rhodes for 4 years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 May 1452</td>
<td>Mercanzie, 10831 27r</td>
<td>Salviati received from Nicola di Piero Capponi 1.000 florins in accomandita for 4 years to commerce in Rhodes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 March 1461</td>
<td>Müller, pp. 190-191 n. 141</td>
<td>The Florentine Signoria complained to the Mahona of the treatments made in Chios to the Florentine merchants. It is also mentioned that Bernardo has a quarrel with Gabriele Giustiniani and a cargo of alum supposed to be sold in Tuscany. Chios.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 March 1466</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 45 131</td>
<td>Bernardo Salviati has a business quarrel in Chios.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 December 1466</td>
<td>Müller, pp. 204-205 n. 156.</td>
<td>Recommendation made by the Florentine Commune to the Grandmaster of Rhodes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo Salviati</td>
<td>23 May 1467</td>
<td>Müller, p. 206 n. 159</td>
<td>Recommendation made by the Florentine Commune to the King of Cyprus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo Salviati</td>
<td>28 April 1475</td>
<td>Müller, p. 221 n. 181</td>
<td>The Florentine Commune pushed the advisors of the Queen of Cyprus Carlotta to return the moneys they owe to Bernardo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giannozzo Salviati</td>
<td>September 1456</td>
<td>Leg. Comm., 14 52-57</td>
<td>Giannozzo Salviati was robbed by the Prince of Taranto. He had wares belonging to Marco and Bernardo Salviati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lionardo Salvucci</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartolomeo Sapiti</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlo Scala</td>
<td>1474</td>
<td>Müller, p. 219 n. 178</td>
<td>The Florentine Signoria recommends Carlo Scala. Candia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlo Scala</td>
<td>7 February 1478</td>
<td>Müller, p. 224 n. 186</td>
<td>Recommendation made by the Florentine Signoria recommends Carlo Scala. Carlo has to recover some moneys. In the text is defined as mercator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niccolo Serragli</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date/Year</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Note</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piero Signorini</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacopo di Piero di Matteo Tedaldi (is the same Jacopo Tedaldi?)</td>
<td>6 August 1458</td>
<td>Mercanzie, 10831 41v</td>
<td>Jacopo di Piero di Matteo Tedaldi received from Carlo di Jacopo di Piero Baroncelli 1000 florins for Romania and Turkey for 3 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacopo Tedaldi</td>
<td>20 September, 1437</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 178, 205</td>
<td>Jacopo changes 70. duc Venetian for 3 hyp. and 5 car. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacopo Tedaldi</td>
<td>25 December, 1439</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 714,730, 731, 757</td>
<td>Jacopo buys with Badoer, med. on behalf of Tommaso di Corone some ox leather. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filippo di Filippo Tornabuoni</td>
<td>August 1459</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 163</td>
<td>Captain of the two great galleys sailed for Constantinople and the Black Sea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filippo di Francesco Tornabuoni</td>
<td>September 1461</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 165</td>
<td>Captain of two great galleys sailed for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Tosinghi</td>
<td>1444</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 160</td>
<td>Owner of a galley sailed to Constantinople (and later sunk towards Constantinople).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainardo degli Ubaldini</td>
<td>20 March, 1438</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 375, 396</td>
<td>Travel of Mainardo together with Lorenzo Tiepolo to Rhodes and Caixa (near Gallipoli) to buy wool. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainardo degli Ubaldini</td>
<td>9 July, 1438</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 379, 396, 397</td>
<td>Mainardo receives as a gift one <em>picco</em> and half of <em>panno</em> negro from the master tailor Giovanni from Rhodes. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainardo degli Ubaldini</td>
<td>4 February, 1438</td>
<td>Badoer, p. 379</td>
<td>Mainardo has attended 1/3 of the travel to Rhodes, investing 175 hyp. and 14 car. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainardo degli Ubaldini</td>
<td>18 April, 1439</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 600, 625</td>
<td>Mainardo buys scarlet panni bastardi for 53 picchi at 89 hyp. for each piece. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainardo degli Ubaldini</td>
<td>20 April, 1439</td>
<td>Badoer, pp. 577, 660</td>
<td>Mainardo buys 2 panni of Florence garbo, one green and one turquoise, amount 106 picchi, for 80 hyp. each piece. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainardo degli Ubaldini</td>
<td>18 April, 1439</td>
<td>Badoer, pp.577, 600, 625, 628, 674</td>
<td>Travel of Mainardo to Rhodes to buy wool. Badoer cover 2/3, while the Florentine 1/3. The travel’s purpose is to deliver a deposit of 6000 asp. (1333 from the Florentine) to the Greek Constantine Strati who lives there. The 30 April 1439, Mainardo returns to Rhodes to load the wool bringing with him 2000 asp. Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainardo degli Ubaldini</td>
<td>23 December, 1439</td>
<td>Badoer, p. 632</td>
<td>Mainardo receives the compensation for his intermediation worth 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainardo degli Ubaldini</td>
<td>28 June 1463</td>
<td>Signori/Otto, 77</td>
<td>Unpublished letter mentioning also the existence of the Ottoman privileges to Florence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donatus Ugholini de Florencia</td>
<td>4 March 1301</td>
<td>Polonio, pp. 311-312 n. 262</td>
<td>Called as witness. He is a censarius. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donatus Ugholini</td>
<td>13 August 1301</td>
<td>Pavoni, pp. 54-55 n. 42</td>
<td>Called as witness. Famagusta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco di Giovanni Ugholini</td>
<td>11 September 1475</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 47 47</td>
<td>He died in Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Ugholini</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco Ugholini</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benedetto di Bernardo Uguccione</td>
<td>6 August 1458</td>
<td>Mercanzie, 10831 40v</td>
<td>Raffaello di Giovanni Corsidoni receives from Benedetto 2000 florins to trade in Romania and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernardo di Uguccione</td>
<td>21 July 1455</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 40 290-291</td>
<td>The boat of Bernardo carrying wheat was attacked near Corefice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dariotto di Bernardo Uguccione</td>
<td>6 August 1458</td>
<td>Mercanzie, 10831 40v</td>
<td>Raffaello di Giovanni Corsidoni (see s.v. Corsidoni) receives from Dariotto 2000 florins to trade in Romania and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariceris Vermillus</td>
<td>1 s.m 1476</td>
<td>Sign. Missive, 47 103</td>
<td>He is mentioned dead in Rhodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariotto di Francesco di Vermiglio</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piero di Giuliano Vespucci</td>
<td>1467</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 170</td>
<td>Owner of the <em>Ferrandina</em> sailed for Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco di Paolo Vettori</td>
<td>1458</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 163</td>
<td>Captain of two galleys sailed for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francesco di Paolo Vettori</td>
<td>Feb/March 1460</td>
<td>Mallett, p. 164</td>
<td>Captain of two galleys sailed for Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagholetto Vettori</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>Pagnini, p. 303</td>
<td>Mentioned in Dei’s list. Levant.</td>
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